THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Reportable

Case No: 330/13

In the matter between

DEAN GILLIAN REES

FIRST APPELLANT

EDWARD CHRISTOPHER JOWITT

SECOND APPELLANT

and

INVESTEC BANK LIMITED

RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Dean Gillian Rees v Investec Bank Limited (330/13) [2014]
ZASCA 38 (28 March 2014)

Coram:
Mthiyane DP, Lewis, Ponnan, Maya and Saldulker JJA

Heard:
20 FEBRUARY 2014

Delivered:
28 MARCH 2014

Summary:
Summary Judgment – Rule 32(2) – Affidavit in support of
application for summary judgment complying with the requirements of the sub
rule– Deponent employee of bank – averring facts obtained in the ordinary
course of her duties as employee of bank – Personal knowledge of every fact
not required.

______________________________________________________________

ORDER
______________________________________________________________

On appeal from: South Gauteng High Court (Johannesburg), Hutton AJ
sitting as court of first instance.

The appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include the costs of two
counsel.

______________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________

Saldulker JA (Mthiyane DP, Lewis, Ponnan, Maya JJA concurring):

[1] This is an appeal against the judgment and order by Hutton AJ in
summary judgment proceedings in the South Gauteng High Court
(Johannesburg) on 5 March 2013. The appeal is with the leave of the high
court .

[2] Described by Hutton AJ  as a „work of epic proportions‟, the combined
summons issued by the respondent, Investec Bank Limited (Investec) against
the first appellant, Dean Gillian Rees (Mr Rees), the second appellant,
Edward Christopher Jowitt (Mr Jowitt), and Benjamin Henry Jowitt NO, in his
capacity as trustee of the Aljebami Trust (the trust), runs into some 250
pages, consisting of 14 claims in all, set out in the particulars of claim from
claim A to claim N.1 The claims are supported by annexures which in turn run
into some 770 pages, consisting of loan agreements, mortgage bonds, deeds

1 Claim A – Plankjol (Pty) Ltd; Claim B – Diepdwang (Pty) Ltd; Claim C – Friedshelf 690 (Pty)
Ltd; Claim D – Before Sunset Properties 40 (Pty) Ltd; Claim E – Silver Armor Properties (Pty)
Ltd; Claim F – Built Up Estates (Pty) Ltd; Claim G – Aish 2 Ou Bottling (Pty) Ltd; Claim H –
Aish 2 Ou; Claim I – Friedshelf 715 (Pty) Ltd; Claim J – Riversong Wildlife Estates (Pty) Ltd;
Claim K – Friedshelf 714 (Pty) Ltd; Claim L – Redeal (Pty) Ltd.

of suretyships, certificates of balances and so on.  The aggregate of these
claims excluding interest amounts to R34 050 118.

[3] The claims are based on an agreement between Investec and 12
principal debtors, each of which is a company. Two of the principal debtors
feature in two claims each. In all but one of the claims, Claim G, the alleged
principal indebtedness arises from one or more loan agreements entered into
between Investec and the principal debtor, secured by a mortgage bond.
Claim G is based simply on an agreement of loan in existence between
Investec and the principal debtor. Mr Rees and the trust are alleged to be
sureties for the indebtedness of the principal debtor in each of the claims.
Investec pleaded that either a default judgment had been taken against the
relevant principal debtors or that the principal debtors had been wound up.

[4] After the appellants gave notice of their intention to defend the action,
Investec launched summary judgment proceedings against the first and
second appellants: the latter is alleged to be a surety in respect of claims E
and J only. The trust was not included in that application and for present
purposes this appeal does not concern the Aljebami trust.

Verifying affidavit
[5] The application for summary judgment was supported by an affidavit by
Ms Mirielle Ackermann, who is employed as a recoveries officer by Investec.
It is necessary to quote her affidavit in full, which  reads:
„1.
I am an adult female Recoveries Officer employed as such by the applicant
at 100 Grayston Drive, Sandton.
2.
I am duly authorised to bring this application and depose to this affidavit on
behalf of the applicant. I refer in this regard to the resolution of the applicant annexed
hereto marked “A”.
3.
In my capacity as Recoveries Officer, I have in my possession and under my
control all of the applicant‟s records, accounts and other documents relevant to the
claims forming the subject matter of the action instituted against the respondents
under the above case number (“the action”).

4.
In the ordinary course of my duties as Recoveries Officer and having regard
to the applicant‟s records, accounts and other relevant documents in my possession
and under my control, I have acquired personal knowledge of the respondents‟
financial standing with the applicant and I can swear positively to the facts alleged
and the amounts claimed in the applicant‟s particulars of claim.
5.
I hereby verify
5.1
the causes of action set out in the applicant‟s particulars of claim;
5.2
that, on the grounds set out therein, the respondents are indebted to
the applicant in the amounts claimed by it.
6.
In my opinion, the respondents –
6.1
do not have a bona fide defence to the action; and
6.2
they have delivered a notice of intention to defend the action solely for
purpose of delay.‟ (my emphasis.)

[6] In response the appellants filed an affidavit by Mr Rees resisting
summary judgment. It stated:
„8.
It is clear from the affidavit in support of summary judgment that Ms
Ackermann derives her knowledge of the case solely from files, books of account and
other documents in her possession.
9.
I am advised and accept the advice that it has been held that where a
deponent acquires her knowledge solely from documents to which she had access,
she cannot swear positively to the facts.
10.
I deny that Ms Ackermann has personal knowledge of the financial standing
of the Respondents with the Applicant.
11.
I submit further that Ms Ackermann did not, during any of the times when the
various suretyships in this matter were concluded, have any dealings with the
Respondents.
12.
Ms Ackermann also did not sign any of the certificates of indebtedness upon
which the Applicant bases its claims.
13.
Having regard to the case law on this issue, I am advised and submit that the
Applicant has failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 32(2) of the Uniform
Rules of Court as the deponent to the affidavit in support of the application for
summary judgment does not have personal knowledge of the facts of the matter and
cannot verify the causes of action and the amounts claimed.
14.
Importantly, Ms Ackermann is also unable to affirm that the Respondents
have no bona fide defence to the action.

15.
For these reasons alone I submit that the application for summary judgment
ought to be dismissed with costs and the Respondents granted leave to enter into the
merits of the action.” (my emphasis.)

[7] After having considered the affidavits filed in the matter, and  applying
the principles laid down in  Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA
418 (A) and  certain other  authorities,2 Hutton AJ granted summary judgment
in favour of Investec in respect of 13 of the 14 claims. Leave to defend was
granted to Mr Rees in respect of claim D as the suretyship that Investec relied
upon in support of that claim  was allegedly not signed by Mr Rees. Investec
also did not   persist in its claim in respect of its various prayers for penalty
interest.

[8] The primary contention advanced on behalf of the appellants  is that
Ms Ackermann was not a person who could „swear positively to the facts‟ as
envisaged in rule 32(2).

[9] Rule 32(2) provides that the plaintiff‟s notice of application for summary
judgment shall be accompanied by „an affidavit made by himself or by any
other person who can swear positively to the facts verifying the cause of
action and the amount, if any, claimed and stating that in his opinion there is
no bona fide defence to the action and that notice of intention to defend has
been delivered solely for the purpose of delay‟.(My emphasis.)

The applicable law
[10] In Maharaj,3 Corbett JA in considering the requirement that the affidavit
should be made by the plaintiff himself „or by any other person who can swear
positively to the facts‟ stated:
„Concentrating more particularly on requirement (a) above, I would point out that it
contemplates the affidavit being made by the plaintiff himself or some other person
“who can swear positively to the facts”. In the latter event, such other person‟s ability

2 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Secatsa Investment  (Pty) Ltd & others 1999 (4) SA 229 (C);
Barclays National Bank Ltd v Love 1975 (2) SA 514 (D); FirstRand Bank Ltd v Huganel Trust
2012 (3) SA 167 (WCC).
3 At 423A-H.

to swear positively to the facts is essential to the effectiveness of the affidavit as a
basis for summary judgment; and the Court entertaining the application therefor must
be satisfied, prima facie, that the deponent is such a person. Generally speaking,
before a person can swear positively to facts in legal proceedings they must be within
his personal knowledge. For this reason the practice has been adopted, both in
regard to the present Rule 32 and in regard to some of its provincial predecessors
(and the similar rule in the magistrates‟ courts), of requiring that a deponent to an
affidavit in support of summary judgment, other than the plaintiff himself, should
state, at least, that the facts are within his personal knowledge (or make some
averment to that  effect), unless such direct knowledge appears from other facts
stated . . . The mere assertion by a deponent that he “can swear positively to the
facts” (an assertion which merely reproduces the wording of the Rule) is not regarded
as being sufficient, unless there are good grounds for believing that the deponent
fully appreciated the meaning of these words. . .  In my view, this is a salutary
practice. While undue formalism in procedural matters is always to be eschewed, it is
important in summary judgment applications under Rule 32 that, in substance, the
plaintiff should do what is required of him by the Rule. The extraordinary and drastic
nature of the remedy of summary judgment in its present form has often been
judicially emphasised . . . The grant of the remedy is based upon the supposition that
the plaintiff‟s claim is unimpeachable and that the defendant‟s defence is bogus or
bad in law. One of the aids to ensuring that this is the position is the affidavit filed in
support of the application; and to achieve this end it is important that the affidavit
should be deposed to by either by the plaintiff himself or by someone who has
personal knowledge of the facts.
Where the affidavit fails to measure up to these requirements, the defect may,
nevertheless, be cured by reference to other documents relating to the proceedings
which are properly before the Court. . .The principle is that, in deciding whether or not
to grant summary judgment, the Court looks at the matter “at the end of the day” on
all the documents that are properly before it….‟ (My emphasis.)

[11] In Barclays National Bank Ltd v Love4 (quoted with approval in Maharaj
at 424B-D) the following is said:
„We are concerned here with an affidavit made by the manager of the very branch of
the bank at which overdraft facilities were enjoyed by the defendant. The nature of

4 Barclays National Bank Ltd v Love1975 (2) SA at 514 (D) at 516H-517A.

the deponent‟s office in itself suggests very strongly that he would in the ordinary
course of his duties acquire personal knowledge of the defendant‟s financial standing
with the bank. This is not to suggest that he would have personal knowledge of every
withdrawal of money made by the defendant or that he personally would have made
every entry in the bank‟s ledgers or statements of account; indeed, if that were the
degree of personal knowledge required it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in
which a bank could ever obtain summary judgment.‟ (My emphasis.)

[12] Since Maharaj, the requirements of rule 32(2) have, from time to time,
occupied the attention of our courts.5 In Shackleton Credit Management (Pty)
Ltd v Microzone Trading 88 CC & another 2010 (5) SA 112 (KZP), para 13, it
was held that:
„[F]irst-hand knowledge of every fact which goes to make up the applicant‟s cause of
action is not required, and that where the applicant is a corporate entity, the
deponent may well legitimately rely on records in the company‟s possession for their
personal knowledge of at least certain of the relevant facts and the ability to swear
positively to such facts.‟ (My emphasis.)

Did the Ackermann affidavit meet the requirements of rule 32?
[13]  Here Investec had issued a combined summons annexed to which
was a comprehensive particulars of claim setting out the cause of action
against the appellants, supported by written agreements concluded with the
principal debtors in each instance and suretyship agreements concluded with
sureties on the terms set out in the agreements. Investec thus had either
obtained judgment against the principal debtor or the principal debtor had
been wound up at the instance of Mr Rees. Those occurrences operated as
the trigger for Investec to proceed on the suretyship agreements against the
appellants.  Moreover, the suretyships provided for a certificate of balance to
be issued by the relevant bank manager of Investec, which would either serve

5 See Shackleton Credit Management (Pty) Ltd v Microzone Trading 88 CC & another  2010
(5) SA 112 (KZP); FirstRand Bank Limited v Beyer 2011 (1) SA 196 (GNP); Mowschenson
and  Mowschenson v Mercantile Acceptance Corporation of SA Ltd  1959 (3) SA 362 (W);
Jefrrey v Andries Zietsman (Edms) Bpk 1976 (2) SA 870 (T);  Standard Bank of South Africa
Ltd v Han-Rit Boerdery CC & others [2011] JDR 0870(GNP); Standard Bank of South Africa
Ltd v Kroonhoek Boerdery & others (1 August 2011) Case No 23054/2011 (GNP); ABSA
Bank Ltd v Le Roux 2013 JDR 2283 (WCC).

as a liquid document or constitute prima facie proof of the sureties‟
indebtedness. It is against that backdrop that Ms Ackermann‟s affidavit must
be viewed.

[14] Ms Ackermann relied on the information at her disposal which she
obtained in the course of her duties as the bank‟s recoveries officer, to swear
positively to the contents of her affidavit. It is not in dispute that in the
discharge of her duties as such she would have had access to the documents
in question and upon a perusal of those documents she would acquire the
necessary knowledge of the facts to which she deposed in her affidavit on
behalf of Investec.  Prior to the institution of the action Ms Ackermann had
been corresponding with the appellant‟s attorney in regard to the principal
debtors‟ delinquent accounts and had also addressed letters of demand to
them, receiving letters in response which canvassed the appellants‟ defences.
She could thus „swear positively to the facts‟, „verify the cause of action and
the amount claimed‟ and assert that in her opinion the appellants did „not have
a bona fide defence to the action‟ and had entered an appearance to defend
„solely for the purposes of delay‟. These factors show that the requirements
set out in Maharaj are met.

[15] The fact that Ms Ackermann did not sign the certificates of
indebtedness nor was present when the suretyship agreements were
concluded is of no moment. Nor should these be elevated to essential
requirements, the absence of which is fatal to the respondent‟s case.6  As
stated in Maharaj, „undue formalism in procedural matters is always to be
eschewed‟ and must give way to commercial pragmatism. At the end of the
day, whether or not to grant summary judgment is a fact-based enquiry. Many
summary judgment applications are brought by financial institutions and large
corporations. First-hand knowledge of every fact cannot and should not be
required of the official who deposes to the affidavit on behalf of such financial
institutions and large corporations.  To insist on first-hand knowledge is not
consistent with the principles espoused in Maharaj.

6 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Kroonhoek Boerdery & Others (1 August 2011) Case
No 23054/2011, para 13 (GNP).

[16] The fact that leave to defend was granted in respect of Claim D does
not mean as was suggested in argument that Ms Ackermann was untruthful
and that her affidavit must be rejected in its entirety. It is clear that Ms
Ackermann acquired her knowledge from documents under her control. She
thus had the requisite knowledge as required by rule 32(2). In making such a
finding Hutton AJ did not err.

[17] Turning to Mr Rees‟ affidavit filed in opposition to the application for
summary judgment, what emerges is that he does not dispute that: (a) A
plethora of loan agreements had been concluded between the principal
debtors and Investec; (b) mortgage bonds had been registered against
various immovable properties as security for Investec‟s debts; (c)  various
deeds of suretyships had been concluded as additional security for Investec‟s
debts; and (d) each of the principal debtors had defaulted on its obligations to
Investec.

[18] The thrust of the appellants‟ case is encapsulated in the following
excerpt from Mr Rees‟ affidavit:
„Once the Respondents, being essentially removed sureties, have had the opportunity  seek
and obtain proper discovery and further particulars, they would be in a better and proper
position to raise all the defences available to them against the Applicant‟.

[19] What exactly is meant by the expression „removed sureties‟ is not
explained. What does emerge later in the affidavit, which on the face of it
appears to put paid to the suggestion that he was a „removed surety‟ is this:
„In an attempt to gain some closure and access documentation relative to the principal
debtors, I instructed my attorneys to apply for the winding-up of the majority of the companies
referred to in the claims with the intention that their assets could in due course be sold by the
liquidator to discharge their indebtedness to the Applicant. In 2010 and 2011, the principal
debtors referred to in Claims E to L were wound up by the Court. In July 2010, the principal
debtors referred to in claims B and C were wound up by way of voluntary resolutions of the
members.‟

[20] Mr Rees‟ affidavit is replete with conjecture and speculation for which
no factual foundation is advanced. Mr Rees has contended that the appellants

and principal debtors have been prejudiced inasmuch as they have been
denied access to their accounts  which have been frozen by Investec, and
which, so it is contended, occurred in breach of the banker/customer
relationship. The freezing of those bank accounts has never been challenged
by any of them on the basis that Investec‟s conduct was unlawful. In any
event a perusal of all of the documentary evidence reveals that Mr Rees was
the alter ego of many of the corporate entities involved in this case and
intimately involved in their affairs. He was in most instances the signatory of
the agreements in question.

[21] The court below correctly reasoned that what is striking about Mr Rees‟
affidavit is the lack of any allegation that the principal debtors would, but for
Investec‟s alleged breach of the banker/customer relationship, have been in a
position to discharge their indebtedness to Investec. The fact is that each of
the principal debtors defaulted on its obligations to Investec and no defence to
the claims against them have been raised.

[22] In my view Mr Rees was sparse with the truth and deliberately vague.
Hutton AJ aptly put it: „The manner in which Mr Rees has put up his
contentions in this regard seems to me to be the work of a man attempting, as
best as possible, to expose himself on as narrow a front as possible.‟ His
claim of prejudice thus rings hollow and appears to smack of desperation as
indeed does his assertion that Ms Ackermann‟s affidavit lacks effectiveness
for the grant of summary judgment.

[23] The appellants argued that summary judgment, which deprives a
defendant of the opportunity to raise its defence in trial proceedings, should
be granted only exceptionally: it is said to be a drastic procedure. However, as
was stated by Navsa JA in Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks
Mavundla Zek Joint Venture:7
„The rationale for summary judgment proceedings is impeccable. The procedure is
not intended to deprive a defendant with a triable issue or a sustainable defence of

7 Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA)
paras 32 & 33.

her/his day in court.  After almost a century of successful application in our courts,
summary judgment proceedings can hardly continue to be described as
extraordinary. Our courts, both of first instance and at appellate level, have during
that time rightly been trusted to ensure that a defendant with a triable issue is not
shut out. In the Maharaj case at 425G-426E, Corbett JA was keen to ensure, first, an
examination of whether there has been sufficient disclosure by a defendant of the
nature and grounds of his defence and the facts upon which it is founded. The
second consideration is that the defence so disclosed must be both bona fide and
good in law. A court which is satisfied that this threshold has been crossed is then
bound to refuse summary judgment. Corbett JA also warned against requiring of a
defendant the precision apposite to pleadings. However, the learned judge was
equally astute to ensure that recalcitrant debtors pay what is due to a creditor.
Having regard to its purpose and its proper application, summary judgment
proceedings only hold terrors and are “drastic” for a defendant who has no defence.
Perhaps the time has come to discard these labels and to concentrate rather on the
proper application of the rule, as set out with customary clarity and elegance by
Corbett JA in the Maharaj case at 425G-426E.‟

[24] Looking at the matter at the „“end of the day” on all the documents that
[were] properly before it‟,8 it cannot be said that the high court erred in
granting summary judgment against the appellants.

[25] In view of the aforegoing, the result is that the appeal must fail. The
following order is made:
„The appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include the costs of two
counsel.‟
____________________
HK SALDULKER
JUDGE OF APPEAL

8 Maharaj at 423H.

APPEARANCES

For Frist and Second Appellant:
E L THERON

Routledge Modise Inc, Johannesburg

Matsepes Inc, Bloemfontein

For Respondent:

A P RUBENS SC, A J MICHAEL

Werksmans Inc, Johannesburg

Symington & De Kok, Bloemfontein