THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

Reportable

CASE  NO:  321/2001

In the matter between :

NAIDOO AND TWO OTHERS
Appellant

and

THE STATE
Respondent
___________________________________________________________________________

Coram:
MARAIS, ZULMAN et MPATI JJA
Heard:
2 MAY 2002
Delivered:
14 NOVEMBER 2002
Murder – culpable homicide – conviction upon multiple counts of culpable homicide
arising from single act – whether permissible.  Sentence – approach in cases of culpable
homicide.

___________________________________________________________________________

J U D G M E N T

___________________________________________________________________________

MARAIS JA/

MARAIS JA:
[1] On the afternoon of 24 March 2000 a tear gas canister was activated in the
Throb Club in Chatsworth while it was packed with schoolchildren celebrating
the end of a school term.  A stampede ensued in which thirteen young people
died and many were injured.  Charges of murder, assault, and unlawful
possession of the tear gas canister were preferred against three persons alleged
to have been responsible for the activation of the canister.
[2] The murder charges failed because the court (Hugo J and assessors)
concluded that it had not been proved that the deaths had been either desired or
actually foreseen.  The court found that the deaths should have been foreseen
and convicted all three accused on thirteen counts of culpable homicide (a
competent alternative verdict in terms of s 258 of Act 51 of 1977).  They were

also convicted on 57 counts of common assault and the count of unlawful
possession of the tear gas canister.
[3] The three accused were each sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment
on each of the thirteen counts of culpable homicide.  In the case of accused nos
1 and 2 the sentences imposed in respect of three of the counts were ordered to
run concurrently with one another and with the sentences imposed in respect of
the remaining counts of culpable homicide.  No such order was made in respect
of accused no 3.  All of the accused were sentenced to six months’
imprisonment in respect of their unlawful possession of the tear gas canister and
five years’ imprisonment in respect of the 57 counts of common assault which
were taken together for the purpose of sentencing.  These sentences were also
ordered to run concurrently with one another and with the sentences imposed in

respect of the convictions of culpable homicide.  The net effect of it all was that
accused nos 1 and 2 were sentenced effectively to fifteen years’ imprisonment
and accused no 3 to nineteen and a half years’ imprisonment.
[4] Accused nos 1 and 2 were granted limited leave to appeal by the court a
quo.  They were restricted to contending that their conviction upon multiple
counts of culpable homicide and assault was impermissible in law and that they
should have been convicted of one count of culpable homicide in which the
death of thirteen people was involved and one count of common assault in
which 57 people were assaulted.  They were granted unrestricted leave to appeal
against their sentences.  They have not prosecuted their appeals and there was no
appearance by them or on their behalf when the appeal was heard.  I shall return
to what the consequence of that should be.

[5] The court a quo granted accused no 3 unrestricted leave to appeal against
all his convictions and sentences.  Heads of argument were filed and counsel
appeared on his behalf at the hearing of the appeal.
[6] The case which the State sought to prove against accused no 3 (to whom I
shall refer hereafter as the appellant) was that he, a part owner of a rival club
(the Silver Slipper) in Chatsworth, supplied accused nos 1 and 2 with the tear
gas canister and commissioned them to smuggle it into the Throb Club and then
activate it so that the patrons would flee the premises and repair to the Silver
Slipper instead.
[7] The appellant denied that he had done so and raised alibis.  He also called
some witnesses in support of his case.  The case for the State rested upon the
evidence of an accomplice, one Dayalan Tyrone Pillay, and the corroboration of

it which was submitted to exist. In essence, the defence case was that Pillay and
the other two accused activated the canister for reasons of their own, more
specifically, to facilitate the robbing of patrons.  That was said to be a technique
which had been employed by a local gang on a previous occasion.
[8] The submissions of counsel for the appellant were, in broad, that the trial
court’s evaluation of the evidence of the accomplice Pillay and of the evidence
which was said to provide material corroboration of it in respects implicating the
appellant was faulty and that the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses had
not been accorded the weight it should have been.
[9] Some of the criticisms of the evidence of Dayalan Pillay have substance
but the trial court acknowledged that to be so and took them into account in
evaluating his evidence.  In deciding that these criticisms did not derogate from

the acceptability of his incrimination of the appellant, the court a quo found
satisfactory corroboration for it in a number of respects.
[10] There was the evidence of Poobalan (Billy) Pillay that the night before the
incident the appellant arrived at his flat in a white Golf motor vehicle and
enquired about the whereabouts of accused no 1 and Dayalan Pillay.  He asked
the witness to tell them that they should come to him at the Silver Slipper.  The
witness testified further that on the morning of the incident the appellant arrived
again at his flat in the same vehicle and again asked for accused no 1 and
Dayalan Pillay.  They were not there but accused no 2 was there and he and the
appellant left in the appellant’s vehicle.
[11] After the incident (at about 16h00) accused nos 1 and 2 and Dayalan
Pillay came to his flat.  Accused no 2 (who is his stepson) had blood on his

clothes and the clothes of accused no 1 were creased.  Both had a bath and left
his flat at about 18h00 together with Dayalan Pillay.  Later that evening the
police arrived.  They were looking for accused no 2.  Five to ten minutes after
the police had left the appellant arrived in the Golf vehicle which he parked
behind the building in a position in which it could not be seen from the road.
(On the two previous visits he had parked it in the front of the building where it
could be seen.)  Accused nos 1 and 2 and Dayalan Pillay were with him.
[12] Upon being informed that the police had come looking for accused no 2,
Dayalan Pillay and the appellant told accused no 2 to pack his clothes so that
they could all “go”.  When the wife of accused no 2 remonstrated with them and
asked who would provide for her in the absence of accused no 2, the appellant

gave her R70,00 and told her not to worry.  All four of them then departed in the
golf vehicle.
[13] This witness  also  testified  that  the  appellant  subsequently  offered
him R70 000,00 and a half a packet of Mandrax tablets to induce his stepson
(accused no 2) “not to talk about him”.  The appellant’s evidence was that none
of these allegations relating to him was true.
[14] It was not disputed that the appellant drove accused nos 1 and 2 and
Dayalan Pillay to Umkomaas and left them there that very evening.  The
appellant’s version was that he encountered accused nos 1 and 2 and Dayalan
Pillay quite fortuitously that evening at a casino a few doors away from the
entrance to the Silver Slipper Club.  Accused no 2 asked him for a lift.  He told
them that he was going to watch soccer at the stadium and all three of them

accompanied him to watch the soccer.  About three quarters of the way through
the match accused no 2 said that he needed to go home urgently.  He looked
very worried.  As the soccer was boring he left with the three of them and took
them to accused no 2'’ home.
[15] Accused no 2 asked him to wait a few minutes for him as he wished to
return to the casino.  While waiting he heard “loud screams” emanating from the
balcony on the second floor.  Accused no 2 and his family were on the balcony
and his wife was hysterical.  They all looked “shocked” and “worried”.  They
begged him to take accused no 2 to Umkomaas.  He assented and accused no 1
and Dayalan Pillay accompanied them to Umkomaas where he dropped them
and returned to the club.

[16] During a bail application by the appellant in the Magistrates’ Court the
appellant told the presiding magistrate that he wished to see a magistrate in
private, that he did not want to talk to his attorney who was present in court and
who wished to speak to him, and that he wanted to make a statement in private
to a magistrate – “maybe a confession”.
[17] While in custody the appellant indicated to Captains Govender and
Cassim that he wished to see the investigating officer because he wanted to
become a State witness.  The appellant’s evidence was that he said nothing of
the sort to them.
[18] There was the evidence of Bradley Moonsamy that on the fatal day he
was told by the appellant to have his entrance fee for the Silver Slipper Club
ready because all the people from the Throb Club would be coming to the Silver

Slipper Club.  That such a statement was made by him was denied by the
appellant.
[19] There was also the evidence given by accused nos 1 and 2 which
implicated the appellant and confirmed Dayalan Pillay’s evidence in many
important respects.  The court a quo bore in mind that they were accomplices on
their own version and that a cautious approach to their evidence was needed.
[20] The evidence given at the trial had of course to be considered in its
entirety before any conclusions could be safely reached.  It is so that if the
evidence given by the appellant and his witnesses is to be given its face value,
the appellant was not implicated in the incident at the Throb Club.  But that
evidence cannot be regarded as reasonably possibly true or accurate because it is
simply not reconcilable with facts which were proved beyond reasonable doubt

to exist.  The facts are those testified to by Poobalan (Billy) Pillay and Bradley
Moonsamy and the appellant’s utterances during his bail application and to
Captain Govender and Cassim.
[21] Poobalan (Billy) Pillay was admittedly not a wholly disinterested witness.
Accused no 2 is his stepson and accused no 1 his nephew.  Yet the evidence
which he gave for the State was adverse to their interests and plainly
incriminated them.  The possibility that he might have deliberately and falsely
concocted the visits to his flat which the appellant denied having made is
rendered remote when it is weighed up against, first, the undisputed fact that the
appellant did in fact consort with accused nos 1 and 2 and Dayalan Pillay on the
evening of the incident and that he took them to Umkomaas and deposited them

there, and secondly, the utterances of the appellant to Bradley Moonsamy, and,
during his bail application, to Captains Govender and Cassim.
[22] When seen in isolation the first of those factors is not conclusive but when
weighed in conjunction with the second factor, which is in itself well nigh
conclusive of the appellant’s involvement in the commission of the crimes, their
combined impact is such as to remove any shadow of doubt that may have
existed about the incrimination of the appellant by Dayalan Pillay and accused
nos 1 and 2 and the evidence of Poobalan (Billy) Pillay as to the appellant’s
visits to his home both before and after the incident.
[23] The appellant’s attempts to explain away his statement that he wished to
see a magistrate in private and maybe make a confession failed to provide any
reasonably possibly true explanation consistent with his non-involvement in the

crimes and the same can be said of his explanation as to how it came about that
he was with accused nos 1 and 2 and Dayalan Pillay after the incident and why
he took them to Umkomaas.
[24] The value of the evidence of the witnesses called in the defence of the
appellant has to be discounted in the light of what has been said in the previous
paragraphs.  To the extent that any of it is incompatible with the involvement of
the appellant, it cannot possibly reasonably be true or accurate.  To the extent
that it remains compatible, it is of course of no help to the appellant.
[25] Much was made of evidence that the appellant’s own son and another
person to whom he is related was, to the appellant’s knowledge, at the Throb
Club.  It was argued that that rendered it highly improbable that the appellant
would have exposed them to teargas.  Even if they were indeed there I do not

think that that rules out the appellant’s involvement.  He obviously thought no
more than temporary discomfort would be caused because he banked on the
persons who fled the Throb Club repairing immediately to his own club.
[26] In the final analysis a court of appeal does not overturn a trial court’s
findings of fact unless they are shown to be vitiated by material misdirection or
are shown by the record to be wrong.  In my view neither has been shown and
the appeal against the appellant’s convictions must fail unless his alternative
contention that he should have been convicted of only one count of culpable
homicide succeeds.  I turn to that question.  (No submissions were made relating
to the multiple convictions of common assault and I refrain from expressing any
opinion on that issue.  The convictions were taken together for the purposes of

sentence and the sentences imposed were ordered to run concurrently with the
sentences imposed in respect of the convictions of culpable homicide.)
[27] What the crimes of murder and culpable homicide have in common is a
fatal outcome for a human being.  Absent a death, absent the particular crime.
What they do not have in common is that absent a death, there may be a
conviction of attempted murder but not a conviction of attempted culpable
homicide.  The reason for the difference lies in the distinction between the two
forms of mens rea which are essential elements of the respective crimes of
murder and culpable homicide.
[28] The crime of murder cannot be said to have been committed unless the act
or omission which caused death was intentionally committed or omitted and
death was the desired result, or, if not the desired result, at least actually

foreseen as a possible result the risk of occurrence of which the accused
recklessly undertook and acquiesced in.  In short, dolus in one or other of its
manifestations (directus, eventualis, indeterminatus, etc) is the kind of mens rea
which must have existed.  Where the act or omission is accompanied by such
dolus but death does not in fact ensue, it is easy to understand why the accused’s
conduct should be visited none the less with penal sanctions.  A deliberate
attempt to commit the crime of murder cannot be ignored and left unsanctioned
simply because the perpetrator has failed to achieve his or her objective.
[29] The crime of culpable homicide, on the other hand, (certainly as regards
the consequence (death) of the impugned act or omission) postulates an absence
of dolus and the presence of culpa.  The fact that the crime of culpable homicide
may be committed even where the act which causes death is an intentional act of

assault should not be allowed to obscure that essential truth.  In such a case the
perpetrator is not convicted of culpable homicide simply because he or she
deliberately assaulted a person as a consequence of which it so happened that
the person died.  If the perpetrator could not reasonably have foreseen that death
might ensue, a conviction of culpable homicide cannot be justified.  Aliter if
death should have been foreseen as a possible consequence.  What this shows is
that it is the perpetrator’s culpable failure to foresee the possibility of death in
cases where an assault has resulted in death and, in cases not involving an
assault, that failure coupled with a further culpable failure, namely, a failure to
do what could and should have been done to prevent the occurrence of death,
that is the rationale for the conviction of culpable homicide.  Culpa is therefore
always present in the crime of culpable homicide.  Sometimes it is also

associated with dolus (as in intentional assaults resulting in reasonably
foreseeable but actually unforeseen death).  Sometimes it is not (as in negligent
conduct resulting in reasonably foreseeable death).  For a penetrating and
instructive analysis of these matters see Professor Roger Whiting’s article
“Negligence, Fault and Criminal Liability” in (1991) 108 SALJ 431.
[30] Since the notion that an intentional unlawful killing may yet be merely a
case of culpable homicide (the so-called “hybrid” case) was jettisoned in S v
Bailey 1982 (3) SA 772 (AD), it has been possible to define without
qualification the crime of culpable homicide as the unlawful negligent killing of
a human being.  See  Snyman,  Criminal  Law,  4th ed at p 425;  Burchell and
Milton, Principles of Criminal Law, 2nd ed at p 474;  Milton,  South  African
Criminal  Law  and  Procedure  Vol  11,  3rd  ed at p 364.  The intellectual

athleticism sometimes devoted in the past to identifying culpa in such situations
in order to justify a verdict of culpable homicide despite the obvious existence
of dolus in the form of an intention to kill, is no longer required.  Such situations
are now classified as murder and the circumstances which in the past might have
prompted verdicts of culpable homicide now come into consideration as
possibly mitigating factors only when sentence has to be imposed.
[31] All this may seem to be an unnecessary excursion into the differing nature
of the respective crimes when the issue is whether appellant should have been
convicted of thirteen counts of culpable homicide or only one count involving
thirteen deaths.  But the analogy (or lack of it) of murder featured in the
arguments addressed to the court and in the cases in which the question has been
considered in the provincial divisions and it would be as well to have a clear

understanding of the similarities and differences between murder and culpable
homicide before attempting to answer the question.
[32] In S v Mampa 1985 (4) SA 633 (C) it was held by Van Heerden J and
Rose-Innes J that a negligent motorist who caused the death of two of his
passengers by driving too fast around a sharp bend should not have been
convicted upon two counts of culpable homicide.  Much of the judgment is
devoted to a general discussion of the law relating to the splitting of charges and
the drawing of a distinction between murder and culpable homicide where more
than one death is the result of the accused’s single act.  With respect, I do not
find the general discussion of the problem of splitting of charges to be of great
assistance in finding the answer.  More importantly, I consider the particular
distinction drawn between an intended act of homicide which causes the death

of more than one person and an unintended act which has the same result to be
based upon a false premise.  Rose-Innes J said:  “The gravity of an accused’s
conduct in offences based on negligence cannot be judged by its actual
consequences.  R v Msimango 1950 (2) SA 205 (N) at 209-210.  It follows that
to charge and convict an accused with one offence or several offences of
culpable homicide arising from a single negligent act or omission according to
the number of persons whose deaths were caused by the accused’s negligence
would  be  arbitrary  and  unrelated  to  his  criminal  blameworthiness.”  (At 639
C–E).
[33]  First, it is undoubtedly so that the reasonably foreseeable consequences of
an accused’s conduct do play a role in assessing the gravity (“criminal
blameworthiness”) of the offence even where the conduct was negligent and not

intentional and that there is no arbitrariness in that.  The  dicta  in  R v
Chamboho  1964  (1)  PH H  69  (SR)  and R v Barnardo 1960 (3) SA 552 (A)
which Rose-Innes J quoted at 638 H-I appear to have been misunderstood.
Those were not cases in which more than one death had been caused.  The point
that was made in those cases was that the result of negligent conduct is
adventitious and ex hypothesi not intended.  Two identical negligent acts might
have vastly different consequences:  one might have no consequence at all, the
other might cause death.  In each case the departure from the standard of care
required of a reasonable person is the same and the moral guilt of the persons
involved in the departure is the same.  However, the fact remains that the
common law does not visit the negligence in the one case with any penal

sanction but it does in the other simply because of the difference in consequence
of the departure.
[34] Both dicta emphasise the importance of bearing that in mind when
sentencing for culpable homicide but both accept that, nevertheless, the
reasonably foreseeable seriousness of the consequence must receive recognition
despite the fact that it was not intended.  Once that is so, it must follow logically
that “criminal blameworthiness” is indeed greater where a large number of
deaths has ensued provided of course that a reasonable person should have
appreciated that a large number of deaths might be caused.  Society at large will
not take kindly to any suggestion that the sentences imposed upon a motorist
whose high speed around a bend has caused his vehicle to capsize and a
hitchhiker to whom he had given a lift to lose his life, and upon a bus driver

whose identical conduct has caused twenty people to lose their lives, should be
the same.  In so far as parity of gravity was invoked as a reason for restricting
the prosecution to one count of culpable homicide where reasonably foreseeable
multiple deaths have resulted from a single negligent act, I do not think it was a
good reason.
[35]  Secondly, in S v Grobler en ‘n Ander 1966 (1) SA 507 (A) this court
accepted that the crime of murder is committed whenever a life is unlawfully
and intentionally taken because the crime of murder is so defined.  The
illustration given was that of A throwing a bomb at B and C intending to kill
them.  That was regarded as amounting to the commission of two murders
although they were the result of one act.  In S v Prins en ‘n Ander 1977 (3) SA
807 (A) this court emphasised that it is of the essence of the crime of murder

that it is a crime against life.  In my view, exactly the same applies to the crime
of culpable homicide.  They are both narrowly consequence-oriented crimes in
the sense that the death of a human being is a sine qua non of both.  It is of
course so that all crimes (save, obviously, attempts to commit crimes) are
consequence-oriented but the distinction between a crime like, say theft, on the
one hand, and murder and culpable homicide, on the other, is the very particular
and unique specificity of the required social consequence of the misconduct.
Thus, and subject of course to the exception of things which are either
absolutely or relatively incapable in law of being stolen, to constitute the crime
of theft it matters not what particular thing is stolen.  But, as we have seen,
without the death of a human being there can be no talk of the crimes of murder
or culpable homicide having been committed.

[36] Just as in the case of murder it is immaterial whether multiple killings
were the result of one act (such as throwing a grenade) and as many counts of
murder as the number of people who have been killed may be preferred, so too
in the case of culpable homicide where multiple deaths have been caused is it
immaterial that they were caused by a single negligent act or omission provided
only that multiple deaths were a reasonably foreseeable consequence.
[37] To hold otherwise would have peculiar results.  If A is legitimately
charged with three counts of murder in that on the same occasion he unlawfully
and with intent to kill set his vicious dogs upon X, Y and Z as a consequence of
which they were killed and the court finds that he did not foresee the possibility
that they might be killed but that he should have, is the court precluded from
returning an alternative verdict of culpable homicide upon each of the three

murder counts?  Surely not.  If it be suggested that a single alternative verdict of
culpable homicide of X, Y and Z could be returned, to which of the three
individual counts of murder may it be returned?  Whichever one be chosen the
consequence would be that the accused would be convicted of unlawfully killing
two persons to whom the chosen count of murder did not relate.  That would not
be permissible for obvious reasons.
[38] It may be suggested that in such cases the State should be obliged to
forego its right to rely upon the competent alternative verdict for which s 258 of
Act 51 of 1977 makes provision and instead draft a single alternative charge of
culpable homicide to all three of the murder charges in which alternative charge
X, Y and Z are all named as having died.  But by virtue of what principle of law
is the State to be deprived of its right to a statutorily provided competent

alternative verdict against the accused upon each of the counts of murder?  I
know of none and none has been suggested.  Moreover, if it is indeed only one
offence of culpable homicide, the principle of autrefois convict would apply to it
and in cases where further deaths ensue after an initial successful prosecution
has run its course, it would not be possible to invoke any further criminal
sanction for the unlawful causing of those additional deaths.  Autrefois acquit
may stand on a different footing depending upon whether the doctrine of issue
estoppel is available against the State in a criminal prosecution. This
problematical aspect of the matter has received some attention in the reported
cases but, with respect, I am left unconvinced that satisfactory answers to the
conundrum which a plea of autrefois convict raises have been provided.

[39] In S v Mavuso 1989 (4) SA 800 (T) the court accepted that a person who
throws a bomb into a room intending to kill A but not caring whether other
persons who are known to be in the room are also killed, can properly be
charged in separate counts with the murder of each person killed.  However, it
sought to distinguish the case where a person fires a single shot knowing that it
might hit and kill a person, but it hits and kills two persons.  It said that it was
unaware of authority for the proposition that two separate counts of murder
could be preferred.
[40] With respect, there is, in my view, no reason in principle or in
considerations of fairness why they should not be.  If such a person intends to
shoot and kill one person (or fires a shot in the direction of one person realising
that it may hit and kill that person but not caring whether that happens) but he

neither knew nor should have known of the presence or possible presence of
another whom it also hits and kills, he cannot be held guilty of either the murder
of that other person or of the culpable homicide of that person.  If he did know
of the presence of the other person and actually foresaw that the shot he intended
to fire might strike and kill both persons but fired the shot not caring whether he
also hit and killed the other person, his position is no different in principle from
that of the bomb thrower.  If he was not aware of the presence or possible
presence of another, he cannot be convicted of the murder of that person.  If he
should have been aware of it and should have appreciated that he was putting
that person’s life at risk, he can be convicted of culpable homicide of that person
and of murder of the person whom he intended to kill.

[41] If that be so, (the same act resulting in separate convictions for crimes
which both entail the unlawful ending of a life) what reason is there to balk at
separate convictions of culpable homicide if the State should fail to prove that
the accused intended to kill anybody (whether by dolus or by dolus eventualis)
but proves that he should have foreseen that he might kill more than one person
if he fired the shot?  I see none.
[42] The court’s erroneous view of the example which it posed in S v Mavuso,
supra, was compounded by what I consider, with respect, to be its equally
erroneous analysis of the legal blameworthiness of an accused in cases of
culpable homicide where negligence is the form of mens rea which characterises
the crime.  It said:  “Die heersende oordeel omtrent billikheid is dat in die
konteks, die feit dat meer as een persoon gedood is nie daarvan afdoen nie dat ‘n

beskuldigde wesenlik een stafbare handeling begaan het en nie twee of ses of 17
maal gestraf behoort te word nie.”  (At p 806 B–C.)
[43] First, there is a petitio principii involved in the statement.  To assert that
such an accused has committed only one punishable act and that reasonableness
requires that he or she face only one count is to answer the question before it has
been addressed.  For the reasons I have given, it is the foreseeable and actual
consequences of the accused’s negligent act which determine whether he or she
is liable to be charged with one or more counts of culpable homicide.  The
punishable act is by definition the unlawful negligent killing of a human being.
The unlawful negligent killing of more than one human being gives rise to more
than one punishable act irrespective of whether the negligent act which caused
death was a series of different acts or the same single act.

[44] Secondly, the reference to repetitive punishment for the same unlawful
conduct is misplaced.  There should be no difference (subject of course to
jurisdictional sentencing limitations) in the sentence imposed whether multiple
deaths have been the subject of separate counts or combined in one count of
culpable homicide.  Whether multiple deaths are the subject of a single count or
a number of separate counts, the totality of the sentence to be imposed will
depend upon the personal circumstances of the accused, the degree of culpability
present in both his or her conduct and in the failure to foresee the reasonably
possible consequences of that conduct, and the actual consequences of that
conduct.  I conclude therefore that the appellant was correctly convicted of
thirteen counts of culpable homicide.  I turn to the appeal against the sentences.

[45] The circumstances in which the crime of culpable homicide may be
committed range across a wide spectrum.  At one end is the case where a
momentary lapse in concentration on the task at hand has a tragic result.  Neither
the lapse nor the failure to foresee the consequences of it is deliberate.  Yet they
have resulted in a loss of life.  They could just as easily not have had that result.
Sentencing fairly and appropriately in such a case is one of the law’s most
difficult tasks.  The culpa may have been slight but the result stirs an
understandable call from society at large (and a fortiori from those close to the
deceased) for the sentence to visit tangible retribution upon the culprit.
Balancing the need for a sentence that, on the one hand, will not appear to rate
the loss of a life with all the attendant trauma to those to whom the deceased was
near and dear as not too serious against, on the other, the need to calibrate the

degree to which the accused’s conduct deviated from the standard of care
expected of a reasonable person and, if it is found to be slight, to also reflect that
adequately in the sentence to be imposed, is inherently difficult.  The outcome
will often satisfy neither those close to the deceased nor those close to the
accused, being too lenient in the eyes of the former and too severe in the eyes of
the latter.  But that does not absolve a court from its duty to strive as best it can
to achieve a proper balance between those objectives.
[46] At the other end of the culpable homicide spectrum is the type of case
where the accused has deliberately assaulted the deceased but has not been
convicted of murder because the State has failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that death was actually foreseen as a reasonably possible consequence of
the assault.  Because it should have been foreseen a verdict of culpable homicide

is returned.  Here there is more involved than culpa.  An assault has been
committed.  Dolus is present.  A deliberate attack upon a person’s bodily
integrity which was intended to harm has resulted in the most irremediable harm
of all:  death.  Few would quibble at the justness of substantial custodial
sentences for that type of culpable homicide.  But even within that class of case
there are distinctions to be drawn.  Was a weapon used?  How obviously
potentially lethal was it?  Was there provocation?  How great was the negligence
in failing to foresee that death might result?
[47] Here we have a case which is situated somewhere between those two ends
of the spectrum.  An assault of sorts was involved.  Intentional use of teargas to
induce physical discomfort for no lawful purpose is plainly an assault.  But it
was not the assault which was the immediate physical cause of the ensuing

deaths.  It was the stampede which followed upon the release of the teargas and
the severely limited number of exits which were available to patrons desperate
to evacuate the club without delay.  It is also relevant that the appellant knew of
an earlier similar incident at another club.  No one had been killed or seriously
injured on that occasion.  While that did not entitle him to ignore the objectively
appreciable risk of possible loss of life should the release of the teargas
precipitate a stampede, it was calculated to induce a belief (albeit misplaced)
that no one would suffer serious harm, far less be killed.  As the court a quo
found, the appellant could not have envisaged serious harm because he hoped
that those present would forsake the Throb Club and proceed instead to his club.
Moreover, he was not aware of the exceptionally large number of persons who
were in the Throb Club and there was evidence which cannot be dismissed

(because it accords with the probabilities) that he asked for the canister to be
activated soon after the Throb had opened its doors.  He is also a first offender.
Those are, in my opinion, important mitigatory factors.
[48] As against those factors there are aggravating factors.  No less than
thirteen young lives have been cut short.  The anguish of their families and
friends must have been immense.  The motive was mercenary:  to deviate
custom to his own club.  The palpable anger of the community from which the
victims came is entirely justified and fully understandable.  The exploitation of
economically vulnerable young men by requisitioning them to place and activate
the teargas canister is also something which tells against the appellant.
[49] When all is said and done anything less than a substantial custodial
sentence would justifiably be regarded by society at large as an unduly lenient

response to the tragic consequences of the appellant’s unlawful conduct,
motivated as it was by commercial considerations.  Yet the sentences imposed
by the court a quo, when regarded cumulatively (effectively  years’
imprisonment), and even taking into account that they were also imposed in
respect of the 57 convictions of common assault and the count of unlawful
possession of the teargas canister, are so far removed from what I consider to be
an appropriate sentence that they fall to be characterised as strikingly
inappropriate and therefore to require amelioration by this court.  It is therefore
unnecessary to deal with the alleged misdirections of which the court a quo was
submitted to have been guilty by counsel for the appellant.  It suffices to say that
the submissions were not without some substance.
[50] I make the following orders in respect of the appeal of the appellant:

(a)
The appeal against the convictions fails and is dismissed.
(b)
The appeal against the sentences imposed in respect of the thirteen counts
of culpable homicide succeeds.  Those sentences are set aside and the following
sentences are substituted for them and, if appellant has been serving the
sentences since they were imposed, antedated to the date upon which he
commenced to serve the sentences:  “On each of the thirteen (13) counts of
culpable homicide, nine (9) months’ imprisonment”.
(c)
For the rest, the sentences imposed by the court a quo remain unaltered.
(This means that appellant’s sentences now amount effectively to nine (9) years’
and nine (9) months’ imprisonment.  In imposing these sentences I take into

account that the appellant was in custody for eight months prior to his
conviction).
[51] Finally it is necessary to record that although Selvan Naidoo and Vincent
Pillay were granted leave to appeal against their “multiple convictions of
culpable homicide and assault and in respect of sentence” (no leave to appeal
against the finding that the crimes of culpable homicide and assault had been
committed by them was sought), no heads of argument were filed on their behalf
and they were neither present nor represented at the hearing of the appeal.  The
explanation given from the bar was that it was assumed that if the appellant’s
contention that, at worst, he should have been convicted of only one count of
culpable homicide and one count of assault was accepted and, if his sentences
were reduced, the court would also mero motu ameliorate the positions of

Naidoo and Pillay.  The court having indicated that the assumption was not well-
founded, counsel were given an opportunity of considering the question and
furnishing further written submissions.  This they have done and are ad idem
that the appeals of Naidoo and Pillay should not be dismissed for want of
prosecution in terms of Rule 13 (3) of the Supreme Court of Appeal Rules and
that their appeals should simply be struck from the roll thus leaving it open to
them, if so advised, to apply for condonation of their non-prosecution of their
appeal and for its reinstatement.  Indeed, counsel for the State was prepared to
allow this court to adjust their convictions and sentences now should the appeal
of the appellant succeed in a respect which would justify doing so.  That cannot
be done.  Apart from this Court’s lack of any inherent review jurisdiction in
criminal matters, Naidoo and Pillay would not have been heard.  It is ordered

therefore that the appeals of Selvan Naidoo and Vincent Pillay be struck from
the roll.

____________________
R M MARAIS
JUDGE OF APPEAL

ZULMAN JA )
MPATI           )     CONCUR