THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

NOT REPORTABLE
Case No: 104/14

In the matter between:

EBRAHIEM TOFIE

APPELLANT

and

THE STATE
RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Tofie v The State (104/2014) [2014] ZASCA 159 (1
October 2014)

Coram:

Lewis JA and Mathopo and Gorven AJJA

Heard:

11 September 2014
Delivered:
1 October 2014

Summary: Evidence ─ adequacy of proof ─ rape of 15 year old girl ─
evidence of complainant in sexual matters ─ complainant‟s evidence
riddled with inherent improbabilities and not corroborated by other
witnesses ─ discrepancies affecting her reliability and credibility.
Conviction overturned.

___________________________________________________________

ORDER

On appeal from: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town (Erasmus and
Gangen JJ sitting as court of appeal):

The appeal is upheld and convictions and sentences are set aside and
replaced with the following:
„The accused is found not guilty and discharged on both counts.‟

JUDGMENT

Mathopo AJA (Lewis JA and Gorven AJA concurring)

[1] The appellant was convicted by the Regional Court Wynberg of
two counts of rape of a 15 year old female person (Ms H) by penetrating
her vaginally and anally. He was sentenced to 10 years‟ imprisonment on
each count. The trial court ordered the sentences not to run concurrently
and therefore imposed an effective sentence of 20 years‟ imprisonment.
Aggrieved by the convictions and sentences the appellant appealed to the
Western Cape High Court, which dismissed the appeal and increased the
sentences to life imprisonment. The high court granted him leave to
appeal against the sentence only. Leave to appeal against conviction and
sentence was granted by this court.

[2] Briefly the facts are as follows: Ms H‟s evidence was that on 8
January 2010 at or around 23h00, she was walking her boyfriend Dean
Lewis (Lewis) home along Hoosen Park. They were coming from a party.

They met the appellant who was known to her as he was a friend of her
father. The appellant asked them for a cigarette lighter which they did not
have. He then followed them, produced a knife and raised his voice in a
threatening manner and instructed Lewis to go home. When Lewis
protested the appellant threatened to stab him. The complainant then
instructed Lewis to go home and proceeded walking with the appellant.
Along the way the appellant put a hand around her neck as if they were a
couple. The complainant told the appellant that she was going to sleep at
her uncle‟s place in Grassy Park.

[3] Along the way she passed a group of Rastas at a party. When they
reached Parkwood and Grassy Park the appellant put a knife against her
neck, threw her on the ground and pulled off her panties, tore her skirt
and shirt then unzipped his trousers. She screamed loudly but the
appellant closed her mouth while holding a knife against her throat. He
then inserted his penis into her vagina. According to Ms H the appellant
penetrated her for a long period of time. She estimated this to be about 90
minutes. The appellant then turned her around, made her lie on her
stomach and half penetrated her anally. As a result, the complainant bled
from her vagina and anus.

[4] The complainant then managed to free herself and ran towards the
house nearby with the appellant in hot pursuit. Mr Walid Ismail (Ismail)
came out of the house and rescued her. The appellant then left. Ismail
contacted the complainant‟s family. Her father and sister arrived and she
was taken to the police station where she wrote a statement. I will deal
with the significance of the statement later in the judgment. She was
thereafter taken to the doctor who examined her at about 05h00 in the

morning. She told the doctor during the examination that she had been a
virgin.

[5] In her statement to the police dated 9 January 2010, the
complainant stated that she had been with her female friend Ronell at a
shop in Bluebird Lane when the appellant accosted her and took her by
force. She did not disclose that she had been at a party with her boyfriend
(Lewis). She later deposed to an affidavit on 21 January 2010 where she
stated that she had been with her boyfriend. When asked why she gave
different versions she said she was scared to tell the truth because her
parents did not give her permission to go to the party. It was clear that the
statements contradicted each other and her evidence in court. When asked
to explain the discrepancies she admitted to lying. When pressed further
she said she lied because her father and sister were present when she
wrote the first statement. In her second statement she admitted that she
had sexual intercourse with Lewis once and this was at her boyfriend‟s
friend‟s house. This piece of evidence was in stark contradiction to the
evidence of the boyfriend who testified that they had sexual intercourse
three times that afternoon at the complainant‟s friend‟s house. Another
disconcerting aspect of her evidence is that she told the doctor that she
was a virgin. This was clearly untrue because she had sexual intercourse
with her boyfriend that afternoon. She explained that she lied to the
doctor because she thought the doctor would tell her mother.

[6] Dr J D G de la Cruz examined her at 05h00 in the morning and he
noted in the medical report known as Form J88 that the complainant was
neat and tidy and that he did not observe any bleeding either vaginally or
anally. She had not bathed at that stage. This contradicted her evidence
that the appellant tore her skirt and shirt during the incident. She told the

doctor that she was penetrated vaginally and anally. However she was not
sure whether the appellant ejaculated or not. On examination of the
vagina the doctor found no bleeding or tears. There was a little bit of
erosion and some discharge in the posterior area of the cervix. The doctor
said that on gynaecological examination of the vagina the redness and
erosion could have been caused by the sexual intercourse with her
boyfriend earlier.

[7] The doctor‟s evidence was not particularly helpful. He conceded
that he was uncertain whether anal penetration took place or not. When
asked by the court, he said the redness on the anus could be attributed to
other facts. Later when pressed further, he stated that after inserting a
sampling brush he found the discharge. When asked to explain how it
came about as people normally do not have a discharge in the anus he
said it was likely that there was penetration and the discharge was caused
by the ejaculation. During cross-examination, he conceded that the
redness as well as the fact that there were no fresh tears could be
attributable to the fact that the complainant had sexual intercourse earlier
in the day with her boyfriend.

[8] Ismail also testified that he heard screams and when he came out to
investigate he saw the complainant standing with the appellant. The
complainant screamed and said „Uncle hy rape me‟. He then noticed the
appellant fastening his trousers and running away. In cross-examination
he changed his version and said the complainant uttered the words „Hy
wil my rape‟. What Ismail in fact said when questioned by the court was:
„HOF: U het eers gesê sy het gesê “Uncle, hy rape me” en toe later u gesê “Uncle, hy
wil my rape” ─ Ja kan u onthou dat dit nie was hy rape my nie, maar hy wil my rape?
─ wil my rape ─ Ja‟

[9] In his defence the appellant admitted that he knew the complainant
very well and was friends with her father. He said that he met the
complainant on the night in question but denied threatening Lewis with a
knife. According to his evidence the complainant asked him to
accompany her to her uncle‟s place in Grassy Park. Along the way he
bought her cigarettes and some items from the garage. It was his evidence
that the complainant threw herself down and asked him to have sex with
her. He refused and this made the complainant angry. He then told the
complainant to insert his penis in her vagina. At that stage his penis was
out of his trousers as he had just finished urinating. When the
complainant touched his penis to insert it in her vagina, he then told her
to stop. She then took off her panties, lifted her skirt and said that she was
going to urinate in the bushes. The complainant then started screaming
and shouting that the appellant had raped her and ran towards the houses.

[10] Initially he denied that he instructed his counsel that he had
penetrated her twice. Later he said the sexual intercourse was consensual.
When asked to explain the discrepancies he could not give a reasonable
explanation save for stating that he wanted the case to be finalised.

[11] The trial court and the court below were satisfied that the
discrepancies in the complainant‟s evidence were not material and
described the evidence as understandable and acceptable in the
circumstances. After applying the cautionary rules both courts were
satisfied that she had told the truth when testifying.

[12] The appeal is based on three grounds: Firstly, that the trial court
and high court erred in accepting that the complainant‟s evidence
satisfied the requirements of the cautionary rule, and that the State proved

its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Secondly, that on
the evidence, the appellant‟s conduct constituted two counts of rape.
Thirdly, that the high court committed an irregularity when it increased
the sentences.

[13] In this court it was submitted that the complainant was a single
witness and that her evidence, especially because she was 15 years old,
required that it be approached with caution. It was contended that because
of the contradictions in her statements and evidence, both courts had
erred in accepting her evidence as reliable and credible. The fact, it was
argued, that the appellant‟s evidence was also contradictory and
improbable, does not necessarily warrant a conclusion that the evidence
of the complainant was reliable and true.

[14] As regards the finding that there were two counts of rape it was
contended that this was a single prolonged act of intercourse with no
interruption.

[15] The State, on the other hand, submitted that the fact that the
complainant admitted to lying in certain parts of the evidence does not
necessarily mean that her evidence should be rejected as a whole.
Counsel contended that evaluating her evidence as a whole, she was a
credible and reliable witness who told the truth. In support of his
arguments, counsel relied on the evidence of Lewis and Ismail as
sufficient corroboration of the complainant‟s evidence. I do not agree.
The complainant contradicted the evidence of Ismail, Lewis and De la
Cruz. And the evidence of Ismail did not corroborate that of the
complainant in relation to the manner in which he saw them. He said that
they had been standing facing each other. In fact Ismail contradicted

himself in cross-examination. In S v Gentle1 the remarks of Cloete JA are
apposite when dealing with corroboration:
„It must be emphasised immediately that by corroboration is meant other evidence
which supports the evidence of the complainant, and which renders the evidence of
the accused less probable, on the issues in dispute (cf R v W 1949 (3) SA 772 (A) at
778-9). If the evidence of the complainant differs in significant detail from the
evidence of other State witnesses, the Court must critically examine the differences
with a view to establishing whether the complainant‟s evidence is reliable. But the
fact that the complainant‟s evidence accords with the evidence of other State
witnesses on issues not in dispute does not provide corroboration.‟
The submission that the complainant was shaken and terrified is
unconvincing. It is only when Ismail intervened that the complainant
cried rape. The complainant was afforded an opportunity to come clean
when she made the second statement but elected not to do so.

[16] The complainant was a single witness with regard to the rapes. It is
trite that when dealing with the evidence of a single witness such
evidence must be approached with the necessary caution. Before a court
can convict, it must be satisfied that such evidence is clear and
satisfactory in all material respects. See S v Jackson.2 It was necessary to
have approached her evidence with the caution referred to in S v Sauls.3
The trial court and the high court paid lip service to that approach. There
is no corroboration in the complainant‟s evidence that the appellant
penetrated her vaginally. The medical evidence is also unclear and
uncertain. In his findings De la Cruz did not find any discharge on
vaginal examination. His evidence did not take the State‟s case any
further. In addition his concession that penetration or ejaculation was not
the only possible cause of the discharge did not help the State‟s case.

1 S v Gentle 2005 (1) SACR 420 (SCA) para 18.
2 S v Jackson 1998 (1) SACR 470.
3 S v Sauls & others 1981 (3) SA 172 (A) at 180E.

[17] It is clear from the judgments of both the courts below that they, in
spite of material discrepancies in the complainants evidence, wrongly
held that it was true and reliable. I find it untenable that both the trial
court and the high court found the complainant‟s evidence credible and
reliable in all material respects notwithstanding the glaring contradictions
if not blatant lies, in her evidence.

[18] I accept that the appellant was also an unsatisfactory witness. He
admitted to sexual intercourse with the complainant, later changed his
version and disavowed what his counsel put to the witnesses. His version
that the complainant asked for sex out of the blue and attempted to pull
his penis out of his trousers is plainly preposterous. While the falsity of
the appellant‟s evidence, and the fact that he did not seriously contradict
the complainant‟s evidence on that score, are factors to be taken into
account when weighing the evidence, it cannot be elevated beyond its
due.

[19] It is trite that there is no obligation upon an accused to prove his
innocence. The State bears the onus of proving the commission of an
offence. If his version is reasonably possibly true he is entitled to his
acquittal even though his explanation is not plausible. As pointed out in
many judgments it is permissible to look at the probabilities of the case to
determine whether the accused‟s version is reasonably possibly true, but
whether one believes him is not the test. It is and remains the State‟s duty
and not the appellant‟s to discharge the onus and it should not be
reversed. The proper test was formulated by Nugent J in S v Van der
Meyden4 as follows:

4 S v Van der Meyden 1999 (1) SACR 449j-450b.

„The proper test is that an accused is bound to be convicted if the evidence establishes
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the logical corollary is that he must be
acquitted if it is reasonably possible that he might be innocent. The process of
reasoning which is appropriate to the application of that test in any particular case will
depend on the nature of the evidence which the court has before it. What must be
borne in mine, however, is that the conclusion which is reached (whether it be to
convict or to acquit) must account for all the evidence. Some of the evidence might be
found to be false; some of it might be found to be unreliable; and some might be
found to be only possibly false or unreliable; but none of it may simply be ignored.‟

[20] Against this backdrop it is necessary to examine the complainant‟s
evidence. In my view the complainant‟s account of how she was
physically overcome by the appellant was inconsistent and unconvincing.
On the face of it, the complainant‟s evidence appeared to be improbable.
One moment she was uncomfortably walking with the appellant, the next
moment she seemed happy to walk with him along the veld late at night.
Sight must not be lost of her evidence that he had just threatened her and
her boyfriend with a knife. Such a change in attitude would indeed be
improbable in a person who was initially threatened. But the complainant
was not. She was happy to continue walking with the appellant. Even
when they passed the group of Rastas she did not ask them for help. This
makes her evidence improbable.

[21] The following aspects of her evidence illustrates her unreliability
and affect the probative value of her evidence. In her first statement to the
police dated 9 January 2010 she stated that the appellant accosted her at
the shop in Bluebird Lane while waiting for her friend Ronell who had
gone home to fetch her jersey. In her second statement dated 21 January
2010 she stated that she was with Lewis at Hoosen Park. She admitted to
sexual intercourse with Lewis only once. This contradicted his (Lewis)

evidence that it happened three times at a different place to the one
suggested by the complainant. It is noteworthy that she failed
inexplicably to seek assistance from the Rastas whom they passed shortly
before the appellant raped her. Her explanation that she was scared of the
appellant is unconvincing. The fact that she did not resist when the
appellant put his arm around her as if they were a couple casts serious
doubt on her credibility. In her statement and evidence in court she
testified that the appellant tore her skirt and shirt when he raped her. This
evidence is contradicted by the doctor who found her clothing to be neat
and tidy when he examined her at 05h00 in the morning. She told the
doctor that she was a virgin. In court she said she was bleeding from her
vagina and anus. However, no such evidence was found on examination
by the doctor. Finally, Ismail stated that when he came out of the house in
response to the screams he noticed the complainant and the appellant
standing, facing each other, and yet she reported that she had just been
raped. As pointed out correctly by counsel for the appellant none of the
state witnesses corroborated her. In fact Lewis, Ismail and De la Cruz
made her evidence open to doubt.

[22] The unreliability of the evidence as to rape is such that the State
has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant must
be acquitted.

[23] I therefore make the following order:
1 The appeal is upheld and the convictions and sentences are set aside
and replaced with the following:
„The accused is found not guilty and discharged on both counts.‟

R S Mathopo

Acting Judge of Appeal

Appearances

For the Appellant:
M Calitz
Instructed by:
Legal Aid South Africa, Cape Town
Legal Aid Board, Bloemfontein

For the Respondent:
M O Julius with him M D September

Instructed by:

Director of Public Prosecutions, Cape Town

Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein