THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
REPORTABLE

CASE  NO: 202/2002
In the matter between :

ANDREW LIONEL PHILLIPS
First Appellant
LADDIES LARK (PTY) LTD

Second Appellant
JANVEST CLOSE CORPORATION

Third Appellant
APVEST CLOSE CORPORATION

Fourth Appellant
MAYVEST CLOSE CORPORATION

Fifth Appellant
JUNVEST CLOSE CORPORATION

Sixth Appellant
AUGVEST CLOSE CORPORATION

Seventh Appellant
DECVEST CLOSE CORPORATION

Eighth Appellant
PORTION 1 of 247 EDENBURG CLOSE CORPORATION

Ninth Appellant
SUSHIMI INV CLOSE CORPORATION

Tenth Appellant
SWINGING TRADING TWISTER CLOSE CORPORATION          Eleventh Appellant
FEBWEST CLOSE CORPORATION

Twelfth Appellant
D MORNINGSIDE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD

Thirteenth Appellant
STEPHEN WERNER CLOSE CORPORATION

Fourteenth Appellant
MOONLIGHT IMPORT & EXPORT CLOSE CORPORATION    Fifteenth Appellant
and
THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Respondent

CORAM:
HOWIE P, ZULMAN, NUGENT, CONRADIE JJA et MLAMBO AJA
HEARD:

15 AUGUST 2003
DELIVERED:
4 SEPTEMBER 2003

Summary:
Restraint order under Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 –

appealability of such order

J U D G M E N T

HOWIE P/

HOWIE P:
[1] For many years first appellant has owned and operated a business called
the Ranch. It is conducted on suburban premises in Sandton. The business
involves providing a venue and facilities where men can go to have sexual
relations with women prostitutes, or sex workers. The women are not employees
of the business. They are free agents. However, they work there in shifts and to
gain access to the premises they each have to pay first appellant a certain sum
per shift. Each customer has to pay him an admission charge. In addition, the
customers pay the women for sexual services rendered but first appellant
receives no part of those payments. The current amount each of the women has
to pay is R450 per shift and a customer’s entry fee is R250.
[2] Arising out of his conduct of this business first appellant is presently
facing criminal prosecution on several counts. Two are based on the provisions
of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. Under s 2 he is charged with keeping a
brothel and, under s 20 (1) (a), with living off the earnings of prostitution. It is
unnecessary for present purposes to refer to the other charges.
[3] In December 2000 the present respondent, the National Director of Public
Prosecutions, applied ex parte to the High Court in Johannesburg for a restraint
order in terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘the

Act’). Cited as respondents were first appellant and 14 companies or close
corporations of which he is either sole shareholder or sole member. The
application came before Labe J in chambers who issued a provisional restraint
order in the form of a rule nisi, with immediate effect pending the return day, in
respect of all first appellant’s realisable property and the property owned by his
companies and corporations.  That same day the property was seized and
attached, some of it at first appellant’s home.  On the return day appellant sought
the discharge of the order. Having heard argument, Heher J confirmed the rule
but subsequently granted first appellant and the other erstwhile respondents
leave to appeal to this Court. The judgment of Heher J is reported as National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips and Others 2002 (4) SA 60 (W).
[4] Of the various issues raised on appeal the first that requires consideration
is the contention on behalf of the respondent that the order made by Heher J is
not appealable.
[5] As the learned judge confirmed the rule without modification, regard must
be had to the contents of the provisional order. Summarised, its three elements
relevant to the present point were these. First, having described the property to
which the order related, it prohibited first appellant, and anyone having
knowledge of the order, from ‘dealing in any manner with the property, except

as required or permitted by this order’. Second, a curator bonis was appointed to
seize the property, to take control and care of it and to administer it. Third, any
of the restrained property in the possession of the appellants had to be
surrendered to the curator.
[6] These three elements were variously based on provisions of the Act.
Consideration of respondent’s contention therefore requires analysis of the
material sections. They are contained in Chapter 5 and embody a scheme
structured to enable the State to obtain confiscation of the proceeds by means of
which convicted criminals have succeeded in making crime pay.
[7] Chapter 5 comprises sections 12 to 36. In s 18 (1) it is provided that in the
event of any conviction the trial court may hold an enquiry to determine whether
the accused (referred to in the Act as ‘the defendant’) derived any benefit from
his offence. If so, that court may make a confiscation order against him.
[8] To ensure in advance that the offender’s assets, or any of them, are
available at the time of trial so as to satisfy a confiscation order, respondent is
empowered by s 26 to apply to the High Court for a restraint order prohibiting
the defendant from dealing in any manner with his assets. The making of a
confiscation order is within the exercise of a wide discretion accorded the trial
court. Although I refer to ‘the trial court’ for convenience, it is made clear in s

13 that proceedings for a confiscation order, and for a restraint order, are in all
material respects civil proceedings, inter alia, in regard to the rules of evidence
and the requirement that facts be established only on a balance of probabilities.
[9] In terms of s 18 (2) the quantum of a confiscation order may not exceed
the lesser of two amounts. One is the value of the benefit which the defendant
derived either from the offence or offences of which he is convicted and,
according to s 18 (1) (c), from any other criminal activity which the court finds
to be ‘sufficiently related’ to those offences. The second determinative amount
is that which might be attained by realising, among other things, such assets as
the defendant has at the time of the confiscation order. For convenience I shall
refer to the assets subject to the restraint order as ‘the restrained assets’.
[10] In terms of s 25 the High Court hearing an application for a restraint order
has a discretion to grant it only if certain jurisdictional facts are established. The
most important one for present purposes is that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that a confiscation order may be made against the defendant.
[11] If a restraint order is made the Court must at the same time make an order
authorising seizure of all movable restrained assets (s 26 (8)); may at any time
appoint a curator bonis to take control and care of the restrained assets (s 28(1));

and may at any time order the endorsement of restrictive  conditions  on  the
title  deeds  of  any  immovable  restrained  assets (s 29(1)).
[12] A restraint order has only temporary duration. It operates pending the
outcome of later events. In terms of s 26(10)(b) it must be rescinded by the High
Court when the proceedings against the defendant are concluded. Conclusion,
says s 17, occurs on acquittal (whether at trial or on review or appeal) or if no
confiscation order is made despite conviction, or if the confiscation order is
satisfied.
[13] Apart from rescission in those instances the Act makes provision for
variation or rescission by the High Court of restraint orders and related orders in
other circumstances. In terms of s 26(10)(a) the court may vary or rescind a
restraint, seizure or other ancillary order on the application of any person
affected, provided it is satisfied on each of two particular grounds. The first is
that the operation of the order will deprive the applicant of the means to provide
for his reasonable living expenses and cause him undue hardship. The second is
that such hardship outweighs the risk that the restrained assets may be
destroyed, lost, damaged, concealed or transferred.
[14] There is no such restriction on the High Court’s power in relation to
orders appointing curators bonis and orders for the surrender of property which

may be varied or rescinded at any time (s 28(3)), and orders for the endorsement
of restrictive conditions on title deeds, which may rescinded at any time
(s 29(7)).
[15] The only provisions of Chapter 5 that concern appeals in some presently
relevant measure are s 24A and s 29A. S24A states that if a restraint order is in
force when a confiscation order is made, the restraint order remains in force
pending the outcome of any appeal against the confiscation order. (The latter
order is by nature and effect obviously an appealable order and the statute
recognises that, albeit in passing.)
[16] S29A provides that the noting of an appeal against variation or rescission
of any order under sections s 26(10) (restraint), 28(3) (curator bonis or
surrender) and 29(7) (restrictions on title deeds) shall suspend such variation or
rescission pending the outcome of the appeal. The aggrieved party in the event
of a variation would normally be the respondent and, in the case of rescission,
could only be the respondent. Moreover the section does not  refer or extend to
appeals against refusing variation or rescission. Has only the respondent an
appeal? If both parties can appeal would it not be extraordinary if the defendant
could appeal against a refusal to vary or rescind but not against the restraint
order itself? I shall revert to these questions.

[17] Turning to the respondent’s argument, its starting point was that Heher J
had rightly held that a restraint order was analogous to an application for an
interim interdict or for attachment of property pending litigation.  Consequently
in the same way that at common law a judgment or order granting interim relief
was in principle not appealable, a restraint order, being a statutory interim
remedy and altogether comparable, was also not appealable.   Counsel for
respondent emphasised in this regard that a restraint order was variable or
rescindable by the court that made it;  that an appeal could only be aimed at a
decision that was final and definitive and not at what was, in effect, a ‘moving
target’;  and that a restraint did not finally dispose of any issue that would arise
for decision in either the criminal or the confiscation proceedings.  Moreover, so
it was urged, to entertain an appeal against a restraint order would defeat the
purpose of the remedy.1  Accordingly, said counsel, when Heher J granted leave
to appeal and, held that his order was final in the sense of that word in the
present legal context, the learned Judge had erred. (I may point out that Heher J
did not actually hold that a restraint order is analogous to an interim common
law restraint pendente lite.  He merely commented (at 76I-J of the reported
judgment) that there is a similarity.

1  Cf Cronshaw and another v Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd 1996(3) SA 686(A) at 691 C-D

[18] In weighing up these submissions, the first consideration to be borne in
mind is that to be appealable a judicial decision of the High Court must be a
judgment or order.2  Generally speaking, a judgment or order is -

1.
Final in effect, ‘final’ meaning unalterable by the court whose

judgment or order it is.

2.
Definitive of the rights of the parties in that it grants definitive and

distinct relief.

3.
Dispositive of at least a substantial portion of the relief claimed

in the main proceedings.3
[19] Clearly, if the decision in issue has none of those attributes it is difficult
(one need put it no higher) to see how it could be susceptible of appeal.   But
what if it has one or some but not all?  The answer, apart from the fact that the
Zweni formulation itself contains the qualification ‘generally speaking’, is that
this Court has held that the formulation is illustrative, not immutable, and that a
decision having final jurisdictional effect can be appealed against even if it is
not definitive or dispositive in the sense meant in Zweni.4

2  S 20 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959.
3 Zweni v Minister of Lw and Order1993 (1) SA 523 (A).
4 Moch v Nedtravel (Pty) Ltd t/a American Express Travel Service 1996 (3) SA 1 (A) at 10E-11B.

[20] Counsel for the respondent is right, in my view, in submitting that a
restraint order is only of interim operation and that, like interim interdicts and
attachment orders pending trial, it has no definitive or dispositive effect as
envisaged in Zweni.  Plainly, a restraint order decides nothing final as to the
defendant’s guilt or benefit from crime, or as to the propriety of a confiscation
order or its amount.  The crucial question, however, is whether a restraint order
has final effect because it is unalterable by the court that grants it.   In this regard
counsel for respondent argued that the provisions of s 26(10)(a) deprived a
restraint order of the finality required for appealability because it permitted
variation and even rescission.
[21] Orders respectively appointing curators, requiring surrender of property
and burdening title deeds are all rescindable at any time.   Presumably the
unstated requirement is that sufficient cause must be shown but otherwise,
unlike the case of s 26(10)(a), no limits are placed on their susceptibility to
rescission.  And in the case of a common law interim interdict or attachment
pendente lite there is no reason why, for sufficient cause, they would not,
generally, be open to variation, if not rescission.
[22] Absent the requirements for variation or rescission laid down in s
26(10)(a) (and leaving aside the presently irrelevant case of an order obtained by

fraud or in error) a restraint order is not capable of being changed.  The
defendant is stripped of the restrained assets and any control or use of them.
Pending the conclusion of the trial or the confiscation proceedings he is
remediless. That unalterable situation is, in my opinion, final in the sense
required by the case law for appealability.
[23]  Returning to the implications of s 29A, it seems to me that its only
purpose is to ensure a restraint order’s existence where an order for variation or
rescission (including under s 26(10)(a) ) is granted and there is an appeal against
the latter order.  The order for variation or rescission would ordinarily be
suspended by noting the appeal but the defendant could apply under Rule 49(11)
for an order that the variation or rescission be not suspended.   There is on the
other hand no need for the section to deal with the case where the defendant fails
to obtain variation or rescission. The restraint order would obviously continue to
exist in that situation.   It is not to be inferred from the section, therefore, that a
defendant does not have an appeal against refusal of either variation or
rescission.  An order for rescission is clearly appealable on ordinary principles,
for it has all the characteristics referred to in Zweni’s case.   A variation of a
restraint order, however, like the restraint order itself, is neither definitive of the
rights of the parties, nor dispositive of any of the relief claimed in the main

proceedings.  Yet the legislature clearly contemplated that such an order should
be appealable notwithstanding that it lacks those characteristics.  It is difficult, in
those circumstances, to see why the legislature should have intended that a
restraint order itself should not be appealable merely because those
characteristics are lacking.   In my view the section, while not decisive in itself,
lends support to the conclusion that a restraint order was intended to be
appealable because it is final (in the sense in which the term was used in Zweni’s
case) notwithstanding that it is not definitive or dispositive of any of the issues
that will arise in the main proceeding.
[24] I also see no reason why the recognition of the appealability of such an
order will necessarily undermine the purpose of the Act.   An appeal from such a
decision lies only with the leave of the court concerned or, where that is refused,
with the leave of this Court, and where such leave is granted, the court
concerned may attach appropriate conditions (see s 20(5)(a) of the Supreme
Court Act 59 of 1959).  Properly applied, those limitations upon an appeal
provide ample scope for adequate protection to be afforded to the respondent in
appropriate cases.
[25] The respondent’s appealability argument must consequently fail.

[26] Turning to the appeal itself, it was first appellant’s argument in the Court
below, and in his counsel’s heads of argument, that the assets of the second to
fifteenth appellants – the companies and close corporations – were wrongly
subjected to the restraint order.  Counsel indicated at the commencement of his
address that this point, and two others it is unnecessary to mention, were not
being pursued.  For convenience I shall therefore refer from now on to first
appellant as ‘appellant’.
[27] The submissions advanced on appellant’s behalf may be shortly
summarised as follows:

1.
Respondent, as ex parte applicant before Labe J, failed to make

disclosure of various matters which it was his duty to include in his

papers.  Heher J ought therefore to have discharged the rule on that

ground alone.

2.
Respondent brought the application with the ulterior motive to have

the Ranch closed down and to put appellant out of business.

3.
The provisional order was executed unlawfully and in violation not

only of the order itself but also in conflict with appellant’s rights to

privacy and dignity.

4.
There are no reasonable grounds for believing that a confiscation

order might be made.

5.
The provisional order should have been amended by placing a

value limitation on the assets to be restrained.
[28] The non-disclosure argument involves a number of points which were
raised before Heher J in limine.  The learned Judge heard argument on them
before hearing counsel on the other issues.  He gave a judgment dismissing all
the points, with costs.   That judgment does not form part of the reported
judgment and was only presented to this Court shortly before the day of the
appeal.
[29] It is trite that an ex parte applicant must disclose all material facts which
might influence the court in deciding the application.  If the applicant fails in
this regard and the application is nevertheless granted in provisional form, the
court hearing the matter on the return day has a discretion, when given the full
facts, to set aside the provisional order or confirm it.  In exercising that
discretion the later court will have regard to the extent of the non-disclosure;  the
question whether the first court might have been influenced by proper
disclosure;  the reasons for non-disclosure and the consequences of setting the
provisional order aside.

[30] Counsel for appellant detailed what he submitted were nine separate
instances of non-disclosure in the founding papers which, individually or
cumulatively, should have persuaded Heher J to set aside the provisional
restraint order.  It is unnecessary, in my view, to say anything more about eight
of them than this.  In his unreported judgment the learned Judge considered
them all.  He found that one did not require disclosure.  He held that five were
such that if disclosure had been made it could not be found that the omitted
material might have influenced Labe J to refuse relief.  The remaining two
concerned disputed issues of fact and were not susceptible to disposal as points
in limine.  I am not persuaded that Heher J erred in any respect in exercising his
discretion not to discharge the rule on these grounds.
[31] The ninth instance of non-disclosure was not raised in the founding papers
and consequently respondent never had the opportunity to deal with it.  It was
raised for the first time on appeal.  Therefore it could not possibly have
influenced Heher J to discharge the provisional restraint order.   The only reason
for discussing this point further is that in argument counsel contended there had
been bad faith on the part of a senior member of respondent’s staff, Mr
Hofmeyr.  The point arises in this way.  Appellant was a State witness in an
earlier prosecution against three men charged with extorting him to organise

what were called ‘sex holidays’ overseas.  In the course of his evidence he
admitted that the Ranch was a brothel.  The admission was part of the evidential
matter in the founding papers on which respondent relied for the allegation that
there were reasonable grounds to believe appellant might be convicted on the
charges under the Sexual Offences Act.
[32] In appellant’s papers he said that he had not been warned before testifying
of his right against self-incrimination or offered an indemnity against
prosecution under the Sexual Offences Act.  (The evidence supports him.)  He
went on to add that Mr Hofmeyr had been present at court when he gave the
evidence in question and that this was no coincidence but an indication that Mr
Hofmeyr was intent, with others, on pursuing a vendetta against him.  Heher J
duly concluded that in view of the omission to give appellant the appropriate
warning it was most unlikely that the admission would be admitted against him
at his own trial.  Before us the argument for appellant had become this:  it was
respondent’s duty to disclose in the ex parte application that appellant’s
admission was inadmissible and Mr Hofmeyr’s presence at the extortion trial
somehow or other warranted the conclusion that appellant had, in effect, been
set up to incriminate himself so that his evidence could be used against him in
the present proceedings.  Mr Hofmeyr, in the replying papers, fully explained

his presence and denied the allegation.  To add fuel to the conflict appellant’s
counsel contended that the matter ‘reeks of mala fides’.  I shall revert to the
imputation of bad faith when dealing with costs.
[33] This non-disclosure point has no merit.  There was no duty on respondent
to raise the possible inadmissibility of appellant’s evidence.  It was not a matter
of fact but of law.  For all the reasons stated above, the non-disclosure argument
fails in all respects.
[34]  The next argument for appellant is that the restraint proceedings were
prompted by the ulterior motive to have the Ranch closed down.  In the hearing
before Heher J this aspect was raised in limine.  The learned Judge dealt with it
fully in his unreported judgment and concluded that had Labe J been informed
that this was respondent’s purpose it would not have influenced him to refuse
relief.   In my view Heher J was right.  His reasons dispose of this point whether
as a component of the non-disclosure argument or an independent ground of
appeal.  The learned Judge held that the closure of the business of the Ranch was
an inevitable concomitant of the restraint given the nature of the business and
that the curator could not seriously have contemplated running the business
economically without the prostitution, or lawfully if there was prostitution.

Accordingly, even if respondent contemplated or wanted the closure of the
business this does not vitiate his actions or the ex parte proceedings.
[35] It is then argued that the execution of the provisional order was unlawful
and in violation of appellant’s rights of privacy and dignity.   There are two
factual allegations which underlie this argument.   The first is that
representatives of the news media, with photographers, were present at the very
beginning of the execution operation and the inference is, says appellant, that
respondent invited their attendance with the purpose of ridiculing or
embarrassing him.  The second is that the search and seizure process resulted,
inter alia, in his home and personal effects being left in an unacceptable state of
disorder and uncleanliness.  In the replying papers Mr Hofmeyr says the media
were informed of the restraint order after it had been granted and denied what he
called the insinuation that the media were invited to the implementation of the
order.  Apart from the fact that this version cannot, in these proceedings, be
rejected, the media point was not raised in appellant’s papers as a ground for
discharging the rule and respondent was not called on to reply to it in greater
detail than was done.
[36] As regards the state of appellant’s home and personal possessions, a large
scale removal operation would no doubt inevitably involve resultant disarray.

However, the implementation of the order was not the task or responsibility of
respondent but the curator.  Any unlawful conduct by employees or agents of the
curator are irrelevant to the issues in this appeal.  The argument founded on
alleged unlawfulness of the execution of the provisional order therefore cannot
succeed.
[37] Turning to the requirements of s 25(1) of the Act, respondent has to show
in a restraint application reasonable grounds for believing a confiscation order
may be made.  This involves reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant
may be convicted as charged, that the trial court may find that he benefited from
the proved offence or related criminal activity, and that a confiscation order may
be made in that court’s discretion.
[38] Analysis of the evidence proffered by respondent in support of the
charges levelled against appellant, and the latter’s responses, took up much time
in the Court below and a material portion of the parties’ heads.  It is enough for
purposes of this judgment, however, to point to what appellant himself said in
his papers.  He has operated the Ranch since 1987.  He aims to attract ‘executive
patrons’ who want ‘personal stress relief’ in a ‘private, clean and secure
environment’.  There are women sex workers there at any time.  He ‘assumes’
that the service they render is sex in some form.  They are paid for the favours

they provide.  I have recounted at the beginning of the judgment the various
sums payable by the women to him and those payable by the patrons.  Appellant
claims that the Ranch has a reputation for being the best establishment of its
kind ‘probably in the southern hemisphere’.
[39] I do not propose to discuss the meaning of ‘brothel’ and ‘keeping a
brothel’.  Heher J did so fully in the reported judgment at 99D-H.  Counsel for
appellant was unable to offer any convincing reason for saying that the Ranch
was not a brothel.  He could only venture that the women were not oppressed
employees in thrall of a domineering employer.  That is irrelevant.
[40] Also on his own version, appellant has earned substantial financial reward
from his conduct of the ranch.
[41] In my view, therefore, there are reasonable grounds for believing that
appellant might be convicted on at least two of the charges preferred : keeping a
brothel and living on the earnings of prostitution.
[42] That appellant has earned handsomely from his enterprise is reflected in
the considerable number and range of assets seized by the curator.  It is
unnecessary to attempt to guess at their value.  It suffices to say that on the
evidence he is a person of considerable financial substance.

[43] There are therefore reasonable grounds for believing that he benefited
within the meaning of the Act and that a confiscation order may be made.
[44] The final submission for appellant is that because the charges cover only
the period 30 June 1999 to 2 February 2002 there cannot be a reasonable
possibility that the reach of any confiscation order might extend to assets
acquired, or assets acquired from income received, prior to that period.  I
disagree.  There are reasonable grounds to believe that the trial court may find
earlier conduct ‘sufficiently related’ criminal activity within the meaning of s
18(1)(c) of the Act.  It would seem to me to be no answer to say that because
earlier conduct was exactly the same it cannot, linguistically or otherwise, be the
same as ‘sufficiently related’ conduct.  In the absence of any feasible suggestion
that the restrained assets were to any material extent the product of any venture
other than that for which the Ranch has, apparently, become so well known,
there is no sensible basis on which to limit the assets hit by the restraint to any
particular sum.  The appeal must accordingly fail.
[45] As to costs, counsel for respondent sought a special order.   They relied on
appellant’s imputations of deliberate non-disclosures in the founding papers and
the insinuation of mala fides on the part of Mr Hofmeyr.  In the latter respect,
they said, no basis for the allegation existed.   The tenor of their argument as to

the alleged mala fides seemed to convey that this accusation had come
somewhat out of the blue.  I am not at all sure this is so.  It had already been
alleged in appellant’s papers that respondent was conducting a vendetta against
him and had brought the proceedings with an ulterior motive. An accusation of
mala fides is not far removed.  Appellant’s case could of course have been stated
in the papers and in argument without resorting to insinuation, baseless
accusations or extravagant language.  Why should respondent and his staff have
to bear the sting of such excesses if they are only trying, in the public interest, to
combat organised crime?  On the other hand, respondent operates in a tough
environment especially in so far as the areas in which asset forfeiture and related
matters are concerned.  If those he accuses are indeed criminals they will be in
the game to obtain rich rewards.   They will not use kid gloves.  They might well
resort to exaggerated vehemence to add weight to their protestations of
innocence.  In all the circumstances I am unpersuaded, but only just, that a
special order is warranted.
[46] The appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.

__________________
CT HOWIE
PRESIDENT
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

CONCURRED:
ZULMAN  JA
NUGENT  JA
CONRADIE  JA
MLAMBO  AJA