THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

Not reportable
Case no: 071/04

In the matter between:

STOREGATE AFRICA (PTY) LIMITED

Appellant

and

AIRLINK CARGO INTERNATIONAL
(PTY) LTD

Respondent

_____________________________________________________

Coram

:
SCOTT, FARLAM, CONRADIE, CLOETE

et  HEHER JJA

Date of Hearing :
17 MARCH 2005
Date of delivery :
30 MARCH 2005

Summary:
Application for security for costs – appealability of order granting
application – jurisdictional facts to be established before court empowered to
exercise discretion conferred in terms of s 13 of the Companies Act

_____________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________

SCOTT JA/…

SCOTT JA:

[1] This is an appeal against the judgment of Willis J in the High
Court, Johannesburg, directing the appellant to provide security for
the respondent’s costs. The learned judge refused leave to appeal
but leave was subsequently granted by this court.
[2] A preliminary question that arises is whether an order
granting security for costs is appealable. In Shepstone & Wylie v
Geyser NO 1998 (3) SA 1036 (SCA) this court held that an order
refusing an application for security is appealable, but left open the
question of appealability where the application is granted. In the
latter event, as pointed out by Hefer JA, the rules make provision
for the registrar to increase the amount of security so ordered.
Nothing like this can occur if security is refused. In coming to the
conclusion he did, the learned judge rejected a view previously
upheld in the Cape Provincial Division that an order granted in
pursuance of an application for security was not appealable as any
order made would not be final and would not dispose of any
portion of the relief claimed. He relied, instead, on a dictum of Van
den Heever J in Ecker v Dean 1937 SWA 3 at 4 in which the latter
pointed out that  –

‘. . . the claim for security was a separate and ancillary issue between the
parties, collateral to and not directly affecting the main dispute between the
litigants . . .’ .
But whether an order for security is granted or refused, the issue is
the same, ie the entitlement of the defendant to security. In either
event, the order will be final. See Bookworks (Pty) Ltd v Greater
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (4) SA 799
(W) at 804C-E. The fact that the registrar, or for that matter the
court, may increase the amount of security does not affect the
finality of that issue. I can therefore see no reason in principle for
distinguishing between the two situations. It follows that in my view
an order granting security for costs is appealable.
[3] I turn to the merits of the appeal. The facts are relatively
straightforward. I shall refer to the parties respectively as the
plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff (now the appellant)
instituted action against the defendant (now the respondent) for
damages arising out of the loss of certain computer equipment
which it was alleged the former had entrusted to the latter for
storage. The defendant opposed the action and filed a plea
denying liability. It thereafter delivered a notice in terms of rule 47
(1) requesting security for its costs from the plaintiff in the sum of
R30 000. The notice recorded that the defendant claimed security

on the basis that the plaintiff was a company with limited liability
which in terms of s 13 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was
obliged to furnish security for the defendant’s costs as the latter
‘believes that the plaintiff will be unable to pay the . . . defendant’s
taxed costs if the . . . defendant is successful in its defence’. The
plaintiff ignored the notice and the defendant some eight months
later approached the court a quo in terms of rule 47 (3) for an
order directing that the security be furnished.
[4] In the affidavit filed in support of the application the attorney
acting on behalf of the defendant stated that the latter was in
possession of a document headed ‘Subrogation Form’, a copy of
which was annexed. In terms of this document, which was signed
on behalf of the plaintiff and addressed to the Mutual & Federal
Insurance Company Limited, it was agreed that the latter was
subrogated to all the rights and remedies of the plaintiff in respect
of the lost goods and that the insurance company was authorised
to make use of the plaintiff’s name for the purpose of any
proceedings to enforce those rights or remedies. The deponent
noted that in terms of the subrogation, all costs and charges
incurred by the insurance company in the proceedings and the use
of the plaintiff’s name were to be borne and paid for by the former,
but pointed out that as the defendant had no contractual nexus

with the insurance company it would not be entitled to recover its
taxed costs from that company in the event of the defendant being
successful in its defence. The affidavit contained a passing
reference to the notice in terms of rule 47(1) but nothing at all to
substantiate the statement in the notice that the defendant
believed that the plaintiff would be unable to pay the defendant’s
costs. The plaintiff filed no answering affidavit but sought to resist
the application on the basis of the defendant’s own papers.
[5] In his judgment, Willis J, after observing that the application
was based ‘essentially’ on the subrogation, said the following:

‘That [the subrogation] in itself does not indicate that there is reason to
believe that the plaintiff would not be able to pay the security called for. On
the other hand, notwithstanding the fact of subrogation alluded to, no facts
have been put before me to indicate that the plaintiff would be able to meet a
costs order granted against it. There is not even a bald allegation that it would
be able to do so, never mind any reference to its assets or its balance sheet.

Taking everything into account it seems to me that the applicant has
indeed made out a case that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
plaintiff would not be able to meet a costs order in this action  in the event of it
being unsuccessful.’
(The reference to ‘the security called for’ in the first sentence was
presumably intended to be a reference to the defendant’s costs in
the event of it being successful.)

[6] The obligation of a company to provide security for costs is
governed by s 13 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. It reads:
‘Where a company or other body corporate is plaintiff or applicant in any legal
proceedings, the Court may at any stage, if it appears by credible testimony
that there is reason to believe that the company or body corporate or, if it is
being wound up, the liquidator thereof, will be unable to pay the costs of the
defendant or respondent if successful in his defence, require sufficient
security to be given for those costs and may stay all proceedings till the
security is given’.
The section affords a court a discretion to order a company to
provide security for costs only if certain jurisdictional facts are
established. The most important of these for present purposes is
that there must appear to be ‘reason to believe’ based on ‘credible
testimony’ that the company will be unable to pay the costs. Until
this requirement has been satisfied the court has no power to
order security and the question of how it is to exercise its
discretion does not arise: Petz Products (Pty) Ltd v Commercial
Electrical Contractors (Pty) Ltd 1990 (4) SA 196 (C) at 204B-E;
Shepstone & Wylie v Geyser NO, supra, at 1041I; see also Vumba
Intertrade CC v Geometric Intertrade CC 2001 (2) SA 1068 (W)
para 8 at 1071E.
[7] It appears from the passage quoted above that the court a
quo acknowledged that the subrogation itself did not constitute a

reason for believing that the plaintiff would be unable to pay the
defendant’s costs. This is clearly correct. Subrogation is a matter
between the insurer and the insured. It does not affect the position
of a defendant (or respondent) one way or the other. Should the
claim be dismissed with costs the defendant (or respondent) would
be entitled to look to the plaintiff (or applicant) for its costs
regardless of whether there had been a subrogation or not.
[8] It appears, however, that the court a quo ultimately based its
decision on the failure on the part of the plaintiff to place facts
before the court ‘to indicate that the plaintiff would be able to meet
a costs order granted against it’. This approach is clearly wrong.
The defendant bears the onus of satisfying the requirements of s
13. The bald statement as to its belief in the rule 47(1) notice was
clearly insufficient; it was not ‘credible testimony’ within the
meaning of the section. Indeed, that statement was not even
confirmed under oath in the subsequent application. Instead, as I
have said, reliance was placed exclusively on the subrogation.
Once the requirements of s 13 have been satisfied, the party
against whom security is sought will run the risk of an adverse
order should it fail to place information before the court as to its
financial position. But until then it has no obligation to do so. (See
in this regard the comments of Cloete J, in the context of s 8 of the

Close Corporations Act 69 of 84, in Vumba Intertrade CC v
Geometric Intertrade CC, supra, paras 8 and 9.)
[9] In this court the respondent sought to justify the order in its
favour on slightly different grounds. Counsel argued, first, that the
failure on the part of the plaintiff to respond to the rule 47(1) notice
notwithstanding the delay of some eight months before the
application was launched and the failure to file an opposing
affidavit, justified on inference of acquiescence on the part of the
plaintiff to the relief sought; in other words, it amounted to an
admission. The argument is without merit. On receipt of the rule
47(1) notice, the plaintiff was under no obligation to respond; it was
entitled to wait and see if the defendant would pursue its demand.
On receipt of the application, which did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of s 13 of the Companies Act, it was entitled to elect
to argue the matter on the defendant’s papers without filing
affidavits. The second contention advanced was that the fact of the
subrogation somehow gave rise to an inference that the plaintiff
would be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if successful. This,
too, is clearly without substance. The wealthiest of companies
insure themselves against claims and sign subrogation forms.
[10] The appeal is upheld with costs. The judgment of the court a
quo is set aside and the following is substituted in its place:

‘The application is dismissed with costs.’

__________________

D G SCOTT

JUDGE OF APPEAL

CONCUR:
FARLAM
JA
CONRADIE
JA
CLOETE

JA
HEHER

JA