THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case No: 335/08

In the matter between:

CITY OF JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
Appellant

and

GAUTENG DEVELOPMENT TRIBUNAL
First Respondent
GAUTENG DEVELOPMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
IVORY-PALM PROPERTIES 20 CC
Third Respondent
P M VAN DER WESTHUIZEN
Fourth Respondent
E E VAN DER WESTHUIZEN
Fifth Respondent
MINISTER OF LAND AFFAIRS
Sixth Respondent
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FOR
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, GAUTENG
Seventh Respondent

Neutral citation:
City of Johannesburg v Gauteng Development Tribunal
(335/08) [2009] ZASCA 106 (22 September 2009)

Coram:
MPATI P, NUGENT, LEWIS, MLAMBO JJA and GRIESEL
AJA

Heard:
18 AUGUST 2009

Delivered:
22 SEPTEMBER 2009

Summary:
Constitutional validity – Chapters V and VI of the Development
Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 – conflict with reservation of powers to
municipalities – chapters declared invalid but declaration suspended
on certain terms.

ORDER

On appeal from: South Gauteng High Court (Gildenhuys J sitting as court
of first instance)

A
The appeal is partly upheld. The orders of the court below are set
aside and the following orders are substituted:
‘1
Chapters V and VI of the Development Facilitation Act 67 of
1995 are declared to be invalid.
This declaration of invalidity is suspended for 18 months from
the date of this order subject to the following provisos:
(a) No development tribunal established under the Act may
accept for consideration or consider any application for
the grant or alteration of land use rights in a municipal
area.
(b)
No development tribunal established under the Act may
on its own initiative amend any measure that regulates or
controls land use within a municipal area.
Save as above the application is dismissed.’

B
The appellant is directed promptly to lodge the record in this matter
with the Registrar of the Constitutional Court in accordance with the rules
and practices of that court.

JUDGMENT

NUGENT JA (MPATI P, LEWIS, MLAMBO JJA and GRIESEL AJA
concurring)
[1] Various provincial Ordinances – the relevant Ordinance in this case
is the Town-Planning and Townships Ordinance 15 of 1986 – confer upon
local authorities (which I will refer to in this judgment as municipalities)
the authority to regulate land use within their particular municipal areas.
The Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 – more specifically in
Chapters V and VI – purports to confer equivalent authority upon
provincial development tribunals that are established under that Act. The
existence of parallel authority in the hands of two separate bodies, with its
potential for the two bodies to speak with different voices on the same
subject matter, cannot but be disruptive to orderly planning and
development within a municipal area.

[2] For some time the appellant – the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan
Municipality (which I will refer to as the municipality) sought to avoid that
disruption through discussions with the other levels of government but that
came to nothing. It then applied to the South Gauteng High Court for,
amongst other things, an order declaring the allegedly offending legislation
to be constitutionally invalid. That court (Gildenhuys J) dismissed the
application but granted leave to appeal to this court.1

[3] The relief that was initially sought in the court below was more
extensive and altered from time to time as matters developed. In view of
the stance now taken by the municipality I need not deal with those aspects

1Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2008 (4) SA 572 (W).

of the judgment of the court below. The municipality also sought in the
court below to review two decisions that were taken by the Gauteng
Development Tribunal (the first respondent) in the exercise of the authority
that purports to have been given to it by the Act. That relief was also
refused and that refusal is also encompassed by the present appeal. The
individual parties who have an interest in the outcome of those applications
for review (the third, fourth and fifth respondents) have not joined in this
appeal and are content to abide the decision of this court.

[4] The principal issue with which we are concerned is the
constitutionality of chapters V and VI of the Act. It is convenient at the
outset to expand a little on the manner in which land use is regulated under
the provincial ordinances and related legislation, and the parallel powers
that are given to provincial development tribunals, before turning to that
issue.

[5] The authority to regulate the use of land within a municipal area is
conferred upon the municipality concerned by four provincial Ordinances
that survived the transition to the present constitutional regime.2 We are
concerned in this case with the Town-Planning and Townships Ordinance
15 of 1986, which was applicable in the former Transvaal province and
continues to apply in the province of Gauteng.

[6] Under the Ordinance the authority to regulate the use of land is
assigned in general to authorised municipalities (the appellant is such a
municipality) with certain powers of oversight vested in the provincial
authorities. The principal tool for regulating land use is through the
introduction and enforcement by the municipality of a town planning

2Townships Ordinance 9 of 1969 (Orange Free State), Town Planning Ordinance 27 of 1949 (Natal),
Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (Cape), Town-Planning and Townships Ordinance 15 of 1986
(Transvaal).

scheme.3 The Ordinance authorises a municipality to prepare a town-
planning scheme for all or any land within its municipal area and thereafter
to amend, to extend and to substitute the scheme. The general purpose of a
town-planning scheme must be directed towards
‘the coordinated and harmonious development of the area to which it relates in such a
way as will most effectively tend to promote the health, safety, good order, amenity,
convenience and general welfare of such area as well as efficiency and economy in the
process of such development.’4

[7] A town planning scheme – sometimes called a ‘zoning scheme’ –
will comprise scheme clauses, scheme maps, plans, annexures and
schedules.5 Regulation 3 of the regulations made under the Ordinance
specifies at length the various matters that might be the subject of such a
scheme. For present purposes it will be sufficient to set out extracts from
that regulation to illustrate the breadth of control that might be asserted
through a town planning scheme:
‘(b)
the use of land for
(i)
new streets;
(ii)
the widening of existing streets;
(iii)
parking areas and public and private open spaces;
(iv)
residential areas;
…..
(e)
the zoning of land to be used for specific purposes, including agricultural
purposes;
(f)
the area of erven;
(g)
the regulation of the erection of buildings with particular reference to –
(i)
the maximum number which may be erected upon any erf or other area of
land;
(ii) the maximum area of any erf or other area of land upon which buildings
may be erected;

3Provided for in Chapter II.
4Section 19.
5See regulation 2 of the Regulations made under the Ordiance and published under Administrator’s
Notice 858, 1987.

(iii) open spaces around buildings and parking areas in and around buildings;
(iv) the position of buildings on any erf or other area of land in relation to any
boundary, street or other building;
(v)
the character, height, coverage, harmony, design or external appearance of
buildings;
…..’
[8] An authorised municipality is also entitled to decide whether and on
what conditions townships may be established within its municipal area.6 A
township means ‘any land laid out or divided into or developed as sites for
residential, business or industrial purposes’ (if certain other features also
exist that are not now relevant). The establishment of a township other than
in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance (subject to certain of its
provisions) is unlawful.7 Applications to establish townships within the
municipal area of an authorised municipality are directed to the
municipality and it has the authority to approve or refuse them, and to
impose conditions where they are approved.8

[9] The Ordinance thus contemplates detailed control and regulation of
land use being exercised by a municipality. Decisions as to the uses it will
allow will necessarily be influenced by numerous local considerations, not
least the ability of the municipality to provide the necessary infrastructure
and services within the constraints of its capital budgets.

[10] While the Ordinance provides for the detail of land use management
other legislation calls for it to be undertaken within the context of broader
interests and objectives. Under the Local Government: Municipal Systems
Act 32 of 2000 (the Systems Act) a municipal council is required to adopt a
‘single, inclusive plan for the development of the municipality’ (referred to
as an ‘Integrated Development Plan’) that

6Provided for in chapter III.
7Section 66(1).
8Part C of chapter III.

‘(a)
links, integrates and co-ordinates plans and takes into account proposals for the
development of the municipality;
(b)
aligns the resources and the capacity of the municipality with the
implementation of the plan;
(c)
forms the policy framework and general basis on which annual budgets must be
based;
(d)
…
(e)
is compatible with national and provincial development plans and planning
requirements binding on the municipality in terms of legislation.’9
An Integrated Development Plan must have as one of its core components a
‘Spatial Development Framework’ that must include ‘the provision of basic
guidelines for a land use management system for the municipality.’10

[11] Section 35 of the Systems Act provides that an Integrated
Development Plan adopted by a municipality
‘(a)
is the principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all
planning and development, and all decisions with regard to planning, management and
development, in the municipality;
(b)
binds the municipality in the exercise of its executive authority, except to the
extent of any inconsistency between a municipality’s integrated development plan and
national or provincial legislation, in which case such legislation prevails;
(c)
…’
Those provisions are reinforced by s 36, which provides that
‘[a] municipality must give effect to its integrated development plan and conduct its
affairs in a manner which is consistent with its integrated development plan.’

[12] It will be apparent that that comprehensive land use regime, when
viewed as a whole, calls for interrelated and coordinated action on the part
of the various departments and functionaries of a municipality if its
objectives are to be achieved. To introduce into that ongoing process a third
party with the power to intervene and impose its own decisions that might

9Section 25.
10Section 26(e).

be inconsistent with the decisions and objectives of the municipality is a
recipe for chaos. That is what is purportedly authorised by chapters V and
VI of the Act.

[13] The long title of the Act describes two of its purposes as being ‘to
introduce extraordinary measures to facilitate and speed up the
implementation of reconstruction and development programmes and
projects’ and ‘to lay down general principles governing land development
throughout the Republic’. In furtherance of the latter purpose chapter I of
the Act, and in particular s 3, lays down various general principles to be
observed in relation to land development. Section 2 provides that those
general principles apply throughout the Republic and
‘(a)
shall also apply to the actions of the State and a local government body;
(b)
serve to guide the administration of any physical plan, transport plan, guide plan,
structure plan, zoning scheme or any like plan or scheme administered by any
competent authority in terms of any law;
(c)
serve as guidelines by reference to which any competent authority shall exercise
any discretion or take any decision in terms of this Act or any other law dealing with
land development, including any such law dealing with the subdivision, use and
planning of or in respect of land;
(d)
…’

[14] On the face of it there is no apparent reason why the national
legislature should not be entitled to lay down planning and developmental
standards to be observed by municipalities. The complaint by the
municipality is directed, however, to those portions of the Act (chapters V
and VI) that create and confer authority upon tribunals to approve land use
applications that might be in conflict with the municipality’s plans.

[15] The provisions of chapters V and VI need to be seen in the context of
chapter III (sections 15 to 26). Section 15(1) establishes for each province

what is called a ‘development tribunal’. Such a tribunal comprises persons
appointed from time to time by the Premier with the approval of the
provincial legislature.11 The first respondent – the Gauteng Development
Tribunal – is one such tribunal. The functions of a development tribunal are
described in s 16 as follows:
‘A tribunal –
(a)
shall deal with any matter brought before it in terms of section 30 (1), 33, 34, 40,
42, 51, 48 (1), 57 or 61 or any matter arising therefrom;
(b)
in dealing with any matter referred to in paragraph (a), (c) or (d) may –

(i)
grant urgent interim relief pending the making of a final order by the
tribunal;

(ii)
give final decisions or grant or decline final orders;

(iii)
refer any matter to mediation as contemplated in section 22;

(iv)
conduct any necessary investigation;

(v)
give directions relevant to its functions to any person in the service of a
provincial administration or a local government body;

(vi)
grant or decline approval, or impose conditions to its approval, of any
application made to it in terms of this Act;

(vii)
determine any time period within which any act in relation to land
development is to be performed by a person;

(viii) decide any question concerning its own jurisdiction;
(c)
shall deal with any other matter with which it is required to deal in terms of this
Act;
(d)
may generally deal with all matters, necessary or incidental to the performance
of its functions in terms of or under this Act.

[16] Certain decisions of a development tribunal are subject to appeal to a
development appeal tribunal established or recognised by the Premier
under s 24. The second respondent is the development appeal tribunal for
Gauteng province.

11Section 15(2).

[17] Section 31 allows for applications to be made to a development
tribunal for the establishment of what is called a ‘land development area’.
That term is defined in sweeping terms to mean
‘any area of land which is the subject of land development, including –
(a)
such an area shown on a layout plan and forming the subject of land
development in terms of Chapter V, or on a settlement plan and forming the subject of
land development in terms of Chapter VI;
(b)
any land which is not subdivided or intended to be subdivided but on which
there are buildings, or on which it is intended to erect buildings or on which sites are
laid out, or on which there are buildings in close proximity to each other, and which is
used for any of the purposes referred to in the definition of ‘land development’; and
(c)
a group of pieces of land or of subdivisions of a piece of land which are
combined with public places and are used mainly for those purposes or are intended to
be so used and which are shown on diagrams or a general plan.’
‘Land development’ is defined to mean
‘any procedure aimed at changing the use of land for the purpose of using the land
mainly for residential, industrial, business, small-scale farming, community or similar
purposes, including such a procedure in terms of Chapter V, VI or VII, but excluding
such a procedure in terms of any other law relating exclusively to prospecting or
mining’.

[18] Section 33(1) authorises the tribunal to approve or refuse such an
application, and if it is approved, to impose any one or more of the
conditions referred to in subsection (2). I need not recite those conditions. I
think it is sufficient to say that the relevant sections of the Act have the
effect of authorising a development tribunal to do everything that an
authorised municipality might do when exercising its authority under the
Ordinance. It is able to override any and all control that a municipality is
capable of exercising over the use of the land, and to do so notwithstanding
opposition by the municipality, and notwithstanding that it will conflict
with the objectives and plans of the municipality. And if an application to a
municipality for an amendment to its town planning scheme, or for a

special consent under such a scheme, or for the establishment of a
township, is turned down, the applicant may simply repeat the application,
this time in the form of an application for approval of a ‘land use area’,
before the relevant development tribunal.

[19] Three illustrative examples of that having occurred are referred to in
the affidavits of the municipality. Eleven town-planning schemes are in
operation within the area of jurisdiction of the municipality, including the
Johannesburg Town Planning Scheme. Under that scheme Portion 2 of erf
326 Linden is zoned as ‘residential 1’ meaning that it may be used only for
‘dwelling houses’, with certain other uses permitted with the consent of the
municipality. Upon application by the owner the Gauteng Development
Tribunal rezoned the land to ‘residential 1 permitting restaurant and retail’
so as to allow for the operation of a restaurant and a gift shop. Why an
application that is quintessentially of local interest should have been
considered to be appropriate to a provincial tribunal is difficult to imagine.
Certainly none of the objectives of the Act as they are reflected in the long
title suggest that it was aimed at deciding where to locate gift shops.

[20] The other two cases concern applications that were made to the
Gauteng Development Tribunal for, in effect, the establishment of
townships on land that fell within the area of the Roodepoort Town
Planning Scheme and was zoned ‘agricultural’. In both cases the land
concerned also fell outside what is called the ‘Urban Development
Boundary’. The Urban Development Boundary – which is one aspect of the
Spacial Development Framework forming part of the Integrated
Development Plan that has been adopted by the municipality – delineates
which areas may be used for urban development and which areas may not
be so used. As I have pointed out earlier the Integrated Development Plan
‘binds the municipality in the exercise of its executive authority’ (except to

the extent of any inconsistency between the integrated development plan
and national or provincial legislation) and the municipality ‘must give
effect to its integrated development plan and conduct its affairs in a manner
which is consistent with its integrated development plan.’ Thus in the
ordinary course the municipality would not have permitted the townships to
be established.

[21] The first application related to Portion 229 (a portion of portion 75 of
the farm Roodekrans 183 IQ). The owner of the land (the third respondent)
applied to the Gauteng Development Tribunal to establish what is in effect
a township, comprising 21 erven of which 19 would be zoned ‘residential
1’, one would be zoned ‘agricultural’, and one would be zoned ‘special’ for
purposes of access to the township. The municipality opposed the granting
of the application on the grounds, amongst others, that the use would be
inconsistent with the town planning scheme and the Integrated
Development Plan. That notwithstanding the Gauteng Development
Tribunal approved the application on 4 August 2004.

[22] The second application related to portion 228 of the farm Ruimsig
265 IQ. That application was similarly, in effect, for the establishment of a
residential township. That land, too, falls outside the municipality’s Urban
Development Boundary, and was similarly opposed by the municipality,
but was granted by the tribunal during September 2004.

[23] The powers that purport to have been conferred upon development
tribunals to regulate land use within a municipal area, which were the
powers exercised by the tribunal in those cases, are said by the municipality
to be reserved to municipalities by the Constitution. If that is so, it was
submitted, then the relevant provisions of the Act are invalid, and the

purported exercise of that authority in relation to the two townships was
also invalid.

[24] The structure of government authority under the present
constitutional dispensation departs markedly from that which existed under
the previous constitutional regime. Under the previous regime all public
power vested in Parliament and devolved upon the lower tiers of
government by parliamentary legislation. Under the present regime,
however, certain powers of government are conferred directly upon the
lower tiers by the Constitution. To the extent that that has occurred the
lower tiers exercise original constitutional powers and no other body or
person may be vested with those powers.

[25] The Constitution establishes government at three levels. At national
level legislative authority vests in Parliament and executive authority vests
in the President (who exercises it together with other members of the
Cabinet). At provincial level legislative authority vests in the provincial
legislatures and executive authority vests in the provincial Premiers (who
exercise that authority together with other members of the executive
councils). At local level government comprises municipalities, which must
be established for the whole of the territory of the Republic, and the
legislative and executive authority of a municipality vests in its municipal
council.

[26] National legislative authority as vested in Parliament confers on the
National Assembly the authority to legislate on any matter, including a
matter within a ‘functional area’ listed in Schedule 4, but excluding, subject
to exceptions, a matter within the functional areas listed in schedule 5.
Provincial legislatures, on the other hand, may legislate with regard to any
matters within the functional areas listed in Schedules 4 and 5. It follows

that functional areas listed in Schedule 4 fall within the concurrent
legislative authority of the national and provincial governments, and the
functional areas listed in schedule 5 fall within the exclusive legislative
authority of the provincial legislatures.

[27] Certain functions of government are, in the same way, reserved to
municipalities by the Constitution. The material provisions of the
Constitution for present purposes are s 156(1) read together with Part B of
Schedule 4. Section 156(1) provides that
‘a municipality has executive authority in respect of, and has the right to administer –
(a)
the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of
Schedule 5; and
(b)
any other matter assigned to it by national or provincial legislation.’

[28] It will be apparent, then, that while national and provincial
government may legislate in respect of the functional areas in schedule 4,
including those in Part B of that schedule, the executive authority over, and
administration of, those functional areas is constitutionally reserved to
municipalities. Legislation, whether national or provincial, that purports to
confer those powers upon a body other than a municipality will be
constitutionally invalid. None of that is controversial. What is in dispute is
only whether the authority that the municipality exercises at present under
the Ordinance falls within the terms of one of those functional areas.

[29] The functional area in Part B of Schedule 4 that is pertinent to this
case is ‘municipal planning’. Other functional areas that are reserved to
municipalities in that Part include ‘air pollution’, ‘building regulations’,
‘electricity and gas reticulation’, ‘stormwater management systems in built
up areas’, and ‘water and sanitation services’ (with some limitations).

[30] The crisp question that is before us is thus whether the functional
area described as ‘municipal planning’ includes the functions that have
been and continue to be performed by municipalities in the regulation of
land use as I outlined them earlier. If so, they are matters that are reserved
to the executive authority and administration of municipalities and may not
be assigned by legislation to another body (in this case a development
tribunal).

[31] On the face of it the introduction, administration and enforcement of
town planning schemes, and the determination of whether land should or
should not be used for the establishment of townships, and if so, the
conditions that should apply, seems to me to fit easily within the ordinary
meaning of the term ‘municipal planning’. The principal argument that was
advanced before us by counsel for the respondents, however, was founded
on a phrase that is used in Part A of Schedule 4. It will be recalled that that
Part lists functional areas that fall within concurrent national and provincial
legislative competence. Listed amongst those functional areas is ‘urban and
rural development’. Counsel submitted that the functions that I have
referred to fall within the ordinary meaning of ‘urban…development’. It
follows, so it was submitted, that they do not constitute ‘municipal
planning’ and may be assigned to any body of their choosing by the
national or provincial legislatures. That has been done, so the argument
went, by assigning them to municipalities under the provincial Ordinances,
and to development tribunals under the Act.

[32] The question that immediately comes to mind on that submission is
what remains within the functional area of ‘municipal planning’ once those
functions are excised? In answer to that question counsel for the
respondents submitted that the term is restricted to what he called ‘forward
planning’. Expanding upon that he submitted that it is confined to

conceiving and preparing long-term plans but not implementing those
plans.

[33] It was along those lines that the court below decided the matter in
favour of the respondents. Referring to a dictionary meaning of the word
‘plan’ – ‘detailed proposal for doing something; decide on or arrange in
advance’ – it said that prima facie the word ‘does not extend to the
implementation of planning’. Fortified by reference to various provisions
of the Constitution the court below went on to say the following (at par 56):
‘An analysis of the Constitution indicates that development is primarily a national and
provincial competence, and that municipal involvement therein is, in the absence of any
assignment under section 156(4), limited to planning for it, promoting it and
participating therein.’

[34] Support for that view was also found in the views expressed by
Rabie J in the North Gauteng High Court (Basson v City of Johannesburg
Metropolitan Municipality; Eskom Pension and Provident Fund v
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality12) in which the learned judge,
confronting the same question, said the following:
‘[40] From the above it would appear, firstly, that the [Development Facilitation Act]
envisages a situation where land development can occur under the auspices of more
than one body and in terms of different legislation. This notion fits in with the
provisions of the Constitution referred to above which allows for both the National and
Provincial [legislatures] legislating in respect of urban development. Secondly, such
applications may entail an amendment to an existing zoning scheme, ie, a town planning
scheme administered by a municipality. Thirdly, such an amendment to a zoning
scheme has legal effect above any provision to the contrary in any other law governing
land development or land-use planning or zoning schemes.

[41] In the result the [municipality’s] contention that only it has the authority to
amend town planning schemes (zoning schemes), cannot be maintained. At present the

12Cited at [2007] JOL 19304 (T).

[municipality] adopts, amends and implements town planning schemes and approve the
establishment of townships in terms of the Town Planning and Townships Ordinance,
which is a Provincial piece of legislation. It does not do so in terms of its own by-laws.
The Constitution provides for concurrent National legislative jurisdiction in respect of
the same area of competence and the [Development Facilitation Act] is such a piece of
legislation. Since the Provincial and the National [legislature] can both legislate in
respect of these issues (the Provincial [legislature] having done so already through the
Town Planning and Townships Ordinance) the provisions of the [Development
Facilitation Act] can therefore not be regarded as unconstitutional. It is in fact a natural
consequence of the National [legislature’s] authority and power to also legislate in this
regard.’

[35] The construction that was adopted by the court below and by Rabie
J, and that was advanced before us by counsel for the respondents, all
proceed by inferential reasoning from the proposition that the functions
with which we are now concerned are embraced by the concept of
‘development’ (a functional area that falls within the concurrent legislative
authority of national and provincial government) and thus, by inference,
fall to be excluded from the functional area ‘municipal planning’. That line
of reasoning seems to me to approach the matter the wrong way round.

[36] It is to be expected that the powers that are vested in government at
national level will be described in the broadest of terms, that the powers
that are vested in provincial government will be expressed in narrower
terms, and that the powers that are vested in municipalities will be
expressed in the narrowest terms of all. To reason inferentially with the
broader expression as the starting point is bound to denude the narrower
expression of any meaning and by so doing to invert the clear constitutional
intention of devolving powers on local government.

[37] That seems to me to be demonstrated by considering the other
functional areas that are reserved to municipalities in Part B of Schedule 4.

On the approach adopted by the court below the term ‘development’ – a
term with the widest of meanings – is capable of including all the
functional areas listed in Part B of Schedule 4, and in particular the
functional areas of ‘air pollution’, ‘building regulations’, ‘electricity and
gas reticulation’, ‘stormwater management systems in built up areas’, and
‘water and sanitation services’. To approach the matter along the lines
adopted by the court below, and that which was advanced before us by
counsel, seems to me to denude all the functional areas that purport to have
been vested in municipalities of any content at all.

[38] I cannot accept that the Constitution was framed so as to confine the
powers of a municipality to conceiving and preparing plans in the abstract,
with no power to implement them. Preparing plans in the abstract would
seem to me to be an altogether useless enterprise. It is suggested in the
judgment of the court below that abstract planning of that kind (without
implementation) might have a use in enabling a municipality to assist and
participate in development that is undertaken by (or at the behest of)
provincial and national government. I fail to see what purpose would be
served by reserving power to local government merely to assist or
participate in the exercise of powers by another tier of government.

[39] It is true, as pointed out by the court below, that a dictionary
meaning of ‘plan’, when used in other contexts, signifies that it is confined
to conceptualisation and does not extend to implementation. But as pointed
out by Hefer JA in Fundstrust (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Van Deventer:13
‘Recourse to authoritative dictionaries is, of course, a permissible and often helpful
method available to the Courts to ascertain the ordinary meaning of words (Association
of Amusement and Novelty Machine Operators and Another v Minister of Justice and
Another 1980 (2) SA 636 (A) at 660F-G). But judicial interpretation cannot be
undertaken, as Schreiner JA observed in Jaga v Dönges NO and Another; Bhana v

131997 (1) SA 710 (A) at 72H-727A.

Donges NO and Another 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) at 664H, by “excessive peering at the
language to be interpreted without sufficient attention to the contextual scene”. The task
of the interpreter is, after all, to ascertain the meaning of the word or expression in the
particular context of the statute in which it appears (Loryan (Pty) Ltd v Solarsh Tea and
Coffee (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 834 (W) at 846G ad fin). As a rule every word or
expression must be given its ordinary meaning and in this regard lexical research is
useful and at times indispensable. Occasionally, however it is not.’

[40] In this case the word is not used in relation to, for example, plans
that are prepared by an engineer for a mechanical device that is to be
constructed, or an architect’s plan for a structure, or a plan that is prepared
by a land surveyor. It is used in the context of municipal activities. And in
that context it has become commonplace throughout the English speaking
world to use the word ‘planning’ to describe the regulation and control of
land use. It has been so used in legislation in this country for many years.
In England, we are told by Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, terms like
‘planning permission’ and ‘planning scheme’ are used in English statutes
that deal with the regulation of land use. Black’s Law Dictionary tells us
that in the United States a ‘planning board’ is understood to mean ‘a local
government body responsible for approving or rejecting proposed building
projects’. Butterworth’s Australian Legal Dictionary refers to ‘planning’ as
‘a term which implies a scheme for the future incorporating some
systematic plan for the development of a town intended to subject the
development of localities or areas of land to direction and restraint’, it
describes a ‘planning instrument’ as an ‘instrument made under a law …
that relates to town planning or use of land’, it refers to ‘planning
standards’ as ‘regulatory or prescriptive standards relating to development
projects, mainly in respect of the quantifiable aspects of site development’
and it notes that ‘planning standards … are imposed by local government in
conjunction with zoning restrictions, and cover such matters as residential
density, car parking, visual privacy, provision of amenity, restriction on

building heights, access to public transport, safety and security, and
building construction.’ In Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd14
Yacoob J had no difficulty understanding the word to convey that meaning
when he said the following:
‘The zoning of land and the question whether subdivision should be allowed in relation
to any land is essentially a planning function in terms of Schedule 4 and Schedule 5 to
the Constitution. Previously, the Minister was afforded a planning function in relation to
agricultural land situated in areas where local government structures were absent. Our
Constitution requires municipal planning to be undertaken by municipalities. To
continue to accord this planning function to the national Minister of Agriculture and
Land Affairs in relation to agricultural land would be at odds with the Constitution in
two respects. First, it would negate the municipal planning function conferred upon all
municipalities. Secondly, it may well trespass into the sphere of the exclusive provincial
competence of provincial planning. I may add that legislation concerning zoning and
subdivision of land was regarded as planning legislation even before the new
Constitution came into operation.’ (At para 131.)

[41] It is clear that the word ‘planning’, when used in the context of
municipal affairs, is commonly understood to refer to the control and
regulation of land use, and I have no doubt that it was used in the
Constitution with that common usage in mind. The prefix ‘municipal’ does
no more than to confine it to municipal affairs. That construction, which
gives meaningful effect to the term, has the effect of leaving in the hands of
national and provincial government the authority to legislate in the
functional area of ‘urban … development’, but reserving to municipalities
the authority to micro-manage the use of land for any such development.
On that construction the functional area of ‘urban development’ retains
considerable scope for national and provincial legislation. One thinks
immediately, for example, of the establishment of financing schemes for
development, the creation of bodies to undertake housing schemes or to

142009 (1) SA 337 (CC), [2008] ZACC 12; 2008 (11) BCLR 1123 (CC).

build urban infrastructure, the setting of development standards to be
applied by municipalities, and so on.

[42] There was some debate in the course of argument, initiated from the
bench, as to whether the Act is capable of being construed restrictively –
confining the powers that are conferred upon development tribunals to a
limited range of land projects for reconstruction and development purposes
– so as to avoid unconstitutionality. Neither counsel showed enthusiasm for
such a construction and correctly so. The Act expresses itself in such wide
terms that any such construction would be artificial and would amount not
to interpretation but to re-writing the Act. The difficulty would in any event
remain that the reservation of ‘municipal planning’ in Part B of Schedule 4
is not capable of being construed as reserving those functions to
municipalities in some circumstances but not in others, no matter how
limited those circumstances might be.

[43] In my view the term ‘municipal planning’ as it is used in Part B of
Schedule 4 includes the various functions that are assigned to
municipalities under the Ordinance, and accordingly they may not be
assigned to other bodies by legislation. Both counsel were agreed that,
bearing in mind the broad terms in which they are framed, the provisions of
chapters V and VI are not capable of being brought into line with the
Constitution by declaring invalid only specific words or phrases or
sections, and that if our finding were to be as I have stated it, the whole of
those chapters falls to be declared invalid.

[44] A declaration of invalidity ordinarily has the effect that the relevant
legislation has been invalid from inception in the absence of a contrary
order under the authority given by s 172(1)(b). That section permits a court,
when declaring a statute to be invalid, to

‘make any order that is just and equitable, including –
(i)
an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and
(ii)
an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.’

[45] Clearly that result would cause considerable disruption, bearing in
mind that development tribunals will have made many decisions affecting
rights in the course of their existence. The municipality asked us to declare
the legislation to be invalid with effect from 16 August 2005, the date upon
which it informed the Gauteng Development Tribunal that its conduct was
unlawful and would not be recognised by the municipality. I think it needs
to be borne in mind that a declaration of invalidity will affect not only the
Gauteng Development Tribunal but other tribunals as well. Moreover, it
will affect parties who might have acted in ignorance of the notice given by
the municipality. It seems to me in the circumstances that a declaration of
invalidity having even limited retrospective effect would not be just and
equitable.

[46] It needs also to be recognised that the functions of development
tribunals are not confined to those functions that are reserved to
municipalities. To declare the legislation to be invalid with immediate
effect will deprive development tribunals of the power to perform other
functions that are legitimately conferred upon them by the Act.

[47] It seems to me in the circumstances that the appropriate order should
be designed, first, so as to protect the validity of decisions that have until
now been given by development tribunals, secondly, to enable development
tribunals to continue to perform their legitimate functions until such time as
Parliament replaces the offending legislation, and thirdly, to ensure that
development tribunals meanwhile restrict their activities to those legitimate
functions. Needless to say, the declaration of invalidity has no force unless

and until it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court.15 To avoid any
uncertainty I should make it clear that the ancillary orders that I intend
making (reflected in paras A2(a) and (b) of the order) are dependent upon
that confirmation.

[48] That leaves the two applications for review of the approval by the
Gauteng Development Tribunal of the establishment of the two townships I
have referred to. On the approach that I take to the invalidity of the
legislation it cannot be said that the tribunal lacked the power to grant the
approvals. Other grounds were also advanced by the municipality in
support of its contention that the decisions of the tribunal ought to be set
aside, principally that it failed to properly take account of their conflict
with the Urban Development Boundary. I do not think it is necessary to
deal with those contentions in this judgment. It is sufficient to say that they
were fully considered by the court below and I see no reason to interfere
with its considered reasons for rejecting them. In those circumstances the
appeal against the decision to dismiss the applications for review must fail.

[49] There remains the question of costs. This matter has not been
approached by the parties strictly as adversaries, but instead to establish
with certainty their respective powers. The litigation has thus been
conducted for the public benefit and I do not think it is appropriate for any
order of costs to be made.

[50] For those reasons the following orders are made:
A
The appeal is partly upheld. The orders of the court below are set
aside and the following orders are substituted:
‘1
Chapters V and VI of the Development Facilitation Act 67 of
1995 are declared to be invalid.

15 Section 167(5) of the Constitution.

This declaration of invalidity is suspended for 18 months from
the date of this order subject to the following:
(a)
No development tribunal established under the Act may
accept for consideration or consider any application for
the grant or alteration of land use rights in a municipal
area.
(b)
No development tribunal established under the Act may
on its own initiative amend any measure that regulates
or controls land use within a municipal area.
Save as above the application is dismissed.’

B
The appellant is directed promptly to lodge the record in this matter
with the Registrar of the Constitutional Court in accordance with the rules
and practices of that court.

__________________
R.W. NUGENT
JUDGE OF APPEAL

LEWIS JA (MPATI P, NUGENT, MLAMBO JJA and GRIESEL AJA
concurring)

[51] I have had the privilege of reading my colleague Nugent’s lucid and
compelling judgment, with which I concur. I write separately, however,
because I think it necessary to say more fully why it is not possible to
construe chapters V and VI of the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995
in such a way as to render their provisions constitutional.

[52] It is now trite that where the constitutionality of legislation is in
issue, the provisions in question should be read in such a way as to render

them consonant with the Constitution if possible. There are numerous cases
where courts have interpreted legislative provisions restrictively so as to
render them constitutional. The principle underlying this approach was put
thus by Langa J in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v
Hyundai motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd:16
‘[J]udicial officers must prefer interpretations of legislation that fall within
constitutional bounds over those that do not, provided that such an interpretation can be
reasonably ascribed to the section.
Limits must, however, be placed on the application of this principle. On the one hand, it
is the duty of a judicial officer to interpret legislation in conformity with the
Constitution so far as this is reasonably possible. On the other hand, the Legislature is
under a duty to pass legislation that is reasonably clear and precise, enabling citizens
and officials to understand what is expected of them. A balance will often have to be
struck as to how this tension is to be resolved when considering the constitutionality of
legislation. There will be occasions when a judicial officer will find that the legislation,
though open to a meaning which would be unconstitutional, is reasonably capable of
being read ‘in conformity with the Constitution’.

[53] It followed, said the learned judge, that
‘where a legislative provision is reasonably capable of a meaning that places it within
constitutional bounds, it should be preserved. Only if this is not possible should one
resort to the remedy of reading in or notional severance’.17

[54] It is correct that neither counsel for the parties in this matter
suggested that Chapters V and VI of the Act should be interpreted in such a
way as to make them comply with the Constitution. The appellant argued
that that was not possible for the reasons given by Nugent JA. The
respondent argued that there was nothing unconstitutional about the
provisions: the powers given to a development tribunal fell within the

162000 (2) SACR 349 (CC) paras 23 and 24, referring to De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC)
and to National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC).
See also S v Dzukuda; S v Tshilo 2000 (4) SA 1078 (CC) para 37, and National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Mohamed NO 2002 (4) SA 843 (CC) para 26 ff.
17Para 26.

functional area of a province – urban development – and were different
from municipal planning. Gildenhuys J, in the court below, concluded that
it was not necessary to restrict the application of the provisions of chapters
V and VI, and that the procedures created by them, and the application of
the Town Planning Ordinance, could operate in parallel. That conclusion is,
as Nugent JA has stated, a recipe for chaos.

[55] But I think it necessary to consider, albeit briefly, why the restrictive
interpretation is not possible, for, as the authorities cited indicate, we
should not lightly strike down as unconstitutional legislation that has in fact
been in operation, and implemented, for over a decade.

[56] The basis for attempting to interpret the provisions of the Act, and
particularly ss 31, 32 and 33, so as to allow for planning functions to be
given to the tribunal is that the Act itself was not ever intended to supplant
municipal planning schemes then in place or passed subsequently pursuant
to the ordinances mentioned by Nugent JA. It was intended to provide a
quick mechanism for establishing urban development for reconstruction
and development purposes, in terms of government policy then in place.
We must read the Act purposively.

[57] For not only are courts required to read legislation in such a way as
to make it constitutionally compliant, but we are also enjoined to interpret
legislation to give effect to its purpose. See in this regard, recently,
Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd18 and
the authorities cited there, which deal with ‘remedial legislation umbilically
linked to the Constitution’. It is helpful, said Moseneke DCJ, ‘to pay due
attention to the social and historical background of the legislation’.19

182007 (10) BCLR 1027 (CC) paras 51-55.
19Para 53.

[58] The Act’s purpose is to be found in the long title to the Act which I
quote in full:
‘To introduce extraordinary measures to facilitate and speed up the implementation of
reconstruction and development programmes and projects in relation to land; and in so
doing to lay down general principles governing land development throughout the
Republic; to provide for the establishment of a Development and Planning Commission
for the purpose of advising the government on policy and laws concerning land
development at national and provincial levels; to provide for the establishment in the
provinces of development tribunals which have the power to make decisions and
resolve conflicts in respect of land development projects; to facilitate the formulation
and implementation of land development objectives by reference to which the
performance of local government bodies in achieving such objectives may be measured;
to provide for nationally uniform procedures for the subdivision and development of
land in urban and rural areas so as to promote the speedy provision and development of
land for residential, small-scale farming or other needs and uses; to promote security of
tenure while ensuring that end-user finance in the form of subsidies and loans becomes
available as early as possible during the land development process; and to provide for
matters connected therewith’ (my emphasis).

[59] The long title tells us that the Act is meant not for municipal
planning in the strict sense. Its purpose is to redress inequalities left by a
policy of separate development, where people of different races were
physically divided and whose housing and property were vastly unequal.
Hence the need for reconstruction and development at a pace that might not
be accommodated within the framework of ordinances regulating normal
municipal planning. The purpose, it seems to me, was not to supplant the
existing procedures for town planning but to provide alternative means for
developing land so as to make provision for low cost housing and facilities
for those previously impoverished.

[60] Having regard to these two principles of interpretation, that a court
must interpret legislation purposively, and so as to render it constitutionally
permissible, it may be arguable that chapters V and VI should be
interpreted so that they regulate only reconstruction and development
projects. They would be constitutional only to that extent. The speedy
mechanisms envisaged for development applications would be available
only for extraordinary schemes – not for run of the mill applications to
amend town planning schemes or to start new township developments that
are not designed for reconstruction and development purposes. Following
on that argument, the applications in issue in this appeal would not have
served properly before the development tribunal. Nor would the other
applications for minor amendments to a town planning scheme, mentioned
in the appellant’s papers, have been dealt with appropriately by the
tribunal. They were applications that did not call for extraordinary
measures, and should have been dealt with by the municipality in terms of
the Ordinance.

[61] There are three difficulties with the argument. The first is that what
is effectively municipal planning is reserved for municipalities by the
Constitution, such that even special developments, falling within the ambit
of municipal planning, even if they do have reconstruction and
development aspects, cannot be dealt with, constitutionally, by any body
other than a municipality.

[62] Secondly, the provisions of the Act discussed by Nugent JA are so
widely drawn that there is no sensible way in which one can whittle them
down to suit the purpose for which they were intended. One would have to
‘read in’ many words to narrow down the definitions of ‘land
development‘, ‘land development areas’, and ‘land development

application’, among others, in order to limit the application of the Act to
special developments.

[63] Thirdly, it would be impossible to draw the line between applications
for the development of a township that should fall within the sphere of the
Act, as apparently intended by the legislature, and those applications that
belong only in a municipality, such as the ones in issue.

[64] It is the first reason that is decisive however. The Constitution does
not permit provincial bodies to take on the function of municipal planning,
and that is precisely what the Act purports to allow and what the
respondents argue for.

[65] For these reasons, although it seems at first blush attractive to
consider a very narrow reading of the Act so as to make it fit its purposes, it
is not possible without an infringement of the Constitution and I
accordingly concur in the order made by Nugent JA.

_______________
CAROLE LEWIS
JUDGE OF APPEAL

Appearances:

For Appellant:
S J du Plessis SC

L B van Wyk SC

Instructed by:

Moodie & Robertson, Johannesburg

Claude Reid, Bloemfontein

For Respondent:
S J Grobler SC
(1st, 2nd, 6th & 7th)
L T Sibeko SC

Instructed by:

The State Attorney, Johannesburg

The State Attorney, Bloemfontein

For 4th Respondent:
None

Instructed by:

Rooth Wessels Maluleke, Pretoria

c/o Hooyberg Attorneys, Johannesburg

Rossouws Inc, Bloemfontein