THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

REPORTABLE
Case No:  214/12

In the matter between:

COMMAND PROTECTION SERVICES
(GAUTENG) (PTY) LTD t/a MAXI SECURITY

APPELLANT

and

SOUTH AFRICAN POST OFFICE LIMITED

RESPONDENT

Neutral citation:
Command Protection Services (Gauteng)(Pty) Ltd v South
African Post Office Limited (214/12) [2012] ZASCA 160
16 November 2012).

Coram:

Mthiyane DP, Brand, Cloete and Pillay JJA and Saldulker

AJA
Heard:

1 November 2012
Delivered:

16 November 2012

Summary:  Acceptance of tender not unconditional ─ hence it did not bring
about a valid and binding contract between the parties.

___________________________________________________________________

ORDER
___________________________________________________________________

On appeal from:    North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria (Poswa J sitting as court of
first instance):
The appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
___________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________

BRAND JA (MTHIYANE DP, CLOETE and PILLAY JJA and SALDULKER AJA
concurring):

[1] This appeal turns on the question whether or not a binding agreement came
into existence between the parties on the terms alleged by the appellant.
Proceedings commenced when the appellant, as the plaintiff, instituted an action
against the respondent, as the defendant, in the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria,
for damages it allegedly sustained through the respondent’s repudiation of an
agreement between them. In broad outline the appellant contended that:
(a)
on 28 July 2003 the parties concluded a written agreement in terms whereof
the appellant undertook to provide guarding services for the respondent’s post
offices in three regions of the Republic;
(b)
on 30 January 2004 the respondent wrote a letter to the appellant which
constituted a repudiation of that agreement, which repudiation was accepted by the
appellant;
(c)
as a result of the respondent’s breach of contract, the appellant suffered
damages in the sum of about R14 million.
The respondent’s answer to this claim consisted, in the main, of a denial that the
agreement relied upon by the appellant ever came into existence.

[2] When the matter came before Poswa J in the court a quo, he was asked, by
agreement between the parties, to order a separation of issues. In terms of the
separation order he consequently granted, the issues relating to the contractual
relationship between the parties were to be determined first while all other issues,
including those relating to the quantum of the appellant’s damages, stood over for
later determination. At the end of the preliminary proceedings, Poswa J, in effect,
decided all issues placed before him against the appellant. In consequence, he
dismissed its action with costs. The appeal to this court against that judgment is with
the leave of the court a quo.

[3] The exact nature of issues that arose on appeal will be best understood
against the factual background that follows. It all started during October 2002 when
the respondent caused an advertisement to be placed in national newspapers
inviting tenders for the guarding of post offices in six specified regions of the country.
Bidders were invited to apply for more than one region. Details of the services
required, so the advertisement said, were stipulated in a document called the Post
Office Request for Proposal, which could be obtained from the respondent.

[4] During November 2002 the appellant submitted tender documents
corresponding to the terms of the Request for Proposal document, to provide
guarding services in all six regions as advertised. These documents were annexed
to the appellant’s particulars of claim as PC2. Hence they were referred to
throughout the proceedings by that description. I find it convenient to do the same.
Clause 5 of annexure E to PC2 stipulated that ‘acceptance of our proposal will be
communicated to us by letter or order through the post’ and that ‘communication as
envisaged above will constitute an agreement between the South African Post Office
Limited and ourselves’. Subsequently, the appellant indeed received a letter of
acceptance from the respondent dated 28 July 2003.

[5] In argument, counsel referred to the letter of acceptance – again emulating
the description of the document in the appellant’s particulars of claim – as PC3 and I

propose to do the same. As it happened, the issues that later arose, both in the court
a quo and on appeal, turned mainly on the wording of PC3. In the circumstances,
the contents of this document seem to warrant a full quotation. It was addressed to
the appellant and it read:
‘LETTER OF APPOINTMENT
It is with pleasure that we inform you that the Tender Board has awarded the above tender
proposal to [you]. As a result you are appointed as the supplier of the above-mentioned
service as per our tender proposal.
This appointment is subject to the following:

BEE improvement; and

The successful finalisation and signing of a formal contract.
A draft contract will be forwarded to you within (7) seven working days for your comment
and to the effect mutually agreed on amendments and finalisation into a formal contract.
You are kindly advised to acknowledge receipt of this letter of appointment and provide this
office with the contact information of the person(s) responsible for the finalisation of the
contract process.
Yours sincerely
[Signed on behalf of the appellant]
Accepted and signed on behalf of the respondent]’

[6] On 30 July 2003 a meeting took place in Pretoria, attended by
representatives of both parties. It is common cause that at that meeting the
appellant’s representatives were told that, though it had tendered for all six regions
advertised, it had been awarded the tender in respect of three of these regions only,
namely the Western Cape, the Northern Region and the Central Region. It is also
common cause that it was agreed at that meeting that, since the respondent’s
contract with its previous service provider would terminate on 31 August 2003, the
appellant would provide the guarding services in the three regions mentioned as of 1
September 2003. Shortly after the meeting, the respondent provided the appellant
with a draft contract. Though it was envisaged at the meeting that the contract would
soon be finalised, this did not happen. Four further drafts were to follow. The last of
these was only provided to the appellant in December 2003. All these drafts were

prepared by the respondent’s attorney. They were all lengthy documents, covering
over 50 pages and their provisions differ in numerous respects from the provisions of
the respondent’s original tender. A further common feature of these drafts was a
clause devoted entirely to the issue of BEE, which is the well-known abbreviation for
black economic empowerment. This topic is covered in clause 39 of both the first
and final draft. In both drafts this clause provides, inter alia, that the appellant would
maintain a BEE component of at least 40 per cent throughout the contract period
and that the respondent reserved the right to monitor compliance with this
requirement at six monthly intervals.

[7] In the meantime, and while the parties were negotiating the terms of the
consecutive drafts, the appellant started providing guarding services for the
respondent in the Western Cape, the Northern Cape and the Central Region as was
contemplated at the meeting of 30 July 2003. As it happened, however, the drafts
never metamorphosed into a formal agreement. The reason flows from a letter
written by the respondent’s chief executive officer to the appellant on 30 January
2004. This letter was subsequently relied upon by the appellant in its particulars of
claim as a repudiation of the contract between the parties. Its contents warrant
citation as it encapsulates the respondent’s version of the relationship between the
parties at the time. The relevant part of this letter stated:
‘1.
As you are aware the South African Post Office (“the Post Office”) conditionally
appointed your company to render guarding security services in 3 operational regions as
delineated by the Post Office for its purposes. This appointment was on a month-to-month
basis from 01 September 2003, subject to and until finalisation of negotiations and
conclusion of the written agreement as contemplated in paragraph 3 hereof.
2.
Prior to such appointment, the Post Office had published an invitation for tenders to
which your company had submitted its response (“the tender response”).
3.
It was a term and condition of the appointment that your company and the Post
Office (collectively referred to as “the parties”) would conclude and sign a written agreement
within a reasonable period from the date of award of the said tender to your company.
4.
. . .

5.
Regrettably, whilst negotiations towards conclusion of a written agreement were in
progress, your company engaged in conduct that has materially and seriously undermined
the trust and utmost good faith relationship between the parties. Examples of such conduct
(and this is by no means an exhaustive list of incidents) are:-
. . .
6.
. . .
7.
. . .  The incidents constitute a clear breach of the basis of the existing relationship
between the parties. The Post Office therefore hereby exercises its rights and gives your
company notice that:-
7.1
it will not continue with any contractual negotiations with your company as envisaged
in the award of the tender to your company; and
7.2
the month-to-month contractual relationship between the parties will come to an end
on 29 February 2004 on which date your company must vacate all premises of the Post
Office.
8.
. . .’

[8] According to the appellant’s particulars of claim, the contract upon which it
founded its case came about when the respondent accepted the offer contained in
PC2, in terms of its letter of 28 July 2003, PC3, which was in turn accepted on behalf
of the appellant, as appears from the wording at the foot of PC3. With regard to the
statement in PC3 that ‘this appointment is subject to . . .

BEE improvement; and

The successful finalisation and signing of a formal contract’, the appellant
pertinently pleaded that these provisions did not constitute suspensive conditions. In
addition, various alternative allegations were made in the appellant’s particulars of
claim, which would arise in the event of the court finding – contrary to the appellant’s
main allegation – that the provisions of PC3 referred to did in fact constitute
suspensive conditions. These related to fulfilment of the suspensive conditions,
waiver, estoppel and fictional fulfilment. In its plea the respondent, in turn, contended
that the provisions of the letter referred to indeed constituted suspensive conditions
which had not been fulfilled. The appellant’s alternative allegations relating to waiver,
estoppel and fictional fulfilment were essentially met in the plea by bald denials.

[9] Much of the evidence led during the course of the trial had relevance to these
alternative allegations. On appeal, counsel for the appellant, however, made it clear
from the outset that these alternative contentions were no longer pursued. Ultimately
the outcome of the appeal thus turns on one question only: whether on a proper
interpretation of PC3, it constituted an unconditional acceptance of the appellant’s
offer contained in the tender document.

[10] The way in which the appellant introduced the debate in its particulars of
claim, raised the concept of suspensive conditions. As explained by Botha J in
Design and Planning Service v Kruger 1974 (1) SA 689 (T) at 695C-E, a suspensive
condition of a contract, properly so called, suspends the operation of all or some of
the obligations flowing from that contract, pending the occurrence or non-occurrence
of a specific uncertain future event. If the condition is fulfilled, the obligations under
the contract become enforceable. If the condition is not fulfilled, the agreement
becomes unenforceable (see also eg Jurgens Eiendomsagente v Share 1990 (4) SA
664 (A) at 674E-J; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg & Handelsreg 5 ed Vol 1 at 146-
154; RH Christie The Law of Contract 6 ed (2011) at 137 and 145).

[11] It is clear that, thus understood, the stipulation in PC3 which rendered ‘this
appointment subject to the successful finalisation and signing of a formal contract’
could never have been intended as a suspensive condition in the true sense. If a
formal contract were to be finalised and signed, this would not result in the
agreement constituted by the respondent’s acceptance of PC2, becoming operative.
What would happen in that event is that a new agreement, being the one constituted
by the ‘formal contract’, would come into operation. At the same time it is equally
clear to me that the respondent’s case was never that the stipulation under
consideration constituted a suspensive condition in the real sense. Right from the
outset the respondent’s case was that PC3 was not an unconditional acceptance of
the appellant’s tender contained in PC2; that, on the contrary, the acceptance was
especially made subject to two conditions; that these conditions were never fulfilled;
and that in consequence the contract between the parties relied upon by the

appellant, with the terms reflected in PC2, never came into existence. By the same
token, the appellant’s case was from the beginning that PC3 constituted an
unconditional acceptance of its offer contained in PC2 with the result that a contract
came into existence on those terms.

[12] The dispute thus arising is not novel. It frequently happens, particularly in
complicated transactions, that the parties reach agreement by tender (or offer) and
acceptance while there are clearly some outstanding issues that require further
negotiation and agreement. Our case law recognises that in these situations there
are two possibilities. The first is that the agreement reached by the acceptance of
the offer lacked animus contrahendi because it was conditional upon consensus
being reached, after further negotiation, on the outstanding issues. In that event the
law will recognise no contractual relationship, the offer and acceptance
notwithstanding, unless and until the outstanding issues have been settled by
agreement. The second possibility is that the parties intended that the acceptance of
the offer would give rise to a binding contract and that the outstanding issues would
merely be left for later negotiation. If in this event the parties should fail to reach
agreement on the outstanding issues, the original contract would prevail (see eg
CGEE Alsthom Equipments et Enterprises Electriques, South African Division v
GKN Sankey (Pty) Ltd 1987 (1) SA 81 (A) at 92A-E; Namibian Minerals Corporation
Ltd v Benguela Concessions Ltd 1997 (2) SA 548 (A) at 567A-C).

[13] Illustrations of cases that were held by this court to be manifestations of the
first possibility are to be found in Namibian Minerals Corporation and in Premier,
Free State v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA) while the facts in
Alsthom Equipment and in Murray & Roberts Construction Ltd v Finat Properties
(Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 508 (A) were held to demonstrate the second (see also Lewis
v Oneanate (Pty) Ltd 1992 (4) SA 811 (A) at 820I-821E). The criterion as to whether
the facts of a particular case indicate the one or the other was succinctly
summarised thus by Corbett JA in Alsthom Equipments at 92E:

‘Whether in a particular case the initial agreement acquires contractual force or not depends
upon the intention of the parties, which is to be gathered from their conduct, the terms of the
agreement and the surrounding circumstances.’

[14] Proceeding from the premise of this criterion, the appellant’s argument started
with a reference to the terms of PC2 and PC3. With regard to the tender, PC2, it
emphasised the stipulation in clause 5 of annexure E that ‘Acceptance of our
proposal will be communicated to us by letter or order through the post’ and that
‘communication as envisaged above will constitute an agreement between [the
parties]’. Since this document originally emanated from the respondent in draft form,
so the argument went, this is a strong indication that both parties intended that the
sending of a letter of acceptance would result in a final and binding agreement
between the parties. With reference to the letter of acceptance, PC3, the appellant’s
argument relied on the following. The letter is headed ‘Letter of Appointment’, it
informs the appellant ‘with pleasure’ that the Tender Board has awarded [past tense]
the above tender proposal to [you]’, ‘and that as a result you are appointed [present
tense] as the supplier of the above-mentioned service as per our tender proposal’.
What was not said, so the appellant pointed out, was that an agreement would only
come into operation on formalisation and signature of a final contract.

[15] Having regard to the terms of both documents, so the appellant’s argument
proceeded, this is not a situation where one is faced with trying to cobble together
the terms of an agreement from, for example, oral communications and items of
correspondence. Annexure PC2 constitutes a detailed written contractual offer,
made up to a large extent of contractual terms emanating from the documents
provided by the respondent itself. There is therefore no improbability about the
parties having concluded an agreement on the particular terms; there is more than
sufficient detail set out in the documents for the parties to implement their
agreement.

[16] Barring the last part of PC3, which follows upon the proviso ‘this appointment
is subject to’, I think the appellant’s arguments based on the terms of PC2 and 3
would be virtually unassailable. In fact it would closely resemble the facts of Alsthom
Equipments (compare the statement by Corbett JA at 93B-D). As it happens,
however, my very difficulty with the argument arises from that last part. I shall
presently revert to that difficulty. But first I proceed to trace the progression of the
appellant’s further argument based on the subsequent conduct of the parties. In this
regard the appellant referred: (a) to the agreement between the parties, at their
meeting of 30 July 2003, that the appellant would provide guarding services from 1
September 2003; and (b) the fact that the appellant pointed out, the appellant indeed
provided those services, despite the parties’ lack of success in finalising a formal
contract. The inherent probabilities are, so the appellant argued, that these services
were rendered in terms of the agreement constituted by PC2 and 3. The position
taken by the respondent in correspondence and in its plea, namely, that what was
provided was merely a service on a month-to-month basis, pending the finalisation
of the formal contract, so the appellant maintained, was not borne out by the
evidence of either Mr Vilakazi or Mr Els, who were the only witnesses who testified
on behalf of the respondent.

[17] Further evidence relied upon by the appellant derived from the testimony of
the respondent’s witness, Mr Els. According to this evidence it was the practice of
the respondent at the time to attempt, after the relevant appointment had been
made, to try to negotiate discounts on the successful tenderer’s price. Such an
alteration would plainly constitute an amendment to the terms of the appointment
agreement hence this practice would explain, so the appellant argued, the reference
to ‘mutually agreed on amendments’ in PC3. What is more, so the argument
proceeded, this reference to ‘mutually agreed on amendments’ lends further support
to the contention that the parties regarded PC3 as resulting in a valid and binding
agreement: if no agreement came into existence by virtue of PC3, there would be no
basis for any reference to ‘mutually agreed on amendments’. In this event, the

parties would simply be free to negotiate whatever terms might ultimately be agreed
upon, if agreement were ever to be reached.

[18] This brings me to my difficulty with the appellant’s argument, which, as I have
said, arises mainly from the last part of PC3. For the sake of the closer analysis I
intend, it bears repetition. It reads:
‘This appointment is subject to the following:

BEE improvement; and

The successful finalisation and signing of a formal contract.
A draft contract will be forwarded to you within 7 (seven) working days for your comment
and to . . . effect mutually agreed on amendments and finalisation into a formal contract.
You are kindly advised to acknowledge receipt of this letter of appointment and provide this
office with the contact information of the person(s) responsible for the finalisation of the
contract process.’

[19] The expression ‘subject to’ is generally understood in the contractual context,
to introduce a some or other condition (see eg Pangbourne Properties Ltd v Gill &
Ramsden (Pty) Ltd 1996 (1) SA 1182 (A) at 1188A-C). Thus understood, the
introduction to the last part immediately gives rise to the impression that PC3 was
not an unconditional acceptance of the tender in PC2, as contended for by the
appellant; that although the tender, PC2, expressly dictated an unconditional
acceptance of its terms, PC3 did not adhere to that demand. Instead, it presented
the appellant with a conditional acceptance or counter-offer which the latter then
formally accepted at the foot of the letter.

[20] Underneath ‘subject to’ PC3 then requires ‘BEE improvement’. It is clear to
me that these words are not sufficiently certain to constitute a provision of a contract,
whether in the form of a condition or a term. Though it indicates that the respondent
was not satisfied with the appellant’s existing BEE status, it is not clear in what
respect and to what extent that status would have to improve in order to meet the
appellant’s requirements. This was therefore clearly a topic on which the respondent
called for further negotiation and agreement. It is true, as the appellant argued, that

the reference to ‘BEE improvement’ could notionally be understood to reflect an
intent that PC3 would give rise to a binding contract while this solitary issue stood
over for later negotiation and agreement. From the respondent’s perspective this
would mean, however, that if the parties should fail to reach agreement on this
issue, the respondent would nonetheless be bound to a two year contract without its
BEE requirements ever being satisfied. I find this postulation highly unlikely. It would
hardly be compatible with the fact that PC3 underscored the appellant’s BEE
improvement as the one topic on which the respondent regarded negotiation and
agreement as essential. Moreover, the notion that the respondent regarded the BEE
issue as one of lesser importance that could subsequently be dealt with in isolation,
is refuted by the draft agreements that were subsequently prepared on its behalf
where the BEE clearly took centre stage. A far more likely inference, in my view, is
that the respondent intended – and that it was so accepted by the appellant – that
there would be no binding agreement until the BEE requirements that the appellant
would have to meet, had been agreed upon.

[21] The second stipulation under ‘subject to’ requires the ‘successful finalisation
. . . of a formal contract’. ‘Finalisation’ envisages a process, which in the context can
only signify further negotiation, while the reference to ‘successful’ suggests an
awareness that the process might not be successful. In the context, ‘successful’ can
only mean resulting in a formal contract. Conversely stated, the requirement can
only mean that unless and until the further negotiations that were contemplated
resulted in a formal agreement, there would be no contractual relationship between
the parties. This inference, I believe, is underscored by the last two sentences of
PC3. The penultimate sentence envisages that a draft agreement would be prepared
by the respondent; that the draft would be forwarded to the appellant; that the
appellant would then have the opportunity to suggest amendments to the draft; and
that, if agreement could be reached on the amendment proposed, this would lead to
the finalisation of a formal agreement. In the last sentence the appellant is asked to
nominate its representatives during the finalisation process. As I see it this means, in
short, that as yet there was no binding contract. The contract would only come into

existence upon the successful finalisation of the contract process, after inter-action
between representatives of the parties.

[22] I believe my interpretation of PC3 is borne out by the subsequent conduct of
the parties. The appellant nominated one of its senior employees, Mr Steve Bolton,
as its representative in the proposed contract negotiations. The respondent’s
attorney, Mr Vilakazi, prepared the first draft contract. The draft was then forwarded
to the appellant and negotiations ensued which in turn led to the preparation of
further drafts by Mr Vilakazi. From all this it should be plain that I do not agree with
the interpretation of ‘mutually agreed on amendments’ in the penultimate sentence
of PC3 which was contended for by the appellant in argument. It will be remembered
that this contention proposes that the expression must be understood to refer to an
amendment to the terms of the agreement constituted by PC2 and PC3. I do not
agree with this proposal. As I see it, the expression is clearly used in the context of
the draft contract which was contemplated. It can therefore only refer to
amendments to the draft which, if agreed upon, would become part of the proposed
contract.

[23] Lastly there is the reliance by the appellant on the agreement by the parties at
their meeting of 30 July 2003, that the appellant would provide guarding services as
from 1 September 2003 and the undisputed evidence that effect was given to that
agreement. The argument which the appellants sought to build on this evidence was
that it constituted confirmation of an agreement embodied by PC2 and PC3. I think
there are several answers to this argument. In the first place, the agreement at the
meeting of 30 July 2003 was clearly reached at a stage when the parties both
anticipated that a formal agreement would be finalised by 1 September 2003. It
therefore lends no support to the inference that a binding agreement already existed
on 30 July 2003.

[24] In the second place there is evidence which seems to indicate that the
appellant rendered the guarding services from 1 September 2003 on terms

pertinently agreed upon at a meeting of 12 August 2003 and that these terms were
substantially different from those reflected in PC2 and PC3. That, of course, would
put paid to the whole argument. But, be that as it may, the wording of PC3, as I have
said, leaves little, if any, room for doubt that final agreement had not yet been
reached. In that light the most likely inference is that the appellant rendered the
guarding services from 1 September 2003 pursuant to a collateral agreement and
not in terms of an agreement reflected in PC2 and PC3. Whether this collateral
agreement was impliedly on a month-to-month basis as suggested by the
respondent, or on some other basis, is therefore of no consequence.

[25] The conclusion I arrive at is therefore that PC3 did not constitute an
unconditional acceptance of the tender contained in PC2; but that it was intended by
the respondent and accepted by the appellant as a counter-offer. The agreement
that came into existence when the appellant accepted this counter-offer was an
agreement to negotiate. Whether that agreement would be enforceable in the light of
decisions such as Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 2005 (2) SA
202 (SCA) and Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd
2012 (1) SA 256 (CC), is one we do not have to consider. That is not the agreement
that the appellant relied upon. The agreement the appellant relied upon is one that,
in my view, never came into existence. I therefore agree with the outcome of the
litigation in the court a quo, albeit for reasons that are materially different.

[26] For these reasons the appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of
two counsel.

_____________
F D J BRAND
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For Appellant:

J A NEWDIGATE SC

N DE JAGER

Instructed by:

GROSS PAPADOPULO & ASSOCIATES

PRETORIA

Correspondents:

LOVIUS BLOCK ATTORNEYS

BLOEMFONTEIN

For Respondent:

J P VORSTER SC

R P A RAMAWELA

Instructed by:

M VILAKAZI TAU ATTORNEYS

PRETORIA

Correspondents:

THE STATE ATTORNEY

BLOEMFONTEIN