THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case no 216/2001
REPORTABLE

In the matter between

Anna Maria Magdalena van Zyl NO                                                    Appellant
and
Kiln Non-Marine Syndicate No 510 of Lloyds of London               Respondent

Before:
Nienaber, Schutz, Cameron, Brand JJA and Heher AJA
Heard:
30 August 2002
Delivered:  26 September 2002

Insurance – accidental bodily injury or death policy – ‘accident’ – ‘wilful exposure to
danger’.

_______________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_______________________________________________________________
SCHUTZ JA
[1] The issue is whether in terms of an accidental death and disability
policy the deceased died in an ‘accident’ and whether, if so, the insurer is
nevertheless exempted from liability because the deceased was guilty of
‘wilful exposure to danger’.
[2] The appellant (applicant below) is Mrs van Zyl, who brought an
application for payment in terms of the policy as the executrix in the estate of
her husband Mr Jacob van Zyl (‘the deceased’) who received fatal injuries in
his car on 28 May 1997.  (I refrain from saying that he was killed in a car
accident, as that would be to pre-judge one of the issues in the case.)  He was
insured under the policy mentioned, by the respondent, Kiln Non-Marine
Syndicate No 510 of Lloyds of London (‘the insurer’).  Mrs van Zyl’s
application was dismissed by Mynhardt J in the Transvaal Provincial Division,
the judge finding against her on both of the points in issue.  She appeals with
his leave.
[3] The deceased was a bank manager at Klerksdorp.  On the night of his
death he attended a party at Wolmaransstad, 110 kilometers away.  He had
made no arrangements to sleep over or to take a lift back.  He arrived at the
party at about 8 pm. and left after midnight, in his car.  He was on his own.

Whilst at the party he drank brandy.  The concentration of alcohol in his
bloodstream at the time of his death was 0.19 gram per 100 ml of blood.  (The
legal limit for driving is 0.05.)  Before leaving he ate a meal.  He was
described as appearing to be normal when he left for home.
[4] Early the next morning the wreck of his car was seen in the veld beside
the road to Klerksdorp.  The car had rolled and the deceased was found dead
some 25 meters away.  The road was tarred and was dry at the time.  For all
practical purposes it was straight.  Skidmarks were visible.  All four wheels
were on the wrong side of the road where the marks commenced.  They then
veered off the road to the right.    There was no sign of anything extraneous
having caused the car to leave the road.  More particularly there were no
potholes or visible obstructions.  As it was the opinion of the forensic
pathologist who deposed for the insurer, dr Klepp, that the deceased could not
have survived his brain injuries for long, it may be taken that when he crashed
the blood alcohol percentage was about 0.19.  Although the cause of the crash
may have been, say an animal straying onto the road or a car approaching on
the wrong side, the facts suggest that the most natural, or plausible inference
to be drawn ( see Aswanestaal CC v South African Eagle Insurance Co Ltd
1992 (1) SA 662(C) at 667J-668A) is that the deceased dozed off at the wheel
as a result of his alcohol consumption and the late hour.
[5] The policy provides cover in cases of ‘accidental bodily injury resulting
in death or disablement’.  The term ‘accident’ is defined to mean ‘a sudden

and fortuitous event occasioned by visible, violent and external means which
occurs at an identifiable time and resulting in bodily injury as defined, and
accidental shall have a corresponding meaning’.  ‘Bodily injury’ means ‘death
or injury caused by accidental means and independent of any other specified
in the policy schedule’.  Listed among the exceptions to liability under the
policy is ‘Wilful exposure to danger (except in an attempt to save human life).
Intentional self-inflicted injury, suicide or such an attempt’.  (The emphases in
this paragraph have been supplied by me.)
Interpretation
[6] The main principles of interpretation of the policy applicable in this
case are to be found in Fedgen Insurance Ltd v Leyds 1995 (3) SA 33(A) at
38B-E:
‘The ordinary rules relating to the interpretation of contracts must be applied
in construing a policy of insurance.  A court must therefore endeavour to
ascertain the intention of the parties.  Such intention is, in the first instance,
to be gathered from the language used which, if clear, must be given effect
to.  This involves giving the words used their plain, ordinary and popular
meaning unless the context indicates otherwise (Scottish Union & National
Insurance Co Ltd v Native Recruiting Corporation Ltd 1934 AD 458 at 464-
5).  Any provision which purports to place a limitation upon a clearly
expressed obligation to indemnify must be restrictively interpreted (Auto
Protection Insurance Co Ltd v Hanmer-Strudwick 1964 (1) SA 349(A) at
354C-D);  for it is the insurer’s duty to make clear what particular risks it
wishes to exclude (French Hairdressing Saloons Ltd v National Employers
Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd 1931 AD 60 at 65;  Auto
Protection Insurance Co Ltd v Hanmer-Strudwick (supra at 354D-E).  A
policy normally evidences the contract and an insured’s obligation, and the

extent to which an insurer’s liability is limited, must be plainly spelt out.  In
the event of a real ambiguity the contra proferentem rule, which requires a
written document to be construed against the person who drew it up, would
operate against Fedgen as drafter of the policy (Kliptown Clothing Industries
(Pty) Ltd v Marine and Trade Insurance Co of SA Ltd 1961 (1) SA 103(A) at
108C.’

See also the dictum quoted by King J in Barnard v Protea Assurance
Co Ltd t/a Protea Assurance 1998 (3) SA 1063(C) at 1068B-C:
‘Now it is an accepted principle in interpreting insurance contracts that it is
the duty of the insurer to make it clear what particular risks he wishes to
exclude.  The principle is stated by May in the following terms:  “No rule in
the interpretation of a policy is more fully established, or more imperative or
controlling, than that which declares that, in all cases, it must be liberally
construed in favour of the insured so as not to defeat without a plain
necessity his claim to an indemnity which in making the insurance it was his
object to secure.”’

King J proceeded (at 1068D):

‘From this it would follow that if a term in a policy (‘term’ in the sense of
designation) is capable of both a broader and narrower meaning it is that
which is favourable to the insured, in other words to the upholding of the
policy, which must be employed.’

Onus
[7] There is a dispute as to the onus in regard to the exception (wilful
exposure).  The ordinary rule is that the insured must prove himself to fall
within the primary risk insured against, whilst the onus is on the insurer to
prove the application of an exception:  Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Willey
1956 (1) SA 330(A) at 334A-335F.  But the insurer seeks to escape the

incidence of the ordinary rule by reliance on Aegis Insurance Co Ltd v
Consani NO 1996 (4) SA 1(A) at 6A-9A and 14H-I.  It is argued that the
concepts ‘accident’ and ‘wilful exposure to danger’ are mutually exclusive, so
that an accident cannot be established without at the same time excluding
wilful conduct on the insured’s part.  The claimant in discharging his onus has
to negate a wilful cause, thereby attracting the insurer’s onus onto himself.
However, I think that the resort to Consani as an analogous case is misplaced.
The issue there was whether the insured had died by accident or by suicide.
The two concepts are indeed mutually exclusive.  Death cannot be accidental
(in the sense of an accident policy) if it comes by the insured’s own hand.  The
case before us is different.  The exception is not ‘wilful death’ or ‘wilful
crashing’, which would be antitheses of ‘accident’.  The adjective ‘wilful’
does not qualify death or crashing, but disregard of danger, which disregard
might increase the chance of an accident happening but in no wise operates to
exclude the possibility of there being an accident.
[8] For those reasons I am of the view that the ordinary rule does apply, so
that the onus of proving the exception rests on the insurer.
Authority
[9] The expressions ‘accident’ and ‘wilful exposure to danger’, and like
expressions, are not newly subject to judicial scrutiny.  The heads of argument
are replete with cases, drawn from many jurisdictions, explaining them.  These
cases are helpful, but, mindful of my readers, I shall not use them all.  I heed

the rebuke by Corinna, a poetess of Thebes, addressed to Pindar, for his
overabundance of instances, ‘Pindar, one should sow with the hand, not with
the whole sack’.  We may now proceed to the issues.
Has Mrs van Zyl proved an accident?
[10] Before answering this question it is necessary in order to understand the
insurer’s argument to have regard to the  uncontroverted evidence of dr Klepp.
Speaking out of her expertise she describes the effects of alcohol on a driver.
Alcohol is a central nervous system depressant.  The brain controls the various
faculties which are required when driving a car.  These faculties are adversely
affected by the depression of the nervous system in various ways, including
the following:  Visual function is degraded, especially at night, causing tunnel
vision.  Information processing is impaired and slowed down, seriously
decreasing reaction times.  Judgement is impaired and false confidence results.
Behaviour becomes impulsive.  Muscular responses are impaired and steering
errors manifest themselves.  Detailed studies which are regarded by the
scientific community as accurate and reliable have shown that the degree of
impairment is very great.  Driving while having a blood alcohol concentration
of 0.19 gram/100ml has been statistically and medically proven to be 50 times
more likely to lead to an accident when compared with driving by a sober
person.
[11] Dr Klepp then proceeds to express an opinion.  It is that an ‘accident’
while driving with such a blood alcohol concentration cannot be said to be

fortuitous;  an ‘accident’ is indeed the probable consequence of driving in that
condition.  Whilst giving respectful weight to what dr Klepp says, I think that
in expressing this opinion she trespasses onto the field of the judge.  Whether
there was an ‘accident’ in terms of the policy is a matter of law, not of medical
opinion.
[12] In any event, if dr Klepp does indeed intend that the happening of an
accident is probable in the sense that it is more probable to occur than not, I do
not think that the data given by dr Klepp supports her conclusion.  The reason
is that no conclusion as to probability can be drawn if the multiplicand is 1
and one knows further only the multiplier (50) but not also the incidence of
accidents with sober drivers.  Suppose that every time that such a driver drives
there is a 1 in a 1 000 chance of his having an accident, then the chances of his
being involved in one with his blood alcohol at 0.19 is 50, which is far below
a just over 50 % chance, which would be represented by 501 chances out of a
1 000.  In any event, to express the opinion without adverting to the facts of a
particular case is unrealistic.  The chance of a drunken driver having an
accident over 110 km is obviously far greater than when a driver similarly
drunk travels 5 km.  Accordingly I consider that there is no factual basis for
the argument grounded on probability of occurrence.
[13] The legal argument for the insurer, based on the alleged probability,
proceeds along these lines.  The definition of ‘accident’ identifies it with a
‘fortuitous’ event.  This accords with the meaning generally attributed to the

word accident – see eg Agiakatsikas NO v Rotterdam Insurance Co Ltd 1959
(4) SA 726(C) at 729C.  ‘Fortuitous’ is rendered by the SOED as ‘That
happens or is produced by fortune or chance:  accidental …’  If, in the
circumstances, the happening of an accident was ‘probable’, as dr Klepp says
it was, the argument goes, then there is more than a 50 % chance of its
occurring, so that it would be the natural or ordinary result of driving with an
alcohol concentration of 0.19 and could not properly be called a fortuitous
happening.  The process of reasoning may be faultless, but, as I have sought to
explain, the premiss is lacking.  Also, logic may be overmastered by the
colloquial, as I shall seek to explain.
[14] Marcell Beller Ltd v Hayden [1978] QB 694 was also concerned with a
drunken driver who was insured against ‘accidental injury’.  Judge Fay QC
said (at 701B-C, 701F, 703E-H):
‘Having considered this evidence I have no doubt that the deceased’s
consumption of alcohol played a causative part in the catastrophe.  The
deceased’s strange loss of control of his car when it was proceeding in
ordinary conditions on an ordinary road becomes readily explicable in the
light of his blood alcohol content.  His excessive speed and his inability to
correct the situation into which it led him are in my view clearly associated
with the loss of judgment induced by alcohol.  If the immediate cause of the
crash was the deceased’s negligence, its predisposing cause was the drink he
had taken.  In the light of these findings of fact I turn to the legal issues.’

……..
‘In dealing with this argument I think it is important to keep distinct the two
causative elements, namely the immediate cause which is the deceased’s
manner of driving and the predisposing cause which is his drinking.  If the
first alone is regarded the crash was accidental.  It has long been established

and was accepted by counsel that the assured’s negligence does not deprive
a happening of the character of accidental.’
……..
‘It seems to me important that in a document such as an insurance policy
which ought to be understandable by laymen, not to depart if possible from
the ordinary meaning of English words.  This was also the view of
Phillimore LJ when he cited the workmen’s compensation case of Trim Joint
District School Board of Management v Kelly [1914] AC 667 and said
[1971] 2 QB 554, 585:
‘All their Lordships agreed that the word “accident” must be given
its ordinary meaning in the context – they differed four to three as to
what that ordinary meaning was.’
I may be risking misinterpreting the ordinary meaning of ‘accident’, but I
am firmly of the view that the word covers the happening with which I am
dealing.  In drafting the narrative part of this judgment I have avoided pre-
empting the decision by using the word ‘accident’, but I have been
conscious that wherever I have used the neutral term ‘crash’ or ‘what
happened’ or ‘catastrophe’ it would have been better English usage to call it
an accident.  I am convinced that the man in the street would say that the
deceased died in a motor accident.  A further reason for adopting this view is
that had some other person been killed by the deceased’s driving this would
have been an accident within the meaning of his own motor policy (see
Tinline v White Cross Insurance Association Ltd [1921] 3 KB 327).  If the
same offence killed both a driver and a bystander, it is the kind of decision
that brings the law into disrepute, to call one an accident and the other not an
accident.’

[15] I agree with the approach of the learned acting judge (as we would call
him) and consider that it is applicable to this case.  Like him, when preparing
this judgment I have constantly had consciously to draw back from using the
word accident as the short colloquial way of describing the accident with
which we are concerned (the restraint is now gone).  Especially should this

approach be followed when one applies the rules of interpretation quoted from
the Fedgen and Barnard cases.  The Court should not ‘defeat without a plain
necessity his claim to an indemnity, which in making the insurance it was his
object to secure’ (the words of Wessels JA as quoted in the Barnard case).
(The facts in this case happen to be such that it is her claim not his claim.)
Even the trial judge, whilst holding that an accident had not been proved,
several times fell into the trap of describing it as such – ‘het daar ‘n ongeluk
gebeur’, ‘breinbloeding weens ‘n motortuigongeluk’ and ‘om een of ander
rede in ‘n motorongeluk betrokke was’.  The pull of the colloquial is strong.
In the words of Lord Macnaghten in Fenton v J Thorley and Co Ltd [1903]
AC 443 at 448 the popular and ordinary sense of the word ‘accident’ denotes
‘an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or
designed’.  Immediately after referring to this passage The Law of South
Africa Vol 12 para 291 proceeds:
‘An accident is therefore an occurrence or event of a fortuitous nature.  The
very essence of an accident is that its occurrence is not intended by its
victim.’

[16] I would add that it is our law too that the fact that the insured was
negligent (as the deceased undoubtedly was) does not in itself prevent the
Court from holding the circumstance to constitute an accident:  Griessel NO v
SA Myn en Algemene Assuransie Edms Bpk 1952 (4) SA 473(T) at 477F-G.

[17] My conclusion is that Mrs van Zyl has proved that her husband was
killed in an accident in terms of the policy.
Has the insurer proved wilful disregard of danger?
[18] In the forefront of the argument for Mrs van Zyl is put the consideration
that there is no express provision in the policy concerning alcohol.  Such an
exclusion is not uncommonly found in accident policies.  But I do not think
that, standing on its own, this argument can succeed, even though it is a factor
to be weighed in the balance.  The question still remains whether, when he
drove as he did, the deceased wilfully courted danger.  One has only to take
the case of a driver, whose policy does not expressly deal with alcohol, being
warned by a doctor that he is in no fit state to drive, yet proceeds to do so.
Clearly he does wilfully court danger.
[19] In their context what do the words ‘wilful exposure to danger’ mean?
There are two senses of the word ‘wilful’ contained in the SOED which could
have application.  The first is ‘Asserting or disposed to assert one’s own will
against persuasion, instruction, or command;  governed by will without regard
to reason;  obstinately self-willed or perverse’.  The second is ‘Done on
purpose or wittingly;  purposed, deliberate, intentional (Chiefly, now always,
in bad sense, of a blameworthy action;  freq. implying “perverse, obstinate”.)’.
[20] At best for the insured the second sense applies.  What the insurer
would have to show is that, subjectively speaking, the insured acted
intentionally in disregarding the danger.  Negligence would not be enough.

Nor would be the consideration that, objectively speaking, there was an
exposure to danger.  But even this second meaning tends strongly to be shaded
by its being used in a ‘bad’ sense.
[21] If the first meaning is intended it would strengthen the insurer’s case.  It
would extend itself to the man who has heard all the warnings of the risks of
drunken driving, but who knows better than the experts, who is in his own
mind immune to accidents, who can ‘hold his liquor’, who is in short perverse
and not apt to heed due warning.
[22] I am of the view that the first meaning was intended, whilst being
mindful of the rule quoted above, that a policy should be interpreted in favour
of the insured.  The first reason for my view is linguistic.  There is a marked
contrast in the course of three lines between the word ‘wilful’ on the one hand
and ‘intentional’ and ‘suicide’ (which is an intentional act) on the other.  This
suggests that something different is intended.  What the difference would then
be, is clear enough.  It would be, broadly speaking, that not only intentional
action but also refusal to heed warnings or the experience of others would be
included.  My second reason supplements the textual one.  It is that it is quite
to be expected that an insurer would not intend to extend cover to one who,
out of perversity, would not hear.  Nor, I suppose, would an insured at the
time of contracting be likely to be heard to say that he was to be insured
against his own perversity.

[23] But on the facts of this case, I am of the opinion that, even if the second
narrower sense is the appropriate one, the conduct of the deceased was
‘wilful’.  I do not find any of the cases to which we have been referred
determinative of this one and we are thrown back on the evidence before us.
[24] According to dr Klepp, in a man of the deceased’s size and weight a
concentration of 0.19 translates into an intake of at least 400 ml of brandy.
400 ml is more than half a bottle.  But there is more to the case than that a lot
was drunk.  The deceased went to the party knowing that he was going to
drive back for 110 km alone and in the dark at the end of a long day and after
drinking alcohol.  I find it impossible to believe that he did not have these
facts in mind as he took successive drinks.  When one reaches the point in the
record where are included photographs of a wreck and a body in the veld
one’s reaction is one almost of inevitability.  Nor do I find it possible to
believe that the deceased was not consciously aware that driving after taking
many drinks poses real dangers.  No doubt he was not acquainted with all the
detail which dr Klepp has so clearly set out.  Her evidence establishes
objective standards and cannot in itself reveal what the deceased knew,
foresaw and intended.  But I cannot accept that a man with experience of life
did not have a broad appreciation of the risk he was taking, however unrefined
his knowledge was.  Even if he was a man who could ‘hold his drink’ (and
there was evidence that he could) he must have known that he was taking a
risk by drinking so much and then driving, particularly after the extended

publicity that has been given to the perils of drinking and driving in the last
few decades (if I may not take judicial knowledge of this, dr Klepp has said it
in evidence).  In consequence I fail to see how even the most benevolent of
interpretations of the exception, including an acceptance of the second sense
of ‘wilful’, can avoid the facts and the inference to be drawn from them as by
far the most probable.  Nor am I deterred by the consideration that in the
Marcell Beller case (above) the judge held that the exception equivalent to the
one here in issue had not been established.  Although there the alcohol
concentration was as high as 0.26, the finding was that there was no evidence
to show that subjectively the insured appreciated the risk that he was taking.
In any event the case was decided 24 years ago.  Since then times have moved
on.
[25] In drawing an inference on the probabilities, among the things I have
taken into account are the following two.  Unlike many of the knocks in life,
motor accidents often have catastrophic consequences.  We all know this –
and it is something that any sensible man will have before his eyes.  The
second factor is that the incidence of accidents due to drunken driving is not
minimal.  The occurrence of such an accident is not a remote possibility.  It
frequently happens.  When expressing these views I do not do so in order to
deliver a moralistic lecture about drunken driving, but simply to state what in
my opinion ordinary people know.  The presence of both these factors, one
adding force to the other, is important in this case, and may distinguish it from

a type that was raised in argument, exemplified by the parachute that fails to
open.  Although the consequence in that case is also catastrophic, the chances
of it happening may be so small that it cannot be said that there is a wilful
exposure to risk by the jumper.  I express no opinion on such a case.
[26] I revert to the first, broader, sense of ‘wilful’.  If it applies, as I think it
does, then even if the deceased had talked himself into believing that he was
not like other people, he was being perverse and consequently acted wilfully.
Of course, in some people, liquor causes or increases perversity, and if
perversity is the issue, I do not see that the manner in which it came about is
relevant, short that is, of a person being so drunk, contrary to his design, that
he does not know what he is doing.  This observation, clearly relevant to the
first sense, may, in accordance with the note to the definition of the second
sense, ‘freq. implying “perverse, obstinate”’ have application to the second
sense also.
[27] I have so far approached the matter on the basis of the deceased’s
anticipations on arrival at and during the course of the party.  What was his
condition when he got into his car?  It may be that he was so befuddled that he
could not appreciate the riskiness of what he was about to do.  If so he may
not have been capable of wilful exposure.  But the evidence is against that.
One of the witnesses says that he appeared to be normal.  That might mean
that he was capable of rational decision.  However, as this is uncertain, I
would rather base my decision on his conduct prior to this moment.

[28] I find that the deceased did wilfully expose himself to risk, so that the
insurer has established the exception.  Accordingly the claim was rightly
dismissed.
[29] The appeal is dismissed with costs.

_____________
W P SCHUTZ
JUDGE OF APPEAL

CONCUR

CAMERON JA
HEHER AJA

BRAND JA

BRAND JA
[30] I have read the judgment of my brother Schutz.   Broadly speaking I
agree with what is said in paras [1] to [18] thereof but I respectfully disagree
with his statement of the law, his interpretation of the facts and his ultimate
conclusion, as contained in paras [19] to [29].   In my view the insurer failed
to prove that the deceased had 'wilfully exposed himself to danger' within the
meaning of the exception upon which the insurer sought to rely.
[31] The exception to be considered, reads as follows:
'Underwriters shall not be liable in respect of death or disablement ... due to:
...
Wilful exposure to danger (except in an attempt to save human life).   Intentional
self-inflicted injury, suicide or any such attempt.'

The case turns in the main on the proper connotation of wilful.   'Wilful' must
not be viewed in isolation.   It must be read in context and in its relation to

'exposure' and to 'danger'.   Each of these three words takes colour from its
juxtaposition to the others.   'Exposure' refers to some form of conduct
whereby the insured places himself at risk or lays himself open to the
realisation of a particular 'danger'.   'Danger', I think, cannot simply mean any
danger or the risk of any danger.   In that wide sense the policy would lose
much of its force.   As was stated by Neill LJ in Morley and Morley v United
Friendly Insurance plc [1993] 1 Lloyds LR 490 (CA) at 492-3 with reference
to an exclusion clause in the accident insurance policy under consideration
which referred to 'wilful expose to needless peril':
'It is common ground that the "peril" referred to in the exclusion clause
means a risk of suffering one or more of the injuries which the policy of
insurance was designed to cover'

and at 493 (column 1) in fine:
'It is clear ... that the words cannot be construed too strictly.   Thus they
cannot be construed so as to remove insurance cover from an insured who
engages in contact sports such as football'

'Danger' in the context in which the phrase is used in the policy therefore
refers to the 'danger' insured against, that is to say, an accident resulting in
death or bodily injury.
[32] The required wilfulness, it seems to me, has to be directed to the
'exposure to danger' and not to the activity which causes the danger.  Within
this context  Schutz JA holds the view that 'wilful' can have one of two
possible meanings.  According to what he refers to as the first meaning
‘wilful’ includes the concept of perversity, obstinacy or stubbornness while in
its second meaning the term would be synonymous with 'deliberate or
intentional'.   Schutz JA then expresses his preference for the first meaning.
This leads to our first area of disagreement.   I accept that in accordance with
one of its dictionary meanings, 'wilful' can convey the meaning of perverse,
obstinate or stubborn in the sense of 'wicked' or morally depraved.  I do not
believe, however, that this was the meaning the parties to the insurance policy
had in mind.   Purely as a matter of language, 'wilful' does not bear

substitution for 'perverse' or 'obstinate' in the phrase to be construed.   To
speak of a perverse or obstinate exposure to danger strikes me as contrived.
Furthermore, the words in parentheses seem to contradict this meaning.   The
situation therein described is specifically excepted.   If it had not been
excepted it would of course have been included and as such would have
typified the sort of conduct the word 'wilful' was meant to describe.   In my
view it goes without saying that the situation described, that is, an attempt to
save a human life, can never be characterised as ‘obstinate’, ‘stubborn’ of
'perverse'.   Schutz JA finds support for his interpretation of ‘wilful’ in what
he describes as 'the marked contrast in the course of three line between
"wilful" on the one hand and "intentional" and "suicide" (which is an
intentional act) on the other.'   With respect, I do not believe that the
references to suicide and intentional self-inflicted injury in the same clause of
the policy lend support to the meaning of 'wilful' that Schutz JA prefers.   In
my view these references may just as well be used in support of the argument

that 'suicide', 'intentional self-inflicted injury' and 'wilful exposure to danger'
all belong to the same genus in that they all have the common element of
deliberate 'intent'.
[33] In my view, the most natural meaning to be ascribed to the term 'wilful'
within the context of the phrase under consideration is that of 'intentional' or
'deliberate'.   Linguistically these synonyms can quite comfortably be used as
substitutes for 'wilful', as in the expression 'deliberate or intentional exposure
to danger'. Moreover, counsel for the insurer accepted that the meaning to be
ascribed to ‘wilful’ in the present context is 'deliberate' or 'intentional'.  His
very argument was that the deceased 'deliberately exposed himself to danger',
ie to an occurrence which was potentially harmful and which, as a probability,
he must have foreseen
[34] My conclusion that 'wilful' must in the present context be construed as
synonymous with 'deliberate' or 'intentional', is not the end of the enquiry into
the meaning of wilful.   The question remains whether a person can be said to

expose himself to a particular danger 'wilfully' – or for that matter,
'deliberately' or 'intentionally' - purely because he contemplates the realisation
of that danger as a notionally possible consequence of the activity that he is
about to embark upon.   I think not.   The unfortunate reality is that by living
in a modern society one knowingly exposes oneself to the notional danger of
being killed or maimed through sometimes the most mundane of activities,
such as driving in a motor car from Johannesburg to Cape Town.   It cannot be
thought that participation in these mundane activities would render the insurer
not liable under the policy.    To refer to another example, can it be said that a
parachutist is wilfully exposing himself to the danger of his parachute not
opening within the meaning of the policy because he contemplates this
eventuality as a remote possibility?   I think not.   The question is then, what
more is required than contemplation of the consequences as a possibility in
order to constitute wilfulness?

[35] In my view 'wilful', when read in conjunction with  'exposed to danger',
requires:
(a)
a contemplation and appreciation of the possibility of the
occurrence of a particular eventuality (in this instance bodily
injury or death due to an accident);
(b)
the realisation that the eventuality is not merely a remote
contingency but a real possibility;
(c)
a reconciliation with its occurrence in the sense of a conscious
decision to proceed notwithstanding (a) and (b) ie with
indifference to the appreciated consequences of his act.
This is analogous to the concept of dolus eventualis in the criminal law (see eg
S v Ngubane 1985 (3) SA 677(A) at 685; S v Beukes 1988 (1) SA 511(A) 522
and S v Maritz 1996 (1) SACR 405 (A) at 416E-G) which has also been
extended
to
insurance
law
(see
Nicolaisen
v
Permanente
Lewensversekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1976 (3) SA 705 (C) at 709E-H).

[36] The viewpoint that the requirement of 'wilfulness', when read in
conjunction with 'exposure to danger', comprises more than merely an
appreciation of the particular eventuality as a theoretical or a hypothetical
possibility is, moreover, in line with current English authority, as appears, eg
from the following statement in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4 ed (reissue)
vol 25 par 583:
'A more modern form of accident policy may exclude liability consequent
upon the assured's deliberate exposure to "exceptional danger" or wilfully
exposing himself to "needless peril".   In the former case the word
"deliberate" imports a subjective test and the exception does not apply where
he drives a car knowing that he has consumed an excessive amount of
alcohol unless there is evidence that he thought about the risk he was taking
and deliberately chose to ignore it.   In a case where injury caused by "wilful
exposure to needless peril" was excluded from cover, it was not enough to
show an intentional act which caused the peril;  rather there had to be a
conscious act of volition (including recklessness) directed to the running of
the risk.'

As authority for this statement of the law the learned author refers, first, to the
decision in  Marcel Beller Ltd v Hayden [1978] QB 694 at 705 C-G that the
deceased in that matter could not be said to have 'deliberately exposed himself
to exceptional danger' by driving his motor car while having a blood alcohol

concentration of 0,26 gram per 100ml.   Secondly, reference is made to the
case of Morley and Morley v United Friendly Insurance plc (supra).   In the
latter case the Court of Appeal (per Beldam LJ) inter alia said the following
about the meaning of 'wilful' at 496:
'Thus the meaning to be given to "wilful exposure to needless peril" in the
clause excluding liability under the policy requires that the conduct relied on
must go beyond negligent exposure to needless peril.   It must be shown that
at the time of his actions the insured was mindful of a real risk of the kind of
injury for which benefit was provided by the policy and that he either
intended to run that risk or exposed himself to it not caring whether he
sustained such injury or not.'

[37] Finally, the meaning that I ascribe to ‘wilful’ seems to accord with how
our courts understood the term 'wilful' in a not  dissimilar context in the past.
In Micor Shipping (Pty) Ltd v Treger Golf and Sports (Pty) Ltd and Another
1977 (2) SA 709 (W), for example, the Court had to interpret a so-called
'owners risk clause' in the contract of a shipping and forwarding agent which
limited the agent's liability to damage to the goods which was 'due to the

wilful act or default of the company or its servants'.   Within this context
Franklin J stated (at 713 D-E):
'Wilfulness imports the notion of a deliberate act by the perpetrator who
knows what he is doing, intends what he is doing and is willing that the
consequences of his act or default should follow.'

(See also, eg Citrus Board v South African Railways and Harbours 1957 (1)
SA 198 (A) )
[38] The legitimacy of the comparison in the present context with how
'wilful' is understood in cases such as Micor Shipping and Citrus Board seems
to find some support in the following statement by Beldam LJ in Morley and
Morley v United Friendly Insurance (supra) 495:
The word "wilful" used in similar contexts has been the subject of judicial
interpretation for over 100 years.   In conjunction with the word
"misconduct" it was construed in contracts of carriage by rail where, for
example, the company had excluded liability except for wilful misconduct of
its servants.

[39] Counsel for the insurer, as I understood his argument, did not contend
that the test was any different from the one that I propose.   His premise was

that it was established on the facts that as a result of the deceased's
intoxication an accident was a probability ie more likely to happen than not.
On that basis it could well be said that the deceased's decision to drive his
motor car knowing that an accident was imminent, would have been 'wilful'
within the meaning of the exclusion clause under consideration.   But for the
reasons stated by Schutz JA, that premise was not a valid one.
[40] With the above meaning of 'wilful' in mind, it is necessary to determine
whether it can be inferred from the uncontroverted evidence that the deceased
not only appreciated the danger of an accident in which he could be maimed
or killed as a theoretical possibility, but as a real possibility and that he
reconciled himself with such an occurrence.   According to the evidence of
those who last saw the deceased when he left the party at Wolmaranstad, he
appeared to be quite 'normal' and in control of his faculties.   He said goodbye
to them and behaved in a manner which was in no way untoward.   They had
no reason to doubt his ability to drive his motor vehicle home.   Then there is

also the evidence of the deceased's wife and his friend to the effect that he was
a man could 'take his liquor' and who regularly drove his car perfectly
competently after consuming alcohol.   From this evidence I infer that the
deceased's attitude was most likely that although he appreciated that the
danger of an accident may have been increased by his consumption of alcohol,
it was not likely to happen; and that, as in the past, he had a more than even
chance of finding his way home safely, despite his  condition.   Schutz JA
believes that his attitude may be described as 'perverse' or 'stubborn'.   That
may or may not be so.   What is decisive, however, is that in these
circumstances the inference is not justified that the deceased had reconciled
himself with the occurrence of the accident as a real possibility.
[41] I consequently find that the insurer had failed to establish the exemption
from liability upon which it relied and that the appellant is therefore entitled to
the benefits provided far in of the policy.   On the papers in the motion
proceedings the insurer conceded that, in the event of it being held liable in

terms of the policy, the appellant would be entitled to payment in a sum of at
least R366 191,05.   During argument in this Court the further concession was
made on behalf of the insurer that the amount of any judgment in the
appellant's favour would bear interest at the rate of 15,5% per annum from 7
March 2001.
[42] For these reasons I would order that:

(1)
The appeal be allowed with costs.
(2)
The order of the Court a quo be set aside and that the following
order be substituted for it:
'(a)
Judgment is granted in favour of the applicant in the sum
of R366 191,05.
(b)
The respondent is ordered to pay interest on the said
amount at the rate of 15,5% per annum from 7 March 2001
to date of payment.

(c)
The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant's costs of
suit.'

FDJ BRAND
JUDGE OF APPEAL

CONCUR:

NIENABER  JA

HEHER AJA:

I have read the judgments of Schutz JA and Brand JA and agree with
the judgment of Schutz JA.
[43]  I think it is necessary to give a meaning to the phrase 'wilful exposure to
danger' that is businesslike having regard to the context in which it is found,
by which I intend a meaning that both the prospective insured and the insurer
must have regarded as meeting their aims in concluding the policy.  It is in this
context that I agree with Schutz JA that the meaning to be attributed to 'wilful'
introduces a pejorative element in relation to exposures to danger that are not
covered.  Indeed, though the suggestion regarding the extended meaning of
'wilful' came from the Bench, counsel for the insurer adopted it, rightly in my
view.
[44]  As I shall attempt to demonstrate, it is not possible to give the words
'exposure to danger' an unqualified meaning.  To do so would be, if not
absurd, at least in obvious conflict with a businesslike interpretation.  This is

implicitly recognised by Brand JA in para [31] of his judgment but he does not
follow this through by applying it to the 'danger' to which the exception refers.
Instead he tries to meet the problem later by limiting the concept of wilfulness
to eventualities which are 'real possibilities'.  For the reasons that follow this
seems to me a flawed solution.
[45]  According to common experience I may expose myself to a greater or
lesser degree to danger of death or disablement in a multiplicity of ways every
day:  driving a motor vehicle, crossing a street, entering a lift, undergoing
radiotherapy.  Each is a question of degree:  one may drive slowly or fast; the
street may be silent or a hive of activity; the lift may be new or antiquated; the
radiography may happen once or be repeated several times.  On each occasion
I venture deliberately with my eyes open to the hazards.  But no one would
suggest that such conduct is, in the pejorative sense, 'wilful', and neither party
to the insurance contract would have supposed that such venturing would
bring the exception into operation.  (For the same reason, conduct in an effort

to save human life would never be stigmatised as 'unlawful'.)  This is not
because the risks are not real and the potential consequences are not
catastrophic, but because they would require that the policy be interpreted
reasonably.
[46]  So understood, the exposure must be to a danger that is not one faced by
the insured going about the day to day business of life in a reasonable manner.
A man who drives his vehicle at a high speed on a busy road exposes himself
to danger; so does one who crosses such a road against the traffic lights.  Both
act unreasonably.
[47]  But the exposure to danger must be wilful before the cover is excluded.
I have no doubt that what the parties intended is that the insured must enter
upon the relevant act or omission appreciating that his conduct (i) is
unreasonable, and (ii) will lay him open to the risk of death or disablement.
On this interpretation it is artificial to say, as Brand JA does, that the required
wilfulness is not directed to the activity that causes the danger.  In my view

the activity and the danger are inseparable.  The enquiry is about the insured's
subjective state of mind but like all such enquiries his own utterances can be
tested against the objective facts or, in the absence of such utterances, the
objective facts alone can be analysed to arrive at the most probable inference
as to what passed through the insured's mind before and during the conduct
that is in question.  The passage from Halsbury cited by Brand JA in para [7]
of his judgment must be read with this qualification in mind.
[48]  Does it matter that the chance of death or disablement is present to his
mind as a probability or is a mere possibility (with the whole range that that
implies)? I think not.  First, the controlling factor is the reasonableness of his
conduct, a standard that builds in all relevant considerations and excludes the
need for raising one (such as the degree of likelihood of harm) to the level of
decisiveness.  Secondly, the plain words 'wilful exposure to danger' give no
indication that the degree of likelihood of the risk eventuating is to be the
determining factor.  Commonsense demonstrates that it cannot be so.  A

simple example will suffice.  I plan to drive my powerful new car at speeds of
up to 250 km per hour over a straight stretch of 12 kilometres of national
highway through the Karoo.  I am an experienced and competent driver.  I
know that there is likely to be other traffic in both directions on the road and
that other drivers may not be as predictable or controlled as I believe myself to
be.  I am also conscious of the reality that tyres, even when new, can burst for
reasons beyond my control, and that game and sheep do stray unexpectedly
through gates and fences.  Despite all these not insubstantial risks, the
probability (judged both subjectively and objectively) is that I will manage to
come through unscathed.  Nevertheless it cannot be seriously suggested that
when I embark on my joyride I do not wilfully expose myself to danger within
the meaning of the policy.  I knowingly behave in a manner which is wholly
unreasonable having regard to the seriousness of the potential consequences,
the absence of any compulsion to travel in the contemplated manner, my
complete inability to control the actions of others, my uncertainty about the

reliability of my own vehicle, and, no doubt, other reasons also.  In the overall
evaluation the degree of risk is unimportant.  The fact is that while some risk
exists (and it can never be excluded) no reasonable person would embark on
such a venture.  In my view if the insurer and insured had been asked whether
this hypothetical case falls within the terms of the exception both would
unhesitatingly have replied 'yes'.  Deliberately overtaking on a blind rise over
a solid barrier line on a quiet road affords another example.  It cannot  be said
in any given instance that there is a probability or even always 'a real
possibility' of a collision, but commonsense tells one that a driver who does
that wilfully exposes himself (and others) to danger.  These examples show
that conduct that falls within the exception will always be 'governed by will
without regard to reason' (ie the first sense conveying an element of
perverseness).
[49]  When Brand JA (in para [6]) draws an analogy between the requisites of
'wilfulness' as propounded by him and dolus eventualis I think, with respect,

that he errs.  There is a long line of authority that makes it clear that if an
accused foresees a consequence of his actions as a possibility he can be held
liable according to the doctrine of dolus eventualis.  The cases are discussed in
Snyman, Strafreg 4 uitg 179 - 81.  It is unnecessary to list them.  In Nicolaisen
v Permanente Lewensversekeringsmaatskappy 1976(3) SA 705 (C) at 709 F,
Van Winsen J applied the doctrine to the facts before him with the following
introductory words:
"Dit is deur mnr. Olivier, wat namens eiser opgetree het, aangevoer dat die versekerde,
alhoewel bewus van die feit dat die rewolwer gelaai is, kon gemeen het dat toe hy die
trekker vir die derde maal getrek het die patroon nie onder die hamer sou kom nie.  Was dit
sy houding sou dit na my mening bewys lewer van die bestaan by hom van ten minste dolus
eventualis.  Dit sou bewys wees van 'n roekelose volharding aan sy kant in 'n
gedragspatroon wat hy voorsien het by die derde trek van die trekker moontlik tot sy dood
aanleiding kon gee."

There is however great divergence as to the strength of the possibility which is
sufficient:  Snyman op cit at 180 fn 155.  In S v Beukes en 'n Ander 1988(1)
SA 511 (A), upon which Brand JA relies, Van Heerden JA expressed a clear
preference for a reasonable possibility (at 522 C - I).  The expression 'real

possibility' is in itself confusing and I would not wish to associate myself with
it.  In any event, given the particular wording of the contract with which we
are concerned I think that the analogy with dolus eventualis is unnecessary
and, probably, of doubtful value.
[50]  Schutz JA has set out the facts which are relevant to the night in
question and the inferences as to the state of the deceased's mind before and
when he made the fatal  decision to make a start for home rather than
deferring the journey until the morning.  I agree entirely with his inferential
assessment of what must have occurred to the deceased.  On those facts the
deceased appreciated the unreasonableness of driving as he then proceeded to
do and the perils attendant on so doing but despite that he was not deterred.
[51]  I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.

____________________

J A HEHER

ACTING
JUDGE
OF
APPEAL

SCHUTZ JA
)Concur

CAMERON JA )