THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

Reportable

CASE NO: 347/04

In the matter between :

GREYS MARINE HOUT BAY (PTY) LTD
First Appellant
HOUT BAY YACHT CLUB
Second Appellant
C-CRAFT CLOSE CORPORATION
Third Appellant

and

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS
First Respondent
THE MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS
AND TOURISM
Second Respondent
BLUEFIN HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD
Third Respondent
________________________________________________________________________
Before:
SCOTT, NAVSA, MTHIYANE, NUGENT JJA & MAYA AJA
Heard:
22 MARCH 2005
Delivered:
13 MAY 2005
Summary:
Administrative action – whether decision by Minister to let state
land constitutes – whether appellants’ rights or legitimate
expectations affected.
________________________________________________________________________

J U D G M E N T
________________________________________________________________________

NUGENT JA

NUGENT JA:
[1] Hout Bay, on the west coast of the Cape peninsula, serves as a harbour
for small fishing boats that operate in that part of the ocean. The fishing
industry, and the picturesque setting of the harbour, has spawned other
commercial activities on the quayside. There are a number of fish-processing
facilities, including one that is owned by the first appellant (Greys Marine).
The Hout Bay Yacht Club (the second appellant) has premises alongside
those of Greys Marine. On the other side of Greys Marine are premises in
which the third appellant (C-Craft) builds and repairs boats. There are also
other enterprises, like restaurants and shops, that attract visitors to the
quayside. Needless to say, available space, both for occupation and for the
passage and parking of vehicles, is at a premium.
[2] Alongside the water, where the fishermen offload their catch, there is a
paved but otherwise undeveloped section of the quayside that is used by
occupants and visitors alike. Greys Marine, for example, whose premises are
situated back from the waterfront, crosses the area with its vehicles to load
fish that have been landed, and to access its lobster pump that is located near
the water. Members of the Yacht Club use the area to launch their boats. The
open space enables C-Craft to manoeuvre large boats to and from its
premises. It is also used by occupants and visitors for the passage and parking
of vehicles and it serves generally to ease traffic congestion on the quayside.

[3] The quayside is owned by the state, which lets portions to the various
occupants, including the three appellants. The authority to let state property
vests in the President, as head of the executive, in terms of the Disposal of
State Land Act 48 of 1961, but has been assigned by the President to the
Minister of Public Works.
[4] The established order of life at Hout Bay was recently disturbed when
the Minister granted a new tenancy on the quayside. The new tenant was a
company (the third respondent, Bluefin) established by a group of women
with deep roots in Hout Bay who wished to enter the fishing industry from
which they were historically excluded. The company soon had access to
fishing quotas, and acquired two fishing boats, and then set its sights on
establishing a new fish-processing facility and associated restaurant at Hout
Bay. It applied to the state to hire portion of the undeveloped area that I have
described (a portion known as Lot 86, situated alongside the water, opposite
the premises of Greys Marine) for the purpose of constructing and operating
the proposed enterprise.
[5] In October 2001 the Minister of Public Works agreed to let the property
to Bluefin. The area to be let was later extended to include an adjacent portion
of the quayside (Lot 86 and the extended area came to be referred to as Lot
86A) and in June 2003 a formal lease was concluded.
[6] The three appellants, in particular, were alarmed at this turn of events.
They felt that the development of Lot 86A would cause traffic congestion on

the quayside, deprive tenants and visitors of necessary parking and
manouevering space, and impede access to their premises and to the
waterside. In September 2003 – after being granted a temporary interdict
restraining Bluefin from developing the property – the appellants applied to
the Cape High Court to review and set aside the Minister’s decision and for
related relief. Their application was dismissed by Cleaver J, who also set
aside the temporary interdict,1 and the appellants now appeal with the leave of
that court.
[7] The background to the grant of the lease to Bluefin is dealt with
voluminously in the papers and I need traverse only the principal events. Lot
86 was one of two lots (the other was Lot 82) that were at one time let to the
Yacht Club. When the Yacht Club hired the properties in 1996 (for a period
of nine years and eleven months) it intended to use Lot 82 (which is set back
from the water on one side of the premises of Greys Marine) to store trailers
and to park vehicles and to construct a new clubhouse on Lot 86. Indeed, the
terms of its lease obliged the Yacht Club to construct its clubhouse on that lot,
and to do so within twelve months of the commencement of the lease.
[8] The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (I will refer to
the department simply as Environmental Affairs) would have preferred Lot 86
to have been left undeveloped. When financial constraints prevented the
Yacht Club from commencing construction of its clubhouse within the
stipulated time it applied for and was granted an extension for a year. Still

1 The decision is reported at [2004] 3 All SA 446 (C).

unable to commence construction by the end of the extended period it sought
a further extension, but that was opposed by Environmental Affairs, which
also declined to approve plans for the proposed clubhouse that were submitted
to it by the Yacht Club. The lack of support from Environmental Affairs
seems to have been what prompted the Yacht Club – in about October 1999 –
to offer to relinquish its lease of Lot 86 in return for support for the
construction of its clubhouse on Lot 82 and an extended lease of that property.
Environmental Affairs was delighted and supported the proposal.
[9] Meanwhile, Bluefin had become aware of the problems that were
besetting the Yacht Club. Anticipating that the Yacht Club would be unable to
fulfil its obligation to construct the clubhouse, and that the future of its lease
was precarious, Bluefin applied to the Department of Public Works (I will
refer to it as Public Works) to lease Lot 86 for its proposed fish-processing
facility and restaurant.
[10] At that stage the Yacht Club had yet to relinquish its lease and for a
while the application by Bluefin was held in abeyance by Public Works.
Public Works was sympathetic to Bluefin’s request, which fitted with the
government’s policy of assisting to transform the fishing industry, but
Environmental Affairs felt that the waterfront should best be left
undeveloped, particularly to allow access to the water for offloading and for
mooring of boats and for the passage of traffic. At first the views of
Environmental Affairs prevailed and in November 2000 Bluefin was told by

Public Works that its application would not be considered because it was
opposed by Environmental Affairs.
[11] But Bluefin was not easily to be deterred. While Public Works was
investigating the possibility of accommodating Bluefin elsewhere in Hout
Bay, Bluefin continued to press for a lease of Lot 86, and became increasingly
exasperated as matters dragged on. Meanwhile, the Yacht Club was
proceeding with negotiations for the relinquishment of its lease of Lot 86 and
the extension of its lease of Lot 82. In the course of the negotiations the Yacht
Club sought from the state, as one of the conditions upon which it would
relinquish its rights, an undertaking that Lot 86 and the adjacent water area
would be left vacant, that it would not be let to any other person, and that it
would not be used for the erection of any substantial buildings. The state
declined to give such an undertaking, which the Yacht Club accepted, no
doubt reluctantly. In June 2001 the Minister approved the Yacht Club’s
proposal and in October of that year the Yacht Club formally relinquished its
rights over Lot 86 and concluded a new lease for Lot 82.
[12] Also in October 2001 a recommendation was made to the Minister by
officials in her department that Lot 86 be let to Bluefin, which the Minister
approved. The recommendation was accompanied by a supporting
departmental memorandum that contained the following comments:
‘The Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism (Marine & Coastal
Management Division) previously held the opinion that Lot 86 (as the only available
undeveloped site with direct access to the water) should be utilised to accommodate

historically disadvantaged fishermen to offload and sell their catch. Bluefin Holdings has
indicated that it would be prepared to accommodate the needs of the small fishermen in the
development of Lot 86. The Department is also considering other opportunities on the
waterfront to accommodate the needs of the small fishermen.’
[13] It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that that passage from the
memorandum must have led the Minister to believe that although
Environmental Affairs was once of the view that Lot 86 should be left vacant
it was no longer of that view (which was not correct) and that the Minister
laboured under that misapprehension when she made her decision. While the
passage is capable of that meaning that is not how the Minister understood it.
In the affidavit to which she deposed the Minister said that when she made
her decision she was aware that Environmental Affairs wanted Lot 86 to be
utilised to accommodate historically disadvantaged fishermen to off-load and
sell their catch, that she did not understand Environmental Affairs to have
changed its position to one that now favoured the lease, and that she
nevertheless granted it. That being so there is no merit in the submission that
the Minister was misled or that she misapprehended the true facts when she
made her decision.
[14] Soon after the Minister approved the grant of a lease Bluefin asked
Public Works to extend the area that was to be let to include an adjacent
portion of the quayside. Public Works invited comments from the public in
general and from other tenants with regard to that proposal. Notwithstanding

the opposition which that elicited Lot 86 and the extended area were let to
Bluefin in June 2003 for twenty years.
[15] It is in that setting that the Minister’s decision is sought to be set aside
but before turning to that issue it is convenient to deal with a subsidiary
matter. The appellants allege that the proposed development of Lot 86A will
contravene one or more legislative measures regulating the use of immovable
property. They referred, for example, to the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15
of 1985 (Cape), which prohibits the use of property for a purpose other than
that for which it is zoned. And to the Environmental Conservation Act 73 of
1989 and the National Environmental Conservation Act 107 of 1998, which
require environmental impact assessments to be made before certain
properties are developed. There are also building laws and regulations that
must be complied with.
[16] Prohibitions on the use of the property until such time as their
requirements have been met are immaterial to the validity of the Minister’s
decision. By letting the property the Minister did not purport to permit
Bluefin to use the property unlawfully or relieve Bluefin of obligations that it
might have under any law. As pointed out in Minister of Public Works v
Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association2 at para 59:
‘The taking of a decision [on how land is to be used] is logically anterior to the
procurement of consents that may be necessary for its execution. Indeed, it is only after a
decision has been taken and details of the work to be done have been determined, that an

2 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC).

application for consent can properly be made and considered. The absence of such consent
may found an application for an interdict to restrain implementation of the decision. In
itself, however, it is not a ground on which the decision can be set aside.’
And at para 105:
‘The power that the government has to use its own land for the purpose of establishing a
transit camp, is not a power that in itself entitles it to eliminate or ignore rights that the
Kyalami residents might have under environmental, township or other legislation. If they
have such rights, they are entitled to seek to enforce them. But their rights, if any, lie
there.’
[17] But apart from the principal relief that the appellants sought (an order
setting aside the Minister’s decision) the appellants also sought an interdict
restraining Bluefin from constructing anything on the property and the
adjacent jetty before there had been an environmental impact assessment as
contemplated by the Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 1989. It was
submitted on their behalf that the application ought to have succeeded to that
extent at least. I do not agree. Whatever Bluefin’s intentions might initially
have been, once the issue was first raised in the correspondence, and Bluefin
had obtained advice, it was made clear to the appellants that Bluefin would
not develop the site in conflict with environmental laws, and in its answering
affidavit it alleged that an environmental impact assessment was in the
process of being compiled. The appellants had no reasonable grounds for
apprehending that Bluefin would not comply with its legal obligations, once
those were brought to its attention, and on that ground alone they were not
entitled to an interdict.

[18] Asserting the right to procedurally fair administrative action that is
conferred by s 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
(PAJA) the appellants complained of not having been consulted or invited to
comment on Bluefin’s request to lease the property before it was approved by
the Minister. It was also submitted on behalf of the appellants – though not
pertinently raised in the founding affidavit – that the Minister’s decision falls
to be set aside in terms of s 6 of PAJA because it was irrational and arbitrary.
[19] The question at the outset is whether the Minister’s decision constitutes
administrative action falling within the terms of PAJA.3
[20] The Constitution is the repository of all state power. That power is
distributed by the Constitution – directly and indirectly – amongst the various
institutions of state and other public bodies and functionaries and its exercise
is subject to inherent constitutional constraint – if only for legality4 – the
extent of which varies according to the nature of the power that is being
exercised.
[21] What constitutes administrative action – the exercise of the
administrative powers of the state – has always eluded complete definition.
The cumbersome5 definition of that term in PAJA serves not so much to

3 It is not necessary for purposes of this appeal to consider whether s 33 of the Constitution has a residual
field of operation in relation to decisions that fall outside the terms of PAJA. See: Iain Currie & Jonathan
Klaaren The Promotion of Administrative Justice Benchbook paras 1.27 and 1.28; The New Constitutional
and Administrative Law Vol 2 by Cora Hoexter with Rosemary Lyster (ed. Iain Currie) pages 87-89. Bato
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 25.
4 Cf. Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA
374 (CC) paras 40, 56-58; President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union
2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 148; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of
the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) paras 51, 85, 90.
5 The definition of ‘administrative action’ in s 1 of PAJA is made particularly cumbersome by its
incorporation of a number of terms that are themselves defined and often overlap.

attribute meaning to the term as to limit its meaning by surrounding it within
a palisade of qualifications. It is not necessary for present purposes to set out
the terms of the definition in full: the following consolidated and abbreviated
form of the definition will suffice to convey its principal elements:
‘Administrative action means any decision of an administrative nature made…under an
empowering provision [and] taken…by an organ of state, when exercising a power in
terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution, or exercising a public power or
performing a public function in terms of any legislation, or [taken by] a natural or juristic
person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or performing a public
function in terms of an empowering provision, which adversely affects the rights of any
person and which has a direct, external legal effect…’.
[22] At the core of the definition of administrative action is the idea of
action (a decision) ‘of an administrative nature’ taken by a public body or
functionary. Some pointers to what that encompasses are to be had from the
various qualifications that surround the definition but it also falls to be
construed consistently, wherever possible, with the meaning that has been
attributed to administrative action as the term is used in s 33 of the
Constitution (from which PAJA originates) so as to avoid constitutional
invalidity.6
[23] While PAJA’s definition purports to restrict administrative action to
decisions that, as a fact, ‘adversely affect the rights of any person’, I do not
think that literal meaning could have been intended. For administrative action

6 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mohamed NO 2003 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 35.

to be characterised by its effect in particular cases (either beneficial or
adverse) seems to me to be paradoxical and also finds no support from the
construction that has until now been placed on s 33 of the Constitution.
Moreover, that literal construction would be inconsonant with s 3(1), which
envisages that administrative action might or might not affect rights
adversely.7 The qualification, particularly when seen in conjunction with the
requirement that it must have a ‘direct and external legal effect’,8 was
probably intended rather to convey that administrative action is action that has
the capacity to affect legal rights, the two qualifications in tandem serving to
emphasise that administrative action impacts directly and immediately on
individuals.
[24] Whether particular conduct constitutes administrative action depends
primarily on the nature of the power that is being exercised rather than upon
the identity of the person who does so.9 Features of administrative action
(conduct of ‘an administrative nature’) that have emerged from the
construction that has been placed on s 33 of the Constitution are that it does
not extend to the exercise of legislative powers by deliberative elected
legislative bodies,10 nor to the ordinary exercise of judicial powers,11 nor to
the formulation of policy or the initiation of legislation by the executive,12 nor

7 Section 3(1) provides that ‘administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights or
legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally fair’.
8 As to the meaning of that phrase see Currie & Klaaren, fn 3, para 2.33.
9 SA Rugby Football Union, fn 4, para 141.
10 Fedsure, fn 4, para 45; SA Rugby Football Union, fn 4, para 140.
11 Nel v Le Roux NO 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) para 24; SA Rugby Football Union, fn 4, para 140.
12 SA Rugby Football Union, fn 4, para 142.

to the exercise of original powers conferred upon the President as head of
state.13 Administrative action is rather, in general terms, the conduct of the
bureaucracy (whoever the bureaucratic functionary might be) in carrying out
the daily functions of the state which necessarily involves the application of
policy, usually after its translation into law, with direct and immediate
consequences for individuals or groups of individuals.14
[25] The law reports are replete with examples of conduct of that kind. But
the exercise of public power generally occurs as a continuum with no bright
line marking the transition from one form to another and it is in that
transitional area in particular that
‘[d]ifficult boundaries may have to be drawn in deciding what should and what should not
be characterised as administrative action for the purposes of s 33’.15
In making that determination
‘[a] series of considerations may be relevant to deciding on which side of the line a
particular action falls. The source of the power, though not necessarily decisive, is a
relevant factor. So, too, is the nature of the power, its subject matter, whether it involves
the exercise of a public duty and how closely it is related on the one hand to policy matters,
which are not administrative, and on the other to the implementation of legislation, which
is. While the subject-matter of a power is not relevant to determine whether constitutional
review is appropriate, it is relevant to determine whether the exercise of the power
constitutes administrative action for the purposes of s 33.’16
It has also been emphasised that the difficult boundaries

13 SA Rugby Football Union, fn 4, paras 145.- 147.
14 SA Rugby Football Union, fn 4, paras 136 and 146.
15 SA Rugby Football Union, fn 4, para 143.
16 SA Rugby Football Union, fn 4, para 143.

‘will need to be drawn carefully in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and the
overall constitutional purpose of an efficient, equitable and ethical public administration.
This can best be done on a case by case basis.’17
[26] It was submitted on behalf of the Minister that because the state is the
owner of the property that is now in issue, and has all the ordinary rights of
ownership, it may use the property as if it was a private owner and its conduct
in doing so is not administrative action. While it is true that the state enjoys
the private rights of ownership it was pointed out in Minister of Public Works
v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association18 that those rights are to be
asserted within the framework of the Constitution. What is in issue in the
present case is not the use to which state ownership is being put but rather the
manner in which those rights of ownership have been asserted.
[27] In Bullock NO v Provincial Government, North West Province19 it was
held by this court that the disposal of a right in state property (the right in that
case was a servitude) constituted administrative action for purposes of s 33 of
the Constitution (as it then read).20 It was submitted on behalf of the Minister
that Bullock’s case is distinguishable because in that case the rights were
alienated in the belief that the provincial government was obliged to do so,21
whereas in the present case the impugned decision ‘amounts to a policy

17 SA Rugby Football Union, fn 4, para 143.
18 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC) para 40.
19 2004 (5) SA 262 (SCA)
20 Until PAJA came into effect s 33(1) and 33(2) were to be read as set out in item 23(2)(b) of Schedule 6 to
the Constitution but that is not material for present purposes.
21 Bullock, fn 16, para 15: ‘The first respondent did not purport to dispose of the right pursuant to a policy a
policy decision taken in the light of broad policy considerations; it disposed of the right because it thought it
was obliged to do so.’

decision’ (the words are taken from the heads of argument). There will be few
administrative acts that are devoid of underlying policy – indeed,
administrative action is most often the implementation of policy that has been
given legal effect – but the execution of policy is not equivalent to its
formulation. The decision in the present case was not one of policy
formulation but of execution.  No matter that the motivation for making the
decision differed from that in Bullock I do not think that the decisions in each
case are materially distinguishable.
[28] Nor do I think there are grounds for distinguishing administrative
action as contemplated by s 33 of the Constitution from administrative action
envisaged by PAJA (at least within the context of the decision that is now in
issue). If the qualifications in PAJA’s definition purport to exclude from its
ambit some acts that would otherwise constitute administrative action for
purposes of s 33 none of them are material to the case that is before us. The
Minister’s decision was made in the exercise of a public power conferred by
legislation, in the ordinary course of administering the property of the state,
and with immediate and direct legal consequences (at least for Bluefin) and I
see no reason to differ from the conclusion in Bullock that it constituted
administrative action.22

22 Transnet Ltd v Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 853 (SCA) and Logbro Properties CC v
Bedderson NO 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA) (which distinguished Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection
Services (Western Cape) CC 2001 (3) SA 1013 (SCA)) and Metro Projects CC v Klerksdorp Local
Municipality 2004 (1) SA 16 (SCA) are consistent with and afford some support for that construction.

[29] But s 3(1) of PAJA confers a right to procedural fairness only in respect
of administrative action that ‘materially and adversely affects the rights or
legitimate expectations of any person.’23
[30] While ‘rights’ may have a wider connotation in this context,24 and may
include prospective rights that have yet to accrue,25 it is difficult to see how
the term could encompass interests that fall short of that.26 It has not been
shown that any rights – or even prospective rights – of any of the appellants
(or of any other person) have been adversely affected by the Minister’s
decision. None of the appellants have any right to use the property that has
been let, or to restrict its use by others, nor has any case been made out that
their rights of occupation of their own premises have been unlawfully
compromised. As pointed out in Kyalami Ridge,27 at para 95:
‘The general rule is that the reasonable use of property by an owner is not subject to
restrictions, even if such user causes prejudice to others.’28
[31] Although in Bullock’s case – in which the aggrieved party had
continuously hired the affected property over a period of 32 years and had
erected structures on the property that were vital for the use of its own
property – an interest falling short even of a prospective right was recognised,
it might be that the court had in mind rather a legitimate expectation,

23 There was no suggestion in the present case that a right in broader terms is conferred by the Constitution
itself.
24 Premier, Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, Association of State-aided Schools 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC)
para 31.
25 Kyalami Ridge, para 100
26 Kyalami Ridge, para 100, but cf. Bullock para 19.
27 Fn 18.
28 Cf Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 102 (A) 106H.

grounded in past practice, that the affected property would continue to be
available for the use of the aggrieved party. But even if reliance may be
placed on an interest falling short of a prospective right – of which I am
doubtful – I do not think that the appellants have shown that they have a
peculiar interest transcending those enjoyed by the public at large.
[32] Nor has it been shown that any of the appellants (or any other person)
has a legitimate expectation that the property would be left vacant, or even
that they would be consulted, or their comments invited, before it was let. In
considering what conduct would give rise to a legitimate expectation Corbett
CJ, in Administrator, Transvaal v Traub,29cited the following passage from
the speech of Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in Council of Civil Service Unions v
Minister for the Civil Service:30
‘Legitimate, or reasonable, expectation may arise either from an express promise
given on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the
claimant can reasonably expect to continue.’
Those requirements were considered in greater detail in National Director of
Public Prosecutions v Phillips,31 which was cited with approval by this court
in South African Veterinary Council v Szymanski.32
[33] Although the property was physically vacant before it was let to
Bluefin and was available in practice for the general use of tenants and the
public at large counsel for the appellants could point us to no conduct on the

29 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) 756I, cited with approval in SA Rugby Football Union, fn 4, para 212.
30 [1984] 3 All ER 935 (HL) 944a-b.
31 2002 (4) SA 60 (W) para 28.
32 2003 (4) SA 42 (SCA) para 19.

part of the state or any of its officials to suggest that the appellants were
brought under the impression that that state of affairs would continue
indefinitely or even that they would be invited to comment before its use was
altered.33 On the contrary, when the Yacht Club sought an undertaking to that
effect the undertaking was expressly refused. Moreover, in recent years at
least, it was not the state that permitted that use of Lot 86, but rather the Yacht
Club, which was the tenant.
[34] The appellants also submitted – although this was not pertinently raised
in the founding affidavit – that the Minister’s decision was irrational and
arbitrary and falls to be set aside in terms of s 6 of PAJA. In advancing that
submission much was sought to be made of the view that Environmental
Affairs had taken of the matter, which, it was submitted, amounted to a policy
to leave the property vacant, with which Public Works had ‘aligned itself’
before the Minister’s decision was taken. It was submitted that the Minister’s
decision was arbitrary and irrational because it purported to vary that policy,
and in any event, because it failed to take account of the traffic congestion
that would result from the proposed development of the property and the
effect of depriving tenants and others of parking and ready access to the
water.
[35] I do not think the evidence established the existence of a policy on the
part of Environmental Affairs – it showed no more than that Environmental
Affairs held views from time to time as to the best use of the property – nor

33 Cf Kyalami Ridge, fn 18, para 99

that Public Works aligned itself with any policy and even less that it adopted
the views of Environmental Affairs as its own. Nor does the evidence
establish that the Minister failed to take account of the consequences of the
property being developed by Bluefin. If the appellants were entitled to seek to
review the Minister’s decision on the grounds set out in terms of s 6 of PAJA
– a matter on which I express no opinion – there are no proper grounds for
finding that the Minister’s decision was arbitrary or irrational and there is no
merit in those submissions.
[36] The appellants have not established proper grounds for impugning the
Minister’s decision and the court a quo correctly dismissed the application
and set aside the temporary interdict. The appeal is dismissed with costs, for
which the appellants are to be jointly and severally liable, which are to
include the costs of two counsel.

__________________
R W NUGENT
JUDGE OF APPEAL

CONCUR:
SCOTT JA)
NAVSA JA)
MTHIYANE JA)
MAYA AJA)