REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

Case number: 18/2001
Reportable

In the matter between:

RD JACKSON
Appellant

and

DG JACKSON
Respondent

CORAM:
HEFER ACJ; MARAIS and SCOTT JJA; CLOETE and
BRAND AJJA

HEARD:

5 NOVEMBER 2001

DELIVERED:       29 NOVEMBER 2001

SUMMARY
Variation of custody order after divorce – onus; factors relevant where custodian spouse wishes to
emigrate with the children.

_____________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________________

CLOETE AJA:

INTRODUCTION
[1] The appellant is the father of two girls Danica and Tasya now aged
nine-and-a-half and seven years respectively.  The respondent is the girls’
mother.  The parties were previously married.  They divorced on 22
December 1998.  The appellant brought an action for leave to remove the
children from South Africa in order to emigrate to Australia.
[2] In May 2000 leave was granted by the judge of first instance (Jappie
J) who gave the following order:
‘1.
The plaintiff is authorised to remove the two minor children born of the
previous marriage namely:-

Danica Skye Jackson and Tasya Erin Jackson permanently from the
jurisdiction of this court for permanent residence in Australia.
2.
That insofar as it may be necessary, the defendant is directed forthwith to
sign all such documents and take all such other steps as are necessary to enable
the plaintiff lawfully to remove the children from the Republic of South Africa,
failing which the sheriff of this Court is authorised to take all such steps on her
behalf.
3.
That the access provisions pertaining to the minor children contained in
the final order of divorce under Case Number 10189/98 is varied by the deletion
of paragraph 3 and substituted therefor is the following:-
3.1
It is recorded that the children would live permanently with the
plaintiff in Australia.
3.2
The defendant shall have access to the children as follows:-
3.2.1 Reasonable rights of access to the children in Australia
whenever the defendant happens to be in the place where
the children reside.

3.2.2 For a three week period in South Africa to coincide as far
as possible with the children’s mid-year school holiday, as
well as a four week period in South Africa to alternate
between 20th December and 17th January on the one hand
and 2nd January to 30 January on the other each alternate
year.
3.2.3 Regular telephonic access with the children at such
reasonable times as the defendant wishes to speak to them.
3.2.4 Access as provided in 3.2.2., or any portion thereof, may be
exercised in Australia if the defendant so wishes.
3.3
The plaintiff shall be responsible for making the necessary
travelling arrangement for the children for those access periods
during which the defendant intends to exercise her rights as
aforesaid and shall notify the defendant in writing one calendar
month before the proposed access period for such travelling
arrangements.  The travelling costs incurred in respect of the
children for the purposes of such access shall be borne by the
plaintiff.
3.4
The defendant shall notify the plaintiff in writing prior to
exercising her rights of access precisely where she will spend her
time with the children and would furnish him with the relevant
addresses and telephone numbers so that he can contact them.  The
plaintiff shall have the right to have telephonic contact with the
children during the defendant’s access period.
3.5
The plaintiff shall furnish the defendant at regular intervals with
copies of the children’s school reports and photographs.  The
plaintiff furthermore will encourage the children to correspond
regularly with the defendant.
3.6
The plaintiff is directed, at his own cost to take all steps necessary
to cause this order to be made an order of the Family Court having
jurisdiction in Australia and/or such other steps as may be

necessary as to ensure that this order is enforceable in Australia,
and to provide proof thereof to the defendant as soon as such order
of the said Family Court has been granted and/or such other
necessary steps have been taken.
4.
Each party is to pay their own cost of these proceedings.’
[3] The order given by the trial court was overturned by the full court of
the Natal Provincial Division (Levinsohn J; Booysen J and Moleko AJ
concurring).  The appellant now appeals further with the special leave of this
Court.
[4] The divorce was unopposed.  Custody of the girls was granted to the
appellant.  Generous rights of access were accorded to the respondent, who
was entitled to have the girls every Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday from
5:30 pm to 7 am the following morning and every alternate Sunday from 7
am until 7 am the following Monday; and also for alternate school holidays
(the December holiday being divided into two periods).
ONUS
[5] The relief sought by the appellant of necessity involved a variation of
this order and the appellant accordingly bore the onus of showing on a
balance of probabilities that such a variation should be granted1, although it
must immediately be said that because the interests of minor children were
involved, the litigation really amounted to a judicial investigation of what

1 Bailey v Bailey 1979(3) SA 128(A) at 135D-136D; Stock v Stock 1981(3) SA 1280(A) at 1290G-H.

was in their best interests: the court was not bound by the contentions of the
parties and was entitled  mero motu to call evidence2.
[6] The guiding principle in matters such as the present, as indeed in all
cases involving children, is that the interests of the children are paramount.
That approach is apparent from previous decisions of this Court3 and it is
now entrenched in the Constitution4, section 28(2) of which provides:
‘A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning
the child’.
Nevertheless, where a matter goes on appeal, the general principle that a
court of appeal must of necessity be guided by the trial judge’s impression of
the witnesses does not cease to be of application.  As Innes CJ said in
Oberholzer v Oberholzer 1921 AD 272 at 274:
‘These matrimonial causes throw a great responsibility upon a judge of first
instance, with the exercise of which we should be slow to interfere.  He is able not
only to estimate the credibility of the parties, but to judge of their temperament
and character.  And we, who have not had the advantage of seeing and hearing
them, must be careful not to interfere, unless we are certain, on firm grounds, that
he is wrong.’
These remarks are equally applicable to custody matters:  Cook v Cook 1937
AD 154 at 166 and 168; Fletcher v Fletcher (supra, footnote 3) at 138 and
Bailey v Bailey (supra, footnote 1) at 141 D-G.

2 Shawzin v Laufer 1968(4) SA 657(A) at 662G-663B; B v S 1995(3) SA 571(A) at 584I-585B.
3 Fletcher v Fletcher 1948(1) SA 130(A) at 134; Fortune v Fortune 1955(3) SA 348(A) at 353H-354C;
Shawzin v Laufer (supra, fn. 2) at 662G-663B; Bailey v Bailey (supra, fn. 1) loc. cit.; Stock v Stock (supra,
fn. 1) at 1290F-1291C; B v S (supra, fn. 2) at 580B-582C, 585C-F and 586C-I; T v M 1997(1) SA 54(A) at
57H-I.
4 Act 108 of 1996.

[7] I now proceed to examine the factors relevant to the decision whether
it is in the children’s best interests for them to emigrate to Australia with the
appellant.
ADVANTAGES OF AUSTRALIA
[8] Perhaps the most significant feature of the present matter is that whilst
the parties were married, they went to Australia with the express purpose of
deciding whether to emigrate and they then decided that they would settle
with the girls in Brisbane.  Even for some six months after they were
divorced, the respondent still intended to emigrate.  She changed her mind
for personal reasons, which had nothing to do with the welfare of the
children or the suitability of Brisbane as a place to settle.
[9] Part of the appellant’s evidence, given in response to questions put by
the trial judge, was the following:
‘I have no personal desire without children to migrate to Australia.  I am doing it
for the sake of the children because I believe it’s better.
And why do you believe that?  ---M’Lord, it perhaps became clearer on this last
visit that I did in 1999 in the difference that has occurred in my lifestyle here, in
the lifestyle of average citizens of South Africa, and specifically Durban, in
comparison with the upbeat change in attitude in Brisbane.  I feel the people there
have become happier, safer, and it’s only in going there in 1996, and having gone
there in 1999 that I noticed how much worse we’ve become, and how much more
depressed people are around you, and how we’ve forgotten to have fun.  We
really have.  And how suppressed my children are.  How they just do not lead a
normal life like I used to lead when I was a kid.  Things have become – they’ve
just become so burdened with the crime, the AIDS, the problems in education, the

concerns that their parents feel for hospitalisation, etc.  It is passed on to them.  So
I think with all of those factors  I made the decision that, in the best interests of
the children, they must move at this stage ...’

[10[ The learned trial judge found (and these findings were not challenged
before this Court):
‘The major factors which motivated the parties to emigrate and which are still the
primary factors which motivate the plaintiff to leave South Africa to settle
permanently in Australia are the following:-
The plaintiff has expressed his concern at the level of crime in South Africa.  The
plaintiff has expressed concern that he as well as his daughters may themselves
become victims of violent crimes.  This compels him to live a constrained and
defensive mode of life.  The plaintiff regards this situation as being an unhappy
and unhealthy context within which the children would grow up should they
remain in South Africa.  There are friends who are close associates of the plaintiff
who themselves had been victims of violent crimes.  Among these were the girls’
after-care teacher, Miss Dawn Oldfield; Miss Gale Patterson and a doctor who is a
close neighbour of the plaintiff.  Coupled with the concern about the crime rate in
South Africa the plaintiff is concerned about the HIV infection rate in the
Republic.  This according to expert testimony has now grown to alarming
proportions and will in the foreseeable future have considerable negative impact
on the way of life of all South Africans.
It was the evidence of the plaintiff and Miss Patterson that the education system in
Brisbane that would be available for the girls is, insofar as private schools are
concerned, as good as, if not better, than that available in South Africa.  On the
evidence it would appear that there is also an excellent public healthcare system
available.  The social and recreational facilities and services are excellent.  This
evidence was not challenged.’

(The ‘Miss Patterson’ – actually Mrs Patterson - to whom reference is
made, is a divorced mother who by now has already emigrated to
Australia with her children and with whom it is the appellant’s
intention to set up house in Australia if allowed to emigrate with the
children.  Mrs Patterson and her children are well known to Danica
and Tasya.)

EMOTIONAL DAMAGE
[11] It was the respondent’s case that the children, particularly the younger
child Tasya, would suffer emotional damage were they to be separated from
her.  The experts were divided on this point.  So were the courts below.
[12] The learned trial judge held:
‘A number of experts testified.  They were Dr Joy Edelstein, Mr Francois De
Marigny, Mrs Sally Van Minnen and Mrs Janet Killian.  These experts were in
agreement that a lengthy separation of the girls from their mother would be
emotionally painful and especially so in the case of Tasya.  It was however the
opinion of Dr Edelstein and Francois De Marigny that as the bond between the
defendant and the children has been firmly established, it is unlikely that a
separation between the defendant and the girls would be so traumatic that it would
have a lasting psychological effect.  According to Marigny, the two minor
children are at the optimum stage of their psycho-social development to adapt to
the cultural and lifestyle changes which would occur with emigration.  All the
experts recommended regular contact between mother and daughters as well as on
going non-physical access by the defendant to the children.  Although both Janet
Killian and Mrs Sally Van Minnen have expressed an opinion that it would not be
in the children’s interest to permit them to emigrate with the plaintiff, their
opinions appear to be based largely on sympathy for the defendant.  In my view,

much of their evidence has shown a bias in favour of the defendant rather than an
objective assessment of the present situation’.

[13] The full court found:
‘Now in the Court a quo the learned Judge was not impressed with Mrs Killian’s
evidence.  He found that she displayed signs of bias in favour of the Defendant.
There is much to be said for this view.  Mrs Killian’s opinions are to a large
extent coloured by the fact that she believed that an injustice had been perpetrated
against the Defendant when the Defendant was deprived by the Plaintiff of her
rightful place as the custodian of the children.  Notwithstanding this I do not think
that her opinions can be thrust aside in their entirety.  She is after all a clinical
psychologist of many years standing.  She has also done a specific study on
questions of risk and resilience.  Her opinions particularly about Tasya cannot be
ignored.  All the experts including the Court are looking into the proverbial
crystal ball attempting to determine what is likely or unlikely to happen.  Mrs
Killian is adamant that Tasya taken away from her mother will suffer emotional
damage.  Drs Edelstein and de Marigny think it is unlikely.  I am disposed to find
on this record that it has been established on a balance of probability that the
weight of the evidence points in the direction that there is a substantial risk factor
as far as the younger child is concerned’.

[14] Because of the importance of the possible emotional damage to the
children, I shall deal with the evidence in a little detail.
[15] The opinion of Mr de Marigny, a clinical psychologist called by the
appellant, as to the short, medium and long term effect on the children were
they to emigrate with the appellant, appears from the following passages in
his evidence (given under cross-examination):

‘In the short term if the children were to relocate with their father and whatever
support system he has to Australia, there would be a period of grieving, of
adjustment, but this is where my opinion of the developmental stage of the
children and the information that I have to say [sic] that they are well-adjusted
children, therefore their defence mechanisms are adequately formed for their ages.
The degree of resilience would be, in my opinion, adequate for them to, with time,
adapt to that situation.  So I’m giving information based on if this were to occur
whether the children would be traumatised to the point of being, let’s call it being
psychologically damaged or not.  In my opinion, no, they wouldn’t be.’
...
‘M’Lord, in my opinion, if we take divorce as a given – this has happened to this
family, and whatever Mr Jackson’s motives are to emigrate if, in effect, the
emigration is for the betterment of the children, medium and long term, it is my
opinion that if the children were prepared for this move and, as the other
professionals or experts have indicated, if Mr and Mrs Jackson are prepared to put
in significant time, effort and energy in compensating as much as possible for this
move, I do – it is my opinion that the children will adjust.  If the move is a
necessary move, and it happens, the ingredients for adequate adjustment appear to
be there.’
[16] Mrs Edelstein, also a clinical psychologist called by the appellant,
expressed the opinion that there would initially be trauma if the children
were to move to Australia, although they were of an age and had a support
system in their father which would help them cope adequately; that no long
term emotional or psychological trauma would be caused by the move; and
that their long term interests would be better served by such a move.
[17] Both Mr de Marigny and Mrs Edelstein were agreed that the optimal
time to move the children was at the time of the trial.  No reason to reject the

evidence of these witnesses appears from the record.  In particular, the
witnesses were in no way discredited in cross-examination, their expertise
was not challenged and there are several examples on the record where Mrs
Edelstein was at pains to be scrupulously impartial.
[18] The evidence of the two social workers called on behalf of the
respondent, namely, Mrs van Minnen and Mrs Scott, need not be dealt with
in any detail.  The evidence of Mrs van Minnen was not relied upon in this
Court.  Mrs Scott, who is also a family counsellor, did express the view that
if the children were not able to have regular access to their mother, they
would suffer emotionally; but as she herself stressed, she had no
psychological qualifications and she was constrained to agree that an expert
with better qualifications than she, who had also interviewed the children for
longer periods than she had, would be in a better position to express an
opinion on this issue.
[19] Mrs Killian, a clinical psychologist called by the respondent, said that
the probabilities were fairly good that Danica would be able to deal with the
problems of emigration and that she would be able to cope in the long term;
but that Tasya was still at a vulnerable age and was far more at risk in terms
of her overall adaptation, and that she would blame herself for what she
would see as an abandonment of her by the respondent.  Mrs Killian even

went so far as to suggest in cross-examination that Tasya would require
years of psychotherapy.  Mrs Killian, as the trial court found and the full
court acknowledged, was, however, biased.  Her undoubted expertise – she
had undertaken a special study of risk resilience in children, as emphasised
by the full court – cannot compensate for the partiality of her approach,
which inevitably detracts from the value of her evidence5.
[20] In my respectful view there was no justification for the conclusion of
the full court quoted in paragraph [13] above.  On the other hand, the
possibility that there may be some risk involved in the case of Tasya simply
cannot be excluded:  the experts were predicting the future and their
discipline is not an exact science.  There is in my view no real risk so far as
Danica is concerned.  The risk to Tasya must obviously be taken into
account because of the potentially serious consequences to her; and it is of
relevance to the ultimate decision which must be made, in respect of both
girls, for as Diemont JA said in Stock v Stock (supra, footnote 1) at 1290H -
1291A:
‘There are many factors to which the Court will have regard in determining
whether the welfare of the children calls for such variation.  So, for example,
where there are several children in the family, it may well be deemed inadvisable

5 Stock v Stock (supra, fn. 1) at 1296E-F:  “An expert in the field of psychology or psychiatry who is asked
to testify in a case of this nature [a custody dispute], a case in which difficult emotional, intellectual and
psychological problems arise within the family, must be made to understand that he is there to assist the
Court.  If he is to be helpful he must be neutral.  The evidence of such a witness is of little value where he,
or she, is partisan and consistently asserts the cause of the party who calls him.”

to separate the siblings.  Then again the Court will bear in mind that any variation
in the order will have a more lasting effect on the younger children than it will on
the older children who will become independent sooner and can then make their
own decisions.  In the case before us the older girl is now 16 years of age and
likely to become independent soon; the younger girl is only 8 years old.  For this
reason more weight may have to be given to the effects on the younger children of
an amendment of the custody arrangements in the case where the relative ages
warrant this.  It will be seen that it is not simply a matter of just counting heads.
Furthermore the interests of one child may be seriously prejudiced by moving him
to another country, whereas the other children will benefit only slightly.  In such a
case the prejudice to the one child may be a weightier consideration than the
slight benefit to the others.’

[21] It is of course so that the sense of personal loss which the respondent
will feel if her children emigrate will be profound and that, at least initially,
the children will also grieve.  Sadly, one’s sympathy for the respondent and
one’s reluctance to subject the children to even temporary emotional trauma
cannot be accommodated if one is convinced that the interests of the children
will be served best by allowing them to emigrate with their father.  Some
consolation exists (although the respondent, understandably, will find that
hard to accept) in the generous financial steps which the appellant is
prepared to take to enable the respondent to the children spend substantial
quality time with her despite the geographical distance which emigration
will put between them.

THE PARENTS’ PAST BEHAVIOUR
[22] A good deal of time was spent at the trial on question of whether the
appellant had misled the respondent about the import of one of the social
worker’s reports which was obtained prior to the hearing of the action for
divorce and whether that led to her agreeing to him being given custody of
the children.  Both courts were sceptical of both the appellant’s and the
respondent’s evidence in that regard.  Some time was also spent on the
respondent’s transient relationships with other men since the divorce and in
particular her visit to Canada to decide whether her future lay with one of
them, whilst that entailed being away from the children for three weeks at a
time when they were emotionally vulnerable because of the recent separation
of their parents.  Little is to be gained by attempting to assess to what degree
these actions merit criticism, if any.  They throw no real light on what is now
in the best interests of the children nor do they give reason to believe that the
appellant will seek to deny the respondent the access tendered by him and
embodied in the order given by the learned trial judge, or that the respondent
will not exercise that access should the children emigrate to Australia with
their father.

THE STATUS QUO
[23] Much was made by the full court and by counsel for the respondent of
the existing arrangements regarding access which were said to be tantamount
to joint custody.  The access to the children which the respondent currently
has is extensive and the appellant is obliged to consult her with regard to
their “health, education and any child minders”.  However, that falls far
short of joint custody.  While the appellant is obliged to consult the
respondent about their health, education and child minders, the ultimate
decision is his to make.  Moreover there are important areas of the children’s
lives which he alone may regulate such as what social activities are
permissible; with which other children they may consort, in which other
homes they may spend the night or part of school holidays; whether they
may ride bicycles and the like or participate in boating, skateboarding, of
rollerblading, and, if so, where.  The list is not exhaustive but it suffices to
show that the respondent’s position cannot be equated with that of a joint
custodian.
[24] The counterclaim by the respondent for a variation of the custody
order was withdrawn by the respondent when the appellant made it clear that
he would remain in South Africa if permission to take the children with him
to Australia were to be refused.  The respondent has thus chosen to

acquiesce in the appellant retaining his role as the custodian parent as long
as he remains in South Africa with the children.  It is true that her
acquiescence cannot be taken to extend to the changed situation which
would arise if permission were given to the appellant to take the children to
Australia and that it might theoretically be open to her to resuscitate the
issue of a variation of the custody order but, once it has been concluded that
it is in the best interests of the children that they be permitted to emigrate
with their father, it is quite unrealistic to suppose that any such application
could succeed.  It is not a situation in which it could be argued that the
appellant had become, solely by reason of his emigration, an unsuitable
custodian.  Accordingly, an attempt to have the existing custody order varied
merely by reason of the impending emigration to Australia would in reality
amount to an attempt to re-open an issue which had already been resolved,
namely, whether it was in the best interests of the children to go to Brisbane
with their father despite the curtailment of the respondent’s rights of access
which that entails.  It is therefore encumbent upon the court to consider the
question before it on the footing that, whatever its decision may be, the
appellant is and will continue to be the custodian parent.
[25] The presently existing extensive rights of access have facilitated a
considerable amount of joint parenting by the parties up until now, but they

cannot be regarded as a continuing point of departure in assessing the best
interests of the children as they grow older – even were the appellant to
continue to reside in KwaZulu-Natal, a possibility that the trial court
considered unlikely for the reasons appearing from the passage quoted in
paragraph [32] below and with which I respectfully agree.  The present
arrangement is likely to prove increasingly disruptive for the girls.  Indeed,
even Mrs Killian (the psychologist called to give evidence by the
respondent) expressed the view that the existing arrangement was too
disruptive for the children and that alternative weeks (instead of split weeks)
with each of the parents would be preferable.  I have little doubt that, as the
children grow older, even alternate weeks will prove irksome and disruptive
to them as their educational, sporting, cultural, recreational and social
horizons expand.  If the best interests of the children are to prevail as the
future unfolds, that is likely to lead to diminished access by the respondent.
[26] This is not a case in which it is possible to take the easy way out by
saying that at present the children’s best interests are not being adversely
affected and that, if and when they are, it will be time enough to allow them
to emigrate with their father.  Emigration to Australia is not an ever present
option for the appellant.  Its availability will diminish as the years go by.

The potential for unhappiness and regret if the appellant and the girls do not
emigrate now appears from the following evidence given by the appellant:
‘I think to remain here, and to sit back, in five years’ time when I’m no longer
able to get entry into Australia ... and say, “I wish we had because we could have
then but we can’t now”, I would feel very distressed that I’d have to tell my
children that I had the opportunity, and didn’t take it.  If we go over, and things
don’t work out, we do have the option of returning.  If things improve
dramatically here in Africa, we have that option of returning, but I don’t have the
option in five years or ten years’ time of leaving with the children, and making a
new life for them – a suitable life for them – and we may just regret that at the
end.’

As for the children, by the time they are old enough to form their own
responsible judgments, and should they choose to emigrate, their prospects
of being admitted entry in their own right may well be non-existent.
[27] The full court was also influenced by the separation of the children
from Darren (the respondent’s son of a previous marriage) which emigration
would involve.  In this Court counsel for the respondent correctly conceded
that this was not a significant factor:  Darren is now nearly 16 years of age
and increasingly likely to have little in common (in terms of shared interests)
with the two little girls.
[28] In short, I do not think that the presently beneficial aspects of the
status quo should be allowed to loom so large in assessing what will be in
the best interests of the children as they progress from childhood through
adolescence to adulthood.

DECISION OF THE CUSTODIAN PARENT
[29] Counsel representing the appellant relied on the decision of the
English Court of Appeal in P(LM)(otherwise E) v P(GE) [1970] 3 ALL ER
659(CA) and more particularly on the following passage which appears in
the judgment of Sachs LJ at 662h-j:
‘When a marriage breaks up, then a situation normally arises when the child of
that marriage, instead of being in the joint custody of both parents, must of
necessity become one who is in the custody of a single parent.  Once that position
has arisen and the custody is working well, this court should not likely interfere
with such reasonable way of life as is selected by that parent to whom custody has
been rightly given.  Any such interference may, as Winn LJ has pointed out,
produce considerable strains which would be unfair not only to the parent whose
way of life is interfered with but also to any new marriage of that parent.  In that
way it might well in due course reflect on the welfare of the child.  The way in
which the parent who properly has custody of a child may choose in a reasonable
manner to order his or her way of life is one of those things which the parent who
has not been given custody may well have to bear, even though one has every
sympathy with the latter on some of the results.’

[30] The approach of the English Court of Appeal in P’s case, which has
been followed in numerous cases decided subsequently6, was explained by
Ormrod LJ in Chamberlain v De la Mare (supra, footnote 6) at 442C-D and
443B-C as follows:

6 Nash v Nash [1993] 2 All ER 704 (CA); A v A (child: removal from jurisdiction) (1979) 1 FLR 380(CA);
Chamberlain v de la Mare (1983) 4 FLR 434 at 439 (CA); Lonslow v Henning (formerly Lonslow) [1986] 2
FLR 378 (CA); Belton v Belton [1987] 2 FLR 343 (CA); Re F (a ward)(leave to remove ward out of the
jurisdiction) [1988] 2 FLR 116(CA); Tyler v Tyler [1989] 2 FLR 158(CA); Re H (application to remove
from jurisdiction) [1999] 2 FCR 34(CA).

‘What Sachs LJ was saying, I think, is that if the court interferes with the way of
life which the custodial parent is proposing to adopt so that he or she and the new
spouse are compelled adopt a manner of life which they do not want, and
reasonably do not want, the likelihood is that the frustrations and bitterness which
would result from such an interference with any adult whose career is at stake
would be bound to overflow on to children.
...
The reason why the court should not interfere with the reasonable decision of the
custodial parent, assuming, as this case does, that the custodial parent is still going
to be responsible for the children, is, as I have said, the almost inevitable
bitterness which such an interference by the court is likely to produce.
Consequently, in ordinary sensible human terms the court should not do
something which is, prima facie, unreasonable unless there is some compelling
reason to the contrary.  That I believe to be the correct approach.’

Thus explained, the approach of the English Court of Appeal reflects the
perspective dictated by our Constitution and accords with our law.  In Bailey
v Bailey (supra, footnote 1) the court a quo said7:
‘I have no doubt that applicant will be in a position to provide the children with a
happier and more stable home in England than if she remains here, a lonely and
discontented person longing to return to England ... I am satisfied that it is, in fact,
in the best interests of these children that the mother as their custodian can
establish a home for them in the country in which she desires to be and where she
will be able to provide a happier and more stable home for them.  A happy and
contented mother is surely of the essence of a happy and stable home, and the
more so where she is the custodian parent.’

7 1979(3) SA 128(A) at 142 B and G.

Trengrove JA said at 144D-F:
‘Counsel submitted that the learned Judge was clearly influenced by his
conviction that the respondent would become “a lonely and discontented person,
longing to return to England”.  He argued that this was a misdirection, for the
respondent has made no such allegation on the papers, and the learned Judge
himself has not made any explicit finding to this effect.  There is no real substance
in this contention.  It is a fair inference, from her statements in her affidavits, that
the respondent is a most unhappy, perhaps even embittered woman, at present.
She is filled with resentment against the appellant whom she blames for the
breakdown of their marriage and, what is even more important, the continuing
dissension between them and she is longing to return to England, with her
children, to be close to her family relations; and, if she is not given permission to
go, the learned Judge’s description of the appellant may well come true.’

[31] The full court distinguished P’s case on the basis that:
‘It is not without significance that the [appellant] will remain in South Africa if he
is refused permission to take the children with him.  That factor removes the case
from the principle which was enunciated in the case of P(LM) v P(GE) ...’
This was a misreading of the facts in P’s case: in that matter the stepfather
and the mother expressly indicated that should leave to take the child to New
Zealand be refused, they would give up their plans to go there8.
[32] The appellant is a civil engineer.  The learned trial judge held:
‘A further factor which has motivated the plaintiff to leave the Republic of South
Africa for Australia is that he believes that his economic prospects are better in
Australia.  According to the evidence the economic position of companies in the
civil engineering industry in which the plaintiff’s companies participate has, over

8 [1970] 3 All ER 659(CA) at 660g-h.

the last few years, deteriorated and is particularly vulnerable to the social and
economic dynamics of the present day and will continue to be so for the
foreseeable future.  This is particularly so in KwaZulu-Natal.  In his evidence, the
plaintiff pointed out that if he was unable to emigrate to Australia with the
children, and were to remain in South Africa for he does not intend to leave
without them, then for economic reasons, he would have to relocate from
KwaZulu-Natal and in all likelihood relocate his business activities to Cape
Town.’

The appellant’s lack of enthusiasm for the last option is reflected in his
description of it as ‘a reasonable survival tactic’.  The finding of the full
court that ‘this is not a case where a person wishes to move with the children
to
further
his
career
or
business
prospects’
accordingly
requires
qualification:  although the appellant was prepared to subordinate his
interests to those of the children, his interests (quite naturally) did play a part
in his decision and his own interests would, on the undisputed evidence, be
adversely affected if he were not to be permitted to emigrate with the
children.
[33] Yet there was no suggestion whatever during the trial, which lasted
some eight days, that the appellant would become bitter or frustrated if he
remained in South Africa.  Nor was this possibility so obvious that it could
remain unsaid.  Of course the possibility exists that the appellant may come
to regret having to stay in South Africa; but in view of his actions which

have always been dictated by his opinion as to what is in the best interests of
the children, and his obvious devotion to them, I do not for a moment
believe that there is any real possibility that he will take out any frustrations
which he may feel on them, or that he will allow any bitterness which he
may feel to impact on the happy relationship which he has with them and the
secure emotional environment which he has provided for them.  I do not
wish to be understood as saying that the appellant’s altruism should be held
against him, but I do not believe that in the present matter the factor much
stressed in the English cases should be accorded significance, much less be
decisive (as it was, with one exception9, in the cases decided by the Court of
Appeal).
[34] Reliance was also placed by the appellant’s counsel on part of the
dictum of Miller J (as he then was) in Du Preez v Du Preez 1969(3) SA
529(D) at 532C-G, approved by the majority of this Court in Bailey’s case
(supra, footnote 1) at 136 A-C.  Miller J said inter alia:
‘This is not to say that the opinion and desires of the custodian parent are to be
ignored or brushed aside; indeed, the Court takes upon itself a grave responsibility
if it decides to override the custodian parent’s decision as to what is best in the
interests of his child and will only do so after the most careful consideration of all
the circumstances, including the reasons for the custodian parent’s decision and
the emotions or impulses which have contributed to it.’

9 The exception is Tyler v Tyler (supra, fn.6).

This statement requires explanation.  The fact that a decision has been made
by the custodian parent does not give rise to some sort of rebuttable
presumption that such decision is correct.  The reason why a court is
reluctant to interfere with the decisions of a custodian parent is not only
because the custodian parent may, as a matter of fact, be in a better position
than the non-custodian parent in some cases to evaluate what is in the best
interests of a child but, more importantly, because the parent who bears the
primary responsibility of bringing up the child should as far as possible be
left to do just that.  It is, however, a constitutional imperative that the
interests of children remain  paramount.   That is the  ‘central and constant
consideration’. 10  Accordingly, the reason why the ‘custodian parent’s
decision and the emotions or impulses which have contributed to it’ require
examination, is because that decision may be egocentric or prompted by a
desire to deny the non-custodian spouse access to the child – both of which
may not be in the best interests of the child itself.
CONCLUSION
[35] When I have regard to the various factors discussed above, I am not
persuaded that the learned trial judge was incorrect in his conclusion.  I
would, on the record, have come to the same conclusion.  The learned trial

10 Cf B v S (supra fn. 2) at 581J; T v M (supra, fn. 3) at 57 I.

judge had the additional advantage of seeing and hearing the parties and the
expert witnesses.  In matters such as the present it is not only in the
assessment of credibility that the judge of first instance enjoys an advantage;
that advantage extends to the assessment of the personality, sense of
responsibility and good faith of each of the parents.  The trial judge here has
not been shown to have misdirected himself in any material respect in
assessing where the best interests of the children lie nor, in my view, does
the recorded evidence show him to have been clearly wrong.  In my
respectful opinion, there was not sufficient justification for reversing the
considered decision of the trial judge.  On the contrary, there was good
reason to uphold it.  The immediate, medium and long term advantages to
the children of emigration to Australia, as they appear from the detailed
evidence given in this regard, are clearly established.  Indeed, the respondent
herself shared that view until she decided it was not in her personal interests
to emigrate.  I do not consider that the possibility that Tasya may suffer
emotional distress with which she may have some difficulty in coping,
outweighs those advantages; or that the risk of that occurring and causing
lasting psychological harm is of such an order that the interests of Danica for
whom (again, I stress, on the evidence) settlement in Australia with her

father would undoubtedly be highly beneficial, should be subordinated to it.
It goes without saying that there is no question of separating the children.
[36] For these reasons I would allow the appeal, with costs, and reinstate
the judgment of the court of first instance by setting aside the decision of the
full court, with costs.
......................
TD CLOETE
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL

SCOTT  JA:

[1] 
I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my brother Cloete.   I
regret that I cannot agree with the conclusion to which he has come.
[2] 
It is trite that in matters of this kind the interests of the children are the
first and paramount consideration.  It is no doubt true that generally speaking where,
following a divorce, the custodian parent wishes to emigrate, a court will not lightly
refuse leave for the children to be taken out of the country if the decision of the custodian
parent is shown to be bona fide and reasonable.  But this is not because of the so-called
rights of the custodian parent;  it is because,  in most cases, even if the access by the non-
custodian parent would be materially affected, it would not be in the best interests of the
children that the custodian parent be thwarted in his or her endeavour to emigrate in
pursuance of a decision reasonably and genuinely taken.  Indeed, one can well imagine
that in many situations such a refusal would inevitably result in bitterness and frustration
which would adversely affect the children.  But  what must be stressed is that each case
must be decided on its own particular facts.  No two cases are precisely the same and
while past decisions based on other facts may provide useful guide-lines they do no more

than that.   By the same token care should be taken not to elevate to rules of law the dicta
of judges made in the context of the peculiar facts and circumstances with which they
were concerned.  In my judgment the present case is one of those in which in all the
circumstances leave to take the children out of the country should have been refused.  I
am also satisfied that the Court a quo was justified in setting aside the decision of Jappie
J.
[3] 
The parties were divorced on 22 December 1998.  The younger daughter,
Tasya, was then only four years of age;  the elder daughter, Danica, was six.  The experts
were agreed that both parties were good parents but differed as to who should be given
custody.  The matter was settled and the appellant (“the father”) was awarded custody.
But the extent of the access afforded to the respondent (“the mother”) was such that each
parent was to have the children for almost an equal amount of time each week.  In terms
of the consent paper the mother was to have the children for three nights one week and
four nights the next.  She was also to have the children every alternate Sunday.  In
addition, she was to be consulted on matters relating to the health and education of the
children as well as in relation to their carers, presumably during the day.  As I have

indicated, it was common cause that the mother is a good parent.   Indeed, she was
described by Mrs Joy Edelstein, a clinical psychologist who gave evidence on behalf of
the father, as “a loving mother” who was “performing her task well”.   In these
circumstances, and having regard in particular to the tender age of the children, it is
difficult to imagine a court ever awarding custody to the father in the absence of an
arrangement along the lines of that agreed upon.
[4] 
Whether such a regime may properly be called de facto joint custody, or
shared access or whatever, is not in issue.  The point is that its consequence was that both
parents continued, albeit separately, to exercise their ordinary function as parents.  Of
importance is that following the divorce there was no separation between parent and child
of the kind that normally occurs upon divorce where the access of the non-custodian
parent is limited to something of the order of alternate weekends and in later years shared
school holidays.  As I have said, both parents continued to exercise a parenting function
in relation to the ordinary day to day welfare of the children.
[5] 
Whatever the demerits of the present arrangement may be – and it was
criticised for its disruptive effect on the children – the experts were agreed that both

children were coping well with the divorce and continued to enjoy secure attachments to
both parents.  Mrs Edelstein acknowledged that by reason of the amount of time the
mother spent with the children the bond between mother and daughters remained intact.
The relationship between them was a close one and in the case of the younger child,
Tasya, her relationship with her mother, whom she found to be the major source of love,
was closer than her relationship with her father.  Indeed, Tasya’s relationship with her
mother appears to have become closer subsequent to the divorce.  After making the point
that initially both parents were the main object of Tasya’s love, Mrs Edelstein, in her
evidence in chief, added the following:
“That has, I think, changed in the last report because it spans a whole difference
of a year, and I think now the younger child tends to have a closer relationship –
she loves both parents equally but she finds her mother the source, the major
source of love.”  (My emphasis)

[6] 
Within a year of the divorce the father approached the Court for leave to
take the children to Australia.  The mother had by then refused to consent to the move.
The father is a semi-retired civil engineer.  He is a man of considerable means with
business interests both in South Africa and abroad.  Although it would suit him to live in

Australia, his principal reason for wishing to emigrate was his conviction that Australia
was a better country in which to bring up children and that it was in their best long term
interests that they make Australia their home rather than remain in South Africa.  He
made it clear, however, that he would not emigrate without the children and if leave were
refused he would remain in South Africa.  In view of his attitude, the mother withdrew
her counter claim for custody.
[7] 
The question which ultimately had to be decided therefore was whether it
was in the best interests of the children for them, at the present stage of their lives, to
emigrate with their father to Australia leaving their mother back in South Africa, or
whether their interests would be better served by the retention of the status quo with the
children spending more or less equal time with each parent.    As appears from the
judgment of Cloete AJA, the trial Court decided that the former was in their best interests
but this decision was reversed by the full bench.  Before turning to the evidence of the
experts there are two preliminary aspects which require consideration.
[8] 
The first is the contention that the present arrangement cannot in any event
be maintained indefinitely and that as the girls grow older they will find it irksome and

increasingly disruptive.  The answer is that whatever changes might have to be made in
the best interests of the children in the future  should the existing regime be left
undisturbed for the present, is not in issue;  nor was it properly investigated.  If the father
were to relocate to another city in South Africa, as he says he might, the mother may well
be able to arrange for her employer to transfer her to that city.  Until that happens what
the solution would be in the best interests of the children is a matter of speculation.
There is certainly no basis for assuming that if the children do not go to Australia the
existing custody arrangement will in any event soon be varied so as to terminate the
parenting function which the mother presently exercises.  It was of course on the premise
that the existing relationship between mother and children be maintained that the father
was awarded custody in the first place.  Had it been clear it could not, the award of
custody may well have been different.  This is especially so in the light of the tender age
of the children and the acknowledged capability of the mother as a parent.
[9] 
The second is the fact that the mother herself had for some-while
favoured emigrating to Australia.  Prior to the divorce the parties had visited Australia
with this in mind and had considered Brisbane to be a suitable city in which to settle.

Even after the divorce the mother continued for some months to favour emigration. But
her support for Australia as a country in which to bring up the children was premised on
the assumption that she herself would emigrate and that the existing custody arrangement
would be maintained.  Once she took the decision not to emigrate, the situation from the
point of view of the welfare of the children changed entirely. Nor can her decision be
categorized as unreasonable in the circumstances.  To emigrate as a family, and with a
wealthy husband, is one thing, but following the divorce the picture changed.  She has a
good job in South Africa and has been with the same employer for the past 13 years.  She
also enjoys the support of her family.  To emigrate to Australia as a single parent with her
young son from a former marriage would obviously involve considerable risk and it is
understandable that she would not wish to be dependent on the appellant.
[10] 
Of particular importance in the present case  is the fact that there has as yet
been no real separation between mother and children.  To this extent therefore the present
case differs materially from all those where the access of the non-custodian parent is
limited to something in the region of alternate weekends.  Were the children to be taken
to Australia the consequence would be the replacement of the mother’s almost equal

parenting role with what in effect would be no more than biannual  visits of a few weeks
each.  Mrs Edelstein accepted that if the children were to emigrate they would initially
suffer a great deal of pain and trauma as a result of their separation from the mother.  She
thought this was justified in the light of her pessimistic view of the future of this country.
It is perhaps not without significance  that her husband had been the victim of a high-
jacking.  She was of the view, however, that the children would not suffer permanent
psychological harm as a result of the separation.   In support of her view, she referred to
the natural resilience of children but at the same time stressed the importance of the need
of the mother to maintain contact with the children.  Another clinical psychologist, Mr
Jean-Francois De Marigny,  also gave evidence on behalf of the father.  He had, however,
not consulted with the children or the parties and his evidence was tendered purely on a
theoretical basis.  He testified that on the information made available to him the children
were well bonded with both parents and were resilient.  He expressed the view that
provided sufficient effort were made by the mother to maintain contact with the children
the traumatising effect of the separation on them would not reach the point of causing
permanent damage.

[11] 
A different view was taken by Mrs Beverley Killian, a clinical
psychologist, Mrs Sally Van Minnen, a social worker, and Mrs Rosemary Scott, the
social worker and counsellor appointed by the family advocate.  (Mrs Van Minnen had
been engaged by the father to investigate the issue of custody at the time of the divorce,
but she had recommended that the mother be awarded custody and not the father.)  All
three were of the opinion that the children should not be separated from their mother and
therefore should not be taken to Australia.    Of particular importance was the evidence of
Mrs Killian.  She is a clinical psychologist of many years standing with experience
gained from working both in hospitals and in private practice.  She is presently a senior
lecturer in the department of psychology in the University of Natal.  She has furthermore
made a special study of risk and resilience in children which involves a study of the types
of children likely to be adversely affected by the vagaries of life in contrast with those
able to cope and rise up above adversity.  In her view Danica was a relatively resilient
child, but not Tasya whom she rated as an “at-risk” child with a poor self esteem and
whose attachments were less secure than those of Danica.  Furthermore, she said that
Tasya was still at the stage of egocentric reasoning and would perceive the move to

Australia as an “abandonment” by her mother rather than simply a separation.  In short,
while recognising that it is impossible to make any definite prediction, Mrs Killian was of
the view that both children would be adversely affected by the separation from their
mother but, unlike Danica who would probably be able to cope, Tasya would not;  she
was likely to perceive the separation as an abandonment by her mother which could have
serious psychological consequences for her in the future.
[12] 
What emerges from the evidence, viewed in its totality,  is that if removed
from their mother and taken to Australia both young girls, to use the words by Mrs
Edelstein, will suffer “a great deal of pain and trauma”.  Although opinions may differ, as
far as the younger child Tasya is concerned, there must, at the least, be a real risk of
psychological harm.  The father made it clear that his primary reason for wishing to
emigrate to Australia was for the sake of the children.  The question is therefore whether
the advantages of a move to Australia at this stage in the lives of these young children
justify the pain and trauma they will undoubtedly both experience and the real possibility
of Tasya suffering psychological harm.

[13] 
Much evidence was adduced on behalf of the father to highlight the
problems that confront South Africa at present.  These included the high crime rate, the
prospect of an aids epidemic and a bleak economic outlook.  By contrast, much was said
in praise of Australia.  But no problem is insoluble  and in a changing world the question
whether to emigrate or not is one on which opinions differ and to which there seldom is a
definite answer.  Nonetheless, one must accept the genuineness of the father’s assessment
of the quality of life available in the two countries, both at present and in the future.  The
father points out that as he grows older there is a greater risk that he may not be accepted
in Australia.  But by the same token as the young girls grow older the trauma of being
separated from one or other parent and the risk of harm will diminish.   When these two
considerations are weighed up I have little doubt that the inevitable pain and trauma to
both children and the risk of psychological harm to Tasya far outweigh the risk of
possibly not being able to emigrate when the children are older, if the circumstances still
warrant such a far-reaching step.
[14] 
I turn to the judgment of Jappie J.  After finding that the father’s wish to
emigrate with the children was reasonable and bona fide, he said the following:

“The defendant [the mother] is a good parent  and she is devoted to
the welfare of her children.  There is a strong bond between the girls
and the defendant.  However, she is the non-custodial parent.  As
already stated, the plaintiff [the father] who is the custodial parent has
decided to emigrate with the girls to Australia.  His decision to
emigrate is based on factors which he considers to be in the best
interest of the girls.  He has come to his decision in good faith.  It is a
settled principle of our law that a court will not readily interfere with
the responsibly and reasonably made decisions of a custodial parent.”

This passage requires comment.  As previously indicated, the inquiry in each
case is what is in the best interests of the children.  It is true that a court will
not readily interfere with a decision of the custodian parent which is
reasonably taken and in good faith.   But it will refrain from doing so
because to do otherwise would ordinarily not be in the children’s best
interests.  In the passage quoted, the judge refers to the fact that the mother
is a good and devoted parent and that there is a strong bond between mother
and children, but proceeds to  dismiss this as a relevant factor or at least
afford it less weight because the mother is the non-custodian parent.  To

afford less weight to something as important as the relationship between
mother and young daughters simply  because the former is the non-custodian
parent is to prefer the rights of the custodian parent over the interests of the
children.  That is a wrong approach.  It is particularly so on the facts of the
present case where both parents continued to exercise a more or less equal
parenting role and where there had been no real separation between children
and the “non-custodian” parent.  It cannot be over-emphasised that each case
must be decided on the basis of its own particular facts.  The question in
issue was whether it was in the interests of the children that they be
separated from the mother and taken to Australia.  That she was the “non-
custodian” parent was of no relevance to this inquiry.
[15] As far as the experts were concerned, Jappie J referred to the
opinion of Mrs Edelstein and Mr De Marigny, which was that “it is unlikely
that a separation between the defendant and the girls would be so traumatic

that it would have a lasting psychological effect”,  and then proceeded to
dismiss the views of Mrs Killian and Mrs Van Minnen in two sentences.
(The judgment contains no reference to the evidence of Mrs Scott.)  They
read –

“Although both Janet Killian and Mrs Sally Van Minnen have
expressed an opinion that it would not be in the children’s interest to
permit them to emigrate with the plaintiff, their opinions appear to be
based largely on sympathy for the defendant .  In my view, much of
their evidence [has] shown a bias in favour of the defendant rather
than an objective assessment of the present situation”.

The evidence of both these witnesses undoubtedly called for more attention
than it received.  Neither the finding that their opinions were based on
sympathy nor the finding of bias was in any way motivated.  Both witnesses
were firmly of the view that the mother, rather than the father, ought to have
been awarded custody at the time of the divorce.  Given the age of children,
their sex and the mother’s recognised parenting capabilities, such a view was

hardly unreasonable.  They also suggested that the mother had been misled
at the time by the father as to Mrs Van Minnen’s recommendation regarding
custody.  The Court a quo found this indeed to have been the case and
categorized the father’s conduct as “deserving of deprecation”.  But
whatever it was that the learned judge had in mind in saying that they were
sympathetic towards the mother, I can find nothing in the record to suggest
that their opinions were based on such sympathy.  As far as the reference to
bias and lack of objectivity is concerned, this was presumably intended to
indicate that the witnesses in question were partisan and unreasonably
supported the cause of the mother.  This is a far reaching finding to make of
a professional witness, particularly when the finding is unsupported by
reasons.  In my view it was unjustified.
[16] Much was made of the advantage of the trial judge who is
afforded the opportunity of observing the witnesses while they testify.  No

doubt this is true, but the advantage must not be over-emphasized;  this is all
the more so when the witness in question is a professional person such as a
psychologist.  As Diemont JA observed in Stock v Stock 1981 (3) SA 1280
(A) at 1296 F –

“…when it comes to assessing the credibility of such a witness (a
psychologist), this Court can test his reasoning and is accordingly to
that extent in as good a position as the trial Court was”.

[17] The evidence of Mrs Killian was of particular importance to the
mother’s case.  As previously indicated, she is a senior academic with many
years of practical experience in the field of psychology.  She spent many
hours
consulting
with
both
parents
and
the
children,
conducting
psychological tests and generally investigating the background to the
dispute.  Thereafter she compiled a detailed and  comprehensive report
which she elaborated  upon in her evidence.  Her view that Tasya’s
separation from her mother at this stage of her life could have serious

psychological consequences for her, was fully motivated.  By contrast, she
expressed the opinion that Danica would probably be able to cope with the
separation.  I can find nothing in her reasoning to suggest bias or lack of
objectivity  on her part.  In my view the trial judge misdirected himself by
simply disregarding the evidence of Mrs Killian.  The evidence of Mrs Van
Minnen and Mrs Scott was of lesser importance regarding the question of
psychological harm as they were social workers and not psychologists.  It is
accordingly unnecessary to deal with their evidence.
[18] It follows that in my view leave to take the children out of the
country ought to have been refused by the trial Court and the Court a quo
correctly set aside the decision of that Court.
[19] The appeal is dismissed with costs.

D G  SCOTT

JUDGE OF APPEAL

CONCUR

HEFER
ACJ
BRAND
AJA

MARAIS JA/

MARAIS JA: [1]
I have had the benefit of reading the judgments of both my
brothers Scott and Cloete.  The differing outcomes and the difference of opinion in the
judgments of the Court of first instance and the court a quo reflect just how difficult these
human (rather than legal) problems are.  On balance I share the conclusion which Cloete
AJA has reached.  In broad my reasons are that I do not believe that sufficient
justification existed for overruling the decision of the trial judge and because, in any
event, my own assessment of the evidence as a whole is that it would be in the best
interests of the children to allow their father to emigrate with them to Australia.
[2] In matters of this kind there are few certainties.  The disruption of the
existing situation which, although not ideal, is for the moment catering
adequately for the children’s needs and allows for continuing extensive
access to their mother, is obviously not something which should be
permitted unless the evidence convinces one that their best interests will be

substantially better served by tolerating the disruption.  But in considering
that question it is unavoidable that best estimates have to be made of the
likely results of preservation of the status quo in the immediate and
foreseeable future as compared with the likely results of disrupting it.
[3] Risk assessment plays a large role in the exercise and there will
always be legitimate differences of opinion in such an exercise.  Because of
its essentially speculative nature and the unfortunate consequences for
children of an assessment which the subsequent unfolding of events may
prove to have been wrong, it behoves a court of course not to be too easily
dismissive of identifiable risks.  But, for the same reason, the comfort
afforded by simply prolonging an existing situation should not lead a court
to magnify such risks unduly.   That is all the more so in a case where the
children stand to benefit greatly if the risks do not eventuate.  If a court,
conscious of and responsive to these caveats, does conclude that the risks are

too great to be run even when measured against the undoubted benefits to
the children which will accrue from emigration, it should refuse to allow
emigration.  If, on the other hand, it regards the risks as worth running in the
interests of the children, it should allow emigration.
[4] In the present case I think that that is really the bone of contention and
it is the differing assessments of the risk of permanent psychological damage
to Tasya which account for the differences of opinion which exist.  Although
the courts which have considered the matter have contented themselves with
findings that the appellant genuinely believes that Brisbane will offer the
children a substantially superior quality of life both now and in the
foreseeable future and that he is bona fide in wishing to take them there, they
abstained (Jappie J to a lesser degree) from making any express finding as to
whether, on the evidence before the court, the appellant was correct in so
believing.

[5] The reluctance of courts to make or to be seen to be making findings
of fact which may reflect adversely upon the quality of life in the countries
in which they are situated is entirely understandable.  It is an invidious task.
However, if they are to do their duty by children whose future is in their
hands, it is, in my respectful view, an obligation which cannot be avoided if
that quality of life is the dominant reason advanced for the contention that it
would be in their best interests to emigrate.  That is the case here.
[6] As to that, there is really no contest on the evidence.  It is the reason
why the respondent herself joined in believing, even after the divorce, that
the best interests of the children would still be served by relocating to
Brisbane.  A considerable body of evidence was placed before the court on
the superior quality of life available to the children there as compared with
that on offer here and there was no rebuttal of it.  The comparison made did
not relate to such trivia as to whether the beaches were better but to aspects

of life which are of critical and fundamental importance to the growth and
development of healthy, happy and stress-free children.  Nothing in that
respect has changed since the respondent held, and on the evidence
justifiably held, the view that a move to Australia was in the best interests of
the children.  All that has changed is her evaluation of her own purely
personal interests.  Her decision now is to give them pride of place.  That of
course is her right and, if her interests alone were the only consideration,
hardly unreasonable, but viewed from the perspective of the children’s best
interests, her change of mind has given rise to a conflict of interests.
Regrettably, it is the unenviable lot of the court to have to resolve the clash
of interests.  In doing so, it has to put the interests of the children first if the
conflicting interests cannot be reconciled.
[7] I am unable to agree that Jappie J misdirected himself in the respect
set forth in para [14] of the judgment of Scott JA.  He prefaced his

discussion of the case with the observation that “the only issue which has
now to be decided --- is, whether it is now in the best interest of the girls for
the [appellant] to be permitted to remove them permanently from the
jurisdiction of this court for permanent residence in Australia.”  Later in his
judgment he said  “Having considered all the evidence, and in particular the
[respondent’s] reasons for withholding her consent, I am nevertheless
persuaded that the interest of the children would be best served by allowing
them to accompany their father to Australia.”  He was aware that the
“practical effect of the access arrangements was such that each parent more
or less spent equal time with both their daughters”.  He was very much alive
to the possible risk of psychological damage if they went to Australia
without their mother and to the virtues of the status quo and he put pertinent
questions thereanent to the witnesses.  His entire approach to the case and
the approach of both counsel in the presentation of their cases was that the

best interests of the children were paramount and that, while a court would
not lightly overrule a custodian parent’s responsibly and reasonably made
decisions, it would be obliged to do so if it was satisfied it was in the best
interests of the children.
[8] This was not the usual class of case in which the judge is faced with a
custodian parent who wishes to emigrate for personal reasons and, from the
point of view of quality of life, the interests of the children would be equally
well served whether they go or stay, but the non-custodian parent with more
limited rights of access objects to the move.  It was a case in which, as
Jappie J was aware, the extensive rights of access enjoyed by the respondent
had resulted in her fulfilling a co-parenting role to a degree greater than is
usually found.  In that capacity the respondent had continued to concur in
the previously jointly made decision to emigrate in the best interests of the
children.  It was not a case in which the parents were at odds as to whether

the best interests of the children (in terms of sheer quality of life) lay in
going to Australia or remaining in South Africa.
[9] I do not think that Jappie J dismissed the fact that the respondent was
a good and devoted parent and that there was a strong bond between her and
the children or that he afforded it less weight simply because the respondent
was the non-custodian parent.  That would not be consistent with the rest of
his judgment and the concern he showed during the leading of the evidence
about the psychological consequences for the children of going to Australia
without their mother.  He was also aware that, desirable as life in Australia
might have been if both parents had moved to Australia, that was no longer
going to happen, and that the postulated absence of the respondent
necessitated a reconsideration of how the interests of the children would be
best served:  by letting them go or by making them stay.

[10] Bluntly put, the respondent’s stance amounted to this:  “Yes, it was in
the children’s best interests to grow up in Australia even although we were
divorced and would be living apart there, but it no longer suits me to
accompany them to Australia. Because my change of mind will severely
curtail my access to them if they are allowed to go, and that in turn will be
detrimental to them psychologically, they must forego the advantages of life
in Australia which we both wanted for them, and stay in South Africa, and
so allow me to live my life as I wish to live it.”  It was thus a fortiori a case
in which emigration should not have been prohibited unless the risk of
permanent and significant psychological damage to the children arising from
curtailed contact with the respondent was so likely to eventuate that it would
best serve their interests to remain in South Africa notwithstanding the
forfeiture of the substantially better quality of life in Australia which that
would entail.

[11] The assessment of the risk arising from the curtailment of access
depends upon the view one takes of the conflicting expert evidence.  The
trial judge preferred the view of Mrs Edelstein and Mr De Marigny.  Jappie J
considered that Mrs Killian displayed signs of bias in favour of the
respondent.  The court a quo said:  “There is much to be said for this view”
but “did not think that her opinions can be thrust aside in their entirety.”
That is no doubt so but one’s confidence in them is obviously much
diminished.  Examples of apparent bias (not in the sense of deliberately
given false evidence, but in the sense of a professional witness so
emotionally wedded to the idea that her client had been the victim of an
injustice when she agreed to custody of the children going to the appellant at
the time of the divorce, that her objectivity was impaired) were not spelt out
by either of the courts.  But they are not far to seek.

[12] Mrs Killian was confronted with the accusation that despite the fact
that the appellant had made it quite plain that, if he was not allowed to take
the children to Australia, he would remain in South Africa, she had none the
less recommended a variation of the custody order.  It was put to her that she
had persisted in recommending that even although the respondent was not
seeking such a variation if the appellant remained in South Africa, and even
if he did remain in South Africa.
[13] The following exchanges occurred:

(a)
“Are you really suggesting that you made the recommendation
for a variation of custody just in case he was lying in his pleadings,
and came and asked for leave to emigrate again later on?  ---  I am
essentially saying that that is what I did.

Where did you say that that’s what you were doing in the
report?  ---  I didn’t say that.

Where did you give any hint in this report that that is what you
were doing?  ---  I think right at the beginning of my report.

You may think that that’s what you did, but it doesn’t read that
way.  Mrs Killian, isn’t it so that, as you said to His Lordship, you
during the course of this assessment, developed a concern – a real

concern – that the wrong person had ended up with custody in the first
place.  You nodded.  Do you agree with that?  ---  That is correct.

Yes.  And is it not also so that that concern had a great deal to
do with two things, (1) your perception that it’s unusual for a suitable
mother of two small children not to end up as the custodian, correct?  -
--  That is correct.

And (2) with the notion that Mr Jackson had, by some means,
misled or defrauded or tricked Mrs Jackson into giving up custody in
the first place?  ---  That is correct, without me having clear
knowledge about the circumstances under which Mrs Jackson had the
incorrect perception of what the final recommendation of Mrs Van
Minnen’s report was.

Did you accept that she truly did have that incorrect perception?
---  I did.

Did you accept that it was because she only learnt too late that
that was incorrect that she had allowed herself to be persuaded to give
up custody?  ---  I did.”

(b)
“[W]ould it not be fair to say that your persistence in
recommending that variation was at least, in part, influenced by your
settled perception at that stage that Mrs Jackson had been conned out
of custody – she’s been taken advantage of?  …  I would even go as
far as saying that that is in large part an issue, given the situation that I
had spoken about previously … [intervention]

Yes, well, that explains it.  ---  …  particularly because after I’d
seen the father, he had confirmed to me that he had implicitly,
indirectly not told her, “Hey, hold on.  You’ve got Mrs Van Minnen

recommending that you get custody”.  That among the things that I
wanted to canvass with the father was, did I have right end of the
story.

Okay, so that makes sense then.  That is why, in spite of there
being absolutely no need for you to make an unqualified
recommendation about variation of custody, you actually did?  Yes?  -
--  Among the reasons, yes.

Well you said a large part of the reason.  ---  Yes, but I’m also
saying that there were other factors that were taken into
consideration.”

(c)
“When you were coming to your conclusions, the impression I
have, and please correct me if I’m wrong, [was] that somehow or the
other Mrs Jackson had been cheated out of having given up custody of
the children.  Is that one of the conclusions which you came to?  ---  I
certainly  had  a  strong  sense  that  that was – that could have been
what had happened, yes.

That somehow it was possible?  ---  Yes.

And together with what you regarded as a prejudicial financial
settlement, as far as the divorce was concerned, did you take that into
account as well?  ---  I’m really not in a position to know the criteria
by which financial assets are partitioned off but it didn’t make sense.

You had an idea that Mr Jackson is a wealthy man, and all she
was getting out of it was …  [intervention]  ---  Some pittance,
relatively.

That was also a factor -  well, I won’t say a factor, but that was
also something which you were concerned about?  ---  Yes.

And the idea that the attorney appeared to have been more on
Mr Jackson’s side than Mrs Jackson’s side, from what you’ve heard?
---  I was worried about that.

Would it appear then that when coming to your conclusions you
were somehow or other attempting to right what could have been a
wrong that had occurred?  ---  I could very well have been considering
that.”

[14] A perusal of Mrs Killian’s evidence as a whole leaves me with the
clear impression that she was reluctant to make  any concession which might
reflect adversely upon the respondent, even in the face of good reason to do
so.  The convoluted and almost incoherent way in which she sought to
justify her “abandonment” proposition is, to my mind, yet another
illustration of insufficient objectivity.  I quote from her evidence:

“You’re seriously suggesting that this child is going to be in
therapy for significant portions of her older life if she’s separated from
Mrs Jackson now?  ---  I think that she will feel that her mother
abandoned her because of her own badness in one way or another, and
I’m serious about that.

And is that what motivates you to suggest that she should not be
permitted to go to Australia at this stage?  ---  That is correct.

Now, she has, according to you, at least an equally strong
psychological bond with her father.  ---  That is correct.

Why then did you so glibly recommend at the end of your
report that the mother be granted custody, and father and mother, with
help, negotiate liberal access arrangements to suit decisions made by
the father as to whether he will go to Australia or not?  It didn’t seem
to perturb you at all that Mr Jackson might go to Australia, and
separate from his children.  ---  It certainly wasn’t intended to be a
glib recommendation.  This was a difficult and complex matter which
actually took a lot of time to think through carefully.  I think at the
back of my mind was still the apparent injustice that had happened at
the time of the divorce.  It also just didn’t seem to me to be logical or
consistent with my experience that here was a loving, caring mother
who had actually lost custody of her children  …  [intervention]

JAPPIE J
Well, I think the point is this.  On the one hand, you say,
“Well, if the children go to Australia with the father, in particular
Tasya, this could leave psychological scars.  However, if the children
stay with the mother, and the father goes off to Australia, the same
sort of prognosis is not foreseen”.  I think what counsel wants to know
is, “How do you reconcile the two?”  ---  No, I would see the same
consequences should the father go off.  However, leaving, and
somebody else – you yourself leaving, and somebody else leaving are
seen very differently by young children.  So the fact that father was
the one that left won’t as readily be seen as an abandonment because
of the egocentric factors that I’ve mentioned earlier in terms of them
going away, and leaving mother, which would then be turned against
the self.  So to argue it more clearly, because I know I’ve not been

clear, if it was father staying here, and mother going to Australia my
remarks would remain exactly the same.  It doesn’t matter which one
stays and which one goes, and that is also building into the equation
the fact that once they go to Australia, I expect there to be a period of
adaptation during which time the children will be making sense of
why they no longer have contact with their mother, and it will be that
initial adaptation period which will be critical and significant.

MR HUNT So you are suggesting that the child who leaves a parent
perceives the parent as having abandoned them but the child whose
parent does abandon them doesn’t?  ---  No, because I don’t think
these  …  [incomplete]

JAPPIE J
Yes, well, what’s the response to that, Mrs Killian?  ---
Okay.  Because when children go to live in a different country, there’s
first of all the excitement.  “We’re going on an aeroplane.  We’re
packing up”.  You know, all that excitement.  It’s almost like, “We’re
going on this big adventure.  Mom’s not part of that, therefore I’m
going to feel bad once I get to Australia because I’ve left her behind
and she’s been excluded from the adventure”.

MR HUNT I thought the point was that these children were going to
feel abandoned by their mother.  That seems to be the way you’ve put
it hitherto.  Now  you’re  talking  about  them  feeling  guilty  about
abandoning their mother.  ---  I’m saying the abandonment is a
reciprocal factor.

Oh, now they’ve both abandoned each other?  ---  Tasya, in
particular, will perceive that she’s been abandoned by mother.  We’re
dealing with perceptions rather than realities.  You know, the logical
thing is that the children would be able to go to Australia, and say,

“Right, we were brought here because, in fact, both parents had our
own interests at heart”, and that’s what happens in many cases when
people emigrate.  But in this situation it is different.

So you say.”

[15] In the case of Mrs Van Minnen she too had made a recommendation
that custody be transferred to the respondent.  She did so without bothering
to interview the appellant despite the fact that the children had been in his
custody since the divorce.  When taxed on her failure to do so, she replied
that she was not asked to look at his suitability.  Taxed further, the following
occurred:

“JAPPIE J Just before Mr Hunt cross-examines, I see in your third
report – that is the report that we were dealing with, the one that’s –
the report of the 8th January this year, in which your recommendation
as to variation is made, at page 19 of that report, I see, “Sources
consulted”.  ---  Yes.

I see amongst those sources is not Mr Jackson, the plaintiff  ---
No, I didn’t consult with him.

CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR HUNT  As the Court pleases.  Why
was that, Mrs Van Minnen?  ---  I didn’t think it was necessary to deal
with it in this – for this report, M’Lord.

Why?  ---  Because I had been asked to look at – to up – to look
at …  [intervention]

Update?  ---  Update – that’s the word I’m looking for, thank
you.  To update the circumstances of Mrs Jackson, and I’d been asked
to focus on a suitability report in terms of custody.

No, you’d also been asked to make a recommendation about
variation of custody, hadn’t you?  ---  Yes, variation too, yes.

And you’d last had any sight of Mr Jackson or his
circumstances more than a year beforehand?  ---  That’s right.  I
wasn’t asked to look at his suitability in this instance, M’Lord.

We’re not talking about suitability, Mrs Van Minnen.  Don’t be
naï ve. We’re talking about a variation  …  [intervention]

JAPPIE J
Well, I think that’s putting it a bit strongly, Mr Hunt.
The question really is that you had seen him almost a year before you
---  Yes, I had, ja.

And we simply want to know why you didn’t consult him.  ---
Okay, I’ve given my one reason, and the other reason was that I’d
actually had sight of the pleadings and the concerns that he had with
regard to her circumstances, and I dealt with those in the report – in
my assessment.

MR HUNT well, do we understand by that that you were only really
looking at Mrs Jackson?  ---  For the purposes of this report, yes.

But surely a recommendation that custody be varied involves an
assessment also of the custodian parent, who has had the children for
the last year, and how they are coping with it  ---  I have not negated
the fact that he’s actually been looking after the children.  I didn’t
look at his – I wasn’t asked to look at his competency as a parent.  I

have been asked, as I said, to look – to update the report in terms of
mother’s suitability to have custody of the minor children, and that is
what I’ve actually – that is the purpose of my report.

Mrs Van Minnen, you’re a professional.  ---  Yes, I am.

You’re not a lay person.  You surely understand the
implications of making a recommendation for the variation of
children’s custody, as opposed to making an original recommendation
at the time of divorce?  You appreciate that there’s a difference
between those two functions?  ---  I have to just agree that I didn’t
consult with him, for the reasons that I actually gave M’Lord.

Well, do you regard those as adequate reasons, given that you
end up with a recommendation that custody be changed?  ---  Yes, I
do, M’Lord.

You didn’t think it was necessary to look at his side of the
story, and what had been going on between him and the children for
the last year?  ---  I had looked at his side of the story prior to that, and
I also know that he has been greatly involved in the lives of the
children.  I don’t think that I – I have never ever at any stage even in a
previous report had I actually said that he was an incompetent parent.
I actually, at the time of writing the one dated the 27th of the 11th, I felt
it was in the children’s interests at that time to be in the custody of
their mother, and I gave reasons for that.  So that’s what I’ve done.

Before
coming to a recommendation, a seriously-made,
professional recommendation to the Court that custody of two
children be varied, you didn’t think it was necessary to hear Mr
Jackson’s side of the last year?  ---  Well, I think his concerns about

her suitability were laid out in the pleadings, as I’ve said, and that is
what I addressed.

Pleadings are not evidence, Mrs Van Minnen.  ---  Well, those
were his concerns.

How do you know that he didn’t have other concerns?  Did you
ask him?  ---  Well, his concerns also have changed quite a lot as well
from the initial investigation.  He had concerns but he didn’t raise
some of those in the previous year.

You didn’t bother to check, did you?  ---  I didn’t feel the
need.”

[16] At another point in her testimony one finds this:

“Is it not so that, when you are asked to make a
recommendation
about
the
variation
of
an
existing
custody
arrangement, the first step is to analyze whether there is anything
wrong with the existing arrangement?  ---  Yes, it is so.

What was wrong with this existing arrangement?  ---  Well,
there was nothing wrong with the existing arrangement, other than
that Mrs Jackson wanted to go – had told me that she was going to
apply for variation of custody, and – because she felt that they should
be with her, and that was why I looked at her suitability.  She raised
no queries about his incompetence to look after the children.

Exactly, exactly, Mrs Van Minnen.  ---  So I didn’t need to then
look at his – whether he was competent or not on that level.  I was
needing to look at whether hers was, she is still suitable, and whether I

still could agree with my previous recommendation.  That was where I
was coming from with that.

Mrs Van Minnen, if the starting point of a variation
recommendation is to check whether there’s anything wrong with the
existing situation, how can you recommend a variation if you don’t
find anything wrong with the existing situation?  ---  Initially – I’ll just
go back again to the November of the previous year.  I know what
you’re saying, and I understand what you’re saying but from the
initial investigation at the time I actually felt – at that time I
recommended, and I gave reasons for why I actually felt the mother
should be the custodial parent.  I just – I up-dated my report, based on
the concerns that were raised about her lifestyle, and I just – in order
to see whether my recommendation still – whether it was still – I
could still recommend her as a custodian, and that is what I found.
That was my point of departure.

Is that a normal approach in recommending a variation of
custody?  ---  No, but different cases warrant different approaches
sometimes.”

[17] Then there is this:

“That’s a letter purportedly dated the 30th November 1998 from
Gail Patterson to you.  Did you receive that?  ---  Yes, I did get this.  I
got a fax, yes.

Yes, well, however you got it  …  [intervention]  ---  Ja.

…  you did get it.  ---  It was, yes, dated 30th.

Did you pay any attention to what she had to say?  ---  Yes, I
did read it, yes, I did.

Perhaps I should put it this way.  Did you give any weight, or
what weight did you give to what Mrs Patterson had to say?  ---
Nothing really, because a lot of these issues I had actually investigated
in the report, and my report at that time – this fax came through on the
30th November, and my report was compiled on the 27th November,
and it was actually finished.

You were aware of Mrs Patterson’s role as a kind of
girlfriend/good friend of Mr Jackson since the break-up of the Jackson
marriage?  ---  Yes.

Now let’s accept that your relationship with Mr Jackson was
strained, to say the least, after the fight over your report during
December 1998.  Have you anything against Mrs Patterson, or would
you expect her to have anything against you?  ---  Well, there
shouldn’t be, no.

And, according to your information, when you redid updated
your assessment for these proceedings, was Mrs Patterson still
involved with Mr Jackson and his family?  ---  As far as I know, yes.

Why didn’t you try and contact her, to get her perspective on
how he was coping with the children, to get her perspective on how
the children were coping with the separation from their mother, and so
forth?  ---  I don’t actually – I didn’t think it was necessary to contact
her either.

JAPPIE J
well, as I’m given to understand, one of the persons who
…  [intervention]  ---She apparently – sorry, M’Lord.

One of the persons you spoke to as how Mrs Jackson got on
with the children was Mrs Jackson’s boyfriend, I think.  ---  Yes.

Gary Osmond.  ---  Yes.

But you knew there was a relationship between Mr Jackson and
Mrs Patterson?  ---  Ja.

And that she interacts with Mr Jackson.  ---  Yes.

The children, but you didn’t consider it necessary to consult
her?  ---  No, because I think, as I’ve said earlier my report was
focusing on Mrs Jackson’s circumstances, and Mrs Patterson, I don’t
believe, would be able to comment on her circumstances.  I know that
she was involved with Mr Jackson but I didn’t think she’d be able to
give me first-hand information on it.”

[18] It is not surprising that Jappie J made the comment which he did about
the extent to which her sympathy for the respondent entered into her
evaluation of the best interests of the children.  Nor is it surprising that the
court a quo made no reference at all to her views on the present controversy.
[19] The belief that the respondent had been “conned” into agreeing to the
appellant having custody at the time of the divorce and the resultant feeling
of sympathy for her is understandable in the light of the misleading

information which the respondent gave these witnesses.  However, it was
allowed to play too great a role in their evaluations.  The court a quo said:
“There is a strong possibility that the [appellant] had been
guilty of an active non-disclosure.  On the other hand, the evidence
that the [respondent] has given about what happened when she found
out there had been this non-disclosure, is unsatisfactory and in my
view improbable.  The fact of the matter is that she allowed the order
to be made and the [appellant] was installed as the custodian of these
two little girls.  It is somewhat strange, given the [respondent’s]
version of the events, and her protests, that she would not have taken
the opportunity when the present action was instituted to right the
wrong which had been inflicted on her by seeking a reversal of the
custody order.”

I agree.
[20] The evidence of Mrs Scott, a social worker, was of little real value in
assessing the risk of permanent psychological harm to Tasya.  It amounted to
stating what was obvious:  that the proposed move would cause emotional
trauma to the children because of “significant maternal deprivation”
resultant upon lack of contact with a parent with whom they have a close

bond.  The question was whether significant and lasting psychological harm
will be done.  She has no training in psychology and her predictions as to
that count for little.
[21] It is so that Mrs Edelstein regarded the respondent as a loving mother
but she did not unqualifiedly support the proposition that she was
“performing her task well”.  She had reservations about that.  I do not read
her evidence as supportive of the proposition that Tasya’s relationship with
her mother was closer than her relationship with her father.  What she said in
that connection was this:  “Tasya has a very close and loving relationship
with both her parents, but she perceives the [respondent] as being marginally
[my emphasis] more loving toward her.  (One more incoming response is
directed to the [respondent] than to the [appellant].)  However more of her
dependency feelings are directed to the [appellant].  (Information from the
Bene-Anthony Family Relations Test.)”  Moreover, Mrs Edelstein’s tests

and her interviews with the children convinced her that the appellant and not
the respondent was the primary psychological parent.
[22] I am unable to agree that it is not relevant to the present enquiry that
the present arrangement is regarded by both Mrs Edelstein and Mrs Killian
as unsatisfactory in so far as it involves frequent short term shuttling
between the parents.  The point is simply that it cannot be taken as an
unqualified given that the existing access regime will continue indefinitely.
[23] I am also unable to accept that there has as yet been no real separation
between mother and children.  She no longer lives in what was their
common home.  Her access to them is generous but they cannot fail to be
aware that she no longer lives with them and the parent they regard as their
primary psychological parent.  The case may differ from the more common
type of case in which children spend time with the non-custodian parent but
it is only a difference of degree and not one of kind.

[24] I am also troubled by the extent to which the appellant’s decision to
abandon his proposed move to Australia if he cannot take the children with
him was allowed by the court a quo to colour the issue of where the best
interests of the children lie.  There is, to my way of thinking, an element of
putting the cart before the horse inherent in that approach.
[25] Leaving the issue for another day does not seem to me to be realistic.
The problems which actuate the appellant in wishing to take the children to
Australia exist now.  If they are indeed soluble they are certainly not soluble
in the short to medium term.  The next ten to fifteen years are what matter
for that is the period during which the children will be growing to adulthood.
The window of opportunity for emigration which presently exists is unlikely
to remain open indefinitely and, on the evidence, the children are at an age
where a move now is likely to cause the least problems of adjustment for
them.

[26] Nor do I think that the scenario which Mrs Killian sketches if Tasya
were to fare badly psychologically is realistic.  If it were to happen that
Tasya was inconsolable and showing evidence of potentially serious
psychological damage, I cannot accept that the appellant would simply
acquiesce in that.  He is quite plainly a highly responsible and devoted
parent who is very conscious of the welfare of the children.  The sacrifices
he has made in the interests of the children and the extent to which he has
modified his life to cater for their welfare are quite inconsistent with the
notion that he would doggedly remain in Australia notwithstanding the harm
it was doing to Tasya.
[27] I too would restore the order of Jappie J and make the appropriate
orders as to costs.

____________________
__

R M MARAIS

JUDGE
OF
APPEAL