THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case no: 183/2002
REPORTABLE
In the matter between:
Jabulane Billyboy SITHOLE
Appellant
and
The STATE
Respondent
Before:
Cameron, Conradie and van Heerden JJA
Appeal:
Monday 30 August 2004
Judgment:
Thursday 16 September 2004
Criminal law – Evidence – When inference may be drawn from
accused’s untruthful assertion that he waived right to pre-trial
silence
‘Value’ in minimum sentence legislation – Dagga in bulk –
Erroneous to equate it with value of dagga sold in one-gram
parcels – Quality and seasonal considerations also relevant
Sentence – Appropriate sentence for dealing in 160kg of dagga
JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________

CAMERON JA:
[1] The regional court at Villiers, Free State, convicted the
appellant of dealing in 160 kilograms of dagga.1  The regional
magistrate, Mr Aucamp, found that the value of the dagga in
question was R160 000.  Since this exceeded the R50 000
figure specified in the 1997 minimum sentence legislation,2 the
minimum sentence of fifteen years became applicable.  The
magistrate found however that ‘substantial and compelling
circumstances’ were present.  These justified a lesser
sentence, and he imposed a seven-year term.  The appellant
appealed to the high court in Bloemfontein against his
conviction and sentence.  His appeal was unavailing.  This is a
further appeal against both conviction and sentence, with leave
granted by the high court (Hattingh J, Ebrahim J concurring).

1 Section 5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 provides (subject to
exceptions not relevant to the present case) that no person shall ‘deal in’ – ‘(a) any
dependence-producing substance; or (b) any dangerous dependence-producing substance or
any undesirable dependence-producing substance’.  Section 1 provides that ‘”deal in”, in
relation to a drug, includes performing any act in connection with the transhipment,
importation, cultivation, collection, manufacture, supply, prescription, administration, sale,
transmission or exportation of the drug’.  Part III of Schedule 2 to the Act classifies ‘Cannabis
(dagga), the whole plant or any portion or product thereof, except dronabinol [(-)-transdelta-9-
tetrahydrocannabinol]’ as an ‘undesirable dependence-producing substance’.  Section 13(f) of
the Act provides that any person who contravenes s 5(b) shall be guilty of an offence.
2Section s 51(2)(a)(i), read with s 51(3)(a), of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
specifies that in the absence of ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ that justify a lesser
sentence, a first offender convicted of ‘an offence referred to in Part II of Schedule 2’ is liable
to a minimum sentence of 15 years.  Part II of Schedule 2 includes any offence referred to in
s 13(f) of Act 140 of 1992 –
‘if it is proved that –
(a) the value of the dependence-producing substance in question is more than R50 000,00;
(b) the value of the dependence-producing substance in question is more than R10 000,00
and that the offence was committed by a person, group of persons, syndicate or any
enterprise acting in the execution or furtherance of a common purpose or conspiracy; or

Conviction of dagga dealing
[2] The appellant was arrested on the N3 highway to Gauteng on
Monday morning 15 November 1999 at a police road block
near the tollgate between Warden and Villiers.  He was driving
a small three-door Opel Corsa sedan with tinted windows.  He
was alone.  When he opened the window at the request of
inspector Masondo of the South African Police Services, a
strong smell of dagga emanated from the vehicle, which was
then searched.  Eight cloth bags (streepsakke) plus two zipped
carry-bags filled with dagga were found.  They were stacked
into the rear of the car and on the back seats and covered with
a blanket.
[3] The appellant did not dispute the material elements of this
evidence.  His case – set out in his plea explanation at the start
of the trial and repeated in his evidence – was that he did not
realise that the load in his vehicle was dagga.  On the day
before his arrest he discovered that his sister’s son had taken
his car without permission from his home in Tsakane, near
Brakpan, Gauteng.  Later that afternoon, the nephew called to
say that the car had broken down alongside the N3 from

(c) the offence was committed by any law enforcement officer.’

KwaZulu-Natal.  He instructed the nephew to wait beside the
car.  The next morning, Monday, he set out along the N3
highway by minibus taxi, reaching the scene at about 06h00.
He was very angry.  The nephew when confronted ran off.
Because he had to return to work that day, the appellant
replaced the spark plugs (arriving prepared for this task) and
summoned the nephew to return with him.  But the latter,
fearing the appellant’s temper, demurred.  The appellant then
drove off.  What of the powerful odour that hit Masondo when
the window was lowered?  The appellant said that he did not
know dagga – indeed, he picked up no strange smell at all.  He
saw goods covered with a blanket stacked in the rear.  But in
his anger and because he was anxious to return to work he
ignored this.  He was then arrested.
[4] The appellant’s nephew, Mr Themba Mlambo, was called as a
defence witness.    He confirmed the main elements of the
appellant’s version.  He testified that a friend, Sipho Khumalo,
asked him to transport a television set to Khumalo’s parents’
home in Bergville, KwaZulu-Natal.  He undertook this task for a
fee, appropriating his uncle’s car without his permission.  After
the television set was delivered, Sipho remained in Bergville
because his father was ill.  But he asked Mlambo to transport a

cargo back to Gauteng, loading the car himself.  Mlambo smelt
an unusual odour.  He then established that it was dagga.  For
this he demanded an extra R500 from Sipho.  Near the tollgate
the vehicle broke down.  He called his uncle.  Events ensued
as the appellant described.  After his uncle drove off, Mlambo
returned to Gauteng by minibus taxi.  Sipho he saw only once
again: he is now untraceable.
[5] The regional magistrate disbelieved the appellant.  He pointed
to a number of improbabilities in his version.  He concluded
that the state had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant himself was guilty of dealing in dagga.  In his
judgment Hattingh J, noting that the abolition of the statutory
presumptions about dealing had not led to the abolition of logic
and common sense, confirmed the appellant’s conviction.
[6] The improbabilities inherent in the exculpatory account related
by the appellant and Mlambo in my view justify its rejection as
false beyond reasonable doubt.  They are principally those
relied on by the magistrate.  Given the smallness of the vehicle,
the size of the load, and the dagga’s strongly obtrusive smell, it
is highly improbable that the appellant – even supposing that
the roadside incident with the nephew had any foundation in
truth – would simply have taken forth the freight without

questioning what it was or where it came from.  In the light of
the evidence of both Masondo and the nephew, the appellant’s
professed failure to notice any smell was clearly untruthful.
This radically undermines his entire account, necessitating the
inference that he was himself a dealer conveying his own load
to Gauteng.
[7] An additional factor is the appellant’s untruthful account of his
arrest.  According to Masondo the appellant when stopped was
acting normally and appeared calm.  He showed the appellant
the dagga and informed him that he was arresting him for it.
He thereupon explained the appellant’s constitutional rights,
including that he was not obliged to answer any questions or to
discuss the case with him. 3  The appellant at no stage offered
any explanation for the dagga.  Nor did he ever mention
Mlambo.
[8] The appellant denied this.  He said that after Masondo stopped
him and showed him that the bags contained dagga, he tried
there and then to give an explanation.  But Masondo silenced
him and ordered him to get into the patrol van.  About an hour
later at the police station, when the bags were photographed,

3 Bill of Rights s 35(1)(a): ‘Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has
the right – (a) to remain silent’.

the appellant urged Masondo to return to the scene to find
Mlambo: Masondo again responded negatively – he dismissed
this as nonsense.  Only later, when inspector Mokoena from
the local narcotics bureau arrived, was he informed of his right
to remain silent.  It was then that he decided to remain silent.
(Mokoena testified that the appellant in fact told him that he
was with a person, whom he at no stage named, when
arrested; but neither side made anything of this.)
[9] In convicting the appellant, the magistrate and the high court by
implication accepted Masondo’s evidence regarding the arrest.
In my view this was correct.  Masondo was a scrupulous
witness who gave a full and coherent account while willingly
conceding lack of recollection or uncertainty on certain aspects.
It is highly unlikely that Masondo would have wanted to or have
been able to silence the appellant had he tried to relate the
story of his nephew, particularly since it entailed that a
perpetrator stranded on the highway just a short distance away
could be brought to book.
[10] The appellant’s belated attempt to assert that he tendered an
explanation to Masondo underscores the improbability of his
account.  It reveals his own perception that, had the story been
true, it would have been in his best interests to communicate it

promptly to Masondo.  This is no more than logical.  An
exculpatory explanation, readily proffered at arrest, and
capable of speedy verification, may save both arrestor and
arrestee a great deal of unnecessary trouble.  That in these
particular circumstances the appellant, though in fact telling
Masondo nothing, later falsely claimed the contrary, contributes
to the inference that all the principal elements of his account in
court – nephew, odourless car, and circumstances of arrest –
were fabricated.
[11] This is not to infer the appellant’s guilt from his exercise of
the right to silence.4  It is rather to infer it from his untruthful
later assertion that he waived it.
Value of the dagga seized
[12] For a minimum sentence to apply to an individual drug dealer
acting alone who is not a law enforcement officer, the
contraband must exceed R50 000 in ‘value’.5  The legislature

4 Compare S v Thebus and another 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) per Moseneke J (Chaskalson CJ
and Madala J concurring) paras 57-59 (‘In our constitutional setting, pre-trial silence of an
accused person can never warrant the drawing of an inference of guilt’, but distinguishing a
credibility finding connected with an accused’s election to remain silent); Goldstone J and
O’Regan J (Ackermann J and Mokgoro J concurring) para 87 (‘If the warning does not inform
the accused that remaining silent may have adverse consequences for the accused, the right
to silence as understood in our Constitution will be breached’);  Yacoob J para 97(h)
(‘Drawing an inference as to guilt or credibility solely from the silence of the accused would
render a trial unfair’).  Ngcobo J (Langa J concurring) paras 117-126 held that on the facts the
right to pre-trial silence did not arise.
5 The provision is set out in footnote 2 above.

specified a monetary figure, and not a weight, presumably
because illegal drugs vary so greatly in value.  A car-load of
dagga may be worth less than a small packet of heroin or
cocaine.  But this entails that the State must prove the value of
the contraband seized – a more exacting task than proving its
weight.  And it must prove value not by showing a notional or
abstract or potential value, but the value of the drugs to the
dealer, whether at the place of seizure, or at the dealer’s
intended point of sale.  This has particular practical relevance
when drugs in large volume are seized.
[13] In S v Legoa6 this court held that ‘value’ in the minimum
sentencing legislation means ‘market value’, and that this
entails that a court asked to apply a minimum sentence should
establish what could be obtained for the thing in question.
Legoa held that it was incorrect to assume that dagga in bulk
has the same value as dagga sold in small quantities.  It was
therefore wrong to conclude that the dagga there – which
weighed 216.3 kg, but was stashed into twenty bags each
weighing somewhat more than 10 kg – should be valued at its
street worth of R1 per gram.

6 2003 (1) SACR 13 (SCA).

[14] In the present case, the State called the investigating officer,
detective inspector Mokoena of the Narcotics Bureau, to prove
the value of the dagga.  He testified that dagga traded at R1 for
one gram.  This was based on two sales he concluded in
Harrismith.  Cross-examined, Mokoena agreed that dagga was
sold in bulk in Lesotho and KwaZulu-Natal.  He was not sure of
the price of a bag.  He conceded the existence of a ‘sales
hierarchy’, involving bulk purchases from the producer, with
smaller and smaller quantities being sold ‘down’ the sales
chain, with each vendor making a profit, until the dagga
changes hands on the street.
[15] The dagga in the appellant’s car weighed 160kg.  It was
stashed in ten bags.  On average each weighed about 16kg.
The state led no evidence as to what a bag of dagga weighing
16kg would fetch.  Nor did it lead evidence of what a car-load
of dagga weighing 160kg was worth.  Mokoena reacted
uncertainly when the defence put to him that a ‘bag of dagga’
(of unspecified weight) fetched between R200 and R400.  But
he did not deny it.  If that is so (and the question was not
explored), the car-load in this case would have been worth
between R2000 and R4000.

[16] In accepting instead that the dagga should be valued at R1
for each gram, the regional magistrate and the high court did
not address this question:  what was the value of the dagga to
the dealer where it was found, and in the condition in which it
was found?  Instead, they ascribed to it a notional value at
some future point in the process of supply and distribution and
sale.  They assigned to the dagga seized the value it might
have when passed on, parcelled up, distributed and sold on the
street.  This attributed to the appellant means and enterprise
and connections that nothing in the evidence suggested he
had.  The dagga was not on the street when it was seized.  Nor
was it in 160 000 one-gram parcels.  It was found in transit in a
bulk load on a road in the north-eastern Free State.  It had not
been separated, rolled, parcelled and packaged.  There was
not a ready supply of willing buyers of one-gram parcels of
dagga at hand, let alone 160 000 of them.
[17] There are further considerations indicating that in the
approach the regional court and high court adopted is
erroneous.  In Legoa, though this evidence is not reflected in
the judgment, the police expert conceded that consignments of
dagga differed in quality, and that quality determines value.
What is more, the time of the year in which the dagga is offered

for sale also affects its value. 7   So quality and seasonal
considerations affecting bulk trading may also affect the
applicability of the minimum sentences.  Neither of these
obvious factors was canvassed in the evidence here.
[18] So the approach applied in the courts below cannot be
correct.  It does not accord with a realistic approach to market
value, nor with common law authority, which indicates that
when market value is in issue it must be determined on the
basis of the price that can be obtained at the time and place
relevant to the object in question, and not at some future time
or location.8
[19] This case does not require us to decide whether the bulk
value of the dagga must be determined at the place where it is
seized, or at the point where the dealer was heading with the
intention of selling it.  The value in this case was not proved on
either assumption.  It follows that the minimum sentencing
legislation was not applicable.

7 S v Legoa, appeal 33/2002, evidence of Capt van Niekerk at vol 1 page 21 of the record:
‘Die gehalte bepaal wat die waarde is’.
8 Voet 18.5.7 [(Gane’s translation): ‘That price is to be borne in mind which was at the time of
sale just in the place at which the sale was solemnized; and not that which is suitable to the
thing at the time when suit is brought.  This is to prevent sales being otherwise rendered void
in a host of ways, since both are there varying prices for things in individual states, and prices
wax and wane from day to day in accord with the differing views of humankind, the scarcity or
abundance of things and other circumstances.  As Seneca rightly said “The price of

The appropriate sentence
[20] The regional magistrate did not sentence the appellant to the
minimum term of fifteen years.  He found escape in the
existence of substantial and compelling circumstances.  This
was the appellant’s first drug-dealing offence.  (He had a
number of other convictions; but the most recent dated to 1987,
and the magistrate rightly attached little weight to them.)  The
appellant was in responsible employment as a foreman at the
Ekurhuleni Municipality.  He had eight children to support.  His
wife died after the events in issue, and some of his children
needed counselling to deal with problems arising from her
death.
[21] Considering that the minimum sentencing legislation was
applicable, the magistrate took the fifteen-year term of
imprisonment as his starting point.  This undoubtedly affected
the sentence he imposed.  Since the minimum sentence is not
applicable at all, we must impose sentence afresh.  Counsel for
the State drew our attention to sentences imposed in the Free
State high court in comparable cases of dealing, and submitted
that it would be appropriate to consider a sentence of

everything is a matter of the time”’], applied in McGee v Mignon 1903 TS 89 97 and Katzoff v
Glaser 1948 (4) SA 630 (T) 636-8.

approximately four years.  In my view, having regard to the
appellant’s personal circumstances, his absence of remorse,
the weight of the dagga, and sentences imposed in comparable
cases,9 a sentence of four years’ imprisonment should be
imposed.
Order
1. The appeal against conviction is dismissed.
2. The appeal against sentence succeeds.
3. The sentence imposed by the regional court is set aside. In
its place there is substituted:
‘The accused is sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.’
E CAMERON
JUDGE OF APPEAL
CONCUR:
CONRADIE JA
VAN HEERDEN JA

9 In S v Caleni 1990 (1) SACR 178 (C), a first offender pressurised into conveying [and thus
dealing in] 800kg was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment, of which two were suspended; in
S v Seoela 1996 (2) SACR 616 (O), a first offender dealing in 24kg of dagga was sentenced
to a fine of R3 000 or 12 months’ imprisonment, with a further 18 months suspended; in S v
Hlongwane 1998 (1) SACR 221 (O), a 35 year old first offender was sentenced to four years’
imprisonment, half of which was suspended, for dealing in 148,25kg of dagga; in S v Heilig
1999 (1) SACR 379 (W) a first offender received a three-year suspended sentence, plus a
fine of R5 000 or 12 months’ imprisonment, for dealing in 20 kg of dagga; in S v Legoa 2003
(1) SACR 13 (SCA), a sentence of five years’ imprisonment for dealing in 216,3kg of dagga
[erroneously reflected at 2003 (1) SACR 17a-b as ‘261,3’ kg] was imposed on a first offender.