THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

REPORTABLE

Case number :  545/04

In the matter between :

TRUSTEES FOR THE TIME BEING
OF TWO OCEANS AQUARIUM TRUST

APPELLANT

and

KANTEY & TEMPLER (PTY) LTD

RESPONDENT

CORAM :

HOWIE P, BRAND, NUGENT, JAFTA JJA
et MAYA AJA

HEARD :

3 NOVEMBER 2005

DELIVERED :

25 NOVEMBER 2005

Summary:
Delictual liability for pure economic loss – allegation that trust
suffered damages as a result of the respondent's negligence in
the design of an aquarium – issue whether alleged negligent
conduct was wrongful
_____________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________
BRAND JA/

BRAND JA:

[1] This appeal raises questions of liability in delict for so-called
pure economic loss resulting from a negligent design by structural
engineers. The appellants are the trustees of the Two Oceans
Aquarium Trust ('the trust') which leases and operates the Two
Oceans Aquarium at the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront in Cape
Town. The respondent is a company of consulting engineers. The
appellants instituted action, on behalf of the trust, against the
respondent and five further defendants in the Cape High Court for
damages of R14 924 395,00 arising out of certain failures which
had developed in the exhibit tanks at the aquarium.

[2] The respondent noted three exceptions to the appellants'
particulars of claim on the basis, inter alia, that they lacked
averments necessary to sustain an action. In addition, it applied for
certain allegations in the particulars to be struck out. Two of the
three exceptions were dismissed by the court a quo (Veldhuizen J
and Hockey AJ). The remaining exception was, however, upheld
and the application to strike out granted with costs. With the leave
of the court a quo, the appellants now appeal against the
upholding of the exception as well as the costs order in favour of
the respondent.

[3] The nature of the exception and the resulting issues can best
be understood against the background of the facts pleaded in the
appellants' particulars of claim. The damages claimed allegedly
resulted from the deterioration of the polyurethane lining used for
waterproofing the exhibit tanks in the aquarium. More particularly,
so it was alleged, the lining material used subsequently turned out
to be porous, allowing penetration of seawater from the tanks into
the surrounding concrete, thereby causing corrosion in the steel
reinforcement. As a result, it was said, remedial work had to be
done, which included the replacement of the waterproof lining with
a more suitable one. The costs of the required remedial work
accounted for part of the claim. The balance related to the
estimated cost of constructing an additional tank in order to
mitigate the trust's anticipated loss of revenue for the duration of
the remedial work.

[4] The six defendants joined in the action were those
responsible, in one or other capacity, for the design and
construction of the tanks. While the respondent – cited as second
defendant – was the structural engineering consultant, the first
defendant was the project manager. Other defendants included the
supplier of the waterproofing material used for the lining; the

builder of the tanks as well as the company responsible, as
subcontractor to the builder, for the actual application of the
waterproof lining. Since the respondent was the only defendant
who filed an exception, the other defendants are not involved in
the present proceedings.

[5] In broad terms the particulars of claim proposed two causes,
in alternative form, for the ultimate failure of the tanks. The first
proposition is that it was due to the wrong option taken by the first
defendant, as the project manager, and the respondent, as the
structural engineer, in the design of the aquarium, to waterproof
the tanks by means of a lining rather than to design water retaining
concrete structures. The case against the first defendant and the
respondent is essentially that they had acted negligently in taking
this wrong option. The alternative proposition is that the tanks had
failed because the waterproofing material was either unsuitable or
had not been properly applied. These propositions constitute the
basis of the alternative claim against the four other defendants.
Because we are not concerned with the other defendants, we must
assume for present purposes that the respondent's decision to
choose the waterproofing option, was the cause of the damages
ultimately suffered by the trust.

[6] According to the particulars of claim, the trust was formed in
July 1994 with the specific objective of developing and operating
the aquarium. Subsequent to the formation of the trust, so it was
alleged, a contractual nexus came into existence between the
respondent and the trust when the respondent was appointed as
structural engineering consultant to advise the trust, inter alia, on
the design and construction of the exhibit tanks.  The respondent's
decision to take the wrong option was alleged to have taken place
in one of two contexts; namely
(a)
in the course of rendering professional services pursuant to
the contract between the parties which came into existence after
the formation of the trust, when the respondent was appointed as
its engineering consultant; or
(b)
prior to the conclusion of that contract in circumstances to
which I shall presently return.

[7] Building on these allegations, the appellants' case is that in
so far as the wrong option was decided upon by the respondent
after the conclusion of its agreement with the trust, it was in breach
of its contractual obligations and therefore liable to the trust in
contract. To the extent that the wrong option was decided upon
prior to the conclusion of the agreement with the trust, the

contention is that the respondent is liable to the trust in delict for
the consequences of its negligent decision. This is so, the
particulars of claim alleged, because the respondent was under a
legal duty, even prior to the conclusion of its contract with the trust,
to act without negligence in deciding upon an appropriate design.

[8] As to the factual basis for the alleged legal duty, the
particulars of claim commenced by referring to a joint venture
agreement between two potential investors in the aquarium
project, which was concluded in 1993, i e prior to the formation of
the trust, with the object of investigating the feasibility of
developing and operating an aquarium in the Waterfront.
Proceeding from this starting point, paras 10 – 14 of the particulars
of claim continued as follows:
'10.
It was at all material times contemplated by the joint venture that the
aquarium was to be developed and operated by a trust to be formed, and the
first defendant [i e the project manager] and the second defendant [i e the
respondent] were aware thereof and dealt with the joint venture on such
basis.
11.
In pursuance of the joint venture's objective as aforesaid, the first
defendant and the second defendant both agreed with the joint venture … that
they would assist, in their capacities as project managers and consulting
engineers, respectively, in the process of investigating the feasibility of
developing and operating the aquarium ('the project') and in the process of

investigating appropriate design options for the aquarium, with a view to their
formal appointment in the event of the project going ahead.
12.
…
13.
In so agreeing to assist the joint venture, first and second defendants
knew, alternatively ought reasonably to have known, that the joint venture
(and the trust upon its formation) would rely upon their professional expertise
and advice and the assistance to be furnished by each of them.
14.
In the circumstances, the first defendant and the second defendant
owed a legal duty to the joint venture (and to the trust upon its formation)
when assisting in the process of investigating the feasibility of developing and
operating the aquarium, and in the process of investigating appropriate design
options for the aquarium and proffering their professional expertise and skill in
this regard, to do so in a proper and professional manner and without
negligence.'

[9] The exception upheld by the court a quo – which therefore
constitutes the subject matter of this appeal – did not relate to the
appellants' claim founded in contract. It was solely aimed at the
delictual claim, essentially on the basis that, on the facts pleaded
in the particulars of claim, the appellants have failed to establish
the existence of the 'legal duty' upon which their case in delict
depends. The declared object of the exception was to preclude the
appellants from relying on any conduct by the respondent in

deciding on the wrong option prior to the conclusion of its
agreement with the trust.

[10] The exception raises the issue of wrongfulness which is one
of the essential elements of the Aquilian action. From the nature of
exception proceedings, we must assume that the respondent's
decision to adopt the waterproofing option in its design was wrong.
We must also assume that the wrong decision was negligently
taken. Negligent conduct giving rise to damages is, however, not
actionable per se. It is only actionable if the law recognises it as
wrongful. Negligent conduct manifesting itself in the form of a
positive act causing physical damage to the property or person of
another is prima facie wrongful. In those cases wrongfulness is
therefore seldom contentious. Where the element of wrongfulness
becomes less straightforward is with reference to liability for
negligent omissions and for negligently caused pure economic loss
(see eg Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002
(6) SA 431 (SCA) para 12; Gouda Boerdery BK v Transnet 2005
(5) SA 490 (SCA) para 12). In these instances, it is said,
wrongfulness depends on the existence of a legal duty not to act
negligently. The imposition of such a legal duty is a matter for
judicial determination involving criteria of public or legal policy

consistent with constitutional norms (see eg Administrator, Natal v
Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A) 833A; Van
Duivenboden supra para 22 and Gouda Boerdery BK supra para
12).

[11] It is sometimes said that the criterion for the determination of
wrongfulness is 'a general criterion of reasonableness', i e whether
it would be reasonable to impose a legal duty on the defendant
(see eg Government of the Republic of South Africa v Basdeo and
another 1996 (1) SA 355 (A) 367E-G; Gouda Boerdery BK supra
para 12). Where that terminology is employed, however, it is to be
borne in mind that what is meant by reasonableness in the context
of wrongfulness is something different from the reasonableness of
the conduct itself which is an element of negligence. It concerns
the reasonableness of imposing liability on the defendant (see eg
Anton Fagan 'Rethinking wrongfulness in the law of delict' 2005
SALJ 90 at 109). Likewise, the 'legal duty' referred to in this
context must not be confused with the 'duty of care' in English Law
which straddles both elements of wrongfulness and negligence
(see eg Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 (2) SA 1 (A) 27B-
G; Local Transitional Council of Delmas v Boshoff 2005 (5) SA 514
(SCA) para 20). In fact, with hindsight, even the reference to 'a

legal duty' in the context of wrongfulness was somewhat
unfortunate. As was pointed out by Harms JA in Telematrix (Pty)
Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority
SA (SCA case 459/04 9 September 2005, para 14), reference to a
'legal duty' as a criterion for wrongfulness can lead the unwary
astray. To illustrate, he gives the following example:
'[T]here is obviously a duty – even a legal duty – on a judicial officer to
adjudicate cases correctly and not negligently. That does not mean that the
judicial officer who fails in the duty because of negligence, acted wrongfully.'
(See also Knop v Johannesburg City Council supra 33D-E.)

[12] When we say that a particular omission or conduct causing
pure economic loss is 'wrongful' we mean that public or legal policy
considerations require that such conduct, if negligent, is
actionable; that legal liability for the resulting damages should
follow. Conversely, when we say that negligent conduct causing
pure economic loss or consisting of an omission is not wrongful,
we intend to convey that public or legal policy considerations
determine that there should be no liability; that the potential
defendant should not be subjected to a claim for damages, his or
her negligence notwithstanding. In such event, the question of fault
does not even arise. The defendant enjoys immunity against
liability for such conduct, whether negligent or not (see eg

Telematrix (Pty) Ltd supra para 14; Local Transitional Council of
Delmas supra para 19; Anton Fagan op cit 107-109). Perhaps it
would have been better in the context of wrongfulness to have
referred to a 'legal duty not to be negligent', thereby clarifying that
the
question
being
asked
is
whether
in
the
particular
circumstances negligent conduct is actionable, instead of just to a
'legal duty'. I say this in passing and without any intention to
change settled terminology. As long as we know what we are
talking about. When a court is requested, in the present context, to
accept the existence of a 'legal duty', in the absence of any
precedent, it is in reality asked to extend delictual liability to a
situation where none existed before. The crucial question in that
event is whether there are any considerations of public or legal
policy which require that extension. And as pointed out in Van
Duivenboden (para 21) and endorsed in Telematrix (para 6) in
answering that question
'… what is called for is not an intuitive reaction to a collection of arbitrary
factors but rather a balancing against one another of identifiable norms.'

[13] Against that background, I revert to the present dispute. The
court a quo's reasons for upholding the exception were essentially
twofold. First, that on a proper analysis of the appellants'

particulars of claim, the 'legal duty' pleaded (in para 14 – quoted in
para [8] above) relies on a contract between the respondent and
the joint venture. Second, that by virtue of the decision of this court
in Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (Pty) Ltd
1985 (1) SA 475 (A):
'a plaintiff must allege and prove the existence of a legal duty without having
recourse to the terms of a contract'
and that
'once it becomes necessary for a plaintiff to rely on the terms of a contract to
prove the legal duty, his claim does not arise ex delicto.'

[14] The appellants' contention was, however, that the court a
quo erred in not recognising that Lillicrap was distinguishable from
the present matter on the facts. Their first argument in support of
this contention, which was somewhat obliquely raised, was that
while the claim in Lillicrap was for pure economic loss, the trust's
claim resulted from physical damage to the aquarium caused by
the respondent's negligent design. Of course, if the appellants'
claim could be construed as one resulting from physical damage to
property, questions regarding the extension of Aquilian liability
would not arise. In such circumstances wrongfulness will be
presumed.  The possibility of a concurrence of contractual and
delictual liability on the same facts, would be of no consequence.

That much was pertinently decided in Lillicrap (at 496D-I). But, it is
apparent, in my view, that the appellants' claim cannot possibly be
construed as one based on physical damage to property. It is
clearly a claim for pure economic loss. As was pointed out by
Grosskopf AJA in Lillicrap (at 497I-498H), with reference to a
similar argument in that case, the appellants' allegation is not that
as a result of the respondent's negligent conduct the aquarium was
'damaged'. Their case is that, as a result of the respondent's
negligent design, the aquarium was defective from the start. It was
always of inferior quality. No conduct on the part of the respondent
had caused it to deteriorate in any way (see also Murphy v
Brentwood District Council [1990] 2 All ER 908 (HL) 919 and
Woolcock Street Investments (Pty) Ltd v C D G (Pty) Ltd (formerly
Cardno & Davies Australia (Pty) Ltd [2004] HCA 16 para 20).

[15] The appellants' second argument as to why Lillicrap is
distinguishable from the present matter is to be understood against
the background of the facts in Lillicrap, which, for present
purposes, can be stated in the following broad terms. The
appellant in that matter, Lillicrap, was a firm of structural
engineers. The respondent, Pilkington, was a manufacturer of
glass products. In mid 1975 Lillicrap was formally appointed by

Pilkington as consulting engineers to design and supervise the
construction of a glass plant on a particular site. Salanc
Contractors (Pty) Ltd was employed as the building contractor for
the construction of the plant. In mid 1976 Pilkington assigned its
contract with Lillicrap to Salanc. As a result of the assignment,
there was no longer any direct contractual relationship between
Pilkington and Lillicrap. Instead, Lillicrap's status was changed to
that of a subcontractor for Salanc. When the completed plant was
put into operation, it became apparent that as a result of soil
instability on the site, there were slight movements between crucial
components in the plant which rendered it unsuitable for the
manufacturing of glass. Pilkington sought to recover the cost of
remedying these defects from Lillicrap on the basis that it resulted
from its professional negligence in the design and supervision of
the construction of the plant.

[16] On these facts two scenarios therefore arose. In the one
there was a direct contractual nexus between the parties. In the
other there was no such contractual privity between them. The
question presented for decision was whether policy considerations
favoured an extension of Aquilian liability in either case. Grosskopf
AJA, writing for the majority, held that there was no need for such

extension. The appellants contended that Grosskopf AJA's
underlying reasoning amounted to this: while there was a
contractual nexus between the parties, each had adequate and
satisfactory remedies if the other were to have committed a
breach. In fact, the very relief claimed by Pilkington could have
been founded on the contract. These considerations did not fall
away as a result of the contract being assigned. The tripartite
relationship between Pilkington, Salanc (as main contractor) and
Lillicrap (as subcontractor) still had its origin in contract. The only
difference was that Pilkington now had to follow the contractual
chain via Salanc to Lillicrap.

[17] Thus understood, so the appellants contended, Lillicrap is
plainly distinguishable from the present matter. In Lillicrap the
presence of satisfactory and adequate contractual remedies was
the principal reason why this court held that an extension of
Aquilian liability was not justified. In the present matter, there is no
question of contractual remedies because there was no contract
between the respondent and the trust when the negligent conduct
occurred. In fact, the trust was not even capable of creating those
remedies because it had not yet been formed when the negligent
conduct occurred. But for the extension of Aquilian liability, so the

argument went, the trust would be without any remedy and have
not been capable of creating one.

[18] In Lillicrap the plaintiff in fact had a remedy emanating from
the contract that coincided with its claim in delict. But I do not think
it was intended to suggest that if there had been no such
contractual remedy a delictual remedy would have been granted.
On the contrary, the observations (at 500G-501B) concerning the
difficulties that would emerge if delictual liability were to be
imposed and the delictual and contractual standard were not to
coincide, shows the converse. The point underlying the decision in
Lillicrap was that the existence of a contractual relationship
enables the parties to regulate their relationship themselves,
including provisions as to their respective remedies. There is thus
no policy imperative for the law to superimpose a further remedy.
Consequently, the mere absence of a contractual remedy in the
present case does not by itself distinguish it materially from
Lillicrap.

[19] I nonetheless agree that Lillicrap is distinguishable from the
present matter on another basis, which is that, unlike in Lillicrap,
the negligent conduct in this matter occurred prior to the inception
of any contractual relationship between the parties. The essential

enquiry is, however, whether this difference on the facts justifies
the extension of delictual liability which was denied in Lillicrap.

[20] The approach to this enquiry contended for by the
appellants, was whether there is any consideration indicated by
public or legal policy why delictual liability should not be extended
to the damages resulting from the respondent's negligent conduct
in this case. Departing from this premise, they argued that no such
consideration, such as, for example, a concern for indeterminate
liability as to amount or class, exists. That may or may not be so.  I
do not believe, however, that the approach to the enquiry
contended for is open to us. It is in direct conflict with the following
statement by Grosskopf AJA in Lillicrap (at 504D-H), with
reference to the judgment of the House of Lords in Anns v Merton
London Borough Council (1978) AC 728 (HL) (which was
subsequently overruled in Murphy v Brentwood District Council
(1990) 2 All ER 908 (HL)):
'No doubt the application of the principle stated in Anns' case, … might lead to
the dismissal of the appellant's exception in the present case, as was indeed
found by the court a quo. However, the approach of English law seems to be
different from ours. … English law adopts a liberal approach to the extension
of a duty of care. … South African law approaches the matter in a more
cautious way, as I have indicated, and does not extend the scope of the

Aquilian action to new situations unless there are positive policy
considerations which favour such an extension.'

[21] In accordance with this cautious approach, so Grosskopf
AJA held (at 500F of Lillicrap), the first question in a case such as
this is whether there is any need for the extension sought. On the
facts of this matter that question should, in my view, for
considerations not dissimilar to those that applied in Lillicrap, again
be answered in the negative. It is true that in this matter there was
as yet no contract between the parties when the negligent conduct
giving rise to the trust's damages occurred, and that until it came
into existence the trust was not capable of contractually regulating
the relationship. Nevertheless, it is clear from the facts pleaded
that it was intended from the outset by all concerned that, if the
aquarium project was to proceed at all, it would be governed by a
contractual relationship that would be created once the trust was
formed. It was also foreseen from the outset that the trust could
not possibly suffer any damages through the negligent conduct of
the respondent, unless and until that contractual nexus was
brought into existence, through the formal appointment of the
respondent, by or on behalf of the trust, as its consultant engineer.

[22] I say this because it is pleaded (in para 10 of the particulars
of claim – quoted in para [8] above) that it was at all times
contemplated by the joint venture, as well as by the respondent
and the project managers that the aquarium project would be
conducted through the vehicle of a trust. It is further alleged (in
para 11 – also quoted in para [8] above) that the respondent had
'agreed with the joint venture that it would assist in its capacity as
consulting engineer in investigating the feasibility of the aquarium
project with a view to its formal appointment in the event of the
project going ahead.' Consequently there would either be no trust
and no project that could give rise to any damages or there would
be a relationship between the trust and the respondent governed
by contract. These were the only two possibilities. There was no
other.

[23] In these circumstances I can see no reason why the trust
could not have been covered against the risk of harm due to the
respondent's
negligent
conduct
by
appropriate
contractual
stipulations covering even conduct that occurred before the trust
was formed. This, so it seems, could have been done on two
occasions. First, by way of a stipulatio alteri in favour of the trust
(to be formed) in the agreement between the joint venture and the

respondent (see eg McCullogh v Fernwood Estate Ltd 1920 AD
204 at 208). Or, by the insertion of apposite provisions relating to
any decisions which might already have been taken by the
respondent, in the contract of formal appointment. I find support for
this consideration in the judgment of the High Court of Australia in
Woolcock Street Investments (Pty) Ltd v C D G (Pty) Ltd (formerly
Cardno & Davies [2004] HCA 16, in which 'vulnerability to risk' was
held to be a critical issue in deciding whether delictual liability
should be extended in a particular situation (see eg McHugh J in
para 80 of the judgment). In this regard it is to be noted that the
concept of 'vulnerability' as developed in Australian jurisprudence
is something distinct from potential exposure to risk and that the
criterion of 'vulnerability' will ordinarily only be satisfied where the
plaintiff could not reasonably have avoided the risk by other means
– for example by obtaining a contractual warranty or a cession of
rights. I find the Australian reasoning to be in accordance with the
cautious approach of our law with regard to the extension of
Aquilian liability that I have referred to.

[24] Generally speaking, I can see no reason why the Aquilian
remedy should be extended to rescue a plaintiff who was in the
position to avoid the risk of harm by contractual means, but who

failed to do so. In argument the only answer to this difficulty
proffered by the appellants' counsel was that the insertion of
appropriate contractual provisions would require a great deal of
wisdom before the event by those acting on behalf of the trust,
which could not be reasonably expected at the time. In support of
this answer counsel placed particular reliance on the minority
judgment of Kirby J (para 173) in the Woolcock case. Though I
obviously express no opinion on the facts of Woolcock, I do not
think that answer is supported by the facts of this case. First, the
trust was represented, not only by presumably able trustees, but
also by professional project managers. Second, it appears from
the way in which the appellants' case was pleaded that it should
have been plain to everybody concerned that the respondent could
opt for a particular design prior to its formal appointment and that if
it was negligent in doing so, the trust would suffer damages when
that wrong option was eventually implemented.

[25] Other considerations alluded to by Grosskopf AJA as to why
Aquilian liability does not fit comfortably in a contractual setting (cf
Lillicrap 500G-501G) also find application in this case. To illustrate
– what would happen if the respondent's design, which was
eventually implemented, complied with its obligations undertaken

in terms of its formal agreement of appointment, but not with the
standards of the notional reasonable engineer? Would it then
make any difference that the design was decided upon prior to the
appointment? Or, what if the appointment contract is construed to
relate to the design as eventually implemented, irrespective of
whether it was decided upon by the respondent before or after its
formal appointment. Would the respondents conduct then be
measured by two different standards – one contractual and the
other delictual?  Or, what if the respondent had been asked, but
refused to give a contractual warranty in respect of the work that it
had done on a speculative basis and without any remuneration
prior to its formal appointment. Would it still be held liable in delict
if that work was negligently done? In short, I believe that the
following statement by Grosskopf AJA in Lillicrap (at 500H-I) is
equally apposite in this case:
'[I]n general, contracting parties contemplate that their contract should lay
down the ambit of their reciprocal rights and obligations. To that end they
would define, expressly or tacitly, the nature and quality of the performance
required from each party.'

[26] Finally, the appellants argued that the position of the trust
vis-à-vis the respondent is analogous to that of the relationship
between the subsequent owner of a building and the builder

responsible for its construction. They therefore sought support for
the extension of Aquilian liability in the present context in those
cases where the subsequent owner was afforded a remedy in
delict against the builder for damages resulting from the negligent
execution of the building contract to which the subsequent owner
was not a party. Authorities referred to in this regard included
judgments of the High Court of Australia (in Bryan v Maloney 1995
(128) A.L.R. 163) and the Supreme Court of Canada (in Winnipeg
Condominium Corp No 36 v Bird Construction & Co (1995) s 12(1)
D.L.R. (4th) 193). The respondent's reply to this argument was
based on equally weighty authorities going the other way (see eg
D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England (1988) 2
All ER 992 (HL); Murphy v Brentwood District Council (1990) 2 All
ER 908 (HL) and Woolcock Street Investments (Pty) Ltd v C D G
(Pty) Ltd (formerly Cardno & Davies Australia (Pty) Ltd) supra).

[27] In the light of the view that I hold on the facts of this matter, I
find it unnecessary to enter into the rather complex debate
regarding the extension of delictual liability to afford a remedy in
the subsequent purchaser situation. Unlike the relationship
between the trust and the respondent in this matter, there is never
any direct contractual relationship between the builder and the

subsequent purchaser. Unlike the trust, the subsequent purchaser
would therefore not have had any opportunity to arrange the
features of that relationship by way of contract. That, as far as I am
concerned, is a material difference. Whether that material
difference will lead to a different result in the subsequent
purchaser situation, is one we do not have to decide.

[28] It follows that in my view the exception was rightly upheld. In
the result –
'The appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two
counsel.'

………………
F D J BRAND
JUDGE OF APPEAL

Concur:

HOWIE P
NUGENT JA
JAFTA JA
MAYA AJA