THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

Reportable
CASE NO. 519/2002
In the matter between

DRS PIERRE VAN DRIMMELEN & PARTNERS
Appellant

and

HAYLEY GOWAR
First Respondent
BEVERLEY ANNE AUCAMP
Second Respondent
THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
Third Respondent

____________________________________________________________

CORAM:
ZULMAN, FARLAM and HEHER JJA

HEARD:
11 NOVEMBER 2003
DELIVERED:
24 NOVEMBER 2003

____________________________________________________________
Vicarious liability – employee intending to perform an act for his own
personal convenience which might ultimately have a bearing on his
employer’s business does not per se render his employer liable for a delict
committed by the employee before and even after performing the act.

JUDGMENT

ZULMAN  JA

[1] The sole issue in this appeal, which is brought with the leave of the
court a quo, is whether the appellant is vicariously liable for the negligence
of a Mr Du Randt.
[2] On 29 December 1994 at approximately 18h30 two collisions
occurred on the south north section of the N1 Highway between
Johannesburg and Pretoria at or near the Buccleuch interchange.  In the
first collision a motor vehicle driven by Du Randt in which the first
respondent was a passenger collided with a bridge and/or concrete barrier.
Shortly thereafter another vehicle driven by Mr P D Kumpf collided with
the vehicle driven by Du Randt.
[3] The first respondent was a minor at the time of the collisions.  The
second respondent is the first respondent’s mother.  The second respondent,
in a first action sued the appellant for damages arising from bodily injuries
sustained by the first respondent in the collisions, alleging that the
collisions were caused by the negligence of Du Randt.  Du Randt was cited
as the first defendant and appeared in person at the trial but is not a party in
the appeal.  It was also alleged that the appellant was liable to the first and
second  respondents on the basis that Du Randt was at all material times an

employee of the appellant and acted within the course and scope of his
employment with the appellant at the relevant time.  In a second action
against the third respondent the first and second respondents alleged that
the second collision was caused by the joint negligence of Du Randt and
Kumpf, alternatively the sole negligence of Kumpf.  Damages were
claimed from the third respondent as a result of the bodily injuries
sustained by the first respondent in the second collision.  By agreement the
two actions were consolidated.  By consent of the parties the court a quo
was only required to decide whether the appellant was vicariously liable for
the damages sustained in the aforementioned collisions.  The court a quo
found that the appellant was indeed so liable.
[4] The principles applicable to vicarious liability have been debated and
elaborated upon in numerous decisions of this court.1 Although the
principles are by now, in a large measure, plain, the difficulty often lies in
their application to the particular facts of a case.2 The basic formulation of
the principle underlying vicarious responsibility was laid down as long ago
as 1914 by Innes CJ in Mkize v Martens3 in these terms:

1 See for example Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382, Estate Van der Byl v Swanepoel 1927 AD 141,
Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945  AD 733, Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 (1) SA 117 (AD) and more
recently Absa Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria)(Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 372 (SCA), Ess Kay
Electronics Pte Ltd and Another v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 2001 (1) SA 1214 (SCA),
Messina Associated Carriers v Kleinhaus 2001 (3) SA 868 (SCA), Bezuidenhout NO v Eskom 2003(3)
SA 83 (SCA), Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit v Phoebus Apollo Aviation BK 2002 (5) SA 475
(SCA) and Costa da Oura Restaurant (Pty) Ltd  t/a Umdloti Bush Tavern v Reddy 2003 (4) SA 34 (SCA).
2 Cf Mkize v Martens (supra) at 391 and Ilkiw  and Others v Samuels and Others [1963] 2 All ER 879
(CA) at 889 A-B.
3 Supra at 390.

‘… a master is answerable for the torts of his servant committed
in the course of his employment, bearing in mind that an act done
by a servant solely for his own interests and purposes, and
outside his authority, is not in the course of his employment, even
though it may have been done during his employment.’

(The emphasis is mine)

[5] Vicarious liability is imposed on innocent employers by a rule of law
and what is required to be emphasised is that the rule and the reason for its
existence must not be confused4.
[6] In order to render a master liable the servant must have committed
the delict ‘while engaged upon the master’s business’5. Ownership by the master,
for example of a vehicle, through which the harm was done, may provide
material for inference, but by itself is irrelevant.  Accordingly the master
will not be liable merely because he is the owner of the vehicle used by the
servant with his permission and entrusted by him to the servant.6
[7] The answer to the question as to whether an employer is vicariously
liable for the particular acts of an employee which are complained of will
depend on a careful analysis of the facts of each case and also

4 See the remarks of Howie JA in Ess Kay Electronics Pte Ltd v First National Bank of Southern Africa
Limited (supra) at 1218 F para [7] to 1219 E para [10].
5 Carter & Co (Pty) Ltd v McDonald 1955 (1) SA 202 (AD) at 207B – C.

6 Carter & Co (Pty) Ltd v McDonald (supra) at 207 E – F.

considerations of policy.7  As recently stated by Heher JA in Bezuidenhout
NO v Eskom,8 ‘the determination of whether an act falls within or without the scope
of employment is a question of fact and often one of degree’ and ‘in determining the
scope of employment one should not look narrowly at the particular act which causes
the delict, but rather at the broader scope of which the particular act may represent only
a part.’.
[8] If the act relied upon is one which is personal to the employee
dependent upon the exercise of his own discretion and for his own
convenience, even if the exercise of that personal act was subsequently to
further the business or affairs of his employer, this would not per se mean
that the servant was performing the act in the course and scope of his
employment.9  Indeed, and in any event, the act may, in certain
circumstances, be merely ‘peripheral’ to the master’s business.10   If for
example, as was the situation in Carter’s case11, a servant hurries from his
own personal business in order that he may return with the least delay to
perform his master’s work, he is still about his own business alone.
[9] The facts in this matter which are either common cause, or not in
dispute, or which, even if disputed, may for the purposes of deciding the

7 Cf Messina Associated Carriers v Kleinhaus (supra) at 875[ para] 15 H – I.
8 Supra at 94 C para [23] and 93 C para[ 21].
9 Cf Union Government (Minister of Justice) v Thorne 1930 AD 47 at 51 and Mhlongo and Another NO v
Minister of Police 1978 (2) SA 551 (AD) at 567 E-H.
10 Messina Associated Carriers v Kleinhaus  (supra) at 875 F-G para [14].
11 Carter & Co (Pty) Ltd v McDonald (supra) at 209 F.

issue be resolved in favour of the respondents,12 and having due regard to
the factual findings of the court a quo, are as follows:
9.1
At all material times the first respondent was employed by the
appellant as a switchboard operator at its laboratory at the
Bosman Building in Johannesburg.  The second respondent
was also employed there by the appellant.

9.2
At the time of the collisions Du Randt, a Mr Pretorius and a
Mr Snyman were employed as machine technicians by the
appellant.  Pretorius was the senior technician.

9.3
The appellant was the owner of the motor vehicle then being
driven by Du Randt.  Du Randt had the use of the vehicle for
both business and private purposes.  Du Randt was entitled to
transport passengers in the vehicle.  During working hours he
was only entitled to transport business passengers, but after
business hours he was entitled to transport social passengers.

9.4
On the day of the collisions Du Randt worked from
approximately 08h00 in the morning until 17h00 in the
afternoon.

9.5
After returning to the appellant’s laboratory in Johannesburg
from Pietersburg on the afternoon of the day in question, he
was asked by Pretorius whether he was prepared to work in

12 Cf the approach to  disputes of fact in motion proceedings for  example in   Stellenbosch Farmers’
Winery Ltd v Stellenvale Winery (Pty) Ltd 1957 (4) SA 234 at 235 E – G.

Snyman’s place in Johannesburg to enable Snyman to
accompany Pretorius to Cape Town over the forthcoming New
Year’s weekend.   If he agreed to this Du Randt would get a
week of his choice off from work.  Du Randt told Pretorius
that he would look at his ‘skietprogram’  in order to decide and
that he would let Pretorius know of his decision ‘daardie aand of
vroeg die volgende oggend’.

9.6
The court a quo found that after leaving the appellants
laboratory that afternoon Du Randt was either ‘on call’ or ‘not
on call’.  Whether Du Randt was on call or not he was
nevertheless entitled to go about his own private business in
whatever manner he chose.

9.7
He chose to go to the first respondent’s sister’s residence to
fetch the first respondent, who was his girlfriend.  He intended
thereafter to proceed with her to his home in Pretoria and
having washed and changed he and the first respondent
proposed to go dancing at a club in Pretoria (Club Topaz).
After reaching his home in Pretoria and checking his
‘skietprogram’  or ‘skietprogram’ he also intended to communicate
with Snyman and Pretorius to advise them of his decision.
(Pretorius’s home is opposite Du Randt’s home and Snyman
lived very nearby).

9.8
After fetching the first respondent at her sister’s home, Du
Randt, as a result of a request conveyed by the second
respondent travelled with the first respondent to the
Marymount Hospital to attend to a problem with a machine.

9.9
Thereafter Du Randt proceeded with the first respondent
towards his home in Pretoria.  Before reaching his home the
collisions occurred.
9.10 According to the second respondent’s evidence in chief, upon
hearing of the collisions and the injury to the first respondent
she telephoned Snyman ‘om vir Mnr Snyman te sê dat Mnr du Randt
en Hayley [first respondent] in ‘n ongeluk is, hulle sou nie by die
vergadering wees nie.’

[10] In my view upon a proper analysis of this evidence and the
probabilities, at the time the collisions occurred Du Randt was about his
own private business and personal interests, namely getting to his home.13
What he intended to do at his home, is not directly relevant to the enquiry
as to whether at the time that the collisions occurred he was acting in the
course and scope of his employment which it is stressed, took place, before
he got there.  The decision that he proposed to make and convey to
Pretorius after consulting his ‘skietprogram’ had a bearing on the appellant’s

13 Cf Mkize v Martens (supra) at 390,  Estate van der Byl v Swanepoel (supra) at 150, Minister of  Police
v Rabie (supra) at 134 C – F and Ess Kay Electronics Pte Ltd v First National Bank of Southern Africa
Ltd (supra) at 1218 F – H (para [7]).

business.  Nevertheless, on a broad and realistic view of the matter, that
was something which depended on his own personal convenience.  Put
differently consulting his ‘skietprogram’ and thereafter conveying his
decision was merely ‘peripheral’ to his employer’s business.  Upon getting to
his home Du Randt might have decided simply to telephone his co-
employees, or to walk to Pretorius’s home and give the simple answer to
the question of whether or not he would be prepared to work on the
weekend in question.  Du Randt’s dominant purpose at the time that the
collisions occurred was to get to his home to wash and change and consult
his ‘skietprogram’ and thereafter to convey the first respondent and himself
in the appellant’s vehicle to Club Topaz.
[11] In all of the circumstances the evidence did not reveal that at the
relevant time Du Randt was acting in the course and scope of his
employment with the appellant.  I would accordingly allow the appeal with
costs.
[12]. The following order is made:

12.1 The orders made by the court a quo are set aside and replaced
by the following:
12.1.1
It is declared that the first defendant was not
acting within the course and scope of his
employment with the second defendant at the
time when the two collisions referred to in the

actions occurred.
12.1.2
The first and second plaintiffs and the first and
third defendants are ordered to pay the second
defendant’s costs jointly and severally the one
paying the other to be absolved.
12.2
The first, second and third respondents are ordered to pay the
appellant’s costs of appeal jointly and severally the one paying
the other to be absolved.

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R H ZULMAN

JUDGE OF APPEAL

FARLAM JA

)
HEHER JA

)CONCUR