THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case number: 2/2009

In the matter between:

GLEN DUNCAN

APPELLANT

and

THE MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL
AFFAIRS AND TOURISM

FIRST RESPONDENT

CHIEF DIRECTOR: RESEARCH
ANTARCTICA AND ISLANDS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
AFFAIRS AND TOURISM

SECOND
RESPONDENT

Neutral citation:
Duncan v The Minister of Environmental Affairs
and Tourism (2/2009) [2009] ZASCA 168 (1 December
2009)

CORAM:

Streicher, Brand, Mlambo, Malan JJA et Leach AJA

HEARD:

12 November 2009

DELIVERED: …
1 December 2009

SUMMARY:

Review – refusal of fishing licence under s 18 of MLR Act
18 of 1998 – appellant seeking to enforce substantive
legitimate expectation to acquire licence – question whether
competent in our law left open because legitimacy of
expectation held not to be established on the facts – further
reliance on legitimate expectation to be heard prior to
refusal – also dismissed on the facts.

_____________________________________

ORDER
_____________________________________

On appeal from:
Cape High Court (Nagan AJ sitting as court of first
instance).
The appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs occasioned by the
employment of two counsel.
_____________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________

BRAND JA (Streicher, Mlambo, Malan JJA et Leach AJA concurring):

[1] The appellant is a commercial fisherman. The first respondent is the
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. The second respondent is the
Chief Director in the same State department (‘the Department’) who is
responsible, inter alia, for the marine and coastal management branch of the
Department. For the sake of convenience I shall refer to the first respondent
as the Minister, to the second respondent as the Chief Director and to both of
them as the respondents. On 4 November 2005 the appellant applied for a
licence to undertake commercial fishing for traditional line fish in terms of s 18
of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998. Acting under delegated
authority of the Minister in terms of s 79, the Chief Director refused his
application. His appeal to the Minister in terms of s 80 was also unsuccessful.
In the event the appellant brought an application in the Cape High Court for
these two decisions to be reviewed and set aside. In due course, the court a
quo (Nagan AJ) dismissed this application with costs. The appeal against that
judgment is with the leave of Traverso AJP in the court a quo.

[2] The licence that the appellant applied for was a long term licence for
the eight year period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2013. As appears
from the reasons given by the Minister and the Chief Director for their

decisions, they refused the appellant’s application on one single ground: to
wit, that he had failed to demonstrate access to a 'suitable line fish vessel'. At
first sight this reason comes across as rather curious because the appellant
was the owner/skipper of the MFV Endeavour which, from a commercial point
of view, was by all accounts undoubtedly suitable for catching line fish. But it
is common cause that the requirement of a 'suitable vessel' is to be
understood in the light of a document entitled 'The Traditional Line Fish
Policy' which was issued by the Department and published in the
Government Gazette during June 2005 (the policy document).

[3] The policy document contained a full exposition of the departmental
policies and objects in regard to the long term line fishing licences that were
about to be issued at that time. It also informed prospective applicants for
these licences of the requirements with which they would have to comply.
One of these requirements was stated thus:
‘All applicants need to demonstrate access to a suitable line fish vessel. A suitable
vessel in the traditional line fishery is a vessel that:

is either a ski-boat or traditional wooden deck boat of approximately 10
metres or less (this criterion should be flexibly applied by the delegated authority)
that is currently operating in the fishery. The vessel must be certified by SAMSA as
being safe for fishing; and

is geared for hand line fishing.’

[4] The appellant’s vessel, the Endeavour, is not a ski-boat or a traditional
wooden deck boat, also known in the trade as a 'chukkie'. The Endeavour
belongs to a class described as freezer boats. Its specifications are
substantially different from those of ski-boats and chukkies. These differences
are vividly illustrated by the following table originating from the respondents’
answering papers:
DETAILS
ENDEAVOUR
TYPICAL SKI-BOATS
CHUKKIES
LENGTH
16,58m
5m-8,9m
6m-11m
GROSS TONNAGE
66,65
1,5-3
5-20
HOLD CAPACITY TONNES
± 30
1-3
3-5
CREW
5-11
5-16

[5] The appellant’s licence application indicates his appreciation that the
Endeavour did not comply with the description of a ‘suitable vessel’ in the
policy document. Hence he proceeded to motivate why it should nonetheless
be regarded as ‘suitable’ in the following way:
‘I have been utilising this vessel [the Endeavour] for the past eight years, initially to
land squid and later line fish . . .
In and during 2001, I submitted an application for a right of access in terms of s 18 of
the Marine Living Resources Act within the traditional line fish sector. On this
application being successful I have been using this vessel to target and harvest
traditional line fish.
The vessel has been certified to carry 25 crewmen using the line fish method and
have been doing so since the allocation was made . . ..
It is, however, noted with concern that the suitability of the vessel is determined by
its length. The policy goes further and indicates that the length should not exceed 10
metres (which discretion should be flexibly applied). The policy, however, does not
clarify or pronounce or offer any further details regarding the flexibility of the
discretion . . ..
It is however submitted that the vessel, Endeavour, despite it being longer than the
average vessel within the traditional line fish sector, is a suitable vessel for the
targeting and landing line fish especially if one considers the economic sustainability
of the traditional line fish business. As stated in previous annexures, the vessel is . . .
[inter alia] fitted with a blast and holding freezer. This allows the rights holder to
operate for longer periods at a time, deliver product of prime quality and negates the
fluctuating and varying factors which perpetuate the line fish sector.’

[6] The appellant’s thesis that he should have been granted a long term
licence to continue his line fishing business by means of the Endeavour
because he had been allowed to do so since 1995, was elaborated upon in
his review application. Accordingly, the appellant explained in his founding
affidavit that he had been involved in the fishing industry for most of his adult
life. Since 1995, so he said, he had been actively involved in both the
traditional line fish sector and the squid sector as skipper and later the
skipper/owner of the Endeavour. In 2001, however, he was compelled to
choose between line fish and squid as a result of a notice published by the
then Minister in the Government Gazette under s 16 of the Act. In terms of
the notice the Minister declared that an emergency had occurred in the line

fishing sector, excluding tuna and hake. In order to protect stocks of line fish
species from being depleted and commercially oversubscribed, so the notice
proceeded, the following restrictions were imposed until further notice:
‘(1)
The Total Applied Effort (TAE) [as defined in the Act] in respect of line fish
shall be restricted to 450 vessels with a maximum of 3450 crew;
(2)
A right in the line fish sector may not be granted to any person who holds a
commercial fishing right in respect of any sector of the fishing industry.
(3)
Hake and tuna will no longer form part of line fish, but will from the coming
into operation of these restrictions, constitute two separate sectors within the fishing
industry . . . ‘

[7] Because he was compelled to make an election in terms of paragraph
(2) of the notice, so the appellant said, he made his calculations and decided
that line fish would be more profitable than squid. When invitations for fishing
licence applications were invited by the Department in 2001, he therefore
applied for line fish only and not for squid. The licence that he applied for was
for a medium term of four years between 2001 and 2005. The vessel he
nominated in his application was the Endeavour. On that occasion his
application was successful. The reasons why other applications did not
succeed, were published at the time in a general statement by the
Department. One of the reasons given was that these unsuccessful
applicants had failed to meet with an essential requirement for a licence
which was formulated thus:

‘Ownership of or access to an appropriate vessel. An appropriate vessel is
typically a small vessel between approximately 5m and 10m in length with two
outboard motors, such a ski-boats. . . . '

[8] The conclusion he drew from all this, so the appellant said, is that,
despite the fact that in 2001 a suitable vessel was also described as one of
less than 10 metres in length, the Endeavour was then regarded as ‘suitable’
though it obviously exceeded that length. In 2005, so the appellant
contended, nothing material had changed. The TAE was still determined by
the Minister at 450 vessels and 3450 crewmen and there was no apparent
reason why the Endeavour would suddenly become non-suitable for
purposes of a long term licence. Moreover, the appellant continued, long term

licences were granted in 2005 for vessels which also exceeded 10 metres in
length. In this regard he referred, by way of example, to a vessel, the Kowie,
for which a licence was granted, despite the fact that it was 13,4 metres long.
In this light, so the appellant's founding affidavit concluded, the refusal of his
application on the sole basis that his vessel was 3 metres longer is, for that
reason alone, manifestly unreasonable.

[9] In his answering affidavit, the Chief Director explained that his decision
not to accept the Endeavour as a suitable vessel must be understood against
the precarious state of our line fish stocks. More pertinently, he said, stock
assessments performed since the 1980s showed that most commercially
exploited species of line fish had been depleted to dangerously low levels. By
December 2000 the situation had not improved. Consequently the then
Minister declared the environmental emergency in the fishery to which the
appellant referred. Pursuant to the declared emergency, the Minister
determined, as we know, that the TAE in this fishery shall be restricted to 450
vessels with a maximum of 3450 crew. With regard to vessels, it had been
considered for some years that smaller vessels of less than 10 metres in
length should be given preference in the fishery. These smaller vessels are
typically the ski-boats and wooden deck boats or chukkies. They are far less
efficient than larger freezer vessels such as the Endeavour. Consequently
they have a much smaller impact on an already compromised resource.
Large vessels are less affected by adverse weather conditions. They can stay
at sea for longer periods. While ski-boats and chukkies have to return at the
end of each day, the Endeavour, for example, can stay out for two weeks.
The operational range of freezer boats is up to 2 000 kilometres while the
maximum range of traditional vessels is no more than 80 kilometres.

[10] Further studies completed in 2003 showed, so the Chief Director
continued, that a substantial number of the species in the traditional line fish
sector had collapsed. Others were in a state of collapse but were fished in
large quantities as this was often the only way in which vessel operators
could generate sufficient income. In these circumstances the limit placed on
the type of vessel in 2005 was designed to reduce the fishing pressure

applied by larger freezer vessels, capable of trips of long duration and range,
to stocks on the Agulhas offshore bank. The objective in this regard was to
allow the Agulhas offshore bank to act as a refuge for these resources to
recover. As they recover they should start to feed the inshore area which is
the typical area fished by ski-boats and chukkies. The further problem with
larger vessels such as the Endeavour, so the Chief Director explained, is that
they have a history of targeting over-fished species, such as carpenter,
because they are capable of reaching the distribution range of these species.

[11] With regard to the Kowie, a vessel that the appellant brought into
comparison, it was pointed out by the Chief Director that the Kowie is a fairly
large traditional wooden deck boat which was built more than 40 years ago.
Though it is 13,4 metres in length (versus the 16,58 metres of the Endeavour)
it has a gross tonnage of 17 (versus the 66,65 of the Endeavour) and a
holding capacity of 4 tons (versus the 30 tons of the Endeavour) and a crew
of 16 (versus the Endeavour's 25). Based on information supplied by the
appellant and by the operators of the Kowie, so the Chief Director pointed
out, the superior efficiency of the Endeavour is illustrated by the fact that it
caught about twice as much fish in kilogram per crewmember per day as the
Kowie. It is an appreciation of these issues, so the Chief Director concluded,
that resulted in the decision reflected in the policy document to restrict
'suitable vessels' to ski boats and chukkies of approximately ten metres or
less.

[12] On 6 March 2006 the appellant was informed by the Chief Director that
his application for a long term licence had been refused because he did not
'demonstrate access to a suitable vessel'. In his refusal letter, the Chief
Director also referred to a document entitled 'General reasons for decisions
on the allocation of rights and effort in the traditional line fish sector' which
was published at the same time. The appellant then launched his appeal to
the Minister in terms of s 80. In his letter of appeal, which had been prepared
by his attorney and covered 25 pages, he sought to persuade the Minister
that the Chief Director had erred in refusing his application on the basis that
the Endeavour was not a suitable vessel. But, as we now know, the argument

was unsuccessful in that the Minister confirmed both the Chief Director's
decision and the reasons that he gave. Relying on the decision of this court in
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Scenematic Fourteen (Pty)
Ltd 2005 (6) 182 (SCA) para 35, the respondents contended at the outset that
it is only the Minister's decision under s 80 that is reviewable, because it
constituted a complete re-hearing and a fresh determination of the appellant's
application on the merits. The appellant, on the other hand, disputed that this
was so. I find this question unnecessary to decide for present purposes. For
the sake of argument I will assume in the appellant's favour that the decision
of the Chief Director is reviewable as well.

[13] The starting point of the appellant’s argument as to why he should
have been granted a long term licence, was his claim that he had a legitimate
expectation of being awarded such a licence in respect of the Endeavour and
that he was entitled to enforce that expectation. This argument immediately
raised the question whether the substantive protection or enforcement of a
legitimate expectation is competent in our law. In its original role the doctrine
of legitimate expectation has been recognised as affording no more than the
right to a fair hearing before an adverse decision is taken (see eg
Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) at 758C-G). In English
law, where the doctrine originated, its operation has, however, in recent years
been extended so as to afford a claim to compel substantive compliance with
the expectation (see eg R v North and East Devon Health Authority, Ex parte
Coughlan [2001] QB 213 (CA); R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council
[2002] 1 WLR 237 (CA); R (Abdi and Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363). Other Commonwealth
jurisdictions, on the other hand, which also inherited the doctrine of legitimate
expectation from English Law, have refused to follow the English extension of
substantive protection (see eg The High Court of Australia in Attorney-
General for the State of New South Wales v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 and the
Supreme Court of Canada in Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC)
[1991] 2 SCR 525; Mount Sinai Hospital Centre v Quebec (Minister of Health
and Social Services) [2001] 2 SCR 281). Thus far our Constitutional Court
has found it unnecessary to decide whether or not we should follow the

English example (see eg Premier, Mpumalanga v Executive Committee,
Association of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC)
para 36; Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (3)
SA 265 (CC) para 96). And in Meyer v Iscor Pension Fund 2003 (2) SA 715
(SCA) paras 27 and 28, the question was pertinently left open by this court.

[14] Since Meyer, the results of extensive academic research and analysis
have been published (see eg Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South
Africa (2007) 382 et seq; John Campbell 'Legitimate expectations: The
potential and limits of substantive protection in South Africa (2003) 120 SALJ
292; Geo Quinot 'The developing doctrine of substantive protection of
legitimate expectations in South African administrative law' (2004) 19 SA
Public Law 543). These publications will undoubtedly be of valuable
assistance when eventually the time comes in an appropriate case, as it
presumably will, for our courts to cut the Gordian knot. But this is not that
case. Even if substantive protection of legitimate expectations were to be
recognised as part of our law, the appellant has in my view failed to lay the
foundation for his claim of a legitimate expectation to acquire a long term
licence in respect of the Endeavour.

[15] Reliance on the doctrine of legitimate expectation for any purpose
presupposes that the expectation qualifies as legitimate. The requirements for
the legitimacy of such expectation have been formulated thus:
(a)
The representation inducing the expectation must be clear,
unambiguous and devoid of any relevant qualifications.
(b)
The expectation must have been induced by the decision maker.
(c)
The expectation must be reasonable.
(d)
The representation must be one which is competent and lawful for the
decision-maker to make.
(See eg National Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips 2002 (4) SA 60
(W) para 28; South African Veterinary Council v Szymanski 2003 (4) SA 42
(SCA) para 19; Woolf, J Jowell, A Le Sueur, De Smith's Judicial Review 6 ed
(2006) paras 12-029 et seq.)

[16] The grounds on which the appellant relied for his substantive
legitimate expectation of being awarded a long term licence in respect of the
Endeavour were summarised by his counsel as follows:

He had been an active participant in the traditional line fish sector since
1995 as skipper and later skipper/owner of the vessel.

In 2001 he had to abandon a lucrative portion of his livelihood in applying
for a medium term licence in the line fish sector in order to stay within the
policy guidelines as formulated by the Department.

The Endeavour had throughout been registered with the Department as a
commercial fishing vessel and had been lodging catch returns with the
Department in respect of her operation since 1995 and the appellant had
complied with all obligations under the medium term licence.

By granting a medium term licence the respondents had blessed
appellant’s vessel nomination in the past and implicitly considered it to be a
suitable vessel.

The policy document indicated that the suitable vessel requirement would
be flexibly applied and a number of vessels the length of which exceeded 10
metres were awarded long term licences.

[17] As I see it, the appellant could not have expected to acquire a long
term licence without any reservation and whatever the circumstances. This is
particularly so because he knew that the concept of a medium term licence
had been introduced as a precursor to long term licences and to provide the
Department with a window of observation and research. Common sense
therefore dictates that even in the appellant's own mind his subjective
expectation must have been subject to some reservations and conditions in
the light of what the uncertain future might bring. But what would these
conditions and reservations entail? Would it be that fish stocks remain the
same; or that the number of participants in the industry remains constant; and
so forth? The applicant does not say. In consequence I do not believe that the
representations he relied upon met the first requirement of certainty and
unambiguity.

[18] As to the second of the stated requirements, it is clear that most of the
factors relied upon by the appellant cannot be ascribed to the Chief Director
or the Department. If the appellant, for example, believed that he would
acquire a long term licence because he had been involved in the industry
since 1995 or because he had complied with the terms of his medium term
licence, that is not something that he had been told by the Department. Any
expectation based on these factors could therefore only be inspired by the
appellant's own beliefs. The same goes for his decision in 2001 to opt for line
fish and not to apply for squid. The appellant did not allege that there was any
intimation by the Department that if he gave up squid he could expect to
acquire a right to catch line fish. Giving up squid was a precondition for his
application in 2001, not a guarantee that the application would be granted.
Hence the appellant gave up squid at his own risk and because he thought
that line fish would be more profitable. As I see it, only two of the factors
relied upon by the appellant could possibly be laid at the door of the Chief
Director or the Department. These are (a) the fact that the appellant had been
granted a medium term licence for the same vessel and, (b) the statement in
the policy document that the suitable vessel requirement would be flexibly
applied.

[19] As to the first of these two factors, it would not, in my view, be
reasonable for the appellant to expect to acquire a long term licence simply
because he was granted a medium term fishing right. He knew that his
medium term licence was granted for a specific period only, from 1 January
2002 until 31 December 2005. Any expectation to the contrary would be in
conflict with s 18(6) which, inter alia, provides that:
'All rights granted in terms of this section shall be valid for the period determined by
the Minister . . . whereafter it shall automatically terminate and revert back to the
State to be reallocated in terms of the provisions of this Act . . ..'

[20] As I see it, the same can be said for the other factor possibly
attributable to the Chief Director or the Department, ie the statement in the
policy document that the suitable vessel requirement would be flexibly
applied. But again, any expectation based on that factor would simply not be
reasonable. An application of the requirement flexible enough to allow the

Endeavour which did not qualify at all, would in effect render the requirements
of a suitable vessel nugatory. In the end I do not believe that any of the
factors relied upon by the appellant – whether attributable to the decision-
maker or not – would, either singularly or collectively, provide a sufficient
basis for characterising his alleged expectation as reasonable. They would all
raise the rhetorical question as to why it would be reasonable for a person
who realised that he did not meet one of the essential requirements for a
licence to expect that he would nonetheless acquire that licence because he
had been involved in the industry for ten years; or because he had been
lodging the prescribed catch returns; or because of any of the other factors on
which the appellant purported to rely. For these reasons I conclude that the
appellant failed to establish the legitimacy of his alleged expectation to
acquire a long term licence.

[21] That, however, is not the end of the matter. On the appellant's papers
and even in the written heads of argument filed on his behalf in this court, his
case turned on the substantive protection of his alleged legitimate expectation
to acquire a long term licence in respect of the Endeavour. But in oral
argument there was an unmistakable shift in focus. What his counsel then
contended for relied on the conventional, procedural role of the legitimate
expectation doctrine as formulated, eg in Traub (at 758E-G), to the effect that
the person concerned may have a legitimate expectation to be heard before
an adverse decision is taken. Departing from this premise appellant's counsel
submitted that on the face of it the requirements for a suitable vessel imposed
in 2005 were substantially the same as those pertaining to a medium term
licence in 2001. Since the Endeavour had been regarded as suitable in 2001,
so the argument went, the appellant had a legitimate expectation in 2005 to
be given fair warning in advance that the goalposts had shifted; that the
Endeavour may no longer be regarded as suitable; and to be given the
opportunity of persuading the Chief Director that, although the Endeavour
does not strictly comply with the requirements stated in the policy document,
it should nonetheless be approved as a suitable vessel.

[22] As I see it, this argument rests on substantially firmer ground than the
appellant's attempt at enforcement of a substantive legitimate expectation.
Yet, for the reasons that follow, I do not believe it can succeed. The policy
document contained sufficient detail to explain what type of vessel would be
suitable. The appellant plainly understood that the Endeavour did not satisfy
these criteria. He thus made specific separate representations in that regard.
These representations have been fully set out earlier in this judgment (para
[5] above). As appears from the quotation, the appellant inter alia reminded
the Chief Director that the Endeavour had been utilised in the industry for
eight years and that it had been granted a medium term licence in 2001. He
then set out to motivate why, despite its excessive length, the Endeavour
should be approved. In his answering affidavit the respondents said – and it is
not disputed – that the appellant's motivation had been considered and that
he was given a further opportunity to deal with the issue on appeal. In this
light, I believe that any legitimate expectation of an opportunity to persuade
the respondents that the Endeavour was a suitable vessel, had been
satisfied.

[23] When met with these obstacles during argument, counsel for the
appellant introduced a further change of tack. What he then contended for
was in essence that the appellant could legitimately expect to be granted an
opportunity to persuade the Chief Director that the requirements for a suitable
vessel, as set out in the policy document, were not only unreasonable but in
fact misconceived. Had the appellant been given this opportunity, so the
argument went, he could explain to the Chief Director that it was wrong to
think that freezer boats like the Endeavour would impose undue pressure on
threatened species and that, in any event, there were other, more effective
ways of protecting these species than by excluding freezer boats from the
sector completely. To my way of thinking, a proper analysis of this argument
shows that it effectively relies on a legitimate expectation to be consulted
about the contents of the policy document. Thus understood, the argument
founders on the undisputed fact that the content of the policy document was
formulated after extensive consultations with a wide variety of interested

parties. This appears, inter alia, from the following statement by the Chief
Director:
'The draft traditional line fish policy was published in isiXhosa, Afrikaans, isiZulu and
English in the Government Gazette and on the Department's website and copies
were distributed along the coastline. For purposes of public consultation, the notice
and comment process set out in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of
2000 and its regulations were adopted. As part of the notice and comment process,
a series of public meetings were held in order to assist interested and affected
parties who cannot read or write or who otherwise needed special assistance. In
April 2005 consultations with communities took place in 15 venues along the coast
regarding the draft traditional line fish policy. At each consultation, every comment
was recorded and documented . . . At the end of the consultation process, more than
1700 fishers between Port Nolloth and Durban had been heard orally. Apart from the
hundreds of oral comments which were recorded, the Department also received
more than 330 written comments on the policy. Significant changes were made to
the policy after the comments were considered. In May 2005, Cabinet approved the
19 "sector specific policies" and the "General policy".

[24] Finally it was contended on the appellant's behalf that the decisions by
the respondents were reviewable under s 6(2) of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. In support of this contention the
appellant sought to rely on a contravention by the respondents of virtually
every sub-section of s 6(2). Hence it was submitted, by way of illustration,
that the respondents' decisions were taken for an ulterior purpose or because
of the unauthorised or unwarranted dictates of another person (s 6(2)(e)(ii)
and (iv)); that the decisions were not rationally connected to the purpose for
which they were taken or to the information before the respondents or to the
reasons given by them (s 6(2)(f)(ii)); and that the decisions were so
unreasonable that they could not have been taken by a reasonable person
(s 6(2)(h)). I do not think it is necessary to record and discuss the content of
these submissions in any detail. Suffice it to say, in my view, that in the light
of the background facts and the reasons given by the respondents for their
decisions, I find the appellant's contentions based on s 6(2) of PAJA without
any merit at all. This inevitably leads me to the order I propose.

[25] The appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs occasioned by
the employment of two counsel.

..……………..
F D J BRAND
JUDGE OF APPEAL

Counsel for the Appellants:
S F Burger SC

M Steenkamp

Instructed by:

Dawson Edwards & Associates

Cape Town

Correspondents:

McIntyre & Van der Post

Bloemfontein

Counsel for the Respondents:
W R E Duminy SC

E A De Villiers-Jansen

Instructed by:

The State Attorney

Cape Town

Correspondents:

The State Attorney

Bloemfontein