IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

REPORTABLE
CASE NO 392/2004

In the matter between

V & A WATERFRONT PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD

First Appellant
VICTORIA AND ALFRED WATERFRONT (PTY) (LTD)
Second Appellant

and

HELICOPTER & MARINE SERVICES (PTY) LTD

First Respondent
THE HUEY EXTREME CLUB

Second Respondent
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY
Third Respondent
________________________________________________________________________

CORAM:
HOWIE P, ZULMAN, NUGENT  JJA, COMBRINCK ET
CACHALIA AJJA
________________________________________________________________________

Date Heard:
15 August 2005

Delivered:
26 September 2005

Summary:   Requirements for final interdict – meaning of ‘injury’ in phrase ‘injury
… committed or reasonably apprehended’ – includes invasion of contractual right.

________________________________________________________________________

J U D G M E N T
________________________________________________________________________

HOWIE P

HOWIE P
[1] The issue in this case is whether all the well-known requirements for
final interdict relief were met.
[2] The first appellant company, through its managing agent, the second
appellant company, lets various commercial properties at the Cape Town
harbour waterfront.   One of them is a helicopter landing site (‘the
premises’).   The other party to the lease of the premises is the first
respondent company. It owns and operates helicopters, including one
originally used in the Vietnam war and known in the relevant flying
fraternity as a ‘Huey’ (‘the helicopter’). The first respondent’s sole director
is also chairman of the second respondent, The Huey Extreme Club, a
juristic person, to which the helicopter is made available and whose
members fly it recreationally.   The first and second respondents’ respective
activities in operating the helicopter are conducted at and from the premises.
[3] In January 2004 The South African Civil Aviation Authority, the third
respondent, issued and served an order, in terms of the Civil Aviation
Regulations promulgated under the Aviation Act 74 of 1962, grounding the
helicopter until the airworthiness of the aircraft could properly be assessed
by its officers.

[4] When it was intimated on behalf of the first and second respondents
that the grounding order would be ignored the appellants applied in the High
Court at Cape Town for an order that the respondents
‘Be interdicted and restrained from operating the …. helicopter … from the (premises)
pending the upliftment of (the) grounding order …’.

The matter came before Comrie J who dismissed the application and refused
leave to appeal.   The appellants appeal with the leave of this Court. The
third respondent has taken no part in the appeal and abides the court’s
decision.   For convenience I shall refer to the first and second respondents
as ‘the respondents’ and to the third respondent as ‘the Authority’
[5] The Court below considered that the grounding order had, for present
purposes, to be regarded as valid and that the first appellant had a clear right
to insist that the respondents complied with it for as long as it stood. The
court nevertheless found that, relief having been sought in final form, and in
the face of a deposition on behalf of the respondents that the helicopter was,
and remained, at all relevant times, airworthy, the appellants had failed to
establish that they had a reasonable apprehension of harm.
[6] The lease contains two provisions which are material now. In the first
the lessee undertook to comply strictly with the regulations and rules of,

inter alia, the third respondent.1 The second forbade contravention by the
lessee of any statutory regulations relating to or affecting the carrying on of
the lessee’s business in the premises.2
[7] Operation of the helicopter would necessarily involve taking off and
landing at the premises and constitute an activity within the course of first
respondent’s business.   Such operation would conflict with the grounding
order.   That order was empowered by, or itself constituted, ‘regulations and
rules’ of the third respondent.   Furthermore, the order was founded on
statutory regulations which bore on the operation of  the helicopter.
Consequently the regulations, through the order, affected the carrying on of
the business at the premises in so far as operation of the helicopter was
concerned.
[8] Therefore, if the grounding order has, for present purposes, to be
regarded as valid, the respondents’ threatened operation of the helicopter
entailed a threat to infringe the appellants’ rights under the lease provisions
referred to.

1  Clause 6.3.5.1 reads:  The Lessee shall be obliged to obtain and maintain for the duration of this lease
including any renewal thereof, the requisite licences and all the necessary approvals from inter alia the
Department of Transport, The South African Civil Aviation  Authority, The Port Captain and any other
Authority who may require approval for the operation of a helicopter landing site. The Lessee undertakes to
strictly comply with the regulations and rules of such authorities.
2 Clause 6.8 contains the following:  ‘The Lessee shall not contravene (or permit the contravention of) any
law, bye-law, statutory regulations or the conditions of any licence relating to or affecting the occupation of
the Premises or the carrying on of the Lessee’s business in the Premises, …’

[9] For the respondents it was alleged in the opposing affidavit, and urged
before us, that the grounding order was the product of reviewably irregular
and thus unlawful administrative action.   It was therefore argued that the
order was invalid and that disregard of it would not be unlawful and could
not constitute breach of the lease.
[10] The defence which the respondents sought to raise in this respect has
sometimes been called ‘collateral challenge’. Its applicability was examined
and explained by this court in Oudekraal Estates Pty Ltd v City of Cape
Town and Others. 3 In brief, it is applicable in proceedings where a public
authority seeks to coerce a subject into compliance with an unlawful
administrative act.4 If these proceedings are not of that nature then the
grounding order will have legal effect until set aside by a reviewing court.
[11] The argument for the respondents was that the application in this case
was really brought by the appellants on the Authority’s behalf and that the
latter sought to coerce the respondents to comply with the allegedly invalid
grounding order. I disagree. The third respondent was joined at its own
request in the court below and an answering affidavit was deposed to on its
behalf by its Senior Manager: Airworthiness. The affidavit did not canvass
the procedural and unfairness issues encompassed by respondents’ review

3 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA)
4 At 244 C-D

grounds but focused on the merits of the grounding order.   In addition, the
deponent declared that the third respondent abided the High Court’s decision
and offered its testimony to assist the court in determining the issue between
the appellants and the respondents.
[12] In support of the respondents’ argument reliance was placed on a
letter from the Authority to the second appellants Property Area Manager. It
was written two days after the grounding order. Having referred to the order,
the writer requested that the second appellant refuse access for the
helicopter’s operation from the premises.   The submission for the
respondents was that this indicated that the Authority was in truth the
applicant.
[13] While it is understandable that the Authority would want to invoke the
appellants’ assistance in combating what it regarded as unlawful operation
of the aircraft, neither the Authority’s joinder nor its letter just referred to
advance the respondents’ case. Quite without the need for any reliance on
the reasons for the grounding order, or the Authority’s joinder for that
matter, the appellants were entitled entirely on their own account to take
legal action against the respondents. They could do so not to enforce the
grounding order but to enforce the lease. It is not adverse to them that the
terms of the interdict sought were aimed at compliance with the grounding

order with no mention of the lease. Had the interdict merely demanded
compliance with the relevant lease provisions it would not have been
specific enough.   Moreover compliance with the grounding order was
necessary to achieve compliance with the lease.
[14] In addition nothing justifies the conclusion that the proceedings
amounted in reality to an attempted enforcement by the Authority against the
respondents or an endeavour by them to review the Authority. Neither in
form nor substance was the case geared to address those questions which
needed to be resolved if the central issue for decision was the validity of the
grounding order.
[15] In the circumstances the proceedings a quo were not such that the
defence of collateral challenge was available.   The grounding order
therefore had to be regarded as valid.   The consequence is that its
infringement by the respondents would have brought about a breach of the
lease if indeed the first respondent bore the obligations of lessee.
[16] The respondents sought to argue that the first respondent had the
rights of lessee but none of the obligations. Reliance was placed in this
regard on the relevant contractual documentation which, it was contended,
supported this submission.

[17] What the papers reveal is that initially the premises were leased by the
first appellant to CHC Helicopters (Africa) Proprietary limited.   Later, that
lessee’s rights and obligations were assigned to Wealth International
Network Proprietary Limited. Later still, the current lease documentation
was signed.   The signatory parties were the first appellant as lessor and the
first respondent, the latter being specifically referred to throughout the
signed document as ‘the tenant’. In badly drawn but nonetheless
understandable preambles to the signed document it was recorded that the
first appellant and Wealth International Network had entered into a new
lease ‘on the same terms and conditions’ as before and that Wealth
International Network had ‘ceded and assigned its rights under the lease’ to
the first respondent. It was this last reference to rights but not obligations
which prompted the argument.
[18] The contention overlooks that in legal parlance ‘assignment’ normally
means the transfer of both rights and obligations but that its interpretation is
in any event dependent on context.5 If use of ‘assigned’ in addition to
‘ceded’ is not enough to indicate the transfer of more than rights, the context
makes it unarguably clear that the first respondent assumed not only the
rights of lessee but the obligations as well.

5  Simon NO v Air Operation of Europe AB and others 1999 (1) SA 217 (SCA) 228I

[19] It follows that the respondents’ threat to ignore the grounding order
amounted at the same time to a threat to breach the lease.
[20] The respondents contended nevertheless that breach did not constitute
‘injury’ for purposes of the second essential requirement for final interdict
relief which was expressed in the classic formulation as ‘injury actually
committed or reasonably apprehended’.6 The argument was that ‘injury’ in
that phrase had necessarily to entail physical harm or pecuniary loss. The
appellants had consequently to show, so the contention proceeded, that the
helicopter was unairworthy and that its operation involved risk to life and
property.
[21] The argument is founded on neither authority nor principle. The
leading common law writer on the subject of interdict relief 7 used the words
‘eene gepleegde feitelijkheid’ to designate what is now in the present
context, loosely referred to as ‘injury’. The Dutch expression has been
construed as something actually done which is prejudicial to or interferes
with, the applicant’s right.8 Subsequent judicial pronouncements have
variously used ‘infringement’ of right9 and ‘invasion of right’.10  Indeed, the

6  Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221, 227.
7 Van der Linden, Judicieele Practijcq  2  19  1;  Koopmans Handboek 3  1  4  7.
8 Blackburn v Krohn (1855) 2 Searle 209, 211; Bok v The Transvaal Gold Exploration and Land Co (1883)
1 SAR 75, 76.
9 Rossouw v Minister of Mines and Minister of Justice 1928 TPD 741, 745.
10 Von Molkte v Costa Areosa (Pty) Ltd 1975 (1) SA 255 (C), 258D

leading case Setlogelo11 was itself one involving the invasion of the right of
possession. Of course it is hard to imagine that a rights invasion will not be
effected most often by way of physical conduct but to prove the necessary
injury or harm it is enough to show that a right has been invaded. The fact
that physical means were employed or physical consequences sustained is
incidental.
[22] In the present case therefore the threatened invasion of the first
appellant’s rights under the lease constituted proof of reasonably
apprehended injury. It was not necessary for the appellants’ success to show
that the helicopter was unairworthy or what the chances were of a fatal or
destructive crash.
[23] Coming to the third and final requirement, the respondents submitted
that an interdict was not the only appropriate remedy. It was said that the
first appellant could sue for damages or cancel the lease. This argument
cannot prevail. The first appellant is entitled to enforce its bargain: to obtain
the lessee’s promised rental while preventing the latter from conducting
itself in a manner that involves breaking the law. The only ordinary remedy
which provides it with the necessary protection is an interdict. Cancellation
would be quite the opposite of that to which the first appellant is entitled.

11  1914 AD 221.

And damages would be difficult to prove if possible to prove at all. Lessors
of commercial complexes stipulate for provisions like those in issue because
they want, understandably, to maintain the standing or repute or safety or
appeal of their properties. However, whether a particular lessee’s
contraventions of the law, and consequent breaches of its lease, have led to
financial loss because aspirant or even existing tenants do not want, in view
of the contraventions, to be involved in the complex, could be exceedingly
problematic to prove.
[24] For these reasons the application in the court below should have
succeeded and the appeal must succeed.
[25] It remains to mention that a good deal of time was devoted in the
appeal to the question whether the appellants were, by interdict proceedings,
really seeking contractual relief in the form of specific performance and, if
so, whether they needed to fulfil the requirements for a final interdict. In
reliance on the views of Professor RH Christie The Law of Contract, 4th ed,
618-9, they argued that there was no such need. One may indeed say that
had the prayer expressly been for specific performance many of the same
issues may have arisen as have arisen. However, an interdict having been
sought, and the requirements for it having been met, it is unnecessary to
decide whether the appellants’ argument was right.

[26] The following order is made:

1.
The appeal is allowed, with costs, including the costs of two
counsel.

2.
The order of the court a quo is set aside and substituted for it is
the following order:

‘(1)
That the first and second respondents be interdicted and

restrained from operating the Bell helicopter, registered

as ZU-CVC-B205 UH 1 H, from the helipad situated at

Building 200, Breakwater East Pier, V&A Waterfront,

Cape Town pending the upliftment of a grounding order

issued by the South African Civil Aviation Authority on

7 January 2004;

(2)
The first and second respondents are ordered, jointly and

severally, to pay the first and second applicants’ costs,

such costs to include the costs of engaging two counsel.’

_______________
HOWIE P
CONCURRED:
ZULMAN   JA
NUGENT  JA
COMBRINCK  AJA
CACHALIA  AJA