THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case No: 86/09

NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Appellant

and

DAVID CUNNINGHAM KING

Respondent

Neutral citation: National Director of Public Prosecutions v King (86/09) [2010]
ZASCA 8 (8 March 2010)

Coram:
HARMS DP, NUGENT, MLAMBO and MALAN JJA, and MAJIEDT AJA
Heard:
15 FEBRUARY 2010
Delivered:
8  MARCH 2010

Corrected:
Summary:
Criminal procedure – right to a fair trial – right to a motivated index of
police docket – litigation privilege

___________________________________________________________________

ORDER

___________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: North Gauteng High Court (Pretoria) (Bosielo J sitting as court of
first instance).

1 The appeal is upheld.

2 The order of the court below is substituted with an order dismissing the application.

___________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

___________________________________________________________________

HARMS DP (NUGENT, MLAMBO and MALAN JJA, and MAJIEDT AJA concurring)

INTRODUCTION
[1] Police dockets, forming a prosecutor’s brief, consist normally of three
sections. Section A contains statements of witnesses, expert reports and
documentary evidence. Section B contains internal reports and memoranda, and
section C the investigation diary.1 In our law, following English precedent, the
general rule is that one is not entitled to see his adversary’s brief.2 This is referred to
as litigation privilege, something different from attorney and client privilege.3
However, as the Constitutional Court has held in Shabalala, a ‘blanket’ docket
privilege in criminal cases conflicts with the fair trial guarantee contained in the Bill of
Rights.4 Accordingly, litigation privilege no longer applies to documents in the police
docket that are incriminating, exculpatory or prima facie likely to be helpful to the
defence.5 This means that an accused is entitled to the content in the docket
‘relevant’ for the exercise or protection of that right. The entitlement is not restricted
to statements of witnesses or exhibits but extends to all documents that might be
‘important for an accused to properly ‘adduce and challenge evidence’ to ensure a
fair trial’.6

1 Shabalala & others v Attorney-General of Transvaal & another 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC) para 10 per
Mahomed DP.
2 R v Steyn 1954 (1) SA 324 (A) 332 per Greenberg JA; S v Alexander & others (1) 1965 (2) SA 796
(A) 812E-G per Ogilvie Thompson JA; S v Mavela 1990 (1) SACR 582 (A) 590g-591a per Eksteen
JA.
3 Richard S Pike ‘The English law of legal professional privilege: a guide for American attorneys’
(2006) 4 (1) Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 51; Three Rivers District Council
and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 5) [2005] 4 All ER 948; [2004]
UKHL 48.
4 Shabalala para 72 A2.
5 Shabalala para 72 A3-A5.
6 Shabalala para 57.

[2] The blanket privilege has not been replaced by a blanket right to every bit of
information in the hands of the prosecution. Litigation privilege does still exist, also in
criminal cases, albeit in an attenuated form as a result of these limitations.7 Litigation
privilege is in essence concerned with what is sometimes called work product8 and
consists of documents that are by their very nature irrelevant because they do not
comprise evidence or information relevant to the prosecution or defence.

[3] This much is hardly contentious. What is in contention in this appeal is
whether an accused is entitled as of right to a full description of each and every
document to which he is denied access – all being documents falling in parts B and
C of the docket – with a statement of the precise basis upon which access is denied
to any document in order to have a fair trial. In other words, is the accused entitled to
a ‘motivated index’ to satisfy him in advance that the trial will be fair? The court
below held in the affirmative and hence this appeal by the National Director of Public
Prosecutions (the NDPP).

[4] It is well to remind oneself at the outset of a number of basic principles in
approaching the matter. Constitutions call for a generous interpretation in order to
give full effect to the fundamental rights and freedoms that they create.9 The right to
a fair trial is, by virtue of the introductory words to s 35(3) of the Bill of Rights,
broader than those rights specifically conferred by the fair trial guarantee therein and
embraces a concept of substantive fairness that is not to be equated with what might
have passed muster in the past.10 This does not mean that all existing principles of
law have to be jettisoned nor does it mean that one can attach to the concept of a
‘fair trial’ any meaning whatever one wishes it to mean.11 The question remains
whether the right asserted is a right that is reasonably required for a fair trial. A
generous approach is called for. This is a question for the trial judge and there is in
general not an a priori answer to the question whether a trial will be fair or not.

7 Blank v Canada (Minister of Justice) [2006] 2 SCR 319 (SCC): the issue in this case was about
when the privilege terminated.
8 R v Card 2002 ABQB 537 (Alberta) provides a useful catalogue of case law. See also the
explanation in S v Mavela loc cit and Shabalala para 15; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v
Baker (No 2) [1998] Ch 356 364.
9 S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) para 14 per Kentridge AJ.
10 Zuma para 16.
11 Zuma para 17.

Potential prejudice may be rectified during the course of the trial and the court may
make preliminary rulings depending on how the case unfolds and may revoke or
amend them.12  Irregularities do not lead necessarily to a failure of justice.13

[5] There is no such thing as perfect justice – a system where an accused person
should be shown every scintilla of information that might be useful to his defence –
and discovery in criminal cases must always be a compromise.14 Fairness is not a
one-way street conferring an unlimited right on an accused to demand the most
favourable possible treatment but also requires fairness to the public as represented
by the state.15 This does not mean that the accused’s right should be subordinated
to the public’s interest in the protection and suppression of crime; however, the
purpose of the fair trial provision is not to make it impracticable to conduct a
prosecution.16 The fair trial right does not mean a predilection for technical niceties
and ingenious legal stratagems,17 or to encourage preliminary litigation18 – a
pervasive feature of white collar crime cases in this country. To the contrary: courts
should within the confines of fairness actively discourage preliminary litigation.
Courts should further be aware that persons facing serious charges – and especially
minimum sentences – have little inclination to co-operate in a process that may lead
to their conviction and ‘any new procedure can offer opportunities capable of
exploitation to obstruct and delay.’19 One can add the tendency of such accused,
instead of confronting the charge, of attacking the prosecution.

[6] The respondent, Mr DC King, has been indicted on 322 counts including
fraud, tax evasion and evasion of the Exchange Control Regulations, as well as
money-laundering and racketeering. The counts relate inter alia to a failure to submit
tax returns, fraudulent misrepresentations in his tax returns, and devising and
implementing an allegedly fraudulent scheme to ‘externalize’ his assets to evade

12 Compare Shabalala para 72 A6.
13 S v Shaik 2008 (2) SA 208 (CC) para 43; S v Basson 2007 (3) SA 582 (CC) para 120: an allegation
that an interlocutory ruling was wrongly made which may have a material impact on the outcome of
the case is not sufficient to demonstrate that the trial was unfair.
14 R v O’Connor [1995] 4 SCR 411 para 193-195.
15 Shaik loc cit.
16 Montgomery v HM Advocate General and another [2003] 1 AC 641 (PC) 673 per Lord Hope of
Craighead quoting Pullar v United Kingdom 22 EHRR 391.
17 Key v Attorney-General, Cape Provincial Division & another 1996 (4) SA 187 (CC) para 13.
18 Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions & others 2009 (1) SA 1 (CC) paras 65-66.
19 Regina v H and others [2004] UKHL 3 para 22 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill.

income tax and obligations under the regulations, involving amounts in excess of R1
billion. The main complainant, as one could expect, is the SA Revenue Services
(SARS). It apparently has a claim of some R3 billion against King flowing from some
of the allegations.

[7] The case has a long history. King was arrested in 2002 and the original
indictment was served during April 2005. (The last indictment ran to some 800
pages.) The trial was initially set down for 26 July 2005. By then the case was
already and has since been conducted by means of correspondence, press
interviews, some case management sessions before a judge allocated for that
purpose, and interlocutory proceedings in civil courts. One of the issues that had
arisen in the correspondence related to King’s right to be provided with a copy of the
docket free of charge. The NDPP refused on the basis that an accused person is
only entitled to free copies if that person cannot pay for copies. King was not ready
to proceed with the trial and on the preceding day he launched an application for a
declaratory order declaring his entitlement to a copy of the docket free of charge and
a review under Uniform r 53 of the decision by the NDPP refusing him a copy free of
charge.

[8] It is common cause that King is a very wealthy man and it cannot be gainsaid
that the application was cynical and without any merit and was brought purely with a
view to delay the criminal proceedings. More need not be said about this issue
because in the event the court below refused this relief on 11 December 2008.
There is no cross-appeal.

THE APPLICATION FOR A MOTIVATED INDEX
[9] On 10 October 2005 King filed an amended notice of motion, adding another
prayer. Bosielo J, in the court below, granted an order on 11 December 2008 in its
terms despite the fact that King had not asked at the hearing – during October 2007
– for an order in those terms because it was common cause that he was not entitled
to the shotgun relief sought. King abandoned much of the order about the time the
application for leave to appeal was to be heard in the court below. What remained
after redaction was an order directing the NDPP to furnish King with (a) a full
description of each document in part B and C of the docket; (b) a full description of

each and every document to which King is denied access; and (c) a statement of the
precise basis upon which access is denied to any document. This is the ‘motivated
index’ this case is about. Bosielo J granted leave to appeal to this Court. However,
King argued that the matter was not appealable, a matter to which I shall revert in
due course.

[10] The docket in this case is not a typical police docket. This is due to the nature
and complexity of the case. Private practitioners were briefed by the State to
conduct the investigation and prosecution, a practice common in countries such as
the United Kingdom and, simply relying on institutional memory, known in this
country since at least 1950.20 There are many documents. Part A, at March 2006,
consisted of about 200 000 pages and contained all the evidence and documents
relevant to the case. King has always had access to them and he now has copies to
the extent that he did not have them before. Much of part B consists of electronic
records, for example, it consisted at the time of – apart from anything else – about
21 000 emails held by the different persons and entities that had been involved in
the case. In addition, the NDPP’s attorneys held about 270 lever arch files of
documents not included in part A. The NDPP has calculated that providing a
motivated list of these documents would cost in excess of R1,5m.

[11] The documents in part B and C of the docket fall in these categories:
 investigators’ files, including their investigation diary, notes taken during
witness interviews, draft witness statements, communications with witnesses,
certain tape recordings of meetings with witnesses, communications and
notes of discussions with expert witnesses;
 communications between the National Prosecuting Authority (the NPA), its
attorneys and counsel, and complainants;
 communications between the NPA and other representatives of the
Department of Justice, attorneys and counsel appointed by the NPA, and the
investigators, including minutes or notes of meetings, requests and
motivations to the NPA for the issue of summonses to witnesses, and
progress reports;

20 The Milne and Erleigh prosecution with many reported cases beginning with R v Milne and Erleigh
1950 (4) SA 591 (W).

 communications between the NPA and other Departments of State such as
the Department of Trade and Industry;
 communications within the NPA, between the NPA and outside prosecutors,
including attorneys and counsel, and communications between attorneys and
counsel briefed in the prosecution;
 communications between the prosecutors and complainants, including their
attorneys;
 communications between investigators and complainants;
 communications between the NPA, its counsel and attorneys, and overseas
authorities and solicitors;
 internal NPA memoranda;
 internal NPA  Status Reports and information contained on the NPA’s case
management system;
 opinions by prosecutors, notes on legal research, copies of judgments
(reported and unreported);
 notes by prosecutors, including notes of telephone calls, notes of matters to
be attended to, and planning memoranda;
 minutes of meetings between the NPA, prosecutors, investigators and
complainants.

THE EVIDENCE
(a) The founding affidavit
[12] King’s attorney in the supplementary founding affidavit (where the issue of the
motivated index arose for the first time) said that ‘it is clear that [King] is entitled to
have access to all the documents in possession of the State, which are relevant to
the charges against him and which are not privileged.’ He then quoted a number of
provisions of the Constitution, two of which were relied on during argument, namely
s 35 (the right to a fair trial) and s 32 (the right to access of information) and
proceeded to recite the terms of the relief sought in relation to the motivated index.
He in particular did not allege that he had reason to believe that there were any
‘relevant’ documents in part B and C that were not privileged or falling within the
Shabalala principle.

(b) The answering affidavit
[13] The then NDPP, Mr Pikoli, in his answering affidavit, after having set out the
information about the categories of documents in the two parts, stated that King did
not require access to them for a fair trial. He said that the reasons for not disclosing
varied from document to document but included the following:
 Many of the documents were irrelevant to the issues in the criminal case.
 None of the documents was exculpatory or prima facie likely to be helpful to
the defence in the trial.
 All or most of the documents were privileged from disclosure on a variety of
grounds.
 The public interest in preserving confidentiality of some documents
outweighed any interest King might have had in their disclosure.

(c) The replying affidavit
[14] King, in reply, merely denied ‘the bald claim of privilege’. Importantly, he did
not traverse the allegation relating to relevance, or that none of the documents was
exculpatory or prima facie likely to be helpful to the defence or the public interest
claim. On ordinary principles this means that the allegations in the answering
affidavit are deemed to have been admitted or, at least, that he is bound by the
answer. Also significant is the fact that King did not attack Pikoli’s ability to give this
evidence; he did not say that it was hearsay; and he did not object thereto. Whether
it was hearsay and whether Pikoli was able to make the allegations was,
accordingly, never raised as an issue. I mention this because King’s argument
before us that we may not or should not (I am not clear what the submission was)
have regard to Pikoli’s evidence is out of order. Had it been raised at the appropriate
time the NDPP could have dealt with it.

[15] Pikoli, while denying that King was entitled to the relief sought, added that the
NDPP was in the process of compiling an index of these documents. This, according
to King in his replying affidavit, was tantamount to a concession that he was entitled
to a copy, a rather disingenuous allegation.

(d) The supplementary answer

[16] A long delay followed while the parties were busy with, primarily, extra-curial
shadow boxing. The application was eventually set down for hearing on 29 October
2007. However, a few days before the hearing the NDPP filed a supplementary
answering affidavit. The purpose of the new evidence – now sworn to by the acting
NDPP, Mr Mpshe – was ‘to further elucidate why [King] is not entitled to these
particulars and to explain . . . the enormous practical difficulties . . . and the costs
that would be incurred’ if the order were to be granted. He stated that the process of
preparing an index had been stopped because it was found to be an extremely
arduous task and would serve no practical purpose. He reiterated that the
documents fell within the categories set out earlier in this judgment. And he dealt
with the cost involved. He also analysed the wider implications of the order to the
criminal justice system to the extent that it would create a development or extension
of the Shabalala principles. It is not necessary to detail the facts because it cannot
be gainsaid that the application of such a general principle would create another
stumbling-block for courts to get to grips with cases and grind an already
overburdened criminal justice system to a halt.

[17] It is necessary to quote a paragraph in the Mpshe affidavit in full because it
forms the factual foundation for King’s argument. It reads as follows:
‘Insofar as the demand for a description of “each of the documents in parts B and C of the
docket” is concerned, the categories of documents in parts B and C (ie, those documents
forming part of the docket which have not been provided to King under section A) have been
described in the answering affidavit [referring to the Pikoli affidavit]. As appears from that
affidavit these documents constitute internal working documents, memoranda, reports,
opinions and correspondence. They have not been disclosed because King does not require
access to them for a fair trial. This is because they are either not relevant to the issues in the
criminal trial or do not fall within the ambit of the information envisaged as being disclosable
by the Constitutional Court in Shabalala, or even if relevant and falling within such
parameters, are privileged from disclosure on a variety of grounds. The public interest in
preserving their confidentiality and the interests of justice outweigh any interest that King
might have in their disclosure. There accordingly is no obligation to disclose them.’

[18] King’s argument is that Mpshe hereby conceded that there are relevant
documents within part B and C of the docket. The submission ignores not only the

context of the statement (being a restatement of what Pikoli had said) but also the
actual wording of the affidavit ignoring content, context and intent.

(e) The supplementary reply
[19] King filed a subsequent affidavit, said to be a supplementary replying affidavit,
but it was in fact much more. To the extent that it amounted to a supplementary
replying affidavit he denied the quoted paragraph from the Mpshe affidavit.
Importantly, he did not allege that it contained any admission and, as in the case of
the Pikoli affidavit, he did not deny Mpshe’s ability to give the evidence or alleged
that it was hearsay. My earlier comments about the belated hearsay objection apply.
He also denied that he had to make out a prima facie case for the relief sought.

[20] King dealt in detail with the issue of delay, something not relevant to this
appeal. The new matter, which had no real antecedent, concerned first the role of
SARS in the prosecution and, second, the fruits of certain overseas investigations
conducted by the prosecution.

(f) The SARS issue
[21] As far as the SARS issue is concerned, King made the following allegations.
He said that the charges against him had arisen out of an investigation conducted by
SARS into his tax affairs. SARS was the primary complainant and SARS was
pursuing parallel civil litigation against him where the same or similar issues arose.
This was suspended pending the finalization of the criminal case. SARS was the
sole funder of the prosecution against him and the private practitioners employed by
the NDPP as prosecutors have been paid by SARS. He said that SARS took over
the financial responsibility of the prosecution because it was not satisfied with the
manner in which the NPA had been conducting it. He submitted that SARS viewed
the prosecution as a means of extracting payment of the alleged tax debt. The
conduct of especially two of the prosecutors, being funded by SARS, gave him
cause to suspect that they lack the independence constitutionally demanded of
prosecutors. It is not necessary to detail the litany of complaints any further and I
turn to his submissions based on these allegations.

[22] He submitted that he was ‘entitled to all documents in the possession of the
NPA that provide evidence’ of contact between the prosecutors and SARS in order
to present in full his case for the removal from the prosecution of the private
attorneys and counsel who, he believes, lacked the independence that he is entitled
to expect under the Constitution. He then submitted that it must be self-evident that
there are many such documents within five of the 13 categories of documents
mentioned earlier. In addition, he said that he was entitled to ‘copies’ of all accounts
rendered to the NPA by these practitioners to identify the fees paid and the persons
within SARS with whom they had any contact.

(g) The ‘foreign’ evidence issue
[23] Less need be said about the second issue, namely the evidence obtained by
the NDPP overseas. King said that he had ‘reason to suspect that at least some of
the evidence obtained by means of the overseas investigations [during 2002 and
2003] may have been procured unlawfully’ and that he intended to object to the
admission of that evidence. To do so he required ‘access’ (he did not say a
motivated index) to the communications between the NPA, its counsel and attorneys
and the overseas authorities. It is common cause that this evidence was disclosed
as a separate section under part A and the NDPP has stated emphatically that it
does not intend to rely on it. This is and was always a non-issue because if the
evidence is not tendered King will have nothing to object against.

(h) The ‘new’ evidence on appeal
[24] King filed an affidavit in this Court on 10 February 2010, two court days
before the hearing of the appeal. The explanation proffered was that the documents
attached to the application to lead further evidence did not exist when the case was
heard in the court below. The documents were supposed to show that the NDPP
was able ‘to furnish [King] with those parts of the docket or an index to the docket
which [King] has sought.’ I should immediately say that there is nothing in the latter-
day correspondence to justify the second part of the quoted statement, namely that
relating to the ability to produce an index. And as appears from this judgment, it
does not concern itself with the ability or otherwise of the prosecution to supply a
motivated index.

[25] One of the documents relied on by King was a document that King had filed
(probably during November 2009) in one of the side shows between the parties in
the South Gauteng High Court. It purports to be a draft special plea in terms of s
106(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which deals with the
prosecutor’s ‘title to prosecute’. The essence of the special plea is (more or less)
that because of the facts recited above in respect of the SARS issue, King has a
reasonable apprehension that SARS has interfered improperly with the obligation of
the NPA to approach all matters concerning his prosecution in an independent
manner and that its continued involvement in his prosecution is unconstitutional and
invalid. (Whether this has anything to do with the prosecutor’s ‘title’ is a matter to be
left for another court.) In a letter of 8 December 2009 King’s attorneys then asked
the NDPP for documents relevant to that issue and gave a specified list. The NDPP,
after some intervening correspondence, replied on 2 February 2010 that it would in
the light of the proposed special plea review all documents in the docket not yet
disclosed to determine whether any of them were relevant to the proposed special
plea, prima facie helpful to King in asserting this defence, and not privileged. (It has
not been suggested in argument or otherwise that the NDPP’s undertaking is not
bona fide.) King was also asked to apprise the NDPP of any other special plea he
intended to raise to enable it to consider disclosure in relation thereto. He has not as
yet responded.

[26] For the sake of completion it is necessary to make some reference to the
NDPP’s affidavit in answer. The deponent, Mr Carter, pointed out with reference to
documents in the appeal record that King had asked on a number of occasions
during 2005 for information about the role of SARS in the prosecution. The last
request was during October 2005. Carter said that all the information requested was
given. King, in vague terms, then threatened a special defence since April 2006 but
when requested to particularize it he refused to do so, alleging that it was his
prerogative to raise the issue when it suited him. Carter also dealt with the list in the
letter of 8 December 2009. He pointed out that the documents in the first seven
categories had either been supplied or relate to common cause facts. The remaining
requests relate to the fee lists of counsel and attorneys, the relevance of which
appears to me to be fanciful.

[27] The new matter, whether in the supplementary replying affidavit or the
papers filed in this Court relating to the SARS and the foreign evidence had nothing
to do with the relief sought or the order granted. King’s new case, which he used to
bolster his motivated index case, was that he is entitled to ‘access’ of these
documents under the ordinary Shabalala principles. He may or he may not be but
that is not what the order sought or granted related to, which was a motivated index
of ‘all’ documents in parts B and C of the docket. At the time the application was
launched the NDPP had no reason to believe that these issues were issues in the
case. As mentioned, King had refused to divulge his special defences or pleas.

KING’S SUBMISSIONS ON FAIR TRIAL
[28] King’s case is built on the general submission that one can assume that all
the withheld documents are in some or other way relevant to King’s prosecution
because there would be no other explanation for their inclusion in the docket. For
this reliance was placed on a recent Canadian case, namely R v McNeil.21 Counsel
took some liberties in interpreting the judgment.

[29] The accused in McNeil sought to obtain access to police disciplinary records
and criminal investigation files relating to the main police witness. The court used the
occasion to reiterate the obligations of the police and prosecution ‘to disclose the
fruits of the investigation under R v Stinchcombe’22 (at para 14). That case
established the prosecution’s duty ‘to disclose all relevant information in its
possession relating to the investigation’ and meaning ‘not only information related to
those matters the Crown intends to adduce in evidence against the accused, but
also any information in respect of which there is a reasonable possibility that it may
assist the accused in the exercise of the right to make full answer and defence’ (at
para 17). The court pointed out that there are many limitations on the duty to
disclose the fruits of the investigation (at para 19). It is in this context that the court
stated in the paragraph relied on by King that there are two assumptions in relation
to the prosecution’s duty to disclose the contents of its file ‘under Stinchcombe’:
‘The first is that the material in possession of the prosecuting Crown is relevant to the
accused’s case. Otherwise the Crown would not have obtained possession of it . . . The

21 [2009] 1 SCR 66 para 20.
22 [1991] 3 SCR 326.

second assumption is that this material will likely comprise the case against the accused. As
a result, the accused’s interest in obtaining disclosure of all relevant material in the Crown’s
possession for the purpose of making full answer and defence will, as a general rule
outweigh any residual privacy interest held by third parties in the material.’ (Para 20.)

[30] As far as the first assumption is concerned, it dealt with information
gathered and not material created. In any event, the second assumption does not
apply because the undisputed evidence is that the material referred to in that
assumption is in part A of the docket. The last sentence quoted merely restates the
Shabalala test in slightly different terms. It uses the word ‘relevant’ in a sense
different from that used by counsel for King. As was said in a Canadian case relied
heavily on by King, ‘(r)elevance must be assessed in relation both to the charge
itself and to the reasonably possible defences’ and that the duty relates to the
disclosure of evidence.23 To explain: a document may be relevant to the prosecution
without being relevant to the accused’s guilt or defence. For instance, King seeks a
motivated list of opinions by prosecutors, notes on legal research, and copies of
judgments (reported and unreported). These documents are clearly relevant to the
prosecution but they are not relevant ‘for the purpose of making full answer and
defence’. In other words, as mentioned at the outset of this judgment, most of the
material covered by litigation privilege in criminal cases would in any event not be
discoverable because the material is not germane to the conduct of the trial, ie, is
not relevant in the sense discussed.

[31] The argument proceeded from the assumption that the NDPP had conceded
that part B and C of the docket included documents that are relevant to the issues in
the case and also documents that are disclosable under Shabalala.  Because of this,
so went the argument, King has no way of considering whether the NPA ‘is justified
in withholding specific documents at least some of which, on the NPA’s own
admission, are relevant to the issues in the criminal trial’. I have already rejected the
submission relating to the concession. Further, the Shabalala documents are by
definition relevant and do not form a separate class of documents. Then, as I have
mentioned, it was not in dispute before the supplementary replying affidavit raised

23 R v Taillefer [2003] 3 SCR 307 paras 59-60. See also Rowe v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 1
para 60.

the SARS issue that none of the documents was exculpatory or prima facie likely to
be helpful to the defence in the trial. And last, the argument kept vacillating between
a Shabalala duty and the duty to provide a motivated index.

[32] This is fortified by King’s concluding submission on the right to a fair trial. The
argument, as stated in the heads, was that it flows from Shabalala that King is
entitled ‘to access to all relevant documents in the docket’ and that the mere ipse
dixit of the NPA is not sufficient to justify the withholding ‘of relevant documents’ in
the docket. In this regard King relied on authorities that deal with the trite proposition
that if documents are admittedly relevant they have to be discovered unless the
refusal to discover can be justified.24 But, as I have stated repeatedly, this case is
about the right to a motivated index to enable King, without any prima facie facts, to
audit part B and C of the docket. Quite clearly, King need not be satisfied with the
say-so of the prosecution but the initial decision remains that of the prosecution and
if shown to be prima facie wrong during the trial, a court may order more.25

THE JUDGMENT A QUO ON FAIR TRIAL
[33] The court below, although emphasizing that the case was not about
disclosure but about a motivated index accepted that the same principles applied.
The learned judge found the Shabalala test too elastic and incapable of precise
definition and he preferred to use Canadian tests that say the same – namely that
information, whether incriminating or exculpatory must be disclosed unless plainly
irrelevant; or that information that can ‘reasonably’ be used by the accused to
advance a defence or making a decision which may affect the conduct of the
defence must be disclosed.

[34] It will be recalled that Bosielo J ordered more than King had asked for at the
hearing. One of the abandoned orders was an order requiring the NDPP to provide a
motivated index of part A of the docket. It would appear that this may not have been
an error on the part of the learned judge because on more than one occasion he
reverted to the facts concerning part A of the docket. And he concluded his judgment

24 Crown Cork & Seal Co Inc v Rheem SA (Pty) Ltd 1980 (3) SA 1093 (W); Air Canada & others v
Secretary of Trade & ano [1983] 1 All ER 910 (HL) 915.
25 Cf Her Majesty's Advocate v Murtagh (The High Court of Justiciary Scotland) [2009] UKPC 36
especially paras 35 and 40.

on this aspect, after referring to the size of the indictment and the number of files
that the NDPP ‘relies’ on, by saying that King could not be expected to wade through
tomes and tomes of documents without knowing what they are (at para 40). One can
only wade through documents if one has access to them. I have, unfortunately, to
reiterate that this was not King’s complaint.

[35] The court also justified its order with reference to the SARS and foreign
evidence issues and said that King had a substantial interest in ‘seeing’ them and
that he cannot prepare his defence without having had ‘sight’ of them. The learned
judge in my view misconceived the issue, not only for the preceding reasons but also
in the light of what follows. The appeal was heard five years after the application was
launched. We know after all these years of only two categories of undisclosed
documents which, according to King, he fairly requires for purposes of his defence.
His counsel was accordingly invited to identify any other possible category and he
did not or could not accept the invitation. Instead, his argument appeared to be, with
reference to the rule that when the existence of information has been identified the
prosecution must justify the non-disclosure – which has been done.26 He was also
invited to say whether he required an order for the disclosure of the documents
relating to these two issues and his answer was in the negative. At the conclusion of
his argument he submitted that he was at least entitled to a motivated index under
oath of all undisclosed documents that fall within the Shabalala formulation. But, as
mentioned ad nauseam, the undisputed evidence was that there is none. Although
he submitted that he was asking no more than what he would have been entitled to
in a civil case, he was mistaken because in civil litigation the documents that fall
under the rubric of litigation privilege are not listed in the discovery affidavit.27

ACCESS TO INFORMATION
[36] King also relied on the fundamental right of access to any information held by
the state contained in s 32(1)(a) of the Bill of Rights. The argument was simple: the
fundamental right to information held by the state is unlimited; the whole docket

26 R v Chaplin [1995] 1 SCR 727. Why it was necessary to rely on foreign jurisprudence for a trite
proposition is unclear but that is apparently how constitutional cases are argued.
27 Uniform r 35(2).

contains information held by the state; ergo, he is entitled to the whole docket. It
should be mentioned that the court below did not deal with this issue.

[37] The interim Constitution (s 23) and the transitional arrangements in schedule
6 of the Constitution defined the right in more restrictive terms. The right was
qualified by the requirement that an applicant for access had to require the
information for the protection of a right. The final Constitution (s 32(2)) in turn
provided that national legislation had to be enacted to give effect to the right. The
necessary legislation was duly adopted: the Promotion of Access to Information Act
2 of 2000. As with the case of the right to administrative justice, once this Act came
into operation an applicant for access to information is obliged to base his case on
the Act and may not, except to the extent that the Act is unconstitutional, rely on s
32(1) simpliciter. In other words, s 32(1) does not provide a free-standing right to
access.

[38] In Shabalala (at para 34) the CC had to consider whether the right to access
of information in the interim Constitution impacted on the right to information that
flowed from the fair trial right. The court said that if an accused is unable to obtain
access to information under the fair trial provision it is ‘difficult to understand’ how
the accused could obtain it under the access to information provision. Whether this
is the case under the final Constitution need not be decided since the answer to the
question has to be sought in the said Act.

[39] On a formal level, the Act requires compliance with certain formalities as a
pre-condition for access (s 11). In this regard reference may be made to s 40, which
contains a mandatory prohibition of disclosure of documents that are privileged from
production in legal proceedings, and s 39, which entitled the NDPP to have refused
the request on a number of relevant grounds. King did not follow the prescribed
route. On a substantive level, s 7 provides that the Act does not apply to a record of
a public body or a private body if—

(a)
that record is requested for the purpose of criminal or civil proceedings;

(b)
so requested after the commencement of such criminal or civil
proceedings, as the case may be; and

(c)
the production of or access to that record for the purpose referred to in
paragraph (a) is provided for in any other law.
‘Other law’ refers in this context to the body of law which includes the rules relating
to discovery, disclosure and privilege. In other words, if access to information is
requested for the purpose of criminal proceedings the right thereto has to be sought
elsewhere. As was said in Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk and another,28 in the context
of civil proceedings, ‘once court proceedings between the parties have commenced,
the rules of discovery take over’. King’s counsel accepted the correctness of the
statement.

APPEALABILITY
[40] King opposed the grant of leave before Bosielo J on the ground that his
decision was not appealable. The issue whether his ‘decision’ could have been
appealed irrespective of the leave granted is a preliminary question in any appeal
but it is one that in the context of this case and in the light of my conclusion can
conveniently be discussed at this late juncture.

[41] Criminal appeals are governed by the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
which, in very general terms, permits appeals against conviction and sentence only.
Civil appeals, in turn, are governed by s 20 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 and
are permitted against ‘judgments or orders’, a term that has a technical meaning that
has evolved and is still evolving. Then there are intermediate cases that fall under s
21(1) of the latter Act, which gives this Court the additional jurisdiction to hear
appeals against any ‘decision’ of a high court. Although the term ‘decision’ has been
interpreted to be equivalent to ‘judgment or order’, this Court in S v Western Areas
Ltd & others29 has held that a judicial pronouncement that is not a judgment or order
– such as an interim ruling during a criminal trial – may be appealable if the interests
of justice require it.

[42] The NDPP relied heavily on this judgment, incorrectly in my view. Howie P
was careful not to decide that the ‘interests of justice’ test applied to civil cases –
something the present case was as an adjunct to an order for a declaratory order

28 2006 (4) SA 436 (SCA) para 19 per Brand JA.
29 2005 (1) SACR 441 (SCA) para 28 per Howie P.

and a review application. This is not the place to reconsider the so-called Zweni test
in civil litigation and I instead prefer to decide the matter with reference to that test.30
This means that it is not necessary to consider the argument about the interests of
justice. The focussed issue is whether the ‘order’ was in substance and not in form
final in effect. In other words, was it capable of being amended by the trial court?

[43] The order in form appears to be ‘interlocutory’ and since ‘interlocutory’ orders
are usually not ‘judgments or orders’ but rulings it is easy to understand why it
appears prima facie not to be final in effect. On closer examination it is, however,
final in substance. The criminal trial cannot begin without compliance and, in any
event, the criminal court will be bound by that ‘decision’. King submitted that the
NDPP could have approached the court that had made the order for a variation on
new facts – but that was a submission without substance because if one asks what
new facts are possible one seeks in vain for a sensible answer. Had the court
refused the application the position may have been different and King may have
been able to raise the matter during his trial. He may eventually argue that his trial
was unfair because there was reason to believe that there were undisclosed relevant
documents. In this regard one may compare the case to the position with
exceptions: a dismissed exception is not appealable but an exception that has been
upheld is. The reason is that in the case of the former the matter may again be
raised by way of a plea or argument during the trial while in the case of the latter the
matter has been laid to rest by the order upholding the exception.

[44] Mahomed CJ said in this regard in Beinash v Wixley:31
‘There can be no doubt that the decision of the then Witwatersrand Local Division to set
aside the impugned subpoena was a “judgment or order” in the ordinary sense of the word
which, if wrong, could be corrected on appeal. The real question is whether it can be
corrected forthwith and independently of the outcome of the main proceedings or whether
the appellant is constrained to await the outcome of the main proceedings before the
decision can be attacked as one of the grounds of appeal - in which event the decision of

30 Zweni v Minister of Law and Order 1993 (1) SA 523 (A).
31 1997 (3) SA 721 (SCA); [1997] 2 All SA 241 (A).

the court a quo now under discussion would not be a “judgment or order” in the technical
sense but a ruling.

"The question which is generally asked . . . is whether the particular decision is
appealable. Usually what is being asked relates to not whether the decision is
capable of being corrected by an appeal Court, but rather to the appropriate time for
doing so. In effect the question is whether the particular decision may be placed
before a Court of appeal in isolation, and before the proceedings have run their full
course" (per Nugent J in Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd v Niselow (1996) 17 ILJ
673 (LAC) at 676 H).

This problem often arises when one or other party seeks to appeal against some preliminary
or interlocutory decision, which is made by a court before it has arrived at a final conclusion
on the merits of the dispute between the parties. The approach of the court in such
circumstances is a flexible approach. In the words of Harms AJA in Zweni v The Minister of
Law and Order 1993 (1) SA 523 (A) at 531J - 532A:

"The emphasis is now rather on whether an appeal will necessarily lead to a more
expeditious and cost-effective final determination of the main dispute between the
parties and, as such, will decisively contribute to its final solution."

What the court does is to have regard to all the relevant factors impacting on this issue. It
asks whether the decision sought to be corrected would, if decided in a particular way, be
decisive of the case as a whole or a substantial portion of the relief claimed, or whether such
decision anticipates an issue to be determined in the main proceedings. The objective is to
ascertain what course would best "bring about the just and expeditious decision of the major
substantive dispute between the parties."’

[45] The point may be illustrated with reference to Clipsal Australia (Pty) Ltd v Gap
Distributors (Pty) Ltd32 where this Court held that an order suspending contempt
proceedings pending review proceedings was appealable. In that case, as in the
present, the court intended the order to be final and not susceptible to amendment
as is apparent from the order itself and was confirmed by the learned judge in his
judgment on leave to appeal. I do not wish to revisit any detail of the Clipsal

32 [2009] ZASCA 49, 2009 (3) SA 292 (SCA),  [2009] 3 All SA 491 (SCA) per Streicher JA.

judgment – its reasoning is applicable to this case – but will limit myself to compare
Bosielo J’s order with an order for security for costs which is a separate and ancillary
issue between the parties, collateral to and not directly affecting the main dispute
between the litigants. It is not a procedural step in attack or defence at all but a
measure of oblique relief sought by one party against the other on grounds foreign to
the main issue. An order determining this collateral dispute is therefore final and
definitive. If a party has been prejudiced by the order his prejudice is irremediable.33
I therefore conclude that Bosielo J was correct in holding that the matter was
appealable.34

[46] It is, however, necessary to emphasize that the fact that an ‘interlocutory’
order is appealable does not mean that leave to appeal ought to be granted because
if the judgment or order sought to be appealed against does not dispose of all the
issues between the parties the balance of convenience must, in addition to the
prospects of success, favour a piecemeal consideration of the case before leave is
granted. The test is then whether the appeal, if leave were given, would lead to a
just and reasonably prompt resolution of the real issue between the parties.35 Once
leave has been granted in relation to a ‘judgment or order’ the issue of convenience
cannot be visited or revisited because it is not a requirement for leave, only a practical
consideration that a court should take into account.

[47] I should mention, although somewhat out of context, that King also submitted
that Bosielo J had exercised a discretion and that this Court cannot interfere with such
an exercise except on very limited grounds. Apart from the fact that the learned judge
did not purport to exercise a discretion the position is fairly simple. Fair trial rights are
not matters for discretion; nor are discovery and related matters. One either has a
right or one does not have one. In any event, as I have indicated, the court below did
misdirect itself in a number of material respects, not only in regard to the facts but also
because its judgment, as did King’s argument, oscillated between the Shabalala right

33 Para 33 where Streicher JA relied on Shepstone & Wylie and Others v Geyser NO 1998 (3) SA
1036 at 1042D-E which quoted, with approval, a passage in Ecker v Dean 1937 (SWA) 3 at 4.
34 He relied on Metlika Trading Ltd v Commissioner SA Revenue Services [2004] 4 All SA 410,
2005 (3) SA 1 (SCA) para 14.
35 Smith v Kwanonqubela Town Council [1999] 4 All SA 331 (SCA), 1999 4 SA 947 (SCA) para 16.

to access and the right to a motivated index to documents that do not fall within the
Shabalala formulation.

CONCLUSION
[48] I have accordingly come to the conclusion that the decision of the court below
is appealable. As to the merits of King’s application I am satisfied that he does not
reasonably require a motivated index of part B and C of the docket to enable him to
conduct his defence. This means that the appeal has to succeed and the order of the
court falls to be substituted with an order dismissing King’s application. Issues of costs
did not arise.

ORDER
1 The appeal is upheld.
2 The order of the court below is substituted with an order dismissing the application.

______________________
L T C Harms
Deputy President

NUGENT JA
NUGENT JA (HARMS DP, MLAMBO and MALAN JJA and MAJIEDT AJA
concurring)

[49] I agree with the order that is proposed by my colleague.

[50] There will be few orders that significantly affect the rights of the parties
concerned that will not be susceptible to correction by a court of appeal.  In Liberty
Life Association of Africa Ltd v Niselow36 (in another court), which was cited with
approval by this court in Beinash v Wixley 1997 (3) SA 721 (SCA), I observed that
when the question arises whether an order is appealable what is most often being
asked is not whether the order is capable of being corrected, but rather whether it
should be corrected in isolation and before the proceedings have run their full

36   (1996) 17 ILJ 673 (LAC).

course.  I said that two competing principles come into play when that question is
asked. On the one hand justice would seem to require that every decision of a lower
court should be capable not only of being corrected but of being corrected forthwith
and before it has any consequences, while on the other hand the delay and
inconvenience that might result if every decision is subject to appeal as and when it
is made might itself defeat the attainment of justice.

[51] In this case it was said on behalf of Mr King that the order is not appealable
because it is interlocutory. Whether that is its proper classification does not seem to
me to be material.  I pointed out in Liberty Life that while the classification of the
order might at one time have been considered to be determinative of whether it is
susceptible to an appeal the approach that has been taken by the courts in more
recent times has been increasingly flexible and pragmatic.  It has been directed
more to doing what is appropriate in the particular circumstances than to elevating
the distinction between orders that are appealable and those that are not to one of
principle.  Even the features that were said in Zweni v Minister of Law and Order37 to
be characteristic, in general, of orders that are appealable was later said by this
court in Moch v Nedtravel (Pty) Ltd38 not to be exhaustive nor to cast the relevant
principles in stone. As appears from the decision in Moch, the fact that the order is
not ‘definitive of the rights about which the parties are contending in the main
proceedings’ and does not ‘dispose of any relief claimed in respect thereof’, which
was one of the features that was said in Zweni to generally identify an appealable
order, is far from decisive.

[52] The order that is under appeal in this case, whether or not it might correctly
be classified as interlocutory, is final in its effect.  If it is indeed capable of being
revisited by the court below, as counsel for Mr King submitted that it was, it is
nonetheless the product of a reasoned judgment, and the prospect that it might be
withdrawn by the court below upon further application can confidently be discounted.
Needless to say, once the order has been executed, which must necessarily occur
before the trial begins, any appeal will be academic. Yet the order has major
implications for the prosecution. It requires a massive exercise to be undertaken by

37  1993 (1) SA 523 (A).
38  1996 (3) SA 1 (A) 10F.

the prosecution at considerable cost.  If the order was erroneously granted I have no
doubt that this is the time for the error to be corrected, failing which it might just as
well never be corrected at all.

[53] I agree with my colleague, for the reasons he has given, that Mr King’s
reliance upon the right of access to information in s 32(1)(a) of the Bill of Rights is
misplaced.  That right has been given effect, as required by the Constitution, by the
enactment of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000.  In the absence
of a challenge to the adequacy of the Act to confer the rights that are constitutionally
guaranteed, Mr King has no claim to a residual constitutional right.39  I confine
myself to his reliance upon the right that he has under s 35(3) to be afforded a fair
trial.

[54] The ambit of the duty upon the prosecution to disclose documents to an
accused person was authoritatively defined by the Constitutional Court in Shabalala
v Attorney General of Transvaal. 40  We were referred to numerous decisions in other
jurisdictions that have dealt with that topic, which do not seem to me to materially
add to or detract from what was held in Shabalala.  Nor did I understand counsel for
Mr King to contend for any extension of the principles laid down in that case so far
as they relate to the disclosure of documents.  But the principles of Shabalala, and
the cases like it, are not what is in issue in this case, because this case is not about
the disclosure of documents at all, as counsel for Mr King correctly took
considerable trouble to remind us.

[55] The case that was advanced on behalf of Mr King in support of the order was
not that the prosecution has failed in the duties that are cast upon it by Shabalala.
As my colleague has pointed out, what was sought by Mr King was a list of all
documents in the possession of the prosecution, together with an explanation in
respect of each document for why it has not been disclosed.  That is a most novel
order and counsel for Mr King could refer us to no court in the English speaking

39  Compare Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) in relation to the right under s
33 to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and administratively fair.
40  1996 (1) SA 725 (CC).

world in which a like order has been granted.  Nor am I aware of any case in which
such an order has even been sought.  I think that the reason for that is plain.

[56] Whether a trial is fair is an objective fact.  To receive a fair trial Mr King is
entitled to the material that is contemplated by Shabalala.  If he has received all that
material, and is then tried, it could hardly be said that his trial was unfair on account
of not having had the list that he requires.  And if he is tried without having been
given that material the proceedings might be set aside if that has denied him a fair
trial, even if he has been given the list.  No doubt he is not obliged to wait until his
trial has been concluded before complaining, and might rightly object if he is faced
with the prospect of a trial that is destined to be unfair because he has not been
furnished with documents to which he is entitled. But I have pointed out that that is
not what the case is about.

[57] The only purpose that is served by the production of the list that Mr King
requires, and evidently the purpose for which it is required, is to enable Mr King to
audit the disclosure that has been made by the prosecution so as to determine
whether the prosecution has fulfilled its duty.  In effect Mr King wants the
prosecution to satisfy him, as a precondition to being tried, that his trial will be fair.

[58] I do not think that s 35(3) goes that far. In its terms it entitles Mr King to be
tried fairly in fact.  It does not entitle him to be satisfied that the trial will be fair.  If he
were able to show in advance that his trial will not be fair it might be that a court will
grant him appropriate relief. But the prosecution is not called upon to satisfy an
accused person that his trial will be fair as a precondition to prosecuting. If that were
to be required as a precondition for a trial it seems to me that there might be few
criminal trials at all.   Criminal proceedings are not a consensual affair.

____________________

R W  Nugent

Judge of Appeal

APPEARANCES:

APPELLANTS:

W Trengove SC

G Budlender SC

J Cassette

Instructed by  Bowman Gilfillan Attorneys,

Pretoria, c/o Friedland Hart Inc, Pretoria

Symington & De Kok, Bloemfontein

RESPONDENTS:

M Chaskalson

A Stein

Instructed by: Moss Cohen & Partners

Pretoria, c/o Jacobson & Levy Inc, Pretoria

Lovius Block, Bloemfontein