In The Supreme Court Of Appeal Of South Africa

Case No 126/2001
REPORTABLE

In the matter between

Phillipus Petrus Nicolaas Coetzee

Appellant

and

Attorneys’ Insurance Indemnity Fund

Respondent

Before:
Nienaber, Marais, Schutz, Navsa and Mthiyane JJA

Heard:
21 May 2002

Delivered: 2 September 2002

Indemnity insurance – limitation clause – interpretation – whether extends to costs claim of
claimant – operation of s156 of Insolvency Act where insured sequestrated.

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JUDGMENT
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SCHUTZ JA
[1] This appeal is concerned with the operation of the limitation of liability
clause in an indemnity policy, in circumstances where the estate of the insured
has been sequestrated, so that s156 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (the Act)
functions.  The section confers a direct action against an indemnifying insurer
upon a third party who has a claim against the insured.
[2] That third party is one Coetzee, who suffered serious injuries when he
slipped on a wet floor at the house of one Schmidt in Welkom.  This led to a
claim against Schmidt of about one and a half million rands.  Coetzee
appointed an attorney, one Botha, to bring action on his behalf.  Acting
negligently, Botha allowed Coetzee’s claim to become prescribed.  Coetzee
then sued Botha for the sum abovementioned, together with costs.  It is this
action that has led to the dispute which has come before us.  The claim for the
capital amount, together with the costs later incurred, far exceeds the limit of
one million rands contained in Botha’s indemnity policy with the respondent,
the Attorneys Insurance Indemnity Fund (the Fund).  As will be explained
below, the Fund was later substituted for Botha as the defendant (under s156
of the Act).  Coetzee, as plaintiff, accepts that the capital amount of his claim
is limited to R1 m, but contends that his recoverable costs are not subject to
the limitation and may be recovered from the Fund in addition to the R1 m.

The Fund, on the other hand, contends that its total liability for capital and
costs is R1 m.  That is the dispute.
[3] Before the trial was heard, and on 9 January 1997, Botha’s estate was
finally sequestrated.  Shortly before the trial date, 2 September 1997,
Coetzee’s representatives gave notice to amend the particulars of claim by
replacing Botha as defendant with his trustee in insolvency, one Wessels.
This led to the need to seek condonation.  Hancke J, before whom the trial
came, then suggested that there should be a substitution of defendants to cite,
not Wessels, but the Fund, this under s156 of the Act.  The parties agreed.
Accordingly on 3 September the Fund became the sole defendant.  The trustee
in insolvency seems to have got lost on the way, as one would have expected
that Coetzee would have claimed from the Fund up to its indemnity limit and
from the trustee for any balance.  Merits and quantum having been separated,
Hancke J in due course decided in favour of Coetzee on the merits.  He also
ordered costs against the Fund.  These costs were later taxed in an amount of
R49 619,13.  That sum is by no means the full measure of Coetzee’s
recoverable costs.
[4] Subsequently quantum was agreed, save that the parties could not agree
whether costs were to be included in the R1 m limit, so that their inclusion
would proportionally reduce the capital claim, or whether they were
recoverable additionally to the R1 m.  This dispute came before Lombard J.
His decision, favourable to Coetzee, is reported as Coetzee v

Vrywaringsversekeringsfonds Vir Prokureurs 2000 (2) SA 262 (O).  It was
reversed by Malherbe J with Wright J and Wessels AJA concurring.  Their
decision is reported as Vrywaringsversekeringsfonds Vir Prokureurs v Coetzee
2001 (4) SA 1273 (O).  It is the appeal against that decision which is now
before us, special leave having been granted by this Court.  The combined
sum of the agreed quantum and Coetzee’s recoverable costs well exceeds one
million rands.
[5] There are two main issues to be decided.  The first is whether in terms
of the indemnity policy Coetzee’s costs are included in the limit.  The second
is whether, even if they are, s156 operates in such a way as to allow him to
recover them in excess of the limit, this because the costs, or at least the post-
sequestration costs, are recoverable not from Coetzee, who is bound by the
terms of the policy, but from a new defendant who has been introduced by
statute and who is not so bound.
The Interpretation of the Policy
[6] The decision of the first question depends upon the interpretation of the
policy.  The limit is contained in clause 3.1, which reads:
‘The liability of Insurers in respect of all claims and claimants’ costs and
expenses and Approved Costs arising out of one event or occurrence shall
not exceed the Limit of Indemnity specified in Schedule A.’

The Schedule A limit is R1 000 000-00.
[7] The indemnity is contained in clause 1, the relevant part of which reads:

‘The indemnity granted in this policy is in respect of:

1.1
the Insured’s legal liability to any third party arising out of the
Conduct of the profession by the Insured which legal liability is the
subject of a claim first made on the Insured during the Period of
Insurance irrespective of when or where such liability arose.
1.2
Approved Costs in connection with any claim under 1.1 …..’

[8] Approved costs are defined in clause 2.3 to mean:
‘”Approved Costs” – all legal and similar costs and expenses which the
Insured may incur with Insurers written consent which shall not be
unreasonably withheld.’

[9] ‘The Insured’ in terms of clause 2.4 of the policy is the attorney Botha.
His costs are, in terms of the definition thereof and as limited by the said
definition of ‘Approved Costs’, included in the indemnity by virtue of clause
1.2.  The Fund’s written consent to the incurring of the costs was given.  The
first of the elements making up the limit in clause 3.1 is therefore identified.
Botha’s costs are the ‘Approved Costs’.
[10] The remaining phrase in clause 3.1 needing interpretation is ‘all claims
and claimants’ costs and expenses’.  The ‘claim’ in this case is plainly
Coetzee’s claim, at least for the capital amount thereof, as it is a claim of the
kind indemnified against in clause 1.1.
[11] There remains the question, the one that has to be decided, whether
Coetzee’s costs are included in the indemnity and also the limit set out in
clause 3.1.  In my opinion those costs are included in both.  As far as the
indemnity is concerned those costs are part of Botha’s ‘legal liability’, even if
not yet incurred or quantified, as a liability for costs potentially flows out of a

liability in delict.  Whether or not the ‘claim’ when first made expressly
mentions costs, a claim for costs is implicitly included.  Any opposite
conclusion would be thoroughly unbusinesslike.  Cf M Zahn Investments (Pty)
Ltd v General Accident Insurance of South Africa Ltd 1981 (4) SA 143
(SECLD) at 148B-C.  It would be astounding if an attorney in Botha’s
position were to be indemnified against a damages claim but not against a
claim for costs inevitably accompanying it.  My conclusion is that Coetzee’s
costs claim is covered by the indemnity.
[12] As regards the limit in clause 3.1, these costs are plainly included in the
words ‘and claimant’s costs and expenses.’  The ‘claimant’ is not Botha, who
is referred to throughout as ‘the insured.’  The ‘claimant’ is the third party, in
this case Coetzee.  So his claim for costs is included in the limit.  Again this is
the businesslike conclusion, as without such inclusion the limit would be
holed and would not really be a limit at all.  In this connection it should be
remembered that a limit and its amount, plays a part in fixing the premium.
[13] A further argument, also based on the terms of the policy, is raised on
behalf of Coetzee.  It is based on sub-clause 6.10.  Clause 6 is headed
‘Conditions’.  The sub-clause reads:
‘Insurers may in their sole discretion, in the case of any claim for indemnity,
pay to the Insured or to any person claiming any benefit under this policy or
to the claimant, the Limit of Indemnity (but deducting in such case any sum
or sums already paid as indemnity) or any lesser sum for which the claim or
claims arising from such claim for indemnity can be settled and Insurers
shall thereafter be under no further liability in respect of such claims for

indemnity, except for the payment of costs and expenses of litigation
incurred prior to the date of payment of such Limit of Indemnity or such
lesser sum’  (emphasis supplied).

Mr Lowe, for Coetzee, contends that the italicised words have the effect
of increasing the indemnity limit by the amount of costs incurred prior to
payment by the insurer in terms of the sub-clause.  In other words he says that
here is a positive enactment increasing the limit elsewhere established.
[14] The Conditions part of the policy is hardly the place where one would
expect to find such a positive enactment, as the function of conditions is
usually to cut down or qualify, in a variety of ways, the insurer’s liability as
defined in general terms in the indemnity section of the policy.  In other words
a condition usually operates as a proviso does.  The expression ‘except for’ in
clause 6.10 has much the same meaning as ‘provided that’.  In S v Mhlanga
and Others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at 899A-C Kentridge AJ said of a proviso:
‘The effect of a proviso is to except something from the preceding portion of
the enactment which, but for the proviso, would be within it.  It cannot be
construed as if it were an enacting clause.  R v Dibdin [1910] P 57 at 125;
Mphosi v Central Board for Co-operative Insurance Ltd 1974 (4) SA
634(A) at 645.’

See also the judgment of Mahomed J at 883H.
[15] The purpose of clause 6.10 appears to me to be to confer on the insurer
the right to form the view that the damages claim is likely to succeed, and in
consequence to pay out (whether to the insured or directly to the claimant) an
amount in settlement up to the limit of the indemnity, leaving the insured to

litigate at his option without further cover.  The purpose of the italicised words
is to ensure that when the insurer withdraws from the fray he does not by so
doing release himself from liability for costs already incurred.
[16] My conclusion that the words should be interpreted in that way and not
as a positive enactment is reinforced by the absence in clause 3.1 of words
such as ‘Except as is provided in clause 6.10’ or in clause 6.10 of words like
‘Notwithstanding what is provided in clause 3.1’.  As things stand there is no
indication of an intention to qualify clause 3.1 and there is no conflict between
the two sub-clauses.  They serve different purposes.
[17] Accordingly I am of the view that the reliance on clause 6.10 is
misplaced.
The Effect Of Section 156
[18] The second main question is whether the substitution of the Fund in
terms of s156 makes any difference:  Section 156 reads:
‘Insurer obliged to pay third party’s claim against insolvent
Whenever any person (hereinafter called the insurer) is obliged to indemnify
another person (hereinafter called the insured) in respect of any liability
incurred by the insured towards a third party, the latter shall, on the
sequestration of the estate of the insured, be entitled to recover from the
insurer the amount of the insured’s liability towards the third party but not
exceeding the maximum amount for which the insurer has bound himself to
indemnify the insured.’

[19] The purpose and operation of this section was explained by Scott JA in
Le Roux v Standard General Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 2000 (4) SA 1035

(SCA) at 1046J-1047G.  In the absence of such a section the insured’s
creditor, upon the former’s sequestration, would have to prove a claim in his
insolvent estate and be content with whatever dividend is paid to the
concurrent creditors;  whilst the insured’s rights under the policy would vest in
his trustee, who would claim from the insurer for the benefit of the general
body of creditors.  The effect of the section, therefore, is that the creditor is
granted the considerable advantage that he does not have to share the proceeds
of the policy with other creditors.  To that end he is given a direct right of
action against the insurer.
[20] However, proceeded Scott JA, the section was not designed to confer
any additional favour upon that creditor.  He would have to prove not only his
claim against the insured, but also that the insured would have succeeded
against the insurer in his claim for an indemnity.  In Le Roux’s case no notice
of a claim against the insured had been given to the insurer, as was required by
the policy.  The plaintiff contended that he had obtained a vested right against
the insurer upon the sequestration of the insured’s estate and that this right
was not extinguished by the insurer’s subsequent nullification of the policy,
based on the insured’s earlier failure to give notice.  This argument was
rejected, Scott JA saying (at 1047F-H):
‘Indien die appellant se vertolking van die artikel korrek is, sou dit beteken
dat ‘n eiser onder die artikel ‘n beter reg teen die versekeraar verkry as wat
die versekerde self geniet het.  Dit sou ook beteken dat die versekeraar
verhoed word om op sy kontraktuele regte te steun indien dit blyk dat die

versekerde kontrakbreuk gepleeg het.  So ‘n vertolking is onhoudbaar en kon
nooit die bedoeling van die Wetgewer gewees het nie.’
[21] See also Woodley v Guardian Assurance Co of SA Ltd 1976 (1) SA 758
(W) at 759 E-H and Canadian Superior Oil Ltd v Concord Insurance Co Ltd
(formerly INA Insurance Co Ltd) 1992 (4) SA 263 (W) at 273H-274B.  In the
latter part of this passage van Schalkwyk J said:
‘What the third party can recover, however, and whether the third party’s
claim is of such a kind as is covered by the indemnity conferred upon the
insured, are matters which have to be determined by reference to the
contract of insurance.  If the liability is not of the kind covered by the
indemnity provided by the insurer, then, it stands to reason, there will be no
liability upon the insurer to the third party.  So also, if the liability is of a
kind for which the contract of insurance makes provision subject to a
condition, the insurer will only be obliged to pay if the condition has been
fulfilled.’

[22] The argument for Coetzee cannot succeed.  It flies in the face of these
passages, which are clearly consistent with the terms and purpose of the
section.  The argument is indeed that in some circumstances a plaintiff has a
better right than the insured, this because, so it is contended, costs are incurred
in enforcing a new statutory right granted against one who was formerly a
stranger.  This argument is contrary to the terms of the section, which refers to
‘the maximum amount for which the insurer has bound himself to indemnify
the insured’.  This liability arises out of the policy, including all its terms and
conditions.

[23] Moreover, the consequence of the argument’s succeeding would be that
the insurer’s liability would be increased.  I can see no basis for such a result
in the section.  Indeed the contrary.  The section is assiduous to assert that the
insurer’s liability is limited to the amount stated in the policy.
[24] A justification for reading the section so as to allow the insured’s
liability to be increased is said to be this.  An unscrupulous or foolish insurer
may allow litigation to drag on and costs to be incurred until the limit of the
policy is reached, then stop, leaving the insured with nothing.  In other words
insurers would be encouraged to litigate not at their own, but at their insureds’
expense.  Though a possible scenario I do not find it a likely one.  An insurer
who behaved in this way would in time find itself in trouble.  Moreover, if
such a case should arise it would not arise because of s156 but because of the
policy.  The policy does indeed envisage that the costs of defending a claim
unsuccessfully will eat into the capital portion of the indemnity.
[25] The point was also made that at least to the extent of the taxed costs of
R49 619,13 mentioned in paragraph [3] the limit should be exceeded because,
so it was argued, there was a separate source of liability based on a court order
between two litigants.  There is no substance in this point.  There is no issue
about the liability.  The question is whether the amount must be deducted from
the limit.  As these costs are part of Coetzee’s costs the answer to that question
is yes.
[26] The appeal is dismissed with costs.

_____________
W P SCHUTZ
JUDGE OF APPEAL

CONCUR

NIENABER JA
NAVSA JA
MTHIYANE JA