THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Not   Reportable
Case
No:
1151/2017

In the matter between:

THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE NORTHERN PROVINCES

APPELLANT
and

PULE ABRAM MOROBADI

RESPONDENT

Neutral citation:
The Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Morobadi
(1151/2017) [2018] ZASCA 185 (11 December 2018)

Coram:

Navsa ADP, Mbha, Zondi, Molemela and Makgoka JJA

Heard:

21 November 2018

Delivered:

11 December 2018
Summary:
Attorney – application for removal from roll of attorneys – attorney
administering deceased estate allegedly improperly charging a fee pursuant to a
contingency fee agreement –admitted unauthorised ‘loan’ from estate bank account –
further allegations of fraudulent conduct -whether the high court misconstrued its role
under s 22(1)(d) of the Attorneys Act – whether interim suspension order appropriate
to protect interests of the public pending full investigation.

___________________________________________________________________

ORDER
___________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (Molopa-Sethosa J
and Nochumsohn AJ sitting as court of first instance):

The appeal is upheld to the extent reflected in the order set out below;
The order of the high court is set aside and is replaced with the following:
‘(a)
The respondent is, as an interim measure suspended from practising as an
attorney pending a disciplinary enquiry concerning his professional conduct;
(b)
The relief sought in prayers 2 up to 8.3, 9, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 11 and
12 of the notice of motion dated 12 January 2016 is hereby incorporated in this order;
(c)
The enquiry referred to in (a) above must be instituted and finalised within 3
(three) months from the date of this judgment;
(d)
The application for the removal of the respondent’s name from the roll of
attorneys pending the finalisation of the enquiry referred to in (a) above, is
postponed;
(e)
The parties may supplement their papers, if so advised, on the matters
emanating from the enquiry.
(f)
Costs are reserved.’
3          No order is made as to costs.
___________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________

Zondi JA (Navsa ADP, Mbha, Molemela and Makgoka JJA concurring)

[1] The appellant, the Law Society of the Northern Provinces (the Law Society)
launched an application in the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (the high
court) in terms of s 22(1)(d) of the Attorneys Act, 53 of 1979 (the Act) seeking an

order that the respondents’ name be removed from the roll of attorneys. The high
court (Nochumsohn AJ, Molopa-Sethosa J concurring) dismissed the application and
ordered each party to pay its own costs.

[2] The Law Society appeals against those orders contending that the respondent
should have been struck off the roll and that a punitive costs order should have been
issued against him. The appeal is with leave of this court.

[3] Section 22(1)(d) of the Act provides that any person who is admitted and
enrolled as an attorney may, on application by the Law Society, be struck off the roll
or suspended from practice by the court, if that person, in the discretion of the court,
is not a fit and proper person to continue to practise as an attorney. I consider it
necessary to begin by setting out the nature of the proceedings under s 22(1) of the
Act and the manner in which they should be dealt with.

[4] Applications for the striking off of an attorney’s name from the roll of
practitioners are not ordinary civil proceedings, they are proceedings of a disciplinary
nature and are sui generis.1 In Solomon v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope
1934 AD 401 at 408-409 the following was said regarding the nature of disciplinary
proceedings:
‘Now in these proceedings the Law Society claims nothing for itself. . . It merely brings the
attorney before the Court by virtue of a statutory right, informs the Court what the attorney
has done and asks the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers over him. . . The Law Society
protects the interests of the public in its dealings with attorneys. It does not institute any
action or civil suit against the attorney. It merely submits to the Court facts which it contends
constitutes unprofessional conduct and then leaves the Court to determine how it will deal
with this officer.’

[5] It is now settled that an application for the removal from the roll, or suspension
from practice, of an attorney involves a three-stage enquiry.2 First, the court has to
determine whether the alleged offending conduct has been established on a balance
of probabilities. It is a factual enquiry. Second, consideration must be given to the

1 Law Society, Transvaal v Matthews 1989 (4) SA 389 (T) at 393D-E.
2 Malan & another v Law Society of the Northern Provinces [2008] ZASCA 90; 2009 (1) SA 216 (SCA)
para 4.

question whether, in the discretion of the court, the person concerned is not ‘a fit and
proper person to continue to practice as an attorney’. This involves a weighing up of
the conduct complained of against the conduct expected of an attorney and is a
value judgment. Third, the court is required to consider whether, in light of all the
circumstances, the name of the attorney concerned should be removed from the roll
of attorneys or whether an order suspending him or her from practice would suffice.3
In Summerley4 the following was said:
‘the exercise of the discretion at the second stage “involves, in reality, a weighing up of the
conduct complained of against the conduct expected of an attorney and, to this extent, a
value judgment” . . . The third enquiry again requires the Court to exercise a discretion. At
this stage the Court must decide, in the exercise of its discretion, whether the person who
has been found not to be a fit and proper person to practise as an attorney deserves the
ultimate penalty of being struck from the roll or whether an order of suspension from practice
will suffice.’

[6] The application came to light as a result of the report that was filed by Mr
Reddy – a Chartered Accountant and Auditor in the employ of the Law Society’s
Monitoring Unit - following an inspection he conducted at the respondent’s firm.
During 2015 two complaints of unprofessional conduct were lodged against the
respondent with the Law Society. One was lodged by Haasbroek & Boezaart
Attorneys on behalf of Dr Kgarume on 2 March 2015. This complaint had three
components. The complaint was that the respondent, on 14 May 2010, was
instructed by Dr Kgarume to attend to the administration of the estate of the late
France Ponky Kgarume under a special power of attorney. Dr Kgarume alleged,
firstly, that the respondent purportedly concluded a contingency fee agreement with
her for the purpose of winding-up the deceased estate. Pursuant to the purported
contingency fee agreement, the respondent charged Dr Kgarume 15 per cent on the
gross asset value of R835 652.99 of the estate, which she contended was in excess
of 3.5 per cent of the gross value of the estate which is the prescribed tariff in terms
of s 51 (1)(b) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965. I must point out that the
actual amount charged by the respondent was R67 726.80 which is 50 per cent of
what he had stipulated in the contingency fee agreement.

3 Summerley v Law Society, Northern Provinces [2006] ZASCA 59; 2006 (5) SA 613 (SCA) para 2 and
the cases there cited.
4 Ibid at 615E-F.

[7] Secondly, the complainant alleged that contrary to s 51(4) of the
Administration of Estates Act the respondent transferred funds from the estate bank
account to his business account, before the estate was distributed and without the
authority of the Master of the High Court. Thirdly, the complaint related to an amount
of R48 000 the respondent took as a ‘loan’ from the estate bank account without the
authority of the executor.

[8] Pursuant to Dr Kgarume’s complaint, Ms Jalo Herholdt of the Law Society
Disciplinary Department on 19 March 2015 requested that an inspection of the
respondent’s financial records be authorised. Authority for the inspection was given
by Mr Van Staden on 5 May 2015 and thereafter Mr Reddy was instructed to inspect
the respondent’s firm’s financial records, which he did on 9 and 25 June 2015.

[9] Mr Reddy on 30 July 2015 furnished the Law Society with a report in which he
recorded his findings. In his report Mr Reddy dealt with the allegations relating to
mismanagement by the respondent of the estate of the late France Ponky Kgarume.

[10] Apart from conducting an investigation arising from Dr Kgarume’s complaint,
Mr Reddy also inspected, among others, the trust ledger account of DK Manganya, a
client of the respondent, although it did not form the subject matter of any complaint.
Mr Reddy noted that the respondent had received an amount of R1 352 780 on 5
June 2014 and a further amount of R103 781.59 on 25 June 2014 from the Road
Accident Fund on behalf of Mr Manganya. An amount of R591 976.59 was paid into
the respondent’s business banking account.

[11] When approached for an explanation regarding these entries the respondent
informed Mr Reddy that he had entered into a contingency fee agreement with Mr
Manganya and that in terms of that agreement the respondent was entitled to fees
which equated to 25 per cent of the capital award. Mr Reddy inspected the statement
of account prepared by the respondent for Mr Manganya, from which it appeared that
the respondent had charged Mr Manganya a fee amounting to R338 195, which
amounts to 25 per cent of the capital awarded by the Road Accident Fund. In

addition, the respondent also retained the party and party costs recovered from the
Road Accident Fund which amounted to R103 781.59.
[12] The statement of account also reflected an amount of R150 000 received by
the respondent from Mr Manganya. When the basis for the payment was queried with
the respondent, his response was that Mr Manganya had thought it necessary to pay
him extra as a gesture of gratitude and the respondent produced a letter from Mr
Manganya, which purported to give him permission to do so.

[13] Mr Reddy’s conclusion was that the respondent had contravened the
provisions of the Act and / or the Rules of the Law Society relating to the keeping and
maintaining of accounting records and the obligation to ensure that at any given time
the trust balances do not exceed trust monies and trust accounts do not have debit
balances. He recommended that his report be referred to the Disciplinary
Department. He was, however, of the opinion that the firm did not pose a significant
risk to trust creditors or the Attorneys Fidelity Fund.

[14] In the meantime and on 23 July 2015 the Law Society received a complaint
from the Gauteng Department of Human Settlements (the department) about the
respondent’s conduct that he had refused to meet with the department. The gist of
the complaint was that Mr Radebe, the Deputy-Director of its Anti-Fraud and
Corruption Unit had asked for a meeting with the respondent in order to conduct a
review of the work done by him and the payments that were made by the department
to him for work that he had performed on its behalf. The department had paid him
R1 865 969 as fees but it could not find underlying documentation. He refused to
meet with Mr Radebe. This formed the basis of the second complaint.

[15] On 21 August 2015 the respondent sent an email to the Law Society to which
was attached his letter dated 12 August 2015 and a letter dated 21 August 2015 from
Ms Gomba, a senior legal adviser in the department. The purpose of this
correspondence was to persuade the Law Society to withdraw the complaint because
the dispute giving rise to it had allegedly been resolved between the parties.

[16] On 7 September 2015 Mr Radebe informed the Law Society that the
department had suspended Ms Gomba for, among others, her response to the Law

Society and that it was still pursuing its complaint, which at that stage was the
respondent’s refusal to meet with the department.
[17] Pursuant to this notification, Mr Radebe and Ms Makhetha both from the
department’s Anti-Fraud and Corruption Unit met with the Law Society on 19
November 2015. At the meeting they furnished the Law Society with the outcome of
the investigation into payments made by the department to the respondent for
services the respondent allegedly rendered on behalf of the department. In short, the
findings of the Anti-Fraud and Corruption Unit are that Ms Gomba colluded with the
respondent’s firm to defraud the department in an amount of R1 687 844 and
submitted for payment, invoices amounting to R1 226 194.40 for work the respondent
had not done. The Anti-Fraud and Corruption Unit recommended that the State
Attorney be instructed to recover R1 687 844 from Ms Gomba and the respondent.
This report was not confirmed by a confirmatory affidavit.

[18] On 6 November 2015 and before the meeting between the Law Society and
Mr Radebe took place, Ms Herholdt recommended to the Council of the Law Society
that an application be brought to have the respondent’s name removed from the roll
of attorneys as a result of the complaint by Dr Kgarume regarding the handling of the
estate and arising out of his handling of DK Manganya’s matter. In other words, the
recommendation of Ms Herholdt to Council that the application be brought for the
removal of the respondent’s name from the roll was based on the findings made by
Reddy in his report relating to Dr Kgarume’s complaint and the Manganye matter.
This is what served before Council and was considered by it on 27 November 2015.

[19] In relation to the department’s complaint, which did not form the basis of Ms
Herholdt’s recommendation, the Disciplinary and / or Investigating Committee of the
Law Society on 24 November 2015 recommended that the respondent be summoned
to appear before the Disciplinary Committee to answer fraud allegations against him
by the department. In other words, the department’s complaint was going to be dealt
with through the disciplinary committee process. Understandably so, because of the
egregious nature of the alleged conduct. That enquiry did not take place.

[20] Following the Council resolution of 27 November 2015 the Law Society, on 24
February 2016, instituted motion proceedings in the high court against the

respondent, seeking an order that his name be removed from the roll of attorneys.
This was based on the allegations of the respondent’s professional misconduct
arising from Dr Kgarume’s complaint, Gauteng Department of Human Settlements
complaint and irregularities which were discovered by Mr Reddy when he reviewed
Mr Manganya’s trust ledger account. It also included the complaint by the department
concerning the fraud allegedly perpetrated against it by the respondent.

[21] The respondent opposed the application and also raised technical defences.
He contended that the Law Society had to be non-suited because of its failure to
follow its own procedures relating to conducting disciplinary proceedings. He
submitted that the Law Society should have referred the complaints to the
Disciplinary Committee as recommended by the Investigating Committee. He argued
that the Law Society’s failure to comply with its own internal processes rendered its
application for his removal unlawful.

[22] The rules which the respondent alleged the Law Society ignored are those that
were made under s 74(1) of the Act and promulgated in Government Gazette No
7164 of 1 August 1980 as amended by Government Gazette No 33050 of 25 March
2010. The rules relating to disciplinary proceedings are contained in Part XIII of the
Rules. In terms of rule 95(2), upon receipt of a complaint the council may where it is
of the opinion that a prima facie case of unprofessional or dishonourable or unworthy
conduct on the part of the practitioner has been made out, furnish the practitioner
with particulars of the complaint and call upon him to furnish the council in writing
with his or her explanation in response to the complaint. Alternatively, the council
may call upon the practitioner to appear before an investigative committee to discuss
the matter. This committee may, after considering the complaint and the practitioner’s
explanation decide either to dismiss the complaint or issue a written warning to the
practitioner.

[23] If the council is of the opinion that there is a prima facie case of unprofessional
conduct to answer, it may call upon the practitioner to appear before a formal
disciplinary enquiry.

[24] In circumstances where the practitioner is convicted of a charge and it is
sought to have him or her suspended from practice or struck from the roll, the
provision of rule 101 is invoked. This rule provides:
‘101.1 Should an enquiry be held before a committee appointed by the council in terms of
Section 67 of the Act, and at the conclusion of the enquiry, the practitioner be found guilty of
unprofessional, or dishonourable or unworthy conduct, in terms of Section 72 of the Act, the
committee may impose any punishment in respect thereof which is permitted in terms of
Section 72 of the Act; provided that if at any stage during the enquiry, the committee is of the
opinion that the conduct of the practitioner is such as to warrant an application by the society
in terms of the Act for suspension from practice or the striking from the roll of the practitioner,
it shall:
101.1.1
as soon as possible submit a written report on its findings to the council,
together with its recommendations regarding the suspension from practice or the striking
from the roll of the practitioner;
101.1.2
at the same time deliver a copy of its report and recommendations to the
practitioner and call upon the practitioner to furnish the council with representations in
writing, within such period as the committee considers reasonable, but in an event within not
less than seven days, why application should not be made for suspension from practice, or
as the case may be, for the striking from the roll of the practitioner.
101.2 On receipt of the report and written recommendations of the committee, in terms of
rule 101.1.1, and the written representations of the practitioner, in terms of rule 101.1.2, the
council shall consider the matter and shall:
101.2.1
if it shall decide to proceed with an application for suspension from practice or
for striking from the roll, advise the practitioner accordingly and take such further steps as
may be necessary in that regard; or
101.2.2
if it shall decide not to proceed with an application for suspension from
practice or for striking from the roll, refer back to the committee, together with a copy of the
written representations of the practitioner, for the committee to dispose of as it sees fit; or
101.2.3
if it considers it appropriate, call upon the practitioner, upon not less than
seven days’ notice, to appear before the council may determine to show cause why
application should not be made for suspension from practice or for striking from the roll of the
practitioner; provided that if the practitioner does not furnish written representations to the
council as requested, or fails to appear before the council, as the case may be, the council
shall be entitled to consider the report and recommendations of the committee, in the
absence of such representations, or in the absence of the practitioner.’

[25] The high court dismissed the procedural challenge, holding that the Law
Society was not bound by the decision of the committee as the committee was not a
disciplinary committee, but rather an investigative committee. The high court’s
reasoning was that it was not peremptory for the Council to have pursued a formal
charge before a disciplinary committee, if in its opinion, the respondent was no longer
considered to be a fit and proper person to remain in practice as an attorney. I agree
with this conclusion. In general it is correct that the Council may proceed with the
application for the striking off of the practitioner or for his or her suspension from
practice without pursuing a formal charge before a disciplinary committee if in its
opinion, having regard to the nature of the charges, a practitioner is no longer
considered to be a fit and proper person.

[26] In relation to the allegations relating to Dr Kgarume’s complaint, the
respondent admitted to have taken and used for his own account an amount of
R48 000 out of the estate bank account, without the knowledge and authority of the
executor and to have taken his fee prematurely. The respondent contended that he
had concluded a contingency fee agreement with the executor, because in addition
to attending to the administration of the estate he also did extensive work relating to
a pension fund claim. The respondent, however, expressed his apology for
‘borrowing’ client’s money which he said was a mistake which he regretted and had
learned from it.

[27] His evidence is that at that time his practice was experiencing cash flow
problems and he was unable to meet its operational expenses. He used R48 000 to
pay some of the firm’s expenses.

[28] In relation to the allegations of unprofessional conduct relating to Mr
Manganya’s matter, the respondent stated that he provided professional services to
Mr Manganya for which he had charged fees in terms of a contingency fee
agreement. He further stated that an amount of R150 000 was given to him by Mr
Manganya as a gesture of thanks and that he had received taxed costs in an amount
of R103 781.59 from the Road Accident Fund on behalf of Mr Manganya.

[29] As regards the allegations of unprofessional conduct arising from the

complaint of the Gauteng Department of Human Settlements the respondent
contended that he had rendered certain legal services on behalf of the department;
that the department’s Deputy-Director of the Anti-Fraud Unit requested a meeting
with him to conduct a review of the work done by him and the payments that he
received from the department and that he refused to meet with him. The respondent
justified his refusal on the basis of the contention that the department had failed to
identify the nature of the information it was seeking from him. This was so, the
respondent contended, because a laptop on which he stored documentation relating
to the department’s matters had crashed.

[30] The high court found in relation to the respondent’s conduct in respect of the
department’s complaint that the evidence presented by the Law Society did not
establish the offending conduct. The high court reasoned that it could not accept
evidence which was not adduced under oath, ‘least of all without the benefit of any
oral evidence having been led under oath before a disciplinary committee; without
the findings of a disciplinary committee, without a report under Rule 101, without the
respondent having been given an opportunity to respond to such report, without the
Council having considered any such report. . . .’

[31] In relation to the allegations of unprofessional conduct arising from the
complaint of Dr Kgarume and Mr Manganya’s matter, the high court found that an
unprofessional and dishonourable conduct had been established, but such
misconduct, was not sufficiently serious as to warrant a suspension from practice or a
striking from the roll having regard to the mitigating factors.

[32] According to the high court the following is what weighed heavily in favour of
the respondent: In relation to Dr Kgarume’s complaint, before the complaint was
lodged with the Law Society, the respondent had approached his client and admitted
to what he had done and undertook to repay the money which he did. The incident
took place six years before the application was brought, and there had been no
further evidence of any misappropriation of trust funds. The respondent was a young
practitioner at the time that he entered into the contingency fee agreement and did
not have the benefit of years of experience to have known that it was incompetent to
enter into a contingency fee agreement in relation to the administration of a

deceased estate and that the respondent did not charge the full 15 per cent provided
for in the agreement. The high court accordingly dismissed the application and
relying on Prokureursorde van Transvaal v Kleynhans 1995 (1) SA 839 (T) it ordered
each party to pay its own costs.

[33] The analysis of the high court’s reasoning makes it clear that its finding that
the Law Society had failed to institute a formal disciplinary enquiry to establish
unprofessional conduct on the part of the respondent, was central to its dismissal of
the application. In para 25 of the judgment the high court states:
‘All aspects considered, and upon application of the applicable tests, enunciated above, upon
the facts, cumulatively assessed and correctly contextualised as presented, there is
insufficient offending conduct established to motivate a striking from the roll or suspension
from practice. This may not have been so, had the allegations made by the Department of
Human Settlements been proven facts. Given the mitigating factors in relation to the other
conduct, even though such conduct is dishonourable, when imposing a value judgement
upon such conduct, we do not consider same to be such so as to render the Respondent
unfit to remain in practice as an attorney.’

[34] The finding by the high court, at least in relation to Dr Kgarume’s complaint
and Mr Manganya’s matter that unprofessional conduct on the part of the respondent
had been established, was on the face of it, sufficient for the high court to proceed to
the second and third legs of the enquiry. It was duty bound to consider whether the
respondent, in its discretion, was not a fit and proper person to continue to practise,
and to enquire whether in all the circumstances the respondent was to be removed
from the roll of attorneys or whether he should be suspended from practice.

[35] In Malan5 the following was said in connection with the third leg of the enquiry
at para 6:
‘As pointed out in Jasat, the third leg is also a matter for the discretion of the court of first
instance, and whether a court will adopt the one course or the other depends upon such
factors as the nature of the conduct complained of, the extent to which it reflects upon the
person’s character or shows him to be unworthy to remain in the ranks of an honourable
profession, the likelihood or otherwise of a repetition of such conduct and the need to protect

5 Ibid fn 2.

the public. Ultimately it is question of degree.’

[36] The high court in respect of the respondent’s admitted misconduct
misconstrued the nature of its role when it is approached under s 22(1)(d) of the Act
to exercise its disciplinary powers over a practitioner. It did not consider the interest
of the public. Importantly, the high court did not pause to consider that this case
given the serious nature of the complaints other than the admitted conduct called for
a full enquiry. This was a case in which the charges levelled against the respondent,
which he did not admit, were sufficiently serious to warrant a full enquiry so that all
the facts could be placed before a court for a final decision on whether the
respondent should be permitted to practise as an attorney. After all, the Law Society
itself initially held the view, in respect of the department’s allegation of fraudulent
conduct, that it had to be referred for investigation. As stated above, the Law Society
is not obliged to have a full disciplinary enquiry as envisaged in the rules as referred
to above before it approaches the court for a relief.

[37] In the present case having regard to the serious allegations of misconduct not
only in relation to the department’s complaint, but also involving the concerns in
relation to Mr Manganya, the high court below and the Law Society should equally
have been alert to having those allegations fully investigated. Even on the limited
facts presented they could not readily be dismissed out of hand.

[38] In light of what has been said in the preceding paragraphs the high court as
custos mores ought, on the admitted misconduct in order to protect the public, to
have postponed a final decision, but also at the same time protect the public with an
interim order of suspension pending a final decision on whether the respondent
should be struck off the roll or some other sanction should follow. This it did not do.

[39] It was conceded on behalf of the Law Society that the order contemplated in
the preceding paragraphs should ensue and that it would be fair that the respondent
be given an opportunity to present his side of the story at a full blown enquiry which
he had always called for. Counsel on behalf of the respondent was constrained to
accept that this was a proper course to follow, notwithstanding Mr Reddy’s
statements referred to in para 13.  Counsel were agreed that the Law Society should

be directed to initiate and complete the envisaged enquiry within a period of three
months from the date of delivery of this judgment, which will be reflected in the
substituted order of the court below that follows.  Counsel on behalf of the
respondent undertook on his behalf to co-operate with the Law Society and not to be
dilatory.

[40] A question arose as to the effect of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 on the
disciplinary enquiries that had hitherto been conducted by the Law Society. This is
not the question for this court to resolve. It is not for us to advise on the provisions of
the Act and on transitional provisions, particularly without the full views of the legal
profession in regard thereto. Suffice to say that the direction envisaged above will
apply to the Law Society and / or its successor in title. It is necessary to record that
the postponed application when it is re-enrolled should be heard by the high court
differently constituted.

[41] A further factor dictating the desirability of a full blown enquiry into the facts is
the effect it may have in the future in the event of a finding that the respondent be
struck off the roll. The full breath of a practitioner’s prior conduct should be before a
court considering an application for re-admission.

[42] In my view, having regard to what is said above, no order as to costs in the
present appeal should be made.

[43] In the circumstances the order in the following terms is issued:
The appeal is upheld to the extent reflected in the order set out below;
The order of the high court is set aside and is replaced with the following:
‘(a)
The respondent is, as an interim measure suspended from practising as an
attorney pending a disciplinary enquiry concerning his professional conduct;
(b)
The relief sought in prayers 2 up to 8.3, 9, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 11 and
12 of the notice of motion dated 12 January 2016 is hereby incorporated in this order;
(c)
The enquiry referred to in (a) above must be instituted and finalised within 3
(three) months from the date of this judgment;
(d)
The application for the removal of the respondent’s name from the roll of
attorneys pending the finalisation of the enquiry referred to in (a) above, is

postponed;
(e)
The parties may supplement their papers, if so advised, on the matters
emanating from the enquiry.
(f)
Costs are reserved.’

No order is made as to costs.

___________________
D H Zondi
Judge of Appeal

APPEARANCES
Counsel for the appellant:
C J Jooste
Instructed by:
Iqbal Mahomed Attorneys, Pretoria

Webbers, Bloemfontein

Attorney for the respondent:
Mr S N Molele
Instructed by:
Victor Mabe Inc Attorneys, Pretoria

NW Phalatsi & Partners, Bloemfontein