REPORTABLE
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No:  311/97
In the matter between
THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAPE TOWN
Appellant
and
GLADYS MARJORIE BAKKERUD
Respondent
CORAM:
HEFER, MARAIS, SCHUTZ, STREICHER JJA et MPATI
AJA
DATE HEARD:
2 May 2000
DATE DELIVERED:
29 May 2000
Municipality - permissive road and pavement repairing powers - liability at
common law for damage caused by holes in pavement - widening of ambit of
liability for omissions in law of delict - whether earlier “municipality cases”
decided in AD remain authoritative.
JUDGMENT

MARAIS JA

MARAIS JA:     [1]     Few problems have so persistently exercised the minds
of lawyers everywhere as liability for omissions in the law of delict (tort).  A
particularly thorny aspect of the wider problem is the liability of local authorities
exercising purely permissive statutory powers of roadmaking and repair when
citizens suffer damage as a consequence of the state of a road or pavement.
This is yet another case in which these issues arise.
[2]      First, the facts.  Respondent, an elderly lady, lives in Mount Nelson Road,
Sea Point in Cape Town.  She was walking along the pavement of that street
towards her home.  There were two holes in the tarred pavement which had been
there for at least six months.  They were approximately fifteen centimetres in
diameter and about ten centimetres deep.  She stepped into one of the holes,
stumbled, and fell.  She had been aware of the existence of the holes but “must
have been thinking about other things” when she stepped into them.  She
sustained injuries and suffered loss.  Within a few days of the incident appellant

Haliwell v Johannesburg Municipal Council 1912 AD 659; Municipality of Bulawayo v
Stewart 1916 AD 357; Cape Town Municipality v Clohessy 1921 AD 4; De Villiers v
Johannesburg Municipality 1926 AD 401; Moulang v Port Elizabeth Municipality
1958(2) SA 518 (A).  Collectively, “the municipality cases”.
(the Municipality of Cape Town) repaired the holes in the pavement.  The
relevant applicable legislation empowered, but did not oblige, appellant to
construct and maintain and repair streets and pavements within its area of
jurisdiction.
[3]     Respondent’s claim for damages was upheld in the magistrate’s court.
The magistrate made no finding on the question of respondent’s possible
contributory negligence, an issue which had been raised by appellant.  Appellant
appealed to the Cape Provincial Division.  A full court (Fagan DJP, Brand et
Hlophe JJ) reviewed the applicable law and concluded that the fetters upon the
imposition of liability in delict in cases of omission were no longer as rigid as had
at one time been supposed.  It considered that earlier cases  decided in this court
which accorded a large measure of immunity from action to local authorities

Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963(1) SA 102 (A); Minister of Forestry v
Quathlamba (Pty) Ltd 1973(3) SA 69 (A); Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975(3) SA 590
(A).  See too Butters v Cape Town Municipality 1993(3) SA 521 (C); 1996(1) SA 473 (C);
Van der Merwe Burger v Munisipaliteit van Warrenton 1987(1) SA 899 (NC);   Rabie v
Kimberley Munisipaliteit en ‘n Ander 1991(4) SA 243 (NC); Silva’s Fishing Corporation
(Pty Ltd v Maweza 1957(2) SA 256 (A).
The phrase is the translation in the law reports of the phrase “regsoortuiging van die
gemeenskap” used by Rumpff CJ at 597 B of Ewel’s case (note 2).  It is not a particularly
happy rendering.  What after all is a legal conviction?  “Sense of what the law ought to be”
would, I think, convey the meaning more accurately. However, as the rendering in the law
reports is commonly used, I shall fall in line and continue to use it in this judgment.

which were empowered, but not obliged, to build and maintain streets and
pavements, were no longer to be regarded as authoritative in the light of
subsequent decisions  of this court relating to omissions, albeit in admittedly
different contexts.
[4]     Writing for the court a quo, Brand J opined that the relative immunity
conferred upon local authorities in what have come to be known as “the
municipality cases” in this court was inconsistent with the current “legal
convictions of the community”  which require “municipalities to keep streets and

pavements in a safe condition”.  Having characterised failure to do so as
wrongful, the learned judge proceeded to consider whether the failure was
attended by fault (culpa) and concluded that it was.
[5]     He acknowledged that, in considering whether or not fault could be
attributed to a municipality, account would have to be taken of all factors,
including financial constraints, which have a bearing upon the reasonableness or
otherwise of the omission.  His conclusion was expressed thus:
“It follows from the aforesaid legal principles that appellant’s failure to
repair the holes constitutes an unlawful act of omission.  The only
question is therefore whether appellant was negligent.  The uncontested
evidence of respondent was that the holes in question had been there for
at least six months prior to the accident.  The fact that the holes were
repaired within two days after the accident, justifies the inference that such
repairs did not impose an undue burden on appellant.  In the absence of
any explanation why the repairs to the pavement were not effected much
earlier, I cannot criticise the learned magistrate’s finding that the appellant
was negligent.   In fact, this was fairly conceded by Mr Binns-Ward in
argument.”

Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 1997(4) SA 356 (C).
[6]     Turning to the question of contributory negligence, the learned judge found
respondent  to have been equally to blame and reduced the award of damages
of R1 500 to R750.  The judgment is reported.   With the leave of the court a
quo, given because of the importance to appellant of the principle of law
involved in imposing a legal duty to repair streets and pavements upon it, the
matter is before this court.  An understandable but unfortunate aspect of the case
is that there was no appearance for respondent in either the court a quo or in this
court.  She has abided the judgment of the court and appellant did not seek a
costs order against her in either court.  It has meant of course that we have not
had the benefit of counter argument from respondent.
[7]     The legal literature on the wider topic of liability for omissions generally
has burgeoned over the years and has by now reached formidable proportions.

Nothing short of a doctoral dissertation can do justice to it all. What follows is
a blend of my own observations and what can be gleaned from the more recent
cases decided in this and other courts in South Africa and elsewhere, and from
the preponderance of legal writing in the text books and journals.
[8]     Society is hesitant to impose liability in law for, as it is sometimes put,
“minding one’s own business”.  The reticence is reflected in legal and judicial
writing by propositions such as no liability in delict for pure (or mere) omissions.
The problem with such beguilingly simple propositions is that, however
convenient they may be, they are apt, at worst, to mislead the unwary and, at
best, to be unhelpful.  The proposition that there is no liability in law for minding
one’s own business is sound only if, in the eyes of the law, the situation which
has arisen, is  someone else’s business and not one’s own.  But whether that is
indeed so is, of course, the very question which has proved so difficult to

Administrateur, Transvaal v Van der Merwe 1994(4) SA 347 (A) at 364 G.  It would of
course be permissible, in an appropriate case where it seems clear that on any view of the
scope of such legal duty to act as could conceivably be imposed in the first phase the defendant
has not behaved in a blameworthy fashion according to the traditional test for culpa, to omit
the first phase, to assume against the defendant that he was not free in law to refrain from any
action, but to acquit him of liability because of the absence of any culpa.
answer in every age.  It is implicit in the second proposition, qualified as it
usually is by the use of accompanying epithets such as “pure” or “mere”, that
there are omissions which are not of that character.  But what kind of omissions
those might be, is left unanswered by such formulations.
[9]     Any attempt to decide whether a particular omission will potentially ground
liability by merely measuring it against the standard of conduct to be expected
of a reasonable person will fail for a number of reasons.  First, that test is
sequentially inappropriate.  It is of course the classic test for the existence of
blameworthiness (culpa) in the law of delict.  But the existence of culpa only
becomes relevant sequentially after the situation has been identified as one in
which the law of delict requires action.   Secondly, the application of the classic

test for culpa to the solution of the anterior question is calculated to produce
consequences which are likely to be too burdensome for society to acquiesce
in shouldering them.   The hypothetical reasonable person (diligens
paterfamilias) would have to be credited with a reasonable sense of ethical or
moral responsibility and a propensity to act in accordance with it.  To use his or
her likely reaction to the situation as the yardstick by which to measure whether
or not action is required by law would be tantamount to converting every
reasonably perceived ethical or moral obligation to act into an obligation or duty
imposed by law.  But that is the very equation against which the law has thus far
set its face.
[10]     The instinctive reluctance of society to sanction the imposition of
delictual liability on the strength of such an equation is precisely because it is
apprehensive about the consequences of simplistically converting moral or

ethical obligations into legal duties.  It is that fear which provides the impetus for
the quest by writers and the courts for a via media between the social inutility of
a barren doctrine that denies liability for any omissions and the extravagance of
a wholesale conversion of ethical or moral obligations into legal duties.  As to the
latter, society is simply not prepared to live under so potentially demanding and
onerous a legal regime in the area of omissions in the law of delict.
[11]     As to the former, the ways in which the courts sought to escape,
Houdini-like, from the confines of the no liability for acts of omission doctrine
were many and varied.  Initially, the techniques used appeared to many to be
casuistic and not linked by any coherent principle.  A doctrine of “prior
conduct” evolved, the gist of which was that the defendant’s own prior conduct
may have been such as to give rise to a legal duty to act.  The introduction of “a
new source of danger” was an example of such prior conduct.  But what of prior

Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330 at 385-388; 408-412.   For a more
guarded and less hostile reaction in the United Kingdom, see Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923
at 954-955.  For an overview of the more recent decisions on the subject of liability in delict
of public bodies in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, see the
contribution by Stephen Todd entitled Liability in Tort of Public Bodies in Torts Tomorrow -
A Tribute to John Fleming, (1998) edited by N J Mullany and A M Linden at 35-36
Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; Parramatta City Council v
conduct that was neutral in terms of creating a risk of harm to others?  Or cases
in which there was no discernible prior conduct on the part of the defendant?
Sometimes a legal duty to act was found to exist because of a particular
relationship (“proximity”) which existed between the parties.  Sometimes it was
found to exist because a duty to act was imposed by statute (despite the fact that
the statute did not itself create an independently existing cause of action for
damages for its breach).  Sometimes it was found to exist because the defendant
had control of the property upon which a hazard arose.  The list is not
exhaustive.
[12]     More  recently  a  much  criticised   doctrine  of  “general  reliance  or
dependence”  has  emerged  in  the  Antipodes.   The  thrust  of  it  is  that if

Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293; Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1988) 192 CLR 330
(Australia);  Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] AC 624 (PC) (New Zealand).
there is a “general expectation” in the community that a statutory power will be
exercised, then even although the statute does not compel the exercise of the
power, its non-exercise may potentially ground liability in tort.
[13]     Looking back at the intellectual war of words which has raged for so long
in this connection, it is easy enough to discern the battle lines.  On one side were
those who were averse to what they regarded as timorous incrementalism
founded on nothing more than a polyglot and casuistic assemblage of cases
thought to resemble one another in one or other respect regarded as significant.
Their aversion set them off in search of a readily identifiable and user-friendly
principle the application of which would yield predictable and just results.  On
the other side were those who, while not antagonistic to the search for such a
principle, had become convinced that it was hopeless and that their energies

should be devoted instead to defending a policy of pragmatic incrementalism
reflective of current societal notions of justice.  There were also those who
hovered in the buffer strip of no man’s land, torn between their philosophic
affection for rational principles capable of being consistently applied and their
innate sense of caution and appreciation of how frequently unintended and
unwelcome consequences flow from well-intentioned attempts to make the law
less complex than it is.  It is far less easy to decide with which group one should
throw in one’s lot.
[14]       Was there a unifying link in the omissions considered in the cases which
would provide a coherent and intelligible principle by which to decide whether
more than moral or ethical disapproval was called for and whether a legal duty
to act should be imposed?  It was not always easy to discern one.   In the end,
this court felt driven to conclude that all that can be said is that moral and ethical

Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975(3) SA 590 (A).  The English translation from the
Afrikaans is taken from the headnote.  See note 3.
The Actionable Omission - Another View of Ewel’s Case (1976) 93 SALJ 85.  The nom
de plume Amicus Curiae was that of the Hon George Colman, the distinguished former
Transvaal judge.   R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations - Roman Foundations of the
Civilian Tradition, 1046 n. 299.
Zimmermann and Visser, Southern Cross - Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa,
obligations metamorphose into legal duties when “the legal convictions of the
community demand that the omission ought to be regarded as unlawful”.   When
it should be adjudged that such a demand exists can not be the subject of any
general rule; it will depend on the facts of the particular case.  It is implicit in the
proposition that account must be taken of contemporary community attitudes
towards particular societal obligations and duties.  History has shown that such
attitudes are in a constant  state of flux.
[15]     While that attempt to devise a workable general principle by which to
determine on which side of the moral/legal divide a duty to act falls has not been
universally acclaimed,  it has been welcomed by most.   Those who welcome

628 n. 225.
it do so because of its inherent flexibility and its liberation of courts from the
conceptual strait jacket of a numerus clausus of specific instances in which a
legal duty to act can be recognised.  Those who do not are distrustful of the
scope it provides for equating too easily with the convictions of the community
a particular court’s personal perception of the strength of a particular moral or
ethical duty’s claim to be recognised as a legal duty.  That is a risk which is not
peculiar to this particular problem.  There are many areas of the law in which
courts have to make policy choices or choices which entail identifying prevailing
societal values and applying them.  But courts are expected to be able to
recognise the difference between a personal and possibly idiosyncratic
preference as to what the community’s convictions ought to be and the actually
prevailing convictions of the community.  Provided that courts conscientiously
bear the distinction in mind, little, if any, harm is likely to result.

[16]     The present position regarding omissions in the law of delict is accurately
described by Corbett JA (as he then was) in the public lecture entitled Aspects
of the Role of Policy in the Evolution of our Common Law and published in
[1987] 104 SALJ 52.  The learned judge of appeal said (at 56):
“Even in 1975 there were probably still two choices open to the court in
the Ewels case.  The one was to confine liability for an omission to certain
stereotypes, possibly adding to them from time to time; the other was to
adopt a wider, more open-ended general principle, which, while
comprehending existing grounds of liability, would lay the foundation for
a more flexible and all-embracing approach to the question whether a
person’s omission to act should be held unlawful or not.  The court made
the latter choice;  and, of course, in doing so cast the courts for a general
policymaking role in this area of the law.”
[17]          In playing that general policymaking role a court should be mindful of
its limitations in diagnosing accurately and prescribing effectively for the ills of
society.  Some have thought that the legislature is the more appropriate sounding
board for proposed extensions of liability in cases when public and private law

Schreiner JA in Moulang’s case (note 1) at 523 F; Amicus Curiae (note 9) at 87.
Faiga v Body Corporate of Dumbarton Oaks 1997(2) SA 651 (W) at 668 E (overturned
on the facts on appeal (1999(1) SA 975 (SCA)), the court refraining from comment on the
court a quo’s view of the law).
intersect, as they do in the municipality cases.    Be that as it may, when a court
is required to consider whether a legal duty should be imposed in a given
situation the “balance ultimately struck must be harmonious with the public’s
notion of what justice demands”.12
[18]          With that prelude I turn to the specific omission in issue in this case.
Appellant’s case was argued in the broad rather than with particular reference to
the facts of this case.  In substance the contention was that the relevant
legislation imposed no obligation and cast no duty upon the municipality to build
or maintain pavements.  It merely empowered it to do so.  That distinction, so
it was argued, had been regarded as critical in all the municipality cases decided
in South Africa.  Where such was the case, and in the absence of any antecedent

1958(2) SA 518 (A)
or concomitant act of commission by the municipality which might necessitate
a different result, it had been consistently held that no legal duty emanating from
the law of delict to repair a street or pavement could arise.
[19]        There can be no doubt that that is indeed the import of the municipality
cases in South Africa.  So entrenched did the principle become that by 1958
when Moulang’s case  was decided by this court, Schreiner JA felt able to
speak of “the general immunity” recognised in those cases and “the high degree
of immunity for municipalities in relation to accidents caused by potholes and the
like in the surface of streets”.
[20]      Little will be gained by subjecting each of the South African cases
decided prior to Moulang’s case to individual analysis. Their import is reflected
accurately enough in the judgment in the latter case.  Before considering whether
their authority has been undermined or terminated by decisions such as those in

1963(1) SA 102 (A)
1973(3) SA 69 (A)
1975(3) SA 590 (A)
Regal,  Quathlamba,  and Ewels  it would be as well to be clear as to what
it was the municipality cases did and did not decide.
[21]          First, they did not decide that at common law a municipality was
absolutely immune from liability and that in no circumstances could it become
obliged to repair a road or pavement or fall under a duty to warn of an unrepaired
road or pavement.
[22]         Secondly, they did not decide that the relevant empowering legislation
per se conferred, either expressly or by necessary implication, absolute or even
relative immunity.  Nor of course could they have so decided; the legislation was
manifestly purely empowering legislation and it was silent on the question of what
obligations might arise in the law of delict if damage was suffered as a

consequence of a negligent omission to repair a road or pavement ownership of
which was vested in a municipality.  The fact that there have been and may still
be, existing side by side with such purely empowering legislation, other
legislation imposing duties of repairs is not sufficient justification for reading into
the former class of legislation an intention to exclude such liability as might exist
at common law for failure to repair a road or pavement.  The priority which
would have to be given to the repair of roads and pavements falling within the
latter class would be of course a relevant factor in deciding whether or not to
impose a legal duty to repair a particular road or pavement falling within the
former class or, where a legal duty to repair arising under the common law is
found to exist, in deciding whether the omission to repair a road or pavement
falling within the former class was culpable.  The weight to be assigned to the
factor will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
[23]        Thirdly, they did not decide that if a municipality chose to exercise its

Moulang’s case (note 1) at 522 F-G
powers of repair, it could not be held liable even if it acted negligently in carrying
out the repair.  On the contrary, it was recognised that it would indeed be liable.
[24]      Fourthly, they did decide that, absent any antecedent or concomitant act
of commission by a municipality which altered the case, the law of delict did not
give rise to a legal duty to repair a street or pavement.  That conclusion did not
rest solely upon the permissive and non-obligatory nature of the relevant
legislation and the narrow view taken of the scope of liability in the common law
for omissions.  It rested at least in part upon policy considerations thought to
make it undesirable to impose a legal duty to repair upon municipalities.17
[25]        To what extent, if any, are the cases which have broadened the scope
of potential liability in delict for omissions destructive of the municipality cases?
They certainly do not expressly profess to overrule them.  However, it seems
plain that they undermine at least part, and a substantial part at that, of the

Schreiner JA in Moulang’s case (note 1) at 522 H
foundations upon which the “general immunity” doctrine rested in those cases.
In so far as the municipality cases proceeded from the premise that “our law of
negligence recognises liability for omissions only exceptionally, and more
particularly when there has been a previous act of commission on the part of the
alleged wrongdoer”,  they inhibited the courts concerned from enquiring
whether, notwithstanding the absence of a legislatively imposed duty to repair or
any prior or concomitant act of commission, the legal convictions of the
community demanded that a legal duty to repair (or to warn) dehors the
legislation should be recognised.
[26]        It is true that in Moulang’s case this court re-asserted the general or
relative immunity of municipalities in this area of the law despite declining to
investigate, far less decide, what “the better view about liability for omissions in

Schreiner JA at 523 E
general”  might be, and that this may suggest that it did not regard the
correctness of its narrow view of that liability as critical to the continued
existence of that immunity.  Nonetheless, once it has been accepted (as it has
been) that the premise was indeed erroneous, the authority of the conclusions
reached in the municipality cases in regard to any supposed general immunity
and the scope of liability for omissions in general must necessarily be
considerably diminished.  In other respects, the authority of those cases remains
unimpaired.
[27]      While the court a quo’s conclusion that it was open to it to re-visit the
general or relative immunity of municipalities and, if justification existed to
jettison the notion, was therefore correct, I think that, having done so, it was
wrong to substitute for it what amounts to a blanket imposition upon
municipalities generally of a legal duty to repair roads and pavements.  In my

view, it has to be recognised that in applying the test of what the legal
convictions of the community demand and reaching a particular conclusion, the
courts are not laying down principles of law intended to be generally applicable.
They are making value judgments ad hoc.
[28]      A minuscule and underfunded local authority with many other and more
pressing claims upon its shallow purse, and which has not kept in repair a little
used lane in which small potholes have developed which are easily visible to and
avoidable by anyone keeping a reasonable look-out, may well be thought to be
under no legal duty to repair them or even to warn of their presence.  A large and
well-funded municipality which has failed to keep in repair a pavement habitually
thronged with pedestrians so densely concentrated that it is extremely difficult
to see the surface of the pavement, or to take evasive action to avoid potholes
of a substantial size and depth, may well be under a legal duty to repair such
potholes or to barricade or otherwise warn of them.  There can be no principle

of law that all municipalities have at all times a legal duty to repair or to warn the
public whenever and whatever potholes may occur in whatever pavements or
streets may be vested in them.
[29]      It is tempting to construct such a legal duty on the strength of a sense
of security engendered by the mere provision of a street or pavement by a
municipality but I do not think one can generalise in that regard.  It is axiomatic
that man-made streets and pavements will not always be in the pristine condition
in  which  they  were when first constructed and  that  it  would  be well- nigh
impossible for even the largest and most well-funded municipalities to keep them
all in that state at all times.  A reasonable sense of proportion is called for. The
public must be taken to realise that and to have a care for its own safety when
using the roads and pavements.
[30]      It is not necessary, nor would it be possible, to provide a catalogue of
the circumstances in which it would be right to impose a legal duty to repair or

to warn upon a municipality.  Obvious cases would be those in which difficult
to see holes develop in a much used street or pavement which is frequently so
crowded that the holes are upon one before one has had sufficient opportunity
to see and to negotiate them.  Another example, admittedly extreme, would be
a crevice caused by an earth tremor and spanning a road entirely.  The variety of
conceivable situations which could arise is infinite.
[31]      Per contra, it would, I think, be going too far to impose a legal duty
upon all municipalities to maintain a billiard table-like surface upon all pavements,
free of any subsidences or other irregularities which might cause an unwary
pedestrian to stumble and possibly fall.  It will be for a plaintiff to place before
the court in any given case sufficient evidence to enable it to conclude that a legal
duty to repair or to warn should be held to have existed.  It will also be for a
plaintiff to prove that the failure to repair or to warn was blameworthy
(attributable to culpa).  It is so that some (but not all) of the factors relevant to

the first enquiry will also be relevant to the second enquiry (if it be reached), but
that does not mean that they must be excluded from the first enquiry.  Having to
discharge the onus of proving both the existence of the legal duty and
blameworthiness in failing to fulfil it will, I think, go a long way to prevent the
opening of the floodgates to claims of this type of which municipalities are so
fearful.
[32]     In the present case there is very little in the way of evidence to go on
when it comes to deciding whether or not it should be held that the municipality
was under a legal duty either to repair these holes or to warn the public of their
existence and that its failure to do either was negligent.  However, there is just
enough to warrant a finding that it was.  Sea Point is a densely populated suburb.
The pavement abutted on residences and would have been in constant use.
There were two holes in close proximity to one another and they were not
shallow.  There was also a pole near the holes from which a wire cable ran which

was attached to the pavement in the vicinity of the holes.  It had the effect of
shepherding a passer-by in the direction of the holes.  The pavement was
relatively narrow.  The holes had been there for many months.  No evidence was
given on the municipality’s behalf.  In this court Mr Binns-Ward adopted the
position that unless the immunity conferred by the municipality cases was re-
affirmed, the municipality accepted that it would be liable.  In the circumstances,
it is unnecessary to subject to any further scrutiny  the factual foundation for the
existence of a legal duty and a finding that there was culpa in failing to fulfil it.
[33]      The appeal is dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs either in this
court or in respect of the application for leave to appeal.

R M MARAIS
JUDGE OF APPEAL
HEFER
JA)

SCHUTZ
JA)
STREICHER  JA)
MPATI          AJA)     CONCUR