THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

REPORTABLE
Case number:   483/02

In the matter between:

CONSOL LIMITED t/a CONSOL GLASS

APPELLANT

and

TWEE JONGE GEZELLEN (PTY) LTD               FIRST RESPONDENT

NICHOLAS CHARLES KRONE JUNIOR
SECOND RESPONDENT

CORAM:

HOWIE P, BRAND, CLOETE, HEHER JJA and
VAN HEERDEN AJA
HEARD:

13 NOVEMBER 2003
DELIVERED:

28 NOVEMBER 2003

Summary:
Contract – interpretation of – whether provision imposes contractual obligation –
whether compliance with the obligation is a precondition for reliance on indemnities –
whether tacit term established – meaning of 'standard', 'written guarantee' and
'implied guarantee'.
_________________________________

JUDGMENT
_________________________________

BRAND JA/

BRAND JA:
[1] The issues in this matter turn on the interpretation of a written
agreement between the parties. The appellant ('Consol') is a
manufacturer of glass products, including wine bottles. The first
respondent ('Twee Jonge Gezellen') produces wine and sparkling wine
at its estate near Tulbagh in the Western Cape. The second respondent,
Mr N C Krone Junior ('Krone'), is a shareholder in and director of Twee
Jonge Gezellen.
[2] Since 1991, Twee Jonge Gezellen has from time to time purchased
bottles for its wine production from Consol. These purchases were
governed by the terms of a general supply agreement ('the supply
agreement'). The terms of the supply agreement were contained in
Consol's standard credit application form which was signed by Krone on
behalf of Twee Jonge Gezellen in August 1991. At the same time Krone
bound himself as surety and co-principal debtor to Consol for the
payment of all amounts owing to it by Twee Jonge Gezellen.
[3] During 1999 Consol instituted action against Twee Jonge Gezellen
and Krone in the Cape High Court. Its claim was for the purchase price
of wine bottles sold and delivered to Twee Jonge Gezellen during 1998.
Apart from a relatively minor discrepancy in relation to the amount
thereof, Consol's claim was not disputed. The issues which arose for

determination relate to Twee Jonge Gezellen's claim in reconvention.
[4] As will shortly be described in more detail, an important part of
Consol's defence to the claim in reconvention was founded on the
exemption and limitation provisions contained in the so-called 'claims
clause' of the supply agreement. At the commencement of the trial ten
issues were identified by agreement between the parties for separate
and prior adjudication, all of which arose from the terms of the claims
clause. The remaining issues stood over for later determination.
Immediately prior to judgment one of the ten issues was, again by
agreement between the parties, excluded from the preliminary
adjudication. In a judgment since reported as Consol Ltd t/a Consol
Glass v Twee Jonge Gezellen (Pty) Ltd and Another 2002 (6) SA 256
(C), the Court a quo (Blignault J) found in favour of Twee Jonge Gezellen
on six of the remaining nine issues. Consol's appeal is directed against
these findings. The other three issues were decided against Twee Jonge
Gezellen. The cross-appeal by the latter is against the findings on two of
these issues. Both the appeal and the cross-appeal are with the leave of
the Court a quo.
[5] Twee Jonge Gezellen's claim in reconvention, which eventually
gave rise to the preliminary issues arose from the sale to it, during 1996
and in terms of the supply agreement, of 29 720 sparkling wine bottles.

The bottles were used by Twee Jonge Gezellen for the production of its
1994 vintage Krone Borealis sparkling wine which was produced in
accordance with a method known as cap classique or méthode
champenoise. This method is characterised by a second fermentation of
yeast in the bottled wine after the primary fermentation in tanks.
[6] It is common cause that, unbeknown to Twee Jonge Gezellen, the
inside surface of these bottles had been treated by Consol, during the
manufacturing process,  with a gas called Freon 134A. The purpose of
this treatment was to combat a phenomenon known as 'bloom' which
sometimes occurs when bottles are placed in storage for periods in
excess of three months. It appears as a haze on the inside of the bottle
making it unattractive to Consol's customers.
[7] When the bottles were used for their intended purpose Twee Jonge
Gezellen experienced problems during the second fermentation process.
As a consequence of these problems, so Twee Jonge Gezellen alleged
in its pleadings, it lost a large portion of its 1994 vintage Krone Borealis
and sustained additional losses listed under various heads. According to
the claim in reconvention the damages suffered as a result of these
losses added up to more than R10m in all. Twee Jonge Gezellen's case
is, in essence, that the problems which were experienced in the second
fermentation process of its 1994 vintage sparkling wine, and its

consequent losses, must be attributed to Consol's use of Freon 134A
during the manufacturing process. The claim is based on two alternative
grounds. The main ground is Consol's alleged failure to comply with a
provision of the claims clause that all bottles supplied 'are manufactured
according
to
Consol's
standard
manufacturing
procedures
and
techniques, utilising standard materials'. I will presently return to this
provision. As an alternative ground Twee Jonge Gezellen relies on the
allegation that Consol was the manufacturer or merchant seller of the
bottles concerned.
[8] As indicated, Consol raised a number of defences to the claim in
reconvention that were based on the provisions of the 'claims clause' in
the supply agreement. Consequently, the provisions of this clause form
the focal point of the appeal. It is therefore necessary to set these
provisions out in some detail. The clause reads as follows:
"CLAIMS:
All goods supplied are manufactured according to the company's standard
manufacturing procedures and techniques, utilizing standard raw materials.
No claims shall be recognised by the company unless lodged within 21 (twenty one)
days after receipt of goods. If goods are damaged at the time of delivery the
customer shall advise the customer's nearest sales office within twenty-four hours of
delivery.
No guarantee or warranty regarding supply or quality is given or implied unless

specifically stated in writing by an authorised company representative. Where any
written warranty is given, the company's liability will be limited to replacement of
defective goods on proven non-compliance with the warranty or accepted
specification. Under no circumstances, with or without written guarantee or warranty,
shall the company be liable for any consequential loss or damage howsoever arising.
The customer shall have no claim for short delivery unless the quantity short
delivered is endorsed on all copies of a delivery note presented for signature. The
company shall be the sole adjudicator in respect of all claims and any decision
undertaken by the company in this regard shall be binding on the customer.'
[9] The formulation of the ten preliminary issues arising from Consol's
reliance on these provisions that were identified for separate adjudication
is set out below. The paraphrased answer of the Court a quo on each
issue which forms the subject matter of the appeal and the cross-appeal,
is indicated in parenthesis:
'1.
Whether in terms of the supply agreement, [Consol] was obliged to

manufacture all bottles delivered to [Twee Jonge Gezellen] according to

Consol's standard manufacturing procedures and techniques, utilising

standard raw materials.

(Yes, Consol did have such obligations.)
2.
Whether the bottles [in question] were manufactured by [Consol] according to
its standard manufacturing procedures and techniques, utilising standard raw
materials, in particular:
2.1
Whether at the time those bottles were made, internal treatment of cap

classique bottles with Freon 134A gas was part of the [Consol's] standard

manufacturing procedures and techniques.

(Yes, it was.)
2.2
Whether when manufacturing those bottles [Consol] applied Freon 134A gas

in accordance with its standard procedures or techniques;

(By agreement between the parties, this issue was excluded from preliminary

adjudication.)
2.3
Whether at the time the bottles were made, Freon 134A gas was a standard

raw material for the manufacture of the bottles in question.

(Yes, it was.)
3.
If such bottles were not manufactured by [Consol] according to its standard
manufacturing procedures and techniques, utilising standard raw materials,
whether [Consol] was entitled to rely on the further provisions of the clause of
the supply agreement headed 'Claims'.

(No, in this event Consol would not be entitled to rely on the further  provisions

of the claims clause.)
4.
Whether the provision of the supply agreement that all goods supplied were
manufactured according to [Consol's] standard manufacturing procedures and
techniques, utilising standard raw materials, is a warranty as contemplated in
the aforesaid clause.

(No, it is not such a warranty.)
5.
Whether [Consol's] liability for the breach alleged by [Twee Jonge Gezellen]
was limited to the replacement of bottles proven to have been defective.

(No, Consol's liability is not so limited.)
6.
Whether [Consol] was exempted from liability in the event of [Twee Jonge
Gezellen] not having lodged its claim within 21 days of delivery of the bottles in

question, or whether it was a tacit term of the supply agreement that [Consol]
would only be entitled to rely on the provision that no claim would be
recognised unless lodged within 21 days after receipt of the goods if the
circumstances giving rise to the claim were reasonably apparent to [Twee
Jonge Gezellen] within 21 days of receipt of the allegedly affected bottles.

(No, Consol was not exempted, because there was such a tacit term.)
7.
Whether [Consol] was exempted from liability for [Twee Jonge Gezellen's]
claim set out in para 3 of the claim in reconvention [which rests on the basis
that Consol was a manufacturer or merchant seller of wine bottles] unless an
authorised representative of [Consol] specifically guaranteed or warranted the
relevant quality of the bottles in writing.

(No, such a written guarantee or warranty was not a prerequisite for Consol's

liability on this basis.)
8.
Whether the damages claimed by [Twee Jonge Gezellen] constituted
consequential loss or damage as contemplated in the aforesaid clause of the
supply agreement.

(Yes, those claims are for consequential loss.)'
[10] Consol's appeal is directed at the decisions of the Court a quo in
respect of the first and the third to the seventh preliminary issues. The
cross-appeal is directed at the findings in relation to parts one and three
of the second preliminary issue. As regards the eighth preliminary issue,
the finding by the Court a quo to the effect that the damages claimed by
Twee Jonge Gezellen were consequential in nature, is not appealed
against by the latter.

[11] I now proceed to deal with the preliminary issues presented for
adjudication on appeal in their numerical sequence.
The first preliminary issue
[12] For ease of reference, I will repeat the formulation of the issue. It
is:
'Whether, in  terms of the supply agreement, [Consol] was obliged to manufacture all
bottles delivered to [Twee Jonge Gezellen] according to [Consol's] standard
manufacturing procedures and techniques utilising standard raw materials.'
The issue arises from the introductory sentence of the claims clause
which provides that 'All goods supplied are manufactured according to
the company's standard manufacturing procedures and techniques,
utilising standard raw materials.' Twee Jonge Gezellen contends that this
sentence imposed an obligation on Consol. Consol denies that this is so.
The contrary position for which it contends is that the sentence created
no rights or obligations but that it is merely a recital in the nature of a
preamble or an introduction to the operative provisions of the claims
clause.
[13] Provisions are sometimes inserted in written contracts by means of
recitals or preambles which create no obligations for any of the
contracting parties. The purpose of such provisions is, for example, to
serve as an introduction to the rest of the contract or to record good
intentions or pronouncements of good faith. The question whether a

provision constitutes a mere recital, on the one hand, or a contractual
obligation, on the other, is dependent upon the intention of the parties.
Such intention is to be found in the language of the stipulation itself, read
in its proper context and construed in accordance with the recognised
tenets of construction. Consequently, an answer can rarely be
transposed from one case to another unless their facts are almost
identical. Nevertheless, considerations underlying the decisions in
comparable cases may serve as useful guidelines.
[14] In First National Bank of SA Ltd v Rosenblum and Another 2001 (4)
SA 189 (SCA) the bank sought to protect itself against liability for
damages by way of an indemnity clause in its standard contract. The
clause (quoted in para [3] 194C-D) provided, inter alia, that
'The bank hereby notifies its customers that while it will exercise every reasonable
care, it is not liable for any loss or damage caused to any article lodged with it for
safe custody … whether the loss or damage is due to the bank's negligence or not.'
In Elgin Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Machinery Suppliers (Pty)
Ltd 1993 (3) SA 424 (A) the relevant part of the clause concerned
(quoted at 427D-E) reads as follows:
'Whilst reasonable care will be taken to ensure that first class materials and
workmanship will be used in the execution of the contract IMS will not be liable for
any loss or damages whatsoever, … due to … defective, faulty or negligent
workmanship or material …'

[15] In both cases this Court held that the provisions introduced by
'while' and 'whilst' in the respective clauses concerned, constituted no
more than a recital which imposed no contractual obligation on the
promisor. Broadly stated, both decisions appear to have been influenced
by two central considerations. The first was that the provisions in issue
were ushered in by 'whilst/while' which is indicative of a mere
introduction signifying no more than 'notwithstanding that'. The second
consideration was that if the stipulations concerned were interpreted as
creating contractual obligations such interpretation would result in a clear
antithesis between the introductory words and the operative parts of the
indemnities (see Elgin Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd at 428C-429B-D and
First National Bank of SA Ltd at 198G-J).
[16] Based on the latter consideration, it was argued on behalf of
Consol that, if the first sentence of the claims clause is to be construed
as imposing contractual obligations it would likewise create an antithesis
with the operative part of the indemnity clause. More particularly, this
argument relied on the specific exclusion in the remainder of the clause
of any 'guarantee or warranty regarding quality'. I do not agree with this
approach. The antithesis contemplated in the two decisions of this Court
would require that Consol is placed under a particular obligation but, at
the same time, exonerated from any breach of that obligation. The first

sentence of the claims clause could not produce this result. Even if the
first sentence is understood to impose an obligation on Consol to ensure
that its standard manufacturing procedures and techniques are applied
and that it utilises standard raw materials, it would not create any
warranty of quality with regard to the products themselves. If the use of
standard procedures and materials resulted in a product of inferior
quality that is what customers would have to accept. If customers wanted
a warranty as to quality they would have to obtain one in writing as
contemplated in the later provisions of the clause.
[17] With regard to the particular wording of the first sentence, it gives
no indication, unlike words such as 'while' or 'whilst' or 'notwithstanding',
that it is of an introductory nature. The sentence contains a positive
statement of fact relating to matters which could, in their ordinary
context, be expected to form the subject matter of a contractual
obligation undertaken by Consol.
[18] Significantly, in my view, other clauses in the same document are,
in contradistinction to the first sentence of the clause, indeed prefaced by
'while' or 'whilst'. So, for example, the clause under the heading 'packing'
begins as follows:
'Whilst the company will have regard under this heading, to any preference by the
customer, the method of packing shall be determined by the company … '

And under the heading 'Force Majeure' the document provides that:
'While the company will use every endeavour to execute orders in accordance with
the terms and conditions thereof, it will not be responsible for any delays or non-
deliveries due to … circumstances over which it has no direct control.'
In contrast with the first sentence of the claims clause, it is in my view
quite clear from the ordinary language used in these provisions that they
were not intended to impose any contractual obligation on Consol but to
serve as a mere introduction to the operative parts that follow them.
Though mindful of the fact that I am not dealing with the interpretation of
a statute, it appears to be a fair inference that a deliberate change of
expression in a carefully prepared document such as this was intended
to indicate some change of intention on the part of the stipulator, i e
Consol.
[19] In the final analysis one wonders why, if the provision under
consideration was not intended to impose any contractual obligation,
such a recital would be necessary at all. What does it contribute? It
serves no introductory function and a customer could hardly derive any
comfort from a 'promise' that Consol will apply its standard
manufacturing procedures and utilise standard raw materials if Consol is
not bound at all by that promise. Consequently I find myself in agreement
with the decision of the Court a quo that the first sentence in the claims
clause does impose a contractual obligation on Consol, which means

that the appeal against this decision must fail.
The second preliminary issue
[20] The second preliminary issue raises two questions.  Firstly,
whether internal treatment of cap classique bottles with Freon 134A gas
was part of Consol's 'standard manufacturing procedures and
techniques'; and secondly, whether Freon 134A could be described as
one of Consol's 'standard raw materials' for the manufacture of these
bottles as contemplated by the first sentence of the claims clause. The
Court a quo  decided both questions in Consol's favour. Twee Jonge
Gezellen contends that these decisions were not supported by the facts.
A consideration of this contention consequently requires a somewhat
more detailed analysis of the evidence.
[21] As indicated, Freon 134A was used for the prevention of a
phenomenon called bloom. Bloom has always been a problem for
Consol, particularly at its Bellville factory. The reason why bloom
formation is more prevalent in the Western Cape than in Gauteng, where
Consol's other three factories are located, has to do with the difference in
climate between the two areas. About 1993, bloom took on what Consol
regarded as alarming proportions. Consequently Consol's technical
experts were enjoined to do something about the problem. One of these
technical experts was Consol's laboratory services manager, Mr J

Polasek who gave evidence on behalf of Consol at the trial. At that
stage, it had been known in the industry for quite some time that
formation of bloom could be prevented by neutralising the alkalinity of the
inside surface of newly manufactured glass bottles. The method for
achieving this result, which had also been known for over thirty years,
was to treat the inside of the bottles with a fluorine-containing gas
compound, called Freon. Amongst the glass manufacturers applying this
method was a company in the United States of America, Owens
Brockway. This company is one of the two largest manufacturers of glass
containers in the world. It also holds 19% of the shares in Consol.
Because of this relationship, Owens Brockway and Consol have a so-
called 'technical agreement', in pursuance whereof Owens Brockway
renders technical assistance to Consol on a regular basis.
[22] The Freon gas compound utilised by Owens Brockway for the
internal treatment of glass bottles has always been Freon 152A. In 1993,
when Consol decided that something had to be done about the
prevention of bloom Freon 152A was therefore the known remedy.
Consol's problem was, however, that Freon 152A was virtually
unobtainable in this country in commercially viable quantities. A solution
to this problem was suggested in a memorandum prepared by one of
Consol's technical personnel in February 1994 after a visit to the

technical centre of Owens Brockway in Toledo, Ohio. According to the
memorandum it had been experimentally established in the laboratories
of Owens Brockway that Freon 152A could be replaced in the internal
treatment process with another fluorine-containing gas called Freon
134A. Although Owens Brockway itself consistently used Freon 152A
and had never substituted Freon 134A for it, it is claimed in the
memorandum that 'Freon 134A is a direct equivalent of Freon 152A and
is used to replace the CFC refrigerant in the automotive and industrial air
conditioning industry'.
[23] As far as Consol knew Freon 134A had not been used by anyone
else in the world for the internal treatment of glass bottles. Because of its
application in the refrigeration industry it was, however, more freely
available than Freon 152A. Solely for reasons of availability, Consol
therefore decided to integrate the internal treatment system developed
by Owens Brockway into the production lines of its Bellville factory but to
adapt that system by substituting Freon 134A for Freon 152A.
[24] Treatment with Freon 134A was introduced in Consol's Bellville
factory in about March 1994. The cap classique bottles that eventually
gave rise to Twee Jonge Gezellen's claim for damages were
manufactured in that factory during February 1996. By that time the
system had therefore been in operation for almost two years. In the

meantime Consol had installed a system of internal treatment with Freon
134A into all but one of its other factories. The exception was the factory
at Clayville in Gauteng which manufactured beer bottles only. Since
bloom formation is associated with storage for periods in excess of three
months and the turnover period of beer bottles is much shorter, it was
unnecessary to treat these bottles for the prevention of bloom.
[25] Because internal treatment with Freon 134A, as opposed to Freon
152A, had not been utilised at a production level before, the system at
the Bellville factory was reviewed on a regular basis. Polasek was
responsible for these reviews. The main purpose of the reviews was to
assess how successful the system had been in achieving the prevention
of bloom. From the reports filed by Polasek on his reviews of the Bellville
system at regular intervals, it appears that Consol never really
succeeded in applying Freon 134A to the inside of all manufactured
bottles on a consistent basis. So, for example, Polasek's report of 30
November 1994 stated:
'It is clear from recent observations at the factory and analysis that the bloom
protection through Freon treatment is lacking.'
And:
'The suspicion falls clearly on the choice of Freon as the major deviation from the
[Owens Brockway] process manual.'
[26] The technical difficulties giving rise to the problem of inconsistent

treatment were associated with the way in which the Freon gas was
physically injected into each bottle. What contributed to the problem was
the fact that Freon is an invisible gas. Operators on the production line
therefore had no way of knowing whether every bottle actually received
its prescribed dose of the gas or was over- or under-treated. With Freon
152A this quality was, however, of lesser consequence than with Freon
134A. The reason is that Freon 152A is considerably more inflammable
than Freon 134A. Because Freon 152A has a relatively low point of
combustion it creates an unmistakable blue flash when injected into the
bottle. As a consequence, the success or otherwise of a particular
injection can be determined by operators through visual inspection.
Freon 134A, on the other hand, does not create such a flash. On the
production line this difference is of vital importance.
[27] The last available report by Polasek relates to a review which he
did in July 1997. In this report he summarised the problems encountered
with Freon 134A treatment as follows:
'There is a concern that internal treatment (I T; freon treatment) of ware is inadequate
to provide long term protection against bloom …

There is a perspective that I T application [with Freon 134A] is synonymous
with bloom protection. This is a very hopeful view … The technology is thirty years
old and our experience is three, with systems that have a large element of our own
design and practice.  … I T has never really worked at Bellville at all since its

inception. There is in fact ample evidence that ware has been treated properly but
not always consistently.

…

The overall finding is that I T application is still erratic, not much changed from
what has been seen before and pointed out in earlier reviews.'
As the primary solution to the problem, Polasek recommended a 'switch
to Freon 152A'.
[28] Towards the end of 1997, Freon 152A became more freely
available in this country. In the result, Polasek's recommendation that
Freon 134A should be replaced with 152A in the internal treatment
system was ultimately implemented by Consol. In cross-examination
Polasek conceded that Consol's use of Freon 134A never reached the
stage where the results achieved were considered to be satisfactory. He
also conceded that Consol's use of Freon 134A was 'part of a learning
curve' and that this learning curve continued for the whole period during
which this gas was used, until the time when usage thereof was
discontinued towards the end of 1997.
[29] Against this background I now turn to the questions raised by the
issue under consideration. The answer to the questions relating to both
procedure and raw material depends, firstly, on whether the relevant
'standard' refers to the situation in 1991, when the supply agreement was
concluded, or to 1996 when the bottles were sold. Twee Jonge

Gezellen's contention is that the enquiry is to be directed at Consol's
'standards' as they existed in 1991. Since it is common cause that in
1991 Consol used no Freon 134A at all it is apparent that if this
contention is held to be correct, the issue must be decided in Twee
Jonge Gezellen's favour. However, I find myself in agreement with the
finding by the Court a quo (at 273A-E) that this result could not have
been intended by the parties. It must be borne in mind that the supply
agreement did not, in itself, constitute an agreement of sale. It
contemplated that there would be sales from time to time and provided
that the standard terms set out in the supply agreement would then be
incorporated into these future sales. Accordingly, when the contract of
sale pertaining to the bottles concerned was concluded in 1996, these
predetermined provisions were embodied in the contract.  Nevertheless,
these provisions can only be construed as part of an agreement that
came into existence in 1996.
[30] If Twee Jonge Gezellen's contention were to be upheld it would
render Consol's position impossible. Its options would be either to apply
in perpetuity its standard procedures and use its standard raw materials,
as they were in 1991, or it would have to seek and obtain the approval of
Twee Jonge Gezellen and, presumably, of all its other customers, each
time it tried to improve or change its standard procedures or raw

materials. I do not believe that the parties could have intended their
agreement to have these impractical results. The questions relating to
Consol's standard procedures and to standard raw materials should
therefore be determined with reference to the situation which pertained in
1996.
[31] I deal first with the question relating to standard procedures. Twee
Jonge Gezellen's one contention in this regard was that since, on
Consol's own showing, it was never really satisfied with the results
obtained with its Freon 134A treatment, it cannot be said that Consol
ever accepted this treatment as its 'standard procedure'. This contention
obviously involves 'standard procedures' as conveying some criterion of
quality. It therefore appears to be based on the misconception that the
term 'standard' is used in the sense of a 'measure to which others
conform', or 'a degree of excellence for a particular purpose', i e, as
synonymous with 'a yardstick' or a 'benchmark'. There is no doubt that
the term 'standard' can have this meaning, particularly when used as a
noun (see e g The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2002)). However,
I find myself in agreement with the Court a quo (at 274A-F) that this
meaning cannot sensibly be reconciled with the rest of the provision
concerned. Read in the context of the provision as a whole, where the
term 'standard' is used as an adjective and in conjunction with a

reference to 'the company', a more appropriate meaning would appear to
be the one given in e g Collins' Dictionary of the English Language
(1979), namely to denote what is 'normal', 'usual' or 'regular'. According
to this interpretation, the first sentence of the claims clause imposes no
greater burden on Consol than to manufacture the bottles sold in
accordance with its normal and usual procedure. Another reason why the
interpretation contended for by Twee Jonge Gezellen is untenable, is
that it would bring the undertaking contained in the first sentence into
conflict with the express provision appearing later in the claims clause,
that 'no guarantee or warranty regarding quality is given or implied'.
[32] Twee Jonge Gezellen's further contention was that, even if
'standard' means 'normal' or 'usual', Consol never reached the stage
where it accepted Freon 134A treatment as its 'normal' or 'usual'
procedure. In support of this contention, reference was made to the
evidence from which it appears that throughout the entire period, during
which Freon 134A was used from 1994 to 1997, the procedure was
subject to constant review and change, and that the reason for these
changes was because the treatment produced inconsistent results. In the
end, so Twee Jonge Gezellen argued, Polasek conceded that, right until
the time when Consol was constrained to give up the practice, it was still
involved in an experimental process or 'learning curve'. I cannot agree

with this argument. In my view it is based on a non sequitur. Neither the
fact that the procedure required constant amendment and change
because the results were inconsistent or otherwise unsatisfactory, nor
the fact that Consol was eventually driven to give up the procedure,
justifies the conclusion that it was never adopted by Consol as its
standard or normal procedure. On the contrary, by the time the offending
bottles were manufactured in 1996, Freon 134A had been used by
Consol for a period of about two years in all its factories, bar one, as part
of its normal and regular manufacturing process. The only factory where
it was not used was where bloom was not a problem. The procedure was
consistent, though the results were not. Moreover, until the end of 1997,
Freon 134A was the only gas used by Consol as a source of fluorine. In
the circumstances, there was no other treatment to combat bloom which
presented itself as a 'standard' procedure. I therefore agree with the
finding by the Court a quo that, when the bottles were manufactured in
February 1996, treatment with Freon 134A was part of Consol's standard
procedure, albeit that the results obtained were not uniform or
satisfactory.
[33] This brings me to the next question, namely, whether at the time
that the bottles were made, Freon 134A gas met the requirements of a
'standard raw material'. Twee Jonge Gezellen's submission in this regard

was that, since the word 'company's' in the claims clause qualifies
'standard procedure' but not 'standard raw materials', it means that the
latter must be of a more general standard than merely Consol's own
standard. In view of the evidence that no-one except Consol used Freon
134A, so Twee Jonge Gezellen argued, this material must fail the
'standard' test. Though the argument seems to derive support from a
literal interpretation of the provision concerned, the problem which arises
with such a literal interpretation is that it would render the meaning of the
provision so vague that it would become virtually meaningless. So, for
example, a literal interpretation immediately invites the question whether
the requirement is that Consol can only use raw material which is
standard in the rest of the world. If so, Consol would be in breach if it
used any locally available materials differing from those used in other
parts of the world. Or would it suffice if the raw material used is standard
in South Africa? If so, would Consol then be entitled, for example, to use
lime derived from sea shells in the Western Cape (as it did in its Bellville
factory) despite the fact that this source of lime was not used in the rest
of the country? In the circumstances I am satisfied that the provision
cannot bear its literal meaning.
[34] In the context of this case I find myself in agreement with the view
expressed by the Court a quo (at 276A-C) that, if the use of Freon 134A

qualifies as a standard procedure, then Freon 134A, which constitutes an
essential part of that same procedure, must necessarily qualify as a
standard raw material. In the present context, the expression 'standard
raw material' therefore does not create any additional requirement.
[35] In the circumstances, the second issue, in both its constituent
parts, was in my view rightly decided in favour of Consol and the cross-
appeal cannot succeed.
The third preliminary issue
[36] It will be remembered that the third issue was formulated as
follows:
'If such bottles were not manufactured by [Consol] according to its standard
manufacturing procedures and techniques, utilising standard raw materials, whether
[Consol] is entitled to rely on the further provisions of the clause of the supply
agreement headed 'Claims'.'
[37] What will also be recalled is that Consol's undertaking to which
reference is made, performs a dual function in Twee Jonge Gezellen's
case. In the first place, the undertaking serves as the foundation on
which its main claim for damages is based. The second role which Twee
Jonge Gezellen seeks to attribute to the undertaking is that of a condition
precedent for Consol's right to rely on the indemnities contained in the
remainder of the claims clause. There is no doubt that the undertaking
can, in principle, perform the first function. It is the second role which

gave rise to the third issue.
[38] Perhaps as a result of the way in which the matter was argued
before the Court a quo, the learned Judge (at 279D-G) dealt with this
issue essentially on the basis that it follows the answer to the first issue
as a matter of course. In the event, his answer in favour of Twee Jonge
Gezellen on the first issue automatically attracted a similar response on
the third.
[39] In this Court Consol's contention was that the first and third issues
are not necessarily interlinked. In principle, I agree with this contention.
The fact that the first sentence of the claims clause is understood to be a
contractual obligation, as opposed to a mere introductory recital, does
not inevitably give rise to the inference that it also constitutes a
precondition for Consol's reliance on the indemnities in the rest of the
clause. There appears to be no reason in principle why the two concepts
cannot operate independently of each other.
[40] Twee Jonge Gezellen found authority for the existence of a
preconditional interlink between the two concepts in Minister of
Education and Culture (House of Delegates) v Azel and Another 1995 (1)
SA 30 (A). In that matter this Court (at 33G-H) found the undertaking by
the Minister contained in the clause concerned (which is quoted at 33C-
E) to constitute a precondition for his reliance on the indemnities

embodied in the rest of the clause. It is apparent, however, that the
decision in that case was based entirely on the wording of the
contractual provisions involved. This is hardly surprising. The answer to
a question such as this is dependent on the intention of the parties to the
contract concerned, as it appears from a proper interpretation of the
written language used by them. That, in my view, is precisely where the
present case differs from Azel. Unlike the clause concerned in Azel, the
clause in casu gives no indication, either in its language or in the way in
which it is formulated, of a link between the undertaking and the
indemnities. Purely as a matter of construction, there appears to be no
room for the reading in of a phrase such as 'provided that' or 'on the
understanding that', as an introduction to the undertaking in the first
sentence of the clause (cf Azel at 33G-H).
[41] However, what weighs even more heavily against the interpretation
contended for by Twee Jonge Gezellen, is that it will give rise to
anomalous situations which could not, in my view, have been intended
by the parties. The thrust of the indemnities which follow upon the
undertaking is obviously to limit Consol's potential liability for claims by
purchasers of its glassware. Broadly stated, they do so in three ways:
Firstly, by imposing a time limit of 21 days after receipt of the goods
within which claims must be made, failing which Consol would not be

liable. Secondly, by differentiating between the ordinary or normal
situation where the purchaser buys standard bottles from the run of the
production process and special cases where a written warranty of quality
is given. In the ordinary or normal situation, Consol explicitly excludes
any guarantee, express or implied, regarding quality. It can therefore not
be held liable for any deficiencies. In those cases where an express
warranty of quality is given, liability is limited to replacement of the
defective goods. The third way in which Consol seeks to limit its liability
is by providing that Consol shall not, under any circumstances, with or
without a written guarantee or warranty, be liable for any consequential
loss or damage.
[42] If the undertaking in the first sentence is to be construed as a
precondition for Consol's reliance on these indemnities, it will not only
undermine the whole scheme and purpose of the clause, but it will result
in glaring inconsistencies. So, for example, if Consol is in breach of a
written guarantee, its liability will be limited to replacement of the goods.
If, on the other hand, it failed to comply with its undertaking in the first
sentence, it will be exposed to liability for consequential damages.
Moreover, if the purchaser relies on breach of a written guarantee, but
can prove that at the same time Consol had failed to follow its standard
procedures in the manufacture of the goods, Consol would lose all the

protection that it derives from the indemnity clause. In this hypothetical
case it would make no difference that Consol's deviation from its
standard procedure had nothing to do with its non-compliance with the
written guarantee. Nor would it matter that there was no causal link
between Consol's non-compliance with its undertaking and the damages
claimed.
[43] Contrary to the finding by the Court a quo, I am therefore of the
view that the third issue should have been decided in favour of Consol,
which means that, on this issue the appeal must succeed.
The Fourth and Fifth Preliminary Issues
[44] For reasons that will soon be apparent, I find it convenient to deal
with the fourth and fifth issues as one. They were formulated as follows:
'4.
Whether the provisions of the supply agreement that all goods supplied are
manufactured according to [Consol's] standard manufacturing procedures and
techniques, utilizing standard raw materials, is a 'warranty' as contemplated by the
[claims] clause.
5.
Whether [Consol's] liability for breach alleged by [Twee Jonge Gezellen] is
limited to the replacement of bottles proven to have been defective.'
Both these issues arise from the provision in the claims clause that:
'Where any written warranty is given, the company's liability will be limited to
replacement of defective goods on proven non-compliance with the warranty … '
[45] With reference to this provision, Consol argues that, since the

words 'any written warranty' are of wide import, they include the
obligation imposed upon it by the first sentence of the claims clause. I do
not agree with this argument. The stipulation relied upon is preceded by
the provision that:
'No guarantee or warranty regarding … quality is given or implied unless specifically
stated in writing by an authorised company representative.'
[46] Read in the context of the latter provision, it is apparent, in my
view, that the provision relied upon by Consol does not refer to the
undertaking in the first sentence of the claims clause but to a 'warranty
regarding quality' specifically given 'in writing by an authorised company
representative'. Since, apart from anything else, the undertaking in the
first sentence does not constitute a warranty of quality (see para [16]
above), it is clear that the fourth issue should be decided in favour of
Twee Jonge Gezellen. Since the determination of the fifth issue is
dictated by the conclusion reached on the fourth issue, the decision of
the Court a quo on both issues should, in my view, be confirmed.
The Sixth Preliminary Issue
[47] The sixth preliminary issue is:
'Whether [Consol] was exempted from liability in the event of [Twee Jonge Gezellen]
not having lodged its claim within 21 days of delivery of the bottles in question, or
whether it was a tacit term of the supply contract that [Consol] would only be entitled
to rely on the provision that no claim would be recognised unless lodged within 21

days after receipt of the goods if the circumstances giving rise to the claim were
reasonably apparent to [Twee Jonge Gezellen] within 21 days of receipt of the
allegedly  affected bottles.'
[48] The issue arises from Consol's contention that it is exempted from
liability because Twee Jonge Gezellen had failed to lodge its claim within
21 days of delivery of the bottles concerned. It is common cause that the
defects relied upon by Twee Jonge Gezellen would not have been
reasonably apparent to it within the 21-day period. In these
circumstances, Twee Jonge Gezellen contends that Consol is precluded
from relying on the 21-day provision by a tacit term of their agreement.
According to the tacit term advanced by Twee Jonge Gezellen, Consol
could only rely on the 21-day provision if the circumstances giving rise to
the claim would be reasonably apparent to Twee Jonge Gezellen within
21 days of receipt of the goods.
[49] The Court a quo decided this issue in favour of Twee Jonge
Gezellen (at 278D), inter alia, on the basis of the contra proferentem
rule. I do not believe, however, that any assistance can be derived from
this rule in resolving the present problem. The rule is one of construction
and it only comes into play where the difficulty lies in resolving an
ambiguity. Such a difficulty does not arise in the present context. The
express provisions of the contract are clear. The answer to the question
raised by this issue is therefore not dependent on rules of construction

but on whether the requirements for the existence of a tacit term have
been met.
[50] The test for establishing the existence of a tacit term, which this
Court has often recognised and applied in the past, is the so-called
'bystander test' (see e g Alfred McAlpine and Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal
Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) 533A-B; Wilkens NO v
Voges 1994 (3) SA 130 (A) 137A-D; Botha v Coopers & Lybrand 2002
(5) SA 347 (SCA) 359G-J.) The test has its origin in the following dictum
by Scrutton LJ in Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) Ltd
and Elton Cap Dyeing Co Ltd [1918] 1 KB 592 (CA) 605:
'A term can only be applied if ... it is such a term that it can confidently be said that if
at the time the contract was being negotiated someone has said to the parties: "What
will happen in such a case" they would both have replied, "Of course, so and so will
happen; we did not trouble to say that; it is too clear." Unless the Court comes to
some such conclusion as that, it ought not to imply a term which the parties have not
expressed.'
[51] Over the years the courts have, through refinement, enhanced the
practical functionality of this test. So, for example, it was decided by
Colman J in Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall 1968 (3) SA 231 (W)
236H-237A that the inference of a tacit term can only be justified if the
bystander's question  'would have evoked … a prompt and unanimous
assertion of the term' from both the contracting parties. If the inference is

that one of the parties would have sought some clarification or some time
to consider before giving an answer, the tacit term suggested would not
pass the bystander test. A further requirement that has developed
appears from the following statement by Trollip JA in Desai and Others v
Greyridge Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 509 (A) 522H-523A:
'… I do not think that it is either clear or obvious which of those forms of the term
should prevail, and hence none of them can be implied. The reason is that the
implication of a term depends upon the inferred or imputed intention of the parties to
the contract … and "once there is difficulty and doubt as to what the term should be
or how far it should be taken it is obviously difficult to say that the parties clearly
intended anything at all to be implied".'
[52] In finding for Twee Jonge Gezellen on this issue, the Court a quo
was influenced (at 278D) by the consideration that, without the
suggested term, the 21-day clause could operate extremely harshly on
the purchaser of bottles, in that he would be deprived of all redress in the
case of latent defects which he could not possibly discover within the 21-
day period. That is undoubtedly so. It can accordingly be accepted with
confidence that Twee Jonge Gezellen's response to the bystander's
enquiry regarding the existence of the suggested tacit term would have
been a positive one. That, however, is not the end of the enquiry. The
further step is to establish what Consol's response would have been.
Consol's problem with the effect of the suggested (tacit) term would in all

likelihood have been that, once the defects are of a kind that cannot
reasonably be recognised within 21 days, there would be no time bar at
all. Though Consol may well have conceded that the 21-day provision
was to be amended or ameliorated if the circumstances giving rise to the
claim were not reasonably apparent within 21 days, it cannot be
assumed that Consol would have agreed to the suggestion that in those
circumstances there would be no time limit at all. At best for Twee Jonge
Gezellen, the inference could be that Consol would have asked for time
to consider or that it would have insisted that in these circumstances the
claim should at least be instituted within 21 days of the alleged problem
having manifested itself. In these circumstances the tacit term suggested
by Twee Jonge Gezellen cannot be inferred.
[53] The problems experienced by Twee Jonge Gezellen in establishing
the tacit term for which it contends, are similar to those encountered by
the insured in Union National South British Insurance Co Ltd v
Padayachee 1985 (1) SA 551 (A). In terms of the insurance policy
concerned in that case, all claims under the policy had to be instituted
within 12 months from the happening of the loss. Like Twee Jonge
Gezellen, the insured, who had failed to institute his action within 12
months, sought to avoid the consequences of this contractual time bar by
means of a tacit term. Upon application of the bystander test, this Court

came to the conclusion that the inference of the tacit term contended for
could not be justified. From the judgment of Miller JA (at 560A-G) it
appears that the considerations which led to that conclusion were
essentially the same as those which have persuaded me that the tacit
term relied upon by Twee Jonge Gezellen cannot be inferred.
Accordingly, the sixth issue should, in my view, be decided in favour of
Consol which means that, on this aspect, the appeal must succeed.
The Seventh Preliminary Issue
[54] This issue is:
'Whether [Consol] is exempted from liability for [Twee Jonge Gezellen's] claim set out
in para 3 of the claim in reconvention [which relies on the alternative basis that
Consol was the manufacturer or merchant seller of the bottles concerned] unless an
authorised representative of [Consol] specifically guaranteed or warranted the
relevant quality of the bottles in writing.'
[55] The issue arises from the provision in the claims clause that
'no guarantee or warranty regarding … quality is given or implied unless specifically
stated in writing by an authorised company representative'.
[56] It will be remembered that Twee Jonge Gezellen relies, as an
alternative basis for its damages claim, on the principle of our law of
contract that merchants who sell goods of their own manufacture or
goods in relation to which they publicly profess to have attributes of skill
and expert knowledge, are liable for consequential damages caused to

the purchaser by reason of a latent defect in the goods (see e g
Kroonstad Westelike Boere Ko-operatiewe Vereniging Bpk v Botha and
Another 1964 (3) SA 561 (A) 571G-572A; Sentrachem Ltd v Prinsloo
1997 (2) SA 1 (A) 17H-18D; Ciba-Geigy (Pty) Ltd v Lushof Farms (Pty)
Ltd en 'n Ander  2002 (2) SA 447 (SCA) 465G-466H).
[57] Consol's contention is that since the basis of this claim amounts to
an implied warranty of quality it is expressly excluded by the
aforementioned provision of the claims clause.  Twee Jonge Gezellen's
answer to this contention is that, although the seller's liability for latent
defects is often loosely described as being derived from an 'implied
warranty against latent defects', this is a misnomer because such liability
is not dependent on any guarantee given by the seller, implied or
otherwise. It is imposed upon the seller by law. Accordingly, so the
argument went, it cannot be said that Consol's liability for latent defects
is excluded by a provision which relates to 'implied warranties'.
[58] Though this argument by Twee Jonge Gezellen found favour with
the Court a quo (at 278G-279D), it is, to my mind, not well-founded. The
statement that the seller's liability for latent defects is imposed by law
and is therefore not dependent upon any contractual consensus between
the parties, is correct. As a consequence it might, from a jurisprudential
point of view, be inappropriate to describe the basis of this liability as an

implied warranty (see e g Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 1973 (3) SA 397 (A)
416H; De Wet en Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 5 ed 342-3).
That, however, is not really the issue. The real issue is what the parties
intended when they referred to 'an implied warranty of quality' in their
written agreement. In answering this question, it is to be borne in mind
that the seller's liability for latent defects has invariably been described,
also by this Court, as being derived from an implied warranty. In fact, I
venture to suggest that in ordinary legal parlance, one of the best known
examples of what is meant by an 'implied term' is the seller's 'implied
warranty against latent defects' in contracts of sale. (See e g Hackett v
G&G Radio and Refrigeration Corporation 1949 (3) SA 664 (A) 667;
Alfred McAlpine and Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration
supra 531E-G; 532C-G.)
[59] In these circumstances it must, in my view, be accepted that when
the parties agreed to exclude liability for any 'implied warranty of quality',
they intended that exclusion to pertain to this most commonly known
'implied warranty' as well (see also Greyling v Fick 1969 (3) SA 579 (T)
580G-581B and compare the difference in the wording of the contract in
Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 (6) SA 453 (SCA) 470A-E). The
purpose of the clause is to exclude liability not expressly undertaken and
its proper interpretation therefore excludes both a tacit term as to quality

as well as a term implied by law. For these reasons, the seventh issue
should be decided in favour of Consol, with result that the appeal on this
issue must succeed.
[60] In summary, I therefore hold the view that the appeal on issues 3, 6
and 7 should be upheld while the appeal on issues 1, 4 and 5, as well as
the cross-appeal must fail. As to the question of costs, Consol has been
substantially successful in the appeal and it has succeeded entirely in
the cross-appeal. I can find no reason why costs should not, in both
instances, follow the event. Moreover, since I consider that Consol was
justified in instructing two counsel, I intend to include these costs in the
order that I propose to make.
[61] In the Court a quo, no costs order was made because the learned
Judge thought it prudent (at 280E) to let all questions of costs stand over
for later determination. Although Consol has now on appeal achieved a
greater measure of success than in the Court below, there are still some
outstanding issues which can, at least in theory, lead to further
proceedings. In the circumstances, I consider it wise not to interfere with
the costs order by the Court a quo.
[62] The following order is made:
(a)
The appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs of two

counsel.

(b)
The cross-appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of

two counsel.
(c)
The findings of the Court a quo in regard to preliminary issues 1 to

7 are amended. As amended the findings read as follows:
'Issue (1): In terms of the supply agreement, plaintiff was obliged to
manufacture all bottles delivered to first defendant according to
plaintiff's standard manufacturing procedures and techniques,
utilising standard raw materials.
Issue (2) part 1: At the time when the bottles in question were
made, internal treatment of cap classique bottles with Freon 134A
gas was part of plaintiff's standard manufacturing procedures and
techniques.
Issue (2) part 3: At the time when the bottles were made, Freon
134A gas was a standard raw material for the manufacture of the
bottles in question.
Issue (3): Even if the bottles were not manufactured by plaintiff
according
to
its
standard
manufacturing
procedures
and
techniques, utilising standard raw materials, plaintiff would still be
entitled to rely on the further provisions of the clause of the supply
agreement headed 'Claims'.
Issue (4): The provision of the supply agreement that all goods

supplied are manufactured according to plaintiff's standard
manufacturing procedures and techniques, utilising standard raw
materials, is not a warranty as contemplated in the claims clause.
Issue (5): Plaintiff's liability for the breach alleged by first defendant
is not limited to the replacement of bottles proven to have been
defective.
Issue (6): Plaintiff is exempted from liability in the event of first
defendant not having lodged its claim within 21 days of delivery of
the bottles in question.
Issue (7): Plaintiff is exempted from liability for first defendant's
claim set out in para 3 of the counterclaim on the ground that no
authorised representative of plaintiff specifically guaranteed or
warranted the relevant quality of the bottles in writing.

……………….
F D J BRAND
JUDGE OF APPEAL
Concur:
HOWIE P
CLOETE JA
HEHER JA
VAN HEERDEN AJA