THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

Case no: 653/2004
REPORTABLE

In the appeal between:

S A FAKIE, NO

Appellant

and

CCII SYSTEMS (PTY) LTD

Respondent

Before:
Howie P, Farlam JA, Cameron JA, Heher JA and
Cachalia AJA
Heard:

Wednesday 15 February 2006
Judgment:
Friday 31 March 2006

Contempt of court – constitutional characterisation – standard of
proof – whether applicant in civil proceedings must prove requisites
beyond reasonable doubt – Applicant failing to establish that Auditor-
General acted wilfully or mala fide in failing to comply with court order
– ORDER IN PARA 67

Neutral citation: Fakie v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd [2006] SCA 54
(RSA)

JUDGMENT
_______________________________________________________

CAMERON JA:

[1] In the Pretoria High Court, De Vos J held the appellant, the
Auditor-General,1 in contempt of an order of court.  As a sanction,
she imposed one month’s imprisonment on him, suspended on
condition that he comply fully with the order within four weeks
from the date of her judgment.  This is an appeal with her leave
against that order.
[2] The dispute has its origin in a Cabinet decision in June 1997 to
buy military equipment.  The purchases (the ‘strategic defence
packages’) were put out to tender: they included four corvettes.
The respondent (CCII), a supplier of military software and
computer systems, was a (partially) unsuccessful bidder for a sub-
contract in relation to the corvettes.  Following widespread claims
that
the
procurement
process
had
been
irregular,
the
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts appointed
the Auditor-General, the Public Protector and the National
Director of Public Prosecutions (the ‘joint investigating team’) to
investigate allegations of corruption.  In November 2001, a joint

1 Constitution Chapter 9, s 181(1) – ‘The following institutions strengthen constitutional
democracy in the Republic: … (e) The Auditor-General’.  Section 181(2): ‘These institutions are
independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and
must exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice.’

report was presented to the President and accepted by
Parliament.
[3] CCII was not satisfied with the report’s findings.  It asked the
Auditor-General under the Promotion of Access to Information Act
2 of 2000 (PAIA) for documentation the joint investigators
considered during their investigation.  This was refused.  CCII
then instituted proceedings in the High Court in Pretoria.  On 15
November 2002, Hartzenberg J upheld the application.2  He
granted CCII an order that required the Auditor-General to provide
it with specified records within 40 court days.  The order3 referred

2 CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd v Fakie NO 2003 (2) SA 325 (T).
3 In full (2003 (2) SA 325 (T) at 335-336):
‘1 The first respondent [the Auditor-General] is ordered to provide the applicant by no later than
40 Court days from the date of this order with the following records:
1.1 all draft versions of the report submitted to Parliament by the joint investigating team
regarding the so-called Strategic Defence Packages for the procurement of armaments for the
South African National Defence Force;
1.2 in respect of all audit files concerning the Strategic Defence Packages for the procurement of
armaments for the SA National Defence Force from 1 January 1998 to 20 November 2001
dealing with:
1.2.1 the de-selection of the applicant as a supplier of the combat suite's information
management system and the selection instead of the detexis diacerto combat suite
databus;
1.2.2 the selection of the supplier of the systems management system, navigation
distribution system and the integrated platform management system simulator;
1.2.3 the role of African Defence Systems (Pty) Ltd, a company controlled by Thomson-
CSF of France (which later changed its name to Thales International), in the supply of the
combat suite for the Corvettes and its conflict of interest by virtue of its involvement in the
supply of the Corvettes at various different levels, namely as:
1.2.3.1 a member of the consortium constituting the prime contractor for the
supply of Corvettes;
1.2.3.2 the supplier of the combat suite and at the same time being the combat
suite integrator;
1.2.3.3 the supplier of various systems and subsystems for the combat suite,
including the SMS and the combat management system; and
1.2.3.4 an associate company (ie a company in the Thomson-CSF group) of the

to these in two parts.  Para 1.1 required the Auditor-General to
provide –
‘All draft versions of the report submitted to Parliament by the Joint
Investigating Team regarding the so-called Strategic Defence Packages for
the procurement of armaments for the South African National Defence
Force.’

[4] The second part required the Auditor-General to furnish to CCII,
from documentation specified, (a) certain files to the disclosure of
which he did not object under PAIA, and (b) a list of the files to the
disclosure of which he did object, setting out his grounds of
objection.  It was clear – and correctly conceded on appeal – that
when CCII instituted the present proceedings the Auditor-General
had not complied with the order of Hartzenberg J.  It is common
cause that the Auditor-General released –
• the files encompassed in the second part of the order (including
the four categories of documents specified – audit files;

supplier of the Detexis system;
1.2.4 the conflict of interest of Shamin Shaikh as:
1.2.4.1 the Department of Defence's Chief of Acquisitions and chairperson or
member of various committees and boards involved in the assessment of the
SDP; and
1.2.4.2 brother of Schabir Shaikh, who at all material times had an indirect
interest in ADS;
1.3 all the documents and records in respect of which [he] has no objection in terms of chap 4 or
s 12 of Act 2 of 2000; and
1.4 a list of all the documents and records in respect of which [he] objects in terms of the
provisions of the aforesaid Act 2 of 2000, setting out clearly and concisely (a) a description of the
document or record, (b) the basis for the objection, (c) an indication if the objection relates to the
whole document or only to portions thereof and if so, (d) to which portions.’
2. The respondents [the Auditor-General, the Public Protector, the National Director of Public
Prosecutions and the Minister of Defence] are ordered jointly and severally to pay the applicants’

contracts; minutes; and working papers), though only after CCII
launched the current application; and
• the draft reports envisaged in para 1.1 of the order, though only
after De Vos J granted leave to appeal against her contempt
finding on 24 November 2004.
[5] The issue before us is whether the circumstances in which the
Auditor-General complied so late with Hartzenberg J’s order
justify De Vos J’s finding that he was in contempt, and her
consequent imposition of suspended imprisonment.  That
depends on the circumstances of the admitted default.  But the
proper approach to considering those circumstances must first be
determined.  This requires a consideration of the nature of this
form of contempt of court, and – what was much argued before us
– whether in these civil proceedings the standard of proof to be
applied in determining whether the Auditor-General was in
contempt is a balance of probabilities or beyond reasonable
doubt.

Contempt of court

costs of the application inclusive of the costs of two counsel.’

[6] It is a crime unlawfully and intentionally to disobey a court order.4
This type of contempt of court is part of a broader offence, which
can take many forms, but the essence of which lies in violating the
dignity, repute or authority of the court.5  The offence has in
general terms received a constitutional ‘stamp of approval’,6 since
the rule of law – a founding value of the Constitution – ‘requires
that the dignity and authority of the courts, as well as their
capacity to carry out their functions, should always be
maintained’.7
[7] The form of proceeding CCII invoked appears to have been
received into South African law from English law8 and is a most
valuable mechanism.  It permits a private litigant who has

4 S v Beyers 1968 (3) SA 70 (A).
5 Melius de Villiers The Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries (1899) page 166: ‘Contempt of
court … may be adequately defined as an injury committed against a person or body occupying a
public judicial office, by which injury the dignity and respect which is due to such office or its
authority in the administration of justice is intentionally violated.’  Cf Attorney-General v Crockett
1911 TPD 893 925-6 per Bristowe J: ‘Probably in the last resort all cases of contempt, whether
consisting of disobedience to a decree of the Court or of the publication of matter tending to
prejudice the hearing of a pending suit or of disrespectful conduct or insulting attacks, are to be
referred to the necessity for protecting the fount of justice in maintaining the efficiency of the
courts and enforcing the supremacy of the law.’
6 S v Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) para 14, per Kriegler J, on behalf of the court (where
contempt of court in the form of scandalising the court was in issue).
7 Per Sachs J in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1995 (4) SA 631 (CC)
para 61, quoted and endorsed by the court in Mamabolo (above).  In Coetzee, statutory
procedures for committal of non-paying judgment debtors to prison for up to 90 days – which the
statute classified as contempt of court – were held unconstitutional.
8 The Roman-Dutch law seems to offer no trace of private enforcement of criminal contempt
remedies for disobedience of a civil order: see Melius de Villiers, note 5 above, pages 166-173.
Cf Attorney-General v Crockett 1911 TPD 893 917 922 where it was held that, as regards
criminal practice in matters of contempt, English procedure should be followed.

obtained a court order requiring an opponent to do or not do
something (ad factum praestandum),9 to approach the court
again, in the event of non-compliance, for a further order declaring
the non-compliant party in contempt of court, and imposing a
sanction.  The sanction usually, though not invariably,10 has the
object of inducing the non-complier to fulfil the terms of the
previous order.
[8] In the hands of a private party, the application for committal for
contempt is a peculiar amalgam,11 for it is a civil proceeding that
invokes a criminal sanction or its threat.  And while the litigant
seeking enforcement has a manifest private interest in securing
compliance, the court grants enforcement also because of the
broader public interest in obedience to its orders, since disregard
sullies the authority of the courts and detracts from the rule of law.
[9] The test for when disobedience of a civil order constitutes
contempt has come to be stated as whether the breach was

9 Although money judgments cannot ordinarily be enforced by contempt proceedings, ‘it is well
established that maintenance orders are in a special category in which such relief is competent’:
Bannatyne v Bannatyne 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC) para 18.
10 Cape Times Ltd v Union Trades Directories (Pty) Ltd 1956 (1) SA 105 (N) 120D-E: ‘Generally
speaking, punishment by way of fine or imprisonment for the civil contempt of an order made in
civil proceedings is only imposed where it is inherent in the order made that compliance with it
can be enforced only by means of such punishment.’
11 JRL Milton ‘Defining Contempt of Court’ (1968) 85 SALJ 387: ‘The concept of contempt of court
is one which bristles with curiosities and anomalies.  Of the various examples which may be
chosen to illustrate this point perhaps the most striking is that of the classification of contempts of

committed ‘deliberately and mala fide’.12  A deliberate disregard is
not enough, since the non-complier may genuinely, albeit
mistakenly, believe him- or herself entitled to act in the way
claimed to constitute the contempt.  In such a case good faith
avoids the infraction.13  Even a refusal to comply that is objectively
unreasonable may be bona fide (though unreasonableness could
evidence lack of good faith).14
[10] These requirements – that the refusal to obey should be both
wilful and mala fide, and that unreasonable non-compliance,
provided it is bona fide, does not constitute contempt – accord
with the broader definition of the crime, of which non-compliance
with civil orders is a manifestation.  They show that the offence is
committed not by mere disregard of a court order, but by the
deliberate and intentional violation of the court’s dignity, repute or

court into civil contempt (or contempt in procedure) and criminal contempt.’
12 Frankel Max Pollak Vinderine Inc v Menell Jack Hyman Rosenberg & Co Inc 1996 (3) SA 355
(A) 367H-I; Jayiya v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 (2) SA 602
(SCA) paras 18 and 19.
13 Consolidated Fish (Pty) Ltd v Zive 1968 (2) SA 517 (C) 524D, applied in Noel Lancaster Sands
(Edms) Bpk v Theron 1974 (3) SA 688 (T) 691C.
14 Noel Lancaster Sands (Edms) Bpk v Theron 1974 (3) SA 688 (T) 692E-G per Botha J, rejecting
the contrary view on this point expressed Consolidated Fish v Zive (above).  This court referred to
Botha J’s approach with seeming approval in Frankel Max Pollak Vinderine Inc v Menell Jack
Hyman Rosenberg & Co Inc 1996 (3) SA 355 (A) 368C-D.

authority that this evinces.15  Honest belief that non-compliance is
justified or proper is incompatible with that intent.
[11] Before the decision of this court in S v Beyers,16 it was not clear
whether disobedience of a civil order could lead to a public
prosecution, since prosecutions were (and still are) almost
unknown.17  Beyers – which involved the alleged violation of an
interdict granted in civil proceedings – ended the uncertainty.  The
force of the issue lay in the fact that after the alleged violation of
the interdict, and while Beyers’s appeal against its grant was
pending, he and his opponent reached a settlement in which the
latter abandoned the interdict with retrospective effect ‘as if it had
never been granted’.  The state decided nevertheless to press
ahead, and this court held that the private abandonment did not
preclude the public prosecution.  Steyn CJ emphasised that while
mere non-compliance did not necessarily constitute contempt,
sustained disregard and flouting of a court order could be

15 See the formulation in S v Beyers 1968 (3) SA 70 (A) at 76E and 76F-G and the definitions in
Jonathan Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (3ed, 2005) page 945 (‘Contempt of court consists
in unlawfully and intentionally violating the dignity, repute or authority of a judicial body, or
interfering in the administration of justice in a matter pending before it’) and CR Snyman Strafreg
(4ed, 1999) page 329 (‘Minagting van die hof is die wederregtelike en opsetlike (a) aantasting van
die waardigheid, aansien of gesag van ‘n regterlike amptenaar in sy regterlike hoedanigheid, of
van ‘n regsprekende liggaam, of (b) publikasie van inligting of kommentaar aangaande ‘n
aanhangige regsgeding wat die strekking het om die uitstlag van die regsgeding te beïnvloed of
om in te meng met die regsadministrasie in daardie regsgeding’).
16 1968 (3) SA 70 (A).

calculated to injure and diminish the authority and status of the
court.18  He described the procedure in terms of which a litigant
can in own interest seek punishment of an opponent for contempt
of court to enforce compliance with a court order as ‘ambivalent in
nature’ (van tweeslagtige aard)19: while it follows the rules of civil
procedure (the ‘contempt in procedure’ of English law), it has not
forfeited its criminal dimension.  South African case law, he
pointed out, repeatedly treats the civil infraction as a crime ‘with
no indication that it is regarded as anything other than common
law contempt of court’.  This appears most clearly ‘from the fact
that an ordinary punishment is imposed if the application
succeeds’ since ‘imposition of punishment without a crime being
committed, would be something repugnant to (onbestaanbaar in)
our law’:
‘Even though enforcement of a civil obligation is the primary purpose of the
punishment, it is nevertheless not imposed merely because the obligation
has not been observed, but on the basis of the criminal contempt of court
that is associated with it.  The fact that the punishment is generally
suspended on condition of compliance with the order in issue, and that the

17 See the remarks of Steyn CJ at 81A-B.
18 1968 (3) SA at 76E-G.
19 Drawing on the preceding analysis in Afrikaanse Pers-Publikasies (Edms) Bpk v Mbeki  1964

punishment is thus not enforced if the applicant should abandon his rights
under the order, does not detract from this at all.  Depending on the nature
and seriousness of the contempt, the court would accordingly be able to
suspend only a portion of the punishment, and then the abandonment of
rights by the applicant would not affect the unsuspended portion.’20
[12] These observations bear directly on the main question of
principle in the appeal, on which our approach to the facts it
presents must depend.  This is whether civil contempt can be
established when reasonable doubt exists as to any of the
requisites of the crime.  The pre-constitutional approach to proof
was that once the enforcer established that the order had been
granted, and served on or brought to the alleged contemnor’s
notice, an inference was drawn that non-compliance was wilful
and mala fide, unless the non-complier established the contrary.21
The alleged contemnor bore the full legal burden of showing on
balance of probabilities that failure to comply was not wilful and
mala fide.22

(4) SA 618 (A) 626.
20 1968 (3) SA at 80C-H (my translation throughout).
21 Noel Lancaster Sands (Edms) Bpk v Theron 1974 (3) SA 688 (T) 691A-D; Putco Ltd v TV &
Radio Guarantee Co (Pty) Ltd 1985 (4) SA 809 (A) 836D-E; Frankel Max Pollak Vinderine Inc v
Menell Jack Hyman Rosenberg & Co Inc 1996 (3) SA 355 (A) 367-8.
22 See the exposition by Pickering J in Uncedo Taxi Service Association v Maninjwa 1998 (3) SA
417 (E) 425G-426C and Frankel Max Pollak Vinderine Inc v Menell Jack Hyman Rosenberg & Co
Inc 1996 (3) SA 355 (A) 367J.

[13] The question is to what extent the introduction of the
Constitution supersedes this (and hence whether constitutional
values might imperil the existence of an important enforcement
mechanism).  Mr Marcus for the Auditor-General made a wide-
ranging attack on the employment of civil proceedings to establish
contempt, arguing in general terms that use of application
procedure was itself unconstitutional (although he conceded that
the Auditor-General had himself acquiesced in the use of motion
proceedings, and that their propriety could therefore not be
challenged in this case).  His main contention was that any onus
short of the absence of reasonable doubt conflicted with the fair
trial guarantees in s 35 of the Constitution.  Mr Rogers for CCII
urged that there was no reason to deviate from the established
common law approach to civil contempt proceedings.
[14] Counsel’s differing contentions are reflected in conflicting high
court decisions.  In Uncedo Taxi Service Association v
Maninjwa,23 Pickering J carefully evaluated the post-constitutional
status of civil enforcement of contempt remedies.  He concluded
that the fact that contempt proceedings are brought summarily by

23 1998 (3) SA 417 (E).  The Zimbabwe Supreme Court followed Uncedo in a related setting in In

way of notice of motion does not entail inevitable unconstitutional
unfairness:  the procedure infringes neither the alleged
contemnor’s constitutional right to be properly informed of the
charge, nor to remain silent, while the question whether the right
to adequate legal representation is infringed depends on the facts
of each case.24  He considered it clearly unconstitutional,
however, to deprive a person of liberty on proof merely on
balance of probabilities, holding that in motion proceedings the
initiator must establish the offence beyond reasonable doubt.  In
Uncedo Taxi Service Association v Mtwa,25 Mbenenge AJ
endorsed this.  He found that once non-compliance and service
were proved, it would be in accordance with constitutional
principle to place an evidential burden on the alleged contemnor
regarding whether disobedience was deliberate and mala fide: in
the absence of evidence raising a reasonable doubt, those
elements would be established to the requisite criminal standard.

re Chinamasa 2001 (2) SA 902 (ZSC) 922E-F and 924-5.
24 Constitution s 35(1): ‘Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has the
right – (a) to remain silent …’  Section 35(3): ‘Every accused person has a right to a fair trial,
which includes the right – (a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it; … (f)
to choose, and to be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly;
(g) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the state and at state expense,
if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly; (h) to be
presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings; …’.
25 1999 (2) SA 495 (E).

In Victoria Park Ratepayers Association v Greyvenouw CC,26
Plasket
J
gave
enhanced
voice
to
the
constitutional
considerations underlying the reasoning in the Uncedo decisions,
applying the criminal onus to the matter before him.
[15] In Laubscher v Laubscher,27 De Vos J dissented from this
approach.  She emphasised that the initiator desires not merely to
punish a respondent, but to enforce compliance with a court
order.  She considered that there was a striking difference
between a public prosecution and a civil proceeding for contempt,
since in the former the accused has to contend with the ‘giant
machinery of the state’, whereas in civil proceedings the
respondent
faces
only
a
similarly-resourced
applicant.
Deprivation of liberty on proof merely on balance of probabilities
was therefore a reasonable and justifiable limitation of rights.  In
the present matter De Vos J followed her earlier ruling: she found
that the Auditor-General had failed to discharge the onus he bore
to establish that his non-compliance with Hartzenberg J’s orders
was not wilful and mala fide.  In Deyzel v Deyzel,28 however, van

26 [2004] 3 All SA 623 (SE).
27 2004 (4) SA 350 (T).
28 Case 19869/05 (T), judgment of 21 December 2005.

Rooyen AJ declined to follow De Vos J, preferring the Eastern
Cape approach.
[16] The full court of the Eastern Cape has subsequently upheld and
elaborated on the reasoning on Uncedo and Victoria Park.  In
Burchell v Burchell,29 Froneman J (Sandi and Dambuza JJ
concurring) held that ‘civil contempt’ remains a criminal offence
under the Constitution, and that a respondent in such proceedings
is inevitably an ‘accused person’ under s 35 of the Bill of Rights.
Froneman J pointed out that committal for contempt of court
orders raises no conflict with freedom of speech30 or other
fundamental rights, but that, on the contrary, compliance with
court orders is of fundamental concern to a society that bases
itself on the rule of law.  The full court thus held that while the
applicant has to prove the elements of civil contempt beyond
reasonable doubt, the application procedure is constitutionally
competent to accommodate the altered onus.  The full court also
found that since there is a purely civil aspect to the proceedings, a
court may issue a declarator that a respondent is in contempt of
court, established only on balance of probabilities, together with

29 Judgment dated 3 November 2005, [2006] JOL 16722 (E).

associated civil relief (such as not suspending the order pending
appeal, and barring the contemnor from access to civil courts until
the contempt is purged).

Constitutional characterisation of contempt of court
[17] The proper conclusion as to what onus is applicable in
contempt proceedings cannot be deduced as a matter of simple
typology from the fact that a public prosecution is competent.
Beyers affirmed only that civil contempt has not divested itself of a
criminal dimension: it did not hold that that its civil character had
been erased (for the procedure is ‘tweeslagtig’, and not criminal
only).  This underlies the finding in Burchell that civil mechanisms
designed to induce compliance, short of committal to prison, are
competent even when proved only on balance of probabilities.
[18] But this appreciation unavoidably raises the question why a
lesser onus should not also be appropriate in at least some
committal proceedings, as CCII urged us to find.  For though civil
contempt applications generally encompass prayers for relief
aimed at both punishment and enforcement – the relief sought

30 As exemplified in S v Mamabolo (above).

and obtained in the present case seemingly an instance – an
applicant may disavow a punitive purpose and claim committal
solely to secure compliance.  In such cases, counsel for CCII
contended, only the civil aspect of the process is engaged, with
the result that imposing a criminal standard of proof is not only
inappropriate, but unfair to those entitled to enforce compliance.
[19] This would be correct if one were to deduce the standard of
proof simply from the nature of the particular proceeding.  But the
question requires a broader approach.  Looming over the debate
about the typology of contempt committal is the more important
question of constitutional characterisation, which the Eastern
Cape decisions address: does the fact that imprisonment may be
sought in committal proceedings purely for enforcement so affect
the nature of the means employed that a lesser standard of proof
can be justified?  Differently put, do constitutional values permit a
person to be put in prison to enforce compliance with a civil order
when the requisites are established only preponderantly, and not
conclusively?  In my view they do not, and the Eastern Cape
decisions that the criminal standard of proof applies whenever
committal to prison for contempt is sought are correct.

[20] There are two principal reasons for this conclusion.  The first is
liberty: it is basic to our Constitution that a person should not be
deprived of liberty, albeit only to constrain compliance with a court
order, if reasonable doubt exists about the essentials.  The
second reason is coherence: it is practically difficult, and may be
impossible, to disentangle the reasons why orders for committal
for contempt are sought and why they are granted: in the end,
whatever the applicant’s motive, the court commits a contempt
respondent to jail for rule of law reasons; and this high public
purpose should be pursued only in the absence of reasonable
doubt.

First consideration: liberty, guilt and incarceration
[21] A long series of Constitutional Court (CC) decisions has
established that it is generally impermissible to find an accused
guilty of a criminal offence in the absence of conclusive proof of
its essential elements.  These decisions provide one of the
leitmotifs of our democratic jurisprudence, and have led to the
invalidation of a number of ‘reverse onus’ provisions, which
placed on an accused the legal burden of disproving an essential

element of the offence.31  The CC has held however that it is
permissible in certain circumstances for an accused to bear the
lesser evidential burden of having to advance evidence that raises
a reasonable doubt about an element of a crime – absent which
the offence is established beyond reasonable doubt.32
[22] The decisions deal with statutory presumptions and reverse
onuses.33  But they undoubtedly entail that where the state
prosecutes an alleged contemnor at common law for non-
compliance with a civil order, the requisite elements must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.  In such a prosecution the
contemnor is plainly an ‘accused person’ in terms of s 35(3) of the
Bill of Rights, and enjoys the inter-related rights that s 35(3)(h)
confers: to be presumed innocent, to remain silent in the face of
the charges and not to testify during the proceedings.  By
developing the common law in conformity with the Constitution,
the reverse onus the accused bore in prosecutions such as

31 See most recently S v Singo 2002 (4) SA 858, 2002 (2) SACR 160 (CC), where Ngcobo J
collates and analyses much of the preceding jurisprudence.
32 See for instance Osman v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1998 (4) SA 1224, 1998 (2) SACR 493
(CC) paras 22-23 and S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC), 2000 (1) SACR 414 (CC) paras 52-59.
33 As Froneman J pointed out in Burchell (para 15), the CC, though acknowledging that the right
to individual freedom and security is not absolute, has only once sanctioned a legislative
provision that places a legal onus on an individual deprived of freedom, namely in bail
applications.  There, an important consideration was the wording of the constitutional provision
permitting deprivation of liberty on arrest (everyone arrested for an offence has the right ‘to be
released from detention if the interests of justice permit, subject to reasonable conditions’: Bill of

Beyers must now be reduced to an evidential burden (as
Mbenenge AJ rightly envisaged in the second Uncedo decision).
Once the prosecution has established (i) the existence of the
order, (ii) its service on the accused, and (iii) non-compliance, if
the accused fails to furnish evidence raising a reasonable doubt
whether non-compliance was wilful and mala fide, the offence will
be established beyond reasonable doubt: the accused is entitled
to remain silent, but does not exercise the choice without
consequence.34
[23] It should be noted that developing the common law thus does
not require the prosecution to lead evidence as to the accused’s
state of mind or motive: once the three requisites mentioned have
been proved, in the absence of evidence raising a reasonable
doubt as to whether the accused acted wilfully and mala fide, all
the requisites of the offence will have been established.  What is
changed is that the accused no longer bears a legal burden to
disprove wilfulness and mala fides on balance of probabilities, but
to avoid conviction need only lead evidence that establishes a
reasonable doubt.

Rights s 35(1)(f); S v Dlamini 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC) paras 6 and 38).

[24] There can be no reason why these protections should not apply
also where a civil applicant seeks an alleged contemnor’s
committal to prison as punishment for non-compliance.  This is
not because the respondent in such an application must inevitably
be regarded as an ‘accused person’ for the purposes of s 35 of
the Bill of Rights.  On the contrary, with respect to the careful
reasoning in the Eastern Cape decisions, it does not seem correct
to me to insist that such a respondent falls or fits within s 35.
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights grants those who are not accused
of any offence the right to freedom and security of the person,
which includes the right not only ‘not to be detained without trial’,35
but ‘not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause’.
36  This provision affords both substantive and procedural
protection,37 and an application for committal for contempt must
avoid infringing it.
[25] And in interpreting the ambit of the right’s procedural aspect, it
seems to me entirely appropriate to regard the position of a

34 Osman v A-G Transvaal 1998 (4) SA 1224 (CC) para 22.
35 Bill of Rights s 12(1)(b).
36 Bill of Rights s 12(1)(a).
37 See Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) paras 145-146 (O’Regan J) and De Lange v
Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) paras 22-25 (Ackermann J) (both dealing with the comparable
provision under the interim Constitution).

respondent in punitive committal proceedings as closely
analogous to that of an accused person; and therefore, in
determining whether the relief can be granted without violating s
12, to afford the respondent such substantially similar protections
as are appropriate to motion proceedings.  For these reasons, the
criminal standard of proof is appropriate also here.
[26] I follow this path because the civil process for a contempt
committal is an oddity that is distinctive in its combination of civil
and criminal elements, and it seems undesirable to strait-jacket it
into the protections expressly designed for a criminal accused
under s 35.38  Certainly, not all of the rights under that provision
will be appropriate to or could easily be grafted onto the hybrid
process.  For similar reasons, the High Court of Australia has
observed, in the context of the English-derived process for
contempt, that ‘to say that [civilly-initiated] proceedings for
contempt are essentially criminal in nature is not to equate them
with the trial of a criminal charge’.39

38 In re Dormer (1891) 4 SAR 64 at 85 per Kotzé CJ (‘Contempts of court are certainly in some
respects analogous to criminal offences, but they are a distinct species of offence, to which a
special mode of summary procedure is applicable, and do not admit of the ordinary and usual
forms and modes of criminal procedure’), applied in Afrikaanse Pers-Publikasies (Edms) Bpk v
Mbeki  1964 (4) SA 618 (A) 626.
39 Witham v Holloway (1995) 131 ALR 401 (HC of A) 408, per Brennan, Deane, Toohey and
Gaudron JJ.

[27] It would certainly be odd to regard the applicant in such
proceedings as a prosecutor, not only because of absence of
office, but because of the presence of manifest personal interest.
During argument there was debate about whether a civil court’s
finding of contempt, with concomitant imposition of punishment,
would count as a ‘previous conviction’ for purposes of s 271 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (which permits the prosecution
in a criminal trial to prove previous convictions in aggravation of
sentence); or whether, if it were, it would feature in the South
African Police Services’ SAP 69 register of previous convictions,
and what mechanisms might be necessary to ensure that it was
so recorded.  Neither counsel ventured firm submissions, and the
debate was inconclusive.
[28] And indeed, these questions are not before us now, and it is not
necessary to decide them: I make only the point that they may be
better answered not through a ‘rights-by-category’ analysis, in
which the protections afforded depend on whether the respondent
is an ‘accused person’ under s 35; but by considering the rights in
that provision a ‘relevant background source’ that furnishes values
instructive in interpreting the full range of constitutional protections

to which the alleged ‘civil contemnor’ sought to be imprisoned as
a punishment for disobeying a court order is entitled.40  Certainly,
the requirement that proof should be conclusive, and not merely
preponderant, seems to me to be among them.41
[29] Since the applicant in punitive committal proceedings must
prove contempt beyond reasonable doubt, why should a lesser
standard be warranted when committal is sought for coercion
alone?  In my view, there can be no reason.  Pickering J pointed
out in Uncedo42 that the application of two different standards of
proof, depending on whether the initiator chooses to lay a criminal
charge, or proceed civilly, is unwarrantable, because it introduces
‘a certain degree of arbitrariness’.  This applies the more if the
standard of proof were to depend on the objective with which the
initiator proceeds, and would run counter to this court’s analysis in
Beyers, which pointed to the ineluctably criminal dimension of the
remedy granted even in proceedings aimed at coercion.43

40 Cf the approach of Sachs J in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1995 (4)
SA 631 (CC) para 43.
41 Compare Nel v le Roux 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) para 11, where it was held that a recalcitrant
witness who is examined under s 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 under the
procedure of s 189 is not an ‘accused person’ and therefore not entitled ‘directly’ to fair trial rights,
but that such an examinee is ‘unquestionably entitled to procedural fairness’.
42 Uncedo 1998 (3) SA 417 (E) 427I-J.
43 In Hicks v Feiock 485 US 624 (1988), the question was the classification of relief imposed in a
state court contempt proceeding as civil or criminal in nature, for purposes of applying the Due
Process clause and other provisions of the United States constitution, since the protections in

[30] While the applicant may disavow punishment as a motive (a
matter to which I return), the means the court is asked to employ
remain the same: the public sanction of imprisonment for
disobedience of a court order.  The invocation of that sanction in
my view requires conclusive proof.  No less than punitive
committal, purely coercive committal uses imprisonment, or its
threat; and whenever loss of liberty for disobedience of an order
of court is threatened it seems to me necessary and proper that
the infraction should be proved conclusively.
[31] Counsel for CCII invoked cases where the Constitutional Court
has upheld statutory provisions providing for imprisonment as a
process in aid to procuring testimony by a recalcitrant witness in
non-criminal proceedings,44 but as Froneman J pointed out in
Burchell (para 12), these decisions do not support the contention
that committal to prison for civil contempt for coercive reasons

question do not apply when the relief is civil in nature.  That constitutional setting differs
considerably from ours, which in my view offers more varied possibilities in characterising the
proceeding in question, and in determining the appropriateness of the applicable protections.
Despite the apparently greater rigidity of the distinction in United States constitutional law, the
majority of the court observed that in contempt cases, both civil and criminal relief ‘have aspects
that can be seen as either remedial or punitive or both’ (485 US at 625), and that the ‘civil’ and
‘criminal’ labels of the law ‘have become increasingly blurred’ in state law codifications (485 US at
631).  See too International Union, United Mineworkers of America v Bagwell 512 US 821 (1993)
826-830, dealing with ‘the somewhat elusive distinction between civil and criminal contempt
fines’.
44 Nel v le Roux 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) (committal of recalcitrant witness under procedures in the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977); De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) (permitting

should be permitted on less stringent grounds than for the criminal
offence.  This case squarely raises the question of what standard
of proof is constitutionally appropriate in determining whether
coercive committal is justified.  That question did not arise in the
CC cases, which were concerned with other aspects of the
procedural and substantive justification of committal.  The CC
therefore did not consider or decide the question of proof.45
[32] And as O’Regan J pointed out  in De Lange v Smuts, the power
to imprison for coercive and non-punitive purposes is ‘an
extraordinary one’:
‘The power to order summary imprisonment of a person in order to coerce
that person to comply with a legal obligation is far-reaching.  There can be no
doubt that indefinite detention for coercive purposes may involve a significant
inroad upon personal liberty.  Clearly it will constitute a breach of s 12 of the
Constitution unless both the coercive purposes are valid and the procedures
followed are fair.  In this case there seems no doubt that the purpose is a
legitimate one.  It also seems necessary and proper, however, for the
exercise of the power to be accompanied by a high standard of procedural
fairness.’46

committal of recalcitrant witnesses in sequestration proceedings by magistrate,).
45 The same applies to Bannatyne v Bannatyne 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC), on which counsel for CCII
relied: but there, in upholding the importance of contempt committal against maintenance
defaulters as process in aid, the CC did not consider the standard of proof.
46 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 147.

[33] Though O’Regan J dissented from the conclusion of the
majority that the power of committal could be constitutionally
exercised where a magistrate presided in an insolvency inquiry,
there is nothing in the judgments of the other members of the
court to suggest that anything less than a ‘high standard of
procedural fairness’ is essential in cases of coercive committal: on
the contrary, I read the judgments as endorsing the principle.
That includes the degree of proof.  In my view, ‘high’ procedural
fairness requires proof beyond reasonable doubt in regard to
wilfulness and mala fides even when coercion and not
punishment is the object.

Second consideration: no ‘purely coercive’ contempt committal –
the public vindication of judicial authority is always involved
[34] The preceding discussion has assumed that it is possible to
disentangle an applicant’s reasons for seeking a respondent’s
committal in contempt proceedings, and thus that it is possible for
a civil contempt application or order to aim purely at the private
object of compliance, drained of punitive dimension.  This is not
so.  The High Court of Australia has expressed ‘considerable

difficulty’ with the notion that, in some cases, the purpose or
object of the proceedings is punitive and, in others, remedial or
coercive.  In any event, the court observed, the purpose of the
proceedings is not the same as the purpose or object of the
individual bringing them.  And:
‘… [P]roceedings for breach of an order or undertaking have the effect of
vindicating judicial authority as well as a remedial or coercive effect.  Indeed,
if the person in breach refuses to remedy the position, as is not unknown,
their only effect will be the vindication of judicial authority.’
The court went on to hold that ‘purpose or object cannot readily
be disentangled from effect’ and that it therefore had to be
acknowledged that punitive and remedial objects are ‘inextricably
intermixed’.47
[35] In Videotron Ltée v Industries Microlec Produits Électroniques
Inc,48 the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, despite the
strong civil setting provided by the Quebec Code of Civil
Procedure, similarly held that the penalty for contempt of court,
even when used to enforce a purely private order, inevitably
involves an element of public law, ‘because respect for the role

47 Witham v Holloway (1995) 131 ALR 401 (HC of A) 407-408.
48 (1992) 96 DLR (4th) 376 (SCC) 398.  The vigorous dissent of l’Heureux-Dubé J turned on the
special nature of injunctive relief in its specific setting in the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure: see

and authority of the courts, one of the foundations of the rule of
law, is always at issue’.  And in England it has long been
accepted that the applicant in contempt proceedings must
establish the requisites beyond reasonable doubt.49
[36] In the United States, the constitutional setting differs markedly
from that in other comparable jurisdictions, including ours, since
the Due Process clause applies only when the proceedings are
properly classified as criminal.  The federal courts therefore
acquire jurisdiction over state proceedings under that clause only
when the proceedings can be so classified, and a bifurcated
classification of contempt proceedings for the purposes of
applying the federal guarantees of the United States constitution
is therefore unavoidable.  The approach of the US Supreme Court
to the classification of contempt must be seen against this
background.  It means that typology is determinative of
constitutional protection under the clause in question, whereas
under the South African Constitution it is not.
[37] And the relevant decisions in the United States, though
performing an obligatory bifurcated classification, express some

pages 386f, 387g, 387-388 and especially 395g.

measure of discomfort with it.  Thus, the US Supreme Court has
observed that it would be ‘misguided’ to attempt to classify relief
by reference to the supposed purpose of the laws, since ‘In
contempt cases, both civil and criminal relief have aspects that
can be seen as either remedial or punitive or both: when a court
imposes fines and punishments on a contemnor, it is not only
vindicating its legal authority to enter the initial court order, but it
also is seeking to give effect to the law’s purpose of modifying the
contemnor’s behavior to conform to the terms required in the
order’.50  The court has also referred to the distinction between
civil and contempt fines as ‘somewhat elusive’.51
[38] Given our very different constitutional setting, the approach of
the English, Australian and Canadian courts seems convincing to
me.  As they have found, there is no true dichotomy between
proceedings in the public interest and proceedings in the interest
of the individual, because even where the individual acts merely
to secure compliance, the proceedings have an inevitable public
dimension – to vindicate judicial authority.  Kirk-Cohen J put it
thus on behalf of the full court, ‘Contempt of court is not an issue

49 Re Bramblevale Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1062 (CA) and the cases following it.

inter partes; it is an issue between the court and the party who
has not complied with a mandatory order of court’.52  Elaborating
this, Plasket J pointed out in the Victoria Park Ratepayers case
that contempt of court has obvious implications for the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the legal system and the legal arm
of government: there is thus a public interest element in every
contempt committal.53  He went on to explain that when viewed in
the constitutional context –
‘it is clear that contempt of court is not merely a mechanism for the
enforcement of court orders.  The jurisdiction of the superior courts to commit
recalcitrant litigants for contempt of court when they fail or refuse to obey
court orders has at its heart the very effectiveness and legitimacy of the
judicial system. … That, in turn, means that the court called upon to commit
such a litigant for his or her contempt is not only dealing with the individual
interest of the frustrated successful litigant but also, as importantly, acting as
guardian of the public interest’.
[39] These expositions seem to me compelling.  A court in
considering committal for contempt can never disavow the public
dimension of its order.  This means that the use of committals for

50 Hicks v Feiock 485 US 624 (1985) at 635.
51 International Union, United Mineworkers of America v Bagwell 512 US 821 (1993) 830.
52 Federation of Governing Bodies of South African Schools (Gauteng) v MEC for Education,
Gauteng 2002 (1) SA 660 (T) 673D-E (Southwood & Basson JJ concurring).

contempt cannot be sundered according to whether they are
punitive or coercive.  In each, objective (enforcement) and means
(imprisonment) are identical.  And the standard of proof must
likewise be identical.
[40] This approach conforms with the true nature of this form of the
crime of contempt of court.  As pointed out earlier (para 10), this
does not consist in mere disobedience to a court order, but in the
contumacious disrespect for judicial authority that is so
manifested.  It also conforms with the analysis in Beyers (para 11
above), where this court held that even though enforcement is the
primary purpose of committal, it is nevertheless not imposed
merely because the obligation has not been observed, ‘but on the
basis of the criminal contempt of court that is associated with it’.
The punitive and public dimensions are therefore inextricable: and
coherence requires that the criminal standard of proof should
apply in all applications for contempt committal.
[41] Finally, as pointed out earlier (para 23), this development of the
common law not require the applicant to lead evidence as to the
respondent’s state of mind or motive: once the applicant proves

53 Victoria Park Ratepayers (above) para 5.

the three requisites (order, service and non-compliance), unless
the respondent provides evidence raising a reasonable doubt as
to whether non-compliance was wilful and mala fide, the
requisites of contempt will have been established.  The sole
change is that the respondent no longer bears a legal burden to
disprove wilfulness and mala fides on balance of probabilities, but
need only lead evidence that establishes a reasonable doubt.  It
follows, in my view, that Froneman J was correct in observing in
Burchell (para 24) that in most cases the change in the incidence
and nature of the onus will not make cases of this kind any more
difficult for the applicant to prove.  In those cases where it will
make a difference, it seems to me right that the alleged
contemnor should have to raise only a reasonable doubt.
[42] To sum up:
(a) The civil contempt procedure is a valuable and important
mechanism for securing compliance with court orders, and
survives constitutional scrutiny in the form of a motion court
application adapted to constitutional requirements.

(b) The respondent in such proceedings is not an ‘accused
person’, but is entitled to analogous protections as are
appropriate to motion proceedings.
(c) In particular, the applicant must prove the requisites of
contempt (the order; service or notice; non-compliance; and
wilfulness and mala fides) beyond reasonable doubt.
(d) But once the applicant has proved the order, service or notice,
and non-compliance, the respondent bears an evidential
burden in relation to wilfulness and mala fides: should the
respondent fail to advance evidence that establishes a
reasonable doubt as to whether non-compliance was wilful and
mala fide, contempt will have been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
(e) A declarator and other appropriate remedies remain available
to a civil applicant on proof on a balance of probabilities.

Application to facts: did CCII show beyond reasonable doubt that
the Auditor-General’s non-compliance was wilful and mala fide?
[43] The question therefore is whether CCII proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the Auditor-General’s failure to comply

timeously with Hartzenberg J’s order was wilful and mala fide.  As
explained earlier (para 4), the default fell into two categories – that
regarding the second part of the order, which related to what the
parties referred to as the ‘audit files’; and that relating to the first
part, namely the draft reports.  Regarding both delays, the
Auditor-General committed himself to an extensive answering
affidavit in which he volunteered an explanation.  At the outset of
his argument Mr Marcus conceded that the Auditor-General’s
undemurring acquiescence in this procedure precluded a
challenge, in the present case, to its constitutionality.  But the
discussion above has necessarily traversed the propriety of such
proceedings, whose use (subject to case-by-case clarification of
the respondent’s constitutional protections) has been found to
pass constitutional muster.
[44] As mentioned earlier (para 4), after the proceedings were
instituted, and before De Vos J heard the matter and gave
judgment on 14 October 2004 (apparently on the same day),
there was compliance in relation to the four categories of
documents mentioned in part two of Hartzenberg J’s order (audit
files; contracts; minutes; and working papers).  After De Vos J

granted the Auditor-General leave to appeal in November 2004,
the Auditor-General supplied CCII with all the draft reports, so
complying with part one.
[45] CCII’s complaint is thus two-fold: (i) that the Auditor-General
had not complied with the bulk of the order when the present
proceedings were instituted; (ii) that he supplied the draft reports
only after De Vos J delivered judgment in October 2004.  Issue (i)
relates principally to the costs in the court below; but issue (ii) –
on which the great bulk of the argument before us focused – goes
to the heart of De Vos J’s finding of contempt and the suspended
penalty she imposed for it.
[46] The 40 days Hartzenberg J granted for compliance with his
order expired on 12 February 2003; but before this the Auditor-
General applied for leave to appeal.  This had the effect of
suspending the order.  The application was set down for hearing
on 13 March 2003.  But the Auditor-General withdrew it after
discussion between the parties’ legal representatives seemed to
result in a common understanding of the meaning and effect of
the order.

[47] But this was not so.  On 15 May 2003 (approximately forty days
after the application for leave to appeal was withdrawn), the
Auditor-General’s attorneys made a first delivery to CCII’s
attorneys.  It was a bundle of documents consisting of some 751
pages, together with a schedule listing the documents he refused
to deliver.  As regards draft versions of the joint investigating
team’s report, he provided two documents: a draft report of the
Public Protector consisting of 78 pages, and chapter 12 of a draft
report prepared by the Auditor-General, consisting of 21 pages.
[48] CCII’s attorneys protested in a letter of 27 May 2003 that para
1.1 of Hartzenberg J’s order contained ‘no limitation’.  The
Auditor-General was obliged to provide ‘all and complete draft
versions of the investigation report’:  ‘By this is meant provision of
copies of all drafts of the report of the three investigating agencies
as well as those of the joint report.’  The Auditor-General’s
attorneys in reply insisted that ‘Your clients’ entitlement in terms of
the order of court was for documents relating to the reduced
record.  This relates to the draft report as well.’  The letter
continued: ‘Our client is in the process of examining whether or

not there are further documents which it may be obliged to
disclose and will revert in due course.’
[49] On 12 June 2003, CCII launched the present proceedings.
Apart from costs CCII sought (a) a declaration that the Auditor-
General had failed to comply fully with the order of Hartzenberg J;
(b) a declaration that he was in contempt of the order; (c) a
direction that he comply fully with the order within two weeks; and
(d) as a sanction for the contempt, the imposition of one month’s
imprisonment, suspended on condition of timeous compliance
with (c).  Only thereafter was there compliance in regard to the
audit reports.
[50] The Auditor-General’s answering affidavits – lodged on 31 July
2003, while the draft reports were still outstanding –
(a) asserted that it had always been his intention to comply with
the order, and affirmed that he was committed to compliance,
since ‘particularly given the constitutional obligations of the
institution of Auditor-General it would be remiss in the extreme
not to comply with a court order’; and
(b) stated that he was still ‘endeavouring to comply fully with the
order’, was doing ‘everything possible to compile the

documentation’ ordered to be disclosed, and that it was ‘plain’
that he had endeavoured, to the best of his ability, to comply
with the order.
[51] With regard to the ‘audit files’, he set out the complexity and
scope of the task required, as well as the administrative
arrangements he undertook to ensure compliance.  He
emphasised that at some stage 12 persons, including himself,
worked on the matter simultaneously: since ‘a proper and credible
process had to be followed in considering these documents, any
further resources assigned to the task would not have speeded up
the process’:
‘Further, I wish to emphasise that no matter how vast the teams may have
been, at some point each and every document had to be considered by me
personally, so that I could satisfy myself that I was indeed complying fully
with the Order.’
Regarding the first part of Hartzenberg J’s order, he stated that
‘My obligation relates only to the reduced record,’ and asserted
that ‘all draft reports relating to the reduced record have been
released’ to CCII.
[52] Mr Rogers urged us to endorse De Vos J’s finding that the
Auditor-General was in clear contempt of Hartzenberg J’s ruling

and that, given the clarity of the terms of that order, the only
appropriate inference was that he had acted wilfully and mala fide.
[53] I am unable to accept this submission, or to agree with De Vos
J’s approach to the evidence.  Central here is that not only the
Auditor-General committed himself to motion proceedings:  CCII
did too.  Large in that choice loomed the fact that the parties were
in dispute about the reasons and justifications for the admitted
failure to comply timeously with Hartzenberg J’s order.  The
Auditor-General asserted that his default was unintentional: in the
case of the audit files, it was because of the administrative burden
of compliance; and in the case of the draft reports it was because
of the interpretation he accorded the order.  CCII asserted that
there was no justification for the default and that the inference to
be drawn from the Auditor-General’s own account was that his
non-compliance was wilful and mala fide.
[54] How was this factual dispute to be resolved?  CCII did not ask
for the matter to be referred to oral evidence, or for the Auditor-
General to be cross-examined.  Had that happened, and had the
Auditor-General given viva voce evidence – or declined to do so –
the disputed facts would have been determined in effect by a live

contest resulting in a trial of the issues.  Instead, CCII chose to
argue, on the opposing affidavits, that the requisites for contempt
of court had been fulfilled.
[55] That conflicting affidavits are not a suitable means for
determining disputes of fact has been doctrine in this court for
more than 80 years.54  Yet motion proceedings are quicker and
cheaper than trial proceedings, and in the interests of justice
courts have been at pains not to permit unvirtuous respondents to
shelter behind patently implausible affidavit versions or bald
denials.  More than sixty years ago, this court determined that a
judge should not allow a respondent to raise ‘fictitious’ disputes of
fact to delay the hearing of the matter or to deny the applicant its
order.55  There had to be ‘a bona fide dispute of fact on a material
matter’.56 This means that an uncreditworthy denial, or a palpably
implausible version, can be rejected out of hand, without recourse
to oral evidence.  In Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck
Paints (Pty) Ltd,57 this court extended the ambit of uncreditworthy
denials.  They now encompassed not merely those that fail to

54 Frank v Ohlsson’s Cape Breweries Ltd 1924 AD 289 at 294, per Innes CJ.
55 Peterson v Cuthbert & Co Ltd 1945 AD 420 at 428, per Watermeyer CJ.
56 Room Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street Mansions (Pty) Ltd 1949 (3) SA 1155 (T) at 1162-1164,
per Murray AJP.

raise a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of fact, but also
allegations or denials that are so far-fetched or clearly untenable
that the Court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers.
[56] Practice in this regard has become considerably more robust,
and rightly so.  If it were otherwise, most of the busy motion courts
in the country might cease functioning.  But the limits remain, and
however robust a court may be inclined to be, a respondent’s
version can be rejected in motion proceedings only if it is
‘fictitious’ or so far-fetched and clearly untenable that it can
confidently be said, on the papers alone, that it is demonstrably
and clearly unworthy of credence.
[57] Can the Auditor-General’s version be rejected on the affidavits
as ‘fictitious’, or as demonstrably uncreditworthy?  In my view,
clearly not.  Regarding his collation of the audit files, which CCII
received in adequate form only after the current proceedings were
initiated, CCII understandably complains that on the Auditor-
General’s own version too little resources were devoted to the
task, and too late.  But it is clear that he did not sit idly by.  He
assigned staff to the task and engaged himself in it as set out in

57 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634-635, per Corbett JA.

the extract quoted above.  He gives details of these efforts.  And
throughout, he asserts the good faith of his efforts to comply with
the order.
[58] Mr Rogers for CCII subjected the Auditor-General’s account to
searching criticism and on the affidavits alone there certainly
appear to be gaps and insufficiencies in the account tendered.
Despite this, I do not think that his assertions can be rejected as
fictitious or as so implausible as to warrant dismissal without
recourse to oral evidence.
[59] The draft reports stand on a different footing.  The order
Hartzenberg J granted is unambiguous.  It requires the Auditor-
General, without qualification, to hand over ‘all draft versions’ of
the joint investigating team’s report.  In his answering affidavit, the
Auditor-General asserts only that this refers to the ‘reduced
record’.  His stance requires some background.  In the
proceedings before Hartzenberg J – the record of which the
parties agreed during argument should be placed before us;
rightly so, given its relevance – the Auditor-General’s answering
affidavit made much of the bulk of the material that he and his
staff would be required to peruse if the application for access

were granted.  In reply, Dr Richard Young, the managing director
of CCII, explained that he was ‘not aware’ when launching the
application of the bulk of the record.  He therefore emphasised
that CCII’s interest lay solely ‘in that portion of the record relating
to its complaints’.  The respondents knew, he asserted, that
CCII’s complaints ‘relate exclusively’ to the acquisition of the
corvettes and its deselection as a supplier (together with related
issues).   He continued:
‘Although [CCII] believes that the [Auditor-General] has overstated the
magnitude of the burden of complying with [CCII’s] request, [CCII] is willing
for purposes of the present proceedings to confine its request to that portion
of the [Auditor-General’s] record which relates to the matters specified …
above.  I shall refer to this portion of the record as “the Reduced Record”.’
The deponent then challenged the Auditor-General to –
‘supplement his answering affidavit by indicating whether he is willing to give
[CCII] access to the Reduced Record and, if not, to justify such refusal’.
[60] It is against the background of this fact – that CCII sought
access only to ‘the Reduced Record’ – that Hartzenberg J issued
his order.  And the Auditor-General’s correspondence consistently
claimed thereafter that the first part of the order, like the second,
referred only to ‘the reduced record’.  In his answering affidavit in

the contempt proceedings, he also claimed that the draft reports
to be furnished related solely to ‘the reduced record’, and
asserted that he had ‘released all draft versions of the report
submitted to Parliament in my possession to which [CCII] is
entitled in terms of my understanding of the court order’.
[61] This was wrong.  There is no ambiguity in Hartzenberg J’s
order.  But is it possible to find on the affidavits alone, as CCII
urged, that the Auditor-General’s stance was wilful and mala fide?
I do not think so.  Telling in this regard is CCII’s own
correspondence.  Twice it stumbles, not meaningfully, but
tellingly, over what ‘the reduced record’ constitutes and whether it
encompasses the draft reports.  Thus, its attorneys’ letter of 23
May 2003 clearly (and correctly) asserts that ‘there is no limitation
in Paragraph 1 of the Order’.  But the letter states earlier that
CCII’s counsel informed the Auditor-General’s counsel ‘that they,
our client and the writer all interpreted the Order as referring to
the so-called reduced record’.  Notable here is that ‘the Order’ is
referred to without differentiating its parts or their application in
relation to ‘the Reduced Record’ – which chimed with the Auditor-
General’s stance regarding the draft reports.  Similarly, in a letter

of 27 May 2003, CCII’s attorneys again allude to the reduced
record, stating that ‘so as not to allow any possibility for ambiguity
to confuse your client about the documents which are due to our
client under the Order, this includes all documents relating to the
corvette component of the Strategic Defence Packages’ – which
again accords with the Auditor-General’s claim that only those
draft reports bearing on the reduced record had to be released.
[62] These statements must of course be read in the light of CCII’s
sustained insistence that the first part of the order encompassed
all draft reports, not only those in the ‘reduced record’; but the
ambiguity of expression is not only unmistakable, but significant,
for it runs counter to CCII’s submission that there was no rational
basis or explanation for the Auditor-General’s understanding of
the order. In my view, the Auditor-General’s claim that he so
understood the order – though clearly wrong – is not entirely
incapable of comprehension.58  Mr Rogers for CCII emphasised
that the Auditor-General had not claimed to rely on legal advice in
taking his stand on the meaning of the order.  That is true; but his
stance is nevertheless not capable of being rejected on the

58 There is long-standing authority that a misunderstanding as to the true meaning of an order

papers as ‘fictitious’ or palpably uncreditworthy, without his being
afforded an oral hearing.
[63] In the light of the proper approach to deciding factual disputes
in motion proceedings, I should add that on the particular form of
process the parties committed themselves to in this case I do not
think that it would make any difference had the onus been only
proof on balance of probabilities.  The accepted approach
requires that, subject to ‘robust’ elimination of denials and
‘fictitious’ disputes, the court must decide the matter on the facts
stated by the respondent, together with those the applicant avers
and the respondent does not deny.  On that approach, since the
Auditor-General’s version cannot legitimately be ‘robusted’ away,
his factual assertions, including those regarding his state of mind,
must be accepted as established.  The proven facts thus establish
more than just a reasonable doubt, but a factual picture that
entails acceptance of the Auditor-General’s version; though that is
incidental to the form of the proceedings before us.
[64] To summarise: On the accepted test for fact-finding in motion
proceedings, it is impossible to reject the Auditor-General’s

negatives an inference that non-compliance is wilful: Botha v Dreyer (1880) 1 EDC 74.

version as ‘fictitious’ or as clearly uncreditworthy.  There is a real
possibility that if a court heard oral evidence on the factual
disputes between the parties, it might accept the Auditor-
General’s version, or at least find that there was reasonable doubt
as to whether the delay in complying with the orders of
Hartzenberg J was wilful and mala fide.  CCII therefore failed to
prove that the default was wilful and mala fide.
[65] The finding of contempt and with it the penalty cannot stand.
That is not however an end of the matter.  The first part of the
order De Vos J granted was a declaration that the Auditor-
General ‘has failed to comply fully with this court’s order of 25
November 2002’.  The third part was a directive to the Auditor-
General ‘to comply fully with the said order within a period of four
weeks from the date of this order’.  Those portions of the order
were plainly justified.  So although CCII has failed in its quest for a
full finding of contempt, with a concomitant penalty, it was entitled
at least to the declarator and to the directory order.
[66] For this reason, the costs order in the court below should
remain undisturbed.  And even though the Auditor-General has
had substantial success on appeal, the litigation and the central

question of principle in this court had a novel constitutional
character which in my view would make it unjust to burden CCII
with the costs of the proceedings in this court.  The parties should
therefore bear their own costs of appeal.
[67] The appeal accordingly succeeds.  The order of the court below
is set aside to the extent that the finding of contempt and the
associated penalty are set aside.  The appellant is to pay the
respondent’s costs in the court below.  There is no order on the
costs of the appeal.

E CAMERON
JUDGE OF APPEAL

CONCUR:
HOWIE P
CACHALIA AJA

HEHER JA:
[68] The facts which Cameron JA has so meticulously analysed
satisfy me that the appellant must succeed, whether one applies the
civil or criminal standard of proof to them. There is no doubt that the
appellant was at all material times able to comply with the terms of
the order. But, without testing under cross-examination, the materials
were lacking for a rejection of the appellant’s (non-wilful and bona
fide) state of mind as expressed in his affidavit and supported by the
trend of the correspondence from his attorneys.
[69] Since Cameron JA has thought it necessary to undertake an
analysis of the onus in civil contempt proceedings I deem it advisable
to express my views on that subject lest silence (or equivocation) be
taken for assent.
[70] I agree that s 35 of the constitution is not engaged by the
substance of such proceedings. For the reasons which follow the
influence of that section on the protection afforded by s 12(1)(a) and
(b) must be very slight.
[71] I also agree that, since all applications for committal for civil
contempt carry the threat of imprisonment, s 12 is immediately
engaged and the respondent must be accorded the widest procedural

fairness in the conduct of the proceedings which is consistent with the
nature and purpose of the remedy. Nevertheless I differ strongly from
Cameron JA that the necessary and proper standard of fairness
demands (a) that the applicant prove his case beyond a reasonable
doubt, and (b) that the existing common law onus which rests on a
respondent to prove absence of wilfulness and absence of mala fides
requires developing in such a manner as to burden the applicant with
proof of wilfulness and mala fides.
[72] The critical point of departure between us seems to be
Cameron JA’s acceptance of a material difficulty in separating
coercive (or remedial) orders of imprisonment made in civil contempt
proceedings from punitive orders. This supposed problem is one
which recurs in judgments in many jurisdictions. In my view it is
overstated. Its solution is cardinal to the proper categorization of civil
contempt proceedings and, as I shall attempt to show, affords the
opportunity to develop our common law in accordance with
constitutional values.
[73] Upon proper analysis the distinction between coercive and
punitive orders has something to do with the intent of an applicant or
the court but much to do with the consequences of the order. It is the

latter aspect to which any judicial officer who is required to consider
whether an order of committal for contempt of court should be
granted should pay careful attention.
[74] The
following
are,
I
would
suggest,
the
identifying
characteristics of a coercive order:
1.
The sentence may be avoided by the respondent after its
imposition by appropriate compliance with the terms of the
original (breached) order ad factum praestandum together with
any other terms of the committal order which call for
compliance.59 Such avoidance may require purging a default,
an apology or an undertaking to desist from future offensive
conduct.60
2.
Such an order is made for the benefit of the applicant in order
to bring about compliance with the breached order previously
made in his favour.
3.
Such an order bears no relationship to the respondent’s degree
of fault in breaching the original order or to the contumacy of

59 The defendants in such proceedings carry ‘the keys of their prison in their own pockets’: Shillitani v
United States 384 US 364 at 368 (1966).
60 In the words of Sachs J in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa; Matiso and others v
Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison, and others 1995 (4) SA 631 (CC) at para 43 fn 34,
imprisonment of this kind is regarded in the jurisprudence of the United States as ‘a flexible remedial
instrument for failure to fulfil an obligation’; cf Chinamora v Angwa Furnishers 1998 (2) SA 432 (ZSC) at
447F-G.

the respondent thereafter or to the amount involved in the
dispute between the parties.
4.
Such an order is made primarily to ensure the effectiveness of
the original order and only incidentally vindicates the authority
of the court.
[75] By contrast a punitive order has the following distinguishing
features:
1.
The sentence may not be avoided by any action of the
respondent after its imposition.
2.
The sentence is related both to the seriousness of the default
and the contumacy of the respondent.
3.
The order is influenced by the need to assert the authority and
dignity of the court and as an example for others.
4.
The applicant gains nothing from the carrying out of the
sentence.
[76] The differences are marked and important. They emphasise
that a coercive order of imprisonment is one to which a respondent
willingly (if reluctantly) and defiantly submits in order to frustrate the
rights of another party. If he is ‘deprived’ of his liberty it is because he
has, with knowledge of the order and the consequences of

disobedience, elected to flout the order. Such an attitude has nothing
to do with an onus of proof: the respondent would or would not submit
or comply irrespective of the onus. Nor can one properly describe as
‘punishment’ that confinement to which a defendant of his own choice
submits to serve his own ends. So understood, the circumstances of
a coercive detention (and the procedure which is fair and appropriate
to its imposition) stand at a vast remove from the case of enforced
deprivation of liberty against which s 12 is primarily concerned to
guard.61
[77] Of course there is a public dimension to both categories of
order. But its emphasis is not the same, as I have pointed out. In any
event, the public interest in having court orders which do not contain
empty promises is a strong factor in favour of retaining the lighter
onus.
[78] I consequently do not accept that a party in civil proceedings
who exposes himself to the deprivation of freedom which flows from
civil contempt and a consequent coercive order against himself

61 There is an intermediate kind of ‘contempt’ proceeding which does not fit readily into either category.
Nel v Le Roux 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) and De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) provide examples.
Such cases do not involve civil contempt in the sense that we are concerned with. Committal is there the
consequence of a refusal to comply with a statutory coercion imposed in the public interest. It is in this
context that the dictum of O’Regan J which Cameron JA quotes at para 31 of his judgment has to be
understood.

deserves or needs an extension or adaptation of the common law to
satisfy the imperatives of s 12(1). In the circumstances the existing
procedures are entirely consonant with the constitutional values
which underpin s 12.
[79] In reaching this conclusion I am very conscious of the strong
body of judicial opinion which has voiced a conclusion contrary in its
tenor to my own. I venture to suggest that there is, generally, an
absence of consideration of the aspects which I have set out shortly
above. An exception is Hicks v Feiock 485 US 624 (1988) in which
the Supreme Court, despite differences in the result, was unanimous
in finding that civil contempt proceedings are primarily coercive in
nature and require proof on a balance of probabilities. I disagree with
my colleague that differences in the constitutional backgrounds of the
United States and South Africa have any significant bearing on the
plain logic which it espouses and which is, in my view, of equal
relevance to the procedural safeguards against abuse of the liberty
provision in s 12(1) and to remedies for the breach of civil orders as
our legal system knows them.62

62 In Witham v Holloway 131 ALR 401 (HC of A) at 418; 183 CLR 525 at 547, McHugh J said,
‘. . . the chief reason for rejecting the United States approach of classifying proceedings for contempt
according to their objective is that it leads to the practical problems to which I have referred.’
I have attempted to address the perceived practical objections in paras 69 to 71 above. The learned Judge

[80] I would go further. The extension of the criminal standard of
proof to civil contempt would have harmful consequences. In my
experience the ordinary litigant (often an indigent woman63) finds it
difficult enough under present procedures to pin down a party who is
determined to avoid the consequences of a judgment. Absence of
wilfulness and mala fides are frequently highly subjective and the
respondent’s protestations often serve to carry the day, particularly as
these are matters within his own ken and the applicant seldom has
the means to pursue the enquiry with the necessary vigour. If the
onus were to be increased to one beyond reasonable doubt the
efficacy of the remedy (and with it the worth of a civil judgment) would
be reduced, to the detriment of justice.64
[81] I should also add that, in principle, it would be wrong and unfair
to align the frailty of the subject with the power of the State by
requiring the former to discharge the criminal onus without

seems to have encountered no obstacle in the constitutional peculiarities of that country. Nor indeed did the
majority of the court express any such reservation in considering the America approach (at 406-7).
63 See Bannatyne v Bannatyne 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC) para 27:
‘Systemic failures to enforce maintenance orders have a negative impact on the rule of law. The courts are
there to ensure that the rights of all are protected. The Judiciary must endeavour to secure for vulnerable
children and disempowered women their small but life-sustaining legal entitlements. If court orders are
habitually evaded and defied with relative impunity, the justice system is discredited and the constitutional
promise of human dignity and equality is seriously compromised for those most dependent on the law.’
64 In addition, as respondent’s counsel submitted, coercive execution by way of attachment and sale of
property is not available to a civil litigant who has obtained an order ad factum praestandum. Contempt
proceedings constitute the primary and, sometimes, the only method of enforcement of such orders. See
also in this regard Witham v Holloway, fn 4 above, at 419 lines 10-22.

comparable means to do so, unless such a conclusion cannot be
avoided.
[82] That is indeed the only conclusion in punitive proceedings for
contempt. For that reason the law does require development: a
judicial officer who has found a litigant in civil proceedings to be in
contempt and who forms the opinion that a punitive sentence may be
warranted, should (whether or not he imposes a coercive sentence)
refer the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions with a view to
prosecution in a criminal court. This would in my view be a desirable
and justified development of the common law to ensure that those
forms of the remedy of contempt of court (and the concomitant
procedures) which are criminal in substance are tried in accordance
with criminal standards, while leaving those that are truly civil in
history, objectives and effects to be treated, as they always have
been, according to civil standards.
[83] The existing reverse onus of proof renders the prospect of a
finding against a respondent in contempt applications more likely than
the application of a heavier onus would. Since such an onus has a
tendency towards deprivation of the freedom of the subject it must be

able to withstand constitutional scrutiny at the previously mentioned
level of procedural fairness.
[84] Applying the test of examination of the nature of the deprivation
and its purpose (De Lange v Smuts NO at para 143), I am satisfied
that the existing procedure survives scrutiny. The following
considerations militate against a development of the common law as
Cameron JA proposes.
1.
The existing reverse onus is a rational response to a proved
breach of a court order which confers a right of enforcement on
a party. It is proper and satisfies one’s sense of justice that the
breaching party should be required to justify non-compliance.
2.
As I have pointed out earlier, the subject-matter of the reverse
onus often lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the
respondent. In such circumstances equity favours the holder of
the order and demands that the already defaulting respondent
not only appear to play open cards but that he satisfy the court
that he is now indeed doing so.
3.
The proceedings are civil in substance and the coercive
imprisonment which may follow is a civil remedy. As I have
attempted to show above the deprivation of freedom which is

threatened is of a singular nature not warranting special
safeguards.
4.
There is no evidence in the long history of the remedy that
injustice has ever flowed from the application of the reverse
onus in its present form.
5.
Abolishing the existing reverse onus will simply render the
remedy less effective without tending towards a corresponding
advantage in the administration of justice.

J A   HEHER
JUDGE OF APPEAL

CONCUR:
FARLAM JA