THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Case no: 204/2014
Not Reportable

In the matter between:

BRENDAN SOLLY NDLOVU                                                    APPELLANT

and

THE STATE

RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Ndlovu v The State (204/2014) [2014] ZASCA 149 (26
September 2014)

Coram:               Maya, Bosielo and Theron JJA

Heard:                10 September 2014

Delivered
26 September 2014

Summary: Sentence – Prescribed sentences – Minimum sentence –
Imposition of in terms of Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 –
Error in charge-sheet – Charge-sheet incorrectly stating offence as one of
contravening s 51(2) instead of s 51(1) of the Act – Such error, without
more, does not result in a failure of justice – Court not precluded from
imposing life imprisonment.

________________________________________________________________
ORDER
________________________________________________________________
On appeal from: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria (Sapire and Bam AJJ
sitting as court of appeal):
The appeal against sentence is dismissed.
________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________
THERON JA (Maya and Bosielo JJA concurring):

[1] This appeal turns on whether an accused, who was charged with rape read
with the provisions of s 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
(the Act), which provides for a minimum sentence of ten years‟ imprisonment
upon conviction, can be sentenced to life imprisonment in terms of s 51(1) of
the Act and whether or not this has infringed such accused‟s right to a fair trial.

[2] The appellant was charged in the regional court, Phalaborwa, with one
count of rape read with the provisions of s 51(2) of the Act. During his first
appearance in the regional court on 26 February 2008, the magistrate advised
him of the seriousness of the offence in respect of which he was charged. He
was advised that a conviction in terms of s 51(2) could attract a minimum
sentence of 15 years‟ imprisonment. The appellant was legally represented at the
trial. Despite his not-guilty plea, he was convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment. His appeal against both conviction and sentence was dismissed
by the North Gauteng High Court (Sapire and Bam AJJ). He appeals to this
court against sentence with the leave of the high court.

[3] The incident giving rise to the appellant‟s conviction occurred during the
early hours of the morning of 27 October 2007. The appellant accosted the
complainant while she was on her way home. He assaulted and threatened to kill
her. She managed to escape but he apprehended and again assaulted her. He
assaulted her with his fists, as well as stones and bricks. He forcibly and without
her consent, had sexual intercourse with her. Naked, and covered in blood, she
managed to escape. She sustained open wounds on her head and mouth and
various scars. One of her teeth had to be removed in consequence of the assault
and the evidence was that more of her teeth would be removed in the future.

[4] It is apparent from the following extract of the magistrate‟s judgment on
sentence that the applicability of life imprisonment had been addressed during
the course of argument on sentence:
„The public prosecutor is of the view that [the] accused was … (indistinct) … on the day in
question and he [suggested] that the accused should be [sentenced] to life imprisonment.‟
It must be presumed that the magistrate, in sentencing the appellant to life
imprisonment, had acted in terms of s 51(1) read with Part I of Schedule 2 to the
Act.

[5] Section 51 of the Act provides:
'(1)  Notwithstanding any other law, but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a regional court or
a High Court shall sentence a person it has convicted of an offence referred to in Part I of
Schedule 2 to imprisonment for life.
(2)   Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a regional court or
a High Court shall sentence a person who has been convicted of an offence referred to in ─
(a)   Part II of Schedule 2, in the case of ─
(i)   a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 15 years;
(ii)  a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less than 20
years; and
(iii)  a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less
than 25 years;

(b)  Part III of Schedule 2, in the case of ─
(i)   a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 10 years;
(ii) a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less than 15
years; and
(iii) a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less
than 20 years; and
(c)  Part IV of Schedule 2, in the case of ─
(i)   a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 5 years;
(ii)  a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less than 7 years;
and
(iii)  a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less
than 10 years;
Provided that the maximum term of imprisonment that a regional court may impose in terms
of this subsection shall not exceed the minimum term of imprisonment that it must impose in
terms of this subsection by more than five years.
(3)(a)  If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) is satisfied that substantial and
compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than the
sentence prescribed in those subsections, it shall enter those circumstances on the record of
the proceedings and must thereupon impose such lesser sentence: Provided that if a regional
court imposes such a lesser sentence in respect of an offence referred to Part 1 of Schedule 2,
it shall have jurisdiction to impose a term of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 30
years.‟
Part 1 of Schedule 2 prescribes the imposition of a minimum sentence of life
imprisonment in circumstances where, inter alia, the rape involved the infliction
of grievous bodily harm.

[6] The right to a fair trial is enshrined in the Constitution. Section 35(3) of
the Constitution provides that every accused person has a right to a fair trial and
this includes, inter alia, the right to be informed of the charge with sufficient
detail to answer it. Lewis JA in S v Makatu,1 and in relation to the details that
should be furnished to an accused, said that an accused must „know what the

1 S v Makatu 2006 (2) SACR 582 (SCA) para 7.

implications and consequences of the charge are‟. Cameron JA in S v Legoa,2
stated that, under the common law it was „desirable‟, although not „essential‟
that the charge-sheet should set out the facts which the state intended to prove in
order to bring the accused within an enhanced sentencing jurisdiction.3 The
judge went on to point out that:
„ . . . under the new constitutional dispensation, the criterion for a just criminal trial is “a
concept of substantive fairness which is not to be equated with what might have passed
muster in our criminal courts before the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108
of 1996 came into force”.‟4

[7] This court has, with good reason, been reluctant to lay down a general
rule as to what the charge sheet should contain. Lewis JA in S v Makatu put it
thus:
„As a general rule, where the State charges an accused with an offence governed by s 51(1) of
the Act, such as premeditated murder, it should state this in the indictment. This rule is clearly
neither absolute nor inflexible.‟ 5
The main reasons for this, as succinctly stated by Cameron JA in Legoa, is that
the matter is one of substance and not form and a „general requirement to this
effect, if applied with undue formalism, may create intolerable complexities in
the administration of justice‟.6 The question to be answered is whether the
accused had a fair trial,7  and this is a fact based enquiry that entails a „vigilant
examination of the relevant circumstances‟.8

[8] The appellant, in support of the contention that his right to a fair trial has
been infringed, relied on the judgment of the majority in S v Mashinini &

2 S v Legoa 2003 (1) SACR 13 (SCA).
3 Paragraph 20.
4 Ibid.
5 Makatu supra para 7.
6 Legoa supra para21. See also S v Ndlovu 2003 (1) SACR 331 (SCA) para 12.
7 S v Legoa supra para 22.
8 S v Ndlovu supra para 12; S v Mthembu 2012 (1) SACR 517 (SCA) para 17.

another,9 where the two appellants and their two co-perpetrators were charged
with rape, read with the provisions of s 51(2) of the Act. They pleaded guilty
and it emerged from their plea explanations that all four of them had raped the
complainant. After conviction, the matter was transferred to the high court,
which confirmed their convictions and sentenced them to life imprisonment. On
appeal to this court, the majority set aside the sentence of life imprisonment, on
the basis that:
„the state decided to restrict itself to s 51(2), where part III of schedule 2 prescribes a sentence
of ten years‟ imprisonment. This is what was put to the appellants and to which they pleaded
guilty. It was not thereafter open to the court to invoke a completely different section which
provides for a more severe sentence, unless the state had sought and been granted an
amendment of the charge-sheet in terms of s 86 of the Criminal Procedure Act prior to
conviction. The state did not launch such an application. The magistrate was therefore bound
to impose a sentence in terms of s 51(2) read with part III of schedule 2.‟10 (Footnotes
omitted.)

[9] This court (Mhlantla JA writing for the majority) found that (i) the
appellants were unfairly sentenced for an offence different to the one for which
they were convicted; (ii) the magistrate ought to have sentenced the appellants
in terms of s 51(2), which prescribed a sentence of ten years‟ imprisonment and
(iii) the high court erred in sentencing the appellants to life imprisonment in
terms of s 51(1) of the Act. The court then considered it competent for it to
impose sentence afresh „given the misdirection, the lapse of time and the fact
that all the evidence is before us‟.11 Having found no substantial and compelling
circumstances justifying a sentence less than the prescribed minimum, the court
imposed a sentence of ten years‟ imprisonment on both appellants.

9 S v Mashinini & another 2012 (1) SACR 604 (SCA).
10 Paragraph 17.
11 Paragraph 19.

[10] In S v Kolea12 the issue on appeal was whether a sentencing court was
precluded from imposing a life sentence upon conviction of rape where the
charge-sheet referred to the incorrect provision of the Act, despite the
jurisdictional facts establishing that the rape fell within the ambit of cases for
which life imprisonment was the applicable minimum sentence having been
proved. This court declined to approve the ruling in Mashinini, finding that the
majority had misread the provisions of s 51(2) in that a minimum sentence is
exactly that; a prescribed minimum, and where the evidence establishes that a
more onerous sentence is justified, the imposition of such does not constitute an
irregularity that implicates fair trial rights. Mbha AJA, writing for the court,
stated:
„The term of 10 years‟ imprisonment referred to therein is the minimum sentence that can be
imposed. This means that any sentence in excess of 10 years' imprisonment, and possibly
even life imprisonment, could be imposed by a court having jurisdiction to do so.
Furthermore, the fact, that a statute provides for an increased sentence with reference to a
particular type of offence when committed under particular circumstances, does not mean that
a different offence has been created thereby.
. . .
The fact, that the Act specifies penalties in respect of certain offences (in this case rape,
where more than one person raped the victim), does not in any way mean that a new type of
offence has been created. Rape remains rape, but the Act provides for a more severe sanction
where, for example, the victim has been raped more than once or by more than one person.‟13

[11] This court concluded that the fact that the charge-sheet had a defect which
was never rectified, did not of its own render the proceedings invalid. Mbha
AJA confirmed that the test is always whether or not the accused had suffered
any prejudice.14 Furthermore, Mbha AJA noted that the appellant had been
sufficiently warned of the charge he faced by virtue of the reference to the
minimum sentencing legislation in his charge sheet, and thus the required

12  S v Kolea 2013 (1) SACR 409 (SCA).
13 Paragraph 17.
14 Paragraph 18.

standard of „sufficient detail‟ contained in s 35(3)(a) of the Constitution was
met, despite the incorrect provision being referred to in the charge-sheet. In
addition, the court found that the appellant was convicted on the evidence
placed before the court and „[i]t has not been demonstrated that the appellant
would have acted differently, had the mistake not been made in the charge-
sheet‟.15 This court dismissed the appeal against sentence and the sentence of
life imprisonment was confirmed.

[12] In this matter, it was brought to the attention of the appellant at the outset
of the trial that the state intended to rely on the minimum sentencing regime
created by the Act, albeit that the incorrect section of the Act was referred to. As
has already been mentioned, the appellant was advised that if convicted, he
faced the possible imposition of a minimum sentence of 15 years‟
imprisonment.  The facts of this matter are closely akin to those of Mashinini
and Kolea. The principle emerging from Kolea is that the imposition of a
sentence of life imprisonment in these circumstances will not in itself result in a
failure of justice which vitiates the sentence.

[13] I turn now to consider whether the appellant‟s right to a fair trial has been
infringed. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had been
prejudiced in that had he known that he faced the prospect of life imprisonment
he would not have taken the decision to have his trial continue without the
results of the DNA analysis from the samples that were sent to the forensic
laboratory for testing. This submission is not borne out by the record. On 9
October 2008, the matter was adjourned at the instance of the defence for „DNA
tests to be conducted on the accused‟. On 6 May 2009, the public prosecutor
advised the court that the DNA results had not yet been received and that there
was a more than six month backlog at the forensic laboratory. The state then

15 S v Kolea supra para 14.

closed its case. The appellant‟s legal representative addressed the court in the
following terms:
„Your worship taking into account the duration of the matter having been pending before the
honourable court, the defence feels that it will still be indefinite that we wait for the results
your worship. It will be in the [interests] of justice that the matter be proceeded with in the
absence of such results.‟

[14] The appellant and his legal representative took a conscious decision to
proceed without the DNA evidence. This notwithstanding that they were aware
of the fact that the state intended invoking the minimum sentencing regime
created by the Act, It is speculation to say that the appellant would have decided
to wait for the DNA results. No factual foundation has been laid by the appellant
to support a finding that his right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the error on the
charge-sheet. This court has held that such mistakes must be approached in the
context of fairness as it applies both to the accused and the public as represented
by the state.16 The high court, in considering this issue stated that the appellant
had been legally represented,
„and the case was conducted in such a way that it cannot be said that any other information
would have changed it. As we have seen the offence on the merits was unsustainable and the
conviction has to be upheld.
It cannot be said that the mere fact that the wrong section of the Act was initially and
repeatedly used in any way prejudiced the appellant as far as the sentence is concerned.‟
I agree with this reasoning and therefore conclude that it has not been
established that the appellant‟s right to a fair trial has been infringed.

[15] The final question to be considered is whether this court should interfere
with the sentence imposed by the trial court. As pointed out by the high court,
the trial court, in determining an appropriate sentence took into account the

16 S v Kolea supra para 20.

appellant‟s personal circumstances. It noted as an aggravating fact that the
complainant was seriously assaulted even before she was raped and stated:
„Bearing in mind the seriousness of the assault I am not convinced that the magistrate erred in
any way in imposing the sentence he did. The appellant acted with aggression and his assault
was a vicious and dangerous one and one can accept that the victim was highly traumatised in
the course of the commission of the offence.‟
The reasoning of the high court is unassailable. In my judgment there were no
compelling and substantial circumstances in this matter justifying a departure
from the prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment.

[16] The appeal against sentence is dismissed.

______________
L V THERON
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES
For Appellant:

H L Alberts
Instructed by:
Justice Centre, Pretoria
Justice Centre, Bloemfontein

For Respondent:

M Jansen van Vuuren

Instructed by:
The Director of Public Prosecutions,
Pretoria
The Director of Public Prosecutions,
Bloemfontein

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

FROM

The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE

26 September 2014

STATUS

Immediate

Brendan Solly Ndlovu v The State
(204/2014) [2014] ZASCA (10 September 2014)

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and does not
form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal

Today the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) delivered a judgment whereby the appeal against the
sentence was dismissed.

The issue before the SCA was whether an accused, who was charged with rape read with the
provisions of s 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the Act), which provided for a
minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment, can be sentenced to life imprisonment in terms of s 51
(1) of the Act and whether or not this has infringed the accused’s right to a fair trial.

On 27 October 2007 the appellant accosted the complainant while she was on her way home.  He
assaulted and threatened to kill her.  She managed to escape, but sustained open wounds on her
head and mouth and various scars.  The appellant was charged with one count of rape read with the
provisions of s 51 (2) of the Act.  It is apparent from the trial court that applicability of life
imprisonment had been addressed during the course of argument on sentence and the appellant was
legally represented at the trail, despite his not-guilty plea, the appellant was convicted and sentenced
to life imprisonment.

On appeal, the SCA held that the appellant had been sufficiently warned of the charge he faced by
virtue of the reference to the minimum sentencing legislation in his charge sheet. It was not shown
that the appellant had suffered prejudice by the incorrect section of the Act being referred to in the
charge-sheet. The SCA found therefore that the appellant’s right to a fair trial has not been infringed

and that there are no reasons to interfere with the sentence imposed by the court below and
furthermore that there was no compelling and substantial circumstances justifying a departure from
the prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment.

--- ends ---