SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

CASE NO:   084/13
Not Reportable

In the matter between:

IAIN CAMERON MCLAGGAN                                                               APPELLANT

and

THE STATE                                                                                       RESPONDENT

Neutral citation:  McLaggan v The State (084/13) [2013] ZACSA 92 (June 2013)

Coram:
Mthiyane DP, Majiedt, Pillay JJA et Willis, Saldulker AJJA

Heard:
17 May 2013
Delivered:
03 June 2013

Summary: Rape – evidence - complainant single witness – sufficient corroboration - all
evidence, not only parts of it, to be taken into account when determining the guilt of
accused – accused’s version not reasonably possibly true - appeal against conviction
dismissed.

Sentence – Prescribed sentence in terms of Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 –
appeal by State against sentence - finding of existence of substantial and compelling
circumstances as envisaged in subsection 52(3) attacked by State – court below
misdirected itself in finding substantial and compelling circumstances – appeal upheld.

ORDER

On appeal from:
Eastern Cape High Court, Grahamstown (Goosen J sitting as court
of first instance)

1 The appeal against conviction is dismissed.
2 The appeal against sentence is upheld.
3 The sentence imposed by the court below is set aside and substituted with the
following:
‘The accused is sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.’

JUDGMENT

PILLAY JA (MTHIYANE DP, MAJIEDT JA ET WILLIS, SALDULKER AJJA
CONCURRING)

[1] This is an appeal against conviction. The appellant, Iain Cameron McLaggan, was
convicted in the High Court, Grahamstown (Goosen J) of one count of rape in the
contravention of s 3, read with s 1, 56(1), 57(1), 58, 59 and 60 of the Criminal Law
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. He was sentenced
to a term of 8 years’ imprisonment.

[2] Leave to this court was granted by the court below, which also granted the
Director of Prosecutions leave to appeal against the sentence. In order to avoid any
confusion, I will hereinafter refer to the appellant (on the merits) and the Director of
Prosecutions as they were referred to in the court below viz accused and the State.
The following are facts which are common cause or undisputed:
[3] At the age of 7 years old, the complainant was diagnosed with a brain tumour
behind the left eye. Her condition was not treated by way of surgery but with vigorous
radiation over a number of years. This treatment affected her control hormone levels
which made her prone to stress and its consequences: It also had an effect on her bodily
sugar levels. At the age of 18, she undertook a trip to South Africa under the auspices of
Worldwide Experiences, a British institution, in order to enhance her chances for
admission to a university in the United Kingdom to persue studies in Veterinary Science.
Worldwide Experiences had established a working relationship with Shamwari Game
Reserve (‘Shamwari’) which is located near Grahamstown. The complainant was placed
there with some fourteen other foreigners to complete courses which, inter alia, included
dealing with large animals.

[4] The group was entrusted to the accused and one Conrad Muller both of whom
seemed to be experienced in working at Shamwari and were to co-ordinate the course.
The complainant and the other international students started the program on 30 August
2010. Some of these students had been at Shamwari for about a week before then.
Towards the end of that week a social outing was arranged at a tavern in Paterson.
Because she felt tired, she was reluctant to go on this outing, but felt in necessary to
socialise with the others. The group went to the tavern where they enjoyed some drinks.
The complainant bought a glass of red wine which she was sipping in front of the fire
place with some of the members of the group. When one of the girls remarked that she
was drinking her wine very slowly the complainant finished her glass of wine and
purchased another. She then continued to consume the wine and joined other members
of the group in playing pool. By the time she started to drink the third glass of wine, she
had also consumed a single shot of Sambuca which the accused had bought. She then
started to feel hot and removed the long sleeved top which she was wearing over another
top.

[5] She then became emotional because she started to think of her failure in obtaining
university entrance while some of her friends had succeeded in doing so. She did not feel
too well and went outside with Ms Laura Sloan, her older roommate and with whom she
had struck up a good sisterly relationship, to get some fresh air. Once outside, she
started to vomit a few times. So violent was the vomiting that she soiled her hair and part
of her clothing. She could not remember for how long she was outside. She was unable
to get up from where she was sitting and had to be carried to the taxi commissioned to
convey them back to the lodge. She has vague memories of the trip back to the lodge.
Thereagain, she had to be carried from the taxi to her bed by the accused. As soon as
she had been placed on the bed, she suffered a seizure. She was gasping for air, her
head was jerking and her back was arched. Amidst this trauma however the complainant
remembers that the accused asked some of the girls to put her to bed and make her
comfortable as he ‘does not want a lawsuit’. She was put into bed after two of her female
friends had taken off some of her clothes and made her comfortable in bed wearing only
a top and her panties. The complainant then again suffered another seizure which lasted
a bit longer. The accused told the others to bring him a spoon and to leave the room
while he attended to the complainant. He emerged from the room shortly thereafter
reporting to the others that she was fine. Later, at about 2h30, the group discovered that
she had fallen out of bed and she was helped back into it. She was then left alone in the
room so that she could rest. At the time the complainant could hear the voices of
members of the group including that of the accused, but she could not make out
everything that was being said. She however remembers him saying that he did not want
a law suit. At about 3 am the accused sent one of the students to go check on her and it
was reported that she was sleeping peacefully.

[6] At 5h00, when all the students had gone to sleep, including her roommate, who
had gone to sleep with another student in light of the circumstances, the accused
decided to go to the complainant’s room himself. He entered and at some stage, he had
sexual intercourse with her. She thereafter went to the bathroom and cleaned herself of
the semen and blood which was a result of her hymen being ruptured. She went back
into the bedroom and saw him dressing. He left the room soon thereafter – at about 5h30
am. She then went back to bed and fell asleep. She was later woken up by Laura Sloan,
the complainant’s erstwhile roommate, and reminded they were scheduled to go to the

Addo Elephant Park. The complainant did this and the group were taken to the Elephant
Park in two groups. She rode with Conrad Muller. During the lunch break at the Elephant
Park she had a conversation with Sloan and asked her for information relating to what
had happened to her the previous night and in particular what she was wearing when she
was put to bed. She then told Sloan that she had been raped by the accused. After a
brief discussion between them, it became apparent that the complainant was especially
concerned about whether the accused had used a condom when he had raped her and
was focussed on getting to a hospital to get treatment to contend with any virus or germ
she might have been contaminated with during the rape.

[7] The group was taken back to the lodge and the complainant took the rest of the
day to consider ways to get medical attention. On the Sunday morning she eventually
approached Nadia Muller, a permanent employee at Shamwari and told her what had
happened. Nadia then immediately reported the event to Conrad Muller. Upon hearing
about the complaint, he called his supervisor, Qiunton Gillson. As a result of what was
explained to him, he decided to conduct a preliminary investigation for purposes of
reporting to his employers. Upon his request, the complainant penned a statement of
what had occurred to her. On considering the content of the statement, he called upon
the accused and informed him that the complainant had alleged that he had raped her.
The accused first responded that he knew ‘it would come to this’. In order to equip
himself to report to his employers and probably to cover himself, he asked the accused to
make a written statement in response to the allegations in terms of company policy
regarding complaints by a student guest. After the complainant had completed her
statement, she was taken to a private doctor who said he was unable to treat her
properly. She was then referred to the Greenacres Private hospital in Port Elizabeth to
which she was then taken. There she was examined by Dr Conradie who recorded his
finding on the customary medico-legal form. She then went to the police station in Port
Elizabeth to lay a charge of rape. She was referred to the Paterson Police Station
because it had jurisdiction over the area where the alleged offence occurred. She was
taken to the Paterson Police Station where she laid a charge of rape against the
accused. As a result the accused was arrested and this culminated in his appearance in
the High Court in Grahamstown.

The Trial
[8] The accused pleaded not guilty and explained that he indeed engaged in sexual
intercourse with the complainant but it was consensual. During the trial the State sought
to admit the statement made by the accused to Gillson, even though it was exculpatory. It
turned out that Gillson had told the accused that no charges had been laid – indeed none
had been laid at that time. Its admissibility was contested and this resulted in a trial-
within-a-trial. In the end the statement was admitted into evidence. It afforded the State a
tool to cross examine the accused. The statement was indeed used to cross-examine the
accused but fortunately the judge in the court below chose to ignore the contents of the
statement and, it seems, all that flowed from cross-examination regarding the statement.
It is just as well that this was ignored in assessing the evidence because I have serious
reservations as to the correctness of the admissibility of that statement into evidence. A
number of other exhibits were admitted by agreement and included a photograph album
and the medico-legal report.

[9] The State lead the evidence of Laura Sloan. The evidence was essentially
common cause and it basically related to the events of the night of 3 to 4 September
2010 at the lodge prior to the alleged rape. Her evidence was not seriously challenged
and was correctly accepted as the truth.

[10] The complainant also testified at the trial. She confirmed the evidence about her
trip to South Africa and her placement at Shamwari. She also confirmed the evidence of
what occurred on the Friday night – early Saturday morning – as far as she could
remember. She also testified about her illness regarding the brain tumour, the treatment
and the effects thereof. She explained that at times she would become susceptible to
stress and consequently, had been granted special allowances during school hours and
additional time to complete examinations. She also said that during her short period at
Shamwari, she found the physical activities exhausting but had nonetheless enjoyed
them.

[11] She confirmed that during the outing she became ill after consuming some alcohol
and as far as she could remember, she experienced the symptoms of seizure. In
particular she testified about the period when she was alone in bed at about 5h00 on the
Saturday morning. She said that she woke up when she became aware that her panties
were being pulled down her legs and that when she opened her eyes, she saw that it was
the accused who was doing it. He was alone with her in the bedroom. She pulled her legs
up but he pulled them down by pulling at her ankles. She blacked out again. She was
then again awoken by a pain in the region of her lower stomach. She opened her eyes
and she discovered the accused on top of her and he was rocking back and forth. His
mouth was on one of her breasts. She realised that she was completely naked. As he
lifted his body – probably when she felt less pressure of his body on her – she tried to
fight him off by pushing him away. He pushed her hands away from him. She stated that
she said ‘no, no, no’. The accused told her to stop that and put his hand over her mouth.
He told her to put her arms around him and moved one of her arms onto his shoulder.
When she removed it, he slapped her lightly on the cheek. He then told her to kiss him.
When he moved his lips towards her mouth, she turned her head to the side. She then
managed to pull some of the bedding over her face. She realised that she was being
raped. She lay still in that position until he stopped. When he got off her, she immediately
sat on the side of the bed and faced the window. She explained that she was extremely
confused and that she remembers that she was concerned about whether he had used a
condom or not. She started looking for it on the floor and in the bin.

[12] She remembers that the accused asked her what was wrong. She did not
respond. In looking for the condom, she saw her brassiere on Sloan’s bed, and put it on.
She then went to the bathroom in order to clean herself. She did so with toilet paper and
discovered a white mucous on the toilet paper. On emerging from the bathroom again,
she went to sit on the bed. The accused was still in the room. According to her, she had
difficulty in conceptualising why and how this rape occurred. She asked him what just
happened. In response, the accused asked her what had happened a few times. She
described how the accused then sat down next to her on the bed when she started to
shake. He put his arm around her and told her to lean her head on his shoulder. She did
not do so and he then tilted her head against his shoulder with his hand. He then asked
her if she wanted him to leave and invited her to say whatever she wanted to about him

and call him whatever she wanted to call him. She in fact referred to him by a crude slang
reference to a penis to which he just laughed. She then told him that she could not
believe that he had just 'taken advantage' of her. The accused responded by saying that
it was a harsh accusation to make and became angry. At the same time he told her how
he had looked after her the whole night, how he had saved her life by putting a spoon in
her mouth to prevent her swallowing her tongue during the seizures. He asked
sarcastically if that was the gratitude she had for all that he had done for her. As he left
she sarcastically said to him 'thanks for the spoon'.

[13] The State also called Dr Conradie to testify. He had noted in the medico-legal
report general redness around the labia of the vagina of the complainant, generalised
redness and swelling in the entire fossa navicularis in the area of where the hymen is
expected to be found as well as two small superficial tears on the posterior of the
fourchette, from which there was bleeding. Further internal gynaecological examination
was not done because the complainant was experiencing pain and discomfort in the area
which required examinations. He concluded that full sexual intercourse with full
penetration had occurred with the complainant. He prescribed anti-retroviral treatment as
a precaution as well as antibiotics. Pregnancy and what is known as Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) tests were also conducted by way of blood tests. He
conceded that from his findings, he could not exclude the possibility that the injuries and
symptoms which he noted could also have been caused during consensual sexual
intercourse.

[14] Quinton Gillson also testified. His evidence was unchallenged and was essentially
as set out above. It was correctly accepted as the truth in the court below.

[15] The State also lead the evidence of Detective Warrant Officer Marshall, the
commanding officer of the Paterson detective unit, who had arrested the accused. The
State sought to rely on his evidence as to what transpired between him and the accused.
The court below rejected his evidence and did not rely on anything he testified to.
Nothing more need be said about his evidence.

[16] The State sought to lead the evidence of Dr Helen Spoudeas a medical specialist
paediatrician and endocrinologist who focuses on brain tumours. She holds a doctorate
in the diagnosis and treatment of children with brain tumours. She is recognised
internationally and is a European expert in the field particularly on the late effects of brain
tumours and the related treatment as well as the long term assessment and treatment of
children who have survived brain tumours. She is involved in research with about 200
child patients. Her credentials were not questioned in the court below nor on appeal.
However because Dr Spoudeas was very much sought after and is so committed that
she was unable to travel to South Africa to testify, an application to lead her evidence by
way of what is referred to as a video-conference was launched by the State in terms of s
158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The application was opposed on various
grounds. After argument, the application was granted and the evidence of Dr Spoudeas
was received by video-conference. On appeal the ruling to receive her evidence was not
attacked and there is no reason to deal with this aspect any further.

[17] Dr Spoudeas testified that she was very familiar with the situation of the
complainant and had been treating her since she was 7 or 8 years old. She was
accordingly also familiar with the pathology experienced by the complainant.

[18] It is perhaps prudent to deal with her evidence relating to endocrinology. She
explained that endocrinology is the study of hormones. In particular she explained that
hormones which originate from the central pituitary axes, (the central area of the brain
which controls the essential rhythms relating to one’s conscious cycles - sleeping
patterns and also body responses to certain stimuli) convey vital information from the
central pituitary axes to certain parts of the body and facilitate body reactions to various
conditions and stimuli. She went further to explain that these hormones control body
rhythms and accordingly permit the habits of waking up and going to sleep. Many of
these functions are vital and any imbalance or deficiency in regard thereto would cause
abnormality which could be life threatening. She said that children who are treated for
cancer, in particular brain tumours are prone to develop pituitary axes deficiencies as a
result of the treatment they receive to deal with the tumours. This, in turn, affects the

glands which produce the hormones and, as I understand this evidence, results in
imbalances in these important hormonal requirements.

[19] Dr Spoudeas testified that in 2000, the complainant presented with an optic
glaucoma which required high dose radiation therapy. As a result of receiving this
treatment she suffered from a permanent growth hormone deficiency. Tests have also
shown that the complainant has a marginal response in her cortisol, the stress hormone.
She explained that cortisol, an important life saving hormone, is essential for one’s daily
rhythm. Cortisol levels also play an important role in dealing with stress. She testified that
the complainant’s cortisol level tested at 480 while the normal level should read between
500 and 550. She further testified that both the aforementioned hormones affect the
production of blood sugar. The effect of the medical regime (as was required by the
complainant), is that if confronted with a stressful situation, she would be unable call on
sufficient cortisol to respond to the stress and this would in turn induce a low blood sugar
level. The deficiencies would restrict any reversal of the low blood sugar level which
would occur in normal circumstances. According to Dr Spoudeas, low blood sugar level
could lead to fitting or epilepsy or seizures and if left untreated, could lead to deep coma
and even death.

[20] Dr Spoudeas took into consideration that prior to the seizures, the complainant
had (a) consumed some liquor – intoxication occurs more readily and quicker in females
than in males (this she said, was based on clinical evidence) and (b) had not eaten very
much – her glucose levels would already be low and the intake of alcohol would have
stunted the production of body glucose and concluded that the complainant’s pathology
regarding the brain tumour, were alcohol related. She described a seizure where the
person’s limbs move involuntarily and where the head jerks as a clonic tonic seizure. She
said that in such an event, it was to be expected that the person would be in a post-ictal
state – state of mind of a person just after suffering a seizure. She explained that a
person in a post-ictal state would be conscious of having experienced the seizure and
may typically have a blurred memory of what had occurred. She further describes that in
a post-ictal state, the person may be in a deep sleep and may appear not fully conscious
though such a person may become aware of some sensation such as touch or pain and

could respond to this. However the person would still be in a state of confusion during the
recovery period though the effects of the alcohol would be wearing off. She stated that
given the history of the intake of alcohol late the Friday night, and the seizures at
approximately 2h30, it was to be expected that by 5h30, the complainant would be in the
latter stages of a post-ictal state. The reaction to pain and touch would be greater, her
memory would be less blurred and her confusion would be less obvious than it was
during its peak period of the pathology.

[21] Dr Spoudeas said the account of the complainant that she was slipping in and out
of consciousness and that she was not aware of certain events she was told of is
consistent with a person, having suffered a series of seizures, in a post-ictal state. In
response to being asked to comment on certain aspects which were raised with the
complainant on behalf of the accused, she explained that the sensation the complainant
felt when her panties were being removed is suggestive of her being in a post-ictal state
but more conscious than earlier after the seizures (clearly in a state of recovery). She
also explained that in the post-ictal state, even during a state of recovery, a measure of
confusion is to be expected. As I understand her evidence the confusion would diminish
in the process of recovery and simultaneously her reaction to pain would also improve.

[22] The accused also testified and essentially confirmed the evidence about the
occurrences that night and early morning as already set out, save for what occurred in
the complainant’s room when he was alone with her at about 5h00. He stated that at
about 4h30 that morning, he went outside from the lounge of the lodge where he was
sitting with some of the students listening to music to smoke and relieve himself. When
he returned, he found that the students had all gone to sleep. He packed up and went to
his room. It then dawned on him that he should again go and check on the complainant
for his own peace of mind. When he opened her bedroom door, he found her awake and
sitting up on the edge of the bed. The bedside light was on and she had wrapped the
duvet around herself. He enquired about her health. She said she was feeling better but
wanted to know what had happened. He then went to sit next to her on the bed and
briefly explained that she had become heavily intoxicated and he had carried her to her
bed and asked some of the girls to make her comfortable.

[23] He further explained that after informing her of what had happened, she leaned
her head against his shoulder and he placed his arm around her shoulder. They
remained sitting like that until the complainant turned her head towards him and kissed
him passionately. He reacted positively to this by kissing her with equal passion. As he
put it, as this developed both of them continued kissing each other while laying on the
bed and that the passion then heigtened to the extent that they started caressing each
other. He testified that she then loosened his belt. This led to him removing his trousers.
The kissing and caressing then intensified. At some point he rolled onto her and started
having sexual intercourse with her. She did not object to or protest against this. The
import of his testimony in this regard is that she was an active participant and was not a
dispassionate partner. He added that she asked him not to ejaculate inside her, a request
he adhered to. Afterwards, they lay next to each other until he noticed that the sun was
beginning to rise. He then decided to leave and got up. When he began to dress the
complainant covered herself with the duvet and went to the bathroom. By the time she
returned, he had already put on his clothes he kissed her on the forehead and then left.

[24] Another significant part of his evidence was that when he was confronted by
Gillson with the complaint, he thought it related to having sexual intercourse with a
student guest and it was in response to that notion that he prefaced his response with the
exclamation that ‘he expected it to come to this’. He explained that he felt obliged to
make a statement (in regard to his employment status) and did not mention the sexual
intercourse with the complainant as he did not want to risk his occupation or his
marriage. In addition he testified that he did not want to say too much as it might be used
to his prejudice. He therefore made an exculpatory statement.
On Appeal
[25] As is apparent from the above, the version of the accused is substantially different
from that of the complainant’s. The issue on the merits is therefore whether there was
consensual sexual intercourse between the complainant and the accused. In other words
whether the State has discharged the onus resting upon it to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused had raped the complainant.

[26] Mr Price who appeared for the accused submitted that the court below had
misdirected itself firstly, by ignoring the many inconsistencies in the complainant's
testimony when measured against her statement to the police and also her statement to
Gillson and secondly, by relying on the evidence of Dr Spoudeas who had not examined
the complainant after the alleged rape and was therefore not in a position to testify about
her condition at the time it occurred or shortly thereafter. He submitted that if these
aspects had properly been considered by the court below, it would have concluded that
the State had not discharged the onus of proving the accused's guilt or that the version of
the accused was reasonably possibly true in the circumstances and therefore entitled to
be acquitted of the charge.

[27] As was pointed out in the judgment of the court below that earlier the accused was
wary that he should be cautious in his dealing with the complainant so as to avoid any
suggestion of impropriety on his part. Quite apart from the legal problems he might face,
he was also mindful of company policy prohibiting any relationship with students. The
accused had nevertheless gone to the complainant’s room alone in the early hours of the
morning. He chose to go and sit next to her on the bed when, if he was only interested in
her health, he need not have entered the bedroom as if he thought he should, he could
have sat on the stool which is clearly depicted in one of the photographs of the inside of
her room. His version that it was the complainant who had initiated the kissing, that she
had loosened his belt and that she was a willing participant in this occurrence which
culminated in sexual intercourse is improbable. It is so because it is hardly likely that a
person that had just been through multiple seizures and had vomited on herself, and in
particular her hair, would have developed an urge to engage in sexual intercourse in
those circumstances.

[28] Mr Price submitted further that it was improbable that the accused would have
raped the complainant with the bedroom light on and the door unlocked and
consequently his version should be accepted as reasonably possibly true. The flaw in this
argument is that it is common cause that sexual intercourse occurred between them
while the light was on and the door unlocked. Yet he knew that even on his version he
was transgressing company policy in those circumstances. The probabilities in this

regard therefore do not detract from the complainant’s version and consequently this
factor does not enhance his version at all since if this event was consensual, the ever
mindful accused would have taken the trouble of locking the door at heart when he took
off his trousers. Furthermore, his evidence that he did not have a conversation about how
he saved her life with the spoon cannot be true. Her knowledge of the significance of the
spoon, which she saw in her room, begs the question as to how she got to know why it
was in her room. His explanation that he thought that Gillson was referring to consensual
intercourse with the complainant is disingenuous simply because he was confronted with
the complaint of rape. If he had not committed rape then he could hardly have ‘expected’
to be confronted with such allegations. The accused was a poor witness. The rejection of
his evidence as being improbable and not being reasonably possibly true cannot be
faulted. There was no misdirection in arriving at that conclusion.

[29] That however is not the end of the matter. It still remains for the State to discharge
the onus it carries. As Maya JA stated at para [14] of Monageng v S [2009] I All SA 237
(SCA) –
‘[14]
But whilst it is entirely permissible for a court to test an accused’s evidence against the
probabilities, it is improper to determine his or her guilt on a balance of probabilities. The
standard of proof remains proof beyond reasonable doubt, ie evidence with such a high degree of
probability that the ordinary reasonable man, after mature consideration, comes to the conclusion
that there exists no reasonable doubt that an accused has committed the crime.’

[30] In assessing whether the State has discharged the onus of proving its case
against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it must consider all the evidence in
arriving at a conclusion whether to convict or acquit an accused. In S v Van der Meyden
1999 (1) SACR 447 (WLD) at 449h – 450b, Nugent J said the following:
‘A court does not base its conclusion, whether it be to convict or to acquit, on only part of the
evidence. The conclusion which it arrives at must account for all the evidence. Although the
dictum of Van der Spuy AJ was cited without comment in S v Jaffer 1988 (2) SA 84 (C), it is
apparent from the reasoning in that case that the Court did not weigh the 'defence case' in
isolation. It was only by accepting that the prosecution witness might have been mistaken (see
especially at 89J - 90B) that the Court was able to conclude that the accused's evidence might be
true.

I am not sure that elaboration upon a well-established test is necessarily helpful. On the contrary,
it might at times contribute to confusion by diverting the focus of the test. The proper test is that
an accused is bound to be convicted if the evidence establishes his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and the logical corollary is that he must be acquitted if it is reasonably possible that he
might be innocent. The process of reasoning which is appropriate to the application of that test in
any particular case will depend on the nature of the evidence which the court has before it. What
must be borne in mind, however, is that the conclusion which is reached (whether it be to convict
or to acquit) must account for all the evidence. Some of the evidence might be found to be false;
some of it might be found to be unreliable; and some of it might be found to be only possibly false
or unreliable; but none of it may simply be ignored.’

This approach was followed and approved in S v Chabalala 2003 (1) SACR 134 (SCA)
para 15. It was stated therein as follows:
‘The correct approach is to weigh up all the elements which point towards the guilt of the accused
against all those which are indicative of his innocence, taking proper account of inherent
strengths and weaknesses, probabilities and improbabilities on both sides and, having done so,
to decide whether the balance weighs so heavily in favour of the State as to exclude any
reasonable doubt about the accused’s guilt. The result may prove that one scrap of evidence or
one defect in the case for either party (such as the failure to call a material witness concerning an
identity parade) was decisive but that can only be an ex post facto determination and a trial court
(and counsel) should avoid the temptation to latch on to one (apparently) obvious aspect without
assessing it in the context of the full picture presented in evidence.’1

[31] Mr Price argued that the complainant was a single witness in regard to the
material aspects involved in this event. He argued that the circumstances are such that
the evidence of the complainant requires to be examined very carefully before it can be
accepted so as to form a foundation by which the State could discharge the onus of
proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. He submitted that her
evidence required to be corroborated. He correctly did not argue that this was more so
because the matter at hand was one involving an alleged sexual violation (See: S v
Jackson 1998 (1) SACR 470 (SCA)).

1 See also: S v Van Aswegen 2001 (2) SACR 97 (SCA)

[32] Mr Price referred to inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence when measured
against the contents of the two statements she had previously made. He attacked her
evidence on the basis that she resorted to an alleged confused state of mind at the
material time in attempting to explain away these discrepancies. His submission in this
regard is consistent with the version of the accused that the complainant was in fact
conscious at the time and was alert to what she was doing and what was happening.

[33] Save to say that absent an acceptable explanation for the discrepencies, the State
might very well have had difficulty in discharging the required onus. The discrepencies
referred to by Mr Price included matters such as her failure to mention certain aspects in
either of her statements, such as where her panties were, where her brassiere was
found, and so forth. In what follows, it is unnecessary to deal with the details of the
contradictions referred to by Mr Price.

[34] Mr Price also argued that if the complainant was indeed in a state of confusion,
how is it possible that she able to remember certain aspects of what occurred to her that
morning viz that it was the accused who was raping her, that she was unable to scream;
how in this confused state she had the presence of mind to look for a condom; that she
put on a brassiere just after being raped and that she had the presence of mind to check
the time.

[35] The explanation for her inability to testify about certain details is to be found in the
evidence of Dr Spoudeas. Immediately prior to Dr Spoudeas’ evidence being lead, Mr
Price objected to it being taken by way of video transmission. The court below ruled that
application to do so be granted. He wisely did not raise that objection on appeal. What he
did submit however is that the court below misdirected itself in having regard to her
evidence because she had not examined the complainant after the incident. This
submission is clearly wrong as it misconstrues the nature of the evidence of Dr
Spoudeas. Dr Spoudeas did not suggest that her testimony was complainant specific
about the rape. Her evidence was indeed of a clinical nature explaining the chemical
reactions to the treatment of a brain tumour. Furthermore she testified to the effects of

such treatment in particular the effects of essential hormones which generally control
human life eg. sleeping and waking up. Of note is her evidence that the effects of alcohol
intake by a person presenting with the ailment the complainant was treated for, was that
the already dangerous levels of these important hormones and also the sugar levels, was
exactly as the complainant described – experiencing violent vomiting and seizures, falling
in and out of a conscious state, improving with time and after approximately 5 hours she
would have been more alert than earlier, capable of better bodily feeling than earlier and
capable of sporadic memory. Her memory would be blurry in regard to certain aspects of
her experience while in regard to others, it would be non-existent and even further it
would be quite clear.

[36] The evidence of Dr Spoudeas was accepted as providing an understanding of the
condition of the complainant and explains her reactions to the intake of alcohol. The court
below was correct in accepting the evidence of Dr Spoudeas. Consequently, taking into
consideration her evidence, it becomes clear that the complainant was still suffering from
the effects of the intake of alcohol and in particular the seizures. She was clearly not in a
condition to realise everything that was happening to her and hence her inability to give a
clear account of events. She readily conceded that in the circumstances she had, in
trying to understand what had happened to her, resorted to some reconstruction of
events. However, what is significant is that from the time she felt the pain in her lower
stomach until the time when the sexual intercourse ended and the accused left, she was
awake and alert. While her memory might be blurred, she was not unconscious at the
material time. Her version of the evening’s events prior to her being raped is corroborated
by Sloan. Her inability to give a cohesive account of certain insignificant details when she
was raped gels with the evidence of Dr Spoudeas. The court below who saw the
complainant when she testified, found her to be a candid and truthful witness and the
record certainly lends itself to that conclusion. There is no reason to conclude that her
evidence is false or incorrect on the material aspects. Her evidence can therefore be
relied upon as being satisfactory in all material respects. Taking a holistic view of all the
evidence, it is clear that the State proved the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt and the appeal against the conviction falls to be dismissed.

[37] I come now to the State’s appeal against the sentence. At the commencement of
the trial, the accused was aware that in the event of a conviction, the State would seek to
invoke s 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. The sub-section
provides for the imposition of a minimum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment if no
substantial and compelling circumstances as envisaged in subsection 51(3), which would
otherwise allow for a deviation of the prescribed sentence, are found to exist.

[38] The evidence of State witness, Ms Smit, Neuro-Psychologist attached to the
University College, London College, was also received by way of video-conference in
terms of s 158 of Act 51 of 1977. Her evidence is relevant because Ms Smit was part of
the team which treated the complainant in respect of her brain tumour. It seems that after
the accused was convicted, Ms Smit was requested by the State to prepare and submit
an updated report focussing on the rape of the complainant. Such evidence is
undoubtedly relevant in considering whether substantial and compelling circumstances
exists and, if so, in considering an appropriate sentence.

[39] The personal circumstances of the accused which were taken into account by the
court below are the following. At the time of sentencing he was a 30 year old male with a
clean record. He is a university graduate having read for a Bachelors degree in Media
Studies. He was married and his family and social circumstances were accepted as
good. He was a high achiever at school both academically and in sport. He was a
talented musician and is evidently an able leader. When he was employed at the
Philharmonic Society in Port Elizabeth he was involved in teaching music in
underprivileged communities. It also seems that he apologised for his indiscretion of
having sexual intercourse with the complainant. The court below accepted that to this
extent he had taken responsibility for the situation he finds himself in.

[40] On the other hand, the accused was employed at the material time as a student
co-ordinator and the 18 year old complainant, together with the other students, was
placed in his trust and care.

[41] Ms Smit having examined the complainant, testified that the complainant will suffer
negatively from the rape, both on a long and short-term basis. She concluded that the
complainant is putting up a veil of defence to protect herself against the full impact of the
rape on her by repressing her emotional responses thereto and to an extent, was in a
state of denial. According to Ms Smit, these protection techniques allow her to function
with apparent ease in her day to day life but they stunt her ability to process the effect of
the rape. She states that in repressing her emotions, the complainant becomes self-
critical and has negative thoughts about herself. This is consistent with a cognitive
response to her trauma and while they assist her on a day to day basis, they are
destructive and have the distinct capability of affecting her negatively in the long-term. Ms
Smit testified that the complainant regards this rape as a serious setback in her quest to
build an independent life as a survivor of a life threatening illness.

[42] Ms Smit stated that generally, the state of mind of victims of rape are not fully
restored. Therapy and counselling may ameliorate the effect of the rape trauma but it
cannot be completely undone. The complainant, she suggested, would require such
therapy but added that she will continue to have long-term traumatic consequences.

[43] It seems that the court below found that, (a) the accused had the ability to
contribute to society; (b) that he was not an obvious threat to society; (c) the rape was
not accompanied by additional violence; (d) there was no threat of violence during or
after the rape and (e) this kind of conduct was not expected of a person of the character
and background of the accused, taken cumulatively, constituted mitigation which would
render the imposition of the minimum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment an injustice,
destructive of his person and would defeat the overriding interest of society to rehabilitate
the offender back into society. In light hereof and the fact that the learned judge in the
court below deviated from the prescribed minimum sentence, it is obvious that he found
substantial and compelling circumstances to exist. There are two other factors which the
learned judge in the court below mentioned viz that he was a first offender and that he
had expressed some remorse to his mother in regard to his conduct. The court accepted
that he took responsibility for the situation he found himself in. I will assume in his favour
that these two factors were also considered as mitigating.

[44] Ms Turner for the State contended that the court below had misdirected itself in
taking into account as mitigating factors that (a) there was a lack of additional violence
other than that inherently involved in the rape (b) regarding his character and his
background as a mitigating factor and (c) the remorse attributed to the accused was not
related to the crime but more self pity.

[45] On the other hand Mr Price submitted that the court below had taken everything
into account and that this court should be loathe to interfere therewith and punish the
accused even more than he has already been.

[46] The approach to substantial and compelling circumstances was dealt with in S v
Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA). At para 25 Marais JA, writing for the court set out
what has essentially become a guideline approach to sentences for listed offences as
follows:
‘[25]
What stands out quite clearly is that courts are a good deal freer to depart from the
prescribed sentences than has been supposed in some of the preciously decided cases and that
it is they who are to judge whether or not the circumstances of any particular case are such as to
justify a departure. However, in doing so, they are to respect, and not merely pay lip service to,
the Legislature’s view that the prescribed periods of imprisonment are to be taken to be ordinarily
appropriate when crimes of the specified kind are committed. In summary –
A. Section 51 has limited but eliminated the courts’ discretion in imposing sentence in respect of
offences referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 (or imprisonment for other specified periods for
offences listed in other part of Schedule 2).
B. Courts are required to approach the imposition of sentence conscious that the Legislature has
ordained life imprisonment (or the particular prescribed period of imprisonment) as the sentence
that should ordinarily and in the absence of weighty justification be imposed for the listed crimes
in the specified circumstances.
C. Unless there are, and can be seen to be, truly convincing reasons for a different response, the
crimes in question are therefore required to elicit a severe, standardised and consistent response
from the courts.
D. The specified sentences are not to be departed from lightly and for flimsy reasons. Speculative
hypotheses favourable to the offender, undue sympathy, aversion to imprisoning first offenders,
personal doubts as to the efficacy of the policy underlying the legislation, and marginal

differences in personal circumstances or degrees of participation between co-offenders are to be
excluded.
E. The Legislature has however deliberately left it to the courts to decide whether the
circumstances of any particular case call for a departure from the prescribed sentence. While the
emphasis has shifted to the objective gravity of the type of crime and the need for effective
sanctions against it, this does not mean that all other considerations are to be ignored.
F. All factors (other than those set out in D above) traditionally taken into account in sentencing
(whether or not they diminish moral guilt) thus continue to play a role; none is excluded at the
outset from consideration in the sentencing process.
G. The ultimate impact of all the circumstances relevant to sentencing must be measured against
the composite yardstick ('substantial and compelling') and must be such as cumulatively justify a
departure from the standardised response that the Legislature has ordained.
H. In applying the statutory provisions, it is inappropriately constricting to use the concepts
developed in dealing with appeals against sentence as the sole criterion.
I. If the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the particular case is satisfied
that they render the prescribed sentence unjust in that it would be disproportionate to the crime,
the criminal and the needs of society, so that an injustice would be done by imposing that
sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser sentence.
J. In so doing, account must be taken of the fact that crime of that particular kind has been
singled out for severe punishment and that the sentence to be imposed in lieu of the prescribed
sentence should be assessed paying due regard to the bench mark which the Legislature has
provided.’

[47] It is noteworthy that in part ‘D’, it is clearly stated that specified sentences should
not be departed from lightly and for flimsy reasons. It further sets out which types of
factors should be excluded from consideration. On the other hand, in part ‘E’, the
approach also allows for all the factors traditionally considered in respect of sentence, to
be included in the overall consideration in the sentencing process. The general approach
as set out in Malgas found support and approval in S v Fatyi 2001 (1) SACR 485 (SCA)
and has been followed since.

[48] In this case, the lack of evidence that the accused did not have a propensity for
such conduct is of no moment. While the legislature has essentially left it for the courts to
deal with sentence, is has ordained prescribed sentences. In particular, it has provided a
sentence for first offenders and consequently, being a first offender does not justify taking

into account the fact that he may or may not have a propensity to commit a crime of this
nature. Indeed sentence for second and subsequent offenders are specifically provided
for in the subsection. The court below clearly misdirected itself in adopting this approach
in regard to this factor. It similarly misdirected itself by concluding that the absence of
additional violence constituted a mitigating factor. The fact of the matter is that rape is
itself a violent intrusion of the rights of the victim. The lack of a threat of violence or
aggression afterwards also does not favour the accused. Such factors if they existed,
may well have lead to a harsher sentence. However their absence cannot serve to
benefit the accused in deciding whether substantial and compelling circumstances exist.

[49] It is not clear from the judgment whether the learned judge in the court below
actually put all the factors, both aggravating and mitigating, into the melting pot as
suggested in Malgas.

[50] The accused, a stranger to the complainant, raped her soon after she had multiple
seizures and when she was, at best for him, asleep. He did so when he was in a position
of trust and indeed betrayed that trust. The complainant has been traumatised by the
rape and is likely to have long-term residual effects as alluded to by Ms Smit.

[51] On the other hand, it is true that the accused had the potential to contribute to
society and that he has a good family and social background. However, the accused’s
remorse was not directed at either the complainant or the actual crime itself. It was more
a matter of apologising for being in the predicament. To the extent that it was used to
favour the accused, it should not have been considered as a mitigating factor in the
circumstances.

[52] The mitigating factors and the aggravating circumstances, especially the residual
effects on the complainant as explained by Ms Smit, ought to have been balanced
against each other in assessing whether substantial and compelling circumstances
existed or not. Even if all the mitigating and aggravating factors were balanced by the

court below, measured against the guidelines as set out in Malgas, it was wrong to
conclude that substantial and compelling circumstances do exist. Neither would the
imposition of the prescribed minimum sentence be disproportionate to the offence itself
and the circumstances in which this offence was committed. The court below therefore
misdirected itself in concluding that substantial and compelling circumstances indeed
exist and ought to have found that none existed.

[53] The effect of this is that the accused must be sentenced in terms of s 51(2) of Act
105 of 1997. The minimum period of imprisonment in the case of a first offender, as is the
accused, is 10 years.

[54] The State contented itself with the minimum prescribed sentence of 10 years’
imprisonment and did not suggest a harsher period of imprisonment. The appeal against
sentence therefore succeeds.

[55] In the result, the following order is made:
1 The appeal against conviction is dismissed.
2 The appeal against sentence is upheld.
3 The sentence imposed by the court below is set aside and substituted with the
following:
‘The accused is sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.’

R PILLAY

JUDGE OF APPEAL

Appearances:

For Appellant:

Mr T N Price (appearing pro bono)

Instructed by

Legal Aid South Africa, Grahamstown

Legal Aid South Africa, Bloemfontein

For Respondent:

Ms N Turner

Instructed by

Director of Public Prosecutions, Grahamstown

Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
03 June 2013
Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and does not
form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

McLaggan v The State (084/13) [2013] ZACSA 92 (June 2013)

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) today dismissed an appeal from the Eastern Cape
High Court, Grahamstown against a conviction of Iain Cameron McLaggan on one count of
rape.

The complainant, a British national, is a brain tumour survivor. She travelled to South
Africa and commenced a wildlife programme at Shamwari Game Reserve in April 2010.
The appellant was one of those to whom she was entrusted at the reserve.

The treatment for the brain tumor caused a hormonal imbalance and the complainant
consequently became susceptible to stress related reactions. As a result of consuming
wine during a night out with fellow students and the appellant, she suffered seizures which
rendered her unconscious at the time. The appellant returned to her room to which he had
earlier carried her and raped her whilst she was recovering.

In sentencing the appellant, the trial court found substantial and compelling circumstances
which allowed it to deviate from the prescribed minimum sentence for this rape and it
imposed a sentence of 8 years’ imprisonment. The State appealed against this finding.

The SCA upheld the appeal by the State and found that no such substantial and
compelling circumstances existed. The effect thereof was that the prescribed minimum
sentence had to be imposed. The sentence was therefore altered to 10 years’
imprisonment.