THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case no:   429/08

In the matter between:

NICOLAAS PETRUS KOTZÈ

Appellant
and
THE STATE

Respondent

Neutral citation: Kotzè v The State (429/08) [2009] ZASCA 93
(15 September 2009)
Coram:
HARMS DP, HEHER and SNYDERS JJA and GRIESEL
and WALLIS AJJA
Heard:
20 August 2009
Delivered:  15 September 2009
Summary: Criminal law – Police trap and undercover operation –
Contraventions of s 20 of Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 – S
252A of the Criminal Procedure Act.

ORDER

On appeal from: Cape High Court (Louw J, Saldanha AJ concurring),
on appeal from the Regional Magistrates’ Court, Bellville.

The appeal is dismissed.

JUDGMENT

WALLIS AJA (HARMS DP, HEHER and SNYDERS JJA and
GRIESEL AJA concurring.)
[1] The appellant, Nick Kotzè, is a successful businessman and a
prominent citizen of Port Nolloth. On four occasions between 14 July
2001 and 12 February 2002 he purchased unpolished diamonds from one
Frik Terblanche. In all he bought 21 diamonds for a total amount of
R63 000. Unbeknown to him (although, as will become apparent, he was
alert to the possibility) Terblanche was a senior and experienced police
officer attached to the Diamond and Gold Squad, who was operating as
an undercover agent in a covert police operation known as Project
Solitaire aimed at syndicates dealing unlawfully in diamonds in the
Namaqualand region.

[2] On the basis of Terblanche’s evidence Kotzè was convicted by the
Regional Magistrates’ Court, Bellville on four counts of purchasing
unpolished diamonds in contravention of s 20 of the Diamonds Act 56 of
1986. He was sentenced on each count to pay a fine of R8 000, with an

alternative of 18 months imprisonment. In addition a further sentence of
18 months imprisonment was imposed, but suspended on certain
conditions. An appeal against his conviction to the Cape High Court was
dismissed. With the leave of that court he comes on further appeal to this
Court. The appeal is confined to one against conviction only. The only
ground advanced in support of the appeal is that in terms of s 252A(3) of
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 the magistrate should have
declined to admit the evidence of Terblanche. In that event there would
have been no admissible evidence of the transactions giving rise to the
convictions and they would fall to be set aside.

[3] The use of traps and undercover agents by the police, both for the
prevention and the detection of crime, is long established, both here and
overseas. However, because it can be seen as generating the crimes under
investigation, it is regarded as controversial as a matter of principle and,
even in circumstances where resort to its use may be thought to be
acceptable, there is room for concern because the methods adopted by the
trap or agent involve deception and can readily be abused. The underlying
fear is that people who would not otherwise be guilty of criminal
behaviour may be induced by the conduct of the trap or undercover agent
to commit crimes and their reluctance to commit crime may be overborne
by the conduct and inducements offered by the trap or undercover agent.
Our courts have in a number of cases expressed concern about the
conduct of traps and it was the subject of an investigation and report by
the South African Law Commission.1 That in turn resulted in the statutory
regulation of the admissibility of evidence derived from the activities of
traps and undercover agents in the form of s 252A of the Criminal
Procedure Act, although the section as ultimately enacted is in material

1 South African Law Commission Report, Project 84, The Application of the Trapping System.

respects different from that proposed by the Law Commission. This
appeal raises the interpretation and application of that section.

[4]      The background to the case is that in about 2000 the police decided
to undertake Operation Solitaire to address the widespread problem of
syndicates engaged in unlawful dealing in diamonds in the Namaqualand
region. Terblanche, who at that stage held the rank of inspector, was
selected as the undercover agent. He and his wife would move to Port
Nolloth on the pretext that he had retired from the police force and was
now a pensioner. There he would make himself known to local people
and seek to become accepted as part of the local community, a process
that it was anticipated would take some nine months. Thereafter he would
engage with various suspects (and possibly others he came to suspect as a
result of his activities) in ways that it was thought would lead to either the
purchase or sale of unpolished diamonds in contravention of the
Diamonds Act. In doing so he would garner the evidence that would then
be used against those persons in subsequent criminal trials. The operation
was expected to last some two years.

[5] Kotzè was one such suspect whose name was given to Terblanche
as a target to be approached. He is a prominent person in the Port Nolloth
community having served for 27 years as a town councillor, 11 of them as
mayor. He operates a motor retail business in the town and also runs a
small shop and café from the same premises. Apart from this business he
owns three farms, some 20 kilometres from Port Nolloth, and another
farm across the border in Namibia that is leased to a company in the
Anglo American group for a rental said at the trial to be in excess of
R1 million per year. He owns and leases residential and business
properties in Port Nolloth and elsewhere. He has over the years been

involved in the diamond industry, in prospecting for, mining, cutting and
polishing diamonds, although at the time of these events he had ceased
these activities, apart from having a stake in two diamond mining
operations for which a licence was held in his son’s name and a share in a
diamond cutting business. Overall it is clear that he is person of financial
substance and some wealth. He is also involved in the local congregation
of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk and testified that it was
customary for him and his wife to entertain members of the congregation
at their home after the services each Sunday with tea and coffee and
general hospitality and discussion about church affairs and religious
matters. This hospitality loomed large in the evidence in this case.

[6] Terblanche arrived in Port Nolloth on 1 August 2000 and he met
Kotzè for the first time on that day in the course of looking for suitable
accommodation. Apparently he and his wife had first approached an
estate agent in the town but she had nothing available that seemed
suitable and, according to Terblanche, suggested that he should approach
Kotzè. Although some point was made of this meeting in cross-
examination, Kotzè himself did not regard it as odd or unusual, which is
not surprising because he rented out houses through an agency operated
by his daughter. Kotzè suggested a house owned by his mother but this
was unsuitable and the following day the Terblanches found a house at
McDougall’s Bay. In the course of effecting introductions Terblanche
told Kotzè that he was a retired policeman, to which he says Kotzè
responded by saying; ‘Ek is ŉ smokkelaar.’2 Kotzè said he had no
recollection of making such a comment but accepts that he might have
done so in jest. However, Terblanche seems to have taken it seriously as
it was conveyed by him to his superiors in the course of the operation.

2 ‘I am a smuggler.’

[7] After this initial incident Terblanche and his wife moved into the
house they had found on 7 September 2000 and settled into life in and
around Port Nolloth on the basis of his cover story that he was a
pensioner. It appears that the community accepted this story at face value.
The evidence does not deal in detail with any matters other than the
development of his relationship with Kotzè, but he must have been
engaged in other activities as at the end of the operation nearly two years
later 34 people were arrested for offences relating to unlawful dealing in
diamonds and, apart from the present one, he gave evidence in a number
of trials arising out of these arrests.

[8] Terblanche established a close and friendly relationship with
Kotzè. He would regularly visit him at his business both to buy a
newspaper and other small items and to chat socially and came to know
him and his family, including Kotzè’s elderly mother with whom he
would on occasions sit and have coffee. He and his wife attended the
NGK church although their affiliation had been with the Afrikaanse
Protestante Church. They were from time to time invited with other
members of the congregation to join Kotzè and his wife for tea at their
home after service. Terblanche ascertained the birthdays of Kotzè’s
children and would telephone and wish Kotzè well on these occasions. At
a later stage of the relationship they discussed personal matters such as
the death of Terblanche’s sister in January 2001, and later still the death
of one of Kotzè’s children and certain fears that Terblanche had about his
health. On one occasion in September 2001 Terblanche and his wife,
together with Mrs Kotzè, spent the day looking at the flowers for which
the area is renowned, although business prevented Kotzè from joining
them. However apart from the visits after church and occasional meals at

the Kotzè home they did not visit one another’s homes. The only
occasions on which Kotzè went to the Terblanche home were pursuant to
two of the transactions giving rise to the charges against him.

[9] The first transaction occurred on 14 July 2001 when Terblanche
sold four unpolished diamonds to Kotzè for a price of R10 000. He
describes the circumstances in which that came about as follows. On
4 April 2001 after a visit to Johannesburg Kotzè asked where he had
been. He told him he had been visiting his children and on the way back
had stayed with a diamond cutter friend whom he wanted to repair his
wife’s ring. Kotzè’s response was to say that if Terblanche had that type
of problem he could have helped and then, according to Terblanche,
added that he would also have a diamond cut and polished for him.3
Kotzè also said that if Terblanche had any other unpolished diamonds he
should bring those as well. There is some confusion in Terblanche’s
evidence whether this latter statement was made on 4 April 2001 or
during a subsequent conversation on 10 May 2001, when he approached
Kotzè on the instructions of his handlers to ascertain whether the earlier
offer to have a diamond polished still stood and, if so, what it would cost.
Be that as it may, Terblanche’s handlers were prompted by his report of
these exchanges with Kotzè to apply to the relevant authorities to use four
unpolished stones for the purpose of Terblanche making an approach to
Kotzè to have one stone polished and to sell three more. This was
approved.

[10] The sale was made on 14 July 2001 when, according to his
evidence, Terblanche went to Kotzè’s business premises and in the
latter’s office showed him the stones. Kotzè told him that he had an

3 ‘Hy sal ook vir my ŉ diamant slyp.’

appointment and that the stones could either be left there or taken away
by Terblanche and brought back on his return. Terblanche left the
diamonds in a desk drawer that Kotzè assured him was safe and returned
about 15 minutes later to be told that the diamonds had been sent to be
valued. When a message was received that the diamond cutter was not
available Kotzè asked if he would sell all four stones and Terblanche said
he would. He asked Kotzè to make him an offer and the latter wrote R10
on a desk calendar. Terblanche understood this to mean R10 000, which
he accepted. Kotzè then sent his son to fetch the money and paid it to
Terblanche, who left the premises and immediately reported the
transaction to his superior.

[11] The second sale occurred on 7 September 2001. Terblanche
testified that he visited Kotzè’s business premises on 18 August 2001 and
was asked if he had brought anything to sell.4 Terblanche answered in the
negative but assumed that the query related to unpolished diamonds and
so on 1 September he told Kotzè that he had been offered a packet of
diamonds but didn’t have the money for them. He hoped that Kotzè
would offer to take over the transaction, as this would enable him to have
a second person present. The reason for this was that the recordings he
had been trying to make on the occasion of the earlier sale were not
satisfactory. He said that Kotzè told him that if he were short of cash for
this purpose he would assist him.

[12] Terblanche returned on 7 September with four diamonds and
wearing a coat with pockets in which he had a video camera. He told
Kotzè he had brought him something and showed him the diamonds.
Kotzè’s response was to say in a whisper that he hoped that Terblanche

4 ‘Hy het my gevra of ek iets gebring het om te verkoop.’

was not trying to catch him. Kotzè then put the diamonds in the drawer of
his desk and they drove out to his farm where he had something to attend
to. During this journey Kotzè questioned Terblanche about his source for
the stones and also his background. Terblanche told him that he had left
the police force on early retirement under something of a cloud. When
they returned from the farm Kotzè said that he would give him R10 000
for the stones. At the business premises a friend of Kotzè’s, a Dr Coetzer,
was waiting and Kotzè left him and Terblanche in conversation while he
went and fetched the money. On his return Terblanche counted the money
and then left. Dr Coetzer gave evidence and confirmed the payment and
said that Kotzè told him after Terblanche left that he had got a ‘bargain’
and showed him a stone that Coetzer thought was an unpolished diamond.

[13] The third sale was effected on 14 December 2001 and involved
seven diamonds and the payment of R26 000 by Kotzè to Terblanche.
Kotzè had been away for much of the time after the second transaction.
On 7 December 2001 Inspector Bruwer, who was part of the covert
operation, gave Terblanche seven unpolished diamonds with instructions
to offer them to Kotzè. On 14 December 2001 Terblanche took the
diamonds and went to Kotzè’s business premises. He says that when he
arrived there Kotzè took him into his office and asked if he had again
obtained unpolished diamonds.5 Terblanche confirmed that he had and
showed the packet of diamonds to him. He assumed Kotzè would want to
value the diamonds and asked when he should return for his money.
Kotzè said that he would bring it to his house. That evening Kotzè came
to his house and gave him R25 000 and said that he would pay him
another R1 000, which he should collect the next day from his business.

5 ‘Hy het my gevra of ek al weer ongeslypte diamante gekry het’

The events that evening were recorded on video and will be referred to in
more detail later in this judgment.

[14] The fourth and last transaction took place on 10 February 2002 and
involved the sale of six unpolished diamonds for a price of R17 000.
According to Terblanche’s evidence its background lay in Inspector
Bruwer giving Terblanche the diamonds with instructions to offer them to
Kotzè. In discussion with Captain Farber, to whom Terblanche was
reporting, it was decided that it would be best if he could bring Kotzè to
his home rather than trying to do a deal at the latter’s business. This was
no doubt due to the problems that had been experienced with recordings
in the latter environment and the availability of the video cameras at the
house. On 24 January 2002 Terblanche accordingly left a message for
Kotzè at the business to come to his house. By chance, as he was driving
home, he encountered Kotzè driving in the opposite direction. He stopped
him and asked him to come to his house and drove off to wait for him.
Shortly thereafter Kotzè arrived and after a brief social conversation
Terblanche took him to his office to view the diamonds. As they left the
lounge Kotzè sought reassurance from Mrs Terblanche that her husband
was not still a policeman and trying to trap him. He then went into
Terblanche’s office where he was shown the diamonds. Kotzè took the
diamonds and left after a lengthy and relaxed conversation with the
Terblanches. No price was discussed at this time. Once again the events
were recorded on video.

[15] The following day Terblanche went to Kotzè’s business premises
and whilst they were sitting in the office Kotzè asked him where he had
got the diamonds he had taken the previous day. He told Terblanche that
four black men driving a red VW Golf had approached two Portuguese

men in the town in a trap using the same diamonds. (There had in fact
been an arrest of three men, two of whom were Portuguese, at a bakery in
the town as a result of a trap and this appears to have been well known.)
Terblanche told him that in that event he should give him back the
diamonds and he would sell them to a contact in Johannesburg. Kotzè
gave them back to Terblanche saying that he valued them at R17 000.

[16] Terblanche said that two Sundays later, on 3 February 2002, when
he stopped at Kotzè’s shop to buy a newspaper, Kotzè asked him if he
still had the diamonds. Terblanche told him that he intended to sell them
to his contact in Johannesburg and Kotzè responded that if he decided not
to do so his offer to buy them for R17 000 stood. The following Saturday,
9 February, Terblanche went to Kotzè’s premises and told him that he
had cancelled his visit to Johannesburg and if Kotzè was still interested
the diamonds were available. He said that he would come and see Kotzè
on the following Monday. On the Monday evening at about 10.00 pm
Kotzè arrived at his house and said that he had brought him some figs. He
told Terblanche that he should give him the diamonds but Terblanche
made an excuse about their accessibility and instead took them to him at
the business the following day. Kotzè took the diamonds and paid him the
R17 000.

[17] Much of this evidence was not disputed by Kotzè. However in the
case of each sale he disputed the circumstances in which it had come
about. He said that Terblanche had become an intimate friend of his and
that they had shared many confidences. He claimed to have been
instrumental in bringing Terblanche and his wife back to a life of faith by

inviting them to the NGK and encouraging a new religious commitment.6
He depicted himself as a person of an emotional and extremely generous
disposition7 who had been completely taken in by Terblanche’s
presentation of himself as a man who had been forced to leave the police
force early with a diminished pension and no medical aid and who was
battling financially. His impression, so he said, was that Terblanche was
in a fairly desperate financial position8 and needed to do things to
increase his income. He laid stress on the fact that Terblanche peddled
fish in a township called Sanddrif, some eighty kilometres away. He also
alleged that on at least five occasions he lent Terblanche money in
amounts varying between R1 000 and R3 000, which was always repaid.
This was hotly disputed by Terblanche and no record of the loans was
produced.

[18] Against that background of close friendship and apparent financial
need Kotzè claimed that on each occasion that he bought unpolished
diamonds from Terblanche the initiative for the transaction had come
from Terblanche. He says that Terblanche incessantly brought the subject
of diamonds into the conversation even though he begged him to desist.
According to him each time a sale was concluded, Terblanche had
approached him with a tale of financial woe and was insistent that Kotzè
should purchase the diamonds so as to assist him. Against his better
judgment and contrary to his religious beliefs and a spiritual commitment
he had made at some time in the past never again to be engaged in the

6  Terblanche’s more prosaic explanation was that he had liked the way in which the minister at the
NGK preached and had decided to attend worship there at the invitation of the minister. He also said
that the Afrikaanse Protestante Church was only a home church where worship was conducted by an
elder and that when it was pointed out to him as the place that flew the old national flag he decided that
it involved itself in politics. None of this evidence was challenged and Kotzè’s claim was not put to
either him or his wife.
7 This contrasted with the impression of Dr Coetzer who said that whilst Kotzè was friendly he always
had the impression that his approach was coloured by an attitude of ‘what’s in it for me’.
8  ‘Finansieël dit nie breed het nie.’

illegal buying and selling of diamonds, he succumbed to Terblanche’s
persistence on each occasion out of a spirit of Christian charity and a
desire to help someone in need. His broad contention, as put to
Terblanche in cross-examination by his leading counsel, was that:
‘...hierdie hele wyse waarop u te werk gegaan het met die beskuldige, die misbruik
wat u gemaak het van die kerk, van sy vriendskap, al die dinge wat ek reeds aan u
gestel het, duidelik daarop dui dat u nie net die geleentheid wou skep vir hom om ŉ
misdryf te pleeg nie, u wou hom betrap en u het gesorg dat u hom ver genoeg uitlok,
dat ŉ man met sy tipe persoonlikheid sal val vir hierdie jammerhartige figuur wat die
paar diamante wou verkoop?’9

[19] The magistrate ruled at the end of a trial within a trial that the
evidence of Terblanche was admissible. It is unfortunate that in deciding
to hold a trial within a trial the magistrate did not require Kotzè to furnish
the grounds on which he challenged the admissibility of the evidence, as
should have been done in terms of the proviso to s 252A(6). That might
have focussed attention on the pertinent matters in dispute and limited the
lengthy examination and cross-examination over a number of days of
Terblanche and Kotzè, as well as obviating the need for some other
evidence to be led. Instead a vast array of issues was traversed at
considerable length and in great detail but at the end of the day most of
this had little bearing on the central issue of admissibility. It is important
for presiding officers faced with challenges to the admissibility of the
evidence of a trap to be aware of and apply subsec (6), in terms of which
the accused must ‘furnish the grounds on which the admissibility of the
evidence is challenged’. The matter may then, in terms of subsec (7), be
adjudicated as a separate issue in dispute, ie, during a trial within a trial.

9  ‘This whole way in which you went to work with the accused, the abuse you made of the church, his
friendship, all the things I have put to you, all show clearly that you did not confine yourself to creating
an opportunity to commit the offence, but you wanted to trap him and you made sure that you tempted
him sufficiently that a man with his type of personality would fall for this type of sorry figure who
wanted to sell a few diamonds?’ (My translation.)

[20] Subsection 6 provides that the burden of proof to show that the
evidence is admissible rests on the prosecution and this burden must be
discharged on a balance of probabilities. This refers to the burden resting
on the prosecution to prove the facts on the basis of which it contends
that the evidence is admissible, whether under subsec (1) or subsec (3).
The decision as to its admissibility is a legal decision taken in accordance
with the provisions of s 252A in the light of the proved facts. Whilst the
section refers to the burden being discharged on a balance of
probabilities, it is in my prima facie view incompatible with the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the constitutional protection
of the right to silence. Those rights must be seen in the light of the
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, in which it has been held that
their effect is that the guilt of an accused person must be established
beyond reasonable doubt.10 That a confession was made freely and
voluntarily and without having been unduly induced thereto must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt and I can see no practical difference
between that case and the case where a conviction is based on the
evidence of a trap. Each deals with the proof of facts necessary to secure
the admission of the evidence necessary to prove the guilt of the accused.
In my prima facie view therefore, and in the absence of argument, in
order for the evidence of a trap to be admitted, it is necessary that the trial
court be satisfied that the basis for its admissibility has been established
beyond a reasonable doubt. That was the case here, for the reasons set out
below, so this issue does not affect the outcome of this appeal.

10  S v Zuma & others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) para 25. The cases in which the Constitutional Court has
reaffirmed the principle are collected in S v Manamela & another (Director-General of Justice
intervening) 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) fn 30.

[21] The starting point for considering the admissibility of Terblanche’s
evidence is section 252A(1) of the Act, which provides that:
‘(1)
Any law enforcement officer, official of the State or any other person
authorised thereto for such purpose (hereinafter referred to in this section as an
official or his or her agent) may make use of a trap or engage in an undercover
operation in order to detect, investigate or uncover the commission of an offence, or
to prevent the commission of any offence, and the evidence so obtained shall be
admissible if that conduct does not go beyond providing an opportunity to commit an
offence: Provided that where the conduct goes beyond providing an opportunity to
commit an offence a court may admit evidence so obtained subject to subsection (3).’
The section adopts the recommendation of the Law Commission that it is
inappropriate to introduce a defence of entrapment in South Africa and
preferable to deal with the problems surrounding the use of traps by way
of an exclusionary rule of evidence.11 Accordingly it excludes the
possibility of such a defence by explicitly stating that the use of a trap or
engaging in undercover operations in order to detect, investigate or
uncover the commission of an offence is permissible. It is not correct to
say, as does one leading commentator,12 that it is an authority to use traps
and undercover operations ‘in certain circumstances’. There is no such
qualification in the section. Absent a constitutional challenge – and there
is no such challenge in the present case – there is no room for an
argument that the use of a trap or the undertaking of undercover
operations is unlawful in South Africa.

[22] The section deals with both traps and undercover operations.
Whilst these usually go together there will be cases where an undercover
operation may involve no element of a trap. Thus for example the

11  That is also the approach in Australia, Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19; the United Kingdom, R v
Looseley [2001] 4 All ER 897 (HL) and Singapore, Mohamed Emran Bin Mohamed Ali v Public
Prosecutor [2009] 2 LRC 484.
12  E Du Toit, F J De Jager, A Paizes, A St Q Skeen and S van der Merwe, Commentary on the
Criminal Procedure Act (Revision service 42, 2009) para 1, p 24-131.

infiltration of an undercover agent into a gang planning a bank robbery, a
cash-in-transit heist or the overthrow of the government will not
necessarily involve any element of a trap, but may merely be an exercise
in obtaining information. Nonetheless it may involve infringements of
rights to privacy – as with the use of a telephone tap or some other form
of listening device – and could potentially be subject to constitutional
challenge. The section explicitly addresses that situation and provides that
such actions are permissible. It also recognises that undercover operations
may have elements of a trap and hence treats the two together. The
present case is a classic instance of an undercover operation that also
involves the use of a trap.

[23] The section lays down two approaches to the admissibility of
evidence obtained as a result of the use of a trap. Evidence is
automatically admissible if the conduct of the person concerned goes no
further than providing an opportunity to commit the offence. If the
conduct goes beyond that the court must enquire into the methods by
which the evidence was obtained and the impact that its admission would
have on the fairness of the trial and the administration of justice in order
to determine whether it should be admitted.

[24] It must be stressed that the fact that the undercover operation or
trap goes beyond providing the accused person with an opportunity to
commit the crime does not render that conduct improper or imply that
some taint attaches to the evidence obtained thereby. All that it does is
create the necessity for the trial court to proceed to the enquiry mentioned
in the previous paragraph. I stress this because there was a misconception
in this regard at the trial. At various places in the cross-examination of
Terblanche it was put to him that the section imposes constraints upon

what may be done pursuant to a trap and this suggestion is repeated
before us in the heads of argument for Kotzè. In summarising the
argument in his practice note counsel said: ‘Die getuienis van die lokvink
behoort as ontoelaatbaar gereël te word aangesien die optrede van die
lokvink verder gegaan het as die blote skepping van ŉ geleentheid om ŉ
misdryf te pleeg.’13 This is a misconception as to the effect of s 252A(1)
and it is as well therefore to lay it to rest. Section 252A(1) does not
purport to prescribe the manner in which undercover operations or traps
are to be conducted by the police. It merely distinguishes on the basis of
the manner in which the trap is conducted between instances where the
evidence thereby obtained is automatically admissible and instances
where a further enquiry is called for before the question of admissibility
can be determined.

[25] Section 252A(1) prescribes a factual enquiry into whether the
conduct of the trap goes beyond providing an opportunity to commit an
offence. Section 252A(2) describes a number of features that may
indicate to a trial court that the undercover operation or trap went beyond
providing an opportunity to commit an offence. It was conceded by the
prosecution and held by both the magistrate and the court below that the
conduct of Terblanche and this undercover operation went beyond merely
providing the opportunity for the commission of the offence.
Unfortunately the findings of both courts on this aspect were not fully
reasoned. A closer examination of the provisions of sections 252A(1) and
(2) is therefore desirable.

13 ‘The evidence of the trap ought to be ruled inadmissible because the conduct of the trap went further
than merely providing an opportunity to commit an offence.’ (My translation)

[26] The starting point is that, in each case where the evidence of a trap
is tendered and its admissibility challenged, the trial court must first
determine as a question of fact whether the conduct of the trap went
beyond providing an opportunity to commit an offence. It does that by
giving the expression its ordinary meaning and makes its decision in the
light of the factors set out in subsec (2). I accept that if one simply peers
at the language of s 252A(2) there appears to be an anomaly arising from
the fact that some matters logically anterior to the conduct of the trap
itself are to be taken into account in considering whether it went beyond
providing an opportunity to commit an offence.14 However there are
always dangers in such a linguistic analysis removed from the context of
the section as a whole and the potential anomaly may on closer
examination be more apparent than real. Thus the fact that the trap was
set without the authority of the Director of Public Prosecutions or that the
conditions set by the Director were disregarded may well indicate that the
trap went beyond providing an opportunity to commit an offence.
Otherwise they will be irrelevant. The fact that the offence in question is
of a minor nature may indicate that the effect of the trap is to place
disproportionate temptation in the path of the accused, so that it went
beyond providing an opportunity to commit an offence.

[27] If one examines the context of subsec (2) it is clear that the
legislature was concerned to identify situations that would be relevant to
and bear upon the factual enquiry postulated in subsec (1). It adopted
language taken from a leading United States decision on entrapment15 in

14 The anomaly is dealt with in Du Toit et al, 24-134 to 24-135 and has been mentioned in some
judgments. S v Odugo 2001 (1) SACR 560 (W) paras 32–34; S v Makhanya & another 2002 (3) SA
201 (N) at 206H-I; S v Reeding & another 2005 (2) SACR 631 (C) at 637i-j.
15 Sorrels v United States (1932), 287 US 435. Other United States sources use the same language as
appears from the Law Commission’s report. The adoption of that language does not indicate an
adoption of meaning.

formulating the factual enquiry to be made. In its judgment the reference
to the trap not going beyond affording an opportunity to commit an
offence describes a situation where no issue exists about the propriety of
the trap or the admissibility of the evidence derived therefrom. It
appended in subsec (2) an open16 list of factors relevant to the factual
enquiry. Those factors must be viewed holistically and weighed
cumulatively as different factors may point towards different answers.
Not all of the factors will be relevant in every case. Sight must not be lost
of the fact that there is only a single question to be answered, namely,
whether the conduct of the trap went beyond providing an opportunity to
commit an offence. If, on considering all relevant factors, the conclusion
is that the conduct of the trap went beyond providing an opportunity to
commit the offence, the enquiry moves on to s 252A(3) because, in the
legislature’s judgment, that conclusion may cast doubt upon the propriety
of the trap and the evidence obtained thereby, so that the situation
requires further scrutiny before the evidence is admitted. If the factors in
subsec (2) are not taken as a checklist17 but merely as matters that may be
relevant to the proper determination of the factual enquiry, taking into
account in any particular case those that are relevant on the facts of that
case, they ought to pose few problems. What will be required in every
case is a careful analysis of the evidence18 in order to determine whether
the conduct of the trap goes beyond the limit set by the legislature.

[28] Although it is difficult to discern the reasons for the magistrate’s
decision on this primary issue there seem to be three matters that could

16 ‘Open’ because it ends with sub-para (n), which includes ‘any other factor which in the opinion of
the court has a bearing on the question’.
17 As this Court has already said should not be the case. S v Hammond [2007] ZASCA 164; [2007]
SCA 164 (RSA); 2008 (1) SACR 476 (SCA) para 26.
18 As occurred in S v Matsabu [2008] ZASCA 149; [2008] SCA 149 (RSA);2009 (1) SACR 513 (SCA)
paras 16 and 17.

underlie it. They are that on the description of the operation a number of
attempts were to be made to trap Kotzè (subsec (2)(e)). Secondly, in
certain respects, sometimes inadvertently and sometimes deliberately,
Terblanche acted outside the ambit of the conditions attaching to the
approval of the undercover operation by the representatives of the
Director of Public Prosecutions (subsec (2)(a)). Thirdly, there can be no
doubt that he was able to make the approaches that he did to Kotzè in
consequence of having formed a friendship with him and this could have
been construed as exploiting that friendship (subsec (2)(h)). The other
grounds, approached holistically, indicate at least prima facie that
Terblanche did not go ‘beyond providing an opportunity to commit an
offence’. For example, the DPP’s prior approval was obtained; buying of
unpolished diamonds in the area is prevalent; there are no other
techniques for the detection of the offence; an average person would not
have succumbed to the temptation because the parcels were small and the
profit on each very small; and, as far as timing is concerned, the police
had more than enough reason to suspect that the appellant was involved
in illicit diamond buying to justify the laying of a trap.

[29] There are difficulties with each of the three factors mentioned
above and hence with the magistrate’s conclusion on this question. As to
the first, repeated attempts did not have to be made before Kotzè
succumbed, whether on the first or later occasions. He accepted the first
offer immediately and the others equally readily. When he resisted the
operation was terminated. As to the second, for reasons dealt with later,
any non-compliance had no effect on the conduct of the trap. As to the
third, I deal below with Kotzè’s version of the facts and reject it. It
follows that Terblanche did not exploit his relationship with Kotzè. In my
view therefore it would appear that the finding that Terblanche’s conduct

went further than providing an opportunity to commit these offences was
incorrect. However, as the prosecution did not press this issue and had
conceded the point in both courts below, I turn to the enquiry under
s 252A(3).

[30] Turning then to s 252A(3) it reads as follows:
‘(3)(a) If a court in any criminal proceedings finds that in the setting of a trap or the
engaging in an undercover operation the conduct goes beyond providing an
opportunity to commit an offence, the court may refuse to allow such evidence to be
tendered or may refuse to allow such evidence already tendered, to stand, if the
evidence was obtained in an improper or unfair manner and that the admission of such
evidence would render the trial unfair or would otherwise be detrimental to the
administration of justice.
(b) When considering the admissibility of the evidence the court shall weigh up the
public interest against the personal interest of the accused, having regard to the
following factors, if applicable:
(i) The nature and seriousness of the offence, including:
(aa) whether it is of such a nature and of such an extent that the security of the State,
the safety of the public, the maintenance of public order or the national economy is
seriously threatened thereby;
(bb) whether, in the absence of the use of a trap or an undercover operation, it would
be difficult to detect, investigate, uncover or prevent its commission;
(cc) whether it is so frequently committed that special measures are required to detect,
investigate or uncover it or to prevent its commission; or
(dd) whether it is so indecent or serious that the setting of a trap or the engaging of an
undercover operation was justified;
(ii) the extent of the effect of the trap or undercover operation upon the interests of the
accused, if regard is had to:
(aa) the deliberate disregard, if at all, of the accused’s rights or any applicable legal
and statutory requirements;

(bb) the facility, or otherwise, with which such requirements could have been
complied with, having regard to the circumstances in which the offence was
committed; or
(cc) the prejudice to the accused resulting from any improper or unfair conduct;
(iii) the nature and seriousness of any infringement of any fundamental right
contained in the Constitution;
(iv) whether in the setting of a trap or the engagement of an undercover operation the
means used was proportional to the seriousness of the offence; and
(v) any other factor which in the opinion of the court ought to be taken into account.’

[31] Subsection (3)(a) establishes two criteria for determining the
admissibility of evidence obtained through the use of a trap or undercover
agent. They are, firstly, whether the evidence was obtained in an
improper or unfair manner and, secondly, whether its admission would
render the trial unfair or would otherwise be detrimental to the interests of
justice. As they are joined conjunctively it appears at first sight that both
must be answered in the affirmative if the evidence is to be excluded, but
I reserve any final decision on that question as there are arguments
pointing in the opposite direction and we have not had the benefit of full
argument on it. The language of the section suggests that such exclusion
is discretionary (‘the court may refuse to allow such evidence to be
tendered or may refuse to allow such evidence already tendered to
stand…’) but insofar as there is a discretion it is a narrow one. The power
of the court to exclude the evidence where the relevant circumstances are
established will ordinarily be coupled with a duty to exclude it.19 This in
turn has implications for the powers of this court on appeal but it is
unnecessary to explore these.

19 Schwartz v Schwartz 1984 (4) SA 467 (A) at 473H-474E.

[32]  Subsection (3)(b) sets out the factors relevant to the exercise of the
court’s power to exclude the evidence. Again this is not a closed list as
the court may take into account any factor that in its opinion ought to be
taken into account in that regard. In this case Kotzè’s counsel confined
himself to the following matters. He accepted that the nature of the
offence and its seriousness is of such a nature that it is difficult to catch
perpetrators without the use of traps.20 He focussed his attack on the
nature of the approaches made to Kotzè as well as the use – or abuse as
counsel would have it – of the relationship Terblanche had formed with
Kotzè. He also argued that it appeared that certain affidavits were back-
dated and characterised Terblanche as an unreliable and untrustworthy
witness with a poor memory who adopted improper and unconventional
methods in going about his task. Lastly reliance was placed on the failure
to observe strictly the conditions attached by the Director of Public
Prosecutions to the authority to pursue the undercover operation and
particularly the fact that the audio and video recordings of encounters
between Kotzè and Terblanche were incomplete in the sense that not
every encounter between Terblanche and Kotzè was recorded and
deficient in that large parts of the sound recordings were inaudible.

[33] In assessing these submissions the necessary starting point is the
evidence of Kotzè in regard to the circumstances in which the
transactions came about and his motivation for buying the diamonds. The
magistrate disbelieved his evidence in this regard as did the court below
and as do I. As counsel accepted, there is not a shred of objective
evidence in the material captured on tape and video recordings that
supports the notion that any of these transactions came about as a result

20 That traps are necessary for this purpose was accepted over a century ago by Innes CJ in Myers and
Misnum v R 1907 TS 760 at 762, a view reaffirmed by the Law Commission.

of a plea by Terblanche that he had fallen upon hard times. Nor is there
any evidence that Kotzè resisted blandishments from the side of
Terblanche but that his resistance was overcome by such blandishments
or pleas of financial hardship. There is nothing that indicates that Kotzè
was anything other than a willing participant in the transactions. Indeed
the recordings, both audio and video, reflect that this was the case. They
show a man who was at ease with his surroundings and with what he was
engaged in. The tone of conversation was always friendly and jovial and
the moment they turned to discussions of the business at hand Kotzè
would drop his voice and conduct proceedings in a whisper as though he
was aware of the risk that the discussions might be recorded. Although he
claimed that in relation to the fourth transaction he had been brought to
the Terblanche house by a gross misrepresentation, the videos give this
the lie. If anything he is the dominant figure in the transactions in
accordance with the picture one derives from the background sketched in
paragraph [5] of this judgment.

[34] All this fell to be taken with Kotzè’s references to the possibility
that Terblanche might try and trap him or arrest him and his discreet
enquiries of Mrs Terblanche whether her husband was still a policeman.
These indicate someone who was well aware that he was engaged in
unlawful conduct and was taking precautionary measures against the
possibility that this might be a trap. Added to this is his denial of the
transactions when confronted by Terblanche at the time of his arrest; his
dishonest evidence at a bail hearing that the amounts of R26 000 and
R17000 were loans and his unwillingness to disclose what happened to
the diamonds he bought from Terblanche. Cumulatively it means that his
evidence was rightly rejected and his counsel made no attempt to reverse
that conclusion. He did however seek to contend that we should

nonetheless accept Kotzè’s version of what transpired prior to the first
transaction, but that evidence is of a piece with the evidence that was
rejected and cannot be separated from it. It too falls to be rejected.

[35] The rejection of Kotzè’s evidence is destructive of the contention
that the evidence was obtained unfairly by virtue of the methods adopted
by Terblanche and is likewise destructive of the submission that its
admission rendered the trial unfair or was detrimental to the
administration of justice. That left counsel to concentrate his submissions
on areas of weakness in Terblanche’s evidence such as the absence of a
note of the offer to cut and polish a diamond, the backdating of certain
statements and certain contradictions that were identified in great detail
in the heads of argument but do not require repetition here. None of these
affect the conclusion that Kotzè was a willing participant in the admitted
purchase of diamonds from Terblanche. Nor does any of it bear upon the
propriety or fairness of the methods adopted to obtain the evidence of
those transactions, or the fairness of the trial.

[36] That left, as the last point in the argument, the proposition that
because Terblanche and other members of the team conducting this
undercover operation departed in certain respects from the conditions
attaching to the Director of Public Prosecutions’ authorisation for
Operation Solitaire the evidence obtained as a result of Terblanche’s
actions should be excluded. Counsel rightly did not pursue a contention
advanced in the heads of argument that these departures disregarded
applicable legal and statutory requirements.21 Part of this argument, based
as it is upon the proposition that Terblanche induced Kotzè to enter into
the transactions by playing upon the latter’s tender emotions, fails with

21 S 252A(3)(b)(ii)(aa).

the rejection of Kotzè’s evidence in this regard. As to the balance, the
principal criticism related to the fact that Terblanche had not sought to
record all of his encounters and conversations with Kotzè, starting from
their first meeting when the Terblanches were seeking accommodation,
but only those where Kotzè was purchasing diamonds. I am not sure that
it was the intention of the Director of Public Prosecutions’ conditions that
every encounter should be recorded inasmuch as it was manifestly
impractical to expect this of Terblanche during an undercover operation
in which he was to spend nine months establishing his new persona and
two years engaged in undercover activities whilst maintaining the public
image of a pensioner. However, even if that was the intention there is
nothing to show that any failure in this regard was, as contended by
counsel, detrimental to the interests of justice or rendered the trial unfair.
The point is accordingly rejected as is the entire challenge to the
admissibility of the evidence of Terblanche.

[37] My conclusion is that the evidence of Terblanche was correctly
admitted. In the result Kotzè’s appeal against his conviction on the four
counts under s 20 of the Diamonds Act is dismissed.

M J D WALLIS
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES

FOR KOTZÈ :

F J MURRAY

Instructed by Schreuders, Springbok.
Symington & De Kok, Bloemfontein

FOR THE RESPONDENT:
L J BADENHORST
Instructed
by
Director
Public
Prosecutions, Cape Town
Director
Public
Prosecutions
Bloemfontein

Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa

MEDIA SUMMARY– JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL

From:   The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

Date:  Tuesday 15 September 2009

Status:  Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and does
not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

NICOLAAS PETRUS KOTZÈ v THE STATE

In a judgment delivered today the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed an
appeal against Mr Kotzè’s conviction in the Bellville Regional Magistrates’ Court on
4 counts of purchasing unpolished diamonds in contravention of s20 of the Diamonds
Act 56 of 1986. Over a period of some 8 months from July 2001 to February 2002 and
on four separate occasions Mr Kotzè purchased a total of 21 unpolished diamonds
from a police undercover agent, Inspector Frik Terblanche, for a total price of
R63 000.
The basis for the conviction was the evidence of Inspector Terblanche. The
appeal raised a challenge to the admissibility of this evidence in terms of s 252A of
the Criminal Procedure Act. Mr Kotzè contended that Terblanche had formed and
then exploited a close personal relationship with him by holding himself out as a
pensioner who had fallen upon hard times financially. He claimed that Terblanche
importuned him to buy diamonds and that on each occasion and against his better
judgment he succumbed to his pleas.
The trial court rejected this evidence as inconsistent with the content of audio
and video recordings of Terblanche’s dealings with Kotzè and certain other objective
facts and the Supreme Court of Appeal agreed. It held that the evidence was
admissible under s252A of the Criminal Procedure Act, as it had not been improperly
obtained and its admission did not render Kotzè’s trial unfair nor was it detrimental to
the administration of justice. The convictions were accordingly upheld.