THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case No: 168/08

W J FOURIE BELEGGINGS

Appellant

And

THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN
REVENUE SERVICE

Respondent

Neutral citation: Fourie Beleggings v CSARS (168/08) [2009] ZASCA 37 (31
March 2009)

Coram:
STREICHER, FARLAM, NUGENT JJA, LEACH and BOSIELO AJJA

Heard:
13 March 2009

Delivered:
31 March 2009

Summary:
Income tax – amount paid to appellant, a hotelier, to compensate it
for the cancellation of a contract to accommodate a number of people in its
hotel for more than two years – such contract not forming part of the
appellant’s income- producing structure – payment  not of a capital nature and
subject to tax.

__________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
__________________________________________________________________
On appeal from: High Court, Bloemfontein (CJ Musi J, Hattingh and Van Der
Merwe JJ concurring, sitting as a court of appeal).

The appeal is dismissed with costs.
_________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

LEACH AJA (STREICHER, FARLAM, NUGENT JJA and BOSIELO
AJJA concurring):

[1]   The so-called “9/11” attack upon the World Trade Centre in New York in
September 2001 caused shockwaves which reverberated around the world, reaching
as far afield as Potchefstroom in the North West Province of this country where the
appellant conducted business as a hotelier, and leading to the cancellation of a
lucrative trading contract the appellant had concluded a few months earlier.
Subsequently, in full and final settlement of all claims arising from the cancellation of
this contract, the appellant received a payment of almost R1,3 million.

[2]   In assessing the appellant’s tax liability for the 2002 tax year the respondent, the
Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service, regarded this payment as
forming part of the appellant’s gross taxable income.  The appellant objected to this
under s 81 of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 (“the Act”), contending that the payment

was an accrual or receipt of a capital nature, not subject to tax.  When this objection
was disallowed, the appellant appealed to the Tax Court.  The appeal was also
unsuccessful, as was a further appeal under s 86A(2)(a) to the Full Bench of the High
Court, Bloemfontein which dismissed the appeal  on 27 September 2007.1 With leave
of the High Court, the appellant appeals now to this court.

[3]   At all material times the appellant conducted business at the Elgro Hotel in
Potchefstroom which it had leased from a company known as Bultfontein Property
Investments (Pty) Ltd. The appellant had previously done business with a company
known as Naschem, a division of Denel (Pty) Ltd and a manufacturer of munitions, for
whom it had provided accommodation for people referred to as ‘students’  but who
appear to have been members of the military forces of the United Arab Emirates,
while they received training in South Africa. In doing so, the appellant had made
special arrangements to meet the dietary needs of the students as well as a number
of their special needs. In April 2001, this led to the appellant concluding a further
agreement with Naschem in which it agreed to accommodate and provide meals to
substantial numbers of such students from April 2001 to 30 May 2003.  Although the
number of people to be accommodated was to vary from time to time during that
period, the majority of the hotel’s rooms had to be set aside for this purpose - which
the appellant was prepared to do as it anticipated earning approximately R8,7 million
from the contract.

1 Its judgment has been reported as WJ Fourie Beleggings CC v Commissioner for South African
Revenue Service (2008) 70 SATC 8.

[4]   The conclusion of this agreement led to the appellant accommodating students
from the Emirates from April to September 2001, during which period it earned some
R4 million for doing so. And then news of the ‘9/11’ attack reached Potchefstroom.
Immediately thereafter, without offering any explanation, the students residing in the
hotel at the time packed up and left, and it soon became apparent that they would not
return.  In the light of this unforeseen development, Naschem repudiated its contract
with the appellant.

[5]   The appellant thus found itself in a quandary.  The vast majority of its clientele
had absconded.  Many of the rooms had been left in a state of considerable disrepair
as not only had many of the students kept pets in their rooms but they had also
smoked hookahs (described in evidence by the appellant’s director, Mr Fourie, as
‘hubbly bubbly pipes’) which had burned carpets, bedding and curtains. While Fourie
stated that if the contract had run its full course the appellant would have shrugged off
this damage as an inevitable expense of a profitable contract, it suddenly found itself
faced with a considerable repair bill in order to return the rooms to a condition in which
they could be hired out. And of course, the appellant also had to meet its normal, on-
going running costs which were substantial. All this it had to do with an extremely
compromised client base.

[6] In these circumstances the appellant felt that it had no option but to look to
Naschem for compensation, and threatened to bring legal proceedings. However,
although the balance of the cancelled contract was worth an estimated R4,7 million,

the appellant was wary of attempting to recover this entire amount from Naschem with
whom it had always enjoyed good business relations and hoped to continue to do so
in the future.  As a result, instead of issuing summons it entered into settlement
negotiations with Naschem which initially offered to pay R600 000 in order to settle
the dispute. This offer was was rejected, but the appellant subsequently accepted an
increased offer of R1 292 760 which was paid in settlement of all claims it might have
arising from the early termination of the contract. It was the payment of this sum which
precipitated the current dispute as to whether the payment is to be regarded as capital
or revenue.

[7]   Whether a receipt or an accrual should be regarded as capital or revenue is
probably the most common issue which arises in income tax litigation.   A taxpayer’s
gross income is defined in s 1 of the Act as ‘the total amount, in cash or otherwise,
received by or accrued to or in favour of (the taxpayer) . . . excluding receipts or
accruals of a capital nature’.   Accordingly, if a receipt or accrual was not of a capital
nature, it must have been of an income or revenue nature.   But the phrase ‘receipts
or accruals of a capital nature’ is not defined in the Act and although it has been held
that the ordinary economic meaning should be attached to the word ‘capital’2 it has
not been possible to devise a definitive or all embracing test to determine whether a
receipt or accrual is of a capital nature, despite the regularity with which the issue has
arisen. At the same time, and although common sense has been described as ‘that

2 Commissioner of Taxes v Booysens Estates, Ltd 1918 AD 576 at 582

most blunt of intellectual instruments’,3 it remains the most useful tool to use in
deciding the issue.4

[8]   The settlement agreement under which the amount in issue was paid recorded
that as Naschem had unilaterally cancelled its agreement with the appellant who
viewed this as a breach of contract which would cause severe financial loss and give
rise to a valid claim for damages, the parties had agreed that Naschem would pay the
appellant R1 292 760 in full and final settlement of all claims it might have, whether
arising from the law of contract or the common law. The only realistic claim the
appellant would have had against Naschem would have been in respect of its loss of
profit suffered through the early termination of the agreement which, on payment,
would clearly have been revenue.5 In this respect the matter is similar to ITC 312.6 In
that case the appellant, whose business consisted of letting property, had let a portion
of a building it owned for five years. When the lease still had more than two years to
run, the tenant sought to cancel. After negotiations, it was agreed that the appellant
would be paid a lump sum less than two-thirds of the total of the remaining rentals. In
holding that this payment was income and not capital, the court said:7
‘The contract was a contract of lease, and it seems to me that a lump sum paid in lieu of, and
as compensation for, the balance of rent due for the period stipulated, is a sum paid under
and by virtue of the letting of property.”

3   Henry Hitchings Doctor Johnson’s Dictionary John Murray Publishers (UK) (2005) at 132
4  Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust case at 56I.
5 Compare ITC 724 (1952) 17 SATC 496 at 498 and ITC 1761(2004) 66 SATC 33 at 39.
6 (1937) 8 SATC 154.
7 At 156.

[9]   The appellant, however, argued that in the present case the contract itself
amounted to an asset that formed part of the its income-producing structure.
Accordingly, so the argument went, the amount paid by Naschem had been paid for
the loss or ‘sterilisation’ of an income earning asset and should be regarded as
capital. In the light of this, the enquiry becomes, as was classically put by Lord
Macmillan in Van den Berghs, Ltd v Clark (Inspector of Taxes)8, ‘whether the
congeries of the rights which the recipient enjoyed under the contract and which for a
price he surrendered was a capital asset’.

[10]    In arguing that the contract it had with Naschem had been a capital asset, the
appellant placed particular emphasis on the decision in this court in Taeuber and
Corssen (Pty) Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue.9 In that case, the appellant
taxpayer had for many years acted as the sole agent in South Africa of a German
producer. Its agency agreement provided that, on termination, the principal (the
producer) would be entitled to require the agent (the taxpayer) not to sell or assist in
the sale of any products in competition with the principal for a period of two years. In
return for this undertaking, the principal undertook to pay the agent an amount
calculated with reference to the commission the agent had previously earned. The
agency agreement was subsequently cancelled and the principal duly paid the agent
the amount it had undertaken to do on that event. This court found the payment to be
of a capital nature, with Rumpff CJ holding that the agent had established ’an income-

8 [1935] AC 431 (HL) at 443.
9 1975 (3) SA 649 (A).

producing structure’ consisting in part of the contractual obligations ‘that flowed from
the contract with (the principal)’. The learned Chief Justice then went on to say:10
“What the parties intended . . . was a payment of a sum of money to restrain the [agent], for a
period of two years, from earning income by the sale of all products competing with those of
[the principal]. In the result, in my view, that part of [the agent’s] income-producing structure
which had sold only [the principal’s] products was not only permanently prevented from selling
[the principal’s] products by the termination of the agreement, but also effectively closed for
two years to the extent that it was prevented, for that period, from selling all such products as
would compete with [the principal’s] products, and the amount payable in terms of [the agency
agreement] was intended to be, and must be construed as, compensation for this closure.’

[11]    The appellant also relied on the decision in ITC 134I11 in support of its
contention that its contract with Naschem had been part of its income-producing
structure.   In that matter the appellant company had conducted business by
registering the transfer of shares although it also despatched dividend warrants, sent
out notices to members of companies and handled the issue of new shares in
companies, including rights issues. The appellant had been formed when its
shareholders, two other companies (A and B) had decided to merge their respective
share transfer departments. In an effort to attract business from other companies as
well, the appellant was given a neutral name not linked to either A or B, although at no
time did outside business form a large part of its business. However, virtually all A and
B’s subsidiary companies made separate contracts with the appellant in which they
bound themselves to employ the appellant for the services it offered. This state of

10 At  663H-664A.
11 (1981) 43 SATC 215.

affairs endured for some twenty years until company B acquired control over another
financial institution, company C, and decided that it and its group of companies would
withdraw from the existing arrangement with the appellant in order to use C’s share-
transfer department. They paid the appellant R260 048 in four equal instalments as
compensation for doing so. It was argued by the tax authority that this amounted to no
more that a surrogatum for future profits surrendered. The court however concluded
that the withdrawal of the B group of companies undermined the whole basic structure
of the appellant, that it resulted in an important ‘limb of the fruit-bearing tree (being)
chopped off’12 and that it impaired the appellant’s income-producing structure. The
payment received in respect of the termination of the contracts with the appellant was
accordingly treated as capital.

[12]   A third decision upon which the appellant placed particular emphasis was that in
ITC 1259.13 In that case the taxpayer had concluded a management agreement with a
large company, C, which had several subsidiaries and extensive holdings in fixed
property. In terms of the agreement the taxpayer undertook not only to manage all C’s
properties but also to act as the secretary and accountant of all C’s subsidiaries; to be
the sole selling agent of the properties owned by C and its subsidiaries; and to act as
an agent for an insurance company associated with C. The agreement was to last for
a minimum of three years. However, a public company subsequently acquired a
controlling interest in C and cancelled the taxpayer’s contract after only 20 months. In
consideration for the early termination of the agreement, the taxpayer was paid the

12 At 223.
13 (1977) 39 SATC 65.

sum of R30 000 which the Secretary for Inland Revenue sought to tax as income. The
Transvaal Special Court found that the contract had been out of the ordinary course of
the business earlier conducted by the appellant, and had resulted in a considerable
disruption of the appellant’s existing business structure which had been obliged to
employ senior executives and experts as well as additional clerical staff. When
implemented, the contract had constituted by far the major part of the appellant’s
property management business. Having regard to these facts, the court concluded
that the contract had constituted a substantial part of the appellant’s income-
producing structure and, relying heavily on the judgment in Taeuber as authority for
the conclusion that compensation paid for parting with a portion of a firm’s business is
to be regarded as capital, held the payment of R30 000 to be of a capital nature and
not taxable.

[13]   I accept that depending on the circumstances a sum paid to a taxpayer as
compensation for the cancellation of a trading contract may be regarded as being of a
capital nature.14 But in considering whether that is here the case, it is of importance to
note that in each of the cases relied on by the appellant the contract in issue, or more
properly the rights and obligations flowing therefrom, were used by the taxpayers for
the purpose of generating income. Thus in Taeuber, the taxpayer had used his right to
freely trade and his business skills (which were sterilised by the restraint) to produce
income. In ITC 1341 the various companies were contractually bound to use the
taxpayer’s services when required; the contract thus channelled work to the taxpayer
from which it earned an income. Similarly, in ITC 1259, the management agreement

14 See eg ITC 1279 (1997) 40 SATC 254 at 258.

and the other contracts provided the structure through which income earning activity
was channelled to the taxpayer. The hallmark of each case is the fact that the contract
created income-earning opportunities for the taxpayer. The contract was therefore a
means used to produce income and was correctly found to have been part of the
taxpayer’s income-producing structure.

[14]   There is of course a fundamental distinction between a contract which is a
means of producing income and a contract directed by its performance towards
making a profit.15 This is graphically illustrated by the Australian decision in Heavy
Minerals Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,16 a case regularly followed  in
that country which has striking similarities to the present case. In that matter the
taxpayer was a party to contracts with both German and American buyers to which it
sold rutile it had mined under a mining lease. When the rutile market collapsed, the
taxpayer agreed to the cancellation of these contracts in consideration for the
payment of monetary compensation. Its argument that this compensation was of a
capital nature was rejected by Windeyer J who, in finding the amounts paid to be
revenue, said:17
‘Even if these contracts were such that they seemed to ensure that the taxpayer would have a
secure market and some regular customers, that would not of itself make them part of the
capital of its business.’

15 See the speech of Lord Moncrieff in Kelsall, Parsons & Co v IRC 21 TC 608 at 623.
16 (1966) 115 CLR 512; 10 AITR 140
17 At CLR 517; AITR 143.

After then referring to the well known remark of Lord Ratcliffe in Commissioner of
Taxes v Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines18 that phrases such as ‘capital
structure’ were ‘essentially descriptive rather than definitive’, His Honour continued
thus:
‘The appellant sought to liken the moneys which the buyers paid to be released from their
contracts to a price received as a consideration for going out of business . . . . But there is no
analogy. The taxpayer’s business was mining rutile and dealing in rutile. Its capital assets
were the mining lease and the plant. After the contracts were cancelled it still had these. It
was free to mine its rutile and to sell it if it could find buyers: and it tried to do so. The taxpayer
was not put out of business by the cancellation of its overseas contracts. It did not go out of
business when they were cancelled.’

[15]   In the present case, the appellant traded as a hotelier before the contract and
continued to do so, both once it had commenced and after it had been cancelled. The
contract did not operate as a means by which the appellant generated business or
through which it acquired business or obtained opportunities from which to earn
income. It was merely a memorial of business the appellant had concluded, in which
the number of persons it had agreed to accommodate, when that would take place
and the rate that would be charged, were recorded.  It may be that the appellant stood
to earn a great deal from the contract which was to form the major source of its
income during the period it lasted but that, and its anticipated duration of more than
two years, did not transform it into part of the appellant’s income-producing structure.
That structure was made up of its lease of the hotel and the use to which the hotel

18 [1964] AC 948 at 959.

was put. The contract the appellant agreed with Naschem was concluded as part of its
business of providing accommodation. It was therefore a product of the appellant’s
income earning activities, not the means by which it earned income.

[16]   In the light of these considerations, I conclude that the appellant’s contract with
Naschem cannot be construed as being an asset of a capital nature forming part of
the appellant’s income-producing structure. That being so, the amount paid to the
appellant on termination of the contract is not in the nature of capital and must, by
definition, be regarded as part of the appellant’s gross income.  The conclusions of
both the Tax Court and the High Court in that regard were correct.

[17]   The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.

________________________

L E LEACH
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL

Appearances:

For appellant:

C Van Breda
Instructed by:

Weavind & Weavind, Pretoria

Matsepes Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For respondent:

G Stevens
Instructed by:

State Attorney, Bloemfontein

Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa
MEDIA STATEMENT
From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
Tuesday 31 March 2009
Status:
Immediate

The appellant, a hotelier, was paid almost R1,3 million as compensation for the early
termination of a contract under which it had agreed to accommodate a number of
foreign students in its hotel for some 2 years. The appellant contended that this sum
had incorrectly been included in its taxable income. It argued that the contract had
formed part of its income-producing structure and that any amount paid for its early
termination was capital. This argument had been rejected in both the Tax Court and
the High Court.

The Supreme Court of Appeal today dismissed a further appeal with costs, holding
that the contract was a product of the appellant’s business, not part of its income-
producing structure, and that the amount paid on its termination was revenue.
--ends--