THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Reportable

Case No: 20844/2014

In the matter between:

THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN
REVENUE SERVICE

APPELLANT

and

CAPSTONE 556 (PTY) LTD

RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: CSARS v Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd (20844/2014) [2016]

ZASCA 2 (9 February 2016).

Coram:
Ponnan, Bosielo, Wallis and Mbha JJA and Van der Merwe

AJA

Heard:
13 November 2015

Delivered:         9 February 2016

Summary:
Income tax ─ whether proceeds of sale of shares revenue or
a receipt of a capital nature ─ dominant purpose of acquisition of shares long
term capital investment to rescue a distressed business ─ at time of
acquisition sale of shares at a profit contemplated only as one of several
possibilities to be explored at the appropriate time in future ─ subsequent sale
of shares unsolicited and fortuitous ─ proceeds a receipt of a capital nature ─
cross-appeal ─ calculation of base cost for capital gains tax purposes ─
inclusion of indemnity payment.

______________________________________________________________

ORDER
______________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town
(Griesel, Yekiso and Baartman JJ sitting as court of appeal):
1 The appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
2.1 The cross-appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
2.2 It is declared that the liability undertaken by the taxpayer during July 2004
to pay the amount of R55 million to Daun et Cie Aktiengesellschaft, formed
part of the base cost of the acquisition of the shares in JD Group Ltd.
______________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________

Van der Merwe AJA (Ponnan, Bosielo, Wallis and Mbha concurring):

[1] During April 2004 the respondent, Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd (Capstone),
disposed of approximately 17 million shares in J D Group Ltd (JDG) and
made a profit of nearly R400 million. The principal question in this appeal is
whether Capstone is liable for tax on the amount of the profit on the basis that
it constituted income (as the appellant, the Commissioner for the South
African Revenue Service (the Commissioner) contends) or a receipt of a
capital nature (as Capstone contends). The Tax Court, Cape Town (Davis J
presiding) found for the Commissioner on this issue, but that finding was
overturned by the full court of the Western Cape Division of the High Court,
Cape Town (Griesel, Yekiso and Baartman JJ) on appeal to it. This court
granted leave to the Commissioner to appeal against the order of the full
court.

Background
[2] In the tax court, Capstone presented the evidence of several
witnesses, whom I shall identify in due course. The Commissioner called no
witnesses. The picture that emerged from the evidence was set out in the
reported judgments of the tax court (ITC 1867 (2013) 75 SATC 273) and that

of the full court (Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African
Revenue Service 2014 (6) SA 195 (WCC); 77 SATC 1). In the result I will
restrict myself to those facts that I consider material and necessary for a
proper understanding of this judgment.

[3] By the end of 2001, Profurn Ltd (Profurn), a JSE listed company in the
retail furniture industry, had run into serious financial difficulties. It owed
FirstRand Bank Ltd (FirstRand) in excess of R900 million. Profurn also owed
between R70 and R90 million to Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd
(Steinhoff). Steinhoff was then a major manufacturer and supplier of furniture
to the retail industry. Its chief executive officer was Mr Markus Jooste, who
was also a major shareholder in Steinhoff. Dr Theunie Lategan, head of the
corporate division of FirstRand, was responsible for Profurn‟s account.
FirstRand also had exposure to other furniture retailers. Profurn risked
imminent liquidation in view of its critical financial position. This represented a
serious financial risk to FirstRand and Steinhoff, as well as a major threat to
the stability of the retail furniture industry in South Africa as such.

[4] Dr Lategan, who was under immense pressure to come up with a
solution to the Profurn problem, discussed it with Mr Jooste. Mr Jooste
referred him to Mr Claas Daun, a wealthy German businessman and director
and shareholder of Steinhoff. Mr Daun also indirectly held a 13 per cent
shareholding in Profurn so stood to suffer financially if Profurn was liquidated.
FirstRand had determined that for Profurn to survive, it needed to reduce its
debt to FirstRand to some R300 million. Hence Profurn needed a capital
injection of approximately R600 million. For this purpose Dr Lategan entered
into discussions with Mr Daun early in 2002. Mr Daun was interested but held
a firm view that what was required to save Profurn, was both an injection of
capital and sound management. He held the managerial skills of Mr David
Sussman, executive chairman of JDG, in high regard. He made it clear that he
would only be prepared to invest if the management of Profurn was taken
over by Mr Sussman. FirstRand therefore approached Mr Sussman. Mr
Sussman was agreeable but in turn insisted that the investor should be
committed to remain on board as a shareholder for as long as it would take to

turn the business of Profurn around. Mr Sussman discussed the matter with
Mr Daun, who gave the required undertaking.

[5] These developments were followed by a series of discussions between
mainly Dr Lategan, Mr Jooste, Mr Daun and Mr Sussman. They resulted in a
plan to rescue Profurn and stabilise the retail furniture industry. All concerned
were ad idem, however, that the attempt to rescue Profurn would be a difficult
operation, would involve high risks and would probably require a period of
three to five years.

[6] In essence, the solution agreed upon was the following. FirstRand
would underwrite a R600 million rights issue by Profurn, thereby converting
R600 million of the debt owed to FirstRand into equity. This would be followed
by a merger between Profurn and JDG, whereby the Profurn shares would be
exchanged for JDG shares. FirstRand would then sell the JDG shares so
acquired by it for R600 million to a South African special purpose vehicle, to
be created in due course when needed (Capstone). Daun et Cie
Aktiengesellschaft (Daun et Cie), a German private holding company
controlled by Mr Daun, would invest R300 million in Capstone, which would
be used to pay half of the purchase price. R200 million of the purchase price
would be settled by the issue by Capstone to FirstRand of redeemable
preference shares and the balance by a participating loan by FirstRand to
Capstone. In this manner the required capital injection and management
would be achieved.

[7] Most of this was reflected in a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
signed by Mr Daun on 26 June 2002 at Rastede in Germany. In terms of the
MOU it was naturally envisaged that final written agreements would be
entered into and that the requisite regulatory approval be obtained. It was
nevertheless accepted by all relevant parties that the MOU gave rise to a
binding commitment by Mr Daun and his associates via the proposed special
purpose vehicle to purchase the JDG shares from FirstRand and that the risk
and reward in respect of the shares passed with effect from 26 June 2002,
which was the express effective date of the MOU.

[8] Despite some efforts by FirstRand to encourage existing shareholders
of Profurn to take up the rights offer, only a handful did so, raising less than
R1 million. This was an indication of the desperate position of Profurn, as was
the fact that after the MOU was signed, Profurn‟s share price fell even further.
As a consequence FirstRand acquired a 78,8 per cent shareholding in
Profurn. Thereafter JDG and Profurn merged and FirstRand acquired
approximately 42 million JDG shares.

[9] In the agreements and amended agreements entered into following on
the MOU, the rescue plan was varied in two material respects. First,
FirstRand determined to retain one-sixth of its JDG shares. In the result five-
sixths of the JDG shares would be transferred to Capstone. This translated to
approximately 35 million JDG shares and a 20,9 per cent interest in JDG.
Second, Mr Daun invited Mr Jooste to participate in the transaction, which
required some restructuring of the special purpose vehicle to keep Mr Daun‟s
financial interests separate from those of Mr Jooste. As a result, half of the 35
million shares were sold to Daun et Cie for R250 million and the other half to
Capstone for the same purchase price. In terms of these agreements the
purchase price of the shares was fixed as at 26 June 2002 and the
purchasers had to pay interest on the purchase price calculated from that
date. Daun et Cie eventually paid R262 725 131 (R250 million plus interest) to
FirstRand in cash. This constituted a significant foreign investment in South
Africa. The funding of the purchase price payable by Capstone was of course
the responsibility of Mr Jooste. Daun et Cie and Capstone thereby committed
themselves to a significant investment of indefinite duration, the ultimate
profitability of which depended upon the ability of Mr Sussman to turn around
the operations of Profurn and integrate them profitably into those of JDG.

[10] Capstone was incorporated on 2 April 2003. It was wholly owned by
another special purpose vehicle, Business Ventures Investments No 687 (Pty)
Ltd (BVI). The financial interest in BVI was held by Mr Jooste and his
associates. Genbel Securities Ltd (Gensec) advanced the amount of R150
million to BVI on condition that it be utilized to enable Capstone to acquire the
JDG shares. BVI thereafter made a shareholder‟s loan to Capstone in the

amount of R150 million on the same terms and conditions as those contained
in the loan agreement between Gensec and BVI. The balance of the purchase
price was settled by the issue by Capstone of three year and one day
redeemable preference shares to FirstRand. For this reason Capstone was
required to comply with FirstRand‟s standard terms and conditions in respect
of preference shares. In the result Capstone took a number of registered
special resolutions. One of these inter alia provided that a special condition be
inserted in Capstone‟s memorandum of association that until the date on
which the preference shares have been redeemed in full, Capstone shall not:
„. . . be entitled to conduct any business whatsoever, enter into any contract or
undertake any obligation whatsoever, other than in respect of the sale and
subscription agreement and a voting pool agreement relating to its shares in JD
Group Limited, provided however that this shall not prevent the company from
acquiring any additional shares in the share capital of the JD Group Limited from time
to time . . . without the express prior written consent of FirstRand.‟
The effect of this and other terms and conditions was that for the period of
three years and a day from 30 May 2003, Capstone was prohibited from
disposing of its JDG shares without the consent of FirstRand.

[11] Two additional liabilities were attached to the acquisition of the JDG
shares by Capstone. First, a due diligence investigation performed in respect
of Profurn at the instance of JDG, revealed contingent liabilities of Profurn in
respect of tax. FirstRand indemnified JDG in respect of these liabilities in the
amount of R150 million. FirstRand required the purchasers of the shares to
carry proportionate shares of its liability in terms of the indemnity to JDG. As a
result, as part of the consideration for the shares, Daun et Cie and Capstone
each indemnified FirstRand in the amount of R62,5 million. The indemnities
were given for a period of five years commencing in early 2003. Second, the
loan agreement between Gensec and BVI provided, in addition to interest on
the loan, for payment of what was referred to as an „equity kicker‟. The equity
kicker was a portion of any gain in the market value of the JDG shares as on
date of repayment of the loan, calculated in accordance with an agreed
formula. It was payable by BVI to Gensec upon repayment of the loan,
irrespective of whether or not the JDG shares had been sold. As the BVI-

Capstone loan duplicated the terms of the Gensec-BVI loan, Capstone in turn
was obliged to pay the equity kicker to BVI.

[12] When Mr Daun invited Mr Jooste to participate, he made it clear that he
would retain sole control over the 35 million JDG shares, which would at all
times be dealt with as one package by Mr Daun. This was understood and
accepted by Mr Jooste. He felt honoured by the invitation and was content
that Mr Daun would be the „captain of the boat‟ in which he would be the
„passenger‟. For this reason Mr Daun and the manager of his South African
interests, Mr Schouten, were directors of Capstone at all times material to the
appeal, whilst Mr Jooste was not. The other directors of Capstone were Dr
Lategan and Mr Steve Müller, who represented the interests of FirstRand and
Gensec respectively. The shares in BVI were held by Daun et Cie as nominee
for companies controlled by Mr Jooste and his associates. Mr Daun was also
the only director of BVI and thus at all times relevant hereto also in control of
BVI.

[13] In terms of an agreement entered into on 20 June 2002, Profurn was
placed under the interim management of JDG pending the final authorisation
of the merger application by the Competition Tribunal. However, substantial
delays occurred due to the need to obtain approval from the Competition
Tribunal and on appeal, the Competition Appeal Court, as well as the South
African Reserve Bank. The Tribunal approved the merger on 12 December
2002, subject to conditions which were set aside by the Competition Appeal
Court on 28 May 2003. The JDG shares were ultimately paid for and
transferred to Daun et Cie and Capstone only on 5 December 2003. By that
date, the share price had risen considerably from the levels at which it stood
when the transaction was originally devised.

[14] In November 2003, when Steinhoff undertook an international „book
building‟ exercise with the assistance of Citigroup Global Markets Ltd
(Citigroup), Mr Jooste was having coffee with Mr Nicholas Pagden of
Citigroup in San Francisco and enquired whether a similar exercise could be
done in respect of the JDG shares that Daun et Cie and Capstone were in the

course of acquiring. A book building exercise is a means of determining a
price and acquiring institutional investors through either the issue and
acquisition of new shares, or the sale of an existing block of shares in
circumstances where the disposal of such a large block of shares in the
market would detrimentally affect the price of the shares on a stock exchange.
The institution undertaking the book building approaches institutional
investors to ascertain how many shares they might buy and at what price.
Once the price is determined the shares are disposed of other than through
the exchange on which they are, or are to be, listed. As a result, in March
2004, Citigroup, represented by Mr Pagden, made a presentation to Mr Daun
concerning a book building. The proposed book building entailed disposal of
the full block of JDG shares controlled by Mr Daun. Mr Daun accepted the
proposal in respect of the approximately 14 million shares held by each of
Daun et Cie and Capstone. Each retained approximately 3,5 million shares.
The sale by book building by Citigroup took place on 29 April 2004. It realised
the price of R42.50 per share. More or less at the same time Capstone sold
its remaining 3,5 million JDG shares to Mayfair Speculators (Pty) Ltd, a
company holding the interests of Mr Jooste and his family, for R45 per share.
The shares had been purchased as at 26 June 2002 for R14.17 per share.

[15] On 30 April 2004 Mr Daun, Mr Schouten and Dr Lategan resigned as
directors of Capstone. On the same date Gensec and BVI entered into a
further written agreement to settle the loan. In terms of this agreement the
liability in respect of the equity kicker amounted to R45 123 050, calculated on
the actual proceeds realised. Although BVI (and therefore Capstone) were
entitled to temporarily retain a portion of the equity kicker, the liability for the
full equity kicker arose on 30 April 2004. Mr Müller resigned as director of
Capstone on 5 July 2004 and shortly afterwards Mr Jooste and an associate
were appointed as its directors.

[16] What remained was Capstone‟s contingent liability in terms of the
indemnity to FirstRand. However, during July 2004 Daun et Cie and
Capstone, represented by Mr Daun and Mr Jooste respectively, agreed that
Daun et Cie would accept the full contingent liability of Capstone towards

FirstRand in return for payment of the amount of R55 million. Capstone thus
incurred liability for payment of R55 million to Daun et Cie in the 2005 year of
assessment in substitution of its contingent liability towards FirstRand. This
debt was settled much later, by operation of set-off.

[17] Capstone calculated and paid capital gains tax on the proceeds of the
sale of its JDG shares (the proceeds). The Commissioner, however, issued
an additional assessment in respect of the 2005 year in terms of which the
proceeds were taxed as revenue. In addition, the Commissioner disallowed
deductions from gross income of R45 123 050 in respect of the equity kicker
and R55 million in respect of the settlement of the indemnity obligation (the
indemnity settlement). Capstone‟s objection to the additional assessment was
dismissed and it appealed to the tax court. As I have said, the tax court held
that the proceeds constituted revenue. However, it revised the assessment to
allow for the deduction of the equity kicker and the indemnity settlement from
gross income in terms of s 11(a) read with s 23(g) of the Income Tax Act 58 of
1962 (the Act). Because Capstone‟s contention that the proceeds were of a
capital nature was upheld on appeal to the full court, the question arose
whether the equity kicker and the indemnity settlement formed part of the
base cost of the acquisition of the JDG shares in terms of paragraph 20 of the
Eighth Schedule to the Act. The base cost is deducted from the proceeds to
determine the taxable capital gain.

[18] Subject to an exception, paragraph 20(2) of the Eighth Schedule
provides that the base cost does not include „borrowing costs, including any
interest as contemplated in s 24J or raising fees‟. The exception is that one-
third of the interest as contemplated in s 24J of the Act on money borrowed to
finance the acquisition of listed shares, does form part of the base cost.
Section 24J defines „interest‟ to inter alia include: „the gross amount of any
interest or related finance charges, discount or premium payable or receivable
in terms of or in respect of a financial arrangement‟. The full court found that
the equity kicker constituted interest as defined. On this basis it concluded
that R30 082 033, that is two-thirds of the amount of R45 123 050, fell to be
included in the capital gain. Before us the parties were ad idem that this

conclusion was correct. However, the full court found that the indemnity
settlement in the amount of R55 million did not constitute part of the base
cost. Capstone noted a cross-appeal against this finding. It also noted a
conditional cross-appeal in the event of a finding that the proceeds were not
of a capital nature.

Test on appeal
[19] Prior to its repeal by the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 with effect
from 1 October 2012, s 86A of the Act dealt with appeals from a tax court. In
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Da Costa [1985] ZASCA 32; 1985 (3) SA
768 (A) at 775B-F, this court characterised the nature of an appeal in terms of
s 86A as follows:
„Section 86A now provides for a full right of appeal against any decision of a Special
Court on issues of fact or law. As was pointed out by Trollip JA in Hicklin v Secretary
for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A) at 485, such an appeal
“is therefore a re-hearing of the case in the ordinary well-known way in which this
Court, while paying due regard to the findings of the Special Court on the facts and
credibility of witnesses, is not necessarily bound by them”.
Having pointed out that the section is silent about the powers of this Court in such an
appeal, Trollip JA went on to say that it was manifestly the intention of the Legislature
that this Court was to have those general powers that are conferred upon it by s 22 of
the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. In my view it is implicit in these dicta that in an
appeal from a Special Court those powers should be exercised according to the
principles and subject to the restrictions applicable to appeals in general. And, there
is indeed no reason to differentiate between an appeal from a Special Court and an
appeal from a Local or Provincial Division. Unlike the position obtaining in a Special
Court where a decision is given on facts which may not have been considered by the
Commissioner, this Court hears an appeal from a Special Court on the record of the
proceedings in that Court.‟

[20] Capstone lodged an objection to the additional assessment on 17 May
2010 and lodged the appeal to the tax court on 2 August 2010. The parties
are nevertheless rightly agreed that the appeal from the tax court was
governed by the provisions of Part E of Chapter 9 of the Tax Administration

Act (ss 133-141). This is provided for in s 270 of the Tax Administration Act.
Section 270(2)(d), in particular, provides:
„The following actions or proceedings taken or instituted under the provisions of a tax
Act repealed by this Act but not completed by the commencement date of the
comparable provisions of this Act, must be continued and concluded under the
provisions of this Act as if taken or instituted under this Act:
. . .
(d)
an objection, appeal to the tax  board, tax court or higher court, alternative
dispute resolution, settlement discussions or related High Court application; . . .‟

[21] The provisions of s 86A of the Act and of Part E of Chapter 9 of the Tax
Administration Act are substantially the same. In terms of s 134(2)(b) of the
Tax Administration Act, a notice of intention to appeal against the decision of
a tax court must indicate the findings of fact or rulings of law appealed
against. Section 139(3)(b) requires the same of a notice of cross-appeal. In
my judgment the principles set out in Da Costa are equally applicable to
appeals from a tax court in terms of the Tax Administration Act. Such appeal
is on the same footing as an appeal from a division of the High Court.  It
follows that the full court was bound by the factual findings of the tax court,
unless they were affected by material misdirection or the full court was
convinced that they were wrong. And in exercising its powers on appeal in
terms of s 19 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, this court essentially has
to consider what order the full court should have made on application of these
principles.

Revenue or capital
[22] In terms of s 82 of the Act (now s 102 of the Tax Administration Act)
the burden of proving that the decision of the Commissioner subject to appeal
was incorrect, rested on Capstone. In line with its predecessors, s 1 of the Act
defines „gross income‟ in essence as the total amount received by or accrued
to a person, excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature. Our courts
have therefore taken the view that any receipt or accrual must be either
income or capital, and „there is no third category or halfway house‟ (see
Crowe v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1930 AD 122 at 129; 22(1) Lawsa,

2 ed, para 46). It follows that Capstone could only discharge the onus by
showing, on a balance of probabilities, that the proceeds were capital. That is
a question of law to be decided on the particular facts of each case, for which
there is no single infallible test. (See Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Pick
‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust [1992] ZASCA 84; 1992 (4) SA 39 (A)
at 56G).

[23] In Overseas Trust Corporation Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue
1926 AD 444 at 452-3, Innes CJ said the following:
„It was pointed out in Commissioner of Taxes v Booysen’s Estate (1918, A.D., p. 576)
that the profit resulting from the sale of an asset might be either capital or income,
according to the circumstances. If the transaction were a mere realisation of capital
at an enhanced value, the entire proceeds would remain capital; but if it were an act
done in the ordinary cause of the vendor‟s business, then the resulting gain would be
income. The reason for the distinction is clear. Where an asset is realised at a profit
as a mere change of investment there is no difference in character between the
amount of enhancement and the balance of the proceeds. But where the profit is, in
the words of an eminent Scotch Judge, see Californian Copper Syndicate v Inland
Revenue (41 Sc.L.R, p.684), “a gain made by an operation of business in carrying
out a scheme for profit making,” then it is revenue derived from capital productively
employed, and must be income.‟

[24] Whilst recognising that it is not universally valid, our courts have in
circumstances such as the present consistently applied the test that a gain
made by an operation of a business in carrying out a scheme of profit-making,
is income and vice versa. In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Stott 1928
AD 252 at 259-260 the passage from Overseas Trust at 452-3 was quoted
with approval. Wessels JA added (at 261): „It is not sufficient that the cutting
up of the land and its sale in lots should in its result prove to be a profit-
making matter so as to stamp the proceeds as gross income. The gain must
be acquired by an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit-
making‟. In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Leydenberg Platinum Ltd
1929 AD 137 at 145, Stratford JA referred to this passage in Overseas Trust
and said that the principles applicable to the question whether profits are
taxable as income or are accruals of a capital nature, „are now well settled‟.

He made clear that the profit in respect of a single transaction of a company
may on application of this test constitute income.

[25] It is true that in Natal Estates Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1975
(4) SA 177 (A) at 198F-H, Holmes JA made reference to „selling an asset in
the course of carrying on a business or embarking on a scheme of profit‟ (my
emphasis). However, reading the case as a whole, it is clear that Holmes JA
was not attempting to propound alternative tests. In my view it is clear that
Holmes JA did not intend to deviate from the established principles. The court
pointed out that in Stott the remarks of Innes CJ in Overseas Trust were
adopted and said that Stott had long been recognised as a leading case. This
is also apparent from the result of the application of the principles to the facts
in Natal Estates. The court found (at 204F-H) that the taxpayer „had crossed
the Rubicon and committed itself on a grand scale to the course and business
of selling land for profit, using the land as its stock-in-trade‟. (See also the
majority judgment of Smalberger JA in Pick ‘n Pay at 56J-57E.)

[26] Hefer AP, in Samril Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South
African Revenue Service [2003] ZASCA 118; 2003 (1) SA 658 (SCA) para 2,
confirmed that the „usual test for determining the true nature of a receipt or
accrual for income tax purposes is whether it constituted a gain made by an
operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit-making‟. He pointed
out that profit-making is also an element of capital accumulation. He said that:
„Every receipt or accrual arising from the sale of a capital asset and designedly
sought for with a view to the making of a profit can therefore not be regarded as
revenue. Each case must be decided on its own facts . . .‟
Thus the mere intention to profit is not conclusive. There must be „an
operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit-making‟ for a receipt
to be income. That expression refers to the use of the taxpayer‟s resources
and skills to generate profits, usually, but not always, of an on-going nature. In
Pick ‘n Pay at 58B-C, the majority similarly found for the taxpayer on the
grounds that it was not carrying on a business by trading in shares and that
even if it was, it was not a business carried on as part of a scheme for profit-
making.

[27] Where a profit is the result of the sale of an asset, the intention with
which the taxpayer had acquired and held the asset is of great importance
and may be decisive. In essence, the question is whether the asset was
acquired for the purpose of reselling it at a profit and assumed the character
of trading stock (see Matla Coal Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1987
(1) SA 108 (A) at 129B-D).

[28] In this regard Wessels JA said the following in Stott at 264:
„It is unnecessary to go so far as to say that the intention with which an article or land
is bought is conclusive as to whether the proceeds derived on the sale are taxable or
not. It is sufficient to say that the intention is an important factor and unless some
other factor intervenes to show that when the article was sold it was sold in
pursuance of a scheme of profit-making, it is conclusive in determining whether it is
capital or gross income.‟
In determining this intention the court „is not concerned with that kind of
subjective state of mind required for the purposes of the criminal law, but
rather with the purpose for which the transaction was entered into‟. (See
Secretary for Inland Revenue v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1975 (2) SA 652 (A)
at 669E-G.) This was formulated as follows in Pick ‘n Pay at 58F-G:
„Contemplation is not to be confused with intention in the above sense. In a tax case
one is not concerned with what possibilities, apart from his actual purpose, the
taxpayer foresaw and with which he reconciled himself. One is solely concerned with
his object, his aim, his actual purpose.‟

[29] And in Commissioner of Taxes v Levy 1952 (2) SA 413 (A) at 421,
Schreiner JA said that „where the purposes of an individual taxpayer are
mixed the only course, on principle as well as for practical reasons, is to seek
and give effect to the dominant factor operating to induce him to effect the
purchase‟. (See also Trust Bank at 670H-671A). This is a matter of degree
depending on the circumstances of the case. (See African Life Investment
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1969 (4) SA 259 (A) at
269E.)

[30] The purpose or dominant purpose of the acquisition of an asset is a
question of fact. (See Trust Bank at 666B-C.) It must be determined
objectively in the same manner that any fact is determined by a court of law.
The credibility and reliability of the evidence of the witnesses for the taxpayer
must be determined in the light of the objective facts and inferences drawn
therefrom, the probabilities and any evidence put up in contradiction thereto.
(See Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Pretoria East Motors
(Pty) Ltd [2014] ZASCA 91; 2014 (5) SA 231 (SCA) at para 8.)

[31] Apart from the intention of the taxpayer, a number of factors must be
considered. First, the nature of the business activities of the taxpayer must be
scrutinised. As Stott and Samril Investments demonstrate the line of
demarcation between the realisation of an asset at a capital gain (Stott) and
turning an existing asset to the purpose of generating revenue (Samril
Investments) may be a fine one. So close regard must be paid to the nature of
the business activities in which the taxpayer is ordinarily engaged. In Stott the
sale of land acquired with the surplus from the taxpayer‟s profession as a land
surveyor was reasonably remote from his main business activity. In Samril
Investments the sale of sand was closely connected to the farming business
already conducted on the property.

[32] Second, the period for which the asset is held and the period for which
it was anticipated it would be held at the time of acquisition will be relevant. In
general the longer that period the more likely it is that the disposal is a
realisation of capital rather than a receipt of income. Third, when dealing with
an investment, the nature of the risk undertaken has a bearing on whether the
exercise is one directed at building up the value of the taxpayer‟s capital or
directed at generating revenue and profit. Finally, it must be recognised that in
many commercial situations there may be no clear intention at the outset and
any endeavour to discern one or select one as more prominent than another,
rather than accepting that the taxpayer‟s future intentions were indeterminate,
may be artificial and unhelpful. In such circumstances a better approach is to
accept the indeterminacy and factor that into the enquiry. Other relevant
factors are set out in Natal Estate, at 202 in fine, but the list is not exhaustive.

Effective date
[33] The tax court rightly noted that it had been accepted by all the relevant
parties that the MOU gave rise to a binding commitment to acquire the JDG
shares at the purchase price to be determined as at 26 June 2002 and
bearing interest from that date. The full court found that the effective date of
the transaction as a whole dated back to 26 June 2002, that „it is accordingly
at that date that one must look when considering the period for which the
asset was held‟ and that the shares were effectively acquired during June
2002, not December 2003.

[34] I agree with what was said by McCreath J on behalf of the full court in
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v General Motors SA (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA
196 (T) at 204A, namely:
„Finally, I consider that the correct approach in a matter of this nature is not that of a
narrow legalistic nature. What has to be considered is the commercial operation as
such and the character of the expenditure arising therefrom. This is perhaps but
another way of expressing the concept that it is the substance and reality of the
original loan transaction that is the decisive factor.‟
(See also Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly
Tycon (Pty) Ltd) [1999] ZASCA 64; 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA) at para 1.) In this
regard I find the following remarks of Lord Hoffman in MacNiven (Inspector of
Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 865 at para 32,
instructive:
„The innovation in the Ramsay case was to give the statutory concepts of “disposal”
and “loss” a commercial meaning. The new principle of construction was a
recognition that the statutory language was intended to refer to commercial concepts,
so that in a case of a concept such as a “disposal”, the court was required to take a
view of the facts which transcended the juristic individuality of the various parts of a
preplanned series of transactions.‟
If the receipt or accrual arises from a detailed commercial transaction the
transaction must be considered in its entirety from a commercial perspective
and not be broken into component parts or subjected to narrow legalistic
scrutiny.

[35] In substance and in commercial reality the purpose of the acquisition of
the shares must in my judgment be determined as at 26 June 2002, in the
context of events leading to the MOU.

Directing mind
[36] The tax court found that Mr Jooste was the „brain‟ and the „mind‟ of
Capstone. On the view that it took of the matter, the full court found it
unnecessary to decide this issue. I am convinced, however, that this finding of
the tax court was wrong.

[37] Generally the intention of a company must be determined by
ascertaining what its directors acting as such intended. (See Commissioner
for Inland Revenue v Richmond Estates (Pty) Ltd 1956 (1) SA 602 (AD) at
606G-H.) But in Trust Bank Botha JA explained at 669A-D:
„Just as there cannot in a case of a one-man company be any reason in principle why
it should be incompetent for him to give evidence as to what the intention of his
company at any given time was, Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Richmond
Estates (Pty) Ltd, supra at p.606, so I can see no reason in principle why the persons
who are in effective control of a company cannot give evidence as to what was the
intention or purpose of a company in relation to any matter at any given time. That
the management committee was for practical purposes in effective control of the
affairs of the respondent bank is clear from the evidence. It was under its leadership
that the respondent‟s business activities had been diversified to such an extent that,
in addition to ordinary commercial banking, it had become engaged in a number of
other incidental business activities as indicated above. I cannot find any reason in
principle why the intention of the members of the management committee in regard
to any matter in which it was concerned on behalf of the respondent cannot be taken
to indicate the intention of the respondent.‟

[38] Mr Daun was de facto in control of the shares from their effective
acquisition to their disposal. Mr Daun therefore determined the purpose of
their acquisition. At the time of their disposal, he, aided by Mr Schouten, was
in any event the controlling director of Capstone. Whether or not the shares
should be sold, was solely the decision of Mr Daun.

Mr Daun’s intention
[39] Thus Mr Daun‟s intention at the time of effective acquisition of the
shares had to be determined. As the full court indicated, the findings of the tax
court in this regard were somewhat ambivalent. The following would,
however, appear to be its central findings, irrespective of who had determined
the intention (paras 77-78):
„The evidence concerning the intention of acquisition is thus not definitively in
appellant‟s favour; it does no more than show that there was always an intention to
realise the shares for a significant profit. The question was not if but when a sale
would occur. Hence, a profit making intention was always a dominant purpose within
the mind of those who controlled appellant; . . .
[T]he evidence does not provide an answer, on the probabilities, that this was to be a
long term investment. There may have been a purpose to so hold, but there is no
clear proof of it being the dominant purpose . . . When both the purpose at the time of
acquisition and sale are considered, it cannot be concluded, on the probabilities, that
a long term investment was realised to best advantage. To the contrary, the mixed
intention had converted into a clear purpose of selling to “cash” in on the profit.‟
The full court disagreed and summarised its findings as follows (para 24):
„In summary, the appellant‟s intention when it first decided to acquire the JDG shares
was to make a strategic investment in a leading company in the furniture industry and
to hold those shares for however long it took to turn around the Profurn ship, which
was anticipated to take in excess of three years.‟

[40] In my view both approaches are flawed. In the tax court the fact that, if
the turnaround strategy involved in the takeover of Profurn by JDG was
successful, Mr Daun, as an investor and entrepreneur, wanted to recover his
investment together with an increase in its value, did not mean that a profit-
making intention was his purpose in making the investment, much less the
predominant purpose. Nor was it correct to say that this was not a long term
investment. The duration of the investment was dependent on Mr Sussman‟s
skills in merging the two businesses as well as factors beyond the control of
either Mr Daun or Mr Sussman, such as the general economic climate. On the
other hand the full court stopped its enquiry at the first stage, without
exploring further the implications of the strategic investment made by Mr

Daun. A more rounded and complete consideration of the whole transaction
was called for.

[41] Before us, counsel for the Commissioner disavowed reliance on a
change of intention after the effective acquisition of the shares. The essential
submission for the Commissioner was that from the outset, that is when the
transaction was first contemplated in early to mid-2002, the intention was to
acquire the shares for resale at a profit, that that intention never changed and
that the shares were acquired as trading stock. The argument for the
Commissioner therefore correctly recognised that if this were shown not to be
the case, the proceeds would be capital.

[42] The witnesses for Capstone were Mr Daun, Mr Jooste, Mr J P Burger,
the chief financial officer of FirstRand, Dr Lategan, Mr Sussman, Mr Müller
and Mr Pagden. The tax court did not comment on the credibility of the
witnesses. No doubt that is because no adverse comment was called for. The
evidence reads well. It portrays Mr Daun as a straight forward, no-nonsense
businessman who regarded a handshake agreement as binding and more
important than hundreds of pages of legal documents. There can be no
criticism of any of the other witnesses. Mr Daun‟s evidence was materially
corroborated by all the other witnesses. His evidence was not detracted from
by objective facts or the probabilities and, importantly, was not contradicted. It
follows that there was no reason not to accept the evidence of Mr Daun as to
the aim with which the shares were acquired or the circumstances in which
they were sold.

[43] Mr Sussman said that because of past experience he expected the
turnaround of the business of Profurn to take a long time and that „what was
of paramount importance was to have a shareholder that would be behind us
through these difficult times‟. Mr Burger said that FirstRand needed somebody
that was prepared to put long term capital into the business. Both therefore
required a long term investment for the purpose of rescuing the business.
Both found what they had required in Mr Daun when he made the
commitment in terms of the MOU. He in turn said that what he did was „not

like buying shares‟. He explained that he made an entrepreneurial long term
investment aimed at rescuing Profurn‟s ailing business. He inter alia said:
„But at that time it was an investment in uncertain surroundings with huge risks. You
didn‟t know what happens, and therefore it was not suitable to make a quick buck,
but first you had to re-organise, to restructure this new business which has got huge
problems.
. . . For me it was a difficult rescue operation which, in the end, with the help of David
Sussman‟s management, went successful.‟

[44] If after three to five years the rescue operation was successful, several
options would be available. I refer to the following evidence of Mr Daun:
„And I was thinking at that time, my personal thinking, that we need perhaps four to
five years when we ─ until we could see real results out of this effort to rescue this
business.
MR SHOLTO-DOUGLAS:
And what would you do after the three to four years, or
four to five years?
MR DAUN:
This on that time was fully open, but for me was quite interesting, I
have known out of other shares deals in South Africa, when you‟re a 20%
shareholder in a quoted company, you have a lot of options and possibilities. You
could increase your shares. I could ─ I didn‟t know where the share price was going.
I was prepared, perhaps, when the public was negative, that I buy further shares on
the market perhaps to go to maturity or to control it.
. . .
MR SHOLTO-DOUGLAS:
Your original intention was to hold these shares until
such time as the transaction had bedded down, although you may not have excluded
other options as well, is that right?
MR DAUN:
No, I had the full theoretically possible options when I have ─ I told
you before, when I have of the South African quoted company more than 20% of the
shares and in case it develops in a certain direction I got a good base as a strong
shareholder to control, to get control of this business. I could buy further shares on
the market, you know this option created for me as well huge traction, it was nothing
in stone, so I could have been ─ it could have been, I‟m looking back I should have
done it, it could have been that I bought more shares, more shares, and get control
solely of the operation including Profurn.
. . .

But I must be clear I was long term original, I had all options open, and I had a good
management, therefore I felt positive.
. . .
MR SHOLTO-DOUGLAS:
Yes, no I understand, I think we understand each other
there now, I mean essentially your share in the benefit of the transaction with what
you were going to get on resale of the shares, not what you were going to get in the
form  of a dividend cheque if JD Group declared a dividend?
MR DAUN:
One option was the sale of the share, other option is utilise 20% to
form another merger, and I get other shares, you know it‟s not only selling, when you
have only 1000 shares you have only one option to sell the shares. When you have
20% you have so many options, of this I can talk about one hour.
MR SHOLTO-DOUGLAS:
I understand that, I understand you had many options,
one of them was to sell the shares at an increased price and take the profit.
MR DAUN:
Yes, yes.‟
Mr Jooste confirmed this in the following terms:
„Claas and I never discussed, and I think I tried to explain it this morning, how we
would exit JD. We spoke about what we would do if it goes wrong. We spoke about a
long term investment in the industry.‟

[45] Mr Daun obviously made the investment because he was of the
opinion that the rescue operation could be successful. And it was naturally
anticipated that a turnaround of the business would result in an increased
share price. But this is neutral, it says nothing about the aim of the acquisition.
Virtually every capital asset is purchased in the hope and anticipation that it
will increase in value and in contemplation of the possibility that it may in
future be sold at a profit. Mr Daun contemplated a resale of the shares at a
profit as one of several possibilities. These possibilities were to be explored at
the appropriate time in future.

[46] At the time of the effective acquisition of the shares their disposal at a
profit was by no means inevitable.  First, the prospects of the rescue
operation succeeding were uncertain. An investment of a very large sum of
money ─ originally R300 million ─ was made in the anticipation that Mr
Sussman‟s managerial skills would not only make a success of the rescue
but, over an indeterminate period, provide some return in the form of growth in

the value of the investment. The risks involved were substantial bearing in
mind that Profurn was staring insolvency in the face. The element of salvaging
something from Mr Daun‟s existing investment in Profurn could not have been
absent. And when he committed himself to the deal Mr Daun had no idea of
how long his commitment would have to last. Second, if the rescue operation
was successful, all options were open. Finally, in regard to a possible sale Mr
Daun testified that the tradability of a block of shares of this magnitude was
low. His undisputed evidence was that he would never have been able to
trade these shares in the market.

[47] Counsel for the Commissioner placed considerable stress upon the
conversation between Mr Jooste and Mr Pagden and Mr Jooste‟s knowledge
in November 2003 of the possibility of disposing of the shares through a book
building exercise. But Mr Daun had no knowledge of the concept of book
building at all before he was informed thereof by Mr Jooste during January or
February 2004 when the latter was in Germany to attend a furniture fair. The
conversation between Mr Pagden and Mr Jooste at the coffee shop in San
Francisco during November 2003 therefore pales into insignificance. What
transpired is in any event clear from the evidence of both Mr Pagden and Mr
Jooste. Only a brief discussion („a minute or two‟) took place to the effect that
it would be possible to do a book building transaction in respect of the JDG
shares. No decision was taken and Mr Jooste said that it was not his decision
in any case. But Mr Pagden sensed an opportunity to make a deal and
pursued it. This led to the presentation for a book building transaction made
by Mr Pagden to Mr Daun in March 2004 when Mr Daun was in Johannesburg
for a Steinhoff board meeting.

[48] Because of his commitment to Mr Sussman, Mr Daun could only
consider this opportunity if it had the blessing of Mr Sussman. When he spoke
to Mr Sussman, this is what transpired:
„And obviously I didn‟t know book building. He didn‟t know it. He says, yes, this is ─
ja, I said, David, but I have to go back to Germany to think about the whole thing, if it
is worthwhile. My plan was long term. I have to discuss this with my supervisory
board at home, that‟s my wife and family.

But in case, David, I asked him, when we would consider to sell, it‟s against
our understanding. What would you say, I asked David. I said would you have any
complaints, because I never would consider this thing when you would say no. And
then I was quite surprised, and David was laughing, he said, the whole thing, this
restructuring of Profurn and this new group works far quicker or better than I thought.
If you really decide ─ I would not recommend that you move, but if you decide to go
out, I would not complain about it because then I get new, it might be exciting,
partners or shareholders, but it‟s your decision, he said to me.‟

[49] Mr Jooste was in fact opposed to selling the shares. He attempted to
persuade Mr Daun not to do so by saying that the share price might rise
further (as it did) and that there might be other restructuring possibilities in
future. Eventually he only managed to persuade Mr Daun to withdraw the
seven million shares from the book building exercise, half of which was
obtained by Mr Jooste through Mayfair Speculators (Pty) Ltd.

[50] Back in Germany, Mr Daun‟s wife (and financial confidante) urged him
to sell on the ground that he was overexposed in South Africa. And so it
happened that after much consideration Mr Daun decided to sell the shares. It
is abundantly clear that from the perspective of Mr Daun, this decision was
the result of the unsolicited and fortuitous offer of book building.

[51] The Commissioner argued and the tax court accepted that the short
term of the Gensec loan and the nature of the equity kicker indicated an
intention to fund the loan repayments by way of the sale of the shares. But the
loan agreement was entered into on 5 December 2003, long after the MOU. In
any event, the equity kicker was payable irrespective of whether the shares
were sold or not, the short term of the loan was fully explained and it is
common cause that refinancing of the transaction would have presented no
difficulty.

[52] In my judgment it is clear from the evidence that the first and primary
purpose of the acquisition of the shares was to rescue a major business in the
retail furniture industry by long term investment of capital. This involved a

commitment of capital for an indeterminate period involving considerable risk
and only a very uncertain prospect of a return. Assuming the rescue was
successful, it was uncertain what would happen next. In effect all options were
open. All of this was consistent with an investment of a capital nature that was
realised sooner than initially expected because of skilled management and
favourable economic circumstances. It was not a purchase of shares as
trading stock for resale at a profit. The factual findings of the tax court in
respect of the intention with which the shares had been purchased, were
therefore clearly wrong. Although the full court did not say so in so many
words, I am satisfied that it was convinced on appeal that the findings were
wrong. It did say that (para 27) „these findings are contrary to the weight of the
evidence‟ and continued to make its own factual findings to the contrary. At
any rate, this is what the full court should have found. I find that Capstone
proved on a balance of probabilities that the proceeds were of a capital
nature. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

Cross-appeal
[53] In the result the conditional cross-appeal falls away. It remains to
consider the cross-appeal. It raises the question whether the indemnity
settlement formed part of the base cost of the shares for purposes of capital
gains tax.

[54] In terms of paragraph 20(1)(a) of the Eight Schedule to the Act, the
base cost includes „expenditure actually incurred in respect of the costs of
acquisition‟ of an asset. It is trite that „expenditure actually incurred‟ refers to
an unconditional legal obligation to pay. The words „in respect of‟ connote a
causal relationship. (See Stevens v Commissioner, South African Revenue
Service [2006] ZASCA 117; 2007 (2) SA 554 (SCA) para 20.)

[55] It is beyond question that the contingent liability of Capstone in terms of
the indemnity to FirstRand formed part of the consideration for the acquisition
of the shares. Had payment in terms thereof taken place during the 2005 year
of assessment, it would have constituted part of the base cost of the shares.
The unconditional obligation in terms of the indemnity settlement to pay R55

million to Daun et Cie was undertaken in substitution of the contingent
obligation to FirstRand. The full court rightly said that the liability to FirstRand
was „converted‟ into liability to Daun et Cie. Whether this was financially a
wise step is immaterial, as is the fact that it was taken after the sale of the
shares. The causal link with acquisition of the shares was not broken. The
acquisition of the shares remained the causa causans of the indemnity
settlement. I am therefore unable to agree with the conclusion of the full court
that (para 59) the indemnity settlement was „entirely separate from the
acquisition of the JDG shares‟ and therefore a novus actus interveniens. It
was the mechanism by which the contingent liability incurred as part of the
acquisition of the shares was monetised and rendered a quantifiable
component of the cost of the shares.

[56] The Commissioner accepted that the liability in terms of the indemnity
settlement was incurred during July 2004, that is, in the 2005 year of
assessment. In my judgment the liability incurred by Capstone to pay the
amount of R55 million to Daun et Cie was an „expenditure actually incurred‟ in
respect of the acquisition of the shares. It follows that the cross-appeal must
succeed.

[57] The following order is issued:
1 The appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
2.1 The cross-appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
2.2 It is declared that the liability undertaken by the taxpayer during July 2004
to pay the amount of R55 million to Daun et Cie Aktiengesellschaft, formed
part of the base cost of the acquisition of the shares in JD Group Ltd.

___________________
C H G van der Merwe
Acting Judge of Appeal

APPEARANCES:
For Appellant:
A R Sholto-Douglas SC (with M W Janisch SC and
H Cassim)
Instructed by:
State Attorney, Cape Town
State Attorney, Bloemfontein

For Respondent:

L Kuschke SC (with T Emslie SC)
Instructed by:
Werksman Attorneys, Cape Town
Lovius Block, Bloemfontein

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

FROM

The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE

9 February 2016

STATUS

Immediate

Please note that the media summary is for the benefit of the media and does not form part of
the judgment.

CSARS v Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd (20844/2015) [2016] ZASCA 2 (9 February 2016)

MEDIA STATEMENT

Today, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) dismissed the appeal of the Commissioner for the South
African Revenue Service (SARS), and upheld the cross-appeal of Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd
(Capstone), against an order of the Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town.  In the
result, the SCA (i) confirmed that the profit of almost R400 million made by Capstone from the sale of
approximately 17 million shares in a company, JD Group Ltd (JDG), was of a capital nature and not of
a revenue nature, even though Capstone had paid for and obtained transfer of the shares less than a
year before; and (ii) held that the amount of R55 million in respect of a tax liability flowing from the
original acquisition transaction formed part of the base cost of the shares.

The issues before the SCA where (i) whether the profit from the sale of the shares was of a revenue
or capital nature; and (ii) whether a contingent liability incurred by Capstone as part of the share
purchase transaction, which was later converted into an unconditional liability to a third party, formed
part of the base cost of the shares.

The shares that formed the subject of the dispute were acquired by Capstone as a result of a
corporate restructuring of a JSE-listed furniture business, Profurn Limited (Profurn), which was in
severe financial difficulty.  The turnaround strategy that was adopted involved the merger of Profurn
with another more financially sound furniture business, JD Group Limited (JDG), in return for JDG
shares.  The shares would initially be issued to First Rand Bank Ltd (FirstRand), who would then on-
sell them in various quantities to, amongst others, Capstone.  The shares were eventually paid for
and transferred by FirstRand to Capstone in December 2003, and were sold less than a year later, in
April 2004, for a profit of almost R400 million.

With regard to the first issue, SARS argued that this profit must be taxed as being of a revenue
nature, while Capstone argued that it was of a capital nature.  The SCA reaffirmed that the applicable
test for determining whether a profit must be treated as revenue is whether it is a gain made by
operation of a business in carrying out a scheme of profit-making.  If so, it is of a revenue nature.  If
not, it is of a capital nature.  And where a profit is the result of the sale of an asset, the intention with
which the taxpayer had acquired and held the asset is of great importance and may be decisive.  The
court held that this was the case here.

Although the shares in question were sold less than a year after Capstone acquired ownership over
them, which would ordinarily suggest a short-term transaction, the SCA held that in substance, risk
and reward was acquired by Capstone at a much earlier date, in June 2002.  This is the date on
which a binding memorandum of understanding was signed by the various parties laying out the
turnaround strategy, and fixing the price at which Capstone was to acquire the shares.  This is the
relevant date to assess the intention with which the acquisition was made.  And at that date, it was
clear that Capstone and its controllers expected the turnaround to take between three and five years,
and they viewed the enterprise as an investment to rescue the business of Profurn.  Capstone’s
controllers did contemplate the potential sale of the shares at some point in the future, but this was
merely one of many options, after a significant period, and not the dominant purpose behind the
acquisition.  Accordingly, the nature of the profit fell to be treated as capital.

With regards to the second issue, part of the acquisition price for the shares that Capstone agreed to
pay to FirstRand was an indemnity in respect of certain tax liabilities incurred by Profurn.  Capstone
subsequently wanted to finalise the entire transaction and so wished to replace its contingent liability
to FirstRand with a quantified and unconditional liability.  Accordingly, in the 2005 year of
assessment, it was agreed between Capstone and another company involved in the restructuring
transaction, Daun et Cie, that Capstone would pay Daun et Cie R55 million if Daun et Cie took over
Capstone’s contingent liability to FirstRand.  The SCA held that it was clear that the initial contingent
liability was part of the base cost.  The SCA held that it was also clear that the obligation to pay R55
million was undertaken in substitution of the contingent obligation to FirstRand, and accordingly that
the liability to FirstRand was ‘converted’ into liability to Daun et Cie.  Overturning the ruling of the
court a quo, the SCA held that there was no break in the chain of causation, and the acquisition of the
shares remained the causa causans of the indemnity settlement.  It therefore formed part of the base
cost of the acquisition of the shares.

Accordingly, the SCA dismissed SARS’ appeal, and upheld Capstone’s cross-appeal.

--- ends ---