THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Reportable
Case no: 121/06

In the matter between:

BRUCE BENNET BELL

APPELLANT

and

THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND

RESPONDENT

CORAM: STREICHER, CAMERON, JAFTA JJA, et SNYDERS, THERON AJJA

DATE OF HEARING: 17 MAY 2007

DATE OF DELIVERY: 1 JUNE 2007

Summary:  Motor vehicle accidents – Compensation – Damages claim in terms of Multilateral Motor
Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 0f 1989 – Whether a flatbed transporter is a ‘motor vehicle’ as defined in
the Act – Whether ‘road’ in the definition of a ‘motor vehicle’ means a ‘public road’.

Neutral citation: This case may be cited as Bell v The Road Accident Fund [2007] SCA
83 (RSA).

___________________________________________________________________________

THERON AJA/

[1] The appellant was employed as a baggage controller by a company based
at Cape Town International Airport, transferring luggage containers to and from
aircraft. On 18 November 1994 he was involved in a collision with a flatbed
transporter inside the operational area of the airport. In consequence he
sustained certain bodily injuries. He instituted an action for damages against the
Road Accident Fund (‘the Fund’) in the Cape High Court on the basis that the
collision was caused by the negligence of the driver of the flatbed transporter.
The Fund, in a special plea, alleged that the appellant’s claim should be
dismissed as the flatbed transporter was not a motor vehicle as defined in s 1 of
the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996.1

[2] In the court a quo, the parties agreed that the issue raised in the special
plea be adjudicated as a stated case in terms of Rule 33 of the Rules of the High
Court. The court (HJ Erasmus J) upheld the special plea, finding that the flatbed
transporter did not fall within the statutory definition of a motor vehicle. It is
against that finding that the appellant appeals, with the leave of the court a quo.

[3] This appeal raises the question whether the flatbed transporter is a motor
vehicle as defined in Articles 1 and 40 of the Agreement Establishing the
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (‘the Agreement’) which Agreement
was entered into pursuant to the provisions of the Multilateral Motor Vehicle
Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989.

1 The parties were agreed that since the collision occurred in 1994, the applicable legislation was the Multilateral
Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989.

In Article 1 of the Agreement it is stated that a:
‘ “motor vehicle”  means any vehicle designed or adapted for propulsion or haulage on a road
by means of fuel or electricity and includes a trailer, a caravan, an agricultural or any other
implement designed or adapted to be drawn by such motor vehicle.’
This definition is substantially similar to that in the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of
1996.
Article 40 of the Agreement provides that:
‘The MMF or its appointed agent, as the case may be, shall subject to the provisions of this
Agreement be obliged to compensate any person whomsoever (in this Agreement called the
third party) for any loss or damage which the third party has suffered as a result of-
(a)
any bodily injury to himself;
(b)
the death of or any bodily injury to any person,
in either case caused by or arising out of the driving of a motor vehicle by any person
whomsoever at any place within the area of jurisdiction of the members of the MMF…’

[4] The vehicle in question is a Transporter 7750A made in Switzerland. It is
powered by a diesel engine and has a hydraulic transmission similar to that of a
standard vehicle with an automatic transmission; a drive lever is fitted to the left
of the driver’s seat with the positions R-N-L-D. The vehicle can reverse and go
forward. The accelerator pedal and foot brake are on the floor and according to
the manufacturer’s specifications it has a speed range of up to 30km/h in drive
and 15km/h in reverse. It was however agreed by the parties that the vehicle can
attain a speed of approximately 50km/h. The vehicle does not have a rearview
mirror, side mirrors or seat belts.

[5] The vehicle is fitted with a raised seat for the driver which is not enclosed.
It is equipped with a power steering, a footbrake on all four wheels and a
separate handbrake. It has four large heavy duty pneumatic tyres. The drive
controls are on a panel to the left of the steering wheel and include a starter and
light switch, fuel gauge, thermometer, oil pressure gauge and blinker switch with
hooter. The vehicle is fitted with headlights which may be dimmed or brightened,
a beacon light, indicator lights and parking lights on all four corners, brake lights
and reflectors at the rear. Its lighting system allows it to be operated twenty four
hours a day. The basic weight of the vehicle is 4000kg and it has a carrying
capacity of up to 6800kg.

[6] According to the manufacturer’s brochure admitted in evidence, it is a self–
propelled vehicle designed for the transportation of baggage and cargo. It is used
at airports to transport baggage and cargo from its place of origin within the
confines of the terminal, to next to an aircraft on the airside of an airport (the
tarmac and runway area where planes arrive and take off). The flatbed
transporter operates only within the confines of the airport.

[7] The airside of the airport has a road system which functions similarly to that
of public roads, except that the general public does not have access to these
roads. The roads are two way with a demarcated middle line. There are standard
traffic control signs such as stop, yield and speed signs. No vehicle may drive
anywhere else on the airside, except on the demarcated roads. The roads on the

airside are utilized by standard licensed vehicles, including bakkies, trucks,
tractors, various types of transporters, and passenger busses, as well as by
pedestrians (personnel and passengers) who cross at designated pedestrian
crossings.

[8] This court has on a number of occasions considered and pronounced upon
the correct interpretation to be given to the phrase ‘designed for propulsion on a
road’ as envisaged in the definition of a motor vehicle. While the third party
insurance legislation has been amended over time, the definition of a ‘motor
vehicle’ has remained fairly constant. The test to determine whether a vehicle
was designed for propulsion on a road is objective.2 In Chauke v Santam,3 Olivier
JA stated that ‘designed for’ connotes ‘the general idea of its purpose’ and added
that the phrase must be given an objective common sense meaning.  The
learned judge explained that the word ‘design’:
‘conveys the notion of the ordinary, everyday and general purpose for which the vehicle was
conceived and constructed and how the reasonable person would see its ordinary, and not
some fanciful, use on a road.’4
Streicher JA in Road Accident Fund v Van Den Berg5 endorsed this reasoning
and described the test as  being ‘the general purpose for which the vehicle,
objectively determined, was conceived and constructed’.

2Chauke v Santam 1997 (1) SA 178 (A) at 183A-C; Road Accident Fund v Van Den Berg 2006 (2) SA 250 (SCA)
paras 6-7.
3 1997 (1) SA 178 (A).
4 At 183A-B.
5 2006 (2) SA 250 (SCA) para 7.

[9] It was common cause that the flatbed transporter was designed for
propulsion on an airport road. The question then is whether the definition of a
‘motor vehicle’ requires that it be designed for propulsion on a public road. On
appeal, counsel for the Fund contended that the definition does so require. This
question was authoratively answered  in Road Accident Fund v Mbendera6 where
Lewis JA held that ‘road’ in the definition should not be narrowly interpreted to
mean ‘public road’. Lewis JA reasoned that the Road Accident Act 56 of 1996
(like the Agreement) ‘applies throughout the Republic and not just to vehicles
used on public roads’.7 I respectfully agree with and adopt the reasoning of Lewis
JA. In my view, the words ‘at any place within the area of jurisdiction of the
members of the MMF’ as contained in Article 40 of the Agreement, supports the
broader interpretation of ‘road’.
[10] It was clearly not the intention of the legislature to limit ‘road’ to a ‘public
road’. There is no reason why ‘road’ should not be given its ordinary meaning,
namely, ‘a line of communication, especially a specially prepared track between
places for use by pedestrians, riders and vehicles’.8 If it was the legislature’s
intention to limit ‘road’ to a ‘public road’, it would, in my view, have said so. If a
passenger bus or any other standard vehicle were to collide with a pedestrian
(third party) within the operational area of the airport, and injure such third party,
the latter would be able to claim compensation from the Fund for any injury
sustained as a result of the collision.  It would be anomalous, as found in
Mbendera, to hold that where the injuries were caused as a result of the

6 [2004] 4 All SA 25 (SCA).
7 At para 13.
8 Per Olivier JA in Chauke v Santam Ltd 1997 (1) SA 178 at 181F-G.

negligence of the driver of a vehicle such as the flatbed transporter, which is
designed for propulsion on a road, the third party would have no claim against
the Fund.

[11] For these reasons I find that the flatbed transporter is a motor vehicle as
contemplated in the Agreement. The appeal is upheld with costs. The order of
the court a quo upholding the special plea is set aside and substituted with an
order dismissing the special plea with costs.

L V THERON
Acting Judge of Appeal

CONCUR:
STREICHER JA
CAMERON JA
JAFTA JA
SNYDERS JA

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

Date:
1 June 2007

Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of
the media and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Appeal

BRUCE BENNET BELL v THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND

In a judgment today the Supreme Court of Appeal has upheld an
appeal by a third party relating to the definition of a ‘motor vehicle’
for purposes of the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act
93 of 1989.

The appellant was employed as a baggage controller by a
company based at Cape Town International Airport, transferring
luggage containers to and from aircraft. On 18 November 1994 he
was involved in a collision with a flatbed transporter inside the
operational area of the airport. In consequence he sustained
certain bodily injuries. He instituted an action for damages against
the Road Accident Fund (‘the Fund’) in the Cape High Court on the
basis that the collision was caused by the negligence of the driver
of the flatbed transporter. The Fund, in a special plea, alleged that
the appellant’s claim should be dismissed as the flatbed
transporter was not a motor vehicle as defined in Articles 1 and 40
of the Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Motor Vehicle
Accidents Fund (‘the Agreement’). The court upheld the special

plea, finding that the flatbed transporter did not fall within the
statutory definition of a motor vehicle.

The SCA, in a judgment by Theron AJA in which Streicher JA,
Cameron JA, Jafta JA and Snyder AJA concurred, that the Act
applied to all roads in South Africa and not just to vehicles used on
public roads. The court stated that it was clearly not the intention of
the legislature to limit ‘road’ to a ‘public road’ and there is no
reason why ‘road’ should not be given its ordinary meaning. If it
was the legislature’s intention to limit ‘road’ to a ‘public road’, it
would have said so.

--ends--