THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable

Case No: 771/2016
In the matter between:
JACOB GEDLEYIHLEKISA ZUMA

APPLICANT/APPELLANT

and

DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE

FIRST RESPONDENT
ACTING NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS

SECOND RESPONDENT
THE HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE OF SPECIAL
OPERATIONS

THIRD RESPONDENT

And in the matter between:

Case No: 1170/2016

ACTING NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS

FIRST APPLICANT/APPELLANT
THE HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE OF SPECIAL
OPERATIONS

SECOND APPLICANT/APPELLANT

and

DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE

FIRST RESPONDENT
JACOB GEDLEYIHLEKISA ZUMA

SECOND RESPONDENT

Neutral Citation:
Zuma v DA (771/2016); ANDPP V DA (1170/2016) [2017]
ZASCA 146 (13 October 2017).
Coram:
Navsa ADP, Cachalia, Bosielo, Leach and Tshiqi JJA
Heard:

14 September 2017
Delivered:

13 October 2017
Summary:
Decision by Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions to
discontinue prosecution – whether decision wanting for invocation and reliance on
inapposite provision of the Constitution– whether decision rational – manner in which
NPA conducted litigation deserving of judicial censure.
___________________________________________________________________
ORDER
___________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: The Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (Ledwaba DJP
with Pretorius and Mothle JJ sitting as court of first instance), reported sub nom
Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions & others 2016
(2) SACR 1 (GP).

The following order is made:
1 The applications for leave to appeal are granted.
2 The appeals are dismissed with costs, including the costs of three counsel and the
costs related to the applications for leave to appeal. The National Prosecuting
Authority and Mr JG Zuma are to pay such costs jointly and severally, the one paying
the other to be absolved.

___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
Navsa ADP (Cachalia, Bosielo, Leach and Tshiqi JJA concurring):
Introduction
[1] T S Eliot spoke of ‘the recurrent end of the unending’.1 The relevance of these
words will soon become apparent. Before us there are two applications for leave to
appeal, referred by this Court for oral argument in terms of s 17(2)(d) of the Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013. In referring the matter for oral argument, this Court directed
the parties to be ready, if called upon to do so, to argue the merits of the appeal. The
two applications were consolidated as they arise out of the same facts. We heard the
applications and directed that the merits be argued as well. The first application is by
Mr Jacob G Zuma, presently the President of the Republic of South Africa. The other
application is by the Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions (the ANDPP)2
and the Head of the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO)3. The applications are
directed against a judgment of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria, in
terms of which the decision on 1 April 2009 by the then ANDPP, Mr Mokotedi
Mpshe, to discontinue the prosecution of Mr Zuma on serious criminal charges,
including charges of racketeering, corruption, money laundering and fraud, was held
to be irrational and was reviewed and set aside. The order was at the instance of the
Democratic Alliance (the DA), the official opposition in the National Parliament.

[2] Eight years ago, in 2009, this Court in National Director of Public Prosecutions
v Zuma [2009] ZASCA 1; 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) (hereinafter referred to as Zuma),
stated the following in para 2:

1 From his poem, Little Gidding, which forms part of Four Quartets, a series of poems that discuss
time, perspective, humanity and salvation. Part of the poem from which it is taken reads as follows:
‘In the uncertain hour before the morning
Near the ending of interminable night
At the recurrent end of the unending. . .’
2 The office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions (the NDPP) was established in terms of
s 179(1)(a) of the Constitution read with s 5 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 (NPA
Act).
3 The Head of the Directorate of Special Operations was established in terms of s 7 of the NPA Act.

‘The litigation between the NDPP and Mr Zuma has a long and troubled history and the law
reports are replete with judgments dealing with the matter. It is accordingly unnecessary to
say much by way of introduction and a brief summary will suffice.’
Save for what is set out below, the litigation history up to that point is recounted in
that case.4 I do not intend to repeat it. Much more litigation followed, culminating in
the matter presently before us. Unlike instances in the past, in the present case, the
National Prosecuting Authority (the NPA) and Mr Zuma made common cause.

[3] The current applications are part of the continuing litigation saga that has
endured over many years and involved numerous court cases. It is doubtful that a
decision in this case will be the end of the continuing contestations concerning the
prosecution of Mr Zuma. Minutes into the argument before us counsel for both Mr
Zuma and the NPA conceded that the decision to discontinue the prosecution was
flawed. Counsel on behalf of Mr Zuma, having made the concession, with the full
realisation that the consequence would be that the prosecution of his client would
revive, gave notice that Mr Zuma had every intention in the future to continue to use
such processes as are available to him to resist prosecution.

[4] The South African public might well be forgiven for thinking that the
description at the beginning of this judgment was coined to deal with the prosecution
or latterly, more accurately, the non-prosecution of Mr Zuma. I shall, in due course,
deal with the nature and import of the concessions made by both the NPA and
counsel on behalf of Mr Zuma.

[5] At this stage it is necessary to set out in some detail the background to the
litigation in the court below. The reason for this is to assess whether the concessions
referred to in para 3 above, which will be dealt with in detail later, were rightly made
and whether there are other equal or perhaps more compelling considerations over
and above those conceded by Mr Zuma and the NPA, which render the decision to
discontinue the prosecution liable to be set aside. Furthermore, the history is
important in that there are certain aspects in respect of which judicial comment is
required. I now turn to deal with the history of the matter.

4 In paras 3-7.

The background
[6] Initially, corruption charges were brought by the NPA against Mr Zuma during
2005, before he was elected to the high office he currently holds, and well after the
conviction of his former business associate, Mr Shabir Shaik, on fraud and corruption
charges.5 Investigations related to the criminal charges against Mr Zuma
commenced in 2001. During 2006 the case against him was struck from the roll by
Msimang J in the Durban and Coast Local Division of the High Court, after an
application by the State for a postponement to complete its investigation and finalise
an indictment was refused.6 This had the result that the prosecution was terminated.7
Not only had Mr Zuma opposed the application by the State for a postponement, but
in addition his legal representatives filed an application for a permanent stay of the
prosecution. When the matter was struck from the roll that too came to an end.

[7] On 28 December 2007, a new indictment containing charges of corruption
and money laundering was served on Mr Zuma. This Court, in Zuma, held that the
then ANDPP, Mr Mokotedi Mpshe, had taken the decision to prosecute.8 The
significance of that finding in relation to the heads of argument initially filed by both
the applicants in this matter, the later supplementary heads filed on behalf of the
NPA, and ultimately on the outcome of this case, will be dealt with during the course
of this judgment.

[8] Subsequent to the indictment being served, further legal battles were waged
by Mr Zuma against the NPA concerning search warrants and other issues related to

5 The core of the State’s case had been that Mr Shaik and corporate entities under his control had
made numerous separate payments of money directly to, or for the benefit of, the then Deputy
President of South Africa, Mr Jacob Zuma, as bribes for the latter to advance Mr Shaiks’ business
interests. President Zuma has complained on an on-going basis that he was prejudiced by not being
charged together with Mr Shaik whilst having to endure the slur of his alleged criminal conduct. See
also para 12 infra. For the details concerning Mr Shaik’s convictions, see the judgment of this Court in
S v Shaik & others [2006] ZASCA 105; 2007 (1) SA 240 (SCA) and the subsequent judgment of the
Constitutional Court in S v Shaik & others [2007] ZACC 19; 2008 (2) SA 208 (CC) refusing an
application for leave to appeal against the convictions and sentences.
6 As reflected in para 5 of National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma [2009] ZASCA 1; 2009 (2)
SA 277 (SCA).
7 See Thint Holdings (Southern Africa) (Pty) Ltd & another v National Director of Public Prosecutions;
Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions [2008] ZACC 14; 2009 (1) SA 141 (CC) in paras 40-
42 and also para 75 of the National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma [2009] ZASCA 1; 2009 (2)
SA 277 (SCA) judgment.
8 Para 6 of the National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA).

his prosecution. For present purposes it is unnecessary to have regard to the other
contestations.

[9] On 10 February 2009, more than a year after the new indictment was served,
Mr Zuma’s legal representatives, in an attempt to persuade the NPA to discontinue
the prosecution, made written representations, purportedly for consideration by Mr
Mpshe, in terms of the provisions of s 179(5)(d) of the Constitution9 which provides:
‘The National Director of Public Prosecutions -
. . .
(d) may review a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, after consulting the relevant
Director of Public Prosecutions and after taking representations within a period specified by
the National Director of Public Prosecutions, from the following:
(i) The accused person.
(ii) The complainant.
(iii) Any other person or party whom the National Director considers to be relevant.’

[10] I pause to record that these representations were not made under oath. They
were also not disclosed to the public, the court below or this Court, on the basis of
confidentiality claimed by Mr Zuma and on the basis that they had been made on a
‘without prejudice’ basis. In resisting the DA’s application in the court below to have
the decision to discontinue the prosecution set aside, the principal deponent on
behalf of the NPA, Mr William Hofmeyr, a Deputy National Director of Public
Prosecutions and the head of the Asset Forfeiture Unit in the NPA, explained that the
written representations on behalf of Mr Zuma covered the following topics:

9 Section 22(2)(c) of the NPA Act echoes the provisions of s 179(5)(d) of the Constitution. It reads as
follows:
‘In accordance with section 179 of the Constitution, the National Director –
. . .
(c) may review a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, after consulting the relevant Director and
after taking representations, within the period specified by the National Director, of the accused
person, the complainant and any other person or party whom the National Director considers to be
relevant.’
This power of review vested in the National Director of Public Prosecutions has to be seen against the
general power vested in the Prosecuting Authority in terms of s 179(2) of the Constitution, to institute
criminal proceedings on behalf of the State and to carry out any necessary functions incidental
thereto. One also has to have regard to the powers of Directors of Public Prosecutions set out in s
24(1) of the NPA Act which include the power to initiate and conduct criminal proceedings and
functions incidental thereto. In addition, in terms of s 22(1) of the NPA Act, the NDPP, as the head of
the prosecuting authority, has authority over the exercise of all the powers, and the performance of all
the duties and functions conferred or imposed on or assigned to any member of the prosecuting
authority by the Constitution, this Act or any other law.

(a) The merits of the prosecution;
(b) His intention to challenge the inclusion of racketeering charges in the indictment
and whether this would inevitably lead to delays in the prosecution;
(c) Mr Zuma’s contention that delays in finalising the prosecution and the trial would
undermine his right to a fair trial;
(d) The financial costs of the prosecution;
(e) Policy and legal implications associated with prosecuting a sitting President.10
(f) The risks of political, economic and social instability, should the NPA proceed with
its prosecution of Mr Zuma;
(g) The impact of the trial on the administration of justice. They argued that even if
the NPA secured a conviction, the majority of South Africans would still believe that
Mr Zuma had been treated unfairly;
(h) The existence of a political conspiracy, of which the NPA was part, to discredit Mr
Zuma.

[11] On 20 February 2009, 10 days after they made written representations Mr
Zuma’s legal representatives, attorney Michael Hulley and his counsel Mr Kemp J
Kemp SC, made oral representations to the NPA. The NPA team receiving the
representations comprised Mr Mpshe and his deputies, including Mr Sibongile
Mzinyathi, a Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and head of the National
Prosecutions Service in the National Director of Public Prosecution’s office and Mr
Thanda Mngwengwe, an investigating Director with the DSO at the time that charges
were re-instituted and prosecutor under whose hand the indictment was filed and
Acting Head: DSO at the time the charges were withdrawn.

[12] Mr Hofmeyr described how the oral representations consisted of two parts.
The following are the relevant parts of his affidavit:
‘241 On 20 February 2009, Michael Hulley and Kemp J Kemp SC (Zuma’s legal
representatives) made oral representations to the NPA. The NPA delegation comprised of
Mpshe and his deputies, including Mzinyathi. Mngwengwe was also present and participated
in the representations process.

10 Although Mr Zuma was not the President of the country at the time, he was nominated by the ANC
and expected to be elected as President after the general elections, scheduled to take place in May of
that year (2009).

242 The oral representations consisted of two parts: the first part was a briefing which
elaborated on the written representations on legal issues and the merits. The second part
was a briefing on the allegations of a political conspiracy which included additional
information that was not contained in the written representations that had been submitted.
243 Hulley disclosed that he was in possession of recordings of [telephone] conversations
between McCarthy and various politicians, including Ngcuka, Mzi Khumalo (a close friend of
Ngcuka) and Ronnie Kasrils (Minister of Intelligence at the time).
244 He maintained that the recordings proved that McCarthy manipulated the timing of the
decision to charge Zuma and that he had deliberately delayed the decision until after
Polokwane with one purpose in mind: to undermine Zuma’s chances of being elected as
ANC President at Polokwane. Following Zuma’s election and Mbeki’s defeat, McCarthy had
moved with haste to charge Zuma.
245 Hulley and Kemp informed the NPA that they intended to apply for a permanent stay in
the prosecution of Zuma if the NPA persisted with its prosecution. They warned that if they
did, the NPA’s involvement in a political campaign to discredit Zuma, as well as McCarthy’s
involvement in delaying the decision to prosecute, and the motive behind it, would become
public.’

[13] Mr Hulley apparently also complained about the decision taken in 2003 by Mr
Bulelani Ngcuka, the then National Director of Public Prosecutions (the NDPP), not
to charge then Deputy President Zuma along with Mr Shabir Shaik whilst announcing
publicly that there was a prima facie case against the former. Mr Zuma’s legal
representatives were adamant that individuals in the NPA, past and present,
conspired to discredit him. They referred to the fact that Mr McCarthy, the head of
the DSO at the time had used the resources of the NPA to source negative
intelligence concerning Mr Zuma. To this end he had initiated the Browse Mole
report which was supposedly based on intelligence gathered by private intelligence
operatives.

[14] On 9 March 2009 Mr Hofmeyr and Mr Mzinyathi, instructed by Mr Mpshe, met
with Mr Hulley and listened to the recordings of the telephone conversations referred
to in para 12, in Mr Hofmeyr’s office and made notes of what they had heard. Mr
Hofmeyr specifically enquired of Mr Hulley whether any member of the prosecution
team, excepting Mr McCarthy, was implicated in any campaign against or wrong-
doing in relation to the prosecution of Mr Zuma. The answer was in the negative. At

this stage it is necessary to record that the prosecutors involved in the day-to-day
running of the prosecution were Mr William Downer SC; Mr Anton Steynberg, a
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions from KwaZulu-Natal; Mr George Baloyi, a
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions from Gauteng; and Mr Johan Du Plooy, a
Senior Special Investigator with the DSO. Mr Downer was involved in the
prosecution of Mr Shaik and it follows that he was the lead prosecutor in relation to
the prosecution of Mr Zuma. The prosecutors referred to above were given the code-
name ‘Project Bumiputera Team’. I shall hereafter refer to them collectively as the
prosecution team.

[15] Mr Hulley asked Mr Hofmeyr when it could be expected of Mr Mpshe to
respond to the representations made on behalf of Mr Zuma. He warned that if the
prosecution continued he would advise Mr Zuma to bring an application for a
permanent stay of proceedings. It will be recalled that such an application had been
brought earlier but was not finally persisted in for the reason set out in para 6 above.

[16] Having received the representations and being concerned about the effect of
the recordings referred to above, Mr Mpshe was anxious about how best to respond.
The prosecution team compiled a memorandum in which they identified what they
considered to be the shortcomings of the representations. First, they pointed to the
fact that they had not been made under oath. They considered the representations to
be self-serving and cautioned that they had to be viewed with circumspection.
Second, and importantly, they asserted that the representations had not addressed
the merits of the case against Mr Zuma. Third, they indicated that whilst Mr Zuma’s
legal representatives pointed to a political conspiracy on the part of Mr Ngcuka and
Mr McCarthy, they did not implicate the prosecution team.

[17] The prosecution team consistently maintained the position set out in the
preceding paragraph. Simply put, their view was that the evidence on which the
charges were based was untainted and the prosecution should continue as the case
against Mr Zuma was strong. This view was supported by eminent outside senior
counsel who advised that insofar as fair trial issues might arise, in relation to
allegations of prosecutorial impropriety, those should be dealt with by the trial court.

[18] When these issues were being debated within the NPA, Mr Mpshe was rightly
concerned about whether the telephone conversations in issue had been lawfully
intercepted and the recordings properly obtained. The following part of Mr Hofmeyr’s
affidavit, confirmed by Mr Mpshe in his affidavit, is relevant:
‘The NIA had informed us that they were in possession of intercepted recordings of
conversations between McCarthy and Ngcuka, obtained during the course of an
investigation into the production and leaking of the Browse Mole report. We were shown a
copy of a certificate, signed by a judge, authorising the interception of McCarthy’s mobile
phone.’
It is important to note that the certificate by the judge indicating the scope of the
authorisation did not form part of the record and counsel for the NPA was unable to
enlighten us in regard thereto. Furthermore, how Mr Zuma’s legal representatives
came to be in possession of what appears to be classified information obtained by
the NIA was not explained. At a meeting between NPA management and the
prosecution team held on 30 March 2009 the following appears:
‘NIA is extremely cross about the info in Hulley's possession
Appears SAPS & NIA were listening to the tapes’
Suffice to say, it is troubling and warrants investigation by the relevant authorities.

[19] During the on-going discussions between Mr Mpshe, his deputies and the
prosecution team concerning the oral representations made on behalf of Mr Zuma, it
appears from the NPA’s own notes that they were all agreed that the case against
him was a strong one on the merits. At one stage during an NPA internal meeting,
when the recordings and the allegations concerning manipulation and a conspiracy
were being discussed, the following was stated:
‘Case against Mr Zuma is watertight.’
They were also all agreed that the prosecution was untainted. Subsequent to the
disclosure of the recordings the NPA’s interactions with Mr McCarthy and Mr Ngcuka
in relation to the allegations against them of a political conspiracy to thwart Mr Zuma
from becoming the President of the country yielded nothing of any substance. Mr
Ngcuka denied the allegations and Mr McCarthy informed them that he would not
respond until he was supplied with details concerning the recordings.

[20] The material parts of notes taken at an internal meeting of the NPA on 1 April
2009, at which it was decided to discontinue the prosecution, read as follows:
‘*Mpshe says after listening to the tapes he can’t separate [McCarthy’s] involvement, he got
angry. He can’t go on with this case. He has decided to drop the charges. We just need to
prepare the motivation and how do we substantiate this decision. He says we have sufficient
(information) to explain our decision.

He has no doubt that the President may have been a player behind the curtains.

He then goes on to the inferences that he draws about the involvement of Mbeki e.g
the fact that you are on your own i.e you have no president to protect you.
*Silas is prepared to abide by your decision. If you are satisfied and can justify I cannot say I
disagree with your decision. I will just need a lot of work to prepare on the motivation.
*[Mr Hofmeyr] says this is the most difficult decision. This is for legal reasons and for the
organisation. This is the correct decision. This would lead the NPA to attack. This is not
because we are weak. We need to think careful[ly] of what to say and how to package. We
need to strategize on how to approach the team and need to have a proper discussion with
them.
*I say I respect the decision and that the fact that I might have come to a different
conclusion, we should be very careful on how to manage this, avoid a cover-up. I would not
be part of the cover-up.
*Silas says there should be a valid and sound legal basis which he is not sure we have. This
needs a lot of a research. There is also a possibility of a nolle prosequi. If you agree, you
have to release the material, if not explain why not.
*Thanda [Mngwengwe] says he also supports it but it should be based on sound legal basis
and we should be careful not to appear to be doing what McCarthy did [to] Zuma.
*In support of Silas’ point about the nexus, what we did by going to NIA was actually to
legitimise an illegitimate process by Hulley.
*I propose that we only use the Hulley tapes and not use the NIA tapes. Mpshe sort of
agrees with me.
*[Mr Hofmeyr] disagrees with me and says there is no train smash by using the NIA tapes
but only refer to them.
Agreed that the press release is on Monday at 11h00.’
It was agreed between the persons who attended that meeting that the prosecution
team would not be informed until shortly before the public announcement was to be
made.

[21] Unaware of what had transpired on 1 April 2009, the very next day the
prosecution team addressed a further memorandum to Mr Mpshe, urging him to
reject the representations made on behalf of Mr Zuma. The following paragraphs of
that memorandum, bear repeating:
‘6. We refer to our memorandum of 20 March [2009], in which we recorded counsel’s advice.
Counsel advised the NPA that if the decision to prosecute Mr Zuma in December 2007 was
taken properly according to the merits of the evidence, then it would withstand Mr Zuma’s
conspiracy claims, whatever their merits. Counsel persist with their advice.
7. Given the importance for the present decision of the 2007 decision to prosecute, the
Bumiputera team re-examined our notes, diaries and memoranda concerning the events of
November and December 2007.
8. Having done so, we are satisfied that the position is quite clear. All the members of the
Bumiputera team and all the NPA top management to whom our recommendations were
presented, were unanimous that Mr Zuma should be charged. The consensus was also that
racketeering charges in terms of POCA should be included. The consensus included the
Acting NDPP. Indeed, on 14 December 2007, [Mr] Mpshe signed the POCA authorization for
the racketeering charges.
9. The recommendations, discussions, motivations and decisions were founded on the
merits of the evidence.
10. Despite this consensus concerning the correctness of the decision in principle, the Acting
NDPP had not actually made the final decision to prosecute, and when, before he went on
leave after 14 December [2007].
11. The delay can be attributed to a difference of approach between the Bumiputera team
and the Acting NDPP regarding when the decision would be taken. The team recommended
that the decision to prosecute should be taken and implemented immediately in early
December or as soon as possible after that, as all obstacles to the prosecution had by then
been removed and we were ready to prosecute. We codified our recommendations in our
memorandum to the Acting NDPP dated 6 December 2007. Part of our motivation was (and
remains) that political considerations, which might include the then impending Polokwane
conference, should be left out of account.
12. [Mr] Mpshe decided nevertheless to delay his decision until after Polokwane. He told Adv
Downer that he did not wish the NPA to be seen to be interfering in the Polokwane
proceedings. Adv Downer noted that the Acting NDPP told him expressly that this decision
was his ([Mr] Mpshe’s) and his alone.
13. Adv McCarthy issued the instruction to Adv Downer after Polokwane on 21 December to
proceed with issuing and serving the indictment and summonsing the accused. We do not

know what interaction between Advocates Mpshe and McCarthy preceded this instruction.’
(Emphasis in the original.)

[22] Significantly, for reasons that will become clear later, Mr Hofmeyr, and not Mr
Mpshe, responded to the memorandum by way of an e-mail that same day and
suggested that the prosecution team’s memorandum be amended to emphasise Mr
McCarthy’s central role in the decision to formally institute proceedings against Mr
Zuma. The relevant part of the email reads as follows:
‘At our meeting on 29 Nov it was decided that the Head of the DSO should take the decision.
His subsequent discussion with [McCarthy] and you was that charges should be after 1 Jan.
He says [McCarthy] phoned him about the 21st or 24th to say he wants to proceed now.
He then informed him that he does not agree, that it should wait until after 1 Jan as
previously agreed. But he said that since it was the Head of the DSO that must take the
decision, it was up to [McCarthy] to make the decision.’
In a further e-mail Mr Hofmeyr said, amongst others:
‘Clearly [McCarthy] made the decision to institute [the prosecution proceedings] between
xmas and new year – without the support of the NDPP, but pretended that he had the
support. As far as one can see, Tanda [Mngwengwe] was not involved in that decision – he
was simply asked to sign.’

[23] The prosecution team maintained its stance and refused to make the changes
suggested by Mr Hofmeyr. This is reflected in Mr Steynberg’s response on behalf of
the prosecution team to Mr Hofmeyr on 3 April 2009. Mr Steynberg responded as
follows:
‘[U]ltimately [Mpshe’s] decision, in accordance with his in-principle decision of 29 November,
whoever finally put their name to it. [Mpshe] has consistently taken responsibility for the
decision since it was implemented. The only issue between him and [McCarthy], it now
seems, was the timing of the decision . . . . The fact that [McCarthy] might have decided, for
his own Machiavellian reasons, to implement the decision on 28 Dec instead of the following
week/month does not in and of itself make it [McCarthy’s] decision and not that of the
ANDPP.’
It is necessary to note that material parts of the record that we may now have regard
to, in relation to the decision to terminate the prosecution, flowed from the decisions
of this Court in Democratic Alliance & others v Acting National Director of Public
Prosecutions & others [2012] ZASCA 15; 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA) and Zuma v

Democratic Alliance & others [2014] ZASCA 101; [2014] 4 All SA 35 (SCA), in terms
of which the disclosure of a reduced record of what was before Mr Mpshe when he
made the decision was ordered.

[24] On 6 April 2009 Mr Mpshe announced publicly that he had made the decision
to discontinue the prosecution of Mr Zuma and issued a detailed media statement
providing the reasons for the decision. It is against those reasons, and those reasons
alone, that the legality of Mr Mpshe’s decision to terminate the prosecution is to be
determined.11 The statement recorded that representations had been received from
Mr Zuma’s legal representatives, both written and oral. The following part of the
statement is important:
‘The representations submitted by the legal representatives pertained to the following issues:

The substantive merits

The fair trial defences

The practical implications and considerations of continued prosecution.

The policy aspects militating against prosecution.
I need to state upfront that we could not find anything with regard to the first three grounds
that militate against a continuation of the prosecution, and I therefore I do not intend to deal
in depth with those three grounds.
I will focus on the fourth ground which I consider to be the most pertinent for purposes of my
decision. I will now deal with the policy aspects militating against the prosecution.’

[25] The statement went on to record, under the heading ‘possible abuse of
process’, that in the course of representations made on behalf of Mr Zuma, very
serious allegations were made about manipulation of the NPA which were
substantiated by the recordings of the telephone conversations. The statement noted
that the NIA ‘confirmed that it had legally obtained the recordings in the course of its
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the production and leaking of the
Browse Mole report’. Mr Mpshe’s statement continued and dealt with what he said
were ‘legal considerations’. It focused on the independence of the office of the NDPP
as constitutionally prescribed and had regard to ‘two categories of abuse of process’,
namely:

11 See National Lotteries Board & others v South African Education and Environment Project [2011]
ZASCA 154; 2012 (4) SA 504 (SCA) at para 27.

‘a) a manipulation or misuse of the criminal justice process so as to deprive the accused of a
protection provided by law or to take an unfair advantage over the accused;
b) where, on a balance of probability the accused has been, or will be prejudiced in the
preparation or conduct of his defence or trial by either a delay or haste on the part of the
prosecution which is unjustifiable. (R v Derby Crown Court, ex Parte Brooks [1985] 80 Cr.
App. R 164, per Ormrod LJ).’

[26] Mr Mpshe framed the issue that he was confronted with as follows:
‘The issue can be formulated as follows:
The question is whether a legal or judicial process which is aimed at dispensing justice with
impartiality and fairness to both parties and to the community which it serves should permit
its processes to be abused and employed in a manner which gives rise to unfairness and/or
injustice. (See Jago v District Court of New South Wales, [1989] 168 CLR 23 at 30, per
Mason CJ).’

[27] In his statement Mr Mpshe stated that the framework within which ‘abuse of
process’ had to be considered was as set out in the English case of R v Latif [1996]
1 WLR 104. Mr Mpshe’s statement proceeded along the following lines:
‘There will always be a tension between two extreme positions in that, if a trial is
discontinued, the public perception would be that the criminal justice system condones
improper conduct and malpractice by law enforcement agencies – and if a trial is
discontinued the criminal justice system will incur the reproach that it is failing to protect the
public from serious crime.’

[28] The statement continued with a reference to the following passages lifted from
Latif:
‘“No single formulation will readily cover all cases, but there must be something so gravely
wrong as to make it unconscionable that a trial should go forward . . .” (R v Martin, [1998] 1
All ER 193, at 216, per Lord Clyde).
“Something so unfair and wrong that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with
what is in all respects a regular proceeding.” (R v Hui-Chi-Ming [1992] 1 AC 34, at 57B, per
Lord Hope)
“An abuse may occur through the actings of the prosecution, as by misusing or manipulating
the process of the court. But it may also occur independently of any acts or omissions of the
prosecution in the conduct of the trial itself.” (Martin (supra), at 215, per Lord Clyde).’

[29] The statement also cited what was said by Harms DP in Zuma, in paras 37-
38:
‘The court dealt at length with the non-contentious principle that the NPA must not be led by
political considerations and that ministerial responsibility over the NPA does not imply a right
to interfere with a decision to prosecute . . . . This, however, does need some
contextualisation. A prosecution is not wrongful merely because it is brought for an improper
purpose. It will only be wrongful if, in addition, reasonable and probable grounds for
prosecuting are absent, something not alleged by Mr Zuma and which in any event can only
be determined once criminal proceedings have been concluded. The motive behind the
prosecution is irrelevant because, as Schreiner JA said in connection with arrests, the best
motive does not cure an otherwise illegal arrest and the worst motive does not render an
otherwise legal arrest illegal. The same applies to prosecutions.
This does not, however, mean that the prosecution may use its powers for “ulterior purpose”:
To do so would breach the principle of legality. The facts in Highstead Entertainment (Pty)
Ltd t/a “The Club” v Minister of Law and Order [1994 (1) SA 387 (C)] illustrate and explain
the point. The police had confiscated machines belonging to Highstead for the purpose of
charging it with gambling offences. They were intent on confiscating further machines. The
object was not to use them as exhibits – they had enough exhibits already – but to put
Highstead out of business. In other words, the confiscation had nothing to do with the
intended prosecution and the power to confiscate was accordingly used for a purpose not
authorised by the statute. This is what “ulterior purpose” in this context means. That is not
the case before us. In the absence of evidence that the prosecution of Mr Zuma was not
intended to obtain a conviction the reliance on this line of authority is misplaced as was the
focus on motive.’

[30] The recordings of telephone calls between Mr McCarthy and Mr Ngcuka were
central to Mr Mpshe’s decision to discontinue the prosecution. According to the
statement, they were considered to be crucial in that they reflected a ‘manipulation of
the prosecution process for ulterior purposes’. In the statement there were also
references to discussions between Mr Ngcuka and Mr McCarthy, involving the timing
of the filing of papers in the Constitutional Court in opposing the appeal against the
decision of this Court in Zuma. This, it was suggested, related to achieving political
ends and was indicative of a further abuse of the prosecution process. The
statement also referred to an interception of Short Message Service (SMS)

exchanges between a private intelligence operative and Mr McCarthy, allegedly
about achieving political ends in relation to the case against Mr Zuma.

[31] It is apparent from Mr Mpshe’s statement, under the heading ‘conclusion’, that
his decision to discontinue the prosecution was driven principally, if not exclusively,
by what he considered to be Mr McCarthy’s abuse of the prosecution process in
relation to the timing of the service of the indictment. It is necessary to consider
carefully the following parts of Mr Mpshe’s statement:
‘[A]n intolerable abuse has occurred which compels a discontinuation of the prosecution.
What actually triggers the abuse of process is a major determining factor, because it is that
trigger which determines the purpose of the abuse and reveals whether the conduct in
question is directed at a legitimate or illegitimate purpose.
In the present matter, the conduct consists in the timing of the charging of the accused. In
general there would be nothing wrong in timing the charging of an accused person, provided
that there is a legitimate prosecutorial purpose for it and the accused is aware, should be
aware or has been made aware of such purpose. For example, the timing may be related to
the availability of witnesses, or the introduction or leading of specific evidence to fit in with
the chain of evidence.
It follows therefore that, any timing of the charging of an accused person which is not aimed
at serving a legitimate purpose is improper, irregular and an abuse of process. A prosecutor
who uses a legal process against an accused person to accomplish a purpose for which it is
not designed abuses the criminal justice system and subjects the accused person to that
abuse of process.
Abuse of process through conduct which perverts the judicial or legal process in order to
accomplish an improper purpose offends against one’s sense of justice.
The above implies the following:
Mr McCarthy used the legal process for a purpose outside and extraneous to the
prosecution itself. Even if the prosecution itself as conducted by the prosecution team is not
tainted, the fact that Mr McCarthy, who was head of the DSO, and was in charge of the
matter at all times and managed it almost on a daily basis, manipulated the legal process for
purposes outside and extraneous to the prosecution itself. It is not so much the prosecution
itself that is tainted, but the legal process itself.
Mr McCarthy used the legal process for a purpose other than which the process was
designed to serve, i.e. for collateral and illicit purposes. It does not matter that the team
acted properly, honestly, fairly and justly throughout. Mr McCarthy’s conduct amounts to a
serious abuse of process and offends one’s sense of justice.

What Mr McCarthy did was not simply being over-diligent in his pursuit of a case, it was pure
abuse of process.
If Mr McCarthy’s conduct offends one’s sense of justice, it would be unfair as well as unjust
to continue with the prosecution.
In the light of the above, I have come to the difficult conclusion that it is neither possible nor
desirable for the NPA to continue with the prosecution of Mr Zuma.
It is a difficult decision because the NPA has expended considerable resources on this
matter, and it has been conducted by a committed and dedicated team of prosecutors and
investigators who have handled a difficult case with utmost professionalism and who have
not been implicated in any misconduct.
Let me also state for the record that the prosecution team itself had recommended that the
prosecution should continue even if the allegations are true, and that it should be left to a
court of law to decide whether to stop the prosecution.
However, I believe that the NPA has a special duty, as one of the guardians of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, to ensure that its conduct is at all times beyond reproach.
As an officer of the court I feel personally wronged and betrayed that on a number of
occasions I have given evidence under oath that there has not been any meddling or
manipulation of the process in this matter.
It is with a great regret that I have to say today that in relation to this case I can not see my
way clear to go to court in future and give the nation this assurance.’ (My emphasis.)

[32] On 14 April 2009 the prosecution team addressed a memorandum to Mr
Mpshe and the management within his office, including Mr Hofmeyr. The purpose,
inter alia, was to record their ‘reservations regarding the decision [terminating the
prosecution] and the process’. The ‘reservations’ in truth were a criticism of the
decision to terminate the prosecution and reflected the disappointment of the
prosecution team. The relevant parts read as follows:
‘The Team wishes to place on record certain further concerns regarding the process and the
merits of the decision:
5.1 The legal aspects of the motivation were not given to us for comment beforehand. In the
few minutes before the press conference it was impossible to digest and comment on the
legal justification given for the decision. Nor was there the opportunity utilised to run this
reasoning past two counsel who were available and eminently qualified to advise on these
issues.

5.2 In our view, the legal motivation provided for the decision is questionable and may be
vulnerable on review. We do not now deem it necessary to undertake an exhaustive critique
of the reasoning, since the die is now cast. However, we point out the following:
5.2.1 The reasoning relies heavily on the “abuse of process” doctrine in UK and Canadian
law. There is no reference to any South African cases which endorse the application of this
doctrine in South African law. We are concerned that this doctrine may have been
inappropriately applied without due consideration of its applicability in our law.
5.2.2 In relying uncritically on this doctrine, we are concerned that a precedent may have
been set which will come back to haunt the NPA in the future.
5.2.3 We are still of the view that the ultimate test should be whether the abuse in
question would prevent the accused from having a fair trial, a question which was not
even addressed.
5.2.4 The normal remedy for procedural unfairness, in circumstances where a trial has not
even commenced, would be to remedy the procedure. We are of the view that the decision
and the reasons given failed to draw the proper distinction between the procedure and the
merits of the decision.
5.3 The two crucial questions that senior counsel both advised needed to be answered, were
not. Namely, whether McCarthy’s manipulation improperly influenced the ANDPP’s decision
and, if so, whether with ex post facto knowledge of all the circumstances he is still of the
view that the decision to prosecute was correct. This failure appears to us to be fatal to the
correctness of the decision.
5.4 The Team still does not have a settled, first-hand version, firstly, of the interaction
between the ANDPP and McCarthy in the crucial periods leading up to the ANDPP’s
instruction on 6 December 2007 to [Mr Downer] that the ANDPP has decided to delay his
decision/announcement until after Polokwane so as not to prejudice/ or to be perceived to be
prejudicing JZ’s election at Polokwane. Secondly, leading up to McCarthy’s instruction to [Mr
Downer] on 21 December 2007 to proceed with summons immediately, and how the
ANDPP’s confirmation under oath that it was his decision, in consultation with the ID and the
Head: DSO, and the Team, to prosecute on 27 December 2007, fits with these
events.’(Emphasis in original.)

[33] Mr Hofmeyr was the most vociferous of those within the NPA management in
advancing the argument that the prosecution should be discontinued and, as
referred to above, was the principal deponent in opposing the DA’s application. The
case sought to be made out by him was that it was Mr McCarthy that had influenced
Mr Mpshe in respect of the timing of the service of the indictment. The timing of the

service of the indictment was in relation to the African National Congress’ (ANC)
national elective conference to be held from 16-20 December 2007 at Polokwane. Mr
Zuma was a candidate to be elected President of the ANC, with the ultimate purpose
of being elected the President of South Africa. According to Mr Hofmeyr the
telephone conversations referred to above prove that Mr McCarthy and his co-
conspirators in favour of former President Mbeki and against Mr Zuma were
concerned that serving the indictment before the Polokwane conference would
enhance Mr Zuma’s chances of being elected. It was suggested further that the
telephone conversations show that after Mr Mbeki’s devastating defeat at the
Polokwane conference, Mr McCarthy and his co-conspirators considered that
serving the indictment after the conference would now be the only way of saving the
country and ousting Mr Zuma. It is in this regard that Mr McCarthy is said to have
influenced the timing of the service of the indictment. It was this conduct that Mr
Hofmeyr and Mr Mpshe contended was so egregious that it amounted to abuse of
process and justified the discontinuation of the prosecution. Mr McCarthy’s co-
conspirators were said by Mr Hofmeyr, to include Mr Ngcuka and Mr Ronnie Kasrils,
the former Minister of Intelligence Services. It was submitted that they acted in
collusion with former President Mbeki. Whether Mr Hofmeyr’s explanations and
conclusions are borne out by the objective evidence and whether they could rightly
have been an appropriate basis for Mr Mpshe’s decision to discontinue the
prosecution, are issues for adjudication in the appeals, in the event of the
applications for leave to appeal being successful.

[34] In relation to Mr McCarthy’s alleged role in the timing of the service of the
indictment, it is necessary to record what Mr Hofmeyr himself stated in the NPA’s
answering affidavit, namely, that the indictment itself was only finalised on
27 December 2007. According to Mr Hofmeyr, McCarthy had originally wanted the
indictment to be served on 24 December 2007, but this had proved impossible to do
because a mistake in the indictment needed to be corrected. Mr Hofmeyr stated that
an additional problem was that the sheriff who was to serve the indictment required
additional copies and the prosecution team could not get everything done on time. In
responding to an assertion in the DA’s supplementary founding affidavit, Mr Hofmeyr
said the following:

‘551 The NPA respondents admit that the prosecution could only be formally instituted once
the indictment had been signed and served on Zuma.
552 The date of signature of the indictment and the date on which it was served should not
be confused with the date on which the decision to prosecute was made. The decision to
prosecute Zuma was taken on 29 November 2007. The authorisation to include POCA
charges in the indictment was signed on 14 December 2007. Mngwengwe signed the
indictment on 27 December 2007.
553 The NPA respondents deny that Zuma’s involvement as a contender for the President of
the ANC was a relevant consideration or that it impacted on the finalisation of the charge at
all.’
This contradicts his earlier assertion that the timing of the service of the indictment
was manipulated by Mr McCarthy. It is clear that the circumstances set out above
are what dictated the timing of the service of the indictment.

[35] For reasons that will become clear later in this judgment, it is worth noting that
counsel on behalf of the NPA wanted it placed on record that no member of its
present legal team had any hand in the drafting and finalisation of the affidavits filed
on behalf of the NPA.

The court below
[36] Ledwaba DJP, in his judgment in the court below, (comprising three members
– the other two being Pretorius and Mothle JJ) had regard to the DA’s rationality
challenge and the response to it by the ANDPP and the head of the DSO. He took
into account Mr Mpshe’s statement to the media, in which he conceded that the
substantive merits of the case against Mr Zuma were strong and that fair trial rights
were not affected. The court below had regard to Mr Mpshe’s assertion that the
decision to discontinue the prosecution was a response to the alleged abuse of
process by Mr McCarthy, when he manipulated the timing of the service of the
indictment on Mr Zuma. Ledwaba DJP observed that the words used by Mr Mpshe in
his media statement bore a striking resemblance to those adopted by Seagroatt J of
the High Court of Hong Kong in the matter of HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee & another.12
Similarly, the DA in an annexure to its heads of argument pointed to several
instances in which passages in Mr Mpshe’s media statement were almost identical to

12 HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee & another [2001] HKCFA 32; (2001) 4 HKCFAR 133; FACC 8/2000 (22
March 2001).

passages from that judgment. The quoted parts from Mr Mpshe’s media statement in
paras 25 and 26 above are two such examples. Mr Mpshe’s media statement did not
mention nor does it appear that he took into consideration that the high court
decision in HKSAR was overturned on appeal. The appeal court in that case said the
following:
‘Although the question is debatable, the better view is that an abuse of process does not
exist independently of, and antecedently to, the exercise of judicial discretion. The judicial
decision that there is an abuse of process which requires the grant of a stay is itself the
result of the exercise of a judicial discretion. It is for the judge to weigh countervailing
considerations of policy and justice and then, in the exercise of the discretion, decide
whether there is an abuse of process which requires a stay.’13

[37] The court below noted that Latif and the appeal court in HKSAR had held that
a determination of whether an abuse of process justified a stay of prosecution was
an exercise for a court of law and could not occur by way of an extra-judicial
pronouncement. In the view of the court below Mr Mpshe ‘surprisingly’ failed to
mention that fact in his media statement.

[38] The court below found that Mr Mpshe had disregarded the prosecution team’s
recommendation that even if the allegations regarding Mr McCarthy were true, the
decision to halt the prosecution had to be made by the trial court. The court below
agreed with the view of the prosecution team and held that it was for a court of law to
deal with allegations of abuse of process.

[39] Ledwaba DJP also had regard to the dictum of this Court in Zuma to the effect
that a prosecution is not wrongful merely because it is brought for an improper
purpose and that it would only be wrongful if, in addition, reasonable and probable
grounds of prosecuting are absent. Ledwaba DJP stated that Mr Zuma did not allege
that there were no reasonable or probable grounds for prosecution.

[40] The court below considered Mr Hofmeyr’s admission that Mr Mpshe had told
Mr Downer that the decision about the timing of the service of the indictment had

13 HKSAR v LEE Ming Tee and Anor [2003] HKCFA 34; (2003) 6 HKCFAR 336 in para 184; FACC
1/2003 (22 August 2003).

been his (Mr Mpshe’s) alone. It weighed this against what Mr Mpshe stated later in
his supplementary affidavit, namely, that he had been untruthful in communicating
this to Mr Downer. It will be recalled that Mr Hofmeyr was the principal deponent on
behalf of the NPA rather than Mr Mpshe, the decision-maker at the centre of the
present dispute. Mr Mpshe initially provided a very brief confirmatory affidavit and
later, only after the DA’s replying affidavit had been filed, did Mr Mpshe provide a
further supplementary affidavit. The court below had regard to the following parts of
that supplementary affidavit:
‘16. McCarthy told me that it would be harmful to the NPA, particularly the DSO which was
under severe attack at the time, if Zuma was prosecuted before the Polokwane conference.
He believed that if Zuma were to be charged before the Polokwane conference, it would
destabilise the DSO, the NPA and the country.
24. I met with the Minister during the evening of 5 December 2007. I raised with her the
issue that the announcement would possibly be delayed. It was clear to me that she agreed
that the prosecution should be delayed. She was concerned that the NPA would be
perceived as targeting Zuma ahead of the Polokwane conference.
25. The following day (6 December 2007) I telephoned Downer to inform him of the decision
to delay the Zuma prosecution. I told Downer that I had taken the decision to postpone the
prosecution independently. I told him that it was my decision and my decision alone. I did so
because Downer was aware that I had met the Minister the previous day. I did not want him
to think that the Minister had interfered or that the Minister had unduly influenced me.
26. I did not tell Downer that it was McCarthy who had persuaded me that it was necessary
and that delaying the prosecution was the better option for the NPA. I knew that the decision
to delay the prosecution was likely to be unpopular. I knew that Downer would be unhappy
with that decision.
27. As head of the NPA, I felt that I had to support the decision. McCarthy had already made
the decision. I did not want to blame it on others when I knew it was likely to be unpopular.
As expected, Downer was angry about the decision to postpone the prosecution.’

[41] Ledwaba DJP took a dim view of the contradictory versions supplied by the
NPA as to who had taken the decision about the timing of the service of the
indictment. In paras 76 and 77 of its judgment, the court below dealt with what it
considered to be a lack of an explanation by the NPA of how Mr McCarthy’s alleged
influence to have the service of the indictment delayed would have disadvantaged
Mr Zuma:

‘76. Apart from the contradictory versions as to who took the decision to delay the service of
the indictment and for what reason, there has been no attempt in the papers to explain how
Mr McCarthy’s alleged influence and lobbying to have the service of the indictment delayed,
would have disadvantaged Mr Zuma. It seems to this Court that it would be logical to assert
the view that the service of the indictment before the Polokwane conference, would have
thwarted the ambitions of Mr Zuma to assume the leadership of the ANC.
77. However, it is not indicated in the papers before us how the service of the indictment
after the Polokwane Conference, as allegedly advocated by Mr McCarthy, would have been
a tool to influence the outcome of elections which, as logic dictates, would by then have
occurred. Indeed it so happened that the indictment was served on Mr Zuma after he had
been elected President of the ANC.’ (Emphasis in original.)
It will be recalled that there was a suggestion by Mr Hofmeyr based on the recorded
conversations that service on Mr Zuma after the Polokwane conference was
considered by Mr McCarthy and his co-conspirators as the only way of dislodging
him. There were arguments for and against service of the indictment before or after
the Polokwane conference timeline, none of which were decisive in relation to the
outcome that Mr McCarthy might have intended to achieve.

[42] Other references by Mr Hofmeyr to Mr McCarthy’s conduct in relation to the
Browse Mole report, were considered by the court below to be unconnected to the
prosecution or the service of the indictment. The court below saw these references
as diversionary and irrelevant. In any event, so the court observed, the reason
supplied by Mr Mpshe for the discontinuation of the prosecution was the timing of the
service of the indictment and not anything else. It held that there was thus no rational
link between Mr McCarthy’s alleged conduct and Mr Mpshe’s decision to discontinue
the prosecution.

[43] Ledwaba DJP found it disconcerting that Mr Downer and the other members
of the prosecution team were kept in the dark when the decision to discontinue the
prosecution was ultimately taken. The court could not comprehend the need for
secrecy. In the view of Ledwaba DJP, Mr Mpshe’s acknowledged feelings of anger
and betrayal caused him to act impulsively and irrationally. For all these reasons the
court below reviewed and set aside the decision to discontinue the prosecution. The
following part of para 92 of the judgment of the court below was initially considered

by counsel on behalf of both the NPA and Mr Zuma to be an unwarranted incursion
by the court into territory that rightly belonged to the NPA:
‘It is thus our view that the envisaged prosecution against Mr Zuma was not tainted by the
allegations against Mr McCarthy. Mr Zuma should face the charges as outlined in the
indictment.’

The position adopted by Mr Zuma and the NPA before the latter filed
supplementary heads and before the hearing of the appeal
[44] The heads of argument filed in this Court on behalf of Mr Zuma, in line with
what was stated emphatically and repeatedly by Mr Hofmeyr, was that Mr
McCarthy’s manipulation in relation to the timing of the service of the indictment was
of such a nature that it amounted to an egregious prosecutorial abuse of process. It
was submitted that the timing of the service of the indictment had been driven by Mr
McCarthy’s aim to hamper Mr Zuma’s presidential prospects, both at ANC and State
level. It defended Mr Mpshe’s decision to terminate the prosecution in the following
terms:
‘The defence of the Decision relies on the proposition that prosecutorial abuse can serve as
the premises of a permanent stay. This submission is made with reference to the rationality
debate.’
Essentially, the contention on behalf of Mr Zuma was that although the prosecutorial
discretion to prosecute or desist was not the mirror image of the jurisprudence on a
permanent stay, the relationship between the two was one relied on in relation to the
rationality of Mr Mpshe’s decision. The following appears in the heads on behalf of
Mr Zuma:
‘Whilst the DA contended that the Zuma case conflated the review with a permanent stay
proceeding, the relevance of such jurisprudence is the following:
a. If a NDPP’s exercise of discretion invokes circumstances which approximate those which
have moved Courts in comparative systems to grant permanent stays, any imputation of
irrationality suffers greatly.
b. It is indeed so that the bar for permanent stays by the Courts is set at different heights. At
present the bar in English jurisprudence is set high.’

[45] In the present case, so it was contended, in the light of the nature of the
prosecutorial abuse complained of, namely, the wielding of prosecutorial powers for

improper political purposes, Mr Mpshe had acted rationally in deciding to discontinue
the prosecution. The following appears in the heads of argument:
‘Where the abuse is designed to impact on who holds the highest office in the land and
affect the political system of choice, and is executed by very powerful functionaries
perceived to interact closely with the office of the President, a blunt cessation of prosecution
will more likely restore faith in than bring into [disrepute], the Prosecution Authority.’

[46] Finally, it was submitted that the NDPP has an unfettered and wide discretion
whether to prosecute in any given instance. With reference to Kaunda & others v
President of the Republic of South Africa & others 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC), it was
contended that a decision not to prosecute can be reviewed only on the very narrow
ground that it offends the principle of legality, which would include irrational decision-
making. Counsel on behalf of Mr Zuma relied on the ‘paramountcy of prosecutorial
independence’ and argued that a bona fide and honest decision by a prosecution
authority has ‘very considerable immunity for review’.

[47] The court below was criticised by the NPA for its finding that Mr Mpshe acted
hastily in making his decision. Furthermore, it was submitted that the court below
had erred in holding that Mr Mpshe ought to have left it to the court to adjudicate the
complaint of abuse of process. In respect of Mr Mpshe’s reliance on the HKSAR and
Latif cases, the following is stated on behalf of the NPA:
‘It is submitted that the Court a quo erred in making the facts of the HKSAR and Latif cases
analogous to the present case, and in finding that Mpshe acted “disingenuously”. Both of the
aforementioned foreign judgments concerned an application by the accused in each case for
a stay of prosecution. The applications for a stay occurred during the trial of the respective
accused.’ (Emphasis in original.)

[48] The case for the NPA was that what is set out above is a far cry from the
position where the prosecution itself believes that there has been an abuse of
process. In such an event, so it was submitted, it would be acting in bad faith for a
prosecutor to continue to prepare on the merits of a case, without informing the
accused of the abuse which it believes justified the termination of the prosecution.
The NPA relied on the decision in Regina (Corner House Research & others) v
Director of the Serious Fraud Office (JUSTICE intervening) [2008] 3 WLR 568 which,

in its view, recognised the existence of a broad discretion in prosecuting authorities.
That, so it was argued, reflected a long-standing practice based on the recognition
that while there is a strong public interest in the enforcement of the criminal law
where the evidence to secure a conviction exists or may be found, there are
exceptional cases in which countervailing public interests require restraint.

[49] The NPA contended that the media statement by Mr Mpshe and the
answering affidavit of Mr Hofmeyr provided the factual justification for the
discontinuation of the prosecution. It was submitted on behalf of the NPA that neither
the court below nor this Court could, in motion proceedings, find that Mr Mpshe’s
discretion was exercised for a collateral purpose or for improper or irrelevant
reasons.

[50] The NPA, in its heads of argument, submitted that the statement by the court
below that Mr Zuma should now face the charges outlined in the indictment was
impermissible and infringed upon the doctrine of the separation of powers.

[51] It was submitted that abuse of process issues go beyond fair trial issues and
that the abuse in this case ‘is among the most egregious imaginable’. The heads of
argument went on to state:
‘What could be more institutionally damaging than an attempt – by manipulating the timing of
service of the indictment – to swing an election in favour of a political aspirant seeking high
office. This seems by far the most momentous form of prosecutorial abuse.’
It was submitted that the court below erred in finding that there was no rational
connection between the need to protect the integrity of the NPA and the decision to
discontinue the prosecution against Mr Zuma.

[52] On behalf of the NPA, it was contended that the court below should have
found that Mr McCarthy’s conduct overall, was such that it clearly evidences the
manipulation of the prosecutorial process for political ends, compelling Mr Mpshe to
discontinue the prosecution.

[53] Finally, it was contended that there had indeed been an attempt in the papers
to explain how Mr McCarthy’s conduct in delaying the service of the indictment would

disadvantage Mr Zuma. For this proposition they relied on the following statement by
Mr Hofmeyr:
‘Before the Polokwane conference, Ngcuka and others opposed to Zuma, debated amongst
themselves whether or not Mbeki’s chances of retaining the ANC Presidency would be
strengthened by delaying the prosecution. Correctly or incorrectly, they believed that Mbeki’s
chances of defeating Zuma would be strengthened if the prosecution were to be delayed.
McCarthy did as he was asked to do although it was clear that at times, he did not agree
with Ngcuka’s instructions. Ultimately, McCarthy ensured that the prosecution was delayed.
He did so for one reason only, to bolster Mbeki’s chances of successfully defeating Zuma.’
It was submitted that it is clear that McCarthy and Ngcuka believed that the service
of the indictment shortly before the Polokwane conference would provoke a backlash
from those who would consider it part of a plot to besmirch Mr Zuma. That would, so
they believed, move delegates to rally around Mr Zuma. That they may have
miscalculated does not detract from the fact that Mr McCarthy persuaded Mr Mpshe
to delay the service of the indictment which he believed would disadvantage the then
President Mbeki if the NPA did not hold back.

Additional heads of argument on behalf of the NPA
[54] Just a little over a week before the present applications for leave to appeal
were to be heard, the NPA filed ‘additional heads of argument’. It is necessary to set
out paras 1-7 of their heads in their entirety:
‘1. These additional heads of argument are submitted to clarify submissions made in the
main heads of argument concerning the applicability of section 179(5)(d) of the Constitution.
2. The applicants accept that Mokotedi Mpshe (“Mpshe”), as the Acting NDPP, could not rely
upon s 179(5)(d) in deciding to discontinue the prosecution of Mr Zuma. In this regard:
2.1 This Court found in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma [2009 (2) SA 277
(SCA) 285] that it was [Mr] Mpshe who decided on 27 December 2007 to indict Mr Zuma.
2.2 This Court also held in the same case that s 179(5)(d) does not allow a review by the
NDPP of his own earlier decisions but is limited to a review of a decision made by a DPP or
some other prosecutor for whom a DPP is responsible.
2.3 In the result, the decision by Mpshe in 2009 to review his earlier decision taken in 2007
to indict Mr Zuma, could not be carried out in terms of s 179(5)(d).
3. However, s 179(2) of the Constitution provides the following:

“179(2) The prosecuting authority has the power to institute criminal proceedings on behalf
of the state, and to carry out any necessary functions incidental to instituting criminal
proceedings.”
4. In the NDPP v Zuma case, Harms DP said:
“Section 179(2) is the empowering provision. It empowers the NPA to institute criminal
proceedings, and to carry out ‘any necessary functions incidental to instituting criminal
proceedings.’ The power to make prosecutorial decisions and review them flows from this.”
5. These incidental functions would include the power of prosecutors to reconsider a
decision to prosecute or not to prosecute.
6. Thus where the decision to prosecute is taken by the NDPP, as permitted in terms of s
22(9) of the NPA Act, the NDPP may reconsider his or her own decision in terms of s 179(2).
7. It is submitted that although Mpshe believed that he was acting in terms of s 179(5)(d),
which he was empowered to do, his decision is not invalidated thereby, because he was in
any event vested with the power to reconsider in terms of s 179(2).’

[55] For the proposition set out in para 7 of the additional heads, counsel on behalf
of Mr Zuma relied on Latib v Administrator, Transvaal 1969 (3) SA 186 (T) and
Howick District Landowners Association v Umgeni Municipality 2007 (1) SA 206
(SCA). In Howick the validity of a council resolution introducing a rates assessment
referred to the incorrect provision of a statute under which it purported to act. It was
held that the resolution was not null and void since the authority that the council
wanted to invoke was plain. In Latib the administrator of the then Province of the
Transvaal, in issuing an Administrator’s Notice declaring a certain route to be a
public main road and throughway, inadvertently failed to mention a particular
subsection of a section of a Roads Ordinance under which he had made the
declaration. The court in that case held that since he had indeed acted under the
appropriate empowering legislation, the notice was not invalidated because of the
administrator’s oversight. In Latib, Galgut J said the following:14
‘It seems clear, therefore, that, where there is no direction in the statute requiring that the
section in terms of which proclamation is made should be mentioned, then, even though it is
desirable, nevertheless there is no need to mention the section, and, further, that, provided
that the enabling statute grants the power to make the proclamation, the fact that it is said to
be made under the wrong section will not invalidate the notice.’

14 At 190H-191A.

[56] In its additional heads, counsel on behalf of the NPA sought to distinguish the
decision of the Constitutional Court in Minister of Education v Harris [2001] ZACC
25; 2001 (4) SA 1297 (CC). In that case the Minister had invoked s 3(4)(i) of the
National Education Policy Act 27 of 1996 to determine the age requirements for the
admission of learners to an independent school. It was a power he did not have and
the court held that to be so. It was submitted on behalf of the NPA that since Mr
Mpshe in any event had the power in terms of s 179(2) of the Constitution to carry
out any necessary functions incidental to instituting criminal proceedings, it was open
to Mr Mpshe to reconsider his own decision in light thereof.

The applications for leave to appeal
[57] The two applications for leave to appeal, as stated at the beginning of this
judgment, were referred for oral argument in terms of the provisions of s 17(2)(d) of
the Superior Courts Act. Section 17(1)(a) provides:
‘(1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the
opinion that –
(a)(i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including
conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration.’
The present case raises issues of public importance. As previously mentioned, it is
part of a longstanding litigation saga that involves the President of the Republic of
South Africa. It concerns the office of the NDPP and its powers and obligations.
Furthermore, the conduct of prosecutors within the NPA falls to be considered. For
these reasons, apart from the question of prospects of success, leave should be
granted in terms of the provision of s 17(1)(a)(ii). In this regard see Minister of
Justice & others v Southern African Litigation Centre & others [2016] ZASCA 17;
2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA)15 It is now necessary to turn our attention to the merits of the
decision to discontinue the prosecution.

A sudden and dramatic change of stance
[58] At the commencement of proceedings before us, the following was put to
counsel on behalf of Mr Zuma: In Harris the Constitutional Court had regard to Latib

15 See paras 22-23. See also Van Loggerenberg Erasmus Superior Court Practice vol. 1 (service
issue 4) at A2-56.

and the dictum set out in para 55 above, but went on to distinguish the facts of that
case from the case it was considering. The Constitutional Court was dealing with a
decision-maker who had consciously made an election to rely on a statutory
provision found wanting.16 Harris was not dealing with an inadvertent or incorrect
reference to a statutory power and where the person exercising the statutory power
had indeed acted consciously under the proper empowering statute. It was dealing
with the obverse, as are we. Furthermore, in Liebenberg NO v Bergrivier Municipality
& others [2013] ZACC 16; 2013 (5) SA 246 (CC), the Constitutional Court was
equally emphatic concerning the invocation and reliance on a statutory power that
was inapposite. Jafta J, in a minority judgment, in differing with the majority on the
construction of a particular word in a statutory provision, set out the law in this
regard. In para 93 the following appears:
‘In our law, administrative functions performed in terms of incorrect provisions are invalid,
even if the functionary is empowered to perform the function concerned by another
provision. In accordance with this principle, where a functionary deliberately chooses a
provision in terms of which it performs an administrative function but it turns out that the
chosen provision does not provide authority, the function cannot be saved from invalidity by
the existence of authority in a different provision.’

[59] Faced with this seemingly insuperable difficulty in relation to Mr Mpshe’s
incorrect invocation of s 179(5)(d) of the Constitution in reviewing the decision to
discontinue the prosecution, counsel on behalf of the NPA conceded that Mr
Mpshe’s decision to discontinue the prosecution was liable to be set aside

[60] Counsel on behalf of Mr Zuma, in turn, summarily also conceded that the
decision to discontinue the prosecution was liable to be set aside and did not attempt
to argue against the applicability of the Constitutional Court decisions referred to in
paras 56 and 58 above. Mr Kemp, on behalf of Mr Zuma, accepted that the decision
by Mr Mpshe was irrational and that a rational decision needed to be made.

[61] Initially, counsel on behalf of the NPA argued that the statement by the court
below, that Mr Zuma should now face the charges set out in the indictment offended
against the doctrine of the separation of powers. When it was put to him, that in the

16 In this regard, see para 17 and 18 of Harris.

event of a finding that the decision to discontinue the prosecution was liable to be set
aside, the ineluctable consequence was that the decision to prosecute made by Mr
Mpshe on 29 November 2007 was revived, he was constrained to concede that this
was so.

[62] Counsel on behalf of Mr Zuma was intent on recording that he reserved all of
his rights in relation to a revived prosecution. It was submitted that Mr Zuma would
be within his rights to make representations to be properly assessed in relation to the
discontinuation of the prosecution and that Mr Zuma would have regard to all the
options at his disposal to resist being prosecuted. These are issues we are not
required to address.

Conclusions
[63] The problems for the NPA and for Mr Zuma go way beyond those relating to
the concessions made on the basis referred to above. It is unsettling that different
law enforcement agencies of government appear to be spying upon each other.
Insofar as the tape recordings of the telephone conversations are concerned, other
than the hearsay evidence of the communications between the members of the NIA
and the NPA, we have no admissible substantiation concerning the authenticity or
accuracy of the recordings. The alleged judge’s certificate, which would have
indicated the breadth of the authorisation to record telephone conversations, was not
made available to the court below or to us. In terms of s 16 of the Regulation of
Interception of Communications and Provisions of Communication-Related
Information Act 70 of 2002, an application for an interception direction has to be
made to a judge.17 The applicant has to comply with the requirements of that section.
Section 16 has very specific requirements, quite clearly intended to ensure that there
is no infringement of rights other than in the manner statutorily provided for. Section
43 of that Act enables a disclosure of the contents of intercepted communications to
another law enforcement officer, only to the extent that such disclosure is necessary
for the proper performance of the official duties of the authorised person, or the law
enforcement officer receiving the disclosure. Section 42 prohibits the disclosure of

17 Interception direction is defined in s 1 as ‘a direction issued under section 16(4) or 18(3)(a) and
which authorises the interception, at any place in the Republic, of any communication in the course of
its occurrence or transmission, and includes an oral interception direction issued under s 23(7)’.

information, save in circumstances set out thereunder. There is no indication of how
the recordings came to be in the possession of Mr Zuma’s legal team. There are
heavy penalties prescribed in relation to contraventions of the Act including those
related to the prohibition against disclosure.18 The question of the admissibility of the
recordings as evidence and the issues referred to above was never seriously
addressed by the NPA. It ought to have been an issue to which the NPA paid greater
and focused attention. Instead, the NPA allowed itself to be cowed into submission
by the threat of the use of the recordings, the legality of the possession of which is
doubtful

[64] Furthermore, this Court raised with counsel on behalf of the NPA our
concerns about the nature and substance of Mr Hofmeyr’s affidavit. We also
enquired of counsel why Mr Mpshe, the decision maker in the present case, was not
the principal deponent and why he only made a ‘supplementary confirmatory
affidavit’ after the DA had provided its replying affidavit. Counsel on behalf of the
NPA accepted that what was suggested to him was preferable and more
appropriate.

[65] Early on in his affidavit, Mr Hofmeyr stated that he was tasked by Mr Mpshe to
investigate Mr Zuma’s claims of a political conspiracy which included ‘but were not
limited’ to allegations that Mr McCarthy manipulated the timing of the service of the
prosecution. A careful consideration of Mr Hofmeyr’s affidavit reveals that much of it
is based on conjecture and supposition. What follows are a few examples of how
careful one has to be in assessing his assertions. In para 23 of his answering
affidavit on behalf of the NPA the following is stated:
‘Until he listened to the recordings himself, Mpshe had been unaware of how deep
McCarthy’s association [with] Ngcuka still was. Most senior managers in the NPA, including
Mpshe, knew that McCarthy and Ngcuka were still friendly. We were unaware of the extent
to which Ngcuka, using McCarthy as his proxy, was involved in directing the Zuma
prosecution, and possibly other investigations and prosecutions. It was Ngcuka, working with
others, and not McCarthy, who ultimately decided when Zuma should be charged.’

[66] In the very next paragraph he stated the following:

18 See s 51.

‘My investigations revealed that McCarthy met regularly with Ronnie Kasrils . . ., former
Minister of Intelligence at critical points before and after the Polokwane conference. They
spoke in guarded terms and were careful not to reveal too much information over the
telephone. It appears further (from the text of their conversations) that Kasrils acted as a
conduit for McCarthy to communicate with Mbeki without arousing any suspicion.’ (My
emphasis.)

[67] In para 26 of Hofmeyr’s affidavit the following appears:
‘Both Kasrils and Pienaar were close to Mbeki. As far as I am concerned, McCarthy’s
interaction with them at critical points during the Zuma investigation, coupled with the tone
and content of their discussions . . ., demonstrated how closely McCarthy identified with
Mbeki’s political aspirations. It shows that he was willing to discuss sensitive NPA
investigations with them and take direction from them on what to do. As far as I was
concerned, Kasrils was a confidant with whom McCarthy could discuss strategy about the
Zuma prosecution. I believe he also served as an intermediary between McCarthy and
Mbeki.’ (My emphasis.)

[68] At the end of para 30 of Mr Hofmeyr’s affidavit he stated the following:
‘He did so for one reason only, to bolster Mbeki’s chances of successfully defeating Zuma.’

[69] In para 41 the following appears:
‘It was rumoured that Mbeki consulted Ngcuka on Pikoli’s suspension. Ngcuka was present
at a meeting between Mbeki and the Minister, on 11 March 2007 at which Pikoli briefed
Mbeki on the Selebi prosecution. We were very surprised to learn that he had been present.’
(My emphasis.)

[70] In para 43, Mr Hofmeyr stated:
‘My own investigations into Zuma’s allegations showed conclusively that Ngcuka and
McCarthy had made politically motivated decisions about prosecutions in at least two other
high profile cases. Both decisions were intended to assist Mbeki. The NPA’s policy does not
permit me to disclose the identities of the two individuals because of the harm that it may
cause them.’ (My emphasis.)

[71] Mr Hofmeyr went on to state, in para 45:
‘Mpshe was deeply concerned about evidence of political interference and manipulation of
NPA cases. Although my investigations had begun to expose the extent of this political

interference, especially in relation to McCarthy’s involvement in the Browse Mole report and
the Selebi investigation, at the time of the press conference, my investigations remained
incomplete.’ (My emphasis.)

[72] With reference to Mr Mpshe’s press statement he said the following:
‘Mpshe’s press statement points out that it had not been possible to deal fully with all of
these aspects and come to firm conclusions. He was satisfied that there was sufficient
evidence for him to conclude that Zuma’s prosecution had been compromised and that
McCarthy had behaved improperly. What he did not know was the extent to which McCarthy
had compromised other cases he was responsible for.’

[73] As can be seen, Mr Hofmeyr did not provide facts from which he or this Court
could draw such damning conclusions against any of the individuals mentioned. He
speaks of his investigations, the ambit and nature of which are not disclosed. He
refers to rumours and tells us what he believes. He makes statements such as ‘as
far as I am concerned’. This is a wholly unsatisfactory approach. He refers to
unconnected political activity which in my view was resorted to in order to create
atmosphere against Mr McCarthy and those he considered to be co-conspirators.

[74] The position Mr Hofmeyr adopted in para 58 of his affidavit was the one
propounded to the world by Mr Mpshe, when he announced the decision to
discontinue the prosecution:
‘As emphasised by Mpshe during the press conference held on 6 April 2009, McCarthy used
the legal process and his statutory powers as head of the DSO for ulterior and illicit
purposes. It does not matter that other members of the prosecution team acted properly,
honestly, fairly and justly throughout the process. McCarthy’s conduct amounted to a serious
abuse of his power for an ulterior purpose. For Mpshe, his behaviour was an affront to his
sense of justice.’

[75] Mr Hofmeyr was intent on imputing the decision to prosecute Mr Zuma to Mr
McCarthy. He sought to dispel as untrue the statement made on behalf of the NPA in
an affidavit in other litigation, that Mr Mpshe had made the decision to prosecute.
This was done notwithstanding that this Court in Zuma had decided on the evidence
placed before it that Mr Mpshe had taken the decision to prosecute Mr Zuma. In his
affidavit in the present case, Mr Hofmeyr claimed that Mr McCarthy had taken the

decision to prosecute, almost immediately before turning to assert Mr Mpshe’s
powers, purportedly in terms of s 179(5)(d) of the Constitution, to review a decision
of a Director of Public Prosecution (DPP). The DPP he was referring to was Mr
McCarthy. One is left with the impression that Mr Hofmeyr took up this position
because he was intent on legitimising Mr Mpshe’s decision to discontinue the
prosecution. It appears contrived.

[76] In resisting the DA’s application and supporting the decision to discontinue the
prosecution on the basis of Mr McCarthy’s manipulation of the timing of the service
of the indictment, Mr Hofmeyr attempted to place the focus on Mr McCarthy being
responsible for the decision to delay the service of the indictment, until after the
Polokwane conference. However, as already alluded to, he contradictorily stated the
following in his affidavit:
‘On 6 December 2007 Mpshe called Downer for the second time. He told Downer that
although he was satisfied with the draft indictment, he had decided to delay the prosecution
until the following year because he did not want to be seen to be interfering with “the
Polokwane process”, particularly in light of President Mbeki’s call for calm and stability prior
to Polokwane.
Mpshe told Downer that he had also discussed the matter with the Minister and that his
conversation with her had given him further “insight” into why it was necessary to delay the
prosecution. Downer was understandably angry. He told him that by now the NPA should
have learned not to take instructions from the Minister. Downer insisted that the prosecution
team would not support any decision to delay the prosecution. He emphasised the
importance of making an announcement by no later than 7 December 2007, the date on
which the NPA’s papers were due to be filed in the Constitutional Court.’ (My emphasis.)
Later in his affidavit, Mr Hofmeyr stated that when he learnt that the prosecution had
been delayed, he was angry and could not understand how such a decision had
been made. He says the following:
‘The decision was clearly intended to favour one faction in the ANC above another.’
Mr Hofmeyr stated that he had asked Mr Mpshe how the decision to postpone the
prosecution had come about. The latter, according to Mr Hofmeyr, confirmed that it
was Mr McCarthy who had persuaded him that it was necessary to postpone the
prosecution. Mr Hofmeyr went on to say:
‘Mpshe felt that it was McCarthy’s decision. He was prepared to support whatever decision
McCarthy made.’

[77] In the later ‘Supplementary Confirmatory Affidavit’ Mr Mpshe said the
following in para 19:
‘I also did not know about McCarthy’s discussions with Ngcuka, Mzi Khumalo or Ronnie
Kasrils in the run up to the ANC’s Polokwane conference. I became aware of this only during
Zuma’s representations. Although I gained the strong impression from listening to the
recordings that McCarthy never agreed with Ngcuka, he nevertheless did as he was asked.
Had I known what McCarthy’s true motivation was, I would never have supported his
decision to postpone the prosecution.’
In paras 24 and 25 Mr Mpshe stated the following:
‘I met with the Minister during the evening of 5 December 2007. I raised with her the issue
that the announcement would possibly by delayed. It was clear to me that she agreed that
the prosecution should be delayed. She was concerned that the NPA would be perceived as
targeting Zuma ahead of the Polokwane conference.
The following day (6 December 2007) I telephoned . . . Downer to inform him of the decision
to delay the Zuma prosecution. I told Downer that I had taken the decision to postpone the
prosecution independently. I told him that it was my decision and my decision alone. I did so
because Downer was aware that I had met the Minister the previous day. I did not want him
to think that the Minister had interfered or that the Minister had unduly influenced me.’

[78] Notes of meetings that Mr Mpshe held with the NPA management, with and
without the prosecution team, reveal Mr Hofmeyr leading the charge to discontinue
the prosecution. At a meeting held on 30 March 2009 he was recorded as saying:
‘We will be criticised by those who want us to proceed
But the depth of the corruption was so deep’
Earlier during that meeting Mr Hofmeyr spoke of ‘ulterior motives’ and was recorded
as being pessimistic about their chances of opposing an application for a permanent
stay of prosecution. He also said that manipulation by Mr McCarthy and Mr Ngcuka
had to be considered and that the timing of the prosecution was important.

[79] Much of Mr Hofmeyr’s motivation for the discontinuation of the prosecution
was based on the recordings attached to Mr Mpshe’s press statement. We were
careful during the debate before us to consider carefully, together with counsel on
behalf of the NPA, how much reliance could be placed on them. Notes, the origins of
which are unknown, were made in the margin of the transcripts of the recorded

telephone conversations. The notes themselves are largely speculative and draw
conclusions which are not necessarily supported by the recorded conversations.
Questions of admissibility aside, the conversations themselves do not impinge on the
integrity of the charges against Mr Zuma nor do they intrude upon the merits of the
case. It is true that in the recorded conversations there are exchanges between Mr
McCarthy and Mr Ngcuka about when Mr Zuma is to be charged. Collectively, the
conversations do not show a grand political design nor is there any indication of
clarity of thought on the part of Mr Ngcuka or Mr McCarthy about how either former
President Mbeki or Mr Zuma would be decisively advantaged or disadvantaged by
the service of the indictment on either side of the Polokwane conference timeline.

[80] The picture that emerges from the documents filed in the court below is of an
animated Mr Hofmeyr, straining to find justification for the discontinuation of the
prosecution. Mr Hofmeyr discounted the objective facts set out in para 34, namely,
that the indictment could in any event not be served before the ANC conference
because it had only been finalised on 27 December 2007. One is, even at this point
in time, left in the dark about how the service of the indictment after the Polokwane
conference would ultimately and conclusively have impacted more severely on Mr
Zuma than if it had been served before the conference. What is clear, however, is
that whatever Mr McCarthy’s design might have been, it was superseded by the fact
that the indictment could only be served after the conference. Moreover, even if one
accepts that Mr McCarthy had an ulterior purpose in seeking to have the indictment
served after the conference, his conduct had no bearing on the integrity of the
investigation of the case against Mr Zuma and did not impact on the prosecution
itself. It also has to be borne in mind that Mr Mpshe himself and the Minister thought
it wise for the sake of the stability of the country, to have the indictment served after
the Polokwane conference. The fact that Mr McCarthy, for his own reasons,
advocated to have the indictment served on 28 December 2007 rather than after
1 January 2008, which was what Mr Mpshe preferred, as pointed out in Mr
Steynberg’s note to Mr Hofmeyr, makes no material difference.19

19 See para 23 above.

[81] I have already set out in some detail parts of Mr Hofmeyr’s affidavit, which are
but a small sample of the manner in which he approached the present litigation. He
is an experienced litigator who should know better than to present the case in the
manner described above. Professedly advancing the cause of the NPA’s
independence and integrity, he achieved exactly the opposite. One now has a better
appreciation of the reluctance of counsel on behalf of the NPA to be associated with
the affidavits filed on its behalf.

[82] The attack by the DA on Mr Mpshe’s decision to discontinue the prosecution
evolved into one based on rationality or, rather, the lack of it. Rationality review is
concerned with the evaluation of a relationship between means and ends: the
relationship, connection or link (as it is variously referred to) between the means
employed to achieve a particular purpose on the one hand, and the purpose or end
itself on the other. The aim of the evaluation of the relationship is not to determine
whether some means will achieve the purpose better than others but only whether
the means employed are rationally related to the purpose for which the power was
conferred.20 Rationality review also covers the process by which the decision is
made. So, both the process by which the decision is made and the decision itself
must be rational.21 If a failure to take into account relevant material is inconsistent
with the purpose for which the power was conferred there can be no rational
relationship between the means employed and the purpose.22

[83] Mr Mpshe’s stated purpose for discontinuing the prosecution was to preserve
the integrity of the NPA and to promote its independence. From his media statement
it appears that Mr Mpshe was willing to accept that the case against Mr Zuma was
strong, that fair trial defences were not threatened and that there were no practical
difficulties in continuing with the prosecution. The motivation for discontinuing the
prosecution appears to have been policy aspects that militate against the
prosecution. According to Mr Mpshe’s statement, the transcripts of the recordings
that he attached to his media statement contained material that ‘was of vital

20 See Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa [2012] ZACC 24; 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) para
32.
21 See Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation & others 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC)
and DA v President of the RSA 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) ibid paras 33 and 34.
22 See DA v President of the RSA ibid para 40.

importance in the NPA reaching its decision’. Towards the end of the media
statement the egregious conduct which Mr McCarthy was considered to be guilty of
by Mr Mpshe and which in his view amounted to an abuse of process was ‘the timing
of the charging of the accused’.

[84] It appears to me to be inimical to the preservation of the integrity of the NPA
that a prosecution is discontinued because of a non-discernible negative effect of the
timing of the service of an indictment on the integrity of the investigation of the case
and on the prosecution itself. There is thus no rational connection between Mr
Mpshe’s decision to discontinue the prosecution on that basis and the preservation
of the integrity of the NPA. If anything, the opposite is true. In these circumstances
discontinuing a prosecution in respect of which the merits are good and in respect of
which there is heightened public interest because of the breadth and nature of the
charges and the person at the centre of it, holding the highest public office, can
hardly redound to the NPA’s credit or advance the course of justice or promote the
integrity of the NPA.

[85] The court below was right to take into account against Mr Mpshe, the
contradictory accounts as to who had made the decision to delay the service of the
indictment. It does not assist Mr Mpshe to explain that he had lied to Mr Downer in
telling him that he alone had made the decision to delay the service of the
indictment, when in fact it was Mr McCarthy who had made that decision. If anything
affects the integrity of the NPA, it is an ANDPP lying to a senior prosecutor. The
admitted deception compellingly affects the credibility of Mr Mpshe’s motivation for
discontinuing the prosecution.

[86] Furthermore, Mr Mpshe’s reliance on Latif for his decision to discontinue the
prosecution was misplaced. The abuse complained of in that case was that one of
the accused persons had been incited by an informer and a customs officer to
commit the offences in question and had lured him into the court’s jurisdiction. The
court in Latif held that it was for a court to consider whether the abuse complained of
was such as to justify a stay of proceedings. Mr Mpshe assigned to himself the role
reserved for courts. If he had had proper regard to the decision in Latif, he would not
have used it to justify the decision to discontinue the prosecution. Thus, he ignored

relevant material such as the relevant dicta in Zuma, Latif and the appeal court
judgment in HKSAR. The courts in the latter two cases were emphatic that
allegations of abuse of process were within the remit of the trial court.

[87] It is significant, as pointed out in para 36 above, that parts of the media
statement were plagiarised from the high court judgment in HKSAR without
considering that they were inapplicable. More particularly, since that judgment was
overturned on appeal.

[88] Moreover, Mr Mpshe ignored the dictum in the Zuma judgment by Harms DP
that a bad motive does not destroy a good case. A prosecution brought for an
improper purpose, so said this Court in that case, is only wrongful if, in addition,
reasonable and probable grounds for prosecuting are absent. In the present case, on
the NPA’s own version, the case against Mr Zuma is a strong one. Once it is
accepted that the motive for a prosecution is irrelevant where the merits of the case
against an accused are good, the motive for the timing of an indictment to begin the
prosecution must equally be so. Mr Mpshe and Mr Hofmeyr appear to have
overlooked the effect of this judgment and uncritically adopted the ‘ulterior purpose’
justification first mentioned by Mr Hofmeyr in the meeting referred to in para 78
above.

[89] The exclusion of the prosecution team from the process leading up to the
decision to discontinue the prosecution, especially the final deliberations that took
place on 1 April 2009, was in itself irrational. The compelling conclusion is that this
exclusion was deliberate. The prosecution team’s subsequent memorandum
protesting their exclusion is understandable. They were senior litigators steeped in
the case, acquainted with the legal issues and had a critically important contribution
to make regarding the ultimate decision to terminate the prosecution. They had
invested a great deal of time and resources in gathering evidence and building a
case that management in the NPA accepted was a strong one. The memorandum
pointed out that the views of the two outside eminent senior counsel, who had been
advising the NPA, were inexplicably also not solicited.

[90] In asserting that the timing of the service of the indictment after the
Polokwane conference was influenced by Mr McCarthy and was the abuse of
process that persuaded him to discontinue the prosecution, Mr Mpshe failed to
consider a material fact, namely, that the indictment would in any event not have
been ready for service before the Polokwane conference for the reasons set out in
para 34 above. It will be recalled that there were errors in the indictment that
required correction and could only be finalised on 24 December 2007, after the
conclusion of the ANC’s elective conference. This is a consideration that was
material to arriving at a rational conclusion. The importance of this is that whatever
the motivations of Mr McCarthy may have been in delaying the service of the
indictment, the indictment was not ready to be served before the conference. What is
more, Mr Mpshe also believed, following his discussion with the Minister of Justice
and Constitutional Development early in December 2007, that it would be prudent to
postpone the service of the indictment until after the conference to avoid the
suggestion, that the service of the indictment before this was politically motivated.
Seen in this light, Mr McCarthy’s alleged motives for delaying the service of the
indictment were ultimately immaterial.

[91] The submissions by the NPA set out in para 48 above, that when the
prosecution itself believes that there has been an abuse of process, it could not be
expected of them to prepare for a case on the basis that a court should later decide
whether a stay of prosecution is justified. It was contended that, in those
circumstances, it ought to be left to the discretion of the prosecuting authority to
decide whether to continue with the prosecution. I disagree. It is incumbent on
prosecutors to disclose to a court any fact which, in their view, may impact negatively
on the prosecution and in favour of the accused. This is in line with constitutional
values and the provisions of the NPA Act. It is in the interest of the NPA, accused
persons and the public’s confidence in the administration of justice, that decisions
concerning allegations of abuse of process be made by a trial court.

[92] In the light of what is set out in the preceding paragraphs, it beggars belief
that the present regime at the NPA, on its own version of events, saw fit to defend Mr
Mpshe’s decision as being rational. For all these reasons I can find no fault with the
reasoning and conclusions of the court below that the decision to discontinue the

prosecution was irrational and liable to be set aside. A question one might rightly ask
is why it took so long to come to the realisation at the eleventh hour that the case for
both the NPA and President Zuma had no merit.

[93] I turn to deal with the concessions made by the NPA and Mr Zuma referred to
earlier. Section 179(5)(d) of the Constitution clearly provides for a review by an
NDPP of decisions made by Directors of Public Prosecutions, in terms of s 24 of the
NPA Act read with s 179(2) of the Constitution. In terms of s 24(1) of the NPA Act,
Directors of Public Prosecutions have the power to institute and conduct criminal
proceedings and to carry out functions incidental thereto as contemplated in
s 20(3).23 In para 6 of the NPA’s main heads of argument, they invoked s 179(5)(d)
of the Constitution read with s 22(2)(c)24 of the NPA Act as the basis for Mr Mpshe’s
decision to discontinue the prosecution. In essence, the contention on behalf of the
NPA was that in reaching that decision Mr Mpshe was reviewing the earlier decision
made by Mr McCarthy, a Director of Public Prosecutions, to institute criminal
proceedings against Mr Zuma. In light of the decision in Zuma, that Mr Mpshe
himself had made that decision to prosecute Mr Zuma, the NPA’s reliance on s
179(5)(d) of the Constitution and s 22(2)(c) of the NPA Act, was misplaced. The
concessions on behalf of the NPA and Mr Zuma referred to earlier, seen against the
authorities referred to in paras 56 and 58 above, were undoubtedly correctly made.

[94] To sum up:
(i) The case presented by the NPA, principally through Mr Hofmeyr, was that Mr
McCarthy’s conduct, in influencing the timing of the service of the indictment so that
it occurred after the ANC’s Polokwane conference was so egregious that it
amounted to an abuse of process to justify a discontinuation of the prosecution. This

23 Section 20(3) reads:
‘Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and this Act, any Director shall, subject to the control and
directions of the National Director, exercise the powers referred to in subsection (1) in respect of –
(a)
The area of jurisdiction for which he or she has been appointed; and
(b)
Any offences which have not been expressly excluded from his or her jurisdiction, either
generally or in a specific case, by the National Director.’
24 Section 22(2)(c) provides:
‘In accordance with section 179 of the Constitution, the National Director –
. . .
(c) may review a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, after consulting the relevant Director and
after taking representations, within the period specified by the National Director, of the accused
person, the complainant and any other person or party whom the National Director considers to be
relevant. ‘

was based largely on conjecture and supposition. The allegations by Mr Hofmeyr of
political machinations on the part of Mr McCarthy were irrelevant because they were
unconnected to the integrity of the investigation of the case against Mr Zuma and the
prosecution itself.
(ii) The authenticity and legality of the recorded conversations which Mr Mpshe
considered vital to his decision to discontinue the prosecution are not beyond doubt.
Since the recorded conversations were considered vital, greater thought ought to
have been given by the NPA to these issues.
(iii) The manner in which the affidavits were drawn and the case conducted on behalf
of the NPA was inexcusable.
(iv) The reasons for discontinuing the prosecution provided by Mr Mpshe do not bear
scrutiny for the recordings themselves on which Mr Mpshe relied, even if taken at
face value, do not impinge on the propriety of the investigation of the case against
Mr Zuma or the merits of the prosecution itself.
(v) Even if one were to accept that Mr McCarthy had his own ulterior purpose for
having the indictment served after the Polokwane conference rather than before it,
what is indisputable is that it was in any event not practically possible to have the
indictment served before the conference. There were nonetheless sound, other
reasons, such as the stability of the country, accepted as such by both Mr Mpshe
and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, that dictated service of
the indictment after the Polokwane conference. In the circumstances Mr McCarthy’s
alleged motive in relation to the timing of the service of the indictment was ultimately
irrelevant.
(vi) The submission on behalf of the NPA and Mr Zuma, that Mr McCarthy had a
central role in the timing of the service of the indictment is at odds with the
contradictory account provided by the NPA in relation to who had made the decision
about the timing of the service of the indictment. Mr Mpshe had told Mr Downer that
the timing of the service of the indictment had been his decision alone. In a
supplementary affidavit he explained that he had been untruthful in that regard in
order not to bring Mr Downer under the impression that he had been influenced by
the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development. That explanation itself
impacts negatively on Mr Mpshe’s credibility and on the soundness of his decision to
discontinue the prosecution.

(vii) The exclusion of the prosecution team from the final deliberations leading up to
the decision to discontinue the prosecution appears to have been deliberate and is in
itself irrational.
(viii) The case law that formed the basis for Mr Mpshe’s decision to terminate the
prosecution does not, in fact, support it. On the contrary, the cases, including an
appeal court decision overlooked by Mr Mpshe, are to the effect that questions of
abuse of process in relation to a prosecution should be decided by a trial court and
not determined by way of an extra-judicial pronouncement.
(ix) In his media statement in which he provided reasons for terminating the
prosecution, Mr Mpshe referred to the following dictum of this Court in Zuma:
‘A prosecution is not wrongful merely because it is brought for an improper purpose. It will
only be wrongful if, in addition, reasonable and probable grounds for prosecuting are absent,
something not alleged by Mr Zuma and which in any event can only be determined once
criminal proceedings have been concluded. The motive behind the prosecution is irrelevant
because, as Schreiner JA said in connection with arrests, the best motive does not cure an
otherwise illegal arrest and the worst motive does not render an otherwise legal arrest illegal.
The same applies to prosecutions.’
However, he missed its true meaning and import and misapplied it.
(x) In the circumstances set out above Mr Mpshe’s stated purpose of preserving the
integrity of the NPA and advancing the cause of justice, can hardly be said to have
been achieved. The opposite is true. Discontinuing a prosecution in respect of which
the merits are admittedly good and in respect of which there is heightened public
interest because of the breadth and nature of the charges and the person at the
centre of it holds the highest public office, can hardly redound to the NPA’s credit or
advance the course of justice or promote the integrity of the NPA. Regrettably, the
picture that emerges is one of Mr Mpshe and Mr Hofmeyr straining to find
justification for the termination of the prosecution.
(xi) Thus the conclusion of the court below, that the decision to terminate the
prosecution was irrational, cannot be faulted.
(xii) In reviewing his own decision to institute criminal proceedings against Mr Zuma,
and ultimately making the decision to terminate the prosecution, Mr Mpshe wrongly
invoked and relied on s 179(5)(d) of the Constitution and s 22(2)(c) of the NPA Act.
These provisions deal with the review by an NDPP of a decision of a DPP and were
inapposite. Thus, the concessions on behalf of Mr Zuma and the NPA that, on that

basis, the decision to terminate the prosecution was liable to be set aside, were
rightly made.
(xiii) In light of what appears above, it is difficult to understand why the present
regime at the NPA considered that the decision to terminate the prosecution could
be defended.

[95] The appeal must therefore fail. The DA sought the costs of three counsel
which, in the circumstances of the case, is not without warrant. The NPA and the
President made common cause and should be liable for the DA’s costs jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.

[96] The following order is made:
1 The applications for leave to appeal are granted.
2 The appeals are dismissed with costs, including the costs of three counsel and the
costs related to the applications for leave to appeal. The National Prosecuting
Authority and Mr JG Zuma are to pay such costs jointly and severally, the one paying
the other to be absolved.

______________________
M S Navsa
Acting Deputy President

Appearances:

Counsel for the First Appellant:
H Epstein SC (with him A L Platt SC and P B Khoza)

Instructed by:

The State Attorney, Pretoria

The State Attorney, Bloemfontein

Counsel for the Second Appellant:
K J Kemp SC (with him H Gani and J Thobela-Mkhulisi

Instructed by:

Hulley & Associates, Sandown

Honey Attorneys Inc., Bloemfontein

Counsel for Respondent:
S P Rosenberg SC (with him H J De Waal, D P
Bergström and S Vakele)

Instructed by:

Minde Shapiro & Smith Attorneys, Belville

Symington & De Kok, Bloemfontein

SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY - JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

FROM
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE
13 October 2017

STATUS
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is for the benefit of the media and does not form part of
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

Zuma v DA (771/2016 & 1170/2016) [2017] ZASCA 146 (13 October 2017)

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) today granted two applications for leave to appeal and thereafter
dismissed the two appeals brought by the current President of the Republic South Africa, Mr Jacob
Gedleyihlekisa Zuma (Mr Zuma), the Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions (the ANDPP)
and the Head of the Directorate of Special Operations (the DSO), respectively.

The appeals were directed against a judgment of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (the
court a quo) in terms of which it held that the decision on 1 April 2009 by the then ANDPP Mr
Mokotedi Mpshe, to discontinue the prosecution of Mr Zuma on serious criminal charges, including
charges of racketeering, corruption, money laundering and fraud, was irrational. The decision was
consequently reviewed and set aside by the court below. The order was at the instance of the first
respondent, the Democratic Alliance (the DA).

The litigation history of the present appeal before the SCA stems from the following factual
background. Initially, after investigations related to the criminal charges had commenced in 2001,
corruption charges were brought by the National Prosecuting Authority (the NPA) against Mr Zuma
during 2005, prior to his election to the high office he currently holds. The charges against Mr Zuma
were instituted after the conviction of his former business associate, Mr Shabir Shaik, on fraud and
corruption charges. During 2006 the case against Mr Zuma was struck from the roll by Msimang J in
the Durban and Coast Local Division of the High Court, after an application by the State for a

postponement to complete its investigation and finalise an indictment was refused. This had the result
that the prosecution was terminated.

On 28 December 2007, a new indictment containing charges of corruption and money laundering was
served on Mr Zuma. In 2009, the SCA in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma [2009]
ZASCA 1; 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) (hereinafter referred to as NDPP v Zuma) held that the then
ANDPP, Mr Mokotedi Mpshe, was the official that had taken the decision to prosecute.

Subsequent to the indictment being served, further legal battles were waged by Mr Zuma against the
NPA concerning search warrants and other issues related to his prosecution. On 10 February 2009,
more than a year after the new indictment was served, Mr Zuma’s legal representatives, in an attempt
to persuade the NPA to discontinue the prosecution, made written representations, purportedly for
consideration by Mr Mpshe. On 20 February 2009, 10 days after they made written representations,
Mr Zuma’s legal representatives, attorney Michael Hulley and his counsel Mr Kemp J Kemp SC, made
oral representations to the NPA. Mr Zuma’s legal representatives were adamant that individuals in the
NPA, past and present, conspired to discredit him. They referred to the fact that Mr McCarthy, the
head of the DSO at the time, had used the resources of the NPA to source negative intelligence
concerning Mr Zuma. They also indicated that they were in possession of recordings of telephone
conversations between Mr McCarthy and various politicians, including Mr Bulelani Ngcuka (the then
National Director of Public Prosecutions, Mzi Khumalo and Ronnie Kasrils (Minister of Intelligence
Services at the time).

Having received the representations and being concerned about the effect of the recordings referred
to above, Mr Mpshe was anxious about how best to respond to the charges against Mr Zuma. The
prosecution team involved in the day-to-day running of the prosecution maintained that the evidence
on which the charges were based was untainted and advised that the prosecution should continue as
the case against Mr Zuma was strong. On 6 April 2009 Mr Mpshe made a public announcement in
which he stated that he had taken the decision to discontinue the prosecution of Mr Zuma and issued
a detailed media statement providing the reasons for this decision.

It is those reasons and the legality of Mr Mpshe’s decision to discontinue and thus terminate the
prosecution that were at the centre of the applications for leave to appeal and ultimately the appeals
themselves.

The SCA had regard to the judgment by Ledwaba DJP (with Pretorius and Mothle JJ concurring) in
the court below, who held that Mr Mpshe had disregarded the prosecution team’s recommendations
that even if the allegations regarding Mr McCarthy were true, the decision to halt the prosecution had
to be made by the trial court. The court below agreed with the view of the prosecution team and held
that it was for a court of law to deal with allegations of abuse of process. The court below also had

regard to the dictum of the SCA in NDPP v Zuma to the effect that a prosecution is not wrongful
merely because it is brought for an improper purpose and that it would only be wrongful if, in addition,
reasonable and probable grounds for prosecuting are absent.

In addition to confirming the reasoning by the court a quo, the SCA held that the case presented by
the NPA, that Mr McCarthy’s alleged conduct in influencing the timing of the service of the indictment
was so egregious that it amounted to an abuse of process, was largely based on conjecture and
supposition. Furthermore, the SCA held that in reviewing his own decision to institute the criminal
proceedings against Mr Zuma, and ultimately making the decision to terminate the prosecution, Mr
Mpshe wrongly invoked and relied on s 179(5)(d) of the Constitution and s 22(2)(c) of the NPA Act,
thus rendering his decision irrational.

The following is a summary of what appears towards the end of the SCA judgment:

(i) The case presented by the NPA, principally through Mr Hofmeyr, was that Mr McCarthy’s conduct,
in influencing the timing of the service of the indictment so that it occurred after the ANC’s Polokwane
conference was so egregious that it amounted to an abuse of process to justify a discontinuation of
the prosecution. This was based largely on conjecture and supposition. The allegations by Mr
Hofmeyr of political machinations on the part of Mr McCarthy were irrelevant because they were
unconnected to the integrity of the investigation of the case against Mr Zuma and the prosecution
itself.
(ii) The authenticity and legality of the recorded conversations which Mr Mpshe considered vital to his
decision to discontinue the prosecution are not beyond doubt. Since the recorded conversations were
considered vital, greater thought ought to have been given by the NPA to these issues.
(iii) The manner in which the affidavits were drawn and the case conducted on behalf of the NPA was
inexcusable.
(iv) The reasons for discontinuing the prosecution provided by Mr Mpshe do not bear scrutiny for the
recordings themselves on which Mr Mpshe relied, even if taken at face value, do not impinge on the
propriety of the investigation of the case against Mr Zuma or the merits of the prosecution itself.
(v) Even if one were to accept that Mr McCarthy had his own ulterior purpose for having the
indictment served after the Polokwane conference rather than before it, what is indisputable is that it
was in any event not practically possible to have the indictment served before the conference. There
were nonetheless sound other reasons, such as the stability of the country, accepted as such by both
Mr Mpshe and the then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, that dictated service of
the indictment after the Polokwane conference. In the circumstances, Mr McCarthy’s alleged motive in
relation to the timing of the service of the indictment was ultimately irrelevant.
(vi) The submission on behalf of the NPA and Mr Zuma, that Mr McCarthy had a central role in the
timing of the service of the indictment is at odds with the contradictory account provided by the NPA in
relation to who had made the decision about the timing of the service of the indictment. Mr Mpshe had
told Mr Downer that the timing of the service of the indictment had been his decision alone. In a

supplementary affidavit he explained that he had been untruthful in that regard in order not to bring Mr
Downer under the impression that he had been influenced by the then Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development. That explanation itself impacts negatively on Mr Mpshe’s credibility and
on the soundness of his decision to discontinue the prosecution.
(vii) The exclusion of the prosecution team from the final deliberations leading up to the decision to
discontinue the prosecution appears to have been deliberate and is in itself irrational.
(viii) The case law that formed the basis for Mr Mpshe’s decision to terminate the prosecution does
not, in fact, support it. On the contrary, the cases, including an appeal court decision overlooked by
Mr Mpshe, are to the effect that questions of abuse of process in relation to a prosecution should be
decided by a trial court and not determined by way of an extra-judicial pronouncement.
(ix) In his media statement in which he provided reasons for terminating the prosecution, Mr Mpshe
referred to the following dictum in of this Court in Zuma:
‘A prosecution is not wrongful merely because it is brought for an improper purpose. It will only be
wrongful if, in addition, reasonable and probable grounds for prosecuting are absent, something not
alleged by Mr Zuma and which in any event can only be determined once criminal proceedings have
been concluded. The motive behind the prosecution is irrelevant because, as Schreiner JA said in
connection with arrests, the best motive does not cure an otherwise illegal arrest and the worst motive
does not render an otherwise legal arrest illegal. The same applies to prosecutions.’
However, he missed its true meaning and import and misapplied it.
(x) In the circumstances set out above, Mr Mpshe’s stated purpose of preserving the integrity of the
NPA and advancing the cause of justice, can hardly be said to have been achieved. The opposite is
true. Discontinuing a prosecution in respect of which the merits are admittedly good and in respect of
which there is heightened public interest because of the breadth and nature of the charges and the
person at the centre of it who holds the highest public office, can hardly redound to the NPA’s credit
or advance the course of justice or promote the integrity of the NPA. Regrettably, the picture that
emerges is one of Mr Mpshe and Mr Hofmeyr straining to find justification for the termination of the
prosecution.
(xi) Thus the conclusion of the court below, that the decision to terminate the prosecution was
irrational, cannot be faulted.
(xii) In reviewing his own decision to institute criminal proceedings against Mr Zuma, and ultimately
making the decision to terminate the prosecution, Mr Mpshe wrongly invoked and relied on s
179(5)(d) of the Constitution and s 22(2)(c) of the NPA Act. These provisions deal with the review by
an NDPP of a decision of a DPP and were inapposite. Thus, the concessions on behalf of Mr Zuma
and the NPA that, on that basis, the decision to terminate the prosecution was liable to be set aside,
were rightly made.
(xiii) In light of what appears above, it is difficult to understand why the present regime at the NPA
considered that the decision to terminate the prosecution could be defended.

The applications for leave to appeal were granted and the appeals dismissed and the following order
was made:
1 The applications for leave to appeal are granted.
2 The appeals are dismissed with costs, including the costs of three counsel and the costs related to
the applications for leave to appeal. The National Prosecuting Authority and Mr JG Zuma are to pay
such costs jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.

_____________________________________________________________________________