THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Not Reportable
Case no: 440/2022

In the matter between:

MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES

FIRST APPELLANT
THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

SECOND APPELLANT
THE HEAD OF THE PRISON: ZONDERWATER
PRISON

THIRD APPELLANT

and

WILHELM PRETORIUS

FIRST RESPONDENT
DR JOHAN PRETORIUS

SECOND RESPONDENT
DR JOHAN (LETS) PRETORIUS

THIRD RESPONDENT

Neutral citation:
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others v
Wilhelm Pretorius and Others (Case no 440/2022) [2023] ZASCA
155 (17 November 2023)
Coram:
DAMBUZA,
MEYER,
MATOJANE
AND
GOOSEN
JJA
AND
UNTERHALTER AJA
Heard:
13 September 2023
Delivered:
17 November 2023
Summary:
Appeal – Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, s 16(2)(a) – mootness –
whether, irrespective of mootness, interests of justice require decision on appeal.

ORDER

On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (Adams J with
Mudau and Dippenaar JJ concurring), sitting as court of appeal):
The appeal is dismissed with costs, including those of two counsel.

JUDGMENT

Meyer JA (Dambuza, Matojane and Goosen JJA and Unterhalter AJA
concurring):
[1] This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the full court of the Gauteng
Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (the full court), per Adams J, with Mudau
and Dippenaar JJ concurring, delivered on 21 January 2022. The first appellant is the
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services (the minister), the second appellant, the
National Commissioner: Department of Correctional Services (the national
commissioner), and the third appellant, the Head of the Zonderwater Correctional
Centre, Cullinan, Gauteng. The first respondent, Mr Wilhelm Pretorius, was registered
for a doctoral degree in Theology at the University of Pretoria. The second respondent
is his brother, Dr Johan Pretorius, a medical doctor who was registered for a masters
degree in Biblical and Ancient Studies at the University of South Africa. The third
respondent is their father, Dr Johan (Lets) Pretorius, a medical doctor, who was
registered for an honours degree in Political Sciences at the University of South Africa.
[2] The respondents were long term prisoners serving sentences of between 20
and 30 years’ imprisonment at the Zonderwater Correctional Centre, Cullinan,
Gauteng. Although they had access to computers in the Zonderwater Correctional
Centre’s computer room between the hours 7:00am and 2:00pm, they were not
permitted to use their personal computers in their cells to progress their studies during
the lengthy hours that they were locked up in their cells. They accordingly brought

proceedings in the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (the high court),
to challenge the Policy Procedures Directorate Formal Education (the policy), pursuant
to which their requests to use their personal computers in their cells for the purpose of
their studies, were declined.
[3] On 14 May 2018, the high court, per Swanepoel AJ, granted an order in their
favour. The order reads:
‘50.1
The Policy Procedures on Formal Education Programmes, as approved by the
[National Commissioner: Department of Correctional Services], insofar as it relates to the use
of personal laptops without a modem in any communal or single cell, is declared to constitute
unfair discrimination in accordance with the provisions of the Promotion of Equality and
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 [the Equality Act], as against applicants.
50.2
First, second and third applicants shall be entitled to use their personal computers
without the use of a modem in their cells, for as long as they remain registered students with
any recognized tertiary institution in South Africa.
50.3
All of applicants’ computers shall be made available for inspection at any given time
by representative of the respondents.
50.4
First and second respondents shall pay the costs of the application jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.’
[4] Aggrieved by that order, the appellants, with leave of the high court, appealed
to the full court. On 21 January 2022, the full court dismissed the appeal with costs.
This appeal, with leave of this Court, lies against that order.  Another appeal, involving
similar facts and the same issues of law, was pending before this Court. It is the matter
of Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others v Ntuli (Judicial
Inspectorate for Correctional services intervening as amicus curiae).1 The Ntuli appeal
was enrolled for hearing in this Court on 12 May 2022. At the request of the appellants,
due to their counsel’s indisposition, the parties agreed to request that the Ntuli appeal
be removed from the roll. This Court considered it efficient and appropriate that this
appeal and the Ntuli appeal be heard together, and both appeals were enrolled for
hearing on 13 September 2023.
[5] However, it turned out that the three Pretorius family members (the respondents
in this appeal) were all released on parole, at the end of March 2022. They, therefore,

1 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others v Ntuli (Judicial Inspectorate for
Correctional services intervening as amicus curiae) (539/2022) [2023] ZASCA 146 (8 November 2023)
(Ntuli).

adopted the stance that the appeal became moot. In a letter dated 30 March 2022,
their attorney brought that fact to the attention of the State Attorney, representing the
appellants. The appellants nevertheless elected to pursue this appeal.
[6] Section 16(2)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, stipulates:
‘(2) (a) (i) When at the hearing of an appeal the issues are of such a nature that the decision
sought will have no practical effect or result, the appeal may be dismissed on this ground
alone.
(ii) Save under exceptional circumstances, the question whether the decision would
have no practical effect or result is to be determined without reference to any consideration of
costs.’
[7] It is clear from the factual circumstances that this matter is moot. In other words,
a decision on appeal would have no practical effect or result. This, however, is not the
end of the inquiry. The central question for consideration is whether, irrespective of its
mootness, it is in the interests of justice for this court to decide the appeal.2 The
interests of justice might well have compelled us to decide this appeal on its merits
had it not been for this Court’s judgment in Ntuli.
[8] The high court found the policy, insofar as it relates to the use of personal
laptops without a modem in any communal or single cell, to constitute unfair
discrimination in terms of the provisions of the Equality Act as against the three
Pretorius family members. Hence, subparagraph 1 of the high court order. The full
court endorsed that order. However, the parties could not demonstrate to us that
Swanepoel AJ, who presided in the high court, had been designated as a presiding
officer of the equality court.
[9] The same happened in Ntuli. There this Court, per Unterhalter AJA, said:
‘[12] I consider, first, Mr Ntuli’s challenge to the policy under the Equality Act. Did the high
court enjoy jurisdiction to entertain this challenge? I think not. A person wishing to institute
proceedings under the Equality Act must notify the clerk of the equality court and a presiding
officer of the equality court must decide whether the matter is to be heard in the equality court
(s 20(3)(a)). Although every high court is an equality court in its area of jurisdiction, a judge of

2 Normandien Farms (Pty) Ltd) v South African Agency for Promotion of Petroleum, Exportation and
Exploitation SOC Ltd & Others [2020] ZACC 5; 2020 (6) BLCR 748 (CC); 2020 (4) SA 409 (CC) paras
46-50.

the high court can only serve as a presiding officer of the equality court if so designated (s
16(1)).
[13] Designation is a ministerial act taken by the Minister after consultation with the Judge
President (s 16(1)(b)). A high court judge, once designated, serves as a presiding officer of
the equality court. Until so designated, a high court judge enjoys no such competence. When
a matter comes before the high court which raises claims both under the Equality Act and
outside of it, the judge of the high court before whom this matter is brought has the power to
entertain all of these claims only if he or she is a judge designated as a presiding officer of the
equality court. If the judge of the high court has not been so designated, then the judge cannot
entertain those claims which have been brought under the Equality Act.
[14] We raised this matter with the parties. They could not demonstrate to us that Matsemela
AJ, who presided in the court below, had been designated as a presiding officer of the equality
court. Once that is so, Matsemela AJ enjoyed no power to entertain Mr Ntuli’s claim under the
Equality Act. The court below made an order that the policy is declared to constitute unfair
discrimination in terms of the Equality Act. Matsemela AJ had no power to make such an order,
and, as a result, that order must be set aside.’
[10] This court, therefore, inter alia set aside the order of the high Court granted
under the Equality Act, it declared the policy, to the extent that it prohibits the use of
personal computers in cells, constitutionally invalid and set it aside. It suspended that
order for 12 months and directed the minister and the national commissioner, after
consultation with the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services, to prepare and
promulgate a revised policy for correctional centres permitting the use of personal
computers in cells for study purposes. Paragraph 6 of this Court’s order provides, inter
alia, that:
‘6. Pending the revision of the education policy:
6.1 The applicant is entitled to use his personal computer in his cell, without the use of a
modem, for as long as he remains a registered student with a recognised tertiary or further
education institution in South Africa.
6.2 Any registered student in a correctional centre who needs a computer to support their
studies, and/or any student who has registered for a course of study that requires a computer
as a compulsory part of the course, is entitled to use their personal computer without the use
of a modem in their cell for as long as they remain a registered student with a recognised
tertiary or further education institution in South Africa.’
[11] This Court’s order in Ntuli, therefore, is not confined to Mr Ntuli, but extends to
‘[a’]ny registered student in a correctional centre who needs a computer to support

their studies, and/or any student who has registered for a course of study that requires
a computer as a compulsory part of the course’.
[12] In the light of this Court’s order in Ntuli, paragraph 1 of the high court’s order
need not be corrected in this appeal. Furthermore, the Pretorius family members, who
are on parole, are afforded adequate protection against an infringement of their
constitutionally entrenched right to further their education should their parole be
revoked, and they are reincarcerated.
[13] Finally, the matter of costs.  The respondents request that the costs of the
appeal should be awarded in their favour on the scale applicable as between attorney
and client on the basis that: (a) the appellants steadfastly persisted with their appeal
despite their knowledge that the Pretorius family members were released on parole
almost eighteen months before the hearing of the appeal; and (b) the appellants failed
to bring that fact to this Court’s attention prior to the granting of leave to appeal on 21
April 2022. I agree that the appellants should bear the respondents’ costs of the
appeal. But this, in my view, is not one of those ‘rare’ occasions where a deviation from
the ordinary rule that the successful party be awarded costs as between party and
party, is warranted.3
[14] In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs, including those of two counsel.

________________________
P MEYER
JUDGE OF APPEAL

3 See LAWSA Vol 3 Part 2 (2 ed) para 320.

Appearances

First, second and third appellants:
M T K Moerane SC (assisted by E B
Ndebele)

Instructed by:
State Attorney, Johannesburg

State Attorney, Bloemfontein

First, second and third respondents:
R du Plessis SC (assisted by A D
Theart)
Instructed by:
Julian Knight and Associates Inc.,
Pretoria

Rossouws Attorneys, Bloemfontein

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:

17 November 2023
Status:
Immediate
The following summary is for the benefit of the media in the reporting of this case and does
not form part of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others v
Wilhelm Pretorius and Others (440/2022) [2023] ZASCA 155 (17 November 2023)
Today, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) dismissed an appeal from the full court of the Gauteng
Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (the full court). The respondents were long term prisoners
serving sentences of between 20 and 30 years’ imprisonment. The first respondent, Mr Wilhelm
Pretorius, was registered for a doctoral degree in Theology at the University of Pretoria. The second
respondent is his brother, Dr Johan Pretorius, a medical doctor who was registered for a degree in
Biblical and Ancient Studies at the University of South Africa. The third respondent is their father, Dr
Johan (Lets) Pretorius, a medical doctor, who was registered for an honours degree in Political
Sciences at the University of South Africa.
Although they had access to computers in the correctional centre’s computer room between the hours
of 7:00am and 2:00pm, they were not permitted to use their personal computers in their cells to
progress their studies during the lengthy hours that they were locked up in their cells. They sought to
use a personal computer in their cells for study purposes, but their requests were rejected, as the
departmental ‘Policy Procedure Directorate Formal Education Programmes’ (the policy) prohibits the
use of a personal computer in a cell for study purposes. They accordingly brought proceedings in the
Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (the high court).
On 14 May 2018, the high court, per Swanepoel AJ, granted an order in their favour. The policy,
insofar as it relates to the use of personal laptops without a modem in any communal or single cell,
was declared to constitute unfair discrimination in accordance with the Provisions of the Promotion of
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the Equality Act), as against the
respondents.
Aggrieved by that order the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, the National Commissioner:
Department of Correctional Services and the Head of the Correctional Centre in question appealed to
the full court. On 21 January 2022, the full court dismissed the appeal with costs. This appeal, with
leave of this Court, lies against the order of the full court. Another appeal, Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development and Others v Ntuli (Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services
intervening as amicus curiae) was enrolled for hearing together with this appeal, since the two
appeals involve similar facts and the same issues of law. However, it turned out that the three
Pretorius family members were all released on parole about 18 months prior to the hearing of the two
appeals.
The SCA held that it is clear from the factual circumstances that the Pretorius appeal is moot. A
decision on appeal would have no practical effect or result. This, the SCA held, however, is not the
end of the inquiry. The central question for consideration is whether, irrespective of its mootness, it is
in the interests of justice for the SCA to decide the appeal. The interests of justice might well have
compelled the SCA to decide this appeal on its merits, had it not been for the SCA’s judgment in the

Ntuli appeal (Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others v Ntuli ((Judicial
Inspectorate for Correctional Services intervening as amicus curiae) (539/2022) [2023] ZASCA 146 (8
November 2023)). There, the SCA found that the constitutional right to further education is, at a
minimum, a right to pursue further education, free of state interference. The policy prevents a prisoner
from effectively pursuing his or her chosen course of study and, therefore, the SCA found the policy to
infringe the constitutional right to further education. In the result, the SCA declared that the blanket
policy prohibiting the use of personal computers in cells was constitutionally invalid and it set it aside.
The order was not confined to Mr Ntuli but extends to any registered student in a correctional centre
who needs a computer to support their studies, and/or any student who has registered for a course of
study that requires a computer as a compulsory part of the course.
The SCA, therefore, concluded that the appeal became moot when the three Pretorius family
members were released on parole. The order in Ntuli affords adequate protection against
infringements of their constitutionally entrenched right to further their education should the Pretorius
family members’ bail be revoked, and they are reincarcerated.
~~~~the end~~~~