THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Not reportable
Case No: 680/2020

In the matter between:

MACSTEEL TUBE AND PIPE, A DIVISION OF
MACSTEEL SERVICE CENTRES SA (PTY) LTD
APPELLANT

and

VOWLES PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD
RESPONDENT

Neutral Citation:
Macsteel Tube and Pipe, a division of Macsteel Service Centres
SA (Pty) Ltd v Vowles Properties (Pty) Ltd (680/2020) [2021]
ZASCA 178 (17 December 2021)
Coram:
MATHOPO, MOCUMIE and MOLEMELA JJA, and KGOELE,
and MOLEFE AJJA
Heard:
4 November 2021
Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to
the parties’ legal representatives by email, publication on the
Supreme Court of Appeal website and released to SAFLII. The
date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10h00 on 17
December 2021
Summary:
Civil Procedure and Practice – an order amending the
quantification of the claim in a summons did not amount to a new cause of action

and did not constitute a final determination on the issue of the court’s jurisdiction to
adjudicate the action – an order amending the description of a defendant in a
summons does not amount to a substitution of the defendant in circumstances
where the description of the defendant was the same as in the lease agreement
concluded by the parties – no prejudice was demonstrated by the appellant –
application to amend was correctly granted – appeal dismissed.

___________________________________________________________________

ORDER

___________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (Mia J and
Malungana AJ sitting as a court of appeal):
The appeal is dismissed with costs.

___________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

___________________________________________________________________

Molemela JA (Mathopo and Mocumie JJA and Kgoele and Molefe AJJA
concurring):

[1] This appeal arises from an interlocutory application pertaining to the
amendment of the particulars of claim in an action that was instituted by Vowles
Properties (Pty) Ltd (Vowles) against Macsteel Tube and Pipe, a Division of
Macsteel Service Centres SA (Pty) Ltd (Macsteel).1 The background facts which
serve as a backdrop for the adjudication of this appeal are set out in the paragraphs
that follow.

[2] On 26 July 2009, Vowles and Macsteel concluded a lease agreement in terms
of which the latter leased the former’s fixed property which was to be utilised for steel
fabrication and storage, among others. One of the terms of the agreement was that
Macsteel was required to maintain the leased premises in good order and could not
sublet the leased premises without Vowles’ consent. On 11 December 2015, Vowles
instituted action in the Kempton Park Regional Court (the regional court) against

1 This is how Macsteel was cited in the face of the original summons. In its proposed amendment,
Vowles sought the substitution of that description with the following citation: ‘Macsteel Service
Centres SA (Pty) Ltd t/a Macsteel Tube and Pipe, a private company duly registered and incorporated
in terms of the Company Laws of the Republic of South Africa, conducting business at 15 Esson
Road, Lillianton, Boksburg’.

Macsteel. It is common cause that the lease terminated on 31 December 2012. In its
particulars of claim, Vowles claimed an amount of R1 567 096.03 as damages for
breach of contract on the basis that Macsteel had breached the terms of the
agreement by failing to return the leased premises in the same condition as they
were when it first took occupation thereof. Macsteel is the appellant in this appeal,
and Vowles the respondent. A second party, Reclamation Holdings (Pty) Ltd, which
was the appellant’s tenant in terms of a subletting arrangement, was cited as a co-
defendant in the particulars of claim. The subletting arrangement need not detain this
appeal, because the appellant’s tenant is not a party before us.

[3] Macsteel excepted to the particulars of claim. On 15 July 2016, the regional
court, by agreement between the parties, upheld the exception raised by Macsteel.
In terms of that order (the July 2016 order), the original particulars of claim were set
aside and Vowles was ordered to file amended particulars of claim within 20 days of
the July 2016 order. The first time that Vowles attempted to amend the particulars of
claim was when on 9 September 2016, more than 20 days after the issuance of the
July 2016 order, it delivered a notice of amendment in terms of rule 55A of the
Magistrates’ Court Rules (the first rule 55A(1) notice) pursuant to being served with a
notice of bar. Macsteel objected to the amendment on the basis that the particulars
of claim no longer existed, as they had been set aside in terms of the July 2016
order. It sought an order dismissing Vowles’ action, alternatively setting aside
Vowles’ notice of amendment.

[4] On 24 January 2017, the regional court granted an order setting aside the
notice of amendment filed by Vowles as an irregular step. On 20 February 2017,
Vowles delivered its second notice of amendment in terms of rule 55A(1) (the
second rule 55A(1) notice). Macsteel again objected, as result of which Vowles
withdrew that notice. On 27 October 2017, Vowles filed another notice of
amendment, this time stating that the application was within the contemplation of rule
55A(4) (the October 2017 amendment application). The notice stipulated that Vowles
intended to make its application on 2 February 2018 at 09h00. However, on 30
January 2018, Vowles’ attorneys filed a notice of withdrawal as attorney of record.
Vowles did not attend the proceedings on 30 January 2018, as a result of which the
regional court dismissed that application with costs.

[5] On 19 June 2018, Vowles, having appointed new attorneys of record,
delivered a Notice of Motion (the 2018 amendment application) indicating its
intention to, in terms of s 111(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944
(Magistrates’ Court Act), alternatively in terms of rule 55A(10), amend the summons
by replacing it with a copy appended to the Notice of Motion as Annexure A. Vowles
sought a number of orders in the alternative, including an order declaring the
proposed amendment as being an amendment of the particulars of claim in
compliance with the July 2016 order. Macsteel opposed the application and raised a
number of objections, including its previous objections.

[6] Furthermore, Macsteel contended that Vowles had not brought its application
in terms of rule 55A(1), which was the ordinary manner in which such applications
are brought and had instead elected to bring this application under the rule 55A(10).
Although Macsteel accepted that it was within the discretion of the court to grant
applications under this sub-rule, it contended that because Vowles had not explained
in its founding affidavit why it elected to follow this route, and not the usual procedure
for amendments, as set out in rule 55A(1), there was no basis for the regional court
to conclude that it should exercise its discretion in favour of Vowles and grant the
June 2018 amendment.

[7] On 24 October 2018, the regional court granted Vowles leave to amend the
particulars of claim and ordered Macsteel to pay the costs of the application.
Macsteel was aggrieved by that order and noted an appeal on the basis that the
regional court had made findings which were final in effect, which would prejudice
Macsteel’s conduct in defending Vowles’ claim. On 21 November 2018, Macsteel
noted an appeal against the whole of the judgment and order of the regional court
except the costs order. Before the Gauteng Division of the High Court,
Johannesburg (the high court), sitting as a full court, Macsteel submitted that the
regional court had erred in allowing the amendment of the particulars of claim.
According to Macsteel, Vowles’ application to amend its particulars of claim should
have been dismissed. The high court rejected that contention and dismissed the
appeal with costs on 20 April 2020. Aggrieved by that order, Macsteel approached

this Court seeking special leave to appeal against the order of the high court. Special
leave was granted by this Court on 28 July 2020.

[8] The main issues raised for adjudication in this appeal are whether the regional
court made a definitive order that cannot be altered in relation to jurisdiction and, in
particular, whether the amendment sought had the effect of introducing a new cause
of action or a new party in relation to a claim that had prescribed. An ancillary issue
raised for determination related to whether or not the order granted by the regional
court was appealable.

[9] Section 111 of the Magistrates’ Court Act is relevant to this appeal. It provides
that a court may at any time before judgment, amend any summons or pleading, if
the granting of the amendment will not prejudice any party in the conduct of that
party’s action or defence. There is a plethora of case-law on the subject and it is now
well-established that a court will always allow an amendment unless the amendment
is mala fide or if the amendment would cause prejudice to the other side, which
prejudice cannot be cured by a costs order. This principle was formulated as follows
in the well-known case of Moolman v Estate Moolman and Another2 and was
confirmed in numerous judgments of this Court:
‘. . . [T]he practical rule adopted seems to be that amendments will always be allowed unless
the application to amend is mala fide or unless such amendment would cause an injustice to
the other side which cannot be compensated by costs. . . .’

[10] Against the backdrop of the legal position set out in the preceding paragraph,
I turn now to deal with the issues raised in this appeal. It is opportune to start with
the ancillary issue of the appealability of the order made by the regional court. It was
contended on behalf of Vowles that the order granted by the regional court did not
have the effect of a final judgment and was consequently not appealable.3 We were
accordingly urged to strike the appeal from the roll with costs.

2 Moolman v Estate Moolman and Another 1927 CPD 27 at 29.
3 Relying on the provisions of s 83 of the Magistrate’s Court Act 32 of 1944, it was contended on
behalf of Vowles that the granting of the amendment is not a judgment within the contemplation of s
48 of the Magistrates Court Act. The right of appeal, so it was contended, is limited to the provisions
of s 83(b) which stipulates that a party has the right to appeal against any rule or order ‘having the
effect of a final judgment’.

[11] It is trite that an appeal lies against an order and not against the reasoning. In
Zweni v Minister of Law,4 and Order this Court held:
‘A “judgment or order” is a decision which, as a general principle, has three attributes, first,
the decision must be final in effect and not susceptible of alteration by the court of first
instance; second, it must be definitive of the rights of the parties; and, third, it must have the
effect of disposing of at least a substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main
proceedings (Van Streepen & Germs (Pty) Ltd case supra at 586I-587B; Marsay v
Dilley 1992 (3) SA 944 (A) 962C-F). The second is the same as the oft-stated requirement
that a decision, in order to qualify as a judgment or order, must grant definite and distinct
relief (Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue & Another 1992 (4) SA 202
(A) at 214D-G).’

[12] It is true that the refusal of an amendment may have a final and definitive
effect because a party may be precluded from leading evidence at the trial in respect
of the aspects which were to be introduced by the amendment of the pleadings.
However, the granting of an amendment does not, without more, have that effect.
Ordinarily, an order granting leave to amend is an interlocutory order which is not
final and definitive of the rights of the parties.

[13] A perusal of the order granted by the regional court does not suggest that the
order it granted had a final effect. However, given Macsteel’s contention that some of
the findings made by the regional court were definitive of the parties’ rights and were
final in effect, it may be necessary to consider the reasoning that informed its
decision. In doing so, it must be borne in mind that some of the remarks were made
in the course of that court addressing itself to the controversy about whether the
grounds of objections raised by Macsteel against the proposed amendment
manifested prejudice that was likely to hinder Macsteel in its defence of the claim. I
consider next the four grounds of objections raised by Macsteel as considered by the
regional court.

[14] The first ground of objection was directed at the jurisdiction of the regional
court to adjudicate the claim beyond its monetary threshold. Section 45(1) of the

4 Zweni v Minister of Law and Order; 1993 (1) SA 523 (A); [1993] 1 All SA 365 (A) para 8.

Magistrates Court Act5 permits the parties to a contract to consent in writing to the
adjudication of their contractual dispute in either the court for the district or the court
for the regional division in respect of an action which would ordinarily fall beyond the
jurisdiction of those courts. The regional court recorded that Vowles had referred it to
clause 20 of the lease agreement, which stipulated as follows:
‘The both parties hereby consents to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court (for the district
having physical jurisdiction over the person of the LANDLORD) in respect of all proceedings
arising out of this AGREEMENT OF LEASE, notwithstanding the amount claimed or the
nature of the claim. In no way derogating there from the LANDLORD shall be entitled to
institute any action arising out of this AGREEMENT OF LEASE in any other court of
competent jurisdiction’.

[15] The regional court then stated as follows on this aspect:
‘The respondent has argued that in terms of the first two lines in this clause, that this Court is
not the district court and that the district having physical jurisdiction over with the person of
the landlord, who is in fact the applicant, is in fact Benoni Court.
Of course the applicant has disagreed with this contention and I shall say no more, except to
say the following: The district of Benoni, did at the time of institution of this summons, fall
under the Regional Court of Kempton Park.
Additionally, the clause is wide enough to include any competent court and the applicant is
then free to even persist in high court if he so wishes. There is no merit in this first ground of
objection raised by the respondent.’
In my view, the regional court merely recognised the existence of a clause in the
parties’ agreement purportedly clothing a court in the district having physical
jurisdiction over Vowles, with the jurisdiction to adjudicate the action, but did not
finally determine the issue of jurisdiction. The dismissal of this ground of objection
appears to have been on the basis that the issue of jurisdiction could not, given
clause 20 of the lease agreement, serve as a bar to granting the amendment. Thus,
nothing precluded Macsteel from subsequently raising the issue of jurisdiction as a
point in limine. It follows that this ground of appeal has no merit.

5 Section 45(1) provides: ‘Subject to the provisions of section 46, the parties may consent in writing to
the jurisdiction of either the court for the district or the court for the regional division to determine any
action or proceedings otherwise beyond its jurisdiction in terms of section 29(1).’ The matters
excluded by s 46 include matters pertaining to the validity of a will, status of a person in respect of
mental capacity, specific performance without the alternative of damages, delivery of property
exceeding a certain value, and a decree of perpetual silence.

[16] The second ground of objection was that the augmentation of the amount of
the claim was tantamount to introducing a new cause of action. There is no merit to
this contention. A plaintiff is not precluded from augmenting its claim for damages if
the new claim merely represents a fresh quantification of the original claim.6 It
follows that this ground of appeal also has no merit.

[17] In its third ground of objection, Macsteel asserted that the amendment of the
citation of Macsteel introduced a new legal entity as a defendant in circumstances
where the claim had prescribed. Macsteel took issue with the fact that the amended
particulars of claim cited the defendant as ‘Macsteel Tube and Pipe Ltd, a division of
Macsteel Service Centres SA (Pty) Ltd. Macsteel submitted that insofar as Vowles
had included the phrase ‘a division of’ in Macsteel’s citation, it had actually cited a
non-existent party. Macsteel further argued that Vowles was attempting to introduce
a new defendant, namely ‘Macsteel Services Centres SA (Pty) Ltd trading as a
division thereof in the name of Macsteel Tube and Pipe’ as a new defendant in the
place of a non-existent one. Macsteel contended that the regional court’s
observation that the citation of the defendant matched the description of Macsteel in
the lease agreement, that the citation referred to the trading name of a defendant
who was easily identifiable was definitive of the parties’ rights and was also final in
effect.

[18] The regional court’s finding that the correction of the cited defendant is not
tantamount to introducing a new party to the proceedings finds support in Foxlake
Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Foxway Developments v Ultimate Raft Foundation Design
Solutions CC t/a Ultimate Raft Design and Another (Foxlake), where this Court
stated as follows:7
‘As stated earlier, Foxway and Foxlake share the same registered address, receptionist and
managing director. The copy of the agreement on which the claim is based was attached to
the original summons. In my view when the summons was served on the registered address
of both Foxway and Foxlake, Foxway recognised its connection with the claim
notwithstanding the error in its description. The amendment sought by the respondents in

6 See Jones & Buckle The Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts in South Africa – Volume 1: The
Act 10 ed (2012) p691.
7 Foxlake Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Foxway Developments v Ultimate Raft Foundation Design
Solutions CC t/a Ultimate Raft Design and Another (Foxlake) [2016] ZASCA 54 para 14.

the court a quo did not seek to introduce a new legal entity as the first defendant. It merely
sought to correct the incorrect description of the defendant and encourage the proper
ventilation of the real disputes between the creditor (the respondents) and the debtor
(appellant). The question of prejudice to the appellants does not arise. The summons was
served on the true debtor in which summons the creditor was claiming payment of the debt
from the debtor.’

[19] The facts in the Foxlake judgment bear many similarities with the present
matter. The regional court’s observation that the citation in the original particulars of
claim matches the description in the lease agreement is borne out by the lease
agreement. Macsteel’s address was exactly the same in both the original summons
and the proposed amendment. The regional court’s finding that the defendant is
easily identifiable cannot be faulted. By parity of reasoning, in this matter, Macsteel’s
objection to the amendment of its citation was ill-conceived because the amendment
of the citation was merely intended to align Macsteel’s description in the summons to
the description in the lease agreement. The question of prejudice therefore did not
arise.

[20] Given the following remarks of this Court in Blaauwberg,8 there can be no
doubt about the fallacy of Macsteel’s contentions that the defendant cited in the
original summons was a non-existent party and that the defendant cited in the
proposed amendment introduced a new legal entity:
‘While the entitlement of the debtor to know it is the object of the [court] process is clear, in
its case the criterion fixed in s 15(1) is not the citation in the process but that there should be
service on the true debtor (not necessarily the named defendant) of process in which the
creditor claims payment of the debt. . . Presumably this is so because the true debtor will
invariably recognise its own connection with a claim if details of the creditor and its claim are
furnished to it, notwithstanding any error in its citation.’
It is clear from this passage, and the passage in Foxlake quoted in the preceding
paragraph, that even if it were to be accepted in Macsteel’s favour that the regional
court’s finding (that the amendment did not introduce a new defendant) was indeed
final in effect, these judgments deal a fatal blow to any prospects of success on an
appeal directed at this leg of Macsteel’s objection. It is plain that Macsteel

8 Blaauwberg Meat Wholesalers CC v Anglo Dutch Meats (Exports) Ltd [2003] ZASCA 144; 2004 (3)
SA 160 SA para 18.

recognised its connection with the claim notwithstanding that it considered the
citation to be flawed. It follows that this ground of appeal also has no merit.

[21] The fourth ground of objection was that the proposed amendment violated the
July 2016 order, as the original particulars of claim had been set aside. Macsteel
contended that in terms of the July 2016 order, Vowles was obliged to re-issue fresh
particulars of claim as opposed to amending them. This contention has no merit. It
must be borne in mind that although Macsteel’s exception was upheld, the regional
court specifically ordered that amended particulars of claim be filed (within 20 days).
The fact that the particulars of claim were set aside and were to be substituted with
amended particulars of claim did not mean there was no longer a pending action
between Macsteel and Vowles. Significantly, Vowles asked the regional court to
condone the late filing of its application to amend the particulars of claim; the
regional court, within its discretion, condoned the delay.

[22] Furthermore, Macsteel’s contention that summons was to be re-issued is
negated by the fact that in its notice of bar, it invited Vowles to file its amended
particulars of claim within five days. Logically, it would not have asked for the filing of
amended particulars of claim if its understanding of the order was that Vowles was
obliged to re-issue particulars of claim. Further and in any event, to the extent that
Macsteel averred that a prescribed cause of action was introduced by the
substitution of the particulars of claim, nothing precluded Macsteel from raising a
special plea of prescription when filing its plea. It follows that the contention that the
regional court made a final determination in relation to prescription has no merit.

[23] As stated before, prejudice is a key consideration in the determination of an
application for amendment of pleadings. Macsteel failed to present facts showing the
prejudice it stood to suffer on account of the proposed amendment. No prejudice
could be established from the objections raised by Macsteel. Since no prejudice was
shown, nothing stood in the way of the regional court granting the amendment. It
remains now to consider the issue of the discretion exercised by the regional court in
deciding whether or not to grant the amendment.

[24] It is trite that applications for amendment of pleadings are regulated by a wide
and generous discretion which leans towards the proper ventilation of disputes.9
Furthermore, amendments ‘will always be allowed unless the amendment is mala
fide (made in bad faith) or unless the amendment will cause an injustice to the other
side which cannot be cured by an appropriate order of costs, or “unless the parties
cannot be put back for the purposes of justice in the same position as they were
when the pleading which it is sought to amend was filed”.’10 The regional court’s
exercise of its discretion is evident from the following passage in its judgment:
‘The granting [or] refusing of an amendment is a matter of the Courts discretion and of
course it must be applied judiciously. The tendency in courts has generally been to allow an
amendment if it can be done with no prejudice to the other side and it is true that the Courts
approach applications in terms of rule 55(a), a little bit more charitably.’

[25] It is unnecessary for purposes of this appeal to determine whether the
discretion exercised by the regional court in granting the amendment brought in
terms of rule 55(10) was a discretion in the true sense or the loose sense. It suffices
merely to state that regardless of the nature of the discretion, the regional court’s
decision ought not to be interfered with lightly on appeal.11

[26] Insofar as Macsteel contended that it would be prejudiced by the granting of
the amendment because of Vowles’ inordinate delay in bringing its application for
amendment of its particulars of claim, it bears noting that a litigant’s delay in bringing
forward its amendment is not a ground for refusing the amendment.12 This is all the
more so in circumstances where the injustice to the other side can be cured by an
appropriate order of costs.13

[27] In this matter, the regional court considered the inordinate delay in bringing
the application and bemoaned the ‘. . . inordinate stops and starts to get the matter
off the ground. . . ’. Having concluded that there was no demonstrable prejudice that

9 Fn 8 above para 8.
10 Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Another 2005 (6) BCLR 529 (CC);
2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) para 9.
11 Trencon Construction Pty (Ltd) v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited and
Another [2015] ZACC 22; 2015 (10) BCLR 1199 (CC); 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC) paras 83-88.
12 See fn 8 above para 9.
13 See fn 10 above para 9.

could not be cured by an appropriate order of costs, it granted the amendment but
ordered Vowles to pay the costs of the application on an attorney and client scale.
On the strength of the authorities mentioned in the preceding paragraph, I am
satisfied that there is nothing to suggest that the regional court’s decision to condone
the delay and grant the amendment was not preceded by a judicial exercise of that
court’s discretion. In my view, that decision cannot be faulted. That being the case, it
follows that the high court correctly dismissed the appeal. For all the reasons
mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, the appeal has no merit and falls to be
dismissed.
Order
[28] The appeal is dismissed with costs.

__________________
M B MOLEMELA
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES

For appellant:

A C McKenzie
Instructed by:

Webber Wentzel, Sandton

Symington De Kok Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For respondent:

A P Bruwer
Instructed by:

Schalk Britz Inc, Benoni

Honey Attorneys, Bloemfontein.

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:

17 DECEMBER 2021
Status:
Immediate
The following summary is for the benefit of the media in the reporting of this case and does not form part of
the judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal
Macsteel Tube and Pipe, a division of Macsteel Service Centres SA (Pty) Ltd v Vowles
Properties (Pty) Ltd (680/2020) [2021] ZASCA 178 (17 December 2021)
Today the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) handed down judgment dismissing, with costs, an appeal
against a decision of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (the high court).
The issues before the SCA were whether the regional court made a definitive order that cannot be
altered in relation to jurisdiction and, in particular, whether the amendment sought had the effect of
introducing a new cause of action or a new party in relation to a claim that had prescribed; and whether
the order granted by the regional court was appealable.
This appeal arises from an interlocutory application pertaining to the amendment of the particulars of
claim in an action that was instituted by Vowles Properties (Pty) Ltd (Vowles) against Macsteel Tube
and Pipe, a Division of Macsteel Service Centres SA (Pty) Ltd (Macsteel). On 24 January 2017, the
regional court granted an order setting aside the notice of amendment filed by Vowles as an irregular
step. On 20 February 2017, Vowles delivered its second notice of amendment in terms of rule 55A(1)
(the second rule 55A(1) notice). Macsteel again objected, as result of which Vowles withdrew that
notice. On 27 October 2017, Vowles filed another notice of amendment, this time stating that the
application was within the contemplation of rule 55A(4) (the October 2017 amendment application). The
notice stipulated that Vowles intended to make its application on 2 February 2018 at 09h00. However,
on 30 January 2018, Vowles’ attorneys filed a notice of withdrawal as attorneys of record. Vowles did
not attend the proceedings on 30 January 2018, as a result of which the regional court dismissed that
application with costs.
On 19 June 2018, Vowles, having appointed new attorneys of record, delivered a Notice of Motion (the
2018 amendment application) indicating its intention to, in terms of s 111(1) of the Magistrates’ Court
Act 32 of 1944 (Magistrates’ Court Act), alternatively in terms of rule 55A(10), amend the summons by
replacing it with a copy appended to the Notice of Motion as Annexure A. Vowles sought a number of
orders in the alternative, including an order declaring the proposed amendment as being an amendment
of the particulars of claim in compliance with the July 2016 order. Macsteel opposed the application and
raised a number of objections.
On 24 October 2018, the regional court granted Vowles leave to amend the particulars of claim and
ordered Macsteel to pay the costs of the application. Macsteel was aggrieved by that order and noted
an appeal on the basis that the regional court had made findings which were final in effect, which would
prejudice Macsteel’s conduct in defending Vowles’ claim. On 21 November 2018, Macsteel noted an
appeal against the whole of the judgment and order of the regional court except the costs order. Before
the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (the high court), sitting as a full court, Macsteel
submitted that the regional court had erred in allowing the amendment of the particulars of claim.

According to Macsteel, Vowles’ application to amend its particulars of claim should have been
dismissed. The high court rejected that contention and dismissed the appeal with costs on 20 April
2020. Aggrieved by that order, Macsteel approached this Court seeking special leave to appeal against
the order of the high court.
In respect of the issue relating to jurisdiction, the SCA held that the regional court merely recognised
the existence of a clause in the parties’ agreement purportedly clothing a court in the district having
physical jurisdiction over Vowles, with the jurisdiction to adjudicate the action, but did not finally
determine the issue of jurisdiction. As regards Macsteel’s contention that the amendment of the amount
claimed was tantamount to the introduction of a new cause of action that had prescribed, the SCA
considered that contention to be without merit on the basis that a plaintiff is not precluded from
augmenting its claim for damages if the new claim merely represents a fresh quantification of the original
claim. The SCA held that Macsteel’s objection to the amendment of its citation was ill-conceived.
Relying on the judgments of Foxlake Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Foxway Developments v Ultimate Raft
Foundation Design Solutions CC t/a Ultimate Raft Design and Another (Foxlake) [2016] ZASCA 54 and
Blaauwberg Meat Wholesalers CC v Anglo Dutch Meats (Exports) Ltd [2003] ZASCA 144, respectively,
the SCA held that even if it were to be accepted in Macsteel’s favour that the regional court’s finding in
relation to the amendment of the citation of Macsteel was indeed final in effect, that ground of appeal
bore no prospects of success, as Macsteel had recognised its connection with the claim notwithstanding
that it considered the citation to be flawed.

~~~~ends~~~~