THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT
CASE NO: 604/06
Reportable
In the matter between:

DESMOND MENQA
First Appellant
OWEN PETER  ROUX
Second Appellant

and

PATRICK MARKOM
Respondents
and 7 Others

Coram:
Scott, Cloete, Van Heerden, Jafta JJA et Kgomo AJA

Heard:
5 November 2007

Delivered:
30 November 2007

Summary:
Sale in execution of residential property – s 66(1)(a) of
Magistrates’ Courts’ Act 32 of 1944 –  warrant of execution invalid as
issued by clerk of magistrate’s court without judicial oversight as required
by Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) – sale in
execution also invalid and not saved by s 70 of Act 32 of 1944 – sale in
execution and all subsequent sales of property declared null and void –
appropriate remedy

Neutral citation: This judgment may be referred to as Menqa & Another v
Markom & Others [2007] SCA 172 (RSA)

VAN HEERDEN JA:

Introduction
[1] This is an appeal against a judgment and order of the Cape High
Court (Zondi AJ) confirming a rule nisi in terms of which, inter alia, the sale in
execution of a certain residential property, namely erf 23584 Maitland, situated
at 17 Camden Street, Maitland (‘the property’), as well as all subsequent sales
of the property, were declared to be null and void.  The first respondent in this
appeal – which is before us with the leave of the court a quo – was the applicant
in the court a quo, while the first and second appellants were cited as the first
and second respondents.  For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to the
parties either by their names or by their respective designations in the court
below.
[2] The applicant, Mr Patrick Markom (‘Markom’), bought the property
from a deceased estate during 1995 for R120 000.  It was occupied at the time
by the sixth respondent, Mr Jules Tromp (‘Tromp’), in terms of a lease with the
previous owner.   The executor of the deceased estate terminated the lease and
gave Tromp notice to vacate the property by 1 June 2005, which the latter failed
to do.   On 4 June 1995, during a visit to the property by Markom, a scuffle
broke out between him and Tromp which gave rise to a claim for damages for
personal injury instituted by Tromp against Markom during September 1996.
This culminated, on 19 November 1999, in a default judgment being granted by
the magistrate’s court against Markom for an amount of R98 665.45 together
with interest and costs. It is that judgment which formed the basis of the sale in
execution which is in issue in these proceedings.
[3] According to Markom, who had in the interim taken transfer of the
property, he only became aware of the default judgment some four years later,
when a notice was served at the property on Thursday 13 November 2003,
notifying him of a sale in execution of the property scheduled for Monday 17
November 2003.  Markom moved into the property some time before it was
registered in his name and, since then, has been residing there with his family.

[4] On the morning of 17 November, Markom applied for and obtained,
on an urgent basis, an interim order staying the sale in execution of the
property, pending an application for rescission of the default judgment to be
brought by him within ten days.  By the time this interim order was received by
the sheriff, the sale in execution had already taken place.  The second
respondent, Mr Owen Roux (‘Roux’), bid for the property and signed the
conditions of sale on behalf of the first respondent, Mr Desmond Menqa
(‘Menqa’).  The selling price was R110 000.
[5] On 1 December 2003 Markom launched an application for
rescission of the default judgment granted against him.  The application was set
down for hearing in the magistrate’s court on 19 January 2004, but was
dismissed on that date because of the non-appearance of either Markom or his
attorney.  On 29 February 2004 Markom gave notice of an appeal to the Cape
High Court against the order dismissing his rescission application.  He
subsequently withdrew this appeal on 27 August 2004, on which date he
applied for rescission of the judgment dismissing his first application for
rescission.  This second application was dismissed during November 2004 and
written reasons for this order were furnished on 18 August 2005.  On 9
September Markom, still not discouraged and now acting in person, noted an
appeal to the Cape High Court against the dismissal of his second application.
This appeal was set down for hearing on 25 November 2005.  On that date, it
was postponed sine die in order for pro bono counsel to be appointed to
represent him.
[6] In the meantime, on 7 September 2005, the property was
transferred to Menqa and the bond over the property in favour of Nedbank was
cancelled.1  Menqa paid the full purchase price of R110 000, plus interest in the
amount of R22 941.78.  In addition he paid arrear rates on the property in the
amount of R1 812.24 and legal costs of R6 475.32.  The total amount paid by

1 In his answering affidavit filed in the court below, Menqa denied having any knowledge of the
events preceding the sale in execution, as set out in para 4 above.

him was thus R141 229.32.  The purchase price plus interest was paid over to
the sheriff who in turn paid R103 331.33 to Nedbank to settle the bond over the
property and R26 610.45 to Tromp’s attorneys.  On 6 December 2005, Menqa
sold the property to Roux for the sum of R490 000.  At the time of the institution
of the proceedings in the court below, the transfer of the property to Roux was
still pending and it was this transfer that Markom sought to interdict.
Judgment of the Cape High Court
[7] In consequence of the judgment of the Constitutional Court in
Jaftha v Schoeman & Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz & Others,2 the court a quo
held that the sale in execution was invalid as the warrant of execution pursuant
to which the sale had taken place had been issued by the clerk of the
magistrate’s court, without judicial supervision as required by the provisions of
s 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (‘the Act’).3
[8] The Consitutional Court in Jaftha declared s 66(1)(a) of the Act (as
it then read) to be ‘unconstitutional and invalid’ in that it failed to provide for
judicial oversight over sales in execution of the immovable property of judgment
debtors.  In her judgment, Mokgoro J (writing for a unanimous court) held that
the section constituted an unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation of the
fundamental right of access to adequate housing protected by s 26(1) of the
Constitution:
‘I have held that s 66(1)(a) of the Act is over-broad and constitutes a violation of s 26(1) of the
Constitution to the extent that it allows execution against the homes4 of indigent debtors,
where they lose their security of tenure.  I have held further that s 66(1)(a) is not justifiable and
cannot be saved to the extent that it allows for such executions where no countervailing
considerations in favour of the creditor justify the sales in execution.’5

2 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC).
3 As amended by a ‘reading in’ of certain words by the Constitutional Court: see para 9 below.
4 See in this regard Nedbank Ltd v Mortinson 2005 (6) SA 462 (W) para 22; Nedbank Ltd v
Mashiya & Another 2006 (4) SA 422 (T) paras 10–11; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v
Saunderson & Others 2006 (2) SA 264 (SCA) paras 15–17.
5 Jaftha above para 52, and see also paras 39–44.

[9] In order to remedy this constitutional defect, the court ordered that
s 66(1)(a) should be amended by a ‘reading in’ of the words underlined below:
‘Whenever a court gives judgment for the payment of money or makes an order for the payment
of money in instalments, such judgment, in case of failure to pay such money forthwith, or such
order in case of failure to pay any instalment at the time and in the manner ordered by the court,
shall be enforceable by execution against the movable property and, if there is not found
sufficient movable property to satisfy the judgment or order, or the court, on good cause shown,
so orders, then a court, after consideration of all relevant circumstances, may order execution
against the immovable property of the party against whom such judgment has been given or
such order has been made.’6 (Emphasis added.)
[10] Zondi AJ7 held that the declaration of invalidity of s 66(1)(a) by the
Constitutional Court applied retrospectively and that, accordingly, a warrant of
execution obtained, prior to Jaftha, without judicial oversight and thus in
violation of the law laid down in that case – without the court making any order
limiting the retrospective effect of its declaration of invalidity8 – was  invalid.
The learned acting judge held further that, in the present case, it was clear that
the warrant of execution pursuant to which the property was sold in execution
on 17 November 2003 had been issued by the clerk of the court without judicial
supervision and was therefore invalid.
[11] The court below went on to consider the effect of this finding on the
subsequent sale in execution.  Section 70 of the Act provides as follows:
‘70. Sale in execution gives good title

6 Paragraph 67.
7 Following the judgment of Davis J in Reshat Schloss v Gordon Taramathi & Others, Case No
2657/2005, unreported judgment of the Cape High Court dated 10 October 2005.
8 In terms of s 172(1)(b)(i) of the Constitution, the provisions of which read as follows:
‘(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court –
(a) . . .
(b) may make an order that is just and equitable, including –
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity’.
See further in this regard Ex Parte Women’s Legal Centre: In re Moise v Greater Germiston
Transitional Local Council 2001 (4) SA 1288 (CC) paras 11–13.

A sale in execution by the messenger shall not, in the case of movable property after delivery
thereof or in the case of immovable property after registration of transfer, be liable to be
impeached as against a purchaser in good faith and without notice of any defect.’
The court held that the provisions of s 70 do not apply to a situation, such as in
this case, where the sale in execution took place pursuant to an invalid warrant
of execution:
‘To apply the provisions of section 70 in these circumstances would defeat the whole purpose of
the Constitutional Court ruling in the Jaftha case.’
[12] Zondi AJ held that, as the sale in execution was invalid, it could not
have served to pass any title to Menqa when the property was subsequently
transferred to him.  Relying on the judgment of McCall AJ in Joosub v J I Case
SA (Pty) Ltd (now known as Construction & Special Equipment Co (Pty) Ltd) &
Others,9 the learned acting judge concluded that Markom, as the owner of the
property, would be entitled to recover it by way of the rei vindicatio.  He
therefore confirmed the rule nisi granted on 10 February 2006 in its entirety,
with costs.  In view of several of the grounds of appeal and of the arguments
advanced by counsel before us, it is necessary to set out the relevant terms of
the rule nisi:
‘1. A rule nisi is hereby issued calling upon all interested parties to show cause on 23 March
2006 why a final order should not be granted in the following terms:
1.1 Declaring as null and void a sale in execution of a property known as erf 23584 Maitland,
Cape Town, situated at 17 Camden Street, Maitland, Cape Town, allegedly held on 17
November 2003, together with all subsequent sales of such property thereafter;
1.2 Interdicting and prohibiting the registration by the Fourth Respondent [the Registrar of
Deeds] of the pending transfer from the First to the Second Respondent of the property
known as erf  23584 Maitland, Cape Town, situated at 17 Camden Street, Maitland, Cape
Town;
1.3 Suspending execution on a judgment obtained against the applicant in the Magistrate’s
Court for the District of Cape Town under case number 26081/1996 in terms of section 78 of

9 1992 (2) SA 665 (N).

Act 32 of 1944, pending finalisation of an appeal against the judgment of the learned
Magistrate Jaxa in the Magistrate’s Court for the District of Cape Town of 18 August 2005
under case number A536/2004 in this Honourable Court, or finalisation of other proceedings
to set aside such judgment instituted within one month of the final order;
1.4 Directing the Fourth Respondent to register the Applicant as owner of a property known
as erf 23584 Maitland, Cape Town, situated at 17 Camden Street, Maitland, Cape Town;
alternatively granting the Applicant leave to proceed to recover ownership of the said
property by way of a restitutio in integrum or otherwise and thereafter to register such
ownership with the Fourth Respondent; and
1.5 Ordering the First to Fourth Respondent/s, jointly and severally as the case may be, to
pay the Applicant’s costs on the scale as between party and party to the extent that this
application is or was opposed by one or any of them.
2. Sub-paragraphs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 above shall together operate as an interim interdict pending
the return day of the rule nisi.’
Lack of judicial supervision
[13] The first and second respondents assailed the judgment of the
court a quo on two bases: first, the applicant had failed in his papers to
establish that the warrant of execution had indeed been issued without the
requisite judicial oversight; and second, on the basis that s 70 of the Act
protects their title.
[14] In his founding affidavit, Markom stated explicitly that he was not
aware of the circumstances under which the warrant of execution was obtained.
Thus, so the respondents’ argument went, it might well be that the warrant of
execution against the property was not issued by the clerk of the court in
circumstances prohibited by the Jaftha judgment, but was in fact issued by the
court on good cause shown.
[15] There is no merit in this argument. In the answering affidavit
deposed to by Menqa, reliance is placed on ‘the re-issued warrant in respect of
the immovable property containing the description of the immovable property’
and a copy of this warrant is attached to the affidavit.  It appears ex facie this
copy that the warrant was issued by the clerk of the court without any judicial

oversight. On the respondents’ own version, therefore, the relevant warrant was
issued without any prior judicial intervention and so in contravention of the
judgment in Jaftha.  It follows that this ground of attack on the judgment of the
court below falls to be rejected.
Section 70 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944
[16] For the purposes of s 70 of the Act,10 there must be bad faith or
notice of any defect at the time of the purchase; a sale in execution is not liable
to be impeached where the purchaser became aware of a defect only after the
sale in execution but before transfer into his or her name had been effected.11
[17] Ordinarily, therefore, an applicant wishing to impeach a sale must
prove bad faith or knowledge of the defect on the part of the purchaser at the
time of purchase.  In the present matter it is common cause that Menqa has
already taken transfer of the property and intends to further transfer it to Roux.
There is no suggestion that Menqa was in bad faith or aware of any defect at
the time of the sale in execution.
[18] As indicated above, the court a quo held that s 70 can have no
application where the sale in execution was a nullity in that it had taken place in
breach of the judgment debtor’s constitutional rights.  In coming to this
conclusion, Zondi AJ relied on the Cape High Court judgment in Schloss12
which concerned the sale of immovable property in execution of a default
judgment obtained in March 2004.  The sale in Schloss took place shortly
before the Constitutional Court handed down its judgment in Jaftha and the
property was transferred to the purchaser in execution and subsequently sold
and transferred to Mr Taramathi.  There the court found that there was no
judicial oversight of the issue of the warrant of execution; that the law as set out
in Jaftha operated retrospectively to the inception of the Constitution; and that,

10 The wording of which appears in para 11 above.
11 Modelay v Zeeman & Others 1968 (2) SA 792 (D) at 795C–E, confirmed in Modelay v
Zeeman & Others 1968 (4) SA 639 (A).
12 Above n 7.

accordingly, the sale in execution took place pursuant to an invalid warrant and
was also void.
[19] As regards the question of the implications of these findings for a
bona fide purchaser of property pursuant to such an invalid sale in execution,
the court in Schloss emphasised that any exercise of public power has to be
carried out in terms of a valid rule of law.  The court approved of the finding of
McCall AJ in Joosub13 to the effect that, where there was no sale in execution or
where the sale in execution which purported to have taken place was a nullity,
then it could not have served to pass any title to the property concerned to the
purchaser or to any successor in title into whose name the property was
subsequently transferred: ‘the plaintiff [the judgment debtor], as owner of the
property, would be entitled to recover the [property] by way of a rei vindicatio.’14
[20] In Joosub the default judgment granted in the High Court and the
warrant of execution purportedly issued pursuant thereto reflected different
judgment debtors and there was thus no valid judgment against the person
whose properties were sold in execution (the plaintiff).  Counsel for Menqa and
Roux sought to distinguish that case inter alia on the basis that, in the present
matter, there was a valid judgment against Markom and that the sale in
execution was therefore protected by s 70 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act even if
the warrant of execution was null and void.
[21] I am not persuaded by counsel’s submissions in this regard.
Section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act was declared to be
constitutionally invalid in the Jaftha case on the ground that it unreasonably and
unjustifiably limited judgment debtors’ fundamental right of access to adequate

13 Above n 9 at 674G.
14 Joosub has been followed in the High Court context in a number of cases: see Sowden v
Absa Bank Ltd & Others 1996 (3) SA 814 (W) at 821H–I; Kaleni v Transkei Development
Corporation & Others 1997 (4) SA 789 (TkS) at 792D–H; Rasi v Madaza & Another [2001] 1 All
SA 498 (Tk) at 510g–j.  See also Van der Walt v Kolektor (Edms) Bpk & Andere 1989 (4) SA
690 (T) at 696H–697D and the criticism of this case by Davis J in Standard Bank of South Africa
Ltd v Prinsloo & Another (Prinsloo & Another Intervening) 2000 (3) SA 576 (C) at 586F–H.

housing entrenched in s 26(1) of the Constitution.  The warrant of execution in
the present case was invalid as it was issued without the judicial oversight
required by the Constitutional Court in Jaftha and the absence of this procedural
safeguard imperilled Markom’s constitutional rights under s 26(1).  The sale in
execution to Menqa was invalid for the same reason.  I agree with the court a
quo that, if one were to hold that the provisions of s 70 of the Act rendered such
a sale in execution unimpeachable, this would indeed ‘defeat the whole purpose
of the Constitutional Court ruling in the Jaftha case.’
[22] This being so, it follows that the sale cannot in these circumstances
be ‘saved’ by an application of s 70 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act15 and the
court a quo was correct in confirming paras 1.1 and 1.2 of the rule nisi.16  I also
have no problem with the confirmation of para 1.3 of the rule – as Markom’s
appeal against the dismissal of his second application for rescission of the
default judgment obtained against him by Tromp is pending in the Cape High
Court, it is logical that execution of this judgment should be suspended pending
finalisation of that appeal.
[23] Paragraph 1.4 of the rule nisi is another matter altogether.  Firstly,
although this paragraph contains two forms of relief in the alternative, it was
confirmed in its entirety.  This is clearly wrong.  Markom’s counsel conceded
this, but contended that we should simply modify the order of the court below to
read that ‘the rule nisi is confirmed in its entirety with costs, including the first
alternative prayer in paragraph 2.4 of the notice of motion [para 1.4 of the rule]’.
In my view, this would neither be ‘appropriate relief’ as required by s 38 of the

15 The grounds on which the warrant and the subsequent sale in execution are invalid in the
present case renders it unnecessary to consider the correctness of the analysis by Van den
Heever JA, in two old decisions of this court, of the Roman-Dutch authorities concerning the
qualified inviolability (in our common law) of sales in execution, and the relationship between the
common law position and s 70 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act: see Messenger of the
Magistrate’s Court, Durban v Pillay 1952 (3) SA 678 (A) at 683F–684H and Sookdeyi & Others v
Sahadeo & Others 1952 (4) SA 568 (A) at 571G–572G.  See also Gibson NO v Iscor Housing
Utility Co Ltd & Others 1963 (3) SA 783 (T) at 786G–787A; Van der Walt above n 14 at 696B–F;
Joosub above n 9, especially at 672C–F, 674G–677H and 679D–681H; Jones & others v Trust
Bank of Afrika Ltd & Others 1993 (4) SA 415 (C) at 419G–420D.
16 See para 12 above.

Constitution, nor would it be a ‘just and equitable order’ in terms of s 172(1)(b).
I say this for the following reasons.
[24] The sheriff derives his or her duty and authority to transfer
ownership pursuant to a sale in execution of immovable property from rule
43(13) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules.17  If the sale in execution is null and void
because it violates the principle of legality, as in the present case, then the
sheriff can have no authority to transfer ownership of the property in question to
the purchaser who will thus not acquire ownership despite registration of the
property in his or her name.
[25] It follows that, in the present case, the registration of the property in
Menqa’s name did not make him owner of the property.  Theoretically,
therefore, Markom is entitled to recover the property in vindicatory proceedings.
However, simply to direct the Registrar of Deeds to re-register the property in
Markom’s name would not, in my view, properly take into account the fact that
Menqa has paid more than R140 000 in respect of the property18 and that, by
virtue of the extinction of Markom’s bond debt to Nedbank (and, at least while
the default judgment in Tromp’s favour stands, by virtue of the partial payment
of Markom’s judgment debt to Tromp), Markom appears to have been
unjustifiably enriched at Menqa’s expense.19  It will be much fairer to both
parties if these claims are dealt with, preferably simultaneously, in future
proceedings which will no doubt be instituted in due course.  Neither Markom
nor Menqa requires the leave of any court to institute such proceedings. For

17Cf Ivoral Properties (Pty) Ltd v Sheriff, Cape Town & Others 2005 (6) SA 96 (C) para 66,
where the Cape High Court pointed out that ‘a Sheriff may not sell immovable property attached
pursuant to a duly issued warrant of execution otherwise than by way of public auction and his
authority is created and circumscribed by the provisions of Uniform Rule 46 . . . .’  The learned
judge also stated that the sheriff has ‘the duty to see that transfer is passed’ and that the
provisions of Uniform Rule 46(13) ‘impose an obligation on him to do everything necessary to
pass transfer’.  See too Mpakathi v Kgotso Development CC & Others [2006] 3 All SA 518
(SCA) paras 4, 5 and 13.
18 And has also presumably been paying rates and taxes in respect of the property since it was
registered in his name in November 2005.
19 See eg 9 Lawsa 2ed (2005) para 209.

these reasons, the confirmation by the court a quo of paragraph 1.4 of the rule
nisi should be set aside.
[26] As regards costs, Menqa and Roux have succeeded in this court to
the extent that an important part of the relief granted by the court below is to be
set aside.  On the other hand, they have failed in their attack on the rest of the
order made by the court a quo.  In light hereof, I am of the view that it would be
appropriate to make no order as to the costs of appeal.  The costs order made
by the court below (appropriately amended to reflect the fact that only Menqa
and Roux opposed Markom’s application) should stand, but it should be noted
that Markom was assisted in that court by pro bono attorneys and counsel.
Order
[27] For the reasons set out above, the appeal succeeds to the following
extent:
1. The confirmation by the court below of paragraph 1.4 of the rule nisi
issued on 10 February 2006 is set aside.
2. The order made by the court below is altered to read:
‘Paragraphs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 of the rule nisi are confirmed. The first and
second respondents are ordered to pay the applicant’s costs jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.’

B J VAN HEERDEN
JUDGE OF APPEAL
CONCUR:

SCOTT JA
JAFTA JA
KGOMO JA

CLOETE JA

[28] I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my
colleague Van Heerden and concur in the order made. The ratio 20 of my
colleague’s judgment on the principal issue in the appeal may be summarised
as follows: The warrant of execution in the present matter is invalid for the same
reason as in the Jaftha21 matter; the sale in execution was accordingly void; and
s 70 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 30 of 1944 (‘the Act’) cannot be interpreted
so as to negate the Jaftha decision. I agree with this conclusion. But it is in my
view desirable to analyse the meaning of the section and provide a rational
basis for its interpretation.
[29] The relevant facts and the principal issue on which the appeal turns
can be briefly stated. The immovable property in question was owned by
Markom; it was occupied by him and his family as their home; it was sold to
Menqa at a sale in execution pursuant to a valid judgment granted against
Markom by default in a magistrate’s court; and it was registered in the name of
Menqa, who subsequently sold it to Roux (in whose name it has not been
registered). The warrant of execution was issued by the clerk of the court and
therefore without judicial supervision ─ a procedure held by the Constitutional
Court in Jaftha to be unconstitutional if the warrant of execution would
compromise the judgment debtor’s rights to access to adequate housing (in
terms of s 26(1) of the Constitution) and would therefore need to be justified (as
contemplated by s 36(1) of the Constitution). The limited ambit of the decision in
Jaftha was emphasized by this court in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v
Saunderson.22 The order of the Constitutional Court requiring words to be read
in to s 66(1)(a) of the Act to cure the unconstitutionality23 was not limited in

20 Contained in paras 21 and 22.
21 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC).
22 2006 (2) SA 264 (SCA) paras 15 -18 and 21.
23 As set out in para 9 of the judgment of my colleague Van Heerden.

terms of s 172(1)(d)(i) of the Constitution. 24  The order accordingly has
retrospective effect.25 There is reason to believe26 that Markom and his family’s
s 26(1) rights of access to adequate housing might have been compromised:
Markom said in his founding affidavit that if he and his family were to be
evicted,27 they would be left ‘effectively homeless’.  Because the warrant of
execution was issued by the clerk of the court, Markom had no opportunity to
place his personal circumstances and those of his family before a court. The
consequences, for the reasons which follow, are that the warrant was invalid
and the sale, a nullity.28 The principal question on appeal is whether s 70 of the
Act protects Menqa, in circumstances where there is no suggestion that he
acted in bad faith or had knowledge of the defect in the warrant.
[30] I shall repeat the wording of the section for convenience:
‘A sale in execution by the messenger shall not, in the case of movable property after delivery
thereof or in the case of immovable property after registration of transfer, be liable to be
impeached as against a purchaser in good faith and without notice of any defect.’
Some defect in the sale is contemplated, otherwise the section would serve no
purpose. On the other hand, the section should not be interpreted as meaning
that any defect in the execution process renders a sale unimpeachable unless
the purchaser did not act in good faith or had notice of the defect ─ for then the
judgment debtor could be deprived of property without valid process of law,
which would be unconstitutional for the reasons set out in para 47 below. The

24 The relevant part of which is quoted in footnote 8 of the judgment of my colleague Van
Heerden.
25 Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) paras 25 to 30; Fose v
Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) p 834 n 200; Ex Parte Women’s Legal
Centre : In re Moise v Greater Germiston Transitional Local Council 2001 (4) SA 1288 (CC)
para 11. It was submitted on behalf of Menqa that this would open the floodgates of litigation.
But that is a question to be addressed by the Constitutional Court.
26 Contrast Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson, above n 22, paras 20 and 21.
27 Section 23 of the Constitution elaborated on by the Legislature in the Prevention of Illegal
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 becomes relevant in the event of
eviction consequent upon a sale in execution: Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113
(SCA). That was not in issue in Jaftha and is not in issue in this appeal.
28 The Constitutional Court was not called upon in Jaftha to decide the validity of a sale pursuant
to an invalid warrant of execution as the parties had consented to the setting aside of the sale ─
see para 8 of the Jaftha judgment.

line is in my view to be drawn where the defect results in the ‘sale’ being a
nullity. In such a case s 70 would not find application. Put conversely, defects
not rendering a sale void would not avail the judgment debtor and s 70 would
protect the purchaser, save in the two situations it excludes. Such an
interpretation accords with the common law and it is a well-established principle
of statutory construction29 that statute law does not alter law (including the
common law) more than is necessary;30 and it is also in accordance with the
dictates of s 39(2) of the Constitution.31 I shall begin with the common law.
[31] The most extensive treatment of the common law relating to sales
in execution can be found in Matthaeus II’s De Auctionibus. 32 The learned
author, writing of the law in the mid-seventeenth century in the Netherlands,
deals in chapter 16 of book 1 of the circumstances in which a sale in execution
is void from the outset or can be set aside by a court. Examples of a sale being
void from the outset are where it was based on fraud;33 where the court lacked
jurisdiction;34 where the sale did not take place at the prescribed place;35 where
what was decreed did not take place on the day advertised;36 where there was
a failure to comply with other formalities37 (although a distinction was drawn38
between formalities which preceded the sale, which had to be complied with
strictly, and formalities after the sale, for example, inability to deliver the goods
sold to the purchaser, which did not); and39 where the sale was not conducted
as a sale in execution, or  the auction was not conducted by the proper official,

29 Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette pp 97-100 and cases quoted in footnote 25.
30 For a discussion of the application of this principle after the advent of the Constitution see Du
Plessis, ‘Statute Law and Interpretation’ LAWSA 1st reissue vol 25(1) para 328.
31 Dealt with in para 47 below.
32 De Auctionibus Libri Duo, quorum prior Venditiones, posterior Locationes, quae sub hasta
fiunt, exequatur: adjecto passim voluntarium auctionum jure. The work was translated into
Dutch in 1774. An incomplete copy of the translation (up to 1.11) is to be found in the library of
this court, and a full copy, in the library of the Pretoria High Court.
33 1.16.2
34 1.16.3.
35 1.16.4.
36 1.16.5.
37 1.16.7.
38 1.16.8.
39 1.16.9.

or where the debtor and other interested parties were not notified of the sale.
Matthaeus concludes his treatment of the topic by saying40 that although all the
requisite formalities must be strictly and precisely complied with, the
proceedings are not vitiated by non-compliance with an insignificant formality
which does not go to the root of the matter.  Examples given of the latter type of
formalities include where the official did not properly record a description of
movable goods attached or for how much each article was sold, where the
advertisements were put up on three and not four market days and where the
King’s standard was not displayed at the immovable property to be sold. In
these and similar cases, says Matthaeus, the sale remains for value because
the authorities do not have regard to trivialities and it would be contrary to good
faith to split hairs over every small legal subtlety.41
[32] Matthaeus goes on42 to deal with the question when a sale, validly
conducted, can be set aside and points out that there are two methods of doing
so: appeal and restitutio in integrum. According to the learned author,43 regard
being had to the practice current in his time, the appeal procedure should be
followed even where the sale is null and void. Matthaeus then considers in what
circumstances restitution can be granted, despite a valid sale in execution, to a
minor 44 and to a major, 45 and concludes that both are possible in certain
circumstances.
[33] In a later chapter Matthaeus says46 that the owner of the goods
ranks above all other creditors when he objects within the prescribed period and
proves his ownership ─ in which case, says Matthaeus, he can even succeed in
having the sale completely set aside. In other cases, says Matthaeus,47 the

40 1.16.11.
41 Ibid.: ‘His & similibus casibus non vitiates decretum : minima enim praetor non curat non
congruit bone fidei de apicibus juris disputare.’
42 1.16.20.
43 Ibid.
44 1.16.23ff.
45 1.16.31ff.
46 1.18.1.
47 1.18.2.

owner still ranks above the creditors even although he took no steps to stop the
attachment, if he can obtain restitution on equitable grounds. Matthaeus then
raises the question48 whether in such cases the owner can claim his property or
its value, and answers that he has a choice. This, says Matthaeus, accords not
only with what is written, but also with the current law because even at common
law, the effect of a sale in execution is not so highly regarded that an owner
who was not negligent was precluded from claiming his goods back.49 The
reason given by Matthaeus requires emphasis because of what is said in para
41 below.
[34] Other
Roman-Dutch
authors
are
to
the
following
effect.
Groenewegen in De Legibus Abrogatis50 commenting on the Code of Justinian
4.44.16 (which is irrelevant for present purposes) says:51
‘1.    By inference from the present text many consider that public sales in execution are
rescinded for harm beyond half the fair price . . .
2.       But, seeing that nowadays sales in execution are conducted with the most exact formality,
and the faith in state action ought not readily to be upset, therefore, the contrary rule applies in
our customs . . . And Neostadius, Decisiones supremi senatus, decis. 75, reports that it has
been so decided in the Supreme Court of Holland.
3.       But, if, indeed, property has been sold by order of court but not with observance of all the
formalities and arrangements of sales in execution, an opportunity to appeal is granted to a
prejudiced party, and we follow this rule.’

[35] In the decision of the Hooge Raad reported by Neostadius52 and
referred to by Groenewegen a farm was put up for sale in execution. The lower
court fixed the date for the auction at which it was to be sold to the highest
bidder and directed that proclamations be made on two fixed days preceding
the auction. On the day of the proclamation the voice of the cryer was not heard

48 Loc cit.
49  ‘Jure enim communi non est tanta subhastationis auctoritas, ut dominus cujus nulla
negligentia argui potest, deneget vindicationem.’
50 Tractatus de Legibus Abrogatis et Inusitatis in Hollandia Vincinisque Regionibus.
51 Translation by Beinart and Hewett vol 3 pp 209-210.
52 Decision 75 in Utriusque, Hollandiae, Zelandiae, Frisiaeque, Curiae Decisions pp 229-230.

by anyone because of the noise of a storm. The property was sold very cheaply
at the subsequent auction because few people attended. The Hooge Raad
refused to set the sale aside. What is important for present purposes, however,
is that the report begins:
‘Fundo hastae subjecto, Hollandiae Curia Venditionis decretum, omni ordine observato
interposuit’
which may be translated as:
‘A farm having been put up for sale in execution the [lower court] issued the following order,
every formality having been observed . . .’.
The decision is authority only for the proposition that if there has been
compliance with the prescribed formalities, the fact that the result could have
been better is irrelevant. The position would be the same, I venture to suggest,
were the execution creditor to publish the notice of sale of immovable property53
in a newspaper circulating in the district where the property is situated, and the
newspaper had a very limited readership, with the result that fewer persons
attended the auction that would have been the case had a newspaper with a
wider circulation been chosen.
[36] Peckius in his Verhandelinghe54 is to the effect that observance of
formalities was required for the validity of sales in execution. The relevant
passage is summarised in the ‘Kort Inhoudt’ at the beginning of part 9 as
‘Der schuldenaerengoedt kan sonder behoorlijcke plechtinghe aen de schulteyschers niet
overgaen’,
ie the goods of debtors do not pass to creditors without proper formalities. The
passage itself reads:

53 As required by rule 43(c) of the magistrates’ courts rules.
54 Verhandelinghe van Handt – Opleggen ende Besetten : Dat is, Arrest op Persoon ende
Goederen; Part 19, pp 326-7.

‘Door wie de besettinghe moet ghedaen werden, soude men moghen vraeghen. Want te
vergeefs versoect ghy, seydt Gordianus in 1.si pacto quo poenam, 14 Cod. de pact. het goedt
van uwen wederdinger sonder plechtelijcke manier van doen, op uw overgedragen te werden.’
The passage may be translated as follows:
‘One might ask by whom the attachment must be performed. Because you will ask in vain, says
Gordianus . . . that the goods of your opponent be transferred to you without the necessary
formalities.’
Van Leeuwen in his note to the second sentence of this passage says:55
‘Hoedanighe solenniteyt in de materie van executie, ende verder manier van procederen wert
vereyscht, hanght teenemael aen de Statuyten ende Ordonnantien van de plaets daer het
geschiedt, daer toe by ons kunnen dienen de Instructien van den Hoghen ende Provincialen
Rade, de executorien van de gemene middelen, de Ordonnantie op’t stuck van de Iustitie
binnen de Steden ende te platten Lande van Hollandt, nopende de praecijse onderhoudinghe
ende naerkominghe van de welcke, ende de solenniteyten daer inne begrepen, by ons mede
een algemeene practijcque is, dat het versuym van de minste solenniteyt, een executie, off een
arrest (het welck soo veel de praecijse onderhoudinge van solenniteyten ten daer toe vereyscht,
daer nefffens gereeckent werdt) geheel nul ende krachteloos maect, endeden aenlegger in de
kosten condemneert’.
The relevant part of the note may be translated as follows:
‘Whatever formalities in execution, and further procedure, are required depend in each case on
the Statutes and Ordinances of the place where this is done. With us the [applicable legislation]
requires the strictest observance and compliance with its provisions and the formalities therein
contained. With us too the general practice is that failure to comply with the smallest formality
renders the execution . . . entirely null and void, and the applicant is ordered to pay costs.’
Innes CJ, Wessels and Mason JJ referred to this part of Van Leeuwen’s note in
Reinhardt v Ricker and David56 but were not prepared to go ‘quite so far as
that’.

55 Ibid.
56 1905 TS 179 at 188.

[37] Van der Keessel deals in his Praelectiones with the question of
moveables57 sold in execution:
‘Daar is verder ‘n belangrike vraag i.v.m. die rei vindicatio van roerende goed, nl. wat die
regsposisie is indien ons saak uit oorsaak van bruikleen of ‘n ander oorsaak, of selfs sonder ‘n
oorsaak maar uit hoofde van ‘n gebrek soos diefstal, aangetref word onder die goed van iemand
wie se goed ten behoewe van sy skuldeisers op bevel van die regter by openbare veiling
verkoop is: kan ons ook hierdie goed wat reeds verkoop is met rei vindicatio terugvorder? Vir
die bevestigende standpunt spreek die argumente wat ons hierbo aangevoer het.58 Maar aan
die ander kant dra die gesag van ‘n openbare verkoop groot gewig, en dis in die belang van
iedereen dat dit nie omvergewerp word nie. Matthaeus self het egter (t.a.p.) na dit skyn ‘n juiste
beslissing in die saak gegee deur ‘n onderskeiding toe te pas; dit is dat indien die eienaar teen
die verkoop kon geprotesteer het, sy nalatigheid hom ten kwade moet kom. Maar indien hy nie
kon nie, moet hy die rei vindicatio hê, wat egter ingestel moet word met terugbetaling van die
koopsom aan die koper, presies soos die skrywer by die volgende paragraaf sal aantoon i.v.m.
diegene wie se goed te goeder trou op openbare markte gekoop is, egter met die voorbehoud
dat die eienaar ‘n verhaalsreg teen die skuldenaar sal hê vir die terugvordering van die
koopsom wat hy aan die koper moes betaal.’
[38] J. Voet in his chapter on vindication says:59
‘Certainly if moveable property has been sold without the knowledge of the owner at public
auction by judge’s order on the petition of creditors, it can hardly be that the customs of today
would suffer the vindication of property so sold. Not even immovables, when sold by judge’s
order and legally delivered after the sale has been prefaced by formal notices, can be vindicated
if the owner does not promptly intervene and oppose. But since I shall have expressly to deal
elsewhere with such public sales and the need for intervention, I add no more at this point.
Meantime let the author mentioned below be consulted.’
The author referred to is Matthaeus and the reference is to De Auctionibus
Book 1 Ch 11.60 In commenting on this passage and the decision of De Villiers

57  Praelectiones Iuris Hodierni ad Hugonis Grotii Introductionem ad Iurisprudentiam
Hollandicam, Th 183, translated by Van Warmelo et al, vol 2 p 45.
58 In the original text there is a reference at this point to Matthaeus’ De Auctionibus 1.11.70, 71.
59 Commentarius ad Pandectas 6.1.13, Gane’s translation vol 2 p 225.
60 Chapter 11 deals with opposition to sales in execution.

CJ in Lange v Liesching61 McCall AJ said in Joosub v J I Case SA (Pty) Ltd
(now known as Construction & Special Equipment Co (Pty) Ltd):62
‘It will be noted that the passage uses the words “sold by Judge’s order” “after the sale has been
prefaced by formal notices”. It is not authority for the proposition that where immovable property
has been sold without the valid authority of a Judge’s order or without formal notice having been
given, the property can nevertheless not be vindicated. De Villiers CJ also referred to Matthaeus
1.11.33. The passage referred to, to the effect that if the creditors of the heir sell his goods the
fideicommissaries are bound to protest in order to preserve their rights, presupposes that the
fideicommissaries are, or should be, aware of their rights, and has no bearing on the question
as to whether a sale sub hasta of the heir’s goods may be valid, notwithstanding the non-
compliance with the required formalities. As I have already indicated above, Matthaeus deals
expressly with the effect of non-compliance with the required formalities in chap 16.’
[39] In his earlier chapter on grounds for restitution of majors, Voet
says:63
‘Nor are majors less to be assisted by restitution when their properties have been openly sold
off as belonging to third parties and have under decree of a judge been knocked down and
delivered to buyers after the formalities of sale by auction, they themselves being ignorant by
reasons of absence or other justifiable cause. This applies to their absence both when they
were cherishing a domicile in some other place, and when they were travelling abroad though
cherishing a domicile at the place of the auctioning.  It is true that the power of the Treasury’s
spear is not slight, especially by the customs of the present day, and that confidence in it ought
not readily to be destroyed. Still it is not going of itself to weigh so heavily that therefore a true
owner, who from reasonable ignorance does not interfere at the selling off of his own properties,
and thus is put beyond blame, would remain stripped of the ownership of his own properties
which have been publicly knocked down to another. It follows that here too we must for a
justifiable ground of ignorance certainly lay down of a major what we have already more fully
stated of a minor.’64
[40] I wish to emphasise that although I have referred to the views of the
old authors not only in regard to invalid sales in execution, but also in regard to
the position where restitution could be obtained in certain cases on the grounds

61 (1880) Foord 55.
62 1992 (2) SA 665 (N) at 675F.
63 4.6.10, Gane’s translation vol 1 p 723.

of fairness despite a valid sale in execution, it is only the former that are
relevant for the purposes of this appeal. The reason I have referred to the latter
will become apparent from what is said in the next paragraph of this judgment in
regard to the status of sales in execution in the Netherlands. The question
whether the Roman-Dutch law relating to restitution despite a valid sale in
execution has been received in South Africa and what the effect of s 70 would
be if that were to be the case, are questions which I expressly leave open.
[41] In view of the exposition of the law by the common law authors the
statement by Van den Heever JA in Messenger of the Magistrate’s Court,
Durban v Pillay65 that the provisions of s 70
‘are in harmony with the dispositions of the Common Law which regarded sales sub hasta66 as
sacrosanct’
cannot be supported. I am further respectfully constrained to disagree with both
propositions in the sentence which follows, namely:
‘The words [of the section] are wide enough to cover not only situations such as that which
arose in Conradie v Jones, 1917 OPD 112, where property not belonging to the judgment
debtor was sold in execution, but every claim that the sale be rescinded.’
Nor with respect is the statement67
‘Where the sale has been held and transfer has not yet been passed I can see no reason why
he should be content to recover from the messenger that elusive surrogate, damages, which in
such circumstances it is extremely difficult to prove and assess, rather than with the rescission
of that which has been done unlawfully’

correct, to the extent that it may suggest that a sale in execution can only be
impugned where transfer has not yet been passed. I am, however, in respectful
agreement with the conclusion reached in that case, namely, that where the
advertisement for the sale in execution was insufficient and invalid because it

64Voet relies on, amongst others, Matthaeus’ De Auctionibus 1.16.31, 32 for this statement.
65 1952 (3) SA 678 (A) at 683G.
66 ie in execution.

did not contain a short description of the property and its situation, 68  the
judgment debtor was entitled to an order setting the sale aside. It is important to
note that as the property sold had not yet been transferred to the purchaser,
s 70 could not find application in any event and all of the dicta which I have
quoted were therefore obiter.
[42] Van den Heever JA dealt with s 70 again, three months after the
Pillay case, in Sookdeyi v Sahadeo.69 In that matter the immovable property
sold in execution in a magistrate’s court had been transferred to the purchaser
and from him, to the respondents. As pointed out by this court in Modelay v
Zeeman70 the sole issue before the court in Sookdeyi was the incidence of the
burden of proof when a judgment debtor seeks to impugn a sale in execution on
the ground of the purchaser’s bad faith or knowledge of a defect at the time
when he bought the property at the sale in question. Much of what is contained
in the passage from the judgment quoted below is accordingly obiter. Van den
Heever JA in the course of his judgment did not repeat his previous statement
in the Pillay case that sales in execution were ‘sacrosanct’ at common law.
Instead, the learned judge held:71
‘Our successive Magistrates’ Courts Acts, 32 of 1917 and 32 of 1944, were enacted “to
consolidate, and amend the law relating to magistrates’ courts”. Many of their provisions have
the characteristics of codification, declaring, unifying and amending the law in force before. Sec.
70 is such a provision.
It was a principle in the Netherlands that a perfected sale in execution should after transfer or
delivery of the subject matter not be lightly impugned quoniam fiscalis hastae fides facile
convelli non debeat. (Groenewegen de Legib. Abrogat, ad C. 4.44.16; ad C. 8.44 (sibi 45)13;
Neostad Decisiones, Decis. 75; Voet 6.1.13 and, dealing with execution in rem, Bynkershoek
Observ. Tumult. Cas 45; Cf Voet 42.1.31 verbis: Et quamvis nec arbiter . . .)

67 At 684A-B.
68 As required by the then applicable rule in the magistrates’ courts quoted at 682A of the
judgment; cf the present rules 43(6)(b) and (c).
69 1952 (4) SA 568 (A).
70 1968 (4) SA 639 (A) at 643.
71 At 571G-572B and 572E-F.

This reluctance to rescind perfected sales sub hasta has been received in our case-law (Lange
and Others v Leisching and Others, 1880 Foord 55; S.A. Association v van Staden, 9 S.C. 95 at
p. 98; Conradie v Jones, 1917 O.P.D. 112).72
These authorities indicate that in certain exceptional circumstances a sale in execution may
nevertheless be impugned. The rules in regard to this qualified inviolability of a sale in execution
were in so far as magistrates’ courts are concerned, codified in sec. 70. It has to be construed in
harmony rather than in conflict with the Common Law.
. . .
Had the section not contained the words “in good faith and without notice of any defect”, a sale
in execution by the messenger would after delivery or transfer have been absolutely
unassailable. These words, however, leave the purchaser open to attack where the judgment
creditor [sic; sc “debtor”] can show that his acquisition was tainted with bad faith or with
knowledge of any defect, but they do not in terms or by implication alter the normal incidence of
the onus of proof.’

These dicta cannot be supported to the extent that they suggest that s 70 limits
the circumstances under which a sale in execution in a magistrate’s court can
be impugned, after delivery of movables or transfer of immovables, to the two
cases mentioned in that section. There are three reasons for this. First, as the
learned judge pointed out, the section should be read so far as possible as
being in accordance with the common law73 but the learned judge apparently
did not consider the views of Matthaeus, Peckius or Van Leeuwen referred to
above in ascertaining what the common law was. Second, the interpretation
given would create an anomaly in that the consequences of void sales in
execution in magistrates’ courts would differ fundamentally from the
consequences in high courts, where the common law applies; and no reason for
such a difference suggests itself. And third, the interpretation does not conform
to the dictates of the Constitution for the reasons given below.74

72 The three cases referred to are analysed and explained by McCall AJ in Joosub above, n 62
at 674I-676G.
73 See n 29 above.
74 Para 47.

[43] For the same reasons, the following dictum of Galgut J in Gibson
NO v Iscor Housing Utility Co Ltd75 is, with respect, wrong:
[Section 70] specifically states that a sale perfected by delivery or registration, as the case may
be, cannot be impeached if the purchaser purchased in good faith. These words cannot refer to
any minor irregularity or defect. Sec 70 was inserted, in my view, to cover the invalid or
defective sale perfected by delivery or registration, because a valid sale, or one without defects,
needs no protection, whether or not delivery has taken place.’
There is no warrant for interpreting s 70 as protecting an ‘invalid’, ie void, sale
nor is any reason given why the section ‘cannot’ refer to any minor irregularity
or defect.
[44] The correct approach was followed, in the case of magistrates’
courts, in Jones v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd76 and in the case of high courts, in
Van der Walt v Kolektor (Edms) Bpk77 and the Joosub case.78 Although I do not
wish to be understood as agreeing with everything that was said in the
judgments in those three cases, I respectfully agree with the conclusions set out
in the next paragraph below.
[45] In Jones79 Friedman JP reasoned that:
‘[W]here there is no judgment there cannot be a valid sale in execution and consequently the
protection afforded by s 70 to sales in execution cannot apply . . .’.
In Van der Walt v Kolektor De Villiers AJ concluded80 that became a ‘sale’ in
execution had not been conducted by the deputy sheriff as required by Uniform
Rule of Court 45(7), but by his agent, a private firm of auctioneers, the
principles set out in the Sookdeyi81 and Gibson82 cases were not applicable.
The decision accords entirely with what Matthaeus says in 1.16.9, namely, that

75 1963 (3) SA 783 (T) at 786C-D.
76 1993 (4) SA 415 (C).
77 1989 (4) SA 690 (T).
78 Above, n 43.
79 At 421H.
80 At 695I-696H.
81 Above, n 69.
82 Above, n 75.

a ‘sale’ is void from inception where the auction was not conducted by the
proper official. The criticism in Van der Walt by Davis J in Standard Bank of SA
Ltd v Prinsloo (Prinsloo intervening)83 that ‘this judgment excessively reduces
the protection afforded by s 70’ is, with respect, for the three reasons set out at
the end of para 42 above, misplaced. In the Joosub case84 McCall AJ held:
‘If . . . the sale which purported to have taken place was a nullity then . . . it could not have
served to pass any title to the purchasers . . .’.
A failure to attach the property sold ─ the position in the present case, where
the warrant of attachment was void ─ has this effect.85
[46] I therefore conclude that at common law, a sale in execution was
void for want of compliance with an essential formality, but that non-compliance
with non-essential formalities did not have this result; and that s 70 should be
interpreted as being to the same effect, save that a sale in execution in a
magistrate’s court can be impugned even for want of non-essential formalities
where the purchaser did not act in good faith or had notice of the non-
compliance. It is not necessary for the purposes of this appeal to consider what
are ‘non-essential’ formalities.86 Because of the modern legislation which deals
with formalities required for a valid sale in execution, resort to the old authorities
would not necessarily be a safe guide. In each case regard would have to be
had in particular to the reason for the formality, the extent of the non-
compliance and the prejudice or potential prejudice caused to interested parties,
especially the judgment debtor. But where, as here, the warrant of execution
was invalid, the sale must be regarded as void and accordingly s 70 does not
protect Menqa.

83 2000 (3) SA 576 (C) at 586G-H.
84 At 674G.
85Joosub  above n 43 at 672G-673E; Sowden v Absa Bank Ltd 1996 (3) SA 814 (W) at 821H-I;
Kaleni v Transkei Development Corporation 1997 (4) SA 789 (TkS) at 792D-H; Rasi v Madaza
[2001] 1 All SA 498 (Tk) at 510g-j.
86 Some of the instances appearing in Standard Bank v Prinsloo (Prinsloo intervening) above, n
83, at 585I-586D, may possibly fall into this category, but I make no finding in this regard.

[47] I reach the same conclusion by having regard to the Constitution,
s 39(2) of which provides:

‘When interpreting any legislation . . . every court . . . must promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights.’
The Constitutional Court held in Investigating Directorate: SEO v Hyundai Motor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd: in re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO87 that
this section provides a guide to statutory interpretation under the constitutional
order. The court laid down the principle that where a legislative provision is
reasonably capable of a meaning that places it within constitutional bounds, it
should be given that meaning. Following this approach, s 70 should be
interpreted as not protecting a ‘sale’ which is void for to do so would put it in
conflict with the basic principle of legality (which requires public power to be
properly exercised in terms of a valid law that authorises it) and s 25(1) of the
Constitution which provides that ‘no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of
property’. Neither consequence could be justified in terms of s 36 of the
Constitution ─ sales in execution were not sacrosanct at common law and there
is no reason why they should be in the modern South Africa (save only in the
two respects mentioned in s 70).
[48] It is for these reasons that I support the conclusion of my colleague
Van Heerden and the court a quo that s 70 cannot be interpreted as rendering a
sale in execution unimpeachable because this would defeat the whole purpose
of the Constitutional Court ruling in the Jaftha case. In my judgment this is
achieved by not  interpreting s 70 as applying to ‘sales’ in execution that are
void, whether because of the decision in Jaftha or for any other reason. I
accordingly agree with my colleague that the court a quo was correct in
confirming paras 1.1 and 1.2 of the rule nisi88 declaring the sale in execution of
the property null and void and interdicting the Registrar of Deeds from

87 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) paras 21 to 26.
88 Set out in para 12 of the judgment of my colleague Van Heerden.

registering the property into the name of Roux. The question then arises: What
happens next?
[49] Matthaeus discusses the position where a debtor succeeds in
having a sale in execution set aside. He says89 that if the debtor wishes to have
the completed sale set aside for want of compliance with formalities, fairness
dictates that he must return to the purchaser the money the latter disbursed.
This is the situation, continues Matthaeus, 90  when the debtor sues the
purchaser and demands the goods unlawfully awarded to him; because if he
sues the creditors, he is not obliged to pay the purchase price to them, but must
pay the debt he owes together with accrued interest ─ and in such a case the
purchaser is required to obtain the money he paid, from the creditors. It is not
necessary to consider the position at common law any further because to
require Markom to pay Menqa the price paid by the latter for the property, or to
pay the execution creditor the full debt owed together with accrued interest, as a
prerequisite to his being allowed to recover the property, might altogether
preclude him from obtaining the property and thereby possibly affect his and his
family’s constitutional right to access to adequate housing. That would be
unconstitutional and therefore impermissible.91
[50] Section 38 of the Constitution confers the power on a court to grant
‘appropriate relief’ to Markom if his constitutional right to adequate housing was
infringed. Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution empowers a court deciding a
constitutional matter to ‘make any order that is just and equitable’. The relief
sought in this court contained in the first part of paragraph 1.4 of the rule nisi ─
‘directing the Registrar of Deeds to register Markom as owner of the property’ ─
may at first blush appear to be just and equitable so far as Markom is
concerned; but his assertion that his and his family’s right to access to adequate
housing will be infringed, has not yet been tested, nor has Menqa been heard,92

89 Op cit 1.16.16.
90 1.16.17.
91 See ss 39(2) and 172(1)(a) of the Constitution.
92 See Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Saunderson, above n 22, para 20 at 275E-F.

and the factors93 relevant for a decision whether to allow execution to proceed
against Markom’s immovable property have neither been considered by the
magistrate nor do they appear from the record. Furthermore Menqa has paid
over R140 00094 in respect of the property and the order sought by Markom,
which does not take account of this fact, would not be just and equitable so far
as Menqa is concerned and therefore not appropriate either.
[51] I accordingly agree with my colleague that the claims of both
Markom and Menqa should be dealt with, preferably simultaneously, in
subsequent proceedings. The order of the court below in relation to paragraph
1.495 of the rule nisi must accordingly be set aside in its entirety as the first part
should not have been granted and the alternative was not persisted in on
appeal.
[52] I agree with the conclusions reached by my colleague in regard to
para 1.3 of the rule nisi and the reasons given for making no order as to the
costs of appeal.

______________
T D CLOETE
JUDGE OF APPEAL
CONCUR:

SCOTT JA

93 Some of which are listed in para 60 of the Jaftha case, above, n 21.
94 Calculated as set out in para 6 of the judgment of my colleague.
95 Quoted in para 12 of my colleague’s judgment.

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

Date:  Friday 30 November 2007

Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media
and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal

Desmond Menqa & Owen Peter Roux v Patrick Markom & 7 Others

The Supreme Court of Appeal today dismissed in part and upheld in part an
appeal against an order made by the Cape High Court in terms of which the
sale in execution of a residential property in Maitland to Mr Desmond Menqa,
as well as a subsequent sale of the property to Mr Owen Peter Roux, were
declared to be null and void.  The Cape High Court also directed the Registrar
of Deeds, Cape Town, to register Mr Patrick Markom as the owner of the
property.  Menqa and Roux appealed to the SCA with the leave of the court
below.

Markom bought the property in 1995 for R120 000.  It was occupied at that
time by a lessee, Mr Jules Tromp.  The lease was teminated, but Tromp
refused to leave the property.  On 4 June 1995, during a visit to the property
by Markom, a fight broke out between him and Mr Tromp and the latter then
claimed damages for personal injury against the former during September
1996.  On 19 November 1999, the magistrate’s court granted default
judgment against Markom in favour of Tromp for nearly R100 000. Markom
subsequently moved into the property and it was registered in his name.  He
lives there with his family.

According to Markom, he only became aware of the default judgment against
him four years later, when a notice arrived at the property on 13 November
2003, notifying him that it would be sold in execution on 17 November.  On
that day, Markom obtained an urgent interim court order staying the sale in
execution, but this order was received by the Sheriff of Maitland after the sale
had already taken place.  Roux bought the property for R110 000 at the sale
on behalf of Menqa.

Markom tried twice to have the default judgment against him set aside, but his
applications were dismissed by the magistrate’s court.  Eventually he noted
an appeal to the Cape High Court against the dismissal of his second
application for rescission.  On 25 November 2005, this appeal was postponed
indefinitely so that a lawyer could be appointed to represent Markom pro
bono.

In the meantime, the property was transferred to Menqa on 7 September 2005
and the Nedbank bond over the property was cancelled.  Menqa paid a total
amount of approximately R140 000, about R103 000 of which went to
Nedbank and R26 500 to Tromp.  On 6 December 2005, Menqa sold the
property to Roux for R490 000.  Markom then launched proceedings in the
Cape High Court to prevent the transfer of the property to Roux.

The Cape High Court held that the warrant of execution obtained by Tromp
against the property was invalid because it was issued by the clerk of the
magistrate’s court without the oversight of a court, as required by the
Constitutional Court in its 2005 judgment in the case of Jaftha v Schoeman;
Van Rooyen v Stoltz.  The absence of this procedural safeguard imperilled
Markom’s fundamental right of access to adequate housing contained in
s 26(1) of the Constitution.  The sale in execution to Menqa was invalid for the
same reason.  As this sale was a nullity in that it had taken place in breach of
Markom’s constitutional rights, s 70 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1994,
which protects sales in execution where the purchaser is in good faith and
does not have knowledge of any defect in the sale, does not apply.

The SCA agreed with the reasoning of the court below and confirmed the
orders of that court declaring the sale in execution of the property, as well as
the subsequent sale to Roux, to be null and void, and prohibiting the Registrar
of Deeds from registering transfer of the property to Roux.

The SCA did not, however, agree with the order of the Cape High Court
directing the Registrar of Deeds to register Markom as the owner of the
property.  It pointed out that the Sheriff derives his or her authority to transfer
ownership pursuant to a sale in execution from the Magistrates’ Courts Rules
and that, if the sale is null and void because it violates the principle of legality
(as in this case), then the Sheriff has no authority to transfer ownership of the
property to the purchaser.  The purchaser thus does not become the owner
despite registration of transfer of the property in his or her name.

It followed that, in this case, Menqa did not become the owner of the property
when it was transferred to him and that, in theory, Markom is entitled to claim
the property back from Menqa.   However, simply to direct the Registrar of
Deeds to re-register the property in Markom’s name would not properly take
into account the fact that Menqa has paid more than R140 000 in respect of
the property and that, amongst other things, by virtue of the cancellation of
Markom’s bond debt to Nedbank Markom seems to have been unjustifiably
enriched at Menqa’s expense.  The SCA thus concluded that it would be

much fairer to both parties if these claims are dealt with, preferably
simultaneously, in future court proceedings which would no doubt be instituted
in due course.  For these reasons, the SCA set aside the relevant order made
by the Cape High Court.

ends ……….