22 U.S.C. § 8701 (FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE)
§ 8701. Definitions
Except as otherwise specifically provided, in this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term “appropriate congressional committees” has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(2) Financial transaction
The term “financial transaction” means any transfer of value involving a financial institution, including the transfer of forwards, futures, options, swaps, or precious metals, including gold, silver, platinum, and palladium.
(3) Knowingly
The term “knowingly” has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(4) United States person
The term “United States person” has the meaning given that term in section 8511 of this title.
(Pub. L. 112–158, § 2, Aug. 10, 2012, 126 Stat. 1216.)
heading: Editorial Notes
heading: References in Text
text: This Act, referred to in text, is Pub. L. 112–158, Aug. 10, 2012, 126 Stat. 1214, known as the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out below and Tables.
heading: Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
heading: Short Title
text: Pub. L. 112–158, § 1(a), Aug. 10, 2012, 126 Stat. 1214, provided that: “This Act [enacting this chapter and sections 8513b, 8514a, and 8514b of this title, amending sections 8511, 8513, 8513a, 8518, 8532, 8551 of this title, section 78m of Title 15, Commerce and Trade, and section 1610 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, enacting provisions set out as notes under this section and sections 8513 and 8513a of this title, section 78m of Title 15, and section 1701 of Title 50, War and National Defense, and amending provisions set out as notes under section 1610 of Title 28 and section 1701 of Title 50] may be cited as the ‘Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012’.”
Pub. L. 112–158, title VII, § 701, Aug. 10, 2012, 126 Stat. 1265, provided that: “This title [enacting subchapter VII of this chapter] may be cited as the ‘Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012’.”
heading: Monitoring Iranian Enrichment of Uranium-235
text: Pub. L. 118–31, div. G, title IV, § 7413, Dec. 22, 2023, 137 Stat. 1078, as amended by Pub. L. 119–60, div. F, title LXVII, § 6711, Dec. 18, 2025, 139 Stat. 1648, provided that:
“(a) Significant Enrichment Activity Defined.—
In this section, the term ‘significant enrichment activity’ means—
“(1) any enrichment of any amount of uranium-235 to a purity percentage that is 5 percent higher than the purity percentage indicated in the prior submission to Congress under subsection (b)(1); or
“(2) any enrichment of uranium-235 in a quantity exceeding 10 kilograms.
“(b) Submission to Congress.—
“(1) In general.—
Not later than 48 hours after the Director of National Intelligence makes a finding described in paragraph (2) pursuant to an assessment, the Director shall submit to Congress such assessment, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
“(2) Finding described.—
A finding described in this paragraph is a finding that the Islamic Republic of Iran has—
“(A) produced or possesses any amount of uranium-235 enriched to greater than 60-percent purity;
“(B) engaged in significant enrichment activity; or
“(C) made the decision to produce a nuclear weapon from highly enriched uranium.”
“(3) Duplication.—For any submission required by this subsection, the Director of National Intelligence may rely upon existing products that reflect the current analytic judgment of the intelligence community, including reports or products produced in response to congressional mandate or requests from executive branch officials.”
[For definition of “intelligence community” as used in section 7413 of Pub. L. 118–31, set out above, see section 7002 of Pub. L. 118–31, set out as a note under section 3003 of Title 50, War and National Defense.]
heading: Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring
text: Pub. L. 117–263, div. E, title LV, § 5593, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3385, provided that:
“(a) Short Title.—
This section may be cited as the ‘Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022’.
“(b) Sense of Congress.—
It is the sense of Congress that—
“(1) an Islamic Republic of Iran that possesses a nuclear weapons capability would be a serious threat to the national security of the United States, Israel, and other allies and partners;
“(2) the Islamic Republic of Iran has been less than cooperative with international inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency and has obstructed their ability to inspect facilities as well as data and recordings collected by surveillance equipment across Iran;
“(3) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to advance missile and drone programs, which are a threat to the national security of the United States, Israel, and other allies and partners;
“(4) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to support proxies in the Middle East in a manner that—
“(A) undermines the sovereignty of regional governments;
“(B) threatens the safety of United States citizens;
“(C) threatens United States allies and partners; and
“(D) directly undermines the national security interests of the United States;
“(5) the Islamic Republic of Iran has engaged in assassination plots against former United States officials and has been implicated in plots to kidnap United States citizens within the United States;
“(6) the Islamic Republic of Iran is engaged in unsafe and unprofessional maritime activity that threatens the movement of naval vessels of the United States and the free flow of commerce through strategic maritime chokepoints in the Middle East and North Africa;
“(7) the Islamic Republic of Iran has delivered hundreds of armed drones to the Russian Federation, which will enable Vladimir Putin to continue the assault against Ukraine in direct opposition of the national security interests of the United States; and
“(8) the United States must—
“(A) ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapons capability;
“(B) protect against aggression from the Islamic Republic of Iran manifested through its missiles and drone programs; and
“(C) counter regional and global terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner that minimizes the threat posed by state and non-state actors to the interests of the United States.
“(c) Definitions.—
In this section:
“(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—
The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—
“(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
“(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
“(2) Comprehensive safeguards agreement.—
The term ‘Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement’ means the Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973.
“(3) Intelligence community.—
The term ‘intelligence community’ has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
“(4) Task force.—
The term ‘task force’ means the task force established under subsection (d).
“(5) Unmanned aircraft system.—
The term ‘unmanned aircraft system’ has the meaning given the term in section 44801 of title 49, United States Code.
“(d) Establishment of Interagency Task Force on Nuclear Activity and Global Regional Terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran.—
“(1) Establishment.—
The Secretary of State shall establish a task force to coordinate and synthesize efforts by the United States Government regarding—
“(A) nuclear activity of the Islamic Republic of Iran or its proxies; and
“(B) regional and global terrorism activity by the Islamic Republic of Iran or its proxies.
“(2) Composition.—
“(A) Chairperson.—
The Secretary of State shall be the Chairperson of the task force.
“(B) Membership.—
“(i) In general.—
The task force shall be composed of individuals, each of whom shall be an employee of and appointed to the task force by the head of one of the following agencies:
“(I) The Department of State.
“(II) The Department of Defense.
“(III) The Department of Energy.
“(ii) Additional members.—
The Chairperson may appoint to the task force additional individuals from other Federal agencies, as the Chairperson considers necessary.
“(iii) Intelligence community support.—
The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the task force receives all appropriate support from the intelligence community.
“(3) Sunset.—
The task force shall terminate on December 31, 2028.
“(e) Assessments.—
“(1) Intelligence assessment on nuclear activity.—
“(A) In general.—
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 23, 2022], and every 180 days thereafter until December 31, 2028, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment regarding any uranium enrichment, nuclear weapons development, delivery vehicle development, and associated engineering and research activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
“(B) Contents.—
The assessment required by subparagraph (A) shall include—
“(i) a description and location of current fuel cycle activities for the production of fissile material being undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including—
“(I) research and development activities to procure or construct additional advanced IR-2, IR-6 and other model centrifuges and enrichment cascades, including for stable isotopes;
“(II) research and development of reprocessing capabilities, including—
“(aa) reprocessing of spent fuel; and
“(bb) extraction of medical isotopes from irradiated uranium targets;
“(III) activities with respect to designing or constructing reactors, including—
“(aa) the construction of heavy water reactors;
“(bb) the manufacture or procurement of reactor components, including the intended application of such components; and
“(cc) efforts to rebuild the original reactor at Arak;
“(IV) uranium mining, concentration, conversion, and fuel fabrication, including—
“(aa) estimated uranium ore production capacity and annual recovery;
“(bb) recovery processes and ore concentrate production capacity and annual recovery;
“(cc) research and development with respect to, and the annual rate of, conversion of uranium; and
“(dd) research and development with respect to the fabrication of reactor fuels, including the use of depleted, natural, and enriched uranium; and
“(V) activities with respect to—
“(aa) producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium (or their alloys);
“(bb) conducting research and development on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys);
“(cc) uranium metal; or
“(dd) casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium;
“(ii) with respect to any activity described in clause (i), a description, as applicable, of—
“(I) the number and type of centrifuges used to enrich uranium and the operating status of such centrifuges;
“(II) the number and location of any enrichment or associated research and development facility used to engage in such activity;
“(III) the amount of heavy water, in metric tons, produced by such activity and the acquisition or manufacture of major reactor components, including, for the second and subsequent assessments, the amount produced since the last assessment;
“(IV) the number and type of fuel assemblies produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including failed or rejected assemblies; and
“(V) the total amount of—
“(aa) uranium–235 enriched to not greater than 5 percent purity;
“(bb) uranium–235 enriched to greater than 5 percent purity and not greater than 20 percent purity;
“(cc) uranium–235 enriched to greater than 20 percent purity and not greater than 60 percent purity;
“(dd) uranium–235 enriched to greater than 60 percent purity and not greater than 90 percent purity; and
“(ee) uranium–235 enriched greater than 90 percent purity;
“(iii) a description of any weaponization plans and weapons development capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including—
“(I) plans and capabilities with respect to—
“(aa) weapon design, including fission, warhead miniaturization, and boosted and early thermonuclear weapon design;
“(bb) high yield fission development;
“(cc) design, development, acquisition, or use of computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices;
“(dd) design, development, fabricating, acquisition, or use of explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources; and
“(ee) design, development, fabrication, acquisition, or use of precision machining and tooling that could enable the production of nuclear explosive device components;
“(II) the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to deploy a working or reliable delivery vehicle capable of carrying a nuclear warhead;
“(III) the estimated breakout time for the Islamic Republic of Iran to develop and deploy a nuclear weapon, including a crude nuclear weapon; and
“(IV) the status and location of any research and development work site related to the preparation of an underground nuclear test;
“(iv) an identification of any clandestine nuclear facilities;
“(v) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains locations to store equipment, research archives, or other material previously used for a weapons program or that would be of use to a weapons program that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency;
“(vi) any diversion by the Islamic Republic of Iran of uranium, carbon-fiber, or other materials for use in an undeclared or clandestine facility;
“(vii) an assessment of activities related to developing or acquiring the capabilities for the production of nuclear weapons, conducted at facilities controlled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, including an analysis of gaps in knowledge;
“(viii) a description of activities between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries or persons with respect to sharing information on, or providing other forms of support for, the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability or activities related to weaponization;
“(ix) with respect to any new ballistic, cruise, or hypersonic missiles being designed and tested by the Islamic Republic of Iran or any of its proxies, a description of—
“(I) the type of missile;
“(II) the range of such missiles;
“(III) the capability of such missiles to deliver a nuclear warhead;
“(IV) the number of such missiles; and
“(V) any testing of such missiles;
“(x) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran or any of its proxies possesses an unmanned aircraft system or other military equipment capable of delivering a nuclear weapon; and
“(xi) an assessment of the extent to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is providing drones, missiles, or related technology from other countries to its proxies or partners.
“(2) Assessment on support for regional and global terrorism of the islamic republic of iran.—
“(A) In general.—
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 23, 2022], and annually thereafter until December 31, 2028, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment regarding the regional and global terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
“(B) Contents.—
The assessment required by subparagraph (A) shall include—
“(i) a description of the lethal support of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including training, equipment, and associated intelligence support, to regional and global non-state terrorist groups and proxies;
“(ii) a description of the lethal support of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including training and equipment, to state actors;
“(iii) an assessment of financial support of the Islamic Republic of Iran to non-state terrorist groups and proxies and associated Iranian revenue streams funding such support;
“(iv) an assessment of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iranian-supported groups to members of the Armed Forces, diplomats, and military and diplomatic facilities of the United States;
“(v) a description of attacks by, or sponsored by, the Islamic Republic of Iran against members of the Armed Forces, diplomats, and military and diplomatic facilities of the United States and the associated response by the United States Government in the previous year;
“(vi) a description of attacks by, or sponsored by, the Islamic Republic of Iran against United States partners or allies and the associated response by the United States Government in the previous year;
“(vii) an assessment of interference by the Islamic Republic of Iran into the elections and political processes of sovereign countries in the Middle East and North Africa in an effort to create conditions for or shape agendas more favorable to the policies of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
“(viii) a description of any plots by the Islamic Republic of Iran against former and current United States officials;
“(ix) a description of any plots by the Islamic Republic of Iran against United States citizens both abroad and within the United States; and
“(x) a description of maritime activity of the Islamic Republic of Iran and associated impacts on the free flow of commerce and the national security interests of the United States.
“(3) Form; public availability; duplication.—
“(A) Form.—
Each assessment required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex for information that, if released, would be detrimental to the national security of the United States. In addition, any classified portion may contain an additional annex provided to the congressional intelligence committees that details information and analysis that would otherwise disclose sensitive sources and methods.
“(B) Public availability.—
The unclassified portion of an assessment required by this subsection shall be made available to the public on an internet website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
“(C) Duplication.—
For any assessment required by this subsection, the Director of National Intelligence may rely upon existing products that reflect the current analytic judgment of the intelligence community, including reports or products produced in response to congressional mandate or requests from executive branch officials.
“(f) Diplomatic Strategy to Address Identified Nuclear, Ballistic Missile, and Terrorism Threats to the United States.—
“(1) In general.—
Not later than 30 days after the submission of the initial assessment under subsection (e)(1), and annually thereafter until December 31, 2028, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the task force, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a diplomatic strategy that outlines a comprehensive plan for engaging with partners and allies of the United States regarding uranium enrichment, nuclear weaponization, missile development, and drone-related activities and regional and global terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
“(2) Contents.—
The diplomatic strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include—
“(A) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran—
“(i) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement as well as the nuclear related commitments endorsed in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015); and
“(ii) has denied access to sites that the International Atomic Energy Agency has sought to inspect during previous 1-year period;
“(B) a description of any dual-use item (as defined under section 730.3 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations or listed on the List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology issued by the Nuclear Suppliers Group or any successor list) the Islamic Republic of Iran is using to further the nuclear weapon, missile, or drone program;
“(C) a description of efforts of the United States to counter efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran to project political and military influence into the Middle East;
“(D) a description of efforts to address the increased threat that new or evolving uranium enrichment, nuclear weaponization, missile, or drone development activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran pose to United States citizens, the diplomatic presence of the United States in the Middle East, and the national security interests of the United States;
“(E) a description of efforts to address the threat that terrorism by, or sponsored by, the Islamic Republic of Iran poses to United States citizens, the diplomatic presence of the United States in the Middle East, and the national security interests of the United States;
“(F) a description of efforts to address the impact of the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran on sovereign governments on the safety and security of United States citizens, the diplomatic presence of the United States in the Middle East, and the national security interests of the United States;
“(G) a description of a coordinated whole-of-government approach to use political, economic, and security related tools to address such activities; and
“(H) a comprehensive plan for engaging with allies and regional partners in all relevant multilateral fora to address such activities.
“(3) Updated strategy related to notification.—
Not later than 45 days after the Chairperson determines that there has been a significant development in the nuclear weapons capability or nuclear weapons delivery systems capability of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update to the most recent diplomatic strategy submitted under paragraph (1).”
heading: Report on Use by Iran of Funds Made Available Through Sanctions Relief
text: Pub. L. 114–113, div. M, title V, § 514, Dec. 18, 2015, 129 Stat. 2926, provided that:
“(a) In General.—
At the times specified in subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the following:
“(1) The monetary value of any direct or indirect forms of sanctions relief that Iran has received since the Joint Plan of Action first entered into effect.
“(2) How Iran has used funds made available through sanctions relief, including the extent to which any such funds have facilitated the ability of Iran—
“(A) to provide support for—
“(i) any individual or entity designated for the imposition of sanctions for activities relating to international terrorism pursuant to an executive order or by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury as of the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 18, 2015];
“(ii) any organization designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) as of the date of the enactment of this Act;
“(iii) any other terrorist organization; or
“(iv) the regime of Bashar al Assad in Syria;
“(B) to advance the efforts of Iran or any other country to develop nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles overtly or covertly; or
“(C) to commit any violation of the human rights of the people of Iran.
“(3) The extent to which any senior official of the Government of Iran has diverted any funds made available through sanctions relief to be used by the official for personal use.
“(b) Submission to Congress.—
“(1) In general.—
The Director shall submit the report required by subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional committees—
“(A) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 18, 2015] and every 180 days thereafter during the period that the Joint Plan of Action is in effect; and
“(B) not later than 1 year after a subsequent agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran takes effect and annually thereafter during the period that such agreement remains in effect.
“(2) Nonduplication.—
The Director may submit the information required by subsection (a) with a report required to be submitted to Congress under another provision of law if—
“(A) the Director notifies the appropriate congressional committees of the intention of making such submission before submitting that report; and
“(B) all matters required to be covered by subsection (a) are included in that report.
“(c) Form of Reports.—
Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
“(d) Definitions.—
In this section:
“(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—
The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—
“(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
“(B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
“(2) Joint plan of action.—
The term ‘Joint Plan of Action’ means the Joint Plan of Action, signed at Geneva November 24, 2013, by Iran and by France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and all implementing materials and agreements related to the Joint Plan of Action, including the technical understandings reached on January 12, 2014, the extension thereto agreed to on July 18, 2014, and the extension thereto agreed to on November 24, 2014.”
heading: Reports on Nuclear Program of Iran
text: Pub. L. 113–291, div. A, title XII, § 1271, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3588, which required the President to report to Congress on interim agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran, including verification of compliance by Iran and assessment of overall state of Iran’s nuclear program, terminated 10 years after Dec. 19, 2014.
heading: Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere
text: Pub. L. 112–220, Dec. 28, 2012, 126 Stat. 1596, provided that:
“SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
“This Act may be cited as the ‘Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012’.
“SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
“Congress finds the following:
“(1) The United States has vital political, economic, and security interests in the Western Hemisphere.
“(2) Iran is pursuing cooperation with Latin American countries by signing economic and security agreements in order to create a network of diplomatic and economic relationships to lessen the blow of international sanctions and oppose Western attempts to constrict its ambitions.
“(3) According to the Department of State, Hezbollah, with Iran as its state sponsor, is considered the ‘most technically capable terrorist group in the world’ with ‘thousands of supporters, several thousand members, and a few hundred terrorist operatives,’ and officials from the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force have been working in concert with Hezbollah for many years.
“(4) The IRGC’s Qods Force has a long history of supporting Hezbollah’s military, paramilitary, and terrorist activities, providing it with guidance, funding, weapons, intelligence, and logistical support, and in 2007, the Department of the Treasury placed sanctions on the IRGC and its Qods Force for their support of terrorism and proliferation activities.
“(5) The IRGC’s Qods Force stations operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and religious and cultural institutions to foster relationships, often building on existing socioeconomic ties with the well established Shia Diaspora, and recent years have witnessed an increased presence in Latin America.
“(6) According to the Department of Defense, the IRGC and its Qods Force played a significant role in some of the deadliest terrorist attacks of the past two decades, including the 1994 attack on the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, by generally directing or supporting the groups that actually executed the attacks.
“(7) Reports of Iranian intelligence agents being implicated in Hezbollah-linked activities since the early 1990s suggest direct Iranian government support of Hezbollah activities in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, and in the past decade, Iran has dramatically increased its diplomatic missions to Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina, and Brazil. Iran has built 17 cultural centers in Latin America, and it currently maintains 11 embassies, up from 6 in 2005.
“(8) Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies with a presence in Latin America have raised revenues through illicit activities, including drug and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, forging travel documents, pirating software and music, and providing haven and assistance to other terrorists transiting the region.
“(9) Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela expressed their intention to assist Iran in evading sanctions by signing a statement supporting Iran’s nuclear activities and announcing at a 2010 joint press conference in Tehran their determination to ‘continue and expand their economic ties to Iran’ with confidence that ‘Iran can give a crushing response to the threats and sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism’.
“(10) The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration concluded in 2008 that almost one-half of the foreign terrorist organizations in the world are linked to narcotics trade and trafficking, including Hezbollah and Hamas.
“(11) In October 2011, the United States charged two men, Manssor Arbabsiar, a United States citizen holding both Iranian and United States passports, and Gholam Shakuri, an Iran-based member of Iran’s IRGC Qods Force, with conspiracy to murder a foreign official using explosives in an act of terrorism. Arbabsiar traveled to Mexico with the express intent to hire ‘someone in the narcotics business’ to carry out the assassination of the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in the United States. While in the end, he only engaged a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency informant posing as an associate of a drug trafficking cartel, Arbabsiar believed that he was working with a member of a Mexican drug trafficking organization and sought to send money to this individual in installments and not in a single transfer.
“(12) In February 2011, actions by the Department of the Treasury effectively shut down the Lebanese Canadian Bank. Subsequent actions by the United States Government in connection with the investigation into Lebanese Canadian Bank resulted in the indictment in December 2011 of Ayman Joumaa, an individual of Lebanese nationality, with citizenship in Lebanon and Colombia, and with ties to Hezbollah, for trafficking cocaine to the Los Zetas drug trafficking organization in Mexico City for sale in the United States and for laundering the proceeds.
“SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
“It shall be the policy of the United States to use a comprehensive government-wide strategy to counter Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere by working together with United States allies and partners in the region to mutually deter threats to United States interests by the Government of Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGC’s Qods Force, and Hezbollah.
“SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
“In this Act:
“(1) Western hemisphere.—
The term ‘Western Hemisphere’ means the United States, Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, South America, and Central America.
“(2) Relevant congressional committees.—
The term ‘relevant congressional committees’ means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
“SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT OF A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS IRAN’S GROWING HOSTILE PRESENCE AND ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.
“(a) In General.—
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 28, 2012], the Secretary of State shall conduct an assessment of the threats posed to the United States by Iran’s growing presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere and submit to the relevant congressional committees the results of the assessment and a strategy to address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.
“(b) Matters To Be Included.—
The strategy described in subsection (a) should include—
“(1) a description of the presence, activities, and operations of Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may be present in the Western Hemisphere, including information about their leaders, objectives, and areas of influence and information on their financial networks, trafficking activities, and safe havens;
“(2) a description of the terrain, population, ports, foreign firms, airports, borders, media outlets, financial centers, foreign embassies, charities, religious and cultural centers, and income-generating activities in the Western Hemisphere utilized by Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may be present in the Western Hemisphere;
“(3) a description of the relationship of Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, and Hezbollah with transnational criminal organizations linked to Iran and other terrorist organizations in the Western Hemisphere, including information on financial networks and trafficking activities;
“(4) a description of the relationship of Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may be present in the Western Hemisphere with the governments in the Western Hemisphere, including military-to-military relations and diplomatic, economic, and security partnerships and agreements;
“(5) a description of the Federal law enforcement capabilities, military forces, State and local government institutions, and other critical elements, such as nongovernmental organizations, in the Western Hemisphere that may organize to counter the threat posed by Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may be present in the Western Hemisphere;
“(6) a description of activity by Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may be present at the United States borders with Mexico and Canada and at other international borders within the Western Hemisphere, including operations related to drug, human, and arms trafficking, human support networks, financial support, narco-tunneling, and technological advancements that incorporates—
“(A) with respect to the United States borders, in coordination with the Governments of Mexico and Canada and the Secretary of Homeland Security, a plan to address resources, technology, and infrastructure to create a secure United States border and strengthen the ability of the United States and its allies to prevent operatives from Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, or any other terrorist organization from entering the United States; and
“(B) within Latin American countries, a multiagency action plan, in coordination with United States allies and partners in the region, that includes the development of strong rule-of-law institutions to provide security in such countries and a counterterrorism and counter-radicalization plan to isolate Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may be present in the Western Hemisphere from their sources of financial support and counter their facilitation of terrorist activity; and
“(7) a plan—
“(A) to address any efforts by foreign persons, entities, and governments in the region to assist Iran in evading United States and international sanctions;
“(B) to protect United States interests and assets in the Western Hemisphere, including embassies, consulates, businesses, energy pipelines, and cultural organizations, including threats to United States allies;
“(C) to support United States efforts to designate persons and entities in the Western Hemisphere for proliferation activities and terrorist activities relating to Iran, including affiliates of the IRGC, its Qods Force, and Hezbollah, under applicable law including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; and
“(D) to address the vital national security interests of the United States in ensuring energy supplies from the Western Hemisphere that are free from the influence of any foreign government that would attempt to manipulate or disrupt global energy markets.
“(c) Development.—
In developing the strategy under this section, the Secretary of State shall consult with the heads of all appropriate United States departments and agencies, including the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the United States Trade Representative.
“(d) Form.—
The strategy in this section may be submitted in classified form, but shall include an unclassified summary of policy recommendations to address the growing Iranian threat in the Western Hemisphere.
“SEC. 6. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
“It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should keep the relevant congressional committees continually informed on the hostile actions of Iran in the Western Hemisphere.
“SEC. 7. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit the rights or protections enjoyed by United States citizens under the United States Constitution or other Federal law, or to create additional authorities for the Federal Government that are contrary to the United States Constitution and United States law.”