PROCEDURE

The case originated in an application (no. 57067/00) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged on 26 April 2000 with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a United Kingdom national, Mark Anthony Grieves (“the applicant”).

The applicant was represented by Mr G. Blades, a solicitor practising in Lincoln. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mr C. Whomersley and, subsequently, Mr J. Grainger, of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The applicant complained that he did not receive a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, he complained that the structure of his court-martial was such that it violated the independence and impartiality requirements, and consequently the fairness requirement, of that Article. He also complained about unfairness based on the particular facts of his case.

The application was allocated to the Fourth Section. On 4 June 2002 a Chamber of that Section declared inadmissible the applicant's specific complaint of unfairness under Article 6 and gave notice to the Government of his main complaint concerning the independence and impartiality of the court-martial (Rule 54 § 2 (b)). On 6 May 2003 a Chamber of that Section (composed of Mr M. Pellonpää, Sir Nicolas Bratza, Mrs V. Strážnicka, Mr R. Maruste, Mr S. Pavlovschi, Mr L. Garlicki, Mr J. Borrego Borrego, and also of Mr M. O'Boyle, Section Registrar) relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected to such relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72 of the Rules of Court).

The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.

Pursuant to Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and Rule 54A § 3 of the Rules of Court, the Grand Chamber notified the parties that it might decide to examine the merits of the complaint before it at the same time as its admissibility and decided to put an additional question to the parties.

The applicant and the Government each filed written observations on the admissibility and merits together with separate submissions on the applicable domestic law and practice.

A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 1 October 2003 (Rule 59 § 3 of the Rules of Court). There appeared before the Court: (a) for the Government Mr J. Grainger, Agent, Mr P. Havers, Q.C., Counsel, Ms T. Jones, Mr H. Morrison, Mr E. Latham, Air Vice-Marshal R. Charles, Commodore J. Blackett, Commander S. Taylor, Brigadier T. Paphiti, Advisers; (b) for the applicant Mr G. Blades, Solicitor, Representative, Mr J. Mackenzie, Solicitor, Adviser. The Court heard addresses by Mr Havers and by Mr Blades.

The Grand Chamber subsequently decided to examine the merits of the complaint before it at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and Rule 54A § 3 of the Rules of Court).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Devon. At the relevant time he was a serving member of the Royal Navy.

On 18 June 1998 he was convicted, pursuant to section 42 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957, by a naval court-martial of unlawfully and maliciously wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. He was sentenced to, inter alia, three years' imprisonment and to be dismissed from the service and reduced in rank. He was also ordered to pay GBP 700 compensation.

The court-martial comprised a President (a Captain of the Royal Navy), four naval officers (a Commander, 2 Lieutenant Commanders and a Lieutenant) and a Judge Advocate (Commander Flanagan). The Judge Advocate was a naval barrister who was working as the naval legal advisor to FLEET (the command responsible for the organisation and deployment of all ships at sea). His rank was lower than that of the President of the court-martial. The prosecution was conducted by a Lieutenant Commander of the staff of the Prosecuting Authority. The applicant chose to be represented by a naval barrister. The defending and prosecuting officers were junior in rank to the Judge Advocate and the defending officer was senior in rank to the prosecuting officer.

At the beginning of the court-martial the Judge Advocate directed the members of the court-martial as follows: “As Judge Advocate it's my role to ensure that the trial is conducted in accordance with the law and I am here to advise and guide you. I will have no role in the finding on the facts. You must accept what I say on matters of law and procedures [as] being correct. If you have any questions of me during the trial ... they must be asked of me in open Court in the presence of the accused, his friend and the prosecutor and any such questions should pass through you ... as President. That means ... that now that this trial has commenced, you and your court can have no direct communication with me except in open Court and therefore if I seem to avoid you outside the environs of the Court ... that's the reasoning behind that and please don't think I am being rude ... Now you and your colleagues may discuss the case when you are together and in private if you so wish, but my strong advice to you at this stage is to resist the temptation until you've heard all the evidence and indeed my own summing up. You must be particularly rigorous in not discussing the case at all during adjournments in the trial when you could be overheard by others such as during lunch in the Ward room where a room has been set aside for you and particularly overnight since you must not be influenced by anything said to you or which you observe which is not evidence in the trial. I will warn you of this ... each time we adjourn and particularly when we adjourn at the end of the days' proceedings.”

On 29 September 1998 the Navy Board decided not to vary the court-martial's verdict and sentence. In his advice to the Navy Board, the Judge Advocate of the Fleet commented that the trial had been “well conducted by all concerned”, that the main directions of law in the Judge Advocate's summing up were “impeccable” and that any errors were, in any event, favourable to the applicant.

On 30 June 1999 a single judge of the Courts-Martial Appeal Court rejected his appeal, as did the full court on 20 January 2000.