PROCEDURE

The case originated in an application (no. 42509/05) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a British national, Mr Thomas John Crompton (“the applicant”), on 20 November 2005.

The applicant was represented by Levys Solicitors, a firm of solicitors based in Manchester. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms H. Moynihan, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

On 13 May 2008 the acting President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29 § 3).

The parties requested an oral hearing. However, the Chamber decided not to hold a hearing in the case.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

The applicant, Mr Thomas John Crompton, is a British national who was born in 1954 and lives in Stalybridge, Cheshire.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

In 1989 the applicant joined the Territorial Army (“TA”) as a pay and accounts clerk, a military post, carrying out duties such as filing, photocopying and maintaining a stationery store. In July 1993 the applicant was informed that he was to be made redundant, following organisational changes in the TA pursuant to a process of civilianisation. He was subsequently informed that the clerical post which he had occupied was to become a civilian post and was to be converted to that of a technical store-man. The applicant applied for this new post, but was informed in February 1994 that he could take it only if he undertook a training course, but that all relevant training courses had been cancelled. He also applied for a number of other clerical posts within the Army but was refused for them all.

The applicant was therefore made redundant. His discharge from the Army, dated 18 February 1994, was formally made, incorrectly, on the basis that his services were no longer required. The applicant later discovered that his former duties were being carried out by an untrained civilian, while the technical store-man post remained vacant.

On 3 May 1994 the applicant complained about his redundancy to the Industrial Tribunal, but his claim was rejected because the Industrial Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over matters involving military personnel.

On 19 December 1994 the applicant claimed redress in respect of his redundancy from his Commanding Officer, under sections 180 and 181 of the Army Act 1955.

On 22 March 1995 the Commanding Officer issued a brief in which he concluded that the applicant had a weak case for redress. He further requested the Army Board of the Defence Council to determine whether the applicant was subject to military law. The applicant's solicitors, on 6 December 1996, submitted observations in reply. The matter was then placed before the Army Board.

In January 1998, the applicant applied for judicial review in respect of the Army Board's failure to determine the case within a reasonable time. His application was granted by the High Court on 2 February 1998 and the Army Board was ordered to deal with the case expeditiously.

The Army Board, without holding an oral hearing or directing a Board of Inquiry to be convened, issued its decision on 7 May 1998, refusing the applicant's claim for redress.

The applicant applied for judicial review of the decision not to hold an oral hearing or convene a Board of Inquiry.

On 3 November 1998, while the judicial review application was pending, the Army Board directed that a Board of Inquiry should be convened. The Board was convened by an order dated 10 February 1999. It sat in March 1999, considered oral and documentary evidence and issued a summary of its factual findings on 6 May 1999. It found in the applicant's favour as regards his argument that he ought to have been, but was not, given priority before five selection boards. It was anticipated that the level of compensation would be fixed by negotiation between the Army Board and the applicant.

The Army Board met to reach a determination on 11 April 2001. It issued its decision on 16 July 2001, ordering that the applicant be offered compensation in respect of the failure to offer him alternative employment within the Army. On 10 August 2001, an award of compensation was notified to the applicant but he disputed the calculation of the compensation.

In November 2001 a further offer of settlement was made to the applicant, which he rejected.

On 11 April 2003 the Army Board made a further compensation offer of GBP 94,016.67. The sum was made up of three parts: loss of salary (minus the applicant's actual earnings during the relevant period); a redundancy payment estimated on the basis that the applicant would have had an extra six years' service; and loss of pension rights, again based on a six-year period. The applicant rejected the offer on the basis that it did not include costs or a sum to compensate him for the stress he had suffered.

The applicant, acting as a litigant in person, subsequently applied for judicial review of the decision, claiming that the award had not been properly assessed. Permission was granted on 23 June 2003. The applicant advanced two criticisms: first, that the award was based on the assumption that he would have been discharged from the army six years after the date on which he was actually discharged; second, that the salary base used for the calculation of all three elements of the award was taken to be GBP 15,800 per year gross. The latter criticism was only formally advanced at the hearing itself.

On 16 October 2003 the High Court rejected the applicant's complaint regarding the six-year cut-off date. However, in light of evidence produced to the court regarding the level of the applicant's salary at the time of his redundancy, the court accepted the Army Board's undertaking to review the level of the annual salary used in its calculation and, if appropriate, to reassess the award of compensation within 35 days. Although formally the applicant was the unsuccessful party in the litigation, and as a result would normally be required to pay the costs of the Army Board, the court ordered the applicant to pay only half of the Army Board's costs partly on the ground that “the history of this matter displays an inordinate period of delay”.

On 20 November 2003, a revised offer of GBP 147,682.42 was made to the applicant. The offer was rejected.

The applicant again applied for judicial review on 11 January 2004 seeking an order requiring the Army Board to investigate and take steps towards redressing his complaint within a prescribed time-frame and damages for the losses suffered by him as a result of the Army Board's failure to perform its duties. There was a hearing on 10 February 2004 but no order was made.

On 13 April 2004, a further offer was made to the applicant in the sum of GBP 153,000.

On 26 July 2004 the applicant again applied for judicial review in respect of the delay but again, following a hearing on 10 August 2004, no order was made.

On 19 May 2005, following another application for judicial review, the High Court adjourned the case pending promulgation by the Army Board of its written decision regarding the offer of compensation.

On 24 May 2005 the Army Board issued its decision awarding the applicant compensation of GBP 153,864.47.

The applicant's application for judicial review was refused on 24 June 2005 on the ground that the Army Board's decision had brought the finality which the applicant had been seeking.

The applicant brought a fresh application for judicial review on the ground that the award of 24 May 2005 had been incorrectly reached. The application was refused on the papers on 22 September 2005. Following the applicant's renewed application and an oral hearing, permission was finally refused on 14 November 2005.