PROCEDURE

The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) on 16 September 1996, within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 § 1 and Article 47 of the Convention. It originated in an application (no. 25942/94) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Commission under Article 25 by Mr Paul Matthew Coyne, a British citizen, on 23 November 1994. The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 and to the declaration whereby the United Kingdom recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 § 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicant stated that he wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule 30).

The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Sir John Freeland, the elected judge of British nationality (Article 43 of the Convention), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 § 4 (b)). On 17 September 1996, in the presence of the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr R. Macdonald, Mr C. Russo, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr R. Pekkanen, Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha and Mr L. Wildhaber (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 § 5). Subsequently, Mr I. Foighel, substitute judge, replaced Mr Macdonald, who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rules 22 § 1 and 24 § 1).

As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 § 6), Mr Ryssdal, acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the United Kingdom Government (“the Government”), the applicant’s lawyer and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 § 1 and 38). Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the Registrar received the applicant’s memorial on 28 April 1997.

In a letter dated 14 March 1997, the Government expressed the view that it would not be necessary to hold oral proceedings and, in a letter dated 8 April 1997, the Secretary to the Commission informed the Court that the Commission’s Delegate also saw no reason to hold a hearing. The applicant, however, in a letter dated 28 April 1997, stated that if the claim for either just satisfaction or costs was contested, he would welcome the opportunity to make representations at a hearing before the Court. On 28 May 1997, the Court decided that it would be necessary to hold an oral hearing, limited to issues under Article 50 of the Convention.

On 24 April 1997 the President decided that legal aid should be granted to the applicant for the proceedings before the Court (Rule 4 of the Addendum to Rules of Court A).

In two letters dated 29 April 1997, the Government indicated that they had no submissions to make on the merits and offered to settle the case on the basis of the payment of the applicant’s reasonable legal costs and expenses. This offer was rejected by the applicant on 6 May 1997.

By a letter dated 7 May 1997, the Government requested the Registrar to obtain from the applicant a breakdown of the legal costs and expenses incurred by him in the Strasbourg proceedings. Mr Coyne responded in a letter dated 16 May 1997. In a letter dated 9 June 1997, the Government commented in detail on the applicant’s claims under Article 50 of the Convention. The applicant submitted written observations in response on 13 June 1997.

In accordance with the Court’s decision (see paragraph 5 above), a hearing limited to issues under Article 50 of the Convention took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 June 1997. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand. There appeared before the Court: (a) for the Government Mr M.R. Eaton, Deputy Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Agent, Mr J. Eadie, Counsel; (b) for the Commission Mr N. Bratza, Delegate; (c) for the applicant Mr G. Blades, Solicitor. The Court heard addresses by Mr Bratza, Mr Blades and Mr Eadie.

AS TO THE FACTS

I. Circumstances of the case

The applicant, Mr Paul Matthew Coyne, was born in 1972 and lives in Bedford.

He joined the Royal Air Force (“RAF”) in 1990. In June 1992, when he was serving as a non-commissioned officer in Brüggen, Germany, he applied for premature voluntary release from the force. This was granted with a view to his final discharge on 9 December 1992. However, following a police investigation into his financial activities in Germany, his final release was refused and the decision was taken to charge him with various offences of forgery and deception and to try him by RAF court martial in Brüggen.

In August 1993 Mr Coyne was charged, pursuant to section 70 (1) of the Air Force Act 1955, with four civilian criminal offences (the second and fourth charges being expressed as alternatives to the first and third charges) of using a false instrument together with obtaining services by deception contrary to the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 and the Theft Act 1968. The charges were connected to a false application for a bank loan.

The convening officer (see paragraphs 24–29 below) was the Air Officer Commanding no. 2 Group, RAF, Rheindahlen and as such was the senior commander of all air force personnel serving in Germany (including approximately one thousand officers). On 26 January 1994 the convening officer convened a district court martial, appointing all three members of the court martial by name. The president was a wing commander of the RAF Station, Uxbridge. He was a permanent president and subordinate in rank to the convening officer. The other two members of the court martial were a squadron leader and a flight lieutenant, both of whom were stationed in Germany and subordinate in rank to, and within the chain of command of, the convening officer.

The prosecuting officer was appointed by the convening officer from the Directorate of Legal Services and was also within the convening officer’s chain of command. A judge advocate was appointed by the Judge Advocate General’s Office (see paragraphs 32–33 below).

The court martial took place at the RAF Station, Brüggen on 26‑28 January 1994. After pleading not guilty to all the charges against him, Mr Coyne was found not guilty on the first and second charges, guilty on the third (under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981) and consequently no finding was made on the fourth charge. He was sentenced to nine months’ detention, dismissal from the air force and reduction to the ranks.

On 31 January 1994 he presented a petition against conviction and sentence to the confirming officer (see paragraph 36 below), claiming that the judge advocate had erred in his summing up of the case, that the finding of guilt on one charge was inconsistent with his acquittal on another charge and that the sentence was excessive. However, on 7 March 1994, his conviction and sentence were confirmed by the confirming officer who had obtained the advice of a judge advocate (not the trial judge advocate).

On 8 March 1994 Mr Coyne presented an appeal petition against conviction and sentence to the Defence Council (see paragraphs 37–38 below). The Air Force Board, having obtained the advice of the Judge Advocate General, informed the applicant’s legal representative on 26 May 1994 of its decision to reject the petition.

The applicant’s subsequent application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence to the Courts Martial Appeal Court (see paragraphs 39–44 below) was accepted by a single judge of that court, not on any of the grounds presented by the applicant, but on the basis of a question raised by the single judge as to whether the judge advocate had properly advised the court martial as to what was required to be proven to establish that an instrument was “false”. On 11 October 1994, the Courts Martial Appeal Court rejected Mr Coyne’s appeal, on the grounds that the judge advocate had properly advised the court martial.

No reasons were given for the decisions of the court martial, the confirming officer or the Air Force Board. The applicant was legally represented before the Courts Martial Appeal Court.