PROCEDURE

The case was referred to the Court on 13 September 1991 by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission“) within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated in an application (no. 13071/87) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) on 29 September 1986 by Derek Edwards, a British citizen. The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the United Kingdom recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision from the Court as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) and Article 13 (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-d, art. 13) of the Convention.

In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of the rules of Court, the applicant stated that he wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule 30).

The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Sir John Freeland, the elected judge of British nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 28 September 1991, in the presence of the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mr J. Cremona, Mr Thór Vilhjálmsson, Mr F. Matscher, Mr R. Macdonald, Mr C. Russo, Mr I. Foighel and Mr F. Bigi (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43). Subsequently, Mr L.-E. Pettiti and Mr J. De Meyer, substitute judges, replaced Mr Cremona whose term of office had expired and whose successor had taken up his duties before the hearing and Mr Macdonald who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rules 2 para. 3, 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1).

Mr Ryssdal assumed the office of President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5) and, through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Government of the United Kingdom (“the Government“), the Delegate of the Commission and the applicant’s representative on the organisation of the procedure (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). In accordance with the President’s orders, the Registrar received, on 7 February 1992, the applicant’s and the Government’s memorials, and, on 10 June 1992, the applicant’s claims under Article 50 (art. 50). By letter of 8 April 1992 the Secretary to the Commission informed him that the Delegate would submit his observations at the hearing.

In accordance with the President’s decision, the hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 24 June 1992. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand. There appeared before the Court:

for the Government Mrs D. Brooks, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Agent, Mr D. Pannick, Q.C., Counsel, Mr R. Heaton, Adviser;

for the Commission Mr F. Ermacora, Delegate;

for the applicant Mr G. Clarke, Counsel, Mr J.K. Campbell (Freeman Johnson), Solicitor. The Court heard addresses by Mr Pannick for the Government, by Mr Ermacora for the Commission and by Mr Clarke and Mr Campbell for the applicant, as well as replies to questions put by the Court and by two of its members individually. Various documents were filed by the applicant in the course of the hearing.

AS TO THE FACTS

I. THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

A. The trial and appeal proceedings

On 9 November 1984 the applicant was convicted at Sheffield Crown Court, inter alia, of one count of robbery and two counts of burglary. The jury’s decision was by a majority verdict of ten to two. He received a sentence of imprisonment of ten years for the robbery, and two sentences of eight years each for the burglary offences. All three sentences were to be served concurrently. The evidence against the applicant consisted of detailed oral admissions that he had allegedly made to the police concerning his involvement in the three offences. According to the police he was questioned on three separate occasions and contemporaneous notes were taken of his statements. However, he had declined to sign them. His defence during the trial was to maintain that these statements had been concocted by the police. He protested his innocence pointing out that he had not denied his numerous misdeeds in the past. The only witnesses called by the defence during the trial were the two police officers who had interviewed him.

Leave to appeal against the sentence but not the conviction was granted by a single judge of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) on 5 February 1985. On 21 May 1985 the substantive appeal against sentence was dismissed by the full court.

The victim of the robbery (Miss Sizer) which took place on 14 April 1984 was a lady of 82 years of age who was awakened from her sleep to find a man standing over her. Before having her hands tied behind her back and being blindfolded she was able to take a quick glance at him. She remained tied up until she was freed the next morning. In a statement to the police she gave a description of the man which corresponded with the applicant and stated that she thought she would recognise him again. She was not called as a witness during the trial but her written statement was read to the jury. The two counts of burglary related to separate incidents which occurred on 19 April and 10 June 1984 also involving the home of an elderly woman. On the latter occasion the police arrested the applicant’s co-defendant in the vicinity. It was his statement to the police which led to the applicant’s arrest.

On 16 May 1985, the applicant petitioned the Secretary of State for the Home Department with complaints against police officers who had investigated his case and given evidence at his trial. An independent police investigation was ordered in the course of which certain facts came to the applicant’s attention (see paragraphs 11-13 below). On 3 December 1985, the applicant applied for leave to appeal against conviction out of time. The police report (the Carmichael report), dated 5 December 1985, was delivered to the Police Complaints Authority which directed it to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The report was requested by the applicant’s advisers but its disclosure was refused on the grounds of public interest immunity. In February 1986, the Director of Public Prosecutions decided that there was insufficient evidence to support criminal charges against the police officers, but recommended that disciplinary charges be brought against three police officers. At the disciplinary hearing, on 13 to 15 June 1988, the tribunal decided that there was no case to answer and dismissed the charges.

B. Reference by the Secretary of State to the Court of Appeal

On 21 March 1986, the Secretary of State for the Home Department referred the applicant’s case to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) under section 17 (1)(a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (“the 1968 Act“; see paragraphs 19 and 20 below). The reference was heard on 18 July 1986 and judgment delivered on the same date.

The applicant submitted to the Court of Appeal that the verdict should be set aside as unsafe and unsatisfactory because of certain shortcomings in the prosecution case, in particular, that certain information had been withheld by the police. At the trial one of the police witnesses had stated under cross-examination that no fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime. In fact two fingerprints had been found which later turned out to be those of the next door neighbour who was a regular visitor to the house. The applicant had not been informed of this by the prosecution before his trial. It was argued by the applicant that the police officer had told lies and that his veracity as regards the admission statements was thus called into question. The Court of Appeal rejected this submission as follows: “We do not accept that interpretation of Detective Sergeant Hoyland’s evidence. We think quite plainly what he was indicating there and intended to indicate was that no fingerprints relating to either of the two alleged burglars were discovered at the scene: neither the fingerprint of Rose nor the fingerprint of Edwards, the present appellant. We do not think, had the matter been carried further, it would have been demonstrated that Hoyland was a person who to that extent could not be believed on his own.“

A further shortcoming complained of by the applicant related to the fact that the police had shown two volumes of photographs of possible burglars (including a photograph of the applicant) to the elderly victim of the robbery who said that she had caught a fleeting glimpse of the burglar. Her statement, read to the jury, said that she thought she would be able to recognise her assailant. Yet she did not pick out the applicant from the photographs. This fact was not, however, mentioned by one of the police witnesses who had made a written statement which was read out to the jury and had not been indicated to the applicant before or during his trial. Counsel for the applicant submitted to the Court of Appeal that this omission cast such doubt on the evidence of the prosecution that it might have led the jury to believe that the confession statements had indeed been “manufactured“ by the police as the applicant alleged. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument: “The fact that Miss Sizer had a fleeting glimpse of her assailant, and the fact that such identification as she did make was largely directed to other matters of identification rather than his features, leads us to believe that the jury would not have been influenced to act other than they did if they had the full story of the photographs and of Police Constable Esdon’s activities with regard to that.“

The Court of Appeal examined other impugned shortcomings which it did not consider to cast any doubt on the verdict. It was of the opinion that, even if these matters had been investigated, it would have made no difference to the outcome.

The court concluded as follows: “It is clear that there was some slipshod police work in the present case, no doubt because they took the view that here was a man who had admitted these crimes fully, and consequently there was very little need for them to indulge in a further verification of whether what he said was true. Although this is a matter which perhaps casts the police in a somewhat lazy or idle light, we do not think in the circumstances there was anything unsafe or unsatisfactory in the end about these convictions. Consequently, treating this matter as we have to according to section 17 of the Act, we think this appeal fails and must be dismissed.“

Counsel for the applicant did not request the Court of Appeal to exercise its discretionary power to rehear evidence under section 23 of the 1968 Act (see paragraph 23 below) with a view, for example, to cross-examining the police officers who gave evidence at the applicant’s trial. He considered that there was little prospect of such a request being granted. Nor did he request the court to order the production of the Carmichael report (see paragraph 9 above).

The applicant took advice concerning the possibility of appealing to the House of Lords but was informed, in an opinion of counsel dated 8 September 1986, that there were no grounds on which an appeal could successfully be pursued before the House of Lords. He petitioned the Secretary of State for the Home Department on 3 June 1987 without success. He is currently serving a sentence of two years’ imprisonment following his conviction on 26 March 1992 at Sheffield Crown Court on three counts of burglary.