PROCEDURE

The case concerned five applications (nos. 47676/99, 58923/00, 58927/00, 61373/00 and 61377/00) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Ms Julie Beet and four others (“the applicants”), who are United Kingdom nationals, on various dates from 1 April 1999 to 13 February 2001.

The applicants, several of whom had been granted legal aid, were represented by Dicksons HMB, solicitors practising in Stoke-on-Trent. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Emily Willmott of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.

The applicants alleged that their detention ordered by the magistrates for failure to pay local taxes or court-imposed fines were unlawful contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention and that they had not been entitled to compensation under domestic law contrary to Article 5 § 5 of the Convention. They further complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) that they were not offered legal representation and were not represented at the hearing at which they were sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

The applications were allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

On 1 November 2001, these cases were assigned to the newly composed Fourth Section (Rule 52 § 1).

By a decision of 21 October 2003, the Court declared admissible the claims under Article 5 of the applicant Beet (47676/99) and the claims under Article 6 of all the applicants, except Beet (47676/99). The remainder of the applicants’ complaints were declared inadmissible.

The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required. On 1 November 2004 these cases were assigned to the newly composed Fourth Section (Rule 52 § 1).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASES

The details concerning the date of birth and place of residence of the five applicants are contained in their application forms and are available in the respective case files.

Each applicant failed to pay sums due in respect of either local taxes (community charge or council tax), or court-imposed fines. In respect of the failure to pay local taxes, the magistrates’ court had in each case determined that the applicant was liable to pay (issuing a “liability order”); in fines cases, the magistrates’ court had imposed the fine as the sentence following a criminal conviction.

Each applicant fell into arrears with the payments due from them. These cases involve the enforcement proceedings in respect of their arrears in the magistrates’ court. Each applicant appeared before the court, following the issuing of an application for their committal to prison as a result of their failure to pay the sums due. At that hearing the magistrates found that the non-payment was due to the applicant’s wilful refusal or culpable neglect. As a result each applicant was sentenced to a period of imprisonment, suspended on terms that the applicant make periodic payments towards the outstanding sum. The applicants failed to comply with the terms imposed. A further hearing was thereafter held in the magistrates’ court at which the suspended term of imprisonment was activated. Each applicant spent a period of time in prison. Legal aid (free legal representation where the applicant did not have sufficient means to pay for it) was not available for these enforcement proceedings prior to 1 June 1997 and none of the applicants was legally represented at the hearings in front of the magistrates.

Following their imprisonment, an application was made on behalf of each applicant, by way of either judicial review or case stated, which resulted in the High Court quashing the orders made by the magistrates. The applicants were released from prison on bail at the time of making their applications to the High Court. In all five cases the orders were quashed following the High Court’s approval of a consent order agreed between the applicants and the magistrates who had sentenced them.

The Court has set out the relevant facts pertaining to each applicant in the table which appears at the end of the decision on admissibility (47675/99, McAndrew and Others v. the United Kingdom, decision of 21 October 2003). That table sets out the following information in respect of each applicant: their name and application number; whether their case involved non-payment of community charge (“CC”), council tax (“CT”) or fines (“F”) and the number of days which they spent in prison; whether their proceedings in the magistrates’ court took place before or after legal aid became available on 1 June 1997; and the grounds upon which the High Court quashed the orders of the magistrates. A summary of the terms of the consent order whereby the orders of the magistrates were quashed is also set out in the table.

Throughout the text of this decision, where there is a reference to a specific applicant, the Court has set out the surname of the applicant followed by their application number in brackets. The words “justices” and “magistrates” are synonymous in domestic law.

The Court sets out the facts of one case more fully below. Julie BEET (47676/99)

The applicant’s proceedings before the magistrates arose in respect of her arrears in payment of the community charge and took place after 1 June 1997. She spent a total of 2 days in prison. The orders of the magistrates’ court were quashed by the High Court as a result of a consent order in which it was agreed that: “(i) The decision of the justices that the applicant had culpably neglected to pay her community charge without having conducted a proper inquiry into her circumstances as of the time that the liability became due was unlawful, see R. v. Leeds Justices ex parte Kennett [1996] RVR 53. (ii) The decision of the justices to issue a sentence of committal to prison and to make an order postponing the issue of the warrant that would have left the threat of imprisonment over her for over 4 years was unlawful having regard to the principles laid down in R. v. Oliver and Oliver [1989] 11 Cr App R(S) 10 and R. v. Ealing Justices ex parte Cloves [1991] RVR 169 and R. v. Newcastle upon Tyne Justices ex parte Devine [1998] RA 97. (iii) In view of the circumstances of the applicant and [her] detention, and the period of detention served, all parties agreed that the matter be remitted back to the magistrates and that the magistrates, upon reviewing the matter, agreed to remit the outstanding community charge arrears, see Brooke LJ in R. v. St Helens Justices ex parte Jones CO/3328/95.” In respect of costs, it was further agreed that: “... in view of the fact that the Hull Justices had acknowledged the same ground in quashing the committal in R. v. Hull Justices ex parte Shawcross (CO/265/98) costs be borne by the respondent justices see R. v. Newcastle upon Tyne Justices ex parte Devine [1998] RA 97.”