PROCEDURE

The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission“) on 29 May 1995, within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 of the Convention (art. 32-1, art. 47). It originated in an application (no. 22500/93) against the French Republic lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by two French nationals, Mrs Marie-Patrice Guillot, née Lassauzet, and Mr Gérard Guillot on 28 March 1987. The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby France recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (art. 8).

In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicants stated that they wished to take part in the proceedings. The President gave the applicants leave, as lawyers, to present their own case to the Court (Rule 30 para. 1).

The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr L.-E. Pettiti, the elected judge of French nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 4 (b)). On 8 June 1995, in the presence of the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mr R. Macdonald, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr J. De Meyer, Mr R. Pekkanen, Mr J.M. Morenilla, Mr F. Bigi and Mr P. Jambrek (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 5) (art. 43). Subsequently, Mr A.B. Baka, substitute judge, replaced Mr Bigi, who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rule 22 para. 1).

As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6), Mr Ryssdal, acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the French Government (“the Government“), the applicants and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the Registrar received the Government's memorial on 27 November 1995. On 30 January 1996, the Secretary to the Commission indicated that the Delegate did not intend to reply in writing.

On 7 February 1996 the Registrar received a letter from the applicants requesting that their daughter be heard by the Court. On 21 February 1996 the Chamber decided not to grant this request (Rule 41 para. 1).

On 17 August 1995 the Commission had produced the documents of the proceedings before it, as requested by the Registrar on the President's instructions.

In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 April 1996. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand. There appeared before the Court: (a) for the Government Mrs M. Dubrocard, magistrat, on secondment to the Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agent, Mrs M.-H. Hurtaud, magistrat, on secondment to the Department of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Mr G. Bitti, member of the Human Rights Office, European and International Affairs Department, Ministry of Justice, Counsel; (b) for the Commission Mr F. Martínez, Delegate; (c) one of the two applicants, Mr Guillot. The Court heard addresses by Mr Martínez, Mr Guillot and Mrs Dubrocard.

AS TO THE FACTS

I. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

Mr Gérard Guillot and his wife, Mrs Marie-Patrice Guillot, née Lassauzet, chose to give their daughter, born on 7 April 1983, the forenames “Fleur de Marie, Armine, Angèle“. After consulting State Counsel at Nanterre, the registrar of births, deaths and marriages for Neuilly-sur-Seine, to whom the child's birth had been declared, refused to register the first of these names on the ground that it did not appear in any calendar of saints' days. The birth certificate drawn up at the time mentions only “Armine, Angèle“.

A. Proceedings in the Nanterre tribunal de grande instance

In a judgment of 7 February 1984 the Nanterre tribunal de grande instance dismissed the applicants' main application for an order that the forename “Fleur de Marie“ be added as their daughter's first forename, but granted their application made in the alternative for the addition of “Fleur-Marie“. It held as follows: “State Counsel objected to the application on the grounds that whereas 'Fleur' and 'Marie' are, when taken separately, acceptable first forenames under French law, that is not the case with 'Fleur de Marie'. The applicants submit that 'Fleur de Marie' is composed of two forenames recognised by French law, which when linked by the preposition 'de' form the name of the heroine of Eugène Sue's Mystères de Paris, a work which is world-famous. However, although a forename may be composed of up to two names already in use, it cannot, as in the present case, consist of a combination of two names linked by a preposition since it would cease to be a mere reuse of a traditional boy's or girl's name and become an image invented at the whim of individuals, for all that they might possess as lively an imagination as Eugène Sue. In any event, this was not the intention of the legislature when it regulated the choice of forenames. Consequently, the main claim in the application must be dismissed but there is no reason not to grant the claim made in the alternative relating to the forename 'Fleur-Marie'. For these reasons, ... Dismisses the applicants' application for an order that the forename 'Fleur de Marie' be added as the first forename of the child born on 7 April 1983 and already called Armine Angèle. Declares, on the other hand, that the forename 'Fleur-Marie' is acceptable under French law and orders that it be added as the first forename of the above-mentioned child. Orders that the operative provision of this judgment ordering the addition of the first forename be entered in the margin of the child's birth certificate. Orders that no certified copy of the certificate shall be delivered without the said addition. (...)“

B. Proceedings in the Versailles Court of Appeal

Mr and Mrs Guillot appealed to the Versailles Court of Appeal, which on 18 September 1984 upheld the judgment of the court below in the following terms: “(...) Although in spite of the mandatory requirements of the Law of 11 Germinal Year XI, which provides that forenames must be chosen from the various calendars in use, case-law is tending towards a more liberal approach in order to take account of changes in social mores, local customs and family traditions, it is necessary to prevent parents from choosing forenames which are excessively whimsical and so eccentric that the child is likely to be the first victim. This is the case with the forename 'Fleur de Marie', notwithstanding that it was the name of the heroine of a famous literary work. On the other hand, there is no reason not to allow the claim made in the alternative that the forename should consist of the two forenames 'Fleur' and 'Marie' juxtaposed. (...)“

C. Proceedings in the Court of Cassation

Relying in particular on Articles 8, 9 and 14 of the Convention (art. 8, art. 9, art. 14), the applicants appealed on points of law to the Court of Cassation (First Civil Division), which dismissed their appeal on 1 October 1986 on the following grounds: “(...) the provisions of section 1 of the Law of 11 Germinal Year XI are not contrary to ... Articles [8, 9 and 14] (art. 8, art. 9, art. 14) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which merely establish general principles relating to respect for private and family life, freedom of conscience and the prohibition of discrimination between individuals; ... ... the Court of Appeal, which was not obliged to go into the finer detail of the parties' reasoning, held, in the exercise of its unfettered discretion, that the chosen forename, because it was eccentric and excessively whimsical, and notwithstanding that it was the name of the heroine of a famous literary work, was likely to harm the interests of the child; in so doing, the Court of Appeal justified its decision in law (...)“