PROCEDURE

The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission“) and by the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden (“the Government“) on 8 and 28 June 1990 respectively, within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention“). It originated in an application (no. 11274/84) against Sweden lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by Mr Jan-Åke Andersson, a Swedish national, on 16 October 1984. The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Sweden recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The object of the request and of the Government’s application was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.

In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that he wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule 30).

On 30 June 1990 the President of the Court decided under Rule 21 para. 6 and in the interest of sound administration of justice, that a single Chamber should be constituted to consider both the instant case and the Fejde case. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mrs E. Palm, the elected judge of Swedish nationality (Article 43 of the Convention)2 (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On the same day, in the presence of the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mrs D. Bindschedler-Robert, Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr J. Pinheiro Farinha, Mr R. Bernhardt, Mr J. De Meyer, Mr S.K. Martens and Mr J.M. Morenilla (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43).

Mr Ryssdal assumed the office of President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5) and, through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Government, the Delegate of the Commission and the lawyer for the applicant on the need for a written procedure (Rule 37 para. 1). Thereafter, in accordance with the President’s orders, the Registrar received on 8 October 1990 the Government’s memorial, on 8 and 22 April 1991 the applicant’s claims under Article 50 (art. 50) and on 15 March and 22 April 1991 certain documents from the files of the Commission. In a letter of 12 November 1990 the Secretary to the Commission informed the Registrar that the Delegate would submit her observations at the hearing.

Having consulted, through the Registrar, those who would be appearing before the Court, the President directed on 15 November 1990 that the oral proceedings should open on 22 April 1991 (Rule 38).

On 23 November 1990 the Chamber decided unanimously, under Rule 51, to relinquish jurisdiction forthwith in favour of the plenary Court.

The hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on the appointed day. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand. There appeared before the Court:

for the Government Mr H. Corell, Ambassador, Under-Secretary for Legal and Consular Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Agent, Ms A.-S. Broqvist, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Justice, Ms E. Jagander, Legal Adviser, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Advisers;

for the Commission Mrs G.H. Thune, Delegate;

for the applicant Mr C. Arnewid, advokat, Counsel, Mr L. Hök, advokat, Adviser. The Court heard addresses by Mr Corell for the Government, Mrs Thune for the Commission and Mr Arnewid for the applicant, as well as their replies to its questions.

At the final deliberations Mr Cremona, the Vice-President of the Court, replaced Mr Ryssdal as President, the latter being unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rule 9).

AS TO THE FACTS

I. PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

Mr Jan-Åke Andersson, a Swedish citizen, is an engineer by profession and resides in Torsås in the South-West of Sweden.

On 26 February 1983 the applicant was stopped by police inspector B. while driving a tractor on a highway (motortrafikled), on which this was prohibited under the Traffic Ordinance of 1972 (vägtrafikkungörelsen 1972:603 - “the 1972 Ordinance“). He refused to pay a fine, maintaining that he had not seen any road sign indicating the category of the road or the prohibition in question.

On 17 May 1983 Mr Andersson was summoned to appear before the District Court (tingsrätten) of Ronneby, charged with having contravened sections 139 and 144 of the 1972 Ordinance. In a letter to the District Court he stated that he expected the public prosecutor to call certain police officers, including police inspector B., as witnesses, as he could not afford to call any himself. Moreover, the public prosecutor should, he said, produce the relevant official meteorological records (see the extracts from the District Court’s judgment in paragraph 12 below). In addition, he requested the District Court to appoint an official defence counsel. On 8 June 1983 this request was refused by the District Court, which considered that the case was simple and that the applicant was able to defend himself. His appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal (hovrätten) of Skåne and Blekinge on 15 June 1983, with no possibility of further appeal.

On 21 September 1983 the District Court held a hearing (huvudförhandling) during which both the applicant and police inspector B. were heard. It did not, however, order the production of the relevant meteorological records. On the same day it found the applicant guilty of the charge brought against him and sentenced him to a fine of 400 Swedish kronor. In its judgment the District Court stated: “[The applicant] has contested criminal liability and has made the following statement: He was on his way from Hässleholm to Torsås driving a tractor that he had just bought. He had travelled with his father to Hässleholm that morning and they had then, inter alia, travelled the same road but in the opposite direction. The mist had been very dense already in the morning and [the applicant] had observed nothing special as regards the road during the trip. He does not know what the concept ‘motortrafikled’ means. When he arrived on the ‘motortrafikled’ west of Karlshamn it was so misty that he saw no road signs that attracted his attention. He was therefore unaware of the character of the road he was driving on and even if he had noticed a road sign indicating ‘motortrafikled’ he would not have known what restrictions this would imply as regards driving certain vehicles. Police inspector B. has been heard as a witness but has not given any information other than that the weather was normal in the area of Ronneby without any signs of mist. [The applicant] - who was driving as alleged by the public prosecutor - drove a long distance by tractor and should therefore have paid particular attention to the rules applicable as regards the driving of such a vehicle. The fact that the weather was misty does not relieve him from his obligations as a driver. He shall therefore be convicted in accordance with the charge against him.“

On 4 October 1983 the applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal of Skåne and Blekinge. He claimed that the proceedings before the District Court had been “unbalanced“ and that numerous “interruptions“ by the judge had prevented him from following the arguments and from presenting his case in a satisfactory manner; that the fine imposed was far too high; and furthermore, that the District Court had overlooked the fact that certain road signs had been missing. In his reply of 31 October 1983, the public prosecutor, referring to the evidence submitted before the District Court, maintained that the applicant was guilty and expressed the opinion that it was not necessary to hold a new hearing. On 2 November the Court of Appeal sent a copy of this reply to the applicant, advising him that since the case could be adjudicated without a new hearing, he was entitled to submit final written observations within two weeks. In his final observations of 9 November 1983, Mr Andersson asked the Court of Appeal to take the absence of certain road signs into account and to consider the weather situation and the fact that he was overtaken by an unmarked police car which failed to warn him. He also applied for a public hearing to be held in Karlskrona, for police inspector B. to be heard as a witness and for the relevant meteorological records to be examined. In addition, he requested free legal assistance since he needed defence counsel and did not have sufficient means to pay for one.

The Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s requests and decided the case on the basis of the case-file. In its judgment of 10 February 1984, upholding the findings of the District Court, it stated: “From the photos which have been referred to, it appears that the fact that the road in question was a ‘motortrafikled’ did appear from appropriate and visible road signs at Stensnäs. For this reason and since [the applicant] nevertheless drove the tractor on [the road] from Stensnäs to Sörby, he committed the offence with which he has been charged by the prosecution.“

Mr Andersson applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (högsta domstolen), claiming that the appeal proceedings had been very “unbalanced“ and had not complied with human-rights standards. The Supreme Court refused the application on 26 April 1984.

Under the rules on public access to official documents, contained in the Freedom of the Press Act 1949 (tryckfrihetsförordningen) and the Secrecy Act (sekretesslagen, 1980:100), the case-files from the courts involved were all accessible to the public.