PROCEDURE

The case originated in an application (no. 49490/08) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Ms Grace Przybylska-Conroy (“the applicant”), on 1 October 2008.

The applicant was represented by Mr J. Pruchniewski, a lawyer practising in Poznań. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On 8 June 2009 the President of the Fourth Section of the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 3).

On 23 December 2009 the Government submitted a unilateral declaration and invited the Court to strike out the application, in accordance with Article 37 of the Convention. The applicant filed an objection.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in New York, USA.

A. Main proceedings [civil proceedings for division of matrimonial property]

On 19 January 1987 the applicant lodged a request for the division of matrimonial property with the Poznań District Court (Sąd Rejonowy).

A hearing, held on 14 December 1987, was adjourned to give the parties an opportunity to settle the case. However, they apparently failed to do so and on 13 April 1988 the first hearing on the merits was held.

Between 18 May 1988 and 26 April 1993, the District Court scheduled 21 hearings, 13 of which were adjourned mostly due to the failure of witnesses to appear or for lack of documents which the parties were expected to supply. During that period the court asked experts to prepare six opinions and supplementary opinions on the value of the matrimonial property.

In the meantime, on 2 February 1993, the case was assigned to another judge.

Between 1 July 1993 and 28 May 2004 the District Court scheduled 49 hearings, 28 of which were adjourned. One hearing was adjourned due to the failure of the applicant to appear. During that period the court asked experts to prepare 10 reports and supplementary opinions on the value of the matrimonial property.

On 4 June 2004 the Poznań District Court gave a decision. The applicant appealed.

On 21 March 2006 the Poznań Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) partly quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case.

Between 13 November 2006 and 18 February 2008 the District Court scheduled 6 hearings, during which the witnesses and the applicant were heard.

On 17 March 2008 the Poznań District Court gave a decision. The applicant appealed.

On 22 December 2008 the Poznań Regional Court dismissed the appeal.0

B. Proceedings under the 2004 Act

On 29 February 2008 the applicant lodged with the Poznań Regional Court a complaint under section 5 of the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”) which entered into force on 17 September 2004. She sought a ruling declaring that the length of the proceedings before the Poznań District Court had been excessive and an award of just satisfaction in the amount of 10,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approx. 2,500 euros (EUR)).

On 29 April 2008 the Poznań Regional Court dismissed her complaint. It limited its examination of the length of the proceedings to the period after 15 November 2005. On that date the Poznań Regional Court had analysed the conduct of the District Court following the complaint lodged by the applicant's former husband ‑ the other party to the proceedings. The excessive length of the proceedings in question had been acknowledged and just satisfaction in the amount of 4,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approx. 1,000 euros (EUR)) was granted to him. Having analysed the conduct of the District Court during the period after 15 November 2005, the Regional Court found that the proceedings had been conducted with due diligence and within a reasonable time. The court stressed that the conduct of the District Court could not be analysed twice, especially since there had been no undue delay after this date.