PROCEDURE

The case originated in an application (no. 53741/00) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a United Kingdom national, Mr Stephen Alexander Crowther (“the applicant”), on 9 February 1999.

The applicant was represented by Mr P.A. Kealey, a lawyer practising in Londonderry. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Willmott, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The applicant alleged, in particular, that the criminal proceedings against him had not been determined within a reasonable time.

The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

By a decision of 8 July 2003, the Court declared the application partly admissible. The Chamber decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 3 in fine).

On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly composed Fourth Section (Rule 52 § 1).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in East Sussex.

On 17 May 1990 the applicant was arrested, questioned at a police station in connection with an alleged importation of drugs, then refused bail and remanded in custody. On 18 December 1990, after a week-long jury trial, he was convicted of conspiracy to import a controlled drug and on 21 March 1991 he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. On the same date, a confiscation order in the sum of GBP 22,000 was imposed, with a term of 18 months' imprisonment to be served consecutively to his main sentence if he failed to make the payment by 21 March 1992.

At the time of the applicant's conviction Her Majesty's Customs and Excise (henceforth, “Customs”) were in possession of a Rolex watch and GBP 2,600 belonging to the applicant. According to the Government, the applicant was informed by a letter dated 16 May 1991 that the order had been registered with Chichester Magistrates' Court, but the applicant denies ever having received such a letter.

On 30 September 1991 Customs wrote to the solicitors who had acted for the applicant at trial and asked how and when he intended to pay the sum ordered. According to the applicant, the solicitors, who had ceased to act for him in May 1991, never informed him of this letter. They wrote to Customs on 7 November 1991 that they had no instructions from the applicant.

On 20 March 1992 the Magistrates' Court wrote to Customs to enquire whether action would be taken to enforce the order in default of payment. Customs replied on 23 March 1992 that the sum ordered had not been paid and that they were considering applying for a distress warrant to be issued in respect of the watch and a receiver to be appointed to deal with the applicant's property.

By a letter dated 8 April 1992, the Magistrates' Court informed Customs that a distress warrant could not be issued. In another letter, dated 12 August 1992, the magistrates sought information from Customs about the appointing of a receiver. Customs replied on 22 October 1992 that the sum ordered had not been paid, but that they had not applied to the High Court to appoint a receiver in the attempt to identify any realisable assets held by the applicant and that they were awaiting further instructions from their Asset Forfeiture Unit.

The applicant was released from prison in May 1994. He had not paid the money due under the confiscation order, but the order had not been enforced.

By a letter dated 24 October 1995 Customs contacted the Magistrates' Court to discover whether payment had been made. The court replied on 27 October 1995 that it had not. On 23 January 1996 Customs contacted the applicant's former solicitors to inform them that they intended to enforce payment of the order.

On 29 February 1996 Customs asked the court to issue a distress warrant in respect of the watch. This was issued in March 1996 and an executed copy of the warrant was sent to Customs in May 1996.

On 25 June 1996 a warrant was issued for the applicant's arrest to bring him to court for a means inquiry to take place in respect of the sum of GBP 17,670 outstanding on the order. The inquiry took place on 10 July 1996. The applicant attended but was not represented. The proceedings were adjourned at the applicant's request to allow him to seek legal aid and a Certificate of Inadequacy (which would dispense him from the obligation to pay the order). According to the Government, the proceedings were adjourned a further twelve times over the following seventeen months at the applicant's request. The applicant denies requesting so many adjournments.

On 18 November 1997 the High Court dismissed the applicant's application for a Certificate of Inadequacy. On 10 December 1997 the Magistrates' Court ordered that proceedings to enforce the confiscation order should take place. The proceedings were subsequently adjourned several more times, but the reason for the adjournments is not clear.

On 13 May 1998 the case was listed for 3 June 1998, and on the latter date the applicant was committed to prison for 15 months for non-payment of the sum outstanding.

On 7 August 1998 the applicant was granted leave by the High Court to apply for judicial review of the magistrates' decision. On 14 October 1998 the High Court refused his application for judicial review, holding that there was no reason to construe the word “consecutive” in the confiscation order in such a strict manner as to mean “in unbroken succession to the time served under the original order”. Lord Justice Brooke in the High Court described the delay on the part of the enforcement authorities between October 1992 and January 1996 in enforcing the order as “wholly unexplained”, and Mr Justice Sedley observed that the “Customs and Excise's inertia between March 1992 and January 1996 was both inexcusable and, given that somebody's liberty was involved, unconscionable”. However, the High Court held that, as a matter of English law, once the confiscation order had been made the onus was on the applicant to pay, and “any continuing lapse of time is then in the eye of the law a product of the failure to pay, not of the failure to enforce”. On 19 October 1998 the High Court refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords.