PROCEDURE

The case was referred to the Court on 18 December 1995 by the applicant, Mr Rolf Gustafson, a Swedish national, within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 of the Convention (art. 32-1, art. 47). It originated in an application (no. 23196/94) against the Kingdom of Sweden lodged by the applicant with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission“) under Article 25 (art. 25) on 5 November 1993. The applicant’s application bringing the case before the Court referred to Article 48 of the Convention (art. 48), as amended by Protocol No. 9 (P9), which has been ratified by Sweden. The object of the application was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1).

On 29 March 1996 the Court’s Screening Panel decided not to decline consideration of the case and to submit it to the Court (Article 48 para. 2 of the Convention) (art. 48-2).

In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 35 para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court B, the applicant designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule 31).

The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mrs E. Palm, the elected judge of Swedish nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 4 (b)). On 27 April 1996, in the presence of the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mr F. Matscher, Mr B. Walsh, Mr C. Russo, Mr J. De Meyer, Mr J.M. Morenilla, Mr B. Repik and Mr P. Jambrek (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 5) (art. 43).

As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6), Mr Ryssdal, acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Government, the applicant’s lawyer and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 39 para. 1 and 40). Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the Registrar received the applicant’s memorial on 25 October 1996 and the Government’s memorial on 6 November 1996.

On 15 January and 3 February 1997 the Commission produced various documents from the file on the proceedings before it, as requested by the Registrar on the President’s instructions.

On 20 January 1997 the Chamber, having regard to the views expressed by the applicant, the Agent of the Government and the Delegate of the Commission, decided to dispense with a hearing in the case, having satisfied itself that the condition for this derogation from its usual procedure had been met (Rules 27 and 40). On 22 and 30 January 1997 the Registrar received supplementary memorials from the applicant and the Government. On 3 February 1997 the Delegate informed the Registrar that he did not wish to submit written observations in reply to these memorials.

AS TO THE FACTS

I. Circumstances of the case

The applicant is a Swedish citizen resident in Stockholm. Since 1973 he has spent a total of eight years in prison for the commission of serious economic offences. Most recently, in October 1996 he was sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment for a serious forgery offence.

The applicant claims that on two occasions, in April-June and June‑July 1991, he was the victim of kidnapping and extortion perpetrated by three persons. According to the applicant, one of the alleged perpetrators, a certain Mr L., had wanted to be paid for the part he played with him in the commission of certain economic crimes.

On 25 March 1993 the public prosecutor charged L. with one count of kidnapping on 17 April 1991, one count of aggravated extortion committed between 17 April 1991 and June 1991 and one count of kidnapping and aggravated extortion committed between 27 June and 3 July 1991. No proceedings were instituted against the other two persons, one of whom had been named by the applicant as a certain Mr P. (see paragraph 17 below).

A. Proceedings before the Stockholm District Court

In the criminal proceedings instituted against L. before the Stockholm District Court (tingsrätt), the applicant requested the court, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 22 of the Code of Judicial Procedure (Rättegångsbalken: see paragraph 20 below), to order L. to pay him a total of 169,350 Swedish kronor (SEK) in compensation in respect of the following items: (a) SEK 9,350 in material damages to his clothes; (b) SEK 10,000 in non-pecuniary damages for injury caused to his head; (c) SEK 50,000 for suffering resulting from an eye injury; (d) SEK 100,000 in non-pecuniary damages for the mental suffering caused by the two alleged kidnappings (see paragraph 9 above). The applicant reserved his right to present further claims in respect of any such damage as he might suffer in the future.

B. The applicant’s claim for compensation before the Criminal Damage Compensation Board

On 15 April 1993 the applicant applied for compensation to the Criminal Damage Compensation Board (Brottsskadenämnden - hereinafter “the Board“) under the Criminal Damage Act 1978 (brottsskadelagen 1978:413 - hereinafter “the 1978 Act“; see paragraphs 20-29 below). In his application he stated that he had sought compensation for personal injury in the amount of SEK 160,000 in the proceedings against L. and that he had reserved his right to make any further claims with regard to future damage. In view of the rules on prescription of compensation claims, he submitted to the Board at that stage a claim for compensation of SEK 160,000 along the lines stated above. He enclosed a copy of the indictment against L.

C. The decision of the Stockholm District Court

On 28 April 1993 the Stockholm District Court convicted L., sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay SEK 144,350 in damages to the applicant. The District Court found, inter alia, that, on the whole, the applicant could not be considered a particularly trustworthy person in view of the fact that he had been convicted of several economic offences (see paragraph 8 above). It stated, however, that this fact did not in itself mean that his allegations concerning his kidnapping and extortion were untrue and it found the evidence to be such that the prosecution’s case against L. had been partially proven.

D. The decision of the Svea Court of Appeal

On 2 July 1993 the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt) reversed the District Court’s decision on the ground that the charges against L. had not been proven, acquitted L. and rejected the applicant’s claim for compensation. The Court of Appeal found that the applicant, in view of his criminal background, could not be deemed a trustworthy person. It followed that the information he had provided on the events which had given rise to the charges against L. (åtalade händelserna) could not, in the absence of strong supporting evidence, ground L.’s conviction, even though the applicant’s evidence had been corroborated by others whom he had told about the incidents. The applicant did not seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) against the decision.

E. The Board’s examination of the applicant’s claim

On 12 August 1993 the applicant, referring to his application for compensation of 15 April 1993 (see paragraph 12 above), asked the Board to proceed with its examination of his claim, stating that he had no insurance which would cover the damage in question. He supplied the Board with copies of the judgments of the District Court and the Court of Appeal.

On 26 August 1993 the Board rejected the applicant’s compensation claim, stating as follows: “A condition for a grant of compensation is that damage has in fact been caused by crime. The Board ... cannot find it established that [the applicant] has suffered damage as a result of crime. Consequently, compensation for damage caused by crime cannot be awarded.“

F. The Board’s reconsideration of the claim

On 11 November 1993 the applicant requested the Board to reconsider its decision. He argued that it was clear from the judgments of the District Court and the Court of Appeal that he had been the victim of a crime and that he had suffered the damage for which he requested compensation. He had identified two of the three persons who were allegedly involved in the offences; the fact that the Court of Appeal had not found it proven that the only one to be charged, L., was guilty was not a reason to doubt that he had been the victim of crime. In support of his request for reconsideration of the decision the applicant submitted a copy of the investigation report concerning the alleged kidnappings and extortions, including a medical report drawn up on 25 February 1993 by Dr Lennart Berglin, a Deputy Senior Physician. According to this report, on 4 July 1991 the applicant had sought emergency care for his right eye, which he stated had been punched. He had been operated on by Dr Berglin on 5 July 1991 and had remained hospitalised until 15 July 1991. On 26 February 1992 he underwent a further operation. Dr Berglin concluded in his report that the applicant’s eye injury could have been caused by a punch. The applicant also submitted a transcript of the testimony given by Crime Inspector S. at the District Court’s oral hearing in the criminal proceedings against L. Inspector S. had been the principal investigator into the economic offences of which the applicant had previously been convicted. He had interrogated both the applicant and L. on a number of occasions. Inspector S. had told the District Court, inter alia: “I was, probably on 4 July 1991, informed [about the alleged kidnapping of the applicant]. A colleague ... telephoned me to say that he had been informed that [the applicant] had been kidnapped ..., that the kidnapping had been staged by [L.] with the help of two ‘gorillas’, ... and that the kidnapping had been combined with an extortion threat against [the applicant] in the amount of SEK 5 million. ... I then ... telephoned [the applicant], who ... denied that he had been kidnapped ... ... I saw [the applicant] in August [1991] in connection with ... criminal proceedings brought against him ... and noted that he had a bruise at [one of] his eye[s]. I asked him what had happened and he stated that he had been the victim of a robbery committed by some persons ... ... Probably in May 1992 [the applicant] mentioned the kidnappings when he was being interrogated as a suspect in another case ... He stated that [they had been carried out] by two black men and a third one, whom he did not wish to name ... He repeated several times that one kidnapping had taken place in April [1991] and [the other] towards the end of June [1991], lasting until the beginning of July [1991] ... We took [the applicant’s statements] seriously ... I have come to know [the applicant] so well that I can somehow see when he is lying or when he is telling the truth ... Having been asked on a number of occasions to name the perpetrators, [the applicant] stated that he would do so, but not right away ... In the autumn [of 1991] he named one of the assistants [during the kidnappings], [P.] ... [The applicant’s description of the environment and premises where he had been kept during the kidnappings] was very accurate as regards many details ...“

Both Dr Berglin’s report and Crime Inspector S.’s testimony had in essence been reproduced in the District Court’s judgment. Inspector S. had also been heard orally before the Court of Appeal, where he had more or less repeated the same evidence he gave to the District Court.

On 1 June 1994 the Board rejected the applicant’s request, for the following reasons: “The submissions in this case in support of the request for reconsideration are not such as to be a reason for the Board to change its previous decision. Nor is there any other reason for changing the decision.“