Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December 2003  [on the report of the First Committee (A/58/462)]  58/51.  Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda        The General Assembly,    Recalling its resolutions 53/77 Y of 4 December 1998, 54/54 G of 1 December  1999, 55/33 C of 20 November 2000 and 57/59 of 22 November 2002,    Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons is a threat to the survival of  humanity and that the only real guarantee against the use or threat of use of these  weapons is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be used  or produced again,    Convinced also that the retention of nuclear weapons carries the inherent risk  of proliferation of those weapons and their falling into the hands of non-State actors,    Reaffirming that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are  equally important and mutually reinforcing processes requiring continuous  irreversible progress on both fronts,    Declaring that the participation of the international community as a whole is  central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and stability, and  that international security is a collective concern requiring collective engagement,    Declaring also that internationally negotiated treaties in the field of  disarmament have made a fundamental contribution to international peace and  security, and that unilateral and bilateral nuclear disarmament measures complement  the treaty-based multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament,    Noting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality  of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996,1    Declaring that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear  weapons by the nuclear-weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and  sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of  the maintenance of international peace and security,    Declaring that each article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear  Weapons2 is binding on the States parties at all times and in all circumstances and  _______________  1 A/51/218, annex; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.  Reports 1996, p. 226.  2 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.   A/RES/58/51  2  that it is imperative that all States parties be held fully accountable with respect to  the strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty, and that the  undertakings therein on nuclear disarmament have been given and implementation  of them remains imperative,    Expressing its deep concern at the limited progress made to date in  implementing the thirteen steps on nuclear disarmament, and determined to  implement these thirteen practical steps, to which all States parties agreed at the  2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  Nuclear Weapons,3    Expressing its deep concern at the continued failure of the Conference on  Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament and to resume negotiations on a  non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty  banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other devices,  taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation  objectives,    Expressing grave concern that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty4  has not yet entered into force,    Stressing the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,    Noting the successful completion in September 2002 of the first phase of the  Trilateral Initiative, involving the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian  Federation and the United States of America, which aims to enable the placement of  excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons under international safeguards,    Convinced that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons  constitutes an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process,    Noting that, despite bilateral agreements, there is no sign of engagement of all  of the five nuclear-weapon States in the multilateral process leading to the total  elimination of nuclear weapons,    Declaring that it is essential that the fundamental principles of transparency,  verification and irreversibility apply to all nuclear disarmament measures,    Expressing its deep concern at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons  option by those three States, India, Israel and Pakistan, that have not yet acceded to  the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that operate  unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, in particular given the effects of regional volatility  on international security, and, in this context, the continued regional tensions and  deteriorating security situation in South Asia and the Middle East,    Expressing also its deep concern at the announcement by the Democratic  People’s Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  Nuclear Weapons and at its decision to restart the Yongbyon nuclear reactor without  International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,  _______________  3 See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled “Article VI and eighth  to twelfth preambular paragraphs”, para. 15.  4 See resolution 50/245.   A/RES/58/51  3    Expressing concern that the development of missile defences could impact  negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms  race on earth and in outer space,    Stressing that no actions be taken that would lead to the weaponization of outer  space,    Expressing its deep concern about emerging approaches to the broader role of  nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including rationalizations for the use,  and the possible development, of new types of nuclear weapons,    Welcoming further the progress in the development of nuclear-weapon-free  zones,    Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration,5 in which the heads of  State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass  destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for  achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international  conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,    Taking into consideration the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon  States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total  elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all  the States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty,6    1.  Reaffirms that any possibility that nuclear weapons could be used  represents a continued risk for humanity;    2.  Calls upon all States to refrain from any action that could lead to a new  nuclear-arms race or that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation;    3.  Calls upon all States to fulfil all their obligations under international  treaties and international law in the field of nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation;    4.  Calls upon all States parties to pursue, with determination, the full and  effective implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference  of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,7 the  outcome of which provides the requisite plan to achieve nuclear disarmament;    5.  Agrees on the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications  required to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty;4    6.  Calls for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear- weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force  of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;  _______________  5 See resolution 55/2.  6 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final  Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled “Article VI and eighth to  twelfth preambular paragraphs”, para. 15:6.  7 See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I.   A/RES/58/51  4    7.  Underlines the urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive  Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the context of the progress achieved in implementing the  international monitoring system;    8.  Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to implement the commitments  made in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,2 as well as in  other nuclear disarmament or reductions agreements or initiatives, and to apply the  principle of irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads and avoid keeping  them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment;    9.  Acknowledges that the reductions in the number of deployed strategic  nuclear warheads envisaged by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (“the  Moscow Treaty”)8 represent a positive first step, and calls on the United States of  America and the Russian Federation to make the Treaty verifiable, irreversible and  transparent and to address non-operational warheads, thus making it an effective  nuclear disarmament measure;    10. Agrees that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should  be accorded a higher priority as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear  weapons and be carried out in a comprehensive manner, including:    (a)  Further reductions in and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons  based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear-arms reduction  and disarmament process;    (b)  The implementation of reductions in a transparent, verifiable and  irreversible manner;    (c)  The preservation, reaffirmation and implementation of the 1991 and 1992  presidential nuclear initiatives of the United States of America and the Union of  Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation on non-strategic nuclear weapons;    (d)  The formalization by the Russian Federation and the United States of  America of their presidential nuclear initiatives into legal instruments and the  initiation of negotiations on further reductions of such weapons;    (e)  The enhancement of special security and physical protection measures  for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and  related materials through, inter alia, the placing of such weapons in physically  secure central storage sites with a view to their removal and subsequent elimination  by the nuclear-weapon States as a part of the nuclear disarmament process to which  they are committed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  as well as the necessary steps to be taken by all nuclear-weapon States in possession  of such weapons in this regard;    (f)  The achievement of further confidence-building and transparency  measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;    (g)  The achievement of concrete agreed measures to reduce further the  operational status of non-strategic nuclear weapons systems so as to reduce the risk  of use of non-strategic nuclear weapons;    (h)  The undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States that possess these  weapons not to increase the number or types of weapons deployed and not to  develop new types of these weapons or rationalizations for their use;  _______________  8 See CD/1674.   A/RES/58/51  5    (i)  The prohibition of those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that have  already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States and the  development of transparency mechanisms for the verification of the elimination of  these weapons;    11. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to increase their transparency and  accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their  implementation of disarmament measures;    12. Agrees that the Conference on Disarmament should establish, without  delay, an appropriate ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament;    13. Agrees that the Conference on Disarmament should resume negotiations  on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable  treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other  nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and  nuclear non-proliferation objectives;    14. Agrees that the Conference on Disarmament should complete the  examination and updating of the mandate on the prevention of an arms race in outer  space in all its aspects, as contained in its decision of 13 February 1992,9 and re- establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible;    15. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the necessary steps  towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process  leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;    16. Notes that the third and, as appropriate, fourth meetings of the  Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty  on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, taking into account the deliberations  and results of the previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a report  containing recommendations to the Review Conference;    17. Stresses the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in  the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;    18. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing  commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of  multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear- weapon States parties;    19. Notes the proposals on security assurances that have been submitted to  the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and  calls upon the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference to allow  time to thoroughly consider the matter of security assurances at its third meeting so  as to make recommendations to the Review Conference on how to take the matter  forward;    20. Calls upon those three States, India, Israel and Pakistan, which are not  yet parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and which  operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear- weapon States promptly and without condition, to bring into force the required  comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, consistent  with the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the  _______________  9 CD/1125.   A/RES/58/51  6  International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by  the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May  1997,10 for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and to reverse clearly and urgently  any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain  from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security  and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the  prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;    21. Reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally  recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at  among the States of the regions concerned enhances global and regional peace and  security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards  realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament;    22.  Expresses concern at tensions in the Middle East and South Asia, and renews  support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other  weapons of mass destruction and of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;    23. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope  safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to  conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the  Model Protocol;    24. Calls upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to reconsider its  recent announcements, with a view to being in full compliance with the provisions  of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in this connection  supports all diplomatic efforts for an early, peaceful resolution of the situation and  for the establishment of an area free of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula;    25. Stresses that the International Atomic Energy Agency must be able to  verify and ensure that nuclear facilities of the States parties to the Treaty on the  Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are being used for peaceful purposes only,  and calls on States to cooperate fully and immediately with the Agency in resolving  issues arising from the implementation of their respective obligations towards it;    26. Calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to  approach the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out the verification  requirements set forth in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement  signed by the two States on the basis of the model legal framework that has been  agreed on and that is now available to be used in new verification agreements  between the Agency and each of the two States;    27. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the  placing, as soon as practicable, of their fissile material no longer required for  military purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant  international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such  material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains  permanently outside military programmes;    28. Affirms that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the  underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument  or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;  _______________  10 International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).   A/RES/58/51  7    29. Acknowledges the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation  of resolution 57/59,11 and requests him to prepare a report, within existing  resources, on the implementation of the present resolution;    30. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session an  item entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda”, and to review  the implementation of the present resolution at that session.    71st plenary meeting  8 December 2003  _______________  11 A/58/162 and Add.1.