Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 July 2026 on the Polish Defence Investment Fund (CON/2026/23)
Date: 2026-07-28
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: legal basis

ECB-PUBLIC 

EN 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 28 July 2026 

on the Polish Defence Investment Fund 

(CON/2026/23) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On  15  April  2026  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the  Marshal  of  the  Polish 

Parliament for an opinion on two alternative draft laws on the Polish Defence Investment Fund 1: a draft law 

submitted by the President of Poland on 10 March 2026 (hereinafter the ‘presidential draft law’), and a draft 

law  submitted  by  a  group  of  Members  of  the  Polish  Parliament  on  24  March  2026  (hereinafter  the 

‘parliamentary draft law’, and together with the presidential draft law, the ‘draft laws’). On 14 July 2026 the 

Marshal confirmed to the ECB that he maintains his request of 15 April 2026 for an opinion on the draft 

laws. 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of Council Decision 98/415/EC2, as the 

draft  laws  concern  Narodowy  Bank  Polski  (NBP).  In  accordance  with  Article 17.5,  first  sentence,  of  the 

Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft laws 

1.1  The draft laws establish the Polish Defence Investment Fund (hereinafter the ‘Fund’) as a special-

purpose public fund administered by Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), Poland’s wholly State-

owned  development  bank.  As  noted  in  the  explanatory  memoranda  accompanying  the  draft  laws 

(hereinafter  the  ‘explanatory  memoranda’),  BGK  was  selected  due  to  its  experience  in  managing 

statutory funds and its operational capacity in areas such as cash pooling, accounting, debt servicing 

and liquidity management. 

1.2  The Fund's primary purpose is to finance the technical modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces 

and  other  tasks  aimed  at  strengthening  national  security.  Expenditure  is  to  be  governed  by  a 

multiannual defence investment programme (hereinafter the ‘Multiannual Programme’) prepared by 

the  Minister  for  National  Defence  and  adopted  by  the  Fund's  governing  bodies.  The  Multiannual 

Programme  is  to  cover  a  period  of  at  least  three  years  and  set  out  the  timetable,  priorities  and 

expenditure limits for all tasks financed from the Fund. 

1.3  The draft laws provide that the Fund is to be financed from: (a) payments from NBP’s annual profit 

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2  

Ustawa o Polskim Funduszu Inwestycji Obronnych. 

Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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pursuant to the amended Article 69(4) of the Law on NBP3; (b) loans and bonds issued by BGK on 

domestic and foreign markets; (c) interest on the Fund’s deposited cash resources; and (d) other 

sources. The draft laws provide that if the amount of the payment made by NBP to the Fund in a 

given financial year is lower than the amount provided for that year in the Multiannual Programme, 

BGK  is  to  grant  the  Fund  a  loan  reflecting  the  difference  between  these  amounts,  which  is  to  be 

repaid  from  funds  of  the  Fund  derived  from  payments  of  the  profits  of  NBP  made  in  subsequent 

financial years.  

1.4  The context for the  NBP profit  distribution  mechanism is set out in both explanatory memoranda, 

noting that, according to a concept jointly presented by the President of Poland and the Governor of 

NBP on 4 March 2026, NBP’s profit resulting from, inter alia, the rising market valuation of Poland’s 

gold reserves is to be directed to the Fund. Both memoranda further note that NBP has increased its 

gold reserves to over 550 tonnes in recent years and that the sharp rise in global gold prices means 

that Poland holds substantial reserve assets that could support defence modernisation. 

1.5  The draft laws are broadly similar in structure and share the same underlying objective, but differ on 

(a) the minimum level of the NBP profit payment to the Fund; (b) the composition and voting rules of 

the  Fund's  governing  bodies;  and  (c)  the  degree  of  presidential  control  over  the  Fund’s  strategic 

decisions. 

1.6 

In particular, the presidential draft law replaces Article 69(4) of the Law on NBP with a requirement 

that part of NBP’s annual profit is to be transferred to the Fund within 14 days of the date of approval 

of NBP’s annual accounts, without specifying any minimum proportion. The parliamentary draft law 

replaces Article 69(4) of the Law on NBP with a requirement that part of NBP’s annual profit is to be 

transferred to the Fund and explicitly stipulates that, for the years 2026 to 2035, the amount of the 

transfer may not be less than nine-tenths of the annual profit. 

1.7  Both draft laws address the scenario in which NBP profits are insufficient to meet the financing needs 

under the Multiannual Programme. In such cases, BGK would be required to grant the Fund a loan 

equivalent to the shortfall, guaranteed by the State Treasury and to be repaid from funds of the Fund 

derived from payments of the profits of NBP. A similar mechanism would apply in the period between 

the entry into force of the draft laws and the first NBP profit payment for 2026. 

1.8  The regulatory impact assessment attached to the parliamentary draft law identifies several elements 

that  depart  from  the  standard  model  of  State  financial  management,  including  the  statutory 

earmarking of NBP profit for the Fund, the possibility of incurring significant multiannual liabilities, 

the  bridging  loan  and  BGK  loan  mechanisms,  and  the  State  Treasury  guarantee.  The  regulatory 

impact  assessment  also  highlights  a  constitutional  risk  in  the  light  of  Article  227  of  the  Polish 

Constitution,  which  governs  NBP’s  institutional  position  and  independence  as  the  State’s  central 

bank,  as  well  as  a  material  economic  risk  arising  from  the  reliance  of  a  significant  portion  of  the 

Fund's financing on NBP profits, which are inherently volatile and not fully predictable. 

1.9  Both explanatory memoranda present the Fund as an option vis-à-vis the Union’s Security Action for 

3  

Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. o Narodowym Banku Polskim (consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw z 2022 r., poz. 
2025). Article 69(4) of the Law on NBP provides that within 14 days from the date of approval of the annual financial 
statements of NBP, part of NBP’s annual profit (payment from NBP’s profit) is transferred to the State budget. 

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Europe (‘SAFE’) programme, though the presidential draft law frames it as a full sovereign substitute, 

while the parliamentary draft law treats it as complementary to SAFE. 

2. 

General observations 

2.1  This opinion examines the  provisions of the draft laws in the  light of their context, specifically the 

scheme  established  for  financing  the  Fund,  which  involves  an  amendment  of  the  Law  on  NBP 

concerning NBP’s finances. 

2.2  Background context of the draft laws 

On 4 March 2026 the President of the Republic of Poland and the Governor of NBP issued a joint 

statement  on  a  concrete,  Polish,  secure  and  sovereign  alternative  to  SAFE  that  would  entail  no 

financial interest costs whatsoever. The ECB notes the Governor of NBP’s statement to the effect 

that NBP had developed a concept to support Poland’s defence efforts 4 and the Governor of NBP’s 

further  statement,  on  5  March  2026,  that  NBP  would  generate  a  very  large  profit  using  standard 

methods,  without  depleting  the  reserves,  ensuring  that  the  initiative  serves  solely  to  strengthen 

Poland’s defence 5. 

2.3  Source of NBP’s profits to be transferred to the Fund 

2.3.1  The ECB notes that in line with the prevailing European System of Central Banks (ESCB) accounting 
standards established in Guideline (EU) 2024/2941 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2024/31) 6, 
to which NBP accounting principles should conform pursuant to the Law on NBP 7, the rising market 

valuation of NBP’s gold reserves has resulted in an increase in NBP’s revaluation accounts. In these 

circumstances,  sales  of  gold  would  result  in  realised  gains,  impacting  on  NBP’s  profit  and  loss 

account  for  the  relevant  financial  year.  At  the  same  time,  the  transfer  of  these  gains  to  the  Fund 

would reduce NBP’s net equity, which currently benefits from the unrealised gains generated by the 

increase in the market price of gold. 

2.3.2  The  ECB  also  notes  that  NBP  has  reported  losses,  not  profits,  since  2022.  The  amount  of  these 

accumulated losses8 is such that NBP would have to make significant sales of gold to offset them9. 

3. 

Specific observations 

3.1  Principle of central bank independence 

3.1.1  As reflected in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the authors of the Treaty 

intended  to  ensure  that  the  ESCB  should  be  in  a  position  to  carry  out  independently  the  tasks 

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5  

6  

7  
8  

9  

Office of the President of the Republic of Poland, Conference on the ‘Polish SAFE 0%’, 4 March 2026, available on 
the official website of the President of the Republic of Poland at www.president.pl. 
National Bank of Poland, Press conference of NBP Governor Adam Glapiński on the financing of defence needs and 
the ‘Polish SAFE 0%’ initiative, video transmission, 11 March 2026, available on NBP’s website at www.nbp.pl. 
Guideline (EU) 2024/2941 of the European Central Bank of 14 November 2024 on the legal framework for accounting 
and financial reporting in the European System of Central Banks (ECB/2024/31) (OJ L, 2024/2941, 11.12.2024, ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2024/2941/oj). 

Article 67 of the Law on NBP. 
Uncovered  losses of  previous financial  years amounted to  PLN  -97,2 billion  of  which  PLN -35,7 billion occurred  in 
2025. 
Gold revaluation gains as at end-2025 stood at PLN 139,7 billion. 

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conferred upon it10. The main evidence of that intention is set out in Article 130 of the Treaty, which 

expressly prohibits the ECB, the national central banks (NCBs), and the members of their decision-

making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, 

from any government of  a Member State or from any other body, on the one hand, and prohibits 

those Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and any government of a Member State from 

seeking to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB and the NCBs in the 

performance of their tasks, on the other.  

3.1.2  Taking into account the NCBs’ hybrid status, the Court of Justice clarified that the principle of central 

bank independence does not necessarily apply in the same way when NCBs carry out tasks within 

the scope of the ESCB compared to when they perform tasks outside that scope11. Specifically, this 

includes  tasks  assigned  to  them  under  national  law  which,  in  the  case  of  Member  States  with  a 

derogation, have not yet been conferred on the Union, such as the management of foreign reserves. 

However,  as  highlighted  by  the  Court  of  Justice,  the  national  rules  established  for  that  purpose 

cannot, without infringing Article 130 of the Treaty, place the NCB concerned in a situation which in 

any way undermines its ability to carry out independently tasks within the scope of the ESCB12. 

3.1.3  Based on the reference in the explanatory memoranda to operations involving NBP’s gold reserves 

for  the  purpose  of  supporting  defence  modernisation,  the  ECB  understands  that  such  operations 

would not be driven by considerations relating to NBP’s task of managing foreign reserves. These 

gold operations are rather aimed at generating profits to finance the Fund.  

3.1.4  Considering the functional nature of Article 130 of the Treaty, the ECB notes that to ensure that NBP 

is in a position to act independently in pursuit of its objectives and in performing its tasks within the 

scope of the ESCB, the members of NBP’s decision-making bodies must not seek instructions from 

the government or from any other body to undertake operations involving NBP’s gold reserves for 

the purpose of financing the Fund. Likewise, the government must respect the principle of central 

bank  independence  and  not  seek  to  influence  the  members  of  NBP’s  decision-making  bodies  to 

undertake operations involving NBP’s gold reserves for the purpose of financing the Fund.   

3.1.5  Member States may not hamper NCBs from building up their reserve capital to the level necessary 

for a member of the ESCB to fulfil its tasks 13. Such obstruction would occur if NBP was required to 

transfer to the Fund the profits generated from realised gains on gold sales without first covering its 

accumulated  losses  and  creating  adequate  financial  provisions  to  safeguard  the  real  value  of  its 

capital and assets. In respect of the allocation of profits, the ECB has consistently held that profits 

may be distributed to the State budget only after any accumulated losses from previous years have 

been covered and financial provisions deemed necessary to safeguard the real value of the NCB’s 

10  

11  
12  
13  

Judgment  of  26  February  2019,  Rimšēvičs  and  ECB  v  Latvia,  C
paragraph 46; Judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, C-45/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraph 93. 
Judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, C-45/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraph 95. 

202/18  and  C

238/18,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:139, 

‑

‑

Judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, C-45/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraph 97. 
See, for example, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2012/69, paragraph 3.3.1 of Opinion CON/2012/73, paragraph 2.1.3 
of Opinion CON/2019/21, paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2020/7 and paragraph 13.3.6 of Opinion CON/2020/13. All 
ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 

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capital and assets have been created14. Hence, a transfer of profits to the Fund without first covering 

NBP’s accumulated losses would not be in line with the financial dimension of the principle of central 

bank independence.  

3.1.6  In addition, the requirement under the draft laws for repayment of BGK’s loan from funds of the Fund 

derived from payments of the profits of NBP could – particularly where NBP profits were insufficient 

to meet the financing needs under the Multiannual Programme – further hinder NBP from building 

up its reserve capital to the level necessary to fulfil its tasks within the scope of the ESCB.  

3.2  Monetary financing prohibition 

3.2.1  As reflected in the case-law of the Court of Justice, Article 131 of the Treaty expressly requires each 

Member State to ensure that its national legislation, including its NCB’s statutes, is compatible with 

the  Treaties.  The  standards  which  are  binding  on  the  Member  States  on  that  basis  include,  in 

particular,  Article 123  of  the  Treaty 15.  Article  123  of  the  Treaty  prohibits  the  central  banks  of  the 

Member States from granting any type of credit facility to public authorities and bodies of the Member 

States.  Based  on  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  3603/9316,  which  seeks  to  define  the  scope  of  the 

monetary  financing  prohibition,  this  includes  the  central  bank  assuming  obligations  vis-à-vis  third 

parties which could potentially be incumbent on other public authorities and bodies17. Considering 

the objective of Article 123 of the Treaty, the central bank could thus not validly be responsible, in 

place of the other public authorities and bodies, for the effective financing of obligations vis-à-vis third 

parties which might result from the economic policy choices made by those public authorities 18.  

3.2.2  It  is  apparent  from  the  above  that,  with  a  view  to  maintaining  the  impetus  for  a  sound  budgetary 

policy, the monetary financing prohibition does not allow an NCB to assume the financing of public 

expenditure, such as expenditure for defence policy.  

3.2.3  While gains resulting from the central bank’s management of gold reserves may generally have a 

positive impact on the financial result to be distributed to the State budget through the ordinary profit 

distribution mechanism, the relevant provisions on NBP finances must be compatible with Article 123 

of the Treaty 19.  

3.2.4  The draft laws, which include an amendment to Article 69(4) of the Law on NBP, provide for the Fund 

to be primarily financed from transfers from the annual profit of NBP. NBP would therefore in effect 

be primarily responsible for the financing of the Fund and therefore assume – contrary to the objective 

of  the  monetary  financing  prohibition  –  responsibility  for  the  financing  of  economic  policy  choices 

made by public authorities and bodies relating to the technical modernisation of the Polish Armed 

14  

15  
16  

17  
18  
19  

See paragraph 4.3 of Opinion CON/2009/85, paragraph 3.2.5 of Opinion CON/2017/17 and paragraph 3.8 of Opinion 
CON/2023/24.  

Judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, C-45/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraphs 58 and 59. 

Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions 
referred 
(OJ  L  332,  31.12.1993,  p.  1,  ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1993/3603/oj). 
Judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, C-45/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraph 67. 

in  Articles  104  and  104b 

the  Treaty 

(1)  of 

to 

Judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, C-45/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraphs 72 to 75. 
See paragraph 3.6 of Opinion CON/2019/23 and paragraph 2.8 of Opinion CON/2025/39.  

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Forces and other tasks aimed at strengthening national security. Sales of NBP’s gold reserves aimed 

at generating profits to be transferred to the Fund would constitute a circumvention of the prohibition 

under Article 123 of the Treaty which precludes central bank financing of public expenditure. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 July 2026. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

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