COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2026 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovakia Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2026 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2026-07-17
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Slovakia, administrative transparency, corruption, democracy, freedom of the press, human rights, independence of the judiciary, pluralism in the media, rule of law, whistleblowing

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 17.7.2026  SWD(2026) 925 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2026 Rule of Law Report                                  Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovakia Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2026 Rule of Law Report                                   The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2026) 900 final} - {SWD(2026) 901 final} - {SWD(2026) 902 final} - {SWD(2026) 903 final} - {SWD(2026) 904 final} - {SWD(2026) 905 final} - {SWD(2026) 906 final} - {SWD(2026) 907 final} - {SWD(2026) 908 final} - {SWD(2026) 909 final} - {SWD(2026) 910 final} - {SWD(2026) 911 final} - {SWD(2026) 912 final} - {SWD(2026) 913 final} - {SWD(2026) 914 final} - {SWD(2026) 915 final} - {SWD(2026) 916 final} - {SWD(2026) 917 final} - {SWD(2026) 918 final} - {SWD(2026) 919 final} - {SWD(2026) 920 final} - {SWD(2026) 921 final} - {SWD(2026) 922 final} - {SWD(2026) 923 final} - {SWD(2026) 924 final} - {SWD(2026) 926 final} - {SWD(2026) 927 final} - {SWD(2026) 928 final} - {SWD(2026) 929 final} - {SWD(2026) 930 final} - {SWD(2026) 931 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

Slovakia has continued engaging in an intensive dialogue with the Commission to resolve the 
issues identified in previous reports, including in the context of the Recovery and Resilience 
Plan  revision.  Amendments  to  the  judges’  laws  introduced  changes  to  the  system  of 
evaluation  of  judges  and  temporary  assignment  of  judges  to  a  higher  court,  broadening  the 
discretionary  power  of  the  Judicial  Council  and  court  presidents  over  judges’  careers.  The 
adopted  amendments  to  the  disciplinary  proceedings  for  judges,  prosecutors,  bailiffs  and 
notaries are subject to constitutional review. A draft amendment of the Constitution and the 
Judicial Council Act limiting the reasons for the dismissal of members of the Judicial Council 
is in the legislative process. The Government obtained an opinion of the Venice Commission 
on  draft  amendments  to  ensure  sufficient  safeguards  when  subjecting  judges  to  criminal 
liability for their decisions. A proposal abolishing the abuse of law offence was submitted to 
the legislative process. The legal framework concerning the power of the Prosecutor General 
to annul final decisions of lower-ranking prosecutors remained unchanged. Data collection on 
the  effects  of  the  2023  judicial  map  reform  is  ongoing.  Efforts  to  increase  the  level  of 
digitalisation  of  the  justice  system  continue,  while  the  justice  system  still  faces  some 
challenges as regards its efficiency, notably in administrative cases. 

Concerns over the anti-corruption framework persist, as the capacity to detect, investigate and 
prosecute  high-level  corruption  has  further  deteriorated.  The  criminal  law  and  institutional 
reforms  of  2024  still  raise  specific  anti-corruption  concerns  and  previously  identified  risks 
continue  to  materialise,  with  the  numbers  of  corruption  cases  detected  and  prosecuted 
showing  a  sharp  decline.  No  new  cases  of  high-level  corruption  were  detected  in  2025. 
Amendments  to  the Criminal  Code and Criminal  Procedure Code risk to  further undermine 
the  anti-corruption  framework.  Political  commitments  to  introduce  legislative  initiatives  on 
lobbying or asset declarations are still to be translated into concrete proposals. 

While  the  adopted  amendments  to  the  Act  on  Media  Services  have  expanded  the 
competences of the national media regulator, concerns have been raised about the impact of 
some pending amendments on the regulator’s independence. Public service media remains an 
area  of  concern.  A  Constitutional  Court  ruling  has  quashed  restrictive  amendments  to  the 
Freedom of Information  Act. Limited measures have been adopted to  enhance the safety of 
journalists, while cases of intimidation and harassment remain common. 

The lawmaking process continues to raise concerns, in particular regarding insufficient public 
consultation  and  stakeholder  involvement,  including  frequent  use  of  fast-track  procedures, 
even  for  high-impact  legislation.  Certain  amendments  to  the  Constitution  adopted  in 
September  2025  are  raising  concerns  related  to  the  principle  of  primacy  of  EU  law.  While 
amendments to the NGO law which were deemed to create additional administrative burden 
on  civil  society  organisations  were  declared  unconstitutional,  the  civil  society  environment 
continues to face pressure. 

1 

 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

Overall, based on the recommendations in  the 2025 Rule of Law Report, considering other 
developments that took place in the period of reference and in addition to recalling the rule of 
law-related infringement procedure referred to in the country chapter, relevant commitments 
made  under  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan  and  the  country-specific  recommendation 
under  the  European  Semester  on  the  judicial  system,  including  its  independence,  and  the 
effectiveness of the anti-corruption framework, the Commission concludes the following: 

•  Some progress was made on measures to ensure sufficient guarantees of independence as 
regards the dismissal of Judicial Council’s members, as draft amendments were prepared 
to address the issue of their premature dismissal. As the legislative process is ongoing, it 
is  recommended to  Slovakia to  advance with reforms to  ensure sufficient guarantees of 
independence for the Judicial Council, including as regards the dismissal of its members, 
taking into account European standards on independence of Judicial Councils. 

•  Significant  progress  was  made  on  ensuring  that  sufficient  safeguards  are  in  place  and 
observed when subjecting judges to criminal liability for “abuse of law” in their judicial 
decisions,  as  the  government  requested  a  Venice  Commission  opinion  on  this  matter. 
Following  this  Opinion  and  approved  changes  to  the  Slovak  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Plan, the Ministry of Justice proposed a draft law abolishing this offence. In view of the 
adjustments  made  to  Slovakia’s  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan,  it  is  recommended  to 
Slovakia to take the necessary steps to repeal the crime of “abuse of law”. 

•  No progress was made on effectively investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption 
to establish a robust track record, as concerns over the anti-corruption framework persist 
and  the  capacity  to  detect,  investigate  and  prosecute  high-level  corruption  has  further 
deteriorated.  Given  a  significant  decline  in  the  number  of  charges,  indictments  and 
convictions in corruption cases and the Prosecutor General’s continued practice to annul 
final police and prosecutor decisions, it is recommended to Slovakia to establish a robust 
track  record  in  corruption  offenses,  in  particular  in  high-level  cases,  including  by 
preventing  any  undue  interference  and  restricting  the  use  of  the  Prosecutor-General’s 
powers to annul final investigatory and prosecutorial decisions. 

•  Limited progress was made on regulating lobbying activities, as initial steps were taken in 
preparing a draft law and some further progress was made to reform conflicts of interest 
rules  as  a  non-binding  code  of  conduct  for  persons  with  top  executive  functions  and  a 
code  of  conduct  for  members  of  parliament  were  adopted.  However,  no  progress  was 
made to strengthen the asset declaration system. It is therefore recommended to Slovakia 
to  introduce  proposals  to  regulate  lobbying,  strengthen  the  asset  declaration  and 
verification system, and continue ongoing efforts to reform conflicts of interest rules. 
•  Limited  progress  was  made  on  advancing  with  establishing  legislative  and  other 
safeguards  to  improve  the  journalists’  physical  safety  and  working  environment, 
including the reform of the defamation law. Therefore, it is recommended to Slovakia to 
advance  with  the  process  to  establish  legislative  and  other  safeguards  to  improve  the 
physical  safety  and  working  environment  of  journalists,  including  the  reform  of  the 
defamation  law,  taking  into  account  the  European  standards  on  the  protection  of 
journalists. 

•  No  progress  has  been  made  to  ensure  effective  public  consultation  and  stakeholders’ 
involvement in the law-making process, which continues to raise concerns. Therefore, it 
is  recommended  to  Slovakia  to  ensure  an  inclusive  and transparent  legislative  process, 
including  by  ensuring effective  public  consultation  and  stakeholder  involvement  in  the 
law-making process and by addressing the frequent use of the fast-track procedure. 

2 

 
As regards the other 2025 recommendations, the Commission concludes that: 

•  No  progress  has  been  made  on  strengthening  the  rules  and  mechanisms  to  restore  and 
further  safeguard  the  independent  governance  and  editorial  independence  of  public 
service media taking into account European standards on public service media. Given that 
the  topics  of  this  recommendation  are  covered  by  provisions  of  the  European  Media 
Freedom Act (EMFA), while the Rule of Law Report will continue to monitor significant 
developments and report on their impact, further follow-up will be ensured as part of the 
Commission’s support to Member States and enforcement of the EMFA. 

3 

 
 
 
 
I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM1 

Independence 

Although increases have been registered, the level of perceived judicial independence in 
Slovakia  continues  to  be  low  among  both  the  general  public  and  companies.  Overall, 
35% of the general population and 38% of companies perceive the level of independence of 
courts and judges to be ‘fairly or very good’ in 20262. The perceived judicial independence 
among the general public has however slightly increased in comparison with 2025 (32%), and 
has  significantly  increased  in  comparison  with  2022  (25%).  The  perceived  level  of 
independence  among  companies  has  increased  in  comparison  with  2025  (34%)  and  has 
significantly increased in comparison with 2022 (30%). 

Amendments  to  the  judges’  laws  introduced  changes  to  the  system  of  temporary 
assignment  of  judges  to  a  higher  court,  broadening  the  discretionary  power  of  the 
Judicial  Council  and  court  presidents  over  judges’  careers.  The  amendments  to  the 
judges’  laws,  initiatives  with  the  objective  of  increasing  efficiency,  were  adopted  in 
September 20253, extending the possibility of temporarily assigning visiting judges to higher 
courts  on  the  request  of  the  president  of  the  higher  court  and  following  the  decision  of  the 
Judicial  Council4.  Allowing  visiting  judges  to  higher  courts  is  generally  welcomed  by 
stakeholders as a useful tool to address backlogs5. The amendments extended the time limit 
of the assignment6, and introduced new grounds for an assignment to a higher court, notably 
for  deepening  or  improving  the  qualification  of  a  judge7.  Sufficient  criteria  are  needed  for 
preventing  the  risk  of  allowing  arbitrary  decisions  by  the  Judicial  Council,  providing 
enhanced career opportunities to certain judges and not to others8. 

The  amendments  to  the  judges’  laws  also  re-introduced  bonuses  for  judges  and 
amended  the  rules  for  evaluation.  As  regards  the  changes  to  the  system  of  evaluation  of 
judges,  several  stakeholders  raised  concerns  over  abolishing  regular  evaluations  every  five 
years, with an evaluation to be made only after the first five years of office of a judge, or if a 
judge  applies  for  a  position  at  a  higher  court9.  Also,  there  is  no  judicial  remedy  against 

1  An overview of the institutional framework for all four pillars can be found here. 
2   Figures  48 and 50, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard and Figures  51 and  53, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. The 
level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  is  categorised  as  follows:  very  low  (below  30%  of  respondents 
perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-
59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

3   Act No. 270/2025 Coll., amending Act No. 385/2000 Coll. on judges and lay judges and on amendments to 

certain acts, as amended, and amending certain acts. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Slovakia, p. 4 et seq. 

4   Slovak Government (2026), written input, p. 6. See also Section 12 of Act No 385/2000 Coll. 
5   Country visit Slovakia, Via Iuris, Association of Judges, Slovak Bar Association. 
6   The time limit was expanded from one to two years within a three year period. 
7   In these instances, the judge is deemed to be exercising the judicial function of a judge on the higher court. 
8   Court of Justice in joint cases C-748/19 and C-754/19, para 79 “In order to avoid arbitrariness and the risk of 
manipulation,  the  decision  relating  to  the  secondment  of  a  judge  and  the  decision  terminating  that 
secondment, in particular where a secondment to a higher court is involved, must be taken on the basis of 
criteria known in advance and must contain an appropriate statement of reasons.” This risk is exacerbated by 
the  lack  of  sufficient  safeguards  to  ensure  the  independence  of  the  Judicial  Council.  Venice  Commission 
(CDL-AD(2026)010),  para  37-40.  Secondments  are  being  done  on  a  temporary  basis  and  in  exceptional 
circumstances. Venice Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2017)018), paras. 86 and 87. Liberties (2026) written 
input, p. 10. See also Via Iuris (2026) written input, p. 9. 

9   Country visit Slovakia, Supreme Administrative Court, Via Iuris, Judges for Open Judiciary.  According to 
European  standards,  the  evaluation  of  judges  is  an  essential  element  of  an  accountable  judiciary,  and  the 

4 

 
 
decisions  of  the  evaluation  committee,  composed  of  three  judges  from  various  districts 
elected  by  the  Judicial  Council  for  five-year  terms10.  The  amendments  to  the  judges’  laws 
also  reintroduced  bonuses  for  judges  who  reached  the  age  of  either  50  or  60.  The  mere 
fulfilment  of  the  age  criterion  makes  a  judge  eligible,  however,  whether  the  bonus  will  be 
awarded is to be decided by the court’s president. In the absence of further conditions on the 
basis of which the court presidents would decide to award bonuses to judges, this introduces a 
level  of  discretion11.  According  to  European  standards,  the  remuneration  of  judges  should 
rely on objective and transparent criteria and bonuses which include an element of discretion 
should be avoided12. Stakeholders voiced concerns over the broadening discretionary powers 
over judges’ careers, including against the background of a framework where safeguards for 
the independence of the Judicial Council remain insufficient13. 

The  adopted  amendments  to  the  disciplinary  proceedings  for  judges,  prosecutors, 
bailiffs and notaries are subject to constitutional review. Following the amendments to the 
judges’ laws, disciplinary proceedings against judges, prosecutors, notaries and bailiffs were 
revised  and  came  into  force  on  1  February  2026.  The  amendments  introduce  a  second 
instance review by establishing an appellate disciplinary senate, which is generally welcomed 
by stakeholders as an additional level of judicial review14. The members of the disciplinary 
senates must have 10 years’ service in a legal profession. The Judicial Council selected the 
judges  and  laypersons  from  which  members  of  the  first  and  second  instance  panels  are 
chosen15.  The  Judicial  Council  now  also  has  the  power  to  initiate  disciplinary  proceedings 
against  judges,  as  well  as  the  right  to  appeal  disciplinary  decisions  to  the  second  instance. 
Several judicial stakeholders and civil society organisations have expressed concerns over the 
Judicial  Council’s  expanded  role  and  the  reduced  number  of  judges  of  the  Supreme 

process should, in principle, encompass all judges periodically, including those performing managerial tasks. 
Any exemptions from this process are recommended to be objectively justified. CEPEJ (2024), p. 9. 

10   Section  27e  para  7  of  Act  No  385/2000  Coll.,  as  amended.  Via  Iuris  (2026)  written  input,  p.  9.  The 
possibility of judicial review of evaluation decisions is important, as the decisions on evaluation may  affect 
“civil  rights”.  CCJE  (2014),  para  41.  Before  the  amendments  of  September  2025,  an  evaluation  was 
conducted every five years and the criteria were stipulated in a clear manner. The amendments of September 
2025 changed the overall framework of evaluation of judges, widening the discretion regarding evaluation 
decisions, rendering the lack of judicial review of these decisions a matter of concern.   

11   During  the  legislative  process,  Association  of  Judges  suggested  removing  the  discretion  when  awarding 

bonuses, which was not reflected in the final law. Country visit Slovakia, Association of Judges. 

12  Venice  Commission  (2010),  para  46.  Section  79  of  Act  No  385/2000  Coll.,  as  amended.  In  the  case  of  a 
district court president, the awarding of the bonus will be decided by the court president of a regional court, 
in case of regional court president by the Minister of Justice , and in the case of Supreme Court and Supreme 
Administrative  Court  it  is  the  Judicial  Council,  following  a  motion  made  by  deputy  Presidents  of  the 
respective courts. 

13   Liberties (2026) written input,  p. 10. See  also Via  Iuris (2026) written input,  p. 9. Country visit Slovakia, 

Slovak Bar Association. 

14   Country visit Slovakia, Judicial Council, Association of Judges, and Specialised Criminal Court.  
15   Two of the three members of the first instance disciplinary panel, which are one judge (who may not be a 
judge  of  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court),  and  one  lay  judge  are  chosen  from  the  respective  databases. 
Three of the five members of the second instance panel are chosen, which are two judges (who may not be 
judges of the Supreme Administrative Court) and a lay judge are chosen from the respective databases. As a 
result  of  the  amendments,  the  judges  of  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  preside  in  first  instance  (one 
position) and hold two positions in second instance, and the amended eligibility rules limit eligible judges of 
that court to 12 out of 25. 

5 

 
 
Administrative  Court  in  disciplinary  panels16.  The  amendments  were  challenged  before  the 
Constitutional Court17. 

There  has  been  some  progress  on  the  recommendation  as  regards  the  dismissal  of 
members  of  the  Judicial  Council18.  Between  November  2023  and  July  2024,  all  non-
judicial  members  of  the  Judicial  Council  had  been  dismissed  before  completing  their 
respective terms19 and the Judicial Council considers the current possibility to dismiss any of 
its  members  without  reasons  as  problematic20.  The  Judicial  Council  plays  a  key  role  as 
regards judges’ careers and accountability, notably in the processes of selection, appointment, 
evaluation,  vetting  procedure,  disciplinary  proceedings,  and  decisions  regarding  judges’ 
criminal  liability  for  the  crime  of  ‘abuse  of  law’.  Its  role  in  some  of  these  areas  has  been 
further reinforced through legislative amendments adopted in September 2025, in particular 
as regards disciplinary proceedings of judges, prosecutors, bailiffs and notaries21. According 
to the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, judicial councils involved in the process of 
judicial appointments  need to  hold  sufficient  guarantees  of independence  in  order to  render 
the judicial appointment process more objective22. A wide discretion for political authorities 
to  dismiss  the  members  of  the  Judicial  Council,  who  were  appointed  by  these  authorities, 
creates  a  potential  risk  of  pressure  on  those  members,  liable  to  impact  on  their 
independence23.  The  Venice  Commission  has  also  underlined  the  importance  of  ensuring 
adequate  safeguards  for  the  independence  of  the  Judicial  Council,  including  merit-based 
appointments of its members and guarantees of their security of tenure24. In May 2026, the 
government proposed draft amendments to the Constitution and the Judicial Council Act with 
a  view  to  limiting  the  grounds  for  dismissal  of  members  of  the  Judicial  Council,  and 

16   Country  visit  Slovakia,  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court,  Slovak  Bar  Association,  Judges  for  Open 

Judiciary, Via Iuris. 

17  The  Constitutional  Court  accepted  the  motion  by  decision  PL.  US  7/2026  in  full.  It  did  not  suspend  the 

effects of the law. 

18   The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended Slovakia to ‘introduce measures to ensure sufficient guarantees 
of independence as regards the dismissal of members of the Judicial Council, notably those not elected by 
judges,  taking  into  account  European  standards  on  independence  of  Judicial  Councils.’  No  progress  was 
previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025, 2024 and 2023. 

19   The Council is composed of 18 Members. Eight members are judges elected by their peers and one judge 
elected by the judges of the Supreme  Court and the Supreme Administrative Court among their peers. The 
Government,  the  Parliament  and  the  President  of  the  Republic  each  choose  three  members  as  well.  2025 
Rule of Law Report, Slovakia, p. 6. Via Iuris (2026) written input, p. 10.  

20   Country visit Slovakia, Judicial Council. 
21   Act No. 270/2025 Coll. amending Act No. 385/2000 Coll. on judges and lay judges and on amendments to 
certain  acts,  as  amended,  and  amending  certain  acts.  Some  parts  of  the  Act  became  effective  as  from  1 
November 2025, obligations of the Judicial Council as regards databases for the disciplinary senates became 
effective  as  from  1  January  2026  and  the  new  system  of  disciplinary  senates  became  effective  as  from  1 
February 2026. Slovak Government (2026) written input, p. 6. 

22   As regards the process for appointing members of the judiciary, the Court of Justice held that, for a Council 
of the Judiciary to contribute to rendering that process more objective, it is necessary that such a body itself 
be sufficiently independent of the legislature, the executive and the authority to which it is required to submit 
an  opinion  on  the  assessment  of  candidates  for  a  judicial  post  (see  for  example  judgment  of  the  Court  of 
Justice in joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, AK, para 137. 

23   Venice  Commission  (CDL-AD(2026)010),  para  39  „[…]  a  constitutional  provision  allowing  for  the 
premature  removal  of  members  of  the  Council  Judicial  without  specific  grounds  undermines  its 
independence and renders it susceptible to external influence. See also GRECO (2025a) Ad hoc Report on 
the Slovak Republic (Rule 34), para 143. A wide discretion to dismiss the members of the Judicial Council 
creates a potential risk of taking decisions with a form of prior compliance. Court of Justice in joint cases C-
313/23, C-316/23 and C-332/23, para 87 et seq. 

24   Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2026)010). 

6 

 
 
submitted  these  for  public  consultation25.  While  elements  of  the  draft  amendments  in  their 
current  form  could  be  part  of  the  solution,  further  steps  are  needed  to  improve  the  current 
system  as  regards  the  independence  of  the  Judicial  Council,  taking  into  account  European 
standards. In view of the foregoing, and considering the submission of a legislative proposal, 
there has been some progress on the implementation of this recommendation. 

There  has  been  significant  progress  on  the  recommendation  to  ensure  that  sufficient 
safeguards are in place when subjecting judges to criminal liability for their decisions, 
as the government proposed a draft law abolishing the abuse of law offence26. Under the 
Criminal  Code,  judges  may  be  prosecuted  for  an  arbitrary  decision  causing  damage  to  or 
bestowing  a  favour  on  another  person27.  Upon  the  concerned  judge’s  request,  the  Judicial 
Council can dissent with the prosecution of the judge for this criminal offence by a vote of at 
least ten of its members. In 2025, according to the data provided by the Ministry of Justice 
and  the  Judicial  Council,  no  criminal  proceedings  were  initiated28.  In  addition  to  creating 
administrative  burden  including  by  vexatious  complaints,  the  lack  of  clarity  and  sufficient 
safeguards  leaves  the  provision  prone  to  misuse,  producing  a  chilling  effect  on  judges' 
independent  decision-making29.  In  October  2025,  the  Government  requested  an  opinion  of 
the Venice Commission on draft legislative amendments to the criminal offence of abuse of 
law  which  aim  to  specify  and  broaden  the  scope  of  the  criminal  offence30  and  subject  any 
criminal  proceedings  against  judges  to  the  prior  consent  of  the  Judicial  Council31.  In  its 
opinion of March 2026, the Venice Commission recommended repealing the crime of abuse 
of law of the Criminal  Code, deeming it unnecessary and prone to  abuse. According to  the 
opinion,  in  the  event  the  authorities  were  to  decide  to  retain  this  provision,  the  draft 
amendments  should  be  revised32.  Following  the  Venice  Commission  Opinion  as  well  as 

25   Draft  law  No.  LP/2026/224  as  regards  the  Constitution  and  draft  law  No.  LP/2026/225  as  regards  the 

Judicial Council Act. 

26   The 2025 Rule of Law  Report recommended  to  Slovakia to ‘ensure that sufficient safeguards are  in place 
and  duly  observed  when  subjecting  judges  to  criminal  liability  for  the  crime of  “abuse of  law”  as  regards 
their judicial decisions’. Limited progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025 and no 
progress in 2024 and 2023. 

27   Section 326a(1) of the Criminal Code stipulates as follows: “(1) Whoever, as a judge, lay judge, or arbitrator 
of an arbitral tribunal, in the course of decision-making, arbitrarily applies the law and thereby causes harm 
to another person or gives someone an undue  advantage, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 
one to five years.”  

28   Country  visit  Slovakia  (2026)  Ministry  of  Justice,  Judicial  Council.  Since  no  criminal  proceedings  were 

initiated, no decision not to prosecute was taken by the Judicial Council. 

29   2024 Rule of Law Report, Slovakia, pp. 7, 8. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Slovakia, p. 7.  
30   Draft Article 326a of the Criminal Code stipulates as follows: „A judge, associate judge or arbitrator who, 
with the intention to harm or favour another, arbitrarily makes a decision in manifest contravention of the 
law, without any basis in law or consciously ignoring the wording of the legal provisions, their purpose or 
established case law, and the arbitrariness of such a decision has been pronounced in a final decision of a 
superior court or the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic shall be punished by imprisonment for one 
to five years.” 

31  Venice Commission (2010), pp. 5 et seq. This means that before indicting a judge for any criminal offence, 
public prosecutors must first obtain from the Judicial Council a reasoned decision granting its consent to the 
prosecution. 

32   The Venice Commission has pointed out that the criminal offence should not encompass situations in which 
a  judge  departs from settled case law; the requirement that the element of arbitrariness be confirmed by a 
final decision of a court of higher instance should be eliminated; the criminal offence should be limited to 
the act of unlawfully conferring an advantage or disadvantage on a person. Furthermore, the requirement of 
prior  consent  of  the  Judicial Council  should  be  limited  to criminal  proceedings relating  specifically  to  the 
exercise of the judicial functions of the judge concerned and the Judicial Council should be required to adopt 
the  relevant  prior  consent  decisions  within  short  time  limits  (Venice  Commission  (2010),  p.  15).  See  also 
GRECO, 100th Plenary, Ad hoc Report on the Slovak Republic (Rule 34), 28 August 2025.  

7 

 
 
approved changes to  the Slovak Recovery and Resilience Plan regarding this  provision, the 
Ministry of Justice proposed a draft law abolishing the abuse of law offence. Regardless of 
whether  the  crime  of  abuse  of  law  would  be  abolished  in  the  Criminal  Code, it  remains  of 
utmost importance that whenever judges are held criminally liable for their decision-making, 
in  place  and  duly observed to  avoid any risk  of  potential 
sufficient  safeguards  be 
abuse33. Considering  that  a  draft  law  was  proposed,  taking  into  account  the  opinion  of  the 
Venice Commission and the legislative process is ongoing, significant progress was made on 
this recommendation.  

Statements of politicians targeting judges and their decisions raise concerns as regards 
judicial  independence. Judicial  stakeholders  reported  that  individual  judges,  including  at 
higher instance courts, have been subject to public statements by politicians and Government 
representatives  with  accusations  of  political  bias  and  calls  for  their  removal34.  Judicial 
associations, civil society organisations and the Supreme Court have highlighted the chilling 
effect of such statements, which risk affecting their independent decision-making35. In some 
instances,  the  Judicial  Council  has  condemned  such  statements  as  undermining  judicial 
independence36.   

The  legal  framework  concerning  the  power  of  the  Prosecutor  General  to  annul  final 
decisions  of  lower-ranking  prosecutors  remained  unchanged.  No  legislative  steps  have 
been  taken  to  revise  the  provisions  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  which  give  the 
Prosecutor  General  the  power  to  annul  final  decisions  of  lower-ranking  prosecutors  or  the 
police37. In 2025, out of 656 motions registered at the Office of the Prosecutor General, the 
Prosecutor  General  granted  annulments  in  110  cases.  In  18  cases,  the  Prosecutor  General 
annulled decisions bringing criminal charges. In a further 22 cases, he annulled decisions  to 
discontinue  criminal  proceedings  due  to  the  shortened  limitation  periods  introduced  by  the 
2024 Criminal Code reform, resulting in the continuation of proceedings concerning offences 
affecting  the  financial  interests  of  the  European  Union38.  The  Government  and  Prosecutor 
General  emphasised  the  benefits  of  this  power  to  correct  procedural  unlawfulness;  on  the 
other hand, the Council of Prosecutors, while acknowledging  the importance of this power, 
warned that using it against decisions bringing criminal charges causes delays and may even 
prevent  cases  from  ultimately  reaching  the  courts39.  The  new  Serious  Crime  Unit40, 
comprising  11  prosecutors,  8  of  whom  are  former  Special  Prosecutors’  Office  (SPO) 
prosecutors,  continues  to  provide  methodological  oversight  for  cases  before  the  Special 

33   Venice Commission (2010), para 13 et seq. 
34   Country  visit  Slovakia,  Supreme  Court,  Judges  for  Open  Judiciary,  Via  Iuris  and  Investigative  Centre  Jan 

Kuciak. Association of Judges (2026), written input, p. 9. Liberties (2026), written input, p. 11 et seq. 

35   Association of Judges (2026) written input, p. 9, Supreme Court (2026), Country visit Slovakia, Judges for 

Open Judiciary, Via Iuris, Transparency International Slovakia.  

36   For  instance,  Judicial  Council  (2025)  decision  No.  258/2025;  No.  259/2025;  No.  49/2025;  No.  166/2025; 
No. 93/2025; No. 331/2025.; No. 214/2025. There were also statements made by the President of the Judicial 
Council,  or  the  individual  members  of  the  Judicial  Council.  In  this  respect,  an  analysis  by  Via  Iuris 
concluded  that  the  Judicial  Council  applies  inconsistent  standards  when  assessing  attacks,  not  aligning  its 
practice  with  the  established  standards,  such  as  those  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights.  Via  Iuris 
(2026), written input, p. 11. 

37   Section 363 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Code. Office of the Prosecutor General (2026), written input, 

p. 8. See also 2025 Rule of Law Report, Slovakia, p. 8. 

38   Office of the Prosecutor General (2026a), additional written input from Slovakia for the 2026 Rule of Law 

Report, factual comments to the draft chapter.  
39   Country visit Slovakia, Council of Prosecutors.  
40   This was established by law within the  Office of the Prosecutor General following the 2024 dissolution of 

the Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO).  

8 

 
 
Criminal  Court.  This  unit,  however,  lacks  the  autonomy  of  its  predecessor41,  and  the 
decisions  on  which  cases  are  allocated  to  it  continue  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  without  objective 
criteria42.  The  Council  of  Prosecutors  noted  lasting  consequences  of  the  SPO’s  dissolution, 
including the loss of expertise and institutional memory, fragmentation of the serious crime 
agenda across unprepared regional offices43.  

Quality  

Data  collection  on  the  effects  of  the  2023  judicial  map  reform  is  ongoing.  Many 
stakeholders value the positive effects of the judicial map reform, such as a higher degree of 
specialisation  and  the  creation  of  administrative  courts44.  They  also  point  to  the  challenges 
concerning  the  accessibility  of  some  courts45  and  the  length  of  proceedings  in  the 
administrative courts46. To partially address the issue of open vacancies in the administrative 
courts,  the  Government  is  considering  amendments  that  would  facilitate  the  mobility  of 
judges from the Supreme Court to the Supreme Administrative Court47. The amendments to 
judges’ laws adopted in  September 2025 also  introduced changes to  the composition  of the 
senates at district courts, to ensure the functioning of small courts48. As regards the evaluation 
of the reform, stakeholders pointed to the lack of data, both in the context of the preparation 
of  the  reform49  and  following  its  implementation50.  The  Ministry  of  Justice  is  currently 
gathering data on the effects of the judicial map reform for year 202551.  

Efforts to increase the level of digitalisation of the justice system continue.  The level of 
digitalisation  of  the  justice  system  is  generally  high,  particularly  regarding  electronic 
communication tools in courts and the prosecution service and regarding digital solutions to 
initiate and follow court cases52, while it could be improved notably in criminal cases53. As 
part  of  Slovakia’s  commitments  under  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan,  the  Digital 
Insolvency  Register  has  been  put  in  place  since  October  202554  and  a  digital  information 
system  providing  judges  with  relevant  professional  material  for  their  decision-making  is  in 
operation  since  December  202555.  A  new  Act  on  the  Business  Register  was  adopted, 
expanding  linking  options  with  other  registers,  with  the  aim  to  reduce  administrative 
burden56. Work on the electronic investigation file has been delayed and the launching of the 

41   Notably, the former SPO was headed by a Special Prosecutor, who was appointed by Parliament. Moreover, 
the  Prosecutor  General  had  no  power  to  issue  instructions  in  ongoing  cases  in  the  remit  of  the  SPO 
prosecutors. 

42   Country visit Slovakia,  Office of the Prosecutor General. For a comparative overvieow of systems of case 

allocation in prosecution services, see Figure 57, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

43   Country visit Slovakia, Council of Prosecutors.  
44   Country visit Slovakia, Slovak Bar Association, Supreme Administrative Court and Via Iuris.  
45   Country visit Slovakia, Judicial Council, Via Iuris, and Supreme Court. 
46   Country visit Slovakia, Supreme Court and Via Iuris. Association of Judges (2026), written input, p. 11. 
47   Country visit Slovakia, Ministry of Justice.  
48   ibidem.  
49   Country visit Slovakia, Association of Judges. 
50   Country visit Slovakia, Supreme Court, and Supreme Administrative Court. 
51   Country visit Slovakia, Ministry of Justice. 
52   Figures 42, 43, 44, 46 and 47, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
53   Figure 45, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
54   Act  No.  240/2025  Coll.  amending  Act  No.  7/2005  Coll.  on  Bankruptcy  and  Restructuring  and  on 
Amendments to Certain Acts, as amended, and on Amendments to Certain Acts. Slovak Government (2026), 
written input, p. 20. 

55   ibidem. 
56  Slovak Government (2026a). 

9 

 
 
pilot electronic investigation file has been postponed. In criminal  cases, the interconnection 
of information systems of the police and the prosecution service is underway57. 

Efficiency 

The justice system continues to face some challenges as regards its efficiency, notably in 
administrative  cases,  while  further  improvements  have  been  made.  The  time  taken  to 
reach a decision in civil and commercial cases at first instance courts further decreased (from 
173 days in 2023 to 151 days in 2024). The estimated time to resolve administrative cases at 
first  instance  courts  decreased  from  1 040  days  in  2023  to  860  days  in  2024,  but  remains 
among  the  longest  in  the  EU.  Additionally,  the  clearance  rate  for  administrative  cases 
increased  from  74%  in  2023  to  93%  in  2024,  indicating  that  courts  were  able  to  resolve  a 
larger  share  of  incoming  cases  than  the  previous  year.  Before  the  first  instance  criminal 
courts, in a narrower category of bribery cases, the average length in 2024 was 366 days58. 
Stakeholders  considered  the  lack  of  specialisation  and  high  workload  at  courts  among  the 
causes for lengthy proceedings59.  

II. 

ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

The  perception  among  experts,  citizens  and  business  executives  is  that  the  level  of 
corruption in the public sector remains high. In the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index by 
Transparency  International,  Slovakia  scores  48/100  and  ranks  23rd  in  the  European  Union 
and  61st  globally60.  This  perception  has  deteriorated  over  the  past  five  years.  The  2026 
Special  Eurobarometer  on  Corruption  shows  that  78%  of  respondents  consider  corruption 
widespread  in  their  country  (EU  average  71%)  and  32%  of  respondents  feel  personally 
affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU average 30%). As regards businesses, 88% of 
companies consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 65%) and 61% consider that 
corruption  is  a  problem  when  doing  business  (EU  average  37%).  Furthermore,  31%  of 
respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from  corrupt 
practices  (EU  average  38%),  while  10%  of  companies  believe  that  people  and  businesses 
caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 31%)61.  

The  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  2026-2029  and  related  Action  Plan  have  been 
adopted62.  The  Strategy  was  adopted  on  21  January  2026,  following  a  public  consultation 
carried  out  in  accordance  with  standard  legislative  procedure  and  within  the  standard 
consultation  period.  It  builds  upon  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  for  2019–2023, 
under which tasks are carried out at the level of individual ministries, and is accompanied by 
an Action Plan that will assess progress across 15 ministries. According to the Government, 
the  main  objective  of  the  strategy  is  to  build  trustworthy,  transparent,  and  resilient  public 
institutions.  The  strategy  comprises  four  pillars,  namely  building  and  strengthening 
capacities,  education  and  communication,  corruption  risk  management  and  data  collection 
and  monitoring.  The  Government  Office  issued  a  methodological  recommendation  on 

57   Office of the Prosecutor General (2026), written input, p. 22.  
58   Figure 21, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
59   Slovak Chamber of Commerce (2026), written input, p. 1 Country visit Slovakia, Rule of Law Initiative. 
60   The level of perceived corruption is categorised as follows: low (above 79); relatively low (between 79-60), 

relatively high (between 59-50), high (below 50). 

61   Data from Special Eurobarometer 573 (2026) and Flash Eurobarometer 582 (2026). 
62   Government Resolution 31/2026. 

10 

 
 
corruption risk management, which aims to serve as a link between anti-corruption laws and 
institutional practice63. 

Previously identified risks  in  relation  to  the  criminal  law  and  institutional  reforms  of 
2024  continue  to  materialise.  While  statistics  provided  by  both  the  government64  and  the 
Office  of  the  Prosecutor  General65  indicate  that  from  2024  to  2025  the  number  of  detected 
and  solved  corruption  crimes  has  slightly  increased,  these  numbers  remain  at  a  lower  level 
compared to  the situation prior to  the reforms  of 2024.  According to data published by the 
Office of the Prosecutor General, over a period of three years, the number of charges66 and 
indictments  filed67,  as  well  as  the  number  of  persons  convicted68  in  corruption  cases  has 
decreased significantly. Some stakeholders consider this decrease to be a direct consequence 
of the reforms adopted in 2024, notably the criminal law amendments and the abolishment of 
the  National  Crime  Agency  (NAKA)69  and  the  Special  Prosecutors’  Office  (SPO).  They 
argue that the current  lack of expertise and specialisation, in  particular among  investigators 
and  operatives  of  the  Regional  Directorates  of  the  Police,  negatively  impacts  the  effective 
detection and investigation of corruption cases70. In this respect, the dissolution of the Special 
Prosecutor’s  Office  undermined  the  benefits  stemming  from  the  accumulated  professional 
expertise and professional relationships with competent law enforcement agencies that SPO 
prosecutors  had  built  over  20  years71.  Some  remedial  measures  are  being  taken  to  address 
these gaps, including an assessment of the current specialisation and training in detection and 
investigation of corruption criminal  offences, training organised by  the  Office  for the  Fight 
Against  Organised  Crime  (UBOK)72,  an  Order  of  the  President  of  the  Police  Force 
introducing  the  formal  specialisation  of  investigators  and  operatives  at  the  Regional 
Directorates of the Police in the field of corruption criminal offences, and instructions issued 
by  the  Prosecutor  General  on  the  specialisation  of  prosecutors  in  corruption  criminal 
offences73.  While  the  number  of  detected  crimes  affecting  the  financial  interests  of  the  EU 
slightly increased74, two cases transmitted by OLAF for judicial follow-up to UBOK and the 
prosecutor’s office have recently been dismissed due to the expiry of the statute of limitation. 
Although  the  mandate  of  the  current  European  Prosecutor  from  Slovakia  will  expire  at  the 
end of July 2026, Slovakia has not yet nominated the three candidates from among which the 
next European Prosecutor will be chosen. 

63   Government Office of the Slovak Republic (2025). 
64  Slovak Government (2026), written input, p. 30. 
65   Slovak Government (2026), written input, Annex Corruption Cases Statistics. 
66   2022: 168, 2025: 42 (-75%); Slovak Government (2025), written input, p. 66. 
67   2022: 83, 2025: 26 (-69%), ibidem. 
68   2022: 118, 2025: 38 (-68%), ibidem. 
69   Office of the Prosecutor General, Slovak Government (2026), written input, p. 66. The Ministry of Justice 
considers  the  drop  in  case  numbers  a  result  of  an  improvement  of  the  qualitative  aspect  of  evidence.  Slovak 
Government  (2025),  written  input,  p.  69.  The  Ministry  considers  the  fluctuation  in  the  number  of  detected 
corruption  crimes  a  short-term  deviation  within  the  natural  variability  of  statistical  data.  Slovak  Government 
(2025), written input, p. 29.  

70   GRECO noted in this context the “notably low number of reports and investigations” registered as of March 
2024  and  throughout  2025”  and  considers  that  training  alone  is  no  longer  sufficient  and  should  be 
complemented by the development of a plan for the specialisation of police officers, including analysts and 
operatives.  GRECO  (2025a)  para.  129.  The  Prosecutor  General  strongly  criticised  the  state  of  the 
institutional framework and the fight against corruption. Country visit Slovakia, Prosecutor General. 

71   GRECO (2025a), paragraph 109. 
72   Slovak Government (2026), written input, p. 50. 
73   Instruction by the Prosecutor General No. 17/2025. See also GRECO (2025a), para. 121, recommending to 
“develop a formal plan for specialisation and continued professional development of prosecutors, in order to 
ensure compliance with anti-corruption standards”. 

74   2022: 37, 2025: 42 (+14%), Slovak Government (2026), written input, p. 68. 

11 

 
 
There  has  been  no  progress  on  the  recommendation  on  effectively  investigating  and 
prosecuting high-level corruption with a view to establishing a robust track record75. In 
2025, the Prosecutor General continued to use his powers to annul final police and prosecutor 
decisions  deemed  to  be  illegal76.  No  amendments  to  the  legal  framework  are  currently 
planned in this regard77. In parallel, these powers were also used to ensure the continuance or 
resumption of criminal prosecutions in cases affecting the financial interests of the EU78. In 
2025,  the  police  did  not  detect  any  new  cases  of  high-level  corruption79.  The  Office  of  the 
Prosecutor General  and  stakeholders consider that, in  addition  to  the impact  of institutional 
changes,  the  significantly  shortened  statute  of  limitations  for  corruption  criminal  offences 
under the 2024 criminal  law reform may hinder the investigation of complicated corruption 
cases80. Amendments81 have been introduced to the Criminal Procedure Code regarding the 
institute  of  cooperating  witnesses,  which  provide  the  possibility  to  accused  persons  that 
significantly  cooperate  with  authorities  to  benefit  from  specific  legal  benefits.  These 
amendments, which are currently suspended for the duration of constitutional review, might 
further weaken the effectiveness of high-level corruption investigations and restrict the range 
of  admissible  evidence82.  Despite  the  ongoing  review  by  the  Constitutional  Court,  the 
Government has proposed  further  amendments  concerning cooperating witnesses. Although 
the Government’s announced intentions are to strengthen legal certainty, accountability, and 
public  confidence  while  preserving  the  effectiveness  of  cooperation  with  law  enforcement 
authorities,  the  amendments  do  not  appear  to  address  the  previously  identified  concerns83. 
Against  this  background,  there  has  been  no  progress  on  the  recommendation  made  in  the 
previous years. 

Amendments to the whistleblower protection legislation were eventually repealed after 
concerns  were  expressed  at  national  and  European  level.  In  202384  and  202585,  the 
Government introduced amendments to the whistleblower law which aimed at changing both 
the  protection  framework,  including  for  persons  that  had  been  granted  protection  under  the 
law then in  force,  and the institutional  setup.  Following concerns  expressed at  national  and 
European  level,  one  amendment  was  withdrawn  before  its  adoption  whereas  the  other  was 

75   The  2025  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Slovakia  to  ‘Ensure  the  effective  and  independent 
investigations and prosecutions of high-level corruption cases to establish a robust track record, including by 
preventing any undue interference and restricting the use of the Prosecutor-General’s powers to annul final 
investigatory and prosecutorial decisions’. No progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 
2025, 2024 and 2023. 

76   The  use  of  these  powers,  which  may  delay or  impede  investigatory  and  prosecutorial  efforts,  continues  to 
raise  concerns  among  stakeholders.  Country  visit  to  Slovakia,  Transparency  International,Zastavme 
Korupciu, and Council of Prosecutors. 

77   Country visit to Slovakia, Ministry of Justice. 
78   In  22  cases,  decisions  of  supervising  prosecutors  to  discontinue  criminal  prosecution  due  to  the  statute  of 
limitations were annulled in view of a link to the financial interests of the EU, Slovak Government (2026), 
written input, p. 9. 

79   The Ministry of Justice considers that the lack of newly detected cases cannot be considered a failure on the 
part  of  law  enforcement  authorities,  as  it  may  also  be  the  result  of  an  absence  of  this  type  of  criminal 
activity, Office of the Prosecutor General Slovak Government (2026), written input, p. 28.  

80   Office  of  the  Prosecutor  General,  Slovak  Government  (2026),  written  input,  p.  69.  Ca.  3 000  criminal 
proceedings  were  halted  and  stopped  due  to  the  amendments.  Country  visit  Slovakia,  Stop  Corruption 
Foundation. 

81   Amendment No. 416/2025 Coll. 
82   Office  of  the  Prosecutor  General,  Slovak  Government  (2026),  written  input,  p.  70.  While  a  constitutional 

review is ongoing, further amendments have been proposed by the Government. 

83   Legislative process LP/2026/124. 
84   Office for the Protection of Whistleblowers (2023).  
85   Act No. 376/2025 Coll. 

12 

 
 
repealed  before  it  entered  into  force,  after  the  European  Commission  had  initiated  an 
infringement  procedure  for  breaches  of  the  Whistleblower  Directive  and  the  Charter  of 
Fundamental  Rights,  which  has  subsequently  been  closed86.  Despite  the  fact  that  these 
amendments did not take legal effect, the stakeholders consider that these developments risk 
to undermine the trust in the stability of the legal framework and the institutions competent to 
provide whistleblower protection, creating a deterrent to report breaches of law and thereby 
undermining the detection of crime87.  

There  has  been  limited  progress  on  the  recommendation  to  regulate  lobbying 
activities88. Lobbying in Slovakia remains unregulated. In its Programme Statement of 2023, 
the Government committed to propose legislation to regulate the contacts of public officials 
with  persons  representing  the  interests  of  individuals  or  organisations  to  strengthen 
transparency  in  the  decision-making  process89.  Initial  steps  in  preparing  the  draft  law  have 
been  taken,  e.g.  with  the  publication  of  the  basic  principles  of  the  envisaged  legislation90. 
However, no legislative proposal has been adopted for legislative deliberations91. Against this 
background,  there  has  been  limited  progress  on  the  recommendation  made  in  the  previous 
years. 

There  has  been  some  further  progress  on  the  recommendation  to  reform  Slovakia’s 
conflicts  of  interest  rules92.  In  August  2025,  a  Code  of  Conduct  for  Persons  with  top 
executive functions was adopted93. The code is based on a set of general principles, including 
the promotion of public interest, a sense of service, honesty and integrity, and objectivity94. 
However, the Code is non-binding95 and does not contain provisions regulating contacts with 
third  parties.  The  Prime  Minister  and  the  government  act  as  the  final  interpreters  of  its 
application, defining the principles and the meaning of key concepts. In January 2026, a code 
of  conduct  for  Members  of  Parliament  was  adopted96,  with  rules  ranging  from  requiring 
respectful  behaviour  in  parliamentary  debate  to  a  prohibition  on  concluding  agreements  to 
use a parliamentary mandate to further the private interests of another person97. Altogether, 
conflicts  of  interest  rules  remain  fragmented  with  some  aspects  being  regulated  in  sectoral 

86   INFR(2026)2012.  Following the repeal of the contested amendment by the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic and the resulting reestablishment of the legal status quo ante, the infringement procedure has been 
closed on 8 July 2026. 

87   Country  visit  Slovakia,  Office  for  the  Protection  of  Whistleblowers,  Transparency  International  and  Stop 

Corruption Foundation. 

88   The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended to Slovakia to “introduce proposals to regulate lobbying […].” 

No progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025, 2024 and 2023. 

89   Slovak Government (2023). 
90   Slovak  Government  (2025).  According  to  these  basic  principles,  the  future  legislation  should  contain 
definitions  of  lobbyists  and  lobbying  activities,  the  rights  and  obligations  of  lobbyists,  establish  the 
procedures for registering lobbyists as well as sanctions for non-compliance with these rules. 

91   No legislative proposal in this regard is included in the draft legislative plan of the Slovak government for 

2026, LP/2025/643. 

92   The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended to Slovakia to “continue ongoing efforts to reform conflicts of 
interest rules.” Some progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025 and no progress in 
2024. 

93   Government Resolution 415/2025. 
94   In addition, the code builds on the principle of a higher standard of care, the principle of responsibility for 
one's actions and decision-making, the principle of transparency, the principle of decency and inclusion and 
the principle of leadership. 

95   The code does not provide for sanctions nor liability. 
96   Act No. 34/2026 amending Act No. 350/1996 of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the Rules 

of Procedure of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. 

97   2025 Rule of Law Report, Slovakia, pp. 13-14. 

13 

 
 
 
acts, ethical codes and guidelines for judges, prosecutors and members of the tax and customs 
authority98.  Against  this  background,  there  has  been  some  further  progress  on  the 
recommendation made in the previous years.   

There  was  no  progress  on  the  recommendation  to  strengthen  Slovakia’s  asset 
declaration system99. The Government committed to introduce uniform rules for submitting 
asset  declarations  by  public  sector  officials,  with  special  emphasis  on  the  digitalisation  of 
asset  declarations,  in  its  Government  Programme  Statement  of  2023100.  The  Government 
reiterates  budgetary  constraints  that  prevent  progress  in  this  regard101.  The  system  of  asset 
declarations  for  members  of  Parliament,  judges,  prosecutors,  public  officials,  and  civil 
servants  remains  decentralised  and  fragmented102.  Draft  legislation  that  could  further  limit 
public access to asset declarations, reducing transparency and monitoring opportunities, is in 
parliamentary  procedure103.  Therefore, 
the  related 
recommendation104. 

there  has  been  no  progress  on 

Preparations for amendments to the political party finance law have advanced. A draft 
amendment to the Political Parties Act was submitted to public consultation in mid-2025105. It 
would  increase  the  threshold  for  political  parties  to  obtain  financial  support  from  the  state 
budget from three to five percent of votes received in elections (with five percent being the 
electoral threshold). The organisation of expert roundtables is envisaged before a legislative 
proposal  will  be submitted to  the  National  Council106.  As  regards  campaign  finance, 
stakeholders continue to flag the lack of effective control, enforcement and oversight, as well 
as incidents of circumvention of the transparency obligation in party campaign finance with 
non-transparent campaign funding channelled through party-affiliated companies107. 

Legislative  amendments 
in  agriculture  are  still under 
examination  in  Parliament108.  Overall,  agriculture  continues  to  rank  among  Slovakia’s 

to  prevent  corruption 

98   See, for public officials, Constitutional Act no. 357/2004; for civil servants, Act no. 55/2017; for the police, 
Act no. 73/1998; for judges, see Act no. 385/2000. Detailed recommendations, including on expanding the 
definition of conflicts of interest and the scope of incompatibilities also in UNCAC (2023), p. 10. An update 
of the Code of Ethics for Civil Servants and the Code of Ethics for Police Officers is proposed in the draft 
Action Plan for 2026–2029.   

99   The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended to Slovakia to "strengthen the asset declaration and verification 

system [...].“ No progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025 and 2024. 

100  Slovak Government (2023). 
101  Country visit  Slovakia, Government Office for the Prevention of Corruption. 
102  There  are  eight  different  norms  or  legislations  for  different  categories  of  obliged  persons,  all  requiring 
different information and disclosure levels. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Slovakia p. 14, reported since 2021. 
103  Legislative amendments to the Cadastral Act, restricting access to cadastre real estate ownership information 
by  mandatory  authentication  obligations,  are  also  progressing  and  have  been  submitted  to  the  Slovak 
National Council on 7 January 2026, Ministry of Agriculture  (2026), written input,  p. 1.  The Government 
explains the necessity of these restrictions with security concerns, 2025 Rule of Law Report, Slovakia, p. 14. 
104  Similarly,  GRECO  (2025b),  para.  64,  urging  authorities  to  make  tangible  progress  in  strengthening  the 

system of asset declarations. 
105  Legislative process LP/2025/344. 
106  Country visit Slovakia, Ministry of Interior. 
107  Country visit Slovakia, Transparency International and Zastavme Korupciu. 
108  Amendments to the Act on Land Modifications, Arrangement of Land Ownership, Land Offices, Land Fund 
and Land Communities; the Act on the lease of agricultural land, agricultural enterprise and forest land; to 
Government Regulation on the conditions of lease, sale, exchange, and acquisition of real estate by the Land 
Fund. 

14 

 
 
high-risk corruption and fraud areas109. Several  new  investigations were opened in  2025110. 
The  practice  of  publishing  lease  contracts  signed  by  the  Land  Fund  has  increased 
transparency,  allowing  to  monitor  free  and  leased  land.  This  progress  is  limited  by  the 
inoperability of the systems  to  geolocate leased  parcels and to link lease  contracts  with  the 
cadastre. 

Public  procurement  rules  provide  for  high  thresholds  for  publication  requirements, 
negatively  impacting  transparency  and  competition,  while  corruption  continues  to 
present  a  high  risk  for  businesses.  The  Flash  Eurobarometer  on  Businesses’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU shows that 40% of companies in Slovakia (EU average  30%) 
think that corruption has prevented them from winning a contract in practice in the last three 
years111.  Only  31%  of  companies  perceive  the  level  of  independence  of  the  public 
procurement  review  body  (the  Public  Procurement  Office)  as  very  or  fairly  good112.  The 
Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard on access to public procurement in Slovakia 
reports 25% of single bids for 2026 (EU average 27%). Stakeholders indicate procurement in 
the  infrastructure,  construction,  IT  and  health  sectors  as  high-risk  areas  for  corruption  in 
Slovakia113.  Some business representatives are dissatisfied with what they perceive as a lack 
of  action  by  public  authorities  to  improve  the  anti-corruption  framework  despite  negative 
trends in key indicators, as well as a lack of predictability with a view to the frequent use of 
fast-track  legislative  procedures114.  Amendments  to  the  Public  Procurement  Act  and  the 
related  law  on  emergency  measures  for  strategic  investments  continue  to  face  criticism, 
raising  concerns  about  effective  safeguards  against  corruption  and  favouritism  that  risk 
impacting  a  fair  and  competitive  market  115.  Contracts  for  advisory  services  procured  by 
public  authorities  are  awarded  to  a  small  number  of  firms,  enabling  them  to  undercut 
competition in commercial tenders116. While the Public Procurement Office recommends to 
also publish tenders below the thresholds that were increased by the amendments, in practice 
a considerable share of tenders is not subject to a legal obligation to do so 117.  

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM  

The competences of the media regulator have been  expanded. With a view to alignment 
with  the European Media Freedom  Act, amendments to  the Act  on Media Services and the 
Publications  Act  have  expanded  the  competences  of  the  media  regulator,  the  Council  for 
Media  Services,  to  include  the  monitoring  of  the  public  broadcaster’s  compliance  with  the 
rules securing its independence as well as the monitoring of the allocation of public funds for 

109  In 2024, the EU Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) concluded extensive casework on agricultural payments. Since 
2019,  OLAF  issued  financial  and  administrative  recommendations  to  correct  EU  budget  fraud  and 
irregularities and to highlight weaknesses in the administration, monitoring and control of the relevant funds. 

110  EPPO (2025).  
111  Flash Eurobarometer 557 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2025).  
112  Figure 59, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard.   
113  Country  visit  Slovakia,  Government  and  Transparency  International.  See  also  2025  Rule  of  Law  Report, 

Slovakia, p. 16. 

114  Country  visit  Slovakia,  Rule  of  Law  Initiative,  National  Union  Employers  and  American  Chamber  of 

Commerce. 

115  Country visit Slovakia, Via Iuris and Stop Corruption Foundation. In some cases, the threshold is in practice 
eight times higher than previously, which is considered as impacting transparency, Country visit Slovakia, 
Rule of Law Initiative, National Union Employers and American Chamber of Commerce. 

116  Country  visit  Slovakia,  Rule  of  Law  Initiative,  National  Union  Employers  and  American  Chamber  of 

Commerce.  

117  Country visit Slovakia, Public Procurement Office. 

15 

 
 
state  advertising118.  The  amendment  has,  furthermore,  introduced  specific  rules  on 
transparency in the allocation of state advertising and has adapted the obligations of providers 
of  audience  measurement  systems119.  Neither  the  register  relating  to  state  advertising 
allocations, nor the unified register relating to media ownership transparency of all media are 
currently  functional  or  publicly  available,  though  work  is  ongoing  in  relation  to  both 
registers120.  In  2025,  the  Council  on  Media  Services  registered  the  Association  for  the 
Protection  of  Journalistic  Ethics  (AONE)  in  the  list  of  self-regulatory  bodies121.  On  7 
November  2025,  a  draft  bill  was  tabled  in  Parliament  which,  if  adopted,  would  introduce 
several structural changes to the national media regulatory authority which would become the 
‘National  Media  Authority’.  The  bill  proposes  establishing  a  one-person  decision-making 
body,  concentrating  all  such  powers  in  the  hands  of  the  President  of  the  authority,  and 
establishing broadly formulated rules for the dismissal of the President. A collegiate Council 
would decide on appeals against decisions of the regulator, acting as a second instance body. 
Stakeholders  have  indicated  that  as  they  stand,  the  draft  provisions  risk  imperilling  the 
independence  of  the  regulator122.  In  January  2026,  the  Director  of  the  regulator  was 
controversially  dismissed123.  Based  on  these  developments,  the  Media  Pluralism  Monitor 
2026 has raised the risk level on the independence of the regulator from very low to medium 
low risk124. 

The  concerns  relating  to  the  autonomy  of  public  service  media  have  not  been 
addressed125.  Several  stakeholders  continued  to  express  concerns  as  regards  the  Act  on 
Slovak Television and Radio (STVR)126, which entered into force in July 2024 and dissolved 
the  previous  entity  (RTVS).  They  highlight  its  implications  for  the  independence  of  the 
public service broadcaster, in particular in terms of the appointment and dismissal procedures 
involved  as  well  as  the  funding  system  put  in  place127.  The  issue  has  been  the  subject  of  a 
specific  ‘systemic  alert’  on  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of 
journalism to which the Slovak government has replied128. Forty-six Members of Parliament 
have  lodged  proceedings  before  the  Constitutional  Court  challenging  various  provisions  of 
the  Act  on  STVR  for  alleged  conflict  with  the  Constitution,  the  European  Media  Freedom 
Act, the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and  a  preliminary  ruling  request  is  ongoing  on  this  matter  before  the  European  Court  of 

118  Law of 10 September 2025 amending the Act on Media Services and the Publications Act, Coll. 256/2025.  
119 The Council for Media Services was designated Digital Services Coordinator in July 2024. 
120  Country visit Slovakia, Ministry of Culture. While awaiting the completion of this work, information on the 
ownership structures of media service providers and their ultimate beneficial owners is publicly available via 
separate registries. 

121  Optional Protocol to the Code of Ethics for Journalists on the Protection of Human Dignity, Humanity and 
Minors  and  the  Second  Optional  Protocol  to  the  Code  of  Ethics  for  Journalists  on  Public  Access  to 
Information, Diversity of Information, Plurality of Opinions, Objectivity and Impartiality. 

122  Slovak  Print  and  Digital  Media  Association  (2026),  written  input,  International  Press  Institute  (2026), 

written input, and Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input.    

123  European Board for Media Services (2025).  
124  Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), pp. 17-18. 
125  The  2025  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Slovakia  to  “[s]trengthen  the  rules  and  mechanisms  to 
restore and further safeguard the independent governance and editorial independence of public service media 
taking into account European standards on public service media.”  No progress was previously assessed on 
this recommendation in 2025 and 2024. 

126  Act No. 157/2024 Coll. 
127  International  Press  Institute  (2026),  written  input,  Reporters  Without  Borders  (2026),  written  input,  and 

Country visit  Slovakia, Ján Kuciak Centre.     

128  Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists (2026).  

16 

 
 
Justice129.  The  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  2026  concludes  that  the  current  governance 
structure, funding system, staff dismissals and recruitment, as well as issues concerning the 
impartiality  and  balance  of  news  content,  all  contribute  to  a  very  high  risk  score  for  this 
area130.  Consequently,  against  this  background,  no  progress  has  been  made  on  the 
recommendation.  

The  Constitutional  Court  has  quashed  restrictive  amendments  to  the  Freedom  of 
Information Act. The amendments, which had come into force in March 2025, provided that 
fees  may  be  charged  for  certain  access  to  information  requests,  namely  in  the  case  of 
‘exceptionally  extensive  searches  for  information’.  Following  a  legal  challenge  before  the 
Constitutional Court lodged by the Public Defender of Rights and a group of MPs, the Court 
first suspended the application of said provisions and, in a ruling in November 2025, quashed 
as  unconstitutional  the  above-mentioned  amendments131.  Several  stakeholders  reported 
deterioration  in  terms  of  access  to  documents  on  the  part  of  government  ministries  with 
various  cases  of  late  replies  and  unsubstantiated  refusals132.  The  Media  Pluralism  Monitor 
concludes  that  these  factors  coupled  with  unsolved,  long-standing  structural  issues  which 
persist - namely slow judicial review of access to information disputes and the absence of a 
specialised  independent  body  capable  of  providing  faster  oversight    –  amount  to  a 
deterioration in the risk level, now considered medium-high133.  

There  has  been  limited  progress  on  establishing  safeguards  to  improve  the  safety  of 
journalists134.  The  Platform  for  the  Promotion  of  Press  Freedom  and  the  Protection  of 
Journalists was established by the Government in 2023 to bring together representatives from 
ministries, the police, other public institutions, journalists, media owner associations and self-
regulatory bodies. Following a temporary interruption caused by personnel changes and the 
inability to reach a quorum135, the Platform resumed its activities at the end of 2025, with a 
first  meeting  convened  in  2026  In  2025,  a  methodology  for  police  procedures  to  protect 
journalists at  high-risk  mass events  was  drafted by the  presidium  of the police force  and is 
ongoing further consultation with stakeholders via the Platform. Parliament adopted the law 
transposing the Anti-SLAPP Directive as regards cross-border cases in the beginning of June. 
In  2025,  three  SLAPP  cases  were  reported136.  Since  July  2025,  the  Council  of  Europe’s 
Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists published six new 
alerts, three of which relate to governance, funding or dismissals at public broadcaster STVR, 
two of which relate to physical attacks on journalists and one to  concerns in relation to the 
independence  of  the  national  media  regulator137.  The  2025  Mapping  Media  Freedom 
monitoring  report  flags  19  new  alerts  which  include  nine  cases  of  verbal  insults  or 

129  File No. PL. ÚS 10/2024. On 11 February 2026, the Constitutional Court referred questions to the Court of 

Justice relating to this matter. 

130  Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), pp. 32-33. 
131  Ruling 350/2025 Coll. of 5 December 2025.  
132  Country  visit  Slovakia,  Slovak  Print  and  Digital  Media  Association,  Transparency  International  Slovakia, 

Let’s Stop Corruption Foundation and Investigative Centre of Jan Kuciak.  

133  Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), pp. 15-16. 
134  The  2025  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Slovakia  to  “[a]dvance  with  the  process  to  establish 
legislative  and  other  safeguards  to  improve  the  physical  safety  and  working  environment  of  journalists, 
including  the  reform  of  defamation  law,  taking  into  account  the  European  standards  on  the  protection  of 
journalists.”  No  progress  was  previously  assessed  on  this  recommendation  in  2025,  and  some  progress  in 
2024. 

135  Country visit Slovakia, Investigative Centre of Jan Kuciak. 
136 Investigative Centre of Ján Kuciak (2026), written input, p. 6. 

137  Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists (2026). The 

Government has replied to three of these alerts.  

17 

 
 
denigration  of  journalists  by  politicians,  the  cases  relating  to  STVR,  the  national  media 
regulator and physical attacks mentioned above as well as paid political adverts used to smear 
journalists138.  Stakeholders  have  reported  numerous  cases  of  harassment,  verbal  and  legal 
threats and physical attacks directed against journalists in 2025 and 2026139. Referring to this 
increase, which  appears to  be more  prevalent  in the case of female journalists, the fact  that 
legal action against perpetrators remains rare and challenging working conditions overall, the 
Media  Pluralism  Monitor  2026  concludes  that  this  remains  an  area  presenting  medium-low 
risk140.  Overall,  there  has  been  limited  progress  on  the  recommendation  in  relation  to 
improving the safety of journalists and their working environment.  

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

There  has  been  no  progress  on  the  recommendation  to  ensure  effective  public 
consultation  and  stakeholder  involvement  in  the  law-making  process,  including  by 
avoiding  the  frequent  use  of  the  fast-track  procedure141.  In  2025,  34%  of  laws  were 
adopted  through  fast-track  procedures  or  on  the  basis  of  parliamentary  proposals,  which 
provide  more  limited  opportunities  for  public  consultation  and  impact  assessment142. 
Stakeholders continue to report that the possibilities for meaningful consultation before draft 
laws  are  submitted  to  Parliament  remain  limited,  and  also  noted  lack  of  transparency  and 
possibilities  for  consultation  in  cases  of  substantial  changes  made  later  in  the  legislative 
process143.  This  includes  additions  of  amendments  insufficiently  related  to  the  substance  of 
the  legislative  proposal  (so-called  ‘legislative  riders’).  Such  practices  were  applied  also  in 
cases  of  important  pieces  of  legislation144  and  stakeholders  indicated  that  they  were  not 
consulted even if the draft law directly concerned them145. European standards stipulate that 
the  legislative  process  needs  to  be  transparent,  inclusive  and  democratic146.  The  Rules  of 
Procedure of the Parliament were amended on 26 January 2026, shortening the time allocated 
for the parliamentary debate. Overall, there has been no progress on the recommendation.  

138  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026). 
139  The  statistics  of  the  Jan  Kuciak  Investigative  Centre  can  be  found  here.  Jan  Kuciak  Investigative  Centre 

(2026), additional written input. 

140  Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), pp. 16-17. 
141  The  2025  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  Slovakia  to  “[e]nsure  effective  public  consultation  and 
stakeholder  involvement  in  the  law-making  process,  including  by  addressing  the  frequent  use  of  the  fast-
track procedure.” No progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025 and 2024. 

142  According to the data provided by the Administration of the Parliament, out of 108 legislative acts, 22 were 
adopted in a fast-track procedure and 15 were adopted based on a proposal of a member of Parliament. The 
share  continues  to  be  considerable  (it  was  44%  in  2024:  58  laws  out  of  131).  2025  Rule  of  Law  Report, 
Slovakia, p. 18. 

143  Country visit Slovakia, Public Defender, Rule of Law Initiative, Platform for Democracy. Slovak Centre for 
Human Rights/ENNHRI (2026), written input,  p. 12. Stakeholders also pointed out that draft laws are  not 
always  publicly  accessible  enough  in  advance  when  debated  in  Parliament.  According  to  the  Government 
Plenipotentiary for the Civil Society Development, Slovakia has well-established mechanisms for public and 
civil  society  participation  in  drafting  government-proposed  laws,  including  mandatory  public  consultation 
via SlovLex and the possibility of collective comments that must be addressed, but parliamentary-initiated 
legislation is not subject to equivalent public consultation, and shortened legislative procedures can limit the 
time or scope for meaningful input. 

144  Constitutional amendments concerning some issues in the area of family law, gender, and the  relationship 
between  national  and  international  law,  whistleblower  protection  laws,  amendments  to  the  Criminal  code 
concerning inter alia the cooperation of the accused person, consolidation package, Act on banks. 

145  NGO laws, whistleblower protection law. 
146  Venice Commission (2025), Rule of Law Checklist, section 6, para. 34. 

18 

 
 
Amendments to the Constitution were adopted, raising concerns related to the principle 
of  primacy  of  EU  law.  On  26  September  2025,  Slovakia  adopted  amendments  to  its 
Constitution,  supplementing  its  Article  7  with  additional provisions  which  allow  Slovak 
authorities,  including  courts,  to  assess  whether  and  to  what  extent  EU  law  may  apply  in 
Slovakia, including rulings of the Court of Justice147. The European Commission had raised 
its  concerns  about  the  envisaged  amendments  on  several  occasions  and  urged  Slovakia  to 
reconsider their adoption148. The Venice Commission also issued an opinion advising against 
adoption of the amendments to Article 7 of the Constitution149. On 21 November 2025, the 
Commission  opened  an  infringement  procedure  by  sending  a  letter  of  formal  notice  to 
Slovakia  for  breaching  fundamental  principles  of  EU  law,  particularly  the  principles  of 
primacy,  autonomy,  effectiveness  and  uniform  application  of  EU  law.  The  Commission 
considers  that  the  amendments  to  Article  7  of  the  Slovak  Constitution,  which  entered  into 
force on 1 November 2025, raise concerns as regards the compliance of Slovakia with these 
principles150. Stakeholders expressed concern that the amendments could pose a serious risk 
to  the  protection  of  human  rights151  and  also  pointed  to  the  irregularities  of  the  legislative 
process leading to the as the draft amendments to the Constitution submitted to the National 
Council  differed  significantly  from  the  draft  circulated  initially  for  inter-ministerial 
consultation152. Also the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
urged the Slovak Government to reconsider the adoption of the constitutional amendments153. 

Less than half of companies surveyed in Slovakia express confidence in the effectiveness 
of investment protection. 35% of companies are very or fairly confident that investments are 
protected  by  law  and  courts,  a  figure  which  has  slightly  declined  in  comparison  with  2025 
(36%)154.  The  main  reason  among  companies  for  their  lack  of  confidence  is  the 
unpredictable,  non-transparent  administrative  conduct  (34%)155.  As  regards  authorities 
relevant for economic operators, 38% of companies perceive the level of independence of the 
national  competition  authority  (The  Antimonopoly  Office)  as  very  or  fairly  good,  a  figure 
which has slightly declined in comparison with 2025 (40%)156. The Supreme Administrative 
Court  has  jurisdiction  in  several  business-related  cases,  including  in  cases  related  to  public 

147  The amendments complemented Article 7 of the Constitution with new paragraphs 6 and 7, which stipulate 
that “(6) the Slovak Republic retains its sovereignty, in particular in matters of national identity, consisting 
in particular of fundamental cultural and ethical issues relating to the protection of life and human dignity, 
private  and  family  life,  marriage,  parenthood  and  family,  public  morality,  personal  status,  culture  and 
language, as well as decision-making on related matters in the fields of health, science, education, personal 
status  and  inheritance,”  and  (7)”nothing  in  this  Constitution  and  the  Constitutional  Laws  shall  be 
interpreted  as  an  approval  of  the  Slovak  Republic  for  the  transfer  of  the  exercise  of  part  of  its  rights  in 
matters constituting national identity.” 

148 See also 2025 Rule of Law Report, Slovakia, p. 19. 
149  Venice  Commission  (2025),  Urgent  Opinion  on  the  Draft  Amendments  to  the  Constitution  (CDL-

AD(2025)040). 

150  2025 Rule of Law Report, Slovakia, p. 19. . 
151  Slovak Centre for Human Rights / ENNHRI (2026), written input, p. 15; Via Iuris (2026), written input, p. 

26. 

152  The draft amendments to the Constitution submitted to the National Council differed significantly from the 
draft  circulated  initially  for  inter-ministerial  consultation,  and  stakeholders  also  raised  concerns  about 
insufficient involvement of civil society and broader public. Venice Commission (2025), para. 18; Via Iuris 
(2026), written input, p. 25. 

153  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations (2025). 
154  Figure 52, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
155  Figure 53, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 29% and 25% of the surveyed investors respectively perceive the    
frequent changes in legislation or concerns about the quality of the law-making process and concerns about 
quality, efficiency or independence of justice as a reason for the lack of confidence in investment protection.  

156  Figure 60, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

19 

 
 
procurement,  public  concessions,  public  contracts  and  economic  regulation.  A  number  of 
judicial  mechanisms  to  improve  efficiency  are  available  in  these  cases,  including  the 
possibility to apply interim measures, joint examination of similar cases and the consolidation 
of multiple appeals157. 

On  1  January  2026,  Slovakia  had  34  leading  judgments  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  pending  implementation,  an  increase  of  3  compared  to  the  previous 
year158.  At  that  time,  Slovakia’s  rate  of  leading  judgments  from  the  past  10  years  that  had 
been implemented was at 30% (compared to 41% in 2025; 70% remained pending), and the 
average time that the judgments had been pending implementation was 4 years and 3 months 
(compared  to  3  years  and  9  months  in  2025)159
.  The  oldest  leading  judgment,  pending 
implementation for more than 13 years, concerns the excessive length of civil proceedings160
. 
As regards the respect  of payment deadlines, on  31 December 2025 there were 14 cases in 
total  awaiting  confirmation  of  payments  (compared  to  4  in  2024)161
.  On  17  June  2026,  the 
number of leading judgments pending implementation had increased to 32162.  

Amendments  to  the  NGO  law  which  introduced  new  reporting  and  information 
disclosure obligations were declared unconstitutional, yet the civil society environment 
continues to face pressure. Civic space in Slovakia continues to be rated as ‘narrowed’ by 
Civicus163. The law amending several acts related to the functioning of NGOs was adopted on 
16 April 2025, despite calls against its adoption by various international actors, including the 
Venice  Commission164.  The  law  introduced  new  reporting  and  information  disclosure 
obligations for civil society organisations. NGOs reported that due to these obligations they 
faced  substantially  increased  administrative  burden165.  On  17  December  2025,  the 
Constitutional  Court  declared  the  law  unconstitutional  due  to  its  non-compliance  with  the 
Constitution  and  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights166.  Following  this,  on  18 
February  2026,  the  Government  adopted  a  decision  calling  on  state  authorities  to  intensify 
controls  of  NGOs  using  existing  legal  mechanisms,  focusing  on  compliance  with  public 
funding rules, labor law, occupational safety, public procurement, and data protection167. In 
parallel, several extensive audits were carried out on selected NGOs in autumn 2025. While 
stakeholders reported that the audits did not confirm any significant deficiencies168, they also 
indicated  that  these  audits  created  additional  burden  and  pressure  on  the  civil  society 

157  Figures 66 and 67, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. The data presented reflects exclusively the mechanisms in   
place at the level of the highest administrative jurisdictions; the same or other mechanisms may be in place 
at lower instance administrative courts. 

158  For an explanation of the supervision process, see the website of the Council of Europe.   
159  All  figures  calculated  by  the  European  Implementation  Network  (EIN)  and  based  on  the  number  of  cases 
that are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2026. EIN (2026), written input, pp. 8-9. 
160  Judgment of the ECtHR, 44482/09, Maxian and Maxianova v. Slovakia, pending implementation since 2012.  
161  Council of Europe (2026), p. 163.   
162  Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC). 
163  Slovakia’s  score  is  67/100.  Ratings  by  Civicus  are  on  a  five-category  scale  defined  as:  open,  narrowed, 

obstructed, repressed and closed.  

164  Venice Commission (2025a); other international actors include (the European Commission in the 2025 Rule 
of  Law  Report),  the  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  Expert  Council  on  NGO 
Law of the Council of Europe. 

165  Slovak National Centre for Human Rights, additional written input . NGOs report that some NGOs have to 
shut down because of the administrative burden and that many lost their donors. Country visit Slovakia, Via 
Iuris, Chamber of NGOs, Platform for Democracy, and Slovak National Centre for Human Rights.  

166  Decision of the Slovak Constitutional Court of 17 December 2025, Pl. ÚS 11/2025. 
167  Government (2026) decision of 18 February 2026, UV-4631/2026, p. 5. 
168  Out of 26 audited entities, irregularities were found in cases of 3 NGOs, representing altogether 0,5% of the 

total financial amount subject to auditing.  

20 

 
 
sector169. Public debate continues to  be polarised and stakeholders  reported on the negative 
effects of the continuous labelling of NGOs by politicians as “political”170. The civil society 
sector  has  also  been  facing  further  funding  cuts171.  In  May  2026,  statements  of  political 
representatives have sparked a wave of violent threats against the Public Defender of Rights, 
impacting the functioning of the Public Defender's office172. The Slovak National Centre for 
Human  Rights173,,  has  continued  working  to  promote  and  deepen  rule  of  law  culture  via 
multiple  initiatives  and  actions  and  pointed  to  lack  of  adequate  follow-up  to  its 
recommendations174.    

169  Country visit Slovakia, Platform for Democracy. The audited entities comprised selected NGOs and several 
business  stakeholders.  According  to  the  Government,  irregularities  were  identified  in  approximately  12% 
audited entities, a proportion that the Government considers relatively high. 

170  Slovak  National  Centre  for  Human  Rights  -  ENNHRI  (2026),  written  input,  p.  6;  Country  visit  Slovakia, 

Chamber of NGOs, Via Iuris; Amnesty International (2026), p. 22-25. 

171  Country  visit  Slovakia,  Slovak  National  Centre  for  Human  Rights  and  Platform  for  Democracy.  The 
Government notes that public funding has decreased also in other sectors, due to general fiscal consolidation 
efforts. 

172  Human Rights Coalition (2026), Public Defender of Rights (2026). 
173  Mandated as National Human Rights Institution and equality body accredited with B-status according to the 

Principles relating to the Status of National Human Rights Institutions (The Paris Principles). 

174  ENNHRI (2026), written input, p. 3. 

21 

 
 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2026 Rule of Law Report 
can 
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2026-rule-law-report-targeted-
stakeholder-consultation_en. 

found 

be 

at 

Amnesty  International  (2026),  Human  rights  defenders  under  the  weight  of  attacks:  Continuing 
erosion 
https://www.amnesty.sk/wp-
content/uploads/2026/06/Slovakia_HumanRightsDefenderUnderWeightAttacks_1.pdf. 

Slovakia, 

space 

civic 

of 

in 

Association of Judges (2026), Input from the Association of Judges for the 2026 Rule of Law Report.  

CCJE  (2014),  Opinion  N°  17  on  the  evaluation  of  judges'  work,  the  quality  of  justice, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/ccje/opinion-n-17-on-the-evaluation-of-judges-work-the-quality-
of-justice-and-respect-for-judicial-independence 

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2026),  Media  pluralism  monitor  2026, 
https://cmpf.eui.eu/projects-cmpf/media-pluralism-monitor/ 

CEPEJ (2024), Guidelines on the evaluation of the quality of work of judges.  

Civicus, Monitor tracking civic space – Slovakia (2026), https://monitor.civicus.org/country/slovakia/ 

Civil  Liberties  Union 
https://www.liberties.eu/f/wtaqoq.  

for  Europe 

(2026),  Liberties 

rule 

of 

law 

report 

2026, 

Constitutional 
https://www.ustavnysud.sk/documents/20121/65360582/TS_4_2026_z.+o+soc.+zabezpe%C4%8Den
%C3%AD+polic.+a+voj.z.+o+Slov.+telev%C3%ADzii+a+rozhlase+Trestn%C3%BD+z%C3%A1ko
n.pdf/6baa15ff-44c7-aff2-4ced-1a3602808e68?t=1770816775889. 

Court 

ÚS 

Pl. 

10/2024,   

Council of Europe (2026) Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists. 

Council of Europe (2026), Supervision of the execution of judgments decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights – 19th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers – 2025, https://rm.coe.int/2025-
annual-report/48802b1633.   

Council of Europe, HUDOC-ESC 

Council 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice-commission/-/cdl-ad-2025-002-e 

Europe:  Venice 

Commission 

(2025), 

of 

Rule 

of 

Law 

Checklist, 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2026),  Slovak  Republic  -  Joint  Opinion  of  the  Venice 
Commission  and  the  Directorate  General  Human  Rights  and  Rule  of  Law  (DGI)  of  the  Council  of 
Europe  on  the  draft  legislative  amendments  regarding  the  criminal  offence  of  abuse  of  law,  CDL-
AD(2026)010, 9 March 2026, https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice-commission/-/opinion-1267. 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2025),  Slovak  Republic  -  Urgent  Opinion  on  the  Draft 
Amendments 
2025, 
CDL-AD(2025)040, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice-commission/-/cdl-ad-2025-040-e. 

Constitution, 

September 

the 

24 

to 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2025a),  Slovak  Republic–  Opinion  on  the  amendments  to 
the Law “On non-profit organisations providing services of general interest”, CDL-AD(2025)041, 9 
October 2025,  Slovak Republic  – Opinion on Law No. 109/2025 amending the Law “on non-profit 
organisations providing services of general interest” and other related laws  - Venice Commission of 
the Council of Europe. 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2010), Report on the Independence of the Judicial System 
Part  I:  The  Independence  of  Judges,  CDL-AD  (2010)004,  https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice--
commission/-/CDL-AD(2010)004-e. 

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2026),  Flash  Eurobarometer  582  on  businesses’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU and selected candidate countries.  

22 

 
Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2026),  Special  Eurobarometer  573  on  citizens’  attitudes 
toward corruption in the EU. 

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2025),  Flash  Eurobarometer  557  on  businesses’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU and selected candidate countries.  

European Board for Media Services (2025).  

EPPO  (2025),  Press  release,  https://www.eppo.europa.eu/en/media/news/slovakia-eppo-indicts-two-
individuals-and-one-company-subsidy-fraud-involving-eu. 

European Commission (2025), 2025 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Slovakia. 

European Commission (2024), 2024 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Slovakia. 

European Commission (2026), EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European Commission (2025), EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European Commission (2025), November infringements package: key decisions, 21 November 2025, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_25_2481.  

European Implementation Network (2026), Input from the European Implementation Network for the 
2026 Rule of Law Report.  

GRECO (2025a), Ad hoc Report on the Slovak Republic (Rule 34), https://rm.coe.int/greco-adhocrep-
2025-1-final-eng-ad-hoc-report-rule-34-slovakia-public/48802818c6  

GRECO  (2025b),  Evaluation  Report  on 
https://rm.coe.int/grecoeval6rep-2025-2-final-eng-evaluation-report-slovak-republic-
publi/48802bba30. 

the  Slovak  Republic,  Sixth  Evaluation  Round, 

Government  Office  of  the  Slovak  Republic  (2025).  Methodological  recommendation  on  corruption 
risk  management,  https://www.bojprotikorupcii.gov.sk/19499-sk/metodicke-odporucanie-k-riadeniu-
korupcnych-rizik/  

Government Resolution 31/2026, Resolution of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 31/2026 
of 21 January 2026 on the draft National Anti-Corruption Strategy of the Slovak Republic for 2026 – 
2029,  https://www.bojprotikorupcii.gov.sk/uznesenie-vlady-slovenskej-republiky-c-312026-zo-dna-
21-januara-2026-k-navrhu-narodnej-protikorupcnej-strategie-slovenskej-republiky-na-roky-2026-
2029/?csrt=9832301567650097181 Human Rights Coalition (2026), Statement by the Human Rights 
Coalition  on  the  Attacks  Against  the  Public  Defender  of  Rights  and  His  Office,  25  May  2026, 
https://hrcoalition.sk/stanovisko-%C4%BEudskopr%C3%A1vnej-koal%C3%ADcie-na-obranu-vop/. 

International Press Institute (2026), Input from the International Press Institute for the 2026 Rule of 
Law Report.  

create 

Judges for Open Judiciary (2024), Press release: “Judges for Open Judiciary: Judicial Council must 
not 
categories”, 
dividing 
https://www.sudcovia.sk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=438:za-otvorenu-justiciu-
sudna-rada-nesmie-vytvarat-dojem-ze-deli-sudcov-na-dve-
kategorie&catid=18&Itemid=337&lang=sk. 

perception 

judges 

into 

two 

of 

a 

for 

the 

Office 
https://www.oznamovatelia.sk/zasahy-do-zakona-na-ochranu-oznamovatelov-prinesu-pravnu-
neistotu-marenie-vysetrovania-a-odstrasia-oznamovatelov/. 

of  Whistleblowers 

Protection 

(2023), 

Press 

release, 

23 

 
Office  of  the  High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  of  the  United  Nations,  OL  SVK  2/2025,  1 
September 
2025, 
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30299. 

Office of the Prosecutor General (2026), Input from the Office of the Prosecutor General for the 
2026 Rule of Law Report.  

Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists (2025),… 

Public  Defender  of  Rights 
https://vop.gov.sk/vypovedal-som-na-policii/. 

(2026),  “Vypovedal 

som  na  policii”,  25  May  2026, 

Reporters Without Borders (2026), Input from Reporters Without Borders for the 2026 Rule of Law 
Report.  

Slovak Centre for Human Rights / ENNHRI (2026), Input from the Slovak Centre for Human Rights / 
ENNHRI for the 2026 Rule of Law Report.  

Slovak  Chamber  of  Commerce  (2026),  Input  from  the  Slovak  Chamber  of  Commerce  for  the  2026 
Rule of Law Report. 

Slovak Government (2026), Input from Slovakia for the 2026 Rule of Law Report. 

Government 

Slovak 
spravy&sprava=ministerstvo-vnutra-spristupnilo-zakladne-vychodiska-k-pripravovanemu-zakonu-o-
lobingu. 

https://www.minv.sk/?tlacove-

release, 

(2025), 

Press 

Slovak Government (2023), Programme Statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic, 2023- 
2027), 
Republiky, 
2027 
https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Dynamic/DocumentPreview.aspx?DocID=535376. 

(Programové 

Slovenskej 

vyhlásenie 

vlády 

2023 

- 

Slovak  Ministry  of  Agriculture  (2026),  Input  from  the  Slovak  Ministry  of  Agriculture  for  the  2026 
Rule of Law Report. 

Slovak 
https://nbs.sk/_img/documents/_legislativa/_basicacts/a483_2001.pdf. 

National 

(2001), 

Bank 

Act 

No 

483/2001 

Coll, 

Slovak  Print  and  Digital  Media  Association  (2026),  Input  from  Slovak  Print  and  Digital  Media 
Association for the 2026 Rule of Law Report.  

Supreme  Audit  Office  of  the  Slovak  Republic  (2025),  Audit  Report  2025  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Plan – Investments and Judicial Map Reform, Najvyšší kontrolný úrad Slovenskej republiky. 

Supreme  Court  (2026),  Statement  on  public  comments  questioning  the  decisions  of  the  appellate 
panel. 
https://www.nsud.sk/245568-sk/vyhlasenie-k-verejnym-vyjadreniam-
spochybnujucim-rozhodnutia-dovolacieho-senatu/. 

23  April 

2026, 

Via Iuris (2026), Input from Via Iuris for the 2026 Rule of Law Report.  

24 

 
Annex II: Country visit to Slovakia 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in February 2026 with: 

Investigative Centre of Jan Kuciak 

•  American Chamber of Commerce 
•  Association for the Protection of Journalistic Ethics in the Slovak Republic 
•  Association of Judges 
•  Association of Television Broadcasters of Slovakia 
•  Chamber of Non-Governmental Organisations 
•  Constitutional Court of Slovakia 
•  Council of Prosecutors 
•  Dutch Chamber of Commerce 
•  Government Office – Corruption Prevention Section 
• 
•  Judges For Open Judiciary  
•  Judicial Council 
•  Ministry of Culture 
•  Ministry of Interior 
•  Ministry of Justice  
•  National Centre for Human Rights 
•  National Union of Employers  
•  Office for the Protection of Whistleblowers 
•  The Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for the Civil Society Development  
•  Parliament administration (replies received in writing) 
•  Platform for Democracy 
•  Praesidium of Slovak Police Force 
•  Office of the Prosecutor General Public Defender of Rights 
•  Office of the Regional Prosecutor 
•  Rule of Law Initiative 
•  Serious Organised Crime Unit (UBOK) 
•  Slovak Bar Association 
•  Slovak Chamber of Commerce (replies received in writing) 
•  Slovak Council for Broadcasting  
•  Slovak Land Fund (replies received in writing)  
•  Slovak National Centre for Human Rights 
•  Slovak Public Procurement Office 
•  Slovak Syndicate of Journalists  
•  Slovak Television and Radio (STVR) (replies received in writing) 
•  Specialised Criminal Court  
•  Supreme Administrative Court 
•  Supreme Audit Office 
•  Supreme Court 
•  Transparency International Slovakia 
•  Via Iuris 
•  Zastavme Korupciu (Let’s Stop Corruption Foundation)  

25 

 
 
* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

•  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
•  Civil Society Europe 
•  End FGM EU 
•  European Civic Forum 
•  European Partnership for Democracy 
•  Human Rights Watch 
• 
ILGA-Europe 
• 
International Federation for Human Rights 
•  Philea - Philanthropy Europe Association 
•  Transparency International EU 

26