COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2026 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2026 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2026-07-17
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Poland, administrative transparency, corruption, democracy, freedom of the press, human rights, independence of the judiciary, pluralism in the media, rule of law, whistleblowing

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 17.7.2026  SWD(2026) 921 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2026 Rule of Law Report                             Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2026 Rule of Law Report                              The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2026) 900 final} - {SWD(2026) 901 final} - {SWD(2026) 902 final} - {SWD(2026) 903 final} - {SWD(2026) 904 final} - {SWD(2026) 905 final} - {SWD(2026) 906 final} - {SWD(2026) 907 final} - {SWD(2026) 908 final} - {SWD(2026) 909 final} - {SWD(2026) 910 final} - {SWD(2026) 911 final} - {SWD(2026) 912 final} - {SWD(2026) 913 final} - {SWD(2026) 914 final} - {SWD(2026) 915 final} - {SWD(2026) 916 final} - {SWD(2026) 917 final} - {SWD(2026) 918 final} - {SWD(2026) 919 final} - {SWD(2026) 920 final} - {SWD(2026) 922 final} - {SWD(2026) 923 final} - {SWD(2026) 924 final} - {SWD(2026) 925 final} - {SWD(2026) 926 final} - {SWD(2026) 927 final} - {SWD(2026) 928 final} - {SWD(2026) 929 final} - {SWD(2026) 930 final} - {SWD(2026) 931 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

In  Poland,  some  further  steps  have  been  taken  to  advance  on  the  implementation  of  the 
Action Plan on the Rule of Law, while legislation aimed at strengthening the independence of 
the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  was  vetoed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic. 
Meanwhile,  attempts  are  being  made  to  strengthen  the  role  of  judges  in  the  election  of  the 
Council’s judges-members, under the existing rules. A revised draft of the law on addressing 
the situation of judges appointed at the request of the National Council for the Judiciary in its 
post-2017  composition  is  under  discussion  in  Parliament.  Judges  continue  to  be  protected 
from  unjustified  disciplinary  proceedings  and  rules  on  case  allocation  have  been  adjusted. 
Plans for amending the structure of the Supreme Court to further strengthen its independence 
remain to be finalised, while the appointment of a new First President is being contested. The 
serious concerns related to the Constitutional Tribunal and its case law have been confirmed 
by the EU Court of Justice. Limited further steps have been taken to separate the office of the 
Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor General and to ensure functional independence 
of  the  prosecution  service  from  the  Government.  The  Government  continues  its  efforts  to 
improve  the  digitalisation  of  ordinary  courts.  The  overall  performance  of  ordinary  and 
administrative courts is showing a slight decrease. 

Work on a strategy to combat foreign bribery is ongoing. The Government is strengthening 
the legislative framework against corruption to increase the independence and coordination of 
anti-corruption entities.  Further efforts have been made to ensure independent and effective 
investigation of high-level corruption cases. There have been no further steps to address the 
broad  immunities  of  top  executives  and  impunity  clauses  or  to  introduce  lobbying  rules. 
Limited  steps  have  been  taken  towards  establishing  an  electronic  asset  declaration  and 
verification  system.  Some  challenges  exist  in  practice  for  the  effective  disclosures  and 
protection of whistleblowers and in the area of political party financing. Public procurement 
remains an area vulnerable to corruption with efforts ongoing to mitigate the risks. 

Legislative  reforms  are  underway  to  address  ongoing  concerns  over  the  impartiality  and 
independence of the media regulator. Some further steps have been taken to ensure adherence 
to fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory procedures in the granting of operating licences to 
media, as well as to ensure an effective legislative framework for the independent governance 
and  editorial  independence  of  public  service  media.  Concerns  have  emerged  regarding  the 
ongoing liquidation proceedings of major public service media. In parallel, the Government is 
reforming  their  funding  framework.  Certain  challenges  persist  in  safeguarding  media 
pluralism,  especially  at  the  local  press  level.  The  legal  framework  for  access  to  public 
information  remains  stable, 
its 
implementation. While the legislation aimed to transpose the Anti-SLAPP Directive is under 
discussion in Parliament, certain challenges related to the safety of journalists persist. 

though  stakeholders  report  certain  challenges  with 

The new rules governing consultations to improve the quality of legislation started to produce 
effects.  The  Ombudsperson  continues  to  fulfil  a  key  role  in  the  system  of  checks  and 
balances.  Some  further  steps  have  been  taken  to  improve  the  framework  in  which  civil 
society  operates.  National  authorities  have  engaged  in  initiatives  to  foster  a  rule  of  law 
culture. 

1 

 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

Overall, based on the recommendations in  the 2025 Rule of Law Report, considering other 
developments  that  took  place  in  the  period  of  reference  and  in  addition  to  recalling  the 
obligation to comply with the rule of law-related rulings of the Court of Justice of the EU and 
the  rule  of  law  related  infringement  procedure  referred  to  in  the  country  chapter  as  well  as 
recalling  the  relevant  commitments  made  under  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan,  the 
Commission concludes the following: 

•  Some  further  progress  has  been  made  on  the  implementation  of  the  Action  Plan  on  the 
Rule  of  Law,  including  as  regards  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  and  the 
Constitutional  Tribunal,  as  the  Government  continued  its  work  on  draft  laws  aimed  at 
strengthening judicial independence, and as judges-members of the National Council for 
the Judiciary have been appointed, including in majority from among judges pre-selected 
by  their  peers.  Therefore,  it  is  recommended  to  Poland  to  continue  the  process  of  the 
Action Plan’s implementation. 

•  Limited  further  progress  has  been  made  on  the  recommendation  to  take  forward  the 
reform to separate the office of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor General 
and to ensure functional independence of the prosecution service from the Government as 
further progress now depends on legislative work that is ongoing as regards sub-statutory 
provisions  that  would  adjust  the  functioning  of  prosecutorial  units  within  the  envisaged 
new  system.  Therefore,  it  is  recommended  to  Poland  to  take  forward  the  reform  to 
separate the function of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor-General and 
to ensure functional independence of the prosecution service from the Government. 

•  No progress has been made to introduce rules on lobbying, and limited progress has been 
made  on  a  standardised  online  system  for  asset  declarations  of  public  officials  and 
members  of  Parliament,  as  the  government  has  announced  its  intention  to  reform  the 
system.  Therefore,  it  is  recommended  to  Poland  to  introduce  rules  on  lobbying  and  a 
standardised  online  system  for  asset  declarations  of  public  officials  and  members  of 
Parliament while ensuring effective verification. 

•  Some  further  progress  has  been  made  in  ensuring  independent  and  effective  corruption 
investigations and prosecutions, while no progress has been made on addressing the broad 
scope  of  immunities  for  top  executives  and  remove  impunity  clauses.  Therefore,  it  is 
recommended  to  Poland  to  continue  efforts  to  ensure  independent  and  effective 
corruption investigations and prosecutions, address the broad scope of immunities for top 
executives  and  remove  impunity  clauses  to  enable  a  robust  track  record  of  high-level 
corruption cases. 

•  Some  further  progress  has  been  made  to  ensure  that  fair,  transparent  and  non-
discriminatory procedures are adhered to for the granting of operating licences to media 
outlets,  as  a  draft  bill  has  been  presented  and  undergone  the  public  consultation. 
Therefore, it is recommended to Poland to continue progress on these legislative efforts to 
finalise  reforms  to  ensure  that  fair,  transparent  and  non-discriminatory  procedures  are 
adhered to for the granting of operating licences to media outlets.  

2 

 
 
 
 
 
As regards the other 2025 recommendations, the Commission concludes that: 

•  Some  further  progress  has  been  made  on  taking  forward  reforms  to  ensure  an  effective 
legislative  framework  for  the  independent  governance  and  editorial  independence  of 
public  service  media,  as  a  draft  bill  has  been  presented  and  undergone  the  public 
consultation. Given that the topics of this recommendation are covered by provisions of 
the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), while the Rule of Law Report will continue 
to monitor significant developments and report on their impact, further follow-up will be 
ensured  as  part  of  the  Commission’s  support  to  Member  States  and  enforcement  of  the 
EMFA. 

•  Some  further  progress  has  been  made  to  improve  the  framework  in  which  civil  society 
operates,  taking  into  account  European  standards  on  civil  society  organisations,  as 
legislative  work  is  ongoing  to  amend  the  law  governing  public  benefit  activities  and 
volunteering. Monitoring of further developments in this area will continue in the Rule of 
Law Report.  

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I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM1 

Independence 

The level of perceived judicial independence in Poland is now average among both the 
general  public  and  companies.  Overall,  42%  of  the  general  population  and  44%  of 
companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly or very good’ 
in  20262.  The  perceived  judicial  independence  among  the  general  public  has  significantly 
increased in  comparison with  2025 (24%),  as  well as in  comparison  with 2022 (24%). The 
perceived judicial independence among companies has significantly increased in comparison 
with 2025 (24%), as well as in comparison with 2022 (19%).  

Some  further  progress  has  been made  on  the recommendation  to  continue  to  advance 
on the implementation of the Action Plan on the Rule of Law, while legislation aimed at 
strengthening the independence of the National Council for the Judiciary was vetoed by 
the President of the Republic3. Following the appointment of a new Minister of Justice4, the 
Government continued its work on draft laws aimed at strengthening judicial independence5, 
notably on the prolongation of the active service of ordinary court judges6, on the Supreme 
Court7,  on  the  status  of  judges8  and  on  the  implementation  of  judgments  of  the  European 
Court of Human Rights9. In January 2026, Parliament approved a revised law on the National 
Council  for  the  Judiciary10  that  restored  the  system  of  appointment  of  judicial  members  by 
their  peers,  taking  into  account  European  standards11.  It  provided  for  an  indiscriminate 
possibility for judges to  take part in the election of candidates to the Council, regardless of 
the  procedure  in  which  they  were  appointed,  and  envisaged  clear  criteria  conditioning  the 
right  of  judges  to  stand  as  candidates12.  In  February  2026,  the  President  of  the  Republic 
vetoed  the  law  considering  it  to  be  unconstitutional13  and  proposed  a  draft  law  on  the 
restoration of the right to a court14. The Government considered the latter to be in breach of 
the Polish constitution and of EU law15, and it was sent by the Marshall of the Sejm to the 

1   An overview of the institutional framework for all four pillars can be found here. 
2   Figures 48 and 50, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard and Figures 51 and 53, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. The 
level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  is  categorised  as  follows:  very  low  (below  30%  of  respondents 
perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-
59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

3   The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to ‘Continue to advance on the implementation of 
the  Action  Plan  on  the  Rule  of  Law,  including  as  regards the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  and  the 
Constitutional Tribunal’. 
4   Ministry of Justice (2025). 
5   2025 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 3. See also Polish Government (2026), written input, pp. 2-5. 
6   Draft law Nr UPRO1 inscribed in the legislative works of the Government. 
7   Draft law prepared by the Codification Committee for the System of Courts and Prosecution. 
8   Draft law on the restoration of the right to an independent and impartial court established by law and on 
addressing effects of resolutions of the National Council for the Judiciary adopted in 2018-2025 The draft 
law is pending before Parliament after first reading.  

9   The draft law is pending before Parliament where it was subject to first reading on 17 April 2026. 
10   Law of 23 January 2026 amending the law on the National Council for the Judiciary and Electoral Code.  
11   Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Council of Europe - Committee of Ministers to member states on 

judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. para 27. 

12   Persons who  (i)  have been judges for at least 10 years and (ii) have spent at least 5 years in the court in 

which they currently adjudicate would be able to stand as candidates in elections. 

13   President of the Republic (2026). The President of the Republic considers the law unconstitutional where it 

provides for a model whereby judges-members of the Council are appointed by their peers. 

14   Presidential  draft  law  on  the  restoration  of  the  right  to  a  court  and  to  have  one’s  case  examined  without 

undue delay, of 19 February 2026. 

15   Notably with the judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 June 2023 in case C-204/21, Commission v Poland.  

4 

 
 
Venice Commission for an opinion16, which recommended that, in light of the fundamental 
shortcomings  identified  in  the  draft  law,  the  Polish  authorities  should  not  pursue  it17.  As 
legislative work has been carried out to advance on the implementation of the Action plan on 
the Rule of Law, there has been some further progress to implement the recommendation.  

Given the difficulty  in achieving  a comprehensive reform, attempts are being made to 
strengthen the role of judges in the election of judges-members of the National Council 
for  the  Judiciary  under  the  current  rules.  Pending  a  comprehensive  reform  on  the 
appointment  of  members  of  the  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary,  Parliament  adopted  a 
resolution whereby it pledged to appoint, based on the current rules governing the nomination 
of  judges-members  of  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary18,  only  judges  who  have  been 
endorsed  by  their  peers  in  organised  pre-elections19.  The  main  opposition  party  and  the 
National Council for the Judiciary requested the Constitutional Tribunal to declare the current 
provisions of the Law on the National Council for the Judiciary unconstitutional, to the extent 
that they would allow the Parliament to appoint judges-members pre-selected by their peers. 
They also requested interim measures which the Constitutional Tribunal granted on 12 May, 
obliging  the  Sejm  to  abstain  from  appointing  by  absolute  majority  of  votes  the  15  judges-
members until its judgment20. On 15 May 2026, the Sejm appointed, under the current law21 
by means of qualified majority of votes, the 15 judges-members of the National Council for 
the Judiciary, of which 13 are judges pre-selected by judges in active service in a procedure 
that  took  place  in  April  2026,  and  two  are  judges  selected  by  the  opposition  parliamentary 
groups22.  The  Venice  Commission  had  already  considered  that  such  a  de  facto  election  of 
judicial members by their peers could be a step in the right direction23. The new Council was 
convened for its first session by the First President of the Supreme Court on 11 June 2026. 
On the same day, the Council elected its President (a Supreme Court judge). On 18 June 2026 
the Minister of Justice published 25 vacancies in ordinary courts24. The budget allocated to 
the National Council for the Judiciary in 2026 was increased25. 

A revised draft of the law addressing the situation of judges appointed at the request of 
the National Council for the Judiciary in its post-2017 composition is being discussed in 

16   Sejm (2026). 
17   Venice Commission opinion of 16 June 2026 on the draft law “on Reinstating the Right to a Fair Trial and 

Hearing the Case Without Undue Delay”, proposed by the President of the Republic (2026b). 

18   Law of 12 May 2011 on the National Council for the Judiciary. 
19   Resolution  of  the  Sejm  of  27  February  2026  on  the  restoration  of  constitutional  standards  governing  the 

appointment of judges-members of the National Council for the Judiciary. 

20   Case  K  7/26;  the  decision  obliged  the  Sejm  to  abstain  from  appointing  judges-members  of  the  Council 
pursuant to Article 11d(6) of the Law on the NCJ, which allows the Sejm to make the appointment by an 
absolute  majority  of  votes  in  the  presence  of  at  least  half  of  the  statutory  number  of  Deputies,  if  the 
qualified 3/5 majority of votes is not attained in first attempt (governed by Article 11d(5) of the Law). It is 
noted  that  the  decision  was  issued  by  a  panel  of  five  judges,  including  a  judge  appointed  in  2017  to  the 
already occupied post and whose participation in the panel raises issues as to its compliance with Article 6 
ECHR requirements, in light of the ECtHR judgment of 14 December 2023 in M.L. v Poland (application 
No. 40119/21), paras. 169-174. 

21   Law of 12 May 2011 on the National Council for the Judiciary. 
22   Resolution  of  15  May  2026 of  the  Sejm  on  the  appointment  of  members  of  the  National  Council  for  the 

Judiciary. 

23   Venice Commission’s opinion of 12 March 2026 (2026) para 62; and of 16 June 2026 (2026a), para. 10. 
24  Official Journal ‘Monitor Polski’ (item 626). 
25   Country visit Poland, National Council for the Judiciary. 

5 

 
 
Parliament. In December 2025, the Government adopted a revised version26 of the draft law 
addressing  the  situation  of  judges  appointed  at  the  request  of  the  National  Council  for  the 
Judiciary in its post-2017 composition and submitted it to Parliament for consideration. In its 
urgent opinion of 27 February 202627, the Venice Commission welcomed that the new draft 
addressed  some  of  its  earlier  recommendations28,  but  underlined  that  adjustments  were  still 
needed, in particular to comply with the principle of irremovability of judges. In March 2026, 
the  EU  Court  of  Justice  further  clarified  its  case  law  regarding  judicial  appointments  and 
held29  that  an  irregularity  in  the  appointment  of  an  ordinary  court  judge  is  not,  in  itself, 
sufficient  to  find  that  the  judge  is  not  independent,  since  an  overall  assessment  of  all  the 
circumstances  surrounding  that  appointment  is  necessary.  The  Court  of  Justice  held  in 
particular  that  the  participation  of  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary in  its  composition 
pursuant to the Law of 8 December 2017 in the judicial appointment procedure or the lack of 
an effective judicial remedy for the unsuccessful candidates30, taken in isolation or together, 
are not sufficient to rule that the judge so appointed does not satisfy the EU requirements of 
independent,  impartial  court  previously  established  by  law31.  The  Court  of  Justice  further 
indicated that it is for Poland to put in place a legislative framework that enables, in view of 
the  nature  and  gravity  of  the  irregularities  committed  during  the  judicial  appointment 
procedure,  an  assessment  of  the  possibilities  for  persons  irregularly  appointed  to  judicial 
posts to continue to perform their duties. The judgment provides important guidance for the 
Polish authorities on how to address in a systemic manner the status of ordinary court judges 
appointed  at  the  request  of  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  in  its  post-2017 
composition.  

Whilst  a  number  of  new  judicial  appointments  were  rejected,  ordinary  court  judges 
continue  to  be  protected  from  unjustified  disciplinary  proceedings  and  rules  on  case 
allocation  have  been  adjusted.  As  announced  in  the  Action  Plan  on  the  Rule  of  Law,  the 
Minister  of  Justice  continues  to  appoint  ad  hoc  disciplinary  officers  to  terminate  undue 
disciplinary  proceedings  against  judges  and  launch  new  disciplinary  proceedings.  All 
disciplinary  proceedings  initiated  against  judges  for  the  content  of  their  judicial  decisions 
have  been  terminated32.  The  President  of  the  Republic  refused  to  promote  by  a  new 
appointment  46  ordinary  court  judges  in  view  of  decisions  they  had  taken  in  the  past, 
considering that they had questioned the legal and constitutional order of Poland33. According 
to the Polish Government, the conduct of judges contested by the President of the Republic 
appears  to  have  consisted  primarily  in  signing  statements,  including  a  letter  addressed  to 

26   2025 Rule of Law Report, Poland, pp. 3-4. The new version of the draft law also provides for changes in the 
structure of the Supreme Court (dismantling the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs) and 
changes in the system of appointment of judges adjudicating in the Chamber of Professional Liability. 
27   The  opinion  was  issued  at  the  request  of  the  Parliamentary  Committee  of  the  Council of  Europe;  Venice 

Commission (2026). 

28   In particular, the draft Law: (i) abandons the approach of ex tunc invalidation of judicial appointments; (ii) 
includes arrangements to ensure a proportionate approach in addressing different categories of judges; (iii) 
endorses  the  appointments  of  entry-level  judges  who  had  no  other  options  of  entering  the  judiciary  but 
through  the  NCJ  as  recomposed;  (iv)  provides  a  certain,  albeit  limited,  form  of  judicial  review;  and  (v) 
establishes a procedure for reopening cases under certain conditions. 

29   Court of Justice, judgment of 24 March 2026 in case C-521/21, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich. 
30   The  appeals  against  a  decision  not  to  recommend  a  candidate  for  judicial  appointment  are  heard  by  the 

Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court. 

31   See also Venice Commission (2026a), para 31, where the Venice Commission takes the view that the mere 
fact that a judge had been appointed by the deficient NCJ  does not in and of itself suffice to establish that 
the judge at issue is not an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 

32   Polish Government (2026), written input, p. 6. 
33   President of the Republic (2025). 

6 

 
 
OSCE/ODIHR,  about  legal  risks  related  to  the  planned  postal  voting  arrangements  in  2020 
and a call on the Polish authorities in 2021 to implement judgments of the Court of Justice in 
cases C-204/21 and C-791/19 concerning the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court34. 
The  Minister  of  Justice  amended  the  rules  governing  the  random  allocation  of  cases  to 
judges, allowing for exceptions in specific cases35. While this change was considered by the 
Constitutional Tribunal as unconstitutional, the amended rules are still applied in practice36.  

Plans  for  amending  the  structure  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  further  strengthen  its 
independence remain to be finalised, while the appointment of a new First President is 
being  contested.  A  revised  draft  law  on  the  Supreme  Court,  prepared  by  the  Codification 
Committee for the System of Courts and Prosecution and presented to the Minister of Justice 
in  February  2026,  is  awaiting  adoption  by  the  Government  ahead  of  its  submission  to 
Parliament.  It  aims  to  recompose  the  Supreme  Court  into  three  Chambers,  remove  the 
extraordinary appeal procedure, and eliminate influence of the executive on the adoption of 
the Supreme Court’s internal rules and on the selection procedure of candidates to the post of 
First  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  Presidents  of  Chambers.  In  February  2026, 
following  one  unsuccessful  attempt  due  to  a  lack  of  quorum,  the  General  Assembly  of 
Supreme Court judges elected five candidates for the post of First President of the Supreme 
Court37,  one  of  which  was  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  on  26  May  202638. 
Judges  appointed  to  the  Supreme  Court  prior  to  2018  boycotted  the  election.  First,  they 
considered that the General  Assembly was convened by a person appointed to the office of 
the First President of the Supreme Court in violation of the law. Second, they deemed that, as 
the  Assembly  comprises  judges  appointed  under  irregular  procedures,  it  could  not  be 
recognised as a lawful body to organise the election39. In a preliminary ruling case submitted 
by an ordinary court40, the EU Court of Justice held that a national court must consider the 
judgment  of  a  higher  court  that  does  not  constitute  an  independent  and  impartial  tribunal 
previously established by law to be null and void, where such a consequence is essential in 
view of the procedural situation at issue in order to ensure the primacy of EU law41. While 
the budget of the Supreme Court has been increased, the First President of the Supreme Court 
considers it may prove insufficient to pay the salaries of all its judges and court staff42.  

The  serious  concerns  related  to  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  and  its  case  law  of  2021 
have  been  confirmed  by  the  EU  Court  of  Justice.  In  December  2025,  the  EU  Court  of 

34  Polish Government (2026a), additional written input, p. 2. 
35   Regulation  of  the  Minister  of  Justice  of  29  September  2025  amending  the  regulation  –  Internal  Rules  of 
Procedure  of  Ordinary  Courts  (Official  Journal  item  1325).  By  judgment  of  12  November  2025  the 
Constitutional  Tribunal  declared  that  Regulation  unconstitutional  (case  U  4/25).  The  ruling  was  not 
published. 

36   Polish Government (2026), written input. 
37   All elected candidates are judges appointed to the Supreme Court as of 2018, including judges appointed to 

the Supreme Court in an irregular procedure. 

38   President of the Republic (2026d). 
39   Konstytucyjny.pl (2026). Also, on 26 May 2026 the Council of Lay Judges of the Supreme Court adopted a 
resolution (No. 9/2026) whereby it considers that the new First President is an unlawfully appointed judge 
and,  consequently,  that  his  appointment  to  that  office  was  not  lawful,  also  in  view  of  the  procedure  of 
selecting candidates to the office; see: Prawo.pl. 

40   The referring court made the referral in a case where it had to reconsider a judgment following a ruling of 
the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court in an extraordinary appeal 
procedure. 

41   Court of Justice judgment of 4 September 2025 in case C-225/22, AW “T”. 
42   Declaration  of  the  First  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  10  December  2025;  Supreme  Court  (2026) 

written input, p. 10 and 12. 

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Justice held43 that Poland had failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law because the Polish 
Constitutional  Tribunal  had  infringed  the  principle  of  effective  judicial  protection  and 
disregarded the primacy, autonomy, effectiveness and uniform application of EU law, as well 
as the binding effect of the Court’s two judgments. The Court, in light of serious irregularities 
vitiating  the  appointment  of  three  judges  of  the  Polish  Constitutional  Court  in  December 
2015  and  of  its  President  in  December  2016,  called  into  question  the  status  of  the 
Constitutional Tribunal as an independent and impartial tribunal established by law within the 
meaning of EU law. The Constitutional Tribunal stated that the EU Court of Justice has no 
jurisdiction to rule on matters related to the Constitutional Tribunal and that its ruling has no 
effect  on  the  Tribunal’s  functioning44.  The  Constitutional  Tribunal  declared  that  the 
independence test as regards administrative court judges is unconstitutional45. Judgments of 
the  Constitutional  Tribunal  are  not  published  in  the  Official  Journal.  In  March  2026, 
Parliament adopted a resolution whereby it recalled the need to restore the independence of 
the  Constitutional  Tribunal46  and  elected,  on  13  March  and  11  June  2026,  seven  judges  to 
vacant posts in the Tribunal47. On 5 May 2026, the European Court of Human Rights issued 
interim  measures  obliging  the  competent  Polish  authorities  to  refrain  from  hindering  the 
taking  up  and  exercise  of  judicial  duties  by  four  of  these  judges48.  The  budget  of  the 
Constitutional Tribunal was increased for 2026 in comparison to the previous year49. 

Limited  further  progress  has  been  made  on  the  recommendation  to  take  forward  the 
reform  to  separate  the  office  of  the  Minister  of  Justice  from  that  of  the  Prosecutor 
General  and  to  ensure  functional  independence  of  the  prosecution  service  from  the 
Government50.  Following  the  adoption  of  a  draft  law  by  the  Permanent  Committee  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers51,  the  core  part  of  the  reform  has  been  prepared  and  is  ready  for 
transmission to Parliament. At the same time, further progress on the reform now depends on 
legislative  work  that  is  ongoing  as  regards  sub-statutory  provisions  that  would  adjust  the 
functioning  of  prosecutorial  units  within  the  new  system  envisaged  by  the  draft  law52.  The 
status of the National Prosecutor was contested in certain instances53, while according to the 

43   Court of Justice, judgment of 18 December 2025 in case C-448/23, Commission v. Poland. 
44   Statements  published  on  the  website  of  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  on  18  December  2025  and  13  March 

2026. 

45   This  concerns  Article  5a  of  the  Law  on  the  Administrative  Courts  Organisation.  See  the  ruling  of  25 

February 2026 in case SK 68/25. The ruling was not published by the Government. 

46   Resolution of the Sejm of 13 March 2026 on the necessary action to be taken in order to ensure that the 
Constitutional  Tribunal  complies  with  requirements  of  an  independent  and  impartial  court  established  by 
law. 

47   The President of the Republic has so far taken the oath from two of the 6 judges elected by the Sejm on 1 
April  2026.  The  remaining  four  judges  delivered  their  oath  on  9  April  2026  in  the  Sejm,  and  lodged 
notarised  copies  of  the  oaths,  addressed  to  the  President  of  the  Republic,  with  the  Chancellery  of  the 
President of the Republic on the same day. As regards the judge appointed on 11 June 2026, the President 
of the Republic has so far not allowed the judge to deliver the oath of office. 
48   Decision of 5 May 2026 in case Dziurda and Others v. Poland (no. 17392/26). 
49   The Law of 20 January 2026 on the Budget for 2026. 
50   The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to ‘Take forward the reform to separate the function 
of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor-General and to ensure functional independence of the 
prosecution  service  from  the  Government’.  Significant  progress  was  assessed  on  this  recommendation  in 
2025 and some progress in 2024. 

51   2025 Rule of Law Report, Poland, pp. 7-8. 
52   Polish Government  (2026), p. 5. So far, this regulation has not been disclosed to the public, including as 

regards its broad outline. 

53   By certain single-judge benches of the Supreme Court and by the President of the Republic. 

8 

 
 
National Prosecutor’s Office, this did not affect its overall functioning54. As so far no further 
steps were taken to transmit the draft law to Parliament, there has only been limited further 
progress on the recommendation to separate the office of the Minister of Justice from that of 
the Prosecutor General and to ensure functional independence of the prosecution service.  

Quality 

The Government continues its efforts to improve the digitalisation of ordinary courts. In 
the context of the ‘Digital Court’ initiative55, the Government has initiated works to develop 
and  integrate  different  IT  tools  used  at  courts  and  to  facilitate  digital  communication  with 
citizens. Courts are more advanced as regards the use of digital technology compared to the 
prosecution system56. A special Committee for the Codification of Civil Law was created at 
the Ministry of Justice, and it is finalising works on introducing fully digital casefiles in the 
context  of  civil  procedures,  including  by  introducing  an  automatisation  of  certain  civil  law 
actions57. 

New  rules  on  legal  aid  entered  into  force,  and  guidelines  were  adopted  on  the  use  of 
artificial  intelligence  by  lawyers.  As  of  January  2026,  a  reform  facilitating  access  to  free 
legal  aid  entered  into  force,  addressing  the  needs  of  citizens  who  cannot  afford  paid  legal 
counsel58.  Poland  also  increased  the  amount  of  legal  fees  for  ex  officio  representation  of 
parties to proceedings, while the increase is not deemed sufficient by lawyers59. In order to 
further improve the quality of their work, the Bar Association and the Council of Attorneys at 
Law  adopted  guidelines60  on  the  use  of  artificial  intelligence  solutions,  including 
recommendations on when artificial intelligence tools can be used. 

Efficiency 

The  overall  performance  of  ordinary  and  administrative  courts  is  showing  a  slight 
decrease. The estimated time needed to resolve civil, commercial, administrative, and other 
cases slightly increased (from 92 days in 2023 to 104 days in 2024), and the same trend exists 
as  regards  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases  in  first  instance  ordinary  courts  (a  slight 
increase  from  357  in  2023  to  360  in  2024).  The  rate  of  solving  civil,  commercial, 
administrative,  and  other  cases  also  slightly  deteriorated  (from  102%  in  2023  to  98%  in 
2024).  As  regards  administrative  courts,  the  rate  of  resolving  administrative  cases  in  first 
instance deteriorated, despite the improving trend in  previous years (from  110% in  2023 to 
102%  in  2024)  yet  the  number  of  pending  administrative  cases  in  first  instance  is 
decreasing61. 

54   Country visit Poland, National Prosecutor’s Office. National Prosecutor (Prawo.pl 2026). 7 NGOs (2026), 

written input, p. 8. 

55   2025 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 8. 
56   Figure 41, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
57   The works of the Committee are focused on mid-term and long-term plans, with the full digitalisation being 

introduced by 2036. See Prawo.pl (2026). 

58   The reform allows such persons to obtain legal counsel, in person or remotely, as regards any type of issue 
concerning civic counselling, legal aid and mediation, with additional modalities provided for persons with 
disabilities. Ministry of Justice (2025b). 

59   The National Bar Council and the National Councils of Attorneys at Law, country visit; Ministry of Justice 

(2025c). 

60   National Council of Attorneys at Law (2025); see also Prawo.pl (2025). 
61   Figures 4, 5, 9, 11 and 14, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

9 

 
 
 
II. 

ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK 

The  perception  among  citizens,  experts  and  business  executives  is  that  the  level  of 
corruption  in  the  public  sector  remains  relatively  high.  In  the  2025  Corruption 
Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Poland scores 53/100 and ranks 19th in the 
European Union and 52nd globally62. This perception has been relatively stable over the past 
five years63. The 2026 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 54% of respondents 
consider corruption widespread in their country (EU average 71) and 46% of respondents feel 
personally affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU average 30). As regards businesses, 
47% of companies consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 65) and 18% consider 
that  corruption  is  a  problem  when  doing  business  (EU  average  37).  Furthermore,  52%  of 
respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from  corrupt 
practices  (EU  average  38),  while  21%  of  companies  believe  that  people  and  businesses 
caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 31)64. 

There is no comprehensive anti-corruption strategy in place, yet current efforts focus on 
a  more  dedicated  approach  against  foreign  bribery.  The  Government  is  working  on  a 
national  strategy  against  foreign  bribery,  following  the  recommendation  of  the  OECD 
Working Group on Foreign Bribery65, focusing on prevention and education. However, there 
has so far been no follow-up to the Supreme Audit Office recommendation on the adoption of 
a new comprehensive and holistic anti-corruption strategy66. 

The  Government  is  strengthening  the  legislative  framework  against  corruption, 
including  plans  for  institutional  changes  at  the  level  of  the  police,  prosecution  and 
courts.  The  envisaged  institutional  changes  aim  to  increase  the  independence  of  anti-
corruption  institutions  to  address  previously  identified  risks  of  politicisation67.  On  11  May 
2026, the President of the Republic vetoed the already revised Government draft law on the 
coordination of anti-corruption activities adopted by Parliament on 13 March 202668, due to 
concerns regarding the division of competences among several entities69 and a possible loss 
of  operational  specialisation  resulting  from  the  dissolution  of  the  Central  Anti-Corruption 
Bureau70.  The  draft  law  was  sent  back  to  the  Sejm,  yet  a  required  majority  to  override  the 

62   The level of perceived corruption is categorised as follows: low (above 79); relatively low (between 79-60), 

relatively high (between 59-50), high (below 50). 

63   In 2021, the score was 56, while, in 2025, the score is 53. The score significantly increases/decreases when 
it changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (between 4-5 points) and is relatively stable (from 
1-3 points) in the last five years. 

64   Data from Special Eurobarometer 573 (2026) and Flash Eurobarometer 582 (2026). 
65   Polish Government, written input, p. 12. OECD (2024), recommendation 1(a), p. 13. The OECD Working 
Group on Bribery discussed the recommendation at the plenary meeting on 23 June 2026 (report still to 
be published). 

66   Supreme Audit Office (2022b) and (2022a). See 2025 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 11. 
67   Polish Government (2026). 2025 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 9 and earlier reports. 
68   Law  on  the  coordination  of  anti-corruption  activities  and  on  liquidation  of  the  Central  Anti-Corruption 
Bureau,  No.  1884.  The  draft  aimed  at  dissolving  the  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  by  end  September 
2026 and transferring  resources and competences to detect, analyse, prevent and investigate corruption to 
the  police,  the  Internal  Security  Agency  (ABW)  and  the  National  Revenue  Administration  (KAS)  by  1 
October.  Country  visit  Poland,  Ministry  of  Interior.  On  the  budgetary  transfers,  see  2025  Rule  of  Law 
Report, p. 10. 

69   The draft law provided for coordination procedures amongst relevant entities, rendering existing ministerial 
guidelines on coordination, of 20 March 2024, binding, which stakeholders had supported. See 2025 Rule 
of Law Report, Poland, p. 9. 

70   See  Press  Statement  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  (2026c).  As  previously  reported,  the  Central  Anti-
Corruption  Bureau  (CBA)  had  been  subject  to  concerns  regarding  its  independence  from  the  executive. 

10 

 
 
presidential  veto  is  lacking.  The  Government  is  working  on  a  new  draft  law  that  would 
preserve  reforms  aimed  at  keeping  the  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  free  from  political 
interference71.  The  draft  reform  aiming  to  establish  a  new  independent  Public  Prosecutor’s 
Office  and  to  abolish  the  National  Prosecutor’s  Office  remains  under  preparation72. 
Amendments  to  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  aiming  to  transfer  the  jurisdiction  for 
corruption cases from local courts to regional courts, proposed by the Council of Ministers, 
were adopted by Parliament and signed into law by the President of the Republic on 11 May 
202673. 

There  has  been  some  further  progress  to  ensure 
independent  and  effective 
investigations and prosecutions for a more robust track record of high-level corruption 
cases74.  The  National  Prosecutor’s  Office  published  its  second  review  report  of  cases  of 
public  interest  concluded  by  the  prosecution  service  between  2016  and  202375,  including 
recommendations  to  address  the  identified  irregularities76.  Large-scale  corruption  cases  are 
being  investigated  irrespective  of  political  affiliation,  and  several  indictments  have  been 
issued  in  prominent  cases  involving  public  officials  and  politicians77.  The  autonomy  and 
cooperation  of  the  relevant  anti-corruption  entities,  as  well  as  their  access  to  relevant 
registries,  continue  to  be  considered  sufficient  to  effectively  carry  out  corruption 
investigations and prosecutions. Parliament has appointed the new leadership of the Supreme 
Audit  Office,  which  was  reorganised  in  six  thematic  departments  with  new  auditing 
priorities78. The enforcement against foreign bribery in practice, while still limited, continues 
to improve 79. The Ministry of Justice continues analytical work on an amendment of the Act 
on  the  liability  of  collective  entities  for  criminal  offences,  with  a  view  to  allowing  such 
liability to be established independently of a prior criminal conviction of a natural person for 

Stakeholders  have  however  recently  welcomed  the  CBA’s  proactive  corruption  investigations  involving 
public officials and politicians. Country visit Poland, Batory Foundation/ Helsinki Foundation. 

71   Country visit Poland, Batory Foundation and Helsinki Foundation (both suggesting in that respect a more 

holistic, strategic anti-corruption policy approach). 

72   Draft  Act  on  the  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  (UD95),  aiming  also  at  the  separation  of  the  position  of  the 
Prosecutor  General  and  Minister  of  Justice.  See  pillar  I  above.  With  several  implementing  acts  for  the 
effective implementation being prepared, the draft will require re-submission to the Council of Ministers. 
Country visit, Poland, Ministry of Justice. 

73   Law  of  27  March  2026  amending  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  originally  prompted  by  an  OECD 
recommendation exclusively for foreign bribery, but broadened to all cases of Arts. 228-229 Penal Code for 
consistency and taxonomy reasons. 

74   The  2025  Rule  of  Law  report  recommended  to  Poland  “to  continue  efforts  to  ensure  independent  and 
effective  corruption  investigations  and  prosecutions  […]  to  enable  a  robust  track  record  of  high-level 
corruption cases”. Some further progress was previously assessed on the 2025 recommendation. 

75   2025 Rule of Law Report, p. 10: the aim is to address risks of selective application of the law and disparity 

in the treatment of corruption cases for political purposes. 

76   National  Prosecutor’s  Office  (2025),  review  of  a  total  of  400  cases  in  both  reports,  selected  by  regional 
prosecutors  and  reported  by  the  public,  finding  significant  irregularities  in  233  cases.  Recommendations 
include  to  commence  or  reopen  discontinued  proceedings,  and  to  implement  disciplinary  or  criminal 
liability against prosecutors. 

77   See  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  (2026)  and  National  Prosecutor’s  Office  (2026a).  On  indictments  in 
the visa scandal, see National Prosecutor’s Office (2025a) and (2025b); on the university diplomas bribery 
scheme,  National  Prosecutor’s  Office  (2025c).  The  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  for  Organised  Crime  and 
Corruption reports a slight decrease of newly opened cases (1083 in 2024, 989 in 2025) however with an 
increased number of suspects; an increase of indictments (633 in 2024, 739 in 2025); and stable figures on 
concluded first instance convictions (1590 in 2024, 1615 in 2025). 

78   Supreme  Audit  Office  (2025a),  (2025b),  (2025c).  The  special  department  for  ad-hoc  inspections,  dealing 
with high-profile cases, no longer exists, but its findings will be published in the September annual report. 
79   Polish Government (2026), written input, p. 9, reporting four ongoing investigations and one pending case. 

OECD (2024), para. 65, see also above on foreign bribery strategy. 

11 

 
 
 
foreign  bribery80.  Since  becoming  operational  in  Poland  in  January  2025,  the  EPPO  has 
investigated several cases of expenditure fraud and corruption, with one open case relating to 
corruption in  202581. Against this background, there has  been some further progress  on the 
recommendation. 

There has been no progress on the recommendation to address the broad immunities of 
top executives and to remove impunity clauses in legislation82. Immunities cause concern 
as  they  act  as  an  obstacle  to  criminal  accountability  for  corruption  committed  by  top 
executives outside their official capacity83. Impunity clauses dating back to the period before 
202284,  exempting  criminal  responsibility  also  for  corruption  and  abuse  of  political  or 
administrative  power  in  a  series  of  specific  circumstances,  are  still  in  force  and  applied.  In 
2025, they were applied in 18 proceedings (compared to 9 in 2024)85. Overall, there has been 
no progress on the recommendation, neither on immunities nor on impunity clauses. 

There  has  been  no  progress  on  the  recommendation  to  strengthen  the  integrity 
framework  on  lobbying86.  The  2005  lobbying  law  defines  lobbying  and  provides  for 
sanctions87, yet no steps have been taken to oblige persons in top executive functions to fully 
disclose  their  contacts  with  interest  representatives  in  a  meaningful  and  timely  manner88. 
Preparatory work in this regard had already been conducted in previous years by the Ministry 
of  Interior89.  Challenges  also  persist  as  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  three  existing  lobbying 
registers,  with  continuing  low  registration  rates,  de-registrations  and  insufficient  oversight 
and enforcement in practice90. In the Sejm, only three out of the 17 registered lobbyists have 
reported lobbying the Parliament in 202591. There have also been no steps taken to broaden 
the scope of post-employment restrictions to effectively deal with conflicting activities and to 

80   2024 and 2025 Rule of Law Report, p. 17 (for 2024) and p. 10 (for 2025). OECD (2024), p. 11. 
81   EPPO (2026), Annual Report 2025, p. 44. A dedicated team has been formed at the Police Headquarters to 

ensure the effective cooperation with the EPPO, Polish Government (2026), written input, p. 9. 

82   The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to “[a]ddress the broad scope of immunities for top 
executives  and  remove  previously  introduced  impunity  clauses  in  legislation  in  order  to  enable  a  robust 
track  record  of  high-level  corruption  cases”.  Some  progress  was  previously  assessed  on  the  2025 
recommendation. 

83   2025 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 10. GRECO (2023), paras. 54-63; (2019) paras. 82-91, reiterating its 
recommendation for an in-depth reform of  top executives’ immunities, including by introducing objective 
criteria for transparent lifting procedures. 

84   Exemptions from criminal responsibility (‘impunity clauses’) exist in  Art.  305(6) Criminal Code; Law  of 
December 2022 on the abandonment of prosecution relating to the organisation of the presidential elections; 
April  2022  amendments  to  Art.  483(1)  of  the  Commercial  Company  Code  Act,  abolishing  liability  of 
management  and  supervisory  boards  for  actions  to  the  detriment  of  the  company.  Art.  76  of  the  Law  on 
special support instruments in connection with the spread of SARS-COV-2 virus, adopted in April 2020. 
85   Country  visit,  Poland,  National  Prosecutor’s  Office:  one  third  originated  from  a  single  proceeding.  The 
impunity  clauses  only  apply  to  active  bribery,  thus  the  public  official  receiving  the  bribe  could  still  be 
prosecuted. 

86   The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to “introduce rules on lobbying”. No progress was 

previously assessed on the recommendation in 2025. 

87   Act of 7 July 2005 on lobbying activities in the law-making process. 
88   Internal guidelines exist only for some ministries since 2006. See GRECO (2025a), recommendation (i) for 
members of parliament, pp. 3-4; GRECO (2025b), recommendation (vi) for the central government, pp. 6-8. 
89   2018-2020  Anti-Corruption  Programme  foresaw  a  revision  of  the  lobbying  law,  Council  of  Ministers 
Resolution  No.  207,  19  December  2017  (M.P.  z  2018  r.  item  12).  Country  visit  to  Poland,  Ministry  of 
Interior intends to await the proposed Directive on transparency of interest representation on behalf of third 
countries. 

90   In 2025, 595 entries in the Government register, with an even lower scale of lobbying in the Parliament: 17 
entries  in  the  Sejm,  and  one  in  the  Senate.  See  also  GRECO  (2025),  paras.  34-36:  the  scope  and 
enforcement of the rules appearing to apply to top executive functions remain unclear in practice. 

91   Office of the Sejm (2025). Country visit Poland, Senate Ethics Committee. 

12 

 
 
prevent revolving doors’ moves to the private sector that could create a conflict of interest92. 
Therefore, there has been no progress on the recommendation. 

There  has  been  limited  progress  on  the  recommendation  regarding  a  standardised 
online  system  for  asset  declarations93.  The  legislative  proposal  introduced  in  November 
2023 to broaden asset declaration rules to cover high-level officials and spouses’ properties 
was abandoned94. Instead, the Government is prioritising a more comprehensive reform of the 
asset  declarations  system95.  As  most  declarations  of  Government  public  officials  are  still 
filled out and in a variety of formats, stakeholders had called for a more holistic reform96. The 
reform  will  aim  at  consolidating  in  one  single,  unified  legal  act  rules  governing  the 
submission  and  verification  of  asset  declarations.  It  will  introduce  a  single  electronic  asset 
declaration  form  for  all  professional  groups,  a  central  register  and  criminal  and  financial 
sanctions. The Minister Coordinator of Special Services is leading on the reform, which will 
be subject to the President’s signature97. Until the entry into force of the digital tool, currently 
set  for  1  January  2027,  the  system  remains  decentralised  with  manual  submissions.  Asset 
declarations  of  members  of  the  Senate  also  remain  mostly  non-digitised98.  There  has  thus 
been  limited  progress  to  introduce  a  standardised  online  system  for  asset  declarations  of 
public officials and Members of Parliament. 

Whistleblower  disclosures  are  still  rare  due  to  a  lack  of  trust  in  effective  protection. 
Police headquarters have introduced whistleblower reporting procedures, which, although not 
fully anonymous as the whistleblower’s identity is known to the police, allow for internal and 
external disclosures. The Ombudsperson Office as the main reporting channel competent also 
for corruption reports if they are linked to breaches of fundamental freedoms has noted low 
reporting levels,  having  received few external  reports in  202599. Stakeholders call for more 
public  awareness-raising  so  that  both  potential  whistleblowers  and  employers  get  a  better 
understanding  of  the  scope  of  the  law100.  A  year  and  a  half  after  the  reporting  channel’s 
establishment, the Office has identified a lack of confidence in the reporting procedure and of 
trust in the level of effective protection101, flagging risks about chilling effects following the 
widely  publicised  breach  of  confidentiality  in  a  public  institution102.  An  assessment  of  the 
effectiveness of the 2024 whistleblower protection law is envisaged for 2027103. The Office 
will  review  the  external  whistleblower  reporting  procedures  in  place  every  three  years. 
Whistleblowers in Poland are also entitled to free legal aid. 

92   GRECO (2025b), recommendation vii, p. 8. 
93   The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to “introduce […]  a standardised online system for 
asset  declarations  of  public  officials  and  members  of  Parliament  while  ensuring  effective  verification”. 
Limited progress was previously assessed on the recommendation in 2025. 

94   The  Bill  amending  the  Act  on  Restrictions  on  the  Conduct  of  Business  by  Persons  Performing  Public 
Functions would extend the scope to cover high-level officials and spouses’ property. Country visit, Poland, 
Ministry of Justice. GRECO (2025b), recommendation ix. 

95   Minister of Supervision of the Implementation of Government Policy (2025), Priority 24. 
96   At  least  16  different  forms  are  in  use;  provisions  are  scattered  among  several  legislative  acts.  GRECO 

(2025b), recommendation ix. Country visit to Poland, Batory Foundation/ Helsinki Foundation. 

97   Country  visit,  Poland,  Ministry  of  Interior:  some  solutions  of  the  previous  draft  of  the  Central  Anti-

Corruption Bureau will inform but not be entirely taken over by the new legislative draft.  

98   Country  visit,  Poland,  Senate  Ethics  Committee.  Senators’  declarations  are  verified  by  the  tax  authority. 

The Sejm adjustments are considered for the declaration of the market value of real estates. 

99   Of  the  561  reports  submitted  to  the  Ombudsperson  (i.e.  Office  of  the  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights), 

only 173 met statutory requirements. 

100   Transparency International (2026). 
101   Country visit Poland, Ombudsperson Office. 
102   Ombudsperson Office (2025). 
103   Polish Government (2026), written input, p. 10. 

13 

 
 
 
Weaknesses  remain  in  political  party  financing.  Challenges  persist  in  the  practical 
application of the 2022 legislation on financing of political parties, particularly regarding the 
transparency104.  Publication  levels  of  party  finances  are  not  standardised  and  still  vary 
significantly. Some good practices exist, where filter functionalities are embedded on parties’ 
websites,  facilitating  the  search  for  specific  party  finance  data105.  In  September  2025,  the 
National  Election  Commission  found  some  irregularities  in  the  financial  information 
provided by political parties and rejected in the second consecutive year one annual report for 
breaches of the Electoral Code on grounds of acceptance of unlawful financial benefits106. In 
2025, the OSCE/ODIHR raised concerns in the context of the Presidential elections regarding 
non-transparent  online  third-party  campaigning  and  campaign  financing  conducted  by 
formally independent entities107. The parliamentary bill of 29 February 2024, which aimed to 
address previously identified systemic transparency challenges relating to clientelist networks 
around state-owned enterprises, has not advanced beyond the first reading in the Sejm and the 
leading Subcommittee’s report of 20 November 2024 and now appears to be discontinued108. 
Stakeholders  highlight  vulnerabilities  and  the  need  to  strengthen  real-time  disclosure 
requirements and enhancements of oversight mechanisms 109. 

Public  procurement  remains  an  area  vulnerable  to  corruption,  with  the  Government 
considering  innovative  solutions  to  enhance  detection.  Businesses’  attitudes  towards 
corruption  in  the  EU  show  that  21%  of  companies  in  Poland  (EU  average  30%)  think  that 
corruption  has  prevented  them  from  winning  a  public  tender  in  practice  in  the  last  three 
years110.  The  Single  Market  and  Competitiveness  Scoreboard  on  access  to  public 
procurement  in  Poland  reports  a  high  53%  of  single  bids  for  2025  (EU  average  27%). 
However,  47%  of  companies  perceive  the  level  of  independence  of  the  public  procurement 
review  body  (National  Board  of  Appeal)  as  very  or  fairly  good,  which  has  significantly 
decreased  in  comparison  to  2025  (58%)111.  Legislative  amendments  to  the  Act  on  Public 
Finances aim to  make information  about contracts of public finance sector entities  publicly 
available in an electronic central register, which will become functional as of 1 July 2026112. 
To protect the State’s economic interests and to increase competitiveness and transparency in 
public  procurement,  the  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  (CBA)  carried  out  38  controls  in 
2025113.  The  CBA’s  continued  investigations  into  suspected  irregularities  relating  to  EU 
structural  funds  and  corruption  at  the  National  Centre  for  Research  and  Development 
(NCBR)  led  to  further  detentions  in  early  2026,  including  of  a  mayor  and  several  public 
officials114.  Investigations  into  alleged  bid-rigging  and  embezzlements  pertaining  to  the 
Justice Fund, which provides post-penitentiary assistance and support to crime victims, have 

104   Batory Foundation et al. (2026), 2025 Rule of Law Report, p. 12. Arts. 25 and 27 of the Act require parties 
to publish up-to-date information in the donations and the contract registers. Stakeholders stress the need to 
test data reliability. 

105   See 2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 17. Parties’ data is published in pdf format or as embedded tables. 
106   National Electoral Committee (2025), due to breaches of Arts. 144(1)(3)(e), 132(5) Electoral Code. 
107   OSCE/ODIRH (2025), pp. 4-5, 18, 20. 
108   Sejm  Deputies;  bill  on  corporate  governance  in  companies  with  State  Treasury  shareholdings,  Paper  no. 
261. 2025 Rule of Law Report, p. 13. Yet, the Ministry of State Assets introduced a Code of Good Practices 
for Ownership Supervision. 

109   Country visit, Poland, Batory Foundation, Helsinki Foundation. 
110   Flash Eurobarometer 582 (2026). This is 9 percentage points below the EU average. 
111   Figure 59, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
112   Act Amending the Criminal Code and Certain Other Acts (Paper no. 1863).  
113   Polish Government (2026), written input, p. 10: as a specialised entity, the CBA has the power to review 

business decisions and to prevent and combat EU budget fraud. 

114   Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2026a) and (2026b). 2025 Rule of Law Report, p. 13. 

14 

 
 
 
led to several convictions for money laundering and misappropriation115. In the related high-
level corruption cases based on allegations of misuse of public funds, an independent court, 
upon a motion by the National Prosecutor’s Office, issued an arrest warrant for a high-level 
official116.  The  Government  and  stakeholders  still  consider  public  procurement  as  the  main 
corruption  risk  sector,  with  potential  impacts  on  investments  and  business  activities117.  To 
address  such  concerns,  the  Government  considers  the  development  of  data  analytical  tools 
supported  by  artificial  intelligence  as  a  strategic  priority  to  facilitate  the  detection  of  fraud 
and corruption patterns and anomalies in public procurement118. 

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM 

The Government continues to work on legislative changes aiming to address persisting 
concerns  regarding  the  impartiality  and  independence  of  the  media  regulator.  In 
December  2025,  the  Government  presented  a  draft  media  law  introducing  several 
amendments  to  the  National  Broadcasting  Act,  which  has  already  undergone  public 
consultation. Based on the draft law as presented to public consultation, the aim of the reform 
is, among others, to enhance the media regulator’s (National Broadcasting Council - KRRiT) 
inclusiveness,  effectiveness,  and  independence,  for  instance  by  introducing  structured 
rotation,  clearer  merit-based  eligibility  criteria,  and  stakeholder-backed  nomination 
requirements  to  reduce  political  influence  and  enhance  accountability119.  At  the  same  time, 
some  stakeholders  advocate  for  a  more  comprehensive  reform  of  the  appointment  process, 
including  more  robust  safeguards120.  As  part  of  the  ongoing  media  law  reform,  the 
Government  has  proposed  to  abolish  the  current  mechanism  linking  the  rejection  of  the 
annual  report  submitted  to  Parliament  to  the  potential  dismissal  of  all  members  of  the 
KRRiT121, and to clarify further the possibility of removing individual members, on explicitly 
specified grounds. The aim of this legislative amendment is to increase the media regulator’s 
independence  and  to  limit  political  interference122.  In  July  2025,  the  Sejm  adopted  a 
resolution  to  bring  charges  against  the  Chair  of  the  KRRiT  before  the  State  Tribunal123.  In 
addition,  the  media  regulator  has  expressed  concerns  that  its  current  human  and  financial 
resources  might  not  be  sufficient  for  it  to  carry  out  the  new  functions  envisaged  in  the 
reform124.  In  parallel,  the  draft  Budget  Act  for  2026  proposed  a  slight  increase  in  the 
KRRiT’s budget125.  

115   National Prosecutor’s Office (2025d). 
116   National Prosecutor’s Office (2025e). 
117   Polish  Government  (2026),  written  input,  p.  10;  Country  visit,  Poland,  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau/ 

National Prosecution Office/ Supreme Audit Office/ Batory Foundation. 

118   Ibid.  
119   Polish Government (2026), written input, p. 12. The draft law foresees, among others, restoring a rotational 
mechanism for the composition of the KRRiT, the introduction of more detailed regulations concerning the 
qualifications  of  candidates  for  membership  in  the  KRRiT,  related  to  education,  professional  experience, 
independence, and political neutrality, the introduction of a requirement for candidates to submit documents 
confirming that their candidacies are supported by non-governmental organizations of creators, journalists, 
and other entities whose activities cover the media sector. 

120   7  NGOs  (2026)  written  input,  p.  40.  The  proposed  safeguards  include  for  instance  introducing  qualified-
majority voting for appointments of members of KRRiT by the Parliament or broader nomination rights. 

121   National Broadcasting Act, Article 12, para. 3-5. 
122   Polish Government (2026), written input, p. 12. 
123   Sejm  (2025),  Resolution  to  bring  charges.  The  KRRiT  considered  that  the  decision  could  be  seen  as 

politically motivated, see Country visit Poland, KRRiT  

124   Country visit Poland, KRRiT. 
125   7 NGOs (2026), written input, p. 40. 

15 

 
 
The reform of public service media’s governance, independence safeguards and funding 
continues126.  The  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  (MPM)  2026  indicator  on  independence  of 
public service media continues to detect a high risk with the same value as in the last year127. 
The MPM 2026 in particular flagged that the governance of public service media structures 
continues to reflect political choices128. The draft media law published by the Government in 
December  2025  with  a  view  to  aligning  with  the  European  Media  Freedom  Act  (EMFA), 
aims to enhance safeguards to protect the independence of public service media and  set out 
provisions  governing  the  appointment  of  public  broadcasting  bodies  to  enhance  both  their 
editorial  and  operational  independence.  Legislative  work  also  continues  to  strengthen  the 
competences of the programme councils of public service media, to ensure the separation of 
editorial  and  management  departments,  and  to  dissolve  the  National  Media  Council.  The 
media  regulator  would  be  re-entrusted  with  the  function  of  appointing  public  broadcasters’ 
management board members to ensure more coherence in the procedure of appointments of 
key leadership positions in public service media. Pending the ongoing media law reform, the 
National Media Council’s effectiveness is contested129 With a legislative draft published by 
the Government that has undergone public consultation, some further progress has been made 
on the recommendation made in the 2025 Rule of Law Report.  

Pending new rules to strengthen the independence of public broadcasters’ governance, 
some concerns have been raised about the ongoing state of liquidation of major public 
service  media.  The  liquidation  of  public  service  media,  namely  Polish  Television,  Polish 
Radio  and  Polish  Press  Agency,  initiated  in  2023,  is  ongoing,  with  liquidators  being 
appointed directly by the Minister of Culture. Some stakeholders also report that the ongoing 
liquidation  restricts  the  ability  of  public  service  media  operators,  in  particular  regional  TV 
and radio broadcasters, to participate in certain EU grant proposals130. In order to ensure the 
operational and financial stability of public service media, the media regulator unblocked the 
payments  of  collected  licence  fees,  suspended  in  2024.  The  initial  suspension  followed  a 
decision to place the funds in court deposits, pending the outcomes of a legal dispute arising 
from the liquidation of public service media131. While there has been a decrease in polarising 
and biased content in public service media in the past two years, the MPM 2026 highlighted 
increased  polarised  media  coverage  of  political  issues  in  news  outputs132,  especially  in  the 
context of electoral campaigns133. 

The Government is working on the reform of funding for public service media. As part 
of the media law reform, the Government had proposed abolishing the licence fee model as 
the primary source of funding for public service media, replacing it with financing from the 
state  budget.  This  funding  reform  is  considered  by  the  Government  as  a  response  to  long-
standing challenges concerning the effectiveness of licence fee collection. While stakeholders 
generally  support  moving  from  license  fees  to  the  state  budget  funding  model,  some  have 

126   The  2025  Rule of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Poland  to “[t]ake  forward  reforms  to  ensure  an  effective 
legislative framework for the independent governance and editorial independence of public service media, 
taking  into  account  European  standards  on  public  service  media.”  Some  further  progress  was  previously 
assessed on the 2025 recommendation. 
127   The Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), p. 32. 
128   The Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), p. 32. 
129   Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, p. 15. 
130   Country visit Poland, Ministry of Culture. 
131   Some  courts  later  ruled  that  withholding  the  funds  was  a  serious  violation  of  the  law  and  ordered  their 

release, which gradually led to payments being resumed. 

132   The Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), p. 28. 
133   Country visit Poland, KRRiT;The Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), p. 30. 

16 

 
 
expressed  concerns  that  the  wording  used  in  the  draft  law  to  describe  the  allocation  of 
budgetary  resources  may  limit  the  flexibility  of  the  mechanism,  potentially  requiring 
amendments to the media law each time budgetary adjustments are needed134. 

The  reforms  to  ensure  fair,  transparent  and  non-discriminatory  procedures  when 
granting  operating  licences  to  media  outlets  are  ongoing,  with  a  public  consultation 
completed on a legislative draft published by the Government135. As part of the ongoing 
reform  of  the  media  law  with  a  view  to  aligning  with  EMFA,  the  Government  proposed 
legislative  amendments  that  underwent  public  consultation.  These  envisaged  amendments 
aim to introduce a revamped licensing system that would streamline the process and ensure 
timely decision-making. The draft law foresees that if KRRiT fails to adopt a resolution on 
the  renewal  of  a  licence  at  least  6  months  before  its  expiry,  the  licence  is  automatically 
extended  by  operation  of  law  for  a  further  period  of  10  years136.  In  light  of  the  ongoing 
legislative  work,  there  has  been  some  further  progress  on  the  implementation  of  the 
recommendation made in the 2025 Rule of Law Report. 

Certain challenges persist in safeguarding media pluralism, especially at the local press 
level. The MPM (2026) assessed the market plurality as scoring medium-high risk, with the 
very high risk scores for plurality of media providers and high risk for editorial independence 
from commercial and owner influence137. Local government bodies continue to publish their 
own  press  outlets,  which  generated  some  concerns  about  media  pluralism,  fair  competition 
and political control over local press outlets138. As such outlets are often edited by employees 
of local municipalities, some stakeholders have raised concerns that such local government-
funded  media  may  undermine  independence  through  financial  and  editorial  dependence, 
while  also  unfairly  competing  with  private  outlets  using  public  resources139.  Furthermore, 
major  commercial  broadcasters,  namely  TVN  and  Polsat,  remain  classified  as  “strategic 
companies”  following  a  government  decision,  requiring  state  approval  for  any  ownership 
changes.  Moreover,  a  company  majority-owned  by  the  Polish  State  Treasury  continues  to 
hold  Polska  Press,  one  of  Poland’s  largest  regional  media  publishers,  raising  additional 
concerns among stakeholders regarding the potential impact on media pluralism140. Under the 
draft  media  law,  which  is  still  under  legislative  review,  the  regulator  would  gain  expanded 
powers to monitor and report on media pluralism. 

There  have  been  no  substantive  developments  with  regard  to  access  to  official 
information  as  the  challenges  identified  in  previous  reporting  periods  persist.  The 
procedure under the Act on Access to Public Information is generally perceived as accessible 
and  with  minimal  formalities141.  The  indicator  of  the  MPM  2026  on  protection  of  right  to 
information  scored  a  lower  risk  than  in  the  last  year,  but  in  the  same  -  medium-low  risk  - 
band142.  However,  some  stakeholders  report  instances  of  unjustified  refusals  or  delays  in 

134   EBU (2026). 
135   The  2025  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Poland  to  “[t]ake  forward  reforms  to  ensure  that  fair, 
transparent  and  non-discriminatory  procedures  are  adhered  to  for  the  granting  of  operating  licences  to 
media outlets.” Some further progress was previously assessed on the 2025 recommendation. 

136   Polish Government (2026a), additional written input, p. 9.  
137   The Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), pp. 19-20. 
138   Ombudsperson (2026) ,Opinion on limiting the ability of local government entities to publish newspapers. 
139   Country visit Poland, Ombudsperson; the Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), p. 37. 
140   International  Press  Institute  (2026),  written  input,  p. 15. In  September  2025,  the  Minister  of  State  Assets 
stated that the company Orlen intends to proceed with the sale of Polska Press after the completion of the 
publisher’s restructuring process, see Wirtualne Media (2025). 

141   7 NGOs (2026), written input, p. 43; similarly, the Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), p. 14. 
142   The Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), p. 14. 

17 

 
 
processing requests for access to information143 as well as incidents in which journalists were 
denied access to public proceedings of state institutions without sufficient grounds144. At the 
same  time,  in  2025  some  legislative  changes  strengthened  selected  aspects  of  access  to 
information,  in  particular  through  the  creation  of  the  Central  Register  of  Public  Finance 
Sector Contracts and the partial implementation of EU pay transparency rules145. 

While an Anti-SLAPP law is under discussion in Parliament, certain challenges related 
to  the  safety  of  journalists  remain.  A  law  on  the  protection  of  persons  participating  in 
public  debate  against  manifestly  unfounded  claims  or  abusive  court  proceedings,  aimed  to 
transpose the  Anti-SLAPP Directive, was adopted by  Parliament  on 29  May and  signed by 
the President of the Republic on 19 June 2026. While stakeholders have flagged the delay in 
the  legislative  works146,  they  have  welcomed  that  the  draft  law  will  cover  also  domestic 
cases, in line with the Anti-SLAPP Recommendation147. Overall, according to data available, 
since 2024 the  number  of SLAPP cases, particularly  those initiated by public entities, have 
generally declined148. At the same time, some civil society organisations have indicated that 
there is little data available on how many SLAPPs are brought against journalists at the local 
media  level149.  While  in  2025  no  imprisonment  sentences  were  handed  down  in  SLAPP 
cases,  civil  society  organisations  have  highlighted  that  criminal  convictions  and  ongoing 
lawsuits  continue  to  pose  concerns150.  Moreover,  some  stakeholders  note  that  defamation 
remains  criminalised  and  used  as  the  primary  legal  ground  for  SLAPP  cases  against 
journalists,  which  may 
the 
criminalisation of defamation is not removed151. The Safety of Journalists Platform reports a 
systemic issue with journalists lacking adequate protection under the current defamation and 
insult laws via the ongoing systemic alert opened since 2024152. Since the 2025 Rule of Law 
Report, the Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of 
journalists  has  recorded  four  new  alerts  concerning  Poland.  Two  of  the  alerts  concern 
harassment  and  intimidation  of  journalists,  while  the  others  concern  the  confiscation  of 
equipment,  and  a  court  order  blocking  an  environmental  CSO’s  website  and  social  media 
profile for the duration of the trial  153. Moreover, the Mapping Media Freedom platform has 

the  effectiveness  of  Anti-SLAPP  protections 

limit 

if 

143   7 NGOs (2026), written input, p. 39, 43. 
144   Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, p. 22; Stefan Batory Foundation 2026, p. 43. Stakeholders 
refer  to  incidents  of  journalists  being  denied  access  to  public  meetings  of  state  institutions,  press 
conferences,  and  state  events:  for  instance,  two  Polish  media  outlets,  Gazeta  Wyborcza  and  OKO.press, 
have  filed  a  notice  to  the  National  Prosecutor's  Office  regarding  an  attempt  to  remove  journalists  from  a 
session of the State Tribunal on 3 September 2025. 

145   Watchdog Poland (2026), Raport o stanie jawności w Polsce 2025. 
146   7 NGOs (2026), written input, p. 39. 
147   Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, p. 23. 
148   As compared to the 2025 Rule of Law Report; see 7 NGOs (2026), written input, p. 39. The CASE coalition 
recorded  140  cases  identified  as  SLAPPs  in  Poland  in  2024,  see  CASE  (2026),  p.  16.  See  also  Polish 
Government (2026), written input, p. 14. 

149   Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, p. 23. 
150   7 NGOs (2026), written input, p. 44. 
151   7 NGOs (2026), written input, p. 44; Reporters Without Borders (2026), written input, p. 23.  Defamation, 

insult and offence are criminal acts in Poland punishable by imprisonment. 

152   Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists (2026). 
153   Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists (2026). The 
Polish Government replied to two of the alerts explaining that, in the case of threats against the journalists, 
the source was non-state and that the applicable criminal and investigative proceedings were undertaken. As 
regards the confiscation of equipment of two journalists covering a protest, the Government explained that 
the Code of Criminal Procedure was applied accordingly. Replies to the other two alerts are still pending, as 
the deadline for submission has not yet passed. 

18 

 
 
noted 23 new alerts.  Ten of the alerts  concern legal  actions against journalists, while seven 
concern harassment or discrediting154. 

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

The  new  rules  governing  consultations  to  improve  the  quality  of  legislation  started  to 
produce  effects.  Poland  strengthened  the  rules  governing  consultations  to  improve  the 
quality  of  legislation,  in  line  with  its  commitments  under  the  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Plan155.  According  to  CSOs156,  this  reduced  the  production  of  legislation  and  improved 
consultations  and  engagement  with  relevant  stakeholders  in  the  legislative  process.  The 
practice  of  bypassing  the  regular  legislative  procedure  by  having  governmental  draft  laws 
proposed  by  individual  Members  of  Parliament  decreased,  thus  further  increasing  public 
consultations  on  draft  laws157.  The  Ombudsperson  nevertheless  considers  that  public 
consultations on draft laws could be more inclusive158. 

Less  than  one  third  of  companies  surveyed  in  Poland  express  confidence  in  the 
effectiveness of investment protection. 32% of companies are very or fairly confident that 
investments  are  protected  by  law  and  courts,  a  figure  which  has  significantly  decreased  in 
comparison with 2025 (39%)159. The main reasons for companies’ lack of confidence are the 
frequent changes in legislation or concerns about quality of the law-making process (57%)160. 
As  regards  authorities  relevant  for  economic  operators,  65%  perceive  the  level  of 
independence  of  the  national  competition  authority  Office  of  Competition  and  Consumer 
Protection) as very or fairly good, a figure which has significantly decreased in comparison 
with  2025  (73%)161.  The  Supreme  Administrative  Court  has  jurisdiction  in  some  business-
related  cases,  including  in  cases  related  to  public  concessions  and  economic  regulation. 
A number  of  judicial  mechanisms  to  improve  efficiency  are  available  in  these  cases, 
including the possibility to apply interim measures, joint examination of similar cases and the 
consolidation of multiple appeals162. 

The Ombudsperson continues to fulfil a key role in the system of checks and balances. 
The Ombudsperson continues to enjoy an ‘A’ status by the UN Global Alliance of National 

154   European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026). 
155   The new rules of procedures of the Sejm entered into force on 1 November 2024, and those of the Council 

of Ministers on 20 August 2024; Polish Government (2025), written input, p. 23. 

156   The  XVI  Report  of  the  Civic  Legislation  Forum  of  15  December  2025.  The  Civic  Legislation  Forum  is 
composed  of  representatives  of  multiple  CSOs  and  operating  at  the  Batory  Foundation,  see  Fundacja 
Batorego (2025). 

157   See also NaszRzecznik.pl (2026). See also 7 NGOs (2026), written input, p. 45, where it is noted that in the 
first year of the legislature, 81 laws were  adopted, of which 74 entered into force, representing the lowest 
annual  figure  in  nearly  two  decades.  In  the  second  year,  legislative  activity  increased:  223  laws  were 
passed, with 206 entering into force. A significant portion of this increase reflected 51 deregulatory laws 
adopted late 2025, suggesting a rapid legislative pace with potential implications for quality scrutiny. 

158   Country visit  Poland,  Ombudsperson’s  Office.  See  also  ENNHRI  (2026)  written  contribution,  where  it  is 
argued that due to the short time since the introduction of new participation tools, their practical application 
requires periodic evaluation and adjustments to ensure the highest standards of citizen participation in the 
legislative process.  

159   Figure 52, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
160   Figure  53,  2026  EU  Justice  Scoreboard.  49%  of  the  surveyed  investors  perceive  concerns  about  quality, 
efficiency or independence of justice as the reason for the lack of confidence in investment protection. 

161   Figure 60, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
162   Figures 66 and 67, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. The data presented reflects exclusively the mechanisms in 
place at the level of the highest administrative jurisdictions; the same or other mechanisms may be in place 
at lower instance administrative courts. 

19 

 
 
Human  Rights  Institutions  (GANHRI)163.  The  overall  budget  of  the  Ombudsperson  was 
increased  for  2026164.  Nonetheless,  the  financial  resources  allocated  to  the  Ombudsperson 
remain limited, considering the range of tasks linked to its mandate165. 

On 1 January 2026, Poland had 57 leading judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights  pending  implementation,  an  increase  of  5  compared  to  the previous  year166.  At 
that  time,  Poland’s  rate  of  leading  judgments  from  the  past  10  years  that  had  been 
implemented  was  at  45%  (compared  to  49%  in  2025;  55%  remained  pending),  and  the 
average time that the judgments had been pending implementation was 5 years and 9 months 
(compared  to  5  years  and  5  months  in  2025)167.  The  oldest  leading  judgment,  pending 
implementation for 20 years, concerns excessive length of proceedings before administrative 
bodies and courts and absence of an effective remedy168. As regards the respect of payment 
deadlines,  on  31  December  2025  there  were  27  cases  in  total  awaiting  confirmation  of 
payments (compared to  26 in  2024)169. By  17 June 2026, the number of leading  judgments 
pending implementation had remained at 57170.  

Some  further  progress  has  been  made  on  the  recommendation  to  improve  the 
framework in which civil society operates171. Civic space in Poland continues to be rated as 
‘narrowed’  by  Civicus172.  Cooperation  between  the  Government  and  civil  society  remains 
positive173.While  CSOs  underline  that  there  is  still  scope  for  improving  the  framework  in 
which  civil  society  operates,  notably  as  regards  the  further  simplification  of  procedures  for 
the  financing  of  CSOs174,  legislative  work  is  ongoing  to  amend  the  law  governing  public 
benefit  activities  and  volunteering.  The  proposed  changes  aim  to  reduce  administrative 
burdens,  expand  simplified  funding  mechanisms,  adjust  reporting  requirements  for  smaller 
organisations  and  improve  the  framework  for  cooperation  between  public  authorities  and 
CSO.  Civil  society  representatives  have  generally  welcomed  these  proposals  as  a  positive 
step175.  In  March  2026,  the  Commission  for  the  examination  of  mechanisms  of  repression 
against  civil  society  organisations,  created  at  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  presented  a  second 
‘Report  on  Repressions  against  Civil  Society  in  the  years  2015-2023’176.  According  to  the 
report,  during  the  reference  period,  i.e.  between  2015  and  2023,  a  significant  number  of 
abusive  court  proceedings  and  administrative  procedures  had  been  initiated  against  media 

163   Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (2023); see also 2025 Rule of Law Report, Poland, 

p. 20. 

164   Country visit Poland, Ombudsperson’s Office. 
165   ENNHRI (2026) written contribution. 
166   For an explanation of the supervision process, see the website of the Council of Europe. 
167   All figures calculated by the European Implementation Network (EIN) and based on the number of cases 
that are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2026. EIN (2026), written input, p. 8. 

168   Judgment of the ECtHR, 51837/99, Beller v. Poland, pending implementation since 2005.  
169   Council of Europe (2026), p.163  
170   Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC). 
171   The  2025  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Poland  to  ‘Continue  ongoing  efforts  to  improve  the 
framework  in  which  civil  society  operates,  taking  into  account  European  standards  on  civil  society 
organisations’.  Some  further  progress  was  assessed  on  this  recommendation  in  2025  and  significant 
progress in 2024. 

172   Poland’s  score  is  69/100.  Ratings  by  Civicus  are  on  a  five-category  scale  defined  as:  open,  narrowed, 

obstructed, repressed and closed. 

173   Country visit Poland, Batory Foundation, Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights, Amnesty International.  
174   7 NGOs (2026), written contribution, p. 52. Cf. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 21. 
175   Polish Government (2026), written input, p. 17 and (2026a) additional written input, p. 10. 
176   Cf. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 21. 

20 

 
 
organisations and NGOs177. In view of the foregoing, overall, some further progress has been 
made to improve the framework in which civil society operates. 

National  authorities  engaged  in  initiatives  to  foster  a  rule  of  law  culture.  As  of 
September  2025,  public  secondary  schools  teach  “Civic  education”  as  a  subject,  available 
voluntarily to interested pupils, with the aim of fostering civic self-awareness and knowledge 
about  the  functioning  of  a  democratic  state  governed  by  the  rule  of  law.  Furthermore,  the 
Government,  together  with  legal  professions  and  associations  of  judges  organised  the  10th 
edition178  of  the  “Day  of  Legal  Education”  with  lawyers  presenting  legal  issues  in  classes 
organised at schools and where pupils are invited to courthouses to learn about law and court 
procedures179.  In  May  2026,  the  Ministry  of  Justice  also  endorsed  the  “Open  Courts  night” 
initiative  under  which  participating  courts  opened  their  buildings  to  the  general  public, 
organising  activities  such  as  court  visits,  mock  hearings  and  workshops,  with  a  view  to 
improving public understanding of the judiciary180. 

177   Ministry of Justice (2026b). 
178   The Government did not participate in the project before 2023. 
179   See https://dzienedukacjiprawnej.ms.gov.pl/.  
180  Polish Government (2026a) additional written input, p. 10. 

21 

 
 
 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2026 Rule of Law Report 
can 
 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2026-rule-law-report-targeted-
found 
stakeholder-consultation_en  

at: 

be 

Batory Foundation (2025), Mały krok do przodu. XVI raport Obywatelskiego Forum Legislacji of 15 
December 
https://www.batory.org.pl/publikacja/maly-krok-do-przodu-xvi-raport-
obywatelskiego-forum-legislacji/;  

2025, 

Batory  Foundation  et  al. (2026),  Równe  i powszechne  v.  2.0:  społeczne  propozycje  zmian  w  prawie 
wyborczym, 
https://odpowiedzialnapolityka.pl/sites/default/files/publikacje/rowne-i-
powszechne_digital_2026-01-22-1.pdf;  

Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2026), News section, https://www.cba.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci;  

Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau 
https://www.cba.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/5281,Korupcyjny-proceder-w-Lublinie.html;  

release:  Corruption 

(2026a),  Press 

in 

Lublin, 

Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2026b), Press release: Mobile Game Project and  Losses of PLN 3 
Million, https://cba.gov.pl/en/news/1430,Mobile-Game-Project-and-Losses-of-PLN-3-Million.html;  

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  (2026),  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  2026,  Country 
report for Poland https://cmpf.eui.eu/country/poland-2026/;  

Coalition against SLAPPS in Europe (2026): CASE-2025-Report-layoutted-vf.pdf;  

Council  of  Europe  (2026x),  Supervision  of  the  execution  of  judgments  decisions  of  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights  –  19th  Annual  Report  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  –  2025, 
https://rm.coe.int/2025-annual-report/48802b1633.Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2026), 
Flash Eurobarometer 582 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption and businesses’ perception of 
the independence of national justice systems in the EU and selected enlargement countries in 2026;  

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2026),  Special  Eurobarometer  573  on  Citizens’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU in 2026;  

European  Broadcasting  Union  (2026),  EMFA  in  focus:  EBU  urges  strong  safeguards  for  public 
in  Poland,  https://www.ebu.ch/news/2026/01/emfa-in-focus-ebu-urges-strong-
service  media 
safeguards-for-public-service-media-in-poland;  

European Commission (2025), 2025 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Poland;  

European Public Prosecutor (2026), Annual Report 2025,  https://www.eppo.europa.eu/assets/annual-
report-2025/index.html; 

European Public Prosecutor (2026), Annual Report 2025,  https://www.eppo.europa.eu/assets/annual-
report-2025/index.html;  

GRECO  (2019),  Poland  -  Fifth  Evaluation  Round,  Evaluation  Report,  https://rm.coe.int/fifth-
evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/168092005c; 

Second  Compliance  Report, 
GRECO 
https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680abff3b; 

-  Fifth  Evaluation  Round, 

(2023),  Poland 

GRECO  (2025a),  Poland  –  Fourth  Evaluation  Round,  Third  Interim  Compliance  Report, 
https://rm.coe.int/grecorc4-2024-9-final-eng-3rd-interim-inc-rule-34-poland-public/1680b35908;  

GRECO  (2025b),  Poland  –  Fifth  Evaluation  Round,  Addendum  to  the  Second  Compliance  Report, 
https://rm.coe.int/grecorc5-2025-10-final-eng-add-to-the-2nd-compliance-report-poland-
pub/1680b6e0b4;  

International Press Institute (2026), Written input to the 2026 Rule of Law Report; 

22 

 
Konstytucyjny.pl (2026), Oświadczenie sędziów SN: odmowa udziału w Zgromadzeniu Ogólnym ws. 
wyboru 
2026 
https://konstytucyjny.pl/oswiadczenie-sedziow-sn-odmowa-udzialu-w-zgromadzeniu-ogolnym-ws-
wyboru-kandydatow-na-pierwszego-prezesa-24-02-2026/;  

na  Pierwszego  Prezesa 

25  February 

(24.02.2026), 

kandydatów 

of 

Krajowa  Rada  Radiofonii  i  Telewizji  (2025),  Decyzję  Sejmu  RP  o  postawieniu  przed  Trybunałem 
Stanu  Macieja  Świrskiego  Przewodniczącego  KRRiT,  traktujemy  jako  motywowany  politycznie  atak 
na  konstytucyjny  organ  of  25  July  2025,  https://www.gov.pl/web/krrit/decyzje-sejmu-rp-o-
postawieniu-przed-trybunalem-stanu-macieja-swirskiego-przewodniczacego-krrit-traktujemy-jako-
motywowany-politycznie-atak-na-konstytucyjny-organ; 

Krajowa  Rada  Radiofonii  i  Telewizji  (2026),  Zawiadomienie  do  prokuratury  -  oświadczenie 
Przewodniczącej  KRRiT  of  8  April  2026,  https://www.gov.pl/web/krrit/zawiadomienie-do-
prokuratury--oswiadczenie-przewodniczacej-krrit; 

Minister of Supervision of the Implementation of Government Policy (2025), List of policy priorities 
of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  Priority  24,  https://www.gov.pl/attachment/fcb30c1f-eb13-4b44-8b21-
a55a2b894e0a; 

Ministry 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/waldemar-zurek-nowym-ministrem-sprawiedliwosci;  

(2025),  Waldemar  Zurek 

nowym  Ministrem 

Justice 

of 

Sprawiedliwości, 

Ministry of Justice (2025a), Stanowisko Ministerstwa Sprawiedliwości dotyczące najnowszej uchwały 
Sądu  Najwyższego  of  5  December  2025,  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/stanowisko-
ministerstwa-sprawiedliwosci-dotyczace-najnowszej-uchwaly-sadu-najwyzszego;  

Ministry  of  Justice  (2025b),  Łatwiejszy  dostęp  do  nieodpłatnej  pomocy  prawnej  i  nieodpłatnego 
poradnictwa obywatelskiego of 30 December 2025, 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/latwiejszy-dostep-do-nieodplatnej-pomocy-prawnej-i-
nieodplatnego-poradnictwa-obywatelskiego?utm_source=chatgpt.com;  

Ministry of Justice (2025c), Nowe stawki za pomoc prawną. Zmiany dla adwokatów i radców of 31 
December  2025,  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/nowe-stawki-za-pomoc-prawna-zmiany-
dla-adwokatow-i-radcow;  

Ministry of Justice (2026), Nowe decyzje Rzecznik Dyscyplinarnej przy Sądach Powszechnych, of 13 
February  2026,  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/nowe-decyzje-rzecznik-dyscyplinarnej-przy-
sadach-powszechnych;  

Ministry of Justice (2026a), Minister Sprawiedliwości powołał Rzecznika Dyscyplinarnego ad hoc, of 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/minister-sprawiedliwosci-powolal-
3 
rzecznika-dyscyplinarnego-ad-hoc3;  

February 

2026, 

Ministry of Justice (2026b), Prezentacja drugiego raportu Komisji ds. represji wobec społeczeństwa 
obywatelskiego  of  23  March  2026,  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/prezentacja-drugiego-
raportu-komisji-ds-represji-wobec-spoleczenstwa-obywatelskiego;  

NaszRzecznik.pl (2026), Mówimy stanowcze NIE pozornym konsultacjom społecznym! of 2 January 
2026, https://naszrzecznik.pl/mowimy-stanowcze-nie-pozornym-konsultacjom-spolecznym/;  

National  Council  of  Attorneys  at  Law  (2025),  AI 
https://kirp.pl/rekomendacje-dotyczace-korzystania-z-ai/;  

in  the  work  of  an  Attorney-at-Law, 

National Electoral Commission (2025), Resolution No. 242/2025 on the report of the political party 
Confederation of Freedom and Independence on the sources of funds raised in 2024 of 22 September 
2025, 
https://pkw.gov.pl/uploaded_files/1758658709_ewp-400-konfederacja-wolnosc-i-
niepodleglosc.pdf;  

National  Prosecutor’s  Office  (2025a),  First  indictment  in  the  so-called  visa  scandal  of  14  August 
2025, https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/pierwszy-akt-oskarzenia-afera-wizowa;  

National Prosecutor’s Office (2025b),  Second indictment in the visa scandal of 30 December 2025, 
https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/drugi-akt-oskarzenia-w-sprawie-afery-wizowej; 

23 

 
 
National  Prosecutor’s  Office  (2025c),  The  first  indictment  in  the  case  of  the  former  Collegium 
Humanum of 27 November 2025, https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/collegium-humanum;  

National  Prosecutor’s  Office  (2025d),  Criminal  Offence  Convictions to the  Detriment  of  the  Justice 
Fund of 10 October 2025, https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/wyroki-skazujace-za-pranie-
pieniedzy-pochodzacych-z-przestepstwa-na-szkode-funduszu-sprawiedliwosci;  

National Prosecutor’s Office (2025d), Suspect Zbigniew Ziobro wanted on a wanted list of 6 February 
2026, https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/lgzz;  

National  Prosecutor’s  Office 
krajowa/aktualnosci; 

(2026a),  News 

section,  https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-

OECD  (2024),  Anti-Bribery  Convention,  Phase  4  –  Two-Year  Follow-Up  Report  on  Poland, 
https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/oecd-anti-bribery-
convention-phase-4-two-year-follow-up-report-on-poland_545b8761/83945426-en.pdf;  

Office of the Ombudsperson (2025), The case of disclosing the whistleblower’s data to her superior: 
letter 
the  Ministry  of  Culture  and  National  Heritage  of  28  August  2025, 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sygnalisci/ujawnienie-danych-sygnalistki-mkidn;  

to 

Ombudsperson  (2026),  Ograniczenie  możliwości  wydawania  prasy  przez  podmioty  samorządowe. 
Opinia 
2026, 
stanowisko 
https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-samorzad-terytorialny-wydawanie-prasy-opinia-mkidn-zmp;  

dla  MKiDN 

6  March 

ZMP 

RPO 

dla 

of 

i 

Ombudsperson  (2026),  Opinion  on  limiting  the  ability  of  local  government  entities  to  publish 
newspapers, 
https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-samorzad-terytorialny-wydawanie-prasy-opinia-
mkidn-zmp; 

OSCE/ ODIHR (2025), Limited Election Observation Mission: Final Report on Poland – Presidential 
Elections 18 may and 1 June 2025 of 20 October 2025, 
https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/2/b/599685_0.pdf;  

OSCE/ODIHR (2024a), Parliamentary Elections, 15 October 2023: Final Report, 
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/8/565423_1.pdf;  

Polish Government (2026), Written input to the Rule of Law Report Country Chapter; 

Polish Government (2026a), Additional written input to the Rule of Law Report Country Chapter; 

Prawo.pl 
(2025),  Adwokaci  pracują  nad  drugą  edycją  "dobrych  praktyk"  w  zakresie 
cyberbezpieczeństwa  of  20  November  2025,  https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/nra-druga-edycja-
dobrych-praktyk-w-zakresie-cyberbezpieczenstwa,535940.html  

Prawo.pl  (2026),  Sędzia  Andrzejewski kieruje  pisma do  prokuratora  Barskiego of  15  January  2026, 
https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/sedzia-andrzejewski-kieruje-pisma-do-prok-
barskiego,536757.html;  

Prawo.pl (2026a), Prof. Namysłowska: Najpierw wybrane postępowania, a za 10 lat pełna cyfryzacja 
of  February 
https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/cyfryzacja-wymiary-sprawiedliwosci-
wywiad-z-prof-namyslowska,1537793.html;  

2026, 

Prawo.pl  (2026b),  Ławnicy  SN  krytyczni  wobec  nowego  I  prezesa  of  27  May  2026, 
https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/lawnicy-sn-krytyczni-wobec-nowego-i-prezesa,1545564.html;  

President of the Republic (2025), Prezydent RP: odmawiam nominacji 46 sędziów, of 12 November 
https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/prezydent-karol-nawrocki-odmawiam-
2025, 
nominacji-46-sedziow,110154;  

President  of the  Republic (2026),  Veto  of the  Law  on  the  National  Council  for the  Judiciary,  of 19 
https://www.prezydent.pl/prawo/ustawy-zawetowane/weto-ws-ustaw-o-krs-oraz-
February 
aktywny-rolnik,115347;  

2026, 

24 

 
 
 
President  of  the  Republic  (2026a),  Spotkanie  z  Prokuratorem  Krajowym  Dariuszem  Barskim  of  12 
January 
https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/spotkanie-z-prokuratorem-
krajowym-dariuszem-barskim,113102;  

2026, 

President  of the  Republic (2026b),  Prezydent  RP  odmówił  podpisania  nowelizacji  ustawy  –  Kodeks 
postępowania karnego of 13 March 2026, https://www.prezydent.pl/prawo/ustawy-zawetowane/weto-
nowelizacja-ustawy-kodeks-postepowania-karnego,116940;  

President  of  the  Republic  (2026c),  The  President  signed  9  acts;  2  vetoed  of  11  May  2026, 
https://www.prezydent.pl/prawo/ustawy-zawetowane/prezydent-podpisal-9-ustaw-2-
zawetowal,120110;  

President of the Republic (2026d), Zbigniew Kapiński Pierwszym Prezesem Sądu Najwyższego of 26 
May 2026, https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/nominacje/zbigniew-kapinski-pierwszym-prezesem-
sadu-najwyzszego,121008?__cf_chl_f_tk=EAaJ6lrr5PAbdgadMBwKtNdlo2lpYJ6Y28djce1mxZA-
1782920684-1.0.1.1-y4k_8k1UTB4Tvh75wBqjIJTlRV9rGykPwZjBmME1di8;   

Reporters Without Borders (2026), Written input to the 2026 Rule of Law Report; 

Sejm,  Marszałek  Sejmu  poprosił  Komisję  Wenecką  o  opinię  nt.  prezydenckiego  projektu  ustawy  o 
sądownictwie, of 20 February 2f026, 
https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm10.nsf/komunikat.xsp?documentId=8439C9A6664C26EDC1258DA400
45DA80;  

Sejm,  Information  on  actions  taken  vis-à-vis  the  Sejm  of  the  Republic  of  Poland  in  2025  by 
professional lobbyists, https://www.sejm.gov.pl/lobbing/informacja_roczna_2025.pdf Sejm (2025),  

Sejm,  Resolution  of  the  Sejm  of  the  Republic  of  Poland  of  July  25,  2025,  concerning  holding  the 
Chairman  of  the  National  Broadcasting  Council,  Maciej  Świrski,  accountable  before  the  State 
Tribunal, 
https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WMP20250000706&utm_source=chatgpt.com;  

Stefan Batory Foundation, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Free Courts Foundation, National 
Federation  of  Polish  NGOs,  Citizen  Network  -  Watchdog  Poland,  Institute  of  Public  Affairs, 
Responsible Politics Foundation (2026), Written input to the 2026 Rule of Law Report; 

Supreme  Audit  Office  (2022a),  Wystąpienie  Pokontrolne  –  Realizacja  Rządowego  Programu 
Przeciwdziałania  Korupcji  n  alata  2018-2020,  https://www.nik.gov.pl/kontrole/wyniki-kontroli-
nik/pobierz,kap~p_21_007_202109201211591632132719~id5~01,typ,kj.pdf;  

Supreme  Audit  Office  (2022b),  Implementation  of  the  Government  Programme  Counteracting 
Corruption for the Years 2018-2020, https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,27014,vp,29814.pdf; 

Supreme  Audit  Office  (2025a),  Welcoming  new  President  of  NIK  of  24  September  2025, 
https://www.nik.gov.pl/en/news/welcoming-new-president-of-nik.html; 

Supreme  Audit  Office  (2025b),  Changes  in  the  top  management  of  NIK  of  19  December  2025, 
https://www.nik.gov.pl/en/news/changes-in-top-management-of-the-supreme-audit-office-of-
poland.html;  

Supreme  Audit  Office  (2025c),  New  charter  of  the  Supreme  Audit  Office  of  Poland  of  14  October 
2025, https://www.nik.gov.pl/en/news/new-charter-of-the-supreme-audit-office-of-poland.html;  

Supreme  Court,  Pismo  Pierwszego  Prezesa  Sądu  Najwyższego  do  Komisji  Weneckiej  (KPP 
V.0720.18.2026) of 4 March 2026 (2026), 
https://www.sn.pl/sites/Serwis_WWW/SiteAssets/Lists/Wydarzenia/AllItems/Pismo%20Pierwszego
%20Prezesa%20SN%20do%20Cz%C5%82onk%C3%B3w%20Komisji%20Weneckiej%20ENG.pdf;  

25 

 
 
 
Transparency  International  (2026),  How  effective 
https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/whistleblower-protection-eu-trends-gaps-practices-
member-states;  

is  whistleblower  protection  in 

the  EU, 

Venice Commission (2026), Urgent Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate Of 
Human  Rights  and  Rule  of  Law  (DGI)  of  the  Council  of  Europe  on  the  Draft  Law  Concerning  the 
Status  of  Judges  Appointed  or  Promoted  between  2018  and  2025  and  other  related  matters  of  12 
March 2026; 

Venice Commission (2026a), Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate Of Human 
Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe on the Draft Law “on Reinstating the Right to 
a Fair Trial and Hearing the Case Without Undue Delay”, proposed by the President of the Republic;  

Wirtualne  Media  (2025),  Orlen  zostaje  z  agencją  mediową.  Kiedy  sprzedaż  Polska  Press? 
https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/orlen-zostaje-z-re58-kiedy-sprzedaz-polska-
press,7200948418824832a.  

26 

 
Annex II: Country visit to Poland 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in February and March 2026 with: 

•  Amnesty International Poland 
•  Association of Judges ‘Iustitia’ (Stowarzyszenie Sędziów Polskich Iustitia)  
•  Association of Jurnalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy) 
•  Association of Polish Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich) 
•  Association  of  Prosecutors  ‘Lex  Super  Omnia’  (Stowarzyszenie  Prorkuratorów  Lex 

Super Omnia)  

•  Batory Foundation (Fundacja Batorego)  
•  Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne) 
•  Chamber of Press Publishers (Izba Wydawców Pracy)  
•  Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Helsinska Fundacja Praw Człowieka)  
•  Ministry  of  Culture  and  National  Heritage  (Ministerstwo  Kultury  i  Dziedzictwa 

Narodowego)  

•  Ministry of Justice (Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości)  
•  National Bar Council (Naczelna Rada Adwokacka) 
•  National Chamber of Attorneys at Law (Krajowa Izba Radców Prawnych)  
•  National Council for the Judiciary (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa)  
•  National Media Council (Rada Mediów Narodowych) 
•  National  Television  and  Radio  Broadcasting  Council  (Krajowa  Rada  Radiofonii  i 

Telewizji) 

•  Ombudsperson’s Office (Biuro Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich) 
•  National Prosecutor’s Office (Prokuratura Krajowa) 
•  Senate of the Republic of Poland (Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) 
•  Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny) 
•  Supreme Audit Office (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli) 
•  Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy)  

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

•  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
•  Civil Society Europe 
•  End FGM EU 
•  European Civic Forum 
•  European Partnership for Democracy 
•  Human Rights Watch 
• 
ILGA-Europe 
• 
International Federation for Human Rights 
•  Philea - Philanthropy Europe Association 
•  Transparency International EU 

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