COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION of Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 98/2013
Date: 2026-07-17
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: application of EU law, chemical product, dangerous substance, exchange of information, explosive, illicit trade, import (EU), supply chain, terrorism, trade restriction

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  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 17.7.2026  SWD(2026) 242 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION  of Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 98/2013      {SWD(2026) 241 final}  
 
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION 

of 

Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 
2019 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 

1. Background 

Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 
on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives  precursors1  (hereinafter  ‘the  Explosives  Precursors 
Regulation’ or ‘the Regulation’) establishes harmonised rules concerning the making available, 
introduction, possession and use of substances or mixtures that could be misused for the illicit 
manufacture  of  explosives,  with  a  view  to  limiting  the  availability  of  those  substances  or 
mixtures to members of the general public, and with a view to ensuring the appropriate reporting 
of suspicious transactions throughout the supply chain. Such substances are called ‘explosives 
precursors’. 

The Regulation strengthened the system of controls and monitoring of explosives precursors of 
Regulation (EU) No 98/2013, which was established in 2013. The strengthening was needed 
because this system did not ensure sufficient levels of public security and the threat posed by 
home-made explosives (HMEs) remained high and continued to evolve2. 

In  accordance  with  Article 21  of  the  Regulation, the  Commission  is  obliged  to  carry  out  an 
evaluation  and  to  present  a  report  on  its  main  findings  to  the  European  Parliament,  to  the 
Council and to the European Economic and Social Committee by 2 February 2026. In line with 
the Better Regulation Guideline and Toolbox3, the evaluation looks into the following criteria: 
effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance, EU added value and impacts on fundamental 
rights and freedoms. It covers the period from the entry into application, on 1 February 2021, 
to September 2025. 

This staff working document builds on desk research, including Commission studies, academic 
literature, legal texts and grey literature, and on various stakeholder consultations, involving 
relevant market participants, authorities and members of the general public. It also used input 

1 Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the marketing 
and use of explosives precursors, amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) 
No 98/2013 (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1148/oj). 

2 European Commission (2018), Commission staff working document, Impact assessment accompanying the 

document proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (SWD(2018) 104 final). 
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=SWD:2018:104:FIN. 
3 European Commission, Better Regulation Guidelines, 2021; European Commission, Better Regulation 
Toolbox, 2023. 

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from  the  monitoring  programme  established  by  the  Regulation,  reports  from  Europol  and 
discussions by the Standing Committee on Precursors. 

The evaluation (and impact assessment) was supported by a study carried out for DG HOME 
by a research team led by ICF (in collaboration with Milieu, WSP and RAND) between October 
2024 and October 2025. 

It  is  important  to  note that  precise information  and data on the use of explosives precursors 
(precise substances, source of diversion, etc.) in the manufacture of HMEs used or attempted 
to be used in terrorist attacks are confidential. This evaluation has therefore not been able to 
draw on such information. 

The cost assessment presented under the efficiency criterion is based on very limited data from 
cost  templates,  interviews and the targeted surveys. It  does not  fully represent  stakeholders’ 
costs  associated  with  the  Regulation.  This  shortcoming  was  mitigated  by  triangulating 
information  from  different  sources  and  validating  findings  in  focus  group  meetings  and 
validation workshops with the relevant stakeholders. 

2. Conclusions 

Effectiveness 

The Regulation has been generally effective in meeting its stated objectives. In particular, it has 
significantly restricted the access of members of the general public to explosives precursors and 
improved  threat  detection  across  Member  States  through  the  obligation  to  report  suspicious 
transactions, disappearances and thefts. Nevertheless, law enforcement authorities across the 
EU continue to frequently discover and dismantle illegal explosives manufacturing sites where 
sometimes huge quantities of regulated explosives precursors have been used or are found. This 
suggests  that,  despite  the  general  effectiveness  of  the  Regulation,  there  are  also  sometimes 
significant shortcomings in the detection procedures of market participants. 

The Regulation has helped raise awareness among most stakeholders and ensured buy-in from 
economic operators as to its intent and provisions. Persisting discrepancies in compliance and 
awareness  call  for  more  inspections  and  awareness-raising  campaigns  to  be  carried  out  in 
certain Member States. 

Overall, the list of regulated explosives precursors covered by the Regulation is considered to 
adequately address the main threat currently posed by HMEs. 

The Regulation has provided a common framework and a certain level playing field across the 
EU, reducing the variety of legal regimes applicable in Member States. Apart from differences 
in enforcement and control, the Regulation is rendered less effective by its silence on the role 
of  customs  authorities  in  applying  its  provisions,  which  means  that  explosives  precursors 
imported into the EU are probably not subject to the same level of checks as those manufactured 
in its Member States. 

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Efficiency 

The  Regulation’s  efficiency  was  found  to  be  generally  satisfactory.  Costs  incurred  by 
stakeholders were found to be proportionate to the wider benefits of ensuring a high level of 
security against the misuse of explosives precursors and to have a level of harmonisation and 
legal  clarity.  Stakeholders  do  face  considerable  costs  in  implementing  the  Regulation, 
particularly  in  verifying  transactions  at  the  point  of  sale  and  ensuring  secure  storage  of 
explosives  precursors,  while  national  authorities  face  the  highest  costs  in  inspections,  inter-
agency coordination and the handling of suspicious activity reports. As such, possible areas for 
simplification  should  be  considered,  especially  in  the  verification  process  in  business-to-
business transactions, where the burden and costs are seen as disproportionate. A common view 
among  public  and private  stakeholders is  that the Regulation  covers too  many mixtures and 
products from which the extraction of regulated explosives precursors is not likely or feasible, 
creating undue burdens and costs for businesses and competent authorities. This shows that the 
1%  w/w  rule  for  homogeneous  mixtures  is  not  efficient  and  should  be  revised,  although 
stakeholders have differing views on what an alternative could be. 

Relevance 

The objectives of the Regulation continue to be relevant. The prevention of attempted attacks 
and a decrease in the number of completed attacks with HMEs manufactured using regulated 
explosives precursors suggest that the Regulation’s restrictions and obligations have generally 
been working and remain necessary. The EU Standing Committee on Precursors has proven a 
key tool in working  towards convergence in  application and  in discussing relevant  security-
related and technological or scientific developments. Questions remain regarding the ability of 
the  Regulation  to  quickly  restrict  new  explosives  precursors  to  address  new  threats,  as  the 
delegation of power to the Commission does not include adding new substances to Annex I to 
the Regulation. 

Coherence 

The Regulation was found to be largely externally coherent with other relevant EU legislation 
and political priorities such as the European internal security strategy (‘ProtectEU’) and the EU 
counterterrorism agenda. The Regulation does not conflict with obligations under EU chemical 
or  environmental  legislation.  However,  its  reliance  on  the  REACH  Regulation  to  define  a 
chemical substance raises an interpretation issue as to whether or not waste is covered by the 
Regulation. In relation to internal coherence, stakeholders identified a number of provisions of 
the Regulation which could be clarified and streamlined. This would resolve a number of the 
current implementation and interpretation problems. 

Impact on fundamental rights and freedoms 

The Regulation does affect fundamental rights and freedoms, although its provisions were 
found to be limited in scope and proportionate to its security objectives. 

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EU added value 

The Regulation creates EU added value and remains a necessary intervention, achieving results 
beyond what Member States could accomplish individually. This includes the provision of a 
level playing field for the legitimate trade in explosives precursors. Its previous framework, by 
contrast, suffered from inconsistencies in national application, leading to regulatory gaps and 
legal uncertainty. Most Member States would not have implemented comparable restrictions 
on  public  access  to  explosives  precursors  without  EU  intervention.  Public  and  private 
stakeholders broadly agree on the Regulation’s continued relevance, with ongoing discussions 
among SCP members underscoring its role in addressing shared security concerns. Given the 
transnational  nature  of  terrorist  networks  and  the  cross-border  movement  of  explosives 
precursors,  weaknesses  in  one  Member  State  can  affect  all,  underscoring  the  need  for  a 
harmonised EU approach. 

3. Lessons learned 

In light of the problems identified above, the evaluation points to the need for the actions listed 
below in future policy interventions on the regulation of explosives precursors. 

● 
Continuously  helping  ensure  harmonised  and  uniform  application  of  the 
Regulation’s provisions across Member States and by economic operators, professional 
users  and  online  marketplaces.  This  includes  raising  awareness  of  the  Regulation  and  its 
provisions  to  ensure  compliance  with  its  obligations,  continued  enforcement  by  national 
authorities  and  strengthening  cooperation  between  Member  States  in  cross-border  cases, 
possibly with the support of Europol. 

● 
Reducing  the  burden  on  industry  and  simplifying  requirements  where  possible, 
including  looking  at  areas  where  risks  of  misuse  are  limited  to  non-existent,  but  in  which 
stakeholders still face disproportionate compliance costs and burdens, so that the single market 
for explosives precursors functions well and is not subject to unnecessary barriers. Reducing 
undue burdens would also support buy-in among economic operators, professional users and 
online marketplaces regarding the security objectives and proportionality of the Regulation. 

● 
Ensuring  that  the  Regulation  enables  a  swift  response  to  emerging  threats  and 
developments. This includes the misuse of new explosives precursors, pre-precursors as well 
as potentially new methods of illicit manufacture of HMEs. 

● 
Addressing any persisting loopholes in the Regulation to maximise its effectiveness 
and limit the risk of circumvention of its requirements, including on customs enforcement and 
waste. 

● 
Clarifying  its  provisions  where  necessary  and  addressing  a  number  of  internal 
coherence issues in the Regulation (e.g. the information requested in the Customer’s Statement 
(Annex IV) is not aligned with the information request in Article 8(2) of the Regulation; it is 
currently unclear whether or not magnalium powder – which is often used for the manufacture 
of HMEs – is covered by the Regulation). 

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