COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2026 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Serbia Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2026 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2026-07-17
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Serbia, administrative transparency, corruption, democracy, freedom of the press, human rights, independence of the judiciary, pluralism in the media, rule of law, whistleblowing

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 17.7.2026  SWD(2026) 931 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2026 Rule of Law Report                                        Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Serbia Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2026 Rule of Law Report                                         The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2026) 900 final} - {SWD(2026) 901 final} - {SWD(2026) 902 final} - {SWD(2026) 903 final} - {SWD(2026) 904 final} - {SWD(2026) 905 final} - {SWD(2026) 906 final} - {SWD(2026) 907 final} - {SWD(2026) 908 final} - {SWD(2026) 909 final} - {SWD(2026) 910 final} - {SWD(2026) 911 final} - {SWD(2026) 912 final} - {SWD(2026) 913 final} - {SWD(2026) 914 final} - {SWD(2026) 915 final} - {SWD(2026) 916 final} - {SWD(2026) 917 final} - {SWD(2026) 918 final} - {SWD(2026) 919 final} - {SWD(2026) 920 final} - {SWD(2026) 921 final} - {SWD(2026) 922 final} - {SWD(2026) 923 final} - {SWD(2026) 924 final} - {SWD(2026) 925 final} - {SWD(2026) 926 final} - {SWD(2026) 927 final} - {SWD(2026) 928 final} - {SWD(2026) 929 final} - {SWD(2026) 930 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

In Serbia, legal amendments removed some of the existing safeguards to protect prosecutorial 
autonomy  and  judicial  independence,  hampering  the  implementation  of  the  constitutional 
reform  of  2023;  following  subsequent  legislative  and  non-legislative  measures,  the  Venice 
Commission confirmed that Serbia addressed a considerable part of its recommendations on 
these amendments. Concerns regarding prosecutorial autonomy remain. Political pressure on 
the  judiciary  and  the  prosecution  increased  significantly,  with  limited  follow-up  from  the 
High  Judicial  and  Prosecutorial  Councils,  the  Government  or  Parliament.  New  magistrate 
members  were  elected  to  the  High  Judicial  Council  and  to  the  High  Prosecutorial  Council, 
while  the  selection  process  for  the  latter  encountered  delays  and  procedural  challenges. 
Challenges  remain  in  filling  the  considerable  number  of  vacant  magistrate  positions.  The 
implementation  of  the  IT  solution  for  the  new  prosecutorial  case  management  system  is 
ongoing,  while  no  steps  were  taken  towards  introducing  a  new  uniform,  centralised  case 
management system for the courts. A new Judicial Development Strategy is being prepared. 
Efficiency  in  civil  and  commercial  cases  remains  stable,  but  there  is  a  negative  trend  in 
criminal  cases;  serious  challenges  in  handling  administrative  cases  and  constitutional 
complaints have not been addressed. 
A  majority  of  the  activities  of  the  previous  Anti-Corruption  Action  Plan  have  not  been 
achieved, with most of them carried over to the new Action Plan. There are concerns about 
the obstacles and attempts of undue influence to the effective functioning of the Prosecutor’s 
Office for Organised Crime. The investigations into the deadly collapse of part of the newly 
renovated  Novi  Sad  railway  station  remain  ongoing.  Challenges  remain  in  establishing  a 
robust  track  record  of  investigations,  indictments  and  final  convictions  in  high-level 
corruption.  Weaknesses  persist  in  law  and  in  practice  regarding  the  verification  and 
enforcement  of    asset  declarations  and  conflicts  of  interest.  A  draft  law  is  in  preparation 
aiming to address concerns about the limited in scope and low transparency requirements in 
the Law on lobbying while amendments to the Law on financing of political activities were 
adopted  and  have  yet 
recommendations. 
Whistleblowers exposing corruption continue to face challenges. Exemptions to the Law on 
public procurement continue to be widely used, circumventing anti-corruption safeguards. 
Serbia’s  audiovisual  market  continued  to  face  serious  challenges  in  the  absence  of  a 
functioning  decision-making  body  of  the  Regulatory  Authority  for  Electronic  Media.  .  In 
early July 2026, the process was relaunched by the National Assembly through the adoption 
of  an  authentic  interpretation  of  the  Law  on  electronic  media,  addressing  legal  concerns 
raised by the four REM Council members who had previously resigned and paving the way 
for their return. Although the Press Council effectively monitored print  media’s compliance 
with  the  Journalists’  Code  of  Ethics,  this  did  not  have  an  impact  on  the  fairness  of  the 
allocation of co-funding by public authorities. Concerns regarding editorial autonomy and the 
pluralism  of  public  service  broadcasters  persisted.  Against  a  backdrop  of  further  media 
market concentration, political and economic influence over the media is a serious concern. 
Media legislation and strategy, particularly with regard to the fairness of public funding and 
transparency  of  ownership  structures,  are  not  being  enforced  adequately.  Journalists 
frequently encounter either refusals by public bodies to disclose information or no response at 
all.  The  safety  of  journalists  has  further  deteriorated,  with  increased  physical  attacks  and 
threats. 
The effectiveness of Parliament and its oversight function continued to be hindered by a lack 
of  genuine  political  debate,  as  well  as  by  the  limited  ability  of  members  of  Parliament  to 
scrutinise  legislative  proposals  properly  and  contribute  to  the  parliamentary  and  legislative 
agenda.  Recent  progress  on  electoral  reform  and  the  launch  of  the  voter  register  audit  still 
need  to  be  fully  implemented.  The  exercise  of  presidential  powers  remains  a  subject  of 
intense public debate. The legal framework for public consultations and its enforcement has 
deteriorated.  Ten  new  judges  were  appointed  to  the  Constitutional  Court,  while  three 
positions  remained  vacant.  Most  independent  bodies  working  in  the  area  of  fundamental 
rights  continue  to  face  resource  constraints,  and  the  follow-up  on  their  recommendations 
remains inconsistent.  Civil  society organisations have been subjected to  increasing  pressure 
and attacks. 

to  be  assessed  against  OSCE/ODIHR 

1 

 
I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM1  

Independence  

The  level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  in  Serbia  continues  to  be  low  among  the 
general  public  and  is  now  average  among  companies.  Overall,  36%  of  the  general 
population and 57% of companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to 
be  ‘fairly  or  very  good’  in  20262. The  perceived  judicial  independence  among  the  general 
public  has  increased  in  comparison  with  2025  (30%),  while  among  companies  it  has 
significantly increased in comparison with 2025 (36%).  

the 

judicial 

implementation  of 

independence,  hampering 

Legal  amendments  removed  some  of  existing  safeguards  to  protect  prosecutorial 
autonomy  and 
the 
constitutional  reform  of  2023;  following  subsequent  legislative  and  non-legislative 
measures, the Venice Commission confirmed that Serbia addressed a considerable part 
of its recommendations on these amendments.  In January  2026, the Parliament amended 
five laws3 based on a proposal of a Member of Parliament in an urgent procedure without a 
transparent  and  inclusive  consultation  process,  citing  efficiency  gains4  and  subsequently 
consulted  the  Venice  Commission.  The Venice  Commission  found  in  its April  2026  urgent 
opinion several concerning shortcomings which removed the safeguards designed to protect 
prosecutorial  autonomy  and  judicial  independence  introduced  through  constitutional 
amendments  of  2023.  For  instance,  the  amendments  transferred  the  authority  to  verify  the 
legality of prosecutorial instructions and workload from the High Prosecutorial Council back 
to  the  prosecutorial  hierarchy,  thereby  reducing  prosecutorial  autonomy,  which  the  Venice 
Commission recommended to reverse. The amendments also introduced renewable mandates 
for  Court  Presidents  and  Chief  Public  Prosecutors  instead  of  the  previous  single  five-year 
mandate, established hierarchical subordination of the Special Department for Cybercrime to 
the  Higher  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  in  Belgrade  and  the  replacement  of  some  of  the 
existing  courts  and  prosecution  offices  by  the  creation  of  new  ones5.  Furthermore,  the 
amendments rapidly terminated temporary assignments of all seconded prosecutors from 11 
March  2026  and  shifted  the  competence  for  secondments  from  the  Supreme  Public 
Prosecutor  to  the  High  Prosecutorial  Council6.  While  the  Venice  Commission  accepted  the 

1   An overview of the institutional framework for all four pillars can be found here.  
2   Flash  Eurobarometers  581  and  582 (2026). The  level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  is  categorised  as 
follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); 
low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

3   The  following  five  laws,  which  implement  the  constitutional  amendments,  were  changed  by  the  legal 
amendments regarding the judiciary and prosecution: The Law on the High Prosecutorial Council, the Law 
on  Judges,  the  Law  on  Organisation  and  Jurisdiction  of  Government  Authorities  for  Suppression  of 
Cybercrime, the Law on Seats and Territories of Courts and Public Prosecutor’s Offices, and the Law on the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office. 

4    Serbian Parliament, explanatory note related to the legal amendments on judiciary and prosecution.  
5    Venice Commission (2026a); Regarding the former, the Venice Commission recommended to revert to the 
former  non-renewable  mandates.  As  for  the  the  Department  for  Cybercrime,  the  Venice  Commission 
recommended  that  it  should  be  granted  greater  structural  and  operational  independence.  Regarding  the 
judicial and prosecution re-mapping, the Venice Commission underlined that additional studies and impact 
assessments  be  conducted,  based  on  a  comprehensive  prior  analysis  of  the  key  factors,  including  an 
examination  of  the  root  causes  of  existing  challenges  and  a  careful  evaluation  of  potential  alternative 
measures to address them. The January 2026 amendments also  required the Minister of Justice to approve 
international prosecutorial cooperation, concerning which the Venice  Commission recommended  a duty to 
notify the Ministry of Justice for certain situations rather than requiring prior consent.  

6   Venice Commission (2026a); amendments to the Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office. This undermined in 
particular  the  functioning  of  the  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  on  Organised  Crime  (POOC),  ending  the 

2 

 
 
shift  of  competence,  it  underlined  that  the  early  termination  of  secondments  without  any 
compelling justification failed to respect the security of tenure of the affected prosecutors and 
recommended  to  reinstate  them.  In  May  and  June  2026,  Serbia  prepared  new  draft 
amendments, and took other non-legislative measures7, which the Venice Commission in its 
its 
follow-up  opinion  of  16  June  2026  regarded  as  addressing 
recommendations.  According  to  the  Venice  Commission,  the  outstanding  recommendations 
included the reinstatement  of the 2  remaining  prosecutors to  the Public  Prosecutor’s Office 
on Organised Crime,  reform providing for a greater structural and operational  autonomy to 
the  Special  Department  for  Cybercrime  and  the  need  to  conduct  studies  and  impact 
assessments  on  the  reorganisation  of  the  judicial  and  prosecution  maps  before  the 
implementation of the organisational changes8.  On 18 June, the High Prosecutorial Council 
reinstated the remaining 2 prosecutors whose secondment had previously been terminated9.  

the  majority  of 

The  revision  of  the  Law  on  the  Judicial  Academy  and  the  adoption  of  the  Court 
Rulebook remain to be  completed.  Full implementation of the  constitutional  amendments 
requires the revision of the Law on the Judicial Academy and the adoption of all relevant by-
laws.  Regarding  the  revision  of  the  Law  on  the  Judicial  Academy10,  Serbia  requested  a 
follow-up  opinion  from  the  Venice  Commission  on  revised  draft  amendments,  which  was 
adopted  on  15  June  202611.  The  Venice  Commission  concluded  that  while  the  new  draft 
addresses  its  recommendation  of  December  2024  that  the  Academy  should  have  exclusive 
responsibility for entry into the judicial and prosecutorial professions, it does not elaborate on 
or  clarify  the  procedures  related  to  the  exercise  by  the  High  Judicial  and  Prosecutorial 
Councils and the specific competencies granted to them12. It also does not fully address the 
recommendation regarding the protection of the Academy from possible undue influence, as 
instead  of  removing  the  Minister  of  Justice’s  ex  officio  membership  of  the  Academy’s 
management board, the draft instead  excludes the Minister of Justice from decision-making 
on  certain  matters13.  Shortly  before  the  adoption  of  the  Venice  Commission  opinion,  on  9 
June 2026, Serbia submitted revised draft amendments to remove the Minister of Justice’s ex 
officio  membership  from  the  Academy’s  management  board,  replaced  with  one  member 
appointed  by  the  government  from  among  law  professors  or  from  among  scientific 
advisors/associates in the field of legal sciences14. This proposal is yet to be assessed by the 

assignment of 11 out of 20 prosecutors of the POOC. The secondments of 7 out of the 11 prosecutors to the 
POOC were extended on 6 March 2026. For further details on the effects on the POOC, see pillar II.  

7    On 4 May, the High Prosecutorial Council decided to reinstate  2 more prosecutors whose secondment had 
previously been terminated (bringing the number of re-seconded prosecutors to 9 out of 11) and to second 3 
new prosecutors to the POOC. 
8    Venice Commission (2026b). 
9   In addition to the reinstatements, the High Prosecutorial Council also seconded 1 additional prosecutor to the 

POOC on 18 June 2026.  

10   Country visit Serbia: the Law  on Judicial Academy is the  final implementing law following constitutional 

amendments, which is yet to be adopted.  

11  Venice Commission (2026c).  
12   Namely: (i) the monitoring of the Academy's operation and its professional supervision, (ii) the review of the 
entrance  examination  report  and ranking, (iii)  the  exercise of discretion  in  reviewing  candidates  following 
successful completion of ‘prior training’ programme at the Academy. 

13  Venice Commission (2024), p. 10. Venice Commission (2026c), p. 11. The Venice Commission noted that 
this  represents  a  welcome  improvement  but  does  not  sufficiently  address  the  underlying  concerns  that 
formed  the  basis  of  the  Commission’s  2024  recommendation.  These  concerns  have  become  even  more 
evident,  given  that  the  Judicial  Academy  is  now  established  as  the  sole  entry  point  to  a  judicial  or 
prosecutorial career. 

14  Venice  Commission  (2026d).  Amended  articles  of  the  draft  law  on  the  judicial  academy,  submitted  by 

Serbia to the Venice Commission on 4 June 2026. 

3 

 
 
Venice  Commission.  The  adoption  of  the  final  by-law  on  the  Court Rulebook,  required  for 
the implementation of the constitutional amendments, has been delayed since 202415. 

Concerns  regarding  prosecutorial  autonomy  remain  and  the  effectiveness  and 
confidentiality  of  criminal  investigations  are  hampered  by  shortcomings  in  law  and 
practice. The prosecution, including the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime, continues 
to face increasing obstacles in its work16. According to stakeholders, the prosecution service 
is  divided  between  prosecutors  close  to  the  Government  and  the  ruling  party  (‘state 
prosecutors’) and more autonomous prosecution offices, including the Prosecutor’s Office for 
Organised  Crime  and  the  Supreme  Public  Prosecution  Office17.  Public  officials  continue  to 
make comments containing information that is not in the public domain, and there is a lack of 
effective  follow-up  to  complaints  about  the  revelation  of  information  by  law  enforcement 
agencies18.  Shortcomings  in  law  and  practice  continue  to  increase  the  risk  of  information 
leaks,  which  undermines 
the 
recommendations  to  revise  the  legal  framework,  which  mandates  the  Security  Information 
Agency to initiate criminal proceedings for certain types of offences involving international 
elements, and the Security Information Agency and the Military Security Agency to carry out 
special  investigative  measures  alongside  the  police,  were  not  addressed19.  Additionally,  the 
police  still  lacks  sufficient  operational  autonomy  from  the  Ministry  of  Interior’s  political 
influence20. Overall, stakeholders reported that recent appointments to crucial police positions 
were  not  merit-based  and  that  the  police  often  does  not  follow  the  instructions  of  the 
prosecution,  which  is  legally  in  the  lead  of  investigations  according  to  the  law,  but  rather 
follows the instructions of their superiors21. 

the  effectiveness  of 

In  particular, 

investigations. 

Political  pressure  on  the  judiciary  and  the  prosecution  increased  significantly,  with 
limited  follow-up  from  the  High  Judicial  and  Prosecutorial  Councils,  the  Government 
or Parliament. The situation regarding undue influence has further deteriorated. Government 
and public officials, and Members of Parliament continued to make undue public comments 
on  ongoing  investigations  and  court  proceedings.  This  includes  criticism  of  the  work  and 
decisions of individual prosecutors and judges and threats of removal addressed to judges and 
prosecutors22.  Attempts  to  exert  undue  influence  on  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  for  Organised 
Crime  have  increased  further23.  While  the  associations  of  judges  and  prosecutors  have 

15  The details of the implementing laws were to be specified through the adoption of 37 by-laws by May 2024. 
36  by-laws  were  adopted  between  2024-2025.  The  outstanding  by-law  needs  to  be  jointly  adopted  by  the 
High Judicial Council and the Ministry of Justice. Serbian Government (2026), written input, p. 184. 

16   For further details, see pillar II.   
17   Country  visit  Serbia,  civil  society  organisations,  High  Prosecutorial  Council,  Supreme  Public  Prosecution 

Office, Anti-Corruption Council.  

18   TV Pink (2025a,b), Novosti (2025), Politika RS (2026).  
19   2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 8 and 48. The Security Information Agency and the Military Security 
Agency are Serbia’s primary civilian and defence intelligence agencies, respectively. Article 12 of the Law 
on  the  Security  Information  Agency  provides  for  certain  competences  regarding  criminal  offences.  The 
Criminal  Procedure  Code  foresees  the  execution  of  all  special  evidentiary  actions  also  for  the  Security 
Information Agency and Military Security Agency in Articles. 168, 173, 176, 180 and 185. 

20   2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 4. In 2025, stakeholders shared concerns that as a result the police is 
prone to follow instructions from their hierarchy even though the law foresees the prosecution in the lead of 
investigations.  

21   Country  visit  Serbia;  N1  (2026b,c).  Concerns  were  reported  by  stakeholders  and  media  concerning  the 
appointments of a new head of the anti-terrorist unit, a new chief of the criminal police, a narcotics service 
commander,  as  well  as  other  lower-ranking  and  operational  roles,  all  seen  as  part  of  a  broader  effort  to 
consolidate political control over law enforcement. 

22   Slavko Ćuruvija Foundation (2025).  
23   European Western Balkans (2026). 

4 

 
 
defended judges and prosecutors in some instances24, the High Judicial Council and the High 
Prosecutorial  Council  have  remained  largely  passive25.  In  2025,  the  High  Judicial  Council 
received  4  new  requests  for  protection  from  undue  influence,  and  the  High  Prosecutorial 
Council  received  15,  of  which  one  was  found  to  be  well-founded26.  Additionally,  the 
Government and the Parliament have not acted in cases involving undue public comments by 
their  respective  members,  despite  such  comments  appearing  to  contradict  their  code  of 
conduct27.  

New  magistrate  members  were  elected  to  the  High  Judicial  Council  and  to  the  High 
Prosecutorial Council, while the selection process for the latter encountered delays and 
procedural challenges. On 6 April 2026, the High Judicial Council and High Prosecutorial 
Council began operating in their new composition, with five new judge and five prosecutor 
members  respectively.  The  High  Prosecutorial  Council  election  process  was  contested  and 
faced delays. Following objections to the elections by unsuccessful candidates in December 
2025, some of the election results were annulled by the Constitutional Court. The Minister of 
Justice filed a criminal complaint against the President of the Council for allegedly neglecting 
his  public  duties  in  relation  to  the  selection  procedure28.  A  re-run  of  the  elections  in  the 
contested  areas  took  place  in  February  2026. This  time,  the  Constitutional  Court  dismissed 
the appeals of the unsuccessful candidates. Stakeholders reported pressure from the Security 
Information Agency  to  select  ‘state  prosecutors’  and  claimed  that  the  Constitutional  Court 
favoured ‘state prosecutors’ despite the appeals being similar29.  

The  transparency  of  the  High  Judicial  Council  was  strengthened.  The  High  Judicial 
Council  began  audio-visually  recording  its  sessions  in  2025,  making  the  recordings  public 
within 24 hours of the session30. Meanwhile, the sessions of the High Prosecutorial Council 
continued to be recorded and livestreamed31. 

Challenges remain in filling the considerable number of vacant magistrate positions. As 
of  June  2026,  164  out  of  899  prosecutor  positions  were  vacant  (compared  to  139  in  May 
2025)32.  Since  May  2025,  the  High  Prosecutorial  Council  has  been  unable  to  make 
appointment  decisions  and  has  only  seconded  prosecutors  including  to  the  Prosecutor’s 
Office for Organised Crime. All appointment processes either ended without results or had to 
be  postponed  due  to  a  lack  of  quorum  in  the  High  Prosecutorial  Council,  which  was  also 
caused  by  the  occasional  absences  of  the  Minister  of  Justice  and  some  other  members33. 

24   Judges Association of Serbia (2026); Association of Prosecutors of Serbia (2026).  
25   Serbian Government, (2026), written input, p. 149. The High Judicial Council issued two public statements 
of general nature in July and August 2025 respectively, reminding of the prohibition of undue influence.  
26   The  High Judicial Council found one case of undue influence and three cases are under review.  The High 
Prosecutorial Council established no undue influence in 11 cases, and the remaining cases are pending. High 
Prosecutorial Council (2025). 

27   2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 2.  
28   Country visit Serbia, High Prosecutorial Council. The complaint was launched based on the HPC President 
having  convened  an  electronic  session  of  the  Council  when  a  session  in  person  was  not  possible.  In  the 
situation  in  question,  the  HPC  had  to  decide  within  48  hours  on  the  appeals  regarding  the  election  of  the 
prosecutor  members  for  the  HPC  and  the  convocation  of  a  session  in  person  had  failed  before  due  to  the 
obstruction of certain members of the HPC, including the Minister of Justice, to attend an in-person session. 

29   Country visit, Serbia, High Prosecutorial Council, Supreme Public Prosecutor and civil society. 
30   In accordance with Article 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the High Judicial Council. 
31   During the country visit, the High Judicial Council expressed its intention to follow the same process as the 

High Prosecutorial Council and livestream its sessions. Country visit Serbia.  

32   High Prosecutorial Council, written contribution.  
33   Serbian Government, (2026), written input, p. 146-147; Country visit Serbia.  

5 

 
 
Between 1 January 2026 and 1 June 2026, the High Judicial Council passed a decision on the 
appointment  of  205  judges..  As  of  June  2026,  2  733  judicial  positions  were  filled  and  394 
were vacant (compared to 383 at the end of 2024)34. 

Quality  

The  implementation  of  the  IT  solution  for  the  new  prosecutorial  case  management 
system is ongoing, but it is not yet fully operational, while no steps were taken towards 
introducing a new uniform, centralised case management system for the courts.  The IT 
solution for the new case management system for prosecution offices was finalised in 2024, 
with  full  operationalisation  expected  by  the  end  of  Q3  202635.  The  new  uniform  and 
centralised case management system for courts is still stalled; the Ministry of Justice has not 
yet  sought  alternative  solutions  for  developing  and  providing  the  necessary  software36. 
Further  work  is  required  to  ensure  that  all  systems  can  operate  efficiently.  This  includes 
legislative changes to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Civil Procedure Code to enable 
digital  documentation  to  be  admitted  as  evidence,  as  set  out  in  the  new  case  management 
systems. This will require adequate staffing, financial resources and upgraded communication 
infrastructure37.  Although  the  number  of  cases  for  which  legal  aid  has  been  granted  has 
increased  slightly  between  2023  and  2024,  shortcomings  remain  regarding  the  capacity  of 
local self-government entities to deal with these requests. In addition, there is still a lack of 
citizen  awareness  about  the  existence  of  legal  aid,  while  there  has  been  an  EU  funded 
awareness campaign to address this38. 

A  new  Judicial  Development  Strategy  is  being  prepared  following  delays  and 
insufficient implementation of previous strategies, and shortcomings remain regarding 
the  quality  of  judicial  training.  There  have  been  delays  in  implementing  the  human 
resources  strategy,  and  the  implementation  of  the  ICT  strategy  is  undermined  by  a  lack  of 
coordination  and  monitoring  mechanisms.  The  Ministry  of  Justice  plans  to  prepare  and 
formally  adopt  a  new  comprehensive  Judicial  Development  Strategy  in  2026.  This  strategy 
should incorporate all the measures from previous strategies that are yet to be implemented39. 
The  institutional  capacity,  internal  expertise,  transparency  of  the  initial  testing  process  and 
the  quality  of  the  mentoring  system  of  the  Judicial  Academy  have  not  yet  been  improved. 
Furthermore, Serbia has not taken any steps towards delivering an advanced programme with 
clearly defined objectives or introducing a system of quality control to improve the quality of 
judicial training, including regarding EU law40.  

34   Serbian Government, (2026), written input, p. 146-147; Country visit Serbia.  
34   High Judicial Council, written contribution. 
35   Serbian  Government,  (2026),  written  input,  pp.  171-172.  As  of  January  2025,  the  programme  has  been 
implemented  in  a  total  of  ten  public  prosecution  offices.  Public  procurement  procedures  are  currently 
ongoing for the continuation of regular maintenance of the application. 

36   2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 5; 2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 5. Country visit Serbia. Despite 
consistent and repeated efforts, no further progress has been possible during the reporting period to solve the 
contractual dispute, which had caused the stalemate regarding the existing project.  

37   Country visit Serbia.   
38   The number of cases for which legal aid has been granted rose from 0.10 per inhabitant in 2023 to 0.11 in 
2024. CEPEJ (2025), 2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 5. Serbian Government, written contribution, p. 4. 
“You  have  the right!”,  a campaign  project  to  raise  public awareness  of  free  legal  aid  through  coordinated 
national and local outreach, media activities, and training, was  launched in October 2024 and concluded in 
September 2025. 

39   Serbian Government (2026), written input, p. 159. 
40   2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 5; 2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 31. 

6 

 
 
Efficiency 

Efficiency of the justice system in civil and commercial cases remains stable, but there is 
a negative trend in criminal cases; serious challenges in handling of administrative cases 
and constitutional  complaints  have not been addressed.  For  civil  and  commercial  cases, 
the clearance rate for first instance cases fell (from 140% in 2023 to 119% in 2024), while the 
disposition  time  remained  stable.  For  second  instance  cases,  however,  the  clearance  rate 
improved (from 97% in 2023 to 106% in 2024), but the disposition time increased (from 351 
in 2023 to 381 days in 2024)41. For criminal cases, the clearance rate decreased slightly for 
both first (from 103% in 2023 to 98% in 2024) and second instances (from 99% in 2023 to 
96% in 2024). Disposition times increased by 63% for first instance criminal cases (from 219 
in 2023 to 170 days in 2024) and by 40% for second instance criminal cases (from 36 in 2023 
to  49  days  2024)42.  Meanwhile,  the  situation  concerning  administrative  justice  remains 
challenging: despite a reduction in incoming cases linked to a drop in lawsuits triggered by 
‘administrative silence’, and an improvement in the clearance rate (from 34.78% in 2023 to 
76% in 2024 and 119% in 2025) and disposition times, the latter remained long (1 362 days 
in 2025 and 1 933 days in 2024, down from 2 095 days in 2023). The authorities attributed 
the  decrease  in  filings  to  the  improved  responsiveness  of  administrative  bodies.  However, 
structural  challenges  persist,  particularly  regarding  the  implementation  of  the  Law  on  Free 
Access  to  Information  of  Public  Importance43.  Preparation  of  a  new  unified  backlog 
programme  for  2026-2030  after  the  expiration  of  the  2021-2025  programme  has  been 
finalised,  but  its  publication  is  pending44.  The  number  of  cases  pending  before  the 
Constitutional  Court slightly decreased but  overall remained high: 42.460 cases as of  April 
2026  (compared  to  43  666  cases  in  2024  and  29  672  in  2023).  Of  these  cases,  99%  are 
constitutional complaints45.  

II. 

ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

The  perception  among  experts,  citizens  and  business  executives  is  that  the  level  of 
corruption in the public sector remains high. In the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index by 
Transparency International, Serbia scores 33/100 and ranks 116th globally46. This perception 
has  deteriorated  over  the  past  five  years47.  The  2026  Special  Eurobarometer  on  Corruption 

41   The disposition time remained relatively stable, with a further slight improvement from 278 in 2023 to 274 

days in 2024. CEPEJ (2025), p. 16.  

42   CEPEJ (2025), pp. 18-20.  
43   CEPEJ (2025), p. 2. In Serbia, the notable drop in the number of incoming administrative cases in 2024 is 
largely due to a decrease in the so-called Ucu cases—lawsuits filed because of the administration's failure to 
respond within the legally prescribed deadlines, mainly directed against the Republic Pension and Disability 
Insurance Fund. In 2023, the Administrative Court received a total of 78 017 cases, of which 61 794 were 
Ucu  cases.  By  2024,  the  number  of  incoming  cases  fell  to  42  741,  with  27  113  falling  under  the  Ucu 
category. According to the authorities, this significant decrease suggests that the competent administrative 
bodies  have  improved  their  responsiveness,  resolving  requests  more  promptly  and  thus reducing  litigation 
triggered by administrative silence. However, challenges persist in the implementation of the Law on Free 
Access to Information of Public Importance, as the legislation remains unchanged and no amendments have 
been introduced to address existing gaps. 

44   Serbian Government (2026), written contribution. 
45   Constitutional Court (2026), written input received after the country visit. 
46   Transparency  International  (2026).  The  level  of  perceived  corruption  is  categorised  as  follows:  low  (the 
perception  among  experts  and  business  executives  of  public  sector  corruption  scores  above  79);  relatively 
low (scores between 79-60), relatively high (scores between 59-50), high (scores below 50). 

47   In 2021, the score was 38, while in 2025 the score was 33. The score significantly increases/decreases when 
it  changes  more  than  five  points;  improves/deteriorates  (changes  between  4-5  points);  is  relatively  stable 
(changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years.  

7 

 
 
shows that 84% of respondents consider corruption widespread in their country (EU average 
71%) and 34% of respondents feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU 
average  30%).  As  regards  businesses,  84%  of  companies  consider  that  corruption  is 
widespread  (EU  average  65%)  and  45%  consider  that  corruption  is  a  problem  when  doing 
business  (EU  average  37%).  Furthermore,  30%  of  respondents  find  that  there  are  enough 
successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt practices (EU average 38%), while 35% 
of  companies  believe  that  people  and  businesses  caught  for  bribing  a  senior  official  are 
appropriately punished (EU average 31%)48.  

A majority of the activities of the previous Anti-Corruption Action Plan have not been 
achieved,  with  most  of  them  carried  over  to  the  new  Action  Plan.  A  National  Anti-
Corruption Strategy for 2024-2028 is in place49. On 4 June 2026, a new Action Plan for 2026-
2028  was  adopted  to  implement  the  strategy,  including  addressing  the  outstanding  GRECO 
recommendations from the 4th and 5th round50. The Agency for the Prevention of Corruption 
has  analysed  the  implementation  of  the  2024-2025  action  plan  and  concluded  that  out  of  a 
total  of  143  activities,  43%  were  fully  implemented,  while  56%  were  not  fully 
implemented51.  According  to  the  implementation  report,  around  80%  of  activities  were 
transferred from the previous action plan to the new one52. The effective implementation and 
monitoring of the new action plan can only be ensured if adequate coordination mechanisms 
and budgetary resources are put  in  place, as well  as  an effective monitoring and evaluation 
system  to  track  progress  and  impact53.  The  absence  of  such  measures  impeded  the 
implementation of the previous action plan. The legal framework to fight corruption remains 
broadly  in  place,  and most  forms of  corruption  are  criminalised54. Serbia  is  not  a signatory 
party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention55. 

There are concerns about the obstacles and attempts of undue influence to the effective 
functioning of the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime. The Prosecutor’s Office for 
Organised Crime (POOC), which has jurisdiction over high-level corruption cases, continues 
to  be  limited  in  its  capacity  to  process  and  investigate  complex  organised  crime  and  high-
level corruption cases56. Following the judicial amendments in January 2026 the secondments 
of 11 of its prosecutors ended57. While the premature ending of the mandates of the seconded 
prosecutors  failed  to  respect  their  security  of  tenure  and  raised  questions  regarding 
compliance  with  the  principles  of  legal  certainty  and  prosecutorial  autonomy,  the    High 

48   Data from Special Eurobarometer 573 (2026) and Flash Eurobarometer 582 (2026). 
49   2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 7. Serbian Government (2026), written input, pp. 218-219. The Anti-
Corruption  Strategy  was  adopted  in  July  2024  and  includes  measures  recommended  by  the  Commission, 
namely to counter corruption in sectors vulnerable to corruption, including health, taxes, customs, education, 
local  self-government,  privatisation,  public  procurement  and  police  and  features  both  prevention  and 
repression objectives. 

50   Serbian Government (2026b); GRECO (2024). According to the latest GRECO compliance report of 4 July 
2024, of the 24 recommendations from the 5th evaluation round, only one has been fully met, and 10 have 
been partially met. During its plenary of 8-12 June 2026, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) 
adopted  the  Second  Compliance  Report  for  Serbia  under  its  Fifth  Evaluation  Round,  which  is  yet  to  be 
published.  

51  Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (2026). Two activities or 1% could not be assessed. 
52   Agency  for  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  (2026).  According  to  the  Agency’s  assessment,  115  out  of  143 

(80%) of the activities from the previous action plan were carried over to the new action plan.  

53   Ibidem. 
54   2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 7. 
55   OECD (2026).  
56   2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 8.  
57   Country visit Serbia.  

8 

 
 
Prosecutorial  Council  eventually  reinstated  these  prosecutors  between  March  and  June  and 
seconded  four  other  prosecutors  in  total  to  the  POOC58.  Furthermore,  cooperation  with  the 
police  has  deteriorated  in  recent  months,  including  instances  where  police  officers  were 
withdrawn from task forces and failed to follow orders from the prosecution, as also reported 
by prosecutors59. Stakeholders further reported increasing internal pressure in the police, with 
the recent appointments at various levels of the police force perceived as attempts to increase 
political  control  over  law  enforcement60.  The  police’s  specialised  organised  crime  unit 
investigating high-level corruption offences lacks sufficient staff to effectively carry out their 
tasks. The role and mandate of the POOC regarding the overall coordination of corruption-
related  investigations,  including  those  conducted  by  specialised  departments  within  the 
Higher  Public  Prosecutors’  offices61,  remains  inadequately  defined  by  law.  No  special 
mechanism has been established to ensure this coordination, and the law does not oblige the 
relevant  institutions  to  inform  each  other  when  investigations  are  launched.  This  leads  to 
parallel  and/or  ineffective  investigations  in  practice  and  risks  hindering  the  consistency  of 
action in  corruption investigations by the different  specialised bodies, resulting  in  a lack of 
effectiveness62.  

The  investigations  into  the  deadly  collapse  of  part  of  the  newly  renovated  Novi  Sad 
railway station remain ongoing. Following the tragic incident at Novi Sad railway station in 
which  16  people  were  killed  in  2024,  which  prompted  widespread  public  protests,  the 
authorities  launched  investigations  into  alleged  corruption  linked  to  the  collapse  of  the 
canopy.  These  investigations  are  yet  to  be  completed63.  The  POOC  reported  a  lack  of 

58   Venice  Commission  (2026a),  p.  18;  Venice  Commission  (2026b),  p.  11.  Of  the  11  temporarily  assigned 
prosecutors, whose mandate ended with effect from 11 March under the January 2026 amendments, the High 
Prosecutorial Council (HPC) renewed the 7 secondments on 6 March, 2 more secondments on 4 May, and 2 
additional secondments on 18 June. The HPC also seconded 3 new prosecutors to the POOC on 4 May and 1 
new prosecutor on 18 June. This means that all 11 prosecutors whose security of tenure was affected, were 
reinstated,  4  additional  prosecutors  were  seconded  and  the  POOC  is  now  functioning  with  24  out  of  25 
prosecutors  (in  addition  to  the  Chief  Public  Prosecutor  for  Organised  Crime).  The  current  premises  of  the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office are not sufficient to accommodate new staff as plans to construct a new  building 
to accommodate  the POOC are currently on hold due to unsecured financial resources (2025 Enlargement 
Report, Serbia, p. 34). 

59   Country visit Serbia; Serbian Monitor (2025a). On 4 September 2025, the Police withdrew 17 police officers 

from the Task Force investigating financial flows linked to the canopy collapse in Novi Sad.  

60   Country  visit  Serbia;  NIN  (2025).  See  also  pillar  I.  Concerns  were  reported  by  stakeholders  and  media 
concerning  the  appointments of  a  new  head  of  the  anti-terrorist  unit,  a new  chief of  the criminal  police,  a 
narcotics  service  commander,  as  well  as  other  lower-ranking  and  operational  roles,  all  seen  as  part  of  a 
broader effort to consolidate political control over law enforcement. 

61  Serbia has four specialised Anti-Corruption Departments within the Higher Prosecution Offices in Belgrade, 
Novi Sad, Nis and Kraljevo, competent for corruption cases not exceeding a value of RSD 200 million and a 
Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  for  Organised  Crime  which  is  the  main  body  in  charge  for  corruption  cases 
exceeding  this  value  (Art.  3  of  the  Law  on  the  Organisation  and  Competence  of  State  Authorities  in  the 
Suppression of Organised Crime, Terrorism and Corruption). 

62   2025  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Serbia,  p.  8.  See  also  the  following  para  for  further  details  on  the  Novi  Sad 

investigations. 

63   2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 6. 16 people were killed in this incident in November 2024, prompting 
widespread  public  protests  over  corruption  and  the  perceived  lack  of  accountability  and  transparency  in 
Government infrastructure and construction projects. In December 2024, the Higher Prosecutor’s Office in 
Novi Sad filed indictments against 13 public officials on charges for endangering public safety, including the 
former  Minister  of  Construction,  Transport  and  Infrastructure,  who  subsequently  resigned  from  his  post. 
Parallel investigations into related corruption crimes caused risks of uncoordinated proceedings at the outset, 
due  to  the divided  competences  between  the  four  specialised  Anti-Corruption  Departments  and  the  Public 
Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime.  

9 

 
 
cooperation by the police regarding the full provision of evidence collected64. The Task Force 
set up by the POOC for this investigation ceased its activities in September 2025 following 
the removal of 17 experienced members by the Ministry of the Interior, explaining that a new 
job classification system had been adopted65. These decisions impeded indictments, resulting 
in  the  Belgrade  Higher  Court’s  decision  to  remove  the  detention  measures  for  the  accused. 
Another factor that has contributed to the slow investigations is the initial initiation of parallel 
proceedings concerning the same case, which were only later incorporated into the POOC-led 
proceedings66.  This  incident  and  the  lack  of  progress  in  its  investigation  continue  to  fuel 
perceptions  of  a  lack  of  accountability  and  transparency  in  Government  infrastructure  and 
construction projects. The investigation of the European Public Prosecutor's Office launched 
in March 2025 into the reconstruction of the railway station is ongoing67. 

Challenges  remain  in  establishing  a  robust  track  record  of  investigations,  indictments 
and final  convictions in high-level  corruption cases and there have been no significant 
judicial outcomes of the anti-corruption operation in 2025. Overall, challenges remain in 
establishing a robust track record of investigations, indictments and final convictions in high-
level corruption cases, including the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets68. Against this 
backdrop, stakeholders continued to express concern about the reluctance on the side of the 
prosecution  and  the  police  to  investigate  corruption  suspects  with  links  to  political  and 
economic power69. The anti-corruption operation which took place primarily from February 
to  April  2025  following  public  announcements  on  an  anti-corruption  campaign  made  by 
senior public officials did not yield significant judicial outcomes. Over 153 individuals were 
arrested during this period. However, many were subsequently released70 and the campaign 
achieved limited results, with no systemic investigation, prosecutorial follow-through or final 
judicial outcomes until now71.  

Weaknesses persist in law and in practice regarding the verification and enforcement of 
asset  declarations  and  conflicts  of  interest.  The  Law  on  prevention  of  corruption,  which 
prescribes  the  duty  for  public  officials  to  file  asset  declarations  and  to  report  conflicts  of 
interest,  still  needs  to  be  amended  to  broaden  the  definition  of  public  official  in  line  with 
GRECO  recommendations.  Serbia  has  prepared  draft  amendments,  which  are  yet  to  be 
assessed  by  GRECO  72.  The  system  for  verifying  declarations  continues  to  raise  concerns. 

64   Country  visit  Serbia,  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  for  Organised  Crime;  Public  statement  of  25  November 

2025 of the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime. 

65   Serbian Monitor (2025b). 
66   Initially,  both  the  Higher  Prosecution  Office  in  Novi  Sad  and  the  Higher  Prosecution  Office  in  Belgrade 
started  separate  corruption  related  investigations,  which  were  later  transferred  by  the  Supreme  Public 
Prosecutor to the POOC, allowing for investigations by one prosecutorial entity, which has, however, since 
ceased.  Stakeholders  during  the  country  visit  underlined  that  the  divided  competences  lead  to  challenges 
regarding coordination and consistency of corruption related offences in Serbia. Country visit Serbia. 

67   Serbian Monitor (2025c). 
68   2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, pp. 6 and 34. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 7.  
69   Country visit Serbia. 
70   European Western Balkans (2025).  
71   Transparency Serbia (2025).  
72   While some public officials are covered by the current law, relevant high-level positions, such as advisors to 
the president, prime minister and heads of cabinets are so far under no obligation to submit asset declarations 
and  to  report  conflicts  of  interest.  See  GRECO  (2022),  pp.  4,21;  2025  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Serbia,  p.  8. 
Serbian  Government,  written  contribution,  p.  13.    Draft  amendments  have  been  prepared  with  the  aim  to 
provide  a  more  detailed  regulation  of  asset  declaration  requirements,  broaden  the  definition  of  public 
officials,  and  strengthen  reporting  obligations  concerning  conflicts  of  interest,  with  a  view  to  aligning  the 
legal framework with the recommendations of GRECO. However, these amendments are yet to be assessed 
by GRECO. 

10 

 
 
The  Agency  for  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  has  continued  to  publish  in  advance  which 
category  of  public  officials  will  be  subject  to  substantive  checks  in  the  respective  year, 
thereby risking to reduce the effectiveness and deterrent impact of controls. While there has 
been a slight increase in the number of Agency employees, its human and technical resources 
remain  insufficient  to  effectively  and  comprehensively  carry  out  its  corruption  prevention 
tasks73.  This  lack  of  capacity  was  demonstrated  in  the  Agency’s  2025  annual  verification 
plan, which indicated that the Agency continued to carry out substantive checks on the asset 
declarations  of  only  around  1%  of  public  officials74.  Sanctions  for  non-compliance  remain 
rare and are predominantly applied to misdemeanour offences75. Furthermore, no steps have 
been taken to enhance the independence, impartiality and accountability of the Agency.  

The lack of systematic consultation and follow-up to the recommendations of the Anti-
Corruption Council as the Government’s advisory body remains a serious concern. The 
Anti-Corruption  Council  continues  to  be  active  in  identifying  and  analysing  systemic 
corruption. However, institutional follow-up is weak. While other institutions still undertake 
limited follow-up on the Council’s findings, the Government neither systematically consults 
the  Council  on  draft  legislation  nor  implements  its  recommendations.  The  Council’s 
operational capacity remains limited due to financial and human resource shortages, and the 
high  number  of  vacancies  remains  unaddressed76.  Furthermore,  also  prosecution  offices 
continue to take only limited action in pursuing cases detected by the Council77.  

A  draft  law  is  in  preparation  aiming  to  address  concerns  about  the  limited  scope  and 
low  transparency  requirements  in  the  Law  on  lobbying  while  the  amendments  to  the 
Law on financing of political activities were adopted and have yet to be assessed against 
OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. The scope of the Lobbying Law is still limited to formal, 
written  contacts  between  representatives  of  interest  groups  and  individuals  in  senior 
executive  roles,  and  it  excludes  all  other  forms  of  interaction.  Lobbying  records  and  the 
annual  activity reports required of lobbyists are  still not  made public, limiting transparency 
and  accountability.  GRECO  has  recommended  addressing  both  of  these  issues78,  and  the 

73   Serbian Government (2026), written input, p. 222. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 8. Compared to the 
previous  reporting  period,  there  has  been  an  increase  in  the  number  of  employees.  Of  the  23  employees 
provided for by the Regulation on Systematization in the Agency, 13 positions have been filled in the Sector 
for  the  Control  of  Assets  and  Income,  which  deals  with  matters  related  to  the  declaration  of  property  of 
public  officials,  but  the  Agency  reports  that  this  sector  needs  to  be  further  strengthened  with  human 
resources. 

74   2025  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Serbia,  p.  8;  Country  visit  Serbia,  Agency  for  Prevention  of  Corruption. 
According  to  the  national  register,  around  30  000  public  officials  exist  in  Serbia.  In  2025,  the  Agency 
checked the asset declarations of 305 public officials, which is a slight increase compared to 290 in 2024, but 
nevertheless accounts only for around 1% of all public officials. 

75   In 2025, the Agency reported 10 criminal offences to the Public Prosecutor’s Office (compared to 1 offence 
in 2024). The Agency imposed 218 warning measures, 7 measures of public announcement on the decision 
on  violation  of  the  law,  118  misdemeanours  and  7  reports  to  other  state  bodies  due  to  the  suspicion  of  a 
criminal offences within their jurisdiction. Country visit Serbia, Agency for Prevention of Corruption. 

76   At  present  the  Council  has  six  members  out  of  11.  While  the  rules  of  procedure  of  the  Council  entail 
safeguards aimed at promoting its independence, such as that appointments to the Council must be based on 
proposals  of  candidates  by  the  Anti-Corruption  Council,  two  members  were  appointed  in  2017  by  the 
government without being proposed by the Council. Against this background, the Anti-Corruption Council 
has expressed concern that adoption of new rules of procedure, as set out in the anti-corruption action plan 
2024-2025, could effectively undermine its independence. Country visit Serbia, Anti-Corruption Council.   
77   Limited action is taken by the prosecution offices to investigate corruption cases. The Council cited the long-
pending issue of police autonomy from the Ministry of the Interior, which undermines the authority of the 
prosecution. Country visit Serbia, Anti-Corruption Council. 

78   GRECO (2022), pp. 18 ff., paras 64-68.  

11 

 
 
authorities have prepared draft amendments to the Lobbying Law with the aim of complying 
with the recommendations79. These amendments have not yet been adopted. Amendments to 
the  Law  on  Financing  Political  Activities  were  adopted  in  July  2026  and  have  yet  to  be 
assessed against OSCE ODIHR recommendations, such as the lack of rules on campaigning 
by third parties, as well as ensuring the effectiveness of the oversight mechanism80. 

Whistleblowers exposing corruption continue to face challenges and the Government is 
planning an analysis of the legal framework. The Government plans to conduct an analysis 
of the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers by 2026 to prepare a new draft law to align 
with  the  EU  acquis,  which  is  yet  to  be  achieved.    While  no  steps  were  taken  during  the 
reporting  period,  the  planned  analysis  would  provide  an  opportunity  to  revise  the  law81  to 
include  all  types  of  disclosures  and  persons,  such  as  former  employees,  and  to  explicitly 
protect  whistleblowers  whose  disclosure  is  not  substantiated82.  Support  mechanisms  for 
whistleblowers, 
legal  aid,  have  not  yet  been  strengthened.  In  practice, 
whistleblowers  face  pressure  from  state  institutions,  including  removal  from  their  positions 
and arrest83, risking causing a chilling effect on reporting and the detection of corruption. The 
enforcement  of  protection  for  whistleblowers  against  any  form  of  retaliation  remains 
ineffective in practice, and challenges related to oversight have not been resolved84.  

including 

Exemptions  to  the  Law  on  public  procurement  continue  to  be  widely  used, 
circumventing  anti-corruption  safeguards,  and  oversight  remains  weak.  The  law 
stipulates  the  publication  of  awarded  contracts  in  the  Public  Procurement  portal,  providing 
for transparency85. However, many contracts are awarded outside the scope of this standard 
public  procurement  legislation  through  project-specific  special  laws  and  intergovernmental 
agreements  used  for  large  infrastructure  projects,  with  provisions  for  exclusive  access  to 
particular bidding procedures. These are not in line with the EU acquis. In 2025, the value of 
public  procurement  exempted  from  the  application  of  the  law  was  close  to  that  of  public 
procurement contracts concluded through regular proceedings86. There are also cases where 
the estimated value of procurement is set just below the thresholds laid down by the law, thus 
being exempted from its scope and procedures.  Although the Criminal Code provides for a 

     Serbia  has  prepared  and  shared  with  the  European  Commission  a  first  draft  of  the  law  for  assessment, 

however, no further steps have been taken.  

80   OSCE/ODIHR (2024), pp. 15 ff.; Venice Commission, OSCE/ODIHR (2022), pp. 22 ff. 
81   Serbian Government (2026), written input, p. 215. Country visit Serbia.  
82   2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 9. 
83   Freedom House (2026).  
84   2025  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Serbia,  p.  9.  Oversight  duties  are  shared  between  several  ministries  with  no 

overall supervision mechanism of the effective follow-up of whistleblower reports. 

85   The  Law  on  public  procurement  is  broadly  aligned  with  EU  acquis,  but  a  large  number  of  contracts  are 
exempted  from  the  application  of  the  law.  No  further  measures  have  been  taken  since  the  most  recent 
amendments  to  this  law  in  2024,  which  introduced  the  requirement  of  the  publication  of  all  contracts 
concluded in public procurement procedures on the Public Procurement Portal. 

86   Public Procurement Office (2026), PrEUgovor (2025), Transparency Serbia (2024). Over the past five years, 
approximately EUR 24 billion has been awarded through procurements exempt from the application of the 
Law on public procurement. This accounts for almost half of the total value of all procurements carried out 
in this period. In 2025, the value of contracts exempted from the Law was EUR 7 billion and the value of 
contracts concluded under the Law was EUR 7.9 billion. In 2024, the value of contracts exempted from the 
Law was slightly lower than in 2023 (the total value of exempt procurements in 2024 was EUR 5.7 billion 
while the total value of contracts concluded under the Law was EUR 8.9 billion; in 2023 the figures were 
respectively EUR 7 billion exempted and EUR 7.3 billion concluded under the Law). However, this data is 
only indicative, as some procurements are not included, especially the contracts based on the provisions of 
special laws.   

12 

 
 
specific  offence  of  abuse  in  public  procurement87,  convictions  remain  rare88.  While  the 
numbers  of  contracts  monitored  by  the  Public  Procurement  Office  is  slowly  increasing  and 
the State Audit Institution’s recommendations are broadly implemented89, 96% of identified 
irregularities  in  2025  relate  to  public  procurement90,  raising  concerns.  Overall,  public 
procurement  in  Serbia  remains  a  high-risk  area  for  corruption  and  irregularities  due  to 
systemic  challenges  with  transparency,  the  extensive  use  of  laws  circumventing  standard 
procedure  and  high-value  infrastructure  project.  Other  areas  at  particular  risk  to  corruption 
include  State-owned  enterprises,  concessions,  bankruptcy  proceedings,  public-private 
partnerships and the health sector91. 

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM 

Serbia’s  audiovisual  market  continued  to  face  serious  challenges  in  the  absence  of  a 
functioning  decision-making  body  of  the  Regulatory  Authority  for  Electronic  Media.  
The election of a new Council of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) had 
been pending since the previous Council’s mandate expired in November 2024. In early July 
2026,  the  process  was  relaunched  by  the  National  Assembly  through  the  adoption  of  an 
authentic interpretation of the Law on electronic media, to address legal concerns raised by 
the four REM Council members who had previously resigned and paving the way for their 
return.  In  the  meantime,  the  audiovisual  market  was  left  without  a  regulatory  authority  to 
react  to  breaches  of  the  media  legislation.  Some TV  channels  have  started  broadcasting  on 
Telekom Srbija cable, without the required airing licence. Some of these channels have also 
received public funding and public officials have appeared on them92. The competition for the 
allocation  of  the  fifth  frequency  for  national  broadcasting,  launched  in  2022,  has  not  yet 
concluded93. Another consequence of the delayed election of the REM Council is that, despite 
the requirements of the  amended Law on Public Broadcasting Services of June 2025, there 
was no REM Council to approve the new secondary legislation concerning the operation of 
public  broadcasters,  including  the  new  rulebook  for  appointing  their  management  boards. 
Serbia  has  not  taken  notable  action  to  combat  foreign  information  manipulation  and 
interference.  RT  Balkans  continues  to  broadcast  in  the  Serbian  language,  via  the  majority 
state-owned  Telekom  Srbija  cable  operator,  and  under  the  licence  previously  issued  by  the 
REM Council in 202494.  

Although  the  Press  Council  effectively  monitored  print  media’s  compliance  with  the 

87   Article 228 Criminal Code. 
88   2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 9. Country visit Serbia. 
89   Serbian Government (2026), written contribution, chapter 32, p. 32. The SAI distinguishes three priorities to 
measure the implementation of recommendations. For each priority, the SAI has set a different standard for 
its  expectation  on  auditees’  follow-up.  In  2025,  auditees  implemented  89%  of  SAI's  first  priority 
recommendations, and 74% second and third priority recommendations. A database of the recommendations 
is available on the SAI website.  

90  In 105 of the audited entities, it was determined that the procurement of goods, services and works was not 
carried out in accordance with the aforementioned law in 923 cases, corresponding to an amount of 108.22 
billion dinars. State Audit Institution (2026), p. 13.  

91   Anti-Corruption Council (2026).   
92      Niš  TV  started  broadcasting  in  2025,  without  a  licence. The  company  owning  this  channel  is  reported  to 
have received public co-funding from the City of Niš. Guests on the programme have included the President 
of the Republic, the head of the ruling party and a Minister. ANEM (2025a) and (2025b).  

93  Prior to the expiry of REM’s mandate, the Council had not allocated it as, according to REM, the procedure 
was interrupted and would continue after the decision of the Administrative Court on the lawsuit against the 
decision on the award of four national licenses. This, however, would not prevent a fifth license from being 
allocated. 

94   2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 41. 

13 

 
 
Journalists’ Code of Ethics, this did not have an impact on the fairness of the allocation 
of  co-funding  by  public  authorities.  In  2025,  the  Press  Council  received  185  complaints, 
which  was  a  sharp  increase  compared  to  2024  (88).  The  Council  found  that  the  Code  of 
Ethics had been violated in 110 cases, and that there had been no violation in 23 cases95. Of 
particular  concern for the Press  Council was the new practice of simultaneously publishing 
identical  texts  across  multiple  media  outlets,  often  with  the  exact  same  headlines,  which 
lacked  basic  journalistic  standards  and  appeared  to  be  intended  to  harm  the  individuals 
mentioned in the articles96. Regarding the authorities’ calls for public co-financing, while the 
Law  on  Public  Information  and  Media  prescribes  the  extent  to  which  the  respective  media 
outlets adhere to ethical standards as one of the criteria for receiving co-funding, some media 
outlets that violated the Code of Ethics continued to receive funding97. 

Concerns  regarding  editorial  autonomy  and  the  pluralism  of  public  service 
broadcasters  persisted.  The  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  (MPM)  2026  found  that  the 
‘independence  of  public  service  media’  indicator  deteriorated  in  2025  and  became  a  very 
high-risk area (85%)98. The amendments to the Law on Public Broadcasting Services in June 
2025 did not ensure the full financial independence of public broadcasters. State funding for 
Radio Television Vojvodina was needed again in 2026 to compensate for the low level of the 
fee99. New secondary legislation, which was legally required by December 2025100, has not 
yet  been  adopted.  This  includes  a  Programming  Council’s  general  act  that  was  to  further 
regulate the procedure for electing a new ‘Commissioner for the Protection of the Rights of 
Listeners, Viewers and Readers’, as well as the scope of work of the Commissioner and the 
termination of their duties. Concerns over limited pluralism and biased reporting in favour of 
the government persisted101. The two public broadcasters continued to be strongly criticised 
by civil society and media associations for their lack of reporting, or their politically slanted 
reporting, of the student protests102. Some journalist redundancies at RTS were reportedly in 
retaliation  for  their  personal  social  and  political  views103.  In  February  2026,  a  new  RTS 
director104  was  appointed,  on  the  basis  of  the  previous  Law  on  Public  Broadcasting 
Services105, following a process criticised by some media associations, during which another 

95   As for other cases, in two cases no consensus was reached, 13 complaints were resolved through mediation, 
in  11  cases  complainants  withdrew  from  the  procedure,  and  26  complaints  were  dismissed  for  formal 
reasons. Press Council (2025). 

96  Most complaints regarding this type of content were submitted by participants in student and civic protests. 

Press Council (2025). 

97  According  to  the  data  in  the  Unified  Information  System  for  the  Implementation  and  Monitoring  of  Co-
financing  of  Projects  in  the  Field  of  Public  Information  (JIS)  of  the  Ministry  of  Information  and 
Telecommunications.  

98  Compared with 70%, a high-risk area, in 2024. 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 33.   
99   According to the Law, the core activity of the public broadcasting service shall be financed from fees. The 

monthly fee is bundled with electricity bills and collected from citizens and legal entities. 

100  Within six months of the adoption of the law, as required by the Law on Public Broadcasting Services. 
101  2026 Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM), p. 41. Aggregated data over the month of April 2026, for example, 
shows  that  the  ruling  majority  was  covered  in  95%  of  airtime  in  the  central  news  broadcast  of  Radio 
Television Serbia (RTS), compared to 5% for opposition parties, according to the data of a CSO specialised 
in democracy and media monitoring in Serbia.  

102  Country visit Serbia, civil society and media associations. 
103  2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 42. 
104  The  new  director  commented  that  the  broadcaster  had  been  destabilised  from  within  during  the  previous 
period  and  that  while  RTS  staff  were  free  to  have  different  opinions  about  the  channel’s  reporting,  they 
could not engage in individual activism. Interview in RTS’s central news, 3 March 2026. RTS (2026). 

105  Stakeholders  have  questioned  the  legality  of  the  procedure  as  the  call  was  published  after  the  law  was 
amended but before the secondary legislation was updated in the absence of a REM Council. Country visit 
Serbia. 

14 

 
 
candidate withdrew, citing irregularities106. 

Against  a  backdrop  of  further  media  market  concentration,  political  and  economic 
influence on the media, including on editorial policy, is a cause of serious concern. The 
MPM 2026 considered that the ‘political independence of media’ indicator, a very high-risk 
area, worsened in 2025 (97%)107. The media market became more concentrated following the 
2023 amendments to the Law on Public Information and Media, which allowed state-owned 
companies  to  own  media  outlets108.  In  August  2025,  concerns  were  raised  about  political 
pressure on media outlets perceived as critical towards the authorities when a leaked phone 
conversation  between  the  CEOs  of  a  private  media  group  and  Telekom  Srbija,  which  is 
majority  state-owned,  regarding  personnel  changes  in  the  former  was  published109.  In 
February 2026, new governance and editorial boards were announced for that private media 
group, followed by the dismissals of the CEO of the subsidiary company and, in April 2026, 
of  the  director  of  its  news  channel.  Several  local  media  outlets,  owned  by  the  same  few 
economic  entities,  were  launched  or  acquired  in  municipalities,  including  those  where 
elections were due to take place in March 2026110.  

Media legislation and strategy, particularly with regard to the fairness of public funding 
and  transparency  of  ownership  structures,  are  not  enforced  adequately.  Media  often 
depend  heavily  on  public  co-funding  due  to  the  large  number  of  registered  media  outlets 
combined  with  the  limited  advertising  market,  particularly  at  the  local  level111.  Out  of  174 
municipalities and self-governments, all but 12 launched calls for media co-financing within 
the  legal  deadline  in  2025112.  Grants  were  allocated  at  national  and  local  levels  even  when 
evaluation  committee  members  did  not  adhere  to  the  scoring  grids  set  out  in  secondary 
legislation113. Other types of public funding are awarded through less transparent processes, 
such as the procurement of information services and advertising114. The objective of Serbia’s 
media  strategy115  to  disclose  all  sources  of  public  funding  in  a  transparent,  comprehensive 
and user-friendly manner in the media register remains to be fully implemented. The register 
still  does  not  reveal  the  ultimate  ownership  of  each  media  outlet,  since  many  owners  are 

106  One of the candidates filed a lawsuit against RTS with the Higher Court in Belgrade.  
107 Compared with 92% in 2024. 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 33. 
108  Reversing  the  previous  prohibition  in  Serbian  legislation,  and  contrary  to  the  objective  of  Serbia’s  media 

strategy 2020-2025. 

109  2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 42. 
110 The 2026 MPM reported that in 2025 the government pursued a strategy of purchasing financially weakened 
local  media  through  its  exponents,  to  secure  more  control  ahead  of  the  March  2026  local  elections.  As  a 
result,  an  increasing  number  of  local  outlets  now  operate  under  direct  or  indirect  political  control  and 
produce content with tightly controlled topics; NPM (2026), p. 47. The election observation mission of the 
Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities also reported on the state of local media as 
negatively affected by ownership concentration and self-censorship; Council of Europe Congress of Local 
and Regional Authorities (2026). 

111  2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 43. 
112  Statistics provided by the Serbian authorities. The Ministry of Information and Telecommunications initiated 

misdemeanour proceedings against them for failing to meet the legal deadline. 

113  Rulebook  on  Co-financing  of  Projects  for  the  Realization  of  Public  Interest  in  the  Field  of  Public 
Information; information provided by the Serbian authorities in the context of Reform and Growth Facility 
payment  requests.  Media  associations  also  continued  to  report  irregularities,  such  as  many  project  co-
financing  committees  being  composed  of  the  same  individuals,  often  not  the  most  qualified  experts,  and 
resulting in the largest allocations going to media linked to senior government officials and their associates; 
2026 Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM), p.29. 

114  2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 43. 
115  Adopted by the Government on 30 January 2020. It expired in 2025, and a new media strategy has yet to be 

adopted. The corresponding action plan had expired already in 2022.  

15 

 
 
listed as subsidiary companies116. The inspections service of the Ministry of Information and 
Telecommunications  over  the  media  register,  as  planned  by  the  Law  on  Public  Information 
and Media, was established in June 2025. The enforcement of the amended provision of the 
Law on Public Information and Media regarding the adoption of internal ethical codes lacks 
monitoring117.  Measures  foreseen  in  the  previous  media  strategy  (2020-2025)  to  ensure  the 
fair  and  transparent  allocation  of  state  advertising  have  yet  to  be  implemented.  The 
privatisation of the media sector, as also planned by the strategy, remains incomplete118.  

Journalists frequently encounter either refusals by public bodies to disclose information 
or  no  response  at  all,  including  regarding  sensitive  information  of  public  importance. 
Serbia  has  signed,  but  not  yet  ratified,  the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  Access  to 
Official  Documents119.  The  Commissioner  for  Information  of  Public  Importance  is  still 
unable  to  enforce  its  decisions  directly  through  coercive  action120. According  to  their  2025 
report,  as  in  previous  years,  a  higher  percentage  of  the  Commissioner’s  decisions  on 
complaints by journalists remain unexecuted than those of other complainants121. In 2025, 72 
complaints  (43%)  out  of  166  filed  by  journalists  were  filed  against  the  silence  of  the 
administration122. During  the same year, of the 195  resolved complaints from  journalists123, 
the  Commissioner  issued  45  decisions  ordering  the  provision  of  information,  10  of  which 
(22%)  were  not  enforced,  and  for  another  12,  no  information  was  provided  as  of  5  March 
2026.  Access  to  sensitive  information  of  public  importance  was  denied  notably  in  cases 
concerning environmental damage, capital projects, the use of public resources, legalisation 
of illegally constructed buildings and the co-financing of media projects124. 

The safety of journalists has further deteriorated, with an increase in cases of physical 
attacks, threats, intimidation and hate speech. The MPM 2025 found that the indicator for 
‘journalistic profession, standards and protection’ worsened in 2025 (77%)125. There was an 
increase  in  cases  of  physical  attacks,  threats,  intimidation  and  hate  speech  against 
journalists126,  which  were  not  consistently  condemned  by  the  authorities127.  Threats  and 

116  2026 Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM), p. 25. The MPM also found that, due to shortcomings in the media 
registers,  it  is  practically  impossible  to  determine  how  many  media  an  individual  owner  owns.  Neither 
register enables searches by the name of the owner or licence holder. 

117  Policy dialogue with the Serbian authorities, RISSP subcommittee of 4 February 2026. 
118  Serbian Government, (2026), written contribution, chapter 23, p. 35. 
119  The Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official  Documents (CETS No. 205), also known as the 

Tromsø Convention, entered into force on 1 December 2020. 

120  2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 12. 
121  The authorities often refuse to disclose information on the unjustified ground that the requests come from 

journalists. Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data protection (2026). 

122  Among ministries, the most complaints about silence on journalistic requests were filed against the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs (6), and when it comes to local government bodies, the most complaints were filed against 
the City Administration of the City of Belgrade (5). Commissioner for information of public importance and 
personal data protection (2026). 

123  Also  including  complaints  received  in  previous  years.  Media  associations  and  CSOs  pointed  out  that  the 
Commissioner increasingly used the possibility of mediation with public bodies before issuing its decisions, 
which slowed down the process. Country visit Serbia. 

124  Commissioner for Information of Public Importance (2026).  
125  Compared with 68% in 2024. 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 12. 
126  The  Independent  Journalists’  Association  of  Serbia  (NUNS)  recorded  371  cases  of  threats  to  journalists’ 
safety  in  2025  (compared  to 168  in 2024),  including 113 physical  attacks  and  165  threats.  NUNS  (2025). 
The  Supreme  Public  Prosecution  Office  also  informed  that  a  higher  number  of  criminal  complaints  and 
reports were filed in 2025 (134, compared to 65 in 2024); Serbian Government (2026), written input, p. 96. 
The Supreme Public Prosecution Office further informed that 142 cases were opened in Public Prosecution 
Offices  between  July  1,  2025  and  May  31,  2026.  The  first-instance  or  final  decision  was  rendered  in  35 
cases, which represents 38,89% of the total number of cases. During this period, 23 cases of physical attacks 

16 

 
 
serious attacks were also reported in the context of local elections in March 2026128. Female 
journalists  were  particularly  vulnerable  to  threats  and  attacks,  especially  online.  Recurrent 
verbal attacks by high-level officials against journalists persisted, having a chilling effect on 
freedom of expression. Some physical attacks against journalists occurred in front of police 
officers who did not intervene, and there have also been reports of police using force against 
journalists,  preventing  media  workers  from  reporting  on  the  protests,  and  briefly  detaining 
journalists129. Few of the reported cases resulted in final convictions130. Since July 2025, the 
Council  of  Europe’s  Platform  for  the  Protection  of  Journalism  and  Safety  of  Journalists 
reported  42  alerts131.  The  Media  Freedom  Rapid  Response  project  has  reported  209  alerts 
since  July  2025,  consisting  of  38  ‘physical  assaults’,  45  ‘attacks  to  property’,  132  ‘verbal 
attacks’,  6  ‘legal  incidents’,  and  41  ‘interferences’132.  Civil  society  has  reported  that  the 
Serbian  authorities  have  continued  to  use  spyware  to  unlawfully  target  journalists, 
environmental  activists  and  other  individuals133.  One  case  was  initiated  in  2025  and  is 
currently  at  the  pre-investigation  stage,  with  no  indication  of  progress  to  date134.  The 
reporting  period  was  also  marked  by  coordinated  bot  attacks  against  the  social  media 
accounts of independent media outlets and CSOs135. Cases of strategic lawsuits against public 
participation  (SLAPP)  persist,  increasingly  hindering  the  work  of  investigative  media  and 
CSOs. There  were  14  complaints  in  2025  compared  with  7  in  2024136.  Serbia  will  need  to 
align  with  the  EU  acquis,  including  covering  the  early  dismissal  of  manifestly  unfounded 
claims and providing remedies against abusive court proceedings137. Courts have continued to 
fail to consistently adhere to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights with regard 

were formed, a continuation of the increase of such cases, with 28 reports filed in 2025 compared with 6 in 
2024. So far, 5 cases were formed during 2026, while 7 cases were formed in the same period of 2025. There 
was a noticeable decrease in the share of cases of attacks against female journalists in the total number of 
victims, especially noticeable in cases of online threats. A higher number of criminal complaints and reports 
were filed in 2025 (118.46% more than in 2024). Criminal offenses committed online decreased in the total 
number of formed cases, with a share of 51,41% in 2025 against 67.69% in 2024.  The first five months of 
2026 compared with the same period in 2025 shows a 33.33% increase in the number of formed cases, as 
well as a 38.1% increase in the cases of the Special Department for Combating High-Tech Crime. Supreme 
Public Prosecution Office, written contribution. 

127  For  example,  a  documentary  series  broadcast  on  several  TV  channels,  including  national  channels, 
contributed  to  a  smear  campaign  against  several  journalists.  NUNS  (2026b).  The  smear  campaign  was 
publicly condemned by OSCE Representative for the Freedom of the Media. OSCE (2026). 

128  Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (2026). 
129  2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 40. See also Media Freedom Rapid Response, Monitoring Report 2025, 
p.  45:  “In  2025,  physical  attacks  increased  alarmingly,  with  44  instances  recorded,  compared  to  14  for 
2024.  Violence  was  normalised,  especially  as  law  enforcement  officers  have  shifted  from  inaction  to 
excessive use of force against journalists covering protests. Of the 16 assaults attributed to police, over 90% 
were recorded at protests and five resulted in injuries”. 

130  The  Supreme  Public  Prosecution  Office  informed  that  three  convictions  were  rendered  in  2025.  Serbian 

Government (2026), written input, p. 95. 

131  Including  14  with  a  state  reply.  The  alerts  consist  in  15  attacks  on  ‘physical  safety  and  integrity  of 
journalists’,  one  ‘detention  and  imprisonment  of  journalists’,  and  23  ‘harassment  and  intimidation  of 
journalists’; three other alerts relate to a smear campaign against independent journalists, cyber-attacks and 
the resignation of REM Council members over obstruction claims.  

132  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Media Freedom Rapid Response – Serbia. 
133  Country visit Serbia, civil society and media associations. 
134  This case concerns at least seven individuals. 2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 40. 
135  International Press Institute (2026a). 
136  SLAPP  cases  against  media,  CSOs  and  other  individuals,  according  to  the  database  of  the  National  Anti-
SLAPP Working Group (2026), an informal collaboration of several civil society organizations and experts. 

137  2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 41. 

17 

 
 
to  SLAPPs138. There has been no progress  in  establishing accountability  for the murders  of 
three journalists in 1994, 1999 and 2001, one of which has reached the statute of limitation139. 
Regarding  one  of  these  three  cases  the  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  the  2024  decision  of  the 
Court  of Appeal  in  Belgrade140  had  significantly  violated  criminal  procedure  provisions  in 
favour of the defendants, without affecting the legal force of the verdict141. 

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

the 

legislative  proposals.  Despite  rules 

The effectiveness of Parliament and its oversight function continued to be hindered by a 
lack  of  genuine  political  debate,  as  well  as  by  the  limited  ability  of  members  of 
Parliament  to  scrutinise 
legislative  proposals  properly  and  contribute  to  the 
parliamentary and legislative agenda. Recent progress on electoral reform and the launch 
of  the  voter  register  audit  still  need  to  be  fully  implemented.  On  electoral  reform, 
amendments  to  four  election-related  laws  were  adopted  in  May  2026,  further  legislation  is 
under preparation following ODIHR opinions, and the Commission for the audit of the voter 
register has started its work, although meaningful data access and full implementation remain 
to  be  completed.  Nine  (regular  and  extraordinary)  plenary  sessions  were  held  since  June 
2025. During these sessions, there continued to be a lack of genuine political debate on the 
to  exceptional 
substance  of 
circumstances,  all  plenary  sessions  were  called  within  a  shorter  timeframe  than  the  regular 
notice  of  at  least  seven  days142.  This  restricted  the  ability  of  members  of  Parliament  to 
propose  changes  to  the  agenda  or  table  amendments  to  adopted  laws  or  bills,  nearly  all  of 
which  were  proposed  by  the  Government143.  Public  scrutiny  and  involvement  in  the 
legislative  process  also  remained  limited.  The  practice  of  amalgamating  large  numbers  of 
often unrelated items into a single agenda item also continued, making meaningful scrutiny 
and  debate  difficult.  Parliamentary  oversight  of  the  executive  is  therefore  weak.  Under  the 
applicable rules, question time with the Prime Minister and the Government should take place 
monthly while Parliament is in session144. No such question time was held in 2026, and only 
one was held in 2025. Furthermore, derogatory language and occasional incidents have been 
reported  during  parliamentary  debates,  including  disruptions,  violence,  and  boycotts.  The 
Rules of Procedure and the Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament are not consistently 
enforced145. 

limiting 

this 

The exercise of presidential powers remains a subject of intense public debate. Although 

138  Country  visit  Serbia,  media  associations.  For  example,  investigative  outlet  KRIK  alone  faces  14  SLAPP 
cases. In 2025, an Appellate Court judge initiated a third action against KRIK over its “Judge Who Judges” 
database, now escalating to a criminal complaint seeking prison sentences and a two-year reporting ban for 
two editors, alleging a breach of privacy, MPM (2026), p. 14. 

139  As referred to in Chapter 23 interim benchmark. Council of the European Union (2016), p. 28. 
140  The 2024 decision had overturned the convictions of four former intelligence officers on charges related to 

the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija. 

141  Verdict issued in October 2025 and made public in January 2026. Supreme Court (2025). The International 
Press  Institute  noted  that  “the  result  is  that  the  murder  case  remains  in  a  state  of  total  impunity  27  years 
later”. International Press Institute (2026b).  

142  Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, Article 86(1).  
143  Some drafts laws proposed by MPs from the ruling coalition were adopted. None of the drafts proposed by 

opposition MPs were put on the agenda. 

144  Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, Article 205. 
145  2025 Enlargement report, Serbia, p. 4. 

18 

 
 
the Constitution provides for relatively limited presidential powers146, the actual exercise of 
presidential powers continues to be intensively debated in the public discourse. Civil society 
and other stakeholders have expressed concerns that the political debate and decision-making 
are, in  practice, steered by the President in  a manner not  set  out  in the Constitution147. The 
President  has  granted  pardons  to  individuals  charged  with  severely  physically  harming 
protesters,  justified  on  the  basis  of  correcting  alleged  injustices  caused  by  prosecutors  and 
courts148,  and  also  announced  potential  pardons  for  senior  officials  involved  in  criminal 
proceedings. This has raised concerns about presidential interference in the independence of 
the judiciary.  

Ten  new  judges  were  appointed  to  the  Constitutional  Court,  while  three  positions 
remained  vacant.  In  December  2025,  the  terms  of  10  Constitutional  Court  judges  ended, 
resulting in significant turnover within the 15-member body. The Court now has 12 serving 
judges, as 10 new judges were elected by Parliament and the President in December 2025 in 
line with the existing legal framework, while three remain to be appointed149. Serbia has not 
yet  taken  any  steps  to  introduce  a  qualified  majority  with  an  anti-deadlock  mechanism  for 
electing those Constitutional Court judges appointed by Parliament, as recommended by the 
Venice  Commission150.  The  High  Judicial  Council  and  the  High  Prosecutorial  Council  still 
need  to  make  their  nominations  to  the  respective  appointment  bodies  for  the  three  vacant 
positions151. They also  need to  adopt  a joint  Rulebook, including  the nomination procedure 
before  proceeding  with  their  nominations152.  The  efficiency  of  the  Constitutional  Court  is 
negatively  impacted  by  the  vacant  positions.  On  22  January  2026,  a  new  president  of  the 
Constitutional Court was appointed, whose public comments concerning the need to dismiss 
judges who oppose the current government153 raised concerns among stakeholders154.  

The legal framework for public consultations and its enforcement has deteriorated, with 
lowered standards and a decrease in the number of consultations. In November 2025, the 
government adopted amendments to its rules of procedure, lowering the standards of public 

146  Primarily the right to propose a Prime Minister, to express state unity, to represent the country at home and 
abroad and to promulgate the Acts of Parliament; Constitution of Serbia, Articles 101, 109, 110 and 111. See 
also Venice Commission, OSCE/ODIHR (2022), para 152. 

147  Country visit Serbia. Freedom House (2024). See also Venice Commission, OSCE/ODIHR (2022), para 152. 
148  2025 Enlargement report, Serbia, p. 30. 
149  10  out  of  15  judges  were  replaced  because  their  nine-year  terms  expired  or  they  reached  the  mandatory 
retirement age. Two judges whose mandates began in 2019 and had not yet expired remain in the Court from 
its previous composition. On 18 December 2025, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia elected 
five  new  judges  to  the  Constitutional  Court  based  on  a  proposal  from  the  President  of  the  Republic. 
Simultaneously, the President appointed five judges from a list submitted by the National Assembly.   

150  Venice Commission (2021), p. 19.  
151  Three vacancies remain for judges to be appointed by the Supreme Court from among candidates proposed 

by the HJC and HPC.  

152  2025 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 15. 
153  Country  visit  Serbia;  NUNS  (2026),  N1  (2026a).  The  comments  were  made  during  an  appearance  on  28 
January on Pink TV and published by the daily Politika on 1 February 2026 and also contained accusations 
that  some  judges  conduct  political  activities  against  the  state.  This  led  to  the  CC  restricting  the  media 
appearances of the CC President.  

154  Country  visit  Serbia;  N1  (2026a).  The  Judges’  Association  of  Serbia  condemned  comments  in  a  press 
release, noting that “all judges, including those on the CC and particularly its president, should refrain from 
commenting  on  issues  that  could  potentially  come  before  the  CC.  It  is  essential  not only  that  they remain 
impartial,  but  that  they  avoid  any  public  perception  of  bias,  which  serves  only  to  undermine  trust  in  the 
judiciary”. The statement also reminded that public officials must not use public appearances to discourage 
judges from speaking out on judicial policy, in particular when judges believe that proposed measures may 
threaten the independence of the judiciary. 

19 

 
 
debate by introducing several exemptions that were not in line with the primary legislation155. 
In June 2026, the government drafted new amendments to address this issue. The percentage 
of public consultations on draft laws fell from 58% in 2024 to 51% in 2025156. During this 
same period, public consultation  of public policy documents fell from  100% to  85%, while 
consultations  on  by-laws  remained  at  30%157. There  is  still  no  central  body  responsible  for 
overseeing and controlling the quality of public consultations158. Although the use of the e-
consultations  platform  is  mandatory  by  law,  it  remains  insufficient159,  and  despite  the 
the  results  of  public  consultations160, 
this  was  not  done 
obligation 
systematically161,  with  limited  information  on  the  rationale  for  dismissing  comments.  In 
addition,  the  quality  of  the  policy-making  process  was  undermined  by  new  Government 
decrees  of  March  2026  exempting  draft  laws  and  public  policy  documents  related  to  the 
European integration process from mandatory impact assessments162. 

to  publish 

Over half of the companies surveyed in Serbia express confidence in the effectiveness of 
investment protection.  61% of companies are very or fairly confident that investments are 
protected  by  law  and  courts,  a  figure  which  as  increased  compared  with  2025  (57%)163. 
Further,  49%  perceive  the  level  of  independence  of  the  public  procurement  review  body 
(Republic Commission for Protection of Rights in Public Procurement Procedures) as very or 
fairly  good,  a  figure  which  has  significantly  increased  in  comparison  with  2025  (32%)164. 
46% perceive the level  of independence of the  national  competition  authority (Commission 
for  Protection  of  Competition)  as  very  or  fairly  good,  a  figure  which  has  significantly 
increased in comparison with 2025 (33%)165. 

On 1 January 2026, Serbia had 22 leading judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights  pending implementation,  an  increase  of  2  compared  to  the  previous  year166.  At 
that  time,  Serbia’s  rate  of  leading  judgments  from  the  past  10  years  that  had  been 
implemented  was  at  56%  (compared  to  62%  in  2025;  44%  remained  pending),  and  the 
average time that the judgments had been pending implementation was 3 years and 4 months 
(compared  to  5  years  and  7  months  in  2025)167.  The  oldest  group  of  leading  judgments, 
pending implementation for 17 years, concern the violation of the applicants’ right of access 

155  Law on State Administration and Law on the planning system. 
156  Laws that ratify international agreements are not included in the calculation. 
157  Serbian Government (2026), written input, pp. 8-10. 
158  One of the three recommendations of the European Commissions in the public administration reform area in 
Serbia, in light of the gap between legal provisions and their enforcement. 2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, 
pp. 5 and 26. 

159  Only  32  %  of  conducted  public  consultations  on  legislation  adopted  by  the  Government  in  2025  were 

performed through the e-consultation platform. 

160  Law on the planning system. 
161  Out  of  the  public  consultations  performed  through  the  e-consultation  platform,  no  more  than  15%  had 

mandatory reports published on the platform. 

162 Government sessions of 19 March and 26 March 2026. Government (2026). 
163  Flash  Eurobarometer  582  (2026)  and  Flash  Eurobarometer  555  (2025).  In  2026,  only  11%  and  9%  of  the 
surveyed  investors  respectively  perceive  concerns  about  quality,  efficiency  or  independence  of  justice  the 
frequent changes in legislation or concerns about the quality of the law-making process as a reason for the 
lack of confidence in investment protection.  

164 Flash Eurobarometer 582 (2026) and Flash Eurobarometer 555 (2026).  
165  Flash Eurobarometer 582 (2026) and Flash Eurobarometer 555 (2026). 
166  For an explanation of the supervision process, see the website of the Council of Europe.   
167  All  figures  calculated  by  the  European  Implementation  Network  (EIN)  and  based  on  the  number  of  cases 
that are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2026. EIN (2026), written input, p. 2. 

20 

 
 
to a court and the peaceful enjoyment of their property 168. As regards the respect of payment 
deadlines,  on  31  December  2025  there  were  13  cases  in  total  awaiting  confirmation  of 
payments (compared to  16 in  2024)169. On 17 June 2026, the number of leading  judgments 
pending implementation had increased to 25 170.  

Most  independent  bodies  working  in  the  area of  fundamental  rights continued  to  face 
resource constraints and the follow-up to their recommendations remained inconsistent. 
The  Ombudsperson  is  the  national  human  rights  institution  (NHRI)  accredited  with  ‘A-
Status’171. While the Office of the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and 
Personal Data Protection reached the staffing target set in Serbia’s action plan for chapter 23, 
the Offices of the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality and of the Ombudsperson still 
had fewer staff than the target number172. There continues to be no systematic follow-up on 
the  recommendations  of  the  independent  bodies173.  In  the  2025  annual  report,  the 
Ombudsman introduced a more formalised mechanism to measure the authorities’ follow-up 
to his general  (systemic) recommendations, which nuances the high follow-up rate reported 
in  previous  years174.  As  in  previous  years,  stakeholders  considered  that  the  independent 
bodies needed to be more vocal in denouncing violations of fundamental rights175.  

Civil  society  organisations  have  been  subject  to  increasing  pressure,  attacks  and 
intimidation,  including  by  high-level  officials,  and  reported  cases  of  excessive  use  of 
force  by  the  police  against  protesters  have  not  led  to  convictions  so  far.  The  space  for 

168  Judgment of the ECtHR, 2269/06, Kačapor v. Serbia, pending implementation since 2008.  
169  Council of Europe (2026), p. 163.  
170  Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC). 
171  Accreditation by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI). 
172  For the Office of the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection: 132 
staff as of January 2026, compared with 129 in the Action Plan for Chapter 23, which is the main document 
in  which  Serbia  sets  out  how  it  will  reach  the  Interim  Benchmarks  for  this  chapter.  For  the  Office  of  the 
Ombudsperson: 72 staff as of  16 June 2026 compared with 106 in the Action Plan for Chapter 23; a new 
staff systematisation rulebook is under preparation. The Ombudsman currently does not have any deputies as 
required by law. For the Office of the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality: 43 staff as of December 
2025 compared with 60 in the Action Plan for Chapter 23; a new rulebook targeting a total of 60 staff in the 
next three years was adopted in May 2026. For a staff increase the independent bodies would need first the 
consent of the Ministry of Finance, before seeking the approval by the Parliament. 

173  Annual reports are submitted to the Parliament by 15 March of each year, which then adopts conclusions on 
them.  The  annual  reports  published  in  March  2026  have  yet  to  be  discussed  in  a  plenary  session  of  the 
Parliament. Parliamentary discussions tend to remain general and do not focus on key recommendations. 
174  While the authorities’ follow-up to individual recommendations of the Ombudsman was reported at 86.7% 
for  2025,  a  more  thorough  analysis  by  the  Ombudsman  of  the  follow-up  to  his  general  (systemic) 
recommendations showed that 6% were fully implemented, 54% partially, 36% not implemented and 3.5% 
could not be determined. Ombudsman (2026). The Ombudsman’s Office  pointed out that the follow-up of 
individual  and  general 
recommendations  should  be  observed  separately;  systemic 
recommendations cannot be viewed in the context of regular annual reports but rather over a longer period of 
time. Ombudsman, written contribution.  

(systemic) 

175  For  example,  they  felt  that  the  Commissioner  for  Personal  Data  Protection  did  not  react  sufficiently  to 
spyware attacks against journalists and human rights activists, nor did the Ombudsperson react sufficiently 
to the alleged use of a sound cannon against protesters in Belgrade in March 2025; country visit Serbia, civil 
society organisations. Regarding the first example and  based on the authorities’ statement that they did not 
have forensic tools for digital data processing and that they were acting within the law, the Commissioner 
for  personal  data  protection  concluded  that  the  conditions  were  not  met  for him  to  conduct  an  inspection; 
country  visit  Serbia,  Commissioner  for  personal  data  protection.  Regarding  the  second  example,  the 
Ombudsman’s Office pointed out that he did respond to the alleged use of a sound cannon against protesters 
in  Belgrade  on  15  March  2025,  that  based  on  information  received  from  the  media  and  CSOs,  the 
Ombudsman launched an investigation procedure on its own initiative on 17 March 2025, and that to date 
none of the requested information has been received from CSOs. Ombudsman, written contribution. 

21 

 
 
civil society was downgraded to ‘repressed’ by Civicus176. Organisations and individuals who 
criticise  the  authorities  continued  to  come  under  pressure177,  particularly  those  monitoring 
alleged  electoral  irregularities  or  campaigning  for  the  rule  of  law  and  anti-corruption 
measures. The police search of the offices of four CSOs in February 2025 has not led to any 
charges, and the search was widely perceived as an act of intimidation against civil society178. 
There have been no concrete improvements in the transparency or fairness of public funding 
for civil society179. In the context of increased pressure on civil society, formal cooperation 
with the authorities has not resumed since, in February 2025, CSO members of the National 
Convention on the EU announced their withdrawal from the government’s working groups180. 
Student  and  civic  protests  demanding  accountability  and  a  more  effective  fight  against 
corruption have continued, albeit less frequently. A large protest took place on 23 May 2026. 
High-level  authorities  continued  to  attempt  to  delegitimise  protesters,  as  well  as  several 
media outlets and CSOs181. The Security Information Agency continued to hold ‘informative 
talks’ with protesters, which were perceived as a form of pressure and intimidation. Overall, 
several  hundred  individuals  were  arrested,  some  of  whom  were  detained  or  placed  under 
house arrest on grounds including ‘invoking a violent change to the constitutional order’182. 
However,  few  of  these  cases  resulted  in  indictments183.  There  have  been  violent  incidents 
against demonstrators and journalists reporting on the protests, and to date only some of the 
perpetrators  have  been  prosecuted184,  while  several  others  were  previously  pardoned  from 
criminal  prosecution by  the President. Cases  of excessive use of force by the police during 
the protests, including against journalists and minors, have been reported and cases handled 
by  the  prosecution  are  either  ongoing  or  have  been  dismissed185.  Regarding  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights’  interim  measure  on  the  alleged  use  of  a  sonic  weapon  for  crowd 
control  at  the  demonstrations  in  Belgrade  in  March  2025186,  there  has  been  no  credible 
follow-up  yet  by  the  authorities,  who  continue  to  deny  such  use187.  Pressure  on  activists, 

176  With  a  score  of  38/100.  CIVICUS  (2026a,b).  Rating  by  CIVICUS;  ratings  are  on  a  five-category  scale 

defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed and closed.  

177  UN  High  Commissioner  on  Human  Rights  (2026).  Freedom  House  (2026).  See  also  pillar  III  on  Media 
Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom  regarding  spyware  attacks  and  SLAPPs  targeting  both  civil  society 
organisations and media.  

178  2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 25. In addition, Serbia’s Administration for the Prevention of Money 
Laundering  requested  in  January  2025  confidential  bank  data  on  five  CSO  employees  who  have  not  been 
informed, since then, about the outcome of the case. FATF (2025). 

179  2025  Enlargement  Report,  Serbia,  p.  25.  Stakeholders  reported  that,  according  to  public  data  collected  by 
investigative journalists and CSOs, some  public funds are allocated to ghost organisations or government-
organised non-governmental organisations; country visit Serbia, civil society organisations. A case filed in 
2023 by CSOs on alleged corruption in the calls implemented by the Ministry of Demography and Family 
Care is still in pre-investigative stage.  

180  Except  for  their  participation  as  members  of  the  Reform  and  Growth  Plan  Monitoring  Committee  in  a 
tripartite  format  with  the  European  Commission.  NCEU  (2025).  CSOs’  membership  in  the  Council  for 
cooperation and development of civil society has also remained frozen since January 2025. 

181  2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 43. 
182  Serbian Government (2026), written input, pp. 111-112. 
183  2025 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 43 and Serbian Government (2026), written input, pp. 111-112.  
184  Serbian Government (2026), written input, pp. 96-97, 110-114. 
185  Statistics provided by the Serbian authorities at the JLS subcommittee, 24-25 February 2026. 
186  The Court indicated to the Government that it should prevent any use of sound devices for crowd control 
(other  than  for  communication  purposes).  It  noted  that  the  use  of  such  weapons  for  crowd  control  was 
unlawful  in  Serbia,  and  the  potentially  serious  health  effects  that  could  be  caused  to  a  large  number  of 
persons.  It  reiterated  that  the  decision  did  not  mean  it  had  taken  any  position  as  to  whether  use  of  such 
weapons had occurred: European Court of Human Rights (30 April 2025). 

187  2025  Enlargement  Report,  Serbia,  p.  43.  A  case  initiated  by  the  Organised  Crime  Prosecutor’s  Office  is 

ongoing. 

22 

 
 
including  gender-based  violence,  increased  in  the  run-up  to  the  local  elections  in  some 
municipalities in March 2026188. 

188  CRTA’s  long-term  observation  of  the  elections  identified more  than  30  cases  of  pressure  and  attacks.  For 
example,  14  women,  either  opposition-affiliated  activists  or  citizens  supporting  the  student  protests, were 
identified  in  a  social  media  post  and  publicly  threatened  with  the  release  of  alleged  intimate  content.  24 
CSOs  and  initiatives  issued  a  joint  statement  characterising  the  case  as  digital  violence,  gender-based 
harassment and political intimidation. CRTA (2026). 

23 

 
 
 
 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order*   

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2026 Rule of Law report 
can be found at https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2026-rule-law-report-targeted-
stakeholder-consultation_en.  

for 

Agency  for  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  (2026), Report  on  the  Implementation  of  the  National 
Strategy 
Action 
Plan, https://www.acas.rs/storage/page_files/Izve%C5%A1taj%20o%20sprovo%C4%91enju%20Naci
onalne%20strategije%20%D0%B7%D0%B0%20borbu%20protiv%20korupcije%20i%20prate%C4%
87eg%20Akcionog%20plana%20za%20period%202024-2025.%20godine.pdf.   

Accompanying 

Corruption 

Against 

Fight 

and 

the 

the 

ANEM (2025a),  “Telekom 
permission”, https://anem.org.rs/en/strane/telekom-izasao-u-susret-prorezimskoj-nis-tv-emituju-ih-
bez-dozvole   

'responded  to'  the  pro-regime Niš TV,  broadcasting  them  without 

ANEM (2025b), “ANEM, NUNS, UNS, Local Press, and the Media Association: On what legal basis 
and criteria did the city of Niš allocate four million for Niš TV?”, https://anem.org.rs/en/strane/anem-
nuns-uns-lokal-pres-i-asocijacija-medija-po-kom-zakonskom-osnovu-i-kriterijumu-je-grad-nis-
dodelio-cetiri-miliona-za-nis-tv  

Anti-Corruption Council (2026), Written input from the Anti-Corruption Council in the context of the 
country visit to Serbia.  

Centre for Judicial Research (2025). 

Centre  for  Media  Pluralism  and  Freedom  (2026), Media  Pluralism  Monitor,  Country  report  for 
Serbia.  

(2025), Dashboard 

CEPEJ 
Collection, https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/-/dashboard-western-balkans-publication-by-cepej-of-
the-2024-data-analyses   

Balkans 

Western 

2024 

– 

Data 

CIVICUS (2026), https://monitor.civicus.org/country/serbia/.  

Commissioner  for  information  of  public  importance  and  personal  data  protection  (2026), annual 
poverenik.rs/images/stories/dokumentacija-
report 
nova/izvestajiPoverenika/2024/LATgod._izvestaj_2025.pdf 

2025, 

for 

Constitutional Court (2026), Written input from the Constitutional Court in the context of the country 
visit to Serbia .  

Council  of Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2025), Supervision  of  the  execution  of  judgments  and 
decisions  of  the European Court  of  Human  Rights,  19th  Annual  Report  of  the  Committee  of 
Ministers, https://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/annual-report-2025 

in  10 
Council  of Europe: Congress  of  Local  and  Regional  Authorities (2026), “Elections 
municipalities  of  Serbia:  violence-free  elections  and  even  playing  field  are  essential  to  build  trust, 
Congress  observers 
say”, https://www.coe.int/en/web/congress/-/elections-in-10-municipalities-of-
serbia-violence-free-elections-and-even-playing-field-are-essential-to-build-trust-congress-observers-
say  

Council  of Europe: Venice  Commission  (2021), Opinion  on  the  draft  constitutional  amendments  on 
the  judiciary  and  the  draft  constitutional  law  for  the  implementation  of  the  constitutional 
amendments (CDL-AD(2021)032).   

Council  of Europe:  Venice  Commission  &  OSCE/ODIHR  (2022), Joint  Opinion  of  the  Venice 
Commission  and  the  OSCE/ODIHR  on  the  constitutional  and  legal  framework  governing  the 
functioning  of  democratic institutions in  Serbia  -  Electoral  law  and  electoral  administration (CDL-
AD(2022)046).      

24 

 
(2023), 
Council  of Europe:  Venice  Commission 
three previous opinions on Judiciary (CDL-PI(2023)005).  

Information 

to 

the  Follow-up  on 

Council  of Europe: Venice  Commission  (2024), Opinion  on  the  draft  Law  on  the  Judicial Academy 
and  draft  amendments  to the  Law  on  Judges  and the  Law  on  the  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office (CDL-
AD(2024)036).  

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2026a) Urgent Opinion on the 28 January 2026 Amendments 
to Laws Governing the Judiciary and the Prosecution (CDL-PI(2026)007-e). 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2026b), Follow-up Opinion to the Urgent Opinion on the 28 
January  2026  Amendments  to  Laws  governing  the  Judiciary  and  the  Prosecution  (CDL-
AD(2026)017). 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2026c), Follow-Up Opinion to the Opinion on the Draft Law 
on the Judicial Academy (CDL-AD(2026)019-e). 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2026d).  Amended  articles  of  the  draft  law  on  the 
judicial  academy,  submitted  by  Serbia  to  the  Venice  Commission  on  4  June  2026  (CDL-
REF(2026)025), https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice-commission/-/cdf-ref-2026-025-e.  

CRTA (Center for  Research,  Transparency  and  Accountability) (2026),  Report on  the  Long-Term 
Observation  of  the  2026  Local  Elections https://crta.rs/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Report-on-the-
Long-Term-Observation-of-the-2026-Local-Elections-1.pdf  

Decision of the Serbian Supreme Court,  Kzz-OK 
https://www.slavkocuruvijafondacija.rs/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Kzz-OK-38-24-
2.4.1.21.1.2.3.2.pdf 

38/2024 

(13.10.2025) 

European Centre 
Freedom, https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/mapping-media-freedom.   

and  Media 

Freedom 

Press 

for 

(2026),  Mapping  Media 

European Commission (2025), 2025 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Serbia.  

European Court  of  Human  Rights  (2008),  Judgment  of  the European Court  of  Human  Rights  of  15 
January 2008, Kačapor v. Serbia, 2269/06.  

European Court  of  Human  Rights  (30 April  2025), Press  release,  Interim  measure  issued  in  sonic-
weapon 
case, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre-press#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-8218363-
11546489%22]}    

FATF  (2025), “Serbia:  Report  to  FATF  on  the  Misuse  of  AML/CFT  Standards  Against  Civil 
Society”, https://fatfplatform.org/news/serbia-report/  

Freedom 
Serbia, https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/freedom-world/2026.   

(2026), Freedom 

House 

the 

in 

World 

2026 

Report: 

GRECO (2022), Fifth Evaluation Report, Evaluation Report on Serbia on Preventing corruption and 
promoting  integrity  in  central  governments  (top  executive  functions)  and  law  enforcement 
agencies, https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/serbia.   

International  Press  Institute (2026a), “Serbia:  Coordinated  bot  attacks  on  Instagram  accounts  of 
independent  media  emerge  as  new  weapon  of  censorship”, https://ipi.media/serbia-coordinated-bot-
attacks-on-instagram-accounts-of-independent-media-emerge-as-new-weapon-of-censorship/.    

International  Press  Institute (2026b), “Serbia:  Justice  for  Slavko Ćuruvija remains  remote  despite 
damning Supreme Court ruling”, https://ipi.media/serbia-justice-for-slavko-curuvija-remains-remote-
despite-damning-supreme-court-ruling/bia:  Justice  for  Slavko  Ćuruvija  remains  remote  despite 
damning Supreme Court ruling – ipi.media  

Judges Association of Serbia (2026); Association of Prosecutors of Serbia (2026). 

25 

 
  
Member  of  Parliament  Marinika  Tepic  (2025),  Public  statement  of  17  December  2025, 
https://x.com/MarinikaTepic/status/2001357952234741856.  

National Anti-SLAPP Task Force (2026), SLAPP database, https://slapp.rs/en/  

judges: 

(2026a), Serbian 

N1 
inappropriate, https://n1info.rs/english/news/serbian-judges-constitutional-court-presidents-
comments-
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%20%E2%80%9Cthe%20sanction%20for,help%2C%20means%20a%20dismissal.%E2%80%9D    

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Court 

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changes/  

anti-terrorist 

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radical 

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26 

 
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27 

 
TV  Pink  (2025b),  HIT  TWIT  05/10/2025  -  President  Vučić  talks  about  the  coloured  revolution  and 
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28 

 
 
Annex II: Country visit to Serbia  

The Commission services held hybrid meetings in March 2026 with:  

•  A11 Initiative 
•  Agency for the Prevention of Corruption 
•  Anti-Corruption Council 
•  Anti-Corruption Unit of Department for Fight Against Organised Crime, Directorate 

of Criminalistics Police 

•  Appellate Court 
•  Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM) 
•  Asylum Protection Center 
•  Autonomous Women’s Center 
•  Basic Public Prosecution Office 
•  Belgrade Centre for Human Rights 
•  BIRN 
•  BIRODI 
•  Civic Initiatives 
•  Commissioner for Personal Data Protection and Access to Information of Public 
•  Constitutional Court 
•  CRTA 
•  Education Center UNS 
•  High Judicial Council 
•  High Prosecutorial Council 
•  Higher Court 
•  Higher Public Prosecution Office 

Importance 
Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia (NUNS) 
Independent Journalists' Association of Vojvodina (NDNV) 

• 
• 
•  Judges Association of Serbia 
•  Judicial Research Center 
•  KRIK 
•  Lawyers’ Association of Serbia 
•  Media Association 
•  Ministry of European Integration 
•  Ministry of Interior 
•  Ministry of Justice 
•  MODS 
•  Ombudsman 
•  Partners for Democratic Change Serbia 
•  Press Council 
•  Prosecutors Association of Serbia 
•  Public Prosecution Office for Organised Crime (POOC) 
•  Radio Television Serbia (RTS) 
•  Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) 
•  SHARE Foundation 
•  Slavko Curuvija Foundation 
•  Supreme Court 

29 

 
•  Supreme Public Prosecution Office 
•  Transparency Serbia 
•  YUCOM 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings: 

•  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
•  Civil Society Europe 
•  End FGM EU 
•  European Civic Forum 
•  European Partnership for Democracy 
•  Human Rights Watch 
• 
• 
•  Philea - Philanthropy Europe Association 
•  Transparency International EU  

ILGA-Europe 
International Federation for Human Rights 

30