COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2026 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Czechia Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2026 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2026-07-17
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Czechia, administrative transparency, corruption, democracy, freedom of the press, human rights, independence of the judiciary, pluralism in the media, rule of law, whistleblowing

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 17.7.2026  SWD(2026) 903 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2026 Rule of Law Report           Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Czechia Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2026 Rule of Law Report            The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2026) 900 final} - {SWD(2026) 901 final} - {SWD(2026) 902 final} - {SWD(2026) 904 final} - {SWD(2026) 905 final} - {SWD(2026) 906 final} - {SWD(2026) 907 final} - {SWD(2026) 908 final} - {SWD(2026) 909 final} - {SWD(2026) 910 final} - {SWD(2026) 911 final} - {SWD(2026) 912 final} - {SWD(2026) 913 final} - {SWD(2026) 914 final} - {SWD(2026) 915 final} - {SWD(2026) 916 final} - {SWD(2026) 917 final} - {SWD(2026) 918 final} - {SWD(2026) 919 final} - {SWD(2026) 920 final} - {SWD(2026) 921 final} - {SWD(2026) 922 final} - {SWD(2026) 923 final} - {SWD(2026) 924 final} - {SWD(2026) 925 final} - {SWD(2026) 926 final} - {SWD(2026) 927 final} - {SWD(2026) 928 final} - {SWD(2026) 929 final} - {SWD(2026) 930 final} - {SWD(2026) 931 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

In Czechia, the new two-instance disciplinary procedure for judges, prosecutors and bailiffs is 
reported  to  function  well.  As  of  1  January  2026,  establishing  judges’  salaries  reverted  to  a 
previous method, and debate is ongoing on the salaries of non-judicial staff. Amendments to 
the  judicial  map,  aiming  at  reducing  the  number  of  district  courts,  are  under  preparation. 
Efforts to digitalise the justice system continued to face delays, particularly the rollout of the 
e-file  system.  Amendments  to  the  Code  of  Administrative  Justice  aiming  to  improve 
efficiency of proceedings have given rise to discussion of their impact on procedural rights. 
The justice system continues to perform efficiently.   

The  implementation  of  the  2023-2026  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  is  being  finalised  as 
preparations  for  a  future  Strategy  begin.  The  number  of  corruption  investigations, 
prosecutions  and  convictions  remains  stable,  with  good  cooperation  between  relevant 
institutions. While the average length of proceedings continues to be an issue, some further 
steps were taken to improve procedural aspects and investigations and prosecutions continue, 
including  in  high-level  corruption  cases.  No  steps  were  taken  to  reinitiate  the  revision  of 
legislation on conflicts of interest, including as regards beneficial ownership. An Ethics Code 
for government members was adopted and technical work continues on assessing the rules on 
asset declarations and revolving doors. Implementation of the new legislation on lobbying is 
on track. The integrity framework for the Parliament was not taken further. New legislation 
on  political  party  financing  entered  into  force,  while  an  expansion  of  the  Supreme  Audit 
Office’s powers is  being  considered. Whistleblower protection system  continues to  operate, 
but  its  effectiveness  is  questioned  by  stakeholders.  Corruption  risks  in  public  procurement 
remain an important point of attention for the authorities.   

Draft legislation which would confer new powers on the media regulator and provide media 
companies with additional rights and responsibilities remains pending. A draft law presented 
by  the  government  which  aims  to  abolish  license  fees  for  public  service  media  has  raised 
concerns.  No  further  steps  have  been  taken  on  reforms  relating  to  transparency  of  media 
ownership. Journalists continue to face serious verbal threats and harassment.  

The  electronic  platform  for  drafting,  commenting  on  and  promulgating  legislation  is 
progressively  becoming  operational.  ‘Legislative  riders’  and  other  ways  of  limiting  public 
consultation  continue  to  impact  the  quality  of  legislative  process.  Implementation  of  the 
amendments  to  the  Ombudsman  Act  establishing  a  National  Human  Rights  Institution  is 
ongoing. While civic space remains favourable, civil society organisations reported funding 
cuts and a change in the narrative regarding their role.  

1 

 
 
 
 RECOMMENDATIONS 

Overall, based on the recommendations in  the 2025 Rule of Law Report, considering other 
developments  that  took  place  in  the  period  of  reference  and  in  addition  to  recalling  the 
relevant  commitments  made  under  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan,  the  Commission 
concludes the following:  

•  As  efforts  to  further  digitalise  the  justice  system  continued  to  face  delays,  it  is 
recommended to Czechia to advance the digitalisation of the justice system, in particular 
by putting into operation the electronic file system. 

•  Some further progress has been made on taking further measures to reduce the length of 
proceedings  and  ensure  independence  of  investigation  and  prosecution  in  high-level 
corruption cases as steps were taken to improve procedural aspects and investigations and 
prosecutions continue, including in high-level corruption cases. However, as the average 
length of such proceedings continues to be an issue, it is recommended to Czechia to take 
further  measures  to  reduce  the  length  of  proceedings  and  ensure  independence  of 
investigation and prosecution in high-level corruption cases, including by reforming the 
criminal procedure. 

•  No  progress  has  been  made  on  taking  further  measures  to  strengthen  the  integrity 
framework for all members of Parliament, as the integrity framework of Parliament was 
not taken further. As gaps in the rules on revolving doors remain for most public officials, 
it  is  recommended  to  Czechia  to  take  further  measures  to  strengthen  the  integrity 
framework, in particular by complementing the existing rules as regards revolving doors. 
•  No  progress  has  been  made  on  reinitiating  the  revision  of  legislation  on  conflicts  of 
interest, including as regards beneficial ownership as no steps were taken. Therefore, it is 
recommended to  Czechia to  reinitiate the revision of  legislation on conflicts  of  interest, 
including as regards beneficial ownership. 

•  As  the  use  of  legislative  procedures  circumventing  public  and  stakeholder  engagement, 
inter-departmental  review  and  impact  assessment  has  become  more  frequent,  it  is 
recommended  to  Czechia  to  take  measures  to  improve  transparency  of  the  legislative 
process  and  meaningful  consultation  of  stakeholders,  including  by  addressing  the 
frequent use of fast-track procedure and the practice of legislative riders. 

As regards the other 2025 recommendations, the Commission concludes that: 

•  No progress has been made on further reforms relating to transparency of information on 
media ownership given that draft legislation remains pending in parliament and no fully 
functional  transparency  register  has  been  formally  established.  Given  that  the  topics  of 
this  recommendation  are  covered  by  provisions  of  the  European  Media  Freedom  Act 
(EMFA), while the Rule of Law Report will continue to monitor significant developments 
and report on their impact, further follow-up will be ensured as part of the Commission’s 
support to Member States and enforcement of the EMFA. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM1  

Independence  

The  level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  in  Czechia  continues  to  be  high  among 
both the general public and companies. Overall, 70% of the general population and 60% of 
companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly or very good’ 
in  20262.  The  perceived  judicial  independence  among  the  general  public  has  increased  in 
comparison with 2025 (64%) and has significantly increased in comparison with 2022 (57%). 
The perceived judicial independence among companies has slightly decreased in comparison 
with 2025 (63%) and has increased in comparison with 2022 (55%).   

The  new  two-instance  disciplinary  procedure  for  judges,  prosecutors  and  bailiffs  is 
reported to function well. With the reform’s stated aim to enhance the principle of legality 
by introducing  a second instance, and the efficiency of disciplinary proceedings for judges, 
prosecutors,  and  bailiffs3,  High  Courts  are  functioning  as  the  first-instance  disciplinary 
bodies,  with  appeals  heard  by  the  Supreme  Court  and  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court4. 
This  reform  applies  to  cases  initiated  after  January  2025  and  established  a  ‘unifying 
disciplinary  panel’  at  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  for  ensuring  consistent  case  law5. 
Also, the deadline to file a disciplinary motion was extended from six to nine months6. The 
reform is part of the commitments under the Czech Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) and 
responds  also  to  a  GRECO  recommendation7.  Stakeholders’  views  continue  to  be  positive 
about  the  introduction  of  the  second  instance8,  although  they  consider  it  is  too  early  to 
evaluate the implementation of the reform. Since 1 January 2026, the limitation period after 
which the disciplinary liability of  a judge or a public prosecutor ceases  was extended  from 
three  to  five  years9.  As  regards  the  reform  of  the  public  prosecution  service,  the 
implementation is ongoing with progressive selection procedures for chief public prosecutors 
and is generally viewed positively by stakeholders10. 

1   An overview of the institutional framework for all four pillars can be found here.   
2   Figures 48 and 50, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard and Figures 51 and 53, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. The 
level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  is  categorised  as  follows:  very  low  (below  30%  of  respondents 
perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-
59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

3   Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 5.  
4   Section 3 para. 2 of the Act on proceedings in the cases of judges, prosecutors and bailiffs. The Supreme 
Court hears cases about judges, while the Supreme Administrative Court hears cases about Supreme Court 
judges, administrative judges (except for judges of the Supreme Administrative Court), public prosecutors 
and bailiffs. See also 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 3.  

5   Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 5. Other procedural novelties are for example the extension of 

the subjective time limit for filing a disciplinary petition from six to nine months. 

6   Section  9  of  Act  No  7/2002  Coll.,  “The  petitioner  must  file  a  motion  to  initiate  disciplinary  proceedings 
within  9  months  of  the  date  on  which  he  or  she  became  aware  of  the  facts  relating  to  the  disciplinary 
offense that are relevant to the filing of the motion.” 

7   Recovery and Resilience Plan: Reform 2 Strengthening the legislative framework and transparency in the 
areas  of  courts,  judges,  prosecutors  and  bailiffs,  component  4.3.  GRECO  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  – 
Evaluation  Report,  recommendation  ix,  introducing  the  possibility  for  judges  to  challenge  disciplinary 
decisions including for dismissal before a court. 

8   The first appeal case at the Supreme Court was heard on 18 March 2026. Country visit Czechia, Supreme 

Court, Union of Judges.  

9   Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 6. Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges.  
10   Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 5. Country visit Czechia, Office of the Prosecutor General and 

Union of Public Prosecutors. 

3 

 
 
 
Representatives of the judiciary reported an increasing number of public statements by 
politicians  concerning  the  status  of  the  judiciary,  including  by  criticising  individual 
judges and ongoing proceedings. Judicial stakeholders, including the Union of Judges and 
the  Supreme  Court,  reported  that  such  statements  have  become  more  frequent  compared  to 
previous years and expressed concerns that such statements risk undermining general trust in 
the  justice  system  and  may  create  a  perception  of  political  influence  over  the  courts11.  The 
statements  concern  the  status  of  the  judiciary  vis-à-vis  other  powers  in  general,  but  also 
concrete  ongoing  judicial  proceedings  and  the  judges  deciding  on  them12.  According  to 
European  standards,  while  criticising  judicial  decisions  is  a  normal  aspect  of  democratic 
discourse,  the  executive  and  legislative  powers  should  avoid  criticism  that  undermines  the 
independence of or public confidence in the judiciary13.  

Quality  

As of 1 January 2026, establishing judges’ salaries reverted to a previous method, and 
debate  is  ongoing  on  the  salaries  of  non-judicial  staff.  In  response  to  a  Constitutional 
Court ruling of May 2024, a law adopted in March 2025 reinstated, as of 1 January 2026, the 
prior method for calculating judicial salaries based on a multiplier14. However, for 2025, this 
law  introduced  a  concrete  nominal  value  for  judicial  salaries,  which  was  also  challenged 
before  general  courts  and  the  Constitutional  Court15.  The  Constitutional  Court  held  in 
October  2025  that  these  provisions  determining  judicial  salaries  for  2025  were  not  in  line 
with  the Constitution, and the Government  provided compensation to  the affected judges16. 
Judicial stakeholders welcomed that the provisions applicable as of January 2026 are now in 
line with the original calculation method17.In 2025, the Ministry of Justice made some efforts 
to  increase  the  budgetary  resources  for  the  salaries  of  support  staff18.  At  the  same  time, 
salaries  are  reported  as  still  not  keeping  pace  with  salaries  in  other  public  sector  positions, 
which is considered to affect the recruitment and retention of qualified staff in the judiciary 
and prosecution services19. 

11   Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges and Supreme Court. 
12   Country  visit  Czechia,  Union  of  Judges  and  Supreme  Court.  The  Supreme  Court  acknowledged  that  the 
judiciary  is  not  immune  from  criticism  but  stressed  that  it  should  be  expressed  through  appropriate 
channels, such as legal publications or academic commentary, and in a manner consistent with the dignity 
of  the  judicial  office.  Union  of  Judges  asked  for  restraint  in  comments  by  politicians.  See  also  Union  of 
Judges (2026).  

13   Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, para. 18. See 

also Venice Commission (2013), CDL-AD(2013)038, paras. 21-22. 

14   The  salary  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of  a  starting  amount  (triple  of  the  average  salary  in  the  country) 
modified according to the instance of the  court of prosecutorial office, length of relevant experience and, 
where  applicable,  the  exercise  of  a  managerial  position.  Czech  Government  (2026)  written  input,  p.  7. 
Constitutional Court, decision of 15 May 2024, Pl. ÚS 5/24. 

15   See also 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 4.  
16   Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 1 October 2025, Pl. ÚS 19/25. Country visit Czechia, Ministry of 

Justice, Supreme Court, Union of Judges and Supreme Administrative Court.  

17   The  rules  for  determining  judges’  remuneration  must  be  objective,  foreseeable,  but  also  stable  and 
transparent,  so as to exclude any arbitrary intervention by the legislature and the executive, and the same 
requirements  apply  to  any  measures  derogating  from  those  rules.  Judgment  of  the  CJEU,  joined  cases 
C-146/23, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and C-374/23, Adoreikė, para 56, paras. 65 et seq.  Stakeholders 
noted  that  further  changes  to the  regime  of  salaries  might be  under  consideration.  Country  visit  Czechia, 
Union of Judges, Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court. 

18   Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 7.  
19   Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges, Supreme Court.  
4 

 
 
 
Amendments to the judicial map, aiming at reducing the number of district courts, are 
under preparation.  The new Minister of Justice announced his  plan to  reform  the judicial 
map  by  the  end  of  2027,  which  would  include  merging  courts,  with  the  stated  aim  of 
improving efficiency and the use of resources for the judiciary20. The reform would not lead 
to  the  termination  of  any  judicial  posts21.  Stakeholders  acknowledged  that  limited  and 
rational  mergers of small  courts could be  appropriate in  specific cases and noted that more 
significant  changes  should  be  based  on  a  proper  analysis  of  staffing  needs  and  court 
workloads22. In the course of 2026, the Government will analyse the data collected in a study 
on staffing needs and will discuss it with the courts 23.  

Efforts to digitalise the justice system continued to face delays, particularly the rollout 
of  the  e-file  system.  Following  initiatives  under  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan24,  the 
Ministry of Justice has taken steps to develop different digitalisation tools25. However, many 
of the projects have been delayed or postponed26 and other outstanding issues have not been 
tackled27.  An  e-file  system  to  enable  parties  to  a  dispute  to  access  relevant  documents  has 
been  in  deployment  since  2008  and  faces  further  delays.  The  deployment  of  the  electronic 
system  for  the  public  prosecution  and  its  operation  also  depend  on  the  e-file  system28. 
Stakeholders also pointed to the lack of interoperability between the existing digital systems 
specific for different courts29 and the often incomplete or inconsistent publication of judicial 
decisions, despite this being a legal obligation30. Stakeholders emphasised that the prevailing 
low  level  of  digitalisation  of  the  justice  system  is  a  significant  challenge31,  resulting  in 
decreasing efficiency of the proceedings, with higher costs for citizens and the justice system, 
limited remote access and less transparency of judicial decisions32.  

Amendments  to  the  Code  of  Administrative  Justice  aiming  to  improve  efficiency  of 
proceedings have given rise to discussion of their impact on procedural rights. Through 
a reform adopted by Parliament in July 2025, several generally applicable provisions of the 
Code  of  Administrative  Justice  were  amended33  to  introduce  the  possibility  to  review  a 
binding  decision  by  an  administrative  authority  and  additional  rights,  such  as  the  right  for 
costs  to  be  paid  by  the  losing  party.  The  shortening  of  certain  procedural  deadlines  and 
widening  the  standing  of  certain  parties  to  the  proceedings  aim  at  enhancing  the  efficiency 

ibidem. 

20   Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice. 
21  
22   Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges and Supreme Court. 
23   Czech  Government  (2026),  written  input,  p.  7.  Country  visit  Czechia,  Ministry  of  Justice  and  Supreme 
Court. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 6. The project is entitled “Strengthening the efficiency of the 
judicial  system  in  the  Czech  Republic”  supported  by  the  Technical  Support  Instrument  of  the  European 
Commission and aimed at determining the staffing needs at individual courts. 

ibidem. 

24   Such as videoconferencing or Justice Portal. 
25   Czech Government (2026), written input, pp. 8-9. 
26  
27   League of Human Rights (2025); Glopolis (2026), written input, p. 9. 
28   Country visit Czechia, Office of the Prosecutor General. 
29   League of Human Rights (2025), p. 4, Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges.  
30   League of Human Rights (2025), p. 4, STEM-Network for the Protection of Democracy, written input, p. 

10; Glopolis, written input, p. 9. 

31   Office of the Prosecutor General, written input, p. 10; Czech Bar Association, written input, pp. 6 and 17, 
STEM-Network for the Protection of Democracy, written input, p. 10, Glopolis, written input, p. 9, Country 
visit Czechia, Union of Judges, Union of Prosecutors, Supreme Court.  

32   League  of  Human  Rights  (2025),  Czech  Bar  Association  (2026),  written  input,  p.  17,  Glopolis  (2026), 

written input, p. 9. 
33   Act No. 314/2025 Coll. 

5 

 
 
 
and  quality  of  the  administrative  procedure34.  However,  some  stakeholders  fear  that  these 
changes could discourage civil associations or citizens from taking part in the proceedings35 
and may adversely affect some vulnerable groups36. Another set of draft amendments to the 
Code  of  Administrative  Justice  was  tabled  by  a  parliamentary  group  in  December  2025, 
limiting the participation of civil society and further changing the scope of judicial review37. 
The increase in court fees for administrative justice matters originally envisaged for adoption 
in 2025 has not been proposed in legislation so far38. 

Efficiency  

The  justice  system  continues  to  perform  efficiently.  The  disposition  time  in  civil  and 
commercial  cases  at  first  instance  remained  at  126  days  in  2024,  among  the  lowest  in  the 
EU39. While the clearance rate for administrative cases at first instance further decreased to 
105% in 2024 (111% in 2023), the administrative courts kept resolving more cases than they 
received  and  the  estimated  time  needed  to  resolve  such  cases  continued  to  improve, 
decreasing to 202 days in 2024 (212 in 2023). The Ministry of Justice is intending to prepare 
the final  analysis of the labour intensity of the courts in  2026, including the discussions on 
the results with the representatives of courts. In more narrow categories, the average length of 
proceedings regarding bribery at first instance courts in 2024 decreased to 380 days (541 in 
2023) but remained among the longest in the EU40.  

II. 

ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

The  perception  among  experts,  citizens  and  business  executives  is  that  the  level  of 
corruption  in  the  public  sector  remains  relatively  high.  In  the  2025  Corruption 
Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Czechia scores 59/100 and ranks 14th in the 
European Union and 39th globally41. This perception has improved over the past five years42. 
The  2026  Special  Eurobarometer  on  Corruption  shows  that  79%  of  respondents  consider 
corruption  widespread  in  their  country  (EU  average  71%)  and  24%  of  respondents  feel 
personally  affected  by  corruption  in  their  daily  lives  (EU  average  30%).  As  regards 
businesses, 75% of companies consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 65%) and 
45%  consider  that  corruption  is  a  problem  when  doing  business  (EU  average  37%). 
Furthermore, 35% of respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter 
people  from  corrupt  practices  (EU  average  38%),  while  16%  of  companies  believe  that 
people  and  businesses  caught  for  bribing  a  senior  official  are  appropriately  punished  (EU 
average 31%)43.  

The  implementation  of  the  2023-2026  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  is  being  finalised  as 
preparations  for  a  future  Strategy  begin.  The  action  plan  covering  2025-2026  is  being 

34   Explanatory memorandum to Act No. 314/2025 Coll, p. 73. 
35   ENNHRI (2026), written input; Country visit Czechia, Glopolis. 
36   Country visit Czechia, Czech Bar Association and Glopolis. 
37   Print No. 67/0, draft amendment to the Construction Act; ENNHRI (2026), written input. 
38   Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 6. See also 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 6.  
39    Figures 1-14, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
40    Figure 21, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
41   The level of perceived corruption is categorised as follows: low (above 79); relatively low (between 79-60), 

relatively high (between 59-50), high (below 50). 

42   In 2021 the score was 54, while, in 2025, the score is 59. The score significantly increases/decreases when 
it  changes  more  than  five  points;  improves/deteriorates  (changes  between  4-5  points);  is  relatively  stable 
(changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years. 

43   Data from Special Eurobarometer 573 (2026) and Flash Eurobarometer 582 (2026). 

6 

 
 
 
implemented and an evaluation shows that, with some important exceptions, the fulfilment of 
most tasks is on track44. Preparations for a new Strategy starting in 2027 have begun45. Some 
civil society stakeholders called for a more comprehensive and longer-term Anti-Corruption 
Strategy,  deeming  the  current  one  insufficient  to  improve  the  overall  anti-corruption 
framework46.  The  Anti-Corruption  Council,  an  advisory  body  to  the  government  which 
includes civil society, met for the first time under the new Government in April 202647. The 
Conflict  of  Interest  and  Corruption  Prevention  Department  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice  is 
responsible for the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy, processing of asset and 
interest  declarations  and  whistleblowing  reports.  It  continues  to  report  a  lack  of  resources 
despite  an  increase  in  tasks,  including  the  implementation  of  the  new  lobbying  legislation, 
leading  it  to  focus  only  on  core  tasks  and  legal  deadlines48.  A  strategy  to  fight  organised 
crime  was  adopted  in  June  2025  and  takes  into  account  the  link  with  corruption,  including 
through  further  encouraging  joint  cooperation  between  customs,  police  and  tax  authorities 
against economic crime49. 

The number of corruption investigations, prosecutions and convictions remains stable, 
with  good  cooperation between  relevant  institutions.  In  2025  the  authorities  opened  243 
corruption  investigations  (154  in  2024)  and  prosecuted  173  individuals  for  corruption 
offences  (166  individuals  in  2024)50.  A  total  of  162  persons  were  brought  to  court  (141  in 
2024)51, while 148 were convicted for corruption in 2025 (99 persons in 2024). 2025 saw 12 
acquittals  for  corruption  (13  in  2024).  Most  cases  related  to  the  offences  of  bribery52. 
Cooperation between the relevant law enforcement institutions remains good. The Ministry of 
Interior  and  the  National  Agency  against  Organised  Crime  (NCOZ)  remain  committed  to 
improving  the  investigative  capacities  of  the  latter53.  As  regards  foreign  bribery,  updated 
statistics are not available. It continues to be the case that only a limited number of cases of 
foreign  bribery  are  detected  and  prosecuted  despite  the  legal  framework  being  in  place54. 
Cooperation  between  the  national  authorities  with  the  European  Public  Prosecutors  Office 

44  Czech  Government  (2026),  written  input,  p.  10  and  Ministry  of  Justice  (2026b).  Notably,  the  three 
remaining tasks in the first pillar of the strategy on “an effective and independent public authority” have not 
been  implemented.  This  includes  in  particular  further  work  on  GRECO’s  recommendations  and  the 
introduction of a Code of Ethics for civil servants.  

45    Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice. 
46   Transparency International Czechia (2025a). 
47  Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice. 
48   No extra resources have been planned so far to be assigned to the responsible department in the Ministry of 
Justice, although an internal reorganisation of posts lead to some additional people in the department. Some 
civil  society  organisations  consider  this  lack  of  resources  puts  at  risk  the  broader  implementation  of  the 
anti-corruption policy and the Anti-Corruption Council already issued a recommendation on this topic to the 
government in 2023. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, pp. 7-8 and Country visit Czechia, Transparency 
International/Lobbio and Ministry of Justice. 
49  Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 15. 
50   Ministry of Interior and National Agency against Organised Crime (NCOZ) (2026) and Public Prosecution 

Service (2026). 

51   This includes indictments, motions for punishments, and agreements on guilt and punishment. 
52   Public Prosecution Service (2026). 
53   For  example,  development  of  the  uniform  analytical  tool  -  a  digital  solution  to  input  data  and  analysis 
uncovered during investigations in a uniform and standardised manner - for investigators continues Czech 
Government  (2026),  written  input,  p.  2  and  Country  visit  Czechia,  National  Agency  against  Organised 
Crime (NCOZ). 

54   As noted previously, in 2024 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 12. 

7 

 
 
 
was reported as good55. Of its open cases in 2025, the EPPO reported that six were related to 
corruption (4.41% of its total open cases)56. 

While  the  average  length  of  proceedings  continues  to  be  an  issue,  some  further  steps 
were taken to improve procedural aspects and investigations and prosecutions continue, 
including  in  high-level  corruption  cases57.  Investigations,  prosecutions  and  adjudications 
continue  in  cases  of  high-level  corruption  involving  both  former  and  current  high-level 
officials  and  additional  cases  were  detected58.  A  targeted  reform  of  the  Criminal  Code  and 
Criminal Procedure Code entered into force on 1 January 2026. It is expected to improve a 
number of procedural aspects relevant also to high-level corruption cases, making it easier to 
discontinue criminal proceedings where the evidence is insufficient to support an indictment, 
and  simplify  certain  procedural  steps  including  in  case  of  proceedings  against  shell 
companies.  Legal  persons  would  also  be  able  to  be  put  on  probation  during  proceedings  if 
they have taken steps to remedy the damage or institute compliance programmes59. Concerns 
persist however over the average length of judicial proceedings in high-level corruption cases 
at all stages of the process60, although the Government and public prosecution emphasise that 
there are important differences depending on the type of offence61. The process for lifting the 
immunities  of  high-level  persons,  such  as  ministers  or  members  of  Parliament,  under 
investigation  has  been  flagged  by  civil  society  as  a  barrier  preventing  investigations  from 
moving  forward62.  There  were  no  reports  of  undue  interference  into  high-level  corruption 
cases63.  On  the  basis  of  these  developments,  there  has  been  some  further  progress  on  the 
recommendation.  

There was no progress on the recommendation to reinitiate the revision of legislation on 
conflicts of interest, including as regards beneficial ownership64.  A revised version of the 
legislation was proposed in the form of a bill by a Member of Parliament and approved by the 
Parliament.  However,  the  Constitutional  Court’s decision  of  December  2024  annulled  it  on 
procedural grounds65. Since then, no new initiatives have been taken by either the former or 

55   EPPO (2026), pp. 13-14. 
56   EPPO (2026a), Annual Report 2025, p. 21. 
57   The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended to Czechia to “Take further measures to reduce the length of 
proceedings  and  ensure  independence  of  investigation  and  prosecution  in  high-level  corruption  cases.” 
Some progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025 and 2024, and no progress in 2023. 
58   Examples  of  high-level  corruption  cases  include  the  Dozimetr  procurement  scandal  linked  to  Prague 
municipal transport, the Brno municipal apartments sales case, and corruption cases in the IKEM and Motol 
hospitals and cities of Olomouc and Pardubice. See 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 8.  

59   Czech Government (2026), written input, pp. 2-3 and Ministry of Justice (2026). 
60   The average length of bribery cases before first instance criminal courts was fourth longest in the EU (380 
days  on  average  in  2024).  Figure  21,  2026  EU  Justice  Scoreboard.  See  also  2024  Rule  of  Law  report, 
Czechia, pp. 11-12 and 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 8. 

61    Ministry of Justice (2026) and  Public Prosecution Service (2026), written input. According to data of the 
prosecution,  the  average  length  of  proceedings  from  the  start  of  investigation  to  the  final  verdict  ranged 
between  70  to  772  days  in  2025,  depending  on  the  corruption  offence,  although  this  data  is  not 
disaggregated between regular and high-level cases (compared to 614 to 854 days in 2024). 

62  Country visit Czechia, Transparency International/Lobbio and Transparency International Czechia (2026), 

written input, pp. 17-18. 

63   Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges, Union of Prosecutors, Public Prosecution Office and Transparency 

International/Lobbio. 

64  The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended Czechia to “Reinitiate the revision of legislation on conflicts 

of interest, including as regards beneficial ownership.” 

65   The  2023  Rule  of  Law  report  recommended  to  Czechia  to  “[c]omplete  the  revision  of  legislation  on 
conflicts  of  interest,  including  by  clarifying  the  definition  of  beneficial  ownership.”  In  2024,  this 
8 

 
 
 
current  government  to  address  the  issue66  and  no  broader  reform  of  the  legislation  is 
planned67.  In  June  2026,  Members  of  Parliament  tabled  a  draft  revision  of  the  conflicts  of 
interest  legislation68.  The  draft  includes  revisions  replacing  the  concept  of  a  controlling 
person  with  that  of  a  beneficial  owner.  The  proposed  draft  would  narrow  the  scope  of  the 
blanket  ban  on  subsidies  and  public  procurement  contracts  for  companies  controlled  by 
members  of  government,  by  allowing  such  subsidies  and  contracts  where  they  are  not 
provided by a ministry under the direct responsibility of the relevant government member69. 
In  its  opinion  on  the  proposal,  the  government  asked  for  further  legislative  and  technical 
amendments to the proposal, as well as an expert discussion on it, including on the proposed 
changes to the ban on subsidies and public procurement contracts70. An intense public debate 
on the enforcement of existing legislation on conflicts of interest and its overall efficiency, in 
particular  as  regards  controls  on  specific  business  interests  of  high-level  officials  is  taking 
place71.  Exchanges  between  the  Government  and  the  European  Commission  on  the  overall 
audit  and  control  system  remain  ongoing.  As  the  outstanding  concerns  have  not  yet  been 
addressed, no progress has been made on the recommendation.  

The  Government  adopted  an  Ethics  Code  for  members  of  the  Government  in  March 
2026.  The  Code  reiterates  existing  legal  obligations  such  as  the  importance  of  avoiding 
conflicts of interest, refraining from criminal conduct such as bribery or abuse of office and 
avoidance  of  gifts72.  Civil  society  expressed  doubts  regarding  future  compliance  with  and 
enforcement of the code given its non-binding nature and its lack of anchoring in the broader 
legislative framework73. As regards ethics in law enforcement, the police  continues work to 
improve  its  ethics  and  integrity  standards74.  Civil  society  highlights  that  the  repeal  and 
replacement  of  the  Civil  Service  Act  raises  concerns  over  the  effectiveness  of  the  integrity 
system for civil servants, including their independence and impartiality in the management of 
public funds75.  

Technical  work  continues  on  assessing  the  rules  on  asset  declarations  and  revolving 
doors.  A  planned  study  on  revolving  doors  under  the  2025-2026  action  plan  of  the  Anti-
Corruption Strategy76 is expected to be launched by the Ministry of Justice in 2026. The lack 
of broader rules on revolving doors for all categories of high-level officials has been flagged 
as  a  gap  in  the  legal  framework77.  A  political  decision  on  possible  revisions  to  the  asset 

recommendation was considered fulfilled on the basis of the adoption of these legislative revisions. In 2025, 
following the ruling of the Constitutional Court, the recommendation was re-introduced.  

66  Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 5. 
67  As also indicated by civil society. Country visit Czechia, Transparency International/Lobbio. 
68  Parliamentary Bill No. 221. 
69 
70  Czech Government (2026c). 
71   The  debate  was  conducted  widely,  primarily  through  the  media.  See  for  example  Seznam  Zpravy  (2026) 

ibidem. 

and CT (2026). See also Glopolis (2026), written input, p. 17. 

72    Czech Government (2026a). 
73  As the code is not created through binding legislation nor institutionally anchored, it has been considered by 
civil society to be a political initiative. Country visit Czechia, Transparency International/Lobbio. See also 
the statement of Transparency International in the media, Forum24 (2026). 

74  Country  visit  Czechia,  Ministry  of  Interior  and  National  Agency  against  Organised  Crime  (NCOZ).  See 

also GRECO (2026a), recommendation xvii. 

75     See  Pillars  on  the  Other  institutional  issues  related  to  checks  and  balances.  Transparency  International 

Czechia (2026a) and Trade Union of Authorities and Organizations (2026), written input.  

76  2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 9. 
77   Including for members of Parliament – see below. 2023 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 14. 

9 

 
 
 
disclosure  rule  following  a  2024  study78  remains  pending79.  As  regards  the  verification  of 
asset  declarations,  the  Ministry  of  Justice  established  779  failures  to  declare  assets  in  2025 
(down from 1 277 cases reported in 2024 and 2097 cases reported in 2023)80. It conducted 42 
in-depth  verifications  of  declarations  filled  by  public  officials  leading  to  23  cases  of 
administrative  proceedings  against  public  officials  at  municipal  level81.  Civil  society 
continues to criticise the decentralised control of declarations, which risks - in their view - to 
result in uneven implementation of the legislation82. 

The new law on lobbying entered into force in July 2025, and its implementation is on 
track.  By  the  end  of  2025,  555  lobbyists  and  2 066  lobbied  persons  were  registered  in  the 
transparency  register83.  The  first  deadline  to  register  declarations  of  lobbying  was  on  30 
January  2026.  The  Ministry  of  Justice  took  steps  to  raise  awareness  among  registered 
lobbyists on their reporting obligations in cases of erroneous or missing declarations84. Both 
Government and stakeholders point to the importance of allocating sufficient resources in the 
relevant  department  in  the  Ministry  of  Justice  to  ensure  effective  implementation85.  The 
legislation remains broadly supported by stakeholders86.  

There  was  no  progress  to  improve  the  integrity  framework  for  the  Parliament, 
particularly  by  complementing  rules  on  revolving  doors87.  Rules  on  revolving  doors 
remain unchanged and a comprehensive framework is lacking in relation to gifts and benefits 
for members of Parliament88. The Chamber of Deputies only has voluntary ethics rules for its 
members,  while  the  Senate  remains  opposed  to  any  such  ethical  rules89.  Therefore,  no 
progress was made on the implementation of the recommendation. 

New legislation on political party financing entered into force, while an expansion of the 
Supreme  Audit  Office’s  mandate  is  still  being  considered.  New  legislation  on  the 
financing of electoral campaigns came into effect on 1 January 202690. The law consolidates 

78   2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 9. 
79   Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice. 
80   85  cases  concerned  failure  to  declare  at  the  beginning  of  term,  620  involved  annual  declarations  and  73 

cases concerned the end of term declarations. Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 13. 
ibidem. 

81  
82   Country  visit  Czechia,  Transparency  International/Lobbio.  As  control  is  generally  carried  out  at  the  local 
level by small municipal offices where the relevant official has his main residence. See also 2025 Rule of 
Law Report, Czechia, p. 9. 

83  Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 11. 
84    Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 11 and Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice. 
85   Czech  Government 

input,  p.  10  and  Country  visit  Czechia,  Transparency 

(2026),  written 

International/Lobbio and Ministry of Justice.  

86  Country visit Czechia, Glopolis/Transparency International/Lobbio and Business associations and Glopolis 
(2026), pp. 17-18. Conversely, a number of professional associations, including the Bar Association, have 
requested  an  amendment  to  the  law  to  exempt  them  from  registering  as  a  lobbyist,  due  to  perceived 
administrative burden concerns. Czech Bar Association (2026), written input, p. 21. 

87   The 2025 Rule of Law report recommended to Czechia to “Take further measures to strengthen the integrity 
framework  for  all  members  of  Parliament,  in  particular  by  complementing  the  existing  rules  as  regards 
revolving doors.”. No progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025 and some progress 
in 2024. 

88   Czech  Government  (2026),  written  input,  p.  3.  See  also  2025  Rule  of  Law  report,  Czechia,  p.  10.  The 
recommendations from GRECO to adopt a Code of Ethics in both chambers of Parliament likewise remain 
only  partially  fulfilled.  GRECO  (2023),  recommendation  ii,  paras.  14-18  and  GRECO  (2026b), 
recommendation ii, paras 18-26 and GRECO (2026c), recommendation ii, paras 17-21. 
89   Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice and 2024 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 15. 
90  Czech Government (2026), written input, pp. 11-12. See also 2025 Rule of Law report, Czechia, p. 10. 

10 

 
 
 
the existing framework on political party financing and introduces some changes, such as an 
extension  on  the  ban  on  the  use  of  public  resources  in  electoral  campaigns,  clearer 
definitions,  monitoring  of  financing,  and  tightening  rules  for  accepting  gifts  and  in-kind 
donations from legal entities91. A reform of the Supreme Audit Office (SAO)92 is included in 
the policy statement of the new Government93. Debates on this draft reform, which requires 
amendment  of  the  constitution,  are  ongoing  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies94.  As  in  previous 
attempts to reform the Office, it would seek to grant powers to the SAO to audit the Czech 
Radio and the Czech Television95.  

The  whistleblower  protection  system  continues  to  operate,  but  its  effectiveness  is 
questioned by stakeholders.  Implementation and awareness-raising of the 2023 legislation 
on whistleblower protection by the Ministry of Justice continued96. The Government reports 
that out of the 238 whistleblower reports received in 202597, employees of legal entities filed 
a  total  of  18  reports  (6  in  2024),  other  citizens  filed  a  total  of  15  reports  (13  in  2024)  and 
there  were  7  anonymous  reports  (the  same  as  in  2024),  with  a  link  to  corruption98.  The 
Government halted funding for a civil society-led anti-corruption programme which includes 
support  for  the  Whistleblower  Centre  informing  citizens  of  their  rights99.  Overall,  civil 
society  assesses  whistleblower  protection  as  weak  in  practice,  stating  that  potential 
whistleblowers do not come forward due to a lack of trust in the system100.  

Corruption risks in public procurement remain an important point of attention for the 
authorities.  As  regards  public  procurement,  businesses’  attitudes  towards  corruption  in  the 
EU  show  that  28%  of  companies  in  Czechia  (EU  average  30%)  think  that  corruption  has 
prevented them from winning a public tender or a public procurement contract in practice in 
the  last  three  years101.  57%  of  businesses  perceive  the  level  of  independence  of  the  public 
procurement  review  body  (The  Office  for  the  Protection  of  Competition)  as  very  or  fairly 
good,  which  has  significantly  increased  in  comparison  with  2025  (43%)102.  The  Single 
Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard on access to public procurement in Czechia reports 
41%  of  single  bids  for  2025  (EU  average  27%)103.  Public  procurement  is  seen  as  a  main 
corruption risk area, including by law enforcement, particularly in cases of alleged collusion 
between  a  bidder  and  a  contracting  authority104.  The  National  Agency  against  Organised 
Crime  (NCOZ)  and  the  Office  for  the  Protection  of  Competition  work  closely  together to 

91  Czech Government (2026), written input, pp. 11-12. 
92   The  law  was  broadly  welcomed  by  stakeholders  and  was  included  in  the  Anti-Corruption  Plan.  See  also 

2025 Rule of Law report, Czechia, p. 10. 
93  Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 4. 
94  Supreme Audit Office (2026), written input. 
95   Supervision of local governments, which was also included in previously proposed amendments, would not 

be included. Supreme Audit Office (2026), written input. 

96   Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 13. 
97  For  example:  accepting  bribes,  bribery,  manipulation  in  public  procurement,  public  tenders,  and  public 

auction. 

98  Ministry of Interior and National Agency against Organised Crime (NCOZ) (2026). 
99     Transparency International Czechia (2026b). 
100   Glopolis (2026), written input, pp. 11-12 and Oziveni (2026), written input, pp. 2-3. 
101   Flash  Eurobarometer  582  on  Businesses’  attitudes  towards  corruption  in  the  EU  (2026).  This  is  2 

percentage points below the EU average. 
102   Figure 59, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
103   2025 Single Market Scoreboard. 
104   Country  visit  Czechia,  Ministry  of  Interior  and  National  Agency  against  Organised  Crime  (NCOZ).  See 

also 2025 Rule of Law report, Czechia, pp. 11-12. 

11 

 
 
 
  
address this issue105. A proposed reform of the Office for the Protection of Competition was 
not  approved  by  the  previous  Government,  despite  having  been  included  in  the  Anti-
Corruption action plan106. This was criticised by civil society107. The construction, health and 
defence  sectors  have  also  been  flagged  by  stakeholders,  including  the  NCOZ  and  the 
prosecution, as being at particular risk of corruption given the large amount of public funds at 
stake in those sectors, and they remain monitored by law enforcement108. 

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM  

Draft  legislation  which  would  confer  new  powers  on  the  media  regulator  and  provide 
media companies with additional rights and responsibilities remains pending.  The draft 
Law on Media Services remains pending. With a view to alignment with the European Media 
Freedom Act, the draft law aims to clarify the role of the media regulator when scrutinising 
market  concentrations,  give  it  a  monitoring  and  oversight  role  to  ensure  that  public  bodies 
publish the amounts allocated for the purpose of state advertising, and expand the definition 
of media service providers to those providing online services. The Media Pluralism Monitor 
2026 confirms its low-risk score in relation to the independence of the media regulator109. In 
August 2025, the main media associations and public service media broadcasters adopted a 
self-regulatory  Code  of  Conduct  addressing  editorial  independence,  transparency  and 
professional  standards,  which  was  followed  up  with  a  ten-point  Memorandum  in  January 
2026110.  

A  draft  law  presented  by  the  new  Government  which  would  abolish  license  fees  for 
public  service  media  has  raised  concerns.  Last  year’s  report  noted  that  the  2025 
amendments  to  the Act on Czech Television and the Act  on Czech Radio  and other related 
acts  had  positively  reformed  the  financing  system  to  ensure  sustainability  of  public  service 
media. On 15 June 2026, the new Government agreed on a draft law for the amendment of 
the Act on Czech TV and the Act on Czech Radio which would, if adopted, abolish licensing 
fees for public service media, leading to circa 15% less revenue overall as of 2027 compared 
to revenues for 2026. Concerns that these changes will seriously imperil the independence of 
public service media and capacity to carry out its tasks, have been voiced by stakeholders and 
prompted  mass  protests  in  the  country  from  March  to  May  2026111.  The  Media  Pluralism 
Monitor  (MPM)  for  Czechia  considers  that  public  service  media  has  come  under  renewed 
political pressure, resulting in intensified efforts to influence editorial direction and personnel 
decisions,  raising  its  risk  level  to  medium-low112.  Alongside  other  aspects  of  the  media 
market,  industry  stakeholders  emphasise  that  diminishing  advertising  revenues,  the  lack  of 

105  Country  visit  Czechia,  Ministry  of  Interior  and  National  Agency  against  Organised  Crime  (NCOZ)  and 

Office for the Protection of Competition (2026) written input, p. 1.  

106  Oziveni (2026), written input, p. 1 and Office for the Protection of Competition (2026). See also 2025 Rule 

of Law report, Czechia, pp. 11-12. 

107   Transparency International Czechia (2026c) and Transparency International Czechia (2026d).  
108  Country visit Czechia, Office of the Prosecutor General, Union of Prosecutors, Office for the Protection of 

Competition (2026) and Transparency International Czechia (2026e). 

109   Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), pp. 15-16.  
110   Country visit Czechia, Ministry for Culture and Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting, Council for 
Radio  and  Television  Broadcasting  (2026),  written  input,  p.  1.  The  Memorandum  seeks  to  replicate 
provisions of the European Media Freedom Act which can be implemented via self-regulation.     

111   European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) (2026).  
112  Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), p. 27. 

12 

 
 
 
compensation for the use of media content published on online platforms, and the impact of 
Artificial Intelligence have become major challenges for the viability of media companies113. 

Pending  the  adoption  of  draft  legislation,  significant  challenges  persist  in  relation  to 
transparency  of  media  ownership114.  The  draft  Law  on  Media  Services  is  expected  to 
designate an authority responsible for the maintenance and monitoring of a media ownership 
transparency database.  It also  contains  an  exemption from  limits  to  access to  the beneficial 
owner  database  for  journalistic  and  other  legitimate  purposes115.  However,  pending  the 
enactment  of  this  legislation,  no  fully  functional  transparency  register  has  been  formally 
established116. The MPM 2026 has increased its risk level from high-risk to very high risk for 
this area in the light of the fact that the Government has limited public online access to the 
register  to  authorities  and  selected  professionals,  while,  pending  the  enactment  of  the  draft 
law, all other individuals must demonstrate legitimate interest through court procedures,117 . 
On this basis, no further progress has been made in relation to the recommendation.  

Journalists continue to face serious verbal threats and harassment. Stakeholders continue 
to point to the prevalence of online harassment and threats against journalists as an ongoing 
phenomenon  in  the  country118.  The  Safe  Journalism  Platform  –  which  establishes  a  non-
governmental  online  environment  where  journalists  can  report  attacks  and  where  they  can 
access  confidential  consultation  and  legal  assistance  –  was  set  up  in  September  2025119.  A 
draft  amendment  to  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  which  would  provide  additional 
protection in terms of journalistic sources and confidential communications, remains pending. 
Stakeholders point to the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) by 
politicians  as  an  ongoing  issue  of  concern120.  A  draft  law  transposing  the  anti-SLAPP 
Directive  which  would  cover  both  cross-border  and  domestic  SLAPP  cases  is  currently 
before  Parliament.  The  MPM  2026  confirms  its  medium-low  risk  analysis  for  this  area 
highlighting the fact that working conditions continue to be a concern and that the frequency 
of online attacks appears to be increasing121. The Council of Europe Platform to promote the 
protection  of  journalism  and  the  safety  of  journalists  received  two  new  alerts  since  the 
publication  of  the  last  rule  of  law  report,  concerning  the  smearing  of  a  journalist  and  the 
planned  reforms  to  public  service  media  mentioned  above  122.  The  Media  Freedom  Rapid 
Response (MFRR) mechanism flagged 27 alerts, the large majority of which concern cases of 
insults,  delegitimization,  threats  of  SLAPP  cases  by  politicians  or  political  ads  targeting 
journalists123. 

113  Country visit Czechia, Czech Association of Public Broadcasters. 
114   The  2025  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Czechia  to  “[p]rogress  with  further  reforms  relating  to 
transparency  of  information  on  media  ownership.”.  No  progress  was  previously  assessed  on  this 
recommendation in 2025, 2024, and some progress in 2023. 

115  Such  as  by  civil  society  organizations  and  non-governmental  non-profit  legal  entities  engaged  in  the 
prevention  of,  or  the  fight  against,  money  laundering  and  related  criminal  activities.  Czech  Government 
(2026d). 

116   Country  visit  Czechia,  Council  for  Radio  and  Television  Broadcasting,  Czech  Syndicate  of  Journalists, 

Lobbio and ECPMF.  

117   Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), p. 18. 
118   Czech Fund for Independent Journalism (2026), written input, p. 1. 
119   Bezpečná žurnalistika (2026).  
120   Country visit Czechia, Czech Syndicate of Journalists and  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 

(ECPMF).  

121   Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), pp. 13-15. 
122   Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists (2026).  
123    Media Freedom Rapid Response (2026). 

13 

 
 
 
IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

The  electronic  platform  for  drafting,  commenting  on  and  promulgating  legislation  is 
progressively becoming operational. The rollout of the eLegislation platform began in 2024 
for  international  law  instruments,  since  2025  its  use  has  been  mandatory  for  drafting  of 
implementing  regulations,  and  since  2026  for  new  ordinary  and  constitutional  laws,  the 
Constitutional Court decisions, and the Senate legislation.124. Deployment of the platform for 
amendments  to  ordinary  and  constitutional  laws  has  been  postponed  until  2027,  with  an 
expected extension to  2029125. Methodological  materials  for participation  in  the lawmaking 
process were adopted in 2025 and pilot testing was carried out126. Stakeholders welcome the 
methodology127  and  underline  that  its  actual  impact  will  depend  on  its  implementation  by 
specific  governmental  bodies128,  while  stressing  the  importance  of  tools  for  monitoring  the 
compliance of draft laws with fundamental rights and international standards129. 

‘Legislative  riders’  and  other  ways  of  limiting  public  consultation  continue  to  impact 
the  quality  of  the  legislative  process.  The  use  of  accelerated  legislative  procedures,  often 
without  justification,  has  become  more  frequent130.  At  the  same  time  the  number  of 
parliamentary  proposals  which  circumvent  public  and  stakeholder  engagement,  inter-
departmental  review  and  impact  assessment,  has  increased  as  well131.  According  to  the 
Government,  the  relatively  high  proportion  of  acts  approved  in  fast-track  procedures  might 
have  been  linked  to  the  end  of  the  legislative  term132.  European  standards  stipulate  that 
legislatures should avoid resorting to expedited adoption of legal acts on a regular basis and 
the  legislative  procedure  needs  to  be  transparent,  inclusive  and  democratic,  allowing  for  a 
meaningful  public  debate133.  Stakeholders  raised  concerns  as  regards  the  application  of 
techniques  circumventing  public  participation  in  cases  of  acts  of  significant  importance134. 
These  include  the  draft  law  on  State  Employees  which  aims  to  remove  civil  service  from 
public  law  and  place  it  under  a  private-law  regime,  easing  the  conditions  for  dismissal  of 
public employees, including independent regulatory bodies135.  

More than half of companies surveyed in Czechia express confidence in the effectiveness 
of investment protection. 64% of companies are very or fairly confident that investments are 
protected by law and courts, a figure which has slightly increased in comparison with 2025 
(61%)136. As regards authorities relevant for economic operators, 55% of companies perceive 
the level of independence of the national competition authority (The Office for the Protection 
of  Competition)  as  very  or  fairly  good,  a  figure  which  has  significantly  increased  in 

124   Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 19. 
125   ibidem. 
126   Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 19. 
127   Glopolis (2026), written input, p. 16. 
128   Country visit Czechia, Office of the Government (civil society section) and Glopolis.  
129   Glopolis (2026), written input, p. 17. 
130   In 2025, out of 99 acts, 27 were adopted in a fast-track procedure. 
131   In 2025, out of 99 acts, 14 were adopted based on the proposal of the members of Parliament. 
132   Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 20. 
133   Venice Commission (2025), para. 34. 
134   ENNHRI,  written  input;  Glopolis,  written  input,  p.  16;  STEM-Network  for  the  Protection  of  Democracy, 
written input, p. 16; Country visit Czechia, Změna k lepšímu, Office of the Public Defender of Rights. 

135   Other examples comprise the Construction Act, Code of Administrative Justice, or Asylum Act. 
136   Figures  52  and  53,  2026  EU  Justice  Scoreboard.  26%  and  23%  of  the  surveyed  investors  respectively 
perceive concerns about quality, efficiency or independence of justice and frequent changes in legislation or 
concerns about the quality of the law-making process as a reason for the lack of confidence in investment 
protection.  

14 

 
 
 
comparison  with  2025  (48%)137.  The  Supreme  Administrative  Court  has  jurisdiction  in 
several  business-related  cases,  including  in  cases  related  to  public  procurement,  public 
concessions, public contracts and economic regulation. A number of judicial mechanisms to 
improve  efficiency  are  available  in  these  cases,  including  the  possibility  to  apply  interim 
measures, joint examination of similar cases and the consolidation of multiple appeals138. 

Implementation  of  the  amendments  to  the  Ombudsman  Act  establishing  a  National 
Human Rights Institution is  ongoing.  Since July 2025, the Office of the Public Defender 
also  comprises  the  mandate  of  the  National  Human  Rights  Institution  (NHRI).  In  addition, 
the position of a Children’s Ombudsperson was created and the process for the election of the 
Public  Defender  has  been  amended  to  include  civil  society  representatives139.  Stakeholders 
welcome these changes140. The Office of the Public Defender progresses with the adaptation 
to the new setup and the application for the GANHRI accreditation is envisaged for 2026141. 
At  the  same  time,  stakeholders  highlighted  uncertainty  as  regards  the  budget  for  the  new 
institutional  setup  as  more  resources  will  be  needed  to  cover  the  new  competencies  of  the 
Office142. 

On 1 January 2026, Czech Republic had 9 leading judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights pending implementation, the same as the previous year143. At that time, 
Czech  Republic’s  rate  of  leading  judgments  from  the  past  10  years  that  had  been 
implemented  was  at  62%  (compared  to  56%  in  2025;  38%  remained  pending),  and  the 
average time that the judgments had been pending implementation was 2 years and 9 months 
(compared  to  2  years  and  8  months  in  2025)144.  The  oldest  leading  judgment,  pending 
implementation for more than 18 years145. As regards the respect of payment deadlines, on 31 
December 2025 there were 2 cases in total awaiting confirmation of payments (compared to 1 
in 2024)146. By 17 June 2026, the number of leading judgments pending implementation had 
increased to 10147.  

While civic space remains favourable, civil society organisations reported funding cuts 
and a change in the narrative regarding their role. Civic space is considered by Civicus as 
‘open’148. Stakeholders reported on a noticeable change of narrative as regards the role of the 
CSOs,  including  increased  labelling  of  CSOs  by  Government  representatives  as  “political 

137   Figure 60, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
138   Figures 66 and 67, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. The data presented reflects exclusively the mechanisms in 
place at the level of the highest administrative jurisdictions; the same or other mechanisms may be in place 
at lower instance administrative courts. 

139  In June 2026, the Parliament elected the new Public Defender.  The Parliament's decision did not take into 
account  the  recommendation  of  the  evaluating  commission  as  regards  the  candidates  for  the  Public 
Defender and the Childrens' ombudsperson issued in the beginning of 2026.  

140   STEM-Network for the Protection of Democracy, written input, p. 17. 
141   Country visit Czechia, Office of the Public Defender of Rights. 
142   Country  visit  Czechia,  Office  of  the  Government,  Office  of  the  Public  Defender  of  Rights,  Glopolis, 

STEM-Network for the Protection of Democracy. 

143   For an explanation of the supervision process, see the website of the Council of Europe.   
144   All figures calculated by the European Implementation Network (EIN) and based on the number of cases 
that are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2026. EIN (2026), written input, p. 3. 
145   Judgment of the ECtHR, 57325/00, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, pending implementation since 

2007.  

146   Council of Europe (2026), p. 162.   
147   Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC). 
148   Rating given by Civicus, Czechia. Czechia’s score is 87/100. Ratings are on a five-category scale defined 

as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed and closed. 

15 

 
 
 
agents”, which has according to them, impacted public trust in the CSOs sector149. As per its 
Programme Statement, the Government is aiming at increasing the transparency of the CSO 
sector  and  introducing  a  register  for  all  CSOs  receiving  public  funds  150,  which  prompted 
concerns  from  stakeholders  as  regards  unnecessary  information  disclosure,  additional 
administrative  burden  and  disproportionate  sanctions  in  case  of  non-compliance151.  Public 
funding for the CSO sector has been considerably reduced, with some domains of CSO action 
losing access to public funding altogether152. 

149   ENNHRI (2026), written input; Glopolis (2026), written input, p. 19; STEM-Network for the Protection of 
Democracy (2026), written input,  p. 20, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2026), written 
input, p. 4 

150   Czech Government (2026b), written input, p. 4. 
151   Transparency International and Glopolis (2026), additional written input. 
152    This  is  the  case  for  example  for  CSOs  operating  in  the area  of  environment  or foreign  aid.  Country  visit 

Czechia, Office of the Government. 

16 

 
 
 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2026 Rule of Law Report 
can 
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2026-rule-law-report-targeted-
stakeholder-consultation_en. 

found 

be 

at 

Bezpečná žurnalistika (2026), 20 April 2026, https://bezpecnazurnalistika.cz/.  

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2026), Media Pluralism Monitor 2026. 

Civicus, Monitor tracking civic space – Czechia, https://monitor.civicus.org/country/czech-republic/. 

Constitutional Court (2024), Judgement of 15 May 2024 on the reduction in the salary base to 2.822 
2024, 
times 
https://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/Tiskova_mluvci/Publikovane_nalezy/2024/pl-5-
24_AN_vc._disentu_3.pdf. 

monthly 

average 

wage 

the 

for 

Constitutional Court (2025), Judgement No. Pl. ÚS 19/25 of 1 October 2025 on the salary restrictions 
for judges for 2025, Pl_ÚS_19_25_nález_odlišné_stanovisko_AN.pdf. 

Construction 
https://www.psp.cz/sqw/text/orig2.sqw?idd=266772. 

(1998), 

Draft 

Act 

amendment 

Print 

No. 

67/0, 

Council  for  Radio  and  Television  Broadcasting  (2026),  Input  from  the  Council  for  Radio  and 
Television Broadcasting for the 2026 Rule of Law Report.  

Council of Europe (2026), Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists. 

Council of Europe (2026), Supervision of the execution of judgments decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights – 19th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers – 2025, https://rm.coe.int/2025-
annual-report/48802b1633.   

of 

database 
Council 
https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/#{%22sort%22:[%22escpublicationdate%20descending%22],%22escdctype
%22:[%22FOND%22,%22Conclusion%22,%22Ob%22]}. 

Council 

Europe, 

Online 

the 

of 

of 

Europe, 

CT  (2026),  Experts  must  assess  if  Babiš  has  resolved  the  conflict  of  interest  said  the  President,  24 
January 
https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/clanek/domaci/jestli-babis-vyresil-stret-zajmu-musi-
posoudit-odbornici-rekl-prezident-369610. 

2026, 

Czech  Bar  Association  (2026),  Input  from  the  Czech  Bar  Association  for  the  2026  Rule  of  Law 
Report.  

Czech  Fund  for  Independent  Journalism  (2026),  Input  from  the  Czech  Fund  for  Independent 
Journalism for the 2026 Rule of Law Report.  

Czech Government (2026), Input from the Czech Government for the 2026 Rule of Law Report.  

Czech  Government 
https://vlada.gov.cz/cz/media-centrum/dulezite-dokumenty/eticky-kodex-vlady-225554/    

(2026a),  Ethical  Code 

for  government  members,  2  March  2026, 

Czech  Government  (2026b),  Programme  Statement  of  the  Government  of  the  Czech  Republic, 
programove-prohlaseni-vlady.pdf. 

Czech  Government  (2026c),  Opinion  of  the  Government  on  the  Proposal  by  deputies  Radek 
Vondráček, David Pražák, Marie Pošarová and Filip Turk to issue an act amending Act No 159/2006 
on conflicts of interest, as amended, and other related acts (Chamber of Deputies Document No 221), 
29 June 2026, https://odok.gov.cz/portal/services/download/attachment/KORNDVHJ2CF1/  

Czech Government (2026d), additional written input.    

Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2026),  Flash  Eurobarometer  582  on  businesses’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU and selected candidate countries.  

17 

 
 
 
Directorate-General  for  Communication  (2026),  Special  Eurobarometer  573  on  citizens’  attitudes 
toward corruption in the EU. 

ENNHRI (2026), Input from ENNHRI for the 2026 Rule of Law Report.  

European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026). Czechia: International organisations warn over 
Czech  public  service  media  funding  reform.  26  March  2026.  https://www.ecpmf.eu/czechia-public-
service-media-funding-warning/. 

European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2026). 

European Commission (2023), 2023 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Czechia. 

European Commission (2024), 2024 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Czechia. 

European Commission (2025), 2025 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Czechia. 

European Commission (2025), 2025 Single Market Scoreboard.  

European Commission (2026), 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European Commission (2025), 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European Court of Human Rights,  Judgement of 13 November 2007, D.H. and Others v. the Czech 
Republic, 57325/00, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-72317%22]}. 

European Implementation Network (2026), Input from the European Implementation Network for the 
2026 Rule of Law Report.  

European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  (EPPO)  (2026),  Input  from  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s 
Office for the 2026 Rule of Law Report. 

European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) (2026a), Annual Report 2025.  

Forum24 (2026), “We can hardly expect Babis to follow it” says Transparency International Czechia 
on the ethical code for government members, 6 March 2026, https://www.forum24.cz/tezko-muzeme-
ocekavat-ze-se-jim-bude-babis-ridit-vzkazuje-transparency-international-ke-kodexu-vlady. 

Glopolis (2026), Input from Glopolis to the 2026 Rule of Law Report.  

(2016), 

GRECO 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000
016806c319b. 

Evaluation 

Evaluation 

Fourth 

Round 

– 

report, 

GRECO  (2023),  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  2nd  interim  Compliance  Report,  16  June  2023, 
https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-
of/1680ab9d3f. 

GRECO (2026a), Fifth Evaluation Round – Compliance Report – Public Summary, Czechia, 1 June 
2026, https://rm.coe.int/grecorc5-2025-25-cze-sum-en/48802bfe17. 

GRECO  (2026b),  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  3rd  interim  Compliance  Report,  29  April  2026, 
https://rm.coe.int/grecorc4-2024-18-final-eng-3rd-interim-czech-republic-pub/48802b8d66. 

GRECO  (2026c),  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  addendum  to  the  2nd  Compliance  Report,  29  April 
https://rm.coe.int/grecorc4-2026-2-final-eng-add-to-the-2nd-compliance-report-czechia-
2026, 
pub/48802b8d82. 

League  of  Human  Rights  (2025),  Digitalisation  Delayed,  Justice  Denied?  https://llp.cz/wp-
content/uploads/ENG_Report.pdf. 

Media Freedom Rapid Response (2026) Monitor, https://www.mfrr.eu/monitor/.  

18 

 
 
Ministry of Justice (2026b), Evaluation of the implementation of the measures referred to. 

Office  for  the  Protection  of  Competition  (2026),  Input  from  the  Office  for  the  Protection  of 
Competition for the 2026 Rule of Law Report. 

Office of the Prosecutor General (2026), Input from the Office of the Prosecutor General for the 2026 
Rule of Law Report.  

Oziveni (2026), Input from Oziveni to 2026 Rule of Law Report.  

Seznam Zpravy (2026), The Ministry is covering up who stopped questions about Babiš's conflict of 
interest,  12  April  2026,  https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/clanek/domaci-kauzy-ministerstvo-tutla-kdo-
zarazil-dotazy-na-babisuv-stret-zajmu-303616. 

STEM-Network  for  the  Protection  of  Democracy  (2026),  Input  from  the  STEM-Network  for  the 
Protection of Democracy for the 2026 Rule of Law Report.  

The  Action  Plan  against  Corruption  2025  –  2026 
https://korupce.cz/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Zhodnoceni-plneni-opatreni-uvedenych-v-Akcnim-
planu-boje-proti-korupci-na-roky-2025-a-2026-za-rok-2025.pdf. 

the  year  2025,  March  2026, 

for 

Transparency  International  Czechia  (2025a),  The  former  Fiala-government  did  not  make  enough 
systemic 
2025, 
https://www.transparency.cz/byvala-fialova-vlada-neudelala-potrebne-systemove-a-legislativni-
zmeny-omezujici-korupci-v-cesku/. 

17  December 

corruption, 

legislative 

changes 

combat 

and 

to 

Transparency International Czechia (2026a) The government of Andrej Babiš is proposing a new law 
on  the civil service,  which  will jeopardize  the  independence of the  state  administration,  23 January 
https://www.transparency.cz/vlada-andreje-babise-navrhuje-novy-zakon-o-statnich-
2026, 
zamestnancich-ktery-ohrozi-nezavisly-vykon-statni-spravy/. 

Transparency  International  Czechia  (2026b),  Minister  Tejc  ends  corruption  prevention  program,  20 
February  2026,  https://www.transparency.cz/ministr-tejc-skrtl-program-prevence-korupce-ten-po-
dvou-dekadach-zanika-a-s-nim-i-statem-podporovana-protikorupcni-pravni-pomoc/. 

Transparency  International  Czechia  (2026c),  Chairman  of  the  Office  for  Protection  of  Competition 
Mlsna will have a key decision to make on the Metro D project for 30 billion crowns, 4 March 2026,  
https://www.transparency.cz/predseda-uohs-mlsna-bude-mit-na-stole-klicove-rozhodnuti-o-projektu-
metra- d-za-30-miliard-korun/. 

Transparency International Czechia (2026d), TI warns against the possible re-election of Petr Mlsna 
to the head of the Office for Protection of Competition and calls for a transparent selection procedure, 
3  March  2026,  https://www.transparency.cz/ti-varuje-pred-moznym-znovuzvolenim-petra-mlsny-do-
cela-uohs-a-pozaduje-transparentni-vyberove-rizeni/. 

Transparency International Czechia (2026e), The government is cutting anti-corruption advice while 
legislation,  23  February  2026,  https://www.transparency.cz/vlada-
enforcing  “pro-corruption” 
omezuje-protikorupcni-poradenstvi-ruku-v-ruce-s-prosazovanim-prokorupcni-legislativy/.  

Union  of  Judges  (2026),  Statement  of  the  Council  of  the  Union  of  Judges (Prohlášení  Republikové 
rady SU ČR), https://www.soudci.cz/zpravy-a-stanoviska/pohledy-a-nazory/2130. 

Venice  Commission  (2010),  CM/Rec(2010)12  Recommendation  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the 
Council of Europe, https://search.coe.int/cm?i=09000016805afb78 

Venice Commission (2013), CDL-AD(2013)038, Opinion on the Legislation on Defamation in Italy, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice-commission/-/cdl-ad-2013-038-e. 

Venice 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2025)002-e. 

CDL-AD(2025)002, 

Commission 

(2025), 

Rule 

Law 

of 

Checklist, 

19 

 
 
 
Annex II: Country visit to Czechia 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in March 2026 with: 

•  Administration of the Parliament (replies received in writing) 
•  Anti-Corruption Council of the Government 
•  Association of Small and Medium Enterprises 
•  Association of Private Broadcasters 
•  Constitutional Court 
•  Czech Bar Association 
•  Czech Syndicate of Journalists 
•  Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting 
•  Endowment for Independent Journalism (replies received in writing) 
•  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
•  League of Human Rights 
•  Lobbio 
•  Ministry of Culture 
•  Ministry of Interior 
•  Ministry of Justice 
•  National Agency against Organized Crime  
•  NeoN/Glopolis 
•  Network for the Protection of Democracy/STEM 
•  Office for the Protection of Competition (replies received in writing) 
•  Office for the Supervision of the Finances of Political Parties and Movements (replies 

received in writing) 

•  Office of the Government (civil society section) 
•  Office of the Prosecutor General 
•  Office of the Public Defender of Rights  
•  Supreme Administrative Court  
•  Supreme Audit Office (replies received in writing) 
•  Supreme Court 
•  Transparency International Czech Republic 
•  Union of Judges 
•  Union of Prosecutors 
•  Změna k lepšímu 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

•  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
•  Civil Society Europe 
•  End FGM EU 
•  European Civic Forum 
•  European Partnership for Democracy 
•  Human Rights Watch 
• 

ILGA-Europe 

20 

 
 
 
 
• 
International Federation for Human Rights 
•  Philea - Philanthropy Europe Association 
•  Transparency International EU 

21