COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EVALUATION of Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 98/2013
Date: 2026-07-17
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: application of EU law, chemical product, dangerous substance, exchange of information, explosive, illicit trade, import (EU), supply chain, terrorism, trade restriction

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 17.7.2026  SWD(2026) 241 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  EVALUATION  of Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 {SWD(2026) 242 final}  
 
 
 
 
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

EVALUATION 

of 

Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 June 2019 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 

Table of contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 4 

Purpose and scope of the evaluation ........................................................................................... 4 

Methodological approach ............................................................................................................ 4 

2.  WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION? ....................................... 6 

2.1 

Description of the intervention and its objectives .......................................................... 6 

2.2 Point(s) of comparison ........................................................................................................ 12 

3.  HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD? ....................... 14 

Current state of play .................................................................................................................. 14 

EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART) ....................................................................... 22 
4. 
4.1.  TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE INTERVENTION SUCCESSFUL AND WHY? .......................... 22 
4.2.  HOW DID THE EU INTERVENTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE AND TO WHOM? .................... 45 
4.3.  IS THE INTERVENTION STILL RELEVANT? .............................................................................. 48 
5.  WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED? ................................................. 51 
5.1.  CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................. 51 
5.2.  LESSONS LEARNED ........................................................................................................................ 54 
ANNEX I: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION............................................................................................. 56 
ANNEX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED ................................................... 58 

ANNEX III. EVALUATION MATRIX AND, WHERE RELEVANT, DETAILS ON ANSWERS 

TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS (BY CRITERION) ............................................................. 62 

ANNEX IV. OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND COSTS AND TABLE ON SIMPLIFICATION 

AND BURDEN REDUCTION ........................................................................................................... 88 
ANNEX V. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT ............................................. 95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Glossary 

Term or abbreviation 

Meaning or definition 

ANFO  

CBRN 

Ammonium nitrate / fuel oil 

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 

DG HOME 

Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 

DSA 

EEA 

EFTA 

FTE 

GDPR 

HME 

NACE 

NCA 

NCP 

REACH 

Digital Service Act 

European Economic Area 

European Free Trade Association 

Full-time equivalent 

General Data Protection Regulation – Regulation (EU) 
2016/679  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council  of  27 April  2016  on  the  protection  of  natural 
persons  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data 
and  on  the  free  movement  of  such  data,  and  repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC 

Home-made explosive 

la  Communauté 

Nomenclature  statistique  des  activités  économiques 
[Statistical 
dans 
classification  of  economic  activities  in  the  European 
Community] 

européenne 

National competent authority 

National contact point 

(EC)  No 1907/2006 

the 
Regulation 
Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation  and Restriction 
of Chemicals 

concerning 

The Regulation 

Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament 
and  of  the  Council  of  20 June  2019  on  the  marketing 
and use of explosives precursors  

RSB 

SCP 

SME 

TATP 

TE-SAT 

Regulatory Scrutiny Board 

Standing Committee on Precursors 

Small and medium-sized enterprise 

Triacetone triperoxide 

Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 

 
 
TFEU 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 
on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives  precursors1  (hereinafter  ‘the  Explosives  Precursors 
Regulation’  or  ‘the  Regulation’)  establishes  harmonised  rules  concerning  the  making 
available, introduction, possession  and use of substances or mixtures that could  be misused 
for  the  illicit  manufacture  of  explosives,  with  a  view  to  limiting  the  availability  of  those 
substances  or  mixtures  to  members  of  the  general  public,  and  with  a  view  to  ensuring  the 
appropriate reporting of suspicious transactions throughout the supply chain. Such substances 
are  called  ‘explosives  precursors’.  Article 114  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European  Union  (TFEU)  on  the  approximation  of  laws  provides  the  legal  basis  for  the 
Regulation. 

Purpose and scope of the evaluation 

In accordance with Article 21 of the Regulation, the Commission is obliged to carry out an 
evaluation2 and to  present  a report on the main  findings to  the European  Parliament, to  the 
Council  and  to  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  by  2 February  2026.  In  line 
with the Better Regulation Guidelines and Toolbox3, the evaluation looks into the following 
criteria:  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence,  relevance,  EU  added  value  and  impacts  on 
fundamental  rights  and  freedoms.  It  covers  the  period  from  entry  into  application,  on 
1 February 2021, to September 2025. 

The  geographical  scope  is  the  European  Economic  Area  (EEA),  which  means  the  27  EU 
Member States and Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway. 

During the period under evaluation no delegated act – as provided for under Articles 15, 16 
and 17 of the Regulation – has been initiated or adopted by the Commission. 

Methodological approach 

This  staff  working  document  builds  on  desk  research,  including  Commission  studies, 
academic literature, legal texts and grey literature, and on various stakeholder consultations, 
involving  relevant  market  participants,  authorities  and  members  of  the  public.  It  also  uses 
input  from  the  monitoring  programme  established  by  the  Regulation,  reports  from  Europol 
and  discussions  by  the  Standing  Committee  on  Precursors.  The  Commission  started  the 
evaluation (and impact assessment) process with a call for evidence, launched in July 2024, 

1 Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the marketing 
and use of explosives precursors, amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) 
No 98/2013 (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1148/oj). 

2  This  evaluation  has  been  conducted  in  the  context  of  an  evaluation  and  impact  assessment  run  in  parallel 

(‘back to back’). However, this staff working document concerns only the evaluation. 

3  European  Commission,  Better  Regulation  Guidelines,  2021;  European  Commission,  Better  Regulation 

Toolbox 2023. 

4 

 
 
which  aimed  to  inform  the  public  and  stakeholders  about  the  evaluation  (and  impact 
assessment) and to gather their feedback on the initiative. 

The evaluation (and impact assessment) was supported by a study carried out for DG HOME 
by  a  research  team  led  by  ICF  (in  collaboration  with  Milieu,  WSP  and  RAND)  between 
October 2024 and October 2025. Most of the data for the evaluation were collected between 
December  2024  and  May  2025  (although  information  which  became  available  up  to 
September 2025 has also been included). The study ran concurrently  with the 36th, 37th and 
38th  meetings  of  the  Standing  Committee  on  Precursors,  during  which  presentations  were 
given and discussions held on the evaluation (and impact assessment) of the Regulation under 
DG HOME’s chairmanship and with the research team in attendance. 

This staff working document takes into account not only the study’s findings, but also other 
relevant information not covered by the study. Due to the limited amount of data available, it 
is  not  possible  to  substantiate  all  conclusions  quantitatively.  These  shortcomings  were 
mitigated,  to  the  extent  possible,  by  using  qualitative  information.  As  only  limited 
information was available through desk research, the findings rely heavily on the stakeholder 
consultations, which reflect participating stakeholders’ experiences and perspectives. 

It is important to note that precise information and data on the use of explosives precursors 
(precise  substances,  source  of  diversion,  etc.)  in  the  manufacture  of  home-made  explosives 
(HMEs) used or attempted to be used in terrorist attacks are confidential. Even exchanges of 
information  between  (law  enforcement)  authorities  are  affected  by  this  practice.  Such 
limitation is justified in order, on the one hand, to avoid inspiring similar attacks and, on the 
other, to protect the existing good cooperation between authorities and the private sector. 

The  market  analysis  has  been  carried  out  for  each  substance  separately.  Analysing  the 
different substances  jointly  would not  have produced meaningful insights as  there are huge 
differences in production, sales and trade data between them. For instance, the annual sales of 
hexamine in the EU is 8 600 tonnes while that of sulphuric acid is 10 000 000 tonnes (based 
on data of Eurostat).   

The  cost  assessment  presented  under  the  efficiency  criterion  is  based  on  very  limited  data 
from  cost  templates,  interviews  and  the  targeted  survey.  It  does  not  fully  represent 
stakeholders’  costs  associated  with  the  Regulation.  This  shortcoming  was  mitigated  by 
triangulating  information  from  different  sources  and  validating  findings  in  focus  group 
meetings and validation workshops with the relevant stakeholders. 

A  detailed  description  of  the  methodology  and  main  sources  of  information  used  for  this 
evaluation is provided in Annex II. 

5 

 
 
2.  WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION? 

2.1 Description of the intervention and its objectives 

The  Regulation  is  designed  to  control  the  availability  and  use  of  explosives  precursors.  Its 
primary  objective  is  to  prevent  the  misuse  of  these  chemicals  for  the  illicit  manufacture  of 
explosives,  often  referred  to  as  home-made  explosives  (HMEs)  by  terrorists  and  criminals. 
Such HMEs were used in terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, Brussels in 2016, Manchester in 
2017 and Lyon in 2019. 

The  manufacture  of  HMEs  is  possible  even  for  people  without  expert  knowledge  of 
chemistry, in particular because of the wide availability of recipes and instruction videos on 
the internet (including the darknet)4. Experts also warn that the growing adoption of artificial 
intelligence  –  including  large  language  models  –  could  further  facilitate  the  production  of 
HMEs by individuals lacking chemical expertise5. 

The  Regulation  strengthens  the  EU’s  counterterrorism  agenda6  and  the  European  internal 
security strategy (‘ProtectEU’)7 by reducing vulnerabilities that can be exploited by terrorists 
and criminals, in this case by denying them the means to carry out attacks with HMEs. 

The Regulation also has a single market objective: by harmonising rules at EU level, it seeks 
to address previously divergent national restrictions and controls which were causing barriers 
to legitimate trade within the EU and impeding the functioning of the internal market. 

The Regulation strengthened the system of controls and monitoring of explosives precursors 
of Regulation (EU) No 98/2013, which was established in 2013, in order to ensure sufficient 
levels  of  public  security  and  addressed  the  continuously  high  and  evolving  threat  posed  by 
HMEs8. Given the scale of the revision needed, Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 was replaced by 
Regulation (EU) 2019/1148. 

4 See for instance the article ‘The Future of Terrorist Use of Improvised Explosive Devices: Getting in Front of 
an  Evolving  Threat’  by  Austin  C.  Doctor  and  Sam  Hunter,  CTC  Sentinel,  December  2023,  Volume  16, 
Issue  12,  page  41:  “Improvised  explosive  devices  are  easy  to  make,  difficult  to  combat,  and  cause 
significant  harm  and  disruption.”  and  the  Report ‘An  examination  of  the  precursor  chemicals  used  in  the 
manufacture  of  explosive  compositions  found  within  Improvised  Explosive  Devices  (IEDs),  Action  on 
Armed Violence (2021) on page 4: “The internet provides ready access to technology and instructions on 
how to use it” 

5 For instance presentation by Europol at the Conference – Global Perspectives on Explosives Precursors, 16-17 

October 2023, Madrid 

6 ProtectEU: Agenda to prevent and counter terrorism, Brussels, 26.2.2026, COM(2026) 101 final. 

7 ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy, Strasbourg, 1.4.2025, COM(2025) 148 final. 

8 European Commission (2018), Commission staff working document, Impact assessment accompanying the 
document proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the marketing and 
use of explosives precursors, amending Annex XVII to Regulation(EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing 

6 

 
 
 
The  Regulation  covers  a  total  of  18  chemical  substances.  They  are  broken  down  into  two 
categories:  nine  restricted  explosives  precursors  (listed  in  Annex  I  to  the  Regulation)9  and 
nine  reportable  explosives  precursors  (listed  in  Annex  II  to  the  Regulation).  Together,  they 
are defined as regulated explosives precursors. Explosives precursors are not only the (pure) 
chemical substances but also mixtures that contain them. These mixtures can be intermediate 
chemicals  (i.e.  substances  produced  during  a  chemical  reaction  that  are  used  as  a  stepping 
stone  to  create  a  final  product)  used  in  the  chemical  industry  or  in  other  industries 
(pyrotechnics, civil explosives, paints, automotive, textiles, etc.). They can also be finalised 
products (detergents, unblockers, fertilisers, etc.) used by companies and private individuals 
for professional and non-professional purposes. 

Regulated explosives precursors 

Annex I – Restricted explosives precursors 

Annex II – Reportable explosives precursors 

- Nitric acid 

- Hydrogen peroxide 

- Sulphuric acid 

- Nitromethane 

- Ammonium nitrate 

- Potassium chlorate 

- Hexamine 

- Acetone 

- Potassium nitrate 

- Sodium nitrate 

- Calcium nitrate 

- Calcium ammonium nitrate 

- Potassium perchlorate 

- Magnesium powders 

- Sodium chlorate 

- Magnesium nitrate hexahydrate 

- Sodium perchlorate 

- Aluminium powders 

The Regulation currently does not include any provisions on criteria or on a methodology to 
be used to add or remove substances to the annexes to the Regulation. This was also not the 
case for its predecessor legislation, namely Regulation (EU) No 98/2013, which was in place 
until  2021.  Consequently,  the  addition  of  three  substances  in  2016  through  Commission 
Delegated  Regulations  was  made  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  further  to  proposals  from  Member 

Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors (SWD(2018) 104 final). 
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=SWD:2018:104:FIN. 

9  The  restrictions  are  applicable  only  above  certain  concentration  limits  (e.g.  hydrogen peroxide  above  12%). 
Under  that  concentration  limit  members  of  the  public  are  still  able  to  buy,  import,  possess  or  use  these 
chemicals, mixtures or products without any restriction. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
States. The main justification for the additions was that these substances had been used in the 
illegal manufacture of explosives in and outside the EU. 

To achieve its security objective, the Regulation has two main strands: 

1)  Limiting the availability of explosives precursors to members of the public 

The Regulation restricts the import of explosives precursors and their sale to – and their use 
and possession by – members of the public. These chemicals (and mixtures and final products 
containing them) are thus banned for the public. However, EU Member States may establish 
a licensing system which allows certain restricted explosives to be bought, imported, used or 
possessed by the public10. This allows the public to buy, under certain conditions, hydrogen 
peroxide (up to 35%), for example, which is used by hunters to clean and whiten the bones of 
animal skulls, or nitromethane (up to 100%), which is used as fuel in remote-controlled cars. 

Eight EU Member States currently have such a licensing system. The other 19 EU Member 
States and the three EEA and EFTA States apply the total ban. 

2)  Ensuring  appropriate  reporting  of  suspicious  activity  to  the  authorities 

throughout the supply chain 

All  actors  (producers,  wholesalers,  retailers,  end  users,  etc.)  along  the  supply  chain  of 
regulated  explosives  precursors11  are  obliged  to  report  suspicious  transactions,  including 
significant  disappearances  and  thefts,  to  the  authorities  of  the  EU  Member  States  within 
24 hours of discovery. Moreover, members of the public who have been granted a licence for 
restricted  explosives  precursors  are  obliged  to  report  significant  disappearances  and  thefts. 
Member  States  are  obliged  to  set  up  dedicated  ‘national  contact  points’  to  this  end  which 
should be reachable 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In most Member States the national 
contact points are within the national police or counterterrorism departments. 

The concrete follow-up that national authorities give to the notifications of suspicious activity 
(analysis, investigations, sharing with other authorities or with other EU Member States, etc.) 
is outside the scope of the Regulation. 

To achieve this overall security objective, four specific objectives can be identified: 

•  Improve the functioning of the single market 

In order to ensure the free movement of explosives precursors, under the Regulation, 
Member  States  must  not  prohibit,  restrict  or  impede  the  making  available  of  a 

10  This  is  currently  the  case  for  four  substances,  namely  nitric  acid,  hydrogen  peroxide,  sulphuric  acid  and 

nitromethane, and even then, there is a concentration limit (e.g. hydrogen peroxide above 35%). 

11 It is important to emphasise that the reporting obligation applies not only to reportable explosives precursors, 
but  also  to  restricted  explosives  precursors.  Some  stakeholders  therefore  suggest  renaming  these  two 
categories of explosives precursors to avoid misinterpretation. 

8 

 
 
regulated  explosives  precursor  with  a  view  to  preventing  the  illicit  manufacture  of 
explosives. 

•  Restrict availability and improve detection 

- Limit the availability of precursors to the general public 

Restricted  explosives  precursors  are  substances  listed  in  Annex  I  to  the  Regulation 
that  exceed  the  concentration  limits  set  in  column  2  of  the  table  in  that  annex, 
including  mixtures  in  which  those  substances  are  present  in  concentrations  higher 
than the applicable limit value. As explained above, they must not be made available 
to – or introduced, possessed or used by – members of the public unless they have a 
licence. 

- Enhance detection of misuse and suspicious activity along the supply chain 

For  the  purpose  of  preventing  and  detecting  the  illicit  manufacture  of  explosives, 
economic  operators  and  online  marketplaces  are  obliged  to  report  suspicious 
transactions concerning regulated explosives precursors within 24 hours to dedicated 
national  contact  points.  Reporting  obligations  are  also  in  place  for  significant 
disappearances and thefts. 

•  Increase awareness 

To this end, economic operators who make regulated explosives precursors available 
should  inform  their  customers  of  the  relevant  obligations  of  the  Regulation.  Each 
economic  operator  in  the  supply  chain  should  therefore  inform  the  recipient  of 
regulated explosives precursors that the making available, introduction, possession or 
use of those explosives precursors by members of the general public is subject to the 
Regulation.  This  ensures  that  there  are  no  gaps  along  the  supply  chain  that  could 
potentially lead to control and monitoring loopholes. 

Additionally,  Member  States  must  ensure  the  provision  of  adequate  resources  and 
training  for  law  enforcement  authorities,  first  responders  and  customs  authorities  to 
recognise regulated explosives precursors in the course of their duties and to react in a 
timely and appropriate manner to a suspicious activity. 

•  Enhance information sharing 

With a view to facilitating cooperation and ensuring that all stakeholders implement 
the Regulation effectively, Member States must organise regular exchanges between 
law  enforcement  authorities,  national  supervisory  authorities,  economic  operators, 
online  marketplaces  and  representatives  of  the  sectors  that  use  regulated  explosives 
precursors.  Economic  operators  are  responsible  for  providing  information  to  their 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
staff on the way explosives precursors are to be made available under the Regulation 
and for raising staff awareness in this regard. 

Strengthening of Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 

As  mentioned  above,  the  Regulation  aimed  to  strengthen  the  system  of  control  and 
monitoring of explosives precursors of Regulation (EU) No 98/2013, which was established 
in 2013. The main changes introduced by the Regulation in 2019 are: 

-  the  inclusion  of  sulphuric  acid  in  Annex  I,  the  lowering  of  the  concentration  limit  for 
nitromethane  in  Annex  I  from  30%  w/w12  to  16%  w/w  (which  means  that  more  products 
containing nitromethane are covered) and the transfer of ammonium nitrate in 16% or more 
from Annex XVII to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 to Annex I; 

-  defining  ‘regulated  explosives  precursor’,  which  covers  not  only  the  restricted  explosives 
precursors listed in Annex I, but also the (reportable) explosives precursors listed in Annex 
II; 

-  a  clearer  definition  of  ‘economic  operator’  and  the  introduction  of  definitions  for 
‘professional user’ and ‘online marketplaces’; 

-  abolishment  of  the  registration  regime  allowing  certain  restricted  explosives  precursors  to 
be  made  available  to,  or  to  be  possessed  or  used  by,  members  of  the  general  public  if  the 
economic operator who makes them available registers the transaction; 

-  tightening  of  the  licensing  system  by  discontinuing  licensing  for  potassium  chlorate, 
potassium  perchlorate,  sodium  chlorate  and  sodium  perchlorate,  and  by  introducing  the 
restriction  that  licences  may  be  provided  only  for  certain  substances  in  concentrations  not 
exceeding an upper limit; 

- the codifying of good practices related to the transfer of information, inter alia by ensuring 
that  every  actor  along  the  supply  chain  and  the  personnel  involved  in  the  sale  of  restricted 
explosives  precursors  are  aware  that  the  product  they  are  handling  is  subject  to  the 
restrictions of the Regulation; 

- an explicit obligation  on economic operators to verify the licence when making restricted 
explosives  precursors  available  to  a  member  of  the  general  public,  and  for  every  other 
transaction  to  verify  that  the  prospective  customer  has  a  demonstrable  need  for  a  restricted 
explosives precursor for purposes connected with their trade, business or profession; 

12 w/w means ‘weight by weight’, indicating the mass of a component (solute) relative to the total mass of the 
entire mixture (solution), expressed as a percentage. For instance, if the total mass of a 100 g nitromethane 
solution  is  made  up  of  30 g  nitromethane  in  70 g  of  water,  then  we  would  express  this  as  nitromethane 
30% w/w. 

10 

 
 
-  extending  the  reporting  obligation  for  significant  disappearances  and  thefts  of  regulated 
explosives precursors to professional users and, insofar as restricted explosives precursors are 
concerned,  to  members  of  the  general  public  who  have  acquired  restricted  explosives 
precursors with a licence; 

-  obligations  on  Member  States  to  organise  training  for  law  enforcement  authorities,  first 
responders and customs authorities to recognise regulated explosives precursors in the course 
of  their  duties  and  to  react  in  a  timely  and  appropriate  manner  to  a  suspicious  activity  and 
awareness-raising  actions  for  the  different  sectors  (producers,  distributors,  end  users,  etc.) 
using regulated explosives precursors; 

-  the  requirement  for  Member  States  to  have  in  place  competent  authorities  to  inspect  and 
control the correct application of the Regulation; 

- an obligation for the Commission to regularly update the existing guidelines; 

- the establishment by the Commission of a detailed programme for monitoring the outputs, 
results and impacts of the Regulation. 

The intervention logic 

The  intervention  logic  of  the  evaluation  examines  the  interrelationships  between:  (1)  the 
problem – and its drivers – that the Regulation was designed to address; (2) the general and 
specific  objectives  that  it  seeks  to  achieve;  (3)  the  inputs  (such  as  human  and  financial 
resources)  required  to  achieve  these  objectives;  (4)  the  activities  and  implementation 
processes;  and  (5)  the  expected  effects  in  terms  of  outputs  (shorter-term  outcomes),  results 
(intermediate outcomes) and impacts (longer-term outcomes) through which the Regulation’s 
general and specific objectives should be achieved. 

The intervention logic below (Figure 1) illustrates the objectives behind the adoption of the 
Regulation and its expected results. 

11 

 
 
Figure  1:  Intervention  logic  of  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1148  on  the  marketing  and  use  of 
explosives precursors 

Source: ICF in collaboration with Milieu, WSP and RAND, Evaluation study of Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 on 
the marketing and use of explosives precursors, final report, 2025. 

2.2.  Point(s) of comparison 

A proper assessment of the Regulation against the evaluation criteria requires a comparison 
between  the  situation  before  the  Regulation  was  adopted,  the  situation  as  expected  in  the 
preferred  option  from  the  Impact  Assessment  of  2018  and  the  situation  after  the  entry  into 
force of the Regulation and its current implementation status. 

The situation preceding the evaluation timeline – spanning the period from 2 September 2014 
to 31 January 2021 – was governed by Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 on the marketing and use 
of explosives precursors. 

Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 required Member States to implement prohibition, licensing or 
registration regimes  for  restricted substances, to  set  up national  contact  points for reporting 
suspicious  transactions  and  to  enforce  penalties  for  non-compliance.  Economic  operators 
were  required  to  label  restricted  substances,  report  suspicious  transactions,  thefts  and 
disappearances  and  to  maintain  transaction  records  for  five  years.  Regulation  (EU) 
No 98/2013 included provisions for data protection, safeguard measures and periodic reviews 
to  address  emerging  threats.  The  following  specific  points  of  comparison,  which  are 

12 

 
 
 
predominantly based on the results of the evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 carried 
out in 2018, were identified as the baseline: 

1.  Security concerns on the misuse of explosives precursors 

Ammonium  nitrate  presented  a  significant  security  threat  as  it  was  only  a  reportable 
explosives  precursor  and  not  a  restricted  one.  The  same  was  true  of  sulphuric  acid.  The 
concentration  level  of  nitromethane,  an  Annex  I  precursor,  was  30%  w/w,  and  this  was 
considered a possible security threat. 

Regulation  (EU)  No 98/2013  was  amended  in  2017  in  order  to  add  aluminium  powder, 
magnesium powder and magnesium nitrate hexahydrate to the list of explosives precursors in 
Annex  II.  The  reason  for  these  additions  was  that  these  substances  have  been  used  in,  and 
acquired for, the production of HMEs in the EU (aluminium powder and magnesium powder) 
and  outside  the  EU  (magnesium  nitrate  hexahydrate).  To  this  end  an  external  consultant 
carried out three separate studies which aimed to determine the usefulness of including these 
substances in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 98/2013. 

The evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 considered that the framework and delegation 
of  powers  to  the  Commission,  which  inter  alia  allows  new  substances  to  be  added  to  the 
Regulation, were not flexible enough to respond to emerging risks. 

2.  Limits of the regulatory framework 

Another  conclusion  of  the  evaluation  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 98/2013  was  that  there  were 
several  gaps,  with  several  of  its  provisions  being  found  to  be  unclear  or  not  relevant  to 
achieving the targeted outcomes. For instance, it failed to define ‘professional users’, and its 
obligations on labelling, reporting of suspicious thefts and disappearances were found to be 
inadequate.  It  did  not  appropriately  address  online  purchases  of  explosives  precursors.  The 
effectiveness  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 98/2013  to  achieving  its  specific  objectives  was 
assessed  as  partial,  in  particular  due  to  the  variety  of  implementation  regimes  it  allowed 
(licensing,  registration  and  overall  ban)  and  unclear  provisions.  Its  provisions  on  labelling 
were found to be particularly costly to implement and registration was considered as the least 
cost-effective implementation regime across Member States. 

3.  Implementation and enforcement 

The  evaluation  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 98/2013  found  that  by  2018  Member  States  had 
widely  different  regimes  regulating  explosives  precursors.  Restricted  precursors  were 
completely  banned  in  13  Member  States,  subject  to  a  licensing  system  for  members  of  the 
general public in nine Member States, subject to registration allowing members of the general 
public to access and possess them in six Member States, while a further two adopted a mixed 
approach.  The  evaluation  noted  that  enforcement  by  customs  authorities  varied  across 
Member States, some of which considered that such a role was not needed for the purposes of 

13 

 
 
the Regulation. There were slight differences in the application of the reporting of suspicious 
transactions, disappearances and thefts, including a few Member States which required this to 
be done by professional  users and members of the general  public and other Member States 
where this obligation did not exist. The exchange of information between Member States, as 
well  as  with  the  Commission,  was  assessed  to  be  insufficient  for  what  was  necessary  for 
detection cases with a cross-border dimension. 

The evaluation also found that implementation by economic operators was ‘fragmented’, and 
some economic operators were unaware of their obligations. Only about half seemed to have 
processes  in  place  to  identify  suspicious  transactions  and  to  train  their  staff  accordingly. 
Compliance  with  the  Regulation’s  obligations  was  found  to  be  significantly  lower  among 
online marketplaces and for online transactions. 

Regulation  (EU)  No 98/2013  was  believed  to  have  met  its  objective  of  ensuring  the  free 
movement of explosives precursors across the EU. 

3.  HOW DID THE SITUATION EVOLVE OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD? 

Current state of play – Implementation since 2021 

This  section  outlines  compliance  trends  among  economic  operators  and  enforcement 
practices across Member States. The section also investigates criminal misuse trends relating 
to explosives precursors, underscoring emerging threats and gaps in the Regulation’s scope. 
Lastly, it presents insights into the EU market for regulated explosives precursors, trade flows 
and the extent of non-professional use. 

3.1. 

Implementation at EU and national level 

The  Regulation  is  directly  applicable  in  all  EU  Member  States  and  does  not  require 
transposition into national law. 

In total, 19 Member States adopted a prohibition regime under which members of the general 
public  are  not  allowed  to  buy  restricted  explosives  precursors.  By  contrast,  eight  Member 
States opted for a licensing regime providing conditions under which certain members of the 
general  public  may  procure  restricted  explosives  precursors.  One  Member  State  (Denmark) 
applied a safeguard clause for substances not listed in Annex I or II, namely salts of nitrate 
and chemical products with more than 90% w/w nitrate or hydrogen peroxide-urea with over 
90% w/w hydrogen peroxide-urea13. 

13 European Commission (2024), ‘Legislation on chemicals used in home-made explosives’. Available at: 
https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-
radicalisation/protection/legislation-chemicals-used-home-made-explosives_en. 

14 

 
 
 
Figure  2  –  Map  with  overview  of  prohibition,  licensing  and  safeguards  under  Regulation 
(EU) 2019/1148 

Source: European Commission (on the basis of information provided by EU Member States) 

Member States carried out a variety of awareness-raising activities. The most notable results 
of  these  awareness-raising  activities  were  observed  among  economic  operators  and  online 
marketplaces,  which  increased  the  number  of  queries  submitted  and  re-evaluated  their 
business  practices  (e.g.  by  discontinuing  the  sale  of  restricted  explosives  precursors).  Most 
Member  States  established  cooperation  between  law  enforcement  authorities,  national 
competent authorities and customs authorities, involving them in regular exchanges between 
2022 and 202414. 

Most  Member  States  reported  taking  legislative  and  non-legislative  measures  to  implement 
the Regulation. 

However,  on  the  basis  of  information  collected  through  the  monitoring  programme,  the 
Commission opened EU dialogues for the lack or potential lack of full implementation of the 
Regulation concerning three EU Member States. During the evaluation period one case was 

14 Monitoring programme data for 2022–2024. 

15 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
converted  into  an  official  infringement  procedure  in  accordance  with  Article 258  of  the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  

It is important to emphasise that, despite the lack or potential lack of full implementation and 
enforcement  of  the  Regulation  by  these  Member  States,  most  of  the  essential  control  and 
monitoring  measures  of  the  Regulation  –  such  as  the  obligation  to  notify  suspicious 
transactions  to  a  national  contact  point  and  the  restrictions  for  explosives  precursors  in 
Annex I – have been applied since 2021 on the basis of the legislation and empowerments put 
in  place  by  its  predecessor  legislation,  namely  Regulation  (EU)  No 98/2013,  and  for  the 
reason  that  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1148  is  directly  applicable.  Therefore,  this  lack,  or 
potential  lack,  of  full  implementation  and  enforcement  did  not  necessarily  significantly 
reduce  the  effectiveness  of  the  control  and  monitoring  of  explosives  precursors  in  those 
Member States. Additionally, further to a complaint made by a member of the public in 2025, 
the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  provisions  on  informing  the  supply  chain  and 
verification  upon  sale  for  online  economic  operators  in  one  Member  States  are  potentially 
inadequate. During the evaluation period the Commission was in contact with the authorities 
concerned to gather additional information on this case through another EU dialogue. 

All  survey  respondents  reported  that  their  Member  State  had  laid  down  penalties  for 
infringement of the Regulation’s obligations, as required by Article 13. 

The  European  Commission  has  established  a  monitoring  programme  in  accordance  with 
Article 20  of  the  Regulation.  This  programme  establishes  a  continuous  and  systematic 
process  for  collecting  data  about  the  functioning  of  the  Regulation.  It  generates  factual 
information  for  future  evaluations  and  helps  identify  actual  problems  in  applying  the 
Regulation. In practice, the competent authorities of the Member States are obliged to submit 
before 31 March of each year information on, inter alia, the following: 

As regards Member States that issue licences to members of the general public: 

-  the  restricted  explosives  precursors  in  respect  of  which  the  Member  State  provides  for  a 
licensing system; 

- the number of licence applications and licences issued for each Member State; 

- the most common reasons in each Member State for refusing to issue licences; 

On improving detection of potential threats and misuse of explosives precursors throughout 
the EU: 

-  the  number  of  reported  suspicious  transactions,  significant  disappearances  and  thefts  per 
Member State, distinguishing between offline and online activities; 

- the kind of procedures for detecting suspicious transactions applied by economic operators 
and online marketplaces, distinguishing between offline and online activities; 

- the number of contacts between national contact points; 

16 

 
On  raising  awareness  along  the  supply  chain  of  relevant  restrictions  and  obligations  as 
regards the marketing and use of restricted explosives precursors, including online: 

- information on inspections carried out, including the number of inspections and economic 
operators  and  online  marketplaces  covered,  distinguishing  between  offline  and  online 
activities; 

- information on awareness-raising actions (e.g. the number and types of actions); 

- the number of regular exchanges between law enforcement authorities, national supervisory 
authorities,  economic  operators,  online  marketplaces  and  representatives  of  the  sectors  that 
use regulated explosives precursors. 

Data concerning four calendar years (2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024) have been collected so far. 

The Commission coordinated the activities of the Standing Committee on Precursors (SCP) – 
an expert group tasked with assisting and monitoring the implementation of the Regulation – 
and  managed  a  secure  online  platform  for  the  exchange  of  information  with  competent 
authorities and stakeholders from the private sector. The European Commission led efforts to 
strengthen implementation capacities across Member States and oversaw the updating of the 
Commission  guidelines  for  national  competent  authorities,  economic  operators  and  online 
marketplaces  and  related  awareness-raising  materials15.  Europol  undertook  complementary 
actions  to  support  the  operational  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  Regulation.  It 
regularly informed the members – i.e. the competent authorities of the EEA EFTA countries 
– of the SCP about the evolving threat of HMEs. 

3.2. 

Implementation and compliance by economic operators 

Through  consultations  with  stakeholders  and  national  authorities,  economic  operators  were 
found generally to have complied with their obligations across Member States. Data collected 
suggest that economic operators have taken steps to ensure that their staff are informed about 
the Regulation and its constituent obligations. Data from the monitoring programme point up 
major differences between Member States in the reporting of suspicious activity, with some 
reporting  high  numbers  and  others  very  few  or  even  no  cases.  Stakeholder  feedback 
suggested that most economic operators did not need to report suspicious transactions, thefts 
or disappearances. 

Most  measures  adopted  to  detect  suspicious  transactions  focus  on  staff  awareness  and 
proactively  scrutinising  customers  for  offline  trade  (i.e.  by  asking  questions  to  prospective 

15  Capacity-building  initiatives  focused  on  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1148  included:  one  regional  workshop  with 
national authorities, initiated by Belgium, with participants from Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, 
the  European  Commission  and  Europol;  a  workshop  focusing  on  the  role  and  responsibilities  of  customs 
authorities. 

17 

 
 
 
customers  and  using  indicator  lists  of  suspicious  behaviour),  but  also  included  retroactive 
data  queries  and  automated  searches  for  around  a  quarter  of  market  survey  respondents. 
When  it  comes  to  good  practices  or  voluntary  actions,  some  national  authorities  consulted 
reported the that some online marketplaces  had  adopted algorithms for detecting suspicious 
transactions. Proactive use of algorithms by such platforms was seen as bringing direct results 
but  is  not  consistently  implemented  by  online  marketplaces,  including  by  national 
subsidiaries of the same company. 

Evaluation findings suggest that compliance varies between both Member States and market 
participants.  Manufacturers  and  distributors  of  chemicals  are  considered  to  have  higher 
compliance  than  operators  further  down  the  supply  chain,  such  as  retailers  and  online 
marketplaces  selling  to  the  general  public.  Compliance  by  online  retailers  and  online 
marketplaces was generally seen as lower. This should be seen in the context of the fact that 
online  marketplaces  (along  with  logistics  service  providers)  tend  to  be  less  controlled  and 
inspected  by  national  authorities16.  Difficulties  in  assessing  compliance  by  non-EU  sellers 
exporting  explosives  precursors  to  the  EU  –  which  is  likely  to  be  lower  –  may  partly  be 
linked  to  problematic  customs  enforcement  by  the  Member  States.  There  was  no  clear 
geographical trend in compliance or lack of compliance across Member States17. 

3.3.  Enforcement 

The  evidence  gathered  –  primarily  through  the  surveying  of  national  authorities  and 
economic operators and through infringement and EU Pilot cases – suggests an uneven level 
of  enforcement  across  Member  States.  This  is  particularly  apparent  when  reviewing 
differences  in  the  number  of  inspections  carried  out,  which  were  not  proportional  to  the 
Member States’ population or chemical market sizes and targeted offline activities in 80% of 
cases18. Germany conducted the vast majority of inspections carried out in the EU since 2021 
and was the main contributor to the overall increase in the number of inspections conducted 
in the EU between 2021 and 2024. By contrast, many other Member States conducted few or 
no inspections or controls over the period. 

National  authorities  generally  considered  the  Regulation’s  provisions  on  penalties  and 
inspections to be effective19. Penalties for infringement of the Regulation  are in place in all 
Member  States.  Member  States  generally  reported  such  penalties  as  being  dissuasive, 
although  the  fact  that  data  were  limited  means  that  their  application  and  practical 

16 Monitoring programme data for 2021–2023. 
17 Survey of national competent authorities. 
18 Based on monitoring programme data for 2021–2024. 
19 Despite the limits to application of penalties identified in the assessment of Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 and 
the  fact  that  at  the  time  the  Regulation  did  not  provide  further  prescription  or  clarification  guidelines  on 
implementing unchanged provisions on penalties. 

18 

 
 
 
effectiveness  could  not  be  independently  ascertained20.  No  Member  States  reported  having 
prosecuted economic operators, online marketplaces or professional users for failing to report 
suspicious transactions, thefts or disappearances. Prosecution, convictions and the imposition 
of  penalties  on  the  basis  of  suspicious  activity  notifications  received  were  reported  in  four 
countries21. 

The absence of an explicit role for customs authorities in the Regulation has led to significant 
differences in customs enforcement of the Regulation. In some countries the role of customs 
is clearly defined on the basis of national legislation. In others it is not defined at all. Around 
half  of  Member  States  adopted  measures  on  customs  enforcement  of  regulated  explosives 
precursors  imported  into  the  EU.  Such  measures  included  intelligence  sharing  between 
national  agencies,  physical  inspection  and  the  detention  of  non-compliant  shipments  by 
customs  authorities.  A  minority  of  Member  States  indicated  that  they  had  mechanisms  for 
reporting  suspicious  activities  at  customs,  that  they  had  adopted  advanced  detection 
technologies  and  that  they  verified  importers’  documentation  to  identify  possible  illegal 
imports of explosives precursors. Some countries reported no enforcement challenges at the 
EU’s  external  borders22,  while  others  face  difficulties  due  to  the  lack  of  standardised 
procedures,  challenges  in  identifying  explosives  precursors  or  mixtures  containing  them, 
insufficient legal frameworks, inconsistent implementation, inadequate technological support, 
insufficient resources, and delays in sharing information23. 

3.4.  Trends in the criminal misuse of explosives precursors 

Over the past decade, the incidence of terrorist attacks using chemicals and explosives in the 
EU  has  significantly  declined.  In  2012,  these  types  of  attacks  accounted  for  88%  of  all 
terrorist  incidents,  but  by  2021  this  figure  had  dropped  to  just  19%24.  According  to  the 
national  authorities  surveyed,  the  number  of  attempted  and  completed  attacks  involving 
HMEs manufactured with regulated explosives precursors plateaued between 2021 and 2025. 
Most  (15)  Member  States  did  not  report  any  change  in  the  frequency  of  attacks  involving 
HMEs since 2021, while three noted a significant decrease. 

There  have  been  no  major  completed  terrorist  attacks  using  HMEs  with  multiple  victims  – 
like the attacks in Paris in 2015, Brussels in 2016 and Manchester in 2017, which attracted 
huge media attention – since 2019, and thus also since the Regulation entered into force on 

20  It  should  be  noted  that  the  monitoring  programme  does  not  collect  data  on  penalties  enforced  for 

infringements of the Regulation. 

21 AT, DE, FR, NO. 
22 BG, CY, CZ, DE, ES, HR, HU, LU, LV, NL, NO, PT, SI, SK. 

23 AT, BE, EE, EL, FR, LT. 

24 University of Maryland, Global Terrorism Database (2021), available at https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 

19 

 
 
 
 
1 February 2021. The last major completed terrorist attack using an HME took place in 2019 
in Lyon (France), with 15 people injured. 

However, any attempt to assess the number of terrorist and criminal attacks with explosives 
manufactured  on  the  basis  of  regulated  explosives  precursors  since  2021  faces  serious  data 
limitations. There is a notable lack of a comprehensive database on this topic, with existing 
sources, such as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), containing data only up to 2021 and 
not  being  verified  by  counterterrorism  or  law  enforcement  agencies.  As  mentioned  in  the 
introduction, Member States are often reluctant to share classified information, and such data 
are absent from the monitoring programme. 

Some stakeholders reported the illicit use of – and suspicious activities related to – hydrogen 
peroxide, sulphuric acid, ammonium nitrate and potassium perchlorate. Restricted substances, 
in particular hydrogen peroxide and ammonium nitrate, were reported to be illicitly used to a 
small  or  moderate  extent  in  about  half  of  the  responding  Member  States.  Under  reportable 
substances, potassium nitrate, aluminium  powders,  acetone, calcium  nitrate and magnesium 
powders were noted for their illicit use. 

According to Europol’s 2023 Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) Report, terrorist and 
extremist groups continue to circumvent restrictive measures  in order to acquire precursors. 
Regulations  can  be  evaded  in  three  main  ways:  (i)  purchasing  chemicals  in  lower 
concentrations  that  are  not  regulated  as  strictly  and  then  concentrating  them;  (ii)  exploiting 
online  marketplaces  and  dark  websites  to  acquire  these  substances  anonymously;  and  (iii) 
purchasing  alternative  chemicals  which  are  not  covered  by  the  Regulation  but  can  also  be 
misused to manufacture HMEs. Europol identified a growing trend in producing home-made 
low  explosives  using  explosives  precursors  such  as  potassium  nitrate,  aluminium  powder, 
sulphur  and  ammonium  nitrate25.  Encrypted  communication  platforms  have  facilitated  the 
sharing  of  instructions  on  manufacturing  HMEs  and  pyrotechnics,  further  promoting  their 
misuse26.  Additionally,  the  increasing  use  of  artificial  intelligence  (AI)  makes  it  easier  for 
people  with  limited  or  no  knowledge  of  chemistry  to  use  these  instructions  to  manufacture 
HMEs. 

25  Although  one  successful  attack  involving  potassium  nitrate  and  sugar  was  carried  out  in  France  in  2024. 
Europol  (2025),  European  Union  Terrorism  Situation  and  Trend  Report  2025  (page  16).  Available  at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/tesat-report.  Last  accessed  25 September 
2025. 

26  Europol  (2022),  European  Union  Terrorism  Situation  and  Trend  Report  2022  (page  16).  Available  at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/tesat-report.  Last  accessed  25 September 
2025. 

20 

 
 
 
 
Criminal misuse of pyrotechnics and the possible link with explosives precursors27 

Recent developments across the EU reveal that pyrotechnic materials are increasingly being 
repurposed for criminal and violent activities. There are indications that illegal pyrotechnics 
manufacturing is taking place within the EU, although there is very little data available on the 
scale or location. 

Illegal  pyrotechnics  manufacturing  is  understood  as  individuals  or  (criminal)  groups 
producing, assembling or modifying pyrotechnic articles intentionally not complying with the 
legal  requirements  laid  down  in  the  Pyrotechnics  Directive.  This  definition  also  includes 
counterfeited pyrotechnic articles, as they are produced without  the  required permits and in 
non-compliance with the requirements of the Pyrotechnics Directive. 

Several additional key characteristics are listed below. 

•  This  can  occur  in  underground  factories  or  labs,  which  the  illegal  manufacturer  aims  to 
keep  hidden  due  to  the  absence  of  proper  permits  and  licences.  Oversight  is  deliberately 
evaded. 

•  Substances are not sourced through approved channels for purchase and use. Indeed, the 
manufacture  of  pyrotechnics  requires  certain  substances,  some  of  which  are  regulated 
explosives  precursors  (e.g.  potassium  perchlorate,  aluminium  powders).  This  consequently 
indicates that the control and monitoring system of the Regulation for these substances is not 
functioning properly. 

•  Safety standards are likely to be neglected, which leads to risks of accidents and related 
health implications. 

•  The motivation behind the illegal manufacturing could be for commercial profit, personal 
use or criminal intent. 

•  Risks  associated  with  illegal  pyrotechnics  manufacturing  are  public  safety  risks, 
environmental damage, economic impacts and national security concerns. 

The security issues in relation to the criminal misuse of pyrotechnics have been raised in the 
evaluation28 of Directive 2013/29/EU of 12 June 2013 on the harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member  States  relating  to  the  making  available  on  the  market  of  pyrotechnic  articles.  A 
specific  study  commissioned  by  DG  HOME  to  support  the  evaluation  of  the  Pyrotechnics 
Directive examines these issues in depth29. 

27  This  section  draws  heavily  on  the  ‘Feasibility  study  on  reducing  the  security  risks  posed  by  the  criminal 

misuse of pyrotechnics – Final report’, Ecorys in collaboration with SAFE, Spark and TNO, 2025. 

28  Commission  SWD,  Evaluation  of  Directive  2013/29/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 
12 June 2013 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the 
market of pyrotechnic articles (recast), SWD(2025) 268, 2025. 

29 See footnote 24. 

21 

 
 
3.5.  EU market for chemical substances and explosives precursors30 

The trends in sales and production of the substances covered by the Regulation between 2010 
and 2023 do not show any correlation with implementation of the Regulation. 

■  The  quantity  of  production  sold  has  fluctuated  for  the  following  substances  within  the 
scope  of  the  Regulation:  hydrogen  peroxide,  nitromethane  (under  the  product  group 
derivatives  of  hydrocarbon  containing  only  nitro  or  only  nitroso  groups);  calcium  nitrate, 
calcium ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate. 

■  For  the  following  substances  the  amount  of  sold  production  has  decreased  over  time: 
nitric acid, acetone, potassium nitrate, sodium nitrate and aluminium powders. 

■  For  the  following  substances  the  amount  of  sold  production  has  increased  over  time: 
sulphuric acid and magnesium powders. 

■  The  amount  of  sold  production  has  remained  reasonably  constant  for  the  product  group 
chlorates and perchlorates. 

Trade flow 

■  The  EU  was  a  net  exporter  for  the  following  substances  between  2010  and  2023: 
hydrogen  peroxide,  nitromethane,  nitric  acid,  sulphuric  acid,  acetone,  calcium  nitrate  and 
ammonium nitrate. 

■  The  EU  was  a  net  importer  for  the  following  substances  in  the  period  under  study:  the 
product  group  chlorates  and  perchlorates;  potassium  nitrate,  sodium  nitrate,  calcium 
ammonium nitrate, magnesium powders and aluminium powders. 

Supply chain and non-professional use 

All substances within the scope of the Regulation have extensive industrial and professional 
use. No specific data are available on the market for non-professional use as a proportion of 
total  sold  production.  However,  the  amount  of  explosives  precursors  substances  present  in 
customer products is deemed to be minor compared to the total sold production. 

4.  EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART) 

4.1.  To what extent was the intervention successful and why? 

4.1.1.  Effectiveness 

30 Analysis shown in this section is derived from data collected through desk research, and especially data from 
statistical  databases,  such  as  Prodcom,  Eurostat  and  Statista,  as  well  as  information  from  the  REACH 
registration data published by ECHA. 

22 

 
 
 
This section offers an overview of the assessed effectiveness of the Regulation,  i.e. whether 
the Regulation has achieved its objectives31. 

Summary of the findings on effectiveness 

In  relation  to  the  four  general  objectives  identified  in  its  Monitoring  Programme,  the 
evaluation concludes that the Regulation has been: 

●  Effective in limiting the availability of explosives precursors to the general public across 
the  EU,  although  explosives  precursors  have  been  used  and  acquired  by  members  of  the 
general public or have been subject of suspicious transactions, thefts or disappearances. 

●  Effective  in  improving  the  detection  of  potential  threats  and  the  misuse  of  explosives 
precursors across the EU. 

●  Somewhat effective in raising awareness along the supply chain regarding restrictions and 
obligations  on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, although discrepancies were 
noted in awareness levels among economic operators and action taken by Member States.  

●  Effective in facilitating the free movement of explosives precursors within the EU. 

Effectiveness in limiting the availability of explosives precursors to the general public 

Restrictions  under  Article 5  have  significantly  reduced  the  availability  of  explosives 
precursors  to  the  general  public.  In  most  Member  States,  the  implementation  of  the 
prohibition has resulted in the removal of restricted explosives precursors from general retail 
channels,  including  both  physical  and  online  points  of  sale.  Those  which  have  a  licensing 
system  in  place  report  low  numbers  of  licences  granted32.  All  Member  States  consulted 
reported  having  established  penalties  for  infringements  of  the  Regulation,  including 
warnings,  stop  orders,  correction  orders,  bans  on  performing  activities,  confiscation, 
revocation  of  licences  (only  applicable  to  members  of  the  public),  administrative  fines, 
restrictions  of  liberty,  arrest  and  imprisonment.  Stakeholder  feedback  has  shown  that  such 
penalties  were  considered  to  have  been  effective  and  dissuasive  in  addressing  infringement 
cases.  Overall,  there  is  stakeholder  consensus  that  the  Regulation  has  restricted  the 
availability of explosives precursors to the general public. However, feedback from the public 
consultation  also  revealed  that  the  Regulation  may  have  created  unintended  consequences, 
especially  for  chemical  hobbyists  and  educational  chemistry,  in  particular  by  preventing 

31 Better Regulation Toolbox, Tool #47. 
32 Monitoring programme data. 

23 

 
 
 
 
hobbyists  from  accessing  certain  restricted  explosives  precursors  and  by  increasing  the 
obligations and responsibilities of educational institutions33. 

Reports  by  surveyed  national  authorities  suggest  that  the  Regulation  has  been  effective  in 
preventing access to most regulated precursors. Many Member States reported that regulated 
precursors had not been appropriated for criminal or terrorist misuse since 2021. However, all 
regulated  explosives  were  reported  to  have  been  illicitly  used  or  acquired  or  subject  to 
suspicious transactions, disappearances or thefts for the purpose of conducting an attack. This 
was  the  case  for  hydrogen  peroxide,  potassium  nitrate,  ammonium  nitrate,  acetone  and 
sulphuric  acid  in  particular,  but  also  for  aluminium  and  magnesium  powders.  Thefts  and 
disappearances of nitrate fertilisers have been significant, with tens of thousands of kilograms 
reported missing in 2022 and 2023, although illegal explosive manufacture  is not known to 
have been the reason for these thefts (the fertilisers are suspected to have been sold on a black 
market  for  use  in  agriculture)34.  While  hydrogen  peroxide  and  sulphuric  acid  have  not 
disappeared or been stolen in these quantities, stakeholders highlight a particular level of risk 
because of their importance for the manufacture of TATP35. 

Despite this positive feedback from national authorities, illegal HME manufacturing sites are 
being  discovered  each year36  in  the EU.  Often  significant  quantities  of regulated explosives 
precursors are found at such sites. These cases show that terrorists and other criminals – who 
should not have access to regulated explosives precursors in these quantities – still succeed in 
circumventing  the  control  system  of  the  Regulation.  Additionally,  anecdotal  evidence  from 
mystery shopping37 exercises also indicates that there are weaknesses in effectively limiting 
the access of members of the general public to restricted explosives precursors. 

The Regulation also allows Member States to adopt more restrictive measures,  in particular 
where  they  are  concerned  about  the  availability  or  misuse  of  certain  precursors  on  their 
territory.  In  practice,  the  Regulation’s  safeguard  clause  (Article 14)  has  been  implemented 
only by Denmark, which added substances like sulphur to its restricted list and implemented 
stricter  concentration  limits  and  additional  restrictions  on  metal  powders.  In  consultations, 
Danish  authorities  confirmed  the  effectiveness  of  their  current  approach,  while  no  other 
Member States indicated that they would like to make use of the safeguard clause. The fact 
that only one Member State adopted the safeguard clause might suggest that the Regulation 
and its annexes have otherwise been found to be appropriate and effective. 

33 Based on responses to surveys of national authorities and market participants and feedback received  on the 

public consultation. 
34 Monitoring programme data. 

35 Monitoring programme data. 

36 e.g. Belgium, Estonia, France, Poland and Sweden (presentations during SCP meetings). 
37  This  is  a  technique  whereby  law  enforcement  or  inspection  authorities  pretend  to  be  regular  customers  to 
check whether an economic operator or online marketplace is duly implementing the Regulation. This can 
be used to control offline and online businesses. In the SCP meetings some Member States have presented 
the outcome of such mystery shopping exercises. 

24 

 
 
Effectiveness  in  improving  the  detection  of  potential  threats  and  the  misuse  of 
explosives precursors across the EU 

The  national  authorities  consulted  agree  that  the  Regulation  has  improved  the  detection  of 
potential  threats  and  misuse  of  explosives  precursors  in  the  EU.  The  evaluation  found  that 
key provisions of the Regulation – namely Articles 5 to 10 – are perceived by stakeholders as 
being  generally  effective  in  contributing  to  the  Regulation’s  security  objectives38.  While 
regulated  precursors  have  been  acquired  for  the  illegal  production  of  explosives,  there  has 
been  no  major  completed  attack  involving  explosives  precursors  in  the  EU  since  the  entry 
into application of the Regulation. 

Around  half  of  Member  States  reported  that  the  Regulation’s  provisions  –  such  as  the 
notification of suspicious transactions, thefts or disappearances – have led to investigations, 
prosecutions  or  convictions by their national  authorities. Reported numbers were highest in 
France – where 81% of notifications received resulted in legal action in 2024, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Spain. Around a third of Member States surveyed reported that notifications 
of  suspicious  transactions,  thefts  or  disappearances  had  led  to  the  dismantling  of  illegal 
bomb-making  laboratories  or  of  terrorist  or  criminal  groups.  Although  such  information  is 
generally  classified,  one  Member  State  (Spain)  reported  13  instances  where  such  bomb-
making facilities had been discovered or dismantled since 2021. Available public information 
shows  that  one  such  laboratory  manufacturing  large  quantities  of  TATP  was  found  and 
dismantled in Spain in 202339. 

According  to  Europol40,  cooperation  between  Member  States  concerning  the  follow-up  to 
notifications  of  suspicious  activity  with  a  cross-border  dimension 
is  currently 
underdeveloped,  resulting  in  possible  missed  opportunities  to  detect  and  dismantle  illegal 
manufacture and use of HMEs in the EU. Europol is willing to provide support in this context 
so as to strengthen cooperation and remedy this problem. 

As  stated  in  Section  3.4,  the  Regulation  should  in  principle  be  able  to  prevent  the  illegal 
manufacture of pyrotechnics which make use of regulated explosives precursors41. However, 
there are indications that significant illegal manufacture of pyrotechnics is taking place in a 
number  of  EU  Member  States42.  Certain  (powerful)  pyrotechnics  may  be  illegally 
manufactured on the basis of regulated explosives precursors and by extracting powders from 
other  types  of  less  powerful  pyrotechnic  articles  which  are  widely  available  to  members  of 

38  Inefficiencies  and  room  for  improvement  were  widely  reported  on  the  implementation  of  Article 8 
(Verification  upon  sale)  in  business-to-business  transactions,  but  stakeholders  generally  supported  its 
rationale and the need to verify buyers’ identity and intent. 

39  For 

instance:  https://www.theolivepress.es/spain-news/2023/03/26/spains-civil-guard-busts-clandestine-

bomb-factory-containing-500-kilos-of-explosive-material/. 

40  Contribution  of  Europol  in  the  context  of  a  dedicated  meeting  on  the  adequacy  of  the  list  of  regulated 

explosives precursors (10 July 2025, Brussels). 

41  Such  as  potassium  nitrate,  potassium  perchlorate,  magnesium  powder  and  aluminium  powder.  Based  on 

interviews with national authorities in three Member States and the European Commission. 

42 Denmark (SCP presentation on 6 October 2025), Italy (2025 study on the criminal misuse of pyrotechnics). 

25 

 
 
the general public in certain Member States. Issues with the availability of pyrotechnics, from 
which explosives precursors may be extracted to illegally build more powerful pyrotechnics, 
have been reported and fall within the remit of Directive 2013/29/EU on the making available 
of pyrotechnic articles43. 

43 European Commission (2019), Study on illegal sales of pyrotechnic articles destined for professional users 
the  general  public.  Available  at  https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-

(category  F4) 
/publication/a577ac1a-714b-11e9-9f05-01aa75ed71a1/language-en, last accessed 25 September 2025. 

to 

26 

 
 
 
 
Adequacy of the list of regulated explosives precursors 

There  is  an  overall  consensus  among  stakeholders  that  the  current  list  of  18  substances 
covered by the Regulation  is  still fit for purpose. In the Standing Committee on Precursors 
(SCP) there are regular discussions on the possible addition of one or more substances or on 
changing  the  concentration  limits  or  any  other  relevant  element  (e.g.  the  particle  size  of 
metals)  of  the  substances  listed  in  the  annexes  to  the  Regulation  in  the  light  of  new  threat 
information from law enforcement authorities and forensic experts or in scientific papers or 
other  relevant  publications.  In  total  about  70  to  80  different  substances  have  been  cited  in 
these discussions or relevant documents in the past four years. 

However, since the Regulation entered into force on 1 February 2021, no formal proposal to 
add  a  substance  or  to  change  any  of  the  other  relevant  elements  of  the  annexes  to  the 
Regulation has been put forward by any stakeholder44. In many cases the additions were not 
pursued  because  stakeholders  agreed  that  the  threat  was  not  high  enough  or  because  the 
potential costs (in terms of impact on industry or competent authorities) would outweigh the 
potential benefits (in terms of increased security in the context of prevention of manufacture 
of  HMEs).  In  all  these  cases  the  discussions  led  to  the  conclusion  that  stakeholders  should 
remain  vigilant  in  case  the  threat  posed  by  the  substance  in  question  should  change 
significantly and warrant a change to the Regulation. 

The  Commission  has  also  not  used  its  delegation  of  power  to  adopt  delegated  acts  in 
accordance  with  Article 16  of  the  Regulation  to  modify  the  limit  values  in  Annex  I  to  the 
extent  necessary  to  accommodate  developments  in  the  misuse  of  substances  as  explosives 
precursors,  or  on  the  basis  of  research  and  testing;  or  to  add  substances  to  Annex  II  to  the 
extent  necessary  to  accommodate  developments  in  the  misuse  of  substances  as  explosives 
precursors. 

There have been only two exceptions. First, in the SCP meeting of 9 July 2025 Norway and 
Sweden  requested  further  discussion  of  the  proposals  they  had  submitted  in  2016  on  the 
addition  of  hydrates  of  nitrate  salts  to  the  annexes  to  the  Regulation.  Currently,  the  least 
common (and in  practice non-existent) form  of  calcium  nitrate is  regulated,  while the most 
common and abundant form is not. The members of the SCP agreed that this matter needs to 
be  looked  into  but  said  that  more  time  was  needed  to  study  the  different  approaches  put 
forward  by  Norway  and  Sweden.  Second,  several  Member  States  have  also  proposed  to 
address  the  current  ambiguity  concerning  the  inclusion  of  magnalium  powders  in  the 
Regulation. 

Additionally, in the context of the support study on the evaluation and impact assessment, a 
dedicated  meeting  was  organised  on  10 July  2025  in  the  secure  zone  of  DG  HOME, 
specifically  to  investigate  the  adequacy  of  the  list  of  regulated  explosives  precursors.  This 

27 

 
 
 
meeting  was  able  to  shortlist  several  substances  (from  the  total  list  of  70  to  80  substances 
mentioned above) that would warrant further discussion. However, on this occasion too, the 
participants  agreed  that  more  information  on  the  threat  perspective,  and  in  particular  the 
impact  on  industry,  was  needed  before  taking  a  decision  on  changing  the  annexes  to  the 
Regulation. 

Another  issue  to  be  mentioned  in  this  context  is  that  some  economic  operators  and  online 
marketplaces are willing to notify suspicious transactions involving non-regulated explosives 
precursors  or  other  materials  (e.g.  watches,  ball  bearings)  for  which  there  are  reasonable 
grounds  to  suspect  that  they  may  be  intended  for  the  illicit  manufacture  of  explosives. 
However, there is currently no clear legal framework to do so (and hence these stakeholders 
are reluctant to do so out of fear of acting illegally). Law enforcement authorities, however, 
confirm that such (voluntary) notifications are often extremely useful for assessing the threats 
concerning  the  illegal  manufacture  of  HMEs.  They  are  therefore  strongly  in  favour  of 
creating  a  clear  and  appropriate  legal  framework  that  allows  for  such  notifications  on  a 
voluntary basis. 

Effectiveness in raising awareness along the supply chain on restrictions and obligations 
on the marketing and use of explosives precursors 

Evaluation  findings  offer  a  contrasting  view  as  to  whether  the  Regulation  has  helped  raise 
awareness  along  the  supply  chains  regarding  security  risks  and  the  obligations  that  the 
different market participants have when it comes to explosives precursors. The most favoured 
outreach  action  taken  by  national  authorities  was  direct  contact  in  person  and,  to  a  lesser 
extent, online. Member States were found to conduct fewer awareness-raising actions online 
and  generally  did  not  use  social  media  channels  to  host  such  campaigns.  Member  States 
generally reported positive outcomes from actions such as greater engagement by economic 
operators  and  online  marketplaces,  changes  in  business  practices  and  higher  suspicious 
activity  reporting45.  The  national  authorities  consulted,  and  to  a  greater  extent  market 
participants,  generally  find  that  the  Regulation  has  been  effective  in  raising  awareness  of 
restrictions  and  obligations  applying  to  explosives  precursors.  They  consider  that  the 
Regulation’s provisions have been effectively implemented when it comes to informing the 
supply chain, training and awareness raising, and that they have positively contributed to the 
Regulation’s security objectives. This is consistent both with the competent authorities’ view 
that companies generally comply with their obligations under the Regulation and with the use 
by  national  authorities  of  reports  received  of  suspicious 
thefts  and 
disappearances. 

transactions, 

45 Monitoring programme data. 

28 

 
 
 
The  evaluation  found  that  the  guidelines46  are  generally  seen  by  national  authorities  and 
several market participants to have helped achieve the Regulation’s objectives. Most Member 
States use the guidance on conducting inspections and controls and also, to a lesser extent, on 
information  exchange.  All  Member  States  with  a  licensing  regime  save  Denmark  reported 
having  used  the  guidelines  for  dealing  with  the  licence  regime  at  least  once  since  2021.  A 
minority  of  stakeholders  suggested  that  the  guidelines  could  be  made  more  prescriptive,  in 
particular  as  concerns  the  assessment  of  suspicious  transactions,  disappearances  and  thefts 
and also the verification-upon-sale obligation. 

Nevertheless,  discrepancies  persist  between  Member  States  and  when  it  comes  to  the 
awareness  levels  of  certain  types  of  market  participants.  Awareness  and  compliance  were 
assessed  as  being  lower  in  sectors  not  specialised  in  explosives  precursors  and  chemical 
trading,  including  retail  and  online  marketplaces.  Data  available  from  the  monitoring 
programme  suggest  that  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions,  disappearances  and  thefts  is 
inexistent  or  very  low  in  certain  countries,  can  vary  greatly  between  online  and  offline 
operators (with country-specific trends) and is not necessarily consistent with Member States’ 
population  or  economy  sizes.  The  limited  compliance  by  some  online  marketplaces 
encouraged the national competent authorities consulted to recommend explicit reference to 
messaging, communication and social media apps in the Regulation. 

Effectiveness in facilitating the free movement of explosives precursors 

The  Regulation  was  found  to  have  effectively  facilitated  the  free  movement  of  explosives 
precursors  and  helped  create  a  level  playing  field  for  economic  operators  across  the  EU.  It 
has  established  equal  requirements  for  economic  operators  in  all  Member  States.  In 
particular, it has helped harmonise regimes on access to explosives precursors for members of 
the general public. Some Member States may opt for a more restrictive regime by using the 
safeguard  clause,  while  the  adoption  of  licensing  regimes  in  a  minority  of  Member  States 
means  that  economic  operators,  retailers  and  online  marketplaces  can  still  sell  certain 
restricted explosives precursors to members of the general public under certain conditions. In 
practice,  the  safeguard  clause  has  been  used  only  by  Denmark47,  and  licence  numbers  for 
members  of  the  general  public  are  low  in  the  Member  States  which  allow  them48. 
Stakeholders  consulted  did  not  consider  these  provisions  to  hinder  the  functioning  of  the 
single market,  and  nor  was  the lack of  cross-border recognition  of licences identified  as an 
issue in the practical implementation of the Regulation. 

46 Commission Guidelines for the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 on the marketing and use of 

explosives precursors (2020/C 210/01) (OJ C 210, 24.6.2020, p. 1). 

47 Information provided further to Article 14(4). 

48 Monitoring programme data. 

29 

 
 
 
Data  from  the  market  analysis  underline  that  the  volume  of  explosives  precursors 
manufactured and traded in the EU has remained constant in the past 10 years, although the 
production  and  sales  volumes  of  some  regulated  precursors  decreased  between  2021  and 
2023 (latest data available)49. Downward trends affect both Annex I and Annex II precursors, 
and any link between those and the Regulation’s entry into force could not be ascertained in 
the market analysis or during stakeholder consultations. 

The main persisting  barrier to  a level  playing field  reported by industry stakeholders lay in 
uneven levels of enforcement across Member States, whereby some economic operators may 
be able to avoid the costs and burden associated with complying with their obligations when 
inspections or controls are low. 

The  evaluation  did  identify  an  instance  of  gold  plating  where  a  Member  State  (Spain)  had 
imposed rules or restrictions beyond what is required by the Regulation. For every transaction 
involving  explosives  precursors,  sellers  in  that  Member  State  must  request  the  information 
listed  in  Article 8(2)  on  verification  upon  sale  and  also  provide  evidence  that  they  are 
registered with the Chamber of Commerce. These measures have a significant impact on the 
free movement of explosives precursors and create undue compliance burdens50. 

Unintended effects and factors reducing the Regulation’s effectiveness 

The  key  factors  reducing  the  effectiveness  of  the  Regulation  are  discrepancies  in  its 
implementation  and  different  national  enforcement  regimes51.  Some  reported  few  to  no 
measures taken on aspects such as inspections or awareness-raising measures between 2021 
and 202552. There are indications that criminals and terrorists are seeking to circumvent the 
Regulation’s  provisions53  and  concerns  that  explosives  precursors  are  more  available  in 
certain Member States. It is not clear whether new security trends and misuse methods have 
limited  the  Regulation’s  effectiveness  in  practice.  The  national  authorities  consulted 
generally  agreed  that  the  lack  of  rules  providing  for  harmonised  controls  by  customs 
authorities limits the Regulation’s effectiveness for imported explosives precursors. 

While there are different levels of awareness along the supply chain, the evaluation has found 
that there is general buy-in as to the Regulation’s objectives and the principle of regulating 

49 Market analyses of the ICF support study. 
50 Reported during a meeting with Cefic (the European chemical industry federation). 
51 Reported in a survey of national competent authorities (7 out of 23), in interviews with market participants (2 

out of 7) and at the 36th meeting of the SCP. 

52 Monitoring programme data. By 2024, 2 out of 27 Member States had not appointed authorities competent for 
inspections and 10 out of 27 reported having conducted fewer than 15 inspections in the previous year, 6 of 
which  did  not  conduct  any  at  all.  By  2024,  9  out  of  25  Member  States  reported  taking  15  or  fewer 
awareness-raising measures of any type in the previous year. 

53  See,  inter  alia,  Europol  (2023),  European  Union  Terrorism  Situation  and  Trend  Report  2023  (page  18). 
Available  at  https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/tesat-report.  Last  accessed 
25 September 2025. 

30 

 
 
 
explosives precursors for security purposes54. The fact that there have been no major attacks 
using HMEs in the past five years could reduce awareness of – and prioritisation by – non-
security stakeholders and those who do not specialise in explosives precursors. It should be 
emphasised  that  the  chemical  industry  is  particularly  important  in  a  limited  number  of 
Member  States,  which  partly  explains  differences  in  awareness,  implementation  and 
enforcement and the related costs and burdens for stakeholders. 

The introduction of additional explosives under Annexes I and II to the Regulation, together 
with  the  redefinition  of  homogeneous  mixtures  in  Article 3,  point  (13),  means  that  more 
products  and  fast-moving  consumer  goods  have  been  brought  under  the  scope  of  the 
Regulation.  This  is  understood  to  have  created  unintended  negative  effects  in  the  form  of 
increased  burden  and  costs  for  businesses  to  comply  with  their  obligations,  as  well  as  for 
national competent authorities tasked with implementation and enforcement55. 

Verification upon sale has created difficulties for business  stakeholders required  to request, 
check  and  handle  customer  personal  data  and  also  concerns  about  heightened  risks  of  data 
breaches56. The evaluation received limited reports that the Regulation had led to businesses 
using alternatives to explosives precursors or removing products from sale57. The lowering of 
the concentration level for nitromethane (from 30% w/w to 16% w/w) was not perceived to 
have caused any significant barriers to hobbyists who use the substance. 

The  unintended  effects  seem  to  have  been  greater  on  the  use  of  explosives  precursors  for 
research by both professional and non-professional chemists. Limited data were collected in 
the academic and  educational sector, but  the provisions of  Article 5 of the Regulation  were 
considered  to  be  neither  appropriate  for  nor  proportionate  to  the  sector  This  has  allegedly 
created reluctance to use these chemicals in school settings and difficulties in complying with 
the  Regulation  when  it  comes  to  the  autonomous  use  of  explosives  precursors  by  PhD 
students58.  Responses  to  the  public  consultation,  mostly  by  members  of  the  EU  public, 
suggest  that  the  Regulation’s  restrictions  have  curtailed  the  possibility  for  non-professional 
chemistry  enthusiasts  to  conduct  experiments  and  contribute  to  chemical  research  and 
innovation. 

54 Based on  the  survey of national competent authorities, interviews  with  (3 out of  7) market participants  and 

discussions from the 36th meeting of the SCP. 

55 Based on  the  survey of national competent authorities, interviews with  (3 out of  7)  market participants  and 

discussions from the 36th meeting of the SCP. 

56  Due  to  an  increase  in  the  number  of  business-to-business  transactions  for  which  verification  upon  sale  is 
needed.  Concerns  about  verification  upon  sale  were  shared  in  (25  out  of  87)  comments  on  the  survey  of 
market participants, interviews with  (3 out of 7) market participants and national competent authorities in 
one Member State (SI). 

57 Based on (3 out of 23) responses to the survey of national competent authorities. 
58 Interview with one academic, as well as responses to the public consultation. 

31 

 
 
When  it  comes  to  the  Regulation’s  security  objectives,  there  are  some  indications  that 
criminals and terrorists have been looking to alternative methods59, using Annex II rather than 
restricted explosives precursors, and that the misuse of pyrotechnic articles has become more 
prevalent than the illicit manufacture of HMEs in several Member States60. 

4.1.2.  Efficiency 

This  section  offers  an  overview  of  the  assessed  efficiency  of  the  Regulation,  i.e.  whether 
good  use  has  been  made  of  financial  and  other  resources  to  achieve  the  goals  of  the 
Regulation61. 

Summary of the findings on efficiency 

Costs  incurred  by  stakeholders  are  overall  believed  to  be  proportionate  to  the  Regulation’s 
objectives and expected benefits. Some of its provisions create significant compliance costs 
for economic operators. Possible areas for simplification should be considered, in particular 
as  concerns  the  verification  process  in  established  business-to-business  transactions,  where 
burden is seen as disproportionate. There seems to be support for a revision upwards of the 
1% w/w rule for homogeneous mixtures, although stakeholders did not reach a consensus on 
what an alternative effective definition could be. 

Costs incurred by national authorities and economic operators 

Evaluation  findings  offer  some  insights  into  the  costs  incurred  by  stakeholders  in 
implementing or complying with the Regulation and provisions which are considered costly 
to implement and could benefit from revision or simplification. Data on compliance costs and 
burdens  for  market  participants  suggest  that  complying  with  the  obligation  to  verify 
transactions  upon  sale,  followed  by  the  need  to  ensure  secure  storage  of  explosives 

59  Such  as  the  use  of  home-made  low  explosives,  which  Europol  defines  as  ‘usually  a  simple  mixture  of  a 
combustible substance and an oxidant that decomposes rapidly (deflagrate, rather than detonate). Examples 
of  low  explosives  include:  black  powder,  flash  powder,  smokeless  powder.’  Source:  Europol  (2022), 
European  Union 
at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Tesat_Report_2022_0.pdf,  last  accessed 
25 September 2025. 

Trend  Report 

Terrorism 

available 

Situation 

(page 

16), 

and 

60 Based on interviews with (2 out of 3) EU entities and (3 out of 7) authorities in two Member States, as well as 
responses to the survey of (4 out of 23) national competent authorities. Some reports and news articles, as 
well  as  a  parliamentary  question  from  the  European  Parliament,  anecdotally  point  to  the  issue  in  a  few 
Member States (e.g. France, the Netherlands, Sweden) and it should be noted that the Commission ordered 
an external study on security risks linked to the misuse of pyrotechnics, still ongoing  at the time of writing 
this  report.  In  February  2024,  the  Dutch  government  asked  for  a  review  of  EU  rules  on  pyrotechnics  to 
address 
at 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2024/02/23/tk-bijlage-3-nl-non-paper-pyrotechnics-
directive. Last accessed 9 October 2025. 

Available 

concerns. 

growing 

security 

61 Better Regulation Toolbox, Tool #47. 

32 

 
 
 
 
precursors, are the costliest aspects of the Regulation to implement. For national authorities, 
the Regulation generated greatest enforcement or implementation costs when it comes to the 
conducting  of  inspections,  ensuring  coordination  and  cooperation  across  authorities  and 
agencies and assessing reports of suspicious transactions, thefts or disappearances. The table 
below  provides  an  overview  of  costs  reported  by  the  national  authorities  and  market 
participants consulted. 

33 

 
 
 
Table 1 – Overview of reported implementation and compliance costs 

Obligation 

Estimated value per year 

rating  
Cost 
(% 
all 
of 
respondents  who 
expressed 
an 
opinion) 

National authorities (18 respondents) 
Conducting inspections 

Very  high  to  moderate: 
80% 
Low: 20% 

Coordination and cooperation with 
other departments and agencies 

High to moderate: 80% 
Low to very low: 20% 

Assessing 
suspicious transactions 

notifications 

for 

High to moderate: 79% 
Low to very low: 21% 

Training and capacity building 

High to moderate: 76% 

Low to very low: 24% 

Awareness  and  communication 
actions  for  companies  and  the 
general public 

High to moderate: 75% 
Low to very low: 25% 

Conducting  investigations  on  the 
basis of notifications received 

Very  high  to  moderate: 
66% 
Low to very low: 34% 

Imposing penalties and sanctions 

High to moderate: 57% 
Low to very low: 43% 

Reporting  obligations  at  national 
and EU levels 

High to moderate: 47% 
Low to very low: 53% 

Economic operators and online marketplaces (71 respondents) 
Verification upon sale 

High to moderate: 85% 
Minor: 15% 

34 

0.05–4 FTEs 
1.8 FTE average 
0.9 FTE median 
Based on 6 responses 
0.01–4 FTEs 
1.2 FTE average 
0.75 FTE median 
Based on 5 responses 
0.1–4 FTEs 
1.5 FTE average 
0.25 FTE median 
Based on 3 responses 
0.25–4 FTEs 
1.75 FTE average 
1 FTE median 
€10 000 per year (1 response) 
Based on 4 responses 

0.03–4 FTEs 
1.3 FTE average 
1 FTE median 
Based on 5 responses 

0.1–2 FTEs 
1.7 FTE average 
1 FTE median 
Based on 3 responses 

0.15–3 FTEs 
1.5 FTE average 
1.5 FTE median 
Based on 4 responses 

0.01–2 FTEs 
0.5 FTE average 
0.2 FTE median 
Based on 5 responses 

€5 000–€400 000 
€115 350 average 
€58 900 median 
FTEs:  0.2  to  5  (avg.  1.675  and 
4 
median 
responses) 

based 

0.75 

on 

 
 
Secure storage 

High to moderate: 79% 
Minor: 21% 

Informing the supply chain 

High to moderate: 70% 
Minor: 30% 

Staff training 

High to moderate: 66% 
Minor: 34% 

Based on 10 responses 

€2 000–€100 000 
Also 1 FTE (about €48 848)62 
€29 310 average €10 000 median 
Based on 6 responses 

€2 000–€40 000 
€13 875 average 
€6 750 median 
Based on 4 responses 

€1 000–€14 400 
€5 400 average 
€5 000 median 
Based on 6 responses 

Licence verification 

High to moderate: 63% 
Minor: 37% 

€20 000–€50 000 
Based on 2 responses 

Reporting suspicious transactions  High to moderate: 42% 

Minor: 58% 

€2 000 
Based  on  1  response  (medium-
sized retailer) 

Source: Surveys of national competent authorities and of market participants 

Benefits, efficiencies and proportionality of the Regulation 

The reporting of suspicious transactions, disappearances and thefts, as well as the assessment 
of such notifications by national competent authorities, seems to have been a rather efficient 
and effective provision of the Regulation63. Although some provisions were reported as more 
costly  for  authorities  to  implement  (e.g.  on  conducting  inspections  or  training  and  capacity 
building), such costs were generally seen as being justified and proportionate64. 

Stakeholders  generally  considered  that  the  Regulation  created  benefits  proportionate  to  the 
costs  incurred,  by  providing  an  enhanced  level  of  security  and  a  clear  legal  framework. 
Consultations with market participants suggest that these stakeholders do not tend to see the 
Regulation as having created benefits for their organisations or industry. This seems to be the 
case  across  all  organisation  types  and  sizes,  and  in  particular  among  small  organisations65. 
However,  even  market  participants  which  believed  that  the  Regulation  had  not  created 
benefits specifically for their organisation found the societal benefits and legal clarity to be 

62 Estimated considering 1 720 hours corresponding to 1 FTE and the hourly labour costs in 2024 for the retail 
sector  extracted  from  Eurostat  Labour  cost  levels  by  NACE  Rev.  2  activity  dataset.  Available  at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/lc_lci_lev__custom_17071137/default/table?lang=en.  Last 
accessed 18 August 2025. 

63  Surveys  of  national  competent  authorities  and  of  market  participants.  When  asked  about  costs  linked  with 
assessing reports of suspicious transactions, thefts and disappearances, 6 out of 22 Member States answered 
‘moderate’ and 6 out of 22 ‘low’ or ‘very low’. Of 87 responding market participants, 41 (47%) considered 
that costs associated with reporting suspicious transactions, thefts and disappearances had been ‘minor’ and 
24 (28%) said that such costs had been ‘moderate’. 

64 Survey of national competent authorities, Q22: 7 out of 22 considered that these costs had been  ‘moderate’ 

but 5 reported ‘high’ costs and 4 ‘low’ or ‘very low’ costs for this item. 

65 Survey of market participants. 

35 

 
 
worth  the  associated  costs.  Member  States  which  provide  licences  to  the  general  public 
considered the costs of managing such a system to be proportionate to its benefits. 

The benefits of the Regulation are not easy to quantify. The EU recorded significantly fewer 
deaths and injuries linked to terrorist attacks between 2021 and 2025 than it had done during 
the  decade  preceding  the  adoption  of  the  Regulation66.  Lives  saved  from  terrorist  attacks 
would save the EU economy millions of euro67. However, the decrease in terrorist attacks in 
the EU cannot be attributed to the Regulation alone – political, geopolitical and technological 
developments, in particular, must also be taken into account. 

Scope for simplification or efficiencies 

Stakeholder  consultations  underlined  the  opportunities  for  simplification  and  greater 
efficiencies  in  implementing  the  Regulation,  in  particular  as  regards  the  verification-upon-
sale obligation in business-to-business relationships. Reported inefficiencies appear to result 
from  the obligation for sellers to  request  proof of identity from  potential buyers, as well as 
the  need  to  undertake  the  verification  process  every  12  months  in  established  business 
relationships.  Several  stakeholders  argued  that  the  request  for  personal  identity  was  not 
proportionate or usual in business relationships, and that the yearly renewal of the verification 
process  was  not  necessary.  Businesses  reported  facing  difficulties  in  requesting  such 
information  and  storing  personal  data  for  18  months  in  line  with  inspections  by  national 
authorities.  Simplifying  verification  upon  sale  in  established  business  relationships  was  the 
main  concern  voiced  by  industry  representatives,  although  these  stakeholders  generally  did 
not  highlight  similar  issues  of  proportionality  when  verifying  sales  with  members  of  the 
general  public.  Cost  estimates  were  very  limited  but  suggest  that  verification  upon  sale  in 
business transactions has caused significant expenditure for the minority of stakeholders who 
reported such data. 

Most  stakeholders  also  strongly  support  a  revision  of  the  1%  w/w  rule68  for  homogeneous 
mixtures  of  more  than  five  ingredients  (Article 3,  point  (13)).  This  rule  means  that  a  wide 
array  of  mixtures  and  products  are  currently  covered  by  the  Regulation  (e.g.  cleaning 
products, cosmetics, glues, aerosols, food supplements) in cases where it is generally believed 

66 On average, terrorist attacks led to 47 fatalities every year between 2010 and 2020, compared to 4 between 
2021 and 2023. Source: Statista, Number of fatalities due to terrorist attacks in the European Union from 
2010 to 2023, available at  https://www.statista.com/statistics/1178596/number-of-fatalities-from-terrorism-
eu/, last accessed 18 July 2025. 

67 Methodologies to assess the statistical value of human life vary, and there is no common approach to assess 
this  at  EU  level.  As  a  reference,  the  literature  review  conducted  for  the  2019  Handbook  on  the  external 
costs of transport published by the European Commission (DG MOVE) estimated that the statistical value 
stood  between  EUR 1  and  4  million.  Source  accessible  at 
of  human 
last 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/9781f65f-8448-11ea-bf12-01aa75ed71a1, 
accessed 18 July 2025. 

the  EU 

life 

in 

68 This analysis is based on the discussions in the SCP in recent years. It differs significantly from the analysis 
presented  in  Annex  III,  which  is  based  on  stakeholder  consultation  carried  out  by  the  consultant  in  the 
context  of  the  support  study.  However,  it  appeared  that  there  was  much  confusion  among  stakeholders 
when replying to the questions on this matter, and this rendered the analyses untrustworthy. 

36 

 
 
that extracting explosives precursors for misuse would be near impossible or require expert 
knowledge, or that it would simply be much easier to acquire those explosives precursors in 
pure  form  in  greater  quantities  or  concentrations  via  other  channels.  The  control  and 
monitoring of these products  – which do not pose a genuine threat  – is time- and resource-
consuming  for  market  participants  and  competent  authorities  and  is  generally  seen  as  a 
significant inefficiency. 

The  main  problem  seems  to  be  with  products  and  mixtures  that  contain  acetone,  although 
other substances from Annexes I and II may also create similar problems. This topic has been 
discussed extensively in the meetings of the SCP in the past few years, and although there is 
strong support for a revision, no concrete and workable proposal has yet emerged. 

4.1.3.  Coherence 

The Regulation should integrate well into the overall legal and policy framework at EU level, 
but also at international and national level69. Contradictions, overlaps or other tensions with 
other measures should be avoided and, ideally, synergies created. This is what is understood 
by ‘external coherence’. At the same time, the various components of the Regulation should 
build on or complement each other in a logical and meaningful way – the Regulation should 
be ‘internally coherent’. External and internal coherence of the Regulation were assessed for 
this  evaluation,  and  one  point  of  external  incoherence  and  a  number  of  points  of  internal 
incoherence were identified. 

Summary of the findings on coherence  

In terms of external coherence, the evaluation did not identify major inconsistencies between 
the Regulation and other EU legal or political instruments. The Regulation is overall coherent 
with  the  security,  including  counter-terrorism,  frameworks  and  strategies.  However,  some 
stakeholders  call  for  streamlining  or  clarifying  a  number  of  minor  issues  such  as  a  better 
alignment  of  the  exceptions  of  the  Regulation  with  the  Pyrotechnics  and  Civil  Explosives 
Directives and the use of the safety data sheet in the context of the informing the supply chain 
obligation and the inclusion of waste in the Regulation in relation to the REACH Regulation. 
Also,  as  far  as  internal  coherence  is  concerned  there  are  some  minor  issues  such  as 
inconsistencies between the definitions of certain actors and their obligations and between the 
main text of the Regulation and its Annexes.  

a)  External coherence 

The  following  legislative  instruments  have  been  reviewed  as  part  of  the  assessment  of  the 
Regulation’s external coherence: 

69 Better Regulation Toolbox, Tool #47. 

37 

 
 
 
•  ProtectEU: a European internal security strategy 

●  The EU counterterrorism agenda 

●  The  EU  action  plan  to  enhance  preparedness  against  chemical,  biological,  radiological 
and nuclear security risks (CBRN action plan) 

●  Directive 2014/28/EU on civil explosives (Civil Explosives Directive) 

●  Directive  2013/29/EU  on  the  making  available  on  the  market  of  pyrotechnic  articles 
(Pyrotechnics Directive) 

●  Regulation  (EC)  No 273/2004  and  Regulation  (EC)  No 111/2005  on  drug  precursors 
(Drug Precursors Regulations) 

●  Regulation  (EC)  No 1907/2006  concerning  the  Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation 
and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) 

●  Regulation  (EC)  No 1272/2008  on  the  classification,  labelling  and  packaging  of 
substances and mixtures (CLP Regulation) 

●  Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human 
use (Medicinal Products Directive) 

●  Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act) 

●  Directive  2012/18/EU  on  the  control  of  major-accident  hazards  involving  dangerous 
substances (Seveso III Directive) 

●  Directive 2008/98/EC on waste (Waste Framework Directive). 

Overall, the evaluation found the Regulation to be coherent with other EU legal or political 
instruments. No major problematic inconsistencies between the Regulation and other pieces 
of  EU  legislation  were  found  and  the  Regulation  supports  the  EU’s  wider  security  and 
counterterrorism  strategic  priorities.  In  general, 
the  obligations  under  chemical  or 
environmental legislation were not found to conflict with the Regulation, given that its remit 
and objectives are totally different. 

The Regulation is coherent with the overall ProtectEU: European Internal Security Strategy 
in  that  it  calls  for  restricting  the  means  for  terrorists  and  criminals  to  commit  attacks. 
Concretely the ProtectEU Strategy announces the Commission’s intention to review the rules 
on explosives precursors.  

The Regulation is aligned with the objective of the EU counterterrorism agenda in preventing 
the  misuse  of  explosives  by  radicalised  individuals  or  groups.  It  does  so  by  limiting  the 
availability of certain dangerous substances or mixtures to the general public (Article 5) and 
by  requiring  any  suspicious  transactions  involving  these  substances  to  be  reported  to  the 
relevant  national  authority  (Article 9).  The  Regulation  is  coherent  with  the  EU’s  CBRN 

38 

 
action plan. Both instruments share the objective of limiting unauthorised access to hazardous 
substances  or  substances  that  can  be  misused  to  carry  out  attacks.  The  evaluation  did  not 
identify  any  inconsistencies,  contradictions  or  overlaps  between  the  Regulation  and  the 
CBRN action plan. 

Overall  coherence  is  ensured  between  the  Regulation  and  the  Pyrotechnic  Directive,  with 
Article  2(2)(b)  explicitly  excluding  pyrotechnic  articles  from  the  Regulation’s  scope. 
However,  according  to  one  stakeholder,  the  exclusions  provided  in  Article  2(2)(b)  are 
creating various interpretation difficulties in one Member State70. A similar conclusion can be 
drawn for the Civil Explosives Directive. There is overall coherence between the Regulation 
and this Directive. However, the same stakeholder claims there are also various interpretation 
difficulties in the same Member State. The Commission is currently consulting other relevant 
stakeholders on this matter.  

Desk research and stakeholder consultations did not identify any issues of  coherence with the 
Drug Precursors Regulations  either. While acetone and sulphuric acid  are regulated in  both 
frameworks,  the  Regulation  adopts  a  more  restrictive  approach71  due  to  the  lethality  of 
explosives liable to  be  manufactured with  small  quantities of  explosives  precursors. With  a 
different  purpose  (fight  against  illegal  drug  manufacture  versus  fight  against  illegal 
explosives  manufacture),  availability  (drug  precursor  policy  focuses  traditionally  on  the 
diversion of larger quantities of chemical substances) and reaction times (quickly reacting is 
more  important  for  explosives  precursors),  having  common  national  contact  points  for 
suspicious  activity  reporting  for  both  frameworks  was  found  to  be  neither  feasible  nor 
desirable72. 

The evaluation did not identify any general incoherence issues with the REACH Regulation. 
They  are  interconnected  in  managing  chemical  substances.  While  REACH  focuses  on 
chemical  safety  through  registration  and  market  controls,  the  Regulation  addresses  security 
by restricting access to certain substances which can be misused for the illegal manufacture 
of explosives and by requiring the reporting of suspicious  transactions.  However, there is  a 
minor  issue  with  Recital  9  of  the  Regulation  which  specifies  that  each  economic  operator 
should  inform  the  recipient  of  regulated  explosives  precursors  that  the  making  available, 
introduction,  possession  or  use  of  those  explosives  precursors  by  members  of  the  general 
public  is  subject  to  this  Regulation  for  example  by  including  that  information  in  the  safety 
data  sheet  compiled  in  accordance  with  the  REACH  Regulation.  It  seems  that  many 
economic operators do not know that if a safety data sheet is required there is an obligation to 
mention this information in Section 15 (Legislation) of the safety data sheet. Therefore,  the 
safety  data  sheet  is  currently  not  a  reliable  source  of  information  for  classification  as  an 

70 Based on a contribution received during the Call for Evidence.  
71  For  instance  by  requiring  the  verification  of  personal  identity  upon  sale  or  by  requiring  Member  States’ 

national contact points to be active 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 
72 Based on discussions held during the 36th and 37th meetings of the SCP. 

39 

 
 
explosives  precursor.  To  avoid  this  confusion  some  stakeholders  call  for  removing  the 
reference to the safety data sheet altogether.   

The CLP Regulation and the Regulation do not contain any explicit cross references to each 
other. However, they intersect through shared oversight of chemical substances, with the CLP 
Regulation ensuring clear hazard communication and the Regulation focusing on the security 
of dangerous substances. 

The  evaluation  found  that  the  Digital  Services  Act  (DSA)  provides  a  robust  horizontal  due 
diligence  framework  addressing,  inter  alia,  the  dissemination  of  illegal  content,  which 
includes the placing on the market of restricted explosives precursors not in compliance with 
the  Regulation.  In  addition,  providers  of  online  platforms  allowing  consumers  to  conclude 
distance  contracts  with  traders  are  subject  to  due  diligence  provisions  ensuring,  inter  alia, 
traceability  of  traders  and  compliance  by  design  regarding  the  provision  of  information  by 
traders.  These  obligations  apply  in  a  complementary  manner  to  the  obligations  for  online 
marketplaces  under  the  Regulation  to  inform  sellers  on  their  platforms  about  their 
obligations, to take measures allowing for effective implementation of the verification-upon-
sale  obligation  and  to  put  in  place  appropriate,  reasonable  and  proportionate  procedures  to 
detect suspicious transactions and to report them to the national contact points. 

Additionally,  Article 9  of  the  DSA  harmonises  the  minimum  conditions  that  orders  to 
intermediary service providers, including online platforms, must meet to require the provider 
to inform the issuing authority without undue delay about the effect given to those orders. If 
the  relevant  legal  basis  meets  these  requirements,  national  authorities  issuing  orders  to 
remove  non-compliant  listings  offering  restricted  explosives  precursors  substances  to  the 
public  may  also  rely  on  this  information  obligation,  enabling  them  to  promptly  seek 
enforcement when a provider indicates not to give full effect to an order. 

Finally, the DSA also harmonises the liability exemption of intermediary services, including 
online platforms, setting out the conditions under which the provider can be held accountable 
for  failing  to  act  against  illegal  content.  The  combination  of  the  DSA  and  the  Regulation 
strengthens  enforcement  overall,  ensuring  that  illegal  online  sales  of  explosives  precursors 
can be swiftly identified and removed. 

Safety,  security  and  reporting  requirements  under  the  Seveso  III  Directive  complement  the 
measures of the Regulation. The obligations under the Seveso III Directive address the secure 
storage  and  handling  of  the  substances  on-site  to  mitigate  risks  of  accidental  incidents.  In 
addition  to  safety  measures,  the  Seveso  III  Directive  aims  to  limit  unauthorised  access  to 
hazardous  substances,  particularly  through  physical  protection  measures  and  site-specific 
safety  protocols.  As  such,  it  complements,  but  does  not  duplicate,  the  provisions  of  the 
Regulation. 

40 

 
 
 
Possible gap in the EU regulatory framework 

In  the  meetings  of  the  Standing  Committee  on  Precursors  discussions  have  taken  place  on  
whether there is currently a loophole in the Regulation concerning ‘waste’. 

One interpretation implies that  ‘waste’ falls outside the scope of the Regulation on the basis 
of  the  following  reasoning:  According  to  Regulation  (EC)  No  1907/2006  concerning  the 
Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation  and  Restriction  of  Chemicals  (‘the  REACH 
Regulation’),  ‘waste’  as  defined  in  Directive  2006/12/EC  (former  Waste  Framework 
Directive)  is  not  a  substance,  mixture  or  article  within  the  meaning  of  Article  3  of  the 
REACH  Regulation.  As  the  Regulation  refers  to  the  REACH  Regulation  to  determine  its 
scope ‘waste’ is also excluded from the scope of the Regulation. Consequently, according to 
this  interpretation,  there  is  currently  for  instance  no  obligation  for  economic  operators  to 
notify  suspicious  transactions  with  waste  of  regulated  explosives  precursors  or  waste 
containing regulated explosives precursors even though in certain cases such waste could still 
be used for the illegal manufacture of HMEs.   

However, it could also be argued that the legislator only intended to use the definitions of a 
substance, a mixture and an article of the REACH Regulation and not the exclusion of waste 
from the scope of the REACH Regulation.  

Stakeholders agree that it would be useful to clarify this matter.  

b)  Internal coherence73 

The analysis on internal coherence of the Regulation found the following issues: 

a)  Definition  of  ‘professional  user’  (Article 13,  point (9)):  ‘any  natural  or  legal  person  or 
public entity or group of such persons or entities that has a demonstrable need for a restricted 
explosives precursor for purposes connected with its trade, business, or profession’ 

Three main issues have been raised by stakeholders: 

- It is not clear from the above definition how ‘purpose connected with its trade, business, or 
profession’  should  be  interpreted  (e.g.  is  the  use  of  a  pipe-cleaning  product  containing 
sulphuric  acid  by  a  car  dealer  to  clean  its  sanitary  facilities  for  staff  and/or  customers 
connected  with  its  trade,  business  or  profession  considering  that  this  has  no  connection  to 
their car-dealing activities?). 

-  The  definition  restricts  the  circle  of  professional  users  to  the  effect  that  the  need  for  a 
limited  restricted  explosives  precursor  must  be  linked  to  the  purpose  of  the  commercial, 
business  or  professional  activity.  Educational  establishments  of  any  kind,  and  in  particular 
their  subjects  (e.g.  university  students,  vocational  school  apprentices,  secondary  school 

73 Based on contributions received in the context of the call for evidence. 

41 

 
 
 
students),  cannot  be  clearly  classified  under  this  definition,  although  their  education  and 
training activities may well require restricted explosives precursors. The same applies to non-
profit  associations  (e.g.  sports  associations,  model  building  associations,  fruit,  horticultural 
and winegrowers’ associations). 

-  The  definition  of  a  professional  user  presupposes  that  the  professional  user  has  a  proven 
need for restricted explosives precursors in the course of their trade, business or profession. 
On the other hand, regulated (non-restricted) precursors from Annex I (below the limit value) 
and Annex II are not covered, which means that business or professional activities involving 
regulated (non-restricted) precursors do not fall within the definition of professional user or 
the  definition  of  a  member  of  the  general  public  (Article 3,  point  (8))  and  are  therefore,  in 
principle,  not  covered  by  the  Regulation.  This  is  also  in  contradiction  with  the  reporting 
obligations laid down in Article 9(5) of the Regulation, according to which professional users 
must  report  the  disappearance  or  theft  of  significant  quantities  of  regulated  explosives 
precursors within 24 hours of detection of the disappearance or theft. 

b) Extended restrictions on mixtures with chlorates and perchlorates 

The  extended  restrictions  on  mixtures  with  chlorates  and  perchlorates  –  currently  codified 
under Article 5(2) – are not consistent with the overall logic of the Regulation. This can lead 
to (unintentional) non-compliance by economic operators and professional users. 

c) Informing the supply chain 

- Article 7(1) states that ‘An economic operator who makes available a regulated explosives 
precursor  to  another  economic  operator  shall  inform  that  economic  operator  that  the 
acquisition,  introduction,  possession  or  use  of  that  regulated  explosives  precursor  by 
members of the general public is subject to reporting obligations as set out in Article 9.’ This 
appears to be a clerical error in the Regulation, as the reporting obligations under Article 9 do 
not link the acquisition, introduction, possession or use of regulated explosives precursors to 
members of the general public. 

-  Additionally,  Article 7(1)  of  the  Regulation  does  not  include  an  obligation  for  economic 
operators to inform professional users or members of the general public of their obligations to 
report  suspicious  activity.  However,  in  accordance  with  Article 9(5)  of  the  Regulation, 
professional users have explicit reporting obligations. This is not consistent. 

d) Verification upon sale 

The requirements  laid down in  Article 8(2) of the Regulation  are  not  fully  aligned  with  the 
template  of  the  customer’s  statement  set  out  in  Annex  IV.  Article 8(2)  states  that  ‘Member 
States may use the template of the customer’s statement set out in Annex IV.’ This is only an 
‘optional’ suggestion. It is not clear what information must actually be included. 

In general, the provisions of Article 8 are difficult to implement in the context of online sales 
by  online  economic  operators  and  online  marketplaces  despite  the  fact  that  there  is  a  clear 
overall obligation for them to comply with that article. 

42 

 
e) Monitoring programme 

Article 19  defines  the  type  of  information  that  Member  States  must  provide  to  the 
Commission  on  an  annual  basis.  Furthermore,  Article 20  requires  the  Commission  to 
establish  a  detailed  programme  for  monitoring  the  outputs,  results  and  impact  of  the 
Regulation.  However,  it  is  unclear  how  the  two  provisions  relate  to  each  other.  One 
stakeholder therefore proposed to delete Article 20 entirely. 

f) Confusing title of Annex II 

Annex II refers to the substances listed in it as ‘reportable explosives precursors’. Apart from 
the fact  that  the concept of ‘reportable  explosives  precursors’ does not  appear  elsewhere in 
the  Regulation  and  is  not  defined  in  Article 3,  this  designation  may  give  the  impression  to 
people who  do  not  have a  detailed  knowledge of  the Regulation  that  only those substances 
are subject to notification. 

g) The inclusion of magnalium 

Magnalium (powder) is an intermetallic mixture of magnesium and aluminium, often used for 
the production of illegal pyrotechnics. It is therefore important to ensure that it is covered by 
the Regulation. Common magnalium powders consist of approximately 50% magnesium and 
about  50%  aluminium.  The  minimum  aluminium  or  magnesium  content  of  70%  w/w 
specified in note (3) of Annex II is not exceeded in this composition. The Regulation does not 
contain any provision that ensures that when the overall concentration of these substances in 
the mixture exceeds the limit value, the mixture is covered by it (as is the case for chlorates 
and perchlorates in Article 5(2)). Such magnalium powders are therefore not formally to be 
classified  as  regulated  explosives  precursors  in  the  Regulation  even  though  they  are 
equivalent  to  magnesium  or  aluminium,  both  chemically  and  from  the  point  of  view  of 
possible  use  for  the  manufacture  of  HMEs  (including  pyrotechnics).  Stakeholders  therefore 
suggest  including  a  provision  similar  to  the  mixtures  with  chlorates  and  perchlorates. 
Furthermore,  in  the  interests  of  clarity,  the  term  ‘magnalium  (powder)’  should  ideally  be 
explicitly mentioned as an example in Annex II. 

h) The addition of hydrates of nitrate salts to the annexes 

Two Member States noted that there is currently a problem with how nitrate salt hydrates are 
referred to in the annexes to the Regulation. This problem existed already in Regulation (EU) 
No 98/2013 but was not addressed by Regulation (EU) 2019/1148. SCP members agreed that 
the  current  method  is  problematic  but  that  more  analysis  is  needed  on  how  to  rectify  the 
situation. 

4.1.4.  Impact on fundamental rights and freedoms 

43 

 
 
This  section  assesses  the  impacts  that  the  Regulation  has  had  on  fundamental  rights  and 
freedoms as defined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 

Summary of the findings on the impact on fundamental rights and freedoms 

The  evaluation  finds  that  the  Regulation  impacts  on  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms,  in 
particular  as  regards  the  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions  and  the  verification  upon  sale 
obligations. However, this impact is limited and proportionate to the security objective of the 
Regulation. 

The  evaluation  recognises  that  the  Regulation  affects  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms,  in 
particular as regards the reporting of suspicious transactions and verification upon sale. The 
requirement  for  sellers  to  report  suspicious  purchases  of  explosives  precursors  involves 
collecting personal data (e.g. proof of identity, contact information and purchase history) and 
sharing  them  with  authorities,  affecting  individuals’  right  to  privacy  (as  acknowledged  in 
recital 22). Individuals engaging in legitimate activities (such as hobby chemists or farmers 
purchasing fertilisers) may be subject to scrutiny if their transactions are deemed suspicious. 
Members  of  the  public  responding  to  the  public  consultation  underlined  their  opposition  to 
what was considered to be over-regulation and excessive encroachment on their personal data 
and  freedoms.  A  parallel  concern  was  reported  by  several  economic  operators  surveyed 
facing  significant  challenges  in  obtaining  proof  of  identity  from  customers.  SMEs  face 
significant challenges in implementing secure data protection measures, with many indicating 
that the cost and complexity of compliance make it difficult for them to meet data protection 
requirements effectively74. 

The  findings  of  the  evaluation  confirm  that  the  objectives  and  scope  of  the  Regulation’s 
impact on fundamental rights and freedoms are proportionate and in line with the GDPR. In 
practice,  the  Regulation  applies  only  to  a  limited  number  of  substances  and  reporting  of 
suspicious  transactions  covers  only  suspect  cases  found  to  be  associated  with  the  illicit 
manufacture  of  explosives.  The  Regulation  is  governed  by  the  GDPR  and  Directive  (EU) 
2016/680  (the  Law  Enforcement  Directive).  It  limits  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions  to 
what  is  seen  as  necessary  to  achieve  its  security  objectives,  aiming  to  avoid  large-scale 
collection  and  possible  misuse  of  personal  data.  On  the  other  hand,  industry  stakeholders 
expressed much concern regarding the necessity and added value of requesting personal proof 
of  identity  (at  least)  every  12  months  in  established  business-to-business  relationships,  an 
obligation which creates considerable burdens as well as uncertainty regarding personal data 
handling  and  storing.  In  particular,  while  Article 8(2)  requires  economic  operators  to 
‘request’  proof  of  personal  identity  from  a  customer  that  is  a  professional  user  or  other 

74 Based on 12 responses to the survey of market participants. 

44 

 
 
 
economic  operator,  sellers  usually  keep  such  information  (including  personal  data)  for  18 
months to ensure that they comply with Article 8(4) and for possible inspections75. 

4.2.  How and to whom did the EU intervention make a difference? 

This section presents the assessment of the EU added value of the Regulation, i.e. whether the 
Regulation has value above and beyond what Member States could achieve without an EU-
wide regulatory framework76. 

To  estimate  the  EU  added  value  of  the  Regulation,  this  assessment  compares  the  situation 
before  the  Regulation’s  implementation  (baseline),  a  hypothetical  scenario  where  no  EU 
intervention had taken place (non-EU counterfactual) and the added value of the Regulation 
in its current form. Its conclusions are that the Regulation has brought coherence, consistency 
and  increased  effectiveness  in  areas  where  national  legislation  alone  would  have  been 
insufficient. 

Summary of the findings on EU added value  

There  is  stakeholder  consensus  that  the  Regulation  created  EU  added  value  and  remains  
necessary. Only an EU-level instrument can provide the necessary coordination to address the 
risks of illegal HMEs while preserving the functioning of the single market. National action 
alone would not have been sufficient to ensure harmonised restrictions and a harmonised list 
of  explosives  precursors  and  criminals  and  terrorists  would  have  been  able  to  exploit 
weaknesses of the most permissive national framework. 

Baseline situation 

The  Regulation  is  found  to  have  created  EU  added  value  and  to  remain  a  necessary 
intervention at EU level, offering results beyond what Member States could achieve by acting 
independently.  Prior  to  the  Regulation,  some  EEA  States  had  implemented  measures  (e.g. 
under Regulation  (EU)  No 98/2013  or national  laws), but  gaps and discrepancies existed in 
terms of substance coverage, concentration thresholds, inconsistent reporting obligations, or 
awareness-raising  practices.  The  evaluation  of  the  previous  Regulation,  Regulation  (EU) 
No 98/2013,  identified  a  ‘regulatory  failure’  and  found  its  level  of  restriction  of  explosives 
precursors  to  be  insufficient,  noting  that  the  Regulation  had  not  enabled  a  level  playing 
field77. 

75  Based  on  replies  to  the  survey  of  market  participants,  interviews  with  chemical  manufacturers  and 

observations made during the 36th and 37th meetings of the SCP. 

76 Better Regulation Toolbox, Tool #47. 
77 European Commission study supporting the evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 98/2013, unpublished. 

45 

 
 
 
 
 
Non-EU counterfactual 

Evidence  suggests  that  most  Member  States  would  not  have  adopted  measures  to  regulate 
explosives  precursors  and  restrict  the  general  public’s  access  to  them  to  the  same  level  as 
provided  by  the  Regulation.  In  the  absence  of  EU  legislation,  Member  States  could  have 
regulated precursors  at  national  level.  Norway,  for instance, had a precursor control  regime 
similar to the EU’s current framework before the Regulation was adopted. Prior to enactment 
of the Regulation, four Member States had notified additional restrictions to the Commission 
under  grounds  of  potential  misuse  of  specific  substances  for  the  illicit  manufacture  of 
explosives. As noted in the impact assessment preceding the Regulation’s adoption, without 
further  EU  action,  some  Member  States  would  have  been  expected  to  introduce  national 
restrictions on sulphuric acid78. However, the effectiveness of such measures in achieving key 
objectives  –  such  as  limiting  availability  to  the  general  public,  requiring  reporting  of 
suspicious transactions and preventing illicit manufacture – would have been constrained by 
the  lack  of  coordination  and  uneven  implementation.  Criminal  actors  could  have  exploited 
legal and enforcement asymmetries between countries, while risk assessment or information 
sharing across internal borders might have remained limited. 

National action alone would not have been sufficient to ensure harmonised restrictions and a 
harmonised list of explosives precursors (with the same concentration levels across the EU). 
This  would  have  posed  security  risks  due  to  the  transnational  nature  of  many  criminal  and 
terrorist groups, which would have been able to exploit the weakness of the most permissive 
national  framework.  The  absence  of  common  rules  would  have  created  difficulties  for 
economic  operators  trading  across  borders,  hindering  the  objectives  of  the  single  market, 
possibly reducing consumer choice and rendering the EU chemical market less competitive. 
Without  shared  obligations,  Member  States  might  not  have  established  effective  contact 
points,  and  the  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions  might  be  lacking  in  some  countries. 
Economic operators and online marketplaces, whose regulatory obligations were found to be 
unclear  in  the  previous  framework,  would  have  faced  legal  uncertainty  and  practical 
difficulties  when  trying  to  ensure  compliance  for  cross-border  transactions.  For  online 
marketplaces, however, the legislative framework has in the meantime evolved considerably 
with the entry into force of the DSA, which further helps tackle the problems covered by the 
Regulation. 

Added value of the Regulation 

No  evidence  suggests  that  Member  States  could  have  independently  adopted  restrictions, 
reporting  mechanisms  and  obligations  on market  participants  in  a  manner  equivalent  to  the 
Regulation  and  in  a  single  market-friendly  manner.  Most  Member  States  relied  on  the  EU 

78  European  Commission  (2019),  Commission  staff  working  document,  Impact  assessment  accompanying  the 
document proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the marketing and 
use  of  explosives  precursors,  amending  Annex  XVII  to  Regulation  (EC)  No 1907/2006  and  repealing 
Regulation  (EU)  No 98/2013  on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives  precursors,  SWD(2018)  104  final, 
Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 

46 

 
 
legal  framework  to  set  restrictions,  impose  reporting  obligations  and  lay  down  rules  for 
market  participants.  Stakeholders  consulted  consistently  agreed  that  only  an  EU-level 
instrument  could  provide  the  necessary  coordination  to  address  the  risks  of  HMEs  while 
preserving the functioning of the single market. 

Consultations with national authorities pointed to a missed opportunity for the Regulation to 
provide a harmonised  framework in  handling explosives precursors imported into the EU79. 
The Regulation lacks explicit provisions on the role of customs authorities to implement it. 
Customs enforcement was reported as a challenge in several Member States, some of which 
do  not  have  a  corresponding  framework  in  place.  Issues  reported  include  difficulties 
identifying regulated explosives precursors at the border, an insufficient legal basis to act and 
limited detection tools. Evaluation findings suggest that greater added value of the Regulation 
in  providing  clarity  on  the  enforcement  of  its  provisions  by  customs  authorities  should  be 
pursued. 

The  monitoring  programme  introduced  by  the  Regulation  has  provided  some  insights  into 
existing implementation efforts as well as possible discrepancies. The quality and reliability 
of  the  data  submitted  by  the  Member  States  varies  significantly,  however,  and  this  makes 
comparing  and  analysing  the  data  challenging.  Member  States  are  of  the  view  that  their 
reporting  obligations  do  lead  to  tangible  results  and  that  the  monitoring  programme  is 
therefore not currently being used to its full potential80. Hence, a discussion on improving the 
added value and usefulness of reported data, and potentially the framework of the monitoring 
programme, should be considered as part of the Regulation’s review. 

While Member States that adopted the licensing system rated it as effective in relation to the 
objectives pursued, some stakeholders raised concerns that differences in licensing conditions 
(or  a  lack  of  licensing  altogether)  lead  to  uneven  public  access  to  restricted  precursors  and 
risk resulting in regulatory circumvention across borders. Of the eight Member States with a 
licensing  regime, only  two reported using the format for the licence provided in  Annex III. 
This suggests that this voluntary format provides only limited added value. 

Results  attributed  to  the  Regulation’s  effectiveness,  such  as  restricted  availability  for  the 
general public, common concentration levels and obligations for market participants, as well 
as  the  usefulness  of  suspicious  activity  reporting  to  launch  and  support  investigations  and 
prosecutions, are understood to have been made possible through EU-level intervention. 

Necessity and subsidiarity of the Regulation 

There  is  stakeholder  consensus  that  the  Regulation  remains  a  necessary  piece  of  EU 
legislation.  Ongoing  discussions  by  SCP  members  regarding  the  adequacy  of  regulated 
explosives precursors demonstrate that coordination at EU level remains useful in addressing 
shared security concerns and emerging trends. 

79 Based on the survey of national authorities and discussions of the 36th and 37th meetings of the SCP. 
80 Based on the interview with the European Commission. 

47 

 
 
The  strengthened  framework  when  it  comes  to  online  transactions  in  explosives  precursors 
remains an important addition of the Regulation – now applying in a complementary manner 
to the DSA. Such obligations for all online platforms acting as marketplaces for explosives 
precursors, as well as minimum requirements for control and inspections of such platforms, 
remain  necessary  as  the  legitimate  buying  of  explosives  precursors  online  has  become 
commonplace  and  is  expected  to  increase  further  (in  line  with  the  overall  trend  in  online 
business). However, it remains to be seen to what extent the DSA is already alleviating the 
problems faced in this sector, also in other online platforms, including the open channels of 
messaging and communication apps and social media81. 

Criminal and terrorist networks remain active in  the EU and are commonly transnational in 
nature,  allowing  explosives  precursors  and  HMEs  to  move  freely  across  internal  borders  – 
meaning that one Member State’s weakness weakens them all. 

4.3. 

Is the intervention still relevant? 

This  section  provides  an  overview  of  the  assessed  relevance,  i.e.  whether  the  Regulation 
remains a pertinent intervention and is future-proof, and hence whether it can stand the test of 
time82. 

Summary of the findings on relevance  

The  evaluation  concludes  that  the  Regulation  is  a  relevant  intervention,  but  that  its  scope 
could  be  redefined  to  ensure  it  remains  fit  for  the  future  and  flexible  to  adapt  to  new 
developments,  including  possibly  high-risk  chemicals83.  There  is  general  buy-in  as  to  the 
objectives  and  usefulness  of  the  Regulation  among  national  authorities  and  industry 
stakeholders. 

Relevance of the Regulation’s provisions 

In particular, the evaluation made a case for strengthening the enforcement role for customs 
authorities as part of the Regulation’s provisions. The Regulation  currently  does  not  confer 
any  enforcement  powers  on  customs  authorities,  unlike  some  other  EU  legal  instruments 
dealing  with  border-sensitive  issues.  Customs  authorities  are  not  tasked  with  inspecting 
imported  regulated  explosives  precursors,  verifying  the  accompanying  documentation  or 
reporting suspicious transactions under the Regulation. The majority of Member States have 
codified  in  their  national  legislation  the  role  of  customs  in  implementing  the  Regulation  or 
taken  measures  such  as  intelligence  sharing,  physical  inspections  at  borders  and  detaining 

81 Survey of national authorities. 
82 Better Regulation Toolbox, Tool #47. 
83  High-risk  chemicals  are  substances  that  can  be  used  to  manufacture  devices  that  can  release  lethal  or 

poisonous gases. Such devices can also be used by terrorists to stage an attack.  

48 

 
 
 
non-compliant shipments. However, the involvement of customs authorities remains indirect 
and  incidental,  and  several  Member  States  report  that  this  absence  of  provisions  in  the 
Regulation creates legal or practical difficulties for them in conducting customs controls on 
explosives precursors. Evidence is mixed84 but suggests that making the role of customs more 
explicit  could  help  address  these  issues  and  ensure  a  higher  level  of  consistency  in 
enforcement,  in  particular in Member States which reported lower enforcement.  One of the 
major challenges in this respect is that it is very difficult to determine for the authorities – and 
in  particular  for  customs  authorities  –  which  products  and  mixtures  are  covered  by  the 
Regulation and should therefore be controlled and monitored. 

However, it should be noted that there is no strong evidence that criminals and terrorists have 
attempted to source regulated explosives precursors by importing them from third countries. 

Stakeholders  were  generally  in  favour  of  explicitly  including  both  messaging  and 
communication  apps  and  social  media  platforms  in  the  Regulation  to  raise  awareness  and 
increase compliance. It should be explored whether other intermediaries are technically able 
and eligible to be covered by current provisions as online marketplaces insofar as they act as 
intermediaries  facilitating trade in  explosives precursors, regardless  of whether the trade  be 
between  members  of  the  general  public  and/or  business  and  professional  users.  There  are 
reports  of  these  intermediaries  being  used  to  bypass  rules  and  facilitate  the  illicit  trade  in 
explosives precursors85. For that reason the national authorities consulted  broadly supported 
the explicit inclusion of messaging and communication apps and social media applications in 
the  Regulation,  despite  practical  difficulties  for  enforceability  and  limits  on  how  online 
private-to-private  sales  can  be  controlled  (due  to  encryption  and  privacy  protection,  in 
particular)86. 

Discussions  on  the  adequacy  of  the  list  of  regulated  explosives  precursors  (see  section  on 
effectiveness) show that there are currently no clear criteria or processes which would allow a 
decision  to  be  taken  swiftly  on  the  addition  of  a  new  explosives  precursor  –  or  any  other 
relevant aspect of the annexes to the Regulation – in the event of an evolving threat posed by 
the manufacture or use of HMEs. 

Most  stakeholders  consulted  believed  that  Annexes  I  and  II  contained  the  right  substances 
and  concentration  limits87  (see  also  the  section  on  effectiveness).  Some  did  ask  for  the 
definition  of  what  constitutes  ‘suspicious’  transactions,  disappearances  and  thefts  to  be 
clarified.  It  was  not  clear  to  what  extent  those  stakeholders  were  familiar  with  existing 

84 Based on the survey of national authorities and discussions of the 36th and 37th meetings of the SCP. 
85 Based on interviews with the European Commission and comments by authorities surveyed in eight countries 

(CY, DE, FR, HU, LT, LU, NO, SI). 

86 Interviews (3) with one EU entity (DG  HOME D2), authorities in one Member State  (SI) and one industry 
association  (VCH).  Survey of  national  competent  authorities,  Q31:  comments  made by authorities  in  one 
Member State (DE). 

87 Based on responses to the surveys of market participants and national authorities, as well as the 36th and 37th 

meetings of the SCP. 

49 

 
 
(public and restricted) guidelines dealing with this matter and which of the indicators listed 
could be revised88. 

A few Member States were in favour of defining the obligations of stakeholders responsible 
for  logistics,  transport  and  shipping  within  the  Regulation,  although  SCP  members  had 
diverging views on this89. 

Is the Regulation fit for the future? 

Apart  from  the  above-mentioned  considerations  on  customs  enforcement,  the  inclusion  of 
messaging and communication apps and social media platforms and the need for criteria or a 
process  that  would  allow  a  decision  on  the  update  of  the  annexes  to  be  taken  promptly  if 
necessary, there is no indication that the Regulation is not fit for purpose. Because the trade 
in chemicals is still taking place increasingly online, and this is expected to continue in the 
future, addressing these issues will help ensure that the Regulation keeps pace with economic 
and  societal  developments  (i.e.  how  individuals  shop).  When  it  comes  to  security 
considerations,  proven  attempts  to  circumvent  the  Regulation  are  concerning  but  do  not 
currently seem to warrant revision of its provisions or annexes90. 

Confidential discussions are still being held on the list of regulated explosives precursors, and 
the evaluation could not conclude whether the annexes to the Regulation need to be amended 
despite data obtained from consultations which suggest that other substances and other pre-
precursors are being used to circumvent the Regulation. 

Attempts  at  circumvention  have  included  criminals  or  terrorists  resorting  to  procuring  or 
manufacturing  pyrotechnics,  which  fall  outside  the  scope  of  the  Regulation  if  regulated 
explosives  precursors  are  not  involved91.  Some  Member  States  have  reported  increasing 
instances  of  pyrotechnics  being  misused,  in  particular  by  criminal  networks,  including 
pyrotechnics  illegally  manufactured  using  regulated  explosives  precursors92,  although  the 
Regulation  should  in  principle  be  able  to  prevent  such  illegal  manufacture.  Extraction  of 
explosives precursors from acquired pyrotechnics is also possible. 

Europol  previously  identified  increasing  trends  in  the  manufacturing  of  home-made  low 
explosives93  using  explosives  precursors.  There  are  concerns  about  pre-precursors  such  as 
alternative  peroxides  used  to  manufacture  hydrogen  peroxide,  a  key  ingredient  in  TATP. 
However, no consensus could be reached on whether their inclusion in the Regulation would 

88 Interviews with national authorities in two Member States and one industry association. 
89 Comments made by authorities surveyed or interviewed in four countries (DE, FI, NO, SE). 
90 Based on the literature review, the survey of and interviews with national authorities as well as the 36th and 

37th meetings of the SCP. 

91 Interviews with national authorities in three Member States (DK, FR, NL) and the European Commission. 
92 Such as potassium nitrate, potassium perchlorate, magnesium powder and aluminium powder. Based on  the 

interviews with national authorities in three Member States and the European Commission. 

93 Such as black powder, flash powder, smokeless powder. Source: Europol (2022), EU Terrorism Situation and 
Trend  Report  (EU  TE-SAT),  page  16.  Available  at  https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-
events/main-reports/tesat-report. Last accessed 25 September 2025. 

50 

 
 
be  effective  or  proportionate  in  meeting  policy  objectives,  with  55%  of  Member  States 
considering that the Regulation meets current and future security needs. 

Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the Regulation provide for the Commission to adopt delegated acts, 
including  through  an  urgency  procedure,  to  amend  its  annexes  without  going  through  the 
ordinary legislative procedure. This helps ensure that the Regulation remains flexible enough 
to  address  new  developments  and  regulate  emerging  substances  susceptible  to  misuse. 
However, the delegation of powers is limited in scope as the Commission does not have the 
authority to  restrict new  substances (or to  remove  explosives  precursors  from the  annexes). 
This  limitation  could  potentially  prevent  the  Regulation  from  being  amended  promptly  to 
address new threats from the manufacture and use of HMEs. 

No delegated acts have been adopted or considered necessary since the Regulation came into 
force.  While  the  effectiveness  of  these  articles  could  not  be  ascertained,  no  stakeholders 
considered the delegation of powers not to be a relevant provision of the Regulation. 

5.  WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED? 

5.1.  Conclusions 

The  proper  implementation  of  the  explosives  precursors  legislation  is  important  in  view  of 
the  EU’s  Counter-terrorism  Agenda  and 
internal  security  strategy 
(‘ProtectEU’). It reduces vulnerabilities that can be exploited by terrorists and criminals, by 
denying them the means to carry out attacks with HMEs. 

the  European 

5.1.1.  Impact of the Regulation since 2021 

The Regulation has generally been effective in meeting its stated objectives. In particular, it 
has  significantly  restricted  the  access  of  members  of  the  general  public  to  explosives 
precursors  and  improved  threat  detection  across  Member  States  through  the  obligation  to 
report  suspicious  transactions,  disappearances  and  thefts.  Nevertheless,  law  enforcement 
authorities  across  the  EU  continue  to  frequently  discover  and  dismantle  illegal  explosives 
manufacturing sites where sometimes huge quantities of regulated explosives precursors have 
been  used  or  are  found.  This  suggests  that,  despite  the  general  effectiveness  of  the 
Regulation, there are also sometimes significant shortcomings in the detection procedures of 
market participants. 

The  Regulation  has  helped  raise  awareness  among  most  stakeholders  and  ensured  buy-in 
from  economic  operators  as  to  its  intent  and  provisions.  Persisting  discrepancies  in 
compliance and awareness call for more inspections and awareness-raising campaigns to be 
carried out in certain Member States. 

Overall, the list of regulated explosives precursors covered by the Regulation is considered to 
adequately address the main threat currently posed by HMEs. 

51 

 
 
The Regulation  has  provided a common framework and a  certain  level  playing field  across 
the  EU,  reducing  the  variety  of  legal  regimes  applicable  in  Member  States.  Apart  from 
differences in enforcement and control, the Regulation is rendered less effective by its silence 
on  the  role  of  customs  authorities  in  applying  its  provisions,  which  means  that  explosives 
precursors imported into the EU are probably not subject to the same level of checks as those 
manufactured in its Member States. 

The  Regulation’s  efficiency  was  found  to  be  generally  satisfactory.  Costs  incurred  by 
stakeholders were found to be proportionate to the wider benefits of ensuring a high level of 
security against the misuse of explosives precursors and to have a level of harmonisation and 
legal  clarity.  Stakeholders  face  considerable  costs  in  implementing  the  Regulation, 
particularly  in  verifying  transactions  at  the  point  of  sale  and  ensuring  secure  storage  of 
explosives precursors,  while national  authorities face the highest costs in  inspections, inter-
agency coordination and the handling of suspicious activity reports. As such, possible areas 
for simplification should be considered, especially in the verification process in business-to-
business  transactions,  where  the  burden  and  costs  are  seen  as  disproportionate.  A  common 
view among public and private stakeholders is that the Regulation covers too many mixtures 
and  products  from  which  the  extraction  of  regulated  explosives  precursors  is  not  likely  or 
feasible,  creating  undue  burdens  and  costs  for  businesses  and  competent  authorities.  This 
shows  that  the  1%  w/w  rule  for  homogeneous  mixtures  is  not  fully  efficient,  although 
stakeholders have differing views on what an alternative could be. 

The objectives of the Regulation continue to be relevant. The prevention of attempted attacks 
and a decrease in the number of completed attacks with HMEs manufactured using regulated 
explosives  precursors  suggest  that  the  Regulation’s  restrictions  and  obligations  have 
generally  been  working  and  remain  necessary.  The  EU  Standing  Committee  on  Precursors 
has  proven  a  key  tool  in  working  towards  convergence  in  application  and  in  discussing 
relevant  security-related  and  technological  or  scientific  developments.  Questions  remain 
regarding  the  ability  of  the  Regulation  to  enable  the  swift  restriction  of  new  explosives 
precursors  to  address  new  threats,  as  the  delegation  of  power  to  the  Commission  does  not 
include adding new substances to Annex I to the Regulation. 

The  Regulation  was  found  to  be  largely  externally  coherent  with  other  relevant  EU 
the  European  internal  security  strategy 
legislation  and  political  priorities  such  as 
(‘ProtectEU’)  and  the  EU  counterterrorism  agenda.  The  Regulation  does  not  conflict  with 
obligations  under  EU  chemical  or  environmental  legislation.  However,  its  reliance  on  the 
REACH  Regulation  to  define  a  chemical  substance  raises  an  interpretation  issue  as  to 
whether  or  not  waste  is  covered  by  the  Regulation.  In  relation  to  internal  coherence, 
stakeholders identified a number of provisions of the Regulation which could be clarified and 
streamlined.  This  would  resolve  a  number  of  the  current  implementation  and  interpretation 
problems. 

The Regulation does affect fundamental rights and freedoms, but its effects on them were 
found to be limited in scope and proportionate to its security objectives. 

52 

 
The  Regulation  creates  EU  added  value  and  remains  a  necessary  intervention,  achieving 
results  beyond  what  Member  States  could  accomplish  individually.  This  includes  the 
provision of a level playing field for the legitimate trade in explosives precursors. Its previous 
framework,  by  contrast,  suffered  from  inconsistencies  in  national  application,  leading  to 
regulatory  gaps  and  legal  uncertainty.  Most  Member  States  would  not  have  implemented 
comparable  restrictions  on  public  access  to  explosives  precursors  without  EU  intervention. 
Public and private stakeholders broadly agree on the Regulation’s continued relevance, with 
ongoing discussions among SCP members underscoring its role in addressing shared security 
concerns. Given the transnational nature of terrorist networks and the cross-border movement 
of  explosives  precursors,  weaknesses  in  one  Member  State  can  affect  all,  underscoring  the 
need for a harmonised EU approach. 

5.1.2.  Persisting challenges 

Building  on  the  assessment  of  the  above  criteria,  the  evaluation  has  highlighted  some 
persisting  challenges  which  affect  the  Regulation’s  effectiveness  or  scope  for  improvement 
when it comes to the costs and benefits associated with its implementation. 

One  regulatory  gap  limiting  the  effectiveness  of  the  Regulation  is  that  it  does  not  clearly 
attribute an enforcement role to national customs authorities. Stakeholders in some Member 
States  reported  that  their  customs  authorities  do  not  have  the  necessary  tools  to  assess 
whether imported explosives precursors comply with the Regulation. This is in part due to the 
fact that it cannot be determined from the customs codes whether goods are covered by the 
Regulation (as there is no breakdown to the relevant concentration levels) and to the fact that 
the  Regulation  and  some  Member  States  do  not  have  rules  in  place  for  enforcing  its 
provisions  at  customs.  This  suggests  that  a  clear  role  for  customs  authorities  should  be 
considered  in  the  Regulation,  together  with  accompanying  guidance  for  practical,  cost-
effective  and  operational  implementation,  exchange  of  best  practices  and  cooperation  with 
national  competent  authorities  and  other  authorities  in  charge  of  the  internal  market  (e.g. 
market surveillance authorities). 

Another  challenge  concerns  cooperation  between  Member  States  on  the  follow-up  to 
notifications  on  suspicious  activity  with  a  cross-border  dimension.  This  is  currently 
underdeveloped, resulting in possible missed opportunities to detect and dismantle the illegal 
manufacture and use of HMEs in the EU. 

The  evaluation  found  the  Regulation  to  be  generally  fit  for  purpose.  However,  the 
motivations  of  criminals  and  terrorists  mean  they  will  keep  trying  to  circumvent  existing 
rules and that the Regulation will need to remain flexible and enable new developments and 
emerging threats to be addressed quickly. There are currently no substances for which there is 
an outspoken and broad support to add them to the scope of the Regulation. There are also no 
other broadly supported proposals to amend  the scope of the Regulation  (e.g. concentration 
limits, particle size of metals). However, ongoing discussions in the context of the SCP show 
that there is a need for permanent vigilance and that the situation could change quickly. These 

53 

 
discussions also show that the lack of clear criteria or a clear process for amending the scope 
of the Regulation is preventing efficient, evidence-based decision-making in this context. 

While the Regulation has garnered buy-in as to its intents and framework, simplification and 
burden  reduction  could  create  benefits  for  stakeholders  without  jeopardising  the  overall 
policy objectives. This is also fully in line with the European Commission’s communication 
on the long-term competitiveness of the EU, looking beyond 2030. This seems to be the case 
the  verification-upon-sale  process  for  established  business-to-business 
for  rules  on 
transactions.  The  need  to  request  personal  identity  documentation  was  highlighted  as  an 
uncommon  practice  in  business-to-business  relationships  and  may  not  always  be  effective. 
The requirement to request this information for every transaction – unless such verification of 
the customer in question already took place less than one year previously and the transaction 
does  not  significantly  deviate  from  the  previous  one  –  in  established  business  relationships 
was  argued  to  be  disproportionate  and  not  to  significantly  contribute  to  the  Regulation’s 
security objectives, in particular when the business information collected remains unchanged. 
Moreover,  many  industry  stakeholders  consulted  and  several  national  authorities  supported 
the  exemption  of  finished  products  from  the  obligations  of  the  Regulation  where  it  is  clear 
that  such  products  cannot  easily  be  misused  or  their  components  extracted  to  manufacture 
HMEs.  Options  to  this  end,  including  in  relation  to  the  1%  w/w  rule  in  homogeneous 
mixtures, could be explored. 

Considerable  discrepancies  in  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  Regulation  across 
Member States remain. Monitoring programme data point to stark differences in the numbers 
of inspections carried out as well as suspicious activity reports received, which suggest that 
awareness  and/or  compliance  by  economic  operators,  professional  users  and  online 
marketplaces  may  be  limited  in  certain  Member  States.  Such  implementation  and 
enforcement  differences  between  Member  States  should  be  addressed.  At  the  same  time, 
exploring to what extent services such as the open channels of messaging and communication 
apps and social media are technically capable and eligible to be covered by current provisions 
as  ‘online  marketplaces’  within  the  meaning  of  the  Regulation,  insofar  as  they  act  as 
intermediaries facilitating trade in explosives precursors could ensure legal clarity, awareness 
and, where appropriate, control of these actors. 

Another  possible  regulatory  gap,  albeit  less  often  reported,  is  that  the  Regulation  does  not 
cover waste. As such, waste containing explosives precursors is not subject to the obligations 
of  the  Regulation.  While  waste  is  bound  by  wider  environmental  and  waste  management 
rules, these do not require law enforcement authorities to be informed about possible security 
risks  (linked  to  e.g.  disappearance  or  misappropriation).  However,  stakeholders  did  report 
instances where this had created security risks in practice. 

5.2.  Lessons learned 

In light of the problems identified above, the evaluation suggests that the aspects listed below 
should be examined in future policy interventions on the regulation of explosives precursors. 

54 

 
●  Continuously helping ensure harmonised and uniform application of the Regulation’s 
provisions  across  Member  States  and  by  economic  operators,  professional  users  and 
online marketplaces. This includes raising awareness of the Regulation and its provisions to 
ensure  compliance  with  its  obligations,  continued  enforcement  by  national  authorities  and 
strengthening  cooperation  between  Member  States  in  cross-border  cases,  possibly  with  the 
support of Europol. 

●  Reducing  the  burden  on  industry  and  simplifying  requirements  where  possible, 
including  looking  at  areas  where  risks  of  misuse  are  limited  to  non-existent,  but  in  which 
stakeholders  still  face  disproportionate  compliance  costs  and  burdens,  so  that  the  single 
market  for  explosives  precursors  functions  well  and  is  not  subject  to  any  unnecessary 
barriers.  Reducing  undue  burdens  would  also  support  buy-in  among  economic  operators, 
professional  users  and  online  marketplaces  regarding 
the  security  objectives  and 
proportionality of the Regulation. 

●  Ensuring  that  the  Regulation  enables  a  swift  response  to  emerging  threats  and 
developments. This includes the misuse of new explosives precursors, pre-precursors as well 
as potentially new methods of illicit manufacture of HMEs94. 

●  Addressing  any  persisting  loopholes  in  the  Regulation  to  maximise  its  effectiveness 
and  limit  the  risk  of  circumvention  of  its  requirements,  including  on  customs  enforcement 
and waste. 

●  Clarifying  its  provisions  where  necessary  and  addressing  a  number  of  internal 
coherence  issues  in  the  Regulation  (e.g.  the  information  requested  in  the  Customer’s 
Statement  (Annex  IV)  is  not  aligned  with  the  information  request  in  Article 8(2)  of  the 
Regulation; it is  currently unclear whether  or not  magnalium  powder  – which is  often used 
for the manufacture of HMEs – is covered by the Regulation). 

94 In this context it should be noted that the Commission has carried out detailed analyses on the need to regulate 
high-risk  chemicals  in  2024  (see  also  page  46).  The  decision  as  to  whether  or  not  to  include  high-risk 
chemicals is outside the scope of this evaluation. 

55 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX I: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

Lead DG, Decide reference and, if relevant, work programme reference 

DG for Migration and Home Affairs 

Agenda planning / work programme reference: PLAN/2023/2771 

Organisation and timing 

After  it  had  been  politically  validated,  the  work  on  the  evaluation  (and  impact  assessment) 
started  with  the  drafting  of  the  terms  of  reference  for  the  external  study  in  support  of  the 
evaluation  (and  impact  assessment)  and  the  creation  of  the  Interservice  Steering  Group 
(ISSG) in the last quarter of 2024. The first ISSG meeting took place on 16 May 2024. The 
contract with ICF for the external study was signed in October 2023 for an initial duration of 
10 months  which, in July 2025, was extended by an additional two months.  The ISSG was 
involved  in  all  steps  of  the  evaluation  (and  impact  assessment)  starting  from  the  terms  of 
reference, the consultation strategy and the call for evidence, and continuing throughout the 
public and targeted surveys and the supporting study until the finalisation of the staff working 
document. In total, the ISSG met three times (on 16 May 2024, 13 January 2025 and 14 May 
2025). 

Evidence  used  together  with  sources  and  any  issues  regarding  its  quality  (i.e.  has  the 
information been quality-assured?) 

The  evaluation  (and  impact  assessment)  used  mainly  information  gathered  through  various 
stakeholder consultation activities, but also studies, reports, academic and grey literature (e.g. 
non-papers) and statistical data from different databases, where available. The availability of 
cost  data  was  very  limited,  and  the  market  analysis  was  compromised  by  a  lack  of 
disaggregated data and data missing for some years within the evaluation period. Quality was 
assured  by  triangulating  information  from  different  sources  and  validating  findings  in  the 
stakeholder validation workshop. A more detailed outline of the methodology can be found in 
Annex II. 

Use of external expertise 

The evaluation (and impact assessment) was supported by a study carried out for DG HOME 
by  a  research  team  led  by  ICF  (in  collaboration  with  Milieu,  WSP  and  RAND)  between 
October 2024 and October 2025. Most of the data for the evaluation were collected between 
December  2024  and  May  2025  (although  information  which  became  available  up  to 
September 2025 has also been included). The study ran concurrently  with the 36th, 37th and 
38th  meetings  of  the  Standing  Committee  on  Precursors,  during  which  presentations  were 
given and discussions held on the evaluation (and impact assessment) of the Regulation under 
DG HOME’s chairmanship and with the research team in attendance. 

56 

 
The  study  consulted  external  experts  on  study  design,  consultation  activities,  analysis  and 
synthesis/reporting. 

57 

 
 
 
ANNEX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED 

The evaluation was supported by an external study carried out by a research team led by ICF 
(in collaboration with Milieu, WSP and RAND). The contractor carried out most of the data 
collection activities and data analysis and organised a stakeholder workshop. DG HOME and 
the  ISG  closely  monitored  the  contractor’s  work  from  the  inception  phase  until  the  final 
report.  Consultation  questionnaires  were  discussed  and  refined  before  being  disseminated. 
The deliverables, in particular the final report, underwent several rounds of commentary and 
revision, to improve their quality. 

1. Data collection activities 

The evaluation relied on information from a variety of sources: 

Desk  research:  Academic  literature,  grey  literature  (e.g.  study  reports,  contributions  and 
documents  shared  by  stakeholders)  and  official  documents  (e.g.  legislation,  Commission 
communications) were consulted to gather information. 

All sources are listed in a bibliography at the end of this annex. 

The  research  team  conducted  an  analysis  of  data  reported  by  Member  States  under  the 
Regulation’s  monitoring  programme  for  the  years  2021  to  2024.  The  data  were  first 
aggregated  and  then  analysed  on  a  year-by-year  basis  in  order  to  generate  relevant 
comparisons and identify trends across the evaluation period. In addition, data for the market 
analysis were retrieved from statistical databases such as Prodcom, Eurostat and Statista and 
combined  with  information  from  the  REACH  registration  data  published  by  ECHA  to 
understand trends in business demographics (production and trade values and volumes). The 
aim of the market analysis was to establish: 

the current  production of precursors;  intended use and cross correlation  with  known 
cases of misuse; 

an initial mapping of the supply chain of current precursors; 

an initial mapping of information on trade in precursors. 

Call  for  evidence:  With  a  call  for  evidence  published  in  all  EU  languages  on  the 
Commission  ‘Have  your  say’  portal  from  23 July  to  20 August  2024,  the  Commission 
gathered  preliminary  reactions  from  stakeholders  on  the  main  elements  of  the  initiative.  In 
total,  feedback  was  received  from  19  stakeholders:  12  business  associations,  4  public 
authorities,  2  businesses  and  1  member  of  the  EU  public.  The  Commission  also  received 
three additional replies from the German federal states of Brandenburg, Baden-Württemberg 
and  Saxony-Anhalt,  which  were  not  made  public  as  they  contained  sensitive  information. 
These replies were also shared with ICF. 

Targeted surveys: Two targeted online surveys were launched to provide information for the 
evaluation.  The  surveys  included  open-ended  questions  and  were  supported  by  a  limited 

58 

 
number  of  follow-up  interviews.  A  comprehensive  approach  was  taken  in  designing  the 
questionnaire,  with  stakeholder  groups  being  asked  about  their  views  across  evaluation 
criteria in a consistent and comparable manner. A minimum of two reminders were sent for 
each survey to increase response rates. 

The  survey  for  national  competent  authorities  and  contact  points  was  launched  on 
17 February  and  left  open  for  a  scheduled  duration  of  six  weeks.  It  was  emailed  to  SCP 
members  as  an  editable  Word  document.  The  survey  received  a  total  of  23  consolidated 
national responses. Follow-up interviews with responding authorities were carried out in six 
Member States. 

The second online survey targeted market participants, i.e. economic operators, professional 
and non-professional users and also retailers and online marketplaces dealing with explosives 
precursors.  The  survey  was  launched  on  ICF’s  Forsta  Plus  survey  platform  on  18 February 
and ran for five weeks. By the time it closed on 25 March, the survey had received a total of 
87 individual responses. Only complete responses were used, meaning that respondents had 
to  reply  to  all  mandatory  questions  in  order  for  their  response  to  be  recorded  and  used  for 
analysis.  Data  cleaning  was  conducted  and  did  not  identify  any  duplicate  or  unusable 
responses. Follow-up interviews were carried out with eight survey respondents. 

Public  consultation:  A  public  consultation  was  held  from  31 March  to  23 June  2025  on 
‘Have  your  say’.  It  included  a  questionnaire  with  closed  and  open  questions  which  the 
general  public  was  invited  to  fill  in,  in  order  to  reach  a  broad  range  and  large  number  of 
stakeholders.  The  consultation  aimed  to  validate  the  topics  and  issues  covered  by  the 
evaluation,  gather  information,  data  and  experience  on  the  application  of  the  Regulation, 
solicit views and opinions of stakeholders on the extent to which the Regulation has met its 
objectives  and  gather  views  on  the  Regulation’s  relevance,  taking  into  account  social 
developments.  In  total,  208  answers  were  collected,  most  (approx.  78%)  of  them  from 
members of the EU public. 

Interviews:  The  contractor  conducted  a  total  of  27  interviews.  A  smaller  number  of 
exploratory ‘scoping interviews’ took place in the inception phase of the study. This allowed 
the  study  team  to  further  develop  the  intervention  logic  by  obtaining  at  an  early  stage 
necessary  and  relevant  information  that  ultimately  also  fed  into  the  questionnaires  and 
interview guides for the remaining stakeholders to be consulted. 

The  majority  of  interviews  were  conducted  in  the  main  phase  of  the  study.  They  took  the 
form  of  ‘semi-structured  interviews’  which  examined  more  closely  some  key  trends  and 
findings from the desk research and the survey and/or filled a few information gaps. 

As part of the semi-structured interviews, several follow-up interviews were carried out with 
respondents  to  the  survey  of  market  participants,  with  the  questions  being  adapted  on  the 
basis  of  their  survey  response.  To  limit  stakeholder  fatigue,  more  defined  interviews  were 
conducted  so  that  survey  respondents  were  not  asked  questions  which  they  had  already 
answered in the targeted online surveys. 

59 

 
2. Data analysis 

All data collected were analysed by the contractor using the indicators and judgement criteria 
from  the evaluation matrix  (see Annex  III)  and information  from  different  sources  that had 
been combined and compared (‘triangulation’). 

Responses from the public consultation and the targeted survey were statistically analysed to 
identify  trends  and  patterns.  Qualitative  insights  from  interviews  complemented  these 
findings  with  context  and  details.  More  information  on  the  methodology  used  to  process 
consultation data can be found in the synopsis report in Annex V. 

3. Bibliography 

Documents from public authorities 

European Commission, Evaluation study of Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 on the marketing and 
use of explosives precursors, final report, ICF in collaboration with Milieu, WSP and RAND, 
2025 (not publicly available) 

European  Commission,  Study  establishing  a  baseline  for  the  monitoring  programme  for 
Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, final report, 
2023 (not publicly available) 

European Commission, Better Regulation Toolbox, 2023 

European Commission, Evaluation of the New Legislative Framework, SWD(222) 365 final, 
2022 

European Commission, Better Regulation Guidelines, 2021 

European Commission, Communication from the Commission, A Counter-Terrorism Agenda 
for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond, COM(2020) 795 final, 2020 

European  Commission,  Impact  assessment  accompanying  the  document  proposal  for  a 
Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  marketing  and  use  of 
explosives precursors, SWD(2018) 104 final, 2018 

European  Commission,  Communication  from  the  Commission,  EU  Action  Plan  to  enhance 
preparedness  against  chemical,  biological,  radiological  and  nuclear  security  risks, 
COM(2017) 610 final, 2017 

European  Data  Protection  Supervisor,  Opinion  on  the  proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  the 
marketing and use of explosives precursors, 2010 

Europol, European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment  – The changing 
DNA of serious and organised crime, 2025 

Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) Report 2024,  2024 

60 

 
Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) Report 2023, 2023 

Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) Report 2022, 2022 

Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) Report 2021, 2021 

Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) Report 2020, 2020 

Danish Safety Technology Authority, Control of explosives precursors, 2025 

UK Government, Home Office, List of chemicals – GOV UK, 2024 

Secondary literature 

Action  on  Armed  Violence,  An  examination  of  the  precursor  chemicals  used  in  the 
manufacture of explosive compositions found within Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 
2021 

Alford Technologies, Low Explosives, (no date) 

GICHD, Basic chemistry of explosives and hazards of home-made explosives and chemical 
precursors,  IEDD  Handbook,  Chapter  5,  Improvised  Explosive  Device  Clearance  Good 
Practice Guide, 2021 

INHERIT  Consortium,  INHibitors,  Explosives  and  pRecursor  InvesTigation,  2025, 
https://h2020-inherit.eu 

ISPI, Tackling the rising threat of improvised explosive device supplies, 2024 

K.  Pawlus,  M.  Kwiatkowski  et  al.,  Synthesis  of  explosive  peroxides  using  unrecognised 
explosive precursors – percarbonates and perborates, FirePhysChem, Vol. 2, Issue 3, pp. 285-
293, 2022 

Benjamin Vogel (Director), Developing Public-Private Information Sharing to Strengthen the 
Fight  against  Money  Laundering  and  Terrorism  Financing  –  Recommendations  for  the 
European Union, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law, 2024 

M. Sáiz-Pardo, Massive  bomb-making workshop dismantled at  remote farmhouse in  Spain, 
SUR in English, 27 March 2023 

University of Maryland, Global Terrorism Database, 2021, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 

61 

 
 
 
ANNEX III. EVALUATION MATRIX AND, WHERE RELEVANT, DETAILS ON ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS (BY CRITERION) 

Question 

Sub-question 

Judgement criteria 

Indicators and descriptors 

Sources of information 

Effectiveness 

EQ1 – What effect 
has the Regulation 
had in preventing 
restricted and 
reportable, and 
possible other, 
explosive precursors 
from being acquired 
and used, by terrorists 
and criminals? 

EQ1.1 – How many 
notifications of 
suspicious 
transactions, thefts or 
disappearances led to 
the discovery of 
illegal bomb-making 
laboratories or the 
dismantling of 
terrorist or criminal 
groups? 

The Regulation and its 
specific obligations have 
effectively prevented 
restricted and reportable, 
and possible other 
explosives precursors 
from being acquired and 
used by terrorists and 
criminals 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Number of reported 

suspicious transactions, 
thefts or disappearances 
(broken down by type) prior 
to (2021) and after the 
Regulation (2022 onwards). 

■  Outcome of notifications: 

number of notifications that 
led to investigations; 
number of investigations 
that resulted in the discovery 
of illegal bomb-making 
laboratories; number of 
investigations resulting in 
the dismantling of terrorist 
or criminal groups. 

Primary sources 
■ 

Interviews with EU 
Commission and EU 
agencies. 

■  Workshops with the 

SCP. 

■  Targeted surveys 

(NCAs, NCPs, economic 
operators). 

Secondary sources 
■  Commission Monitoring 
programme reports. 

■  Global Terrorism 

Database. 

■  Europol reports – e.g. 
TE-SAT reports. 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Type of regulated explosive 

precursors used in 
attacks/attempted attacks. 
■  Extent to which stakeholders 
(e.g. NCA/NCPs) report 
instances of cross-border 
cooperation and intelligence 
sharing resulting from 
notifications. 

Methods 
■  Content analysis of 
documents /reports. 
■  Descriptive and trend 
analysis of secondary 
data and survey data 
(compared pre and post-
Regulation). 
Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 

62 

 
 
 
 
EQ1.2 - How many 
notifications of 
suspicious 
transactions, thefts or 
disappearances led to 
prosecutions or 
convictions of 
persons trying to 
manufacture HMEs? 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Number of arrests made 

following notifications and 
types of charges filed 
against individuals (e.g. 
intent to manufacture 
HMEs). 

■  Number of convictions 

resulting from investigations 
initiated by notifications. 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Extent to which stakeholders 
(e.g. NCA/NCPs) report 
instances of cross-border 
cooperation and intelligence 
sharing resulting from 
notifications. 

EQ2 – To what extent 
have the Regulation’s 
key provisions been 
effective in achieving 
the Regulation’s 
objectives? 

EQ2.1 - Which 
specific provisions or 
parts of the Regulation 
are considered by 
stakeholders to be (i) 
most effective and (ii) 

There are provisions in 
the Regulation that fully 
achieved the expected 
objectives. 

Qualitative indicators: 
■  Share of stakeholders that 

consider specific provisions 
to be the most effective / 
least effective. 

There are provisions in 

■  Bottlenecks and enablers in 

63 

Primary sources 
■ 

Interviews with EU 
Commission and EU 
agencies. 

■  Workshops with the 

SCP. 

■  Targeted surveys 

(NCAs, NCPs, economic 
operators). 

Secondary sources 
■  Commission Monitoring 
programme reports. 

■  Global Terrorism 

Database. 

■  Europol reports – e.g. 
TE-SAT reports. 

Methods 
■  Content analysis of 
documents /reports. 
■  Descriptive and trend 
analysis of secondary 
data and survey data. 

Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 
Primary sources 
■  Targeted surveys 
(NCAs, NCPs). 

Methods 
Descriptive analysis of 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the Regulation that did 
not fully achieve the 
expected objectives. 

the achievement of the 
expected outputs according 
to feedback of stakeholders.  

survey data.  

least effective in 
achieving the 
Regulation’s 
objectives? 
EQ2.2 - Are the 
existing applications 
of the ‘safeguard 
clause’ (see Article 14 
of the Regulation) 
effective? 

The Regulation and 
existing applications of 
the ‘safeguard clause’ 
were effective in 
preventing access to 
emerging alternative 
substances that can be 
misused to stage attacks 
in the Member State 
concerned through 
HMEs. 

EQ2.3 - Is the 
Monitoring 
Programme delivering 
relevant and useful 
insight into the 
outputs, results and 
impact of this 
Regulation? Has the 
Monitoring 
Programme proven 
useful to check 

The monitoring 
programme includes 
relevant and 
comprehensive 
indicators aligned with 
the Regulation’s 
objectives and provides 
clear, actionable 
insights and 
recommendations for 
improving 

64 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Number of instances across 
Member States where the 
‘safeguard clause’ has been 
implemented. 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Rationale for the adoption of 
the ‘safeguard clause’ and 
cases of prevented attacks 
linked to the newly 
restricted substances. 

■  Extent to which stakeholders 

(EU Commission, 
NCAs/NCPs) perceive that 
the ‘safeguard clause’ is 
effective at mitigating risks.  

Quantitative indicators 
■  Response rate to 

Commission surveys and 
compliance with reporting 
requirements imposed by the 
monitoring programme. 

Primary sources 
■  Commission Monitoring 
Programme reports. 

■  Targeted surveys 
(NCAs, NCPs). 

■  Meeting with SCP #1. 
Interviews with EU 
■ 
Commission. 

Methods 
■  Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 

■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data. 

Primary sources 
■ 

Interviews with EU 
Commission. 

■  Meeting with SCP #1 
■  Targeted surveys 
(NCAs/NCPs). 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Mapping of the indicators in 
the monitoring programme 
against the Regulation’s 

Secondary sources 
■  EU policy documents 
(e.g. Monitoring 
Programme for 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
implementation. 

The monitoring 
programme collects 
high-quality, accurate, 
and timely data, and 
produces reports and 
updates at appropriate 
intervals to effectively 
track progress towards 
the Regulation’s 
objectives. 

The monitoring 
programme successfully 
identifies specific 
problems and challenges 
in the application of the 
Regulation. 
There are penalties laid 
down in national law that 
are considered to be 
effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive.  

whether the 
implementation of the 
Regulation is ‘on 
track’ as regards the 
objectives of the 
Regulation and helped 
identify actual 
problems in the 
application of the 
Regulation? 

EQ2.4 – To what 
extent have the 
penalties laid down 
in national law that 
are applicable to 
infringements of the 
Regulation proven to 
be effective, 
proportionate and 
dissuasive? 

65 

objectives and provisions. 

■  Extent to which the 

European Commission finds 
the information gathered 
through the monitoring 
programme to be useful for 
tracking progress. 

■  Extent to which Member 
States perceive that the 
benefits of the monitoring 
programme outweigh the 
burden and reporting 
requirements imposed.  

Regulation (EU) 
2019/1148, SWD(2020) 
114 final). 

■  Commission Monitoring 
Programme reports. 

Methods 
■  Content analysis of key 

documents. 

■  Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 

■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data. 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Type and severity of 

Primary sources 
■  Targeted surveys 

penalties imposed at the 
national level for 
infringements of the 
Regulation. 

■  Extent to which stakeholders 
(e.g. economic operators, 
NCA/NCPs) perceive 
penalties laid down in 
national law for 
infringements to the 
Regulation to be effective, 

(NCAs/NCPs, economic 
operators). 

Secondary sources 
■  For information obtained 
through primary sources: 
National legislation/laws 

Methods 
■  Legal analysis 
■  Content analysis of key 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EQ3 – To what extent 
has the Regulation 
facilitated the free 
movement of 
explosives precursors 
within the EU?  

EQ3.1 To what extent 
has the Regulation 
contributed towards a 
level playing field at 
the EU level when it 
comes to control 
measures and access 
restrictions to 
explosives precursors?  

The Regulation has 
effectively ensured the 
legitimate use and trade 
of explosives precursors 
within the EU. 

66 

documents 

■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data  

Data sources 
■  Reports/updates 

stemming from the 
Monitoring Programme. 

■  Eurostat data 
■ 

Interviews with market 
participants 

■  Survey to economic 

operators 

Methods 
■  Quantitative/Qualitative 
analysis of the data 
collected 

■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data. 

proportionate and 
dissuasive. 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Extent to which production, 
import, export, (changes in) 
uses, market concentration 
in explosive precursors has 
increased or stabilised. 

■  Extent of increase in 

availability of regulated 
products and across product 
ranges for legitimate users. 

■  Extent of increase of the 
Trade Competitiveness 
Index (TCI) for EPs in the 
EU 

■  Size of shift towards online 
sales compared to physical 
retail sales 

■  Quantitative results from the 

market analysis. 

■  Value (in EUR) of cross-

border trade in explosives 
precursors among Member 
States. 

■  Ratio between cross-border 
and purely national trade in 
explosives precursors among 
Member States. 
■  Number of economic 
operators reporting 

 
 
 
 
 
■ 

supplying explosives 
precursors cross-border 
among Member States 
Increase in market 
diversification (e.g. 
evolution of the part of 
smaller EOs in overall 
market) 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Stakeholder’s views on 
proportionality of the 
Regulation’s obligations. 

■  Level of difficulty for 

operators to implement the 
Regulation in their business 
activities. 

■  Reduced market access 
barriers and increased 
predictability as reported by 
industry stakeholders 
■  Level of complexity of the 
framework and how it 
affects the freedom of 
movement of explosive 
precursors. 

■  Qualitative results from the 

market analysis.  

EQ3.2 - Is the lack of 
mutual recognition of 
licences creating any 
problem for licence 

The lack of mutual 
recognition of licences is 
creating problems for 
licence owners and 

■  Number of MS recognising 
licences from another MS. 
■  Number of cases of lack of 
mutual recognition of 

Data sources 
■  Targeted interviews. 
■  Targeted surveys 

(NCAs, NCPs, economic 

67 

 
 
owners or distorting 
the internal market? 

distorting the internal 
market. 

EQ4 – To what extent 
has the Regulation 
increased awareness 
throughout the supply 
chain that certain 
chemicals can be 
misused to 
manufacture HMEs? 

EQ4.1 - Have the 
training and 
awareness raising 
campaigns reached 
the target audiences 
and achieved the 
required results? 

The Regulation has 
contributed to increasing 
awareness throughout the 
supply chain that certain 
chemicals can be 
misused to manufacture 
HMEs. 

operators). 

Methods 
■  Quantitative/Qualitative 
analysis of the data 
collected. 

Primary sources 
■  European Commission 
Monitoring Programme 

■  Targeted surveys 

(NCAs, NCPs, economic 
operators). 

■  Targeted interviews. 
■  Meeting with SCP #1. 

Methods 
■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data. 

■  Secondary analysis of 

Monitoring programme 
data.  

licences between MS, 
concerned MS and 
additional obligations 
requested. 

■  Stakeholder views on 

recognition of licences and 
its impacts. 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Number of awareness 

raising training modules 
delivered to supply chain 
stakeholders on the potential 
misuse of certain chemicals 
to manufacture HMEs. 
■  Proportion (%) of supply 

chain stakeholders reached 
by training activities. 
■  Number of awareness 

raising campaigns organised 
by Member States. 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Share (%) of stakeholders 

agreeing that the Regulation 
has positively contributed to 
raising awareness and 
compliance among the 
supply chain that certain 
chemicals can be misused to 
manufacture HMEs. 
■  Share (%) of stakeholders 
declaring that training 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
 
modules they attended 
proved effective in raising 
their awareness on the 
potential misuse of certain 
chemicals for the 
manufacturing of HMEs. 
■  Coverage of the Regulation 
provisions by guidelines. 
■  Level of dissemination of 

guidelines along the supply 
chain. 

■  Share (%) of stakeholders - 
either a) from the chemical 
supply chain or b) 
competent authorities - 
agreeing that the guidelines 
issued by the Commission 
pursuant to Article 12 of the 
Regulation proved effective 
to assist them in applying 
the Regulation.  
Qualitative indicators 
■  Extent to which stakeholders 
report external factors linked 
to the achievement of the 
general and specific 
objectives of the Regulation 
(e.g. national or EU-level 
policy developments, 
socioeconomic trends, 
technological developments, 
social and cultural factors, 

Primary sources 
■  Targeted surveys 

(NCAs, NCPs, economic 
operators). 

■  Targeted interviews. 
■  Meeting with SCP #1. 

Methods 
■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data. 

■  Secondary analysis of 

Monitoring programme 
data. 

Primary sources 
■  Exploratory interviews 
with EU Commission 
and EU agencies. 
■  Meeting with the SCP. 
■  Targeted surveys 

(NCAs, NCPs, economic 
operators). 

Methods 
■  Thematic analysis of 

Guidelines have 
effectively assisted actors 
in the chemical supply 
chain and the competent 
authorities in the 
application of the 
Regulation. 

EQ4.2 - Have the 
guidelines issued by 
the Commission 
pursuant to Article 12 
of the Regulation 
proven effective in 
assisting actors in the 
chemicals supply 
chain and the 
competent authorities 
in the application of 
the Regulation? 

EQ5 – Are there 
specific factors 
affecting the 
effectiveness of the 
Regulation? 

EQ5.1 What are the 
exogenous factors, if 
any, that 
facilitated/hindered 
progress towards 
achieving the 
Regulation’s 
objectives?  

External factors that 
facilitated or hindered 
the achievement of the 
general and specific 
objectives of Regulation 
can be identified.  

69 

 
 
 
 
EQ6 – Has the Regulation had any unintended 
effects? 

Unintended effects 
caused by the 
implementation of the 
Regulation can be 
identified 

cross-border movements and 
international trade etc.). 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Extent to which stakeholders 
report unintended effects of 
the Regulation 

■  Nature of the unintended 

effects reported 

EQ7 – What are the costs for authorities and 
economic operators to implement the 
Regulation? What are the key drivers for those 
costs? 

Efficiency 

The Regulation’s 
implementation entails 
different costs 
depending on the 
category of stakeholders 
concerned 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Administrative costs of 

collecting and analysing the 
monitoring data 

■  Administrative costs of 

inspections 

■  Costs of reporting 

suspicious transactions for 
operators and online 
marketplaces 

EQ8 – What are the 
benefits of the 
Regulation and who 

EQ8.1 Has the 
Regulation helped to 
reduce the use of 

The Regulation has 
helped to reduce the use 
of precursors to produce 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Trend in the number of 

disappearances and thefts of 

70 

interview data. 

■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data. 
Primary sources 
■  Exploratory interviews 
with EU Commission 
and EU agencies. 
■  Meeting with the SCP. 
■  Targeted surveys 

(NCAs, NCPs, economic 
operators). 

Methods 
■  Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 
Descriptive analysis of 
survey data. 

Primary sources 
Targeted consultation with 
competent authorities, 
national contact points, 
economic operators 

Methods: 
■  Descriptive analysis of 
the data collected 
■  Standard Cost Model 
■  CBA or CEA 
Primary sources 
Targeted consultation with 
competent authorities, 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
has benefited? 

precursors to produce 
HMEs? 

HMEs 

explosive precursors 

Benefits of decrease in 
terrorist activities using 
HME 

The harmonised 
framework established 
by the Regulation has 
benefited EU 
businesses, for example, 
by reducing the 
administrative burden of 
cross-border trade. 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Types of benefits produced 
for citizens (increased 
security), Competent 
Authorities (improved 
administrative capacity) and 
businesses (smooth 
functioning of the internal 
market, including cost 
savings and information 
availability, impact on 
SMEs) 

EQ8.2 Have 
businesses benefited 
from the harmonised 
framework established 
by the Regulation? If 
so, in what way? 

national contact points, 
economic operators 

Methods 
■  Descriptive analysis of 
the data collected 
■  Standard Cost Model 
■  CBA or CEA 

EQ9 - Are the costs 
for complying with 
the provisions or 
specific parts of the 
Regulation 
proportionate to the 
benefits? 

EQ9.1 - Does the 
‘1%-rule’ for 
mixtures of 
Article 3(13) strike 
the right balance 
between costs and 
security? 

The Regulation has 
provided other benefits, 
such as better functioning 
of the EU internal market 
in explosive precursors 
and increased 
administrative capacity 
of national competent 
authorities. 
The 1% rule strikes the 
right balance between 
costs and security 

71 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Market impact of the 1% 

rule 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Share (%) of stakeholder 

Primary sources 
Call for Evidence 
1st SCP Meeting notes 
Targeted consultation with 
competent authorities, 
national contact points, 
economic operators 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
who consider the costs to be 
justifiable against the 
benefits stemming from the 
Regulation 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Administrative costs of 

collecting and analysing the 
monitoring data 

■  Costs of implementing a 

license 

■  Market impact of the 
licencing system 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Share (%) of stakeholder 

who consider the costs to be 
justifiable against the 
benefits stemming from the 
licencing system 

■  Share (%) of stakeholder 

who consider is beneficial to 
have a licensing system 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Administrative costs of 

collecting and analysing the 
verification upon sale 
■  Costs for businesses of 
implementing the 
verification upon sale 
provision 

Methods: 
■  Descriptive analysis of 
the data collected 
■  Standard Cost Model 
■  CBA or CEA 
Primary sources 
Targeted consultation with 
competent authorities, 
national contact points, 
economic operators 

Methods 
■  Descriptive analysis of 
the data collected 
■  Standard Cost Model 
■  CBA or CEA 

Primary sources 
Targeted consultation with 
competent authorities, 
national contact points, 
economic operators 

Methods 
■  Descriptive analysis of 

The costs for creating 
and managing a system 
of licences by the 
Member States for 
members of the public 
are proportionate to the 
benefits 

EQ9.2 - Are the costs 
for creating and 
managing a system of 
licences by the 
Member States for 
members of the public 
proportionate to the 
benefits (i.e. the 
continued access to 
certain explosives 
precursors to members 
of the public for non-
professional usage)? 

EQ9.3 – Does the 
‘Verification upon 
sale’ (Article 8 of the 
Regulation) strike the 
right balance between 
the administrative 
burden it creates for 
the actors along the 

The verification upon 
sale strikes a right 
balance between the 
costs and the 
administrative burden it 
creates 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
supply chain and the 
increase of security? 

EQ10 – Which parts of the Regulation are 
most efficient? 

EQ11 – Which parts of the Regulation are least 
efficient and what is the potential for 
simplification and for cost savings? 

Specific provisions or 
parts of the Regulation 
are considered by 
relevant actors to be 
efficient in terms of 
achieving the objectives 
at least cost 
Specific provisions or 
parts of the Regulation 
are considered by 
relevant actors to be 
inefficient in terms of 
achieving the objectives 
at least cost. 

73 

■  Market impact of the 
verification upon sale 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Share (%) of national 

authorities and economic 
operators that perceive the 
verification requirements 
to be practical and effective 
at preventing irregular or 
illicit trade in explosive 
precursors. 

■  Outcome of inspections by 

national inspection 
authorities and LEAs of 
verification upon sale 
requirements.  
Qualitative indicators: 
■  Share (%) of provisions that 

relevant stakeholders 
consider to be the most 
efficient in terms of the 
costs incurred and the 
benefits they produce 

Qualitative indicators: 
■  Share (%) of provisions that 

relevant stakeholders 
consider to be the least 
efficient in terms of the 
costs incurred and the 
benefits they produce 
■  Share (%) of stakeholders 

the data collected 
■  Standard Cost Model 
■  CBA or CEA 

Primary sources 
■  Targeted surveys 

(NCAs, NCPs, EOs). 

Methods 
■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data.  
Primary sources 
Targeted consultation with 
competent authorities, 
national contact points, 
economic operators 

Methods 
■  Descriptive analysis of 

 
 
 
 
 
 
the survey data collected 

■  Standard Cost Model 

The assessment of the 
costs and benefits of the 
Regulation and the 
comparison of the 
different implementation 
experiences at national 
level highlights 
opportunities to 
maximise the efficiency 
of the processes at stake 
and simplify the 
Regulation 

that consider the Regulation 
produces: 
cost/burden duplication 
complexity 

Quantitative indicators: 
■  Estimated administrative 
burden costs in EUR 
resulting from the 
Regulation 

■  Potential cost-savings (in 

EUR) through 
administrative simplification 
and burden reduction 
■  Potential cost-savings (in 
EUR) from reducing 
redundant/overlapping 
requirements with other 
international, EU or national 
regulations 

■  Time spent by operators on 
compliance activities  

EQ12 – To what extent does the Regulation 
address current and likely future needs 
considering the role of HMEs in the 
developments of terrorism and organised 
crime? Are there any security gaps not 
currently addressed by the Regulation?  

Relevance 

Stakeholders consider 
the Regulation has been 
relevant in addressing 
current and likely future 
EU security 
needs/challenges 
concerning the role of 
HMEs in the 
developments of 

Qualitative indicators 
■  List of current and likely 

future EU needs/challenges 
regarding the role of HMEs 
in terrorism and organised 
crime. 

■  Extent to which stakeholders 
perceive that the Regulation 
addresses current 

Primary sources 
■  Public consultation. 
■  Exploratory interviews 
with EU Commission 
and EU agencies. 
■  Targeted surveys 

(NCAs, NCPs, economic 
operators). 

74 

 
 
 
 
terrorism and organised 
crime. 

The Regulation does not 
leave any gaps that could 
be exploited by terrorists 
or criminals.  

needs/challenges regarding 
the role of HMEs in 
terrorism and organised 
crime and will continue to 
do so. 

■  Mapping the gaps and areas 
of alignment between the 
priorities of the Regulation 
and the identified needs and 
developments.  

EQ13 – Should the 
definitions contained 
in the Regulation, or 
the Regulation’s 
scope, be 

EQ13.1 – Is there a 
need to reformulate 
some of the 
definitions listed in 
the Regulation, or to 

The definitions listed in 
the Regulation are free 
from ambiguity. 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Level of alignment between 
the Regulation definitions 
adopted at the national level. 

■  Extent to which 

75 

Secondary sources 
■  Policy communications 
on the role of HMEs in 
terrorism and organised 
crime. 

■  Public and policy 

statements on terrorism 
and organised crime, 
specifically the role of 
HMEs. 

■  Academic studies and 
grey literature on the 
evolution of terrorism 
and organised crime, 
specifically the role of 
HMEs. 

■  Feasibility study and 
impact assessment on 
high-risk chemicals 

Methods 
■  Content analysis of key 

documents. 

■  Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 

■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data. 
Primary sources 
■  Workshops with the 

SCP. 

■  Targeted surveys 
(NCAs, NCPs) 

 
 
 
 
reformulated in order 
to address current and 
likely future needs?  

introduce new ones, to 
clarify the scope of 
the provisions and to 
facilitate national 
enforcement? 

NCAs/NCPs perceive that 
the definitions listed in the 
Regulation are clear and 
comprehensible (not 
ambiguous).  

EQ13.2 – Should 
private-to-private 
websites/social media 
applications be 
included in the scope 
of the legislation 
because they provide a 
potential way to 
circumvent the current 
measures? 

Private-to-private 
websites and social 
media applications are 
being used to bypass the 
current measures, and it 
would be feasible to 
extend the Regulation to 
explicitly include them. 

EQ13.3 – Should the 
role of customs be 
made more explicit? 

There is a lack clarity in 
the way customs 
enforce the Regulation, 
and this creates 
loopholes in the 
regulatory system that 
can be exploited by 

76 

Qualitative indicators: 
■  Examples of incidents and 
case studies where private-
to-private websites or social 
media applications have 
been used to circumvent 
current measures. 

■  Extent to which stakeholders 
(NCAs, NCPs, economic 
operators) perceive that 
extending the Regulation to 
include private-to-private 
websites and social media is 
likely to be both feasible and 
impactful.  

Qualitative indicators: 
■  Level of alignment between 
practices and measures 
implemented by customs 
when regulated substances 
enter the EU market 
■  Extent to which customs 

Secondary sources 
■  National legislation. 

Methods 
■  Legal analysis. 
■  Thematic analysis of 
workshop data. 

■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data. 
Primary sources 
■  Workshops with the 

SCP. 

■  Targeted surveys 

(NCAs, NCPs, economic 
operators) 

Methods 
■  Thematic analysis of 
workshop data. 

■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data. 

Primary sources 
■ 

Interviews with EU 
Commission. 

■  Workshops with the 

SCP. 

■  Targeted surveys 
(national customs 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EQ14 – To what 
extent does the 
Regulation and its 
provisions provide the 
flexibility to cover 
current or future 
developments in the 
manufacturing of 
HMEs? 

EQ14.1 – Are the 
current limits to the 
delegation of powers 
in the Regulation 
appropriate in terms 
of an efficient 
management of the 
Regulation and in 
terms of reacting 
quickly to changes in 
the threat situation? 

authorities) 

Methods 
■  Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 

■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data. 

Sources 
■ 

Interviews with EU 
Commission. 

■  Workshops with the 

SCP. 

■  Targeted surveys 
(NCAs, NCPs) 

Methods 
■  Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 

■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data. 

authorities report that their 
role in enforcing the 
Regulation is clear and 
actionable or requires 
clarification.  

Qualitative indicators 
■  Number of times delegated 
acts have been used to 
amend limit values (Annex 
I) or add substances (Annex 
II), and the time taken to 
implement delegated acts. 
■  Assessment of whether the 

amendments address 
emerging threats and new 
developments in the 
manufacturing of HMEs. 
■  Extent to which stakeholders 
(EU Commission, NCAs, 
NCPs) are satisfied with the 
flexibility, effectiveness and 
efficiency of delegation 
powers.  

criminals 

The delegation of 
powers in the Regulation 
(which is limited solely 
to amending the limit 
values in Annex I and 
adding substances to 
Annex II) provides 
sufficient flexibility to 
ensure the efficient 
management of the 
Regulation, while 
accommodating current 
and future developments 
in the manufacturing of 
HMEs. 

The mechanism of 
delegated acts is lengthy, 
requiring multiple 
approval steps, that 
impedes the ability to 
react quickly to changes 
to the threat situation.  

Coherence 

EQ15 – Is the 

EQ15.1 How does 

The Regulation the 

Qualitative indicators 

Sources 

77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulation coherent 
with the overall 
Counter-Terrorism 
Agenda for the EU: 
Anticipate, Prevent, 
Protect, Respond? 

the Regulation align 
with the objectives of 
the Counter-
Terrorism Agenda, 
particularly in 
preventing the 
misuse of explosives 
by radicalised 
individuals or groups 
and promoting 
international 
cooperation to 
restrict access to 
explosives 
precursors? 

EQ16 – Is the Regulation coherent with the 
EU Action Plan to enhance preparedness 
against chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear security risks? 

capacity to anticipate 
potential terrorist threats 
by controlling access to 
explosives precursors. 

The Regulation 
contributes to 
preventing terrorist 
attacks, particularly by 
limiting access to 
materials that could be 
used in homemade 
explosives. 

The Regulation 
promotes law 
enforcement cooperation 
with third countries in 
controlling the sale and 
distribution of 
explosives precursors. 
The Regulation supports 
the overarching goals of 
the EU Action Plan, 
such as reducing 
vulnerabilities, 
improving detection, 
enhancing response 
capacities, or securing 
sensitive materials. 

The Regulation includes 

78 

■  Enhanced international 

■  Academic and grey 

cooperation as a result of the 
implementation of the 
Regulation 

literature 

Methods 
■  Literature review 
■  Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Degree of alignment of the 

Sources 
■  Academic and grey 

■ 

Regulation’s objectives with 
the key goals of the Action 
Plan 
Impact of the Regulation in 
the fulfilment of the 
objectives of the Action 
Plan.  

literature 

Methods 
■  Literature review 
■  Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 

 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
specific provisions that 
address the prevention, 
protection, and response 
phases of CBRN risk 
management. 

The Regulation reflects 
recent threat assessments 
and emerging risks as 
identified in the CBRN 
Action Plan. 

The Regulation fosters 
cooperation between 
public authorities, 
private sectors, and civil 
society, as encouraged 
by the Action Plan. 
The Regulation aligns 
with other existing EU 
laws in particular the 
Directives on civil 
explosives, on 
pyrotechnic articles, and 
the Regulation on drug 
precursors. 

The Regulation 
adequately 
complements other 
existing EU laws in 
particular the Directives 

79 

EQ17 – Is the 
Regulation coherent 
with other EU 
legislation, especially 
the Directives on 
Civil Explosives and 
Pyrotechnic Articles, 
the Regulations on 
Drug Precursors, 
REACH and CLP 
Regulations? 

EQ17.1 Are there any 
inconsistencies, 
contradictions, 
overlaps or potential 
for synergies between 
the Regulation and 
the Directives on 
Civil Explosives, 
Pyrotechnic Articles, 
as well as the Drug 
Precursors 
Regulation?  
EQ17.2 Are there any 
inconsistencies, 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Degree of double regulation. 
■  Degree of complementarity. 
■  Degree of alignment of 

terminology and definitions. 

■ 

Impact of synergies 
(achievement of share 
objectives, reduction in 
compliance costs).  

Sources 
■  Academic and grey 

■ 

literature. 
Interviews with key 
stakeholders such as 
NCA’s, EOs and the 
Commission, in 
particular DG GROW 
and DG ENV (for 
REACH and CLP). 

Methods 
■  Literature review. 
■  Thematic analysis of 

 
 
 
 
 
 
contradictions, 
overlaps or potential 
for synergies between 
the Regulation and 
other EU legislation 
governing the same 
chemical substances 
(e.g. REACH and 
CLP Regulations, 
Medicinal Products 
Directive)? 

EQ18 – Is the 
Regulation rendered 
more effective 
thanks to Article 9 of 
the Digital Services 
Act (‘Orders to act 
against illegal 
content’)?  

EQ18.1 -Does the 
DSA or other 
applicable EU law 
sufficiently provide 
for the removal of 
online content 
making restricted 
explosives precursors 

on civil explosives, on 
pyrotechnic articles, and 
the Regulation on drug 
precursors. 

The terminology and 
definitions used in the 
Regulation are 
consistent with those 
found in other relevant 
EU laws in particular 
the Directives on civil 
explosives, on 
pyrotechnic articles, and 
the Regulation on drug 
precursors. 
There are positive 
synergies with other 
existing EU laws in 
particular the Directives 
on civil explosives on 
pyrotechnic articles, and 
the Regulation on drug 
precursors. 
Better tracking of illegal 
sales 

Better cooperation 
between stakeholders 

Reduction in criminal 
activities 

80 

interview data. 
■  Legal analysis. 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Number of illegal sales 
detected/reported. 

■  Frequency and quality of 
transparency reports. 
■  Time to detect/remove 

illegal listings. 

Sources 
■  Academic and grey 

■ 

literature. 
Interviews with 
enforcement authorities 
and the Commission in 
particular DG 
CONNECT. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
available to the 
general public 
online? 

EQ18.2 Has 
Article 9 enhanced 
cooperation between 
digital platforms and 
national authorities 
responsible for 
enforcing the 
Regulation? 
EQ19.1 How do the 
safety, security, and 
reporting 
requirements under 
the Seveso III 
Directive 
complement or 
overlap with the 
measures for 
explosives precursors 
under the 
Regulation?  

EQ19 – To what 
extent is the 
Regulation coherent 
with certain 
environmental 
legislation (e.g. 
Seveso-III Directive 
(Directive 
2012/18/EU)? Are 
there instances where 
the measures for 
security have 
unintended 
consequences for 
safety? 

EQ20 – Waste is 
excluded from the 

EQ20.1 Are the 
existing provisions 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Use of automated detection 

tools. 

■  Number of user-reported 

illegal listings. 

Methods 
■  Literature review. 
■  Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 

Compatibility of 
reporting processes and 
requirements under both 
legal texts. 

Clarity and simplicity of 
compliance for 
operators managing 
substances regulated by 
both frameworks. 

■ 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Degree of double regulation. 
■  Degree of complementarity. 
■ 

Impact of synergies 
(achievement of share 
objectives, reduction in 
compliance costs). 
Impact of security measures 
on safety objectives under 
the Seveso Directive.  

Sources 
■ 

Interviews with NCAs, 
EOs and competent 
authorities for Seveso-III 
Directive. 

■  Academic and grey 

■ 

literature. 
Interviews with key 
stakeholders (Seveso 
Member States working 
group). 

Methods 
■  Literature review. 
■  Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 
■  Legal analysis. 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Documented cases of waste 

Sources 
■  Academic and grey 

Consistency between 
safety and security 
requirements. 

Effectiveness of security 
measures in reducing 
safety risks. 
The extent to which 
waste materials could 

81 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REACH Regulation. 
As Regulation 
2019/1148 refers to 
REACH to define a 
substance (see 
Article 3(1)) waste is 
outside the scope of 
Regulation 
2019/1148. Is there a 
need to address this 
loophole and how? 

within EU waste 
management rules 
(e.g. Waste 
Framework 
Directive) that 
control hazardous 
substances, including 
explosives 
precursors, sufficient 
to address security 
concerns? 

■ 

literature 
Interviews with key 
stakeholders in the waste 
sector and wit DG ENV 
of the Commission. 

Methods 
■  Literature review 
■  Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 

be repurposed or 
misused for the illicit 
production of 
explosives. 

The vulnerability of 
waste disposal and 
recycling systems to 
exploitation by criminal 
organisations or 
individuals seeking 
explosive precursors. 

The ability to effectively 
monitor and control 
waste containing 
explosive precursors 

materials being used in 
terrorist or criminal 
activities involving 
explosive precursors. 
■  Studies highlighting how 

waste streams (e.g. 
industrial, chemical, or 
agricultural) contain 
dangerous chemicals that 
could serve as explosive 
precursors. 

■  The sufficiency of current 
EU waste legislation (e.g. 
the Waste Framework 
Directive 2008/98/EC) in 
addressing the specific risks 
posed by waste that contains 
explosive precursors. 

EU added value 

EQ21 – To what 
extent has the 
Regulation permitted 
achievements which 
could not be reached 
by legislation at 
Member State level? 

EQ21.1 – To what 
extent could Member 
States have 
introduced national 
rules: 
■  Limiting the 

availability of 
substances and 
mixtures that 
could be misused 
to make HME to 
the public; 
■  Requiring any 

■  The Regulation 

enabled 
achievements which 
could not be reached 
by national 
legislation at 
Member State level 

■  Rules on making 

available, 
introduction, 
possession and use of 
substances and 
mixtures that could 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Share (%) of key consulted 
stakeholders agreeing that 
the Regulation permitted 
achievements which could 
not be reached by national 
legislation at Member State 
level 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Number of Member States 
with national rules with 
proven equivalent 

Primary sources 
■  Targeted interviews 
■  Mapping of the national 

legislation 
■  Targeted survey 
questionnaires 

■  Exploratory interviews 
■  Targeted consultations 
■  Legal documents 
mentioned under 
Coherence; 

■  Available statistics (e.g. 
EUROPOL reports, etc.) 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
■  Europol data 

effectiveness to the rules of 
the Regulation 

■  Number of suspicious 

transactions involving the 
substances to the appropriate 
authorities prior and after 
the introduction of the 
Regulation 

■  Number of seizures and 
confiscation of illicit 
substances and explosives 
prior and after the entry into 
force of the Regulation 

suspicious 
transactions 
involving the 
substances to be 
reported to the 
appropriate 
authorities. 
■  Preventing the 

illicit manufacture 
of explosives 
using chemical 
precursors 

be misused to make 
homemade 
explosives have been 
introduced / 
enhanced by the 
Regulation to an 
extent that would 
have been 
unreachable at 
Member State level 
■  The availability of 
those substances or 
mixtures to the 
public was limited by 
the Regulation 
■  The reporting of any 

suspicious 
transactions 
involving the 
substances to the 
appropriate 
authorities was 
effectively achieved 
through the 
implementation of 
the Regulation 

■  The illicit 

manufacture of 
explosives was 
prevented through 
the Regulation more 
effectively than the 

83 

 
 
 
relevant national 
legislation at 
Member State level 
Member State rules that 
go beyond those 
specified in the 
Regulation can be 
identified.  

EQ22 – To what 
extent have Member 
States issued national 
rules on explosives 
precursors that go 
beyond the scope of 
the Regulation?  

EQ22.1 – To what 
extent do the 
additional national 
rules on explosives 
precursors indicate 
gaps or inadequacies 
in the 
comprehensiveness 
of the Regulation? 

Sources 
■  Regulation 2019/1148 
■  National legislation 
■  Workshops with the 

SCP. 

■  Targeted surveys 

(NCAs) 

Methods 
■  Content analysis / 
implementation 
assessment of national 
legislation. 

■  Thematic analysis of 
workshop data. 

■  Descriptive analysis of 

survey data. 

Quantitative indicators 
■  Number of Member States 
with national rules that go 
beyond the scope of the 
Regulation (e.g. in relation 
to concentration limits, 
licensing and registration 
requirements, scope of 
regulated substances, sale 
and distribution controls, 
storage and handling 
requirements, monitoring 
and surveillance, awareness 
and training programs, 
penalties and enforcement 
measures, customs and 
border controls, national 
databases). 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Mapping of nature/type of 

national rules that go beyond 
the scope of the Regulation. 

■  Extent to which Member 
States perceive that the 
Regulation is comprehensive 
for tackling the problem.  

84 

 
 
 
 
EQ23 – To what 
extent is EU level 
intervention still 
warranted? 

EQ24 - What has 
been the impact of the 
Regulation on 
fundamental rights 
and freedoms? 

EQ23.1 To what 
extent is EU level 
intervention still 
warranted to limit the 
availability of 
explosives precursors 
to the general public? 
EQ23.2 To what 
extent is EU level 
intervention still 
warranted to ensure 
the appropriate 
reporting of 
suspicious 
transactions 
throughout the 
supply chain? 

Right to privacy 
and protection of 
personal data  

EQ24.1 How does 
the mandatory 
reporting of 
suspicious 
transactions 
involving explosive 
precursors affect 
individuals’ right to 
privacy? 

Sources 
■  Targeted surveys. 
Targeted interviews. 

Relevant stakeholders 
believe that EU 
intervention is still 
warranted to limit the 
availability of substances 
and mixtures that could 
be misused to illicitly 
manufacture HMEs and 
to ensuring the 
appropriate reporting of 
suspicious transactions 
throughout the supply 
chain. 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Proportion (%) of relevant 
stakeholders that believe 
that EU intervention is still 
warranted to limit the 
availability of substances 
and mixtures that could be 
misused to illicitly 
manufacture HMEs and to 
ensuring the appropriate 
reporting of suspicious 
transactions throughout the 
supply chain. 

Impact on fundamental rights and freedoms 

Assessment of the extent 
and nature of personal 
data collected during the 
reporting of suspicious 
transactions (e.g. volume, 
types of data, sensitivity). 

Assessment of whether 
the collected data is 
strictly necessary and 
relevant to the purpose of 
detecting and preventing 

Qualitative indicators 
■  Volume of data and type of 

Sources 
■  Academic and grey 

data. 

■  Data sensitivity. 
■  Data relevance. 
■  Justification for data fields 
■  Average costs per business 

■ 

for compliance. 
Interview data from 
businesses regarding the 
burden of compliance. 
■  Feedback from new entrants 

■ 

literature. 
Interviews with 
economic operators and 
enforcement authorities. 

Methods 
■  Literature review. 
■  Thematic analysis of 
interview data. 

85 

 
 
 
 
regarding the challenges 
posed by Regulation (EU) 
2019/1148. 

■  Qualitative data from law 
enforcement agencies 
regarding the usefulness of 
the data collected under the 
regulation in preventing 
attacks. 

EQ24.3 To what 
extent do data 
protection rules 
under the GDPR 
mitigate privacy 
concerns associated 
with the Regulation? 
Freedom to 
Conduct a Business 
EQ24.4 How does 
the Regulation 
impact the ability of 
businesses, 
especially those in 
the chemical 
industry, to operate 
without undue 
regulatory burdens? 
Principle of 
Proportionality 

EQ24.5 Is the 
limitation on 
fundamental rights 
imposed by the 
Regulation 
proportionate to the 
objective of 
preventing terrorist 
attacks?  

terrorist acts. 

Assessment of the 
compliance costs and 
effort required by 
businesses (cross-
reference to efficiency 
questions). 

Assessment of whether 
Regulation (EU) 
2019/1148 creates 
significant barriers to 
entry for new businesses 
in the chemical industry. 

Assessment of whether 
the Regulation creates 
significant barriers to 
entry for new businesses 
in the chemical industry. 

Assessment of whether 
the Regulation is likely 
to be effective in 
achieving its intended 
security objectives. 

Assessment of the 
balance between security 
objectives and 
fundamental right.  

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX IV. OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND COSTS AND TABLE ON SIMPLIFICATION AND BURDEN REDUCTION 

Table 1. Overview of costs and benefits identified in the evaluation95 

Citizens/Consumers 
Comment 

Quantitative  

Quantitative  
Cost 

Businesses 

Comment 

Administrations 

Quantitative 

Comment  

Costs for compliance with the 
Regulation’s obligations per 
new regulated or restricted 
precursor 

recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Verifying which products fall 
under the Regulation’s 
requirements 

One-off 

N/A 

N/A 

Expected at 
between €22 430 
and €59 690 per 
company per year 
on average96. 

Around €6 040. 
(0.097 FTE) per 
company per year 
on average 

Complying with verification 
upon sale in business-to-
business transactions 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

Around €58 000 per 
company per year 
on average 

Varies widely based on 
company type and 
precursor. 
Estimates vary widely 
between €5 000 to 
€372 902 per company 
per year 

Expected between 
€3 455 and €8 630 
(0.05 and 0.13 FTE) 
per company per year 
on average. 
Update of estimate 
made by the 2018 
evaluation. 
Moderate to high costs 
for 85% of companies. 
Varies widely based on 
company type and 
client list 

Unknown 

Unknown 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

95  Cost  data  in  this  table  is  based  on  cost  templates  and related  interviews,  as  reported  in  European  Commission,  Evaluation  study  of  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1148  on  the 

marketing and use of explosives precursors, Final Report, ICF in collaboration with Milieu, WSP, and RAND, 2025. 

96  Monetary  estimates  based  on  number  of  FTEs  provided  during  the  stakeholder  consultations,  were  calculated  by  multiplying  the  average  yearly  cost  of  labour  for  the 
business sector in the EU, as of 2024 (latest available data). The yearly cost of labour in the EU was assessed as €62 150.4, the result of the average hourly cost of labour 
for the business economy in the EU in 2024 (€33.2) and the average number of hours worked per week in the EU (36 hours), multiplied by 52. Specific data for public 
administration were not available and sector-agnostic averages have been used instead. 

Sources: Eurostat (2024): ‘Hourly labour costs’. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Hourly_labour_costs. Last accessed 15 October 

2025. 
Eurostat (2025): ‘Usual and actual hours of work’. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Actual_and_usual_hours_of_work. Last 
accessed 15 October 2025. 

88 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Verifying licences for 
members of the general 
public 

Recurrent  Unknown 

Unknown 

Unknown 

Reporting and handling of 
suspicious transactions, thefts 
and disappearances 

Recurrent  N/A. 

N/A 

Informing the supply chain 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

Around €2 000 
(0.03 FTE) per 
company per year 
on average. 

Between €6 750 
and €13 875 per 
company per year 
on average. 

Insufficient cost data 
obtained during the 
evaluation (two 
estimates ranging 
€20 000 - €50 000 
reported per company 
per year). 
Update of estimate 
made by the 2018 
evaluation suggests that 
costs per company per 
year should average 
€5 980 (0.096 FTE) but 
this should have been 
reduced due to the 
decrease in licensing 
regime across Member 
States. 
Update of estimate 
made by the 2018 
evaluation. 
Minor costs for 58% of 
companies. 

Unknown 

Unknown 

Unknown 

Rates as ‘low’ to 
‘very low’ in 
49% of Member 
States. 

Moderate to high costs 
for 70% of companies 

N/A 

N/A 

Conducting inspections 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Between €56 440 
and €112 880 
(0.9 and 1.8 FTE) 
on average per 
Member State per 
year97 

Moderate to very 
high costs in 80% 
of Member States 

97 Monetary estimates from calculation of data on FTE provided during the stakeholder consultations, multiplied by the average yearly cost of labour in the EU, as of 2024 
(latest available data). The yearly cost of labour in the EU was assessed as €62 712, the result of the average hourly cost of labour in the EU in 2024 (€33.5) and the 
average number of hours worked per week in the EU (36 hours), multiplied by 52. Specific data for public administration were not available and sector-agnostic averages 

89 

 
 
 
Interagency coordination and 
cooperation 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Training and capacity-
building 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

Between €5 000 
and €5 400 per 
company on 
average. 

High costs reported for 
66% of companies. 

Awareness and 
communication actions for 
companies and the general 
public 

Conducting investigations 
based on received 
notifications 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Imposing penalties and 
sanctions 

Reporting obligations at 
national and EU levels 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Between €47 035 
and €75 255 
(0.75 and 1.2 
FTE) on average 
per Member State 
per year 
Between €62 710 
and €109 745 (1 
and 1.75 FTE) on 
average per 
Member State per 
year 
Between €62 710 
and €81 525 (1 
and 1.3 FTE) on 
average per 
Member State per 
year 
Between €62 710 
and €106 610 (1 
and 1.7 FTE) on 
average per 
Member State per 
year 
Around €94 070 
(1.5 FTE) on 
average per 
Member State per 
year 
Between €12 540 
and €31 355 (0.2 

Moderate to high 
costs in 80% of 
Member States 

Moderate to high 
costs in 76% of 
Member States 

Moderate to high 
costs in 75% of 
Member States 

Moderate to high 
costs in 75% of 
Member States 

Moderate to high 
costs in 57% of 
Member States 

Low to very low 
costs in 53% of 

have 
instead.  
Sources:  Eurostat  (2024):  ‘Hourly  labour  costs’.  Available  at  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Hourly_labour_costs.  Last  accessed 
2025. 
15 October 
Eurostat (2025): ‘Usual and actual hours of work’. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Actual_and_usual_hours_of_work. Last 
accessed 15 October 2025. 

been 

used 

90 

 
 
Member States 

and 0.5 FTE) on 
average per 
Member State per 
year 

Developing databases and IT 
systems 

One-off 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

No cost data obtained 
during the evaluation. 

Unknown. 

Maintaining and updating 
databases and IT systems 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

No cost data obtained 
during the evaluation. 

Unknown. 

Insufficient cost 
data obtained 
during the 
evaluation (two 
estimates ranging 
between no costs 
and €62 710 (1 
FTE) Member 
State per year). 
Insufficient cost 
data obtained 
during the 
evaluation (two 
estimates ranging 
between no costs 
and €62 710 (1 
FTE) Member 
State per year) 

91 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report any simplification, burden reduction and cost savings achieved already by the intervention evaluated, including the points of comparison/ where available (e.g. 
REFIT savings predicted in the IA or other sources).  

TABLE 2: Simplification and burden reduction (savings already achieved) 

Citizens/Consumers/Workers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

Quantitative  

Comment 

Quantitative  

Comment 

Quantitative 

Comment  

Removal of registration, licensing or mixed schemes across nine Member States 

One-off 

N/A 

N/A 

€5 980 (0.096 FTE) 
saved per company 
per year on average. 

Administrative costs 
linked to verifying 
licences for members 
of the general public 
no longer apply in 
those Member States. 
Update of estimate 
made by the 2018 
evaluation. 

N/A 

N/A 

Identify further potential simplification and savings that could be achieved with a view to make the initiative more effective and efficient without prejudice to its policy 
objectives98. 

PART II: II Potential simplification and burden reduction (savings) 

Citizens/Consumers/Workers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

Quantitative  

Comment 

Quantitative  

Comment 

Quantitative 

Comment  

Complying with verification upon sale in business-to-business transactions – removal of requirement to renew every twelve months 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Between €40 000 
and €53 050 per 
company per year on 
average 

Estimates vary 
widely between 
€5 000 and €167 810 
(0.1 and 2.7 FTE) 
savings per company 
per year. 
Expected to vary 
widely based on 
company type and 
client list 

N/A 

N/A 

98 This assessment is without prejudice to a possible future Impact Assessment. 

92 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complying with verification upon sale in business-to-business transactions – removal of ID request 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Between €30 000 
and €62 180 per 
company per year on 
average. 

Removal of an explosives precursor from Annex I or Annex II99  

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Between €10 000 
and €22 430 per 
company per year on 
average 

Revision of the 1% w/w rule upwards 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Unknown 

99 Based on estimates received for acetone and sulphuric acid. 

93 

Estimates vary 
widely between 
€6 215 and €217 525 
(0.1 and 3.5 FTE) 
savings per company 
per year. 
Expected to vary 
widely based on 
company type and 
client list 

Based on limited 
reports by consulted 
companies – 
expected to differ 
significantly between 
precursors and 
company sector 
Includes recurring 
training costs 
estimates at up to 
€,9 000 per year per 
company. 

Expected to be 
significant but 
limited evidence, 
based on reports by 
consulted companies 
including one 
estimate of €18 645 

N/A 

N/A 

Unknown 

Limited estimates in 
only one Member 
State of €250 850 
and €376 270 (4 and 
6 FTEs) could not be 
triangulated. 

N/A 

N/A 

 
 
 
 
 
(0.3 FTE) saving. 

94 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX V. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT 

1.  Introduction 

This  synopsis  report  provides  a  concise  summary  of  the  key  findings  and  insights  gathered 
during the evaluation of Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 on the marketing and use of explosives 
precursors. The report supports the European Commission by presenting evidence, analysis, 
and conclusions relevant for assessing  the Regulation’s relevance,  effectiveness,  coherence, 
efficiency,  and  EU  added  value.  Engaging  a  diverse  range  of  stakeholders,  this  report 
incorporates  perspectives  from  national  authorities, 
industry  representatives,  NGOs, 
economic operators, and EU citizens across all 27 EU Member States. 

2.  Consultation strategy 

The  consultations  conducted  as  part  of  the  evaluation  of  the  Explosive  Precursors  were 
designed to assess whether the current EU rules remain effective, relevant, and fit for purpose 
in  achieving  their  objective  and  addressing  the  needs  and  problems,  including  emerging 
challenges, in  the sector. Their overall aim was to evaluate the success  of the legislation in 
achieving  its  objectives,  identify  gaps  or  areas  for  improvement,  and  assess  whether  it 
remains aligned with evolving societal, technological, and security priorities. To achieve this, 
several  types  of  consultation  were  carried-out  a  Call  for  Evidence,  a  Public  Consultation, 
online  surveys,  two  targeted  email  questionnaire,  two  Meetings  of  the  Standing  Committee 
on Precursors, two focus groups discussions, and interviews. A summary of insights gathered 
during discussions at the validation workshop was also incorporated into this synopsis report. 

Each consultation tool played a complementary role in ensuring a comprehensive evaluation 
of the Explosive Precursors Regulation. The public consultation provided a broad platform to 
gather  diverse  views  from  the  general  public  and  stakeholders,  offering  a  wide  range  of 
perspectives  on  the  legislation.  The  targeted  online  survey  focused  on  collecting  detailed, 
structured  input,  enabling  a  more  technical  and  nuanced  assessment  of  the  Regulation’s 
impact and challenges. Meanwhile, the interviews allowed for in-depth discussions with key 
stakeholders,  providing  qualitative  insights  and  context  that  enriched  the  understanding  of 
sector-specific  issues.  Together,  these  tools  ensured  a  balanced  mix  of  broad,  focused,  and 
detailed inputs to support a robust evaluation. 

Table 1: Consulted stakeholders by consultation activity 

Consultation method 

Stakeholder consulted 

Stakeholder group 
EU entities 
DG GROW 

Europol 
DG HOME 
Member State public authorities 
National competent authorities 
National competent authorities 
and contact points 
National competent authorities 
and contact points 

Scoping and semi-structured 
interviews 
Scoping interviews 
Semi-structured interviews 

Scoping interviews 
Semi-structured interviews 

Targeted online survey 

3 interviews 

2 interviews 
2 interviews 

3 interviews 
6 interviews 

23 responses 

95 

 
National competent authorities 
and contact points 
Public authorities 
National competent authorities 
and contact points 
National competent authorities 
and contact points 

National competent authorities 
and contact points  
Public authorities 
Third-sector stakeholders 
Academic and educational 
institutions 
Academic / Research 
institutions  
NGOs 
Associations of non-
professional users  
Industry stakeholders 
Industry associations 

Manufacturers / distributors 

Retailers and online 
marketplaces 
Market participants 
Business associations 
Businesses 
Market participants 
Market participants  
Market participants  

Businesses 
Business associations  
Other stakeholders 
EU citizens 
EU citizens 
Non-EU citizens 
Other 

Targeted e-mail questionnaire 

3 responses 

Call for Evidence 
Focus group discussions 

7 responses 
40 participants 

Meetings of the Standing 
Committee on Precursors (SCP) 
– three meetings 
Validation workshop 

Participating SCP Members 

25 participants 

Public consultation 

1 response 

Follow-up interviews 

1 interview 

Public consultation 

4 responses 

Public consultation 
Semi-structured interviews 

1 response 
1 interview 

Scoping and semi-structured 
interviews 
Scoping and semi-structured 
interviews 
Scoping and semi-structured 
interviews 
Targeted online survey 
Call for Evidence 
Call for Evidence 
Focus group discussion 
Targeted e-mail questionnaires  
Meetings of the Standing 
Committee on Precursors 
Public consultation 
Public consultation 

Call for Evidence 
Public consultation 
Public consultation 
Public consultation 

11 interviews 

4 interviews 

1 interview 

87 responses 
12 responses 
2 responses 
21 participants 
11 responses 
n/a 

13 responses 
8 responses 

1 response 
162 responses 
19 responses 
1 response 

3.  Results of the consultation activities 

3.1.  Scoping interviews 

The study team conducted a total of 8 scoping interviews during the inception phase: 

Two interviews with EU entities 

The Regulation has generally improved security by restricting access to explosives 
precursors and harmonising rules, but overlaps with other regulations (e.g. 
drug precursors) create some administrative burden. 

Respondents see the Regulation as broadly effective, with evidence that criminals 
are being forced to seek alternatives, though implementation varies across 
Member States. 

96 

 
 
There is no urgent call for major revision; the Regulation is seen as fit for purpose, 

but due diligence and compliance costs are notable. 

Unintended consequences include a shift by malicious actors to less-regulated 

products (e.g. pyrotechnics), highlighting gaps outside the Regulation’s scope. 

Any future changes should be proportionate, evidence-based, and coherent with 

other EU chemical and security legislation. 

Three interviews with national competent authorities 

The Regulation has been effective in restricting access and harmonising rules, 

with high compliance levels, especially where stricter national measures are in 
place (e.g. Denmark). 

No major unintended impacts or limiting factors were identified; the Regulation is 

seen as relevant and necessary for current and future security needs. 

Authorities recommend expanding the Regulation to cover new substances and, in 

some cases, related equipment and materials used in making explosives. 

Digitalisation of processes and improved alert systems are seen as beneficial, with 

proactive inspections and significant fines acting as effective deterrents. 

Collaboration and information-sharing between Member States and with 

stakeholders (including online marketplaces) are considered essential for 
effective enforcement. 

Three interviews with industry associations 

Significant administrative and compliance burdens, especially due to inconsistent 

national implementation and additional requirements. 

Disproportionate impacts on consumer products with low concentrations of 

precursors and the complexity of identifying regulated products in the supply 
chain. 

Calls for simplification, clearer definitions, and differentiation between 

obligations for the general public and economic operators (B2B vs B2C). 

Industry supports harmonisation and digitalisation but warns against 

overregulation, especially regarding high-risk chemicals not directly relevant 
to explosives manufacturing. 

Open dialogue with stakeholders and alignment with other EU and international 

regulations are seen as crucial for future amendments. 

3.2.  Semi-structured interviews 

The study team conducted a total of 19 semi-structured interviews as part of the evaluation 
phase: 

Five interviews with EU entities. 

DG HOME has set up monitoring programmes, guidelines, and secure 

communication platforms to support Regulation 2019/1148, but effectiveness 
is limited by uneven Member State engagement and reporting quality. 

97 

 
Verification upon sale and reporting of suspicious transactions remain major 
issues for both authorities and private sector actors, with significant 
discrepancies in enforcement and awareness across Member States. 

Technical and administrative overlaps exist with REACH, Drug Precursors 
Regulation, and environmental laws, especially regarding substance 
definitions, waste exclusion, and dual compliance burdens. 

Online sharing of explosive-making instructions, increased use of pyrotechnics in 
crime, and fertiliser thefts present ongoing risks not fully addressed by current 
regulation. 

Interviewees suggest a centralised information hub for reporting, targeted 

amendments to the Regulation (e.g. updating substance lists, clarifying online 
marketplace coverage), and balancing increased regulatory detail with 
administrative burden. 

Six interviews with Member States national competent authorities and contact 

points. 

The Regulation has generally succeeded in restricting the availability of 

explosives precursors to the general public and raising awareness among 
economic operators, though its direct impact on suppressing terrorist or 
criminal activities is difficult to measure. 

Significant challenges remain, especially regarding cross-border inconsistencies, 
online sales (including private-to-private and platforms outside the EU), and 
the practicalities of verifying transactions and reporting suspicious activities. 

The ‘1% rule’ for mixtures and reliance on CAS numbers are widely seen as 

problematic, leading to regulatory loopholes and unnecessary burdens. There 
is a call for clearer, substance-specific thresholds and more practical 
definitions. 

The lack of a clear role for customs authorities and insufficient data sharing 
between customs, inspection authorities, and contact points limit the 
Regulation’s effectiveness, especially for imports and online purchases. 

Broad support for maintaining an EU-wide approach, but stakeholders recommend 
simplifying administrative requirements, clarifying obligations (especially for 
online and cross-border transactions), and improving cooperation and 
information sharing across Member States. 

Seven interviews with industry associations. 

Stakeholders strongly support having an EU-wide regulation, as it simplifies 
compliance and creates a level playing field for companies operating in 
multiple Member States. 

The main challenge cited is the administrative burden, especially for B2B 
transactions, where repeated ID checks and data collection are seen as 
disproportionate and sometimes unnecessary, particularly for established 
business relationships. 

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Differences in national implementation and interpretation of the Regulation create 

confusion and extra work. There is a call for clearer, more harmonised 
guidelines from the European Commission. 

Many interviewees suggest revising the 1% w/w threshold for mixtures, proposing 
higher limits to reduce regulatory burden on products unlikely to be misused, 
and caution against expanding the list of regulated substances without strong 
justification. 

There are concerns about loopholes in the control of online sales, especially on 
smaller platforms and private-to-private transactions, with calls to explicitly 
include these in the Regulation and improve enforcement. 

One interview with an association of non-professional users. 

The Regulation is seen as having little to no security benefit for the radio-

controlled racing sector, with no evidence of misuse of nitromethane for 
malicious purposes. However, it imposes restrictions and compliance burdens 
that are viewed as disproportionate for hobbyists and non-professional users. 

There are significant disparities in how the Regulation is implemented and 

enforced across EU Member States, leading to confusion, uneven playing 
fields, and challenges for cross-border participation in competitions. 

While harmonisation of rules is valued, the current approach (including licensing 

systems and concentration limits) is seen as unnecessarily complex. 
Stakeholders prefer stable, harmonised rules and suggest that further 
tightening of restrictions would negatively impact the sector without clear 
security gains. 

As part of semi-structured interviews, several follow-up interviews were carried out with 
respondents to the survey of market participants, whereby questions were adapted based on 
their respective survey response. To limit stakeholder fatigue, more defined interviews were 
conducted so that survey respondents were not asked questions which they had already 
answered in the targeted online surveys. 

3.3.  Targeted online surveys 

Two targeted online surveys were administered to inform the evaluation: 

•  Survey for national competent authorities and contact points: launched between 
17 February and 15 April 2025, it was disseminated as a Word editable document via 
email to SCP members. It received a total of 23 consolidated national responses. 
Follow-up interviews were carried out with responding authorities in six Member 
States. 

The Regulation is seen as ‘somewhat effective’ in preventing criminal access to 
explosives precursors, but enforcement and the definition of customs’ roles 
vary significantly across Member States. 

Compliance is highest among manufacturers but weakest among online 

marketplaces and the general public, with many stakeholders lacking 
awareness of their obligations. 

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SMEs and authorities face high administrative and operational burdens, with 

complex requirements leading to product reformulation, market withdrawals, 
and confusion about definitions and thresholds. 

Criminals increasingly use online platforms and private-to-private sales to 

circumvent controls, prompting strong support for expanding the Regulation’s 
scope to cover these channels. 

Overlaps and inconsistencies with other EU regulations (e.g. REACH, CLP) cause 

confusion and dual compliance burdens for businesses and authorities. 

Respondents call for clearer definitions, harmonised enforcement, digitalisation of 
compliance processes, stronger regulation of online trade, and regular updates 
to the list of regulated substances. 

Survey for market participants: launched between 18 February and 25 March 2025 
launched on ICF’s Forsta Plus survey platform, it received a total of 87 individual 
responses. Follow-up interviews were carried out with eight survey respondents. 

The Regulation has successfully raised awareness about explosives precursors in 
the supply chain, but is seen as less effective at preventing their misuse by 
criminals or terrorists. 

Verification requirements, particularly for business-to-business transactions, are 

considered burdensome and not always fit for long-term customer 
relationships. 

The Regulation is perceived as more effective for offline transactions, with online 

sales posing greater challenges for verifying customer legitimacy. 

Compliance costs are highest for verification upon sale, and most respondents 

(especially retailers) report few direct benefits from the Regulation. 

Stakeholders call for more harmonised rules across Member States, simpler 
processes for regular customers, and reduced administrative burdens. 

There are significant concerns about privacy, GDPR compliance, and the handling 

of personal data required for verification. 

3.4.  Call for Evidence 

The evaluation was informed by feedback received to the Call for evidence, which ran on the 
Commission’s  ‘Have  you  Say’  website  from  23  July  to  20 August  2024  and  received  19 
responses: 12 from business associations, 4 from public authorities, 2 from businesses, and 1 
from  an  EU  citizen,  with  geographical  representation  from  Germany  (5),  Belgium  (4), 
Denmark (2), France (2), the Netherlands (2), Hungary (1), Lithuania (1), and Romania (1). 
There  were  12  submissions  by  EU  or  national  business  associations  which  are  a  mix  of 
micro-,  small-,  medium-,  and  large-  enterprises.  However,  while  some  of  these  business 
associations are classified as micro- or small- enterprises, they have large membership bases, 
making  their  submission  more  representative  to  that  of,  for  example,  a  private  sector  small 
business distributing chemicals. 

Business Associations: there were 12 submissions from business associations operating 
in chemicals manufacture or distribution, fertiliser manufacture or distribution, the 

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cleaning sector, retail sector, cosmetics and detergents manufacturers, and explosives, 
pyrotechnics and fireworks manufacturers. They highlighted the need for enhanced 
digital traceability, simplification of administrative processes, and flexibility in 
verification procedures. Concerns were raised about the broad scope of the regulation 
and the impact on sectors like disinfectants and cleaning agents. 

Public Authorities: submissions focused on environmental issues, public arms control, 
and policing emphasising the importance of uniform implementation across Member 
States and the need for clear definitions and exemptions for low-risk products. 
Coordination at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
level was suggested to enhance international coherence. 

Businesses: two businesses discussed the administrative burdens imposed by the 

regulation and highlighted the need for harmonised legislation and improved digital 
traceability. 

EU citizen: one EU citizen who expressed concerns about the reporting mechanisms 
under the current regulation and the cost for businesses in the chemical industry. 

3.5.  Public consultation 

The 12-week public consultation100 was launched on 31 March and ran until 23 June 2025. It 
received a total of 208 responses, the majority of which (78%, 168) were submitted by 
respondents categorising themselves as EU citizens. Reponses from Non-EU Citizens made 
up 9% (19), 6% of responses were from Companies/Businesses (13), 4% of responses were 
from Business Associations (8), 2% were from Academic/Research Institutions (4), and three 
respondent groups were each represented by 1 respondent, there were NGOs, Public 
Authorities, and Other. 

EU Citizens 

Regulations hinder legitimate use, especially for hobbyists and educational 
purposes. Many feel the system discourages scientific curiosity and 
experimentation, making it difficult to obtain chemicals for benign or 
household uses. 

Negative effect on education and innovation, stifling learning outside formal 
institutions and discouraging youth from pursuing STEM, especially 
chemistry. 

Social costs are significant, with restrictions making alternatives more expensive 

and less effective 

Many believe the regulation fails to deter criminals but disproportionately affects 

law-abiding citizens. 

100  More  information  on  the  public  consultation  can  be  found  in  the  ‘Factual  Summary  Report  -  Public 
Consultation: Marketing and use of explosives precursors – updated rules’ which has been published on the 
‘Have your say’-website of the European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-
your-say/initiatives/14353-Marketing-and-use-of-explosives-precursors-updated-rules/public-
consultation_en) 

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Companies/Businesses 

High administrative and operational burdens, especially for small businesses. 

Compliance costs (licensing, documentation, IT systems) are 
disproportionately high. 

Financial strain, increased purchase prices, need for costly alternatives, and 

barriers to market entry. 

Regulations seen as creating a competitive disadvantage for smaller entities, while 

larger companies adapt more easily 

Support for exclusion from verification obligations for B2B transactions and 

professional users. 

Business Associations 

Need for harmonisation and standardisation across Member States. Inconsistent 

enforcement creates confusion and unequal burdens. 

Advocacy for central coordination, binding guidelines, and industry-led training to 

balance security and access. 

Promotion of voluntary tracking, staff training, and sharing best practices (e.g. 

BASF platforms, Fecc Model Agreement). 

Academic/Research Institutions 

Restrictions hinder legitimate scientific exploration, especially for independent 
researchers and students. Bureaucratic burden detracts from research time. 

Stifling of innovation and scientific progress, negative impact on education and 

research freedom. 

Support for exclusion from verification obligations for academic and research 

institutions. 

NGO, Public Authority, Other 

Concerns generally focused on proportionality and practicality of compliance 

requirements, especially in agriculture and scientific inquiry. 

Questioned effectiveness in deterring malicious actors, highlighting 

inconsistencies in enforcement and unintended consequences for legitimate 
users. 

3.6.  Meetings of the Standing Committee on Precursors 

Findings of the impact assessment were informed by exchanges held at the 36th and 
particularly the 37th SCP meetings (in November 2024 and May 2025, respectively). These 
meetings provided opportunities for assessing problems and policy objectives to be addressed 
by a potential revision of the Regulation. 

36th meeting 

EU Member States & EEA States 

•  Administrative burden, especially for licensing and verification processes 
•  Mixed views on the effectiveness of licensing versus authorisation regimes 

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•  Challenges for retailers with supervision, reporting, and threshold levels 
•  Limited public awareness about licensing and regulatory requirements 
•  Need for greater regulatory clarity and harmonisation across Member States 
•  Reduced general public access to chemicals in some countries 
•  Technical and transparency issues raised, including preferences for previous labelling 

rules 

Industry Stakeholders & Observers 

•  Concerns about the administrative burden imposed by current regulations and 

overlapping legislation. 

•  Fragmentation across Member States, with divergent national requirements and data 

protection issues. 

•  Need for flexibility due to sectoral differences and exemptions for B2B transactions, 

reflecting a shared desire for adaptable regulatory approaches. 

Online Marketplaces 

•  Algorithms for suspicious transaction reporting often lead to overreporting or miss 

suspicious cases. 

•  Challenges in identifying suspicious activities, especially with combinations of 

products. 

•  Voluntary measures (Product Safety Pledge) in place; need for differentiation between 

global and national marketplaces. 

37th meeting 

EU Member States & EEA States 

•  Mixed views on whether changes should be legislative or handled through guidelines. 
•  Some prefer non-legislative adjustments to avoid overcomplicating the Regulation. 
Others see value in legislative changes for specific issues (e.g. customs, waste, 
acetone thresholds). 

•  Divided on the need for an EU-wide contact point; some support a central portal, 

others prefer national systems. 

•  Mixed opinions on whether transporters should have reporting obligations; concerns 

about practicality and administrative burden. 

•  Broad agreement that current acetone regulation is unnecessarily strict; suggestions to 

raise thresholds or remove it from scope. 
• 
Interest in using systems like ICSMS for better enforcement and information sharing. 
•  Most oppose expanding the Regulation’s scope to include high-risk chemicals without 

clear definitions and mapping. 

Industry Stakeholders & Observers 

•  Concerns about high administrative and compliance burdens, especially for B2B 

transactions and ID verification. 

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•  Requested exemptions for low-risk products (e.g. nail polish, paint aerosols) and 

clearer definitions to avoid unnecessary regulation. 

•  Large operators support a centralised EU portal to simplify cross-border compliance 

and reporting. 

•  More feedback from authorities is desired after reporting suspicious transactions. 
•  Strongly opposed to including high-risk chemicals and additional products unless 

clearly justified. 

•  Noted underrepresentation of retailers and online marketplaces in consultations; 

highlighted lower compliance due to less chemical expertise. 

•  Guidelines vs legislation - some issues (e.g. ID verification, product lists) require 

legislative change, not just guidelines. 

3.7.  Validation workshop 

The validation workshop consisted of a half-day event held on the 17 September 2025 and 
aimed to discuss findings from the study and ensure that all relevant data sources have been 
appropriately utilised and correctly interpreted. The workshop involved 26 participants. 

Ongoing debate about whether the 1% rule strikes the right balance between costs and 
security. The private sector argues that some substances are unlikely to be used by 
terrorists due to cost and availability of alternatives. 

Legislative gaps identified: lack of a defined role for customs and insufficient coverage of 
chemical waste. Most participants agreed that these gaps hinder effective enforcement 
and may require legislative revision. 

Acetone and sulphuric acid regulation: strong consensus emerged against removing 

acetone and sulphuric acid from the Regulation, as both are widely used in homemade 
explosives. While industry sees challenges, most Member States and the Commission 
support continued regulation. 

Enforcement and inspections: there are significant differences in how Member States 

conduct inspections, including mystery shopping. Most participants do not support 
making mystery shopping mandatory due to resource constraints and legal barriers, 
but see value in guidelines and best practices. 

Enforcement is complicated by the rise of online marketplaces, with questions about 

responsibility and sanctions for cross-border sales. Member States highlighted the 
need for EU-level solutions. 

Mixed views on using Safety Data Sheets to communicate explosive precursor status. 

Some support mandatory SDS references for relevant substances, while others argue it 
is not suitable for all products and may conflict with existing regulations. 

An informal vote showed strong support (13 participants) for amending the Explosive 

Precursors Regulation to address identified gaps and improve enforcement, with no 
opposition. 

Participants noted that it is too early to take a definitive stance on specific policy options 

and called for more detailed recommendations and continued dialogue. 

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