COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation and enforcement of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, in accordance with Article 52(2) thereof
Date: 2026-07-14
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy, application of EU law, economic concentration, foreign capital, foreign investment, merger control, public procurement, restriction on competition, single market

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 14.7.2026  SWD(2026) 183 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation and enforcement of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, in accordance with Article 52(2) thereof {COM(2026) 368 final}  
 
 
CONTENTS 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 6 

1.1.  Context: the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and its objective ................ 6 

1.2.  Legal basis and purpose of the Report .................................................. 7 

2.  LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND .................................................................. 7 

3.  CURRENT SET UP UNDER THE FSR ........................................................ 9 

3.1.  Substantive concepts ............................................................................. 9 

3.1.1.  Foreign financial contributions and foreign subsidies ............. 9 

3.1.2.  Distortion of the internal market ............................................. 9 

3.1.3.  Balancing test ........................................................................ 10 

3.2.  Enforcement procedures ...................................................................... 10 

3.2.1.  Ex officio review (Article 9 FSR) ......................................... 11 

3.2.2.  Ex ante notification of concentrations (Chapter 3 FSR)........ 11 

3.2.3.  Ex ante notification in public procurement procedures (Chapter 
4 FSR) .................................................................................... 12 

3.2.4.  Possibility to request prior notification ................................. 14 

3.2.5.  Sources of information and market investigations ................ 14 

3.3.  Division of responsibilities between DG COMP and DG GROW ...... 14 

3.4. 

Interactions with other instruments ..................................................... 15 

3.4.1. 

Interaction with the EUMR ................................................... 15 

3.4.2. 

Interaction  with  the  framework  set  up  by  the  FDI  Screening 
Regulation .............................................................................. 16 

3.4.3. 

Interaction with the Public Procurement Directives .............. 16 

4.  PREPARATION OF THE REPORT ............................................................ 17 

4.1.  Sources of information and workstreams ............................................ 17 

4.2.  Scope and methodology of the review ................................................ 17 

4.2.1.  The FSR Review Study ......................................................... 17 

4.2.2.  The FSR Review Public Consultation ................................... 18 

4.2.3.  Commission’s internal FSR review ....................................... 19 

4.3.  Objectives sought with the Report ...................................................... 19 

4.3.1.  Transparency ......................................................................... 19 

4.3.2.  Simplification ........................................................................ 21 

4.3.3.  Optimisation of work ............................................................. 21 

 
 
 
 
4.3.4.  Observation on international obligations ............................... 21 

5.  FINDINGS .................................................................................................... 22 

5.1.  Status of implementation ..................................................................... 22 

5.2.  Status of enforcement .......................................................................... 22 

5.2.1.  Relevance,  clarity  and  appropriateness  of  substantive 
provisions .............................................................................. 23 

5.2.1.1.  Feedback from stakeholders .................................. 23 

5.2.1.2.  The Commission services’ assessment .................. 25 

5.2.2.  Ex officio investigations ........................................................ 25 

5.2.2.1. 

Information on cases.............................................. 25 

5.2.2.2.  Review by the EU Courts ...................................... 26 

5.2.2.3.  Feedback from stakeholders .................................. 27 

5.2.2.4.  The Commission services’ assessment .................. 27 

5.2.3.  Notification of concentrations ............................................... 28 

5.2.3.1. 

Information on cases.............................................. 28 

5.2.3.2.  Detailed analysis of Commission practice ............ 29 

5.2.3.3.  Feedback from stakeholders .................................. 39 

5.2.3.4.  The FSR Review Study ......................................... 40 

5.2.3.5.  The Commission services’ assessment .................. 40 

5.2.4.  Submissions in public procurement procedures .................... 42 

5.2.4.1. 

Information on cases.............................................. 42 

5.2.4.2.  Detailed analysis of the Commission’s practice .... 44 

5.2.4.3.  Enhanced legal guidance and procedural support . 53 

5.2.4.4.  Engagement of Member States in FSR enforcement
 ............................................................................... 54 

5.2.4.5.  Feedback from stakeholders .................................. 54 

5.2.4.6.  The FSR Review Study ......................................... 56 

5.2.4.7.  The Commission’s assessment .............................. 57 

5.3.  Developments in third countries’ subsidy control systems ................. 59 

5.3.1. 

Introduction ........................................................................... 59 

5.3.2.  Analysis ................................................................................. 60 

5.3.3.  Conclusion ............................................................................. 61 

6.  ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FSR ........................ 61 

6.1.  FSR in general and policy objectives .................................................. 61 

6.2. 

In relation to the ex officio procedure ................................................. 62 

6.3. 

In relation to the notification procedure for concentrations ................ 62 

2 

 
6.4. 

In relation to notifications in public procurement procedures ............. 63 

7.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 63 

3 

 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1. 

Context: the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and its objective 

Regulation  (EU)  2022/2560  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 
14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (1) (the ‘FSR’) was 
adopted to address distortions in the internal market caused by subsidies granted by third 
countries. The FSR seeks to ensure a level playing field in the internal market by enabling 
the European Commission (the ‘Commission’) to identify, assess, and, where necessary, 
redress distortive foreign subsidies.  

Before  the  adoption  of  the  FSR,  the  Union  legal  framework  contained  a  structural 
regulatory gap. While Union State aid rules ensure that the subsidies granted by Member 
States  do  not  unduly  distort  competition  within  the  internal  market,  Regulation  (EC) 
139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the 
‘EUMR’)  assesses  whether  concentrations  may  lead  to  a  significant  impediment  to 
effective competition, and Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (‘TFEU’) assess the presence of anti-competitive agreements and abuse 
of dominant position, none of these instruments  allowed for a systematic assessment of 
subsidies granted by third countries to undertakings operating in the Union. In addition, 
traditional EU trade defence instruments, are limited to subsidised imports of goods and 
do not capture distortions arising from subsidised investments, services or financial flows. 
As a result, foreign subsidies could distort any sector of the economy such as, inter alia, 
participation in public procurement procedures or acquisition of undertakings or engaging 
in any other economic activities in the Union, without being subject to scrutiny comparable 
to that applicable to State aid. The FSR was therefore conceived as a horizontal instrument 
complementing existing Union merger, antitrust, State aid, public procurement and trade 
policy  rules,  with  the  objective  of  preserving  fair  competition  and  the  integrity  of  the 
internal market.  

The  FSR  is  based  on  non-discriminatory  principles  and  objective  criteria.  It  covers  all 
sectors and economic activities in the internal market, targeting distortions caused by any 
foreign  subsidy  to  the  internal  market.  The  FSR  applies  in  full  respect  of  international 
obligations.  While  the  Commission  remains  committed  to  constructive  dialogue  and 
cooperation with third-country authorities and economic operators, it will continue to use 
all  investigative  and  procedural  tools  available  under  the  FSR  to  ensure  its  effective 
application and safeguard the level playing field in the internal market. 

At  international  level,  the  Union  has  consistently  expressed  preference  for  addressing 
subsidy-related distortions through multilateral instruments, notably within the framework 
of the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’). However, existing WTO rules, in particular the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘ASCM’), are limited in scope, for 
reasons  such  as  their  focus  on  trade  in  goods,  and  face  some  challenges  in  view  of 
transparency shortcomings and enforcement constraints. In the absence of comprehensive 
and effective multilateral rules capable of addressing the full range of distortions observed 
in the internal market, the EU considered it necessary to equip itself with an autonomous 
instrument  to  address  distortions  caused  by  foreign  subsidies,  while  remaining  open  to 
future multilateral solutions (2). 

(1) 

(2) 

Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 
on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, pp. 1–45. 
See Recital 6 FSR. 

4 

 
 
 
1.2. 

Legal basis and purpose of the Report 

Article 52(2) FSR requires the Commission to review how it implements and enforces the 
FSR  and  report  on  its  functioning  to  the  European  Parliament  and  Council  every  three 
years,  with  the  first  report  due  by  14  July  2026  (the  ‘Report’).  The  Report,  therefore, 
assesses the early implementation and enforcement of the FSR as well as the experience 
gained by the Commission in its initial period of application.  

The  scope  of  the  Report  covers  the  application  of  the  key  substantive  and  procedural 
provisions  of  the  FSR,  especially  the  application  of  Articles  4,  5,  6  and  9,  and  the 
notification thresholds set out in Article20(3), Article 28(1) and (2) FSR (3). In the context 
of its review, the Commission should also report on developments in international relations 
involving third countries’ subsidy control systems.  

This  Staff  Working  Document  complements  the  Report  in  providing  more  detailed 
analysis. 

The review under Article 52 FSR is intended to ensure that the FSR remains proportionate, 
effective and consistent with its stated objective and the Union’s international obligations, 
while allowing for possible adjustments if warranted by enforcement experience (4). 

This Staff Working Document accompanies the Report to provide more comprehensive 
overview of the FSR legislative background, the current FSR set up and its enforcement 
procedures and the experience gained by the Commission in its initial period of application.  

2. 

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND  

On 17 June 2020, the Commission adopted a White Paper on levelling the playing field as 
regards  foreign  subsidies  (the  ‘White  Paper’) (5).  The  White  Paper  launched  the  public 
debate on the topic of distortive foreign subsidies in the internal market, from 17 June 2020 
until 23 September 2020, during which, the Commission received 150 contributions from 
interested  stakeholders ( 6).  Following  a  gap  analysis  of  existing  EU  and  international 
instruments, the White Paper concluded that while some tools already existed, they were 
insufficient  to  adequately  address  the  issue  of  foreign  subsidies  distorting  the  internal 
market.  The  White  Paper  proposed  solutions  and  called  for  new  tools  to  address  the 
identified regulatory gap for tackling distortive foreign subsidies in the internal market.  
On 5 May 2021, following additional consultation activities (7), the Commission adopted 
a  proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  foreign  subsidies  distorting  the  internal  market ( 8 ), 

(3) 
(4) 

(5) 
(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

See Article 52 FSR.  
Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on Regulation (EU) 
2022/2560. 
White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies, COM(2020) 253 final. 
The results from the public  consultation on the White  Paper on foreign subsidies is available at 
Have your say portal (White Paper on Foreign Subsidies).  
On 6 October 2020, the Commission published an Inception impact assessment, which was open 
for feedback until 29 October 2020 and 22 interested stakeholders provided feedback. The Inception 
impact assessment presented policy options that could be combined and announced the assessment 
of  the  different  impacts.  In  the  context  of  the  consultation  activities  with  stakeholders,  between 
October 2020 and January 2021, the Commission gathered  targeted feedback  from business and 
industry groups active in sectors that appear to be affected by foreign subsidies as well as expert 
groups,  public  authorities,  representatives  of  SMEs,  consumers  as  well  as  third-country 
stakeholders. 
See Commission Proposal for a Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market. 

5 

 
 
accompanied by an Impact Assessment Report (9). This proposal for a Regulation initiated 
the legislative procedure with the Council and the European Parliament. (10) 

On 30 June 2022, the Council and the European Parliament reached a political agreement 
on the Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (11). The final text of 
the  FSR  was  adopted  on  10 November  2022  by  the  European  Parliament (12)  and  on 
28 November 2022 by the Council (13). 

Following  the  adoption  of  the  FSR  and  its  entry  into  force  on  13 January  2023,  the 
Commission  invited  stakeholders  to  give  feedback  on  the  draft  Foreign  Subsidies 
Implementing  Regulation  (‘FSIR’)  on  6 February  2023.  Interested  stakeholders  were 
invited to submit their comments by 6 March 2023 via the ‘Have Your Say’ portal and 74 
of  them  submitted  feedback,  which  was  taken  into  account  in  the  final  FSIR (14).  The 
Commission also carried out targeted consultations with selected stakeholders and the draft 
FSIR was approved by the Foreign Subsidies Advisory Committee, in line with Article 48 
FSR (15). 

On  10  July  2023,  the  Commission  adopted  the  FSIR  laying  down  the  procedures  for 
notifying and content of notifications of concentrations  and  of public procurement bids 
involving  foreign  financial  contributions ( 16 ),  rules  on  disclosure,  access  to  file  and 
confidential information, transparency requirements, rules for calculating time limits, and 
the  Commission’s  investigation  process,  including  procedural  details  for  proposing 
commitments by the undertaking under investigation. On 12 July 2023, the Commission 
also  adopted  the  Communication  C(2023)4749  on  transmitting  documents  to  the 
Commission in the context of the FSR (17). The FSIR entered into force on 13 July 2023. 

The FSR started to apply from 13 July 2023 and as of that date, the Commission could 
initiate  ex  officio  investigations.  By  way  of  derogation,  the  notification  obligation,  for 
concentrations  under  Article 21  FSR  and  for  foreign  financial  contributions  in  public 
procurement procedures under Article 29 FSR, started to apply from 13 October 2023. The 
rules on the provision of assistance by Member States in the context of inspections under 

(9) 

(10) 

(11) 

(12) 

(13) 

(14) 

(15) 

(16) 

(17) 

See Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a 
Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  foreign  subsidies  distorting  the 
internal market.  
The FSR legislative background and the Commission’s presentations to the members of the Council 
Working Party on Competition in a series of meetings from May to December 2021 is documented 
at FSR legislative background. 
Commission press release of 30 June 2022 on Foreign Subsidies: Commission welcomes political 
agreement on Regulation on distortive foreign subsidies.  
European Parliament press release of 10 November 2022 on Parliament approves new tool to ensure 
fair competition on the single market.  
Council press release of 28 November 2022 on Council gives final approval to tackling distortive 
foreign subsidies on the internal market.  
See the FSR draft Implementing Regulation and the feedback received on the Commission  Have 
your say portal (Distortive foreign subsidies – procedural rules for assessing them).  
On  30  June  2023,  following  two  previous  meetings  in  February  and  May  2023,  the  Foreign 
Subsidies  Advisory  Committee  approved  the  draft  FSIR.  The  documentation  is  available  on  the 
Commission Comitology Register for the Foreign Subsidies Advisory Committee. 
Annex  I  to  the  FSIR  concerns  the  Form  FS-CO  relating  to  the  notification  of  a  concentration 
pursuant to the FSR and Annex II to the FSIR concerns the Form FS-PP relating to the notification 
of financial contributions in the context of public procurement procedures pursuant to the FSR. 
Communication from the Commission – Communication pursuant to Articles 4(2), 8(1), 15, 17(2) 
and 25 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1441 on detailed arrangements for the conduct of 
proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament 
and  of  the  Council  on  foreign  subsidies  distorting  the  internal  market,  C/2023/4749,  OJ  C  246, 
13.7.2023, pp. 2–5. 

6 

 
 
the FSR entered into force on 13 January 2024 (18) to allow Member States sufficient time 
to prepare the necessary national administrative framework for such assistance. 

3. 

CURRENT SET UP UNDER THE FSR  

3.1. 

Substantive concepts 

This section outlines the main substantive concepts underpinning the FSR application, its 
enforcement procedures and the division of responsibilities between DG Competition (DG 
COMP)  and  DG  Internal  Market,  Industry,  Entrepreneurship  and  SMEs  (DG  GROW), 
both in charge of the FSR implementation, as well as the interaction of the FSR with the 
other legal instruments of the Union. 

3.1.1.  Foreign financial contributions and foreign subsidies 

The FSR relies on the concept of foreign financial contributions (‘FFCs’) as a starting point 
for its enforcement framework. Article 3(2) FSR defines the notion of FFCs to include any 
financial  exchange  with  a  third  country  government  or  entity  whose  actions  can  be 
attributed to a third country, such as direct transfers of funds or liabilities, the foregoing of 
revenue otherwise due, and the provision or purchase of goods or services. The notion of 
FFCs  serves  as  a  basis  for  the  jurisdictional  threshold  for  the  purposes  of  ex  ante 
notification  procedures  under  the  FSR  and  underlying  reporting  obligations  under 
Articles 21 and 29 FSR.  

The  FFCs  itself,  however,  is  not  sufficient  to  conclude  on  the  existence  of  a  foreign 
subsidy. Under Article 3(1) FSR, an FFC granted directly or indirectly by a third country 
will  be  a  foreign  subsidy  if  it  (i) confers  a  benefit  on  an  undertaking  engaging  in  an 
economic activity in the internal market, and (ii) is limited, in law or in fact, to one or more 
undertakings or industries. The distinction between FFCs and foreign subsidies is therefore 
central to the structure of the FSR.  

When  the  Commission  has  sufficient  indications  on  the  presence  of  foreign  subsidies 
distorting the internal market, it shall open an in-depth investigation under the FSR.  

3.1.2.  Distortion of the internal market 

Once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established, the Commission should assess if the 
foreign subsidy is distortive to the internal market.  

Articles 4 and 5 FSR set out the framework for assessing whether a foreign subsidy distorts 
the internal market. Article 4 FSR establishes the general concept of distortion, focusing 
on two cumulative criteria: (i) whether a foreign subsidy improves the competitive position 
of  an  undertaking  in  the  internal  market  and,  in  doing  so,  (ii) actually  or  potentially 
negatively  affects  competition.  Article 5  FSR  identifies  certain  categories  of  foreign 
subsidies  that  are  considered  most  likely  to  distort  the  internal  market.  By  contrast, 
Article 4(2)  FSR  establishes  a  rebuttable  presumption  that  certain  foreign  subsidies  are 
unlikely to distort the internal market, while Article 4(3) provides that foreign subsidies 
below the de minimis threshold are deemed not to distort the internal market. 

The approach taken by the Commission in assessing distortions under the FSR has been 
developed in detail in the Guidelines on the application of certain provisions of Regulation 
(EU)  2022/2560  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  foreign  subsidies 

(18) 

Article 54(3) FSR indicates that by way of derogation, Article 14(5), (6) and (7) FSR shall apply 
from 13 January 2024. 

7 

 
 
distorting  the  internal  market  (‘FSR  Guidelines’),  published  on  9  January  2026 (19).  In 
particular, the FSR Guidelines provide insight on the assessment of the two cumulative 
conditions  included  in  Article  4  FSR  –  improvement  of  competitive  position  of  the 
undertaking  and  the  actual  or  potential  negative  effect  on  competition  in  the  internal 
market.  

3.1.3.  Balancing test 

Once the distortion of the foreign subsidy to the internal market is identified, the parties 
can bring forward arguments if there are positive effects of the foreign subsidies that can 
outweigh the negative effects through the so-called balancing test, under Article 6 FSR.  

Article 6 FSR envisages that the Commission may, on the basis of information received, 
conduct  a  balancing  test  to  take  into  account  the  potential  positive  effects  of  a  foreign 
subsidy on the development of the subsidised economic activity when assessing its overall 
impact on the internal market. This test forms part of the substantive assessment framework 
and may influence the outcome of an investigation where both negative and positive effects 
are identified in  terms of the type of decision to  be adopted and the appropriateness  of 
remedial measures intended to address the identified distortion. In all cases, the outcome 
after conducting a balancing test should not be less favourable to the undertaking under 
investigation than if no balancing had taken place. 

The FSR Guidelines provide more information about the way the Commission performs 
the balancing test, clarifying in particular the situations in which positive effects may be 
assessed, the types of positive effects that can be taken into account, and  the conditions 
that need to be met for those positive effects to be taken into account. 

3.2. 

Enforcement procedures 

The FSR is structured around three enforcement procedures that allow the Commission to 
address distortions caused by foreign subsidies (20). While these procedures are based on 
partially  distinct  frameworks,  they  rely  on  a  common  set  of  substantive  concepts  and 
investigative powers, and may in certain cases overlap in their application. In particular, 
the  ex  officio  tool  may  also  be  used  to  examine  economic  activities  including 
concentrations  and  public  procurement  procedures  or  other  forms  of  public  spending, 
which do not fall under the ex ante notification obligation, pursuant to Articles 21 and 29 
FSR.  

Under  all  three  enforcement  procedures,  the  FSR  investigations  have  a  two-phase 
structure, consisting of: (i) a preliminary review, as set out in Article 10 FSR and, where 
appropriate,  (ii) an  in-depth  investigation,  as  set  out  in  Article 11  FSR.  These  phases 
determine the procedural steps and timelines of the Commission’s assessment. 

(19) 

(20) 

Communication  from  the  Commission  –  Guidelines  on  the  application  of  certain  provisions  of 
Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies 
distorting  the  internal  market,  C/2026/42.  See  Commission  press  release  of  9  January  2026  – 
Commission publishes Foreign Subsidies Regulation Guidelines. 
In addition to the three enforcement procedures against specific undertakings, Article 36 FSR lays 
down the possibility of the Commission conducting a market investigation into a particular sector, 
a particular type of economic activity or into the use of a particular subsidy instrument in case the 
information available to the Commission substantiates a reasonable suspicion that foreign subsidies 
in the particular sector, for the particular type of economic activity or based on the particular subsidy 
instrument may distort the internal market. 

8 

 
 
3.2.1.  Ex officio review (Article 9 FSR) 

Article 9 FSR empowers the Commission to examine, on its own initiative, information 
from  any  source  indicating  the  possible  existence  of  a  foreign  subsidy  distorting  the 
internal  market.  This  ex  officio  mechanism  is  not  subject  to  notification  obligations  or 
quantitative thresholds. 

Where  the  Commission  considers  that  the  information  referred  to  in  Article 9  FSR 
indicates the possibility that a foreign subsidy distorting the internal market exists, it carries 
out  a  preliminary  review  pursuant  to  Article 10(1)  FSR.  For  the  purposes  of  this 
preliminary  review,  the  Commission  seeks  all  information  it  considers  necessary  to 
determine, on a preliminary basis, whether the FFC under examination constitutes a foreign 
subsidy  and  whether  it  distorts  the  internal  market.  To  that  end,  the  Commission  may 
request information in accordance with Article 13 FSR and conduct inspections within or 
outside the Union pursuant to Articles 14 and 15 FSR respectively. The FSR does not lay 
down a fixed statutory deadline for the completion of the preliminary review in ex officio 
cases. 

Where, following the preliminary review in an ex officio case, the Commission considers 
that there are sufficient indications that a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market, it 
opens an in-depth investigation in accordance with Article 10(3) FSR. In accordance with 
Article 11  FSR,  during  the  in-depth  investigation,  the  Commission  further  assesses  the 
foreign  subsidies  and their distortive effects  identified in  the opening  decision and will 
seek  all  additional  information  necessary  by  making  use  of  the  investigative  tools  in 
Articles 13,  14  and  15  FSR.  Article 11(5)  FSR  provides  that  the  Commission  will 
endeavour to conclude the in-depth investigation within 18 months of it being opened. 

3.2.2.  Ex ante notification of concentrations (Chapter 3 FSR) 

Chapter 3 FSR introduces an ex ante notification system for concentrations.  

In accordance with Article 20(3) FSR, a concentration must be notified to the Commission 
prior to its implementation, when: 

• 

• 

the  acquired  undertaking,  at  least  one  of  the  merging  undertakings,  or  the  joint 
venture is established in the Union and generates an aggregate EU turnover of at 
least EUR 500 million, and 

the parties to the concentration concerned have received combined FFCs exceeding 
EUR 50 million in the three years preceding the conclusion of the agreement, the 
announcement of the public bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest. 

The notification form for concentrations (‘Form FS-CO’), adopted as Annex I to the FSIR, 
obliges  notifying  parties  to  disclose  certain  information  required  to  assess  potential 
distortive foreign subsidies in the concentration. This information includes details about 
the parties to, type of, and rationale of the transaction, its financing, and FFCs received by 
the parties, in the three years prior to the concentration (that is preceding the conclusion of 
the  agreement,  the  announcement  of  the  public  bid  or  the  acquisition  of  a  controlling 
interest).  

The Form FS-CO adopts a two-limb structure for the reporting of FFCs, depending on the 
nature of the FFCs received: 

•  FFCs liable to constitute foreign subsidies most likely to distort the internal market 
(in accordance with the definition in Article 5 FSR), which will trigger: (i) detailed 
reporting concerning any FFCs exceeding EUR 1 million granted to the notifying 
party /  parties  or  the  target;  and  (ii) explanation  if  the  FFC  constitutes  a  foreign 

9 

 
 
subsidy (i.e., if it confers benefit and is limited in fact or law to specific (group of) 
undertakings. 

•  Other FFCs, which need to be reported if the aggregate amount of FFCs received 
from  a  third  country  exceeds  EUR 45  million  in  the  three  years  prior  to  the 
concentration, with certain exceptions. For these FFCs, no line-by-line disclosure 
is  required.  Instead,  the  Form  FS-CO  requires  a  description  of  the  categories  of 
FFCs received and an indicative range of the amount of FFCs per third country. 

Pursuant to the FSIR, the below FFCs do not require reporting in the Form FS-CO: 

•  deferrals of payment of taxes or of social security contributions, tax amnesties and 
tax holidays as well as normal depreciation and loss-carry forward rules that are of 
general application. If these measures are limited, for example, to certain sectors, 
regions or (types of) undertakings, they have to be included; 

•  application of tax reliefs for avoidance of double taxation in line with the provisions 
of bilateral or multilateral agreements for avoidance of double taxation, as well as 
unilateral tax reliefs for avoidance of double taxation applied under national tax 
legislation to the extent they follow the same logic and conditions as the provisions 
of bilateral or multilateral agreements;  

•  provision / purchase of goods or services (except financial services) at market terms 
in the ordinary course of business, for example the provision / purchase of goods 
or services carried out following a competitive, transparent and non-discriminatory 
tender procedure; 

• 

individual FFCs below EUR 1 million; and  

•  specific exceptions related to transactions involving private equity or investment 

fund acquirers, subject to defined conditions. 

The  FSIR  also  allows  for  the  possibility  of  requesting  a  waiver  to  disclose  certain 
information in the Form FS-CO where: 

• 

• 

the information is not reasonably available; or 

the information is not necessary for the Commission’s assessment under the FSR. 

Upon  receipt  of  a  complete  notification,  in  accordance  with  Article 24(1)(a)  FSR,  the 
Commission  carries  out  a  preliminary  review  within  25 working  days.  Where  the 
Commission has found sufficient indications of the presence of distortive foreign subsidies 
in  the  concentration,  it  may  open  an  in-depth  investigation,  which,  in  accordance  with 
Article 24(1)(b) FSR, must be concluded within 90 working days, subject to extensions or 
suspensions as provided for in the FSR. 

3.2.3.  Ex ante notification in public procurement procedures (Chapter 4 FSR) 

Chapter  4  FSR  establishes  an  ex-ante  notification  system  for  public  procurement 
procedures. Economic operators are required to notify FFCs where: 

• 

• 

the estimated value of the public procurement contract or framework agreement is 
at least EUR 250 million (or the value of the individual lot, or the combined value 
of all lots bid on, is at least EUR 125 million), and 

the economic operator concerned, including its main subcontractors and suppliers 
where applicable, has received aggregate FFCs of at least EUR 4 million per third 
country in the three years preceding the notification. 

10 

 
Where  these  two  thresholds  are  met,  economic  operators  are  required  to  submit  a 
notification.  Where  only  the  first  threshold  is  met  (i.e.,  no  notifiable  FFCs  have  been 
granted to the notifying party/parties (21) in the last three years preceding the notification), 
economic operators are required to submit a declaration. In both cases, economic operators 
have to use Form FS-PP, adopted as Annex II to the FSIR.  

For declarations, Form FS-PP obliges the notifying parties to disclose certain information 
that may be relevant for the assessment of each public procurement bid in the context of 
the FSR. This information includes details about the public procurement and the notifying 
parties. Moreover, the Form FS-PP for declarations requires: 

• 

Individual reporting of all non-notifiable FFCs in the last three years preceding the 
declaration, above EUR 1 million; 

•  Aggregate  reporting  in  Table  2  of  FFCs  the  value  of  which  is  between 

EUR 1 million and the de minimis threshold (22); 

•  No reporting of FFCs the value of which is below the de minimis threshold. 

For  notifications,  Form  FS-PP  obliges  notifying  parties  to  disclose  certain  information, 
necessary  for  the  assessment  of  potential  distortive  foreign  subsidies  in  the  public 
procurement procedure. This information includes details about the public procurement, 
the notifying parties, the type of FFCs received, any justifications regarding the fact that 
the FFCs did not allow the notifying parties to submit an unduly advantageous tender, as 
well as information about potential positive effects. 

Form FS-PP for notifications distinguishes the reporting requirements depending on the 
nature of the FFCs received: 

•  FFCs  liable  to  constitute  foreign  subsidies  most  likely  to  distort  the  internal 
market (in accordance with the definition in Article 5 FSR), which will trigger 
(i) detailed reporting, including supporting documents, is required in respect of 
any  FFC  exceeding  EUR 1 million  granted  to  each  of  the  notifying  parties 
individually; and (ii) explanation if the FFC constitutes a foreign subsidy (i.e., 
if  it  confers  benefit  and  is  limited  in  fact  or  law  to  specific  (group  of) 
undertakings. 

•  Other FFCs, for which disclosure in Table 1 is required in respect of any FFC 
exceeding  EUR 1 million  granted  to  the  notifying  parties.  For  these  FFCs  no 
line-by-line disclosure is required. The Form FS-PP requests a description of the 
categories of FFCs received and an indicative range of the amount of FFCs per 
third country. 

•  Pursuant to the FSIR, the following FFCs are subject to exception from reporting 

in the Form FS-PP: 

o  deferrals  of  payment  of  taxes  or  of  social  security  contributions,  tax 
amnesties and tax holidays as well as normal depreciation and loss-carry 
forward rules that are of general application. If these measures are limited, 
for example, to certain sectors, regions or (types of) undertakings, they have 
to be included; 

(21) 

(22) 

Under  Article  2(3)  FSR,  ‘notifying  parties’  for  the  purpose  of  notifications  and  declarations 
regarding  foreign  financial  contributions  in  public  procurement’  means  all  economic  operators, 
groups of economic operators, main subcontractors and main suppliers covered by the notification 
obligation in accordance with Article 29(5) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560. 
As defined in Article 3(2), first subparagraph, of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013. 

11 

 
 
 
o  application of tax reliefs for avoidance of double taxation in line with the 
provisions of bilateral or multilateral agreements for avoidance of double 
taxation, as well as unilateral tax reliefs for avoidance of double taxation 
applied  under  national  tax  legislation  to  the  extent  they  follow  the  same 
logic  and  conditions  as  the  provisions  of  bilateral  or  multilateral 
agreements;  

o  provision /  purchase  of  goods  or  services  (except  financial  services)  at 
market terms in the ordinary course of business, for example the provision / 
purchase  of  goods  or  services  carried  out  following  a  competitive, 
transparent and non-discriminatory tender procedure; 

o  FFCs below the individual amount of EUR 1 million. 

The  FSIR  also  allows  for  the  possibility  of  requesting  a  waiver  to  disclose  certain 
information in the Form FS-PP, during the pre-notification contacts, where: 

• 
• 

the information is not reasonably available; or 
the information  is  not  necessary for the Commission’s assessment under  the 
FSR. 

Following the notification or declaration, the Commission conducts a preliminary review 
within  20 working  days. Where the Commission  considers that a  foreign subsidy  could 
distort the internal market, it may open an in-depth investigation, which must be concluded 
within  110 working  days,  subject  to  extensions  or  suspensions  as  provided  for  in  the 
Regulation. 

3.2.4.  Possibility to request prior notification 

In addition to the three enforcement procedures described above in subsections 3.2.1, 3.2.2. 
and 3.2.3, the Regulation allows the Commission to examine cases below the notification 
thresholds through the use of ‘call-in powers’, where there are suspicions that there are 
foreign subsidies granted in the particular concentration or public procurement procedure. 
These  call-in  mechanisms  complement  the  notification-based  system  and  can  be  relied 
upon to request notifications for both concentrations and public procurement procedures 
below the notification thresholds.  

The  FSR  Guidelines  provide  further  clarity  on  the  conditions  necessary  for  the 
Commission  to  be  able  to  request  prior  notification  and  shed  light  on  the  types  of 
considerations  it  can  take  into  account  when  deciding  in  which  situations  a  prior 
notification may be appropriate. 

3.2.5. 

Sources of information and market investigations 

Market information on potentially distortive foreign subsidies plays a central role in the 
Commission’s  enforcement  of  the  FSR.  This  is  particularly  relevant  for  the  effective 
functioning  of  the  ex  officio  procedure  and  the  exercise  of  call-in  powers.  For  its 
enforcement  of  the  FSR,  the  Commission  may  rely  on  information  from  any  source, 
including  Member  States,  contracting  authorities,  competitors,  market  participants  and 
other sources, as well as on market investigations conducted under Article 36 FSR, which 
constitute a horizontal information-gathering tool applicable across the three enforcement 
procedures. 

3.3. 

Division of responsibilities between DG COMP and DG GROW 

The FSR is enforced exclusively by the Commission.  

12 

 
 
DG COMP is responsible for applying the FSR in relation to concentrations and for the 
general use of the ex officio investigative mechanism.  

DG  GROW  is  responsible  for  applying  the  FSR  in  relation  to  public  procurement 
procedures  and  for  the  use  of  ex  officio  investigative  mechanism  linked  to  public 
procurement procedures and similar forms of public spending.  

This  division  of  responsibilities  reflects  the  respective  experience  of  the  services  in 
competition enforcement and public procurement and supports the coherent application of 
the FSR. Any enforcement activities under the FSR benefit from coordination of actions 
between the responsible services to ensure alignment in interpretation and enforcement of 
the Regulation. In addition, final decisions under the FSR are adopted in accordance with 
the principle of collegiality in decision-making.  

3.4. 

Interactions with other instruments  

The  FSR  operates  alongside  a  number  of  existing  EU  instruments  that  pursue  distinct 
objectives  and  rely  on  different  legal  tests  and  procedural  frameworks.  In  practice, 
behaviours and procedures subject to review under the FSR may also fall within the scope 
of other EU regimes, which may give rise to parallel proceedings. 

3.4.1. 

Interaction with the EUMR 

A high number of concentrations notified under the FSR also fall within the scope of the 
EUMR.  Based  on  enforcementexperience  to  date ( 23 ),  approximately  80%  of  the 
concentrations notified under the FSR were also notifiable under the EUMR. This is not 
surprising,  considering  that  both  regimes  are  triggered  by  the  same  economic  event, 
namely a concentration, and both use turnover as a jurisdictional threshold. In addition, the 
FSR’s turnover threshold is set at a higher level than the corresponding per-undertaking 
EU turnover threshold under the EUMR. The result is that concentrations that meet the 
FSR threshold will in most cases also fall within the scope of the EUMR (24). 

Even  if  the  same  transaction  may  be  subject  to  review  under  both  instruments,  the 
objectives  and  substantive  assessments  differ.  The  EUMR  assesses  whether  a 
concentration would significantly impede effective competition as a result of changes in 
market structure and, therefore, economic power. By contrast, the FSR examines whether 
foreign  subsidies  confer  an  undue  advantage  that  distorts  competition  in  the  internal 
market, either during the acquisition process or in the activities of the combined entity post 
transaction.  The  outcome  of  the  assessment  under  one  instrument  is  therefore  not 
determinative for the outcome under the other. 

While the substantive assessments and overall objectives of the two instruments differ, in 
an effort to enhance legal certainty and ensure consistency in the interpretation of shared 
concepts,  many  of  the  concepts  in  the  concentration  procedure  of  the  FSR  have  been 
aligned  with  the  concepts  under  the  EUMR.  Most  notably,  the  FSR  relies  on  the  same 
notions of concentration and of control that are applicable under the EUMR. In practice, 
this  has  resulted  in  alignment  between  parts  of  the  information  required  under  the  two 
notification  forms,  with  Sections 1  to  3  of  Form  FS-CO  following  the  same  logic  and 

(23) 

(24) 

Unless specifically stated otherwise, the Report includes information on the enforcement activities 
under the FSR until 31 May 2026. 
Under Article 20(3)(a) FSR, at least one of the undertaking concerned must be established in the 
Union and generate an aggregate Union turnover of at least EUR 500 million. Under Article 1(2) 
EUMR, the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned must exceed 
EUR  5  000  million  and  the  Union-  wide  turnover  of  each  of  at  least  two  of  the  undertakings 
concerned must exceed EUR 250 million.  

13 

 
 
structure  as  the  initial  sections  of  the  notification  form  used  for  procedures  under  the 
EUMR.  

3.4.2. 

Interaction with the framework set up by the FDI Screening Regulation  

Certain  transactions  reviewed  under  the  FSR  are  also  subject  to  national  foreign  direct 
investment (‘FDI’) screening mechanisms and may be communicated to the Commission 
under  Regulation  (EU)  2019/452  of  19  March  2019  establishing  a  framework  for  the 
screening  of  foreign  direct  investments  into  the  Union.  Approximately  28%  of  FSR 
concentration cases were also subject to at least one FDI screening procedure notified by 
a Member State to the Commission. 

The FSR includes specific information obligations in relation to such cases. In particular, 
Article 10(2)  and  (4)  FSR  provide  for  the  exchange  of  information  with  the  respective 
Member  State  authorities  which  have  informed  the  Commission  about  a  concurrent 
national FDI procedure. 

While  FDI  screening  focuses  on  risks  to  public  security  and  public  order,  the  FSR 
addresses distortions of competition in the internal market. The two frameworks therefore 
operate in parallel with distinct objectives. 

3.4.3. 

Interaction with the Public Procurement Directives 

The interaction between  the EU  public  procurement  directives  (Directives 2014/23/EU, 
2014/24/EU, and 2014/25/EU) and the FSR creates a ‘parallel track’ system where a single 
public procurement procedure is governed by two distinct legal frameworks. While EU 
public  procurement  rules  govern  the  procedural  conduct  of  the  tender  (selection, 
evaluation,  and  award)  by  the  relevant  contracting  authority,  the  FSR  introduces  a 
mandatory screening mechanism for distortive FFCs that is managed exclusively by the 
Commission.  Under  this  interaction,  for  large  public  procurement  procedures,  the 
contracting  authority  acts  as  a  gateway,  receiving  submissions  of  FFCs  from  economic 
operators and sending them to the Commission. Furthermore, the FSR imposes a ‘standstill 
obligation’:  while  the  contracting  authority  can  proceed  with  evaluating  bids  and 
identifying  the  ‘most  economically  advantageous  tender’  under  EU  public  procurement 
rules,  the  actual  award  of  the  contract  is  legally  prohibited  until  the  Commission  has 
cleared the submission of an economic operator under the FSR. This creates a procedural 
dependency where the contract award can be vetoed by an FSR finding of a ‘distortive 
subsidy’, effectively making FSR clearance a new condition for contract award in the EU 
internal market. 

Despite  the  procedural  overlap,  the  substantive  assessments  performed  by  contracting 
authorities and the Commission are distinct. The closest point of convergence lies in the 
Commission’s scrutiny of an ‘unduly advantageous tender’ and the contracting authority’s 
evaluation  of  an  ‘abnormally  low  tender’  (under  Article 69  of  Directive  2014/24/EU). 
However, even these are governed by a different internal logic: the contracting authority 
focuses on operational viability, seeking to determine if a price is so low that the economic 
operator will be unable to execute the contract technically or financially. In contrast, the 
Commission’s  assessment  focuses  on  determining  if  a  foreign  subsidy  enabled  the 
economic operator to submit an offer that is ‘unduly advantageous’ (25). 

The  considerations  discussed  in  relation  to  the  interaction  between  FSR  and  the  public 
procurement directives apply also to the interaction between the FSR and the Regulation 

(25) 

See  2.5.1  Communication  from  the  Commission  –  Guidelines  on  the  application  of  certain 
provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign 
subsidies distorting the internal market, C/2026/42. 

14 

 
 
(EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 
2024  on  the  financial  rules  applicable  to  the  general  budget  of  the  Union  (recast)  (the 
‘Financial  Regulation’).  This  results  from  Article  143(e)  of  the  Financial  Regulation, 
which extends the application of FSR to public procurement procedures initiated by entities 
falling  under  the  Financial  Regulation  the  estimated  value  of  which  reaches  EUR  250 
million. 

4. 

PREPARATION OF THE REPORT  

4.1. 

Sources of information and workstreams 

To gather the evidence required for the Report, multiple and complementary sources of 
information and parallel workstreams have been considered:  

First, the Commission commissioned an expert study from an external contractor under a 
Framework  Contract  for  the  provision  of  expert  consultancy  services  and  studies 
(COMP/2023/OP/0017) (the ‘FSR Review Study’) (26). 

Second,  the  Commission  collected  input  from  external  stakeholders  through  a  public 
consultation, comprising a call for evidence, and an EU Survey questionnaire (the ‘FSR 
Review ‘public consultation’).  

Third,  the  Commission  services  conducted  an  internal  review  of  their  own  practice, 
collecting feedback from case teams engaged in the enforcement of the FSR and analysing 
collected data and experience on its enforcement practice, drawing on artificial intelligence 
tools and a manual review of case files (the ‘Commission’s internal FSR review’). 

4.2. 

Scope and methodology of the review 

The  FSR  Review  Study  provided  an  independent,  evidence-based  assessment  of  the 
functioning of the FSR, including an analytical perspective on its enforcement. The public 
consultation  allowed  the  Commission  to  gather  a  broad  range  of  views  and  factual 
information from stakeholders affected by the FSR, while targeted interviews allowed for 
a  more  in-depth  examination  of  specific  issues  and  practical  experiences.  Based  on  the 
design  and  questions  in  the  public  consultation  and  the  targeted  interviews,  the 
stakeholders’ views provided evidence regarding the main FSR concepts, thresholds for 
notifications  and  the  scope  of  information  to  be  reported  in  FSR  notifications,  among 
others. The internal review offered operational insights into the day-to-day enforcement of 
the FSR, including challenges encountered in practice and potential areas for improvement 
or  simplification.  In  parallel,  the  analysis  of  enforcement  data  supported  a  systematic 
assessment of trends, procedural aspects and outcomes across cases.  

Taken together, these sources allowed the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review 
of  the  scope,  effectiveness  and  practical  implementation  of  the  FSR,  ensuring  that  the 
conclusions and options presented in this SWD and the Report are grounded in a robust 
and balanced evidentiary basis. 

4.2.1.  The FSR Review Study 

The FSR Review Study was prepared by London Economics (‘LE’) Europe, a specialist 
economics  and  policy  consultancy,  together  with  data+law  and  Associated-Professor 

(26) 

Multiple Mixed Framework Contract for the Provision of Expert Consultancy Services and Studies 
in 
to  Foreign  Subsidies 
Investigations  and  Enforcement  Related 
(COMP/2023/OP/0017). 

the  Context  of 

15 

 
 
Dr Lena Hornkohl. The study started in June 2025 and lasted for six months. It covers the 
period from October 2023 to June 2025. The FSR Review Study is included in Annex I. 

The analysis carried out in the FSR Review Study consists of three main  sections: (i) a 
survey of legal practitioners and contracting authorities on their experience with the FSR 
and potential simplification measures; (ii) an analysis of the Commission’s case practice; 
and  (iii) a  review  of  developments  in  international  relations  concerning  third  countries’ 
subsidy control systems. 

i. 

Survey of legal practitioners and contracting authorities  

This section examines stakeholders’ experience with the application of the FSR, drawing 
on  surveys  of  legal  practitioners  (the  ‘FSR  Practitioners’  Survey’)  and  contracting 
authorities of EU Member States. It assesses how the FSR operates in practice, identifies 
compliance frictions, and explores possible avenues for simplification.  

The Practitioners’ Survey was addressed to both practitioners with FSR experience in the 
concentration or the public procurement procedures across a wide range of sectors.  

ii.  Analysis of the Commission’s case practice  

This  section examines  how the Commission  has implemented and enforced the FSR in 
concentration  and  public  procurement  cases.  It  analyses  enforcement  practice  between 
October 2023 and June 2025 and assesses the overall approach adopted by the Commission 
and  identifies  patterns  in  its  assessment  practice,  in  particular  with  regards  to  the 
application of Articles 4, 5, 6, 9, 20(3) and 28(1) and (2) FSR.  

iii.  Review of developments in third countries’ subsidy control systems 

This section reports on developments in international relations involving third countries’ 
subsidy control systems, as referred to in Article 52 FSR.  

The  analysis  focuses  on  Canada,  China,  Japan,  Switzerland,  Türkiye,  the  United  Arab 
Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States. Other jurisdictions with which the 
Union  has  bilateral  trade  or  investment  agreements  are  addressed  at  an  overview  and 
aggregate level. The study also covers international developments in subsidy control, in 
particular in relation to jurisdictions that have recently entered into Free Trade Agreements 
with the Union. 

4.2.2.  The FSR Review Public Consultation  

In August 2025, the Commission launched the FSR Review public consultation, which ran 
until 18 November 2025. The FSR Review public consultation contained two components: 
first, a call for evidence invited general feedback from all interested parties on the main 
objectives  of  the  Report,  as  well  as  on  its  scope  and  context;  and  second,  a  public 
consultation questionnaire aimed to gather views on specific aspects of the implementation 
and enforcement of the FSR from a broad range of stakeholders, including companies, law 
firms, Member States, business associations, individuals and the research community. All 
interested parties were able to submit their views on the call for evidence and respond to 
the  questionnaire  in  any  official  EU  language.  Additional  input  was  obtained  through 
targeted interviews with selected stakeholders. 

The  public  consultation  generated  a  high  level  of  participation,  including  respectively 
49 responses  to  the  call  for  evidence  and  54 responses  to  the  public  consultation 

16 

 
questionnaire (27). This input was subsequently complemented by targeted interviews with 
selected stakeholders and meetings with Member States. 

4.2.3.  Commission’s internal FSR review  

In the first half of 2026, the Commission services conducted an internal review among case 
teams engaged in enforcing the FSR, seeking feedback on the experience with enforcement 
and analysed data related to the enforcement practice. 

The data analysed for DG COMP focused on FSR concentration cases notified between 
October 2023 and January 2026, reflecting the availability of data and practical experience 
in  this  area ( 28 ).  The  internal  review  assessed  cases  across  several  characteristics, 
including: (i) characteristics of the notifying parties; (ii) the amount and type of reported 
FFCs; (iii) the economic activities of the parties to the concentration (identified by NACE 
codes);  (iv) the  reported  EU  turnover  of  the  target,  (v) consideration  paid  for  the 
transaction; and (vi) experience with pre-notification discussions.  

To  assess  the  application  of  the  FSR’s  public  procurement  procedure,  the  Commission 
services used data on submissions received between 13 October 2023 and 31 January 2026. 
The  data  examined  covers  in  particular  the  number  of  notified  public  procurement 
procedures,  the  number  of  pre-notification  contacts,  the  number  of  notification  and  the 
distributions  of  submissions  per  sector.  Additionally,  an  analysis  of  global  ultimate 
ownership (29) (i.e. country where the ultimate parent company is registered), carried out 
in the context of the review of the EU public procurement directives, has been included in 
this  Staff  Working  Document,  covering  the  period  between  13 October  2023  and 
31 December  2025,  a  slightly  narrower  timespan  than  the  submissions’  dataset.  The 
differences in timespan do not represent a material difference for the current analysis. 

4.3. 

Objectives sought with the Report 

The objectives set out in this section are grounded in the broader policy framework of the 
Commission  and  the  legal  framework  governing  the  implementation  of  the  FSR.  In 
particular,  the  objectives  of  transparency,  simplification,  and  optimisation  of  work  are 
closely aligned with the Commission’s overarching priorities, as reflected in the Political 
Guidelines and  the Commission  Work Programme, which emphasise the importance of 
enhancing  clarity,  reducing  administrative  burdens,  and  ensuring  the  efficient  use  of 
resources in the application of EU rules (30). 

At the same time, the Commission remains fully committed to its international obligations 
as set out in Article 44(9) FSR and the compliance of the implementation and enforcement 
of the Regulation with the Union’s obligations under international law. 

4.3.1.  Transparency  

Enhancing  transparency  is  a  key  objective  of  the  Report.  Transparency  is  essential  to 
ensure predictability, facilitate compliance, and strengthen stakeholders’ understanding of 
the application of the FSR. In this context, the Report and this SWD aim to provide further 

(27) 

(28) 
(29) 

(30) 

See the European Commission’s public consultation on the Commission Have your say portal, and 
the Call for Evidence, available on the same Have your say portal.  
With a particular focus on cases administratively closed after the preliminary review phase. 
i.e. country where the ultimate parent company is registered. See Section 5.4.2.1. (f) of the present 
document. 
Ursula  von  der  Leyen,  Political  Guidelines  For  The  Next  European  Commission  2024−2029. 
Communication  from  the  Commission  –  Commission  Work  Programme  2025.  Moving  forward 
together: A Bolder, Simpler, Faster Union, COM(2025) 45 final. 

17 

 
 
insight into the Commission’s implementation and enforcement of the Regulation during 
the initial phase of its application. 

This objective builds on steps already taken by the Commission to ensure transparency. 
Since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  FSR,  the  Commission  has  progressively  expanded  the 
information  it  makes  available  about  its  enforcement  practice.  Notably,  DG  COMP 
publishes on its website key details of all notified cases, including case number, parties 
involved, procedural timeline, and economic activities concerned (31).  

In  addition,  the  Commission  services  has  taken  measures  to  clarify  the  substantive 
framework  for  assessment  under  the  FSR.  While  gaining  experience  in  applying  the 
Regulation, it has provided increasing guidance to stakeholders, thereby contributing to 
greater  legal  certainty.  Notably,  DG  GROW  provides  online  guidance  to  economic 
operators on whether to submit a notification or declaration and on how to complete the 
sections  of  the  Form  FS-PP  on  the  notification  of  FFCs  in  the  context  of  public 
procurement procedures. 

In July 2024, a Staff Working Document was published, offering initial clarifications on 
key concepts under the FSR (32). Features of the document included initial indications on 
how the Commission interprets substantive FSR concepts and, in particular, factors to be 
considered in assessing whether a distortion exists, and the methodology it would apply in 
the  balancing  test.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  services  regularly  update  a  set  of 
dedicated FSR questions and answers (‘FSR ‘Q&As’’) on the Commission website (33). 
These updates address recurring issues arising in practice and provide additional guidance 
on a range of topics, including procedural and jurisdictional aspects (such as notification 
obligations, threshold calculations, and FFCs). The Commission also publishes dedicated 
FSR briefs on specific policy developments (such as the first 100 days of enforcement of 
the FSR (34) and on FSR Guidelines and on case practice (such as the brief on the first final 
decision  with  commitments  adopted  in  case  FS.100011) ( 35 ).  Additionally,  the 
Commission maintains a rigorous communication strategy on its in-depth investigations 
via press releases and daily news bulletins to provide stakeholders with timely updates on 
critical  procedural  milestones.  This  practice  enhances  administrative  transparency  and 
procedural predictability. 

Finally, as already mentioned in Section 3.1.2, the FSR Guidelines, published in January 
2026,  represent  a  key  milestone  in  enhancing  predictability  and  transparency  for 
companies.  They  clarify,  inter  alia,  how  the  Commission  determines  whether  a  foreign 
subsidy distorts competition, how it balances any negative effects against potential positive 
effects, and how it may exercise its power to require prior notification of concentrations or 
public procurement procedures falling below the established thresholds. 

(31) 

(32) 

(33) 

(34) 

(35) 

DG GROW is currently exploring possibilities to increase transparency of proceedings for public 
procurement while ensuring the confidentiality of national public procurement procedures. 
Commission  Staff  Working  Document  –  Initial  clarifications  on  the  application  of  Article  4(1), 
Article 6 and Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal 
market, SWD(2024) 201 final. 
DG COMP website – FSR Q&As. 
DG GROW website – FSR Q&As. 
Competition FSR brief (Issue 1, February 2024)  – The Foreign Subsidies Regulation – 100 days 
since the start of the notification obligation for concentrations 
Competition FSR brief (Issue 1, December 2025) – The e&/PPF Telecom case – Interference on the 
foreign subsidies line to the EU. 

18 

 
 
4.3.2. 

Simplification 

Assessing the need and  scope for  potential simplification is  another key  element  of the 
Report.  

Assessing  the  need  and  possibility  for  simplification  is  aligned  with  the  Commission’s 
current  policy  priorities.  Speed,  coherence,  and  simplification  are  central  principles 
guiding  the  Commission’s  work.  The  Political  Guidelines  and  the  Commission  Work 
Programme  2025  emphasise  that  simplifying  EU  policies  and  legislation,  as  well  as 
improving their implementation, is crucial to making it easier and faster to do business in 
Europe.  These  efforts  are  also  at  the  core  of  the  Commission’s  strategy  to  strengthen 
Union’s  competitiveness,  as  developed 
the  Commission's  Competitiveness 
Compass (36). 

in 

4.3.3.  Optimisation of work 

Consistent  with  the  above,  based  on  the  findings  outlined  in  the  Report,  further 
optimisation  of  the  enforcement  of  the  FSR  and  an  efficient  use  of  available  resources 
should be ensured by enabling a focus on cases and sectors where the risk of distortion 
caused by foreign subsidies is most prominent. 

In  the  initial  phase  of  implementation,  the  application  of  the  Regulation  required  the 
establishment of new processes and the allocation of administrative resources. To enable 
effective  implementation,  the  Commission  has  allocated  dedicated  resources  for  the 
enforcement  of  the  FSR,  including  a  dedicated  directorate  within  DG  COMP,  and  a 
dedicated unit within DG GROW. Drawing on experience with the enforcement of other 
competition instruments and public procurement practices, relevant procedures have been 
implemented to enable the efficient review of cases (37). 

4.3.4.  Observation on international obligations 

Ensuring consistency with the Union’s international obligations constitutes an overarching 
objective  of  the  Report.  Any  recommendations  put  forward  in  pursuit  of  greater 
transparency,  simplification,  and  optimisation  must  remain  aligned  with  the  EU’s 
obligations under international agreements. 

The  Regulation  operates  in  a  global  economic  context  and  interacts  with  existing 
international  frameworks,  including  those  governing  subsidies  and  trade.  It  is  therefore 
essential  that  its  implementation  respects  the  Union’s  obligations  under,  inter  alia,  the 
World Trade Organisation framework. 

Maintaining  such  consistency  contributes  to  legal  certainty  and  supports  a  rules-based 
international system.  

(36) 

(37) 

Communication from the Commission – A Competitiveness Compass for the EU, COM(2025) 30 
final. 
This included the provision of practical information and templates for supporting documents on the 
Commission’s  website,  the  creation  of  a  dedicated  FSR  Registry  to  handle  correspondence  by 
notifying  parties,  the  introduction  of  internal  procedures,  aiming  to  ensure  timely  response  to 
submissions,  and  proper  staffing  of  cases  with  combined  legal  and  economic  expertise  and 
exploring  possibilities  to  increase  transparency  of  proceedings  for  public  procurement  while 
ensuring the confidentiality of national public procurement procedures. 

19 

 
 
5. 

FINDINGS 

5.1. 

Status of implementation  

The FSIR and notification forms for the two ex ante notification procedures of the FSR 
were  adopted  on  10 July  2023,  within  the  timelines  set  out  in  Article 47(4)  FSR.  That 
allowed for the timely operationalisation of the notification-based enforcement procedures. 
The Commission has continuously requested Member States to report on their progress in 
implementing,  in  their  respective  jurisdictions,  measures  allowing  them  to  assist  the 
Commission  in  inspections  in  accordance  with  Article 14(5),  (6)  and  (7)  FSR,  which 
became applicable as from 12 January 2024. 

Figure 1 provides an overview of the current state of play on the national implementation 
of  provisions  enabling  Member  States’  cooperation  with  the  Commission  in  FSR 
inspections:  

•  Member  States  that  have  confirmed  the  adoption  of  implementing  provisions 
include Bulgaria, Czechia, Finland,  France,  Hungary,  Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.  
•  Member  States  that  have  introduced  legislative  proposals  which  are  pending 
adoption include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia and Germany.  
•  Member  States  that  have  not  confirmed  yet  their  legislative  proposals  include 

Croatia, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Sweden.  

Figure 1 – Implementation of domestic legislation for cooperation under the FSR 

Implementation of domestic legislation for cooperation under 
the FSR, in particular Article 14(5)-(7) FSR

6

6

15

Adopted

Non-adopted

Pending application

Source: Information provided by Member States. 

In  addition,  the  adoption  of  supplementary  guidance,  discussed  in  Section  4.3.1  above, 
contributed  to  a  more  consistent  understanding  of  the  Commission’s  approach  to  the 
application of key substantive notions under the FSR, particularly during the initial phase 
of enforcement. 

5.2. 

Status of enforcement  

This section presents an overview of the enforcement of the FSR to date. It first examines 
whether  the  substantive  provisions  of  the  Regulation  are  understood  and  considered 

20 

 
 
 
appropriate in light of the early enforcement experience. It then turns to the application of 
the  FSR  through  its  main  enforcement  tools,  namely  ex  officio  investigations  and 
notification-based  review  of  concentrations  and  public  procurement  procedures.  The 
analysis distinguishes between feedback received from stakeholders and the Commission 
services’ assessment in line with the sources of information identified in Section 4. 

Before addressing each subsection, the following considerations should be made:  

First,  the FSR  is  still  in the very early stages  of its enforcement.  This  has  resulted in  a 
necessary  learning  period  for  both  the  Commission  and  the  undertakings  involved  in 
procedures under the FSR, as well as the contracting authorities, with notable differences 
between early cases and more recent ones, and with a clear tendency towards quicker and 
more efficient processes in most recent cases. 

Second,  it  is  important  to  highlight  that  the  Stakeholders’  Consultations  and  the 
conclusions that can be drawn from them predate several significant developments in the 
enforcement of the FSR, namely the adoption of the final decisions in concentration case 
FS.100156 ADNOC/Covestro and in public procurement case FSP.103117 – Design and 
construction, acquisition of vehicles and maintenance services of the Violet Line of the 
Lisbon  Metro  in  Portugal,  the  adoption  of  the  decisions  to  open  ex  officio  in-depth 
investigation in cases FS.100068 Nuctech and FS.100143 Goldwind, the adoption of the 
in  concentration  case  FS.100253 
decision 
JD.COM/CECONOMY as well as the adoption of the FSR Guidelines on 9 January 2026. 
The  findings  from  the  stakeholder  consultations  therefore  do  not  take  into  account  the 
additional  clarifications  and  insights  into  the  FSR  enforcement  brought  by  those 
developments.  This  is  the  case  in  particular  with  respect  to  the  FSR  Guidelines,  which 
provide additional clarity and transparency into the approach taken by the Commission in 
its assessment under the FSR. 

to  open  an 

investigation 

in-depth 

Third, case practice has varied significantly depending on the enforcement procedure, with 
a smaller number of cases reviewed under the ex officio procedure, followed by a moderate 
number of cases reviewed under the notification procedure for concentrations, and a higher 
number of submissions under the notification procedure for public procurement. Yet, in 
many instances, the feedback received does not clearly distinguish between procedures, 
which makes it more difficult to draw self-standing conclusions for each procedure (38).  

5.2.1.  Relevance, clarity and appropriateness of substantive provisions  

5.2.1.1.  Feedback from stakeholders  

The stakeholder feedback presented in this  Section is based on the results of the public 
consultation conducted by the Commission in the context of the review of the Regulation 
pursuant  to  Article 52 FSR (39) as well  as on the  Practitioners’  Survey  and the targeted 
consultations with selected stakeholders (together the ‘Stakeholders’ Consultations’).  

Respondents to the Stakeholders’ Consultations broadly acknowledge the relevance and 
necessity of the FSR. A large majority recognises that the FSR addresses a regulatory gap 
that existed prior to its adoption and consider the objective of ensuring a level playing field 
in the internal market undistorted by foreign subsidies to be legitimate and appropriate. 
Concerns  raised  in  the  consultations  focus  primarily  on  the  practical  application  of  the 

(38) 
(39) 

This is the case in particular with regards to the two ex ante notification procedures 
The contributions to the call for evidence are available on the Commission Have your say portal, 
along with the contributions to the public consultation and a factual summary of the replies (Have 
your say portal). 

21 

 
 
rules  and  the  administrative  burden  associated  with  enforcement,  rather  than  on  the 
underlying policy choice to introduce the FSR. 

Addressing Article 3 FSR, and the concepts of foreign subsidies and FFCs, respondents 
to the Stakeholders’ Consultations generally acknowledge the need for a broad definition 
of FFCs in order to ensure effective detection of potentially distortive support. However, 
the  feedback  also  indicates  that  the  concept  of  FFCs,  while  understood  as  intentional, 
generates some uncertainty when determining the scope of reportable contributions. The 
most salient aspect identified was the broad scope of the definition, which encompasses a 
wide  range  of  measures,  as  emerged  from  the  Practitioner’s  Survey,  where  72%  of 
respondents rated the broad scope of the definition as a significant challenge. This results 
in a burden for companies which often have to collect information on FFCs across multiple 
jurisdictions for the purposes of their reporting obligations under Chapters 3 and 4 FSR, 
as detailed Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 respectively.  

Other concepts within Article 3 FSR were considered to be clearer, such as the definition 
of a ‘third country’.  In addition, most legal practitioners who participated in the survey 
indicated that the definitions of benefit and specificity raised some difficulties when they 
had to be applied for particular cases. 

As regards the assessment of distortion under Article 4 FSR, respondents to the public 
consultation  express  mixed  views.  While  10  stakeholders  out  of  the  54  submissions 
consider the provision sufficiently clear, 28 stakeholders report difficulties in predicting 
how  the  concept  of  distortion  will  be  applied  in  individual  cases.  The  limited  body  of 
Commission  decisional  practice  at  the  time  of  the  survey  responses  is  cited  by 
3 stakeholders  as  a  factor  contributing  to  this  uncertainty.  In  the  Practitioners’  Survey, 
respondents also identified the limited guidance on determining when a foreign subsidy is 
distortive  as  a  challenge.  Respondents  mention  the  lack  of  benchmarks  or  concrete 
examples  illustrating  how  the  indicators  under  Article 4  FSR  are  used  and  how 
improvements in an undertaking’s competitive position translate into a finding of distortion 
in the internal market. According to the results of the Practitioners’ Survey, the guidance 
on  categories  of  non-distortive  subsidies  (Articles 4(3)  and  4(4)  FSR)  was  considered 
sufficiently clear. In particular, guidance for subsidies unlikely to be distortive when the 
subsidy does not exceed EUR 4 million over any consecutive period of three years, was 
viewed positively.  

Stakeholders  generally  view  Article 5  FSR  as  a  useful  indicator  of  the  Commission’s 
priorities in enforcing the FSR, as it identifies categories of foreign subsidies that are more 
likely to distort the internal market. However, around half of the respondents to the public 
consultation raise concerns about the breadth of certain categories listed in Article 5 FSR 
and  the  clarity  of  their  scope.  In  particular,  18  respondents  point  to  some  uncertainty 
surrounding the criterion of subsidies that ‘directly facilitate a concentration’ or enabling 
the submission of ‘unduly advantageous tenders’. Similarly, in the Practitioners’ Survey, 
views on the categories of likely distortive subsidies set out in Article 5 FSR were mixed. 
Specific concerns were raised about the ‘unduly advantageous tender’ criterion in public 
procurement,  as  well  as  the  limited  guidance  in  Article 5  FSR  on  how  to  apply  the 
‘enabling  to  submit’  criterion.  Respondents  with  procurement  experience  reported 
difficulties  in  assessing  whether  a  tender  is  ‘advantageous’,  determining  when  such  an 
advantage  becomes  ‘undue’,  and  substantiating  these  assessments  with  appropriate 
evidence, including identifying factors that may justify the advantageous nature of a tender. 
Assessing  the  impact  of  foreign  subsidies  on  concentrations  was  rated  a  moderate 
challenge by a majority of respondents with concentration experience, due to the need to 
evaluate counterfactual scenarios. 

22 

 
As  regards  Article 6  FSR,  stakeholders  welcome  the  existence  of  the  balancing  test. 
However,  a  large  number  of  respondents  consider  that  the  practical  relevance  of  the 
balancing test remains limited at this stage. In the public consultation, 23 stakeholders out 
of the 54 submissions report a lack of clarity about the types of positive effects that may 
be  taken  into  account,  the  evidentiary  standards  applicable,  and  the  methodology  of 
weighing positive and negative effects. As a result, respondents indicate uncertainty as to 
when and how the balancing test can be meaningfully invoked in practice. Similarly, the 
Practitioners’  Survey  identified  concerns  regarding  the  clarity  and  application  of  the 
balancing  test,  despite  most  respondents  having  limited  practical  experience  with  it,  as 
their cases did not involve distortive subsidies. 

Overall, the stakeholders’ feedback highlights areas in which legal predictability could be 
improved, in particular as regards the practical application of certain substantive notions 
and the application of the analytical framework in individual cases. 

5.2.1.2.  The Commission services’ assessment  

With respect to the Stakeholders’ Consultation, stakeholders express their understanding 
of  the  overall  objective  of  the  FSR  and  they  acknowledge  the  relevance  of  the  FSR. 
Stakeholders’  feedback  nonetheless  highlights  areas  where  legal  predictability  could  be 
improved, in particular as regards the practical application of certain substantive notions 
and the application of the analytical framework in individual cases. 

Indeed, some of the reported uncertainties are expected to diminish as decisional practice 
and potential related jurisprudence develops, and stakeholders gain more experience with 
the  application  of  the  Regulation.  In  a  similar  vein,  the  efforts  undertaken  to  publish 
information  in  a  timely  manner  on  cases,  including  non-confidential  versions  of  the 
Commission’s  final  decisions,  also  contribute  to  a  better  understanding  on  how  the 
substantive  notions  have  been  applied  in  practice  in  specific  cases.  In  parallel,  further 
clarification  through  guidance  (notably  via  the  published  Q&As)  and  consistent 
administrative  practice  contribute  to  a  better  stakeholder  understanding  of  the  key 
concepts. The Commission services also frequently appear in conferences and engage with 
legal  practitioners  on  various  FSR-related  issues,  bringing  further  clarity  on  the 
Commission’s practice. 

Based  on  the  obtained  feedback,  the  Report  already  identifies  certain  areas  for 
consideration, which could be streamlined and lead to lower the administrative burden on 
businesses, while preserving the objectives of the Regulation. These issues are examined 
further in Section 6 below, notably in relation to the functioning of the notification systems 
for concentrations and public procurement procedures. 

5.2.2.  Ex officio investigations 

5.2.2.1.  Information on cases 

The Commission continuously assesses whether there is sufficient evidence to merit the 
launch of new ex officio investigations, based on its own analysis, information received 
from stakeholders and investigations of market information, as applicable. 

In two cases, the Commission has opened in-depth investigations.  

During  its  in-depth  investigations,  the  Commission  assesses  whether  the  preliminary 
findings  are confirmed.  The opening  of an in-depth  investigation does not  prejudge the 
outcome of the investigation. In accordance with Article 11 FSR, at the end of its in-depth 
investigation, the Commission may (i) accept commitments proposed by the undertaking 

23 

 
under  investigation  if  they  fully  and  effectively  remedy  the  distortion,  (ii) impose 
redressive measures, or (iii) issue a no objection decision. 

a.  Case FS.100068 - NUCTECH 

In the Nuctech case, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation on 11 December 
2025  to  assess  the  activities  of  Nuctech  in  the  production  and  sale  of  threat  detection 
systems and the provision of related services within the EU (40). 

The case was initiated in April 2024 by conducting on-site inspections in the EU premises 
of Nuctech in Poland and the Netherlands following the adoption of a decision requiring 
Nuctech to submit to inspections pursuant to Article 14(3) FSR (the ‘Inspection Decision’). 
Following the assessment of the collected information during the preliminary review phase 
of the investigation, the Commission found sufficient indications that Nuctech may have 
been granted foreign subsidies from China supporting the EU activities of the company 
(such  as  grants,  loans,  and  tax  measures)  that  could  distort  the  EU  internal  market.  As 
regards  distortion,  the  Commission  also  found  indications  that  the  possible  foreign 
subsidies  may  improve  Nuctech’s  competitive  position  in  the  internal  market  and  may 
negatively affect competition by allowing Nuctech to offer customers lower prices or better 
commercial conditions than competitors.  

b.  Case FS. 100143 - GOLDWIND 

In the Goldwind case, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation on 3 February 
2026 to assess the activities of Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (‘Goldwind’) in 
the production and sale of wind turbines and the provision of related services within the 
EU (41). The case was initiated ex officio  by the sending  of requests for information  in 
April 2024. 

The Commission found sufficient indications that foreign subsidies which may have been 
granted by China in the form of grants, loans and tax measures could distort competition 
in the internal market, by unduly supporting Goldwind, at the expense of its competitors. 
In  particular,  the  Commission  found  indications  that  foreign  subsidies  may  enable 
Goldwind to offer lower prices than its competitors, thereby winning more wind project 
tenders in the EU than it would have done in the absence of those foreign subsidies. 

5.2.2.2.  Review by the EU Courts 

In the context of ex officio investigations, some investigative acts of the Commission have 
been subject to review by the Union Courts: 

a)  Case T-284/24 – Nuctech – in May 2024, Nuctech brought an action for annulment 
before the General Court challenging the Commission’s Inspection Decision (42). 
At the same time, Nuctech also applied for interim measures, seeking suspension 
of  the  Commission’s  Inspection  Decision  pending  the  outcome  of  the  main 
proceedings (43). In August 2024, the President of the General Court rejected the 
application  for  interim  measures  (44),  consequently  confirmed  on  appeal  by  the 

(40) 

(41) 

(42) 
(43) 

(44) 

Summary  Notice  concerning  the  initiation  of  an  in-depth  investigation  in  case  FS.100068  – 
NUCTECH pursuant to Article 10(3)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560, OJEU C/2026/545.  
Summary  Notice  concerning  the  initiation  of  an  in-depth  investigation  in  case  FS.100143  – 
Goldwind, pursuant to Article 10(3)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560, OJEU C/2026/1120.  
Case T-284/24, Nuctech Warsaw and Nuctech Netherlands v Commission, OJ C, C/2024/4107. 
Case  T-284/24  R,  Nuctech  Warsaw  Company  Limited  Sp. z  o.o.  and  Nuctech  Netherlands  BV  v 
Commission, EU:T:2024:564. 
Case  T-284/24  R,  Order  of  the  President  of  the  General  Court  of  12  August  2024,  OJ  C, 
C/2024/5824. 

24 

 
 
Vice-President of the Court of Justice in March 2025 (45). At time of publication of 
this Report, the proceedings related to the action for annulment of the Inspection 
Decision remain pending before the General Court. 

b)  Case  T-335/26  –  Goldwind  –  in  May  2026,  Goldwind  brought  an  action  for 
annulment  before  the  General  Court  challenging  the  Commission’s  request  for 
information (46) and requested interim measures for its suspension (47). The request 
for  information  was  sent  as  part  of  the  in-depth  investigation  into  Goldwind’s 
activities  in  the  EU  wind  sector  in  Case  FS.100143.  At  time  of  publication,  the 
proceedings related to both applications remain pending before the General Court. 

5.2.2.3.  Feedback from stakeholders  

Stakeholders  generally  recognise  the  ex-officio  investigation  mechanism  as  a  central 
element  to  ensuring  a  level  playing  field  in  the  internal  market  as  it  is  reported  by  25 
stakeholders  out  of  the  54  submissions  in  the  public  consultation.  Respondents  to  the 
Stakeholders’ Consultations widely acknowledge that the ability for the Commission to act 
on its own initiative is necessary to address potentially distortive foreign subsidies. At the 
same time, respondents to the public consultation note that there remain some uncertainties 
in relation to the duration of investigations. In addition, several respondents flag the lack 
of  transparency  and  guidance  for  circumstances  in  which  ex  officio  investigations  are 
initiated and how prioritisation decisions are taken.  

5.2.2.4.  The Commission services’ assessment 

Based  on  the  Commission  practice  to  date  and  the  feedback  in  the  Stakeholders’ 
Consultations,  the  Commission  services  consider  that  the  ex-officio  investigation 
mechanism functions as intended and that the relevant provisions of the FSR provide an 
effective framework to pursue the Regulation’s objective of ensuring a level playing field 
in the internal market. In particular, the ex officio review powers enable the Commission 
to address potentially distortive foreign subsidies in any economic activity.  

Some of the early stakeholders’ feedback indicates a possible lack of predictability on the 
duration  of  ex  officio  investigations  which  may  create  uncertainty  for  businesses. 
However, experience shows that the duration of these proceedings is often also impacted 
by  the  level  of  cooperation  of  the  undertaking  under  investigation  and  the  provision  of 
relevant information to the Commission for assessment as well as actions brought before 
the EU Courts. Furthermore, it is noted that in current investigations, the 18-months periods 
referenced in Article 11(5) FSR have not expired.  

In  accordance  with  Article 10(3)  FSR,  the  opening  decisions  in  these  cases  have  been 
accompanied  by  summary  notices  published  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the  EU,  which 
provide a short overview of the Commission’s preliminary assessment of the presence of 
distortive foreign subsidies in those cases which servers to raise awareness and to invite 
comments from any other interested party.  

(45) 

(46) 

(47) 

Case  C-720/24  P(R),  Order  of  the  Vice-President  of  the  Court  of  21  March  2025, 
ECLI:EU:C:2025:205. 
Case  T-335/26,  Goldwind  Science  &  Technology  v  Commission,  main  proceedings,  application 
lodged on 29 May 2026. 
Case T-335/26 R, Goldwind Science & Technology v Commission, application for interim relief, 
lodged on 29 May 2026. 

25 

 
 
 
Similarly to notified cases, a timely publication of the outcome of in-depth investigations 
in  ex  officio  cases  will  be  ensured,  once  the  assessment  has  been  finalised  and  a  final 
decision has been adopted.  

All  of  these  efforts  provide  further  clarity  and  transparency  of  the  Commission's 
enforcement practice with respect to the use of its ex officio powers. 

5.2.3.  Notification of concentrations 

5.2.3.1.  Information on cases 

From  the  start  of  the  notification  obligation  until  31  May  2026,  the  Commission  has 
received  272  formal  notifications  under  the  concentration  notification  procedure,  as 
follows: 

•  11 were notified in 2023 (from October 2023 until end of 2023); 

•  102 were notified in 2024;  

•  99 were notified in 2025; 

•  60 were notified between 1 January and 31 May 2026. 

Of all the above cases, 247 were closed after the assessment in the preliminary review did 
not result in sufficient indications about the presence of distortive foreign subsidies. Four 
cases  were  withdrawn  during  the  preliminary  review  phase,  and  for  18  cases  the 
preliminary review was still ongoing. 

In three cases, the Commission initiated in-depth-investigations.  

Until the same date, the Commission has not made use of its power to request  the prior 
notification of any concentrations in accordance with Article 21(5) FSR. 

a.  Case  FS.100011  -  EMIRATES  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  GROUP  /  PPF 

TELECOM GROUP 

The Emirates Telecommunications Group Company PJSC (‘e&’) / PPF Telecom Group 
B.V  transaction  was  conditionally  approved  on  24  September  2024.  It  concerned  the 
acquisition by e&, the incumbent national telecommunications operator in the United Arab 
Emirates (‘UAE’), of PPF’s telecommunication operations in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia 
and Serbia. 

The Commission found evidence of the presence of  foreign subsidies in the form of an 
unlimited  guarantee,  grants  and  loans.  The  Commission  did  not  find  a  distortion  in  the 
acquisition  process  but  found  distortions  in  the  activities  of  the  merged  entity  post-
transaction (in the form of possibly distorted investments).  

In  order  to  address  the  distortion  detected,  the  Commission  accepted  commitments 
proposed  by  the  notifying  parties,  which  involved  (i) ensuring  that  e&’s  Articles  of 
Association  do  not  deviate  from  ordinary  UAE  bankruptcy  law,  thereby  removing  the 
unlimited State guarantee, and (ii) hold-separate obligations between e& and the target's 
activities in the EU internal market. 

The final non-confidential version of the decision with commitments is published on DG 
COMP website (48). 

(48) 

Commission  decision  of  24.9.2024  finding  that,  with  the  binding  commitments,  the  foreign 
subsidies in the concentration do not distort the internal market (Case FS.100011 – e&/PPF Telecom 
Group), C(2024) 6745 final.  

26 

 
 
b.  Case FS.100156 - ADNOC / COVESTRO 

The  Abu  Dhabi  National  Oil  Company  (‘ADNOC’) /  Covestro  transaction  was 
conditionally approved on 14 November 2025. It concerned the acquisition by ADNOC, a 
state-owned oil and gas producer and the national oil company of Abu Dhabi, of Covestro 
AG, a chemicals producer established in Germany. 

The Commission found evidence of the presence of foreign subsidies granted by the UAE 
to both the acquirer and the target, including an unlimited guarantee to  ADNOC, and a 
capital increase to Covestro. This was found to lead to distortion both in the acquisition 
process and in the activities of the merged entity post-acquisition. 

In  order  to  address  the  distortions  detected,  the  Commission  accepted  commitments 
proposed by the notifying party, which involved (i) a change of Articles of Association for 
ADNOC so that they do not deviate from ordinary UAE bankruptcy law, thereby removing 
the  unlimited  State  guarantee,  and  (ii) the  obligation  to  licence  certain  of  Covestro’s 
patents with market participants. 

A provisional non-confidential version of the decision with commitments is published on 
DG COMP website (49). 

c.  Case FS.100253 – JD.COM / CECONOMY 

This case involves the acquisition of CECONOMY AG, a German retailer specialised in 
the field of consumer electronics and home appliances, by JD.com, a company that belongs 
to a China-based group operating a retail business and an online e-commerce marketplace 
in China.  

On 28 May 2026, the Commission opened in-depth investigation into the transaction. In 
the  preliminary  review  phase,  the  Commission  found  indications  of  foreign  subsidies 
distorting the EU internal market. These include preferential financing, tax incentives and 
grants provided by entities whose actions are possibly attributable to the People’s Republic 
of China.  

At  time  of  publication,  the  in-depth  investigation  was  ongoing.  In  accordance  with 
Article 25(3)  FSR,  at  the  end  of  its  in-depth  investigation  of  a  concentration  case,  the 
Commission may (i) accept commitments proposed by the undertaking under investigation 
if  they  fully  and  effectively  remedy  the  distortion,  (ii) prohibit  the  concentration,  or 
(iii) issue a no objection decision. 

5.2.3.2.  Detailed analysis of Commission practice 

This section presents statistical data compiled as part of the internal data analysis for the 
purposes of the Report. The data analysed for concentration cases was focussed on cases 
notified  between  October  2023  and  January  2026 ( 50 )  and  summarises  data  on 
(i) characteristics  of  the  notifying  parties;  (ii) the  amount  and  type  of  reported  FFCs; 
(iii) the economic activities of the parties to the concentration (identified by NACE codes); 
(iv) the reported EU turnover of the target; (v) consideration paid for the transaction; and 
(vi) experience with pre-notification discussions. 

(49) 

(50) 

Provisional non-confidential version of Commission decision of 14.11.2025 on finding that, with 
the binding commitments the foreign subsidies in the concentration do not distort the internal market 
(Case FS.100156 – ADNOC/COVESTRO), C(2025) 7800 final/2. 
With a particular focus on cases closed after the preliminary review phase. The period for this more 
detailed part of the analysis of the Commission’s practice is the same for any conclusions reached 
in the present Section. 

27 

 
 
Some  statistical  data  derived  from  the  FSR  Review  Study  was  also  included  in  the 
analysis (51). These statistics are presented in comparison with the internal statistics of the 
Commission. In instances where statistical  data is  available only  from  the FSR Review 
Study and not from the Commission’s internal data analysis, such data is presented as novel 
evidence contributing to the overall assessment (52). 

a.  Characteristics of notifying parties 

The internal analysis of cases shows that 32% of all notified cases, which were closed after 
the preliminary review phase of investigation, involved an investment fund / private equity 
fund as an acquirer. This figure is overall consistent with the findings of the FSR Review 
Study,  where  the  corresponding  proportion  was  higher  at  43%.  This  difference  can  be 
explained by the use of different samples underlying the respective analyses (53).  

In addition, Table 1 below provides information on the distribution of cases, based on the 
reported country of incorporation of the parties involved in the transactions: 

Table 1: Cross border element (in % of all preliminary review concentration cases) 

Cross-border nature of concentration 

Intra-EU concentrations (cross-border) 
Intra-EU concentrations (same Member State) 
EU - non EU concentrations 
non EU - non EU concentrations (different non-EU country) 
non EU - non EU concentrations (same non-EU country) 

Source: Commission services. 

of 

all 

% 
preliminary 
review 
concentrations 
19% 
20% 
39% 
12% 
10%  

The  data  presented  in  Table  1  are  closely  aligned  with  the  data  presented  in  the  FSR 
Review Study (54). 

b.  Amount and type of reported FFCs 

With  regards  the  amount  and  type  of  reported  FFCs,  the  internal  analysis  of  case  data 
showed the following distribution of FFCs that do not fall under Article 5 FSR: 

(51) 

(52) 

(53) 
(54) 

The  analysis  carried  out  in  the  FSR  Review  Study  is  based  on  a  sample  of  cases  selected  to be 
representative, as explained in Section 4.2 of the FSR Review Study. 
This  is  the  case  specifically  in  the  following  sections:  point  e  ‘Concentration  types’  and  point  i 
‘Duration of pre-notification discussions’. 
Please see Section 4.2, page 121 of the FSR Review Study (Annex X). 
Please see Section 4.2, Table 66 of the FSR Review Study (Annex X). 

28 

 
 
Table 2: Concentrations classified according to the size of reported FFCs that do not 
fall under Article 5 FSR  

Concentrations  classified  to  ranges  of 
FFCS that are not Article 5 

of 

all 

% 
preliminary 
review 
concentrations 

EUR > 1000 million 

EUR 500-1000 EUR million 

EUR 100-500 EUR million 

EUR 45-100 EUR million 

Cases with no reported FFCs  

Source: Commission services. 

49% 

10% 

15% 

6% 

20%  

As can be seen from Table 2, under the reporting obligations in Form FS-CO, in 20% of 
cases closed after  a  preliminary review phase, notifying parties did  not report any  such 
FFCs,  even  if  they  reached  the  required  FFC  threshold  of  EUR 50  million  included  in 
Article 20(3)(b) FSR, which had triggered their notification obligation. Such cases arose 
predominantly  in  situations  where  the  FFCs  granted  were  in  the  form  of  one  of  the 
categories of FFCs which are benefited from an exception from the reporting obligation, 
most  often  in  the  form  of  provision  or  purchase  of  goods  or  services  (except  financial 
services) at market terms in the ordinary course of business. Those cases were found to not 
raise concerns under the FSR and only necessitated limited confirmation of information 
during pre-notification discussions with notifying parties. 

In addition, in 6% of cases closed after the preliminary review, the total amount of reported 
FFCs  that  do  not  fall  under  Article 5  FSR  in  the  Form  FS-CO  did  not  exceed 
EUR 100 million. Those cases were also generally found to not raise concerns and were 
subject to streamlined pre-notification discussions. 

Figure 2 provides an overview of the types of reported FFCs that do not fall under Article 5 
FSR (55).  Among  those  types  of  FFCs,  the  most  recurrent  reported  FFCs  included  tax 
advantages (32%), followed by capital commitments (18%) and credit facilities (15%). For 
completeness,  information  about  cases  where  no  FFCs  were  reported  has  also  been 
included. 

(55) 

The  analysed  information  on  reported  FFCs  has  been  provisionally  compiled  in  five  broad 
categories  (capital  commitments,  tax  advantages,  credit  facilities,  licence  payments  and  R&D 
funding) to enable a streamlined presentation. This categorisation does not directly reflect all types 
of FFCs as self-assessed and reported by notifying parties. 

29 

 
 
Figure 2 

Distribution of cases per Type of FFC

Licence payments
6%

R&D funding
12%

No FFCs reported
18%

Credit facilities
15%

Capital commitment
17%

Tax advantage
32%

(56) 

Source: Commission services. 

c.  Type of reported FFCs in investment funds/ private equity cases 

Within the subset of cases with investment fund / private equity acquirer, the most common 
type  of  FFCs  reported  were  contributions  by  Limited  Partners (57)  (‘LP  contributions’), 
attributable to third countries. Such LP contributions were found to be provided on similar 
terms and to confer similar rights to those associated with LP contributions by partners 
non-attributable  to  third  countries.  This  type  of  FFCs  was  found  to  not  give  rise  to 
distortive foreign subsidies in the assessed cases. In some cases, there were also reported 
FFCs to the portfolio controlled by the same fund. In general, the assessment showed that 
there  were  limited  possibilities  for  cross-subsidisation  of  the  transaction  (both  at 
acquisition level and activity post-transaction). As a result, cases with investment fund / 
private equity acquirers with reported FFCs limited to the above two categories were found 
to  not  raise  concerns  under  the  FSR  and  only  necessitated  confirmation  of  some  facts 
during the pre-notification discussions with notifying parties. 

The FSR Review Study found that, among the cases analysed in which the acquirer was a 
fund,  69%  involved  potentially  Article 5  FSR  foreign  subsidies  –  those  most  likely  to 
distort the internal market. All of them, fell under Article 5(1)(d) FSR - namely, those that 
could  directly  facilitate  the  transaction  and  arose  from  capital  commitments  made  by 

(56) 
(57) 

Data from cases after mid 2025. 
While there is no legal definition of the term ‘Limited Partners’ in the FSR legal framework, this 
term is understood to mean passive investors who contribute capital to a partnership (fund) but are 
strictly prohibited from participating in the management of the fund, lest they forfeit their limited 
liability status. If justified, the Commission may request more information from the notifying party 
as  to  whether  LPs  can  influence  the  fund’s  broader  mandate  through  the Limited  Partnership 
Agreement or have negotiated excusal rights via side letters to avoid specific sectors. 

30 

 
 
 
Limited  Partners  investing  in  the  fund,  which  were  potentially  attributable  to  foreign 
countries,  in  particular,  sovereign  wealth  funds  or  pension  funds.  In  two  cases, 
Article 5(1)(d)  FFCs  also  took  the  form  of  loans  granted  to  the  acquiring  fund  for  the 
purpose of financing the transaction. In the remaining 31% of cases, no  Article 5 FFCs 
were reported. 

However,  across  all  cases  in  which  the  FFCs  consisted  of  capital  contributions,  these 
investments were deemed to be made on ‘pari passu’ terms, equivalent to those of private 
investors.  Therefore,  no  benefit  was  conferred  so  the  FFC  did  not  constitute  a  foreign 
subsidy (58). 

d.  Economic activities of the target in the concentration 

The  analysis  of  the  economic  activities  of  the  parties  to  the  concentration  (based  on 
identified NACE codes) of notified cases is presented in Figure 3 below.  

Figure 3: Economic activities of target in the concentration (59) 

Nace Code Total %

S - ARTS, SPORTS AND RECREATION

R - HUMAN HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK…
O - ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT…
N - PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND…

M - REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES
L -  FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE ACTIVITIES

K - TELECOMMUNICATION, COMPUTER…
J - PUBLISHING, BROADCASTING, AND…
I - ACCOMMODATION AND FOOD SERVICE…

1%

2%

3%

2%
3%

3%
3%

2%

H - TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE
G - WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE
F - CONSTRUCTION

E - WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE…
D - ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR…

1%

C - MANUFACTURING
B - MINING AND QUARRYING
A - AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING

1%
1%

4%

7%

8%

13%

19%

28%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Source: Commission services. 

It follows that around 28% of cases concern manufacturing activities, followed by 19% of 
wholesale and retail activities and 13% of financial and insurance activities. 

e.  Concentration types 

The FSR Review Study performed an analysis of the types of concentration among the 
notified cases. The most common type was the acquisition of sole control over an entire 
company, accounting for 41% of cases. This was followed by acquisitions of joint control, 
which represented 14% of cases and mergers which represented 1% of cases (60). 

(58) 
(59) 

(60) 

For more information, please see Section 4.7.1 of the FSR Review Study (Annex X). 
The  data  are  largely  consistent  with  those  presented  in  the  FSR  Review  Study.  Any  slight 
differences are explained by differences in the samples on which the respective analyses are based. 
See Section 4.2, Table 64, of the FSR Review Study (Annex X). 
See Section 4.2, Table 65, of the FSR Review Study (Annex X). 

31 

 
 
 
Table 3: Concentration Type  

Count of Concentration Type 

Acquisition of joint control of part of a company 

Acquisition of joint control of the whole company 

Acquisition of joint control through a joint venture 

Acquisition of sole control of part of a company 

Acquisition of sole control of previously reduced or enlarged companies 

Acquisition of sole control of the whole company 

Acquisition of sole control through a subsidiary of a group 

Merger 

N\A 

Total 

(%) 

1% 

11% 

2% 

7% 

1% 

41% 

3% 

1% 

32% 

100% 

Source: Commission services. 

f.  Reported EU turnover of the target 

The internal analysis of cases shows that the median of the reported EU turnover of the 
target across all cases closed after preliminary review was around EUR 1 billion (i.e., for 
50% of those cases the target had a turnover of around EUR 1 billion or less).  

The distribution of turnover across all cases closed after preliminary review is represented 
in Figure 4 below. 

32 

 
Figure 4: Distribution of target turnover across all concentration cases closed after 
preliminary review 

Source: Commission services. 

In addition, internal analysis of the same data indicated that 15% of notified cases involved 
a transaction where the reported EU turnover of the target fell between EUR 500 million 
and EUR 600 million. There has not been any observed pattern of concentration of certain 
types of cases (in terms of economic activities) in the lower turnover segment of cases. 
Cases involving economic activities in general have been equally distributed regardless of 
the turnover of the target.  

In  particular,  Figure  5  below  presents  the  ratio  of  cases  with  turnover  between 
EUR 500 million and EUR 600 million across all economic activities. As noted above, the 
results are broadly comparable to the whole sample. 

Similarly, the FSR Review Study showed that, if the threshold were at EUR 600 million, 
a reduction of 16% in cases notified to the Commission would have occurred (61). 

The  analysis  on  presence  of  specific  patterns  was  performed  also  taking  in  account  of 
several acts of EU secondary law (62), to verify any patterns in the presence of the specific 
activities  identified  in  those  legislative  acts  and  the  reported  turnover  of  the  target  in 
notified concentration cases under the FSR. For each legislation assessed, the distribution 
of cases with such activities, which concerned a target with reported EU turnover below 
EUR 600 million, does not differ materially from the overall distribution of cases in these 

(61) 
(62) 

See Section 4.4 of the FSR Review Study (Annex X). 
The assessment included comparison with the sectors identified as priority sectors in line with the 
broader policy objectives of the Union in  Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable 
investment,  proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 
screening  of  foreign  investments  in  the  Union  and  repealing  Regulation  (EU)  2019/452  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council;  and  Regulation  (EU)  2024/1735  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  June  2024  on  establishing  a  framework  of  measures  for 
strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem 

33 

 
 
 
 
activities  across  all  notified  cases.  It  therefore  seems  that  an  increase  of  the  turnover 
threshold would not limit in a disproportionate way the Commission’s ability to detect and, 
if necessary, address distortive foreign subsidies with respect to these economic activities. 

Figure  5:  Economic  activities  of  target  in  the  concentration,  for  cases  where  the 
Turnover of the target was below EUR 600 million 

TOTAL of <600 per NACE CODE %

S - ARTS, SPORTS AND RECREATION

R - HUMAN HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK…
O - ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT…
N - PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND…

0%

0%

M - REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES
L -  FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE ACTIVITIES

K - TELECOMMUNICATION, COMPUTER…
J - PUBLISHING, BROADCASTING, AND…
I - ACCOMMODATION AND FOOD SERVICE…

0%

H - TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE
G - WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE
F - CONSTRUCTION

2%

2%
2%

2%

2%

12%

5%

E - WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE…
D - ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR…

0%

7%

C - MANUFACTURING
B - MINING AND QUARRYING
A - AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING

0%

2%

17%

20%

24%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Source: Commission services. 

g.  Consideration paid for the concentration 

The  internal  analysis  of  cases  shows  that  the  median  of  the  consideration  paid  over  all 
analysed  cases  was  around  EUR 900 million  (i.e.,  50%  of  those  cases  the  total 
consideration  paid  was  EUR  900  million  or  less).  This  distribution  of  reported 
consideration is presented in Figure 6 (63): 

(63) 

This includes cases closed after the preliminary review phase, cases in which a decision to open in-
depth investigation was adopted, as well as cases withdrawn after notification. Several cases were 
excluded, where the reported consideration did not have a cash equivalent. 

34 

 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Consideration paid for the concentration 

Consideration (EUR M)

35000

30000

)

M
R
U
E
(

n
o
i
t
a
r
e
d
i
s
n
o
C

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0

0

Cases

50

100

150

Consideration (EUR M)

200

250

Source: Commission services. 

h.  Experience with pre-notification discussions (waivers and duration) 
The FSR Review Study analysed the duration of pre-notification discussions (64). 

Since  the  mandatory  standstill  period  in  the  preliminary  review  phase  always  lasts  25 
working days in cases where the Commission does not initiate an in-depth investigation, 
only the number of days between the submission of the first draft notification form and the 
filing of the complete notification is variable and can be affected by the notifying parties 
and / or the Commission.  

The median number of working days in this pre-notification phase fell from 36 working 
days for cases notified between September 2023 and March 2024 to 24 working days for 
cases notified between October 2024 and April 2025, a notable reduction of around 33%. 
This suggests that the Commission services, the notifying parties, or both have become 
more familiar and efficient with the (pre-) notification process and analysis. 

(64) 

See Section 4.3 of the FSR Review Study (Annex X).  

35 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Average number of working days from draft notification to legal deadline 
(by period) 

Draft 
notification 
period 

Number of 
cases 
notified 

September 2023 
- March 2024 

- 
April  2024 
September 2024 

October  2024  - 
April 2025 

Total reduction 

36 

29 

25 

Source: FSR Review Study. 

Average 
working days 
from draft 
notification to 
end of 
standstill 
period 
67 

Median 
working days 
from draft 
notification to 
end of 
standstill 
period 
61 

Median 
working days 
from draft 
notification to 
receipt of 
complete 
notification 
36 

64 

60 

58 

49 

33 

24 

10% 

20% 

33% 

In  79  cases  the  parties  made  a  waiver  request,  which  represents  around  39%  of  all 
cases (65). Figure 7 provides information on broad types of waivers requested during pre-
notification discussions.  

Figure 7: Types of waivers requested during pre-notification discussions 

Source: Commission services. 

Figure 7 shows that the most common type of waiver requested was on the disclosure of 
FFCs  considered  not  necessary  for  the  Commission’s  analysis  (27.9%),  followed  by 
information not being readily available (21.3%) and no link to the transaction, and sensitive 
information/confidentiality waiver (each accounting for 9.8%). 

(65) 

Assessed on a sample of 201 cases. 

36 

 
 
 
 
5.2.3.3.  Feedback from stakeholders  

Stakeholders  generally  recognise  the  added  value  of  the  notification  system  for 
concentrations  in  enabling  the  Commission  to  address  potentially  distortive  foreign 
subsidies in the context of concentrations. At the same time, respondents emphasise that 
the current notification reporting generates administrative burden for economic operators 
that is partly perceived as disproportionate to the risk of distortion identified in the internal 
market at the time of the survey responses. 

a)  Positive aspects identified by stakeholders 

In the context of the Practitioners’ Survey, a broad range of stakeholders express positive 
views on the functioning of the notification procedure in practice, in particular as regards 
the  conduct  of  pre-notification  contacts,  with  46%  of  the  37  respondents  finding  pre-
notification  contacts  helpful  compared  to  24%  that  found  them  unhelpful.  Stakeholders 
consistently highlight the accessibility and responsiveness of Commission case teams, as 
well as the usefulness of pre-notification discussions in clarifying the scope of reportable 
FFCs and the level of detail expected in the notification. Respondents also approved that 
the statutory deadline of 25 working days for the preliminary review phase which allows 
a  degree  of  predictability  once  a  complete  notification  has  been  submitted.  Overall, 
communication with the Commission services was viewed positively in engagement with 
the Commission case teams and the Commission’s responsiveness. Feedback on the clarity 
of the Commission services’ guidance during the notification process was also positive.  

Regarding  the  notification  thresholds,  the  notification  threshold  based  on  EU  turnover, 
prescribed by Article 20(3)(a) FSR, was largely viewed positively (66). An overwhelming 
majority (95% out of the 37 respondents to the Practitioners’ Survey) found it clear and 
easy to apply, and 47% of the respondents viewed turnover as an appropriate proxy for 
prioritising cases, suggesting the threshold is a relevant. 

b)  Challenges raised by stakeholders 

A significant number of respondents to the Stakeholders’ Consultations identify challenges 
associated with the notification obligation for concentrations. A recurrent concern relates 
to  the  identification,  collection  and  reporting  of  FFCs.  More  concretely,  half  of  the 
respondents  to  the  public  consultation,  primarily  businesses  and  business  associations, 
consider  that  the  reporting  of  foreign  financial  contributions  is  too  broad.  Respondents 
report  that  the  breadth  of  the  concept  and  reporting  obligation  for  FFCs  often  require 
internal data-gathering exercises across multiple entities, jurisdictions and time periods. 
The feedback received indicates that the scope of the reporting obligation is perceived as 
cumbersome because the concept of FFCs used in Article 3 FSR is based on an open-ended 
list, with a few exhaustive reporting exceptions. The feedback highlights in particular the 
difficulties with the FFCs in the form of contracts for the provision of goods or services or 
purchase of goods or services. Currently, an exception from the reporting obligation for 
such FFCs applies to provisions or purchases made at market terms on the ordinary course 
of business, except for financial services. Respondents point out that in order to benefit 
from  this  exception,  they  still  need  to  collect  information  to  assess  whether  they  are 
conducted on market terms. 

Stakeholders  also  raise  concerns  about  the  scope  and  level  of  detail  required  by  the 
Commission case teams in response to the first submitted notification forms and additional 

(66) 

Pursuant to Article 20(3) FSR, a concentration is notifiable when two thresholds are met. The first 
is  the  turnover  threshold,  which  is  satisfied  where  at  least one  of  the  merging undertakings,  the 
acquired undertaking, or the joint venture is established in the Union and generates an aggregate 
turnover in the Union of at least EUR 500 million. The second threshold concerns FFC of more than 
EUR 50 million received by the parties.  

37 

 
 
requests for information during the Commission review. Finally, 24 respondents out of 54 
in the public consultation note that the concentrations subject to notification under the FSR 
are often also reviewed under other EU or national instruments, in particular the EUMR 
and  national  FDI  screening  mechanisms.  While  stakeholders  acknowledge  the  distinct 
objectives  of  these  frameworks,  they  underline  the  cumulative  administrative  burden 
associated with parallel procedures and information requests. 

In the Practitioners’ Survey, respondents indicated that the notification process imposes a 
not insignificant burden in terms of time and resources. As a result, companies, in the vast 
majority of cases, engage external legal counsel to prepare their notifications. The most 
challenging  aspect  identified  relates  to  the  FFC  threshold  both  for  notification  and 
reporting purposes. A majority of respondents noted that increasing these thresholds would 
reduce the administrative burden. As regards the value of the turnover threshold, 44% of 
the  37  respondents  to  the  Practitioners’  Survey  considered  that  raising  the  turnover 
threshold would significantly decrease the overall level of burden in the notifications of 
concentration, compared to 31% of the respondents who disagreed with such statement. In 
a similar manner, a majority of respondents (62%) stated that raising the FFC thresholds 
would  significantly  reduce  the  overall  burden  created.  In  particular,  with  respect  to  the 
reporting  thresholds  set  out  in  the  FSIR  –  EUR 45  million  per  third  country  and 
EUR 1 million per individual FFC – most respondents considered both thresholds to be too 
low, with particular concern expressed about the EUR 1 million threshold. 

5.2.3.4.  The FSR Review Study 

This section presents the conclusions of the FSR Review Study based on the analysis of 
case practice, following the methodology described in Section 4.2.1 above.  

Overall, the analysis indicates that the FSR is functioning effectively. The study concludes 
that the Commission consistently meets procedural deadlines and has improved efficiency 
over time. The notification thresholds (EUR 500 million turnover and EUR 50 million in 
FFCs) appear to appropriately capture transactions with the highest risk of distortion.  

At the same time, the FSR Review Study identifies areas for improvement. A significant 
number  of  cases  raising  no  concerns,  closed  after  preliminary  review,  particularly 
involving investment fund acquirers, continue to be notified. It should be pointed out that 
the  feedback  received  in  the  FSR  Review  Study  does  not  include  the  recent  guidance 
(notably Question 26 of the DG COMP Q&A), which has alleviated this burden. In this 
regard, the FSR Review Study concludes that further refinements may be beneficial, such 
as extending the list of exempted FFCs to include FFCs in the form of LP contributions 
and FFCs to portfolio companies that cannot cross-subsidise the acquiring funds. 

In addition, the FSR Review Study notes that some uncertainty remains over the treatment 
of  specific  types  of  FFCs,  such  as  tax  measures,  where  further  clarification  would  be 
useful. 

In  conclusion,  the  FSR  Review  Study  found  that  the  FSR  was  broadly  achieving  its 
objectives by targeting distortive subsidies without imposing disproportionate burdens on 
undertakings.  Nonetheless,  targeted  adjustments  considering  the  points  outlined  in  this 
section  could  enhance  its  effectiveness  and  reduce  administrative  burden  for  both 
companies and the Commission. 

5.2.3.5.  The Commission services’ assessment 

Early enforcement experience under the concentration notification  procedure provides a 
solid basis for assessing the functioning of FSR as a new enforcement instrument. While 
the  number  of  notified  cases  has  been  higher  than  initially  anticipated  in  the  Impact 

38 

 
Assessment which accompanied the proposal for the Regulation (67), this experience has 
offered valuable insight into both the strengths of the framework and areas where further 
calibration  may  be  warranted.  In  particular,  experience  to  date  indicates  that,  the 
Commission  closed  around  97%  of  notified  concentrations  after  preliminary  review, 
without opening an in-depth investigation (68). This proportion does not differ significantly 
from the proportion of compatible cases reviewed in Phase I under the EUMR (69). In this 
regard,  part  of  the  perceived  administrative  burden  reflected  in  the  Stakeholders’ 
Consultations also reflects the learning curve associated with a new regulatory framework, 
both for notifying parties and for the Commission. 

Key elements of the notification framework for concentrations are considered to function 
effectively.  In  particular,  the  turnover  threshold  for  notified  concentrations  is  generally 
perceived as an appropriate proxy for the system to capture transactions with a meaningful 
economic nexus to the EU. In addition, it should also be noted that under Chapter 3 FSR, 
in cases, which result in the creation of joint ventures, the turnover threshold is calculated 
with  reference  to  the  joint  venture  itself,  and  not  to  the  undertakings  creating  the  joint 
venture. This limits the obligation to notify only to cases where the joint venture itself has 
realised  a  significant  EU  turnover,  in  contrast  to  the  practice  under  the  EUMR,  which 
contributes, among others, to a lower number of notifications under the FSR compared to 
the EUMR. For any case below the threshold, the Commission may still use its powers to 
request  prior  notification  in  accordance  with  Article 21(5)  FSR,  which  provides  further 
reassurance that potential distortive foreign subsidies may be caught by the enforcement 
efforts of the Commission. 

The  high  number  of  FSR  notifications  confirm  the  relevance  of  the  Regulation  and  its 
stated  objective  of  addressing  distortions  in  the  internal  market  caused  by  foreign 
subsidies. In particular, the volume of notifications indicates that a significant number of 
transactions in the internal market involve parties that have received a significant number 
of FFCs, which could constitute potentially distortive foreign subsidies demonstrating the 
practical importance of the FSR as a framework to assess whether such contributions may 
give  rise  to  distortive  effects.  That  said,  the  feedback  received  from  stakeholders  also 
highlights the need for the Commission to continue to carefully observe its practice and to 
identify ways to simplify the compliance process for businesses, while not undermining 
the effectiveness of the FSR. Early enforcement experience also confirms the importance 
of  pre-notification  contacts,  which  are  widely  used  and  broadly  supported  by  notifying 
parties. The swiftness and accessibility of communication with Commission case teams 
during the pre-notification phase facilitate early clarification of reporting obligations and 
contribute to more efficient handling of cases. 

A  progressive  reduction  was  observed  in  the  overall  length  of  the  review  process,  as 
experience  with  the  FSR  system  increases.  In  addition,  the  statutory  25  working  day 
deadline for preliminary review phase provides procedural predictability once a complete 
notification has been submitted. The availability of exceptions and the granting of waivers 
for certain information is generally viewed favourably and has proven useful in reducing 

(67) 

(68) 

(69) 

The  estimated  number  of  concentrations  was  set  at  30-40  per  year,  whereas  in  reality,  the 
Commission has received around 100 formal notification per year during the first three years since 
the start of the notification obligation in October 2023. 
The  number  includes  cases  closed  after  preliminary  review  and  cases  withdrawn  during  the 
preliminary review phase. 
The proportion of cases found compatible in accordance with Article 6(1)(b) EUMR in the first 
phase of the mergers investigation in the last five years ranges between 93% to 99% on an annual 
basis according to official statistics published on the Commission’s website. 

39 

 
 
reporting obligations. However, experience suggests that further clarification on the scope 
and application of exceptions may enhance their effectiveness.  

At the same time, early enforcement experience highlights a few challenges that contribute 
to the administrative burden for notifying parties. Two main areas can be identified. 

First, the identification, collection and reporting of FFCs is perceived as resource intensive. 
The breadth of the concept of FFC, combined with the volume of information required, 
necessitate internal data gathering exercises. Related to that, the scope and level of detail 
of  information  required  by  notification  forms  and  subsequent  information  requests  can 
place a not insignificant burden on notifying parties.  

Second, uncertainty linked to the possibility of call-in below notification thresholds is said 
to affect transaction planning and risk assessment. While call-in powers are an important 
safeguard, their breadth is claimed to have a deterrent effect in certain situations, which 
underscore the importance of transparency and predictability in the criteria used for their 
application.  

With respect to the last point, it should be recalled that the recently adopted FSR Guidelines 
provide additional clarity and transparency about the legal requirements and considerations 
taken by the Commission when assessing whether to request prior notification. In addition, 
the future exercise of the call-in powers in specific cases will also provide more clarity and 
reduce legal uncertainty with respect to those powers.  

With respect to the FFC reporting thresholds set out in the FSIR, the two-limbed approach 
to  reporting  should  be  preserved,  as  it  appropriately  distinguishes  between  the  more 
detailed information  required for FFCs that may fall under  Article 5 FSR and the more 
aggregate reporting of other FFCs. However, the experience gathered so far suggests that 
the current reporting thresholds – EUR 1 million per individual FFC and EUR 45 million 
per third country – might capture a significant volume of information that, in most cases, 
has not proven particularly relevant to identifying a risk of distortion. 

5.2.4. 

Submissions in public procurement procedures  

Between 13 October 2023, when Article 29 FSR started to apply, and 31 May 2026, in the 
public procurement module of the FSR, the Commission received 5 150 submissions from 
economic  operators.  These  submissions  originated  from  863  public  procurement 
procedures, representing a total value of over EUR 712 billion. 

The submissions received by the Commission can be broken down to: 

•  4 293 declarations (83.4% of the cases), 

•  733 notifications (14.2% of the cases), and 

•  124 pre-notifications (2.4% of the cases).  

5.2.4.1.  Information on cases 

Out of the 5 150 submissions received, the Commission initiated and subsequently closed 
four in-depth-investigations – three of them were closed following the withdrawal of the 
economic  operators  from  the  public  procurement  procedure  and  in  one  case  the 
Commission took a final decision. 

40 

 
During that period, the Commission had, for the first time, exercised its power to request 
the  prior  notification  of  FFC  in  a  public  procurement  procedure  pursuant  to 
Article 29(8) FSR. 

a)  Case FSP.100147 – Supply of railway rolling stock in Bulgaria 

The  Commission  opened  an  in-depth  investigation  on  16  February  2024  to  assess 
potentially  distortive subsidies in  an  open public procurement  procedure for the project 
related to the provision of several electric ‘push-pull’ trains as well as related maintenance 
and staff training services launched by the Ministry of Transport and Communications of 
Bulgaria. 

The  in-depth  investigation  was  initiated  following  a  preliminary  review  in  which  the 
Commission found sufficient indications that China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation 
Qingdao  Sifang  Locomotive  Co.,  Ltd.,  (‘CRRC  Qingdao  Sifang’)  owned  by  CRRC 
Corporation Limited (‘CRRC’), had received various foreign subsidies from the People’s 
Republic  of  China  (‘the  PRC’).  These  subsidies  took  the  form  of  public  contracts 
potentially awarded on non-market terms and of government grants. 

On 26 March 2024, shortly after the opening of its in-depth investigation, the Commission 
announced  the  closure  of  the  case  following  the  legally  binding  withdrawal  of  CRRC 
Qingdao Sifang, from the public procurement. As a result, the Commission closed the case 
without adopting a final decision pursuant to Article 31 FSR.  

b)  Cases  FSP.100151  and  FSP.100154  –  Design,  construction  and  operation  of  a 

photovoltaic park in Romania 

The Commission opened two in-depth investigations on 3 April 2025 to assess potentially 
distortive subsidies in the open public procurement procedure for the design, construction 
and operation of a photovoltaic park in Romania launched from Societatea Parc Fotovoltaic 
Rovinari Est S.A. 

During  the  preliminary  review,  the  Commission  found  sufficient  indications  that  two 
economic operators were granted foreign subsidies by the PRC, in the form of provision 
of government grants, tax measures, financing and in the form of public contracts awarded 
potentially  on  non-market  terms  that  distorted  competition  in  the  internal  market. 
Therefore, the Commission found indications that foreign subsidies may have enabled the 
two economic operators, (i) Shanghai Electric UK Ltd. and Shanghai Electric Hong Kong 
International Engineering Company, and (ii) ENEVO Group – LONGi Solar Technologie 
Consortium to offer lower prices than their competitors, thereby enabling them to submit 
a  tender  that  was  unduly  advantageous  in  relation  to  the  works,  supplies  or  services 
concerned. 

On 7 June 2024, the Commission announced the closure of both in-depth investigations, 
following  the  legally  binding  withdrawal  of  both  economic  operators  from  the  public 
procurement procedure. As a result, the Commission closed the case without adopting a 
final decision pursuant to Article 31 FSR. 

c)  Case  FSP.103117  –  Design  and  construction,  acquisition  of  vehicles  and 

maintenance services of the Violet Line of the Lisbon Metro in Portugal 

The tender of the consortium led by Mota-Engil Engenharia e Construção, S.A. (‘Mota-
Engil’) was  conditionally cleared on 21 April 2026. The procedure concerned the open 
public procurement procedure for the ‘Design  and  construction, acquisition of vehicles, 
and  maintenance  services  for  the  Violet  Line  of  the  Lisbon  Metro’,  to  be  awarded  by 
Metropolitano  de  Lisboa,  E.P.E.  The  tender  submitted  by  Mota-Engil  relied  on  a  main 

41 

 
subcontractor for the supply of rolling stock and related services, i.e. Portugal CRRC, an 
undertaking belonging to the CRRC group. 

The  Commission  found  evidence  of  the  presence  of  foreign  subsidies  in  the  form  of 
government grants, tax measures and turnover from public contracts which exceeds the 
turnover  which  would  have  been  achieved  in  a  competitive,  transparent  and  non-
discriminatory procedure, which enabled Portugal CRRC to submit an advantageous offer 
to the consortium led by Mota-Engil and subsequently, enabled the consortium to submit 
an  unduly  advantageous  tender,  thus  distorting  competition  in  the  public  procurement 
procedure. 

In  order  to  address  the  detected  distortion,  the  Commission  accepted  commitments 
proposed by Mota-Engil on behalf of the consortium,  in  which it committed to  replace 
Portugal  CRRC  by  the  Polish  Pojazdy  Szynowe  PESA  Bydgoszcz  Spółka  Akcyjna 
('PESA') for the entire duration of the contract performance period. 

At  the  time  of  publication,  the  final  non-confidential  version  of  the  decision  with 
commitments was not yet available for publication. 

d)  Cases  FSP.101606  and  FSP.101626  –  Decisions  declaring  a  tender  irregular  – 

Article 29(4) FSR 

During the reference period, the Commission issued two decisions on incompleteness in 
the context of public procurement procedures. Case FSP.101606 concerned an economic 
operator that submitted an offer for the construction of a long-distance tunnel in a tender 
in Poland. Case FSP.101626 concerned an economic operator that submitted an offer for 
the supply of computers and workstations in a tender in France. In both cases, a decision 
was issued declaring the submissions of the respective economic operators incomplete and 
requiring  them  to  submit  a  complete  notification  within  10  working  days.  As  the 
notifications  in  both  cases  were  not  completed  within  the  deadline,  in  March  2025  the 
Commission issued decisions declaring both tenders irregular. Ultimately, the contracting 
authorities rejected the irregular tenders and both economic operators were excluded from 
the public procurement procedures. 

e)  Case FSP.103175 – Request for prior notification – Article 29(8) FSR 

During the reference period, the Commission requested one economic operator to submit 
prior  notification  pursuant  to  Article 29(8)  FSR.  This  request  was  issued  in  November 
2025  and  covered  two  public  procurement  procedures  launched  for  the  construction  of 
various sections of a motorway in Croatia. As the economic operator that was required to 
submit  a  prior  notification  did  not  comply  with  the  reporting  obligation,  the  relevant 
contracting  authority  issued  a  request  to  the  economic  operator  concerned  to  submit  a 
missing notification pursuant to Article 29(3) FSR. Ultimately, the contracting authority 
considered  the  tender  inadmissible,  inappropriate,  and  technically  unacceptable,  and 
excluded the economic operator from the procedure.  

5.2.4.2.  Detailed analysis of the Commission’s practice 

This section presents statistical data compiled as part of the Commission’s internal analysis 
conducted for the purposes of the Report. The data analysed for public procurement cases 
was  focussed  on  cases  notified  between  October  2023  and  January  2026 ( 70 )  and 
summarises the data collected in the sections below. 

(70) 

With a particular focus on preliminary review cases, as there were only three in-depth investigation 
cases, see above. The period for this more detailed part of the analysis of the Commission’s practice 
will remain untouched. 

42 

 
 
Some statistical  data derived from  the  FSR Review Study  were included as well in  the 
analysis. These statistics are presented in comparison with the internal statistics developed 
by  the  Commission.  In  instances  where  statistical  data  is  available  only  from  the  FSR 
Review Study and not from the Commission’s internal data analysis, such data is presented 
as evidence contributing to the overall assessment. 

5.2.4.2.1. 

Quantitative analysis of the Commission’s case practice 

a)  Submissions by sector  

The Commission services identified the industrial sectors in which submissions were most 
frequently  received  in  large  public  procurement  procedures.  To  determine  the  sector  to 
which a submission belongs, the Commission services use the main Common Procurement 
Vocabulary  (CPV)  codes (71)  indicated  by  the  contracting  authority (72)  in  the  contract 
notice  published  in  Tenders  Electronic  Daily  (TED) (73).  As  contracting  authorities  use 
CPV  codes  with  varying  degrees  of  granularity,  specific  codes  were  grouped  into  their 
broader  parent  categories  for  consistency.  These  are  then  classified  under  six  main 
categories:  construction,  energy,  health,  information  and  communication  technology 
(ICT), transport and other.  

Figure 8: Submissions per sector in public procurement 

Not filled-in by 
contracting 
authorities
6%

Transport
12%

Submissions per sector

Other
13%

Construction
26%

Energy
9%

ICT
24%

Health
10%

Source: Commission services. 

As  outlined  above,  the  most  common  sectors  identified  through  submissions  are 
construction (26.1 % of the number of submissions), energy (9.5 %), health (10.0 %), ICT 
(23.6 %) and transport (13.4 %). 

b)  Procedures and submissions per Member State 

First, concerning the number of public procurement procedures of an estimated value of at 
least EUR 250 million net of VAT for which the Commission received a submission (74), 

(71) 

(72) 

(73) 
(74) 

The  CPV  has  a  single  classification  system  for  public  procurement  aimed  at  standardising  the 
references  used  by  contracting  authorities  and  entities  to  describe  the  subject  of  procurement 
contracts. CPV codes consist of eight digits indicating increasing level of detail (main category (first 
two  digits),  sub-category  (third  digit),  class  (fourth  digit),  category  (fifth  digit)  and  specific 
refinements (sixth to eighth digit). CPV - Common Procurement Vocabulary - TED 
Reference  to  ‘contracting  authorities’  should  be  understood  as  to  include  both  ‘contracting 
authorities’ and ‘contracting entities’. 
TED - EU Tenders, the Supplement to the Official Journal - TED  
This  number  includes  procurements  divided  into  lots,  where  the  estimated  contract  value  net  of 
VAT exceeded EUR 250 million and the value of the lot or the aggregate value of all the lots to 

43 

 
 
 
in total there were 730 public procurement procedures. The three Member States where 
the number of such public procurement procedures was the highest accounted for 53% of 
the total number of procedures (in total 389 public procurement procedures). These three 
Member States are Germany, France and Italy. At the same time, there are five Member 
States that have not yet transferred any submission in a public procurement procedure that 
would fall under the FSR, which may be justified if a Member State has not initiated any 
public  procurement  procedure  meeting  that  threshold.  This  demonstrates  a  significant 
difference between the number of public procurement procedures that reach the value of 
EUR 250 million among Member States. This variation across Member States may reflect 
differences in the size of public projects, in the organisation of procurement procedures 
(carried out by central purchasing bodies or individually per contracting authority). At the 
same  time,  it  may  also  underscore  a  fragmented  understanding  of  the  FSR  reporting 
obligation, as well as the potential lack of sufficient administrative capacity.  

Figure 9: Total number of notified procedures per Member State (October 2023 – 
January 2026) 

Number of procedures notified by Member State (October 2023 - January
2026)

150

100

50

0

134

131

124

17 13 5

17

0

40

14 12

1

0

4

7 14

0

0

4

0

2

2 10

39 39

63

38

AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK

Source: Commission services. 

Second, according to the analysis of internal data, contracting authorities from Germany, 
France and Italy transferred the highest number of submissions to the Commission. At the 
same  time,  several  Member  States  have  not  forwarded  any  submission  in  a  public 
procurement procedure that would fall under the FSR – similarly to the above, in some 
cases, this may be justified by the lack of public procurement procedures reaching the FSR 
jurisdictional  threshold.  The  number  of  submissions  indicates  the  number  of  economic 
operators in a public procurement procedure. Based on Commission data, the number of 
economic operators exceeds by more than five times the number of public procurement 
procedures  in  which  the  Commission  received  submissions,  indicating  on  average  five 
economic operators per procedure. The number of economic operators per procedure varies 
significantly – with procedures reaching up to 20-50 or at times over 100 submissions in 
one single procedure. The variation between the number of submissions may depend on 
the  tender,  the  level  of  competition  in  a  Member  State,  the  type  of  procedure  or  other 
factors. 

which the tenderer applied was equal or greater than EUR 125 million, in accordance with Article 
28(2) FSR.  

44 

 
 
Figure  10:  Total  number  of  submissions in  notified  procedures  per  Member  State 
(October 2023-January 2026) 

Number of submissions in public procurement procedures per Member State 
(October 2023 - January 2026)

1500

1000

500

0

656

214

94 77 13 0 41

961

717

5 86 41

0 11 43 58

0

0

165

0

279199

184266

2

6 30

AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK

Source: Commission services. 

c)  Comparison  of  published  public  procurement  procedures  with  and  without  FSR 

submission 

To  approximate  the  level  of  compliance  with  the  FSR  the  Commission  services  may 
(i) compare the number of public procurement procedures in which it received at least one 
submission with the number of contract notices published in TED database with a value of 
at least EUR 250 million net of VAT; and (ii) compare the number of submissions received 
per  public  procurement  procedure  with  the  actual  number  of  tenders  submitted  to  the 
contracting authority in a given procedure. 

For the purposes of the Report, the Commission services conducted a comparison of the 
list of public procurement procedures that met the jurisdictional threshold for application 
of  the  FSR  published  in  TED,  with  the  list  of  procedures  in  which  at  least  one  FSR 
submission was submitted (75). At the same time, the Commission services decided not to 
cross-check  the  number  of  submissions  transferred  to  it  against  the  number  of  tenders 
submitted to the contracting authority, in order to minimise the administrative burden on 
the contracting authority. 

As a result of the data analysed, during the first year of application of the FSR – between 
1 October 2023 and  30 September  2024 –  in  40 % of all published public procurement 
procedures of at least EUR 250 million, the Commission received at least one submission. 
During the second year between October 2024 to September 2025, this figure rose to 70 %, 
however  the  rate  has  dropped  significantly  to  45%  between  October  2025  and  January 
2026. While this data does not provide conclusive evidence on the level of compliance of 
economic operators with their FSR obligation, it suggests a decreasing trend in compliance 
rate. 

(75) 

TED data has been used for illustrative purposes and is not a final assessment of compliance. The 
analysis  represents  an  approximation.  The  TED  data  used  was  obtained  from  publicly  available 
sources rather than official records provided by the competent national authorities. The Commission 
processed the data to ensure that each tender carrying several notices is counted as one (please note 
that the identification of a unique tender in the TED dataset does not definitively confirm a legal 
obligation to notify). It was not possible to account for several factors that may affect the exactness 
of TED data, such as (i) situations where a contracting authority did not insert an estimated contract 
value, (ii) situations where the contracting authority reported an individual lot’s value rather than 
the  entire  contract’s,  (iii)  such  registrations  of  framework  agreements  or  dynamic  purchasing 
systems that reflect annual estimates rather than the contract values for the entire duration of the 
contract or (iv)  situations in which a tendering procedure was  discontinued. The time difference 
between the date of publication of a contract notice and the date of filing a notification may have 
underestimated the number of submissions compared to the number of published contract notices. 

45 

 
 
 
Figure 11: Compliance rate with FSR reporting obligations (number of procedures).  

Compliance with FSR reporting obligations

70 %

40 %

45 %

s
e
s
a
c

f
o

r
e
b
m
u
N

500

400

300

200

100

0

10/2023 - 10/2024

10/2024 - 10/2025
Time frame

10/2025 - 01/2026

Number of notified FSR procedures

Number of TED procedures

Compliance rate

Source: Commission services, TED. 

Furthermore, limited awareness among contracting authorities, combined with inconsistent 
application of the FSR, may reduce predictability for stakeholders and may undermine the 
FSR  objectives.  Based  on  available  evidence,  contracting  authorities  sometimes  fail  to 
require the submission of FSR notifications or send them to the Commission at a late stage 
of  the  procedure,  in  exceptional  cases  after  the  award  of  the  contract.  In  addition, 
notifications are not always submitted using a standard Form FS-PP. These formats often 
lack  the  prescribed  formal  and  substantive  requirements  or  impose  additional  reporting 
requirements that go beyond those of Form FS-PP.  

d)  Recurring submissions 

The analysis of internal data collected from the start of the FSR reporting obligation until 
31 January 2026 has shown that there are several economic operators or entities belonging 
to the same corporate group, that repeatedly participated in public procurement procedures 
that meet the jurisdictional threshold for the application of the FSR, resulting in multiple 
FSR  submissions  during  the  reference  period.  During  this  period,  the  40  economic 
operators  that  submitted  Forms  FS-PP  the  most  frequently  account  for  16%  of  all 
submissions  (672  in  total).  During  the  reference  period,  the  highest  number  of  FS-PP 
forms, 51 in total, was submitted by an economic operator active across key sectors. This 
was followed by two economic operators in the construction sector, which submitted 43 
and 36 FS-PP forms respectively. 

e)  Distribution of cases per contract value 

The  FSR  Review  Study  assessed  how  submissions  are  distributed  across  public 
procurement procedures according to estimated contract values. This analysis covers the 
period from  October 2023 until  June 2025, and did  not  include those in which specific 
value was not available, i.e. because the contracting authority did not publish the estimated 
contract values. The Commission services’ own data derived from submissions covering 
the same period shows that this was the case for 7 % of the notified procedures (50 out of 
737). In a further 1% of cases (eight out of 737) contracting authorities reported ranges 

46 

 
 
 
 
instead of estimated contract values (e.g. more than EUR 250 million, more than EUR 700 
million). It is possible that for some procedures contracting authorities did not estimate the 
contract value and did not notify the Commission. Furthermore, the Commission services 
data does not allow conclusions on the number of such public procurement procedures to 
be drawn.  According to  the FSR Review Study,  approximately 40% of  all  submissions 
were made in public procurement procedures with an estimated value net of VAT between 
EUR 250 million and EUR 500 million. The remaining 60% of all submissions represented 
bids for amounts superior to EUR 500 million. 

Figure  12:  Hypothetical  distribution  of  cases  if  the  jurisdictional  threshold  were 
raised 

Source: FSR Review Study. 

The  diagram  above  shows  the  hypothetical  distribution  of  cases  if  the  jurisdictional 
threshold were raised. This leads to the following conclusions: first, an increase of 20% of 
the  jurisdictional  threshold  (to  EUR 300  million)  would  achieve  a  reduction  of 
approximately 15% in  the number of submissions; second, a significant  increase of the 
jurisdictional  threshold to  EUR 500 million  would achieve a decrease in  the number of 
cases by more than 55%; finally a significant share of 25% of all cases reach a value of 
EUR 1 billion. 

f)  Global Ultimate Ownership of Economic Operators 

The  Commission  services  systematically  review  the  place  of  establishment  of  the 
economic operator and that of its global ultimate owner (‘GUO’) (76). This constitutes an 
integral  part  of  the  Commission’s  assessment.  To  define  the  GUO,  the  Commission 
services follow the controlling shareholding line of the economic operator up until the last 
entity that holds directly or indirectly the majority of the shares of the economic operator. 
For the purposes of the current analysis, covering the period between October 2023 and 
December 2025, the Commission services matched the name of the economic operator, or 

(76) 

For the purposes of the Report, Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) - i.e. top owner worldwide – is to 
be understood as the individual or entity at the top of the corporate ownership chain and represents 
the final point of control within a group structure. This concept is not defined under EU law and 
differs from that of the Ultimate Beneficial Owner (UBO) as set out in Directive (EU) 2015/849 (4 
Anti Money Laundering Directive, AMLD).  

47 

 
 
 
in case of a consortium, the name of individual members of a consortium with the Orbis 
database. Thus, the number of companies listed in the submissions increased to 5 745. 

In  its  analysis,  the  Commission  services  identified  the  GUO  for  4 339  out  of  5 745 
companies listed in FSR submissions and found that for 3 310 (58%) companies listed in 
submissions, the GUO was established in the EU, 1 029 companies listed in submissions 
(18%) had their GUO based in a third country. For the remaining 1 406 (24%) companies 
listed in submissions identifying the GUO was not possible, as the data was not retrievable 
in the Orbis database.  

For  GUOs  from  third  countries,  235  companies  listed  in  submissions  had  their  GUO 
established in the United States (4.1 % of the total), 146 in the United Kingdom (2.5 %), 
106 in Switzerland (1.9 %), 86 in Japan (1.5 %), 83 in Türkiye (1.4 %) 54 in China (0.9 %), 
48 in India (0.8%), 45 in Norway (0.7%), 21 in Canada and in South Korea (0.3%).  

5.2.4.2.2. 

Qualitative assessment of the Commission’s case practice 

This  section  describes  the  practical  experience  of  the  Commission  services  in  handling 
FSR submissions in the context of public procurement procedures with the aim of assessing 
the effectiveness of predefined FSR concepts and practices.  

a)  Compliance with the reporting obligation  

The  FSR  sets  out  a  framework  to  notify  FFCs  received  by  economic  operators  under 
specific  conditions  when  participating  in  large  public  procurement  procedures.  These 
conditions  clarify  the  temporal  and  personal  scope  of  the  reporting  obligation.  The 
collection of data on FFCs is the responsibility of economic operators which relies on self-
assessment, as  economic operators are required to screen their own finances to identify 
FFCs listed by way of example in Article 3(2) FSR and to consider whether these fall under 
any of the exceptions listed in Section B (6) of Form FS-PP. 

On the basis of the above, the following findings can be made: 

First, on the temporal scope of the reporting obligation, stakeholder feedback to the public 
consultation and the Practitioners’ Survey indicates that economic operators often find it 
difficult to report on FFCs that were granted in the current financial year as consolidated 
data is often unavailable. 

Second, stakeholder feedback to the public consultation and the Practitioners’ Survey also 
notes challenges stemming from the scope of the reporting obligation, which covers the 
economic  operator  itself,  its  holding  companies,  and  subsidiary  companies  without 
commercial  autonomy,  but  excludes  ‘sister  companies’.  In  practice,  companies  usually 
publish consolidated financial statements at the level of the parent company, covering the 
entire corporate group, including entities that fall outside the specific scope of the reporting 
obligation. As a result, economic operators may not have immediate access to FFC data at 
the  level  of  individual  entities.  Extracting  entity-specific  financial  information  can 
therefore be challenging, particularly under time constraints at the time of the notification. 
In addition, the exclusion of sister companies may create data gaps and reduce the overall 
representativeness of the collected information. It may also require economic operators to 
provide additional justification for ringfenced FFCs (77). 

(77) 

Section  2.5.1  Communication  from  the  Commission  –  Guidelines  on  the  application  of  certain 
provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign 
subsidies distorting the internal market, C/2026/42.  

48 

 
 
 
Third,  according  to  the  FSR  Review  Study,  self-assessment  by  economic  operators 
exposed significant deficiencies in the completeness and quality of notifications. Based on 
the  Commission  services’  experience,  submissions  appeared  frequently  incomplete, 
provided  in  non-standardised  formats,  or  omitted  essential  information,  including 
ownership structures, financial statement, or appropriate description of FFCs granted to 
holding companies or subsidiary companies without commercial autonomy.  

Fourth, in terms of reporting obligation, stakeholder feedback to the public consultation 
and the Practitioners’ Survey also indicated that economic operators – including SMEs and 
economic  operators  that  are  active  only  locally  –  are  often  required  by  Form  FS-PP  to 
provide detailed information, even where such information  has limited  relevance to  the 
substantive assessment, creating a compliance burden for these economic operators that, 
in turn, generates administrative work for the Commission services. 

Finally, while the FSIR allows for the possibility of requesting a waiver to submit certain 
information  required  by  Form  FS-PP (78),  this  option  is  available  only  during  the  pre-
notification phase. The FSR Review Study indicates that, due to time constraints, economic 
operators often do not have the possibility to engage in pre-notification contacts, therefore 
limiting their practical effectiveness in reducing unnecessary reporting. 

b)  Origin, type and amounts of FFCs 

Commission  services’  experience  and  the  FSR  Review  Study  findings  revealed  limited 
insights into FFCs based on FS-PP forms. The main reasons for this are limited awareness 
and limited level of compliance of economic operators with the reporting obligation. As 
described in Section a), submitted FS-PP forms often lack minimum information required 
and do not capture all notifiable FFCs, declarations often do not contain any FFCs, and 
economic  operators  often  submit  declarations  when  a  notification  should  have  been 
submitted (79).  Furthermore,  Table  1  of  Form  FS-PP  –  which  is  the  most  used  form  to 
declare notifiable FFCs  – requires submission of information on FFCs  by third country 
within set ranges (80). According to the Commission services’ analysis, this allows neither 
the quantification of individual FFCs, nor the possibility of making average calculations 
in a conclusive manner by FFC type, because the indicated ranges are too broad in both 
cases. 

Despite limited overall information, the FSR Review Study analysed a sample of 30 cases 
with  a  total  of  42  submissions  (nine  notifications  and  33  declarations)  to  gain  a  more 
granular insight. Only a minority of submissions clearly indicated that the included FFC 
information was granted to the notifying party (or parties), to their holding companies and 
subsidiaries. In most submissions, FFCs granted to group entities other than the notifying 
party within the scope of Article 28(1)(b) FSR were missing. 

(78) 
(79) 

(80) 

See recital 6 of the Introduction to the Form FS-PP of FSIR 
According to Article 29(1) FSR, ‘Where the conditions for the notification of financial contributions 
in  accordance  with  Article 28(1)  and (2)  are  met,  economic  operators  participating  in  a  public 
procurement procedure, shall notify the contracting authority or contracting entity of all foreign 
financial contributions as defined in Article 28(1), point (b). In all other cases, economic operators 
shall list in a declaration all foreign financial contributions received and confirm that the foreign 
financial contributions received are not notifiable in accordance with Article 28(1), point (b)’.  
Table 1 of the Form FS-PP requires economic operators to list the FFCs using the following ranges: 
‘EUR 45-100  million’,  ‘ EUR  > 100-500  million ’,  ‘ EUR  > 500-1 000  million ’,  ‘ more  than 
EUR 1 000 million.  

49 

 
 
 
Furthermore,  none  of  the  nine  notifications  reported  FFCs  that  could  fall  under 
Article 5(1), points (a) to (c) and (e) FSR (81). All nine forms included FFCs that do not 
fall into Article 5 FSR. Eight of those nine submissions contained FFC details in Table 1 
in Form FS-PP. In the remaining submission, Table 1 was intentionally left blank, because 
the contributions were considered exempt under Section B (6) of Form FS-PP (82). 

In  the  eight  cases  where  Table  1  was  completed,  economic  operators  notified  having 
received  on  average  11.4  different  FFCs  from  2.8  countries.  The  third  countries  which 
provided those FFCs included Benin, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, India, Iraq, Japan, Libya, 
North  Macedonia,  Norway,  Philippines,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  Serbia,  Singapore, 
Switzerland,  Taiwan,  Türkiye,  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
United  States  (including  Puerto  Rico).  The  types  of  FFCs  in  these  tables  included  tax 
advantages,  fiscal  incentives,  purchase  of  goods  and  services,  grants,  financing 
instruments,  overdraft  facilities,  automatic  direct  debit  systems,  guarantees  and  loans. 
Aggregate estimated value ranges per country were also provided in tables.  

c)  The Commission’s RfI practice  

Based  on  the  FSR  Review  Study,  the  Commission  services  often  use  requests  for 
information (‘RfIs’) during the preliminary review. Due to continued lack of awareness of 
economic operators about their own reporting obligation, these RfIs serve to clarify various 
aspects  of  Form  FS-PP  or  to  request  information  that  appears  to  be  missing,  e.g. 
information known from publicly available sources that should have been included in Form 
FS-PP. In this regard, the Commission services’ case practice shows limited use of pre-
notification contacts prior to submission. 

According to the analysis of the FSR Review Study, focusing on a limited sample of 30 
cases, an average of 1.75 RfIs were issued per case under the public procurement procedure 
of  the  FSR.  Each  RfI  included  on  average  three  questions,  although  with  significant 
variation ranging from one to ten questions. In cases where multiple RfIs were issued, later 
requests followed up on unresolved issues from previous ones and added new questions. 
The average deadline was four working days after the date of request, and the median was 
four working days as well, with a range from two to eight working days. 

The data on replies to RfIs and response timing assessed by the FSR Review Study showed 
considerable  differences  in  compliance.  In  some  cases,  the  replies  were  complete  and 
addressed the questions raised in the RfIs. In others, key information was missing, which 
triggered a follow-up RfI.  

The main topics covered in the RfIs concerned the ownership structure of groups, details 
of FFCs, potentially notifiable FFCs not reported, financial statements or yearly reports or 
most recent FFCs. 

d)  Procedural timelines 

The FSR Review Study notes that the 20-working-day deadline for the preliminary review 
under Article 30(2) FSR is often challenging, particularly in cases where the Commission 
envisages adopting a decision on incompleteness, on opening an in-depth investigation or 
on the imposition of fines. Because of formal and substantive shortcomings of submissions 
the  Commission  services  often  spend  a  significant  part  of  the  preliminary  review  on 
gathering data that should have been included in the initial notification. In practice, this 
requires sending RfIs with deadlines of typically 3–5 working days. For large corporations 

(81) 

(82)  

Article 5(1) FSR provides for the categories of foreign subsidies that are more likely to distort the 
internal market. 
Section B (6) of Form FS-PP provides a list of FFCs types that do not need to be included in Table 
1 and are therefore exempted from the reporting obligation.  

50 

 
 
with worldwide holdings and subsidiaries, providing the requested information within such 
a timeframe is  challenging. These difficulties are further compounded when  RfIs target 
entities that are established in third countries, with differing time zones, working practices, 
and  legal  frameworks  that  render  coordination  operationally  time-consuming  for  both 
economic operators and the Commission services. 

Similarly, as the FSR Review Study indicates, the tight timeline for in-depth investigations 
limits  the  time  for  substantive  analysis.  In  particular,  the  110-day  period  pursuant  to 
Article 30(5) FSR for such investigations is operationally challenging.  

5.2.4.3.  Enhanced legal guidance and procedural support  

The  Commission  services  is  actively  refining  and  deploying  a  coherent  set  of 
administrative  measures  and  tools  to  ensure  their  effective  and  timely  handling.  This 
includes  the  establishment  of  a  dedicated  notification  and  registration  system,  which 
supports streamlined processing and improved traceability. 

Over the past three years, the Commission services have focused mainly on strengthening 
procedural and legal guidance for stakeholders, and on developing IT systems tailored to 
the FSR.  

The Commission services have stepped up its efforts to make it easier for stakeholders to 
navigate the FSR and to clarify their legal obligations and the applicable procedures. This 
has brought a dual result: (i) reducing the volume of queries received, and (ii) facilitating 
more  efficient  and  streamlined 
interactions  between  Commission  services  and 
stakeholders.  

Through  a  dedicated  functional  mailbox,  the  Commission  receives  queries  both  from 
contracting  authorities  as  well  as  from  economic  operators:  on  average  20  queries  per 
month about legal interpretation and approximately 45 per month on procedural aspects. 
An average response time of 24 hours is maintained for procedural queries to ensure timely 
and  reliable  guidance.  Response  time  to  substantive  queries  about  legal  interpretation 
varies  on  the  complexity  of  the  question,  not  exceeding  a  maximum  15  working  day 
response time. 
As the primary entry point for stakeholders, the official website of DG GROW on FSR is 
continuously  updated  to  provide  information  and  guidance  that  is  clear,  comprehensive 
and accessible (83). 

Building  on  the  experience  gained  during  the  FSR  implementation,  the  dedicated 
webpages  for  contracting  authorities ( 84)  and  economic  operators ( 85)  now  offer  more 
detailed legal guidance (e.g. on the timing for submitting Forms FS-PP in relation to the 
public  procurement  procedure  at  stake).  The  online  ‘Practical  Information’  section  has 
been  expanded  since  the  beginning  of  this  year  to  address  recurring  stakeholders’ 
questions.  

In  order  to  facilitate  submissions,  the  Commission  services  developed  a  standardised 
online  Form  FS-PP  that  became  available  in  all  EU  languages.  It  enables  economic 
operators  to  fill  out  Form  FS-PP  online  that  respect  all  formal  requirements  while 
maintaining confidentiality of sensitive financial information. 

(83) 
(84) 

(85) 

DG GROW website – Foreign subsidies regulation.  
DG  GROW  website  –  Guidance  for  contracting  authorities  -  Internal  Market,  Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs. 
DG  GROW  website  –  Guidance  for  economic  operators  -  Internal  Market,  Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs. 

51 

 
 
Furthermore, the Commission services has developed integrated and secure IT systems for 
case handling, while minimising the risk of data breaches.  Case@EC (a comprehensive 
case management case management platform) and EU SEND (a secure messaging system 
for stakeholder communication) are designed to support smooth administrative handling. 
Both systems implement robust access controls, role-based permissions, and secure data 
storage  protocols,  reinforcing  the  integrity,  reliability,  and  security  of  the  Commission 
services’ operations.  

Taken  together,  these  measures  enhance  transparency,  facilitate  compliance,  reduce 
uncertainty, and enable contracting authorities and companies to manage procedures more 
efficiently while fulfilling their obligations under the Regulation. 

5.2.4.4.  Engagement of Member States in FSR enforcement 

While the Commission is solely responsible for enforcing the FSR, it fostered a network 
of national contact points (‘NCPs’) to facilitate dialogue with Member States, in line with 
Recital 58  FSR.  NCPs  act  as  the  primary  interface  between  the  Commission  and 
contracting  authorities,  serving  both  as  multipliers  of  information  and  as  channels  for 
feedback to the Commission.  

Member States appointed NCPs in 2023. DG GROW and DG COMP convened two joint 
online  meetings,  on  24  January  2024  and  on  16  December  2024,  ensuring  coordinated 
expertise across the public procurement and concentrations modules.  

Building  on  cooperation  with  the  NCPs  and  with  a  view  to  further  consolidating 
coordination on FSR-public procurement, the Commission went on to set up a dedicated 
Expert Group (86) in December 2025. Bringing together these NCPs, this forum underpins 
the primary role of Member States to provide guidance and expertise in the Regulation’s 
implementation, while keeping them regularly informed, fostering a shared understanding 
of the legal framework, and facilitating dialogue on enforcement. The Expert Group also 
functions as a platform to harmonise different practices, by offering practical insights and 
identifying gaps or areas in need of clarification. It contributes to enhancing compliance 
by  embedding  the  FSR  in  national  procurement  practices,  as  well  as  raising  awareness 
among public bodies.  

To  draw  on  the  expertise  of  the  Expert  Group  on  FSR-Public  Procurement,  the 
Commission holds two meetings per year, one in person and one online six months later. 
The first one took place on 19 January 2026, and the second one is scheduled  for June 
2026.  

5.2.4.5.  Feedback from stakeholders 

In the context of the public consultation, stakeholders generally agree with the importance 
of  the  notification  system  for  public  procurement  procedures,  noting  that  it  enables  the 
Commission  services  to  effectively  identify  and  address  potentially  distortive  foreign 
subsidies  in  the  context  of  large  public  procurement  procedures.  At  the  same  time, 
respondents  emphasise  that  the  current  notification  and  declaration  reporting  system 
generates  an  administrative  burden  for  bidding  economic  operators  that  is  perceived  as 
disproportionate vis-à-vis the risk of distortion identified so far in the internal market. 

(86) 

European  Commission’s  Register  of  Commission  Expert  Groups  and  Other  Similar  Entities  – 
Informal  Commission  Expert  Group  on  Foreign  Subsidies  Regulation  –  Public  Procurement 
(E04021). 

52 

 
 
(a) 

Positive aspects identified by stakeholders 

Stakeholders  from  the  international  trade  in  services  sector,  emphasised  the  value  of 
regular interaction, viewing it as an important link between the Commission and the private 
sector. Within the industrial landscape, several trade associations have been particularly 
positive about the overall objectives of the public procurement module of FSR, describing 
it  as  a  ‘key  tool’  for  ensuring  a  level  playing  field  within  the  EU  procurement  market. 
These  associations  acknowledged  the  legitimacy  and  clarity  of  the  public  procurement 
module and commended the Commission’s efficiency.  

In particular, the Commission services’ ability to provide fast, accurate replies and to close 
preliminary reviews within 20 working days has been noted by stakeholders as a significant 
procedural strength that enhances legal certainty for economic operators.  
In addition, in the public consultation (87), respondents were asked how appropriate of the 
thresholds are, including both the jurisdictional threshold of a turnover of EUR 250 million 
and the notification threshold for FFCs. Overall, 48% of the respondents did not advocate 
for an increase or decrease in the thresholds, indicating a broad level of acceptance of the 
current framework.  

Figure 13: Respondents' views on threshold appropriateness of thresholds 

Support 
increasing 
thresholds; 
20; 
37%

Support 
decreasing 
thresholds; 
8;
15%

No opinion; 
16; 
30%

Support 
current 
thresholds; 
10; 
18%

Source: Commission services. 

Finally, in terms of effects on participation into public procurement procedures, only 26% 
of respondents to the public consultation observed a reduction in participation by both EU- 
and non-EU-based companies. At the same time, 41% of respondents had no firm view on 
the FSR’s effect on the participation of third-country economic operators, and a further 
26%  considered  it  too  early  to  assess  the  FSR’s  impact  in  this  respect.  While  some 
respondents  suggested  that  perceived  reductions  in  participation  may  be  linked  to 
administrative  burdens  associated  with  the  FSIR  reporting  obligations  or  to  concerns 
relating  to  potential  scrutiny  under  the  regime,  the  overall  distribution  of  responses 
indicates that a majority of stakeholders either do have not observed such effects or are not 
yet in a position to assess them. 

(b) 

Challenges raised by stakeholders 

Conversely,  the  practical  application  of  the  FSR  has  revealed  substantial  bottlenecks, 
primarily concerning the administrative burden of the Regulation. Trade associations have 
largely  characterised  reporting  obligations  as  ‘administratively  burdensome’  and  overly 
complex,  questioning  the  proportionality  of  the  system  given  the  high  volume  of 
submissions compared to the relatively low number of in-depth investigations initiated so 

(87) 

See the European Commission’s public consultation on the Commission Have your say portal. 

53 

 
 
far. A majority of stakeholders (57%) find the reporting obligations unclear. Form FS-PP 
is  also  widely  criticised  for  its  complexity,  with  37%  of  respondents  calling  for 
simplification  and  22%  describing  it  as  difficult  to  understand.  To  mitigate  this, 
associations have proposed narrowing the definition of FFCs and simplifying reporting for 
consortia, which are required to aggregate the amounts of FFCs received by each member 
undertaking.  

Furthermore, there is a noted lack of awareness among contracting authorities about their 
duties, leading  trade  associations to  call for a more comprehensive Q&A to  bridge this 
knowledge  gap.  International  trade  associations  also  pointed  to  a  lack  of  guidance  at 
national  level,  which  has  led  to  inconsistent  practices  among  various  contracting 
authorities across the EU. This was also reflected in the public consultation, where a large 
majority of respondents (61%) highlighted the need for a clearer and more precise text of 
the FSR and the FSIR to enable contracting authorities to understand their obligations. 

The feedback by chambers of commerce representing third-country businesses has been 
relatively  critical,  citing  high  compliance  costs  and  a  lack  of  transparency  that  forces 
frequent,  burdensome  internal  due  diligence  exercises  to  collect  FFC  data  on  a  rolling 
basis. These stakeholders have suggested various changes both to the FSR and the FSIR, 
including  increasing  the  FFC  thresholds,  excluding  certain  types  of  FFCs  relating  to 
turnover – such as that from the sale of goods and services without alternative sources of 
supply – and limiting the geographical scope of reporting to specific countries, providing 
clearer  guidance  on  waivers  and  minimising  administrative  burden  on  SMEs  and  on 
economic operators that do not engage in any economic activity in third countries.  

Finally,  specific  concerns  were  raised  by  other  trade  associations  about  the  ‘systematic 
risk’  of  operators  continuing  to  bid  for  new  contracts  while  under  an  active  in-depth 
investigation, leading to calls for stricter monitoring obligations to prevent ongoing market 
distortion during the investigative process. 

5.2.4.6.  The FSR Review Study  

The FSR Review Study, in addition to the statistical overview of all cases, reviewed the 
Commission’s practice through its three in-depth investigations, two irregularity decisions 
as  well  as  a  sample  of  30  cases  for  which  no  decision  was  required.  The  assessment 
provides conclusions on Articles 3, 4 and 5 FSR interpreted in the light of Chapter 4 FSR 
on public procurement procedures (88). 

The FSR Review Study found that the Commission services applied in a consistent and 
structured  manner  the  concepts  under  Article 3  FSR,  which  identifies  a  list  of  FFCs, 
including  grants,  loans,  guarantees,  tax  measures,  public  contracts  and  intra-group 
transactions and assessed benefit, specificity and attribution to a third country. The FSR 
Review  Study  found,  for  in-depth  cases  specifically  that  incomplete  information  meant 
that the Commission services had to make cautious inferences, applying the ‘best evidence 
available’ approach under Article 16 FSR on non-cooperation. 

An assessment of how Article 4 FSR is applied to detecting distortion revealed that the 
Commission services applied Article 4(1) FSR indicators consistently across all decisions, 
following the procedure set out by the FSR Guidelines. This also applies to cases where 
incomplete  information  submitted  by  the  economic  operators  resulted  in  reliance  on 
Article 16 FSR.  

(88) 

The assessment pursuant to Article 3, 4 and 27 FSR did not take place in the cases that resulted in 
a  decision  declaring  a  tender  irregular,  as  these  cases  focus  on  the  completing  of  missing 
information on FFCs, rather than a substantive assessment of the FFCs notified. 

54 

 
 
The  findings  of  the  FSR  Review  Study  on  the  notification  thresholds  set  out  in 
Article 28(1) and (2) FSR are summarised together with the Commission services’ findings 
in Section (e). Economic operators displayed significant and recurring misunderstandings 
of  Article 28(1)(b)  FSR  relating  to  the  FFC  threshold,  including  confusion  about  the 
calculation of the aggregate amount of FFCs received (89). In this context, the requirements 
of Table 1 of Form FS-PP were often not met by economic operators and some economic 
operators refused to provide replies to RfIs. The main issues were linked to the lack of 
evidence  on  the  ring-fencing  of  FFCs  (i.e.  their  clear  segregation  across  entities)  and, 
consequently,  to  insufficient  information  on  FFCs  provided  to  entities  outside  of  the 
vertical line of control of the economic operator, as well as to the incorrect application of 
the exceptions and misunderstandings about the relevant date for reporting. 

The FSR Review Study found that on the basis of the sampled cases, the Commission’s 
practice on procedural rules timelines pursuant to Article 29 and 30 FSR was consistent, 
that its assessment respected 20 working days for preliminary review in open procedures, 
and that it suspended the preliminary review in case of multi-stage procedures. Further to 
that,  the  FSR  Review  Study  did  not  assess  the  Commission’s  practice  in  extending  the 
timeline of the preliminary review or in-depth investigation, as the first deadline extension 
in an in-depth investigation took place after conclusion of the FSR Review Study. 

Overall,  the  FSR  Review  Study  found  that  early  public  procurement  case  practice 
demonstrates that the Commission services have applied the FSR in a structured, coherent 
and  cautious  manner.  As  the  FSR  Review  Study  concludes,  the  main  operational 
challenges  arise  from  incomplete  or  incorrect  submissions  by  economic  operators. 
Therefore,  potential  targeted  streamlining  of  the  reporting  obligation  and  additional 
guidance  and  awareness  raising  both  on  substantive  and  technical  aspects  of  the 
notifications  under  the  public  procurement  module  of  FSR  may  further  enhance  its 
effectiveness. 

5.2.4.7.  The Commission’s assessment 

The  Commission’s  early  enforcement  of  the  FSR  public  procurement  module  offers 
valuable insights into its effectiveness to address distortive foreign subsidies and safeguard 
fair competition in the internal market. Overall, early practice indicates that the framework 
is operational and achieving its core objectives, while also revealing areas where further 
refinement would be useful. 

First,  as regards  efficiency,  while the number of  submissions received has significantly 
exceeded initial expectations (90), only a limited proportion of cases have required further 
scrutiny. To date, the Commission has opened four in-depth investigations, one of which 
resulted in a decision with commitments, while three closed following the withdrawal of 
the economic operators. In addition, the Commission has declared two tender’s irregular, 

(89) 

(90) 

Pursuant to Article 28(1)(b) FSR, the FSR notification threshold is met when the economic operator, 
including  its  subsidiary  companies  without  commercial  autonomy,  its  holding  companies,  and, 
where applicable, its main subcontractors and suppliers involved in the same tender was granted 
aggregate  FFCs  of  at  least  EUR  4  million  per  third  country  in  the  three  years  preceding  the 
notification.  
See Commission Staff Working Document – Impact Assessment. Accompanying the Proposal for 
a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  foreign  subsidies  distorting  the 
internal market, SWD(2021) 99 final: indicating that for a threshold of EUR 250 million, there may 
be up to 36 cases per year, for a threshold of EUR 500 million up to 13 cases. This is due to various 
reasons, which include the lack of reliable data due to the shortcomings of the TED database at the 
time  of  the  impact  assessment,  as  well  as  several  years  of  continuously  high  inflation  that 
substantially increased the price of public projects. 

55 

 
 
 
opened one ex-officio investigation that is currently in preliminary review stage and issued 
one request for prior notification (call-in).  

Although these figures may raise questions about the FSR’s proportionality, it is important 
to interpret them in light of its deterrent effect. Early enforcement suggests that the FSR is 
already influencing market behaviour as in several cases the Commission services have 
observed  that  economic  operators  may  choose  to  bid  only  in  procedures  below  the 
EUR 250 million threshold, refrain from participating in certain tenders, participate only 
as  subcontractors  or  suppliers  rather  than  as  consortium  members  or  withdraw  from 
ongoing procurement procedures, often in the face of potential scrutiny. This appears to 
reflect a reluctance on the part of certain economic operators to subject themselves to FSR 
review, rather than a response to the administrative burden of the FSR. Withdrawals seem 
to suggest that FSR may be functioning as a targeted filter for economic operators that are 
reluctant to disclose information on received FFCs. Such effects indicate that the FSR is 
capable  of  achieving  its  purpose  in  fostering  fairer  competition  not  only  through  direct 
enforcement, but also indirectly without formal intervention. 

Second, the Commission’s ability to conclude preliminary reviews within the 20-working-
day deadline and deliver accurate assessments despite the high volume of submissions has 
been widely recognised as an important procedural success, enhancing legal certainty for 
economic  operators  and  stakeholders,  while  ensuring  timely  progress  for  contracting 
authorities in their public procurement procedures. In parallel, early case practice shows 
that  the  Commission  services  have  applied  the  FSR  in  a  carefully  calibrated  manner, 
notwithstanding the novelty and, in some respects, the complexity of the legal framework. 

This  consistent approach has been further reinforced through the Commission services’ 
growing understanding of market dynamics across critical sectors. In particular, based on 
the  CPV  categorisation  and  the  notifications  submitted  by  economic  operators,  the 
Commission has progressively built a robust knowledge base on market developments and 
on the sectors most prone to the presence of FFCs. The recurring appearance of similar 
companies  and  similar  types  of  FFCs  within  each  sector  has  in  turn  enabled  the 
Commission  services  to  develop  a  sector-based  approach  to  cases,  thereby  further 
strengthening consistency in case handling.  

Third,  the  Commission  services  have  made  sustained  efforts  to  enhance  clarity  and 
cooperation  with  stakeholders.  Through  the  establishment  of  NCPs,  the  creation  of  a 
dedicated  Expert  Group,  and  the  continuous  strengthening  of  procedural  and  legal 
guidance, the Commission services have sought to facilitate compliance and foster a shared 
understanding  of the  framework. These efforts are particularly important  in  light of the 
identified  issue  of  the  contracting  authorities  potentially  lacking  awareness  of  FSR 
obligations  and the  non-notification by  economic  operators.  Furthermore,  strengthening 
the  digital  dimension  of  case-handling  tools  reflects  a  clear  commitment  to  greater 
transparency and more efficient case management.  

At the same time, early practice has highlighted several challenges that affect the overall 
efficiency,  proportionality  and  clarity  of  the  system.  Lack  of  clarity  can  give  rise  to  a 
degree  of  legal  uncertainty  for  economic  operators  and  may  add  complexity  to  the 
Commission’s assessment, potentially lengthening the process if it is required to request 
missing  information.  A  major  concern  relates  to  the  administrative  burden  imposed  on 
economic  operators.  Stakeholders  frequently  point  to  the  broad  scope  of  the  reporting 
obligation, the perceived inadequacy of thresholds, and the complexity and lack of clarity 
of the FS-PP forms, which can result in disproportionate reporting requirements, including 

56 

 
for  companies  that  may  not  be  the  primary  targets  of  the  FSR.  These  difficulties  are 
compounded by practical challenges in identifying, collecting and reporting FFCs. Since 
the collection of data on FFCs is based on the self-assessment of economic operators, they 
are required to screen their own finances to identify FFCs and consider whether these fall 
under any of the exceptions listed in Section B (6) of Form FS-PP. As a result, submissions 
are often initially incorrect or incomplete and thereby insufficient for a proper assessment.  

These  considerations  have  direct  implications  for  the  effectiveness  of  the  FSR.  The 
Commission  services  are  frequently  required  to  devote  significant  time  during  the 
preliminary  review  phase  to  gathering  missing  information.  As  a  result  of  the  lack  of 
practical use of pre-notification contacts shortcomings linked to submissions can only be 
addressed  during  the  preliminary  review,  which  strains  the  Commission’s  assessment. 
Furthermore, the absence of a ‘stop-the-clock’ mechanism, combined with tight timelines 
for both preliminary reviews and in-depth investigations, further constrains the ability of 
the  Commission  to  carry  out  thorough  substantive  assessments,  particularly  in  more 
complex cases.  

In addition, the Commission services note that economic operators that are subject to the 
FSR reporting obligation on a recurrent basis face an additional administrative burden. In 
this context, the 40 economic operators that submitted the most FS-PP forms submitted on 
average  16.8  submissions  during  the  reference  period  (approximately  two  years  from 
October  2023  until  January  2026),  that  is  on  average  8.4  submissions  per  year.  In  this 
regard, the Commission services note that introducing a single submission that would be 
updated twice a year (instead of individual submissions), or systematically using waivers 
for  this  purpose  could  have  resulted  in  160  submissions  in  total  instead  of  672,  which 
would lead to a decrease of approximately 76% in the number of submissions among the 
40 economic operators submitting the highest number of notifications. 

Moreover,  while  progress  has  been  made  in  enhancing  transparency  and  providing 
guidance, stakeholders continue to call for further clarification of key FSR legal concepts 
and more comprehensive support. Such improvements are considered necessary to address 
inconsistencies in implementation and to enhance overall predictability and legal certainty 
in the Commission’s practice. 

In  conclusion,  early  enforcement  demonstrates  that  the  FSR  is  already  contributing  to 
safeguarding fair competition in public procurement by enabling the detection and scrutiny 
of  potentially  distortive  foreign  subsidies.  Nevertheless,  the  experience  gained  so  far 
underscores the need to consider targeted improvements, especially streamline reporting 
obligations, enhance the quality and completeness of submissions, increase transparency 
and further strengthen guidance and cooperation with contracting authorities and economic 
operators. Addressing these challenges will be essential to ensure that the FSR operates in 
a proportionate, predictable and fully effective manner. 

5.3. 

Developments in third countries’ subsidy control systems 

5.3.1. 

Introduction 

This  chapter  examines  developments  in  third  countries’  subsidy  control  systems,  as 
referred to in Article 52 FSR. The aim of this analysis is to ensure that the way in which 
the FSR is applied remains responsive to evolving global economic and legal conditions. 

In this context, the Commission is required to monitor and assess developments in subsidy 
control  frameworks  outside  the  Union,  as  they  may  affect  the  effectiveness  and 
proportionality of the FSR. Such monitoring enables the Commission to determine whether 

57 

 
the assumptions underlying the FSR continue to hold true and whether adjustments may 
be necessary to preserve a level playing field within the internal market. 

This chapter has been developed drawing mostly on the research and analysis carried out 
in the FSR Review Study. 

5.3.2.  Analysis  

This section reviews developments in a number of key jurisdictions: Canada, PRC, Japan, 
Switzerland, Türkiye, UAE, the United Kingdom and the United States. These jurisdictions 
have been selected due to their significant economic engagement with the Union, including 
trade, investment flows, mergers and acquisitions, and participation in public procurement. 
As such, their subsidy practices are particularly relevant for assessing potential distortions 
of competition within the EU internal market. 

A central finding of this review is that the EU remains unique in operating a comprehensive 
and cross-sectoral State aid control system. The EU framework combines both ex ante and 
ex post elements: it allows for the prior screening of potentially distortive subsidies before 
they are granted, while also providing mechanisms to address subsidies that may escape 
initial scrutiny. This dual structure ensures a high level of oversight and legal certainty. 
The frameworks in EEA countries and EU accession candidates, while often aligned or 
influenced by the EU model, are generally less extensive or not as fully integrated. 

By  contrast,  none  of  the  other  jurisdictions  examined  has  put  in  place  a  similarly 
comprehensive system based on independent ex ante control. While certain countries have 
taken steps toward greater regulation of subsidies, these efforts remain limited in scope or 
fragmented in design. 

The  United  Kingdom  represents,  amongst 
the  closest 
approximation  to  the  EU  model.  Its  subsidy  control  regime,  introduced  following  its 
withdrawal  from  the  EU,  incorporates  a  set  of  substantive  principles  and  provides  for 
oversight mechanisms. However, it does not replicate the EU system of prior notification 
and approval and therefore lacks an equivalent level of ex ante control. 

the  countries  analysed, 

In other jurisdictions, developments have been more partial or sector specific. Switzerland, 
for example, has introduced forms of subsidy screening in particular areas such as aviation, 
but does not operate a unified, cross-sectoral regime. Türkiye has explored the introduction 
of  a  subsidy  control  framework  through  legislative  initiatives,  yet  a  fully  functioning 
notification,  assessment,  or  recovery  system  comparable  to  the  EU’s  has  not  been 
implemented to date. 

Elsewhere, subsidy control continues to be addressed through alternative or indirect means. 
The United States does not operate, nor has taken steps to implement, at either the federal 
or sub-federal level, a subsidy control regime comparable to the EU State aid framework. 
China  does  not  operate,  nor  has  taken  steps  to  implement  a  subsidy  control  system 
comparable  to  the  EU’s.  In  addition  to  not  taking  measures  to  place  an  independent 
mechanism for the systematic oversight of subsidies, public sources indicate that China 
continues to pursue an active industrial policy with large-scale subsidisation representing 
one of its core components (91). Canada and Japan also lack centralised ex ante screening 
systems, instead addressing subsidies through more limited or ad hoc tools, for instance 
within  the  context  of  sectoral  regulation  or  public  finance  and  administrative  control 
measures. 

At the international level, both bilateral and multilateral developments remain relatively 
modest. The EU has included subsidy-related provisions in several free trade agreements 

(91) 

OECD (2026), OECD MAGIC Database of Industrial Subsidies, OECD Publishing, Paris. 

58 

 
 
with  these  jurisdictions,  although  these  provisions  vary  in  scope  and  enforceability. 
Agreements  such  as  the  EU–Canada  Comprehensive  Economic  and  Trade  Agreement 
(CETA) and the EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) primarily emphasise 
transparency and cooperation, with limited binding constraints. The EU–United Kingdom 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) goes further by setting up a dedicated subsidy 
control framework, yet it does not include an EU-style ex ante approval mechanisms. 

At the multilateral level, discussions within the WTO have not resulted in significant new 
disciplines on subsidies since the adoption of the FSR in 2022. Progress has been largely 
confined to specific sectors, such as fisheries, and has not addressed the broader issue of 
distortive subsidies across the global economy. 

5.3.3.  Conclusion 

Overall, the analysis indicates that there has been no fundamental change in third countries’ 
subsidy control systems since the adoption of the FSR. Developments have generally been 
gradual and limited in scope, whether in the context of bilateral agreements or multilateral 
negotiations. In other words, risks related to possible distortive foreign subsidies appear 
largely unchanged. 

As  such,  these  findings  suggest  that  the  assumptions  underlying  the  FSR  remain  valid. 
Continued monitoring remains important, especially in light of evolving industrial policies 
and potential future reforms.  

On  this  basis,  the  FSR  can  be  considered  as  still  fit  for  purpose  in  addressing  foreign 
subsidies that risk distorting competition within the EU internal market. 

6. 

ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FSR 

6.1. 

FSR in general and policy objectives 

In view of the findings outlined above, the overall objective of the FSR remains valid and 
this instrument contributes positively to the preservation of the level playing field in the 
internal market. Moreover, in the absence of material developments at international level, 
which can contribute to the effective tackling of distortive foreign subsidies, which are not 
caught  by  the  traditional  trade  defence  mechanisms  of  the  Union,  the  FSR  remains 
necessary to preserve the level playing field in the internal market.  

In  terms  of  substantive  concepts,  while  some  questions  remain,  which  is  only  to  be 
expected  when  a  new  legal  framework  begins  to  be  enforced,  it  appears  premature  to 
consider  undertaking  structural  changes  of  the  FSR.  The  recent  publication  of  the  FSR 
Guidelines  has  provided  further  clarity  and  predictability  on  the  approach  taken  by  the 
Commission  when  applying  these  key  assessment  concepts,  including  assessing 
distortions,  conducting  the  balancing  test  and  exploring  the  possibility  to  call-in 
notifications. These guidelines come in addition to other initiatives such as the publication 
of  the  non-confidential  versions  of  the  adopted  final  decisions  under  the  FSR,  regular 
updates  to  the  Q&As  published  on  the  Commission’s  website  (in  the  sections  for 
‘Competition’  and  ‘Internal  Market’,  respectively),  and  the  publication  of  FSR  briefs, 
where  the  Commission’s  approach  on  specific  cases  or  policy  development  is  further 
explained. Those efforts, together with the accumulation of more case practice, are positive 
steps that will continue to contribute to the better understanding of notions specific to the 
FSR.  

59 

 
Nevertheless,  efforts  will  be  continued  to  increase  transparency,  legal  certainty  and 
predictability, by engaging with stakeholders and by continuing the practices outlined in 
Section 4.3.1.  

6.2. 

In relation to the ex officio procedure 

Based on the findings above, the role and objective of the ex officio procedure of the FSR 
is  perceived  as  positive  and  its  importance,  as  part  of  the  FSR  investigative  powers,  is 
widely acknowledged. 

The recent advancement of two ex officio cases to in-depth investigation will help bring 
more  transparency  and  better  understanding  of  the  approach  taken  by  the  Commission 
when assessing potentially distortive foreign subsidies.  

In reply to the concerns expressed with respect to the length of investigations under the ex 
officio procedure, it should be noted that the length depends on the level of complexity in 
individual cases, the degree of cooperation by the undertakings under investigation and, in 
some instances, by the actions brought by the EU Courts.  

Efforts  will  be  continued  to  increase  transparency  and  provide  further  insights  into  the 
approach to ex officio cases in line with the practices outlined in Section 4.3.1.  

6.3. 

In relation to the notification procedure for concentrations 

As  confirmed  by  the  review,  the  notification  procedure  for  concentrations  remains  an 
important element of the FSR regulatory set up, allowing the Commission to identify and 
address distortive foreign subsidies in the context of acquisitions. 

At  the  same  time,  a  significant  portion  of  the  feedback  received  in  the  context  of  the 
Stakeholders’  Consultation  focused  on  the  administrative  burden  associated  with  the 
notification system for concentrations.  

The Commission services have also carefully screened the enforcement practice to date to 
determine whether it is possible to further streamline the reporting obligation while still 
preserving the possibility for it to meaningfully review and assess notified concentrations 
for the presence of distortive foreign subsidies.  

As  identified  in  Section  5.2.3.5,  stakeholders  have  raised  concerns  related  to  (a) the 
perceived burden associated with the identification, collection and reporting of FFC and 
the scope of information required by notification forms and (b) the perceived uncertainty 
linked to possibility of call-in and deterrent effect of wide-ranging provisions: 

(a) 

Perceived burden associated with the identification, collection and reporting 
of FFCs and with the scope of information required  

In order to address this concern, it may be appropriate to consider possible adjustments to 
the  FSR  procedural  set  up.  Such  adjustments  would  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the  overall 
number of notifications and a more streamlined reporting for certain categories of cases or 
types of FFCs, which could be considered less likely to raise concern, in line with feedback 
received from stakeholders. 

Alongside any possible changes to the procedural set-up, the Commission will continue its 
effort to enhance the transparency and predictability of its enforcement practice including 
outreach activities for stakeholders. 

60 

 
(b) 

Uncertainty  linked  to  possibility  of  call-in  and  deterrent  effect  of  wide-
ranging provisions 

With regards to the perceived uncertainty linked to the Commission’s call-in powers and 
the  potential  deterrent  effect  of  this  provision  on  investment  incentives  into  the  EU,  it 
should be noted that the publication of the FSR Guidelines, combined with the evolving 
case  practice,  decrease  the  perceived  uncertainty,  without  need  for  further  targeted 
measures at this stage.  

6.4. 

In relation to notifications in public procurement procedures 

As confirmed by the review, the ex ante notification procedure for public procurement is 
an important component of the FSR framework, enabling the Commission to identify and 
address  potentially  distortive  foreign  subsidies  in  high-value  public  procurement 
procedures.  

At  the  same  time,  a  large  proportion  of  stakeholders’  feedback  focused  on  the 
administrative burden associated with the FSR filing requirements in the context of public 
procurement procedures.  

The Commission services have also carefully reviewed its enforcement practice, with  a 
view to identifying possible actions to simplify the reporting of FFCs, while preserving the 
ability to carry out a meaningful assessment of those contributions and safeguarding the 
effectiveness of the FSR public procurement procedure. 

As set out in Section 5.2.4.5, stakeholders have raised concerns related to (a) the perceived 
burden associated with the identification, collection and reporting of FFCs and the scope 
of information required by Form FS-PP; and (b) the perceived lack of awareness and clarity 
concerning  FSR  obligations,  together  with  the  need  for  greater  transparency  in  the 
enforcement practice. 

a)  Perceived burden associated with the identification, collection, reporting of FFCs 

and with the scope of information required 

To address these concerns, the Commission may consider possible adjustments to the FSR 
procedural framework informed by implementation experience and stakeholder feedback. 
Such  adjustments  could  help  focus  scrutiny  on  cases  that  are  most  likely  to  involve 
distortive foreign subsidies, while alleviating burdens in less critical situations. 

b)  Perceived lack of awareness, clarity and transparency 

Alongside any possible amendments to the procedural framework, efforts are continued to 
enhance  the  transparency  of  the  enforcement  practice.  Strengthening  awareness  and 
capacity-building  also  continue,  including  through  outreach  activities  for  contracting 
authorities, economic operators and practitioners. In parallel, the dialogue with Member 
States is further deepened through regular exchanges with the NCPs and the dedicated FSR 
Public Procurement Expert Group, with the aim of ensuring a consistent understanding of 
FSR obligations across the Union.  

Overall, these initiatives aim to bridge the gap between the regulatory framework and its 
practical  implementation,  ultimately  ensuring  higher  compliance  and  greater  legal 
certainty. 

7. 

CONCLUSION  

The FSR plays a fundamental and key role in the Union’s efforts to address distortions in 
the internal market caused by foreign subsidies. The overall objective of the FSR, which 

61 

 
is  to  prevent  distortions  in  the  internal  market  caused  by  foreign  subsidies,  is  widely 
acknowledged  and  remains  very  relevant.  The  findings  of  the  review  highlight  the 
importance of the FSR and confirm that the Regulation has been successful in capturing 
high-risk concentrations and public procurements, as demonstrated by the Commission’s 
case practice and the adopted final decisions with commitments under Chapters 3 and 4 
FSR  as  well  as  its  ongoing,  at  time  of  publication,  investigations  under  the  ex  officio 
procedure.  

In light of the stakeholders’ feedback, the Commission may consider possible adjustments 
to  the  FSR  procedural  set  up  to  reduce  the  administrative  burden  on  businesses  and 
facilitate compliance, while maintaining the FSR’s effectiveness. 

62