REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation and enforcement of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, in accordance with Article 52(2) thereof
Date: 2026-07-14
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy, application of EU law, economic concentration, foreign capital, foreign investment, merger control, public procurement, restriction on competition, single market

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 14.7.2026  COM(2026) 368 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation and enforcement of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, in accordance with Article 52(2) thereof    {SWD(2026) 183 final}  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Regulation  (EU)  2022/2560  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 
14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (1) (the ‘FSR’) was 
adopted to address distortions to the internal market caused by subsidies granted by third 
countries  to  undertakings  engaging  in  economic  activities  in  the  European  Union  (the 
‘Union’). The FSR seeks to ensure a level playing field in the internal market by enabling 
the European Commission (the ‘Commission’) to identify, assess, and, where necessary, 
redress distortive foreign subsidies.  

Before  the  adoption  of  the  FSR,  undertakings  active  in  the  Union  were  able  to  finance 
economic activities in the internal market with subsidies granted by third countries. This 
concerned  any  sector  of  the  economy  and  included,  inter  alia,  participation  in  public 
procurement procedures, acquisition of undertakings, or engaging in any other economic 
activities in the Union. Such foreign subsidies were not subject to Union State aid rules. 
The Union legal framework contained no mechanism to tackle distortions caused by these 
foreign subsidies to the internal market, as the traditional trade defence mechanisms apply 
only  to  imports  of  traded  goods.  The  FSR  was  conceived  as  a  horizontal  instrument 
complementing existing Union merger, antitrust, State aid, public procurement and trade 
policy  rules,  with  the  objective  of  preserving  fair  competition  and  the  integrity  of  the 
internal market.  

The  FSR  is  based  on  non-discriminatory  principles  and  objective  criteria.  It  covers  all 
sectors and economic activities and targets distortions caused by any foreign subsidy in the 
internal  market.  The  FSR  applies  in  full  respect  of  international  obligations.  While  the 
Commission  remains  committed  to  constructive  dialogue  and  cooperation  with  third 
country authorities and economic operators,  it will continue to use all investigative and 
procedural tools available under the FSR to ensure its effective application and safeguard 
the level playing field in the internal market. 

The purpose of this Report is to present the findings of the first review of the FSR to the 
European Parliament and the Council.  

This Report is prepared pursuant to Article 52(2) FSR, which requires the Commission to 
review how it implements and enforces the FSR, especially the application of Articles 4, 
5, 6 and 9, and the notification thresholds set out in Article 20(3), and Article 28(1) and 
(2) FSR. In the context of its review, the Commission should also report on developments 
in international relations involving third countries’ subsidy control systems. 

The FSR entered into force on 13 January 2023 and became applicable from 13 July 2023. 
The  ex  ante  notification  obligation  for  concentrations,  pursuant  to  Article  21 FSR  and 
public  procurement  procedures,  pursuant  to  Article 28 FSR,  became  applicable  from 
13 October 2023. This Report, therefore, covers the initial  three-year period in the FSR 
implementation and enforcement. 

The  FSR  is  enforced  exclusively  by  the  Commission.  DG  Competition  (DG  COMP)  is 
responsible for applying the FSR in relation to concentrations and for the general use of 
the ex officio investigative mechanism. DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship 
and  SMEs  (DG  GROW)  is  responsible  for  applying  the  FSR  in  relation  to  public 
procurement procedures and for the use of ex officio investigative mechanism linked to 
public  procurement  procedures  and  similar  forms  of  public  spending.  This  division  of 

(1) 

Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 
on  foreign  subsidies  distorting 
internal  market,  OJ  L 330,  23.12.2022,  pp. 1–45, 
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj 

the 

1 

 
 
responsibilities  reflects  the  respective  experiences  of  the  services  in  competition 
enforcement and public procurement and supports the coherent application of the FSR.  

The Commission’s review of the early days of FSR implementation and enforcement is 
based  on  a  combination  of  qualitative  and  quantitative  evidence,  including  information 
obtained  through  the  FSR  Review  Study,  conducted  by  an  external  contractor (2).  The 
review  also  takes  into  account  the  submissions  to  the  public  consultation  exercise 
conducted  by  the  Commission  (a  targeted  public  consultation,  a  public  questionnaire 
seeking  specific  feedback  in  relation  to  the  FSR  implementation,  and  a  call  for 
evidence) (3) as well as the Commission’s internal review of its practice. 

Overall, the early days of FSR implementation and enforcement show that the instrument 
is fit for purpose and contributes to its objective of preserving the level playing field in the 
internal  market.  On  the  side  of  ex  ante  notifications  for  concentrations  and  the  public 
procurements, the Commission has already launched several in-depth FSR investigations, 
some of which were concluded with  commitments offered by the parties to address the 
identified distortions to the internal market caused by foreign subsidies. On the ex officio 
side, the Commission has launched several in-depth investigations, which are ongoing at 
time  of  publication,  and  it  has  also  used  its  inspection  as  well  as  call-in  powers.  The 
objectives  of  the  FSR  are  widely  acknowledged  and  supported  in  the  feedback  from 
stakeholders.  Stakeholders  also  claimed  that  the  FSR  creates  disproportionate  costs, 
especially  in  the  context  of  the  ex  ante  notifications  procedures.  They  have  called  for 
simplification of the rules and higher legal certainty concerning certain FSR concepts.  

The accompanying Staff Working Document contains further details from the review. 

2. 

FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW  

2.1. 

Early  FSR  implementation  and  actions  of  the  Commission  to  provide 
guidance to stakeholders  

2.1.1.  Actions of the Commission 

On 10 July 2023, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1441 on 
detailed  arrangements  for  the  conduct  of  proceedings  by  the  Commission  pursuant  to 
the FSR  (‘FSIR’).  The  FSIR  also  sets  out  accompanying  forms  for  the  FSR  ex  ante 
notifications  to  the  Commission ( 4).  The  FSIR  and  the  accompanying  forms  made  it 
possible to put the notification-based enforcement procedures into practice quickly.  

Since the entry into force of the FSR, the Commission has taken multiple steps to provide 
more transparency and guidance to stakeholders, as set out in specific terms below.  

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

the  Context  of 

Multiple Mixed Framework Contract for the Provision of Expert Consultancy Services and Studies 
in 
to  Foreign  Subsidies 
Investigations  and  Enforcement  Related 
(COMP/2023/OP/0017). 
Summary report on the Public Consultation on the FSR Review Report, available at Have your say 
porta at Foreign Subsidies Review Report - public consultation . 
Annex  I  to  the  FSIR  concerns  the  Form  FS-CO  relating  to  the  notification  of  a  concentration 
pursuant to the FSR and Annex II to the FSIR concerns the Form FS-PP relating to the notification 
in the context of public procurement procedures pursuant to the FSR. The FSIR also concerned the 
rules on access to file and treatment of confidential information, transparency requirements,  rules 
for calculating time limits, and the Commission’s investigation process, including procedural details 
for proposing commitments by the undertaking under investigation. 

2 

 
 
In July 2024, a year after the FSR started applying, a Staff Working Document offering 
initial  clarifications  on  key  concepts  under  the  FSR  was  published (5).  Features  of  the 
document  included  initial  indications  on  the  interpretation  of  substantive  FSR  concepts 
and, in particular, factors to be considered in assessing whether a distortion exists, and the 
methodology applied in the balancing test. 

The Commission services regularly update a set of dedicated FSR questions and answers 
(‘FSR  Q&As’)  on  the  Commission  website (6).  These  updates  address  recurring  issues 
arising  in  practice.  They  provide  additional  guidance  on  a  range  of  topics,  including 
procedural  and jurisdictional  aspects  (such  as notification obligations,  exceptions under 
the FSIR, threshold calculations, and foreign financial contributions). 

In January 2026, the Commission published the FSR Guidelines, marking a key milestone 
in  enhancing  predictability  and  transparency  for  stakeholders (7).  The  FSR  Guidelines 
include  guidance  to  stakeholders  on  the  assessment  of  distortion  to  the  internal  market 
caused by foreign subsidies, the balancing test, and the call-in powers of the Commission 
for  concentrations  or  public  procurement  procedures  falling  below  the  established 
thresholds. 

Finally,  the  Commission  regularly  publishes  information  on  cases,  non-confidential 
versions of its decisions concluding in-depth FSR investigations (as well as summary of 
the decisions to open in-depth investigations) and dedicated FSR briefs on specific policy 
developments (such as the first 100 days of FSR enforcement (8), the FSR Guidelines (9)) 
and its case practice (such as the brief on the first final decision with commitments adopted 
under  the  concentration  chapter  of  the  FSR  in  case  FS.100011) ( 10).  In  addition,  for 
concentration  proceedings,  DG  COMP  has  a  dedicated  FSR  Registry,  which  enhances 
transparency, and informs the public about ongoing FSR concentration cases, following 
their formal notification (11).  

The Commission services also engage with Member States through a dedicated network 
of national contact points and Commission expert groups, as well as with stakeholders such 
as  legal  practitioners  and  business  associations  through  conferences  on  various  FSR-
related issues, bringing further clarity on its practice. 

2.1.2.  Results of the review 

The actions of the Commission to provide further guidance on the FSR were welcomed 
and seen as positive. The review, however, highlights areas in which stakeholders consider 
that higher legal certainty is needed, in particular for a number of substantive FSR concepts 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

(10) 

(11) 

Commission  Staff  Working  Document  –  Initial  clarifications  on  the  application  of  Article  4(1), 
Article 6 and Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal 
market, SWD(2024) 201 final. 
DG COMP website – FSR Q&As. 
DG GROW website – FSR Q&As.  
Communication  from  the  Commission  –  Guidelines  on  the  application  of  certain  provisions  of 
Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies 
distorting the internal market, C(2026) 42 final.  
Competition FSR brief (Issue 1, February 2024)  – The Foreign Subsidies Regulation – 100 days 
since the start of the notification obligation for concentrations.  
Competition FSR brief (Issue 1, March 2026) – Guidelines on the implementation of the Foreign 
Subsidies Regulation (‘FSR Guidelines') – Shedding light on key concepts.  
Competition FSR brief (Issue 1, December 2025) – The e&/PPF Telecom case – Interference on the 
foreign subsidies line to the EU.  
DG GROW is currently exploring possibilities to increase transparency of proceedings for public 
procurement while ensuring the confidentiality of national public procurement procedures. 

3 

 
 
and  the  application  of  the  analytical  framework  in  individual  cases.  Below  are  some 
specific examples.  

Regarding  the  concept  of  foreign  financial  contributions  (‘FFCs’)  from  third  country 
authorities under Article 3 FSR, stakeholders acknowledge the need for a broad definition 
of FFCs, which could encompass a wide range of measures to detect potentially distortive 
subsidies.  The  feedback,  however,  also  indicates  that  the  broad  FFC  concept  poses  a 
challenge when undertakings need to collect the relevant FFC information across multiple 
jurisdictions and determine the scope of their reportability for the purpose of their ex ante 
notifications under the FSR. 

Regarding  the  assessment  of  distortion  under  Article 4  FSR,  stakeholders  report 
difficulties in predicting how the concept is applied in individual cases. The limited body 
of Commission decisional practice at the time of the consultation activities in preparation 
of the Report is cited as a factor contributing to this uncertainty. 

Regarding the foreign subsidies most likely to distort the internal market, under Article 5 
FSR, stakeholders note that although these are seen as a useful indicator, there remains 
some uncertainty about the subsidies that ‘directly facilitate a concentration’ or enable the 
submission of ‘unduly advantageous tenders’. 

Regarding the balancing test under Article 6 FSR, the stakeholders welcome the possibility 
to have this exercise under the FSR. However, its practical relevance is deemed limited 
since there are not yet examples of how the Commission would apply the test in practice. 

2.2. 

Early FSR enforcement shows that the instrument is fit for purpose  

The Commission enforces the FSR through three main procedures:  

a)  A suspensory ex ante notification for concentrations in which at least one of the 
merging undertakings, the acquired undertaking or the joint venture is established 
in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 500 
million and the aggregate FFCs received by the parties to the concentration was 
more  than  EUR 50  million  in  the  three  years  preceding  the  conclusion  of  the 
agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling 
interest;  

b)  A suspensory ex ante notification for public procurement procedures in which 
the estimated contract value is at least EUR 250 million – or EUR 125 million for 
lot-based public procurements, and the combined FFCs of the bidding party and its 
main  subcontractors  or  suppliers  were  at  least  EUR 4  million  in  the  three  years 
before the notification. In cases in which the parties to the public procurement are 
below the EUR 4 million FFC threshold, the parties must still file a declaration.  

c)  An  ex  officio  procedure  to  investigate  all  other  market  situations,  where  the 

Commission can start an investigation on its own initiative. 

Overall, the review of early FSR enforcement shows that the instrument is fit for purpose 
and  is  working  well  in  practice.  The  Regulation  is  recognised  as  an  effective  tool  that 
addresses the regulatory gap that existed before its adoption. In addition, the objective of 
ensuring  a  level  playing  field  in  the  internal  market  is  considered  legitimate  and 
proportionate.  The  FSR  enforcement  has  progressed  steadily  since  the  start  of  its 
application, with the Commission gaining valuable experience in applying its substantive 
and procedural provisions.  

4 

 
 
 
 
2.2.1.  FSR ex officio investigations 

2.2.1.1.  Information on cases 

The Commission continuously assesses whether there is sufficient evidence to merit the 
launch of ex officio investigation, based on its own analysis, information received from 
stakeholders and investigations of market information, as applicable. 

In  two  cases,  at  time  of  publication,  the  Commission  opened  in-depth  investigations, 
pursuant to Article 10(3) FSR: 

a)  Case FS.100068 – Nuctech – on 11 December 2025, the Commission opened an 
in-depth investigation, to assess whether the activities of Nuctech in the production 
and  sale  of  threat  detection  systems  and  the  provision  of  related  services  in  the 
Union benefitted from foreign subsidies that could distort the internal market. The 
possible foreign subsidies take the form of grants and preferential tax measures and 
financing, which may have improved Nuctech’s competitive position in the internal 
market and may have negatively affected competition (12). The case was initiated 
in  April  2024  with  the  adoption  of  a  decision  requiring  Nuctech  to  submit  to 
inspections pursuant to Article 14(3) FSR (the ‘Inspection Decision’). 

b)  Case FS.100143 – Goldwind – on 3 February 2026, the Commission opened an 
in-depth investigation to assess the activities of Goldwind in the production and 
sale  of  wind  turbines  and  the  provision  of  related  services  within  the  EU.  The 
possible  foreign  subsidies  include  grants,  preferential  tax  measures,  and 
preferential  financing  in  the  form  of  loans.  The  Commission  has  preliminary 
concerns that these foreign subsidies may have improved Goldwind’s competitive 
position in the internal market and may negatively affect competition (13). 

2.2.1.2.  Review by the Union Courts 

In the context of ex officio investigations, some investigative acts of the Commission have 
been subject to review by the Union Courts: 

a)  Case T-284/24 – Nuctech – in May 2024, Nuctech brought an action for annulment 
before the General Court challenging the Commission’s Inspection Decision (14). 
At the same time, Nuctech also applied for interim measures, seeking suspension 
of  the  Commission’s  Inspection  Decision  pending  the  outcome  of  the  main 
proceedings (15). In August 2024, the President of the General Court rejected the 
application  for  interim  measures  (16),  consequently  confirmed  on  appeal  by  the 
Vice-President of the Court of Justice in March 2025 (17). At time of publication of 
this Report, the proceedings related to the action for annulment of the Inspection 
Decision remain pending before the General Court. 

(12) 

(13) 

(14) 

(15) 

(16) 

(17) 

Summary  Notice  concerning  the  initiation  of  an  in-depth  investigation  in  Case  FS.100068  – 
NUCTECH pursuant to Article 10(3)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560, OJEU C/2026/545.  
Summary  Notice  concerning  the  initiation  of  an  in-depth  investigation  in  Case  FS.100143  – 
Goldwind, pursuant to Article 10(3)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560, OJEU C/2026/1120.  
Case  T-284/24,  Nuctech  Warsaw  and  Nuctech  Netherlands  v  Commission,  OJ  C,  C/2024/4107, 
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4107/oj. 
Case  T-284/24  R,  Nuctech  Warsaw  Company  Limited  Sp. z  o.o.  and  Nuctech  Netherlands  BV  v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2024:564. 
Case  T-284/24  R,  Order  of  the  President  of  the  General  Court  of  12 August  2024,  OJ  C, 
C/2024/5824, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5824/oj. 
Case  C-720/24  P(R),  Order  of 
ECLI:EU:C:2025:205. 

the  Court  of  21 March  2025, 

the  Vice-President  of 

5 

 
 
 
 
b)  Case  T-335/26  –  Goldwind  –  in  May  2026,  Goldwind  brought  an  action  for 
annulment  before  the  General  Court  challenging  the  Commission’s  request  for 
information (18) and requested interim measures for its suspension (19). The request 
for  information  was  sent  as  part  of  the  in-depth  investigation  into  Goldwind’s 
activities  in  the  EU  wind  sector  in  Case  FS.100143.  At  time  of  publication,  the 
proceedings related to both applications remain pending before the General Court. 

2.2.1.3.  Results of the review 

The  ex  officio  procedure  allows  the  Commission  to  assess  and  address  potentially 
distortive  foreign  subsidies  affecting  any  market  situation  and  economic  activity  in  the 
internal  market.  The  results  of  the  review  indicate  that  the  ex  officio  investigation 
mechanism  functions  as  intended  and  that  the  relevant  provisions  provide  an  effective 
framework to pursue the FSR’s objective of ensuring a level playing field in the internal 
market. 

While the ongoing investigations do not prejudge their outcomes, the FSR has allowed the 
Commission to act on the basis of sufficient indications of foreign subsidies distorting the 
internal market. In the absence of the FSR, the Commission would not have been able to 
conduct  these investigations and assess  whether  distortions  on the internal  market  were 
caused by foreign subsidies. The feedback from stakeholders indicates uncertainty when it 
comes to the duration of ex officio investigations. The initial FSR enforcement experience, 
however, indicates that the duration varies, and takes longer, in particular in cases where 
the undertakings under investigation take longer to provide the requested information. In 
some cases, the timeline is also impacted by the actions brought before the EU Courts.  

2.2.2.  FSR notification of concentrations 

2.2.2.1.  Information on cases 

The obligation for ex ante notification of concentrations began on 13 October 2023 and by 
31 May 2026, the Commission had received 273 formal notifications. Of those cases, 247 
were  closed  after  the  preliminary  review,  four  cases  were  withdrawn  during  the 
preliminary review phase, and for 19 cases, the preliminary review was still ongoing. 

In three cases, the Commission initiated in-depth-investigations:  

a)  Case FS.100011 – e& / PPF Telecom: This case involved the acquisition of PPF 
Telecom Group (excluding its Czech business), a telecommunication operator in 
Czechia,  Bulgaria,  Hungary, 
by  Emirates 
Serbia 
Telecommunications  Group  (e&),  a  United  Arab  Emirates-based  operator.  The 
Commission  identified  foreign  subsidies  in  the  form  of  an  unlimited  state 
guarantee, grants, and loans, which were found be able to distort competition at the 
level of the merged entity, post-transaction. To address these concerns, the parties 
committed  to  removing  the  state  guarantee  and  implementing  hold-separate 
obligations between e& and the target’s EU activities. The final non-confidential 
version of the decision with commitments is published on DG COMP website (20). 

Slovakia, 

and 

(18) 

(19) 

(20) 

Case  T-335/26,  Goldwind  Science  &  Technology  v  Commission,  main  proceedings,  application 
lodged on 29 May 2026. 
Case T-335/26 R, Goldwind Science & Technology v Commission, application for interim relief, 
lodged on 29 May 2026. 
Commission  decision  of  24.9.2024  finding  that,  with  the  binding  commitments,  the  foreign 
subsidies in the concentration do not distort the internal market (Case FS.100011 – e&/PPF Telecom 
Group), C(2024) 6745 final. 

6 

 
 
 
b)  Case  FS.100156  –  ADNOC  /  Covestro:  This  case  involved  the  acquisition  of 
Covestro, a German chemicals producer, by the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company 
(ADNOC). The Commission found that foreign subsidies, including an unlimited 
state guarantee to ADNOC and a capital increase to Covestro, created distortions 
both  in  the  acquisition  process  and  the  post-acquisition  activities.  The  parties 
committed  to  amending  ADNOC’s  articles  of  association  to  remove  the  state 
guarantee  and  to  license  certain  Covestro  patents  to  market  participants.  A 
provisional non-confidential version of the decision with commitments is published 
on DG COMP website (21). 

c)  FS.100253  –  JD.COM  /  CECONOMY:  This  case  involves  the  acquisition  of 
CECONOMY  AG,  a  German  retailer  specialised  in  the  field  of  consumer 
electronics and home appliances, by JD.com, a company that belongs to a China-
based group operating a retail business and an online e-commerce marketplace in 
China.  During  the  preliminary  investigation,  the  Commission  found  sufficient 
indications of foreign subsidies distorting the EU internal market and on 28 May 
2026,  it  opened  an  in-depth  investigation.  At  time  of  publication  the  in-depth 
investigation was ongoing.  

During the review period, the Commission has not exercised its powers under Article 21(5) 
FSR to call-in concentrations below the jurisdictional thresholds. 

2.2.2.2.  Results of the review 

The early experience with the FSR notification procedure for concentrations reveals that 
the instrument is fit for purpose. The main takeaways from the review are set out below. 

The number of notifications (around 100 per year) has exceeded the Commission’s initial 
projections (30-40 per year, as estimated in the impact assessment that accompanied the 
proposal for the FSR (22)). The Commission closed around 97% of notified concentrations 
after  preliminary  review,  without  opening  an  in-depth  investigation.  This  share  is 
consistent with the outcome of cases reviewed and cleared in Phase I under  Regulation 
(EC) 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the ‘EUMR’) (23). 

At the time of publication, the Commission had launched three in-depth investigations into 
concentrations, two of which were conditionally approved after accepting commitments 
from  the  notifying  parties  to  address  potential  market  distortions  caused  by  foreign 
subsidies. The in-depth investigation in one concentration was still ongoing.  

The FSR has  allowed the Commission to  scrutinise concentrations, identify  if there are 
foreign subsidies in the concentrations which could actually or potentially cause distortions 
in  the  internal  market  and  address  them  through  the  regulatory  FSR  process.  The  two 
finalised cases with commitments illustrate the importance of the FSR in maintaining the 
level playing field and signal to acquirers that while the Union remains open to investment, 

(21) 

(22) 

(23) 

Provisional non-confidential version of Commission decision of 14.11.2025 on finding that, with 
the binding commitments the foreign subsidies in the concentration do not distort the internal market 
(Case FS.100156 – ADNOC/COVESTRO), C(2025) 7800 final/2. 
Commission  Staff  Working  Document  Impact  Assessment  Accompanying  the  Proposal  for  a 
Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  foreign  subsidies  distorting  the 
internal market 
The  proportion  of  cases  found  compatible  in  accordance  with  Article 6(1)(b)  EUMR  without 
commitments in the first phase of the EUMR investigation in the last 5 years ranges between 93% 
to 99% on an annual basis according to official statistics published on the Commission’s website. 

7 

 
 
 
such investments will be scrutinised for the presence of foreign subsidies to ensure they 
are not distorting the internal market. 

Stakeholders consider the EU-wide turnover threshold as a clear and appropriate measure 
for identifying the relevant transactions. They also welcomed the FSR’s approach to joint 
ventures,  where  turnover  is  calculated  based  on  the  turnover  of  the  joint  venture  itself 
rather than those of its parent companies (24), which has led to a reduction of notifiable 
transactions compared with the EUMR. 

Early  enforcement  highlights  the  value  of  pre-notification  engagements  with  the 
Commission  case  teams,  which  notifying  parties  widely  use  and  support.  Stakeholders 
have commended case teams for their responsiveness, improving clarity and efficiency in 
the  notification  process.  Stakeholders  also  welcomed  the  exceptions  available  from  the 
reporting obligations under the FSIR and the possibility of requesting waivers for certain 
information from the Commission.  

The  results  of  the  review  also  highlight  two  main  concerns  for  stakeholders.  The  first 
relates to FFC data collection that undertakings need to undertake  before a notification, 
which is seen as resource intensive by stakeholders and capturing information that, in their 
view, may not be relevant to identifying a risk of distortion. The second concern relates to 
a  perceived  uncertainty  about  the  Commission’s  call-in  powers,  which  is  seen  as 
potentially disruptive for transaction planning and risk assessments, notwithstanding the 
legitimate goal of the call-in power to capture below-threshold concentrations that could 
involve distortive foreign subsidies. 

2.2.3.  FSR submissions in public procurement procedures  

2.2.3.1.  Information on cases 

Under Chapter 4 FSR, economic operators are required  to notify or declare FFCs when 
participating  in  large  public  tenders,  specifically  where  the  estimated  contract  value 
exceeds  EUR 250  million  or  125  million  for  lot-based  public  procurements  and  the 
economic operator has received aggregate FFCs of at least EUR 4 million per third country 
in the preceding three years. 

Since the start of the notification obligation on 13 October 2023 and until 31 May 2026, 
the Commission received 5 150 submissions from economic operators across 863 public 
procurement  procedures,  including  4 293  declarations,  733  notifications  and  124  pre-
notifications. Of these cases, the Commission opened four in-depth investigations, one of 
which  resulted  to  a  final  decision  with  commitments,  while  three  cases  were  closed 
following  the  withdrawal  of  the  economic  operators  from  the  public  procurement 
procedures.  

a)  Case  FSP.100147  –  Supply  of  railway  rolling  stock  in  Bulgaria  –  The 
Commission  opened  an  in-depth  investigation  on  16 February  2024  to  assess  if 
CRRC Qingdao Sifang part of the CRRC group, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, 
received foreign subsidies that enabled it to submit an unduly advantageous tender 
for a Bulgarian railway project. On 26 March 2024, the case was closed without 
adopting a final decision pursuant to Article 31 FSR after the economic operator 
withdrew from the procurement procedure. 

(24) 

The  turnover  of  the  joint venture  itself  is  considered  as  better  proxy  for  self-standing  economic 
activity, and not just auxiliary operations. 

8 

 
 
 
b)  Cases FSP.100151 and FSP.100154 – Design, construction and operation of a 
photovoltaic  park  in  Romania  –  The  Commission  opened  two  in-depth 
investigations  on  3 April  2025  to  assess  if  (i) Shanghai  Electric  UK  Ltd.  and 
Shanghai  Electric  Hong  Kong  International  Engineering  Company,  and 
(ii) ENEVO  Group  –  LONGi  Solar  Technologie  Consortium  had  received 
potentially distortive subsidies in the open public procurement procedure for the 
design, construction and operation of a photovoltaic park in Romania. On 7 June 
2024,  both  cases  were  closed  without  adopting  a  final  decision  pursuant  to 
Article 31 FSR following the withdrawal of the economic operators from the public 
procurement procedure.  

c)  Case  FSP.103117  –  Design  and  construction,  acquisition  of  vehicles  and 
maintenance services of the Violet Line of the Lisbon Metro in Portugal - The 
tender of the consortium led by Mota-Engil Engenharia e Construção, S.A. (‘Mota-
Engil’) was conditionally cleared on 21 April 2026. The procedure concerned the 
open public procurement procedure for the ‘Design and Construction, Acquisition 
of Vehicles, and Maintenance Services for the Violet Line of the Lisbon Metro’, to 
be  awarded  by  Metropolitano  de  Lisboa,  E.P.E.  The  tender  submitted  by  Mota-
Engil relied on Portugal CRRC, an undertaking belonging to the CRRC group, as 
a  main  subcontractor  for  the  supply  of  rolling  stock  and  related  services.  The 
Commission  found evidence of the presence of  foreign  subsidies in the  form  of 
government grants, tax measures and compensation from public contracts which 
exceeds the turnover which would have been achieved in a competitive, transparent 
and  non-discriminatory  procedure,  which  enabled  Portugal  CRRC  to  submit  an 
advantageous offer to the consortium led by Mota-Engil and subsequently, enabled 
the  consortium  to  submit  an  unduly  advantageous  tender,  thus  distorting 
competition in the public procurement procedure. To address these concerns, Mota-
Engil committed to replace Portugal CRRC by the Polish Pojazdy Szynowe PESA 
Bydgoszcz  Spółka  Akcyjna  (‘PESA’)  for  the  entire  duration  of  the  contract 
performance period. At time of publication the final non-confidential version of the 
decision with commitments was not yet published. 

In addition to these in-depth investigations, the Commission declared two tenders irregular 
due to incomplete submissions. 

a)  Cases FSP.101606 and FSP.101626 – Decisions declaring a tender irregular –
The  decisions  concerned  Case  FSP.101606,  which  involved  an  offer  for  the 
construction of a long-distance tunnel in a tender in Poland, and case FSP.101626, 
which involved an offer for the supply of computers and workstations in a tender 
in  France.  In  both  cases,  the  Commission  issued  a  decision  declaring  the 
submissions of the respective economic operators incomplete and requiring them 
to submit a complete notification within 10 working days. As the notifications in 
both cases were not completed within the deadline, in March 2025 the Commission 
issued  decisions  declaring  both  tenders  irregular.  Ultimately,  the  contracting 
authorities  rejected  the  irregular  tenders  and  both  economic  operators  were 
excluded from the public procurement procedures. 

The Commission also has the power to request the prior notification of FFCs in a public 
procurement procedure that does not meet the relevant thresholds, pursuant to Article 29(8) 
FSR. During the review period, the Commission has, for the first time, exercised its power. 

a)  Case FSP.103175 – Request for prior notification – This request was issued in 
November 2025 and covered two public procurement procedures launched for the 
construction  of  various  sections  of  a  motorway  in  Croatia.  As  the  economic 

9 

 
operator that was required to submit a prior notification did not comply with the 
reporting  obligation,  the  relevant  contracting  authority  issued  a  request  to  the 
economic  operator  concerned  to  submit  a  missing  notification  pursuant  to 
Article 29(3)  FSR.  Ultimately,  the  contracting  authority  considered  the  tender 
“inadmissible,  inappropriate,  and  technically  unacceptable”,  and  excluded  the 
economic operator from the procedure.  

2.2.3.2.  Results of the review 

The Commission’s early enforcement of the FSR demonstrates that the framework is fit 
for purpose and fulfils its objectives, while further refinement would be useful. 

The  system  has  proven  efficient,  handling  more  submissions  than  anticipated  while 
pursuing  in-depth  review  in  only  a  limited  number  of  cases.  In  addition  to  in-depth 
investigations, irregularity cases and one request for prior notification, the FSR’s deterrent 
effect is demonstrated in cases where economic operators, reluctant to share information 
on FFCs received, withdrew from public procurement procedures, thereby fostering fairer 
competition. 

The  Commission  has  met  tight  deadlines  and  completed  preliminary  reviews  within  20 
working days despite the complexity of the procedural framework. This has been positively 
received  by  stakeholders,  as  it  has  strengthened  legal  certainty  for  businesses  and 
supported the smooth conduct of procurement procedures. Furthermore, the Commission’s 
consistent  guidance  to  Member  States  and  regular  and  constructive  engagement  with 
stakeholders have been widely welcomed, fostering greater clarity and cooperation in the 
implementation of the framework. 

However,  challenges  remain,  particularly  around  awareness  gaps  among  contracting 
authorities  and  non-notification  by  economic  operators.  The  comparison  between  large 
procurement procedures published in Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) (25) and those with 
at least one FSR submission suggests a decreasing compliance trend over time. Following 
a  significant  rise  in  FSR  notifications  from  40%  to  70%  during  the  first  two  years  of 
enforcement, compliance fell to 45% in late 2025. 

Furthermore,  key  concerns  raised  by  stakeholders  include  the  administrative  burden  on 
economic  operators,  driven  by,  in  their  views,  broad  reporting  obligations,  complex 
reporting thresholds and submission forms. Difficulties in identifying and reporting FFCs 
often lead to incomplete filings, requiring the Commission to gather missing data during 
the  preliminary  review.  Tight  deadlines  compounded  by  the  lack  of  a  ‘stop-the-clock’ 
mechanism strain assessments, especially in complex cases. 

While  progress  has  been  made  in  providing  guidance  and  improving  transparency, 
stakeholders  continue  to  explain  that  targeted  improvement  and  simplification  of  the 
current  framework  is  needed,  as  well  as  enhanced  transparency  to  support  a  more 
consistent enforcement and greater predictability. 

2.3. 

Developments in third countries’ subsidy control systems 

Pursuant to Article 52(2) FSR, in the context of its review, the Commission is bound to 
report on developments in international relations involving third countries’ subsidy control 
systems.  

(25) 

TED - EU Tenders, the Supplement to the Official Journal - TED. 

10 

 
 
The FSR Review Study therefore also assessed the developments in international relations 
regarding third countries’ subsidy control systems. The findings on the issue are presented 
in more detail in the accompanying Staff Working Document.  

In  sum,  the  review  of  these  developments  indicates  that  there  have  been  no  material 
developments in third countries’ subsidy control systems since the adoption of the FSR. 
As  a  result,  the  FSR  remains  relevant  to  address  the  distortions  in  the  internal  market 
caused  by  foreign  subsidies,  which  are  not  caught  by  the  traditional  trade  defence 
mechanisms of the Union.  

Continued monitoring of these developments, however, remains important, especially in 
light  of  evolving  industrial  policies  of  third  countries  and  potential  future  reforms  at 
international level.  

3. 

ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FSR  

Based on the review’s findings, the overall objective of the FSR remains valid and  it is 
widely acknowledged that the FSR contributes positively to the preservation of the level 
playing field in the internal market.  

In  terms  of  substantive  FSR  concepts,  stakeholders  reported  a  need  for  higher  legal 
certainty and clarity, which is typically associated with the implementation of a new legal 
framework. In this regard, the Commission undertakes a number of initiatives to clarify 
the FSR concepts, including the recent publication of the FSR Guidelines, the publication 
of  the  non-confidential  versions  of  the  adopted  final  decisions  concluding  its  in-depth 
investigations, regular updates to the FSR Q&As and the publication of FSR briefs. The 
Commission  will  remain  committed  to  these  practices  going  forward.  The  Commission 
also  expects  that  the  accumulation  of  FSR  case  practice  will  bring  more  clarity  to 
stakeholders and contribute to a better understanding of the specific FSR concepts.  

The  Commission  will  also  continue  to  engage  with  stakeholders  and  Member  States 
authorities on the FSR.  

Based on the review’s findings, the FSR does not merit structural changes.  

In  line  with  the  Commission’s  2024–2029  priorities,  the  review  also  looked  at 
administrative burdens  on businesses, including  small  and medium-sized enterprises,  in 
the implementation process.  

3.1. 

In relation to the FSR ex officio procedure 

Based on the review, the role and objective of the ex officio procedure under the FSR is 
widely acknowledged. 

The  recent  advancement  of  two  ex  officio  cases  to  in-depth  review,  pursuant  to 
Article 10(3) FSR, offers further insight into the Commission’s approach when assessing 
potentially distortive foreign subsidies.  

In terms of the concerns expressed by stakeholders with respect to the length of ex officio 
investigations,  the  Commission  notes  that  this  can  largely  be  explained  by  the  level  of 
complexity in individual cases, additional challenges brought before the Union Courts as 
well as the degree of cooperation of the undertakings under investigation.  

In light of the above, the Commission considers that no immediate steps concerning the ex 
officio procedure are needed. The Commission remains committed to make full use of such 
procedures whenever necessary to ensure that the internal market, EU competitiveness and 
economic security are not undermined by  distortive foreign subsidies. The Commission 

11 

 
will continue with its efforts to increase transparency and provide  further insights in its 
approach  for  ex  officio  cases,  in  line  with  the  practices  outlined  in  this  Report  and  the 
accompanying Staff Working Document.  

3.2. 

In relation to the FSR notifications for concentrations 

As confirmed by the review, the ex ante notification procedure for concentrations remains 
an important enforcement tool of the FSR, which allows the Commission to identify and 
address  distortive  foreign  subsidies  in  the  context  of  concentrations  and  prior  to  their 
implementation.  

At the same time, the Commission takes note of the stakeholders’ feedback concerning the 
administrative burden associated with FFC data collection for the purpose of notifications 
of concentrations under the FSR. In order to address this feedback, the Commission may 
consider possible adjustments to the procedural set up to reduce administrative burden and 
facilitate compliance, while maintaining the FSR’s effectiveness.  

In addition, the Commission will remain committed to ensure transparency concerning the 
FSR enforcement, including updates to the Q&As, additional FSR briefs on key topics, 
and the timely publication of case-related information. 

3.3. 

In relation to notifications in public procurement procedures 

As confirmed by the review, the ex ante notification procedure for public procurement is 
an important component of the FSR framework, enabling the Commission to identify and 
address  potentially  distortive  foreign  subsidies  also  in  high-value  public  procurement 
procedures. At the same time, early enforcement experience together with stakeholders’ 
feedback seem to indicate that the filing requirements related to the reporting of FFCs, in 
particular  the  preparation  of  Form  FS-PP  and  the  underlying  process  of  gathering 
information, may generate a disproportionate burden for economic operators.  

To address these concerns, while preserving the effectiveness of the FSR, the Commission 
may consider possible adjustments to the procedural set-up to reduce the administrative 
burden on businesses and facilitate compliance.  

In  parallel,  the  Commission  will  continue  its  efforts  to  strengthen  awareness  and 
compliance and to enhance the transparency of its enforcement practice, including outreach 
activities  for  contracting  authorities,  economic  operators  and  practitioners.  It  will  also 
further  deepen  its  dialogue  with  Member  States  through  regular  exchanges  with  the 
national contact points and the dedicated FSR Public Procurement Expert Group with the 
aim of ensuring a consistent understanding of FSR obligations across the Union. 

4. 

CONCLUSION  

The FSR plays a fundamental and key role in the Union’s efforts to address distortions in 
the internal market caused by foreign subsidies. The overall objective of the FSR, which 
is  to  prevent  distortions  in  the  internal  market  caused  by  foreign  subsidies,  is  widely 
acknowledged  and  remains  very  relevant.  The  findings  of  the  review  highlight  the 
importance of the FSR and confirm that the Regulation has been successful in capturing 
high-risk concentrations and public procurements, as demonstrated by the Commission’s 
case practice and the adopted final decisions with commitments under Chapters 3 and 4 
FSR  as  well  as  its  ongoing,  at  time  of  publication,  investigations  under  the  ex  officio 
procedure.  

12 

 
In light of the stakeholders’ feedback, the Commission may consider possible adjustments 
to  the  FSR  procedural  set  up  to  reduce  the  administrative  burden  on  businesses  and 
facilitate compliance, while maintaining the FSR’s effectiveness. 

The Commission remains committed to enforce the FSR whenever necessary to ensure a 
level playing field and protect the internal market from distortive foreign subsidies. 

13