COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Sudsidiarity grid Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 and Regulation (EU) 2024/982, and repealing Regulation (EU) 2016/794
Date: 2026-06-24
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: Europol, fight against crime, operation of the Institutions, police cooperation, terrorism

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 24.6.2026  SWD(2026) 582 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT    Sudsidiarity grid        Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 and Regulation (EU) 2024/982, and repealing Regulation (EU) 2016/794   {COM(2026) 580 final} - {SEC(2026) 580 final} - {SWD(2026) 580 final} - {SWD(2026) 581 final}  
 
 
Subsidiarity Grid 

1.  Can the Union act? What is the legal basis and competence of the Unions’ intended 

action? 

1.1 Which article(s) of the Treaty are used to support the legislative proposal or policy 
initiative? 

The legal basis is Article 88 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
which provides for the establishment and functioning of Europol and for the determination 
of its tasks, structure and operation. 

1.2  Is  the  Union  competence  represented  by  this  Treaty  article  exclusive,  shared  or 
supporting in nature? 

In the case of law enforcement cooperation, the Union’s competence is shared (Article 4(2)(j) 
TFEU). Pursuant to Article 88(2) TFEU, Europol's role is limited to supporting, coordinating 
and strengthening cooperation between national law enforcement authorities, while executive 
law enforcement powers remain with the Member States. The new Europol proposal does not 
alter this distribution of competences but further develops Europol's supporting role within 
the framework of shared competence. 

Subsidiarity does not apply for policy areas where the Union has exclusive competence as 
defined  in  Article  3  TFEU1.  It  is  the  specific  legal  basis  which  determines  whether  the 
proposal falls under the subsidiarity control mechanism. Article 4 TFEU2 sets out the areas 
where competence is shared between the Union and the Member States. Article 6 TFEU3 sets 
out the areas for which the Unions has competence only to support the actions of the Member 
States. 

2.  Subsidiarity Principle: Why should the EU act? 

2.1 Does the proposal fulfil the procedural requirements of Protocol No. 24: 

-  Has there been a wide consultation before proposing the act? 
- 

Is  there  a  detailed  statement  with  qualitative  and,  where  possible,  quantitative 
indicators allowing an appraisal of whether the action can best be achieved at Union 
level? 

The preparation of the proposal was supported by a thorough and comprehensive consultation 
process  to  gather  input  from  Member  States,  Europol,  other  EU  bodies,  law  enforcement 
networks, private sector actors and civil society, ensuring that the proposal was informed by 
a broad range of perspectives.  

1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E003&from=EN  
2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E004&from=EN  
3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E006:EN:HTML  
4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016E/PRO/02&from=EN  

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Initial scoping discussions between April and June 2025 involved high-level exchanges with 
the  Standing  Committee  on  Operational  Cooperation  on  Internal  Security  (COSI),  the 
Europol Management Board, and national police chiefs.  

These  exchanges  were  followed  by  in-depth  evidence  gathering  between  July  2025  and 
February 2026 through a Call for Evidence, a public consultation and thematic workshops 
with Member States’ experts. 

The preparation of the impact assessment also relied on an external study, which provided a 
comprehensive evidence base drawing on desk research, interviews, surveys, focus groups 
and  case  studies  involving  Member  States,  Union  bodies,  law  enforcement  networks  and 
other relevant stakeholders. 

The  input  received  from  the  stakeholders  directly  informed  the  design  of  the  proposal,  in 
particular by confirming the need to address information gaps, operational fragmentation and 
technological capability constraints. It also guided the development of measures to strengthen 
data  exchange,  simplify  procedures  and  enhance  cooperation,  while  ensuring  appropriate 
safeguards and respecting the limits of Europol’s mandate under the Treaty. 

The explanatory memorandum of the proposals and the impact assessment (chapter 3) contain 
a section on the principle of subsidiarity (see the reply to question 2.2 below). 

2.2 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the 
Commission’s proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the conformity 
with the principle of subsidiarity? 

The conformity with the principle of subsidiarity is assessed in the explanatory memorandum 
and in the Impact Assessment accompanying the legislative proposal. 

The  challenges  addressed  by  this  proposal  are  inherently  cross-border  and  cannot  be 
effectively  tackled  by  Member  States  acting  in  isolation.  The  most  serious  and  organised 
forms  of  crime  are  now  predominantly  transnational  in  nature,  with  criminal  networks 
operating  seamlessly  across  jurisdictions  and  digital  environments.  They  exploit  the 
fragmentation  of  national  information,  operational  action  and  capabilities.  As  a  result, 
Member States have only partial visibility of criminal activities and face structural limitations 
in  connecting  investigations  and  responding  effectively  to  criminal  activities  that  extend 
beyond their national jurisdiction. 

Action at Union level is therefore more effective and necessary. The scale, speed and cross-
border  nature  of  criminal  activity  require  a  level  of  coordination,  data  aggregation  and 
analytical  capacity  that  cannot  be  achieved  by  Member  States  acting  individually.  By 
operating at Union level, Europol is able to combine information from multiple jurisdictions, 
identify patterns and connections that would otherwise remain undetected, and support the 
prioritisation and coordination of operational action across borders. In doing so, it enhances 
the impact of national investigations and ensures that responses to cross-border crime are not 
fragmented  but  aligned  and  mutually  reinforcing.  It  also  enables  the  development  and 
deployment of advanced capabilities that are beyond the reach of individual Member States 
acting  alone,  which  also  enables  economies  of  scale  in  areas  where  the  development  of 
capabilities is resource-intensive and requires critical mass. By centralising such capacities 

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at  Union  level  and  making  them  available  across  Member  States,  the  proposal  avoids 
duplication, reduces costs and ensures a consistent and high level of effectiveness. 

In a Schengen area without internal frontiers, this collective capacity is essential to ensure 
that the level of law enforcement cooperation is commensurate with the level of integration 
achieved. 

2.3 Based  on  the  answers  to  the  questions  below,  can  the  objectives  of  the  proposed 
action be achieved sufficiently by the Member States acting alone (necessity for EU 
action)? 

The  objectives  of  the  proposal  cannot  be  achieved  sufficiently  by  Member  States  acting 
alone.  Serious  and  organised  crime,  terrorism,  cyber-enabled  crime  and  hybrid  threats 
increasingly  operate  across  borders  and  exploit  differences  between  national  systems. 
Individual  Member  States  have  only  a  partial  view  of  criminal  activities  and  cannot 
independently  generate  a  comprehensive  EU-wide  criminal  intelligence  picture.  While 
national  authorities  remain  responsible  for  investigations  and  enforcement,  only  action  at 
Union level can effectively connect information, support coordinated operational responses, 
and  provide  advanced  analytical  and  technological  capabilities  that  require  economies  of 
scale. Europol therefore addresses challenges that are inherently transnational and exceed the 
capacities of individual Member States. 

(a)  Are there significant/appreciable transnational/cross-border aspects to the problems 

being tackled? Have these been quantified? 

Yes.  The  problems  addressed  are  inherently  transnational.  Serious  and  organised  crime 
networks and terrorist groups operate across multiple jurisdictions, use digital infrastructures 
that transcend national borders and exploit differences between national legal and operational 
systems. The explanatory memorandum highlights that crime is increasingly "international 
by  default",  requiring  cross-border  intelligence  gathering,  operational  coordination  and 
information  sharing.  Europol's  evaluation  covering  2017-2024  also  confirmed  that  a 
significant share of the Agency's operational support concerns cross-border investigations.  

(b) Would  national  action  or  the  absence  of  the  EU  level  action  conflict  with  core 
objectives  of  the  Treaty5  or  significantly  damage  the  interests  of  other  Member 
States? 

The absence of EU-level action would undermine the Treaty objective of providing citizens 
with a high level of security within an area of freedom, security and justice. It would also risk 
creating  further  operational  blind  spots  and  reducing  the  effectiveness  of  cross-border 
investigations, thereby negatively affecting other Member States whose security increasingly 
depends on effective cooperation and information sharing across the Union. 

(c)  To what extent do Member States have the ability or possibility to enact appropriate 

measures? 

Member  States  can  adopt  national  measures  and  remain  responsible  for  law  enforcement 
activities  and  investigations.  However,  they  cannot  by  themselves  establish  a  complete 
criminal  intelligence  picture  across  the  Union,  systematically  connect  information 
originating  from  different  jurisdictions,  or  provide  the  same  level  of  cross-border 

5 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en  

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coordination and shared technological capabilities. National action alone would therefore be 
insufficient 
information  fragmentation  and  operational  gaps  affecting 
investigations with a cross-border dimension. 

to  address 

(d) How does the problem and its causes (e.g. negative externalities, spill-over effects) 

vary across the national, regional and local levels of the EU? 

While operational impacts may vary between Member States, regions and local authorities 
depending  on  crime  patterns  and  exposure  to  specific  threats,  information  fragmentation, 
difficulties in linking investigations and limited access to advanced technological capabilities 
are common challenges across the Union that national measures alone cannot address. 

(e)  Is the problem widespread across the EU or limited to a few Member States? 

The  problem  is  widespread  across  the  EU.  Serious  and  organised  crime,  terrorism, 
cybercrime  and  hybrid  threats  affect  all  Member  States,  albeit  to  varying  degrees.  The 
functioning of the Schengen area without internal border controls further reinforces the need 
for coordinated responses across the Union. 

(f)  Are Member States overstretched in achieving the objectives of the planned measure? 

Not  necessarily  in  terms  of  legal  competence  or  resources,  but  Member  States  acting 
individually  face  structural  limitations  in  achieving  the  objectives  of  the  proposal.  They 
cannot  independently  overcome  the  fragmentation  of  information  and  operational  action 
across  the  Union,  nor  can  they  efficiently  develop  and  maintain  certain  advanced 
technological  capabilities  that  require  significant  investment  and  critical  mass.  This 
assessment is supported by stakeholder consultations, which showed broad consensus on the 
need  to  strengthen  Europol’s  information-processing,  analytical  and  operational  support 
functions, as well as EU-level technological capabilities. 

(g) How  do  the  views/preferred  courses  of  action  of  national,  regional  and  local 

authorities differ across the EU? 

Overall,  stakeholders  expressed  strong  support  for  Europol’s  added  value,  particularly  in 
facilitating cross-border information exchange, criminal intelligence analysis and operational 
coordination. At the same time, they identified important operational shortcomings limiting 
the  Agency’s  effectiveness,  in  particular  legal  and  procedural  constraints  related  to  data 
processing.  Stakeholders  also  emphasised  the  need  to  strengthen  Europol’s  operational 
support, develop more automated and interoperable systems, and enhance technological and 
analytical capabilities, including through EU-level digital tools and stronger cooperation with 
Union bodies. Private-sector stakeholders further underlined the importance of legal certainty 
in data sharing, particularly in the area of cybercrime. 

Consultations  also  highlighted  the  importance  of  ensuring  that  any  strengthening  of 
Europol’s role remains fully consistent with fundamental rights, in particular data protection 
requirements,  and  respects  Member  States’  responsibilities  for  national  security  and  law 
enforcement. Diverging views emerged regarding a possible further expansion of Europol’s 
in relation to hybrid threats, which several stakeholders considered politically sensitive but 
in  principle  well  covered  in  Europol’s  legal  framework.  Nevertheless,  there  was  broad 
consensus across Member States and operational authorities regarding the need to strengthen 
Europol's information-processing, analytical and operational support functions. 

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2.4 Based on the answer to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action 
be  better  achieved  at  Union  level  by  reason of  scale  or  effects  of  that  action  (EU 
added value)? 

The objectives can be better achieved at Union level because Europol provides clear added 
value  as  a  central  information,  operational  and  technology  hub.  Union  action  allows 
information from different jurisdictions to be connected and analysed, facilitates coordinated 
cross-border investigations, and enables the development of advanced capabilities that would 
be  difficult  or  costly  for  individual  Member  States  to  develop  separately.  The  proposal 
therefore generates economies of scale, reduces duplication, strengthens legal certainty and 
ensures a more coherent response to security threats affecting the Union as a whole. 

(a)  Are there clear benefits from EU level action?  

Yes.  The  evaluation  of  Regulation  (EU)  2016/794,  as  amended  by  Regulation  (EU) 
2022/991,  conducted  in  parallel  with  the  impact  assessment  accompanying  this  proposal, 
confirms  that  Europol  plays  a  central  and  unique  role  in  supporting  Member  States  in 
preventing and combating serious and organised crime and terrorism, particularly in cross-
border investigations. Covering the period 2017-2024, the evaluation found that Europol has 
significantly strengthened information exchange and operational coordination at Union level. 

EU-level  action  provides  clear  added  value  because  Europol  is  uniquely  positioned  to 
aggregate and analyse information originating from multiple jurisdictions and to generate a 
Union-wide criminal intelligence picture that no individual Member State could establish on 
its  own.  By  connecting  information,  identifying  cross-border  links  and  supporting 
coordinated  operational  responses,  Europol  enables  Member  States  to  address  threats  that 
extend  beyond  national  borders  more  effectively  and  efficiently  than  would  be  possible 
through purely national action. 

(b) Are there economies of scale? Can the objectives be met more efficiently at EU level 
(larger  benefits  per  unit  cost)?  Will  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market  be 
improved? 

Yes. Significant economies of scale can be achieved through the centralised development of 
analytical  tools,  secure  data  infrastructures,  technological  capabilities  and  specialised 
expertise.  Instead  of  each  Member  State  developing  equivalent  capacities  independently, 
Europol can provide shared services and capabilities at Union level, reducing duplication and 
increasing efficiency. 

(c)  What are the benefits in replacing different national policies and rules with a more 

homogenous policy approach? 

A  more  homogeneous  approach  improves  interoperability,  information  exchange  and 
operational  cooperation  between  national  authorities.  It  reduces  legal  and  procedural 
fragmentation, facilitates cooperation with other EU bodies and agencies, and ensures more 
consistent support for cross-border investigations throughout the Union. 

(d) Do the benefits of EU-level action outweigh the loss of competence of the Member 
States and the local and regional authorities (beyond the costs and benefits of acting 
at national, regional and local levels)? 

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Yes.  The  proposal  does  not  transfer  core  law  enforcement  powers  to  the  Union.  Member 
States remain fully responsible for investigations, operational decisions and the exercise of 
coercive  powers.  The  benefits  generated  through  improved  information  exchange, 
coordination  and  shared  capabilities  therefore  outweigh  the  limited  constraints  associated 
with stronger Union-level cooperation. 

(e)  Will there be improved legal clarity for those having to implement the legislation? 

Yes.  By  repealing  and  replacing  the  current  Regulation  with  a  comprehensive  and 
modernised  framework,  the  proposal  clarifies  Europol's  responsibilities,  operational  role, 
data-processing framework and cooperation mechanisms. This increases predictability and 
legal certainty for Member States, EU agencies and private stakeholders. 

3.  Proportionality: How the EU should act 

3.1  Does  the  explanatory  memorandum  (and  any  impact  assessment)  accompanying 
the  Commission’s  proposal  contain  an  adequate  justification  regarding  the 
proportionality  of  the  proposal  and  a  statement  allowing  appraisal  of  the 
compliance of the proposal with the principle of proportionality? 

The  explanatory  memorandum  and  the  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  legislative 
proposal contain adequate justification regarding the proportionality of the proposal.  

In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on 
the European Union, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve 
its objectives. 

The  proposal  introduces  a  more  integrated  framework  for  Union-level  support  to  law 
enforcement,  reflecting  the  scale  and  complexity  of  cross-border  crime.  It  focuses  on 
enabling  more  effective  use  of  information,  strengthening  support  to  cross-border 
investigations  and  improving  access  to  shared  capabilities,  which  cannot  be  achieved 
satisfactorily  by  Member  States  alone,  without  altering  the  fundamental  balance  of 
competences between the Union and the Member States. In particular, it does not confer any 
coercive powers on Europol, which remain the exclusive competence of Member States. 

Where  relevant,  the  proportionality  of  the  measures  is  further  supported  by  the  analysis 
carried out in the accompanying impact assessment. 

3.2 Based on the answers to the questions below and information available from any 
impact assessment, the explanatory memorandum or other sources, is the proposed 
action an appropriate way to achieve the intended objectives? 

The  proposal  constitutes  an  appropriate  and  proportionate  response  to  the  identified 
problems. It focuses on those aspects that cannot be addressed effectively by Member States 
alone,  namely  the  creation  of  an  EU-wide  criminal  intelligence  picture,  enhanced  cross-
border  operational  support  and  the  development  of  shared  technological  capabilities.  The 
choice  of  a  Regulation  ensures  legal  certainty  and  uniform  application  across  the  Union, 
while  preserving  Member  States'  responsibility  for  law  enforcement  activities  and 
maintaining the principle that Europol has no coercive powers. 

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(a)  Is  the  initiative  limited  to  those  aspects  that  Member  States  cannot  achieve 

satisfactorily on their own, and where the Union can do better? 

Yes. 

(b) Is the form of Union action (choice of instrument) justified, as simple as possible, and 
coherent  with  the  satisfactory  achievement  of,  and  ensuring  compliance  with  the 
objectives  pursued  (e.g.  choice  between  regulation,  (framework)  directive, 
recommendation, or alternative regulatory methods such as co-legislation, etc.)? 

Yes.  The  choice  of  a  Regulation  is  justified  because  Europol  itself  is  established  by  a 
Regulation  and  operates  directly  across  all  Member  States.  Repealing  and  replacing 
Regulation (EU) 2016/794 ensures a coherent, comprehensive and directly applicable legal 
framework.  The  explanatory  memorandum  also  explains  that  incremental  amendments 
would  not  be  sufficient  to  accommodate  the  substantial  operational,  analytical  and 
technological changes envisaged by the proposal. 

(c)  Does the Union action leave as much scope for national decision as possible while 
achieving satisfactorily the objectives set? (e.g. is it possible to limit the European 
action to minimum standards or use a less stringent policy instrument or approach?) 

Yes.  The  proposal  leaves  responsibility  for  criminal  investigations,  operational  decisions, 
national security and coercive measures entirely with Member States. Europol's role remains 
supportive, analytical and coordinative. The proposal therefore limits Union action to what 
is necessary to achieve its objectives while preserving national discretion wherever possible. 

(d) Does  the  initiative  create  financial  or  administrative  cost  for  the  Union,  national 
governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators or citizens? Are these 
costs commensurate with the objective to be achieved? 

Yes. As assessed in the impact assessment and the legislative financial and digital statement, 
the  proposal  has  budgetary  implications  at  both  Union  and  Member  State  level.  These 
investments  relate  in  particular  to  enhanced  data-processing  and  analytical  capacities, 
operational support, technological capabilities and secure digital infrastructures.  However, 
these adjustments are expected to be proportionate and are outweighed by the benefits arising 
from  improved  information  exchange,  stronger  operational  coordination,  more  efficient 
cross-border  investigations  and  access  to  shared  Union-level  capabilities.  By  reducing 
fragmentation,  avoiding  duplication  of  effort  and  enabling  economies  of  scale  in  the 
development  and  deployment  of  advanced  technological  and  analytical  capabilities,  the 
proposal is expected to generate significant operational benefits for national authorities while 
enhancing the security of citizens across the Union. 

(e)  While respecting the Union law, have special circumstances applying in individual 

Member States been taken into account? 

No, as there are no such special circumstances in the aspects addressed by the proposal. 

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