COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1727
Date: 2026-06-24
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: Eurojust, cross-border cooperation, fight against crime, operation of the Institutions

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 24.6.2026  SWD(2026) 571 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT    Accompanying the document Proposal for a  REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 {COM(2026) 570 final} - {SEC(2026) 570 final} - {SWD(2026) 570 final} - {SWD(2026) 572 final} - {SWD(2026) 573 final}  
 
 
Impact assessment for the review of the Eurojust Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2018/1727) 

Executive summary sheet 

A.  Need for action 

What is the problem and why is it a problem at EU level? 

This  impact  assessment  follows  the  evaluation  of  the  Eurojust  Regulation  (Regulation  (EU)  2018/1727  on  the 
European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, EJR or the Regulation) published on 2 July 2025. The 
EJR established Eurojust as an EU agency with legal personality, laying down its mandate, structure and operational 
framework.  The  Regulation  defines  Eurojust’s  core  mission  as  supporting  and  strengthening  coordination  and 
cooperation  between  national  investigating  and  prosecuting  authorities  in  relation  to  serious  crime,  particularly  in 
cases affecting multiple Member States, based on information supplied by Member States’ authorities, Europol, the 
European  Public  Prosecutor  Office  (EPPO)  and  OLAF.  Eurojust’s  material  competence  covers  serious  forms  of 
crime  listed  in  Annex  I  of  the  Regulation,  together  with  related  offences,  ensuring  legal  clarity  while  allowing 
operational flexibility. 

The evaluation’s findings strongly support the case  of reforming Eurojust’s mandate, particularly  in areas such as 
efficiency and cooperation with EU partners and third countries. Optimisation of internal processes and interactions 
with the broader criminal justice ecosystem would enable Eurojust to fully realise its potential in the fight against 
serious and organised cross-border crime.   

For the purpose of the impact assessment two sets of problems have been identified: 

-  Problem 1: Suboptimal efficiency of Eurojust’s internal organisation and processes, and 
-  Problem 2: Limitations in Eurojust’s interaction with partners. 

Concretely, problem 1 involves an increasing demand for services across Member States while struggling to filter 
out lower-complexity cases, which could be more efficiently handled through bilateral cooperation or the European 
Judicial  Network  (EJN),  thereby  diverting  resources  from  complex  cases,  where  Eurojust  generates  its  greatest 
added value. Due to an expanding mandate and growing caseload tensions have arisen between workload and staff 
allocation,  leading  to  reduced  support  capacity  and  delays  in  responding  to  Member  States.  This  problem  can 
partially  be  explained  with  the  absence  of  a  clearly  defined  mandate  and  operating  mostly  reactively  to  Member 
States requests. Another part of the problem lies in the current governance practices of the agency where decisions 
that could be taken at lower level are often escalated to collective governance bodies, increasing procedural burden. 
Eurojust’s current governance structure is overly complex, with oftentimes unclear separation between operational 
and administrative responsibilities.  Administrative work tends to  deflect  a significant  share of Eurojust’s National 
Members’  attention  away  from  casework.  Criteria  on  what  qualifies  as  a  “Eurojust  case”  and  how  to  select  or 
prioritise  cases  are  lacking.  The  status,  powers  and  skills  of  Eurojust’s  National  Members  (prosecutors,  judges, 
representatives  of  a  judicial  authority)  vary  across  member  states,  leading  to  an  uneven  distribution  of  Eurojust’s 
added value across Member States.  

Problem  2  describes  the  shortcomings  in  Eurojust’s  interaction  with  partners  at  EU  (especially  with  Europol,  the 
EPPO  and  OLAF)  and  international  level  (cooperation  with  third  countries).  Interaction  with  EU  bodies  and 
agencies  still  lacks  structure  and  institutionalisation  and  is  prone  to  procedural  complexity  and  duplication. 
Information exchange could be improved: as system of indirect mutual access to data bases (“hit/no-hit” system) is 
in place only bilaterally in relation to Europol, EPPO and OLAF and cumbersome requiring manual follow-ups. On 
the  international  level,  existing  arrangements  may  not  be  sufficiently  robust  or  evenly  implemented.  New 
international agreements cannot be concluded by Eurojust but require the involvement of the European Commission, 
Council and Parliament which made the process time-consuming. Further issues in this area surround the conclusion 
of  working  arrangements  (in  the  absence  of  international  agreements),  legally  underdefined  activities  in  capacity-
building, or the underusage of so-called Liaison Magistrates (Eurojust officials posted in third countries) and Liaison 

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Prosecutors (third-country officials posted at Eurojust on the basis of international agreements). 

These problems  are genuinely rooted at EU level, since Eurojust is an EU decentralised agency and can therefore 
only be solved at EU level. The cross-border nature of the crimes dealt with by Eurojust demand a joint European 
response implementing Eurojust’s mission in line with Article 85 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union  (TFEU).  Without  EU  intervention,  the  problems  are  likely  to  persist  as  they  relate  to  Eurjust’s  legal 
framework,  governance  design,  legacy  organisational  culture,  dependence  on  Member  States,  and  the  broader 
dynamics in the EU justice architecture.  

What should be achieved? 

General objective: The revision of the EJR seeks to better attain the goals set out in the Treaties, namely to support 
and  strengthen  coordination  and  cooperation  between  national  investigating  and  prosecuting  authorities  and  to 
ensure  a  high  level  of  security  through  measures  that  prevent  and  combat  crime  and  measures  that  foster 
coordination and cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities. 

Two specific objectives were identified: 

1.  Strengthen Eurojust’s internal functioning, governance and operational performance 
2.  Strengthen Eurojust’s external cooperation and integration with EU-level and international partners 

What is the added value of action at EU level (subsidiarity)? 

Eurojust’s functions (coordination, cooperation facilitation, and operational support) are transnational by nature and 
cannot be performed effectively solely on Member State level. The agency provides a neutral EU-level perspective 
across juristdictions, facilitates multilateral cooperation in parallel, and ensures that no Member State is placed at a 
disadvantage.  Scale  and  complexity  of  cross-border  investigations  render  EU-level  coordination  indispensable  for 
national  prosecutorial  and  judicial  authorities,  calling  for  EU-level  action  and  thus  adhering  to  the  subsidiarity 
principle. Eurojust offers operational, legal, and strategic value that improve the functioning of national systems and 
the  coherence  of  the  EU’s  Area  of  Freedom,  Security  and  Justice.  Action  by  Eurojust  does  not  replace  that  of 
national authorities but enhances it through supporting services. There are clear ecomonies of scale and efficiency 
gains  by  further  improving  Eurojust,  enabling  it  to  bring  together  expertise  from  national  practicioners  in  one 
agency,  coordinate  fast  and  more  efficiently  in  the  fight  against  transnational  crime,  avoiding  duplication  and 
conflicting investigations.  

B.  Solutions 

What are the various options to achieve the objectives? Is there a preferred option or not? If not, why? 

The  impact  assessment  evaluates  policy  options  spanning  from  non-legislative  to  regulatory  interventions.  Each 
policy option consists of a set of measures (numbered i, ii, iii, etc.), selected based on their ability to address a given 
problem  (or  its  driver),  and  screened  for  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  coherence.  For  each  of  seven  intervention 
areas (A-F), three policy options have been developed, varying in intensity (PO1 being the lightest set of measures, 
PO2 moderate, and PO3 the most far-reaching set of measures).  

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 1 (INTERNAL):  
STRENGTHEN EUROJUST’S INTERNAL FUNCTIONING, GOVERNANCE AND OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 

Options 

Light 
change 

Moderate 
change 

Substantial 
change 

A. Extending the scope of material competences to face the new judicial landscape 

Addressing problem driver(s): 
#2 Insufficient competences and associated toolset 

A.PO1 

A.PO2 

A .PO3 

i. Enhancing Eurojust’s support in EU policy-making and strategic cycles – through working arrangements with 
IBOAs (i.a) or by introducing a dedicated provision in the EJR (i.b) 

i.a 

i.b 

i.b 

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ii. Entrusting Eurojust with new operational functions (in the areas of e-evidence, victims’ rights support to asset 
recovery) – through non-binding guidelines (ii.a) or by introducing a dedicated provision in the EJR (ii.b) 

ii.a 

ii.b 

ii.b 

iii. Introducing semi-permanent operational platforms to support JITs – through operational arrangements (iii.a) 
or by introducing a reference in the EJR (iii.b) 

iii.a 

iii.b 

iii.b 

iv. Extending Eurojust’s material competence to new crimes (VURM, cybercrime, GBV) 

iv 

v. Expanding Eurojust’s analytical function to key crime areas (organised crime and accessory crimes) 

iv 

v 

B. Harmonising Member State implementation of the EJR, including on allocation of cases 

Addressing problem driver(s): 
#1 Inadequate model to select and prioritise cases; 
#3 Divergent Member State engagement and implementation of the EJR 

B.PO1 

B.PO2 

B.PO3 

i. Introduce a Eurojust-EJN case-allocation system – through non-binding guidelines (i.a) or by introducing a 
EJR provision defining a ‘Eurojust case’ (i.b) 

ii. Reinforce the status of National Members to give them full operational powers – through advocacy and 
political push (ii.a) or by amending the relevant EJR provisions (ii.b) 

iii. Entrusting National Members with new competences (subject to their attributions under national law): 
issuing freezing orders (or immediate action), European Production and Preservation Orders (e-evidence), and 
signing JIT agreements 

i.a 

i.b 

ii.a 

ii.b 

iii 

iv. Grant National Members the authority to open Eurojust cases 

i.b 

ii.b 

iii 

iv 

C. Establishing a streamlined, coherent and role-clear governance system that accelerates decision-making 

Addressing problem driver(s): 
#4 Lack of clear separation between operational and administrative responsibilities 
#5 Complex governance structure and outdated legacy organisational culture 

i. Revision of the allocation of responsibilities between governance bodies 

ii. Reform of the Executive Board 

iii. Introduction of a Management Board 

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 2 (EXTERNAL):  
ACHIEVE OPTIMAL ALIGNMENT AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION WITH EU PARTNERS AND THIRD COUNTRIES 

C.PO1 

C.PO2 

C.PO3 

i 

 i  

ii 

i  

ii  

iii 

Options 

Light 
changes 

Moderate 
changes 

Substantive 
changes 

D. Fostering and strengthening structured operational cooperation with Europol 

Addressing problem driver(s): 
#8 Absence of a structurally embedded cooperation with Europol 

D.PO1 

D.PO2 

D.PO3 

i. Automating and optimising Eurojust-Europol’s system for indirect access to the respective databases 
(interagency hit/no-hit system) – through technical measures only (i.a) or through technical measures linked to 
new legal obligations (i.b) 

i.a 

i.b 

i.b 

ii. Revising the 2010 Eurojust-Europol Working Arrangements – through a political push for its renegotiation 
(ii.a) or by introducing in the EJR a legal obligation of periodic review in consultation with the Commission 
(ii.b) 

ii.a 

ii.b 

ii.b 

iii. Creating a dedicated cooperation channel for systematic follow up on SIRIUS referrals 

iv. Granting participation in College meetings to Europol representatives 

v. Codifying cooperation modalities between Eurojust and Europol (e.g., notification to Eurojust upon reaching 
of “judicial threshold”, creation of Joint Operational Platforms or task forces) 

iii 

iv 

iii 

iv 

v 

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E. Promoting fully developed cooperation with the EPPO 

Addressing problem driver(s): 
#9 Constrained cooperation with the EPPO 

E.PO1 

E.PO2 

E.PO3 

i. Automating and optimising Eurojust-EPPO’s system for indirect access to the respective databases 
(interagency hit/no-hit system) – through technical measures only (i.a) or through technical measures linked to 
new legal obligations (i.b) 

i.a 

i.b 

ii. Establishing an explicit mandate for Eurojust to provide reinforced support in EPPO cases (JITs, coordination 
meetings, Action Days) 

iii. Granting participation in College meetings to EPPO representatives 

iv. Setting up a Eurojust-EPPO clearing-house mechanism for case allocation 

 ii 

iii 

i.b 

ii 

iii 

iv 

F. Consolidating cooperation with third countries and international organisations 

Addressing problem driver(s): 
#10 Cumbersome process for establishing relations with international actors 

F.PO1 

F.PO2 

F.PO3 

i. Introducing cooperation obligations in agreements with third countries with financial implications – as a cross 
cutting non-legislative measure (i) 

i 

ii. Clarifying the legal framework governing Liaison Magistrates 

iii. Institutionalising Resident Contact Points for priority countries 

iv. Granting participation in College meetings to Liaison Prosecutors 

v. Entrusting Eurojust with an explicit capacity building mandate in external action 

i 

ii 

iii 

iv 

i 

ii 

iii 

iv 

v 

According  to  the  analysis  and  the  assessment,  the  preferred  option  consists  of  a  package  of  the  policy  options 
under  each  area  of  intervention:  A.PO3,  B.PO3,  C.PO3,  D.PO3,  E.PO2,  F.PO2.  These  policy  options  are 
complementary and score highest regarding their impact on the three evaluation criteria effectiveness, efficiency and 
coherence.  

What are different stakeholders’ views?  

Consultations with stakeholders have shown that there is very broad support for reforming Eurojust.  

In particular, stakeholders  like  Eurojust’s administration  were in favour of the proposed governance reform as it 
would,  in  their  view,  address  inefficiencies  experienced,  reducing  not  only  National  Members’  time  spent  in 
meetings but also time required to take decisions. National Members, however, pointed to the downsides of taking 
certain decision-making powers away from them and transferring them to a Management Board that might not be as 
familiar with Eurojust and might still ask to be briefed. 

Across all areas of intervention surveys illustrated stakeholder support for measures like giving Eurojust a support 
role  vis-à-vis  e-evidence  and  relations  with  service  providers  and  strengthen  the  ability  of  Eurojust  National 
Members to issue e-evidence orders (50,3%; area A), encouraging Member States to select National Members with 
strong  operational  powers  and  qualifications  (64,9%;  area  B),  adopting  a  more  standard  governance  model  by 
introducing  a  full  Management  Board  (72,3%;  area  C),  improving  the  hit/no-hit  system  between  Eurojust  and 
Europol and the EPPO by having an automated process (48,9%; area D and E), allowing the participation of Liaison 
Prosecutors in the College on cases involving third countries (59,1%; area F). According to the respondents these 
measures would contribute to achieving the envisaged objectives to a moderate or large extent.  

C. Impact of the preferred option 

What are the benefits of the preferred option (if any, otherwise of main ones)? 

The preferred option is a package that generates cumulative impacts by combining measures that address different 

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but  interrelated  drivers  of  the  problem.  Taken  together,  these  measures  form  a coherent  and  mutually  reinforcing 
revision of the Eurojust mandate: they strengthen Eurojust’s ability to support Member States to combat serious and 
cross-border  crime  more  effectively  than  any  individual  measure  alone. The  two  specific  objectives  would  be 
reached and the package aligns with stakeholder demands and EU strategic priorities, ensuring political feasibility 
and operational relevance. Eurojust’s proactivity would be improved, transforming it from a reactive coordination 
body to a strategic and analytical hub for cross-border judicial cooperation. In detail, the measures would: 

- 

- 

codify  and  expand  Eurojust’s  mandate  and  operational  competences  to  emerging  crime  areas  through 
amendments  of  Annex  I.  In  parallel,  Eurojust’s  analytical  capacity  would  be  strengthened  by  providing  a 
mandate  to  use  judicial  data,  supporting  national  authorities  in  evidence-building  and  strategic  case 
development.  
reinforce operational coordination and legal certainty within Eurojust by spelling out the concept of a 
“Eurojust  case”,  the  eligiblity  requirements  for  National  Members  and  their  powers  to  issue  mutual  legal 
assistance requests and investigative orders. 

-  modernise Eurojust’s governance, decision making and internal management structure. 
- 

enhance  data  protection  and  data  management  capabilities,  specifying  the  application  of  the  EU  data 
protection regime within the EJR. 
strengthen  cooperation  with  key partners  at  EU  (in  particular  Europol  and  the  EPPO)  and international 
levels (notably strategic third countries). 

- 

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