REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2025
Date: 2026-06-23
Institutions: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: European neighbourhood policy, economic stabilisation, macro-financial assistance, macroeconomics, multiannual financial framework, structural adjustment, third country

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 23.6.2026  COM(2026) 294 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2025 {SWD(2026) 160 final}  
 
 
CONTENTS 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 2 

2.  MACRO-FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS IN 2025 ......................... 3 

2.1 Eastern Neighbourhood ......................................................................................................... 3 

•  Ukraine ............................................................................................................................ 3 

2.2 Southern Neighbourhood ...................................................................................................... 5 

•  Egypt ................................................................................................................................ 5 

• 

Jordan ............................................................................................................................... 6 

2.3 Western Balkans .................................................................................................................... 8 

•  North Macedonia ............................................................................................................. 8 

3.  ENSURING PROPER USE OF MFA FUNDS: OPERATIONAL 
ASSESSMENTS AND EX POST EVALUATIONS ...................................................... 9 

3.1 Operational assessments ........................................................................................................ 9 

3.2 Evaluations .......................................................................................................................... 10 

4.  GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO THE MFA INSTRUMENT .. 11 

4.1 

Functioning of the MFA instrument .............................................................................. 11 

4.2  MFA in the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework ............................................ 12 

4.3  MFA as proposed in the next multiannual financial framework 2028-2034 
Commission’s proposal ............................................................................................................. 13 

5  LOOKING AHEAD – MFA OPERATIONS AND THE BUDGETARY 
SITUATION IN 2026 ..................................................................................................... 14 

Table 1: Commitments and payments for MFA grants and disbursements of MFA loans 2023-
2026 (EUR) ............................................................................................................................... 16 

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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND THE COUNCIL 
on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 20251 

1.  INTRODUCTION 
Macro-financial  assistance  (MFA)  is  an  EU  financial  instrument2  provided  to  partner 
countries  experiencing  balance-of-payments  difficulties.  Since  its  introduction  in  1990, 
MFA has contributed to strengthening macroeconomic and financial stability in countries 
neighbouring  or  geographically  close  to  the  EU,  including  candidate  countries,  while 
supporting their implementation of structural reforms. Its provision is generally conditional 
on the existence of a non-precautionary arrangement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  A  political  precondition  also  applies  to  MFA  operations,  requiring  respect  for 
human rights and effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary 
system and the rule of law, complying with the principles and objectives of the external 
action of the Union laid in Article 21(1) TEU. 

MFA is designed to alleviate immediate external financing pressures and to help resolve 
the  underlying  causes  of  balance-of-payments  stress.  By  providing  timely  and  targeted 
financial assistance, it enables beneficiary countries to increase fiscal space, improve debt 
sustainability,  and  advance  necessary  reforms.  By  smoothing  the  macroeconomic 
adjustment  path,  MFA  operations  can  mitigate  adverse  economic  and  social  impacts, 
thereby  allowing  partner  countries  sufficient  time  to  address  the  root  causes  of  their 
balance-of-payments crisis. 

MFA is mainly provided in the form of long-term concessional loans, although operations 
may combine loans and grants where appropriate. MFA loans are financed under the EU’s 
diversified  funding  strategy,  whereby  the  Commission  issues  single-branded  EU  bonds 
and channels  the proceeds  into  a central  funding pool that finances  multiple EU policy 
programmes, including MFA. MFA grants are financed directly from the EU budget. 

MFA  is  usually  released  in  instalments,  subject  to  the  fulfilment  of  clearly  defined 
economic policy conditions agreed with the partner country. MFA complements regular 
EU cooperation assistance and contributes to the EU’s broader objectives of safeguarding 
stability,  fostering  prosperity,  and  promoting  EU  values  beyond  its  borders.  This 
assessment is supported by several independent ex post evaluations of MFA operations3, 
and by the 2023 meta-evaluation  covering  all  MFA operations  evaluated  between 2010 
and 20204. 

1 This report is based on information available up to April 2026. 
2  The  legal  basis  for  MFA  to  third  countries  other  than  developing  countries  is  Article 212  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 213 TFEU may be used as a legal basis when the third country 
requires urgent financial assistance. 
3  All  ex post  evaluations  are  available  on  the  Commission’s  website:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/evaluation-reports-
economic-and-financial-affairs-policies-and-spending-activities_en. 
4 Commission staff working document, Evaluation of macro-financial assistance to third countries (meta-evaluation of 
operations for 2010-2020), SWD(2023) 16. 

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In 2025, the MFA instrument continued to demonstrate its capacity to respond swiftly and 
effectively  to  exceptional  circumstances,  while  maintaining  its  core  mission  of 
safeguarding macroeconomic stability and promoting structural reforms. In Ukraine, the 
EU disbursed EUR 18.1 billion in MFA loans as part of the G7 ‘Extraordinary Revenue 
Acceleration Loans for Ukraine’ (ERA) initiative5. Although specific in its features, as for 
previous  MFA  operations,  this  support  aimed  to  address  the  country’s  acute  financing 
needs  and  support  its  economic  resilience,  amid  ongoing  attacks  by  Russia  resulting  in 
heavy  damage  to  Ukraine’s  critical  infrastructure  and  significant  macroeconomic 
repercussions. At the same time, MFA operations for Egypt and Jordan  helped stabilise 
their  economies  amid  heightened  challenges  arising  from  the  complex  and  unstable 
regional  situation  in  the  Middle  East  and  the  need  to  accelerate  important  structural 
reforms. 

The  2025  MFA  annual  report  has  been  prepared  in  accordance  with  the  Commission’s 
reporting  obligations  under  EU  law.  It  is  accompanied  by  a  Commission  staff  working 
document providing a more detailed assessment of the implementation of individual MFA 
operations. 

2.  MACRO-FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS IN 2025 

In 2025, the EU provided macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, Egypt and Jordan. 

In the face of Russia’s continued war of aggression, Ukraine remained the biggest MFA 
recipient,  with  EUR  18.1 billion  disbursed  throughout  the  year  as  part  of  the  G7  ERA 
initiative, under which a total of EUR 45 billion in loans were made available, to be repaid 
from extraordinary revenues from immobilised Russian sovereign assets. In the Southern 
Neighbourhood, in June 2025 the co-legislators approved a EUR 4 billion MFA operation 
for  Egypt,  of  which  EUR 1 billion  was  disbursed  in  January 2026.  In  addition,  in 
April 2025 the co-legislators approved a EUR 500 million MFA operation for Jordan, with 
EUR 250 million  disbursed  in  September 2025.  In  August 2025,  the  Commission 
proposed an additional EUR 500 million MFA operation for Jordan. Finally, with respect 
of the Western Balkans, there was no further progress with the ongoing EUR 100 million 
MFA operation for North Macedonia. 

2.1 Eastern Neighbourhood 

• 

Ukraine 

Amid the severe destruction caused to human and physical capital since Russia’s full-scale 
invasion  in  2022,  Ukraine’s  economy  has  continued  to  demonstrate  notable  resilience, 
although growth has slowed markedly in recent quarters. After a 3.5% increase in 2024, 
real  GDP  growth  weakened  in  2025  to  1.8%  owing  to  intensified  attacks  on  energy 
infrastructure,  labour  shortages  and  continued  capacity  constraints.  The  economy  has 
continued to rely heavily on the functioning of export corridors through the Black Sea and 
the  Danube,  as  well  as  sustained  international  financial  assistance,  including  support 

5 Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2024 establishing the Ukraine 
Loan  Cooperation  Mechanism  and  providing  exceptional  macro-financial  assistance  to  Ukraine,  OJ L,  2024/2773, 
28.10.2024. 

3 

 
 
 
under the EU’s ERA MFA and Ukraine Facility. Inflation accelerated during early 2025 
amid energy disruptions, food price pressures and strong wage growth, but has since eased 
considerably, reaching 7.4% in January 2026. This was partly the result of the National 
Bank of Ukraine’s tight monetary stance throughout 2025, which was relaxed only recently 
with the key policy rate lowered to 15% in January 2026. The external position remains 
fragile, with the current account  deficit  still sizeable at an estimated  14.5% of  GDP in 
2025, reflecting high import demand related to defence needs, energy and reconstruction, 
and  the  gradual  reduction  of  grant  financing.  Public  finances  remain  under  intense 
pressure,  with  the  state  budget  deficit  standing  at  19.5%  of  GDP,  reflecting  sustained 
wartime  spending  and  reconstruction  needs,  despite  new  tax  measures  that  aim  to 
strengthen revenues. The banking sector has so far remained stable and well capitalised, 
supported by prudent regulation and strong liquidity, despite the extremely challenging 
operating environment. Looking ahead, economic prospects remain highly uncertain and 
are  constrained  by  the  continued  destruction  of  energy  and  productive  infrastructure, 
labour  shortages,  and  the  unpredictable  course  of  the  war.  Against  this  background, 
sustained  and  predictable  international  financial  support  remains  essential  to  preserve 
macroeconomic  stability  and  enable  Ukraine  to  continue  resisting  Russia’s  war  of 
aggression. 

Following successive MFA operations, which had disbursed a total of EUR 25.2 billion 
from the start of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression until end 2023, the war continued to 
place significant pressure on Ukraine’s public finances. As a result, additional financing 
was required in 2025 to address the country’s financing gap. 

Against this background, at their June 2024 summit in Apulia, Italy, G7 leaders committed 
to  provide  Ukraine  with  EUR 45 billion  in  ERA  loans,  to  be  repaid  using  future 
extraordinary revenues generated by immobilised Russian sovereign assets held in the EU 
and other relevant jurisdictions. Building on this commitment, the European Parliament 
and the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 on 24 October 2024, which entered 
into force on 29 October 2024. Following confirmation of G7 partners’ contributions at 
the G7 Finance Ministers’ meeting of 25 October 2024, the EU confirmed an MFA loan 
of EUR 18.1 billion to Ukraine, to be disbursed in a single instalment. The Commission 
adopted the Decision authorising the release of the sole instalment on 18 December 2024, 
following  its  assessment  that  the  policy  conditions  attached  to  the  instalment  had  been 
fulfilled6. These conditions covered key reform areas, including macro-financial stability, 
state-owned enterprises, public administration, energy, the rule of law and anti-corruption, 
and defence. They were designed as interim steps towards the implementation of broader 
measures under the Ukraine Plan. 

The full MFA amount was disbursed in 2025 in tranches, with an initial disbursement of 
EUR 3 billion in January. No disbursement was made in February due to this partial front-
loading.  Thereafter,  disbursements  followed  a  stable  schedule,  with  tranches  of 
EUR 1 billion  extended  between  March  and  September 2025.  As  frontline  hostilities 
intensified, Ukraine’s military financing needs in Q4-2025 exceeded earlier estimates. The 
flexibility embedded in the disbursement schedule enabled a tranche of EUR 6.1 billion, 

6 The ERA MFA loan was guaranteed by the EU budget headroom. Given the headroom availability period, for the loan 
to benefit from this guarantee the release decision for the sole instalment had to be adopted by 24 December 2024. 

4 

 
 
originally planned for December 2025, to be frontloaded and top up the regular October 
to 
and  November 2025  disbursements.  Consequently,  disbursements  amounted 
EUR 4 billion in October 2025 and EUR 4.1 billion in November 2025. 

The political precondition continued to be assessed positively throughout the year, based 
on  ongoing  evaluations  by  the  Commission  services  and  the  European  External  Action 
Service.  However,  developments  in  July 2025  affecting  the  institutional  framework 
governing  the  independence  of  anti-corruption  bodies  –  notably  the  National  Anti-
Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s 
Office  (SAPO)  –  raised  concerns;  they  were  perceived  as  a  potential  significant  step 
backwards  in  safeguarding  the  autonomy  of  key  anti-corruption  institutions.  The 
Commission engaged closely with the Ukrainian authorities to reverse the situation, restore 
the  independence  of  NABU  and  SAPO,  and  ensure  that  any  risks  to  institutional 
independence were adequately addressed ahead of any disbursement under the MFA (with 
the payment being withheld until the situation was resolved). 

In  parallel,  Ukraine  successfully  completed  several  reviews  under  the  IMF’s  2023 
Extended Fund Facility arrangement, underscoring its continued commitment to advancing 
reforms despite exceptionally challenging circumstances. 

2.2 Southern Neighbourhood 

• 

Egypt 

Egypt experienced challenging macroeconomic conditions at the beginning of the current 
decade amid multiple external shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Gaza 
and  the  attacks  on  ships  in  the  Red  Sea.  Slow  progress  on  economic  reforms  created 
uncertainty and deterred foreign investment. Egypt’s real GDP growth reached 4.4% in 
the fiscal year from July 2024 to June 2025 (FY 2024-25) and accelerated further to 5.3% 
year-on-year in H2-2025. With advances in the management of macroeconomic policies, 
the impact of the liberalisation of the exchange rate in 2024 and some improvements in the 
business environment, the situation started to improve. Growth was primarily driven by 
private  consumption  and  private  investment,  while  public  investment  diminished.  The 
contribution of net exports of goods and services remained negative. The unemployment 
rate decreased to 6.2% in Q4-2025, from 6.4% a year before. Inflation has stabilised at 
around 12% in H2-2025, down from 28.5% in 2024. The general government deficit stood 
at 7.2% of GDP in FY 2024/25, with interest payments on government debt surpassing 
10% of GDP. Public debt declined to 84% of GDP. The current account deficit narrowed 
to 4.2% of GDP in FY 2024-25, with increased remittances from work abroad and receipts 
from tourism partially offsetting the widening merchandise trade deficit. Foreign direct 
investment  amounted  to  3.3%  of  GDP  in  FY  2024-25.  The  central  bank’s  net  foreign 
currency  reserves  reached  USD 53 billion  at  the  end  of  April 2026,  equivalent  to  six 
months’  goods  and  services  imports,  an  increase  compared  with  the  USD 48.1 billion 
registered a year before. However, given its dependence on imported oil and gas, tourism 
and  remittances  the  country  remains  vulnerable  to  external  shocks,  such  as  the  recent 
Middle East  conflict, even if  the reform efforts  undertaken make Egypt  better  prepared 
than in the previous energy crisis. 

5 

 
 
In March 2024, the EU and Egypt concluded a strategic and comprehensive partnership 
for shared prosperity, stability and security, underpinned by a financial package of up to 
EUR 7.4 billion in short- and longer-term support. Given Egypt’s difficult economic and 
financial situation and its role as an important stabilising factor in an increasingly volatile 
region,  the  Commission  proposed  to  support  Egypt  with  two  MFA  operations  of  up  to 
EUR 5 billion,  divided  into  (i) a  short-term  MFA  operation  of  EUR 1 billion,  and  (ii) a 
regular MFA operation of up to EUR 4 billion. The short-term MFA of EUR 1 billion was 
approved  by  the  Council  in  April 20247  and  fully  disbursed  in  a  single  instalment  in 
December 2024. 

The follow-up operation of EUR 4 billion was approved by the European Parliament and 
the Council in June 20258. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which was subject 
to  the  opinion  of  the  Member  States  committee,  was  signed  in  July 2025.  The  first 
instalment  of  EUR 1 billion  was  disbursed  in  January 2026  following  a  positive 
assessment of the implementation of the 13 policy measures linked to the first instalment 
(focusing on strengthening public finances, improving social protection and labour market 
policies,  enhancing  competitiveness  and  the  business  environment,  and  supporting  the 
green transition), progress on the implementation by Egypt of the concrete and credible 
steps  required  under  the  political  precondition,  and  the  IMF  programme  remaining  on 
track. The second and third MFA instalments, amounting to EUR 1.5 billion each, are also 
planned to be disbursed in 2026, subject to a positive assessment of the conditions. 

The fourth review of the IMF’s USD 8 billion Extended Fund Facility was concluded by 
the Executive Board in March 2025. Owing to delays in policy implementation, the fifth 
review  was  merged  with  the  sixth  review  and  took  place  in  December 2025.  It  was 
approved by the IMF Executive Board in February 2026. The IMF programme is set to 
expire in December 2026. 

• 

Jordan 

Jordan’s  economy  and  outlook  continue  to  be  weighed  down  by  persistent  regional 
uncertainties, despite broadly resilient macroeconomic performance. Jordan’s real GDP 
growth accelerated to 2.7% in Q1-Q3-2025, from 2.4% in the same period of 2024. Growth 
in  2025  was  broad-based,  reflecting  continued 
in  agriculture, 
manufacturing, and transport services, while mining  contracted slightly. Disruptions  to 
air  travel  linked to  heightened regional tensions  over the summer were short-lived and 
appear to have had limited repercussions on tourism and trade. Average inflation stood at 
1.8% in 2025. In September 2025, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) cut its policy rate by 
25 basis points (bps) to 6.25%, its first reduction since December 2024, broadly aligning 
with US monetary easing given the dinar’s peg to the US dollar. 

improvement 

The current account deficit narrowed to 7.4% of GDP in H1-2025, from 8.3% of GDP a 
year  earlier.  This  improvement  was  driven  by  stronger  exports  of  goods  and  services, 
which more than offset import growth. Trade in goods recorded a deficit of 25.7% of GDP, 
which  was  partly  cushioned  by  robust  tourism  receipts.  Foreign  direct  investment 

7  Council  Decision  (EU) 2024/1144  of  12 April  2024  providing  short-term  macro-financial  assistance  to  the  Arab 
Republic of Egypt, OJ L, 2024/1144, 15.4.2024. 
8 Decision (EU) 2025/1267 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2025 providing macro-financial 
assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt, OJ L, 2025/1267, 27.6.2025. 

6 

 
 
increased to 4.0% of GDP in H1-2025 (compared to 3.1% of GDP in 2024). The CBJ’s 
gross  foreign  reserves  remained  high,  amounting  to  USD 24.6 billion  at  the  end  of 
November 2025,  which  covers  around  8.8 months  of  goods  and  services  imports.  The 
overall central government deficit is projected to narrow from around 5.3% of GDP in 
2025  to  around  4.8%  of  GDP  in  2026  (4.3%  of  GDP  in  2027),  reflecting  expected 
continued  revenue  mobilisation  and  expenditure  discipline.  Public  and  publicly 
guaranteed debt remained elevated at 108.6% of GDP at the end of 2025 (83.4% of GDP 
net of Social Security Corporation’s holdings), with 42.2% of GDP external debt. In 2025, 
credit  rating  agencies  have  maintained  Jordan’s  sovereign  credit  rating  at  speculative 
grade. 

The  outbreak  of  the  war  in  Gaza  in  October 2023  generated  significant  spillovers, 
increasing pressure on Jordan’s security and testing its economic resilience. Against this 
background, the Jordanian authorities requested a new MFA operation in October 2023. 
The co-legislators approved the ‘MFA IV’ operation in April 2025 for EUR 500 million in 
loans9, and a first disbursement of EUR 250 million followed in September 2025. This first 
disbursement  was  conditional  on  fulfilment  of  the  preconditions,  i.e.  the  political 
precondition and a satisfactory track record under the IMF programme. The operation was 
front-loaded in order to help Jordan meet urgent external financing needs amid heightened 
regional instability, while partly compensating for the unusually long delay between the 
October 2023  request  and  the  April 2025  adoption.  Part  of  this  delay  was  linked  to  the 
2024 European Parliament elections and the subsequent constituent process. 

The  remaining  instalments  of  EUR 150 million  and  EUR 100 million  are  scheduled  for 
2026 and 2027, subject to fulfilment of the preconditions and the policy conditions agreed 
in the MoU, which focus on strengthening public finances, enhancing governance and anti-
corruption,  improving  social  protection  and  labour  market  policies,  and  supporting  the 
green transition and a more dynamic business environment. 

Jordan’s close relationship with the IMF is anchored in a four-year Extended Fund Facility 
arrangement  approved  in  January 2024  with  total  access  equivalent  to  around 
USD 1.3 billion,  and  a  Resilience  and  Sustainability  Facility  arrangement  approved  in 
June 2025,  with  access  equivalent  to  around  USD 700 million.  The  most  recent  review 
under  the  two  facilities  took  place  in  April 2026,  when  the  IMF  reached  a  staff-level 
agreement with the authorities; it highlighted the strong programme performance despite 
an  increasingly  challenging  external  environment  resulting  from  the  latest  war  in  the 
Middle  East.  The  IMF  assessed  Jordan’s  fiscal  performance  as  remaining  in  line  with 
programme  targets,  supported  by  robust  revenue  collection  and  disciplined  current 
spending. The authorities are committed to sustaining a gradual fiscal consolidation to set 
the public debt ratio on a downward path, anchored in the Medium-Term Revenue Strategy 
and improvements in public utility finances, while preserving space for essential social and 
public investment spending. 

Given  a  challenging  economic  situation  and  sizeable  unmet  financing  needs,  Jordan 
requested an additional EUR 500 million ‘MFA V’ operation in January 2025. The request 

9 Decision (EU) 2025/793 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 April 2025 providing macro-financial 
assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, OJ L, 2025/793, 22.4.2025. 

7 

 
 
pointed  to  a  deteriorating  economic  and  political  environment,  with  regional  turmoil 
intensifying  throughout  2024  against  an  already  uncertain  global  backdrop.  The  co-
legislators approved the new operation in January 202610, with disbursements planned over 
2026-2027 in parallel with MFA IV. Negotiations on the MoU are ongoing. Both MFA IV 
and V  are part of the broad framework of the EU-Jordan Strategic  and  Comprehensive 
Partnership initiated in January 2025.  

2.3 Western Balkans 

• 

North Macedonia 

GDP growth accelerated from 3% in 2024 to 3.5% in 2025, largely driven by investment 
as  works  on  public  road  projects  gathered  pace.  Private  investment  also  increased, 
supported by government-subsidised loans. Household consumption growth remained at 
the  same  level  as  one  year  earlier  (2.2%  year-on-year),  underpinned  by  rising  real 
disposable  incomes  due  to  increases  in  pensions  and  wages  amid  temporarily  easing 
inflation,  as  well  as  by  robust  credit  expansion.  A  further  contribution  to  growth  came 
from public consumption (+5.3%), mainly reflecting strong public-sector wage increases. 
Exports recovered in 2025 (+6.1%), after declining, in real terms, in 2024. However, with 
investment  and  export  production  depending  heavily  on  imported  inputs,  the  annual 
increase in imports was more substantial (+6.8%). Overall, the contribution of net exports 
to GDP growth remained negative. Average annual consumer price inflation accelerated 
to  4.1%  in  2025,  from  3.5%  in  2024,  driven  by  food  prices  despite  the  government’s 
temporary price controls, and on the domestic front by rising wage costs, which impacted 
services.  The  central  bank  maintained  a  cautious  policy  stance,  raising  reserve 
requirements  and  bolstering  its  macroprudential  instruments.  In  December 2025,  it 
adjusted  its  monetary  policy  framework  to  improve  liquidity  management  and  policy 
transmission. The current account deficit widened in 2025 by 2.1 percentage points year-
on-year to 4.3% of GDP, mainly due to a lower surplus in the secondary income balance 
and  in  the  services  balance.  Net  foreign  direct  investment  inflows  decreased  from  an 
exceptionally  high  level  in  2024  (6.6%)  to  2.2%  of  GDP  in  2025,  as  a  result  of  large 
outflows of intercompany lending rather than a decline in greenfield investments. Fiscal 
policy remained expansionary. The general government deficit declined by 0.5 percentage 
points in annual terms to 4% of GDP in 2025, as targeted by the government. A mid-year 
budget  rebalancing  cut  capital  expenditure  to  fund  new  spending  commitments,  in 
particular for public-sector wages and pensions. At the end of 2025, North Macedonia’s 
public  debt  level  was  some  10 percentage  points  above  its  pre-pandemic  level  (2019), 
amounting  to  59.6%  of  GDP,  with  general  government  debt  having  risen  by 
11.3 percentage points to 51.8% in this period. 

In  February 2023,  the  Commission  adopted  a  proposal  to  provide  MFA  to  North 
Macedonia of up to EUR 100 million in loans, to be disbursed in two equal instalments. 

10 Decision (EU) 2026/188 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2026 providing macro-financial 
assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, OJ L, 2026/188, 23.1.2026. 

8 

 
 
 
The  co-legislators  approved  the  operation  in  July 202311,  and  the  Commission  and  the 
North  Macedonian  authorities  signed  the  MoU  in  January 2024.  The  MoU  contains  20 
policy  conditions  (eight  of  which  relate  to  the  first  instalment)  in  the  following  areas: 
public  finance,  business  environment,  education  and  labour  market,  energy,  judiciary, 
good  governance  and  the  fight  against  corruption.  The  Commission  disbursed  the  first 
instalment of EUR 50 million in April 2024, after assessing that all related conditions were 
met. 

To date, the second instalment of EUR 50 million has not been disbursed as the authorities 
have not requested the funds, and have therefore not submitted a compliance statement for 
the  implementation  of  the  policy  reforms  attached  to  it.  Following  the  expiry  of  the 
Precautionary  and  Liquidity  Line  arrangement  with  the  IMF  in  November 2024,  North 
Macedonia has not agreed on a new disbursing programme with the IMF, which is among 
the preconditions for the release of an MFA instalment. The availability period of the MFA 
operation ends in August 2026. 

3.  ENSURING  PROPER  USE  OF  MFA  FUNDS:  OPERATIONAL 

ASSESSMENTS AND EX POST EVALUATIONS 

3.1 Operational assessments 

In line with  the requirements of  Regulation  (EU, Euratom) 2024/250912  (the ‘Financial 
Regulation’), the Commission carries out operational assessments with the help of external 
consultants  to  obtain  reasonable  assurances  on  the  functioning  of  administrative 
procedures and financial circuits in beneficiary countries. 

Operational  assessments  examine  public  financial  management  (PFM)  systems,  in 
particular the institutional set-up and procedures of ministries of finance and central banks, 
and  more  specifically  the  management  of  accounts  receiving  EU  financial  assistance. 
Special attention is also paid to the functioning, independence and work programmes of 
external audit institutions, and to the effectiveness of their controls. In addition, central-
level public procurement procedures are reviewed. 

An operational assessment of Ukraine’s administrative and financial circuits was carried 
out in 2022, preceding the exceptional MFA support (2022), the MFA+ (2023), and the 
ERA  MFA  (2024-2025).  It  concluded  that  considerable  progress  had  been  made  in 
strengthening PFM systems and other financial circuits since the previous assessment in 
2018.  It  also  highlighted  the  Ukrainian  authorities’  ongoing  commitment  to  continuous 
improvement.  The  assessment  emphasised  prioritising  PFM  reforms  in  key  areas  and 
recommended further action once security improves, given the significant reconstruction 
efforts ahead. 

11 Decision (EU) 2023/1461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 providing macro-financial 
assistance to the Republic of North Macedonia, OJ L 180, 17.7.2023, p. 1. 

12 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the 
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024. 

9 

 
 
 
In early 2026, in view of the expected launch of a new MFA operation for Ukraine, the 
Commission  initiated a new operational  assessment  of the  country’s  administrative and 
financial  circuits.  The  assessment  concluded  that  Ukraine’s  PFM  systems  and  other 
financial  circuits  had  improved  considerably  since  the  assessment  in  2022.  On  the  one 
hand, it praised the government’s sustained focus and commitment despite the protracted 
war and deteriorating conditions in the country, and noted ample evidence to suggest that 
several  reforms  to  improve  crucial  regulatory  issues,  systems  and  processes  have  been 
implemented or are ongoing. On the other hand, the assessment highlighted that many of 
the regulatory reforms would need to be tested in practice and stressed that several critical 
areas would require the authorities’ attention once normality was restored in Ukraine. 

In 2023, an operational assessment of North Macedonia was carried out ahead of the MFA 
operation. The assessment found that the country’s financial circuits and procedures were 
satisfactory  and  deemed  the  PFM  systems  generally  sound,  noting  significant  recent 
progress. 

As  regards  Egypt  and  Jordan,  operational  assessments  were  carried  out  in  2024  in 
preparation for their respective MFA operations. In Egypt, the assessment established that 
the  authorities  had  made  significant  progress,  including  introducing  new  legislation 
governing  PFM  and  banking  operations,  and  concluded  that  the  PFM  framework  and 
financial circuits were adequate for MFA, if reform momentum was maintained. 

The operational assessment for Jordan was the second since 2020 and confirmed progress 
in  improving  PFM  systems  and  public  spending  efficiency.  However,  it  also  identified 
some  challenges,  such  as  limited  independence  and  transparency  of  the  Audit  Bureau, 
underutilisation  of  the  Procurement  Complaints  Review  Committee,  and  a  shallow 
secondary  market  for  government  securities.  Despite  these  issues,  the  assessment 
concluded that Jordan’s administrative and financial circuits provided a strong foundation 
for  the  implementation  of  MFA  operations.  Some  of  the  identified  weaknesses  were 
reflected in the policy conditionality of the respective operations13. 

3.2 Evaluations 

In line with the Financial Regulation and the respective MFA decisions, the Commission 
systematically carries out ex post evaluations after the completion of MFA operations. The 
purpose of these evaluations is to analyse the impact of MFA on the beneficiary country’s 
economy, in particular the sustainability of its external position, and to assess the added 
value of the EU’s intervention. 

In January 2025, the Commission published the joint ex post evaluation of MFA operations 
in three Eastern Neighbourhood countries (Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine) between 2017 
and  2020.  For  all  three  countries,  the  evaluation  concluded  that  the  operations  had  a 
positive impact on debt sustainability and on the country’s macroeconomic stabilisation. 
This was particularly significant for Ukraine, given the larger scale of the operation and 
the country’s challenging economic situation. The evaluation also concluded that the three 

13 For Jordan’s MFA IV MoU, the operational assessment helped shape several measures, including: (i) requiring an 
annual  procurement  report  to  summarise  procurement-related  complaints  and  dispute-resolution  outcomes;  (ii) 
strengthening the Audit Bureau’s independence by gradually withdrawing from ex ante audit activities in internal control 
units; and (iii) significantly expanding the scope of the Audit Bureau’s annual report, starting with the edition covering 
2025 activities. 

10 

 
 
operations  successfully  fostered  positive  change  in  several  key  reform  areas,  including 
governance and anti-corruption, and that they were consistent with the broader EU policy 
framework, aligning with the authorities’ reform agendas and other donors’ programmes. 

In  December 2025,  the  Commission  published the  ex post  evaluation  of  the  COVID-19 
MFA  operations  for  10  partner  countries  (2020-2022).  The  evaluation  assessed  the 
EUR 3 billion  MFA  package  provided  in  2020  to  partners  across  the  Eastern 
Neighbourhood,  Western  Balkans  and  Southern  Neighbourhood  regions  to  mitigate  the 
economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The evaluation concluded that the package 
was a timely, well-targeted and highly relevant response to the unprecedented economic 
shock triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. The instrument was capable of providing a 
rapid  and  effective  response  to  a  systemic  external  shock  affecting  multiple  countries 
simultaneously without compromising the quality of MFA intervention, progress on the 
reforms  to  improve  macroeconomic  management,  or  economic  governance  and 
transparency. It also fostered sustainable growth and related policy conditionality. 

In  2025,  the  Commission  launched  an  ex post  evaluation  of  the  four  MFA  operations 
provided to Ukraine from 2022 to 2023 as a sizeable contribution to the financing of the 
country’s immediate funding needs in the face of Russia’s war of aggression (Emergency 
MFA, Exceptional MFA I and II, and MFA+, of EUR 1.2, 6 and 18 billion respectively). 
The evaluation will consider the exceptional context of a country defending itself against 
a war of aggression and the urgency of the financing needs, as well as the resulting design 
specificities of the operations. 

4.  GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO THE MFA INSTRUMENT 

4.1  Functioning of the MFA instrument 

The  2013  Joint  Declaration  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  MFA14 
frames the assistance as macroeconomic and financial in nature and states that its aim is 
‘to  restore  a  sustainable  external  finance  situation  for  eligible  countries  and  territories 
facing external financing difficulties’. As an emergency instrument, MFA must therefore 
be mobilised effectively and in a timely manner. Decision-making involving the ordinary 
legislative procedure has often been identified as fairly time-consuming, which constitutes 
a significant constraint for a crisis tool intended to provide a swift response to a balance-
of-payments crisis. 

However, in exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 crisis and Russia’s war 
of aggression against Ukraine, the relevant  MFA packages  were adopted  rapidly, as  all 
institutions made full use of available procedural flexibilities. In these cases, the European 
Parliament and the Council agreed to apply existing urgency procedures, enabling adoption 
within  one  month  of  the  Commission’s  proposals.  The  European  Parliament  invoked 
Rule 163 of its Rules of Procedure to swiftly  proceed with  the legislative proposal and 
adopt it directly in plenary, streamlining the consultation of committees. 

14 Decision No 778/2013/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 August 2013 providing further macro-
financial assistance to Georgia, OJ L 218, 14.8.2013, p. 15. 

11 

 
 
 
The  Rules  of  Procedure  of  both  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  provide  for 
urgency procedures enabling swift adoption in exceptional cases. The standard procedure 
is  considerably  lengthier,  as  illustrated  by  the  Commission’s  ‘MFA IV’  proposal  for 
Jordan, proposed by the Commission in April 2024 and adopted by the co-legislators in 
April 2025. This timeframe was partly the result of the June 2024 European Parliament 
elections and the subsequent reconstitution of its committees. By contrast, the ‘MFA V’ 
for  Jordan  was  adopted  much  more  quickly,  with  the  Commission’s  proposal  in 
August 2025  and  approval  by  the  co-legislators  in  January 2026.  In  Egypt’s  case,  the 
urgent  need  to  deliver  support  in  the  second  half  of  2024  led  the  Commission  to 
exceptionally  propose  in  March 2024  a  first  urgent  short-term  MFA  operation  under 
Article 213 TFEU (applicable in  cases where urgent  financial  assistance is needed,  and 
requiring adoption by the Council only). However, the Commission proposed to provide 
the bulk of the support via a second and more medium-term MFA operation following the 
normal procedure under Article 212 TFEU (involving both co-legislators). 

In this regard, it is important to note that the simplified procedure for the adoption of a 
European Parliament decision has been amended. In contrast to the urgent procedure, the 
simplified procedure does not require a request from the President to treat the proposal as 
urgent and streamlines the adoption process by requiring fewer steps for approval than the 
standard procedure. This procedure has not yet been used for ongoing MFAs, but could fit 
well  with  the  emergency  nature  of  MFA;  it  is  a  welcome  step  towards  potentially 
increasing the effectiveness of regular operations. 

4.2  MFA in the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework 

The  current  multiannual  financial  framework  (MFF)  period  has  been  characterised  by 
multiple crises, extremely high geopolitical tensions and uncertainty that have hit the EU’s 
partner  countries  and  exacerbated 
their  structural  economic  vulnerabilities.  In 
chronological order these include the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and, more recently, the escalating conflicts in 
the Middle East. Against this background, MFA has been in high demand in recent years, 
proving to be a major pillar of the EU’s response to address macroeconomic instability in 
its  neighbourhood  (including  candidate  countries),  complementing  the  EU’s  external 
policies  and  helping  partner  countries  implement  critical  reforms.  Given  the  continued 
challenging global outlook, the need for the EU to provide MFA is likely to remain high 
in the years to come. 

MFA  loans  are  guaranteed  by  the  External  Action  Guarantee  under  Regulation 
(EU) 2021/94715 (the ‘NDICI_GE Regulation’) at a provisioning rate of 9% at portfolio 
level, as was the case for previous MFFs. Recognising the exceptional situation of lending 
to  a  country  at  war,  initially  without  the  backing  of  a  disbursing  IMF  programme, 
provisioning to Ukraine has been set at 70%, starting with the exceptional MFA in 2022. 

The total budget initially earmarked for the provisioning of MFA loans was fixed at around 
EUR 1 billion in the current MFF, which translates into a loan volume of EUR 11 billion. 

15  Regulation  (EU) 2021/947  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  9  June  2021  establishing  the 
Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe ; OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, pp. 1–
78 

12 

 
 
Given the EU’s sizeable support to Ukraine via MFA in 2022, its higher provisioning rate, 
and  increasing  tensions  in  the  Middle  East,  more  than  two  thirds  of  the  earmarked 
provisioning  had  been  used  by  the  end  of  2023.  In  the  context  of  the  MFF  mid-term 
revision,  it  was  decided  to  reinforce  the  budget  for  the  provisioning  of  MFA  loans  by 
EUR 180 million.  This  enabled the mobilisation  of sufficient  resources to  fund a short-
term MFA to Egypt of up to EUR 1 billion, and a regular MFA operation for Egypt of up 
to EUR 4 billion, adopted in April 2025 by the co-legislators, while leaving some room for 
other MFA operations until the end of 2027 (see Section 5 for a list of MFA operations 
funded from 2021 to 2027). 

As crises are unpredictable by nature, it is essential to keep a sufficiently large budget for 
potential future MFA operations in the two remaining years of this MFF (2026-2027). The 
budget  available at  the reporting  date could  cover up to  EUR 2.2 billion of loans  at  the 
standard 9% provisioning rate. Loans granted to Ukraine as part of the MFA+ programme, 
and the ERA MFA loan (EUR 18 billion and EUR 18.1 billion respectively) are backed by 
the  headroom  under  the  own  resources  ceiling  and  not  provisioned  ex ante.  They  are 
backstopped by the possibility of calling on additional own resources from Member States 
after having exhausted all other possibilities within the existing budgetary framework. In 
the case of the ERA MFA operation, loan repayments (including interest and any other 
costs related to the loan) from the extraordinary revenues arising from the immobilised 
Russian central bank assets provide significant financial backing. 

4.3  MFA as proposed in the next multiannual financial framework 2028-2034 

Commission’s proposal 

The Commission presented its  proposals for the next Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) on 16 July and 3 September 2025, including the one for Global Europe 16, the main 
financing instrument for external action.  With a proposed budget of EUR 200 billion, the 
objective of Global  Europe  is  to  support  EU  enlargement, neighbourhood,  international 
partnerships and humanitarian aid. In addition, to underpin the EU’s unwavering support 
for Ukraine, additional EUR 100 billion may be mobilised for Ukraine over 2028-2034.  

Global Europe includes expanded use of financial instruments, budgetary guarantees and 
loans  backed  by  the  EU  budget  to  increase  leverage  in  financing  actions  in  partner 
countries.  On the basis of the proposal, the provisioning for MFA loans would be sourced 
from Global Europe budget, although the governance of MFA operations would remain 
specific,  as  is  currently  the  case  under  the  NDICI  Regulation.  This  would  preserve  the 
current interinstitutional balance on decision-making for MFA, in line with the 2013 Joint 
Declaration by the European Parliament and the Council. MFA would remain available 
alongside  the  proposed  policy-based  loans  as  a  complementary  instrument  within  the 
external  financing  toolbox,  enabling  the  EU  to  continue  responding  to  balance-of-
payments crises in partner countries, hand in hand with the IMF. 

Negotiations on the next MFF have started, and the European Parliament and the Council 
are establishing their positions. 

16 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Global Europe, COM/2025/551 
final 

13 

 
 
5  LOOKING AHEAD – MFA OPERATIONS AND THE BUDGETARY SITUATION IN 2026 

Considering the non-programmable, crisis-driven nature of MFA, it is difficult to provide 
an  accurate  prediction  of  future  operations  for  the  remainder  of  the  current  MFF.  This 
section therefore focuses on operations already approved in 2026 and points to potential 
future operations, highlighting the rapidly changing geopolitical environment. 

In the Eastern Neighbourhood, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to 
have a significant economic impact on the region. Ukraine and Moldova are most exposed. 
Both countries remain reliant on substantial international aid, with the EU playing a key 
role in this respect. 

In view of Russia’s continued war of aggression and the resulting significant and persistent 
financing and defence needs faced by Ukraine, EU leaders agreed on 18 December 202517 
to provide a new limited-recourse support loan of EUR 90 billion for 2026-2027, financed 
through EU borrowing on capital markets, backed by the EU headroom. The loan will be 
repayable only  once reparations are received by  Ukraine,  while mobilisation of the EU 
budget guarantee under enhanced cooperation ensures that the financial obligations of non-
participating Member States (Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia) remain unaffected. 

Building  on  this  political  agreement,  on  14 January  2026  the  Commission  adopted  a 
legislative package comprising a proposal establishing the Ukraine Support Loan (USL) 
and  amendments  to  the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  Regulation  and  the  Ukraine 
Facility Regulation. The co-legislators adopted the USL package between February and 
April 202618. The new support framework will deliver substantial budgetary assistance of 
about  one  third  of  the  USL  through  a  combination  of  instruments,  including  MFA  and 
funding channelled via the Ukraine Facility and via the defence leg of the USL. 

The  MFA  component  will  focus  on  conditions  strengthening  domestic  revenue 
mobilisation as well as the sustainability  and quality  of public expenditure. It  will seek 
complementarity with the new IMF programme and will try to address the root causes of 
corruption  in  public  finances.  Beyond  MFA,  the  EU’s  EUR 50 billion  Ukraine  Facility 
(2024-2027),  which  aims  to  support  key  structural  reforms  in  Ukraine’s  path  to  EU 
accession, will be topped up via the USL. 

In  addition,  Moldova’s  Growth  Plan  of  up  to  EUR 1.9 billion  in  2025  to  2027  aims  to 
support the country’s economic convergence with the EU and help bring the country closer 
to EU membership by accelerating reforms and improving Moldova’s access to the EU’s 
single market. 

In  the  Southern  Neighbourhood,  in  November 2022  Tunisia  requested  MFA  of 
EUR 1.2 billion  to  support  its  financing  needs  against  the  background  of  the  worsened 
global environment and high international commodity prices. This followed a staff-level 

17 European Council conclusions, 18 December 2025. 
18 Regulation (EU) 2026/467 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 February 2026 implementing enhanced 
cooperation on the establishment of the Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027, OJ L, 2026/467, 26.2.2026; Regulation 
(EU) 2026/468 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 February 2026 amending Regulation (EU) 2024/792 
establishing  the  Ukraine  Facility,  OJ L,  2026/468,  26.2.2026;  Council  Regulation  (EU)  2026/469  of  23  April  2026 
amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 
2027, OJ L, 2026/469, 23.4.2026. 

14 

 
 
 
agreement reached with the IMF in October 2022 for a new Extended Fund Facility (four 
years, USD 1.9 billion). However, the IMF Board did not adopt the programme owing to 
Tunisia’s  inability  to  implement  prior  actions,  notably  a  fuel  subsidy  reform.  After  the 
Tunisian President voiced his opposition to an IMF programme in March 2023, contact 
with the IMF was reduced to a minimum, with Article IV surveillance also discontinued. 
In  the  meantime,  buoyant  tourism  and  steady  remittances  have  temporarily  eased  the 
external  financing  pressure  on  Tunisia.  Subject  to  a  careful  assessment  of  MFA 
preconditions  and  Tunisia’s  external  financing  needs,  the  Commission  stands  ready  to 
prepare a proposal  for a new MFA once an IMF programme is in place confirming the 
country’s willingness to address the root causes of its external financing pressures. This 
was also confirmed as part of the comprehensive partnership between the EU and Tunisia 
agreed in July 2023; however, it was noted that substantial and forceful implementation of 
additional reforms would be required. 

In  April 2022,  Lebanon  reached  a  staff-level  agreement  with  the  IMF  (four  years, 
USD 3 billion), but so far, it has made only limited progress on its long list of prior actions. 
GDP  has  since  continued  to  shrink,  while  many  public  institutions  have  stopped 
functioning  and  the  currency  has  dramatically  lost  value,  leading  to  broad-based 
dollarisation of the Lebanese economy. In January 2025, the Lebanese Parliament elected 
a president, and a new prime minister was appointed a few days later, ending more than 
five years of political deadlock and creating the conditions for a new push for reforms and 
re-engagement with the IMF. In March 2025, the new government officially requested a 
new IMF programme, a potential positive step in addressing the economic crisis through 
international assistance and comprehensive reforms. Since then, the government has made 
some progress on crucial reforms, including by adopting legislation that would partially 
resolve  the  banking  sector  crisis.  Such  reforms  are  a  precondition  for  a  new  IMF 
programme. However, as of April 2026, key laws had either not yet been adopted by the 
parliament or needed to be reopened as IMF core demands had not been fully met. While 
the postponement by two years of the next elections may be conducive to further progress 
on these laws, the recent resurgence of conflicts in the country and the region represents 
an additional challenge for economic reforms. The Commission stands ready to support a 
comprehensive reform agenda with an MFA operation once the preconditions (including 
an updated on-track disbursing IMF programme) are fulfilled. 

The Commission stands ready to consider future requests for MFA and will, if appropriate, 
propose new and/or follow-up MFA operations to eligible partners. 

Table 1  provides  an  overview  of  commitments  and  payments  of  MFA  grants  and  the 
disbursement of MFA loans for 2023, 2024, 2025 and (tentatively) 2026. 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Commitments and payments for MFA grants and disbursements of MFA 
loans 2023-2026 (EUR)19 

Commitment appropriations for grants in 
the budget 

45 423 330 

57 367 177 

59 267 773 

61 511 946 

Operational assessments, ex post evaluations 

350 000 

619 440 

331 775 

750 000 

2023 

2024 

2025 

2026 

Other possible MFA operations 

45 073 330 

56 747 737 

58 935 998 

60 761 946 

Commitments, total 

45 423 330 

57 367 177 

59 267 773 

- 

Payment appropriations for grants in the 
budget 

39 880 000 

57 367 177 

59 267 773 

61 511 946 

Operational assessments, ex post evaluations 

329 765 

749 270 

331 775 

750 000 

MFA Moldova (Decision (EU) 2022/563) 
(completed) 
MFA Moldova (top-up) (Decision (EU) 
2023/1165) (completed) 

10 000 000 

5 000 000 

22 500 000 

22 500 000 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Other possible MFA operations 

- 

- 

- 

60 761 946 

Payments, total 

32 829 765 

28 249 270 

331 775 

61 511 946 

Unused allocations for grants payments 

7 050 235 

29 117 907 

58 935 998 

Disbursements of MFA loans 

MFA Jordan III (completed) 

200 000 000 

- 

- 

MFA Moldova (completed) 

40 000 000 

45 000 000 

Emergency MFA Ukraine (completed) 

Exceptional MFA Ukraine (completed) 

- 

- 

- 

- 

MFA Moldova top-up (completed) 

50 000 000 

50 000 000 

MFA+ Ukraine (completed) 

18 000 000 000 

- 

MFA North Macedonia  

MFA Egypt short-term (completed) 

MFA Egypt – regular 

MFA ERA Ukraine (completed) 

MFA Jordan IV 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

50 000 000 

1 000 000 000 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

18 115 700 000 

- 

250 000 000 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

-  

- 

1 000 000 000  

Disbursements of all MFA loans, total 

18 290 000 000 

1 145 000 000 

18 365 700 000 

1 000 000 000 

19 This table does not take into account any proposal for new MFA operations after December 2025. 

16