Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Hungary
Date: 2026-06-03
Institutions: European Commission, Reform and Investment Task Force
Subjects: Hungary, budget policy, economic policy, economic recovery, economic reform, employment policy, investment, macroeconomics, social policy, stability pact

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 3.6.2026  COM(2026) 217 final  Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Hungary {SWD(2026) 217 final}  
 
Recommendation for a 

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION 

on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Hungary 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular 
Article 121(2) and Article 148(4) thereof, 

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of  29 April 2024  on  the  effective  coordination  of  economic  policies  and  on  multilateral 
budgetary  surveillance  and  repealing  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1466/97  (1),  and  in 
particular Article 3(3) thereof, 

Having  regard  to  Regulation  (EU)  No  1176/2011  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council  of  16  November  2011  on  the  prevention  and  correction  of  macroeconomic 
imbalances (2), and in particular Article 6(1) thereof, 

Having regard to the recommendation of the European Commission, 

Having regard to the resolutions of the European Parliament, 

Having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Employment Committee, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Social Protection Committee, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic Policy Committee, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

1 

2 

Regulation  (EU)  2024/1263  specifies  the  objectives  of  the  economic  governance 
framework,  which  aims  at  promoting  sound  and  sustainable  public  finances, 
sustainable  and  inclusive  growth  and  resilience  through  reforms  and  investments,  as 
well  as  preventing  excessive  government  deficits.  The  Regulation  stipulates  that  the 
Council  and  the  Commission  conduct  multilateral  surveillance  in  the  context  of  the 
European Semester in accordance with the objectives and requirements set out in the 
Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU).  The  European  Semester 
includes, in particular, the formulation, and the surveillance of the implementation, of 
country-specific recommendations. 

Regulation  (EU)  2024/1263  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  29 April 2024  on  the 
effective  coordination  of  economic  policies  and  on  multilateral  budgetary  surveillance  and  repealing 
Council  Regulation 
ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj) 
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 
imbalances  (OJ  L  306,  23.11.2011 
on 
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/1176/oj) 

the  prevention  and  correction  of  macroeconomic 

30 April 2024, 

(EC)  No 

2024/1263, 

1466/97 

(OJ 

L, 

EN 

1 

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(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

On  16 July 2025,  the  Commission  adopted  its  proposal  for  a  regulation  establishing 
the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, 
fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending 
Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 (3). The proposal 
aims to increase the effectiveness of Union funding by reducing the fragmentation of 
the  financial  architecture  and  to  support  Member  States  in  the  coordination  of  their 
economic policy in line with Article 175 (TFEU).   

On  25 November 2025,  on  the  basis  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1176/2011,  the 
Commission  adopted  the  2026  Alert  Mechanism  Report,  in  which  it  identified 
Hungary as one of the Member States for which an in-depth review would be needed. 
The  Commission  also  adopted  a  recommendation  for  a  Council  recommendation  on 
the  euro  area,  a  recommendation  for  a  Council 
the  economic  policy  of 
recommendation on human capital in the European Union, and a proposal for the 2026 
Joint  Employment  Report,  which  analyses  the  implementation  of  the  Employment 
Guidelines  and  the  principles  of  the  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights.  The  Council 
adopted the Recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area (4)  on 21 April 
2026  and  the  Joint  Employment  Report,  and  the  Recommendation  on  human  capital 
on 9 March 2026.  

On  29 January 2025,  the  Commission  published  the  Competitiveness  Compass,  a 
strategic  framework  that  aims  to  boost  the  Union’s  global  competitiveness  over  the 
next  five  years.  It  identifies  the  three  transformational  imperatives  of  innovation, 
decarbonisation  and  competitiveness,  and  security  as  critical  pillars  for  sustainable 
economic  growth.  The  European  Semester  is  aligned  with  the  Competitiveness 
Compass,  ensuring  that  Member  States’  economic  policies  are  consistent  with  the 
Commission’s  strategic  objectives,  creating  a  unified  approach 
to  economic 
governance that fosters sustainable growth, innovation and resilience across the Union. 

In  2026,  the  European  Semester  for  economic  policy  coordination  continues  to 
develop  alongside  the  final  stage  of  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (RRF) 
implementation (5). Recovery and resilience plans (RRPs), along with cohesion policy 
funding, have been essential for delivering on the policy priorities under the European 
Semester, as the plans were required to effectively address all or a significant subset of 
challenges identified in the relevant country-specific recommendations issued in recent 
cycles, and programmes funded by the European cohesion policy were required to take 
country-specific recommendations into account. As the RRF approaches the end of its 
lifetime,  it  remains  essential  to  sustain  the  reforms  and  investments  supported  and 
implemented  under  the  RRF,  in  particular  those  that  contribute  to  addressing 
challenges identified in the country-specific recommendations.  

(6) 

On  3 June 2026,  the  Commission  published  the  2026  country  report  for  Hungary.  It 
relevant  country-specific 
in  addressing 
assessed  Hungary’s  progress 

the 

3 

4 
5 

Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  establishing  the  European 
Fund  for  economic,  social  and  territorial  cohesion,  agriculture  and  rural,  fisheries  and  maritime, 
prosperity  and  security  for  the  period  2028-2034  and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  2023/955  and 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 - COM(2025) 565 final. The proposed Regulation is currently the 
subject of negotiations with the co-legislators. 
OJ C, C/2026/2434, 28 April 2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/2434/oj   
Regulation  (EU)  2021/241  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12 February 2021 
(OJ  L  57,  18.2.2021,  p.  17,  ELI: 
establishing 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj). 

the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility 

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recommendations  and  took  stock  of  Hungary’s  implementation  of  the  RRP.  On  the 
basis  of  that  analysis,  the  country  report  identified  the  most  pressing  challenges 
Hungary is facing. It also assessed Hungary’s progress in implementing the European 
Pillar  of  Social  Rights  and  in  achieving  the  Union  headline  targets  on  employment, 
skills  and  poverty  reduction,  as  well  as  progress  in  achieving  the  United  Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals.  

The  Commission  carried  out  an  in-depth  review  under  Article  5  of  Regulation  (EU) 
No 1176/2011 for Hungary. The main findings of the Commission’s staff assessment 
of  macroeconomic  vulnerabilities  for  Hungary  for  the  purposes  of  that  Regulation 
were published on 20 May 2026 (6). On 3 June 2026, the Commission concluded that 
Hungary  is  experiencing  macroeconomic  imbalances.  In  particular,  vulnerabilities 
related to competitiveness, government financing needs, and house prices persist, and 
policies  have  continued  compounding  those  vulnerabilities.  Inflation  and  unit  labour 
costs  growth  have  been  among  the  highest  in  the  EU  despite  stagnating  economic 
activity. Price and cost pressures are expected to ease only gradually, while remaining 
much higher than in the euro area and EU. Government deficits have been elevated in 
the past years and are not forecast to improve. Government financing needs and debt 
servicing costs remain high, although the government debt-to-GDP ratio has risen only 
marginally  thanks  to  the  high  nominal  GDP  growth  in  the  context  of  still  elevated 
inflation.  Banks  continue  to  hold  large  sovereign  exposures,  partly  reflecting  tax 
incentives. House prices have continued to increase strongly and risks of overvaluation 
have risen. The current account has remained in surplus, but Hungary’s high reliance 
on  energy  imports  makes  it  vulnerable  to  higher  and  more  volatile  energy  prices. 
Policies  have  not  improved  and  have  compounded  some  of  the  vulnerabilities. 
Untargeted subsidies that add to price pressures and compound fiscal challenges have 
even  been  stepped  up,  while  extensive  government  subsidised  lending  strain  public 
finances  and  limit  the  effectiveness  of  monetary  policy.  Looking  ahead,  effectively 
overcoming those policies would reduce vulnerabilities. 

On  18 February 2025,  the  Council,  upon  the  assessment  and  recommendation  of  the 
Commission, adopted a Recommendation endorsing the national medium-term fiscal-
structural  plan of Hungary (7). The plan  covers the period from  2025 until  2028 and 
presents  a  fiscal  adjustment  spread  over  four  years.  The  Council  recommended  the 
following  maximum  growth  rates  of  net  expenditure:  4.3%  in  2025,  4.0%  in  2026, 
3.9%  in  2027  and  3.7%  in  2028,  which  correspond  to  the  maximum  cumulative 
growth rates calculated by reference to the base year of 2023 of 9.1% in 2025, 13.5% 
in 2026, 17.9% in 2027 and 22.2% in 2028. For the years 2025-2026, these maximum 
growth rates of net expenditure coincide with the corrective path, as recommended by 
the Council under Article 126(7) TFEU on 18 February 2025, with a view to bringing 
an  end  to  the  situation  of  an  excessive  deficit  in  Hungary  (8).  Based  on  the 

SWD(2026) 138 final. 
Council  Recommendation  of  18 February 2025  endorsing  the  national  medium-term  fiscal-structural 
plan of Hungary (OJ C, C/2025/1707, 18 March 2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1707/oj).  
Council  Recommendation  with  a  view  to  bringing  an  end  to  the  situation  of  an  excessive  deficit  in 
Hungary,  adopted  on  18 February 2025.  All  documents  related  to  the  excessive  deficit  procedure  of 
Hungary 
https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-governance-
framework/stability-and-growth-pact/corrective-arm-excessive-deficit-procedure/excessive-deficit-
procedures-overview/Hungary_en. 

found 

can 

at: 

be 

(7) 

(8) 

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(9) 

Commission’s assessment on effective action of 3 June 2026 (9), the excessive deficit 
procedure for Hungary is held in abeyance. 

Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine  and  its  repercussions  constitute  an 
existential  challenge  for  the  European  Union.  The  Commission  has  invited  Member 
States  to  request  the  activation  of  the  national  escape  clause  of  the  Stability  and 
Growth Pact in a coordinated manner to support the EU efforts to achieve a rapid and 
significant  increase  in  defence  spending  (10)  and  this  proposal  was  welcomed  by  the 
European Council of 6 March 2025. Following the request of Hungary, on 8 July 2025 
the  Commission,  adopted  a 
the  Council,  upon  a 
Recommendation  allowing  Hungary  to  deviate  from  the  recommended  maximum 
growth  rates  of  net  expenditure  (11).  The  period  when  the  national  escape  clause  is 
activated  (2025-2028)  allows  Hungary  to  reprioritise  government  expenditure  or 
increase  government  revenue  so  that  lastingly  higher  defence  expenditure  would  not 
endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.  

recommendation 

from 

(10)  As  of  the  date  of  adoption  of  this  Recommendation,  Hungary  has  not  submitted  its 
2026  Annual  Progress  Report  on  adherence  to  the  recommended  maximum  growth 
rates  of  net  expenditure.  Hungary  has  also  not  submitted  the  report  on  action  taken 
under  the  excessive  deficit  procedure,  which  would  otherwise  be  integrated  in  the 
Annual Progress Report.  

(11)  Real  GDP  growth  in  2025  was  0.5%  and  HICP  inflation  stood  at  4.4%.  The 
Commission  Spring  2026  Forecast  projects  real  GDP  to  grow  by  1.8%  in  2026  and 
2.1% in 2027, and HICP inflation to stand at 3.2% in 2026 and 3.1% in 2027. 
(12)  Based  on  data  provided  by  Eurostat  (12),  Hungary’s  general  government  deficit 
decreased from  5.1% of  GDP in  2024 to 4.7% of GDP in  2025.  The decrease in  the 
deficit  in  2025  mainly  reflects  lower  interest  expenditure  and  cuts  to  public 
investment.  Based on policy measures known by the cut-off date of the  forecast,  the 
Commission Spring 2026 Forecast projects a deficit of 6.2% of GDP in 2026 and 5.8% 
of GDP in 2027. The increase in 2026 mainly reflects measures targeting households, 
including the further phasing in of the personal income tax exemption for mothers, the 
family tax allowance increase, the 14th month pension, housing supports and a bonus 
for military and law enforcement employees, as well as expenditure slippages.  
(13)  Based  on  the  Commission’s  estimates,  the  fiscal  stance  (13),  which  includes  both 
nationally and EU financed expenditure, was expansionary, by 0.4% of GDP, in 2025. 

9 

10 

11 

12 
13 

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central 
Bank,  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee,  the  Committee  of  Regions  and  the  European 
Investment Bank, 2026 European Semester – Spring Package, COM(2026)200 final.  
Communication  from  the  Commission,  'Accommodating  increased  defence  expenditure  within  the 
Stability and Growth Pact’, Brussels, 19 March 2025, C(2025) 2000 final. 
Council Recommendation of 8 July 2025 allowing Hungary to deviate from the maximum growth rates 
of net expenditure as set by the Council under Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 (Activation of the national 
escape clause), (OJ C, C/2025/3068, 20 August 2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3968/oj). 
Eurostat-Euro Indicators, 22 April 2026. 
The fiscal stance is defined as a measure of the annual change in the underlying budgetary position of 
the  general  government.  It  aims  to  assess  the  economic  impulse  stemming  from  fiscal  policies,  both 
those  that  are  nationally  financed  and  those  that  are  financed  by  the  EU  budget.  The  fiscal  stance  is 
measured as the difference between (i) the medium-term potential growth and (ii) the change in primary 
expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and including expenditure financed by non-repayable 
support (grants) from the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other Union funds. 

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It  is  projected to  be  expansionary, by 1.7% of GDP,  in  2026, and broadly neutral  in 
2027. 

(14)  Based on data provided by Eurostat (14), Hungary’s general government debt increased 
from  73.5%  of  GDP  at  the  end  of  2024  to  74.6%  of  GDP  at  the  end  of  2025.  The 
increase  in  the  debt  ratio  in  2025  mainly  reflects  elevated  interest  expenditure  and 
lower  nominal  GDP  growth.  Based  on  policy  measures  known  at  the  cut-off  date  of 
the forecast, the Commission Spring 2026 Forecast projects the debt-to-GDP ratio to 
increase to 75.1% by the end of 2026 and to further increase to 76.8% by the end of 
2027. The increase in 2026 and 2027 mainly reflects elevated interest expenditure and 
the primary deficit, which are tempered by strong currency appreciation in 2026.  
(15)  Based on Eurostat data (15), total general government defence expenditure in Hungary 
amounted  to  1.8%  of  GDP  in  2025,  corresponding  to  an  increase  of  0.8  percentage 
points  of  GDP  compared  to  the  reference  year  2021.  According  to  the  Commission 
Spring  2026  Forecast,  it  is  projected  at  2.1%  of  GDP  in  2026,  corresponding  to  an 
increase of 1.1 percentage points of GDP compared to 2021. 

(16)  The  Union  continues  to  face  risks  of  energy  supply  disruptions  and  elevated  price 
volatility,  exacerbated  by  geopolitical  tensions  which  affect  global  oil  and  gas 
markets.  Experience  from  the  2022–2023  energy  crisis  has  shown  that  broad  and 
untargeted  measures  entail  large  fiscal  costs  and  are  socially  and  economically 
inefficient.  Since  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  the  Middle  East  in  February 2026, 
Hungary  has  adopted  fiscal  policy  measures  to  mitigate  the  impact  of  high  energy 
prices  on  households  and  firms  (16),  namely  an  untargeted  reduction  in  excise  duties 
for diesel and petrol of 19 HUF per litre, with expiry date on 1 May 2026. According 
to the Commission Spring 2026 Forecast, the fiscal cost of this measure is projected to 
amount  to  less  than  0.1%  of  GDP  in  2026.  According  to  Commission  estimates,  if 
these measures were to remain in force until end-2026, its fiscal cost would amount to 
0.1% of GDP in 2026. 

(17)  Based on the Commission’s calculations, net expenditure in Hungary grew by 8.1% in 
2025  and  11.2%  cumulatively  over  2024  and  2025.  The  net  expenditure  growth  in 
2025 is above the recommended maximum growth rate, corresponding to a deviation 
of  1.5%  of  GDP  in  annual  terms.  When  considering  2024  and  2025  together,  the 
cumulative growth rate of net expenditure is also above the recommended maximum 
growth  rate,  corresponding  to  a  deviation  of  0.8%  of  GDP  in  cumulative  terms. 
However,  the  deviation  is  within  the  flexibility  of  the  national  escape  clause,  taking 
into account the increase in defence spending. 

(18)  Based  on  the  Commission’s  calculations,  net  expenditure  in  Hungary  is  projected  to 
grow  by  9.7%  in  2026,  and  22.0%  cumulatively  over  2024,  2025  and  2026.  The 
projected  net  expenditure  growth  in  2026  is  above  the  recommended  maximum 
growth  rate,  corresponding  to  a  deviation  of  2.3%  of  GDP  in  annual  terms.  When 
considering 2024, 2025 and 2026 together, the projected cumulative growth rate of net 
expenditure is also above the recommended maximum growth rate, corresponding to a 
deviation of 3.0% of GDP in cumulative terms. Taking into account the flexibility for 
higher defence spending provided for by the national escape clause, considering 2024, 

14 
15 
16 

Eurostat-Euro Indicators, 22 April 2026. 
Eurostat, government expenditure by classification of functions of government (COFOG). 
This reflects the situation at the cut-off date of the Commission’s Spring 2026 Forecast (4 May 2026). 

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2025  and  2026  together,  the  projected  cumulative  deviation  of  net  expenditure 
amounts to 1.9% of GDP. 

(19)  Some  practices  distort  the  functioning  of  the  financial  and  retail  market,  which  may 
also  limit  the  effectiveness  of  monetary  policy.  While  caps  on  bank-deposit  and 
corporate-lending rates were phased out in 2024, the government kept the interest rate 
of  retail  mortgage  loans  frozen  at  their  October 2021  level.  To  boost  domestic 
demand, there is a widespread use of broadly targeted subsidised loans to households 
and  corporations.  The  proportion  of  subsidised  loans  remains  high  compared  to  pre-
COVID-19 levels,  which leads to  suboptimal  capital  allocation by financing projects 
with  low  returns  and  limited  productivity  gains.  In  2025  the  government  capped  the 
difference between the retail purchase price and the sales price of a wide range of food 
products and non-durable industrial goods. Additionally motor fuel prices were capped 
in March 2026. 

(20)  The  national  fiscal  framework  offers  only  limited  incentives  for  fiscal  sustainability. 
The  ‘state  of  danger’  in  force  since  2020  has  lifted  the  requirement  to  publish  a 
multiannual budgetary plan and therefore limits the ability of the fiscal framework to 
ensure  a  medium-term  orientation  and  accountability.  The  practice  of  early  budget 
adoption  and  frequent  revisions  reduces  the  credibility  of  targets.  The  national  debt 
rule that requires the government to ensure the public debt ratio is reduced each year 
was not met in 2024 or 2025 and in good times it tends to have a procyclical impact 
exacerbating  imbalances.  The  mandate  and  operational  capacities  of  the  Hungarian 
Fiscal Council remain limited. Moreover, public fund management structures created 
by the government, such as public interest trusts, weaken budgetary oversight as they 
seem  to  operate  without  effective  control  mechanisms.  While  Hungary  conducted 
spending  reviews  in  2023-2024,  the  results  were  not  published  or  reflected  in 
budgetary planning.  

(21)  With an ageing population, Hungary is facing one of the largest increases in pension 
spending  as  a  share  of  GDP  in  the  EU  between  2025  and  2070  (4.1pps).  This  is 
expected to weigh on the long-term sustainability of the public finances. According to 
the Commission’s debt sustainability analysis, Hungary’s risks to fiscal sustainability 
are overall high in both the medium and long term. Moreover, the gradual decline in 
pension adequacy for low-income earners and increasing expenditure on pensions for 
high-income  individuals  have  widened  inequalities  among  pensioners.  In  addition  a 
14th  month  pension  benefit  has  been  introduced  which  is  expected  to  raise  average 
pension levels, but it is non-targeted, it will further impact on inequalities and will add 
to the projected spending pressures weighing on long-term fiscal sustainability.   

(22)  The systematic, meaningful and timely involvement of local and regional authorities, 
social partners, civil society and other relevant stakeholders remains essential in order 
to  ensure broad ownership  for the successful  implementation  of the Union’s funding 
instruments, as well as in the context of the European Semester.    

(23)  The implementation  of  cohesion  policy  programmes,  which  encompass  support  from 
the  European  Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF),  the  Just  Transition  Fund  (JTF), 
the  European  Social  Fund  Plus  (ESF+)  and  the  Cohesion  Fund  (CF)  in Hungary, 
remains  below  EU  average,  both  in  terms  of  project  selection  and  payments.  It  is 
important to step up and accelerate efforts to ensure the swift delivery of investments, 
while maximising their impact on the ground. Hungary is already taking action under 
and 
its 
growth. However, Hungary  continues  to  face  challenges,  including  those  relating  to 

competitiveness 

programmes 

cohesion 

policy 

boost 

to 

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deficiencies  in  the  management  and  control  system,  overly  complex  and  restrictive 
public  procurement  procedures,  and  the  low  take-up  of  financing-not-linked-to-cost 
schemes  in  the  ERDF.  Further  issues  are  the  absence  of  predictable  planning  and 
coordination of calls across several programmes and of mature project pipelines, weak 
territorial  cooperation  and  partnership  mechanisms,  insufficient  professional  and 
financial  capacity  at  subnational  level,  limited  use  of  evaluations,  and  redundant 
administrative and legal arrangements such as the rules governing public investments 
(Act LXIX of 2023) or the system of investments of major importance to the national 
economy.  There is also  scope for Hungary to  ensure the sustainability of key public 
policy  projects  supported  by  ESF+,  including  through  policy  mainstreaming.  At  the 
same time, Hungary needs to  accelerate implementation  of the JTF, as  resources  are 
due  for  disbursement  by  the  end  of  2026.  It  is  essential  to  ensure  that  the  new 
investments  identified  by  Hungary  in  its  mid-term  review  of  the  cohesion  policy 
funds,  notably  those  linked  to  the  five  priorities  identified  in  the  Mid-Term  Review 
Regulation (17), are deployed rapidly and effectively. 

(24)  Hungary  faces  several  challenges  related  to  the  business  environment,  quality  of 
legislation,  public  procurement,  anti-corruption  framework,  access  to  finance, 
innovation,  taxation,  reliance  on  Russian  fossil  fuels,  fossil-fuel  subsidies,  balancing 
of the electricity network, water management, circular economy, transport, education, 
skills  levels  and  integration  of  disadvantaged  groups  into  the  job  market,  social 
assistance, social dialogue, healthcare and housing. 

(25)  The weak business environment is a major barrier to productivity growth. According 
to competitiveness indicators, Hungary was among the worst performers in the EU in 
2025. Business dynamics is low as stringent regulations hold back business creations. 
High  prevalence  of  subsidy  schemes  keeps  less  productive  firms  on  the  market. 
Product  Market  Regulation  is  one of the strictest  among  the OECD EU countries, in 
particular  in  subcategories  on  distortion  induced  by  state  involvement.  The  lack  of 
equal treatment of companies limits competition. The market structure is concentrated 
and  only  a  few  firms  compete  in  specific  markets.  Several  services  are  entrusted  to 
state-owned  or  private  firms  that  operate  without  competition.  The  retail  sector,  in 
particular, operates in an unstable business environment. Retailers are also affected by 
administrative  interventions,  such  as  retail  price  caps,  limits  on  sales  margins, 
mandatory discounts, prohibition of selling food products 48 hours before their expiry 
date  and  mandatory  online  price  reporting.  Policy  measures  and  high  taxes  decrease 
the  competitiveness  of  retailers.  The  State  is  active  in  business  transactions  and 
crowds  out  private  actors  by  purchasing  or  facilitating  the  purchase  of  several  large 
companies.  Various  state  interventions  have  been  used  to  force  –  mostly  foreign  – 
owners to sell their firms, facilitating the creation of public or government-connected 
national  champions.  Firms  are  forced  to operate at  a  loss  due  to  a  supplementary 
mining  tax,  a  CO2  quota  tax,  price-margin  caps  in  retail  and  export  restrictions  on 
construction  materials. These are  not  consistent  with  single  market  rules.  Businesses 
increasingly face  problems  with late  payments. Business  to business  and  public 
sector payment  gaps are  both  on  the  increase  and  above  the  EU average. The 
increasing  presence  of  private  equity  funds  creates  new  challenges.  This  company 
structure  is  used,  in  particular,  by  individuals  with  links  to  the  government  as  it 

17 

Regulation  (EU)  2025/1914  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  18 September 2025 
amending  Regulations  (EU)  2021/1058  and  (EU)  2021/1056  as  regards  specific  measures  to  address 
strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review. 

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ensures  anonymity.  Private  equity  funds  have  increased  significantly  in  number  and 
size  in  recent  years.  Private  equity  funds  are  increasingly  investing  in  companies 
winning public procurements and securing high-value concessions, and have a strong 
presence  in  business  transactions  with  the  State.  The  weak  business  environment 
contributed  to  the  erosion  of  competitiveness  and  holds  back  investments,  and 
ultimately leads to  higher inflation and slow economic recovery as  shown by the in-
depth review on Hungary under the macroeconomic imbalance procedure. 

(26)  Businesses  continue 

to  face  a  highly  volatile  and  unpredictable  regulatory 
environment,  characterised  by  frequent  amendments,  extensive  use  of  emergency 
measures  and  limited  preparation  time  for  economically  significant  regulatory 
changes.  The  sustained  reliance  on  decree-based  regulation  under  the  emergency 
regime  limits  parliamentary  scrutiny  and  contributes  to  compliance  uncertainty  and 
elevated regulatory risk for businesses. Stakeholder involvement and the application of 
better regulation tools remain limited in practice. Hungary scores among the lowest in 
the  EU  for  stakeholder  engagement  in  developing  primary  laws.  Consultation  is  not 
required  in  the  early  phases  of  rulemaking  and  ex  post  evaluation,  while  legally 
mandated, is not conducted systematically. Important draft laws continue to be tabled 
by  individual  members  of  Parliament,  formally  exempting  them  from  standard 
consultation  and  impact  assessment  requirements.  There  is  no  independent  oversight 
body responsible for ensuring the quality of regulatory impact analysis or the breadth 
of  stakeholder  consultation.  Even  when  consultation  is  conducted,  stakeholder  input 
does not necessarily lead to substantive adjustments. 

to  hinder  effective  competition 

(27)  The  procurement  market  remains  vulnerable  to  anticompetitive  practices  and 
corruption risks. The number of public procurement review decisions relative to calls 
for  competition  is  among  the  highest  in  the  EU.  The  perceived  independence  of  the 
Public  Procurement  Arbitration  Board  remains  low  among  businesses.  Structural 
in  procurement  procedures, 
factors  continue 
particularly  in  infrastructure,  defence  and  centralised  procurement  sectors.  High 
market concentration, including among companies with the same ownership structure, 
remains  a  persistent  concern.  Companies  affiliated  with  politically  connected 
economic  actors  are  significantly  more  likely  to  win  public  procurement  contracts, 
including  in  EU-funded  tenders.  The  extensive  use  of  framework  agreements  may 
further  limit  competition  by  locking  in  certain  firms  and  reinforcing  market 
concentration, with limited transparency in second-stage call-off procedures. While the 
transparency of the public procurement system is in general good, in practice concerns 
remain  for  the  lack  of  transparency  of  certain  public  procurement  data  and  the 
application of conflict-of-interest rules. 

(28)  Corruption  remains  an  area  of  strong  concern  as  systemic  weaknesses  of  the  anti-
corruption framework persist. The perception of  widespread  corruption remains very 
high, and it continues to increasingly be perceived as an obstacle to businesses. While 
some  steps  have  been  taken  to  address  corruption  in  general,  high-level  corruption 
remains  a  problem  and  the  anti-corruption  framework  requires  further  strengthening. 
The  asset  declaration  system  still  does  not  fulfil  its  role,  conflict  of  interest  rules 
remain fragmented and their supervision is lacking effectiveness. Similarly, the post-
employment  limitations  applicable  to  high-level  government  officials  are  inadequate 
and  ineffectively  enforced.  The  proliferation  of  new  types  of  public  money 
management  structures  –  in  particular  public  interest  asset  management  foundations 
and private equity funds – lack transparency and pose corruption risks. This is coupled 
by increasing limitations to access to public information and worsening level of media 

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freedom which also limit independent public oversight and control on the government 
and  contribute  to  lowering  the  effectiveness  of  the  anti-corruption  framework 
altogether. 

(29)  Capital  markets  as  channels  to  finance  start-ups  and  highly  innovative  small  to 
medium-sized enterprises are underdeveloped in Hungary. The government policies, in 
particular  through  taxation,  divert  savings  rather  towards  government  bonds  and 
housing  than  capital  markets  which  would  finance  productive  investments.  Recent 
policy measures  have further obstructed the development  of capital  markets,  such  as 
tax-free  long-term  bonds  for  retail  investors,  financial  transaction  tax  on  securities, 
high  presence  of  subsidy  schemes  for  SMEs  and  tax  incentives  for  housing 
investment.  

(30)  Public R&D spending, including in universities, is one of the lowest in the EU, which 
holds  back  scientific  excellence.  The  continued  reorganisation  of  public  research 
sector,  as  well  as  unclear  evaluation  mechanisms  of  research  institutes,  contribute  to 
uncertain  working  conditions  for  researchers.  Science-business  linkages  remain 
underexploited, and innovation activities continue to be concentrated in a small group 
of  foreign-owned  firms,  limiting  the  development  of  a  broader  domestic  innovation 
base  in  particular  of  SMEs.  Only  a  few,  mainly  large,  companies  benefit  from  the 
various  subsidies  due  to  the  heavy  administrative  burden  and  not  always  clear 
eligibility  rules  on  innovation  expenditure.  Regions  have  difficulty  putting  in  place 
strategic  R&D  and  innovation  frameworks  for  boosting  regional  competitiveness 
effectively considering the region’s specific needs and competitive advantages. 

(31)  The high number of tax exemptions, tax incentives and sector-specific taxes make the 
tax  system  complex.  The  increasing  use  of  sector-specific  taxes  disproportionately 
impacts  larger,  often  foreign-owned  firms.  Revenues  from  sector-specific  taxes 
accounts  more  than  2%  of  GDP.  The  sectors  most  affected  include  banking,  energy, 
retail,  construction  materials,  insurance  and  telecommunication.  Large  number  of 
small taxes raise compliance costs, in particular for smaller firms. The tax burden on 
labour  has  decreased  but  remains  high  for  low-income  earners.  Hungary  relies  on 
consumption taxes, which inherently place a higher burden on low-income earners.   

(32)  Hungary remained highly dependent on Russian energy sources and steps to diversify 
brought marginal results. The share of imports from Russia increased in 2025 to more 
than  90%  in  the  case  of  oil  and  in  the  case  of  gas  Hungary  imported  volumes  of 
Russian  gas  well  above  its  4.5 bcm  long-term  contract.  It  is  also  important  for 
Hungary to develop a comprehensive national plan with clear timelines and regulatory 
measures  to  fully  phase  out  its  dependence  on  Russian  nuclear  fuel.  Energy  imports 
remain  substantial,  making  the  external  balance  vulnerable  to  increases  in  energy 
prices, which is a challenge identified under the macroeconomic imbalance procedure. 

(33)  Hungary  records  sizeable  relevant  fossil-fuel  subsidies  without  a  planned  phase-out 
before 2030. In particular, fossil-fuel subsidies that address neither energy poverty in a 
targeted way nor genuine energy security concerns, hinder electrification and are not 
crucial  for  industrial  competitiveness  could  be  considered  a  phase-out  priority.  In 
Hungary, fossil-fuel subsidies – such as the utility cost reduction programme, a value 
added  tax  reduction  for  district  heating  using  natural  gas,  and  excise  tax  refunds  for 
agricultural use of diesel – are economically inefficient, perpetuate reliance on fossil 
fuels and do not incentivise electrification. The objectives served by these fossil-fuel 
subsidies  can  be  achieved  through  alternative  forms  of  support  that  do  not  generate 
harmful environmental externalities. 

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(34)  Hungary continues to face high price spikes during peak-demand hours due to limited 
non-fossil  flexibility  and  persistent  reliance  on  fossil  fuels  for  marginal  electricity 
generation. Hence, accelerating the roll-out of renewable energy sources, in particular 
wind,  is  vital.  However,  the  grid  has  remained  under  strain  and  requires  significant 
investment as connection queues also slow the uptake of renewables. Hungary is yet to 
join  PICASSO  and  MARI  limiting  its  ability  to  fully  integrate  into  the  internal 
electricity market and benefit from cross-border balancing mechanisms. Demand-side 
response is hampered by household’s limited access to dynamic pricing, energy price 
caps  for  households,  the  slow  rollout  of  smart  meters  and  the  marginal  role  of 
aggregators  and  energy  communities.  As  a  result  of  low  competition  between 
suppliers,  burdensome  regulations  and  taxes  in  the  sector  and  high  network 
transmission fees, electricity prices for corporates remained far above the EU average, 
hampering competitiveness.   

(35)  Hungary  faces  significant  climate  risks, necessitating  action  to  improve  climate 
resilience  by  updating  the  related  adaptation  strategy  and  action  plan,  setting  up  a 
monitoring  and  evaluation  system,  and  ensuring  adequate  funding  of  adaptation 
measures,  also  in  view  of  the  uneven  climate  vulnerability  across  regions.  Water 
scarcity  is  a  particularly  significant  climate  risk,  evidenced  by  the  droughts  it 
experienced in  recent  years, which led to  significant losses in the agricultural sector. 
Insufficient green infrastructure undermines Hungary’s overall water resilience, and in 
particular 
the  successful 
implementation  of  sustainable  water  management  practices  is  impeded  by  a  lack 
of green skills  at  the  policy  and  implementation  levels.  Water  quality  is  poor  due  to 
pollution  from  agriculture,  industry  and  human  settlements,  compounded  by 
insufficient investments in water utilities. 

retention  capacity.  Furthermore, 

its  natural  water 

(36)  Hungary’s  circular  economy 

transition 

its  resource 
productivity is well below the EU average. With insufficient emphasis on reuse, repair 
and  recycling,  landfilling represents 54%  of  municipal  waste in  2024,  more  than 
double  the  EU  average  (22% in  2023). Scarce  resource  allocation,  low  competition 
and insufficient monitoring and treatment  capacities in  the waste management sector 
have resulted in relatively low recycling rates and an over-reliance on landfilling.  

is  not  progressing,  and 

(37)  Decarbonising  transport  remains  a  major  challenge  in  Hungary,  as  the  sector 
contributes  significantly  to  the  high  emission  levels  and  persistent  air  quality  issues. 
Transport  is  the  second-largest  consumer  of  final  energy,  accounting  for  26%  of  the 
country’s total energy use. Hungary lags behind in rail network quality, including its 
climate resilience, and the share of inland freight transported by rail has fallen rather 
than increased, undermining efforts to achieve a modal shift away from road transport. 
In  road  transport,  mandated  electric  recharging  infrastructure  is  lagging behind  2030 
targets  for  cars  and  for  trucks, charging infrastructure  is largely  missing.  Insufficient 
funding  and  planning  of  comprehensive  public  transport  infrastructure  hinders  the 
development  of  less  developed  and  peripheral  areas  and  equal  access  to  quality 
public transport services.  

(38) 

In light of the crucial role of human capital in enhancing the Union’s competitiveness 
and  strategic  autonomy,  in  2026  the  Council  recommended  that  Member  States take 
action to  urgently  address  human  capital-related  structural  challenges  in  the  areas  of 
skills  and  education,  which  hamper  competitiveness.  The  2026 country-
specific recommendations addressed to  Hungary can contribute to  the implementation 
of the Council Recommendation on human capital in the Union.   

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(39)  Large  inequalities  in  educational  outcomes  limit  Hungary’s  competitiveness  and 
innovation potential. Socio-economic background remains a strong predictor of basic 
skills,  early  school  leaving  and  educational  attainment,  with  children  of  low-skilled 
parents,  Roma  and  persons  with  special  educational  needs  or  disabilities  being 
particularly  affected.  Educational  segregation  reinforces  these  inequalities  through 
early  tracking  and  multiple  school  types,  with  Roma  being  exposed  to  the  highest 
levels of segregation. Existing measures are insufficient to ensure the full participation 
of  disadvantaged  groups  in  quality  mainstream  education.  Vocational  education  and 
training  programmes  allocate  insufficient  time  to  basic  skills  that  are  essential  for 
further  learning  and  adapting  to  labour  market  transitions.  Lack  of  permeable 
vocational  education  and  training  pathways  also  hampers  progression  to  further 
education. Limited school institutional autonomy impedes pedagogical innovation and 
efficiency  of  resource  use,  and  the  attractiveness  of  the  teaching  profession  remains 
low. While teacher salaries have been recently increased, teachers’ motivation to stay 
in the profession is compromised by heavy workload and lack of systemic support for 
novice  teachers.  Despite  economic  demand  for  tertiary  graduated  workforce,  the 
student  support  system  is  ineffective  at  improving  young  people’s  access  to  tertiary 
studies,  especially  among  those  from  disadvantaged  backgrounds.  Publicly  funded 
study  places  have  not  increased  in  line  with  rising  applications  to  higher  education. 
Enrolment in science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes remains 
below  the  EU  average,  constraining  Hungary’s  innovation  potential  in  key  strategic 
sectors.  

relatively 

low  unemployment 

(40)  The  employment  rate  remains  high,  but  access  to  jobs  is  uneven.  People  with  low 
education, Roma, persons with disabilities, and young people face difficulties finding 
and  keeping  stable  employment,  alongside  significant  regional  disparities  in  labour 
market  outcomes.  Despite  a 
long-term 
unemployment  is  rising,  with  one  in  three  registered  unemployed  remaining  jobless 
for 12  months  or  more.  A  fragmented  institutional  framework  hinders  effective 
coordination  of  measures  addressing  long-term  unemployment,  limiting  relevant 
support for those most in need. Disadvantaged groups lack access to effective re- and 
upskilling measures, including for basic and digital skills, and comprehensive targeted 
mental, social, health and job seeking support. The Public Employment Service (PES) 
lacks staff and capacity to consistently provide quality training and career counselling 
to the unemployed, with no regular monitoring and assessment of services. Sustainable 
national  funding  for  PES  is  key,  while  prioritising  measures  targeting  long-term 
employability. There is further potential for the PES to coordinate the different bodies 
responsible for active labour market policies, skills forecasting and training design at 
national and county level.  

rate, 

(41)  The effectiveness of social dialogue and the involvement of social partners in policy-
making remain limited - especially in the public sector. There is a legal framework for 
the  tripartite  forum  of  the  private  sector,  which  is  involved  in  setting  the  minimum 
wage,  and  some  working  groups  were  set  up  on  key  topics.  Nevertheless,  the 
transparency of its working methods and outcomes could be improved, and should be 
used for effective cooperation between the government, employers  and trade unions. 
Collective  bargaining  coverage  and  trade  union  density  are  among  the  lowest  in  the 
EU.  Collective  bargaining  is  prohibited  in  healthcare  and  public  administration  and 
hampered  by  recent  changes  in  the  status  of  some  public  sector  workers.  There  is 
scope for further capacity building  support for social partners as  well as a reform  of 
the  Labour  Law  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  social  dialogue,  and  measures  to 
support workers’ rights in the public sector. 

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(42)  Progress  in  reducing  poverty  and  social  exclusion  has  been  uneven,  with  rising 
inequalities  across  the  country.  The  severe  material  and  social  deprivation  rate  has 
improved, but it remains one of the highest in the EU. Children, Roma, persons with 
disability  and  those  with  a  low  level  of  education  are  particularly  vulnerable.  Over 
three quarters of children with low educated parents were at risk of poverty of social 
exclusion in 2025. Rising poverty rates have led to more children entering state child 
protection services, while the number of foster families is  insufficient  and declining. 
Social  transfers  and  the  tax-benefit  system  are  not  effective  in  reducing  poverty  and 
income inequality. The adequacy of the minimum income benefit is one of the lowest 
in  the  EU,  and  it  lacks  any  periodic  adjustment.  Indexing  the  minimum  income  and 
social benefits to living costs as well as targeted support measures could contribute to 
raising  people  out  of  poverty.  The  three-month  limit  on  unemployment  benefits 
constrains skills development or finding a relevant and stable job, increasing the risk 
of  poverty  among  jobseekers.  Vulnerable  groups,  especially  in  rural  areas,  face 
challenges  in  accessing  essential  and  social  services,  such  as  childcare,  schools, 
healthcare  and  social  and  long-term  care  services  at  least  partially  due  to  financial 
constraints and reduced fiscal autonomy of municipalities. Residential and educational 
segregation of Roma is still high, with recent ‘local identity protection’ decrees risking 
further  marginalization.  The  EU  funded  programme  targeting  the  300  most 
disadvantaged  municipalities  is  a  positive  initiative,  but  more  efforts  are  needed  to 
sustainably invest into mainstream essential (digital, transport, water and energy) and 
social (health, education and care) services, including services targeting children. 

(43)  Life  expectancy  is  one  of  the  lowest  while  preventable  and  treatable  mortality  in 
Hungary  is  among  the  highest  in  the  EU.  Persistent  staff  shortages,  low  health 
spending, inefficient resource allocation and regional disparities hinder equal access to 
healthcare  services.  The  healthcare  profession,  including  doctors,  nurses  and  other 
healthcare  workers,  has  low  attractiveness  among  young  people.  Recruitment, 
retention and geographical distribution of staff are a challenge. Prevention and primary 
care  are  not  sufficiently  developed,  and  receive  low  public  funding,  impacting 
population  health  and  productivity.  Healthy,  independent  living  for  older  people, 
especially  in  rural  areas,  is  increasingly  difficult  due  to  underdeveloped  home  and 
community-based  services.  High  out-of-pocket  costs  limit  access  for  vulnerable 
groups, while staff shortages shift care burdens onto healthcare systems and families, 
reducing care quality and women’s labour market participation. 

(44)  Hungarian households need to save more than 15 years of income to buy a 100 sqm 
flat, which is one of the highest in the EU and almost the double of the EU average. 
House prices have increased faster than in any other EU country and rents have also 
risen sharply, outpacing wage growth over the last decade.  Rising housing costs put 
more pressure on household  income, especially  for those at  risk of poverty or social 
exclusion and tenants. More children are placed in temporary accommodations due to 
families’  financial  difficulties,  and  homelessness  has  increased.  At  the  same  time, 
municipals’  social  housing  stocks,  already  limited,  are  further  decreasing,  and  there 
are  no  targeted,  means-tested  housing  support  measures,  including  rental,  for  low-
income  groups.  In  the  absence  of  effective  urban  and  rural  social  cohesion  policies, 
residential  segregation  remains  an  issue.  Generous  and  untargeted  housing  subsidies 
and  restricted  housing  supply  contributed  to  house  price  increases,  reducing 
affordability,  which  is  a  challenge  identified  under  the  macroeconomic  imbalance 
procedure. 

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(45) 

In  light  of  the  Commission’s  in-depth  review  and  conclusions  on  the  existence  of 
imbalances,  recommendations under Article 6 of Regulation  (EU) No 1176/2011  are 
reflected  in  recommendations  (1),  (2),  (3),  (4)  and  (6).  Policies  referred  to  in 
recommendation  (1),  (2),  (3)  and  (4)  help  to  address  vulnerabilities  linked  to  public 
finances.  Policies  referred  to  in  recommendations  (3)  and  (4)  help  to  address 
vulnerabilities linked to cost competitiveness. Policies referred to in recommendation 
(6) help to address vulnerabilities linked to housing. 

HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Hungary take action in 2026 and 2027 to:  

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

In view of the material deviation projected for 2026 by the Commission vis-à-vis the 
recommended net expenditure ceiling, take action to control net expenditure so that it 
respects the corrective path recommended by the Council on 18 February 2025 while 
making  use  of  the  flexibility  under  the  national  escape  clause  for  higher  defence 
expenditure.  Reinforce  defence  spending  and  readiness  while  ensuring  spending 
efficiency  and  gradually  adapting  the  budget  to  sustain  structurally  higher  defence 
spending. Ensure that any measures taken to mitigate the impact of the hike in energy 
prices  are  temporary,  targeted  at  protecting  vulnerable  households  or  at  addressing 
the  needs  of  energy-intensive  firms,  preserve  incentives  for  energy  savings  while 
ensuring  that  their  fiscal  cost  is  compatible  with  the  commitments  under  the  EU 
fiscal  framework.  Pursue  effective  coordination  and  clear  demarcation  of 
macroeconomic policies to ensure fiscal and external sustainability. Phase out price 
and  interest-rate  caps,  and  equivalent  measures,  to  reduce  distortive  effects  and 
facilitate the smooth  transmission  of monetary policy. Strengthen the medium-term 
budgetary  framework.  Improve  the  long-term  sustainability  of  the  pension  system, 
while preserving adequacy. 

Ensure continuity of reforms and investments implemented under the Recovery and 
Resilience  Facility.  Accelerate  significantly  efforts  to  implement cohesion  policy 
programmes,  building,  where  appropriate,  on  the  reallocation  to  strategic  priorities 
and flexibilities in the mid-term review of the cohesion policy framework. 

Improve the regulatory framework and enhance competition in product markets and 
services,  in  particular in retail,  in  line  with  the principles of the  Single  Market  and 
the rule of law. Improve the quality and transparency of the decision-making process, 
including  through  effective  engagement  with  stakeholders  and  regular  impact 
assessments.  Reinforce  the  anti-corruption  framework,  including  by  improving 
prosecutorial  efforts  and  access  to  public  information.  Eliminate  practices  that 
restrict  competition  in  public  procurement.  Stimulate  the  development  of  capital 
markets  by  increasing  tax  and  regulatory  incentives.  Strengthen  the  innovation 
framework  for  the  public  sector  and  businesses  by  improving  the  predictability  of 
public  R&D  spending  and  better  targeting  existing  measures  towards  SMEs,  also 
taking  into  account  regional  competitive  advantages  and  needs.  Simplify  the  tax 
system  including  by  phasing  out  distortive  taxes  imposed  on  specific  sectors  and 
increasing its fairness. 

Accelerate the diversification of energy supply to phase out dependence on Russian 
sources and take concrete steps to phase out fossil-fuel subsidies, in particular those 
related to excise duties on diesel and those hindering electrification in the residential 
sector. Improve 
sector, 
by strengthening the  balancing  market,  demand  response  and  grid  infrastructure  as 
well  as  by  increasing  the  deployment  of  renewables. Improve  climate  and  water 
resilience including through natural water retention and addressing green skill gaps, 

competition 

electricity 

flexibility 

and 

the 

in 

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5. 

6. 

and improve  circularity, in  particular  by strengthening  waste  treatment  capacities. 
Promote clean transport, including by accelerating the investment into electrification 
and affordable public transport. 

Improve  education  outcomes  and  tertiary  attainment  rate  and  increase  the 
participation  of  disadvantaged  groups,  in  quality  mainstream  education  by  further 
increasing the attractiveness of the teaching profession.  

Increase access to effective active labour market measures, in particular by providing 
upskilling and reskilling opportunities to disadvantaged groups, and ensure effective 
social  dialogue.  Improve  the  adequacy  of  social  assistance  and  unemployment 
benefits,  and  ensure  access  for  all  to  quality  mainstream  essential  services,  in 
particular in disadvantaged municipalities. Improve access to quality healthcare and 
long-term  care,  in  particular  preventive  and  primary  care  services.  Target  support 
measures  in  the  housing  sector  to  low-income  households  and  increase  housing 
supply, including for affordable and social housing. 

Done at Brussels, 

For the Council 
The President 

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