COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2026 Country Report - Poland Accompanying the document Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Poland
Date: 2026-06-03
Institutions: European Commission, Reform and Investment Task Force
Subjects: Poland, budget policy, economic policy, economic recovery, economic reform, education policy, employment policy, energy policy, social policy, stability pact

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 3.6.2026  SWD(2026) 221 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2026 Country Report - Poland Accompanying the document Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION  on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Poland {COM(2026) 221 final}  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND KEY POLICY 
CHALLENGES 

Robust growth momentum and 
fiscal imbalances  

Poland  has  one  of  the  fastest-growing 
economies in the EU. Its GDP grew by 3.6% 
in 2025 and growth is also set to remain high 
in  2026,  driven  by  private  consumption  and 
investment  (this  includes  investment  funded 
by  the  EU).  The  negative  contribution  to 
economic  growth  from  trade  is  expected  to 
lessen as exports gradually increase.  

Price  pressures  are  continuing  to  ease. 
Inflation  decreased  from  3.7%  in  2024  to 
3.3%  in  2025.  Inflation  is  set  to  increase  in 
2026  due  to  higher  energy  prices  and 
moderate in 2027. 

The  labour  market  remains  robust  and 
tight.  In  2025,  the  employment  rate  among 
people  aged  20-64  reached  78.8%  and  the 
labour  market  slack  was  significantly  below 
(see  Annex 11).  The 
the  EU  average 
unemployment 
broadly 
unchanged,  around  3%  in  2025  (one  of  the 
lowest in the EU).  

remained 

rate 

Public  finances  are  unbalanced,  and 
Poland  has  high  deficits  and  growing 
debt. 
The  general  government  deficit 
increased from 6.4% of GDP in 2024 to 7.3% 
of  GDP  in  2025, largely because  of  increased 
spending on social protection and defence. The 
Commission’s  Spring  2026  Economic  Forecast 
projects that  the deficit  will  decrease to  6.5% 
of  GDP  in  2026  and  6.3%  of  GDP  in  2027. 
Public  debt  reached  59.7%  of  GDP  in  2025 
and is expected to increase to 68.3% of GDP in 
2027,  mostly  due  to  high  deficits  and  cash 
prefinancing  of  military  investments.  Poland 
has  been  in  the  excessive  deficit  procedure 
(EDP)  since  2024,  with  a  recommendation  to 
reduce the deficit below 3% of GDP by 2028.  

2 

Graph 1.1: Evolution of Poland’s general 
government deficit and debt (% of GDP) 

Source: European Commission Spring 2026 Forecast 

Contained macroeconomic 
challenges and persistent 
competitiveness challenges 

risks 
Macro-financial  challenges  and 
remain 
limited  overall,  but  concerns 
about  competitiveness  remain.  The  real 
effective  exchange 
rate  has  appreciated 
significantly  and,  despite  slowing  down, 
growth in unit labour costs has remained high. 
Poland  has  gained  export  market  shares 
against  advanced  economies  in  recent  years. 
the  current  account  balance 
In  2025, 
worsened  as  buoyant 
imports  outpaced 
exports. The financial sector remains stable.  

Substantial  fiscal  challenges  persist  and 
are  linked  with  the  structural  imbalance 
in  public  finances.  Poland’s  medium-term 
fiscal-structural  plan  (MTP)  for  2025-2028 
contains  a  commitment  to  limit  expenditure 
growth  that  would  reduce  the  fiscal  deficit  in 
its  EDP  and  place  debt  on  a 
line  with 

0.001.002.003.004.005.006.007.008.000.010.020.030.040.050.060.070.080.0201920202021202220232024202520262027DebtDeficit(rhs)% of GDP 
 
   
the 

downward  trajectory  (see  Annex  2).  According 
to  the  MTP, this  would  imply  an improvement 
in 
structural  primary  balance  of 
3.3 percentage  points  between  2025  and 
total  public  expenditure 
2028.  Poland’s 
relative  to  GDP  has  increased  above  the  EU 
average,  rising  from  around  41%  of  GDP  in 
2019  to  around  51%  of  GDP 
in  2025. 
However, government revenues only increased 
from about 41% of GDP to 44% of GDP during 
the same period, resulting in a persistent fiscal 
deficit.  

on 

social 

fiscal 

relative 

defence, 

strategy 

Poland’s 
relies  on 
expenditure  restraint  and  discretionary 
revenue  increases.  The  consolidation  effort 
planned  in  the  2026  budget  is  lower  than 
assumed  in  the  MTP,  while  the  recommended 
net expenditure growth is respected. Moderate 
growth 
in  public-sector  salaries  and  the 
reduction  of  subsidies  are  contributing  to  a 
gradual 
financed 
reduction  of  nationally 
to  GDP.  However, 
expenditure 
benefits, 
spending 
healthcare  and  long-term  care  is  expected  to 
grow.  Consolidating  total  expenditure  will 
therefore  be  a  significant  challenge  for  the 
government in the medium term. Government 
revenues  are  expected  to  increase  in  2026, 
driven  by  discretionary  revenue  measures 
(particularly  the  non-indexation  of  personal 
in 
income  tax  brackets  and  an 
corporate  income  tax  on  banks).  Some  tax 
increases  planned  by  the  government  are 
subject  to  political  risks 
in  the  national 
In  addition,  tax  non-
legislative  process. 
compliance  is  undermining  revenue  collection, 
and  the  VAT  compliance  gap  is  estimated  to 
have increased to 16% in 2023 (EU: 9.5%). In 
2024,  Poland  saw  a  decrease  in  the  VAT 
compliance  gap  to  10.9%.  Further  revenue 
mobilisation (especially  by  broadening  the  tax 
base  for  sources  less  detrimental  to  growth 
and  by  strengthening  tax  compliance)  may 
help 
(see 
to 
Annex 3). 

rebalance  public 

finances 

increase 

the area of public investment, but no progress 
has  been  made  on  better  targeting  social 
benefits. In particular, no measures were taken 
to expand means-testing in family benefits. In 
line with its recovery and resilience plan (RRP), 
Poland  has  introduced  a  public  investment 
management  framework and  initiated  a  long-
term  reform  of  the  budgetary  system.  The 
Polish  Fiscal  Council  was  established  on 
1 January 2026  with  a  clear  mandate  to 
assess  the  national  macroeconomic  forecast 
and the draft budget law’s compliance with EU 
and  national  fiscal  rules.  However,  it  has  no 
mandate  to  regularly  assess  long-term  public 
finance 
reviews 
sustainability.  Spending 
carried  out  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and 
sectoral ministries since 2024 have had only a 
limited 
spending 
reallocations  and  the  framework  is  being 
revised under the RRP in 2026. A requirement 
to  broaden  coverage  of  public  spending  and 
tax  expenditures  with  spending  reviews  could 
contribute  to  fiscal  consolidation  and  improve 
the efficiency of public spending. 

terms  of 

impact 

in 

Spending  on  defence  is  set  to  continue 
increasing 
in  accordance  with  new 
geopolitical  priorities.  Total  expenditure  on 
defence  rose  from  1.6%  of  GDP  in  2021  to 
3.4%  of  GDP  in  2025  and  is  scheduled  to 
increase  further  in  the  coming  years.  In  the 
consolidation 
compensating 
of 
absence 
measures,  this  surge 
is  pushing  up  the 
government’s  deficit.  It  is  even  more  quickly 
pushing up public debt, which is also rising due 
to  the  cash  prefinancing  of  military  contracts 
with  future  planned  deliveries.  The  Council  of 
the European Union has activated the national 
escape  clause  for  Poland (1) 
in  order  to 
facilitate  an  increase  in  defence  spending. 
Following  an  assessment  by  the  Commission 
of  Poland’s  national  defence  investment  plan 
under  Security  Action  for  Europe  (SAFE),  the 
Council  adopted  a  decision  that  makes  up  to 
EUR 43.7  billion 
financial  assistance 
available  to  Poland  for  strategic  defence 

in 

of 
but  weaknesses 

Reforms  to  enhance  the  quality  and 
finances  are 
efficiency 
public 
underway, 
remain. 
Substantial  progress  has  been  made  on  the 
2025  country-specific  recommendation  (CSR) 
to improve the efficiency of public spending in 

(1)  The  activation  of  the  national  escape  clause  gives 
Member  States  budgetary  flexibility  to  increase  defence 
expenditure without immediately requiring them to finance 
this 
revenue-raising 
measures.  This  flexibility  gives  Member  States  the  time 
they  need  to  accommodate  higher  defence  expenditure 
within national budgets. 

increase  with  spending  cuts  or 

3 

 
 
in  2025-2030.  Poland’s  defence 
projects 
capacity 
further  bolstered  by 
is  being 
investment  from  the  Security  and  Defence 
Fund  (financed  by  Recovery  and  Resilience 
loans)  along  with  projects 
Facility 
financed  through  the  EU’s  cohesion  policy 
funds. 

(RRF) 

in 

to 

relation 

Challenges  to  competitiveness  persist, 
particularly 
the  business 
environment,  research  and  innovation,  skills 
and education, and the clean energy transition. 
Polish  firms  have  a  low  investment  rate  and 
low  volume  of  high-tech  exports.  Access  to 
finance  is  limited  and  leans  heavily  towards 
the  traditional  banking  system.  Corporate 
growth  is  hindered  by  the  low  absorption  of 
digital  solutions  and  increases  in  labour  costs 
that  exceed  gains  in  labour  productivity  (see 
Section 2). Significant progress has been made 
in  recent  years,  but  Poland  remains  heavily 
carbon-dependent  and  this  in  turn  increases 
energy  prices  and  poses  environmental 
challenges  (see  Section 3).  Enterprises  are 
suffering  from  skills  shortages  that  are  being 
exacerbated  by  a  decline 
in  adults’  and 
students’ basic skills. This is in turn increasing 
reducing 
inequalities 
participation in adult learning as well as STEM 
programmes at tertiary level (see Section 4). 

in  education  and 

Addressing the affordable housing 
shortage 

Poland’s  housing  market  has  in  recent 
years  been  characterised  by  a  slowing 
down supply of housing and a decrease in 
affordability.  House  prices  and  rents  have 
been  rapidly  increasing  since  2015  (by  117% 
and  74%  respectively  –  far  above  the  EU 
averages  of  62%  and  21%),  particularly  in 
cities  and  urban  areas.  Despite  a  relatively 
high number of completed dwellings per 1 000 
citizens when compared to other EU countries, 
housing  supply  has  been  slowing  down  since 
2022,  and  investment  in housing  remains  the 
lowest in the EU (2.2% of GDP vs EU average 
of 5%), while the overall number of dwellings 
per  1  000  inhabitants  is  significantly  below 
the  EU  average  (see  Annex  16).  Housing 
remain  challenging,  with  high 
conditions 

4 

overcrowding  rates.  Poland’s  RRP  has  only 
partly  addressed  the  existing  housing  stock’s 
low  energy  efficiency.  Access  to  social  and 
municipal housing is low and many people fall 
into a ‘rental gap’: they face excessive housing 
costs  in  their  owned  or  rented  house  but 
remain  above  the 
income  thresholds  for 
accessing social and municipal housing. Poland 
could invest more in expanding the social and 
municipal  housing  stock  and  making 
it 
available to more social and vulnerable groups 
(including those affected by the rental gap). 

and 

levels 

subnational 

Poland’s housing policies are fragmented. 
The  governance  of  housing  policy  at  the 
national 
is 
(see  Annex 16).  No  holistic 
uncoordinated 
programme  for  monitoring  and  analysing  the 
housing stock and housing needs has been set 
up  to  help analyse precise housing needs and 
existing  stock  (including  at  the  local  level). 
There  is  also  no  legal  definition  of  affordable 
housing set. Strengthening the coordination of 
housing  policy  at 
level, 
implemented  in  a  long-term  perspective  with 
consistent political support and stable funding 
sources, alongside active local housing policies 
by  municipalities  and  a  multi-level  data 
collection  mechanism,  would  help  better 
satisfy  housing  needs  at  the  local  level. 
Strengthening  authorities’  cooperation  with 
civil  society  organisations  and  the  private 
sector  and  setting  a 
legal  definition  of 
affordable housing would also be beneficial. 

the  national 

riskier 

Some  existing  regulations  are  creating 
inflationary  pressures  for  house  prices 
and hindering the rental market’s growth. 
Financial assets such as stocks are taxed more 
than  housing 
heavily  and  are 
investments.  This  in  turn  creates  risks  of 
speculative  demand  and  fuels  house  price 
increases. Poland could consider adjusting the 
tax  environment  and  moving  away  from  flat-
rate  property  taxation  in  favour  of  a  value-
based tax on land or a cadastral property tax. 
This  would  help  curb  speculative  investment 
demand and slow down housing price inflation, 
while 
the  potential 
into  account 
distributional  impacts  of  value-based  taxes. 
is  unbalanced, 
The  private  rental  market 
because  current  legislation  does  not  protect 
landlords’ 
The 
implementation  of  the  existing  regulatory 

tenants’ 

rights. 

taking 

and 

 
framework  needs  to  be  further  improved. 
Poland  could  implement  a  more  balanced 
approach  to  landlords’  rights  and  tenants’ 
security in order to facilitate stable, long-term 
renting,  and  to  improve  the  enforcement  of 
the  existing  law.  Regulatory  procedures  in  the 
construction  sector  could  also  be  improved. 
The  significant  amount  of  time  required  to 
obtain a building permit in some municipalities 
is constraining housing supply (see Annex 16). 

Vulnerable  groups  face  specific  barriers 
when seeking to access housing (including 
discrimination 
accessibility 
and 
constraints).  Housing  policies  increasingly 
reflect  demographic  ageing  and  the  need  for 
accessible  housing  solutions  for  older  people. 
One  example  is  the  2023  introduction  of 
senior 
(see  Annex 16). 
Homelessness  remains  a  persistent  social 
challenge.  Poland’s  efforts 
implement 
housing-led  and  person-centred  schemes  of 
interventions to address housing exclusion are 
significantly limited in their scope. 

lease  agreements 

to 

Regional and territorial disparities 

(both  between 

Poland has achieved substantial progress 
in narrowing regional disparities in recent 
decades,  but  significant  differences 
persist 
regions  and 
between  larger  cities  and  rural  areas). 
The main challenges stem from economic (see 
Section 2),  demographic,  environmental  and 
energy  transformation  (see  Section 3)  and 
governance  factors.  These  regional  disparities 
highlight  a  continuing  need  for  precise  and 
well-planned 
and 
investment at both national and regional level. 

interventions 

policy 

faces 

uneven 

demographic 
Poland 
pressures,  with  eastern  and  rural  areas 
marked  by  a  significant  population 
decline  due  to  outward  migration  and  an 
insufficient  provision  of  public  services. 
Smaller  towns,  which  historically  served  as 
subregional  or 
local  centres,  are  facing 
increasing  difficulties  in  terms  of  an  ageing 
population,  a  lack  of  attractive  jobs  and  brain 
drain.  Strengthening the  functional  role  of 

in 

hubs 

in 
to  a  decline 

small  and  medium-sized  towns  as  service, 
innovation 
employment 
for 
and 
is  therefore  crucial  to 
surrounding  areas 
decline 
counteracting 
demographic 
cohesion. 
and maintaining territorial 
Particularly 
rural  areas,  unsatisfactory 
availability  and  quality  of  public  services 
(particularly  education  and  health)  as  well  as 
transport  accessibility  are 
deficiencies 
contributing 
in  population, 
undermining  both  economic  opportunities  and 
residents’  right  to  stay.  The  eastern  border 
regions  face  additional  challenges  due  to 
security  pressures  from  neighbouring  Russia 
and Belarus. These have been compounded by 
Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine, 
which  has  exacerbated  their  already  difficult 
economic  and  demographic  situation.  These 
factors  make  these  regions  significantly  less 
attractive  for  inhabitants  and  investors.  To 
public 
trends, 
counter 
investments 
(guided  by  strategic  spatial 
planning) could help revitalise struggling areas. 
Digitalising 
improving 
connectivity and upskilling residents to access 
digital  tools  would  also  strengthen  these 
communities’ quality of life and attractiveness.  

targeted 

services, 

public 

these 

Regional authorities are actively involved 
in 
implementing  EU  funding.  Poland 
manages  cohesion  policy  funds  through  a 
mixed system. One central authority manages 
national  and  multiregional  programmes  that 
account  for  56%  of  total  funds.  16  regional 
authorities manage regional programmes that 
account for the remaining 44%. The persistent 
regions  across  many 
disparities  between 
sectors 
and 
education 
healthcare)  underscore  the  varying  capacities 
of  regional  authorities  to  efficiently  plan  and 
invest  available  funds,  and  to  implement 
changes  needed  to  address  these  disparities. 
Strengthening 
in 
strategic  planning  and  execution)  could  allow 
more  effective 
local  and 
responses 
subregional priorities.  

regional  capacity 

(i.e. innovation, 

(both 

to 

Pension system and active ageing 

The  declining  adequacy  of  pension 
benefits  poses  a  significant  risk  of 

5 

 
benefits 

strengthen 

in  2024 (2)  and 

taking  measures  on 

poverty  among  seniors  and  of  increased 
budget  spending.  Poland  received  a  CSR  in 
2025  to  ensure  the  adequacy  of  future 
pension 
the 
and 
sustainability of the pension system (including 
by 
the  effective 
retirement  age  and  reforming  preferential 
pension  schemes),  but  Poland  has  made  little 
progress  in  addressing  this  recommendation. 
The ratio  of the average gross pension to the 
average wage decreased from 66% in 2005 to 
55% 
this  decline  will 
accelerate in the coming years (3). The average 
pension for women is about two thirds that for 
men (4).  The  employment  rate  of  people  aged 
55-64  was  59%  in  2024  (EU: 65.2%).  The 
particularly  low  employment  rate  for  women 
(48.3%  vs  59.4%  in  the  EU)  reflects  their 
lower  statutory  retirement  age.  The  effective 
retirement  age  remains  close  to the  statutory 
threshold  (averaging 65.1  years  for  men  and 
60.6 years  for  women  in  2024)  and  has 
remained  stable  for  several  years,  despite 
policy actions (5).  

and 

Significant  risks  of  inadequate  pension 
coverage are present for persons on non-
standard  work  contracts.  Persons  who  are 
self-employed 
minimal 
contributions (6)  as  well  as  those  on  civil  law 
contracts are at risk of receiving low pensions 
from the universal system. It is estimated that 
those  who  began  their  professional  activity 
after  1998  will  fail  to  accumulate  sufficient 
pension  capital  for  the  minimum  pension (7). 

pay 

(2)  Statistics  Poland,  2025,  Retirement  and  other  pensions 
in 2024, Warsaw. 

(3)  European  Commission,  2024  Ageing  Report,  Economic 
and  Budgetary  Projections  for  the  EU  Member  States 
(2022-2070). 

(4)  Statistics  Poland,  2025,  Retirement  and  other  pensions 
in 2024, Warsaw.  

(5) According to tax data from 2024, over 157 000 seniors 
benefited from the PIT-0 allowance. This constituted 2% of 
pensioners.  

(6)  99.18%  of  self-employed  persons  in  the  analysed 
sample did not declare social contributions higher than the 
basic minimum (60% of the projected average salary in the 
economy). 

(7) Petelczyc, J. and Lasocki, T., 2024, Dobrowolne ubóstwo. 
dla 
O 
Ekonomii, 
samozatrudnionych, 

konsekwencjach 

dobrowolnego 

Polska 

Sieć 

ZUS 

The State budget will  therefore need to cover 
the  shortfall (8).  The  number  of  the  self-
employed  has  grown  by  over  40%  between 
2015-2024 (9), which can also be explained by 
the  significant  difference  in  the  tax  wedge 
between  income  from  business  activities  and 
employment  contracts  (see  Section 4).  By 
2040,  50%  of  pensioners  may  receive  a 
retirement  benefit  that  equals  the  statutory 
minimum (10).  Poland  provides  annually  two 
additional  one-off benefits to compensate for 
the 
in  adequacy.  With  the  current 
loss 
for 
demographic 
additional  expenditure  to  alleviate  the  loss  in 
the  replacement  rate  will  increase  and  this 
might 
system’s 
sustainability.  If  the  current  pension  benefit 
ratio (average pension benefit as a percentage 
is  maintained,  pension 
of  average  wage) 
spending 
increase  by 
2.5 percentage  points  of  GDP  by  2045 (11). 
Supplementary  pensions  play  only  a  limited 
role in the provision of retirement income, with 
limited  financial  assets  allocated  to  voluntary 
pension schemes (see Annex 2). 

is  projected 

the  pension 

jeopardise 

pressure 

trends, 

the 

to 

special 

The Polish pension system is fragmented, 
certain 
regimes 
with 
for 
professions.  The 
largest  special  pension 
scheme (the KRUS scheme (12)) is dedicated to 
farmers. It receives substantial subsidies from 
the  State  budget  (around  0.7%  of  GDP  in 
2025) (13)  because  contributions  paid  by 
farmers  cover  less  than  10%  of  the  benefit 
amount  (compared  with  around  80%  in  the 

https://www.zus.pl/-/-dobrowolne-ub%C3%B3stwo-o-
konsekwencjach-dobrowolnego-zus-dla-
samozatrudnionych-raport. 

(8)  Act  of  17 December 1998  on  pensions  and  disability 
benefits  from  the  Social Insurance  Fund  (consolidated  text 
at Journal of Laws 2025, item 1749) 

(9) This excludes those who are self-employed in agriculture.  

(10) Malec, M. and Tyrowicz, J., 2017, Starzenie się ludności. 
Rynek pracy i finanse publiczne, European Commission.  

(11)  European  Commission,  2024  Ageing  Report,  Economic 
and  Budgetary  Projections  for  the  EU  Member  States 
(2022-2070). 

(12) ‘Kasa Rolniczego Ubezpieczenia Społecznego’ - 
Agricultural Social Insurance Fund 

(13)  0.66%  of  GDP  is  planned  for  2026  according  to  the 
State budget law.  

6 

 
 
 
 
pension 

system) (14).  Significant 
general 
changes  have  occurred  in  the  agricultural 
sector,  such  as  population  outflow  and  farm 
structure  shifts  that  have  led  to  productivity 
growth (15).  However,  the  KRUS  scheme  has 
remained  unchanged.  Social  contributions 
from  large-scale  agricultural  activity  have  not 
kept  pace  with  farmers’  incomes (16).  Rules 
governing  the  calculation  of  transfers  of 
pension capital  from  the KRUS scheme to  the 
general  ZUS  scheme  do  not 
incentivise 
farmers  to  switch  to  the  general  scheme. 
Other  special  pension  schemes  exist  for  the 
uniformed  services  and  for 
judges  and 
prosecutors.  Their  dedicated  pension  schemes 
provide for higher pension benefits and earlier 
retirement  options  than  the  general  scheme 
(ZUS).  These  are  not  linked  to  contributions 
and  therefore  rely  on  State  budget  subsidies 
(1% of GDP in 2025) (17). 

Health and long-term care 

Unsustainable 
funding  and  unequal 
access  to  services  are  the  primary 
challenges  for  the  healthcare  system. 
Healthcare spending has grown significantly in 
recent  years  but  remains  below  the  EU 
average.  The  funding  level  reached  7.1%  of 
GDP  in  2023 (18),  compared  with  the  EU 
average  of  almost  10%.  The  State  budget’s 
share  in  the  healthcare  system’s  financing  is 
insurance 
increasing 
cover 
to 
contributions  are 

health 
insufficient 

because 

(14)  ZUS,  2025,  Podsumowanie  sytuacji 
finansowej 
Funduszu  Ubezpieczeń  Społecznych  po  trzech  kwartałach 
2025 r., 
https://www.zus.pl/o-zus/dla-mediow/analizy-i-
raporty. 

(15)  Total  factor  productivity  in  the  agriculture  sector  grew 
moderately and steadily in the EU by around 9% in 2012-
2022, but Poland recorded growth of 25% in this period.  

(16)  The  replacement  rate  in  the  KRUS  scheme  is  around 
29%.  

(17)  On calculations  that  concern  the  budgeted  expenditure 
within  the  remit  of  the  Ministry  of  Defence,  Ministry  of 
Justice and Ministry of Internal Affairs, see data for 2025.  

(18) Statistics Poland, 2025, Health and health care in 2024, 
Warsaw and Kraków, p. 191.  

in 

this 

salaries 

However, 

increased 

expenditures (19)  and  this  poses  risks  to  fiscal 
sustainability. 
increased 
expenditure  has  not  improved  accessibility, 
primarily because resources are not efficiently 
allocated.  Access  to  healthcare  services  in 
Poland is unequal, largely due to a shortage of 
medical personnel (especially in small counties 
and  rural  areas) (20).  Physician  density  has 
increased  significantly  in  recent  years  but 
remains below the EU average (3.9 vs 4.3 per 
1 000 population). Recent changes in the rules 
setting minimum wages for medical staff have 
the 
significantly 
sector (21).  Despite  actions  taken  under  the 
RRP, the system continues to support inpatient 
hospital  treatment  at  the  expense  of  primary 
and  outpatient  care.  The  number  of  hospital 
beds per capita remains above the EU average 
(5.6  vs  4.4  per  1 000  inhabitants  in  2023). 
Spending  on  preventive  healthcare  in  Poland 
was  among  the  lowest  in  the  EU  in  2023, 
accounting  for  only  1.7%  of  total  healthcare 
spending.  Recent  government  and 
local 
authority  measures  to  limit  alcohol  sales  and 
increase 
tobacco  and  nicotine 
products  were  steps  in  the  right  direction. 
Nevertheless,  the  absence  of  an  earmarked 
funding  stream  for  prevention  is  preventing  a 
different 
consistent 
administrative 
institutions. 
Preventive  programmes  are  often  short-term 
and  project-based,  hindering  the  achievement 
of lasting outcomes (22) (see Annex 15).  

approach 
levels 

between 
and 

taxes  on 

Long-term care services are not prepared 
to meet growing demographic challenges, 
there 
is  a  marked  preference  for 
residential  care  and  Poland  is  facing 
affordability  challenges.  In  2022,  public 
expenditure  on  long-term care  was low (0.5% 
of GDP vs 1.7% in the EU) (23). In 2022, public 

(19) A decade ago, health insurance  contributions and other 
non-subsidy  revenues  of  the  National  Health  Fund  (NFZ) 
covered 97% of its expenses. In 2024, it was only 84%.  

(20) OECD Country Health Profile 2025: Poland.  

(21)  Instytut  Finansów  Publicznych,  2024,  Luka  finansowa 
systemu ochrony zdrowia w Polsce, Warsaw, p. 5. 

(22)  SGH  think  tank  dla  ochrony  zdrowia,  2026,  Nowa 
architektura  finansowania  ochrony  zdrowia  w  Polsce, 
Warsaw, p. 47. 

(23)  Ageing Report 2024: https://economy-

finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/2024-ageing-report-

7 

 
 
 
 
Box 1: 

SDG progress box 

Poland has made progress on the SDGs related to macroeconomic stability (SGDs 8, 16 and 17), 
competitiveness (SDGs 4, 8 and 9) and social fairness (SDGs 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10) and on some 
of the SDGs related to sustainability (SDGs 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15).  

Poland  exceeds  the  EU  average  on  SDG 1  (no  poverty),  SDG 4  (quality  education),  SDG 10 
(reduced  inequalities),  SGD 11  (sustainable  cities  and  communities),  SGD 15  (life  of  land),  SDG 
16  (peace  and  personal  security)  and  SDG 17  (partnerships  for  the  goals).  However,  its 
performance  is  declining  for  some  of  the  targets  for  SDG 2  (zero  hunger),  which  includes 
indicators on malnutrition, sustainable agricultural production and the environmental impacts of 
agricultural production.  

the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (see  Box 
3)  and  Cohesion  policy  funds  (see  Box  2).  In 
addition, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
provides  Poland  with  an  EU  contribution  of 
EUR  22.1  billion  under  the  CAP  strategic  plan 
for  2023-2027  (26).  A  further  EUR  560.5 
million  are  available  under 
the  Asylum, 
(AMIF), 
Migration  and 
together  with  the  Border  Management  and 
Visa 
Internal 
Security Fund (ISF). Other EU programmes also 
for 
support 
instance  through  open  calls  under  Horizon 
Europe and the Connecting Europe Facility. 

Integration  Fund 

(BMVI)  and  the 

competitiveness 

in  Poland, 

Instrument 

lack 

long-term  stable 

long-term  care  expenditure  was 
largely 
allocated to  residential  care  (65.4% in  Poland 
vs 46.2% in the EU) (24). Support programmes 
for  municipalities  aimed  at  developing 
community-based  care,  such  as  Care 75+ 
(Opieka 75+), 
remain  underfunded.  Newly 
created  day  care  places,  such  as  Day  Care 
Homes  (Dzienne  Domy  Pomocy)  and  Day 
Medical  Care  Homes 
(DDOM),  are  highly 
dependent  on  project-based  EU  support  and 
therefore 
funding. 
Progress  in  establishing  home  care  standards 
has  been  delayed.  In  2024,  the  number  of 
long-term  care  workers  per  100  individuals 
aged 65 or over was very low (0.4 in Poland vs 
3.3 in the EU). This underscores the continuing 
overall  reliance  on  informal  care.  Legislative 
work  is  ongoing  on  a  draft  law  on  the 
coordination of the long-term care to introduce 
a  senior  voucher  that  will  support  family 
caregivers  and  reduce  informal  employment. 
Public  social  protection  is  limited  for  older 
people  with  moderate  and  severe  needs, 
leading  to  out-of-pocket  costs  that  are  above 
the EU average (25) (Annex 12). 

funding 

instruments 

provide 
EU 
considerable  resources  to  Poland.  They 
support investments and structural reforms to 
increase 
environmental 
fairness  and 
sustainability,  skills,  social 
security,  while  helping  to  address  challenges 
identified in the CSRs. Key instruments include 

competitiveness, 

economic-and-budgetary-projections-eu-member-
states-2022-2070_en  

(24)  EU Labour Force Survey. 

(25) OECD https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/ageing-
and-long-term-care/social-protection-for-older-people-
with-ltc-needs.html. 

(26)  An overview of Poland ’s formally approved strategy to 

implement the EU’s common agricultural policy 
nationally can be found at 
https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/cap-my-country/cap-
strategic-plans/poland_en   

8 

 
 
 
 
 
Box 2: 

Contribution of cohesion policy funds 

EU cohesion policy funding is supporting Poland’s efforts to boost competitiveness, environmental 
sustainability,  skills  and  social  fairness.  In  the  2021-2027  programming  period,  EU  cohesion  policy 
funds (27) are providing EUR 75.46 billion (amounting to EUR 90.48 billion paired with national co-financing), or 
almost  9%  of  2024  GDP (28),  to  Poland.  This  makes  cohesion  policy  one  of  the  main  sources  of  public 
investment in the country. The value of selected projects corresponded to 66.4 % of the total allocation as of 
March 2026, with additional calls for projects in the pipeline. 

• 

Innovation,  business  environment  and  productivity:  EUR 12.2 billion  is  allocated  to 
research,  innovation  and  SMEs  competitiveness.  Selected  projects  are  already  supporting 
over  32 000 businesses  (including  almost  6 500 SMEs),  as  well  as  science–business 
cooperation  (over  100 research  institutions  are  participating  in  joint  projects  with 
enterprises). Alongside enterprise, funding is supporting strategic innovation hubs to provide 
advisory, analytical and start-up acceleration assistance. 

•  Decarbonisation, energy affordability and sustainability: EUR 28.8 billion is allocated 
to  the  green  transition,  out  of  which  EUR  11.9  billion  has  been  dedicated  to  sustainable 
transport.  The  projects  under  this  policy  objective  will,  in  addition  to  other  aims,  add 
4 269 MW  of  renewable  energy  capacity;  increase  waste  recycling  capacity  by  92 260 
tonnes per year; and deliver new or upgraded wastewater treatment capacity equivalent to 
over 2 million people, thus strengthening environmental protection and climate resilience. 

•  Skills, quality jobs and social fairness: Under the ESF+, inclusive education and training 
is supported by EUR 2.1 billion, as well as lifelong learning (EUR 1.38 billion) and education 
and  training  systems  (EUR 729 million).  The  fund  also  intervenes  in  fields  such  as  active 
inclusion and measures to counter severe material deprivation (EUR 1.7 billion), healthcare 
(including  long-term  care  services  for  older  people  and  persons  with  disabilities) 
(EUR 1.88 billion)  and  access  to  employment  (EUR 1.69 billion).  In  addition,  100 000 new 
childcare places will be supported to tackle the gender employment gap. 

•  Digital transformation: the EU allocation to Digital Development programme for 2021-
27  amounts  to  EUR  1.99  billion.  The  programme  covers  support  to  public  e-services, 
cybersecurity and digital skills as well as connection of nearly 46 000 dwellings and over 5 
000 businesses to broadband and VHC network.  

The mid-term review (29) reinforced cohesion policy’s contribution to emerging strategic priorities, reallocating 
EUR 8.05 billion. More than 78% of this reallocation is to support defence (particularly military mobility) as well 
as  industrial  capacity  in  order  to  foster  defence  and  dual-use  capabilities.  The  mid-term  review  will  further 
strengthen  competitiveness  by  supporting  the  development  and  manufacturing  of  critical  technologies  under 
the Strategic Technology for Europe Platform (STEP) (12% of the reallocated funds have been allocated to this). 
The reallocations will also support a range of other priorities, including water resilience and sustainable water 
management, affordable housing, sustainable energy and energy security. 

(27) ERDF, ESF+, CF and JTF. 

(28) Eurostat,  Gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  and  main 
components 
income) 
[nama_10_gdp]. 

expenditure 

(output, 

and 

It 

(29) The  mid-term  review  was  undertaken  halfway  through 
is  a  formal 
the  2021-2027  programming  period. 
assessment  process  required  under  Article 18  of  the 
Common 
the 
implementation of a programme; and, where necessary, to 
propose adjustments to improve its performance, ensure its 
continuing  relevance  in  the  light  of  new  and  emerging 
needs and maintain consistency with other EU policies. 

Regulation 

Provisions 

assess 

to 

9 

 
 
 
 
Box 3:  Key achievements of the RRF  

Poland’s recovery and resilience plan (RRP) has a total envelope of EUR 54.7 billion (corresponding to 
8%  of  GDP)  to  support  reforms  and  investments  that  contribute  to  the  green  and  digital  transitions, 
strengthen  economic  resilience  and  address  long-standing  structural  challenges  identified  in  the 
European Semester. 

As  of  2  June 2026,  EUR 34.15 billion  (around  62%  of  the  total  allocation)  had  been  disbursed  to 
Poland following the satisfactory fulfilment of 166 milestones and targets (this included EUR 19.7 billion 
in loans). Implementation has progressed steadily, with a growing number of reforms and investments 
already fulfilled and delivering tangible results on the ground. 

Highlights and impact of the RRP 

•  accelerated  renewable  energy  deployment:  major  investments  have  been  made  in  more 
affordable  and  clean  energy,  and  far-reaching  reforms  are  enabling  faster  deployment  of 
renewables  (especially  onshore  wind  installations),  already  connecting  38.9  GW  of 
renewables to the grid, overachieving the target of 30 GW by 2026; 

• 

• 

• 

• 

enhanced  competitiveness  and  resilience  of  the  Polish  economy:  a  mix  of  reforms  to 
reduce  the  regulatory  and  administrative  burden  on  businesses  (digitalising  administrative 
procedures,  reducing  the  use  of  two-instance  procedures,  etc.),  support  for  the  digital  and 
green  transition  of  SMEs  and  businesses,  and  improvement  of  the  innovation  ecosystem 
(by  constructing  more  than  50 research  laboratories  and  investing  in  technologies  for  the 
circular economy); 

increased  labour  market  participation  of  parents:  construction,  renovation  or  adaptation 
of  1 060 childcare  facilities  (nurseries,  children’s  clubs)  for  children  below  three  years  of 
age) and of caregivers (by improving long-term care services); 

improved effectiveness of public employment services: reforms and investments (training 
courses  on  new  and  improved  procedures  provided  to  50%  of  employees  of  public  service 
services and the creation of 120 sectoral skills centres) are helping to increase the matching of 
skills and qualifications with labour market requirements as well as decrease unemployment; 

energy efficiency in buildings: the RRP is expected to reduce primary energy consumption by 
4.2 TWh  a  year  (equivalent  to  the  average  usage  of  280 000 households)  through  energy 
efficiency reforms that target households (e.g. through the ‘Clean Air’ Priority Programme) and 
businesses, coupled with investments to improve energy efficiency and reduce energy intensity 
in buildings, as well as in industrial and production installations in businesses.; 

•  digital  transformation  in  education:  digital  infrastructure  and  equipment  will  be 
delivered  to  more  than  15 000 schools,  supported  by  comprehensive  reforms  that  will 
introduce  a  digital  competence  development  programme  and  binding  standards  for  equipping 
schools with digital infrastructure; 

•  modernisation of healthcare infrastructure: over 120 hospitals will be modernised (with 
highly  specialised  care  centres),  building  on  reforms  that  are  establishing  the  national 
oncological and cardiological networks; 

• 

• 

increased coverage with affordable, high-quality and high-speed broadband services: 
the  extension  of  high-speed  broadband  access  to  over  400 000  households  in  underserved 
areas, enabled by reforms that are removing legislative barriers to broadband investment and 
aligning national legislation with the EU-wide Connectivity Toolbox; 

zero-emission  transport:  increased  provision  of  clean  public  transport  services  through  the 
purchase  of  88 trams  for  public  transport  in  cities  and  at  least  77 units  of  rolling  stock  for 
regional transport.  

10 

 
 
INNOVATION, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND 
PRODUCTIVITY 

in 

(CSRs) 

reduce 

strengthen 

framework; 

In 2025, Poland received country-specific 
recommendations 
to  simplify 
improve  and  stabilise  the 
regulation; 
regulatory 
the 
administrative  burden  for  companies; 
encourage 
public 
competition 
procurement; 
science-
business links; modernise public research 
system;  and  focus  economic  policy  on 
innovation.  Several  measures  have  been 
implemented, 
simplifying 
regulation  and  digitalising  administrative 
procedures.  Challenges  nevertheless  remain, 
especially 
research-generated 
innovation on the market and efficiently using 
digital  technologies  in  the  public  and  private 
sectors. 

in  placing 

focusing 

on 

Turning ideas into growth – 
strengthening the Polish 
innovation ecosystem 

and 

policy 

economic 

innovation 

Poland  has  stepped  up  efforts 
to 
stimulate private investment in research, 
development 
(RDI), 
including  by  raising  public  expenditure, 
but the impact remains incomplete so far. 
In  2025,  Poland  received  a  CSR  to  focus 
investment-related 
on 
innovation. Since then, besides the existing tax 
incentives, Poland has directed a large stream 
of  financing  towards  innovation  in  business, 
both  from  cohesion  policy 
the 
European 
Economy 
for 
Funds 
programme)  and  national  funds  (such  as  the 
in 
Innovate  Poland  programme 
Q4 2025).  Business  expenditure  on  R&D 
(BERD)  in  Poland  has  grown  substantially  in 
recent  years  (both  for  enterprises  in  general 
and  for  SMEs)  but  remains  far  below  the  EU 
average  (see  Annex 4).  Despite  consistent 
economic growth and a strong industrial base, 

launched 

(notably 

Smart 

Polish enterprises (especially SMEs) invest less 
in new products or services, resulting in a low 
level of high-tech exports and a low number of 
innovations  being  introduced  to  the  market 
(see Annex 6). R&D expenditure is growing but 
does  not  effectively  translate  into  market-
ready  innovations.  Polish  enterprises  are  not 
sufficiently 
high-value 
innovation chains.  

integrated 

into 

of 

areas 

financing 

Public 
is  not  sufficiently 
strategically used to leverage private RDI 
expenditure,  including  by  focusing  on 
selected 
specialisation. 
Disparities  between  Polish  regions  highlight 
the  need  for  region-focused  solutions  to 
ensure  spillover  effects.  This  particularly 
concerns  eastern  regions  and  smaller  regions 
in  western  Poland.  Smart  specialisation 
strategies  in  these  regions  are  often  not 
sufficiently  focused  on  regional  specificities 
and  would  require  adjustment  to  improve  the 
regional  competitiveness  (see  Annex 18  for 
details).  Public  support  is  often  dispersed 
between  various  instruments  and  priorities, 
which makes it difficult to access and does not 
sufficiently  mobilise  private  investment  in 
in 
general  and 
particular (30).  Intermediaries  in  the  business 
environment  (such  as  incubators,  clusters, 
venture capital funds and contact points) could 
be more engaged in innovation ecosystems in 
order  to  provide  more  tailor-made  support, 
strengthen  science-business 
linkages,  and 
enhance  smart  specialisation  and  innovation 

investment 

innovation 

in 

(30)  Kłosiewicz-Górecka, U.,  Rozbicka, I.,  Szymańska, A., 
Wincewicz-Price, A.  and  Zybertowicz, K.,  2025,  Aktywność 
inwestycyjna polskich  firm  – skala  i  bariery,  Polski Instytut 
Ekonomiczny, Warsaw. 

11 

 
 
 
(including  networking  and  spillover 

focus 
effects; see also Annex 5) (31). 

attractiveness  and  competitiveness  of  the 
research career system. 

competences 

The  number  of  start-ups,  scale-ups  and 
‘unicorns’  is  growing  but  remains  low 
given  the  size  of  the  Polish  economy. 
Start-ups  face  difficulties  in  finding  support 
for  growth,  particularly  in  terms  of  financing 
(see 
but  also  managerial 
Annex 4).  This  restricts  the  number  of  growth 
champions leading the economy towards more 
innovation-based  competitiveness.  Poland  is 
preparing  a  strategy  for  developing  the  start-
up  ecosystem  until  2035  and  this  strategy 
could  bring  improvements  in  the  regulatory 
framework, access to finance and entrance to 
international  markets.  Legislative  changes 
already 
the 
include 
(Kwalifikowany 
Investment  Fund 
Qualified 
Fundusz 
aim 
Inwestycyjny)  with 
tofacilitate VC development. Strengthening the 
early-stage financing market  (seed or venture 
capital), supporting the creation of start-ups in 
research entities and developing the ability of 
founders  to  interact  with  investors  could  be 
considered  in  order  to  develop  the  ecosystem 
in the future. 

introducing 

initiated 

the 

remain 

barriers 

research 

infrastructure 

The 
and 
regulatory framework have improved, but 
significant 
to 
commercialising the scientific results and 
this is hindering the full realisation of its 
innovative potential. The number of public-
private 
research  projects,  co-publications, 
patent  applications  and  researchers  employed 
by  businesses  is  increasing,  but  progress 
levels  are 
remains  uneven,  and 
(see 
significantly  below  the  EU  average 
Annex 4).  The  main  challenges  include  an 
underfunded  and 
technology 
transfer  ecosystem,  not  facilitating  business-
(including 
science  collaboration  effectively 
motivating  businesses  to  source  innovation 
from  research),  a  research  evaluation  system 
that  fails  to  fully  incentivise  and  reward 
limited 
commercialisation, 

fragmented 

and 

the 

the 

(31)  Kogut-Jaworska, M.  and  Ociepa-Kicińska, E.,  2023,  Do 
Regional  Smart  Specialization  Strategies  Affect  Innovation 
in Enterprises? Sustainability. 

12 

improving 

is  expected 

is  aimed  at 

implementation 

results  within 
(provided, 

Further  strengthening  science-business 
cooperation at both national and regional 
levels  remains  essential.  The  continuing 
professionalisation  and  capacity-building  of 
university-based  technology-transfer  centres 
and knowledge-transfer companies, as well as 
their  associations,  are  crucial  for  enhancing 
their role and the pipeline of investment-ready 
projects  following  on  from  research.  Cohesion 
policy funds include measures to promote the 
commercialisation  of  scientific  results.  Their 
effective 
to 
further  advance  these  efforts  in  Poland.  One 
is  the  Science4Business 
notable  example 
(Nauka  dla  biznesu)  project,  which  was 
launched  in  2025  with  funding  from  the 
European  Funds  for  Smart  Economy  2021-
the 
2027  and 
effectiveness  of  technology-transfer  centres 
and  university  knowledge-transfer  companies, 
which  are  crucial  for  creating  start-ups  and 
spin-offs.  A  stronger  focus  of  the  projects 
selection  criteria  on  the  commercialisation  of 
research 
support 
inter  alia,  by  the 
instruments 
National Centre for Research and Development 
(NCBR)  and  the  Foundation  for  Polish  Science 
(FNP))  would  further  bridge  the  gap  between 
research  and  commercial  application.  At  the 
regional 
technology-
fostering 
transfer  ecosystem  could  involve  structured 
collaboration  platforms  that  connect  SMEs, 
universities  and  technology  parks  to  support 
applied  R&D,  prototyping  and  technology 
transfer.  Poland  has  initiated  several  actions, 
but many are still at an early stage and have 
had  only  a  limited  impact  so  far.  Noteworthy 
measures (taken in the context of a 2025 CSR 
to  strengthen  science-business  links)  include 
establishing  new  rules  for  the  Council  for 
Innovation; forming an expert team to enhance 
the  transfer  of  scientific  results  to  the 
economy; 
comprehensive 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the science-
business  cooperation  support  system;  and 
works  on  a  strategy  for  developing  the  start-
up  ecosystem  until  2035  (see  Annex 4).  The 
strategic 
from 
recommendations 
documents  and  experts’  insights  could  boost 
science-business  links  if  they  are  translated 

launching 

public 

these 

level, 

the 

a 

 
 
into  concrete 
changes. 

legislative  and 

institutional 

Further progress in the ongoing review of 
the academic evaluation system is crucial 
for  fostering  an  entrepreneurial  culture 
among  scientists  and  in  academia.  In 
2025,  Poland  received  a  CSR  highlighting  the 
need  to  create  incentives  for  researchers  to 
engage  with  the  private  sector.  A  review  is 
necessary because public research institutions 
still  undervalue  links  with  businesses  and 
market.  Higher  education  reforms  (including 
those  that  introduced  the  Constitution  for 
Science 
the  Excellence 
initiated 
Initiative  –  Research  University  (IDUB)  and 
strategic  document 
adopted 
‘National science policy’ (see Annex 4)) did not 
sufficiently 
The 
prioritisation  of  publication  over  practical 
application  remains  a  key  weakness  of  the 
current framework.  

the  2022 

address 

(2018), 

issue. 

the 

in 

structural 

challenges 

Modernising  the  public  research  system 
and 
improving  the  attractiveness  of 
research  careers  (as  recommended  by  a 
CSR  in  2025)  requires  additional  policy 
measures.  The  number  of  PhD  students  per 
1 000  inhabitants  and  researchers  per  1 000 
employees  in  the  public  sector  remains  low 
and below the EU average (see Annex 4). This 
the 
indicates 
attractiveness  of  the  research  career  path, 
especially  when  compared  with  offers 
in 
industry  or  from  outside  Poland.  The  Polish 
RRP  includes  investments  in  the  research  and 
analytical infrastructure that are already being 
implemented,  but 
further  measures  are 
needed  to  ensure  a  lasting  impact  on  the 
research  system.  Establishing  a  robust  and 
attractive 
research  career  system  could 
involve  offering  competitive  salaries  for  PhD 
candidates  and  postdoctoral  researchers,  and 
providing  transparent  pathways  to  stable 
employment and enhanced job security. 

13 

Digitalisation: an enabler of 
innovation, growth and 
productivity 

as 

well 

businesses, 

Poland  has  made  progress  in  digitalising 
its public services, but challenges remain 
regarding  their  availability  for  citizens 
and 
as 
interoperability  of  state  systems.  Some 
recently 
improvements  have  been  made 
thanks  to  RRP  investment  (e.g. measures  on 
public  e-services  and  IT  solutions  for  public 
administration  and  on  scaling  up  digital 
applications in the public sphere, the economy 
and  society).  However,  Poland  scores  below 
the EU average on availability of digital public 
services for citizens and for businesses as well 
as cross-border access to services for citizens 
(Poland  scores  71,  85  and  50;  EU  averages: 
82,  86  and  71).  In  addition,  low  levels  of 
interoperability  and  data  exchange  in  State 
systems  are  undermining  their  potential  to 
reduce 
for 
administrative 
businesses (as recommended by a 2025 CSR). 
Further  meaningful  steps  could  be  taken  to 
further  digitise  sectors  such  as  justice,  with 
potential 
and 
accessibility  (see  Annex 7).  To  enable  the 
cross-border exchange of data and documents 
between authorities through the EU Once-Only 
Technical  System  (OOTS)  Poland  could  still 
identify the types of documents and data that 
could  be  exchanged  through  the  system;  and 
could explore ways to shift from submission of 
documents  to  exchange  of  structured  data. 
This could unlock further benefits of the single 
market (see Annex 7). 

efficiency 

improve 

burden 

the 

to 

the 

and 

integration  of  advanced  digital 
The 
technologies 
broader 
digitalisation  of  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises  is  progressing,  but  remains 
significantly  below  the  EU  average  and 
this  is  hindering  productivity  growth.  In 
2025,  only  59%  of  Polish  SMEs  achieved  at 
least  a  basic  level  of  digital  intensity  (below 
the EU average of 71.4%) (see Annex 18). This 
hampers  productivity  and 
innovation.  The 
adoption of the most advanced technologies is 
also  sluggish.  For  instance,  in  2025  8.4%  of 
enterprises  adopted  AI  –  well  below  the  EU 

 
 
in 

research  and 

average  of  20%  (see  Annex 4).  Stimulating 
investment 
innovation, 
providing  financial  and  specialised  knowledge 
support  and  further  participation  in  EU-wide 
initiatives  could  accelerate  the  dissemination 
of these technologies. 

Nurturing growth: business 
environment  

and 

economy 

Poland  has  strong  business  dynamics,  a 
resilient 
favourable 
business  condition,  but  more  measures 
are  needed  to  improve  the  business 
environment.  The  business  churn  rate (32) 
was 23.9% in 2023, above the EU average of 
19%.  This  made  Poland  one  of  the  most 
dynamic Member States in the EU. Productivity 
among Polish SMEs remains low (at only 68% 
of large firms’ productivity in 2021 – the OECD 
median  was  78%).  Collaboration  between 
firms  in  Poland  is  notably  scarce,  with  just 
14%  of  enterprises  engaged 
in  strategic 
partnerships  (compared  with  37%  in  Finland 
and  25%  in  Germany).  Smaller  firms  are 
particularly  struggling  with  limited  capacities 
and facing challenges in accessing knowledge, 
technology and market expertise. Clusters and 
innovation  hubs  are  opportunities  for  Polish 
firms  to  enhance  innovation  and  access  skills 
and  technology,  acting  as  accelerators  by 
providing  SMEs  with  access 
to  advisory 
networks,  global  value  chains,  specialised 
knowledge  and  shared  resources.  However, 
business  support 
(BSIs)  are 
concentrated  mainly 
in  metropolitan  and 
economically  stronger  regions.  They  are  more 
dispersed and narrower in scope in structurally 
weaker  areas  (particularly  in  eastern  regions). 
72%  of  Polish 
companies  experienced 
difficulties because of late payments in 2024 
– the highest share in the EU. To combat this, 
Poland  is  introducing  the  National  e-Invoicing 
System  (KSeF)  under  the  RRP  to  mandate 

institutions 

(32) Eurostat defines the business churn rate as the sum of 
enterprise  births  and  death  rates.  High-growth  enterprises 
are  enterprises  that  had  at  least  10  employees  at  the 
beginning  of  a  three-year  period  and  an  annual  growth  in 
the number of employees above 10% during that period. 

14 

invoices.  Further 

improvements 
structured 
could complement the e-invoicing system with 
payment  monitoring,  which  may 
increase 
transparency and motivate timely settlements. 

the 

Their 

sector. 

better 

regulation 

has  made 

and 
Poland’s 
simplification 
particular 
progress by introducing regulatory impact 
assessments and reducing administrative 
burdens  on  businesses.  These  measures 
were  taken  in  the  context  of  a  2025  CSR  on 
the  need  to  simplify  regulation, 
improve 
legal 
tools  and  make 
regulatory 
framework  more  stable  and  clearer  for  the 
effective 
business 
implementation 
In  2025, 
introduced  deregulatory  measures, 
Poland 
notably  in  the  tax  law,  through  initiatives  like 
SprawdzaMY  (‘We  check’),  which  gathers  and 
relays  business  proposals  to  the  government. 
However, 
is  a 
challenge  for  Polish  companies,  with  85% 
complaining  about  frequent  changes  in  the 
legislative  framework  (see  Annex 5).  Poland 
has introduced a reform under the RRF, which 
requires 
impact 
preparation 
assessments  and public  consultation  for  draft 
laws. 

legislative  unpredictability 

is  still  ongoing. 

the 

of 

in 

in 

rates 

encourage 

single-bid 

competition 

In  2025,  Poland  continued  to  experience 
high 
public 
procurement. Poland received a CSR in 2025 
to 
public 
procurement  processes,  making  them  more 
efficient  and  less  cumbersome  (especially  for 
SMEs).  Single-bid  rates  reached  over  60%  in 
sectors like medical and health services – well 
above  the  EU  average  of  29%.  Even  for 
contracts over EUR 5 million, rates remain high 
at  52-57%.  Discrepancies  exist  among 
contracting  authorities  (rates  for  the  central 
government  are  below  rates  for  local  and 
regional  bodies  and  public-law  organisations). 
Direct  awards  play  an 
role, 
accounting  for  7%  of  the  overall  number  of 
public  procurements  and  ranging  from  2.4% 
and  3.4%  for  works  and  supplies  respectively 
to  13%  for  the  procurement  of  services  (see 
Annex 5).  Poland 
in 
strategic  procurement  and  SME  involvement; 
and  actively  monitors  green,  social  and 
innovation  criteria.  Despite  increased  use  of 
green and social criteria, the planning is often 

is  making  progress 

important 

 
 
strictly aligned with annual budgets, restricting 
bidder  preparation  time.  Authorities  could 
enhance  participation  by  developing  tentative 
multiannual  plans,  especially  for  substantial 
procurements.  This  would  allow  broader 
participation of companies (including SMEs) in 
public procurement processes. 

Gaps in access to finance 

Poland’s  credit  supply  to  the  economy 
lags  behind  EU  peers.  Banks  are  facing 
country-specific  challenges  (see  Annex 6)  and 
is  relatively 
the  domestic  capital  market 
shallow (33). The share of bank assets invested 
in Polish sovereign bonds is one of the highest 
in the EU. This is due to distortionary bank levy 
rules that exempt these holdings from the tax 
base, which is being revised in 2026.  

their 

Non-bank  financial 
intermediaries  are 
footprint. 
gradually  expanding 
Institutional investors have a very conservative 
asset allocation profile. In particular, allocating 
assets  under  management  to  riskier  asset 
classes  such  as  venture  capital  remains  an 
exception.  This  is  primarily  due  to  systemic 
and regulatory reasons, particularly for private 
pension  funds.  However,  the  shallow  venture 
capital  and  private  equity  markets  are  not 
sufficiently  stimulating  the  development  of 
adequate  management  know-how  that  fund 
managers  need  to  develop  in  this  market 
segment. Seed and venture capital financing is 
channelled 
dominated  by  public 
primarily 
national 
development  institutions  (see  Annexes 4  and 
6). Later-stage financing of growth companies 
on  the  domestic  market  is  insufficient.  The 
Warsaw  Stock  Exchange  (WSE)  rarely  offers 
the  right exit  opportunities  for  venture  capital 
investors.  Making  the  WSE  more  attractive 
would require governance reforms and deeper 
integration  into  EU  capital  markets.  Better 
governance of State-owned enterprises, which 
account  for  a  significant  share  of  the  WSE’s 

funds 
various 

through 

listings,  could  also  enhance  domestic  market 
credibility. 

instruments. 

There is ample scope to increase the level 
of  direct  or  indirect  retail  investment  in 
capital  market 
Polish 
households  prefer  bank  deposits  and  non-
financial  wealth  (e.g. real  estate  ownership) 
and  have  accumulated  only  limited  financial 
wealth. Only a quarter of this is invested as a 
result  of  relatively  lower  levels  of  financial 
literacy  among  Polish  citizens.  Upcoming 
changes  to  the  private  pensions  pillar  could 
increase the level of financial wealth invested 
in  capital  markets.  However,  these  products 
need  to  be  carefully  designed  in  order  to 
ensure that the public support is not regressive 
and  that  a  domestic  bias  does  not  reduce 
returns for Polish households. 

The single market 

Poland  is  strongly  integrated  into  the 
EU’s single market. Around 70% of Poland’s 
foreign  trade  takes  place  within  the  EU.  In 
2025,  more  than  75%  of  Polish  exports  were 
directed  to  other  EU  Member  States  (see 
Annex 5),  reflecting  Poland’s  deep  integration 
in 
chains 
into  EU 
manufacturing sectors such as the automotive 
and  assembly 
industries).  Poland’s  export 
structure  remains  relatively  concentrated  in 
low-technology  goods  and  services,  indicating 
scope  to  expand  the  knowledge-intensive 
industries.  

(particularly 

value 

in  Poland 

However,  the  functioning  of  the  single 
market 
is  affected  by 
reluctance  to  transpose  and  enforce  EU 
rules.  Poland’s  transposition  deficit  reached 
2.1%  in  December  2025  (above  both  the  EU 
average  and  the  1%  target).  Conformity 
deficits  and 
the  number  of  pending 
infringement  cases  also  remain  above  the  EU 
average (34). 
administrative 
Easing 
requirements in the implementation of posting 

OECD 

Economic 

(33) 
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-
surveys-poland-2025_483d3bb9-en.html. 

Surveys: 

Poland 

2025, 

(34) This is one of the barriers highlighted in the 2025 single 
market  strategy  (‘Terrible  10’).  See  also  the  Annual  Single 
Market and Competitiveness Report 2026. 

15 

 
 
 
compliance, 

–  without 

of  workers  rules  could  reduce  regulatory 
fragmentation  within 
the  single  market, 
facilitate  cross-border  mobility  and  foster 
competitiveness 
undermining 
workers’ protections (see Annex 5). Businesses 
report  that  divergent  national  approaches  to 
cross-border  waste  shipments  and  goods 
packaging  are  a matter  of  significant  concern 
potential 
regarding 
penalties  and  market  access.  Barriers  to 
competition  also  persist 
in  some  service 
sectors.  The  number  of  regulated  professions 
in Poland remains one of the highest in the EU. 
Restrictions 
services 
(e.g. regulated  fees,  geographical  restrictions 
and mandatory professional body membership 
including  notaries, 
for  certain  professions 
lawyers,  architects  and 
civil  engineers) 
continue to limit market entry and competition. 

professional 

costs, 

on 

16 

 
DECARBONISATION, ENERGY AFFORDABILITY AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 

on 

its 

flexible, 

sources, 

received 

reforming 

expanding 

dependency 

a 
(CSR) 
its  green 

country-specific 
Poland 
in  2025 
to 
recommendation 
transition  by 
accelerate 
reducing 
coal, 
advancing  the  deployment  of  renewable 
energy 
grid 
infrastructure, making the energy system 
electricity 
more 
pricing,  and  phasing  out  fossil  fuel 
subsidies,  as  well  as  to  build  climate 
resilience  by  strengthening  adaptation 
governance  and  focusing  on  sustainable 
water management. Poland has since made 
(deployment  of 
progress 
renewables 
grid 
of 
infrastructure). However, no progress has been 
made  in  other  areas  (e.g. reforming  electricity 
pricing 
for 
electrification  and  phasing  out  fossil  fuel 
subsidies). 

in  some  areas 

to  strengthen 

expansion 

incentive 

and 

the 

Addressing structural elements of 
the energy transition – market 
reforms and infrastructure 
investments for improved 
affordability and security 

Poland’s  energy  transition  is  a  mixed 
picture. Renewables in the electricity mix  are 
increasing (31% in 2025) while coal continues 
to  decrease  (53%  in  2025;  70%  in  2022). 
However,  gas  still  plays  a  critical  role  as  the 
main  flexible  balancing  resource  and  Poland 
has the most carbon-intensive energy sector in 
for 
signal 
the 
electrification,  grid  bottlenecks,  the  lack  of  a 
district  heating  decarbonisation  programme 
and coal subsidies are significant action gaps. 
Moreover, Poland is the only Member State not 
to have submitted an updated national energy 
is 
and  climate  plan 

(NECP)  and 

distortions 

Price 

this 

EU. 

undermining  the  overall  long-term  planning, 
coordination  and  predictability  of  the  energy 
and  industrial  transformation.  An  NECP  could 
inform  the  strategic  use  of  the  substantial 
its  disposal  to 
resources  Poland  has  at 
advance  the  deployment  and  penetration  of 
clean  and  cheaper  energy.  These  resources 
include  among  other  revenues  from  the  EU’s 
(ETS)  and  the 
emissions  trading  system 
Modernisation Fund (supplied by the EU ETS).  

that 

price 

signals 

Poland’s  electricity-pricing  framework 
remains  heavily  distorted  by  government 
intervention  and  the  high  share  of  fossil 
fuels 
in  the  generation  mix.  Poland 
received  a  CSR  in  2025  to  promote  balanced 
support 
electricity 
investment  in  clean  electricity  generation  by 
adjusting  taxes  and  levies  on  electricity  for 
households  and  industry  relative  to  those  on 
fossil  fuels,  but  no  progress  has  since  been 
made in this respect. Consumer protection was 
a  legitimate  short-term  goal,  with  electricity 
prices frozen until the end of September 2025, 
but the share of taxes and levies in electricity 
prices  was  the  highest  in  the  EU  during  the 
first half of 2025 (Poland’s share was around 
50%,  EU  average:  28%).  These  charges 
(including  capacity 
fees  and 
cogeneration  charges)  result  in  legacy  costs 
being  passed  on  to  consumers  –  rather  than 
price  signals  being  aligned  with  energy 
transition  priorities.  Coal  and  gas  accounted 
for  71%  of  electricity  generation  in  2025  on 
average.  Expensive  fossil  fuels 
therefore 
remained  the  primary  marginal  price  setters, 
driving  the  average  wholesale  electricity  price 
up to 105 EUR/MWh (one of the highest in the 
EU). Daytime prices have fallen in recent years 
(owing to the growing penetration of solar and 
onshore  wind),  but  Poland  remains  heavily 
exposed  to  price  spikes  during  peak-demand 
hours.  

fees,  RES 

Poland’s  coal  mining  sector  is  heavily 
subsidised  and  absorbs  resources  that 

17 

 
 
could otherwise be used to accelerate the 
clean  energy  and  industrial  transition. 
Poland has received a CSR to phase out fossil 
fuel  subsidies,  especially  those  related  to 
mining.  However,  in  2025,  the  government 
spent  PLN 9 billion  (approx.  EUR 2.2 billion) 
propping up the coal mining sector in the form 
of production subsidies paid to the three main 
state-owned  mining  companies  (35).  Other 
subsidies  covered miners’ pensions  and  social 
security  benefits,  and  state-backed  financial 
support  for  mine  closures,  decommissioning 
costs  and  worker  severance  packages  (see 
Annex 9).  The  scale  of 
the  challenges 
associated  with  the  transformation  makes  it 
necessary  that  if  engaged,  public  funds  are 
used  strategically  to  effectively  move  away 
from mining  and  change  the  economic  profile 
of coal regions. 

Investment  in  the  grid  is  underway,  but 
critical  bottlenecks  are  still  slowing  the 
pace of  the  energy transition.  Grid-related 
challenges  in  Poland  have  become  acute  due 
to the rapid growth of renewables and system 
inflexibility. This has clear regional implications 
(storage,  demand-response, 
interconnection 
and dynamic dispatch) (see Annex 18). Poland 
has received a CSR to boost grid capacity and 
flexibility.  In  2025,  connection  requests  for 
approximately  42  GW  of  renewable  capacity 
were  declined  (the  total  installed  capacity  in 
the  Polish  system  is  72 GW).  Polskie  Sieci 
Energetyczne  (PSE,  the  Polish  transmission 
system  operator)  recognised  these  challenges 
in its 2025 investment strategy, which outlines 
infrastructure 
priorities: 
transmission  networks;  establishing  a  north-
south 
transmission  corridor  as  well  as 
dedicated corridors to new capacities currently 
under  development 
(both  offshore  and 
nuclear);  and  flexibility  solutions.  The  Polish 
electricity 
weakly 
interconnected. The level of interconnection of 
the  Polish  energy  system  was  4.3%  in  2025, 
well  below  the  2030  target  of  15%.  The 
Harmony Link with Lithuania is the only cross-
border  connection  project  currently  underway 
and there are no other interconnection projects 

investment 

remains 

system 

(35)  Polska Grupa Górnicza (PGG), Południowy Koncern 

Węglowy (PKW) and Węglokoks Kraj.  

resilience  plan 

improving  grid  access 

in  the  pipeline.  However,  recent  regulatory 
reforms  and  investments  under  the  Polish 
(RRP)  are 
recovery  and 
significantly 
for 
(examples 
renewable  energy  developers 
include  the  introduction  of  cable  pooling  and 
an overhaul of electricity grid connection rules, 
as well as the construction of 370 km of new 
lines).  

decoupled 

constraints 

have 
Capacity-allocation 
systematically 
Polish 
electricity prices from the EU market and 
are  now  contributing  to  higher  prices. 
Poland  has  received  a  CSR  to  increase  cross-
border  trading  and  limit  restrictions  to  cases 
rules 
justified  under  EU  energy  market 
(particularly  in  cases  involving  constraints  in 
allocating  national  capacity).  The  use  of 
allocation constraints is declining thanks to the 
balancing market reform under the Polish RRP, 
which  is  modifying  the  market  structure  by 
introducing  obligation  for  earlier  procurement 
of  balancing  reserves,  but  the  frequency  of 
allocation 
still 
constraints  activation 
concerning.  Under  the  inherited  integrated 
scheduling  process,  the  TSO  continues  to 
optimise  real-time  power  flows,  restricting 
exports  and  imports  from/to  Poland  when 
needed. 
sufficient 
to 
upward/downward balancing capacity at home 
(i.e. a  reserve  margin)  that  is  ready  to  be 
ramped  up/down 
in 
renewables  or  a  spike  in  demand  occurs;  and 
to  avoid  oversupply  because  the  generation 
levels  of  large  coal-fired  units  cannot  be 
modulated.  This  probably  increases  the  need 
to  reduce  other  sources  (such  as  renewables 
or  imports)  when  coal  output  cannot  be 
further.  By  September  2025, 
reduced 
reportedly 
accumulated  RES 
curtailment 
topped  1.13 TWh  – 
lost 
opportunity for clean energy (see Annex 8).  

if  a  sudden  drop 

indicating  a 

retain 

This 

is 

is 

Further  integration  of  renewables  in  the 
energy  system  is  being  hampered  by 
limited  flexibility,  demand-side  response 
and  permitting  time.  30 GW  of  new  solar 
and  offshore  capacity  has  been  delivered 
under the Polish RRP. Solar capacity continued 
to increase in 2025 (albeit more slowly), while 
onshore  wind  stagnated  due  to  constraints  in 
the  permitting  rules.  The  development  of 

18 

 
 
their 

deployment 

Poland’s  first  offshore  capacity  as  part  of  its 
RRP  is  ongoing.  Poland  concluded  its  first 
offshore  wind  auction  at  the  end  of  2025, 
awarding  support  to  three  projects  for  a  total 
of  3.4 GW  of  additional  offshore  wind 
capacity.  A  reform  under  the  Polish  RRP  to 
introduce an obligation to designate renewable 
energy acceleration areas (RAAs) was adopted 
in  2025  but  is  yet  to  yield  results.  Timely 
designation  of  RRAs  is  key  to  unlocking  the 
potential  of  different  renewable  technologies, 
accelerating 
and 
coordinating  infrastructure  planning.  It  is  also 
crucial  to  address  legal  and  grid  connection-
in  RES  development. 
related  constraints 
Poland’s  current 
installed  battery  storage 
capacity (BESS) is still modest (about 200 MW 
online  in  early  2025),  but  the  project  pipeline 
is  extremely  large.  An  additional  450 MW  of 
storage  capacity  will  already  be  delivered  in 
2026 under the Polish RRP. Over 4 GW of new 
battery  capacity  secured  contracts  in  the  last 
three capacity mechanism auctions (for 2027-
2029  delivery).  Demand-response  solutions 
also  face  market  access  barriers.  Potential 
solutions  (e.g. aggregators  that  offer  flexible 
load  reduction  services  to 
industrial  and 
commercial  consumers;  dynamic  electricity 
tariffs  that  enable  households  to  adjust 
consumption  in  response  to  real-time  price 
signals;  virtual  power  plants  that  aggregate 
installations;  and  battery 
prosumer  solar 
storage)  are  therefore  not  being  deployed  at 
all or only to a very limited extent.  

Taking a strategic approach to 
energy and industrial 
decarbonisation to foster growth 
and a just transition 

The  industrial  transformation  lacks  a 
coherent  framework  that  would  align 
policy  incentives,  infrastructure  planning 
and  financial  support  with  objectives  to 
advance  investments  in  priority  sectors. 
The priority sectors in terms of both economic 
relevance  and 
industrial  decarbonisation 
include  cement,  chemicals  and 
challenge 
fertilisers  production,  oil  refining  and  coke 
extraction,  as  well  as  steel  and  metal 

in 

rather 

these  sectors 

production.  Key  decarbonisation  interventions 
needed 
(electrification, 
deployment  of  onsite  renewables,  uptake  of 
green  hydrogen  and  deployment  of  carbon 
capture,  utilisation  and  storage  (CCUS))  are 
implemented 
than 
incrementally 
structurally.  The  cement  sector  is  investing  in 
CCUS  under  the  Innovation  Fund,  which  is 
funded  by  the  EU  ETS,  but  the  legislative 
framework  for  the  capture,  transport,  storage 
and use of carbon and the strategic vision for 
the  recycled  carbon  chain  are  lacking.  In  the 
chemicals and fertiliser production sectors, the 
uptake  of  hydrogen  is  constrained  by  the 
limited availability of additional renewable and 
nuclear  energy  capacity.  With  the  enabling 
policy  and  support  framework,  rural  areas 
could  also  assume  their  role  in  the  energy 
transition  through  bioeconomy  with  special 
focus on agriculture waste. 

natural 

Above-average  energy  prices  and  the 
disproportionate tax burden on electricity 
gas)  are 
(compared  with 
hampering  the  electrification  of  industry 
sectors.  Industrial  consumers  pay  around 
three  times  more  for  electricity  than  for  gas. 
Taxes  and  levies  account  for  a  third  of  their 
electricity  bill.  The  share  of  renewable  energy 
sources  (RES)  in  the  energy  consumed  by  the 
industry 
low. 
(electricity  and  heat) 
Electrification  in  Polish  industry  is  advancing 
mainly 
and  medium-
lower- 
temperature heat, efficiency upgrades, rooftop 
solar photovoltaics for onsite consumption and 
power  purchase  agreements  for  renewable 
energy.  However,  far-reaching  electrification 
also  depends  on  sufficient  pricing  incentives 
and  the  deployment  of  onsite  renewables. 
Complex  permitting  and  grid  connection 
remain the main obstacles for the latter.  

through 

is 

The  phasing-out  of  coal  poses  major 
economic and social challenges for those 
regions  that  are  still  reliant  on  mining 
and  emission-intensive  industries.  Five 
regions in southern and central Poland receive 
support  from  the  Just  Transition  Fund:  the 
Śląskie, 
Dolnośląskie, 
Wielkopolskie  and  Łódzkie  regions.  Poland 
accounts for nearly 97% of the EU’s hard-coal 
extraction,  with  around  80%  of  national 
in  the  Śląskie  and 
reserves  concentrated 

Małopolskie, 

19 

 
regions.  The  mining 

industry 
Małopolskie 
remains  highly  important  for  these  regions, 
both demographically  and economically but is 
becoming  increasingly  unprofitable.  The  north 
of  Poland  is  set  to  become  more  important 
thanks  to  new  offshore  and  expected  nuclear 
energy capacities, and the associated expected 
infrastructure. 
that  grid 
reinforcement  reflects  the  emergence  of  the 
northern  regions  in  the  energy  and  industry 
transition,  while  also  enabling  a  clean 
transition for the coal-dependent regions.  

is  essential 

It 

Poland  lacks  a  national  strategic  vision 
for  the  energy  and  industrial  transition. 
The  phasing-out  of  coal  mining  is  challenging 
in  terms  of  a  just  transition  (especially  in 
reskilling)  but  is  also  an  opportunity  for 
regional 
innovation  and  growth.  Mining 
technologies and skills can be repurposed into 
specialised  engineering  and  technical  services 
(e.g. underground  engineering  works  and  land 
reclamation),  thus  enabling  the  regions  in 
question to maintain their competitiveness and 
capitalising  on 
learned  from  the 
ongoing Just Transition Fund. Clear investment 
priorities,  policy  incentives  and  support  for 
regional 
mechanisms  would  help 
transition  away  from  coal  toward  clean 
technologies. Poland does not currently assess 
and 
integrate  climate-related  macrofiscal 
implications  into  macroeconomic  projections 
and  budget  plans  at  national  level.  Better 
awareness  of 
implications  would 
facilitate the planning of industrial transition. 

lessons 

these 

steer 

Phasing out coal from heating and 
making buildings more efficient 

efficiency 

improvements 
remain  key  challenges 

Some  progress  has  been  made,  but 
phasing coal out of individual heating and 
in 
energy 
buildings 
to 
reducing  emissions  and  air  pollution, 
improving  living  comfort  and  reducing 
energy  poverty.  Poland  has  received  a  CSR 
to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, including by 
transitioning  to  decarbonised  systems  that 
integrate 
renewable  energy  sources  and 
improve energy efficiency. It is estimated that 

20 

around  2 million  households  still  use  coal  for 
heating  and  around  1.5 million  households 
experience  energy  poverty.  No  other  EU 
Member State uses anything like as much coal 
for heating and Polish cities have some of the 
worst air quality levels in the EU. The Clean Air 
Programme,  which  is  supported  by  the  Polish 
RRP, cohesion policy and revenues from the EU 
ETS,  has  helped  advance  heat  source 
replacement, the deployment of small RES and 
thermal modernisation. However, its successful 
implementation  in  the  near-term  hinges  on 
replacement  with 
coupling  heat  source 
thermal  modernisation.  This 
is  critical  to 
mitigate  air  pollution  from  biomass  boilers 
that are mostly being installed to replace coal 
boilers.  

Heat  pump  deployment  fell  by  35%  in 
2024  due  to  the  disproportionate  tax 
burden  on  electricity  compared  with 
natural gas. Heating and cooling account for 
81%  of 
residential  energy  consumption. 
Renewables  supply  only  21%  of  the  energy 
used  for  heating  and  cooling  in  all  sectors. 
Income-based  incentives  and  subsidies  for 
heat  pumps  exist,  including  from  the  Polish 
RRP  and  cohesion  funding.  However,  their 
impact  is  likely  to  be  affected  by  electricity 
being  more  expensive  than  fossil-fuel-based 
heating and cooling sources. 

shift 

from 

sector,  but 

A 
to  gas-based 
coal 
cogeneration  is  underway  in  the  district 
integration  of 
heating 
lagging 
is 
renewable  energy  sources 
behind. 
in  district  heating 
Investments 
decarbonisation are being supported under the 
the  Modernisation  Fund 
Polish  RRP  and 
(funded  by  the  EU  ETS).  Only  22%  of  district 
heating  systems  in  Poland  currently  meet 
efficiency  requirements  under  the  Energy 
Efficiency  Directive.  Deployment  of  district 
heating  systems  based  solely  on  renewable 
and  low  emission  heat  sources  is  limited  to 
demonstration  projects  and  a  few  smaller 
cities.  Scaling-up  hinges  on  more  effective 
spatial  planning  and  investment  in  heating 
networks 
integration. 
Dedicated  support  in  this  respect  (linked  to 
specific  investment  objectives)  will  be  key  to 
advancing  investment  decisions,  because  the 
regulatory  model  for  district  heating  tariffs  is 

to  promote 

their 

 
not  keeping  up  with  wholesale  market 
developments (particularly as regards the high 
share of cogeneration). 

Poland  is  analysing  possible  support  for 
power-to-heat  technology  with  a  view  to 
promote the offtake of surplus renewable 
energy; however, this is an example of an 
incremental  intervention  rather  than  a 
structural  change.  Poland  is  considering 
simplifying network connections for power-to-
heat 
them  from 
capacity  charges  and  adjusting  tariffs  to 
promote  the  offtake  of  surplus  renewable 
energy.  According  to  the  government,  power-
to-heat is a supplementary way to ensure that 
the  district  heating  sector  complies  with  the 
increasingly  stringent  efficiency  requirements 
of the Energy Efficiency Directive.  

installations,  exempting 

Advancing the shift to sustainable 
transport 

The  shift  towards  sustainable  transport 
in  Poland,  with 
remains  challenging 
emissions  from  road  transport  having 
nearly  doubled  in  the  last  two  decades. 
Emissions from road transport grew by 95% in 
2005-2024  despite  incremental  efforts  to 
decarbonise  private  and  freight  transport  as 
well as increase the uptake of public transport. 
Continued  investments  in  rail  infrastructure, 
intermodal  terminals,  and  zero-
including 
emission  rolling  stock  can  further  advance 
decarbonisation  efforts.  Since  the  end  of 
2019,  the  number  of  electric  vehicles  has 
increased more than 27-fold. However, private 
and freight transport incentives for the uptake 
of  zero-emission  vehicles 
lack  scale  and 
subsidy  programmes  do  not  match  demand. 
By 2025, there were 237 000 electric vehicles 
in  Poland,  representing  only  1.1%  of  the  car 
fleet  and  including  121 000  battery-electric 
(BEVs)  and  116 000  plug-in  hybrid  vehicles. 
Targeted  support  under  the  RRP  and  cohesion 
policy  has 
improved  the  availability  and 
accessibility  of  low-carbon  public  transport  at 
regional  and  local  levels,  modernised  the 
railway 
the 
acquisition  of  zero-emission  rolling  stock, 

infrastructure  and  supported 

in 

Interventions 

buses  and  trams  (see  Annex  8).  The  RRP  has 
also  introduced  a  reform  that  requires  public 
transport operators in large cities to purchase 
zero-emission  buses.  More  ambitious  efforts 
are  needed  in  order  to  significantly  increase 
the  low  market  share  of  electric  vehicles  – 
particularly  for  private  users,  who  have  not 
benefited  from  the  same  levels  of  dedicated 
(e.g. 
support  and  sustainable  frameworks 
green  public  procurement  rules  for  public 
transport). 
line  with  the 
‘polluter  pays’  principle  (e.g. emissions-related 
fees  for  highly  pollution  combustion-engine 
vehicles  and 
incentives  such  as 
emission-related  modulation  of  registration 
fees  for  light  vehicles  or  exemptions  for 
heavy-duty  vehicles  from  the  infrastructure-
charge  element  of  the  toll)  would  help 
incentivise the shift to sustainable transport  – 
if  they  are  accompanied  by  accelerated 
infrastructure.  At 
deployment  of  charging 
present,  the  limited  availability  of  charging 
points  for  both  private  and  freight  transport 
remains  an  obstacle  that  is  delaying  the 
electrification of road transport.  

fiscal 

Climate adaptation depends on 
effective governance and 
environmental resilience  

that 

Strengthening  climate  adaptation  action 
relies  on  the  updating  of  the  national 
strategy, which  has  been  underway  since 
2023.  Poland  has  received  a  CSR  to  improve 
climate  adaptation  governance  (particularly 
policies that are focused on the management, 
protection  and  sustainable  use  of  water 
resources,  and 
incorporate  current 
assessments  of  climate  change  impacts  to 
ensure  the  long-term  sustainability  of  sectors 
and  activities  dependent  on  water  ecosystem 
services).  Work  on  the  national  strategy  is 
reportedly  advancing  but  is  only  expected  to 
be  completed  in  2027.  Meanwhile,  Poland  is 
particularly vulnerable to high risks of drought, 
flood, heatwaves and extreme weather events, 
which 
threaten  economic  and  personal 
security. Coordination is lacking between local, 
regional  and  national  authorities  when 
it 
comes  to  addressing  the  acute  challenges  of 

21 

 
is 

This 

effort. 

climate resilience, preparedness and financing 
adaptation 
particularly 
problematic  given  the  risk  of  floods  in  the 
south  of  Poland.  The  efforts  to  strengthen 
resilience  and  the  resources  allocated  to  this 
do  not  appear  comprehensive  enough  to 
address the level of risk being faced.  

is 

are 

change 

that  allow 

ecosystems 

invasive  and 

exacerbating 
Climate 
environmental risks, and water resources 
and 
particularly 
vulnerable.  Unabated  water  pollution  from 
industry remains a critical challenge. Increased 
salinity caused by wastewater discharge from 
coal  mining  and  other  industrial  activities 
(combined  with  increased  temperatures  and 
biogenic  influx  from  agriculture)  is  creating 
conditions 
toxic 
species to bloom, poisoning waters, destroying 
natural  habitats  and  endangering  peoples’ 
safety.  Limiting  wastewater  discharges  from 
the  mining  and  industrial  sectors  will  require 
incentives 
desalination 
invest 
installations  and  higher  environmental  fees in 
line with the ‘polluter pays’ principle. Measures 
included  in  the  common  agricultural  policy 
(CAP)  strategic  plan  offer  some  positive 
examples  of  how  water  management  in  rural 
areas  can  be  improved  through  investment  in 
water 
infrastructure, 
rainwater  harvesting,  water  recirculation  and 
digital  water  management  solutions.  The  CAP 
strategic  plan  also  promotes  water  retention 
and  the protection  of peatlands  and  wetlands 
in  order  to  mitigate  drought  and  flood  risks 
and strengthen resilience. 

and  wastewater 

to 

in 

and 

climate 

ecosystem 

adaptation 

Effective 
and 
mitigation  require  action  in  all  economic 
sectors. Climate adaptation outcomes depend 
on 
effective 
integrity 
environmental  protection  policies.  The  energy 
and  industry  sectors  put  pressure  on  water 
resources. 
industry 
In  2024,  energy  and 
accounted  for  68%  of  water  use  in  Poland. 
Gradual  decarbonisation  would  help  alleviate 
the  situation,  but  investments  in  retention 
(including 
and 
wastewater  treatment)  are  urgently  needed. 
Support  for  wastewater  treatment  systems  in 
rural  area  is  being  provided  under  Poland’s 
RRP. 
in  particular, 
additional  pressure  on  water  use  comes  from 

In  years  of  drought 

nature-based 

solutions 

retention 

is  still  not 
agriculture,  where 
sufficiently developed to foster water balance 
in  rural  areas  and  enhance  the  resilience  of 
farming  businesses  to  drought.  There  are  no 
dedicated  incentives  and  education  initiatives 
to  enhance  retention  and  use  water  more 
effectively  in  agriculture.  A  project  under  the 
EU’s  Technical  Support  Instrument  will  assist 
in  designing  a 
the  Polish  government 
comprehensive  set  of  policies  to  improve 
water  management  in  agriculture.  Improved 
water  management  is  also  linked  to  climate 
change  mitigation  potential.  Carbon  removals 
in Poland are not ambitious enough to meet its 
2030 target for land use, land-use change and 
forestry 
(LULUCF).  Existing  policies  focus 
mainly  on  forestry,  with  less  emphasis  on 
wetland  and  peatland  agriculture,  and  on 
urban settlements management. 

22 

 
SKILLS, QUALITY JOBS AND SOCIAL FAIRNESS 

In 2025, Poland received country-specific 
recommendations  (CSRs)  in  the  areas  of 
education  and  training,  skills  and  labour 
market inclusion. Poland was recommended 
to  improve  the  quality  and  inclusiveness  of 
education  and  training;  the  quality  of  teacher 
education;  and  boost  participation  in  science, 
technology,  engineering  and  mathematics 
(STEM)  programmes  at  tertiary  level.  The 
recommendation  also  called  on  Poland  to 
foster  skills  relevant  to  the  labour  market 
(including for the digital and green transitions) 
and  further  strengthen  the  efficiency  of 
vocational  education  and 
(VET). 
However,  only 
limited  progress  has  been 
made. A few measures have been adopted  or 
their 
but 
preparation, 
are 
implementation is yet to show results. 

training 

under 

Facilitating learning in science, 
technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM); and boosting 
basic skills to support 
competitiveness 

increasing 
Declining  basic  skills  and 
inequalities 
remain  a 
in  education 
challenge. In 2025, Poland received a CSR on 
fostering  high-quality  and  inclusive  education. 
Some  measures  supporting  inclusion  and  the 
curriculum  reform  are  in  preparation,  but 
progress  has  been  limited.  The  decreasing 
increasing 
basic  skills  of  Polish  students, 
inequalities  and 
inclusive 
in 
education  pose  challenges  for  human  capital 
development  and  the  competitiveness  of  the 
the 
Polish 
underachievement  among  15-year-olds 
in 
basic  skills  has  increased  more  than  the  EU 
average.  However,  the  proportion  of  top 
performers  has  decreased,  and  this  limits  the 
(see  Annex 13).  Urban-rural 
talent  pool 

challenges 

economy. 

2018, 

Since 

disparities  are  above  the  EU  average  – 
pointing  to  gaps  in  the  quality  of  teaching. 
Spatial  inequalities  remain  –  in  relation  to 
outcomes  as  well  as  to  access  to  education 
(see Annex 18). The impact of students’ socio-
economic  backgrounds  on  their  educational 
results  has  increased,  deepening  inequalities 
between  students.  The  highest  proportion  of 
students  with  low  basic  skills  is  clustered  in 
VET  sectoral  stage I  schools.  Integration  of 
students  with  a  migrant  background  also 
continues to pose challenges. This is reflected 
in the higher drop-out rates of secondary-level 
students (see Annex 13), for which monitoring 
at the national level is missing. 

and 

Poland  has  prepared  a  comprehensive 
curriculum reform to improve the quality 
of school education outcomes but a long-
term  strategic  approach  to 
inclusive 
education  would  also  be  necessary.  The 
curriculum  reform  covers  the  pre-primary, 
primary  and  secondary  levels  and  is  to  be 
rolled out gradually between September 2026 
and  mid-2032.  The  reform  aims  to  increase 
the  focus  on  competences  (including  basic 
skills),  address  widening 
inequalities  and 
strengthen  the 
inclusiveness  of  the  core 
curricula.  It  also  aims  at  improving  students’ 
well-being 
digital 
competences.  Monitoring  and  evaluating  the 
reform  from  an  early  stage  will  be  necessary 
in order to ensure its effective implementation. 
In  the  area  of  inclusive  education,  Poland  is 
(with  ESF+  support)  developing  support  for 
students  with  special  educational  needs  in 
mainstream 
is  also 
supporting  Ukrainian  students  through  the 
‘Przyjazna  Szkoła’  programme  and  ESF+ 
funding,  but  further  systemic  solutions  would 
be needed, a because many of these Ukrainian 
students  are  being  taught 
in  segregated 
classes 
(see  Annex 13).  Students  with 
disabilities  also  continue  to  face  barriers  to 
effective 
in  mainstream 
education and this is further undermining their 

education.  Poland 

participation 

developing 

23 

 
 
employment  prospects.  Developing  a  long-
term strategic approach to inclusive education 
would 
facilitate  stakeholder  engagement, 
implementation  of  comprehensive  measures 
and widening of access to inclusive education 
for all students. 

the 

education  are 

Equipping  teachers  with  the  necessary 
skills  and  improving  teacher  retention 
would  also  be  key  to  a  successful 
implementation  of  the  curricular  reform. 
In  the  context  of  the  2025  CSR  on  improving 
teacher  education,  some 
the  quality  of 
impact  on  formal 
measures  with 
limited 
teacher 
currently  being 
implemented.  Teacher  shortages,  which  are 
low  proportion  and 
exacerbated  by 
retention  of  young  teachers,  as  well  as 
insufficient skills are affecting the quality and 
inclusiveness  of  education.  Poland  is  mainly 
implementing  measures  related  to  continued 
teacher  education,  such  as  post-graduate 
degrees.  A  sufficient  number  of  highly  skilled 
teachers is also key in the context of the new 
successful 
curricular 
implementation  would  benefit 
from  a 
sufficiently 
teacher  workforce, 
staffed 
modernisation of initial teacher education and 
sustained  investment  in  their  professional 
development  (including 
in  the  context  of 
inclusive education). 

reform. 

Its 

in 

tertiary 
is 

A  more  comprehensive  approach  to 
promoting STEM fields is needed to boost 
education 
participation 
for 
key 
programmes,  which 
competitiveness. In relation to the 2025 CSR 
on  stepping  up  participation  in  STEM  fields  in 
higher  education,  Poland  has  only  undertaken 
selected  measures  that  do  not  directly  target 
tertiary  education.  Persistently  low  enrolment 
in STEM is restricting the economy’s innovation 
capacity  and  its  green  and  digital  transition. 
tertiary 
Despite 
comparatively 
educational  attainment  rate,  enrolment 
in 
STEM  study  programmes  has  dropped  since 
2015  and  remains  below  the  EU  average. 
Enrolment  in  science  and  mathematics  is 
low.  Under  the  recovery  and 
particularly 
resilience  plan 
(RRP),  Poland  has  been 
investing in digitalising school education, STEM 
and AI laboratories; and in training teachers in 
digital  skills.  The  upcoming  curriculum  reform 

high 

a 

in 

ICT-related  fields; 

also  aims  to  strengthen  science  teaching  in 
schools.  A  2025  TSI  project  aims  to  help 
Poland  identify  existing  barriers  to  women’s 
participation 
identify 
actions that could promote the participation of 
girls  in  ICT  education  and  women  in  ICT 
professions;  and  develop  instruments  and  a 
methodology  that  will  enable  Poland  to 
monitor  the  effectiveness  of  initiatives  to 
increase  the  share  of  women  in  the  ICT 
workforce.  A  more 
integrated  approach 
towards  STEM  education  (including  better 
career awareness, mentoring and reaching out 
to  disadvantaged  groups)  would  not  only 
monitor  the  impact  of  these  measures  but 
also  be  beneficial  in  proactively  encouraging 
students  (especially  women)  to  pursue  STEM 
careers. 

long-term  underfunding 

Improving  the  quality  and  relevance  of 
higher education remains a challenge. The 
outcomes  of  higher  education  continue  to  be 
affected  by  gaps  in  the  quality  assurance 
(see 
system  and 
Annex 13).  While  the  consultation  process  on 
the  draft  2025-2035  higher  education 
development 
still  ongoing, 
stakeholders’  comments  would  need  to  be 
considered.  Sufficient  funding  would  have  to 
underpin the strategy to facilitate progress. 

strategy 

is 

Encouraging adult learning, 
improving the effectiveness of 
vocational education and training, 
and boosting green and digital 
skills 

Some  progress  has  been  made  (primarily 
supported  by  the  RRP  and  cohesion 
funds), but green and digital skills remain 
bottlenecks for the twin transitions. Some 
progress has been achieved (primarily via RRP-
funded  measures)  in  response  to  the  2025 
CSR  calling  on  Poland  to  foster  skills  relevant 
to  the  labour  market  (including  green  and 
digital  skills).  The  challenges  regarding  skills 
shortages  in  the  context  of  green  and  digital 
transition  nevertheless 
remain  significant. 
Despite  a  recent  decline,  Poland  still  has  one 
of  the  largest  shares  of  workers  in  emission-

24 

 
in  2024 

intensive industries in the EU, at 4.9% of total 
employment 
(EU  average: 3.5%). 
Digital  skills  also  remain  a  key  bottleneck  for 
innovation  and  productivity.  The  proportion  of 
young people aged 16-24 with basic or above 
basic digital skills grew from 68.6% in 2021 to 
73.6%  in  2025,  but  only  50.4%  of  the 
population  aged  16-74  had  at  least  basic 
digital  skills  in  2025  (10 pps  below  the  EU 
average). To address these challenges, Poland 
has been pursuing investments under the RRP 
to  increase e-competencies in  the  society  via 
training,  as  well  as  ESF-funded Digital 
Development Clubs. Poland has also set out to 
digitalise  school  education  with  the  Digital 
Transformation  of  Education  Policy  to  2035 
and  to  set  up  the  ‘Digital  Student’  national 
programme  for  2025-2029.  Furthermore,  the 
2025-2029  Cybersecurity  Strategy  aims  to 
raise  awareness  of  cyber  threats  through 
education  and  training.  In  the  area  of  green 
skills, 
implementation  of  an  RRP-funded 
measure to amend qualification frameworks in 
sectors  critical  to  the  green  transition  is 
ongoing.  Poland  could  benefit  from  closer 
monitoring  and  evaluation  of  reforms  and 
investments  in  skills  at  all  levels,  as  well  as 
from  a  more  holistic  approach  to  addressing 
skills  shortages  in  the  context  of  the  twin 
transitions. 

but 

RRP, 

under 

the  development  of 

Despite  high  participation  rates,  the 
relatively low efficiency of the vocational 
education  and  training  (VET)  system  is 
limiting 
skills 
relevant  to  the  labour  market.  Some 
measures have been taken in response to the 
2025 CSR to further strengthen VET efficiency, 
including 
their 
the 
implementation is ongoing. Participation in VET 
remains  strong,  but  labour  market  outcomes 
for  VET  graduates  have  declined  weakened. 
Despite  increased  employer  involvement  in 
vocational  education  and  sectoral  discussions 
about  vocational  education  and  skills,  the 
employment rate of recent VET graduates has 
decreased  from  82.3%  in  2022  to  76.9%  in 
2025,  below  both  the  EU  average  of  80.2% 
and  the  EU-level  target  of  at  least  82%  by 
2025.    The  creation  of  a  network  of  sectoral 
skills  centres  under  Poland’s  RRP  is  ongoing. 
Poland  has  also  been  reviewing  curricula  for 
chosen  professions  in  order  to  improve  the 

labour market relevance of the VET offer; and 
has  been  developing  the  sectoral  council 
system  in  order  to  build  cooperation  between 
business,  education  and  public  administration. 
The identification of the root causes of poorer 
employment outcomes of VET graduates and a 
dedicated  action  plan  to  address  them  could 
improve the situation of VET graduates. 

in 

in 

received  a  CSR 

Participation 
adult 
learning remains below  EU  average,  with 
limited  progress  achieved,  despite RRP 
In  2025, 
and ESF+-funded  measures. 
to facilitate and 
Poland 
increase  adult  participation 
learning, 
including  in  non-formal  learning  and  in  areas 
key  for  Poland's  competitiveness.  However, 
only limited progress has been made, as adult 
participation  in  learning remains below the  EU 
the  Adult  Education 
average according to 
Survey  and  Labour  Force  Survey. The  2023 
PIAAC  results  for  Poland  also  show  a  sharp 
increase  in  the  share  of  adults  performing  at 
the  lowest  proficiency  levels  compared  with 
2012:  39.5%  (up  from  19%)  in  literacy  and 
38%  in  numeracy  (up  from  23%)(36).  Public 
funding  for  adult 
learning remains heavily 
dependent  on  the  European  Social  Fund  Plus 
(ESF+)  and  other  EU 
instruments.  This 
includes a  financial  instrument  in  the  form  of 
education  loans  and the  planned  piloting  of 
individual  learning  accounts  as  well  as  the 
development 
Local 
Knowledge  and  Education  Centres  (LOWE). 
Despite  new  measures  introduced  under  the 
RRP  (the  2025  Act  on  Labour  Market  and 
including  enhanced 
Employment  Services), 
the 
support 
system remains fragmented 
and 
national-level 
could benefit from 
coordination.  However,  an  important  step  in 
this direction was taken in the form of another 
RRP related initiative – new Act of 27 February 
2026  on  Regional  Coordination  Teams  for 
skills  policy which  aims  at  enhancing  the 
regional coordination of skills policy and at the 
same time gives the foundation for the future 

for  disadvantaged  groups, 

expansion 

stronger 

and 

of 

(36)  Note: In Poland, there were issues with the data quality 
for a high share of respondents. Despite efforts to 
minimise the (negative) impact of data anomalies, 
results should be interpreted with greater caution than 
those of other participants.  

25 

 
 
development  of  the  coherent  skills  policy 
system in Poland.  

Removing barriers to labour 
market participation and 
integration, while reducing labour 
market segmentation 

is  exacerbating 

Participation  of  persons  with  disabilities 
in  the  labour  market  remains  a  major 
challenge  and 
labour 
shortages. In 2025, Poland received a CSR on 
increasing  the  participation  of  disadvantaged 
groups in the labour market, including through 
effective 
education-to-employment 
transitions.  The  progress  achieved  (including 
under  the  RRP)  varies  between  groups.  Low 
participation  of  underrepresented  groups  in 
the labour market persists, notably for persons 
with  disabilities.  The  disability  employment 
gap  further  increased  from  33.9 pps  in  2023 
to  35.6 pps  in  2024,  higher  than  the  EU 
average  of  24 pps (37).  The 
labour  force 
participation of persons with disabilities is just 
above  50%,  because  disability  and  illness 
remain  a  leading  driver  of  inactivity.  Further 
progress  is  constrained  by  limited  access  to 
tailored  labour  market  support.  Poland  has 
introduced  a  new  Act  on  the  Labour  Market 
and Employment Services (Journal of Laws of 
2025,  item  620),  while  the  European  Social 
Fund  Plus  (ESF+)  and  the  Polish  RRP  also 
supports 
Services. 
However, strengthening targeted support could 
help  in  making  full  use  of  this  opportunity  to 
support disadvantaged groups. 

Employment 

Public 

Progress  has  been  made  on  access  to 
childcare  services,  but  the  participation 
of  women  in  the  labour  market  remains 
low  and  an  untapped  source  of  potential 
growth. 
labour  force 
participation  stood  at  70.1.%,  compared  with 
80.3% for men (71.1% vs 80.1% for the EU as 
a  whole).  This  reflects  persistent  barriers 

In  2025,  women’s 

(37)Eurostat, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/product/page/tep
sr_sp200. 

in 

reform 

linked  to  care  responsibilities,  the  limited 
availability  of  institutions  and  services  that 
provide  care  for  dependants,  inflexible  and 
relatively  long  working  hours,  and  lower  job 
sectors  where  women  are 
quality 
overrepresented.  With  the  support  of  the  RRF 
and  ESF+,  Poland  has  been  implementing  a 
comprehensive 
the 
accessibility,  quality  and  affordability  of 
childcare services for children under the age of 
three.  The  ‘Active  Parent’  programme  was 
launched  in  2024  and  contributes  to  parent’s 
childcare  costs.  The  share  of  children  under 
the  age  of  three  participating 
in  formal 
childcare  increased  by  6 pps  between  2024 
and  2025  to  21%  but  remains  far  below  the 
EU  average  of  40.5%.  Regional  disparities 
remain pronounced. 

improve 

to 

Low  social  protection  of  non-standard 
workers and the self-employed can cause 
economic  and 
social  vulnerabilities. 
Effective  access  to  social  protection  is  very 
limited for several groups (see Annex 12). The 
proportion  of  civil  -law  contracts  in  total 
employment is increasing. In the third quarter 
of  2025,  the  number  of  people  working 
exclusively  on  contract  of  mandate  exceeded 
1.5  million,  representing  a  16%  rise  over  the 
past  2.5  years.  The  number  of  self-employed 
workers  without  employees  of  their  own  has 
risen  by  42%  over  the  last  10 years  and  is 
now  close  to  14%  of  total  employment  (EU 
average:  around  9.5%).  Both  groups  are  not 
fully covered by social protection and they are 
at  risk  of  receiving  low  pensions  due  to  the 
right to make lower pension contributions than 
would  be 
the  standard 
(see  Section 1).  The 
employment  contract 
the  number  of  non-standard 
in 
growth 
contracts  is  due  to  the  wide  variations  in  the 
tax wedges for different types of work (38) and 
these 
labour  market 
turn  encourage 
in 
segmentation.  Poland  has  taken  steps 
addressing labour market segmentation under 

required  under 

in 

(38)  The  tax  wedge  for  the  average  wage  in  Poland  varies 
considerably.  It  is  over  40%  for  employment  contracts; 
21-34% for the self-employed (depending on the available 
tax  reliefs);  15-37%  for  mandatory  contracts;  and  6%  for 
specific-task  contracts.  The  difference  in  the  tax  wedge 
rises with income (for example, in the case of a salary that 
is twice the average, the tax wedge is 46% for employment 
contracts and 31% for the self-employed).  

26 

 
 
 
8% OECD averages). In 2023, 48% of non-EU 
nationals  worked  below  their  qualification 
level.  Their  integration  into  the  labour  market 
and  full  utilisation  of  their  skills  could 
contribute  to  addressing  Poland’s  existing 
labour and skills shortages. 

the  RRP  by  reforming  the  State  Labour 
Inspectorate. Since the law will enter into force 
in July 2026, the effects remain to be seen. 

in 

lacking 

(11.6% 

continuing 

shortcomings 

limited,  and 
Social  dialogue  remains 
low-income  households  do  not 
many 
support. 
receive  minimum 
income 
Collective  bargaining  coverage 
in 
2023) and trade union density (9.4% in 2022) 
remain  low.  Bargaining  is  largely  confined  to 
the  company  level  and  sectoral  agreements 
are 
(see  Annex 12).  Stakeholders 
the 
report 
functioning of the Social Dialogue Council and 
in  consultation  practices (39).  Amendments  to 
the Act on the Social Dialogue Council are still 
under  preparation.  Recent  reforms,  including 
the  2025  Act  on  Collective  Agreements 
(Journal of Laws of 2025, item 1661), aim to 
broaden  the  use  of  collective  bargaining  and 
strengthen  social  partner  involvement.  Their 
effectiveness  will 
timely 
implementation  and  monitoring  (including  in 
the  context  of  the  Directive  on  Adequate 
Minimum  Wages). 
In  addition,  minimum 
income  benefits  in  real  terms  have  been 
eroded  by  inflation,  resulting  in  very  low 
adequacy levels (see Anex 12).  

depend 

on 

Further  measures  to  improve  the  labour 
market  integration  of  non-EU  nationals 
would  help  to  address  existing  labour 
shortages.  Labour  shortages 
remain  a 
significant challenge for companies. The share 
of  managers  reporting  labour  shortages  as  a 
factor  limiting  production  remains  very  high: 
62.4%  of  businesses  in  industry  (EU:  17.5%), 
67.5% in construction (EU: 27.5%) and 56.5% 
in  services  (EU:  23.1%)  in  Q4 2025.  Poland 
scores  only  44/100  in  the  Migrant  Integration 
Policy  Index  (EU  average: 54/100).  Its  43/100 
labour  market  mobility  score  is  considered  as 
‘halfway  favourable’  and  is  below  the  EU 
average. Non-EU workers’ skills are underused, 
despite  ongoing  work  on  a  strategy  to 
integrate  them  and  strong  labour  market 
participation  and  3% 
indicators 
unemployment  compared  with  the  77%  and 

(81% 

(39) 
Eurofound, 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/publications/all/nationa
l-level-social-governance-european-semester-and-
recovery-and-resilience. 

27 

 
 
 
KEY FINDINGS 

In  areas  covered  by  existing  CSRs,  Poland 
would benefit from: 

• 

• 

improving  the  efficiency  of  public 
spending  through  spending  reviews  and 
better targeting of social benefits; 

improving the adequacy of the pension 
system, while preserving its long-term 
sustainability  by  increasing  the  effective 
retirement  age,  addressing  the  pension 
poverty  of  women  and  the  self-employed, 
and reforming the special pension schemes; 

financing 

•  enhancing  innovation  by  using  available 
public 
to  more  efficiently 
leverage private RDI investments (including 
for  start-ups  and  scale-ups)  by  creating 
innovation-friendly  ecosystems,  and  by 
updating smart specialisation strategies; 

the 
through 

•  enhancing 
research-market 
pipeline 
support 
mechanisms, 
for 
and 
academia-industry 
attractive  working  conditions  for  research 
professions;  

collaboration 

incentives 

effective 

strong 

•  fostering the agility of institutions and 
leaner  regulatory  framework  by 
administrative 
implementing 
and 
further 

a 
further 
procedures, 
interoperable 
encouraging 
transparency  and 
competition in public procurement; 

effectively 
digital 

simplifying 

solutions, 

•  boosting  local  administrative  capacity 
to  maximise  the  impact  of  EU  funding 
and  reducing  territorial  disparities  in  key 
innovation,  education  and 
sectors 
healthcare; 

like 

•  advancing 

the 

deployment 

of 
renewable  energy  sources  and  coal 
phase-out (particularly in heating), coupled 
with  storage  and  other  flexibility  solutions 

better 

by 
permitting 
coordinating 
procedures and infrastructure planning, and 
phasing out fossil fuel subsidies;  

•  boosting  grid  capacity  and  flexibility 
as  well  as  advancing  integration  with 
EU  energy  markets  by  removing  barriers 
to  cross-border  trading  and  enhancing 
interconnectivity; 

•  fostering 

incentives  for  the  clean 
energy  and 
industry  transition  by 
addressing the tax burden on electricity and 
phasing 
subsidies 
fossil 
(particularly for coal mining); 

fuel 

out 

•  strengthening 

climate 

adaptation 
governance  by  finalising  the  national 
strategy,  establishing  a  regular  update 
process  and  strengthening  coordination 
mechanisms between governance levels; 

•  advancing  ecosystem  restoration  to 
enhance  climate  resilience,  in  particular 
of  water  ecosystems  by  effectively 
implementing  the  ‘polluter  pays’  principle, 
increasing  water  retention  and  promoting 
efficient water use;  

•  enhancing  human  capital  development 
by  reversing  the  basic  skills  decline 
and reducing inequalities in education, 
through  efficient  implementation  of  the 
curriculum  reform,  enhanced  literacy  and 
numeracy 
vocational  programmes, 
strategic  approach  to  inclusive  education, 
as  well  as  improved  teacher  retention  and 
quality of teacher education; 

in 

• 

in  science, 
increasing  participation 
technology, 
and 
mathematics  in  higher  education  by 
enhancing  career  guidance  and  promoting 
STEM learning from an early age; 

engineering 

28 

 
 
•  reducing  administrative  barriers  to  the 
functioning  of  the  single  market,  while 
fostering  the  development  of  knowledge-
intensive sectors; 

• 

intensity  of 
increasing  the  digital 
(particularly 
businesses 
by 
accelerating 
the  adoption  of  digital 
(including  advanced)  technologies  (e.g. AI) 
that have a high impact on productivity; 

SMEs) 

•  continuing  to  reduce  labour  market 
segmentation  and  improve  access  to 
for 
social  protection 
non-standard 
workers  and 
self-employed  by 
the 
addressing tax  arbitrage  between  different 
types  of  contracts  and  strengthening  the 
social dialogue; 

•  advancing  the  shift  to  sustainable 
mobility  by  improving  the  accessibility  of 
zero-emission public transport and creating 
incentives  for  the  acquisition  of  zero-
emission vehicles (both private and freight); 

•  ensuring 

in  particular 

investments 
for 

in  transport 
sustainable 
infrastructure 
in  the  TEN-T 
transport, 
network, 
to  support  economic  growth, 
competitiveness, connectivity and resilience 
of the transport system, including dual-use 
infrastructure, as well as the deployment of 
alternative 
and 
investments  incentivising  the  shift  from 
road to rail. 

infrastructure 

fuels 

•  fostering 

transition 
long-term 
strategies  for  coal-dependent  regions, 
combining  economic  diversification  and 
industrial transformation; 

•  taking  measures  to  meet  the  targets 
for  land  use,  land  use  change  and 
forestry  (LULUCF),  focusing  on  wetlands, 
agriculture 
settlement 
management. 

urban 

and 

•  addressing labour and skills shortages 
(particularly  in  the  context  of  the  twin 
transitions)  by  increasing  participation  in 
life-long  learning,  strengthening  the  VET 
improving  the 
system’s  efficiency,  and 
integration  of  non-EU  nationals  into  the 
labour market; 

• 

of 

the 

persons 

labour  market 
increasing 
participation 
with 
disabilities  and  women  by  better 
targeting  active  labour  market  policies  to 
support  disadvantaged  groups  and  further 
addressing regional  disparities in access to 
early childhood education and care. 

In other areas, Poland would benefit from: 

•  mobilising 

revenues, 
additional 
especially  by  broadening  the  tax  base  of 
sources  less  detrimental  to  growth  and  by 
strengthening 
to  help 
rebalance public finances; 

tax  compliance, 

• 

(including 

increasing  the  supply  of  affordable 
rental,  social  and 
housing 
municipal)  and  targeting  specific 
local 
housing  needs  and  housing-led  solutions 
for  the  vulnerable  by  implementing  the 
coherent  coordination  of  housing  policies 
with  a  long-term  strategy  alongside  the 
introduction  of  a  system  for  monitoring 
housing needs and housing stock;  

•  anchoring  house  prices  and  curbing 
speculatory  risks  in  the  market  by 
adjusting  the  property  taxation  regime 
(including  by  moving  towards  value-based 
taxes on land or a cadastral tax); 

•  addressing  funding  challenges  in  the 
healthcare  system  by  increasing  public 
spending  (including  on  outpatient  care  and 
health  prevention)  and  further  increasing 
the density of medical staff;  

• 

improving  the  quality  of,  and  access 
to,  long-term  care  services  (particularly 
homecare  and  community-based  care)  by 
financing  and 
increasing 
its 
related 
the  availability  of 
sustainability,  and 
deinstitutionalised forms of care; 

29 

 
 
ANNEXES 

 
 
 
 
LIST OF ANNEXES 

A1.  CSR implementation 

Fiscal 

A2.  Fiscal developments and debt sustainability 

A3.  Taxation 

Productivity 

A4. 

Innovation to business 

A5.  Single market and industry 

A6.  Savings, investment and access to finance 

A7.  Effective institutional framework 

Sustainability 

A8. 

Industry decarbonisation, circularity and climate mitigation 

A9.  Affordable energy transition 

A10.  Climate adaptation, preparedness and environment 

Fairness 

A11.  Labour market 

A12.  Social policies 

A13.  Education and skills 

A14.  Social scoreboard 

A15.  Health and health systems 

A16.  Housing 

Horizontal 

A17.  Sustainable development goals 

A18.  Competitive regions 

A19.  Transport 

LIST OF TABLES 

A1.1. 
A2.1. 
A2.2. 
A2.3. 
A3.1. 
A4.1. 

2025 CSR implementation and Commission assessment 
Supplementary pension schemes - scope for expansion 
Projected change in ageing-related expenditure in 2025-2040 and 2025-2070 
Fiscal governance database indicators and public accounting maturity 
Taxation Indicators 
Key innovation indicators 

33 

35 

43 

43 

48 

52 

52 

58 

68 

75 

80 

80 

89 

97 

107 

107 

112 

117 

122 

123 

127 

132 

132 

135 

144 

35 
45 
46 
47 
49 
57 

 
 
 
Single Market and Industry 
Savings and Investment Union summary diagnostic 
Financial sector indicators 
Poland. Selected indicators on better regulation practices for primary legislation 
Digital Decade key performance indicators: availability of digital public services 
Key clean industry and climate mitigation indicators: Poland 
Key energy indicators 

A5.1. 
A6.1. 
A6.2. 
A7.1. 
A7.2. 
A8.1. 
A9.1. 
A10.1.  Key Adaptation Indicators 
A14.1.  Social Scoreboard for Poland 
A15.1.  Key health indicators 
A18.1.  Main development trends, challenges and allocation of resources 
A18.2.  Key regional indicators for Poland (NUTS 2 level) 
A19.1.  ERTMS deployment in Poland. 

LIST OF GRAPHS 

Composition of non-financial companies' funding 
Capital markets and financial intermediaries 
Composition of households' financial assets 
Trust in the justice system, regional / local authorities and in government 

A2.1. 
Contributions to the change in the general government balance (% of GDP) 
A2.2. 
Public investment evolution and composition (% of GDP) 
A2.3. 
Primary spending evolution and composition 
A3.1. 
Tax revenue by economic function in 2024, PL (outer ring) and EU-27 (inner ring) 
A3.2. 
Tax wedge for single and second earners as a % of total labour costs, 2025 
A3.3. 
VAT gap indicators 
A4.1. 
R&D intensity (gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % of GDP), 2024 
A5.1.  Manufacturing output: total and selected sector, index (2021=100), 2015-2024 
A6.1. 
A6.2. 
A6.3. 
A7.1. 
A7.2.  Most time-consuming aspects of service delivery 
A8.1. 
A9.1. 
A9.2. 
A9.3. 
A11.1.  Activity, employment and unemployment rates (annual) 
A12.1.  At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate and its components 
A12.2.  Old-age dependency ratio 
A13.1.  Employment rate by educational attainment 
A15.1.  Treatable mortality 
A15.2.  Healthcare infrastructure investment by year 
A16.1.  House prices, rents and price-to-income evolution in PL and EU27 since 2005 
A16.2.  House supply indicators in PL since 2005 
A16.3.  Housing affordability selected indicators 
A17.1.  Progress towards the SDGs in Poland 
A18.1.  R&D expenditure (GERD, 2023) at NUTS 2 level 
A18.2.  The share of children with a primary school within a 15-minute walk and the share of population with a hospital within 10 

Greenhouse gas emissions in the effort sharing sectors, 2005, 2023, and 2024 
Electricity and gas prices for household and non-household consumers, S1 2025 
Low-carbon electricity generation vs. electricity wholesale prices, 2025 
Poland’s installed renewable capacity vs electricity generation mix 

minutes by car in rural areas, (NUTS 2), 2023 

A19.1.  Poland's road fatalities per million, 2024 

LIST OF MAPS 

A18.1.  GDP per head compared with the EU average 
A18.2.  Average annual % change in working-age population (20-64) in Poland (2015-2024) (NUTS 2) 
A19.1.  TEN-T cross-border & national priority sections in Poland. 
A19.2.  Poland's road safety map 

34 

67 
68 
74 
76 
77 
88 
96 
106 
122 
124 
136 
141 
145 

43 
44 
44 
48 
49 
51 
52 
65 
69 
69 
70 
75 
76 
83 
90 
90 
93 
107 
112 
114 
120 
123 
125 
127 
128 
130 
132 
138 

140 
146 

135 
138 
145 
146 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 1: CSR IMPLEMENTATION  

Table A1.1:  2025 CSR implementation and Commission assessment 

(Continued on the next page) 

35 

Poland faces challenges in a wide range of policy areas, as identified in the country-specific recommendations (CSRs). Poland was recommended, among other things, to strengthen defence and fiscal sustainability, boost private and public investment, accelerate the green transition, enhance education and labour market skills, and foster innovation and R&D. The Commission has assessed the degree of implementation of the 2025 CSRs considering the policy action taken by Poland to date*. To do so, the Commission has taken into account the information provided by Poland in its Annual Progress Report as well as other information sources. This annex provides summary information on the policy actions taken or planned by Poland for each CSR. More detailed information on these actions is included in the relevant chapters and other annexes of the report. *CSR 2 is not assessed in CeSaR. RRP implementation is monitored through the assessment of RRP payment requests and analysis of the bi-annual reporting on the achievement of the milestones and targets, to be reflected in the country reports. Progress with the cohesion policy is monitored in the context of the Cohesion Policy of the European Union.  Recommendation text Main measures adopted or implemented  By 30 April 2026  Preparatory steps/ credibly announced measures By 30 April 2026 Assessm. of progress  1.1 Reinforce overall defence and security spending and readiness while ensuring debt sustainability in line with the European Council conclusions of 6 March 2025. Total general government defence expenditure in 2026 is projected at 3.4% of GDP, corresponding to an increase of 0.5 ppt. compared to 2024. Total general government defence expenditure in 2027 is projected at 4.0% of GDP, corresponding to an increase of 1.1 ppt. compared to 2024. Substantial progress 1.2 Adhere to the maximum growth rates of net expenditure recommended by the Council on 21 January 2025, with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive deficit while making use of the allowance under the national escape clause for higher defence expenditure. Cumulated deviation in 2025 amounted to 1.2% of GDP but is fully explained by the NEC flexibility (1.5 pps. of GDP).  Cumulated deviation in 2026 projected at 1.0% of GDP but it is fully explained by the NEC flexibility (1.5 pps. of GDP). The EDP is held in abeyance. Full implementation 1.3 Improve the efficiency of public spending, including through better targeting of social benefits, improving the budgetary process, Some provisions in the Act on public finances improving budget management and classification entered into force in April 2026.   Limited Progress 1.4 providing more transparency in investment planning and using standardised procedures for project assessment and selection more extensively. Adoption process for the reform of public investment management and standardisation of appraisals completed in April 2026 also part of RRP.  Substantial Progress 1.5 Front-load mature public investment projects Poland is implementing large-scale public investments, in particular in defence, transport, energy, as well as digital and green transition, including in the RRP context.  Full Implementation 1.6 and promote private investment to further the economic recovery. Several RRP investments that are being implemented can incentivize private investment. The economic recovery is accomplished as GDP grew 3.6% in 2025, a fifth  Full Implementation  
 
 
 
     
 
Table (continued) 

(Continued on the next page) 

36 

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or implemented  By 30 April 2026  Preparatory steps/ credibly announced measures By 30 April 2026 Assessm. of progress  consecutive year of economic growth. 1.7 Ensure the adequacy of future pension benefits and strengthen the sustainability of the pension system, including by taking measures on the effective retirement age and reforming preferential pension schemes. In 2021 Poland passed the law that introduced ‘PIT-0 for senior’ as from 2022 tax year (Act of 29 October 2021 amending the act on personal income tax, corporate income tax and some other acts (Journal of Laws of 2024, item 497)). Seniors who, despite acquiring the right to a pension (60 for women, 65 for men), temporarily resigned from receiving it and remained professionally active can benefit from the tax  - they will not pay tax on income from full-time employment, contract work or business activity and maternity benefits – until they reach the tax threshold.   The recent evaluation report on the tax relief (PIT-0) for seniors ( ), which should lead to an increase in the effective retirement age, shows a rather low but rising uptake. The total  number of persons benefitting from the tax exemption amounted to 125 957 in 2022 and 142 535 in 2023. To a large extent, this is linked to the fact that there is more attractive solution embedded in the pension system that allows a person to receive a pension and a salary at the same time. Benefitting from this measure excludes the possibility to apply for PIT-0 for seniors. Almost four times more persons chose to work and receive pensions rather than work, not receive pensions and benefit from the tax exemption. The 2024 Ageing report ( ) indicates that the pension system's sustainability factor will lead to a substantial decline in pension benefits due to a shrinking working-age population. If the current benefit ratio is maintained, pension expenditure is expected to increase by 2.5 percentage points of GDP by 2045. The statutory retirement age in the Polish system is 60 years for women and 65 years for men. According to ZUS data for 2023 ( ), the average age of pension award for men equals the statutory age while for women, it is slightly above the  Limited Progress   
 
 
     
 
Table (continued) 

(Continued on the next page) 

37 

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or implemented  By 30 April 2026  Preparatory steps/ credibly announced measures By 30 April 2026 Assessm. of progress  statutory age (60.7 vs. 60) but has remained stable for several years.    Poland did not take measures to implement this part of the CSR 1. Pension benefits for farmers (KRUS) are subsidised by the state, amounting to 0.68% of GDP in 2025, and the method of calculating collected insurance contributions does not encourage them to move to the general pension system. On the other hand, KRUS has become a pension system which affects less people than in the past.  Only between 2018 and 2023 the number of KRUS pensioners dropped by 9% and the number of insured in KRUS decreased by 15%. To compare: the number of insured in ZUS (general pension scheme) is growing and in 2022 amounted to 16 276 thousand. KRUS – with 1 092 thousand of insured in 2022, is 15 times smaller than ZUS. 3.1 Simplify regulation, improve regulatory tools and ensure the legal framework is stable and clear for the business sector. Introduce measures to reduce the administrative burden placed on companies.    Poland has taken measures in response to the need to simplify regulations and enhance predictability of law with adoption of a deregulation act from May 2025 that introduced inter alia a six-month vacatio legis for regulations imposing obligations on entrepreneurs. To address the lacking systematic evaluation of laws after their enactment, the new deregulation law introduced a mandatory ex post regulatory impact assessment (a periodic evaluation of existing legislation is to be adopted by a Resolution of the Council of Ministers every three years). Poland approved a Deregulation Act in 2025 and is preparing a Regulatory Programme 2026–2028 on simplification. Several small administrative changes have been introduced in 2025. However, the work done by the Deregulation Task Force needs to be enhanced in the coming years. Simplification measures should have a measurable economic impact. Stakeholders still report the lack of consultation and the frequent changes of legislation.   Other measures in order to simplify and digitalise procedures and services for businesses and citizens  Limited Progress  
 
 
     
 
Table (continued) 

(Continued on the next page) 

38 

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or implemented  By 30 April 2026  Preparatory steps/ credibly announced measures By 30 April 2026 Assessm. of progress  were introduced in 2025. The changes concerned, among others, the following areas: taxpayer rights (including the introduction of the presumption of innocence of the taxpayer); taxes and public finances (including a higher VAT exemption threshold and the extension of the “silent consent” principle); and the digitalisation of services (including the digitalisation of court proceedings, the creation of a single database of entrepreneurs instead of several separate registers, and the expansion of the mObywatel application with new functionalities).    In addition, the government introduced new rules for inspections of businesses, including a reduction in the maximum duration of inspections for micro-enterprises, the obligation to provide entrepreneurs with a preliminary list of requested information and documents before the inspection begins, and the adjustment of the frequency of planned inspections to the identified level of risk. Measures were also introduced to make administrative procedures faster and simpler. These included the introduction of a hybrid administrative decision (where the decision itself is issued in paper form while attachments are provided electronically) and greater use of so-called “soft requests”, allowing authorities to contact entrepreneurs and request clarification without formally initiating administrative proceedings. 3.2 Encourage competition in public procurement processes, making them more efficient and less cumbersome, especially for SMEs In 2025, Poland announced changes in its public procurement system to streamline the process. New legislation has introduced non-mandatory contractor certification and streamlined appeal procedures through remote trials and hearings to make them more efficient. However, the key issue of competition in the public procurement sector is not sufficiently covered, and SMEs share of awards declines in number and in value.   In March 2026, the State Procurement Policy was adopted, including measures to boost SME participation.  Some Progress  
 
 
     
 
Table (continued) 

(Continued on the next page) 

39 

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or implemented  By 30 April 2026  Preparatory steps/ credibly announced measures By 30 April 2026 Assessm. of progress  3.3 Strengthen science-business links by improving support structures, implementing targeted funding schemes, and creating incentives for researchers to engage with the private sector. Poland established a task force for enhancing transfer of research results and commissioned an evaluation of support for science-business links (results still pending). When using EU funding for innovation (FENG programme, measures implemented by NCBR and Foundation for Polish Science), PL applies criteria that support science-business links.  The Task Force and the evaluation have been launched. Poland has outlined a timeline for collecting and implementation of the recommendations, but without further operational details.  Limited Progress 3.4 Improve and modernise the public research system by making research careers more attractive, raising public R&I investment, and supporting research institutions.   Limited impact measures encouraging women to go into STEM and pursue scientific careers. Support for the AI ecosystem and for applying to EU programmes for research financing.   Some Progress 3.5. Focus investment-related economic policy on innovation.   Large AI-hub financed, AI regulatory sandbox under preparation. In FENG (R&I support programme in Cohesion Policy), EUR 942 m was reallocated to support STEP initiatives. Late in 2025, Poland launched Innovate Poland, a programme based on French Tibi scheme and meant to match public and private financing to boost innovation, mainly through VC funding. The first funds were launched in April 2026. Some Progress 4.1 Promote balanced electricity price signals that support investments in clean electricity generation by adjusting taxes and levies on electricity for households and industry relative to those on fossil fuels. No changes of the electricity tax regime made.  No changes of the electricity tax regime announced.  No Progress 4.2 Boost grid capacity and flexibility, increase cross-border electricity trading, and limit restrictions to cases justified under EU energy market rules, particularly in cases involving constraints in allocating national capacity.   Cross-border trading has seen limited progress, primarily due to the continued application of capacity allocation constraints, which restrict the efficient use of interconnectors and hinder market integration.  While investments are underway, grid capacity and flexibility are not advanced enough to fully enable effective integration of renewable sources in the electricity system. Recommendations for further actions were published following the assessment of the impact of balancing market reform on the use of allocation constraints. Polish TSO (PSE) published its strategy for the transformation of grids to integrate new renewables, and storage capacity.  Actions to follow-up on the recommendations for the energy market reform or to implement the TSO strategy have not been announced.  Limited Progress 4.3 Reduce the reliance on fossil fuels by accelerating Investments in heat source replacement and thermal Clean Air Programme under review. Draft Social Climate Limited Progress  
 
 
     
 
Table (continued) 

(Continued on the next page) 

40 

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or implemented  By 30 April 2026  Preparatory steps/ credibly announced measures By 30 April 2026 Assessm. of progress  the phasing-out of coal in the heating sector by transitioning to decarbonised systems that integrate renewable energy, improve energy efficiency, modernisation and RES deployment in both single and multifamily as well as public buildings under various programmes ongoing (including with RRF support). Issues ensuring a stable source of financing of these programmes remain. Investments in coal phase out in district heating in progress.  Plan prepared. No updated NECP. 4.4 and phase out fossil-fuel subsidies, especially those related to coal mining.   No measures implemented.   No Progress 4.5 Improve climate adaptation governance, particularly policies focused on the management, protection, and sustainable use of water resources, incorporating current assessments of climate change impacts to ensure the long-term sustainability of sectors and activities dependent on water ecosystem services.   Poland is updating its national climate adaptation strategy, designing a process of regular updates for the future. Action on water resilience and pollution is lacking. Third River Basin Management Plans only contain limited information on the impacts of climate change on water management. The plans do not include much information regarding risk assessment and analysis of the impacts of climate change on environmental objectives. Also, water efficiency does not feature in the third RBMPs either. Water tariffs or water use fees do not provide specific incentives for sustainable water use (efficiency, re-use etc.) and pollution reduction. PL is incorporating green public procurement into the State Procurement Policy for 2026–2029. Poland is yet to adopt its updated Climate Adaptation Strategy. The document was originally  prepared in 2013 and has not been updated since. Poland aims to develop a new National Adaptation Strategy and National Adaptation Plan by the first half of 2027.  Draft law on the revitalisation of the Oder River dropped from parliamentary agenda.  Limited Progress 5.1 Foster quality and inclusive education and skills relevant to the labour market, including green and digital skills, Some progress has been made by Poland, but it varies between fields. In school education, a new subject of citizenship education was introduced in September 2025, no but no measures to address basic skills decline at large were reported. The implementation of the curricular reform remains to be conducted (to be launched in September 2026). In the area of inclusive education, some projects (on inclusion of Ukrainian students and students with disabilities) are ongoing, including under European Funds for Social Development 2021-2027 programme (FERS),  but either remain at early implementation stage or have been commenced prior to the 2025 CSRs being issued. Implementation of multiple measures concerning digital skills and some in  Some Progress  
 
 
     
 
Table (continued) 

(Continued on the next page) 

41 

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or implemented  By 30 April 2026  Preparatory steps/ credibly announced measures By 30 April 2026 Assessm. of progress  green skills (mainly under the RRP) is ongoing. 5.2 step up participation in STEM fields in higher education,   Only limited progress has been made, as some measures, not catering directly for tertiary education, are expected to be implemented (e.g. C2.2.1 – delivery of AI/STEM laboratories – under Poland’s RRP). A reference to STEM has also been made as part of the PL development strategy until 2035. Furthermore, a 2025 TSI project "Improving girls' and women's interest and participation in ICT in Poland", while focused on tertiary education, centres primarily on early stages of the policy cycle, such as identification of tools to monitor progress of prospective initiatives. Its implementation is also at early stages. Strategy for development of Poland till 2035 refers to improving business and industry link in STEM education and increasing the number of students admitted in the fields, but no specific measures to be undertaken.  Planning and continuation of campaigns to promote the teaching profession and improve its image Limited Progress 5.3 and improve the quality of teacher education Limited progress has been made, as solely measures not related directly to teachers' formal education, such as postgraduate degrees, training in digital skills, and counselling for teachers, are being implemented.  Limited Progress 5.4 and further strengthen the efficiency of vocational education and training Some progress has been achieved, including through measures under Poland’s RRP, such as creation of the network of Sectoral Skills Centres (ongoing and at an advanced stage). Review of VET curricula for certain professions is also ongoing (EFSD project "Industry agreement for vocational education and training. Increasing the involvement of industry representatives in the development of vocational education and workplace learning.") to improve their labour market relevance. Poland is also developing sectoral council system aimed at building cooperation between business, education and public administration.  Introduction of new professions to the vocational education classification and updates to core curricula to incorporate new technologies and green and digital skills. Some Progress 5.5 Facilitate and increase adult participation in learning, including in non-formal learning and in areas key for Poland's competitiveness.   The progress is limited, as mainly already long-standing measures are reported by Poland (initiated visibly before 2025 CSRs) including:  • Promotion and support of non-formal education, with broader access through quicker, more flexible activities suitable for adults. • Development and expansion of Local Knowledge and Education Centres (LOWE),  Limited Progress  
 
 
     
 
Table (continued) 

Source: Poland’s reporting and Commission assessment 

42 

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or implemented  By 30 April 2026  Preparatory steps/ credibly announced measures By 30 April 2026 Assessm. of progress  enabling schools to support adult education, especially in disadvantaged and rural areas.  To some extent, the ongoing implementation of Sectoral Skills Centres (measures A3.1.1 and A3.1.1 of Poland’s RRP) is also contributing to addressing this subpart, including through career guidance and new provisions on Regional Coordination Teams,  under the Act of 27 February 2026 on Regional Coordination Teams for skills policy. 5.6 Take steps to increase the participation of disadvantaged groups in the labour market, including through effective education to employment transitions Poland introduced measures to increase the participation of parents (especially women) in the labour market: • ‘Active Parent’ programme (2024) contributes to childcare costs for parents • RRF and ESF+ supported ‘Active Toddler’ programme will deliver over 102 500 new childcare places for children under 3 by 2029, targeting municipalities without childcare institutions. • Introduction in 2024 of quality care and education standards in childcare provision for children below 3.   Poland announced reforms and investments supported under the Recovery and Resilience Facility aimed at improving access to LTC and increase participation of informal caregivers (especially women) in the labour market. Some Progress   
 
   
 
FISCAL 
ANNEX 2: FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 

in 

in 

strategy 

developments 

This annex discusses selected topics in public 
finance  and 
fiscal-
structural  country-specific  recommendations 
(CSRs)  addressed  to  Poland in  July  2025. 
These  CSRs  include  a  call  to  strengthen  defence 
spending  and  readiness  while  implementing  a 
the  Council 
fiscal 
Recommendation of 21 January 2025. Poland also 
received  a  recommendation  to:  (i)  improve  the 
efficiency  of  public  spending;  (ii)  provide  more 
transparency  to  investment  planning;  and  (iii) 
front-load mature public investment projects while 
promoting  private  investment.  In  addition,  Poland 
received  a 
the 
future  pension  benefits  and 
adequacy  of 
strengthen the sustainability of its pension system. 

recommendation 

to  ensure 

line  with 

On 21 January 2025, the Council adopted the 
recommendation endorsing Poland’s medium-
term  fiscal-structural  plan  (40).  The  plan 
includes  a  fiscal  adjustment  over  four years. On 
8 July 2025, 
the 
national  escape  clause  for  Poland  in  order  to 
facilitate  its transition  to higher  levels  of  defence 
spending (41)(42). 

the  Council  also  activated 

Developments in the government 
balance, debt and public 
expenditure (43) 

Poland’s  government  deficit  was  equivalent 
to 7.3% of GDP and the government debt-to-
GDP  ratio  amounted  to  59.7%  at  the  end  of 
2025.  Based  on  the  Commission  Spring  2026 
Forecast,  Poland’s  government  deficit  is  projected 
to  decrease  to  6.5%  of  GDP  in  2026  and  then 
decrease to 6.3% of GDP in 2027. The increase in 

(40)  OJ C, C/2025/642, ELI: EUR-Lex - 32025H00642 – EN – 

EUR-Lex. 

(41)  OJ C/2025/3971, ELI: EUR-Lex - 32025H03971 – EN – EUR-

Lex.   

(42)  Compliance by Poland with the maximum growth rates of net 

expenditure recommended by the Council is assessed 
in COM(2026)200. 

(43)  Figures underpinning fiscal surveillance (net expenditure 
growth) are provided in the Fiscal Statistical Tables 
(SWD(2026)200) providing background data relevant for the 
assessment of the budgetary policies of the Member States. 

the  deficit  was  largely  driven  by  Poland’s  rising 
general  government  expenditure,  which  reached 
50.9% of GDP in 2025, around 1.7 pps higher than 
in  the  previous  year.  Expenditure  is  expected  to 
increase  further,  reaching 51.8%  of  GDP in  2026. 
Based  on  a  no-policy-change  scenario,  a  gradual 
fiscal consolidation is projected in 2027 (44). 

Graph A2.1: Contributions to the change in the 
general government balance (% of GDP) 

Source: European Commission Spring 2026 Forecast 

Rising  public  investment  is  improving  the 
quality  of  expenditure  in  Poland.  After  a 
decline in 2021-2022, public investment increased 
substantially in 2023. It is expected to reach 5.3% 
of GDP in 2026, up from 4.3% in 2019 (see Graph 
A2.2).  It  is  set  to  rise  further  in  2027  despite the 
lower  support  from  the  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Facility 
to  higher  expected 
investment  on  defence  financed  by  the  national 
budget,  including  by  loans  from  SAFE  instrument. 
In  2026  and  2027,  Poland  is  projected  to  spend 
more on nationally financed investment than it did 
before the COVID-19 pandemic.   

thanks 

(RRF), 

(44)  Large amounts of RRF-financed expenditure and revenue in 
2026 (estimated at 1.7% of GDP) impact the changes of 
total expenditure and revenue in 2026 and 2027 presented 
on the graph (the bars). Nationally-financed expenditure is 
estimated to contribute to improving the budget balance in 
2026 and to worsening it in 2027, while nationally-financed 
revenue is estimated to contribute to improving the balance 
in both 2026 and 2027.  

43 

-5-4-3-2-10123452021202220232024202520262027RevenueExpenditureChange in budget balance% of GDP 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph A2.2: Public investment evolution and 
composition (% of GDP) 

Graph A2.3: Primary spending evolution and 
composition 

Source: European Commission Spring 2026 Forecast 

interest  has 

The  type  of  expenditure  that  has  a  greater 
impact  on  GDP  had  remained  broadly  stable 
three  decades,  but  has  slightly 
over 
in  on  the 
increased  since  2019.  Zooming 
composition  of 
social  protection 
spending, 
accounts for the largest share of total expenditure 
(37%),  followed  by  health,  economic  affairs  (45), 
general  public  services,  and  education  (all  four  of 
which  are  above  10%  of  total  spending).  Since 
2019,  public  expenditure  on  defence,  other 
economic  affairs  and 
increased 
in  defence  spending 
strongly,  with  the  rise 
reflecting  recent  security  developments. 
(See 
Graph  A2.3).  Spending  on  health,  environment, 
R&D and housing has risen more modestly in that 
time,  By  contrast,  spending  on  education  and 
transport  has  declined.  This 
trend  deserves 
attention,  as  these  categories  (transport  and 
education)  are  generally  considered  growth-
friendly  spending  categories. 
In  the  case  of 
education,  the  decline  in  spending  is  concerning 
due  to  Poland’s  declining  performance  in  basic 
skills  and  equity.  The  country’s  upcoming 
curriculum  reform  will  need  to  be  appropriately 
resourced  to  achieve  the  necessary  results  (see 
Annex 13). 

(45)  This refers to the set of government activities, policies, and 

expenditures aimed at regulating, supporting, and developing 
economic activity across major sectors, including general 
economic and labour policies, agriculture and natural 
resources, energy, industry, construction, and other economic 
functions not elsewhere classified. Although transport and 
communication, as well as research and development 
activities, are normally considered part of this function, they 
are treated separately in the graph presented 

Source: Eurostat.  
Note: Based on economic literature, the categories considered 
to have a greater growth impact include education, R&D, 
health, transport and communication (See Barbiero and 
Cournede (2013), Gemmel et al. (2016), Lupu et al. (2018), 
Cepparulo and Mourre (2020) and OECD (2025)).   

Poland  has  relatively  low  tax  revenues  as  a 
share  of  GDP  and  relatively  high  tax 
compliance  gaps.  In  2025  Poland’s  total  tax 
revenues  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  (including 
compulsory  social  contributions)  amounted  to 
36.7%,  compared  with  an  EU  average  of  39.9%. 
Total  tax  revenues  are  projected  to  edge  up  to 
37.2% of GDP in 2026 and 37.7% of GDP in 2027 
according to the Spring 2026 Forecast (46). Poland 
relies  relatively  heavily  on  consumption  taxation, 
while  tax  revenues  from  labour  taxation  are 
low.  Meanwhile,  Poland’s  shadow 
relatively 
economy  is  estimated  to  be  larger  than  the  EU 
average, and available estimates point to large tax 
gaps  in  corporate  and  value  added  taxation  (see 
Annex 3).  

(46)  Data retrieved from the AMECO database (https://economy-

finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-research-and-
databases/economic-databases/ameco-database_en).  

44 

0123456201920202021202220232024202520262027% of GDPOther nationally-financedRRF grants and other EU fundsDefence1014182244485256200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024a) Evolution (% of GDP)Primary expenditureSpending with higher impact on GDP (rhs)-1.0-0.6-0.20.20.6GeneralservicesInterestspendingEducationR&DCultureCommunicationDefencePublicorderHousingSocialprotectionHealthOther economicEnvironmentTransportb) Compositional change 2024-2019 ( % of total spending) 
   
 
 
  
 
Table A2.1:  Supplementary pension schemes - scope for expansion 

Source: European Commission. 

The costs of ageing 

Total  ageing-related  spending  in  Poland  is 
projected  to  remain  stable  in  the  medium 
term, rising by about 1 pp. of GDP in the long 
term  (see  Table  A2.2).  The  broad  overall 
stability  in  this  spending  category  is  due  to  a 
projected  decline 
in  pension  spending  with 
unchanged  policy,  which  will  partly  offset  an 
expected  increase  in  healthcare  and  long-term 
care  spending.  At  21%  of  GDP  in  2070,  total 
ageing-related  spending  would  remain  below  the 
EU average.  

Public pension spending as a share of GDP is 
projected  to  decline  by  about  1 pp.  in  the 
long  term.  By  2070,  public  pension  outlays  in 
Poland  are  projected  to  be  equivalent  to  10%  of 
GDP, compared with an EU average of about 12%. 
With  unchanged  policy,  pension  spending  would 
decline, but so would pension adequacy. Therefore, 
Poland  received  a  CSR  in  2025  encouraging  it  to 
ensure  the  adequacy  of  future  pension  benefits 
and  strengthen  the  sustainability  of  its  pension 
system,  including  by  taking  measures  on  the 
reforming 
effective 
No 
preferential 
pension 
progress was made  over 
to 
address this CSR. 

last  year 

retirement 

schemes. 

and 

age 

the 

however, 

Supplementary  pension  schemes  can  make 
the  pension  system  more  resilient  by 
diversifying  retirement  income  sources.  In 
Poland, 
these 
the 
supplementary  schemes  remains  limited.  By  the 
end of 2024, private pension assets amounted to 
around  8%  of  GDP  while  participation  covered 
around  62%  of  the  working-age  population  (47). 
This  coincides  with  a  projected  decrease  in  the 

uptake 

of 

(47)  Source: OECD Pension Market in Focus 2025. The highest 

participation rate in at least one supplementary pension plan 
is reported.   

45 

replacement  rate  (48)  by  around  23  pps  between 
2025  and  2040  (Table  A2.1),  which  may  lead  to 
rising medium-term pressures from public pension 
spending. 

Public healthcare expenditure is projected to 
be  4.5%  of  GDP  in  2025  (below  the  EU 
average of 6.6%) and is expected to increase 
by 0.5 pps between 2025 and 2040 and by a 
further 0.5 pps between 2040 and 2070 (49). 
Public  expenditure  on  long-term  care  is  projected 
to  be  0.5%  of  GDP  in  2025  (well  below  the  EU 
average  of  1.7%)  and  is  expected  to  increase  by 
0.3 pps of GDP between 2025 and 2040 and by a 
further  0.6  pps  of  GDP  between  2040  and  2070 
(50). 

National fiscal framework   

The  CSRs  addressed  to  Poland  in  2025 
include  a  call  to  improve  the  efficiency  of 
public  spending,  including  through:  (i)  better 
targeting of social benefits; (ii) improving the 
budgetary  process; 
(iii)  providing  more 
transparency in investment planning; and (iv) 
the  more  widespread  use  of  standardised 
procedures  for  project  assessment  and 
selection. Substantial progress has been made on 
the  recommendations  concerning  the  budgetary 
process  and  public  investment.  In  line  with  its 
recovery  and  resilience  plan  (RRP),  Poland  has 
its  framework  for 
introduced  a 
reform 
managing 

investment. 

reform  of 

public 

The 

(48)  The (gross) replacement rate refers, depending on data 

availability, to both public and private pensions. It is based 
on projections from the 2024 Ageing Report.  

(49)  Key performance characteristics, recent reforms and 

investments of the Polish healthcare system are discussed in 
Annex 15. 

(50)  The adequacy and quality of the Polish long-term care 

system are covered in Annex 12. 

Assets in 2024 (% GDP)Participation in 2024 (% working-age population)PL8.4-22.761.7PLEU32.4-2.855.9EUGross replacement rate at retirement: (pps change 2025-2040)  
 
 
 
       
 
Table A2.2:  Projected change in ageing-related expenditure in 2025-2040 and 2025-2070 

Source: 2024 Ageing Report (EC/EPC). 

comprises  general  and  sectoral  criteria  and 
procedures  for  assessing  investment  projects.  No 
progress  has  been  made  on  better  targeting  of 
social  benefits.  In  particular,  Poland  has  taken  no 
measures  to  expand  the  use  of  means-testing  in 
family benefits.  

will  have  seven  members  supported  by  a 
secretariat. Its main tasks will consist of assessing 
macroeconomic  forecasts,  analysing  draft  state 
budgets,  monitoring  Poland’s  compliance  with 
fiscal  rules,  and  supporting  transparency  in  the 
public finance debate. 

The  Ministry  of  Finance’s  legal  mandate  to 
carry out spending reviews was strengthened 
in 2025 and 2026 as part of the Polish RRP. 
While  a  number  of  spending  review  reports  were 
published since 2024, these had limited impact in 
terms  of  spending  reallocations  or  savings.  Under 
the  2026  reform  under  the  RRP,  line  ministries 
must now include the findings of spending reviews 
in  the  budget  proposals they  send  to  the  Ministry 
of Finance.   

and 

comprehensive 

taken  steps 

Although  Poland  has 
to 
strengthen  the  assessment  of  investment 
projects,  both  transparency  in  investment 
budgeting  and  ex  post reviews  remain weak. 
The  planning  of  public  investment,  including  by 
state-owned  enterprises,  would  benefit  from  an 
integrated 
document, 
anchored in a long-term strategy and aligned with 
Poland’s medium-term fiscal-structural plan. Such 
a  document,  when  made  public  and  kept  up-to-
date, could offer transparency and predictability to 
the private sector. After sufficient time has passed 
since  a  public  investment  project  was  completed 
(e.g. three to five years), a comprehensive ex post 
review  are 
justified  to  assess  the  strategic 
performance of the project. These reviews require 
careful  planning  and  are  resource  intensive.  In 
Poland, ex post reviews are neither systematically 
required, not frequently conducted. 

Since  1 January 2026,  Poland  has  a  Fiscal 
Council,  an  independent  fiscal  institution 
which  is  in  the  process  of  building  its 
capacity.  When  fully  staffed,  the  Fiscal  Council 

46 

Accrual  accounting  improves  transparency 
over  a  public  body’s  financial  position  and 
performance,  and  can  support  sustainability 
and 
(14) 
intergenerational  equity.  Most 
implemented  accrual 
Member  States  have 
accounting  across  the  general  government  sector 
and  five  are  set  to  do  so  by  2030  (51).  Poland  is 
close  to  the  EU  average  in  terms  of  public 
accounting  maturity  (see  Table  A2.3)  but  has  not 
yet  implemented  accrual  accounting  for  social 
security funds. The ongoing reforms in Poland are 
not expected to improve its standing in this area in 
the medium term (52).  

(51)  Report on public accounting in the EU (COM(2025)746 and 
accompanying Staff Working Document SWD(2025)396). 
Countries with an accounting maturity of 70% or more in 
relation to International Public Accounting Standards are 
deemed to apply accrual accounting. 

(52)  Annexes 3.1 and 3.4 of SWD(2025)396.  

PL20.1-0.50.50.3-0.20.120.1PLEU24.30.50.30.4-0.30.925.2EUPL20.1-1.11.00.90.10.921.0PLEU24.30.20.60.8-0.31.325.6EUageing-related expenditure change in 2025-2040 (pps GDP) due to:ageing-related expenditure pensionshealthcarelong-term careeducationtotalageing-related expenditure change in 2025-2070 (pps GDP) due to:ageing-related expenditure pensionshealthcarelong-term careeducationtotal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
Table A2.3:  Fiscal governance database indicators and public accounting maturity 

(1) "The Country Fiscal Rule Strength Index (C-FRSI) shows the strength of national fiscal rules aggregated at the country level 
based on: i) the legal base; ii) how binding the rule is; iii) monitoring bodies; iv) correction mechanisms; and v) resilience to shocks. 
The Medium-Term Budgetary Framework Index (MTBFI) shows the strength of the national MTBF based on: i) coverage of the 
targets/ceilings included in the national medium-term fiscal plans; ii) connectedness between these targets/ceilings and the 
annual budgets; iii) involvement of the national parliament in the preparation of the plans; iv) involvement of independent fiscal 
institutions in their preparation; and v) their level of detail. A higher score is associated with higher rule and MTBF strength. 
The score for public accounting reflects the degree of maturity in relation to the International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
(IPSAS). Countries with an accounting maturity of 70% or more in relation to IPSAS are deemed to apply accrual accounting. For 
more information, see the report on public accounting in the EU (COM(2025)746 and accompanying Staff Working Document 
SWD(2025)396)." 
Source: Fiscal Governance Database, European Commission 

47 

2024PolandEU AverageCountry Fiscal Rule Strength Index (C-FRSI)14.5814.81Medium-Term Budgetary Framework Index (MTBFI)0.330.722025 Public accounting maturity of general government67%65% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
ANNEX 3: TAXATION 

This  Annex  provides  an 
indicator-based 
overview  of  Poland’s  tax  system.  It  includes 
information  on  the  tax  mix,  on  competitiveness 
and fairness aspects of the tax system, and on tax 
collection and compliance. In the area of taxation, 
the  2025  country-specific  recommendations  for 
Poland highlighted challenges in energy pricing for 
households and industries with high prices of clean 
electricity  generation  relative  to  the  fossil  fuels 
(further details in Annex 9). 

In  Poland,  tax  revenues  expressed  as  a 
percentage  of  GDP  are  considerably  below 
the EU aggregate, despite the slight increase 
in 2024. In 2024, total tax revenues amounted to 
36.6% of GDP, compared to the EU-27 average of 
39.4%.  Poland  has  a  relatively  low  reliance  on 
labour  taxation  -  amounting  to  14.8%  of  GDP 
compared  with  an  EU  average  of  20.3%  in  2024. 
Revenues  from  personal  income  tax  (PIT)  as  part 
of  GDP  were  significantly  lower  than  the  EU 
average  (5%  in  Poland  and  9.4%  in  the  EU). 
Consumption taxes account for 12.3% of GDP (EU 
average:  10.6%)  and  capital  taxes  for  9.4%  (EU 
average:  8.5%).  Recurrent  taxes  on  immovable 
property  in  Poland  as  part  of  GDP  remain  at  the 
same level and are slightly above the EU average 
(1% vs  0.9%), but  the total  share  of  the property 
taxes  in  relation  to  GDP  remains  below  the  EU 
average (1.5% vs 1.8%). 

Poland’s revenues from environmental taxes 
as  a  percentage  of  GDP  are  above  the  EU 
average (3.4 % of Polish GDP in 2023 and 3% in 
2024,  compared  with  the  EU  average  of  2.1%). 
Energy taxes account for the largest percentage of 
these  environmental  taxes  making  up  7.4%  of 
total tax revenue in Poland (in comparison with the 
EU average of 4.1%). The effective carbon rate in 
2023 was EUR 68 per tonne of CO2 emission while 
the  EU  average  was  EUR 84.8.  However,  there  is 
still  some  room  for  solutions  that  promote  the 
‘polluter pays’ principle, especially in the context of 
carbon  taxes,  transport  taxes  or  pollution  and 
resources taxes. 

Low  revenues  from  taxation  of  labour  are 
in  the  context  of 
particularly  relevant 
persistent labour shortages, largely driven by 
a shrinking working-age population. While the 
lower tax burden can support employment, it also 
constrains revenue collection in a tax base that is 
already  under  demographic  pressure, 
in  the 
context  of  substantial  fiscal  consolidation  needs 
(see Annex 2). 

Graph A3.1: Tax revenue by economic function in 
2024, PL (outer ring) and EU-27 (inner ring) 

Source: Taxation Trends Data, DG TAXUD 

Poland’s  labour  tax  burden  is  comparatively 
high at low earnings levels.  Graph A3.2 shows 
that  the  labour  tax  wedge (53)  in  Poland  in  2025 
was  above  the  EU  average  for  single  workers  at 
low  earnings  levels  (35.1%  vs  31.6%  for  workers 
earning  50%  of  the  average  wage;  see  also 
Table A3.1),  whereas  other  wage  levels  are  closer 
to the EU average. Second earners at a wage level 
of 67% of the average wage, whose spouses earn 
the  average  wage,  were  also  subject  to  a  tax 
wedge (at 42.9%) that was above the EU average 
(38.5%)  and higher than the tax wedge for single 
earners  at  the  same  wage  level  (38.2%).  It  is 
therefore  possible  that  the  current  design  of  the 
tax-and-benefit  system 
is  having  a  negative 
impact  on  the  share  of  low-skilled  workers  and 
women entering the labour market. 

Although  income  inequality  in  Poland  is 
modest,  the  tax-and-benefit  system  has  a 
relatively  small  inequality-reducing  effects 
in  the  EU.  In  2024,  the  difference  between  the 
Gini  coefficient (54)  for  market  income  before 

(53)  The  tax  wedge  is  an  indicator  of  the  tax  burden  on  labour 
that  can  be  assessed  at  various  levels  of  earnings.  It  is 
defined as the sum of personal income taxes, employee and 
employer  social-security  contributions,  and  other  mandatory 
contributions,  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  total  labour 
costs  (the  sum  of  the  gross  wage  and  social-security 
contributions  paid  by  the  employer).  Tax  wedge  data in  the 
2026  country  reports  are  calculated  by  the  Joint  Research 
Centre  of  the  European  Commission  and  based  on  the 
EUROMOD model, while in the past country reports they were 
based  on  the  OECD  tax  and  benefit  model.  While  the 
underlying  methodology  is  very  similar,  differences  in  the 
assumptions  can  lead  to  different  results  between  both 
models.   

(54)  The  Gini  coefficient  measures  the  extent  to  which  the 
distribution  of  income  within  a  country  deviates  from  a 

48 

51.526.821.640.633.725.7Taxes on labourTaxes on consumptionTaxes on capital 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Table A3.1:  Taxation Indicators 

(1) Forward-looking effective tax rate (KPMG).  
(2) A higher value indicates a stronger redistributive impact of taxation. 
(*) EU-27 simple average. 
(**) Forecast value for 2024. EU-27 refers to the median value. For more data on tax revenues as well as the methodology 
applied, see the Data on Taxation Trends webpage. 
Source: European Commission, OECD, ISORA. 

social  transfers  and  total  disposable  household 
income  was  6.1 percentage  points 
in  Poland 
(compared  with  an  EU  average  of  7.8 pps).  This 
indicates  a  lower  effect  of  taxes  and  benefit 
transfers  on  reducing  income  inequality  than  in 
other  EU  countries,  although  somewhat  higher 
than  in  previous  years  (see  Table A3.1).  At  the 
same  time,  in  terms  of  disposable  income  after 
taxes  and  benefits,  Poland  shows  one  of  the 
lowest Gini indices (26.0%) against the EU average 
(29.1%),  indicating  lower  income  inequality  in 
Poland than in other EU countries (55). 

A  reform  adopted 
in  2025  will  reduce 
taxation  of  families  with  children.  The 
statutory  PIT  rate  is  12%  for  income  up  to 
PLN 120 000  (about  EUR 28 000)  and  32%  for 
income above this threshold. A tax reform adopted 
in 2025 and applicable from 2026 will reduce the 
tax  burden  of  families  with  at  least  two  children 
earning up to PLN 140 000 (EUR 32 973) a year to 
zero.  Poland  does  not  have  a  wealth  tax,  but 
people  who  earn  over  PLN 1 million  a  year  must 

perfectly  equal  distribution.  A  coefficient  of  0  expresses 
perfect equality where everyone has the same income, while 
a coefficient of 100 expresses full inequality where only one 
person has all the income.  

(55)  European Commission based on EU-SILC. 

49 

pay a solidarity contribution of 4% on the income 
over  that  amount  (after  the  deduction  of  social 
security  contributions).  The  revenues  from  the 
solidarity  contribution  are  used to  finance  the 
Solidarity  Fund  for  Persons  with  Disabilities. 
Poland levies inheritance and gift taxes with rates 
varying from 0% (for closest relatives) to 20%. 

Graph A3.2: Tax wedge for single and second 
earners as a % of total labour costs, 2025 

Source: European Commission  
Note: The second earner tax wedge assumes a first earner at 
100% of the average wage and no children. For the 
methodology of the tax wedge for second earners, see 
OECD, 2016, Taxing Wages 2014-2015. 

Poland 
tax 
environment  for  the  growth  of  businesses. 

is  building  a 

favourable 

35.138.239.942.842.92025303540455050100150Tax wedge, % of total labour costsEarnings as % of the average wageSingle earner - PLSingle earner - EU averageSecond earner -  PLSecond earner -  EU average2019202220232024202520192022202320242025Tax structureTotal taxes (including compulsory actual social contributions) (% of GDP)34.834.235.036.639.939.739.039.4Taxes on labour (% of GDP)14.113.413.514.820.620.119.920.3of which, social security contributions (SSC, % of GDP)13.212.813.414.313.012.712.713.0Taxes on consumption (% of GDP)12.212.011.712.311.210.910.510.6of which, value added taxes (VAT, % of GDP)7.97.27.38.07.17.47.17.1Taxes on capital (% of GDP)8.58.89.99.48.18.78.58.5Personal income taxes (PIT, % of GDP)5.34.54.45.09.69.49.39.6Corporate income taxes (CIT, % of GDP)2.22.82.72.42.63.23.23.1Total property taxes (% of GDP)1.71.51.41.52.22.11.91.8Recurrent taxes on immovable property (% of GDP)1.11.01.01.01.21.00.90.9Environmental taxes (% of GDP)2.52.83.43.02.62.12.12.1Effective carbon rate in EUR per tonne of CO2 equivalentsnana68.0nanana84.8naTax wedge at 50% of average wage (single person) (*)39.833.433.934.735.132.431.631.531.531.6Tax wedge at 100% of average wage (single person) (*)41.038.839.339.739.940.139.739.939.940.0Corporate income tax - effective average tax rates (1) (*)16.915.212.212.220.019.219.019.3Difference in Gini coefficient before and after taxes and cash social transfers (pensions excluded from social transfers) (2) (*)5.34.65.36.17.88.07.97.8Outstanding tax arrears: total year-end tax debt (including debt considered not collectable) / total revenue (in %) (*)29.821.919.2na31.832.630.7naVAT gap (% of VAT total tax liability, VTTL) (**)14.911.216.010.910.57.38.2naProgressivity & fairnessTax administration & complianceBy tax baseSome tax typesEU-27Poland 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
The  standard  corporate  income  tax  (CIT)  rate  in 
Poland  is  below  the  EU  average  (19%)  and  a 
reduced  rate  of  9%  applies  to  new  and  small 
businesses. The forward-looking effective average 
tax rate dropped to 12.2% in 2024 (from 15.9% in 
2022), reaching one of the lowest levels in the EU 
(EU  average:  19.1%  in  2024).  Based  on  the 
available estimates, the effective average tax rate 
for SMEs is even lower (below 6% in 2023). At the 
same  time,  Poland’s  tax  system  is  quite  complex, 
which  may  impede  development  of  businesses. 
Poland included a simplification of tax law on the 
list  of  key  government  priorities  announced  in 
September 2025. 

investments.  Available 

Poland offers a wide range of tax incentives 
tax 
to  encourage 
incentives  include  accelerated  depreciation,  up  to 
immediate  expensing  for  certain  fixed  assets, 
investment  deductions  for  new  investments  or 
jobs creation, and an investment reserve for future 
investments  which  is  tax-deductible.  To  further 
stimulate  retail  investment,  Poland  announced 
that in 2026 it will introduce individual investment 
accounts  featuring  certain  tax  incentives.  More 
investment  from  individuals  would  make  the 
capital market deeper and improve its liquidity. 

It also offers a wide range of tax incentives 
for  R&D.  To  incentivise  R&D,  taxpayers  may 
deduct  an  additional  100%  of  all  qualifying 
expenses  incurred  in  connection  with  R&D.  As  of 
2022,  Poland  has  also  increased  tax  deductions 
for  expenses  incurred  for robotisation, prototypes, 
expansion of sales market, consolidation and IPOs. 
An incentive for innovative employees allows their 
employers  to  reduce  tax  advance  payments 
withheld  from  the  employees'  salaries  by  the 
qualifying  R&D  expenses  that  were  not  deducted 
in  the  previous  year.  Startups  can  benefit  from 
several  types  of  tax  relief  in  Poland  (such  as 
reduction  of  withholding  tax  rate;  immediate 
deduction  of  certain  fixed  assets;  refund  of  R&D 
expenses that could not be deducted from the tax 
base). 

Poland  does  not  regularly  report  on  tax 
expenditures.  Its  last  detailed  report  on  tax 
expenditures  was  published  in  2021,  covering 
2016-2018 (56).  Based  on  its  results,  the  total 
amount of tax expenditures in 2018 related to PIT, 

(56)  Report on Tax Preferences in Poland (Raport – Preferencje 

podatkowe w Polsce).  

CIT, VAT, excise tax, and local taxes (i.e. real estate 
tax, agricultural tax, forestry tax) was estimated at 
PLN 118.3 billion  (about  EUR 27.75 billion).  This 
represented  5.6%  of  GDP  and  27.7%  of  total  tax 
revenues.  The  use  of  tax  expenditures  in  PIT  is 
is  currently 
limited.  The  Ministry  of  Finance 
working to resume the tax expenditure reporting in 
2026. 

Foregone revenues from PIT are below the EU 
average.  Based  on  the  micro-simulations  using 
the  EUROMOD  model,  tax  expenditures  related  to 
PIT  in  Poland  reduce  PIT  revenues  by  7% (57). 
These  foregone  revenues  amount  to  about  0.4% 
of GDP, compared to the EU average of 1.2%. The 
tax  expenditures  are  related  to  employment  and 
family, each making up for about half of the total 
PIT revenue reduction. Their impact on households’ 
disposable income is modest, giving an increase of 
about  0.5%,  and  even  smaller  for 
income 
inequality which remains almost unchanged. 

Poland’s shadow economy is estimated to be 
larger  than  the  EU  average  and  available 
estimates  point  to  a  large  CIT  gap.  National 
sources  estimate  the  CIT  gap  at  around  30%  of 
potential  revenues (58),  and  its  high  levels  are 
confirmed  by 
the  European  Commission’s 
estimates (59).  Poland 
is  using  the  Technical 
Support Instrument to build its tax gap estimation 
capacities (60).  In  2025  Poland  established  the 
National  Revenue  Administration  Competence 
Centre  for  Combating  Aggressive  Tax  Planning  in 
Corporate  Income  Taxation,  to  support  audits  in 
the field of combating aggressive tax planning. 

(57)  Turrini, A., Guigue, J., Kiss, Á., Leodolter, A., Van Herck, K., 

Neher, F., Leventi, C., Papini, A., Picos, F., Ricci, M., Lanterna F.; 
(2024). Tax Expenditures in the EU: Recent Trends and New 
Policy Challenges. European Economy-Discussion Papers, 
(212). 

(58)  Polish Economic Institute, based on 2019-2020 data 

(59)  Based on a methodology developed by the Joint Research 
Centre (European Commission, 2025) which relies on a top-
down approach using statistical data. 

(60)  European Commission: Technical Support Instrument - 
Country Factsheet, Poland; European Commission: 
Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union, Annual 
report on taxation 2025 – Review of taxation policies in the 
EU Member States, Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2025. 

50 

 
 
 
for electronic handling of all tax-related matters in 
the field of VAT,  PIT and CIT, also through mobile 
application.  

Graph A3.3: VAT gap indicators 

Note: The rate gap and the national policy-driven exemption 
gap are measured as percentage of notional ideal revenues. 
Compliance gap is measured as a percentage of VAT total tax 
liability. EU refers to median values. 
Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Taxation and Customs Union, VAT gap in the EU - 2025 report.  

In 2023 the VAT compliance gap continued to 
increase up to 16%  (61) of the VAT  total  tax 
liability.  This  was  the  third  largest  compliance 
gap  in  the  EU.  VAT  losses  due  to  missing  trader 
fraud  were  estimated  over 
intra-community 
EUR 1.3 billion  in  2023.  Several  factors  are  likely 
to  have  contributed  to  this  increase,  including  a 
rise in bankruptcy declarations, an increase in the 
share  of  services  in  the  economy  and  growing 
consumption  of  recreation  services,  restaurants 
and  accommodation.  However, 
is 
expected  to  revert  back  to  2024  levels  (VAT 
compliance  gap  estimated  at  10.9%  of  VAT  total 
tax  liability).  On  the  other  hand,  the  VAT  policy 
gap (62)  was  still  among  the  highest  in  the  EU, 
largely  due  to  the  widespread  application  of 
reduced  VAT  rates.  In  2023  it  was  estimated  at 
nearly 51% of the national ideal revenue, with the 
slight decrease in 2024 estimated at 49.8%. 

trend 

this 

The  digital  transformation  is  progressing 
well. The electronic payment of VAT obligations is 
compulsory, and the IT system used by the Polish 
tax  administration  to  manage  VAT  arrears  can 
prioritise  cases  based  on  their  size  and  age  and 
allow arrears to be collected via instalment plans. 
In  2026  the  system  of  structured  e-invoices 
in  the  national  e-invoicing  system 
registered 
(KSeF), introduced in 2022, became mandatory as 
of 1 February 2026 for the biggest companies and 
as of 1 April 2026 for other taxpayers. Its aim is to 
facilitate and tighten the collection of VAT and its 
control in real time (63). 

New  tools  are  helping  fight  fraud  and  tax 
evasion. In recent years Poland has implemented 
several new tools such as: SAF-T (the international 
standard for the electronic exchange of accounting 
data  developed  by  the  OECD);  an  account-
monitoring  platform  (STIR),  which  enables  real-
time  monitoring  of  company  finances  via  bank 
integration  or  comparison  of  financial  flow  data 
with  other  data  held  by  the  National  Revenue 
Administration  (KAS),  such  as  the  JPK-VAT  file,  to 
effectively prevent undue VAT refunds. In 2022, an 
‘e-Tax Office’ (e-Urząd Skarbowy) was established 

(61)  European Commission (2025), Mind the Gap report, Country 

fiche - Poland p. 299.  

(62)  The VAT policy gap refers to the revenue lost due to the 

application of VAT exemptions and reduced, super-reduced, 
and zero VAT rates on selected products. 

(63)  European Commission (2025), Mind the Gap report, Country 

fiche - Poland, p. 303. 

51 

0%2%4%6%8%10%12%14%16%18%20%Rate gapNational policy-driven exemptiongapCompliance gapPLEU 
 
   
PRODUCTIVITY 
ANNEX 4: INNOVATION TO BUSINESS  

in 

(EIS)(64), 

research 

Despite  improvements,  Poland  still  faces 
challenges 
and 
the 
innovation (R&I) ecosystem  in  areas  such  as 
into 
translating  scientific  breakthroughs 
research 
impactful 
innovation,  making 
careers  more  attractive  and 
increasing 
business  investments  in  R&I.  Poland  is  an 
emerging  innovator  according  to  the  European 
Innovation  Scoreboard 
ranking  23rd 
among  EU  Member  States  and  performing  above 
the  average  of  emerging  innovators  in  the  EU 
(65.9% vs 56.4% of the EU average in 2025). For 
country-specific 
2025 
Poland, 
the 
recommendations 
in 
challenges 
highlighted 
strengthening  science-business  links  as  well  as 
improving  and  modernising  the  public  research 
investment-related 
system  and 
economic 
Poland’s 
investment  in  research  and  development  (R&D) 
has  shown  steady 
improvement,  with  R&D 
intensity(65)  rising  from  0.88%  of GDP  in  2012 to 
1.41%  in  2024.  Despite  this  positive  momentum, 
Poland  still  falls  below  the  EU  average  of  2.24%, 
indicating a persistent gap with leading innovation 
economies.  Additionally,  the  attractiveness  of 
research  careers  and  the  strength  of  science-
business  links  remain  key  weaknesses,  holding 
back  Poland’s  overall  innovation  capacity  with 
fundamental  institutional  and  market  challenges. 
Despite improvement, Poland still trails behind the 
EU  average  in  terms  of  the  digitalisation  of 
businesses  and  the  adoption  of  advanced  digital 
technologies. Despite this, the use of AI, cloud and 
data analytics in companies is on the rise.  

focusing  on 
on 

innovation. 

policy 

(64)  2025 European Innovation Scoreboard, country profile: 

Poland. The scoreboard provides a comparative analysis of 
innovation performance in EU countries, including the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of their national innovation 
systems (also compared to the EU average). 

(65)  Defined as gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a 

percentage of GDP. 

52 

Graph A4.1: R&D intensity (gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % of GDP), 2024 

Source: DG Research and Innovation - Chief Economist - 
Common R&I Strategy and Foresight Unit 
Data: Eurostat, OECD, DG JRC, Science Metrix (Scopus), Invest 
Europe, European Innovation Scoreboard, 2024 

Excellent science 

improvements,  Poland’s 
Despite  gradual 
public  R&D  sector  remains  underfunded  and 
less  internationally  competitive  than  the  EU 
average,  underscoring  the  need  for  stronger 
public  investment  and  policies  to  improve 
research  excellence  and  global  visibility. 
Public  sector  investment  in  R&D  as  a  percentage 
of  GDP  in  Poland  stagnated  from  2012  to  2023 
(both 0.55%) but dropped in 2024 to 0.51%, even 
further below the EU average of 0.72%. This slight 
decline  suggests  that  more  public  funding  is 
needed  to  accelerate  progress,  confirming  the 
2025  country-specific  recommendation  on  raising 
public  R&I  investment.  In  addition,  highly-cited 
scientific publications(66) were only 5.58% of total 
Polish  research  output  in  2022,  below  the  EU’s 
average of 9.44%, indicating that research impact 
and  international  visibility  require  strengthening.  
International co-publications have grown, reaching 
43.17%  of  total  publications  in  2024,  albeit  still 
below the EU average of 57.24%. 

The  attractiveness  of  research  careers  and 
the  overall  support  system  for  researchers 
still  require  improvement.  The  number  of 
researchers  per  thousand  employed  in  the  public 

(66)  Scientific publications of the country within the top 10% 

most cited publications worldwide as % of total publications 
of the country. 

00.511.522.533.5SKSIROPLDENLPTHUEU 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
the 

incentivise 

demonstrated 

capital, 
to 
to  Poland, 

sector slightly increased from 3.1 in 2012 to 3.6 in 
2024  but  remains  behind  the  EU  average  of  4.3. 
This  increase  demonstrates  a  growing  investment 
in 
through 
human 
programmes 
return  of 
such  as  NAWA’s 
researchers 
programmes(67),  First  Team(68)  and  International 
Research  Agendas(69),  in  line  with  the    2025 
country-specific  recommendations  on  improving 
and  modernising  the  public  research  system  by 
making  research  careers  more  attractive  and 
supporting  research  institutions.  The  number  of 
inhabitants  remains 
PhD  students  per  1000 
among the lowest in the EU (0.5 vs 1.3 in the EU in 
2022)(70).  This  indicates  research  careers  are 
relatively unattractive in Poland. It might also point 
to low financial and career incentives in academia 
compared  with  industry  and  abroad.  The  low 
intake  reflects  the  perceived  poor  pay,  instability 
and  weak  progression  prospects.  Despite  the 
programmes listed above, Poland still lags behind 
in  nurturing 
research  excellence  and  career 
prospects  for  its  scientists,  specifically  on  the 
reform  of  the  evaluation  process  of  scientific 
activities,  still  seen  as  excessively  focused  on 
bibliometrics  and  not  tapping  sufficiently  to  the 
commercialisation side.  

improve 

collaboration, 

ties  between  research,  business,  and  technology, 
including  those  driven  by  reforms  under  the 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (Reform  A2.4 
Strengthening  cooperation  mechanisms  between 
science and industry) aimed at enhancing science-
business  collaboration  and  the  update  of  the 
national  science  policy.  Additionally,  to  foster 
effective 
the 
commercialisation  and  scaling  up  of  research 
results,  remove  regulatory  barriers  to  innovation 
and  increase  the  efficient  use  of  EU  and  private 
financing,  Poland  adopted  new  rules  for  the 
Council  for  Innovation  (Order  No.  62  of  the  Prime 
Minister of November 4, 2025). It also established, 
a new task force under the Prime Minister’s office, 
aiming  to  identify  gaps  and  provide  long  term 
the 
solutions, 
effectiveness  of  the  system  supporting  science-
business  links(72),  and  initiated  preparations  for  a 
strategy for developing the start-up ecosystem for 
the years 2027-2035(73). 

launched  an  evaluation  of 

Business innovation 

Poland's  R&I  system  still  faces  significant 
challenges  in  inter-institutional  cooperation. 
This situation is primarily due to fragmented R&D 
infrastructure  and  weak 
linkages  between 
research  organisations  and 
academia,  public 
industry.  On  the  public  administration  side,  the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Technology 
is responsible for innovation policy, while research 
policy  falls  under  the  Ministry  of  Science  and 
Higher  Education.  The  Ministry  of  Funds  and 
Regional  Policy,  as  well  as  agencies  such  as  the 
Polish  Agency  for  Enterprise  Development(71),  the 
National Centre for R&D, the Foundation for Polish 
Science  and  the  Polish  Development  Fund  are 
involved 
in  financing  from  EU  and  national 
sources,  creating  too  many  players  in  the  R&I 
system.  Poland’s  R&I  governance  is  currently 
undergoing modernisation, aimed at strengthening 

(67)  Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange programmes 

for scientists and institutions.  

(68)  First Team.  

(69)  International Research Agendas.  

(70)  Eurostat : educ_uoe_grad06. 

Poland’s  innovation  system  is  undergoing  a 
dynamic  transformation,  but  business  R&D 
investment 
is  still  subdued.  The  main 
innovational  sectors  remain  the  ICT  and  the  life 
sciences/health  sector,  with  clean  energy  R&D 
surging  as  one  of  the  main  priorities.  On  the  less 
innovational  side  the  main  issue  continues  to  be 
domestically  focused,  smaller  firms  that  invest 
little in R&D and digital technologies. According to 
the 2025 European Innovation Scoreboard, Poland 
underperforms  in  the  adoption  of  product  and 
business  process  innovation  from  R&D-intensive 
companies,  when  compared  to  other  EU  markets, 
innovation 
limiting  the  country’s 
visibility. 
enterprise 
Additionally, 
in  Poland  grew 
expenditure  on  R&D  (BERD) 
substantially  from  0.33%  of  GDP  in  2012  to 
0.89%  in  2024,  with  a  peak  in  2023  (1.0%),  but 
still  far  from  the  EU  average  (1.49%).  Likewise, 
BERD  performed  by  SMEs  has  also  risen  quite 
strongly, from a mere 0.11% in 2012 to 0.37% in 
2023, but still below the EU average (0.47%) This 

international 
business 

(72)  Ministry of Science and Higher Education, www.gov.pl. 

(71)  Polish Agency for the Development of Businesses (PARP).  

(73)  Ministry of Development and Technology, www.gov.pl.   

53 

 
 
 
 
(PARP). 

Development 

could be linked to the tax incentives implemented 
by  the  government  and  the  increase  in  direct 
funding  through  the  National  Centre  for  Research 
and  Development  (NCBR)  and  Polish  Agency  for 
Enterprise 
Patent 
applications  filed  under  the  Patent  Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT) have decreased from 0.95 in 2012 to 
0.63  in  2022  and  remain  well  below  the  EU 
average  of  2.81,  reflecting  a  continued  gap  in 
high-value,  internationally  competitive  inventions, 
despite  the  621  patent  innovations  in  2025  with 
the European Patent Office, indicating a 58% rise 
since 2016(74). 

Public  support  for  business  innovation  in 
Poland 
is  provided  through  a  mix  of 
increasing  direct  grants  and  R&D  tax 
incentives.  Business  enterprise  expenditure  on 
R&D  (BERD)  financed  by  the  public  sector  in 
Poland 
the  EU 
rose  noticeably,  overtaking 
estimated average (0.11% of GDP) throughout the 
period.  The  indicator increased  from  about  0.06% 
of GDP in 2012 to around 0.15% in 2023, showing 
a  near  three-fold  rise  in  R&D  tax  incentives  and 
signalling  a  stronger  policy  effort  to  stimulate 
private  R&D,  such  as  the  Critical  Technology 
Support Fund. R&D tax incentives as a percentage 
of  GDP  were  0.06%  in  2023,  up  from  0.007%  in 
2017,  but  still  well  below  the  EU  average  of 
0.102%.  These  incentives  include  measures  such 
as tax relief for R&D in companies, which has had 
some  success,  offering  consistent  deductions  on 
eligible  costs.  Direct  public  support,  through  both 
EU  and  national  funds,  such  as  the  Innovate 
Poland  scheme, 
remains  vital  for  fostering 
innovation  among  firms,  particularly  those  with 
riskier 
Recent 
developments  have  also  streamlined  grant 
programmes,  facilitated  programme  access  and 
tailored  support  towards  SMEs  and  high-tech 
sectors. 

higher-cost 

projects. 

or 

collaboration  and 
research 

the 
Science-business 
into 
translation  of  academic 
business  innovation  are  improving,  yet  in 
need of further progress. Scientific cooperation 
between  the  public  and  private  sectors  has 
improved  slowly,  with  public-private  research  co-
publications  (75)  rising  to  5.78%  in  2024  from 

(74)  EPO PL: https://www.epo.org/en/about-us/statistics/statistics-

centre#/countrydashboards  

3.65%  in  2012;  however,  this  indicator  is  still 
below the EU average of 7.62%. Key public bodies 
such  as  the  National  Centre  for  Research  and 
Development are tasked with awarding grants and 
fostering  industry-university  partnerships.  Poland 
has  mechanisms  in  place  to  support  applied 
research  (implementing  research  results  in  the 
economy  and  using  them  in  industry)  primarily 
financed by the National  Centre for Research and 
Development  (NCBR).  Another  example  is  the 
PRIME  Project(76)  by  the  Foundation  for  Polish 
Science  (FNP),  an  EU  Cohesion  funds  programme 
aimed  at  improving  business  competences  for 
scientists working in Polish research organisations. 
Technology  transfer  via  spin-off  companies  has 
been on the rise in the past decade, reaching over 
230  companies  in  2023(77).  This  is  due  to  higher 
education reforms, like the Constitution for Science 
(Law  on  Higher  Education  and  Science,  2018), 
greater  EU  funding,  and  the  emergence  of 
technology  transfer  offices  in  universities  as  part 
'third  mission'  approach(78)  and  the 
of  the 
Excellence  Initiative  –  Research  University  (IDUB). 
The Law on Higher Education and Science of 2018 
further  supports  these  links  and  the  national 
science policy (2022) enhanced the strategic goals 
for quality research and stronger science-business 
ties.  The  national  science  policy 
is  currently 
undergoing a revision to further align with parts of 
the  2025  country-specific 
recommendations, 
namely  on  research  careers  attractiveness  and  a 
stable and clear legal framework. 

The  digitalisation  of  SMEs  and  adoption  of 
advanced  digital  technologies  in  Poland  is 
progressing gradually, while remaining below 
the  EU  average.  According  to  Poland’s  Digital 
Decade Report(79), in 2024, 68.95% of Polish SMEs 
reached  at  least  a  basic  level  of  digital  intensity, 
an  increase  from  60.95%  in  2022,  but  still  well 
below  the  EU  average  of  72.91%.  8.36%  of 
businesses adopted AI after a significant increase 

(76)  PRIME Project – Science Commercialisation Support  

(77)  with equity ties to universities in Poland 

https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Population-of-academic-
spin-offs-with-equity-ties-to-universities-in-Poland-from-
2010-to_fig3_385870741 

(78)  This concept was institutionalised primarily through 

the Constitution for Science (2018), which mandated that 
higher education institutions contribute to the innovativeness 
of the economy and the development of culture as a core 
obligation. 

(75)  As a proportion of the total number of publications. 

(79)  2025 Digital Decade Country Report Poland  

54 

 
 
 
through 

including 

to  focus 

investments 

recommendation 

of  over  50% between  2023  and  2025, but  below 
the  EU  average  of  19.95%.  On  grassroot  support 
for  digital  innovation,  Poland  has  some  support 
in  place  such  as  comprehensive 
measures 
digitalisation  advice, 
the 
European  Digital  Innovation  Hubs.  In  addition, 
Poland uses the RRF to provide loans covering the 
in  advanced  digital 
costs  of 
technologies  to  businesses 
(measure  C4.1.1). 
Poland  is  taking  some  measures  to  address  the 
2025 
investment-
related  economic  policy  on  innovation  through 
strengthening the country’s AI ecosystem. Work is 
underway on establishing the AI Fund Council as a 
coordination  mechanism  for  AI-related  funding. 
Additionally,  Poland  is  expected  to  launch  two  AI 
factories to develop, test and deploy state-of-the-
art  AI  technologies  and  has  submitted  a  proposal 
for a Baltic AI giga factory as the leader of a Baltic 
states’  consortium.  There  are  concerns  about  the 
effectiveness  of  existing  support,  with  several 
operators  citing  regulatory  instability  and  lack  of 
access to funding opportunities as primary hurdles 
preventing  SMEs  from  investing  in  innovative 
solutions. Moreover, Polish stakeholders are active 
in  the  IPCEI  Next  Generation  Cloud  Infrastructure 
and  Services  through  the  National  Recovery  and 
Resilience Plan (measure C3.1.1).  

Entrepreneurial dynamism 

for 

startups  and 

Financing 
scale-ups 
continues  to  improve  but  is  unable  to  reach 
its  potential  due  to  institutional  investors' 
reluctance  while  also  facing  rising  labour 
costs  and  difficulties  in  securing  financing. 
According  to  the  latest  figures  in  Dealroom,  over 
2.9  companies  in  Poland  received  financing  from 
external investors such as venture capital funds or 
business  angels.  Out  of  these,  around  11  are 
unicorns(80) companies established in Poland, with 
a  combined  valuation  of  over  EUR 32  billion. 
Venture  capital  investment  as  a  percentage  of 
GDP  in  Poland  surged  from  0.004%  in  2012  to  a 
peak  of  0.028%  in  2022,  only  to  drop  in  the  last 
two years to 0.017% in 2024, a figure less than a 
third  of  the  EU  average  (0.063%).    To  bridge  this 
gap, Poland has deployed targeted initiatives since 

2020,  led  by  the  Polish  Development  Fund’s  (PFR 
Ventures)  funds-of-funds  model  and  Poland’s 
Development Bank (BGK), channelling EU resources 
(e.g. European Funds for a Smart Economy (FENG) 
2021-2027)  into  more  than  90  seed/venture 
capital/private  equity  funds  and  backing  nearly 
950  startups(81).  The  Polish  Agency  for  Enterprise 
Development  (PARP)  also  supports  early-stage 
startups  through  evolving  programs  that  now 
include  post-acceleration  phases  and  dedicated 
tracks  for  sectors  like  social  impact  or  deep-tech. 
Polish  universities  show  an  increasing  pipeline  of 
projects  from  science  to  sturt-ups,  showing  that 
Polish universities are around 50% of EU average 
in  number  of  startups  per  EUR100m  of  public 
financing  (82).  Despite  increasing  activity,  56%  of 
startups  report  difficulties  in  securing  financing, 
and  50%  highlight  rising  labour  costs  as  a  major 
challenge(83).  Participating in  government  and  EU-
funded schemes, startups are beginning to benefit 
from  targeted  public  policies  supporting  early-
stage  innovation  and  entrepreneurship.  This  is 
being  done  with  support  from  national  funds, 
where the Ministry of Finance has launched in late 
2025  the  Innovate  Poland  scheme(84),  comprising 
start-up  and  scale-up  financing  from  public  and 
private  sources  in  line  with  the    2025  country-
specific recommendations on focusing investment-
innovation  and 
related  economic  policy  on 
implementing targeted funding schemes. 

Although  regulatory  sandboxes and  targeted 
introduced,  ongoing 
policies  have  been 
fragmentation and administrative complexity 
for  innovation  persist.  Regulatory  "sandboxes" 
have  been  launched,  mainly  for  fintech  and 
emerging  sectors  (e-health,  smart  manufacturing, 
dual  use),  but  the  coverage  remains  limited  with 
only  pilot  and  virtual  environments  in  place  by 
2025. The national policy framework is evolving to 
align  with  EU  digital  and  AI  regulations,  but 
practical 
terms  of 
accessible  and  comprehensive  support.  New 
strategic  policy  document  deriving  from  public 
procurement  legislation,  largely  based  on  the 
ProcurComp  EU  framework(85),  will  be  in  place  in 

implementation 

lags 

in 

(81)  Our portfolio | Serwis Spółki PFR Ventures, accessed on 

16.02.2026 

(82)  Redstone University Index 2025: Poland  

(83)  https://www.trade.gov.pl/en/news/polands-start-up-potential/ 

(80)  Unicorn - a privately held company (not on the stock market) 

valued at over USD 1 billion 

(84)  https://innovatepoland.pl/en 

(85)  ProcurCompEU 

55 

 
 
 
is 

tertiary 

no  monitoring 

are applicable to all teachers(88). There have been 
also several initiatives promoting entrepreneurship 
among  students,  including  the  entrepreneurship 
for  secondary  school  students. 
competition 
However, 
of 
there 
level. 
entrepreneurship  education  at 
Furthermore,  the  low  proportion  of  students  in 
STEM  study  programme  (21.2%  vs  EU  26.9%  in 
2023), in natural sciences and mathematics (3.3% 
vs  EU  6.8%)  limits  the  innovation  capacity  of 
Poland's  economy  and  contributes 
the 
to 
shortages  of 
subjects. 
teachers  of  STEM 
Entrepreneurship  opportunities  are  sought  equally 
often  by  men  and  women,  but  they  face  same 
barriers  to  business  development:  too-high  non-
wage  labour  costs,  problems  with  acquiring  new 
customers,  complicated  financial  formalities  and 
procedures,  and  the  volatility  of  labour  laws. 
Despite 
the  strong  skills  policy  framework, 
research  shows  that  lack of  skills  remains  one  of 
to  enterprise  development.  No 
the  barriers 
framework for monitoring and evaluating learning 
outcomes  is  in  place  and  data  collection  is 
insufficient to provide robust evidence for shaping 
policies,  while  students  are  not  given  sufficient 
encouragement 
tertiary 
programmes. 

in  STEM 

to  enrol 

early 2026. One of the objectives of the amended 
legislation is to increase accessibility for SMEs. As 
a  result,  startups  still  face  moderate  barriers  to 
entry  and  scaling  up  due  to  administrative 
burdens,  costs,  and  patchy  infrastructure,  in  line 
with  the  2025  country-specific  recommendation 
on reduction of administrative burden.  

Although  growing,  the  supply  of  innovative 
talent in Poland lags behind its regional and 
international peers. According to the latest data 
from  Eurostat,  the  number  of  new  graduates  in 
science  and  engineering  per  thousand  population 
in 2024 is estimated to be about 12.30, below the 
EU  average  of  16.82.  The  number  of  researchers 
employed  by  business  per 
thousand  active 
population  (in  FTE)  has  risen  from  0.9  in  2012  to 
4.7  in  2024  yet  is  still  below  the  EU  average  of 
5.9. Despite this rise, the public and private sectors 
both  point  to  persistent  skill  shortages  as  a 
constraint on innovation (see Annex 13 for more), 
particularly  in  the  digital,  engineering  and  high-
tech  fields(86).  The  Skills  Strategy  2030  initiative 
aims  to  rectify  this  gap,  with  policies  supporting 
upskilling,  re-skilling  and  the  attraction  of  global 
talent.  

Several 

development, 

environment. 

demonstrating 
to 
The 

Poland  has  a  strong  strategic  framework 
promoting  entrepreneurship  skills,  but  they 
remain insufficient, limiting innovation in the 
business 
national 
strategies  seek  to  promote  the  entrepreneurial 
a 
skills 
expand 
comprehensive 
approach 
competence. 
entrepreneurship 
primary 
to  develop  entrepreneurial 
curriculum  aims 
competences,  which  appear  across  different 
subjects(87).  However,  the  current  school  curricula 
have  been  knowledge-centred,  limiting  creativity 
values  associated  with 
and  enquiry, 
entrepreneurial thinking.  The  upcoming  curriculum 
reform,  which  is  to  be  introduced  in  September 
2026  in  grades  I  and  IV,  aims  to  increase  the 
focus  on  competences.  At  upper  secondary  level, 
entrepreneurship  education  is  taught  through  the 
subject  Business  and  Management,  which  was 
updated in 2023, adding many practical elements. 
is 
Reference 
included in teacher competence frameworks, which 

to  entrepreneurship  education 

the 

(86)  European Innovation Scoreboard  

(87)  European Commission / EACEA / Eurydice, 2025, 

(88)  European Commission / EACEA / Eurydice, 2025, 

Entrepreneurship education at school in Europe – 2025. 
Eurydice Report 

Entrepreneurship education at school in Europe – 2025. 
Eurydice Report 

56 

 
 
 
 
Table A4.1:  Key innovation indicators 

(1) EU average for the last available year or the year with the highest number of country data. * break in series  
Source: Eurostat, DG JRC, OECD, Science-Metrix (Scopus database), Invest Europe, European Innovation Scoreboard 

57 

R&D intensity (gross domestic expenditure on R&D as % of GDP)0.721.001.371.441.561.41:2.243.44Public expenditure on R&D as % of GDP0.530.530.510.490.550.51:0.720.64Scientific publications of the country within the top 10% most-cited publications worldwide as % of total publications of the country 3.814.795.085.58:::9.4412.31Researchers (FTEs) employed by public sector (Gov+HEI) per thousand active population3.23.23.63.63.63.6:4.3:International co-publications as % of total number of publications27.7429.3534.5339.1940.6843.17:57.24:Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) as % of GDP0.190.460.860.951.000.89:1.492.69Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) performed by SMEs as % of GDP0.060.170.290.350.37::0.470.30Researchers employed by business per thousand active population0.71.73.74.64.64.7:5.9:Patent applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty per billion GDP (in PPS €)0.781.250.940.63:::2.812.20Employment share of high-growth enterprises measured in employment (%):::0.930.91::0.87:SMEs with at least a basic level of digital intensity% SMEs (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 90%)::::50.04:58.9871.39:Data analytics adoption% enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%)::::19.31:24.5039.85:Cloud adoption% enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%)::::46.50:45.7746.69:Artificial intelligence adoption % enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%)::::3.675.908.3619.95:Public-private scientific co-publications as % of total number of publications3.404.034.835.415.585.78:7.62:Public expenditure on R&D financed by business enterprises (national) as % of GDP0.030.020.010.010.01::0.060.02Total public sector support for BERD as % of GDP0.030.080.190.200.21::0.21:R&D tax incentives: foregone revenues as % of GDP0.000.000.030.040.06::0.100.16BERD financed by the public sector (national and abroad) as % of GDP 0.030.080.160.1600.15::0.11:Venture capital (market statistics) as % of GDP (calculated as a 3-year moving average)0.0060.0060.0170.0280.0220.017:0.063:Seed stage funding share (% of GDP)0.0000.0010.0020.0030.0020.002:0.005:Start-up stage funding share (% of GDP)0.0010.0030.0070.0140.0130.009:0.030:Later stage funding share (as % of GDP)0.0040.0020.0090.0110.0070.007:0.027:New graduates in science & engineering per thousand population aged 25-34:16.4712.0212.5812.3312.30:16.82:Graduates in the field of computing per thousand population aged 25-34:2.612.863.534.144.58:3.84:Science and innovative ecosystemsPoland2010201520202022202320242025EU average (1)USHeadline indicatorInnovative talentR&D investment & researchers employed in businessesInnovation outputsDigitalisation of businessesAcademia-business collaboration Public support for business innovationFinancing innovation 
 
 
 
 
  
 
ANNEX 5: SINGLE MARKET AND INDUSTRY 

and 

business 

investment 

investment 

environment 

Poland’s 
is 
characterised  by  strong  entrepreneurial 
dynamism  and  a  broadly 
favourable 
regulatory  framework,  but  it  continues  to 
face  structural  constraints  that  weigh  on 
productivity, 
business 
growth.  For  Poland,  the  2025  CSRs  highlighted 
challenges  in  improving  the  public  procurement 
processes,  simplifying  the  regulatory  framework, 
making  it  stable  and  clear  for  businesses,  and 
fostering innovation (see Annex 4). While business 
creation  and  churn  rates  are  above  the  EU 
average, the economy remains dominated by low-
productivity  micro-enterprises,  with  persistent 
difficulties  in  scaling  up,  limited  innovation,  and 
constrained  access  to  long-term  finance,  which 
together contribute to subdued private investment 
levels  well  below  those  of  peer  countries.  Foreign 
direct 
substantial  and 
remains 
anchored  in  Poland’s  integration  into  EU  value 
chains,  yet  it  is  still  concentrated  in  medium-
technology and assembly activities, with relatively 
limited  R&D-intensive  investment.  On  connectivity 
infrastructure,  Poland has shown progress  in  very 
high-capacity networks and 
the 
premises coverage  (FTTP).  However,  it  lags in  the 
rollout  of  5G  technology. Advances  have  been 
including 
regulatory  simplification, 
made  on 
deregulation  initiatives,  one-stop-shop  procedures 
and  strengthened  SME  support,  but  frequent 
legislative  changes  and  short 
implementation 
periods  continue  to  undermine  predictability  for 
businesses. Recent reforms in public procurement, 
aim  to  simplify  procedures  and  improve  SME 
access 
certification  and 
contractor 
streamlined  appeals,  but  challenges  persist  in 
terms of high single-bid rates, limited competition 
and continued reliance on direct awards in certain 
sectors. 

through 

fibre 

to 

Business dynamics  

Poland's  economy  is  dominated  by  low-
productivity micro firms, which constitute 95% 
of  the  business  population.  These  micro  firms 
contribute  disproportionately  little  to  value-added 
and  turnover  relative  to  their  employment  share. 
Small firms account for 4% of the total population 
and  medium  firms  only  1%.  The  notable  absence 
of  medium-sized 
systemic 
firms 
challenges  in  scaling  up  operations  and  fostering 
knowledge  and  technology  transfers  to  smaller 

indicates 

58 

businesses,  particularly  in  sectors  crucial  to  the 
domestic  economy  that  have  attracted  significant 
FDI  levels.  Overall,  SMEs  play  a  vital  role  in  the 
lower technology manufacturing sector, accounting 
for 42% of employment and 37% of value-added, 
particularly in the textiles and wood sectors (89).  

Poland has shown robust business dynamism 
its  resilient 
in  recent  years,  supported  by 
economy  and  favourable  business  environment. 
The  business  churn  rate  was  23.9%  in  2023, 
above the EU average of 19%, making Poland one 
of  the  most  dynamic  countries  in  Europe  (90). 
Enterprise  births  in  the  business  economy  were 
11.5%  and  deaths  at  12.4%,  also  above  EU 
averages.  In  addition,  high  growth  businesses 
accounted  for  9.3%  of  companies  and  14.3%  of 
employees  (EU  average  is  10.5%  and  12.9%, 
respectively).  Higher  churn  rates  might  suggest 
dynamic  business  environments  characterised  by 
and 
entrepreneurial 
competitive  pressure.  Strengthening 
insolvency 
procedures, including by enhancing the capacity of 
courts  for  timely  processing  would  also  support 
higher dynamism (91).   

innovation 

activity, 

Overall,  productivity  of  Polish  SMEs  remains 
relatively  low,  with  many  lagging  behind  their 
peers  in  innovation,  technology  adoption,  and 
global  integration.  In  2021,  their  productivity 
amounted  to  just  68%  of  that  of  large  firms, 
compared  with  an  OECD  median  of  78%  (92).  
Polish  SMEs  tend  to  be  more  productive  in  the 
service  sector,  particularly 
low-technology 
services, where their productivity is almost 87% of 
that of large firms. The productivity gap is wider in 
the manufacturing sector, where SME productivity 
is on average 60% of that of large firms. However, 
in  high-technology  activities,  SMEs  are  more 
productive  than  their  peers  in  lower  technology 
manufacturing. This advantage may be due to the 
stronger  presence  of  SMEs  in  these  industries,  as 
well  as  their  greater  flexibility  in  adapting  to 
change. 

in 

(89)  Strengthening FDI and SME Linkages in Poland, OECD, 2025. 

(90)  As defined by Eurostat, the business churn rate is the sum of 
enterprise births and death rates. High-growth enterprises 
are enterprises that have had at least 10 employees at the 
beginning of a 3-year period and an annual growth in the 
number of employees above 10% during that period. 

(91)  IMF Article IV Consultation. Poland, IMF, 2025.  

(92)  Strengthening FDI and SME Linkages in Poland, OECD, 2025. 

 
 
 
 
 
Many  companies  struggle  to  scale  up  due  to 
limited  access  to  long-term  financing  for 
innovation,  technology  and  R&D.  The  financial 
system is relatively small and dominated by banks 
and  alternative  sources  of  finance  (for  example, 
venture  capital)  are  limited  in  use  among  Polish 
SMEs,  posing  challenges  to  them  scaling  up  and 
accessing  funding  for 
innovative  and  riskier 
ventures (see Annex 6). There is also a low level of 
investment in intangibles, reaching 8.4% of GDP in 
2024  (Germany:  10.5%,  France:  15.6%)  (93).  In 
November  2025,  Poland 
“Innovate 
investment  programme 
Poland”,  a  national 
designed  to  mobilise  around  EUR  900  million  to 
support  innovative  Polish  companies  and  bridge 
the  financing  gap  for  high-growth  startups  and 
scale-ups,  combining  public  development  capital 
with private institutional investment (94). 

launched 

The  degree  of  inter-firm  collaboration  in 
Poland  is  notably  low.  Only  14%  of  Polish 
companies  report  cooperation  through  strategic 
partnerships  with  other  businesses,  compared  to 
37% in Finland, 25% in Germany, 20% in Czechia 
and 19% in the Slovak Republic (95). The low levels 
of  cooperation  are  especially  prevalent  among 
smaller firms as they face limited capacities linked 
to  challenges  in  accessing  knowledge, technology, 
skills and market knowledge. In this sense, clusters 
and  innovation  hubs  may  enhance  Polish  firms’ 
possibilities to innovate and access new skills and 
technology,  acting  as  accelerators  that  provide 
SMEs with access to the advisory and partnership 
network, 
specialised 
knowledge  and  shared  resources.  A  dedicated 
cluster  policy  at  national  level  have  created 
efficient  agglomerations  of  businesses,  research 
and  specialised  service  providers,  which  are 
grouped  in  82  cluster  organisations  with  a  strong 
focus  on  renewable  energy,  digital,  construction, 
agri-food, transport, defence and health (96). 

chains, 

global 

value 

Business environment  

Higher  private  investment  rates  could  boost 
Poland’s long-term growth. Poland’s investment 
to GDP ratio was 17% in 2024, considerably below 
the EU average (21.7%) and that of peer countries 
(Hungary: 23.1%, Czechia: 26.5%). The low level of 
business  investment  explains  this  considerable 
gap:  while in Poland business investment remains 
below  10%  of  GDP  (9.4%  in  2023  and  8.8%  in 
2024), that rate is around 15% in comparable EU 
countries.  This  persistent  investment  gap  reflects 
structural  challenges  in  Poland’s  economy,  which 
remains dominated by low-tech SMEs rather than 
large-scale 
industries.  As  a  result, 
high-tech 
business investment and innovation-driven growth 
remain constrained, making Poland’s private sector 
less  dynamic  than those of  its  regional  peers  (97). 
The  perceived  investment  gap  is  higher  in  Poland 
than  in  the  EU,  as  20%  of  Polish  firms  report 
underinvestment in the last three years, compared 
to just 12% in EU. Furthermore, Polish firms invest 
less  than  the  EU  average  in  new  products  or 
services (19% vs 23% EU) (98). 

The three main obstacles to Polish companies 
investing  in  2025  were  uncertainty  about  the 
future (86%, compared to an EU average of 83%), 
energy costs (86%, while EU average is 75%) and 
the  availability  of  skilled  staff  (81%,  in  line  with 
EU averages) (99). Reports confirm that uncertainty 
about  future  profitability  and  the  macroeconomy 
had  an  impact  on  firm  investment  decisions,  and 
weaker  profit  expectations  contributed  to  lower 
investments  following  the  global  financial  crisis 
(100). Polish firms are more optimistic about future 
investment:  the  net  balance  of  firms expecting to 
increase investment is 8%, double the EU average. 
Over  the  next  three  years,  38%  of  Polish 
companies  are  prioritising  the  replacement  of 
existing  capacities  (below  the  EU  average:  43%), 
while  26%  plan  to  prioritise  expansion.  A  further 
22% intend to develop new products, processes or 
services. 

(93)  World Intangible Investment Highlights 2025, WIPO, 2025.  

(94)  These measures address the 2025 CSR to focus investment-

(97)  Strengthening FDI and SME Linkages in Poland, OECD, 2025. 

related economic policy on innovation. 

(98)  EIB Investment Survey 2025, European Union overview, 

(95)  Strengthening FDI and SME Linkages in Poland, OECD, 2025. 

(96)  European Cluster Collaboration Platform, Clusters and 

Europe’s Competitiveness, ECCP Summary Report 2025, 
ECCP Summary Report 2025. 

European Investment Bank, 2025. 

(99)  EIB Investment Survey 2025: Poland overview, European 

Investment Bank, 2026.  

(100) IMF Article IV Consultation. Poland, IMF, 2025. 

59 

 
 
 
is  primarily  concentrated 

Poland  continues  to  attract  substantial 
foreign  investment,  thanks  to  a  generally  good 
investment climate. In 2023, inward FDI stock was 
40%  GDP,  slightly  lower  than  in  other  regional 
peers, although higher than in Germany (101). FDI in 
in  medium-
Poland 
productivity  industries  (assembly  and  processing 
activities),  while  high-tech  services  investment 
remains  limited  –  less  than  2%  of  greenfield  FDI 
projects between 2003 and 2023 involved R&D, a 
lower  share  than  in  peer  EU  economies  (Czechia, 
Slovenia and Slovakia).  Foreign investment comes 
predominantly from other EU Member States (86% 
in 2022), over 40% of which from the Netherlands 
and  Germany,  reflecting  the  country’s  strong 
position 
The 
development  of  battery  production  underpinned 
the  increase  in  FDI  in  recent  years.  As  labour 
becomes  more  expensive,  boosting  output  and 
productivity  will  require  further  investment  in 
automation  and  digitalisation  (102).  In  general, 
Poland’s  economy  is  open  to  FDI,  with  a  few 
market access restrictions concentrated in the real 
estate,  transport  and  media  sectors.  Furthermore, 
investment  screening 
Poland's  foreign  direct 
regime,  originally  introduced  in  2020  was  made 
permanent  in  2025  for  non-EU  investors  on  the 
grounds of public security, order and health. 

European 

chains. 

value 

in 

Poland  is  making  notable  progress  in  the 
rollout  of  connectivity 
infrastructure.  By 
2024  the  coverage  of  high-capacity  networks 
(VHCN) reached 83.84%, above the EU average of 
82.49%,  while  the  fibre-to-the-premises  (FTTP) 
coverage  reached  77.79%,  also  above  the  EU 
average  (69.24%  in  2024).  However,  Poland  is 
lagging  in  the  roll-out  of  5G  technology:    overall 
5G coverage in 2024 stood at 89.28%, below the 
EU average of 94.35%, while 5G coverage in rural 
areas  reached  72.35%  (below  the  EU’s  79.57%). 
The growth rate for the roll-out of 5G both overall 
and  in  rural  areas  outstripped  the  EU  average.  
Poland  has  relied  on 
investment  under  the 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  and  cohesion 
in 
policy 
connectivity 
is 
expected to improve further after the auctions for 
the  3.6  GHz  and  700  MHz  pioneer  bands, 
respectively. 
in  2023  and  2025, 
concluded 

regional  disparity 
infrastructure.  5G  deployment 

to  address 

the 

Furthermore,  the  upcoming  National  Broadband 
Plan  is  expected  to  define  specific  measures  to 
achieve  100%  connectivity  coverage  in  line  with 
national and EU objectives by 2030.   

Rail  interoperability  is  improving.  Poland  is 
making  efforts  to  deploy  the  European  Railway 
Traffic  Management  System  by  providing  another 
134  km  of  equipped  lines  in  recent  years  (2022-
2024)  to  the  already  existing  603  km  before 
2022. Poland would need to continue these efforts 
as it aims to achieve the target of 4.894 km to be 
equipped by 2030 on the core trans-European rail 
network. This would ensure easy access of railway 
operators from other Member States to the Polish 
railway  networks  with 
the  highest  safety 
standards,  increasing  competition  and  supporting 
cross-border dual use of rail. 

streamline 

It 
regulatory 

business 
lower  associated  costs 

Poland  has  made  important  progress  on 
simplification. 
performs 
regulatory 
particularly  well 
impact 
regarding 
evaluations  and  administrative  burden  on 
business,  reflecting  sustained  efforts  in  recent 
registration 
to 
years 
procedures  and 
for 
entrepreneurs  (103).  In  2025,  Polish  administration 
set  up  a  Government  Deregulation  Team  and 
launched  a  series  of  deregulation  measures,  with 
the tax law being one of the most important areas. 
For  instance,  the  SprawdzaMY  initiative  collected 
regulatory  barriers  and  deregulation  proposals 
from  businesses  and  sent  a  first  wave  of 
recommendations  to  the  government.  Recent 
reforms,  including  a  six-month  vacatio  legis  for 
business  regulations,  the  “one-in,  one  out  rule”  or 
the  mandatory 
impact 
assessment  aim  to  streamline  administrative 
processes  (104).  However,  about  91%  of  Polish 
firms  employ  staff  to  deal  with  regulatory 
compliance.  Around  19%  of  firms  devote  more 
than 10% of staff to regulatory requirements, well 
above  EU  average  of  11%.  Among  exporting 
companies,  83%  report  that  their  product  or 
service must comply with differentiated regulatory 
requirements 
states 
(significantly above the EU average of 62%) (105). 

EU  member 

regulatory 

ex-post 

across 

(101) OECD Economic Surveys: Poland 2025, OECD, 2025. 

(104) These measures address the 2025 CSR to simplify 

(102) Just over a third of entrepreneurs (36%) intend to increase 

robotisation/automation soon. NBP Quick Monitoring. Analysis 
of the situation of the business sector. July 2025. 

regulation, improve regulatory tools and ensure the legal 
framework is stable and clear for the business sector. 

(105) EIB Investment Survey 2025: Poland overview. 

(103) OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators, 2024. 

60 

 
 
 
(106). 

investment  decisions 

Stability  and  predictability  in  law-making 
remain a challenge for Polish companies. Half 
of  them  believe  they  are  not  up  to  date  with 
changes  to  laws  and  85%  complain  about  the 
excessive frequency of this. This uncertainty about 
future  legislative  changes  may  be  holding  back 
some 
In  addition, 
although  the  vacatio  legis  in  economic  laws  has 
slightly increased from 31 (two years ago) and 37 
(in  2024)  to  38  days  (107),  still  around  half  of 
Polish companies complain about the short time to 
implement  the  changes.  Poland  is  preparing  the 
first  Regulatory  Programme  for  2026-2028,  that 
will  define  the  actions  to  create  a  simpler  and 
more  predictable  regulatory  framework.  Further 
simplification 
for  permitting  and 
planning  and  environmental  proceedings  for 
investment), burden reduction through streamlined 
and digitalised procedures and the development of 
regulatory sandboxes would improve the business 
environment in Poland. 

(especially 

Strengthening  public  consultations  could 
improve  the  quality  of  the 
law-making 
process. In 2025, there were no consultations for 
29%  of  draft  laws,  and  for  another  46%  the 
comments  were  not  addressed  by  the  legislator, 
indicating a lack of genuine dialogue between the 
(108). 
legislative  authorities  and  stakeholders 
Expanding  the  role  of  bodies  like  the  Council  of 
Social  Dialogue  could  facilitate  stakeholders’ 
engagement  and  promote  structure  consultations 
with  businesses,  the  academic  community  and 
other  public  organisations.  Nevertheless,  Poland 
has 
changes  aimed  at 
strengthening  and  improving  the  use  of  public 
consultations,  including  in  the  Parliament,  under 
the RRF. 

introduced 

some 

69 days for the public sector (58 days in 2020 and 
around 70 days since then) (109). Polish companies 
estimate  that  11.5%  of  their  total  revenues  are 
typically paid late by customers, slightly above the 
European  average  of  11.4%.  Micro  companies 
have the highest percentage of invoices settled in 
due date, 89% in 2024 (up from 84% in 2023). On 
the other hand, large businesses only paid on time 
49%  of  their  transactions.  To  address  this 
challenge,  Poland  is  implementing  a  mandatory 
system for issuing structured invoices (National e-
Invoicing System – KseF), included in the RRP. The 
relevant  legislation  is  already  adopted  and  enters 
into  force  in  the  first  half  of  2026.  In  addition, 
Poland  is  the  only  Member  State,  along  with 
France,  to  have  a  national  enforcement  authority, 
the  UOKIK,  with  a  right  to  impose  additional 
financial penalties to late payers. 

transfer 

legislation  makes 

Polish 
of 
assignments  of  credits  conditional  to  the 
discretion of the public entities in the health 
sector.  Transport  and  logistics  are  amongst  the 
sectors  more  affected  by  late  payments  (110). 
Situation is particularly acute in the health sector, 
where  Polish  public  hospitals  chronically  pay 
suppliers late, far beyond legal limits. Against the 
background  of  systemic  payment  delays  in  the 
public  health  sector,  reassignments  of  credits 
could  provide  an  additional  form  of  external 
finance and liquidity which is vital for the survival 
of  businesses.  However,  practices  whereby  the 
assignment  of  credits  are  systematically  banned, 
despite  the  contractual  obligations  having  been 
fulfilled  by  the  creditor  and  accepted  by  the 
debtor,  complicate  the  financial  management  of 
suppliers, and especially SMEs. 

Late payment is a growing concern for Polish 
companies.  72%  of  Polish  companies  in  2024 
experienced  difficulties  because  of  this,  the 
highest share in the EU. This percentage has been 
increasing  since  2021,  and  it  is  back  to  2019 
levels.  The  average  number  of  days  for  actual 
payment  are  62  days  for  business-to-business 
transactions  (up  from  just  50  days  in  2020)  and 

(106) Grant Thornton. The volatility and burden of the law. How do 
entrepreneurs assess the frequency and scope of changes in 
legal regulations affecting business operations? July 2025. 

(107) Grant  Thornton.  Analysis  of  the  stability  of  the  legal 
environment in the Polish economy – 12th edition. April 2026.  

(108) Ibid., page 24. 

Single Market  

Poland  is  well  integrated  into  the  Single 
Market.  Around  70%  of  its  foreign  trade  takes 
place within the EU (in 2025, over 75% of Poland’s 
exports  and  50%  of  imports  involve  other  EU 
Member  States),  illustrating  the  importance  of 
intra-EU  economic  integration.  Poland's  exports 
low-technology 
remain  heavily  specialised 

in 

(109) European Payment Report 2025, Intrum, 2025. 

(110) EU Payment Observatory: Annual Report 2025, European 

Commission, 2025. 

61 

 
 
 
goods  and  services,  which  made  up  60%  of  total 
gross  exports.  This  is  significantly  higher  than 
neighbouring countries such as Czechia (42%) and 
Slovak  Republic  (38%),  indicating  potential  for 
export  sophistication.  High-tech  manufacturing, 
which  constitutes  25%  of  Poland's  exports,  has 
slowed  since  the  2008-09  financial  crisis.  The 
automotive  sector  dominates  Poland’s  high-tech 
exports and is very well integrated in global value 
chains,  with  over  90%  of  production  exported  to 
Europe,  particularly  Germany.  Additionally,  high-
tech  services  exports  have  grown  significantly, 
from 2% in 1995 to 10% in 2020  (111), driven by 
the  installation  of  service  centres  that  were 
subsidiaries  of  multinational  companies  and  by 
business services outsourced to Poland.  

Further  efforts  are  needed  to  reduce 
transposition  and  conformity  deficits,  which 
are above the EU average (112), to improve the 
smooth functioning of the Single Market in Poland. 
The transposition deficit (the percentage of Single 
Market directives not transposed) reached 2.1% in 
December  2025,  above  both  the  EU  average  of 
1.1% and the 1% target set by the EU Council. The 
average  delay  in  transposing  directives  and  the 
conformity deficit (the percentage of all directives 
transposed 
incorrectly)  were  also  above  the 
average  EU  figures.  The  number  of  pending 
infringements  and  the  average  time  to  solve 
infringement  proceedings  were  also  quite  high, 
above the  EU  average.  This  persistent  compliance 
gap  may  undermine  the  trust  of  firms  and  the 
public  in  the  effective  functioning  of  the  Single 
Market.  In  2025  Poland  resolved  60.7%  of  the 
SOLVIT  cases  it  handled  as  lead  centre  (the  EU 
average was 84.6%).  

Compliance  of  products circulating  in  the 
Single Market (113) is key to ensuring a level-
playing  field  for  law-abiding  companies  and 
the safety of consumers. In Poland, the number 
of  market 
has 
increased  compared  with  2019.  In  2025,  national 
authorities  reported  in  the  EU  system  for  market 
surveillance  (ICSMS)  a  total  of 73.2 investigations 

investigations 

surveillance 

(111) Strengthening FDI and SME Linkages in Poland, OECD, 2025. 

(112) Part  of  the  barriers  highlighted  in  the  2025  Single  Market 
Strategy (“Terrible 10”), Single market strategy. See also the 
Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report 2026. 

(113) Part  of  the  barriers  highlighted 

in  the Single  market 
strategy (‘Terrible Ten’)  and  the 2026  Annual  Single  Market 
and Competitiveness Report. 

number 

of 136.2. The 

per one million inhabitants, which is lower than the 
of 
EU median 
notifications remains limited 
in  absolute  terms, 
which  may  also  be  the  result  of  insufficient  IT 
national interoperability to the ICSMS system. The 
upcoming  revision  of  the  Market  Surveillance 
Regulation  will  upgrade 
fully 
interoperable EU digital platform.  

ICSMS 

to  a 

in 

limit 

shortages 

the  ability  of 

national 
Resource 
standardisation  bodies can  hinder the  Single 
Market  and  burden  SMEs.  In  Poland,  these 
the  Polish 
constraints 
Committee  for  Standardisation  (PKN)  to  offer 
SMEs  clear  guidance,  easy  access  to  standards, 
and  effective  implementation  support.  They  also 
reduce  PKN’s  capacity  to  ensure  strong  Polish 
involvement  in  developing  European  harmonised 
standards  and  to  provide  timely  translations  into 
Polish.  As  a  result,  businesses  may  face  higher 
costs (for translations, expert advice, or conformity 
assessments)  while  struggling  to  keep  pace  with 
changing  technical  requirements.  Strengthening 
Poland’s  standardisation  system 
therefore 
to  standards, 
improving  access 
essential  to 
reducing  market  barriers,  and  enhancing  the 
competitiveness of its industrial  ecosystem within 
the Single Market. 

is 

Poland’s  regulatory  framework  is  broadly 
favourable  to  competition.  OECD’s  Product 
Market Regulation (PMR) indicates that the overall 
restrictiveness  is  below  the  average  and  like 
France and Spain and have significantly decreased 
over the past decade (114). Nevertheless, regulatory 
and  administrative  barriers  to  single  market 
remain affecting goods and services trade as well 
as  freedom  of  establishment.    This  includes 
regulatory  barriers  to  competition  affecting  some 
lawyers, 
services  professions 
architects  and  civil  engineers).  The  number  of 
regulated  professions  in  Poland  is  among  the 
highest 
the  EU.  Restrictions  affecting 
professional services — including notaries, lawyers, 
architects  and  civil  engineers  —  continue  to  limit 
competition  and  market  entry.  These  restrictions 
include  regulated  fees,  geographical  restrictions 
and  mandatory  membership  of  professional 
bodies.  Businesses  also  report  that  fragmented 
requirements  for  packaging,  labelling  and  waste 
management  can  create  additional  compliance 
costs  when  operating  across  borders,  including 

(e.g.,  notaries, 

in 

(114) Product Market Regulation Indicators, OECD, 2024.  

62 

 
 
 
differences  in  waste  classification  and  shipment 
requirements (115). 

the 

(UPCA).  This  has 

The  unitary  patent  does  not  cover  Poland. 
Although  Poland  participates  in  the  enhanced 
cooperation  on  unitary  patent  protection,  it  has 
neither signed nor ratified the Unified Patent Court 
Agreement 
following 
consequences: 
firstly,  Polish  and  non-Polish 
companies  remain  burdened  by  the  significant 
administrative  costs  of  national  validation  and 
maintenance  fees  to  obtain  patent  protection  in 
Poland.  Secondly,  enforcing  European  patents  in 
Poland can only take place before national courts, 
without benefiting from the advantages offered by 
the  UPC  as  regards  centralised  litigation.  By 
refraining  from  joining  the  unitary  patent  system 
Poland  may  be 
less  attractive,  in  terms  of 
innovation  support,  than  the  Member  States 
already  participating  in  that  system.  Finally,  the 
fact that several Member States do not participate 
in  the  unitary  patent  system  weakens  the  single 
market, making the EU less attractive for inventors 
and innovative entities. 

Poland’s  public  procurement  system  continues 
to  face  challenges  in  terms  of  transparency, 
efficiency  and  competition.  Procedures  remain 
lengthy  and  complex,  and  bidder 
relatively 
participation is limited in parts of the market. Key 
issues include persistently high single-bid tenders, 
concentration of awarded value, and continued use 
of  direct  awards  in  certain  segments.  In  2025, 
Poland  is  implementing  changes  in  its  public 
procurement  system  to  streamline  the  process. 
New  legislation  has  introduced  non-mandatory 
contractor  certification  and  streamlined  appeal 
procedures  through  remote  trials  and  hearings  to 
make  them  more  efficient.  It  has  also  restricted 
access  to  public  procurement  procedures  for 
contractors  from  outside  the  EU  and  from  third 
countries 
relevant 
agreements with the EU (116). 

that  do  not  have 

the 

Single-bid  tenders  remain  very  high  in  2025 
across Poland’s public procurement. Single-bid 
rates exceed 60% in several sectors (which is well 

(115) European  Round  Table  for  Industry  (ERT),  Single  Market 
Compendium  of  Obstacles,  21  May  2025,  Single  Market 
Compendium of Obstacles 

(116) These  measures  contribute  to  addressing  the  2025  CSR  to 
encourage  competition  in  public  procurement  processes, 
making them more efficient and less cumbersome, especially 
for SMEs 

63 

above  the  EU  median  of  27%),  including  medical, 
repair, laboratory and health-related services, and 
remain  elevated  even  for  higher-value  contracts, 
at  around  52–57% 
(above  EUR  5 000 000). 
Concessions  show  the  highest  single-bid  rates, 
while utilities remain the lowest. Large differences 
persist  across  contracting  authority  types,  with 
central  government  comparatively 
lower  than 
local/regional bodies and public-law organisations. 
Supplies  remain  particularly  affected  (56.6%), 
while works show very low single-bid levels (7.2%). 
In  addition,  the  World  Bank  (117)  highlights  low 
bidder  turnout  and  concentration  of  awarded 
value:  71%  of  contracts  attracted  only  1–3 
tenderers 
(2021–2025),  and  around  8,000 
tenderers  received  9%  of  contracts  but  almost 
59% of total awarded value. 

Direct  awards  remain  a  relevant  feature  of 
Poland’s  procurement  landscape  in  2025 
(7%). Services show the highest direct-award rate 
(13.0%),  while  supplies  (3.4%)  and  works  (2.4%) 
remain  much  lower.  Direct  awards  are  heavily 
concentrated  in  the  lowest  value  band  (60.5%), 
with  rates  falling  sharply  as  contract  values 
increase  (12.7%).  A  recent  European  Commission 
evaluation study on transparency and integrity (118) 
flags that excessive use of accelerated procedures 
can  deter  participation  and  raise  integrity-related 
risks.  It  reports  that  Poland’s  average  use  of 
accelerated procedures exceeds 2% and shows an 
upward trend, whereas in most Member States the 
share remains below 2%. 

is 

Challenges in certification and centralisation 
in  public  procurement  persist.  A  national 
competency  framework  for  public  procurement 
professionals 
in  place,  with 
still  not 
professionalisation  relying  instead  on  guidance, 
training  and  standardisation  initiatives,  and  the 
planned  rollout  of  the  ProcurCompEU  framework 
under  the  forthcoming  State  Purchasing  Policy 
2026-2029.  In  parallel,  a  voluntary  contractor 
certification  system  is  expected  to  start  applying 
from  July  2026.  Certification  should  facilitate 
access to public procurement for SMEs, reduce the 
number  of  formal  obligations  for  contractors,  the 
costs of participation in procedures and ensure the 
objectivity  and  transparency  of  the  contractor’s 

(117) Study  on  Competition  in  the  European  Union’s  Public 

Procurement Markets (2018-2023), 2025. 

(118) Evaluation of transparency and integrity - Publications Office 

of the EU 

 
 
 
the 

remains 

verification  process.  As 
regards  purchasing 
largely 
system 
organisation, 
decentralised,  but  the  legal  framework  provides 
instruments for centralised and joint procurement. 
In practice, a gradual intensification of these tools 
is  reported,  with  the  Centre  for  Government 
Administration  Service  acting  as  the  central 
purchasing body for government administration in 
standard 
and  with 
increasing  use  of  framework  agreements  and 
dynamic purchasing systems. 

purchasing 

categories 

Progress  has  been  made  on  strategic 
procurement and SME access. Poland monitors 
the uptake of green, social and innovation-related 
criteria  through  annual  reporting  and  publishes 
results in the President of the Public Procurement 
Office  annual  report.  Recent  data  points  to 
increased  use  of  green  and  social  requirements, 
while  innovation  tools  are  used  more  selectively, 
notably  through  innovation-related  award  criteria, 
consultations  and  pre-
preliminary  market 
commercial  procurement. 
support  SME 
participation, Poland has introduced the simplified 
below-threshold  “basic  procedure”  as  the  main 
low-burden  channel  for  tendering.  This  initiative 
will  be  complemented  by  the  new  certification 
system  and  by  further  guidance  and  training, 
aimed at reducing documentary requirements. 

To 

'very'  or 

in  and  participated 

Businesses’  views  on  corruption  risks  in 
public procurement are below the EU average 
level.  In  Poland,  43%  of  companies  (EU  average: 
58%)  consider 
tailor-made  specifications  for 
companies  in  public  procurement  procedures,  and 
40% (EU average: 51%) involvement of bidders in 
the  design  of  specifications, 
'fairly 
widespread' practice. Among companies that have 
experience 
in  a  public 
procurement procedure, 12% think that corruption 
has prevented them from winning a public tender 
or  a  public  procurement  contract  in  practice  (EU 
(119). Also  58%  of  companies 
average:  25%) 
perceive  the  level  of  independence  of  the  public 
procurement  review  body  (National  Board  of 
Appeal)  as 
is 
reviewing public procurement cases (120). However, 
highly 
public 
corruption and while public 
vulnerable 

‘very’  or ‘fairly  good’ when 

procurement remains an 

area 

to 

it 

(119) Flash  Eurobarometer  557  on  Businesses’  attitudes  towards 

corruption in the EU (2025). 

(120) Justice Scoreboard (2025), p. 53; Flash Eurobarometer 555, 

p. 39. 

64 

procurement  data is  publicly  available,  corruption 
risk  monitoring  is  difficult  due  to  scattered  data 
(121).  

and 

Poland’s 

stronger 

fragmented 

Poland’s 
eProcurement 
landscape  and  data  quality  issues  highlight 
the need for interoperable systems, common 
standards, 
data 
decentralised 
governance. Given 
eProcurement  landscape,  with between  two  and 
five separate Procurement  services in  operation 
(122),  economic  operators  must  use  several 
to  access  all  public  procurement 
systems 
procedures,  creating complexity  and barriers  to 
participation.  This  fragmentation  underscores  the 
need  for introducing interoperability  and  common 
standards. The once-only principle is only partially 
implemented  at  national  level  (see  the  Annex  on 
Institutional Framework), and buyers across the EU 
still  lack  digital  access  to  relevant  evidence. 
Moreover,  the  country  lacks  a  public procurement 
data  strategy  defining  processes  and  objectives 
procurement-related 
for 
system 
data. Therefore, 
Polish 
public 
dedicated 
would benefit from a 
procurement 
analysis 
data 
service within  the  government to  support  data-
driven oversight of the procurement lifecycle (123). 

managing 

collection 

and 

the 

Industry and economic security  

lower 

towards 

Poland's  economic  structure,  while  well-
diversified,  is  characterised  by  a  stronger 
technology 
inclination 
industries compared to many of its EU peers. The 
economy  is  predominantly  service-oriented,  with 
services  comprising  around  64%  of  Poland’s  total 
value  added,  comparable 
to  other  Eastern 
European countries but below the levels of Italy or 
Germany.  Most  of  these  services  are  primarily 
found  in  low-tech  industries,  such  as  retail,  real 
estate, and transportation, which together account 
for  around  30%  of  the  economy.  Despite  this, 

(121) Rule of Law Report- Country Chapter Poland (2025), p. 13. 

(122) As reported on the eProcurement matrix. 

(123) European  Court  of  Auditors,  Special  Report  28/2023: Public 
Procurement  in  the  EU.  Less  competition  for  contracts 
awarded for works, goods and services in the 10 years up to 
2021,  2023, Special  report  28/2023:  Public  procurement  in 
the EU. 

 
 
 
high-tech services like IT and professional services 
have  demonstrated  encouraging  growth,  as  their 
share  of  value  added  has  risen  to  8%  in  recent 
years, 
IT  and 
computer programming (124). 

largely  driven  by  progress 

in 

industries 

technologies 

remain 
Lower 
dominant 
in  manufacturing,  highlighting  a 
significant aspect of Poland's industrial landscape. 
Sectors  such  as  food,  rubber,  and  basic  metals 
in  the  manufacturing 
play  a  significant  role 
domain.  High-tech  manufacturing, 
including 
automotive  and  pharmaceuticals,  contributes  a 
modest  6%,  a  smaller  share  than  in  many  peer 
countries,  remaining  constant  over  the  last  two 
decades. Expanding knowledge-intensive industries 
might  boost  productivity  and  elevate  Poland's 
position in global value chains. 

trend 

industries  show  a  negative 

Energy-intensive  industries  face  significant 
challenges  due  to  the  high  energy  costs,  a 
carbon-intensive energy mix (notably on hard coal 
and  lignite)  and  the  transition  required  by  EU 
climate  policies.  Steel,  cement,  and  fertiliser 
industries, 
production,  highly  energy-intensive 
directly  account  for  around  2.5%  of  gross  value 
added  and  for  around  2%  of  employment.  While 
some 
in 
production  like  wood  (-6.6%  since  2021)  or  basic 
metals  (-9.1%),  others  increased  production  like 
chemicals  or  rubber  (increasing  by  7.8%  since 
for 
2021,  see  graph).  The  main  obstacle 
decarbonisation  is  the  high  cost  of  electricity, 
caused  by  power  generation  reliant  on  coal  and 
the  dependence  on  imported  fossil  fuels  (see 
Annex  9).  Supporting  the  decarbonisation  of  EIIs 
(for  instance,  steel,  cement  or  chemicals)  would 
require the development of pipeline infrastructure 
to  transport  hydrogen  and  carbon  dioxide,  and  to 
ensure  sufficient  onshore  storage.    However,  the 
geographical  dispersion  of  industrial  plants  in 
Poland poses a major challenge to developing such 
pipeline networks (125) (see Annex 9).  

Graph A5.1: Manufacturing output: total and 
selected sector, index (2021=100), 2015-2024 

Source: Eurostat. 

Poland has become a major clean technology 
in  Europe,  driven  by 
manufacturing  hub 
significant 
location, 
investments,  a  strategic 
government  support  and  active  role  of  industry 
clusters  in  advancing  clean  transformation.  While 
the battery sector is a standout leader, the country 
is also seeing robust growth in solar photovoltaics 
(PV), 19 ongoing projects of offshore wind energy 
with a target of 12GW of installed capacity and is 
attracting  new 
in  heat  pump 
investment 
manufacturing.  Poland  is  the  leading  producer  of 
lithium-ion  batteries  in  Europe,  holding  a  60% 
market  share  and  ranking  second  globally  behind 
China.  The  value  of  Poland's  battery  exports  has 
grown  exponentially,  cementing  its  role  as  a  key 
contributor  to  Europe's  electromobility  sector. 
However, the sector faces challenges, including the 
need  to  decarbonize  its  energy  grid  and  address 
supply  chain  vulnerabilities.  In  addition,  Poland's 
defined  by 
hydrogen 
in 
adopted 
the Polish  Hydrogen 
November 2021. An update is expected in 2026 to 
align  with  the  latest  EU RED  III mandates,  which 
require  industry  to  use  at  least  42%  renewable 
hydrogen  by  2030. 
late  2025,  Poland 
In 
committed approximately EUR 500 million in non-
repayable  subsidies  from 
the  Recovery  and 
Resilience Plan to five major projects totalling 343 
MW of capacity, with the objective to transitioning 
from being one of the world's largest producers of 
"grey"  hydrogen  to  a  leader  in  "green"  and  low-
carbon  hydrogen  to  meet  EU  climate  neutrality 
goals. 

is primarily 
Strategy, 

strategy 

(124) Strengthening FDI and SME Linkages in Poland, OECD, 2025.  

(125) Polishing the Pathway to Net-Zero Energy-intensive 

industries, Polish Economic Institute, 2025. 

Poland  has included  two projects  in  the  EU's 
list  of  47  strategic  raw  materials  projects. 
These are a rare earths separation plant in Puławy 
and  a  battery  raw  material  (platinum  group 
metals,  PGMs)  and  copper  recycling  facility  in 

65 

55657585951051152015201620172018201920202021202220232024ManufacturingManufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materialsManufacture of paper and paper productsManufacture of chemicals and chemical productsManufacture of rubber and plastic productsManufacture of other non-metallic mineral productsManufacture of basic metals 
 
          
Zawiercie. These projects are considered crucial for 
diversifying  the  EU's  supply,  reducing  reliance  on 
imports,  and  bolstering  the  circular  economy.  In 
late  2025,  Poland  initiated  discussions  on  a  draft 
law  to  secure  its  national  economy's  access  to 
critical  raw  materials.  The  new  legislation  will 
implement  the  EU's  Critical  Raw  Materials  Act 
(CRMA),  including  setting  up  a  single  point  of 
contact  for  strategic  projects.  Those  projects  will 
be  considered  as  public  investment  and  will  be 
subject  to  special  rules  for  permit  granting.  The 
new  legislation  will  require  the  adoption  of  a 
National  Raw  Materials  policy,  a  strategic 
document  in  the  field  of  raw  materials.  In  2025, 
Poland  amended  the  special  tax  on  extraction  of 
copper  and  silver,  decreasing  its  rate  in  2026, 
2027  and  2028.  The  tax  could  be  a  serious 
obstacle  for  the  profitability  of  new  projects  and 
investment in Poland. 

66 

 
Table A5.1:  Single Market and Industry 

Source: (1) Eurostat, (2) EIB Investment Survey, (3) EIF SME Access to Finance Index, (4) Intrum Payment Report, (5) SAFE survey, 
(6) OECD, (7) data up to 2024: Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard, 2025: Commission calculation based on TED data, 
accessible at the Public Procurement Data Space (PPDS) (*) the value represented here under EU average is the median, (8) Single 
Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard, (9) European Commission calculations. 

67 

POLICY AREA20212022202320242025EU-27 average61.963.763.566.468.6100.09.09.09.48.8-12.64.13.85.14.8-3.9Business environment and simplification34.332.333.730.839.034.00.650.530.490.52-0.430.160.090.110.12-0.1910.117.115.918.117.317.49.021.716.813.115.013.6from private entities in the previous or current quarter---65.365.247.1from public entities in the previous or current quarter---14.517.715.938.843.138.635.234.340.70.0520.0520.0520.0520.0520.05050525456532781097761.52.11.61.72.111.61.71.51.31.91.18891.3809760.784.63734313138250.12030.18230.23510.19110.19040.146229.830.326.4--32.715.616.616.717.8-25.219.720.820.621.0-22.47.06.77.87.7-12.2PolandINDICATOR NAMEBusiness environment and investmentProductivity and investmentLabour productivity (GDP per hour worked in PPP terms), % of EU271Business investment (share of GDP)1Public investment (share of GDP)1Impact of regulation on long-term investment, % of firms reporting business regulation as a major obstacle2SME liquidityEIF Access to Finance for SMEs index - loans3EIF Access to Finance for SMEs index - equity3Late paymentsPayment gap - corporates B2B, difference in days between offered and actual payment4Payment gap - public sector, difference in days between offered and actual payment4Share of SMEs experiencing late payments, %5Industry and economic securitySingle Market IntegrationEU trade integration, average(intra-EU imports + intra EU exports)/GDP, %1EEA Services Trade Restrictiveness index6Public procurementSingle bids, % of total contractors7*Direct awards, % of negotiated procedures7*ComplianceTransposition deficit, % of all directives not transposed8Conformity deficit, % of all directives transposed incorrectly8SOLVIT, resolution rate per country, %8Number of pending infringement proceedings8Energy-intensive industriesElectricity prices for non-household consumers1Electrification (electricity as a share of total energy consumption in industry)1Share of energy from renewable sources (renewable energy generation as a share of overall energy consumption)1Critical raw materialsMaterial import dependency, %1Circular material use rate1Operational cleantech manufacturing capacity in 20259 - Solar PV (c: cell, w: wafer, M:module), GW0.439 (m) - Electrolyzer, GW- - Heat pump assembly 0.87 - Battery, GW86.0 
 
     
 
ANNEX 6: SAVINGS, INVESTMENT AND ACCESS TO FINANCE 

Table A6.1:  Savings and Investment Union summary diagnostic 

Source: OECD (pensions), Eurostat (households' financial wealth), FISMA CMU dashboard (VC and PE), national sources (capital 
taxation). 

Poland has made progress along some of the key 
indicators  of  the  Savings  and  Investment  Union 
though the country trails behind western European 
peers.  Within  a  business  landscape  that  closely 
resembles  the  EU  average,  Polish  companies  rely 
more than their EU peers on internal  funding. The 
domestic  listed  equity  market  remains  modest 
from  a  European  perspective,  while  debt  markets 
primarily  channel  savings  to  the  government  and 
to  banks.  Households  have  a  very  conservative 
approach  to  managing  their  financial  wealth  and 
still  have  ample  space  to  increase  their  level  of 
direct and indirect participation in capital markets. 
Despite  some  country-specific  challenges,  the 
Polish  banking  sector  remains  robust.  Lending  to 
households  has  been  more  dynamic  than  lending 
to  companies.  Non-bank  financial  intermediaries, 
which  have  both  the  funds  and  the  capacity  to 
drive  capital  market  progress,  exhibit  a  very 
conservative asset allocation that does not favour 
equity.  The  insurance  sector,  which  has  been 
expanding  steadily  on  the  back  of  a  growing 
economy,  still  has  much  room  to  develop.  The 
2025 CSRs for Poland highlighted between others 
the need for strengthening the sustainability of the 
pension system given the demographic challenges 
faced  by  the  country.  The  gradually  growing 
private  pension  funds  are  expected  to  contribute 
positively  to  future  pensions.  The  venture  capital 
ecosystem  remains  small  due  to  systemic  and 
regulatory  reasons  and  is  dominated  by  public 
funds channelled primarily by the various national 
development institutions. 

Business landscape and company 
funding 

For local entrepreneurs, self-financing is the 
preferred option. Poland’s economic structure, in 
terms  of  structure  and  size,  represents  well  the 
European  average.  Poland’s  structure  of  non-
financial  corporations  (NFCs)  remains  broadly  in 
line  with  EU  average  with  an  overwhelming 
majority  of  microenterprises (126).  The 
size 
structure of local NFCs is a key explanatory factor 
for  the  funding  breakdown  of  firms.  Internal 
funding is the dominant engine of investment with 
72%  of  Polish  firms  financing  their  capital 
spending  from  retained  earnings (127),  above  the 
EU average of 66%, and a clear signal of caution 
toward  external  financing.  When  external  funding 
is  tapped,  the  mix  is  very  traditional.  Owners’ 
equity  constitutes  the  largest  share  (at  33.7%  of 
the  total),  followed  closely  by  bank  loans  at 
the  EU’s  27%.  Market-based 
31.3%,  above 
instruments  (listed  shares  and  corporate  bonds) 
account  for  a  modest  12.5%,  about  half  the  EU’s 
23.8%  average,  underscoring 
that 
Poland’s  capital  market  is  still  behind  the  highly 
developed  western  European  markets.  On 
aggregate,  NFC  external  funding  stood  at  93.6% 
of  GDP  in  2024,  less  than  half  the  EU’s  level  of 
225.6%. 

the  fact 

(126) See also Annex 5. 

(127) European Investment Bank’s 2024 Investment Survey. 

68 

Main featuresRelative EU positioningAssets at 10.3% of GDP (32.3% in the EU)10-year real return of -0.5 (1.4% in the EU)The low asset-backed pension assets yield a low real return (despite mandatory equity investments).EUR 19 664 per capita (EUR 85 090 in the EU)o/w 4.0% in listed shares and bonds (7.6% in the EU)o/w 6.1% in investment funds (11.0% in the EU)o/w 2.1% in life insurance (13.4% in the EU)o/w 9.9% in  pension claims (13.6% in the EU)Low level of financial assets. Low share of households' financial assets is invested into equity and in capital markets. No savings and investment account (SIA).VC at 0.018% of GDP (0.064% in the EU)PE at 0.093% of GDP (0.487% in the EU)Low venture capital and low private equity investments.Capital gains and dividends taxed at 19%.No preferential tax treatment for equity investments. Preferential tax treatment for dwelling rental income at 8.5%-12.5%.1-34-1011-1718-2425-27Colours indicate the country's relative ranking based on five groups, ranging from the three best to the three worst performers. The relative ranking as regards an SIU diagnostic topic derives from a consistent cross-country comparison, the starting point of which is the average of the underlying main features.TopicAsset-backed pension schemesHouseholds' financial assetsVenture capital (VC)Private equity (PE)Capital taxation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
stock  exchange  (WSE)  is the  primary  platform  for 
equity  trading  in  Poland.  The  exchange  operates 
with  its  own  CSD  and  CCP  infrastructure,  fully 
integrated  under  the  same  group.  The  market 
capitalisation  remained  fairly  stable  in  2023  and 
2024 at about 20% of GDP, around a third of the 
European  average  of  68%  of  GDP.  NFCs  account 
for  approximately  60%  of  the  capitalisation, 
underscoring the stock market’s role in supporting 
the  largest  Polish  NFCs.  The  initial  public  offering 
(IPO)  activity  of  the  WSE  remains  overall  rather 
subdued, with only a handful of companies listing 
on the main market in 2023 and 2024. The much 
smaller NewConnect segment is more dynamic but 
small  and  highly  illiquid.  The  Polish  government 
has  launched  several  measures  to  bolster  the 
capital  market,  The  main  one  being  the  2019 
capital  market  development  strategy (130).  More 
recently, Polish authorities and market participants 
(including  the  WSE,  business  associations,  banks 
etc.) are jointly working on a more comprehensive 
roadmap  to  further  develop  the  financial  market 
as  part  of  Poland’s  medium-term  2035 
development  goals.  Lastly,  to  stimulate  regional 
markets, in 2025 the WSE signed a memorandum 
of  understanding  with  seven  other  central  and 
eastern European stock exchanges including Sofia, 
Bratislava,  Bucharest,  Budapest,  Ljubljana,  Zagreb 
and Skopje, together with the EBRD to foster joint 
development  of  national  capital  markets  through 
closer  cooperation,  regulatory  alignment,  and 
increased market integration. 

Graph A6.2: Capital markets and financial 
intermediaries 

Graph A6.1: Composition of non-financial 
companies' funding 

Source: Eurostat. End-2024. 

Size and structure of the financial 
sector 

sector 

financial 

local  banking  system 

Poland’s 
remains 
predominantly  bank-driven  with  non-bank 
financial  intermediaries  gradually  expanding 
their footprint. By the end of 2024, the banking 
sector’s  assets  reached  95.1%  of  GDP,  far  below 
the  EU  average  of  253.2%  but  well  above  any 
other  part  of  the  Polish  financial  system  (see 
Graph  A6.2).  The 
is 
moderately concentrated with the top five lenders 
owning 58.5% of total assets, while 58.6% of the 
sector  is  domestically  owned  with  a  large  share 
(49.6%)  held  by  state-owned  or  state-controlled 
banks  within  the  system.  The  insurance  sector, 
with  assets  below  6.1%  of  GDP  in  Q4-2024  is 
relatively small but it is an expanding segment of 
the  domestic  financial  market.  Pension  funds, 
which come on top of the national pay-as-you-go 
system, are a mix between two key components – 
the second pillar legacy funds, known as OFE (128) 
and  third-pillar  employee  capital  plans,  known  as 
PPK (129). These funds’ assets represent about 6% 
of  GDP,  while  local  asset  managers  have  under 
management assets worth about 11.2% of GDP. 

The  domestic  capital  market  is  relatively 
modest  by  European  standards.  The  Warsaw 

Source: ECB, EIOPA, EMACO. End-2024. 

(128) Otwarte Fundusze Emerytalne (Open Pension Funds). 

(129) Pracownicze  Plany  Kapitalowe,  a  relatively  new  form  of 

(130) This  strategy  was  jointly  developed  with  the  EBRD  and 

retirement plans legislated back in 2019. 

financed largely by EU’s Technical Support Instrument. 

69 

050100150200250PLEU% of GDPLoansTrade credit and advancesBondsListed sharesUnlisted sharesOther equityNon-financial corporationsFinancial corporationsNon-financial corporationsMFIsInsurance  and pension fundsOther financialsGovernmentMFIs​Insurance corporationsInvestment funds0102030405060708090100   Listed equity               Bonds                        Assets by sector% of GDP 
     
 
     
 
Financing  through  debt  securities  is  mostly 
undertaken  by  the  sovereign  and  local  MFIs. 
The  outstanding  volume  of  private  sector  debt 
securities stood at 12.7% (see Graph A6.2) of GDP 
in 2024, with monetary financial institutions (MFIs) 
contributing  around  72%  of  this  total,  the  rest 
being  spread  among  the  few  biggest  NFCs  in  the 
country and some real  estate developers. General 
government  bonds  dwarf  the  rest  of  the  bond 
market and were the equivalent of 38.1% of GDP 
in  2024,  driven  by  increased  public  borrowing  to 
fund 
infrastructure  projects,  energy  transition 
initiatives  and  investments  into  defence  amid 
geopolitical tensions. Private sector debt securities 
are  almost  exclusively  denominated  in  the  Polish 
zloty (PLN). 

Households’ participation in capital 
markets 

Graph A6.3: Composition of households' financial 
assets 

Source: Eurostat. End-2024. 

Polish  households  are  conservative  when 
managing their financial assets. About 60% of 
household  financial  assets  are  held  on  current 
accounts and bank deposits (131), almost twice the 
European average of c. 32% (see Graph A6.3). The 
capital  market  participation  of  households  trails 
other  EU  Member  States.  Polish  households  have 
about  a  quarter  of  their  financial  wealth  invested 
in  listed  stocks,  bonds,  pension  and  investment 
funds. That figure is low when compared with the 
EU  average  of  around  45%  and  reflects  the 

(131) Eurostat. 

cautious  behaviour  of  local  households  and,  their 
relatively  low  financial  wealth  compared  with  the 
EU average. On aggregate, Polish households have 
financial  assets equivalent  to  81%  of  Polish GDP, 
whereas the EU  average stands at 210% of GDP. 
In  2023,  the  average  monthly  available  income 
per  capita  in  Poland  stood  at  about  EUR 620  and 
remains  quite  modest  by  European  standards, 
whereas the saving rate in 2023 stood at 13.2%, 
the same as the EU average according to Eurostat. 

tax 

and 

financial 

incentives 

through 
(such  as  the 

There  is  still  ample  space  to  increase  the 
level  of  direct  or  indirect  retail  investment. 
Boosting  the  weight  of  the  capital  market  in 
Poland  would  be  helped  by  education  and 
increased investor confidence in the market, while 
making  access  to  capital  easier  and  cheaper  for 
local  NFCs.  The  authorities  have  already 
introduced  measures 
to  encourage  greater 
household  participation  in  the  capital  market, 
pension 
including 
investment  accounts 
individual 
retirement  account  (IKE)  or  the  individual  pension 
security account (IKZE) allowing for tax-deductible 
education 
contributions) 
programmes.  The  impact  of  these  initiatives  has 
been  moderately  successful  so  far  but  the 
onboarding  of  Polish  households  into  the  capital 
market  is  ongoing.  Tax  regime  generally  do  not 
incentivise  retail  investors  to  hold  bonds  over 
equity  products  as  the  capital  gains  tax  is  the 
same on both products. The ambition of the future 
savings and investment account (known in Poland 
as  osobiste  konto  inwestycyjne  or  OKI)  is  to 
continue  spreading  awareness  about  investing  in 
the  capital  market.  OKI  is  based  on  the  Swedish 
model Investeringssparkonto (ISK) and is designed 
to 
invest  up  to  PLN 100 000 
(EUR 23 400) tax free, PLN 25 000 (EUR 6 850) of 
which  can  be  allocated  in  low-risk  deposits  or 
government  bonds.  Anything  above  the  PLN  100 
000  (EUR  23  400)  threshold  faces  a  one-off  flat 
tax on the value of assets held, calculated as 19% 
multiplied  by  the  reference  rate  of  National  Bank 
of Poland. Additionally, the changes in the second 
pillar  pension  segment,  in  particular  the  major 
reform from 2014 that nationalised about half of 
the  second  pillar  funds,  have  had  a  damaging 
effect both on the capital market itself as well as 
retail investors’ confidence. 

individuals 

let 

Low levels of financial literacy in Poland are 
one  reason for  low participation  in  the local 
capital  market.  Poland  suffers  from  a  financial 
literacy deficit. Since 2017, financial education has 

70 

0100200300050100PLEUPLEUper capita (000 EUR) (lhs)% of GDP (rhs)Other equityUnlisted sharesListed sharesBondsInvestment fundsInsurance and pension fundsCurrency and depositsHH Debt (liability) 
     
 
been  included  in  the  curriculum  for  primary  and 
secondary  schools,  aiming  to  equip  students  with 
basic  financial  skills  and  knowledge.  Yet,  uptake 
remains  uneven,  with  just  25  per  cent  of  schools 
fully  integrating  the  modules  by  2024,  according 
to  the  central  statistical  office.  According  to  the 
Eurobarometer  survey,  only  16%  of  the  Polish 
public exhibit a high level of financial literacy, 65% 
a  medium  level,  and  19%  a  low  level  (compared 
with  the  EU  averages  of  18%,  64%,  and  18%, 
respectively).  This  results  in  an  overall  financial 
literacy score of 43.5, against the EU’s average of 
45.5 and a very conservative stance on investment 
decisions.  The  2023-2030  national  strategy  for 
financial  education  focuses  on  several  key 
objectives,  which  include  increasing  the  ability  of 
households  to  plan  their  finances  responsibly, 
manage  risks,  and  access  unbiased  financial 
information. 

The banking sector: resilience and 
financing of the economy 

in 

requirements.  Both 

The  banking  sector  is  resilient  despite  some 
country-specific challenges and is overall not 
its  role  of  funding  the 
constrained 
economy. Local lenders are well capitalised with a 
Common  Equity  Tier  1  (CET1)  ratio  at  18%  (Q3-
2025),  above  the  EU  average  of  16.8%.  MREL 
(Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible 
Liabilities) and the combined buffer requirement in 
addition  to  MREL,  are  comfortably  exceeding  all 
liquidity  and 
regulatory 
profitability metrics (in Table A6.2) are very strong, 
and all major domestic banks have navigated the 
EU-wide  stress  tests  effectively.  The  loan-to-
deposit  ratio  stood  at  just  68.8%,  well  below  the 
EU  average  of  93%,  reflecting  a  conservative 
funding model reliant on domestic deposits, which 
constitute  71%  of 
total  assets.  The  non-
performing loans (NPL)  portfolio (the NPL ratio at 
3.9%)  has  been  steadily  decreasing in  size  and  is 
not  considered  an  issue  for  the  sector,  also  given 
that  the  coverage  ratio  of  close  to  60%  largely 
surpasses  the  EU’s  average  of  42.6%.  Holding  on 
balance sheets NPL is a rational economic decision 
for  Polish  banks,  not  mismanagement.  Given  the 
NPL  market  is  shallower  than  in  some  more 
developed  EU  markets  and  the  relatively  long 
judicial enforcement, selling NPLs often yields less 
cash than a patient internal workout, especially for 
is  a  key 
secured  exposures.  This  dynamic 

71 

structural reason that NPL ratios remain higher in 
Poland  than  in  countries  with  deeper,  more  liquid 
secondary  markets  or  faster  judicial  proceedings. 
The  banks’  asset  quality  outlook  is  subject  to 
increased  uncertainty  due  to  the  geopolitical 
uncertainty  and  its  impact  on  energy  prices  and 
economic  growth.  Despite  being  profitable  overall 
and  well  capitalised,  the  banking  sector  also  has 
some  weak  spots. 
legacy  FX 
mortgages  as  well  as  the  more  recent  legal 
challenges over the fairness of the Polish interest 
rates  benchmark,  the  Warsaw  interbank  offered 
rate (WIBOR), continue to pose a legal question for 
local lenders. While FX exposures where borrowers 
claimed  unfair  currency  risk  allocation  are  well 
provisioned for, the legal challenges to the WIBOR 
by  consumer  groups  have  escalated,  which  could 
lead 
revisions  and 
additional financial strain on local lenders.  

to  widespread  contract 

In  particular, 

Corporate  credit  growth  was  volatile  in  the 
past  few  years.  In  2024  demand  for  new 
corporate  loans  started  to  pick  up  again  and 
accelerated in 2025 yielding 4.8% year-on-year in 
credit  growth  in  Q3-2025.  More  importantly,  in 
2024, credit demand has been widespread across 
both  large  and  small  firms’  segments.  This  credit 
recovery  is  expected  to  continue  as  policy  rates 
have  been  steadily  decreasing  and  banks  have 
been  easing  their  lending  standards.  Segment 
leaders  include  construction  and  real  estate,  and 
manufacturing, 
robust 
benefiting 
infrastructure  spending.  Lending  to  households 
was  relatively  higher  both  in  2024  and  the  first 
quarter  of  2025,  with  year-on-year  growth  of 
5.2%  in  the  Q3-2025,  driven  by  mortgage  credit. 
Overall,  household  credit  is  poised  for  more 
gradual growth, supported by economic expansion 
and generally positive consumer confidence data. 

from 

Role of non-bank financial 
intermediaries 

Institutional  investors  have  both  the  funds 
and  the  capacity  to  drive  capital  market 
development forward. Given the country’s rapid 
GDP  growth  over  the  past  decades  and  the 
increasing  wealth  of 
local  economic  agents, 
Poland’s  financial  industry  is  in  a  favourable 
situation  where  assets  under  management  (AUM) 
are  steadily  growing  with  constant 
inflows. 
institutional 
However, 

role  of  domestic 

the 

 
investors in deepening the capital market remains 
restrained.  The  restrictive  regulatory  framework 
has been identified as an important factor shaping 
asset  allocation  patterns  by  investors.  A  recent 
study (132)  showed  that  Polish  pension  funds 
accounted  on  average  for  only  6%  of  PE  (private 
equity)  and  VC  (venture  capital)  funds  raised 
annually over the timeframe 2007-2023, a figure 
that falls substantially short of the 19% figure for 
the  Baltic  states  or  share  of  over  20%  in  Nordic 
Member States.  

the  non-life 

Poland’s insurance sector is expanding on the 
back  of  the  growing  economy.  Over  the  past 
decade  the  compound  annual  growth  rate  (CAGR) 
stood at 5.5%, outpacing the EU average of 3.8%. 
One of its key strengths is the strong performance 
of 
insurance  segment,  driven 
predominantly  by  rising  risk  awareness  and  the 
country’s  strong  economic  growth.  A  special 
domestic feature is the sector’s reliance on state-
owned  insurers  like  PZU,  which  hold  a  significant 
market share and heavily influence pricing policies. 
While  there  are  no  major  vulnerabilities  in  the 
sector,  the  high  reliance  on  expected  profits 
included  in  future  premiums  (EPIFP)  within  own 
funds  persists,  alongside  the  unregulated  double 
gearing  of  capital.  By  end-2023,  EPIFP  in  life 
insurance  reached  approximately  EUR 2.7 billion, 
equivalent  to  over  half  of  own  funds.  Meanwhile, 
non-life  insurers  held  over  EUR 6 billion  in  in 
insurance  and  banking  entities  by  mid-2024,  not 
deducted  from  own  funds  per  regulations,  and 
causing  double  gearing  across  parent  and 
subsidiary  risks.  According  to  Poland’s  central 
bank,  adjusting  the  solvency  for  these  two  items 
would  slash  the  non-life  solvency  ratio  by  60 
percentage points down to 149%. 

Polish  institutional  investors  exhibit  a  very 
conservative  asset  allocation  model.  Insurers 
are  part  of  the  big  institutional  investors  with  a 
growing  asset  base.  The  sector's 
investment 
portfolio  is  dominated  by  fixed-income  securities, 
with 
for 
bonds 
approximately  45%  of  total  assets (133)  compared 
with just 19% for the European Economic Area as 
a  whole.  This  conservative  approach  ensures  low 
risk  and  predictable  stable  returns.  Corporate 

government 

accounting 

is 

invested 

bonds  make  up  around  15%  of  AUM  whereas 
equities  represent  about  10%  of  the  portfolio. 
Lastly,  around  20%  of  AUM 
in 
investment  funds  with  a  significant  portion 
allocated  to  mixed  and  equity  funds.  Cash  and 
deposits, held mostly for liquidity management are 
roughly  5%  of  the  allocation. 
Insurers  point 
towards Solvency II requirements penalising equity 
allocation  as  main  culprit  for  choosing  to  invest 
into  fixed-income  instruments.  Sovereign  bonds 
provide  a  zero-capital  charge  alternative  that 
matches  the  insurers’  liabilities  well.  Moreover, 
equity  returns,  especially  when  invested  in  the 
domestic 
capital  market,  have  historically 
performed  in  line  with  expected  capital  costs  and 
proved to be volatile. 

Poles  remain  underinsured  with  coverage 
lagging  behind  western  European  peers. 
Insurance penetration is relatively low in Poland. It 
reached 6% of GDP in 2023, below the EU average 
of  7.8%,  suggesting  a  moderate  protection  gap, 
particularly 
in  rural  areas  where  agricultural 
insurance  uptake  lags.  Property  cover  remains 
insufficient  with  close  to  half  of  surveyed  agents 
claiming  that  home  insurance  sums  are  too  low 
for  current  rebuilding  costs (134),  often  leaving 
owners  exposed  to  storms  or  floods  risks.  On  the 
positive  side,  life  insurance  has  been  steadily 
expanding  over  the  past  decade  reflecting  rising 
financial  awareness.  Life  insurance  has  been 
evolving  from  group  policy  contracts  towards  a 
more  diversified  portfolio  emphasising  individual 
and unit-linked products. In 2024 some 23 million 
Poles  were  covered  through  some  form  of  life 
insurance, though as in other insurance segments 
penetration remains below EU averages.  

The asset management industry continues to 
mature. The combined assets under management 
(AUM)  of  local  asset  managers  in  end-2023 
[update] were equivalent to about 20% of Poland’s 
GDP,  very  far  from  the  EU  average  of  198%  of 
GDP  in  2023.  Mutual  funds  continue  to  dominate 
the  market,  with  a  significant  portion  of 
investments channelled into bond funds (46.1% of 
the  market)  and  equity  (around  13.2%)  (135).  The 
market  will  continue  expanding  as  households 
become  aware  of  investment  alternatives  to  low 

(132) Source: Closing the gaping hole in the capital  market for EU 
start-ups  –  the  role  of  pension  funds,  A.  Thomadakis, 
ECMI/CEPS 

(134) SW  Research  on  behalf  of  the  Polish  Insurance  Association, 

July 2022. 

(135) Source: 

Izba  Zarządzających  Funduszami 

i  Aktywami 

(133) Source: Polska Izba Ubezpieczen, Insurance in Figures. 

(Chamber of Fund and Asset Managers). 

72 

 
 
 
third-pillar 

yielding  bank  deposits.  Moreover,  the  introduction 
of  the  employee  capital  plans  (PPK)  –  the 
voluntary 
savings 
programme  –  back  in  2019  has  also  triggered 
more  interest  in  the  opportunities  offered  by  the 
capital market. Local  asset managers  are  hopeful 
for  more  inflows  into  the  third  pillar  as  the  PPK 
gradually gains critical mass. 

long-term 

are 

still  managing 

Polish pension funds are undergoing a major 
transformation. Poland’s pension system mainly 
relies  on  the  mandatory  pay-as-you-go  (PAYG) 
scheme.  The  PAYG  is  also  backed  by  a  relatively 
small  Demographic  Reserve  Fund,  worth  about 
EUR 16 billion  at  end-2024  and  mostly  invested 
into  fixed-income  securities.  The  Open  Pension 
Funds (known as OFE in Poland) are the remainder 
of  the  pension’s  second  pillar  that  was  reformed 
multiple  times  over  the  past  decade  and  are 
heavily  regulated  through  local  legislation (136). 
over 
Currently  OFEs 
EUR 50 billion  worth  of  assets  of  future  retirees, 
mostly  allocated  to  listed  equities  (about  90%  of 
the  AUM)  and  a  few  fixed-income  instruments  as 
well  as  cash.  By  law,  the  rules  governing  OFEs 
asset  allocation  are  very  stringent  and  target 
predominantly  investments  into  publicly  listed 
equity  at  the  Warsaw  stock  exchange.  Other 
the 
investments  are  mostly  excluded  given 
mandatory requirement for regular fund transfers 
at  the  pace  of  one  tenth  per  year  into  the  PAYG, 
starting  10  years  before  retirement.  Despite  the 
impressive  volume  of  AUM,  OFEs  do  not  currently 
participate 
local 
corporate bonds or PE/VC markets given that they 
are  legally  mandated  to  invest  most  funds  into 
equities.  Changing  the  paradigm  would  require  a 
complete  revision  of  the  legislation  on  OFEs 
including  the  slider  mechanism  (the  10-year  rule 
for transfers into PAYG) and the very vast array of 
impractical 
that  make 
alternative investments effectively impossible. The 
more  recent  employee  capital  plans  (PPK)  –  the 
future  retirees’  third  pillar  –  are  bound  to  play  a 
crucial  role  in  the  future  but  currently  their  AUM 
are still not very sizeable (about EUR 7 bn in early 
2024).  PPK  funds  work  with  an  autoenrollment 
system  and  have  a  diversified  approach  to 
investing with 40% of AUM invested into equities, 
about 35% into bonds, and a further 25% in mixed 
and other assets. However, in 2025 the local PPKs, 
given the regulatory requirements that define their 

in  the  development  of  the 

concentration 

limits 

(136) Dz.U. 1997 nr 139. 

73 

investments policies, have not been able to invest 
into  the  VC  or  PE  space,  due  in  part  to  the 
concentration  limits  imposed.  With  their  AUM 
focused  on  the  long  term  and  an  increasing 
number of participants (currently some 55% of the 
the 
working  population),  PPKs  seem 
appropriate  institutional  investors  for  investing  in 
long-term  projects  and  supplementing  the  PAYG 
system with a funded capital-based system. 

to  be 

Venture capital ecosystem 

in  2024) (137)  are  gradually 

The Polish VC market has been growing from 
a  very  low  base.  Both  the  PE  segment  (worth 
0.093% of GDP in 2023) as well as VC (0.018% of 
GDP 
increasing. 
However, these figures are still significantly lower 
than  the  EU  averages  of  0.487%  and  0.064%  of 
GDP  respectively  and  the  number  of  VC/PE  deals 
remains relatively low in Poland. Companies in the 
growth  phase  often  require  strong  backing  both 
through capital injections as well as management 
know-how  transfer,  which  local  investors  are  not 
always  able  to  provide  adequately (138).  This 
suggests that while there is a solid foundation for 
VC  in  Poland,  there  is  still  a  financing  gap  for 
early-stage firms. Yet just 20 years ago there was 
no real PE/VC market in Poland at all.  

Boosting  the  VC  ecosystem  is  part  of  the 
medium-term 
development 
2035 
strategy (139).  The  authorities  are  finalising  the 
framework  for  the  medium-term  development 
goals, among others targeting the financial sector 
and  capital  market  development.  In  that  respect, 
increasing  the  availability  of  VC  funds  is  one 
strategic 
remains 
dominated  by  public  funds  channelled  into  this 
niche  market  predominantly 
through  Polish 
development  institutions.  Apart  from  the  Polish 
Development  Fund  (PFR),  Poland’s  Development 

target.  The  VC 

landscape 

(137) Differences in VC/PE indicators across annexes reflect the 
use of distinct data sources. The Savings, Investment and 
Access to Finance Annex uses CMU Dashboard data for 
consistency across CMU indicators, while the Innovation to 
Business Annex uses InvestEurope data, which 
is disaggregated by investment stage. Variations in reported 
figures are therefore due to underlying source definitions. 

(138) See also Annex 4. 

(139) Strategia Rozwoju Polski do 2035 r., Ministerstwo Funduszy i 

Polityki Regionalnej (MFiPR). 

 
 
 
Table A6.2:  Financial sector indicators 

(1) Annualised data. EU data for credit growth and pension funds refer to the EA average. 
Source: ECB, Eurostat, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, DG FISMA CMU dashboard, AMECO. 

therefore 

Bank (BGK) and the state-owned insurer PZU, all of 
which are mostly publicly owned, there is a lack of 
institutional  investors  such  as  commercial  banks 
or  pension  funds  and 
insufficient 
liquidity  to  finance  innovative  projects.  There  is  a 
set of systemic reasons behind this lack of interest 
on the investors’ side. While it is possible to invest 
into  funds  of  funds,  Poland  still  does  not  have  a 
proper investment vehicle to cater for the needs of 
small  VC  funds.  Fund  managers  are  therefore 
setting  up  relatively  expensive  funds  under  the 
Luxembourg 
regime,  which  ultimately 
increases  their  operational  costs  (140).  Further, 
pension funds, despite being the natural long-term 
oriented  group  of  potential  investors,  are  at  the 
current  juncture  structurally  and  legislatively  not 
apt  to  invest  into  the  VC  space  given  liquidity, 
asset  class  and  shareholding  concentration  limits. 
Local lenders mostly worry about excessive capital 
risk  weights  on  exposures  against  the  relatively 
illiquid and perceived as risky holdings in VC funds. 
A  byproduct  of  the  lack  of  market  depth  is  the 
relatively  small  group  of  specialised  VC  asset 
managers. Lastly, local portfolio managers point to 

legal 

(140) Legislative  efforts  are  underway to  enhance  the  framework 
for  venture  capital  funds, 
the 
introduction  of  Qualified  Investment  Funds  (Kwalifikowany 
Fundusz Inwestycyjny – KFI). 

in  particular 

through 

a  lack  of  worthwhile  projects  (the  demand  side) 
ready  to work with VC oriented investors. Most of 
these  issues  are  being  discussed  in  the  2035 
development  strategy,  which  also  comes  forward 
with  a  set  of  recommendation  on  how  to  tackle 
these  systemic  weaknesses  to  build  a  solid  VC 
ecosystem. 

74 

20182019202020212022202320242025-Q3EUTotal assets of MFIs, % of GDP91.591.3101.099.291.895.194.592.5246.1Common equity Tier 1 ratio16.115.917.516.116.318.017.918.016.8Total capital adequacy ratio17.917.819.617.918.019.519.319.520.2Overall NPL ratio, % of all loans6.26.16.05.04.34.13.93.71.9NPL ratio, loans to NFCs8.48.18.06.55.75.26.26.13.5NPL ratio, loans to HHs5.85.75.44.74.54.73.53.22.1Return on equity ratio17.06.93.14.87.311.614.616.29.6Loans to NFCs, % of GDP16.516.014.413.512.811.811.211.129.3Loans to HHs, % of GDP33.733.832.931.225.924.022.221.143.6NFC credit growth rate, %6.62.9-6.44.59.60.65.48.02.5HH credit growth rate, %5.66.51.55.0-4.41.04.23.92.6Stock market capitalisation, % of GDP--20.524.017.822.019.122.669.9Initial public offerings, % of GDP0.030.020.060.110.010.010.01-0.06Market funding ratio45.944.747.847.546.145.344.1-49.7Private equity, % of GDP0.3070.2780.1340.1440.1300.1140.093-0.487Venture capital, % of GDP0.0120.0120.0170.0220.0270.0220.018-0.064Financial literacy, composite index-----42.5--45.5Bonds, % of HHs' financial assets0.60.70.50.40.80.80.7-2.8Listed shares, % of HHs' financial assets2.62.93.84.03.63.83.2-4.8Investment funds, % of HHs' financial assets6.06.65.85.74.55.16.1-11.0Insurance/pension funds, % of HHs' financial assets15.314.613.013.812.514.313.8-27.8Total assets of insurers, % of GDP8.88.48.47.35.96.56.06.153.9Pension assets, bn EUR---62.656.575.887.8-5813.8Pension assets, % of GDP---10.78.510.110.3-32.310y real return average of pension assets, %-----0.5-0.5-1.4Pension funds assets, ECB (% of GDP)---------1-34-1011-1718-2425-27Colours indicate performance ranking among the 27 EU Member States.Banking sectorNon-banking sector 
 
 
 
 
     
 
ANNEX 7: EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 

of companies that see fast-track legislation as an 
obstacle  to  making  business  has  dropped  by  16 
percentage  points  over  the  past  two  years  (142). 
There  are  comprehensive  legal  requirements  for 
the  impact  assessment  of  all  new  primary  and 
secondary  legislation  on  competitiveness,  small 
and  medium-sized  businesses,  specific  social 
groups  and  regions.  The  government  is  obliged  to 
consider  submitted  comments  when  developing 
the  final  primary  laws  and  secondary  regulations, 
and  to  publish  a  response  to  comments  made  in 
all  public  consultations.  All  regulatory  impact 
assessments  (RIAs)  are  made  publicly  available 
online.  The  Chancellary  of  the  Prime  Minister 
reviews  the  quality  of  RIAs  for  both  primary  and 
secondary legislation and ex post evaluations (143). 
is 
The  oversight  of  better 
hampered by the lack of published assessments of 
the effectiveness of RIAs (Table A7.1).  

regulation 

tools 

In 2025 Poland introduced new rules to check 
the  impact  of  laws  related  to  the  launch, 
operation  and  closing  of  business.  Such 
assessmnt  should  be  done  two  years  after  the 
entry into force, in case where pubilc consultaitons 
are  not  possible.  Deregulation  and  simpleification 
measures address the 2025 CSRs and put forward 
proposals  made  by  Polish  companies.  These  aims 
to  simplify  regulations  (Annex  5)  and  strengthen 
the  regulatory  quality  in  Poland.  It  also  provides 
for  a  periodic  evaluation  of  existing  legislation  to 
be  adopted  by  a  Resolution  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers  every  three  years  (144).  To  improve  the 
quality of lawmaking, Poland has strengthened the 
rules 
their 
effectiveness remains to be seen.  

consultations, 

governing 

but 

trust  built  on 

institutional  framework 

An  effective 
is 
essential  for  competitiveness.  This  requires 
public 
integrity,  high-quality 
legislation,  regulatory  simplification  and  efficient 
services  for  people  and  businesses.  The  2025 
country 
(CSRs) 
highlighted  challenges  for  Poland  in  the  areas  of 
on legislative complexity and ensuring an effective 
institutional framework (see also Annex 5).   

recommendations 

specific 

Public trust 

Graph A7.1: Trust in the justice system, regional / 
local authorities and in government 

(1) EU-27 since 2019 ; EU-28 before 
Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 
surveys. 

(Graph  A7.1).  Regional  and 

Trust in public institutions in Poland remains 
strong 
local 
authorities  enjoy  the  highest  level  of  public  trust, 
while  trust  in  government  has  seen  a  mid-term 
increase,  well  above  the  EU  average.  Both 
businesses  (Poland  85%;  EU  79%)  and  people 
(Poland  80%;  EU  72%)  have  very  strong 
confidence in the ability of public administration to 
protect  their  personal  data  and  to  handle  their 
data securely and responsibly (141). 

Quality of lawmaking 

(142) European Commission, 2026, Flash Eurobarometer surveys 
567 and 568 on satisfaction with administrative services. 

Poland  has  good  lawmaking  rules,  and  their 
application  has  improved  laws.  The  proportion 

(141) European Commission, 2026, Flash Eurobarometer surveys 
567 and 568 on satisfaction with administrative services. 

75 

(143) For  more  details,  see  OECD,  2025, Better  Regulation 
Union 

Practices 
2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/6f007516-en. 

European 

across 

the 

(144) Ustawa z dnia 21 maja 2025 r. o zmianie niektórych ustaw 
w celu deregulacji prawa gospodarczego i administracyjnego 
oraz 
prawa 
gospodarczego. 

opracowywania 

doskonalenia 

zasad 

00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9AutumnSpringAutumnSpringSpringAutumnWinterSummerWinterSpringWinterSummerAutumnSpringAutumnSpringAutumnSpring202520242023202220212020201920182017Justice,  legal system EU-27Justice,  legal system PLRegional or local public authorities EU-27Regional or local public authorities PLGovernment  EU-27Government  PL 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Table A7.1:  Poland. Selected indicators on better regulation practices for primary legislation 

Source: OECD, 2025, Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025 [https://doi.org/10.1787/56b60e39-en] and Better Regulation across the 
European Union 2025. 

Public service delivery and 
digitalisation 

Graph A7.2: Most time-consuming aspects of 
service delivery 

Source: European Commission, 2026, Flash Eurobarometer 
surveys 567 and 568 on satisfaction with administrative 
services. 

delivery 

public-service 

Regarding 
and 
digitalisation, Poland is making progress, but 
user  friendliness  is  lagging  behind.  40%  of 
individuals  and  55%  of  companies  say  they  are 
satisfied  with  administrative  services,  compared 
with an EU average of 45% and 42%, respectively 
(145).  At  the  same  time,  Poland  has  seen  a  sharp 
fall  in  the  proportion  of  people  who  find  public 
administration  complex  and  burdensome,  from 

the 

longest  delays  stem 

46%  in  2023  to  37%  in  2025.  For  people  and 
companies, 
from 
preparing  documents  and  waiting  for  responses, 
though  Poland  performs  better  than  the  EU 
average in this regard: 29% of users report time-
consuming  processes  versus  39%  across  the  EU 
(Graph  A7.2).  While  these  challenges  rarely  cause 
operational  disruption,  there  is  clear  demand  for 
improvement:  69%  of  people  want  more  user-
friendly  digital  services,  and  75%  would  like 
clearer step-by-step guidance. 

The  availability of  digital  public  services  for 
public  remains  lower  than  the  EU  average, 
despite  a  sharp  increase  since  2023  (Table 
A7.2).  Poland  also  lags  behind  the  EU  average  in 
terms  of  cross-border  access  to  such  services 
(Poland  50;  EU:  71)  but  the  trend  is  upward  (7 
points  in  Poland  vs  3  across  the  EU).  Poland 
continues  to  make  progress  in  offering  electronic 
health  records  exceeding  the  EU  average  with  a 
score  of  92  (146).  This  has  been  boosted  by 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (RRF)  funding 
(measure D1.1.2).  

There is a wide range of digital public services and 
solutions available. These include: 

−  mObywatel,  a  Polish  digital  identity  wallet, 
providing  people  with  access  to  a  range  of 
identity  cards, 
digital  documents 

including 

(145) European  Commission,  2026,  Flash  Eurobarometer  surveys 
567 and 568 on satisfaction with administrative services 

(146) European Commission, 2025, Digital decade e-health 

indicator study. 

76 

0%10%20%30%40%50%Time forresponsesDocumentspreparationSubmittingandexchanginginformationApplicationformsDocumentspreparationTime forresponsesPeopleBusinessesEUTools for smart legislation: Share of possible impacts assessed for all primary laws when developing legislation 1Regulators are required to identify and quantify the benefits of a new primary law1Regulators are required to identify and assess the impacts of alternative non-regulatory options1Tools for effective implementation: when developing laws, regulators are required to:Assess the level of compliance1Identify and assess potential enforcement mechanisms1Specify the methodology of measuring progress in achieving the law's goals1Oversight of better regulation: There is an external  body responsible for reviewing the quality of RIAs and of ex post evacuations 1There are publicly available assessments of the effectiveness of RIA in modifying regulatory proposals 0There are reports on the level of compliance by government department with the requirements of RIA1There are indicators on the percentage of ex post evaluations that comply with guidelines0The effectiveness of ex post evaluations in improving the regulatory stock has been assessed in the last five years0 
  
 
 
 
   
 
Table A7.2:  Digital Decade key performance indicators: availability of digital public services 

(1) Digital Decade target by 2030: 100. (2) Publishing year, data was collected in the previous year 
Source: European Commission, 2025, State of the Digital Decade report. 

driving 
licences,  e-prescription  and  public 
services,  expanded  using  RRF  measure  C2.1.1 
(147),  

−  ePUAP,  a  key  platform  enabling  users to  apply 
for  public  services  across  multiple  public 
institutions,  and  even  receive  correspondence 
(148) and  

−  e-PIT/E-Tax  Office,  enabling  individuals  and 
legal entities to deal with all aspects of the tax 
system  online,  developed  further  with  national 
recovery  and  resilience  plan  measure  C2.1.1) 
(149).  

(150). 

administration 

However,  challenges  remain  in  terms  of  the 
lack of interoperability and skills gaps of the 
draft 
public 
Digitalisation  Strategy  for  Poland  2035  proposed 
by the Ministry of Digital Affairs includes a number 
of  key  goals  relating  to  public  services,  including 
ensuring that all key services are available via the 
mobile application and full interoperability of state 
systems and registers (151).  

The 

The  availability of  digital  public  services  for 
businesses  in  Poland  grew  rapidly  in  2024 
(from  73  to  85)  (152).  Poland  performs  below  the 
EU  average  for  access  of  EU  companies  to  such 
services  (Poland  70;  EU  74)  but  has  had  a 
significantly higher growth rate (19 p. in Poland vs 
the  EU).  Poland's  online  business 
1  p. 

in 

(147) Gov.pl, mObywatel. 

(148) Gov.pl, Załatw sprawy urzędowe przez internet na ePUAP. 

(149) Gov.pl, Your e-PIT/E-Tax Office - Ministry of Finance. 

(150) European Commission, forthcoming, Simplification of key life 

registration  systems  allow  entrepreneurs 
to 
register a business quickly and free of charge. The 
integration of the system with the tax authorities, 
social  security  and  statistical  offices  significantly 
reduces administrative burdens for both users and 
officials. Using the RRF Poland launched a system 
(153)  for  obligatory  use  of  structured  e-invoices 
(measure 2.1.1).  

requirements,  a 

Since  2020,  Poland  has  been  developing  a 
robust  digital  permitting 
infrastructure, 
marked  by  initiatives  such  as  the  e-Budownictwo 
portal  for  electronic  building-permit  applications. 
However,  Poland's  fragmented  regional  and  local 
government undermines the quality of service due 
to  varying 
level  of 
low 
interoperability  and 
limited  data  exchange. 
Following  legal  reforms  from  2024,  Poland  is 
taking  action 
to  digitalise  and  standardise 
environmental permitting. Using the RRF funds, an 
for 
IT  platform 
renewable 
been 
introduced.  Furthermore,  the  Technical  Support 
Instrument 
simplifying, 
accelerating  and  digitalising  its  industrial  and 
environmental  permitting  framework,  in  line  with 
the  EU  Directive  on  Industrial  Emissions  (154). 
Additonal investments in digital public servcies and 
syber  security  are  mader  under  the  Cohesion 
policy funding. 

for  permitting  procedures 
installations 

supports  Poland 

energy 

has 

in 

Poland  is  ready  to  enable  the  cross-border 
exchange  of  data  and  documents  between 
authorities 
the  EU  once-only 
technical system(155). As once-only services (156) 

through 

events. 

(153) Krajowy System e-Faktur (KSeF). 

(151) Gov.pl, Strategia Cyfryzacji Polski do 2035 roku - 

(154) European Commission, 2026, Poland Technical Support 

Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji. 

Instrument - Country Factsheet. 

(152) European Commission, 2025, Digital Decade: eGovernment 

(155) European Commission, Once-Only Technical System 

Benchmark. 

Acceleratormeter, Ec.europa.eu. 

77 

EU-272023202420252025606471827373858686909283Digital public services for citizens (0 to 100)Digital public services for businesses (0 to 100)Access to electronic health records (0 to 100)Poland 
 
 
 
  
 
become  accessible,  people  and  businesses  will  no 
longer have to search for their data, download and 
upload documents manually  across  e-government 
portals in different Member States. Poland has yet 
to  identify  the  types  of  documents  and  data  to 
exchange through the system and explore ways to 
shift  from  the  submission  of  documents  to 
exchange of structured data. 

Civil service 

The  proportion  of  civil  servants  in  Poland 
under  50  continues  to  be  well  above  the  EU 
average (Poland 73% compared to EU average of 
60%) (157). Nevertheless, as with other sectors, the 
civil  service  is  affected  by  demographic  changes 
and  an  ageing  population.  There 
is  a  high 
proportion  of  public-sector  employees  who  have 
completed  higher  education  (significantly  above 
the  EU  average)  (158),  and  increasing  participation 
rates  in  adult  learning  (159).  This  produces  skills 
in  the  private  sector  and 
that  are  valued 
contributes  to  the  turnover  of  staff  in  the  public 
sector.  

Attracting  and  retaining  talent  in  the  public 
sector remains a challenge in Poland.  HR and 
payroll  policies  are  too  complex  (the  system  is 
regulated  by  over  200  legal  acts)  and  lack 
transparency.  Although  the  average  civil-service 
salary  is  higher  than  the  average  salary  in  the 
national  economy,  there  are  significant  pay 
discrepancies 
local 
government,  across  central  administration  and 
between  different  groups  of  employees/job 
categories in the same type of work (160).  

between 

central 

and 

The  head  of  the  civil  service  has  prepared  a 
human  resources  management  strategy  for  2034 
to ensure consistent modernisation of civil service 
in  Poland,  which  was  approved  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers  on  16  January  2026  (161).    Poland  is 
working on a new concept for civil service pay that 
is  expected  to  be  presented  2027  (162).  The 
objective  is  to  introduce  competitive  pay  and 
improve  the  management  of  human  resources. 
The  concept  concerns  the  civil  service  only 
(approximately  120 000  employees),  not  all 
public-sector staff.  

Integrity  

Although  the  perception  of  corruption  when 
doing business in Poland is relatively low, the 
reported  level  of  experienced  corruption  is 
above  the  EU  average.  Overall,  perceptions  of 
widespread  corruption  are  below  the  EU  average 
(Poland  41%;  EU  63%)  and  fewer  firms  see 
corruption  as  a  barrier  to  doing  business  (Poland 
19%;  EU  35%)  (163).  However,  concerns  about 
overly  close  links  between  business  and  politics 
leading  to  corruption  are  considerably  higher  in 
Poland  than  the  EU  average  (Poland  86%;  EU 
76%). Sectors particularly vulnerable to corruption 
in Poland are public procurement and construction 
(164) (see Annex 5). More firms (than in the EU as a 
whole)  report  being  asked  or  expected  to  offer 
gifts  or  extra  payments  for  permits,  services  or 
procurement  (Poland  12%;  EU  10%),  while  far 
fewer  than  the  EU  average  believe  that  those 
caught  bribing  senior  officials  are  appropriately 
punished  (Poland  21%;  EU  33%)  (165),  which 
suggests  greater  corruption  pressure  and  weak 
deterrence. 

(156) Procedure types under Annex II of the 

SDGR (2018/1724/EU) and directives 2005/36/EC, 
2006/123/EC, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU. 

(157) European Commission, Eurostat, 2026, European Union 

Labour Force Survey, Employed persons by economic activity 
(NACE Rev. 2) (2008-2026). 

(158) European Commission, Eurostat, 2026, European Union 

Labour Force Survey, Employees by educational attainment 
level and NACE Rev. 2 activity (2008-2026). 

(159) European Commission, Eurostat, 2026, European Union 
Labour Force Survey, Participation rate of employees in 
education and training (last 4 weeks) by NACE Rev. 2 activity 
(2008-2026). 

(160) 2024 Annual report of the Head of Civil Service. 

(161) Gov.pl, Rada Ministrów przyjęła projekt Strategii zarządzania 
zasobami  ludzkimi  w  służbie  cywilnej  -  Serwis  Służby 
Cywilnej 

(162) Mid-Term Strategy until 2035 available at Gov.pl, Strategia 
Rozwoju Polski do 2035 r. - Ministerstwo Funduszy i Polityki 
Regionalnej. 

(163) European Commission, 2025, Flash Eurobarometer survey 
557 on businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU 
and selected enlargement countries. 

(164) European Commission, 2025, Rule of Law Report. 

(165) European Commission, 2025, Flash Eurobarometer survey 
557 on businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU 
and selected enlargement countries 

78 

 
 
 
low 

Poland  has  taken  no  measures  to  improve 
the  prevention  and  detection  of  corruption. 
The  country  has  public  registers  for lobbyists,  but 
major  concerns  persist  about  their  effectiveness, 
with 
registration  numbers,  even  some 
insufficient  oversight  and 
deregistration  and 
enforcement.  In  addition,  Poland  does  not  have 
lobbying rules in place for high-level executives to 
interest 
contacts 
disclose 
representatives. 
holistic 
new 
government  approach  to  corruption  is  not  yet  in 
place,  with  the  last  anti-corruption  strategy  and 
action  plan  covering  the  period  from  2018  to 
2020. 

with 
strategic, 

their 

A 

to  ensure 

Poland  is  taking  measures  to  improve  the 
prosecution  of  corruption.  The  country  has 
taken  some  steps  to  address  shortcomings, 
hopefully leading to a more robust track record of 
corruption cases. There are several ongoing large-
scale  corruption  investigations  involving  public 
officials and politicians. Further efforts have  been 
made 
independent  and  effective 
investigations  and  prosecutions.  There  are 
persistent issues with immunity for top executives 
and  impunity  clauses.  Furthermore,  there  is  a 
shortfall 
in  the  asset  declarations  of  public 
officials and politicians, and there is an absence of 
a  central  submission  and  monitoring  system  to 
help  trace  illicit  wealth  and  undue  influence.  The 
effectiveness of enforcing the law against bribery 
of foreign officials is still rather low (166).  

Justice 

efficiency 

The  Polish  justice  system  has  a  reasonable 
level  of  digitalisation,  and  the  overall 
efficiency  of  ordinary  and  administrative 
courts remains relatively stable. More could be 
done  to  ensure  that  the  prosecution  service 
communicating 
increases 
electronically  (on  secure  platforms).  Poland  lags 
behind  in  digital  solutions  to  initiate  and  follow 
proceedings in civil/commercial and administrative 
cases,  and  in  online  access  for  the  general  public 
to published judgments. However, it performs well 
regarding  arrangements  for  producing  machine-
readable judicial decisions. Steps have been taken 
to implement the action plan on the rule of law to 

by 

(166) European Commission, 2025, Rule of Law Report. 

address  concerns  regarding  judicial  independence. 
Further measures are being drawn up as regards i) 
the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary,  ii)  the 
Constitutional Tribunal, iii) the status of judges, iv) 
the  separation  of  the  function  of  the  Minister  of 
Justice from that of the Prosecutor General and v) 
the  functional  independence  of  the  prosecution 
service from the government (167). 

(167) For  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  performance  of  the 
justice system in Poland, see the upcoming 2026 EU Justice 
Scoreboard and the 2025 Rule of Law Report. 

79 

 
 
 
 
SUSTAINABILITY 
ANNEX 8: INDUSTRY DECARBONISATION, CIRCULARITY AND CLIMATE MITIGATION 

Industrial  emissions  are  decreasing,  but 
Poland still faces challenges in decarbonising 
industry.  Poland  has  a  stable  and  diverse 
industrial  base  and  an  above-average  share  of 
industry  in  GDP.  While  industrial  emissions  have 
been decreasing since 2005, most of the reduction 
since  2018  has  resulted  from  decreased  output 
and  slightly  increased  efficiency.  Moreover,  the 
implementation  of  low-carbon  and  sustainable 
technologies  faces  significant 
limitations  and 
constraints. The main challenges that Poland faces 
in decarbonising industry include: (i) barriers to the 
deployment  of  renewable  energy  sources  (RES); 
(ii) the  absence  of  coordinated  fossil  fuel  phase-
out  trajectories  and  lack  of  coordination  for 
industry; (iii) the slow pace of development of the 
country’s  carbon  capture  and  storage 
(CCS) 
potential;  (iv) infrastructural  constraints  for  the 
deployment  of  sustainable  transport;  (v) the  low 
innovation rate for circular economy solutions; and 
(vi) unsustainable  usage  of  water  and  air 
resources. 

Industry decarbonisation 

Greenhouse gas emissions from industry 

gas 

(GHG)  manufacturing 
Greenhouse 
emissions  in  Poland  have  decreased  by  19% 
between  2019  and  2024  (168).  Manufacturing 
contributed  15%  of  emissions  in  2024  (169). 
Between 2019 and 2024, emissions fell by 17% in 

(168)This Annex discusses the transition of Poland's 

manufacturing industry, specifically its energy-intensive 
industries, to low-carbon and net-zero modes of production, 
which is key to preserving competitiveness on the path 
towards climate neutrality as mandated by the European 
Climate Law. A broader perspective on the current 
competitiveness challenges facing Poland's manufacturing 
industry is provided in Annex 5. For a more detailed 
description of greenhouse gas emissions from industry, see 
European Commission (2025),  
2025 Country Report - 
Poland, Commission staff working document, SWD (2025) 
205 final, Brussels, 4.6.2025, Annex A7. Clean industry and 
climate mitigation. 

(169) In 2024. Data on the manufacturing sector exclude the NACE 
division C19 manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 
products, for better match of the sectoral data from Eurostat 
(gross value added) with those from the UNFCCC under the 
Common Reporting Format. Also see further indicators on 
industry decarbonisation, as well as the annotation for 
further information, in table A8.1 at the end of this Annex.  

the  non-metallic  minerals  industry  (NACE  division 
C23), remained broadly stable in the manufacture 
of  chemicals  (C20),  and  declined  by  28%  in  the 
iron and steel industry (C24). 

industrial  emissions 

The  decrease  of 
in 
Poland was partially due to decreased energy 
consumption in manufacturing as a result of 
increased  efficiency  and  reduced  output. 
Energy  consumption  fell  by  16%  between  2018 
and 2023, from 189.9 TWh/y to 159.6 TWh/y (170). 
The  RES  share  in  final  energy  consumption  by 
Polish  industry  increased  to  11.2%  in  2024, 
nearing the EU-27 average of 11.7%. However, the 
overall  share  of  renewables  in  energy  consumed 
by  industry  in  2024  remained  significantly  lower 
than in the EU as a whole, given the lower share of 
renewable  and  zero-emission  energy  in  heat  and 
electricity  generation  (17%  in  Poland  and  32%  in 
the  EU  as  a  whole).  As  heat  and  electricity 
consumption  accounted  for  36%  of  energy 
consumption  by  Polish  industry,  compared  with 
39%  in  the  EU  as  a  whole,  the  overall  share  of 
renewable  energy  in  Poland’s  industrial  energy 
consumption in 2024 remained significantly lower 
(18% in Poland, 23% in the EU as a whole).  

Among  Poland’s  energy-intensive  industries, 
the production of cement clinker is the most 
significant emitter of greenhouse gases (171). 
Among the over 200 Polish industrial installations 
covered  by  the  EU  ETS,  emissions  decreased  by 
10%  between  2018 (172)  and  2023 (173).  However, 
the 
in  many  emission-intensive 
observed  reduction  of  emissions  was  in  many 
cases partially a result of the decline in production 
output 
of 
decarbonisation (174):  between  2018  and  2023, 
annual  raw  steel  production  in  Poland  decreased 

industries, 

result 

only 

and 

not 

a 

(170) See Eurostat, Energy balance flow diagram - Poland, year 

2024. 

(171) https://union-registry-data.ec.europa.eu/report/eu-registry-

compliance. 

(172) https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/przemysl-

budownictwo-srodki-trwale/przemysl/produkcja-wyrobow-
przemyslowych-w-2018-roku,8,2.html. 

(173) https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/przemysl-

budownictwo-srodki-trwale/przemysl/produkcja-wyrobow-
przemyslowych-w-2023-roku,8,7.html. 

(174)https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/NID%202025%2

0POL%2015.04.2025.pdf. 

80 

 
 
 
 
 
 
by  37% 
(from  10.3 Mt  to  6.5 Mt),  fertiliser 
production  decreased  by  33%  (from  2.9 Mt  to 
1.9 Mt) and cement production decreased by 11% 
(from 19.0 Mt to 16.8 Mt). 

Policies to promote industry decarbonisation 

industry  decarbonisation 

In  Poland, 
is 
constrained  by  the  lack  of  a  coherent  policy 
framework,  even  though,  in  the  other  economic 
sectors, Poland combines strong economic growth 
with  falling  GHG  emissions  from  manufacturing 
production.  Key  challenges  are  the  lack  of  clarity 
about  strategic coordination  and  financial  support 
for 
to 
affordable  clean  energy  for  industry,  and  barriers 
to  the  development  of  carbon  capture  utilisation 
and storage. 

industry  decarbonisation, 

low  access 

Poland  has  not  submitted  the  final  updated 
draft of its national energy and climate plan 
for  2021-2030.  That  document  is  essential  to 
gain  clear  signals  regarding  Poland’s  ambitious 
industry transformation targets for 2030 and also 
contains  projections  for  2040.  It  models  emission 
reduction trajectories in different energy-intensive 
sectors and sets out applicable policies to support 
industry decarbonisation. The plan should facilitate 
for 
coordination, 
industrial  transformation  remain  fragmented  and 
there  is  a  need  for  strategic  oversight  of  the 
industrial decarbonisation process. 

responsibilities 

although 

industrial 

Poland’s 
decarbonisation 
trajectory has not yet been explicitly mapped 
out,  although  it  is  partially  set  out  in 
strategic  documents  such  as  Poland’s  2050 
national  development  concept (175), 
its  2030 
productivity  strategy (176), 
its  2030  hydrogen 
strategy and its nuclear power programme, as well 
as  in  analytical  documents  such  as  the  white 
papers on transformation for 2025-2049 (177) and 
on industrial development (178). 

(175)https://www.gov.pl/web/fundusze-regiony/koncepcja-rozwoju-

kraju-2051. 

(176)https://www.gov.pl/web/rozwoj-technologia/strategia-

produktywnosci-2031. 

(177)https://www.gov.pl/web/energia/biala-ksiega-transformacji. 

(178) https://www.gov.pl/attachment/63b14b68-1ec8-4748-8f7c-

a3c74e87a4ca. 

and 

district 

Poland’s  strategic  documents  fail  to  provide 
a vision for phasing out coal and fossil fuels 
and  achieving  carbon  neutrality  in  industry. 
The industry aspects of the transition are expected 
to  be  set  out  in  Poland’s  2035  development 
strategy (179) 
heating 
2040 
transformation  strategy  (regarding  waste  heat 
from  industry),  which  are  expected  in  2026.  The 
2023-2025  clean  industry  strategy  (containing 
projections  for  2030) (180)  was  drawn  up  by  the 
Industrial  Development Agency and has a specific 
focus  on  renewable  energy  and  offshore  wind,  as 
well  as  hydrogen.  However,  it  has  not  been 
updated, and although it was envisioned as part of 
the Polish Development Fund (PFR) Group’s 2026-
2030  strategy (181),  it  was  reformulated  in  the 
than 
the  modernisation, 
context  of 
transformation, of industry. 

rather 

in  2025 

renewable  energy, 

to  decarbonised  systems 

Important  framework  conditions  for  phasing 
out  coal  and  decarbonising  industry  are 
missing.  On  phasing  out  coal,  Poland  received  a 
country-specific 
to 
recommendation 
reduce the reliance on fossil fuels by accelerating 
the  phasing-out  of  coal  in  the  heating  sector  by 
transitioning 
that 
integrate 
improve  energy 
efficiency  and  phase  out  fossil  fuel  subsidies, 
especially  those  related  to  coal  mining.  The  Just 
Transition  Fund  supported 
training  of  over 
100 000  workers  and  decontamination  of 
2 800 ha of post-mining areas, helped to increase 
energy efficiency and mitigated some of the socio-
economic 
transition 
process (182). However, in Poland, there is currently 
just 
no  authority  tasked  with  managing  the 
transition.  Nor  are  there  any  strategy  documents 
about  the  process.  This  is  a  significant  challenge 
as regards the predictability and acceptance of the 
the 
coal  phase-out  process.  Realisation  of 
potential  for 
industrial  decarbonisation,  with 
renewables, CCS and hydrogen (183), would require 

consequences 

the 

of 

(179)https://www.gov.pl/web/fundusze-regiony/strategia-rozwoju-

polski-do-2035-r-. 

(180)https://arp.pl/documents/265/Czysty_Przemysl_strategia_AR

P.pdf. 

(181)https://pfr.pl/artykul/strategia-grupy-pfr-na-lata-2026-2030-

wspolna-wizja-rozwoju-polski-i-wsparcie. 

(182) https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-
budget/performance-and-reporting/programme-
performance-statements/just-transition-mechanism-
performance_en. 

(183)https://www.gov.pl/web/klimat/ccus-korzysci-transformacja. 

81 

 
 
 
the  financial  support  framework  to  become 
effective. 

to 
in  Poland 

Barriers  to  renewable  energy  deployment 
and  affordable  clean  energy  significantly 
impact the pace of industry decarbonisation. 
The  barriers  identified  Annex  9  are  limiting  the 
scope  for  electrification  of  industrial  processes. 
the  development  of 
Severe  constraints 
renewable  energy 
legal 
include 
constraints,  difficulties  obtaining 
connection 
agreements,  environmental  permitting  constraints 
and national defence-oriented restrictions, covered 
in  Annex  9:  Affordable  energy  transition.  The 
introduction  of  renewable  acceleration  areas,  as 
required under the Recovery and Resilience Facility 
(RRF), is supposed to partially address these issues 
by  reducing  the  cost  of  the  solidarity  tariff  for 
those  areas.  Addressing 
direct 
connection 
requires 
reforms  to  the  legal  framework.  Such  reforms 
could  aim  to  introduce  mandatory  milestones  in 
the  connection  process,  increase  connection  fees, 
introduce  new  types  of  connection  agreements, 
to 
expand 
information  about  available  grid  capacity  and 
speed up dispute resolution. Reforms of taxes and 
tariffs relating to fossil fuels  and electricity could 
further  encourage  the  electrification  of  industry, 
but no plans or actions are currently envisioned in 
these areas. 

increase  access 

cable  pooling, 

lines  within 

constraints 

agreement 

and 

environmental 

The  development  of  CCS  is  hampered  by 
legal, 
transport 
constraints,  including  the  lack  of  locations  for 
new facilities. According to the Ministry of Climate 
and  Environment,  those  constraints  are  supposed 
to  be  addressed.  No  structured  national  financial 
instruments  (such  as  contracts  for  difference) 
have  been  implemented  to  support  full-scale  CCS 
applications.  The  GO4ECOPLANET  CCS  project  at 
the  Kujawy  cement  plant  (annual  capacity:  10 Mt 
CO₂eq)  has  received  EUR 228 million  of  support 
project 
from 
implementation  planned  in  2027. (184).  At  present, 
the most significant drivers of CCS development in 
Poland  are  the  legal  obligations  imposed  on 
obligated  entities  following  Commission  Decision 
(EU)  2025/1479,  which  have 
the 
corporate strategies of those entities. The National 

Fund,  with 

Innovation 

impacted 

the 

(184) https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/5c3a41d2-

5c3b-40f6-92c4-
712a04cdffc4_en?filename=if_pf_2022_go4_en_0.pdf. 

82 

to 

applied 

Centre  for  Research  and  Development  has  a 
research 
support 
mechanism 
programmes,  such  as  the  NEON  project,  which 
provides 200 mln PLN of support for the areas of 
decarbonisation  (including  CCS/CCU  and  low-  and 
economy 
zero-emission 
solutions and digitalisation of industrial processes. 

hydrogen), 

circular 

Reduction of effort sharing emissions 

Compliance  with  effort  sharing  limits  with 
domestic measures 

these  emissions  are  expected 

For 2030, Poland is projected to overachieve 
its  effort  sharing  target (185).  In  2024,  GHG 
emissions from Poland’s effort sharing sectors are 
expected  to  have  been  5%  below  those  of  2005. 
By  2030,  with  current  and  planned  policies  and 
measures, 
to 
decrease  by  18.2%,  resulting  in  a  surplus  of  0.5 
percentage  points  relative  to  the  2030  target  of 
−17.7%.  Poland  is  projected  not  to  exceed  its 
effort  sharing  emission  limits  in  any  year  in  the 
2021-2030  period.  Poland  still  has  not  yet 
submitted  its  final  updated  energy  and  climate 
plan, which negatively impacts the accuracy of the 
assessment. 

(185) The  national  GHG  emission  reduction  target  is  set  out  in 
Regulation (EU) 2018/842 (the  Effort Sharing Regulation). It 
applies  jointly  to  buildings  (heating  and  cooling),  road 
transport,  agriculture,  waste  and  small  industry  (known  as 
the effort sharing sectors). The emissions from effort sharing 
sectors for 2024 are based on approximated inventory data. 
The  final  data  will  be  established 
in  2027  after  a 
comprehensive  review.  Projections  about  the  impact  of 
current  policies 
(‘with  existing  measures’,  WEM)  and 
additional  policies (‘with  additional  measures’,  WAM)  as  per 
Poland’s 2025 reporting under Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 
2018/1999 (the Governance Regulation). Also see European 
Commission  (2025),  Climate  Action  Progress  Report 2025  – 
Technical  Information,  Commission  staff  working  document, 
Brussels,  Chapter  9  (pp. 111ff.),  and  in  particular  Tables  25 
and 26. 

 
 
 
Graph A8.1: Greenhouse gas emissions in the 
effort sharing sectors, 2005, 2023, and 2024 

Source: European Environment Agency. 

Sustainable transport 

Poland has recently seen a dramatic increase 
in  the  number  of  electric  vehicles,  but  their 
market  share  is  still  very  small.  In  2025,  the 
(BEVs) 
number  of  battery  electric  vehicles 
registered  in  Poland  increased  by  73%  year-on-
year,  while  the  number  of  plug-in  hybrid  vehicles 
grew  by  75(186).  By  the  end  of  2025,  there  were 
over  237  000  passenger  electric  vehicles  in 
Poland, accounting for 1.8% of the total passenger 
cars  fleet  (187),  including  over  121  000  BEVs  and 
116  000  plug-in  hybrids.  The  share  of  hydrogen-
powered passenger cars remained low (561 by the 
end of 2025). Since the end of 2019, the number 
of  electric  vehicles  has  increased  more  than  27-
fold.  Between  2020  and  2024,  the  share  of 
consumers  considering  buying  an  electric  car 
increased  from  7%  to  26%.  Nevertheless,  by  the 
end of 2025, only around 11% of newly registered 
vehicles were electric. Growth was limited by poor 
access  to  charging  infrastructure.  Moreover,  the 
public support programmes which had significantly 
fuelled the uptake of electric vehicles, such as My 
BEV  (Moj  Elektryk) (188)  and  the  RRF-cofinanced 
OurEcar (189) programme, were being phased out. 

The  uptake  of  electric  and  zero-emission 
vehicles is  higher  in public transport  than  in 
the  private  sector.  In  2024,  zero-emission 

(186) https://www.pzpm.org.pl/pl/Elektromobilnosc/Licznik-

Elektromobilnosci/Grudzien-2025. 

(187) https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/bdl/dane/podgrup/temat  

(188) https://www.gov.pl/web/elektromobilnosc/aktualne-

ogloszenia-o-naborach. 

(189) https://www.gov.pl/web/nfosigw/program-naszeauto-do-40-

vehicles made up 1.8% of the fleet of coaches and 
buses,  although  this  was  much  less  than  the  EU 
average  of  3.3% (190).  Between  2019  and  2025, 
the number of electric zero-emission and hydrogen 
buses  increased  from  167  to  1 731  and  from  57 
to  123  respectively.  This  increase  is  expected  to 
continue.  Under  its  recovery  and  resilience  plan 
(RRP),  Poland  introduced  a  reform  requiring  large 
cities  to  purchase  zero-emission  buses  for  public 
urban  transport,  which  entered  into  force  on 
1 January  2026  and 
is  expected  to  further 
increase  the  share  of  electric  vehicles  in  public 
transport.  Under  its  RRP,  Poland  also  supports 
cities and rural  areas in purchasing zero-emission 
buses.  In  addition,  railway  transport  capacity  is 
growing 
in  Poland,  with  zero-emission/electric 
regional  rolling  stock  units  and  locomotives  being 
purchased  with  support  from  the  RRF.  The  RRF 
remained  one  of  main  drivers  of  decarbonisation 
of  public  transport:  by  April  2026,  493  of  the 
planned  1 044  zero-emission  buses  and  285  of 
the  planned  381  zero-emission  rolling  stock  units 
had already been delivered (191). 

Poland  faces  challenges  in  decarbonising 
freight  transport.  The  modal  shift  of  freight 
transport  away  from  rail  to  trucks  is  contributing 
negatively  to  decarbonisation.  The  share  of  rail 
freight  in  inland  freight  transport  fell  by  3.7% 
between  2018  and  2022.  Poland 
is  not 
counteracting  this,  as  it  does  not  yet  encourage 
the  uptake  of  zero-emission  trucks  by  exempting 
them from the infrastructure charge component of 
road  tolls (192),  which  is  a  demand-side  economic 
incentive  allowed  under  EU  law  until  30 June 
2031. 

to 

Poor  access 
fast-charging  stations 
remains  a  significant  limiting  factor  for 
electromobility  in  Poland  –  both  for  light- 
and  heavy-duty  vehicles.  By  the  end  of  2025, 
the number of charging stations in Poland reached 
14  521,  after  a  52%  increase  relative  to  the 
previous  year (193).  However,  at  13.5,  the  number 
of  light  electric  vehicles  per  public  charging  point 
was still above the EU average of 12.8. The power 
capacity of charging points in Poland is 2.4 kW per 

(190)https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/road_eqs_bus

mot__custom_19787051/default/table. 

(191) https://www.kpo.gov.pl/strony/o-kpo/energetyka-i-mobilnosc/. 

(192) https://etoll.gov.pl/en/e-toll-system/rates-and-payments/. 

tys-zl-doplaty-do-samochodu-elektrycznego. 

(193) Infrastructure | European Alternative Fuels Observatory 

83 

050100150200250200520232024MtCO2eDomestic transport (excl. aviation)Buildings (under ESR)AgricultureSmall industryWaste 
  
 
 
is  below 

electric  vehicle,  which 
the  EU 
average (194).  By  the  end  of  2024,  about  76%  of 
the  highway  network  had  a  charging  point  for 
every  50 km,  which  is  less  than  in  other  EU 
Member  States (195).  The  challenges  in  deploying 
charging  infrastructure  are  illustrated  by  the  fact 
that less than 15% of the mandated infrastructure 
for 2030 had been deployed by the end of 2025. 
The  lack  of  such  infrastructure,  especially  for 
trucks,  risks becoming  a  significant bottleneck  for 
the  uptake  of  electric  trucks  and  for  truck 
manufacturers’ ability to meet their legally binding 
sales targets. The issue is supposed to be partially 
addressed  by  programmes  to  develop  the  power 
grid for future electric car charging stations and by 
support  for  the  construction  or  expansion  of 
publicly  accessible  charging  stations  for  heavy 
transport. That support is being coordinated by the 
National  Fund  for  Environmental  Protection  and 
Water Management (NFOŚ) and financed from the 
Modernisation Fund (196). 

current 

electromobility 

the  RRF,  which  supported 

The 
support 
programmes  struggle  with  low  prioritisation 
important 
for  public  spending.  The  most 
programmes  supporting 
the  development  of 
electromobility  in  Poland  were  ‘My  electric  car’ 
(2021-2025), managed  by  NFOŚ,  followed  by the 
‘My e-car’ programme (from 2025 to April  2026), 
financed  by 
the 
acquisition, lease or rental of M1, M2 or N1 BEVs, 
with higher support granted to larger families. The 
‘My electric bike’ programme (managed by NFOŚ), 
which  is  aimed  at  supporting  the  acquisition  of 
electric bikes, was subject to public consultation in 
2024-2025, but has not been implemented yet in 
2026  and  remains  in  the  ‘project’  stage.  The 
‘Green  public  transport’  programme  (managed  by 
NFOŚ  and  financed  by  the  RRF)  supports  the 
purchase  of  zero-emission  buses  for  public 
transport  in  municipalities  as  well  as  purchase  or 
leasing of zero-emission vehicles of categories N2 
and  N3.  NFOŚ  has  organised  a  series  of  calls  for 
proposals  for  local  governments  to  support  the 
deployment  of  charging  infrastructure,  including 
for heavy-duty vehicles. 

(194) https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/number-of-
electric-light-duty-vehicles-per-public-charging-point-and-
kilowatt-per-electric-light-duty-vehicle-2024. 

(195) https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/7ea38b60-3033-
42a6-9589-71134f4229f4/GlobalEVOutlook2025.pdf. 

(196) https://www.gov.pl/web/funduszmodernizacyjny/Programy-

Priorytetowe. 

84 

Sustainable industry 

Circular economy industry 

In  2019,  Poland  adopted  a  road map for  the 
transition  to  a  circular  economy (197),  which 
focused on  four areas of action:  sustainable 
sustainable 
production, 
industrial 
consumption,  bioeconomy  and  new  business 
models.  The  road  map  provided  a  set  of  tools 
aimed at creating the conditions for implementing 
a  new  economic  model  in  Poland.  The  actions 
mainly  concerned  analytical  and  conceptual  work, 
information  and  promotion,  and  coordination  in 
individual 
areas  falling  within  the  remit  of 
ministries.  Implementation  of  the  road  map  has 
been slow, but the first actions included setting up 
a government information platform for the circular 
economy and developing a system of indicators to 
assess  progress  towards  a  circular  economy.  The 
road  map  was  intended  to  run  until  the  end  of 
2023  and  has  not  been  updated.  Therefore,  from 
2024,  the  only  planning  document  for  waste 
management at national level is the 2028 national 
waste management (198). 

Despite  recent  improvement,  Poland  ranks 
below the EU average as regards the circular 
economy 
indicators.  The  country’s  circular 
material  use  rate (199)  was  7.7%  in  2024 (200)  (EU 
average: 
resource 
productivity (201)  reached  EUR 1.38  per  kg  (EU 
average:  EUR 2.99  per  kg)(202).  Raw  material 
consumption  has  remained  quite  stable  since 
in 
2015, 

reaching  15.3 tonnes  per 

12.2%), 

capita 

while 

its 

(197) Mapa drogowa GOZ - Gospodarka Obiegu Zamkniętego w 

Praktyce, Link. 

(198) Krajowy plan gospodarki odpadami 2028, Link. 

(199) Circular material use rate (CMUR) is the share of the total 

amount of material used in the economy that is accounted 
for by recycled waste. A higher CMUR value means that more 
secondary materials were used as a substitute for raw 
materials, thus reducing the environmental impact of 
extracting primary material. 

(200) Eurostat - Circular material use rate, Link. 
(201) Resource productivity measures the total amount of 

materials directly used by an economy in relation to gross 
domestic product (GDP). 

(202) Eurostat – Resource productivity, Link 

 
 
 
2023 (203)  (EU  average:  13.7),  underscoring  a 
persistent reliance on primary resources. 

On 
the  other  hand,  Poland  continues  to 
generate  less  municipal  waste  per  capita 
(387 kg  in  2024) (204)  than  the  EU  average 
(517 kg)  and,  since  2016, 
its  waste 
generation  has  decoupled  from  economic 
growth.  In  2024,  31%  of  municipal  waste  was 
recycled  (EU  average:  48%),  while  as  much  as 
30%  was  still  landfilled  (EU  average:  21%).  This 
means that, despite improvement, Poland is not on 
track  to  reach  the  2025  EU  target  of  preparing 
55%  of  municipal  waste  for  reuse  and  recycling. 
Nor  is  it  on  track  to  meet  the  2035  target  of 
landfilling  a  maximum  10%  of  municipal  waste. 
Municipal  waste  incineration  has  increased  over 
time  and  reached  22%  of  the  municipal  waste 
generated  in  2024.  On  a  positive  note,  Poland’s 
recycling  rate  for  plastic  packaging  improved 
in  2023  (EU 
significantly  and  reached  46% 
average:  42%) (205).  On  1 October  2025,  a 
mandatory  deposit-refund  system  was  launched 
for  beverage  packaging,  aimed  at  boosting 
recycling  of  this  waste  stream.  Consumers  pay  a 
deposit on PET bottles and metal cans (PLN 0.5 or 
around  EUR 0.11)  and  reusable  glass  bottles 
(PLN 1  or  around  EUR 0.23),  which  is  refundable 
without a receipt. 

Poland is  not  very innovative when  it  comes 
to  circular  economy  solutions.  In  2021,  the 
country  filed  only  14  patents  for  climate  change 
mitigation  technologies  relating  to  wastewater 
treatment  or  waste  management  and  is  on  a 
downward  trend  (in  2012,  Poland  filed  53  such 
patents). Although the number of people employed 
in  the  circular  economy  sector  increased  by 
8% (206)  between  2014  and  2023,  the  sector’s 
share  in  the  overall  employment  rate  fell  slightly 
from  2.4%  to  2.3%  in  the  same  period  (EU 
average: 2%). 

Poland  applies  fiscal  tools  for  circular 
practices, but there is room for improvement. 
Poland  has  a  landfill  tax  of  PLN 270  per  tonne 

(EUR 60  per  tonne).  Landfilling  of  separately 
collected  biodegradable  waste  was  banned  in 
2013.  In  addition,  since  2016,  there  has  been  a 
ban  in  place  on  the  landfilling  of  combustible 
waste  with  a  total  organic  carbon  content  above 
5%,  a  loss  of  ignition  value  above  8%  and  a 
calorific  value  exceeding  6 MJ/kg (207).  However, 
the country has no incineration tax. 

an 

and 

covers 

system 

extended 

responsibility 

Poland  has  a  mandatory  pay-as-you-throw 
system 
producer 
responsibility system in place. The pay-as-you-
throw  system  is  targeted  only  at  non-household 
sources  of  municipal  waste.  The  extended 
producer 
all 
packaging  waste  fractions  from  both  household 
and non-household sources, but there is no system 
of advanced fee modulation in place to discourage 
the  use  of  difficult-to-recycle  plastic  types  or 
combinations  of  materials.  Poland  has  a  tax  on 
plastic carrier bags and fees for single-use plastic 
products.  The  country  has  achieved  a  noticeable 
reduction  in  the  consumption  of  plastic  carrier 
bags per capita – from 23 in 2019 to less than 7 
in  2023,  which  is  the  second-best  result  in  the 
EU (208). 

to 

an 

EUR 1 251 million 

in  2021-2027,  with 

To meet its environmental objectives for the 
circular  economy  and  waste,  Poland  would 
need  to  increase  investment  in  the  circular 
economy  by  an  estimated  EUR 979 million  per 
additional 
year 
EUR 272 million for waste management action not 
linked  to  the  circular  economy.  Combined,  this 
amounts 
year, 
representing  0.19%  of  Poland’s  GDP.  Of  this 
circular  economy  gap,  EUR 256 million  is  covered 
by  recent  initiatives,  such  as:  (i) eco-design  for 
sustainable  products,  packaging  and  packaging 
waste;  (ii)  labelling  and  digital  tools;  (iii) critical 
raw material recycling; and (iv) measures proposed 
under  the  amended  Waste  Framework  Directive. 
EUR 723 million  constitutes  further 
investment 
needed  to  unlock  Poland’s  circular  economy 
potential (209). 

per 

Bioeconomy industry 

(203) Eurostat – Material footprint., Link. 

(204)Eurostat – Municipal waste by waste management 

operations,  

Link. 

(207) EEA, Early warning assessment related to the 2025 targets 

for municipal and packaging waste – Poland, 2022. 

(208) Eurostat – Consumption of lightweight plastic carrier bags, 

(205) Eurostat – Packaging waste by waste management 

Link. 

operations, Link. 

(209) European Commission, Environmental Implementation 

(206) Eurostat, Persons employed in circular economy sectors, Link. 

Review (2025), Poland country report, Link. 

85 

 
 
 
In  Poland,  bioeconomy  value  added  has 
grown  significantly  in  recent  years  (7.9% 
between  2018  and  2023),  driven  in  particular  by 
the  food  and  beverages  and  bio-based  chemicals 
and  plastics  subsectors.  The  food  and  beverages 
subsector  registered  the  highest  growth  in  value 
added  (7.9%  on  average  between  2018  and 
2023) (210). 

Overall  bioeconomy  employment  has  fallen 
slightly.  However,  the  bio-based  chemicals  and 
plastics  as  well  as  wood  products  and  furniture 
subsectors  bucked that trend,  recording  growth  in 
total employment between 2018 and 2023 (3.9% 
and 0.1% on average respectively) (211)(212). 

Labour  productivity  in  the  bioeconomy  – 
measured  as value  added  per person  employed  – 
stood  at  62.0%  of  the  national  average  and  has 
grown from 53.0% in 2018 (213). 

in 

region; 

the  Lodzkie 

focusing  on 

technology  parks 

R&D business expenditure from bioeconomy-
relevant  subsectors  has  grown  slightly  more 
than  the  overall  R&D  business  expenditure  in 
Poland  (13.3%  compared  with  an  average  of 
11.3% between 2018 and 2023) (214). Poland has 
several 
the 
bioeconomy,  such  as  the  Kutno  Agro-industrial 
the  Wrocław 
Park 
Technology  Park  (coordinator  of  the  Nutribiomed 
cluster)  in  the  Dolnoslaskie  region;  and  Łódzki 
Naukowo-Technologiczny 
Regionalny 
(coordinator of BioNanoPark) in the Lodzkie region. 
In  addition,  the  International  Centre  for  Research 
on  Innovative  Bio-based  Materials.  (ICRI-BioM)  in 
Lodz is a cooperation between the Lodz University 
of  Technology  and  the  Max  Planck  Institute  in 
Mainz,  Germany  (215).  The  Wrocław  University  of 
Environmental  and  Life  Sciences  (UPWr)  in  the 
is  a  highly  specialised 
lower  Silesia  region 
university  with  a  research  centre  specialising  in 

Park 

(210)Joint  Research  Centre,  Developments  of  Economic  Growth 
and Employment in Bioeconomy Sectors across the EU, Link. 

(211) Ibid. 

(212)Bioeconomy  subsectors:  food  and  beverages;  bio-based 
textiles;  wood  products  and  furniture;  bio-based  chemicals  and 
plastics. 

(213)Joint Research Centre, Developments of Economic Growth 
and Employment in Bioeconomy Sectors across the EU, Link. 

(214)Joint Research Centre, Business expenditure in Research and 
Development (R&D) in the EU bioeconomy, Link. 

environment, 
technologies in the food sector. 

agri-business 

and 

innovative 

a 

developing 

The  Polish  National  Hub  for  Bioeconomy  is 
currently 
bottom-up 
contribution  to  the  roadmap  for  the  circular 
bioeconomy  in  Poland.  This  work  is  intended  to 
provide a structured and practical basis for future 
national action and will be subject to consultations 
with key ministries. The development of a national 
Bioeconomy  Strategy  would  be  the  next  step,  in 
which the National Hub for Bioeconomy could play 
a supportive role. However, such a process requires 
a  political  decision  and 
leadership  from  a 
responsible ministry. The current bottom-up effort 
is therefore aimed at creating a strong foundation 
and momentum for such a strategic process. 

Zero-pollution industry 

Over the past two decades, Poland has made 
progress  in  reducing  key  air  pollutants,  but 
challenges  remain.  Emissions  of  several  air 
pollutants  have  decreased  significantly  in  Poland 
since 2005, while GDP growth has continued (216)). 
In 2024, emission levels above the limit values set 
by the Ambient Air Quality Directive (2008/50/EU) 
)two  air  quality 
were  still  recorded  for  NO2(
zones and for PM10 in five air quality zones (218). 

217

Despite  this  progress,  Poland  continues  to 
grapple  with  significant  air  pollution  costs. 
For 2023, the European Environment Agency (EEA) 
points to an estimated 1 191 years of life lost per 
100 000  inhabitants  at  risk  attributable  to  air 
pollution due to PM2.5 concentrations that exceed 
the  World  Health  Organization’s  air  quality 
guideline levels (219). 

A recent OECD study (220) on the impact of air 
pollution  on  labour  productivity  suggests 
that improvements in air quality contributed 
significantly to labour productivity growth in 

(216) European Commission, Environmental Implementation 

Review (2025), Poland country report, Link. 

(217) Strefa Dolnośląska, Aglomeracja Krakowska, Strefa 

Malopolska., Aglomeracja Górnośląska and Strefa Śląska. 

(218) EEA, Eionet Central Data Repository, Link. 

(219) EEA, 2025, Harm to human health from air pollution in 

Europe: burden of disease status, 2025, Link. 

(220) Dechezleprêtre, A. and Vienne, V., 2025, The impact of air 

(215) ICRI-BioM — Międzynarodowe Agendy Badawcze, Link. 

pollution on labour productivity (EN), Link. 

86 

 
 
 
Europe since 2000 and could further contribute to 
economic development in the future. This positive 
contribution  has  been  unequally  distributed 
geographically,  with  Poland  being  one  of  the 
countries  with  the  biggest  air  pollution  reduction 
and  hence  the  biggest  labour  productivity  gain. 
Poland  may  have  experienced  a  4.8%  increase  in 
labour  productivity  since  2000  thanks  to  cleaner 
air. 

Investment  in  pollution  reduction  still  falls 
short.  To  meet  its  environmental  objectives  for 
pollution  prevention  and  control,  Poland  would 
need  to  invest  an  additional  EUR 1.6 billion  per 
year (0.24% of GDP), mostly in relation to clean air 
and noise (224). 

States  whose 

On  the  other  hand,  over  the  last  decade, 
Poland  has  consistently  been  in  the  top  five 
facilities 
EU  Member 
contributed  the  highest  external  costs  of 
industrial  air  emissions.  In  2021,  the  external 
cost  aggregated  over  all  pollutants  was 
EUR 50 billion  in  Poland,  following  the  value  of  a 
statistical life (VSL) methodology. This underscores 
the potential benefit of action to reduce emissions, 
particularly 
regions  and  urban 
transport corridors. 

industrial 

in 

sector 

(total  organic 

Water pollution from industry also remains a 
critical challenge. In 2022, Poland had the third 
highest  emissions  of  heavy  metals  to  water  and 
was in fourth position for emission intensity, above 
the  EU  average  intensity  of  0.86 kg/EUR 1 billion 
GVA (221).  The  main 
industrial  contributors  to 
emissions  to  water  in  Poland  are  the  waste 
management 
carbon, 
phosphorus  and  heavy  metals)  and  the  chemical 
(nitrogen  and  hydrocarbons).  However, 
sector 
nitrogen  pollution  also  results  from  atmospheric 
deposition  from  burning  fossil  fuels.  Water 
pollution  by  industry  imposes  direct  and  indirect 
costs  of  EUR  19  million  annually  (222),  not  yet 
sufficiently  borne  by  the  polluters.  On  a  positive 
note,  industrial  heavy  metal  releases  (cadmium, 
mercury,  nickel  and  lead)  were  down  by  83%  in 
Poland  compared  with  2010,  while  total  organic 
carbon  emissions  to  water  decreased  by  55% 
since  2010,  as  reported  under  the  Industrial 
Emissions Directive (223). 

(221) European Environment Agency (EEA) – Industrial pollutant 

releases to water in Europe, Link. 

(222) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, 
IEEP, Green taxation and other economic instruments – 
Internalising environmental costs to make the polluter pay 
(p. 35, Table 5), 2021, Link. 

(223) EEA, Water pollutant releases changes from 2010 to 2022 

for the EU Member States, 2024, Link. 

(224) European Commission, Environmental Implementation 

Review (2025), Poland country report, Link. 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A8.1:  Key clean industry and climate mitigation indicators: Poland 

Sources and notes: Industry decarbonisation: All data are from Eurostat; data following the UNFCCC Common Reporting 
Format (CRF) are from the European Environment Agency (EEA), republished by Eurostat. (1) Sectors covered: all divisions of 
section C - Manufacturing - of the NACE Rev. 2 statistical classification of economic activities, except C19 (manufacture of coke 
and refined petroleum products). (2) GHG emissions as per UNFCCC Common Reporting Framework (CRF) categories 1.A.2 - fuel 
combustion in manufacturing in industries and construction (that broadly correspond to the broadly correspond to the NACE 
sections C - Manufacturing and E - Construction, excluding C-19),  and CRF2 - industrial processes and product use. The figures 
shows the emissions in the 1.A.2 category as a share of the sum of CRF1.A.2. and CRF2 emissions. (3) Sectors covered: CRF 1.A.2 
as described above. Gross value added (GVA) data in the denominator aligned in sectoral coverage, in 2020 prices. (4) Sectors 
covered: NACE section C excluding C19. (5) Nominator: NACE divisions C17, 20, 23, 24; denominator: NACE section C excluding 
C19 (see above). (6) GVA (denominator) in 2020 prices. Reduction of effort sharing emissions: Data source: European 
Environment Agency, greenhouse gas data viewer; European Commission, Climate Action Progress Report, 2025. For details, see 
the footnote in the "Reduction of effort sharing emissions" section. Sustainable road transport: (7) Source: Eurostat; (8) Source: 
European Alternative Fuels Observatory; (9) Source: Eurostat. For all climate mitigation indicators, the trend arrows compare the 
latest available data (year t) with the data four years earlier (t-4). Sustainable industry: Bioeconomy value added, employment 
and productivity: JRC, Developments of Economic Growth and Employment in Bioeconomy Sectors across the EU. Bioeconomy 
R&D business expenditure: JRC, Business expenditure in Research and Development (R&D) in the EU bioeconomy. Damage cost for 
industrial pollution: EEA, The costs to health and the environment from industrial air pollution in Europe, 2024. Water industrial 
pollutants releases: EEA, Industrial releases of pollutants to water and economic activity in the EU-27, 2024. Water chemical 
status: WISE, Surface water bodies: Chemical status, 2024 and WISE Groundwater bodies: chemical status, 2024. Other indicators: 
Eurostat. For circular economy indicators, the trend arrows compare the latest available data (year t) with the data two years 
earlier (t-2). 

88 

Climate mitigationTrendIndustry decarbonisation201820192020202120222023202420182023GHG emissions intensity of manufacturing production, g/€ (1)6485996036145070-330-Share of energy-related emissions in industrial GHG emissions (2)55.855.854.555.554.357.4-55.557.9Energy-related GHG emissions intensity of manufacturing and construction, g/€ (3)377.9349.9343.4355.4290.7262.2-203.9163.0Share of electricity and renewables in final energy consumption in manufacturing, % (4)39.840.541.639.140.637.742.342.843.9Energy intensity of manufacturing, GWh/€ (4)2.132.022.072.121.741.501.591.271.05Share of energy-intensive industries in manufacturing production, % in GVA (5)16.8616.2016.3917.7417.39----GHG emissions intensity of production in sector [...], g/€ (6)- paper and paper products (NACE C17) 791          825          725                 684            613                  549           -722             619            - chemicals and chemical products (NACE C20) 3 549       3 418       3 366              3 744         3 223               2 709        ---- other non-metallic mineral products (NACE C23) 3 574       3 823       3 787              3 867         3 596               3 834        -2 495          2 352         - basic metals (NACE C24) 4 696       4 193       3 905              4 156         4 084               3 371        -2 842          3 099         Reduction of effort sharing emissions201820192020202120222023202420182023GHG emission reductions relative to base year, % 7.52.01.7-5.0- domestic road transport80.283.074.989.291.889.481.9-1.4-5.6- buildings-2.6-12.7-11.2-8.8-20.5-21.0-27.8-20.3-33.520052021202220232024TargetWEMWAMEffort sharing: GHG emissions, Mt; target, gap, %192.5206.9196.4195.7182.9-17.7%-14.3%-18.2%Sustainable road transport2018201920202021202220232024202520182021New zero-emission vehicles, electricity motor, % (7)0.130.260.851.572.683.582.991.038.96Number of publicly accessible AC/DC charging points (8)--1586251034496091955514521446956n/aShare of electrified railways, % of total (9)61.7761.8962.4962.7462.7162.4662.2555.4756.49Sustainable industryTrendEU-27Circular economy transition20182019202020212022202320242018latest dataMaterial footprint, tonnes per person17.216.216.216.716.315.315.014.813.7Circular material use rate, %10.5          9.2           7.4                  7.0             6.7                    7.8             7.711.612.2Resource productivity, €/kg0.7            0.8           0.8                  0.9             1.0                    1.2             1.42.13.0Employees in circular economy2.5            2.52.5                  2.5             2.3                    2.3             -2.12.0Patents in circular economy28.7123.8         29.4                14.5           12.312.0Recycling rate           34.3           34.1                  38.7             40.3                   40.9            27.6 31.1            46.4048.1Plastic recyling 36%32%---46%-41%42%Construction and demolition waste (CDW) recovery 84-748889Bioeconomy industry 2018201920202021202220232024CAGR 2018-202320182023Value added, million EUR34 82837 01438 41239 61949 43955 067-7.9%642 438863 436Employment, total number of people employed2 436 6692 309 0282 362 1362 393 9102 378 9382 291 714--1.0%17 649 04017 085 642ProductivityValued added per worker, thousand EUR14.316.016.316.620.824.0-9.0%36.450.5Valued added per worker, % of national average53.056.858.356.461.762.0--62.270.7R&D business expenditureTotal bioeconomy (biomass producing and converting sectors)31341737043550066413.3%15 67223 335Total R&D business expenditure3 9784 4284 5825 2076 2867 549-11.3%196 587259 525Zero pollution industry201820192020202120222023202420182021Damage cost for industrial pollution53.144.934.250.0---414.9352.7Water industrial pollutants releases 2021change (2010)2021change (2010)2021change (2010)2021change (2010)10 911     -83%9 855 200       -55%-                   -37%424 080      -36% Water chemical statusGood1 050              Good (%)0.2                    Poor2268.0Poor (%)54%EUTOCPhosporusPolandPolandCd, Hg, Ni, Pbnitrogen 
 
  
 
 
ANNEX 9: AFFORDABLE ENERGY TRANSITION 

This  annex  outlines  the  progress  made  and 
the  ongoing  challenges  faced  in  increasing 
energy  affordability,  while  advancing  the 
transition 
the 
implementation  of  past  energy-related  country 
specific recommendations (CSRs). 

to  net  zero. 

reflects 

It 

that  did  not  submit  its  updated  national  energy 
and climate plan. 

Energy prices and costs 

that 

signals 

The  2025  energy-related  CSR  highlights  the 
need  for  Poland  to:  promote  balanced 
electricity  price 
support 
investments  in  clean  electricity  generation 
by  adjusting  taxes  and  levies  on  electricity 
for households and industry relative to those 
on  fossil  fuels;  promote  and  increase  grid 
cross-border 
capacity, 
limiting  market 
electricity 
restrictions to those justified under EU rules; 
accelerate the phaseout of coal in heating by 
adopting 
energy-efficient 
systems  powered  by  renewables;  and  phase 
out fossil fuel subsidies, particularly for coal 
mining. 

flexibility 
trade  while 

decarbonised, 

and 

grid 

hinder 

further 

penetration 

congestion while 

The  decarbonisation  of  the  Polish  energy 
system is progressing, but challenges persist. 
Although  progress  has  been  made  in  deploying 
solar  PV  installations,  the  Polish  system  is  still 
dominated  by  fossil  fuels.  Moreover,  district 
heating  remains  largely  reliant  on  coal.  Grid 
bottlenecks 
of 
renewable energy, with curtailment of renewables 
becoming  more  prevalent.  Further  integration  of 
the  electricity  and  heat  sectors  is  one  way  of 
addressing 
promoting 
decarbonisation. Power-to-heat technologies (such 
as  heat  pumps  and  e-boilers)  in  district  heating 
systems  can  operate  cost-effectively  during 
periods of high generation from renewable energy 
sources  (RESs)  and  falling  electricity  prices,  but 
only  few  demonstration  projects  exist  in  Poland. 
Additional  capacity  has  been  promoted  through 
instruments  rewarding  flexibility  and 
lowering 
network  charges.  Significant  investment  in  non-
fossil  grid  flexibility  and  the  reinforcement  of 
internal grids have yet to bear fruit in a context of 
increasing RES curtailment. Industry pays some of 
the  EU. 
the  highest  electricity  prices 
Electrification is progressing slowly, due in part to 
the  unfavourable  electricity-to-gas  price  ratio, 
exacerbated  by higher  taxation  on  electricity  than 
on  gas.  Both  industrial  and  household  consumers 
pay around three times as much for electricity as 
for gas. Poland remains the only EU Member State 

in 

In 

Although  government  action  has  kept 
household energy bills below the EU average 
in  recent  years,  industrial  consumers  in 
Poland have faced above-average prices. The 
disproportionately  skewed  tax  burden  on 
electricity in Poland undermines affordability 
and  distorts  accurate  price  signals  for 
electrification. 
the  first  half  of  2025, 
household  electricity  prices  in  Poland  remained 
below the EU average, at EUR 0.2559/kWh, largely 
due  to(225)  the  price  cap  introduced  in  2023).  The 
cap stopped being applied in early 2026. Although 
industrial  consumers 
retail  energy  prices  for 
(EUR 172/MWh)  fell  slightly  in  the  first  half  of 
2025, 
the  EU  average 
(EUR 164/MWh). While 40% of the electricity price 
for industry is accounted for by the wholesale cost, 
network  cost,  carbon  cost  and  taxes  represent 
19%, 24% and 17% respectively of the electricity 
bill. 

remain  above 

they 

Final energy prices in Poland are unbalanced, 
mainly  due  to  disproportionately  skewed 
taxation  on  electricity.  For  large  businesses, 
electricity was 3.1 times more expensive than gas 
in  first  half  of  2025  (up  from  2.9  in  the  second 
half  of  2024),  primarily  due  to  the  tax  structure. 
For  non-household  consumers,  taxes  and  levies 
account,  on  average,  for  35%  of  electricity  bills, 
but  for  only  2%  of  gas  bills.  Excluding  taxes  and 
levies, the electricity-to-gas price ratio would have 
fallen  to  2.  A  similar,  though  smaller,  effect  is 
visible  for  households,  where  the  ratio  decreases 
from 3.1 to 2.8 once taxes are excluded (226). It is, 

(225)The same trend can be observed in household gas prices, 
where October estimates remained below the EU average. 
Source: Household Energy Price Index. 

(226) Analysis  based  on  Eurostat  data  for  industrial  consumers 
(first  half  of  2025).  Since  Poland  did  not  report  any 
household gas prices to Eurostat, VaasaETT data were used 
instead  for  household  consumers  (with  October  2025 
estimates  as  a  proxy  for  the  first  half  of  2025).  An 
alternative  data  source  was  used  for  household  consumers 
because Poland had not disclosed its household gas prices to 
Eurostat.  The  data  are  sourced  from  VaasaETT,  which 
collects  prices  from  capitals  and  large  cities  across  the  EU. 
For  non-household  consumers,  the  consumption  band  is  ID 

89 

 
 
 
 
 
increased 

Poland  increased  by  8%  in  2025  amid  rising 
natural  gas  costs  and  structurally  expensive  coal. 
Short-run  marginal  costs (228)  of  gas  and  coal  in 
the  EU 
from  EUR 96/MWh  and 
EUR 94.50/MWh  in  2024  to  EUR 103/MWh  and 
EUR 95.80/MWh  respectively  in  2025.  Although 
daytime prices have fallen in recent years owing to 
the  growing  penetration  of  solar  power,  Poland 
remains  vulnerable  to  severe  price  spikes  during 
peak-demand  hours.  This  is  because  falling  solar 
output in the evening and early morning, combined 
with 
leads  to  a 
significant ramp-up of thermal plants to cover the 
supply–demand 
price 
spreads (229)) in Poland averaged EUR 135/MWh in 
2025,  a  12%  increase  compared  to  2024  and 
above the EU average of EUR 121/MWh. 

limited  non-fossil  flexibility, 

gap.  As 

result, 

a 

Graph A9.2: Low-carbon electricity generation vs. 
electricity wholesale prices, 2025 

Unavailable data for Cyprus and Malta. Wholesale price is 
given as average of day-ahead electricity prices over 2025. 
EU-27 average is calculated as consumption-weighted. EU 
low-carbon share is calculated out of total EU electricity 
generation. Low-carbon share by country is calculated out of 
total public electricity generation. Low-carbon includes 
renewables and nuclear. 
Source: Eurostat 

Act 

however,  important  to  note  that  the  Polish  Excise 
energy-intensive 
Duty 
businesses to obtain partial relief from excise duty 
on consumed electricity. 

certain 

allows 

Graph A9.1: Electricity and gas prices for 
household and non-household consumers, S1 
2025 

(i) For household consumers, the consumption band is DC for 
electricity and D2 for gas. 
(ii) For non-household consumers, the consumption band is ID 
for electricity and I4 for gas. VAT and recoverable charges are 
not displayed for non-household consumers as these are 
typically recovered by businesses. This also applies to the ‘% 
of taxes and levies’, which is shown excluding VAT and 
recoverable charges for non-household consumers. 
(iii) ‘Without taxes and levies’ indicates the retail price 
excluding all taxes and levies. It always includes the 
energy/supply and network cost components, which are not 
disaggregated in Eurostat’s six-monthly price dataset. 
Source: Eurostat 

for 

fuels 

fossil 

Due  to  a  combination  of  reliance  on 
expensive 
electricity 
generation and a lack of non-fossil flexibility 
and 
interconnectivity,  Poland’s  wholesale 
electricity  prices  averaged  EUR 105/MWh  in 
2025 (227)),  the  ninth  highest  in  the  EU  (the 
EU average was  EUR 85/MWh in 2025). Fossil 
fuels  still  accounted  for  67.3%  of  electricity 
generation  (54%  coal)  -  third-highest  fossil  fuel 
share  in  the  electricity  mix,  maintaining  their 
structural  role  as  the  dominant,  and  costly, 
marginal  price-setting  technology  (83%  of  price-
setting 
electricity 
generation)Average  day-ahead  electricity prices  in 

67.3% 

hours 

for 

for  electricity  and  I4  for  gas.  The  term  ‘non-household 
consumers’  refers  to  large  consumers,  providing  insight  into 
international  competitiveness.  (The  price  used  for  the 
calculation excludes VAT and other recoverable taxes, levies 
and  fees  as  non-household  consumers  are  usually  able  to 
recover VAT and some other taxes). 

(227) Ember. 

(228) Short-run marginal costs (SRMCs) are the sum of the variable 
costs  associated  with  producing  electricity  using  hard  coal 
and  fossil  gas.  These  are  fuel  costs,  carbon  costs  and 
variable  operating  and  maintenance  costs.  Estimates  are 
provided by Ember. 

(229) ‘Spread’  refers  to  the  difference  between  the  highest  and 
lowest hourly day-ahead electricity prices in a single day. 

90 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Flexibility and electricity grids 

fully  removing  cross-border  constraints  is  still 
highly dependent on further grid reinforcement. 

the 

factors. 

importer 

(1%  of 

in  2025, 

to  various 

The  level  of  interconnection  of  the  Polish 
electricity  system  with  the  neighbouring 
Member States remains low. Poland is a slight 
net  electricity 
its  own 
consumption),  exporting  significant  volumes  to 
Slovakia,  while  importing  from  Germany  and 
Sweden.  At  4.3% 
level  of 
interconnection  is  well  below  the  2030  target  of 
15%.  The  situation  has  not  improved  in  recent 
years,  due 
Increasing 
deployment of new power generation has led to a 
further  reduction  in  the  level  of  interconnection. 
Capacity  allocation  constraints  are  one  of  the 
factors  negatively  affecting  interconnectivity  and 
are to be resolved mainly by internally reinforcing 
the grid. The fact that there are no plans for new 
interconnectors in the longer run is also a point of 
concern. The only cross-border electricity project of 
common  interest  at  the  moment  is  the  Harmony 
Link  with  Lithuania.  The  project  has  faced  some 
delays in the past due to a change in design, but it 
is  now  advancing  and 
to  be 
commissioned 
in  2030.  At  the  same  time, 
additional  efforts  are  being  made  to  increase 
transfer  capacity  to  Ukraine  by  modernising  the 
existing lines. 

is  planned 

Despite  some  progress  in  2024,  available 
estimates  suggest  that  Poland  has  not  yet 
reached an adequate level of technical cross-
border  capacity,  following  the  2025  CSR  to 
‘increase  cross-border  electricity  trading, 
and limit restrictions to cases justified under 
EU energy market rules, particularly in cases 
involving  constraints  in  allocating  national 
capacity’ (230)). Member States are to ensure that 
at least 70% of technical cross-border capacity is 
available 
trading.  Poland  has  declared 
allocation  constraints  limiting  total  exchanges  to 
and  from  the  Polish  bidding  zone  and  benefits 
from  a  derogation  on  the  grounds  of  excessive 
loop  flow  from  neighbouring  Member  States.  In 
June  2024,  as  part  of  Poland’s  recovery  and 
resilience  plan,  the  Polish  transmission  system 
operator  implemented  a  significant  reform  of  the 
balancing  market 
allocation 
to 
constraints.  Despite  this,  the  TSO’s  reliance  on 
redispatching  shows  that  the  long-term  goal  of 

eliminate 

for 

(230) 2025 Monitoring Report, ACER. 

91 

The 

national 

Planned  investments  in  the  grid  focus  more 
internal  constraints, 
on  addressing  the 
‘boost  grid 
following  the  2025  CSR  to 
capacity’. 
network 
2025 
development  plan,  which  runs  until  2034,  makes 
provision  for  PLN 64  billion  in  investments  to 
modernise  transmission  networks  and  enable 
further 
integration  of  renewables,  marking  a 
significant  increase  from  the  previous  plan.  The 
Polish  transmission  system  operator  has  also 
already  started  to  make  investments  that  will 
allow  energy  to  be  collected  from  offshore  wind 
farms and from a nuclear power plant to be built 
in the future. The Recovery and Resilience Facility 
(RRF)  is  providing  substantial  support  for  the 
construction  or  modernisation  of  distribution 
networks. 

response, 

Although  some  action  has  been  taken  to 
follow  the  2025  CSR  to  ‘boost  flexibility’, 
non-fossil  flexibility,  including  storage  and 
remains 
demand-side 
underutilised.  Demand-response  solutions,  such 
as  independent  aggregators,  face  market  access 
barriers. While demand response can participate in 
the  capacity  market  and  has  been  awarded 
contracts  representing  4-8%  of  the  total  capacity 
awarded  between  2021  and  2028,  it  is  currently 
not  allowed  access  to  wholesale  energy  markets. 
Access  to  the  balancing  market  is  possible,  but 
barriers  remain,  such  as  the  long  prequalification 
time or the high minimum bid. The Polish capacity 
market  has  also  awarded  contracts  to  non-fossil 
flexibility  assets,  such  as  battery  storage  or 
pumped  hydro  storage 
(2 GW  and  1.15 GW 
respectively)  for  2028.  About  2 GW  of  installed 
storage capacity is currently operational in Poland 
and  a  further  2.7 GW  has  been  announced.  The 
recovery and resilience plan includes investment in 
battery  energy  storage  systems  and  a  pumped 
hydroelectric  energy  storage  facility.  A  recent 
amendment  to  the  Building  Law  introduced  more 
favourable  conditions  for  the  development  of 
small-scale energy storage systems, removing the 
requirement  for  building  permits  to  construct 
energy  storage  facilities  with  capacity  of  up  to 
30 kWh. 

In  the  past  few  years,  Poland  has  had  an 
increasing 
curtailments  and 
occurrences  of  negative  electricity  prices. 
This  has  taken  on  greater  significance  due  to  the 

level  of 

 
 
in 

leading 

the  mix, 

lack  of  non-fossil  flexibility  and  the  growth  of 
to  periodic 
renewables 
electricity  surpluses  when  weather  conditions  are 
favourable. Poland’s large fleet of coal-fired plants 
have limited operational flexibility and struggle to 
the  varying  production  of 
to 
adapt  output 
renewable  energy 
sources.  Negative  prices 
occurred  53  times  in  2024,  representing  197 
hours.  Between  January  and  June  2025,  Poland 
had more hours of negative electricity prices than 
it  had  done  in  all  of  2024.  The  year-on-year 
increase reached 50%. In terms of curtailment, the 
volume of RES energy redispatched between June 
and  September  2025,  was  almost  double  that 
from  summer  2024,  reaching  almost  500 GWh, 
with  solar  PV  installations  accounting  for  75%  of 
the  total)  Although  in  2023  Poland  amended  its 
energy law to require compensation for generators 
affected  by 
for 
calculating fair payments remains unclear. 

redispatching, 

the  process 

continues 

empowerment 

low) (231),  with 

Consumer 
to 
progress steadily. To benefit from price signals, 
since  August  2024,  customers  have  had  the  right 
to  enter  into  dynamic-price  contracts  with  any 
supplier  serving  more  than  200 000  customers. 
This has increased the household switching rate by 
one  fifth  since  2023  (although,  at  0.4%,  it  is  still 
the  vast  majority  of 
very 
households  still  on  regulated  tariffs  (63%)  or 
fixed-price  contracts  (26%)  with  no  incentives  for 
flexibility.  By  the  end  of  2025,  about  50%(232)  of 
Polish  household  had  access  to  smart  meters,  a 
substantial  progress  compared  to  2023,  but  still 
below the EU average of 63% and the 2030 target 
of  80%.  The  accelerated  roll-out  of  smart meters 
further  accelerate  off-peak  demand 
could 
management. 
consumers 
participating  actively  in  the  electricity  market 
though  prosuming  is  rising  (9%  of  households  in 
Poland,  an  increase  of  14%  compared  to  2023). 
The  development  of  energy  communities 
is 
accelerating quickly: over 600 energy communities 
were registered as of February 2026, with a total 
capacity of almost (233) MW, compared to about 60 
energy  communities  in  February  2025)  This  trend 

number 

The 

of 

(231)All data on consumer empowerment are from the 2025 
ACER Market Monitoring Report and ACER: Electricity country 
sheets – 2025 Monitoring Report, July 2025. 

(232)Economic Weekly 8/2026, February 27, 2026 – Polish 
Economic Institute  

(233)https://www.gov.pl/web/kowr/wykaz-spoldzielni-
energetycznych. 

92 

is  supported  by  the  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Facility,  which  invested  in  setting  up  20  energy 
communities.  However,  near-real-time  energy 
sharing  between  multiple  consumers  is  not  yet 
possible.  Closing  retail  markets  to  new  actors 
limits flexibility and may increase the scale of new 
network  investments  and  thus,  in  turn,  consumer 
costs. 

largely  stagnant 

In  2024,  electricity  accounted  for  17.4%  of 
Poland’s final energy consumption, below the 
EU  average  of  23.4%,  and  this  share  has 
in  the  past 
remained 
decade (234),  partly  due  to  an  extremely 
unfavourable  electricity-to-gas  price  ratio. 
Further progress in electrification across sectors is 
required  in  order  to  cost-effectively  decarbonise 
the economy and bring the benefits of affordable 
renewable  generation  to  consumers.  When  it 
comes  to  households,  electricity  accounts  for 
14.2%  of  final  energy  consumption,  while  in 
industry  it  represents  31.6%  (see  also  Annex  8). 
For  the  transport  sector,  this  share  remains 
negligible, at 1.4%.   

Renewables and long-term contracts 

Poland  took  some  measures  to  address  the 
‘transitioning  to 
2025  CSR  relating  to 
integrate 
that 
systems 
decarbonised 
renewable  energy’.  By  December  2025,  for  the 
first  time  ever,  the  share  of  renewable  energy 
sources  in  the  installed  capacity  in  Poland  had 
exceeded  50%.  Hydropower  represented  1.6%, 
biomass  4.6%,  wind  14,5(%  and  solar  12.6%  of 
the  electricity  mix.  Solar  power  continued  to 
increase, but at a slower pace. In 2025, RES total 
installed  capacity  grew  above  38 GW  (+ 4.2 GW 
compared  to  2024).  Whilst  total  solar  installed 
capacity grew above 25,4 GW ( + 17% compared 
to  2024),  the  potential  of  wind  energy  in  Poland 
remains  largely  untapped:  in  2025,  total  onshore 
wind  installed  capacity  barely  increased,  reaching 
10.6 GW  (+450  MW  compared  to  2024).  Poland 
has  provided  a  clear  picture  of  auctions  of 
offshore  wind  in  the  coming  years  on  the  Union 
Renewables  Development  Platform,  with  4 GW 

(234)CAGR (compound annual growth rate) of −0.43% between 
2015 and 2024 and minimum/maximum share of 16.5% and 
18.1% respectively (source: Eurostat). 

 
 
 
being  auctioned  in  2025, 2027  and  2029.  Poland 
also  pledged  to  boost  onshore  wind  generation, 
albeit by comparatively modest amounts. In 2025 
renewable energy sources accounted for 32.7% of 
the  electricity  mix,  stagnating  compared 
to 
2024(235) (EU overall RES share of 47%). 

more  personnel  will  be  required  to  deal  with  the 
expected  increase  in  permitting  procedures.  There 
is  thus  room  for  further  improvement  to  shorten 
the permit-granting procedure for RESs, especially 
in  the  light  of  the  guidance  on  speeding  up  such 
procedures. 

Graph A9.3: Poland’s installed renewable capacity 
vs electricity generation mix 

Electricity mix is given as net electricity generation (gross 
electricity production minus consumption of power stations’ 
auxiliary services). Electricity produced in pumped hydro 
plants is excluded from total net electricity production, as it 
was previously counted as electricity produced from another 
source. 
“Other” includes renewable municipal waste, solid biofuels, 
liquid biofuels, and biogas. 
Source: IRENA, Eurostat 

Poland  has  made  some  progress  towards 
speeding  up  permitting,  but  challenges 
remain. These include efforts to improve internal 
coordination,  digitalise  procedures  and  ease 
conditions  for  grid  connection.  Progress  made 
includes  reforms  under  the  RRF  on  cable  pooling 
and  coordinated  grid  development  as  well  as  the 
locations  for 
identification  and  planning  of 
projects.  Several  significant  initiatives  have  been 
undertaken,  such  as  identifying  necessary  priority 
investments in grid expansion and modernising the 
law  on  spatial  planning.  In  particular,  the  law 
setting 
identification  of 
renewable energy acceleration areas was adopted 
in  November  2025  as  part  of  the  Polish  recovery 
and  resilience  plan  (RRP).  However,  the  reform 
reducing the minimum distance between buildings 
and  onshore  wind  installations  (from  700 m  to 
500 m) was not adopted following the President’s 
veto.  This 
reform  would  have  significantly 
increased  the  area  available  for  wind  power.  On 
the other hand, there is still no unified process for 
the  single  contact  point,  and  there  are  no 
established  rules  for  wind  repowering.  Moreover, 

the  basis 

the 

for 

Regarding  power  purchase  agreements 
(PPAs),  Poland  is  among  the  top  five  EU 
countries,  ranking  third,  with  a  contracted 
volume  of  1.5 GW  in  2025.  This  was  a  slight 
increase  in  contracted  capacity  (from  0.7 GW) 
compared  to  the  previous  year,  driven  by  solar 
PPAs. 

This progress needs to be offset against the 
fact  that  the  Polish  energy  mix  is  still 
dominated  by  fossil  fuels,  which  cover  85% 
of  total  available  energy.  Poland  remains  the 
most  coal-dependent  country  in  the  EU:  although 
the share of coal has continued declining, by more 
than  seven  percentage  points,  from  40.2%  in 
2020 to 32.7% in 2024, the share of RESs is still 
15%(236). 

Although  there  are  currently  no  nuclear 
power  reactors  in  operation  in  Poland,  the 
country  has  been  working  intensively  on 
launching  a  nuclear  programme.  Poland  is 
considering  constructing  two  large-scale  nuclear 
power  plants  with  a  total  capacity  of  6-9 GWe. 
Following  the  Commission’s  approval  of  PLN 60.2 
billion  in  public  support  in  December  2025,  the 
first  reactor  is  planned  to  be  launched  in  2036 
with  units  2  and  3  coming  online  in  2037  and 
2038  respectively  at  the  Lubiatowo-Kopalino  site, 
after which the other reactors will follow. By 2040, 
the  total  installed  capacity  of  the  nuclear  fleet  is 
expected  to  reach  7.4 GWe.  To  ensure  security  of 
nuclear  fuel  supplies,  Poland  plans  to  conclude 
long-term  supply  contracts  with  reliable  suppliers. 
Polish entities are pursuing an ambitious multi-site 
deployment  of  Small  Modular  Reactors  (SMRs), 
risk-
necessitating 
mitigation  frameworks.  Meeting  timelines  will 
depend on streamlining administrative procedures, 
fostering collaboration between domestic suppliers 
and  international  developers,  and  strengthening 
human resources and stakeholder engagement.  

capital  and 

substantial 

(235) Eurostat (nrg_cb_pem). 

(236) Gross inland consumption (Eurostat). 

93 

 
 
 
 
Energy efficiency 

predictable  pathway  towards  an  energy-efficient 
and decarbonised building stock. 

In  2024, 

Poland  has  made  insufficient  progress  in 
final  energy 
energy  efficiency. 
consumption  (FEC)  stayed  the  same  as  2023,  to 
69.8 Mtoe,  plateauing  after  the  declining  trend 
since  2019.  In  industry,  FEC  increased  slightly 
compared to 2023, partially reversing the positive 
downward  trend  since  2019  (− 11.9%).  In  the 
residential  and 
sectors,  FEC  has 
decreased  (by  8.5%  and  3.4%  respectively  since 
2019).  In  transport  it  has  increased  (by  7.9%) 
since 2019. 

services 

financing 

Poland’s  national  financing  framework  for 
is  dominated  by  non-
energy  efficiency 
repayable 
schemes,  primarily 
grants,  but  also  involves  mixed  schemes,  in 
its  white  certificates 
particular  through 
market  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  financial 
instruments.  Poland  is  in  the  process  of  setting 
up  its  national  hub  under  the  European  Energy 
Efficiency Financing Coalition, which aims to foster 
cooperation with financial institutions and leverage 
private investments. 

long-term 

renovation 

The  observed  reduction  in  residential  final 
energy  consumption 
is  primarily  due  to 
in  energy  efficiency (237), 
improvements 
indicating progress in implementing Poland’s 
2020 
strategy. 
Successful  programmes  are  being  implemented, 
such as the clean air programme, a key instrument 
to  accelerate  the  replacement  of  coal-based 
heating  sources  and  improve  energy  efficiency  in 
households.  Since  31 March  2025,  significant 
improvements  have  been  made, 
including 
mandatory  energy  audits  and  verification  of 
building  energy  standards  before  and  after 
renovation.  Since  1999,  the  TERMO  programme, 
which  has  served  as 
initiative 
supporting  thermal  modernisation  and  energy 
efficiency 
in  multifamily  buildings,  has  also 
benefited from RRP funds. Nevertheless, given the 
share  of  energy  consumed  in  Poland  used  in 
buildings, Poland is encouraged to submit its draft 
national  building  renovation  plan  pursuant  to  the 
recast  EPBD  in  order  to  ensure  a  clear  and 

the  primary 

(237) https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/9f833801-5c6e-11f0-a9d0-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en.  

94 

Structural  challenges  persist 
in  heating 
decarbonisation, despite coal reliance in this 
area declining from 61% in 2023 to 57.4% in 
2024.  Poland  has  put  in  place  policies  to  phase 
out  individual  coal-based  heating  and  set  targets 
to  eliminate  the  installation  of  gas  boilers in  new 
buildings. However, the national heating strategy is 
still being prepared. The share of households using 
coal-based  individual  heating  and  hot  water  is 
declining  steadily,  from  39%  in  2015  to  15%  in 
2025(238).  At  the  same  time,  households’  energy 
consumption  for  heating  and  hot  water  is  also 
sourced  from  district  heating,  with  nearly  50%  of 
households connected to district heating networks. 
The Polish district heating sector still relies largely 
on  coal,  but  is  fast  transitioning  to  gas  combined 
heat  and  power.  These  investments  in  gas-based 
heat  generation  must  consider  the  post-2035 
Energy  Efficiency  Directive  (EED)  rules,  which 
require  a  progressive  reduction  in  the  share  of 
high-efficiency cogeneration in the heat baseload. 
As  of  2025,  only  22%  of  district  heating  is 
considered  energy-efficient,  and  RESs,  chiefly 
biomass,  account  for  only  14.7%  of  gross  final 
energy  in  district  heating.  Despite  technical  and 
financial  challenges,  decarbonisation  efforts  can 
leverage  district  heating  as  a  key  enabler  of 
system 
power-to-heat 
technologies  to  stabilise(239)  the  electricity  grid, 
integrate renewable energy sources and unlock the 
potential of geothermal and solar thermal heating. 
Although Renewables for district heating and other 

flexibility, 

using 

(238) Economic Weekly 5/2026, February 6, 2026 – Polish 

Economic Institute 

(239) In district heating in Gdańsk, e-boilers operate as controllable 
electricity  loads,  providing  ancillary  services  to  the  Polish 
transmission  system  operator  (PSE).  Year-on-year,  the  need 
for  dispatch  orders  is  increasing  –  in  2024  there  had  been 
83,  while  in  2025,  by  September  alone,  there  were  already 
100. Almost all of them are executed using e-boilers (84% in 
2024), which clearly shows the potential for synergies. Since 
2022, e-boilers have consumed 16 017 MWh, which enabled 
renewable  energy  sources  to  operate  within  the  energy 
system  –  sources  that  would  otherwise  have  had  to  be 
curtailed. In so doing, they produced 580 230 GJ of heat and 
reduced  CO₂  emissions  by  5 926 tonnes  and  coal 
consumption  by  2 830 tonnes.  If  the  full  potential  of  the 
boilers  had  been  utilised  under  favourable  regulations,  they 
could  have  produced  up  to  16  times  more  energy 
(226 000 MWh)  during  this  period,  covering  around  30%  of 
Gdańsk’s  heat  demand.  Source:  PGE  Energia  Ciepła, 
stakeholder  consultation  event  for  the  EU  heating  and 
cooling strategy, 7.11.2025. 

 
 
 
support  programs  by  the  National  Fund  for 
Environmental  Protection  and  Water  Management 
(NFOŚiGW) provide support for district heating, the 
lack  of  clear  visibility  and  investment  for  small 
and  medium-sized  district  heating  to  invest  in 
modernisation and electrification, combined with a 
lack  of 
incentives  from  a  tariff  perspective, 
remains a key bottleneck. In that context, the RRF 
is  supporting  23  new  clean  combined  heat  and 
power systems. 

for  81% 

Heat  pump  deployment  fell  by  35%  in  2024 
due  to  an  unfavourable  electricity-to-gas 
price  ratio  and  increased  popularity  of  gas 
and  biomass  boilers.  Heating  and  cooling 
account 
energy 
of 
consumption, with renewables supplying only 21% 
of the total energy used for heating and cooling in 
all sectors. Income-based incentives exist for heat 
pumps. However, their impact is likely to be offset 
by the fact that electricity is more expensive than 
fossil solutions. 

residential 

Fossil fuel subsidies 

In  response to  rising  energy prices  following 
the regional crisis in the Middle East, Poland 
has  imposed  price  caps  on  profit  margin  of 
specific  downstream  products  in  the  supply 
chain.  For  instance,  ORLEN  S.A.  has  significantly 
reduced its retail margin on diesel fuel, supporting 
a temporary promotion at its stations that helped 
lower  fuel  prices  during  March  and  April.  Poland 
has  proposed  the  "CPK  Package"  to  combat  rising 
fuel  prices  amid  the  Middle  East  crisis,  including 
cutting  VAT  on  fuels  from  23%  to  8%,  reducing 
excise  duties  to  EU  minimums,  imposing  daily 
maximum  retail  prices,  and  taxing  oil  companies' 
excess profits. Poland has also introduced fines up 
to  1  million  PLN  for  non-compliance  and  is 
including 
implementing 
dynamic  pricing  contracts  and  smart  grid 
digitalisation.  Poland  also  contributed  to  the  IEA 
collective  action  to  release  400  million  barrels  of 
emergency oil reserves.  

structural 

reforms, 

Poland has taken no measures to address the 
2025  CSR  on  phasing  out  fossil  fuel 
subsidies,  especially  those  related  to  coal 

95 

mining.  In  2024,  environmentally  harmful (240) 
fossil  fuel  subsidies  without  a  planned  phaseout 
before 2030 accounted for 0.28% (241) of Poland’s 
GDP (242)  –  below  the  EU  weighted  average  of 
0.32%.  Ongoing  subsidies  for  the  coal  mining 
industry,  tax  exemptions  for  coal  and  fuel  oil (243) 
and  excise  duty  refunds  on  diesel  used 
in 
agriculture remain in place as fossil fuel subsidies 
without a planned phaseout before 2030 which do 
not specifically address, in a targeted way, energy 
poverty  or  genuine  energy  security  concerns. 
Additionally,  Poland’s  2023  effective  carbon 
rate (244)  averaged  EUR 68  per  tonne  of  CO₂  – 
below the EU weighted mean of EUR 84.80 (245). 

The  overall  value  of  support  for  the  coal 
mining  sector  (in  the  form  of  both  budget 
subsidies  and  capital  support)  has  increased 
in  recent  years.  The  2025  state  budget 
earmarked  PLN 8.94  billion  for  the  hard  coal 
mining  sector  (in  the  form  of  both  budget 
subsidies and capital support), and the 2026 state 
budget earmarks PLN 5.50 billion in subsidies. The 
only  phaseout  of  subsidies  remains  correlated  to 
the closure of coal mining. 

In  December  2025,  Poland  adopted  a  law 
introducing  a  package  of  benefits  for 
workers at companies that are closing mines, 
including  tax-free  severance  payments  of 
PLN 170 000  (EUR 40 000).  The  plan  provides 
for  the  closure  of  five  mines  within  the  next 
decade  and  a  complete  phaseout  of  thermal  coal 
mining  by  2049,  the  latest  phaseout  date  in  the 
EU. 

(240) Explicit fossil fuel subsidies (e.g. direct transfers) and implicit 
fossil fuel subsidies (i.e. tax expenditures linked to forgone 
tax revenues that have an identifiable fiscal impact for the 
central budget) that support fossil fuel energy production, 
transmission and/or consumption.  

(241) European Commission calculation based on underlying data 
from the Study on energy subsidies and other government 
interventions in the EU – 2025 edition, Enerdata. 

(242) 2024 gross domestic product at market prices, Eurostat. 

(243) Fuel oil used for the following purposes is exempted from 
excise duty: the production of electricity and heat in 
cogeneration or in agricultural, horticultural, greenhouse and 
forestry activities. 

(244) The effective carbon rate is the sum of carbon taxes, ETS 
permit prices and fuel excise taxes, representing the 
aggregate effective carbon rate paid on emissions. 

(245) OECD (2024), Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2024. 

 
 
Table A9.1:  Key energy indicators 

Source: Eurostat, ENTSO-E, S&P Platts 

96 

20212022202320242021202220232024Household consumer - Electricity retail price (EUR/KWh)0.1628          0.1651              0.2222              0.2393          0.2314              0.2649          0.2877          0.2879          Energy & supply [%]28.1%32.2%25.1%25.1%36.6%54.3%55.6%47.8%Network costs29.5%29.8%26.9%28.3%26.7%25.3%24.8%27.2%Taxes and levies including VAT42.3%38.0%48.0%46.6%36.7%20.3%19.6%25.0%VAT18.7%5.9%18.7%18.7%14.5%13.4%13.8%14.6%Household consumer - Gas retail price0.0427          0.0551              0.0750              0.0839          0.0684              0.0948          0.1121          0.1128          Energy & supply55.3%78.0%64.0%63.3%43.7%61.0%64.5%53.9%Network costs24.8%20.9%16.5%17.3%22.5%17.3%17.1%18.3%Taxes and levies including VAT19.9%1.1%19.5%19.4%33.8%21.7%18.4%27.8%VAT18.7%0.2%18.7%18.7%15.5%11.6%10.2%13.6%Non-household consumer - Electricity retail price0.0973          0.1534              0.2080              0.1859          0.1242              0.1895          0.1971          0.1661          Energy & supply35.9%48.7%41.0%36.9%43.0%66.5%63.0%55.8%Network costs15.1%11.4%12.2%14.1%15.8%10.7%11.9%15.5%Taxes and levies excluding VAT37.2%35.4%34.7%37.2%30.4%9.9%11.2%15.4%Non-household consumer - Gas retail price0.0330          0.0839              0.0858              0.0590          0.0328              0.0722          0.0672          0.0517          Energy & supply70.0%93.2%74.6%71.1%66.2%77.3%77.3%68.7%Network costs9.6%5.3%6.0%9.1%7.7%3.8%5.3%7.1%Taxes and levies excluding VAT2.1%1.1%0.9%1.4%12.5%6.1%7.3%11.6%Wholesale electrity price (EUR/MWh)86.8166.3111.996.4111.0233.299.184.7Dutch TTF (EUR/MWh)n/an/an/an/a46.9123.140.534.420172018201920202021202220232024Gross Electricity Production (GWh)170,465        170,039            163,989            158,043        179,631           179,748        167,362        -Combustible Fuels152,295     154,428         145,269         137,254     156,279        148,579     127,848     -Nuclear-              -                 -                 -              -                 -              -              -Hydro3,034         2,387             2,665             2,937         3,101            3,018         3,734         -Wind14,909       12,799           15,107           15,800       16,234          19,780       24,176       -Solar165             300                711                1,958         3,934            8,310         11,107       -Geothermal-              -                 -                 -              -                 -              -              -Other Sources62               125                237                94               84                  61               497             Gross Electricity Production [%]Combustible Fuels89.3%90.8%88.6%86.8%87.0%82.7%76.4%-Nuclear0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%-Hydro1.8%1.4%1.6%1.9%1.7%1.7%2.2%-Wind8.7%7.5%9.2%10.0%9.0%11.0%14.4%-Solar0.1%0.2%0.4%1.2%2.2%4.6%6.6%-Geothermal0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%-Other Sources0.0%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.0%0.0%0.3%-Net Imports of Electricity (GWh)2,2875,69510,62313,267888-1,6773,737-As a % of electricity available for final consumption 1.6%3.8%7.0%8.9%0.6%-1.1%2.5%-Electricity Interconnection [%]4.0%4.0%4.0%3.9%7.0%6.8%5.5%5.1%Share of renewable energy consumption - by sector [%]Electricity13.1%13.0%14.4%16.2%17.2%21.0%25.8%-Heating and cooling14.8%21.5%22.0%22.1%21.0%22.1%20.4%-Transport4.2%5.7%6.2%6.6%5.7%5.8%6.0%-Overall11.1%14.9%15.4%16.1%15.6%16.6%16.6%-20202021202220232020202120222023Import Dependency [%] 42.8%40.5%46.0%48.0%57.5%55.5%62.5%58.3%of Solid fossil fuels 0.3%-3.6%8.0%5.0%35.8%37.2%45.9%40.8%of Oil and petroleum products 96.9%96.4%98.4%96.8%96.8%91.7%97.8%94.5%of Natural Gas 78.3%83.6%81.2%81.3%83.6%83.6%97.6%90.0%Dependency from Russian Fossil Fuels [%]of Natural Gas 54.9%56.6%19.6%0.0%41.0%40.9%20.7%9.3%of Crude Oil72.0%63.4%43.0%2.0%25.7%25.2%18.4%3.0%of Hard Coal73.6%66.1%12.4%0.0%49.1%47.4%21.5%1.0%2017201820192020202120222023Gas Consumption (in bcm)20.1               20.2                  20.8                  21.3               22.8                  19.6               20.2               Gas Consumption year-on-year change [%]4.4%0.5%2.9%2.6%7.2%-13.9%2.9%Gas Imports - by type (in bcm)15.7               15.8                  17.5                  17.4               18.5                  15.2               15.9               Gas imports - pipeline14.0               13.0                  14.0                  13.6               14.4                  9.0                 9.2                 Gas imports - LNG1.82.73.53.84.16.26.7Gas Imports - by main source supplier [%]Germany22.7%18.8%22.6%21.0%17.7%28.9%7.3%Ukraine0.0%0.0%0.0%0.6%2.0%0.5%3.5%United States0.6%0.5%5.4%5.7%8.6%22.6%0.0%Russia65.6%61.6%55.0%54.9%56.6%19.6%0.0%PolandEU 
 
 
 
 
   
 
ANNEX 10: CLIMATE ADAPTATION, PREPAREDNESS AND ENVIRONMENT 

to 

the 

climate 

resources, 

to  ensure 

integrated,  up 

While  Poland  has  made  progress  in  climate 
adaptation policies, some challenges remain. 
Poland received a CSR in 2025 to improve climate 
adaptation  governance,  in  particular  as  regards 
water 
long-term 
sustainability  of  sectors  and  activities  dependent 
on  water  ecosystem  services.  Over  the  last  year, 
progress  has  been  made  in  developing  local  and 
sectorial  investment,  partially  improving  climate 
resilience, applying pilot  nature-based solutions in 
climate  adaptation  and  improving  wastewater 
management.  The  main  challenges  include  a  lack 
to  date  planning  and  a 
of 
coordinated 
climate 
strategic  approach 
adaptation  between  regional  and  national  level, 
and 
financing  mainly 
depending on EU funds. Additionally, the insurance 
gap  and  continuous  ecosystem  degradation 
remain  significant  issues.  Without  an  overarching 
framework  and  up  to  date  risk  assessment,  the 
infrastructure, 
investments  crucial  for  Polish 
ecosystem, and agriculture resilience might not be 
implemented.  Environmental  challenges 
result 
from eutrophication of rivers, lakes and the Baltic 
Sea,  driven  by  excessive  nutrient  loads.  Hydro-
morphological  pressures  aggravate  the  situation, 
largely  causing  failure  to  achieve  good  ecological 
status/potential  of  water  bodies.  Finally,  Poland 
faces a serious risk of missing the LULUCF target, 
increasing  the  gap  and  lacking  the  adequate 
response  in  particular  in  the  areas  of  urban 
settlements, wetland and agriculture management. 

adaptation 

Climate adaptation and preparedness 

Poland faces serious risks related to climate 
change  impacts  which  require  significant, 
coordinated  actions  and  investments  across 
sectors. In the Central and Eastern Europe region, 
Poland  faces  one  of  the  greatest  increases  of 
average and extreme temperatures and decreases 
of  heating  degree  days  and  total  precipitation  in 
Europe  in  recent  decades(246).  Poland  observes 
persisting  dry  periods  (with  the  daily  sum  of 
precipitation  below  1 mm)  and  wet  periods 
(>10 mm/d)(247).  As  such,  Poland  is  particularly 
exposed  to  floods,  droughts  and  heatwaves,  as 
landslides.  This 
well  as  extreme  winds  and 

(246) https://www.iea.org/articles/poland-climate-resilience-policy-

indicator.  

(247) https://www.gov.pl/web/klimat/adaptacja-do-zmian-klimatu.  

97 

increasingly affects critical sectors, including water 
management,  agriculture  aquaculture  and  energy. 
Climate  change  also  affects  coastal  areas  in 
Poland,  including  tourism  and  sectors  such  as 
fisheries. If current levels of coastal protection are 
not  raised,  direct  economic  damages  and  social 
impact  from  coastal  flooding 
in  Poland  are 
projected to rise sharply this century.  

in  the  Oder, 
The  environmental  crisis 
Poland’s second largest river, remains one of 
the most urgent climate change challenges in 
Increased  salinity  caused  by 
recent  years. 
wastewater discharge from coal mining and other 
industrial  sources,  combined  with 
increased 
temperatures caused by climate change and influx 
of  biogens  from  agriculture  create  conditions  in 
which Prymnesium parvum (golden algae) blooms. 
This poisons waters, destroys natural habitats and 
endangers  people’s  safety(248).  Efforts  have  been 
made to monitor  the  risk of  golden  algae  blooms 
and  to  strengthen  preparedness  to  address  this 
threat,  such  as  developing  effective  crisis 
procedures.  Other  measures  are  envisioned, 
focusing  primarily  on  increasing  water  retention 
and  conducting  R&D 
to  create  desalination 
technologies  that  are  less  energy-intensive  and 
more cost-effective. Nevertheless, legal incentives 
for industry to invest in desalination plants remain 
weak, including low fees for wastewater discharge. 

A  recent  study(249)  commissioned  by  the 
Directorate-General 
for  Climate  Action 
estimates  that  Poland  will  need  to  invest 
over EUR 3 550 million in climate adaptation 
per  year  up  to  2050  (0.3%  of  annual  GDP, 
which is below the EU average of 0.5%). This 
investment  would  be  first  and  foremost 
in 
ecosystems (around 37% of the total), followed by 
infrastructure (around 36% of the total) and food 
production  (around  17%  of  the  total).  Between 
2005  and  2023,  annual  Polish  climate-related 
economic 
losses  were  estimated  at  over 
EUR 390 million(250).  Over  90%  of  climate-related 

(248) https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-024-66943-9.  
(249)European  Commission  (2026),  Assessment  of  EU  and 
Member States adaptation investment needs, Table 25, Link. The 
study  provides  detailed  estimates  of  adaptation  investment 
needs  at  the  level  of  the  EU  and  individual  Member  States  per 
type of measure. It relies on a common methodology that makes 
estimates  comparable  across  the  EU.  Four  accompanying 
methodological reports provide a detailed description of how the 
results were estimated to ensure full transparency. 
(250) https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/europe-environment-

2025/countries/poland/climate-related-economic-losses. 

 
 
 
 
 
losses  in  Poland  between  1980  and  2023  have 
been  attributed  to  hydrological  disasters,  such  as 
floods  and  droughts(251).  One  study  estimates  the 
annual  GVA  loss  at  EUR 0.35 bn  and  warns  that 
those costs may triple in Poland by the end of the 
decade(252).  Without 
adaptation 
measures,  in  2100,  the  annual  cost  of  direct 
damage  from  coastal  flooding  alone  might  vary 
between  EUR 2.3  and  9.3 billion,  with  the  number 
of people expected to live in areas facing very high 
risk  of  flooding  between  estimated  24 000  and 
47 000(253). 

sufficient 

The  Ministry  of  Climate  and  Environment  of 
Poland  has  been  developing  the  updated 
national  strategy  for  climate  adaptation. 
Poland received in 2025 a CSR to improve climate 
adaptation  governance,  and  only  some  partial 
progress  is  observed.  The strategy  is  supposed to 
update the existing strategic adaptation plan 2020 
with a perspective to 2030 adopted in 2013(254). It 
is  supposed  to  be  submitted  by  June  2027  and 
updated every four years. 

is 

lacking  between 

local, 
Coordination 
regional  and  national  authorities  to  address 
acute  challenges  of  climate  resilience  and 
preparedness and finance adaptation efforts. 
Moreover, 
the  share  of  Poland’s  population 
covered  by  the  EU  Covenant  of  Mayors  was  14% 
in  2024  and  remained  significantly  lower  than  in 
the  EU  (34%)(255).  However,  73%  of  signatories 
submitted  a  2030/2050  action  plan.  The  regional 
adaptation  strategy  of  the  Małopolskie  region  is 
under  preparation.  However,  the  relation  between 
the national, regional and municipal levels remains 
unclear.  At  the  municipal  level,  cities  with  more 
than 100 000 inhabitants implemented adaptation 
plans(256). Investments are supported by the Polish 
Development  Bank  (BGK)  via  a  dedicated  loan 
programme  financed  from 
(B3.4.1. 
Investments  in  a  green  transformation  of  cities), 
the  climate  adaptation  of  Polish 
supporting 

the  RRF 

(251)https://sdi.eea.europa.eu/catalogue/srv/eng/catalog.search#/
metadata/7bab0fee-9353-45ff-b2b5-35a2973b07d9. 

(252)https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=548420

6.  

(253) https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-15665-3. 

(254) https://www.gov.pl/web/klimat/strategiczny-plan-adaptacji-

2020.  

to 

cities(257).  The  amendment 
the  national 
Environmental  Protection  Law  of  November  27, 
2024,  introduced  an  obligation  that  any  Polish 
city/town  with  a  population  above  20,000 
inhabitants  must  adopt  a  Municipal  Adaptation 
Plan (MPA) by January 2028. 

in 

for 

climate 

provides 

Allocating  resources  to  climate  adaptation 
might  be  not  sufficient,  given  that  Poland's 
vulnerability 
preparedness 
remains  one  of  the  highest  in  the  EU(258).  In 
the  water  management 
sector,  adaptation 
management  is  enacted  by  the  State  Water 
Holding  Polish  Waters,  which  combines  both 
operational  and 
capacities  and 
regulatory 
implements 
river  basin  management  plans, 
drought  effects  counteracting  plans(259).  The 
National  Fund  for  Environmental  Protection  and 
Water  Management 
climate 
adaptation 
projects,  with  EUR 163  million 
(20 000-
designated  for  medium-sized  cities 
100 000  inhabitants),  losing  their  socio-economic 
functions  in  East  Poland(260).  Implementation  of 
new 
under 
is 
Biostrategy(261)  and  Hydrostrategy(262)  by  The 
National Centre for Research and Development. In 
2025,  the  Ministry  of  Climate  and  Environment 
launched  an  advisory  project,  financed  by  the 
European  Funds  for  Eastern  Poland  2021-2027, 
entitled 
in 
Eastern  Poland.’  The  project  is  addressed  to 
resort 
medium-sized 
municipalities 
voivodeships. 
Preparation  of  regional  and  municipal  adaptation 
strategies  and  plans  is  partially  financed  through 
the 
the  FEnIKS  2021-2027  programme  by 
National  Fund  for  Environmental  Protection  and 
Water  Management.  The  adaptation  funding  gap 
was  partially  alleviated  by  some  investments 
under recovery and resilience plans, in particular B 
3.4.1. Investments in increasing biologically active 

‘Support  for  Adaptation  Measures 

cities 
in 

coordinated 

technology 

health 

Polish 

and 

six 

(257) https://www.bgk.pl/produkty/pozyczka-wspierajaca-zielona-

transformacje-
miast/?__cf_chl_tk=ujCuAzuvYe1A7yNpFhFJ6z3Wij4khn7De
TWMP8kAoRA-1769164558-1.0.1.1-
1GyicdNo%209zvErfkG2k6TA_dDTKivarz8kUxtVYAt4Iw#c33
424.  

(258) https://www.clientearth.pl/media/cdynvfyt/co-polacy-
my%C5%9Bl%C4%85-o-klimacie-raport.pdf.  

(259) https://www.gov.pl/web/nfosigw/harmonogram-naborow.  

(260) https://www.gov.pl/web/nfosigw/fepw0202-iw01-00225.  

(255) https://eu-mayors.ec.europa.eu/en/node/1684.  

(261) https://www.gov.pl/web/ncbr/biostrateg.  

(256) https://www.gov.pl/web/klimat/mpa-44. 

(262) https://www.gov.pl/web/ncbr-en/hydrostrateg.   

98 

 
 
 
surfaces 
reducing  soil  sealing;  sustainable 
management 
infrastructure 
(760.9 mn EUR). 

in  urban  and  functional  areas  and 
rainwater 
green-blue 
solutions 

involving 
nature-based 

systems 
and 

Climate  risks  have  a  direct  and  significant 
effect  on  Poland’s  economy,  while  the 
insurance  coverage  remains  low.  Between 
1980  and  2024,  Poland  recorded  EUR 27.9  billion 
in  economic 
losses  and  faced  over  6 700 
fatalities(263)  caused  by  weather-  and  climate-
related  extreme  events.  Only  6%  of  those  loses 
were  covered  by  insurance.  Latest  studies  show 
that  extreme  weather  events  are  likely  to  have 
prolonged  and  intensifying  impact  on  economic 
activity in Poland(264). The Polish insurance market 
remains insufficiently developed to respond to this 
impact. In 2024, the insurance penetration rates in 
Poland  (2.2%  GDP)  were  over  three  times  lower 
than  the  EU  average  (6.7%  GDP)  and  the  OECD 
average (6.2% GDP). In particular, the penetration 
rate  of  life  insurance  (0.6%  GDP)  was  over  six 
times lower than the EU average (4.0%)(265), and a 
negative  trend  has  been  observed  from  2014-
2022(266). While the insurance coverage of single-
family  houses  for  extreme  weather  events  is 
significant  (71%  for  hurricanes  and  strong  winds, 
63%  for  floods),  the  coverage  of  all  residential 
buildings 
(including  blocks  of  flats)  remains 
significantly lower (40% for strong winds and 36% 
for floods). The high coverage for privately owned 
single-family  houses  results  from  mortgage  loan 
requirements in the Polish banking sector, whereas 
blocks  of  flats  are  not  covered  by  the mandatory 
insurance requirement(267). 

Transport  infrastructure  is  highly  vulnerable 
to  climate 
to 
preparedness,  economic  and  social  capacity 
and  quality(268).  The 
total  Polish  TEN-T 

risks  when 

it  comes 

(263) EEA, 2024, Economic losses and fatalities, Link. 
(264) Usman,  Parker  &  Vallat  (2025),  Dry-roasted  NUTS:  early 
estimates of the regional impact of 2025 extreme weather, 
Link. 

infrastructure  adaptation  costs  in  the  transport 
sector  have  been  estimated  to  be  as  high  as 
EUR 2.2 billion  by  2050,  particularly 
rail 
(EUR 1.60 billion) 
transport 
and 
(EUR 0.47 billion).  Against  that  background,  only 
EUR 0.2 billion was invested and EUR 0 048 billion 
was  under  consideration  for  TEN-T  adaptation 
investments 
implemented  or  considered  by 
authorities by 2023.  

road 

in 

In  the  road  transport  sector,  the  adaptation 
to  climate  change  is  included  in  the  policies 
of  the  General  Directorate  for  National 
Roads and Motorways, with EU funds playing 
a  central  role.  Financial  support  (500 million 
technical  assistance  of  European 
EUR)  and 
intended  to  support  the 
Investment  Bank 
renovation  of  up  to  125 km  of  national  roads, 
including  repairing  bridges  and  adapting  drainage 
systems to heavier rainfall to prevent flooding(269). 
Total EIB involvement in transport infrastructure in 
Poland  reached  EUR 35 billion(270).  For the  railway 
sector,  the  Polish  railway  infrastructure  manager 
(PKP  Polskie  Linie  Kolejowe  SA)  published  the  rail 
infrastructure climate adaptation plan(271) in 2024.  

is 

The  exposure  to  the  crucial  identified  risks 
for  the  rail  infrastructure  (heavy  rainfall, 
flooding)  were  localised  (southern  Poland) 
and  addressed  with  organisational,  design 
and investment measures. While river transport 
in  Poland  is  among  the  most  heavily  affected  by 
drought  risk in  the  EU(272),  it  remains  below  0.1% 
of the total Polish freight transport on land(273). 

A  nationwide  systemic  approach  to  reduce 
the  climate-related  vulnerability  of  energy 

Publications Office of the European Union, 
2024.https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2832/7839720 

(269) https://www.gov.pl/web/gddkia/europejskie-srodki-na-

przebudowy-drog-krajowych.  

(270) https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2025-547-eib-invested-

nearly-eur1-38-billion-in-2025-to-develop-poland-s-road-
network.  

(265) https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/global-insurance-

(271) https://www.plk-

market-trends-2025_0d11ecf4-en/full-report/component-
3.html.  

(266) https://piu.org.pl/raport-roczny-piu/.   

(267) https://piu.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/PIU-raport-

klimatyczny-2023_final_druk_eng_lekki.pdf.  

(268) European Commission: Directorate-General for Mobility and 
Transport, Support study on the climate adaptation and 
cross-border investment needs to realise the TEN-T network, 

sa.pl/files/public/user_upload/pdf/Ochrona_srodowiska/29.8.2
024/Plan_adaptacji_infrastruktury_kolejowej_do_zmian_kli
matu_-_wersja_WCAG.pdf.  

(272)https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC135

215.  

(273) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/facts-funding/studies-data/eu-

transport-figures-statistical-pocketbook/statistical-
pocketbook-2025_en.   

99 

 
 
 
 
infrastructure is missing in Poland. Structured 
steps  are  observed  at  TSO  for  electricity  level. 
Polish  TSO  for  electricity  (PSE)  in  the  PSE  2040 
strategy(274) (published December 2025) envisions 
the preparation of the PSE climate policy, which is 
scheduled  for  the  first  half  of  2026.  The  climate 
adaptation  risk  and  policies  are  not  directly 
addressed in the Polish TSO for gas (GAZ-SYSTEM) 
strategies and development plans. 

in 

and 

solution 

projects 

planning(276) 

Nature-based  solutions  are  being  developed 
in  Poland,  but  the  scope  of  their  application 
remains  limited.  Between  2023  and  2030,  4 
nature-based 
climate 
adaptation  are  financed  with  LIFE,  with  a  total 
budget of EUR 18.5 million (59% EU contribution). 
The project focuses on Małopolska(275), monitoring, 
spatial 
vulnerability 
assessment(277).  In  its  updated  drought  effects 
counteracting  plans,  Polish  Waters  plans  to  give 
priority  to  nature-based  solutions  to  enhance 
water  retention,  biodiversity  conservation  and 
agricultural  production  stability.  The  draft  will  be 
subject  to  nationwide  public  consultation  in  the 
implementation  of 
first  half  of  2026.  The 
measures  set  out  in  the  plan  will  aim  to  reduce 
drought  risk  and  minimise  economic,  social  and 
environmental 
the 
implementation  of  the  document  will  rest  with 
central  and  local  government  authorities,  as  well 
is  scope  for  more 
as  Polish  Waters.  There 
in  Poland  to 
significant  action  and  funding 
implement nature-based solutions, in particular to 
manage  rainwater  where 
into  the 
ground at the place of precipitation exceeds losses 
due  to  evaporation  and  surface  runoff,  so  as  to 
decrease the drought and flooding risks.  

losses.  Responsibility 

infiltration 

for 

(274) https://strategia.pse.pl/Strategia_PSE_2040.pdf.  

(275)https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/life/publicWebsite/project/LIFE2
3-CCA-PL-LIFE-DREAM-CITIES-101158113/life-dream-cities-
designing-and-realisation-of-exemplary-adaptation-among-
medium-sized-cities-malopolska-ready-for-adaptation.  

(276)https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/life/publicWebsite/project/LIFE2
4-CCA-PL-LIFE-RIVEREASE-101213967/application-of-nbs-
to-ease-agricultural-impact-on-water-resources-in-the-face-
of-climate-change.  

(277)https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/life/publicWebsite/project/LIFE2
0-CCA-PL-001573/solution-for-climate-change-vulnerability-
risk-assessment-and-adaptation-planning-in-large-
commercial-architecture.  

Water resilience 

Water  resources  in  Poland  are  very  scarce 
compared  to  other  countries,  earning  it  a 
reputation as the ‘dry man of Europe’. Some 
97%  of  resources  come  from  rainfall,  but 
much of it is lost to leakages and waste(278). 
Electricity  cooling,  public  water  supply  and 
agriculture  are 
the  most  water-dependent 
sectors(279).  The  national  water  exploitation  index 
plus (WEI+)(280), a measure of how much water is 
being  used  compared  with  the  total  renewable 
freshwater resources available for a given territory 
and period, was at 5.16 in 2023, very close to the 
EU-27  average  (5.15).  However,  Poland  has  the 
fourth lowest renewable freshwater resources per 
1 000  habitats  in  the  EU  at  1.6  million  m³/year, 
showcasing  water 
risks.  Moreover, 
according  to  the  third  river  basin  management 
plans 
is  mainly 
estimated  based  on  available  permit  data,  while 
abstractions  exceeding  the  permitted  volumes  or 
non-permitted abstractions are not captured, most 
likely  causing  an  underestimation  of  abstracted 
volumes and the associated pressure(281). 

(RBMPs),  water  abstraction 

scarcity 

Water  productivity  in  Poland(282)  stood  at 
EUR 64  per  m³  of  abstracted  water  in  2023, 
which  is  far  below  the  EU-27  average  of 
EUR 153  per  m³.  This  reflects  inefficiencies 
in abstraction-heavy sectors like energy and 
agriculture, despite the upwards trend. These 
inefficiencies pose 
risks, 
especially during peak seasons. In 2023, electricity 
cooling  was  responsible  for  nearly  54%  of 
freshwater abstraction, with public water supply at 
29%(283). Water efficiency does not feature in the 

competitiveness 

(278) Poland - Environment - European Commission. 

(279) EEA, Water abstraction by economic sector, 2000-2023, 

2025.  

(280) Eurostat, Water Exploitation Index, plus.  

(281) Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2025)19 
accompanying the Report from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on the implementation 
of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the 
Floods Directive (2007/60/EC), Link. 

(282) Water  productivity  is  a  metric  that  is  calculated  by  dividing 
GDP  (in  chain-linked  volume)  by  total  water  abstraction.  It 
indicates the average economic value (GDP) a Member State 
creates for each unit of water it takes from nature. 

(283) EEA, Water abstraction by economic sector, 2000-2023, Link.  

100 

 
 
 
RBMPs.  Water  efficiency  does  not  feature  in  the 
RBMPs. Measures related to water efficiency were 
implemented  in  the  second  RBMPs  (for  2015-
2021),  but  they  are  not  planned  in  the  current 
ones  (for  the  2022-2027  period).  Water  tariffs, 
regulated by the Polish Water Law (Prawo Wodne), 
do  not  provide  specific  incentives  to  use  water 
efficiently. 

The  ecological  status/potential  of  Poland’s 
surface  water  bodies  as  well  as  their 
chemical  status  have  deteriorated  between 
the second (covering 2015-2021) and third RBMPs 
(2022-2027).  The  share  of  surface  waterbodies 
with  at  least  good  ecological  status/potential  has 
decreased  from  31.2%  to  8.4%  since  the  second 
RBMPs, although this is partially due to a very high 
proportion  (27.9%)  of  water  bodies  reported  as 
having  unknown  status.  Furthermore,  none  of  the 
transitional  and  coastal  waterbodies  have  a  good 
is  the 
ecological  status.  A  striking  example 
deterioration  of  the  Oder,  which  in  summer  2022 
and  to  some  extent  in  the  following  summers, 
experienced  an  uncontrolled  blooming  of  an 
intrusive  gold  algae,  poisoning  water  and 
destroying  habitats.  Failure  to  take  appropriate 
measures,  such  as  review  of  water  permits  for 
saline  discharges  (from  industry,  especially  coal 
mines) or renaturalisation of the river has left the 
Oder  vulnerable  to  potential  recurrence  of  the 
algae bloom and further deterioration. 

to 

good 

achieve 

Hydro-morphological  pressures  are  among 
the  dominant  pressures  in  Poland  causing 
failure 
ecological 
status/potential.  According  to  the  electronic 
reporting,  50%  of  all  surface  water  bodies  and 
64%  of  rivers  are  subject  to  significant  hydro-
morphological  pressures, 
such  as  physical 
alterations  of  channel,  bed,  riparian  area  and 
shore  or  creation  of  dams,  barriers  and  locks.  In 
the river basin districts of the Vistula and the Oder, 
90%  of  rivers  and  60-70%  of  lakes  are  at  risk 
because  of  anthropogenic  pressures,  including 
those due to hydro-morphological alterations. 

Nutrient  pollution  remains  one  of  Poland’s 
most  persistent  water-quality  challenges. 
Diffuse  pollution  from  agriculture  due  to  nutrient 
leakage  and  pesticide  use  is  identified  as  a 
impact  for  43%  of 
significant  pressure  and 
surface  water  bodies  and  51%  of  groundwater 

bodies(284). The excess of nitrogen and phosphorus 
leads  to  eutrophication,  causing  proliferation  of 
algae  blooms  and  oxygen  depletion.  As  indicated 
by the 2020-2023 data reported by Poland under 
the  Nitrates  Directive,  eutrophication  is  a  severe 
problem  across  Poland,  with  around  76%  of 
monitoring  stations 
rivers,  all  monitoring 
stations  in  transitional  and  coastal  waters  and 
75%  of  monitoring  stations 
lakes  being 
eutrophic or at risk of becoming eutrophic (a total 
of  76%  of  eutrophic  surface  water  bodies,  higher 
than  the  EU  average).  A  2026  report  by  Poland’s 
found  national 
Supreme  Audit  Office 
measures  to  control  nutrient  pollution  from 
agriculture to be mistargeted and ineffective(285). 

(NIK) 

in 

in 

Eutrophication  is  a  major  issue  in  the  Baltic 
Sea.  The  latest  HELCOM  assessment  in  2023 
reveals little progress in improving the Baltic Sea’s 
environment  with  no  significant  reduction 
in 
nitrogen  input  in  Baltic  coastal  areas  since  1997-
2003(286).  The Baltic  Sea’s poor  environmental 
status  clearly  impacts a  wide  range  of  ecosystem 
services and affects different sectors, like fisheries 
and  coastal  tourism.  Moreover,  pollution  and 
oxygen-deprived  dead  zones 
in  Baltic  Sea 
contribute  to  the collapse  of  stocks  of  some fish 
species (e.g. Baltic cod)(287). 

Poland’s  drinking  water  infrastructure  is 
ageing  and  access  to  drinking  water  of 
adequate  quality  is  uneven  between  urban 
and  rural  areas.  A  2022  audit  report  by  NIK, 
covering  water  management 
in  rural  areas, 
revealed  significant  water  loss  (up  to  a  third  of 
treated  water)  from  old,  failing  pipeline  networks, 
with  many  companies  lacking  funds  for  repairs 
and inspections. The NIK auditors also found water 
quality  problems  in  80%  of  units(288).  Despite 
overall  significant  improvements  in  access  to 
drinking  water  and  sanitary  services  over  the  last 

(284) Commission Staff Working Document SWD 

(2025)19 accompanying the Report from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament on the 
implementation of the Water Framework Directive 
(2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC), Link.  

(285) Polska bezradna wobec zanieczyszczenia wód azotanami z 

rolnictwa – Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, Link. 

(286) HELCOM-Thematic assessment of eutrophication 2016-

2021, Link. 

(287) State of the Baltic Sea 2023 in brief, Link. 

(288) Zmarnowane miliardy litrów wody na wsiach - Najwyższa 

Izba Kontroli, Link. 

101 

 
 
years,  the  situation  is  much  worse  in  rural  areas 
compared to cities. 

EUR 1.5 billion per year, corresponding to 0.23% of 
the national GDP(289). 

Wastewater  treatment  is  a  persistent  cause 
for  concern.  Although  93.1%  of  the  generated 
wastewater load in Poland was compliant with the 
Urban  Wastewater  Treatment  Directive  according 
to  the  EEA  2022  data,  which  is  an  improvement 
compared to 2020, still only 19 out of 36 big cities 
were  compliant.  Further  efforts  are  needed  to 
provide  collection  of  additional urban  wastewater 
and  biological  treatment,  including  with  nitrogen 
and phosphorus removal. 

climate 

Impacts  of 
change  are  not 
systematically  taken  into  account  in  water 
management  planning.  Third  RBMPs  do  not 
include  much 
risk 
information 
assessment and analysis of the impacts of climate 
change  on  environmental  objectives  of  water 
bodies.  This  would  need  to  be  improved  to  better 
incorporate  current  assessments  of  climate 
change  impacts  into  policies  focused  on  the 
management,  protection  and  sustainable  use  of 
water resources. 

regarding 

To  address  some  of  the  issues  described 
above,  Poland  is  implementing  investments 
in  sustainable  water  and  wastewater 
management.  Under  the  recovery  and  resilience 
plan 
the 
construction,  extension  or  modernisation  of  water 
supply  or  wastewater  disposal  systems  in  rural 
areas.  The  cohesion  policy  programmes  support 
investments 
in 
in  wastewater 
agglomerations non-compliant with UWWTD.  

infrastructure 

investments 

support 

(RRP), 

the 

for 

the  protection  and 

The annual water investment needs reach an 
estimated  EUR 4.3  billion  (in  2022  prices)  in 
2021-2027  in  Poland,  both  for  the  water 
industry  and 
the 
management  of  water.  Of  the  total  annual  need, 
EUR 2.4  billion  relates  to  the  management  of 
wastewater. A further EUR 1.5 billion is necessary 
for drinking water-related investments and around 
EUR 435  million 
and 
management  of  water.  Considering  current 
investments,  which  are  estimated  to  be  around 
EUR 2.8 billion per year, the financing gap reaches 

protection 

the 

for 

Nature restoration 

(EU 

the 

value 

added 

economy 

country’s 

Nature  degradation  creates  significant  risks 
and 
to 
competitiveness.  Poland  has  a  supply chain 
dependency  on  ecosystem  services  of  26%  of  its 
gross 
average:  22%). 
Overall, 40% of Poland’s economy is dependent on 
ecosystem  services to  produce 
its gross  value 
added (EU average: 44%)(290). Several sectors such 
water 
as 
utilities have 100% of 
value 
added directly dependent  on  ecosystem  services. 
Estimates  from  2023  analysis  put  the  annual 
costs  of  ecosystem  restoration  and  maintenance 
in  Poland  at  EUR 0.54  billion,  while  the  annual 
benefits  are  expected  to  be  as  high  as  EUR 5.98 
billion(291). 

and 
their gross 

agriculture, forestry 

Poland’s 

exceptionally 

Despite 
rich 
biodiversity  –  reflected  in  39.6%(292)  of  its 
territory  designated  as  protected  areas  – 
habitat  degradation  continues.  Natural  water 
bodies  are  subject  to  artificial  modification,  while 
wetlands  delivering  essential  water  retention  and 
climate  regulation  functions  are  among  the  most 
threatened  ecosystems.  According  to  the  latest 
available  report  submitted  by  Poland,  for  2013-
2018, as much as 78.26% of habitats and 46.69% 
of species have a bad or poor conservation status. 

Under  the  Nature  Restoration  Regulation, 
Poland,  along  other  Member  States,  should 
contribute  to  the  achievement  of  the  EU 
target  to make  at least  25 000 km  of  rivers 
free  flowing  by  2030.  The  aim  is  to  restore 
freshwater ecosystems and the natural function of 

(289) 2025 Environmental Implementation Review – Country 

Report POLAND, Link. 

(290) Dataset from Commission/JRC, based on Hirschbuehl et al, 
2025, The EU economy’s dependency on nature, Link. 

(291) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, 
IEEP, IUCN, Trinomics and UNEP-WCMC, Impact assessment 
study to support the development of legally binding EU 
nature restoration targets – Final report, Publications Office 
of the European Union, 2023, Link. 

(292) Eurostat, Protected Areas Indicator, Link. 

102 

 
 
local 

including  enhanced 

rivers  and  to  mitigate  the  impact  of  floods.  Free-
rivers  also  generate  broader  socio-
flowing 
economic  benefits, 
rural 
landscape  quality,  new  recreation  and  tourism 
opportunities,  strengthened 
job  creation, 
improved  water  quality,  and  better  sediment 
transport  that  protects  deltas  and  coastal  areas 
against  erosion  and  rising  sea  levels.  In  2020, 
Poland  produced  the  national  programme  for 
renaturalisation(293)  and  a 
surface  waters 
handbook  on  restoration  that  outlines  objectives 
and  examples  of  measures  (including  nature-
based solutions), but the implementation of those 
documents  is  lagging.  Some  measures  are  being 
implemented,  including  actions  to  increase  water 
retention  and  ecosystem  resilience,  as  well  as 
forest-related  initiatives  aimed  at  strengthening 
the environmental functions of ecosystems. 

Nature  degradation  is  further  amplified  by 
invasive  alien  species,  with  36  recorded  in 
Poland  in  2025  (as  compared  to  27  in  2023  and 
33  in  2024),  inflicting  estimated  damages  of 
EUR 80  million  up  to  2020,  primarily  affecting 
agriculture and public health(294). 

Sustainable agriculture and land use 

increased, 

Carbon  removals  in  Poland  fall  considerably 
short  of  the  level  of  ambition  needed  to 
meet  its  2030  target  for  land  use,  land-use 
change  and  forestry  (LULUCF). In  Poland,  net 
carbon  removals  in  the  LULUCF  sector have  been 
declining.  While  the  forest  and  grassland  sectors 
removals  have 
in 
settlements contribute to the negative trend in net 
removals  observed  in  Poland.  The  main  drivers 
impacting  LULUCF  stock  identified  by  Poland 
include  intensifying  climate-related  disturbances, 
most  notably  reduced  tree  growth  caused  by 
prolonged droughts and heat stress – compounded 
declining 
by 
ageing 
regeneration 
frequent 
droughts  and  prolonged  heat  stress  significantly 

stands  with 
Increasingly 

forest 
capacity. 

land  use 

the 

(293) Krajowy program renaturyzacji wód powierzchniowych - 
Państwowe Gospodarstwo Wodne Wody Polskie, Link. 

(294) Neobiota,  Economic  Cost  of  invasive  alien  species  across 
Europe  (2021).  Link.  European  Commission:  Directorate-
General  for  Environment,  EMRC,  Logika  Group  and  RPA 
Europe;  Update  of  the  costs  of  not  implementing  EU 
environmental law (2025). Link. 

removals, 

constrain  tree  growth.  To  meet  its  2030  LULUCF 
target,  additional carbon  removals  of  3.3  million 
tonnes  of  CO2  equivalent  (CO2eq)  are  needed(295). 
The  latest  available  projections  show  a  gap  to 
target  of  5.4  Mt  of  CO2eq  for  2030(296). 
Thus, additional measures would  be needed in  the 
land  sector  to  reach  the  2030  target.  In  addition 
to increasing  LULUCF  net 
further 
investments in healthy forests and soils are key to 
building  resilient bio-based product  value  chains 
and  enabling  a  growing, 
competitive  EU 
bioeconomy. In  particular  continued improvements 
removal 
in 
data and will  be  crucial  in  supporting timely and 
effective action in the sector. Finally, the synergies 
between  climate  adaptation,  increasing  carbon 
removals,  military  defence  potential  (East  Shield 
programme),(297)  and  biodiversity(298),  suggested 
by research institutions(299)  could  be explored and 
implemented. 

the  monitoring  system  of  net 

and 

urban 

including 
selective  harvesting 

Existing  Polish  LULUCF  policies  focus  mainly 
on  forestry,  with  less  emphasis  on  wetland, 
agriculture 
settlements 
management.  In  the  forestry  sector,  current 
policies  aim  to  prioritise  biodiversity-oriented 
longer  rotation 
forest  management, 
periods, 
systems  and 
increased  retention  of  deadwood.  Planned  actions 
focus  on  further  scaling  up  close‑to‑nature 
forestry practices – longer rotations, mixed‑species 
stands,  and  increased  deadwood  retention  –  to 
stabilise  removals  and  reduce  forest  vulnerability 
to  droughts,  pests  and  extreme  weather  events. 
Expansion  of  afforestation  and  restoration  of 
degraded  forest  land  and  peatlands  is  envisaged 
where  feasible,  subject  to  land‑availability  and 
cost constraints. 

The  Polish  Supreme  Audit  Office  found  in 
2025 that State Forests did not take correct, 
reliable  and  adequate  measures  to  adapt 
forest  management  to  the  climate  change 

(295)National LULUCF targets of the Member States in line with 
Regulation (EU) 2023/839 Link 

(296) Climate action progress report 2025. Link. 

(297) https://tarczawschod.wp.mil.pl/en/about-the-programme/.  

(298)https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S00163287

25002149.  

(299) https://academia.pan.pl/zielona-tarcza-wschod-bagna-w-

sluzbie-obronnosci/  

103 

 
 
 
of 

afforestation 

(300).  The  corrective  actions,  namely  drawing  up 
the national forest programme and amending the 
Forests Act and the Nature Conservation Act, were 
initiated  but  not  finalised.  The  new  State  Forests’ 
‘Forests  for  Climate’  programme,  launched  in 
2025,  will  cover  more  than  50 000 ha  and  will 
land, 
include 
diversification 
underplanting, 
species 
share  of 
(including  a  higher 
composition 
broadleaves  and  Douglas  fir)  and  soil‑improving 
practices 
The 
programme 
to  promote  natural 
regeneration  and  sound  silvicultural  practices  as 
core  sequestration  tools.  Additional  subsidies  are 
available under the rural development programme 
(PROW)  for  private  forest  owners  (0.1-40 ha)  to 
support regeneration. 

enhance  CO₂  uptake. 
intended 

non‑forest 
of 

that 
is 

urban 

development, 

land  use  planning 

For  settlements,  Polish  policies  focus  on 
compact 
green 
infrastructure and  renaturation measures  to 
limit emissions from land conversion and soil 
sealing.  Pressures  from  investment  activity  and 
urban  expansion  are  to  be  addressed  through 
that 
biodiversity-aligned 
prioritises  co-benefits.  A  pilot  project  launched  in 
2024 by the Ministry of Climate and Environment 
has created 14 ‘community  forests’ around major 
urban  areas  such  as  Warsaw,  Kraków  and 
for 
Wrocław,  providing  access 
approximately  13  million 
the 
agriculture sector, under the CAP strategic plan for 
2023-2027  (301)  a  total  of  EUR 66.52  million  has 
been 
in 
for 
afforestation/creation  of  woodland.  The  planned 
amount  of  the  Carbon  Farming  and  Nutrient 
Management  eco-scheme  is  approximately  EUR 
2.63 billion. 

to  nature 
In 

investments 

residents. 

allocated 

EU  average  of 670 ppm/year  in  2018-2021).  This 
ongoing  land  take  and  the  associated  soil  sealing 
causes less resilient ecosystems, decreased carbon 
sequestration  and  impaired  flood  protection  (302). 
The  greatest  contributor  to  Poland’s  unhealthy 
soils is loss of soil organic carbon in mineral soils 
(303), which affects 29% of land and 58% of total 
cropland and grassland areas. 17% of the national 
territory experiences unsustainable soil erosion by 
water,  wind,  tillage  and  harvest,  mainly  in  the 
southern  part  of  the  country.  8%  of  soils  contain 
nitrogen  concentrations  above  50 kg/ha,  and  8% 
of  the  national  territory  is  highly  or  very  highly 
susceptible to topsoil compaction. 

Organic  farming  is  not  very  widespread  in 
Poland,  accounting  for  an  estimated  4.88% 
of the country’s land area. Although the figure 
has  increased  significantly  over  the  last  two 
decades,  it  is  still  among  the  worst  results  in  the 
EU.  Poland  is  above  the  EU  average  for  the 
frequency of pesticide residues in topsoil samples, 
with  14.5%  of  soil  samples  having  more  than  10 
distinct  pesticides  residues  (EU-27  average  11%) 
and  for  pesticide  residues  concentrations,  with 
70%  of  soil  samples  presenting  pesticide 
concentration  above  0.05 mg/kg  (EU-27  average 
57%) (304). 

On  a  positive  note,  Poland  has  met  its  emission 
reduction  commitments  for  2020-2029  and  is  on 
track  to  reach 
its  commitments  from  2030 
onwards (305). Ammonia emissions reported for the 
year  2023  indicate  that  with  21.1 kg/ha  in  2023 
(306), the agriculture sector is responsible  for 96% 
of the total national emissions. 

functional  urban  area 

Poland  faces  environmental,  climate  and 
public  health  risks  due  to  persistent  soil 
sealing  and  agricultural  pollution  pressures. 
Poland’s 
(FUA)  has 
considerably  expanded  in  the  last  years,  with  a 
yearly  net  land  take  increasing  from  923 ppm  of 
the  total  urban  surface  of  the  country  in  2012-
2018  up  to  1 298 ppm  in  2018-2021  (the  third-
biggest land take in the EU-27 and far above the 

(300) https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/ochrona-

srodowiska/adaptacja-gospodarki-lesnej-do-zmian-
klimatu.html  

(302) EEA,  Land  take  and  land  degradation  in  functional  urban 

areas, 2022, Link. 

(303) De Rosa, D., Ballabio, C., Lugato, E. et al., ‘Soil organic carbon 
stocks in European croplands and grasslands: How much 
have we lost in the past decade?’, Global Change Biology, 
Vol. 30, No 1, 2023, e16992, Link. 

(304) Vieira et al. (JRC), Pesticides residues in European agricultural 
soils  -  Results  from  LUCAS  2018  soil  module,  Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2023. Link. 

(305) 2025 Environmental Implementation Review – Country 

(301) https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/cap-my-country/cap-

Report POLAND, Link. 

strategic-plans/poland_en.  

(306) Eurostat – Ammonia emissions from agriculture, Link. 

104 

 
 
 
 
Table A10.1: Key Adaptation Indicators 

(1) EFFIS (European Forest Fire Information System). Link. 
(2) The climate protection gap refers to the share of non-insured economic losses caused by climate-related disasters, based on 
modelling of the risk from floods, wildfires and windstorms and on the insurance penetration rate. Scale: 0 (no protection gap) – 4 
(very high gap). EIOPA, 2025, Dashboard on insurance protection gap for natural catastrophes. 
(3) This measures total water consumption as a percentage of the renewable freshwater resources available for a given territory 
and period. Values above 20% are generally considered to be a sign of water scarcity, while values equal to or greater than 40% 
indicate severe water scarcity. 
(4) European Commission, 2024, Seventh Implementation Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) (Third 
River Basin Management Plans and Second Flood Risk Management Plans). 
(5) Indicator refers to concentrations of nitrate (NO3) in groundwater, measured as milligrams per litre (mgNO3/L). Nitrate can 
persist in groundwater for a long time and accumulate at a high level through inputs from anthropogenic sources (mainly 
agriculture). The EU drinking water standard is limited to 50 mgNO3/L to avoid threats to human health. 
(6) Net removals are expressed in negative figures, net emissions in positive figures. Reported data are from the 2025 
greenhouse gas inventory submission. 2030 value of net greenhouse gas removals as in Regulation (EU) 2023/839 – Annex IIa. 
Source: Eurostat, EEA and JRC 

105 

Climate adaptation and preparedness:EU-27201920202021202220232024latest dataDrought impact on ecosystems14.512.571.827.167.96-2.76[area impacted by drought as % of total]Forest fires burned area (1)60            5 383       40            465          47            30            354 510     [burned area in ha. per year]Economic losses from extreme events-          451          33            1              1              2 938       40 452       [EUR million at constant 2022 prices]Insurance protection gap (2)---2              2              2               -[composite score between 0 and 4]Sub-national climate adaptation action6              8              13            15            18            18            34               [% of population covered by the EU Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy]Water resilience:EU-27201920202021202220232024latest dataWater Exploitation Index Plus, WEI+ (3)6.83         6.22         5.11         6.33         5.16         -4.53            [total water consumption as % of renewable freshwater resources]Water productivity52            54            54            57            64            -151[EUR per m3]Water abstractionWater abstraction by source (% from surface water)73.88%72.75%74.16%75.18%72.67%-Water abstraction by sectorAgricultureElectricity coolingManufactu-ringPublic water supplyMining and QuarryingConstru- ction 10.40%54.18%5.42%29.37%0.61%0.01%Status of water bodies (4)[% of water bodies in a good status]Surface water bodies (ecological)-----8%38%Groundwater bodies (quantitative)-----91%93%Nature restoration:EU-27201920202021202220232024latest dataEcosystem dependency---40%--44%[% of direct dependency]Protected area39.639.639.639.639.626.4[% of terrestrial protected areas]Invasive alien species (IAS)-----3329.2[number of IAS of Union concern]Damage cost of IAS----0.081.69[EUR billion]Eutrophication 200200295[AAE of area at risk of euthrophication]Sustainable agriculture and land use:EU-272012-20182018-2021latest dataYearly net land taken by Member State923          1 298       670            [ppm of total urban surface per Member State]Land conversion in functional urban area [% of total land taken from 2018-2021]Arable land49%Complex and mixed cultivation0%Forests8%Herbaceous vegetation associations1%Open spaces with little or no vegetation0%Pastures41%Permanent crops0%Water0%Wetlands0%201920202021202220232024latest dataNitrates in groundwater (5)12.611.610.39.18.6[mgNO₃/l]Livestock density0.69:0.75(number of livestock units per hectare of utilised agricultural area)Ammonia emissions 96%96%96%96%96%-94%[% of total utilised agricultural area]Pesticide contamination on rivers and lakes water bodiesrivers13%27%[% of monitoring sites with pesticides exceeding thresholds, 2018-2023]lakes0%18%Pesticide contamination in soil 70%57%[% of samples with a concentration over 0.5 mg/Kg⁻¹]Net greenhouse gas removals from LULUCF (6)-23227.3-24057.6-24875.1-36449.8-32656.2--198 421 [ktCO₂-eq] 
 
      
 
FAIRNESS 
ANNEX 11: LABOUR MARKET 

Poland’s labour market  remains  robust, with 
strong  headline  outcomes,  but  participation 
gaps continue to constrain labour supply and 
exacerbate labour shortages. Unemployment is 
among  the  lowest  in  the  EU,  and  the  national 
employment  rate  target  of  78.3%  has  been  met. 
Meanwhile,  the  reported  labour  shortages  remain 
high,  also  driven  by  demographic  trends  and 
persistently 
low  participation  among  several 
groups,  including  women, persons  with  disabilities 
Insufficient  availability  of 
and  older  people. 
issues  undermining  work-life 
childcare,  and 
inclusive  employment  support 
balance  and 
continue 
labour  supply.  These 
structural  weaknesses  limit  the  labour  market’s 
capacity  to  address  current  and  future  shortages, 
while  also  holding  back  progress  on  social 
inclusion,  quality  jobs  and  competitiveness.  The 
for 
2025 
Poland  highlighted  the  need  to  foster  education 
and skills relevant to the labour market, including 
the 
green  and  digital  skills  and 
in  the 
participation  of  disadvantaged  groups 
labour  market, 
through  effective 
education-to-employment transitions.  

recommendations 

country-specific 

to  constrain 

including 

increase 

Graph A11.1: Activity, employment and 
unemployment rates (annual) 

to 

rise, 

continues 

Employment 
and 
unemployment  remains  at  record  lows,  but 
strong  regional  disparities  in  labour  market 
outcomes  persist.  The  employment  rate  among 
people  aged  20-64  increased  to  79.2%  in  Q4-
2025  and  was  78.8%  for  the  whole  year  2025, 
while the unemployment rate has hovered around 
3%  since  2022, matching  pre-pandemic lows  and 
remaining  well  below  the  EU  average  (6%  in  Q3-
2025).  Labour  market  slack  stood  at  5%  in  Q2-
2025,  slightly  up  from  4.8%  in  Q2-2024  but  still 
significantly  below  the  EU  average  of  10.9% (308). 
Labour force participation among people aged 15-
64  grew  from  66.4%  in  2014  to  74.7%  in  2024, 
reaching a level close to the EU average of 75.3% 
but around 15 pps lower than the top-performing 
Member  States.  Labour  force  participation  rates 
vary substantially across regions. In 2024, the gap 
between  the  highest  and  lowest  regional  labour 
force participation rates reached 9.3 pps, up from 
8.1  pps 
in 
Dolnośląskie in the west to 68.4% in Podkarpackie 
in  the  south-east).  Similar  regional  disparities  are 
observed in employment and unemployment rates 
(with  gaps  of  9.2  pps  and  2  pps  respectively). 
Boosting  the  economic  activation  of  groups  who 
remain  outside  the  workforce  is  essential  to 
alleviate  shortages  and  ensure  sustainable 
employment  growth.  The 
implementation  of 
activation  measures  is  largely  financed  by  the 
including 
European  Social  Fund  Plus 
through 
supporting 
regional 
personalised counselling, training and labour office 
services.  

(ranging  from  77.7% 

programmes 

in  2023 

(ESF+), 

recent 

country-specific 

improvements, 

Despite 
gender 
disparities  in  employment  remain  high.  The 
for 
2025 
Poland  noted  the  barriers  disadvantaged  groups 
encounter when trying to enter the labour market. 
The gender employment gap has fallen by 3.2 pps 
since 2020 but is still at 11.6 pps, 1.6 pps above 

recommendations 

Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a, une_rt_a](307) 

(307) Note: Some indicators contain breaks and other flags. See 

Eurostat-LFS for further details on the dataset.   

(308)  Labour  market  slack 
is  the  sum  of  the  following: 
unemployed  people,  underemployed  part-time  workers,  people 
seeking work but not immediately available for work, and people 
available for work but not seeking a job. Labour market slack is 
expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the  extended  labour  force.  The 
extended  labour  force  is  the  total  number  of  all  employed  and 
unemployed  people  (the  labour  force),  plus  those  seeking  work 
but not immediately available for work, plus those available for 
work but not seeking a job. 

106 

02468101245505560657075808520092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025% of labour force% of populationPLUnemployment rate 15-74 (rhs)Activity rate 20-64Employment rate 20-64 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
responsibilities, 

the  EU  average(309).  The  gender  pay  gap  widened 
from 4.5% in 2020 to 5.9% in 2023 but then fell 
to  4%  in  2024.  In  2025,  women’s  labour  force 
participation stood at 70.1.%, compared to 80.3% 
for  men,  reflecting  persistent  barriers  linked  to 
limited  availability   of 
care 
institutions  and  services  providing  care  for 
dependants,  inflexible  and  relatively  long  working 
hours  and  lower  job  quality  in  sectors  where 
in 
women  are  over-represented.  Participation 
formal  early  childhood  education  and  care  for 
children  under  three  years  of  age  increased  by  3 
pps to 15.1% in 2024 but is still far below the EU 
average  (39.2%) (310).  In  2024,  Poland  launched 
the  ‘Active  Parent’  programme,  which  involves  a 
subsidy  to  childcare  costs,  while  the 
‘Active 
Toddler’  programme,  supported  by  the  ESF+  and 
the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (RRF),  will 
further 
labour  market 
positive 
participation  trends  with  the  creation  of  over 
102 500  new  places  in  childcare  institutions  for 
children  under  three  years  of  age  by  2029, 
targeting  municipalities  without 
childcare 
institutions ). Support to address the lower quality 
of  jobs  more  commonly  done  by  women  is 
the  ESF+  gender  equality 
financed  under 
objectives, 
including  projects  promoting  equal 
opportunities  and  reducing  barriers  to  women’s 
employment.  

support 

remain  weak. 

Labour  market  outcomes  for  persons  with 
disabilities 
The  disability 
employment gap slightly dropped from 35.6 pps in 
2024  to  35.0  pps  in  2025  (EU:  24.2  pps).  For 
persons  with  severe  disabilities,  the  gap  reaches 
61  pps  (EU:  45.5  pps).  Labour  force  participation 
among persons with disabilities is just above 50%, 
as disability or illness remains a leading cause of 
inactivity.  Poland  has  met 
interim  2025 
employment  target  for  persons  with  disabilities 
(32.5%),  but  further  progress  is  constrained  by 
limited  access  to  tailored  labour  market  support. 
Regional  disparities  are  also  significant.  In  Q2-
2025,  the  employment  rate  of  persons  with 
disabilities  aged  16–64  ranged  from  42.5%  in 
Dolnośląskie  and  37.0% 
in  Lubuskie  and 
Pomorskie to 25.0% in Warmińsko-mazurskie and 
26.0%  in  Kujawsko-pomorskie,  compared  with  a 
national average of 30.2%, which points to uneven 

its 

(309) Values refer to the 20–64 age group 

(310)C_2022484EN.01000101.xml. 

labour  market  integration  across  regions (311).  The 
ESF+  supports  measures  to  reduce  the  disability 
employment  gap  by  promoting  labour  market 
inclusion. Poland also increased wage subsidies for 
persons  with  disabilities  in  2025  and  now  offers 
reimbursement  of  recruitment  and  training  costs. 
A  pilot 
‘supported  employment’  scheme  has 
potential,  but  existing  labour  market  instruments 
remain insufficiently effective. 

Stronger  labour  market  integration  of  third-
country  nationals  (TCNs)  is  needed  to  better 
harness  the  available  skills  and  help  tackle 
labour  shortages.  On  1 January 2024,  around 
699 900 TCNs resided in Poland (making up 1.9% 
of the population). By end-January 2025, 993 015 
non-EU  citizens who fled the war in Ukraine were 
in  Poland  under  temporary  protection(312).  Labour 
market  indicators  for  foreign-born  nationals  are 
robust:  81%  participation  (OECD:  77%)  and  3% 
their 
unemployment 
skills are underused: in 2023, 48% of TCNs worked 
in  jobs  below  their  qualifications.  Among  the 
Ukrainian migrants, this number rose from 35% in 
2021  to  68%  in  2024(314).  Poland  scores  44/100 
on  the  Migrant 
Index  (EU: 
54/100),  rated  ‘halfway  favourable’,  with  labour 
market  mobility  at  43/100,  also  below  the  EU 
average(315). 

(OECD:  8%)(313). However, 

Integration  Policy 

Employment  rates  among  older  workers 
remain below the EU average. The employment 
rate  for  workers  aged  55-64  stood  at  60.1%  in 
2025(EU:  66.4%).  Older  people  account  for  over 
35%  of  the  economically  inactive  population  of 
working  age  (316).  Early  exit  patterns,  health 
limitations  and  insufficient  access  to  life-long 
learning  hinder  labour  market  participation.  The 
employment  rate  among  older  women  (55-64) 
remains particularly low at 48.3%, compared with 

(311)Statistics Poland, 
https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/bdl/dane/podgrup/temat#.   

(312)https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-
asylum/migrant-integration/migrant-integration-hub/eu-
countries-updates-and-facts/migrant-integration-poland_en.  

(313)https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/11/international-
migration-outlook-2025_355ae9fd/full-
report/poland_9206f6b3.html.  

(314)https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/poland-almost-half-
foreign-workforce-overqualified-2024-08-26_en.  

(315)https://www.mipex.eu/Poland.   

(316)https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/lfsa_igan__c
ustom_19518898/default/table.  

107 

 
 
 
59.4% at EU level, while the rate for older men is 
70.7%  (EU:  71.4%).  This  gap  is  largely  explained 
by  the  lower  statutory  retirement  age  for  women 
(60,  compared  with  65  for  men).  To  increase 
labour  market  participation,  Poland  introduced 
subsidies  for  employers  hiring  workers  above  the 
retirement  age  under  the  new  Act  on  Labour 
Market and Employment Services. 

Working  time  patterns  are  among  the  most 
intensive  in  the  EU,  which  has  a  negative 
impact  on  job  quality  and  labour  market 
inclusiveness.  Over  76%  of  workers  work  more 
than  40  hours  per  week  (EU:  47.5%),  the  fifth 
highest share in the EU, while only 5% work part-
time  (EU:  17%).  Remote  work  in  Poland  remains 
comparatively  rare  (14%  vs  22%  in  the  EU  in 
2023) (317).  Although  flexible  schedules  are  more 
common 
less 
widespread  in  larger  companies.  These  patterns 
may  discourage  people  with  care  responsibilities, 
persons  with  disabilities  and  older  workers  from 
entering the labour market. 

in  small  firms,  they  are  far 

instruments  to 

increase 
Labour  market 
participation rely heavily on the EU Cohesion 
Fund and RRF funding. In response to the 2025 
country-specific  recommendation  regarding  the 
participation  of  disadvantaged  groups 
in  the 
labour  market,  Poland  has  reformed  its  public 
employment services by expanding their proactive 
outreach  to  economically  inactive  people,  piloting 
‘supported  employment’  schemes  for  people  with 
disabilities,  and  refocusing  training  and  activation 
measures towards groups furthest away from the 
labour  market.  Better  targeting  of  measures  is 
crucial  for  activating  vulnerable  groups.  At  the 
same time, the sustainability of these instruments 
remains  a  concern  due  to  their  heavy  reliance  on 
EU  funding.  Moreover,  the  budget  of  the  national 
Labour  Fund  used  to  finance  Poland's  active 
labour  market  policies  has  been  decreased 
substantially  for  2026.  Ensuring  sustainability  is 
also a concern for social economy  entities, whose 
potential 
integration  of 
labour  market 
disadvantaged groups is still largely untapped. 

in 

The  working-age  population  continues  to 
shrink,  further  tightening 
labour  supply. 
Between 2023 and 2024, the population aged 15-
64  decreased  by  around  0.8%,  and  demographic 

(317)https://eures.europa.eu/living-and-working/labour-market-
information/labour-market-information-poland_en.  

level 

is  recorded 

pressures  are  expected  to  intensify  over  the 
medium  term.  Although  the  rate  of  young  people 
neither  in  employment  nor  in  education  and 
training  (NEETs)  in  Poland  is  below  the  EU-27 
average (9.4% and 11.1% respectively in 2024), it 
is  unevenly  distributed  across  regions(318). 
In 
Podkarpackie,  Łódzkie,  Warmińsko-mazurskie  and 
Świętokrzyskie regions, the NEET rate exceeds the 
average  for  Poland  by  28%  or  more,  while  the 
in  the  Warszawski 
lowest 
Stołeczny  region  (about  30%  below  the  average 
for  Poland).  This  may  translate  into  growing 
rates 
regional  disparities,  since  high  NEET 
undermine the supply potential of the regional and 
local  labour  markets.  According  to  projections  by 
Polish Economic Institute, employment is expected 
to decline by around 2.1 million by 2035, or 12.6% 
of  the  employment  level  in  2024(319).  Assuming 
that 
remains 
unchanged  (65  for  men  and  60  for  women), 
around  3.8  million  workers  are  projected  to  leave 
the  labour  market  by  2035,  while  the  projected 
inflow  of  new  cohorts  would  amount  to  only  1.7 
million  people, 
labour 
shortages.  Demographic  decline  has  a  strong 
regional  dimension.  These  trends  may  further 
reduce  regional  labour  supply  and  exacerbate 
labour  shortages,  particularly  in  regions  which 
already face structural challenges. 

further  exacerbating 

retirement  age 

the  statutory 

to 

the  green 

labour  market  challenges 
Poland  faces 
related 
transition,  with 
significant  regional  implications.  Despite  a 
considerable  (7.4%)  decrease  since  2019,  the 
proportion  of  workers 
in  emission-intensive 
industries  is  the  third  highest  in  the  EU  (4.9%  vs 
EU:  3.5%  in  2024).  While  most  of  these  workers 
are  employed  in  vehicle  manufacturing  (which 
accounted for 1.8% of total employment in 2024), 
the  non-metallic  minerals 
employment 
manufacturing  sector  and  in  chemicals  is  well 
above  EU  average  (1%  vs  EU:  0.5%  and  0.7%  vs 
EU:  0.5%  respectively).  With  lignite  and  hard  coal 
sectors  highly  concentrated  in  western  regions 
such  as  Silesia  and  Greater  Poland,  the  country 
employs four times as many workers in mining as 
the  EU  average  (with  employment  in  mining 
accounting  for  0.9%  of  total  employment  in 
Poland  vs  EU:  0.2%  in  2023),  or  over  190 000 

in 

(318) Data refers to 15-29 age group 

(319)Polish Economic Institute, 2024 https://pie.net.pl/przy-
obecnych-trendach-demograficznych-do-2035-r-zatrudnienie-w-
polsce-moze-spasc-o-ponad-12-proc/.  

108 

 
 
 
in 

workers 
the 
in  2024.  Also,  employment 
environmental goods and services sector was only 
2% in Poland in 2022, compared with 3.1% in the 
EU.  Managing  the  transition  requires  targeted 
support,  upskilling  and  reskilling,  as  well  as 
regional  development  measures  to  safeguard 
workers’  job  transitions,  as  industries  such  as 
mining  undergo  significant  changes  or  structural 
decline.  In  this  regard,  Poland  reports  a  relatively 
high  number  of  active  policies  to  support  quality 
employment in the context of the green transition.  

teaching 

remain  a  significant 
Labour  shortages 
challenge for companies. While the job vacancy 
rate remains comparatively low (0.8% in Q2-2025, 
below its pre-pandemic level of 1.1% in Q4-2019), 
the share of managers reporting labour shortages 
as  a  factor  limiting  production  remains  very  high, 
with 62.4% of businesses in industry (compared to 
17.5%  in  the  EU),  67.5%  in  construction  (EU: 
27.5%)  and 56.5% in services (EU:  23.1%)  in Q4-
2025  reporting  such  problems.  A  breakdown  of 
labour  demand (320)  by  occupation  shows  a 
particularly  strong  demand  for  manufacturing 
certain 
staff, 
categories of social workers. Considering the green 
transition,  shortages  are  also  reported  among 
construction  workers  and  the  related  professions 
of  electrician,  welder  and flame  cutter,  which  can 
impact  the  deployment  of  cleaner  energy  sources 
and green construction works. Furthermore, the ICT 
sector 
ICT 
total 
specialists  accounting 
employment  in  2024,  compared  to  5%  in  the  EU. 
Poland also lags behind the EU in terms of digital 
skills  levels  among  the  broader  population,  with 
only  50.4%  of  individuals  aged  16-74  having  at 
least  basic  digital  skills  in  2025  (compared  to 
60.4% in the EU). 

underdeveloped,  with 

for  4.5%  of 

professionals 

remains 

and 

to  competitiveness,  while 

Wage  growth  has  been  robust  but  poses  a 
risk 
in-work 
poverty is  rising.  Wages  grew  relatively  fast,  at 
13%  in  2024,  translating  into  strong  real  wage 
growth  (8.8%).  Looking  ahead,  wage  growth  is 
projected  to  have  moderated  to  8%  in  2025  and 
to slow to 6.7% in 2026, while real wage growth is 
expected  to  continue  (at  a  pace  of  4.8%  in  2025 
and  3%  in  2026),  being  driven  primarily  by 
continued  nominal  wage  growth  coupled  with 
continued  disinflation.  The  statutory  minimum 

wage  rose  by  55%  between  January  2022  and 
July  2025,  an  increase  of  nearly  21%  in  real 
terms (321).  Since  2020, 
real  effective 
exchange rate has grown much faster than the EU 
average (322).  At  the  same  time,  rising  in-work 
poverty  (9.3%  vs  EU:  8.2%)  and  a  large  share  of 
low-wage  earners  (19%  vs  EU:  14.7%)  in  2024 
give rise to concerns regarding job quality. 

the 

dialogue, 

employers’ 

Social  dialogue  continues  to  face  systemic 
challenges,  which  limits  its  role  in  shaping 
labour  market  policies (323).  Despite  the  new 
government’s  explicit  commitment  to  improving 
social 
and  workers’ 
representatives  report  no  tangible  progress.  The 
Social  Dialogue  Council’s  powers  are  still 
in 
restricted,  and  government  participation 
meetings 
the 
consultation processes persist, including bypassing 
or shortening  the mandatory consultation periods, 
as was the case during the preparation of Poland’s 
medium-term fiscal-structural plan.  

Irregularities 

limited. 

in 

is 

social 

Both  collective  bargaining  coverage  (11.6% 
in  2023)  and  trade  union  density  (9.4%  in 
2022)  are  among  the  lowest  in  the  EU, 
impeding  meaningful 
dialogue. 
Employer  organisation  density  was  at  56.3% 
(2022)(324).  Social  partners  have 
insufficient 
capacity  for  effective  social  dialogue.  Wage 
bargaining  is  largely  confined  to  company  level, 
and no sectoral agreement has been concluded for 
a  decade.  Multi-employer  agreements  are  rare, 
and 
is  decreasing.  Poland 
introduced  a  new  Act  on  Collective  Agreements 
and  Collective  Bargaining  in  November  2025, 
which  aims  to  increase  the  use  of  collective 
agreements. The Act creates a mandatory national 
register  of  collective  agreements,  introduces  an 
list  of  matters  governed  by  collective 
open 
agreements,  and  simplifies 
the  process  for 
concluding 
such  agreements,  and  allowing 
mediators  to  be  involved  in  collective  bargaining. 
In  addition,  it  also  simplifies  the  process  for 

their  prevalence 

(321)Eurofound, Industrial relations and social dialogue. Minimum 
wages in 2025: Annual review, 2025. Note: Calculations based 
on national currency and purchasing power standards. 

(322)Výškrabka, M. and A. Bodea, 2026, ‘After the Inflation Shock. 
Taking Stock of Price Competitiveness in the EU’, European 
Economy Discussion Paper 240, DG ECFIN, European 
Commission, see in particular pp. 25-26. 

(320)Cedefop Skills-OVATE, EURES - Demand for occupations, 
data from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025. 

(323)https://www.ituc-csi.org/poland.  

(324)OECD/AIAS ICTWSS v2.0. 

109 

 
 
 
company-level agreement extension at the request 
of social partners. Moreover, since 2023, the Polish 
government  and  the  two  Chambers  of  the  Polish 
Parliament  have  adopted  resolutions  to  improve 
the  methods  for  consulting  social  partners.    The 
correct  transposition of the Directive on Adequate 
Minimum  Wages 
to  encourage 
promoting  collective  bargaining  as  well  as 
improving enforcement mechanisms.  

is  essential 

110 

 
ANNEX 12: SOCIAL POLICIES 

The  social  situation  in  Poland  has  continued 
to  improve,  but  some  challenges  remain.  
Poverty  and  income  inequality  have  declined, 
thanks to a strong labour market, increases in the 
minimum wage, higher child-rearing benefits  and 
lower inflation. However, as many family  benefits 
are  not  means-tested,  their  impact  on  poverty 
reduction  is  less  targeted,  which  suggests  that 
there  is  a  need  to  improve  the  targeting  and 
efficiency of social  benefits , as highlighted in the 
2025  country-specific  recommendation.  At  the 
same  time,  the  risk  of  poverty  or  social  exclusion 
continues to display significant regional and socio-
economic disparities, with pronounced  urban–rural 
differences  and  high  risks  for  certain  population 
groups.  Gaps  in  coverage  and  effective  access  to 
social protection services persist for non-standard 
workers  and  self-employed  and  unemployed 
people, 
impact  of  social 
benefits  on  poverty 
reduction.  An  ageing 
population  is  further  increasing  the  demand  for 
long-term  care,  while  service  provision  remains 
limited and workforce shortages persists, resulting 
in  a  heavy  reliance  on  informal  care.  The  2025 
called  on 
country-specific 
Poland  to  ensure  the  adequacy  of  future  pension 
benefits  and  strengthen  the  sustainability  of  the 
pension  system,  including  by  taking  measures  on 
the  effective  retirement  age  and  reforming 
preferential pension schemes. 

limiting  the  overall 

recommendations 

Graph A12.1: At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion 
rate and its components 

Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_peps01n, ilc_li02, ilc_mdsd11, 
ilc_lvhl11n] 

reflects 

small  but 

The  number  of  people  at  risk  of  poverty  or 
in  Poland  has 
social  exclusion  (AROPE) 
decreased,  reflecting  reductions  in  poverty 
and  material  deprivation.  Between  2019  and 
2024,  this  number  fell  by  760  000,  representing 
just  over  half  of  the  targeted  reduction  of  1.5 
million by 2030. In 2024, the AROPE rate declined 
marginally  by  0.3  percentage  points 
(pps) 
compared  with  2023, to  16%,  which is broadly  in 
line  with  the  level  recorded  in  2022.  This  overall 
improvement 
consistent 
reductions in two of the three AROPE components. 
The  at-risk-of-poverty  (AROP)  rate(325)  decreased 
from  14%  in  2023  to  13.8%  in  2024,    while 
severe  material  and  social  deprivation  fell  more 
noticeably,  from  3.0%  to  2.3%,  over  the  same 
period. However, the proportion of people living in 
households with very low work intensity remained 
unchanged,  indicating  persistent  labour  market 
attachment  challenges  among  certain  population 
groups. Measures addressing the risk of poverty or 
social  exclusion  are  primarily  supported  through 
the  European  Social  Fund  Plus  (ESF+),  which 
finances  active  inclusion  policies,  access  to  social 
services  and  community-based  activities,  with  a 
strong  focus  on  disadvantaged  regions  and 
vulnerable groups. In addition, with a total budget 
of  around  EUR  583  million,  the  2021-2027 
European  Funds  for  Food Aid  programme  aims  to 
combat  material  deprivation  by  providing  food 
assistance  to  people  most  severely  affected  by 
alongside 
deprivation, 
children, 
accompanying  measures 
that  support  social 
inclusion.  The  EU  anti-poverty  strategy  could  help 
address  the  multiple  dimensions  of  poverty  and 
achieve the national anti-poverty target. 

including 

Despite  the  overall  decline,  poverty  and 
social  exclusion  remain  unevenly  distributed 
across  regions.  In  2024,  AROPE  rates  in  some 
regions  were  more  than  double  those  in  others, 
pointing  to  significant  regional  disparities.  Rates 
were  highest  in  the  more  rural  north-eastern 
regions  of  Podlaskie  (26.4%)  and  Warmińsko-
Mazurskie  (23.6%),  and  substantially  lower  in  the 
more  urbanised  and  industrialised  south-western 
regions of Śląskie (10.3%) and Opolskie (13.9%) . 
These  regional  differences  reflect  a  persistent 
urban–rural  divide.  In  2024,  the  AROPE  rate  in 
rural  areas  stood  at  20.9%,  which  was  8.7  pps 
higher  than  the  rate  in  cities  (12.2%).  This  gap 

(325) AROP, like other income related indicators for 2024, refers to 

income earned in 2023. 

111 

05101520252015201620172018201920202021202220232024% of populationPLAt-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion rateAt-risk-of-poverty rateSevere material and social deprivationPeople living in low work intensity households 
 
   
 
 
 
highlights ongoing challenges related to access to 
employment  opportunities,  services  and  social 
support  in  rural  areas,  which  contribute  to  higher 
poverty  risks  and  social  exclusion  outside  urban 
centres.  

Regional  disparities  are  particularly  evident 
in  rural  and  more  remote  areas,  where 
vulnerable  population  groups  suffer  from 
transport  poverty.  Effective  public  transport 
infrastructure  is  often  insufficient  in  rural  and 
peripheral  areas  and  in  the  regions  located  along 
(see  Annex  19),  which 
Poland’s  borders 
exacerbates  access  to  services(326).  According  to 
the  2024  EU-SILC  ad  hoc  module  on  access  to 
services,  9.6%  of  the  population  reported  using 
public  transport  daily,  which  is  slightly  below  the 
EU average of 10.7%. 

Poverty  rates  among  children  continue  to 
decline. Between 2023 and 2024, the AROPE rate 
among children decreased by 0.8 pps to 16.1% (vs 
the  EU  average  of  24.2%).  As  part  of  its  national 
child  poverty-reduction  commitment,  Poland  aims 
to reduce the number of children at risk of poverty 
of  social  exclusion  by  at  least  300  000  by  2030 
compared  with  2019.  However,  as  the  reduction 
between  2019  and  2024  amounted  to  only  19 
000 children, further efforts are needed to achieve 
this  target.  To  mitigate  the  impact  of  poverty  on 
children,  Poland  is  implementing  the  European 
Child  Guarantee,  which  is  also  supported  by  the 
ESF+.  

in 

early 

backgrounds 

participation 

disadvantaged 

Low 
childhood 
education  and  care  among  children  under 
three  disproportionately  affects  children 
from 
and 
remains a barrier to parents' participation in 
the  labour  market.  The  share  of  children  under 
three participating in formal childcare increased by 
6 pps between 2024 and 2025, to 21. However, it 
still  remains  well  below  the  EU  average  of  40%.  
lower  for 
Furthermore,  participation 
children at risk of poverty or social exclusion, both 
under  and  over  the  age  of  three  (3% vs  24%  for 
the EU and 67% vs 82% for the EU respectively). 

is  much 

(326) No data on public transport accessibility in Poland are 
available on the Commission’s Transport Poverty Hub, 
because the data on Poland’s national access point set up 
under Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1926 (the 
Multimodal Travel Information Services Regulation 
Regulation)) are incomplete. 

There  are  also  significant  regional  disparities 
remain,  with  the  number  of  available  childcare 
places  per  1  000  children  under  three  ranging 
from  343  places  in  Dolnośląskie  to  187  in 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie  in  2024(327).  With  support 
from  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  and  the 
ESF+,  Poland  has  implemented  a  comprehensive 
reform  to  improve  the  accessibility,  quality  and 
affordability of early childhood education and care 
for  children  under  three  3  (Reform  A4.2  and 
measures A4.2.1 under the Facility). Over 100 000 
new  childcare places  are planned,  and mandatory 
quality  standards  were  introduced  in  January 
2026. The ‘Active Parent’ programme, launched in 
2024, contributes towards parents’ childcare costs. 
Effective 
and 
evaluation of these measures will be necessary to 
inform policy. 

implementation,  monitoring 

formal 

Non-standard  workers  face  substantial  gaps 
coverage. 
social  protection 
in 
Temporary  employees  account  for  15.1%  of  total 
employment  (EU:  12.8%),  while  self-employed 
people  without  employees  represent  14.4%  (EU: 
9.3%),  one  of  the  highest  rates  in  the  EU.  Large 
groups  of  non-standard  workers  lack  access  to 
social  protection.  For  example,  around  1.4  million 
workers  on  ‘contracts  of  mandate’  -  flexible  civil-
law  agreements  for  performing  specific  tasks, 
distinct  from  standard  employment  contracts 
under  the  Labour  Code  –  do  not  have  access  to 
unemployment  benefits.  Fewer  than  40%  of  all 
non-standard workers have access to sickness and 
maternity  or  paternity  benefits.  Among  self-
employed  people,  around  1.75  million  individuals 
below  the  income  threshold  are  not  covered  by 
unemployment  insurance.  Self-employed  people 
eligible  for  start-up  relief  are  exempt  from 
contributions  for  the  first  six  months  and  are 
therefore not covered during this period. Although 
broad  gaps  remain,  some  progress  has  been 
made. Following a 2025 amendment to the Labour 
Code, introduced by the Act of 26 September 2025 
amending the Act  – Labor Code and certain other 
acts  (Journal  of  Laws  of  2025,  item  1423), 
contracts  of  mandate  and  periods  of  self-
employment  now  count  towards  employment 
history  and  seniority.  Moreover,  following  a  2026 
amendment  to  the  National  Labour  Inspectorate 
Act, the possibilities of verifying civil law contracts 

(327) https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/dzieci-i-

rodzina/dzieci/opieka-nad-dziecmi-w-wieku-do-lat-3-w-
2024-r-,3,12.html  

112 

 
 
 
in the context of the existence of an employment 
relationship  will  be  increased.    The  new  Labour 
Market  and  Employment  Services  Act  (Journal  of 
Laws  of  2025,  item  620)  adopted  in  June  2025 
now allows all farmers to register as unemployed 
and potentially access benefits, subject to general 
eligibility conditions. 

Effective  access  to  social  protection  is  very 
limited  for  several  groups.  Only  3.5%  of  self-
employed  people  at  risk  of  poverty  (before  social 
benefits) receive social cash benefits (EU: 11.5%). 
Coverage is also low for temporary workers at risk 
of  poverty  (5.3%  vs  38.3%  for  the  EU)  and 
unemployed people (13.9%  vs  52.8%  for the  EU). 
Only 16.6% of those unemployed for less than 12 
months  report  receiving  unemployment  benefits 
compared  with  36.8%  in  the  EU.  In  2024,  around 
44.2%  were  at  risk  of  poverty  or  social  exclusion, 
compared  with  48.8%  in  the  EU.  In-work  poverty 
has  increased  in  recent  years,  exceeding  the  EU 
average  (9.1%  vs  8.2%).  Overall,  social  benefits 
have  a  comparatively  limited  poverty-reducing 
effect  on  unemployed  people  and  temporary 
workers. 

The 

2025 

Social  protection  spending  in  Poland  has 
increased  further  but  remains  unevenly 
country-specific 
distributed. 
recommendations  emphasised 
to 
the  need 
increase  the  efficiency  of  social  spending.  Total 
expenditure on social protection benefits rose from 
22.1%  of  GDP  in  2023  to  24.0%  in  2024 
(compared  with  27.3%  in  the  EU).  Between  2023 
and  2024,  spending  on  disability  benefits 
increased from 0.96% to 1.06% of GDP (compared 
with  1.92%  in  the  EU),  while  expenditure  on  old-
age benefits rose from 10.28% to 10.83% of GDP 
(compared  with  11.34%  in  the  EU).  By  contrast, 
spending  on  unemployment  benefits  remained  at 
a  very  low  level  of  0.18%  of  GDP  in  2024 
(compared with 1.08% in the EU). The structure of 
social protection spending continues to rely heavily 
cash  benefits,  which 
on  non-means-tested 
accounted  for  70.1%  of  total  social  benefit 
expenditure in 2023 (compared with 58.0% in the 
EU),  thereby  limiting  the  system’s  redistributive 
capacity.  

Many  low-income  households  do  not  receive 
minimum income support, leading to significant 
coverage gaps.  In 2024, the benefit recipient rate 
– measured as a share of the population aged 18–
64  at  risk  of  poverty  and  living  in  jobless  and 
quasi-jobless  households  –  stood  at  70%, 

compared  with  an  EU  average  of  83.2%.  In 
addition,  minimum  income  benefits  in  real  terms 
have been eroded by inflation, resulting in very low 
adequacy levels. Low pension contributions among 
many self-employed workers raise concerns about 
  Many  may  not 
future  pension  adequacy. 
accumulate  sufficient  pension  capital 
to  be 
entitled  to  a  minimum  pension(328).  In  2024,  the 
adequacy  rate  was  just  29.5%  of  the  poverty 
threshold,  compared  with  an  EU  average  of 
56.3%(329). 
Increasing  adequacy  and  ensuring 
the  Council 
active 
income,  would 
Recommendation  on  minimum 
support the most vulnerable. 

line  with 

inclusion, 

in 

Graph A12.2: Old-age dependency ratio 

Source: Eurostat, [demo_pjanind] 

Demographic  ageing  continues  to  challenge 
the  future  adequacy  of  the  pension  system. 
In  2024,  the  proportion  of  people  aged  65  and 
over at risk of poverty or social exclusion declined 
to  16.3%  (from  18.0%  in  2023),  which  is  below 
the EU average of 19.2%. However, labour market 
remains 
participation  among  older  workers 
low.  The  employment  rate  for 
comparatively 

(328) https://www.zus.pl/documents/10182/24154/Raport+-

+Dobrowolne+ub%C3%B3stwo.pdf/7456a747-c715-44ef-
9431-d5c082e974cd?t=1737752803323.  

(329) European  Commission:  Directorate-General  for  Employment, 
Social  Affairs  and  Inclusion, The  2025  minimum  income 
report  –  An  overview  of  the  implementation  of  the  2023 
Council  recommendation  on  adequate  minimum  income 
ensuring  active  inclusion  across  EU  Member  States  –  Joint 
report prepared by the Social Protection Committee and the 
European  Commission,  Directorate-General  for  Employment, 
Social  Affairs  and  Inclusion.  Part  2,  Country  analyses, 
Publications 
Union, 
2025, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/3005188.  

European 

Office 

the 

of 

113 

20222426283032343620142015201620172018201920202021202220232024PLEU 
   
 
the 

lower 

reflecting 

people  aged  55–64  stood  at  59%  in  2024, 
compared  with  65.2%  in  the  EU.  Participation  is 
particularly low among women (48.3% v 59.4% in 
EU),  partly 
statutory 
retirement  age.  At  the  same  time,  the  effective 
retirement  age  remains  close  to  the  statutory 
threshold, averaging 65.1 years for men and 60.6 
years for women in 2024(330). The pension system 
is fragmented, with separate schemes for farmers, 
officers  of  uniformed  services  and  professional 
soldiers, 
judges  and  prosecutors.  Long-term 
projections  indicate  a  marked  decline  in  pension 
adequacy, with net replacement rates expected to 
fall from 76.3% to 54% for single men and from 
63.3%  to  45%  for  single  women  between  2022 
and 2062.  

Population ageing is accelerating the demand 
for 
long-term  care,  putting  additional 
pressure  on  an  already  constrained  system. 
According  to  population  projections  for  2023–
2060,  Poland  is  expected  to  experience  rapid 
population ageing, with an increasing proportion of 
people  aged  65  and  over,  and  a  significant 
decrease  in  the  number  of  children  and  young 
people (331).  Between 2020 and 2024, the old-age 
dependency  ratio  rose  from  27.5  to  31.8,  a 
significantly  faster  increase  than  in  the  EU  over 
the  same  period  (from  32.0  to  33.9,  see  Graph 
A12.2). Due to the age structure of the population, 
this trend is expected to continue. In 2019, 35.9% 
of people in Poland aged 65 and over were in need 
of long-term care - defined as having at least one 
severe  difficulty  with  personal  care  or  household 
activities -. This was well above the EU average of 
26.6%.  Of  those  in  need  of  long-term  care,  only 
18.8%  of  people  aged  65  and  over  used  home 
care  services  (compared  with  28.6  %  in  the 
EU)(332).  Administrative  data  show  that,  in  2022, 
only  2.6%  of  the  population  aged  65  and  over 
received care at home (compared with 5.5% in the 
EU)(333).  Reforms  and  investments  in  long-term 

(330) https://lang.zus.pl/benefits/old-age-pensions.  

(331) Statistics Poland, 2023 

https://stat.gov.pl/download/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/default
aktualnosci/5469/11/1/1/1-
prognoza_ludnosci_na_lata_2023-2060_.pdf.  

(332) Share of people aged 65+ with severe difficulties in personal 
care or household activities who used home care services for 
personal needs in the past 12 months, EHIS, 
hlth_ehis_am7ta, 2019 

(333) European Commission, https://economy-

finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/2024-ageing-report-

care  are  supported  under  the  Recovery  and 
Resilience  Facility  and  complemented  by  ESF+ 
measures  to  strengthen  service  provision  and 
workforce capacity at national and regional levels. 

Formal  provision  of  long-term  care  remains 
insufficient  relative  to  needs  and  is  heavily 
skewed  towards  residential  care.  Public  social 
protection  in  Poland  is  strongest  for  people  with 
low  needs  but limited  for those  with moderate  or 
severe  needs.  This  results  in  higher  out-of-pocket 
costs  than  the  EU  average.  For  long-term  home 
care,  public  social  protection  covers  only  20%  of 
total  costs  for  people  with  moderate  needs  and 
27%  for  those  with  severe  needs,  compared  with 
an EU average of 62% and 68% respectively. As a 
result,  out-of-pocket  costs  for  older  people  are 
much  higher,  amounting  to  59%  of  their  median 
income  for  moderate  needs  and  99%  for  severe 
needs  in  Poland,  compared  with  44%  and  67% 
respectively in the EU. Poverty risks linked to home 
care remain above the EU average for people with 
moderate and severe needs(334). Public expenditure 
on long-term care remains low, at 0.5% of GDP in 
2022,  compared  with  an  EU  average  of  1.7%, 
accounting  for  only  2.8%  of  total  age-related 
public  spending  (7.1%  in  the  EU)(335).  In  2022, 
public  expenditure  on 
long-term  care  was 
predominantly  directed  towards  residential  care 
(65.4%  in  Poland  vs  46.2%  in  the  EU),  while 
spending on cash benefits was negligible (0.5% vs 
25%  in  the  EU)(336).  This  reflects  limited  system 
capacity,  continued  reliance  on  unpaid,  informal 
care,  and  a 
long-term  care 
lack  of  formal 
provision.  To  expand  home  and  community-based 
services,  it  would  be  beneficial  if  Poland  adopted 
measures to strengthen social enterprises active in 
long-term  care,  encourage  the  creation  of  new 
providers,  and 
to  public 
procurement for social economy entities. Although 
Poland has comprehensive formal coverage of LTC 
needs  and  a  standardised  needs-assessment 

facilitate  access 

economic-and-budgetary-projections-eu-member-states-
2022-2070_en  

(334) OECD 2025 Adequacy of social protection for long-term care. 

Poland country fiche. 

(335) European Commission, https://economy-

finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/2024-ageing-report-
economic-and-budgetary-projections-eu-member-states-
2022-2070_en  

(336) European Commission, https://economy-

finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/2024-ageing-report-
economic-and-budgetary-projections-eu-member-states-
2022-2070_en  

114 

 
 
 
 
procedure,  key  parameters  such  as  maximum 
waiting times for services are not regulated, which 
limits system responsiveness.  

Severe  workforce  shortages  and  widespread 
informality  further  undermine  access  to 
long-term care services. In 2024, Poland had an 
extremely low ratio of 0.4 long-term care workers 
per 100 individuals aged 65 and above, compared 
with  3.3  in  the  EU.  A  substantial  proportion  of 
long-term  care  is  provided  through  undeclared 
domestic  work,  often  by  migrant  workers.  Poland 
International  Labour 
has  not 
Organization’s  Domestic  Workers  Convention,  and 
lacks specific legislation regulating domestic long-
term  care  workers  or  live-in  carers.  Although 
formal  employment  is  possible  under  general 
labour  law,  existing  regulations  are  perceived  as 
complex  and  burdensome,  which  encourages 
informal  arrangements.  These  factors  risk  further 
limiting  access  to  care  and  increasing  the  burden 
on informal carers, particularly women. 

ratified 

the 

115 

 
 
ANNEX 13: EDUCATION AND SKILLS 

for 

Poland 

declining 

challenges 

learning,  posing 

intensified,  reflected 

in  falling 
STEM 
in  quality 

Poland continues to face gaps in  quality and 
inclusive  education  as  well  as  in  skills  and 
adult 
for 
sustainable  and 
inclusive  growth  and 
competitiveness.  The  2025  country-specific 
recommendations 
highlighted 
challenges in quality and inclusive education, skills 
relevant  to  the  labour  market,  participation  in 
science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM)  fields  in  higher  education,  the  quality  of 
teacher  education,  the  efficiency  of  vocational 
education  and  training  (VET),  digital  and  green 
skills, and adult participation in learning, including 
in  areas  key  for  the  country’s  competitiveness. 
Pressures  on  the  education  and  training  system 
have 
learning 
enrolment, 
outcomes, 
underfunding  and  gaps 
in  higher 
education,  and  acute  teacher  shortages.  Despite 
past  improvements,  recent  evidence  points  to 
shortages,  persistently  high 
growing 
mismatches  and  a  decline  in  basic  skills  among 
young  people  and  adults.  Gaps  in  the  quality 
assurance  and  evaluation  systems 
in  higher 
education  continue  to  affect  the  quality  of 
educational  and  scientific  outcomes.  Digital 
proficiency  remains  among  the  lowest  in  the  EU, 
constraining  innovation  and  the  capacity  of  firms, 
in  particular  small  to  medium-sized  enterprises 
(SMEs).  Adult  participation  in  learning  remains 
insufficient  to  support  the  green  and  digital 
lifelong 
transitions,  while 
learning  governance  and  weaknesses  in  skills 
intelligence 
limit  the  effectiveness  of  policy 
interventions.  These  structural  challenges  risk 
constraining  competitiveness  and  human  capital 
formation. 

fragmentation 

skills 

in 

Decreasing  basic  skills  levels  raise  concerns 
about  quality  and  equity  in  education  and 
human  capital  development.  While 
still 
performing  above  the  EU  average,  Poland  has 
experienced  one  of  the  largest  declines  in  basic 
skills  since  2018  (337).  Fewer  than  1 
in  5 
disadvantaged  15-year-olds  (19.4%;  EU  average: 
16.3%)  performed  well  in  at  least  one  domain  in 
PISA  2022,  compared  with  28.7%  in  2018  (EU 
average: 20.7%). The decrease among advantaged 

(337) PISA 2022 (OECD, 2023). Compared to 2018, the proportion 
of low achievers has increased by 8.3 percentage points 
(pps) in mathematics (EU average: 6.6 pps), 7.5 pps in 
reading (EU average: 3.7 pps) and 4.8 pps in science (EU 
average: 2 pps). 

students was similarly high as only 64.8% of them 
performed  well  in  at  least  one  domain  in  2022, 
compared  to  72.1%  in  2018  (EU  average:  59% 
and  62.5%,  respectively).  Top  performance  has 
also fallen steeply to below 10% in all areas. The 
urban-rural  disparities  in  basic  skills  are  higher 
than  the  EU  average  (see  Annex 18),  pointing  to 
challenges  in  the  quality  of  teaching.  Learning 
outcomes  are  especially  weak 
in  vocational 
pathways,  where  more  than  60%  of  learners  in 
stage  I  sectoral  vocational  schools  underachieve 
across  all  three  domains.  Widespread  teacher 
shortages  further  exacerbate  the  deterioration  of 
basic skills.   

Inclusive  education  remains  a  challenge. 
Education  outcomes  for  persons  with  disabilities 
lag significantly  behind those of their peers: early 
school  leaving  stands  at  17.4%  (vs  2.8%  for 
persons  without  disabilities),  and  students  with 
disabilities  constituted  only  1.8%  of  the  total 
tertiary  student population  in  2023 (338).  Students 
from  Ukraine  are  often  taught  in  segregated 
classes  and  tend  to  drop  out  before  completing 
upper secondary education (339). According to TALIS 
2024,  many  young  teachers  do  not  feel  prepared 
to  teach  diverse  classrooms,  and  26.9%  of 
teachers  indicated  a  need  for  training  in  teaching 
students  with  special  educational  needs.  The 
number  of  students  placed  in  special  schools 
continues to grow (e.g. in special primary schools, 
it  grew  from  47  099  in  2019/2020  to  53  094  in 
2024/2025  (340) despite  the  decreasing  overall 
number of students. Several European Social Fund 
Plus  (ESF+)  projects  on  inclusive  education  are 
under  way  and  are  expected  to  be  finalised  by 
2027;  monitoring  and  evaluation  of 
their 
implementation will be necessary to inform policy. 
A 
inclusive 
education  and  better  stakeholder  engagement 
could 
and 
sustainability  of  measures.  Recent  national 
analysis 
enhance 
the 
intercultural  education  in  schools,  individualised 
(341),  and 
approaches,  teachers’  competences 

long-term  strategic  approach 

implementation 

indicates 

enhance 

need 

the 

to 

to 

(338) EC report on disability equality 2025-2026 - Poland. 

(339) Uczniowie-cudzoziemcy w polskich szkołach w roku szkolnym 

2024/2025. 

(340) Statistics Poland (2025). Education in the 2024/2025 school 

year, and earlier editions. 

(341) Dolińska, A. (red.). (2025). Uczniowie i uczennice z 

doświadczeniem migracji i uchodźstwa w polskich szkołach 
2004–2024. 

116 

 
 
 
 
 
 
recognition of learning outcomes achieved abroad. 
A  national  project  supporting  the  inclusion  of 
refugee  children  from  Ukraine  was  launched  in 
July 2025. 

teaching 

content  and 

Poland  is  preparing  a  curriculum  reform, 
which  will  require  substantial  support  and 
training  for  teachers.  Announced  in  2024,  the 
reform  aims  to  boost  students’  key  competences, 
modernise 
increase 
curriculum  flexibility (342).  The  full  new  curriculum 
for pre-primary and primary education (grades I to 
IV)  will  be  implemented  from  September  2026, 
and  the  one  for  upper  secondary  education  from 
September  2027.  The  draft  curriculum  has  been 
sent  out  for  public  consultation.  The  reform  has 
been  prepared  by  educational  experts  and 
overseen  by  a  monitoring 
Its 
sustainable implementation could be facilitated by 
providing  substantial  teacher  training,  updating 
initial  teacher  education  programmes,  providing 
support  for  schools,  and  ensuring  continuous 
monitoring and evaluation from an early stage.  

committee. 

Poland  has  exceeded  the  EU-level  target for 
early  childhood  education  and  care  (ECEC) 
above 
three;  however,  participation  of 
younger  children  remains  below  the  EU 
average.  In  2024,  the  participation  rate  of 
children  aged  three  and  above  was  97.2%,  up  by 
0.6  percentage  points  (pps)  from  2023.  The 
participation  rate  of  three-year-olds  has  also 
increased  (by  21.4  pps)  since  2015  but  remains 
below  the  EU  average (86.6%;  EU  average:  91%). 
The  upcoming  curriculum reform  aims  to improve 
the  teaching  of  basic  skills  also  at  pre-primary 
level. In January 2026, new quality standards were 
introduced  in  ECEC  for  children  under  three.  They 
aim to improve education and care from the early 
years  onwards;  however,  participation  in  formal 
childcare remains low (see Annex 12).  

Teacher  shortages  may  deepen  as  the 
challenges  in  attracting  and  retaining  new 
staff persist. In 2024, shortages were estimated 
at  15 000  teachers (343)  (around  3%  of  the 
workforce).  According  to  TALIS  2024,  only  4%  of 
lower-secondary school teachers are under 30 (EU 
average: 7.3%), and over a quarter of them (29%) 

initial 

plan  to  leave  the  profession  within  five  years, 
double  the  EU  average.  TALIS  2024  and  national 
surveys  highlight 
insufficient  preparedness  of 
novice teachers to manage student behaviour and 
teach diverse classrooms, and inadequate practical 
teacher  education (344). 
training  during 
Poland’s  2026  Occupational  Barometer  continues 
to  indicate  shortages  across  nearly  all  types  of 
teachers,  including  those  teaching 
in  general 
education,  VET,  apprenticeships,  pre-primary 
education  and  special  needs  education.  Schools 
increasingly  rely  on  retired  teachers.  Significant 
salary  increases  were  implemented  in  2024  (of 
30%, and 33% for new teachers) and 2025 (5%); 
however,  their  impact  is  still  to  be  evaluated  as 
only  20.5%  of  teachers  were  satisfied  with  their 
(EU  average:  37.3%)  at  that  time. 
salaries 
Furthermore, only 10.4% (EU average: 15.4%) feel 
valued  by  society,  a  drop  by  7.6  pps  since  2013. 
Poland  has  amended  the  Teachers’  Charter  to 
improve work arrangements and remuneration for 
overtime; however, low pay, high workload and low 
perceived  social  value  continue  to  discourage 
young 
teaching 
from  pursuing 
profession.  

talent 

the 

Participation  in  VET  remains  strong,  but 
labour  market  outcomes  for  VET  graduates 
have weakened. Enrolment in medium-level VET 
has  been  fairly  stable  since  2014,  standing  at 
57.9%  in  2024,  above  the  EU  average  (52.9%). 
Exposure to work-based learning is relatively high: 
in  2024,  62.0%  of 
recent  VET  graduates 
participated  in  work-based  learning  during  their 
studies,  exceeding  the  EU-level  target  (at  least 
60%  by  2025),  although  remaining  slightly  below 
the EU average (65.2% in 2024). Despite this, the 
employment  rate  of  people  who  have  recent  VET 
graduates  has  declined,  reaching  75.4%  in  2024, 
below  both  the  EU  average  (80.0%)  and  the  EU-
level  target  (at  least  82%  by  2025).  While  the 
reasons  for  this  decline  have  not  yet  been  fully 
analysed,  it  may  be  linked  to  low  basic  skills 
among  VET  graduates  and  low  relevance  of  VET 
programmes,  reflecting  persistent  inefficiency  of 
the  VET  system.  Since  2023,  Poland  has  been 
implementing Sectoral Skills Centres with Recovery 
and Resilience Facility (RRF) support. Supported by 
the  ESF+,  a  national  team  of  sector  consultations 

(342) https://reforma26.men.gov.pl/. 

(343) https://www.pap.pl/en/news/poland-lacks-15000-teachers-

says-education-minister. 

(344) Dobkowska, et al., (2024). Young teachers leave schools: 

Report on the reasons for leaving the teaching profession by 
Warsaw teachers during the first five years. 

117 

 
 
 
innovation  and 

proportion  of  STEM  tertiary  students,  including  at 
doctoral  level,  risks  exacerbating  skills  shortages, 
teachers,  and 
including  shortages  of  STEM 
constraining 
to 
support  the  green  and  digital  transitions.  Poland 
investments  to 
has  been 
improve  the  digital 
in  schools, 
including  by  providing  ICT  equipment  and  setting 
up  artificial  intelligence  and  STEM  laboratories 
(measure C2.2.1). 

implementing  RRF 

the  capacity 

infrastructure 

of 

Polish 

system 

jeopardise 

the  higher  education  quality 
Gaps 
in 
higher 
assurance 
education  outcomes.  In  2024,  close  to  3 000 
(29%)  did  not  have  the 
study  programmes 
accreditation 
Accreditation 
the 
Commission, while 2 209 of the programmes that 
had  not  been  followed  up  were  attended  by 
students (348). Government expenditure per tertiary 
student  amounts  to  USD 12 558,  far  below  the 
EU-25  average  of  15  830  USD (349).  Long-term 
underfunding  contributes  to  low  academic  quality 
and weak scientific performance (see Annex 4). In 
October 2025, the Ministry for Science and Higher 
Education  presented  a  draft  strategy  for  higher 
education  for  2035,  which  also  focuses  on 
excellence  in  science  and  teaching  (350).  The  rules 
for  evaluating  on  academic  performance  for  the 
2026-2030 cycle are to be made more reliable. An 
internationalisation  strategy  is  to  be  presented  in 
2026.  Better  outcomes  could  be  achieved  by 
addressing  quality  assurance  challenges,  ensuring 
sufficient  funding,  and  implementing  effective 
monitoring and evaluation of systemic measures.  

has  been  set  up  to  improve  the  VET  system  and 
adapt curricula. 

Tertiary  educational  attainment  remains  in 
line  with  the  EU-level  target,  but  the  higher 
education  sector  poorly  supports  social 
mobility. In 2025, tertiary educational attainment 
in Poland was 45.2% a decrease by 0.5 pps since 
2024 and by 1.1 pps since 2023. The gender gap 
in  favour  of  women  is,  however,  among  the 
highest  in  the  EU  (18.2  pps  vs  EU  average:  11.3 
pps). Also, the urban-rural gap is wider than the EU 
average  (32.1  pps  vs  22  pps)  (see  Annex  18).  A 
significant majority (79%) of 25-34-year-olds with 
at least one parent holding a tertiary qualification 
have attained tertiary education, compared to only 
11% among those whose parents did not complete 
upper 
tertiary 
attainment gap is one of the largest among OECD 
countries  (44  pps) (345).  Also,  around  half  of 
top-performing  mathematics 
disadvantaged 
students lack academic ambition (346), which limits 
their  career  possibilities  and  undermines  the 
competitiveness of Poland’s economy. 

secondary 

education. 

This 

Participation  in  STEM  at  tertiary  level  has 
dropped  while  there  is  unlocked  potential, 
also among disadvantaged students.  In 2024, 
42.9%  of  medium-level  VET  students  were 
enrolled  in  STEM  programmes,  exceeding  the  EU 
average  (36.9%)  and  approaching  the  proposed 
2030  EU-level  target  (45%).  By  contrast,  only 
21.2%  of  tertiary  students  were  enrolled  in  STEM 
programmes  in  2023  (EU  average:  26.9%),  a 
decline  of  5.6  pps  since  2015.  Participation  in 
natural  sciences,  mathematics  and  statistics  is 
particularly  low  (3.3%;  EU  average:  6.8%).  The 
gender 
and 
in 
communications  technology  (ICT)  is  among  the 
highest  in  the  EU  as  women  accounted  for  only 
in  2023.  The 
17%  of 
ICT  tertiary  students 
proportion  of  female  students 
in  STEM  VET 
(15.7%) is also below the EU average (15.9%). The 
number  of  STEM  tertiary  graduates  per  1 000 
inhabitants  aged  20-34  remains  below  the  EU 
average  (11.9  vs  14.3).  As  shown  by  PISA  2022, 
over  half  (58%)  of  disadvantaged  15-year-olds 
aspire  to  high-skilled  jobs,  but  do  not  plan  on 
low 
attending 

education(347). 

information 

imbalance 

tertiary 

The 

(345) Education at a Glance 2025. Country note: Poland. 

(346) OECD (2024). Challenging Social Inequality Through Career 
Guidance: Insights from International Data and Practice. 

(347) OECD (2023), PISA 2022 Results. 

(348) https://pka.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Analiza-

wersja-do-publikacji.pdf 

(349) Education at a Glance 2025. Country note: Poland. 

(350) Strategia rozwoju szkolnictwa wyższego. 

118 

 
 
 
Graph A13.1: Employment rate by educational 
attainment 

Source: Eurostat, labour force survey [lfsa_ergaed](351). 

Skills  shortages  and  mismatches  remain  a 
significant  constraint  on  Poland’s  economic 
performance.  In  2023,  82%  of  SMEs  reported 
difficulties in filling vacancies, reflecting persistent 
shortages across both high-skilled and elementary 
occupations.  Labour  market  tightness  has  been 
partially mitigated by the inflow of refugees from 
Ukraine,  78%  of  whom  were  in  employment  in 
2024(352).  However,  half  of  those  employed  work 
in  low-skilled  jobs  and  46%  report  working  below 
their  qualification  level.  Cedefop’s  Skills  Forecast 
2025  indicates  that  among  professionals,  the 
most  acute  shortages  arise  due  to  structural 
demand  growth,  while  among  technicians  and 
associate  professionals,  shortages  are  driven  by 
replacement 
are 
concentrated  at  both  ends  of  the  skills  spectrum, 
with  comparatively  fewer  shortages  in  skilled 
manual  and  non-manual  occupations.  Lack  of 
basic  skills  hampers  upskilling  and  reskilling,  and 
the  2023  PIAAC(353)  results  for  Poland  show  a 
sharp increase in the share of adults performing at 
the lowest proficiency levels compared with 2012: 

needs.  Hiring 

difficulties 

(351)Despite methodological changes in 2021, the data are still 

comparable. 

(352) International Migration Outlook 2025, OECD based on data 

from the Polish Central Bank. 

(353) OECD Programme for the International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies (PIAAC). Poland’s results should be interpreted 
with caution due to high share of respondents with unusual 
response patterns.  

39.5%  (up  from  19%)  in  literacy  and  38%  in 
numeracy  (up  from  23%).  The  macroeconomic 
skills  mismatch  stood  at  23.1%  in  2024,  well 
above  the  EU  average  of  19.2%,  0.8  pps  higher 
than  in  2023  and  only  slightly  below  the  record 
high  of  24%  in  2013.  This  underscores  the  need 
for  further  efforts  to  improve  the  quality,  equity 
and  labour-market  relevance  of  education  and 
training.  

Digital  skills  remain  a  key  bottleneck  for 
innovation  and  productivity.  The  proportion  of 
young  people  aged  16-24  with  basic  or  above-
basic  digital  skills  grew  from  68.6%  in  2021  to 
73.6% in 2025 but remains below the EU average 
(74.5%).  In  2025,  only  50.4%  of  the  population 
aged 16-74 had at least basic digital skills, 10 pps 
below  the  EU  average.  Low  levels  of  digital 
proficiency  also  hold  back  Polish  SMEs,  only  59% 
of  which  had  a  basic  level  of  digital  intensity  in 
2025  (EU  average:  71%).  To  address,  this  Poland 
pursues  RRF  investments  to  increase  digital  skills 
in society via training (measure C2.1.3). Poland has 
also set out to digitalise school education with the 
Digital  Transformation  of  Education  Policy  to 
2035.  In  line  with  this  policy,  Poland  aims  to 
expand the use of digital technologies in teaching 
and 
investments  (measures 
C2.1.2  and  C2.2.1).  The  2020-2030  Digital 
Competence  Development  Programme  aims  to 
equip  80%  of  citizens  with  at  least  basic  digital 
skills  by  2030.  Efficient 
implementation  and 
monitoring  of  these  measures  could  help  achieve 
the  expected  results.  However,  a  lack  of  strategic 
approach  to  digitalisation  in  higher  education 
hinders comprehensive digital transformation.  

learning  via  RRF 

Adult  participation 
learning  remains 
in 
significantly below  the EU  average.  According 
to  the  adult  education  survey,  20.3%  of  adults 
participated  in  education  and  training  in  2022, 
around  half  the  EU  average  of  39.5%,  and  well 
below both the national 2030 target of 51.7% and 
the  EU-level  target  of  60%.  Participation  varies 
markedly  by  educational  attainment  (see  Country 
Report  2025).  Place  of  residence  also  plays  an 
important  role,  with  participation  rates  of  16%  in 
rural areas and 18.7% in towns, compared to 26% 
in  cities(354).  More  recent  data,  from  the  labour 
force  survey,  suggest  a  possible  increase  in 
participation rates between 2022 and 2024. Public 
remains  heavily 
funding 

for  adult 

learning 

(354) Education and Training Monitor 2025 - Poland. 

119 

30405060708090100200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024PLHigh skilledMedium skilledLow skilled 
   
 
 
dependent on the ESF+ and other EU instruments. 
This  includes  the  planned  piloting  of  individual 
learning  accounts.  Despite  new  measures 
introduced  under  the  2025  Act  on  Labour  Market 
and  Employment  Services,  including  enhanced 
support  for  disadvantaged  groups,  the  system 
remains  fragmented  and  lacks  strong  national-
level coordination.  

The  green  transition  increases  pressure  on 
upskilling and reskilling. Poland has one of the 
largest  shares  of  workers  in  emission-intensive 
industries,  at  4.9%  of  total  employment  in  2024 
(EU average: 3.5%). At the same time, employment 
in these sectors has declined by 7.4% since 2019, 
and  the  phase-out  of  hard  coal  is  expected  to 
accelerate  this  structural  change.  With  highly 
regionally  concentrated  lignite  and  hard  coal 
sectors, Poland employs four times the EU average 
number  of  workers  in  mining  (see  Annex  11). 
Between  2017  and  2022,  the  environmental 
goods  and  services  sector  expanded  considerably, 
increasing  from  a  1.4%  to  a  2%  share  of  total 
employment,  although  it  remained  below  the  EU 
average of 3.1%. There is a clear need to advance 
upskilling and reskilling efforts, as these industries 
are  experiencing  significant  changes  or  even 
structural  declines  in  activity,  such  as  in  mining. 
However, in 2024, adult participation in training in 
emission-intensive industries remained one of the 
lowest  in  the  EU,  at  7.8%  (EU  average:  12%), 
raising  concerns  about  workers’  preparedness  for 
reallocation  into  emerging  green  sectors.  Under 
the  Just  Transition  Fund,  investments  support  the 
reskilling  and  upskilling  of  workers  in  coal  and 
lignite  regions,  equipping  those  working  in  fossil 
fuel and energy-intensive industries with skills for 
employment  in  renewable  and  climate-neutral 
sectors. Under the Polish RRP, Poland is envisaged 
the  sectoral 
to  adopt  an  act 
qualification  frameworks  for  construction,  water 
management, waste management and energy into 
the Integrated Qualifications System. 

incorporating 

remains 

its  main 

intelligence 

evidence-based 

fragmented, 
Skills 
limiting 
policymaking. 
Poland’s  skills  intelligence  system  is  fragmented, 
instruments  administered  by 
with 
different 
institutions  and  based  on  distinct 
methodologies.  These  include  the  Polish  Labour 
Market  Forecasting  System  (long-term  projections 
to  2050),  the  Occupational  Barometer  (annual 
shortage  and  surplus  forecasts),  separate  annual 
forecasts  for  vocational  education  occupations 
published  in  Monitor  Polski,  and  the  Data  Blender 

reducing 

coherence  and 

tool integrating administrative labour market data. 
Apart  from  limited  exceptions,  results  from  one 
instrument  are  not  systematically  used  by  the 
others, 
synergies. 
Moreover, the limited integration of these outputs 
training 
into  curricula,  career  guidance  and 
provision  constrains  their  impact  on  workforce 
planning and human capital development. Poland’s 
Occupational Barometer condenses information on 
the  current  labour  market  situation  for  public 
employment  services’  counsellors  by  processing 
data collected by various public institutions on the 
and 
demand 
qualifications (355).  The  barometer  has  now  been 
implemented  nationwide  and  is  updated  annually, 
as  part  of  Poland’s  broader  strategy  to  refine 
labour  market  forecasting  by  2050.  The  2025 
edition identified 23 deficit occupations at national 
level  and  no  surplus  occupations,  pointing  to 
continued labour market tightness. Its county- and 
regional-level  forecasts  are  increasingly  used  to 
inform  career  guidance,  training  provision  and 
short-term workforce planning. 

occupations 

specific 

for 

(355) https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/helping-

pes-anticipate-emerging-challenges-and-future-skills-
needs-role-labour-market-and-skills-2025-05-23_en, p. 25. 

120 

 
 
 
ANNEX 14: SOCIAL SCOREBOARD 

Table A14.1: Social Scoreboard for Poland 

Update of 4 May 2026. Members States are categorised based on the Social Scoreboard according to a methodology agreed with 
the EMCO and SPC Committees. Please consult the Annex of the Joint Employment Report 2026 for details on the methodology 
(https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/joint-employment-report-2026_en). 
Source: Eurostat 

121 

20.34.050.49.211.33.6378.83.10.8166.115.015.638.935.04.121.02.9Critical situationTo watchWeak but improvingGood but to monitorOn averageDynamic labour markets and fair working conditionsSocial protection and inclusionShare of individuals who have basic or above basic overall digital skills(% of the population aged 16-74, 2025)Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction(% reduction of AROP, 2025)Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare (% of the under 3-years-old population, 2025)Self-reported unmet need for medical care (% of the population aged 16+, 2025)Disability employment gap (percentage points, population aged 20-64, 2025)Housing cost overburden (% of the total population, 2025)Adult participation in learning (during the last 12 months, excl. guided on the job training, % of the population aged 25-64, 2022)Equal opportunities and access to the labour marketBest performersBetter than averageEarly leavers from education and training(% of  the population aged 18-24, 2025)Young people not in employment, education or training(% of the population aged 15-29, 2025)Gender employment gap(percentage points, population aged 20-64, 2025)Income quintile ratio (S80/S20, 2025)At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate (% of the total population, 2025)Employment rate(% of the population aged 20-64, 2025)Unemployment rate(% of the active population aged 15-74, 2025)Long term unemployment(% of the active population aged 15-74, 2025)Gross disposable household income (GDHI) per capita growth(index, 2008=100, 2024)At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate for children(% of the population aged 0-17, 2025) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
ANNEX 15: HEALTH AND HEALTH SYSTEMS 

the  health  of 

Poland’s health system faces challenges that 
its 
negatively  affect 
population,  social  fairness  and  productivity. 
Challenges  include  low  life  expectancy,  resulting 
from high preventable and treatable mortality, and 
unmet  needs,  with  regional  disparities.  These 
issues  are  mainly  caused  by: 
(i) suboptimal 
cost-effectiveness  and  funding  of  the  health 
insufficient  focus  on  disease 
system; 
prevention  and  outpatient  care;  and (iii) shortages 
of healthcare workers. 

(ii) an 

Life  expectancy  at  birth  in  Poland  was  still 
low  compared  with  the  EU  average  in  2024, 
and  2022  avoidable  mortality  –  preventable 
or  treatable  –  was  high.  In  2023,  treatable 
mortality was high compared with the EU average, 
suggesting  shortcomings  in  the  effectiveness  of 
the health system. Moreover, Poland is the only EU 
country where mortality from treatable causes has 
(see 
deteriorated  over 
Graph A15.1). Diseases of the circulatory system – 
cardiovascular  diseases  (CVDs)  –  and  cancer  are 
the  leading  causes  of  death,  with  the  former 
accounting for around 36% of all deaths in Poland 
in  2023,  the  latter  21%.  Deaths  from  cancer  in 
Poland were among the highest in the EU.  

last  10 years 

the 

Graph A15.1: Treatable mortality 

Age-standardised death rate - mortality that could be avoided 
through optimal quality healthcare. 
Source: Eurostat (indicator: hlth_cd_apr) 

Preventable mortality was also high in 2023 
and has only decreased slightly over the past 
10 years.  In  view  of  these  health  outcomes, 
expenditure  in  disease  prevention  is  critically  low 
in  Poland,  and  has  fallen  over  the  last  10 years, 
from 2.7% of spending in 2014 to 1.7% in 2023. 
Poland participates in several joint actions  funded 
by  EU4Health  aimed  at  reducing  the  burden  of 
cancer,  CVDs,  diabetes  and  respiratory  diseases, 
such  as  the  joint  actions  JACARDI,  EUnetCCC  JA, 

(NCDs), 
for 

diseases 
networks 

JANE-2  and  SOLACE  (356).  Poland  also  benefits 
from  EU4Health  grants  for  the  prevention  of 
the 
non-communicable 
establishment 
cancer 
of 
infrastructure  and  expertise,  and 
innovative 
approaches  to  cancer  screening.  Poland  is  also 
rolling  out  a  national  oncology  and  cardiology 
network with support from the Polish recovery and 
resilience plan (RRP), improving patient access and 
quality  of  diagnostics  and  care.  Strengthening 
health promotion and prevention is an integral part 
of  the  national  programme  for  cardiovascular 
diseases (NPChUK) (2022-2032) (357). 

Preventable  mortality  in  Poland  is  closely 
linked  to  environmental  factors  such  as  air 
pollution  (see  Annex 8)  and  behavioural  risk 
factors.  Behavioural  and  environmental 
risk 
factors accounted for 35% of all deaths in Poland 
in 2021, which was higher than the EU average of 
29% (358). Mortality linked to air pollution is one of 
the highest in the EU. Smoking rates among adults 
have fallen over the past two decades, though less 
so  among  adolescents.  The  use  of  e-cigarettes 
among  adolescents  has  risen  particularly  sharply. 
In  2022,  close  to  one  in  three  15-year-olds 
reported smoking e-cigarettes in the past month, a 
much  higher  proportion  than  the  EU  average. 
Average  alcohol  consumption  among  adults  was 
slightly  above  the  EU  average.  The  proportion  of 
15-year-olds in Poland classified as overweight or 
obese has increased in recent years, from 16% in 
2018 to 20% in 2022, with boys twice as likely to 
be  affected  as  girls.  Poor  diet  was  the  leading 
cause  of  death  from  behavioural  risk  factors  in 
Poland  in  2021  (359).  Since  2020,  Poland  has 
strengthened  tax  measures  targeting  alcohol  and 
tobacco consumption. Excise taxes on tobacco and 
alcohol,  which  had  previously  been  frozen  or 
reduced,  are  now  subject  to  regular  annual 

(356) JACARDI - Joint Action on CARdiovascular diseases and 
DIabetes, EUnetCCC JA - The European Comprehensive 
Cancer Centre Network, JANE-2 - Joint Action on Networks of 
Expertise on Cancer, SOLACE - Strengthening the screening 
of Lung Cancer in Europe. 

(357) Narodowy Program Chorób Układu Krążenia na lata 2022-

2032 - Ministerstwo Zdrowia. 

(358) OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 
(2025), Country Health Profile 2025: Poland. State of Health 
in the EU. 

(359) OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 
(2025), Country Health Profile 2025: Poland. State of Health 
in the EU.  

122 

130.9133.7144.2145.9140.0132.794.889.291.793.389.786.8201420192020202120222023per 100 000 populationPolandEU 
 
      
 
 
 
Table A15.1: Key health indicators 

*The EU average is weighted for all indicators except for doctors and nurses per 1 000 population, for which the EU simple 
average is used based on 2023 data (or latest available). Doctors’ density data refer to practising doctors in all countries except 
Greece, Portugal (licensed to practise) and Slovakia (professionally active). Density of nurses: data refer to practising nurses (EU 
recognised qualification) in most countries except Portugal (licensed to practice) and Slovakia (professionally active). Latest data 
update on nurses for Belgium and Sweden: 2022; for France: 2021; for Luxembourg: 2017. 
** latest available 10-year trend: ratio 2023/2014 or 2024/2013; a factor of 2.00 means that it has doubled in 10 years. 
***‘Available hospital beds’ covers somatic care, not psychiatric care. 
Source: Eurostat 

increases,  covering  both  traditional  and  newer 
products (360). 

and 

hence 

Poor  health  outcomes  negatively  affect 
its 
Poland’s  workforce 
productivity  and  competitiveness.  In  Poland, 
mortality  at  working  age  as  a  proportion  of  total 
mortality  is  high  compared  with  the  EU  average 
(19%  vs  14%),  exacerbating  the  effects  of 
population ageing on a shrinking labour force (see 
Annex 11).  Gains  in  health  status  from  further 
prevention  investment  could  alleviate  this  impact. 
As regards NCDs, it is estimated that up to 80% of 
CVDs and type 2 diabetes in the world, up to half 
of  cancer  cases,  and  most  chronic  lung  diseases 
illustration, 
can  be  prevented 
preventing  all  deaths  from  NCDs  in  Poland  would 
result  in  a  1.2%  gain  in  working-life  years  from 
2022  to  2040 
(vs  0.9%  for  the  EU,  see 
Graph A15.2).  Cancer  in  particular  has  a  large 
impact,  accounting  for  more  than  53%  of  the 
potential  prevention  gains  in  working-life  years. 
The gain in working-life years is one of the highest 
potential  increases  across  Member  States  and 
would  save  about  4 290 500 life  years  in  Poland 
over  2022-2040.  This increase  would  mitigate  an 
otherwise expected 7% reduction of the workforce 
the  2022 
due 
population (7% for the EU). 

to  demographic  ageing  of 

(361).  As  an 

(360) Country Health Profile 2025: Poland – see earlier footnote. 

(361) NCD Alliance, 2025: Noncommunicable Diseases (NCDs) 

overview | NCD Alliance. 

is 

health 

system 

strongly 
Poland’s 
hospital-centred.  Although  health  spending  per 
inhabitant  in  Poland  increased  over  the  preceding 
decade,  it  was  among  the  lowest  in  the  EU  in 
2023.  Over  a  third  of  Poland’s  health  spending  – 
the largest share – goes on hospital services, while 
less than a third goes on outpatient care. Medical 
goods  (retail  pharmaceuticals  and  therapeutic 
appliances)  accounted  for  less  than  a  fifth  of 
health  spending.  Private  spending  plays  a 
prominent  role,  as  16%  of  spending  is  accounted 
for  by  out-of-pocket  (OOP)  payments.  The  largest 
share  of  OOP  payments 
is  made  up  of 
pharmaceuticals  (63%)  and  outpatient  medical 
care  (14%).  Poland’s  relatively  large  hospital 
to 
capacity  has  historically  proved  difficult 
consolidate.  Various  initiatives  under  the  Polish 
RRP  seek  to  repurpose  some  excess  acute  care 
beds  for  long-term  care  services.  An  amendment 
to  the  law  on  publicly  funded  healthcare  services 
allows  local  governments  to  consolidate  public 
healthcare 
recovery 
programmes to be prepared for indebted hospitals 
to strengthen their efficiency.  

institutions  and 

requires 

sector 

Poland’s  pharmaceutical 
is  of 
relatively  modest  economic  significance. 
in  pharmaceutical  manufacturing 
Employment 
remains among the lowest in the EU. The number 
of clinical trials is moderate, but three quarters are 
multi-country  studies,  showing  Poland  is  part  of 
international  pharmaceutical  R&D  networks.  The 
industry  has  a  consistently  low  share  of  extra-EU 
exports  (2.2%  in  2024  vs  13.9%  for  the  EU 
average) (see Annex 4). 

123 

2020202120222023202410-year change**EU average* (latest year) Cancer mortality per 100 000 population279.7259.9268.0274.0n.a.0.94233.1 (2023)Mortality due to circulatory diseases per 100 000 population 523.8 541.4 489.6 451.0n.a.0.76313.0 (2023)Current expenditure on health, purchasing power standards, per capita1 6331 7651 9672 2402 6582.013834.9 (2023)Public share of health expenditure, % of current health expenditure 72.3 72.5 74.3 77.6 78.01.1180.6 (2023)Spending on prevention, % of current health expenditure 1.92.11.91.7n.a.0.623.7 (2023)Available hospital beds per 100 000 population*** 563 578 567 564n.a.0.94440 (2023)Doctors per 1 000 population*3.43.53.63.9n.a.1.674.3 (2023)*Nurses per 1 000 population* 5.6 5.8 5.8 5.9n.a.1.127.6 (2023)*Mortality at working age (20-64 years), % of total mortality21.420.920.519.919.10.7414.3 (2023)Consumption of antibiotics in the community and hospital sectors,      defined daily doses per 1 000 inhabitants 18.5 20.2 23.6 23.2 22.60.9420.3 (2024) 
 
 
      
 
(2021-2027) 

cohesion  policy 

the  EU’s  average 

Relative to population size, Poland's hospital 
capacity  is  high,  but  investment  in  health 
infrastructure  remains  well  below  the  EU 
average. Polish hospitals had among the highest 
numbers  of  hospital  beds  in  the  EU  in  2023. 
However,  the  occupancy  rate  is  relatively  low. 
Meanwhile,  the  trend  of  low  investment  in  the 
health sector continued. Poland recorded less than 
level  of  health 
half  of 
infrastructure investment per capita in 2023. This 
is reflected in the low availability of key diagnostic 
technology: Poland has one of the lowest rates of 
medical imaging devices per capita in the EU. The 
EU 
currently 
dedicates  EUR 1.17 billion  (EU  co-financed  share) 
to  healthcare  for  Poland’s  health  infrastructure. 
Poland’s  estimated  domestic  spending  per  capita 
on prevention, preparedness and response is in the 
low EU range. Another significant challenge, which 
affects  hospitals  in  particular,  is  antimicrobial 
resistance  and  related  multi-resistant  infections. 
Poland is one of the countries that has set targets 
to reduce high antibiotic use, due to concerns over 
antimicrobial  resistance  (362).  The  consumption  of 
antibiotics  in  Poland  fell  only  slightly  between 
2023  and  2024.  Continued  efforts  are  needed  to 
keep  on  track  with  the  2030  recommended 
the 
target.  Poland  participates 
national 
joint  action  EU-JAMRAI  2 
EU4Health-funded 
addressing 
and 
healthcare-associated infections (363). 

antimicrobial 

resistance 

in 

Graph A15.2: Healthcare infrastructure investment 
by year 

Source: Country Health Profiles - Dashboard 

Challenges  in  accessing  healthcare  persist, 
In  2025,  the 
particularly  in  rural  areas. 
proportion  of  the  Polish  population  reporting 

(362) National target set by the Council Recommendation on 

stepping up EU actions to combat antimicrobial resistance in 
a One Health approach, 2023/C 220/01. 

(363) EU-JAMRAI 2 - Joint Action Antimicrobial Resistance and 

level).  High  unmet  needs 

unmet needs for medical care was higher than the 
EU  average  (2.9%  vs  2.4%).  The  main  reasons 
reported  are  long  waiting  times;  other  reasons 
include  cost  and  travel  time.  The  share  of  people 
with  medical  needs  who  reported  unmet  needs  is 
also higher than the EU average (4.1% vs 3.6% at 
EU 
for  medical 
examination are reported in rural areas. Only 18% 
of  the  population  in  rural  areas  of  Poland  lived 
within  a  10-minute  drive  of  a  hospital  in  2023 
(see  Annex 18).  Unmet  needs  for  primary  care  in 
particular  are  more  than  double  the  EU  average 
(7.1%  vs  EU  3.1%  in  2024)  (364).  Potentially 
avoidable hospital admissions in Poland are one of 
the  highest  in  the  EU  for  congestive  heart  failure 
and diabetes. Unmet needs for mental  healthcare 
are  also  high,  reaching  11.8%  compared  with  the 
EU  average  of  7.2%.  Poland  is  attempting  to 
address  long  waiting  times  through  a  new  cost-
based  tariff  structure.  It  is  designed  to  increase 
payments and align them more closely with actual 
expenses for service providers (365). 

Shortages  of  health  professionals  limit  the 
provision of healthcare. In 2023, the number of 
practising nurses per 1 000 population was below 
the  EU  average.  Moreover,  more  than  a  third  of 
nurses are 50-59 years of age. Poland also had a 
comparatively low number of nursing graduates in 
relation  to  its  population.  Also,  fewer  than  1%  of 
15-year-olds  aspire  to  become  nurses  (366).  Some 
regions may face challenges in workforce renewal. 
factors  combined  pose  a  significant 
These 
challenge  to  the  long-term  accessibility  of  health 
services and, more broadly, to the care system. For 
several years, the density of doctors in Poland (see 
Table A15.1) has been below the EU average. The 
number  of  general  practitioners  per  inhabitant  is 
one of the lowest in the EU, and their share is very 
low  compared  with  specialists.  Primary  care 
services,  however,  can  be  provided  by  physicians 
specialising  in  family  medicine,  internal  medicine 
and paediatrics, as well as by physicians without a 
specialisation  who  hold  the  appropriate  licences. 
Around a fifth of doctors are 55-64 years of age. 
Moreover, healthcare workers in Poland report one 
of the highest rates of depression, with nearly half 
of respondents meeting the threshold for probable 
major  depressive  disorder  and  32%  reporting 

(364) Country Health Profile 2025: Poland – see earlier footnote. 

(365) Country Health Profile 2025: Poland – see earlier footnote. 

Healthcare-Associated Infections 2. 

(366) OECD (2025), Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators. 

124 

4.84.04.65.96.26.86.36.819.619.519.720.421.521.421.921.920152016201720182019202020212022EUR million per 100 000 populationPolandEU 
      
 
 
anxiety  (367).  Shortages  of  health  workers  have 
in  specific  specialisations  and 
been  reported 
regions,  particularly  in  the  small  counties  around 
large cities and in rural areas.  

lowest  in  the  EU,  which  could  explain  the  low 
uptake  of  e-Health  tools  by  patients  (50.4%  of 
people with at least basic digital skills in 2025 vs 
an EU average of 60.4% – see Annex 13). 

to 

the 

(370)). 

boost 

digital 
Investments 
transformation of Poland’s health sector are 
planned. These investments have the potential to 
improve  the  effectiveness  and  accessibility  of 
healthcare and are planned under the 2021-2027 
cohesion  policy  or  as  part  of  the  Recovery  and 
Resilience  Facility  and  EU4Health-funded  projects 
The 
(e.g.  Patient  Summary  Poland 
government  has  set  up  a  central  e-registration 
system, which standardises the process of booking 
appointments  and  improves  access  to  services. 
From January 2026, the system is mandatory for 
selected  services  and  will  gradually  be  expanded. 
innovative  digital 
Through 
solutions, 
artificial 
intelligence  (AI),  are  being  developed.  The  ‘e-
Health  KPO’  project,  launched  in  April  2025, 
provides  new  digital  services  such  as  a  patient 
health  analysis  tool,  a  decision-making  support 
tool  for  doctors  based  on  AI  algorithms,  and  a 
medical  data repository. In the first half of 2026, 
an intelligence services platform will be launched. 
Hospitals  and  their  security  systems  will  also 
receive  funding  to  develop  AI  services  supporting 
diagnostics.  Through  these  actions,  Poland  is 
implementing  a  comprehensive  digital  reform, 
resulting  in  a  data-driven  healthcare  system  that 
uses  AI  to  support  clinical  decisions,  accelerate 
diagnostics and optimise processes.  

the  Polish  RRP, 
tools 

including 

using 

Salary 

Systemic  solutions  are  being  introduced  by 
the  government  to  develop  the  competences 
and  legal  rights  of  nurses  and  midwives.  As 
of July 2025, authorised nurses and midwives can 
prescribe  additional  medicines  and  refer  patients 
for new diagnostic tests, enabling them to provide 
a  new  service  called  ‘My  Health  –  Adult  Health 
Check-up’.  The  Ministry  of  Health  also  provides 
annual  funding  of  specialist  training  for  nurses 
and  midwives  and  has  adjusted  the  curriculum 
standards. 
been 
implemented to boost nursing workforce numbers, 
but higher salary costs have had collateral effects 
on  the  finances  of  community  hospitals  (368). 
Regarding  doctors,  medical  student  loans  have 
been made available since 2022. The NPChUK also 
plans to strengthen the role of doctors, particularly 
primary  care  doctors.  Through  the  RRP,  Poland  is 
also implementing reforms to incentivise students 
to  pursue  medical  studies  and  is  increasing  the 
capacity  of  teaching  facilities.  Poland  participates 
in  the  HEROES  joint  action  (369)  under  EU4Health, 
through  which  EU  countries  share  knowledge  and 
experience on health workforce planning. 

increases 

have 

The  digitalisation  of  Poland’s  health  system 
has matured but suffers from a digital divide 
in  the  population.  The  shares  of  people 
accessing their personal health records online and 
using  online  health  services  (excluding  phone) 
increased 
in-person  consultations 
instead  of 
between 2020 and 2024, but are close to or below 
EU  average.  Despite  the  above-average  overall 
technical  deployment  of  electronic  health  records, 
their  use  by  patients  is  comparatively  low  (see 
Annex 7).  The  use  of  online  health  services  is 
particularly  low.  Moreover,  Poland  has  one  of  the 
widest digital  divides in the EU: major differences 
were observed in patient use according to people’s 
socio-economic  background.  This  relates  both  to 
accessing  health  services  online  and  to  using 
electronic  health  records.  Also,  digital  literacy  in 
Poland – people’s basic digital skills – is one of the 

(367) WHO Regional Office for Europe (2025), Mental Health of 
Nurses and Doctors survey in the European Union, Iceland 
and Norway.  

(368) Country Health Profile 2025: Poland – see earlier footnote. 

(369) JA HEROES I Health workforce planning project. 

(370) Patient Summary Poland.  

125 

 
 
 
ANNEX 16: HOUSING 

supply 

slowed 

Housing 
down 
has 
considerably  and  the  level  of  investment  in 
housing  is  one  of  the  lowest  in  the  EU.  The 
number  of  building  permits  for  new  dwellings 
decreased considerably, although less than the EU 
average. The construction producer prices for new 
residential buildings exceed the EU average. There 
is  untapped  potential  for  using  vacant  buildings 
and transforming them into housing. There are no 
sufficient, 
long-term 
financing schemes to help local authorities support 
the development of social housing solutions. 

impactful  and 

stable, 

in 

Poland 

affordability 

Housing 
has 
deteriorated over the last decade. Since 2015, 
house prices and rents (including existing and new 
increased, 
rental  contracts)  have  massively 
especially  in  urban  areas,  far  exceeding  the  EU 
averages. The housing affordability challenges are 
unequally  spread  across  the  regions  (see  Annex 
18) and income groups. 

remain 

conditions 

Housing 
challenging, 
particularly with regard to overcrowding and 
quality. In 2024, one third of the population lived 
in  overcrowded  dwellings,  which  is  double  the  EU 
average.  The  housing  stock  in  Poland  is  old  and 
characterised  by  low  energy  efficiency,  making  it 
even more unaffordable (see Annex 9). 

Complex  social  challenges  affect  access  to 
housing.  There  is  a  relatively  limited  municipal 
and social  housing stock. One third of  households 
fall into the rental gap (between social and private 
market  conditions)  (371).  Moreover,  the  arrival  of 
over  one  million  displaced  persons  from  Ukraine 
has  had  an  impact  on  the  level  of  demand,  while 
homelessness 
social 
challenge.  People  with  some  or  severe  disabilities 
and women suffer levels of discrimination that are 
above the EU average. 

remains  a  persistent 

The  strategic  and  governance  framework  is 
limited.  There  is  no  mechanism  to  coordinate 
housing  policies  between  administrations  at  the 
central 
is 
currently  no  strategic  approach  to  ensuring  a 
sustained  and  holistic  engagement  of  public 

local  authorities.  There 

level  and 

authorities  and  a  coherent 
framework 
measures and investments in the longer term. 

for 

Housing market developments 

Housing  shortages  are  causing  house  prices 
and rents to rise in Poland. Poland is faced with 
an  acute  housing  shortage,  especially  in  urban 
areas, which has resulted in spiralling house price 
and rental inflation. Since 2015, house prices and 
increased  by  117%  and  74% 
rents  have 
respectively,  far exceeding  the  EU  averages (62% 
and 21%)  and total  cumulated inflation in Poland 
and the EU (49% and 30% respectively as regards 
the  harmonised  index  of  consumer  prices  (HICP) 
(372). 

Graph A16.1: House prices, rents and price-to-
income evolution in PL and EU27 since 2005 

Source: Eurostat 

Given 
the  high  prices  combined  with 
relatively high mortgage interest rates since 
2022,  the  situation  on  the  market  does  not 
support  people  –  and,  in  particular,  young 
people – who wish to buy a property. After an 
significant  increase  of  15%  in  2024,  nominal 
house  prices  growth  decelerated  to  4.9%  in2025. 
The  price-to-income  ratio  was  10  percentage 
points  below  its  long-term  average.  However,  it 
takes  11.8  years  of  income  to  buy  a  100 m² 
apartment,  while  the  long-term  EU  median  is  8 
years,  suggesting  that  house  prices  are  high 

(371)Effectiveness of housing policy assessment through the lens 
of the housing affordability gap in Poland between 2010 and 
2022, A. Czerniak, J. Kroszka and A. Twardoch Ruch Prawniczy, 
ekonomiczy I socjologiczny, zeszyt 4, 2025, p 220. 

(372) Housing in Europe – 2025 edition; Eurostat housing statistics. 

Eurostat: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-
publications/housing-2025#housing-cost.  

126 

50751001251501752002252502753003253503754004250507091113151719212325Index (2005 = 100)Nominal prices PLNominal prices EU27Rental prices PLRental prices EU27Price-to-income ratio PLPrice-to-income ratio EU27 
 
 
     
 
 
 
relative  to  average  income.  (373).  Mortgage  rates 
roughly doubled following the COVID-19 pandemic 
(374).  While  mortgage  rates  have  been  decreasing 
since  their  peak  in  August  2022,  they  remain 
higher  than  the  pre-pandemic  average  (375).  As  a 
is 
result,  Poland’s  housing  market  situation 
especially  challenging  for  first-time  buyers  and 
renters – primarily young people – decreasing their 
mobility and making planning for the future more 
difficult. 

Housing costs absorb a growing proportion of 
income,  although 
household  disposable 
headline  affordability 
remain 
indicators 
below  the  EU  average.  In  2024,  total  housing 
costs in  households’ disposable income amounted 
to 16.7% slightly below the EU average of 19.2%. 
For  rents,  the  percentage  increased  steadily  from 
18.8%  in  2021  to  20.2%  in  2024,  vs  the  EU 
average of 22.3% in 2024. Over the same period, 
the average housing cost overburden rate for both 
homeowners  and  tenants  declined  slightly  (from 
5.9%  in  2023 to  5.2% in 2024),  remaining  below 
the  EU  average  (8.2%  in  2024)  (376).  These 
indicators  indicate  rising  cost  pressures  despite  a 
comparatively lower housing cost overburden rate 
(377). 

(373) Alert Mechanism Report 2026 – European Commission. 

(374) OECD Economic Surveys: Poland 2025. 

https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-

poland-2025_483d3bb9-en.html.  

(375) Statystyka stóp procentowych, NBP. 

https://nbp.pl/statystyka-i-sprawozdawczosc/statystyka-

monetarna-i-finansowa/statystyka-stop-procentowych/.  

(376) The overburden rate should be read together with the tenure 
structure (homeowner, tenants), that may differ across 
country and regions.   

(377) It is important to note here that the housing cost overburden 
indicator is based on income data for 2023 (EU SILC 2024); 
and, therefore, does not take into account the most recent 
developments in housing and rental prices. 

Graph A16.2: House supply indicators in PL since 
2005 

Source: Eurostat 

Since  2022,  investment  in  housing  in  Poland 
has  remained  low,  while  construction  costs 
have  grown.  In  Poland,  investment  in  housing  is 
the lowest in the EU (2.2% of GDP compared with 
an  EU  average  of  5% 
in  2025).  Structural 
challenges  remain  to  address  high  level  of  needs 
of various parts of the population. Despite Poland 
being  among  the  frontrunner  countries  in  the  EU 
regarding  the  number  of  completed  dwellings 
yearly per 1,000 citizens (5.3 per 1,000 citizens in 
2024)  (378),  housing  construction  needs  remain 
high - the housing construction gap is estimated at 
124  000  dwellings  above 
forecasted 
constructions(379),  and  the  overall  number  of 
dwellings  per  thousand  inhabitants  is  relatively 
low (402 per 1000 inhabitants in 2021 compared 
to  the  EU  average  of  514  in  2022)  (380).  Since 
2022,  Poland  has  seen  a  slowdown 
in  the 
construction  of  new  housing,  which  may  have 
contributed  to  higher  nominal  house  prices  and 
warrants closer monitoring. Between 2021 and Q3 
2025,  construction  producer  prices  for  new 
residential  buildings  increased  by  36%,  exceeding 
the  EU  average  of  24%,  while  the  number  of 
building permits for new dwellings between 2021 
and  2023  decreased  by  30%  (compared  with  the 

the 

(378) Deloitte Property Index 2025 

https://www.deloitte.com/be/en/Industries/real-
estate/research/property-index.html  

(379) Balouktsi et al. (2026) Housing investment needs in the EU, 

JRC Technical Report 144419.  

(380) OECD Affordable Housing Database 

https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/oecd-affordable-
housing-database.html  

127 

0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.5801201602002402800507091113151719212325% of GDPIndex (2005 = 100)Residential building permits in m2, indexResidential buildings producer prices, indexInvestment in dwellings (right-hand side axis) 
 
     
 
EU  average  decrease  of  23%).  While  the  number 
of new building permits rebounded in 2024, rising 
by  22%  compared  with  2023  (381),  it  remains 
below  2021 
levels  (86%  of  annual  building 
permits in 2021).  

Structural policies 

improving 

(Narodowy 

programme 

together  with 

Polish  housing  policy  is  fragmented,  with  no 
coordinated  approach  to  governance  on  the 
national  and  subnational  levels.  The  national 
housing 
Program 
Mieszkaniowy)  adopted  in  2016  was  repealed  in 
the 2025. The government is currently working on 
a  medium-term  strategy  for  Poland  that  will 
include  housing.  The  proposed  measures  include 
increasing  the  availability  and  affordability  of 
housing 
housing 
conditions.  The  strategy  sets  a  10%  target  for 
social housing. However, the draft made available 
for  public  consultation  does  not  cover  all  social 
aspects  such  as  people  leaving  institutional  care, 
homelessness  and  housing  for  older  people.  As 
reported by the OECD (382), housing governance in 
Poland  is  highly  fragmented  and  lacks  a  body  to 
oversee and coordinate the complex policy area of 
housing.  Coordination  between  the  at  least  seven 
ministries  and  government  agencies  with  some 
degree of responsibility for housing policy remains 
limited.  The  lack  of  coordination  also  concerns 
multilevel governance, where no mechanism exists 
to coordinate the local and regional authorities. 

So far, no holistic programme for monitoring 
and  analysing  housing  stock  and  needs  has 
been  created.  No  coordinated  and  harmonised 
monitoring of housing data or analysis of housing 
needs  is  being  performed  at  the  national  level. 
This  prevents  a  clear  overview  of  the  housing 
situation being gained and hinders efficient use of 
the  existing  stock.  According  to  census  data  from 
2021, 1 789 000 houses were uninhabited (383) in 
Poland, including 10% of the municipal stock (384). 

(381)Eurostat, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/STS_COBP_A__c
ustom_19802593/default/table.  

(382)OECD (2025), Housing Reforms in Czechia and Poland, OECD 
Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4988c473-en.  

(383)As the data were gathered during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
they may not correspond to the post-lockdown reality. 

(384)Questionnaire sent to PL for the European Semester mission. 

Additionally,  there  is  no  definition  of  a  vacant 
building in the Polish legal system, which makes it 
difficult to identify all vacant dwellings.  

(iii)  social  housing;  and 

There is still insufficient social and municipal 
housing in Poland to cover demand, while the 
affordable housing solutions are still limited. 
Social  rental  housing  consists  of  four  categories 
designed  to  serve  different  needs  and  income 
levels:  (i)  subsidised  social  housing;  (ii)  communal 
housing; 
(iv)  rental 
cooperatives.  The  construction  of  social  housing 
has  not  caught  up  with  the  demand.  Since  2024, 
117 805 households have been on the waiting list 
for  municipal  housing.  There  is  no  system  to 
monitor the beneficiaries of the social housing and 
whether  they  fulfil  the  requirements  to  benefit 
from  it.  Meanwhile,  there  is  no  legal  definition  of 
affordable  housing  in  Poland,  and  the  system  is 
underdeveloped.  The  Social  Rental  Agency 
(Społeczne  Agencje  Najmu)  programme  was 
created  in  2021  to  tackle  the  problem.  So  far, 
however,  the  uptake  has  been  limited:  as  of  31 
December  2025,  a  total  of  14  social  rental 
agencies  are  in  operation,  providing  housing  for 
395  people.  At  the  end  of  2025,  the  Ministry  of 
Development  Funds  and  Regional  Policy  signed  a 
contract  with  the  National  Real  Estate  Stock 
Agency  to  develop  the  programme  further  with 
funding from the European Social Fund Plus and to 
double the number of social rental agencies. 

Public  financing  for  social  housing  will 
increase in the years to come. Poland’s housing 
policy involves several financing programmes. The 
preferential loan programme for investors in social 
rental  housing,  available  since  2015,  offers 
preferential  financing  to  social  housing  initiatives, 
housing cooperatives and municipal companies for 
constructing rental flats or drawing up cooperative 
tenant  rights.  Bank  Gospodarstwa  Krajowego 
provides  the  financing,  backed  by  state  subsidies 
to  reduce  the  interest  rate  costs.  The  programme 
was  extended  in  2025,  and  in  2026,  over  PLN  2 
billion  will  be  made  available  to  finance  up  to 
9 500 
for  another 
flats.  Financing 
programme,  the  municipal  and  social  housing 
programme,  which  is  supported  by  the  Subsidy 
Fund,  has  been  also  increased.  In  2026-2030, 
dedicated  expenditure  amounts  to  PLN  39 454 
billion,  with  annual  allocations  rising  each  year. 
The  government  also  provides  subsidies  under  a 
number of programmes such as the Flat for Start 
(Mieszkanie  na  start)  programme  for  first-time 
tenants.  The  programme  “A  flat  without  own 

rental 

128 

 
 
contribution”  (Mieszkanie  bez  wkładu  własnego) 
allows  people  with  sufficient  creditworthiness  to 
take out a mortgage even if they do not have the 
down payment required by the bank.  

There is a need for innovative instruments, such as 
revolving  funds  and  blending  operations 
(a 
combination 
financial 
of 
instruments), to be implemented. 

subsidies 

and 

to 

2% 

help 

previous 

launched 

introduced 

government 

The 
programme 
Safe  Mortgage 
(Bezpieczny  Kredyt  2%)  programme,  which 
prospective 
was 
homeowners  buy  their  first  home,  led  to  a 
further  increase  in  housing  prices.  In  2023, 
the 
two 
programmes for first-time buyers under the Act on 
State Aid for Saving for Housing Purposes (Ustawa 
o  pomocy  państwa  w  oszczędzaniu  na  cele 
mieszkaniowe).  The  first  one,  the  Contract  Saving 
System  (Konto  Mieszkaniowe)  involves  regular 
monthly  deposits,  which  are  used 
later  for 
purchasing a home. Key benefits include an annual 
premium, accelerated savings for a down payment 
on a home, and tax-exempt interest. In July 2023, 
2%  Safe  Mortgage  programme  programme,  with 
subsidised  loans  and  interest  capped  at  around 
2%  for  the  first  10  years,  was  launched  for  first-
time buyers. While there was huge demand for the 
programme  and  91  000  loans  were  signed,  the 
increased demand pushed house prices up quickly. 
The  programme  was  closed  after  six  months  and 
has  not  been  continued.  No  further  programmes 
are planned at the moment. 

Some  tax  measures  are  in  place  to  support 
first-time buyers, discourage financialisation 
and  increase  the  social  housing  stock.  Fiscal 
measures  were  introduced  in  2023  to  help  more 
including  an 
people  become  homeowners, 
exemption from the civil law transaction tax on the 
purchase  of  a  first  dwelling.  In  parallel,  measures 
to  limit  speculative  demand  and  financialisation 
were  strengthened.  Those  measures  include  the 
introduction  in  January  2024  of  a  6%  tax  on  the 
purchase  of  a  sixth  and  subsequent  residential 
property  from  the  same  developer  on  the  same 
plot  of  land.  Homeowners  are  exempted  from:  (i) 
VAT  when  letting  their  properties  for  residential 
purposes or to social  rental  agencies;  and (ii)  VAT 
tax  when 
local 
government  unit  and  their  associated  entities  for 
the  purpose  of  further  letting  or  leasing  for 
residential purposes. 

letting  their  properties  to  a 

land  use  and 

related  policies 

In 2023, Poland started to reform its spatial 
planning  system  but  the  results  of  the 
changes  have  not  yet  been  evaluated.  The 
Spatial Planning and Development Act is the main 
national  regulation  for  planning.  Coordination 
between 
is 
performed  at  national  level  by  the  Ministry  of 
Economic  Development  and  Technology,  while 
local  governments  draw  up  specific  spatial  plans. 
In  2023,  Poland  reformed  the  spatial  planning 
system  with 
the  aim  of  simplifying  and 
accelerating  planning  procedures.  Given  the  short 
period of time since the reform was adopted, it is 
too  early  to  draw  conclusions  on  the  results. 
However, some stakeholders indicate that the new 
reform 
and 
administrative burdens for practitioners. Preparing 
the  environmental  assessment  can  be  a  lengthy 
process. In 2025, it took 47.5 days on average to 
obtain  a  building  permit,  but  this  can  vary 
considerably  across  regions  and  cities.  There  is  a 
need  for  a  better  approach  to  land  development 
and management. 

complexities 

brought 

has 

the 

In  Poland, 

rental  market 

The  Polish  rental  market  is  underdeveloped, 
while  the  rights  of  tenants  and  landlords  in 
the  Polish  rental  market  are  perceived  as 
is 
unbalanced.  The  Polish 
underdeveloped,  with  only  13%  of  the  population 
renting  an  accommodation. 
the 
regulation  of 
rental  market  does  not 
adequately protect either landlords or tenants. On 
the  one  hand,  landlords  have  limited  possibilities 
to effectively terminate contracts and recover the 
premises if there are disputes with the tenant. On 
the  other  hand,  tenants  face  legal  instability  and 
difficulties  in  planning  their  long-term  lives.  In 
2024, 7 000 households were evicted, while 2 000 
were  awaiting  eviction.  The  Act  on  the  Protection 
of  Tenants’  Rights  sets  a  minimum  level  of 
protection for tenants while upholding the right of 
landlords  to  derive  benefits  from  their  property. 
The  Act 
rental 
agreements:  (i)  the  civil  law  contract  (strong 
tenant 
tenancy 
(ii) 
agreements  with  natural  persons  (with  an  end 
date);  and  (iii)  institutional  tenancy  agreements 
with legal persons (low tenant protection). The two 
latter types are the result of a recent reform that 
gives  greater  freedom  to  both  parties  in  shaping 
the  content  of  the  contract  and  balances  their 
rights more evenly. 

lays  down 

protection); 

occasional 

types  of 

three 

129 

 
Graph A16.3: Housing affordability selected indicators 

Source: Eurostat and European Commission calculations.  The overburden rate should be read together with the tenure structure 
(homeowner, tenants), that may differ across country and regions. 

Vulnerable groups 

Homelessness  remains  a  persistent  social 
challenge,  with  overall  numbers  remaining 
broadly  stable  over  time.  The  2024  National 
Homeless  Survey 
identified  31  042  people 
experiencing  homelessness,  which  is  within  the 
range  observed  over  the  past  seven  years  (e.g. 
around 30 000 in 2019 and 33 000 in 2017). Men 
accounted  for  around  80%  of  the  homeless 
population,  women  for  20%,  while  children  and 
young people under 18 represented around 5% of 
the overall homeless population and 95% of them 
were  located  in  institutions  such  as  houses  for 
mothers with young children and pregnant women. 

Rehabilitation  of  Persons  with  Disabilities, 
including  subsidies  for  exchanging  dwellings  for 
barrier-free housing. 

The  ageing  population  puts  further  pressure 
on  the  availability  of  the  adequate  housing 
stock. In 2024, the housing cost  overburden rate 
among people aged  65 and over was higher than 
for the total population (5.8% vs 5.2%), and older 
people  reported  a  markedly  higher  incidence  of 
perceived discrimination when looking for housing 
(4.9%  vs  the  EU  average  of  1.9%).  At  the  same 
time,  older  people  are  more  likely  to  live  in 
underoccupied  dwellings  (19.8%  among  those 
aged  65+  vs  17.3%  for  the  total  population  in 
2024),  indicating  potential  mismatches  between 
housing size, accessibility and changing household 
needs in an ageing society. 

Responses  to  homelessness  are  primarily 
implemented  at  the  local  level  and  focus  on 
temporary  and  supported  housing  solutions. 
In  2024,  around  80%  of  people  experiencing 
homelessness were residing in temporary shelters, 
training apartments or assisted living apartments. 
Municipalities are responsible for providing shelter 
under  the  Social  Assistance  Act,  and  these  forms 
of  accommodation  are  delivered  within  broader 
frameworks 
services, 
including housing-led approaches. 

for  developing 

social 

Vulnerable  groups  face  specific  barriers  to 
accessing  housing,  including  discrimination 
and accessibility constraints. In 2024, 6.2% of 
the  population  reported  feeling  discriminated 
against when seeking housing (EU average: 5.8%), 
with  higher  proportions  among  people  with  some 
or severe disabilities (12.7% vs the EU average of 
8.2%) and among women (7.1% vs the EU average 
of  5.9%).  Housing  support  for  people  with 
disabilities is provided through the State Fund for 

support 

housing 

policies 

programmes 

increasingly 

Housing 
reflect 
demographic  ageing  and  the  need  for 
accessible housing solutions for older people. 
Social 
the 
construction  and  modernisation  of  accessible 
dwellings  and  common  spaces,  with  allocation 
criteria  favouring  older  applicants.  Legislative 
proposals  prepared  in  2023  aim  to  introduce 
senior  lease  agreements,  allowing  older  people 
living in upper-floor dwellings without elevators to 
move  to  accessible  municipal  housing  while 
enabling  municipalities  to  reallocate  their  former 
dwellings within the municipal housing stock. 

in 
Young  adults  also  face  constraints 
accessing  independent  housing.  In  2024,  over 
half  (51.6%)  of  young  adults  aged  18–34 in  full-
time employment in Poland continued to live with 
their parents, well above the EU average (36.8%), 
reflecting  delayed  residential  independence  and 
persistent  barriers  to  young  adults  –  even  those 
with jobs – entering the housing market. 

130 

 
 
HORIZONTAL 
ANNEX 17: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 

dimensions 

This annex assesses Poland’s progress on the 
sustainable  development  goals  (SDGs)  along 
competitiveness, 
of 
the 
and 
fairness 
social 
sustainability, 
macroeconomic stability. The 17 SDGs and their 
related  indicators  provide  a  policy  framework 
under  the  UN’s  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable 
Development.  The  aim  is  to  end  all  forms  of 
inequalities  and  tackle  climate 
poverty,  fight 
change  and 
the  environmental  crisis,  while 
ensuring that no one is left behind. The EU and its 
Member  States  are  committed  to  this  historic 
global  framework  agreement  and  to  playing  an 
active  role  in  maximising  progress  on  the  SDGs. 
The graph below is based on the EU SDG indicator 
set developed to monitor progress on the SDGs in 
the EU. 

Poland  is  improving  on  SDGs  related  to 
competitiveness  (SDGs 4,  8  and  9).  Poland 
performs  well  on  its  employment  rate  among 
people  aged  20-64  (SDG 8;  78.8%  in  2025,  vs 

Graph A17.1: Progress towards the SDGs in Poland 

72.6%  in  2019;  EU  average  of  76.1%  in  2025). 
Poland  also  performs  well  on  tertiary  educational 
attainment  among  people  aged  25  to  34  (SDG  4; 
45.2%  in  2025,  vs  44.6%  in  2019;  EU  average 
44.8% in 2025)On the downside Poland is moving 
away from the EU average on the indicator for the 
investment share of GDP (SDG 8; 17% in 2024, vs 
19.2%  in  2019;  EU  average  of  21.6%  in  2024). 
The  Polish  recovery  and  resilience  plan  (RRP) 
includes  several  measures 
the 
investment climate. 

improve 

to 

Poland performs well but still needs to catch 
up  with  the  EU  average  on  other  indicators 
for  industry,  innovation,  and  sustainable 
infrastructure (SDG 9), including gross domestic 
expenditure  on  R&D  (1.41%  of  GDP  in  2024,  vs 
1.31%  of  GDP  in  2019;  EU  average  of  2.24%  in 
2024). The same is true of air emissions intensity 
of  fine  particulate  matter  (PM2.5)  from  industry 
(0.09 g per euro in 2023; EU average: 0.05 g). 

For a detailed progress assessment towards the various SDGs, see the annual Eurostat report ‘Sustainable development in the 
European Union’; for extensive data on the short-term SDG progress of EU countries, see Key findings – Sustainable development 
indicators; for an interactive visualization of SDG progress of EU countries, see SDG country overview. A high status does not 
mean that a country is close to reaching a specific SDG, but signals that it is doing better than the EU on average. The progress 
score is an absolute measure based on the indicator trends over the past five or six years. The calculation does not take into 
account any target values, as most EU policy targets are only valid for the aggregate EU level. Depending on data availability for 
each goal, not all 17 SDGs are shown for each country. 
Source: Eurostat, latest update of 29 April 2026. Data refer mainly to the period 2019-2024 or 2019-2025. Data on SDGs may 
vary across the report and its annexes due to different cut-off dates. 

131 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poland  is  moving  away  from  some  of  the 
targets  for  SDG 2  (Zero  hunger).  The  area 
under  organic  farming  in  Poland  (4.9%  of  the 
utilised agricultural area in 2024) is below the EU 
average (10.9% in 2024). Government support for 
agricultural  R&D  was  only  EUR 0.2  per  inhabitant 
in  Poland  in  2024,  significantly  below  the  EU 
average of EUR 8.5. 

Poland  is  improving  on  some  of  the  SDGs 
related to sustainability (SDGs 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 15). For SDG 6, the percentage of inland 
water bathing sites with excellent water quality in 
Poland  rose  from  18.7%  in  2019  to  57.4%  in 
2024  but  needs  to  catch  up  with  the  EU  average 
of 78.3% (2024). Poland has made some progress 
on  energy  consumption  indicators,  increasing  the 
percentage  of  renewable  energy  in  gross  final 
energy consumption (SDG 7) from 15.4% in 2019 
to  17.8%  in  2024  (against  the  EU  average  of 
25.2% in 2024). 

However,  it  needs  to  catch  up  with  the  EU 
average  on  per  capita  net  greenhouse  gas 
(GHG)  emissions  (SDG  13),  where  its  8.7 
tonnes  in  2024  were  above  the  EU  average 
of 6.5 tonnes. Moreover, Poland is rapidly losing 
carbon  sinks,  with  net  GHG  emissions  (emission 
and  removals)  from  the  land  use  and  forestry 
(LULUCF) sector increasing from  -99.3 tonnes CO2 
eq.  per  km²  in  2019  to  -78.9 tonnes  in  2024  (EU 
average: -54.7). In addition, Poland’s energy import 
dependency  (SDG 7)  increased  from  45.3%  in 
2019  to  45.7.%  in  2024  (EU  average:  57.3%  in 
2024). As for affordable energy, the percentage of 
the  Polish  population  unable  to  keep  their  homes 
warm  enough  was  lower  than  the  EU  average 
(3.3%  against  9.2% 
in  2024).  Poland’s  RRP 
includes measures to address some of the energy-
related  challenges,  namely  the  energy  renovation 
of buildings, energy efficiency of business and the 
decarbonisation of energy production. 

Poland  is  improving  on  several  indicators 
related  to  SDG 11  (Sustainable  cities  and 
communities).  However,  its  share  of  buses  and 
trains  in  total  passenger  transport  has  fallen  but 
remains  above  the  EU  average  (from  19.6%  in 
2018  to  18.0%  in  2023;  EU  average  16.9%  in 
2023). The country is improving on the number of 
premature  deaths  due  to  exposure  to  fine 
particulate  matter  (PM2.5)  but  is  still  performing 
below EU average (a decrease of 121 per 100 000 
in 2018 to 69 in 2023; EU average: 41). 

Poland  is  also  progressing  on  SDGs 14  and 
15. The percentage of coastal water bathing sites 
with  excellent  water  quality  rose  from  29.4%  in 
2019  to  60.3%  in  2024,  but  is  below  the  EU 
average  (88.8%).  It  is  also  performing  well in  the 
percentage  of  marine  protected  areas  (22%  in 
2023)  (the  EU  average  13.7%).  The  country  is 
improving in the targets for SDG 15 (Life on land). 
In  particular,  it  reduced  the  area  of  the  country 
impacted  by  drought  on  ecosystems  from  16.2% 
in  2019  to  2.6%  in  2024,  which  is  below  the  EU 
average on this (3.7% in 2024). 

(ii) 

Poland is improving on most SDGs related to 
social  fairness  (SDGs 1,  3,  4,  5,  7,  8,  10).  It 
performs  well  on  the  indicators  for:  (i)  people  at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion (SDG 1; 16.0% in 
2024, vs 17.9% in 2019; EU average of 21.0% in 
2024); 
the  severe  material  and  social 
deprivation rate (SDG 1; 2.3% of the population in 
2024, vs 3.5% in 2019; 6.4% EU average in 2024); 
and (iii) income distribution (SDG 10; 3.85 in 2024, 
vs  4.37 in  2019;  EU  average  of  4.66 in  2024).  In 
addition,  the  long-term  unemployment  rate  fell 
(SDG 8;  0.8%  in  2025  vs  0.7%  in  2019;  EU 
average  of  1.9%  in  2025).  Poland  also  improved 
and  performed  better  than  the  EU  average  on 
participation  in  early  childhood  education  for 
children  aged  3  and  over  (SDG 4),  with  97.2%  in 
2024 against the EU average of 95%. 

the  percentage  of 

It  needs  to  catch  up  on  some  indicators  for 
SDGs 3,  4  and  5.  For  SDG 3,  Poland  needs  to 
take  measures  to  significantly  reduce  avoidable 
mortality  (341.5  deaths  per  100 000  in  2023 
against  the  EU  average  of  237.7).  On  SDG  4 
(Quality  education), 
the 
population  aged  16-74  with  at  least  basic  digital 
skills  increased  from  42.9%  in  2021  to  50.4%  in 
2025  and  is  getting  closer  to  the  EU-level  2030 
target,  even  though  it  is  still  lower  than  the  EU 
average  (60.4%  in  2025).  Poland  also  needs  to 
catch up with the EU average on gender equality in 
employment,  in  particular  on  positions  held  by 
women in senior management (SDG 5). Only 23% 
of  positions  in  senior  management  were  held  by 
women in 2025 against an EU average of 33.6%. 

improved  on  SDG 8 

Poland  is  improving  on  SDGs  related  to 
macroeconomic  stability  (SDGs 8,  16,  17),.  It 
has 
(Decent  work  and 
economic  growth),  although  real  GDP  per  capita 
(up  from  EUR 14 310  in  2019  to  EUR  17  170  in 
2025) remains below the EU average (EUR 34 110 
in  2025).  Poland  made  considerable  progress 

132 

 
increasing  the  percentage  of  households  with  a 
high-speed  internet  connection  (SDG 17),  from 
60.3%  in  2019  to  83.8%  in  2024,  above  the  EU 
average of 82.5% in 2024. 

However,  it  still  needs  to  catch  up  with  the 
EU  average  on  some  indicators  for  SDG 16 
(justice  and  strong  institutions).  Poland  has 
increased its general government total expenditure 
on  the  law  courts  from  EUR 72.3  in  2019  per 
capita to EUR 120.7 per capita in 2024, but it still 
lags  behind  the  EU  average  of  EUR 131.4. 
Meanwhile, perceptions of the independence of the 
justice  system  have  deteriorated,  with 
the 
percentage  of  people  who  consider  it  to  be  fairly 
good and very good sharply dropping from 39% in 
2019  to  24%  in  2025  (the  EU  average  in  2025 
was  54%).  Poland’s  Corruption  Perceptions  Index 
score  has  also  fallen  from  58  in  2019  to  53  in 
2025  (EU  average:  62  in  2025).  The  Polish  RRP 
includes  measures  on  the  independence  of  the 
justice system. 

As the SDGs form an overarching framework, any 
links  to  relevant  SDGs  are  either  explained  or 
depicted with icons in the other annexes. 

133 

 
 
 
ANNEX 18: COMPETITIVE REGIONS 

Regional development trends 

Map A18.1:  GDP per head compared with the EU 
average 

Over  the  past  two  decades,  Polish  regions 
have undergone rapid economic development, 
narrowing  the  gap  with  other  EU  regions, 
albeit  at  different  speeds.  Between  2004  and 
2024, all regions in Poland recorded improvements 
in  GDP  per  head  (in  PPS)  relative  to  the  EU 
average.  Warszawski  stołeczny  was  the  only 
region above the EU benchmark in 2004, with GDP 
per head at 107% of the EU average. It was also 
the only Polish region to exceed the EU average in 
2024,  reaching  157%  of  EU  average  GDP  per 
head. For all other regions in the country, GDP per 
head  ranged  between  55%  and  83%  of  the  EU 
average in 2024, with two regions exceeding 80%.  
These  were  Dolnośląskie  and  Wielkopolskie  (both 
of  which  have  benefited  from  strong  growth  in 
manufacturing and tradable  services, high foreign 
investment  and  strong  regional  centres).  Despite 
continued growth in the past 20 years, more than 
half of Polish regions continue to rank among the 
bottom  20%  of  EU  regions  in  terms  of  GDP  per 
head  (PPS).  The  eastern  regions  –  Podlaskie, 
Podkarpackie,  Lubelskie,  Warmińsko-mazurskie, 
and  Świętokrzyskie  –  remain  the  most  lagging, 
though all  have made progress over the past two 
decades.  

The  gap  between  Poland’s  eastern  regions 
and  the  rest  of  the  country  remained 
substantial  throughout  2004-2024.  Over  this 
period,  eastern  regions  —excluding  Mazowiecki 
regionalny  —  recorded  the  lowest  levels  of  GDP 
per  capita  (in  PPS)  among  all  Polish  regions  with 
no  change  in  their  relative  standing  by  2024.  In 
that  year,  their  GDP  per  capita  levels  did  not 
exceed  61.3%  of  the  EU  average,  placing  them 
among the lowest 20% of all EU regions. In terms 
of  growth  dynamics,  over  the  period  of  2014–
2024,  the  highest  average  annual  growth  rate  of 
real GDP among the eastern regions was recorded 
in  Podkarpackie  (3.5%),  while  the  lowest  was 
observed 
(2.7%).  By 
comparison,  the  average  annual  growth  rate  of 
real GDP for Poland in that period was 3.7%, with 
the  highest 
in  Warszawski 
stołeczny  (4.8%)  and  Pomorskie  (4.3%).  Overall, 
these 
the  benefits  of 
in  Poland  remain  unevenly 
economic  growth 
distributed. 

in  Warmińsko-Mazurskie 

trends  suggest 

recorded 

rates 

that 

(1) 2021-2023 average GDP per head in purchasing power 
standard compared with the EU average 
Source: Commission calculations based on Eurostat 16 July 
2025 data. 

Regions  in  the  south-western  part  of  the 
country and major urban outperform the rest 
of the country in terms of productivity. These 
regions  benefit  from  the  presence  of  high-value 
added  economic  sectors,  modern  industry,  and 
integration  into  global  value  chains,  and  they 
therefore outperform the other regions in terms of 
productivity.  Warszawski  stołeczny,  Śląskie  and 
Dolnośląskie  reached  104.3%,  67.6%  and  67.3% 
of  EU  average  productivity  in  2023,  respectively. 
However, the eastern regions are characterised by 
narrower, less diversified economic structures and 
limited  integration  into  high-value  segments  of 
value  chains,  and  therefore  continued  to  lag 
behind  the  national  average.  In  2023,  none  of 
these  eastern  regions,  except  for  Mazowiecki 
regionalny,  exceeded  51.1%  of  the  EU  average  in 
terms  of  labour  productivity,  with  the  lowest 
values  in  Warmińsko-mazurskie  and  Lubelskie 
the  EU  average 
(45.9%  and  46.5%  of 
respectively).  Higher 
in 
and 
Warszawski 
Wielkopolskie  are  driven  by  a  combination  of 
modern  industry,  strong  inflows  of  foreign  direct 
investment (FDI), and growth in business services. 
In  Śląskie,  the  greater  productivity  is  driven  by 
capital-intensive  industrial  activities  undergoing 
restructuring.  

levels  of  productivity 
Dolnośląskie, 

stołeczny, 

134 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A18.1: Main development trends, challenges and allocation of resources 

Source:  European Commission based on Eurostat data; categories of regions base on Map A.18.1 

135 

Main development trendsLess developed regions (population 20.8 million). Minimum allocation EUR 47.2 billion.Most Polish regions qualify as less developed regions (with a GDP per head in PPS below 75% of the EU average) based on 2021-2023 data. Their structural weaknesses go beyond GDP and productivity indicators, reflecting also gaps in industrial restructuring capacity, innovation ecosystems and connectivity. The economies of these regions are often concentrated in lower value added sectors such as agriculture or basic manufacturing,  which generate relatively limited productivity growth and smaller fiscal revenues. In parallel, the absence of strong metropolitan hubs in these regions reduces opportunities for innovation spillovers, advanced services and investment diffusion. In 2023, more than half of Poland’s regions ranked among the 20% least developed within the EU. Data indicate that transport infrastructure in Poland’s less developed regions is improving, unlocking regional development, improving mobility, and helping to attract investments and reduce the isolation of peripheral areas. Some regions are trying to diversify their economies, leveraging special economic zones. At the same time, these less developed regions face demographic pressures (outmigration from rural and small cities, ageing populations, and a shrinking labour force) that constrain the labour market, increase pressure on social services and the healthcare system, and weaken investment prospects. Transition regions (population 12.8 million)Wielkopolska, Dolnośląskie, Śląskie and Pomorskie have GDP per head (in PPS) between 75% and 100% of the EU average based on  2021-2023 data. These regions are gradually diversifying beyond dependency on a single industry, and are attracting more business services, light manufacturing, automotive supply chains (Śląskie) and ICT and digital services. Pomorskie, has a unique economic ecosystem compared with other regions, with a large share of GVA and employment in the ‘blue economy’ (i.e. a more dominant role for port activities, shipbuilding, costal tourism, and marine living resources, including fisheries and processing). At the same time, Poland’s coal-dependent regions are making an effort towards the energy and green transition, by planning the closure or phase-out of coal mines. Wielkopolska is focusing on an early exit from coal mining and the expansion of renewables. These structural shifts require large-scale reskilling and upskilling of the workforce.More developed regions (population 3.3 million)Poland’s capital Warsaw (Warszawski stołeczny) is in a league of its own, having consistently exceeded the EU average for GDP per head (PPS) since Poland’s accession to the EU, rising from 107% of the EU average in 2004 to 155% in 2023. It is characterised by high-value services, hosting  the headquarters for major domestic and international firms and attracting the highest levels of FDI. A strong higher education base has driven the rapid growth of start-ups, innovation and technology. Warsaw’s strong labour market and educational opportunities make it one of only two Polish regions –  alongside Pomorskie – to record population growth, suggesting positive growth spillovers. At the same time Warszawski stołeczny is facing increasing  pressure in its housing market.Specific territories Because they are eastern regions, Podlaskie, Warmińsko-mazurskie, Lubelskie and Podkarpackie were particularly affected by the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, with lasting socio-economic consequences. These regions were already lagging behind before the war. Their main challenges include: (i)  a weak labour market (with Poland’s lowest employment rates in high-technology sectors and knowledge-intensive services); (ii) limited educational opportunities; (iii) a low level of competitiveness and innovation; and (iv) lower connectivity and accessibility. Moreover, these regions also have the highest outmigration rates in the country, compounding their existing demographic pressures. At the same time, regions bordering Ukraine (Podkarpackie or Lubelskie), could serve as hubs for post-war reconstruction efforts, attracting investment in logistics and supply chains. Pomorskie (adjacent to the Kaliningrad exclave) is also exposed to a higher level of threat, including  hybrid threats in the Baltic Sea, and is impacted by increased freight and logistics costs in its ports.National cohesion aspectsPoland’s transport infrastructure needs are focused on modernisation, improving regional accessibility and decarbonisation. Important aspects of the transition include: (i) making zero- and low-emission public transport more competitive with road transport; and (ii) supporting the shift towards a more sustainable urban transport model, including through more digitalised urban transport systems. Parts of the TEN-T network, including the core network, remain incomplete, as do efficient traffic management systems. Further improvements are also needed on Poland’s three freight corridors (North Sea-Baltic, Baltic-Adriatic and Amber) to support freight traffic.  These challenges remain relevant for reducing territorial disparities, increasing competitiveness and supporting the green transition.Polish regions, which have scarce water resources compared with other EU regions, are also increasingly exposed to the impacts of climate change, especially droughts, water scarcity and floods. These trends point to persistent investment needs in water management, climate adaptation, disaster resilience and environmental infrastructure.  
 
   
 
intensity 

investment 

Higher 
in  metropolitan 
regions  located in  both  the  south-western  part  of 
the country and the capital region is also driven by: 
stronger  profitability;  the  presence  of  higher 
education 
accessibility, 
including  via  the  dense  railway  network;  and 
greater optimism about future demand and labour 
supply. 

institutions; 

better 

the  many 

Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine 
has  exacerbated 
structural 
weaknesses  of  Poland’s  eastern  border 
regions,  most  of  which  were  already  the 
economically  weakest  territories 
in  the 
country before the war. In particular, Lubelskie, 
Podkarpackie, Warmińsko-mazurskie and Podlaskie 
are  affected  by:  (i)  the  depopulation  of  already 
poorly inhabited  areas; (ii)  low  levels  of economic 
activity;  (iii)  the  declining  attractiveness  of  local 
housing;  (iv)  rising  security  concerns;  and  (v) 
underexploited natural potential. These challenges 
have  highlighted  the  need  to  reallocate  funds 
within  the  current  programmes  towards  new 
strategic priorities in cohesion policy to strengthen 
critical 
civil  preparedness,  protect 
regional 
infrastructure  and  increase  innovation  in  dual-use 
technologies and defence. 

Key challenges for regional 
competitiveness 

limited 

is  very 

innovation 

R&D  and 
in 
Poland’s  eastern  and  north-western  regions. 
Many  regions  located  in  the  eastern  and  north-
western  part  of  the  country  rely  on  fragmented 
policy interventions, constraining their productivity 
growth.  These  eastern  and  north-western  regions 
are  characterised  by  inadequate  infrastructure, 
limited  ICT  staffing  in  local  administrations,  and 
fragmented 
Smart 
specialisation  strategies  (385)  in  these  regions  are 
often  not  developed  to  give  due  consideration  to 
regional  specificities,  or  these  strategies  are  too 
broad  in  thematic  scope  resulting  in  limited 

provision. 

e-service 

(385) Smart specialisation strategies are strategic, territorially 

based frameworks for innovation and industrial policy that 
help Member States and regions identify and leverage their 
unique comparative advantages to address structural 
challenges, foster economic transformation and increase 
competitiveness. 

leading 

Pomorskie, 

Dolnośląskie 
in 

development  effects  (386).  Taken  together,  these 
factors not only reduce the competitiveness of the 
enterprises, but also the possibility of residents to 
stay  in  their  home  regions  (‘the  right  to  stay’).  In 
contrast,  the  metropolitan  regions  Warszawski 
and 
stołeczny, 
Małopolskie  are 
this  area,  with 
Warszawski stołeczny the only region to approach 
the  EU  average  in  the  technological  readiness 
index  (99.4%  of  EU  average)  in  2022.  These 
regions form a group in which smart specialisation 
strategies are well aligned with existing economic 
structures,  business  activity,  R&D  assets  and 
labour-market  profiles.  In  2025  Mazowieckie  had 
the  highest  share  of  enterprises  with  a  high  or 
very high level of digital intensity (39%), followed 
by  Małopolskie  and  Pomorskie.  By  contrast,  the 
lowest  shares  are  observed  in  Świętokrzyskie  and 
Warmińsko-mazurskie 
20.3%, 
respectively)(387).  

(18.3% 

and 

Regional disparities in innovation are further 
strengthened by the spatial concentration of 
FDI.  Poland’s  growth  model  remains  strongly 
anchored in FDI, with investment concentrated in a 
small  group  of  better-performing 
regions. 
Dolnośląskie and the Warsaw capital region attract 
the  bulk  of  technologically  advanced  FDI,  with 
Warszawski stołeczny alone accounting for around 
40%  of  Poland’s  total  FDI  between  2010  and 
2024.  Beyond  these 
leading  regions,  Śląskie, 
Wielkopolskie, and Pomorskie have also developed 
significant  high-tech  manufacturing 
clusters 
alongside expanding knowledge-intensive business 
services,  embedded  in  global  value  chains.  By 
contrast,  some  regions  in  northern  Poland  along 
with  some  eastern  regions,  such  as  Warmińsko-
mazurskie  and  Podlaskie,  remain  less  integrated 
into  global  value  chains  and  attract  investment 
less 
oriented 

lower-technology  and 

towards 

(386) Kogut-Jaworska, M., Ociepa-Kicińska, E. (2023). Do Regional 

Smart Specialization Strategies Affect Innovation in 
Enterprises? Sustainability; Sabal M. (2023). Regional Smart 
Specializations and Sustainability: The Challenges of the 
European Green Deal. AGH w Krakowie. Barometr 
Regionalny;.  Wiatrak A. (2021). Regionalne Inteligentne 
Specjalizacje jako narzędzie rozwoju obszaru. Uniwersytet 
Warszawski. Zagadnienia Doradztwa Rolniczego. 

(387) Statistics Poland (2025). Społeczeństwo informacyjne w 

Polsce w 2025 r. https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-
tematyczne/nauka-i-technika-spoleczenstwo-
informacyjne/spoleczenstwo-informacyjne/spoleczenstwo-
informacyjne-w-polsce-w-2025-r-%2C1%2C19.html 

136 

 
 
 
knowledge-intensive  activities, 
capacity for innovation-driven upgrading(388). 

limiting 

their 

Graph A18.1: R&D expenditure (GERD, 2023) at 
NUTS 2 level 

lacking 

regions, 

for  example,  Warszawski  stołeczny,  Kraków, 
Gdańsk  and  Poznań  continue  to  attract  residents 
owing  to  their  stronger 
labour  markets  and 
educational  opportunities.  At  the  same  time,  less 
developed 
comparable 
opportunities,  face  the  highest  outmigration  rates 
nationally. In 2024 Warszawski stołeczny recorded 
a  net  population  increase  of  5.3  inhabitants  per 
1 000,  while  Świętokrzyskie  and  Lubelskie 
experienced  significant  declines,  with  population 
decreases  of  9.4  and  7.2  inhabitants  per  1 000, 
respectively.  As  a 
the  working-age 
population has been gradually shrinking in weaker 
territories,  such  as  Lubelskie  or 
peripheral 
Warmińsko-mazurskie 
or 
Zachodniopomorskie  and  Lubuskie  in  the  west, 
further  reinforcing  the  territorial  divide.  Over  the 
long  term,  these  demographic  trends  pose  a 
structural challenge to the growth potential of less 
developed  regions,  as  the  contraction  of  the 
working-age  population  constrains  labour  supply 
and productive capacity. 

result, 

east 

the 

in 

Map A18.2:  Average annual % change in working-
age population (20-64) in Poland (2015-2024) 
(NUTS 2) 

Source: Eurostat 

policies 

economic 

The  2025  country-specific  recommendation  for 
Poland  underscores  the  importance  of  focusing 
on 
investment-related 
innovation.  Through  the  regional  programmes, 
Poland’s  regions  use  cohesion  funds  to  increase 
research  and  innovation  by  direct  support  to 
enterprises  or  by  developing  strategic  innovation 
hubs.  These  innovation  hubs  provide  advisory 
services and analysis capacities, and can also help 
start-ups and advise companies on how to expand 
internationally. 

The  population  is  declining  in  many  less 
developed  regions  of  Poland.  Demographic 
trends  are  further  deepening  disparities  between 
some  less  developed  Polish  regions  on  the  one 
hand and major metropolitan regions on the other, 

(388) OECD. (2025). Strengthening FDI and SME linkages in Poland. 

OECD Publishing, p. 23. 

Source: Eurostat 

Differences  in  regional  competitiveness  are 
further shaped by low transport accessibility 
in  peripheral  areas  and  in  regions  located 
along Poland’s borders. The quality and density 
of  local  road  networks,  as  well  as  the  availability 
of  public  transport,  remain  highly  uneven  within 
regions.  This  contributes  to  transport  exclusion  in 

137 

0.3%0.5%0.6%0.8%0.8%0.9%0.9%1.0%1.0%1.0%1.1%1.2%1.4%1.7%2.3%2.7%2.8%Mazowiecki regionalnyLubuskieŚwiętokrzyskieZachodniopomorskieOpolskieKujawsko-pomorskiePodlaskieWarmińsko-mazurskieŁódzkieŚląskieWielkopolskiePodkarpackieLubelskieDolnośląskiePomorskieMałopolskieWarszawski stołeczny 
   
 
 
 
 
of  upgrades 

many  rural  and  peripheral  municipalities  (389)  in 
eastern border regions and some western regions. 
In these regions, poor-standard local roads and an 
absence 
still  weaken  daily 
accessibility  to  labour  markets,  education  and 
services, particularly for rural municipalities. High-
density  rail  networks  are  an  advantage  for 
industrialised and economically developed regions, 
notably  Śląskie,  Warszawski 
stołeczny  and 
Dolnośląskie, with 13 Polish regions exceeding the 
EU average of 49 km of railroad per 1 000 km². In 
contrast, most eastern regions, (with the exception 
of Podkarpackie and Świętokrzyskie) remain below 
the  EU  average  on  this  score,  with  Podlaskie 
reaching  just  38.5 km  per  1 000 km².  In  2025, 
25.8% of Poland’s population lived in areas where 
the  public  transport  accessibility  index  was  below 
30%  of  the  national  average(390)  (mainly  the 
eastern  border  regions  of  Warmińsko-mazurskie, 
Podlaskie,  Podkarpackie  and  Lubelskie,  and  the 
and 
regions 
western 
Zachodniopomorskie). 

Lubuskie 

of 

Climate  change  affects  regions  differently 
depending  on  their  geography  and  exposure. 
In  Poland’s  southern  and  mountain  regions,  the 
main  climate-related  threats  are  intense  rainfall, 
flash floods and landslides (391). In 2024, southern 
Poland  experienced  severe  flooding,  resulting  in 
damage  to  more  than  10 000  buildings  (392). 
Although significant investments have been made 
in 
in 
vulnerable  regions,  the  2024  floods  revealed  the 
limited 
the  measures 
implemented so far. In particular, the 2024 floods 
revealed  the  limited  effectiveness  of  the  work 
previously  undertaken 
flood-
protection  systems  and  expand  nature-based 
water-retention  capacity  in  high-risk  regions  such 
as  Dolnośląskie,  Lubuskie,  Opolskie  and  Śląskie 

to  modernise 

to  strengthen 

recent  years 

effectiveness 

resilience 

of 

(393).  At  the  same  time,  in  Polish  coastal  regions 
(Zachodnio-pomorskie, Pomorskie and Warmińsko-
mazurskie),  climate  change  and  the  deteriorating 
environmental  state  of  marine  and  inland  waters 
significantly 
limit  fish  stocks  and  negatively 
impact the livelihoods of local communities (394). 

Access to healthcare is difficult in many less 
developed  regions  of  Poland.  The  regions’ 
large  hospital  capacity  does  not 
relatively 
translate 
to  healthcare. 
into  equal  access 
Ambulatory  and  primary  care  infrastructure,  like 
hospital infrastructure, remains dense in cities and 
functional  urban  areas  (395).  However,  many  rural 
and  peripheral  municipalities  rely  on  sparse 
networks of clinics, often with high staff workloads 
and  difficulties  in  securing  specialists  (see  also 
Annex  15).  In  2024,  the  highest  number  of 
ambulatory 
capita 
(including  consultations  from  admission  rooms  in 
in  Mazowieckie  and 
hospitals)  was  recorded 
Lubelskie,  whilethe  lowest  in  Lubuskie,  Opolskie, 
(396). 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie  and  Podkarpackie 
Difficult  access  to  healthcare  is  a  major  obstacle 
to  attracting  and  keeping  people  in  regions  which 
are  already  facing  a  significant  demographic 
challenge. The lack of staff and underfinancing of 
outpatient 
territorial 
translate 
inequalities  in  waiting  times,  access  to  specialists 
and quality of care in the regions. 

consultations 

care 

care 

into 

per 

by 

significant 

There  is  a  significant  urban-rural  divide  in 
access to education, which is more prevalent 
in  some  regions.  Education  in  Polish  regions  is 
characterised 
geographical 
inequalities,  reflected  in  both  access  to  schooling 
and educational outcomes (see also Annex 13). In 
2023,  27%  of  children  under  the  age  of  15  in 
Poland’s  rural  areas  lived  within  a  15-minute 
walking  distance  of  a  primary  school,  compared 
with the EU average of 34%. The lowest levels are 
recorded 
the  Łódzkie  and  Mazowiecki 
regionalny.  The  regions  closest  to  the  EU  average 

in 

(389) Taylor Economics (2025). Wpływ polityki spójności na rozwój 

obszarów wiejskich. 

(393) The indicated regions were affected by the September 2024 

(390) Piotr Rosik and Patryk Duma, “Transport Poverty in Poland – A 
Spatial Approach to Public Transport Demand and Supply,” 
Geographia Polonica 98, No. 3 (2025): 255–76. 

floods and are eligible for support under the RESTORE 
Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/3236 of 
19 December 2024). 

(391) Instytut Meteorologii i Gospodarki Wodnej – Państwowy 

Instytut Badawczy (IMGW-PIB). (2025). Klimat Polski 2024. 
IMGW-PIB 

(394) Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries 
(STECF) – The 2025 Annual Economic Report on the EU 
Fishing Fleet (STECF 25-03 & 25-07). 

(392) Państwowe Gospodarstwo Wodne Wody Polskie. (2025). 
Raport z przeglądu i aktualizacji wstępnej oceny ryzyka 
powodziowego w 3 cyklu planistycznym. Załącznik nr 7: 
Powódź we wrześniu 2024, p.30. 

(395) Statistics Poland (2025). Zdrowie i ochrona zdrowia w 2024 

r. Główny Urząd Statystyczny. 

(396) .Statistics Poland (2025). Zdrowie i ochrona zdrowia w 2024 

r. Główny Urząd Statystyczny. 

138 

 
 
 
Lubuskie, 

Podkarpackie, 

Podlaskie, 
and 
Świętokrzyskie  exhibited  substantially lower  rates, 
not exceeding 2.6%. Existing housing programmes 
have  so  far  insufficiently  targeted  the  needs  of 
lower-income and vulnerable households (see also 
energy 
Annex  16).  Housing 
performance  of  social  dwellings  are  a  challenge 
especially 
In  growth 
in  depopulating  regions. 
regions and metropolitan areas, the central priority 
is to expand the supply of stable, affordable rental 
housing  in  locations  well  connected  to  labour 
markets and services. 

quality 

and 

Graph A18.2: The share of children with a primary 
school within a 15-minute walk and the share of 
population with a hospital within 10 minutes by 
car in rural areas, (NUTS 2), 2023 

were Opolskie (34%) and Śląskie (33%). According 
to the 2022 PISA results, students in Poland’s rural 
areas  achieve  lower  scores  than  their  peers 
in urban agglomerations across all three assessed 
domains  (reading,  mathematics,  and  science)(397). 
In  2025,  the  national  urban-rural  gap  in  tertiary 
educational attainment was 32.1 pps, higher than 
the  EU  average  of  22  pps.  Kujawsko-pomorskie 
(32.3%)  and  Warmińsko-mazurskie 
(33.5%) 
continued  to  have  the  lowest  tertiary  educational 
attainment  rates  compared  with  the  national  rate 
In  contrast,  Warszawski  Stołeczny 
of  45.2%. 
(50.5%)  both  had 
(69.6%)  and  Dolnośląskie 
tertiary educational attainment rates greater than 
the national average. High education attainment is 
corelated  with  subsequent  higher  productivity 
employment activities, which is a critical factor for 
sustained long-term growth. Lubuskie, Warmińsko-
mazurskie,  Kujawsko-pomorskie,  and  Opolskie 
limited  capacity  to  attract  knowledge-
have 
retain  university 
intensive 
graduates 
limited 
capacity  to  improve  their  productivity  and  growth 
prospects over the long term. 

investment  and 
(398).  This 

translates 

into 

Pressure  on the  housing  market is  strongest 
in  regions  with  dynamic  labour  markets.  It  is 
particularly  acute  in  major  urban  centres  such  as 
Warszawa,  Kraków,  Wrocław,  Poznań  and 
Trójmiasto  (Gdańsk,  Gdynia  and  Sopot),  where 
gentrification, but also tourism-driven speculation, 
have 
intensified  affordability  constraints.  The 
demand  for  municipal  dwellings  or  temporary 
accommodation is particularly high in urban areas 
of  Śląskie,  Dolnośląskie  and  Mazowieckie(399). 
Meanwhile,  many  rural  areas  continue  to  face 
depopulation  and  an  underutilised  housing  stock. 
The cost overburden rate varies across regions. In 
2025  Kujawsko-pomorskie,  Łódzkie,  Dolnośląskie, 
Pomorskie and Warszawski Stołeczny recorded the 
highest  housing  cost  overburden  rates,  exceeding 
5%,  whereas  less  developed  regions,  including 

(397) According to PISA methodology, in each test subject, there is 
theoretically no minimum or maximum score in PISA; rather, 
the results are scaled to fit approximately normal 
distributions, with means for OECD countries around 500 
score points and standard deviations around 100 score 
points.  

(398) Statistics Poland (2023). Narodowy Spis Powszechny 
Ludności i Mieszkań 2021. Ludność. Stan i struktura 
demograficzno-społeczna w świetle wyników NSP 2021. 
Główny Urząd Statystyczny. 

(399) Główny Urząd Statystyczny. (2025). Gospodarka 

mieszkaniowa i infrastruktura komunalna w 2024 r. Główny 
Urząd Statystyczny.  

Source: Eurostat 

is  a  key 
Household  energy  efficiency 
challenge  in  some  regions.  Many  dwellings  in 
Poland  have  low  energy  efficiency  and  rely  on 
carbon-intensive heating systems instead of high-
performing  insulation  (see  also  Annex  9).  This  is 
especially  the  case  in  the  country’s  industrial  and 
post-industrial  regions,  and  in  its  shrinking  cities 
rural  areas.  Prefabricated  multi-family 
and 
buildings and older single-family houses are often 
the  least  energy  efficient.  The  highest  shares  of 
households unable to keep their homes adequately 
in  Lubuskie,  Świętokrzyskie, 
warm  are  found 

139 

3427243123242132282534293129303327252230182329101718171818232014101123141919EUPolandPodlaskiePodkarpackieLubelskieŚwiętokrzyskieŁódzkiePomorskieWarmińsko-mazurskieKujawsko-pomorskieOpolskieDolnośląskieLubuskieZachodniopomorskieWielkopolskieŚląskieMałopolskieWarszawski stołecznyMazowiecki regionalnyAccess to primary school% of children under 15 years oldAccess to healthcare% of population 
 
     
Table A18.2: Key regional indicators for Poland (NUTS 2 level) 

(1) Dark green - the indicator is 120% or more of the EU average. 
Light green - the indicator is 100% or more, but less than 120% of the EU average. 
Yellow - the indicator is 90% or more, but less than 100% of the EU average. 
Light red – the indicator is 75% or more, but less than 90% of the EU average. 
Dark red – the indicator is below 75% of the EU average. 
This colour scale applies to ‘positive’ indicators, where higher values are favourable. 
For ‘negative’ indicators (where higher values are unfavourable), the colours are reversed. 
Source: Eurostat and JRC 

indicator  exceeds  5%. 

Podkarpackie  and  Warmińsko-mazurskie,  where 
the 
in 
Mazowieckie, Małopolskie and Podlaskie the share 
oscillates  around  2%.  Low  energy  efficiency  and 
outdated heating systems generate high operating 
costs (400). 

In  contrast, 

industrial 

The  energy  and 
transition, 
particularly  the  phase-out  of  coal,  poses  a 
major challenge for many polish regions that 
remain  highly  reliant  on  coal  and  heavy 
(Dolnośląskie, 
industries. 
Małopolskie,  Wielkopolskie,  Śląskie  and  Łódzkie) 
receive support from the EU’s Just Transition Fund. 

them 

Five 

of 

(400) Projekt Krajowego Planu w dziedzinie Energii i Klimatu do 

2030 r. z perspektywą do 2040 r. - wersja opracowana przez 
ME do zatwierdzenia rządowego - Ministerstwo Energii - 
Portal Gov.pl 

these 

regions, 

Poland accounts for nearly 97% of the EU’s hard-
coal  extraction,  with  around  80%  of  national 
reserves  concentrated  in  Śląskie  and  Małopolskie. 
Although  the  mining 
industry  remains  highly 
important  for  the  demographic  and  economic 
situation  of 
its  profitability 
continues  to  fall.  Śląskie  is  the  most  exposed 
region.  Hard-coal  mining,  coal-based  power,  steel 
and  related  activities  still  underpin  Śląskie’s  local 
labour  markets  and  municipal  finances,  while 
legacy industrial  sites and dense urban  structures 
amplify  social  and  environmental  risks.  The 
industrial 
is  also 
transformation  of  Śląskie 
impacting:  the  neighbouring  region  of  Western 
Małopolska  (the  home  of  both  many  coal  miners 
who travel to work in Silesian mines); and SMEs in 
the supply chains dependent on the coal mines in 
Śląskie.  The  socio-economic 
the 
imminent  phasing  out  of  lignite  extraction  and 
combustion-related activities will be significant for 

impact  of 

140 

GDP per head (PPS, index)Population growthNet migrationReal GDP growthProductivity: GDP (PPS) per hour worked (index)Change in working age population (20-64)Energy povertyR&D expenditureR&D expenditure in business enterprise sector (BERD)EU27=100Average annual change per 1000 residentsAverage annual change per 1000 residentsAverage annual % changeEU27=100Average annual % change% of total population% of GDP% of GDP20242015-20242015-20242014-202420232016-2025202520232023EU1001.83.51.6100-2.69.22.261.5Poland78-4-1.83.764-13.13.41.561Małopolskie70-0.2-0.14.158-6.92.52.731.72Śląskie79-7.9-42.968-18.52.910.69Wielkopolskie82-0.403.863-8.63.71.140.49Zachodniopomorskie64-7.2-3.7353-18.53.10.760.37Lubuskie63-6.5-3.62.853-17.45.10.45Dolnośląskie83-2.50.73.567-12.34.21.661.04Opolskie63-7.8-42.855-17.52.50.780.51Kujawsko-pomorskie63-7.3-4.53.152-17.24.80.850.49Warmińsko-mazurskie56-9.8-7.12.746-20.830.96Pomorskie751.11.14.360-6.62.22.321.66Łódzkie74-7.4-2.43.362-17.44.30.980.47Świętokrzyskie60-11.5-6.4350-235.30.640.43Lubelskie55-10.2-6.82.947-20.34.11.40.55Podkarpackie57-6.8-5.63.551-16.35.11.190.97Podlaskie61-7.9-5.33.447-17.63.80.920.38Warszawski stołeczny15710.810.84.81046.61.82.792.02Mazowiecki regionalny71-7.3-4.83.865-16.92.80.280.23  
 
 
  
 
local  communities  in  the  small  towns  of  Konin  in 
Wielkopolska, where the local economy and labour 
markets are highly dependent on these fossil-fuel 
activities. Although it will be challenging to ensure 
a  just  transition  (especially  in  reskilling  the  older 
cohorts of the labour force), the phase-out of coal 
mining simultaneously presents an opportunity for 
regional 
growth.  Mining 
technologies  and  skills  can  be  repurposed  into 
specialised  engineering  and  technical  services, 
such  as  underground  engineering  works  or  land 
reclamation, enabling the regions to maintain their 
competitiveness,  capitalising  on  lessons  learned 
from the ongoing Just Transition Fund (401).  

innovation 

and 

transition 

Poland’s  energy 
is  placing 
mounting  pressure  on  its  power  grid,  with 
clear  regional  implications.  As  the  share  of 
renewables  becomes  higher 
in  the  country’s 
electricity production, the northern regions, such as 
Pomorskie and Zachodniopomorskie, are becoming 
increasingly  important  thanks  to  their  favourable 
conditions  for  offshore  and  onshore  wind,  large-
scale  solar  photovoltaic,  and  planned  nuclear 
power  plants.  Some  regions,  such  as  Łódzkie  and 
Opolskie,  have  high  levels  of  electricity  self-
sufficiency, but rely predominantly on large, fossil-
fuel plants with very low shares of renewables in 
generation.  By  contrast,  several  regions  in  the 
north  and  north-west, 
including  Pomorskie, 
Zachodniopomorskie,  Wielkopolskie,  Warmińsko-
mazurskie  and  Podlaskie,  record  high  –  or  rapidly 
growing – shares of renewable energy in electricity 
production,  but  their  overall  generation  and  local 
grid  capacity  often  remains  insufficient  to  make 
the most of this potential. However, an increase in 
a  country’s  share  of  renewables in its  energy mix 
does  not  automatically  translate  into  regional 
energy  autonomy,  security  or  competitiveness 
gains. The existing transmission grid infrastructure, 
historically oriented toward the coal regions of the 
south, including Śląsk and Małopolska, will become 
progressively less capable of meeting the system’s 
evolving  needs.  These  developments  create  the 
need  for  substantial  grid  reinforcement  and  a 
stronger  investment  planning  and  coordination 
framework for distribution networks. This will help 
enable  the  territorially  balanced  integration  of 
renewable energy and electrification as the energy 

(401) Territorial Just Transition plans for Silesia, Commission 
decision of  4.3.2026 C(2026)1524,  Territorial Just 
Transition plans for Eastern Wielkopolska, Commission 
decision of 04/03/2026 C(2026)1596 

access 

Reliable 

low-carbon  electricity 

regions  would  make 

transition becomes a competitiveness condition for 
to 
economies. 
regional 
competitively  priced, 
in 
industrial 
them  more 
attractive  places  to  invest.  The  potential  of  these 
less  industrialised  areas  to  become  producers  of 
green  energy  could  also  be  increased  by  targeted 
grid  reinforcement  and  the  introduction  of  grid 
investment  planning,  aligning  distribution  system 
the  one  hand  with  spatial 
operators  on 
development  plans,  storage  and  smart-grid 
solutions on the other (see also Annex 9)(402). 

to 

According 
the  European  quality  of 
government index (403), in 2024 the quality of 
governance in Poland remained below the EU 
average,  with  Dolnośląskie,  Świętokrzyskie 
Podkarpackie  and  Warszawski  stołeczny  the 
weakest  performers.  The 
constraints  on 
governance  in  Poland  are  uneven  and  tend  to  be 
most  binding  in  peripheral,  shrinking,  rural  and 
border  territories,  while  large  metropolitan  areas 
face  different  coordination  challenges.  Many 
regional authorities in eastern border regions (and 
many  authorities  in  peripheral  areas  and  areas 
with  falling  populations)  are  hampered  by  limited 
administrative  capacity,  fragmented  coordination 
and unstable and limited financing capacity. These 
problems force authorities in the affected areas to 
focus  on  formal  compliance  rather  than  effective 
service delivery. In rural and border areas, complex 
frameworks, 
procedures  and  weak  planning 
combined  with  a  high  reliance  on  discretionary 
transfers,  undermine  institutional  trust  and  the 
ability to pursue strategic action. At the same time, 
stronger 
metropolitan  areas 
administrative 
face  different 
capacity  but 
challenges  such  as  coordination  and  governance 
across  functional  areas  and  across  multiple 
institutions. 

typically  have 

The  local  finance  system  in  Poland  remains 
exposed  to  central  decision-making  through 
shared-tax rules.  Poland’s 2024 reform of local 
government  revenues  aims  to  reshape  the  way 
the 
resources  are  distributed  and 

improve 

(402) Projekt Krajowego Planu w dziedzinie Energii i Klimatu do 

2030 r. z perspektywą do 2040 r. - wersja opracowana przez 
ME do zatwierdzenia rządowego - Ministerstwo Energii - 
Portal Gov.pl 

(403) European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional and 

Urban Policy, European Quality of Government Index, 
accessed 17 December 2025. 

141 

 
 
 
predictability of own contribution and multi-annual 
planning. The outmigration of younger people and 
the  shrinking  working-age  population  weaken  the 
tax  base  of  the  rural  and  peripheral  areas, 
impacting the delivery of public services (404).  

(404) Strategia Rozwoju Polski do 2035 r. - Ministerstwo Funduszy 

i Polityki Regionalnej - Portal Gov.pl. 

142 

 
 
ANNEX 19: TRANSPORT 

This  Transport  Annex  presents  the  state  of  play 
and 
the 
the  challenges  Poland  faces  with 
implementation  of  the  trans-European  transport 
network  (TEN-T),  the  European  railway  traffic 
management system (ERTMS) and road safety. 

Three  European  transport  corridors  cross 
Poland  (North  Sea  –  Baltic,  Baltic  Sea  – 
Adriatic  Sea  and  Baltic  Sea  –  Black  Sea  – 
Aegean  Sea).  The  TEN-T  in  Poland  comprises 
10 259 km of railway lines (4 894 of which are on 
the  core  network)  and  8 079 km  of  roads  (3 702 
of  which  on  the  core  network),  while  its  TEN-T 
inland waterways comprise just 54 km. In addition, 
Poland  has  13  airports  (including  nine  core 
airports), five ports (including four core ports) and 
30 urban nodes on the TEN-T network (405). 

The  country  made  significant  progress  in 
upgrading  its  rail  infrastructure  to  ensure 
network  compliance  with  TEN-T  parameters 
and  improve  rail  transport  competitiveness. 
Nevertheless,  some  bottlenecks  and  missing  links 
still exist.  

with 

completed 

sidings  needed 

The  core and  extended core  network are  not 
yet 
modernisation, 
expansion, and revitalisation of railway lines 
and 
TEN-T 
parameters.  Other  issues  to  address  include 
improving  capacity  of  certain  sections  (especially 
those  connecting  seaports  and  urban  areas), 
eliminating level crossings, the gradual realisation 
of  the  high-speed  rail  programme  and  the 
deployment of ERTMS.  

to  meet 

The  ongoing  construction  of  the  first  high-
line 
speed  Warsaw-Łódź-Poznań/Wrocław 
with  speeds  above  300 km/h  and  the  cross-
border  sections  Poznan-Berlin  and  Warsaw-
Vilnius,  are  essential  for  the  North  Sea  – 
Baltic  corridor,  connecting  the  Baltic  states 
to  central  Europe  via  Rail  Baltica.  It  is 
important  to  strengthen  the  connectivity  with 
neighbouring  countries  to  create  a  level  playing 
field  for  railway  undertakings  operating  across 
borders. 

The  railway  lines  leading  to  the  major 
seaports,  in  particular  Gdynia,  Gdańsk,  and 
Szczecin-Świnoujście  have  not  yet  been 
modernised according to the TEN-T requirements. 
Also, rail resilience in the border area with Czechia 
has  yet  to  be  improved  on  the  Kędzierzyn  Koźle-
Chałupki  section  as the  line  does  not meet  TEN-T 
is  not  fit  for  current  and 
parameters  and 
anticipated 
critical 
bottlenecks  need  to  be  removed  to  enhance 
connectivity  and  ensure  dual  use 
railway 
parameters along the eastern flank of the EU and 
NATO,  notably  on  the  Rzeszów-Lublin-Bialystok 
sections. Substantial investments are also needed 
to  enhance  the  country’s  rail  network  for  military 
mobility, 
to 
accommodate 740 m trains with higher axle loads. 

in  particular  smaller  upgrades 

traffic  volumes.  Further 

Implementing  the  ERTMS  is  essential  to 
digitalising  the  railways  and  to  modernising 
and  harmonising  railway  operations  across 
Europe.  The  ERTMS  ensures  the  safety  of  rail 
networks  by  providing  a  unified  signalling  system 
that  significantly  reduces  the  risk  of  accidents.  It 
also provides interoperability between national rail 
systems, improving cross-border train movements. 
Finally, the ERTMS enhances network capacity and 
operational 
the 
competitiveness of the rail sector. 

efficiency, 

increasing 

To  meet  its  national  plan’s  ERTMS  roll-out 
target  by  2035 (406),  Poland  aims  to  deploy 
ERTMS  on  an  additional  length  of  4 552 km 
for estimated cost of at least EUR 1.1 billion. 
No  plan  for  the  decommissioning  of  the  legacy 
signalling system is in place yet. 

The  timely  delivery  of  major  infrastructure 
projects  is  affected  by  complex  and  lengthy 
land  acquisition  and  permitting  procedures. 
Reviewing  and  streamlining  these  procedures 
could  accelerate  the  implementation  of  projects. 
Poland does have a  TEN-T strategic framework in 
place. However, it dates to 2019 and has not been 
updated.  Finally,  a  stable  long-term  financing 
framework is required to ensure a smooth roll-out 
of 
Poland.  Moreover, 
harmonising  technical  and  operational  rules  with 

high-speed 

rail 

in 

(405) TENtec Information System, according to Reg. 2024/1679. 

Coordinator Matthias Ruete. 

(406) Based on ERTMS – Third work plan of the European 

143 

 
 
 
 
 
the minimisation of national  rules  in line with  the 
EU  directives  on  rail  interoperability  and  safety 

remains critical to ensuring seamless cross-border 
rail transport.   

Map A19.1:  TEN-T cross-border & national priority sections in Poland. 

Table A19.1: ERTMS deployment in Poland. 

Source: Based on ERTMS – Third work plan of the European Coordinator Matthias Ruete. 

144 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  map  below  presents  the  roads  where  the 
safety of the infrastructure is poor and thus where 
urgent action is required.  

Map A19.2:  Poland's road safety map 

Source: TENtec Information System and TEN-T map library – 
European Commission 

Road  crashes  impose  an  enormous  social, 
economic  and  health  burden  on  the  EU 
economy.  The  external  socio-economic  costs  of 
fatal,  serious  and  minor  injuries  have  remained 
persistently  high  despite  the  progress  made  in 
reducing  crash  frequency  and  severity.  These 
resources 
innovation, 
education,  healthcare  and  other  crucial  public 
investments (407). 

could  otherwise 

fuel 

In  2024,  Poland  was  above  the  EU  average 
(45),  with  52 
fatalities  per  million 
inhabitants.  Based  on  the  data,  a  decrease  of 
35% in road fatalities was recorded between 2019 
and  2024.  The  number  of  serious 
injuries 
decreased  by  27%  over  that  period.  Road  crash 
fatalities  and  serious  injuries  also  declined  for  all 
groups examined over this period.  Compared with 
the  EU  average,  the  distribution  of  fatalities  in 
Poland  showed  a  high  proportion  of  pedestrians 
and fatalities within urban areas. There was also a 
high  number  of  crashes  deemed  as  extremely 
serious,  which  points  to  the  consequences  of 
excessive driving speeds.   

The implementation of road safety actions is 
progressing smoothly, without any particular 
gaps  being  reported.  All  planned  measures  in 
the current strategy are well on track, which is also 
reflected  in  the  progress  made  in  terms  of  road 
safety  outcomes  (fatalities  and  serious  injuries). 
Poland  is  well  on  track  to  meet  both  2030 
targets(408).  

Graph A19.1: Poland's road fatalities per million, 
2024 

Source: Report at the Mid-Point - Poland, SWD(2026) 53 
final. 

(407) Report on the implementation of the EU Road Safety Policy 

framework at the Mid-Point, COM(2026) 77 final. 

(408) More details in Report on the implementation of the EU Road 

Safety Policy framework at the Mid-Point – Poland, 
SWD(2026) 53 final. 

145 

 
 
 
 
 
 
146