REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL in accordance with Article 27 of Directive 2014/36/EU on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers
Date: 2026-05-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: admission of aliens, housing, illegal migration, labour inspectorate, seasonal employment, seasonal worker, third country, trafficking in human beings, work permit, working conditions

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 8.5.2026  COM(2026) 261 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL in accordance with Article 27 of Directive 2014/36/EU on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers  
 
 
I. 

INTRODUCTION 

The EU’s seasonal economy is an important, high-volume driver of growth in different sectors of 
strategic importance for the overall EU economy and competitiveness. The main seasonal sectors 
in  the  EU  are  agriculture  and  horticulture,  tourism,  and  the  hotel,  restaurant  and  catering 
(HORECA)  sector,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  food  processing  and  construction.  In  2024,  the  EU’s 
agricultural sector generated EUR 228.6 billion in gross value added (about 1.2% of EU GDP) and 
EUR 531.9  billion  in  agricultural  output,  while  agri-food  exports  reached  EUR 235.4  billion1. 
Tourism  industries,  including  accommodation  and  food  services,  are  estimated  to  account  for 
around 5% of the EU’s gross value added2. Many of these sectors rely structurally on seasonal 
work, where labour demand peaks at specific times of the year.  

Although seasonal sectors and the size of seasonal work vary across the EU, all Member States 
have a structural  need for seasonal  workers.  Rough estimates suggest  that between 2.53 and 44 
million  seasonal  workers  are  needed  annually  across  the  EU.  Nationals  from  the  countries 
themselves represent  the largest  group of seasonal  workers, but  their number has been steadily 
declining. 

Demographic changes, rural depopulation and persistent labour shortages increasingly require the 
contribution  of  mobile  EU  seasonal  workers  (who  move  from  one  EU  country  to  another  for 
seasonal jobs) and workers from non-EU countries to sustain production and services in seasonal 
sectors. According to estimates from 2021, over 420 000 third-country nationals take up seasonal 
work in agriculture alone in the EU each year5. In 2023, 9% of the labour force in tourism industries 
was made up of third-country nationals6.  

Seasonal  work  presents  specific  challenges  associated  with  heightened  vulnerability  and 
enforcement risks. This is due to the combination of temporary and physically demanding tasks, 
long working hours during peak periods, comparatively low pay, limited job security and remote 
workplaces. Workers’ limited bargaining power, the difficulty of conducting inspections in remote 
rural areas, and fierce competition that may result in the cutting of labour costs further contribute 
to seasonal workers’ vulnerability and risks of exploitation. Third-country nationals employed in 
seasonal sectors are at greater risk than EU nationals, facing challenges in access to decent housing, 

1   Eurostat, Performance of the agricultural sector – Statistics Explained – Eurostat. 
2   Eurostat,  Tourism  statistics  –  expenditure  –  Statistics  Explained  –  Eurostat  (4.5%  in  2019);  Money-maker or 

scourge? Tourism across the EU flourishes | European Newsroom (5.1%). 

3   European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  (EESC),  Collecting  data  on  the  situation  of  social  protection  of 

seasonal workers in the agriculture and food sectors in EU Member States after COVID-19, 2023. 

4   European  Federation  of  Food,  Agriculture  and  Tourism  Trade  Unions  (EFFAT),  Working  conditions  in  EU 

Agriculture, The Figures of Precarity, Exploitation, and Inequality, 2024. 

5   EESC, footnote 3, p. 18. 
6  

In accommodation services, which employed 2.1 million workers in 2021, third-country nationals accounted for 
11% of the workforce in 2023, Tourism industries – employment – Statistics Explained – Eurostat. In 2022, they 
constituted approximately 12.6% of the workforce in the HORECA sector in the EU, European Labour Authority 
(ELA),  Accommodation  and  food  service  activities:  issues  and  challenges  related  to  labour  mobility,  p.  37. 
However, the number of seasonal workers from non-EU countries in this sector is not known. 

1 

 
 
 
health care, as well as certain parts of social security. Intersectional discrimination can increase 
those risks. Short contracts, dependence on a single employer, limited access to information and 
support, and fear of adverse consequences if they report abuses7 affect their ability to assert their 
rights and seek redress. Seasonal workers are also more at risk of falling victim to trafficking in 
human  beings  for  labour  exploitation,  which  has  increased  significantly  in  recent  years8, 
particularly  in  high-risk  sectors  such  as  agriculture,  food  processing,  hospitality,  transport  and 
logistics and construction. 

Before  the  adoption  of  the  Seasonal  Workers  Directive9  (the  Directive),  national  rules  and 
protection  standards  were  fragmented,  with  definitions,  admission  criteria,  length  of  stay, 
procedures  and  rights  varying  widely  from  one  country  to  another.  In  several  Member  States, 
seasonal  sectors  were  associated  with  illegal  employment,  overstaying  and  poor  working  and 
living conditions.  

Adopted in 2014 and to be transposed by 30 September 2016, the Directive seeks to reconcile two 
objectives:  more  accessible  and  transparent  labour  mobility  pathways  to  help  employers  meet 
seasonal  labour  demand,  thereby  incentivising  a  reduction  in  illegal  migration  and  illegal 
employment; and promoting decent working and living conditions for seasonal workers, strong 
safeguards against exploitation, as well as measures to ensure enforcement, such as monitoring, 
assessment and inspections. 

In  accordance  with  Article  27  of  the  Directive,  this  report  focuses  on  the  transposition  and 
application of the Directive in the Member States, covering mainly the period between 2019 and 
202410. It also outlines the measures taken to support the correct transposition and application of 
the Directive, identifies remaining challenges, and presents the steps that the Commission intends 
to take to address them.   

The  report  is  based  on  information  received  through  the  monitoring  and  support  measures 
described in sections II and III, on statistical data reported by Member States to Eurostat, and on 
contributions  from  a  broad  range  of  stakeholders,  including  Member  States’  authorities,  trade 
unions,  employers’  and  business  associations,  non-governmental  organisations,  migrant 
representatives, academia and publicly available sources.  

7   Commission, ‘Targeted study on the need and potential policy options to better protect third-country nationals 
under the Seasonal Workers Directive’, by Milieu Ltd and Ramboll Consulting, 2024, hereafter referred to as 
Targeted study; Oxfam, Essential but invisible and exploited, 2024, p. 5; Employment Equality Bulletin, Portraits 
of Precariousness: Seasonal Workers Picking Strawberries and Other Berries in Huelva (Boletín de Igualdad en 
el Empleo, Retratos de la Precariedad: Temporeras de la fresa y otros frutos rojos en Huelva), 2023. 
Increase of 70% in trafficking for labour exploitation between 2019 and 2023, as can be gleaned from the Eurostat 
report on 10 years (2013-2023) of EU data on trafficking in human beings, published in October 2025.   

8  

9   Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of 
entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 
p. 375. The Directive is not applicable to Denmark and Ireland. 

10   The extended reporting period is largely due to gradual and differentiated transposition of the Directive by EU 

countries, gaps in comparable data and the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  

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As outlined in the European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy of 29 January 202611, it 
is key to attract workforce from non-EU countries that the European economy needs, including 
seasonal  workers,  while  ensuring  protection  against  exploitation  and  preventing  illegal 
employment. Promoting and ensuring effective access to labour mobility pathways for the purpose 
of seasonal work, as viable alternatives to illegal migration, is also part of the Global Alliance to 
counter migrant smuggling12. 

This report, together with the report on the implementation of the Employers Sanctions Directive13, 
aims to promote a better enforcement of EU rules to counter illegal employment and exploitation 
of migrant workers. It will also feed into the upcoming strategy on combating trafficking in human 
beings in 2026 and contribute to the EU’s broader approach under the Quality Jobs Roadmap14 to 
ensure decent working conditions for every worker.  

II.  MONITORING AND MEASURES TO SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION  

Since  2016,  the  Commission  has  taken  a  range  of  legal  and  operational  steps  to  ensure  the 
Directive’s  correct  implementation.  In  2016,  it  opened  infringement  procedures  for  failure  to 
notify  transposition  measures  against  20  Member  States  bound  by  the  Directive.  By  2019,  all 
Member States had notified complete transposition, leading to the closure of those infringement 
cases.  Most  provisions  were  correctly  transposed  in  each  Member  State,  though  some  gaps 
persisted  in  areas  such  as  admission  and  withdrawal  conditions,  the  issuance  and  renewal  of 
authorisations,  information  obligations,  the  facilitation  of  re-entry,  accommodation,  sanctions, 
compensation and procedural safeguards. In 2023 and 2024, the Commission therefore launched 
infringement  procedures  for  incorrect  transposition  of  the  Directive  against  all  Member  States 
bound  by  the  Directive.  As  a  result,  all  Member  States  concerned  have  taken  or  are  taking 
additional  measures  to  align  their  national  law  with  the  Directive.  To  date,  nine  infringement 
procedures have been closed, while the others remain under assessment.  

To support the effective application of transposed provisions, the Commission has complemented 
legal enforcement with analytical15 and operational16 measures. EU funding has financed targeted 

11   Commission  Communication  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  European  Asylum  and  Migration 

Management Strategy, 29 January 2026, COM(2026) 45 final, p. 21. 

12   See Joint Declaration on the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling, 10 December 2025. 
13   Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  application  of  Directive 
2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of 
illegally staying third-country nationals COM(2026)260. 

14   Communication from the Commission, Quality Jobs Roadmap, 4 December 2025, COM(2025) 944 final. 
15   European Migration Network (2020), Attracting and protecting the rights of seasonal workers in the EU and the 
United  Kingdom  –  Synthesis  Report,  2020,  and  related  country  reports;  Ad  Hoc  Query  on  2023.18  Seasonal 
Workers Directive, requested by EMN Luxembourg on 5 May 2023;  Targeted study, footnote 7; Commission, 
Study  on  the  working  conditions  of  farm  employees  in  the  EU  agriculture  sector,  by  Milieu,  Law  &  Policy 
Consulting, 2025. 

16   For example, Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on seasonal workers in the EU in the context of 
the COVID-19 outbreak, 2020/C 235 I/01, OJ C 235I, 17.7.2020, p. 1; ELA, Campaign information note third-
country national seasonal workers (2021), Information note on seasonal workers.pdf. 

3 

 
 
 
projects, for example, in Italy, Greece, Spain and France, to support the practical implementation 
of the Directive for third-country seasonal workers in agriculture17.  

The Commission has discussed the remaining challenges and potential next steps to improve the 
Directive’s application with Member States, social partners and stakeholders in various fora and 
consultations18.  Commission  departments  have  participated  in  further  exchanges  organised  by 
third parties and related to EU-(co)-funded projects19. These exchanges highlighted the need to 
better  operationalise  admission  channels  to  deliver  the  required  seasonal  workforce  in  time, 
increase awareness among third-country seasonal workers of their rights and of how to enforce 
them, and to support the use of complaint and redress mechanisms. Stakeholders also frequently 
drew attention to  insufficient monitoring, enforcement, inspections and sanctioning  in  seasonal 
sectors, alongside recurrent problems of inadequate accommodation and labour law infringements. 

III.  COMPLIANCE OF TRANSPOSITION AND APPLICATION  

While  Member  States  have  correctly  transposed  most  provisions  of  the  Directive,  some  gaps 
remain, as shown in the following sections.   

1.  Streamlined and easily accessible labour mobility pathways for seasonal workers 

a.  Scope of the Directive – Article 2 

The Directive applies to  third-country nationals who reside outside the territory of the Member 
States and who apply to be admitted, or who have been admitted to the territory of a Member State 
for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers. It does not apply to third-country nationals 
who at the time of application reside in the territory of a Member State, with the exception of third 
country  nationals  who  intend  to  extend  or  renew  their  stay  (Article  2).  The  Directive  defines 
‘seasonal worker’ a third-country national who retains the principal place of residence in a third 
country and stays legally and temporarily in the territory of a Member State to carry out an activity 
dependent on the passing of the seasons, under one or more fixed-term work contracts concluded 

to 

SU.PR.EME. 

17   For example, the Commission allocated EUR 30.2 million in 2019 to SU.PR.EME. Italia and EUR 30 million in 
undeclared 
to 
2023-24 
work and unlawful recruitment activities; EUR 3.25 million, 95% of which came from the Asylum Migration and 
Integration  Fund  (AMIF),  to  the  Women  as  Financially  Independent  Rural  Actors  (WAFIRA)  project  (2021-
2025) and WAFIRA II (2025-2028) in Spain; and EUR 5.23 million, with 95% from AMIF, to France. It also 
funded the INTEGRALITY project, to fight against the labour exploitation of migrants in agriculture and work 
to ensure they are locally integrated, in Greece. 

prevent 

against 

fight 

Italy 

and 

in 

2 

18   For example, at meetings of the Labour Migration Platform in October 2023 and October 2025, a meeting of the 
Expert  Group  on  the  Views  of  Migrants  in  October  2025,  a  meeting  of  the  European  Migration  Forum  in 
November 2024, and an ad hoc meeting with social partners in December 2025. 

19   For example, Solidar, Realising Fair and Just Working Conditions for Migrant Workers in Europe (October 2025); 
Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD)/Government  of  the  Netherlands,  Hybrid 
Workshop  on  Labour  Migration  in  Agriculture  (December  2025);  Seasonal  and  fair  employment  blueprints 
(SaFE)/International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)/Migration Partnership Facility (MPF), 
Workshop, Building functional pathways for seasonal work in agriculture and tourism (January 2026); European 
Policy  Centre  (EPC)/Dignity  for  migrant  workers  in  farm  to  fork  labour  markets  (DignityFirm),  Roundtable, 
Migrant workers in farm to fork sectors: What way forward for effective EU policies ensuring dignity? (January 
2026). 

4 

 
 
 
directly between that third-country national and the employer established in that Member State 
(Article 3 (b)). Within these parameters, Member States must list the seasonal sectors (Article 2(2)) 
and set the maximum cumulative stay for seasonal work between five and nine months in any 12-
month period (Article 14). All Member States have listed agriculture as a seasonal sector. Many 
mention horticulture20, forestry21, including the gathering of wild non-wood products22, or fishing 
and marine aquaculture23. Most, but not all, have also designated accommodation, food services 
and/or  tourism  and  related  leisure  services  as  seasonal  sectors24.  Some  include  one  or  more 
additional sectors25.  

Admissions  of  third-country  seasonal  workers  under  the  scope  of  the  Directive  have  increased 
steadily in the past years. Eurostat data26 show that authorisations for seasonal work in the EU rose 
from 115 726 in 2019 to 273 89727 in 2024, with a particularly strong increase between 2021 and 
2024 (from 154 91528 to 273 897; over +77%), reflecting post-COVID recovery, higher demand 
for  seasonal  labour  from  non-EU  countries,  and  more  complete  reporting  by  some  Member 
States29. In several Member States, streamlined procedures30 and higher quotas of admission for 
third-country  seasonal  workers31  have  made  mobility  pathways  more  attractive  and  accessible. 
Intensified labour inspections and higher detection of irregularities32 in the same period suggest 
that growth in legal employment may have been triggered in some Member States by the taking 
of more decisive action against undeclared work and illegal employment. 

In  2024,  six  Member  States  accounted  for  over  90%  of  authorisations  under  the  scope  of  the 
Directive: Italy (146 099; 53%), France (41 700; 15%), Spain (20 810; 8%), Croatia (16 555; 6%), 
Greece  (15  206;  6%)  and  Bulgaria  (9  542;  3%). Almost  70%  of  authorisations  were  issued  to 
people from the following non-EU countries: Morocco (76 579; 28%), Bangladesh (53 567; 20%), 

20   Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands and Romania. 
21   Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia,  France, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Finland, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Sweden, 

Slovenia and Slovakia. 
22   Finland and Lithuania. 
23   Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia. 
24   Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Germany,  Estonia,  Greece,  Finland,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Lithuania, 

Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia and Slovakia. 

25   Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and Slovakia listed one 
or more of the following sectors, for example: hunting, food/tobacco/beverage production, sawmills, construction, 
film/television  production,  passenger  water  transport,  wholesale/retail  trade,  industrial  activities,  services 
supporting the performing arts or civil engineering. 

26   Unless  otherwise  stated,  the  figures  mentioned  are  Eurostat  figures.  For  the  2019  figure,  data  is  missing  for 
Belgium and France, see: Authorisations for the purpose of seasonal work by status, length of validity, economic 
sector and citizenship [migr_ressw1_1]. 

27   Plus 22 079 ‘renewed’ decisions, mainly in Austria (19 805), France (1 183) and Croatia (863). Austria clarified 
vis-à-vis the Commission services that the 19 805 renewals included 15 397 seasonal permits issued for up to six 
months for the first time for a specific season but not for the first time to a specific worker, and 4 408 renewals 
for the extension of a stay for a total stay of up to nine months within the 12-month period. 

28   Data for Belgium is missing. 
29   For example, by Belgium, Cyprus and France. 
30   For example, in Greece, Spain, France.  
31   Austria, Spain, Italy and Romania. 
32   See Section III.2.b. below and, for more detail, the Implementation Report on the Employers Sanctions Directive. 

5 

 
 
 
India (39 137; 14%), Tunisia (12 675; 5%) and Ukraine (7 524; 3%). Except for Ukrainian workers, 
largely concentrated in Poland, other above-mentioned nationalities were predominantly employed 
in southern Europe, particularly Italy, France and Spain.  

In  2024,  most  third-country  seasonal  workers  admitted  under  the  Directive  were  men  (at  least 
216 954), while women accounted for almost one fifth (at least 53 895, or 20%)33. Although men 
predominated in  most  Member States, women represented more than 88% of seasonal  workers 
under the Directive in Poland (4 516) and more than 80% in Spain (16 677)34.  

Eurostat data for 2024 show that authorisations are concentrated in agriculture, forestry and fishing 
(196 650; 72%) and accommodation and food service activities (47 203; 17%). Several Member 
States rely  on parallel  admission routes  not  governed by the  Directive to meet  seasonal  labour 
needs. They also use students35, applicants for, or beneficiaries of, international protection36 from 
non-EU countries, and national seasonal work permits for people already present on their territory. 
Other third-country nationals with the right to work or perform a remunerated activity also work 
in seasonal sectors. The share of illegally employed workers from non-EU countries remains high 
in seasonal sectors in many Member States37. 

Divergent national definitions of seasonal sectors, which are due to the wide discretion of Member 
States left by the Directive and parallel admission pathways for seasonal work, can result in uneven 
protection for workers and make monitoring, inspection planning and data comparability across 
the EU difficult. 

b.  Authorisations for seasonal work, admission criteria, procedures and fees 

33   The aggregates were calculated based on available data. There are missing data by sex for Germany and Portugal 

in 2024. 

34   Women also accounted for sizeable shares in Finland (2 714, 58%) of first issued authorisations, Croatia (45%, 7 
530), Austria (35%, 2 023), Bulgaria (2 730, 29%), Greece (3 804, 25%). Italy issued 9 142 authorisations for 
seasonal work to women, yet this represented only 6% of the country’s total. 

35   Germany, which applies the Directive for seasonal workers only  by means of bilateral schemes with Moldova 
and Georgia for stays of up to 90 days administered through the public employment service. Ferienbeschäftigung 
für.  Studierende  –  Auswärtiges  Amt;  Expert  Council  for  Integration  and  Migration  (Sachverständigenrat  für 
Integration und Migration (SVR)), precarious work (prekäre Beschäftigung), precarious participation (prekäre 
Teilhabe), Bericht, 2023. 

36   Italy and Greece. Sources: Eurispes, Agromafie, Eighth report on agri-food crimes in Italy (8° rapporto sui crimini 
agroalimentari in Italia), 2025; Hoque, Migration Policy Institute,  Trapped by Italy’s Policy Paradox, Asylum 
Seekers  and  Other  Migrants  Can  Fall  into  Exploitative  Farm  Labor,  August  2024;  Guidi/Berti,  ‘Labor 
exploitation in the Italian agricultural sector: the case of vulnerable migrants in Tuscany’, Front Sociol. 2023 Oct 
4;  Piovesan,  Della  Puppa,  ‘Da  richiedenti  asilo  a  lavoratori  essenziali’  (‘From  asylum  seekers  to  essential 
workers’), Anno  XIV,  no.  1/2024,  Rivista  quadrimestrale  dell’INAPP  (Istituto  Nazionale  per  l’Analisi  delle 
Politiche  Pubbliche) 
for  Public  Policy  Analysis). 
Blouchoutzi/Zaples/Manou/Papathanasiou,  ‘Refugees’  Settlement  in  Greece:  Employment  in Agriculture  as  a 
Criterion for an Alternative Dispersal Plan’, Growth and Change 2025, Volume 56, Issue 2, p. 1; Generation 2.0 
RED, SolidarityNow, Revealing the Unseen Migrant Workers, Joint Research Study, 2025. 

(Quarterly  Review  of 

the  National 

Institute 

37   See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 
2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of 
illegally staying third-country nationals. 

6 

 
 
 
Article 12 of the Directive requires Member States to issue an authorisation for seasonal work if 
the admission conditions are met and there are no grounds for rejection, subject, where relevant, 
to the availability of quotas. Almost all Member States have transposed this obligation correctly. 

According to Eurostat data, in 2024, most seasonal work authorisations concerned stays exceeding 
90  days.  Only  11%  (30 843)  were  issued  for  stays  not  exceeding  90  days.  Such  short-stay 
authorisations were mainly issued by Bulgaria and Finland, where they accounted for 81% (7 744) 
and 74% (3 463) of their totals respectively38.  

Authorisations not exceeding 90 days – Article 5 and Article 12(1) 

For short-stay seasonal  work,  not  exceeding  90 days,  Member States apply  one or more of the 
three authorisation models set out in Article 12(1) of the Directive: a dedicated short-stay visa for 
seasonal work39, a combination of a short-stay visa and a work permit40, or a stand-alone work 
permit for people who don’t require a visa41. Procedures for obtaining an authorisation typically 
involve two steps, with employers often first seeking approval/a work permit from the competent 
labour authorities, and then, if required, a worker applying for a visa.  

Documentation  requirements  for  obtaining  an  authorisation  have  largely  been  streamlined  and 
harmonised in line with the exhaustive list in Article 5 of the Directive. However, the conformity 
assessment found that the national  legislation of  16  Member States  was initially not  compliant 
with the Directive. Six Member States required additional documents, such as health insurance 
covering the whole stay (instead of requiring it only for periods during which the seasonal worker 
is not covered by the social security of the Member State), proof of professional qualifications, or 
financial guarantees for their return. Nine Member States did not require some of the mandatory 
documents,  such  as  a  work  contract  or  binding  job  offer,  evidence  of  sickness  insurance  or 
evidence of adequate accommodation. Subsequent transposition measures have addressed these 
shortcomings,  but  evidentiary  requirements  still  vary  from  one  Member  State  to  another:  for 
example,  some  require  declarations  from  employers42,  whereas  others  require  formalised 
contractual evidence43. Adequate pre-admission checks by the relevant national authorities remain 
essential to ensure decent working and living conditions, protect workers and prevent abuse and 
fraud, as demonstrated by more stringent pre-admission checks in some  Member States, which 
have led to higher application rejection rates44. 

38   Significant numbers of short-stay titles were also issued in Croatia (7 597, 46%), Poland (1 729, 34%), Austria 

(1 944, 34%) and Italy (6 199, although this is only 4% of Italy’s total). 

39   For example, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia and Portugal. 
40   For example, Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Spain, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania 

and Slovakia. 

41   For example, Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Croatia, Sweden and Slovenia. 
42   For example, Austria, Germany, Latvia, Malta and the Netherlands. 
43   For example, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Spain, Finland, France, Croatia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Slovenia.  
44   Sweden (What does the Swedish Migration Agency do to counteract abuse and crime? – The Swedish Migration 
Agency); France reported an application rejection rate of around 40% for seasonal workers from Morocco due to 
fraud or inadequacy for the job profiles for 2024 during the OECD workshop, footnote 19. 

7 

 
 
 
Authorisations exceeding 90 days – Article 6 and Article 12(2) 

In 2024, Member States issued 240 104 seasonal work authorisations for stays exceeding 90 days, 
including 65 942 for stays of 91 days to  five months and 174 162 for stays of 91 days to nine 
months. For this kind of authorisation, Member States have chosen the option under Article 12(2) 
of the Directive  that best  fits  their existing  national  migration arrangements  and labour market 
management: some use long-stay visas45, some single residence and work permits46, requiring a 
visa only as an entry formality, if at all, and most combine long-stay visas with residence permits47. 
This has meant that procedures have continued to vary greatly across the EU. At the same time, 
documentation  requirements  for  these  long-stay  authorisations  are  also  streamlined  and 
harmonised in line with the exhaustive list in Article 6. Member States have largely aligned their 
legislation with Article 6 of the Directive, following the correction of initial instances of incorrect 
transposition. 

Obligation to notify the decision on an application within 90 days – Article 18(1) 

To provide more legal certainty and enable employers and workers to plan within the short and 
time-sensitive seasonal window, Article 18(1) of the Directive requires Member States to notify 
applicants in writing of a decision regarding their application as soon as possible and, at the latest, 
within 90 days of the date of submission of a complete application. Transposition of this provision 
is largely compliant across the EU, with initially some instances of incorrect transposition in six 
Member States, such as: the start of the deadline for the adoption of a decision on the application 
only after notification of the completeness of the application to the applicant, a requirement for 
timely adoption of the decision instead of timely notification to the applicant, the possibility of 
unjustified extensions, and no obligation to notify a refusal in writing. 

In practice, processing times still vary significantly amongst Member States, reflecting different 
administrative  set-ups,  the  number  of  authorities  involved,  the  use  of  labour  market  tests  or 
quotas48,  regionalised  procedures,  levels  of  digitalisation  and  available  resources.  Streamlined 
online application models, especially for stays not exceeding 90 days, tend to deliver the fastest 
outcomes49, while quota-bound, multi-authority permit procedures, often managed at least partly 
locally or regionally, are more time-consuming50. Employers and Member States’ representatives 
noted that in some Member States complex or lengthy procedures still in place can hinder the legal 

45   For example, Austria, Estonia and Lithuania (all with prior authorisation to work), Czechia, Greece, Latvia and 

Portugal. 

46   For example, Cyprus, Finland (no additional visa required), Sweden, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
47   For  example,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Poland  and 

Romania. 

48   For example, Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia 

and Slovakia. Also, FI for single permits exceeding six months. 

49   For example, Estonia, Finland and Croatia. 
50   For example, Greece and Italy. 

8 

 
 
 
recruitment  of  third-country  seasonal  workers51.  The  forthcoming  Commission/OECD  study 
“Making Migration Work: Admitting Labour Migrants” is expected to provide further insight into 
composition and current length of admission procedures in the Member States.  

Grounds for rejection and withdrawal – Articles 8 and 9 

Member  States  have  had  to  bring  national  rules on  rejection  and  withdrawal  into  line  with  the 
exhaustive grounds set out in Articles 8 and 9 of the Directive. Initially, 11 Member States added 
or kept grounds not provided for in the Directive or failed to transpose certain mandatory grounds, 
including grounds linked to business inactivity or prior sanctions for undeclared work or breaches 
of the Directive. Most of these instances of incorrect transposition have since been corrected. 

Eurostat records 11 101 seasonal work authorisations withdrawn in 2024. Only 10 Member States 
reported withdrawals, with nearly 90% of the overall withdrawals in the EU concentrated in two 
countries: Greece (7 917, 71% of all withdrawals, equivalent to 52% of permits issued by Greece) 
and Croatia (2 015, 18% of withdrawals, equivalent to 12% of permits issued by Croatia52). Greece 
also  reported  the  withdrawal  of  84%  of  permits  in  2023.  Italy  (440)  and  Lithuania  (346)  also 
reported significant numbers of withdrawals in 2024, while they remained low or non-existent in 
most other Member States, despite the high-risk nature of seasonal sectors. This divergence may 
reflect incomplete reporting to Eurostat, the short duration of authorisations, more often expiring 
rather than being withdrawn, and, in some cases, limited inspection activity, with correspondingly 
low detection, sanctioning and withdrawal rates. 

Proportionate fees – Article 19 

Article  19  of  the  Directive  allows  Member  States  to  charge  fees  for  processing  seasonal  work 
applications,  provided  they  are  not  disproportionate  or  excessive.  Fees  generally  appear 
proportionate,  but  three  Member  States53  charge  comparatively  high  fees  for  authorisations 
exceeding  90  days.  Several  Member  States  allocate  part  of  the  costs  to  employers54.  Licensed 
intermediaries operating in Member States are often prohibited from charging workers. However, 
documented abuses persist, primarily, though not exclusively, in countries of origin, by unlicensed 
intermediaries  during  recruitment  and  admission,  sometimes  also  during  employment55, 
underscoring the need to strengthen cooperation with those countries and to step up oversight. 

51   Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) United, Business Europe, Services of General Interest (SGI) Europe, 
Employers’  Input  following  the  social  partner  hearing  on  the  Seasonal  Workers  and  Employers  Sanctions 
Directives, 19 December 2025; Targeted study, footnote 7. 

52   Croatia reported that withdrawals occurred where Articles 5 and 6 of the Directive were no longer being complied 

with. 

53   Finland, Malta and the Netherlands.   
54   For example, Greece and Lithuania. 
55   See  for  example  Hooper  et  al.,  Best  Practices  for  Designing  and  Managing  Labour  Migration  Corridors  to 
Europe, 2025; ELIAMEP, Policy paper164/2024,  ‘Looking for seasonal workers: Greece’s search for migrant 
labour’, p. 19; Solidar, Realising Fair and Just Working Conditions for Migrant Workers in Europe, 2025, p. 23. 
The problem of intermediaries charging seasonal workers high fees for assistance during recruitment was also 
reported by France during the OECD/NL workshop, footnote 19. 

9 

 
 
 
c.  Extension of stay, change of employer and facilitation of circular migration 

Extension of stay with the same or a different employer – Article 15 

Article 15 of the Directive requires Member States to ensure that third-country seasonal workers 
can, within the maximum period of five to nine months laid down in Article 14, extend their stay 
with  the same employer  at  least  once, and  change employer at  least  once. Member States may 
permit  multiple extensions. The provision  aims to secure labour supply  and make workers less 
vulnerable by limiting their dependency on a single employer. 

All Member States allow at least one extension of a stay with the same employer and, in most 
cases, multiple extensions56. Initial compliance issues in the case of six Member States, such as 
limiting extensions  to  stays above or below 90  days, treating extensions as optional,  or adding 
conditions not provided for in Article 15(1) of the Directive, have largely been rectified.  

All Member States also allow at least one change of employer, and most57 allow multiple changes 
within the maximum period. Similar initial non-compliance issues were detected in the national 
law of eight Member States as the ones reported for extensions with the same employer, and these 
have been addressed. 

In many systems, each change of employer requires a new authorisation. Only a limited number 
of  Member  States58  permit  changes  under  the  same  authorisation,  sometimes  by  means  of  a 
simplified application to add an employer59 or a take-over notification procedure60. Digitalisation, 
tighter  decision  deadlines  and,  in  some  cases,  the  removal  of  quota  checks,  have  facilitated 
renewals in several Member States61. 

Under Article 18(2) of the Directive, Member States shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that 
seasonal workers can continue working with the same or a different employer while an application 
for extension or renewal is being processed. Three Member States initially felt short of ensuring 
full compliance, but they have now addressed the matter.  

Renewals and employer changes appear nevertheless to remain exceptional in practice. In 2024, 
11  Member  States  reported  6 682  renewed  seasonal  work  authorisations,  mainly  in  Austria 
(4 408)62.   This  limited  uptake  suggests  that,  to  date,  the  right  to  change  employer  has  not  yet 
reached its full potential for the retention of experienced seasonal workers, pointing to the need to 

56   For example, Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, 

Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and Slovakia. 

57   For  example,  Austria,  Belgium,  Cyprus,  Czechia,  Germany,  Estonia,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Hungary,  Italy, 

Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and Slovenia. 

58   For example, Belgium, Finland and Italy. 
59   Finland. 
60   Belgium. 
61   For example, Austria, Spain, France and Portugal. 
62   While Austria reported 19 805 issued authorisations as renewed ones to ESTAT, it clarified that 15 397 of these 
authorisations were for a repeated stay of the same person during a new maximum period/season, which does not 
qualify as an extension. France (1 183) and Croatia (863) also reported issuing significant numbers of renewed 
authorisations.  

10 

 
 
 
address  practical  barriers,  such  as  unawareness  of  the  possibility  of  changing  employer  and 
renewal procedures for short seasons that are too complex. 

Supporting circular migration – Article 16 

Under Article 16 of the Directive, Member States shall facilitate the re-entry of bona fide seasonal 
workers who have been admitted at least once within the previous five years and complied with 
the obligations of their stay. The compliance assessment showed that seven Member States did not 
provide for any facilitation or limited it to specific subcategories (notably stays exceeding 90 days 
or repeat employment with the same employer). In this context, facilitation typically takes the form 
of faster processing63, priority handling64, documentation facilitations65 and, in a limited number 
of cases, multi-season authorisations66. By rewarding compliance, these arrangements can increase 
the number of orderly returns and promote predictable legal re-entry. There is good practice in this 
regard in France, combining a multi-season authorisation with the obligation to register the return 
to the country of origin within 15 days of the work contract’s expiring, to prevent overstaying67.  

Some Member States68 have also established bilateral seasonal worker schemes with specific non-
EU  countries.  Such  schemes  can  provide  safer  and  more  reliable  circular  pathways  by  setting 
quotas,  standardising  recruitment,  supporting  circular  migration  and  embedding  safeguards 
through  model  contracts,  housing  commitments  and  social  security  arrangements.  Talent 
partnerships  with  Tunisia,  Morocco,  Egypt,  Bangladesh  and  Pakistan69  also  provide  circular 
seasonal labour mobility in agriculture and tourism and help to operationalise fair and sustainable 
circular migration in line with the Directive. The EU-India Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
on  a  comprehensive  framework  of  cooperation  for  mobility70  seeks  to  facilitate  the  circular 
mobility of seasonal workers from India to the EU in line with the Directive. The Commission 
supports the development and operationalisation of such circular mobility schemes for seasonal 
work  through  targeted  funding71,  including  under  the  Migration  Partnership  Facility. Two  EU-

63    Austria  (for  visa  procedures),  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Hungary,  Italy,  Latvia,  Malta,  Portugal,  Sweden, 

Slovenia and Slovakia. 

64   Austria (for visa procedures), Cyprus, Czechia, Germany, Italy, Malta, Poland and Portugal. 
65   Finland, Croatia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal and Romania.  
66   Austria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Spain, Italy and Poland for specific countries of origin. 
67   France reported this during the OECD/The Netherlands workshop, footnote 19. 
68   For example, Spain with Morocco (the GECCO programme for migrant employment and circular migration), as 
well as new MoUs (2024) with Mauritania, Gambia and Senegal; France with Morocco and Tunisia; Germany 
with Georgia and Moldova; Greece with Egypt and Bangladesh, and, currently under negotiation, MoUs on labour 
mobility,  including  in  tourism  and  agriculture,  with  Armenia,  Georgia,  Moldova,  India,  the  Philippines  and 
Vietnam;  Portugal  has  general  labour  mobility  agreements  with  India,  Morocco  and  the  community  of 
Portuguese-speaking countries that include seasonal workers; Italy with Morocco. 

69   See Talent Partnerships - Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission. 
70   See Towards 2030: A Joint European Union-India Comprehensive Strategic Agenda.  
71   For example, the EU-funded WAFIRA (2021-2025) and WAFIRA II (2025-2028, extended to France) projects 
co-funded  under  AMIF  scale  up  ethical  recruitment,  the  protection  of  workers’  rights,  return  and  circularity 
through reintegration support for Moroccan female seasonal workers. 

11 

 
 
 
funded  sector-specific  SaFE  (Seasonal  and  Fair  Employment)  blueprints  are  currently  being 
developed for agriculture and tourism to give Member States practical guidance on this72. 

2.  Better protection of third-country seasonal workers 

The  Directive  establishes  a  comprehensive  framework  for  ensuring  fair  working  and  adequate 
living conditions for third-country seasonal workers. By making it mandatory for Member States 
to  provide  accessible  information  on  rights,  obligations  and  complaint  mechanisms,  and  by 
strengthening monitoring, inspections and sanctions, the Directive also seeks to empower workers 
to enforce their rights  and to ensure that employers comply with the Directive, while deterring 
abusive practices.   

For third-country seasonal workers who fall within the scope of the Directive, its transposition and 
application have increased the level of legal protection compared with the pre-Directive situation. 
Nevertheless,  significant  shortcomings  persist  across  Member  States  in  relation  to  labour 
exploitation, workers’ rights and adequate accommodation, as well as to accessing social security 
and continue to be reported in seasonal sectors.  

The scope of the Directive and the lack of disaggregated and comparable data73 make it difficult 
to precisely quantify shortcomings affecting seasonal workers the Directive covers. Inspection and 
statistical data are rarely disaggregated based on the specific legal statuses of the affected workers. 
Given the documented prevalence of risks in seasonal work and the indications consistently given 
by Member States and stakeholders, it is reasonable to conclude that workers under the Directive’s 
scope are also affected by such risks, even though they might not often be the most affected due 
to  the  Directive’s  protective  framework74.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  has  identified  the 
following four priority areas where more needs to be done to ensure fair working and decent living 
conditions in line with the Directive’s objectives.  

a.  Enabling third-country seasonal workers to enforce their rights 

Provision of information – Article 11 

Article 11(1) of the Directive requires Member States to make easily accessible to applicants all 
information on the documentation required and the conditions of entry and stay, including rights, 
obligations  and  procedural  safeguards.  Article  11(2)  of  the  Directive  requires  that,  when  an 
authorisation is issued, Member States give this information on rights and obligations, including 
complaint procedures, to workers in writing. Most Member States fulfil these obligations, although 
several have not transposed Article 11(1) explicitly and 16 of them originally failed to transpose it 
correctly. As a result of enforcement efforts, the situation has improved in many Member States. 
In practice, all Member States provide online information for applicants, but its completeness and 

72   To be delivered in 2026, Seasonal and fair employment blueprints – ICMPD. 
73   SafeHabitus, ‘Seasonal and migrant workers in agri-food value chains’, Policy briefing, 2025, pp. 1-2; Targeted 

study, footnote 7. 

74   See  López-Sala/Molinero-Gerbeau,  ‘Coming  out  of  the  shadows?  Housing  conditions  of  irregular  migrant 

workers in Spanish agricultural enclaves’, Revista Calitatea Vieții 33(2), p. 1 and following. 

12 

 
 
 
accessibility  vary.  Procedural  aspects  are  usually  well  documented,  but  information  on  the 
following  key  rights  often  remain  absent:  the  right  to  change  employer  (Article  15(3)),  the 
facilitation of re-entry (Article 16), the safeguard against the interruption of work if a decision on 
an extension is pending or while awaiting a decision on an application to change employer (Article 
18(2)), detailed housing safeguards (Article 20), the overview of all equal treatment rights (Article 
23), and the right to compensation (Article 17(2)). Many Member States and stakeholders have 
identified better information provision for seasonal workers as a priority75. 

In terms of good practices, a few Member States provide a single, multilingual, user-friendly portal 
consolidating information on all rights and explaining complaint and redress mechanisms76. 

With regard to the obligation set out in Article 11(2) of the Directive, some Member States require 
that a written notice on rights and complaint procedures accompany decisions and be delivered at 
the same time that a visa and/or residence permit is issued and directly handed out to third-country 
seasonal  workers77.  Employer-driven models that rely  on employers to  inform  workers  of their 
rights  without  systematic  verification  or  sanctions  can  have  difficulties  ensuring  that  the 
information actually reaches the worker. 

Effective mechanisms for lodging complaints and seeking legal redress – Article 25 

Article 25 of the Directive requires Member States to ensure that third-country seasonal workers 
can  lodge  complaints  and  seek  legal  redress  effectively. All  Member  States  formally  provide 
complaint  and  redress  mechanisms,  allow  representation  by  third  parties,  which  have,  in 
accordance  with  the  criteria  laid  down  by  their  national  law,  a  legitimate  interest  in  ensuring 
compliance with this Directive, and offer safeguards against retaliation equal to those for nationals. 
However, these systems’ practical accessibility and effectiveness vary from one country to another. 

In  several  Member  States78,  complaint  and  redress  mechanisms  remain  difficult  to  use  due  to 
language and digital barriers, the limited visibility of available redress options and of support to 
access them, and/or the absence of clear complaint channels in case of inadequate accommodation. 
By contrast, other Member States79 have introduced user-friendly portals, multilingual helplines, 
simplified  mandates  for  representation,  anonymous  reporting  options,  explicit  accommodation-

75   During  the  consultation  activities  listed  in  footnotes  18and  19.  See  also  SME  United,  Business  Europe,  SGI 
Europe,  footnote  51;  Council  of  Europe,  Parliamentary  Assembly,  Resolution  2536  (2024),  Precarious  and 
irregular  work  situations  of  migrant  seasonal  and  domestic  workers,  point  24.6;  Generation  2.0  RED, 
SolidarityNow,  footnote  36,  p.  37;  ELIAMEP,  footnote  55,  p.  25;  Finnish  Government,  Accommodation  of 
Foreign Workers and its Supervision, 2022,  Section 4.4; Targeted study, footnote 7; ELA, footnote 6, p. 103; 
EFFAT,  Written  Input  to  Social  Partner  Hearing  on  Employers  Sanctions  and  Seasonal  Workers  Directive, 
December 2025. 

76   For example, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. 
77   For example, France, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Sweden. 
78   For  example,  Austria,  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Cyprus,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Slovenia  and 

Romania. 

79   For example, Belgium, German, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, 

the Netherlands and Portugal.  

13 

 
 
 
related complaint mechanisms and/or expedited, low-cost dispute mechanisms, to improve access 
to complaint and redress mechanisms. 

Despite  these  arrangements,  the  violation  of  seasonal  workers’  rights  is  likely  to  remain 
underreported.  Seasonal  workers’  short  stay,  limited  awareness  of  their  rights,  their  perceived 
dependence on employers, cultural and linguistic barriers, and the perceived risks associated with 
contacting enforcement bodies may often deter workers from making complaints. The difficulty 
of  conducting  legal  proceedings  from  their  country  of  origin,  of  proving  violations,  of  getting 
compensation or backpay, and the time it takes to do so, as well as the costs of doing so, are further 
deterrents80.  Trade  unions  and  non-governmental  organisations  provide  essential  information, 
mediation and representation, but their outreach to third-country seasonal workers is uneven and 
union membership among this group remains low81. Where workers refrain from reporting abuses, 
inspectorates lose an important source of intelligence. This undermines early detection and shifts 
enforcement to proactive and risk-based inspections and alternative data sources. Better enabling 
and supporting third-country seasonal workers to lodge complaints and seek legal redress has also 
been identified as essential by Member States and stakeholders82. 

b.  Strengthening monitoring, inspections and sanctions 

Monitoring, assessment and inspections – Article 24 

Article 24 of the Directive requires Member States to adopt measures to prevent and detect abuses 
and to sanction violations of the Directive, including through monitoring, assessment and, where 
appropriate, inspections with effective access to workplaces and, with the consent of workers, to 
accommodation.  

All Member States formally make provision for such measures, but their practical effectiveness 
varies considerably. According to various Member States and stakeholders, labour inspections in 
seasonal sectors often remain insufficient in terms of coverage and frequency, particularly during 
peak seasons83. Effectiveness  is  determined by the available resources,  the targeting of and the 
balance  struck  between  complaint-driven  and  proactive  risk-based  inspections,  cooperation 
between agencies, and the involvement of interpreters, cultural mediators and trade unions. Access 

80   ELA, footnote 6, p. 82 and following; SVR, footnote 35; Targeted study, footnote 7; Solidar, footnote 55, p. 30 

and following. 

81   ELA, footnote 6, p. 82; Solidar, footnote 55, p. 43 and following; The Finnish Trade Union PAM offers a special 

seasonal worker membership, Seasonal worker – PAM. 

82   Council  of  Europe,  footnote  75,  point  24.6;  Generation  2.0  RED,  SolidarityNow,  footnote  36,  p.  37;  Finnish 
Government, footnote 75, Section 4.4; EFFAT, footnote 75; Solidar, footnote 55, p. 30 and following, Oxfam, 
footnote 7, p. 44; Employment Equality Bulletin, footnote 7. 

83   ELA, footnote 6, p. 102 and following; The European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU), representing 
labour inspectors, pointed out that labour inspectors across the EU were under-funded, under-staffed and under-
trained, with the result that workers’ rights are not respected. According to EPSU,  EU countries did not fulfil 
common minimum obligations of International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 81, Contribution to 
the  strategic  consultation on  the  implementation  of  the  Employers  Sanctions  Directive  and  Seasonal  Workers 
Directive, December 2025; EFFAT, footnote 75; Targeted study, footnote 7. This was also mentioned by a large 
number of stakeholders during the consultation activities mentioned in footnotes 18 and 19. 

14 

 
 
 
to back-pay, compensation and support to find alternative employment can also affect workers’ 
willingness to make complaints about employers. 

Some Member States have strengthened their approach through strict general monitoring84, risk-
based systems, unannounced inspections, multi-agency operations and regular seasonal inspection 
campaigns85, but others continue to be hampered by resource constraints, fragmented mandates, 
insufficient risk-related targeting of inspections and uneven coverage across seasonal sectors.  To 
better detect  and  address  the exploitation  of workers, including  legally  employed  third-country 
seasonal  workers,  and  provide  support,  the  EU  Fundamental  Rights  Agency  (FRA)  and  the 
European Labour Authority (ELA) have developed practical guidance for labour inspectorates86. 
The guidance provides concrete tools for implementing worker-centred inspection practices. 

By  contrast,  the  monitoring  and  inspection  of  the  seasonal  worker’s  accommodation  and  of 
employers’ fulfilment of their obligations under Article 20(2) of the Directive remain weaker and 
more fragmented. Housing checks are frequently divided among several authorities87, sometimes 
without  formalised  cooperation.  Routine  proactive  inspections  are  rare,  with  enforcement 
sometimes  triggered  only  by  complaints88  (that  seasonal  workers  are  unlikely  to  make). 
Ambiguous adequacy standards further undermine effective enforcement in some Member States. 
Some countries have good practices in place, such as integrating housing checks into workplace 
inspections, doing systematic inspections on arrival or using innovative tools to detect suspicious 
housing  arrangements,  but  accommodation-related  controls  seem  to  generally  lag  behind 
workplace inspections.  

Stepping up effective risk-based monitoring and inspections has been acknowledged as one of the 
main  ways  of  preventing  and  fighting  exploitation  and  inadequate  accommodation  in  seasonal 
sectors by Member States and stakeholders89. The European Federation of Food, Agriculture and 

84   In the case of Latvia, this has taken the form of checking each worker’s tax and social security data to detect 
anomalies, when an application to extend a seasonal work permit is submitted to the Employment Service. The 
State Labour Inspectorate also analyses, evaluates, and uses information provided by the Employment Service on 
work permits issued to seasonal workers for targeted inspections. 

85   For  example,  the  Italian  Labour  Inspectorate  reported  8 847  inspections  in  agriculture  in  2024,  with  non-
compliance detected in 68.4% of cases. The Inspectorate also intensified anti-caporalato (gangmaster system, in 
which unscrupulous intermediaries exploit vulnerable workers) operations, including 763 inspections by multi-
agency task forces under the A.L.T. Caporalato D.U.E. – Actions for Legality and Protection of Labour: Dignity, 
Equality and Equity (Azioni per la Legalità e la Tutela del lavoro  – Dignità, Uguaglianza ed Equità (A.L.T. 
Caporalato  D.U.E.))  project  which  led  to  the  identification  of  73  victims  of  gang  mastering  and  labour 
exploitation. The National Labour Inspectorate also issued 962 business suspension orders in agriculture, 83% of 
which were revoked following regularisation and payment of the amounts due. For the same period Spain reported 
1 615 actions, with 255 infringements in hospitality detected, complemented by regional campaigns in agriculture. 
Bulgaria recorded almost 4 000 inspections per year in agriculture in 2023 and in 2024. 

86   FRA, How workplace inspectors can protect third-country workers’ rights, Training Manual, 2024; ELA/FRA, 

Detecting and addressing labour exploitation, A guide for labour inspectors, 2025. 

87   For example, in  Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Finland, Malta and Poland. 
88   For example, in Cyprus and Slovenia. 
89   EPSU urges EU countries to ensure adequate  funding, resources and training for effective labour inspections, 
footnote 83; ELA, footnote 6, p. 102 and following; Targeted study, footnote 7; Council of Europe, footnote 75, 

15 

 
 
 
Tourism Trade Unions (EFFAT) and Solidar call for the strengthening of the ELA’s mandate in this 
regard90. 

Effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, including compensation – Article 17 

The sanction frameworks legally established by Member States broadly meet the requirements set 
out in Article 17(1) of the Directive to ensure effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for 
the  non-fulfilment  by  the  employers  of  their  obligations,  including  the  possibility  to  refuse  or 
withdraw  the  authorisation  for  the  purpose  of  seasonal  work  or,  in  serious  cases,  exclusion  of 
employers  from  employing  seasonal  workers.  However,  according  to  some  stakeholders  the 
deterrent  effect  of  sanctions  appears  to  remain  limited  in  some  Member  States91. All  Member 
States have administrative or criminal sanctions for employers infringing their obligations under 
the Directive in place, which are often scaled for each worker affected by the infringements, and 
supplemented  by  ancillary  measures  such  as  the  closure  of  unsafe  premises  or  delisting  from 
certification schemes. However, their deterrent effect may vary due to divergent levels of fines, 
the uneven visibility of applicable  rules92, the complexity and length  of  procedures taking into 
account short seasonal periods, and the targeting and frequency of fines. Initially, eight Member 
States did not have sanctions in place for inadequate employer-arranged accommodation but have 
transposed this obligation under the Directive in the meantime. In some Member States93, specific 
fines for breaches of housing obligations remain relatively low and therefore risk not  having  a 
deterrent effect.  

Article  17(2)  of  the  Directive  makes  provision  for  the  right  to  compensation  for  third-country 
seasonal workers in situations in which an authorisation is withdrawn for certain employer-related 
reasons. In these situations, the employer must compensate the worker for any outstanding amount 
that would still have been owed if the authorisation had not been withdrawn. Member States have 
transposed  this  right  in  different  ways,  with  some  making  provision  for  an  explicit  right94  and 
others using general labour and/or civil law provisions95. The right’s practical relevance remains 
low  in  most  Member  States,  given  the  short  stays  of  seasonal  workers  and  the  infrequency  of 
authorisation withdrawals96. 

point 24.3; Generation 2.0 RED, SolidarityNow, footnote 36, p. 36; EFFAT, footnote. 4; EFFAT, footnote 75, 
Oxfam, footnote 7, p. 44; Boletín de Igualdad en el Empleo, footnote 7. 

90   EFFAT, footnote 75; Solidar, footnote 55, pp. 19 and 50. 
91   EFFAT calls for hefty sanctions for employers who infringe the Directive, footnote 75. 
92   Some EU countries – for example, Greece, Finland, Croatia, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia – 
explicitly link employers’ obligations under the Directive to specific sanction clauses, including  fines for each 
worker exploited, rent caps or thresholds and direct references to permit refusal or withdrawal, thereby improving 
clarity and increasing deterrence. 

93   For example, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. 
94   For  example,  Austria,  Belgium  (Wallonia),  Czechia,  Estonia,  Greece,  Italy,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Portugal, 

Romania and Sweden. 

95   For example, Cyprus, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, 

Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
96   Except for Greece and Croatia. 

16 

 
 
 
Across  the  EU,  the  limited  availability  of  disaggregated  and  comparable  data  on  inspections, 
sanctions and outcomes concerning third-country seasonal workers impedes thorough national risk 
analysis and the  assessment  of the effectiveness  and efficiency of  the Directive. Disaggregated 
data collection was mentioned by some Member States and stakeholders as being crucial for better 
assessing the situation of third-country seasonal workers97. 

c.  Ensuring adequate accommodation – Article 20 

Article 20 of the Directive establishes a specific right to adequate accommodation for seasonal 
workers, strengthened by pre-admission checks by the competent authorities to verify that such 
accommodation  will  in  practice  be  available  (see Articles  5(1)(c)  and  6(1)(c)  and  Recital  41). 
Accommodation that guarantees an adequate standard of living must be available for the entire 
duration of a stay, in line with national law and general health and safety standards. All Member 
States have transposed this requirement. Many have defined adequate accommodation in national 
law, but with significantly varying precision: some set binding standards with specifics regarding 
space, sanitation, utilities, equipment and, in certain cases, transport accessibility and requirements 
for separate facilities for men and women98, whereas others use general housing or occupational 
safety legislation for this purpose99.  

Pre-admission  checks  are  predominantly  done  by  means  of  documentary  controls100,  although 
some  Member  States  have  adopted  more  rigorous  practices,  including  systematic  database 
verification,  interviews  and  routine  inspections101.  Evidence  required  ranges  from  rental 
contracts102 to simple employers’ attestations103. Seven Member States initially did not require any 
proof  of  adequate  accommodation,  but  subsequent  amendments  have  improved  formal 
compliance. 

Despite  these  legal  frameworks,  there  are  still  significant  shortcomings,  particularly  during 
seasonal  peaks  in  agriculture and tourism  when inflows intensify and local  housing capacity is 
insufficient104.  Inadequate  accommodation  is  often  linked  to  forms  of  labour  exploitation,  with 
Member  States  and  stakeholders  regularly  calling  for  improvements105.  Certain  Member  States 
have begun to address these issues more structurally. For example, Italy’s multi-year plan against 

97   Council of Europe, footnote 75, point 24.7; Targeted study, footnote 7. 
98   For example, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Croatia, 

Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden.  

99   For example, Greece, Hungary and Poland. 
100   For example, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Slovenia; Hellenic Foundation for European and 

Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), footnote 55, p. 19. 

101   For example, Belgium, Czechia, Finland, Croatia and Malta. 
102   For example, Belgium and Malta. 
103   For example, Austria, Germany. 
104   For example in Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and  Spain. 10 000 migrant workers were  counted as living in 
informal  settlements  in  Italy:  Ministry  of  Labour  and  Social  Policies  and  National  Association  of  Italian 
Municipalities,  Le  condizioni  abitative  dei  migranti  che  lavorano  nel  settore  agro-alimentare  (The  living 
conditions of migrants working in the agri-food sector), 2022. 

105   For example, the Finnish Government, footnote 75; ELIAMEP, footnote 55, pages 19 and 25, Eurispes, footnote 

36. 

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caporalato  (exploitative  intermediation  (gangmastering)),  supported  by  AMIF106,  includes 
measures to develop decent housing for agricultural workers by re-using confiscated assets and 
through  integrated  reception  systems  and  coordinated  territorial  governance.  Furthermore,  the 
Italian  National  Programme  for  Inclusion  and  the  Fight  against  Poverty  2021-2027107  and  the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) support the integration of third-country workers 
and access  to  quality  housing for them. The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) co-funds, 
with EUR 200 million under the Italian national recovery and resilience plan, initiatives to counter 
illegal  settlements  and  combat  the  exploitation  of  agricultural  workers  in  37  affected 
municipalities108. 

The  specific  housing  obligations  under Article  20  for  employers  who  arrange  accommodation, 
namely the rules requiring non-excessive rent, prohibiting automatic wage deductions, and making 
written  rental  contracts  mandatory,  were  initially  either  not  transposed,  or  only  partially 
transposed, by eight Member States. Some Member States transposed these obligations in a clearly 
visible manner109, and some110 have introduced concrete thresholds, such as capping rent at about 
one  third  of  wages  or  establishing  maximum  permissible  deductions,  thereby  increasing  both 
clarity and enforceability. Stakeholders nonetheless continue to report frequent breaches and link 
them to a lack of information and insufficient monitoring, inspections and sanctions. Concern was 
also raised about rental contracts often being provided in a language workers do not understand. 
Stakeholders regularly stress that more needs to be done by national, regional and local authorities 
to ensure adequate accommodation for third-country seasonal workers, in particular by expanding 
accommodation  capacity  (including  the  construction  of  new  facilities  and  the  refurbishment  of 
existing buildings) and by strengthening monitoring111. 

d.  Equal access to certain branches of social security – Article 23 

All Member States have formally transposed the obligation under Article 23(1)(d) of the Directive 
to ensure that third-country seasonal workers get the same treatment as EU nationals in the types 
of social security listed in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004112, to the extent that those 
branches  exist  in  national  law,  while  excluding  social  assistance.  Many  Member  States  have 

106   See footnote 17 and Programmazione pluriennale in tema di politiche del lavoro, integrazione e inclusione 2021-

2027. 

107   National programme for inclusion and fight against poverty 2021 - 2027, Priorities | MLPS - PN. 
108   PNRR, 200 million to 37 municipalities to overcome informal settlements. 
109   For  example,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Poland,  Portugal and  Romania.  Others, 
such as Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Latvia, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Slovakia and Slovenia transposed them in a more fragmented way. 

110   For example, Germany, Italy, Lithuania and Malta. 
111   Cour des Comptes, Le logement des travailleurs saisonniers (Seasonal workers’ accommodation), rapport, 2025; 
SME United, Business Europe, SGI Europe, footnote 51; Generation 2.0 RED, SolidarityNow, footnote 36, p. 38; 
ELIAMEP, footnote 55, p. 25; Targeted study, footnote 7; IG Bau, Saisonarbeit in der Landwirtschaft (Seasonal 
work in agriculture), Bericht 2024; Oxfam, footnote 7), p. 45; Boletín de Igualdad en el Empleo, footnote 7. 
112   Sickness, maternity and paternity, invalidity, old-age and survivors’ benefits, benefits for accidents at work and 

occupational diseases, death grants. 

18 

 
 
 
activated the optional derogations for unemployment113 and/or family benefits114 (Article 23(2)). 
However, in some Member States, effective access remains constrained by requirements linked to 
periods of social security contributions, residence and labour market availability that third-country 
seasonal workers usually cannot meet.  

Access to public health insurance also varies. Most Member States provide direct affiliation when 
a worker registers or is registered with social security115, but others impose income thresholds, 
minimum contributions, enrolment steps or minimum residency requirements that can be difficult 
to meet at least immediately on arrival116. Several Member States use simplified short-term hiring 
schemes that do not confer full health insurance status117.  

Accidents  at work  and occupational  diseases  are  generally  covered  from the first  day of work. 
However, qualifying periods for maternity and paternity, invalidity and cash sickness benefits often 
exceed  the  length  of  a  seasonal  work  stay  and  are  sometimes  even  coupled  with  residence 
conditions, limiting the practical usability of these entitlements. 

Old-age and survivors’ pensions118 are, in principle, granted on the same terms as for people from 
the EU country in question, including the possibility of aggregation and export. However, effective 
access  depends on the existence of bilateral  agreements with  countries of origin, as  well as on 
systems for recording contributions, aggregating insurance or contribution periods, and paying out 
pensions to seasonal workers who have returned to their countries of origin or to their survivors. 
In  several  Member  States,  the  absence  or  partial  coverage  of  such  agreements,  high  minimum 
contribution  thresholds,  burdensome  certification  in  terms  of  paperwork,  and  cumbersome 
payment procedures hinder practical access for seasonal workers and their survivors after return119. 
Some Member States have good practices, and they export and aggregate entitlements smoothly 
by having clear websites explaining the applicable social security agreements between the Member 
State  and  the  country  of  origin  and  digital  ‘proof  of  life’  possibilities.  A  forthcoming  study 
conducted by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development  (ICMPD) and funded 
under the Migration Partnership Facility (MPF) will provide further insights into the remaining 
challenges related to accessing pensions.  

113   For example, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Croatia, 

Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta and Poland. 

114   For example, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, 

Lithuania, Luxembourg and Poland. 

115   For example, Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, 

Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. 

116   For example, Austria, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
117   For example, Germany and Hungary (for seasonal workers in agriculture for stays not exceeding 210 days); for 

Germany, see SVR, footnote 35; IG Bau, footnote 111, 2024, S. 8. 

118   Survivors of seasonal workers residing in a non-EU country deriving rights from the seasonal worker. 
119   Austria,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy  and  Poland  ensure  export of pensions  and  aggregation  of  insurance  and 
contribution periods through bilateral agreements with the most common or all countries of origin of their third-
country seasonal workers. In Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Latvia, Luxembourg and Romania 
such bilateral agreements exist only for a part of the common countries of origin. 

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IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS 

Taking into account the relevance of third-country seasonal labour in important economic sectors, 
and in the context of persistent labour shortages and demographic change, the Directive remains a 
key  instrument  for  ensuring  both  an  orderly  admission  framework  and  effective  safeguards  in 
sectors exposed to vulnerability, exploitation and enforcement risks. The report’s findings indicate 
that  effective  labour  attraction  and  enforcement  are  mutually  reinforcing.  Labour  mobility 
pathways  can  help  address  structural  shortages  if  they  are  sufficiently  swift,  predictable  and 
credible for both employers and workers. Credibility also comes from visible enforcement by the 
national  authorities  that  prevents  non-compliant  employers  from  gaining  an  advantage  through 
illegal employment, under-declared work, or substandard working and living conditions.  

Compared with the fragmented pre-2014 situation, the Directive and its implementation have led 
to more streamlined labour mobility pathways, helping to reduce incentives for illegal employment 
and undeclared work. The Directive has also strengthened the legal position of seasonal workers 
through,  among  other  things,  the  right  to  change  employer,  provisions  on  equal  treatment, 
accommodation  safeguards,  information  obligations,  complaint  and  redress  mechanisms,  better 
oversight and stricter sanctions.  

While  Member  States  have  overall  brought  their  national  legislation  in  line  with  the  Directive 
following the opening of the infringement procedures, persistent practical implementation gaps in 
several of them risk undermining both labour pathways and the effective protection of workers. 
Shortcomings are most evident in the practical difficulties of changing employer quickly before a 
season  ends,  the  quality  and  accessibility  of  information,  the  effectiveness  of  inspections  and 
sanctions, access to complaint and redress mechanisms (including from the country of origin), the 
availability and adequacy of accommodation, compensation mechanisms, access to certain types 
of social security as well as the portability of rights. 

Overall, this report’s findings indicate that the current legal framework is fit for purpose and that, 
at this stage, the Directive does not need to be amended. The priority for the Commission is to 
ensure  the  full,  consistent  and  effective  application  and  enforcement  of  existing  obligations, 
supported by better governance, operational capacity and comparable data. 

To use the full potential of the Direrective, efforts should be twofold: (i) to make seasonal labour 
pathways  more  attractive,  by  ensuring  timely,  predictable  and  fair  recruitment  and  admission 
procedures, including for peak season needs, the provision of clear multilingual information, that 
workers have the possibility of changing employer, that they have adequate accommodation and 
that  their  rights  are  respected;  and  (ii)  to  step  up  the  fight  against  illegal  employment  and 
undeclared work, through more effective, risk-based inspections and sanctions, closer cooperation 
among  competent  authorities  (including  across  borders  and  along  subcontracting  chains),  and 
better  access  to  complaint  and  redress  mechanisms.  Alongside  the  implementation  of  the 
Employers Sanctions Directive, this combined approach is essential for meeting seasonal labour 
needs in key sectors while removing incentives for employers not to comply with the Directive, 
preventing exploitation, and contributing to the EU’s priorities on competitiveness and migration 

20 

 
 
management.  For  this  purpose,  the  Commission  will  implement  the  following  actions  in  the 
coming years: 

•  Follow up on ongoing infringement procedures to ensure the Directive is correctly and fully 

transposed by all Member States bound by it;  

•  Promote the development and implementation of seasonal work mobility schemes as part of 
cooperation  with  non-EU  countries,  including  under  Talent  Partnerships  and  the  EU-India 
Comprehensive Framework for Cooperation on Mobility;  

•  Support Member States to develop and operationalise bilateral cooperation with countries of 
origin on circular seasonal work, notably through the SaFE – Seasonal and Fair Employment 
blueprints, the provision of technical assistance and financial support;  

•  Support  the  exchange  of  good  practices  among  Member  States  on  how  to  ensure  effective 
admission  procedures  for  seasonal  workers,  based  on  the  findings  of  the  forthcoming 
OECD/Commission study ‘Making Migration Work: Admitting Labour Migrants’;  

•  Support Member States, including with the ELA and dedicated AMIF funding, in designing 
targeted information provision and awareness raising activities, as well as accessible complaint 
and redress mechanisms;  

•  Support Member States, including with the ELA and dedicated AMIF funding, in establishing 
effective monitoring, assessment and sanctioning mechanisms to prevent, detect and sanction 
infringements by employers, especially by supporting inspection campaigns. This should also 
include strengthening the systematic collection and reporting of disaggregated and comparable 
data on inspections, sanctions and outcomes; 

•  As part of the revision of the ELA mandate in 2026, review how the Authority could better 
address the challenges related to abuses of the working conditions of third-country nationals, 
including seasonal workers. 

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