REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2025
Date: 2026-05-05
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy, State aid, anti-trust legislation, competitiveness, digital single market, foreign aid, foreign capital, international cooperation, merger control, sustainable development

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 5.5.2026  COM(2026) 180 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2025 {SWD(2026) 125 final}  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 2 

2. A modern and simplified competition policy enables competitiveness and sustainable and 
inclusive growth ......................................................................................................................... 3 

Modernising and simplifying State aid rules and guidance. .................................................. 4 

Modernising and simplifying the Merger Guidelines ............................................................ 6 

Modernising and simplifying antitrust rules and guidance. ................................................... 6 

Foreign Subsidies Regulation Guidelines and Review report ............................................... 7 

Review report on the Digital Markets Act ............................................................................. 8 

3.  Competition  enforcement  defends  and  facilitates  competitive,  fair  and  well-functioning 
markets ....................................................................................................................................... 8 

State aid control ..................................................................................................................... 9 

Antitrust enforcement .......................................................................................................... 11 

Merger control ..................................................................................................................... 14 

Enforcement of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation............................................................... 15 

Enforcement of the Digital Markets Act .............................................................................. 16 

4. Benefits of competition enforcement for consumers and citizens ....................................... 18 

5. Competition policy in a European and global context ......................................................... 19 

Cooperation in the European Competition Network ........................................................... 19 

International relations – reaching out to partners across the globe ................................... 19 

6. Supporting competition policy with communication and advocacy .................................... 21 

7. Relations with other EU institutions .................................................................................... 21 

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1.   INTRODUCTION 

Europe  is  currently  experiencing  a  period  of  profound  uncertainty,  driven  by  climate  change, 
sudden geopolitical shifts, and the rapid evolution of digital markets. The EU – and in particular its 
economy – is confronted with major challenges requiring swift reactions from policymakers and 
lawmakers.  EU  competition  policy  exists  to  ensure  our  well-being  in  the  EU  by  protecting  us 
against distortions of competition that harm the public interest. This is a reminder of the breadth of 
the competition mandate. 

President von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines1 set out the Commission’s vision for responding to 
the  multiple  challenges  facing  the  EU.  Central  to  the  Commission’s  2025-2029  mandate  is  the 
Competitiveness Compass2, a framework designed to allow the EU to regain competitiveness and 
ensure sustainable prosperity. The Clean Industrial Deal (CID)3 implements the Competitiveness 
Compass.  Among  other  things,  the  CID  focuses  on  closing  the  innovation  gap4,  securing  vital 
supply chains, leveraging decarbonisation, and enhancing economic resilience. 

From the start of the new Commission, Executive Vice-President Teresa Ribera took charge of the 
competition  portfolio  with  a  mandate  focusing  on  modernisation,  simplification,  robust 
enforcement,  and  ensuring  a  clean,  just  and  competitive  transition.  The  Directorate-General  for 
Competition (DG Competition) implements this mandate in the competition field. When enforcing 
the EU competition rules, the Commission continues to make dynamic assessments of consumer 
welfare to protect competition and the innovative capacity of EU companies, while contributing to 
EU resilience and meeting the objectives of the green and digital transitions. 

Throughout 2025, the Commission undertook substantial work aligned with its mandate. A major 
step was the adoption of the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF)5, which ensures 
swift and targeted support for the clean and green transition while avoiding fragmenting the Single 
Market.  Moreover,  the  Commission  launched  a  review  of  the  Horizontal  and  Non-Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines to provide a comprehensive, predictable, and lasting framework for all types of 
mergers  and  all  economic  sectors  reflecting  multiple  transformational  changes  in  the  economy, 
ranging from digitalisation to globalisation. Concurrently, the Commission continued to vigorously 
enforce the antitrust rules against abuses of dominant market positions and other anti-competitive 
practices that stifle effective competition on price, choice, quality, and innovation. In this context, 
the Commission is finalising its Guidelines on exclusionary abuses under Article 102 TFEU. The 
Foreign  Subsidies  Regulation  (FSR)6  contributed  to  countering  anti-competitive  and  market-
distortive activities by firms active in the EU that receive subsidies from outside the EU. Moreover, 

1 Europe’s choice - Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024−2029 - Ursula von der Leyen - Candidate for the European 
Commission President, 18.7.2024. 
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the European Committee of the Regions - A Competitiveness Compass for the EU, (COM/2025/30 final), 29.1.2025 
3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee  of  the  Regions  -  The  Clean  Industrial  Deal:  A  joint  roadmap  for  competitiveness  and  decarbonisation  (COM/2025/85  final), 
26.2.2025. 
4 As compared to other major economies in the world. 
5 Communication from the Commission - Framework for State Aid measures to support the Clean Industrial Deal (Clean Industrial Deal State 
Aid Framework (C/20025/3602), 25.6.2025. 
6 Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal 
market, OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, p. 1. 

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the  Digital  Markets  Act  (DMA)7  was  enforced  to  unlock  digital  competitiveness  by  addressing 
unfair behaviour of gatekeepers and ensuring market contestability. 

The  Commission’s  competition  enforcement  in  2025  transformed  key  EU  values  into  tangible 
market  realities.  This  work  ensured  that  competition  could  take  place  on  fair  and  equal  terms, 
reinforced  legal  certainty  for  businesses,  and  promoted  cohesion  in  the  Single  Market.  It  also 
supported  EU  competitiveness  in  strategic  sectors,  drove  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth,  and 
enabled consumers and companies  to benefit more from the economic advantages of the  Single 
Market. 

The  2025  Report  on  Competition  Policy  (ACR)  provides  a  succinct  overview  of  how  the 
Commission has translated political priorities into concrete action8. The ACR is accompanied by a 
Staff  Working  Document  (SWD),  which  provides  a  comprehensive  account  of  policy 
developments, enforcement, and key EU case-law in the competition field. These documents are 
addressed by the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union (the 
Council), the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), and the European Committee of 
the Regions (CoR). 

2.  A  MODERN  AND  SIMPLIFIED  COMPETITION  POLICY  ENABLES  COMPETITIVENESS  AND 
SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH  

The  2024-2029  Commission  mandate  calls  for  EU  policies  to  shift  from  reactive  regulation  to 
proactive  strategic  action.  To  meet  this  objective  and  guarantee  sustainable  prosperity  and 
competitiveness,  the  Commission  aims  to  ensure  that  the  EU  competition  rules  are  modern, 
streamlined, and aligned with other EU policies so that they contribute more to the clean and digital 
transition. 

In  2025,  the  Commission  continued  modernising  key  competition  rules  to  support  broader  EU 
policy goals. Rules have been and are being reviewed and simplified to reduce regulatory burdens 
and compliance costs, improve guidance, ensure predictability, and increase legal certainty. These 
efforts aim to incentivising and accelerate critical investments across the EU. 

As a world-leading competition enforcer, the Commission must ensure that its competition rules 
are  modern  and  reflect  market  changes.  This  is  key  for  the  review  agenda  of  the  2024-2029 
Commission.  To  ensure  that  the  competition  framework  remains  effective,  the  Commission  is 
regulations,  notices,  guidelines,  and 
reviewing  and,  where  appropriate, 
communications. In doing so, the Commission is preserving the fundamental rules that have stood 
the test of time, while responding to today's complex technological, economic, and geopolitical 
challenges. To ensure that competition policy contributes to promoting prosperity, innovation and 
consumer choice, the Commission sought public feedback on multiple files in public consultations 
in 2025. 

revising 

its 

7 Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the 
digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1. 
8 See also Directorate-General for Competition Infograph ‘2025 at a glance’ of 6.1.2026. This one-page infograph summarises main events 
during the ‘competition policy year 2025’ for the Commission. https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/43bc2a9e-
7172-4163-bc7c-d4b1afadd150_en?filename=2025_at_a_glance.pdf 

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Modernising and simplifying State aid rules and guidance. 

The  adoption  of  the  Clean  Industrial  Deal  State  Aid  Framework  (CISAF)  was  a  strategic 
priority in 2025. CISAF is designed to facilitate the EU’s clean transition at the necessary speed 
and  scale  with  the  objective  of  making  the  EU  a  key  global  player  in  state-of-the-art  clean 
technologies. The new framework goes further than just simplifying and speeding up support for 
decarbonisation - it recognises the State as a strategic investor in our net-zero future. CISAF is a 
tool to drive climate ambitions, strengthen the resilience of the Single Market, and ensure that the 
EU industry remains globally competitive. The EU achieves this while defending the integrity of 
the Single Market, avoiding undue distortions to competition, making energy systems more stable, 
affordable, and fair, while promoting equitable labour market outcomes such as fair wages, decent 
working conditions, training, and transition to fair jobs. 

Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework adopted  
The framework sets out the conditions under which Member States can grant support for investments and 
objectives in clean industry in line with EU State aid rules. The rules are intended to accelerate the roll-out 
of renewable energy, speed up industrial decarbonisation, and stimulate clean tech manufacturing in the 
EU. These objectives should be fulfilled without undue distortion of competition in the Single Market while 
safeguarding economic cohesion.  
CISAF  gives  Member  States  the  appropriate  tools  to  accelerate  the  transition  to  a  net-zero  economy  by 
enabling  them  to  notify  schemes  that  the  Commission  will  assess  and,  if  appropriate,  authorise.  On  this 
basis,  Member  States  can  then  swiftly  grant  State  aid  to  individual  projects.  By  the  end  of  2025,  the 
Commission had adopted eight decisions approving nine national measures notified by five Member States 
with a total amount of EUR 18.4 billion.  
CISAF  remains  in  force  until  the  end  of  2030.  It  complements  other  State  aid  instruments,  not  only  the 
General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)9 but also the Climate, Environmental protection and Energy 
Aid Guidelines (CEEAG)10, and the Regional Aid Guidelines (RAG)11. 
CISAF simplifies the State aid rules across seven main areas: (i.) roll-out of clean energy and low-carbon 
fuels;  (ii.)  temporary  electricity  price  relief  for  energy-intensive  users;  (iii.)  decarbonisation  of  existing 
production facilities; (iv.) development of clean tech manufacturing capacity in the EU; (v.) measures to 
stimulate demand for clean technology products; (vi.) facilitation of Innovation Fund projects; and (vii.) de-
risking of investments related to Clean Industrial Deal objectives. 
The Commission encourages Member States to design State aid measures so that resilience objectives are 
fully addressed and to consider wider social and environmental policy objectives during the implementation 
of the projects.  

To support and accelerate the scaling up of key industries and build strategic autonomy - as required 
by the Clean Industrial Deal Communication - the Commission launched in April 2025 a Design 
Support Hub in the context of the Joint European Forum for Important Projects of Common 
European Interest (JEF-IPCEI)12. The Design Support Hub works closely with Member States 
to streamline and accelerate the development of IPCEI candidate projects from start to finish. At 
the end of 2025, four IPCEI candidate projects were in development in the Design Support Hub13. 
Since it was launched, the JEF-IPCEI has published 12 recommendations, helping Member States 
to streamline, simplify and speed up the set-up and the implementation of IPCEIs. 

9  Commission Regulation  (EU)  No  651/2014  of  17  June  2014  declaring  certain  categories  of  aid  compatible  with  the  internal  market  in 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187 26.6.2014, p. 1. 
10 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy 2022, C/2022/481, OJ 
C 80, 18.2.2022, p. 1. 
11 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on regional State aid 2021/C 153/01, OJ C 153, 29.4.2021, p. 1. 
12 https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/ipcei/design-support-hub_en  
13 https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/ipcei/joint-european-forum-ipcei_en  

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To  tackle  the  housing  crisis,  new  State  aid  rules  for  Services  of  General  Economic  Interest 
(SGEI)  concerning  affordable  housing14  were  adopted  in  2025,  directly  supporting  social 
objectives for an inclusive and just transition. The new rules facilitate Member States’ support to 
affordable and energy-efficient housing. The revised and clearer rules simplify procedures and 
give  more  flexibility  for  Member  States  to  finance  support  for  social  and  affordable  housing 
initiatives. The revision is a key component of the Commission’s European Affordable Housing 
Plan adopted in December 202515. 

In  a  just  and  inclusive  social  market  economy,  all  EU  citizens  should  have  access  to  critical 
medicines. In 2025, the Commission provided guidance to Member States on how EU State aid 
rules  apply  to  public  support  for  critical  medicines16  in  the  context  of  the  proposed  Critical 
Medicines Act17. The proposed Act would incentivise EU pharmaceutical companies to diversify 
their  supply  chains  and  boost  pharmaceutical  manufacturing  in  the  EU.  The  guidance  informs 
Member States how to apply EU State aid rules to support the supply of critical medicines.  

In 2025, the Commission started a major revision of the General Block Exemption Regulation 
(GBER)18  in  line  with  the  Competitiveness  Compass  and  the  CID.  The  GBER  is  an  important 
simplification tool because it reduces the regulatory burden for Member States and companies and 
allows aid to be granted expediently without prior Commission approval if specific conditions are 
met and the distortion of competition in the Single Market is minimal. 

An  efficient  and  sustainable  EU  transport  system  is  key  for  a  clean,  just  and  competitive 
transition, increasing the coherence between essential infrastructure and decarbonisation goals. The 
Commission’s commitment to green logistics and efficient networks is a direct implementation of 
the  CID  and  the  Commission's  Sustainable  and  Smart  Mobility  Strategy19.  To  this  end,  the 
Commission continued its  work  on  the  Transport  Block  Exemption  Regulation  (TBER)  and 
Guidelines  on  State  aid  for  land  and  multimodal  transport.  The  TBER  and  Guidelines  are 
intended  to  encourage  a  shift  from  road  to  rail  and  incentivising  multimodal  transport  such  as 
combining rail and inland waterways.  

The current Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) State aid Guidelines20 allow Member States to 
give State aid to certain electricity-intensive users to compensate them for a part of high electricity 
costs. The Guidelines, which apply until 2030, ensure that the Commission’s climate goals, and 
competitive market principles work in concert to drive decarbonisation. In 2025, the Commission 

14 https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/sgei_en 
15https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/proximity-and-social-economy/social-economy-eu/affordable-housing-
initiative_en 
16 Guidance on the application of State aid rules in the context of the Critical Medicines Act, 11.3.2025.  
17 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying a framework for strengthening the availability and security 
of  supply  of  critical  medicinal  products  as  well  as  the  availability  of,  and  accessibility  of,  medicinal  products  of  common  interest,  and 
amending Regulation (EU) 2024/795, COM(2025) 102 final, 11.3.2025. 
18  Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market  in 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1. 
19 Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the European economic and social committee and the 
Committee of the regions sustainable and smart mobility strategy – putting European transport on track for the future, COM/2020/789 final, 
9.12.2020. The Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy is the Commission’s roadmap to transform the EU transport system into a greener, 
smarter, and more resilient sector, aiming for a 90% reduction in transport emissions by 2050. 
20 Communication from the Commission guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading post-2021, C/2020/6400, OJ C 317, 25.9.2020, p. 5. 

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launched a review21 of the ETS State aid Guidelines and adopted, based on the most recent data 
available, technical updates22 relating, among other things, to CO2 emission factors, geographic 
areas  and  included  additional  industrial  sectors  eligible  for  compensation.  The  State  aid  rules 
contribute to the restructuring and modernisation of EU industries and their production capacities. 

Modernising and simplifying the Merger Guidelines 

Since  its  inception,  EU  merger  control  has  been  instrumental  in  shaping  the  Single  Market, 
operating  as  a  streamlined  ‘one-stop-shop’  that  successfully  facilitates  company  expansions, 
investment, and market predictability across the EU. This framework has ensured effective merger 
control where approximately 90% of proposed mergers are handled in a simplified manner year on 
year, promoting economic growth. In 2025, the Commission received  384 merger notifications. 
325 decisions were adopted, of which 97% were approved without conditions. Of all decisions, 
88%  were  adopted  by  simplified  procedure.  The  Commission  authorised  nine  notified  mergers 
subject  to  commitments.  No  proposed  merger  was  prohibited  in  2025,  and  no  transaction  was 
withdrawn by the notifying parties during the second-phase investigation. To ensure that this robust 
framework remains an effective tool in a rapidly transforming economy, the Commission launched 
a major revision of its Merger Guidelines in 2025. This essential update covers the Horizontal 
Merger  Guidelines23  (covering  mergers  among  competitors)  and  the  Non-Horizontal  Merger 
Guidelines24 (covering mergers in the supply chain and closely related markets). This revision 
is  aligned  with  the  Commission’s  mandate  to  enhance  global  competitiveness  and  effectively 
address current and future geopolitical challenges. 

The revision reflects transformational market developments that impact competitive dynamics in 
many markets. These new market realities include rapid digitalisation, the competitive advantages 
of  controlling  massive  amounts  of  digital  data  about  customers  and  competitors,  and  Artificial 
Intelligence  (AI).  Other  factors  include  globalisation  and  decarbonising  the  EU  economy.  The 
comprehensive  review  began  with  a  public  consultation25.  In  close  collaboration  with  the  EU 
national competition authorities (NCAs), the Commission identified multiple relevant factors such 
as innovation, investments, resilience, and global competitive capacity. The revised Guidelines are 
expected in 2026 and will reflect evolving Commission practice and case-law of the EU courts.  

Modernising and simplifying antitrust rules and guidance. 

The  antitrust  rules  are  equally  important  when  tackling  market-distorting  conduct  in  a  rapidly 
changing economy. To ensure that the antitrust rules remain effective in the future, the Commission 
is  currently  reviewing  its  core  antitrust  procedural  framework  (Regulations  1/2003  and 
773/2004). The aim is to improve the effectiveness of the antitrust procedural framework, notably 
simplify procedures, accelerate investigations, and more generally ensure that the Commission’s 
enforcement tools fit the fast pace of change in new and evolving markets. In 2025, the Commission 

21  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14801-Technical-updates-of-the-Emissions-Trading-Scheme-
ETS-State-aid-guidelines_en?G-RB4EH5DG40= 
22  Communication from the Commission amending the guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse 
gas emission allowance trading post-2021, OJ C, C/2026/196, 5.1.2026. 
23 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 
OJ C 31, 5.2.2004, pp. 5–18. 
24  Guidelines  on  the  assessment  of  non-horizontal  mergers  under  the  Council  Regulation  on  the  control  of  concentrations  between 
undertakings, OJ C 265, 18.10.2008, pp. 6–25. 
25  https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/mergers/review-merger-guidelines_en 

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launched  a  call  for  evidence  and  a  public  consultation  questionnaire  to  gather  feedback  from 
stakeholders  on  options  for  revising  the  rules.  This  was  complemented  by  a  ‘reality  check’ 
workshop26  in  December  2025  to  engage  further  with  stakeholders  on  their  perspectives  on  the 
various policy options outlined in the call for evidence. 

Work  continued  in  2025  on  the  new  Article  102  Guidelines  on  exclusionary  abuses.  The 
Commission is currently revising the draft Guidelines, incorporating the feedback received from a 
public consultation, a workshop as well as conclusions to be drawn from the EU Court judgments 
that were issued following the publication of the draft Guidelines in 2024. The Commission aims 
to adopt the Guidelines in 2026, ensuring that the final text reflects the latest EU court judgments 
delivered during the drafting process.  

The Commission continued its review of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation 
(TTBER) and its accompanying Guidelines in 2025. The Commission is revising this framework 
to ensure that companies have clear, simple and up-to-date rules for pro-competitive technology 
licensing agreements. The revised TTBER framework, expected in 2026, will facilitate technology 
dissemination,  incentivise  early-stage  R&D&I  while  simultaneously  reducing  compliance  costs 
and associated administrative burdens for businesses. 

Foreign Subsidies Regulation Guidelines and Review report 
The FSR27 seeks to ensure competition on fair and equal terms by tackling competition-distortive 
subsidies granted by third countries to companies active in the Single Market.28  

In 2025, the Commission consulted stakeholders on the draft FSR Guidelines. Among other things, 
the new Guidelines would provide guidance on the determination of a distortion caused by a foreign 
subsidy and the criteria applied, and the application of the ‘balancing test’ (that is to say weighing 
positive  effects  of  foreign  subsidies  against  their  distortive  effects).  Moreover,  the  Guidelines 
would  cover  the  Commission’s  power  to  call  in  ‘below  notification  threshold’  mergers,  public 
tenders, and the criteria considered. The Guidelines would provide clarity on the application of the 
FSR for companies engaged in concentrations and public procurement procedures in the EU. 

The  FSR  stipulates  that  the  Commission  must  submit  a  report  to  the  European  Parliament  and 
Council by July 2026. To this end, the Commission carried out a public consultation and call for 
evidence in 202529 to assess the implementation and enforcement of the FSR. Feedback was sought 
on critical operational issues, including the  costs the FSR places on businesses, the notification 

26 Reality checks are part of the Commission’s simplification toolbox. They help the Commission to understand at technical level the practical 
experience of companies and practitioners who apply EU law, for example by identifying administrative burdens and regulatory bottlenecks. 
The knowledge gathered at ‘reality checks’ is used to identify opportunities to simplify and reduce administrative burden. 
27  DG  Competition  is  responsible  for  enforcing  the  FSR  rules  on  concentrations  and  to  start  own-initiative  procedures  outside  public 
procurement procedures, while DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) is responsible for enforcing the FSR 
in the context of public procurement. 
28 The FSR closes a regulatory gap in the Single Market where subsidies granted by Member States are subject to scrutiny under EU State aid 
rules, while subsidies granted by non-EU governments go largely unchecked. Under the FSR, companies have to notify financial contributions 
received from non-EU public authorities in the last three years, before implementing a concentration (that is to say a merger, an acquisition, 
or a joint venture) or the award of a contract in a public procurement procedure in the EU above given notification thresholds. The FSR 
allows the Commission to conduct own-initiative reviews if information indicates the existence of a foreign subsidy distorting the Single 
Market. 
29 https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/FSR_ReviewReport2026 

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thresholds, the balancing test30, as well as the rules’ degree of complexity, and their effectiveness 
in preventing distortions in the Single Market. 

Review report on the Digital Markets Act 

The DMA is a Single Market instrument which aims to make the EU digital sector fairer and more 
contestable31. The DMA applies to large digital platforms designated as ‘gatekeepers’32 and is 
intended to prevent unfair market practices and increase market contestability.  A wide range of 
obligations  apply  to  designated  gatekeepers,  notably  vertical  and  horizontal  interoperability, 
prohibited self-preferencing, and giving business users access to critical data accumulated by the 
digital  platforms.  The  DMA  provides  EU  companies  and  non-EU  firms  alike  with  better 
opportunities  to  challenge  the  gatekeepers.  Such  challenges  boost  innovation  and  ultimately 
increase consumer choice in the EU (and likely beyond due to regulatory and economic spill-over 
effects).   

To formally assess the DMA’s early impact and its capacity to face emerging challenges, such as 
the  transformative  rollout  of  AI-powered  services,  the  Commission  carried  out  a  public 
consultation and call for evidence in 2025. This process sought feedback from interested parties on 
the DMA’s overall effectiveness and implementation and its ability to face emerging challenges 
such as the rapid and transformative rollout of AI-powered services. Based on the input received, 
the Commission is preparing its first review report, to be presented to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the EESC by May 2026. 

3. COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT DEFENDS AND FACILITATES COMPETITIVE, FAIR AND WELL-
FUNCTIONING MARKETS 

Effective enforcement remains vital to  safeguard the credibility and integrity of the  competition 
rules. In 2025, robust enforcement across all instruments - State aid, antitrust, merger control, the 
FSR, and the DMA - upheld the integrity and resilience of the Single Market and in many cases 
transformed the strategic vision of boosting the clean, just and competitive transition into concrete 
market  reality.  Enforcement  creates  the  predictable,  transparent,  and  fair  market  conditions 
necessary to make it easier for companies to grow and invest in the Single Market and beyond. This 
commitment to fairness ensures that the Single Market remains a level playing field, creating new 
business opportunities and give access to key inputs for all market participants, many of whom rely 
on the Commission’s enforcement to compete successfully. By acting against companies engaging 
in  anti-competitive  behaviour  that  risks  fragmenting  the  Single  Market,  EU  competition 
enforcement helps alleviate the economic damage when the EU is hit by external economic shocks 
and geopolitical interference. 

The  Commission's  competition  enforcement  creates  EU  added  value.  When  prioritising  its 
enforcement  measures  and  deciding  whether  to  initiate  investigations  on  its  own  initiative,  the 

30  When  conducting  the  balancing  test,  the  Commission  needs  to  take  into  account  whether  and  to  what  extent  the  foreign  subsidies 
distorting the internal market under consideration have positive effects on the ‘development of the relevant subsidised economic activity 
on the internal market’. In addition, the Commission also has to ‘examine broader positive effects in relation to the relevant policy objectives, 
in particular those of the Union’. 
31 More information about the DMA and its enforcement may be found in the DMA Annual Report 2025. 
32 Under the DMA, designated ‘gatekeepers’ are large digital platforms that provide ‘core platform services’ as listed in the DMA, for example 
online search engines, app stores, or messaging services. 

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impact on the Single Market is one of the main criteria. When pursuing high-impact cases,  DG 
Competition uses its scarce resources to maximise the pro-competitive impact of its interventions. 
The Commission may also pursue certain cases for their precedent-setting value. 

State aid control 

The Commission’s State aid enforcement in 2025 demonstrated how competition policy supports 
the clean, just and competitive transitions of the EU economy. The cases below illustrate how the 
Member States have turned their strategic visions into concrete investment projects. 

Boosting renewable energy sources: The Commission authorised France under CISAF to invest 
EUR  11  billion  to  accelerate  the  use  of  renewable  energy33.  This  20-year  project  supports  the 
construction  and  operation  of  three  floating  offshore  wind  farms.  The  funding  is  granted 
following a bidding process and will take the form of a monthly variable premium, showing how 
the new rules can facilitate targeted public investment at the necessary speed and scale required for 
sustainable transformation. 

Decarbonisation schemes: Several large national schemes were authorised in 2025 to accelerate 
the shift to a net-zero economy. For example, a EUR 5 billion German scheme was approved to 
help  companies  subject  to  the  EU  Emission  Trading  Scheme  to  decarbonise  their  production 
processes, requiring a 90% emission reduction goal per project34. Moreover, Finland’s EUR 2.3 
billion  plan  was  approved  under  the  State  aid  Temporary  Crisis  and  Transition  Framework  to 
support investments in strategic sectors and decarbonising production processes35. In addition, a 
Dutch EUR 1.2 billion scheme was approved to reduce lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, with 
funds granted through a competitive bidding process prioritising the largest environmental benefits 
for the lowest cost36. The Commission also approved, under CISAF, a Spanish aid scheme for the 
decarbonisation of the manufacturing industry. The scheme supports electrification, shifting to 
renewable or low-carbon hydrogen, recovery of waste heat, carbon capture, storage and utilisation, 
in a wide range of sectors. The aid consists of direct grants determined on the basis of pre-defined 
aid intensities. The scheme is open to companies of all sizes and to installations and sectors within 
and outside of the Emission Trading System37. 

Ensuring sufficient manufacturing capacity in clean technologies: Six national schemes with 
total  budgets  of  EUR  6.7  billion  were  authorised  under  CISAF  in  2025,  all  contributing  to  the 
achievement of the 40% resilience benchmark of the Net-Zero Industry Act38. For example, a EUR 
4.1 billion Hungarian scheme39 and a EUR 1.5 billion Italian scheme40 were approved to incentivise 
production based on net-zero technology.  

33 Case SA.115764 – EPIP - Régime de soutien à trois parcs éoliens en mer, l'un au large du Sud de la Bretagne et deux autres en Méditerranée, 
5.8.2025. 
34 Case SA.116065 – Förderprogramm Klimaschutzverträge  –  Second auction of the Climate Protection Contracts scheme, 24.3.2025. 
35 Case SA.114934 –  TCTF - Act on Tax Credit for Certain Large Investments Aiming at a Climate Neutral Economy, 18.2.2025. 
36 Case SA.103901 – NL_KGG_RGG_VI_Nationale Investeringsmodule Klimaatprojecten Industrie (NIKI), 20.5.2025. 
37 Case SA.119880 – Spain - CISAF/RRF - Aid scheme for the decarbonisation of manufacturing industry. 
38 Regulation 2024/1735 of the European parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s 
net-zero  technology  manufacturing  ecosystem  and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1724,  13.6.2024.  The  Net-Zero  Industry  Act  (NZIA) 
creates a regulatory framework aimed to boost the competitiveness of EU industry and technologies crucial for decarbonisation.  A core 
target of the NZIA is the 40% resilience benchmark. It mandates that by 2030, EU manufacturing capacity for strategic net-zero technologies 
should meet at least 40% of the annual deployment needs of the EU. 
39 Case SA.120705 – CISAF - Aid to ensure sufficient manufacturing capacity in clean technologies, 17.12.2025.  
40 Case SA.120488 - Italy - RRF-CISAF - Framework scheme for manufacturing capacity related to clean technologies, 9.12.2025. 

9 

 
 
 
Boosting  the  use  of  green  energy:  In  2025,  the  Commission  approved  targeted  support  for 
developing  green  energy  sources.  An  Austrian  measure  of  EUR  400  million  was  approved  to 
support the production of renewable hydrogen through the European Hydrogen Bank’s ‘Auctions-
as-a-Service’ tool41. Moreover, a Danish EUR 36 million scheme was authorised to encourage the 
use of sustainable aviation fuel accelerating the decarbonisation of the aviation sector42.  

Secure supply of energy: In 2025, the Commission approved several State aid measures aiming 
to ensure that there is sufficient capacity to produce, store or flexibly consume electricity, and that 
electricity  production  meets  the  expected  demand.  For  example,  a  EUR  300  million  Swedish 
strategic electricity reserve to safeguard security of electricity supply in emergency situations43 and 
a EUR 750 million Estonian strategic reserve to support security of electricity44, were approved. 
The projects that will benefit from the aid in both measures will be selected through a transparent, 
non-discriminatory  competitive  bidding  process.  In  addition,  the  Commission  approved  under 
CEEAG a reform of the market-wide electricity capacity mechanism of France45. The redesigned 
French mechanism will operate for ten years with an estimated budget of EUR 2 billion per year, 
totalling EUR 20 billion over its duration. 

Consolidating  nuclear-based  energy:  In  2025,  the  Commission  approved  support  for  the 
construction  and  operation  of  nuclear  power  plants,  contributing  to  the  decarbonisation  of  the 
energy  sector and  the  security of electricity  supply.  A  Belgian  support measure  for  the lifetime 
extension  of  two  nuclear  reactors,  Doel  4  and  Tihange  346,  was  authorised  after  an  in-depth 
investigation. In addition, the Commission approved aid measures for the first nuclear power plant 
in Poland47, which will consist of three new nuclear reactors. 

The IPCEI Tech4Cure48: In 2025, to support breakthrough innovation in the health sector, the 
Commission  approved  another  IPCEI  in  the  health  sector,  Tech4Cure.  This  IPCEI  enables  five 
Member States (France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and Slovenia) to provide up to EUR 403 million 
of funding to ten companies, unlocking an additional EUR 826 million in private investments. The 
Commission’s ambition to involve more SMEs in IPCEIs was successful. In Tech4Cure, 60% of 
participating  companies  are  SMEs.  Moreover,  it  creates  a  broader  IPCEI  ecosystem  involving 
associated and indirect partners. Tech4Cure enables cross-border research and innovation and the 
first  industrial  deployment  of  a  new  generation  of  medical  devices  with  advanced  and  novel 
digital/AI solutions to support the concept of predictive, preventive, and personalised medicine (3P 
Medicine). This project aims to make healthcare better, faster, and cheaper. In addition, Tech4Cure 
served as a pilot project for the IPCEI Design Support Hub, which was launched in the spring of 
2025.  

41 Case SA.116277 – Austria's Participation in EU Hydrogen Bank Auction, Förderung der Erzeugung von erneuerbarem Wasserstoff nicht 
biogenen Ursprungs, 10.3.2025. 
42 Case SA.102731 – Aid Scheme for Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) in Domestic Aviation, 29.7.2025. 
43 Case SA.112968 – Sweden – Electricity Strategic Reserve, 29.7.2025. 
44 Case SA.112459 – Estonia – Electricity Strategic Reserve, 28.10.2025. 
45 Case SA.117564 – France - Réforme du mécanisme de capacité, 22.12.2025. 
46 Case SA.106107 – Belgium – Lifetime extension of two nuclear reactors (Doel 4 and Tihange 3). 
47 Case SA.109707 – Poland – Aid measures for the first nuclear power plant in Poland. 
48 Cases SA.113212 – France; SA.117899 – Hungary; SA.117859 – Italy; SA.117793 – Slovakia; SA.117849 - Slovenia – Important Project of 
Common European Interest – Innovative medical devices and support software (IPCEI Tech4Cure). 

10 

 
 
 
Antitrust enforcement  

The Commission continued in 2025 to pursue several antitrust investigations against companies 
active  in  numerous  markets,  ensuring  that  these  companies  do  not  abuse  their  market  power. 
Specific attention was placed on digital markets, which possess unique features and present distinct 
challenges  due  to  prevailing  business  models  and  complex  market  dynamics.  For  instance, 
companies may acquire data or technology to heighten barriers to entry or exploit rivals’ data for 
their own benefit, for example in the case of dual function digital platforms or companies acting 
both as an intermediary and a competitor. 

Online  display advertising  technology  services: The  Commission  adopted  the  Google Adtech 
decision49  in  2025.  The  case  concerns  online  display  advertising  technology  services  and  other 
data-related practices. The Commission imposed a fine of EUR 2.95 billion on Google for abusing 
its  dominant  market  position  by  favouring  its  own  online  display  advertising  technology 
services to the detriment of competing providers of advertising technology services, advertisers 
and  online  publishers  (‘self-preferencing’).  The  Commission  ordered  Google  to  cease  self-
preferencing practices and implement measures which would end the conflicts of interest inherent 
in  the  Google  Adtech  supply  chain.  Once  implemented,  companies  using  Google’s  Adtech 
technology will be able to compete and innovate on fair and equal terms, and consumers will have 
better possibilities to make informed choices. 

Digital communication and collaboration tools: In the Microsoft Teams50 case, the Commission 
accepted  commitments  from  Microsoft  to  address  competition  concerns  over  anti-competitive 
tying  of  Microsoft  Teams  to  the  Microsoft  Office  365  and  Microsoft  365  software  suites  for 
business customers. Under the commitments, Microsoft has to unbundle Microsoft Teams, that is 
to say offer versions of these software suites without Microsoft Teams included at a reduced price. 
Moreover, Microsoft has to allow customers with long-term licenses to switch to software suites 
without  Microsoft  Teams.  Finally,  Microsoft  must  ensure  interoperability  with  competing 
communication tools and facilitate the use of competing software solutions. These commitments 
were  essential  to  restore  fair  competition  and  re-open  the  market  for  other  providers  of 
communication and collaboration tools in the EU. 

Break-resistant glass for handheld electronic devices: The Commission made legally binding 
under  EU  antitrust  rules  commitments  offered  by  U.S.-based  company  Corning51.  The 
commitments  resolve  the  concerns  that  Corning  may  have  abused  its  dominant  position  by 
concluding exclusive supply agreements for Alkali-aluminosilicate glass (Alkali-AS Glass). This 
break-resistant  glass  is  used  for  smartphones  and  other  handheld  electronic  devices.  Corning 
committed to waive all exclusive dealing clauses and no longer impose sourcing requirements on 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) of handheld electronic devices or companies that finish 
raw glass (finishers). Moreover, Corning will no longer require OEMs or finishers to purchase more 
than 50% of their respective demand from the company. The commitments will make market access 
for Corning’s competitors easier, thereby securing innovation and resilience in the supply chain for 
handheld electronic devices. 

49 Case AT.40670 - Google - Adtech and Data-related practices, 5.9.2025. 
50  Case  AT.40721  -  Microsoft  Teams  –  Commitments  decision,  12.9.2025;  case  AT.40873  -  Microsoft  Teams  II  –  Commitments  decision 
12.9.2025. 
51 Case AT.40728 – Corning, 18.7.2025. 

11 

 
 
 
High-end  consumer  goods:  In  2025,  the  Commission  fined  Gucci,  Chloé  and  Loewe  -  three 
companies active in the high-end consumer goods sector – a total amount of EUR 157 million for 
engaging  in  resale  price  maintenance  (RPM)  across  several  Member  States.52  The  three 
companies restricted the commercial freedom of their independent online and physical retailers to 
set their own prices. These restrictions covered almost the entire product range sold by the three 
firms  under  their  respective  brand  names.  Products  included  apparel,  leather  goods,  shoes,  and 
fashion  accessories.  This  decision  reaffirms  the  Commission’s  commitment  to  tackling  anti-
competitive RPM practices, ensuring that consumers benefit from genuine price competition. 

Incomplete  responses  to  information  requests:  The  Commission  fined  Eurofield  SAS  and  its 
former parent company, Unanime Sport SAS, EUR 172 000 for providing incomplete responses to 
information requests in the context of an antitrust investigation in the synthetic turf (artificial grass) 
sector53. If firms under investigation by the Commission do not respect their legal and procedural 
obligations,  the  effectiveness  of  the  Commission’s investigation may  be  jeopardised.  It  was the 
first time the Commission fined a company for providing incomplete information in an antitrust 
investigation.  This  intervention  demonstrates  the  Commission's  increased  vigilance  and 
determination  to  sanction  companies  under  investigation  which  do  not  comply  with  procedural 
obligations. 

Guidance letters  and  a  first  opinion:  Applying  the  competition  rules is  not  only about  ‘hard’ 
enforcement, that is to say going after companies that have already broken the competition rules. 
‘Soft’ interventions such as issuing guidance letters allow the Commission to give companies ex 
ante legal certainty for their compliance with antitrust rules. The Commission issued two guidance 
letters54  in  2025. The  first  guidance  letter concerns  firms active  in  the automotive  sector55. The 
letter provides clarity to companies on the creation of a licensing negotiation group to negotiate 
licenses for the use of technologies covered by standard essential patents, with the aim of increasing 
efficiency in the licensing of digital technologies. These technologies are expected to contribute to 
Europe’s  decarbonisation  and  transition  to  net-zero  goals.  This  guidance  letter  supports  the 
competitiveness of EU’s automotive sector and increases consumer choice. The second guidance 
letter  concerns  cooperation  in  the  form  of  joint  purchasing  and  setting  of  minimum  technical 
specifications for electric container-handling equipment in port terminals56, providing additional 
clarity  about  a  sustainability  initiative  to  facilitate  the  switch  from  diesel-powered  to  battery-
powered  equipment.  Finally,  the  Commission  issued  its  first  opinion  under  the  Common 
Organisation  of  the  Markets  in  Agricultural  Products  Regulation57.  This  opinion  concerns  wine 
producers in Occitanie region in France cooperating to produce wine sustainably. The agreement 
sets  orientation  prices  for  six  grape  varieties  sold  in  bulk  wine  transactions58.  The  Commission 
clarified that price coordination among agricultural producers may be compatible with EU antitrust 
rules, provided that the coordination is strictly necessary to achieve specific sustainability goals. 

52 Cases AT.40840 – Gucci; AT.40880 – Chloé; and AT.40881 - Loewe, all 14.10.2025.  
53 Case AT.40966 – Synthetic Turf (procedure), 8.9.2025. 
54 Issued under the 2022 Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel or unresolved questions concerning Articles 101 and 102 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that arise in individual cases (guidance letters), OJ C 381, 4.10.2022, p.9.  
55 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/202536/AT_40979_104.pdf 
56 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/202536/AT_40976_98.pdf 
57 First opinion regarding the compatibility of a sustainability agreement with competition rules for the agricultural sector’ based on Article 
210a of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 establishing a common organisation of markets in agricultural products (‘CMO Regulation'). 
58 Commission opinion on the request for opinion pursuant to Article 210a(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 by Vignerons Coopérateurs 
de France - Sustainability agreement in the wine sector in Occitanie, 15.7.2025.  

12 

 
 
 
The  opinion  gives  wine  producers the legal certainty  to  continue  investing  in  sustainable  wine-
production practices.  

The Commission's 2025 enforcement activities also included cartels – considered the most hard-
core infringements of competition law. Several decisions sanctioning anti-competitive behaviour 
with  profound  impact  on  the  EU  economy  and  with  direct  and  tangible  negative  effects  on 
consumers are summarised below. 

End-of-life vehicle (ELV) recycling: The Commission fined 15 major car manufacturers and the 
European  Automobiles  Manufacturers'  Association  (ACEA)  EUR  458  million  in  total  for 
participating  in  the  End-of-life  vehicle  (ELV)59  recycling  cartel60.  For  over  15  years,  the  car 
manufacturers and ACEA agreed not to pay car dismantlers for processing ELVs because they had 
agreed to consider ELV recycling to be a sufficiently profitable business. The cartel members also 
shared commercially sensitive information, coordinated their behaviour towards dismantlers, and 
agreed not to disclose how much of an ELV can be recycled, recovered, and reused and how much 
recycled material is used in new cars. This intervention by the Commission directly supported the 
goals of the green transition by protecting the recycling value chain and stimulating the circular 
economy. 

Online food and grocery deliveries: The Commission fined Delivery Hero and Glovo61 a total of 
EUR  329  million  for  operating  a  cartel  between  July  2018  and  July  2022.  The  cartel  involved 
agreeing not to poach each other's employees, exchanging sensitive commercial information, and 
dividing geographic markets in the European Economic Area. It was the first time the Commission 
sanctioned a cartel affecting the labour market by restricting competition for talent and reducing 
opportunities for workers, demonstrating that competition enforcement actively promotes inclusive 
growth by protecting the free movement and fair wages of workers across the Single Market. It was 
also the first time the Commission addressed the use of a minority shareholding to coordinate the 
behaviour of competitors. 

Automotive  starter  batteries:  The  Commission  fined  three  automotive  starter  battery 
manufacturers and the trade association Eurobat a total of EUR 72 million for engaging in a long-
running cartel concerning automotive starter batteries62. The manufacturers agreed to create and 
publish  premiums  calculated  based  on  their  purchasing  price  of  lead.  They  agreed  to  use  these 
premiums in the price negotiations with their respective OEM customers to ensure that the resulting 
surcharge was kept at a higher level. The Commission concluded that it is illegal for suppliers to 
secretly coordinate surcharges to use them as an industry-wide standard. 

Furthermore,  the  Commission  carried  out  three  unannounced  inspections  at  the  premises  of 
companies suspected of breaching the antitrust rules in several industries: vaccines, non-alcoholic 
drinks,  and  ski  equipment.  Making  unannounced  inspections  is  one  of  the  most  important 
enforcement  tools  at  the  Commission’s  disposal  in  the  field  of  competition.  Inspections  are 
essential for securing evidence and maintaining the element of surprise is necessary for effective 
enforcement.  They  allow  the  Commission  to  objectively  assess  suspicions,  ensuring  that  the 
competition rules are respected and deter anti-competitive behaviour.  

59 An End-of-Life Vehicle is a car that is no longer fit for use, either due to age, wear and tear, or damage. These vehicles are dismantled and 
processed for recycling, recovery, and disposal. 
60 Case AT.40669 - End-of-life vehicle recycling, 1.4.2025. 
61 Case AT.40795 – Food delivery services, 2.6.2025. 
62 Case AT.40545 – Automotive starter batteries, 15.12.2025. 

13 

 
 
 
Merger control 

In 2025, the Commission continued to enforce the merger rules to protect businesses and consumers 
from price increases, but also from a deterioration of other important parameters of competition 
such as quality, choice, and innovation in many vital areas of the EU economy. Merger control 
prevents  concentrations  that  significantly  impede  effective  competition  in  the  internal  market, 
leading to for example excessive market power, market foreclosures, and the elimination of market 
entrants, thereby supporting the Commission’s priorities. 

A selection of key cases adopted in 2025 resulting in clearance decisions subject to commitments 
are  summarised  below.  In  addition,  two  important  cases  are  presented  concerning  potential 
breaches of the Merger Regulation.  

Software  for  chips:  The Commission  conditionally  approved  Synopsys’ acquisition  of  Ansys63. 
The U.S.-based companies have largely complementary activities, but the Commission found that 
the transaction would have increased market concentration and reduced global competition in the 
markets for the supply of: (i.) optics software simulating how light behaves in large macro-scale 
systems  (for  example  screens  or  car  headlights);  (ii.)  photonics  software  simulating  how  light 
behaves in smaller nano-scale optical systems (for example digital cameras or solar panels); and 
(iii.) register-transfer-level power consumption analysis software, which is a software tool used at 
the early stage of the chip design process to measure the power consumption of chips. To address 
these  concerns,  the  merging  parties  offered  to  divest  their  activities  in  the  problematic  markets 
mentioned above. The structural remedies were essential to prevent the elimination of effective 
competition  and  preserve  the  integrity  of  the  supply  chain  in  these  critical,  high-technology 
markets. 

Trimmable  horizontal  stabiliser  actuator  systems  for  aerospace:  The  Commission 
conditionally  approved  the  acquisition  of  part  of  the  Collins  Aerospace  actuation  business  by 
Safran USA Inc.64 (controlled by the French company Safran S.A.). The Commission found that 
the  merger  significantly  reduced  competition  in  the  market  for  trimmable  horizontal  stabiliser 
actuator systems (THSA), by combining two main suppliers. To resolve the competitive concerns, 
Safran offered to divest its entire North American THSA business. 

Aerostructures and large commercial aircraft: The Commission approved Boeing’s acquisition 
of  Spirit  subject  to  conditions65.  The  Commission  found  that  the  proposed  transaction  risked 
significantly reducing competition in global aerostructures and large commercial aircraft markets. 
In particular, Boeing could have restricted or worsened Spirit’s supply of aerostructures to Airbus 
and  gained  access  to  Airbus’s  commercially  sensitive  information.  To  address  these  concerns, 
Boeing  committed  to  divest  all  Spirit  businesses  supplying  Airbus  to  Airbus  itself.  Moreover, 
Boeing  committed  to  divest  Spirit  AeroSystems  Malaysia  to  Composites  Technology  Research 
Malaysia. 

Aluminium  packaging  containers  and  lids  for  wet  pet  and  human  food:  The  Commission 
approved the acquisition of Aluflexpack by Constantia, subject to conditions66. The Commission 
found that the proposed transaction would have reduced competition in the market for the supply 
of  sterilisable  aluminium containers  and  lids  for  wet  pet and human  food  in  the  EU, leading  to 

63 Case M.11481- Synopsys / Ansys, 23.5.2025. 
64 Case M.11253 - Safran / Part of Collins Aerospace’s actuation and flight control activities, 17.6.2025. 
65 Case M.11578 – Boeing / Spirit, 14.10.2025. 
66 Case M.11536 – Constantia / Aluflexpack, 6.5.2025. 

14 

 
 
 
higher prices and less choice  for customers. To address the Commission’s concerns, Constantia 
offered to divest the entirety of Aluflexpack’s wet pet and human food business in the EEA. 

Merger referrals under Article 22 Merger Regulation: The Commission conditionally approved 
Brasserie Nationale’s proposed acquisition of Boissons Heintz67. Luxembourg referred the case to 
the  Commission  pursuant  to  Article  22  Merger  Regulation  because  it  lacks  a  national  merger 
control regime. The original transaction would have combined Luxembourg’s two main wholesale 
distributors  of  beverages  to  hotels,  restaurants,  and  cafés  in  Luxembourg,  putting  smaller 
competitors at a disadvantage. To address these concerns, the merging parties committed to divest 
the majority of Boissons Heintz's beverage distribution activities to a suitable buyer. The remedy 
package  includes  an  option  for  the  buyer  to  acquire  Boissons  Heintz's  name,  online  shop,  and 
exclusive import agreements. In addition, the acquisition of Downtown by UMG68, was referred to 
the Commission by Austria and the Netherlands under Article 22 Merger Regulation. The proposed 
transaction was in second-phase investigation at the end of 2025. 

Conditional  approval  of  UniCredit’s  proposed  acquisition  of  Banco  BPM  and  investigation  under 
Article 21 Merger Regulation into Italy's use of its ‘Golden Powers’ legislation  
The Commission approved UniCredit’s proposed acquisition of Banco BPM69 subject to commitments. Both 
banks are based in Italy and provide corporate and retail banking services as well as insurance and asset 
management  services.  The  proposed  acquisition  has  an  EU  dimension  because  UniCredit  also  had 
significant operations in Germany and central and eastern Europe. Following a preliminary investigation, 
the Commission was concerned about the impact on competition in the markets for deposits and loans to 
retail  customers  and  SMEs  in  certain  local  markets  in  Italy.  UniCredit  addressed  these  concerns  by 
committing to divest 209 bank branches in 21 Italian provinces where the combined bank would have had 
particularly strong market positions.  
However, UniCredit subsequently withdrew its takeover offer for Banco BPM on the grounds that it was not 
able to comply with additional conditions imposed on the potential takeover by the Italian government under 
its domestic investment screening legislation. The Commission investigated the conditions imposed by the 
Italian government and in July 2025 adopted a preliminary assessment70 which found that these conditions 
may  breach  Article  21  of  the  Merger  Regulation  as  well  as  EU  financial  services  legislation  and  the 
provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union regarding the free movement of capital 
and the role of the European Central Bank under the Single Supervisory Mechanism.   

Potential breach of the stand-still obligation: Ensuring that companies respect the ex ante nature 
of the EU merger control regime is central to preserving effective competition within the Single 
Market. To this end, the Commission issued a Statement of Objections to Vivendi,71 informing the 
company of its preliminary view that it had  breached the standstill obligation  in Article 7(1) 
Merger Regulation - which requires that companies do not implement a merger before it has been 
approved - and the conditions attached to the Vivendi/Lagardère merger clearance decision72. The 
Commission’s  preliminary  assessment  is  that  Vivendi  exercised  decisive  influence  over 
Lagardère's media operations before the acquisition was completed. 

Enforcement of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation  

In  2025,  the  Commission  continued  to  rigorously  enforce  the  FSR  to  protect  the  EU  from 
competition-distortive subsidies granted by non-EU countries to companies operating in the Single 
Market.  Such  distortions  can  arise  with  respect  to  any  economic  activity,  particularly  in 

67 Case M.11485 - Brasserie Nationale / Boissons Heintz, 17.7.2025. 
68 Case M.11956 – UMG / Downtown, ongoing (second-phase investigation). 
69 Case M.11830 - Unicredit / Banco BPM, 19.06.2025. 
70 Case M.12052 - UniCredit / Banco BPM – Article 21(4) – Preliminary assessment, 14.07.2025. 
71 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pl/ip_25_1867 
72 Case M.10433 - Vivendi / Lagardere, 8.11.2023. 

15 

 
 
 
concentrations and public procurement procedures. The FSR is co-enforced by DG Competition 
and  the  Directorate-General  for  Internal  Market,  Industry,  Entrepreneurship  and  SMEs  (DG 
GROW)73.  A  proactive  enforcement  of  the  FSR  -  including  own-initiative  investigations  -  is 
essential for upholding the EU’s global competitiveness.  

During  the  year,  the  Commission  investigated  for  example  the  acquisition  of  Covestro  AG  (a 
German  supplier  of  high-performance  polymers  and  components)  by  Abu  Dhabi  National  Oil 
Company PJSC (ADNOC), the national oil company of Abu Dhabi. After an in-depth investigation, 
ADNOC  offered  commitments,  which  the  Commission  subsequently  made  legally  binding  in  a 
commitment decision74. These commitments were essential to remedy the distortive effects on the 
Single Market from the foreign subsidies (an unlimited State guarantee and tax benefits to ADNOC, 
as well as a committed capital increase by ADNOC into Covestro). These subsidies would have 
distorted competition both during the acquisition process and during the future market activities of 
the  combined  entity.  First,  ADNOC  committed  to  remove  the  unlimited  State  guarantee,  by 
adapting its articles of association so that they no longer deviate from ordinary UAE insolvency 
law.  Second,  ADNOC  committed  to  share  Covestro's  sustainability  patents  with  those 
companies that are particularly reliant on Covestro's sustainability technology. The Commission 
found that the offered commitments would fully and effectively remedy the distortive effects on 
the  Single  Market  caused  by  the  foreign  subsidies.  The  ADNOC/Covestro  decision  marks  the 
second final Commission decision under the FSR since it entered into force. 

Furthermore,  in  2025,  the  Commission  opened  an  own-initiative  in-depth  investigation  into 
Nuctech75,  a  Chinese-owned  company  active  in  the  manufacturing  and  sale  of  threat  detection 
systems (scanners used for example at airports, in harbours and at borders). The Commission had 
indications  that  Nuctech  had  been  granted  foreign  subsidies,  allowing  it  to  offer  prices  and 
conditions that could not be matched by other market players. If these competitive concerns are 
confirmed  in  the  investigation,  the  Commission  may  impose  redressive  measures  or  accept 
commitments offered by the company that would address the concerns. 

The Commission also carried out one unannounced inspection under the FSR at the premises of a 
company active in the e-commerce sector76 and continued working on its preliminary review in the 
wind energy sector. 

Enforcement of the Digital Markets Act 

The  DMA  ensures  that  companies  of  all  sizes  can  compete,  enhancing  the  Single  Market's 
attractiveness and providing new opportunities for both EU and foreign firms77. Since the DMA’s 
entry  into  force,  and  throughout  2025,  its  enforcement  has  resulted  in  tangible  and  practical 
benefits for both businesses and consumers. For example, DMA enforcement opened up mobile 
ecosystems,  allowing  developers  to  offer  competing  app  stores  on  Apple’s  iOS  and  iPadOS. 

73 DG Competition is responsible for enforcing the FSR in the field of mergers. In addition, DG Competition has the power to start own-
initiative investigations to tackle distortions on the Single Market caused by foreign subsidies outside public procurement procedures. DG 
Grow (the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs) is responsible for enforcing the FSR for foreign 
subsidies public procurement procedures and to start own-initiative investigations to tackle the distortive effects of  foreign subsidies in 
public procurement procedures.  
74 Case FS.100156 - ADNOC / COVESTRO, 14.11.2025. 
75 Case FS.100068 – Nuctech, 11.12.2025 
76 On 10.12.2025, a Commission spokesperson stated that ‘[we] can confirm that the Commission has carried out an unannounced inspection 
at the premises of a company active in the e-commerce sector in the EU, under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation.’ 
77  More  information  how  the  Commission  enforces  the  DMA  is  available  in  the  DMA  Annual  Report  2025.  It  will  be  available  here: 
https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/about-dma/dma-annual-reports_en. 

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Moreover, eSIMs78 can now be transferred to and from Android phones and iPhones, ensuring full 
interoperability. Users are also offered a choice screen so that they can easily select their preferred 
default browser on iOS devices.  

Regulatory dialogue is a crucial element of the DMA. In 2025, the Commission held regulatory 
dialogues with every company designated as a gatekeeper. This type of exchange is an effective 
way  to  prevent  problems  before  they  occur,  build  trust  between  the  parties  involved,  and 
encourage early compliance with the DMA. Regulatory dialogues allow the Commission to guide 
gatekeepers'  behaviour  almost  in  ‘real  time’,  rather  than  only  relying  on  ex  post  competition 
enforcement.  In  2025  the  Commission  also  organised  six  technical  compliance  workshops79, 
which  allowed  interested  stakeholders  to  discuss  proposed  compliance  solutions  with  the 
Commission and the gatekeepers themselves.  

The  Commission  adopted  its  first  decisions  following  specification  proceedings80.  Such 
specification decisions provide specific compliance guidance to the designated gatekeepers. The 
Commission’s  specification  decisions  specified  what  Apple  must  do  to  ensure  effective  and 
seamless  interoperability  between  iOS,  iPadOS  and  competing  operating  systems.  Apple  has 
appealed both specification decisions81.   

Furthermore, the Commission concluded  three non-compliance investigations in 202582. After 
constructive regulatory dialogue, the Commission closed its investigation into Apple’s user-choice 
architecture83 when the company agreed to change its browser choice screen, making it easier for 
users to set a new default browser on their iPhones.  

In a separate case, the Commission found that Apple’s anti-steering practices breached the DMA 
and imposed a EUR 500 million fine84. The Commission also imposed a cease-and-desist order 
obliging Apple to remove all technical and commercial steering restrictions within 60 days. The 
decision was appealed by Apple85. The company subsequently revised its contractual terms for app 
distribution on iOS.  

Furthermore, the Commission found that Meta’s ‘consent or pay’ advertising model breached the 
DMA and imposed a EUR 200 million fine86 and imposed a cease-and-desist order requiring Meta 
to make the model compliant within 60 days. The decision was appealed by  Meta87. Following 
dialogue with Meta, the Commission took note of Meta’s proposed commitment to offer users in 

78 An eSIM is a digital, embedded SIM card that functions like a physical card but is built directly into the device. This eliminates the need to 
insert a physical card, allowing for quicker activation and easier switching between mobile telephony payment plans.  
79 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/events/workshops_en 
80 Specification decisions are  taken following specification proceedings. In this procedure, the Commission and a designated gatekeeper 
engage in a formalised regulatory dialogue to allow the Commission to identify concrete measures that the gatekeeper should take to comply 
with an obligation laid down in Articles 6 or 7 of DMA. Case DMA.100203 – Article 6(7) – Apple – iOS – SP – Features for Connected Physical 
Devices, 19.3.2025; Case DMA.100204 – Article 6(7) – Apple iOS and iPadOS – SP - Process, 19.3.2025. 
81 Case T-354/25 - Apple and Apple Distribution International v Commission, 6.10.2025 and Case T-359/25 - Apple and Apple Distribution 
International v Commission, 6.10.2025. 
82 A non-compliance decision concludes, following an investigation, that a gatekeeper has been non-compliant with a DMA obligation. The 
non-compliance decision orders the gatekeepers to cease and desist the infringement. In a non-compliance decision, the Commission may 
impose fines. Case DMA.100055 – Meta – Article 5(2), 23.4.2025; Case DMA.100109 – Apple - Online Intermediation Services - app stores - 
AppStore - Art. 5(4), 23.4.2025; CASE DMA. 100185 – Apple - Operating systems - iOS - Art. 6(3), 23.4.2025. 
83 Case DMA.100185 – Apple – Operating systems – iOS – Article 6(3), 23.4.2025.  
84 Case DMA.100109 – Apple - Online Intermediation Services - app stores - AppStore - Art. 5(4), 23.4.2025. 
85 Case T-438/25 Apple v Commission, 7.7.2025. 
86 Case DMA.100055 – Meta – Article 5(2), 23.4.2025. 
87 Case T-435/25 Meta Platforms v Commission, 4.7.2025. 

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the EU an alternative, free version of its social networks using fewer personal data and less targeted 
advertising. 

The Commission, moreover, launched proceedings into a potential breach of the DMA by Google 
by  demoting  media  publishers’  content  in  search  results88.  The  Commission’s  investigation 
focuses  specifically  on  Google’s  ‘site  reputation  abuse  policy’  determining  if  its  application 
complies with DMA obligations.  

The Commission also opened three market investigations into cloud computing services in the 
course  of  2025.  Two  market  investigations  assess  whether  Amazon  and  Microsoft  should  be 
designated as gatekeepers for their cloud computing services, Amazon Web Services and Microsoft 
Azure89.  The  third  market  investigation  examines  if  the  DMA  obligations  effectively  tackle 
practices that may limit competitiveness and fairness in the EU cloud computing sector90.   

No new gatekeeper designations were made in 2025. However, the Commission concluded that 
Meta’s online intermediation service Facebook Marketplace should no longer be designated as 
a gatekeeper under the DMA91. The changes made by Meta to Facebook Marketplace reduced the 
number of business users so that Facebook Marketplace no longer fulfilled the DMA designation 
thresholds. 

4. BENEFITS OF COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT FOR CONSUMERS AND CITIZENS    

The Commission’s enforcement in the fields of antitrust and mergers generate direct benefits for 
citizens. DG Competition measures the impact of its enforcement in the areas of antitrust (cartels 
and non-cartel antitrust) and merger control in several ways.  

An  important  measure  is  ‘direct  customer  savings’,  that  is  to  say  likely  direct  price  effects  for 
customers in markets where the Commission has intervened. Based on a simplified OECD method, 
DG Competition estimates that direct customer savings generated by the Commission’s antitrust 
(cartels and non-cartel antitrust) and merger enforcement in 2025 amounted to a sum in the range 
of EUR 12.4 - 21.9 billion. In relative terms, competition enforcement saved each household in the 
EU around EUR 60 - 100 per year in the period 2012-2025. 

The Commission is not the only enforcer of the EU competition rules. Its partners in the European 
Competition Network (ECN) also play an active role. In 2025, DG Competition and participating 
NCAs within the ECN continued to work on measuring additional customer savings generated by 
enforcement action taken by these NCAs. For the period 2020-2024, the analysis indicates that the 
combined customer savings sum up to a range of EUR 18 - 30 billion per year. This means that the 
NCAs  contribute  at  least  another  50%  of  direct  savings  on  top  of  those  generated  by  the 
Commission. The total amount of direct customer savings corresponds to some EUR 100 - 160 per 
household per year for this period.  

Competition policy enforcement does not only have a positive economic impact at microeconomic 
level. It also serves as an important driver of welfare and growth at macroeconomic level. Estimated 
price reductions resulting from competition policy interventions (both directly and indirectly, via 
deterrence effects) can be used to improve economy-wide performance indicators on investment, 

88 Case DMA.100231 – Alphabet – Google Search – Site reputation abuse policy, 12.11.2025. 
89 Cases DMA.100032 – Microsoft – cloud computing services and DMA.100033 – Amazon – cloud computing services, 18.11.2025. 
90 Case DMA.100236 – Cloud – Article 19, 18.11.2025. 
91 Case DMA.100044 – Meta – online intermediation services – marketplace, 23.4.2025. 

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employment, prices, productivity and ultimately on gross domestic product (GDP)92.  

5. COMPETITION POLICY IN A EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT 

Cooperation in the European Competition Network 

Cooperation in the ECN contributes to a consistent and effective enforcement of EU antitrust rules, 
ensures enforcement cohesion and promotes a common competition culture in the EU.  

The  Commission  and  the  EU  NCAs  apply  EU  antitrust  rules  (Articles  101  and  102  TFEU)  in 
parallel. In the ECN, they coordinate enforcement activities and cooperate to ensure that these rules 
are  applied  in  an  effective  and  consistent  manner  across  all  Member  States  and  promote  a 
common  EU  competition  culture.  To  this  end,  NCAs  have  an  obligation  to:  (i.)  inform  the 
Commission about a new investigation at the stage of the first formal investigative measure; and 
(ii.) notify the Commission their envisaged national decisions applying EU antitrust rules.  

In 2025, the Commission and the NCAs launched 154 new investigations and the NCAs notified 
71 envisaged decisions to the Commission. The Commission and the NCAs hold regular meetings 
in  multiple  working  groups  to  discuss  and  exchange  views  on  new  and  ongoing  investigations, 
case-law  developments,  and  various  other  competition  policy-related  issues.  In  2025,  37  ECN 
meetings took place.  

International relations – reaching out to partners across the globe 

The Commission’s international activities in the competition field are important for creating a more 
competitive  and  assertive  EU,  as  the  EU  faces  multiple  geopolitical  challenges  that  risk 
fragmenting the world politically and economically. Among other things, international cooperation 
in  the  competition  field  is  built  on  trust,  knowledge  sharing,  and  exchange  of  best  practices.  
Coordinated competition enforcement across jurisdictions is more important today than ever. The 
fact that the EU is widely recognised as a world-leading competition policymaker and enforcer 
allows it to leverage its partnerships to defend a rules-based international order.  

In 2025, the Commission deepened its engagement with multilateral organisations, continued to 
invest  in  bilateral  relationships  through  cooperation  and  trade  agreements  (notably  with  the 
United  Kingdom,  Canada,  Japan,  and  China),  as  well  as  through  its  cooperation  activities  with 
African countries to foster coordination of competition law and its enforcement. The Commission 
also  continued  its  engagement  with  candidate  countries  (and  the  potential  candidate)  seeking 
membership in the EU.  

Multilateral  organisations:  The  Commission  engaged  with  international  forums  such  as  the 
Competition Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
the OECD Global Forum on Competition, the International Competition Network (ICN), and the 
United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD).  This  work  focused  on 
increasing global convergence on key enforcement challenges, for example those arising from rapid 
digitalisation, the impact of AI, and the green transition highlight of its activities in the OECD was 
Executive Vice-President Ribera’s keynote speech93 at the OECD Global Forum on Competition, 

92 Economic literature shows that competition enforcement – alongside other procompetitive market policies (single market policy, trade 
policy) – contributes to higher productivity and economic growth. For references, see for example OECD (2014), Factsheet on competition 
and  macro-economic  outcomes.  https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2014/10/factsheet-on-competition-
and-macro-economic-outcomes_24994985/660b93ab-en.pdf   

93 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_2869 

19 

 
 
 
where the Commission was also one of the lead examiners in the OECD Peer Review of Kenya’s 
competition framework94. In the ICN, one of the Commission’s main achievements in 2025 was 
finishing its co-chairmanship of the ICN Merger Working Group by delivering updated chapters 
on unilateral and coordinated effects for the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis95.  

Free  Trade  Agreements:  The  Commission  aims  to  include  strong  provisions  on  competition 
policy  and  subsidy  control  when  negotiating  free  trade  agreements  (FTAs).  In  2025,  FTA 
negotiations were concluded with Indonesia and continued with India, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and an association of five Eastern and Southern African countries, the so-called ESA-
596. Moreover, the Commission started FTA negotiations with the United Arab Emirates, which 
include a chapter on competition policy.  

Competition  Cooperation  Agreements  and  other  arrangements:  In  2025,  the  Commission 
continued its bilateral cooperation in the competition field with the UK as foreseen in the EU/UK 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)97 and the Withdrawal Agreement98. DG Competition’s 
contribution  to  the  EU/UK  negotiations  focused  on  the  control,  monitoring  and  reporting  of 
potentially competition-distorting subsidy schemes in the UK, as well as on competition legislation 
and  its  enforcement.  Importantly,  the  Commission  adopted  proposals  for  Council  decisions  to 
conclude  the  EU/UK  Competition  Cooperation  Agreement99.  Moreover,  the  Commission 
continued  the  negotiations  for  an  EU/Canada  competition  cooperation  agreement,  intended  to 
replace the current agreement of 1999100. The Commission also continued its cooperation with the 
Korea Fair Trade Commission, the Japan Fair Trade Commission, and China's State Administration 
for Market Regulation, under their respective cooperation agreements and other arrangements101.  

Regional cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa: In 2025, the Commission cooperated with several 
African national and regional authorities, such as the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU),  the  East  African  Community  (EAC),  and  the  Common  Market  for  Eastern  and 
Southern  Africa  (COMESA).  The  core  objective  is  to  strengthen  their  policy  frameworks  – 
including  competition  rules  –  and  to  support  continental  and  regional  economic  integration  in 

94 https://www.oecd.org/en/events/2025/12/global-forum-on-competition-2025.html 
95 https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/portfolio/recommended-practices-for-merger-analysis/ 
96 The five Eastern and Southern African (ESA-5) countries are Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe. Since 2012, 
these countries have an interim Economic Partnership Agreement (iEPA) with the EU. Interim Agreement establishing a framework for an 
Economic Partnership Agreement between the Eastern and Southern Africa States, on the one part, and the European Community and its 
Member States, on the other part, OJ L 111, 24.4.2012, p. 1. 
97 Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part, OJ L 149, 30.4.2021, p.10. 
98 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European 
Atomic Energy Community, OJ C 384I, 12.11.2019, p. 1. 
99 Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European Union and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding cooperation on the application of their competition laws, COM/2025/232 
final, and Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding cooperation on the application of their competition laws, 
COM/2025/233 final. 
100 Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of Canada regarding the application of their competition laws, 
Official Journal L 175, 10 July 1999, p. 50. 
101 Agreement between the European Community and the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning cooperation on anti-competitive 
activities, OJ L 202, 4.8.2009, p. 36; Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Japan concerning cooperation 
on anti-competitive activities - Agreed minute, OJ L 183, 22.7.2003, p. 12; Terms of Reference of the EU-China Competition Policy Dialogue 
between  on  the  one  side  the  Directorate-General  for  Competition  of  the  European  Commission  and  on  the  other  side  the  State 
Administration  for  Market  Regulation  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China,  44fa06fb-3f63-46cb-90c0-b7ff542b3043_en;  Memorandum  of 
Understanding on a dialogue in the area of the State aid control regime and the Fair Competition Review System between the Directorate-
General for Competition of the European Commission and the National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of 
China, 73c7a2da-5a4f-4476-a455-7d63a73ee802_en. 

20 

 
 
 
Africa and the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), providing 
stability and market access for EU and African countries.  

Enlargement: For the candidate countries102 and potential candidate103, the Commission's main 
competition-policy objective is supporting the setting up of legislative frameworks and creating 
well-functioning and operationally independent competition and State aid authorities. This ensures 
that  these  countries  can  build  up  solid  enforcement  records,  aligning  them  with  the  EU  Single 
Market  framework.  In  2025,  the  Commission  continued  to  monitor  reforms,  enforcement,  and 
overall  compliance  of  the  candidate  countries  and  the  potential  candidate  in  line  with  the 
Commission’s 2025 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy104. 

6. SUPPORTING COMPETITION POLICY WITH COMMUNICATION AND ADVOCACY 

The Commission’s communication and advocacy activities in the competition field fulfil important 
objectives - to promote a competition culture within the EU and beyond and increase the visibility 
and  transparency  of  EU  competition  activities  to  reinforce  their  deterrent  effect  and  increase 
awareness  among  consumers  and  citizens  how  competition  enforcement  benefits  them.  The 
purpose and benefits of competition law and enforcement need to be communicated and visualised 
effectively to different target groups. The Commission uses multiple communication channels with 
differentiated messaging to achieve this.  

In social media, DG Competition significantly increased its reach and number of followers in 2025. 
DG  Competition  is  mainly  active  on  YouTube,  X  and  LinkedIn.  Among  other  things,  DG 
Competition  focused  on  the  development  of  its  YouTube  channel.  The  channel  hosts  videos  of 
senior  managers  speaking  at  conferences  as  well  as  the  ‘COMP  Flash’  series  where  DG 
Competition officials explain high-profile cases in short videos. DG Competition issued more than 
130 press releases in 2025. Finally, the DG Competition website attracted over 12 million views. 

Events with the greatest impact were those where Executive Vice-President Ribera participated. 
Key political dialogues such as the implementation dialogues on IPCEIs and Affordable Housing 
allowed Executive Vice-President Ribera and the Commission to gather input and receive feedback 
critical for the effective implementation of competition policy in areas central to the priorities of 
the Commission.  

The  Director  General  of  DG  Competition  participated  in  many  international  events  in  2025. 
Moreover, DG Competition organised or co-organised five reality checks to gather technical input 
from stakeholders105.  

7. RELATIONS WITH OTHER EU INSTITUTIONS 

An  effective  competition  policy  relies  on  a  continuous  and  constructive  engagement  with  the 
Council,  the  European  Parliament,  the  EESC,  and  the  CoR.  This  engagement  ensures  that  the 
Commission’s  activities  in  the  competition  field  also  reflect  broader  EU  objectives.  Moreover, 

102 Countries granted candidate country status by the European Council on the basis of a recommendation by the European Commission: 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine.  
103 Potential candidate for EU membership: Kosovo.  
104  https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/2025-communication-eu-enlargement-policy_en.  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2025 Communication 
on EU enlargement policy, COM/2025/690 final, 4.11.2025. 
105 Reality Check topics in 2025 were  Social/Affordable Housing; Trade Defence Instruments and Foreign Subsidies; (co-organised by DG 
Trade, DG Competition and DG Grow); the TTBER and guidelines; Private enforcement of State aid rules, and the Revision of Reg. 1/2003. 

21 

 
 
 
these  dialogues  allow  Executive  Vice-President  Ribera  to  steer  the  competition  portfolio  in  a 
direction that contributes to sustainable and inclusive growth and overall competitiveness. 

In  line  with  President  von  der  Leyen’s  Political  Guidelines  and  the  Faster  and  Simpler  Europe 
Communication106,  each  College  member  submits  an  Annual  Progress  Report  on 
Implementation, Simplification and Enforcement107 to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the EESC, and the CoR. The objective of this exercise is to ensure accountability and transparency 
in the implementation and simplification of EU law, a process that is central to the von der Leyen 
Commission’s commitment to a ‘simpler and faster Europe’. The aim is to create shared ownership 
among the EU institutions to improve the effectiveness of EU rules, reduce regulatory burdens, and 
boost EU competitiveness. 

Executive  Vice-President  Ribera’s  Report  on  Implementation,  Simplification  and  Enforcement 
covers the first seven months of 2025. The Report illustrates the priority that the Executive Vice-
President attaches to the Commission’s implementation and simplification agenda. It describes the 
efforts made to revise and simplify existing legislation and to make new legislation more simple 
and  easier to  implement. The  Report  gives  examples  of  finalised  or  ongoing  simplification  and 
implementation efforts, including CISAF, the GBER for State aid, the updated SGEI Decision for 
affordable housing108, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
Regulation 1/2003, the FSR, and the DMA. 

In  2025,  Executive  Vice-President  Ribera  regularly  participated  in  exchanges  of  views  and 
structured dialogues in both the European Parliament and the Council. In the European Parliament, 
she  appeared  before  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs  Committee  (ECON  Committee);  the 
Committee  on  Industry,  Research  and  Energy;  the  Internal  Market  and  Consumer  Protection 
Committee; the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs; the Committee on Environment, 
Climate  and  Food  Safety,  and  the  Special  Committee  on  the  Housing  Crisis.  In  addition,  she 
discussed her 2025 Annual Progress Report on Implementation, Simplification and Enforcement 
in  a  structured  dialogue  with  the  ECON  committee.  In  the  Council,  Executive  Vice-President 
Ribera participated in a policy debate on industry competitiveness. 

Finally,  in  2025  DG  Competition  staff  participated  in  meetings  convened  by  the  rapporteur 
responsible for drafting the EESC’s Opinion on the Commission’s Report on Competition policy 
2024. This interaction on a ‘technical’ level provided the rapporteur and his drafting team with 
contextual  information  and  factual  explanations.  This  exchange  of  views  also  deepened  the 
Commission's understanding of the perspectives on competition policy of employers, employees, 
civil society, and other stakeholders.  

106 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee  of  the  Regions  -  A  simpler  and  faster  Europe:  communication  on  implementation  and  simplification,  com/2025/47  final, 
11.02.2025. 
107 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/ba6e04fd-27f5-4723-93d4-
747fa4f0a425_en?filename=RIBERA_APR_SPI_2025_45_EN.pdf  
108 Commission decision of 16.12.2025 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State 
aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest and repealing Decision 2012/21/E. 

22