COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2025
Date: 2026-05-05
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy, State aid, anti-trust legislation, competitiveness, digital single market, foreign aid, foreign capital, international cooperation, merger control, sustainable development

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 5.5.2026  SWD(2026) 125 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT   Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2025 {COM(2026) 180 final}  
 
 
CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 4 

I.  POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND ENFORCEMENT TRENDS ..................................... 4 

1.  Antitrust and cartels ............................................................................................................. 4 

1.1. Recent enforcement trends in antitrust and cartel enforcement ................................... 5 

1.2. The fight against cartels remains a top priority ............................................................ 6 

1.3. Modernising and simplifying antitrust rules and guidance .......................................... 7 

1.4. Significant judgments by EU Courts in antitrust and cartels ....................................... 9 

1.5. Cooperation within the European Competition Network (ECN) and with national courts 14 

2.  Merger control ................................................................................................................... 15 

2.1. Recent enforcement trends ......................................................................................... 15 

2.2. Modernising and simplifying the Merger Guidelines ................................................ 17 

2.3. Significant judgments by EU Courts in merger control ............................................. 17 

3.  State aid control ................................................................................................................. 18 

3.1. Recent enforcement trends in State aid control .......................................................... 19 

3.2. Modernising and simplifying State aid rules and guidance ........................................ 20 

3.3. Significant judgments by EU Courts in State aid ....................................................... 26 

3.4. Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts ...................................... 29 

4.  The Foreign Subsidies Regulation ..................................................................................... 30 

4.1. Context ....................................................................................................................... 30 

4.2. Developments on rules and guidance ......................................................................... 31 

4.3. Enforcement ............................................................................................................... 32 

5.  The Digital Markets Act .................................................................................................... 34 

5.1. Context ....................................................................................................................... 34 

5.2. Enforcement ............................................................................................................... 35 

5.3. Developments on rules ............................................................................................... 36 

5.4. Regulatory cooperation and transparency .................................................................. 37 

6.  Developing the international dimension of EU competition policy .................................. 37 

6.1. Multilateral relations .................................................................................................. 37 

6.2. Bilateral relations........................................................................................................ 39 

7.  Benefits of EU competition policy for consumers and citizens ........................................ 40 

7.1. Benefits of EU competition for consumers and citizens ............................................ 40 

7.2. Ex post evaluation....................................................................................................... 42 

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II.  SECTORAL OVERVIEW ................................................................................................ 43 

1.  ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT ............................................................................................... 43 

1.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors ................................................................. 43 

1.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges in the green economy  44 

1.3. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges in energy markets54 

2. 

INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION, TECHNOLOGIES & MEDIA ....................................... 55 

2.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors ................................................................. 55 

2.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 56 

3.  FINANCIAL SERVICES ........................................................................................................ 63 

3.1. Overview of key challenges in the sector ................................................................... 63 

3.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 64 

4.  TAXATION & STATE AID ................................................................................................... 69 

4.1. Overview of key challenges on tax evasion and avoidance, and fiscal aid ................ 69 

4.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 71 

5.  BASIC INDUSTRIES & MANUFACTURING .......................................................................... 71 

5.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors ................................................................. 71 

5.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 72 

6.  AGRI-FOOD & FISHERIES ................................................................................................. 76 

6.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors ................................................................. 76 

6.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 77 

7.  PHARMACEUTICAL & HEALTH SERVICES ........................................................................ 83 

7.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors ................................................................. 83 

7.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 83 

8.  TRANSPORT, POST, HOUSING & OTHER SERVICES .......................................................... 86 

8.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors ................................................................. 86 

8.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 87 

III.  SUPPORTING EU COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT ................................................. 96 

1.  DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION ............................................................................................. 96 

1.1. Case Management modernisation ............................................................................... 96 

1.2. Improving digital exchanges with Member States, consumers and citizens .............. 96 

1.3. Advanced data support and digital solutions for competition investigations ............. 97 

2.  SINGLE MARKET PROGRAMME ........................................................................................ 97 

3.  EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION & ADVOCACY .................................................................. 98 

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INTRODUCTION 

This Staff Working Document (SWD) consists of three parts. Part I presents the policy developments 
and enforcement trends in 2025 across the three competition instruments: State aid, antitrust and cartels 
and merger control. It also includes developments regarding the Digital Markets Act (DMA)1 and the 
Foreign  Subsidies  Regulation  (FSR)2:  two  Single  Market  instruments  complementing  the  EU 
competition policy framework. Part II focuses on specific sectoral policy developments and enforcement 
actions in 2025, while Part III discusses activities supporting competition enforcement3. 

I.  POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND ENFORCEMENT TRENDS 

EU competition policy strengthens the integrity of the Single Market. Its primary objective is to promote 
and maintain fair and efficient competition contributing to predictable market conditions for companies 
to grow and invest in the EU. By keeping markets open and dynamic, a robust competition policy acts as 
a  key  enabler  of  competitiveness  and  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth.  It  also  increases  companies’ 
resilience as it enables strong and diversified supply chains and addresses behaviours undermining the 
Single  Market.  Complementing  traditional  competition  instruments,  the  DMA  increases  market 
contestability in the digital sector and addresses unfair behaviour by proactively tackling issues arising 
from digital gatekeepers, while the FSR addresses market distortions caused by subsidies from non-EU 
governments - ensuring a genuinely level playing field across all markets.  

In 2025, the European Commission (Commission) continued to modernise and simplify EU competition 
policy to ensure that it fully supports a clean, just and competitive transition. This modernisation and 
simplification effort combined with robust enforcement of the EU competition rules, the DMA and the 
FSR contributes to bringing down remaining barriers to the Single Market,  promotes competitive and 
affordable clean technologies and the free flow of products and capital and ensures that digital markets 
remain contestable and fair.  

1. 

ANTITRUST AND CARTELS 

Articles 101, 102 and 106 TFEU 
According to Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), anti-competitive agreements are 
prohibited as incompatible with the internal market. Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements with an anti-competitive object 
or  effect  where  companies  coordinate  their  behaviour  instead  of  competing  independently.  However,  an  agreement  that 
restricts competition may be exempted from the prohibition under Article 101(3) TFEU if it ultimately fosters competition 
(for  example  by promoting  technical  progress  or  by  improving distribution,  while  allowing  consumers  a  fair  share  of  the 
resulting benefit). 

Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. It is not in itself illegal for an undertaking to be in a dominant 
position or to acquire such a position. Dominant undertakings, as any other undertaking in the market, are entitled to compete 
on  the  merits.  However,  Article  102  TFEU  prohibits  behaviours  by  dominant  undertakings  that,  for  example,  directly  or 
indirectly  imposes  unfair  purchase  or  selling  prices  or  other  unfair  trading  conditions,  or  limits  production,  markets  or 
technical development.  

In relation to public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Article 106(1) 
TFEU prevents Member States from enacting or maintaining in force measures contrary to the Treaty rules. 

1 Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair 
markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), OJ L 265, 
12.10.2022, p. 1–66. 
2  Regulation  (EU)  2022/2560  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14  December  2022  on  foreign  subsidies 
distorting the internal market, OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, p. 1-45. 
3  See  also  Directorate-General  for  Competition  Infograph  ‘2025  at  a  glance’  of  6.1.2026  https://competition-
policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/43bc2a9e-7172-4163-bc7c-d4b1afadd150_en?filename=2025_at_a_glance.pdf   

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1.1. Recent enforcement trends in antitrust and cartel enforcement 

The figures below provide an overview of the number and type of antitrust decisions in the past ten years, 
including  decisions  rejecting  complaints,  and  letters  informing  complainants  of  the  Commission’s 
intention to reject their complaint in the last six years. In parallel, based on the possibility for stakeholders 
to request individual guidance when facing genuine uncertainty about the legality of their actions4, in 
2025,  the Commission  issued its first  two guidance letters.  One  addressed an agreement  for the  joint 
purchasing and setting of minimum technical specifications for electric container-handling equipment 
used in ports, and the second one the creation of a licensing negotiation group in the automotive sector 
for the licensing of standard essential patents (see below Part II, section 8.2.6 and 5.2.3 respectively).  

Figure 1: Antitrust and cartel decisions 2016-2025 

Figure 2: Rejection of complaint decisions 2016-2025 

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

12

Rejection of complaint decisions

9

7

5

4

8

3

2

5

3

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

Figures include decisions under Articles 7(2) and 9 of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004
Source: Directorate-General for Competition

4 Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel or unresolved questions concerning Articles 101 and 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that arise in individual cases (guidance letters), OJ C 381, 4.10.2022, p. 9. 

5 

 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Rejection of complaint letters5 2020-2025 

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Rejection of Complaint Letters

9

10

5

5

6

14

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

Figures include only letters adopted under Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004
Source: Directorate-General for Competition

1.2. The fight against cartels remains a top priority   

Cartels cause an immense damage to the EU economy and harm businesses and consumers. Detecting 
and sanctioning cartels therefore remains a core mission for the Commission. Cartel enforcement is even 
more important  at  a time when  companies are  adjusting  to  new market  realities,  as  the temptation to 
collude risks increasing.  

In 2025, the Commission continued to build up a diversified portfolio of cartel cases, covering different 
sectors and behaviours, based either on leniency applications or leads obtained from its own ex officio 
activities which resulted in new dawn raids6.  

The  Commission’s  ex  officio  strategy  enables  the  detection  of  new  cartel  cases  outside  the  leniency 
regime.  Building  on  its  experience  and  lessons  drawn  from  recent  investigations,  the  Commission  is 
constantly  refining  methods  to  proactively  identify  suspicious  patterns  of  behaviour.  This  strategy 
combines the use of pro-active market screening with intelligence gathered through market contacts and 
cooperation with other authorities and ensures that the Commission is able to act even in the absence of 
leniency applications. This approach also enables the Commission to safeguard the deterrent effect of 
EU competition policy by maintaining a credible enforcement presence across markets, including those 
where incentives to cooperate under the leniency programme may be weaker. 

The leniency programme also continues to play an important role in the detection and investigation of 
cartels.  The  Commission  receives  a  significant  number  of  leniency  applications  covering  a  broad 
spectrum of collusion scenarios stretching across a wide range of sectors. Potential leniency applicants 
frequently use practical arrangements to improve this programme, including the option to reach out to 
designated  Leniency  Officers  within  the  Directorate  General  for  Competition  (DG  Competition)  for 
informal  guidance  and  to  discuss  potential  leniency  applications  on  a  ‘no-names’  basis.  The 
Commission’s online platform - eLeniency tool7 - remains the primary means to submit applications and 
access leniency materials, the use of oral statements being less frequent.   

5 The figures included in Figure 3 include rejection of complaint letters (Article 7(1)) which have been followed by a decision 
rejecting the complaint (Article 7(2)) mentioned in Figure 2. 
6 
instance 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2430  
7 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/leniency/eleniency_en 

unannounced 

inspections 

equipment 

See 

the 

ski 

for 

sector  

in 

6 

 
 
 
In 2025, the Commission adopted several cartel decisions. On 1 April 2025, the Commission imposed 
fines  totalling  approximately  EUR  458  million  on  15  major  car  manufacturers  and  the  European 
Automobiles Manufacturers' Association (ACEA) for participating in a long-lasting cartel concerning 
end-of-life vehicle recycling8. So far, this is the largest case (in terms of number of addressees) concluded 
under the Commission’s Cartel Settlement Procedure (see below Part II, section 1.2.10.2). 

On 2 June 2025, the Commission fined Delivery Hero and Glovo, two major food delivery companies, a 
total of EUR 329 million for participating in a cartel in the online food delivery sector9. This is the first 
time the Commission has sanctioned a cartel in the labour market (so-called no-poach arrangement) and 
the use of a minority shareholding to collude (see below Part II, section 6.2.2). 

On 4 July 2025, the Commission also fined Alchem International Pvt. Ltd. and its subsidiary Alchem 
International  (H.K.) Limited EUR  489 000 for their participation, for more than 12 years, in  a  cartel 
affecting an important pharmaceutical ingredient necessary to produce abdominal antispasmodic drugs 
10 (see below Part II, section 7.2.2). 

On 15 December 2025, the Commission fined several automotive starter batteries manufacturers as well 
as the trade association Eurobat a total of around EUR 72 million for engaging in a long-running cartel 
concerning automotive starter batteries11. The decision clarifies that while a surcharge is in general a 
legitimate tool which contract partners can use to reflect changes in raw material costs in product prices, 
it  is  clearly  illegal  for  suppliers  to  secretly  coordinate  to  introduce  and  use  such  a  surcharge  as  an 
industry-wide standard (see below Part II, section 5.2.3). 

The Commission remains dedicated to investigating possible anticompetitive conduct that impacts the 
clean, just and competitive transition.  

1.3. Modernising and simplifying antitrust rules and guidance  

In 2025, the Commission continued to modernise and simplify EU antitrust rules to ensure that they fully 
support  a  clean,  just  and  competitive  transition.  The  developments  outlined  below  concern  rules  of 
horizontal nature. The developments on sectoral rules and guidance are included in the relevant sections 
of Part II. 

1.3.1.  Revision of Regulations 1/2003 and 773/2004 ongoing 

Regulation 1/200312 and its implementing act, Regulation 773/200413, establish a procedural framework 
aimed at ensuring the effective and uniform application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.  

The evaluation of the two Regulations concluded in 2024 shows that they have generally achieved their 
objective of effective, efficient and uniform application of EU competition rules and remain relevant. 
That  evaluation  also  identifies  several  areas  for  further  reflection14.  The  evidence  gathered  in  the 
evaluation  indicated  that  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  some  of  the  Commission’s  investigative 
tools, in particular requests for information and inspections, is increasingly affected by digitalisation as 

8 Case AT.40669 – End-of-life vehicle recycling. 
9 Case AT.40795 – Food delivery services.  
10 Case AT.40636 – SNBB. 
11 Case AT.40545 – Automotive starter batteries. 
12 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L, 4.1.2003, p. 1. 
13 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April  2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the  Commission 
pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18. 
14 
See 
evaluation_en  

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13431-EU-antitrust-procedural-rules-

7 

 
 
these tools were conceived for ‘paper world' investigations with less data. The evaluation has shown that 
certain other aspects of the Commission’s procedures are also not optimally efficient. For example, the 
interim measures power, while intended for urgent situations where harm to competition is imminent, is 
procedurally  intensive,  meanwhile  commitment  procedures,  while  generally  regarded  as  an  efficient 
alternative to prohibition decisions, remain relatively lengthy. Finally, the procedures for granting access 
to file and for rejecting formal complaints were found to be resource-intensive and not optimally efficient. 
All these elements also stand in the way of having faster investigations. In addition, by decentralising 
enforcement, the Regulations have allowed national competition authorities (NCAs) to become effective 
enforcers  of  Articles  101  and  102  TFEU.  This  has  been  supported  by  the  creation  of  the  European 
Competition Network (ECN) which has been pivotal to achieving a uniform and effective application of 
EU  competition  rules.  Still,  the  evaluation  indicated  that  the  cooperation  within  the  ECN  could  be 
enhanced further, in particular by avoiding unnecessary parallel investigations and further improving the 
interplay between EU and national competition laws to ensure the coherent enforcement of all available 
legal instruments. 

As a follow-up, the Commission launched the revision process on 10 July 2025. It seeks to keep up with 
transformative changes, such as the digitalisation of the economy and its impact on the Commission's 
enforcement  tools,  speed  up  investigations,  and  optimise  the  system  of  parallel  enforcement  by  the 
Commission and the NCAs. The process began with a stakeholders’ consultation via a call for evidence 
and a public consultation questionnaire to gather feedback on options for revising the rules, running from 
July  to  October  202515. On 15 December 2025, the Commission  organised  a reality  check to  engage 
further with stakeholders on their perspectives regarding the various policy options outlined in the call 
for  evidence.  The  reality  check  was  organised  around  four  breakout  sessions  covering  the  following 
topics:  (i)  the  Commission’s  evidence-gathering  toolbox  (inspections,  preservation  orders  and 
interviews); (ii) convergence and cooperation in the ECN, the handling of complaints, and third-party 
participation  in  proceedings;  (iii)  granting  access  to  the  file:  confidentiality  rings;  and  (iv)  the 
Commission’s  decision-making  procedures:  interim  measures,  commitments  and  remedies.  The 
discussion also collected views on simplifying the rules and on the practical implications of the proposed 
policy options, to ensure they are well-targeted and achieve the intended benefits. 

1.3.2.  Work on Guidelines on exclusionary abuses ongoing  

Exclusionary abuses harm consumers and citizens; they lead to higher prices, reduced innovation, limited 
choice, and poorer quality of goods and services.  

In  2025,  the  Commission  continued  working  on  the  future  Guidelines  on  exclusionary  abuses  of 
dominance. The purpose of the initiative is to codify the case-law on Article 102 TFEU, ensuring legal 
certainty and predictability of the legal framework while providing operational guidance to companies. 
The  initiative  also  aims  to  contribute  to  the  modernisation  of  the  EU’s  competition  policy  by 
strengthening and making more effective and efficient the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU, thereby 
keeping markets open, encouraging investments and enabling the development of innovative products 
and services.  

Following  the  public  consultation  on  the  draft  Guidelines  in  202416,  the  Commission  organised  a 
workshop in February 2025 to  continue the dialogue with stakeholders.  The topics discussed were as 
follows: single and collective dominance; capability to produce exclusionary effects; evidentiary burden 
and  substantive  legal  standard;  departure  from  competition  on  the  merits  (notion  and  practical 

15 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1795  
16 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/public-consultations/2024-article-102-guidelines_en  

8 

 
 
application);  objective  necessity  and  efficiencies;  predatory  pricing  and  margin  squeeze;  exclusive 
dealing and conditional rebates; tying; self-preferencing, and refusal to supply and access restrictions.  

The  review  of  the  draft  Guidelines  is  ongoing,  incorporating  feedback  from  stakeholders  and  recent 
developments in the case-law of the EU Courts. The Commission aims to adopt the Guidelines in 2026. 

1.3.3.  Revision of rules on technology transfer agreements ongoing  

In 2025, the Commission launched the impact assessment phase of the review of the Technology Transfer 
Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER)17 and the accompanying Guidelines (TTGL)18. This builds on the 
results  of  the  evaluation  completed  on  22  November  2024  with  the  publication  of  a  staff  working 
document. 

The evaluation showed that the TTBER and TTGL have been largely successful in ensuring the effective, 
efficient  and  uniform  application  of  EU  competition  rules  to  technology  transfer  agreements. 
Specifically, both instruments have successfully assisted companies in self-assessing the compliance of 
their technology transfer agreements with EU competition rules. 

However, the evaluation also indicated areas for improvement to increase legal certainty (for example, 
to address stakeholders’ practical difficulties in calculating market shares on technology markets) and 
that the rules could be updated to  reflect recent market developments (for example, in relation to the 
growing  importance  of  the  licensing  of  certain  types  of  data,  which  are  not  addressed  by  the  current 
rules). 

In light of the results of the evaluation, the impact assessment seeks to review possible policy options for 
those areas of the rules that could be improved to ensure that the framework remains fit for purpose in 
light of evolving technologies and market dynamics.  

In 2025, the Commission gathered evidence through several means, including an external expert study 
on data licensing, a call for evidence, and a public consultation on the proposed options for revising the 
rules. A public consultation on drafts of a revised TTBER and Guidelines was held in September and 
October.  A  reality  check  was  organised  on  12  November  2025  to  test  the  practical  implications  of 
proposed changes regarding data licensing, licensing negotiation groups and technology pools. More than 
80 stakeholders participated in the reality check. Their feedback will inform the finalisation of the revised 
TTBER and Guidelines, which are expected in 2026.  

1.4. Significant judgments by EU Courts in antitrust and cartels 

1.4.1.  Antitrust 

In  2025,  the  EU  Courts  adopted  significant  judgments  and  preliminary  rulings  on  various  aspects  of 
antitrust enforcement.  

1.4.1.1. Anticompetitive agreements under Article 101 TFEU 

The Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling of 8 May 2025 in Beevers Kaas19 clarified the conditions under 
which an exclusive distribution system could benefit from an exemption under the 2010 Vertical Block 
Exemption Regulation20. The Court confirmed for the first time that one of the conditions for an active 

17 Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to categories of 
technology transfer agreements, OJ L 93, 28.3.2014, p. 17. 
18  Communication  from  the  Commission  —  Guidelines  on  the  application  of  Article  101  TFEU  to  technology  transfer 
agreements, OJ C 89, 28.3.2014, p. 3. 
19 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 May 2025 in Case C-581/23, Beevers Kaas, ECLI:EU:C:2025:323. 
20 Commission Regulation No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) TFEU to categories of 
vertical agreements and concerted practice, OJ L 336, 29.12.1999, p. 21. 

9 

 
 
sales ban imposed to protect an exclusive distribution system to benefit from the 2010 Vertical Block 
Exemption Regulation is that the supplier must obtain the (express or implicit) acceptance of the sales 
ban by all its other distributors in the European Economic Area (EEA). That condition is included in the 
definition of exclusive distribution systems in the 2022 Vertical Block Exemption Regulation21. 

On 23 October 2025, the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal lodged by Teva and Cephalon against the 
General Court’s judgment22 upholding a Commission decision which fined those companies for having 
entered  into  an  anticompetitive  pay-for-delay  agreement23.  On  26  November  2020,  the  Commission 
established  that  Teva  and  Cephalon  had  infringed  Article  101  TFEU  by  concluding  a  settlement 
agreement under which Teva agreed to delay the entry of its generic product in exchange for a value 
transfer from Cephalon24. Unlike in previous pay-for-delay cases (Fentanyl25, Lundbeck26 and Servier27), 
the payment (value transfer) to Teva was made predominantly through a package of commercial deals, 
which were all very lucrative for Teva, rather than as a straightforward cash payment. By establishing 
that these side deals would not have been concluded (or at least not on the same terms) under normal 
market conditions, i.e. had Teva not agreed to the non-compete and no-challenge clauses in the settlement 
agreement, the Commission concluded that the side deals indeed represented an illegal value transfer. 
The  Court  rejected  the  appeal  in  its  entirety  thus  confirming  the  Commission’s  decision  that  the 
settlement agreement constituted an infringement of Article 101 TFEU by both object and effect. 

1.4.1.2. Abuses of dominance under Article 102 TFEU 

On 25 February 2025, the Court of Justice delivered a preliminary ruling in Alphabet/Autoritá Garante 
della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Android Auto)28. The Court clarified that, where a dominant company 
has  developed  a  digital  platform  intended  for  use  by  third  parties,  refusing  to  grant  interoperability 
between that platform and a third-party app may constitute an abuse of dominant position. The Court 
also emphasised that this refusal can be an abuse even if access to that platform is not indispensable for 
the  commercial  operation  of  the  third-party  app,  but  is  such  as  to  make  that  app  more  attractive  to 
consumers. Furthermore, the Court of Justice clarified that the fact  that the third-party  app and other 
competitors remained on the market or even grew their position despite not having access to the dominant 
company’s  platform  does  not  mean  that  the  refusal  of  interoperability  did  not  have  anti-competitive 
effects and was therefore not abusive. Such refusal can still be considered abusive if it has the potential 
to hinder competition on the market. This judgment is significant as it provides clarity when a refusal to 
grant interoperability may be abusive under Article 102 TFEU. 

In  Cluj  Airport29,  the  Court  of  Justice  clarified  on  27  February  2025  in  a  preliminary  ruling  that  the 
Council Directive 96/67/EC on access to the ground handling market at Union airports does not exclude 
the application of EU competition law’s prohibition of abusive conduct in situations where the airport 
provider  refuses  access  to  the  airport  infrastructure  necessary  for  the  provision  of  ground  handling 

21 Commission Regulation 2022/720 of 10 May 2022 on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU  to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 134, 11.5.2022, p. 4. 
22  Judgment  of  the  General  Court  of  18  October  2023  in  Case  T-74/21,  Teva  Pharmaceutical  Industries  and  Cephalon  v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2023:651. 
23 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 23 October 2025 in Case C-2/24 P, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries and Cephalon v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2025:825. 
24 Case AT.39686 – Cephalon. 
25 Case AT.39685 – Fentanyl. 
26 Case AT.39226 – Lundbeck. 
27 Case AT.39612 – Perindopril (Servier). 
28 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 25 February 2025 in Case C-233/23, Alphabet/Autoritá Garante della Concorrenza e 
del Mercato (Android Auto), ECLI:EU:2025:110. 
29 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 February 2025 in Case C-220/24, Cluj Airport, ECLI:EU:C:2025:124. 

10 

 
 
services at EU airports. The judgment confirms that the mere existence of sectoral rules does not mean 
that the conduct in question is exempted from the competition rules laid down by the Treaties, irrespective 
of whether or not those sectoral rules are applicable to that conduct. 

On  10  December  2025,  the  General  Court  dismissed  Intel’s30  application  for  annulment  of  the 
Commission’s  2023 decision  imposing on Intel  a fine of EUR 376 million  for infringing Article  102 
TFEU by imposing so-called naked restrictions on HP, Acer and Lenovo concerning the use of AMD 
processors. The 2023 decision followed a legal  battle between  Intel  and the Commission  regarding a 
2009 decision by which the Commission fined Intel EUR 1.06 billion for infringing Article 102 TFEU 
by means of exclusivity rebates and payments granted to certain customers (so-called naked restrictions). 
Together, those two types of conducts were considered to form a single and continuous infringement as 
part of a strategy aimed at excluding a competitor from the market  for microprocessors. In 2022, the 
General Court annulled the Commission’s 2009 decision as regards the part of the single and continuous 
infringement relating to exclusivity rebates but annulled the fine in full, since it was not in a position to 
identify the amount of the fine relating solely to the naked restrictions part of the decision that was upheld. 
Consequently,  in  2023,  the  Commission  re-adopted  a  decision  imposing  a  fine  on  Intel  of  EUR  376 
million  only  for  the  naked  restrictions.  Intel  again  challenged  that  decision.  In  its  judgment  of  10 
December 2025, the General Court fully endorsed the Commission’s decision to re-adopt a fine for the 
naked restrictions but, at the same time, reduced that fine by 37% to EUR 237 million in view of the 
lower gravity of the naked restrictions in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction. 

1.4.1.3. Antitrust procedure  

On  30  January  2025,  the  Court  of  Justice  delivered  a  preliminary  ruling  in  Caronte  &  Tourist31.  It 
concluded that the ECN+ Directive32 and Article 102 TFEU, read in light of the principle of effectiveness 
of EU law, preclude national legislation from imposing a 90-day time limit on a national competition 
authority to initiate proceedings concerning a competition law infringement in a case such as the one 
pending before the referring court. The underlying national legislation provides such a 90-day time limit 
starting from the moment the competition authority gained knowledge of the essential elements of the 
alleged  infringement,  and  sanctions  the  failure  to  observe  that  period  with  the  annulment  of  that 
authority’s  final  decision  and  the  revocation  of  the  authority’s  power  to  initiate  new  infringement 
proceedings regarding the same practice. 

1.4.2.  Cartels 

In  2025,  the  EU  courts  dealt  with  several  actions  for  annulment  of  cartel  decisions  and  appeals  and 
clarified the Commission’s inspection powers.  

In Replacement Tyres33, the General Court upheld on 9 July 2025 the Commission’s inspection decision 
as regards the ‘main period’ of the suspected infringement. The Court confirmed that the Commission 
can launch inspections purely based on information obtained through the screening of publicly available 
information, and that the inspection decision was sufficiently reasoned. It also noted that the Commission 
can use its inspection powers even in a scenario where the evidence may be limited to publicly available 
information  -  in  the  present  case,  regular  public  calls  with  investors  (so-called  earnings  calls)  -  and 

30 Judgment of the General Court of 10 December 2025 in Case T-1129/23, Intel v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2025:1091. 
31 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 30 January 2025 in Case C-511/23, Caronte & Tourist, ECLI:EU:C:2025:42. 
32 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition 
authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, 
OJ L 11, 14.1.2019, p. 3. 
33  Judgment  of  the  General  Court  of  9  July  2025  in  Case  T188/24,  Compagnie  générale  des  établissements-  Michelin  v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2025:686. 

11 

 
 
rejected the claim that a request for information would have been more appropriate in such a scenario. 
The Court however annulled the part of the decision regarding to the ‘earlier period’ of the suspected 
infringement,  finding  that  the  Commission  did  not  show  sufficiently  serious  indicia  to  support  the 
suspicions for those few years in the more distant past. The judgment is final. 

On 30 April 2025 in Symrise34, the General Court fully upheld the legality of the inspection in the ex 
officio  Consumer  Fragrance  investigation.  The  Court  confirmed  that  the  Commission  had  sufficient 
indicia  of  a  possible  infringement  to  justify  its  actions.  Importantly,  the  Court  also  upheld  the 
Commission’s right to protect the confidentiality of its sources and investigation methods at this stage of 
the proceedings, recognizing that disclosing their identity or the precise origin of the information could 
undermine the effectiveness of cartel detection. The judgment is final. 

In EGB (European Government Bonds), the General Court dismissed all six actions for annulment of the 
Commission’s  decision  on  26  March  202535.  In  particular,  the  Court  confirmed  that  the  conduct 
constituted  a  single  and  continuous  infringement.  It  further  held  that  the  exchanges  of  commercially 
sensitive information, price-fixing arrangements, market sharing and customer allocation - on both the 
primary and secondary market for EGBs - were particularly harmful to competition. Furthermore, the 
Court confirmed the Commission’s legitimate interest in finding an infringement with regard to Bank of 
America and Natixis, both of which were not fined because their infringement fell outside the limitation 
period.  The  Court  also  upheld  the  Commission’s  methodology  for  calculating  the  fines  but  made 
marginal corrections. Five investment banks have since appealed against the judgment36. 

In FOREX, the General Court partly upheld the application for annulment by Credit Suisse - now UBS - 
of the Commission’s decision of 2 December 2021 that imposed  a fine of EUR 83 million on Credit 
Suisse for its participation in 2012 in one of the FOREX cartels37. All other banks had settled their case 
with the Commission for a total of EUR 1.4 billion. The Court confirmed that Credit Suisse participated 
in the cartel and rejected all arguments in that regard but reduced the amount of the fine to EUR 28.9 
million.  The  Commission  had  calculated  the  value  of  sales  on  the  basis  of  a  proxy  that  contained  a 
uniform  reduction  factor,  while  Credit  Suisse  had  provided  the  Commission  with  more  granular 
individual data. The Court found that the Commission was obliged to use this ‘best available data’ when 
it applied its own Fining Guidelines38. Neither the Commission, nor UBS, have appealed the judgment 
and the Commission has adapted and further individualised its fining methodology in financial cartel 
cases.  

The  judgments  above  are  in  line  with  previous  case-law  predominantly  upholding  the  Commission’s 
decisions  sanctioning  investment  banks  for  the  anticompetitive  conduct  of  their  traders  through  the 
exchange  of  commercially  sensitive  information  in  a  network  of  contacts  between  competitors,  and 
endorsing - albeit sometimes with corrections - the fines calculations in the Commission’s financial cartel 
cases.  

34 Judgment of the General Court of 30 April 2025 in Case T-263/23, Symrise AG v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2025:417. 
35 Judgments of the General Court of 26 March 2025 in Cases T-441/21, T-449/21, T-453/21, T-455/21, T-456/21, T-462/21, 
UBS Group and UBS v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2025:337. 
36 Cases C-370/25 P – UniCredit, C-375/25 P – Nomura, C-376/25 P – Portigon, C-379/25 P – UBS and C-384/25 P – Natixis. 
37 Judgment of the General Court of 3 July 2025 in Case T-84/22, UBS Group and Others v Commission, as successor Credit 
Suisse v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2025:752. 
38 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, OJ C 210, 1.9.2006, 
p. 2. 

12 

 
 
1.4.3.  Private enforcement of EU competition law 

In  2025,  the  Court  of  Justice  issued  several  significant  rulings  regarding  private  enforcement  in  EU 
competition law. 
The Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling of 28 January 2025 in ASG 239 concerned a stand-alone action 
where several sawmills, which allegedly suffered losses following an infringement of Article 101 TFEU, 
assigned their damages claims to a legal person that brought a bundled action for damages on behalf of 
the  sawmills.  The  Court  clarified  that  the  principles  of  effectiveness  and  effective  judicial  protection 
preclude national law which has the effect of preventing persons allegedly harmed by competition law 
infringements from assigning their claims for compensation on a fiduciary basis to a provider of legal 
services,  provided  that:  (i)  there  are  no  equivalent  legal  or  contractual  possibilities  for  consolidating 
claims; and (ii) the bringing of individual actions for damages is, having regards to all the circumstances, 
impossible  or  excessively  difficult.  The  judgment  is  significant  as  it  states  that  national  legislation 
preventing a group action to claim damages may infringe EU law. 
In its preliminary ruling of 13 February 2025 in Athenian Brewery and Heineken40, the Court of Justice 
clarified that a parent company and its subsidiary can be jointly sued at the place where one of them is 
domiciled if the parent company exercises decisive influence on the economic activity of the subsidiary. 
Where the parent company holds all or almost all the shares of its subsidiary, a rebuttable presumption 
applies  that  the  parent  exercises  such  decisive  influence  over  that  subsidiary  for  the  purpose  of 
determining jurisdiction.  
In its preliminary ruling of 4 September 2025 in Nissan Iberia41, the Court of Justice found that Article 
101  TFEU,  read  in  the  light  of  the  principle  of  effectiveness  and  the  Damages  Directive42,  must  be 
interpreted as meaning that the limitation period under national law for bringing an action for damages - 
allegedly  arising  from  an  infringement  of  EU  competition  law  found  in  a  decision  by  a  national 
competition authority - cannot begin to run until that decision is no longer susceptible to appeal. The 
Court also emphasised that judgments in which such a decision  has been definitively upheld must be 
officially published, freely accessible to the public, and have a clearly specified date of publication. 
The Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling of 30 October 2025 in FL und KM Baugesellschaft and S43 
clarified  that  EU  law  does  not  grant  an  absolute  protection  to  leniency  statements  and  settlement 
submissions (i.e. the voluntary self-incriminating statements made by parties subject to a competition 
law investigation to obtain immunity or a fine reduction). In particular, the Court held that EU law does 
not  preclude  mechanisms  for  administrative  assistance  that  would  require  a  national  competition 
authority  to  transmit  its  files,  including  leniency  statements  and  settlement  submissions  and  the 
information obtained from them, to the national criminal authorities, upon request, provided that such 
mechanisms do not jeopardize the effectiveness of leniency programs and settlement procedures as tools 
to detect and establish competition law infringements. The Court however clarified that once leniency 
statements and settlement submissions end up in criminal files, pursuant to Article 31(3) of the ECN+ 

39 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 28 January 2025 in Case C-253/23, ASG 2, Ausgleichsgesellschaft für die Sägeindustrie 
Nordrhein-Westfalen GmbH v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, ECLI:EU:C:2025:40.  
40  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  13  February  2025  in  Case  C-393/23,  Athenian  Brewery  SA  and  Heineken  NV  v 
Macedonian Thrace Brewery SA, ECLI:EU:C:2025:85. 
41 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 4 September 2025 in Case C-21/24, CP v Nissan Iberia SA, ECLI:EU:2025:659. 
42 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing 
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 1. 
43  Judgement  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  30  October  2025  in  Case  C-2/23,  FL  und  KM  Baugesellschaft  and  S, 
ECLI:EU:C:2025:848. 

13 

 
 
Directive44,  access  to  these  statements  and  submissions  can  only  be  granted  to  persons  under 
investigation for the purposes of exercising their rights of defence, in particular where complaints against 
those persons are based on information contained therein. Access cannot be granted to other parties, in 
particular  injured  parties  who  seek  compensation  for  the  harm  caused  by  the  competition  law 
infringement. The Court further clarified that this access limitation does not extend to documents and 
information provided in order to explain, specify in detail and prove the content of leniency statements 
or settlement submissions. 

1.5. Cooperation within the European Competition Network (ECN) and with national courts 

1.5.1.  Cooperation with the national competition authorities (NCAs) within the ECN 

Along with the Commission, NCAs and national courts enforce EU antitrust rules (Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU) within their respective jurisdiction. The cooperation with NCAs takes place through the ECN45 
ensuring effective and consistent application of these rules. This unique joint enforcement has not only 
significantly contributed to fair competition in the Single Market, but also reinforced the relevance and 
credibility of EU law. 

Two key mechanisms safeguard the effective and consistent application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU: 
(i) the NCAs’ obligation to inform the Commission of a new investigation at the stage of the first formal 
investigative measure, and (ii) the NCAs’ obligation to notify the Commission of their envisaged national 
decisions  applying  those  provisions.  In  2025,  the  Commission  and  the  NCAs  launched  154  new 
investigations, and the NCAs notified 71 envisaged decisions to the Commission.  

In addition to these formal cooperation mechanisms, the ECN members meet regularly to inform each 
other of new investigations, and to discuss ongoing investigations, case-law developments and various 
competition  policy-related  issues.  For  instance,  the  Commission  and  several  NCAs  pooled  their  data 
scientists to work on common detection projects within the ECN Digital Investigations and AI working 
group. In 2025, 37 ECN meetings took place.  

1.5.2.  ECN+ Directive  

The  ECN+  Directive  aims  to  ensure  that  NCAs  have  effective  enforcement  tools  and  the  necessary 
resources to detect and sanction companies infringing EU antitrust rules. It also aims to ensure that the 
NCAs can take their decisions in full independence.  

In March 2025, the Commission closed the infringement proceedings which had been opened against 15 
Member States for the late transposition of the Directive46. On 23 January 2025, the Court of Justice 
imposed  a  lump sum  and  periodic  penalty  payment  on  Estonia  for  lack of  transposition47.  Early  July 
2025, Estonia notified to the Commission the full transposition of the Directive. The Commission closed 
the infringement proceeding against Estonia on 11 December 202548. 

44 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition 
authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, 
OJ L 11, 14.1.2019, p. 3. 
45 The functioning of the ECN is governed by the Notice on Cooperation within the ECN, the Joint Statement of the Council 
and the Commission on the Functioning of the Network of Competition Authorities as well as the ECN+ Directive. 
46 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/european-competition-network/ecn-directive_en 
47  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  23  January  2025  in  Case  C-77/23,  Commission  v  Estonia  (Directive  ECN  +), 
ECLI:EU:C:2025:38. 
48 The closure of infringement proceedings for non-communication of the transposition measures is without prejudice to the 
Commission's ability to address transposition issues it identifies. 

14 

 
 
1.5.3.  Cooperation with national courts 

In addition to cooperating with the NCAs within the ECN, the Commission also cooperates with national 
courts. The Commission supports national courts in enforcing the EU competition rules in an effective 
and consistent manner by providing case-related information or opinions on matters of substance, or by 
intervening as amicus curiae in proceedings pending before national courts.  

1.5.4.  Private enforcement 

The Damages Directive aims to simplify the process for those harmed by an infringement of EU antitrust 
rules to exercise their right to compensation before national courts. Since its adoption in 2014, the number 
of damages actions before national courts increased significantly, and such actions have become much 
more widespread across the EU. In light of this trend, DG Competition launched a study in summer of 
2024 to examine the development of antitrust damages actions in the EU. This study, which is being 
conducted by an external consortium, seeks to take stock of the quantitative and qualitative development 
of private antitrust damages actions across various EU jurisdictions, including their interplay with public 
competition law enforcement. Work on the study is currently ongoing. 

2. 

MERGER CONTROL 

The purpose of EU merger control is to ensure that market structures remain competitive while enabling smooth restructuring 
of  the  industry.  This  applies  not  only  to  EU-based  companies,  but  also  to  any  company  active  on  the  EU  markets.  The 
Commission  assesses  the  transactions  under  the  EU  Merger  Regulation  (EUMR)49.  While  industry  restructuring  is  an 
important way of fostering the efficient allocation of production assets, consolidation can, in certain situations, give rise to 
harmful effects on competition. EU merger control ensures that changes in the market structure which  would lead to such 
harmful effects on competition are prevented.  

EU merger control ensures that companies active on EU markets can compete on fair and equal terms. 
Proposed  transactions  which  are  likely  to  distort  competition  are  subject  to  close  scrutiny  by  the 
Commission.  If  necessary  to  protect  competition,  the  Commission  can  give  merging  companies  the 
opportunity to dispel competition concerns by offering commitments. If sufficient commitments cannot 
be  found  or  agreed  upon,  the  Commission  may  prohibit  the  transaction.  In  its  assessment,  the 
Commission considers the efficiencies brought about by mergers. Such efficiencies may have positive 
effects on costs and innovation, provided they are verifiable, merger-specific, and likely to be passed on 
to consumers. 

2.1. Recent enforcement trends  

In 2025, the Commission received 384 notifications and adopted 370 decisions. This represents a slight 
decrease compared to the previous year and is broadly in line with the ten-year average. Moreover, in 
2025 the Commission received 31 reasoned submissions from notifying parties during pre-notification, 
requesting the referral of a case either from the Commission to an NCA or vice versa. The Commission 
agreed to examine one transaction following a referral pursuant to Article 22 EUMR50 and did not refer 

49 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 24, 
29.1.2004, p. 1. 
50 Case M.11956 – UMG / Downtown. 

15 

 
 
 
any transaction to NCAs for examination under Article 9 EUMR51. 

The vast  majority of mergers notified in  2025 did not  raise competition  concerns  and were reviewed 
speedily. The simplified procedure was applied in 88% of all decisions: the Commission adopted 325 
merger decisions under this procedure. Nevertheless, merger enforcement remained intensive due to the 
complexity of a significant number of cases. The Commission intervened in nine cases, all of which were 
approved subject to conditions. The Commission did not prohibit any transaction in 2025. 

A  significant  number  of  non-simplified  transactions  concerned  already  concentrated  industries. 
Reviewing  these  required  the  Commission  to  assess  their  potential  impact  on  competition  carefully, 
employing sophisticated quantitative techniques and comprehensive qualitative investigative tools.  

In  2025,  the  Commission  opened  in-depth  investigations  (Phase  II)  in  four  cases,  concerning  the 
wholesale markets for branded food52, the wholesale market for the distribution of recorded music53, the 
market for low-carbon ferronickel54, and the market for container terminal services55.  

Figure 4: Merger outcome 2016-2025 

All  remedies  accepted  by  the  Commission  in  2025  consisted  of  divestitures  of  tangible  or  intangible 
assets. This confirms the Commission’s general preference for structural remedies in merger cases, as 
they are best suited to address competition concerns arising from a concentration in a durable manner. 

In the nine instances where the Commission cleared transactions subject to remedies, the notifying parties 
offered  comprehensive  remedy  packages  already  in  Phase  I.  This  includes  transactions  in  which  the 
divestment business from a previous transaction once again constituted the remedy package, as seen in 
Safran’s acquisition of part of Collins Aerospace56. In this case, clearance was conditional upon Safran’s 
divestment of its North American trimmable horizontal stabiliser actuator systems business, which fully 

51 One Article 9 EUMR referral request was sent by Italy in M.11830 UNICREDIT / BANCO BPM and rejected on 19 June 
2025. 
52 Case M.11753 – Mars / Kellanova. 
53 Case M.11956 – UMG / Downtown. 
54 Case M.11944 – MMG / Anglo American Nickel. 
55 Case M.11811 – TIL / Hutchinson Ports / TERCAT. 
56 Case M.11253 – Safran / part of Collins Aerospace’s actuation and flight control activities. 

16 

 
 
 
addressed the competition concerns identified by the Commission. 

2.2. Modernising and simplifying the Merger Guidelines 

In 2025, DG Competition launched the review of the EU Merger Guidelines, a key policy initiative in 
line with the Executive Vice-President Ribera’s Mission Letter57.  

Both a public and a targeted consultation were held simultaneously and ran from 8 May until 3 September 
2025.  The  Commission  received  243  responses  in  total,  out  of  which  106  were  replies  to  the  public 
consultation. On 29 October 2025, the Commission published a factual summary of the feedback received 
from the public  consultation58 showing that a majority is in favour of updating the  Guidelines and to 
replace the currently separate Guidelines by one single document. The Commission also published an 
overview of the main trends from the consultation59.  

On 4 December 2025, DG Competition organised the first stakeholder workshop on the review of the 
Guidelines.  Around  120  participants  discussed  topics  such  as  scale,  market  power,  resilience, 
competitiveness and efficiencies in six interactive break-out sessions. The second workshop will be held 
in January 2026. The revised EU Merger Guidelines are expected in 2026. 

2.3. Significant judgments by EU Courts in merger control 
In  E.ON60,  on  26  June  2025,  the  Court  of  Justice  dismissed  the  appeal  of  five  German  public  sector 
undertakings against judgments of the General Court61 upholding a Commission decision that authorised 
a  transaction  between  German  energy  companies  RWE  and  E.ON62.  E.ON  and  RWE  announced  in 
March 2018 a complex asset swap by means of three transactions. One of the questions addressed before 
the Court of Justice was whether those three transactions formed part of a ‘single concentration’ and that, 
therefore, they ought to have been examined in the context of a single merger control procedure and not 
through three separate procedures as was the case here63. The Court of Justice dismissed this ground of 
appeal  on  the  basis  that  the  concept  of  a  ‘single  concentration’  does  not  apply  where  independent 
undertakings gain control of different targets, as is the case with this asset swap.  

In  Brasserie  Nationale  and  Munhowen,  the  General  Court  dismissed  an  action  for  annulment  of  a 
Commission decision on 2 July 2025. The contested decision had granted a referral request under Article 
22  EUMR,  submitted  by  the  Luxembourgish  Competition  Authority,  regarding  the  acquisition  of 
Boissons Heintz by Brasserie Nationale64. The action for annulment was brought, in particular, on the 
grounds that the applicants considered the referral request to be submitted out of time. They argued this 

See 

https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/5a34ea69-5876-4cd9-a9ff-

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14596-Merger-guidelines-review/public-

57 Mission letter to EVP Teresa Ribera Rodríguez  https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5b1aaee5-681f-470b-
9fd5-aee14e106196_en . The revision of the Merger Guidelines was also indicated in the Competitiveness Compass and the 
Clean Industrial Deal Communication. 
58  See 
consultation_en   
59 
bc475cd6150e_en?filename=merger-guidelines-review-consultations-2025_overview-of-main-trends.pdf  
60 Judgment of 26 June 2025, in  Joined  Cases C-464/23 P, C-465/23 P, C-467/23 P, C-468/23 P and C-470/23 P, EVH v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2025:478. 
61  EVH  v  Commission  (T-312/20),  Stadtwerke  Leipzig  v  Commission  (T-313/20),  TEAG  v  Commission  (T-315/20), 
EnergieVerbund  Dresden  v  Commission  (T-317/20),  GGEW  v  Commission  (T-319/20)  (together,  ‘the  judgments  under 
appeal’). 
62 Case M.8871 – RWE / E.ON Assets. 
63 Two transactions were examined by the Commission (M.8871 – RWE/E.ON Assets and M.8870 – E.ON/Innogy) and one 
by the German Federal Competition Authority (Case B8-28/19). 
64  Judgment  of  the  General  Court  of  2  July  2025,  in  Case  T-289-24,  Brasserie  Nationale  and  Munhowen, 
ECLI:EU:T:2025:655. 

17 

 
 
constituted  a  breach  of  the  second  subparagraph  of  Article  22(1)  EUMR,  which  states  that  a  referral 
request must be submitted within 15 working days of the date on which the concentration was  ‘made 
known’ to the Member State. The General Court ruled that the ‘making known’ of a concentration must 
consist of an active transmission - by the undertakings concerned, third parties or any other source - of 
relevant and sufficient information to the competent authority of the Member State concerned. 

3. 

STATE AID CONTROL 

State aid control is an integral part of EU competition policy and a necessary safeguard to preserve effective competition 
and free trade within the Single Market. 

The Treaty establishes the principle that State aid which distorts, or threatens to distort, competition is prohibited insofar as it 
affects  trade  between  Member  States  (Article  107(1)  TFEU).  However,  certain  types  of  State  aid  may  be  considered 
compatible with the internal market (for example, under Article 107(3) TFEU).  

The objectives of the Commission’s control of State aid are to ensure that aid is growth-enhancing, efficient and effective, 
and better targeted in times of budgetary constraints and that aid does not unduly restrict competition. In addition to this, the 
Commission acts to prevent and recover State aid that is incompatible with the Single Market. 

In  the  area  of  State  aid  control,  several  policy  initiatives  advanced  the  EU  economy  on  its  route  to 
competitiveness, growth and resilience. Most significantly, the Commission adopted the Clean Industrial 
Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF)65 to accompany the Clean Industrial Deal (CID)66, the EU’s plan for 
competitiveness and decarbonisation launched on 26 February 2025. The Commission  also adopted a 
new  Services  of  General  Economic  Interest  (SGEI)  Decision,  introducing  important  new  rules  for 
affordable housing SGEIs (see below Part II, section 8.2.1.1), and published guidance on how Strategic 
Projects - as defined in the Critical Medicines Act proposal - can receive financial support from Member 
States while complying with State aid rules67 (see below Part II, section 7.2.1). 

65 Communication from the Commission – Framework for State Aid measures to support the Clean Industrial Deal (Clean 
Industrial Deal State Aid Framework), C/2025/7600, OJ C, C/2025/3602, 4.7.2025. 
66  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  –  The  Clean  Industrial  Deal:  A  joint  roadmap  for  competitiveness  and 
decarbonisation, COM(2025) 85 final, 26.2.2025. 
67 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a51c37be-2f9f-4d92-bdf5-ae38bfa91908_en  

18 

 
 
3.1. Recent enforcement trends in State aid control 

Figure 5: State aid decisions 2016-2025  

2025 saw several Commission decisions approving aid measures in key policy areas, such as investments 
in the transition towards a net-zero economy, and in digital infrastructure and technologies.  

Under  the  new  CISAF,  the  Commission  adopted  eight  decisions  approving  nine  national  measures 
notified  by  five  Member  States.  The  total  budget  notified  by  Member  States  under  these  State  aid 
measures amounted to  approximately  EUR 18.43 billion. In particular, the Commission  approved six 
investment  aid  schemes  to  support  investment  projects  adding  manufacturing  capacity  for  clean 
technologies, key components, and related critical raw materials, based on section 6.1 CISAF, with a 
total budget of around EUR 6.68 billion (see below Part II, section 1.2.11). It also approved one EUR 
11.3 billion scheme, under section 4.1 CISAF regarding the rollout of renewable energy (see below Part 
II, section 1.2.4), as well as a EUR 408 million scheme under section 5 CISAF (decarbonisation) (see 
below Part II, section 1.2.9).  

Under the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF)68, which remained applicable until 25 
June 202569, the Commission adopted eight decisions (including two amendment decisions), approving 
six national measures notified by seven Member States70. The overall budget that Member States notified 
to the Commission under such State aid measures amounted to around EUR 2.78 billion. In particular, 
the Commission approved strategic investment aid schemes based on sections 2.5 and 2.8. For example, 
aid was approved for the deployment of large-scale energy storage to foster the transition to a net-zero 
economy (see below Part II, section 1.2.4).  

68 Communication from the Commission on the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework for State Aid measures to support 
the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia, OJ C 101, 17.3.2023, p. 3. This TCTF replaced the TCF 
adopted on 28 October 2022, which had replaced the previous TCF adopted on 23 March 2022, as amended on 20 July 2022. 
The TCF was withdrawn with effect from 9 March 2023. 
69 Member States could grant aid through existing aid schemes under the sections covering the possibility to accelerate the 
roll-out of schemes for renewable energy, energy storage and decarbonisation of industrial production processes (sections 2.5 
and 2.6 TCTF) and adopt measures further accelerating investments supporting transition towards a net-zero economy (section 
2.8) until the end of 2025, while the other sections had already expired in the previous year. 
70  For  instance,  case  SA.117292  –  Czechia  -  TCTF:  Strategic  investments  for  a  climate  neutral  economy,  by  which  the 
Commission approved a scheme set by Czechia with a budget of EUR 960 million. 

19 

 
 
 
Additionally, based on Article 107(2)(b) TFEU, the Commission adopted two  decisions related to the 
COVID-19 crisis in 202571. It also adopted decisions in at least 13 cases for which the Member States 
had indicated that RRF72 funding will be used73.  

3.2. Modernising and simplifying State aid rules and guidance 

The developments outlined below relate to rules of horizontal nature (for developments on sectoral rules 
and guidance, see below Part II).  

3.2.1.  New State aid framework supporting the CID (CISAF) adopted 

On  25  June  2025  the  Commission  adopted  the  CISAF  to  enable  Member  States  to  accelerate  the 
development of clean energy, industrial decarbonisation and clean technology.  The CISAF will be in 
place until 31 December 2030, replacing the TCTF which had been in place since 2022. 

CISAF simplified State aid rules in five main areas: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

iv. 

v. 

the  roll-out  of  renewable  energy  and  low-carbon  fuels  and  new  rules  on  non-fossil  flexibility 
measures and on capacity mechanisms following a target model; 

temporary electricity price relief for energy-intensive users to ensure the transition to low-cost 
clean electricity; 

the decarbonisation of existing production facilities; 

the development of clean tech manufacturing capacity in the EU, and 

the de-risking of investments in clean energy, decarbonisation, clean tech, energy infrastructure 
projects and projects supporting the circular economy. 

Other State aid rules relevant to the CID, such as the Climate, Environmental protection and Energy Aid 
Guidelines (CEEAG)74, continue to apply in parallel and may be used by Member States for different 
and more complex support measures. Member States will also continue to implement State aid measures 
in  this  field  under  the  General  Block  Exemption  Regulation  (GBER)75  without  the  need  for  prior 
notification  to  the  Commission.  On  4  November  2025,  the  Commission  published  a  staff  working 
document accompanying the CISAF, which outlines policy rationale and the evidence base considered 
when adopting the CISAF76. 

3.2.2.  State aid for horizontal and other objectives 

As in previous years, Member States continued to award a substantial part of aid under block-exempted 
measures  in  2025.  The  block  exemption  regulations  –  the  GBER,  the  Agriculture  Block  Exemption 

71 Cases SA.113257 – Finland – COVID-19: Traficom damage compensation scheme to passenger car ferry companies, and 
SA.57982 – Greece – COVID-19: Compensation to ELTA for damage suffered as a direct result of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
72 See https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en  
73 See below Part II. Sectoral Overview for examples of RRF cases. 
74 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection, and energy, OJ C 
80, 18.2.2022, p.1. 
75 Commission Regulation 2023/1315 of 23 June 2023 amending Regulation 651/2014 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty and Regulation 2022/2473 declaring 
certain categories of aid to undertakings active in the production, processing and marketing of fishery and aquaculture products 
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 167, 30.6.2023. 
76 
6e82700da393_en?filename=CISAF_staff-working-doc_C_2025_850_en.pdf  

https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/d960b2f1-d699-45c5-ad80-

See 

20 

 
 
Regulation (ABER)77, and the Fisheries Block Exemption Regulation (FIBER)78) - allow Member States 
to implement a wide range of public support measures without prior notification to the Commission. This 
reduces the administrative burden for public authorities and accelerates the delivery of public support. 

While  the  ABER  and  FIBER  are  sector-specific,  measures  can  be  implemented  under  the  GBER  in 
various  areas,  such  as  research  and  development,  environmental  protection,  broadband  connectivity, 
regional  development,  employment,  or  support  for  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs).  As 
illustrated by the figures below, the vast majority of horizontal aid falls under the GBER. 

Figure 6: State aid expenditure 2014-2024, in EUR billion, in constant prices 

Figure 7: GBER State aid expenditure by objective in the EU 2019-2024, in EUR billion, in constant 
prices 

77 Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/2472 of 14 December 2022 declaring certain categories of aid in the agricultural and 
forestry sectors and in rural areas compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European, OJ L 327, 21.12.2022, p. 1. 
78 Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/2473 of 14 December 2022 declaring certain categories of aid to undertakings active in 
the  production,  processing  and  marketing  of  fishery  and  aquaculture  products  compatible  with  the  internal  market  in 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 327, 21.12.2022, p. 82.  

21 

 
 
 
 
3.2.2.1. Evaluation of aid schemes 

The ex post evaluation of aid schemes was introduced by the 2012 State Aid Modernisation (SAM)79. 
The aim is to gather the necessary evidence to identify the impact - both positive and negative - of the 
aid and to provide input for future policy-making by the Member States and the Commission. Since 1 
July  2014,  ex  post  evaluation  has  been  required  for  large  block-exempted  aid  schemes  in  certain  aid 
categories under the GBER, as well as for a selection of notified schemes approved by the Commission 
under State aid guidelines80. Under the ABER and FIBER, evaluation has also been required for certain 
aid categories since 1 January 202381.  

For an aid scheme subject to the evaluation obligation, Member States must first notify an evaluation 
plan and subsequently submit an evaluation report in line with the plan approved by the Commission. By 
the  end  of  2025,  the  Commission  had  in  total  approved  163  evaluation  plans,  covering  20  Member 
States82 and the United Kingdom (the UK). 

Most of the approved plans concerned notified energy and broadband schemes, alongside large regional 
aid and research, development, and innovation projects under the GBER. In total, these schemes account 
for over EUR 130 billion in annual State aid budgets83. By the end of 2025, the Commission services had 
reviewed a total of 67 interim and 57 final evaluation reports, which were considered to be of average to 
good quality - particularly the final reports84. 

By assessing these reports, the Commission seeks to: (i) provide appropriate feedback to Member States; 
(ii) make sure that results are used for more effective policy-making; and (iii) provide evidence to assist 
Member States when considering future legal developments. 

3.2.2.2. Review of the State aid GBER ongoing 

On 14 July 2025, the Commission launched a call for evidence and public consultation85 seeking input 
on the scope and content of the review of the GBER. The review aims at reducing the administrative 
burden of Member States and undertakings, resolving implementation difficulties or errors, and providing 
Member States with greater flexibility in designing support measures.  

79 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/modernisation_en  
80 Evaluation can apply to notified aid schemes with large budgets, containing novel characteristics or when significant market, 
technology or regulatory changes are foreseen, and with a total duration that exceeds three years, starting from 1 January 
2022. 
81 Aid schemes for certain aid categories under ABER and FIBER are subject to an ex post evaluation if they have a State aid 
budget or accounted expenditures over EUR 150 million in any given year or EUR 750 million over their total duration, that 
is  the  combined  duration  of  the  scheme  and  any  predecessor  scheme  covering  a  similar  objective  and  geographical  area, 
starting from 1 January 2023. Ex post evaluations are required for aid schemes the total duration of which exceeds three years, 
starting from 1 January 2023. 
82 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, The 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden. 
83 This figure corresponds to the sum of the average annual budgets of all State aid schemes subject to evaluation, including 
schemes that have already expired. 
84 All the submitted evaluation reports are reviewed by the JRC within the framework of the Administrative Arrangement 
established between DG Competition and the JRC on the: ‘Support to the quality assessment of evaluation reports in the area 
of State Aid, 2018-2020’. The JRC has continued to support DG Competition under the new Administrative Arrangements 
for the ‘Support to the quality assessment of evaluation plans and reports in the area of State Aid, 2021-2023 (EVALSA II)’ 
and for the ‘Support to the quality assessment of evaluation plans and reports in the area of State Aid, 2024-2026 (EVALSA 
III)’. 
85 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1814  

22 

 
 
This includes a review of the current rules for social enterprises, training and employment aid, following 
up on the ‘Action Plan for the Social Economy’ (2021)86 and the ‘Union of Skills’ (2025)87, as well as a 
review  of  aid  rules  for  affordable  and  energy-efficient  housing.  The  latter  is  intended  to  be 
complementary to the new State aid rules on the SGEI adopted on 16 December 202588 (see below, Part 
II, section 8.2.1.1).  

Both the questionnaire-based public consultation and the call for evidence closed on 6 October 2025. In 
essence, respondents to the public consultation found that the GBER aligns, to some extent, with certain 
policy objectives, such as legal certainty, promoting green and digital transitions, fostering resilience, 
promoting  R&D,  and  economic  and  social  cohesion.  However,  they  emphasised  the  need  to  reduce 
administrative burden, improve user-friendliness and legal certainty, simplify compatibility conditions, 
and  adapt  to  current  political,  economic,  technical,  and  social  changes.  Contributions  to  the  call  for 
evidence also expressed keen interest in simplifying the GBER, reducing administrative burdens, and 
ensuring alignment with current EU policy priorities.  

Overall, the Commission received 217 replies to the public consultation and 282 contributions to the call 
for  evidence  from  a  wide  variety  of  stakeholders,  including  public  authorities,  business  associations, 
individual  companies,  NGOs,  trade  unions,  academic  and  research  organisations,  and  citizens89.  The 
adoption of the revised GBER is planned for the end of 2026, before the current GBER expires on 31 
December 2026.  

3.2.2.3. Aid for research, development, and innovation (R&D&I) 

R&D&I is a key driver of economic growth and is necessary to achieving a variety of policy objectives, 
including those of the European Green Deal and the Digital Strategy. Where there is a market failure due 
to a high risk related to investment, and this market failure leads to suboptimal R&D&I activities, State 
aid for such activities can be necessary and appropriate. 

The vast majority of all R&D&I State aid measures are implemented under the GBER, which does not 
require prior notification to the Commission. Prior authorisation under the framework for State aid for 
research,  development  and  innovation  (R&D&I  Framework)90  is,  however,  possible  for  large  aid 
amounts. 

3.2.2.4. Important Project of Common European Interest (IPCEI) 

In 2025, the Commission approved one new IPCEI: the IPCEI Tech4Cure91. This is the second health-
related IPCEI and it supports cross-border research, innovation, and the first industrial deployment of a 
new generation of medical devices. These devices incorporate advanced and novel digital/AI solutions 
to support the concept of predictive, preventive, and personalised medicine (‘3P medicine’) (see below 
Part II, section 7.2.4).  

https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/sgei_en#targeted-revision-of-the-sgei-rules-for-

86  See  https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/eu-employment-policies/social-economy-and-
inclusive-entrepreneurship/social-economy-action-plan_en  
87 See https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/union-skills_en  
88 
See 
affordable-housing 
89 
Block-Exemption-Regulation_en  
90 Communication from the Commission – Framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, OJ C 7388, 
19.10.2022, p. 1. 
91 Cases SA.113212 – France; SA.117899 – Hungary; SA.117859 – Italy; SA.117793 – Slovakia; SA.117849 – Slovenia – 
Important Project of Common European Interest – Innovative medical devices and support software (IPCEI Tech4Cure).  

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14772-General-revision-of-the-General-

See 

23 

 
 
Throughout  2025,  the  Commission  also  continued  to  work  in  close  partnership  with  Member  States 
through the Joint European Forum for  IPCEIs (JEF-IPCEI). The JEF-IPCEI provides a platform for 
close  and  flexible  cooperation  between  Commission  services  and  Member  State  authorities;  where 
relevant, they may also invite representatives from candidate countries, industry, academia, and other 
stakeholders. Jointly led by DG Competition and the Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship  and  SMEs  (DG  GROW),  the  JEF  IPCEI  covers  the  entire  IPCEI  life  cycle,  from 
identification  of  areas  of  strategic  interest  for  potential  future  IPCEIs,  to  the  design,  assessment  and 
implementation of IPCEIs at national level. Its objectives include improving speed and efficiency of the 
IPCEI  process  by  streamlining  procedures  and  aligning  potential  new  IPCEIs  with  the  EU  industrial 
strategy and other relevant EU strategies.  

The  dedicated  JEF-IPCEI  website92  provides  regular  updates  on  the  forum's  activities,  including 
technologies currently being identified as potential new IPCEI candidates as well as those currently in 
the  design  phase,  thus  ensuring  visibility  and  transparency  of  efforts  and  results.  By  publishing 
streamlined  IPCEI  templates,  factsheets,  reports  and  recommendations,  the  website  also  provides 
guidance to Member States and interested stakeholders. There are currently two ongoing working groups 
identifying potential future IPCEI: clean, connected, and autonomous vehicles, and critical raw materials.  

Since its creation in 2023, the JEF-IPCEI’s work has enabled eight IPCEI candidates to enter the design 
phase, including four in 2025 (innovative nuclear technologies, biobased chemicals, biobased materials, 
biotechnologies for food and feed), and has led to the publication of 12 recommendations covering the 
entire IPCEI life-cycle and enabling Member States to streamline, simplify and speed up the set-up and 
the implementation of IPCEIs. 

Following the  adoption of the CID, the Commission launched the IPCEI Design Support Hub93 on 9 
April 2025. The Hub aims to provide dedicated support to the Member States involved in the design 
phase, streamlining  the process, increasing efficiency  and better preparing the subsequent  assessment 
phase. It comprises a team led by DG Competition, in close collaboration with relevant experts across 
the  Commission,  including,  whenever  relevant,  the  Joint  Research  Centre  (JRC).  Currently,  all  eight 
IPCEI candidates in the design phase are being supported by the Hub94.  

3.2.2.5. Aid to support EU semiconductor ecosystem  

Since outlining the principles of support for capacity building in the semiconductor industry in the Chips 
Act Communication95, the Commission has approved 11 cases, authorising up to EUR 13.8 billion in 
public  support.  Of  the  measures  supporting  new  semiconductor  manufacturing  facilities,  six  were 
approved in 202596, with a combined budget of approximately EUR 2.3 billion. 

3.2.2.6. Regional aid  

In 2025, the Commission adopted several decisions concerning regional investment aid  

92 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/ipcei/joint-european-forum-ipcei_en  
93 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/ipcei/design-support-hub_en  
94 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/ipcei/design-support-hub_en#ipcei-candidates-in-the-design-support-
hub  
95  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A Chips Act for Europe, COM(2022) 45 final, 8.2.2022. 
96  Cases SA.106117 – Germany – Infineon MEGAFAB-DD project; SA.113428 – Austria - ams OSRAM; SA.117987 – Italy 
– Aid to Ephos for project Fab-2; SA.117291 – Czechia – Aid for ON SEMICONDUCTOR CZECH REPUBLIC’s investment 
in the manufacturing of silicon carbide semiconductor devices; SA.118843 – Germany – Aid to GlobalFoundries for project 
SPRINT; SA.119086 – Germany – X-FAB MEMS FOUNDRY GMBH - FAB4MICRO. 

24 

 
 
Specifically, it approved aid to: PCC for the setting up of a chemical plant in Poland97 (see below Part 
II, section 5.2.5.); Envision for the construction of an electric vehicle battery factory in France98 (see 
below  Part  II,  section  1.2.11);  Sunwoda  for  the  construction  of  an  electric  vehicle  battery  factory  in 
Hungary99 (see below Part II, section 1.2.11); and to Vetter Pharma for the construction of a production 
facility in the pharmaceutical sector in Germany100 (see below Part II, section 7.2.4).  

The Commission also approved an amendment to a tax scheme that aims at supporting investments in 
French outermost regions101. In another instance, the Commission found that aid granted by Germany 
to  Abalon  Hardwood  Hessen  was,  at  least  in  part,  incompatible  with  State  aid  rules  because  the  aid 
granted exceeded the maximum allowed in that specific assisted area and called for recovery of this part 
of the aid102. Furthermore, the Commission opened a formal investigation into planned aid by Poland to 
Man Trucks. In this case, the Commission expressed doubts as to both the incentive effect of the aid and 
its proportionality103.  

3.2.2.7. Infrastructure support measures  

In 2025, the Commission dealt with several infrastructure support measures. In particular, it approved a 
Greek support measure for the construction of two sections of the motorway on the island of Crete, called 
BOAK, under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU104. The Commission also approved changed Lithuanian support 
for the construction of a multifunctional complex in Vilnius105. Moreover, the Commission approved aid 
for the set-up of an infrastructure dedicated to the gaming industry in a Just Transition area in Poland. 
This project, co-financed by the Just Transition Fund (JTF), combines the rehabilitation of a former coal 
mine  with  the  construction  of  a  multifunctional  technological  facility106  (see  below  Part  II,  section 
2.2.3.2).  

3.2.3.  EU environmental and State aid law – access to justice in relation to State aid decisions  

The  EU  and  its  Member  States  are  parties  to  the  United  Nations  Economic  Commission  for  Europe 
(UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice  in  Environmental  Matters  (the  Aarhus  Convention).  To  address  the  findings  of  the  Aarhus 
Convention  Compliance  Committee  in  case  ACCC/C/2015/128107,  the  Commission  established  an 
internal review mechanism covering certain State aid decisions. This mechanism was introduced by an 

97 Case SA.38330 – Poland – LIP – Alleged unlawful regional investment aid to PCC MCAA Sp. z o.o. (PCC).  
98 Case SA.109228 – France – LIP – Aide régionale à Envision AESC France. 
99 Case SA.114496 – Hungary – LIP – Regional investment aid for Sunwoda Automotive Energy Technology Kft. 
100 Case SA.118989 – Germany – LIP – Regional aid for large investment project - Vetter Pharma. 
101 Case SA.114320 – France – Amendements au régime d’aide fiscale à l’investissement productif dans les outre-mer. 
102 Case SA.24030 – Germany – Investment loan and working capital loan guarantees in favour of Abalon Hardwood Hessen 
GmbH. 
103 Case SA.114436 – Poland – Aid to Man Trucks. 
104 Case SA.107691  – Greece – RRF: Northern Road Axis of Crete  (BOAK)  - Kissamos-Chania and Chania-Hersonissos 
sections. 
105  Case  SA.113357  –  Lithuania  –  Multifunctional  health,  education,  culture  and  business  support  complex  in  Vilnius  - 
Additional State aid to SA.62831.  
106 Case SA.114301 – Poland – JTF – Aid to the “New Technology District – Katowice Gaming and Technology Hub”. 
107 The Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee had found that by failing to provide access to administrative or judicial 
procedures for members of the public to challenge decisions on State aid measures taken by the Commission under Article 
108(2) TFEU that contravene EU law relating to the environment, the EU fails to comply with Articles 9(3) and 9(4) of the 
Aarhus Convention.  

25 

 
 
  
 
amendment  of the  Implementing  Regulation108 and of the Best  Practices  Code109 adopted on 12 May 
2025.  

This mechanism enables eligible non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to request an internal review 
of certain Commission final State aid decisions that close a formal investigation procedure under Article 
108(2) TFEU, on the grounds that the activity subject to State aid and/or any of the aspects of the State 
aid measure approved by that decision that are indissolubly linked to the object of the aid, contravene a 
specific rule or rules of Union environmental law. 

The first Aarhus review request concerned the 2024 Commission’s decision on the PALLAS project, 
which  involved  aid  for  the  construction  of  a  research  reactor  and  of  an  isotope  processing  facility  in 
Petten for cancer diagnosis and treatment110. The Dutch NGO Stichting Laka requested the Commission 
to review the compliance with EU environmental law of its decision which found the Dutch authorities’ 
measures in favour of the PALLAS project compatible with the internal market. The request was rejected 
as inadmissible111.  

3.3. Significant judgments by EU Courts in State aid  

In  2025,  the  EU  Courts  adopted  several  important  judgments  in  the  field  of  State  aid,  concerning  in 
particular  the  notions  of  ‘advantage’  and  ‘selectivity’,  the  assessment  of other  provisions  of  EU  law, 
damages actions, as well as the national implementation of aid schemes.  

3.3.1.  Notions of advantage and beneficiary 

In European Gaming and Betting Association (EGBA)112, the Court of Justice confirmed the annulment 
by the General Court of the Commission’s decision approving the extension of lottery licences in the 
Netherlands. The Court of Justice held that the Commission could not have excluded serious difficulties 
in its assessment that the measure at issue was no aid without looking into whether it conferred an indirect 
advantage to some of the charitable entities that would be remitted funds from certain licence holders. 
Given that the remittance of part of the proceeds generated by the activity of the licence holders to bodies 
designated  by  those  licences  constituted  one  of  the  main  features  of  the  legislation  at  issue,  the 
Commission could not have excluded the existence of serious difficulties in this case. 

3.3.2.  Selectivity  

In Prezydent Miasta Mielca113, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered a preliminary ruling 
considering that general and abstract tax exemptions are presumed to be inherent to the normal tax system 
(i.e. the reference system) and do not - as a general rule - confer a selective advantage unless a consistent 
category of beneficiary undertakings is formed.  Accordingly, the Court of Justice considered that the 

108  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  794/2004,  as  modified  inter  alia  by  Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU) 
2025/905 of 12 May 2025 amending Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 as regards an internal review mechanism to follow up on 
the findings of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee in Case ACCC/C/2015/128 and other procedural updates, OJ 
L, 2025/905, 13.6.2025. 
109  Communication  from  the  Commission  –  Code  of  Best  Practices  for  the  conduct  of  State  aid  control  procedures, 
C/2025/2823, OJ C, C/2025/2810, 13.6.2025. 
110 Case SA.103925 and SA.103926 – The Netherlands – PALLAS project: Aid for the construction of a research reactor and 
of an isotope processing facility in Petten. 
111 Case SA.103925.AR| SA.103004_NL_VWS_Medical isotopes_NewCo: PALLAS-programme - Aarhus review.  
112 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 October 2025 in Case C-59/24 P, The Netherlands v European Gaming and Betting 
Association, ECLI:EU:C:2025:798. 
113 Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 29 April 2025 in Case C-453/23, E. sp. z o.o. v Prezydent Miasta 
Mielca, ECLI:EU:C:2025:285.  

26 

 
 
Polish real estate tax exemption for land and structures forming part of railway infrastructure in question 
did not appear to confer a selective advantage.  

3.3.3.  Assessment of other provisions of EU law  

In its judgment of 23 January 2025 in Neos v Ryanair114, the Court of Justice set aside the judgment by 
which the General  Court had annulled the Commission’s 2020  decision  approving an  Italian damage 
compensation scheme for airlines during the COVID-19 pandemic for lack of reasoning as regards certain 
requirements (for example minimum remuneration). The Court of Justice noted that given the extremely 
large number of provisions and principles of EU law that could have been infringed by the grant of aid 
in question, the Commission could not be required to provide specific reasoning concerning each one of 
them, but could disregard those provisions and principles that were either not relevant with respect to the 
measure at hand or, in any event, had not been infringed. On this basis, the Court of Justice considered 
that  the  Commission  had  sufficiently  explained  its  assessment  of  the  minimum  remuneration 
requirement. 

On 11 September 2025, in Paks II115, the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) annulled the Commission’s 
2017 decision approving aid for two nuclear reactors in Hungary. The Court held that the Commission 
should  have  ascertained  whether  the  direct  award  of  the  contract  for  the  construction  of  the  nuclear 
reactors  to  a  Russian  undertaking  complied  with  EU  public  procurement  rules.  The  Court  of  Justice 
considered that the public procurement procedures for the construction of the nuclear reactors in question 
were inextricably linked to the State support of the electricity production from these reactors, and that 
the direct award was a pre-condition for the financing of the construction project. 

3.3.4.  State aid in the aviation sector 

On 13 February 2025, the Court of Justice annulled the General Court's judgment of 8 February 2023 in 
Carpatair116. This judgment concerned a Commission decision finding that agreements signed between 
Wizz  Air  and Timisoara airport for the use of the airport infrastructure  were in  line with  the Market 
Economy Operator (MEOP) test, based on an ex post reconstruction of the financial analysis with the 
information available to the airport prior to the conclusion of the contracts. In its judgment, the General 
Court had considered that the Commission could not demonstrate the compliance with the MEOP test 
based on evidence reconstructed entirely after the conclusion of the agreements, even if that evidence is 
based  on  information  that  was  available  and  on  developments  foreseeable  at  the  time  when  the 
agreements were signed. The Court of Justice annulled the General Court's judgement, finding that the 
General  Court  had  not  substantiated  its  conclusion  that  Carpatair’s  action  for  annulment  of  the 
Commission’s decision was admissible. The Court of Justice did not take a position on the application 
of the MEOP test but referred the case back to the General Court. 

On  2  April  2025  in  Ryanair  (LOT)117,  the  General  Court  upheld  the  Commission’s  decision  of  22 
December 2020, which had approved a Polish State aid measure to the airline LOT under the Temporary 
Framework for State aid measures to support the economy during the COVID-19 pandemic. Two points 
of  particular  interest  were  addressed:  (i)  the  identification  of  the  beneficiary  of  the  aid  measure. 
Specifically, the necessity to assess the respective roles of a parent undertaking and its affiliates within a 

114 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 23 January 2025 in Case C-490/23 P, Neos v Ryanair, ECLI:EU:C:2025:32. 
115  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  (Grand  Chamber)  of  11 September  2025  in  Case  C-59/23  P,  Austria  v  Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2025:686. 
116 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 13 February 2025 in Joined Cases C-244/23 P to C-246/23 P, Commission and Others 
v Carpatair SA, ECLI:EU:C:2025:87. 
117 Judgment of the General Court  of 2 April 2025 in Case T‑398/21, Ryanair DAC and Ryanair Sun S.A.  v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2025:357. 

27 

 
 
group;  and  (ii)  the  issue  of  eligibility  for  aid,  since  the  Temporary  Framework  established  that,  for 
recapitalisation measures, the beneficiary must be unable to find financing on the markets at affordable 
terms.  

In its judgment of 25 June 2025 in Condor II118, the General Court confirmed the 2021 Commission’s 
decision approving approximately EUR 145 million of damage compensation to the airline Condor for 
the damage suffered between March and December 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

In a judgment of 10 December 2025 in Restructuring aid for TAP119, the General Court dismissed in full 
Ryanair’s challenge of the legality of the Commission’s decision of 21 December 2021, which approved 
a EUR 2.55 billion restructuring aid for TAP. The Court confirmed the Commission’s findings relating 
to the eligibility of TAP to receive the restructuring aid and the role the company plays in the connectivity 
of  Portugal  and  in  the  Portuguese  economy.  The  Court  also  confirmed  that  the  restructuring  plan 
presented by Portugal for TAP was realistic, coherent, far-reaching and that it ensured company’s return 
to long-term viability. The Court confirmed the proportionality of the aid amount. It rejected Ryanair’s 
arguments that the compensatory measures proposed by Portugal were insufficient or inadequate to limit 
distortive effects of the restructuring aid on competition and internal market. Those measures included a 
divestiture of 18 daily slots at the Lisbon airport, a limitation of the size of TAP’s fleet until end 2025 
and a divestiture of TAP SGPS’s stakes in Cateringpor and Groundforce. 

3.3.5.  Damages actions  

In Kargins120, the General Court confirmed the lawfulness of the possibility for the Commission to submit 
amicus curiae in national proceedings concerning State aid121. The Court also clarified that an invitation 
by one of the parties to intervene does not affect the Commission’s impartiality. On this basis, the General 
Court dismissed the action seeking damages from the EU in relation to an allegedly unlawful intervention 
by the Commission as amicus curiae within the context of a national dispute. 

3.3.6.  National implementation of an aid scheme 

In Toode122, the Court of Justice delivered a preliminary ruling on the effect of an unlawful refusal of an 
aid application by the Latvian authorities. The Court considered that, in the case at hand, the right to an 
effective  remedy  under  Article  47  of  the  European  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  precluded  an 
interpretation  of  national  law  whereby  the  date  of  the  grant  could  not  correspond  to  the  date  of  the 
unjustified refusal. This applies specifically where the refusal occurred within the time-limit set by the 
Commission’s decision, but a judicial finding of unlawfulness was only reached after that time-limit had 
expired.  

118 Judgment of the General Court of 25 June 2025 in Case T-366/22, Ryanair DAC v Commission (Condor II; COVID-19), 
ECLI:EU:T:2025:637. 
119 Judgment of the General Court of 10  December 2025, T-458/22  – Ryanair DAC  v  Commission (Restructuring aid for 
TAP), ECLI:EU:T:2025:1094. 
120 Judgment of the General Court of 23 January 2025 in Case T-350/23, Kargins v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2025:312 (under 
appeal). 
121 As foreseen under Article 29(2) of Regulation 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of 
Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, pp. 9–29 (Procedural Regulation). 
122  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  3  July  2025  in  Case  C-653/23,  Toode  SIA  v  Valsts  ieņēmumu  dienests, 
ECLI:EU:C:2025:517. 

28 

 
 
3.4. Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts 

3.4.1.  Increased monitoring of existing State aid to ensure competition on fair and equal terms 

As in previous years, the majority of the new State aid measures implemented in 2025 were covered by 
a  block  exemption  regulation,  such  as  the  GBER123.  It  is  essential  for  the  Commission  to  verify  that 
Member States apply State aid schemes correctly and that they only grant aid when all  conditions are 
met.  

The  Commission  monitoring  consists  of  regular  ex  post  controls  based  on  a  sample  of  existing  aid 
schemes, both block-exempted and approved measures. This serves as a necessary complement to the 
approval of State aid schemes by the Commission, and acts as a counterweight to the ‘self-assessment’ 
performed by Member States resulting from the exemption from the notification obligation.  

As part of the monitoring process, the Commission follows up on irregularities and uses the tools at its 
disposal  to  address  the  competition  distortions  that  those  irregularities  may  have  caused.  In  some 
instances,  Member  States  offer  to  rectify  detected  problems  voluntarily,  for  example  by  amending 
national  legislation  or  recovering  aid  granted  in  excess  of  the  permitted  levels.  In  other  cases,  the 
Commission may need to take formal action. 

In 2025, the Commission launched a new monitoring cycle of block exempted and approved aid granted 
in 2022 and 2023. The selected sample includes aid granted to support the economy during the COVID-
19 pandemic, as well as aid schemes introduced in response to the Russian war of aggression against 
Ukraine.  

3.4.2.  Restoring competition by recovering State aid granted in breach of the rules 

To ensure the integrity of the Single Market, Member States must take all necessary measures to recover 
unlawful and incompatible aid.  The purpose of recovery is  to  restore the situation that existed  in the 
internal market prior to the granting of the aid. This is necessary to maintain effective competition. 

In 2025 the Commission adopted three new recovery decisions124. By the end of the year, 25 recovery 
cases - resulting from previously adopted negative decisions with recovery - were pending. 

As of 31 December 2025, the total amount of unlawful and incompatible aid recovered from beneficiaries 
stood at EUR 39.8 billion125. At the same point in time, the outstanding amount pending recovery was 
EUR 6.2 billion. 

Figure 8: Recovery Decisions in 2025  

Recovery decisions adopted in 2025  

Pending recovery cases on 31/12/2025 

3 

25 

In 2025, the Commission imposed penalties on Greece and Italy based on Court judgments condemning 

123 See the State Aid Scoreboard: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/scoreboard_en  
124 Cases SA.24030 – Germany – Investment loan and working capital loan guarantees in favour of Abalon Hardwood Hessen 
GmbH; SA.51051 – Czechia – Aid for insurance premium for large enterprises; SA.33962 – France - Mesures en faveur de 
la  chambre  de  commerce  et  d’industrie  de  Carcassonne,  Aéroport  de  Carcassonne,  de  Ryanair  et  d’Airport  Marketing 
Services. 
125 The reference period is 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2025. This amount includes also the amount of aid registered in 
pending insolvency proceedings. In addition, the amount of EUR 5 billion could not be recovered from concluded 
insolvency proceedings because of the lack of mass from the liquidation of assets which did not allow satisfying the State 
aid claims. 

29 

 
 
these two Member States for having infringed EU State aid rules126.  

3.4.3.  Cooperation with national courts to ensure the effectiveness of State aid rules 

The Commission cooperates with national courts under Article 29 of Regulation 2015/1589127 and in 
accordance with the Notice on the enforcement of State aid rules by national courts (the Notice)128. This 
cooperation  includes  direct  case-related  assistance,  where  national  courts  and  tribunals  may  request 
information  from  the  Commission  or  seek  an  official  opinion  on  the  application  of  State  aid  rules. 
Additionally, the Commission may submit amicus curiae observations on its own initiative. To ensure 
transparency,  the  Commission  publishes  these  opinions  and  amicus  curiae  observations,  as  well  as 
observations to other bodies, such as arbitration tribunals, on its website129. 

The Commission also reaches out to national judges by providing training on State aid rules and on the 
practical implications of the Notice. In this context, the Commission encourages national judges to utilise 
the Notice to promote the coherent enforcement of State aid rules at national level across the EU. Past 
studies on the enforcement of State aid law at national level indicate a relatively limited number of State 
aid cases being brought before national courts130.  

Since national courts can play a crucial and complementary role in enforcement of State aid rules, the 
Commission has recently stepped up its efforts to reach out to judges with more tailored training sessions. 
For  instance,  following  a  general  tender  for  the  training  of  national  judges131,  the  Commission  is 
cooperating  with  the  Vrije  Universiteit  Brussel  (VUB)  to  provide  trainings  through  the  SUNAJUST 
programme. This programme is designed to: (i) develop accessible and engaging course materials; and 
(ii) organise numerous training events for judges, prosecutors, apprentice national judges, and national 
court staff. On 3 December 2025, the Commission hosted a reality check on State aid private enforcement 
and the use of State aid rules in national courts to gather insights from judges, lawyers, academics and 
other stakeholders on the practical challenges and opportunities in enforcing State aid rules at national 
level. 

4. 

THE FOREIGN SUBSIDIES REGULATION  

The FSR is a Single Market legislation that aims at addressing possible distortions of competition in the 
Single Market when subsidies granted by non-EU governments benefit economic activities in the EU. It 
started to apply in July 2023. 

4.1. Context  

The FSR fills a regulatory gap by tackling distortive effects created in the EU Single Market in situations 
where undertakings benefitting from foreign subsidies have an advantage when acquiring undertakings 
active in the Single Market, participating in public procurement processes or more generally when they 

126 Cases SA. 34572 – Greece – State aid to Larko General Mining & Metallurgical Company S.A.; and SA.9398 – Italy – 
Employment measures. 
127 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (codification) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, pp. 9–29. 
128 Communication from the Commission – Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid rules by national courts, OJ 
C 305, 30.7.2021, p. 1. 
129 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/state-aid/national-courts_en   
130 Final Study on the enforcement of State aid rules and decisions by national courts (COMP/2018/001), Publications Office 
of the European Union, Luxemburg, 2019. 
131  Training  of  National  Judges  in  EU  Competition  Law,  see  https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/single-market-
programme-smp/calls-proposals-grants_en   

30 

 
 
invest  and  make  commercial  decisions  in  the  EU  Single  Market.  Such  distortive  foreign  subsidies, 
including  below-market  interest  rate  loans,  unlimited  State  guarantees,  favourable  tax  agreements  or 
dedicated State funding, would be problematic if granted by an EU Member State when assessed under 
EU State aid rules. 

Considering the challenge to find a multilateral solution to subsidies within a reasonable timeframe, the 
Commission  committed,  as  part  of  the  New  Industrial  Strategy  for  Europe,  to  explore  how  best  to 
strengthen  the  EU’s  anti-subsidies  mechanisms  and  tools.  As  a  result,  the  FSR  was  adopted  on  14 
December  2022.  This  set  of  rules  enables  the  Commission  to  address  distortions  caused  by  foreign 
subsidies and allows the EU to  ensure a level  playing  field  for all companies operating in  the Single 
Market, while remaining open to trade and investment. 

Under the FSR, the Commission has the power to examine any foreign subsidy granted to an undertaking 
engaging in an economic activity in the Single Market. It may act on its own initiative (ex officio) or 
through the review of compulsory notifications for large concentrations and large public procurement 
procedures. Within the Commission, DG Competition is in charge of concentration notifications and ex 
officio investigations, while DG GROW deals with public procurement procedures and related ex officio 
cases. 

4.2. Developments on rules and guidance 

To  provide  legal  clarity  regarding  the  implementation  of  the  FSR  and  ensure  transparency  on  the 
Commission’s action, DG Competition’s and DG GROW’s websites provide regularly updated Q&As 
providing clarifications on a number of procedural, jurisdictional and implementation issues132. In 2025, 
clarifications  were  added  regarding:  (i)  which  foreign  financial  contributions  should  be  taken  into 
account  for  the  purpose  of  calculating  the  relevant  notification  thresholds  (Q9);  (ii)  whether  a  third 
country’s collateral to a loan granted to it by a financial institution constitutes a separate foreign financial 
contribution (Q18); (iii) which parts of a loan need to be reported where such a loan is provided by a 
third country or to a third country or both (Q19); and (iv) how passive investments by limited partners 
attributable to a third country should be notified in case of acquisitions of control or creation of joint 
ventures by a private investment fund (Q26). 

In  2024,  the  Commission  provided  initial  clarifications  on  several  key  concepts  of  the  Regulation, 
including  the  distortion  caused  by  a  foreign  subsidy  on  the  internal  market  (Article  4(1)  FSR),  the 
application  of  the  balancing  test  (Article  6  FSR),  and  the  assessment  of  a  distortion  in  a  public 
procurement procedure (Article 27(1) FSR)133.  

In 2025, the Commission worked on additional clarifications provided as Guidelines to be adopted by 13 
January  2026  as  laid  down  in  Article  46  FSR.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  launched  a  call  for 
evidence  in  March  2025.  Following  a  pre-consultation  phase  with  targeted  stakeholders,  a  public 
consultation on the draft guidelines was held between 18 July 2025 and 12 September 2025. Around 60 
stakeholders provided input, ranging from EU industry associations (20%), consultants (27%), EU public 
authorities  (16%),  undertakings  (14%),  third  countries’  authorities  and  associations  (14%),  academia 
(2%)134. These Guidelines intend to cover the: (i) application of the criteria for determining the existence 
of  a  distortion  (Article  4(1));  (ii)  application  of  the  balancing  test  (Article  6);  (iii)  application  of  the 
Commission’s power to request the prior notification of any concentration (Article 21(5)) or of foreign 

132 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/foreign-subsidies-regulation/questions-and-answers_en and on https://single-
market-economy.ec.europa.eu/single-market/public-procurement/foreign-subsidies-regulation/questions-and-answers_en  
133 Initial clarifications on the application of Article 4(1), Article 6 and Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign 
subsidies distorting the internal market - Commission Staff Working document. 
134 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/public-consultations/guidelines-foreign-subsidies_en  

31 

 
 
financial  contributions  received  by  an  economic  operator  in  a  public  procurement  procedure  (Article 
29(8)); and (iv) assessment of a distortion in a public procurement procedure (Article 27). 

In  parallel,  the  Commission  launched  the  FSR  Review  in  August  2025.  The  process  started  with  the 
publication of a call for evidence and a public consultation135. The review focuses on the: (i) assessment 
of foreign subsidies that distort the internal market; (ii) application of the balancing test (that is to say 
whether  positive  effects  of  the  foreign  subsidy  counterbalance  its  distortive  effects);  (iii)  review  of 
foreign  subsidies  with  a  possible  distortive  effect  in  the  internal  market  on  the  Commission's  own 
initiative; (iv) notification thresholds; and, (v) level of complexity of the rules and the costs incurred by 
businesses. Interested stakeholders submitted their views until November 2025. An external study has 
also been commissioned to provide a factual overview of the Commission’s case practice and identify 
potential aspects of the FSR implementation for simplification. The FSR Review report is scheduled for 
publication by 14 July 2026, as set out in the Regulation.  

On 15 October 2025, the Directorate-General for Trade & Economic Security (DG TRADE), DG GROW 
and DG Competition held a joint reality check. This event sought technical feedback from practitioners 
on the implementation of the trade anti-dumping and anti-subsidies regime136 (TDI) and the FSR. The 
Commission services presented the various activities under these instruments and answered questions 
from stakeholders. 

4.3. Enforcement  

Under the FSR, the Commission reviews notified proposed concentrations and participation in public 
procurement  procedures.  It  also  carries  out  ex  officio  investigations  if  information  suggests  a  foreign 
subsidy is distorting the internal market. DG Competition is tasked with concentration notification cases 
and  ex  officio  procedures:  those  activities  are  described  below.  FSR  enforcement  benefits  from  the 
support of the intelligence and digital forensic teams of the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) Unit in DG 
Competition. 

In 2025, 99 concentrations were notified under the FSR. 

In the case of the acquisition by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company PJSC (ADNOC) of sole control of 
Covestro AG (Covestro), ADNOC notified the transaction on 15 May 2025. ADNOC, headquartered in 
the UAE, is a State-owned oil and gas producer and the national oil company of Abu Dhabi. Covestro 
(formerly Bayer MaterialScience AG), a publicly listed company incorporated in Germany, is a chemical 
producer that focuses on the supply of high-performance polymers and components for such polymers. 
The Commission opened the in-depth investigation on 28 July 2025. ADNOC offered commitments in 
the early phase of this investigation, in the interest of addressing the Commission’s concerns. Therefore, 
while carrying out a detailed in-depth investigation, the Commission was able to adopt the decision well 
ahead of the legal deadline, without needing to formalise its concerns in a Statement of Grounds. On 14 
November  2025137,  the  Commission  adopted  a  decision  with  commitments.  This  is  the  second  final 
Commission decision under the FSR. 

The Commission identified foreign subsidies in the form of an unlimited State guarantee and tax benefits 
to ADNOC, as well as a committed capital increase by ADNOC into Covestro. It assessed the possible 
distortive effects  of the foreign  subsidies both  in the acquisition process  and, looking forward, in  the 
activities  of  the  combined  entity.  The  decision  concludes  that,  in  view  of  the  unduly  favourable 

135 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14760-Foreign-subsidies-review-report_en  
136  Anti-dumping  Regulation  (EU)  2016/1036,  OJ  L  176, 30.6.2016, p. 21 (codification); Anti-subsidies  Regulation  (EU) 
2016/1037, OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 55 (codification). 
137 Case FS.100156 – ADNOC / Covestro. 

32 

 
 
conditions - including the capital increase which directly facilitated the acquisition, and the seemingly 
unduly inflated price - offered by ADNOC for the acquisition of Covestro, which may have deterred 
other investors from making an offer, the foreign subsidies could have potentially led to negative effects 
on competition in the acquisition process. As to distortions in the activities of the combined entity in the 
internal market, the decision concludes that the foreign subsidies would have artificially improved the 
capacity  of  the  combined  entity  to  finance  its  activities  in  the  internal  market  and  increased  its 
indifference to  risk. In the specific context of the chemical  sector, this would  likely  have affected its 
investment  strategies  -  such  as  capital  expenditures,  future  acquisitions,  etc.  -  to  the  detriment  of 
competition and other market players. The commitments offered by ADNOC provide that ADNOC will 
adapt its articles of association so that they no longer deviate from ordinary UAE insolvency law, thereby 
removing the unlimited State guarantee. They also provide that Covestro’s sustainability patents will be 
shared within the internal market at transparent terms and conditions set in advance, benefitting those 
companies  that  are  particularly  reliant  on  Covestro’s  sustainability  technology.  ADNOC  appointed  a 
trustee who will monitor compliance with the commitments. 

In 2025, the Commission also continued working on its ex officio investigations in the fields of security 
equipment for airports and ports and wind energy. 

In the field of security equipment, the Commission adopted a decision on 11 December 2025 to open an 
in-depth investigation into Nuctech. This was based on sufficient indications that the company had been 
granted foreign subsidies distorting the internal market138. These subsidies reportedly take the form of 
grants,  preferential  tax  measures  or  loans  on  preferential  terms.  The  Commission  holds  preliminary 
concerns that the foreign subsidies may have improved Nuctech's competitive position in the internal 
market, allowing it to offer prices and conditions that cannot be reasonably matched by other market 
players, thereby  distorting competition  in  the internal  market. The Commission  will investigate these 
concerns  in  detail  during  the in-depth investigation.  Should  they be confirmed, the Commission  may 
impose  redressive  measures  or  accept  commitments  from  the  company  to  effectively  address  the 
concerns. 

Regarding the court proceedings related to this case, on 21 March 2025, the Vice-President of the Court 
of  Justice  upheld  the  order  of  the  President  of  the  General  Court,  which  had  rejected  Nuctech’s 
application for interim measures concerning the Commission’s inspection decision139. In his order, the 
Vice-President of the Court of Justice confirmed that the Commission is entitled to address an inspection 
decision to an undertaking incorporated outside the EU, provided it operates within the EU, and may 
inspect the EU premises of such undertaking. It was further confirmed that Commission must be able to 
inspect  information  accessible  from  a  business’  EU  premises,  even  when  that  information  is  stored 
outside  of  the  EU.  Nuctech’s  appeal  against  the  Commission’s  decision  to  carry  out  unannounced 
inspections at its two EU entities on 23 April 2024 remains pending140.  

Furthermore, the Commission continued its preliminary review into the conditions for the development 
of a number of wind parks in some Member States. This review is based on indications that some wind 
manufacturers  and  other  companies  active  in  the  internal  market  may  benefit  from  foreign  subsidies, 
granting  them  an  unfair  competitive  advantage141.  This  investigation  followed  the  ‘European  Wind 

138 Case FS.100068 – Nuchtech. 
139 Order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 21 March 2025 in Case C‑720/24 P (R), Nuctech Warsaw Company 
Limited and InsTech Netherlands v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2025:205. 
140 Case T-284/24, Nuctech Warsaw Company Limited and InsTech Netherlands v Commission. 
141 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_24_1927  

33 

 
 
Power Action Plan’142 through which the Commission committed to closely monitoring potential foreign 
subsidies that create distortions of competition. The preliminary review is based on Articles 9 and 10 
FSR,  which  empower  the  Commission  to  examine  information  from  any  source  regarding  alleged 
distortive foreign subsidies on its own initiative. Under these provisions, where the available information 
indicates  the  possibility  of  a  distortive  foreign  subsidy,  the  Commission  may  seek  all  information 
necessary  to  assess,  on  a  preliminary  basis,  whether  the  financial  contribution  constitutes  a  foreign 
subsidy and whether it distorts the internal market.  

5. 

THE DIGITAL MARKETS ACT  

The DMA is a Single Market legislation that harmonises the obligations of gatekeepers - large digital 
platforms  that  provide  services  that  are  an  important  gateway  for  business  users  to  reach  end  users  - 
across  the  EU.  It  contributes  to  a  well-functioning  Single  Market  by  laying  down  rules  that  ensure 
contestability  and  fairness  in  digital  markets.  The  DMA  therefore  opens  ecosystems,  creates  real 
opportunities for businesses to enter and expand into new markets, and provides end users with more and 
genuine choice. As one of the centrepieces of the European Digital Strategy143, the DMA complements 
EU competition rules, which continue to apply to digital platforms. The DMA entered into force on 1 
November 2022 and became applicable on 2 May 2023. 

5.1. Context 

The DMA is the first regulatory tool in the world to comprehensively regulate the gatekeeper power of 
the largest digital companies. Currently, the DMA applies to  seven gatekeepers together operating 23 
regulated  platforms.  The  Commission  (with  DG  Competition  and  DG  Communications  Networks, 
Content and Technology (DG Connect) in the lead) is the sole enforcer of the DMA. It works in close 
cooperation with the NCAs within the ECN in accordance with Articles 37 and 38 DMA. 

Following the first designation decisions in September 2023, which triggered the six-month deadline for 
gatekeepers’  compliance,  the  Commission  moved  into  the  implementation  and  enforcement  stage  in 
March  2024.  Throughout  2025,  the  Commission  continued  an  intense  regulatory  dialogue  with  all 
designated gatekeepers to implement the DMA obligations effectively. It organised public compliance 
workshops  to  provide  a  forum  for  third  parties  to  engage  with  the  gatekeepers  on  their  compliance 
solutions. The Commission also continued the non-compliance investigations opened in March 2024 and 
concluded three of them. Moreover, the Commission issued two specification decisions, the first-of-their-
kind, which provide guidance to gatekeepers on how to comply with certain obligations.  

The Commission’s efforts have led to very tangible changes to the benefit of both businesses active in 
Europe as well as European consumers. These include for example: opening up mobile ecosystems by 
allowing developers to offer alternative app stores on iOS and iPadOS to contest Apple’s own App Store, 
allowing  eSIMs  transfer  from  an  Android  phone  to  an  iPhone  and  vice  versa,  enabling  greater 
interoperability  across  services  and  devices  (for  instance  by  granting  device  manufacturers  and  app 
developers improved access to iPhone features that interact with such devices), and offering a choice 
screen for users to select their preferred default browser on iOS devices. These changes, which directly 

142  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – European Wind Power Action Plan, COM/2023/669 final. 
143  See  A  Europe  fit  for  the  digital  age,  https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-
digital-age_en  

34 

 
 
 
benefit consumers, were acknowledged by the European consumer organisation, BEUC, in its November 
2025  report,  ‘First  Bloom:  Increased  Consumer  Choice  After  Eighteen  Months  of  the  DMA’144.  The 
report underscores that these outcomes represent early but meaningful progress under the DMA. 

5.2. Enforcement  

5.2.1.  Gatekeeper designations 

In 2025 no new Core Platform Services (CPSs) were designated by the Commission. 

On  23  April  2025,  following  a  market  investigation,  the  Commission  concluded  that  Meta’s  online 
intermediation  service  Facebook  Marketplace  should  no  longer  be  designated  as  a  CPS  under  the 
DMA145.  The  decision  follows  a  request  submitted  by  Meta  on  5  March  2024  to  reconsider  the 
designation in September 2023 of Facebook Marketplace as an online intermediation service. Following 
an assessment of Meta’s arguments and market investigation, the Commission found that the changes 
Meta brought to the service resulted in a reduction of business users in Facebook Marketplace below the 
designation thresholds.  

5.2.2.  Formal proceedings 

On 19 March 2025, the Commission adopted two decisions specifying the measures that Apple must take 
to comply with its interoperability obligation (Article 6(7) DMA) for hardware and software features 
controlled by its operating systems iOS and iPadOS146. The first case concerns nine iOS connectivity 
features,  predominantly  used  for  connected  devices.  This  covers  for  example  the  display  of  iPhone 
notifications on a smartwatch. The second case concerns request process put in place by Apple, which 
developers must follow to obtain interoperability with iOS and iPadOS. The measures implemented are 
based on technical input from Apple as well as feedback from third parties gathered during the public 
consultations and bilateral exchanges. The first measures have been implemented in the iOS 26 version 
and  are  already  delivering  concrete  improvements  for  users.  Apple  has  appealed  both  specification 
decisions147. 

On 23 April 2025, the Commission concluded its investigation into Apple’s anti-steering practices by 
finding that Apple breached Article 5(4) DMA and imposing a EUR 500 million fine on Apple148. The 
Commission imposed a cease and desist order, forcing Apple to remove all technical and commercial 
restrictions  on  steering  within  60  days  subject  to  periodic  penalty  payments.  The  decision  has  been 
appealed by  Apple. On  26 June 2025, Apple rolled out updated terms for the  App Store and revised 
contractual  terms  for  app  distribution  on  iOS.  The  Commission  continues  monitoring  Apple’s 
compliance with its decision of April 2025. 

On  23  April  2025,  the  Commission  also  concluded  its  investigation  into  Meta’s  ‘consent  or  pay’ 
advertising model finding that Meta breached Article 5(2) DMA and imposing a EUR 200 million fine149. 
In addition, the Commission imposed a cease and desist order, forcing Meta to bring the non-compliance 
of its ‘consent or pay’ model effectively to an end within 60 days subject to periodic penalty payments. 
The decision has been appealed by Meta. Following a close dialogue with Meta, the Commission took 
note on 8 December 2025 of Meta’s undertaking to offer users in the EU an alternative, free version of 

See 

https://www.beuc.eu/sites/default/files/publications/BEUC-X-2025-

144 
101_Increased_consumer_choice_after_eighteen_months_of_the_DMA.pdf  
145 Case DMA.100044 – Meta – online intermediation services – marketplace. 
146 Case DMA.100203 – Article 6(7) – Apple – iOS – SP – Features for Connected Physical Devices and Case DMA.100204 
– Article 6(7) – Apple – SP - Process. 
147 Cases T-354/25 and T-359/25, Apple and Apple Distribution International v Commission. 
148 Case DMA.100109 – Apple – AppStore. 
149 Case DMA.100055 – Meta – Article 5(2). 

35 

 
 
its social networks using less personal data for an experience with less targeted advertising, based on a 
specific choice interface and flow for users. Following its implementation, the Commission will seek 
feedback and evidence from Meta and other relevant stakeholders on the impact and uptake of this new 
ad model. 

On 23 April 2025, the Commission closed the investigation into Apple’s user choice architecture and its 
compliance with the obligations to easily uninstall software applications and change default settings on 
iOS150. This closure follows a constructive dialogue between the Commission and Apple.  Among the 
results, Apple changed its browser choice screen, streamlining the user experience of selecting and setting 
a new default browser on iPhone. 

On 6 November 2025, the Commission launched proceedings into potential breach by Google of Article 
6(12) and 6(5) DMA obligations through demoting media publishers’ content in search results151. The 
Commission’s investigation focuses specifically on Google’s ‘site reputation abuse policy’ and the extent 
to which its application complies with the obligations set out in Articles 6(12) and 6(5) DMA to ensure 
transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions to Google Search’s ranking. 

On  18  November  2025,  the  Commission  opened  three  market  investigations  in  relation  to  cloud 
computing services. Two market investigations seek to assess whether Amazon and Microsoft should be 
qualitatively designated as gatekeepers for their cloud computing services, Amazon Web Services and 
Microsoft Azure152. The third market investigation will examine if the existing DMA obligations can 
effectively tackle practices that may limit competitiveness and fairness in the cloud computing sector in 
the EU153. The investigations opened on 25 March 2024, against Alphabet with regard to its anti-steering 
rules154 and self-preferencing on Google Search155 are still ongoing.  
The investigation opened on 23 April 2024 against Apple concerning Apple’s contract terms156 in relation 
to third party app stores is also ongoing.  

5.3. Developments on rules  

In addition, as required by Article 53 DMA, the Commission initiated the  first review of the DMA in 
2025. 

The Commission consulted a broad set of stakeholders to gather input that will feed into its report. On 3 
July,  the  Commission  launched  a  public  consultation,  seeking  feedback  from  any  interested  parties, 
including citizens, SMEs, business organisations, and other stakeholders, on the impact and effectiveness 
of the DMA and its readiness to face emerging challenges, such as the rollout of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI)-powered services157. 

In June 2025, the Commission also invited the members of the Digital Markets Act Advisory Committee 
(DMAC)158  to  reflect  on  their  possible  contribution  to  this  exercise  and  provide  their  input  for  the 
purposes of the first DMA review. Member States have also been informed of this process at a meeting 
of the Council Working Party on Competition in June 2025. Based on the input received, the Commission 
will prepare a review report assessing  the impact  of the DMA so far, which will also  be shared with 

150 Case DMA.100185 – Apple – Operating systems – iOS – Article 6(3).  
151 Case DMA.100231 – Alphabet – Google Search – Site reputation abuse policy. 
152 Cases DMA.100032 – Microsoft – cloud computing services and DMA.100033 – Amazon – cloud computing services. 
153 Case DMA.100236 – Cloud – Article 19. 
154 Case DMA.100075 – Alphabet - Online Intermediation services - app stores - Google Play - Art.5(4). 
155 Case DMA.100193 – Alphabet - Online Search Engine - Google Search - Art. 6(5). 
156 Case DMA. 100206 – Apple – new business terms. 
157 See https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/consultation-first-review-digital-markets-act_en  
158 The Digital Markets Act Advisory Committee supports the Commission in the adoption of implementing acts under the 
DMA.  It  is  classified  as  a  committee  under  Regulation  (EU)  No  182/2011  and functions  in  accordance  with  its  Rules  of 
Procedure. 

36 

 
 
Member States. The Commission is required to complete its review of the DMA by 3 May 2026. The 
resulting report will be presented to the European Parliament (Parliament), the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee.  

5.4. Regulatory cooperation and transparency 

The DMA provides for close cooperation between the Commission, as the sole enforcer, and NCAs. It 
also established a High-Level Group comprising the European bodies and networks identified within the 
Regulation.  The  primary  objective  of  the  High-Level  Group  is  to  support  the  coherent  and  effective 
implementation of the DMA alongside other sector-specific regulations applicable to gatekeepers. The 
Group  convenes  several  times  a  year  to  discuss  and  coordinate  on  current  topics  of  regulatory 
relevance159.  On  7  March  2025,  the  High-Level  Group  held  its  fourth  plenary  session  in  Brussels. 
Additionally, three sub-group meetings took place in 2025, focusing on data-related obligations, Article 
7 (interoperability), and AI. 

The  Commission  also  cooperated  regularly  with  NCAs  under  the  DMA’s  specific  mechanism  to 
coordinate  the  complementary  application  of  the  DMA  and  national  competition  law,  as  well  as  by 
participating in multilateral fora such as the G7 Competition Summit160.  

In  accordance  with  its  transparency  obligations,  the  Commission  publishes  a  DMA  annual  report161 
which  details  the  state  of  implementation  and  the  progress  made  towards  achieving  the  DMA’s 
objectives. 

Finally,  in  2025,  the  Commission  received  information  about  36  transactions  pursuant  to  Article  14 
DMA, which requires gatekeepers to inform the Commission of intended acquisitions within the digital 
sector. The summaries of these transactions are regularly published on the DMA website162. 

6. 

DEVELOPING THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF EU COMPETITION POLICY 

Given the current geopolitical challenges and the fact that many markets extend far beyond the EU, the 
Commission  -  as  a  competition  policymaker  and  enforcer  -  is  committed  to  remaining  a  leading  and 
respected  international  actor.  Through  global  cooperation,  the  Commission  contributes  to  a  ‘Global 
Europe’ that leverages the EU’s power and partnerships. Fostering a level playing field and the rule of 
law abroad contribute to advance the interests and competitiveness of EU firms. Such interests can only 
be  safeguarded  through  a  combination  of  effective  trade  rules  and  fair,  transparent  and  non-
discriminatory  competition  regimes  in  foreign  jurisdictions,  supported  by  sustained  investment  in 
bilateral and multilateral relations. 

6.1. Multilateral relations 

In  2025,  the  Commission  continued  to  engage  actively  in  international  competition-related  fora, 
including  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  Competition 
Committee, the International Competition Network (ICN), the G7 Competition Summit and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 

159  See  https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/high-level-group-digital-markets-act-agrees-coordinate-efforts-ensure-ai-
development-aligns-dma-2024-05-23_en   
160  See,  for  example  https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/g7-competition-summit-effective-international-cooperation-
contributing-fair-open-and-contestable-ai-2024-10-04_en    
161 See https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/about-dma/dma-annual-reports_en   
162 See https://digital-markets-act-cases.ec.europa.eu/acquisitions  

37 

 
 
 
At the OECD Competition Committee meeting in June 2025, the Commission participated in exchanges 
regarding cloud computing services, corporate influence; efficiencies in merger control; mobile payment 
services; detection tools and on the assessment of the impact of competition authorities’ activities163. In 
December 2025, Executive Vice-President Ribera delivered a keynote speech164 at the OECD Global 
Forum on Competition. During this forum, the Commission served as one of the lead examiners in the 
OECD Peer Review of Kenya’s competition framework and contributed to the roundtable on competition 
and  the  healthcare  sector165.  Additionally,  the  Commission  intervened  in  roundtables  held  by  the 
Competition Committee and its Working Parties No. 2 and No. 3. These discussions focused on market 
studies  and  other  market  analysis  tools;  cooperative  antitrust  in  remedy  design;  competition  in  AI 
infrastructure, and experiences with the use of AI by competition authorities166. 

The Commission continued to serve as co-chair of the ICN Merger Working Group until May 2025. In 
this capacity, it worked on the revision of the chapters on unilateral and coordinated effects for the ICN 
Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis167. These two updated chapters were adopted at the ICN 
annual conference in May 2025168. The unilateral effects chapter was revised to include new theories of 
harm, additional factors relevant for the assessment, non-price parameters of competition and updated 
guidance  on  evidence.  The  coordinated  effects  chapter  was  updated  with  guidance  on  the  various 
dimensions and forms of coordination, factors to assess the incentives to coordinate as well as potential 
disruption.  In  May  2025,  the  Commission  was  appointed  co-chair  of  the  ICN  Unilateral  Conduct 
Working Group. In that capacity, it organised a webinar in November 2025 on the use of evidence in 
antitrust enforcement against unilateral conduct. In May 2025, the Commission also participated in the 
ICN annual conference, with the Deputy-Director General for mergers speaking on the Merger Working 
Group  plenary  panel,  and  other  Commission  speakers  contributing  to  several  breakout  sessions169. 
Throughout  the  year,  the  Commission  moderated  and  facilitated  sessions  at  several  key  international 
workshops: (i) the ICN unilateral conduct workshop which took place in March 2025 in Brazil170; (ii) the 
ICN  merger  workshop  held  in  October  2025  in  Mauritius171; and  (iii)  in  the  ICN  cartel  workshop  in 
November  2025  in  South  Korea172.  In  October  2025,  the  Commission  was  appointed  co-chair  of  the 
Interest Group Use of AI by Competition Agencies within the ICN Technologist Working Group. In this 
context, it hosted a knowledge sharing event on applied AI tools in competition enforcement. 

At the October 2025 G7 Competition Summit in Ottawa173, the discussions focused on digital competition 
concerns,  specifically  algorithmic  pricing,  and  their  impact  on  competition  and  the  economy. 
Participating  authorities  and  agencies  exchanged  views  on  enforcement  experiences  and  detection 
strategies,  alongside  emerging  policy  issues  related  to  conduct  in  digital  markets.  At  the  request  of 
Canada, the OECD presented a new scoping note focusing on algorithmic pricing and competition174. 

163 See https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-roundtables-on-competition-policy-papers_20758677.html  
164 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_2869  
165 See https://www.oecd.org/en/events/2025/12/global-forum-on-competition-2025.html  
166 See https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-roundtables-on-competition-policy-papers_20758677.html  
167 See https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/portfolio/recommended-practices-for-merger-analysis/  
168 See https://icn25cma.co.uk/  
169 See https://icn25cma.co.uk/agenda/   
170 See https://www.gov.br/cade/en/matters/news/icn-workshop-discusses-unilateral-conducts-in-brazil 
171 See https://competitioncommission.mu/the-icn-merger-workshop-2025-in-mauritius/  
172 See https://www.icn2025korea.com/  
173 See https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/en/press-release/canada-hosts-g7-summit-discussing-competition-issues-
related-algorithmic-pricing  
174 See https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/algorithmic-pricing-and-competition-in-g7-jurisdictions_f36dacf8-en.html   

38 

 
 
The summit culminated in the publication of an updated version of the compendium of approaches to 
improve competition in digital markets175, reflecting the shared views of competition authorities  

In  July  2025,  the  Commission  attended  the  9th  UN  Conference  on  Competition  and  Consumer 
Protection176. Participants discussed competition and consumer protection issues at the national, regional 
and  international  levels,  to  continue  enhancing  consumers  welfare  through  open,  fair,  dynamic  and 
inclusive  markets.  The  Commission  intervened  in  sessions  on  ‘Competition  and  regional  economic 
organisations’ and ‘Investigative techniques and digital tools in a modern enforcement world’.  

6.2. Bilateral relations  

In  2025,  the  Commission  continued  cooperate  bilaterally  with  the  UK  as  provided  for  in  the  EU/UK 
Trade  Cooperation  Agreement  (TCA)177 and  the  Withdrawal  Agreement178.  The  Commission’s  work 
focused  on  controlling  potentially  competition  distorting  subsidy  schemes  in  the  UK;  this  includes 
monitoring and reporting on subsidy, competition  legislation and enforcement.  The Commission also 
represented the EU in the formal committees established under the TCA and Withdrawal Agreement. In 
addition, following the joint announcement by the EU and UK of a ‘New Strategic Partnership’ at the 
Summit  on  19  May  2025179,  the  Commission  engaged  in  discussions  with  the  UK  on  several  topics, 
including State aid and energy cooperation. In May 2025, the Commission also adopted proposals for 
Council decisions to sign and conclude the competition cooperation agreement between the EU and the 
UK180. 

In 2025, the Commission continued the negotiations on a competition cooperation agreement between 
the EU and Canada, which is intended to replace the current agreement of 1999181. 

Moreover, the Commission continued its cooperation on competition  policy with  the  Korean  and  the 
Japanese  Fair  Trade  Commissions  and  China's  State  Administration  for  Market  Regulation.  DG 
Competition's multilateral technical cooperation continued as well with an activity with the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) competition authorities. DG Competition and DG Connect signed 
a Cooperation Arrangement with the Japan Fair Trade Commission regarding cooperation in the field of 
digital platform regulation182. 

The Commission aims to include provisions on competition and subsidy control when negotiating Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs). In 2025, the Commission concluded FTA negotiations with Indonesia and 

See 

175 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/compendium-of-approaches-to-improving-competition-in-digital-
markets-2025  
176 See https://unctad.org/meeting/9th-united-nations-conference-competition-and-consumer-protection  
177 Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one 
part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part, OJ L 149, 30.4.2021, pp. 10–2539.  
178 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and 
the European Atomic Energy Community 2019/C 384 I/01, OJ C 384I, 12.11.2019, pp. 1–177. 
179 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_1267  
180 Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European 
Union  and  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  regarding  cooperation  on  the  application  of  their 
competition laws, COM/2025/232 final, and Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
Union,  of  the  Agreement  between  the  European  Union  and  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland 
regarding cooperation on the application of their competition laws, COM/2025/233 final. 
181 Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of Canada regarding the application of their 
competition laws, OJ L 175, 10.7.1999, p. 50. 
182 See https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commissions-services-sign-arrangement-japan-fair-trade-commission-
common-goal-promoting-2025-07-23_en  

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1edla1hi/eu-uk_joint-statement.pdf 

; 

39 

 
 
continued FTA negotiations with India, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and ESA5183. The Commission 
increasingly engaged with the Middle East and started negotiations with the United Arab Emirates on a 
FTA, which includes a chapter on competition. 

As  regards  (potential)184  candidate  countries185,  the  Commission's  primary  objective  regarding 
competition  law  is  to  support  the  setting  up  of  legislative  frameworks  ensuring  well-functioning  and 
operationally  independent  competition  and  State  aid  authorities  that  will  build  up  solid  enforcement 
records in these countries. In 2025, the Commission continued to monitor national reforms, enforcement 
of  competition  rules  and  the  overall  compliance  of  the  (potential)  candidate  countries  with  their 
commitments under the Association Agreements to ensure the legal alignment of their national rules with 
the  EU  acquis.  The  Commission  also  followed  and  assessed  the  progress  made  in  relation  to  the 
implementation of support facilities for Ukraine and Moldova and for the Western Balkan countries that 
aim to assist the candidate and potential candidate countries with their legal, administrative and economic 
integration  with  the  EU  internal  market.  In  2025,  the  screening  meetings  and  consequent  screening 
reports including  about  competition  policy were conducted  and concluded for Ukraine  and Moldova. 
This compulsory step in the EU accession negotiations process paves the way for further alignment and 
formal negotiations under the chapters relating to competition policy186. 

In 2025, the Commission also engaged actively with several African national and regional authorities to 
strengthen  their  policy  frameworks  and  support  continental  and  regional  economic  integration.  The 
Commission cooperated with three African regional economic communities - the West African Economic 
and  Monetary  Union  (WAEMU);  the  East  African  Community  (EAC);  and  the  Common  Market  for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) - and the authority supporting the implementation of the African 
Continental Free Trade Area (the AfCFTA Secretariat) at continental level, to support competition and 
consumer welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Commission also cooperated on a bilateral basis with few 
competition  authorities  on  the  continent  (for  instance  Egypt,  Kenya,  South  Africa)  and  has  assisted 
Gambia in setting up its merger control rules.  

7. 

BENEFITS OF EU COMPETITION POLICY FOR CONSUMERS AND CITIZENS 

7.1. Benefits of EU competition for consumers and citizens 

The Commission’s enforcement in the fields of antitrust and mergers generate direct benefits for citizens. 
DG Competition measures the impact of its enforcement activities in the areas of antitrust (cartels and 
non-cartel antitrust) and merger control in several complementary ways.  

An important measure is ‘direct customer savings’, that is to say likely direct price effects for customers 
in markets where the Commission has intervened. Based on a simplified OECD method, the estimated 
direct customer savings from Commission interventions in 2025 were in the range of EUR 12.4 - 21.9 
billion. This amounted to EUR 12 - 20 billion on average per year over the period 2012-2025. In relative 
terms, this corresponded to savings of around EUR 60 - 100 per EU household per year.  

183 Five Eastern and Southern Countries: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe. 
184 Potential candidate for EU membership: Kosovo. 
185 Countries granted candidate country status by the European Council on the basis of a recommendation by the European 
Commission:  Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Georgia,  Moldova,  Montenegro,  North  Macedonia,  Serbia,  Türkiye  and 
Ukraine. 
186 See https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/2025-communication-eu-enlargement-policy_en  

40 

 
 
 
Figure 9: Customer savings by instrument (2012-2025) in billion EUR (midpoints) 

Antitrust

Cartel

Merger

€ 40

€ 35

€ 30

€ 25

€ 20

€ 15

€ 10

€ 5

€ 0

The Commission is not the only enforcer of the EU competition rules. Its partners in the ECN also play 
an active role. In 2025, DG Competition and participating NCAs within the ECN continued to work on 
measuring additional customer savings generated by enforcement action taken by these NCAs. For the 
period 2020-2024, the analysis indicates that the combined customer savings (Commission and NCAs) 
sum up to a range of EUR 18 - 30 billion per year. This means that the NCAs contribute at least another 
50% of direct savings on top of those generated by the Commission. The total amount of direct customer 
savings (Commission and NCAs) corresponds to some EUR 100 - 160 per household per year for this 
period.  

Interventions  by  competition  authorities  not  only  aim  to  stop  anticompetitive  behaviour  by  market 
participants in specific cases (‘direct effects’), they also deter future anticompetitive behaviour by other 
market participants (‘deterrent effects’). It is well known that this type of indirect effects is difficult to 
measure, which is why the Commission has launched a survey study to obtain further knowledge on the 
magnitude and main drivers of deterrence effects. 

Beyond  direct  and  indirect  price  effects,  the  Commission’s  enforcement  activities  also  have  positive 
effects on innovation and quality. Economists tend to agree that such ‘dynamic effects’ are significant 
and important for productivity growth and competitiveness, but they also agree that their magnitude is 
very difficult to measure. In 2025, the Commission and the OECD continued their collaborative effort to 
gain further insights into the impact of innovation on competition and competition enforcement187. In 
addition, DG Competition commissioned and published two studies for this purpose188.  

Competition policy enforcement does not only have a positive economic impact at microeconomic level; 
it  also  serves  as  an  important  driver  of  welfare  and  growth  at  macroeconomic  level.  Estimated  price 
reductions resulting from competition policy interventions (both directly and indirectly, via deterrence 
effects)  can  be  used  to  improve  economy-wide  performance  indicators  on  investment,  employment, 

187 Contribution Agreement COMP/2025/CA/0001, Activity 2: The impact of M&A on innovation, business dynamism and 
technology diffusion.  
188 Study on dynamic merger effects, Contract notice 59/2025 191698-2025, published in the Official Journal on 25/03; Study 
on the impact of mergers reviewed by the Commission on markups and innovation, EC-COMP-2025-MVP-0044.  

41 

 
 
 
prices, productivity and ultimately on gross domestic product (GDP)189. The impact of competition and 
competition enforcement was the subject of the OECD Working Party meeting on 16 June 2025190, where 
DG Competition contributed to the update of the OECD Factsheet on Competition and Macroeconomic 
Outcomes of 2014.   

Figure 10: Competition enforcement contributing to economic growth 

Using  QUEST  III,  the  Commission’s  basic  macro-economic  forecasting  tool  modelling  by  the  JRC, 
suggests that the Commission’s competition enforcement activities may trigger an increase of real EU 
GDP relative to the baseline in the range of 0.6% - 1.1% in the medium to long term (the equivalent of 
an uplift of EUR 100-180 billion in GDP), a 0.3%  - 0.7% reduction in the overall price level  and an 
increase  in  consumption  (0.5  -  1.0%)  and  investment  (1.1  -  1.7%)191.  These  results  indicate  that 
competition policy directly supports GDP growth, investment and consumption across the EU economy. 

7.2. Ex post evaluation 

On 20 February 2025, DG Competition published a first-of-its-kind study assessing the effectiveness of 
antitrust remedies imposed or accepted by the Commission over the past 20 years under Articles 7 and 9 
of Regulation 1/2003192. While the effectiveness of the Commission’s antitrust remedies seems to have 
improved over the last 20 years, the study also shows that: (i) past antitrust remedies have not always 
been implemented; moreover, fewer than half in the selected sample were fully effective in achieving 
their goal; (ii) purely behavioural remedies were less likely to be both fully implemented and effective, 
than other forms of remedies; and (iii) implementation and effectiveness seem to have improved over 

on 

and 

competition 

189 Economic literature shows that competition enforcement – alongside other procompetitive market policies (single market 
policy, trade policy) – contributes to higher productivity and economic growth. For references, see for example OECD (2014), 
2014, 
Factsheet 
https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2014/10/factsheet-on-competition-and-macro-economic-
outcomes_24994985/660b93ab-en.pdf   
190 See https://www.oecd.org/en/events/2025/06/assessing-the-impact-of-competition-authorities-activities.html  
191  European  Commission:  Directorate-General for  Competition,  Directorate-General  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs, 
Joint Research Centre, Dierx, A., Fedotenkov, I. et al., Modelling the macroeconomic impact of competition policy – 2023 
update and further development, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2763/959314 
192 Grimaldi Alliance and NERA, Ex post evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of EU antitrust remedies, Final 
report  prepared 
the  European  Union,  2025, 
for 
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2763/4894234   

the  European  Commission,  Publications  Office  of 

macro-economic 

outcomes, 

42 

 
 
 
time. On 27 March 2025,  DG Competition hosted an expert online workshop with  the authors of the 
study and leading experts.193 

Also in 2025, the findings of the ex post evaluation study into ‘killer acquisitions’ in the pharma sector 
were discussed with economic and legal experts in a workshop194. 

II.  SECTORAL OVERVIEW 

1. 

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT  

1.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors  

The European electricity market - the largest integrated market in the world - has become a cornerstone 
of the clean energy transition. The continued integration of the EU electricity market enhances resilience, 
reduce consumer costs, and supports investment in renewable generation195.  

In 2025, the situation in the energy markets continued to stabilise across both electricity and gas sectors 
following the energy crisis of 2021-2023. This stability, although at levels above historical averages, was 
achieved thanks to the rapid deployment of clean energy, the diversification of supply, the availability of 
energy interconnections and the solidarity demonstrated across Member States. However, price volatility 
persists, and energy prices are still significantly higher than outside the EU, and they vary considerably 
across EU Member States. These high  prices and the disparity  remain  a  major  concern  for European 
consumers and many industries. As highlighted in the Draghi report, high energy costs are at the core of 
the challenges currently facing the European economy. 

On 26 February 2025, the Commission published the CID to support industry and companies through the 
transition towards a carbon-neutral economy. The CID outlines a series of actions to lower energy prices 
and create quality jobs and the right conditions for companies to thrive. In parallel and as part of the ClD, 
the Commission presented the ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy’ (AEAP)196, introducing both short-
term and structural measures to deliver stable and predictable energy costs, increase energy efficiency, 
and  expand  renewable  generation,  ensuring  that  businesses  can  remain  competitive  while  consumers 
benefit  from  affordable  energy.  Together  the  CID  and  the  AEAP  underline  how  a  cleaner  and 
independent energy system helps boost the economy while also contributing significantly to Europe's 
decarbonisation  ambitions.  Complementing  these  strategies,  the  Commission  presented  a  Roadmap 
towards ending Russian energy imports in May 2025197. This plan aims to fully eliminate dependence on 
Russian energy by stopping the import of Russian gas and oil and phasing out Russian nuclear energy, 

of 

are 

and 

Final 

video 

report 

projects, 

prepared 

recording 

available: 

the  workshop 

https://competition-

further  materials 

193  A 
policy.ec.europa.eu/about/reaching-out/online-expert-workshop-antitrust-remedies_en   
194 Workshop held on 10 April, 2025 on the report by Lear (2024),  Ex-post evaluation: EU competition enforcement and 
acquisitions of innovative competitors in the pharma sector leading to the discontinuation of overlapping drug research and 
development 
( 
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2763/3714497).  A  video  recording  of  the  workshop  and  further  materials are  available: 
https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/reaching-out/online-expert-workshop-killer-acquisitions_en  
195  European  Commission:  ACER,  Progress  of  EU  electricity  wholesale  market  integration  -  Monitoring  Report  2025, 
https://www.acer.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Publications/ACER-2025-Electricity-market-integration.pdf   
196  Communication  from  the  commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Action Plan for Affordable Energy Unlocking the true value of our Energy 
Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans, COM(2025) 79 final, 26.2.2025. 
197  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports, COM(2025) 440 final/2, 
12.5.2025. 

the  European  Commission,  November 

2024 

for 

43 

 
 
 
while simultaneously ensuring stable energy supplies and prices across the EU.  

In this context, competition and State aid policy play a crucial role in shaping a conducive environment 
for  green  investments,  driving  efficiency  in  public  support  for  a  competitive  European  economy.  To 
achieve  the  ambitions  of  the  CID  and  assist  Member  States  in  designing  measures  that  support  its 
objectives, the Commission adopted the CISAF on 25 June 2025 (see above Part I, section 3.2.1).  

The CISAF also introduces simplified compatibility criteria for aid schemes making use of the ‘Grants-
as-a-service-tool’  under  the  Innovation  Fund  ‘regular’  grants  calls  (GaaS)198.  This  mechanism  builds 
upon the synergies existing between Innovation Fund requirements and State aid rules. A guidance on 
the  GaaS  possibility  has  been  published  in  November  2025199  and  notification  forms  for  CISAF, 
including GaaS are available on the Commission website200.  

1.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges in the green economy  

In 2025, competition policy and enforcement continued to contribute to the EU environmental objectives 
through the application of the State aid, antitrust and merger rules.  

1.2.1.  Revised State aid EU Emission Trading System (ETS) Guidelines adopted  

On 23 December 2025, the Commission adopted targeted amendments of the ETS State aid Guidelines201.  

The ETS Guidelines aim at reducing the risk of ‘carbon leakage’ - where companies move production to 
countries outside the EU with less ambitious climate policies - leading to less economic activity in the 
EU and no reduction in greenhouse gas emissions globally. They enable Member States to compensate 
companies in at-risk sectors for part of the higher electricity prices resulting from the carbon price signals 
created by the EU ETS (so-called indirect emission costs). Hence, the ETS Guidelines also contribute to 
the  competitiveness  of  European  industries.  They  are  complementary  to  the  measures  allowed  under 
CISAF, if overcompensation is excluded. 

The ETS Guidelines were adopted for the full duration of the current EU ETS phase - running from 2021 
until 2030 - to ensure predictability, with a possible update of certain technical parameters in 2025 to be 
in  line  with  the  most  recent  available  data,  if  deemed  necessary.  Against  this  background,  the 
Commission has adopted the following amendments to the current ETS Guidelines: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

the extension of the list of industrial sectors eligible for compensation to include 20 new sectors 
and two new subsectors. This includes the manufacture of organic chemicals and certain activities 
in the ceramic, glass, and batteries sectors;  

an increase in the aid intensity from 75% to 80% for sectors that were already eligible before the 
amendment to cater for their increased risk of carbon leakage;   

the option for Member States to notify sectors or subsectors that are not included in the amended 
list of eligible sectors, if they can demonstrate these are at genuine risk of carbon leakage;  

198 GaaS relates to the possibility offered under the Innovation Fund to Member States to allocate a support budget dedicated 
to support projects which have met minimum qualification requirements in the Innovation Fund evaluation and have therefore 
received a STEP seal. In such situation, the Member State saves administrative resources by directly taking over the quality 
evaluation already carried out under the Innovation Fund, in particular on the decarbonisation and innovativeness potential of 
the project.     
199 
580ffa900634_en?filename=Grants%20as%20a%20Service%20concept%20note.pdf  
200  See  https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/contribution-clean-just-and-competitive-transition/clean-industrial-
deal-state-aid-framework-cisaf_en  
201 Communication from the Commission amending the Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system 
for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post-2021, C/2025/9298, OJ C, C/2026/196, 5.1.2026. 

https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/74cf1aca-e062-4fd7-9c77-

See 

44 

 
 
iv. 

the  requirement  for  large  beneficiaries  to  contribute  to  the  green  transition  by,  among  others, 
investing  a  share  of  the  aid  in  projects  that  contribute  to  reducing  the  costs  of  the  electricity 
system. 

The CO2 emission factors and geographic areas are also updated for 2026-2030, based on the most recent 
data  available.  The  CO2  emission  factors  reflect  the  CO2  emission  content  of  fossil  fuels  used  for 
electricity production in a given geographic area and are used to determine the amount of compensation. 
The  amendment  allows  Member  States  to  apply  a  gradual  transition  from  2026  to  2030,  where  the 
decrease in the applicable maximum regional CO2 emission factor compared to the previous factor for 
2021-2025 is particularly large. 

The ETS Guidelines are expected to be further supplemented with electricity efficiency benchmarks for 
the newly eligible sectors.  

1.2.2.  Guidance on two-way contracts for difference and other guidance  

On 10 December 2025, the Commission adopted the Guidance on the design of two-way contracts for 
difference (2w-CfD)202. The ‘2w-CfD’ are defined as contracts between a power-generating installation 
operator and a counterpart, usually a public entity, that provides both minimum remuneration protection 
and a limit to excess remuneration. The Electricity Regulation203 mandates that direct price support for 
certain types of renewable electricity generation facilities204 and for new nuclear electricity generation 
facilities, take the form of ‘2w-CfD’. The Guidance provides interpretation and clarification on the design 
principles to help Member States design their support schemes in line with the Electricity Regulation. It 
also provides examples of best practices that can be applied by Member States in the ‘2w-CfD’ support 
schemes.  

In parallel, the Commission continued to provide guidance to stakeholders to facilitate the interpretation 
and application of the rules and guidelines as well as to harmonise their application among the Member 
States. For instance, the Commission participated in several sectoral conferences to present the CISAF 
(see above Part I, Section 3.2.1) and provide explanations on its scope and provisions. The Commission 
also  participated  in  several  technical  presentations  and  meetings,  for  example  a  webinar  for  Member 
States and national regulatory authorities (NRAs) on non-fossil flexibility support schemes co-organised 
by DG ENER and DG Competition on 1 December 2025.  

Furthermore, the Commission provided hands-on support to Member States regarding the interpretation 
of the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA) Regulation205 and the implementation of the NZIA criteria. These 
criteria will become mandatory for a minimum of 30% in terms of volume, or 6 GW, of renewable energy 
source auctioned each year per Member State, as from 30 December 2025. Specifically, the Commission 
provided guidance to several Member States on the design of the NZIA non-price criteria related to the 
supply chain resilience within the Renewable Energy Sources (RES) schemes.  

These  communication  and  outreach  activities  aim  to  enhance  transparency  and  provide  greater  legal 
certainty in the implementation of the State aid rules across the EU. 

202 Commission guidance on the design of two-way contracts for difference, (C/2025/6701), OJ C, 19.12.2025. 
203 Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 
2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design, OJ L, 2024/1747, 26.6.2024. 
204 The obligation for direct price support schemes to take the form of 2w-CfD applies to the following renewable generation 
technologies: wind, solar, geothermal and hydropower without reservoir. 
205 Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework 
of  measures  for  strengthening  Europe’s  net-zero  technology  manufacturing  ecosystem  and  amending  Regulation  (EU) 
2018/1724, OJ L, 2024/1735, 28.6.2024. 

45 

 
 
1.2.3.  Supporting hydrogen production  

In 2025, under the CEEAG, the Commission approved three State aid schemes totalling EUR 836 million 
to support the production of renewable hydrogen through the European Hydrogen Bank206's ‘Auctions-
as-a-Service’207 tool.  

These three measures include a EUR 400 million Austrian State aid scheme208 and a EUR 36 million 
Lithuanian State aid scheme209, both approved in March 2025, as well as a EUR 400 million Spanish 
State aid scheme210 approved in April 2025. The schemes support the production of up to 112 000 tonnes 
of renewable hydrogen in Austria, 13 000 tonnes in Lithuania, and 221 000 tonnes in Spain, potentially 
avoiding up to 1.6 million tonnes of CO2 emissions in total. The companies planning to construct new 
electrolysers in Austria, Lithuania and Spain must comply with EU criteria for producing renewable fuels 
of non-biological origin (RFNBOs), including contributing to the deployment or financing of additional 
renewable electricity needed to support hydrogen production under the scheme211. The ‘Auctions-as-a-
Service’ model provides several  advantages, notably  in  terms of  cost-efficiency in  awarding support, 
unlocking private investment and combining national and European support schemes, while supporting 
the CID's goal of accelerating EU industry decarbonisation and bolstering competitiveness.  

1.2.4.  Encouraging the deployment of renewable energy sources 

In 2025, the Commission approved several State aid schemes supporting the deployment of renewable 
energy  sources,  having  assessed  their  compatibility  under  specific  State  aid  guidelines,  in  particular 
section  2.5  TCTF,  section  4.10  CEEAG,  and  section  4.1  CISAF.  These  approved  measures  include 
investment aid for constructing new renewable energy production capacity or storage, as well as direct 
price  support  schemes  providing  aid  for  the  production  of  electricity  or  heat  from  renewable  energy 
sources.  

For instance, on 28 February 2025, the Commission approved under section 4.10 CEEAG, a EUR 103 
million Czech State aid scheme to support the production of heat from biomass in existing district heating 
installations212. The scheme promotes the use of renewable energy sources in heat production, in line 
with  the  objectives  of  the  REPowerEU  Plan213.  The  aid  will  take  the  form  of  a  green  bonus,  which 
consists of a subsidy granted for each gigajoule of heat from biomass supplied to the heat distribution 
system. The bonus will be determined by the Czech Energy Regulatory Office on an annual basis. The 

for 

206 The Hydrogen Bank is a financing instrument to accelerate the establishment of a full hydrogen value chain in Europe. 
The Commission’s executive agency, the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) is 
running  ‘Auction-as-a-Service’  under  the  Innovation  Fund  (IF  https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-
projects 
budget/performance-and-reporting/programme-performance-statements/innovation-fund-performance_en) 
supporting  the  production  of  renewable  hydrogen.  These  projects  are  assessed  and  ranked  in  the  competitive  auction 
procedure. If the IF budget is insufficient to cover all eligible projects, Member States can contribute with financial resources 
to  support  additional  non-awarded  projects  located  on  their  territory.  See  https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/eus-energy-
system/hydrogen/european-hydrogen-bank_en  
207 
bb46ac813332_en?filename=policy_funding_innovation_concept_paper_aaas_en.pdf  
208 Case SA.116277 – Austria - Austria's Participation in EU Hydrogen Bank Auction. 
209 Case SA.116745 – Lithuania – European Hydrogen Bank Auctions-as-a-Service 2024. 
210 Case SA.116676 – Spain – European Hydrogen Bank Auctions-as-a-Service 2024. 
211  See  EU 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_594  
212 Case SA.113882 – Czechia – Maintenance support of heat from renewable energy sources with a nominal heat output 
above 1 MW burning biomass. 
213  Communication  from  the  Commission  -  REPowerEU  Plan,  COM(2022)  230  final,  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0230  

https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/b0316108-0e2b-402d-8e16-

fuels  of  non-biological  origin 

the  production  of 

(RFNBOs), 

renewable 

criteria 

See 

for 

46 

 
 
aid amount will be equal to the cost difference of producing heat from biomass compared to producing 
heat from coal. Eligible beneficiaries are owners of existing heat installations using biomass with a heat 
output above 1 MW. 

On 17 March 2025, the Commission approved,  under section 2.5 TCTF, a EUR 699 million  Spanish 
State  aid  scheme  to  support  investments  in  energy  storage  to  facilitate  the  transition  to  a  net-zero 
economy214. The objective of the scheme is to provide investment aid for the deployment of large-scale 
energy storage, which will reduce reliance on fossil fuel imports and allow for a higher penetration of 
variable renewable energy sources in the Spanish electricity system. The aid - provided as direct grants 
and partially financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) - supports the construction 
of 1.8 GWh of new electricity storage capacity. The aid is granted through a competitive bidding process 
open to all storage technologies connected to either the transmission network or distribution network.  

On 5 August 2025, the Commission approved, under section 4.1 CISAF, a EUR 11 billion French scheme 
to support offshore wind energy and boost this clean tech industry in the EU in line with the objectives 
of the CID215. This aid measure will support the construction and operation of three floating offshore 
wind farms of 500 MW capacity each, that will generate around 2.2 TWh of electricity, equivalent to the 
annual consumption of 450 000 French households. The support will be provided as direct price support, 
through  a  ‘2w-CfD’  over  a  20-years  period,  awarded  via  a  transparent  and  non-discriminatory 
competitive bidding process. Resilience has been included as tender prequalification and award criterion 
to diversify wind turbine and main specific components supply chains, to reduce dependency on imports 
from China, in line with the NZIA criteria. 

1.2.5.  Consolidating nuclear-based energy  

For  some  Member  States,  nuclear  energy  is  an  important  component  of  decarbonisation,  industrial 
competitiveness, and security of supply strategies. Acknowledging Member States’ right to determine 
their energy mix, the Commission continued in 2025 to assess the compatibility of State aid for nuclear 
energy  generation  under  Article  107(3)(c)  TFEU,  which  enables  Member  States  to  support  the 
development of certain economic activities. Several significant measures were approved or were under 
investigation in 2025. 

On 21 February 2025, following an in-depth investigation, the Commission approved a Belgian support 
measure  for  the  lifetime  extension  of  two  nuclear  reactors,  Doel  4  and  Tihange  3216.  In  June  2024, 
Belgium notified the Commission of its plan to extend the lifetime of these two nuclear reactors - which 
have a combined capacity of approximately 2 GW - to reduce Belgium’s dependency on fossil fuels and 
preserve  the  security  of  electricity  supply  in  Belgium  and  neighbouring  countries.  In  July  2024,  the 
Commission opened an in-depth investigation to assess the compatibility of the proposed aid measure 
with  the  internal  market,  with  a  focus  on  the  assessment  of  the  financial  arrangements  and  the 
proportionality of the nuclear waste liabilities. The reactors are majority-owned by Engie's Belgian unit 
Electrabel with 89.9% share, while Luminus (an EDF subsidiary) holds a 10.1% minority share. A new 
50-50  joint-venture  between  the  Belgian  State  and  Electrabel,  BE-NUC,  was  created  to  cover  the 
necessary capital cost of the extension. A ‘2w-CfD’ ensures stable revenues for a period of 10 years and 
limits excess remuneration. Additional financial protective mechanisms, such as a loan and an operating 
cashflow guarantee, are also part of the financial set-up. To address the Commission’s concerns, Belgium 
clarified  that  those  financial  arrangements  are  complementary,  covering  different  risks  related  to  the 

214 Case SA.116836 – Spain – TCTF – Support for energy storage. 
215 Case SA.115764 – France – EPIP – Régime de soutien à trois parcs éoliens en mer, l'un au large du Sud de la Bretagne et 
deux autres en Méditerranée. 
216 Case SA.106107 – Belgium – Lifetime extension of two nuclear reactors (Doel 4 and Tihange 3). 

47 

 
 
project,  and  thus  necessary  to  ensure  its  long-term  financial  viability.  The  measure  also  includes 
Electrabel transferring liabilities related to the storage and disposal of nuclear waste and spent fuel, to 
the Belgian state for a lump sum payment of EUR 15 billion which will be managed and controlled by a 
dedicated national body, Hedera. Moreover, the measure ensures risk-sharing and legal protection in the 
event of future legislative changes. 

On 9 December 2025, following an in-depth investigation, the Commission approved aid measures for 
the first nuclear power plant in Poland217. In September 2024, Poland notified the Commission of its 
plan to support State-owned company Polskie Elektrownie Jądrowe sp. z o.o (PEJ) in the construction 
and operation of a new nuclear power plant in Lubiatowo-Kopalino. The project consists of three new 
nuclear reactors, each with a capacity of 1250 MW. Under the aid measures, the beneficiary will benefit 
from direct price support in the form of ‘2w-CfD’’ running for 40 years to provide stable revenues to the 
nuclear power plant. In addition to the CfD, the support package includes an equity injection covering 
approximately 30% of the project’s costs and State guarantees covering 100% of the debt taken by PEJ 
to finance the investment project. The plant is expected to increase the security of electricity supply for 
Poland and its neighbouring countries, contributing to the decarbonisation of the energy sector and the 
diversification of the Polish energy mix. This decision followed the opening of a formal investigation in 
2024,  which  focused  on  the  appropriateness  and  proportionality  of  the  aid,  potential  distortions  in 
electricity markets, and the measure's compliance with relevant provisions of EU law. To address the 
Commission’s  concerns  raised  during  the  investigation,  Poland  adjusted  the  measures,  notably  by 
changing the design of the CfD and shortening its duration.  

On  22  December  2025,  the  Commission  opened  a  formal  investigation  regarding  the  support  for  the 
construction  and  operation  of  two  new  nuclear  units  at  the  Dukovany  site218.  In  April  2024,  the 
Commission  approved  aid  for  the  construction  and  operation  of  a  single  new  nuclear  reactor  in 
Dukovany219. In October 2025, Czechia notified the Commission of its plan to extend the investment in 
nuclear capacities and support the construction and operation of two new nuclear units in Dukovany, 
with an electricity generation capacity of up to  976 MWe each. This project serves Czechia’s plan to 
decarbonise its electricity sector and address an identified gap in electricity supply. The beneficiary of 
the aid measure is Elektrárna Dukovany II (EDU II), owned by the Czech state (80%) and ČEZ (20%), 
the only nuclear power plant operator in Czechia. Under the aid measure, the beneficiary will benefit 
from direct price support in the form of a ‘2w-CfD’ with a duration of 40 years. The beneficiary will also 
benefit from a low-interest repayable State loan of an initial amount currently estimated between EUR 
23 billion and EUR 30 billion, which will cover the full construction costs, and of a protection mechanism 
against  unforeseen  events  or  policy  changes  that  may  make  the  realisation  of  the  project  impossible. 
Based on its preliminary assessment, the Commission has doubts on the compatibility of the aid measure 
with  the  internal  market,  namely  regarding  its  appropriateness  and  proportionality,  its  impact  on 
competition in the market, as well as its compliance with other provisions of EU law (in particular with 
the design principles set out in Article 19d(2) of the Electricity Regulation as regards the CfD).  

Following the annulment by the Court of Justice of the Commission’s decision declaring the State aid 
for the construction of two new reactors on the Paks site in Hungary compatible with the State aid rules 
(see above Part  I, section  3.3.3), the Commission is  again assessing  the compatibility  of the measure 
following its decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU.  

217 Case SA.109707 – Poland – Aid measures for the first nuclear power plant in Poland. 
218 Case SA.117794 – Czechia – Support for the construction and operation of two new nuclear units at the Dukovany site. 
219 Case SA.58207 – Czechia – Support for Dukovany II, a new nuclear power plant in Czechia.  

48 

 
 
1.2.6.  Ensuring security of supply 

On 29 July 2025, the Commission approved, under section 4.8 CEEAG,  a EUR 300 million Swedish 
strategic electricity reserve to safeguard security of electricity supply in emergency situations220. On 28 
October 2025, also under section 4.8 CEEAG, the Commission approved a EUR 750 million Estonian 
strategic reserve to support security of electricity221. The strategic reserves222 in Sweden and Estonia will 
be in place until 2035 and must be open to all projects that can contribute to achieving the security of 
supply objective, including electricity generation, demand-side response and storage. The projects that 
will benefit from the aid in both these cases will be selected through a transparent, non-discriminatory 
competitive bidding process. Capacity funded through these measures will not participate in electricity 
markets while held in the reserve. This restriction is designed to minimise the distortion of competition 
within these markets.  

On  6  October  2025,  the  Commission  approved,  under  section  4.8  CEEAG,  an  Austrian  scheme  to 
safeguard security of electricity supply and network stability223 for a period of 5 years. This scheme is 
an extension and update of the existing network reserve that was approved in 2021 and that will end in 
2026224. Several technical changes were introduced to, among other things, increase the participation of 
smaller  resources,  in  particular  electricity  consumers  that  can  provide  demand  response  by  reducing 
energy use. The scheme will also be open to electricity storage facilities and demand-response providers. 
The  subsidised  capacity  must  remain  available  and  be  located  in  parts  of  Austria  or  neighbouring 
countries where it can help manage transmission congestion. The aid will take the form of direct grants 
paid per MW of available capacity held in the reserve, as well as payments to cover operating costs when 
capacity is activated. The costs of the aid scheme will be recovered from consumers in locations where 
there is a capacity shortfall, via network charges on consumer bills.  

On 22 December 2025, the Commission approved a French capacity mechanism225 with an estimated 
budget of EUR 20 billion. The scheme, approved for a period of 10 years under section 4.8. CEEAG, 
represents  an  extension  and  update  of  the  capacity  mechanism  originally  approved  in  2016.  Various 
design changes were introduced to simplify its functioning (from a decentralised to a market-wide design) 
and to promote the development of a sufficient amount of non-fossil flexibilities. The scheme will also 
be  open  to  all  technologies  emitting  less  than  550gCO2/kWh  of  electricity  produced,  and  fossil  fuel 
technologies will not be granted long-term contracts under the aid measure. The subsidised capacity must 
remain  available  during  the  delivery  periods  (November  to  March)  and  be  located  in  France  or  in 
interconnected Member States having signed a cross-border agreement with France (for instance Belgian 
capacities may participate as of the first auction). The aid will take the form of direct grants paid per MW 
of  available  capacity.  The  costs  of  the  scheme  will  be  recovered  from  consumers  based  on  their 
consumption during hours when a risk on security of supply exists.  

1.2.7.  Addressing electricity costs for energy-intensive industries  

On  24  April  2025,  the  Commission  approved,  under  section  4.11  CEEAG,  a  Portuguese  scheme 
providing  aid  for  energy  intensive  users  (EIUs)226.  The  scheme  concerns  a  reduction  for  EIUs  in  the 

220 Case SA.112968 – Sweden – Electricity Strategic Reserve. 
221 Case SA.112459 – Estonia – Electricity Strategic Reserve. 
222 The strategic reserve is a type of capacity mechanism that remunerates resources held outside the market and used in cases 
of emergency when the electricity demand exceeds the available supply, which in Sweden occur in winter months. Under the 
strategic reserve, projects need to comply with the CO2 emission limits set out in the EU Electricity Regulation. 
223 Case SA.113090 – Austria – Austrian Electricity Network Reserve 2026. 
224 Case SA.52263 – Austria – Austrian Network Reserve. 
225 Case SA.117564 – France – Réforme du mécanisme de capacité français. 
226 Case SA.111450 – Portugal – Electricity levy reduction for energy-intensive users in Portugal. 

49 

 
 
payment  of  levies  aimed  at  financing:  (i)  electricity  production  from  renewable  energy  sources;  (ii) 
support for energy efficiency; and (iii) social tariffs and promotion of electricity generation in isolated 
regions. The scheme will run until 22 April 2035 and has an estimated budget of EUR 612 million. The 
beneficiaries are required to conduct energy audits, as defined by Article 8 of Directive 2012/27/EU227. 
They  also  must  commit  to  at  least  one  of  the  following  actions:  (i)  implement  certain  energy  audit 
recommendations; (ii) cover at least 30% of electricity consumption with renewable energy sources; or 
(iii)  invest  at  least  50%  of  the  aid  in  projects  leading  to  significant  reductions  of  the  installation's 
greenhouse  gas  emissions.  The  scheme  intends  to  reduce  the  risk  that  activities,  in  certain  economic 
sectors  particularly  exposed  to  international  trade  and  relying  heavily  on  electricity  for  their  value 
creation,  will  relocate  outside  the  EU  where  environmental  policies  are  absent  or  less  ambitious.  In 
parallel, it maintains incentives for an effective decarbonisation. The scheme is in line with the  CID, 
which recognises that European industries need urgent support to decarbonise, electrify, to confront high 
energy costs, unfair global competition, and complex regulations, harming their competitiveness.  

1.2.8.  Supporting the shift to clean mobility  

In 2025, the Commission continued to provide guidance to Member States on the use of Articles 36a and 
36b GBER on clean mobility.  A growing  number of schemes for  clean  mobility  are  implemented  by 
Member States under those GBER provisions.  

On 29 July 2025, the Commission approved, under the CEEAG, a EUR 36 million (DKK 268 million) 
Danish measure aimed  at  reducing  greenhouse  gas emissions in  the  domestic aviation  sector228. The 
scheme is designed to incentivise the use of sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) for domestic flights. The 
primary objective of the scheme is  to support at least  one domestic air route using 40% SAF, which 
approaches the current technical limit of 50%. This exceeds the minimum set by the ReFuelEU Aviation 
Regulation229, which requires fuel suppliers to achieve a minimum share of 2% during the scheme period. 
The aid level will be determined through a competitive bidding process, ensuring cost-effectiveness and 
efficiency.  The  scheme  also  includes  rules  to  prevent  overcompensation,  namely  by  ensuring  that 
supported SAF is excluded from parallel support measures under the ReFuelEU Aviation regulation and 
the EU ETS Directive230, and by prohibiting the use of SAF that has already received subsidies from 
Denmark, other EU Member States, or third countries. 

On 17 December 2025, the Commission approved, under the CEEAG, a German EUR 1.6 billion scheme 
to support the deployment of publicly accessible fast-charging stations for electric heavy-duty vehicles 
(e-HDVs) at  non-serviced rest  sites  along  the German motorways231. This measure contributes to  the 
objectives  of  the  European  Green  Deal  and  the  ‘Fit  for  55’  package232.  In  particular,  it  supports  the 
development of a cross-border charging network and facilitates the shift from diesel trucks or buses to 
electric ones, providing them with the recharging infrastructure at spots where this infrastructure is not 

227 Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending 
Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 1. 
228 Case SA.102731 – Denmark – Aid scheme for Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) in domestic aviation. 
229 Regulation 2023/2405 of the European parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on ensuring a level playing field 
for sustainable air transport (ReFuelEU Aviation), OJ L 2405, 31.10.2023, p. 1. 
230  Directive  2023/959  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  10  May  2023  amending  Directive  2003/87/EC 
establishing  a  system  for  greenhouse  gas  emission  allowance  trading  within  the  Union  and  Decision  (EU)  2015/1814 
concerning  the  establishment  and  operation  of  a  market  stability  reserve  for  the  Union  greenhouse  gas  emission  trading 
system, OJ L 130, 16.5.2023, pp. 134–202. 
231 Case SA.114664 – Germany – Network for fast charging infrastructure of heavy-duty vehicles on the German motorways. 
232  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Fit for 55’: delivering the EU's 2030 Climate Target on the way to climate 
neutrality, COM/2021/550 final. 

50 

 
 
yet supplied by the market. The beneficiaries will be companies with experience in the construction and 
operation  of  recharging  infrastructure,  to  be  selected  following  a  competitive  bidding  process.  All 
participating  charging  point  operators  will  offer  different  pricing  options:  an  ad  hoc  pricing  model 
(without the need for a subscription), a contract-based pricing model, and a ‘pass-through’ pricing mode 
(where the drivers can use the pricing of their own energy supplier). These models increase choice at 
charging points, which ensures sufficient price competition.  

1.2.9.  Reducing industrial emissions  

In 2025, under the CEEAG, section 2.6 TCTF and section 5 CISAF, the Commission approved almost 
EUR 12 billion of aid for the decarbonisation of the industry, either through aid schemes or aid to specific 
projects233.  

One Finnish aid scheme234 took the form of a tax credit assessed under section 2.6 TCTF to support (next 
to the production of renewable energy and the production of strategic equipment assessed respectively 
under  sections  2.5  and  2.8  TCTF)  the  decarbonisation  of  industrial  production  processes  by  helping 
companies  reduce  greenhouse  gas  emissions  from  their  production  processes  by  at  least  40%  and/or 
reduce  their  energy  consumption  by  at  least  20%.  Three  additional  German,  Danish  and  French  aid 
schemes  presented  similarities  with  carbon  CfDs  and  were  based  on  competitive  bidding  processes. 
While  the  German  scheme  focused  on  undertakings  subject  to  the  ETS235  and  was  open  to  all 
technologies, including Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), the Danish scheme focused more specifically 
on  incentivising  the  switch  to  cleaner  fuels  by  industries236.  The  French  scheme  was  focusing  on 
undertakings subject to the ETS and open to all technologies, except those already subsidised through 
already existing support schemes such as support for renewable energy generation, including support for 
renewable hydrogen237.  

On 15 December 2025, the Commission approved, under section 5 CISAF, a Spanish aid scheme for the 
decarbonisation of manufacturing industry238. The scheme will support investments into technologies 
such as electrification, shifting to  renewable or low-carbon hydrogen, recovery of waste heat,  carbon 
capture,  storage  and  utilisation,  in  a  wide  range  of  sectors  including  chemicals,  ceramics,  paper  and 
metallurgy. Under the scheme, the aid will take the form of direct grants determined based on pre-defined 
aid intensities. The measure will be open to enterprises of all sizes, and to installations and sectors within 
and outside of the Emission Trading System. 

1.2.10. Stimulating the circular economy 

1.2.10.1. State aid enforcement 

The Commission also approved aid schemes aimed at incentivising projects promoting a more circular 
economy in 2025.  

On 3 February 2025 the Commission approved, under section 4.4 CEEAG, a EUR 500 million French 
scheme to  support the  chemical  recycling of  certain types of  plastic waste, such as trays,  films, non-

233 Concerning aid for specific projects, see for instance Case SA.104899 – Greece, RRF – Aid to Motor Oil Hellas for green 
hydrogen project; Case SA.105083 – Germany – Project CHESS – Uniper Hydrogen GmbH. 
234 Case SA.114934 – Finland – TCTF – Tax credit scheme for investments aiming at climate-neutral economy. 
235  Case  SA.116065  –  Germany  –  “Förderprogramm  Klimaschutzverträge”  –  Second  auction  of  the  Climate  Protection 
Contracts scheme. 
236 Case SA.113683 – Denmark – State aid for decarbonisation of industrial processes in Denmark. 
237 Case SA.120297 – France – Appel d’offres 2026 en faveur de Grands Projets Industriels de Décarbonation. 
238 Case SA.119880 – Spain – CISAF/RRF - Aid scheme for the decarbonisation of manufacturing industry. 

51 

 
 
 
 
beverage bottles and textile materials with a certain amount of polyester content239. The scheme aims to 
support chemical recycling technologies that convert mixed and/or contaminated plastic waste back into 
‘virgin-like’ raw materials. The maximum amount of aid is 40% of the extra investment costs calculated 
by comparing the total investment costs of a project of chemical recycling of plastic waste with those of 
less environmentally friendly projects.  

On 20 May 2025, the Commission approved a EUR 1.2 billion Dutch scheme to support companies in 
their efforts to improve resource efficiency and the circular economy by using secondary or bio-based 
raw materials instead of primary or fossil-based raw materials240. Given that such projects can reduce 
lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions - in addition to the environmental benefit of a more circular economy 
-  they  will  compete  within  the  same  bidding  process  as  decarbonisation  projects  (reducing  direct 
emissions). However, they will be evaluated and compared on the basis of their total emission reductions. 

1.2.10.2 Antitrust enforcement 

On 1 April 2025, the Commission fined 15 major car manufacturers and one association a total of EUR 
458  million  for  participating  in  a  long-lasting  cartel  concerning  end-of-life  vehicle  recycling241. 
Mercedes-Benz was not fined as it revealed the cartel to the Commission under the leniency programme. 
For over 15 years, these car manufacturers coordinated  their behaviour to avoid  paying  for recycling 
services. Furthermore, they agreed not to compete on advertising, the extent to which their cars could be 
recycled, and to remain silent on the recycled materials used in their new cars. High quality recycling in 
key sectors such as the automotive plays a crucial role for meeting the EU’s circular economy objectives, 
not only to cut waste and emissions, but also to reduce dependencies, lower production costs and create 
a  more  sustainable  and  competitive  industrial  model  in  Europe.  This  decision  illustrates  the 
Commission’s readiness to investigate novel types of anticompetitive conduct that may have an adverse 
impact on the clean transition. This case also marks a new record for the settlement procedure, with all 
17 parties involved agreeing to acknowledge their participation in exchange of a 10% reduction in fines.  

Furthermore,  the  Commission  continued  its  investigation  into  the  synthetic  turf  industry  in  several 
Member States to determine whether the companies active in this sector have infringed EU competition 
rules.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  imposed  fines  on  Eurofield  SAS  and  Unanime  Sport  SAS,  the 
ultimate  parent  of  Eurofield  at  the  time  of  the  infringement,  of  a  total  of  around  EUR  172 000  for 
providing an incomplete reply to a request for information issued in the context of the Commission's 
investigation242.  This  is  the  first  time  that  the  Commission  used  its  powers  under  Article  23(1)(b)  of 
Regulation  1/2003  to  ensure  that  companies  do  not  compromise  its  antitrust  investigation  by  not 
providing full and complete replies to information requests.  

The Commission also finalised its ex officio preliminary investigation initiated in 2024 into possible anti-
competitive conduct in breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by the Irish Farm Film Plastics Group 
(IFFPG), a non-profit association operating the only licenced extended producer responsibility (EPR) 
scheme for farm plastic waste recovery in Ireland. The Commission’s preliminary investigation under 
Article 102 TFEU focused on whether the design and remunerative structure of IFFPG’s EPR scheme is 
capable  of  producing  exclusionary  effects  towards  independent  waste  collectors  and  whether  certain 
elements of IFFPG’s constitutive documents and its contracts with authorised waste collectors may be 
contrary to Article 101 TFEU and the ‘polluter pays’ principle. Following the Commission’s preliminary 
investigation, IFFPG made modifications to its EPR scheme. These modifications will lead to a shared 
responsibility for the financing of IFFPG’s EPR scheme between IFFPG’s members and Irish farmers. 

239 Case SA.108044 – France – Régime relatif aux aides en faveur du recyclage chimique de plastiques.  
240 Case SA. 103901 – The Netherlands – Nationale Investeringsmodule Klimaatprojecten Industrie (NIKI). 
241 Case AT.40669 – End-of-life vehicle recycling.  
242 Case AT.40966 – Synthetic Turf (Procedure). 

52 

 
 
  
 
They will also increase competition on the level of collectors of farm plastic waste, as well as on each 
level of the farm plastics supply chain. The Commission’s investigation has now been closed.  

Moreover,  the  Commission  continued  its  investigation  into  the  collection  and  recovery  of  packaging 
waste in Czechia under Article 106 in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU following up on the Letter of 
Formal Notice addressed to Czechia in June 2024243. 

1.2.11. Investments in clean tech manufacturing 

In 2025, the Commission approved six schemes based on section 6.1 CISAF, incentivising investment 
projects that add manufacturing capacity in clean technologies. On 22 October 2025, the Commission 
approved a EUR 61 million aid scheme for Emilia Romagna244 and on 3 November 2025, a EUR 219 
million  aid  scheme  for  Lazio245.  On  6  November,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  700  million  aid 
scheme for Spain246. On 9 December 2025, the Commission approved a EUR 1 500 million aid scheme 
for Italy247 and on 12 December 2025, a EUR 100 million aid scheme for Austria248. On 17 December 
2025, the Commission approved a EUR 4 100 million aid scheme for Hungary249. 

The Commission also approved State aid for individual projects adding manufacturing capacity in clean 
technologies  under  the  Regional  Aid  Guidelines  (RAG)250.  On  31  January  2025,  the  Commission 
approved a EUR 48 million French State aid measure to support Envision AESC France’s production of 
batteries for  electric vehicles251 in  Douai,  Hauts-de-France, which is  an area eligible for  regional  aid 
under  Article  107(3)(c)  TFEU.  The  project  will  create  about  1 000  direct  jobs,  as  well  as  additional 
indirect jobs. On 14 August 2024, the Commission approved a EUR 264 million Hungarian State aid to 
support  the  electric  vehicles  battery  plant  of  Sunwoda  in  Nyíregyháza252.  The  project  is  eligible  for 
regional aid under Article 107(3)(a) TFEU. It is expected that 2 500 direct and 470 indirect jobs will be 
generated. 

1.2.12. Coal phase-out 

The phasing out of coal-fired power plants is a vital component of the transition towards a climate-neutral 
economy, in alignment with the European Green Deal. In 2025, the Commission continued examining 
aid measures to support the phase-out of coal-fired power generation. 

On 18 November 2025, the Commission adopted a final positive decision to allow Germany to grant up 
to  EUR  1.75 billion in favour of Lausitz Energie Kraftwerke AG (LEAG)253, concluding  its  in-depth 
investigation into the German lignite phase-out under section 4.12.1 CEEAG. The aid will compensate 
LEAG  for  the  early  phase-out  of  its  lignite-fired  power  plants  in  the  Lusatian  mining  area  by  2038. 
LEAG's plants will be permanently decommissioned over a ten-year period, with closures set for 2028, 
2029, 2035 and 2038. The measure compensates LEAG for additional fixed costs of the early closure of 
plants, including social costs to support employees when transitioning to new work, and forgone profits 

243 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3188  
244 Case SA.118614 – CISAF – Regional Framework scheme to support investment projects to ensure sufficient manufacturing 
capacity in clean technologies (Emilia-Romagna). 
245 Case SA.120013 – CISAF – Regional Framework scheme to support investment projects to ensure sufficient manufacturing 
capacity in clean technologies (Lazio). 
246 Case SA.119884 – CISAF – Strengthening of the industrial value chain of clean technologies and components (IDAE). 
247 Case SA.120488 – RRF – CISAF – Framework scheme for manufacturing capacity related to clean technologies. 
248 Case SA.120165 – CISAF – Special Directive for the TWIN Transition Support Programme of the Federal Minister for 
Economic Affairs, Energy and Tourism. 
249 Case SA.120705 – CISAF – Hungary – Aid to ensure sufficient manufacturing capacity in clean technologies. 
250 Communication from the Commission Guidelines on regional State aid 2021/C 153/01, OJ C 153, 29.4.2021, p. 1. 
251 Case SA.109228 – France – LIP – Aide régionale à Envision AESC France. 
252 Case SA.114496 – Hungary – LIP – Regional investment aid for Sunwoda Automotive Energy Technology Kft. 
253 Case SA.53625 – Germany – Lignite phase-out.  

53 

 
 
to be determined based on an approved formula. According to the German coal phase-out law, the use of 
coal to produce electricity will have to be phased out by 2038. Germany decided to enter into agreements 
with the main producers of lignite-fired electricity, LEAG and RWE Power AG (RWE), to encourage 
the early closure of lignite-fired power plants. In 2021, Germany notified the Commission of its plan to 
compensate  these  operators  with  EUR  4.35  billion:  EUR  1.75  billion  for  the  LEAG  installations  in 
Saxony and Brandenburg and EUR 2.6 billion for the RWE lignite installations located in the Rhineland. 
In March 2021, the Commission opened an  in-depth investigation to assess whether Germany's plans 
constituted State aid. In 2023, the Commission adopted a final positive decision to allow Germany to 
grant RWE aid in the amount of EUR 2.6 billion.  

1.2.13. Arbitration 

On 24 March 2025, the Commission concluded that an arbitration award in which Spain is ordered to 
pay compensation to Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar 
B.V.  (Antin)  for  the  modification  of  a  renewable  electricity  support  measure,  constitutes  illegal  and 
incompatible State aid254. The proceedings were brought based on the investor-State dispute resolution 
provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). In line with the judgments in Achmea255 and Komstroy256, 
the ECT’s arbitration clause does not apply intra-EU, i.e. in a dispute brought against a Member State by 
an investor established in another Member State, in the same way as intra-EU investor-State arbitration 
mechanisms based on Bilateral  Investment  Treaties  (BITs) are  contrary to EU law. The Commission 
therefore  considered  that  the  arbitration  award,  and  in  any  event,  its  implementation,  payment,  or 
execution, infringes Article 19(1) TEU and Articles 267 and 344 TFEU, as well as the general principle 
of autonomy of the EU legal order, and that it cannot be found compatible with the internal market. In 
its  decision, the Commission  instructed Spain  not to  pay  any compensation based on the  award. The 
decision  further  required  Spain  to  ensure  that  no  payment,  execution,  or  implementation  otherwise 
occurs. Furthermore, the decision recalled the obligation of national courts to assist Spain in ensuring 
compliance with the Commission's decision, including by taking all necessary measures to prevent the 
recognition, execution, or enforcement of the arbitration award in third countries. 

Reliable and transparent legal frameworks regarding investments to produce electricity from renewable 
energies are important to ensure investor confidence and enable investments necessary for the CID and 
to  reach  the  Union's  decarbonisation  objectives.  The  fact  that  EU  law  precludes  intra-EU  investment 
arbitration under BITs or the ECT does not mean that investors do not enjoy investment protection in the 
EU. Actions by individual investors seeking the annulment of national measures or claiming financial 
compensation are of the competence of national courts. Investors from Member States benefit from the 
protection afforded under the fundamental freedoms and relevant secondary legislation, the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, and the general principles of Union law. 

1.3. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges in energy markets 

In  2025,  the  Commission  worked  within  the  framework  of  the  Gas  Market  Task  Force  (GMTF), 
established under the CID, to assess the functioning of EU natural gas and gas derivatives markets with 
a view to ensuring their proper operation. To this end, extensive analytical work was undertaken within 
the GMTF to identify potential inefficiencies or shortcomings. This included a structural mapping of the 
EU wholesale gas supply markets. The results of this work will be published in a forthcoming report. 

254 Case SA.54155 – Spain – Arbitration award to Antin. 
255 Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 6 March 2018 in Case C-284/16, Slowakische Republik v Achmea 
BV, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158. 
256 Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 2 September 2021 in Case C-741/19, République de Moldavie v 
Komstroy LLC, ECLI:EU:C:2021:655. 

54 

 
 
1.3.1.  Antitrust enforcement 

On 31 July 2025, the Commission welcomed the measures proposed by France to settle the investigation 
in the French hydropower concessions case257. The case concerned the French State’s direct award of 
most  of  hydropower  concessions  (approximately  85%  of  France’s  total  hydropower  capacity)  to  the 
electricity incumbent EDF, without competitive tendering and for very long duration (up to 75 years). In 
its Letter of Formal Notice258, the Commission took the view that this situation created an inequality of 
opportunity  in  the  French  electricity  market,  thereby  reinforcing  EDF’s  dominance  on  this  market  in 
breach of Articles 106 and 102 TFEU. France’s proposal consisted in a reform of the legal regime for the 
hydropower sector, accompanied by remedial measures. These measures are designed to grant EDF’s 
competitors and final electricity consumers access to a significant share of EDF’s hydropower production 
via  the  sale  of  wholesale  products  replicating  the  production  of  the  hydropower  assets.  Pending  the 
adoption of the necessary measures by France, the case remains open.  

Finally, the Commission continued its investigation into the Greek wholesale electricity market under 
Article  102  TFEU  following  up  on  the  statement  of  objections  addressed  to  the  Greek  electricity 
incumbent Public Power Corporation (PPC) in February 2024259.  

1.3.2.  Merger control 

The  energy  sector  saw  a  slight  decrease  in  the  total  number  of  cases  in  2025  relative  to  2024.  The 
overwhelming  majority  of  these  cases  were  dealt  with  under  the  simplified  procedure,  with  a  large 
proportion relating to electricity generation from renewable sources. 

The most notable of these was the planned acquisition of Techem by TPG260. The Commission’s review 
focused on the transaction’s potential impact  on the management and allocation of utility and energy 
costs  in  residential  buildings,  as  well  as  the  monitoring  of  household  energy  consumption.  After  the 
parties  failed  to  address  the  Commission’s  preliminary  concerns  with  suitable  commitments,  they 
ultimately abandoned the transaction. The Commission also reviewed several cases involving emerging 
markets for the liquefaction, transport and storage of CO2

261.  

2. 

INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION, TECHNOLOGIES & MEDIA  

2.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors 

Markets in the information, communication, technologies and media sectors (ICT) continue to be key 
drivers for a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Digital services have increased consumer choice, 
and improved efficiency and competitiveness. Large platforms providing digital services represent key 
structural elements of today’s economy.  

At the same time, certain features of ICT markets, such as access to critical inputs, network effects and 
increasing returns to scale, render them particularly susceptible to consumer lock-in and entrenchment 
of positions of dominant undertakings. Furthermore, some dominant undertakings impose unfair trading 
conditions that are detrimental to their business partners or consumers. These risks have been identified 
as being equally acute within the AI ecosystem and virtual worlds.  

Digital  services  based  on  generative  AI  developed  dynamically  across  platforms  in  2025.  The 

257 Case AT.40276 – French hydropower concessions. 
258 C(2015) 7207 final. 
259 Case AT.40278 – Greek wholesale electricity market. 
260 Case M.11751 – TPG / Techem. 
261 For example, cases M.11782 – Air Liquide / Fluxys / JV and M.12164 – GIM / Eni / Eni CCUS JV. 

55 

 
 
Commission continued to follow closely the activities of several companies in the industry to monitor 
whether any anticompetitive practices are taking place in the related fast-moving markets. For example, 
the Commission looked into possible vertical or other concerns relating to investments and partnerships 
between large digital players and generative AI developers, and whether agreements between Google 
and  original  equipment  manufacturer  (OEMs) (such as Samsung) for the pre-installation  of Google’s 
small  AI  model  ‘Gemini  Nano’  on  mobile  devices  may  raise  anticompetitive  problems262.  The 
Commission also expressed concerns about the growing use of AI-powered summaries of news and other 
content, often used without consent or payment, and potentially in risk of breaching copyright laws263.  

The  Commission  also  has  preliminary  investigations  ongoing  into  markets  that  are  crucial  for  the 
development of generative AI and virtual worlds, like cloud or different types of specialised chips (such 
as GPUs and other AI accelerators) and related equipment and software264. Further, the Commission is 
actively monitoring different IT markets. 

As regards mergers, the Commission continued to monitor closely the partnerships between AI startups 
and established firms, as well as the structure of these transactions. In recent years several transactions 
have raised questions regarding the boundaries of merger control, notably whether certain investments 
into, or the hiring of staff of, small AI developers by large companies constitute a concentration under 
the  EUMR.  The  Commission  is  committed  to  ensuring  that  no  transaction  avoids  effective  merger 
control. 

With respect to State aid, the Commission continued its activity aimed at: (i) modernising State aid rules 
in the field of broadcasting; (ii) assessing State aid measures in the audiovisual and press sectors; and 
(iii)  supporting  the  broadband  sector  through  measures  of  deployment  of  networks  and  take-up  of 
broadband services by consumers.  

2.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

2.2.1.  Technology markets 

2.2.1.1. Antitrust enforcement 

2025 was characterised by several Commission decisions finding that large dominant digital players had 
imposed unfair trading conditions. These practices were found to be liable to prejudice the interests of 
both consumers and the dominant players’ business partners.  

For instance, the Commission finalised its investigation into Google’s advertising technology and data-
related practices (Google Adtech) and, on 5 September 2025, adopted a decision finding that Google had 
breached  EU  competition  rules  by  distorting  competition  in  the  adtech  industry265.  The  Commission 
concluded that Google had leveraged its dominance on both the publisher-facing and advertising-facing 
ends  of  the  adtech  supply  chain,  to  favour  its  own  ad  exchange  in  the  middle,  to  the  detriment  of 
competing  providers  of  advertising  technology  services,  advertisers,  and  online  publishers.  The 
Commission fined Google EUR 2.95 billion and ordered the company to implement measures to cease 
its  inherent  conflicts  of  interest  along  the  adtech  supply  chain.  In  late  2025,  the  Commission  started 

262  Competition  Policy  Brief,  Issue  3,  September  2024,  Competition  in  Generative  AI  and  Virtual  Worlds,  see 
https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/publications/competition-policy-briefs_en  
263 'The decision to impose a fine on Google: defending press and media freedom in the EU' - Opening commission statement 
delivered 
see 
Vice-President 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_2460 
264 See op. cit. Competition Policy Brief, Issue 3, September 2024.  
265 Case AT.40670 – Google – Adtech and Data-related practices. 

Executive 

Ribera, 

Teresa 

by 

56 

 
 
 
analysing Google’s proposed measures to comply with the decision of 5 September 2025 and gathering 
market intelligence from third parties. 

Figure 11: Google Adtech 

Source: European Commission 

Moreover, following a market test, on 12 September 2025, the Commission adopted a decision rendering 
binding  the  commitments  offered  by  Microsoft  to  address  its  competition  concerns  relating  to 
Microsoft’s popular team collaboration platform Teams266. These commitments address the competition 
concerns  related  to  the  tying  of  Microsoft  Teams  to  the  company's  popular  productivity  applications 
Word,  Excel,  PowerPoint,  Outlook,  included  in  its  Office  365  and  Microsoft  365  suites  for  business 
customers.  Under  the  commitments,  Microsoft  will:  (i)  make  versions  of  these  suites  without  Teams 
available  at  a  reduced  price;  (ii)  allow  customers  with  long-term  licenses  to  switch  to  suites  without 
Teams; (iii) provide interoperability for key functionalities between communication and collaboration 
tools that compete with Teams and certain Microsoft products; and (iv) allow customers to move their 
data out of Teams to facilitate the use of competing solutions. The commitments will be in place for 
seven years, except the interoperability and data portability commitments that will have a duration of ten 
years. In this context, Microsoft also unilaterally decided to align its worldwide suites offers and pricing 
with these commitments.  

On  25  September  2025,  the  Commission  also  opened  a  formal  investigation  against  SAP  SE  (SAP) 
regarding an alleged infringement of Article 102 TFEU concerning SAP’s conduct in the aftermarket for 
maintenance  and  support  services  of  its  on-premises  Enterprise  Resource  Planning  software267.  The 
Commission has concerns that SAP’s conduct may limit its customers’ choice to procure maintenance 
and  support  services  from  third  parties  and  may  increase  the  costs  paid  by  those  customers  for  such 
services.  The  Commission  sent  its  preliminary  assessment  to  SAP  on  the  day  of  the  opening  of  the 
investigations. In response to the preliminary assessment, SAP submitted a formal commitments proposal 
to  address the Commission’s concerns.  On 17 November 2025 the Commission invited all interested 
parties to submit their views on the commitments until 17 December 2025. 

On 4 December 2025, the Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation to assess whether Meta's 
new policy on AI providers' access to WhatsApp may breach EU competition rules268. Meta's new policy, 
announced  in  October  2025,  prohibits  AI  providers  from  using  a  tool  that  allows  businesses  to 
communicate  with  customers  via  WhatsApp,  the  ‘WhatsApp  Business  Application  Programming 

266 Cases AT.40721 – Microsoft Teams, and AT.40873 – Microsoft Teams II. 
267 Case AT.40823 – SAP ERP aftermarket support services. 
268 Case AT.41034 – Exclusion of AI competitors from WhatsApp. 

57 

 
 
 
Interface’,  when  AI  is  the  primary  service  offered.  Businesses  may  still  use  AI  tools  for  ancillary  or 
support  functions,  such  as  automated  customer  support  offered  via  WhatsApp.  The  Commission  is 
concerned that such new policy may prevent third party AI providers from offering their services through 
WhatsApp in the EEA, while Meta's own AI service ‘Meta AI’ would remain accessible to users on the 
platform. The formal investigation will cover the EEA, except Italy. This is to avoid an overlap with the 
Italian Competition Authority's parallel proceedings for the imposition of interim measures concerning 
Meta's conduct which, by decision of 24 December 2025, led to ordering Meta to immediately suspend 
the WhatsApp Business Solution Terms in Italy to preserve access to the WhatsApp platform for Meta 
AI’s competitors. 

On  8  December  2025,  the  Commission  opened  a  formal  antitrust  investigation  into  possible 
anticompetitive  conduct  by  Google  in  the  use  of  online  content  for  AI  purposes269.  The  investigation 
intends  to  assess  whether  Google  has  breached  EU  competition  rules  by  using  the  content  of  web 
publishers, as well as content uploaded on the online video-sharing platform YouTube, for AI purposes. 
The  investigation  will  notably  examine  whether  Google  is  distorting  competition  by  imposing  unfair 
terms and conditions on publishers and content creators, or by granting itself privileged access to such 
content, thereby placing developers of rival AI models at a disadvantage. 

2.2.1.2. Merger control  

In 2025, the Commission assessed several transactions under the merger rules. 

On  10  January  2025,  the  Commission  approved  the  acquisition  of  Ansys  by  Synopsys,  subject  to 
remedies270. Ansys is a global provider of engineering simulation software and services, supplying a wide 
range  of  simulation  solutions  that  allow  for  the  design,  testing,  and  optimisation  of  products  and 
processes  across  various  industries.  Synopys  is  a  global  provider  of  electronic  design  automation 
software, tools and services, as well as semiconductor intellectual property products and services. The 
Commission's investigation showed that, while the companies' activities are largely complementary, the 
transaction,  as  notified,  would  reduce  competition  in  the  global  markets  for  the  supply  of:  (i)  optics 
software  simulating  how  light  behaves  in  large  macro-scale  systems  (for  example,  screen  or  car 
headlight); (ii) photonics software simulating how light behaves in smaller nano-scale optical systems 
(for example, digital camera or solar panel); and (iii) register-transfer-level power consumption analysis 
software, which is an electronic design automation software tool used at the early stage of the chip design 
process to check its power consumption. The transaction would result in high combined market shares 
and high concentration levels in the affected markets, and there would not be sufficient competitors to 
exert competitive pressure on the merged entity which would have led to higher prices and less choice 
for customers. To address these competition concerns, the parties offered to divest to a suitable purchaser: 
(i)  Synopsys'  optics  and  photonics  software  (including  Code  V,  LightTools,  LucidShape,  RSoft  and 
ImSym); and (ii) Ansys' register-transfer-level power consumption analysis software (PowerArtist). The 
Commission  concluded  that  the  transaction,  as  modified  by  the  remedies,  would  no  longer  raise 
competition concerns.   

On 12 March 2025, the Commission unconditionally approved the acquisition of ZT by AMD, both of 
which are U.S.-based companies271. ZT is a designer and supplier of server and storage solutions for data 
centres.  AMD  is  a  global  semiconductor  company  that  develops  computer  processors  and  related 
technologies. The Commission concluded that the transaction would not raise competition concerns as 
the parties’ activities do not  overlap horizontally.  The Commission  also  found  that the merged entity 

269 Case AT.40983 – Google AI and Data-related practices. 
270 Case M.11481 – Synopsys / Ansys. 
271 Case M.11749 – AMD / ZT. 

58 

 
 
would not have the ability to engage in anticompetitive bundling or tying practices in relation to AMD’s 
field-programmable gate array semiconductors and ZT’s activities in the global markets for the supply 
of data centre servers. 

On 10 June 2025, the Commission also unconditionally approved the acquisition of Intelsat by SES, both 
based in Luxembourg272. Intelsat and SES are satellite networks operators and provide ‘one-way’ satellite 
capacity (to broadcasters) and ‘two-way’ satellite capacity (to satellite service providers across industry 
sectors such as aviation, maritime and government). During its investigation, the Commission examined 
whether the transaction might reduce competition in the markets for the supply of ‘one-way’ and ‘two-
way’  satellite  capacity  (and  potential  segments  thereof)  globally  and  in  the  EEA.  The  Commission 
concluded that the transaction would not  raise competition  concerns as  a number of  competitors  will 
likely continue to exert sufficient competitive pressure on the merged entity. The Commission also found 
that the merged entity will be constrained by terrestrial alternatives such as fibre in the market for the 
supply of ‘one-way’ satellite capacity, and by low Earth orbit operators in the market for the supply of 
‘two-way’ satellite capacity. In addition, the Commission concluded that the merged entity would not 
have  the  ability  to  foreclose  competing  satellite  service  providers  by  restricting  access  to  its  satellite 
capacity. 

Moreover, in 2025, the Commission continued monitoring partnerships in the AI sector and so-called 
‘acqui-hires’, meaning transactions whereby a player acquires all or almost all the key employees of the 
target company. The Commission also continued to further monitor transactions in the sectors of ICT to 
identify cases that might be suitable for referral by Member States to the Commission under Article 22 
EUMR. 

2.2.2.  Electronic communications sector 

The  Commission’s  activity  in  the  electronic  communications  sector  aims  at  ensuring  that  European 
consumers can benefit from increased choice in the telecommunication sector thanks to low prices, high 
quality and innovative services. 

On 26 February 2025, the Commission unconditionally approved the acquisition of Infinera, based in the 
U.S., by Nokia, based in Finland273. Both companies supply optical transport equipment used to transmit 
data  through  optical  fibre  cables.  The  Commission  concluded  that  the  transaction  would  not  raise 
competition  concerns  as  the  parties’  market  position  in  the  global  or  EEA  markets  for  the  supply  of 
optical transport equipment (and potential segments thereof) would remain moderate and a number of 
competitors would likely exert sufficient competitive pressure on the merged entity.  

On 24 July 2025, the Commission opened a formal investigation to determine whether KKR provided 
incorrect  or misleading  information274  during the  review  of its acquisition of  NetCo  (which had been 
unconditionally  approved  on  30  May  2024)275.  NetCo,  based  in  Italy,  comprises  the  primary  and 
backbone  fixed-line  network  business  of  Telecom  Italia  (TIM),  as  well  as  FiberCop,  a  joint  venture 
between TIM and KKR comprising TIM’s secondary fixed-line network. KKR, based in the U.S., is a 
global investment firm. During the initial merger review, the Commission investigated the impact of the 
transaction on the market for wholesale broadband access services in Italy. It concluded at the time that 
the merged entity would not be able to degrade the conditions for access to passive services, or terminate 
such  access,  because  of  long-term  agreements  FiberCop  had  concluded  with  several  access  seekers, 

272 Case M.11602 – SES / Intelsat. 
273 Case M.11663 – Nokia / Infinera.  
274 Case M.12099 – KKR / NetCo. 
275 Case M.11386 – KKR / NetCo. 

59 

 
 
including Fastweb and Iliad. Under the current investigation, the Commission is assessing whether KKR 
provided incorrect or misleading information about these agreements. 

2.2.3.  Media 

The Commission’s activity in the media sector aims at ensuring that consumers can benefit both from a 
wide  choice  and  unrestricted  access  to  high  quality  content  at  competitive  prices,  as  well  as  from 
increased technological innovation. 

2.2.3.1. Evaluation of the State aid Broadcasting Communication ongoing 

On 15 October 2025, the Commission launched a call for evidence and a public consultation to seek input 
on the evaluation of the 2009 Broadcasting Communication276. This Communication sets out State aid 
rules for public service broadcasting.  

The goal of the initiative is to collect views and experiences from stakeholders on how the Broadcasting 
Communication has worked since its last revision in 2009 and whether it continues to meet its objectives. 
The Commission is also seeking to identify any challenges stakeholders may have encountered in the 
application or interpretation of the rules. The results of the evaluation will be published in a staff working 
document.  

2.2.3.2. State aid enforcement 

The  Commission  examined  several  State  aid  measures  with  a  total  value  of  approximately  EUR  1.3 
billion. These were aimed at supporting the audiovisual sector - through direct grants277, tax credit278 or 
tax reductions279 - with a view to promote cultural diversity and support the creation, production, and 
distribution  of  European  contents.  In  addition  to  the  above,  the  Commission  also  approved  the 
prolongation of a scheme of approximately EUR 153 million to support the production and dissemination 
of printed newspapers and periodicals to ensure media pluralism and accessibility to news in Italy280. On 
22 December 2025, the Commission also adopted a decision finding that a planned Czech scheme of EUR 
18 million to support digital terrestrial television infrastructure operators was incompatible with State 
aid rules due to the absence of an incentive effect, the lack of a market failure, and the aid not being 
limited to the minimum necessary281.  

Moreover, the Commission adopted four decisions approving aid measures benefiting the videogames 
sector, for a total amount of approximately EUR 60 million282. 

On 23 June 2025, the Commission also approved a EUR 192 million Polish measure for the construction 
of  a  gaming  and  technology  hub  in  Katowice283.  The  project,  co-financed  by  the  JTF,  combines  the 

276 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2383   
277 Cases SA.117455 – Germany – Reintroduction of the German Motion Picture Fund (GMPF), prolonged by decision in 
case SA.120906 – Germany – Prolongation of the German Motion Picture Fund (GMPF); case SA.117364 – Germany – 
Reintroduction  of  the  German  Federal  Film  Fund  (DFFF),  prolonged  by  decision  in  case  SA.120710  –  Germany  – 
Prolongation  of  the  German  Federal  Film  Fund  (DFFF);  case  SA.104406  –  France  –  Fonds  de  soutien  à  l’expression 
radiophonique, and case SA.118346 – Czech Republic – Audiovisual Production Incentives Scheme. 
278 Case SA.117991 – Ireland – Tax Credit for Unscripted Production. 
279 Case SA.117698 – Ireland – Irish film tax relief support scheme – Modification of SA.110921. 
280 Case SA.119447 – Italy – Aid for newspaper and periodical publishers – Second modification of SA.106115. 
281 Case SA.64153 – Czechia – Aid for terrestrial television parallel broadcasting in DVB-T2/HEVC. 
282  Cases  SA.119176  –  Germany  –  Prolongation  and  modification  of  North  Rhine-Westphalian  scheme  to  support  the 
development and production of digital games; SA.118962 – Germany – Reintroduction of the Baden-Württemberg Guidelines 
for the promotion of digital games; SA.118272 – Germany – Prolongation of the Bavarian Guidelines for the promotion of 
digital games, and SA.120528 – Ireland – Prolongation of the Tax Credit for Digital Games.  
283 Case SA.114301 – Poland – JTF – Aid to the “New Technology District – Katowice Gaming and Technology Hub”. 

60 

 
 
  
 
 
 
rehabilitation of a former coal mine with the construction of a multifunctional technological facility to 
form an infrastructure dedicated to the gaming industry. 

2.2.3.3. Merger control  

On 10 February 2025, the Commission approved the acquisition of joint control of NAI by members of 
the Ellison family and RedBird, both of which are U.S.-based. The Commission also approved the Ellison 
family’s acquisition of sole control of Paramount, also based in the U.S.284. These two acquisitions are 
interdependent and therefore constitute a single concentration within the meaning of the EUMR. NAI is 
a  cinema  operator  and  media  holding  company.  The  Ellison  family  invests  in  a  wide  portfolio  of 
companies across various industries. RedBird is a private investment firm. Paramount is a global media, 
streaming and entertainment company that creates content and experiences for audiences worldwide. The 
Commission  concluded  that  the  transaction  would  not  raise  competitive  concerns,  given  the  parties’ 
limited market positions. This case was examined under the simplified merger review procedure.  

On 29 April 2025, the Commission unconditionally approved the acquisition of joint control of Alpha, 
based in Greece, by United Group, based in the Netherlands, and Motor Hoil (Hellas) based in Greece285.. 
Alpha operates the free-to-air (FTA) TV channel in Greece. United Group is active in the provision of 
telecoms and media services in Southeast Europe. Motor Oil (Hellas) operates mainly in the petroleum 
refining sector. The Commission concluded that the transaction would not raise competition concerns as 
the parties’ market position in the market for the retail supply of audio-visual services in Greece would 
remain  moderate  and  several  competitors  would  likely  exert  sufficient  competitive  pressure  on  the 
merged entity. In addition, the Commission found that the merged entity would not have the ability to 
engage in input foreclosure (given it would not have market power in the market for the wholesale supply 
of FTA TV channels in Greece) nor to foreclose access to the downstream market for the acquisition of 
FTA channels in Greece.  

On 23 June 2025, the Commission unconditionally approved the acquisition of Dorna Sports, based in 
Spain, by Liberty Media, based in the U.S.286. Dorna Sports is the organizer and the holder of exclusive 
commercial and television rights of the FIM World Championship Grand Prix (commonly referred to as 
MotoGP).  Liberty  Media  operates  and  owns  interests  in  media,  sports  and  entertainment  businesses, 
including  the  exclusive  commercial  rights  for  the  FIA  Formula  One  World  Championship.  The 
Commission  carried  out  an  in-depth  investigation  over  concerns  that  the  transaction  could  restrict 
competition in the licensing of broadcasting rights for sports content. While leaving the exact product 
market definition open, the Commission assessed the effects of the transaction on the narrowest plausible 
markets that would be affected by the transaction. Specifically, it examined the national market for the 
licensing of broadcasting rights for all regular non-premium sports content in Czechia, Germany, Italy, 
Malta,  the  Netherlands  and  Spain.  The  Commission  concluded  that  the  transaction  would  not  raise 
competition  concerns  because  Liberty  Media  and  Dorna  Sports  are  not  close  competitors  within  the 
identified markets. The Commission also found that, post-transaction, broadcasters would continue to be 
able  to  license  a  range  of  other  sports  attracting  larger  or  similarly  large  audiences.  Therefore,  the 
transaction would not remove important competitive constraints between Formula 1 and MotoGP.  

On 18 July 2025, the Commission sent a statement of objections to Vivendi, taking the preliminary view 
that the company breached the notification requirement, the standstill obligation under the EUMR, as 
well  as  the  conditions  and  obligations  attached  to  its  decision  of  9  June  2023  approving  the 

284 Case M.11744 – Pinnacle Media / Redbird / NAI / Paramount. 
285 Case M. 11807 – United Group/ Motor Oil (Hellas)/ Alpha Satellite TV. 
286 Case M.11539 – Liberty Media / Dorna Sports. 

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Vivendi/Lagardère  transaction287.  The  preliminary  findings  indicate  that  Vivendi  exercised  decisive 
influence over Lagardère’s magazines and newspapers (Paris Match and Journal du Dimanche) and its 
radio  station  Europe  1:  (i)  before  the  transaction  was  notified  to  the  Commission;  (ii)  between  the 
notification  date  and  the  Commission’s  conditional  clearance  decision;  and  (iii)  between  the 
Commission's  clearance  decision  and  the  Commission’s  final  buyer  approval  decision.  If  confirmed, 
these violations of the EUMR could lead to fines of up to 10% of Vivendi’s annual worldwide turnover 
for each infringement. The investigation is ongoing. 

On 24 November 2025, the Commission sent a statement of objections to Universal Music Group (UMG) 
over  the  proposed  acquisition  of  Downtown288.  UMG,  based  in  the  Netherlands,  is  globally  active in 
music recording, music  publishing, merchandising, and audiovisual content.  Downtown, based in  the 
U.S., is a global music company providing artist and label (A&L) services both to independent record 
companies as well as to artists, notably through its FUGA music distribution platform. Downtown also 
provides  royalty  accounting  services  through  its  Curve  platform,  which  offers,  amongst  others, 
processing,  accounting,  payment  and  distribution  services  in  relation  to  royalties  as  well  as  rights 
management. The Commission is concerned that UMG may have the ability and incentive to gain access 
to  commercially  sensitive  data  that  is  stored  and  processed  by  Downtown’s  Curve  and  that  such 
information advantage for UMG would hamper rival labels’ ability and incentive to compete with UMG. 
On 11 December 2025, the parties submitted commitments to the Commission.  

2.2.4.  Facilitating the Digital Transition 

Performant, reliable and secure electronic communications networks are essential enablers of the EU’s 
Digital Transition. They are crucial to bridging the digital divide and ensuring social cohesion, as well 
as promoting a competitive, sustainable and resilient economy.  

In 2025, DG Competition cooperated closely with DG Connect on several initiatives for which the latter 
is  in  the  lead.  The  Commission’s  2025  Work  Programme  included  a  Digital  Networks  Act  (DNA) 
initiative  to  create  opportunities  for  cross-border  network  operation  and  service  provision,  enhance 
industry competitiveness and improve spectrum coordination. This initiative follows the Commission’s 
2024 White Paper on ‘How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs?’289, which initiated a broad 
consultation among various stakeholders on trends and challenges in the digital infrastructure sector. The 
work on the DNA initiative is accompanied by the review and evaluation of the European Electronic 
Communications  Code  (EECC)  and  related  legal  acts.  This  presents  an  opportunity  to  simplify  and 
further  harmonise  the  legal  framework  for  electronic  communications,  with  a  view  to  reinforcing 
competitiveness  and  fostering  a  more  integrated  Single  Market.  A  call  for  evidence  for  an  impact 
assessment on the DNA was launched in June 2025290.  

Furthermore, a goal of the regulatory framework for electronic communications is to roll back ex ante 
regulation  progressively  as  competition  develops  over  time,  with  the  ultimate  goal  of  relying  on 
competition law. This approach has been largely successful, making it possible to reduce the number of 
markets identified as susceptible to ex ante regulation – as defined in the Commission’s Recommendation 
on relevant markets291 - from 18 to just two fixed infrastructure markets. In June 2025, the Commission 

287 Case M.10433 – Vivendi / Lagardère. 
288 Case M.11956 – UMG / Downtown. 
289 See https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/white-paper-how-master-europes-digital-infrastructure-needs   
290 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14709-Digital-Networks-Act_en  
291 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/2245 of 18 December 2020 on relevant product and service markets within the 
electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with the Code, OJ L 439, 29.12.2020, p. 23-
31. 

62 

 
 
launched a consultation on the review of the Recommendation on relevant markets292. This review will 
consider  recent  market  and  technological  developments,  such  as  the  deployment  of  5G  and  fibre 
networks, and reflect broader trends in the Member States. This process will enable the Commission to 
assess whether the current list of relevant markets should be subject to further revision.  

As regard State aid, the Commission approved three amendments to previously approved measures for 
the  deployment  of  broadband  networks,  aimed  at  taking  into  account  the  extension  of  deployment 
timelines justified by the national authorities293. The Commission also approved two measures aimed at 
fostering  the  take-up  of  broadband  services  and  promoting  digital  inclusion,  with  a  total  budget  of 
approximately EUR 43 million294. 

3. 

FINANCIAL SERVICES 

3.1. Overview of key challenges in the sector 

The financial services sector remains subject to significant transformation driven by regulatory changes, 
the 
technological  advancements,  and  fluctuating  market  conditions.  Developments  such  as 
implementation of the EU Banking Package295 is shaping how banks measure risks and manage capital. 
Progress on the Savings and Investments Union296 is influencing the structure of EU trading, clearing 
and settlement activities, while work continues toward deeper financial integration to support investment 
across all sectors, including into the green and digital transitions. Furthermore, tighter profit margins and 
increased digitalisation continue to impact competition between financial institutions, as new, innovative 
and data-driven players enter the market. 

In banking, consolidation trends and digital transformation are affecting both competitive dynamics and 
access  to  finance.  Furthermore,  credit  rating  agencies  are  continuing  to  capitalise  on  their  data-
distribution activities and competition in the credit rating markets remains limited. In insurance, ongoing 
reforms to the Solvency II Directive297 and the growth of digital distribution platforms are transforming 
how firms compete and design their products. 

In the payments sector, the European Parliament and Council continued their deliberations on several 
Commission initiatives throughout 2025298. These proposals are aimed at enhancing competitiveness and 

292  See  https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-launches-consultation-revision-recommendation-relevant-
markets  
293 Cases SA.118443 – RRF – Spain – Amendment of SA.104933-5G equipment and infrastructure, SA.118444 - RRF – Spain 
–  Amendment  of  SA.103451–Deployment  of  backhaul  networks  for  mobile  connectivity,  and  SA.116725  –  Portugal  – 
Prolongation of measure SA.105187. 
294  Cases  SA.107041  –  France  -  Régime  notifié  relatif  aux  aides  en  faveur  de  la  cohésion numérique  des  territoires,  and 
SA.110674 – Slovakia –- Social vouchers to support pupils to procure or retain broadband services. 
295 The Capital Requirements Regulation III (Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 (CRR III, OJ L 1623, 19 June 2024) and Capital 
Requirements Directive VI (Directive (EU) 2024/1619 (CRD VI , OJ L 1619, 19 June 2024), together part of  the EU Banking 
Package, were formally adopted in June 2024 and apply from 1 January 2025. 
296 See https://finance.ec.europa.eu/regulation-and-supervision/savings-and-investments-union_en  
297  European  Parliament  legislative  resolution  of  23  April  2024  on  the  proposal  for  a  directive  amending  Directive 
2009/138/EC (Solvency II) as regards proportionality, quality of supervision, reporting, long-term guarantee measures, macro-
prudential  tools,  sustainability  risks,  group  and  cross-border  supervision  (COM  (2021)  0581  –  2021/0295(COD)).  The 
Solvency II reforms aim to update the EU’s prudential framework for insurers so that it better balances resilience, consumer-
protection and capital-use efficiency. 
298  Including  the  proposed  third  Payments  Services  Directive/Payments  Services  Regulation  (PSD3/PSR)  (Proposal  for  a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on payment services and electronic money services in the Internal 
Market amending Directive 98/26/EC and repealing Directives 2015/2366/EU and 2009/110/EC COM/2023/366 final and 

63 

 
 
 
innovation in EU payments markets. Key issues include: a level playing field between banks and non-
bank  payment  service  providers,  open  finance,  fair  compensation  and  removing  barriers  to  entry. 
Regulation  and  competition  enforcement  in  payments  go  hand  in  hand  and  DG  Competition  liaises 
closely  with  the  Directorate-General  for  Financial  Stability,  Financial  Services  and  Capital  Markets 
Union (DG FISMA) on these initiatives to ensure a level playing field and fair competition in the sector.   

3.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

3.2.1.  Contribution of EU competition policy to innovation in the payment sector 

The EU payments sector is evolving at a rapid pace; digitalisation has fostered the market entry of new 
operators  and  the  development  of  new  forms  of  payment.  Firms  are  adapting  their  models  to  meet 
consumer demand for smarter, faster and safer access. New means of payment create opportunities by 
offering significant innovation. To ensure that consumers benefit most from innovation in the payments 
sector, it is important that no barriers to entry prevent payment firms from entering or expanding their 
activity in this field, in line with what has been envisaged by EU legislation. 

DG Competition follows closely developments in the sector and pro-actively advocates competition. In 
2025, DG Competition published a market study on the online payments sector in the EU299, assessing 
the competitive dynamics in online payments and analysing practices that risk favouring or entrenching 
the  position  of  established  players.  DG  Competition  also  issued  a  paper  on  competition  in  mobile 
payments in the context of the OECD roundtable on payments 300. 

In 2025, DG Competition continued to monitor the commitments made binding on Apple in the Apple 
Pay commitments decision of 11 July 2024301. The remedies have led to market entry and innovation. 
Many  companies  developing  wallet  apps  were  granted  licences  under  the  commitments  and  several 
launched competing wallet apps on iPhones302.  

DG Competition remains vigilant to intervene in case of competition concerns, either through advocacy 
or competition enforcement. It also closely liaises with DG FISMA in this area to ensure consistency 
between sectoral regulation and competition law.   

3.2.2.  Antitrust enforcement in the financial services sector 

In the  area of  financial derivatives,  the Commission  opened  a formal  investigation to  assess whether 
Deutsche  Börse  and  Nasdaq  have  breached  EU  antitrust  rules  by  coordinating  their  conduct303.  In 
particular, the Commission is concerned that Deutsche Börse and Nasdaq entities may have entered into 
agreements  or  concerted  practices  not  to  compete  in  the  EEA  for  the  listing,  trading  and  clearing  of 
certain  derivatives.  The  Commission  will  also  investigate  whether  the  undertakings  have  allocated 

Proposal for a  Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on payment services in the internal market and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, COM/2023/367 final); the Financial Access to Data Regulation (FIDA) (Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for Financial Data Access and amending 
Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010, (EU) No 1095/2010 and (EU) 2022/2554 COM/2023/360 final) and 
the Digital Euro Regulation (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment 
of the digital euro, COM/2023/369 final).   
299  European  Commission:  Directorate-General  for  Competition, Market  study  on  competition  in  online  payments  –  Final 
report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2025, p. 220. 
300 Competition in Mobile Payment Services – Note by the European Union 18 June 2025 (DAF/COMP/WD(2025)10), p. 3.  
301 Case AT.40452 – Apple – Mobile Payments. 
302 See, for example, Vipps MobilePay launches the world’s first alternative to Apple Pay on iPhone | Vipps MobilePay ; 
Curve rivals Apple with iOS digital wallet in EEA - FStech ; and PayPal launches iPhone NFC payments in Germany after 
EU forced Apple to open up | The Verge  
303 Case AT.40945 – DBAG / Nasdaq (financial derivatives). 

64 

 
 
demand, coordinated on price, and exchanged commercially sensitive information.  

In the field of motor insurance, the Commission is closely monitoring Insurance Ireland’s compliance 
with the commitments made binding by decision in 2022, with the assistance of a monitoring trustee304. 
In this case, Insurance Ireland committed to ensure fair and non-discriminatory access for a duration of 
ten  years  to  its  Insurance  Link  information  exchange  system,  which  contains  important  data  for 
companies offering motor vehicle insurance services in Ireland. In 2025, Insurance Ireland updated its 
terms  of  access  to  ensure  that  also  self-insured  entities  continue  to  have  unobstructed  access  to  the 
Insurance Link database. 

In the area of licencing inputs for trading credit default swaps, the Commission continued in 2025 to 
monitor - with the assistance of two monitoring trustees - the compliance of the International Swaps and 
Derivatives  Association  and  the  provider  of  commodity  and  financial  data,  IHS  Markit  (part  of  S&P 
Global) with the commitments made binding by Commission decision in 2016. The commitments apply 
for a total period of 10 years until and including 2026305. 

3.2.3.  Merger enforcement in the financial services sector 

The Commission continued to review mergers and acquisitions in the financial services sector throughout 
2025, reviewing transactions in markets such as retail banking and payments, corporate banking, asset 
management, insurance and pensions. Both national and small cross-border acquisitions are continuing 
to take place while there have been few large pan-European deals. 

In 2025, the Italian banking sector experienced a wave of consolidation. In this context, UniCredit made 
a hostile take-over offer for Banco BPM, and although both of these banks are headquartered in Italy, the 
merger had an EU dimension due to UniCredit’s presence in Germany and Central and Eastern Europe. 
The banks’ activities overlapped in retail and corporate banking, asset management and insurance and 
the merger would have created the largest Italian banking group by number of branches and the second 
largest by total assets. The Commission’s preliminary investigation found that the merger would likely 
raise competition concerns in several local markets within Italy for deposits by SMEs and loans to both 
retail customers and SMEs. On 19 June 2025 the Commission cleared the proposed acquisition, subject 
to the divestment of 209 branches in 21 Italian provinces which addressed the concerns identified306. 

However, the Italian authorities also imposed conditions on the proposed merger under their domestic 
investment screening legislation which led UniCredit to subsequently withdraw its take-over offer for 
Banco BPM. The Commission investigated these conditions and, in July 2025, sent a letter to Italy setting 
out its preliminary findings that the conditions imposed were in breach of Article 21(4) EUMR307. Under 
Article  21(4)  EUMR,  Member  States  can  only  impose  conditions  on  mergers  with  an  EU  dimension 
where these are necessary to protect legitimate interests, are compatible with EU law, and are appropriate, 
proportionate and non-discriminatory. The Commission came to the preliminary view that the conditions 
imposed by the Italian authorities were neither necessary nor proportionate to protect legitimate interests 
and were not compatible with the free movement of capital, the role of the European Central Bank within 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism or with EU financial services legislation. In November 2025, in a 
parallel procedure, the Commission launched infringement proceedings against Italy under Article 258 
TFEU challenging the compatibility of the Italian domestic investment screening legislation with EU 
banking regulations as well as Articles 49 and 63 TFEU.  

304 Case AT.40511 – Insurance Ireland: Insurance claims database and conditions of access. 
305 Case AT.39745 – CDS Information Market. 
306 Case M.11830 – UniCredit / Banco BPM.  
307 Case M.12052 – UniCredit / Banco BPM (Art. 21(4)). 

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In December 2025, the Commission unconditionally approved the proposed acquisition of Worldpay by 
Global  payments308  following  a  Phase  1  market  investigation.  Both  companies  are  global  payment 
providers supplying merchant acquiring services  in the EEA. While the merger led to high combined 
market  shares  in  Ireland,  the  Commission  concluded,  following  its  market  investigation,  that  it  was 
unlikely  to  harm  competition  as  sufficient  credible  competitors  will  remain  after  the  merger,  and  the 
relevant payment markets were found to be dynamic and contestable.  

In parallel, the Commission closely monitors mergers and acquisitions in the financial services sector to 
ensure that Member States and market participants are not creating barriers to the emergence of cross-
border  financial  services  providers  which  could  undermine  the  EU’s  global  competitiveness  and  the 
progress made towards the completion of the Banking and Capital Markets Unions. 

3.2.4.  State aid control in the financial services sector 

3.2.4.1. Evaluation of State aid rules  

On 13 October 2025, the Commission published the results of the evaluation of the Guarantee Notice in 
a staff working document309. The evaluation established that the State aid rules on guarantees are still 
relevant as they increase predictability and legal certainty, but that some improvements and simplification 
are  necessary.  These  particularly  concern  the  estimation  of  aid  amounts,  the  market  conformity  of 
guarantee premia concerning SMEs, and the passing-on of risk benefits. As part of the evaluation, the 
Commission  gathered  evidence  to  understand  how  the  Guarantee  Notice  has  functioned  since  its 
adoption.  This  evidence  included  feedback  obtained  from  a  public  consultation  and  a  targeted 
consultation. The Commission had also commissioned an external study310 conducted by a consortium 
of independent experts, which fed into the staff working document.  

In 2025, the Commission also continued its evaluation of the State aid rules for banks in difficulty311. 
The  objective  is  to  assess  how  the  rules  have  functioned,  as  well  as  the  role  of  State  aid  control  in 
preserving financial stability in the EU single market while ensuring a level-playing field by mitigating 
competition distortions. 

3.2.4.2. State aid enforcement 

In 2025, the Commission approved several new State aid measures and amendments to existing ones in 
the financial services sector. On 4 April 2025, the Commission approved a EUR 1.5 billion (PLN 6.4 
billion) Polish scheme to support transport on the territory of Ukraine312. Under the scheme, the Polish 
public export credit agency (KUKE) will provide reinsurance for war-related risks, whereby it will cover 
80%  of  the  war-related  risks,  while  private  insurance  companies  will  retain  the  remaining  20%.  The 
scheme will be in place until 30 June 2027. 

On 8 May 2025, the Commission approved a French reinsurance measure for short-term export-credit 
insurance to the U.S.313 which applied until 8 July 2025. The measure was found to be compatible with 
the short-term export credit insurance Communication314 considering that due to a shortage of export 
credit insurance, certain risks were temporarily non-marketable for exporters in France. 

308 Case M.12006 – Global Payments / Worldpay. 
309 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2355  
310 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/publications_en  
311 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/public-consultations/2022-sa-banking-rules_en  
312 Case SA.111121 – Poland – Reinsurance of transport insurance on the territory of Ukraine. 
313 Case SA.118757 – France – Réassurance de l’assurance-crédit à l’exportation à court-terme vers les Etats-Unis. 
314 Communication from the Commission on the application of Article 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to short-term export credit insurance, OJ C 497, 10.12.2021, p. 5. 

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On  25  July  2025,  the  Commission  approved  an  amendment  of  the  remit  of  the  Latvian  Development 
Finance Institution ALTUM315, to also enable the provision of mortgage loans to natural persons outside 
Riga and its surrounding municipalities. The new activity was considered as being limited to address a 
well-defined market failure and thus, remained compatible with State aid rules. The measure is authorised 
until 31 December 2029. 

On 28 July 2025, the Commission did not to object to an amendment to a French income tax reduction 
scheme  for  natural  persons  who  make  cash  subscriptions  to  the  capital  of  SMEs316.  The  amendment 
notably  concerned  an  increase  of  the  tax  rate  reduction  for  units  in  special  investment  funds  for 
innovation. The Commission found that the measure as amended continued to be compatible with the 
2021  Risk  Finance  Guidelines317.  The  validity  of  the  scheme  until  31  December  2025  remained 
unchanged.  On  17  December  2025,  the  Commission  approved  a  prolongation  of  the  scheme  until  30 
September 2026318. 

On 18 September 2025, the Commission also approved an amendment of two commitments of Cyprus in 
the context of the orderly winding down of Cyprus Cooperative Bank (CCB) Ltd319. The Commission 
found  that  the  amendment  would  allow  for  an  accelerated  winding-down  process  of  CCB,  while 
minimizing the downside risk for the State. The Commission also stated that the amendments did not 
constitute the granting of any additional State aid to the residual entity of CCB and that they did not alter 
the balance of the initial decision, so the aid remained compatible.  

On  11  December  2025,  the  Commission  approved  a  capital  increase  of  EUR  350  million  by  the 
Netherlands into Invest International, a joint venture between the Dutch State and the Dutch development 
finance institution320. The Commission found that the measure is compatible with State aid rules because 
it facilitates the development of an economic activity, does not adversely affect the trading conditions to 
an  extent  contrary  to  the  common  interest  and  the  positive  effects  outweighed  the  limited  negative 
impacts on the internal market. The measure was authorised until 31 December 2027.  

In 2025, the Commission moreover authorised the prolongations and reintroductions of certain existing 
State aid schemes allowing Member States to provide aid to foster the restructuring or orderly market 
exit  of  entities  in  distress  in  case  of  need.  On  11  July  2025,  the  Commission  approved  the  fourth 
prolongation of a Danish scheme for the winding-up of banks with a total balance sheet below EUR 3 
billion for another 12 months starting from 12 July 2025321. On 22 July 2025, the Commission approved 
the reintroduction of the resolution and stabilisation scheme for the credit union sector in Ireland which 
will  combine  two  previously  separated  measures  in  one  scheme322.  On  2  September  2025,  the 
Commission  adopted  a  decision  concerning  a  12  month-prolongation  of  a  Polish  scheme  for  the 
liquidation of failing or likely to fail credit unions323. On 11 December 2025, the Commission approved 

315 Case SA.116351 – Latvia – Amendment of the remit of Altum to enable the provision of mortgage loans to natural persons 
for home purchases in certain Latvian regions. 
316 Case SA.119189 – France – Amendements du dispositif IR-PME de réduction d’impôt sur le revenu pour les personnes 
physiques qui effectuent des souscriptions en numéraire au capital de petites et moyennes entreprises (PME). 
317 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid to promote risk finance investments, OJ C 508, 16.12.2021, 
p. 1. 
318 Case SA.120665 – France – Prolongation du dispositif IR-PME. 
319 Case SA.118999 – Cyprus – Fourth amendment to the liquidation aid for the orderly market exit of Cyprus Cooperative 
Bank (CCB) Ltd. 
320 Case SA.120017 – The Netherlands – Capital Increase of Invest International. 
321 Case SA.118986 – Denmark – Prolongation of the winding-up scheme for small banks. 
322 Case SA.119051 – Ireland – Re-Introduction of the Resolution and Stabilisation Scheme for the Credit Union Sector in 
Ireland. 
323 Case SA.119065 – Poland – Prolongation of the Credit Unions Orderly Liquidation Scheme. 

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the prolongation of a Finnish short-term export credit insurance scheme until 31 December 2028324. On 
12  December  2025,  the  Commission  approved  a  12  month-prolongation  of  a  Polish  scheme  for  the 
resolution of cooperative banks and small commercial banks, which took effect on 13 December 2025325.  

In 2025, the Commission also adopted several no-aid decisions. On 24 March 2025, the Commission 
adopted  a  decision  declaring  the  recapitalisation  of  Romanian  State-owned  CEC  Bank  as  market-
conform326. The Commission assessed the planned recapitalisation against the Market Economy Investor 
Principle (MEIP) and found that the recapitalisation of RON 1 billion into CEC Bank does not grant an 
advantage to the bank that it could not receive under normal market conditions.  

On 19 May 2025, the Commission adopted a decision according to which the capital injection of EUR 
300 million into Suomen Teollisuussijoitus Oy (Tesi) was market-conform and thus, did not constitute 
aid327.  Tesi  emerged  from  the  consolidation  of  four  Finnish  state-owned  investment  companies.  The 
Commission  concluded  that  Tesi  will  be  funded  and  operate  on  market  terms  and  will  therefore  not 
receive any economic advantage compared to other commercial market participants.  

On 20 June 2025, the Commission adopted a decision in which it found that the planned capital injection 
of RON 1.25 billion into State-owned bank Exim Banca Româneasca (Exim) complied with the MEIP 
because a prudent market economy investor would have taken part in a share capital increase of Exim in 
similar circumstances328. Accordingly, the planned capital injection will not grant an advantage to the 
bank. 

Regarding State aid in the form of public guarantees, the Commission adopted seven decisions under the 
Guarantee Notice329 approving methodologies to price public guarantees in 2025.  

In  a  Greek  case330,  the  Commission  approved  an  amendment  and  prolongation  of  the  calculation 
methodology for market-conform guarantee premiums to large undertakings on 20 January 2025. The 
methodology was prolonged until 21 April 2028. In a Portuguese case331, the Commission approved a 
prolongation and modifications to the pricing methodology for guarantees to SMEs on 15 July 2025. The 
methodology  was  approved  until  31  January  2026.  In  a  Finnish  case,  the  Commission  approved  the 
extension and amendment of an existing methodology for calculating market-conform guarantees premia 
for SMEs in the agriculture, agri-food, and forestry sectors. The amended methodology is valid until 31 
December 2030332. 

On  10  November  2025,  the  Commission  approved  a  Spanish  methodology  for  calculating  market-
conform  guarantee  premia  regarding  loans  or  credits  enhancing  the  environmental  performance  of 

324 Case SA.120313 – Finland – Prolongation of the Amended Scheme on short-term export-credit insurance for SME and 
single-risk cover. 
325 Case SA.120624 – Poland – Prolongation of the resolution scheme for cooperative banks and small commercial banks. 
326 Case SA.115898 – Romania – Market-conform recapitalisation of CEC Bank. 
327 Case SA.113383 – Finland – Tesi Group consolidation. 
328 Case SA.115897 – Romania – Market-conform recapitalisation of Exim Banca Româneasca. 
329 Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees, OJ C 
155, 20.6.2008, p. 10.  
330 Case SA.116266 – Greece – Amendment and prolongation of the Calculation Methodology for guarantee fees to banks for 
Large Corporate Financing. 
331  Case  SA.119370  –  Portugal  –  Prolongation  of  the  Pricing  model  for  guarantee  schemes  Under  the  SNGM  (Sistema 
Nacional de Garantia Mutua). 
332 Case SA.119113 – Finland – Methodology for calculating market-conform state guarantees premiums for agriculture. 

68 

 
 
Spanish shipping  companies' merchant  fleets. The approved methodology is  valid until  31 December 
2029333. 

In a Latvian case, the Commission approved a calculation methodology for guarantee premia concerning 
large undertakings. According to the methodology, three amounts must be calculated for each exposure: 
a  risk-based  premium,  an  Effective  Interest  Rate  premium,  and  a  CDS  premium.  The  applicable 
guarantee  premium  will  be  the  highest  of  those  amounts.  The  methodology  will  be  valid  until  31 
December 2030334. 

On 17 December 2025, the Commission approved the reintroduction of an Italian methodology for the 
calculation of market-conform guarantee premia used by ISMEA, a public entity providing services of 
insurance  and  guarantee  to  enterprises  in  the  agricultural  sector  and  to  fisheries  enterprises  in  the 
aquaculture sector. The methodology is valid until 30 June 2028335. On the same date, the Commission 
approved an amendment of the method used by Denmark to calculate the aid element in guarantees. The 
amended methodology is valid until 31 December 2027336. 

4. 

TAXATION & STATE AID  

4.1. Overview of key challenges on tax evasion and avoidance, and fiscal aid 

Outside the spheres in which EU tax law has been harmonised, Member States can decide, by exercising 
their own  competence in this area, how to tax economic activities, which ones to  tax, which  rates to 
apply,  and  which  tax  base  to  take  into  account.  Member  States’  fiscal  sovereignty  is  however  not 
absolute: this competence must be exercised in accordance with EU law, including State aid rules337. 

In the context of fiscal measures, the key aspect to find State aid is the existence of a selective advantage. 
This is because such measures mitigate the charges that the undertakings would normally have to bear 
under the relevant system of charges. It is therefore necessary to identify a reference system (the normal 
tax system) against which those measures must be assessed. It is for the entity alleging the existence of 
aid to demonstrate that the fiscal measures concerned selectively favour certain undertakings or specific 
sectors of activity338. The Court of Justice has clarified that, to identify the reference system (in direct 
taxation), the Commission must rely on national law339 following an exchange of arguments with the 
Member  State,  and  carry  out  an  objective  examination  of  the  content,  structure  and  effects  of  the 
applicable rules340. The Member States, on their side, must in good faith provide the Commission with 

333 Case SA.110155 – Spain – Methodology for calculating market-conform guarantee premiums for the modernization of the 
merchant fleet of Spanish shipowners. 
334 Case SA.119003 – Latvia – Guarantee methodology for large undertakings. 
335 Case SA.119813 – Italy – Reintroduction with amendments of the ISMEA calculation method for issuing direct guarantees 
at market conditions to undertakings active in the agricultural, agri-food and fishery sectors. 
336 Case SA.118719 – Denmark – Amendment calculation method for Danish guarantee scheme (SA.109413). 
337 Judgments of the Court of Justice of  5 December 2023 in Joined Cases C-451/21 P and C-454/21 P, Luxembourg and 
Others v Commission, EU:C:2023:948, paragraph 112; and of 10 September 2024 in Case C-465/20 P, Commission v Ireland 
and Others, EU:C:2024:724, paragraph 81. 
338 Judgments of the Court of Justice of 4 June 2015 in Case C-15/14 P, Commission v MOL, EU:C:2015:362; and of 30 June 
2016 in Case C-270/15 P, Belgium v Commission, EU:C:2016:489. 
339 Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 8 November 2022 in Joined Cases C-885/19 P and C-898/19 P, Fiat 
Chrysler Finance Europe and Ireland v European Commission, EU:C:2022:859. 
340 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 December 2023 in Joined Cases C-451/21 P and C-454/21 P, Luxembourg and Others 
v  Commission (Engie), EU:C:2023:948, paragraph 111. See  also  Judgment of  the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 6 
October 202 in Joined Cases C-51/19 P and C- 64/19 P, World Duty Free Group SA and others v Commission, EU:C:2021:793, 
paragraph 62. 

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all relevant information necessary for this purpose341. In 2025, the Court of Justice provided additional 
guidance as to which tax exemptions should be considered as part of the reference system in Prezydent 
Miasta Mielca (see above in Part I, section 3.3.2). 

To this end, the Court has developed the so-called three-step test to assess selectivity in relation to tax 
measures. The first step consists of identifying the reference framework, that is to say, the ‘normal’ tax 
regime applicable in the Member State concerned. The second step consists of demonstrating that the tax 
measure  at  issue  constitutes  a  derogation  from  that  reference  framework,  insofar  as  it  differentiates 
between operators which are in a comparable factual and legal situation in light of the objectives pursued 
by that reference framework. The third step concerns whether the derogation is justified by the logic of 
the system. Indeed, the concept of ‘State aid’ does not encompass measures that differentiate between 
undertakings  which,  in  the  light  of  the  objective  pursued  by  the  legal  regime  concerned,  are  in  a 
comparable factual and legal situation and which are, therefore, a priori selective, where the Member 
State  can demonstrate that that differentiation is  justified because it flows from  the nature or general 
structure of the system of which those measures form part342. 

In this regard, the Court of Justice clarified that the Commission cannot rely on any parameters and rules 
external to the national tax system, unless it refers explicitly to such parameters or rules343. Furthermore, 
for the assessment of selectivity in relation to an individual application of the tax rules (for example a 
tax ruling), the Court of Justice also clarified that, to identify the reference system or the ‘normal’ tax 
regime on the basis of which that individual application must be analysed, the Commission must rely on 
the provisions of national law as interpreted by the Member State, provided that this interpretation is 
compatible with the wording of those provisions. This presumption is conditional on the Member State 
concerned fulfilling its duty of sincere cooperation as regards the national case-law and administrative 
practice.  The  Commission  may  depart  from  the  Member  State’s  interpretation  only  if  it  is  able  to 
establish, on the basis of reliable and consistent evidence, that another interpretation prevails in the case-
law or the administrative practice of the Member State concerned344. Both in Engie345 and in Apple346, 
the Court of Justice provided guidance in this respect: it focused in particular on the interpretation of the 
national tax provisions presented by the relevant Member State and the Commission respectively in the 
light of the wording but also the objective and effects of those provisions. In Engie, the Court of Justice 
decided  in  favour  of  the  interpretation  defended  by  the  Member  State  and  in  Apple  in  favour  of  the 
interpretation defended by the Commission347. 

The Commission usually enforces State aid rules in relation to tax schemes in the context of State aid 
complaints or notifications. It also has an important ex officio workstream in relation to aggressive tax 
planning practices involving discriminatory treatment of companies. Aggressive tax planning strategies 
involving  the  granting  of  State  aid  can  take  a  variety  of  forms.  Companies  may  strike  individual 
‘sweetheart deals’ with tax authorities, by which they benefit from a level of taxation which is lower than 
what would apply to other taxpayers. They may also benefit from schemes that selectively offer fiscal 
advantages and that are based on legislation or administrative practice. Either way, such practices may 

341 Judgment of the Court of Justice in Engie, op.cit., paragraph 122. 
342 Judgments of the Court of Justice of 19 December 2018 in Case C-374/17, A-Brauerei, EU:C:2018:1024, paragraphs 36 
and 44; and of 10 September 2024 in Case C-465/20 P, Commission v Ireland and Others, EU:C:2024:724, paragraph 76 and 
the case-law cited. 
343 Judgment of the Court of Justice in Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe and Ireland v European Commission, op.cit., paragraph 
96. 
344 Judgment of the Court of Justice in Engie, op.cit., paragraph 121. 
345 Judgment of the Court of Justice in Engie, op.cit., paragraphs 120, 121, 122 and 130. 
346 Judgment of the Court of Justice in Commission v Ireland and Others, op.cit., paragraphs 200, 201, 374, 375, 376 and 377. 
347 Judgment of the Court of Justice in Commission v Ireland and Others, op.cit., paragraphs 200-201. 

70 

 
 
have distortive effects on the Single Market, as they unduly reinforce the competitive position of certain 
companies.  

4.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

In 2025, the Commission continued to enforce State aid rules in both direct and indirect tax matters. 
Relevant developments are discussed below. 

4.2.1.  State aid enforcement in aggressive tax planning 

The  Commission  continued  the  investigation  of  pending  cases  concerning  alleged  aid  granted  by  the 
Netherlands  to  Inter  Ikea348  and  Nike349,  as  well  as  alleged  State  aid  granted  by  Luxembourg  to 
Huhtamäki350and  Engie351,  and  by  Gibraltar  to  the  Mead  Johnson  Nutrition  group352.  In  addition, 
following the annulment by the Court of Justice in 2024 of the Commission’s negative decision353 in 
relation to the UK Controlled Foreign Companies (UK CFC) case for failing to correctly identify the 
appropriate reference system354, the Commission resumed its investigation into the UK CFC regime.  

At  the  same  time,  the  Commission  continued  monitoring  Member  States’  tax  rulings  legislation  and 
practice. 

4.2.2.  State aid enforcement and judgment in relation to tax schemes 

The Commission also pursued its investigations in the area of tax schemes throughout 2025. In particular, 
the Commission adopted a decision in relation to amendments to a Finnish tax on soft drinks355. This tax, 
which  has  been  in  place  in  Finland  since  1940,  aims  to  raise  revenues  and  re-direct  production  and 
consumption  towards  alternatives  that  are  sugar-free  or  that  contain  less  sugar.  Following  the 
amendments, the tax will be progressive depending on the sugar content of the drink. The Commission 
assessed the notified amendment under EU State aid rules and found that the Finnish soft drinks tax had 
been designed based on non-discriminatory parameters and in line with the objectives pursued. On this 
basis, the Commission concluded that the tax, as amended, does not involve State aid. 

5. 

BASIC INDUSTRIES & MANUFACTURING  

5.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors 

Accounting for nearly one-sixth of the EU’s  economy,  manufacturing is  a  key  driver  for growth  and 
innovation,  providing  employment  for  around  30  million  people,  roughly  14%  of  the  EU  workforce. 
European businesses operating in this sector face significant challenges, including energy price increases, 
trade  tensions,  the  rapid  introduction  of  advanced  technologies  and  the  need  to  transition  towards 
environmentally sustainable production. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression 
against Ukraine have intensified this situation, significantly disrupting supply chains and inflating the 
costs of energy, raw materials and components. These disturbances persisted throughout 2025. Both the 
RRF and the REPowerEU Plan strive to tackle these challenges by stimulating investment throughout 

348 Case SA.46470 – The Netherlands – Potential aid to IKEA. 
349 Case SA.51284 – The Netherlands – Alleged aid to Nike. 
350 Case SA.50400 – Luxembourg – Huhtamäki. 
351 Case SA.44888 – Luxembourg – Engie. 
352 Case SA.34914 – United Kingdom – Gibraltar Corporate Income Tax Regime. 
353 Case SA.44896 – United Kingdom – State aid scheme UK CFC Group Financing Exemption.  
354  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  19  September  2024  in  Joined  Cases  C-555/22  P,  United  Kingdom  and  Others  v 
Commission, C-556/22 P, ITV v Commission and Others and C-564/22 P, LSEGH (Luxembourg) and London Stock Exchange 
Group Holdings (Italy) v Commission and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2024:763. 
355 Case SA.104131 – Finland – Reform of the Soft Drinks Tax. 

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the post-pandemic recovery phase and facilitating the transition to a clean, digital and resilient economy 
that is independent of Russian fossil fuels356. 

Enforcing  antitrust  and  merger  rules  in  the  manufacturing  and  basic  industries  sectors  supports  these 
transformations in accordance with the principles of the Single Market. This ensures that innovation is 
not hampered and that companies can compete on fair and equal terms. Meanwhile, the enforcement of 
State aid rules ensures that purely national interests do not lead to distortions of competition within the 
Single Market.   

5.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

5.2.1.  Revision of the State aid Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines ongoing 

The  Rescue  and  Restructuring  Guidelines  (R&RG)  set  out  the  conditions  under  which  aid  to  non-
financial undertakings in difficulty may be considered in line with EU rules357.  

To ensure that the rules remain up to date, the Commission launched the revision process with call for 
evidence and a public consultation in August 2025. The Commission consulted stakeholders on two main 
issues: (i) whether the steel sector should be included in the Guidelines and (ii) whether the definition of 
undertaking in difficulty should be modified by excluding certain startups and scale ups from the scope 
of the definition to enable such companies to benefit from other types of State aid, if they are not at risk 
of  bankruptcy.  The  Commission  also  intends  to  align  the  Guidelines  with  the  recent  case-law.  The 
revision of these Guidelines is ongoing.  

5.2.2.  Evaluation of Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation ongoing  

The Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation (MVBER)358 lays out the conditions under which motor 
vehicle spare parts distribution and repair and maintenance service agreements are exempted from the 
application  of  Article  101(1)  TFEU.  The  supplementary  Guidelines  provide  detailed  guidance  on  the 
interpretation of the MVBER359.  

In  April  2023,  the  Commission  extended  the  MVBER  for  five  years,  until  31  May  2028360. 
Simultaneously,  it  introduced  limited,  but  important  changes  to  the  supplementary  Guidelines,  in 
particular  with  regard  to  vehicle-generated  data.  The  Commission  concluded  that  further  significant 
market developments are anticipated in the near future, particularly regarding access to vehicle-generated 
data. Consequently, it decided to reassess the situation at an earlier date. 

The  ongoing  evaluation  of  the  MVBER,  launched  in  2024,  therefore  particularly  reflects  the  rapid 
transformation of the automotive aftermarket, marked by increasing digitalisation, vehicle connectivity 

356  See  https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en  and 
https://commission.europa.eu/topics/energy/repowereu_en  
357 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings 
in difficulty, OJ C 249, 31.7.2014, pp. 1–28. The guidelines were originally set to expire at the end of 2025, but their validity 
has been extended until end 2026. 
358 Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/2010 of 27 May  2010 on the  application of Article  101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector, 
OJ L 129, 28.5.2010, p. 52 as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/822 of 17 April 2023 on amending Regulation 
(EU) No 461/2010 as regards its period of application, OJ L 102I, 17.4.2023, p. 1. 
359 Commission Notice on supplementary guidelines on vertical restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor 
vehicles and for the distribution of spare parts for motor vehicles, OJ C 138, 28.5.2010, p. 16 as amended by 
Communication from the Commission Amendments to the Commission Notice – Supplementary guidelines on vertical 
restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor vehicles and for the distribution of spare parts for motor vehicles 
2023/C 133 I/01, OJ C 133I , 17.4.2023, p. 1. 
360 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2248   

72 

 
 
and the growing role of software and data. While the MVBER was largely designed for a market centred 
on  physical  spare  parts  and  traditional  repair  and  maintenance  services,  stakeholders  have  pointed  to 
potential  challenges  in  ensuring  effective  competition  where  access  to  vehicle-generated  data,  digital 
interfaces and software-controlled functions increasingly determines competitive conditions. 

In  this  context,  the  Commission  solicited  information  from  NCAs  in  January  2025,  and  the  public 
consultation of stakeholders was concluded in May 2025. The work continued throughout 2025 on an 
evaluation support study commissioned with the JRC: an interim report was produced late 2024 and the 
final report was submitted in December 2025. The results of the evaluation will be published in a staff 
working document361. 

5.2.3.  Antitrust enforcement in the basic industries and manufacturing sectors 

On  18  July  2025,  to  safeguard  innovation  and  resilience  in  the  supply  chain  for  handheld  electronic 
devices, the Commission adopted a decision making legally binding the commitments offered by Corning, 
a  U.S.-based  company362.  These  commitments  resolve  the  Commission’s  concerns  that  Corning  -  by 
concluding  allegedly  anticompetitive  exclusive  supply  agreements  for  Alkali-aluminosilicate  glass 
(Alkali-AS  Glass)  -  may  have  abused  its  dominant  position.  This  break-resistant  glass  is  used  for 
smartphones and other handheld electronic devices. Corning committed to waive all exclusive dealing 
clauses and no longer impose sourcing requirements on Original Equipment Manufacturers of handheld 
electronic devices (OEMs) or companies that finish raw glass (finishers). Moreover, Corning would no 
longer  require  OEMs  or  finishers  to  purchase  more  than  50%  of  their  respective  demand  from  the 
company. The commitments will make market access for Corning’s competitors easier. 

On 14 October 2025, the Commission fined Gucci, Chloé and Loewe, three companies active in the high-
end fashion sector, for resale price maintenance (RPM) practices363. The companies restricted the ability 
of both their online and brick-and-mortar retailers - which are independent resellers - to set their own 
retail prices. This restriction applied to almost the entire range of products designed and sold under their 
respective  brand  names,  including  apparel,  leather  goods,  shoes  and  fashion  accessories.  The 
infringements  lasted  several  years  and  covered  the  entire  territory  of  the  EEA.  All  three  companies 
cooperated  with  the  Commission  under  the  antitrust  cooperation  procedure.  Consequently,  they  were 
granted fine reductions: 15% for Chloé, and 50% for Gucci and Loewe. Total fines amounting to EUR 
157 million were imposed on the three companies. 

On 15 December 2025, the Commission fined three automotive starter batteries manufacturers, Exide, 
FET (including its predecessor Elettra) and Rombat, as well as the trade association Eurobat at total of 
around EUR 72 million for engaging, together with Clarios (formerly JC Autobatterie), in a long-running 
cartel  concerning  automotive  starter  batteries  sold  to  cars  and  trucks  manufacturers  (OEMs)  in  the 
whole territory of the EEA364. The manufacturers agreed to create and publish premiums calculated based 
on their purchasing price of lead (the so-called EUROBAT premiums) in the industry publication ‘Metal 
Bulletin’. They also agreed to use such premiums in the price negotiations with their respective OEMs 
customers to ensure that the resulting surcharge was kept at a level higher than it would have been without 
such agreement. In general, a surcharge is a legitimate tool suppliers use to reflect changes in raw material 
costs in product prices, allowing them to transfer this cost risk to the customers. However, it is clearly 
illegal  for  suppliers  to  secretly  coordinate  to  introduce  and  use  such  a  surcharge  as  an  industry-wide 

361  See  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14126-Motor-Vehicle-Block-Exemption-
Regulation-evaluation_en  
362 Case AT.40728 – Corning. 
363 Cases AT.40840 – Gucci; AT.40880 – Chloé; and AT.40881 – Loewe. 
364 Case AT.40545 – Automotive starter batteries. 

73 

 
 
standard.  Clarios  (including  its  parent  companies  Johnson  Controls  International  PLC  and  Johnson 
Controls, Inc.) cooperated with the Commission under the leniency programme (2006 Leniency Notice) 
and therefore received full immunity for revealing the cartel to the Commission. FET (including one of 
its parent companies Resonac) and Rombat (including its parent company Metair) cooperated with the 
Commission under the leniency programme and received a fine reduction of 50% and 30%, respectively. 

On  9  July  2025,  the  Commission  issued  a  guidance  letter  addressed  to  companies  active  in  the 
automotive sector regarding the creation of ALNG a licensing negotiation group in the automotive sector 
that aims to negotiate licences for standard essential patents (SEPs)365. The Commission considered that 
ALNG  does  not  raise  concerns  under  Article  101  TFEU  to  the  extent  that  its  activities  satisfy  the 
following  criteria:  (i)  ALNG  negotiates  licences  for  standards  that  are  not  specific  to  the  automotive 
sector; (ii) its members together represent no more than 15% of the total demand for the licensing of the 
relevant SEPs; (iii) participation in ALNG remains open to other companies in the sector and negotiations 
are  voluntary;  and  (iv)  the  exchange  of  information  between  ALNG  members  is  limited  to  what  is 
objectively necessary, and no commercially sensitive information is shared between members of ALNG. 
This guidance letter is among the first issued by the Commission pursuant to its 2022 Notice on Informal 
Guidance.  

On 1 April 2025, the Commission launched a fact-finding exercise to boost the EU’s competitiveness in 
Critical Raw Materials (CRMs), aiming to make their procurement, recycling, and re-use more efficient 
for sectors such as clean technology, the green transition, and defence. Through systematic engagement 
with stakeholders, the Commission seeks to explore how EU competition rules can support the industry. 
As part of this process, a workshop with stakeholders and Commission representatives took place on 11 
December 2025, to further discuss how companies can cooperate in compliance with EU antitrust rules 
and hear the industries’ concerns on the implementation of EU competition law instruments, including 
State Aid, the FSR and antitrust366.  

5.2.4.  Merger enforcement in the basic industries and manufacturing sectors 

On 24 January 2025, the Commission approved the proposed acquisition of DS Smith by International 
Paper, subject to conditions367. The acquisition as notified raised serious doubts in the markets for the 
manufacture and supply of conventional and heavy-duty corrugated sheets and boxes in certain areas of 
France, Portugal and Spain. The Commission’s investigation showed that the combination of the parties’ 
activities,  and  their  ability  to  foreclose  inputs  to  rivals,  would  have  resulted  in  higher  prices  for 
consumers. The acquisition was approved subject to the divestment of five of International Paper's plants 
in Europe (three plants in France, including two box plants and one sheet plant, one box plant in Portugal; 
and one box plant in Spain).  

In  the  chemicals  sector,  the  Commission  unconditionally  approved  two  mergers  following  a  Phase  I 
market  investigation.  On  12  May  2025,  the  Commission  approved  the  acquisition  of  the  German 
chemicals  producer  Covestro  by  Abu  Dhabi  National  Oil  Company's  (ADNOC)368.  The  transaction 
resulted in multiple horizontal and vertical links. Following its market investigation, the Commission 
concluded that the merger was, however, unlikely to  harm competition  because the parties’  activities 
were clearly differentiated, their combined market positions remained modest, and there were sufficient 
alternative suppliers of the few chemicals for which affected markets arose. The Commission’s in-depth 
investigation of this transaction under the FSR was concluded on 14 November 2025 with a clearance 

365 Case AT.40979 – Guidance – Automotive LNG. 
366 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/manufacturing-basic-industries/critical-raw-materials_en  
367 Case M.11564 – International Paper / DS Smith. 
368 Case FS.100156 – ADNOC / Covestro. 

74 

 
 
decision conditional on the implementation of the commitments submitted by ADNOC to address the 
Commission’s preliminary concerns (see above Part 1, section 4.3).  

On  13  May  2025,  the  Commission  approved  the  acquisition  of  OCI's  global  methanol  business  by 
Methanex369. Despite the fact that the transaction made Methanex the leading supplier of methanol in the 
EEA, the results of the Commission’s market investigation showed that its market share would remain 
limited and that customers would have access to many alternative sources of supply. The Commission 
also investigated the possibility of price coordination among methanol suppliers in the EEA. It concluded 
that this risk was limited due to the absence of price transparency in the market and the strong bargaining 
power of customers, both of which result in significant discounts off public list prices. Throughout its 
investigation, the Commission cooperated closely with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which 
also conducted an in-depth investigation into the deal. Ultimately, the FTC also unconditionally cleared 
the transaction.   

With regards to raw material and manufacturing, on 29 January 2025, the Commission approved the 
acquisition of Aluflexpack by Constantia, subject to conditions370. Aluflexpack and Constantia are both 
producers of  a range of  different packaging  materials.  The Commission  found that the transaction  as 
notified would have reduced competition in the markets for the supply of flexible aluminium containers 
and lids for wet pet and human food in the EEA. The combined entity would have had large combined 
market shares in both markets. This would have likely led to higher prices and less choice for human and 
pet food customers in the EEA. To address the Commission’s concerns, Constantia offered to divest the 
entirety of Aluflexpack’s wet pet and human food business in the EEA, including all assets and personnel 
currently part of Aluflexpack’s production plant Omial in Omiš (Croatia). Constantia proposed to divest 
the  business  to  the  MTX  Group,  a  Czech  industrial  trading  and  production  holding  active  in  flexible 
packaging. 

On 4 April 2025, the Commission approved the acquisition of parts of Collins Aerospace’s actuation 
business  by  Safran,  subject  to  conditions371.  The  Commission's  investigation  revealed  that  Collins’ 
actuation business and Safran overlapped significantly in the supply of trimmable horizontal stabiliser 
actuator systems  (THSA), where they were the two main suppliers. To ensure that the THSA market 
remains competitive, the Commission conditionally cleared the transaction subject to Safran’s divestiture 
of its North American THSA business (a business that serves mostly civil aviation) to an independent 
player.  On  17  June  2025,  the  Commission  approved  the  purchase  of  Safran’s  THSA  business  by 
Woodward, a rival supplier of aerospace equipment.  

Furthermore, on 14 October 2025, the Commission approved Boeing’s acquisition of Spirit, subject to 
conditions372. The Commission’s investigation concluded that the transaction, as initially notified, risked 
to significantly reducing competition in the global aerostructures and large commercial aircraft markets. 
In particular, the Commission found that Boeing could have restricted or worsened Spirit’s supply of 
aerostructures to Airbus while gaining access to Airbus’s commercially sensitive information. To address 
these concerns, Boeing committed to divest all Spirit businesses supplying Airbus to Airbus itself, as 
well as Spirit’s Malaysian site to CTRM.  

Moreover, on 4 November 2025, the Commission opened an  in-depth investigation into the proposed 
acquisition of Anglo American’s nickel business by MMG373. MMG is a multinational mining and metals 

369 Case M.11812 – Methanex / OCI Methanol Business. 
370 Case M.11536 – Constantia / Aluflexpack. 
371 Case M.11253 - Safran / part of Collins Aerospace’s actuation and flight control activities. 
372 Case M.11578 – Boeing / Spirit. 
373 Case M.11944 – MMG / Brazilian Nickel Business of Anglo American. 

75 

 
 
company  controlled  by  the  Chinese  state-owned  company,  China  Minmetals  Corporation.  The  target 
business consists of two operating ferronickel facilities and two greenfield projects located in Brazil. The 
Commission preliminarily found that the transaction could enable MMG to divert the target’s ferronickel 
supply  away  from  European  stainless-steel  producers  in  favour  of  its  group’s  downstream  activities, 
possibly.  This  could,  potentially  increase  production  costs  for  European  stainless-steel  producers  and 
undermine their ability to compete. The Commission will carry out an  in-depth investigation into the 
effects of the proposed transaction to determine whether its initial competition concerns are confirmed.  

Finally, with regard to consumer goods, the Commission  unconditionally approved the acquisition of 
About You by Zalando374 on 1 July 2025. Both companies operate as online multi-brand fashion retailers 
in several EEA countries and provide different software solutions, such as platform integration software 
and  web  shop  creating  software.  The  Commission  concluded  that  this  transaction  would  not  raise 
competition  concerns  because:  (i)  a  large  number  of  credible  alternative  online  multi-brand  fashion 
retailers will remain available to both brands and consumers; (ii) the merged entity will continue to face 
significant out-of-market constraints, notably from physical retail stores and mono-brand websites; (iii) 
both companies will remain constrained by the bargaining power of fashion brands; and (iv) consumers 
will  retain  the  ability  to  switch  between  various  retailers  and  sales  channels.  Furthermore,  the 
Commission concluded that the transaction was unlikely to raise concerns arising from the conglomerate 
links between the parties’ online fashion platforms and their software’ offerings. It was determined that 
the merged entity would lack the market power necessary to pursue any foreclosure strategies. 

5.2.5.  State aid enforcement in the basic industries and manufacturing sectors 

On  13  January  2025,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  12.5  million  rescue  aid  loan  granted  by  the 
French government to Le Coq Sportif International SAS, a French group active in the production and 
distribution of sports apparel and equipment, with 160 employees in France and subsidiaries in Spain and 
Italy375. Le Coq Sportif International SAS was designated supplier of the French teams in the Olympic 
and Paralympic games organised in Paris in the summer of 2024. The Commission concluded that the 
aid  is  compatible  with  the  internal  market  pursuant  to  Article  107(3)(c)  TFEU,  as  it  satisfies  the 
conditions set out in the R&RG. France has submitted a restructuring plan, which the Commission is 
assessing.  

On 23 January 2025, the Commission concluded, after formal investigation, that two support measures 
totalling EUR 23 million awarded by Poland in 2012 and 2013 to the chemical company PCC MCAA sp. 
Z o.o for an investment into a new plant producing ultra-pure MCAA376 are in line with the regional aid 
rules. The project is located in the Wałbrzych Special Economic Zone. 

6. 

AGRI-FOOD & FISHERIES 

6.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors 

Against a backdrop of global uncertainties, EU agricultural markets generally demonstrated resilience in 
2025.  Several  sectors  such  as  cereals,  milk,  poultry,  and  olive  oil  recorded  a  growth  in  production, 
whereas  others,  like  sugar  and  wine,  experienced  a  contraction.  The  fruits  and  vegetables  sector  saw 
disparate trends driven by volatile weather conditions. In a challenging trade context, overall agricultural 
exports were anticipated to decrease by 6% over the year, while imports remained steady377. 

374 Case M.11854 – Zalando / About You. 
375 Case SA.119205 – France – Aide à la restructuration du Groupe Le Coq Sportif. 
376 Monochloroacetic acid, also referred to as MCAA, is used as a versatile intermediate in the production of chemicals. 
377 See https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/afc32c26-6b98-11f0-bf4e-01aa75ed71a1  

76 

 
 
Food inflation maintained  a moderate rate  of approximately 3%,  however,  it continued to  exceed  the 
overall inflation rate, which stabilised at around 2%378. In several national markets, such as Bulgaria, 
Czechia, Estonia, Romania, food inflation remained high. Although food prices were relatively stable 
throughout  2025,  they  remained  significantly  higher  than  pre-COVID-19  pandemic  levels  for  many 
products379. On average, EU consumers paid, 40 % more for food compared to 2020 levels, with a 30% 
increase recorded in the Euro area380.   

As  reported  in  the  Spring  2025  edition  of  the  report  on  State  of  Food  Security  in  the  EU381,  food 
affordability remains a primary concern. This is largely driven by volatile input costs, extreme weather 
conditions and a heavy reliance on imports for  certain inputs. According to Eurostat  data from 2024, 
8.5% of the EU population were unable to afford a meal containing meat, fish, or a vegetarian equivalent 
every second day (this represents a 1% decrease from the 9.5% recorded in 2023)382.  

In 2025, non-investment-related input costs for agriculture rose. Veterinary expenses saw the steepest 
hike (+3.0%), while the rise in costs for fertilisers (+0.9%) and energy and lubricants (+0.7%)383 was 
more moderate. Although the first half of 2025 showed an overall stabilisation of input costs for farmers, 
they remain approximately 30% higher than the 2020 average. Uncertainty however persists due to the 
tensions in the Middle East, which primarily impact energy and fertilisers prices384.  

The Vision for Agriculture and Food385, adopted on 19 February 2025, identified the challenges of the 
agri-food  system  due  to  global  competition  and  climate  change  and  proposed  a  roadmap  toward  a 
competitive, resilient, and fair agri-food system. It builds on the report of the Strategic Dialogue on the 
Future of EU Agriculture386 and emphasises the importance of simplifying policies, adopting innovation 
and embracing digitalisation in all actions needed to achieve its goals. 

6.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges  

6.2.1.  Proposals  to  introduce  new  exclusions  from  the  application  of  Article  101  TFEU  to 
agricultural products and other regulatory developments  

To address concerns expressed by farmers387, the Commission adopted a proposal on 10 December 2024 
for a targeted revision of Regulation No 1308/2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets 

oil, 

See 

and 

have 

cocoa 

increased 

chocolate 

378 The inflation for 2025 is projected to be 2.0% in the Euro area according to the Eurostat, while food inflation in particular 
was  projected  at  3.3%  in  the  Euro  area.  These  projections  are  based  on  information  up  to  July  2025,  see 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-01082025-ap  
379 Meat prices for beef, poultry and pork, for example, are now more than 30% higher than at the end of 2019. Meanwhile, 
milk prices have risen by around 40% and butter by around 50% compared to pre-pandemic levels (Chart 2). Prices for coffee, 
olive 
Source 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2025/html/ecb.blog20250925~7fd65a388a.en.html  (ECB blog).  
380 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2025/html/ecb.blog20250925~7fd65a388a.en.html. 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/website/economy/food-price-monitoring/   
381 
f06a68f78863/file.bin  
382 See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20250828-1  
383See  https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/048136bf-53f1-4f74-b92d-d13954196505_en?filename=short-
term-outlook-spring-2024_en.pdf  
384 See https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/afc32c26-6b98-11f0-bf4e-01aa75ed71a1  
385 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_530  
386 
See 
agriculture_en  
387 
concerns_en#strengthening-the-position-of-farmers-in-the-food-supply-chain  

https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/overview-vision-agriculture-food/main-initiatives-strategic-dialogue-future-eu-

https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/3d8755a5-094d-4688-8562-

https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/overview-vision-agriculture-food/eu-actions-address-farmers-

more. 

even 

See 

See 

See 

also  

77 

 
 
in agricultural products (CMO Regulation)388. The proposal aims to introduce new exclusions from the 
application of Article 101 TFEU for agricultural products389. The Commission proposal was discussed 
in the course of 2025 by the Council and the European Parliament. The new exclusions proposed are: (i) 
extending the current exclusion from Article 101 TFEU – previously reserved for producer organisations 
(POs) formally recognised by Member States - to encompass all POs; (ii) extending the sustainability 
objectives of Article 210a of the CMO Regulation to include certain socio-economic aspects; and, (iii) 
allowing associations of producer organisations (APOs) to negotiate contract terms - including price - on 
behalf  of  their  members,  for  their  members’  production,  without  the  need  to  integrate  any  of  their 
activities provided that their market  share does not  exceed 33% of the national  market  for any given 
product.  

On  28  March  2025,  the  Commission  adopted  the  ‘Wine  package’390,   a  set  of  measures  designed  to 
address  the  challenges  faced  by  the  EU  wine  sector.  Those  challenges  include  continuous  decline  in 
consumption (-3%) driven by changing consumer trends, climate change and market uncertainties. The 
proposal  contains  targeted  measures  to  help  the  sector  manage  its  production  potential,  to  adapt  to 
evolving consumer preferences and to unlock new market opportunities. The Council and the European 
Parliament  also  agreed  on  a  new  exclusion  from  Article  101  TFEU  for  agreements  by  Inter  Branch 
Organisations on orientation prices for wine. 

Following a call from the Competitiveness Council in May 2024, the Commission - working together 
with Member States within the Single Market Enforcement Task Force (SMET) - mapped the prevalence 
of ‘Territorial Supply Constraints’ (TSCs)391. The results of this fact-finding exercise were presented in 
the  SMET  meeting  in  Krakow  (February  2025)392  and  later  during  a  Stakeholder  Dialogue  (April 
2025)393.  On  21  May  2025,  the  Commission  adopted  the  Single  Market  Strategy394,  which  aims  at 
removing  the  ‘Terrible  Ten’  barriers  preventing  a  seamless  Single  Market.  TSCs  were  among  these 
barriers. The Commission committed to submit a proposal by  the end of 2026 to develop tools to act 
against unjustified TSCs that are not captured by EU competition law.   

6.2.2.  Antitrust enforcement in the agri-food sector  

On  2  June  2025,  the  Commission  adopted  a  decision  imposing  fines  totalling  EUR  329  million  on 
Delivery Hero and Glovo, two major food delivery companies, for their participation in a cartel in the 
online food delivery sector395. Both companies admitted their involvement in the cartel and agreed to 
settle  the  case.  In  July  2018,  Delivery  Hero  acquired  a  minority  non-controlling  stake  in  Glovo  and 
progressively increased this stake until it acquired sole control of Glovo in July 2022. The Commission 
found that during that period, Delivery Hero and Glovo progressively removed competitive constraints 
between them and replaced competition with multi-layered anticompetitive coordination. In particular, 

388 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1308/2013, 
(EU)  2021/2115  and  (EU)  2021/2116  as  regards  the  strengthening  of  the  position  of  farmers  in  the  food  supply  chain, 
COM(2024) 577 final. 
389 Agriculture has a special status as regards the application of competition rules based directly on the TFEU. Article 42 
thereof confers on the EU legislators (the European Parliament and the Council) the power to determine the extent to which 
competition rules apply to the production of and trade in agricultural products, taking into account the objectives of the CAP 
set out in Article 39 TFEU.  
390 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_25_900/IP_25_900_EN.pdf    
391  Territorial  supply  constraints  are  limitations  imposed  by  certain  large  manufacturers  that  make  it  very  difficult  or 
impossible for retailers to buy products in one Member State and resell them in another. 
392 See https://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smet/meetings/index_en.htm  
393 See https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/news/stakeholder-dialogue-territorial-supply-constraints-2025-04-07_en  
394 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1274  
395 Case AT.40795 – Food delivery services. 

78 

 
 
the  two  companies  agreed:  (i)  not  to  poach  each  other's  employees;  (ii)  to  exchange  commercially 
sensitive information; and (iii) to allocate geographic markets. The infringements covered the EEA and 
lasted four years. This is the first decision where the Commission finds a cartel in the labour market and 
the first time it sanctions the anti-competitive use of a minority share in a competing business. Cartels of 
this type reduce  choice  for consumers  and business  partners, reduce opportunities for employees  and 
reduce incentives to compete and innovate. All the abovementioned practices were facilitated by Delivery 
Hero's minority shareholding in Glovo. Owning a stake in a competitor is not in itself illegal, but in this 
specific case it facilitated anti-competitive contacts between the two rival companies at several levels. It 
also enabled Delivery Hero to gain access to commercially sensitive information and exert influence over 
Glovo’s decision-making processes. This ultimately allowed the two companies to align their respective 
business strategies. This shows that horizontal cross-ownership between competitors may raise antitrust 
risks and should be handled carefully. 

Figure 12: Food delivery services 

Source: European Commission 

On 13 November 2025, the Commission initiated a formal investigation against Red Bull regarding a 
suspected abuse of dominance396. Red Bull is suspected of having developed an EEA-wide strategy to 
restrict  competition  from  energy  drinks  in  formats  over  250  ml  within  the  off-trade  channel  (like 
supermarkets, petrol station shops, wholesalers). This strategy is alleged to have specifically targeted the 
product range of its closest competitor. The Commission’s decision to open the investigation focused on 
the alleged implementation of this strategy in the Netherlands, where Red Bull appears to hold a dominant 
position,  by  engaging  in  two  suspected  anticompetitive  practices:  (i)  granting  monetary  and  non-
monetary incentives to its off-trade customers to stop selling (delist) or disadvantage competing energy 
drinks exceeding 250 ml; and (ii) misusing its position as category manager at off-trade customers so 
that energy drinks exceeding 250 ml are delisted or disadvantaged, for example, in terms of visibility 
incentives  to  retailers  to  stop  selling  competing  energy  drinks.  This  is  the  Commission's  first  formal 
investigation into a potential abuse relating to the misuse of a category management position by a supplier 
to limit or disadvantage competing products. 

396 Case AT.40819 – Red Bull. 

79 

 
 
 
In March 2025, the Commission carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of companies active 
in  the  non-alcoholic  drinks  sector and  sent  out  a formal  request  for information to  a company  in the 
personal care sector397.  

On  15  July  2025,  the  Commission  issued  its  first  opinion  on  the  compatibility  of  a  sustainability 
agreement with competition rules for the agricultural sector398. Wine producers in the French Occitanie 
region,  meeting  the  organic  and  Haute  Valeur  Environnementale  (HVE)  standards,  requested  the 
Commission to provide an opinion on the compatibility of the agreement with Article 210a of the CMO 
Regulation. The agreement concerns the setting of indicative (orientation) prices for wine produced in 
accordance  with  organic  and  HVE  standards  within  the  French  Occitanie  region.  The  agreement  is 
concluded between producers of wine meeting these standards and their respective buyers and is designed 
to guide bulk wine transactions. In the prevailing situation of a significant oversupply in the French wine 
sector, a lack of awareness  among  consumers of the cost  of sustainable production, and an increased 
consumer  price  sensitivity  linked  to  inflation,  many  producers  of  organic  and  HVE  wine  are  less 
profitable than conventional wine producers and might either switch to conventional production or exit 
wine production altogether. The agreement is in place for two years. The orientation prices are to be set 
at a level covering production costs in accordance with one of the two relevant sustainability standards, 
in addition to a profit margin of up to 20% of such costs. The Commission issued a positive opinion on 
the agreement. 

6.2.3.  Merger control in the agri-food sector  

On 17 July 2025, the Commission approved the acquisition of Boissons Heintz by Munhowen, subject to 
conditions399. The case was referred to the Commission by the Luxembourgish competition authority in 
accordance with Article 22 EUMR. Munhowen and Boissons Heintz are the two largest wholesalers of 
beverages  in  Luxembourg  for  hotels,  cafes  and  restaurants  (HoReCas).  In  addition,  Munhowen  is 
controlled  by  Brasserie  Nationale,  which  produces  beer  and  bottled  water  in  Luxembourg.  The 
Commission found that the transaction would have granted the combined entity a significant competitive 
advantage  over  smaller  wholesalers,  leaving  HoReCas  with  insufficient  alternative  wholesalers.  In 
addition,  the  Commission  found  that  the  combined  entity  could  have  favoured  the  sale  of  Brasserie 
Nationale's mineral water, to the detriment of competing local and international brands, and ultimately 
harming consumers. To alleviate these concerns, Munhowen offered to divest the majority of Boissons 
Heintz’s activities within the HoReCa channel. These commitments removed the serious doubts of the 
Commission and will enable the entry of a new independent player on the market. 

On 11 August 2025, the Commission approved the takeover of JustEat Takeaway, an online food delivery 
platform, by Naspers, subject to conditions400. The acquirer already held a minority shareholding in a 
competing food delivery platform and the Commission’s investigation therefore focused on the structural 
link created by the transaction. The Commission’s findings highlighted the risks of increased likelihood 
of coordination in an industry with recent antitrust issues (see above Part II, section 6.2.2). The remedies 
offered by the parties removed the Commission’s concerns and ensured continued competition in this 
growing and dynamically changing sector, while allowing Naspers to bring technical expertise and global 
scale to accelerate growth of Just Eat Takeaway. 

397 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_737  
398  Commission  Opinion  on  the  request  for  opinion  pursuant  to  Article  210a(6)  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1308/2013  by 
Vignerons Coopérateurs de France - Sustainability agreement in the wine sector in Occitanie, C(2025) 4863 final.  
399 Case M.11485 – Brasserie Nationale / Boissons Heintz.  
400 Case M.11936 – Naspers/ Just Eat Takeaway. 

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On 20 October 2025, the Commission unconditionally approved the acquisition of Nova Sea by Mowi401. 
Prior to this concentration, Mowi already held approximately 42.91% of Nova Sea’s issued share capital. 
Both companies are Norway-based farmers and suppliers of primary-processed Norway-farmed Atlantic 
salmon (NFAS). Mowi is also active in the supply of secondary processed salmon products in the EEA. 
The Commission’s unconditional clearance was based on the lack of serious doubts in the concerned 
markets. In particular, in relation to the production and supply of primary-processed NFAS in the EEA 
the  parties’  combined  market  share  remained  moderate  (below  30%),  with  a  number  of  credible 
alternative suppliers remaining post-transaction.  

On  22  October  2025,  the  Commission  approved  the  acquisition  of  Milcobel  by  FrieslandCampina, 
unconditionally402. Both companies are dairy cooperatives operating across the dairy supply chain. The 
transaction  would  result  in  horizontally  affected  markets  in  Belgium  and/or  in  the  Netherlands, 
specifically concerning the procurement of raw milk, supply of hard/semi-hard cheese, of low-moisture 
mozzarella, of bulk butter, of bulk cream and of whole milk powder. It would also result in vertical links 
in  the  supply  of  hard/semi-hard  cheese  in  Belgium  as  Milcobel  is  also  active  as  a  wholesaler  and  in 
conglomerate  links  between  Belgian  Gouda  and  the  Dutch  Gouda  in  the  modern  retail  channel  in 
Belgium. The results of the Commission's investigation confirmed, however, that the transaction would 
not raise serious doubts regarding its compatibility with the internal market. In all the markets, market 
participants confirmed the presence of sufficient and credible alternatives to the parties. 

On 8 December 2025, the Commission unconditionally approved the acquisition by Mars of Kellanova 
(formerly  Kellogg  Company)  following  an  in-depth  investigation403.  Both  companies  are  global 
manufacturers and suppliers of popular food brands. The Commission investigated whether by enlarging 
its  product  portfolio  with  the  addition  of  Kellanova's  very  popular  brands,  the  merged  entity  could 
increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis retailers, and as a result, the merged entity could be in a position 
to use this increased leverage to, for example, extract higher prices during negotiations, which in turn 
would lead to higher prices for consumers. The Commission found that whilst Mars and Kellanova have 
market power in individual product categories and engage in linked negotiations with retailers across 
their product portfolios, the acquisition would not significantly increase the merged entity’s bargaining 
power to the detriment of retailers or consumers across EEA countries.  

On  18  December  2025,  the  Commission  approved  the  acquisition  of  Délifrance  by  Vandemoortele, 
subject  to  conditions404.  Both  companies  are  European  manufacturers  of  frozen  bakery  goods.  The 
transaction raised competition concerns in relation to the supply of frozen laminated dough products to 
the retail and foodservice channel in France, as well as the supply of frozen laminated dough products to 
the retail channel in Italy. To address the Commission’s concerns, the companies offered to divest two 
Délifrance production sites dedicated to the production and supply of frozen laminated dough products - 
one located in Avignon (South-East of France), and one located in Béthune (North of France). 

6.2.4.  State aid enforcement in the agriculture and fisheries sectors 

State aid to promote the economic development of the agriculture and fisheries sectors is embedded into 
the broader framework of the CAP and Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The main agricultural (ABER 
and agriculture, forestry and rural development Guidelines405) and fisheries (FIBER and fisheries and 

401 Case M.11914 – Mowi / Nova Sea. 
402 Case M.11939 – FrieslandCampina / Milcobel. 
403 Case M.11753 – Mars / Kellanova. 
404 Case M.11974 – Vandemoortele / Delifrance. 
405 Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas, OJ C 485, 21.12.2022, p. 1. 

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aquaculture Guidelines406) State aid rules entered into force in 2023, and the Commission continued to 
enforce them throughout 2025. Supporting the green transition and climate adaptation in these sectors 
continued to be a key priority, promoting innovation and ensuring their long-term sustainability.  

In 2025, Member States adopted 707 schemes under the sectorial block exemption regulations (641 under 
the ABER, and 66 under the FIBER), and the Commission approved 91 aid measures in these sectors out 
of which 76 under the agriculture, forestry and rural development Guidelines, 13 under the fisheries and 
aquaculture Guidelines, one under both Guidelines, and one directly on the basis of Article 107(3) TFEU.  

In  agriculture,  the  Commission  approved  several  initiatives  to  decarbonise  agriculture,  enhance 
biodiversity,  and foster innovation. State aid  was approved to  support bio-resource valorisation407; to 
support the construction of a cutting-edge hydroponic plant, creating jobs and supporting the transition 
of lignite-dependent  regions408; and to  foster climate adaptation,  encouraging insurance companies to 
offer  crop  insurance  against  drought  and  long  rainy  periods409.  Financial  support  aiming  at  reducing 
pesticide and fertiliser use in vulnerable areas, addressing water quality degradation was also approved 
by the Commission410. Exceptional financial support to farmers to prevent the spread of diseases and the 
development  of  biosecurity  measures411  also  remained  key  in  2025.  Furthermore,  the  Commission 
approved  aid  focused  on  strengthening  supply  chains412,  promotion  of  high-quality  products  and 
increasing of consumers awareness413 as a way of supporting SMEs. 

In  fisheries,  the  Commission  approved  several  schemes  to  balance  fishing  capacity  with  ecological 
sustainability414  and  support  generational  renewal415.  Support  measures  were  approved  to  ease  the 
permanent cessation of fishing activities416 or adapt the existing fleet to extend fishing zones safely417 in 
outermost regions. Aid was also approved to finance new fish processing and storage facility aiming at 
improving  the  efficiency,  including  energy  efficiency  and  reduce  the  environmental  impact  of  fish 
farming418.    

6.2.5.  State aid enforcement in the forestry sector 

In  2025,  State  aid  was  approved  to  support  forest  holders  in  adopting  practices  beyond  standard 
management to improve sustainability419. Schemes were also approved to convert agricultural land into 
forests420. 

On 24 February 2025, following a complaint, the Commission initiated a formal investigation procedure 
to  assess  whether  Croatia  had  granted  aid  to  Hrvatske  Šume  d.o.o.  (‘HŠ’)  -  the  100%  State-owned 
company  managing  the  country’s  public  forests  and  to  a  number  of  wood  processing  companies  in 

406 Guidelines for State aid in the fishery and aquaculture sector, OJ C 107, 23.3.2023, p. 1.  
407 Case SA.118314 – Estonia – RRF – Investment support for bio-resource valorisation. 
408 Case SA.118977 – Greece – Wonderplant. 
409 Case SA.114323 – Lithuania – Partial refinancing of compensation indemnities for drought and long rainy periods. 
410 Case SA.116275 – France – Compensatory aid for water protection in Hauts-de-France. 
411 Case SA.119263 – Estonia – Exceptional investment support for foot-and-mouth disease prevention. 
412 Case SA.116125 – Italy – Criteria for the implementation of District Contracts and related aid measures. 
413 Case SA.118136 – Slovenia – Promotion of agricultural products in the cereals sector. 
414 Case SA.117742 – The Netherlands – Shrimp fishery cessation scheme. 
415 Case SA.120169 – Germany – Crab and flatfish fishery cessation scheme. 
416 Case SA.118191 – Croatia – Permanent cessation of fishing activities. 
417 Case SA.116287 – Spain (Canary Islands) – Investments in safety improvement equipment for small-scale fishing vessels. 
418 Case SA.114880 – Malta – State aid for the strengthening of the Bluefin tuna industry in Malta. 
419 Case SA.117255 – Italy (Abruzzo) – Payment for forest-environment and climate commitments. 
420 Case SA.118866 – Denmark – Aid for afforestation. 

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Croatia421. The investigation focuses on: (i) an alleged lack of remuneration by HŠ to the Croatian State 
for the exclusive rights to manage and commercially exploit the Croatian public forest; and (ii) the alleged 
failure to apply market-conform prices in relation to the rates offered by HŠ to certain Croatian wood 
processing companies which have entered into a Framework and Annual Log Purchase Agreement with 
HŠ or have been granted ad hoc annual purchase contracts. The investigation is ongoing.  

7. 

PHARMACEUTICAL & HEALTH SERVICES  

7.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors 

Patient  access  to  innovative  and  affordable  medicines  is  one  of  the  pillars  of  the  Commission’s 
Pharmaceutical  Strategy  for  Europe422.  To  support  these  objectives,  the  Commission  and  the  NCAs 
maintained the robust enforcement  of  EU competition  rules  across  the pharmaceutical and healthcare 
sectors throughout 2025. Competition enforcement serves as an important complement to the regulatory 
framework  in  these  sectors423:  it  fosters  dynamic  competition  which  incentivises  the  development  of 
more innovative medicines and ensures effective price competition which contributes to more affordable 
and accessible medicines and treatments. 

7.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

7.2.1.  Guidance on the application of State aid rules to public support for critical medicines in 
the context of the proposed Critical Medicines Act (CMA) 

On 11 March 2025, DG Competition published a guidance on the application of State aid rules424 in the 
context of the CMA proposal425. The purpose of this guidance paper is to clarify how ‘Strategic Projects’ 
as defined in the CMA proposal (support projects regarding the security of supply for critical medicines) 
can receive financial support from Member States in compliance with State aid rules. 

The guidance particularly focuses on State aid rules for SGEIs which enable Member States to coordinate 
to tackle supply chain vulnerabilities of critical medicines by entrusting operators to reserve capacity, 
produce, or stockpile, critical medicines or key ingredients needed to produce these critical medicines, 
under certain conditions. 

In particular, the guidance  states that the SGEI rules provide flexibility  as: (i) market  failures  can be 
addressed  at  the level  of one or more Member States or at  EU level;  (ii) they allow the financing of 
Strategic Projects but also of the operating deficit (if any) of producing critical medicines; and (iii) they 
do  not  require  a  notification  to  the  Commission  below  EUR  15  million/year  (under  the  2012  SGEI 
Decision) which should cover most of the projects envisaged by the sector. 

421 Case SA.63845 – Croatia – Complaint about State aid to certain Croatian wood companies. 
422  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe, COM (2020) 761 final. 
423 On 26 April 2023 the Commission adopted a proposal for a new Directive and a new Regulation, which revise and replace 
the  existing  general  pharmaceutical 
(‘pharma  package’);  see  https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-
products/pharmaceutical-strategy-europe/reform-eu-pharmaceutical-legislation_en  On 11 December 2025, the Council and 
the European Parliament reached a provisional agreement on a revised version of the ‘pharma package’, which now needs to 
be endorsed by both the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, before being formally adopted and 
entering into force upon publication in the EU’s Official Journal. 
424 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a51c37be-2f9f-4d92-bdf5-ae38bfa91908_en  
425  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  laying  a  framework  for  strengthening  the 
availability and security of supply of critical medicinal products as well as the availability of, and accessibility of, medicinal 
products of common interest, and amending Regulation 2024/795, COM(2025) 102 final, 2025/102 (COD), 11.3.2025. 

legislation 

83 

 
 
With the  new SGEI Decision adopted on 16  December 2025 (see below  Part  II, section 8.2.1.1),  the 
Commission  clarified  that  measures  facilitating  the  support  of  projects  for  the  security  of  supply  of 
critical medicines can fall within the scope of the SGEI Decision and be exempted from prior notification 
to the Commission. Furthermore, the applicable ceiling has been increased from EUR 15 million to EUR 
20 million/year and can now be multiplied by the number of Member State entrusting jointly an operator 
in case of a joint entrustment. 

7.2.2.  Antitrust enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector 

Building on its enforcement activities in 2024, including the decision to impose a fine of EUR 462.6 
million on Teva426 and to accept binding commitments proposed by Vifor427, the Commission continued 
to investigate the pharmaceutical sector throughout 2025. Following the inspections carried out in 2021 
and  the  opening  of  a  formal  proceedings  in  March  2024,  the  Commission  pursued  its  in-depth 
investigation into possible anticompetitive conduct by Zoetis over a novel pain medicine for dogs428. The 
Commission is concerned that Zoetis may have engaged in exclusionary behaviour by terminating the 
development  of  a  late-stage  pipeline  product  and  refusing  to  transfer  it  to  a  third  party  which  had 
exclusive commercialisation rights. 

Moreover,  on  4  July  2025,  the  Commission  fined  Alchem  International  Pvt.  Ltd.  and  its  subsidiary 
Alchem International (H.K.) Limited (together Alchem) EUR 489 000 for breaching EU antitrust rules429. 
The  decision  follows  an  earlier  settlement  decision  adopted  in  October  2023  against  six  other 
undertakings for participating in the same cartel. Alchem decided not to settle the case and, as a result, 
the Commission's investigation against Alchem continued under the standard cartel procedure. For more 
than 12 years, from 2005 to 2018, Alchem and the other cartel participants, coordinated and agreed to fix 
the  minimum  sales  price  of  a  pharmaceutical  ingredient  (N-Butylbromide  Scopolamine/  Hyoscine  - 
SNBB)  necessary  to  produce  abdominal  antispasmodic  drugs  to  their  customers  (that  is  to  say, 
distributors  and  generic  drug  manufacturers)  and  to  allocate  quotas.  In  addition,  Alchem  exchanged 
commercially sensitive information. 

Furthermore,  following  inspections  in  the  medical  devices  sector430,  the  Commission  continued  its 
preliminary investigation in the sector in 2025. Finally, in September and October 2025, the Commission 
carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of a company active in the vaccines sector431. The 
Commission holds concerns that the inspected company may have violated the EU antitrust rules through 
alleged exclusionary practices and is examining whether those amount to anticompetitive disparagement. 

On 23 October 2025, the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal lodged by Teva and Cephalon (Cephalon 
pay-for-delay case) against the General Court judgment upholding a Commission decision fining those 
companies  for  entering  into  an  anticompetitive  pay-for-delay  agreement  (see  above  Part  I,  section 
1.4.1.1). 

7.2.3.  Merger control in the pharmaceutical sector 

Throughout 2025, the Commission continued to ensure that concentrations in the pharmaceutical sector 
did  not  result  in  higher  prices  for  patients,  fewer  treatment  options,  or  reduced  innovation.  The 
Commission reviewed several transactions covering different aspects of healthcare. Most were cleared 

426 Case AT.40588 – Teva Copaxone. 
427 Case AT.40577 – Vifor (IV iron products). 
428 Case AT.40734 – Zoetis-Librela. 
429 Case AT.40636 – SNBB. 
430 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4517 
431 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2255  

84 

 
 
under the simplified procedure, while three transactions were unconditionally cleared following a Phase 
I market investigation. 

On  10  January  2025,  the  Commission  unconditionally  approved  Uriach  as  purchaser  of  Cooper’s 
Bebegel divestment business432. This decision follows the Commission’s earlier approval of Cooper’s 
acquisition of Viatris’s European over-the-counter business in 2024, subject to conditions. The conditions 
included the divestment of Viatris’s infant laxative medicine (Bebegel) in Portugal, as well as of Viatris’s 
earwax removal product (Otowaxol) in Germany. The Commission had approved the proposed purchaser 
of the Otowaxol divestment business in December 2024.  

Also  in  February  2025,  the  Commission  unconditionally  approved  the  acquisition  of  IFF’s  Pharma 
Solutions business by Roquette433. The two companies’ activities overlapped in the production of several 
pharmaceutical excipients, but the results of the Commission’s market investigation showed that they 
were not close competitors on those markets and that there are sufficient alternative suppliers of these 
excipients.  

On 9 October 2025, the Commission unconditionally approved Intuitive’s acquisition of AB Medica’s 
distribution  activities  for  Intuitive’s  products  in  Italy,  Malta,  San  Marino,  Slovenia,  Spain  and 
Portugal434.  Intuitive  is  a  supplier  of  robotic  assisted  surgery  equipment  for  minimally  invasive 
procedures. The Commission  investigated whether the transaction might  lead to  potential  foreclosure 
concerns. It concluded that the acquisition would not significantly alter the prevailing market dynamics, 
given that AB Medica was already the sole distributor of Intuitive’s products in the relevant countries 
and did not distribute any competing products.  

Finally, the Commission unconditionally approved Rhône Capital’s acquisition of Invacare and DHG 
on 5 December 2025435. Both Invacare and DHG supply medical equipment for patients with reduced 
mobility, such as mattresses and cushions for pressure ulcer prevention, healthcare beds, and patient lifts. 
Following its market investigation, the Commission concluded that the transaction was unlikely to harm 
competition, as the market share increments were limited, and the parties were not close competitors in 
the few affected markets.  

In parallel, the Commission continued to further monitor mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical 
sector to identify cases that might be suitable for referral by Member States to the Commission under 
Article  22  EUMR.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  sent  several  information  requests  to  companies 
involved  in  a  number  of  transactions,  inquiring  about  jurisdictional  aspects  including  the  status  and 
outcome of reviews in other jurisdictions.  

7.2.4.  State aid enforcement in the health sector 

On  22  July  2025,  the  Commission  adopted  a  State  aid  decision  regarding  the  IPCEI  Tech4Cure436 
authorising five Member States (France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and Slovenia) to provide up to EUR 
403 million of State aide to ten companies (direct participants) and expected to unlock an additional EUR 
826 million in private investments.  

This  IPCEI creates  a broader  IPCEI ecosystem  involving  18 associated and 45 indirect  partners. The 
IPCEI Tech4Cure enables cross-border research and innovation and the first industrial deployment of 

432 Case M.11383 – Cooper / Viatris (European OTC Business). 
433 Case M.11592 – Roquette / IFF Pharma Solutions Business. 
434 Case M.11900 – Intuitive / AB Medica (Distribution Activities of Intuitive Products). 
435 Case M.12089 – Rhône Capital / Invacare / DHG. 
436 Cases SA.113212 – France; SA.117899 – Hungary; SA.117859 – Italy; SA.117793 – Slovakia; SA.117849 – Slovenia – 
Important Project of Common European Interest – Innovative medical devices and support software (IPCEI Tech4Cure). 

85 

 
 
new generation medical devices with advanced and novel digital/AI solutions to support the concept of 
predictive, preventive, and personalised medicine (so-called 3P medicine). It served as a pilot for the 
IPCEI Design Support Hub.  

Figure 13: IPCEI Tech4Cure 

Source: European Commission 

On 9 December 2025, the Commission approved, under the RAG, EUR 47 million German State aid for 
Vetter Pharma’s new aseptic filling plant in the Saarland437. The project is expected to create at least 
1200  direct  jobs,  as  well  as  further  indirect  jobs.  Saarland  is  eligible  for  regional  aid  under  Article 
107(3)(c) TFEU. 

Furthermore, the Commission adopted a decision on 12 September 2025 finding that the purchase price 
payments made by the German Federal Ministry of Health  to the company Fiege for the provision of 
protection masks do not constitute State aid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU438. 

On 11 September 2025, the Commission initiated an in-depth investigation to assess whether the transfer 
of a number of assets from the municipality of Ljubljana to Javni Zavod Lekarna Ljubljana - a public 
pharmacy set up by the municipality of Ljubljana - is compatible with EU State aid rules439. In a 2020 
decision,  the  Commission  had  originally  concluded  that  those  measures  constituted  either  no  aid  or 
existing aid. However, the General Court partially annulled that decision in April 2022. The Court of 
Justice  subsequently  upheld  the  General  Court’s  findings  in  September  2024440,  ruling  that  the 
Commission should have opened an in-depth investigation in relation to the transfer of assets. 

8. 

TRANSPORT, POST, HOUSING & OTHER SERVICES 

8.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors 

Transport is a crucial sector underpinning the economy and a prerequisite for the functioning of the Single 
Market. Based on the latest available data441, the transport and storage services sectors (including postal 
and courier) accounted for approximately 4.8 % of the EU’s total Gross Value Added (GVA) in 2023. 

437 Case SA.118989 – Germany – LIP – Regional aid for large investment project - Vetter Pharma. 
438 Case SA.104368 – Germany – Alleged aid in the context of the provision of protection masks for German Federal Ministry 
of Health.  
439 Case SA.43546 – Slovenia – Alleged State aid to Lekarna Ljubljana.  
440  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  5  September  2024  in  Case  C-447/22  P,  Slovenia  v  Flašker  and  Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:678. 
441 See EU Transport in figures, statistical pocketpook 2025, European Commission. 

86 

 
 
 
These sectors employed around 10.7 million persons, representing about 5.4 % of the total workforce. 

An  efficient  and  sustainable  European  transport  system  is  critical  to  a  clean,  just  and  competitive 
transition  in  the  EU.  However,  the  transport  sector  continues  to  face  massive  investment  needs,  in 
particular  to  accelerate  its  decarbonisation  and  digitisation,  to  cope  with  a  growing  demand  from 
passengers and shippers, to foster connectivity, and drive economic growth. Most transport modes face 
various major barriers to entry, which continue to hinder the actual liberalisation and efficiency of the 
sector. 

Housing  affordability  has  become  a  critical  issue  in  many  Member  States,  impacting  diverse 
demographic  groups.  The  issue  is  not  confined  to  low-income  groups,  it  increasingly  affects  a  wider 
section of society including lower middle-class households, single parents, larger families, and those in 
precarious employment. With house prices rising by more than 50% on average, and rents by more than 
20% since 2010442, millions of Europeans are struggling to access affordable housing. By stifling labour 
mobility,  access  to  education,  and  family  formation,  the  housing  crisis  undermines  both  the 
competitiveness of the EU economy and social cohesion.   

8.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

8.2.1.  State aid control in the housing sector 

8.2.1.1. New SGEI Decision adopted  

In 2025, the Commission launched the revision of the SGEI Decision443 as part of a set of initiatives to 
address housing affordability issues in the EU. The main objective of the revision was to grant Member 
States greater flexibility when financing affordable housing projects. 

The revision of the SGEI Decision included several consultations of Member States and stakeholders. A 
call for evidence and a public consultation regarding the main principles of the revision were conducted 
between 5 June and 31 July 2025. This was followed by a second public consultation on the draft revised 
text, which took place between 3 October and 4 November 2025. A reality check to gather input from 
stakeholders on the SGEI rules, in particular on social and affordable housing, was convened on 10 July 
2025. Furthermore, on 13 November 2025, Executive Vice-President Ribera hosted an implementation 
dialogue to gather critical feedback on the effective implementation of the SGEI rules444. 

On  16  December  2025,  the  Commission  adopted  a  new  SGEI  Decision445,  introducing  new  rules  for 
affordable  housing  SGEIs  with  the  aim  to:  (i)  prevent  undue  distortion  of  competition  in  the  private 
housing sector; (ii) avoid a detrimental effect on social housing; and (iii) bring sufficient legal certainty 
to Member States and public authorities, while at the same time allowing them to tailor their housing 
measures to their specific national and local housing context.  

Besides housing-related changes, the revision included sectoral changes for critical medicines (see above 

https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/sgei_en#targeted-revision-of-the-sgei-rules-for-

442 See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-publications/housing-2025#housing-cost   
443 Commission Decision of 20 December on the application of Article 106(2) TFEU to State aid in the form of public service 
compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of Services of General Economic Interest, OJ L7, 
11.01.2012, p. 3-10. 
444 
See: 
affordable-housing  
445 Commission Decision (EU) 2025/2630 of 16 December 2025 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest and repealing Decision 2012/21/EU, OJ L, 2025/2630, 
19.12.2025; 
https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/0548ab89-a029-4d12-ac6e-
a1d503093ba6_en?filename=2025_SGEI_revised_decision_Q%26A.pdf  

also: 

see 

87 

 
 
Part II, section 7.2.1), the aviation446 and maritime447 sectors, as well as horizontal changes448 updating 
and simplifying the SGEI Decision. 

8.2.1.2. State aid enforcement  

The  Commission  enforces  State  aid  rules  in  the housing  sector  to  prevent  distortions  of  competition, 
ensuring that State support does not excessively favour certain market players and that private investment 
is not deterred, while taking into account the particular characteristics of the sector in Member States.  

On 17 March 2025, the Commission approved, based on Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, a Czech scheme aiming 
at providing subordinated loans for affordable rental housing and amendment to an existing aid scheme 
for  the  construction,  reconstruction,  and  acquisition  of  affordable  rental  flats449.  Funding  for  both 
schemes in the State budget is made available through the RRF. 

8.2.2.  State aid control in the aviation sector 

8.2.2.1. Revision of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines ongoing 

Air transport is one of the most rapidly increasing sources of greenhouse gas emissions, placing the sector 
under  increasing  pressure  to  reduce  its  carbon  footprint.  The  2014  Aviation  Guidelines450  provide 
guidance on the notion of aid in the aviation sector and lay out the conditions under which State aid to 
airports and airlines can be deemed compatible with the internal market. The aviation sector may also 
benefit from support under the CEEAG.  

The Fitness Check conducted in 2019/2020451 identified a need to amend the Aviation Guidelines in the 
medium term to take account of the Green Deal objectives and address the issue of regional airports that 
remained loss making at the end of the transitional period452. In 2024, at a time when the aviation sector 
had sufficiently recovered from the COVID-19 pandemic, DG Competition initiated the revision of the 
Guidelines.  To  ensure  that  the  Guidelines  remain  fit  for  the  future,  the  Commission  has  undertaken 
extensive public and stakeholder consultations. A call for evidence was held between 27 August and 8 
October  2024,  followed  by  a  public  consultation  (with  a  questionnaire  open  for  input)  between  11 
December 2024 and 5 March 2025. DG Competition also commissioned an external study on the aviation 
sector. 

The  revision  is  focusing  on  a  number  of  key  policy  questions  such  as:  (i)  whether  operating  aid  for 
regional airports should be allowed beyond the existing 2027 transitional period and, if so, under what 
conditions; (ii) whether start-up aid for airlines launching new routes is still needed; (iii) considering that 

446 The airport threshold is increased from 200 000 to 500 000 passengers per year. In addition, the new SGEI Decision covers 
not only air links to islands but also mainland air links. 
447 The new SGEI Decision specifies an annual freight maritime threshold of 75 000 linear metres, while the previous SGEI 
Decision did not include a specific threshold for maritime freight. The new SGEI Decision also raises the threshold for port 
SGEIs from 300 000 to 400 000 passengers and covers all outermost region ports. 
448 The changes include: (i) a higher compensation cap; (ii) a reduction in the frequency of the overcompensation checks (with 
full exemption in some cases); (iii) the removal of the obligation to include a reference to the SGEI Decision in the entrustment 
act(s); (iv) the removal of the reporting obligation (with instead the enhancement of transparency provisions); (v) an increased 
threshold for joint entrustments by several Member States; and, (vi) more flexible rules for non-profit entities. 
449 Case SA.115811 – Czechia – Affordable housing - RRF - Subordinated loans ('NDB programme') and Amendment to the 
aid scheme SA.106249 for the construction, reconstruction and acquisition of affordable rental flats. 
450 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJ C 99, 4 April 2014, p.3. 
451 Commission Staff Working Document Fitness Check of the 2012 State aid Modernisation Package, Railway Guidelines 
and Short-term export credit insurance (SWD/2020/0257 final). 
452 The Aviation Guidelines were amended in 2023 to prolong the 10-year transitional period for operating aid to all regional 
airports by a further 3 years, from 2024 (when it was originally due to expire) until 2027, to cater for the impact of the COVID-
19 pandemic. 

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the GBER and the CEEAG already allow State aid for greening initiatives in the aviation sector, whether 
there  are  any  gaps  that  the  new  Aviation  Guidelines  should  fill;  and  (iv)  whether  the  beneficiaries’ 
performance as regards decarbonisation should be taken into account when granting aid, for example by 
allowing higher aid intensities to greener undertakings. 

The work on the Aviation Guidelines is ongoing. In addition, certain changes to aviation-specific rules 
have been introduced in the new SGEI Decision adopted on 16 December 2025 (see above Part II, section 
8.2.1.1). 

8.2.2.2. State aid enforcement 

On  21  February  2025,  the  Commission  adopted  a  decision  regarding  the  public  financing  granted  to 
Târgu Mureş Airport453. The Commission concluded that the public financing of operating costs in the 
periods 2007-2009, 2011-2014 and 2014-2019, as well as funding for the purchase of ground handling 
equipment  in  2011,  constituted  compatible  aid.  The  Commission  also  found  that  the  airport  charges 
applied to airlines operating at that airport between 2013 and 2019 did not constitute aid.  

In April 2025 the Commission approved around EUR 321 million  of restructuring aid to support the 
return to viability of German leisure airline, Condor454. This followed the General Court’s annulment of 
a previous 2021 approval, on the grounds of a lack of reasoning regarding the remuneration of the aid 
instruments455. In particular, the Court held that the Commission should have assessed whether Germany 
received sufficient upsides from debt write-offs after former shareholders had contributed to sharing the 
burden of the restructuring. Following an in-depth investigation initiated in July 2024456, the Commission 
concluded that Condor and its new private investor, Attestor, had significantly contributed to covering 
the cost of restructuring, funding over 70% of the total. Moreover, as former shareholders had seen the 
value of their investment reduced to zero, full burden-sharing was deemed to have been achieved, and 
the aid had not triggered any moral hazard issues. The investigation confirmed that, in those specific 
circumstances, Germany had received adequate remuneration linked to Condor’s future valuation, and 
that appropriate safeguards to limit distortions of competition in the internal market accompanied the aid.  

On  23  December  2025,  the  Commission  concluded  its  formal  investigation  and  adopted  a  decision 
approving - under conditions - the modification of the French restructuring plan and additional aid of 
EUR 167.8 million to Corsair, after having noted that the company reimbursed the EUR 32.4 million in 
previous additional aid, including interest457. Earlier, on 11 April 2025, the Commission had extended its 
formal  investigation  (initially  opened  in  February  2024)  into  France’s  proposed  amendments  to  the 
restructuring plan approved by the Commission in December 2020 in favour of French airline Corsair. 
This  extension  concerned  new  factual  elements,  specifically  the  earlier  grant  of  EUR  32.4  million  in 
additional  State  aid  to  Corsair  between  April  2021  and  April  2022,  provided  through  three  separate 
schemes.  The  Commission  also  raised  concerns  regarding  possible  breaches  by  Corsair  of  the 
commitments provided by France in 2020, particularly concerning the limitation of its aircraft fleet size. 
The extension of the investigation enabled the Commission to undertake a thorough assessment of the 
compatibility of these new elements with the EU state aid rules.  

453 Case SA.33769 – Romania – Aid to Târgu Mureş Airport.  
454 Case SA.63203 – Germany – Restructuring aid for Condor.  
455 Judgment of the General Court of 8 May 2024 in Case T-28/22, Condor, ECLI:EU:T:2024:301 (under appeal). 
456 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4042  
457 Case SA.109662 – France - Modification de l’aide et du plan de restructuration de Corsair (SA.58463 (2020/N) Aide à la 
restructuration de Corsair). 

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On 22 September 2025, the Commission adopted a decision regarding the agreements between Ryanair 
and  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry  (CCI)  of  Carcassonne-Limoux-Castelnaudary458,  the 
manager of Carcassonne airport until 2011, as well as the government funding provided to the CCI. The 
Commission concluded that the majority of the contracts signed between CCI and Ryanair conferred an 
advantage on the airline, constituting incompatible State aid. The total advantage obtained by Ryanair 
was quantified at EUR 1.8 million. 

In  2025,  the  EU  courts  adopted  several  relevant  judgments  concerning  Commission  decisions  in  the 
aviation sector (see above, Part I, section 3.3.4). 

8.2.3.  Antitrust enforcement in the aviation sector 

On  7  August  2024,  the  Commission  initiated  proceedings  to  investigate  a  potential  restriction  of 
competition by the A++ joint venture between Lufthansa, United and Air Canada on transatlantic routes 
to/from  several  EEA  airports459.  On  the  same  day,  the  Commission  sent  a  statement  of  objections to 
Lufthansa  where  it  preliminarily  concluded  that  interim  measures  might  be  required  to  ensure  the 
effectiveness  of any final  decision taken by the Commission in the future.  On 27 February 2025, the 
Commission decided to close the interim measures proceedings against Lufthansa. The Commission’s 
investigation in the main proceedings is ongoing. 

8.2.4.  State aid enforcement in the maritime transport sector 

The maritime transport sector is of key importance for both intra-EU and global trade. Its competitiveness 
is fundamental for the functioning of the Single Market, largely due to the spill-over effects generated 
across other sectors in the globally integrated European maritime ecosystem.  

On  7  May  2025,  the  Commission  approved  the  reintroduction  of  the  Italian  International  Registry 
scheme,  in  favour  of  seafarer  and  maritime  transport  companies460.  The  scheme  includes  several  aid 
measures  and  aims  to  encourage  the  flagging  or  re-flagging  to  Member  States’  registers  and  the 
consolidation of the maritime cluster, while maintaining an overall competitive fleet on world markets. 
The scheme will apply until the end of 2033.  

On 20 October 2025, the Commission approved the prolongation of the Swedish seafarer scheme, given 
its compatibility with the internal market under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and the Maritime Guidelines461. 
The scheme, which will apply from 1 January 2026 until 31 December 2028, provides tax benefits in 
favour of seafarers active in the maritime transport sector. 

Furthermore, on 10 November 2025, the Commission approved a prolongation of the Estonian tonnage 
tax and seafarer schemes under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and the Maritime Guidelines462. The schemes, 
which  will  apply  from  1  July  2026  until  30  June  2032,  provide  tax  benefits  in  favour  of  shipping 
companies and seafarers active in the maritime transport sector.  

8.2.5.  Merger control in the maritime sector  

In 2025, the Commission reviewed several cases concerning services incidental to water transportation. 
These  investigations  included  cargo  handling  terminals463,  cruise  terminal  development  and 

458 Case SA.33962 – France — Mesures en faveur de la Chambre de commerce et d’industrie de Carcassonne, Aéroport de 
Carcassonne, de Ryanair DAC et d’Airport Marketing Services. 
459 Case AT.40940 – A++ transatlantic joint venture. 
460 Case SA.111368 – Italy – Italian International Registry Scheme (reintroduction of SA.48260).  
461 Case SA.119573 – Sweden – Prolongation of aid scheme in favour of seafarers.  
462 Case SA.120534 – Estonia – Amendments to State aid in favour of maritime transport.  
463 Case M.12032 – BROOKFIELD / QATAR HOLDING / QUBE HOLDINGS / PATRICK TERMINALS. 

90 

 
 
management464, and ship repair facilities465. The Commission also reviewed a case concerning the port 
and logistics sector in Spain466. None of these cases raised competition concerns. They were assessed 
under the simplified merger control procedure allowing for a fast and streamlined approval process. The 
Commission also unconditionally cleared a merger between two companies active in the leasing of sea 
containers467. 

Moreover, on 10 December 2025, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into the proposed 
acquisition  of  a  container  terminal  in  the  port  of  Barcelona,  Spain  (Terminal  Catalunya)  by  two 
companies  including  MSC,  a  global  leader  in  container  shipping  services468.  The  Commission  has 
preliminary  concerns  that  the  transaction  may  lead  to  higher  prices  or  reduced  quality  of  container 
terminal services at the port of Barcelona. 

8.2.6.  Antitrust enforcement in the maritime sector 

On 9 July 2025, the Commission addressed a guidance letter to APM Terminals regarding an agreement 
between  port  operators  to  jointly  purchase  and  set  minimum  technical  standards  for  battery-electric 
straddle carriers, a type of container handling equipment469. Most European ports currently use diesel 
carriers,  and  operators  hesitate  to  switch  to  battery-electric  ones  due  to  higher  costs  and  a  lack  of 
interoperability. The agreement aims to lower the parties’ costs by pooling demand, providing suppliers 
with  reliable  demand  forecasts,  and  enhancing  the  interoperability  of  charging  equipment.  The 
Commission considered that the proposed agreement does not raise concerns under Article 101 TFEU 
provided in particular that: (i) operators can continue to purchase carriers independently; (ii) there is a 
limit to the volume that can be jointly purchased; and (iii) the exchange of sensitive information does not 
exceed what is objectively necessary. The Commission’s guidance is based on the information that the 
applicant  submitted  and  remains  valid  for  five  years  and  is  limited  to  the  territory  of  the  EEA.  This 
guidance  letter  is  one  of  the  first  issued  by  the  Commission  based  on  its  2022  Notice  on  Informal 
Guidance. 

8.2.7.  State aid control in the land and multimodal transport sector  

8.2.7.1 Work on State aid guidelines for land and multimodal transport and Transport 
Block-Exemption Regulation  

Throughout 2025, the Commission continued to work on the Land and Multimodal Transport Guidelines 
(LMTG)  and  the  Transport  Block  Exemption  Regulation  (TBER).  The  primary  objective  of  these 
initiatives is to provide a comprehensive rulebook for aid to sustainable transport. 

Through  the  TBER,  the  Commission  intends  to  exempt  certain  categories  of  aid  in  the  rail,  inland 
waterways and multimodal transport sector from the requirement of prior notification. This represents a 
major simplification, enabling Member States to provide aid rapidly, provided that the conditions limiting 
the distortions of competition in the Single Market are satisfied. The TBER will complement the LMTG, 
which  will  set  out  the  conditions  for  assessing  the  compatibility  with  the  Single  Market  of  aid  for 
sustainable land transport that does not qualify for block-exemption.  

The objectives of the LMTG and TBER are to:  (i) consolidate and streamline the Commission's case 
practice under Article 93 TFEU, for instance by covering all land transport modes that are less polluting 

464 Case M.11822 – RCL Cruises / MSC Cruises / NAHA JV. 
465 Case M.11896 – Carnival / RCCL / MSC / GBSY JV. 
466 Case M.11938 – APMC / BYC / Berge Infraestructuras y Servicios Logisticos.  
467 Case M.12043 – Stonepeak / Seaco.  
468 Case M.11811 – TIL / HUTCHISON PORTS / TERCAT. 
469 Case AT.40976 – APM Terminals.  

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than road-only transport and by introducing new categories of operating and investment aid; (ii) provide 
for more flexible rules for aid that directly contributes to the green and digital transitions to boost modal 
shift from road to more sustainable modes of transport; and (iii) introduce safeguards to support the entry 
and growth of new operators in the sustainable land transport market. 

The work on the LMTG and TBER derives from the conclusions of a Fitness Check470, which showed 
that  the  2008  Railway  Guidelines  no  longer  reflect  market  and  technological  developments  and  the 
current  EU  strategic  priorities.  In  December  2022,  the  Council  adopted  an  Enabling  Regulation 
authorising the Commission to adopt a new block exemption regulation for railway, inland waterway and 
intermodal transport471. The work on the new rules is substantiated by evidence from an Inception Impact 
Assessment472, a roadmap473, a call for evidence474 and a supporting  study475. It  also  incorporates the 
feedback from stakeholder consultations on a questionnaire476 and on the drafts LMTG and TBER477 ,as 
well as from a consultation of Member States on the revised draft TBER.  

8.2.7.2 State aid enforcement 

Throughout  2025,  the  Commission  continued  to  enforce  State  aid  rules  in  the  rail  and  intermodal 
transport sector. The Commission approved 19 aid measures for the coordination of transport478, out of 

470 Staff Working Document, Fitness Check of the 2012 State aid modernisation package, railways guidelines and short-term 
export credit insurance, SWD(2020) 258 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020SC0258. 
471 Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2586 of 19 December 2022, on the application of Articles 93, 107 and 108 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of State aid in the rail, IWW and multimodal transport sector, OJ 
L 338, 30.12.2022. 
472 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13154-Rail-transport-revision-of-State-aid-
guidelines_en  
473 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13153-Greener-land-transport-simplified-
state-aid-rules-New-Land-Transport-Enabling-Regulation-_en  
474 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14184-Block-exemption-regulation-on-the-
application-of-Articles-93-and-108-of-the-Treaty-to-State-aid-for-the-land-transport-sector_en  
475 Impact assessment support study for the review of the Community guidelines on State aid for railway undertakings, see 
https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/36a36ea6-3143-4fe8-8ead-c4e7fc424fc2_en   
476 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13154-Rail-transport-revision-of-State-aid-
guidelines/public-consultation_en   
477 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/public-consultations/2024-lmtg-and-tber_en  
478 Cases SA.115978 – Croatia – RRF – Aid scheme to support noise reduction measures for rail freight wagons; SA.116931 
–  Germany – Support for ERTMS and ATO in  the Stuttgart metropolitan region; SA.115472  – Slovakia – Investment aid 
scheme for the construction and modernisation of intermodal terminals and transhipment points; SA.18853 – Germany – DB 
REGIO  AG  -  Public  service  contract  Berlin-Brandenburg;  SA.116752  –  France  –  Aide  à  l’exploitation  d’un  service 
d’autoroute ferroviaire entre les terminaux de Cherbourg et de Mouguerre; SA.117936 – Italy – RRF –  Aid for digitalisation 
of freight transport in Italy; SA.117068 – Hungary - Amendment of the scheme on excise duty exemptions and refunds for fuel 
used in railway and inland waterway transportation (SA.104781); SA.21143 – Denmark – Public service contracts between 
the Danish Government and Danske Statsbaner; SA.117920 – France - Prolongation avec amendements d’un régime d’aides 
à l’exploitation de services de transport ferroviaire de marchandises par wagons isolés; SA.118317 – Slovakia – Slovakia 
Aid  scheme  for  the  acquisition  of  rail  freight  rolling  stock;  SA.119045  –  Poland  –  Amendment  to  SA.109124  -RRF  – 
Investment aid to intermodal transport facilities, equipment and rolling stocks; SA.118796 – Poland – Support scheme for the 
implementation  of  ERTMS  under  the  FEnIKS  programme;  SA.118718  –  Italy  –  Expansion  of  the  Terminal  of  Bologna 
Interporto;  SA.120392  –  Germany  –  Amendment  to  Guideline  for  the promotion  of  long-distance passenger  rail  services 
through  track  access  charges  reduction;  SA.117606  –  Sweden  –  Prolongation  and  amendments  to  the  scheme  on 
environmental  compensation  for  rail  freight  transport;  SA.120704  –  Germany  –  Prolongation  of  the  guidelines  on  the 
construction, extension, reactivation and replacement of railway sidings and related infrastructure;  SA.120620 – France – 
Mesures de soutien au secteur du transport ferroviaire de marchandises sur la période 2025-2030; SA.120977 – Austria – 
Prolongation of investment programme combined transport; SA.119775 – Slovakia – Operating aid scheme for single wagon 
load operations. 

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which 18 based on the 2008 State aid Railway Guidelines479 and one directly under Article 93 TFEU, 
encompassing  aid  for  rail  infrastructure  use,  aid  for  the  reduction  of  external  costs  or  aid  for 
interoperability,  the  latter  in  particular  to  support  the  deployment  of  the  European  Rail  Traffic 
Management System (ERTMS) as well as aid to support the renewal of freight rolling stock.  

In  addition,  on  6  October  2025,  the  Commission  adopted  a  decision  in  which  it  concluded  that  the 
reintroduction  by  Slovakia  of  a  State  aid  scheme  in  support  of  transports  by  inland  waterways  was 
compatible with the internal market based on Article 93 TFEU480. 

All these measures support the modal shift from road to rail or inland waterways as the safer and more 
environmentally friendly transport modes, in line with the Commission’s Sustainable and Smart Mobility 
Strategy. 

Moreover,  on  27  October  2025,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  225  million  ten-year  aid  scheme 
partially compensating undertakings  in  the French rail freight sector  for  social security  contribution 
‘T2’481. The scheme, which finances specific advantages under the statutory pension scheme for workers, 
is  intended  to  accompany  the  gradual  phasing-out  of  statutory  benefits  following  a  recruitment 
interruption for railway workers on 31 December 2019. In France, statutory workers are employed mostly 
by  companies  belonging  to  the  public  railway  group  SNCF.  However,  since  January  2020  statutory 
workers  that  leave  SNCF  and  are  employed  by  other  undertakings  in  the  railway  sector,  may  retain 
protection deriving from the French statutory pension system. In such cases, the new employer must pay 
the  employer’s  part  of  the  T2  contribution.  The  measure  approved  by  the  Commission  applies  to 
undertakings operating in France that are subject to the T2 social contribution for workers whose main 
activity is rail freight transport. Alternatively, the measure extends to those active in the maintenance of 
railway  rolling  stock  or  in  the  provision  of  railway  safety  services,  provided  that  these  activities 
predominantly contribute rail freight transport operations.  

On 22 December 2025 the Commission approved a EUR 60.1 million rescue loan granted by the Belgian 
government via the Belgian sovereign wealth fund (FPIM/SPFI) to Lineas Group SA/NV (Lineas Group). 
Lineas Group - a privately controlled Belgian rail freight operator with subsidiaries and operations in 
several Member States, including Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Germany - employs around 1550 
individuals and operates a fleet of approximately 250 locomotives and 7500 wagons. Over the past years, 
Lineas Group has experienced financial difficulties with continuous operating losses despite increasing 
turnover.  On  22  August  2025,  Belgium  notified  a  rescue  loan  to  Lineas  Group,  which  was  partly 
disbursed on 14 August 2025. The aid is intended to address Lineas Group’s short-term liquidity needs. 
The Commission assessed the rescue loan and found that the aid is compatible with the internal market 
pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU under the conditions of the  R&RG482. Belgium has committed to 
submit a restructuring plan to the Commission, no later than six months following the first disbursement 
of the aid. In parallel, the Commission assessed whether two separate capital injections granted to Lineas 
Group in 2023 and in 2024 constituted State aid483. FPIM made those investments together with the other 
shareholder of Lineas Group, the private investor Argos Wityu. For both, the Commission concluded that 
neither injection could be qualified as State aid. 

479 Communication from the Commission – Community guidelines on State aid for railway undertakings, OJ C 184, 22.7.2008, 
p. 13. 
480 Case SA.112601 – Slovakia – Reintroduction of a State aid scheme in support of inland waterway transport. 
481 Case SA.117491  – France  – Compensation des cotisations spécifiques T2 dans le  secteur du transport ferroviaire  des 
marchandises. 
482 Case SA.120185 – Belgium – Rescue aid to Lineas Group. 
483 Case SA.101469 – Belgium – Complaint against Lineas. 

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8.2.8.  State aid enforcement in the road transport sector 

By  enforcing  State  aid  rules  in  the  road  transport  sector,  the  Commission  ensures  in  particular  that 
compensation granted to companies entrusted with public passenger transport services obligations do not 
go beyond what is necessary for the performance of these obligations.  

On 27 February 2025, the Commission concluded that the attribution of licences to certain private hire 
vehicles operators in the context of the Paris 2024 Olympic Games did not entail State aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU484. 

Furthermore,  on  30  September  2025,  the  Commission  approved,  under  Article  93  TFEU,  the 
reintroduction of an aid scheme contributing to the coordination of transport485. The scheme  aims at 
strengthening the customer service of public transportation in the region of the transport association ZV 
go.Rheinland by providing funding for electronic systems. 

On 3 February 2025, the Commission adopted an amended opening decision, supplementing its formal 
investigation procedure, on the issues of economic continuity and recovery of aid in a case regarding a 
Finish  State  aid  measure  to  Helsingin  Bussiliikenne  Oy.  This  follows  a  2019  decision  in  which  the 
Commission  found  that  aid  of  approximately  EUR  54  million  to  Helsingin  Bussiliikenne  Oy  was 
incompatible with the internal market and ordered its recovery486. However, on 29 July 2024, the Court 
of  Justice  annulled  that  decision.  The  Court  ruled  that  the  Commission  should  have  adopted  a 
supplementary  opening  decision  to  take  account  for  the  2015  sale  and  transfer  of  the  bus  transport 
business  of  the  beneficiary  Helsingin  Bussiliikenne  Oy  to  its  economic  successor  (Koiviston  Auto 
Helsinki Oy).487. The Court held that the absence of such a decision constituted an infringement of an 
essential  procedural  requirement,  as  it  deprived  interested  parties  of  their  right  to  comment  on  the 
transfer. The investigation remains ongoing. 

8.2.9.  State aid enforcement in the postal sector 

State aid control in the postal services sector ensures that incumbent service providers compete fairly 
with other market participants, that State aid beneficiaries are not shielded from market developments, 
and that incentives exist to foster innovation, productivity, and efficiency.  

On 6 January 2025, the Commission decided not to raise objections to the compensation to ELTA, the 
Greek  postal  operator,  for  the  damage  suffered  as  a  direct  result  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  on  the 
grounds of compatibility with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(2)(b) TFEU488. 

On  3  February  2025,  the  Commission  approved,  based  on  Article  106  TFEU  and  under  the  SGEI 
Framework, the compensation to Czech Post for the net cost of the obligation to provide Universal Postal 
Services over the period 2023-2024489. Similarly, on 7 July 2025, the Commission approved, based on 
Article  106  TFEU  and  under  the  SGEI  Framework,  the  Universal  Service  Obligation  (USO) 

484 Case SA.109742 – France – Aides d’État présumées dans le secteur des taxis dédiés au transport de personnes à mobilité 
réduite dans le cadre des Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024. 
485  Case  SA.119780  –  Germany  –  Investment  in  Intermodal  Transport  Control  System  and  electronic  billing  system  (re-
introduction of aid scheme SA.56519). 
486 Case SA.33846 – Finland – Effective liberalisation of bus transport (Helsinki).  
487 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 July 2024 in Case C‑697/22 P,  Koiviston Auto Helsinki Oy  v Commission a.o., 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:641. 
488  Case  SA.57982  –  Greece  –  Compensation  to  Hellenic  Post  for  damages  suffered  as  a  direct  result  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic.  
489 Case SA.104103 – Czechia – Compensation of the postal licence holder (Česká pošta, s.p.) for the net cost of USO 2023-
2024. 

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compensation to Poste Italiane for the period 1 January 2025 to 30 April 2026490. On 15 July 2025, the 
Commission  also  approved,  based  on  Article  106  TFEU  and  under  the  SGEI  Framework,  the 
compensation to La Poste for the provision of its territorial presence mission provided over the period 
2023-2025491. 

Furthermore, on 25 July 2025, the Commission  approved,  based on Article 106 TFEU and under the 
SGEI Framework, the compensation to Czech Post for the net cost of the obligation to provide Universal 
Postal Services over the period 2025-2029492. On 15 December 2025, the Commission approved, based 
on Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, a planned measure in favour of Post Danmark intended to cover legacy costs 
arising from the dismissal of 429 former civil servants under special terms, following Post Danmark’s 
strategic decision to close its mail business493. 

8.2.10. State aid enforcement in the cultural sector  

By enforcing  State aid  rules in  the cultural  sector, the Commission  ensures fair competition  between 
private and public service providers, while  allowing  Member States to  support the establishment and 
development of institutions throughout their territory and to enhance the level of services provided. 

On 17 December 2025, the Commission found that the public financing granted by France to the Institut 
national  d’archéologie  préventive  (INRAP)  over  the  period  2008-2021  constitutes  State  aid  that  is 
compatible with the internal market under Article 107(3)(d) TFEU, as it promotes culture and heritage 
conservation494. 

8.2.11. State aid enforcement in the gambling sector  

State aid enforcement in the gambling sector allows the Commission to ensure that competition between 
operators active in that sector is not distorted by State support measures.  

On 11 April 2025, the Commission closed a formal investigation by concluding that the exclusive right 
granted to Ladbrokes to operate a form of virtual betting in Belgium did not constitute State aid within 
the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU495.  

8.2.12. State aid supporting employment 

On 31 January 2025,  the Commission  approved a  EUR 1.1 billion scheme supporting  employment  of 
specific workers  in  Italy and in  Southern Italy  (Mezzogiorno)496, partly  funded through the European 
Social Fund Plus. Under this scheme, employers could receive wage subsidies for the recruitment under 
contracts of indefinite duration of two specific categories of workers: (i) young people up to the age of 
35 who have never been employed with a contract of indefinite duration; and (ii) women who have not 
been in regular paid employment in the previous six months and reside in Southern Italy.  

8.2.13. Merger control in the data centres sector 

On  10  November  2025,  the  Commission  approved  a  joint  venture  between  Echelon  DC,  a  company 

490 Case SA.114526 – Italy – USO compensation to Poste Italiane from 1 January 2025 to 30 April 2026.  
491  Case  SA.108393  –  France  –  Compensation  de  la  mission  d'aménagement  du  territoire  en  faveur  de  La  Poste  pour la 
période 2023-2025. 
492 Case SA.116631 – Czechia – Compensation to Czech Post for the net cost of the obligation to provide Universal Postal 
Service in 2025-2029.  
493 Cases SA.120372– Denmark – Support to Post Danmark A/S for legacy costs related to the closure of its mail business.  
494 Case SA.51268 – France – Aides d'Etat mise à exécution par la France en faveur de l'INRAP.  
495 Case SA.53630 – Belgium – Alleged illegal state aid related to virtual betting.  
496  Case  SA.114799  –  Italy  –  Aid  scheme  supporting  employment  of  specific  workers  in  Italy  and  in  Southern  Italy 
(Mezzogiorno). 

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specialised in large-scale data centres, and the Spanish electric utility company Iberdrola497. Under the 
simplified procedure, the Commission cleared the path for both companies to invest in important digital 
and AI infrastructure, namely sustainable and high-performance data centres throughout Spain. Projects 
such as this go towards supporting broader Commission policy priorities, including the digital and clean 
transitions.  

III. SUPPORTING EU COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT 

1. 

DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION 

Adapting to an ever-evolving digital environment presents persistent challenges for the enforcement of 
EU competition policy. The use of advanced digital tools and algorithms by economic operators, coupled 
with an exponential growth in electronic communications and the vast volumes of data and documents 
in  case  files,  has  added  significant  complexity  to  competition  investigations.  Digital  transformation 
remains a key priority for DG Competition. Through the implementation of its Digital Strategy, which is 
in line with the broader Commission revised Digital Strategy498, DG Competition is deploying innovative 
and optimised digital solutions. These tools are designed to streamline data processing and enhance the 
effectiveness of competition enforcement.  

1.1. Case Management modernisation 

In 2025, significant advancements were made in updating DG Competition's case management solutions. 
The  previous  case  management  system  for  Antitrust  and  Cartels  was  successfully  replaced  with 
CASE@EC, and major progress was made in the transition to CASE@EC for Mergers. The CASE@EC 
modules supporting the DMA and the FSR were also further enhanced. 

1.2. Improving digital exchanges with Member States, consumers and citizens 

DG Competition has further developed its digital solutions to fully digitise and enhance communication 
and collaboration processes with external stakeholders, notably Member State administrations, NCAs, 
consumers, citizens and legal representatives. 

The  implementation  of  the  new  eAidRegister  was  finalised  in  2025  and  it  is  expected  to  become 
operational  as  of  January  2026.  This  solution  will  assist  Member  States  in  fulfilling  the  enhanced 
transparency requirements of the General, SGEI and Agriculture de minimis regulations499. It will enable 
them  to  record  de  minimis  aids,  improving  transparency  in  public  spending,  and  reducing  reporting 
obligations for companies receiving aid. Significant progress has also been made on the eNotifications 
solution, which is set to further digitise notification processes. The rollout will initially focus on merger 
control and State aid control, with other instruments to be integrated in subsequent phases. The initial 
version of the tool is planned to be operational by mid-2026, replacing SANI2. 

Furthermore,  DG Competition has  optimised several  other digital solutions  that support its activities. 

497 Case M.12144 – ECHELON DC / IBERDROLA / CPD4GREEN CENTRO DE DATOS. 
498  Communication  of  the  Commission  –  European  Commission  digital  strategy  –  Next  generation  digital  Commission, 
C(2022) 4388 final, 30.6.2022. 
499 Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/2831 of 13 December 2023 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ L 2023, 15.12.2023; Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/2832 
of 13 December 2023 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
de  minimis  aid  granted  to  undertakings  providing  services  of  general  economic  interest,  OJ  L  2023,  15.12.2023,  and 
Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3118 of 10 December 2024 amending Regulation EU (No) 1408/2013 on the application 
of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the agriculture sector, 
OJ L 2024/3118, 13.12.2024. The new regulations introduced an obligation for all Member States to provide as from 2026 
complete information on de minimis aid granted in a central register at national or EU level. 

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These technical enhancements concern: (i) requests for information (eRFI)500; (ii) leniency programme 
(eLeniency)501; 
file  procedures 
(eConfidentiality)502;  (iv)  public  search  tool  for  competition  decisions  (COMP  Cases)503;  (v) 
collaboration and communication tool within the ECN (ECN2); (vi) calculation of interests due on State 
aid recovery cases aid (AIDCAL)504; (vii) State aid notification (SANI2);505 and (viii) reporting (SARI2). 

(iii)  negotiation  on  confidentiality  claims 

in  access 

to 

1.3. Advanced data support and digital solutions for competition investigations  

As  DG  Competition  faces  a  rapidly  increasing  volume  of  electronic  communications  and  digital 
evidence,  it continues to  invest in  developing  bespoke  digital solutions  to  better manage and  process 
significant volumes of submissions and the ‘on-premises’ access to file. 

In 2025, the pilot phase for an AI-based eDiscovery tool using Technology Assisted Review (TAR) to 
support the analysis of voluminous files was finalised, with the solution expected to become operational 
in 2026. Moreover, the DG Competition AI toolkit was expanded with new platforms facilitating the re-
use of corporate AI services and enabling cross-case analysis through LLM (large language models) and 
Retrieval-Augmented Generation capabilities. 

DG Competition’s horizontal unit ‘Data Analysis and Technology’ (CTO team) supports competition 
enforcement  with  specialist  skills,  leveraging  technological  advancements  to  enhance  digital 
investigations, intelligence gathering and market monitoring, with digital forensics during inspections as 
well  as  eDiscovery  (in  particular  the  AI-based  eDiscovery  software).  It  also  assists  in  analysing  the 
functionality and decision-making processes of AI systems used by companies. Additionally, it offers 
advanced data services to facilitate the processing and utilisation of non-standard submissions involving 
large  volumes  of  documents.  The  CTO  team  collaborates  with,  among  others,  European  Institutions, 
Member  States  and  organisations.  In  the  context  of  the  2025  TSI  cycle506,  the  CTO  team  guided  the 
technology units of 15 Member States in designing and submitting a project aimed at supporting Digital 
Transformation in competition law enforcement. The project includes training sessions, workshops and 
guidance on AI and data science.  

2. 

SINGLE MARKET PROGRAMME 

DG  Competition  benefits  from  a  dedicated  Competition  Programme,  part  of  the  Single  Market 
Programme  (SMP),  which  finances  actions  to  enhance  the  Commission’s  competition  enforcement 
capacity, policy initiatives, international cooperation and competition policy advocacy. In addition to the 
development of digital business solutions, the programme supported the training of judges in competition 
law. It also targeted non-competition national enforcers, including prosecutors, investigative judges and 
economic and financial police forces. The goal of this outreach is to increase their capacity to identify 
competition  infringements  in  their  daily  work  and  to  promote  the  transmission  of  evidence  to  the 
Commission thereby strengthening ex officio investigations. Furthermore, the programme enabled DG 
Competition to fund studies, evaluations, and research to underpin effective and robust policy making. 
With  an  EU  budget  allocation  of  EUR  22  million  for  2025,  the  Competition  Programme  channelled 

500 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/mergers/procedures/erfi_en  
501 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/leniency/eleniency_en   
502 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/index/it-tools/econfidentiality_en  
503 See https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/  
504 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/procedures/recovery-unlawful-aid_en 
505 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/forms-notifications-and-reporting_en  
506 The Technical Support Instrument (TSI) is the Commission’s instrument for assisting Member States in designing and 
implementing reforms. 

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investments into areas that support effective and up-to-date enforcement of EU competition policy.  

3. 

EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION & ADVOCACY  

DG Competition maintains an active dialogue with businesses, national courts, lawyers, policy makers, 
academics,  students,  and  civil  society.  Various  channels  are  used,  such  as  the  participation  of  the 
Executive Vice-President Ribera in events, press conferences and speeches, as well as press releases, 
newsletters, conferences, specialised publications, and social media.  

In 2025, DG Competition issued over 130 press releases. Several policy initiatives garnered broad media 
attention, for example the start of the review of the Merger Guidelines507, the adoption of CISAF508, as 
well as the consultations on the first reviews of the DMA509 and FSR510. High-profile enforcement cases 
were also widely reported in the media, for example Google Adtech511, the first DMA fines against Apple 
and Meta512, and the fines against Delivery Hero and Glovo for participating in a cartel in online food 
delivery513. 

In 2025, Executive Vice-President Ribera held her first annual Youth Policy Dialogue on 4 March514. 
Her  two  annual  implementation  dialogues  followed:  the  first  held  in  Madrid  on  30  June,  focused  on 
IPCEIs 515; and the second, held in Brussels on 13 November, explored how State aid rules can facilitate 
public support to affordable housing. DG Competition also held five reality checks in Brussels or online 
to  get  feedback  from  stakeholders516.  Additionally,  on  15  May,  the  Chief  Economist  Team  of  DG 
Competition held a conference on competition economics to mark the 20 years of its founding. Beyond 
these structured events, Executive Vice-President Ribera delivered numerous speeches on competition 
policy to a variety of audiences517, while the Director General and senior management of DG Competition 
engaged in extensive outreach efforts on the benefits of a strong and effective competition policy and 
enforcement. 

Regarding social media, DG Competition’s digital accounts increased their reach and followers base in 
2025. Its LinkedIn presence grew to over 47 000 followers, while its X account surpassed 24 000. DG 
Competition also focused on the development of its YouTube channel, which now has more than 2 100 
subscribers. The channel hosts videos of senior managers speaking at conferences as well as the ‘COMP 
Flash’  series  where  DG  Competition  officials  explain  high-profile  cases  in  a  very  short  video. 
Furthermore, DG Competition’s weekly newsletter reached over 13 000 subscribers in 2025, while its 
digital  publications  were  viewed  or  downloaded  more  than  68 000  times.  DG  Competition’s  website 
attracted over 12 million pageviews throughout the year.  

507 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/mergers/review-merger-guidelines_en  
508 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1598  
509 See https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/consultation-first-review-digital-markets-act-2025-07-03_en  
510 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1954  
511 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/ip_25_1992  
512 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1085  
513 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1356  
514 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/reaching-out/youth-policy-dialogue_en  
515 See https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/reaching-out/implementation-dialogues-and-reality-checks_en  
516 These were devoted to Social/Affordable Housing (10 July), Trade Defence Instruments and Foreign Subsidies (15 October 
—  joint  event  led  by  DG  Trade,  DG  Grow  also  participated),  Technology  Transfer  Block  Exemption  Regulation  and 
Guidelines  (12  November,  online  only),  the  Private  enforcement  of  State  aid  rules  (3  December)  and  the  Revision  of 
Regulation 1/2003 (15 December). 
517 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_24_6341 

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