REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE on the application of Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders
Date: 2026-04-10
Institutions: Directorate-General for Citizens’ Rights, Justice and Institutional Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: application of EU law, confiscation of property, criminal proceedings, fight against crime, judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU, offence, organised crime, seizure of goods

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 10.4.2026  COM(2026) 156 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE on the application of Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders                    
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 2 

2.  GENERAL POINTS OF ASSESSMENT ...................................................................................... 5 

2.1.  General matters ................................................................................................................... 5 

2.2. 

2.3. 

Time limits and response times (Articles 9 and 20; Articles 7(2) and 18(5)) ..................... 5 

Postponement and impossibility to execute (Articles 10, 13, 21 and 22) ........................... 6 

2.4.  Communication between competent authorities and with affected persons (Articles 25 

and 32) ................................................................................................................................ 8 

2.5.  Costs (Article 31) ................................................................................................................ 8 

2.6.  Other issues ......................................................................................................................... 9 

3.  SPECIFIC POINTS OF ASSESSMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 38 .................. 10 

3.1. 

3.2. 

Possibility to make and withdraw declarations under Articles 4(2) and 14(2) ................. 10 

Interaction between respect for fundamental rights and mutual recognition of freezing 
orders and confiscation orders (Articles 8 and 19) ........................................................... 10 

3.3.  Management and disposal of frozen and confiscated property, including restitution and 

compensation (Articles 28, 29 and 30) ............................................................................. 13 

4.  STAKEHOLDER PROPOSALS .................................................................................................. 15 

4.1.  Member States................................................................................................................... 15 

4.2. 

Eurojust ............................................................................................................................. 17 

5.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 17 

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1.  INTRODUCTION 

The main motive for  criminal  organisations that  operate  across borders, including  high-risk 
criminal  networks,  is  financial gain.  According to Europol’s latest  European Union Serious 
and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU-SOCTA)1, published in 2025, organised crime 
generates billions in profits within the EU every year. This results in an increasing number of 
victims and generates substantial costs for Member States in responding to and mitigating the 
damage  wrought  by  such  criminal  activity.    Illicit  profits  are  moved  across  borders  for  the 
purpose  of  money  laundering,  allowing  criminal  organisations  to  establish  a  financial  base. 
This, in turn, enables them to continue their criminal activities, fund corruption and infiltrate 
legitimate  economies.  The  availability  of  proceeds  of  crime  therefore  poses  a  significant 
threat to the integrity of the economy  and society, eroding the rule of law and fundamental 
rights.  

this  background,  depriving  criminals, 

if  criminal 
Against 
organisations, of the proceeds of their crimes is essential to tackling the serious threat posed 
by  organised  crime.  Efforts  to  do  so  effectively  must  be  significantly  stepped  up,  as 
confiscation rates within the EU remain very low. This is also important for victims of crime, 
as freezing and confiscation measures are essential tools for facilitating compensation and the 
return of property to its legitimate owners. 

in  particular  members 

Regulation  (EU)  2018/1805  on  the  mutual  recognition  of  freezing  orders  and  confiscation 
orders2 (the ‘Regulation’) was  adopted in  recognition  of the fact  that effective cross-border 
cooperation  is  essential  to  freezing  and  confiscating  the  instrumentalities  and  proceeds  of 
crime effectively. The Regulation is one of several essential pieces of the wider puzzle that 
constitutes the EU legal framework for fighting money laundering and organised crime3 and 
replaced  the  less  far-reaching  Framework  Decisions  2003/577/JHA4  and  2006/783/JHA5, 
which now apply only to cooperation with and between Denmark and Ireland. 

Based on Article 82(1)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
the  Regulation  sets  out  rules  that  oblige  Member  States  to  recognise,  without  further 
formalities, freezing orders and confiscation orders issued by other Member States within the 
framework  of  proceedings  in  criminal  matters  and  to  execute  those  orders  within  their 
territories.  The  Regulation  presupposes  that  decisions  to  be  recognised  and  executed  will 
legality,  subsidiarity  and 
always  be 

in  compliance  with 

the  principles  of 

taken 

1  Available  at  The  changing  DNA  of  serious  and  organised  crime  -  EU  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat 
Assessment 2025 (EU-SOCTA) | Europol. 
2 OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, p. 1. 
3  Instruments  that  are  substantively  and  operationally  interlinked  with  the  Regulation  include,  among  others: 
Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European 
Investigation Order in criminal matters (OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, p. 1); Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on asset recovery and confiscation (OJ L, 2024/1260, 2.5.2024); 
and  the  EU  anti-money  laundering  acquis,  in  particular  Directive  (EU)  2015/849  of  the  European  Parliament 
and  of  the  Council  of  20 May  2015  on  the  prevention  of  the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the  purposes  of 
money laundering or terrorist financing (as amended) (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73). 
4 Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the European Union of orders 
freezing property or evidence (OJ L 196, 2.8.2003, p. 45). 
5 Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to confiscation orders (OJ L 328, 24.11.2006, p. 59). 

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proportionality. The Regulation also aims to ensure that the rights of persons affected by the 
recognition of such orders are upheld in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU and the EU procedural rights acquis6. As indicated in its recital 13, the Regulation 
applies to all freezing and confiscation orders issued within the framework of proceedings in 
criminal matters. ‘Proceedings in criminal matters’ is an autonomous concept of Union law 
interpreted  by  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union.  The  term  covers  all  types  of 
freezing orders and confiscation orders issued following proceedings in relation to a criminal 
offence.  This  includes,  but  is  not  necessarily  limited  to,  orders  falling  under  the  remit  of 
Directive (EU) 2024/12607. By contrast, confiscation orders issued within the framework of 
proceedings in civil or administrative matters fall outside the scope of the Regulation. 

Article 38  of  the  Regulation  requires  the  Commission  to  submit  a  report  to  the  European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the application 
of the Regulation, including information on: 

(a)  the possibility for Member States to make and withdraw declarations under Articles 

4(2) and 14(2); 

(b) the interaction between respect for fundamental rights and the mutual recognition of 

freezing orders and confiscation orders; 

(c)  the application of Articles 28, 29 and 30 in relation to the management and disposal 
of  frozen  and  confiscated  property,  the  restitution  of  property  to  victims  and  the 
compensation of victims. 

To  compile  information  on  points  (a),  (b)  and  (c),  the  Commission  sent  Member  States  a 
questionnaire. It received replies from 19 of the 25 participating Member States. 

This  information  supplements  the  statistical  data  that  Member  States  must  regularly  collect 
from  their  relevant  authorities  and  send  to  the  Commission  each  year  in  accordance  with 
Article 35  of  the  Regulation.  Those  statistics  include  the  number  of  freezing  orders  and 
confiscation  orders  received  by  a  Member  State  from  other  Member  States  that  were 
recognised  and  executed  and  the  number  of  freezing  and  confiscation  orders  that  were 
refused the recognition and/or execution of which were refused. 

Member States must also send the following statistics to the Commission where available at 
central level: 

6  Directive  2010/64/EU  on  the  right  to  interpretation  and  translation  in  criminal  proceedings  (OJ  L  280, 
26.10.2010,  p. 1);  Directive  2012/13/EU  on  the  right  to  information  in  criminal  proceedings  (OJ  L  142, 
1.6.2012,  p. 1);  Directive  2013/48/EU  on  the  right  of  access  to  a  lawyer  in  criminal  proceedings  and  in 
European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty 
and  to  communicate  with  third  persons  and  with  consular  authorities  while  deprived  of  liberty  (OJ  L  294, 
6.11.2013,  p. 1);  Directive  (EU)  2016/343  on  the  strengthening  of  certain  aspects  of  the  presumption  of 
innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ L 65, 11.3.2016, p. 1); Directive 
(EU) 2016/1919 on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons 
in European arrest warrant proceedings, (OJ L 297, 4.11.2016, p. 1); corrigendum to Directive (EU) 2016/1919 
(OJ L 91, 5.4.2017, p. 40); Directive (EU) 2016/800 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 
2016 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings (OJ L 
132, 21.5.2016, p. 1). 
7 Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on asset recovery 
and confiscation (OJ L, 2024/1260, 2.5.2024). 

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(a)  the number of cases in which a victim was compensated or granted restitution of the 
property obtained through the execution of a confiscation order under this Regulation; 
and 

(b) the  average  period  required  for  the  execution  of  freezing  orders  and  confiscation 

orders under the Regulation. 

The  Commission  notes  that  not  all  Member  States  have  fully  met  the  requirements  of 
Article 35.  Two  Member  States  have  consistently  failed  to  provide  data,  while  six  did  not 
provide  information  for  all  four  years  since  the  Regulation  entered  into  force  (2021-2024). 
The  format  and  comparability  of  the  data  received  also  vary,  with  some  Member  States 
having provided only aggregated data for freezing and confiscation orders. 

This report also draws on Eurojust’s casework report on Regulation 2018/18058, which was 
published in September 2025, and on research conducted under relevant  projects funded by 
the Justice Programme9.  

The Court of Justice of the European Union has not yet had occasion to issue any judgements 
on  the  interpretation  of  the  Regulation,  however,  a  preliminary  reference  concerning  the 
Regulation, Case C-8/24, is currently pending, with the opinion of Advocate General Richard 
de la Tour having  been  delivered on 12 June 2025.  Beyond the Regulation itself, the  Court 
has  also  been  called  on  to  interpret  the  Regulation’s  predecessor,  Framework  Decision 
2006/783/JHA  on  the  application  of  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition  to  confiscation 
orders10 and EU instruments establish minimum rules on freezing and confiscation measures 
at  national  level  as  well  as  law  enforcement  cooperation  for  the  purpose  of  criminal  asset 
recovery,  such  as  Framework  Decision  2005/212/JHA  on  Confiscation  of  Crime-Related 
Proceeds,  Instrumentalities  and  Property11,  Directive  2014/42/EU  on  asset  recovery  and 
confiscation12 and its successor, Directive (EU) 2024/126013. The Court’s case law on these 
instruments  may  be  considered  to  be  of  contextual  relevance  for  the  interpretation  of  the 
Regulation, for instance where it provides guidance on the interpretation of concepts which 
are  common  to  all  EU  criminal  asset  recovery  instruments14  or  on  minimum  standards  for 
effective  remedies  which  may  play  a  role  in  determinations  by  the  executing  State  on  the 
recognition of foreign freezing and confiscation orders15. 

8  https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/publication/eurojust-report-regulation-20181805-mutual-recognition-freezing-
and-confiscation-september2025. 
9  For  details  on  the  justice  programme,  see  https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-
funding-programmes/justice-programme_en. 
10  See,  for  instance,  the  recent  Judgment  of  the  Court  (Fifth  Chamber)  of  29  January  2026,  Munik,  Case 
C‑562/24, EU:C:2026:55. 
11  Council  Framework  Decision  2005/212/JHA  of  24  February  2005  on  Confiscation  of  Crime-Related 
Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property (OJ L 68, 15.3.2005, pp. 49). 
12  Directive  2014/42/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  3  April  2014  on  the  freezing  and 
confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union (OJ L 127, 29.4.2014, pp. 39). 
13 Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on asset recovery 
and confiscation (OJ L, 2024/1260, 2.5.2024). 
14 While the Court’s judgement in Case C-655/24, Latranov, is still pending, the Opinion of Advocate General 
Sánchez-Bordona of 11 December 2025 (EU:C:2025:969) already discussed the interpretation of the concept of 
‘instrumentalities’ in the context of EU criminal asset recovery.   
15  See,  for  instance,  Judgment  of  the  Court  (First  Chamber)  of  14  January  2021,  OM,  Case  C-393/19, 
EU:C:2021:8. 

4 

 
 
 
2.  GENERAL POINTS OF ASSESSMENT 

Since it entered into force, the Regulation has facilitated the recognition and enforcement of 
thousands  of  freezing  and  confiscation  orders.  Based  on  the  statistics  notified  to  the 
Commission in accordance with Article 35 of the Regulation, over 2 700 freezing orders were 
recognised  between  December  2021  and  December  2024,  with  more  than  1500  reported  as 
executed.  For  confiscation  orders,  more  than  800  requests  were  recognised,  of  which  370 
were reported as executed. The number of freezing and confiscation requests received by any 
one Member State differs widely, with half a dozen Member States consistently accounting 
for more than two thirds of all such requests received. 

At the same time, Member States reported more than 200 refusals to recognise and/or execute 
freezing orders and more than 100 refusals to recognise and/or execute confiscation orders. In 
addition,  Eurojust  indicated  that  it  had  been  asked  to  intervene  to  facilitate  cooperation  in 
more  than  900  cases  during  the  reference  period  (2021-2024).  Indeed,  Eurojust’s  casework 
report and the Member States’ responses to the Commission’s targeted questionnaire confirm 
that  questions  and  challenges  concerning  the  application  of  the  Regulation  remain.  In  this 
context, the present report highlights specific aspects of the Regulation and their application 
in practice. 

2.1. General matters 

By  its  very  nature,  the  Regulation  is,  in  principle,  directly  applicable  and  does  not  require 
transposition  into  national  law.  Nevertheless,  Member  States  may  adopt  implementing 
measures  to  facilitate  its  application.  Such  measures  must  not  prejudice  the  Regulation’s 
direct applicability. 

Of  the  19  Member  States  that  responded  to  the  Commission’s  questionnaire  on  the 
Regulation, 17 have adopted legislative or practical implementation measures to facilitate its 
application in their legal systems. Such measures include, for instance: 

1)  implementing legislation that clarifies the position and functioning of the Regulation 

in relation to pre-existing EU acquis and national law; 

2)  legislative  amendments  to  lay  down  national  rules  on  matters  left  to  the  procedural 
autonomy  of  the  Member  States16  and/or  to  ensure  that  national  law  does  not 
contradict or impede the application of the Regulation; 

3)  handbooks and other guidance documents for national practitioners on the recognition 

and execution of freezing and confiscation orders. 

Furthermore, 12 Member States indicated that they have some form of national mechanism in 
place to monitor the use and effective application of the Regulation. 

2.2. Time limits and response times (Articles 9 and 20; Articles 7(2) and 18(5)) 

Articles 9 and 20 of the  Regulation  lay down the time limits  within which foreign  freezing 
and confiscation orders must be recognised and executed. For freezing orders, the executing 

16 For instance, the adoption of rules under national law on effective remedies in accordance with Article 33 of 
the Regulation. 

5 

 
 
 
authority must decide on recognition and execution and execute the order without delay and 
with the same speed and priority as in a similar domestic case.  For confiscation orders, the 
executing authority must decide on recognition and execution without delay and no later than 
45 days after receipt. 

11  Member  States  reported  that,  when  acting  as  the  issuing  State,  they  had  occasionally 
encountered  cases  in  which  the  time  limits  for  recognising  and  executing  a  freezing  or 
confiscation  order  had  not  been  respected.  9  Member  States  indicated  that  they  had 
encountered  issues  in  meeting  the  time  limits  when  acting  as  the  executing  State.  In  most 
such cases, the delays appear to have resulted from the need to request additional information 
from the issuing State or to verify information required for execution. One Member State also 
indicated  that  delays  were  sometimes  linked  to  the  high  workload  of  the  competent 
authorities. In general, however, the time limits seem to be met. 

Eurojust  reports  that  the  average  time  taken  by  the  authorities  in  the  Member  States  to 
recognise and execute freezing orders ranges from 10 days to several months17. In its report, 
Eurojust  identifies  the  lack  of  specific  time  limits  in  the  Regulation  for  recognising  non-
urgent  freezing  orders  as a reason for this significant  divergence in  the speed of  execution. 
Article 9 of the Regulation does not specify a number of days but only states that orders must 
be  executed  ‘without  delay  and  with  the  same  speed  and  priority  as for  a  similar  domestic 
case’. 

For  urgent  freezing  requests,  meaning  requests  where  there  are  legitimate  grounds  to  fear 
imminent  dissipation  of the  property,  the  Regulation  sets  a  much  stricter  response  time:  48 
hours for the decision on recognition and a further 48 hours for the execution of that decision. 
Member States did not report any particular difficulties in complying with these time limits 
for urgent freezing requests. However, Eurojust reports18 that Member States’ interpretations 
of ‘urgency’ differ, with some applying the concept more broadly than others. 

12  Member  States  indicated  that,  when  acting  as  the  issuing  State,  they  had  occasionally 
encountered issues with the timely reporting by executing authorities on the recognition and 
execution of freezing  and confiscation orders in  accordance with Articles 7(2)  and 18(5) of 
the Regulation.  In some  cases, they had experienced delays of up to  six  months  or had not 
received  any  relevant  communication  at  all.  Most  Member  States  affected,  however, 
indicated  that  such  delays  are  not  the  norm  and  that  compliance  with  Articles  7  and  18  is 
generally  ensured.  Despite  this  overall  high  level  of  compliance,  some  Member  States 
suggested that the time limits set out in the Regulation are too short and should be adjusted. It 
was  also  suggested  that  the  lack  of  time  limits  in  the  Regulation  for  providing  additional 
information required to make a decision on recognition can lead to disproportionate delays. 

2.3. Postponement and impossibility to execute (Articles 10, 13, 21 and 22) 

Articles  10,  13,  21  and  22  of  the  Regulation  cover  cases  where  it  is  temporarily  or 
permanently  impossible  to  execute  a  freezing  or  confiscation  order.  Articles  10  and  21 

17 See Eurojust casework report, p. 14. 
18 Ibid. 

6 

 
 
 
 
provide that execution may be postponed, for instance, in cases where it would undermine an 
ongoing  criminal  investigation  or  where  the  property  in  question  is  already  the  subject  of 
another  order.  Articles  13  and  22  govern  situations  where  it  is  permanently  impossible  to 
execute  an  order.  The  executing  authority  may  declare  execution  impossible,  for  instance, 
where the property has already been confiscated, cannot be found at the location indicated in 
the certificate or has otherwise disappeared or been destroyed. 

11  Member  States  provided  data  on  the  use  of  the  option  under  Articles  10  and  21  to 
postpone the execution of freezing and confiscation orders. A handful of these Member States 
indicated  that  their  competent  authorities  had  postponed  the  execution  of  a  freezing  order 
because the property was already the subject of an existing order issued by another Member 
State (Article 10(1)(b)) or because it was the subject of an existing domestic order that had 
priority under national law (Article 10(1)(c)). In at least one Member State, the latter situation 
is  relatively  common.  Eurojust  reports19  that  this  mostly  arises  when  cross-border  fraud 
offences are investigated in the issuing State and the related money laundering offences in the 
executing State. 

No Member State reported having postponed execution of a confiscation order in accordance 
with Article 21. 

The same 12 Member States also provided information on cases where it was impossible to 
execute  a  freezing  or  confiscation  order  (Articles  13  and  22).  For  freezing  orders,  one 
Member  State  reported  an  instance  in  which  an  order  could  not  be  executed  because  the 
property  had  already  been  confiscated  (Article 13(3)(a)).  7  Seven  Member  States  had 
encountered  cases  in  which  the  property  had  disappeared  (Article 13(3)(b))  or  could  not  be 
found  (Article 13(3)(d)).  2  Member  States  reported  requests  concerning  property  that  had 
been  destroyed  (Article 13(3)(c)),  and  4  reported  instances  in  which  property  could  not  be 
located  because  the  information  in  the  freezing  certificate  was  not  sufficiently  precise 
(Article 13(3)(e)).  One  Member  State  indicated  that,  in  general,  for  about  60  per  cent  of 
freezing requests the property at issue typically cannot be located or the amount of money or 
value  of  other  property  found  is  negligeable.  7  other  Member  States  reported  similar 
experiences. 

For confiscation requests, the number of cases in which it was impossible to execute an order 
appears to be significantly lower. Only 4 Member States had encountered such cases. These 
concerned  property  that  had  disappeared  (Article 22(3)(b),  reported  by  2  Member  States), 
property that had been destroyed (Article 22(3)(c), reported by one Member State), property 
that  could  not  be  found  (Article 22(3)(d),  reported  by  2  Member  States)  and  property  that 
could  not  be  located  due  to  insufficiently  precise  information  in  the  confiscation  certificate 
(Article 22(3)(e), reported by 2 Member States). 

19 See Eurojust casework report, p. 15. 

7 

 
 
 
2.4. Communication  between  competent  authorities  and  with  affected  persons 

(Articles 25 and 32) 

Article 25 of the Regulation requires issuing and executing authorities to consult each other 
to ensure the efficient application of the Regulation, using direct communication and, where 
appropriate, involving their central authorities. 

9  Member  States  reported  challenges  relating  to  communication  between  competent 
authorities.  All  Member  States  confirmed  that  consultations  can  take  place  through  direct, 
informal  contact  between  competent  authorities  (i.e.  by  email  or  telephone),  either  with  or 
without  the  involvement  of  their  designated  central  authorities.  However,  some  Member 
States pointed out limitations regarding the volume and type of data that can or should be sent 
by  email.  Several  Member  States  indicated  that  they  had  worked  with  Eurojust  and  the 
European Judicial Network to facilitate coordination in urgent cases, particularly because the 
response  times  of  certain  types  of  competent  authorities,  such  as  courts,  were  often  slow. 
Language barriers, failure to confirm message receipt and difficulties in identifying the right 
contact points were also indicated as obstacles to efficient consultations. Eurojust confirmed 
that, in several cases, it had been asked to assist in identifying the competent authorities in the 
requested Member State. Eurojust reports, for instance, that, in some Member States, when a 
freezing order targets several assets located in different areas of the same country – such as 
bank accounts opened  with different  banks – multiple authorities  must be  contacted  for the 
execution of the same certificate20. 

Two  Member  States  also  pointed  out  difficulties  in  complying  with  the  obligation  under 
Article 32 of the Regulation to inform affected persons of the execution of a freezing order, 
or  of  a  decision  to  recognise  and  execute  a  confiscation  order,  and  of  any  assistance  the 
executing authority may request from the issuing authority in this context. This obligation is 
particularly  challenging  when  the  affected  person  is  not  located  in  either  the  issuing  or  the 
executing Member State. 

Another  issue  noted  was  the  need  to  reconcile  information  requirements  with  the 
confidentiality  of  the  investigations.  Article 11(2)  of  the  Regulation  confirms  that  the 
executing  authority  must  inform  affected  persons  as  soon  as  a  freezing  order  has  been 
executed,  in  accordance  with  Article 32.  However,  Article 11(3)  clarifies  that  the  issuing 
authority may ask the executing authority to postpone informing affected persons to protect 
ongoing  investigations.  As  Eurojust  confirms21,  this  has  caused  problems  for  at  least  one 
Member State whose national law conflicts with the Regulation in this respect in that it does 
not allow derogations from the requirement to inform affected persons immediately. 

2.5. Costs (Article 31) 

Article 31 of the Regulation requires each Member State to bear its own costs resulting from 
the application of the Regulation. It does, however, permit the executing authority to submit a 
proposal for the sharing of large or exceptional costs. 

20 Ibid. p. 10. 
21 Ibid. pp.15-16. 

8 

 
 
 
2  Member  States  reported  that  their  competent  authorities  sometimes  incur  large  or 
exceptional costs when executing freezing or confiscation orders under the Regulation. They 
also  highlighted  that  management  costs  in  particular  can  become  disproportionately  high 
when  freezing  requests  are  not  followed  by  a  final  confiscation  decision  in  the  issuing 
Member State within a reasonable period. 

In most Member States,  however, such cases  appear to  be  relatively rare.  6 Member States 
reported  never  having  incurred  large  or  exceptional  costs.  Only  2  Member  States  provided 
anecdotal accounts of challenges in  negotiating such cost-sharing  agreements in accordance 
with Article 31(2). 

More  generally,  several  Member  States  noted  that  in  a  number  of  cases  they  had  received 
freezing requests where the value of the assets found was so low that the resources required 
to  freeze  and  confiscate  them  were  disproportionate.  They  criticised  the  fact  that  the 
Regulation  does  not  allow  for  such  requests  to  be  refused  solely  on  the  grounds  that  the 
recovery costs are disproportionate to the value of the property. 

2.6. Other issues 

In addition to the issues discussed in sections 2.1 to 2.5, Member States noted certain further 
challenges  that  are  not  strictly  related  to  the  application  of  the  Regulation,  but  which  are 
interlinked  with  it.  One  such  issue  concerns  the  lack  of  a  legal  basis  for  issuing  freezing 
requests for the sole purpose of victim compensation, without a confiscation decision being 
pursued – something which is provided for in the legal system of some Member States. Such 
requests  are  not  covered  by  the  Regulation,  which  defines  a  ‘freezing  order’  as  ‘a  decision 
issued or validated by an issuing authority in order to prevent the destruction, transformation, 
removal, transfer or disposal of property with a view to the confiscation thereof’. 

Another issue that has been reported by Member States is a lack of a dedicated EU legal basis 
for  requesting  investigative  measures  to  identify,  trace  and  secure  assets  after  a  conviction. 
Directive (EU) 2024/1260 explicitly requires Member States to facilitate cooperation between 
Asset  Recovery  Offices  (AROs)  for  the  purpose  of  asset-tracing  investigations,  including 
after  a  conviction.  The  Directive  on  the  European  Investigation  Order22  (EIO  Directive), 
governs judicial cooperation for the purpose of obtaining evidence. However, some Member 
States  have  posed  the  question  whether  these  tools  are  sufficient  to  ensure  effective  asset 
recovery during the post-conviction phase of criminal proceedings. At the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council meeting on 9 December 2025, Belgium specifically raised this matter. 

The  Commission  has  also  been  made  aware  by  Member  States  of  a  lack  of  clarity  for 
practitioners on the intended interplay between the Regulation and the other EU instruments 
in the area of criminal asset recovery. Such instruments include not only the  EIO Directive 
and the revised Asset Recovery Directive, but also instruments regulating access to financial 
information23 and anti-money laundering mechanisms24. 

22 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European 
Investigation Order in criminal matters (OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, p. 1). 
23 Directive (EU) 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 laying down rules 
facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution 
of certain criminal offences, and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 122). 

9 

 
 
 
Finally,  it  has  been  noted  that  some  Member  States  impose  conditions  or  requirements  for 
cooperation  that  are  not  supported  by  the  Regulation.  This  includes,  for  instance,  the 
requirement for a freezing request to be renewed and the underlying order to be reissued or 
reconfirmed by the competent authorities in the issuing State at regular intervals in order for 
the  freezing  measure  to  be  maintained.  This  issue  has  also  been  highlighted  by  Eurojust25, 
which further notes that some Member States proactively reissue freezing orders and request 
extensions of freezing measures in the executing State at regular intervals even though this is 
not required or foreseen by the Regulation. 

3.  SPECIFIC POINTS OF ASSESSMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 38 

3.1. Possibility to make and withdraw declarations under Articles 4(2) and 14(2) 

Article 4 of the Regulation governs the transmission of freezing orders. Paragraph 2 of that 
Article provides that Member States may  declare that, when a freezing certificate is sent to 
them for recognition or execution of a freezing order, the issuing authority must also attach 
the original freezing order or a certified copy. The same applies to confiscation orders under 
Article 14(2) of the Regulation. 

16  Member  States  have  made  a  declaration  in  accordance  with  Article 4(2).  The  same 
Member States have also made declarations in accordance with Article 14(2). However, not 
all  of  these  declarations  state  that  the  issuing  authority  should  always  send  the  original 
freezing  or  confiscation  order  together  with  the  certificates.  In  fact,  2  Member  States 
explicitly  state  that  this  is  not  required,  while  another  Member  State  allows  but  does  not 
require its executing authorities to request the original order. 

No declarations under Articles 4(2) or 14(2) have been withdrawn. 

Eurojust reports that even in cases where Member States have not made a declaration under 
Articles  4(2)  or  14(2),  their  competent  authorities  sometimes  still  request  the  underlying 
national  freezing  or  confiscation  orders.  These  requests  can  be  the  result  of  insufficient 
information in the standard freezing or confiscation certificate26. 

3.2. Interaction  between  respect  for  fundamental  rights  and  mutual  recognition  of 

freezing orders and confiscation orders (Articles 8 and 19) 

As noted in the introduction to this  report, the Regulation is based on mutual trust between 
Member States, which in turn facilitates mutual recognition. However, mutual trust does not 
imply that all requests for judicial cooperation must always be recognised and executed. The 
Regulation  sets  out  optional  grounds  for  refusing  recognition  and/or  execution  of  freezing 

24 See, in particular, Directive (EU) 2024/1640 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 
on the mechanisms to be put in place by Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system for 
the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Directive(EU) 2019/1937, and amending and 
repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849 (OJ L, 2024/1640, 19.6.2024). 
25 See Eurojust casework report p. 14. 
26 See Eurojust casework report, p.9. 

10 

 
 
 
and confiscation orders (Articles 8 and 19), in order to, among other purposes, ensure respect 
for the fundamental rights of persons affected by such requests. 

Several of the grounds for refusal set out in Articles 8 and 19 of the Regulation, such as those 
linked to the principle of ne bis in idem and trials in absentia (Articles 8(1)(a) and 19(1)(a) 
and  (g)),  have  a  fundamental  rights  dimension  or  are  relevant  to  fundamental  rights.  In 
addition, Articles 8(1)(f) and 19(1)(h) explicitly provide that the executing State may refuse 
to recognise or execute a confiscation order if, ‘in exceptional situations, there are substantial 
grounds to believe, on the basis of specific and objective evidence, that the execution of the 
freezing order or confiscation order would, in the particular circumstances of the case, entail 
a manifest breach of a relevant fundamental right as set out in the Charter, in particular the 
right to an effective remedy, the right to a fair trial or the right of defence’. 

In  its  questionnaire,  the  Commission  asked  the  Member  States  to  confirm  the  number  of 
cases in which each of the specific grounds for refusal set out in the Regulation  (Articles 8 
and 19) had been applied. The responses suggest that so far, most of these grounds have only 
been used only to a limited extent. 

For  freezing  orders,  13  Member  States  provided  disaggregated  information  on  the  grounds 
for refusal invoked by their competent authorities to date. Of those, only one Member State 
indicated  that  its  competent  authorities  had  invoked  the  ground  for  refusal  based  on  the 
principle of ne bis in idem (Article 8(1)(a)), and one Member State stated that it had refused a 
freezing order on the grounds that the conduct in relation to which the order had been issued 
did not constitute a criminal offence under its law (Article 8(1)(e)). The number of cases in 
which these grounds were invoked was in the single digits. The grounds for refusal based on 
privileges  or  immunities  (Article 8(1)(b)),  the  extraterritorial  nature  of  the  offence 
(Article 8(1)(d)) and fundamental rights concerns (Article 8(1)(f)) were not invoked at all. 

However,  one  Member  State  that  was  unable  to  provide  concrete  data  on  the  refusal  of 
freezing  requests  underlined  that  its  authorities  had  frequently  encountered  cases  in  which 
affected persons relied on fundamental rights arguments when seeking such refusals. 

Eurojust  also  reports27  having  encountered  cases  in  which  executing  authorities  have 
effectively refused to recognise or execute freezing orders on the basis of a perceived undue 
interference with the rights of affected third parties. This includes cases in which fraudulently 
acquired goods were quickly resold to another person. The Regulation allows Member States 
to  refuse  to  recognise  or  execute  confiscation  orders  where  the  rights  of  affected  persons 
would  make  it  impossible  under  the  law  of  the  executing  State  to  execute  the  confiscation 
order. For freezing orders, however, no such ground for refusal exists. Eurojust indicates that, 
at  least  in  some  cases,  the  executing  authorities  have  nevertheless  found  ways  of  refusing 
recognition  on  this  basis,  such  as  by  formally  invoking  another  ground  for  refusal  instead, 
such as that the freezing certificate was incomplete (Article 8(1)(c)) or by relying on broader 
arguments  relating  to  fundamental  rights  and  proportionality,  without  clearly  indicating  the 
ground for refusal being invoked. 

The  only  ground  for  refusal  invoked  by  several  Member  States  was  the  incompleteness  or 
incorrect completion of the freezing certificate (Article 8(1)(c)). This ground also appears to 

27 See Eurojust casework report, p. 16. 

11 

 
 
 
account  for  the  bulk  of  all  refusals.  In  one  Member  State,  31  refusals  were  linked  to 
incomplete or incorrect certificates. 

Issues reported include incorrect  or outdated information  on the assets to be frozen or their 
location,  and  problems  with  the  quality  of  translations  of  the  freezing  certificates.  Eurojust 
confirms that the quality of translations of the standard certificates is frequently poor and has 
often  required  its  intervention  to  clarify  resulting  misunderstandings28.  In  this  context,  one 
Member  State  specifically  stressed  the  importance  of  requested  authorities  consulting  with 
requesting authorities  before refusing a  request, as required by the Regulation, to  allow the 
latter to remedy any issues identified. 

A similar picture emerges for confiscation orders. 11 Member States provided disaggregated 
information  on  the  grounds  for  refusal  under  the  Regulation  applied  by  their  competent 
authorities  so  far.  Only  one  Member  State  indicated  that  its  competent  authorities  had 
invoked  the  grounds  for  refusal  based  on  the  principle  of  ne  bis  in  idem  (Article 19(1)(a)); 
one had invoked the existence of privileges or immunities (Article 19(1)(b)); and one the fact 
that  the  rights  of  affected  persons  made  it  impossible  under  that  Member  State’s  law  to 
execute the confiscation order (Article 19(1)(e)). As with the refusal of freezing requests, the 
number of cases in which these grounds were invoked  was in the single digits. The ground 
for  refusal  based  on  the  extraterritorial  nature  of  the  offence  (Article 19(1)(d))  was  not 
invoked  at  all.  Three  Member  States  refused  to  recognise  confiscation  orders  linked  to 
conduct  that  does  not  constitute  a  criminal  offence  under  their  law  (Article 19(1)(f)).  Two 
Member  States  refused  recognition  on  grounds  related  to  the  affected  person  having  been 
tried in absentia (Article 19(1)(g)). 

The most frequently used ground for refusal  was the submission of incomplete or incorrect 
confiscation  certificates  (Article 19(1)(c)).  Seven  Member  States  reported  invoking  this 
ground  for  refusal.  However,  the  number  of  affected  cases  seems  to  be  lower  than  for 
freezing requests. Fundamental rights concerns as such (Article 19(1)(h)) were only invoked 
in two Member States as a ground for refusal, with fewer than five cases reported. 

The interpretation of the grounds for refusal based on fundamental rights concerns, as set out 
in Article 19(1)(h) has been raised in the preliminary reference to the Court of Justice in Case 
C-8/24.  This  case  concerns  judicial  cooperation  under  the  Regulation  between  Croatia  and 
Slovenia. The Court was asked to clarify whether the Regulation precludes the recognition of 
a  confiscation  order  where  the  person  affected  by  the  confiscation  did  not  enjoy  certain 
procedural  rights.  The  opinion  of  Advocate  General  Richard  de  la  Tour  was  delivered  on 
12 June  202529.  The  Advocate  General  concluded  that Article 19(1)(h)  of  Regulation 
2018/1805  must  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that  the  recognition  and  execution  of  a 
confiscation order may not be refused, if the person affected was duly served with the order 
in  question,  yet  failed  to  claim  an  available  remedy  that  could  have  led  to  a  review  of 
compliance with fair trial standards. A final judgment by the Court is, however, still pending. 

28 See Eurojust casework report, p. 9. 
29 Opinion of AG de la Tour of 12 June 2025, Case C-8/24, EU:C:2025:430. 

12 

 
 
 
3.3. Management  and  disposal  of  frozen  and  confiscated  property,  including 

restitution and compensation (Articles 28, 29 and 30) 

Articles 28, 29 and 30 of the Regulation govern the management and disposal of frozen and 
confiscated assets and the protection of victims’ rights. 

Article 28 requires Member States to ensure that frozen and confiscated property is managed 
in  a  way  that  prevents  depreciation.  One  key  tool  for  competent  authorities  to  achieve  this 
objective is  the possibility to  sell frozen property  before it is  confiscated. This  type of pre-
confiscation  sale,  typically  referred  to  as  an  ‘interlocutory  sale’,  is  also  provided  for  in 
Article 20  of  the  EU’s  Asset  Recovery  Directive30.  Under  that  Directive,  the  sale  must  be 
subject to stringent safeguards to ensure respect for the rights of affected persons. 

No  issues  were  reported  in  relation  to  the  implementation  of  Article 29.  4  Member  States 
indicated  that  they  applied  different  rules  to  managing  property  in  domestic  asset  recovery 
proceedings  than  those  applied  in  cooperation  procedures  in  accordance  with  Article 28  of 
the  Regulation.  However,  these  differences  were  not  reported  to  have  caused  any  issues  in 
practice. 

Article 29  governs  the  restitution  of  frozen  property  to  victims  of  crime.  Where  the 
competent judicial authorities in the requesting State have decided that specific assets should 
be  returned  to  a  victim,  the  issuing  authority  must  inform  the  requested  authority  of  this 
decision.  The  requested  authority  must  then  return  the  property  in  accordance  with  its  own 
national procedures. Direct transfers of such property to the victim are possible. However, it 
is  essential  that  the  victims’  title  to  the  property  is  not  contested,  that  the  property  is  not 
required as evidence and that the rights of persons affected by the restitution are not violated 
in the process. 

16  Member  States  provided  information  on  their  experience  with  the  application  of 
Article 29. All but one of these indicated that they had returned frozen property to victims. 5 
Member States encountered particular challenges in this regard. One Member State noted, for 
instance, that it had encountered cases in which the executing Member State insisted that the 
decision to return frozen property to the victim must be issued by a court in the issuing State. 
This requirement, however, is not supported by the Regulation, which does not limit the types 
of  authority  that  can  issue  such  a  decision  for  it  to  be  recognised  in  accordance  with 
Article 29.  Member  States  and  Eurojust31  also  reported  that  the  application  of  Article 29  is 
challenging where more than one victim has a claim to the return of property and the frozen 
property  is  insufficient  to  satisfy  all  the  victims’  claims,  or  where  there  are  victims  with 
legitimate claims in multiple jurisdictions. The Regulation does not set out the procedure to 
be followed in such cases. 

Eurojust’s  report  on  its  casework  also  highlights  that  the  restitution  of  frozen  property 
remains  operationally  complex.  In  addition  to  confirming  the  challenges  that  arise  in  cases 
involving  multiple  and/or  competing  victims’  claims,  Eurojust  reports  on  several  cases  in 
which the executing Member State has fully or partially refused to comply with Article 29 of 

30 Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on asset recovery 
and confiscation (OJ L, 2024/1260, 2.5.2024). 
31 See Eurojust casework report, p. 19. 

13 

 
 
 
the Regulation, citing conflicting provisions of national law that do not  permit the return of 
frozen  property,  or  at  least  certain  types  of  such  property,  before  a  final  confiscation  order 
has been issued32. 

Most of the responding Member States commonly transfer property earmarked for return or 
compensation  directly  to  the  victims,  without  the  issuing  State  acting  as  intermediary, 
although the method of transfer typically varies depending on the circumstances of the case. 
This is in line with Articles 29 and 30 of the Regulation. 

Good  practice  was  reported  on  the  coordination  of  action  under  the  Regulation  with  action 
under  Directive  2014/60  on  the  return  of  cultural  objects33.  However,  Eurojust’s  casework 
report notes that the time  taken by  the executing authorities to  actually  transfer property to 
victims,  particularly  frozen  property  to  be  returned  under  Article 29  of  the  Regulation,  can 
vary greatly. While in some cases returns have taken less than two months, in others, victims 
have  had  to  wait  more  than  a  year.  This  is  not  consistent  with  the  requirement  set  out  in 
Article 29 for returns to be made as soon as possible. 

Article 30  governs  the  disposal  of  confiscated  assets.  The  primary  rule  for  such  disposal  is 
that  enforcing  decisions  on  the  restitution  of  property  to  victims  of  crime  or  their 
compensation  takes  precedence.  As  with  Article 29,  the  issuing  State  must  inform  the 
executing State of such decisions. The executing State must then execute those decisions as 
soon  as  possible  and  transfer  the  property  to  the  victim  either  directly  or  via  the  issuing 
Member  State.  If  it  is  not  possible  to  return  the  original  property  taken  from  a  victim  but 
money has been obtained as a result of the execution of a confiscation order  relating to that 
property, the corresponding sum must be transferred to the victim. 

Only  one Member State reported  difficulties in  returning confiscated property to  victims of 
crime,  and  the  issue  appears  to  have  been  operational  rather  than  legal.  A  similar  picture 
emerges with regard to the use of confiscated assets to compensate victims of crime: only one 
Member State reported that it had, on rare occasions, experienced issues with the rules under 
Article 30 on the execution of decisions to compensate victims. Eurojust reports34, however, 
that it has encountered cases in which compliance with the rules on disposing of confiscated 
property  for  restitution  or  compensation  proved  challenging.  In  the  case  presented  by 
Eurojust, the difficulty  arose from  specific  features of the national  law of the issuing  State. 
The competent authorities in the issuing State adopted decisions on victim compensation, but 
no  confiscation  order  was  issued  for  the  property  frozen  in  the  executing  State  that  could 
have provided a basis for satisfying the compensation claims. 

As the vast majority of Member States do not collect information on the number of cases in 
which restitution or victim compensation has been facilitated, the Commission does not have 
an overview of how frequently the relevant provisions of the Regulation (i.e. Articles 29 and 
30(1)-(5)) are applied. 

32 See Eurojust casework report, p. 19. 
33 Directive 2014/60/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the return of cultural 
objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 
(OJ L 159, 28.5.2014, p. 1). 
34 See Eurojust casework report, p. 21. 

14 

 
 
 
Where  there  are  no  victims’  claims  to  be  satisfied  or  where  the  value  of  the  property 
confiscated  exceeds  those  claims,  the  remainder  must  be  shared  between  the  issuing  and 
executing  States.  Where  money  is  concerned,  the  rules  are  very  simple.  Any  sum  above 
10 000  euro  is  to  be  split  equally  between  these  States,  unless  otherwise  agreed.  Any  sum 
equal to or lower than 10 000 can be retained by the executing State and does not have to be 
shared.  For  property  other  than  money,  sharing  arrangements  can  take  various  forms, 
including the option to sell the property and share the proceeds equitably, as outlined above. 
It is also possible for the issuing and executing States to agree that the property should remain 
in the executing State, for use in the public interest or for social purposes. The option to be 
applied must be agreed between the Member States involved in each case. 

All  but  one  responding  Member  State  confirmed  that  they  applied  the  default  rules  for 
sharing money. The one Member State that reported a different practice indicated that, in rare 
cases, other informal arrangements had been agreed, as permitted by the Regulation. 

4.  STAKEHOLDER PROPOSALS 

4.1. Member States 

In  light  of  the  challenges  outlined  above  concerning  the  application  of  the  Regulation,  the 
Commission  asked  the Member States  whether  they see a need to  amend the Regulation  to 
enhance  its  usefulness  or  ensure  its  effective  application.  8  Member  States  confirmed  that 
they see such a need. Proposed amendments include, among other things, laying down: 

1)  specific time limits for recognising and executing freezing orders; 
2)  a  specific  time  limit  for  notifying  the  issuing  authority  of  any  circumstances  that 

prevent the immediate recognition or execution of a freezing order; 

3)  a  specific  time  limit  for  reporting  on  the  execution  of  freezing  and  confiscation 

orders; 

4)  a maximum period for which freezing measures may be maintained by the executing 
State  to  avoid  a  disproportionate  burden  on  that  State  and  unnecessarily  lengthy 
interference with the rights of affected persons; 

5)  a  ground  for  refusal  of  freezing  or  confiscation  orders  relating  to  low-value  assets 
where the resources required to execute the order are disproportionate to the value of 
the assets; 

6)  an  explicit  ground  for  refusal  of  freezing  orders  on  the  basis  of  undue  interference 

with the rights of bona fide third parties; 

7)  a  rule  requiring  the  acceptance  of  freezing  certificates  in  English,  at  least  in  urgent 

cases, with a translation to be supplied as soon as possible; 

8)  a legal basis for requesting the freezing of assets for the sole purpose of restitution or 

compensation of victims; 

9)  a procedure allowing Member States to link requests to seize evidence under an EIO 

with requests to freeze criminal assets under the Regulation; 

10) an option enabling the issuing authority, when sending a freezing request, to explicitly 
ask  the  executing  authority  to  conduct  further  investigations  into  the  property  and 

15 

 
 
 
financial  affairs  of  a  suspect  or  accused  person  in  the  executing  State  in  order  to 
determine whether  further property that  could  or should be  confiscated is  located in 
the executing State’s territory; 

11) a  section  in  the  freezing  certificate  that  prompts  the  issuing  authority  to  specify  the 
type  of  confiscation  (e.g.  object  confiscation  versus  value-based  confiscation)  to 
which the freezing request relates. It was suggested that this would make it easier for 
competent  authorities  to  quickly  execute  freezing  orders  in  the  way  intended  by  the 
issuing authority; 

12) a standard form for reporting on the execution of a freezing order. 

One Member State also indicated that the application of the Regulation is generally hampered 
by  a  lack  of  harmonisation  of  national  procedures  intended  to  facilitate  its  application.  As 
noted  throughout  this  report,  both  the  Member  States  and  Eurojust  have  reported  repeated 
instances  in  which  the  degree  of  procedural  autonomy  left  to  the  Member  States  under  the 
Regulation or the failure to amend national law to prevent conflicts with the Regulation might 
have interfered with its effective application. 

Member States  were also asked whether they see added value in  the development  of a soft 
law  measure  that  provides  guidance  on  how  the  Regulation  interacts  with  other  EU  legal 
instruments  that  facilitate  cooperation  for  the  purpose  of  criminal  asset  recovery,  such  as 
Directive  2014/41  (EIO  Directive)  and  Directive  2024/1260  (revised  Asset  Recovery 
Directive). 15 out of the 19 responding Member States indicated that they do see such added 
value, particularly with regard to ensuring clarity on the interplay between the Regulation and 
the  revised  Asset  Recovery  Directive.  One  Member  State  noted  more  generally  that  any 
measure  that  promotes  a  uniform  approach  among  Member  States  to  applying  Regulation 
(EU)  2018/1805  would  be  beneficial,  although  it  was  also  noted  that  any  such  initiative 
should  minimise  any  potential  burden  on  national  authorities,  as  also  highlighted  in  the 
Report of the High-Level Forum on the Future of EU Criminal Justice35. 

One  Member  State  also  proposed  clarifying  the  interplay  between  the  Regulation  and  EU 
instruments in the area of cooperation in civil matters (e.g. Regulation (EU) 655/201436 and 
Regulation  (EU)  1215/2012)37,  which  may  become  relevant,  in  particular,  where  criminal 
proceedings are discontinued and freezing measures under the Regulation must be lifted but 
there are still victims with civil claims that require the subsequent civil seizure of assets. 

The vast majority of responding Member States also support the idea of creating a dedicated, 
multidisciplinary expert group on criminal asset recovery (with representatives from at least 
law enforcement and judicial authorities) and/or providing further dedicated EU funding for 
training practitioners involved in the application of the Regulation. 

35 Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/606f0f38-12f9-4893-8941-
3ac835229bcd_en?filename=JUST_template_comingsoon_standard_16.pdf. 
36 Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
European Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial 
matters (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 59). 
37  Regulation  (EU)  No 1215/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12 December  2012  on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (OJ L 
351, 20.12.2012, p. 1). 

16 

 
 
 
4.2. Eurojust 

In its casework report, Eurojust identifies several root causes of challenges in the application 
of the Regulation. It notes that, in practice, national norms and traditions still prevail at times 
over  the  Regulation.  Eurojust  also  criticises  the  low  degree  of  harmonisation  between 
Member  States’  legal  frameworks,  particularly  on  legal  provisions  and  mechanisms 
supporting  the  application  of  the  Regulation  where  it  leaves  matters  to  the  procedural 
autonomy  of  Member  States.  This  includes  divergent  approaches  to  designating  competent 
authorities.  Eurojust 
the  correct 
interpretation  of  the  Regulation,  in  particular  with  respect  to  autonomous  concepts  such  as 
‘proceedings  in  criminal  matters’  and  expresses  concerns  about  the  user-friendliness  of  the 
standard certificates. 

identifies  challenges 

in  determining 

furthermore 

Eurojust  therefore  calls  for  clear  guidance  on  the  application  of  certain  provisions  of  the 
Regulation (such as the provisions of Articles 29 and 30 on restitution and compensation of 
victims),  particularly  in  complex  cases38.  The  casework  report  also  highlights  the  need  to 
strengthen cooperation between judicial authorities and other authorities involved in the asset 
recovery chain (such as Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)). 

5.  CONCLUSION 

The aim of the Regulation is to facilitate efficient and effective criminal asset recovery across 
borders, particularly in order to tackle cross-border organised crime. It does so by setting out 
detailed rules on how requests for the recognition of freezing and confiscation orders are to 
be  made  and  how  they  are  to  be  handled  by  the  requested  Member  State.  This  generates  a 
high degree of legal  certainty for practitioners applying this instrument and  prevents delays 
caused  by  the  absence  of  clear  rules  on  key  procedural  aspects.  Combined  with  the 
mandatory  use  of  standard  certificates  and  the  maintenance  of  effective  communication 
routines,  judicial  cooperation  between  Member  States  in  criminal  asset  recovery  is 
streamlined  to  the  greatest  extent  possible.  As  such,  the  Regulation  is  a  widely  used  key 
instrument for judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It fulfils a unique and crucial function 
within  the  wider  EU  acquis  by  tackling  money  laundering,  organised  crime  and  terrorist 
financing  and  has  significantly  improved  cross-border  asset  recovery.  Nevertheless,  there 
remains  room  for  improvement  in  increasing  the  proportion  of  identified  criminal  proceeds 
that are ultimately confiscated or returned to victims of crime or re-used for their benefit. 

A  number  of  challenges  persist  in  the  effective  application  of  the  Regulation.  This  is  also 
confirmed  by  Eurojust  in  its  casework  report,  which  highlights  that  in  some  cases  the 
Regulation is still not correctly applied and is even challenged with reference to national law. 

Many  of  the  issues  highlighted  in  this  report  and  in  Eurojust’s  casework  report  can  be 
attributed  to  human  error  or  insufficient  familiarity  with  the  legal  systems  of  the  other 
Member  States  involved.  This  includes,  for  instance,  cases  where  cross-border  cooperation 
was  hindered  or  delayed  because  requests  for  the  recognition  of  freezing  or  confiscation 
orders were sent to the wrong authorities in the executing State or because certificates were 

38 See Eurojust casework report, p.22. 

17 

 
 
 
completed incorrectly. The ongoing digitalisation of certificates is expected to address some 
of these issues. The inclusion of prompts and pre-defined messages should make them more 
user-friendly and ensure  greater consistency between the form and content of requests. Soft 
law guidance on the  application of the Regulation, best  practices  and  increased training  for 
relevant  practitioners  may  also  help  reduce  these  obstacles.  Most  Member  States  support 
allocating EU funds specifically for such training. 

However, some issues are of a more legal or systemic nature and may need to be addressed at 
a legislative or political level in the Member States. These include, for instance, the unilateral 
imposition of conditions for cooperation under national law that are not  provided for in the 
Regulation.  They  also  include  recurrent  non-compliance  with  time  limits  and  significant 
delays  between  the  issuing  of  freezing  requests  and  the  follow  up  with  a  request  for 
confiscation.  Addressing  these  types  of  issues  requires,  among  other  things,  changes  to 
national law and practice and a review of the resources allocated to the authorities responsible 
for issuing and executing requests for the recognition of freezing or confiscation orders under 
the Regulation. The Commission reserves the right to take the necessary measures to ensure 
full compliance with the Regulation. 

Finally, this report shows that there is a need to examine the limitations of the Regulation and 
the  wider  context  in  which  it  operates.  Member  States  have  proposed  amendments  to  the 
Regulation that they believe would enhance its effectiveness. They have also highlighted that 
not all phases or elements of the asset recovery procedure are covered by the Regulation or 
other relevant  EU law.  This is  particularly  the  case  with  regards to  judicial cooperation  for 
the  purpose  of  post-conviction  asset  tracing  and  freezing  assets  for  the  purpose  of  victim 
compensation without a confiscation order being pursued. The Commission will follow up on 
the Belgian initiative39 in this regard. In addition, the intended interplay between the different 
instruments  in  the  field  of  criminal  asset  recovery  is  not  always  easy  for  practitioners  to 
understand.  A clear majority  of Member States  has  therefore indicated support  for soft law 
guidance on this matter. 

Many  Member  States  have  also  expressed  support  for  setting  up  a  multidisciplinary  expert 
group on criminal asset recovery that could facilitate a more holistic understanding of the EU 
criminal  asset  recovery  framework.  The  Judicial  Focus  Group  on  Money  Laundering  and 
Asset Recovery recently launched by Eurojust40 is of particular relevance in this context. 

The Commission  will  reflect  on how best  to  address  the challenges  identified in  this report 
concerning  the  application  of  the  Regulation  and  on  the  proposals  and  recommendations 
made by the Member States and Eurojust to determine the best way forward. In particular, the 
Commission will endeavour to provide guidance on the application of the Regulation within 
the broader EU criminal asset recovery framework. 

39 See Section 2.6. 
40 For details, see https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/eurojust-meeting-tackles-emerging-trends-money-
laundering-and-asset-recovery. 

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