COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Nuclear Illustrative Programme presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty – Final (after the opinion of the EESC)
Date: 2026-03-10
Institutions: Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
Subjects: energy production, innovation, investment, nuclear energy, nuclear policy, nuclear power station, nuclear safety, nuclear technology, radioactive waste, storage of waste

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 10.3.2026  COM(2026) 120 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Nuclear Illustrative Programme presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty – Final (after the opinion of the EESC) {SWD(2026) 84 final}  
 
 
1 

Introduction 

Homegrown, affordable and clean energy supports our decarbonisation, competitiveness and 
resilience objectives as indicated in the Clean Industrial Deal (1) and Action Plan for Affordable 
Energy (2). 

For  some  EU  Member  States,  nuclear  energy 
important  component  of 
decarbonisation, industrial competitiveness, and security of supply strategies. The updated 
National  Energy  and  Climate  Plans  (NECPs)  indicate  that  installed  nuclear  capacity  is 
anticipated  to  increase.  Nuclear  power  plants  supply  clean  power,  suitable  for  low-carbon 
baseload  electricity,  also  enhancing  system  integration  and  providing  flexibility  facilitating 
further  roll-out  of  other  clean  technologies. These  benefits  accrue  to  the  whole  EU  energy 
system. 

is  an 

As  outlined  in  Commission’s  2040  climate  target  impact  assessment  (3),  all  zero-  and  low-
carbon energy solutions are needed to decarbonise the energy system. Projections show that 
zero- and low-carbon energy sources will generate over 90% of electricity in the EU in 2040, 
primarily from renewables, complemented by nuclear energy. Delivering Member States’ plans 
regarding  nuclear  energy  will  require  significant  investments  until  2050,  both  for  lifetime 
extensions  of  existing  reactors  and  the  construction  of  new  large-scale  reactors. Additional 
investments are needed for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and Advanced Modular Reactors 
(AMRs) and in fusion for the longer-term future. 

The choice of the energy sources in the energy mix, including the decision to use or not use 
nuclear  energy,  remains  within  the  remit  of  each  Member  State  in  accordance  with  the  EU 
Treaties (4). Some EU  countries are setting nuclear programmes extending operating life of 
existing reactors and announcing new builds. Finally, some are considering including nuclear 
in  their  energy  mix  for  the  first  time.  The  outlook  of  nuclear  energy  share  in  the  EU 
electricity production depends on long-term operations of existing reactors. 

The  EU  industrial  leadership  in  nuclear  energy  has  firm  roots  in  fundamental 
commitments:  mastering  of  the  entire  fuel  cycle,  fostering  innovative  start-ups  ecosystems 
and  conducting  leading-edge  research,  all  while  ensuring  the  highest  standards  of  nuclear 
safety, security and safeguards, of safe and responsible management of radioactive waste, 
high-class  education  and  training,  as  well  as  promoting  transparency  and  public 
engagement. Further developing essential infrastructure for spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management,  such  as  deep  geological  disposal  facilities,  as  well  as  integrating  circular 
economy  principles  are  therefore  critical  components  in  all  nuclear  programmes.  Future 
industrial  planning  and  investments  in  nuclear  capacity  and  research  infrastructure  must  be 
closely aligned with advances in these areas. 

Diversification  is  key  at  the  EU  level;  scenarios  incorporating  varying  levels  of  nuclear 
energy deployment, based on Member States decisions, may support the transformation of our 
energy system to accomplish both the decarbonisation of our economy and the strategic energy 
independence of our continent. In order to foster economic security of the EU, the Commission 
has  presented  the  Roadmap  towards  ending  Russian  energy  imports  outlining  measures  to 
diversify energy supplies and reduce dependence on external sources (5). 

(1)  
(2)  
(3) 
(4) 
(5)  

COM(2025) 85 final.  
COM(2025) 79 final. 
COM(2024) 63 final. 
Article 194 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
COM(2025) 440 final/2, EUR-Lex - 52025DC0440R(01) - EN - EUR-Lex. 

1 

 
 
 
This  nuclear  illustrative  programme  of  the  Commission  (6)  provides  quantitative  and 
qualitative information on the scope of investment needs across the nuclear energy life-cycle, 
pinpointing  areas  where  Member  States’  action  should  be  prioritised. As  illustrated  below, 
achieving the objectives set out by some Member States will require significant investment, 
blending public and private financing. Clear policy frameworks to de-risk projects will be 
crucial in mobilising the necessary resources. 

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) issued its Opinion on 4 December 
2025 (7) on this nuclear illustrative programme (8), in line with the Euratom Treaty. Adopted 
by a large majority, the Opinion affirms that nuclear energy plays and will continue to play a 
crucial  role in  decarbonising  the European continent,  especially  given that  the  EU needs to 
consolidate its strategic autonomy in energy and technology.  

The  EESC  Opinion  calls  on  the  Commission  to  set  out  regulatory  and  financial  measures 
supporting  the  planned  investments  in  Member  States.  Furthermore,  the  EESC  has 
recommended a technology-neutral approach across all instruments supporting investments in 
clean technologies, as well as speeding up investments through specific measures, such as a 
streamlined State aid process, fiscal measures, licensing processes, and faster decisions at the 
EU and national levels (including a commitment to open up access to EU cohesion funds when 
Member States choose to do so and long-term financing). Moreover, the EESC has expressed 
recommendations pertaining to hydrogen, the role of nuclear energy in system integration, and 
SMRs.  

The  Commission  welcomes  the  Opinion  and  recommendations,  which  align  with  the 
Commission’s recent and upcoming policy initiatives. In 2025, the Commission adopted a new 
State  aid  framework  accompanying  the  Clean  Industrial  Deal  (CISAF),  part  of  which 
streamlines  State  aid  supporting  manufacturing  capacity  in  clean  technologies,  including 
nuclear technologies. In addition, the Commission provided guidance to Member States on 
the design of effective Contracts for Difference and Power Purchase Agreements, in line 
with a technology-neutral approach. The Commission also adopted the delegated act setting 
the  methodology  for  accounting  of  greenhouse  gas  emission  of  low-carbon  fuels,  thus 
further paving the way for hydrogen production using nuclear energy.  

Furthermore, the Commission will prepare an energy system needs assessment for the clean 
transition  which will update the investment  needs  in  the energy sector in the period 2031-
2040, looking at the energy system holistically and in a technology-neutral way. As part of the 
Energy Package of March 2026, including this nuclear illustrative programme and the SMR 
Strategy,  the  Commission  also  presents  a  Clean  Energy  Investment  Strategy  aiming  at 
mobilising  private investments  at  scale  for all clean energy technologies,  including  nuclear. 
Furthermore  and  building  on  the  work  of  the  European  SMR  Industrial  Alliance,  the 
Commission’s SMR strategy supports the acceleration of the development and deployment of 
such  reactors  in  the  EU  in  early  2030s  in  view  of  reinforcing  the  EU’s  industrial 
competitiveness.  The  upcoming  EU  fusion  strategy  will  lay  out  a  comprehensive  set  of 
strategic actions to guide European public and private sector activities in the coming years and 
will  confirm  ITER  as  a  cornerstone  of  the  EU’s  efforts  to  accelerate  fusion  energy 
commercialisation.  

(6)  

(7) 
(8) 

The  nuclear  illustrative  programme  of  the  Commission,  or  Programme  Illustrative  Nucléaire 
Communautaire (PINC) is an obligation of the Commission under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty. 
TEN/856-EESC-2025 
COM(2025) 315 final  

2 

 
 
 
2  Nuclear energy in the current context 

At  the  end  of  2024,  there  were  101  nuclear  power  reactors  operating  across  12  Member 
States (9).  Their  installed  net  capacity  totalled  about  98 Gigawatt  electric  (GWe).  In  2023, 
nuclear energy provided 23% of the EU’s electricity generation (10). The reactor fleet in the EU 
includes three new units recently connected to the grid and three more under construction (11).  

For  comparison,  on  a  global  scale,  there  were  410  power  reactors  in  operation  in  over  30 
countries in 2023. 63 additional reactors were under construction, three quarters of which in 
emerging economies and half in China alone (12).  

Resilient  supply  chain  and  competitive  European  nuclear  industry  are  essential  for 
maintaining EU leadership in this sector. Across the life-cycle of nuclear fuel and nuclear 
installations, there are vulnerabilities and dependencies requiring coordinated intervention of 
Member States and the Commission, the Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports (13) 
will contribute to phasing out Russian nuclear dependencies. Moreover, engaging new talents 
and  supporting  start-ups,  retraining  the  existing  workforce  and  maintaining  and 
reinforcing  skills  in  nuclear  technologies  will  be  crucial  to  support  the  EU  strategic 
leadership. 

Innovative  nuclear  technologies  are  emerging  and  maturing. The  willingness  of  several 
Member States and the European industry to develop Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and 
Advanced  Modular  Reactors  (AMRs),  including  designs  based  on  Generation  IV 
technologies,  has  led  to  the  establishment  of  a  European  Industrial Alliance  (14).  Looking 
ahead, development and commercialisation of nuclear fusion technologies would require an 
EU strategic approach to contribute significantly to meeting and sustaining the ambitious EU 
climate, energy and industrial targets in the second half of this century. 

Beyond the energy sector, modern healthcare is interlinked with the nuclear value chain 
supplying  radioisotopes for medical  diagnostics and treatment.  Maintaining the sectoral  EU 
competitiveness is key to ensure patients’ access to vital medical procedures and therapies (15). 

3  The EU engagement on highest safety standards 

The fundamental commitments on ensuring highest possible standards in nuclear safety across 
three pillars is the foundation of the EU strategic leadership in this sector. 

3.1  Strong and independent regulatory framework 

Strong and independent national regulatory authorities are instrumental to achieving high levels 
of nuclear safety. Endowing the national regulators with sufficient resources – both human and 
financial – to carry out their tasks of regulating, monitoring, and enforcing nuclear safety rules 
is an essential component of regulatory independence. The Euratom legislation, particularly 

(9)  

Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Spain, France, Hungary, Netherlands, Romania,  Slovenia (Croatia), 
Slovakia, Finland, and Sweden. 

(10)   Slight increase in nuclear power production in 2023 - News articles - Eurostat. 
(11)   Mochovce  3  in  Slovakia  was  connected  to  the  grid  in  January  2023,  Olkiluoto  3  in  Finland  started 
commercial operation in May 2023, and Flamanville 3 in France was connected to the grid in December 
2024. One reactor in Slovakia (Mochovce 4) and two others in Hungary (Paks II) are under construction. 
IEA (2025), The Path to a New Era for Nuclear Energy, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/reports/the-path-
to-a-new-era-for-nuclear-energy, Licence: CC BY 4.0. 

(12)  

(13)   COM(2025) 440 final/2, EUR-Lex - 52025DC0440R(01) - EN - EUR-Lex. 
(14)   European Industrial Alliance on Small Modular Reactors - European Commission (europa.eu). 
(15)  COM(2025) 440 final/2, EUR-Lex - 52025DC0440R(01) - EN - EUR-Lex – Action 7 

3 

 
 
 
through the Nuclear Safety Directive (16) and the Radioactive Waste Directive (17), addresses 
the aspects of adequacy of regulators’ financial resources and human capacity.  

At the same time, the environmental acquis must be implemented, through assessments such 
as those stemming from relevant Directives (18). 

Different national circumstances, such as size of the nuclear programme, characteristics of the 
national legal and regulatory framework, and structure of the safety authority, translated into 
domestic and systematic approaches to estimate regulatory resources needs. 

The  European  Nuclear  Safety  Regulators  Group  (ENSREG)  has  contributed  to  share 
information on staffing plans at national level to maintain and reinforce regulatory capacities 
in view of Member States’ plans. Compared to the 2024 baseline figures, planned additional 
positions range from a 10% to 50% staff increase up to doubling the number of staff, depending 
on national  circumstances. Adequate staffing  of regulators is  indispensable  for the safe  and 
effective rollout of national plans. 

Cross-border cooperation between national regulatory authorities can facilitate and speed up 
the  licencing  of  new  installations,  possibly  reducing  administrative  burden  on  individual 
regulators.  The Commission  recommends Member States planning to  use nuclear energy to 
consider  forming  a  “regulatory  coalition  of  willing  countries”,  as  part  of  which  they  might 
converge their regulations or agree to mutually recognise their licensing decisions. 

3.2  Transparent and open public engagement process  

Engaging civil society and public at large through transparent and open dialogue in all stages 
of  the  nuclear  projects  development  (strategic  and  policy  decisions,  siting,  construction, 
operation, decommissioning, spent fuel and radioactive waste management) is pivotal for their 
success.  

Member States should consider investment needs also in this sector, supporting civil society 
representatives and increased education or communication. 

3.3  Effective decommissioning, responsible waste management and circular economy 

Effective decommissioning and responsible management of radioactive waste and spent fuel 
are key to ensuring safety and continued public support to the use of nuclear energy. 

Alongside  any  nuclear  expansion  plans,  Member  States  are  encouraged  to  set  out  policies 
incentivising  progress  in  decommissioning  and  to  advance  the  realisation  of  the  needed 
infrastructure  for  the  management  of  radioactive  waste,  including  deep  geological  disposal 
facilities.  This  requires  governmental  commitment  and  adequate  funding  from  waste 
generators  in  line  with  secondary  Euratom  legislation  (14).  The  Taxonomy  Regulation 
establishes 
technical  screening  criteria  for  classifying  certain  nuclear  activities  as 
sustainable (19). 

(16)   Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom as amended by Council Directive 2014/87/Euratom. 
(17)   Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom. 
(18)  

In particular Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects 
on  the  environment,  Directive  2001/42/EC  on  the  assessment  of  the  effects  of  certain  plans  and 
programmes on the environment, Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild 
fauna and flora, and Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of 
water policy. 

(19)  Regulation  (EU)  2020/852,  OJ  L  198,  22.6.2020,  p.  13–43;  Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU) 

2022/1214, OJ L 188, 15.7.2022, p. 1–45. 

4 

 
 
 
In the EU, about 40,000 m3 of radioactive waste and around 1,000 tonnes of heavy metal (20) 
of spent nuclear fuel are generated each year against a supply of 620 TWh of electricity taking 
year 2023 as reference (21).  

The EU nuclear industry is well equipped to deliver radioactive waste management activities 
(both  for  operations  and  decommissioning),  and  nuclear  decommissioning  works,  applying 
circular economy principles, maximising recycling and reuse of materials/equipment.  As an 
example,  more  than  95%  of  materials  resulting  from  the  dismantling  of  the  Bohunice V1 
reactors in Slovakia was recycled. The unit cost for the overall decommissioning of that plant 
may  be  estimated  at  EUR 8.33  per  supplied  MWh  (22),  including  all  waste  management 
operations except the geological disposal of high-level waste.  

While  cost  assessments  are  steadily  getting  more  accurate  based  on  experience,  further 
improvements should be pursued to increase transparency and security of funding. Significant 
funding  is  needed  to  complete  the  radioactive  waste  management  infrastructure,  including 
geological disposal facilities. In the latest report published by the Commission (23), the overall 
EU cost estimate for the management of all radioactive waste, i.e. including waste generated 
from  past  activities,  all  waste  expected  from  ongoing  and  future  activities,  and 
decommissioning of operational activities, was around EUR 300 billion (24).  

In line with circular economy principles, there is a need to explore further multiple recycling 
of used fuel by manufacturing a new fuel (MOX) for nuclear reactors. 

4  Outlook for nuclear energy in the EU electricity system 

Looking back at the previously published PINC in 2017 (25) (26), the prospected scenario for 
nuclear energy in the EU-27 had been set  around 80 GWe  in  2025. The  current capacity is 
slightly below 100 GWe, mostly due to a higher number of existing installations continuing 
long-term operations than projected at the time of the previous PINC. 

The analysis presented in the accompanying staff working document provides a deployment 
scenario for large-scale nuclear reactors including sensitivity analyses, prospects for roll out of 
Small Modular Reactors along with gap analyses covering the nuclear fuel cycle market and 
facilities, and the industrial supply chain.  

4.1  Nuclear power generation capacity until 2050 

Based primarily on updated National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) (27) and investment 
projects  notified  to  the  Commission  under Article  41  of  the  Euratom  Treaty,  a  ‘base case’ 
scenario of 109 GWe of net electricity generation capacity from large-scale nuclear reactors in 

(20) 

Tonnes of heavy metal, abbreviated as tHM, is a unit of mass used to quantify uranium, plutonium, thorium, 
and mixtures of these elements. 
Shedding light on energy in Europe – 2025 edition, ESTAT, ISBN 978-92-68-22424-3. 

(21) 
(22)   The  figure  of  EUR  8.33  per  MWh  represents  a  ratio,  where:  (i)  the  numerator  is  sum  of  incurred 
expenditures for decommissioning and all waste management operations except the geological disposal; 
and (ii) the denominator is the electric energy generated during the plant’s operational life.  

(23)   COM(2024)  197  final,  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  on 
progress  of  implementation  of  Council  Directive  2011/70/EURATOM  and  an  inventory  of  radioactive 
waste and spent fuel present in the Community's territory and the future prospects - THIRD REPORT. 
This figure represents the sum of Member States’ individual estimates. However, Member States’ estimates 
vary  widely  in  terms  of  methodology,  assumptions,  completeness  of  data,  scope  and  time  frames. 
Individual Member States’ figures may or may not represent a present value figure.    

(24) 

(25)   COM(2017) 237 final. 
(26)   Adjusting also for Brexit. 
(27)   COM(2025) 274 final.  

5 

 
 
 
2050 derives from the assumptions that: (i) at least some of the existing reactors extend their 
service life beyond 60 years; and (ii) planned reactor new build projects are delivered on time. 
As lifetime extensions are subject to verification that standards for nuclear safety, safeguards, 
and security are met, there is uncertainty around the availability of all such reactors in 2050. 
Uncertainty  also  exists  around  the  delivery  of  new-builds  as  planned  (on  schedule  and 
according  to  planned  budget). These  uncertainties  were  assessed  and  resulted  in  a  range  of 
outcomes spanning around the ‘base case’ scenario (Figure 1).  

Figure 1 – ‘Base case’ scenario capacity evolution and uncertainty range. 

Power  plants  undergoing  lifetime  extensions  are  set  to  contribute  a  significant  share  of  the 
nuclear installed capacity in 2050 (cf. light blue bars in Figure 2). In one scenario, the installed 
capacity could drop to less than 70 GWe by 2050. Conversely, if existing reactors extended 
their service life to 70 or even 80 years and all planned new build projects got delivered on 
time,  the  installed  capacity  could  reach  144 GWe  in  2050  (28). The  rate  of  achievement  of 
lifetime extensions will be the main driver behind a wide range of outcomes. 

(28)  

In 2023, the Finnish Government granted the Loviisa nuclear power plant a new operating license until the 
end  of  2050,  at  which  point  it  will  have  completed  more  than  70  years  of  operation. These  presented 
scenarios reflect only potential LTOs of currently operational nuclear power plants. They do not consider 
the potential re-start of already shutdown plants, which could add further capacity if realised.  

6 

                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – ‘Base case’ scenario of large-scale power generation capacities in the EU, 

2024 - 2050. LTO denotes long-term operation (lifetime extensions). 

In addition to traditional large-scale reactors, the scenario may be supplemented with SMRs. 
The European SMR Industrial Alliance is setting out a strategic plan to achieve first SMRs in 
commercial operation in the early years of the next decade. In 2023, in the preparatory phase 
of the European SMRs Industrial Alliance, a preliminary evaluation by the sector organisations 
resulted in projections of SMR capacity ranging from 17 GW to 53 GW by 2050 (29). Such 
projections are consistent with other more recent reports (30) (31). 

Building on the work of the European SMR Industrial Alliance, the Commission’s strategy for 
SMRs (32)  seeks  to  support  the  acceleration  of  the  development  and  deployment  of  such 
reactors in the EU in early 2030s. 

The  ‘base case’  scenario  requires  investments  of  around  EUR 241 billion  in present  value 
terms (33), with new-build of large-scale reactors accounting for EUR 205 billion and lifetime 
extensions  accounting  for  EUR 36 billion.  Thus,  while  actual  lifetime  extensions  will 
determine the installed capacity by 2050, they account only for a minor share of investment 
needs. On the other hand, building new large-scale reactors on schedule and in accordance with 
planned  budget  is  an  important  component  for  total  investment  needs.  The  following 
quantitative  example  shows  that  if  new-build  projects  get  delayed  by  five  years,  installed 
capacity  in  2050  would  decrease  by  almost  9  GWe,  while  the  required  investments  would 
increase by more than EUR 45 billion (34), i.e. spending more for less capacity (Figure 3). With 

(29)   European  SMR  pre-Partnership  -  nucleareurope,  Note  that  this  scenario  include  power  for  electricity 

generation and heat supply. 

(30)   The  Path  to  a  New  Era  for  Nuclear  Energy,  IEA,  2025,  The  Path  to  a  New  Era  for  Nuclear  Energy. 
Considering large-scale reactors and SMRs jointly, the IEA projected global installed nuclear generation 
capacity to increase from 416 GWe in 2023 to between 650 GWe, 870 GWe, and more than 1,000 GWe by 
2050 across three scenarios.  

(31)   Pathways to 2050: the role of nuclear in a low-carbon Europe, Compass Lexecon, 2024, Pathways to 2050 

- nucleareurope. 
(32)  COM(2026)117. 
(33)   The Commission calculated the present value using a discount rate of 7.5%. The investment needs indicated 
include new build and lifetime extensions. Section 3.3 covers investment needs for decommissioning and 
management of radioactive waste and spent fuel separately. 
The quantitative example assumes that construction costs increase proportionally with construction time. 

(34) 

7 

                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
delays leading to further costs, investment needs incurred until 2050 stay well above EUR 200 
billion, even though the available capacity decreases.  

Figure 3 – Investment needs for new build capacity until 2050 for delayed new-build deployment 

scenarios. 

4.2  Energy system effects 

By supplying clean, reliable baseload as well as flexible power nuclear energy may contribute 
to support system integration providing flexibility and inertia for grid stability. High upfront 
capital  costs  of  nuclear  energy  may  be  mitigated  by  systemic  savings  lowering  investment 
needs for transmission, distribution, and storage infrastructure.  

Flexibility  requirements  are  to  increase  across  all  timescales  (daily,  weekly,  and  seasonal). 
Where  utilised,  nuclear  energy  may  primarily  support  the  weekly  and  longer-term  monthly 
flexibility needs (Figure 4).  

Nuclear energy can contribute to support total system integration domestically and across the 
borders. Electricity trade data show that Member States with nuclear energy are net exporters 
(9 out of 10 net exporters in 2023 had nuclear capacity) (35).  

While taking into account its costs, nuclear energy can also contribute alongside other cost-
efficient solutions (including flexibility, storage, grids,  and interconnections) to reduce total 
system  costs  by  complementing  renewables  (like  wind  and  solar)  with  firm,  low-carbon 
capacity that supports grid stability, integration, and storage needs (36). This should be aligned 
to minimise the cost of decarbonisation in line with EU’s climate objectives. 

(35)   Accompanying Staff Working Document, Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. 
(36)  

IEA (2025), The Path to a New Era for Nuclear Energy, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/reports/the-path-
to-a-new-era-for-nuclear-energy, Licence: CC BY 4.0  

8 

 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Contribution of nuclear energy to daily, weekly, and monthly flexibility needs in 

energy volume in the EU and selected Member States in 2030. 

4.3  Emerging innovative technologies 

There is a growing interest in the development of the industry of small and advanced modular 
reactors (SMRs and AMRs) as well as microreactors worldwide. Although not competitors of 
large-scale  reactors  on  the  energy  market,  their  designs  are  conceived  for  faster  and  more 
efficient  deployment  than  large-scale  reactors,  as  factory-built  modules  benefit  from 
competitive effects of in-series manufacturing. SMRs and AMRs are not competing with large-
scale reactors as they may serve different energy needs.  

Though numerous start-up projects exist in the EU, demonstration throughout the realisation 
of first-of-a-kind plants is needed. In the EU, the market size in individual countries does not 
match  the  necessary  production  volumes  for  series  economies  to  materialise.  Therefore,  a 
coordinated approach across Member States is needed, for instance increased cooperation in 
relation  to  regulatory  requirements  by  national  competent  authorities.  In  this  respect,  the 
Commission announced the launch of the design phase of a new potential Important Project of 
Common European Interest (IPCEI) candidate on innovative nuclear technologies. Interested 
EU  countries  will  develop  its  scope  and  structure  with  support  of  the  new  IPCEI  Design 
Support Hub. 

The comparatively small land footprint, reduced cooling water usage, combined utilisation of 
heat  and  most  importantly  the  expected  reduced  construction  costs  make  these  reactors  a 
potentially more appealing option for private investors. A prominent example is the substantive 
amounts of capital being invested by high-tech companies to supply low-emission and reliable 
energy  to  data  centres  and  the  increased  uptake  of  artificial  intelligence  (in  2020  the 
consumption  of  data  centres  globally  stood  at  more  than  10%  of  the  EU  electricity 
consumption). 

Furthermore,  SMRs  and  AMRs  may  form  a  component  of  future  hybrid  energy  systems, 
serving  as  a  reliable  source  of  heat  for  urban  districts  and  specific  hard-to-abate  industries, 
including low-carbon hydrogen production. SMRs can effectively support grid load balancing, 
owing to their typically greater operational flexibility compared to large-scale nuclear reactors. 
Due to their size, such reactors can be placed in a wide variety of locations; on the one hand 
this feature may help optimising the use of existing infrastructures and facilitate the integration 

9 

                                                   
 
 
of  diverse  and  complementary  energy  sources  within  a  given  region;  on  the  other  hand, 
however it poses peculiar safety, security, and safeguards challenges to be tackled. On a general 
level, when selecting locations, Member States should perform a screening for climate risks 
next to the general risk assessment for the planned infrastructure and take into account which 
areas are more conducive to reduce the identified risks to acceptable levels.  

Microreactors are designed as transportable, including via air. Thus, in spite of a high levelized 
cost  of  electricity  (projected  around  140  USD/MWh),  they  are  attracting  interest  for  use  in 
defence applications, in difficult to access markets, such as remote mining sites where energy 
costs are high, in oil and gas industry both on- and off-shore, and in maritime transport. 

4.4  Financing models 

For national plans to materialise, Member States, who have decided to deploy nuclear energy 
should  consider  investing  early  and  developing  policies  to  maintain  a  sustainable  industrial 
ecosystem for nuclear energy. 

The Commission identified instances of lacking market-based instruments for private actors to 
implement  their desired  risk allocation, as well  as challenges  of  “hold-up” risk  (37), i.e. the 
perceived  risk  that  applicable  laws  and  regulations  change  after  private  parties  have  sunk 
capital in a project. 

Therefore,  a  combination  of  diverse  sources  of  financing  complemented  by  de-risking 
instruments may be the  response, where public intervention addresses the above challenges 
taking also into account the benefits, e.g. the potential to increase system integration and supply 
of flexibility.  

The  instruments  set  out  in  the  revised  Electricity  Market  Design  enable  Member  States  to 
support  project  developers  through  re-allocating  electricity  market  and  construction  risks. 
Projects’  financing  may  rely  also  on  Power  Purchase Agreements  (PPAs);  in  those  cases, 
Member States may design support instruments targeting the producer in the given PPA. Other 
jurisdictions, e.g. the US and the UK, are testing other innovative instruments to further manage 
construction  risk,  e.g.  by  adapting  the  regulated  asset  base  model,  an  option  which  some 
Member States have recently considered as well.  

The  Commission  provided  guidance  to  Member  States  on  how  to  design  Contracts  for 
Difference (CfD)  for energy-related projects (38),  including their potential  combination with 
Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), in line with the state aid rules, as indicated in Draghi’s 
report and announced in the Clean Industrial Deal. In line with the approach in the Electricity 
Market Design, the Commission is engaged with the EIB to promote PPAs, including cross-
border PPAs, in a technology-neutral way.  

When designing features of public support, Member States should retain incentives to ensure 
beneficiaries’ efficient behaviour, e.g. delivering construction on time and within budget and 
dispatching capacity based on market signals.  

5  Beyond electricity generation  

Both the existing nuclear reactor fleet and new projected investments at EU and global level 
are largely  focused on electricity supply. However, nuclear technologies can  also  provide a 

(37)   Commission  Decision  (EU)  2015/658  of  8  October  2014  on  the  aid  measure  SA.34947  (2013/C)  (ex 
2013/N) which the United Kingdom is planning to implement for support to the Hinkley Point C nuclear 
power station. 
(38)  C(2025) 8479 final. 

10 

 
 
 
 
source  of  low-carbon  heat  for  households  and  various  industrial  applications  and  are  also 
instrumental in producing medical radioisotopes.  

5.1  Heat supply 

Many industrial processes require high-temperature heat, traditionally generated using fossil 
fuels.  Currently,  the  demand  for  industrial  heat  in  the  EU  is  around  1900  TWh,  with 
approximately 960 TWh needed at temperature levels between 500°C and 1000°C. In line with 
the projected electrification of demand sectors, studies (39) see the demand of high temperature 
heat dropping by 40% to about 620 TWh in 2050. 

Heat from nuclear power plants has already been used or considered for district heating, the 
chemical  industry  or  water  desalination.  Besides,  SMR  developers  see  a  place  for  such 
technologies in the high temperature heat market, as they can contribute either supplying heat 
directly for hard-to-abate processes or via hydrogen production (Figure 5). 

Supplying district heating is one of the potential use cases for SMRs. For instance, the CityHeat 
project, which was selected by the European Industrial Alliance on SMRs, explores this use 
case. 

Figure 5 – SMRs deployment scenarios with shares of heat/hydrogen supply.  

5.2  Medical radioisotopes  

Nuclear  research  reactors  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  production  of  radioisotopes,  which  are 
essential for both healthcare and various industrial applications.  

In the medical sector, radioisotopes are indispensable for diagnosis of diseases, such as cancer, 
cardiac,  pulmonary  and  neurological  ones,  and  they  are  increasingly  important  for  cancer 
therapy.  Projections  show  that  the  number  of  patients  eligible  for  radiopharmaceutical  / 
radioligand  therapies  in  the  EU  will  triple  until  2035  (40).  Therefore,  secure  and  long-term 
supply of medical radioisotopes in the EU is vital for all citizens.  

The EU is a global leader in this market, consistently providing more than 65% of the global 
irradiation  services,  with  a  strong  export  position.  However,  there  are  vulnerabilities  upon 

(39)   Accompanying Staff Working Document, Section 3.1.2. 
(40)   Accompanying Staff Working Document, Section 3.2.1. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
which  to  act  timely,  such  as  specific  foreign  dependencies  (e.g.  supply  of  high-assay  low 
enriched uranium – HALEU) and ageing of EU research reactors. While two research reactors 
are being built to produce radioisotopes for medical use and are scheduled to be ready in the 
early 2030s, innovation should also be pursued to diversify production means and increase the 
system resilience. 

To date, other western countries, namely the US and the UK, have already invested substantial 
amounts  for  domestic  supply  of  HALEU  in  the  order  of  USD 1.2  billion  and  GBP  300 
million (41).  Member  States  should  catch  up  with  similar  investments  in  securing  source 
materials and developing new industrial capacities.  

Under the Strategic Agenda for Medical  Ionising  Radiation Applications  (SAMIRA) Action 
Plan (42), the Commission started a process towards establishing the “European Radioisotope 
Valley Initiative” (ERVI) to secure EU supply of medical radioisotopes (43). 

6  Strategic independence and diversification 

The EU’s strategic independence is  linked to the strengths and vulnerabilities of the supply 
chain. In view of national plans including nuclear energy to decarbonise the energy system and 
maintain  energy  security,  there  is  a  need  to  nurture  a  competitive  EU  nuclear  industry 
ecosystem.  

6.1  Control of the fuel cycle supply chain  

Ensuring security of supply from ore to nuclear fuel should remain a strategic objective of the 
Member States with nuclear energy programmes including elimination of current dependencies 
and  avoidance  of  dependence  in  the  future.  All  Member  States  should  also  consider  the 
strategic importance of security of supply of radioisotopes. 

Russia’s unjustified military aggression against Ukraine has disrupted the global supply system 
for all sources of energy. It has affected the EU market across the entire nuclear fuel supply 
chain: in particular conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication services are to be strategically 
handled; to a lesser extent uranium mining requires attention, too.  

EU’s strategic independence is vulnerable insofar as conversion and enrichment services (both 
in homeland and in like-minded partners) are not sufficient to ensure adequate supplies in view 
of projected nuclear expansion scenarios.  In the ‘base case’ scenario  EU conversion supply 
capacity barely matches foreseen demand until 2050, while EU enrichment supply capacity is 
forecasted to be marginally sufficient with  a definite lack in relation to HALEU, especially 
needed for certain SMRs. 

Uranium conversion and enrichment prices almost tripled from February 2022 to December 
2023. Conversion and enrichment capacities in the EU must increase to meet demand and avoid 
dependence  on  any  single  or  unreliable  supplier.  While  investments  into  new  enrichment 
capacities have been announced (44), investments into conversion capacities are lagging, see 
Figure 6. Both conversion and enrichment service providers need long-term commitments to 
underwrite these investments. 

(41)   Accompanying Staff Working Document, Box Supply of High-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU). 
(42)   SAMIRA Action Plan - European Commission. 
(43)  COM(2025) 440 final/2, EUR-Lex - 52025DC0440R(01) - EN - EUR-Lex – Action 7 
(44)   France: EIB and Orano sign a loan agreement for €400 million relating to the project to extend the Georges 

Besse 2 uranium enrichment plant, European Investment Bank, 10 March 2025. 

12 

 
 
 
Figure 6 – Global demand for conversion services vs supply capacity projections. (tU as UF6 

per year). 

Most  EU  utilities  can  purchase  nuclear  fuel  from  at  least  two  alternative  suppliers.  As  an 
exception, dependence on a single design and supplier of fuel was the case for Russian design 
nuclear reactors operating in the EU (VVER) and became a vulnerability for the security of 
supply  (45).  Almost  all  concerned  EU  operators  have  taken  action  to  diversify  nuclear  fuel 
supply;  alternative  VVER  fuel  supplies  are  expected  to  become  fully  available  by  2027, 
pending regulatory approval. 

Uranium mining in the EU has significantly declined over the past decades, leading to a heavy 
reliance on imports from five countries to meet the region’s nuclear energy needs. The global 
uranium  market  is  facing  challenges  due  to  Russia’s  unjustified  military  aggression  against 
Ukraine, the coup d’état in Niger, production issues, difficulties in transportation, and stronger 
demand, which influenced supply and demand forecast setting upward pressure on uranium 
prices. 

Phasing out supplies from unreliable partners is a necessity to ensure economic security of the 
EU. The prerequisite would be to ensure that safe and open markets could  make up for the 
Russian capacity. Increased cooperation between the EU and reliable international partners is 
crucial in this context. The EU and several countries should coordinate to ensure a resilient 
nuclear supply chain to achieve the goals which the Commission presented in the Roadmap 
towards ending Russian energy imports (46).  

6.2  Capacity of the industrial life-cycle supply chain 

The nuclear energy supply chain in the EU has a pronounced domestic character and should be 
able  to  address  possible  upcoming  disruptions  that  are  due  to  geopolitical,  raw  materials 
availability, or climate change. Maintaining a robust, reliable and interlinked supply chain is 

(45)   Fuel  to  those  reactors  has  been  originally  delivered  from  TVEL  (RU),  subsidiary  of  Rosatom  within 
bundled contracts offering uranium and all related services including production of fuel assemblies. 

(46)   COM(2025) 440 final/2, EUR-Lex - 52025DC0440R(01) - EN - EUR-Lex. 

13 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
essential  to  materialise  the  forecast  demand  for  nuclear  capacity  in  the  EU.  In  the  recent 
decades,  the  EU’s  nuclear  supply  chain  was  marked  by  both  contraction  and  reorientation 
trends towards maintenance and upgrades rather than new construction activities. 

Current plans for new builds in the EU imply that the supply chain needs to ramp up to larger 
capacities to produce all needed components for a nuclear power plant. To achieve 60 GWe of 
new large-scale nuclear power capacity by 2050, Member States and industry would have to 
engage in multiple construction projects at the same time. This implies that because of the long 
construction period of large-scale nuclear plants, over the next 25 years, the equivalent of c. 20 
GWe, representing about 15 large nuclear reactors, would have to be built simultaneously. The 
Commission’s analysis identified critical manufacturing processes, such as heavy forging, that 
require immediate intervention (47). Making the nuclear energy supply chain in the EU more 
resilient would also enable further diversification of nuclear technologies and their related fuel 
cycle. 

Availability of workforce and skills  

A high demand for skilled workers spans across all facets of the nuclear ecosystem, including 
nuclear  engineers  and  scientists,  power  plant  operators,  technicians,  and  regulatory  staff. 
Impending  workforce  bottlenecks,  exacerbated  by  an  ageing  workforce  and  an  insufficient 
inflow of younger professionals, due to low attractiveness of the sector and a deficit in science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education, create various challenges to the 
EU nuclear authorities and industry. 

A study (48) provided estimates on the EU nuclear sector needs in terms of jobs. Additional 
180 000  –  250 000  new  professionals  will  have  to  be  engaged  until  2050,  in  addition  to 
replacing retiring employees. Approximately 100 000 – 150 000 professionals may be required 
to cover the construction phase of planned new nuclear power plants. Another 40 000 to almost 
65 000 professionals are necessary to operate and maintain the planned nuclear power plants. 
Lastly, the decommissioning sector may require a further 40 000 professionals. Even under a 
no-growth scenario (equivalent to the ‘base case’ scenario), around 100 000 people would still 
need to be recruited to replace retiring workers. Particular attention is also required in the fusion 
sector to maintain the EU leading role. 

A  multi-tiered  response  comprising  of  mapping  workforce  needs,  enhancing  education  and 
training,  improving  communications,  offering  better  working  conditions,  and  supporting 
workers’  mobility  (from  adjacent  industries  or  from  third  countries),  and  access  to  nuclear 
research infrastructures may address this challenge. 

If no action is undertaken, Europe will suffer a skills and workforce shortage in the nuclear 
sector, including for certain regulatory bodies. This gap may be even starker in cutting-edge 
technologies such as SMRs. The workforce needs replenishment, rejuvenation, and a transfer 
of  skills  and  experiences  to  the  next  generation.  Whereas  the  nuclear  sector  must  take  the 
initiative to attract new talent, the Commission and Member States can support this process, 
e.g. through Net-Zero Industry Academies and by reinforcing further Euratom Research and 
Training  Programme-funded  action  in  support  to  the  assessment,  maintenance  and 
development of the necessary strategic competences at EU level. 

(47)   Accompanying Staff Working Document, Section 4.3.2. 
(48)   Report  on  the  European  nuclear  ecosystem,  prepared  by  Deloitte  for  DG  ENER,  in  preparation  for 

publication. 

14 

 
 
 
The SKILLS4NUCLEAR project (49), launched in 2025 with an Euratom funding of EUR 1.5 
million,  aims  to  strengthen  capacity-building  in  nuclear  safety,  decommissioning,  waste 
management,  radiation  protection,  and  medical  applications  while  fostering  industry-driven 
workforce development. Additionally, the project will establish a European forum for nuclear 
workforce and skills to update training programmes based on emerging developments and to 
develop reskilling and upskilling initiatives for workers. 

The  need  for  robust  European  nuclear  research  infrastructure  has  a  vital  significance  as  it 
supports cutting-edge research, fosters innovation, and enhances collaborative efforts among 
Member  States.  This  includes  the  development  and  maintenance  of  experimental  facilities, 
data-sharing platforms, and integrated research networks that enable scientists and engineers 
to  conduct  comprehensive  studies  in  nuclear  safety,  safeguards,  waste  management,  fusion 
energy,  and  the  development  of  next-generation  reactor  technologies.  It  also  ensures  that 
Europe  remains  at  the  forefront  of  nuclear  science  and  technology,  maintaining  Europe's 
competitive  edge  in  the  global  research  landscape  and  in  meeting  future  energy  and 
environmental challenges. 

6.3  Strategic international cooperation  

The  Euratom’s  external  relations  framework  is  instrumental  to  promote  the  highest  nuclear 
safety standards, facilitating knowledge and technology exchange, as well as support the EU 
competitive nuclear supply chain, via forward looking partnerships and trade and commercial 
cooperation (50). 
In view of bolstering EU’s strategic autonomy, reviewing existing cooperation agreements or 
entering  in  new  ones  is  essential.  They  may  also  help  strengthening  compliance  with  the 
international  nuclear  standards  and  facilitate  incorporating  emerging  and  innovative 
technologies, such as SMRs and fusion energy.  

Most importantly, increased cooperation between the EU and reliable partners will enhance 
security  of  supply  for  uranium  and  nuclear  fuel  cycle  services  and  will  facilitate  access  to 
markets for the EU supply chain to nurture its industrial capabilities. 

To enhance cooperation between the EU and reliable partners, the Euratom Community should 
embark  in  either  renewing  (e.g.  with  Canada  or  Kazakhstan)  or  negotiating  new  Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding. 

6.4  Leadership in research and training 

Public and private research at national level contribute significantly to the EU’s leadership in 
nuclear technologies. Research efforts contribute to ensuring the highest standards for nuclear 
safety and safeguards when building new nuclear power plants or when extending the lifetime 
of existing ones. Euratom’s task is to complement Member States’ contributions by means of 
the  Euratom  Research  and  Training  Programme.  The  2021-2025  Programme  supported  the 
development  of  essential  knowledge  (51)  for  those  Member  States  who  plan  to  use  nuclear 
energy, and for those who need reassurance that nuclear power plants in neighbouring countries 
meet  the  highest  safety  standards.  The  public  also  stands  to  benefit  from  Euratom  funded 
research on other applications of ionising radiation, in particular in medicine. The Commission 

(49)  
(50)  

https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101213280 
In addition. the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) is a key tool for 
strengthening the adoption of the highest international nuclear safety standards globally. 

(51)   See interim evaluation, COM(2025)61 

15 

 
 
 
proposal  for 2028-2032  Euratom Programme  (52) aims  at  increased  funding for research on 
safe, innovative nuclear technologies for a prosperous, resilient and sustainable EU. 

7  Preparing for a future with nuclear fusion energy 

The  EU’s  flagship  project  ITER,  based  in  France,  is  the  world’s  largest  fusion  experiment 
aimed at demonstrating the scientific and technological feasibility of fusion. As a major driver 
of innovation ITER is bringing the knowledge and industrial base which are essential for the 
development of the first demonstration fusion power plant in the EU. 

It is very important to anchor further investments in ITER and fusion in general in a broader 
European action aimed at mastering fusion not just as a research topic, but also as a tool for 
long-term  energy  independence,  decarbonisation  as  well  as  nearer-term  European  industrial 
competitiveness. Public-private partnerships can accelerate commercialisation of fusion energy 
by leveraging the strengths of both sectors. Continued spending on the development of a fuel 
cycle for fusion technologies and on closing the technology gaps will be needed in parallel with 
the definition and implementation, if necessary, of a differentiated and proportionate regulatory 
framework for fusion installations. 

In line with Draghi’s report and as announced in the Action Plan for Affordable Energy, the 
Commission is preparing a comprehensive EU fusion strategy, whereby ITER is confirmed as 
a cornerstone, with a view to accelerating the long-term development of fusion energy. 

Such developments are supported by research and technology development carried out by the 
Euratom co-funded European Partnership EUROfusion (53) and Fusion for Energy (F4E). The 
commercial  deployment  of  fusion  energy  should  be  accelerated  by  strengthening  the  large 
fusion  community  brought  together  in  the  Fusion  Expert  Group,  the  European  Fusion 
Stakeholder  Platform,  the  launching  of  a  Public  Private  Partnership  with  industry,  and  the 
support to the fusion startups. 

8  Conclusions 

As  several  EU  countries  have  chosen  to  rely  on  nuclear  energy,  it  will  continue  to  play  an 
important role in the EU’s diversified energy system. Therefore, it is essential to ensure its safe, 
efficient and sustainable integration and to reap all benefits nuclear energy may bring, including 
system integration.  

All investment projects in the EU nuclear industry need to comply with the highest standards 
of  nuclear  safety,  radiation  protection,  radioactive  waste  management,  and  safeguards 
applicable in the EU. New nuclear projects must adhere to highest safety objectives, ensuring 
that  innovative  reactor  designs  meet  these  stringent  requirements.  Member  States  should 
intensify  their  efforts  to  provide  long-term  solutions  for  the  management  of  high-level 
radioactive waste and spent fuel. 

In  2050,  a  wide  range  of  outcomes  is  anticipated  for  the  actual  installed  capacity.  Lifetime 
extensions carried out under strict safety conditions and new plants will be critical as well as 
the ability of the industry to deliver on time and on budget. 

Substantial investments are implied across the entire nuclear life-cycle until 2050. Compared 
to the previously published PINC, the Commission has not observed a significant change in 
envisaged investment amounts, however plans are more articulated and diversified, looking at 
innovative  technologies  and  the  full  industrial  ecosystem.  Specific  attention  is  needed  for 
SMRs development and actual deployment, to enhancing the resilience of the supply chain, 

(52)   COM(2025)594  
(53)  

https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101052200 

16 

 
 
 
guaranteeing sufficient, diversified and sovereign EU capacity for conversion and enrichment, 
regulatory  capacity,  research,  the  workforce,  and  delivering  a  secure  supply  of  medical 
radioisotopes.  

To  thrive,  the  EU  nuclear  supply  chain  needs  stable  long-term  commitments,  greater 
standardisation levels and enhanced cooperation. Investing in the competitiveness of the EU 
nuclear industry and strengthening its supply chain is essential, with the ambition to operate 
worldwide. 

17