Opinion of the European Central Bank of 9 March 2026 on emergency powers (CON/2026/8)
Date: 2026-03-09
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: banking supervision, financial stability, legal basis, monetary policy, money, payment system

ECB-PUBLIC 

EN 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 9 March 2026  

on emergency powers 

(CON/2026/8) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 19 December 2025, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Finnish Ministry of 

Justice for an opinion on a working group report containing a draft law on emergency powers 1 (hereinafter 

the ‘draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 2(1), second, third, fifth and sixth indents, of Council 

Decision  98/415/EC2,  as  the  draft  law  relates  to  means  of  payment,  Suomen  Pankki,  payment  and 

settlement systems, rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability 

of financial institutions and markets, and the ECB’s tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit 

institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) TFEU. In accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the Rules of 

Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The draft  law repeals  the  existing  law  on emergency powers3 (hereinafter  the ‘existing law’). The 

explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law (hereinafter the ‘explanatory memorandum’) 

states that the aim of the draft law is to reform the existing law to align it with a modern understanding 

of the comprehensive security of a society and the threats that may have a serious impact on it4. 

Moreover, the draft law aims to provide for a coherent and up-to-date regulatory regime facilitating 

timely and effective responses to different types of emergency conditions 5.  

1.2  To this end, the draft law, inter alia, (a) expands the general preparedness obligation imposed on 

specific  entities,  including  Suomen  Pankki  and  the  Finnish  Financial  Supervision  Authority  (FIN-

FSA); (b) slightly amends the procedure for declaring emergency conditions under the existing law; 

and (c) amends some of the emergency powers in the financial sector.   

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Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, valmiuslain kokonaisuudistus, Oikeusministeriö. 

Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).  

Valmiuslaki (1552/2011); see also Opinions CON/2002/27 and CON/2006/6. All ECB opinions are published on EUR-
Lex. 
Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, p. 117. 

Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, p. 117. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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1.3  General preparedness obligation for specific entities 

The draft law maintains the general preparedness obligation for specific entities, including Suomen 

Pankki and the FIN-FSA, that already applies in normal circumstances 6. This means that Suomen 

Pankki and the FIN-FSA are required to ensure the uninterrupted performance of their statutory tasks 

in all circumstances to the greatest extent possible7. Suomen Pankki and the FIN-FSA are required, 

inter  alia,  to  assess  and  manage  risks  in  their  operating  environment  and  preserve  operational 

readiness in emergency conditions, and to compose  and  maintain a preparedness plan outlining, 

inter  alia,  the  necessary  actions  and  arrangements  concerning  governance,  communication  and 

cooperation8. The draft law also obliges Suomen Pankki and the FIN-FSA to prepare for situations 

in  which  certain  emergency  powers  under  the  draft  law 9  are  adopted,  and  account  for  this  in  the 

preparedness plan 10.  

1.4  Procedure for declaring emergency conditions 

1.4.1  The  draft  law  slightly  amends  the  procedure  for  declaring  the  emergency  conditions  under  the 

existing law. It sets out the substantive conditions based on which the Government of Finland, in 

consultation with the President of the Republic of Finland, may declare the emergency conditions 11, 

i.e. (a) that a situation which may be considered to constitute emergency conditions exists 12 and (b) 

that the management of that situation requires the adoption of one or more of the emergency powers 

under the relevant provisions13 of the draft law14. Emergency conditions may be deemed to exist, for 

instance, in the event of: (a) an armed attack directed against Finland, or an attack comparable to it 

in terms of severity, and its immediate aftermath (‘armed attack’) 15; (b) a significant threat of an armed 

attack directed against Finland, or of an attack comparable to it in terms of severity (‘threat of an 

armed attack’) 16; and (c) certain hybrid scenarios that pose an immediate threat to, or an act, event, 

or a combination thereof affecting, for example, the livelihood of the citizens or the foundations of the 

national economy or the availability of essential payment and securities services (‘hybrid scenario’) 17.  

1.4.2  Following a declaration of emergency conditions under the draft law18, the Government may adopt a 

commissioning decree that may remain in force for a maximum duration of six months at a time19. 

As  a  general  rule,  the  commissioning  decree  must  be  submitted  for  the  approval  of  the  Finnish 

Parliament 20. Subsequently, the Government, or in some cases in the financial sector, the Ministry 

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Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, p. 197; Section 6 of the draft law. 

Section 6 of the draft law. 
Sections 7 and 8 of the draft law; työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, pp. 203-208. 
Chapter 16 of the draft law. 

Section 6, first paragraph, of the draft law. 
Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, pp. 47 and 220; Sections 11 and 12 of the draft law. 

Section 11 of the draft law. 
Part III of the draft law. 

Section 11, second paragraph, of the draft law. 
Section 11, first paragraph , point (1), of the draft law. 

Section 11, first paragraph, (1), point (2), of the draft law. 
Section 11, first paragraph, point (5), of the draft law. 

Section 12 of the draft law. 
Section 14, second paragraph, of the draft law. 
Sections  15  and  16  of  the  draft  law.  Section  17  of  the  draft  law  also  provides  for  immediate  application  of  the 
commissioning decree in certain circumstances. 

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of  Finance21,  may  adopt  the  necessary  implementing  decree(s)  for  the  purpose  of  applying  the 

relevant emergency powers22. The availability of the different  emergency powers depends on the 

basis of which the emergency conditions are declared. 

1.5  Emergency powers in the financial sector 

1.5.1  The  draft  law  follows  the  existing  law  in  continuing  to  provide  for  emergency  powers  in  various 

sectors,  including  communications,  housing,  social  security,  energy  supply  and  financial  and 

insurance markets, whilst proposing some amendments to them.  

1.5.2  In particular, the emergency powers that are vested in Suomen Pankki under the existing law and 

which aim to ensure the adequacy of the capital required by Finland’s economy are transferred to 

the Government23. The explanatory memorandum explains that this transfer is considered necessary 

in  view  of  the  potentially  undesirable  effects  that  the  application  of  the  relevant  provisions  of  the 

existing law24 may have on people’s lives and on businesses’ operational needs 25. The explanatory 

memorandum considers the lack of legislative limitations regarding, for example, the duration and 

substance of the measures available to Suomen Pankki under the existing law to be problematic 26, 

and notes that Suomen Pankki does not have the necessary resources to process the large number 

of administrative decisions that are expected27.  

1.5.3  The  draft  law  continues  to  enable  the  Government  to  grant  exemptions  from  requirements 

concerning, for example, the financial position of credit institutions 28. Additionally, these powers have 

been broadened to encompass reporting requirements29. The Government may also regulate, inter 

alia, interest rates charged by credit institutions 30 and, with a view to ensuring the smooth operation 

of payments and settlement systems, restrict payments and asset withdrawals 31. 

1.5.4  The draft law also expands the emergency powers in other respects32. It introduces a new provision 

which empowers the Ministry of Finance to require financial institutions such as credit institutions to 

(a)  provide  basic  banking  services  and  other  financial  services  necessary  for  the  functioning  of 

society; (b) offer services at certain locations in certain times; and (c) prioritise certain services or 

service users over others 33. The explanatory memorandum notes, however, that a financial institution 

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Section 121 of the draft law. 

Section 18 of the draft law. 
Section 110 of the draft law. Under Section 15 of the existing law, following the declaration of emergency conditions 
and the adoption of a Government decree, matters including, for example, the import and export of securities, payment 
instruments and debt obligations and certain transactions that affect or may affect the quantity or quality of foreign 
payment instruments, securities or receivables owned or held by Finnish residents are subject to the authorisation of 
Suomen Pankki. Moreover, under Section 16 of the existing law, Suomen Pankki may, for example, grant exemptions 
from the duty of repatriation and the prohibition of currency transactions with non-residents provided for in Section 15 
of the existing law. 
Section 16 of valmiuslaki (1552/2011). 

Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, pp. 56-57. 
Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, pp. 56-57. 

Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, pp. 56-57. 
Section 115, first paragraph, of the draft law.  

Section 115, second paragraph, of the draft law.  
Section 111, first paragraph, point (1), of the draft law. 

Section 114 of the draft law. 
On  the  content  of  the  existing  law,  see  paragraph  B  of  Opinion  CON/2002/27  and  paragraphs  3  to  7  of  Opinion 
CON/2006/6. 

Section 121 of the draft law. 

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cannot be obliged to provide services that it does not already provide in normal circumstances 34. The 

draft law also takes account of changes in Union legislation, addressing, for example, the emergence 

of new  asset classes, proceedings such as bank resolution,  and the establishment of the Finnish 

Financial  Stability  Authority  (FIN-FFSA).  Finally,  the  draft  law  enables  the  Government  to  adopt 

implementing decrees providing for exemptions from, for example, the legal requirements concerning 

bank resolution proceedings35. 

1.5.5  Emergency powers in the financial sector are available if the emergency conditions are declared on 

the basis of an armed attack, a significant threat of an armed attack or in certain hybrid scenarios36. 

The authorities responsible for enforcing the implementing decrees adopted for the purpose of using 

the emergency powers in the financial sector are Suomen Pankki, the FIN-FSA and the FIN-FFSA 

in accordance with their statutory tasks. 

1.6  Non-operationality of the ESCB  

1.6.1  As a general condition for the application of several emergency powers in the financial sector 37, the 

emergency powers may be exercised only if the ECB and Suomen Pankki, acting in the performance 

of  the  tasks  of  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks  (ESCB)  as  part  of  that  system,  are  not 

operational during the emergency conditions38.  

1.6.2  The explanatory memorandum states that the non-operationality of the ESCB is to be interpreted 

broadly 39 as encompassing all situations in which the means of the ESCB are considered insufficient 

to  manage  the  crises  affecting  the  stability  of  financial  markets 40.  Moreover,  the  explanatory 

memorandum also notes that this provision of the draft law applies only insofar as the emergency 

powers under the draft law overlap with the tasks of the ESCB41, meaning that the ESCB’s tasks 

related  to  central  banking  enjoy  primacy  vis-à-vis  the  emergency  powers  of  the  draft  law 42.  The 

explanatory memorandum also notes that the supervision of banks and other credit institutions does 

not fall within the scope of this  provision of the draft law as such supervision  is  considered to be 

separate from the ESCB 43.  

2. 

General observations  

2.1  Scope of this opinion 

This opinion is confined to the provisions of the draft law concerning emergency powers relevant for 

the financial markets, Suomen Pankki and the FIN-FSA44. 

Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, p. 413. 
Section 117 of the draft law.  

Section 11, first paragraph, points (1), (2) and (5), of the draft law. The only exception is Section 121 of the draft law 
which does not have any limitation in relation to the grounds for the declaring emergency conditions.  

Sections 110 and 111, Section 113, first paragraph, point (3), and Sections 114 and 115 of the draft law.  
Section 109 of the draft law. 

Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, pp. 385-386. 
Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, pp. 385-386. 

Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, pp. 385-386. 
Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, pp. 385-386. 
Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, pp. 385-386. 

Sections 109 to 117 and 120 and 121 of the draft law. 

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2.2  Conferral of competences on the Union 

The  ECB  has  previously  noted  that  under  the  TFEU  several  competences  are  conferred  on  the 

Union, including the exclusive competence for monetary policy for Member States whose currency 

is the euro45,  46. The tasks that Member States assigned to the ESCB in this respect include, inter 

alia, setting interest rates, injecting or withdrawing liquidity in the market, ensuring efficient and sound 

clearing and payment systems, managing foreign reserves, issuing banknotes, and contributing to 

the  stability  of  the  financial  system.  Moreover,  under  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/201347 

(hereinafter  the  ‘SSM  Regulation’),  specific  tasks  concerning  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit 

institutions  have  been  conferred  upon  the  ECB48.  The  responsibilities  of  the  ECB  in  this  respect 

include, inter alia, the granting and withdrawal of authorisations to take up the business of a credit 

institution, the assessment of acquisitions of qualifying holdings in credit institutions, the imposition 

of prudential requirements, reporting and disclosure obligations, and ensuring compliance with the 

relevant Union law as specified in Article 4 of the SSM Regulation.  

3. 

Specific observations  

3.1  Principle of sincere cooperation  

3.1.1  Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European 

Union, the Union and the Member States must, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying 

out tasks which flow from the Treaties 49. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, 

general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting 

from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of 

the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's 

objectives. 

3.1.2  Against this backdrop, the ECB welcomes the fact that the draft law obliges Suomen Pankki and the 

FIN-FSA to ensure that their statutory duties are carried out with as little disruption as possible under 

all circumstances. The explanatory memorandum notes that the term ‘statutory tasks’ is generally 

intended to cover the tasks for the performance of which the entity in question has been established, 

or which it is legally obliged to undertake 50. The term therefore includes the tasks Suomen Pankki 

carries out as an integral part of the ESCB under the Treaties and FIN-FSA’s responsibilities under 

the SSM Regulation.  

3.1.3  In addition to obliging Member States to strengthen the resilience and to safeguard the security of 

supply  of  Suomen  Pankki  and  the  FIN-FSA  in  the  event  of  an  impending  uncertain  security  and 

45  

46  

47  

48  

49  

50  

See  paragraph 2.1 of  Opinion CON/2020/2, paragraph  2.1  of Opinion  CON/2021/35  and paragraph 2.4 of  Opinion 
CON/2025/18. 
Article 3(1), point (c), of the TFEU. 

Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  (OJ  L  287,  29.10.2013,  p.  63,  ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). 
See  paragraph 2.1 of  Opinion CON/2020/2, paragraph  2.1  of Opinion  CON/2021/35  and paragraph 2.4 of  Opinion 
CON/2025/18. 
See  paragraph  10  of  Opinion  CON/2002/27,  paragraph  8  of  Opinion  CON/2006/6,  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion 
CON/2020/2, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2021/35 and paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2025/18. 

Työryhmän mietintö 2025:50, pp. 197-198. 

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supply situation  the principle of sincere cooperation also obliges Suomen Pankki and the FIN-FSA 

to  prepare  for  such  a  situation.  The  ECB  notes  that  the  draft  law  does  not  distinguish  between 

Suomen  Pankki  and  the  FIN-FSA  on  the  one  hand  and  other  specific  entities  on  the  other  hand, 

which –  differently from  Suomen Pankki  and the FIN-FSA –  do  not act  under the authority of the 

Union, in relation to the performance of Union tasks. As the ECB has its own contingency planning 

in place to ensure the continued performance of the tasks of the ESCB and the continued exercise 

of the responsibilities under the SSM Regulation, the general obligation of Suomen Pankki and the 

FIN-FSA to prepare should be made subject to coordination with the ECB, in line with the principle 

of sincere cooperation51.  

3.2  Safeguard clause of Article 347 TFEU 

Article 347 TFEU comprises a ‘safeguard clause’, which recognises, in essence, that a Member State 

may adopt the measures it considers necessary in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting 

the  maintenance of  law and order  in the event of war, serious  international tension constituting a 

threat of war, or in order to fulfil obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and 

international security. Similarly, Article 15(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 

Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms  (ECHR)  allows  Member  States,  in  time  of  ‘public  emergency 

threatening the life of the nation’, to ‘take measures derogating from its obligations under this Con-

vention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures 

are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law’. 

3.3  Conditions 

3.3.1  It appears that the Court of Justice has not thus far ruled on the conditions for the application of this 

‘safeguard clause’52. The fact that the draft law defines substantive conditions based on which the 

Government of Finland, in consultation with the President of the Republic of Finland, may declare 

emergency conditions on its territory is not, in itself, decisive. Otherwise, the application of Article 

347  TFEU  would  vary  according  to  the  conditions  laid  down  in  the  national  law  of  each  Member 

State53. Rather, the conditions of that provision would need to be given a uniform interpretation by 

the  Court.  Until  now,  the  Court  has  clarified  that  Article  347  TFEU  concerns  ‘wholly  exceptional’ 

situations 54. In this respect it has been suggested that the circumstances in question must constitute 

genuine crises, verging on total collapse of internal security, the occurrence of which represents a 

grave danger for the very existence of the State55. The Court has also clarified that Article 347 TFEU 

is an exceptional and clearly defined provision whose limited character does not lend itself to a wide 

interpretation, and is a derogation which must be interpreted strictly56.  

51  
52  

53  

54  

55  

56  

See paragraph 10 of Opinion CON/2002/27 and paragraph 10 of Opinion CON/2006/6. 
Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Emiliou  of  2  June  2022,  Valstybės  sienos  apsaugos  tarnyba,  Case  C-72/22  PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2022:431, paragraph 111. 
Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Emiliou  of  2  June  2022,  Valstybės  sienos  apsaugos  tarnyba,  Case  C-72/22  PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2022:431, paragraph 113. 
Judgment of 15 May 1986, Johnston, Case 222/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, paragraphs 27. 

Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Emiliou  of  2  June  2022,  Valstybės  sienos  apsaugos  tarnyba,  Case  C-72/22  PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2022:431, paragraph 113. 

Judgment  of  the  Court  of  19  December  1968,  SpA  Salgoil  v  Italian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade,  Case  13/68, 
ECLI:EU:C:1968, paragraph 5; Judgment of  the Court of 15 May 1986, Johnston, Case 222/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, 
paragraph  26;  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  17  December  2020,  Commission  v  Hungary,  Case  C-808/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:1029, paragraph 215. 

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3.3.2  The wording of both the ‘safeguard clause’ and of Article 15(1) of the ECHR (‘in the event of’) requires 

(a) an emergency situation and (b) a causal link between that emergency situation and the measure 

adopted by a Member State. The draft law establishes two safeguards with the objective of ensuring 

the existence of a causal link in adopting the emergency powers. First, as noted in paragraph 1.4.1, 

emergency conditions may only be declared (a) if a situation which may be considered to constitute 

emergency conditions exists57 and (b) if the management of the emergency conditions requires the 

adoption of one  or more  of the emergency powers  under the relevant provisions of the  draft law. 

Second, depending on the situation on the basis of which the emergency conditions are declared, 

only a given set of emergency powers is available. While the ECB observes that these safeguards 

are not able to solve the problem of the potential absence of an emergency situation, it takes the 

view that the compatibility of preventive legislation58 with Article 347 TFEU is ultimately for the Court 

of Justice to decide. 

3.4  Possible measures  

3.4.1  Based on the assumption that preventive legislation is possible, the ECB understands that Article 

347  TFEU  could  theoretically  allow  for  a  general  derogation  from  all  provisions  of  the  TFEU  and 

those adopted on its basis 59. On the basis of emerging doctrine in this developing area of law that 

has as yet attracted little in the way of commentary, a Member State may not only derogate from 

individual obligations imposed on it under Union law, but is also entitled to selectively adopt measures 

within the competence of the Union. This will not, however, have any bearing on the distribution of 

competences between the Union and the Member States60. Rather, the competence of the Union 

and the right of a Member State to selectively adopt measures within that competence under Article 

347 TFEU exist in parallel for the limited duration of the emergency situation61. Therefore, Article 347 

TFEU  does  not  allow  the  temporary  removal  and  taking  over  of  the  competence  of  the  Union 

altogether or undermining the proper functioning of Union authorities.  

3.4.2  Against this backdrop, the draft law may neither make the exercise of the emergency powers depen-

dent  on  an  assessment  by  national  authorities  that  the  ECB  and  Suomen  Pankki,  acting  in  the 

performance of the tasks of the ESCB as part of that system, are not operational nor interpret that 

non-operationality broadly. The tasks of the ESCB under the TFEU and the responsibilities of the 

ECB  and  the  FIN-FSA  under  the  SSM  Regulation  apply  in  all  circumstances,  including  during 

emergency conditions, and cannot be unilaterally set aside by national authorities based on unilateral 

determinations  of  their  operational  capacity  under  national  law 62.  Rather,  the  exercise  of  the 

emergency  powers  under  Section  109  of  the  draft  law  concerning  the  application  of  emergency 

57  

58  
59  

60  

61  

62  

Section 11 of the draft law. 

Preventive legislation refers to laws designed to anticipate potential harms or threats before they occur. 
Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Emiliou  of  2  June  2022,  Valstybės  sienos  apsaugos  tarnyba,  Case  C-72/22  PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2022:431,  paragraph  112.  However,  it  is  doubtful  that  Article  347  TFEU  constitutes  a  reserve  of 
sovereignty, see in this respect Koutrakos, P. ‘Is Article 297 EC a “reserve of sovereignty”?’, Common Market Law 
Review, Vol. 37, Issue 6, pp. 1339-1362. 
See  Dittert,  D.,  ‘Article  347  TFEU’,  in  von  der  Groeben,  H.,  Schwarze,  J.,  Hatje,  A.,  Terhechte,  J.  P.  (eds.), 
Europäisches Unionsrecht, 8th edn. 2025, paragraph 22. 
See Jaeckel, L., ‘Article 347 TFEU’, in Grabitz, E., Hilf, M., Nettesheim, M. (eds.), Das Recht der Europäischen Union, 
September 2025,  paragraph 24; Karpenstein, U., ‘Article 347 TFEU’, in Schwarze, J., Becker, U., Hatje, A., Schoo, J. 
(eds.), EU-Kommentar, 4th edn. 2019, paragraph 9; Kokott, J., ‘Article 347 TFEU’, in Streinz, R. (ed.), EUV/AEUV, 3rd 
edn., 2018, paragraph 7. 

See paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/18. 

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powers in the financial sector in emergency conditions should, as a general rule63, be made subject 

to  consultation  of  the  ECB.  Such  consultation  should  establish  whether  the  ECB  is  planning  any 

measures of its own in relation to the specific emergency conditions in Finland and, if not, whether a 

unilateral measure by Finland would jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives, such as the 

maintenance  of  price  stability  under  Article  127(1)  TFEU  or  the  objectives  pursued  by  the  SSM 

Regulation. As the draft law focuses on the tasks of the ESCB, the ECB finds it useful to clarify that 

the ECB should be consulted irrespective of whether a unilateral measure affects the tasks of the 

ESCB or the responsibilities of the ECB and the FIN-FSA under the SSM Regulation.  

3.4.3  Regarding  the  speed  with  which  the  ECB  would  respond  to  any  consultation  by  the  Finnish 

authorities,  the  ECB  has  been  able  in  the  past,  in  times  of  financial  crisis,  to  deliver  opinions  in 

response to extremely urgent consultation requests by Member States on both legislative and non-

legislative matters64.  

3.5 

Limitations 

When a Member State adopts the measures that it considers necessary under Article 347 TFEU, it 

must comply with the principles of proportionality and sincere cooperation. The measures adopted 

must therefore be appropriate for solving the emergency situation at hand and not go beyond what 

is necessary in order to do so. As a result, derogations from Union law must be, inter alia, temporary. 

As Article 347 TFEU explicitly mentions that the measures that a Member State may be called upon 

to  take  may  affect  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market,  the  ECB  highlights  that  the  exercise  of 

emergency  powers  in  the  financial  sector  may  also  affect  the  functioning  of  the  Economic  and 

Monetary Union in view of their spill-over effects on other Member States. In such case, irrespective 

of the fact that it is not explicitly mentioned in Article 347 TFEU, the principle of sincere cooperation 

would require the ECB to be consulted also ex post with a view to adjusting these measures.      

3.6  Role of cash in exceptional circumstances  

3.6.1  As noted in paragraph 1.5.4, where the emergency conditions are declared, the Ministry of Finance 

may oblige certain financial institutions to provide basic banking services and other financial services 

essential for the functioning of a society, offer certain financial services at certain locations and times, 

and  prioritise  certain  financial  services  over  others.  In  this  regard,  Directive  2014/92/EU  of  the 

European Parliament and of the Council65 provides that basic banking services include, inter alia, 

cash  deposits  and  withdrawals 66.  This  has  been  transposed  into  Finnish  law67  and  implemented. 

Therefore,  the  ECB  notes  that  the  draft  law  may  enhance  the  availability  of  cash  services  in 

emergency conditions to some extent.      

63  

64  

65  

66  

67  

As there is no obligation to do the impossible (impossibilium nulla obligatio est), the obligation of national authorities 
to consult the ECB is subject to its being possible in the concrete emergency situation at hand. 
In respect of legislative consultations, see, for example, Opinions CON/2008/44 (two days), CON/2009/16 (two days), 
CON/2015/24 (one day) and CON/2015/25 (one day). 
Directive 2014/92/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and of the  Council  of  23  July  2014 on the  comparability of  fees 
related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features (OJ L 
257, 28.8.2014, p. 214, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/92/oj). 
Article 16(1) and Article 17 of Directive 2014/92/EU. 

Laki luottolaitostoiminnasta (610/2014). See Section 6a of Chapter 14.  

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3.6.2  The  ECB  understands  that  electronic  payment  instruments  are  the  preferred  payment  method  in 

Finland, while the use of cash is generally declining 68. However, the ECB has previously emphasised 

that cash could play an important role in the event of a disturbance in the payment system, even 

though  automated  teller  machines  (ATMs)  and  other  service  points  may  be  affected  due  to  their 

dependency on the interaction with the account-holding institutions 69. To strengthen the operational 

resilience of the cash supply in emergency conditions, financial institutions may therefore consider 

preparing  for  the  provision  of  in-person  cash  services,  including  through  bank  clerks  or  other 

appointed agents or service providers, or offline cash withdrawals at ATMs. 

3.6.3  Furthermore, the ECB notes that Sweden, where electronic payment methods are similarly preferred, 

has introduced legislative provisions to support the continued use of and access to cash 70. Credit 

institutions  and  branches  that  provide  payment  accounts  with  basic  functions  to  consumers  in 

Sweden are required to provide adequate cash withdrawal services to all consumers holding such 

accounts  throughout  the  country 71.  These  measures,  aimed  at  ensuring  that  cash  remains  a 

functional alternative to electronic payments, have also been considered necessary to contribute to 

enhancing preparedness for contingencies causing major disruptions in the payment system 72.  

3.6.4  However, the ECB notes that the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 

and of the Council on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins 73 may result in measures aimed 

at ensuring the availability of cash in different exceptional circumstances where demand for it could 

rapidly increase, or where cashless payments are significantly disrupted 74.        

3.7  Capital controls 

The draft law empowers the Finnish Government to impose capital controls if emergency conditions 

are declared75. The ECB wishes to emphasise that any such restrictive measures should be strictly 

temporary  and  aimed  at  restoring  financial  stability.  Furthermore,  the  ECB  invites  the  consulting 

authority to reconsider the removal of capital control powers from Suomen Pankki, given the latter’s 

expertise and the critical role it would have in mitigating the costs and distortions associated with 

such capital controls. In order to ensure timely and efficient responses to capital flights, it is important 

not to reduce Suomen Pankki’s tasks. In view of Article 5 of the Statute of the European System of 

Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, the statistical data needed to support such action 

would be readily available to Suomen Pankki. 

68  

69  
70  

71  
72  

73  
74  

75  

The ECB, Study on the payment attitudes of consumers in the euro area (SPACE) (2024), available on the ECB’s 
website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 

See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2019/41. 
See paragraph 1.3 of Opinion CON/2019/41. 

See paragraph 1.3 of Opinion CON/2019/41. 
See paragraph 1.5 of Opinion CON/2019/41. 

COM(2023) 364 final. 
Article 8a and recital 8a of the Council Negotiating Mandate on the Proposal for a Regulation on the legal tender of 
euro banknotes and coins envisages that Member States should ensure that a cash resilience plan or combination of 
measures is established in order to ensure access to cash in different exceptional circumstances. Available on the 
Council’s website at www.consilium.europa.eu. 

Section 110 of the draft law.  

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3.8 

Insolvency and bank resolution proceedings 

The  draft  law  would  allow  the  Finnish  Government  to  adopt  implementing  decrees  providing  for 

exemptions from, for example, the legal requirements concerning insolvency proceedings and extend 

such  powers  to  bank  resolution  proceedings 76.  The  ECB  underlines  that  adherence  to  the  bank 

resolution  framework  of  the  Union77  and  the  ECB’s  competence  in  relation  to  Regulation  (EU) 

No 806/2014  and  the  SSM  Regulation  is  critical  for  safeguarding  financial  stability  and  protecting 

depositors, while avoiding the imposition of a burden on taxpayers if banks fail. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 9 March 2026. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

76  
77  

Section 117 of the draft law. 
Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and 
Directives  2001/24/EC,  2002/47/EC,  2004/25/EC,  2005/56/EC,  2007/36/EC,  2011/35/EU,  2012/30/EU  and 
2013/36/EU,  and  Regulations  (EU)  No  1093/2010  and  (EU)  No  648/2012,  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/59/oj) and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for 
the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism 
and  a  Single  Resolution  Fund  and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No 1093/2010  (OJ  L  225,  30.7.2014,  p.  1,  ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/806/oj). 

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