COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating firearms trafficking and other firearms-related offences and amending Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council
Date: 2026-02-26
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: arms trade, cross-border cooperation, fight against crime, firearms and munitions, illicit trade, non-proliferation of arms, offence, penalty

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 26.2.2026  SWD(2026) 102 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating firearms trafficking and other firearms-related offences and amending Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council {COM(2026) 102 final} - {SEC(2026) 102 final} - {SWD(2026) 103 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ................................................................7 
1. 
PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................................................................... 12 
2. 
3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ......................................................................................................... 41 
4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ................................................................................ 43 
5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ..................................................................... 47 
6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ............................................................ 62 
7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ............................................................................................. 75 
PREFERRED OPTION ....................................................................................................................... 82 
8. 
9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................. 84 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................. 85 
LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES ................................................................... 85 
1. 
2.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING ...................................................................................................... 85 
3. 
CONSULTATION OF THE RSB ....................................................................................................... 86 
EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY ......................................................................................... 87 
4. 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) ................................................. 88 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 88 
1. 
CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES ........................................................................................................ 91 
2. 
PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND CALL FOR EVIDENCE ............................................................. 91 
3. 
RESULTS ............................................................................................................................................ 95 
4. 
ANNEX 3: PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND CALL FOR EVIDENCE .................................................. 119 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 119 
1. 
PUBLIC CONSULTATION .............................................................................................................. 119 
2. 
3. 
CALL FOR EVIDENCE ................................................................................................................... 132 
ANNEX 4: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ......................................................................................... 139 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE ................................................................... 139 
1. 
SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS ...................................................................................... 140 
2. 
3. 
RELEVANT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS .............................................................. 142 
ANNEX 5: ANALYTICAL METHODS .................................................................................................... 143 
1.  OVERVIEW OF THE DATA USED ................................................................................................ 143 
2.  DATA ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................ 145 
3.  DATA LIMITATIONS ...................................................................................................................... 183 
ANNEX 6: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK ............................................................................................... 185 
1.  OVERVIEW OF IMPACTS ON COMPETITIVENESS .................................................................. 185 
SYNTHETIC ASSESSMENT ........................................................................................................... 185 
2. 
3. 
SME TEST ......................................................................................................................................... 185 
ANNEX 7: CASE STUDIES....................................................................................................................... 189 

1 

 
 
1. 
2. 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 189 

ILLICIT MANUFACTURING, ILLICIT TRAFFICKING, AND ILLICIT MODIFICATION OF 
MARKINGS ...................................................................................................................................... 189 

ANNEX  8:  EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY  OF  THE  PREPARATORY  STUDY  ASSESSING  AND 

COMPARING THE CRIMINALISATION OF OFFENCES RELATED TO FIREARMS ............. 200 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 200 
1. 
THE MAPPING STUDY ................................................................................................................... 200 
2. 
3.  DEFINING THE OFFENCES REGARDING FIREARMS .............................................................. 202 
4. 
SANCTIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 209 
5.  MAIN KEY FINDINGS .................................................................................................................... 217 
ANNEX 9: CALCULATIONS FOR COSTS FOR ADMINISTRATIONS ............................................... 219 
1. 

COSTS OF AN INCREASE IN STAFF IN MEMBER STATE POLICE AND PROSECUTION 
OFFICES............................................................................................................................................ 219 
2. 
COSTS OF AN INCREASE IN BALLISTIC DEPARTMENTS WITHIN MEMBER STATES. ... 222 
ANNEX 10: MONITORING FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................ 224 
ANNEX 11: ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY ..................................................... 227 
ANNEX 12: OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................... 232 

Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

Core firearms offences 

The core firearms offences cover illicit trafficking, illicit 
manufacturing, illicit modification of markings and illicit 
possession.1  The  first  three  of  these  offences  are 
mandatory  offences  according  to  the  UN  Firearms 
Protocol,  and  the  Firearms  Directive  implicitly  requires 
the criminalisation of illicit possession.  

Dual incrimination 

In a situation where an act has a cross-border element and 
involves two Member States, there is dual incrimination 
when such act is recognised as a crime in both Member 
Stats. Some acts may, on the other hand, be criminalised 
in one Member State but not in the other – in such cases, 
there is no dual incrimination.  

1 See Annex 12 for the legal definition of each offence.  

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EMPACT 

Europol Firearms Hub 

Firearms Directive 

European  multi-disciplinary  platform  against  criminal 
threats.  It  is  a  cooperation  instrument  gathering  EU 
Member  States,  supported  by  relevant  EU  institutions, 
bodies and agencies (such as, Europol, Frontex, Eurojust, 
CEPOL,  OLAF,  EU-LISA,  EFCA  and  others).  The 
platform  aims  to  identify,  prioritise  and  address  threats 
posed  by  organised  and  serious  international  crime. 
EMPACT  runs  in  four-year  cycles  and  is  driven  by  the 
EU  Member  States, 
international 
organisations,  and  other  public  and  private  partners  are 
also associated. 

third  countries, 

A  repository  of  firearms  related  data  managed  by 
Europol. It is currently in development. Upon completion, 
it  will  include  two  modules:  automatic  exchange  of 
ballistic information and information of firearms seizures 
in the MS in the context of criminal activities.  

Directive (EU) 2021/555 of the European Parliament and 
of  the  Council  24  March  2021  on  the  control  of  the 
acquisition and possession of weapons.  

The  Directive  sets  common  minimum  standards  on  the 
acquisition,  possession,  and  commercial  exchange  of 
civilian firearms (e.g. firearms used for sport shooting and 
hunting) within the EU. 

JIT 

Joint Investigation Team 

A  JIT  is  an  international  cooperation  tool  based  on  an 
agreement between competent authorities – both judicial 
(judges,  prosecutors,  investigative  judges…)  and  law 
enforcement  –  of  two  or  more  States,  established  for  a 
limited duration and for a specific purpose, to carry out 
criminal  investigations  in  one  or  more  of  the  involved 
States 

The  UN  Firearms  Protocol  defines  three  offences  that 
to  criminalise  (illicit 
Member  States  are  required 
trafficking,  illicit  manufacturing  and  illicit  modification 
of marking) 

Mandatory offences 

NFFP 

National Firearms Focal Point 

3 

 
 
Recast Firearms Regulation 

NFFPs are central contact point for cross-border requests, 
investigations  and  cooperation.  The  role  of  NFFP  is  to 
gather,  analyse  and  improve  the  information  flow 
regarding  the  criminal  use  and  the  illicit  trafficking  of 
firearms into and within the Member State and across into 
the EU at a strategic and operational level. It relies on a 
coordinated  collection  and  sharing  of  information  to 
enhance  the  intelligence  picture  and  better  inform  law 
enforcement agencies.  

Regulation (EU) 2025/41 of the European Parliament and 
of  the  Council  of  19  December  2024  on  import,  export 
and  transit  measures  for  firearms,  essential  components 
and ammunition, implementing Article 10 of the United 
Nations Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and 
trafficking  in  firearms,  their  parts  and  components  and 
ammunition, 
the  United  Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN 
Firearms Protocol). 

supplementing 

The  Recast  Regulation  introduces  a  comprehensive 
system of authorisations and controls for civilian firearms 
trade with non-EU countries. 

SIENA 

Secure Information Exchange Network Application 

SIENA is a platform for the exchange of operational and 
strategic  crime-related  information.  It  is  managed  by 
Europol, connecting national law enforcement authorities 
and other relevant bodies (e.g.: Eurojust, Frontex, OLAF 
and Interpol). 

SIS 

Schengen Information System 

Small arms 

SIS  is  an  information  sharing  system  for  security  and 
border management in Europe. Amongst other modules, 
it  includes  a  database  of  all  lost,  stolen  or  otherwise 
sought firearms in the EU. 

“Small arms” are, broadly speaking, weapons designed to 
be carried and operated  by an individual. They include, 
inter  alia,  revolvers  and  self-loading  pistols,  rifles  and 
carbines, shotguns, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and 
light machine guns. 

4 

 
 
SOCTA 

Serious Organised Crime and Treat Assessment 

SOCTA  is  a  Europol  report  that  assesses  the  most 
threatening criminal phenomena in the EU and identifies 
priority areas for the EU policy level. 

TE-SAT 

European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.  

TFEU 

UN 

TE-SAT is a Europol report that provides an overview of 
the terrorism phenomenon in the EU in a given year. 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

United Nations 

UNODC 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

Illicit  firearms  are  a  direct  threat  to  the  security  of  citizens  of  the  European  Union2. 
Firearms are a key enabler for other criminal activities. They are the tool of choice for offenders 
to  carry  out  serious  and  organised  crime-related  violence  and  other  forms  of  serious  and 
organised crime, such as drug trafficking, extortion and racketeering, armed robberies, migrant 
smuggling and street gang activities3.  

Firearms  have  long  lifespans  –  unlike  other  criminal  goods  such  as  drugs,  they  are  not 
consumable  and  thus  even  small  amounts  of  trafficked  firearms  can  accumulate  over  time. 
Antique firearms are still used for criminal and terrorist purposes. 

Research suggests that the criminal demand for firearms is increasing in various EU Member 
States.4 A 2021 comparative study on firearms-related violence in Europe has pointed out that 
the observed increased availability of various types of illicit firearms to criminals has led 
to  an  escalation  of  criminal  firearms-related  violence  in  several  European  countries  and 
sometimes also to arms races among criminals5. 

Gang and drugs-related shootings involving illegal firearms have become a regular occurrence 
in European cities. In a press conference on 12 August 2025, the Brussels public prosecutor 
reported that 57 shootings had taken place in the city since the start of the year. Some of these 
shootings were done with Kalashnikov type firearms. Other examples in 2025 include Grenoble 
(France)6, Uppsala (Sweden)7, Örebro (Sweden)8, Bydgoszcz (Poland)9, Randers (Denmark)10, 
Madrid (Spain)11, Naples  (Italy)12  to  name only  a few.  Research conducted through the EU 
funded project INSIGHT, suggests that firearms violence results in around 1,341 deaths and 

2 Europol, European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), The Hague, 2025, p.61.  
3 idem, p.62.  
4 De Schutter, A. & Duquet, N. (2023), The nexus between drug markets and gun violence in the European Union, 
Flemish Peace Institute and EMCDDA, https://www.euda.europa.eu/drugs-library/nexus-between-drug-markets-
and-gun-violence-european-union_en. 
5 Duquet, N & Vanden Auweele, D (2021), Targeting Gun Violence and Trafficking in Europe, Brussels, Flemish 
Peace  Institute,  https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/20211221-rapportTARGET-web-
def.pdf  
6 On 16 September 2024, two people were shot by a Kalashnikov-type firearm in a drug-related event, one man 
died, 
https://www.lejsl.com/faits-divers-justice/2024/09/16/l-un-des-deux-blesses-dans-la-fusillade-de-
see 
samedi-est-decede 
7  Three  people  between  18  and  20  were  killed  in  a  shooting  in  a  barbershop  on  29  April  2025,  see 
https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/04/30/police-in-sweden-say-teenager-under-arrest-after-three-
killed-in-uppsala-shooting 
8 On 19 May 2025, an individual opened fire among several people, including children, in a gang-related incident, 
see https://omni.se/skytten-i-orebro-oppnade-eld-mitt-bland-flera-barn/a/dRezBX  
9 A shooting occured on 11 January 2025, resulting in one injured man and the arrest of a 39-year-old suspect 
linked to drug-related activities. See https://maps.gunviolence.eu/info/grp-20250114011430568323 
10 A 22-year-old man was arrested for participating in a shooting at Hells Angels' clubhouse in January 2025, see 
https://www.berlingske.dk/indland/mand-faengslet-for-skud-mod-rockeres-klubhus-efter-nye-beviser 
11 Two men were seriously injured in separate shootings on 15 January 2025, with one incident linked to a drug 
deal  and  the  other  possibly  involving  violent  youth  gangs.  See  https://maps.gunviolence.eu/info/grp-
20250116004021456767 
12  A  25-year-old  man  was  fatally  shot  on  16  May  2025,  with  the  police  investigating  the  organised  crime 
connection, see https://maps.gunviolence.eu/info/ita-00000000000000791044 

6 

 
 
 
5,096  injured  each  year,  further  highlighting  the  urgent  need  for  action.  At  this  time,  it  is 
however not always possible to determine if these incidents happened with the use of legal or 
illegal firearms. 

Firearms are also the tool of choice for perpetrators carrying out terrorist or right-wing 
extremism fuelled attacks.  On 16 October  2023, 3 peoples were shot with  an AR-15 type 
firearm during a football match in Brussels, outside the stadium, killing two Swedes.13 In April 
2025, France grappled with shooting targeting 7 prisons, described as terrorist attacks, possibly 
in response to the government’s crackdown on drug trafficking14. On 31 May 2025, in Puget-
sur-Argens,  an  individual  in  possession  of  several  firearms  fatally  shot  his  neighbour,  a 
Tunisian man, following racist motives15. 

The threat  of illicit  firearms  contributes  to  the worrying phenomenon of  young Europeans 
being roped in criminal activities, with an increasing number committing and suffering from 
firearms violence. The last SOCTA published by Europol observed that individuals involved 
in  gun violence are increasingly younger16. The increased availability of  illicit  firearms has 
facilitated the gradual trickling-down of the possession and use of firearms to lower segments 
of the criminal hierarchy in several EU Member States, including younger criminals17. This is 
to  be  juxtaposed  against  the  rising  phenomenon  of  violence-as-a-service  where  instigators 
outsource  the  commission  of  crimes  to  (often  young)  perpetrators18.  Findings  from  the  EU 
funded project TARGET19 stated that young men (under the age of 35), are the main victims 
and perpetrators of lethal firearms violence. 

The availability of illicit firearms and the threat they are posing are expected to worsen 
in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.  The war has  led to  a high 
demand  of  firearms  among  military  and  law  enforcement  services  in  Ukraine,  with  many 
countries from all the world sending thousands of small arms as part of their military support 
to  Ukraine.  Some of small arms lost by both  sides  of the war are inevitably  in  unregulated 
possession in Ukraine. This so far has not resulted in systemic trafficking due to international 
cooperation and efforts of law enforcement services of Ukraine. However, once the conflict 
reaches an end, demand for unregulated possession will drastically decrease and will result in 
a surplus of firearms. Past experiences from the Western Balkans have shown that a part of that 
surplus is likely to find its way into the illegal market in neighbouring countries. The legacy of 

13 Guillaume Derclaye, "Attentat à Bruxelles : un individu interpellé en rapport avec l’arme utilisée par Abdesalem 
Lassoued”,  Le  Soir,  25  Octobre  2023,  https://www.lesoir.be/545497/article/2023-10-25/attentat-bruxelles-un-
individu-interpelle-en-rapport-avec-larme-utilisee-par  
14 Ian Aikman and Jessica Rawnsley, ”French prison attacks are 'terrorism' says justice minister”, BBC, 15 April 
2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwy75231z90o 
15 A. S., “Meurtre raciste dans le Var : ce que l'on sait”, TF1 Info, 2 June 2025, https://www.tf1info.fr/justice-
faits-divers/var-puget-sur-argens-il-tue-son-voisin-et-publie-des-videos-racistes-2374396.html  
16 Europol, European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), The Hague, 2025, p.33.  
17 Duquet, N. and De  Schutter, A The nexus between drug markets and gun violence in the European Union. 
Flemish peace institute, Brussel, 2023. 
18 Europol, 'From instigator to perpetrator: how violence‑as‑a‑service operates', press release, 14 August 2025, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/instigator-to-perpetrator-how-
violence%E2%80%91%E2%80%91%E2%80%91service-operates  
19 Duquet, N. and Vanden Auweele, D., Targeting gun violence and trafficking in Europe, Flemish Peace Institute, 
Brussels, 2021 

7 

 
 
 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and unrest in Albania has resulted in the Western Balkans 
region being awash with firearms and the main origin of many of firearms illegally trafficked 
into the EU20.  

In addition, recent technological advances, such as 3D printing which is getting increasingly 
accessible,  will  increase  this  threat.  The  potential  these  technologies  offer  for  criminals 
underscores the need to stay ahead of the curve21. 

Legal context 

At  the  international  level,  the  trafficking  of  firearms  and  other  firearms-related  criminal 
offences  is  regulated  by  the  United  Nations,  through  the  Protocol  against  the  Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition22 
(hereafter  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol).  The  UN  Firearms  Protocol  supplements  the  UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and provides for a framework for States to 
control and regulate licit arms and arms flows. It establishes the basic rules regarding brokering 
and dealing in firearms, the marking of firearms, how deactivated firearms should not be able 
to be reactivated, how import, export and information sharing between State Parties should be 
organised etc. The main objective of this text is to prevent the diversion of firearms into the 
illegal circuit. The UN Firearms Protocol therefore also requires the cooperation between State 
Parties to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of related offences. 

The UN Firearms Protocol defines a certain number of firearms-related offences such as illicit 
trafficking, illicit manufacturing and illicit modification of firearms markings. State Parties are 
required to criminalise these three offences (hereafter the ‘mandatory offences’). To date, 25 
of the 27 EU Member States have ratified the UN Firearms Protocol and are thus State Parties.23 
The European Union ratified it in 201424, however, the EU has not adopted any specific legal 
instrument to ensure the implementation of the legal obligations under Article 5 of the 
Protocol which criminalises the mandatory offences.  

The EU has adopted several instruments in the field of firearms, but only from the perspective 
of the legal market. Therefore, these EU instruments mainly regulate the legal acquisition and 
possession  of  firearms.  Directive  (EU)  2021/555  of  24  March  2021  on  the  control  of  the 

20 De Schutter, A. and Duquet, N., The nexus between drug markets and gun violence in the European Union, 
European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drugs Addiction/Flemish Peace Institute, Brussels, 2023 and Joint 
issue  paper  UNODC-Flemish  Peace  Institute,  Firearms  and  Drugs:  partners  in  transnational  crime, 
Brussels,2023. 
21 See section 2.2.2. 
22  Protocol  against  the  Illicit  Manufacturing  of  and  Trafficking  in  Firearms,  Their  Parts  and  Components  and 
Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 31.05.2001. 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-c&chapter=18&clang=_en  
23Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.  
24 Council Decision 2014/164/EU on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol against the 
Illicit  Manufacturing  of  and  Trafficking  in  Firearms,  Their  Parts  and  Components  and  Ammunition, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, OJ L 89, 25.3.2014, p. 7. 
11.02.2014.  

8 

 
 
 
acquisition  and  possession  of  weapons  (the  Firearms  Directive)25  sets  common  minimum 
standards on the acquisition, possession, and commercial exchange of civilian firearms (e.g. 
firearms used for sport shooting and hunting) within the EU. Regulation (EU) 2025/41 of 19 
December 2024 on the import, export and transit of firearms26 (the recast Firearms Regulation) 
introduces  the  requirement  to  obtain  an  import  and  export  authorisations  to  move  firearms 
across  the  EU  border  from  and  towards  third  countries.  By  defining  what  is  legal,  both 
instruments inevitably demarcate what is illegal.  

To further support this demarcation, the EU instruments provide definitions for two of the UN 
mandatory  offences,  specifically  illicit  manufacturing  and  illicit  trafficking.  Both  illicit 
manufacturing and illicit trafficking are defined, amongst others, based on the absence of the 
correct authorisations to manufacture or move a firearm. These authorisations are established 
as  part  of  the  legal  market  in  both  EU  instruments.  Therefore,  the  absence  of  these 
authorisations inevitably defines the illicit nature.  

Unfortunately, the UN Firearms Protocol and both EU instruments have different scopes. The 
UN  Firearms  Protocol  establishes  rules  within  and  between  State  Parties,  the  Firearms 
Directive  establishes  rules  applicable  in  the  territory  of  the  EU  and  the  recast  Firearms 
Regulation establishes rules at the border of the EU (so between the EU and third countries). 
This has led to gaps in the transposition of the mandatory UN offences. This is explained in 
detail as part of Problem driver 1: current legal landscape is too cumbersome and complex for 
practitioners.  

Due  to  the  focus  on  the  legal  market,  both  the  Firearms  Directive  and  the  recast  Firearms 
Regulation do not set any rules for the penalties applicable to infringements of the legal rules. 
Instead, it requires Member States to adopt such rules and to ensure that the penalties provided 
for  shall  be  effective,  proportionate  and  dissuasive.27  It  follows  that  the  penalties  for  the 
offences  from  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol,  the  Firearms  Directive  and  the  recast  Firearms 
Regulation are set by Member States themselves.  

As a result, there are large divergences between Member States in how firearms-related 
offences  are  defined  and  sanctioned,  with  national  penalties  for  firearms-related  offences 
varying greatly in their severity. In absence of any specialised EU legislation establishing EU 
wide minimum rules on the definitions of criminal offences and penalties on firearm-related 
crimes, the criminal law framework dealing with such offences is fragmented at EU level. This 
is particularly concerning as firearms trafficking and other firearms-related offences often 
involve  a  cross-border  element.  The  fight  against  such  phenomenon  thus  requires 
cooperation  between  Member  States  and  a  common  classification  of  offences.  The 
inconsistencies and gaps between Member States’ criminal laws lead, by nature, to challenges 

25 Directive (EU) 2021/555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 on control of the 
acquisition and possession of weapons, OJ L 115, 6.4.2021. 
26  Regulation  (EU) 2025/41 of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  19  December  2024 on  import, 
export and transit measures for firearms, essential components and ammunition, implementing Article 10 of the 
United Nations Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components 
and  ammunition,  supplementing  the  United  Nations  Convention  against  Transnational  Organised  Crime  (UN 
Firearms Protocol) (recast), OJ L, 2025/41, 22.1.2025. 
27 Article 23 of the Firearms Directive. 

9 

 
 
 
in cross-border operational cooperation. Incoherences in the classification of offences and 
the  corresponding  penalties  negatively  affect  enforcement  and  prosecution.  As  the 
investigation and prosecution of firearms offences become cumbersome, national authorities 
prefer devoting their efforts in prosecuting other easier offences with lower penalties and lower 
deterrent effect28.  

A further comparison between the different legal texts can be found in Annex 12. 

Political context 

The  fight  against  the  threat  posed  by  illicit  firearms  has  been  a  long-standing  priority  at 
European level. In 2015, the European Council identified in several statements the fight against 
illicit trafficking of firearms as one of the measures to fight terrorism on which further progress 
should be made29.  

Additionally, the fight against firearms trafficking has been identified as a European priority 
since 2014 by the Member States, with dedicated operational action plans under the framework 
of  the  European  multi-disciplinary  platform  against  criminal  threats  (EMPACT).  This 
assessment was recently renewed by the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs of the Member 
States  for  the  period  2026-202930.  In  2018,  in  a  resolution  on  3D  printing  focusing  on 
intellectual property rights and civil liability, the European Parliament referenced the security 
concerns raised by the use of 3D technology to manufacture weapons31. 

On top of that, in June 2022, the Council adopted conclusions calling upon the Commission to 
assess the need to  establish  minimum rules on offences  and sanctions in  the field  of illegal 
firearms trafficking32.  

The Commission has repeatedly identified the trafficking of firearms as a major threat to the 
European  Union  internal  security.  ProtectEU33,  the  new  European  internal  security  strategy 
unveiled in  April 2025,  reiterates that  firearms  are a key enabler of the increasing  violence 
perpetrated by organised crime groups. One of the objectives, is the harmonisation of criminal 
law standards on illicit firearms trafficking.  

28  Extracted  from  conclusions  from  various  meetings  and  consultations  carried  out  by  the  Commission  in  the 
framework of the stakeholder consultation, reflected in Annex 2. 
29 Council documentation 9422/1/15; 5855/15; 5322/15; 5897/15; 6891/15 
30 Council conclusions on the enhancement of EMPACT and on EU crime priorities for the next EMPACT cycle 
2026-2029, Council doc. 9397/25, 13 June 2025 
31 https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/en/procedure-file?reference=2017/2007(INI)  
32 Council Conclusions on Protecting Europeans from Terrorism: Achievements and Next Steps, point 47, Council 
doc. 9997/22,09.06.2022.  
33 Communication of from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ProtectEU: a European Internal 
Security Strategy, COM(2025) 148 final, 1.04.2025 

10 

 
 
 
The threat of firearms trafficking was previously mentioned in the Internal Security Strategy 
2015-202034, then identified as a crime priority in the 2020-2025 EU Security Union Strategy35 
and the 2021-2025 EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime36. 

As a result, and to address this threat in a comprehensive manner, the European Commission 
adopted the 2020-2025 EU Action Plan on firearms trafficking37. One of the priorities of the 
Action Plan is to increase pressure on the illegal market for firearms. This includes identifying 
how  criminals  exploit  possible  gaps  in  the  existing  EU  legislative  framework  on  the  legal 
possession and acquisition of firearms and on the legal import, export and transit of firearms, 
and assessing the need to introduce minimum criminal-law rules. The Commission also urged 
Member States to complete the establishment of fully staffed and trained Firearms Focal Points. 

Another key priority identified in the Action plan is the building of a better intelligence picture. 
In the relevant working groups of the Council in May 2024, Member States agreed on the need 
to develop a repository at EU level of seized firearms, essential components and ammunition38.  

Sustainable Development Goals 

The initiative contributes to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (Promote peaceful and 
inclusive  societies  for  sustainable  development,  provide  access  to  justice  for  all  and  build 
effective,  accountable  and  inclusive  institutions  at  all  levels),  including  targets  16.1 
(significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere) and 16.4 (by 
2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return 
of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime).  

Overall,  the  high  number  of  firearms-related  incidents  across  European  cities,  the  looming 
threat of firearms flowing into Europe when the conflict in Ukraine ends, the rapid pace of the 
technical  advances  and  the  long-standing  political  prioritisation  of  countering  firearms 
trafficking in the Council are among the most relevant reasons justifying urgent EU action. 

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

The problems, underlying problem drivers and consequences that are relevant for the proposal 
are presented in Figure 1. 

34  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  the 
European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  on  the  EU  Strategy  to  tackle 
Organised Crime 2021-2025, COM/2021/170 final, 14.04.2021 
35  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Security Union Strategy, 
COM(2020)605 final, 24.07.2020.  
36 Communication of from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  on  the  EU  Strategy  to  tackle 
Organised Crime 2021-2025, COM(2021)170 final, 14.04.2021 
37  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 2020-2025 EU action plan on 
firearms trafficking, COM(2020)608 final, 24.07.2020. 
38 Meeting of the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) under the Belgian 
Presidency on 29 May 2024 

11 

 
 
 
Figure 1: Problem tree 

12 

                         Insufficient qualitative and comprehensive statistical data 3 Current legal landscape is too complex and cumbersome for practitioners 1  New technologies are creating unforeseen risks PROBLEM DRIVERS  Penalty levels are not sufficiently effective and dissuasive 2 Insufficient cooperation and coordination between Member States’ competent authorities 4 3 Challenges in cross-border cooperation Security threats posed by the high number of illegal firearms present on EU territory Firearms-related violence threatens the security of EU citizens PROBLEMS 1 2 CONSEQUENCES High number of firearms-related incidents Investigations are hindered and the deterrence effect is lessened Inadequate policies and resources FINAL  CONSEQUENCE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.  What are the problems? 

2.1.1.  Security threats posed by the high number of illegal firearms present on 

EU territory  

There  is  no  accurate  numbers  of  incidents  committed  using  illegal  firearms  in  the  EU.  The 
records provided by national  authorities, when they are available, often do not  differentiate 
between incidents involving legally owned firearms and illegal ones. Nevertheless, available 
information suggests that this number is high as the numbers of firearms-related incidents, 
where firearms have been used to commit a crime, remain high and are on the rise in 
many places in the EU. 

In the Netherlands, the National Statistics Agency indicated in March 2025 that the number of 
firearms-related  crimes  has  gone  up  24%  over  the  10  years  since  201439.  In  Brussels,  the 
Belgian Federal Police reported a surge of 65% of shooting incidents between 2022 and 202440. 
The  Swedish  National  Council  for  Crime  Prevention  carried  out  a  study  examining  gun 
violence trends in the criminal world since the mid-2000s and found that the number of injuries 
and  deaths  from  gun  violence  steadily  increased  nationwide  between  2005  and  202341.  In 
Germany, the Federal Criminal Police Office indicated that crimes involving firearms that were 
recorded in 2023 were 6.7% higher than in 2022, and 14.5% higher than in 202142.  

The AI-powered Incident Monitor of the online knowledge platform Gunviolence.eu43 which 
tracks  firearms-related  incidents  using  open-source  media  since  2023,  has  identified  7,591 
incidents with firearms in the EU in 2023, and 7,705 incidents in 2024. Similarly, to reports 
from national authorities, it is not possible to draw any correlation between incidents involving 
firearms in the EU and illicit firearms as the platform does not differentiate between incidents 
involving  legally  owned  firearms  and  illicit  ones.  Nevertheless,  increasing  the  strictness  of 
rules on legal ownership tends to reduce the number of homicides in the affected country44. As 
the rules on legal ownership have not been loosened in the last years, the increase in incidents 
is expected to come from an increase in the availability of illicit firearms.  

in  2024”,  4  March  2025, 

39  Dutch  National  Statistics  Office,  “Minder  misdrijven  geregistreerd 
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2025/10/minder-misdrijven-geregistreerd-in-2024 
40 Marie-Laure Mathot, “Fusillades à Bruxelles : voici les cartes qui témoignent d’une augmentation des 
violences liées à la drogue dans la capitale", RTBF, 21 February 2025, , https://www.rtbf.be/article/fusillades-a-
bruxelles-cartographie-d-une-augmentation-des-violences-liees-a-la-drogue-dans-la-capitale-11507104 
41Henrik Angerbrandt, Mariana Dufort & Victor Dudas,  "Increased Gun Violence in Sweden", Report 2024:7, 
Brottsförebyggande  rådet  2024,  https://bra.se/english/publications/archive/2025-01-24-increased-gun-violence-
in-sweden#h-Brasassessment 
42 Official website of German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), Federal Situation Report on Gun Crime 2023, 1st 
August 2024, p. 7, accessible at 
https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/Waffenkriminalita
et/waffenkriminalitaetBundeslagebild2023.pdf  
43 EU funded project INSIGHT, ISFP-2020-AG-FIRE, accessible at Firearms Incident Monitor | Gunviolence.eu 
44  Krüsselmann K., Aarten P.,  Liem M., Firearms and violence in Europe  – A systematic review, PLoS ONE 
16(4), April 2021, accessible at https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0248955 

13 

 
 
 
Although  difficult  to  quantify  precisely  due  to  similar  limitations,  the  threat  posed  by 
firearms  is  considered  to  inflict  significant  harm  and  expense  on  society.  Based  on  the 
research into the size of lethal and non-lethal gun violence in the EU from the project INSIGHT 
(International  Network  Studying  Incidents  with  Guns:  Harm  and  Trafficking)45  firearms 
violence  can  be  estimated,  in  the  EU,  to  result  in  around  1,341  deaths  and  5,096  persons 
physically injured each year46. This is not taking into account the trauma and the feeling of 
insecurity these shootings cause.  

The limited picture due to the lack of data is further highlighted as a problem on its own in 
section 2.1.3 below. Seeking to improve this data through dedicated research would be unlikely 
to yield accurate results, not least because the lack of data is a structural problem linked to how 
firearms offences are defined, implemented and recorded at national level.  

The main factor fuelling firearms-related violence, especially those used in correlation with 
other  organised  crime  such  as  drugs  trafficking,  is  the  high  availability  of  illicit  firearms 
which  are  being  illegally  trafficked  within  and  into  the  EU47.  The  proliferation  of  illicit 
firearms in the EU increases the risk of their use in criminal acts, including terrorist attacks and 
organised  crime.  The  demand  for  illicit  firearms  trafficking  within  the  European  Union  is 
largely driven by criminals48. 

The  illicit  firearms  market  in  the  EU  used  to  be  a  closed  market  where  it  was  difficult  for 
persons lacking extensive criminal connections to access firearms. It has since evolved to  a 
model where illicit firearms have become more easily available for lower-level criminals and 
terrorists  with  the  right  criminal  connections49.  Law  enforcement  agencies  from  various 
European  countries  have  noted  an  increased  availability  of  firearms  for  criminals  in  their 
country in the past decade50. Some Member States have even observed the existence of criminal 
firearms  pools,  where  criminals  can  rent  firearms  for  certain  periods  of  time51.  An  analysis 
performed by the UNODC, based on the seizure data provided by Member States and research 
on the illicit flows  of firearms, concluded  that this  evolution  occurred  mainly  due to  cross-

at 

EU 

call 

under 

project 

funded 

INSIGHT, 

Accessible 

ISFP-2020-AG-FIRE. 

45 
https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/en/project-
insight/#:~:text=This%20online%20knowledge%20platform%20offers%20policymakers%2C%20police%20off
icers%2C,information%20about%20firearms%20violence%20in%20the%20European%20Union 
46 Krüsselmann, K, Lethal and non-lethal Firearms Violence in the European Union, Brussels, 2023, p. 12 
47  UNODC  and  Flemish  Peace  Institute,  Firearms  and  Drugs:  Partners  in  Transnational  Crime,  accessible  at 
https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Issue-paper-on-firearms-drugs-links_final.pdf  
48  UNODC,  Illicit  Trafficking  in  Firearms  their  Parts,  Components  and  Ammunition  to,  from  and  across  the 
European 
at 
report, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf 
49  UNODC,  Illicit  Trafficking  in  Firearms  their  Parts,  Components  and  Ammunition  to,  from  and  across  the 
European 
at 
report, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf 
50 Duquet, N. and De  Schutter, A The nexus between drug markets and gun violence in the European Union. 
Flemish peace institute, Brussel, 2023. 
51  UNODC,  Illicit  Trafficking  in  Firearms  their  Parts,  Components  and  Ammunition  to,  from  and  across  the 
European 
at 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf 

Vienna,2020, 

Vienna,2020, 

Vienna,2020, 

accessible 

accessible 

accessible 

regional 

regional 

regional 

analysis 

analysis 

analysis 

Union; 

Union; 

Union; 

report, 

p.17, 

14, 

17, 

p. 

p. 

14 

 
 
 
border smuggling of firearms from post-conflict countries, the increased availability of easy-
to-convert weapons, easy-to-reactivate deactivated firearms and increased online trafficking52.  

Other  main  channels  for  the  supply  of  illicit  firearms  include:  diversion  from  legal  supply 
chains (e.g. illegal sale of historical or antique weapons and army surplus material); targeted 
thefts  of  firearms  from  legal  owners  (e.g.  hunters,  collectors  or  sport  shooters);  illicit 
manufacturing  (clandestine  workshops  and  gunsmiths);  illicit  brokering  and  professional 
misconduct (tampering with record-keeping and licensing), and; diversion of firearms outside 
the EU during international transfers53. 

The  high  number  of  firearms  makes  it  easier  for  criminals  to  access  firearms  and  conduct 
criminal  activities  such  as  drug  trafficking,  extortion  and  racketeering,  armed  robberies, 
migrant smuggling and street gang activities54. The cost on the European society is not only 
that of the injuries and the deaths resulting from the use of these illicit firearms, but also that 
of  the  feeling  of  insecurity  stemming  from  the  criminal  activities  enabled  by  these  illicit 
firearms. The increase of violence is most notable in the case of drug trafficking: 

Drug trafficking is one of the most serious security threats facing Europe 
today. The situation is escalating, with an unprecedented increase in the 
availability of illicit drugs in Europe, in particular cocaine from South 
America. Moreover, the level of violence associated with the drug trade 
appears to be increasing in Europe. 

Eurojust 2024 Annual Report55 

Some EU Member States are experiencing unprecedented levels of drug market-
related violence, often related to the cocaine and cannabis markets. This appears to 
be concentrated in distribution hubs and in competitive retail markets. Such violence 
includes killings, torture, kidnappings and intimidation, and often takes place 
between criminal networks, although innocent people are also victims. This has 
severe impact on society as a whole, increasing the perception of public insecurity. 

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), EU Drug 
Markets Analysis 202456 

52 Idem, p.17 
53 As reported by law enforcement experts (EMPACT firearms and the European Firearms Experts group) and 
Europol - Sources are sensitive, non-classified documents.- 
54 Europol, European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), The Hague, 2025, p. 62.  
55 Eurojust annual report 2024, p. 26 
56  Key  insights  for  policy  and  practice  –  p.  17  -  https://www.euda.europa.eu/publications/eu-drug-
markets/analysis-key-insights-policy-and-practice_en 

15 

 
 
 
Due  their  illicit  nature,  it  is  impossible  to  accurately  quantify  the  numbers  of  illegal 
firearms currently in circulation in the European Union. The 2020-2025 EU action plan on 
firearms trafficking states that it is estimated that 35 million illicit  firearms  were owned by 
civilians in the EU in 2017 (56% of the estimated total of firearms)57. This number is based on 
a study by Small Arms Survey in 201758. However, this number is likely to be outdated and 
itself relies on sources that are also estimates. Moreover, this number does not only represent 
the  firearms  that  are  being  illicitly  trafficked  or  used  for  criminal  purposes.  Many  of  these 
firearms are in the hands of persons who do not commit criminal activities but rather failed to 
declare or register their firearms.  

Instead, the numbers on firearms seizures are regarded as the best proxy for estimating 
the scope and value of the scale of illicit firearms. Yet not every Member State has a national 
database on seized firearms. Furthermore, the data that is recorded is done in an unharmonised 
manner. Therefore, the inconsistent reporting between Member States does not allow for the 
drawing of any conclusion on trends. Available numbers solely depict the tip of the iceberg as 
they only capture a fraction of the criminal activities. This difficulty is further compounded by 
the lack of reliable and comparable data on other indicators which could help evaluate the scale.  

An example of this difficulty is the last global firearms study, carried out by UNODC59. Only 
19 EU Member States reported to the UNODC the number of illicit firearms seized by their 
national authorities between 2021 and 2023. However, only 6 Member States reported numbers 
for all three years60, while one Member State reported for both 2022 and 2023 and two Member 
States reported for 2021 and 202361.  

The  total  number  of  seizures  that  were  reported  by  16  Member  States  to  UNODC  in  2021 
amounts  to  52,412  illicit  firearms  seized.  In  2022,  this  number  was  21,904  for  13  Member 
States, and 55, 613 for 11 Member States in 2023. 

It is more than likely that this number of seizures is underreported as during the consultation 
activities, 11 different Member States reported over 36,500 illicit firearms seized in 2022 to 
the European Commission. Open sources indicate that the number of seized weapons in 2023 

57  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 2020-2025 EU action plan on 
firearms trafficking, COM(2020)608 final, 24.07.2020. 
58 Small Arms Survey, “Estimating Global Civilian-held Firearms Numbers”, Briefing Paper, June 2018. Dataset 
under 
available 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/Weapons_and_Markets/Tools/Firearms_holdings/SAS-BP-
Civilian-held-firearms-annexe.pdf 
59 UNODC, Global Study on Firearms Trafficking, 2020 
60 One additional Member States (Poland) was discounted due to a statistical incoherence with numbers of seizure 
being above 1000 for three years consecutively, then just 8 in 2023.  
61 Data available in official web of UNODC Global statistical series on crime, criminal justice, drug trafficking 
and  prices,  drug  production,  and  drug  use.  Specific  data  on  firearms  trafficking:  https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-
firearms-arms-seized  

16 

 
 
 
 
in France amounts to two third of that number: the French Ministry of Justice recorded 8,147 
convictions in 2023 for illicit trafficking with seized weapons numbering almost 23,00062.  

Another  indicator  as  to  the  important  number  of  illicit  firearms  in  the  EU  is  the  626,739 
firearms registered as lost, stolen or sought in the EU in the Schengen Information System63. 
These  various  figures  offer  an  incomplete  or  fragmented  view.  They  remain  nonetheless 
striking and indicative of an upward trend. 

To date, the Western Balkans remains the main source of illegal firearms coming from conflict 
zones, despite the massive inflow of weapons into Ukraine64. An example at national level is 
Sweden where, according to information provided in the project INSIGHT65, the most common 
seized  semi-automatic  pistols  during  the  period  2017-2022  within  the  region  of  Stockholm 
were traced back to Balkan countries (59%). Likewise, the firearms used in terrorist attacks in 
Paris in November 2015 and Vienna in November 2020 were traced back to the Balkans66. 

However, this could change once the conflict in Ukraine reaches an end. The EU needs to be 
aware of the mid- to long-term consequences on firearms trafficking which could unfold in a 
post-conflict situation. The arms trafficking risk from such situation is an order of magnitude 
larger than that posed by the Balkans67. The conflict has led to a soaring demand for firearms 
among military and law enforcement services in Ukraine, has caused numerous cases of loss 
of firearms (including losses of Russian military in the territory of Ukraine) and resulted in an 
increase of firearms-related crimes within Ukraine. According to Ukrainian law enforcement 
agencies68,  the  number  of  crimes  where  firearms  were  used  or  related  to  firearms-related 
offenses increased from 275 in 2022 to 4147 in 2023 and to 13,413 in 2024. The Ukrainian 
Ministry of  Interior indicated that  it is  estimated there  could  be  anywhere between 1  and 5 
million of ‘trophy weapons’ (a weapon found on the battlefield or captured from an enemy) in 
the hands of the population in Ukraine. 

“How many weapons do we have, as we call them, trophy weapons? It is impossible to count. 
From a million to 5 million are the figures that are mentioned. It's a fireworks display of 
numbers. Somewhere we will say that after the war there will be 2-3 million, I think, at least 
firearms. I mean, these are not short-barrelled weapons, these are automatic weapons, these 

62 C. Delbecque, ‘"En dix ans, le marché a radicalement changé" : enquête sur la banalisation du trafic d'armes en 
France’,  L'Express,  10  March  2025,  accessible  at  https://www.lexpress.fr/societe/en-dix-ans-le-marche-a-
radicalement-change-enquete-sur-la-banalisation-du-trafic-darmes-en-france-
3CFCVN6RUFHRFIWEIWOH7H3CK4/ 
63 Last information available from EU-LISA on 1 June 2025. 
64 Varisco, A E, : Types of Firearms Used in Violence in the European Union. SIPRI, Stockholm, 2023. EU funded 
project INSIGHT, under call ISFP-2020-AG-FIRE . 
65 Varisco,A E, : Types of Firearms Used in Violence in the European Union. SIPRI, Stockholm, 2023. EU funded 
project INSIGHT, under call ISFP-2020-AG-FIRE . 
66 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , “The Western Balkans is still the criminals’ choice 
for weapons”, Risk bulletin 18, May 2024, accessible at https://riskbulletins.globalinitiative.net/see-obs-018/04-
western-balkans-still-criminals-choice-weapons.html 
67 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “Tomorrow’s fire: future trends in arms trafficking 
from 
https://globalinitiative.net/wp-
2025, 
content/uploads/2025/02/Tomorrows-Fire_conference-report.v1-MR-PB-MR-18-Feb-PB-PG-MR-PB2.pdf 
68 Restricted information in the framework of EMPACT firearms actions. 

the  Ukraine 

accessible 

conflict”, 

February 

at 

17 

 
 
 
are grenades, these are mines and more serious weapons that are in the hands of our citizens 
and will be in the hands of our citizens”  

Ukrainian Minister of Interior, Ihor Klymenko69 

Once the hostilities cease, the military demand for firearms will drastically decrease. It will 
result in a surplus of firearms and a wealth of opportunities which criminals will seek to exploit. 
There are already signs that the arms trafficking market is becoming more organised within 
Ukraine, with larger stockpiles being assembled, including close to the EU border70. In August 
2024, Ukrainian law enforcement authorities broke up an arms trafficking ring in Lviv, some 
70 kilometres from the Polish border, and seized 72 pistols, 20 assault rifles, 29 grenades and 
almost  49,000  rounds  of  ammunition71.  Ukraine  could  replace  the  Western  Balkans  as  a 
principal source of illegal weapons, or the trafficking infrastructure that has been created by 
Balkan players over the past three decades could potentially be used to smuggle weapons from 
Ukraine into the EU72.  

At  the  moment,  it  is  not  possible  to  accurately  assess  the  number  of  firearms  which  could 
potentially be trafficked to the EU. However, the scale of the threat can be inferred from the 
numbers  that  Ukrainian  authorities  have  shared  with  Europol:  there  are,  so  far,  more  than 
800,000 (including  firearms  out  of control,  from  before the invasion of Ukraine by Russia) 
records of lost and stolen firearms in Ukraine, which is more than the total number of lost or 
stolen firearms in the EU73. 

Another factor that is likely to contribute into the high number of illicit firearms being available 
to criminals is the development of new technologies such as 3D printing. Formerly very costly 
and  limited  to  people  with  specialist  knowledge,  the  increasing  quality  and  relatively  easy 
accessibility of 3D printing is already providing criminals with new opportunities to exploit 
and leading to growing availability of home-made firearms.  

2.1.2.  Challenges in cross-border cooperation 

The problem of the security threats posed by the high number of firearms present in the EU has 
an intrinsic cross-border element. One of the main channels for trafficking illicit firearms 
into  the  EU  is  the  cross-border  smuggling  of  firearms  from  post-conflict  countries,  during 
which a firearm often journeys into several countries. Moreover, due to their portability, their 

69  Interview  within  the Congress  of  Local  and  Regional  Authorities  on  12  April  2024,  reported  by  UNN: 
https://unn.ua/en/news/up-to-5-million-serious-weapons-could-be-in-the-hands-of-ukrainians-interior-minister  
70 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “Heavy metal: A new phase of arms trafficking in 
Ukraine”, 23 September 2024, accessible at https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/a-new-phase-of-arms-trafficking-
in-ukraine/ 
71 Idem. 
72 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , “The Western Balkans is still the criminals’ choice 
for weapons”, Risk bulletin 18, May 2024, accessible at https://riskbulletins.globalinitiative.net/see-obs-018/04-
western-balkans-still-criminals-choice-weapons.html 
73 Around 630,000 firearms registered as lost, stolen or sought in the EU in the Schengen Information System. 

18 

 
 
 
non-consumable nature and their long lifespan, even the firearms manufactured locally within 
the EU are likely to eventually cross a border, to satisfy a demand elsewhere74.  

Addressing  this  threat  thus  requires  cooperation  between  Member  States  and  a  common 
classification  of  offences.  However,  Member  States  face  significant  challenges  in  their 
cooperation due to significant discrepancies in how they define firearms offences and sanction 
those offences 

First  cross-border  judicial  cooperation  can  become  difficult  due  to  the  lack  of  dual 
incrimination.  As  will  be  shown  below,  some  offences  are  not  equally  criminalised  in  all 
Member States, meaning that in some cases, national authorities cannot criminally charge an 
individual on their territory for an offence such as illicit manufacturing, because the act took 
place in a Member States which does not criminalise said offence.  

In other cases, dual incrimination is ensured but is imperfect. The Member States criminalise 
the same offence but have different requirements or penalties, resulting in practical hurdles for 
investigators such as having to provide different levels of evidence, or having to use different 
investigative techniques. The consultation meetings with magistrates revealed that it could lead 
to criminal investigations initiated in one Member State to be limited, if not discontinued. As 
the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  firearms  offences  become  cumbersome,  national 
authorities  prefer  devoting  their  efforts  in  prosecuting  other  easier  offences  with  lower 
penalties  and  lower  deterrent  effect75.  Although  there  is  no  precise  data  to  support  it,  the 
consultations  with  law  enforcement  officials  and  judicial  experts  have  confirmed  that  the 
numbers of investigations and prosecutions on firearms-related offences remain low in general 
when compared to the number of incidents that have occurred76.  

The  third  element  is  the  disparity  in  the  prioritisation  and  the  resources  allocated.  The 
absence of transposition, or the inadequate transposition of the different definitions leads to 
gaps  in  investigations  and  convictions,  resulting  in  low  numbers.  In  turn,  the  political 
prioritisation of these offences is affected, leading to inappropriate resources being allocated77. 
It  subsequently  impacts  cross-border  cooperation,  with  cases  stalling  because  there  is 
insufficient personnel.  

The  study  that  the  Commission  commissioned  in  2023-202478  specifically  analysed  how 
Member  States  implemented  the  offences  provided  by  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  and  the 
Firearms Directive, as well as how such offences are sanctioned. These firearm offences are 

Union; 

analysis 

regional 

Vienna,2020, 

74  UNODC,  Illicit  Trafficking  in  Firearms  their  Parts,  Components  and  Ammunition  to,  from  and  across  the 
European 
at 
report, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf 
75  Extracted  from  conclusions  from  various  meetings  and  consultations  carried  out  by  the  Commission  in  the 
framework of the stakeholder consultation, reflected in Annex 2 
76 See Annex 2, stakeholders consultation, p. 97. 
77 See Annex 2, stakeholders consultation, p. 97. 
78 Csonta A, Dupont C, Adamis-Császár K, Marziali M, Zanting R(eds.), 28 studies assessing and comparing the 
criminalisation in the Member States and the UK in relation to Northern Ireland of offences related to firearms, 
Brussels,  February  2024,  accompanying  this  impact  assessment  and  summarised  in  in  Annex  8:Executive 
summary of the preparatory study assessing and comparing the criminalisation of offenses related to firearms. 

accessible 

17, 

p. 

19 

 
 
 
illicit manufacturing, illicit trafficking of firearms, illegal modification of markings on firearms 
and illegal possession of firearms79. 

The below examples80 are indicative of the current state of play: 

•  The criminalisation of illicit manufacturing in some Member States does not cover 
all firearms as defined in Annex I of the Firearms Directive. In two Member States81, 
only the illicit manufacturing of military weapons or category A (prohibited firearms) 
is  criminalised,  leaving  out  firearms  of  category  B  (subject  to  authorisation)  and 
category  C  (subject  to  declaration).  This  means  that  individuals  in  these  Member 
State would not face criminal charges for assembling a firearm of category B or C 
without having sought appropriate authorisation or applying required marking on the 
firearm.  Likewise,  they  would  not  face  criminal  charges  for  assembling  those 
firearms from the essential components of illicitly trafficked firearms. This is likely 
to significantly hamper investigations of crimes involving these firearms as they are 
unregistered and unmarked. The identification of firearms used in criminal activities 
can  be  furthermore  obfuscated  by 
individuals  disassembling,  mixing  and 
reassembling the essential parts of these firearms into new ‘recycled’ firearms.  
•  Six Member States do not cover all the relevant activities falling within the definition 
of illicit trafficking of the Firearms Directive (acquisition, sale, delivery, movement 
or transfer of firearms, their essential components or ammunition)82. Similarly, four 
Member States fail to penalise the trafficking of firearms without marking, as illicit 
trafficking83. 
Illicit modification of markings is not criminalised in 14 Member States84. Markings 
of firearms are one of the main sources to investigate their illicit trafficking, as it is 
possible to trace them back to the last legal owner, giving very important information 
to the investigators. The lack of criminalisation their illicit modification means that 
individuals would not face criminal charges for actions which significantly hamper 
investigations  requiring  the  identification  of  firearms.  Furthermore,  among  the 
Member  States  that  do  criminalise  this  offence,  three  of  them  do  not  apply  the 
relevant rules on essential components, the marking of which is foreseen in Article 4 
of the Firearms Directive85. 

• 

79 See Annex 12 for a definition of these offences. 
80 Annex 8 with executive summary of the study contains more detailed information. 
81 Sweden and Malta. 
82 Austria, Czech Republic, Spain, Italy, Malta, Sweden. 
83 Belgium, Spain, Italy, Malta. 
84  Austria,  Bulgaria,  Germany,  Spain,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Malta,  The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden. 
85 Belgium, Denmark, Romania. 

20 

 
 
 
•  Although  illegal  possession  is  penalised  in  all  Member  States,  there  is  a  large 
divergence on the method of penalising, with seven Member States only providing 
administrative penalties for certain types of firearms86. 

The  Commission’s  mapping  study  further  shows  that  there  are  large  divergences  between 
Member States in how firearms offences are sanctioned. The figures below shows that national 
penalties for the core firearms offences vary greatly in their severity. 

Highest imprisonment sanction available in the 
MS for illicit trafficking (in years)

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Figure 2: Highest maximum imprisonment sanctions available in the Member States for illicit 
trafficking (in years) 

Highest imprisonment sanction available in the 
MS for illegal possession (in years)

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86 Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Slovenia, Romania. 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Highest maximum imprisonment sanctions available in the Member States for the 
illegal possession (in years) 

In the case of illicit possession87, the highest maximum sentence is 10 years (Cyprus), and the 
lowest is 4 months (Denmark). For illicit trafficking, the highest maximum sentence is 15 years 
(Germany), and the lowest is 4 months (Denmark). Similarly, the highest maximum sentence 
for illicit manufacturing88 is 15 years (Cyprus), and the lowest is 4 months (Denmark). Among 
the thirteen Member States that criminalise the illegal modification of markings, as described 
under Article 5(1)(c) of the UN Firearms Protocol, Cyprus has the highest maximum sentence 
with 10 years, and Denmark the lowest with 4 months.  

The Commission’s mapping study has also identified considerable divergences in how Member 
States apply accompanying penalties, aggravating circumstances, and criminalise the attempt 
to commit illicit manufacturing, illicit trafficking or illegal modifications of markings.  

•  Accompanying penalties: in addition to the principal penalties courts can also impose 
accompanying  penalties.  For  firearms-related  offences,  these  penalties  can  be 
confiscation  of  a  firearm,  withdrawal  or  refusal  of  the  firearms  authorisation, 
deprivation of rights (e.g. to carry a firearm), and/or prohibition to engage in certain 
professional activities. During the discussions with the Commission Expert Group on 
EU Criminal Policy, the experts agreed that a broad range of accompanying penalties 
at the disposal of the criminal judge might even be more of a deterrent than financial 
fines  alone.  However,  according  to  the  results  of  the  Commission’s  mapping  study, 
there  is,  in  general,  considerable  divergence  across  Member  States  in  the  use  of 
accompanying penalties that can be imposed under national law for the core firearms 
offences. 

•  Aggravating circumstances: there are two types of aggravating circumstances related 
to  firearms  offences  that  exist  in  EU  Member  States’  legislation.  One  concerns  the 
number or/and the dangerous nature of the firearms involved. The other is related to 
whether the offence is committed in the context of organised crime or with a terrorist 
intent. Similarly to the accompanying penalties, the mapping study shows that there is 
significant  divergence  among  Member  States  in  the  way  national  laws  impose 
aggravating  circumstances.  In  addition,  the  number  of  firearms  involved,  or  the 
dangerous  nature  of  firearms  are  not  consistently  considered  as  aggravating  factors 
across all Member States. 

•  Attempt: the UN Firearms Protocol requires also the criminalisation of the attempt to 
commit  illicit  manufacturing,  illicit  trafficking  or  illegal  modifications  of  markings. 
Nevertheless, the mapping study shows that a significant number of Member States do 
not sanction attempts for at least one of these firearms-related offences89. For instance, 
attempt of illicit manufacturing is penalised in 17 Member States, while the attempt of 

87 See Annex 8, section 4.1.1 
88 See Annex 8, section 4.1.1  
89  See  Annex  8:Executive  summary  of  the  preparatory  study  assessing  and  comparing  the  criminalisation  of 
offenses related to firearms. 

22 

 
 
 
illegal  modification  of  markings  is  not  penalised  in  2  of  the  13  Member  States  that 
criminalise this offence.  

2.1.3.  Insufficient qualitative and comprehensive statistical data  

The 2020-2025 EU Action Plan on firearms trafficking90 indicated that the intelligence picture 
remains patchy due to the absence of comprehensive and comparable data on firearms seizures 
across the continent. The problem is intensified by a lack of communication and coordination 
between  different  administrations,  within  countries  and  at  transnational  level,  with  some 
Member States even lacking a national database on seizures. One of the four priorities of the 
EU Action Plan is ’building a better intelligence picture’. This priority was included to address 
remaining legal loopholes and inconsistencies in firearms controls that hinder police91. 

One of the most relevant data in the field of firearms policy is the number of firearms seized. 
Firearms  investigations  mostly  start  when  an  illegal  firearm  is  discovered  and  seized.  An 
important element in any firearms investigation is tracing the seized firearms back to their last 
legal owner, to identify when the firearm was diverted into the illegal market. However, such 
investigations are often difficult as soon as the cross-border element appears, due to the lack 
of a harmonised dataset on seized firearms and because some Member States do not even have 
a  database  on  seized  firearms.  This  issue  was  highlighted  in  the  consultations,  with  law 
enforcement, judicial actors and even in the public consultations, with strong support for the 
establishment of a harmonised minimum dataset of seized firearms and an EU repository of 
these seized firearms92. 

Another recurrent issue in cases involving seized firearms is the incorrect reporting. Firearms 
are often seized in the context of other crimes, such as drugs trafficking or migrant smuggling. 
Instead  of  being  reported  as  a  stand-alone  offence,  firearms  are  reported  as  an  aggravating 
circumstance linked to these other crimes categories.  

The  lack  of  data  is  not  limited  to  the  number  of  firearms  seized  in  the  context  of  criminal 
offences. For all Member States, there is a sustained lack of reliable and disaggregated official 
statistical data on investigations, prosecutions, convictions, dismissed cases, number of legal 
persons involved, the level and type of penalties imposed93.  

For  each  of  these  different  categories,  the  level  of  completeness  varies,  limiting  their 
comparability.  This  lack  of  available  statistical  data  is  explained  in  Annex  5  of  this  impact 
assessment. This is not only visible in the data from UNODC but also in the dedicated data the 
Member States sent to the Commission as part of the consultation activities94. Multiple Member 
States could not differentiate the firearms cases based on the offence. Furthermore, the data 

90  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 2020-2025 EU action plan on 
firearms trafficking, COM(2020)608 final, 24.07.2020. 
91 See annex 2: stakeholder consultation. 
92 See annex 2: stakeholder consultation 
93 Duquet, N., & Vanden Auweele, D.,Targeting gun violence & trafficking in Europe, Flemish Peace Institute, 3 
December 
https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/TARGET-
2021, 
OnlineVersion.pdf 
94 Annex 2, section 2.2.1 

accessible 

at 

23 

 
 
 
that Member States could share with the Commission all contained different categories and 
grouping of firearms. As a result, the few data received cannot be compared to one another. 
For  example,  from  the  11  Member  States  that  did  answer  the  targeted  questionnaire,  some 
Member  States  stated  that  their  seizure  data  on  firearms  contained  both  criminal  and 
administrative  offences  and  that  they  could  not  make  the  distinction.  Other  Member  States 
could only send the number of cases involving seizures of firearms rather than the number of 
all firearms seized. When asking about cross-border trafficking, only 3 Member States could 
give some fragmented data about firearms that were traced back outside their national borders. 
One  Member  State  could  not  answer  most  questions  because  the  data  linked  to  firearms 
offences was counted as criminal offences for larger topics such as breach of regulations for 
the circulation of goods or linked to military material.  

There  is  also  a  lack  of  data  on  the  consequences  of  firearms-related  violence.  There  is  no 
accurate number of related deaths or injuries at European level. The best tool, that is available, 
the online knowledge platform Gunviolence.eu which tracks firearms-related incidents, comes 
with important limitations: the platform uses artificial intelligence to scan open-source medias, 
thus capturing only a fraction of the incidents. Not all incidents are subject to media coverage, 
especially when a lot of incidents are occurring at a given time. In addition, the platform does 
not differentiate between incidents involving legally owned firearms and illicit ones. Witnesses 
and journalists often misidentify the types of firearms and are seldom able to distinguish a non-
lethal  firearm  (airsoft  gun,  alarm  and  signal  weapon)  from  a  live  firing  firearm.  Reports  of 
hearing shots are registered as shootings, even if it is later identified that it was a weapon firing 
blanks and not bullets. This can still contain indications of firearms related violence, but it is 
hard  to  draw  conclusions  on  the  consequences.  Lastly,  but  not  least,  there  is  little  to  no 
academic research on the economic and social costs of firearms violence, in part due to the 
problem of lacking sufficient qualitative and comprehensive statistical data.  

Without accurate and complete data providing a clear picture, it is difficult for policy makers 
and practitioners to appropriately grasp the size of the problem, to monitor the effectiveness of 
their  policies,  to  identify  obstacles  in  the  law  enforcement  chain  and  to  take  targeted  and 
informed decisions95. The lack of available statistics can also have an influence on the general 
public’s  lack  of  awareness  of  the  scale  and  impact  of  firearms  crimes,  the  lack  of  political 
prioritisation  and  the  lack  of  necessary  budget,  human  and  financial  resources  for  law 
enforcement authorities.  

During the consultation with law enforcement agencies, experts from multiple Member States 
explained that the number of police officers per Member States sufficiently trained to be able 
to correctly identify firearms is low96. Furthermore, forensic departments are often lacking the 
resources  to  test  firearms  within  a  reasonable  amount  of  time.  Due  to  the  requirements  by 
prosecutors to test all or almost all firearms seized and the lack of resources in forensic centres, 

95  Schutter,A,  Criminal  gun  violence  in  the  European  Union,  Flemish  Peace  Institute,  EU  funded  project 
INSIGHT, Brussels, 2023, p.2. and Varisco,A E,  Types of Firearms Used in Violence in the European Union, 
SIPRI, EU funded project INSIGHT, Brussels, 2023, p.2. 
96 Annex 2: stakeholder consultations: consultations with law enforcement agencies. 

24 

 
 
 
investigations can be delayed for months. All these elements benefit offenders who can take 
advantage of these difficulties.  

At  EU  level,  Eurostat  has  a  mandate97  to  harmonise  definitions,  classifications  and 
methodologies to produce European official statistics, in cooperation with national statistical 
authorities.  Eurostat  could  collect  this  data  however,  Member  States  cannot  be  obliged  to 
provide the data. There is some collection of data  from the broader category “trafficking of 
weapons and explosives” which is too unspecific for firearms policy purposes in addition to 
presenting  similar  completeness  issues.98  Enabling  Eurostat  to  efficiently  collect  specific 
firearms-related data would require a legislative initiative. It is, however, not legally possible 
to include such an obligation, nor is it the purpose of the initiative described in this report, as 
this calls for a specific and separate instrument, which will take too long.  

2.2.  What are the problem drivers? 

2.2.1.  Current legal landscape is too complex and cumbersome for practitioners  

This problem driver links to problems 1 (Security threats posed by the high number of firearms 
present  on  EU  territory),  2  (Challenges  in  cross-border  cooperation)  and  3  (Insufficient 
qualitative and comprehensive statistical data). 

Member  States  are  currently  required  to  criminalise  4  firearms-related  offences  (‘the  core 
offences’).  Three  of  them  are  the  mandatory  offences  set  out  in  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol, 
while  the  fourth  offence  results  from  the  provisions  of  the  Firearms  Directive.  Article  5 
paragraph 1 of the UN  Firearms Protocol  requires the Parties to  adopt  legislative and other 
measures necessary to criminalise the (1) illicit manufacturing and (2) illicit trafficking of 
firearms,  their  parts  and  components  and  ammunition,  as  well  as  (3)  falsifying  or  illicitly 
obliterating, removing, or altering the marking(s) on firearms.  

The UN has adopted a legislative guide for the implementation of the UN Firearms Protocol. 
In that guide, the UN recommends that States Parties go beyond the mandatory offences by 
including complementary optional and voluntary offences in their national legislation. 

The  UN  Protocol  does  not  oblige  Member  States  to  criminalise  the  offence  of  (4)  illicit 
possession  of  firearms,  essential  components  and  ammunition,  although  it  is  one  of  the 
suggested offences. However, under the Firearms Directive the acquisition and possession of 
firearms is only permitted in the specific circumstances described in Articles 6 to 11 thereof. 
Furthermore, Article 23 of the Firearms Directive requires Member States to lay down rules on 
penalties  applicable  to  infringements  of  the  rules  pursuant  to  the  Firearms  Directive.  The 

97  Regulation  (EC)  No  223/2009  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  European  statistics  and 
repealing  Regulation  (EC,  Euratom)  No  1101/2008  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 
transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities, 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  322/97  on  Community  Statistics,  and  Council  Decision  89/382/EEC,  Euratom 
establishing a Committee on the Statistical Programmes of the European Communities,  OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 
164–173, 11.03.2009. 
98  Eurostat  reported  that  only  16  Member  States  reported  consistently  on  this  category  between  2020-2023. 
Source: meeting with Eurostat on 16 June 2025. 

25 

 
 
 
Firearms  Directive  thus  requires  the  criminalisation  of  the  illicit  possession  of  firearms, 
essential components and ammunition, albeit not expressly. 

Nevertheless, the illicit market of firearms engages in more offences than just the core firearms 
offences.  Other  sources  of  illegal  firearms  are  facilitated  through  the  illicit  reactivation  of 
deactivated  weapons,  illicit  brokering,  arms  embargo  violations,  illicit  carrying,  and 
misconduct in the context of record-keeping and licensing. Not criminalising firearms-related 
offences  in  a  comprehensive  manner  makes  it  difficult  to  reduce  the  availability  of  illicit 
firearms in the EU. If the aim is to reduce the availability of illicit firearms in the EU, then 
there is a need to go beyond the scope of the core firearms offences and address all supply 
channels.  Moreover, it leads  to  discrepancies between the legal  frameworks  of the Member 
States, with some voluntarily criminalising certain offences, while others do not.  

One of the reasons which could explain the inadequate coverage of the core firearms offences 
by Member States is the challenge arising from the combination of the definitions included in 
the UN Firearms Protocol and the Firearms Directive, with several pitfalls observed:  

First, the UN Firearms Protocol defines the three mandatory offences (illicit trafficking, illicit 
manufacturing and illicit modification of marking), amongst other things, by referring to the 
marking requirements of the UN Firearms Protocol itself. Article 8 thereof requires the marking 
of  each  firearm.  However,  the  EU  marking  requirements  are  stricter  than  the  marking 
requirements of the UN Firearms Protocol. Specifically, the EU Directive requires the marking 
of every essential component of a firearm.  

As  a  result,  the  Member  States  must  combine  both  elements  to  adequately  cover  the 
criminalisation of these offences. For example, the ‘manufacturing or assembly of firearms, 
their parts and components or ammunition (…) without marking the firearms at the time of 
manufacture’ is defined as illicit manufacturing by Article 3(d) of the UN Firearms Protocol. 
With the Firearms Directive requiring the marking of every essential component99, this means 
that EU Member States must criminalise as illicit manufacturing not only the manufacturing or 
assembly of firearms which were without marking at the time of manufacture, but also that of 
the essential components of a firearm which were without marking at the time of manufacture. 
The  mapping  study  has  highlighted  that  manufacturing  firearms  from  illicitly  trafficked 
essential  components  is  not  considered  a  criminal  offence  in  five  Member  States  (Austria, 
France, Hungary, Malta and Sweden)100. 

An  additional  pitfall  coming  from  the  texts  is  that  multiple  definitions  exist  for  the  same 
offence. There are currently three different definitions for illicit trafficking of firearms at EU 
and international level. At EU level, illicit trafficking is currently defined both in the recast 
Firearms Regulation and the Firearms Directive, covering complementary aspects according to 
their different legal base.  

• 

In  the  recast  Firearms  Regulation,  illicit  trafficking  means  the  import,  export,  sale, 
delivery, movement or transfer of goods listed in Annex I of the Regulation to, from or 

99 Article 4 of the Firearms Directive. 
100 See Annex 8, section 4.1.2. 

26 

 
 
 
• 

• 

across the territory of one Member State to or from that of a third country, if specific 
conditions apply101. 

In  the  Firearms  Directive  illicit  trafficking  means  the  acquisition,  sale,  delivery, 
movement or transfer of firearms, their essential components or ammunition from or 
through the territory of one Member State to that of another Member State, if any of 
the Member States concerned does not authorise it in accordance with the Directive, or 
if the firearms, essential components or ammunition are not marked in accordance with 
Article 4 of the Directive102. 

In  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  illicit  firearms  trafficking  means  the  import,  export, 
acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components 
and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another State 
Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it in accordance with 
the terms of the Protocol or if the firearms are not marked in accordance with article 8 
of the Protocol103. 

As reflected in the results of the Commission’s mapping study on firearms-related offences, 
several Member States have only proceeded with the transposition of the relevant definition of 
the Firearms Directive. As a result, illicit trafficking of firearms to and from a third country is 
not covered and thus not sanctioned. 

The different instruments and the variety of definitions inevitably lead to discrepancies in how 
Member States define and sanction firearms-related offences.  

In  addition  to  hampering  enforcement  and  cross-border  operation  cooperation,  the 
inconsistencies and gaps in the legal framework provide criminals with opportunities to exploit 
for their criminal operations, ultimately feeding into the high number of firearms in circulation 
on the EU territory and the ensuing security threat. The case study104 below shows how ill-
intentioned  persons  may  acquire  extensive  knowledge  of  these  gaps  and  use  these  to  their 
advantage. Other case studies can be found in Annex 7105.  

101 Article 1(35) of Regulation (EU) No 2025/41 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 
2024 (recast) 
102 Article 1, paragraph 1, (12) of the Firearms Directive. 
103 Article 3(e) of the UN Firearms Protocol 
104  Official  web  of  Europol,  ‘firearms  trafficker  supplying  contract  killer’,  26.11.  2024,  accessible  at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/firearms-trafficker-supplying-contract-killers-
arrested-in-cross-border-operation and official web of UNODC, Digest of Firearms trafficking and related cases 
2023, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-
protocol/Publications/Digest_of_Firearms_Trafficking_Cases.pdf  
105 See for example case-study no. 5 (Operation Alpes). 

accessible 

29, 

p. 

at 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
Case study: firearms trafficker supplying contract killer 

In  November  2024,  law  enforcement  of  Poland,  together  with  Austria,  Czechia,  Germany  and 
Sweden,  coordinated  by  Europol,  arrested  a  firearms  trafficker  supplying  firearms  to  criminals 
across Europe. The suspect, a Polish national, had previously worked as a licensed firearms dealer. 
This gave him expertise regarding firearms laws in Europe, including a loophole regarding weapons 
parts kits in Austria, which he exploited for his illegal activities. After legally buying weapons parts 
kits in Austria, investigators believe the suspect sent some parts to Poland and  trafficked the rest 
into Poland himself. Once in Poland, he manufactured the weapons illegally. Further investigation 
proved that the suspect had sold dozens of illegal weapons, including automatic guns and pistols, to 
criminal  networks  operating  in  Germany  and  Poland.  Thanks  to  international  cooperation  and 
exchanging intelligence, Swedish investigators discovered that a violent gang was using weapons 
sold  by the suspect  to  carry out  contract  killings. Moreover, authorities established that firearms 
previously seized in Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and Sweden could be attributed to the suspect. 

The complexity of the legal landscape also feeds into the problem of insufficient qualitative 
and  comprehensive  statistical  data.  In  absence  of  any  harmonised  definition  or  common 
approach on how such incidents are registered across Member States, and even globally, it is 
virtually  impossible  to  gather  data  that  can  be  compared  in  a  reliable  and  valid  manner106. 
Investigators  and  prosecutors  take  a  pragmatic  approach  when  it  comes  to  choosing  which 
offences to investigate in-depth and prosecute a person for. If there are one or several other 
criminal offences that are easier to prosecute, notably because it is easier to secure the required 
evidence,  the  national  authorities  may  choose  to  put  their  efforts  into  investigating  and 
prosecuting those offences rather than the firearms ones. As a result, the available data will be 
limited and will not match the reality on the ground and the concerns expressed by Member 
States about the scale of the phenomenon107.  

Case study: dismantling network selling semi-automatic firearms in Brussels108 

The  Belgian  Federal  judicial  police  dismantled  a  network  that  imported  and  sold  semi-
automatic firearms in Brussels. The main distribution point of the network was in Brussels, 
however the network supplied customers in Belgium and abroad. The investigators discovered 
close links with other criminal groups abroad, which enabled the transportation of weapons 
across  borders.  The  weapons  seized  linked  to  the  investigation  proved  to  be  illegally 
manufactured. Even though this was the case, the suspects were charged with membership of 
a criminal organisation, possession of weapons and ammunition, and sale of firearms (which 
according to BE law deals with domestic sales only).  

106 Poole H., ‘Understanding the global firearms phenomenon’ in Poole H. & Sneddons S. (eds), Firearms: Global 
perspectives  on  consequences,  crimes  and  control,  Routledge,  2022;  Hellenbach  et  al.,  “Challenges  to  the 
effective policing of gun crime in Europe”, European Journal of Criminology, 15(2), 2018, pp 172-196.  
107 Annex 2: stakeholder consultations: consultations with law enforcement agencies. 
108 Belga News Agency, “Police dismantle network selling semi-automatic firearms in Brussels”. 1 October 2025, 
accessible  at  https://www.belganewsagency.eu/police-dismantle-network-selling-semi-automatic-firearms-in-
brussels  

28 

 
 
 
  
 
 
2.2.2.  New technologies are creating unforeseen risks 

This problem driver links to problems 1 (Security threats posed by the high number of firearms 
present on EU territory) and 2 (Challenges in cross-border cooperation). 

Recent technological progress has enabled the modus operandi of firearms traffickers to evolve, 
leading to new challenges for law enforcement and judicial authorities. In the last years, an 
increasing interest in illicit privately manufactured firearms, such as 3D-printed firearms (also 
called additive manufacturing), has been observed. The difficulty with privately manufactured 
firearms is that they do not have serial markings which makes them almost impossible to trace. 
This complicates law enforcement investigations. In addition to printing firearms, there is also 
the ability to print parts and accessories such as suppressors, extended magazines and 'glock 
switches'  (also  known  as  an  auto  sear),  which  is  a  small  part  that  converts  a  pistol  into  an 
automatic weapon. 

Already in 2018, Europol warned that technological progress would make 3D printing widely 
available in the future, and that this would also offer opportunities for the illicit production of 
and trade in firearms109. In its recent TE-SAT report, Europol highlighted the noticeable upward 
trend in the seizure of 3D-printed firearms110. Europol explains that 3D-printed firearms are 
seen as symbols of defiance against state control, mainly within extremist circles. The project 
HamsTeR,  a  German  research  project111,  identified  23  seizures  of  3D  printed  firearms  in 
Germany  between  2020  and  2024.  4  out  of  the  11  Member  States112  who  answered  the 
quantitative survey from the Commission  indicated that in  total  227 3D  printed firearms or 
essential  components  were  identified  between  the  years  2020  and  2022.  153  of  these  were 
identified by Finland.  

Case study: research project HamsTer testing the durability of 3D printed firearms 

The project analysed the durability of the FGC-9, a hybrid 3D printed semi-automatic firearm 
invented around 2020 and currently considered as the most popular model. The rifled barrel 
and  receiver  are  made  of  metal  while  the  frame  and  most  other  parts  are  printed.  All 
components and required tools are easily available at hardware stores. After some additional 
improvements it was possible to produce a fully automatic version of the FGC-9 which had 
a cadence of 830 rounds/minute and a projectile velocity of around 340 m/s with reliable 
precision and no loss of functionality of the weapon. The mode of operation corresponds to 
that of commercially produced submachine guns. 

The  threat  of  illegal  manufacturing  of  firearms  or  essential  components  with  3D  printers 
derives from the relative affordability of the technology and the availability of the blueprints 
on the Internet. In November 2024, the Commission, Europol and EMPACT Firearms visited 

109 Duquet, N, Illicit gun markets and firearms acquisition of terrorist networks in Europe, EU funded project 
SAFTE, Brussels, 17.04.2018.  
110 Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report (EU TE SAT), The Hague, 2024, p.37-38.  
111 See Annex 2, stakeholders consultations, section 16.1.2. 
112 Spain, Finland, Sweden and Cyprus 

29 

 
 
 
Formnext, one of the biggest conferences on additive manufacturing in the world113. This visit 
confirmed that the technology  is  becoming increasingly more sophisticated with  techniques 
such  as  direct  metal  laser  melting  and  highly  durable  polymer  filaments.  Discussions  with 
participants of Formnext showed that the industry is aware that the technology can be misused 
for the creation of illicit firearms. In general, the focus of the industry is on the use of additive 
manufacturing for industrial purposes or for personal enjoyment (printing of toys or items that 
can  be  useful  for  hobbies  or  the  household).  Multiple  industrial  participants  stated  that  the 
stronger filaments that are being developed are not developed with the intent to be used for the 
creation of firearms. The usage of these filaments for the private manufacturing of firearms 
was considered a negative side-effect, that could give the industry a bad reputation. There were 
however some participants that did see economic value in the firearms industry; e.g. to print 
colourful  frames  for  firearms.  Nevertheless,  these  participants  stated  that  clear  rules  were 
needed for them to know what is legally allowed.  

Furthermore,  3D  printers  are  also  becoming  less  expensive.  HamsTer  shows  that  the 
manufacturing of a reliable 3D printed firearm can be done with no prior knowledge by just 
following the instructions provided by the respective manuals or community. The initial costs 
are moderate, and the learning curve is steep. 3D printed firearms are therefore likely to become 
more performant and more affordable in the future.  

Even  if  the  available  data  seems  to  indicate  that  3D  printed  firearms  are  not  yet  being 
considered  as  a  viable  and  reliable  alternative  by  criminals  for  traditional  firearms,  their 
increasing quality and relatively easy accessibility are already leading to growing availability, 
thus worsening the security threat posed by the high number of firearms on the EU territory. 

The advent of 3D-printable firearms and the possibility of using them for criminal purposes 
has spurred a debate on gun control legislation around the world, including in the European 
Union. Private 3D-printing of firearms is already covered by the existing legal framework, as 
the Firearms Directive applies equally to all firearms, including 3D-printed: they can only be 
manufactured by licensed dealers, and are subject to restrictions, such as authorisation before 
private  acquisition.  However,  during  the  consultations  with  Member  States  and  EMPACT 
Firearms,  participants  explained  the  difficulties  for  the  implementation.  In  most  Member 
States, the prosecution for illicit manufacturing of privately made firearms, such as those 3D 
printed firearms or essential components, actually depends on the ability of police officers and 
forensic centres to prove that these firearms or essential components are functional. There are 
exceptions to this rule, such as in the Netherlands, where a court recently decided that not all 
3D printed firearms and components had to be tested (see case study underneath). Additionally, 
when an illicit workshop is discovered, semi-finished essential components and semi-finished 
firearms risk not being considered as sufficient proof for the illicit manufacturing of firearms. 
The law enforcement agencies of the Member States where the illicit workshop is discovered, 
would  first  need  to  finish  these  essential  firearm  components  and  test  them.  Consequently, 
these  requirements  increase  the  already  heavy  burden  of  forensic  centres.  As  some  courts 
require proof of the finalisation and functioning of privately made firearms, it could lead to 

113  Formnext  is  considered  the  central  information  platform  for  industrial  3d  printing  experts  and  production 
professionals  from  a  wide  range  of  application  industries,  with  an  annual  trade  show  in  Frankfurt. 
https://formnext.mesago.com/frankfurt/en.html  

30 

 
 
 
perpetrators not being prosecuted for illicit manufacturing, even though the intent is clearly 
demonstrated. 

Case study: example from the Netherlands 

The requirement to test firearms and their essential components on their functioning is not 
definite in all Member States. In the Netherlands, the court convicted a suspect in the case: 
71-033073-22 without the need to test all 3D printed firearms and components. The fact that 
the person had 9 3D printers and 2 blueprints and that there was proof of him selling FGC-9 
firearms online was considered enough. Additionally, in the Netherlands the supreme court 
ruled in case 21/04545 that the mere fact that an object is found in a disassembled state or 
that the object is not ready for immediate use due to the absence of a part or parts does not 
negate the possibility that the object is intended for or suitable as a firearm. 

To produce a 3D-printed firearm, one needs a 3D-printer, durable filaments and a blueprint 
with instructions on how to print and assemble the firearm. The preparatory study conducted 
by the Commission in 2023 - 2024 discovered that no Member States had already taken specific 
measures to possibly restrict any of the three elements needed to produce a 3D printed firearm 
or essential component. This was also confirmed in the consultations with the private sector 
and the Member States.  

Case study: French customs 

French customs came across a person that had bought blueprints and a 3D-printer. As there 
is  no  legislation  on  blueprints  or  3D  printers,  authorities  could  not  proceed  with  a  house 
search. Only when the person started selling firearms online, were they granted a warrant for 
a house search. During the house search, they found 10 fully printed FGC-9 guns.  

Some  other  countries114  in  the  world  have  already  criminalised  the  illicit  possession  of 
blueprints for 3D printing of firearms and some respondents of the public consultation and the 
magistrates (interviewed during the targeted consultation) suggested to focus on regulating 3D 
printers themselves. As no Member State has taken similar actions, it hinders the effective and 
preventive mitigation of the threat of 3D printing of firearms or essential components in the 
EU as a whole. 

These new technologies are creating challenges in cross-border cooperation as the current legal 
frameworks of Member States are not always adapted to deal with these threats. The lack of 
dual incrimination, the different approaches and requirements between Member States, such as 
the level of evidence needed to secure a conviction, significantly hamper effective investigation 
and prosecution of cross-border cases.  

114 Singapore, Canada and North Macedonia. Serbia and the United Kingdom are currently in the progress of 
changing their criminal law with the same aim. 

31 

 
 
 
2.2.3.  Penalty levels are not sufficiently effective and dissuasive in all Member 

States.  

This problem driver links to problems 1 (Security threats posed by the high number of firearms 
present  on  EU  territory),  2  (Challenges  in  cross-border  cooperation)  and  3  (Insufficient 
qualitative and comprehensive statistical data). 

Article 23 of the Firearms Directive requires Member States to lay down rules on penalties 
applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive and to 
take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. Due to the Firearms Directive 
being  an  internal  market  instrument  based  on  Article  114(1)  TFEU,  rather  than  a  criminal 
instrument, it only requires penalties to be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’, thus giving 
considerable discretion to Member States whether to apply administrative or criminal penalties.  

As  a  result,  large  divergences  between  Member  States  in  how  firearms  offences  are 
sanctioned can be seen. Evaluations of existing criminal law legislations, such as the 2008 
Directive on environmental crime, showed that low sanctions did not deter criminals enough 
and therefore, sanctions had to be increased115. So far, there has not yet been another evaluation 
focusing on the consequences following the amendment to the Environmental Crime Directive 
which has increased the penalties. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that sanctions which 
are  not  dissuasive  enough,  are  likely  to  result  in  heightened  criminal  activities  in  Member 
States. 

Maximum Prison sentence for illicit firearms trafficking in years

s
r
a
e
y
n
i

e
c
n
e
t
n
e
s
n
o
s
i
r
P

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

EU Member States

115 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EVALUATION of the DIRECTIVE 2008/99/EC of the 
European  Parliament  and of  the  Council  of  19  November 2008 on  the protection of  the  environment  through 
criminal law (ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME DIRECTIVE), p.80 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Maximum prison sentence for illicit firearms trafficking in years116 

Incidents of illicit firearms trafficking per 100 000 inhabitants, 
2020-2022

100

80

60

40

20

0

Incidents of illicit firearms trafficking per 100 000 inhabitants, 2020-2022

Figure 5: Incidents of illicit firearms trafficking per 100.000 inhabitants, 2020-2022117. 

The numbers in the above figures suggests a negative correlation between incidents of illicit 
firearms trafficking and the severity of the penalties for illicit firearms trafficking: Cyprus and 
Romania have the lowest numbers of incidents and are the Member States with the harshest 
penalties. Conversely, Croatia and Netherlands have the highest numbers of incidents and are 
among the Member States with the softer penalties. This seems to suggest that the penalties in 
these countries are not sufficiently dissuasive to  deter criminals.  However, when looking at 
such numbers, it is  important  to  keep in  mind that other factors can be at  play, such as the 
geographic proximity with the Western Balkans, from where, historically, many weapons were 
illicitly trafficked. Similarly, some Member States may have cultural sensitivities and strong 
social programs contributing to a low crime rate and a low demand for firearms. More than the 
severity of the penalties, this might explain this low demand that leads to few incidents of illicit 
firearms trafficking.  

Figures 2 and 3 in section Error! Reference source not found., and figures 1 and 3 in Annex 
8, section 4.1.1 show that for a number of Member States, the penalty levels provided for the 
core firearms offences are significantly low.  

116 Csonta A, Dupont C, Adamis-Császár K, Marziali M, Zanting R(eds.), 28 studies assessing and comparing the 
criminalisation in the Member States and the UK in relation to Northern Ireland of offences related to firearms, 
Brussels, February 2024, accompanying this impact assessment. The data source is only examines basic offenses, 
excluding aggravating circumstances.. 
117 EU Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Malta, 
Slovenia. 
Data Source: UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-arms-
seized.Accessed on 05./02.2025. EUROSTAT Crime Statistics 2024. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
•  Illegal  possession  (figure  3  in  Annex  8)  is  sanctioned  on  average  with  a  maximum 
sentence of 5 years and 3 months of imprisonment. The highest maximum sentence is 
10 years (Cyprus), and the lowest is 4 months (Denmark). 

•  Illicit  trafficking  (figure  2  in  Annex  8)  is  sanctioned  on  average  with  a  maximum 
sentence  of  6  years  of  imprisonment.  The  highest  maximum  sentence  is  15  years 
(Germany), and the lowest is 4 months (Denmark). 

•  Illicit manufacturing (figure 1 in Annex 8) is sanctioned on average with a maximum 
sentence of 5 years and 4 months of imprisonment. The highest maximum sentence is 
15 years (Cyprus), and the lowest is 4 months (Denmark). 

•  Of the thirteen Member States that criminalise the illegal modification of markings, 
as described under Article 5(1)(c) of the UN Firearms Protocol, the average maximum 
sentence  is  4  years  and  2  and  half  months  of  imprisonment.  The  highest  maximum 
sentence is Cyprus with 10 years and the lowest is 4 months (Denmark). 

A comparison against the penalties set by other EU Directives on serious crimes suggests that 
some  of  the  penalties  set  by  Member  States  for  firearms  offences  are  particularly  low  and 
unlikely  to  significantly  deter  criminals.  The  Anti-Money  Laundering  Directive118  requires 
Member States to set penalties with a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 4 years. This 
means that the lowest maximum penalty across the Member States should always be 4 years 
and  that  the  average  maximum  prison  sentence  for  all  Member  States  will  certainly  be 
somewhere  above 4 years. This  is  to  be compared with  the  lowest  maximum  sentence of  4 
months that one Member State set for the core firearms offences and the averages provided 
above. Similarly, the Counterfeiting Directive requires Member States to set penalties with a 
maximum term of imprisonment of at least 5 to 8 years, depending on the crime119. In the area 
of  drug  trafficking,  the  maximum  term  of  imprisonment  must  be  at  least  5  to  10  years, 
depending on the crime120. 

In addition to these low maximum sentences, one must take into account that the penalty levels 
imposed  in  practice  are  even  lower.  The  consultation  meetings  with  magistrates,  law 
enforcement agencies and experts on criminal policy have indicated that judges rarely make 
full use of the available penalty range. Imprisonment penalties are rare and often suspended. It 
is  likely  that  financial  penalties  are  more  often  handed  out  than  imprisonment  penalties. 
Unfortunately, statistical data on the level of fines imposed following conviction of a firearm 
offence is scarce, preventing any in-depth analysis.  

The low levels of these penalties are likely to be contributing to the security threat posed by 
the high number of illicit firearms in circulation and available to criminals. Low penalties do 

118 Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating money laundering by 
criminal law, OJ L 284, 12.11.2018, 23.10.2018, pp. 22–30 
119 Directive 2014/62/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the euro and other 
currencies against counterfeiting by criminal law, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA, OJ 
L 151, 21.5.2014, 15.05.2014, pp. 1–8 
120 Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, OJ L 335, 25.10.2004, pp. 8–11. 

34 

 
 
 
not  sufficiently  deter  criminals121,  and  this  might  lead  to  criminals  taking  advantage  of  the 
regulatory discrepancies, by selecting Member States where they are less likely to face harsh 
penalties. The weak levels of penalties in one Member State can result in a negative knock-on 
effect in other Member States due to the free movement of goods and persons in the Internal 
Market.  

The  absence  of  effective,  proportionate  and  dissuasive  penalties  has  direct  implications  to 
cross-border cooperation. Access to special investigative techniques, such as surveillance of 
telecommunications and undercover investigations, is often conditional on the seriousness of 
the crime defined by a certain minimum or maximum level of penalties that is available for the 
suspected crime. Member States that regard firearms offences as minor could  only  have the 
standard  investigative  tools  at  their  disposal.  The  consultation  meeting  with  magistrates 
confirmed that this can prevent cross-border cooperation, for example if surveillance measures, 
which  are  often  linked  to  the  penalty  threshold, ordered  in  one  Member  State cannot be 
continued or complemented in another Member State involved. In addition, where certain types 
or areas of criminal activity are not covered by the legal framework of all the Member States, 
cross-border judicial cooperation becomes difficult for lack of dual incrimination. 

Furthermore, national authorities tend to prioritise the investigation and prosecution of offences 
which  have  harsher  penalties  over  those  with  lower  penalties.  Consultation  with  national 
authorities have confirmed that the disparities between the penalties is likely to lead in priorities 
and resources allocation being mismatched between Member States, further hampering cross-
border judicial cooperation122. 

Further to that, and in a similar fashion to the complexity of the legal landscape (see section 
2.2.1 above), the low penalties levels also contribute to the problem of insufficient qualitative 
and comprehensive statistical data the problem of data. As part of the pragmatic approach taken 
by  investigators  and  prosecutors  in  choosing  which  offences  to  investigate  in-depth  and 
prosecute  a  person  for,  these  actors  might  opt  for  offences  which  result  in  more  deterring 
penalties if the penalties for firearms offences are low123. This would result in a lower number 
of firearms offences being investigated and prosecuted, thus not reflecting accurately the reality 
on the ground.  

2.2.4.  Insufficient  cooperation  and  coordination  between  Member  States 

competent authorities 

This problem driver links to problems 1 (Security threats posed by the high number of firearms 
present  on  EU  territory),  2  (Challenges  in  cross-border  cooperation)  and  3  (Insufficient 
qualitative and comprehensive statistical data). 

As an internal market legislative act, the focus of the Firearms Directive is on regulating the 
legal market of firearms. It therefore does not contain rules on jurisdiction, investigative tools 

121 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EVALUATION of the DIRECTIVE 2008/99/EC of the 
European  Parliament  and of  the  Council  of  19  November 2008 on  the protection of  the  environment  through 
criminal law (ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME DIRECTIVE), p.80 
122 Annex 2: stakeholder consultations, section 17.3.3: consultation meeting with magistrates 
123 Annex 2: stakeholder consultations, section 17.3.2: consultations with law enforcement agencies. 

35 

 
 
 
or  the  establishment  of  national  contact  points.  It  does  not  oblige  Member  States  to  work 
together during investigations, for example through Europol or Eurojust.  

The fight against firearms  trafficking  was identified as a European priority for the Member 
States,  with  a  specific  EMPACT  operational  action  plan  since  2014.  This  prioritisation  has 
been renewed for the years 2026-2029124.  

Member States are thus invited to cooperate through the dedicated EMPACT group. However, 
the activity and participation levels of Member States vary greatly. Judicial and cross-border 
operational cooperation are thus adversely affected, leading to low numbers of firearm crimes 
being reported and cross-border cases initiated. 

2020  

2021  

2022  

2023  

2024  

2025  
(22 Jan)  

Total  

 Bilateral 
cases  

19  

29  

39  

42  

44  

3  

175  

 Multilateral 
cases  

 Total  

10  

29  

5  

34  

8  

47  

12  

54  

10  

54  

3  

45  

221  

Figure 6: Bilateral and multilateral cases involving illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and 
explosives. Source: Eurojust, 2025.  

According  to  data  from  Eurojust,  there  was  an  increase  in  bilateral  cases  involving  illicit 
firearms  trafficking  between  2020-2025,  while  the  multilateral  cases  remained  stable 
throughout that period. However, in 2024, Eurojust had only 54 firearms cases (bilateral and 
multilateral combined), while the total number of working cases within the whole of Eurojust 
(ongoing from previous years and new registered) for the year 2024 was 12,972. This means 
that firearms cases only represent 0,4% of all open cases dealt by Eurojust. This is an extremely 
low number, especially  as firearms is  an EU priority  crime  within EMPACT and there is  a 
known nexus between firearms and organised crime, and firearms and terrorism.  

Also  relevant  is  the  amount  of  Joint  Investigation  Teams  (JIT)  regarding  illicit  firearms 
trafficking. Their number has increased slightly over the years, from 1 new JIT in 2020 to 3 
new JITs in 2024. The total number of JITs supported by Eurojust in 2024 was 361 (ongoing 
from previous years and newly opened). For firearms there were 3 new JITs initiated in 2024 
and 4 JITs which were still ongoing. This means that JITs related to firearms only represent 
1,9% of all ongoing JITs. As a comparison, there were 95 drug trafficking related JITs (26,31% 
of  all  ongoing  JITs),  41  JITs  on  trafficking  of  human  beings  (11,35%  of  total),  93  JITs  on 
swindling  and  fraud  (25,76%  of  total)  and  87  money  laundering  related  JITs  (24,09%  of 

124 European Commission DG HOME’s website, “EMPACT fighting crime together”, 1 July 2025, accessible at 
https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/law-enforcement-cooperation/empact-
fighting-crime-together_en 

36 

 
 
  
  
 
total).125 Due to illicit firearms trafficking being a EU priority crime and given the inherent 
cross-border nature of such crime, one would normally expect a higher number of JITs on such 
topic. The low number is indicative of the poor judicial cooperation.  

In addition to the lack of judicial cooperation through Eurojust, Europol also reported a low 
number  of  exchanges  via  the  messages  on  the  Secure  Information  Exchange  Network 
Application  (SIENA).  SIENA  is  a  platform  managed  by  Europol  connecting  national  law 
enforcement authorities and other relevant bodies (e.g.: Eurojust, Frontex, OLAF and Interpol) 
through which operational and strategic crime-related information is exchanged. For the years 
2021-2022,  the  number  of  exchanges  linked  to  the  Analysis  Project  on  Weapons  and 
Explosives only represents 1,6% of total messages exchanged via SIENA.  

The  data  from  both  Eurojust  and  Europol  suggest  a  lack  of  international  cooperation  on 
firearms offences. Yet this cooperation is essential in the fight against firearms trafficking due 
to the cross-border element involved. A direct consequence of this lack of cooperation is the 
insufficient  sharing  of  data  between  Member  States,  as  well  as  EU  agencies,  leading  to  an 
incomplete picture of the scale of firearms-related offences and their consequences. This lack 
of cooperation and coordination also results in Member States having different appreciations 
of  the  problem  and  thus  approaching  it  mostly  from  a  national  perspective.  These  different 
national perspectives result in the lack of a common approach in tackling firearms offences at 
European  level.  This  is  especially  notable  between  Member  States  with  different  legal 
frameworks that include different definitions of such offences, and different penalties. These 
differences lead Member States authorities to encounter legal and operational obstacles when 
investigating  transnational,  cross-border  firearms  crimes,  such  as  dual  incrimination  issues. 
These challenges diminish the effectiveness of law enforcement to address the high number of 
firearms in circulation in the EU and curtailing the security threat posed by those firearms. 

Another  cross-border  cooperation  and  coordination  instrument  are  National  Firearms  Focal 
Points  (NFFP).  The  role  of  NFFPs  is  to  gather,  analyse  and  improve  the  information  flow 
regarding the criminal use and the illicit trafficking of firearms into and within the Member 
State  and  across  into  the  EU  at  a  strategic  and  operational  level.  It  relies  on  a  coordinated 
collection and sharing of information to enhance the intelligence picture and better inform law 
enforcement agencies. Their specific tasks are set out by the Council conclusions of 13 July 
2021126 on the implementation of NFFPs in the EU Member States. 

However, the establishment on fully staffed and trained NFFPs is optional for Member States. 
Despite the importance of NFFPs having been recognized and advocated by the Council127 and 
it being identified as a specific action (3.1) under priority III “Increasing pressure on criminal 

125 Eurojust’s website, Overview of Eurojust casework by crime type 2024, https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/crime-
types-and-cases/casework 
126 Council Conclusions 10726/21 on the implementation of the National Firearms Focal Points (NFFPs)  
in  the  EU  Member  States,  13  July  2021:  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10726-2021-
INIT/en/pdf 
127 Council Conclusions 10726/21 on the implementation of the National Firearms Focal Points (NFFPs)  
in  the  EU  Member  States,  13  July  2021:  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10726-2021-
INIT/en/pdf 

37 

 
 
 
markets” of the 2020 – 2025 EU Action Plan on firearms trafficking, few Member States have 
fully established NFFPs. 

According to the results of the annual Commission´s questionnaire128, out of the 24 Member 
States have proceeded with the establishment of a National Firearms Focal Point, only 8 of 
them fulfil more than 75% of the tasks reflected in the Council Conclusions. 9 Member States 
are currently performing between 25% and 75% of the tasks. The remaining 7 Member States 
fulfil less than 25% of the tasks.  

2.3.  How likely is the problem to persist? 

Problem 1 – Security threats posed by the high number of firearms present on EU territory. 
All signs point toward this problem persisting despite the work done by the Commission on 
the implementation of the 2020-2025 EU Action Plan on firearms trafficking. 

The advancement of EU policies against criminal groups could limit the capacity of criminal 
groups  involved  in  firearms  trafficking  to  operate.  The  EU  Strategy  to  tackle  Organised 
Crime,129 foresees a stronger response to criminal finances through the adoption of the new 
Directive on asset recovery and confiscation.130 This measure could impact firearms trafficking 
as the UN Firearms Protocol is specifically mentioned in Article 2(1) point k of this Directive.  

However, judicial and law enforcement authorities would still lack effective means to tackle 
cross-border  criminal  markets  in  illegal  firearms.  The  cross-border  cooperation  and 
coordination difficulties are likely to remain, resulting in criminal investigations initiated in 
one  Member  State  to  be  discontinued  or  limited.  As  a  result,  the  rate  of  prosecutions  or 
convictions  would  probably  remain  low.  This  will  lead  to  criminals  continuing  to  use  the 
discrepancies, to hide behind borders and to enhance their activities. 

Moreover, the problem is likely to worsen in view of Russia’s war of aggression against 
Ukraine and the emergence of new technologies. Once the hostilities in Ukraine have ended, 
there is expected to be an increase in firearms trafficking. Firearms and other weapons that are 
then in irregulated possession will be made available in large quantities, providing criminals 
with opportunities to make easy money. While the Commission is cooperating with Ukraine to 
reign in this phenomenon, the scale is such that full mitigation will be unlikely.  

Furthermore,  all  information  gathered  from  Europol  and  the  Member  States  point  to  a 
continuous increase of the threat of new technologies, specifically for privately manufactured 
firearms. According to the recent SOCTA assessment from Europol in 2025131, technological 

128 Annual scoreboard published on European Commission DG HOME’s website: https://home-
affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/1bd09cc9-a62a-4051-b118-0391bcbd64cb_en?filename=National-
firearms-focal-points-scoreboard_en.pdf 
129 Communication of from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  on  the  EU  Strategy  to  tackle 
Organised Crime 2021-2025, COM(2021)170 final, 14.04.2021 
130 Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council on asset recovery and confiscation. 
OJ L, 2024/1260, 2.5.2024 
131 Europol, European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), The Hague, 2025, p. 
62.  

38 

 
 
 
as  well  as  geopolitical  developments  also  impact  and  facilitate  the  illicit  production  and 
trafficking  of  weapons  in  and  to  the  EU.  These  factors  suggest  an  evolving  landscape  of 
firearms trafficking, posing increased security risks across the EU that artificial intelligence 
will enhance access to and the precision of weapon designs for 3D printed weapons, facilitate 
the  production  of  homemade  metal  firearm  parts  and  explosives,  and  make  knowledge  of 
weapon conversion and modification more readily available. 

While  other  countries,  such  as  Canada,  North  Macedonia,  and  Singapore  have  already 
criminalised  the  illicit  possession,  creation  and  dissemination  of  blueprints  to  produce  3D 
printed firearms and essential components, with Serbia and the UK also being in the process 
of amending their criminal codes, no EU Member State has taken such step. The consultation 
meetings with Member States have indicated that no Member State is inclined to do so without 
EU coordination. 

Problem 2 – Challenges in cross-border cooperation. Even though the EU has ratified the UN 
Firearms Protocol since 2014, multiple Member States have still not correctly transposed the 
definition of the mandatory criminal offences. There are no indications that these gaps will be 
amended by the Member States any time soon. In 2017, the UNODC published a legislative 
guide to implement the Protocol but no notable improvement was subsequently noticed.  

While  some  implementation  issues  are  likely  to  be  corrected  through  the  Commission’s 
enforcement of the Firearms Directive in the Member States, including through infringement 
proceedings  as  appropriate,  correct  transposition  of  the  Firearms  Directive  would  likely  be 
insufficient  to  solve  most  of  the  problems  identified.  Even  though  the  Firearms  Directive 
contain definitions of illicit manufacturing and illicit trafficking, the scope of the Directive is 
limited.  This  is  particularly  relevant  in  the  case  of  the  definition  of  illicit  trafficking  as  the 
scope of the Firearms Directive is focused on trafficking between Member States and does not 
include trafficking from or towards third countries. These infringement proceedings would also 
not solve the lack of a harmonised definition of illicit possession, as the Firearms Directive 
only sets out the rules for the legal possession of firearms.  

Similarly, there are no indications from the Member States that the levels of penalties would 
be  adjusted  without  intervention  from  the  Union.  Infringements  linked  to  the  incorrect 
transposition of the Firearms Directive would not contribute to solving this problem because 
the  requirement  that  penalties  should  be  ‘effective,  proportionate  and  dissuasive’  lacks  the 
necessary specificity. Additionally, without any intervention at Union level, Member States are 
unlikely to make use of the full set of accompanying penalties. As can be read in Annex 8, 
which  summarises  the  preparatory  study,  several  Member  States  have  few  accompanying 
penalties. The experts of the Commission Expert Group on EU Criminal Policy specifically 
pointed to these accompanying penalties as having large potential deterrence effects. 

Overall, enforcement action from the Commission is unlikely to solve the wide divergences in 
how Member States define and sanction firearms-related offences, meaning that the landscape 
at EU level would remain fragmented.  

Problem 3 – Insufficient qualitative and comprehensive statistical data. Member States experts 
have  indicated  that  if  the  Commission  does  not  require  the  collection  of  harmonised  data 

39 

 
 
through legislative action, there will be little change on the ground132. While Member States 
might be encouraged to work towards the creation of an EU repository, including through the 
voluntary  contribution  of  data,  the  absence  of  any  legal  obligation  will  result  in  patchy 
reporting and will negatively affects the comparability of such data – as it is currently the case 
with  the  UNODC  database  on  firearms  seizures.  Moreover,  the  lack  of  data  is  a  structural 
problem  linked  to  how  firearms  offences  are  defined  and  implemented.  Without  EU  action 
addressing these structural issues, the lack of clear data and statistical evidence on the number 
of seized firearms  for criminal acts,  investigations  and convictions will continue to  remain. 
This will continue to cause problems to evaluate and monitor Member States and Union policy 
regarding firearms. The lack of awareness for the scale of the problem at political level is likely 
to  subside,  negatively  affecting  the  available  resources  for  law  enforcement,  forensic 
departments and the judicial actors.  

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1.  Legal basis 

The legal bases for the proposed Directive are Article 83(1) and (2) TFEU. Article 83(1) TFEU 
provides for the legal basis to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension. 
The provision lists illicit arms trafficking as one of these particularly serious crimes. Article 
83(2) TFEU sets out the EU’s competence to establish minimum rules if the approximation of 
criminal  laws and regulations of the Member States proves essential to  ensure the effective 
implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures. 
The area of firearms policy, notably the conditions to acquire, possess, trade within the EU, 
import and export firearms, essential components and ammunition has already been subject to 
harmonisation by virtue of the Firearms Directive and the recast Firearms Regulation.  

3.2. 

Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action 

Despite the difficulty to accurately define the scale of the threat posed by illicit firearms, due 
to the lack of qualitative and comprehensive data, the few available indicators point towards 
this threat being of considerable magnitude (for example the amount of shootings in the EU), 
echoing the concerns repeatedly expressed by Member States. Additionally, the lessons learned 
following the Western Balkan conflict suggest that the war in Ukraine will lead to an increase 
in  the  flow  of  illicit  firearms  into  the  EU.  Furthermore,  the  Commission’s  mapping  study 
highlighted  the  discrepancies  in  how  Member  States  define  and  sanction  firearms-related 
offences.  

While some Member States might be more affected than others by firearms-related violence, 
the threat posed by illicit firearms is not a localised problem that is likely to be adequately and 
efficiently  addressed  at  Member  States’  level  only.  Very  often  these  firearms  have  been 
trafficked from abroad and have transited through other Member States and isolated Member 
States  action  is  likely  to  target  only  a  fraction  of  the  criminal  networks,  while  criminals 

132 Commission Expert Group on firearms trafficking and the Implementation of Directive (EU) 2021/555 (the 
Firearms Directive) (E02211). 

40 

 
 
 
upstream in the trafficking channels are out of reach. As stated in Europol´s SOCTA, “Criminal 
networks and their activities are unhindered by borders, be it within the EU or between the EU 
and the rest of the world”133. Transnational criminal groups capitalize on discrepancies between 
Member States’ legal  systems  and weak border  controls  to  commit firearms-related crimes, 
especially  the  illegal  trafficking  of  firearms  across  countries.  The  detection  and  tracking  of 
such activities is made difficult by the sophisticated networks and resources they employ. The 
weaknesses in one Member State has a negative knock-on effect in other Member States due 
to the free movement of goods and persons in the Internal Market. 

A  harmonised  framework  for  firearms-related  offences,  enabling  close  cross-border 
cooperation  between  law  enforcement  and  judicial  authorities  is  therefore  essential.  The 
Member States already foresaw the necessity for the EU to act by listing illicit arms trafficking 
as one of the serious crimes with a cross-border dimension mentioned in Article 83(1) TFEU.  

Union  action  is  urgently  needed  to  mitigate  the  risk  posed  by  geopolitical  instability,  in 
particular conflicts in neighbouring regions such as Russia´s war of aggression against Ukraine, 
which will become a significant source of illicit firearms once hostilities cease. Similarly, the 
technological advances, such as 3D printing, and the new challenges they pose for regulation 
and  enforcement,  further  calls  for  coordination  at  EU  level.  Security  starts  with  effective 
anticipation. While the issue is yet to materialize, the potential of the threat and the few early 
cases  that  have  been  observed  are  convincing  enough  that  urgent  action  is  required  to  stay 
ahead of the curve, in line with the motto laid out in the ProtectEU strategy134: ‘security starts 
with effective anticipation’. 

3.3. 

Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action 

Union action clarifying the requirements to criminalise firearms-related offences and providing 
a certain minimum level of harmonisation for the penalty levels, is more effective than what 
Member States acting alone can achieve. It would lead to a more harmonised framework with 
a minimum degree of harmonised criminal law protection across the EU and facilitate cross-
border cooperation on investigations and prosecutions. Member States will be able to tackle 
more effectively firearms-related crimes, make European societies safer, which should lead to 
a reduction in firearms-related violence and lower its societal cost.  

Union action harmonising and requiring the collection of data for seized firearms would also 
improve the awareness of policy makers and practitioners, helping them to adequately prioritise 
and allocate human and financial resources, as well as monitoring the effectiveness of their 
policies.  An  effective  EU  wide  policy  on  firearms  crime  may  also  benefit  other  EU  policy 
objectives. Firearms crimes are often linked to other forms of crime such as money laundering, 
terrorism, drugs trafficking, violent crimes, counterfeiting or other forms of organised crime 
against  which  the  EU  has  adopted  a  range  of  legislation  in  recent  years.  A  more  effective 

133 Europol, European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), The Hague, 2025, p. 
81. 
134 Communication of from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ProtectEU: a European Internal 
Security Strategy, COM(2025) 148 final, 1.04.2025 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
legislation  would  contribute  to  effective  criminal  law  enforcement  strategies,  at  EU-  and 
national level that address all relevant aspects of criminal interaction, thus increasing the level 
of security in Europe.  

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1.  General objectives 

The overall objective of the EU firearms policy is to contribute to the protection of the people 
in the Union against the threat posed by illicit firearms. The focus should be on enhancing 
the level of security for our citizens and decreasing firearms-related crimes. The reduction in 
shootings  throughout  the  EU  would  be  an  important  indicator  to  measure  the  increased 
protection  of  our  citizens.  The  reduction  of  shootings  is  considered  an  indicator  for  the 
reduction of illicit firearms in circulation, which cannot be quantified due to the lack of data. 

This  overarching  objective  can  therefore  be  distilled  into  three  separate  general  objectives 
which address the problems identified in Section 2: (i) reduce the number of illicit firearms and 
the activities of the illegal firearms market in the EU; (ii) reducing discrepancies between EU 
Member States and harmonising firearms-related offences and penalties across Member States; 
and  (iii)  enhancing  the  overall  picture  on  the  threat  posed  by  firearms  by  improving  the 
availability and the quality of data. The attainment of the general objective (ii) would contribute 
to both other general objectives, without any trade-off.  

4.2. 

Specific objectives 

The specific objectives (hereafter SO) of the initiative are designed to address the problems 
and problem drivers described above (see Figure 7 below). As each of the specific objectives 
address one or two problem drivers, they complement each other to help achieve the general 
objectives. Both SO2, SO3 and SO4 contribute to SO1.  

The specific objectives have been identified to be in line with other EU policies and consistent 
with the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  

The specific objectives have been assessed against the potential additional burden they could 
result in for economical operators. However, given that this initiative focuses on the illicit part 
of the firearms market, and the impact on the legal market being negligible, this assessment 
will not  be  described in  a separate specific objective. Each objective is  presented using the 
SMART framework (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound). 

The  completion  of  these  specific  objectives  will  be  assessed  through  monitoring  and  an 
evaluation. A monitoring framework is detailed in Annex 10. This evaluation should be carried 
out, in principle not earlier than five years after the deadline for transposition. This will ensure 
a  sufficiently  long  period  to  evaluate  the  effects  of  the  initiative  after  it  has  been  fully 
transposed  across  all  Member  States.  To  facilitate  this  monitoring,  a  specific  Commission 
expert group will be created, to employ the Member States’ expertise to support the correct and 
timely transposition of the provisions in the corresponding national legislation.  

42 

 
 
 
Figure 7: Correspondence between problems drivers and the objectives 

4.2.1  Making it easier to investigate and prosecute firearms-related offences 

Specific:  Enhance  investigations  and  prosecutions  of  firearms  offences  by  addressing  the 
challenges that arise from gaps and discrepancies in how Member States define and sanction 
those offences. 

Measurable: All Member States criminalise all required offences following the transposition 
of the initiative and this leads to an increase of successful prosecution of firearms offences by 
20% within five years.  

Achievable:  In  order  to  support  the  implementation  of  this  objective,  specialised  training 
sessions  for  prosecutors  needs  to  be  accessible  to  at  least  80%  of  the  legal  professionals 
involved in firearms cases within two years;  

Relevant: This effort is directly linked with the implementation of the obligations under the 
UN  Firearm  Protocol  and  aims  to  ensure  that  EU  Member  States’  laws  are  consistent  with 
international standards. 

Time-bound: The increase in investigations and prosecutions of all firearms-related offences 
should  be  deduced  from  the  statistical  data  that  Member  States  need  to  provide  to  the 
Commission at the end of the first five years implementation of the new initiative.  

43 

              3     rre t  e a   a  s a e  s t     m  e  a     mbers me   r  ra t t   ers  e  te        es are  reat        resee  r s s       M       S  e a t   e e s are   t s     e t   e e t  e a     ss as  e   s     e t     erat    a      r   at    bet ee  Member States’   m ete t a t  r t es                  S  e       t e   mber a   a a  ab   t      rearms M     arm   sat         rearms   e  es a    e a t es a r ss Member States  m r      t e   era      t re t r     m re a   better  ata   s r    e e t  e    ss as  e a    r   rt   ate  e a t  t  es a    e e s   r  rearms re ate    e  es Ma      t eas er t     est  ate a    r se  te  rearms   e  es S                 S   s r    a   t re  r    e   r eme t     rearms re ate    e  es  m r       a  e   r eme t a         a      erat    a    arm   se   ata     e t        rearms re ate    e  es  
 
 
4.2.2  Ensuring a future proof enforcement of firearms-related offences  

Specific:  Member States should be able to counter the new and developing threat of privately 
manufactured firearms in a coordinated, harmonised and proactive manner.  

Measurable:  An  increase  in  investigations  and  prosecutions  of  cases  involving  new 
technologies with 20% throughout the EU.  

Achievable: In order to support the implementation of this objectives, Member States will have 
to work together to jointly test blueprints and exchange information about the results of these 
tests.  

Relevant: Focusing on new technologies, and specifically on the blueprints needed to privately 
manufacture firearms, was already recommended by the Commission in 2021, by EMPACT in 
2022 and by the UN in 2024.  

Time-bound: The increase in investigations and prosecutions of offences linked to privately 
manufactured firearms should be deduced from the statistical data that Member States need to 
provide  to  the  Commission  at  the  end  of  the  first  five  years  implementation  of  the  new 
initiative. 

4.2.3  Ensuring effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalty types and levels for firearms-

related offences 

When providing the penalties for criminal offences, criminal law usually allows judges to apply 
the penalty they deem the most appropriate in regard of the offences and the circumstances in 
which they took place. Criminal law guides the choice of judges by providing for each offence 
possible  options  (e.g.  jailing  time,  fines,  accompanying  penalties)  and  the  range  for  each 
option. Judges can thus select between a minimum and a maximum. 

In the context of EU criminal law, the expression "minimum levels of maximum penalties" 
means  ensuring  that  the  maximum  penalty  available  for  a  given  offence  is  above  a  certain 
threshold in each Member State’ legal system. It aims to prevent situations such as where an 
offence is punishable by a maximum penalty of 10 years of imprisonment in Member State A 
while the same offence is punishable by a maximum of 2 years of imprisonment in Member 
State B. This concept ensures a degree of harmonisation across the EU regarding how serious 
crimes  are  penalised,  while  still  allowing  Member  States  the  flexibility  to  impose  stricter 
penalties if they choose to do so. 

Specific:  establishing  at  EU  level  penalty  levels  for  firearms-related  offences  that  are 
sufficiently effective and dissuasive by harmonising minimum levels of maximum penalties. 
Ensuring that Member States make use of the full range of accompanying penalties. Ensuring 
that  national  authorities  have  the  required  tools  at  their  disposal  when  investigating  and 
prosecuting relevant firearms-related offences. 

Measurable:  the  current  gap  between  the  Member  States’  lowest  and  highest  minimum 
maximum  penalties  is  diminished  by  20%  within  five  years.  Furthermore,  the  Commission 
should monitor the compliance by the Member States with the new minimum penalty types 

44 

 
 
and  levels.  The  increase  in  penalty  levels  should  lead  to  a  long-term  decrease  of  offences. 
However, this will not be able to be measured in at least the first 10 years due to the current 
lack of data.  

Achievable:  In  order  to  support  the  implementation  of  this  objective,  workshops  on  the 
implementation of the new initiative should be organised over a period of two years after the 
adoption. Specialised training sessions for prosecutors needs to be accessible to at least 80% 
of the legal professionals involved in firearms cases within two years; 

Relevant: the aim is to reduce the opportunities for criminals to resort to forum-shopping, and 
to deter them from engaging in criminal firearms-related activities by making the ratio risk-
reward less attractive.  

The  access  by  investigators  to  special  investigative  techniques,  such  as  surveillance  of 
telecommunications and undercover investigations, is often conditional to the seriousness of 
the crime, which is defined by the sanction applicable to the offence in question.  

Time-bound: The decrease of the current gap between the Member States’ lowest and highest 
minimum  maximum  penalties  should  be  deduced  from  the  legislation  communicated  to  the 
Commission  by  Member  States  the  end  of  the  first  five  years  implementation  of  the  new 
initiative. 

There is a potential trade-off between SO3 and SO1 in that ensuring effective, dissuasive and 
proportionate  penalty  types  and  levels  could  lead  to  less  offences  being  committed,  thus 
lowering the metrics against which the success of SO1 is measured. 

4.2.4 

Improving law enforcement and judicial cooperation and harmonised data collection on 
firearms-related offences 

Specific:  Increasing  the  cooperation  between  Member  State’s  law  enforcement  and  judicial 
authorities. Improving the quality and availability of relevant data on firearms-related offences, 
such as the number of firearms seizures. 

Measurable: the number of SIENA exchanges and JITs initiated for firearms at Europol and 
Eurojust would increase by 20% respectively. All Member States would have fully established 
NFFPs performing the full tasks list as set out in Council Conclusions 10726/21135 and would 
report statistical data to the Commission within two years after adoption of the proposal.  

Relevant:  improving  the  cooperation  between  law  enforcement  and  judicial  authorities, 
including  with  the  support  of  the  EU  Agencies,  would  improve  the  fight  against  firearms-
related offences and enable those authorities to quicker adapt to the new modus operandi and 
illegal business models of offenders. The harmonisation of data collection on firearms-related 

135 Council Conclusions 10726/21 on the implementation of the National Firearms Focal Points (NFFPs)  
in 
INIT/en/pdf 

the  EU  Member  States,  13.07.2021:  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10726-2021-

45 

 
 
 
offence seeks to improve the statistical knowledge linked to the response to firearms-related 
offences, and to provide a better picture of the scale and impact of firearms crime.  

Achievable:  In  order  to  support  the  implementation  of  this  objective,  workshops  on  the 
implementation of the new initiative should be organised over a period of two years after the 
adoption.  

Time-bound: he improvement on statistical data collection would be assessed by the rate of 
reporting  by  Member  States  on  seized  firearms  within  five  years  of  implementation  of  the 
initiative and the possibility to perform analysis using comparable and meaningful data.  

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? 

The baseline scenario assumes no further EU level intervention beyond the actions described 
in  the  EU  Action  Plans  on  firearms  trafficking,  and  the  Commission  monitoring  the 
implementation of the Firearms Directive. The Commission will adopt a renewed EU Action 
Plan on firearms trafficking in 2026, to replace the 2020-2025 Action Plan136.  

As part of the priorities  set  out  in  the  Action Plan, the Commission  would continue urging 
Member States to complete the establishment of fully staffed and trained  National Firearms 
Focal Points. This would be done by organising the yearly meeting to facilitate exchange of 
information.  The  lessons  learned  from  these  meetings  would  be  gathered  in  an  official 
recommendation paper together with the scoreboard developed by the Commission to evaluate 
the Council Conclusions on National Firearms Focal Points137. The implementation of these 
recommendations have shown to be slow.  

The operational response to firearms crime at the EU level would continue to take place within 
existing  frameworks,  such  as  EMPACT  and  its  Operational  Action  Plans,  and  in  the 
cooperation  with  the  EU  Agencies,  such  as  Europol  and  Eurojust.  Any  improvement  on 
cooperation levels between Member States and provision of data would remain contingent on 
the efforts that Member States are willing to voluntarily deploy, including sending statistical 
data to Eurostat.  

The legal framework criminalising firearms-related offences would remain fragmented at EU 
level, with significant disparities between how Member States define and sanction firearms-
related  offences.  Some  implementation  issues  are  likely  to  be  corrected  through  the 
Commission’s enforcement of the Firearms Directive in the Member States, including through 
infringement proceedings as appropriate. However, even this is unlikely to solve the disparities 
and gaps in coverage between Member States due to the limited scope of the Firearms Directive 

136 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 2020-2025 EU action plan on 
firearms trafficking, COM(2020)608 final, 24.07.2020. 
137 Council Conclusions 10726/21 on the implementation of the National Firearms Focal Points (NFFPs)  
in 
INIT/en/pdf 

the  EU  Member  States,  13.07.2021:  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10726-2021-

46 

 
 
 
and differences in the definition of certain offences, as illicit trafficking in the UN Firearms 
Protocol, the Firearms Directive and the recast Firearms Regulation (Annex 12 includes a full 
comparison between the three legal texts). Moreover, the current infringement strategy does 
not include pursuing grievances against Member States which penalties cannot be considered 
effective,  nor  dissuasive,  according  to  Article  23  of  the  Firearms  Directive.  Given  the 
considerable degree of discretion left to Member States in setting administrative or criminal 
penalties, the Commission assessed that it would be very difficult to demonstrate that Member 
States have incorrectly implemented this provision.  Even if it were able  to  pursue the most 
obvious  cases  of  penalties  levels  being  insufficiently  effective  or  dissuasive,  the  disparity 
between the Member States is  such that  the infringement  proceedings would  be unlikely  to 
achieve the minimum level of harmonisation required to address the problem driver described 
in Section 2.2.3.  

Judicial and law enforcement authorities would still lack effective means to tackle cross-border 
criminal  markets  in  illegal  firearms.  The  lack  of  awareness  for  the  scale  of  the  problem  at 
political level would remain, negatively affecting the available resources for law enforcement, 
forensic departments and the judicial actors. As a result, the rate of prosecutions or convictions 
is likely to remain low. 

The advancement of some other EU policies could have an impact on the threat posed by illicit 
firearms, such as measures set out in the 2021-2025 EU Strategy to tackle Organise Crime138, 
including the adoption of the new Directive on asset recovery and confiscation139. However, 
without action specifically and comprehensively targeting firearms-related offences, it is likely 
that the effects of these measures will be limited.  

In the baseline scenario, the number of illicit firearms, and their availability to criminals, 
is projected to increase. It is possible to make this assumption based on the increased cases 
linked to technological developments, the experiences of the past linked to conflict situations, 
and the current upward trends regarding the use of firearms within organised crime groups, as 
well  as  the  number  of  firearms-related  incidents.  For  example,  no  specific  arrangement  is 
currently  being  made  to  take  into  account  the  technical  advances  regarding  the  increased 
availability of privately manufactured firearms, such as through 3D printing. The blueprints for 
3D printing of firearms are currently widely available online. Following a consultation with 
the EU Counter Terrorism Centre of Europol, it was confirmed that Europol can already target 
some dissemination of these blueprints, but only when there is a clear link to terrorism140. It 
cannot  proactively  track  blueprints.  This  will  continue  to  be  the  case  without  intervention. 
Additionally, so far, no Member State has taken steps that would allow their law enforcement 
to proactively address the threat of privately manufactured firearms, such as those 3D printed.  

138 Communication of from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  on  the  EU  Strategy  to  tackle 
Organised Crime 2021-2025, COM(2021)170 final, 14.04.2021 
139 Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council on asset recovery and confiscation. 
OJ L, 2024/1260, 2.5.2024 
140  Due  to  the  implementation  of  the  Terrorist  Content  Online  Regulation:  Regulation  (EU)  2021/784  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online.  OJ L 172, 
29.4.2021 

47 

 
 
 
More importantly, the end of the conflict in Ukraine is expected to lead to a surge in illicit 
firearms trafficking, with hundreds of thousand, if not millions, of firearms (see Section 2.1.1 
above). The Commission is working to enhance the already good cooperation and exchange of 
information with the Ukrainian government to anticipate this threat. However, full mitigation 
is unlikely due to the sheer number of firearms involved and the absence of any visibility on 
the firearms that the Russian aggressor has illegally imported into the Ukrainian territory. The 
current  framework  at  EU  level  has  not  been  sufficient  to  successfully  prevent  the  flow  of 
firearms from the Western Balkans, it is unlikely that it will be able to do so with the firearms 
from  Ukraine.  As  a  result  of  the  increased  number  and  availability  of  illicit  firearms,  it  is 
expected that firearms-related violence will increase, with an uptick in firearms use in crimes 
such  as  drugs  trafficking,  theft  and  extorsion,  etc.  It  is  expected  that  firearms-violence  will 
continue  to  claim  lives,  with  the  number  of  killed  and  injured  rising.  If  the  current  trend 
observed in some Member States continues, the share of young perpetrators and victims will 
continue to increase.  

In  the  absence  of  sufficient  and  qualitative  statistical  data,  the  projection  of  the  number  of 
firearms increasing is made on the basis of past experience from the Balkans, analysis of case 
studies, specific national studies (e.g. the study carried out by the Swedish National Council 
for  Crime  Prevention  examining  gun  violence  trends  in  the  criminal  world  since  the  mid-
2000s141) and consultation activities. 

5.2.  Description of the policy options 

Starting from this baseline of taking no further EU action on harmonising the response towards 
firearms-related offences, four possible policy options have been considered.  

Together with figure 7 in section 4.2, the table below presents the intervention logic by showing 
what problem each policy option is trying to address and what it is expected to achieve.  

141 Henrik Angerbrandt, Mariana Dufort & Victor Dudas, "Increased Gun Violence in Sweden", Report 2024:7, 
Brottsförebyggande  rådet  2024,  https://bra.se/english/publications/archive/2025-01-24-increased-gun-violence-
in-sweden#h-Brasassessment. 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problem Drivers 
PD2  PD3 

PD1 

Specific objectives 

PD4  SO1  SO2 

SO3 

SO4 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Policy option 1: non-legislative 
measures and enhancing 
enforcement 
- infringement action on incorrect 
transposition of UN Firearms Protocol 
and against Member States with lowest 
penalties 
- recommendation paper on definitions of 
firearms-related offences 
- recommendation paper on how new 
technologies fit in the current legislation 
and lessons learned from Member States 
and other countries 
- setting up of a Focus Group to improve 
cross-border judicial cooperation 
- recommendation paper on 
harmonisation of minimum dataset for 
seizures of firearms 
Policy option 2: legislative initiative on 
core firearms offences 
- harmonising definitions on illicit 
trafficking, illicit manufacturing, illicit 
modification of marking and illicit 
possession of firearms, essential 
components and ammunition 
-include the offence of illicit possession, 
creation and dissemination of 3D printing 
blueprints 
- harmonising minimum maximum 
penalty types and levels for the core 
offences 
- harmonising minimum dataset for 
seizures of firearms and sharing the data 
with European Firearms Hub 
- requiring reporting of dedicated statistic 
5 years after implementation 
- provisions on establishment of NFFPs 
and cooperation with EU agencies, and 
on special investigative tools 
Policy option 3: legislative initiative on 
core firearms offences and non-
legislative measures 

49 

 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
x 

x 

x 

- harmonising definitions on illicit 
trafficking, illicit manufacturing, illicit 
modification of marking and illicit 
possession of firearms, essential 
components and ammunition 
-include the offence of illicit possession, 
creation and dissemination of 3D printing 
blueprints 
- clarifying through recitals how wider 
firearms-related offences fit within the 
core offences 
- harmonising minimum maximum 
penalty types and levels for the core 
offences 
- harmonising minimum dataset for 
seizures of firearms and sharing the data 
with European Firearms Hub 
- requiring reporting of dedicated statistic 
5 years after implementation 
- provisions on establishment of NFFPs 
and cooperation with EU agencies, and 
on special investigative tools 
- recommendation paper on lessons 
learned from Member States and other 
countries to tackle new technologies and 
focus on joint testing of blueprints 
- setting up of a Focus Group to improve 
cross-border judicial cooperation 
Policy option 4: legislative initiative on 
wider set of firearms offences 
- harmonising definitions on all firearms-
related offences as recommended by the 
UN guidelines 
- include the offence of illicit possession, 
creation and dissemination of 3D printing 
blueprints 
- harmonising minimum maximum 
penalty types and levels for all firearms-
related offences 
- harmonising dataset for seizures of 
firearms 
- recommendation paper on lessons 
learned from Member States and other 
countries to tackle new technologies and 
focus on joint testing of blueprints 
- requiring yearly reporting of dedicated 
statistic 
- provisions on establishment of NFFPs 
and cooperation with EU agencies, and 
on special investigative tools 
- setting up of a Focus Group to improve 
cross-border judicial cooperation 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 x 

x 

x 

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x 

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x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

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Figure 8. Policy measures and policy options 

Policy option 1 (PO1) is designed conservatively as regard adding new legislative obligations 
and is limited to non-legislative measures that are indispensable to address each of the problem 
drivers and to meet all specific objectives. 

Policy  option  2  (PO2)  departs  from  this  conservative  approach  and  foresees  legislative 
measures to address each of the problem drivers and meet all specific objectives. 

Policy  option  3  (PO3)  is  designed  to  provide  a  more  integrated  approach.  It  builds  on  the 
measures already included in PO2 with additional non-legislative measures described in PO1.  

Policy option 4 (PO4) builds on PO3 and takes its integrated approach but compared to PO3 it 
extends the scope of the offences to be criminalised to include all firearms-related offences 
instead of only the core ones. In addition, it includes mandatory reporting of statistical data on 
firearms trafficking to the Commission every year.  

5.2.1.  Policy option 1: non-legislative measures and enhancing enforcement 

Policy  Option  1  consists  of  a  package  of  non-legislative  measures,  which  on  the  one  hand 
would  provide  support  to  the  Member  States  through  recommendations  on  how  national 
measures could reduce the identified problems.  On the other hand, this  package would also 
contain enforcement measures through infringement actions addressing Member States with 
gaps in their existing legislation and addressing Member States with penalties that cannot be 
considered effective nor dissuasive. The following actions could be envisaged under PO1: 

(a)  Extended enforcement strategy 

The  Commission  would  pursue  infringement  proceedings  against  those  Member  States,  as 
identified in the preparatory study, which are currently incorrectly transposing the definitions 
of  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol.  Article  5(1)  of  this  Protocol  requires  all  State  Parties  to 
criminalise  illicit  trafficking,  illicit  manufacturing,  and  falsifying  or  illicitly  obliterating, 
removing or altering the marking(s) on firearms.  

The infringement  actions of the Commission would also tackle gaps in the transposition by 
Member States of Article 5(2) of this Protocol which requires all State Parties to criminalise 
the attempt to commit, participating as an accomplice of any of the above-describe offence and 
organising, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the commission of the above-
described offences. 

This approach would differ from the baseline scenario where the Commission is only pursuing 
infringement on the incorrect implementation of the Firearms Directive. In this policy option, 
the Commission would rely on a legal theory, untested to date and which would require setting 
a precedent, according to which it is able to directly launch infringements proceedings against 
Member  States  for  the  failure  to  correctly  transpose  the  provisions  of  an  international 
agreement (the UN Firearms Protocol in this case) which the EU has ratified. 

This  represents  a  haphazard  infringement  strategy  as  there  is  significant  uncertainty  as  to 
whether the Commission has the ability to launch such infringements In particular, it is not 

51 

 
 
clear  what  extent  of  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  the  Union  has  the  exclusive  competence  to 
apply.  Recital  6  of  the  Council  Decision  of  11  February  2014  on  the  conclusion  of  the 
Protocol142 is, at best, ambiguous when it states that ‘[i]nsofar as the provisions of the Protocol 
fall  within  the  scope  of  the  competence  conferred  on  the  Union,  the  Protocol  should  be 
approved on behalf of the Union.’ Given the political sensitivity on the topic of firearms, it is 
highly  likely  that  some  Member  States  would  challenge  those  infringements  proceedings 
before the Court of Justice, with the risk that the Court invalidates the legal theory they are 
based on. 

Additionally, infringement proceedings by the Commission could also target those Member 
States,  as  identified  in  the  preparatory  study,  which  currently  have  penalties  that  cannot  be 
considered  effective,  nor  dissuasive,  according  to  Article  23  of  the  Firearms  Directive. 
Although unlikely to achieve harmonisation, this would eliminate the most egregious cases of 
penalties levels being insufficiently efficient or dissuasive. 

The  obligations  related  to  this  action  would  be  mainly  for  the  Commission,  the  affected 
Member States and the Court of Justice. This action would target 3 identified problem drivers: 
it  would  eliminate  the  instances  of  non-transposition  or  incorrect  transposition  of  the  three 
mandatory offences mentioned in Article 5(1) of the UN Firearms Protocol (problem driver 1), 
directly contributing toward SO1 and SO4. Investigators and prosecutors would benefit from a 
clearer  legal  framework  which  fits  better  their  needs.  This  action  would  also  ensure  that 
Member States have set sanctions that are sufficiently effective and dissuasive (problem driver 
3  and  SO3).  In  addition,  the  action  would  target  the  issue  of  lack  of  cooperation  and 
coordination (problem driver 4), which would be improved as there would be more consistency 
between the frameworks of Member States, dual incrimination for the mandatory offences, and 
more  incentive  to  investigate  &  prosecute  these  offences  due  to  the  dissuasive  sanctions, 
thereby serving SO1, SO3 and SO4.  

(b) Recommendation paper(s) 

The  Commission  would  produce  non-binding  recommendation  paper(s)  addressed  to  the 
Member States. These recommendations would focus on clarifying definitions related to the 
discrepancies between the UN Firearms Protocol and the Firearms Directive, for example the 
three definitions on illicit firearms trafficking, as explained under problem driver 1, and the 
requirements for each of them. This would serve SO1 and SO4. Additionally, the Commission 
would clarify how privately manufactured firearms (such as 3D printed firearms) fit within the 
existing definition of illicit manufacturing of firearms.  

The  recommendations  would  also  include  a  greater  focus  on  new  technologies.  The 
Commission would carry further the recommendations made in the two dedicated conference 
on 3D printing, organised by EMPACT Firearms to criminalise illicit possession, creation and 
dissemination  of  digital  blueprints.  The  Commission  would  support  the  Member  States  to 
implement  these  recommendations,  which  in  doing  so  would  then  also  adhere  to  the 

142 Council Decision 2014/164/EU on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol against 
the  Illicit  Manufacturing  of  and  Trafficking  in  Firearms,  Their  Parts  and  Components  and  Ammunition, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, OJ L 89, 25.3.2014, p. 7. 
11.02.2014.  

52 

 
 
 
recommendations made at the UN level to indeed criminalise illicit possession, creation and 
dissemination  of  these  digital  blueprints143.  Additionally,  these  recommendations  would 
present good practices to increase the law enforcement cooperation on 3D printed weapons and 
to  increase  the  cooperation  with  the  private  sector.  The  consultations  show  that  multiple 
Member States struggle with determining whether a given blueprint results into a functioning 
firearm  when  manufactured.  The  Commission  would  recommend  joined  testing  for  these 
blueprints,  fostering  EU  projects  or  consider  closer  cooperation  with  initiatives  at  national 
level144. This would address problem driver 2 and serve SO2, and incidentally, SO1 by making 
it  easier  for  law  enforcement  to  investigate  and  prosecute  firearms  offences  involving  new 
technologies.  It  would  also  contribute  towards  SO4  as  the  establishment  of  a  common 
understanding on new technologies would facilitate cooperation between Member States.  

To  further  address  the  problem  driver  of  insufficient  cross-border  cooperation  between 
Member  States  as  well  as  with  EU  Agencies  such  as  Eurojust,  (problem  driver  4)  the 
Commission  would  also  recommend  establishing  a  Focus  Group  of  specialised  prosecutors 
against firearms trafficking, hosted by the Commission. The objective of the group would be 
to  build  specialised  expertise  and  intensify  judicial  cooperation  for  a  more  robust  criminal 
justice response to firearms trafficking. It would provide a forum for judicial practitioners to 
exchange knowledge, expertise and best practices. It would contribute towards the objective of 
improving  cross-border  judicial  cooperation,  which  should  result  in  more  successful 
investigations,  prosecutions  and  convictions  for  trafficking  offences  (SO1  and  SO4).  The 
Focus Group would also help in increasing Member States’ use of the support and capacity of 
coordination  of  the  EU  Agencies,  in  particular  Eurojust.  This  Focus  Group  should  also  be 
interconnected  with  EMPACT  Firearms,  Europol  and  Eurojust  to  facilitate  the  work  of  the 
entire  judicial  chain.  This  measure  would  respond  to  the  fourth  driver  which  focuses  on 
insufficient cooperation and coordination between Member States competent authorities. As 
an  outcome  of  the  meetings  of  this  Focus  Group,  analytical  papers,  reports  and 
recommendations  could  be  developed  in  order  to  guide  and  support  the  work  of  relevant 
practitioners. 

Lastly, in the context of creating an EU repository of seized firearms (SO4), the Commission 
would  build  on  the  exchanges  in  the  Commission  Expert  Group  on  firearms  policy  and 
implementation of Firearms Directive145 on the establishment of a minimum dataset on seized 
firearms, as well as on the definitions of proposed data in the dataset. This includes the type, 
make/brand,  model,  calibre,  criminal  context,  geographical  context,  unique  firearms  ID 
reference, picture, and if available, the serial number. The results of these discussions would 
be  set  out  in  a  Recommendation  for  implementation  by  the  Member  States.  This  would 

143  Resolution  12/3  of  the  Conference  of  the  Parties  to  the  United  Nations  Convention  against  Transnational 
Organized  Crime  on  its  twelfth  session,  held  in  Vienna  from  14  to  18  October  2024,  enhancing  measures, 
including under the Firearms Protocol, to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking 
in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, in view of technological developments; Resolutions and 
Decisions Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
144 For example, EU funded project MIX3D under call ISF-2024-TF2-AG-PROTECT. 
145 Commission Expert Group on firearms trafficking and the Implementation of Directive (EU) 2021/555 (the 
Firearms Directive) (E02211). 

53 

 
 
 
contribute to addressing the problem driver 4 by providing a common support for investigators, 
helping them identifying connections between cases and tracking trafficking networks. 

The  action  of  an  extended  enforcement  strategy,  together  with  the  action  of  producing 
recommendation papers would cover all the problem drivers and specific objectives. The main 
actor for creating these recommendation papers would be the Commission, the implementation 
of these recommendations would be for the Member states.  

5.2.2.  Policy option 2: legislative proposal on the core firearms offences 

Policy Option 2 (PO2) includes a legislative initiative to harmonise the criminalisation of the 
core firearms offences (illicit trafficking, illicit manufacturing, illicit modification of markings 
and illicit possession of firearms). This option would ensure that the EU and Member States 
fulfil their international obligations and solve problems arising from a lack of harmonisation. 
The following actions could be envisaged under PO2: 

(a)  Harmonising definitions and establishing minimum levels of maximum penalties 

The focus of the legislative initiative would be on establishing harmonised definitions for illicit 
trafficking,  illicit  manufacturing,  illicit  modification  of  markings  and  illicit  possession  of 
firearms, directly addressing the problem driver of the landscape being too complex (problem 
driver 1), and contributing towards SO1, as harmonised definitions will facilitate cross-border 
investigations and prosecution. Additionally, these legal obligations would solve the existing 
gaps.  Current  gaps  prevent  law  enforcement  agencies  to  pursue  the  core  offences.  The 
definitions of the first three offences would be based on the definitions established in the UN 
Firearms Protocol but adjusted to the harmonised marking requirements as established by the 
EU  Firearms  Directive  and  the  content  of  the  definitions  of  illicit  trafficking  within  the 
Firearms Directive and Regulation on import, export and transit of firearms.  

The  harmonised  definition  of  illicit  possession  would  be  linked  to  the  harmonised  rules  on 
ownership and licenses as established by the Firearms Directive. However, taking into account 
the comments received during the consultations for this impact assessment, the Commission 
would require criminal intent in the definition of illicit possession. To avoid overregulation, 
situations such as a citizen being late with the renewal of their firearms license or people finding 
old  firearms  without  any  document  to  prove  their  control  in  the  attic  of  deceased  relatives 
should not be included in the scope.  

This  action  would  also  include  the  establishment  of  specific  minimum  levels  of  maximum 
penalties for the harmonised offences to address the problem driver of penalty levels being not 
sufficient (see section 2.2.3 Error! Reference source not found.above). These offences would 
include minimum levels of maximum penalties based on the average of the penalties in the 
Member States, as this would lead to harmonisation of penalties without affecting the Member 
States with higher penalties. While this would not completely eliminate forum shopping, this 
would ensure that the penalties for each firearms offence are sufficiently dissuasive in all of 
the Member States, and deter opportunistic criminals who are drawn by the weak sanctions. 
Additionally, it would ensure that the penalty levels are sufficiently high to allow for the use 
of special investigation techniques. This criterion would be used to determine the appropriate 

54 

 
 
set of aggravating circumstances and accompanying penalties, in addition to the consultation 
of national experts. 

Additionally,  following  the  requirements  of  Article  5(2)  of  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol,  the 
legislative  initiative  would  include  a  focus  on  attempt  and  abiding.  This  would  contribute 
towards SO3.  

As the complexities in the legal landscape and the insufficient levels of penalties also impacts 
the cooperation between Member States and their use of special investigation techniques, this 
action  also  targets  the  problem  driver  4.  Harmonised  definitions  of  firearms  offences  and 
minimum levels of maximum penalties would improve cross-border cooperation, by providing 
national law enforcement authorities a common framework to work together, and eliminating 
dual incrimination issues, in line with SO4.  

(b) Introduce a legislative focus on new technologies 

The  legislative  initiative  under  PO2  would  specifically  clarify  how  privately  manufactured 
firearms, essential components and ammunition (including 3D printed) fit within the definition 
of illicit manufacturing. Additionally, Member States would be required to criminalise illicit 
possession, illicit creation and illicit dissemination of digital blueprints and their hard copies 
needed to  privately  manufacture firearms, essential components and ammunition. However, 
the  focus  of  this  new  offence  would  be  on  illicit  use,  meaning  that  authorised  dealers  and 
brokers  would  not  be  prevented  from  experimenting  or  using  these  new  technologies. 
Furthermore, these blueprints would be focused on new technologies such as 3D printing or 
computer numerical control (CNC) cutting.  

Already in 2021, the Commission announced the need to assess specific rules on prohibiting 
the illicit possession, creation and distribution of digital blueprints and their hard copies by 
non-authorised  arms  dealers146.  Within  the  Operational  Action  on  3D-printed  firearms, 
EMPACT firearms already organised two conferences to exchange information on this growing 
threat.  In  both  conferences,  possible  legal  actions  were  discussed,  and  as  conclusion  the 
criminalisation of illicit possession, creation and dissemination of blueprints was considered as 
the best way forward. These conclusions were also confirmed during the consultation with law 
enforcement agencies as it would allow them to proactively address the threat, instead of only 
reactively. Additionally, this possible legislative action was supported by the citizens present 
during the presentation of the initiative by the Commission, which took place in the Formnext 
conference147.  

This  action  would  specifically  target  the  problem  driver  ‘new  technologies  are  creating 
unforeseen  risks’  and  would  serve  the  objective  ‘ensuring  a  future  proof  enforcement  of 
firearms-related offences’. Furthermore, as explained in the consultation in annex 2, multiple 
experts have stated that a harmonised definition of illicit possession, creation and dissemination 

146 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive (EU) 
2021/555 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, COM(2021) 647 final, 27.10.2021. 
147  Formnext  is  considered  the  central  information  platform  for  industrial  3d  printing  experts  and  production 
professionals  from  a  wide  range  of  application  industries,  with  an  annual  trade  show  in  Frankfurt. 
https://formnext.mesago.com/frankfurt/en.html  

55 

 
 
 
of  blueprints  would  facilitate  a  coordinated  law  enforcement  and  judicial  response  to  the 
(upcoming) threat of privately manufactured firearms. Therefore, this action would also serve 
to  implement  the  objective  on  improving  effective  response  through  cooperation  and 
harmonising data. Especially, as this new offence, and specifically the dissemination element, 
could be implemented through the application of the Digital Service Act. As blueprints would 
become illicit, the removal of these blueprints from online portals active in the EU could be 
requested through the enforcement of the Digital Service Act148.  

(c)  Establish harmonisation of data collection 

The legislative initiative would include requirements for establishing a harmonised minimum 
dataset for seizures of firearms and for all Member States to record this data. Specifically, it 
would  take  the  measure  developed  in  PO1  and  make  it  binding.  When  Member  States  are 
collecting data on seizure of firearms, they would be required to use the typology set in the 
legislative measure.  

This  action  would  require  the  dissemination  of  data  from  Member  States  to  the  European 
Firearms  Hub  at  Europol.  This  repository  is  designed  to  gather  all  information  related  to 
firearms seized in the context of criminal activities.  The purpose of this European Firearms 
Hub is to analyse the phenomenon of illegal firearms at EU level, identifying trends, modus 
operandi and becoming an instrument for investigators and policy makers. Furthermore, this 
harmonised  dataset  and  the  corresponding  national  databases,  together  with  the  European 
Firearms  Hub  will  also  facilitate  the  collection  of  data  by  other  stakeholders,  such  as  the 
Commission or UNODC.  

It would also facilitate the transmission of data to the Commission for the evaluation of the 
Directive. To that end, the legislative initiative would include a requirement for Member States 
to  report 5 years  after the implementation  of the  Directive statistics on seizures, number of 
arrests, anonymised data on perpetrators, number of convictions etc. Without such requirement, 
it is  unlikely  that all Member States will  voluntarily provide the data, resulting  in  a patchy 
picture and impeding the analysis. 

This  action  would  specifically  target  the  problem  driver  of  insufficient  cooperation  and 
coordination, which is linked to the specific objective of ensuring effective response through 
cooperation and harmonising data (SO4). As already explained above, obliging Member States 
to have a harmonised minimum dataset for seizures of firearms will improve the cross-border 
cooperation on firearms cases, as the gathering of this data in the European Firearms Hub will 
allow for the analysis and cross-referencing of seizure data. Additionally, the reporting after 5 
years  of  implementation  will  provide  the  required  information  to  improve  the  intelligence 
picture of the threat, which could have an effect on the prioritisation of the threat and therefore 
on resources for law enforcement.  

(d) Requirements for cooperation and coordination 

148 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital 
Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) OJ L 277, 19.10.2022, p. 1–102 

56 

 
 
 
All  actions  already  explained  under  PO2  would  work  towards  improving  cooperation  and 
coordination. In addition, the legislative initiative would include a specific measure in the form 
of the requirement for Member States to establish a National Firearms Focal Point (NFFP) in 
the meaning of Council conclusions of 13 July 2021 on the implementation of NFFPs in the 
EU  Member  States149.  Existing  good  practices  have  shown  that  well-established  NFFPs 
improve the national and international coordination and cooperation, including throughout the 
entire judicial chain. 

These  NFFPs  serve  as  a  central  contact  point  for  cross-border  requests,  investigations  and 
cooperation.  The  specific  tasks  set  out  by  the  Council  Conclusion  include,  inter  alia, 
establishing a national repository for firearms-related intelligence, both criminal and ballistic; 
establishing  a  repository  for  all  lost,  stolen  and  recovered  firearms;  tracing  of  all  seized 
firearms, when possible, from manufacturer to the last legal owner; analysing of seized firearms 
tracing data to identify the type, make, model, calibre and country of manufacture of a firearm, 
etc.  

Currently the measure set in the Council Conclusion is on a voluntary basis for Member States. 
Most Member States have already established NFFPs but they do not assume the full extent of 
the  tasks  as  agreed  under  the  Council  Conclusions.  Making  the  establishment  of  NFFPs 
mandatory for Member States would improve the coordination and cooperation both on the 
national level, and international level, as they serve as a central contact point for cross-border 
requests, investigations and cooperation. 

Additionally, the legislative initiative would include a specific focus on the need to allow the 
use of special investigative tools. To ensure the success of investigations and the prosecution 
of firearms-related offences, those responsible for investigating or prosecuting such offences 
should have the possibility to make use of effective investigative tools such as those which are 
used in combating organised crime or other serious crimes, such as counter-terrorism. The use 
of such tools, in accordance with national law, should be targeted and consider the principle of 
proportionality and the nature and seriousness of the offences under investigation and should 
respect  the  right  to  the  protection  of  personal  data.  Such  tools  would,  where  appropriate, 
include, for example, the search of any personal property, the interception of communications, 
controlled deliveries, covert surveillance including electronic surveillance, the taking and the 
keeping of audio recordings, in private or public vehicles and places, and of visual images of 
persons  in  public  vehicles  and  places,  and  financial  investigations.  It  is  important  for  all 
Member States to allow access to these special investigative tools, so that investigations with 
a cross-border component are not hindered by one Member State not allowing such tools. For 
some Member States, this requirement is linked to sufficiently high level of penalties.  

These measures would specifically target the problem driver of insufficient cooperation and 
coordination. As a result, it would help to realise the objective of ensuring effective response 

149 Council Conclusions 10726/21 on the implementation of the National Firearms Focal Points (NFFPs)  
in 
INIT/en/pdf 

the  EU  Member  States,  13.07.2021:  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10726-2021-

57 

 
 
 
through cooperation and harmonising data (SO4), in addition to making it easier to investigate 
and prosecute offences (SO1).  

The actions of a), b), c), d) together cover all the problem drivers. The majority of tasks would 
have to be implemented by the Member States, with the support of the Commission. Those 
Member States that currently do not have NFFPs, that have gaps in the definition of the core 
offences and those who have the lowest penalties would be affected most.  

5.2.3.  Policy option 3: legislative proposal on the core firearms offences and 

non-legislative measures 

Policy option 3 (PO3) would combine the legislative measures included in PO2 with some of 
the non-legislative measures from PO1, specifically: 

- 

- 

the  recommendations  to  set  up  a  dedicated  Focus  Group  for  prosecutors  specialised  in 
firearms  offences.  Not  only  will  it  support  Member  States  in  implementing  the  new 
Directive,  it  will  also  facilitate  exchange  of  information  and  best  practices  amongst 
Member  States.  As  explained  under  PO1,  this  action  would  therefore  support  SO1  and 
SO4.  

the facilitation of the exchange of good practices between the Member States and, possibly 
through EU funding, the joint testing of blueprints. It would be set up with the objective 
of avoiding placing an excessive burden on Member States. As explained under PO1, this 
action would therefore support mainly SO2, but it would also improve investigations and 
cooperation (SO1 and SO4). 

-  Lastly, policy option 3 would include an additional non-legislative measure, to specifically 
address some of the wider set of offences, other than the core offences included in the UN 
legislative guidelines that implement recommendations formulated in UN Resolution 12/3 
on firearms offences150.  

It would clarify how to address these offences without establishing specific harmonised 
definitions at the EU level. It could be done through the recitals of the legislative initiative, 
or via annexed legislative guidance, indicating that: 

• 

• 

illicitly  reactivated  deactivated  firearms  fit  within  the  definition  of  illicit 
manufacturing as it implies that the reactivation is done without an authorisation. 

illicit brokering or illicit dealing fits within the definition of illicit manufacturing 
and illicit trafficking as again the prerequisite for both manufacturing and trade is 
having a license as dealer or broker, as established by the Firearms Directive.  

•  arms embargo violations would be linked with the definition of illicit trafficking as 
exports  towards  countries  under  arms  embargoes  should  not  be  granted  an 

150 Resolution 12/3 adopted at the 12th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention 
against 
at 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/COP12/Resolutions/E/Resolution_12_3.pdf 

Transnational 

Organized 

accessible 

Crime, 

2024, 

58 

 
 
 
authorisation,  which  is  an  important  element  in  the  definition  of  illicit  firearms 
trafficking.  

This would further address problem driver 1 and serve SO1.  

As  for  PO2,  most  actions  would  have  to  be  implemented  by  the  Member  States,  with  the 
support of the Commission. The non-legislative measures would require more work from the 
Commission,  than  only  the  legislative  measure  described  in  PO2.  Furthermore,  as  was 
described under PO2, certain Member States which currently have a lesser framework to tackle 
firearms-related offences, will have more implementation tasks than those Member States who 
have already taken action in the past years.  

5.2.4.  Policy option 4: legislative proposal on a wider set of firearms-related 

offences 

Policy option 4 (PO4) would build further on the measures described under PO3. However, it 
would  not  only  include  a  focus  on  the  core  firearms  offences  but  extend  the  scope  of  the 
legislative initiative to all firearms-related offences, as suggested by the UN in their guidelines. 
These recommended offences are illicit reactivation of deactivated weapons, illicit brokering, 
arms embargo violations, illicit  carrying, and misconduct in the context of record-keeping and 
licensing. The following additional actions would be envisaged under PO4 (all measures as 
described under PO3 would also be part of PO4): 

(a)  Harmonising definitions and establishing minimum levels of maximum sanctions 

Under this policy option, measures would be taken to not only harmonise the definitions of the 
core  firearms  offences,  but  to  harmonise  the  definitions  of  all  firearms-related  offences 
described above. These would include all the firearms-related offences as suggested by the UN 
in their legislative guidelines: illicit reactivation of deactivated weapons, illicit brokering, arms 
embargo  violations,  illicit    carrying,  and  misconduct  in  the  context  of  record-keeping  and 
licensing. However, as the legal base of this initiative is to regulate criminal offences, all these 
harmonised definitions would need to clearly exclude activities regulated by the legal market 
rules, unless there is a clear criminal intent such as misconduct in the context of record-keeping 
and licensing. This action would also include specific minimum levels of maximum penalties 
for the harmonised offences of this legislative initiative, as described in PO2.  

Similarly to point (a) under PO2, this action would target 3 of the 4 identified problem drivers. 
It  would  address  problem  driver  1  the  current  legal  landscape  being  too  complex  and 
cumbersome as it would harmonise the definitions of all firearms-related offences in the EU. 
Practitioners throughout the EU would therefore only need to understand those set definitions 
and  not  diverging  definitions  from  neighbouring  Member  States.  This  would  therefore  also 
facilitate cooperation between the Member States (SO1 and SO4). Additionally, by defining 
all the firearms-relates offences, it would become possible to establish effective, dissuasive and 
proportionate minimum penalty levels for all these offences (SO3).  

(b) Establish harmonisation of data collection 

59 

 
 
Under this policy option, measures would be taken to not only establish a harmonised minimum 
dataset for seizures of firearms and report this data to the European Firearms Hub, but also to 
oblige Member States to collect and report a wider set of data on firearms to the Commission 
every year. This data should include number of seizures, number of arrests, anonymised data 
on perpetrators, number of convictions etc. It would contribute to the specific objective 4 by 
improving harmonised data collection on firearms offences. 

The action would eliminate the gaps and inconsistencies in reporting which prevent statistics 
from capturing the whole scale of firearms threat within the EU.  

Under  this  policy  option,  Member  States  would  be  formally  required  to  collect  data  on  all 
firearms  offences  and  seized  firearms  and  report  those  statistics  to  the  Commission  on  an 
annual basis in order to have a more up-to-date overview and to monitor the scale of the threat, 
as well as to detect emerging trends.  

The action of harmonising definitions and establishing minimum levels of maximum sanctions, 
introducing  a  legislative  focus  on  new  technologies,  together  with  the  action  establishing 
harmonisation of data collection would cover all the problem drivers and specific objectives.  

These actions would mostly increase the tasks for the Member States, in comparison with PO3.  

5.3.  Options discarded at an early stage 

Multiple  respondents  to  the  call  for  evidence  called  upon  the  Commission  to  focus  on 
regulating the ownership and possession of 3D-printers. Furthermore, the magistrates consulted 
on  this  issue  suggested  an  approach  where  software  in  printers  would  be  able  to  detect 
blueprints of firearms, which would then block the printer. This approach mimics the approach 
used  for  the  prevention  of  printing  and  falsifying  money.  However,  consultations  with  the 
private  sector  and  the  visit  to  the  Formnext  conference151  showed  that  the  additive 
manufacturing sector contributes to industrial manufacturing, innovative ways of working and 
creative processes. Targeting 3D-printers would overregulate and burden this sector, bridling 
innovation.  

In the case of falsifying money, the software’s reach and restrictions can be easily limited and 
targeted given that they are aimed at preventing the replication of a very identifiable and fixed 
set of pictures (money bills) which do not often change. In the case of 3D printing of firearms, 
the ‘pool’ of prints which could be used to make a firearm, or an essential component, is much 
larger as well as constantly and rapidly evolving. To effectively prevent the printing of firearms 
or  essential  components,  the  software  would  have  be  very  intrusive  to  prevent  bypassing 
through small tweaks. It would then risk restricting the printing of parts which have unrelated 
and legitimate practical applications but which are diverted to make firearms. Additionally, the 
software of these printers would have to be continuously updated to accommodate the ever-
changing blueprints. 

151  Formnext  is  considered  the  central  information  platform  for  industrial  3d  printing  experts  and  production 
professionals  from  a  wide  range  of  application  industries,  with  an  annual  trade  show  in  Frankfurt. 
https://formnext.mesago.com/frankfurt/en.html  

60 

 
 
 
This option was discarded because any imposition of detection of blueprints of firearms in 3D 
printers would be disproportionate in regard of the results it would yield, and the availability 
of  other  options.  Limited  and  targeted  detection  in  printing  software  would  be  ineffective 
because it would be easily bypassed. Extensive and intrusive detection which could effectively 
prevents  the  printing  of  firearms  or  essential  components  would  disproportionately  affect 
unrelated and legitimate projects, curtailing and hampering innovation.  

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

The actual impact of the policy options is often difficult to assess due to the absence of data. 
To alleviate  this difficulty  and in  anticipation  of  the next  section, the impacts  of the policy 
options are primarily assessed against each other.  

This initiative is designed to harmonise the criminal law on firearms-related offences. Focusing 
on harmonising definitions, penalties, new technologies or cooperation does not have a direct 
or known impact on the environment. Therefore, none of the policy options are expected to 
have an environmental impact. This criterion will not be addressed in the analysis below.  

Insufficient qualitative and comprehensive statistical data is identified as one of the problems 
in this document, as stated in section 2.1.3. For all Member States, there is a sustained lack of 
reliable and disaggregated official statistical data on investigations, prosecutions, convictions, 
dismissed cases, number of legal persons involved, the level and type of penalties imposed, 
and the number of firearms seized in the context of criminal offences152.  

Without  such  data,  it  is  very  difficult  to  quantitatively  establish  the  impacts  of  the  current 
situation as baseline and to assess the impacts of the different policy options. This is especially 
problematic because of the little to no academic research on the social and economic costs of 
firearms violence in the EU. 

To compensate the limitation  of lack of data affecting the measurement  of the impacts,  the 
baseline scenario and the impact of the intervention will be assessed based on the existing few 
studies, official reports and stakeholder consultations. The lack of data results in the absence 
of  a  credible  assessment  of  the  quantification  and  monetisation  of  the  social  and  economic 
impacts of the baseline scenario. These limitations are further detailed in Annex 5, section 3. 
In the absence of such data, the assessment is made using the quantification and monetisation 
analysis  of  specific  situations.  The  social  and  economic  impacts  of  firearms  in  the  EU  is 
inferred from the analysis of these specific situations. This leads to a high degree of uncertainty 
regarding their exact impacts as the context of these specific situations  does not necessarily 
mirror that of the whole of the EU.   .  

6.1. 

Social impacts 

There are some studies on the social impact of the firearms-related violence, but it is still an 
under-researched sector within the EU. Therefore, it is difficult to make a methodologically 

152 Duquet, N., & Vanden Auweele, D. ,Targeting gun violence & trafficking in Europe, Flemish Peace Institute, 
3  December  2021,  accessible  at  https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/TARGET-
OnlineVersion.pdf 

61 

 
 
 
sound claim on the social impact of firearms offences. Nevertheless, the security impact was 
identified as the most significant social impact, followed to a lesser degree by the impact on 
citizens who legally own firearms. 

Therefore, the assessment of the score of social impact will be mainly assessed by the security 
impact, with variables from the impact on citizens who legally own firearms. 

6.1.1.  Security impacts 

The baseline scenario is the one described in section 2.1.1 “Security threats posed by the high 
number of firearms present on EU territory”. 

As  reflected  in  a  study  from  2023  in  the  EU153,  the  impact  of  firearms  violence  and  its 
coinciding violence in the drug milieu is not limited to damages within the criminal milieu. 
Often,  these  shootings  also  impact  the  broader  community  and  create  spill-over  effects 
affecting other parts  of societal  life.  For example, the increase in  shootings in  Brussels and 
Malmo have resulted in certain areas to be considered dangerous, which in its turn effects real 
estate and investments into that area.  

Indirect  current  impacts  must  also  be  taken  into  consideration,  where  entire  communities, 
families and children experience social, emotional and physical trauma following the pervasive 
culture of fear and violence that dominates these communities. These conflicts also impact the 
people’s trust in government institutions. 

Society at large is also impacted by another specific type of firearms-related violence: terrorist 
attacks  using  firearms.  The  nexus  between  firearms  and  terrorism  has  been  reiterated  by 
Europol  in  the  last  SOCTA  published  in  March  2025154.  This  nexus  has  been  especially 
prominent since 2015 in France, Belgium and Denmark, with different terrorist attacks where 
illicit firearms have been used. Terrorist attacks where firearms are used, typically have a larger 
number of deaths than attacks with knives or other means. During the 2015 Paris attacks 137 
people were killed and 416 people were injured. The attackers used suicide bombs bus also 
illicitly  modified  salute  and  acoustic  weapons  and  illicitly  trafficked  firearms  which  were 
traced back to the Western Balkans.  

All  described  policy  options  are  expected  to  have  a  positive  security  impact.  However,  the 
impact  of  PO1  would  be  dependent  on  whether  Member  States  fully  implement  the 
recommendations. During the consultations, multiple experts stated that they do not believe 
recommendations  would  be  implemented  without  a  legal  obligation,  especially  if  the 
implementation  of  the  recommendations  would  lead  to  costs.  This  comment  was  especially 
linked to the recommendations regarding harmonising the data of seized firearms. This dataset 
could lead to changes in IT systems, for which the expert stated they would not be prioritised. 

153 De Schutter, A. and Duquet, N. (2023), The nexus between drug markets and gun violence in the European 
Union, Flemish Peace Institute and EMCDDA,  https://www.euda.europa.eu/drugs-library/nexus-between-drug-
markets-and-gun-violence-european-union_en. 
154 Europol, European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), The Hague, 2025, p.61-
63. 

62 

 
 
 
Additionally, the enforcement actions, as described under PO1, would only target the Member 
States which have gaps in their transposition of the UN Firearms Protocol and those Member 
States which have insufficient penalty levels. Therefore, the security impacts would be limited 
to those Member States. Furthermore, as established above, the exclusive enforcement of the 
UN  Firearms  Protocol  might  not  yield  the  desired  security  impact  because  the  marking 
requirements  of the  Firearms Directive  are stricter than those of the UN  Firearms Protocol. 
Therefore, PO1 is expected to have the lowest security impact compared with the three other 
policy options. 

In comparison, PO2 would have more security impacts than PO1, however, it is expected that 
PO2 would have less security impacts than PO3 and PO4. This comes from the fact that PO2 
would include mandatory legal obligations equal to PO3 (core offences, specific offence on 3D 
blueprints,  harmonising  minimum  maximum  penalties,  harmonising  minimum  dataset  for 
seizures  and  provisions  establishing  NFFPs  and  special  investigation  tools),  but  would  not 
include the non-legislative measures. PO3 would have a lesser security impact than PO4 as the 
latest includes a legal obligation on a wider set of offences. The legal obligations in PO2, PO3 
and  PO4  are  expected  to  have  a  positive  security  impact  because  it  would  facilitate  the 
cooperation  between  Member  States  in  their  fight  against  firearms-related  offences.  This 
expectation comes from the fact that gaps and discrepancies between Member States would be 
resolved. Furthermore, the establishment of NFFPs is a proven and recognized good practice 
that  improves  national  and  international  cooperation,  which  facilitates  tracing  of  firearms, 
tackling  cross-border  investigations  and  prosecutions.  This  can  be  observed  in  the  Western 
Balkans, where almost all partners (except Bosnia & Herzegovina) have established functional 
firearms focal points a few years ago. This has improved the region’s fight against trafficking 
in firearms.  

As PO3 has the same legal obligations as PO2, it is expected that PO3 would have a higher 
security  impact  than  PO1.  The  introduction  under  PO3  of  recommendation  papers  on  good 
practices regarding new technologies, including the joint testing of blueprints, and the setting 
up of a focus group to improve cross-border judicial cooperation, are expected to create clear 
security impacts. Especially the sharing of good practices in terms of new technologies will 
support Member States in tackling these new threats, which would have been defined as an 
offence  in  the  legal  requirements,  and  the  joint  testing  of  blueprints  will  reduce  the  costs 
associated with this new offence. Furthermore, the establishment of a focus group to improve 
cross-border  judicial  cooperation  will  support  the  implementation  of  the  offences  in  the 
different Member States. These non-binding measures will especially contribute to SO1, SO2 
and SO4, which have a clear impact on security. Therefore, PO3 is expected to have a higher 
security impact than PO1 and PO2.  

PO4 would contain the highest degree of security impact, compared against the other POs, with 
the legal obligations of the additional offences, beyond the core ones, and the obligation for 
Member States to provide statistical data. 

Therefore, in preparation for section 7, comparing the policy options, PO1 scores 1, PO2 scores 
2, PO3 scores 2,5 and PO4 scores 3 on their impact  to increase security related to firearms 
violence (to be calculated together with impact on legal firearms owners). 

63 

 
 
It should be noted that any initiative which makes it more difficult for criminal to access and 
use  firearms  is  likely  to  lead  those  criminals  to  look  for  alternatives,  such  as  heavy 
pyrotechnics.  Organised  crimes  groups  already  favour powerful  pyrotechnics,  like  F4  flash 
bangers, over  firearms,  viewing  them  as  less  regulated  and  easier  to  access155.  Europol  has 
reported having been informed of increased misuse of pyrotechnic articles by criminal groups, 
especially for intimidation against other rival groups or law enforcement authorities156. Some 
Member  States  have  reported  an  increase  in  the  use  of  category  F4  pyrotechnic  articles  in 
improvised  explosive  devices,  to  carry  out  attacks  (e.g.  against  automated  teller  machines, 
ATMs)157. In June 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions recognising 
pyrotechnics  as  a  significant  and  evolving  threat  to  public  safety  and  internal  security158. 
Cracking  down  on  firearms  offences  might  result  in  a  further  increase  in  the  use  of  heavy 
pyrotechnics. It was already observed that the tightening of the rules on explosive precursors 
has led to pyrotechnics being an attractive alternative159. In addition, organised crime groups 
have been displaying recruiting strategies which downplay the criminal side of pyrotechnics 
when recruiting and involving minors and youth, advertising them as “harmless”, opposed to, 
for example, explosives and firearms160. 

6.1.2.  Impact on citizens who legally own firearms 

Most of the respondents of the public consultation considered the threat of firearms trafficking 
important to very important for public security. However, both in the public consultation and 
in the call for evidence, multiple citizens expressed concerns about infringing the rights of legal 
owners, as a result, the respondents preferred PO1 over the other policy options.  

The enforcement actions described in PO1, could have an effect on the citizens who legally 
own  firearms  in  the  targeted  Member  States.  However,  the  rules  on  legal  ownership  are 
determined  in  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol,  the  Firearms  Directive  and  the  recast  Firearms 

for 

the 

sake  of  public  order  and 

155  European  Commission,  Feasibility  study  on  reducing  the  security  risks  posed  by  the  criminal  misuse  of 
pyrotechnics, Final report, Ecorys in collaboration with SAFE, Spark and TNO, 2025, pp. 49, 50, 124, 127, 201 
156  Idem,  p.  15;  See  also  Europol,  EU  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat  Assessment  2025  (EU-SOCTA), 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publication-events/main-reports/changing-dna-of-serious-and-organised-crime, 
pp. 31, 57 and 63. 
157 This has been observed in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France and Sweden. See for example: 
A.S Fabre, N. Florquin, M. Schroeder (2023), Illicit firearms ammunition and other explosive munitions in the 
European  Union,  https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/illicit-firearms-ammunition-and-other-explosive-
munitions-european-union;  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  Council  of  the  Netherlands,  Modify  the  Pyrotechnics 
the  Netherlands  2023. 
Directive 
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads/document?id=2024D06671;  Europol  (2022),  Heavy  fireworks  off  the 
market for safer holidays, https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/heavy-fireworks-market-
for-safer-holidays; Regeringens (2023), Skjutvapen och explosiva varor – skärpta straff för de allvarligare brotten, 
proposition  2023/24:33  (Firearms  and  explosive  materials  –  tougher  penalties  for  the  more  serious  crimes), 
(2022), 
https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/proposition/2023/10/prop.-20232433; 
Lägesrapport 
ämnen. 
farliga 
https://polisen.se/siteassets/dokument/ovriga_rapporter/arsrapport_2021_polisen.pdf/download/ 
158 Council conclusions on combating trafficking of weapons and fighting threats stemming from firearms and 
pyrotechnic articles, 12 June 2025, 9907/25. 
159  European  Commission,  Feasibility  study  on  reducing  the  security  risks  posed  by  the  criminal  misuse  of 
pyrotechnics, Final report, Ecorys in collaboration with SAFE, Spark and TNO, 2025, p. 15. 
160 Idem, p. 40.  

safety.  Non-paper  by 

explosiva 

avseende 

Polisen 

andra 

och 

64 

 
 
 
Regulation.  Therefore, the actual impact  on citizens who legally own firearms, comes from 
those texts. Enforcing the rules is a legal obligation for the European Commission.  

The introduction of the legal  obligations regarding offences, as described  in  PO2, PO3 and 
PO4 are expected to have a similarly low impact on citizens who legally own firearms. The 
reason for this is similar as described above. The legal provisions will define the illegal side of 
the firearms market. As explained in the introduction: legal context, what constitutes the legal 
market  is delineated by the existing  legislation, and whatever falls outside this demarcation 
constitutes  the  illegal  market.  Therefore,  the  new  legal  provisions  on  the  illegal  side  of  the 
firearms market will use the existing rules on legal ownership as the defining line between what 
is illegal and legal. The rules on the legal ownership of firearms will not change. Therefore, all 
citizens who currently own a firearm according to the current legal rules, will not be impacted.  

The exception on the above statement relates to the new legal obligation, as described in PO2, 
PO3  and  PO4,  to  criminalise  the  illicit  possession,  creation  and  dissemination  of  digital 
blueprints and their hard copies. Until now, blueprints are not regulated in the EU. Therefore, 
adding these rules would have an effect on those citizens who already own such blueprints. 
Therefore, as described under point (b) of PO2, it would be important to carefully consider the 
focus on new technologies such as 3D printing or CNC cutting. A careful and targeted approach 
should minimize the impact on citizens.  Especially, because private citizens  are already not 
allowed to manufacture firearms without being a registered dealer. Furthermore, as explained 
in section 5.2.2 (point b), dealers authorised to manufacture firearms, will not be impacted by 
this new prohibition.  

The initiative is designed to address the recurring comments from legal firearms owners that 
the  Commission  should  focus  on  improving  law  enforcement  cooperation  and  address  the 
threats relating to firearms trafficking, instead of focusing on the legal owners. In PO1, PO3 
and PO4, the proposed recommendation to set-up a Focus Group of specialised prosecutors 
against  firearms  trafficking,  would  improve  a  harmonised  judicial  answer  to  the  threat,  as 
prosecutors would be able to learn from good practices in other Member States. Additionally, 
the proposed measure to establish NFFPs in PO2, PO3 and PO4 would reinforce national and 
international  cooperation  amongst  all  relevant  firearms  stakeholders.  A  combination  of  this 
recommendation and the establishment of NFFPs (as described in PO3 and PO4) would have 
the highest impact on the request of citizens to improve cooperation. Unfortunately, based on 
the comments of the citizens in the public consultation and call for evidence, it became clear 
that they did not realize this and anticipated that the initiative would include additional rules 
for legal firearms owners. Those concerns are acknowledged and will be accounted for in the 
text of the proposal. The respondents to the public consultation who correctly understood the 
scope of the initiative in general expressed support for it.  

For a non-firearms owning citizen, the impact of the different policy options is mainly related 
to  improving  security.  This  is  described  in  the  above  section.  Therefore,  in  preparation  for 
section  7,  comparing  the  policy  options,  the  introduction  of  the  new  offence  related  to 
blueprints might have a slightly negative impact on legal owners, but this would be offset by 
the positive impact of additional cooperation through the establishment of NFFP. and the focus 
group. As a result, PO1 would score 0.5, PO2 would score 0.5, PO3 and PO4 would score 1. 
This has to be calculated together with the security impacts, as these are considered of higher 

65 

 
 
importance for the social impact, the final scores are PO1 scores 1, PO2 scores 2, PO3 scores 
2,5 and PO4 scores 3. 

6.2.  Economic impact 

The economic impact of firearms-related crime is a highly under-researched sector within the 
EU,  as  explained  at  the  beginning  of  this  section;  therefore,  it  is  difficult  to  make  a 
methodologically sound  claim  on the  economic impact of firearms offences to  society. The 
most significant economic impacts are identified as the impact on SMEs and competitiveness 
and the regulatory costs for Member States. 

The assessment of the economic impact will be mainly done using the economic costs, with 
variables from the impact on SMEs and competitiveness and regulatory costs. 

6.2.1.  Economic costs linked to shootings 

Due to the lack of specific studies at EU on the economic costs, it is not possible to quantify 
the costs. A mostly qualitative assessment is used instead. 

Nevertheless, the project INSIGHT161 does include research into the size of lethal and non-
lethal gun violence in the EU. The research suggests that within the EU there are on average 
0.3 firearms homicides per 100,000 population in 2021162. Extrapolated to the total population 
of the EU (447 million in 2021163), this would be around 1,341 homicides by firearms each 
year. The research further states that lethal firearms violence only presents about 5% of all total 
firearms violence. From the remaining 95% non-lethal firearms violence, about 20% results in 
physical injuries. Other types of violence are threats with firearms or shootings at objects. The 
project however, does not differentiate between violence using legal or illegal firearms.. 

A 2022 study about the nexus on firearms and drugs in the EU164 found that firearm-related 
injuries  result  in  higher  direct  medical  costs  and  indirect  loses  of  productivity  than  those 
resulting from injuries inflicted by sharp instruments. These disproportionally higher costs for 
firearms violence are attributed to the higher proportion of firearm-inflicted injuries resulting 
in death or injuries warranting hospitalisation. 

161EU funded project INSIGHT, under call ISFP-2020-AG-FIRE. Accessible at 
https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/en/project-
insight/#:~:text=This%20online%20knowledge%20platform%20offers%20policymakers%2C%20police%20off
icers%2C,information%20about%20firearms%20violence%20in%20the%20European%20Union  
162 Krüsselmann, K, Lethal and non-lethal Firearms Violence in the European Union, Brussels, 2023, p. 12. 
163  European  Commission  Eurostat’s  website,  population  and  population  change  statistic,  available  at 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population_and_population_change_statistics  
164 De Schutter, A. en Duquet, N. (2023),  The nexus between drug markets and gun violence in the European 
Union, Flemish Peace Institute and EMCDDA, https://www.euda.europa.eu/drugs-library/nexus-between-drug-
markets-and-gun-violence-european-union_en. 

66 

 
 
 
Swedish  economist  Oscar Erixon estimated165 the cost  of a  shooting in  Sweden,  in  which  a 
person was slightly injured and another seriously injured person, to be SEK 75 million (EUR 
6.7 million). This figure includes the cost to society for health care, police, the judicial system, 
witness  support  and  penal  care166.  Information  received  from  gunviolence.eu,  states  that 
Sweden experienced 104 shootings in the first half of the year 2024. Using the conclusions of 
the project INSIGHT (95% of firearms violence is non-lethal, of which about 20% results in 
physical injuries), it could be surmised that around 20 of these shootings resulted in non-lethal 
but physical injuries. If all these 20 shootings were to have resulted in a slightly injured person 
and another seriously injured person, the cost of these shooting for the Swedish society would 
be somewhere around EUR 120 to 140 million, for the first half of 2024 alone. The cost is 
purely theoretical as it relies on the hypothesis that all shootings resulted in one slightly injured 
person  and  another  seriously  injured,  while  some  of  these  shootings  might  have  actually 
resulted  in  less  injuries  and  others  in  more  injuries.  The  above  explanation  nevertheless 
illustrates  that  the  costs  of  firearms-related  violence,  while  difficult  to  estimate,  are  not 
negligible.  

According to Mr. Erixon, shootings lead to anxiety and fear in society, and this in turn can be 
expressed in various outcomes that result in an actual cost, such as people going on sick leave 
or achieving poorer results in school, starting to take antidepressants or moving away.167. 

Another economic impact reflected in open sources and articles is the depreciation of property 
assets in areas affected by shooting incidents.168 As a Swedish real estate expert states it: “in 
certain neighbourhoods, you can clearly establish a link with crime rates”, “when violence and 
unrest  escalate,  it  is  certainly  not  the  ideal  time  to  try  to  sell  your  house  or  apartment  at  a 
favourable price”169. 

Against this baseline scenario, all policy options would have some kind of positive economic 
impact, as they would serve the general objective of reducing the number and availability of 
illicit firearms, and would reduce the firearms-related violence threatening the security of EU 
citizens (final consequence of the problem). 

The enforcement actions in PO1 would address the Member States that have clear gaps in the 
transposition of the UN Firearms Protocol and the Member States with the lowest penalties. 
However, as explained above, in section 5.2.1(point a), the enforcement of the UN Firearms 
Protocol  through  infringements  is  uncertain.  Furthermore,  all  other  suggested  measures  are 
non-binding,  it  is  therefore  highly  uncertain  if  the  Member  States  would  implement  them. 

165  Researcher  in  economics  at the  Institute  for  Housing  and  Urban  Research,  project  manager  of  an  ongoing 
project called “Living with the Aftermath: Consequences of Gun Violence for Affected Residential Areas and 
Individuals” (not available at the moment).  
166  Gunnarsson,  Sandra.  (2023).  Gun  violence  risks  costing  society  dear.  University  of  Uppsala  (Sweden) 
https://www.uu.se/en/news/2023/2023-09-18-gun-violence-risks-costing-society-dear.html?utm  
167  Gunnarsson,  Sandra.  (2023).  Gun  violence  risks  costing  society  dear.  University  of  Uppsala  (Sweden) 
https://www.uu.se/en/news/2023/2023-09-18-gun-violence-risks-costing-society-dear.html?utm  
168 Kristien Amerijckx, “Schietincidenten Anderlecht drukken  vastgoedprijzen: "Overheid moet ingrijpen",  vrt 
nws,  7  February  2025,  https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2025/02/07/doen-de-schietpartijen-in-anderlecht-de-
huizenprijzen-dalen/ 
169 Idem. 

67 

 
 
 
Based on the positive experience from some Member States, in terms of improved national 
cooperation  and  coordination,  and  as  it  is  an  internationally  recognized  good  practices,  the 
establishment of NFFPs would have the highest potential impact on reducing the number of 
illicit  firearms  in  circulation,  which  in  its  turn  would  reduce  the  economic  costs  linked  to 
shooting incidents. The Commission has been advocating the establishment of NFFPs since 
2020 and in 2021, the Council did the same through Council Conclusions. Unfortunately, this 
has not resulted in well-equipped NFFPs in all Member States. PO1 would have no impact on 
this. Therefore, PO1 would have a small or possibly even neutral impact on the economic costs 
in comparison to the baseline.  

PO2, PO3 and PO4 contain a legal obligation to establish a NFFP, therefore it is expected that 
these  policy  options  would  have  a  higher  impact  on  the  reduction  of  the  economic  costs, 
especially  those  linked  to  shootings.  Other  important  measures  to  reduce  shootings,  and 
therefore the economic costs linked to them, are increasing the conviction rate of criminals, so 
that they cannot commit more shootings, and addressing the trafficking networks of firearms 
in order to reduce the availability of illicit firearms. Both measures will be supported through 
the establishment of a Focus Group to improve cross-border judicial cooperation (part of PO1, 
PO3 and PO4), as this group will facilitate the exchange of good practices and information.  

As explained in section 2.1.3. the lack of available statistics can also have an influence on the 
lack  of  political  prioritisation  and  therefore  on  the  lack  of  necessary  budget,  human  and 
financial resources  for law enforcement authorities. Including a legal obligation, which will 
harmonise the data collection of seized firearms (included in PO2, PO3 and PO4), will improve 
the data quality. However, the yearly reporting  on the statistics of firearms-related violence 
(included in PO4) will have the largest impact on improved political prioritisation. This in turn, 
is expected to have a larger impact on improving the necessary budget for law enforcement, 
which will ultimately have an impact on the number of firearms in circulation in the EU and 
the economic costs related to shootings.  

Lastly, the developments in new technologies involve a threat to the increased availability of 
untraceable  firearms  in  the  EU,  which  will  have  an  effect  on  firearms  violence.  The  legal 
obligation  regarding  blueprints  (included  in  PO2,  PO3  and  PO4)  is  expected  to  reduce  this 
threat substantially. The added recommendation paper (included in PO3 and PO4) to exchange 
good practices and to establish joint testing of blueprints between Member States is expected 
to support the implementation of this new legal obligation. Therefore, the combination of the 
legal obligation with the recommendation paper is expected to have the highest impact on the 
reduction of this threat, which in turn will reduce the economic costs associated with shootings. 
Following the above argumentation,  PO2, PO3 and PO4 would have a gradually increasing 
impact on the economic costs associated with firearms violence. Therefore, in preparation for 
section 7, comparing the policy options, PO1 scores 0.5, PO2 scores 1, PO3 scores 2 and PO4 
scores  3  on  their  impact  to  reduce  the  economic  costs  related  to  firearms  violence  (to  be 
calculated together with  impact  on SMEs and regulatory costs for section 7:  comparing  the 
policy options).  

6.2.2.  Impact on SMEs and competitiveness 

This  initiative focuses on the illicit firearms market.  The rules and procedures for the legal 
market are established in the Firearms Directive and the recast Firearms Regulation. Therefore, 

68 

 
 
this initiative has no impact on companies and SMEs who follow the rules established in these 
and  national  legislations170.  None  of  the  policy  options  would  have  an  impact  on  the  legal 
market,  therefore  there  would  not  be  a  negative  effect  on  SMEs  or  the  competitiveness  of 
businesses. This was also confirmed during the consultation strategy. 

If any, this initiative would have a positive impact on competitiveness. Effective criminal law 
enforcement  would  actually  protect  legitimate  businesses  against  unfair  competition  from 
illegal businesses the activities of which negatively affect the image of the whole sector and 
result in a loss of profit.  

The criminalisation of the illicit production, possession and dissemination of digital blueprint 
(included  in  PO2,  PO3  and  PO4)  for  the  purpose  of  manufacture  of  firearms  or  essential 
components  with  new  technology  should  not  affect  licensed  dealers  and  brokers  (meaning 
businesses  licensed  to  manufacture,  trade,  exchange,  hiring  out,  repair,  modify  or  convert 
firearms,  essential  components  and  ammunition  according  to  the  Firearms  Directive).  New 
technologies could provide valuable innovations for the sector. The criminalisation would help 
towards  the  protection  of  intellectual  rights  over  these  innovations,  and  thus  represents  a 
beneficiary factor. Therefore, in preparation for section 7, the score of all policy options related 
to their impact on SMEs and competitiveness is considered neutral.  

A dedicated SME test has been performed in annex 6.  

6.2.3.  Regulatory costs 

The  main  costs  for  any  of  the  policy  options  will  be  for  the  administration  of  the  Member 
States, rather than for the economic operators or for private citizens.  

Costs of an increase in staff in Member State police and prosecution offices 

Costs  stemming  from  more  effective  investigations  and  from  a  broader  scope  of  offenses 
related to firearms and essential components would mainly be the need for additional staff in 
the Member States to carry out the investigation and prosecution of firearms crime cases. To 
calculate  costs,  it  is  assumed  that  a  higher  volume  of  cases  would  primarily  impact  the 
practitioners  along  the  enforcement  chain  dealing  with  investigation,  prosecution  and 
conviction.  

There are no studies nor data regarding a potential impact of increase in staff related to firearms 
offenses,  instead  the  studies  carried  out  during  the  impact  assessment  for  a  proposal  for  a 
Directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law, carried out in 2021, will 
be used.171  

170 The Firearms Directive establishes minimum rules on the internal market. Every Member State can decide to 
be stricter.  
171 More information can be found in the final report (JUST/2020/JACC/FW/CRIM/0122), study to supply the 
impact assessment accompanying the document for a proposal for a Directive on the protection of the environment 
through criminal law and replacing Directive 2008/99/EC (SWD(2021) 465 final. 

69 

 
 
 
The transferability of this study comes from the fact that neutral data related to labour costs in 
the EU has been used and environmental crimes and firearms crimes share common problems, 
such  as  the  lack,  in  many  occasions,  of  special  prosecutor  offices  or  specialised  units  for 
investigations. 

Based on this data (quantitative baseline data and calculation of % of police and prosecutors 
working on environmental crime in 12 Member States), and calculations estimated in Annex 
9, annual costs have been estimated at EUR 4,069,175 in total for all Member States during at 
least the 5 first years following the transposition of the Directive. However, if more offences 
are criminalised, as proposed in PO4, this cost would increase. Calculating this additional cost 
is uncertain as the additional offences cannot be considered as  a net increase.  As explained 
under PO3, 3 out of the 5 additional offences can be covered by the larger offences such as 
illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms.  The remaining 2 additional offences, illicit 
carrying and misconduct in the context of record-keeping and licensing, are assumed to be less 
prevalent  than  for  example  illicit  possession  and  illicit  manufacturing.  Therefore,  a 
conservative  estimate  would  be  an  additional  cost  of  EUR  500,000  for  all  Member  States 
during the 5 first years because of these additional offences in PO4172.  

 Costs of an increase in ballistic departments within Member States. 

The inclusion of the provisions included in PO2, PO3 and PO4 would include an increase of 
administrative  costs  for  forensic  departments  of  Member  States,  as  the  number  of  seized 
firearms could be increased. Costs related to finalising and testing (3D printed) firearms depend 
on judges requiring the testing of all seized firearms. Case studies in Spain and Germany173 
show that it might not always be needed to test every single essential component or firearm 
found.  Additionally,  under  PO1,  PO3  and  PO4,  the  Commission  suggested  to  facilitate  the 
exchange of information on blueprints that lead to functioning firearms. If such an exchange 
of information can be established, not all Member States would have to test the same blueprints, 
which would be a reduction in costs. There are no studies nor official data regarding the costs 
in terms of working hours of ballistic experts. The only reliable and available data comes from 
the Global firearms study conducted by UNODC in 2020, where not all EU Member States 
participated (only 13 MS).  

There is a correlation between number of inhabitants per Member State and number of legal 
firearms, which also has a correlation with number of firearms lost or stolen. Based on that 
correlation, the estimation of administrative costs was calculated per inhabitant, with a total of 
EUR 574,564 per year for administrative costs for ballistic reports in all 27 Member States and 
an additional EUR 332,107 per year for ballistic reports on digital blueprints174. 

Costs of establishment of National Firearms Focal Points in all Member States. 

172 Estimate based on additional cases due to an increase in offences. This estimation is based on the calculations 
done  in  the  preparatory  study  to  support  the  impact  assessment  of  the  revision  of  the  Environmental  crimes 
Directive. Further explanations on the calculations for costs of administrations can be found in Annex 9 
173 See Annex 9:calculations for administrative costs. 
174 See annex 9: calculations for administrative costs. 

70 

 
 
 
PO2, PO3 and PO4 would include a dedicated measure on the requirement for Member States 
to  establish a National  Firearms Focal  Point (NFFP) in  the meaning  of Council Conclusion 
10726/21175. This requirement will have different effects on Member States, depending on how 
well-developed the current NFFPs are. According to the scoreboard published yearly by the 
Commission, 3 Member States have yet to establish a NFFP, 8 Member States have a NFFP 
which performs more than 75% of the tasks as described in the Council Conclusions, 7 Member 
States have NFFPs that fulfil between 50 and 75% of the tasks described, 5 Member States 
have NFFPs that fulfil between 26 and 50% of the tasks described and 7 Member States have 
NFFPs that fulfil less than 25% of the described tasks176.  

During the consultation meetings with the Member States, those Member States with highly 
developed NFFPs advocated towards the other Member States the positive effects of NFFPs in 
terms  of  improved  cooperation,  national  and  international  coordination,  threat  analysis, 
exchange of information etc. The scoreboard of the Commission shows a clear tendency for 
Member States to indeed further develop their NFFP (see footnote 62). The establishment of 
National Firearms Focal Points have been advocated by the Commission within the 2020-25 
EU Action Plan on firearms trafficking, as part of the priority “Increasing pressure on criminal 
markets”. 

It  is  difficult  to  establish  the  administrative  cost  for  the  full  establishment  of  a  NFFP  in  a 
Member State, as it depends on multiple factors, such as size and population, model of NFFP 
(the Council Conclusions focus on tasks, not minimum requirements), model of the State and 
distribution of competences of Law Enforcements Agencies on firearms, etc. 

In March 2025 an ISF project, to develop in a harmonised way the National Firearms Focal 
Points in the EU, was signed, for a total amount of EUR 1,788,285.65, where Austria, Portugal, 
Romania and Spain are the main beneficiaries, with an estimated amount per Member State of 
EUR 447,071. This project includes not only the establishment at national level of NFFPs, but 
also  studies  and  technical  assistance  to  support  the  development  in  other  countries  and 
development of operational actions within the EMPACT firearm. 

The development of national capabilities of National Firearms Focal Points could be greatly 
facilitated  by  using  the  national  envelope  of  the  Internal  Security  Fund.  This  was  done  by 
Spain.  

In this sense, the regulatory costs linked to the different policy options would have a neutral to 
negative effect in the final score of economic impact (within section 7: comparing the policy 
options). PO1 would score 0, PO2 and PO3 would score –1 (costs described below and derived 
from the implementation of modifications in national databases) and PO4 would have a more 
significant negative score with -3 as it would increase the direct and indirect costs derived from 

175 Council Conclusions 10726/21 on the implementation of the National Firearms Focal Points (NFFPs)  
in the EU Member States: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10726-2021-INIT/en/pdf 
176 European Commission DG HOME’s website, EU Action Plan on firearms trafficking, scoreboard of state of 
play of NFFPs. Accessible at https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/1bd09cc9-a62a-4051-b118-
0391bcbd64cb_en?filename=National-firearms-focal-points-scoreboard_en.pdf 

71 

 
 
 
the inclusion of additional offences in the criminal codes of multiple Member States and the 
costs derived from the statistic reporting obligation. 

In combination with the scores under the section of costs linked to shootings and the impact on 
SMEs and competitiveness, PO1 would score 0.5, PO2 would score 0, PO3 would score 1 and 
PO4 would score 0.  

6.3. 

Impact on fundamental rights 

By  addressing  the  threat  of  firearms  trafficking,  all  envisaged  options  will  have  a  positive 
impact on ensuring the security of the EU citizens. However, following the assessment in 6.1.1. 
section, policy option 4 will have a larger impact.  

Article 16 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union recognises the freedom 
to conduct a business “in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.” The 
initiative will not affect the right to conduct business as the rules on authorising arms dealers 
to trade in firearms is established in the Firearms Directive. These rules will not change due to 
this initiative. 

Article 17 of the Charter recognises the right to property. It is settled case-law that the right to 
property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter is not absolute and can be limited, subject to the 
principle  of  proportionality,  and  only  if  the  limitations  are  necessary  and  genuinely  meet 
objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights 
and  freedoms  of  others.  It  is  the  Firearms  Directive  which  establishes  the  rules  on  legal 
ownership of firearms, essential components and ammunition. These rules will not change due 
to this initiative. 

In this sense, the impact of the different policy options on fundamental rights is mainly linked 
to the added security and therefore the scoring would be similar as under section 6.1.1.: PO1 
scoring 1, PO2 scoring 2, PO3 scoring 2.5 and PO4 scoring 3.  

6.4. 

Impact on digitalisation 

PO2, PO3 and PO4 would include measures on establishing the harmonised minimum dataset 
for  seizures  of  firearms  and  the  mandatory  reporting  of  the  data  within  that  dataset  to  the 
European Firearms Hub. Depending on how the Member States organise their databases on 
seizures,  there  will  be  some  developments  needed  to  adjust  the  national  databases.  Some 
Member States might not have to adjust their dataset as all required fields are already used, 
others might have to adjust to a much larger extent. These 3 policy options would thus have a 
similar score. 

As stated under section 5.2.2 (c), the Commission intends to finalise the discussions with the 
Member  States  on  this  minimum  dataset  before  launching  the  legislative  initiative.  These 
discussions are being held in the Expert Group on Firearms Trafficking and the Implementation 
of the Firearms Directive.  

Based  on  past  experience  with  Member  States  requested  to  modify  their national  databases 
(Slovakia under their national programme of ISF in 2020 or Spain, Portugal and Romania under 

72 

 
 
project  FOCAL-SF177),  an  estimate  average  cost  of  EUR  400,000  per  Member  State  is 
expected. 

PO4 includes a requirement for Member States to collect data on the different firearms-related 
offences and to report those statistics to the Commission on an annual basis, so this measure 
would have a negative effect in  terms of costs. A similar exercise under the Environmental 
Crime research showed that Member States would have a one-off costs of €428.034 and yearly 
cost of €255.411 for the harmonised collection of data178. This would have a bigger impact on 
those Member States who could not differentiate between the different offences when sending 
data to the Commission during the consultation exercise of this impact assessment.  

Therefore, in preparation for section 7, comparing the policy options, PO1 scores 0, PO2 and 
PO3 score –0.5 and PO4 scores -1 on their impact on digitalisation. 

6.5. 

Impact on youth 

Illicit  firearms  contribute  to  the  worrying  phenomenon  of  young  European  being  roped  in 
criminal  activities  and  suffering  themselves  from  firearms  violence.  The  last  SOCTA, 
published  by  Europol,  observed  that  individuals  involved  in  gun  violence  are  increasingly 
younger.  Additionally,  studies  highlight  how  the  increased  availability  of  firearms  has 
facilitated the gradual trickling-down of the possession and use of firearms, especially to lower 
segments  of  the  criminal  hierarchy  in  several  EU  Member  States,  including  younger 
criminals179. Findings from the EU funded project TARGET stated that young men (under the 
age of 35), are the main victims and perpetrators of lethal firearms violence. 

Firearms are a key enabler of other crimes. Therefore, the highest impact on youth would be 
all measures described in the policy options, that are designed to reduce the circulation of illicit 
firearms  in  the  EU.  These  measures  are  the  same  as  those  described  under  section  6.2.1 
economic costs linked to shootings.  The measures with the highest expected impact  are the 
legal obligation to establish NFFPs (included in PO2, PO3 and PO4), the establishment of a 
focus  group  to  improve  cross-border  judicial  cooperation  (included  in  PO3  and  PO4), 
improving the statistics to get more political support and resources through a legal obligation, 
to harmonise the data collection of seized firearms (included in PO2, PO3 and PO4) and the 
yearly  reporting  on  the  statistics  of  firearms-related  violence  (included  in  PO4).  Lastly,  the 
developments in new technologies could lead to an increased availability of firearms in the EU. 
The legal obligation regarding blueprints (included in PO2, PO3 and PO4) is expected to reduce 
this  threat  substantially.  The  added  recommendation  paper  (included  in  PO3  and  PO4)  to 
exchange good practices and to establish joint testing of blueprints between Member States is 
expected to support the implementation of this new legal obligation. The reasoning why these 
measures would have the highest impact on youth are the same as for economic costs linked to 

177 EU funded project FOCAL-SF, under call ISFP-2018-AG-OC-FIRE. 
178 Milieu Consulting SRL, Final Report – Study to supply the impact assessment of the Directive 2008/99/EC on 
the  protection  of  the  environment  through  criminal  law,  JUST/2020/JACC/FW/CRIM/0122,  p.7,  accessible  at 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/study_final_report_en.pdf 
179 Duquet, N. and De Schutter, A  The nexus between drug markets and gun violence in the European Union. 
Flemish peace institute, Brussel, 2023. 

73 

 
 
 
shootings.  Therefore,  the  policy  options  would  have  a  gradual  increase  in  impact.  In 
preparation for section 7, comparing the policy options, PO1 scores 0.5, PO2 scores 1, PO3 
scores 2 and PO4 scores 3. 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

Due to the limitations explained in the previous section, it is not possible to exactly quantify 
the impact of the different options, nor the criterions of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence 
and proportionality. Instead, a qualitative assessment has been performed, where the numeric 
rating of the magnitude of the expected effects of every policy option vis-à-vis the baseline 
scenario in relation to each criterion and impact is considered. Whereas the baseline scenario 
has been explained and limitations highlighted, by definition, rated with ‘0’ in relation to each 
criterion, the other four policy options will be scored on a scale from -1 to -3 where -1 = small 
negative extent, /-2 = moderate negative extent/ -3 = high negative extent and 1 to 3 where 1= 
Small positive extent / 2=Moderate positive extent / 3=High positive extent. A score of 0 means 
that the option would have the same expected effect as the baseline scenario.  

The ratings have been based on the triangulation of the limited quantitative data and mainly 
the qualitative data collected throughout the preparatory study and impact assessment report 
by means of desk research, interviews, Commission expert groups, discussion papers, an online 
survey  with  representatives  from  the  Member  States,  the  call  for  evidence  and  the  public 
consultation. 

Different weights have been allocated to different criteria and impacts based on their relative 
importance.  Social,  economical  and  digital  impacts  have  been  prioritised  in  relation  to 
fundamental rights and youth impacts. Positive impacts on the latter are more likely to occur 
as  a  by-product  of  positive  social,  economical  and  digital  impacts.  The  social,  economic, 
fundamental rights, digital and youth impacts of the policy options are described in Section 6. 

In the table below, numbers in brackets depict the relative weight of each criterion and type of 
impact for the multi-criteria analysis. The criteria used to assess the effects have been rated in 
relation to each specific objective whereas the types of impacts have been rated in relation to 
each policy option as a whole (as described in Section Error! Reference source not found.). 

Criteria 

Types of impacts  

-  Effectiveness (weight 4) 

-  Social (weight 4) 

-  Efficiency (weight 4) 

-  Economic (weight 3) 

-  Coherence (weight 4) 

-  Fundamental rights (weight 2) 

-  Proportionality (weight 4) 

-  Digital (weight 3) 

Table 1 – criteria and types of impacts, and their corresponding weight 

-  Youth (weight 1) 

74 

 
 
 
 Each of the policy options are assessed against each other and given a score between 1 and 4 
(4 being the total number of policy options). The least impactful option is given a score of 1. 
If several options equally compare, they are given the same score. If all options have the same 
impact, they all have a score of 1. If each option has a different impact, the most impactful 
option is given a score of 4.  

A  more  detailed  analysis  is  performed  for  effectiveness  and  efficiency,  with  each  specific 
objective being assessed separately. The total score of each of these criterion is thus divided by 
the number of specific objectives (4) to allow comparison with other criteria. The score of each 
criterion is subsequently adjusted to the weight of each criterion. 

7.1.  Effectiveness  

Based on the assessment described above, the conclusion on effectiveness is that PO4 is the 
most effective of all policy options with a score of 3. A detailed analysis of the effectiveness 
of  each  policy  options  assessed  against  each  of  the  specific  objectives  of  this  initiative  is 
available in Annex 11. 

Summarising  the  conclusions  of  that  detailed  assessment,  when  effectiveness  is  assessed 
against  the  specific  objective  “making  it  easier  to  investigate  and  prosecute”,  PO2  is  more 
effective than PO1, mainly due to the fact that experts from the Member States indicated that 
recommendations alone would not result in changes in the criminal code. Furthermore, PO3 is 
more effective than PO2 due to the additional support for Member States in implementing the 
requirements. Lastly, PO4 is more effective than PO3, due to the higher amount of offences.  

Regarding  the  specific  objective  “ensuring  a  future  proof  enforcement  of  firearms-related 
offences,”  PO2,  PO3  and  PO4  are  seen  as  equally  effective  as  PO2.  The  effectiveness  of 
recommendations on new technologies as described under PO1 are considered especially low, 
as  these  recommendations  were  already  made  by  the  Commission,  EMPACT  and  the  UN, 
without any result. 

On  “ensuring  effective,  dissuasive  and  proportionate  penalty  types  and  levels  for  firearms-
related offences,” PO3 is equally effective as PO2, and they are both more effective than PO1. 
PO4 could be slightly more effective than PO2 and PO3 as it would establish minimum levels 
of maximum penalties for the wider set of firearms-related offences. 

On “improving law enforcement and judicial cooperation and harmonised data collection on 
firearms-related offences”, PO3 is equally effective as PO2, and they are both more effective 
than PO1. PO4 would be considered slightly more effective than both PO2 and PO3 as it would 
add the obligation for Member States to collect and report data to the Commission on a yearly 
basis.  

SO1: making it easier to investigate and prosecute firearms offences 

Score  

< 

PO1 
1 

PO2 
2 

< 

PO3 
3 

< 

PO4 
4 

SO2: Ensuring a future proof enforcement of firearms offences 

PO1 

< 

PO2 

= 

PO3 

= 

PO4 

75 

 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
Score 

1 

2 

2 

2 

SO3: Ensuring effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalties types 
and levels 
= 
PO2 
2 

PO3 
2 

PO1 
1 

PO4 
3 

< 

< 

Score 

SO4: Improving law enforcement and judicial cooperation and 
harmonised data collection on firearms-related offences 
PO4 
PO2 
3 
2 
12 
8 

PO3 
2 
9 

PO1 
1 
4 

= 

< 

< 

Score 
Total 

Total/4 

1 

2 

   2.25 

3 

7.2.  Efficiency 

This section compares the estimated costs and benefits of the policy options for the different 
stakeholders.  The  conclusion  on  efficiency  is  that  PO3  has  the  overall  higher  efficiency, 
followed closely by PO2. A detailed analysis of the efficiency of each policy options assessed 
against each of the specific objectives of this initiative is available in Annex 11.  

When  the  policy  options  are  assessed  against  the  specific  objective  “making  it  easier  to 
investigate and prosecute” PO2, PO3 and PO4 have a higher level of efficiency than PO1, their 
benefits would be to harmonise the three mandatory firearms offences as defined by the UN 
Firearms Protocol and the additional core offense of illegal possession, which is considered 
one  of  the  most  important  offenses  for  Member  States180  and  for  the  citizens.181  Another 
important  benefit  would  be  to  include  essential  components  in  all  the  offenses,  as  the  UN 
Firearms Protocol has different marking requirements than the Firearms Directive. PO1 would 
not facilitate this change.  

PO3  is  slightly  more  efficient  than  PO2  insofar  as  it  includes  additional  non-legislative 
measures which have a low cost of implementation, easily offset by the benefits these provide, 
even if small.  

PO4 would have a lower level of efficiency than PO3, as the additional legal obligations of 
PO4  regarding  the  harmonisation  of  the  wider  set  of  firearms-related  offences  would  mean 
more costs than benefits, given that the additional offenses included in PO4 are not so relevant 
as  the  ones  included  in  PO3182.  This  is  due  to  the  possibility  to  address  all  the  additional 
firearms-related  offences  within  the  remits  of  the  core  offences  (as  explained  under  PO3, 
section 5.2.3) Additionally, based on the consultations with national firearms experts (in both 
the meeting with the firearms expert group and with law enforcement agencies) and the position 

180 Annex 2: consultation with law enforcement agencies p. 91. 
181 Annex 2: public consultation: need for EU actions on different firearms-related offenses p. 109.  
182 Annex 5: analytical methods. 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
of Member States in  respect  of the future of EU criminal  law183, it is  unclear what  the real 
additional efficiency of these definitions would be. PO4 is thus estimated to be scoring equally 
to PO2.  

On “ensuring a future proof enforcement of firearms-related offences”, PO2, PO3 and PO4 are 
expected  to  be  equal,  with  higher  efficiency  than  PO1,  due  to  the  benefit  of  introducing  a 
harmonised offence of illicit possession, illicit creation and illicit dissemination of blueprints 
needed to privately manufacture firearms, essential components and ammunition. Furthermore, 
all three policy options would include a specific clarification in the legal text of how privately 
manufactured firearms, essential components and ammunition (including 3D printed) fit within 
the  definition  of  illicit  manufacturing.  PO1  would  focus  on  recommendations  on  new 
technologies only with no extra cost, but also little benefit. Additionally, PO3 and PO4 would 
be  more  efficient  than  PO2  due  to  the  addition  of  the  recommendation  paper  with  good 
practices to tackle 3D printing and the joint testing of blueprints.  

On  “ensuring  effective,  dissuasive  and  proportionate  penalty  types  and  levels  for  firearms-
related  offences,”  PO2  would  be  of  a  higher  efficiency  than  PO1  due  to  the  benefits  of 
establishing minimum maximum penalty levels for the core firearms-related offences reflected 
in the UN Firearms Protocol, without the cost resulting from infringement proceedings. PO3 
would have the same requirements as PO2, and would thus be equally efficient. 

It is not clear whether PO4 would be more efficient than PO3 in establishing minimum levels 
of maximum penalties for the wider set of firearms-related offences. It would incur more costs 
as it would require more legislative and implementation work. A conservative approach puts 
the benefits as lower than PO2 and PO3 as the consultations have not allowed to identify any 
clear additional impacts of the harmonising efforts of these wider sets of offences. 

On “improving law enforcement and judicial cooperation and harmonised data collection on 
firearms-related offences”, PO2, PO3 and PO4 would be of a higher efficiency than PO1 due 
to  the  benefits  of  including  a  legal  obligation  for  Member  States  to  establish  a  National 
Firearms Focal Point and to harmonise the dataset for seizure of firearms, which would also 
facilitate reporting to the European Firearms Hub, through a legal provision. The establishment 
of the NFFPs would include specific costs184, but it would be compensated by the benefits to 
increase law enforcement and judicial cooperation.  

PO2, PO3 and PO4 would establish the harmonised dataset for seizure of firearms through a 
legal provision. This measure would have additional costs185, with the update or creation of 
national databases but the benefits would be higher, as it would mean a significant increase of 
the  intelligence  picture,  which  is  fundamental  for  the  attribution  of  resources  and  correct 
assessment of the threat at national and international level. Another additional benefit would 
be  the  ability  to  better  perform  analyses  through  which  cross-border  connections  can  be 
identified.  

183  The  future  of  EU  criminal  law:  report  of  the  presidency:  overview  of  the  discussions.  Council  Document 
16102/24. 4 December 2024. 
184 Annex 4: who is affected and how, section 2: Summary of costs and benefits.  
185 idem. 

77 

 
 
 
PO2, PO3 and PO4 also add the obligation for Member States to collect and report data on 
the different firearms offences to the Commission. While PO2 and PO3 require such data to 
be provided 5 years after the implementation of the Directive, as part of its evaluation, PO4 
requires such data to be provided on a yearly basis. This requirement would benefit the 
harmonised data collection on firearms-related offences as it is unlikely that all Member 
States will provide such information voluntarily. The benefit of being able to properly 
evaluate the Directive and its impact is seeing as outweighing the costs that Member States 
would have to incur to provide the required data. However, the yearly reporting is seen as 
being more cost intensive than the requirement of reporting 5 years after implementation. 
PO4 is thus seen as less efficient than PO2 and PO3.  

SO1: making it easier to investigate and prosecute firearms offences 

Score  

PO1 
1 

< 

PO2 
2 

< 

PO3 
3 

> 

PO4 
2 

SO2: Ensuring a future proof enforcement of firearms offences 

< 

= 

= 

Score 

PO4 
2 

PO1 
1 

PO3 
2 

PO2 
Score 
2 
SO3: Ensuring effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalties types 
and levels 
PO2 
= 
3 
SO4: Improving law enforcement and judicial cooperation and 
harmonised data collection on firearms-related offences 
PO4 
PO2 
2 
3 
8 
10 

PO3 
3 
11 

PO1 
1 
4 

Score 
Total 

PO3 
3 

PO1 
1 

PO4 
2 

= 

< 

> 

< 

> 

Total/4 

1 

2.5 

2.75 

2 

7.3.  Coherence  

Internal coherence assesses how various elements of the proposed options are expected to work 
together  to  achieve  the  objectives.  Although  all  four  policy  options  address  the  identified 
specific objectives and underlying problem drivers, they do so in different ways, and with a 
different level of intervention. Among the four policy options, PO3 and PO4 are expected to 
benefit from a broader range of synergies that can contribute to a higher level of achievement 
of the objectives. This is thanks to their more comprehensive approach compared to PO1 and 
PO2. The differences between PO3 and PO4 are limited. The harmonisation of a wider set of 
offences and a wider set of penalties as proposed in PO4, is not expected to have an effect on 
internal coherence as both the offences and the penalties are extended at the same time.  

External coherence focuses on the compliance of the initiative with other EU instruments and 
relevant  EU  policies,  as  well  as  national  policies  or  international  obligations.  All  identified 
policy options show strong links to several EU instruments. In terms of external coherence, all 
policy options are considered consistent with relevant EU strategies and legal instruments and 

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contribute to EU policy priorities. All policy options are, in particular, in full coherence with 
the EU Action Plan on firearms trafficking as this document announced that ‘the Commission 
will also start a stakeholders’ consultation to examine if gaps exist in the legislative framework 
and assess the need for establishing common criminal law standards on trafficking of firearms 
and  illicit  manufacturing,  in  line  with  Article  83  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European Union’. Even though not all policy options would address the assessment made in 
the same manner (enforcement or different legal obligations), all are based on the conclusions 
of the assessment which shows clear gaps in the existing legislative framework. Additionally, 
the initiative is coherent with the Council Conclusions on Protecting Europeans from Terrorism 
of 2022 calling upon the Commission to commence the work announced in the EU Action Plan.  

PO1 is coherent with the UN Firearms Protocol as it would enforce this legal acquis(?) .PO2, 
PO3 and PO4 would increase the coherence with the UN Firearms Protocol as it would translate 
the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  into  EU  legislation.  PO3  goes  further  by  also  supporting  the 
implementation of the legislative guide to implement the UN Firearms Protocol by clarifying 
the links between the additional firearms offences and the core offences. Lastly PO4 is fully 
coherent with the Firearms Directive, and with the UN Firearms Protocol and its legislative 
guide  as  it  would  implement  the  recommendation  to  criminalise  the  wider  set  of  firearms-
related offences.  

The  specific  measures  within  PO2,  PO3  and  PO4  on  new  technologies,  specifically  on  the 
criminalisation related to the blueprints is considered to be ensuring more coherence with the 
above  texts,  as  well  as  UN  Resolution  12/3  adopted  during  the  twelfth  session  of  the 
Conference of the parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime,  which  invites  Parties  to  regulate  blueprints,  than  PO1  which  only  proposes  a 
recommendation.  

PO1  <  PO2  <  PO3  =  PO4 

Score  

1 

2 

3 

3 

7.4. 

Proportionality 

PO1 aims  at  reinforcing  the  implementation  of  the  current  EU  legal  and  policy  framework 
through  non-binding  measures,  which  would  not  require  changes  in  the  scope  of  national 
decision-making, making it the option scoring the highest on the proportionality score. Citizens 
in the public consultation and the call for evidence preferred this option the most. However, it 
has to be taken into consideration that many respondents did not fully grasp that the initiative 
would focus on the illegal market only and that the rules for legal ownership and acquisition 
of a firearm would not change. Therefore, their preference for this option comes from the fear 
that this initiative would introduce additional rules for legal firearms owners, which it does not.  

The legislative measures proposed as part of PO2, PO3 and PO4 fall within the scope of the 
ratification  of  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  by  the  EU  and  the  Firearms  Directive.  Firearms 
trafficking is already identified in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU as a Euro crime and 
as a particularly serious crime with  a cross-border component, for which a directive can be 
adopted to improve the fight against firearms trafficking on a common basis. As the legislative 
measures  described  in  the  policy  options  include  more  offences  than  only  those  linked  to 

79 

 
 
  
  
  
  
 
firearms  trafficking,  particular  attention  has  been  directed  to  ensure  proportionality  when 
describing  the  different  measures  under  section  5.  Specifically,  the  provisions  on  illicit 
possession  will  consider  national  traditions  on  administrative  law  by  interconnecting  the 
definition with a criminal intent. Additionally, the introduction of a harmonised offence for 
illicit possession, illicit creation and illicit dissemination of blueprints will have measures to 
ensure proportionality towards the industry and citizens. The focus of this offence will be on 
illicit  use,  meaning  that  authorised  dealers  and  brokers  should  not  be  prevented  from 
experimenting  or  using  these  new  technologies.  Furthermore,  these  blueprints  should  be 
focused on new technologies such as 3D printing or CNC cutting. It cannot be the intention to 
criminalise 2D blueprints gathered by collectors and museums. Other suggested options such 
as  targeting  3D  printers  themselves  through  an  obliged  tracing  or  through  changes  in  the 
software in order to detect blueprints of firearms were not considered proportionate as it would 
target a much larger industrial sector.  

Introducing  the  criminalisation  of  blueprints  does  however  include  an  additional  cost  for 
Member States, specifically the testing of these blueprints by forensic centres can put further 
pressure on these institutions. Therefore, the recommendation in PO3 and PO4 to exchange 
good practices regarding the fight against 3D printing and especially the facilitation regarding 
joint testing of blueprints, will improve the proportionality of this new legal obligation.  

In the absence of data allowing the carrying out  of a cost quantification specifically for the 
introduction of legislative provisions, the proportionality comparison between PO2 and PO4 
cannot  be  assessed  in  detail.  Higher  numbers  of  offences  that  need  to  be  criminalised  (as 
included in PO4) are expected to increase the costs for Member States. However, the support 
to Member States in regards to the joint testing for blueprints is expected to reduce costs in 
comparison  to  PO2.  Therefore,  PO2  and  PO4  will  be  considered  equal  in  terms  of 
proportionality.  

PO1  >  PO2  <  PO3  >  PO4 

Score  

3 

1 

2 

1 

The overall score of each impact and criterion is presented in the below table.  

Table 2 - Comparison of policy options 

Criteria 
impacts 

and 

type  of 

weight 

Rating 

BS 

PO 1 

PO 2 

PO3 

PO4 

Criteria 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

4 

4 

0 

0 

1 

1 

2 

2.5 

2.25 

2.75 

3 

2 

80 

 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1 

3 

1 

0.5 

1 

0 

0.5 

32 

2 

1 

2 

0 

2 

-0.5 

1 

3 

2 

2.5 

1 

2.5 

-0.5 

2 

41.5 

58.5 

3 

1 

3 

0 

3 

-1 

3 

54 

Coherence 

Proportionality 

Types of impacts 

Social 

Economic 

Fundamental rights 

Digital 

Youth 

4 

4 

4 

3 

2 

3 

1 

Total  (relative  to  the 
weight) 

8.  PREFERRED OPTION 

8.1. 

Policy option 3 

The  preferred  option  is  PO3  which  focuses  on  a  legislative  initiative  for  the  core  firearms 
offences only, and some non-legislative measures. This option would address all problems and 
objectives identified in an effective way. Furthermore, it balances this effectiveness with the 
needed  proportionality.  Therefore,  PO3  is  the  option  which  manages  to  balance  the  needed 
increase  in  security  with  providing  enough  room  for  Member  States  to  regulate  further  at 
national level.  

The legislative focus on the core offences is considered sufficient, especially as the initiative 
will also clarify how the wider set of firearms-offences can be addressed. PO3 also facilitates 
the  EU’s  implementation  of  its  international  responsibilities  in  the  most  coherent  way.  It 
ensures  the  implementation  of  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol.  It  focuses  on  clarifying  the 
suggestions in the UN legislative guidelines and it implements recommendations formulated 
in  the  UN  Resolution  12/3.  The  recommendations  to  set  up  a  dedicated  Focus  Group  for 
prosecutors  specialised  in  firearms  offences  will  not  only  support  Member  States  in 
implementing  the  new  Directive,  it  will  also  facilitate  exchange  of  information  and  best 
practices amongst Member States.  

All analysis and consultations pointed to the growing threat of privately manufactured firearms, 
specifically 3D printed firearms. Policy option 3 would include a specific focus on harmonising 
the  criminalization  of  digital  blueprints  and  their  hard  copies.  This  would  allow  law 
enforcement agencies to deprive criminals of the means to produce a 3D printed firearm in the 
most proportionate manner. Additionally, it meets the recommendations made at the UN level 
(Resolution 12/3), the EU level (EMPACT conferences) and at the national level (the majority 
of  the  Member  States  who  responded  to  the  discussion  paper  preferred  this  action). 

81 

 
 
 
 
Additionally,  supporting  Member  States  in  exchanging  information  on  blueprints  that  have 
been proven to produce live firing firearms will help the implementation of the new offence on 
blueprints. 

PO3  would  also  ensure  the  development  of  the  National  Firearms  Focal  Point  entities 
throughout all the EU Member States. The Commission and some of the Member States have 
been actively promoting these NFFP as a particularly valuable measure to improve the much-
needed cooperation at international and national level. This was also recognized by the Council 
through Conclusions. Therefore, this action is considered as highly effective and proportionate.  

Lastly,  policy  option  3  would  address  the  needed  harmonisation  of  a  minimum  dataset  for 
seized firearms related to criminal offenses. As with NFFPs the harmonisation of a minimum 
dataset for seized firearms has been discussed with Member States for years. There is an overall 
agreement  on  the  need  to  have  such  a  dataset  as  it  will  allow  for  the  creation  of  an  EU 
Repository,  which  could  be  integrated  in  the  EU  intelligence  hub  for  the  purpose  of  data 
exchange that is being developed by Europol. It will facilitate cross-border investigations and 
analysis. However, as stated by the national experts, this harmonised minimum dataset would 
only be effective if it is a legal obligation for the Member States.  

For all of the above reasons and for all the reasons explained in section 7 when comparing the 
policy options, PO3 is considered the preferred option.  

8.2.  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) 

This  initiative is  not  a revision of existing  legislation;  therefore, a REFIT test has not  been 
performed.  

8.3.  Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach  

The ‘one in, one out’ approach refers to the principle whereby each legislative proposal creating 
new burdens should relieve people and businesses of an equivalent existing burden at EU level 
in the same policy area.  

This  initiative  would  not  entail  administrative  costs  for  the  private  sector,  and,  as  to 
administrative and adjustment costs and savings, it would mainly concern public authorities. 

As explained under sections 6.1.2 and 6.2.2. the rules regarding acquisition and possession of 
firearms for citizens and businesses derive from the Firearms Directive and the recast Firearms 
Regulation. This initiative is only focused on the illegal market, it therefore excludes any new 
rules for the legal market. This is especially important to keep in mind when introducing the 
new offences related to the illegal possession, dissemination and creation of blueprints for 3D 
printed firearms. In order to keep this new offence proportionate, it will be important to exclude 
licensed  dealers,  so  that  the  industry  can  have  access  to  these  innovative  techniques. 
Furthermore, a good definition of blueprints will be needed to make sure that collectors and 
museums  which  have  blueprints  of  antique  or  classic  firearms  in  their  possession  are  not 
targeted.  

82 

 
 
As a result, this initiative does not contain costs for businesses and citizens. This assessment 
was also confirmed during the consultation meeting with manufacturers. Furthermore, based 
on  the  discussion  in  section  7.2,  it  is  assumed  that  the  initiative  is  expected  to  generate 
significant cost savings to society, derived from a reduction in firearms violence.  

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

The impacts of the initiative will be evaluated against the specific objectives : (1) making it 
easier to investigate and prosecute firearms offences, (2) ensuring a future proof enforcement 
of firearms-related offences, (3) ensuring effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalty types 
and  levels  for  firearms-related  offences  and  (4)  improving  law  enforcement  and  judicial 
cooperation and harmonised data collection on firearms-related offences. 

To  assess  these  objectives,  the  Commission  will  measure  the  number  of  investigations, 
prosecutions,  convictions  and  sanction  levels  in  each  Member  State,  and  assess  the 
improvement of the intelligence picture and data collection on firearms trafficking.  

This  initiative  would  therefore  include  a  monitoring  and  evaluation  of  the  impacts,  which 
should be carried out, in principle not earlier than five years after the deadline for transposition 
to ensure that there is a sufficiently long period to evaluate the effects of the initiative after it 
has been fully transposed across all Member States.  

The preferred policy option 3 does not include a provision obliging Member States to annually 
report  to  the  Commissions  statistics  on  the  numbers  of  investigations,  prosecutions  and 
convictions, but the Commission will ask Member States for input before this quinquennial 
report,  as  it  did  now  through  the  consultation  strategy.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  will 
cooperate with Eurostat to collect more regular statistics, which will allow for a more constant 
monitoring of the initiative.  

Additionally, the Commission will monitor the implementation of the specific objectives of 
cooperation and coordination via different methods. A table with the suggested indicators to 
monitor the different objective is available in Annex 10.  

Finally  in  order  to  monitor  and  evaluate  the  social  and  economic  impacts  stated  in  the 
document, the Commission will add a specific focus on these impacts in the evaluation study 
(5 years after transposition).  

83 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

10.  LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES 

The lead DG is the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) for the 
preparation  of  this  initiative  and  the  work  on  the  impact  assessment.  No  other  DGs  were 
associated to the initiative. The initiative is listed in the Commission Work Programme 2025. 

11.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

The inter-service steering group for the impact assessment was set up on 11 July 2024186with 
participation of the following Directorates-General: Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood 
(ENEST),  Foreign  Policy  Instrument  (FPI),  Defence  Industry  and  Space  (DEFIS),  Internal 
Market,  Industry,  Entrepreneurship  and  SMEs  (GROW),  Justice  and  Consumers  (JUST), 
European External Action Service (EEAS) the Legal Service (LS) and the Secretariat-General 
(SG). 

The call for evidence and the public consultations were jointly launched on 1 October 2024 
and concluded on 24 December 2024.Targeted stakeholder consultations were conducted from 
October 2024 to February 2025. 

ISG meetings:  

4 ISG meetings and 4 written consultations were organised: 

- written consultation in August 2024 on call for evidence and consultation strategy 

-  ISG  meeting  on  26  September  2024  focused  on  the  political  context  of  the  initiative,  the 
mapping study, the initial problem tree and the consultation strategy 

- ISG meeting on 16 January 2025 focused on the data analysis and problem description, the 
first  results  of  the  call  for  evidence  and  the  public  consultation,  the  results  of  the  wider 
consultations with stakeholders and a first assessment of the policy options. 

- Written feedback on the data analysis and problem description were asked to be submitted by 
24 January 2025 

- ISG meeting on 20 February 2025 focused on updates regarding the legal base and the last 
consultation meetings and discussions on the impact of the initiative for SME’s.  

- Written feedback on the draft impact assessment were asked to be submitted by 28 February 
2025 

186 Ref. Ares(2024)5020582 

84 

 
 
 
-  Written  consultation  was  initiated  on  17  March  2025  on  the  final  draft  of  the  impact 
assessment.  

- ISG meeting on 29 September 2025 focused on the revised impact assessment following the 
comments made by the RSB issued on 5 May 2025.  

12.  CONSULTATION OF THE RSB 

The  first  version  of  the  draft  Impact  Assessment  report  was  submitted  to  the  Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board (RSB) on 2 April 2025. The hearing took place on 30 April 2025.  

The focus on the discussion was on the scale of the problem and the need to act; the gaps that 
the initiative aim to fill and how does it articulate with other legal instruments; the evidence 
supporting  the  link  between  illicit  activity  and  Member  States  divergences;  the  data  and 
evidence available on the use of illegal firearms in criminal activity; the social and economic 
impact of the different policy options, and key data limitations and assumptions.  

Subsequently  to  the  meeting,  the  RSB  delivered  a  negative  opinion  on  5  May  2025, 
flagging four shortcomings that the report presented.  

1)  The report did not sufficiently substantiate the scale or urgency of the problem with 
robust evidence. It did not show how the initiative articulates with the existing legal 
framework.  It  did  not  clearly  identify  and  show  the  link  between  increased  illicit 
activity and Member State divergence. 

2)  The report did not set out what success would look like in terms of reaching the specific 

objectives which are insufficiently S.M.A.R.T. 

3)   The report did not demonstrate the causal links between the options and objectives. It 
did not sufficiently clarify how minimum levels of maximum penalties would dissuade 
illicit activity and mitigate forum shopping. 

4)  The report did not adequately assess the economic and social impacts of the options. It 
did  not  quantify  the  costs  of  all  options.  The  proportionality  assessment  was 
insufficient. 

The RSB provided 8 recommendations for improvement alongside further technical comments. 
It invited DG HOME to revise the report in accordance with the Board’s findings and resubmit 
it for a final RSB opinion 

The problem description was revised to highlight in particular the severe limitations regarding 
the lack of EU harmonised data on seized firearms and statistics on firearms-related crimes, 
the patchy and incomplete data and statistics at national level and the lack of specific studies 
to support the description of the problems and the impacts of the policy options. The lack of 
data was upgraded to a main problem instead of a problem driver, bringing the number of main 
problem to 3. The report highlights the high number of incidents and the upcoming threats to 
justify the urgency of union action as opposed to gathering more data first.  

The  main  problem  ‘Offenders  take  advantage  of  regulatory  discrepancies  between  Member 
States’ was discarded and replaced by ‘Challenges in cross-border cooperation’ to address the 
issue of evidence supporting the link between illicit activity and Member States divergences.  

85 

 
 
Furthermore,  the  report  was  revised  to  better  explain  the  current  framework  and  its 
shortcomings, to show how the initiative articulates with the existing legal framework. 

The  specific  objectives  were  revised  to  be  more  specific,  measurable,  achievable  and  time-
bound. 

The  report  was  revised  to  better  demonstrate  the  causal  links  between  the  options  and 
objectives.  The  analysis  on  economic  and  social  impacts  of  the  options  was  revised  to 
highlighting  the  limitation  in  the  quantification  and  monetisation  of  such  impacts.  The 
proportionality analysis was revised with better justification behind the scores of each policy 
option.  

The revised impact assessment was submitted to the RSB via written procedure on 13 October 
2025.  The  RSB  delivered  a  positive  opinion  with  reservations  on  10  November  2025.  The 
Board asked to rectify the following aspects:   

•  Further substantiate the problem description by ensuring that all causal links are 
supported by evidence and analysis  
•  Further  improving  the  description  of  the  objectives,  using  the  S.M.A.R.T. 
methodology  
•  Specify that the impacts of the options contain a degree of uncertainty due to 
the lack of data  

The report was revised to implement these comments.   

13.  EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

For  the  purpose  of  this  impact  assessment,  the  Commission  collected  data  through  various 
sources and consultations methods.  

The research for the initiative and this impact assessment started with a mapping study, which 
took place in 2023/2024 and mapped how Member States are currently criminalising the core 
firearms offences.  

The Commission gathered also evidence following a consultation strategy, which included an 
open  call  for  evidence,  public  consultation  and  a  dedicated  stakeholder  consultation.  More 
details can be found in annexes 2 and 3. 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) 

14.  INTRODUCTION 

This annex provides a synopsis report of all stakeholder consultation activities undertaken in 
the context of this impact assessment.  

To ensure that the interest of different stakeholders throughout the EU is properly reflected in 
the Commission's approach to the Firearms Trafficking initiative, the Commission regards it 
as a duty to conduct stakeholder consultations and wishes to consult as widely as possible. The 
consultation aimed to enable an evidence-based preparation of the future Commission initiative 
and  to  strengthen  the  fight  against  the  illicit  trafficking  of  firearms  with  the  help  of  the 
stakeholders. The consultation aimed at receiving relevant input and the individual needs of 
the stakeholders, on the following main objectives:  

i.) 

Better describing the problem(s) 

ii.) 

Alternative ways of harmonising the criminalisation firearms-related offences  

iii.) 

The scope of harmonising national rules criminalising firearms-related offences  

iv.) 

The possible pros and cons of a new legislative framework 

The aim of the consultation was for the Commission to receive relevant input, and the relevant 
needs  of  the  stakeholders  consulted,  to  obtain  a  comprehensive  picture  of  the  opinions  and 
views on the Firearms Trafficking Initiative.  

To do this, the Commission identified relevant stakeholders and consulted them on an early 
stage of the development of the draft proposal. The Commission sought views from a wide 
range of stakeholders, including, (i) law-enforcement authorities and customs authorities; (ii) 
judicial  authorities  and  prosecutors;  (iii)  other  authorities  in  the  field  of  firearms  policy, 
including ministries of the interior and ballistic expertise centres; (iv) legal firearms users and 
owners (hunters, sport shooters and collectors); (v) economical operators such as dealers and 
brokers  (manufacturers,  traders  etc.);  and  (vi)  international  organisations  and  non-
governmental organisations in the field of firearms policy.  

During the consultation process, the Commission applied a variety of methods and forms of 
consultation. They included: 

•  The  consultation  on  the  call  for  evidence  and  a  Public  Consultation  which  took  12 

weeks and, which collected views from all interested parties 

•  A  series  of  expert  groups  meetings,  both  online  and  in-person,  where  dedicated 
questionnaires or discussion papers were sent out in advance to prepare for the meetings 
hosted by the Commission 

87 

 
 
•  Bilateral online meetings with a wide range of stakeholders organised at the initiative 
of the Commission or the stakeholders, such as with law enforcement agencies, judicial 
authorities, EU Agencies and criminal law experts.  

•  Position  papers  and  analytical  papers  from  European  agencies,  practitioners, 
professional networks, industry representatives, public authorities from Member States 

In total, the consultation activities lasted from October 2024 to February 2025. 

The consultation was designed to follow the logic of the impact assessment, starting with the 
problem  description  and  gradually  developing  into  the  possible  policy  options  and  their 
impacts.  

The diversity of the perspectives gathered throughout the consultation is valuable in supporting 
the Commission in ensuring that its political options address the needs and concerns of a broad 
spectrum of stakeholders, both at national and EU level.  

The following synopsis report will give an overview of the consultations undertaken, followed 
by  a  section  of  the  results  of  the  consultations  and  a  section  on  how  the  results  of  the 
consultations are used.  

88 

 
 
 
Overview of the consultation activities 

Consultation activity  Feedback on call for evidence  Public consultation 

Targeted consultations/discussions  Meetings 

Indicative planning 

October 2024 

October 2024 

impact  assessment  on 
trafficking initiative 

firearms 

With the UNODC Experts, 

Member States  

✓ 

EMPACT Firearms   ✓ 

EU Agencies 

International 
Organisations 

Citizens, 
owners/users 
economic operators 

firearms 
and 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

With Member States Experts (law 
enforcement,  judicial,  EMPACT 
Firearms,  firearms  policy  units 
etc.) 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

 ✓ 

89 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
15.  CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES 

The following section will give an overview of the consultations held. The consultation was 
structured as follows: 

16.  PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND CALL FOR EVIDENCE  

A  public  consultation  and  call  for  evidence  for  the  impact  assessment  for  the  Firearms 
Trafficking  Initiative was  conducted, covering a  time period of 12 weeks, from  01 October 
2024 to 24 December 2024 (midnight Brussels time) and sought the views from all interested 
parties.  

The  public  consultation  was  designed  to  follow  the  same  logical  sequence  of  the  impact 
assessment,  commencing  with  a  problem  description  and  gradually  developing  towards  the 
possible policy options and their potential impacts. Additionally, the call for evidence provided 
for the possibility to formulate feedback on the Commission’s understanding of the problem 
and possible solutions. By gathering this qualitative data, the Commission tried to ensure that 
the general public interest in the EU is well reflected in the proposal on the criminalisation of 
firearms-related offences. 

16.1.  Targeted stakeholder consultations 

Targeted  stakeholder  consultations  were  an  integral  part  of  the  consultation  activities 
conducted by the European Commission. They helped gather feedback, data and case studies, 
as  part  of  the  evidence-based  preparation  process  of  the  Firearms  Trafficking  Initiative. 
Stakeholders involved ranged from the Member States to law enforcement agencies, the private 
sector, international partners, international organisations to the judiciary. 

16.1.1. Member State consultations 

Discussion papers on the Firearms Trafficking Initiative  

Member  States  were  consulted  through  a  discussion  paper  on  the  Firearms  Trafficking 
Initiative, which was discussed orally during the 4th Expert Group meeting on the Firearms 
Trafficking and the implementation of the Firearms Directive, held on 13 November 2024. The 
discussion paper mapped out the context, problem description and posed questions on three 
topics relevant to the initiative. It was sent to the Member States on 31 October 2024. Written 
input was provided by Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Romania, Sweden and Spain. 

Questionnaire on quantitative data 

2 The input requested was also part of the process to further substantiate the data analysed, 
since  data  on  firearms-related  offences  is  often  incomplete,  inconsistent  and  untransparent. 
Questions targeted the timeframe 2020-2022, to be coherent with the time frame of the data 
analysis. 11 responses were submitted, by Spain, Slovenia, Finland, Czech Republic, Greece, 
Ireland Belgium, Lithuania, France, Sweden and Cyprus.  

4th Expert Group on Firearms Trafficking and the implementation of the Firearms Directive, 
13-14 November 2024 

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On 13-14 November, the 4th Expert Group meeting was held in Brussels to discuss firearms 
trafficking and the implementation of Directive (EU) 2021/555. This meeting marked the first 
edition  of  the  Expert  Group  under  its  expanded  mandate,  which  encompasses  not  only  the 
implementation of the Firearms Directive but also the EU Action Plan and its external actions. 

The meeting covered the following topics: i) The status of implementing the EU Action Plan 
on firearms trafficking, ii.) key performance indicators for specific actions under the EU Action 
Plan focused on the Western Balkans, iii) the status of a proposal by the Commission for a new 
EU legislative act aimed at harmonising criminal offenses related to firearms trafficking, iv) 
the harmonisation of data collection on seized firearms, including the development of an EU 
Hub for firearms and a repository of seized firearms at the EU level within EUROPOL. The 
meeting also touched on v) the review of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1423, 
which deals with the systematic exchange of information on refusals to grant authorizations for 
firearms acquisition or possession (IMI), and potential revisions to this regulation. 

Bilateral follow-up with the Netherlands: Supreme Court Ruling ECLI:NL:HR:2023:936 

The  Commission  conducted  a  bilateral  follow-up  request  with  the  Netherlands  after  the  4th 
Expert  Group  meeting,  to  gather  more  input  of  the  Dutch  Supreme  Court  Ruling 
ECLI:NL:HR:2023:936,  in  which  the  judge  did  not  require  a  testing  of  seized  3D-printed 
firearms and their essential components.  

Discussions at the Law Enforcement Working Party, 10 January 2025 

The Polish Presidency of the Council organised a specific meeting of LEWP-P on firearms-
related threats and issues. The meeting covered the following topics: i) information from the 
Presidency; ii) new threat related with reproductions of antique black powder weapons; iii) the 
dangers  of  3D  printed  firearms;  iv)  counterfeit  weapons;  v)  converted  alarm  and  signal 
weapons; vi) the risks linked to the use of pyrotechnics products; vii) harmonisation of data 
collection of seized firearms; viii) automatically deleted SIS alerts; ix) firearms smuggling and 
illegal arms trafficking with particular emphasis on Ukraine.  

Bilateral with Finland, based on the non-paper presented, 20 March 2025. 

Finland presented a non-paper on its views on this initiative on 31 January 2025. The content 
of  the  non-paper  was  discussed  during  a  meeting  between  DG  Beata  GMINDER  and 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice on 10 February 2025. Also Finish Permanent 
Mission in Brussels requested a bilateral with the firearms team within DG HOME, which was 
held  on  20  March  2025.  Finland  expressed  its  support  in  general  terms  to  the  initiative, 
especially  in  the  current  geopolitical  situation  with  the  Russia´s  war  of  aggression  against 
Ukraine. 

They  pointed  out  the  importance  to  clarify  and  sufficiently  explain  the  legal  base  of  the 
initiative, the importance to address specifically the use of new technology and carefully define 
the potential new offenses and the extend of it. They also highlighted that both at national and 
EU level, criminal law can only be used as last resort, the importance to demonstrate the rules´ 
likely  impact  on  crime  and  sufficiently  broad  evidence-based  assessment  of  other  possible 
preventive measures. They expressed their opinion that there are grounds justifying the use of 

91 

 
 
EU criminal law in the fight against firearms crimes so they are in favour of a EU criminal law 
on firearms. 

16.1.2. Targeted Stakeholder Events 

Seminar  on  the  prevention  of  firearms  trafficking,  firearms  printed  with  3D  technology. 
Conclusions and results, 6-7 November 2023, Madrid  

From 6-7 November 2023, the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU, with the support 
of EMPACT Firearms and Guardia Civil, organised an event on 3D-printed firearms in Madrid. 
This  event  was  not  organised  as  part  of  the  consultation  strategy,  but  it  was  an  important 
instigator  for  certain  policy  options.  The  event  was  a  continuation  of  a  conference  in  the 
framework  of  the  OA  1.6.  and  the  EMPACT  Firearms  on  the  subject  to  understand  3D-
technology and the threats of it. Key conclusion of the event was that 3D-firearms are a real 
threat, that needs to be addressed by i) strengthening law enforcement authority cooperation, 
the private sector and judiciary, to have the tools to respond to the challenges of the expansion 
and easy use of 3D-technlogy. The first day of the conference focused on the cooperation of 
the private sector, police and judicial entities, and the second day on operational challenges at 
the level of investigation, regulation and forensic studies.  

Consultations with Law Enforcement Agencies, 17 December 2024 

Consultations with  law enforcement  agencies (LEAs) were held  on the 17 December 2024, 
through an online meeting with EMPACT firearms, with the participation of law enforcement 
agencies from Portugal, Spain, France and Belgium. The Commission distributed a discussion 
paper beforehand. The aim of the meeting was to obtain insights from the LEA to consider 
their practical needs and consequences in relation to criminal law. Based on a discussion paper 
sent  to  LEA before the  meeting, discussions  targeted how  criminal  law  helps  or affects  the 
work  of  LEA,  with  key  discussion  points  on  i)  judges/  prosecutors’  requirements  for 
investigations, ii) 3D-printed weapons, iii) blueprints, iv) illicit possession and illicit trafficking 
and v) special investigation measures.  

Commission Expert Group on EU Criminal Policy, 21 January 2025 

The Commission Expert Group on EU Criminal Policy is managed by DG JUST and gathers 
10 academics and 10 practitioners specialised in criminal law. The meeting took place on 21 
January,  with  the  session  on  firearms  trafficking  between  14h30  and  17h.  To  facilitate  the 
discussion, a discussion paper was prepared and sent to the participants beforehand. The issues 
discussed were: the limited scope of offences, unclear definitions and lack of focus on illicit 
3D printing of firearms, and penalties. 

Consultation meeting with magistrates, 02 February 2025 

On  6  February  2025,  a  consultation  meeting  with  magistrates  was  organised,  together  with 
EMPACT  firearms,  to  discuss  the  Firearms  Trafficking  Initiative.  French  and  Spanish 
magistrates participated, along with one customs officer from France and the EMPACT Driver 
from  Spain.  Key  topics  discussed  were  i)  cross-border  investigations,  ii)  3D-printing,  iii) 
special investigation measures, iv) sanctions and v) statistics.  

92 

 
 
Closing  workshop  of  the  HamsTeR  project  to  assess  potential  threats  from  3D  printed 
firearms, 12-13 February 2025, Wiesbaden, Germany 

The project HamsTeR is a research project to investigate the potential danger of 3D printed 
firearms financed by the funding measure “Anwender  – Innovativ:  Forschung für die zivile 
Sicherheit II” by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. It is coordinated 
between the Fraunhofer Society and the German Criminal Police Office (BKA) in cooperation 
with two state police forces. It was initiated in 2020 with the objective to assess the potential 
threat that was posed by firearms privately manufactured with 3D printers.  

The workshop covered three key areas: i.) Police investigation findings of 3D printed firearms 
in  Germany,  ii.)  application  of  current  printer  models  and  new  filament  materials,  and 
simulation of their behaviour and iii.) forensic methods to trade the use and production of 3D 
printed firearms.  

16.1.3. Consultations with EU Agencies  

To consult the EU agencies, dedicated requests were sent to Europol and Eurojust. Questions 
targeted the timeframe from 2020-2022, to be coherent with the analytical timeframe covered 
in the data analysis, and potentially fill in data gaps. 

Europol 

The  Europol  experts  on  firearms  were  consulted  to  provide  written  input  on  the  initiative 
through a set of questions, which were discussed bilaterally in January 2025. Information was 
requested on aspects of international and cross-border cooperation, cases of different firearms-
related offences, 3D-printed firearms, and messages exchanged in SIENA.  

Eurojust 

Eurojust submitted a report providing reflections of figures on crime type “illicit trafficking in 
arms,  ammunition  and  explosives”  in  the  Case  Management  System  (CMS)  and  the  excel 
overview  of  their  Data  Management  Unit  (DMU),  including  data  on  coordination  meetings 
(CMs), coordination centres (CCs) and joint investigation teams (JITs). The timeframe covered 
in their data is 1 January 2020 to 22 January 2025. 

16.1.4. Consultations with International Organisations  

UNODC  

Three consultation meetings were held with UNODC, on 10 July 2024, on 16 October 2024 
and on 21 January 2025. During these meetings, the different steps of the EU legislative process 
were discussed, and UNODC gave insights from their lessons learned in the field. Furthermore, 
the bilateral meeting focussed on how to incorporate Article 5 of the UN Firearms Protocol and 
discussions on harmonisation were held. UNODC expressed themselves as supportive of the 
initiative.  

16.1.5. Consultations with International Partners 

Western Balkans 

93 

 
 
Through a bilateral follow-up, specific questions were asked to UNDP, regarding the Firearms 
Trafficking  Initiative  discussions  with  the  Small  Arms  and  Light  Weapons  (SALW) 
commissions. The Commission asked UNDP to confirm information regarding the number of 
cases  of  3D-printed  firearms,  the  criminalisation  of  the  possession  of  blueprints,  the 
functionality of the weapon, and the classification of weapons.  

16.1.6. Private stakeholder consultations 

Formnext conference, 21 November 2024 

FormNext is a yearly conference organised by and for the Additive Manufacturing industry 
(3D printing). The conference takes 4 floors of the exposition hall in Frankfurt and contains 
850 exhibitors. The different economic operators show the latest technological developments 
in the industry. The Commission visited the conference together with Europol’s EUCTC and 
an officer from the Spanish EMPACT Firearms Driver support team. 

ESFAM, 3 December 2024 

On  3  December  2023,  the  Commission  met  with  ESFAM,  the  Association  of  European 
Manufacturers  of  Sporting  Firearms.  High-level  representatives  of  CZ,  Dikar,  Browning, 
Arex/Steyr and he ESFAM secretariat were present for the consultations, covering a range of 
manufacturers.  

17.  RESULTS 

The following section presents a on overview of the results of the consultation activities listed.  

17.1.  PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND CALL FOR EVIDENCE 

See Annex 3 on the public consultation and call for evidence.  

17.2. 

 CONSULTATION OF THE MEMBER STATES 

17.2.1. Responses to the discussion papers and discussions in the Expert Group 

on Firearms Trafficking, 13 November 2024 

initiative 

including 

legislative 

to  harmonise  various  definitions, 

The  general  trend  throughout  the  consultation  suggests  that  Member  States  tend  towards 
supporting  a 
the 
criminalisation of the illicit creation, possession and dissemination of the intellectual materials 
for 3D printings. The majority of Member States who sent in written replies to the discussion 
paper  also  supported  a  legislative  initiative  focused  on  all  firearms-related  offences  as 
suggested  by  the  legislative  guidelines  of  the  UN  (illicit  trafficking,  illicit  manufacturing, 
modification  of  markings,  illicit  possession  and  carrying,  illicitly  reactivating  deactivated 
firearms, illicit brokering, arms embargo violations, and misconduct in the context of record-
keeping and licensing). Furthermore, the Member States suggested a combinational approach 
of options regarding sanction types and levels, which will be further discussed below. It was 
also visible that across the Member States difficulties in cooperating with other Member States 
due  to  differences  in  definitions  of  firearms-related  offences  varied,  where  some  did  not 
encounter  any difficulties in  the past  and others  experience a  range of issues regarding this 
matter.  

94 

 
 
I. 

Unclear definitions and lack of focus on 3D printing of firearms and essential 
components 

In the first section, five questions were posed, with regards to the following policy options to 
discuss:  

A.  Official recommendations from the Commission on the definitions and how illicitly 3D 
printed firearms fit within the definition of illicit manufacturing, including on how to 
deal with 3D printed parts detected during investigations.  

B.  Legislative  initiative  to  harmonise  the  various  definitions  and  give  guidance  and 
examples of best practices on how to implement the definition of illicit manufacturing 
related to illicitly 3D printed firearms in non-binding guidelines.  

C.  Legislative initiative to harmonise the various definitions, including the criminalization 
of  the  illicit  creation,  possession,  and  dissemination  of  the  intellectual  materials 
(blueprints) needed for 3D printing. 

1.   Are  you  experiencing  difficulties  to  cooperate  with  some  Member  States  due  to 

differences in definitions of firearms-related offences? 

The scope of difficulties encountered in  the cooperation with  other Member States differed 
throughout  the  replies.  Most  of  Member  States  stated  that  they  did  not  encounter  any 
difficulties yet, from sides of the authorities, as well as during investigations, but it was noted 
by the respondents that the potential of these issues is present and can pose obstacles for cross-
border cooperation. Finland, Sweden, Belgium and Spain indicated that they have encountered 
problems  in  the  past.  Key  issue  was  the  different  understandings  between  Member  States 
regarding the definition of essential components, such as frame, receiver and lower, which lead 
to  differences  in  authorisation  in  different  countries.  Furthermore,  it  was  noted  that  when 
involving the judicial system in cross-border operations, difficulties can arise from different 
definitions  and  punishable  acts  in  each  Member  States  given  the  principle  of  double 
incrimination. Another issue of definition regards alarm and signal weapons, which are sold 
freely in some Member States leading to a lack of information and difficulties in tracing. During 
the oral discussions in the Expert Group, it was noted that certain definitions, such as illicit 
manufacturing,  could  be  split  up  into  three  different  offences,  and  that  the  EU  should 
incriminate the different sub-elements of the definitions. These answers showcase that there is 
a set of different problems arising through different definitions, which can affect cross-border 
cooperation.  

2.  Are  the  options  equally  suitable  to  improve  the  clarity  of  the  definitions  for  both 

practitioners and duty holders? 

Most of the Member States agreed that option C is the most suitable to address issues of clarity 
of the definitions for both practitioners and duty holders. Two Member States opted for option 
A, three for option B and five for option C. The Member States agreeing with option C argued 
that it is the most comprehensive approach, addressing both legal inconsistencies and emerging 
threats posed by rapid technological advancements. One Member States reasoned their favour 
for  option  C  with  the  need  for  uniformity  in  criminal  offenses  related  to  firearms  and  their 
components at the European level. If this does not exist because the Member States do not want 

95 

 
 
to  heed  the  various  non-binding  recommendations  that  may  come  from  different  European 
institutions, the problem will continue to exist. Those opting for the less binding legislative 
option,  or  the  recommendation  argued  that  all  options  have  the  potential  of  improving  the 
clarity of the definitions and that a legislative initiative to harmonise definitions provides clear 
guidance and ensures consistency across Member States  

3.  Which problems do you encounter in  your Member State when detecting illicitly 3D 

printed firearms, essential components or illicit 3D printing workshops? 

During the Expert Group meeting, Member States discussed whether the focus should only be 
placed on 3D printed firearms alone, or privately manufactured firearms in general, including 
other methods of manufacturing such as metal welding or CNC. The discussion showed that 
the  Member  States  are  aware  of  problems  that  can  occur.  It  was  noted  that  methods  of 
manufacturing will develop over time, where 3D printing is the current issue, but it can soon 
be any other method. Therefore, it was considered necessary to make the initiative future proof 
by referring to privately manufactured firearms.  

A specific issue that was mentioned by multiple Member States was the difficulty and needed 
resources for tests of seized 3D printed firearms and essential components. In general judges 
require all parts to be completed and tested before they are considered admissible in court. The 
Netherlands highlighted a recent court case where the judge concluded that it does not matter 
whether  the  printed  parts  are  functional  or  not,  as  the  production  of  these  parts  make  an 
individual liable under the definition of manufacturing illegal weapons. Sweden noted that the 
issues of 3D printing are relatively unknown to ‘non-experts’ but that they have tried to solve 
the problem by an information sheet on what is important at the crime scene and for further 
investigation from both forensic and criminal law perspectives. This is combined with keeping 
track  of  court  practice  regarding  firearms  crime  where  3D-printed  weapons  occur.  Also, 
Belgium  noted  that  their  national  law  covers  these  violations,  however,  in  an  investigative 
manner, a specific database to register the information is needed, in order to compare cases. 
Greece stressed that there is a lack of expertise or specialised equipment to detect 3D-printed 
firearms or workshops, as well as difficulties in distinguishing 3D-printed firearm blueprints 
from legitimate 3D printing designs. Spain noted that regulations should not be too specific, 
since  fast  technological  advances  and  new  manufacturing  methods  might  not  fall  into  the 
definition that may be adopted in relation to 3D printing. The diverse set of answers of the 
Member States suggests that the topic is pressing and on the agenda of the Member States as 
the current technological landscape may create issues in the future.  

4.  How can blueprints of firearms be distinguished from blueprints for toy guns? And how 

should this be reflected in the legislation? 

The Member States discussed the need for clear legislation to define what constitutes blueprints 
of a firearm versus a toy gun, including criteria such as kinetic energy, functional components, 
and materials used. For example, Lithuania is proposing that toy guns should be required to 
have distinct markings, such as bright colours or transparent materials, to differentiate them 
from  real  firearms.  In  contrast,  the  Czech  Republic  is  finding  it  challenging  to  make  a 
distinction, as most 3D printed firearms are assembled from both polymer and metallic parts, 
and the metallic parts are currently still not produced on a 3D printer and thus are not included 
in  the  blueprints.  France  is  proposing  that  the  authorities  distinguish  between  these  two 
categories of blueprints depending on whether the result is the manufacture of a firearm or a 

96 

 
 
dummy  weapon.  Belgium  is  questioning  whether  it  would  be  possible  to  criminalize  the 
downloading of blueprints, and the Netherlands is calling for cooperation to decrease the means 
to acquire blueprints online. Cyprus is suggesting that a distinction can be achieved through 
technical specifications and unique design features included in firearm blueprints. Moreover, 
it was discussed whether the possession of a 3D printing blueprint for firearms can be regarded 
as a preparatory act,  as  a blueprint can be seen  as a specific instrument  to  manufacture 3D 
printed firearms. 

Generally,  the  responses  showcase  an  increasing  concern  about  the  misuse  of  3D  printing 
technology to create functional firearms, which can be easily downloaded from the internet and 
printed at home, and the diverse nature of the responses and issues around the topic highlights 
how there is the need to find a common ground in the distinguishment of blueprints, that can 
effectively be translated into the legislation. 

5.  Which option would be the best for addressing the threat of illicitly 3D printed firearms 

and essential components (combinations of options are possible)? 

To address the threat of illicitly 3D printed firearms and essential components, Member States 
were asked to elaborate which of the options provided were the most suitable. Three Member 
States opted for option A, so the recommendation, two for option B as a minimum together 
with option C, and four for option C. Hence, most Member States agree the most with adopting 
option  C,  being  a  legislative  initiative  to  harmonise  the  various  definitions,  including  the 
criminalization of the illicit creation, possession and dissemination of the intellectual materials 
(blueprints) needed for 3D printing. Sweden put forward that option A could be applied in the 
short run, with the aim for option C in the long run. Those Member States agreeing with option 
A argued that the issue is still very new, and that the different realities of the Member States 
need to be considered. At the current stage of development, it is not clear what the practical 
lifespan of a legislation aimed at a specific form of technology is.  

II. 

Limited scope of current mandatory offences 

Addressing  the  limited  scope  of  current  mandatory  offenses  as  listed  in  the  UN  Firearms 
Protocol, the following options were provided for discussion:  

A.  Enforcement  of  the  three  obliged  firearms-related  offences  as  defined  in  the  UN 
Firearms  Protocol  (illicit  trafficking,  illicit  manufacturing,  and  modification  of 
markings) by addressing those Member States which have gaps in the transposition of 
the Protocol.  

B.  Legislative initiative to  further harmonise the definitions of the  mandatory offences, 

including illicit possession. 

C.  Legislative  initiative  to  further  harmonise  the  definitions  of  the  mandatory  offences 
(including illicit possession) and give guidance and examples of best practices in the 
Member States in non-binding guidelines of the Commission or in the recitals to the 
Directive on the additional offences.  

D.  Legislative  initiative  focused  on  all  firearms-related  offences  as  suggested  by  the 
legislative guidelines of the UN (illicit trafficking, illicit manufacturing, modification 

97 

 
 
of markings, illicit possession and carrying, illicitly reactivating deactivated firearms, 
illicit  brokering,  arms  embargo  violations,  and  misconduct  in  the  context  of  record-
keeping and licensing) 

The following questions were discussed: 

1.  What  is  your  definition  of  illicit  possession  and  carrying  of  firearms,  essential 

components and ammunition? 

All  input  to  the  responses  were  given  according  to  the  national  legislations  of  the  Member 
States. Across the Member States the concept of "illicit possession" and "illicit carrying" is 
widely recognised, referring to the unauthorised or unauthorised possession and carrying of 
firearms, their essential components, and ammunition. However, the responses show that there 
are nuances in the definitions between the Member States. Romania noted that they emphasise 
the operation of lethal or non-lethal firearm and ammunition in their definition, or any devices 
without authorisation. France distinguishes between the unlawful possession of firearms, their 
parts  and  ammunition  and  the  unlawful  carrying  and  transport  of  firearms,  its  parts  and 
ammunition.  In  the  Finnish  legislation,  the  definition  of  illicit  possession  also  covers 
transporting  and  storing  a  firearms,  components,  cartridges  and  especially  dangerous 
projectiles.  Sweden’s  definition  of  illicit  possession  also  covers  cases  where  an  individual 
possesses  knowledge  about  the  location  of  an  illicitly  possessed  firearm,  showing  that,  in 
addition to the physical possession, immediate control of the firearm is sufficient. Furthermore, 
more than one person can be in possession of a firearm at the same time. In the Expert Group 
meeting, Sweden presented an example where a person was convicted of an aggravated firearm 
offence after telling another person (who also was convicted) the location of the firearm. Both 
Greece and Belgium do not have a specific definition on their national laws, but in Greece, 
illicit possession  is  criminalised in  relation to  the firearm category.  The scope of definition 
throughout the responses shows, that there are discrepancies between the Member States which 
could potentially be taken advantage of by criminals and could pose difficulties in cross-border 
cooperation.  

2.  How  is  illicit  trade  of  firearms  within  your  Member  State,  so  without  cross-border 

movement, criminalised? 

On the definition of illicit trade of firearms, based on the national legislation of the Member 
States all Member States agree that illicit trade of firearms within their Member State, without 
cross-border  movement,  is  criminalised.  Most  Member  States  emphasize  the  importance  of 
proper authorization or permits for the trade, manufacture, and distribution of firearms, their 
components,  and  ammunition.  Notably,  Greece  emphasises  the  importance  of  proper 
authorisation or permits for the disposal of firearms, including for businessmen/ dealers and 
private  individuals/citizens.  Sweden  also  includes  the  lending  of  a  firearm  to  an  individual 
without a permit or authorisation as illicit trade. Generally, the replies showed a clear link with 
illicit possession.  

3.  Which  of  the  firearms-related  offenses  mentioned  in  option  (d)  would  you  prefer  to 
address from a criminal law point of view and which from an administrative point of 
view? Which of the above options the wider problem of firearms-related incidents better 
(combinations of options are possible)? 

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On  the  side  of  criminal  law,  most  Member  States  agreed  that  illicit  trafficking  should  be 
addressed under criminal law, followed by illicit manufacturing and illicit possession. Also, 
the illicit modification of markings, reactivation of deactivated weapons, illicit brokering and 
arms embargo violations are mainly to be addressed from a criminal law point of view, however 
not by all Member States. Notably, some Member States did not submit a response for every 
offence listed under option D, which means that not listing a category under criminal law does 
not imply that the category should fall under administrative law. Regarding administrative law, 
Member  States  agreed  that  misconducts  regarding  record  keeping  and  licensing  should  be 
addressed through administrative measures. Moreover, some Member States classified illicit 
possession or carrying of firearms as on offence to be addressed from an administrative point 
of  view,  where  Spain  argues  that  if  there  is  no  offence  of  illicit  possession  but  only  illicit 
carrying, it is an administrative offence in their legislation. Greece stated explicitly that under 
their  legislation,  all  the  offences  listed  entail  criminal  sanctions  and  at  the  same  time 
administrative measures, being the revocation or temporary removal of the license.  

4.  Do you have specific cases that show the need to address the wider set  of firearms-

related offences in option D from an EU level? 

Member States were asked to provide, if applicable, any specific cases that highlight the need 
to address the wider set of firearms-related offences in the option D from an EU level. Sweden 
and Belgium indicated that they already had such cases. Sweden noted that the criminalisation 
of lending and shortcomings in storage may be included as well, and Belgium responded that 
all  the  mentioned  offences  are  needed  to  respond  to  firearms-related  offences  in  Belgium. 
Although not having encountered any difficulties, Cyprus suggested that there is a need for 
EU-level action to harmonise laws and improve coordination between the Member States due 
to potential for firearms-related offenses that involve cross-border elements. Moreover, Greece 
noted that the popular modus operandi is legal importation by arms trading companies of EU 
Member States as well as trading of converted firearms in the domestic market.  

5.  Which  of  the  above  options  (a-d)  addresses  the  wider  problem  of  firearms-related 

incidents better (combinations of options are possible)? 

The majority of Member States opted for option D. Responses are broken down the following 
way: 

OPTIONS:  

A.  Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, Sweden  

B.  Sweden 

C.  Sweden 

D.  Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Sweden, Belgium, Spain 

From the responses, the majority of the Member States prefer a legislative initiative focused 
on  all  firearms-related  offences  as  suggested  by  the  legislative  guidelines  of  the  UN  (illicit 
trafficking,  illicit  manufacturing,  modification  of  markings,  illicit  possession  and  carrying, 

99 

 
 
illicitly  reactivating  deactivated  firearms,  illicit  brokering,  arms  embargo  violations,  and 
misconduct in the context of record-keeping and licensing).  

On  its  position,  France  stated  in  the  Expert  Group  meeting  held  in  November  2024  that  if 
infringements are chosen, they must be  split up into sub-groups. Additionally, based on the 
stronger rules for deactivation in the EU, France is not convinced of the need to include the 
illicit  reactivation  of  deactivation  as  there  have  not  been  many  cases.  Regarding  illicit 
possession, France noted that it is important to consider the fact that the EU Firearms Directive 
only establishes minimum rules, and that Member States can be stricter, therefore harmonising 
the criminalisation of illicit possession would have to reflect this. They also consider that arms 
embargo violations are covered within the definition of illicit trafficking as a person should be 
authorised  to  export  firearms.  Same  goes  for  illicit  brokering,  it  can  be  covered  by  the 
definitions of illicit trafficking and illicit manufacturing. There is no need to have this offence 
as a separate offence. 

III. 

Sanction types and levels 

The  following  options  regarding  different  sanction  types  and  levels  were  proposed  to  the 
Member States for discussion: 

a)  Introduce  provisions  on  harmonising  minimum  levels  of  maximum  sanctions 

(“maximum penalty of at least...”). 

b)  Include a provision on aggravating circumstances (for example the number of firearms 
involved, if more dangerous firearms are involved, if cases relate to organised crime or 
terrorism; use of corruption; systematic repeated offences).  

c)  Include a provision on a broad range of accessory sanctions and measures such as the 
confiscation  of 
firearms 
authorisation/license, deprivation of rights linked to the possession and use of firearms 
(e.g. hunters permit), prohibition to engage in certain professional activities. 

the  withdrawal  or 

refusal  of 

firearms, 

the 

the 

d)  Include  a  provision  on  attempts,  when  someone  takes  intentionally  significant  steps 

towards committing a crime but ultimately does not complete the act. 

e)  Link  the  level  of  imposed  penalties  to  the  profits  expected  or  generated  and  to  the 
financial  situation  of  businesses  involved  in  committing  the  crime  (for  instance  by 
taking a percentage of the annual turnover as yardstick). 

Include  provisions  in  the  Directive  to  oblige  Member  States  to  better  coordinate  their 
administrative  and  criminal  sanctioning  systems  to  improve  adequate  sanctioning  in  the 
individual cases. 

1.  Are the envisaged provisions – individually or in combination – suitable to obtain more 

effective, dissuasive, and proportionate sanctioning in practice? 

Out of the options provided, introducing provisions on harmonising minimum maximum levels 
of  sanctions  (“maximum  penalty  of  at  least...”)  (provision  a)  is  supported  the  most  by  the 
Member  States  including  Cyprus,  Finland,  Lithuania,  France,  Sweden  and  Belgium. 
Reservations were expressed especially towards provision e, being linking the level of imposed 

100 

 
 
penalties  to  the  profits  expected  or  generated  and  to  the  financial  situation  of  businesses 
involved in committing the crime (for instance by taking a percentage of the annual turnover 
as yardstick). Sweden reasoned their position arguing that the damage caused to society by an 
illegal trade exceeds the profit made by trading firearms by far, meaning that the offence is 
more  serious  than  the  monetary  transaction.  Generally,  most  Member  States  a  combinatory 
approach  towards  the  positions,  to  create  a  more  comprehensive  and  flexible  system  for 
addressing  firearms-related  offences.  Greece  suggested  more  holistic  approaches,  such  as 
opting for administrative fines, with measures that provide for special treatment for juvenile 
offenders and their parents.  

2.   To what extent is it necessary to introduce minimum sanctions to ensure that national 

authorities may use special investigation measures? 

Cyprus,  Greece  and  Belgium  support  the  introduction  of  minimum  sanctions  to  ensure  that 
national  authorities  may  use  special  investigation  measures,  where  Cyprus  argued  that  they 
create a baseline for firearms-related offences, ensuring consistency and proportionality across 
Member States and facilitate joint investigation and enforcement amongst the Member States. 
Greece further noted that, although supporting the establishment of minimum penalties, these 
should be limited to specific cases only, such as crimes of degree.  

A  neutral  position  was  adopted  by  Czech  Republic  and  France  where  arguments  by  Czech 
Republic  included  were  that  specific  investigation  measures  can  be  used  regardless  of  the 
penalty level in most cases, with some exceptions where a minimum penalty rate is required, 
and France reasoned their neutral position as they are open to listen to other Member States 
opinions  on  this  matter,  which  suggests  that  France  could  also  take  a  supportive  stance. 
However, they also put forward that under French law, special investigative techniques can 
already be used in investigations into offences related to firearms trafficking.  

Sceptical  opinions  were  given  by  Lithuania  and  Romania.  Lithuania  suggests  that  the 
recommendations  of  the  European  Commission  may  be  insufficient  to  enable  national 
authorities  to  use  special  investigation  measures,  and  Romania  expressed  that  minimum 
sanctions  are  not  necessary,  as  Romania’s  criminal  legislation  already  allows  special 
investigation measures to be used without requiring minimum sanction.  

Despite the different opinions expressed amongst the Member States the responses show that 
introducing minimum sanctions attained the most support, where cooperation in investigation 
and law enforcement was given as a reason. This also suggests that international cooperation 
on firearms-related offences is a matter Member States want to address.  

3.  Are there other suitable measures not mentioned here? 

MS were given the opportunity to add additional input to their responses to the discussion paper 
submitted.  Key  subject  addressed  by  the  Member  States  was  international  cooperation  and 
coordination, expressed through suggestions of the establishment for regional task forces to 
share  intelligence  and  cooperation,  enhance  national  firearms  focal  points  and  enhanced 
cooperation  at  administrative  level,  such  as  promoting  sufficient  recordings  of  IMI  denials. 
Furthermore, Cyprus suggested a more holistic approach, where, apart from the comprehensive 
list  of  provisions,  educational  and  awareness  programmes  for  firearms  users  and  law 
enforcement entities should be provided.  

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17.2.2. 4th  Expert  Group  on  Firearms  Trafficking  initiative  meeting,  13-14 

November 2024 

i.) 

Firearms trafficking initiative: Call for evidence 

The Commission presented the state of play of a proposal by the Commission for a possible 
new EU legislative act on the harmonisation of criminal offenses related to firearms trafficking. 
The  Member  States  discussed  the  discussion  paper  on  the  Firearms  Trafficking  Directive. 
Discussion topics focussed on the unclear definition of firearms trafficking, the limited scope 
of  current  obligatory  offences  and  differing  sanction  types  and  levels.  Member  States 
contributed to the discussions on topics such as 3D-printed firearms and related issues such as 
blueprints, different scopes of criminalisation and sanctions in Member States and national law 
cases  showcasing  how  Member  States  prosecute  different  firearms-  related  offences.  The 
different replies during the meeting where based on the discussion paper which was send before 
the  meeting.  Several  Member  States  discussed  the  mapping  study  carried  out  by  the 
Commission, asking for verification of the numbers presented. The Commission commented 
that  the  study  examined  only  basic  offences,  without  any  aggravating  circumstances. 
Luxembourg suggested to add more data to the study, to which the Commission replied that 
they are happy to receive more data, adding to the detail and extent of the study. As a result, 
the Commission shared the country reports of each Member States with the respective Member 
States for them to give it a factual check.  

ii.) 

Harmonisation of data collection on seized firearms: Proposal of minimum dataset 
and discussions 

As part of priority 2 of the EU Action Plan on firearms trafficking (building a better intelligence 
picture), the establishment of a minimum dataset on seized firearms was discussed, as well as 
the definitions of proposed data in the dataset. The purpose of such EU repository is to improve 
the intelligence picture, with harmonised and consistent data, as well as providing an IT tool 
for investigators to identify links between investigations in which firearms have been reported 
and seized, to identify trafficking networks. The Commission pointed out the interest of some 
Member States to revise the categories of some firearms in the Schengen information system. 
The discussion was opened to the Member States, where aspects such as data protection, other 
datasets  such  as  INTERPOL’s  iArms  dataset  and  the  connection  to  national  databases  of 
Member  States  were  discussed.  They  all  agree  on  the  need  of  such  EU  repository  and  the 
importance of the correct development of NFFPs to develop such initiative at national level.  

Member States agreed that the best way to harmonise the dataset of national databases and the 
interconnexion  with  Europol  would  by  an  EU  legislative  initiative  (legally  binding 
instrument)Member States also agreed that it is important to establish a minimum database, 
where the origin of the firearm is a key component in fighting crime. On the technicalities of 
the database, some Member States suggested to add pictures of the firearm seized, for marking 
analysis purposes.  

Presentation by EUROPOL: EU Intelligence Hub on firearms. 

EUROPOL presented the works for the establishment of an EU intelligence hub for the purpose 
of  data  exchange,  following  the  key  strategy  of  fighting  against  weapons  trafficking.  To 
identify  flows  and  movements  of  illicit  firearms,  EUROPOL  pointed  out  its  intention  for  a 

102 

 
 
database  on  ballistic  objects  (fired  cartridge  cases  and  bullets)  to  identify  firearms,  and  a 
database on technical characteristics of seized firearms. The current situation shows that there 
is no national technical database that centrally stores the technical data on firearms seized in 
the Member States, leading to the problem that without centralised data, it is not possible to 
attain an overview of how many and what kind of firearms are seized on national, European 
and extra-European level. The database TRAFFIC as an existing application for this purpose 
presented, which stores data on the characteristics of seized weapons.  

Member States expressed doubt on how to connect to TRAFFIC and if interconnection with 
national databases will be possible. The Commission stressed the importance of the works to 
first try to harmonise the data at national level and the need to align the minimum dataset with 
the  dataset  of  TRAFFIC.  Europol  did  not  provide  any  details  on  the  next  steps.  The 
Commission presented a proposal on the minimum dataset, focusing on technical discussions 
about the firearm type. As references of firearm types, the Firearms Directive, UNODC, the 
Schengen Information System and the Canadian Mounted Police were discussed, and it was 
suggested that the database should have the option to add several serial numbers, as confiscated 
firearms can have multiple serial numbers. The Commission agreed to investigate the option 
to  include  the  operational  system  of  the  firearm  in  the  dataset,  under  request  of  Lithuania. 
Moreover, some of the Member States suggested to add ticking boxes in the dataset, instead of 
boxes for typing manually, to have harmonised entries on the same type of firearm.  

17.2.3. Quantitative input requested from the Member States 

A  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  quantitative  data  submitted  can  be  found  in  Annex  5  on 
sanctions and offences, Section 2.8. 

Member States were asked to provide responses regarding:  

•  Cases of seizures of illicit firearms  

•  Arrests, prosecutions and convictions for illicit firearm trafficking  

•  Cases of illicit trafficking  

•  Cases of illicit possession  

•  Cases of illicit modification of markings  

•  Cases of illicit manufacturing  

•  The  number  of  cases  of  firearms-  related  offences,  where  the  firearms,  essential 
components and/or ammunition came from outside the borders of the Member State  

•  Cases involving privately manufactured (e.g. 3D-printed firearms) 

•  Cases involving alarm & signal weapons (converted and non-converted) 

Every question was followed up by asking whether the data provided depicts a complete or 
partial picture of the Member State, which helps mapping out gaps.  

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The Commission received 11 responses. Throughout the responses, it was visible that Member 
States gather statistics in different ways, leading partly incoherent answers. An example for 
this  is  data  submitted  by  Czech  Republic  on  cases  of  seizures  of  illicit  firearms  registered 
between 2020 and 2022, where they noted that the offence of “unlicensed arming” includes 
illicit possession, illicit modification of markings and illicit manufacturing, and that statistical 
data  does  not  distinguish  between  them,  which  affected  following  questions  on  specific 
offences. Some of the other respondents, on the other hand, were able to submit individual data 
on the offences themselves. Furthermore, the data sources differed between the Member States, 
including the police or customs authorities. Furthermore, whilst some Member States were able 
to  gather  data  on  all  questions,  such  as  Spain,  others  did  not  have  any  data  available  on 
questions such as the number of cases of illicitly modified markings. The discrepancies of the 
responses highlight the need for harmonised definitions, as well as a harmonised dataset, which 
enhances comparability and cooperation, and addresses the issue of inconsistent, incomplete 
and untransparent data on firearms-related offences.  

17.2.4. Discussions at the Law Enforcement Working Party, 10 January 2025 

The Polish presidency decided to organise a dedicated meeting on firearms to discuss current 
and future threats. 2 topics on the agenda were of particular relevance to the firearms trafficking 
initiative: the dangers of 3D printed firearms and the harmonisation of data collection of seized 
firearm.  

On 3D printed firearms, the European Firearms Expert group and EMPACT firearms presented 
the main issues affecting 3D printed firearms, as the readiness of technology with cheap 3D 
printers and available blueprints in internet. Also the fact that technology evolves quickly and 
there  are  already  more  robust  polymers  mixed  with  metallic  particles  which  increase  the 
effectiveness and durability of such weapons. There is a worrying annual increase of number 
of 3D printed weapons seized in the EU. EFE and EMPACT firearms would be in favour to 
regulate  and  ban  the  possession  and  distribution  of  blueprints  without  licence.  EMPACT 
firearms  monitor  the  threat  by  an  annual  operational  action  called  PHANTOM.  The 
Commission presented the legislative initiative to harmonise the criminal offenses at EU level, 
including the offense of illicit manufacturing of 3D printed weapons and the potential inclusion 
of a specific offense of illicit creation, possession and distribution of blueprints, which allow 
the manufacture of any essential component of a firearm by the use of any technology. FI and 
FR  acknowledge  the  problem  and  welcome  and  support  the  legislative  initiative  of  the 
Commission, however both referred to the need to have a good impact assessment. 

On  harmonisation  of  data  collection  of  seized  firearms,  the  Commission  delivered  a 
presentation on the need for harmonisation of data collection of seized firearms, identified as 
an  action  within  one  of  the  priorities  of  the  current  2020-25  EU  Action  Plan  in  firearms 
trafficking. Based on the needs, identified by Member States in the last 3 COSI meetings under 
BE  and  HU  presidencies,  the  Commission  continued  the  discussion  in  the  context  of  the 
Commission Expert Group on firearms trafficking and implementation of Firearms Directive. 
The Commission  will pay special attention to  align this work with  potential revision of the 
dataset in firearms alerts in SIS and the works to integrate the data on seizures of firearms from 
Member States in the future EU hub on firearms in EUROPOL.  

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17.2.5. Commission Expert Group on EU Criminal Policy, 21 January 2025 

On 21 January 2025, exchanges with the Commission Expert Group on EU Criminal Policy 
regarding the Firearms Trafficking Initiative were held. The main issues discussed were i.) the 
limited scope of offences, ii.) unclear definitions lack of focus on illicit 3D printing of firearms, 
and iii.) sanctions.  

i. 

Limited scope of offences 

During the discussions on the scope of offences, participants expressed varying interpretations 
regarding the EU's legal competence under Article 83(1) TFEU. Some participants maintained 
that the EU should focus exclusively on harmonising standards for illicit arms trafficking. They 
argued that this legal base does not extend to cover illicit manufacturing or modification of 
markings  unless  directly  associated  with  arms  trafficking  activities.  For  instance,  illicit 
manufacturing  with  the  intent  to  traffic  could  fall  within  the  scope,  but  broadening  the 
definition to include standalone offences could potentially narrow the scope currently outlined 
in the UN Firearms Protocol, despite the EU's ratification of that protocol. 

Conversely,  others  proposed  a  broader  interpretation  akin  to  drug  trafficking  models, 
suggesting the inclusion of illicit possession with the intent to traffic within the EU's regulatory 
framework. However, some judges and prosecutors highlighted practical  difficulties, noting 
that it is challenging to prove intent to traffic, often leading authorities to prioritise securing 
convictions for trafficking over possession. 

The  concept  of  illicit  possession,  particularly  when  linked  to  a  criminal  context  rather  than 
administrative  concerns  of  legal  possession,  was  discussed  in  depth.  Some  participants 
suggested that such cases might better align with organised crime frameworks instead of illicit 
arms trafficking under EU competence. An illustrative example from Ireland highlighted the 
contested  nature  of  offences  related  to  illicit  possession  and  carrying  of  firearms  under 
suspicious circumstances, emphasising the necessity to clearly define possession not intended 
for legal purposes. 

Moreover,  the  requirement  of  a  cross-border  element  for  euro  crimes  was  debated.  Several 
participants contended that if an investigation proves trafficking, demonstrating a cross-border 
aspect should not be imperative. Others noted that cross-border implications might be inferred 
from special needs, such as discrepancies between Member States. Despite these views, there 
was no consensus, and it was stressed that the European Commission must substantiate why 
certain  issues  cannot  be  effectively  addressed  at  the  Member  State  level,  adhering  to  the 
subsidiarity principle. 

ii. 

Unclear definitions and 3D printing 

The experts concurred that clarifying definitions is always beneficial, as harmonised definitions 
provide clear guidance for practitioners and duty holders.  

Discussions also addressed the potential criminalisation of the illicit possession of blueprints. 
The  primary  concern  was  the  legal  basis  for  such  an  offence,  along  with  the  challenge  of 
proving criminal intent, which could render the law ineffective in practice. Therefore, some 
suggested  addressing  blueprints  through  administrative  law,  where  the  burden  of  proof  is 

105 

 
 
lighter,  and  imposing  high  sanctions  for  deterrence.  However,  there  were  objections  to  this 
approach, noting that moving under administrative law might bypass essential legal safeguards 
for offenders. 

An expert cited existing legislation in Germany that criminalises the uploading of blueprints 
for  explosives.  Additionally,  the  experts  agreed  that  differentiating  between  blueprints  for 
firearms  and  those  for  toys  should  not  pose  difficulties,  as  investigations  would  focus  on 
confirming  the  functionality  of  the  firearm.  There  was  a  consensus  on  the  value  of  sharing 
information about blueprints already identified as capable of producing functional firearms, as 
this could aid in broader enforcement efforts. 

iii. 

Sanctions 

During the discussion on sanctions, participants had mixed views on the efficacy of penalties 
in  reducing  firearm  incidents.  While  some  remained  unconvinced  about  their  impact,  the 
example of Japan was highlighted, where severe penalties were correlated with a reduction in 
firearm  incidents.  Additionally,  the  Commission  presented  data  suggesting  a  statistically 
significant  correlation  between  higher  firearm  incidents  and  lower  sanction  levels  within 
certain Member States. 

Experts advised caution against incorporating too many aggravating  circumstances, as each 
element  must  be  substantiated,  complicating  investigations  and  prosecutions.  It  was 
recommended  to  avoid  overlaps  with  other  offences,  such  as  organised  crime  or  terrorism, 
when considering aggravating circumstances. If a firearm is linked to organised crime, both 
offences  should  be  prosecuted  separately  to  avoid  complicating  legal  proceedings  through 
overlapping charges. 

Moreover, it was emphasised that legislation should clearly define aggravating circumstances, 
such as high quantities of weapons or particularly dangerous firearms, to ensure these concepts 
are  concrete  and  actionable.  Lastly,  participants  noted  that  accompanying  sanctions,  when 
appropriately applied, could enhance deterrence, particularly given the legal status of firearms 
as commodities. 

17.3.  TARGETED STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS 

17.3.1. Seminar on the prevention of firearms trafficking, firearms printed with 

3D technology. Conclusions and results, 6-7 November 2023, Madrid 

Key  outcomes  of  the  conference  were  the  aim  to  strengthen  the  cooperation  amongst  law 
enforcement  agencies,  the  private  sector  and  judiciary,  to  have  the  tools  to  respond  to  the 
challenges  of  the  expanding  use  of  3D-technology.  One  of  the  main  threats  identified,  on 
European as well as global scale is the illicit manufacturing of firearms using 3D-printing as a 
method. The main concern is that this technology is affordable and that parts of society, namely 
acting under the extreme right ideology, has a growing interest in the production of firearms.  

i.) 

Understanding of the threat 

The ARES investigation centre gave a presentation of the historical and future context of the 
threat  of  privately  manufactured  firearms  (PMFs).  Key  conclusion  was  that  previous 

106 

 
 
limitations  are  being  eroded  by  3D-printing  technologies,  especially  hybrid  firearms. 
Furthermore, the main emerging technology in this field is 3D printing, also known as additive 
manufacturing,  which,  as  a  method,  greatly  reduces  the  barriers  of  entry,  by  reducing  the 
production costs, increasing access to the tools needed and raw materials, which facilitates the 
production of firearms and their components.  

ii.) 

Cooperation with the private sector  

Working  in  close  cooperation  with  the  private  sector  is  essential  to  tackle  the  issue,  as 
technology  evolves  rapidly,  and  new  trends  need  to  be  identified  and  addressed  quickly. 
Technological advancement is not subject of the printer and software exclusively, but also for 
the filament or other types of materials that can be used for printing. Private sector companies 
present  at  the  conference  were  ZIGGZAGG,  MELTIO/SICNOVA,  TARGET,  COINBASE 
and MICROSOFT. Discussions were held on the printers not being the threat, but the filament 
used, such as metal  filaments, which are being  used in  the aerospace industry. Cooperation 
with tech companies is essential, and Microsoft offered all available avenues of cooperation to 
address  this  threat.  Furthermore,  the  links  between  3D-printing  of  firearms  and  the  use  of 
cryptocurrency were discussed, with the use of Blockchain technology. COINBASE expressed 
their  clear  mission  in  the  intersection  of  3D-printed  firearms,  with  the  objective  to  provide 
intelligence, being the detection and termination of any accounts illegally using COINBASE 
platforms or services to  procure, distribute or supply PMFs, hybrid firearms or components 
that can be 3D-printed or constructed by additive manufacturing.  

iii.) 

Police cooperation 

On police cooperation, different law enforcement agencies presented their work, to show the 
work  and  response  the  emerging  threat  from  actors  around  the  world.  The  Royal  Canadian 
Mounted Police explained how they work on a comprehensive response, based on the pillars 
of prevention, detection and investigation. The United States presented cases, explaining how 
3D-printing is  becoming a growing trend  and risk. Cases  are presented from  the Caribbean 
area, as well as from Brazil, Europe including the United Kingdom, which presents Operation 
SWEEPFORWARD,  an  undercover  operation  that  began  in  May  2022,  which  was  able  to 
dismantle a network dedicated to the manufacture and distribution of 3D firearms on the black 
market, mainly FGC9.  

iv.) 

Cooperation with the judicial sector  

Experts from the USA, Canada, Jamaica, Singapore, Northern Macedonia, the Netherlands and 
the  European  Commission,  agreed  on  the  common  vectors  of  change,  being  the  of  the 
possession of blueprints of 3D firearms.  

v.) 

Project of the creation of hybrid firearms in Guardia Civil 

Aiming  to  assess  the  threat  with  its  own  means,  the  Spanish  Guardia  Civil  addressed  the 
process of 3D-producing firearms internally. Based on the apprehension at global level and the 
most popular printed firearms, they produced a long gun and a short gun. The models printed 
were the Glock 19 and FGC-9 MKII. Concerning materials, Polylactic Acid has shown that 
printed at  100%  filler is more than  enough to  provide the necessary hardness  to  absorb the 
energies generated at the moment of firing. In the case of both the GLOCK and the FCG-9, its 

107 

 
 
hardness and quality of finish allow for a perfect and functional assembly. The fastest printing 
was identified for the HP MULTIJET FUSION 850, which allows printing a complete firearm 
in only 16 hours. Regarding costs, the use of Polylactic Acid allows to obtain functional and 
quality  components  for  not  much  more  than  60  Euro.  In  summary,  valuing  all  the  aspects 
mentioned  above,  the  cost  of  the  machine  and  materials,  as  well  as  the  accessibility  to  the 
general  public,  the  BAMBULABS  X1  CARBON  printer  is  positioned  as  the  most 
recommendable printing option, for its quality of finishes, printing speed, reliability, possibility 
of remote control and price; which makes it an accessible and reliable printer for these tasks. 
The  firing  tests  and  forensic  ballistic  analysis  proved  to  be  very  enlightening.  The  9  mm 
ammunition was used for firing, with an initial velocity of 350 m/s, ballistic gel penetration of 
64  cm.  This  implies  that  the  injury  potential  of  the  firearms  studied  is  the  same  as  with  a 
conventional weapon. Given these results, it was concluded that this globally emerging threat 
calls for the cooperation of and exchange on the operational level and with the private sector, 
to keep up with the fast developments of the technology. 

17.3.2. Consultations with law enforcement agencies, 17 December 2024 

During  the  consultation,  a  presentation  was  held  on  the  Firearms  Trafficking  Initiative, 
explaining the legal basis for the establishment of minimum rules concerning the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of serious crimes with cross-border dimensions. 
The following topics were discussed.  

A.  Court requirements  

The discussion showed that the court requirements to test the functionality of firearms differ 
strongly between the Member States, where e.g. in the case of Belgium, the decision to test the 
functionality of the firearm depends on the type of crime committed, where murder weapons 
are subject to ballistic comparison and the magistrate decides whether a case is administrative 
or  judicial  and  if  the  weapon  undergoes  ballistic  examination.  In  Spain,  on  the  other  hand, 
every firearm needs to be tested to see if the weapon is functional and can be classified as a 
firearm.  This  pushes  the  already  understaffed  forensic  centres,  which  leads  to  delays  in 
investigations. Additionally, especially Belgium commented on the fact that the identification 
of firearms requires technical knowledge. Often first responders police officers do not have 
enough  knowledge  which  leads  to  misclassification  of  firearms.  The  other  Member  States 
concurred that this is indeed an issue.  

The  lack  of  resources  in  ballistic  and  forensic  departments  also  have  consequences  on  the 
prioritisation  of  firearms  incidents.  In  Belgium,  the  national  strategy  determined  that  only 
firearms seized in the Canal zone of Brussels would be checked from a ballistic point of view. 
Additionally, the establishment and staffing of National Firearms Focal Points in the different 
Member States also suffer from the lack of prioritisation of firearms violence.  

B.  3D-printed firearms 

On 3D-printed firearms, it was discussed to what extent the functionality of the firearm plays 
a  role,  where  Belgium  noted  that  they  already  encountered  cases  where  test-firing  was 
requested. Spain added that this is a challenge they are facing, as only a functional firearm is 
considered a firearm, affecting the prosecution of the crime. It was also discussed at what stage 

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3D-printing  a  firearm  is  illicit  manufacturing  or  a  preparatory  act,  where  Portugal  gave  the 
examples of 3D-printing toy guns or 3D-printing a firearm without the intent to use it.  

C.  Blueprints 

It  was discussed on how to  legally address  blueprints,  questioning  on how to  deal  with  the 
preparatory  acts  including  illicit  ownership  and  dissemination  of  blueprints.  The  idea  of 
criminalising  the  download  of  blueprints  was  welcomed,  to  also  tackle  issues  of  the  server 
being outside of the EU, where the participants noted that the illicit possession of blueprints 
could be criminalised, which would then cover the online and offline sphere.  

D.  Illicit possession vs illicit trafficking 

The legalities behind illicit trafficking were discussed, with a special focus on the cross-border 
element, as well as legal gaps and loopholes with regards to illicit trafficking. Spain noted that 
illicit possession is a key element that needs to be included in the initiative and harmonised, as 
it can fill gaps where illicit manufacturing or illicit trafficking cannot be proven. Belgium and 
France  also  agreed  to  this,  and  Portugal  noted  that  the  illicit  possession  of  a  firearm  is  an 
additional crime, as under their legislation, an individual can be prosecuted for illicit trafficking 
for facilitating trafficking, without being in the possession of the firearm itself.  

E.  Special investigation measures 

The  availability  of  special  investigation  measures  and  potential  benchmarks  for  their 
application  was  discussed,  which  differed  throughout  the  Member  States.  Spain  noted  that 
these  measures  need  to  be  allowed  by  the  judges,  which  happens  on  a  case-by-case  basis, 
balancing penalty versus privacy. In France, benchmarks are similar, and an offence is needed 
first, before these measures are requested/granted. Similarly to Spain, it is decided if a crime is 
severe  enough  to  infringe  the  person’s  privacy  rights.  However,  a  distinguishment  is  made 
between customs and police authorities, where for customs, almost all offences investigated 
are severe enough to be granted special investigation measures, but for the police forces, the 
remit is wider and can vary. In Portugal, illicit possession and illicit trafficking of firearms is 
defined  in  their  law  on  special  investigation  measures,  therefore  making  them  a  commonly 
available instrument which is not subject to individual cases.  

17.3.3. Consultation meeting with magistrates, 02 February 2025 

During these consultation activities, the following output was discussed:  

i.) 

Cross border investigations 

The  discussions  revealed  several  key  insights  regarding  the  intersection  of  firearms-related 
offences  with  other  criminal  activities  and  the  challenges  faced  in  cross-border  cases.  The 
French magistrate noted that while firearms cases are less frequent compared to drug cases, 
many  involve  connections  to  both  firearms  and  drugs.  A  significant  challenge  in  handling 
cross-border firearms cases is the legislative differences, particularly in the categorisation of 
firearms and essential components. There was a general agreement on the need for harmonised 
definitions across the EU to address these disparities. 

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The  Spanish  magistrate  highlighted  the  role  of  European  investigation  orders  in  facilitating 
cross-border  cooperation,  emphasizing  that  these  orders  must  be  pursued  even  without 
harmonised  crime  definitions.  The  linkage  between  firearms  and  other  crimes  was  further 
explored,  with  firearms  often  serving  as  indicators  of  violence  in  cases.  In  France,  specific 
incrimination  of  firearms  is  considered  within  the  same  case,  and  separate  cases  are  only 
pursued when sufficient evidence of smuggling or manufacturing exists. 

Furthermore, the Spanish magistrate addressed the connection between firearms and terrorism, 
explaining that two separate investigations are opened in terrorism cases involving firearms. 
Firearms frequently appear in drug-related crimes and violent crimes committed by organised 
crime organizations, illustrating the intertwined nature of these offences. 

ii.) 

3D-printing 

The  discussions  highlighted  several  key  issues  regarding  3D-printed  firearms  and  the 
associated legal challenges. In France, current 3D-printed firearms are typically hybrid models, 
where barrels are illegally imported, often from the USA, while other components are printed. 
This combination raises significant concerns about traceability, which is expected to worsen 
with advancements in metal printing technology. To address these issues, there is a proposal to 
implement  software  blocks  on  3D  printers  to  prevent  the  printing  of  firearms  or  essential 
components, similar to technology used to prevent the illegal copying of money. 

In  Spain,  existing  criminal  laws  have  gaps  concerning  new  technologies,  particularly  with 
blueprints for 3D printing. The Spanish magistrate suggested using existing laws on money 
forgery  as  a  model  for  drafting  new  legislation  on  blueprints.  Such  laws  would  empower 
prosecutors to act in cases where blueprints, printers, and residues are found, but the firearm is 
absent. Currently, without specific legislation, investigations cannot proceed, especially where 
proving illicit manufacturing is challenging. 

Additionally,  in  Spain,  to  initiate  a  criminal  investigation  based  on  blueprints,  it  must  be 
demonstrated that these blueprints pose a risk to public order by proving they can produce a 
real firearm. The magistrates also stressed that future legislation should be broad enough to 
accommodate technological advancements and avoid overly narrow definitions, which could 
limit the efficacy and adaptability of the laws over time. 

iii.) 

Special investigation measures 

In  France,  firearms  offences  are  included  on  a  list  of  incriminations  that  permit  special 
investigation  measures,  such  as  controlled  deliveries.  However,  due  to  safety  concerns  for 
officers,  these  measures  are  typically  applied  to  essential  components  rather  than  fully 
assembled  firearms.  In  contrast,  Spain  does  not  have  a  predefined  list  for  such  measures; 
instead, the decision to allow controlled deliveries is made on a case-by-case basis and largely 
depends on the discretion of the judge involved. 

When discussing the potential need for harmonisation at  the EU level,  both  the French and 
Spanish  magistrates  expressed  support.  The  French  magistrate  highlighted  that  the  lack  of 
harmonisation  affects  cooperation  in  cross-border  cases,  causing  delays.  The  Spanish 
magistrate  concurred,  pointing  to  the  provisions  in  the  Counter  Terrorism  Directive  as  a 
suitable example for establishing a more uniform approach across Member States. 

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iv.) 

Sanctions  

The French magistrate emphasised the importance of including the conversion of weapons in 
the definition of illicit manufacturing. He pointed to cases in France where firearms, such as 
Glocks,  have  been  modified  with  3D-printed  parts  to  convert  them  from  semi-automatic  to 
fully automatic. This type of modification should be considered an aggravating circumstance 
in legal terms. 

Additionally, the magistrate suggested that the absence of markings on 3D-printed firearms 
could also serve as an aggravating circumstance during prosecution. While illicitly 3D printing 
a  firearm  constitutes  illicit  manufacturing,  the  lack  of  identifiable  markings  could  lead  to 
additional charges, further strengthening the legal framework for addressing such offences. 

v.) 

Statistics 

The  French  magistrate  highlighted  the  crucial  role  of  systematically  recording  seizures  and 
ballistic  information,  emphasizing  the  need  for  harmonisation  across  Member  States.  Such 
harmonisation would facilitate comparisons and enhance the traceability of firearms, which is 
vital for uncovering the routes and networks involved in illicit activities. 

He cited an example where an investigation began with the illegal importation of essential parts 
for  Glock  pistols.  By  focusing  on  tracing  these  routes,  authorities  uncovered  more  than  52 
firearms and parts. The comprehensive recording of firearms not only led to the discovery of 
additional weapons but also enabled the identification of illicit manufacturers in Austria. This 
case illustrates the pivotal role that standardised recording and collaboration play in effectively 
tackling firearms trafficking. 

17.3.4. Closing  workshop  of  the  HamsTeR  project  to  assess  potential  threats 

from 3D printed firearms, 12-13 February 2025, Wiesbaden, Germany 

The results from the project showed that the manufacturing of a reliable 3D printed firearm can 
be done with no prior knowledge by just following the instructions provided by the respective 
manuals or community. The initial costs are moderate, and the learning curve is steep. The fact 
that there is a very small number of 3D printed firearms used at crime scenes is attributed to 
the fact that even though they are easy to manufacture, for the moment, it is still easier and 
cheaper  to  buy  illegally  a  regular  firearm  or  a  convert  an  alarm-  and  signal  weapon.  The 
development of 3D printing needs to be monitored, and research continued within EMPACT 
firearms and further projects like MIX3D (part of the ISF Protect-call). 

The aim of the HamsTeR project was to provide an overview of what had changed since 2013 
and  to  provide  German  legislators  with  the  information  needed  to  adequately  assess  the 
potential threat of “modern” 3D printed weapons like the FGC-9.  

i.)  Police investigation findings of 3D printed firearms in Germany 

The seizures of 3D printed firearms in Germany are monitored since 2020. Normally, these are 
bycatches of other operations carried out by the state polices and are reported to the BKA. The 
annual number has constantly been very low; until the end of 2024 only 23 3D printed firearms 
(or essential components) were seized. Most of the seizures concerned the model FGC-9. None 

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of them had been used in a crime scene; however, those searched had committed the crime of 
illegal possession and illegal manufacturing.  

ii.) Application of current printer models and new filament materials, and simulation of 

their behaviour 

The Fraunhofer society has several modern printers of various quality levels at its disposal. In 
the project, only printers with a purchase price of up to EUR 6,000 were used to cover the area 
up to the advanced consumer level. The printers were capable to print various filaments with 
different material properties (e. g. strength and flexibility) that affect their durability.  

The project analysed the durability of the FGC-9, a hybrid 3D printed semi-automatic firearm 
invented around 2020. The rifled barrel and receiver are made of metal while the frame and 
most other parts are printed. All components and required tools are easily available at hardware 
stores. After some additional improvements it was possible to produce a fully automatic version 
of the FGC-9 which had a cadence of 830 rounds/minute and a projectile velocity of around 
340  m/s  with  reliable  precision  and  no  loss  of  functionality  of  the  weapon.  The  mode  of 
operation corresponds to that of commercially produced submachine guns. 

iii.) Forensic methods to trace use and production of 3D printed firearms 

Forensic aspects examined include fragments lost from the firearms during the shot, bullets 
with  possible  adhesions,  breech  face  of  cartridge  cases,  gun-smoke  residue  (GSR)  and 
individual characteristics of the printing device (printer bed, nozzle). It was shown that traces 
on  bullets  and  cartridge  cases  differ  largely  from  traces  on  ammunition  fired  from  regular 
firearms. While this is helpful in determining that a 3D printed gun was used it does not allow 
to identify the individual firearm because the characteristics change after each shot in case of 
printed barrels. In hybrid weapons like the FGC-9, however, it can be possible to identify the 
tool that was used to insert the rifling if found in a workshop. 

Overall, it was found that the forensic examination of 3D printed objects differs significantly 
from conventional ballistic examinations and requires special training. 

17.4.  CONSULTATIONS WITH EU AGENCIES 

17.4.1. Europol 

The Europol experts on firearms were consulted to provide their input on the initiative through 
a set of questions, which were discussed bilaterally in January 2025. Information was requested 
on  aspects  of  international  and  cross-border  cooperation,  cases  of  different  firearms-related 
offences, 3D-printed firearms, and messages exchanged in SIENA.  

The consultations with Europol at expert level highlighted how between 2017-2019 and 2020-
2022, the total number of cases and exchanged messages by Europol in general has increased, 
whilst the total number of cases and exchanged messages by AP “Weapons & Explosives” has 
decreased.  As  part  of  the  information  provided,  Europol  suggested  that  by  assessing  the 
numbers of SIENA messages, it seems that the cooperation on firearms cases through Europol 
has significantly decreased for the years 2020-2022 compared to 2017-2019.  

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On cross-border cooperation, Europol stated that it would be useful to include provisions on 
obliged cooperation with EU agencies, for the purpose of creating better knowledge of weapon 
trends and criminal networks involved in trafficking. The cases contributed will still be subject 
to  a  prioritising  mechanism.  The  cooperation  will  need  to  follow  Europol’s  mandate  and 
include  a  nexus  to  serious  organised  crime  investigations.  Limitations  in  cross-border 
cooperation  identified  by  Europol  included  legal  loopholes  in  some  European  and  non-
European countries regarding the availability of certain “non-essential” firearms components, 
which  are  transferred  outside  their  borders  into  other  Member  States.  Issues  arise  if  these 
transfers are not proven, indicated or expected and the lack of punishable acts in their criminal 
law for “non-essential” components limits applying investigative measures.  

Also,  on  alarm  and  signal  weapons,  many  EU  countries  do  not  consider  these  as  firearms, 
resulting  in  purchase,  possession,  import/export  in  these  firearms  not  being  subject  to 
registration.  This  limits  investigative  measures  in  such  countries,  disabling  tracing,  arrests, 
observations and/or documentation seizure. Harmonisation of the offences of illicit trafficking, 
illicit manufacturing, illicit possession and the illicit modification of markings is considered 
supportive to enhancing international cooperation by Europol. 

Generally, Europol notes a lack of international cooperation between National Firearms Focal 
Points and a lack of specialised expert knowledge between the focal points.  

Europol was not in the position to provide and assess specific information on the number of 
referrals related to firearms blueprints, investigations hindered the fact that possession, creation 
and  dissemination  of  blueprints  to  produce  privately  manufactured  firearms  are  not 
criminalised in the EU Member States, cases of illicit manufacturing shared with Europol, cases 
of illicit modifications of markings, cases of illicit modification of markings and cases of illicit 
possession, as these actions are not processed as structured specifications in their database as 
such.  

17.4.2. Eurojust 

Eurojust submitted a report providing reflections of figures on crime type “illicit trafficking in 
arms,  ammunition  and  explosives”  in  the  Case  Management  System  (CMS)  and  the  excel 
overview  of  their  Data  Management  Unit  (DMU),  including  data  on  coordination  meetings 
(CMs), coordination centres (CCs) and joint investigation teams (JITs). The timeframe covered 
in their data is 1 January 2020 to 22 January 2025. As an overview:  

•  221 new cases involving illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and explosives were 

registered 

•  51 coordination meetings cases involving illicit trafficking in  arms, ammunition and 

explosives 

•  0  coordination  centres  cases  involving  illicit  trafficking  in  arms,  ammunition  and 

explosives  

•  10 new JITs established in cases involving illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and 

explosives  

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Key statistics provided by Eurojust include: 

•  A total of 175 bilateral cases and 45 multilateral cases. 

•  Bilateral cases ranged from 19 in 2020 to 44 in 2024, with three already reported in 

2025. 

•  Multilateral cases fluctuated from 10 in 2020 to 12 in 2023, with no cases yet in 2025. 

•  Coordination meetings increased over time, notably 16 in 2024 and 3 as of January 22, 

2025. 

•  Newly signed JITs varied annually, with three in 2024. 

The  overview  shows  that  there  is  cooperation  with  Europol  and  the  International  Criminal 
Court (ICC), but that it is at low and declining rates. In 2020, there were 3 cooperations in case 
with Europol, in 2022 it was only one, and the total number of cooperations between 2020 and 
2025 was 4. With regards to ICC, there was only one cooperation on a case in 2024. Due to the 
nature  of  the  cases,  figures  may  change  post-reporting,  as  stated  by  Eurojust.  Additionally, 
figures on CMs, CCs and JITs for 2024 are provisional. 

Key  implications  from  the  input  submitted  by  Eurojust  include  a  consistent  increase  in  the 
number of bilateral  cases over the years and a variable yet  notable increase in  coordination 
meetings,  but  relatively  stable numbers of JITs,  with  a slight  overall increase due to  newly 
signed JITs, which may suggest enhancing collaborative efforts. The involvement of non-EU 
countries underlines a widespread concern and need for international cooperation in combating 
illicit trafficking. 

17.5.  CONSULTATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 

17.5.1. Meetings with United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 

As part of the consultations with  international  organisations, three meetings were held  with 
UNODC.  

The first meeting with the head of the firearms team in UNODC took place on 10 July 2024. 
During the meeting, UNODC expressed their support for the initiative. In the meeting, UNODC 
suggested to implement the UN Firearms Protocol and to focus on the additional offences, next 
to the mandatory offences as established in Article 5 in the UN Protocol. They also suggested 
to look at the self-assessment questions for the review mechanism under the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and asked if there would be the 
possibility  to  focus  on  corruption  related  offences  as  an  aggravating  circumstance.  In  this 
context,  suggestions  were  made  to  focus  on  public  officials  and  destroying  documents. 
Moreover, UNODC referred to the lessons learned in drugs, related to the harmonisation of 
offences, especially the ballon effect and “shopping around” by criminals.  

On 16 October 2024, the second meeting with UNODC was held in Vienna, with three team 
members of the UNODC Firearms team. During the meeting, the Commission walked UNODC 
through the different steps of the legislative processes of the EU and gave a short overview of 
the results of the criminalisation study, which examined the transposition of the UN Firearms 

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Protocol by different Member States. The link with the Palermo Convention, as this Convention 
requires confiscation and the criminalisation of the attempt, was discussed. On illicit possession 
of firearms, UNODC suggested to investigate the criminal code of Singapore, noting that they 
could have an interesting definition of illicit possession for the purpose of illicit trafficking. 
Moreover, UNODC offered to help substantiate some of the problems identified through cases, 
referring  to  the  Divert  publication,  and  obstacles  for  cooperation  through  unharmonised 
definitions  and  through  the  lack  of  mutual  recognition  and  harmonised  rules  for  the  use  of 
special investigative measures were discussed. Further discussed topics in the meeting were 
the  lack  of  reliable  statistics  regarding  firearms-related  offences,  and  the  definition  of 
aggravating sanctions linked to large quantities of firearms.  

A  third  meeting  under  the  consultation  took  place  on  21  January  in  Brussels.  During  the 
meeting, the state of play of the impact assessment was provided, and restrictions of the EU’s 
competence were explained to the UNODC. UNODC further reiterated that they are happy to 
help in the search for more cases if needed in the research feeding into the impact assessment.  

During  the  three  meetings,  UNODC  expressed  their  support  to  the  initiative,  suggesting 
focusing on the additional offences beyond only the mandatory offences in the UN Protocol. 
Furthermore, UNODC showed itself enthusiastic to provide cases and input if needed, showing 
how both organisations share the same interest in this issue.  

17.6.  CONSULTATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS 

17.6.1. Western Balkans 

The Commission presented the firearms trafficking initiative to the SALW commissions of the 
Western Balkan. The discussion during the meeting focused mainly on 3D printing of firearms. 
However, there are clear indications that the phenomenon is entering the region. In the Western 
Balkan  region,  no  3D  printed  firearms  have  been  seized  so  far.  Nevertheless,  some  of  the 
countries  have  already  taken  legislative  actions  to  address  the  threat.  North  Macedonia  has 
already criminalised the illicit possession of blueprints and Serbia is in the process of doing the 
same.  

During the discussion, a reference was made to the FLARE database of the UK. The intend of 
the FLARE database is that it will contain digital files, through which it will be possible to see 
if this is a common blueprint and/or if this blueprint is found in other cases/ identified as a 
lethal and functioning firearm.  

17.7.  CONSULTATIONS WITH PRIVATE STAKEHOLDERS  

17.7.1. Formnext conference, 21 November 2024 

The  Commission  together  with  a  representative  of  Europol’s  EUCTC  and  the  Spanish 
EMPACT  Firearms  Drivers  team  visited  the  Formnext  conference.  FormNext  is  a  yearly 
conference  organised  by  and  for  the  Additive  Manufacturing  industry  (3D  printing).  The 
conference takes 4 floors of the exposition hall in Frankfurt and contains 850 exhibitors. The 
different economic operators show the latest technological developments in the industry.  

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The objective of the visit was to  understand the latest technological  advances and to give a 
presentation  to  raise  awareness  on  3D  printing  of  firearms  and  the  upcoming  legislative 
firearms trafficking initiative. The following elements were noteworthy:  

-  Some exhibition stands publicly showed firearms parts such as frames and silencers. 
When asked about some stands explained that they think silencers are legal, which is 
not true in Germany but it is indeed not regulated at EU level, and the company that 
was showing the frames explained that they are a subcontracting company from a legal 
firearms manufacturing and they stated that because of that, according to them, they do 
not need to be licensed.  

-  Metallic printing is no longer a future technology. There were many exhibitors showing 
the latest metallic printers in which complicated metallic parts can be printed from zero. 
The smallest of these printers, capable to print full metal costed around 7.000 euro but 
the prices go up to 250.000 euro for printers of 1,5 meters by 1 meter.  

-  Some printers that predominately print polymer fillers are also able to print metal if the 
particles inside the filament are smaller than 0.1 mm. Which is very feasible, and these 
printers costed about 1.700 euro.  

-  The technological developments of the ‘plastic’ fillers has also advanced to where the 
printed elements are extremely durable. It can withstand up to 1.000 newtons of force, 
more than enough to fire a firearm.  

The  presentation  from  Europol  focused  on  a  few  important  cases  showing  the  threat  of  3D 
printing.  Following  the  presentation,  the  participants  were  asked  some  questions  regarding 
their knowledge of the threat and the legislation, including the upcoming firearms trafficking 
initiative.  

Participants in general were not aware of the possibility to 3D print firearms, although 

- 
some did know as they had come across online blueprints to print firearms. 

- 
Participants  were  interested  in  the  fact  that  you  can  3D  print  firearms  and  essential 
components if you are licensed to do so. There is clear need to raise more awareness of the fact 
that printing firearms and essential components without a license is a criminal act.  

- 
A participant noted that silencers and frames should not be presented in the expo halls 
because it might give people ideas to try it out. More awareness raising efforts should go to 
contacting the organisation of the conference to prevent this.  

- 
There was an agreement in the room that the technology should not be misused for the 
illegal  printing  of  firearms  and  essential  components.  Ideas  from  the  audience  where  the 
following:  

• 

Instead of focusing on tracing blueprints, companies should produce printers that 
recognize  blueprints  and  refuse  to  print  them  (similar  as  is  done  with  banking 
notes). An idea was launched that there could be some certificate for those printers 
who do this.  

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•  Criminalising the dissemination of blueprints was considered a good idea.  

•  Creating a guidebook that shows pictures of essential components which cannot be 
printed without a license was also suggested. This guidebook could be distributed 
to  3D  printing  shops  to  raise  awareness  and  to  inform  them.  These  guidebooks 
should also refer to firearms contact points in the MS, so that persons can contact 
them if they have questions. 

17.7.2. ESFAM, 3 December 2024 

High-level  representatives  of  CZ,  Dikar,  Browning,  Arex/Steyr  and  the  ESFAM  secretariat 
were present for the consultations, covering a range of manufacturers.  

The main focus of the meeting was the recast Firearms Regulation.  

Regarding  the  firearms  trafficking  initiative,  the  manufacturers  asked  if  this  new  initiative 
would influence the legal trade or manufacturing. The Commission assured that the aim of the 
initiative focusses on the illicit side of firearms, not targeting the legal side. The only concern 
they had was if blueprints of 3D printed firearms are prohibited, it might curb possible future 
developments linked to experimenting with legal 3D printing, as experts on 3D printing will 
not be licensed dealers.  

Incorporation of the results 

The  results  of  these  consultations  have  been  included  throughout  the  impact  assessment, 
considering the different feedback obtained from the wide range of the stakeholders. As the 
consultation  strategy  followed  a  similar  structure  as  the  impact  assessment  itself,  the 
incorporation of the feedback was facilitated, to, if necessary, feed into the relevant sections of 
the impact assessment and substantiate it. 

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ANNEX 3: PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND CALL FOR EVIDENCE 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The public consultation and the call for evidence for an impact assessment for the Firearms 
Trafficking Initiative covered a period of 12 weeks, from 01 October 2024 to 24 December 
2024 (midnight Brussels time) and sought the views from all interested parties.  

The  public  consultation  was  designed  to  follow  the  same  logical  sequence  of  the  impact 
assessment,  commencing  with  a  problem  description  and  gradually  developing  towards  the 
possible policy options and their potential impacts. Additionally, the call for evidence provided 
for the possibility to formulate feedback on the Commission’s understanding of the problem 
and possible solutions. By gathering this qualitative data, the Commission tried to ensure that 
the general public interest in the EU is well reflected in the proposal on the criminalisation of 
firearms-related offences.  

The  consultation  aimed  at  gathering  views  on  (i)  better  describing  the  problem(s);  (ii) 
alternative ways of harmonising the criminalisation of firearms-related offences; (iii) the scope 
for  harmonising  national  rules  criminalising  firearms-related  offences;  and  (iv)  the  possible 
pros and cons of a new legislative framework. 

Key stakeholders identified were (i) law-enforcement authorities and customs authorities; (ii) 
judicial  authorities  and  prosecutors;  (iii)  other  authorities  in  the  field  of  firearms  policy, 
including ministries of the interior and ballistic expertise centres; (iv) legal firearms users and 
owners (hunters, sport shooters and collectors); (v) economical operators such as dealers and 
brokers  (manufacturers,  traders  etc.);  and  (vi)  international  organisations  and  non-
governmental organisations in the field of firearms policy.  

16  responses  were  received  for  the  public  consultation  and  81  responses  for  the  call  for 
evidence.  

2.  PUBLIC CONSULTATION 

2.1.  OVERVIEW OF THE RESPONDENTS  

In total, 16 responses were received to the online public consultation. More than half of the 
respondents listed Switzerland, France or the Czech Republic as their country of origin. Second 
highest number of responses was given from Belgium followed by Romania, Greece, Finland 
and Germany. Figure 1 gives a more detailed breakdown of respondents listed by country of 
origin.  

118 

 
 
Country of origin of the respondents

Switzerland
France
Czech Repubic
Belgium
Romania
Greece
Germany
Finland

0

1

2

3

4

Figure 1: Source: Public Consultation, publishes on EU Have Your Say, 2025. 

I am giving my contribution as:

2

1

5

8

Public authority

Non-governmental organisation (NGO)

EU citizen

Other

Figure 2: Key stakeholders identified. Source: Public Consultation, EU Have Your Say, 2025. 

Key stakeholders identified were public authorities, who account for 50% of the respondents, 
EU  citizens,  who  make  up  for  nearly  one  third  of  respondents,  NGOs  (6,25%)  and  other 
stakeholders that make up for 12,5% of the respondents. All data is visualised in Figure 2. Out 
of the public authorities, 75% indicated that they belong to a large organisation, with 250 or 
more employees.  

2.2.  GENERAL TRENDS AND APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS  

The questionnaire first asked the respondents to give some information on their category of 
stakeholder  and  interest  in  the  initiative,  as  discussed  in  the  previous  section.  After  this, 
respondents were asked 42 questions on the initiative, clustered into three sub-sections:  

i. 
ii. 

Questions concerning current problems  
Need for EU Action and possible policy options  

119 

 
 
  
 
iii. 

Evaluation of the impact of options 

Respondents  were  given  the  opportunity  to  answer  based  on  ordinal  scales,  ranking  six 
different categories such as extent, level of risk, level of importance, level of mitigation or scale 
of appropriateness. One section of questions on different forms of sanctions (prison sentence 
or financial sanctions) gave the opportunity to personally allocate the perceived appropriate 
level  of  sanctions  for  the  different  core  firearm-related  offences,  where,  unlike  the  other 
questions, it was possible to select multiple answers. Furthermore, each section included open-
response questions, where respondents could further elaborate on their opinions expressed.  

The general trend of the responses suggests a more restrained attitude of the public regarding 
the legislative initiative, and that minimum rules on the offences do not have a great effect in 
resolving the issues discussed throughout the questionnaire. Respondents were generally most 
supportive  of  policy  options  focusing  on  the  enhancement  of  pre-existing  legislative 
frameworks,  namely  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  and  the  firearms  Directive.  Furthermore,  it 
appeared  as  if  the  perception  of  threat  towards  the  security  of  the  public  is  not  extensively 
connected  to  specific  firearms-related  offences,  as  visible  in  the  questions  below.  A  re-
emerging topic in the open question was enhanced border controls, which was seen as the key 
point  in  addressing  firearms-related  offences.  Generally,  it  appeared  as  if  public  authorities 
were  more  supportive  of  the  legislative  initiative  than  EU  citizens,  NGOs  and  respondents 
identifying  themselves  as  “other”.  Overall,  the  answers  to  the  publication  suggest  that 
respondents regard addressing firearms-related offences as a national responsibility, where EU 
intervention should remain low. 

2.3.  ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS  

2.3.1.  QUESTIONS CONCERNING CURRENT PROBLEMS  

Respondents were asked to answer questions on the more general threat perception in the EU, 
as well as how they estimate the role and effectiveness of national laws in addressing firearms-
related offences.  

How  would  you  generally  rate  the  threat  of  firearms,  their  essential  components  and 
ammunition to the security of people living in the EU? 

120 

 
 
How would you generally rate the threat of firearms, their 
essential components and ammunition to the security of 
people living in the EU?

1

4

4

3

4

Very important

Important

Moderately important

Slightly important

Not important

Figure 3: Source: Public Consultation, EU Have Your Say, 2025. 

can be found in Figure 3.  

majority 

25%  of  the  respondents 
rate  the  threat  as  very 
important,  18,75%  rates  it 
as  important  and  another 
as  moderately 
25% 
that 
important,  showing 
the 
of 
respondents 
perceive 
firearms  as  a  threat  to 
public security. 31,25% of 
the  respondents  attribute 
slightly  to  no  importance 
to the threat of firearms to 
the  security  of  the  people 
living 
the  EU.  A 
breakdown  of  the  number 

in 

In your view, have existing national laws that criminalise firearms offences contributed to 
effectively bringing criminals to justice? If you can, please explain why in your view, existing 
national laws that criminalize firearms offences contributed or did not contribute to reducing 
gun violence and bringing criminals to justice. 

The responses indicate a high level of confidence in the national legal systems in addressing 
firearms-related offences, where 68,75% of the respondents answered either “high extent” or 
“moderate extent”. Figure 4 gives a detailed overview of the responses. Only one respondent 
answered that national laws do not effectively bring criminals to justice, reasoning their reply 
in the open-answer section with the argument that criminals do not care about existing laws. In 
total, nine respondents gave explanations to why national laws that criminalise firearms-related 
offences do or do not contribute to reducing gun violence and bring criminals to justice. Topics 
addressed  on  the  side  of  national  laws  not  being  effective  enough  included  the  lack  of 
systematic tracing of seized firearms, preventing effective prosecution and the punishment of 

In your view, have existing national laws that 
criminalise firearms offences contributed to 
effectively bringing criminals to justice?

2

1

1

1

7

4

Don't know
Figure 4: Source: Public Consultation, EU Have Your Say, 2025. 
Not at all

Small extent

High extent

Moderate extent

Very high extent

121 

 
 
 
offenders, as well as the declining application of judicial steps throughout the judicial chain. 
Moreover,  one  public  authority  highlighted  how  the  criminalisation  of  firearms-related 
offences enables the use of investigative resources otherwise not available and stresses the need 
for closer European and international cooperation. A similar view was expressed by another 
public  authority,  noting  that  the  criminalisation  allows  for  more  efficient  investigation  and 
prosecution  of  the  perpetrators.  More  critical  respondents  argued  that  the  only  effective 
measure to address the problem is increase border controls.  

In your view, to what extent does each of the below firearm’s offences imply security risks? 

Out of the offences listed within the question, the respondents regarded illicit possession, illicit 
cross-border  trade  and  illicit  manufacturing  of  firearms,  their  essential  components  and 
ammunition as those offences posing the highest risk to security.  

Offences  with  the  lowest  level  of  risk  to  security  were  two  administrative  offences:  the 
licensing offences and record-keeping  offences.  Beyond this, illicit modification of existing 
firearms to increase their capacity and illicit conversion of firearms are the categories with the 
highest  disparity  of  replies,  where  the  majority  of  replies  were  given  on  both  ends  of  the 
spectrum, with similar amounts of respondents indicated very high/ high risks and small risks 
to security.  

In your view, to what extent does an uneven criminal framework regarding firearms offences 
in the EU area, without internal borders, lead to the following problems? 

Security  gaps  and  obstacles  for  cross-border  operational  cooperation  were  identified  as  the 
main problems coming from an uneven criminal framework regarding firearms. From the 11 
responses given, six ranked obstacles to cross border cooperation as high or very high extent, 
and  7  security  gaps  as  very  high  or  high.  Also,  on  “criminals  exploiting  diverging  legal 
frameworks and finding the most favourable location for their criminal activities” the response 
given the most was a “very high extent”. The problem “feelings of insecurity among the EU 
public” was seen as the least problematic amongst the respondents.  

In  your  view,  to  what  extent  do  the  below  issues  linked  to  the  criminalisation  of  illicit 
trafficking limit an effective EU approach to the firearms threat? 

On the criminalisation of illicit trafficking, most respondents indicated that only focusing on 
cross-border trafficking and not covering illicit domestic trade limits an effective EU approach 
to the firearms threat to the highest extent. Also diverging sanctions and ways of applying them 
is regarded as an extensive issue for an effective approach to the firearms threat. No explicit 
criminalisation of either arms embargo violations, illicit brokering activities, record keeping 
offences or licensing offences were not seen as extensive issues by the respondents, were 50-
56%  of  the  respondents  either  attributed  no  extent  at  all  or  a  small  extent  to  the  question. 
Besides arms embargo violations and illicit brokering, it shows that the respondents do not see 
an extensive link in administrative offences and the criminalisation of illicit trafficking limiting 
an effective EU approach to the firearms threat.  

Without further EU intervention, how do you think that the firearms threat will develop in 
the next 5-10 years? 

122 

 
 
 
The respondents were asked to estimate how the firearms threat will develop in the next 5-10 
years without further EU intervention. 31,25% of the respondents indicated that the situation 
would deteriorate and that there will be an increase in illicit trade (or diversion) of firearms to 
conflict zones and dictatorships, and/or smuggling of firearms and convertible weapons into 
the  EU.  Another  31,25%  responded  that  the  situation  will  remain  unchanged,  and  that  the 
current  framework  will  be  enough  to  ensure  proper  law  enforcement  cooperation,  but 
intelligence-based targeted checks  will  remain defective. 25% of the respondents  suggested 
that the situation would improve in the next 5-10 years without EU intervention, and that the 
current framework will  be enough to  ensure increased cooperation  among law  enforcement 
agencies, more intelligence gathering and increased detection of firearms smuggling.  

Without further EU intervention, how do you think that the 
firearms threat will develop in the next 5-10 years?

2

5

5

4

Don’t know

The situation will deteriorate: there will be an increase in: (i) illicit trade (or diversion) of firearms to conflict
zones and dictatorships; and/or (ii) smuggling of firearms and convertible weapons into the EU.

The situation will improve: the current framework will be enough to ensure increased cooperation among law
enforcement agencies, more intelligence gathering and increased detection of firearms smuggling.

The situation will remain unchanged: the current framework will be enough to ensure proper law enforcement
cooperation, but intelligence-based targeted checks will remain defective.

Figure 5: Source: Public Consultation, EU Have Your Say, 2025. 

2.3.2.  NEED FOR EU ACTION AND POSSIBLE POLICY OPTIONS  

In the second section of the consultation, a series of questions was posed concerning the need 
for EU action and possible policy options. Respondents were given the opportunity to give a 
ranking  as  a  reply  to  the  questions,  either  in  terms  of  importance,  or  appropriateness  of 
measures for types of offences, the extent to which issues are resolved by options posed, levels 
of mitigation or questions for open replies to support the response were given.  

Question: Do you think that the EU is sufficiently addressing firearms threats?  

As an opening question to the second section on the need for EU action and possible policy 
options, respondents were asked if they think that the EU is sufficiently addressing firearms 
threats. 56,25% of the respondents indicated that the EU sufficiently addresses these threats, 
and 43,75% of the respondents do not think that the EU sufficiently addresses firearms threats. 
Figure 6 shows an exact breakdown of the numbers. The nine respondents indicating “yes” 
comprised of 5 public authorities, 2 EU citizens, 1 NGO and 1 other, showcasing how the vast 
majority  of  those  thinking  that  the  EU  addresses  firearms  threats  sufficiently  are  public 

123 

 
 
 
authorities. Of those responding “no”, response  categories  were more  evenly  spread out,  as 
there were 3 public authorities, 3 EU citizen, and 1 other.  

Do you think that the EU is sufficently 
addressing firearms threats? 

7

9

No

Yes

Figure 6: Source: Public Consultation, EU Have Your Say, 2025. 

Question:  In  your  view,  how  important  is  it  to  establish  minimum  EU-wide  rules  on  the 
definition of, and sanctions regarding, the below firearms offences?  

Respondents were asked to indicate how important they regard establishing minimum rules on 
the  definition  of,  and  sanctions  regarding,  different  firearms  offences  provided  in  the 
questionnaire.  Illicit  cross-border  trafficking,  illicit  manufacturing  (including  3D-printing), 
illicit  possession,  illicit  domestic  trade  and  the  modification  of  markings  of  firearms, 
ammunition and essential components were regarded as the most important offences, where 
minimum  EU-wide  rules  on  the  definition  of,  and  sanctions  on,  should  be  established.  As 
visible  in  Figure  7,  the  majority  of  the  criminal  offences  were  ranked  as  very  important  or 
important by 50% or more of the respondents. Regarding the administrative offences, as shown 
in Figure 8, the respondents suggest that harmonised minimum rules are less important.  

124 

 
 
 
In your view, how important is it to establish minimum EU-
wide rules on the definition of, and sanctions regarding, the 
below firearms offences? Responses to criminal offences

Arms embargo violations

25%

12,50%

6,25%

18,75%

25%

12,50%

Illicit brokering activities

18,75%

18,75%

25%

25%

12,50%

 Illicit conversion of firearms

25%

18,75%

12,50%

12,50%

31,25%

 Illicit reactivation of deactivated firearms

25,00%

12,50%

12,50%

12,50%

37,50%

Illicit modification of existing firearms to increase their
capacity

25%

25,00%

6,25%

6,25%

37,50%

Illicit possession of firearms

31,25%

18,75%

6,25%

18,75%

25%

Modification of markings of firearms

25%

25%

6,25%

18,75%

25%

Illicit domestic trade of firearms

31,25%

18,75%

6,25%

18,75%

25%

 Illicit cross-border trade of firearms

43,75%

12,50%

18,75%

6,25%

18,75%

Illicit manufacturing of firearms ((including illicit 3D
printing of firearms)

25%

25%

12,50%

18,75%

18,75%

Very important

Important Moderately important

Slightly important Not important

Don't know

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Figure 7: All categories cover firearms, their essential components an ammunition. Data source: EU Have Your Say, 2025.  

In your view, how important is it to establish minimum EU-wide 
rules on the definition of, and sanctions regarding, the below 
firearms offences? Responses to administrative offences

Licensing offences

18,75%

12,50%

12,50%

50%

6,25%

 Record-keeping offences

12,50%

25%

12,50%

18,75%

25%

6,25%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Very important

Important

Moderately important

Slightly important

Not important

Don't know

Figure 8: Data Source: EU Have Your Say, 2025. 

125 

 
 
 
 
If you consider EU intervention necessary, what would be the appropriate measure for each 
type of identified offence? 

Enhancing enforcement of the firearms Directive and the UN Firearms Protocol (addressing 
Member  States  who  have  a  lack  of  effective,  dissuasive  and  proportionate  penalties)  was 
ranked as the most appropriate intervention, where 9 out of 16 respondents indicated that they 
found it either a very appropriate or appropriate intervention. 5 respondents, 2 EU citizens and 
3  public  authorities  regarded  a  legislative  proposal  on  the  core  firearm  offences  as  an 
appropriate intervention, whereas the option including the voluntary firearms offences did not 
gather significant support from any category. Four written responses were submitted. Out of 
these replies, one respondent indicated that they do not find any EU intervention necessary, 
another respondent highlighted the need for better actual prosecution of organised crime and 
another respondent called for stronger border controls and increased human resources on the 
ground.  

When focusing on the different offences, respondents were asked how establishing minimum 
rules on the criminalisation of a specific offence would solve different issues (the issues being: 
criminals exploiting legal discrepancies, increase number of illicit firearms, lack of systematic 
tracing of firearms, feelings of insecurity, deficiencies in law enforcement, security gaps and 
obstacles for cross-border cooperation): 

- illicit manufacturing: respondents  do not  think  that minimum  rules on criminalising  illicit 
manufacturing have an extensive role in resolving the issues listed. However, minimum rules 
are  considered  to  have  the  highest  extent  of  resolving  deficiencies  in  law  enforcement, 
prosecution and/or the confiscation of criminal proceeds and resolving security gaps. 

-  illicit  cross-border  trafficking:  respondents  suggested  that  obstacles  for  cross-border 
operational  cooperation  and  criminals  exploiting  diverging  legal  frameworks  would  be 
resolved  to  the  highest  extent,  in  comparison  with  the  other  issues.  Small  to  no  extent  of 
resolution at all was regarded for deficiencies in law enforcement and feelings of insecurity 
among the EU public. 

- illicit domestic trade: respondents primarily regarded minimum rules as extensively helping 
to  resolve the issue of an increased number of illicit firearms in  the EU, where 50% of the 
respondents either answered either a “very high” or “high” extent. Unlike the previous replies 
on  the  public  perception  of  security,  the  respondents  suggested  that  minimum  rules  on 
criminalising illicit domestic trade would help resolve this issue to a moderate to small extent. 
On  criminals  exploiting  diverging  legal  frameworks,  the  highest  number  of  replies  was  no 
extent at all, where, however, the majority of respondents indicating a very high to high extent 
were public authorities. 

- modification of markings: Respondents the action would resolve obstacles for cross-border 
operational cooperation. Generally, however, replies suggest that respondents think that this 
action would not resolve most issues. 

- illicit possession: the respondents suggests that the action would have a small influence in 
resolving the issues listed in the figure. Notably, nearly all indications of a very high extent of 
focusing on illicit possession resolving the issues below were by public authorities. 

126 

 
 
- illicit brokering activities: respondents do not think that the intervention is going to have an 
extensive influence in resolving the listed issues.  

- arms  embargo violations:  responses suggest  that  this EU intervention  will not  sufficiently 
address  the  issues  listed.  Especially  on  security  gaps,  feelings  of  insecurity  among  the  EU 
public and an increased number of illicit firearms in  the EU, the respondents  indicated that 
minimum  rules  would  have  no  extent  or  only  a  small  extent  in  resolving  these  issues. 
Respondents thought that it would have a slightly higher effect on obstacles for cross-border 
operational cooperation and criminals exploiting diverging legal frameworks. 

-  record-keeping  offences:  most  respondents  indicated  that  minimum  rules  on  criminalising 
record-keeping offences would have no extent at all or only a small extent in resolving these 
issues.  

- licensing offences: most respondents indicated that minimum rules would not have any extent 
or only a small extent in resolving the issues.  

In your view, what would be an appropriate level of sanction for the different core firearms 
offences? 

Respondents were asked to indicate what they found the appropriate level of sanction for the 
different  core  firearm  offences,  where  they  could  choose  multiple  options.  In  this  block  of 
questions,  sanctions  included  both  prison  sentence  in  years  and  financial  sanctions. 
Respondents  suggested  the  highest  level  of  prison  sentence  (>10  years)  and  the  highest 
financial  sanctions  (EUR  500,000-1,000,000)  for  illicit  cross-border  trafficking  of  firearms, 
ammunition  and  their  essential  components.  5-10  years  prison  sentence  were  suggested  for 
illicit manufacturing and 2-5 years for illicit possession and the modification of markings of 
firearms, ammunition and essential components. 

In your view, which circumstances should contribute either to mitigating or aggravating the 
sanctions for the core firearms offences? 

Respondents were asked to indicate which circumstances (listed in Figure 9) should contribute 
as  either  a  mitigating  or  aggravating  circumstance  for  the  five  core  firearms  offences.  The 
strongest aggravating circumstances were firearms offences in the context of terrorism, where 
75%  of  the  respondents  indicated  this  as  a  strong  aggravating  circumstance  and  firearms 
offences in the context of organised crime ranked by 65.75% of the respondents. The strongest 
mitigation  was  suggested  for  misconducts  in  record-keeping  and  for  non-intentional 
commissions of firearms-related offences, both accounting for 18.75% of the respondents.  

127 

 
 
In your view, which circumstances should contribute either to 
mitigating or aggravating the sanctions for the core firearms 
offences? 

Misconduct with licensing

31,25%

43,75%

12,50%

12,50%

 Misconduct with record-keeping

37,50%

31,25%

18,75%

12,50%

 Violation of arms embargoes

31,25%

6,25%

6,25%

18,75%

37,50%

 Non-intentional commission of the firearms offense

25%

37,50%

18,75%

18,75%

Firearms offences with a high number of illicit firearms,
components or ammunition

18,75%

12,50%

6,25%

12,50%

50%

 Firearms offences involving dangerous weapons

37,50%

12,50%

31,25%

18,75%

Firearms offences in the context of terrorism

18,75%

6,25%

Firearms offences in the context of organised crime

12,50%

6,25%

12,50%

75%

68,75%

Organising and directing firearms offences (rather than
being an accomplice)

31,25%

6,25%

6,25%

25%

31,25%

Participation as an accomplice (aiding, abetting,
facilitating or counselling) in firearms offences

Attempt of a firearms offences, without actually
performing the criminal act.

31,25%

25,00%

12,50%

31,25%

18,75%

62,50%

6,25%

6,25%

6,25%

Don't know

Moderate mitigation

Strong mitigation

Moderate aggravation

Strong aggravation

0,00%

20,00%

40,00%

60,00%

80,00%

100,00%

Figure 9: Source: Public Consultation, EU Have Your Say, 2025. 

To what extent do you think that the following actions contribute to a more effective EU-
wide criminalisation strategy on firearms offences? 

Respondents were asked about different actions (more details in Figure 10) contributing to a 
more  effective  EU-wide  criminalisation  strategy  on  firearms  offences.  The  general  trend 
through  the  replies  suggests  that  the  majority  of  respondents  regard  the  actions  listed  as 
moderately to not contributing to a more effective EU-wide criminalisation strategy. Actions 
with the highest extent of contribution, as suggested by the respondents, were harmonised rules 
on criminal sanctions for firearms offences, where 12.5% of the respondents indicated a high 
contribution  (all  of  them  public  authorities),  and  25%  a  very  high  extent  of  contribution. 
Moreover, criminalising firearms offences that involve illegal 3D printing (without a dealer’s 
or broker’s license) was amongst the actions with the highest extent of contribution to a more 
effective EU-wide criminalisation strategy of firearms offences.  

128 

 
 
 
To what extent do you think that the following actions contribute 
to a more effective EU-wide criminalisation strategy on firearms 
offences?

Other

75%

6,25%

6,25%

6,25%

6,25%

Harmonised rules on the criminalisation for attempted
firearms offences

Harmonised rules on aggravating circumstances in firearms
offences

Harmonised rules on administrative sanctions for firearms
offences

Harmonised rules on financial sanctions for firearms
offences

Harmonised rules on criminal sanctions for firearms
offences

Publishing recommendations on minimum rules

Criminalising illicit brokering activities

Criminalising licensing offences

Criminalising record-keeping offences

12,50%

31,25%

25%

12,50%

6,25%

12,50%

12,50%

31,25%

18,75%

6,25%

18,75%

12,50%

18,75%

25%

12,50%

18,75%

6,25%

18,75%

12,50%

31,25%

12,50%

6,25%

18,75%

18,75%

12,50%

31,25%

6,25%

12,50%

12,50%

25%

12,50%

6,25%

31,25%

12,50%

18,75%

18,75%

12,50%

12,50%

12,50%

31,25%

12,50%

18,75%

12,50%

18,75%

18,75%

31,25%

12,50%

6,25%

12,50%

18,75%

31,25%

25,00%

6,25%

6,25%

Criminalising the creation, possession and dissemination of
materials for 3D printing (preparatory acts)

Criminalising firearms offences that involve illegal 3D
printing (without a dealers or brokers' license)

31,25%

18,75%

18,75%

25%

6,25%

25%

25%

12,50%

12,50%

25%

Don't know

Not at all

Small extent

Moderate extent

High extent

Very high extent

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Figure 10: Source: Public Consultation, EU Have You Say, 2025. 

2.3.3.  EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF OPTIONS 

In the third part of the public consultation, respondents were asked to rank how they see the 
impact of different policy options.  

In your view, to which extent will the following policy options help protect society against 
gun-related violence? 

Throughout the responses, it was visible that the respondents did not regard the policy options 
listed  as  remarkably  helpful  against  gun-related  violence.  The  highest  extent  of  helpfulness 
against gun-related violence was  attributed to  a  new legislative proposal regarding the  core 
firearms  offences:  illicit  manufacturing  (including  illicit  3D  printing),  illicit  firearms 

129 

 
 
 
 
 
trafficking,  illicit  modification  of  marking  and  illicit  possession,  where  31,25%  of  the 
respondents suggested it was either helpful or very helpful. After this, enhancing enforcement 
of the firearms Directive and the UN Firearms Protocol was seen as helping to a high to very 
high extent by 25% of the respondents.  

In your view, to which extent will the following policy options increase the administrative 
burden on national authorities (in transposing these rules into national legislation)? 

As visible in Figure 11, respondents suggest a generally increasing degree in administrative 
burden on national authorities in transposing the rules listed into national legislation. Excluding 
the question “other”, on only two options, less than 50% of the respondents saw a high to very 
high  increase  in  administrative  burden.  These  options  were  a  recommendation  paper  and 
enhancing enforcement of the firearms Directive and the UN Firearms Protocol, and the option 
to enhance enforcement of the firearms Directive and the UN Firearms Protocol, so notably 
options that focussed on already-existing measures. On all other responses, 56% or more of the 
respondents  suggested  increased  administrative  burdens.  The  majority  of  public  authorities 
suggested a high to very high extent of administrative burden throughout the options.  

In your view, to which extent will the following policy options 
increase the administrative burden on national authorities (in 
transposing these rules into national legislation)?

Other

81,25%

6,25%

12,50%

Establishing minimum rules on administrative
sanctions

12,50%

12,50%

6,25%

6,25%

25%

37,50%

Establishing minimum rules on financial sanctions

12,50%

12,50%

6,25%

6,25%

25%

37,50%

 Establishing minimum rules on imprisonment
sanctions

New legislative proposal regarding the core firearms
offences and the additional optional or voluntary…

New legislative proposal regarding the core firearms
offences: illicit manufacturing (including illicit 3D…

 Recommendation paper and enhancing enforcement
of the firearms Directive and the UN Firearms Protocol

 Enhancing enforcement of the firearms Directive and
the UN Firearms Protocol

12,50%

12,50%

6,25%

6,25%

25%

37,50%

12,50%

12,50%

18,75%

25%

31,25%

12,50%

6,25%

12,50%

25%

43,75%

12,50%

12,50%

25,00%

18,75%

12,50%

18,75%

12,50%

12,50%

31,25%

6,25%

12,50%

25%

Don't know

Not at all

Small extent

Moderate extent

High extent

Very high extent

0,00%

20,00%

40,00%

60,00%

80,00% 100,00%

Figure11: Source: Public Consultation, EU Have Your Say, 2025. 

Is there anything else you wish to mention on the issue of establishing minimum EU rules 
on the definition and sanctions of firearms offences – within the scope of this questionnaire? 

130 

 
 
 
The final thematic question in the consultation gave room for an open reply on the issue of 
establishing  minimum  EU  rules  on  the  definition  and  sanctions  of  firearms  offences.  One 
respondent noted that any EU rules setting minimum rules on firearms-related offences must 
be  coherent  with  other  EU  criminal  law  instrument,  such  as  the  ENVI-Directive.  Two 
respondents linked firearms-related crimes to open borders within the EU, requesting stronger 
border controls. One French public authority suggested that penalties for participation as an 
accomplice  in  a  firearms-related  crime  should  be  aligned  with  those  for  predicate  offences, 
without any mitigation or aggravation and without preventing the criminal court from adjusting 
the penalties according to the facts before it. More critical  responses did  not agree with the 
approach towards the legislative initiative, suggesting an impact assessment and then a public 
consultation based on the impact assessment, whereas other respondents stated that any new 
legislative action by the EU on this matter is not needed.  

3.  CALL FOR EVIDENCE 

3.1.  OVERVIEW OF RESPONDENTS 

A total of 82 feedback were given, out of which 81 are considered valid, as one comment did 
not  comply  with  the  European  Commission’s  rules  for  feedback  submission.  As  shown  in 
Figure  12,  respondents  came  from  eight  different  categories:  i.)  EU  citizens;  ii.)  public 
authorities;  iii.)  business  associations;  iv.)  companies/businesses;  v.)  non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs); vi.) non-EU citizens; vii.) trade unions and viii.) other. Out of the total 
responses, nearly 80% were submitted by EU citizens (64 out of 81 responses). The second 
biggest category were public authorities, followed by business associations. Trade unions, with 
one response, make the smallest category.  

Observing  the  data  by  country  (Figure  13),  the  highest  number  of  responses  was  issued  by 
stakeholders from the Czech Republic, covering 26% of the total responses. They are followed 
by France (21%) and Belgium (12%). Six responses from non-EU countries were issued, with 
five from Switzerland and one from the United Kingdom. Out of the 27 EU Member States, 
stakeholders from 16 Member States responded to the public consultation. 

The data for these statistics was retrieved from the EU Have Your Say platform187.  

187  Firearms  Trafficking 
say/initiatives/14314-Firearms-trafficking-Directive/feedback_en?p_id=33172995 [accessed 07/01/2025]. 

Initiative:  Statistics.  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-

131 

 
 
 
 
Figure  12:  Public  consultation  responses  by  category  of  respondent.  Data  retrieved  from  and  chart  generated  by 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14314-Firearms-trafficking-
Directive/feedback_en?p_id=33172995 [accessed 03/01/2025]. 

132 

 
 
 
Figure  13:  Public  consultation 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14314-Firearms-trafficking-
Directive/feedback_en?p_id=331729 [accessed 03/01/2025]. 

responses  by  country.  Data 

retrieved 

from  and  graph  generated  by 

3.2.  GENERAL TRENDS AND ANALYSIS OF THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED 

Respondents were asked to provide feedback on the call for evidence published for the firearms 
trafficking initiative.  

Although  not  all responses showed a clear and  constructive position on whether they  agree 
with  the  initiative  described  and  their  opinions  on  the  three  different  policy  options,  it  was 
clearly visible that opinions against the initiative as a whole mainly came from EU and non-
EU citizens, whereas positions supporting the initiative stakeholders such as non-governmental 
organisations,  police  authorities,  public  authorities,  business  associations  and  universities. 
From this trend, it appears that the underlying position of citizens as public stakeholders is 
against  the  legislative  initiative,  whereas  police  authorities,  NGOs,  public  authorities  and 
business  associations,  as  more  operational  authorities,  are  on  the  supporting  side  of  the 
initiative. It needs to be stressed that this does not imply that all positions by (non-) EU-citizens 
were against the legislative, but that the majority of disagreements came from the citizen side.  

133 

 
 
 
Furthermore, it is important to stress that an analysis of the answers from the citizens, reveals 
that many might not have understood fully the objectives of the initiative. Multiple citizens 
criticised the initiative stating that the EU should not focus on law abiding citizens and legal 
owners but rather on reinforcing law enforcement response and the illegal market. Both are 
exactly amongst the objectives of the initiative. Additionally, multiple respondents expressed 
general anti-EU feelings and therefore rejected any EU intervention at all.  

Several respondents criticised that the internal mapping study of the European Commission, 
which was referred to as a source for the discrepancies of sanctions for firearms-related crimes 
across  the  EU,  was  not  published  with  the  call  for  evidence.  The  majority  of  respondents 
mentioning this requested the source and another public consultation, where responses can be 
based on the sources mentioned.  

Those  respondents  who  support  the  proposal  argue  that  a  harmonisation  of  criminal 
classifications  and  penalties  for  firearms-related  offenses  is  necessary  to  improve  legal 
coherence  and  facilitate  transnational  cooperation.  They  also  believe  that  a  more  uniform 
approach  to  regulating  3D  printed  firearms  and  unauthorised  reactivation  of  deactivated 
weapons is desirable. Additionally, respondents cherished the idea of a single EU database with 
detailed information on all firearms seized in the EU, which help law enforcement authorities 
to identify criminal networks and combat arms trafficking more effectively. 

Respondents opposing the proposal, who, as mentioned above, are mainly (non) EU-citizens, 
argue that any legislative revision that affects law-abiding firearm owners should be avoided. 
They also believe that further legislation will not effectively address the issue of terrorism and 
organised crime, and that criminalization of possession of blueprints for 3D printing of firearms 
is unacceptable. Some argue that harmonisation of criminal law at the EU level is unnecessary 
and  would  lead  to  a  loss  of  national  sovereignty,  while  others  believe  that  links  to  the  UN 
Firearms  Protocol  are  undesirable  and  would  lead  to  increased  security  restrictions. 
Furthermore,  an  explicit  prohibition  on  possessing  computer  files  that  can  be  used  for  3D-
printing of firearms is seen as unnecessary and would infringe on intellectual freedom. 

Some stakeholders expressed neutral and open-ended positions on the proposal, suggesting that 
it should prioritize the non-legislative path. Others believe that the proposal should focus on 
regulating both industrial-grade and consumer-grade 3D printing technology. A more nuanced 
approach to regulating 3D printing of firearms is also seen as necessary. 

3.3.  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  OPINIONS  EXPRESSED  IN  THE  CALL  FOR 

EVIDENCE 

Key topics addressed by the respondents were the following:  

A.  Legal firearms owners 

42% of the respondents  expressed concerns that the initiative will also affect legal firearms 
holders, such as hunters, sports shooters or collectors. Out of these 42%, 86% were EU citizens. 
In other words, from the 62 respondents who from the category “EU Citizen”, 48% interpreted 
the questionnaire as targeting legal firearms users. Comments highlighted the importance that 
the legislation should not infringe upon the existing rights of legal firearm owners, as they are 
not part of the issue of firearms-related offences. It was suggested to enforce already existing 
laws, instead of narrowing down the rights of legal firearms owners. However, it is to be noted 

134 

 
 
that many respondents interpreted the initiative as enhanced laws on the licit side, instead of 
tackling  illicit  firearms  related  offences.  Moreover,  antique  firearms  were  mentioned  in  the 
consultation responses by different stakeholders, being EU citizens and a regulatory authority 
for public auctions. It  was raised that legal  collectors already face a lot of issues with  their 
local/national authorities, and that the initiative should not create more barriers.  

B.  Challenges in the industry, research and technology 

Progressive  regulatory  framework  can  impose  significant  burdens  so  SMEs,  who  face 
challenges in  adapting to  the frequent  changes in regulations. Some respondents  stated that 
legal  frameworks  in  the  civilian  firearms  sector  have  become  increasingly  complex  and 
therefore  sometimes  difficult  to  interpret,  making  room  for  good-faithed  errors  for 
manufacturers.  Concerns  were  raised  about  the  destabilisation  of  the  industry  through 
excessive punishments  for these clerical  errors.  These concerns of overregulating  were also 
expressed by the Conseil Maisons de Vente for antique firearms, expressing concerns about 
heavy regulations discouraging operators from the legitimate market in favour of illicit actors. 
Conversely, they propose simplifying regulation targeting the legal market, to ensure a higher 
compliance with the law. This is also linked to the concerns about legal firearms owners, in the 
context of collectors.  

C.  Regulation of blueprints for 3D-printed firearms  

Opinions expressed on the criminalisation of illicit firearms by means of 3D-printing or the 
illicit creation, possession and dissemination of the intellectual materials (blueprints) needed 
for 3D-printing differed amongst the responses. Arguments in favour included the problems 
due  to  lack  of  traceability  and  control  of  3D-printed  firearms  as  well  as  uncontrolled 
proliferation. A registry for 3D-printers was supported by respondents, where one respondent 
mentioned the focus on industrial- and consumer grade printers, similar to the regulation of 
illicit  drone  activities  under  the  European  Union  Aviation  Safety  Agency.  The  respondent 
proposed a uniform regulatory framework enabling Member States to coordinate effectively 
and implement proportionate penalties for the misuse of 3D-printing technology, particularly 
the  illicit  manufacturing  of  firearms.  Amongst  those  in  favour  of  the  criminalisation  of  the 
illicit creation, possession and dissemination of blueprints, it was pointed out that the wording 
in the directive should not accidentally include files used in computer games which represent 
firearms, so called “models”, that look similar to blueprints but are only digital representations 
of  firearms.  Furthermore,  concerns  were  expressed  about  the  blueprints  for  lethal  firearms 
compared to toy guns, which can look similar and should not be subject to the criminalisation.  

Respondents against the criminalisation of blueprints followed rationales arguing that the 3D-
printing firearms falls into the category of illicitly manufacturing, and hence does not need to 
be criminalised additionally. Furthermore, it was argued that the possession of blueprints would 
not differ from possessing knowledge or information on how to manufacture a regular firearm 
with common machining tools, and that it would harm those people with the intellectual interest 
in  the  technology  and  theoretical  aspects  of  manufacturing  firearms.  These  responses  were 
submitted in the context that the criminalisation of the possession, creation and dissemination 
of blueprints would infringe the privacy and right to freely gather information in the EU.  

D.  Further opinions expressed 

Further  solutions  expressed  included  enhanced  activities  on  the  ground  through  law 
enforcement  rather  than  a  legislative  solution.  Often,  these  comments  were  put  forward  in 
connection to concerns about the rights of legal firearms owners. Furthermore, a small number 

135 

 
 
of responses raised to tackle firearms-related crimes from the angle of examining why people 
decide  to  engage  in  violence  and  commit  crimes,  where  comments  were  made  about  the 
circumstances  “dragging”  individuals  into  committing  crimes,  such  as  the  social  conditions 
and  upbringing.  Moreover,  one  responded  suggested  empowering  armed  and  trustworthy 
citizens with greater responsibility for public safety.  

Policy Options: 

The call for evidence provided three policy options for the legislative initiative. From the 81 
responses  in  total,  nine  expressed  a  clear  position  regarding  the  policy  options.  Two 
respondents were NGOs, three EU citizens, two public authorities, one business association 
and one trade union.  

Out of those respondents four opted for policy option 1, two for each option 2 and 3 and one 
agreeing with both option 2 and 3. The following rationales backed the respondent’s opinions:  

Policy Option 1: Non-legislative measures and enhancing enforcement  

Arguments  by  stakeholders  opting  for  policy  option  1  included  that  states  should  remain 
managing their legislation in the area of firearms at national level and that local actors, who 
are best informed about national history and culture, should develop the precise norms in this 
area.  National  differences  were  also  indicated  as  the  key  argument  for  another  stakeholder 
agreeing with option 1, noting that these differences could not be accommodated under policy 
option 3. Furthermore, it was argued that a non-legislative response would minimise the risk 
of affecting the legal market, whilst curbing the illicit market for firearms. Beyond this, option 
1 was also supported with the argument that it would cause less “bureaucratic entanglement” 
than  passing  additional  laws,  whilst  Member  States  could  concentrate  on  better  enforcing 
already-existing legislative frameworks and enhanced cross-border information exchange. 

Policy Option 2: Legislative proposal on the ‘core’ firearms offences  

Key  arguments  by  stakeholders  supporting  policy  option  2  included  greater  public  safety 
through the measures taken focusing on the core firearms-related offences. With regards to 3D-
printed  firearms,  the  creation  of  an  EU-wide  registry  for  3D-printers  was  supported  and 
compared to the current legislation on illicit drone activities. Potential drawbacks mapped out 
by the respondents included that amending or leveraging the current legislation (e.g. EASA or 
Union Customs Control) requires resources and time, and that the EU legislation or regulations 
do not get outpaces by technological developments. Furthermore, issues surrounding operator 
privacy were raised, noting that the 3D-printer registry would need to be compliant with the 
General Data Protection Regulation.  

Policy Option III: Legislative proposal on a wider set of firearms-related offences 

Public stakeholders arguing in favour of option 3 pointed out that the third option is the most 
appropriate, as it goes beyond harmonising definitions and firearms-related offences, and of 
sanctions/penalties,  stressing  in  the  context  of  currently  ongoing  conflicts  on  or  near  the 
borders of the EU, potentially leading to an upsurge in illicit transfer into the EU, once these 
conflicts are over. 

136 

 
 
From a law enforcement perspective, it was indicated that a legislative proposal on a wider set 
of firearms-related offences would offer the highest level of safety for police officers.  

137 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 4: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? 

1.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE 

1.1 Member States public authorities 

The adoption of a legislative initiative harmonising the definitions and sanctions of the core 
firearms offences (illicit trafficking, illicit manufacturing, illicit modification of markings and 
illicit  possession)  and  introducing  the  new  offence  of  illicit  possession,  creation  and 
dissemination of blueprints, are expected to crease some costs for judicial and law enforcement 
authorities in the Member States. As some Member States have not transposed all core offences 
into criminal law yet, the requirement to do so via a Directive, will need additional resources 
in  terms  of  staff  along  the  enforcement  chain  (mainly  in  the  police,  forensic  centres  and 
prosecution of firearms offences).  

Equally,  the  obligation  to  establish  a  well-functioning  National  Firearms  Focal  Point,  will 
create a burden for those Member States that have not yet established such focal point or have 
not  yet  attributed  all  tasks  to  make  them  well-functioning.  Lastly  the  establishment  of  a 
harmonised minimum dataset on seized firearms will create a burden for those Member States 
that will have to adjust their databases accordingly.  

1.2 The European Commission 

The implications of the proposal on the European Commission are not considered high and for 
the  most  part  limited  in  times.  For  instance,  most  of  the  obligations,  which  rely  upon  the 
Commission,  only  occur  once  and  are  linked  to  the  follow-up  of  the  transposition  of  the 
Directive.  

One  recurring  cost  would  be  the  organisation  of  the  meetings  of  the  Focus  Group  for 
prosecutors specialised in firearms offences.  

1.3 EU businesses and SMEs 

As this initiative is only focused on criminal law and not on breaches of administrative law and 
rules,  there  are  no  direct  cost  foreseen  for  EU  businesses  associated  with  this  legislative 
initiative. More effective law enforcement in the area of firearms crimes would protect legally 
operating  businesses  from  unfair  competition  from  illegal  business  activities.  Furthermore, 
reputational damage for the legal side of the firearms industry would be reduced. 

1.4 EU citizens 

Increased  enforcement  of  cases  related  to  firearms  crimes  are  expected  to  have  a  positive 
impact  on  society  at  large.  The  reduction  in  criminal  activity  supports  better  governance, 
reduced corruption and reduction of the risks posed by organised crime groups and terrorist 
mis-using firearms.  

As this initiative is focused on criminal law, it will not affect legitimate firearms owners such 
as hunters and sport shooters.  

138 

 
 
2.  SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 

Description 

Amount 

Direct benefits 

Comments 

Reduction in firearms crimes 
in  the  EU  due  to  increased 
enforcement activity 

Indicatively, the costs related to shootings would 
go  down.  Costs  where  calculated  for  shootings 
resulting  in  injuries  (+/-  20%  of  shootings)  in 
Sweden  alone  as  amounting  to  €120  to  140 
million in half a year.  

 It  is  not  possible  to  quantify  exactly  the 
costs related to shooting, nor the decrease of 
shootings  due  to  increased  enforcement. 
However, the costs are estimated to be very 
high, so the benefits are ensured.  

Improved 
between Member Sates 

cooperation 

So far only 8 NFFPs of Member States fulfil more 
than  75%  of  the  tasks.  3  Member  States  do  not 
even have a NFFP yet.  

national 

NFFPs  are  a  proven  way  of  working  that 
improve 
international 
cooperation,  coordination  and  exchange  of 
information.  It  is  not  possible  to  quantify 
these benefits.  

and 

and 
Reputational 
for 
competition  benefits 
legally compliant businesses 

Businesses that comply with firearms law will not 
face  unfair  competition  from  those  that  do  not. 
The  reputation  of  the  industry  will  improve  if 
there is less criminal activity. 

Not quantifiable  

Indirect benefits 

Improved  knowledge  and 
exchange  of  information  on 
offences 
firearms-related 
between 
and 
prosecutors 

judges 

The  Focus  Group  of  specialised  prosecutors 
allow 
against 
prosecutors  to  exchange  information  and  best 
practices.  

trafficking  will 

firearms 

It 
is  unclear  how  many 
specialised 
trafficking 
prosecutors  against  firearms 
there  are  in  the  EU.  Based  on  the  contacts 
with EMPACT Firearms and Eurojust, there 
are  not  that  many.  The  Focus  Group  will 
therefore  not  only  facilitate  exchange  of 
information it will allow Member States to 
increase 
specialised 
amount 
prosecutors.  

the 

of 

(1)  Estimates  are  gross  values  relative  to  the  baseline  for  the  preferred  option  as  a  whole  (i.e.  the  impact  of 
individual  actions/obligations  of  the  preferred  option  are  aggregated  together);  (2)  Please  indicate  in  the 
comments column which stakeholder group is the main recipient of the benefit;(3) For reductions in regulatory 
costs, please describe in the comments column the details as to how the saving arises (e.g. reductions in adjustment 
costs, administrative costs, regulatory charges, enforcement costs, etc.;);.  

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/ 
Consumers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

Recurre
nt 

One
-off 

Recurre
nt 

One-off 
MS 

One-off 
EC 

Recurrent MS 

Recurrent EU 

On
e-
off 

Action 
(a)  

Direct 
adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

EUR 
12,070,917 
(National 

EUR 
906,671 
(increase  in  number 
of  ballistic  reports 

139 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
firearms+3D 
blueprints) 

Firearms 
Focal 
Points) 
EUR 
10,800,000 
(modificati
on 
of 
national 
databases) 

EUR 
4,069,175 
(costs of an increase 
in  staff  in  Member 
and 
police 
State 
prosecution  offices 
per  year,  during  at 
least 5 years. ) 

Direct 
regulatory fees 
and charges 

Direct 
enforcement 
costs  

Indirect costs 

(1)  Estimates (gross values)  to be provided with respect to the baseline; (2) costs are provided for each 
identifiable action/obligation of the preferred option otherwise for all retained options when no preferred 
option is specified; (3) If relevant and available, please present information on costs according to the 
standard  typology  of  costs  (adjustment  costs,  administrative  costs,  regulatory  charges,  enforcement 
costs, indirect costs;).  

III. Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach – Preferred option(s) 

One-off 

Recurrent 

Total 

[M€] 

(annualised total net present 
value over the relevant period) 

(nominal values per year) 

Businesses 

New administrative 
burdens (INs) 

Removed administrative 
burdens (OUTs) 

Net administrative 
burdens* 

Adjustment costs** 

Citizens 

New administrative 
burdens (INs) 

Removed administrative 
burdens (OUTs) 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

140 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Net administrative 
burdens* 

Adjustment costs** 

Total administrative 
burdens*** 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

(*) Net administrative burdens = INs – OUTs;  
(**) Adjustment costs falling under the scope of the OIOO approach are the same as reported in Table 2 above. Non-
annualised values;  
(***) Total administrative burdens = Net administrative burdens for businesses + net administrative burdens for citizens. 

3.  RELEVANT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 

IV. Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 
 – Preferred Option(s) 
Relevant SDG 

Expected progress towards the Goal 

Comments 

SDG  no.  16  –  Promote 
inclusive 
and 
peaceful 
societies 
sustainable 
for 
development, provide access 
to  justice  for  all  and  build 
effective,  accountable  and 
inclusive  institutions  at  all 
levels 

Increased  enforcement  activity  and  improved 
cooperation between Member Sates will lead to a 
reduction of firearms-related violence and related 
death through  

In  addition,  it  will  lead  to  a  reduction  of  arms 
flows  and  will  help  the  fight  against  organised 
crime.  

141 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 5: ANALYTICAL METHODS 

1.  OVERVIEW OF THE DATA USED  

The data for the impact assessment covers the timeframe from 01/01/2020 to 31/12/2022, as 
the UNODC Firearms dataset only covers data up until 2022 and this dataset is one of the most 
important sources.  

Quantitative  data  comes  from  two  key  sources:  The  UNODC  Firearms  dataset  and 
gunviolence.eu.  This  data  was  further  enriched  with  data  from  Eurojust,  Europol  and 
quantitative data submitted by the Member States as per request.  

The UNODC firearms trafficking dataset is based on submissions of national data by Member 
States to the UNODC through the Illicit Arms Flow Questionnaire (UN-IFAQ) or other means, 
which are not further elaborated in the methodological report or metadata information provided 
by  UNODC.  The  dataset  covers  national  data  on  firearms,  their  components  and  parts, 
ammunition  and  the  criminal  justice  system  responses,  collected  through  UN-IAFQ. 
Complementary data included in the dataset has been collected from the United Nations Office 
for Disarmament Affairs’ National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action 
on  small  arms  and  light  weapons.  The  UN-IFAQ,  key  input  for  the  UNODC  Firearms 
Trafficking  dataset,  falls  under  the  framework  of  the  UN  Protocol  against  the  Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition. 
EU Member States not part of the dataset are Austria, Germany and Malta. 

Gunviolence.eu is a website developed by EU funded project INSIGHT (International Network 
Studying  Incidents  with  Guns:  Harm  and  Trafficking),  with  the  aim  to  build  a  better 
intelligence  picture,  through  the  creation  of  an  online  knowledge  platform  that  clusters  all 
information on firearms-related violence and firearms trafficking in the 27 EU Member States. 
It provides an almost real-time and automated tracking tool of firearms-related incidents in all 
EU Member States. Data is collected by deploying different methods of artificial intelligence 
(AI),  such  as  machine  learning  and  large  language  models,  which  automate  the  process  of 
identifying, assessing, clustering and analysing media articles on firearms seizures and firearms 
violence across the EU. However, this media information is not complemented by official data 
from  police  sources.  Classifiers  are  established  to  distinguish  the  relevance  of  the  articles, 
where cases regarding the following media articles are not included in the data:  

•  Articles  referring  to  explosions  and  explosives,  nor  those  referring  to  fireworks 

and/or pyrotechnics. 
•  Shooting of animals. 
• 
• 

(Legitimate) shootings by police forces.  
(Murder-)suicide in which the suicide was committed with a gun, whereas a 
murder occurred with a weapon other than a firearm (e.g., a knife). 

Data on the maximum imprisonment sanctions for firearms-related offences is taken from the 
European  Commission  Mapping  Study  from  2023/2024,  which  summarises  the  highest 
criminal sanctions in Member States for firearms-related crimes. The study is summarised in 

142 

 
 
 
Annex 8 This study is based on desk research and national reports sent by the Member States. 
The data only  covers the basic offenses and excludes aggravating circumstances. The study 
focused on illicit manufacturing, illicit trafficking, illegal possession and the falsification or 
illicit  obliteration,  removal,  or  alteration  of  the  marking(s)  on  firearms  and  essential 
components. The desk research provided information as follows:  

•  Offences covered, i.e., what specific offence(s) this sanction covers.  
•  Type of firearms covered by this sanction, i.e., Category A, B, C of the Directive or 
any firearms. Military, war and nuclear weapons should not be considered, unless 
these include several Category A firearms of the Directive (if it only includes, for 
instance, Category A1, it is not relevant - in such cases, the next sanction that covers 
most  Category  A  firearms  should  be  indicated).  If  not  clear  what  firearms  the 
sanction covers, please indicate 'Not specified'. 

•  Other note - any other information relevant for the comparability and interpretation 

of the data. 

Further  data  on  illicit  trafficking  of  firearms,  ammunition  and  essential  components  was 
provided by Eurojust, as well as data on joint investigation teams (JITs). The sources of the 
Eurojust  data  are  the  Case  Management  System  (CMS)  and  an  Excel  overview  at  the  Data 
Management  Unit  (DMU)  with  data  on  coordination  meetings  (CMs),  coordination  centres 
(CCs) and joint investigation teams (JITs). The report reflects figures on crime type 14b - Illicit 
trafficking in arms, ammunition and explosives in CMS, where the full name of this crime type 
has been replaced by the shorter version “illicit trafficking in firearms” in the charts. CMs and 
CCs that took place during the reporting period are included in the report and one case can deal 
with more than one crime type and can have more than one CM, CC or JIT. Notably, due to 
the ongoing nature of cases, the figures may change after the reporting date, and as stated by 
Eurojust, figures on CMs, CCs and JITs for 2024 are provisional, not yet verified by the desks. 

The  Europol  experts  on  firearms  were  consulted  to  provide  written  input  through  a  set  of 
questions,  which  were  discussed  bilaterally  in  January  2025.  Information  was  requested  on 
aspects  of  international  and  cross-border  cooperation,  cases  of  different  firearms-related 
offences, 3D-printed firearms, and messages exchanged in SIENA.  

Demographic  data  is  taken  from  the  EUROSTAT  dataset  on  population  change,  the 
“Demographic balance and crude rates at national level dataset”, which summarises national 
data sent by the Member States to the compiling agency EUROSTAT. EUROSTAT is also the 
source for data on crime, regarding intended homicide, robbery, theft and burglary.  

Values per 100 000 inhabitants were calculated by determining the average population of each 
Member State for the years 2020, 2021 and 2022, based on the EUROSTAT demographic data. 
After this, the value per capita of the variable of interest, e.g. number of cases of illicit firearms 
trafficking, was calculated, and the result multiplied by 100 000. By transforming the absolute 
values  of  the  data  into  standardised  values  by  100  000  inhabitants,  the  data  is  made  more 
comparable amongst the Member States. 

143 

 
 
 
2.  DATA ANALYSIS 

2.1. 

Illicit manufacturing  

Number of illicitly manufactured firearms found, 
seized, surrendered, 2020-2022

s
m
r
a
e
r
i
f

f
o

r
e
b
m
u
N

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

EU Member States*

2020

2021

2022

Figure 1: A more detailed breakdown of the data can be found in Table 1. 
* Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Slovenia. 
Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-
arms-seized (Accessed on [28/11/2024]). 

Figure 1 shows the number of illicitly manufactured firearms seized, found or surrendered per 
Member  State  for  the  timeframe  of  2020-2022.  The  absolute  values,  as  shown  in  Figure  1, 
show how Greece had the highest number of illicitly manufactured firearms seized, found or 
surrendered in the three consecutive years. This is followed by Spain in 2021 and Bulgaria in 
2022. Regarding the relative number of illicitly manufactured firearms per 100 000 inhabitants, 
Figure  2  illustrates  that  Greece,  Bulgaria  and  Slovakia  count  (in  the  order  mentioned)  the 
highest number of illicitly manufactured firearms per 100 000 inhabitants for the three years 
combined.  

The detailed data feeding into both figures can be found in Table 1.  

144 

 
 
  
 
 
 
Illicitly manufactured firearms seized, 
surrendered, found per 100 000 inhabitants

s
m
r
a
e
r
i
f

f
o

r
e
b
m
u
N

50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

EU Member State*

Figure  2:  *  EU  Member  States  missing:  Austria,  Belgium,  Croatia,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France, 
Germany, 
Malta. 
Data Sources: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-
arms-seized 
[28/11/2024]). 
EUROSTAT (2024), Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level (Accessed on [28/11/2024]). 

(Accessed 

Ireland, 

Italy, 

on 

ILLICITLY MANUFACTURED FIREARMS SEIZED, SURRENDERED, FOUND 
PER 100 000 INHABITANTS, 2020-2022 

Country 

Illicit 
manufacturin
g 2020-2022 

Average 
Population 
2020-2022 

Illicitly  manufactured 
firearms 
seized,  surrendered,  found  per  100 
000 inhabitants 

Bulgaria 

1523 

6,527,959 

23.33041733 

Cyprus 

4 

896,239 

0.446309522 

Greece 

5040 

10,618,993 

47.46212753 

Hungary 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Netherlands 

Poland 

Portugal 

0 

10 

20 

9 

0 

19 

429 

9,650,413 

0 

1,892,218 

0.528480241 

2,808,912 

0.712019458 

635,412 

1.416404588 

17,491,224 

0 

37,307,085 

0.050928664 

10,396,936 

4.126215514 

145 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

67 

832 

0 

1646 

167 

19,190,985 

0.349122257 

5,450,789 

15.26384622 

2,107,495 

0 

47,401,897 

3.472434869 

10,386,403 

1.607871316 

Table 1: Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-
firearms-arms-seized (Accessed on [28/11/2024]). 
* Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Slovenia. 

146 

 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. 

Illicit modification of markings 

Number of illicit firearms found, seized or surrendered with 
modified markings, 2020-2022

s
m
r
a
e
r
i
f

f
o

r
e
b
m
u
N

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Cyprus

Greece

Latvia

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Spain

Sweden

EU Member State*

2020

2021

2022

Figure 3: Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. 
https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-arms-seized (Accessed on [28/11/2024]). 

Figure 3 summarises the number of illicit firearms found, seized or surrendered with modified/ 
removed  marking(s)  for  the  years  2020-2022.  In  absolute  numbers,  Sweden  reported  the 
highest  number  of  firearms  for  all  three  years,  followed  by  Spain  and  Slovakia.  In  relative 
numbers, as depicted in Figure 4, Sweden also counts for the highest number of firearms seized, 
found or surrendered per 100 000 inhabitants for 2020-2022, followed by Slovakia and Greece. 
For both graphs it is to be noted that missing Member States do not directly imply that there 
was no reporting  on the numbers of firearms with modified/removed markings, as Member 
States such as Bulgaria and Hungary have reported an absence of cases, whereas other Member 
States might have not reported on the absence of cases and are therefore not mentioned in the 
dataset under the according parameters. This, however, further underlines the lack of reliable, 
accurate and complete data on firearms proceedings across the MS, preventing national policy-
makers  and  practitioners  from  monitoring  the  effectiveness  of  their  measures.  Table  2 
complements both Figures 3 and 4.  

147 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of firearms seized, found, surrendered 
with modified markings per 100 000 inhabitants, 
2020-2022

s
m
r
a
e
r
i
f

f
o

r
e
b
m
u
N

8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

EU Member States*

Figure 4: * EU Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia. 
Data Sources: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-
firearms-arms-seized (Accessed on [28/11/2024]). 
EUROSTAT (2024), Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level (Accessed on [28/11/2024]). 

148 

 
 
 
 
 
 
FIREARMS WITH MODIFIED MARKINGS SEIZED, SURRENDERED, FOUND, 
2020-2022 

Country  Total  illicit  firearms  seized, 
found  with 
surrendered, 
modified  markings,  2020-
2022 

Average 
2020-2022 

population 

Value  per  100  000 
inhabitants 

Bulgaria  0 

Cyprus 

8 

Greece 

195 

Hungary  0 

Latvia 

3 

Portugal  48 

Romania  34 

Slovakia  116 

Spain 

374 

Sweden 

711 

6,527,959 

896,239 

10,618,993 

9,650,413 

1,892,218 

10,396,936 

19,190,985 

5,450,789 

47,401,897 

10,386,403 

0 

0.89261904 

1.83633232 

0 

0.15854407 

0.46167446 

0.17716652 

2.12813241 

0.78899796 

6.84548806 

Ireland, 

Table  2:  *  EU  Member  States  missing:  Austria,  Belgium,  Croatia,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France, 
Germany, 
Slovenia. 
Lithuania, 
Data Sources: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-
arms-seized 
[28/11/2024]). 
EUROSTAT (2024), Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level (Accessed on [28/11/2024]). 

Luxembourg, 

Netherlands, 

(Accessed 

Poland, 

Malta, 

Italy, 

on 

149 

 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. 

Illicit possession 

Number of illicitly possessed firearms seized, 
found or surrendered, 2020-2022

3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0

s
m
r
a
e
r
i
f

f
o

r
e
b
m
u
N

EU Member States*

2020

2021

2022

Figure 5: * Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, Portugal, Poland.  
Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-
arms-seized (Accessed on [28/11/2024]). 

Figure 5 gives an overview of the number of illicitly possessed firearms that were seized, found 
or surrendered in the years 2020 to 2022 in the EU. 13 EU Member States reported on this data, 
from which the Netherlands had the highest absolute number of illicitly possessed firearms for 
2020 (2810) and 2021 (2473) (no values were reported for 2022). In 2020, Greece (1436) and 
Spain (1430) have the second and third-highest values, whereas in 2021 Greece (1292) and 
Sweden (1154) follow after the Netherlands (2473). Regarding 2022, Greece has documented 
the  highest  number  of  illicitly  possessed  firearms  (1593),  followed  by  Sweden  (1419)  and 
Spain (707).  

150 

 
 
 
 
 
 
When  standardised  to  illicitly  possessed  firearms  seized,  surrendered  or  found  per  100  000 
inhabitants in 2020-2022 (Figure 6), Greece, Sweden and Croatia document the highest number 
of firearms. A more detailed overview of the numbers is shown in Table 3, feeding into Figures 
5 and 6.  

Illicitly possessed firearms seized, surrendered, 
found per 100,000 inhabitants, 2020-2022

50
40
30
20
10
0

s
m
r
a
e
r
i
f

f
o

r
e
b
m
u
N

EU Member States*

Figure 6: * Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, Portugal, Poland.  
Data Sources: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-
firearms-arms-seized (Accessed on [28/11/2024]). 
EUROSTAT (2024), Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level (Accessed on [28/11/2024]). 

ILLICITLY POSSESSED FIREARMS SEIZED, SURRENDERED, BY MEMBER 
STATE*, 2020-2022 

2020 

2021 

2022  Total 

2020-2022 

Average 
Population 
2020-2022 

Illicit 
possession 
per  100  000 
inhabitants 

Bulgaria 

47 

298 

345 

6,527,959 

5.284959933 

Croatia 

Cyprus 

Denmark 

Greece 

Hungary 

1438 

1438 

3,896,281 

36.90699216 

8 

15 

23 

896,239 

2.566279754 

430 

331 

761 

5,845,409 

13.01876321 

1436 

1292 

1593 

4321 

10,618,993 

40.69124069 

Lithuania 

335 

296 

Luxembourg 

82 

59 

22 

59 

653 

82 

9,650,413 

0.611372777 

2,808,912 

23.24743531 

635,412 

12.90501958 

Netherlands 

2810 

2473 

5283 

17,491,224 

30.20371816 

151 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Romania 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

135 

578 

54 

767 

19,190,985 

3.996668227 

0 

0 

2,107,495 

0 

1430 

941 

707 

3078 

47,401,897 

6.493411013 

1101 

1154 

1419 

3674 

10,386,403 

35.37316896 

Table 3: *Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, Portugal, Poland.  
Data Sources: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-
firearms-arms-seized (Accessed on [28/11/2024]). 
EUROSTAT (2024), Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level (Accessed on [28/11/2024]). 

2.4.  Maximum prison sentence for illicit firearms trafficking 

Maximum Prison sentence for illicit firearms trafficking in 
years

20

15

10

5

0

s
r
a
e
y
n
i

e
c
n
e
t
n
e
s
n
o
s
i
r
P

EU Member States

Figure 7: The study only examines basic offenses, excluding aggravating circumstances. 
Data Source: European Commission Mapping Study, 2023. 

Figure 7 depicts the maximum prison sentence for illicit firearms trafficking in years for 25 of 
the  EU  Member  States188.  The  data  examines  the  basic  offences,  excluding  aggravating 
circumstances. The graph highlights the variance and discrepancies between Member States, 
with values stretching from 15 years (Cyprus) to 4 months (Denmark). The input was taken 
from the European Commission Mapping Study from 2023, which summarised the differences 
in prison sentencing and financial sanctions for firearms-related offences across the Member 
States. 

188 CZ and LT missing 

152 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5. 

Illicit trafficking 

Cases of illicit firearms trafficking per 100,000 inhabitants, 
2020-2022

1,4
1,2
1
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,2
0

s
t
n
a
t
i
b
a
h
n
i
0
0
0
,
0
0
1
r
e
p

s
e
s
a
C

EU Member States*

Figure 8: *EU Member States missing: Czech Republic, Latvia. 
Data Sources: Gunviolence.eu (2024), Incident Monitor. Firearms Incident Monitor | Gunviolence.eu. Accessed on 
[18/11/2024]. EUROSTAT (2024), Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level (Accessed on 
[28/11/2024]). 

Total number of cases involving trafficking in 
firearms

47

54

54

29

34

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025 (22 Jan)

3

Figure 9: Data Source: Eurojust, 2025. 

Figure 8 summarises  cases of illicit firearms trafficking  per 100 000 inhabitants in  the EU. 
Czech Republic and Latvia are excluded, as no data was available. The data originates from 
the  incident  monitor  of  gunviolence.eu,  by  Project  INSIGHT.  It  is  based  on  the  variable 

153 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“trade.crime”, which summarises illicit trafficking of firearms, firearms cache, illicit modified 
markings (removed serial number) and illicit firearms.  

The  data  was  taken  for  the  timeframe  2020-2022.  Hits  in  the  gunviolence.eu  dataset  were 
clustered by Member State, where media articles covering the same incident, this incident was 
grouped as one case, summarising the total cases of illicit firearms trafficking for 2020-2022. 
The value was then divided by the average population of each Member State for the years 2020 
to 2022 and multiplied by 100 000, to calculate the number of cases per 100 000 inhabitants.  

The number of cases of illicit firearms trafficking per 100 000 inhabitants varies throughout 
the EU Member States. Lithuania (1.2816 cases per 100 000 inhabitants) and Sweden (1.0494 
cases per 100 000 inhabitants) count for the highest numbers, whereas Slovakia and Hungary 
have the lowest numbers, with 0.0183 (Slovakia) and 0.02072 (Hungary) cases per 100 000. 
The data substantiating the graph in Figure 8 is found in Table 4 below. As visible in Figure 9, 
there has been a steady increase in cases supported by Eurojust of illicit trafficking in the past 
years.  

CASES OF ILLICIT FIREARMS TRAFFICKING PER 100 000 INHABITANTS, 
2020-2022* AND MAXIMUM PRISON SENTENCE FOR ILLICIT FIREARMS 
TRAFFICKING IN YEARS. 

Country 

Average 
population 
2020-2022 

of 

Cases 
illicit 
firearms 
trafficking, 
2020-2022 

illicit 

Cases  of 
firearms 
trafficking 
100.000 
inhabitants, 2020-
2022 

per 

Maximum 
sentence 
firearms 
in years 

Prison 
for 
illicit 
trafficking 

Slovakia 

5,450,789 

Hungary 

9,650,413 

1 

2 

0.018345969 

0.020724501 

Poland 

37,307,085 

12 

0.032165472 

Germany 

83,186,289 

37 

0.044478484 

Finland 

5,535,775 

3 

0.054192951 

Spain 

47,401,897 

30 

0.063288606 

Estonia 

1,330,280 

1 

0.075172144 

France 

67,719,757 

54 

0.079740392 

Romania 

19,190,985 

26 

0.135480279 

Slovenia 

2,104,006 

3 

0.142585145 

8 

8 

10 

5 

2 

4 

5 

5 

12 

5 

154 

 
 
 
Luxembourg 

635,412 

1 

0.157378288 

Greece 

10,618,993 

18 

0.169507598 

Austria 

8,937,552 

17 

0.190208676 

Malta 

517,051 

1 

0.193404394 

Portugal 

10,396,936 

25 

0.24045545 

Ireland 

5,077,923 

Bulgaria 

6,527,959 

14 

19 

0.275703257 

0.291055764 

Belgium 

11,564,943 

34 

0.293991929 

Italy 

59,302,611 

177 

0.29846915 

Netherlands 

17,491,224 

65 

0.371614931 

Denmark 

5,845,409 

33 

0.56454558 

Cyprus 

896,239 

7 

0.781041664 

Croatia 

3,896,281 

38 

0.975289083 

Sweden 

10,386,403 

109 

1.049448943 

Lithuania 

2,808,912 

36 

1.281635025 

8 

5 

3 

10 

10 

7 

10 

5 

3 

4 

0.4 

15 

3 

3 

6 

 Table  4:  EU  Member  States  missing:  Czech  Republic,  Latvia.  The  maximum  prison  sentence  for  illicit  trafficking  only 
examines 
circumstances.  
Data  Sources:  Gunviolence.eu  (2024),  Incident  Monitor.  Firearms  Incident  Monitor  |  Gunviolence.eu.  Accessed  on 
[18/11/2024]. EUROSTAT (2024), Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level (Accessed on 
[28/11/2024]). 

aggravating 

excluding 

offenses, 

basic 

Comparison between the figures 7 and 8 suggests a degree of proportion in the relationship 
between the maximum prison sentence for illicit firearms trafficking and the number of cases 
per 100 000 inhabitants. However, there is no total alignment in the two variables. An outlier 
is  Cyprus,  as,  although  ranking  the  highest  for  prison  sentencing  (15  years),  they  still  rank 
number 4 in cases per 100 000 inhabitants.  

This trend observed can be further substantiated Figure 10, showing the relationship between 
the  number  of  illicit  firearms  seized,  found,  surrendered  per  100  000  inhabitants  and  the 
maximum average prison sentence for firearms-related offences, 2020-2022. 

155 

 
 
 
Relationship between the number of illicit firearms seized, found, 
surrendered per 100,000 inhabitants and the maximum average prison 
sentence for firearms-related offences, 2020-2022

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

,
d
n
u
o
f

,
d
e
z
i
e
s

s
m
r
a
e
r
i
f

t
c
i
i
l
l
i

f
o

r
e
b
m
u
N

d
e
r
e
d
n
e
r
r
u
s

0

2

8
Maximum average prison sentence for firearms-related offences in years

10

12

14

6

4

16

Figure 10: EU Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Germany, Malta, 
Slovenia. The maximum prison sentence for illicit trafficking only examines basic offenses, excluding aggravating 
circumstances. 
Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-
arms-seized (Accessed on [23/10/2024]). EUROSTAT (2024), Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at 
national level (Accessed on [23/10/2024]).  
European Commission Mapping Study (2023).  

The UNODC dataset defines seized arms as “arms, their parts and components and ammunition 
that have been temporarily physically apprehended by a competent authority in relation to a 
suspected criminal offence or administrative violation related to these items. Seized items can 
be  permanently  confiscated  at  a  later  stage  by  the  state  or  returned  to  their  legitimate 
owners”189. It is to be noted that the UNODC label for the variable is “arms” and not “firearms”, 
but the definition accounts for firearms. Since the number of illicit firearms seized, found or 
surrendered  includes  illicit  trafficking,  illicit  possession,  illicit  manufacturing  and  the 
modification/  removal  of  marking(s)  in  the  same  variable,  the  maximum  average  prison 
sentence for firearms-related offenses compiles of national maximum prison sentences for the 
corresponding offenses. The values for each Member State are the average value of the Member 
States in the European Commission Mapping Study from 2023 to the maximum prison sentence 
in years for illicit manufacturing, illicit trafficking, illegal possession and the falsification or 
illicit  obliteration,  removal,  or  alteration  of  the  marking(s)  on  firearms  and  essential 
components (only examining basic offenses and excluding aggravating circumstances).  

The  explanatory  variable  in  Figure  10  is  “Maximum  average  prison  sentence  for  firearms-
related offences in years” and the response variable “Number of illicit firearms seized, found, 
surrendered”,  standardised  to  100  000  inhabitants.  The  regression  line  suggests  a  negative 
relationship  between  the  two  variables,  where  a  higher  number  of  average  prison  years  for 

189 UNODC (2024): Data UNOC - Metadata Information, p.1. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-arms-seized 
([Accessed 02/12/2024)].  

156 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
firearms-related  offences  corresponds  to  a  lower  number  of  illicit  firearms  seized,  found  or 
surrendered per 100 000 inhabitants.  

The values substantiating the regression are summarised in table 5 below.  

157 

 
 
MAXIMUM PRISON SENTENCE (YEARS) AND CASES OF ILLICIT FIREARMS 
SEIZED/ NUMBERS OF ILLICIT FIREARMS SEIZED, SURRENDERED, FOUND 
2020-2022. 

MS  Maximum 

prison 
sentence 
for 
illicit 
possession 
in years 

Maximu
m  prison 
sanction 
for 
traffickin
g in years 

illicit 

Maximum 
prison 
sanction 
illicit 
manufacturin
g in years 

for 

Cases of 
firearm
s 
seizures 
2020-
2022 

Illicit firearms 
seized,  found, 
surrendered 
per  100  000 
inhabitants, 
2020-2022 

Average 
prison 
sanction 
for 
firearms-
related 
crimes 
years 

in 

DK 

0.4 

0.4 

0.3 

NL 

0.75 

CZ 

AT 

FI 

ES  

HR 

IT  

LV 

SE 

BE 

LT 

EE 

DE 

EL 

RO 

SI 

IE 

FR 

SK 

PT 

BG 

HU 

2 

2 

2 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

7 

7 

8 

8 

8 

8 

4 

2 

3 

2 

4 

3 

3 

3 

3 

5 

6 

5 

5 

5 

12 

5 

7 

5 

8 

10 

10 

8 

4 

2 

2 

2 

4 

3 

3 

3 

2 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

7 

5 

5 

7 

8 

8 

6 

8 

0.37 

2.92 

2 

2.34 

2 

3.67 

3 

3 

3 

2.67 

5 

5.33 

5 

5 

5 

8 

5 

6.33 

6.33 

8 

8.67 

8 

8 

765 

20.78554179 

8217 

91.42870733 

75.96045263 

14412 

88.92260156 

3613 

92.72945943 

10151 

43.12963531 

233 

37.04646486 

3081 

44.62565001 

23 

25.73950341 

4777 

1193 

68.10438617 

6.628112106 

9.86623797 

8027 

23.89701416 

678 

1785 

1587 

59 

37.4808147 

112.3504042 

24.80101488 

3.626787661 

158 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LU 

PL 

8 

8 

MT  10 

CY   15 

8 

10 

10 

15 

3 

10 

10 

15 

6.33 

9.33 

10 

15 

93 

82.46622269 

4185 

11.21770828 

21 

2.343124992 

Table 5: EU Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Germany, Malta, 
Slovenia. The maximum prison sentence for illicit trafficking only examines basic offenses, excluding aggravating 
circumstances. 
Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-
arms-seized (Accessed on [23/10/2024]). EUROSTAT (2024), Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at 
national level (Accessed on [23/10/2024]).  
European Commission Mapping Study (2023).  

2020 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2024 

 Bilateral cases 

 Multilateral cases 

 Total 

19 

10 

29 

29 

5 

34 

39 

8 

47 

42 

12 

54 

44 

10 

54 

2025 (22 
Jan) 

Total 

3 

3 

175 

45 

221 

Table 6: Bilateral and multilateral cases involving illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and explosives. Source: Eurojust, 
2025.  

As  table  6  shows,  bilateral  cases  involving  illicit  trafficking  in  arms,  ammunition  and 
explosives have increased steadily from 2020-2025 (notably, the numbers of 2025 only include 
January), whilst multilateral cases have remained rather stable in the timeframe covered.  

159 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Intentional homicide rates and incidents of illcit firearms 
trafficking per 100 000 inhabitants, 2020-2022

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Intentional homicide 2020-2022 per 100 000 inhabitants

Incidents of illicit firearms trafficking per 100 000 inhabitants, 2020-2022

Figure 11: EU Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Malta, Slovenia. 
Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. 
https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-arms-seized (Accessed on [05/02/2025]). EUROSTAT Crime Statistics 
2024. 

Putting illicit firearms trafficking in the bigger context of crime in the Member States, Figures 
11 and 12 compare the incidents of this offence with intentional homicide, robbery, burglary 
and  theft,  as  these  crimes  often  involve  firearms.  Figure  11  depicts  a  basic  comparison  of 
incidents of illicit firearms trafficking with intentional homicide rates, for the years 2020-2022. 
Notably, incidents of illicit firearms trafficking per 100 000 inhabitants do not correspond with 
intentional homicide rates, as both columns do not increase or decline proportionally. Hence, 
on this, a connection between crime in Member States and illicit firearms trafficking cannot be 
suggested.  This  is  further  seen  in  the  linear  regression  in  Figure  12,  which  examines  the 
relationship between robbery, burglary and theft and incidents of illicit firearms trafficking per 
100 000 inhabitants, 2021-2022, that shows that there is no significant correlation between the 
two variables in either direction. Therefore, it can be suggested that illicit firearms trafficking 
is an issue beyond and outside the general criminal context of the Member States, which needs 
to be tackled. 

160 

 
 
 
Relationship between robbery, burglary and theft and incidents of illicit 
firearms trafficking per 100 000 inhabitants, 2021-2022

 400,00

 350,00

 300,00

 250,00

 200,00

 150,00

 100,00

 50,00

 -

s
t
n
a
t
i
b
a
h
n

i

0
0
0
0
0
1
r
e
p
g
n
i
k
c
i
f
f
a
a
r
t

t
i
c
i
l
l
i

f
o
s
t
n
e
d
i
c
n

I

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

Police recorded ofences of robbery, burglary and theft per 100 000 inhabitants

Figure 12: EU Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia. 
Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. 
https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-arms-seized (Accessed on [05/02/2025]). EUROSTAT Crime 
Statistics 2024. 

Figure 12: EU Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia. 
Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. 
https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-arms-seized (Accessed on [05/02/2025]). EUROSTAT Crime 
Statistics 2024. 

Figure 12: EU Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia. 
Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. 
https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-arms-seized (Accessed on [05/02/2025]). EUROSTAT Crime 
Statistics 2024. 

Figure 12: EU Member States missing: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia. 
Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. 
https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-arms-seized (Accessed on [05/02/2025]). EUROSTAT Crime 
Statistics 2024. 

161 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6. 

 Judicial response 

Figure 13: *Member States not included: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Malta. 
Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-
arms-seized (Accessed on [23/10/2024]). EUROSTAT (2024), Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at 
national level (Accessed on [23/10/2024]). 

Cases/incidents per 100,000 inhabitants, 2020-2022

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

s
t
n
e
d
i
c
n
i
/
s
e
s
a
c

f
o

r
e
b
m
u
N

EU Member States*

Figure 14: *Member States not included: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Malta. 
Data Source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-
arms-seized (Accessed on [23/10/2024]). EUROSTAT (2024), Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at 
national level (Accessed on [23/10/2024]). 

162 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Individuals arrested/suspected and targeted by the criminal 
justice system for illicit firearms trafficking per 100,000 
inhabitants, 2020-2022

4

3,5

3

2,5

2

1,5

1

0,5

0

Bulgaria

Cyprus

Greece

Spain

Netherlands

Hungary

Arrested/suspected for illicit trafficking per 100,000

Targeted by the criminal justice system for illicit trafficking per 100,000

Figure 75: Data only available for the Member States shown in the figure. 
Data source: UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-
arms-seized (Accessed on [23/10/2024]). EUROSTAT (2024), Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at 
national level (Accessed on [23/10/2024]). 

Figures 13 and 14 show the number of cases/incidents of illicit firearms seized per 100 000 
inhabitants,  compared  to  the  judicial  response  in  the  Member  States.  These  responses, 
standardised to the number per 100 000 inhabitants, are broken down into arrests, prosecutions, 
convictions and individuals targeted by the judicial system. UNODC defines the variables as 
the following:  

•  Individuals prosecuted: Alleged offenders against whom prosecution commenced 
in the reporting year. Persons may be prosecuted by the public prosecutor or the law 
enforcement agency responsible for prosecution. All persons for which prosecution 
starts are included, irrespective of the case-ending decision.  

•  Individuals targeted by criminal justice system: Persons brought before any legal 
body authorised to pronounce a conviction under national criminal law, whether the 
person is finally acquitted or convicted, at the national level. Persons brought before 
court in a plea-bargaining procedure, or in an abbreviated procedure, are included.  
•  Individuals  convicted:  Persons  found  guilty  by  any  legal  body  authorised  to 
pronounce a conviction under national criminal law, whether or not the conviction 

163 

 
 
 
was  later  upheld.  Persons  receiving  a  sentence  after  plea-bargaining,  or  in  an 
abbreviated court procedure, are counted as persons convicted. 

•  Instances/cases of seizures: The counting unit is the case of seizure. In most cases, 

an individual seizure case covers more than one arm.190 

The metadata information does not provide a definition for individuals arrested. 

Comparing figures 13 and 14 suggests that throughout the EU Member States, the judicial steps 
taken do not reflect on the number of cases per 100 000 inhabitants, with cases often exceeding 
the judicial responses. Furthermore, different values for arrests, prosecutions, convictions and 
the  general  judicial  response  to  firearms-related  crimes  suggests  that  judicial  action  taken 
decrease with every judicial step, potentially indicating insufficient sanctioning for firearms-
related offenses.  Figure 15 however suggests that, for those Member States where data was 
available, the number of individuals targeted by the justice system for illicit firearms trafficking 
is lower than the number of arrests for illicit trafficking, apart from the data on Cyprus, where 
judicial response exceeds the number of arrests. 

The fragmented reporting on the legal actions taken against firearms-related offenses further 
shows the lack of transparent and coherent data on firearms-related crimes across the EU. 

2.7. 

 International cooperation 

Looking at the comparisons between 2017-2019 and 2020-2022 in Table 7 below, it can be 
seen that the total number of cases and exchanged SIENA messages by Europol in general has 
increased.  However,  the  total  number  of  cases  and  exchanged  SIENA  messages  by  AP  on 
weapons and explosives as overall decreased. The numbers provided by Europol in the targeted 
questions  suggest  that  the  cooperation  on  firearms  cases  through  Europol  has  significantly 
decreased for the years 2020-2022, compared to 2017-2019.  

HOW  MANY  MESSAGES  ON  FIREARMS  WERE  EXCHANGED  IN  SIENA 
COMPARED TO OVERALL AMOUNT FOR THE YEARS 2020-2022? 

2017-2019  2021-
2022 

Overall amount of SIENA messages exchanged 

505899 

541546 

Number  of  SIENA  messages  exchanged  with  or  by  AP 
Weapons & Explosives 

12575 

8781 

Number of cases (initial messages in SIENA) overall 

63578 

84162 

Number of cases (initial messages in SIENA) for AP W&E  970 

875 

Table 7: Data Source: Europol reply to the targeted question: How many messages on firearms were exchanged in SIENA 

190 UNODC (2024), UNODC Research - Data Portal – Firearms Trafficking, p. 2. https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-
firearms-arms-seized (Accessed on [13/12/2024]). 

164 

 
 
 
 
compared to overall amount for the years 2020-2022 (2025). 

Data provided by Eurojust suggests a slight increased international cooperation through joint 
investigation teams (JITs), in the timeframe between 2020 and 2024 (2025 is only covered for 
January). Out of the total supported JITs, as shown in Figure 16, there was an increase in the 
number of newly signed JITs, and a slight decrease in JITs from previous years. Notably, the 
Total  supported  JITs  shows  the  number  of  unique  JITs  supported.  One  JIT  may  have  been 
supported in multiple years*. 

In total, 12 EU Member States have been involved in establishing JITs involving illicit firearms 

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

2

3,5

3

2,5

2

1,5

1

0,5

0

Supported JITs involving trafficking in firearms

Parties in JITs involving trafficking in firearms
established between 1 January 2020 and 22 January 2025

5

4

2

4

3

3

1

2

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

4

1

1

4

1

1

1

1

3

2
1

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025 (22 Jan)

New JITs signed

Ongoing from previous years

Figure 16: Joint investigation teams in cases involving illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and 
explosives. Source: Eurojust, 2025.  
*Newly signed JITs during the reporting period plus JITs ongoing during the reporting period that were 
signed prior to the reporting period. 

Figure 17: Parties in JITs involving firearms trafficking established between 2020-2025. This figure also includes non-EU 
States, as they can be involved in JITs with EU Member States.  
Data Source: Eurojust (2025).  

trafficking between 2020 and 2025. As depicted in Figure 17, most parties are only involved 
in one establishment of a JIT. However, Belgium, Poland and Sweden were involved in more 
than one, where Sweden was involved in establishing 3 JITs and Poland and Belgium 2 each. 
Notably, beyond leading in the number of JITs established in the timeframe analysed, Belgium 
and Sweden also lead in their performance as a national firearms focal point (NFFP), as shown 
in their status of implementation, where both Member States cover 76%-100% of the tasks in 
the questionnaire on NFFP fulfilment for both 2023 and 2024191. Furthermore, as previously 
depicted, Sweden counted the highest number of cases of illicit firearms trafficking per 100,000 
inhabitants in the years 2020-2022.  

191 National Firearms Focal Points in the Member States (2025):  Copy of NFFP_Scoreboard_2024 update and 
comparison with 2023.xls  

165 

 
 
 
Furthermore, as the data provided by Eurojust in Table 9 suggests, cooperation between international 
partners, namely Europol and ICC, is generally low, and decreasing. This can be further seen 
through the lack of coordination centres, as depicted in table 8 below.  

2020 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2024 

 Coordination meetings  8 

 Coordination centres 

- 

10 

- 

6 

- 

8 

- 

16 

- 

Table 8: Data Source: Eurojust, 2025.  

2025  (22 
Jan) 

Total 

3 

- 

51 

- 

Cooperation with partners in cases involving illicit trafficking in arms ammunition and explosives 

 Partners 

2020 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2024 

2025 
Jan) 

(22 

Total 

 Europol 

 ICC 

3 

- 

- 

- 

1 

- 

- 

- 

- 

1 

- 

- 

4 

1 

Table 9: Data Source: Eurojust, 2025.  

Looking at coordination meetings, there has been a general increase throughout the EU, where 
the number of coordination meetings doubled from 2020 to 2024, as depicted in Figure 18. By 
country, Italy, France and the Netherlands have organised the largest number of coordination 
meetings involving trafficking in firearms by organising country (Figure 19).  

Total number of CMs involving trafficking in firearms

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

8

10

6

8

16

3

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025 (22 Jan)

Figure 18: Data Source: Eurojust, 2025. 

166 

 
 
  
 
 
 
Total number of CMs involving trafficking in firearms by 
organising country
(1 January 2020 - 22 January 2025)

11

10

7

6

5

2

2

2

1

1

2

1

1

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Figure 19: Data Source: Eurojust, 2025. 

Looking at joint investigation teams (JITs), there was an increase in newly signed JITs from 2020 to 
2024, and the number of ongoing JITs from the previous years has remained stable. Overall, the total 
supported  JITs  in  cases  involving  the  illicit  trafficking  of  firearms,  ammunition  and  explosives  has 
increased slightly. By country, as seen in Figure 20s, Sweden, Poland and Belgium have had the highest 
numbers of JITs in the timeframe analysed, with Sweden having 3 JITs, and Poland and Belgium each 
2.  

Joint investigation teams in cases involving illicit trafficking of arms, ammunition and explosives2025 
(22 Jan) 

 Newly signed 

 Ongoing from previous years 

 Total supported 

1 

4 

5 

2 

3 

5 

2 

5 

7 

2 

4 

6 

3 

4 

7 

- 

4 

4 

Table 10: Data Source: Eurojust, 2025. Newly signed JITs during the reporting period plus JITs ongoing during the reporting 
period that were signed prior to the reporting period. The Total supported JITs shows the number of unique JITs supported. 
One JIT may have been supported in multiple years. 

167 

 
 
 
 
 
Parties in JITs involving trafficking in firearms
established between 1 January 2020 and 22 January 2025

3

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

3,5

3

2,5

2

1,5

1

0,5

0

Figure 20: Data Source: Eurojust, 2025. 

2.8.  Responses to the targeted questionnaire sent to the Member States 

To fill in the gaps in the data, a targeted questionnaire was sent out the Member States, posing 
questions on the following topics:  

Member States were asked to provide responses regarding:  

•  Cases of seizures of illicit firearms  

•  Arrests, prosecutions and convictions for illicit firearm trafficking  

•  Cases of illicit trafficking  

•  Cases of illicit possession  

•  Cases of illicit modification of markings  

•  Cases of illicit manufacturing  

•  The  number  of  cases  of  firearms-  related  offences,  where  the  firearms,  essential 
components and/or ammunition came from outside the borders of the Member State  

•  Cases involving privately manufactured (e.g. 3D-printed firearms) 

•  Cases involving alarm & signal weapons (converted and non-converted) 

Every question was followed up by asking whether the data provided depicts a complete or 
partial picture of the Member State, which helps mapping out gaps.  

168 

 
 
 
 
In total, 11 Member States replied to the questionnaire, being Spain, Slovenia, Finland, Czech 
Republic, Greece, Ireland, Belgium, Lithuania, France, Sweden and Cyprus.  

The cases of seizures of illicit firearms registered for the years 2020-2022 ranged from 43,925 
(Spain)  to  74  (Cyprus).  Within  the  responses,  some  Member  States  pointed  out  that  these 
seizures  include  criminal  as  well  as  administrative  offences,  and  other  Member  States 
submitted  the  number  of  firearms  seized,  instead  of  the  cases,  making  the  data  difficult  to 
compare.  On  the  judicial  responses,  being  arrests,  prosecutions  and  convictions,  for  illicit 
trafficking, the data of the Member States is difficult to compare, as some Member States only 
submitted information on arrests and suspicion, whilst others submitted data on all offences 
rather  than  illicit  trafficking,  and  other  Member  States  indicated  that  there  is  no  such  data 
available, making the responses to the question generally fragmented. 

On cases of illicit trafficking, Spain accounted for the highest number with 955 cases between 
2020 and 2021, followed by Belgium with 583. The least cases were Cyprus, with 0. On illicit 
possession, the highest number was recorded by France, with 13,185 cases, and again Cyprus 
had 0 cases. The data was getting sparser on replies on cases of illicit manufacturing identified 
in the period of 2020-2022, where Spain had the highest number of cases with 255, and Cyprus 
the lowest with 2. However, 5 out of the 11 respondents did not have any data available, and 
Sweden  noted  that  in  the  timeframe  analysed,  they  could  not  provide  data,  as  illicit 
manufacturing  was  not  criminalised.  Although  asking  for  the  number  of  cases  regarding 
firearms  with  removed  or  altered  markings,  most  Member  States  submitted  the  number  of 
firearms  seized  with  modified  markings.  Sweden  counted  700  firearms  with  modified 
markings, however noting that it is difficult to precisely say, as an additional 100 firearms had 
no information on serial numbers at all.  

To gather a picture of cross-border trafficking, the Member States were asked to indicate the 
number  of  cases  of  firearms-related  offences,  where  the  firearm/essential  component/ 
ammunition could be traced back outside of their national borders. Only Spain, Slovenia and 
Cyprus were able to provide data. In Spain, these were 863 cases, in Slovenia 1 and in Cyprus 
2.  On  the  number  of  cases  of  privately  manufactured  firearms  (e.g.  3D-printed),  Finland 
counted  the  highest  number  with  153  cases,  and  both  Greece  and  Cyprus  have  0  cases. 
Nevertheless, many other respondents were not able to provide data, which does not imply, 
that there were no cases at all. On the number of cases of seizures of alarm and signal weapons, 
both converted and non-converted, Finland indicated 1,664 cases and Sweden indicated that 
more than 1,000 alarm and signal weapons had been seized in the years 2020-2022 (making up 
for 954 cases). Out of these 1000, 600 were found converted.  

For most of the questions, Czech Republic was unable to provide data, as their statistical data 
does not allow for more detailed distinction, as cases are counted as criminal offences of Breach 
of Regulations on Circulation of Goods in Relation  with  Foreign  States (Article 261 of the 
Criminal  Code)  and  of  criminal  offences  of  Conducting  Foreign  Business  with  Military 
Material without Licence or Permit (Article 265 of the Criminal Code). These crimes may also 
include  illegal  firearms  trafficking,  but  statistical  data  do  not  allow  for  a  more  detailed 
distinction. 

The  difference  in  the  data  landscape  amongst  the  Member  States  responding  to  the 
questionnaire highlights the incomplete, incoherent and also untransparent data available on 
firearms-related  offences  throughout  the  EU,  further  showcasing  a  need  for  a  harmonised 

169 

 
 
dataset.  Furthermore,  the  lack  of  harmonised  definitions  show,  that  certain  countries  can 
provide detailed data on the offences discussed, whilst other countries do not have the tools to 
distinguish in detail between the data. A comprehensive overview of the responses submitted 
can be found in Tables 11 and 12 below. 

170 

 
 
RESPONSES OF THE MEMBER STATES TO THE QUANTITATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE, PART I.  

Memb
er 
State 

Spain 

Does 
the 
above 
answer
ed  data 
provide
: 

How 
many 
cases  of 
illicit 
firearms 
trafficki
ng  did 
you 
record 
between 
2020-
2022?  

How 
many 
of 
cases 
seizures of 
illicit 
firearms 
you 
did 
have/regis
ter 
between 
2020-
2022? 

23,065 

arrests, 
How  many 
and 
prosecutions 
illicit 
convictions 
trafficking did you have 
from 2020-2022? 

for 

Does 
the 
above 
answer
ed  data 
on 
seizure
s 
provide
: 

the 

Does 
above 
answered 
data 
on 
arrests, 
prosecuti
and 
ons 
conviction
s provide: 

of 

How 
many 
cases 
illicit 
traffickin
g  can  be 
identified 
for 
the 
period  of 
2020-
2022? 

Does the 
above 
answere
d  data 
on  illicit 
trafficki
ng 
provide: 

Partial 
picture 

In  2020,  443  people 
arrested  or  suspected  to 
offences 
to 
firearms 

related 

Partial 
picture 

955 

Partial 
picture 

How 
many 
cases  of 
illicit 
possessi
on  can 
be 
identifie
d for the 
period 
of  2020-
2022? 

3,078 

Does the 
above 
answere
d  data 
on  illicit 
possessi
on 
provide
: 

Partial 
picture 

In  2021,  148  people 
arrested  or  suspected  to 
to 
offences 
firearms 

related 

In  2022,  127  people 
arrested  or  suspected  to 
offences 
to 
firearms 

related 

171 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data  according 
IAFQ. 

to 

the 

Sloveni
a 

Finland 

173 

5,929 

Comple
te 
picture 

/1, 
Illicit  modification 
Illicit  possession  109, 
illicit manufacturing/ 23,  

Partial 
picture 

15 

Partial 
picture 

109 

Complet
e picture 

Comple
te 
picture 

Firearms  offence;  arrests 
n.a.,  3,094  prosecutions 
and  2,808  convictions.  

Complete 
picture 

n/a 

No  data 
available 

n/a 

No  data 
availabl
e 

attempted: arrests n.a., 23 
prosecutions 
18 
convictions. 

and 

Aggravated 
firearms 
offence:  arrests  n.a.,  207 
prosecutions 
176 
convictions. 

and 

attempted:  arrests  n.a.,  2 
1 
prosecutions 
conviction. 

and 

Petty 
firearms  offence: 
2,402 
n.a., 
arrests 
prosecutions  and  2,266 
convictions. 

172 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
it 

to  divide 
for 

Unfortunately 
not 
possible 
the 
illicit 
offences 
modification  or  marking, 
illicit  manufacturing  and 
illicit possession. 

Partial 
picture 

n/a 

Partial 
picture 

n/a 

Partial 
picture 

Czech 
Republ
ic 

2,557 

Partial 
picture 

1,098 

Partial 
picture 

Between  2020-2022,  4 
cases of criminal offences 
of  Breach  of  Regulations 
on Circulation of Goods in 
Relation  with  Foreign 
States  (Article  261  of  the 
Criminal  Code)  and  4 
cases of criminal offences 
of  Conducting  Foreign 
Business  with  Military 
Material  without  Licence 
or  Permit  (Article  265  of 
the  Criminal  Code)  were 
registered.  These  crimes 
may  also  include  illegal 
firearms  trafficking,  but 
statistical  data  do  not 
allow  for  a  more  detailed 
distinction. 

173 

 
 
 
 
Greece 

Ireland 

Belgiu
m 

Lithuan
ia 

France 

4,703 

777 

11,253 

1,109 

43,925 

Partial 
picture 

Comple
te 
picture 

Partial 
picture 

Partial 
picture 

Partial 
picture 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

692 

19 

n/a 

Complete 
picture 

Partial 
picture 

4101 

No  data 
available 

593 

Partial 
picture 

Complet
e picture 

data 

No 
available 

583 

Partial 
picture 

11,607 

Complet
e picture 

Complete 
picture 

n/a 

No  data 
available 

1,164 

Complet
e picture 

Partial 
picture 

13,185 

Partial 
picture 

Prosecutions 
between 
2020  and  2022  (Ministry 
Justice) 
of 

Partial 
picture 

2020 
Illicit 
- 
manufacturing: <5 - Illicit 
possession:  2,823  -  Illicit 
modification  of  marking: 
8 

2021 
Illicit 
- 
manufacturing:  9  -  Illicit 
possession:  3,771  -  Illicit 
modification  of  marking: 
7 

2022 

- 

Illicit 

Number  of 
prosecutio
ns 
(Ministry 
of  Justice)  
Illicit 
transfer  
2020:  29  
2021:  23  
2022:  23 
Illicit 
acquisition  
2020:  344  
2021:  459  
2022:  418 
Illicit 
import  
2020:  34  

174 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
manufacturing:  7  -  Illicit 
possession:  3,772  -  Illicit 
modification  of  marking: 
14 

Convictions between 2020 
and  2022  (Ministry  of 
Justice)  

2020 
Illicit 
- 
manufacturing: <5 - Illicit 
possession:  2,985  -  Illicit 
modification  of  marking: 
7 

Illicit 
- 
2021 
manufacturing: 15 - Illicit 
possession:  4,074  -  Illicit 
modification  of  marking: 
10 

2022 
Illicit 
- 
manufacturing: 15 - Illicit 
possession:  4,207  -  Illicit 
modification  of  marking: 
13 

Data 
from 
Gendarmerie:  

French 

2021:  63  
2022:  65  

Number  of 
conviction
s (Ministry 
of  Justice)  
Illicit 
transfer  
2020:  49  
2021:  62  
2022:  59 
Illicit 
acquisition  
2020:  418  
2021:  591  
2022:  515 
Illicit 
import  
2020:  44  
2021:  98  
2022:  87  

Number  of 
procedures 
from 
French 
Gendarme
rie:  
2020: 

175 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,818 
2021: 
2,154 
2022: 
2,138 

Convictions between 2020 
and  2022  (Ministry  of 
Justice)  

2020  -  Firearms  related 
offences  47,163  -  Illicit 
transportation/carrying(ca
tegory D): 7,581 (6,194) - 
Illicit  possession:  4661 

2021  -  Firearms  related 
offences  50,495  -  Illicit 
transportation/carrying 
(category  D): 
7,110 
(6,360) - Illicit possession: 
4,513 

2022  -  Firearms  related 
offences  53,174  -  Illicit 
transportation/carrying 
(category  D): 
7,573 
(6,772) - Illicit possession: 
4,011 

Nearly  80%  of  criminal 
proceedings 
involving 
weapons  are  concerned 
with  illegal  transport  and 
carriage,  with  category  D 
weapons  (free  acquisition 

176 

 
 
 
 
 
 
and possession for adults) 
accounting  for  between 
81% and 89% of the cases.  

Incriminations  relating  to 
modifications  of  marking 
are  difficult  to  delimit: 
numerous references exist 
referring to the absence or 
alteration of markings, but 
as  a  de  facto  aggravating 
is 
circumstance, 
impossible to discriminate 
between 
isolated  wilful 
action. 

it 

difficult 
as 

is 
Simple  manufacture 
to 
also 
the 
discriminate, 
“nature of offence” frame 
groups 
of 
together 
illegal 
manufacturing and trading 
activities.  

reference 

These last two aggregates 
form  part  of  the  6%  of 
miscellaneous breaches of 
regulations. 

177 

 
 
 
 
 
Swede
n 

Cyprus 

3,000 

74 

Partial 
picture 

Comple
te 
picture 

n/a 

Partial 
picture 

115 

Partial 
picture 

2,400 

Partial 
picture 

2020: 

7 

persons 

Complete 
picture 

0 

Complet
e picture 

0 

2021: 

11 

persons 

2022: 16 

Table 11: Data Source: EU Have Your Say, 2025.  

RESPONSES OF THE MEMBER STATES TO THE QUANTITATIVE QUSTIONNAIRE, PART II.  

Does  the 
above 
answered 
data  on 
illicit 
modificat
of 
ion 
marking(
s) 
provide: 

How  many 
cases 
of 
illicit 
manufactu
ring can be 
identified 
the 
for 
period 
of 
2020-2022? 

How 
many 
cases  of 
illicit 
modificat
ion 
of 
marking(
s)  can  be 
identified 
the 
for 
period  of 
2020-
2022? 

Memb
er 
State 

the 

Does 
above 
answered 
data 
illicit 
manufactu
ring 
provide: 

on 

How many cases of 
firearms-related 
offences  occurred, 
where 
the 
firearms/essential 
components/ammu
could  be 
nition 
traced  back 
to 
outside  of  your 
national borders? 

Does 
the 
above 
answer
ed data 
on 
tracing 
provid
e: 

How many 
cases 
of 
firearms-
related 
offences 
with 
privately 
manufactu
red 
firearms 
(e.g. 
printed) 
did 
register 

you 

3D 

on 

the 

Does 
above 
answered 
data 
privately 
manufactu
red 
firearms 
provide: 

How 
many 
cases  of 
seizures 
linked 
to 
alarm 
and 
signal 
weapon
s 
(conver
ted  and 
not-

Does 
the 
above 
answer
ed data 
on 
alarm 
and 
signal 
weapo
ns 
provid
e: 

178 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
between 
2020-
2022? 

Partial 
picture 

255 

Partial 
picture 

863 

Partial 
picture 

60 

Partial 
picture 

convert
ed)  did 
you 
register 
between 
2020-
2022? 

238 

324 

1 

239 

n/a 

179 

n/a 

Spain 

Sloven
ia 

Finlan
d 

Czech 
Republ
ic 

Greece 

Ireland 

Complete 
picture 

23 

Complete 
picture 

1 

Partial 
picture 

Partial 
picture 

n/a 

n/a 

Complete 
picture 

12 

data 

No 
available 

n/a 

data 

No 
available 

n/a 

Partial 
picture 

Partial 
picture 

0 

n/a 

data 

No 
available 

n/a 

3 

Compl
ete 
picture 

153 

n/a 

ο 

n/a 

No data 
availab
le 

No data 
availab
le 

No data 
availab
le 

Partial 
picture 

Partial 
picture 

Compl
ete 
picture 

Partial 
picture 

Complete 
picture 

1 

Partial 
picture 

Partial 
picture 

1,664 

n/a 

n/a 

data 

No 
available 

n/a 

No data 
availab
le 

179 

 
 
 
 
 
n/a 

n/a 

29 

700 

9 

Belgiu
m 

Lithua
nia 

France 

Swede
n 

Cyprus 

data 

No 
available 

31 

Partial 
picture 

n/a 

data 

No 
available 

n/a 

data 

No 
available 

n/a 

Partial 
picture 

Partial 
picture 

16 

n/a 

Partial 
picture 

Partial 
picture 

35 

n/a 

Partial 
picture 

1 

Complete 
picture 

2 

Table 13: Data Source: EU Have Your Say, 2025.

n/a 

n/a 

No data 
availab
le 

No data 
availab
le 

Partial 
picture 

n/a 

11 

0 

No data 
availab
le 

Compl
ete 
picture 

data 

No 
available 

n/a 

Partial 
picture 

data 

No 
available 

n/a 

data 

No 
available 

n/a 

Partial 
picture 

1,000 

Complete 
picture 

14 

No data 
availab
le 

No data 
availab
le 

Partial 
picture 

Compl
ete 
picture 

180 

 
 
2.9.  Data on arrest, prosecutions and convictions (2020-2022) 

The  following  tables  below  summarise  an  overview  of  judicial  responses  in  Finland,  France  and 
Sweden.  

Finland 

Firearms 
offence 

Attempted 
firearms 
offence 

Aggravated 
firearms 
offence 

Arrest 

n.a.  

Prosecution 

3,094 

conviction 

2,808 

n.a. 

23 

18 

n.a. 

207 

106 

Attempted 
aggravated 
firearms 
offence 

n.a. 

2 

1 

Petty firearms 
offence 

n.a. 

2,402 

2,266 

France 

Data on prosecutions 

Illicit 
manufacturing 

Illicit 
possession 

Illicit 
modification  of 
marking 

2020 

2021 

2022 

<5 

9 

7 

Data on convictions 

2,823 

3,771 

3,772 

8 

7 

14 

Illicit 
manufacturing 

Illicit 
possession 

Illicit 
modification  of 
marking 

<5 

15 

15 

2,985 

4,074 

4,207 

7 

10 

13 

2020 

2021 

2022 

Sweden 

Decisions on prosecution 

181 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weapons 
offences 

Serious 
weapons 
offences 

Extremely 
serious weapons 
offence 

Marking 
offence 

2020 

2021 

2022 

338 

377 

381 

577 

632 

777 

2 

23 

33 

1 

0 

2 

Number of convictions, excluding summary impositions of a fine and abstentions from prosecution 

Weapons 
offences 

Serious 
weapons 
offences 

Extremely 
serious weapons 
offence 

Marking 
offence 

2020 

2021 

2022 

282 

235 

251 

366 

443 

500 

1 

4 

18 

1 

0 

1 

3.  DATA LIMITATIONS 

Although  the  general  landscape  on  firearms-related  offences,  judicial  responses  and  international 
cooperation  could  be  sketched  out  in  this  data  analysis  section,  the  incompleteness  of  the  data 
available makes a comprehensive analysis difficult. Throughout the different categories analysed, the 
level of incompleteness between the variables, as well as the Member States, varies, limiting their 
comparability. Regarding the Member States, in certain cases there were no submissions at all for 
datasets,  such  as  the  UNODC  firearms  data,  leaving  entire  Member  States  out  of  the  analysis. 
Moreover, variables were often incoherently labelled, causing differences between Member States 
within the same datasets, and together with often inconclusive metadata lacking transparency on the 
input  into  different  variables,  comparability  is  further  compromised.  To  add  to  this,  the  data  of 
UNODC does not distinguish between the absence of data (e.g. number of cases) and Member States 
not reporting any data, adding to the impreciseness of the data.  

To  tackle  these  issues,  Member  States  were  asked  to  fill  out  a  survey  with  specific  questions 
substantiating the gaps in the data. The questions focussed on the number of cases of illicit trafficking, 
illicit  modification  of  markings,  illicit  manufacturing,  illicit  possession,  the  number  of  arrests, 
prosecutions and convictions for illicit trafficking, as well as cases of converted alarm  and signal 
weapons and 3D-printed weapons. Despite extensive submissions by Member States, questions were 
interpreted differently, numbers taken from different datasets, or the legislature does not separate the 
different offences, leading to the submission of partly incomparable numbers. Notably, Spain was 
the only  Member State  where the numbers of the UNODC  IFAQ dataset  were the same as those 
submitted in the targeted questions. For all other Member States that replied to the questionnaire, 
there were discrepancies between the numbers. Their responses are discussed in the previous section 
2.8.  

182 

 
 
 
 
 
These  issues,  however,  highlight  the  fragmented  and  incomplete  data  landscape  on  firearms  and 
firearms-related offences, showcasing the need for a harmonised dataset between the Member States, 
to ensure coherency, transparency and comparability of data.  

183 

 
 
 
ANNEX 6: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK 

1.  OVERVIEW OF IMPACTS ON COMPETITIVENESS  

Dimensions of 
Competitiveness 

Impact of the initiative 
(++ / + / 0 / - / -- / n.a.) 

References to sub-sections of the 
main report or annexes 

Cost and price competitiveness  n.a 

International competitiveness  

Capacity to innovate 

SME competitiveness 

n.a 

n.a 

n.a 

2.  SYNTHETIC ASSESSMENT  

This initiative aims to harmonise at EU level the criminalisation of offenses related to firearms, as 
illicit  manufacture,  possession,  trafficking  and  alteration  of  marking  of  firearms  and  essential 
components. Consequently, it will not affect the competitiveness of the legal business of firearms 
for civilian use in all areas analysed, nor the cost and price, nor the international dimension, nor the 
capacity to innovate, nor the SME competitiveness. 

3.  SME TEST 

Step 1/4: Identification of affected businesses 

This initiative focuses on the illicit firearms market. The rules  and procedures for the legal 
market are established in the Firearms Directive (acquisition, possession and intra EU trade 
of  firearms,  essential  components  and  ammunition  for  civilian  use)  and  the  Firearms 
Regulation (import, export and transit of firearms, essential components and ammunition for 
civilian use). Therefore, this initiative has no impact on companies and SME’s which follow 
the rules established in these legislations, as well as in the national ones. The exception is the 
new focus on blueprints used to 3D print firearms. However, the offence will be written in a 
matter that will allow licensed dealers to keep using this innovative production.  

To what extent is the initiative relevant for SMEs? 

This initiative is considered not relevant for SMEs.  

184 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2/4: Consultation of SME Stakeholders

The public consultation did not include any specific section focusing on SME, as this initiative 
is not considered to be relevant. 
Notwithstanding, there were several inputs from citizens and SME in the call of evidence.  
Some  respondents  stated  that  legal  frameworks  in  the  civilian  firearms  sector  have  become 

increasingly  complex  and  therefore  sometimes  difficult  to  interpret,  leading  to  honest  errors 

from  manufacturers.  Concerns  were  raised  about  the  destabilisation  of  the  industry  through 

excessive punishments for these clerical errors. These concerns about overregulation were also 

expressed  by  the  Conseil  Maisons  de  Vente  for  antique  firearms,  indicating  that  it  could 

discourage  operators  from  the  legitimate  market  in  favour  of  illicit  actors.  Conversely,  they 

propose simplifying regulation targeting the legal market, to ensure a higher compliance with 

the law. This is also linked to the concerns of legal firearms owners, in the context of collectors.  

Opinions were expressed on the criminalisation of illicit firearms by means of 3D-printing or 

the illicit creation, possession and dissemination of the intellectual materials (blueprints) needed 

for 3D-printing differed amongst the responses. Those in favour of the criminalisation of the 

illicit creation, possession and dissemination of blueprints, pointed out that the wording in the 

directive should not accidentally include files used  in computer videogames which represent 

firearms, so called “models”, that look similar to blueprints but are only digital representations 

of  firearms.  Furthermore,  concerns  were  expressed  about  the  blueprints  for  lethal  firearms 

compared to toy guns, which can look similar and should not be subject to the criminalisation.  

Some respondents who are against the criminalisation of blueprints argued that the 3D-printing 

firearms falls into the category of illicitly manufacturing, and hence does not need to be further 

criminalised. Furthermore, it was argued that the possession of blueprints would not differ from 

possessing knowledge or information on how to manufacture a regular firearm with common 

machining  tools,  and  that  it  would  harm  those  people  with  the  intellectual  interest  in  the 

technology and theoretical aspects of manufacturing firearms. These responses were submitted 

as part of a wider argument that the criminalisation of the possession, creation and dissemination 

of blueprints would infringe the privacy and right to freely gather information in the EU.  

185 

 
 
The public consultation did not include any specific section focusing on SME, as this initiative 
is not considered to be relevant. 
Notwithstanding, there were several inputs from citizens and SME in the call of evidence.  
Some  respondents  stated  that  legal  frameworks  in  the  civilian  firearms  sector  have  become 

increasingly  complex  and  therefore  sometimes  difficult  to  interpret,  leading  to  honest  errors 

from  manufacturers.  Concerns  were  raised  about  the  destabilisation  of  the  industry  through 

excessive punishments for these clerical errors. These concerns about overregulation were also 

expressed  by  the  Conseil  Maisons  de  Vente  for  antique  firearms,  indicating  that  it  could 

discourage  operators  from  the  legitimate  market  in  favour  of  illicit  actors.  Conversely,  they 

propose simplifying regulation targeting the legal market, to ensure a higher compliance with 

the law. This is also linked to the concerns of legal firearms owners, in the context of collectors.  

Opinions were expressed on the criminalisation of illicit firearms by means of 3D-printing or 

the illicit creation, possession and dissemination of the intellectual materials (blueprints) needed 

for 3D-printing differed amongst the responses. Those in favour of the criminalisation of the 

illicit creation, possession and dissemination of blueprints, pointed out that the wording in the 

directive should not accidentally include files used in computer  videogames which represent 

firearms, so called “models”, that look similar to blueprints but are only digital representations 

of  firearms.  Furthermore,  concerns  were  expressed  about  the  blueprints  for  lethal  firearms 

compared to toy guns, which can look similar and should not be subject to the criminalisation.  

Some respondents who are against the criminalisation of blueprints argued that the 3D-printing 

firearms falls into the category of illicitly manufacturing, and hence does not need to be further 

criminalised. Furthermore, it was argued that the possession of blueprints would not differ from 

possessing knowledge or information on how to manufacture a regular firearm with common 

machining  tools,  and  that  it  would  harm  those  people  with  the  intellectual  interest  in  the 

technology and theoretical aspects of manufacturing firearms. These responses were submitted 

as part of a wider argument that the criminalisation of the possession, creation and dissemination 

of blueprints would infringe the privacy and right to freely gather information in the EU.  

186 

 
 
 
Step 3/4: Assessment of the impact on SMEs 

As stated in step 1, this initiative is not considered to be relevant for SME. 
If any, this initiative would have a positive impact on competitiveness. Effective criminal law 
enforcement  would  actually  protect  legitimate  businesses  against  unfair  competition  from 
illegal business which activities negatively affect the image of the whole sector and result in a 
loss of profit.  

The criminalisation of the illicit production, possession and dissemination of digital blueprint 
for the purpose of manufacture of firearms or essential components with new technology should 
not  affect  licensed  dealers  and  brokers  (meaning  businesses  licensed  to  manufacture,  trade, 
exchange, hiring out, repair, modify or convert firearms, essential components and ammunition 
according to the Firearms Directive). ). New technologies could provide valuable innovations 
for the sector. The criminalisation the illicit manufacturing would help towards the protection 
of intellectual rights over these innovations, and thus represents a beneficiary factor.  

Step 4/4: Minimising negative impacts on SMEs 

Not applicable. 

187 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 7: CASE STUDIES 

1.  INTRODUCTION 

Current EU legislation contains rules on the legal possession and acquisition of firearms and rules 
on the legal import, export and transit of firearms. However, there is no EU legislation establishing 
EU-wide minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences and penalties on firearms-related 
crimes. 

The below case studies highlight various issues that could benefit from EU-wide criminalisation to 
better  address  the  firearms  threat.  This  annex  aims  to  compensate  for  the  lack  of  quantitative 
European data by illustrating both the need for criminalisation and examples of best practices. In 
doing so, it aids in understanding and formulating effective legislative responses to these threats. 

The first section presents case studies on the illicit manufacturing of firearms, illicit cross-border 
trafficking of firearms, and the illicit modification of markings. The next section features cases that 
underscore the necessity of criminalising the illicit possession of firearms. Lastly, the third section 
includes cases that illustrate the significance of other firearms offenses, such as illicit brokering 
activities, violations of arms embargoes, and record-keeping and licensing violations. 

All the presented case studies underscore three primary concerns regarding firearms threats: the 
emergence of illegally manufactured 3D-printed weapons, the risks associated to converted alarm 
and signal weapons, and the risk that firearms offenses linked to other offenses go uninvestigated 
or unprosecuted due to the lack of formal criminalisation of firearms offenses.  

2.  ILLICIT MANUFACTURING, ILLICIT TRAFFICKING, AND ILLICIT MODIFICATION OF MARKINGS 

Article 5 of the UN Firearms Protocol required State Parties to enact legislative and other measures 
to  criminalise  the  illicit  manufacturing  of  firearms,  the  illicit  trafficking  of  firearms,  and  the 
falsification, obliteration, removal, or alteration of firearm markings. The first two offenses are also 
explicitly included in the EU Firearms Directive. 

The 2024 Europol report, “Decoding the EU’s Most Threatening Criminal Networks,” highlights 
the relevance of such measures by revealing that many of the most dangerous criminal networks 
are  involved  in  the  illicit  trafficking  and  use  of  firearms.  This  involvement  may  be  either  their 
primary criminal activity or connected to their other main business operations. Unfortunately, this 
impact assessment shows that the national legislation of EU Member States varies significantly and 
does not fully align with the definitions of the UN Firearms Protocol and the Firearms Directive. 
This  inconsistency  results  in  an  uneven  criminal  framework  within  the  borderless  EU  area.  A 
harmonised criminalisation of firearms offenses at the EU level is, however, necessary to address 
obstacles  in  cross-border  operational  cooperation,  security  gaps,  and  deficiencies  in  law 
enforcement, prosecution, and the confiscation of criminal proceeds. 

188 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 1: Legal reforms in North-Macedonia, 2023. 192 

On 7 September 2023, North Macedonia made a significant advance in the fight against illegal 
firearms by introducing  key amendments to its Criminal Code. The revisions to articles 395, 
396, and 396-a criminalise the illicit manufacturing, trafficking, and falsification of firearms: 
Article 395 focuses on the manufacturing and procurement of weapons and means intended for 
committing  a  crime,  while  article  396-a  focuses  on  counterfeiting  firearms.  Article  396 
addresses unauthorised production, possession, brokering, and trade of weapons and explosive 
materials. 

Article 396 (1) states: “whosoever without authorisation imports, exports, transports, transfers, 
delivers  or  sells,  buys  or  otherwise  brokers  or  trades  in  firearms,  parts  and  components  of 
firearms, ammunition or explosive substances, or trades in firearms, parts and components of 
firearms, ammunition and explosive substances (...) will be punished with imprisonment from 
four to ten years.” Next, Article 396 (2) states: “(...) individuals engaging in the unauthorised 
manufacture,  assembly,  repair,  modification  of  firearms,  parts  and  components  of  firearms, 
ammunition,  or  explosive  substances,  as  well  as  those  involved  in  the  development  of  new 
weapons or possession of electronic technical drawings and designs for production through 3D 
printers  or  similar  devices  for  parts  and  components  of  firearms,  ammunition,  or  explosive 
substances, shall be subject to sanctioning.” Lastly, Article 395 paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 explicitly 
identify  aggravating  circumstances,  such  as  large  quantities  of  firearms,  components,  or 
ammunition, or if the crime is committed by a group, gang, or other criminal association. 

These  legal  reforms  align  North  Macedonia’s  criminal  justice  system  with  the  UN  Firearms 
Protocol and highlight the relevance of such measures in effectively tackling the firearms threat, a 
significant  challenge  in  the  Western  Balkans.  Notably,  North  Macedonia  explicitly  opts  for 
sentences between 4-10 years, identifies aggravating circumstances, and explicitly acknowledges 
the threat posed by 3D printing within its legislative framework. This initiative may act as a useful 
example for various EU member states. 

Illicit manufacturing of firearms 

The preparatory study to this impact assessment revealed that, while a majority of Member States 
have criminalised the illicit manufacturing of firearms, there are significant discrepancies in the 
definitions  used:  the  scope  of  criminalisation  in  some  Member  States  does  not  encompass  all 
categories of civilian firearms, certain Member States have not addressed all constitutive elements 
of this offense, and some Member States fail to include the illicit manufacturing of essential firearm 
components.  

192  UNODC:  “Enhanced  Cooperation  in  North  Macedonia  to  Tackle  Illicit  Firearms  Following  Landmark  Legal 
Reforms,”  and  UNODC,  “Presentation  by  The  Higher  (Appellate)  Public`s  Prosecution`s  office  Skopje  on  the 
implementation of the Article 5 (Criminalization) of the Firearms Protocol in the legislation of North Macedonia.” The 
(English translation of the) articles can be retrieved in “Regional narrative progress report on the implementation of 
the  roadmap  for  a  sustainable  solution  to  the  illegal  possession,  misuse  and  trafficking  of  Small  Arms  and  Light 
Weapons  (SALW)  and  their  ammunition  in  the  Western  Balkans  by  2024,”  p.26  (URL:  10th-Regional-Roadmap-
Narrative-Report.pdf (seesac.org) ). 

189 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additionally, none of the Member States have explicit laws criminalising the illegal manufacturing 
of firearms via 3D printing technologies, and Member States lack a legal framework targeting the 
creation,  possession,  and/or  dissemination  of  3D  printing  materials,  including  blueprints  (cf. 
preparatory acts). 

Case study 2: 10 illegal firearms workshops dismantled, 2023. 193 

In early 2023, the Spanish Guardia Civil initiated an investigation into the manufacturing of 
illegal firearms, which revealed several clandestine workshops dedicated to this illicit activity. 
In  some  instances,  the  individuals  operated  heavy  industrial  machinery  to  produce  illegal 
weapons,  while  in  others,  they  employed  3D  printing  technologies  to  create  essential 
components for assembling the firearms. 

The investigative activities in the countries led to 15 action days, which led to the dismantlement 
of  10  illegal  firearms  workshops  (DE,  ES,  CA,  UK),  10  arrests  (ES,  SE,  UK),  24  location 
searches (DE, ES, IE, NL, SE, CA, UK,), 49 new investigations initiated, and the seizure of 70 
illegal firearms (including assault rifles, 3D-printed semi-automatic submachine guns, pistols 
and drill presses), other weapons, over 37,000 rounds of ammunition, and weapon parts and 
components (barrels, silencers and magazines). 

Case study 3: Halle Synagogue shooting, 2019. 194 

On  09  October  2019,  a  far  right,  antisemitic  extremist  unsuccessfully  tried  to  enter  the 
synagogue  in  Halle,  Germany,  during  the  Jewish  holiday  of  Yom  Kippur.  The  shooter  was 
prevented from entering the synagogue, in which 52 people were congregated, by a heavy barred 
door. Unable to enter, the attacker fatally shot a woman who was passing by the synagogue and 
hurled an explosive device at a nearby kebab shop, where he subsequently murdered a 20-year-
old man. 

Using  a  3D  printer,  blueprints  and  tutorials  he  found  online,  the  perpetrator  produced  3D 
printed parts of firearms and together with originals parts and metal components assembled 7 
firearms  that  he  later  used  during  the  attack.  His  arsenal  included  two  automatic  pistols,  a 
submachine  gun,  and  a  shotgun.  Additionally,  he  manufactured  at  least  1,364  rounds  of 
ammunition  and  several  explosive  devices.  While  all  the  firearms  were  operational,  the 
submachine gun malfunctioned and repeatedly jammed during the attack. Notably, the attacker 
live-streamed  the  incident  and  later  disseminated  the  instructions  for  manufacturing  the 
firearms on the internet. 

Although  the  court  thoroughly  examined  the  manufacturing  of  the  weapons  and  consulted 
forensic experts on the functionality of the firearms, the defendant was not charged with any 
firearm-related offenses, despite their relevance to this case. Instead, the prosecution opted to 
concentrate  solely  on  the  charges  of  murder  and  attempted  murder,  thereby  resulting  in  the 
specific firearms offenses going unpunished. 

193 Europol: “10 illegal firearm workshops dismantled.” 
194 UNODC: Digest of Firearms trafficking and related cases, p. 26. 

190 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above case studies illustrate that the illicit manufacturing of firearms, including those produced 
with 3D printers, remains a substantial illicit business activity across Europe and other countries. 
On the one hand, these examples illustrate the complexity of prosecuting and convicting firearms 
offenses. On the other hand, these examples demonstrate how both individuals and organised crime 
groups can easily manufacture firearms, thereby significantly lowering the barriers for these entities 
to engage in illegal activities, violence and disruption. As technology becomes more accessible and 
sophisticated,  the  potential  for  misuse  grows,  suggesting  an  urgent  need  for  updated  regulatory 
measures and enhanced enforcement strategies to address these emerging threats. 

Illicit trafficking of firearms 

The preparatory study to this impact assessment demonstrated that several Member States do not 
adequately address  all the essential aspects  of firearms trafficking.  Some  Member States fail to 
encompass all related activities, do not classify the trafficking of unmarked firearms as illicit, and/or 
do not explicitly criminalise the trafficking of essential components. 

Additionally, note that the definitions of firearms trafficking in both the UN Firearms Protocol and 
the EU Firearms Directive explicitly include a cross-border element, thereby implicitly suggesting 
the lack of criminalisation of domestic firearms trade. This omission leaves domestic trade activities 
less regulated or unaddressed (cf. see section 3 infra).  

Case study 4: Criminal network that trafficked illegally converted firearms, 2020-2021. 195 

Investigations  into  the  case  started  in  February  2020  when  22  converted  Flobert  guns  were 
seized in the Dutch port of Hoek van Holland, in a vehicle bound for the United Kingdom. The 
Flobert guns were originally modified to be used legally for recreational or sporting activities 
but had been illegally converted into lethal live-firing arms for criminal purposes.  

Eurojust provided support to  Slovak, Czech, and Dutch authorities, ultimately leading to the 
dismantlement  of  a  criminal  network  involved  in  trafficking  illegally  converted  firearms. 
Eurojust  assisted  in  establishing  a  joint  investigation  team  between  Slovakia  and  the 
Netherlands  and  offered  judicial  support  throughout  the  operations.  Additionally,  Eurojust 
facilitated the Czech authorities in executing European Arrest Warrants (EAWs) and European 
Investigation Orders (EIOs) to ensure the efficient transmission of evidence. 

Law enforcement believes that this criminal syndicate, specialised in the conversion of Flobert 
guns,  supplied  over  1,500  firearms  to  criminal  groups  in  NL,  AT,  DK,  DE,  PT,  SE  and  CZ. 
During  multiple  operations,  six  suspects  were  arrested  across  SK,  CZ  and  NL,  and 
approximately 350 firearms were seized. 

Case study 5: Operation Alpes, 2018. 196 

Operation Alpes was an international effort led by the Spanish National Police with support 
from Austrian authorities. This investigation unveiled an organised crime group based in Spain 

195 UNODC: Digest of Firearms trafficking and related cases, p.32 and p.103 
196 UNODC: Digest of Firearms trafficking and related cases, p. 29  

191 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
with connections to the US and Austria. The network was involved in trafficking firearm parts 
and  components  for  the  purpose  of  reactivating  and  reassembling  weapons.  The  police 
investigation  revealed  the  potential  involvement  of  organised  crime  groups  and  further 
transactions between the main suspect and criminal gangs active in drug trafficking and were 
able to link the main suspect to another supplied in the United States. 

The main suspect, a Spanish national and resident, held two firearms licences granted to him 
for the purpose of hunting and sports activities. With these licenses, he was able to purchase 
deactivated firearms as well as firearms components required for the reactivation of firearms in 
Austria,  where  such  transactions  were  subject  to  fewer  restrictions.  He  shipped  these 
components to Spain through postal and fast parcel services, where he used them to illegally 
assemble and reactivate previously deactivated weapons. 

Case study 6: reduced firearms trafficking in Estonia. 197 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonian society faced significant upheaval during the 
early years of its transition to democracy. This period saw a rise in crime and the emergence of 
organised criminal groups, along with the proliferation of weapons and a marked increase in 
violence, including gun violence.  

Since regaining independence, Estonia has undergone substantial changes in its approach to 
firearm  trafficking.  The  country  has  strengthened  its  institutions  and  implemented  stringent 
firearms  laws:  although  Estonian  legislation  lacks  any  specific  legislation  or  sentencing  for 
firearm-trafficking, this offence is covered in the penal code by the very broad term “unlawful 
handling.” The illicit handling of firearms, essential parts of them and ammunition is punishable 
by  up  to  three  years’  imprisonment,  although  if  it  is  the  second  case,  or  involving  large 
quantities, or committed by a group, it is punishable by up to five years. In cases concerning the 
illicit handling of firearms, their essential parts and ammunition prohibited for civilian use, it 
is  punishable  by  from  one  to  five  years.  Similarly,  for  a  second  time,  or  in  large  quantities, 
punishment increases to between 5 and 15 years. 

Today, the trafficking of firearms and the general availability of illicit firearms in Estonia have 
significantly  diminished.  This  shift  is  also  evident  in  the  scope  and  characteristics  of  gun 
violence, which is currently considered a low-level threat. 

The provided case studies offer only a snapshot of the actual illicit trafficking figures but highlight 
that  the  illicit  trafficking  of  firearms  poses  a  significant  challenge  to  EU  Member  States.  Each 
trafficker or organised crime group involved in this activity has the potential to supply firearms to 
individuals who may use these weapons to harm EU citizens. 

Although the reduction in levels of firearms trafficking and violence in Estonia is likely a result of 
both  broader socio-economic developments  and multiple measures,  it does demonstrate that the 
broad criminalisation of firearms offenses likely plays a significant role in the effective and efficient 
approach to combating firearms trafficking. Additionally, as illustrated by the first two case studies, 
international  cooperation  in  addressing  cross-border  criminal  activities  -  especially  when 

197 The Flemish Peace Institute “Firearm related violence and trafficking in Estonia,” 2022. 

192 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
individuals  or  organised  crime  groups  exploit  differences  in  legislation  between  different 
jurisdictions  -  is  necessary.  Coordinated  action  and  harmonised  criminalisation  at  the  European 
level can thus contribute to more effectively tackling such illicit cross-border activities. 

Modification of markings of firearms 

The preparatory study for the impact assessment made clear that fourteen Member States have not 
criminalised the falsification, illicit obliteration, removal, or alteration of the markings of a firearm. 
Among  the  thirteen  Member  States  that  have  criminalised  this,  three  do  not  extend  this 
criminalisation to the modification of markings on essential components, which, it should be noted, 
is not included in the UN Firearms Protocol. 

Case study 7: altered or no firearms markings in Greece between 2019 - 2022. 198 

UNODC data on the markings of seized weapons in Greece illustrates that firearms markings 
are  often  erased  or  altered.  The  Greek  authorities  seized  59,  101,  17,  and  73  firearms  with 
altered markings between 2019 and 2022, and 33, 102, 21, and 68 firearms with no markings 
over the same period. 

However,  Greek  legislation  does  not  specifically  define  the  offenses  of  falsification,  illicit 
obliteration, removal, or alteration of the markings on firearms and essential components. The 
only relevant provision is Article 7(8) of L. 2168/1993, which is part of the legislation on illegal 
possession. This provision criminalizes acts of deleting or falsifying the number or any other 
element of the weapon's marking or of an essential component. These acts are punishable when 
committed intentionally, with short-term imprisonment ranging from three months to five years 
and a pecuniary penalty between 600 and 15,000 euros. Additionally, there is an administrative 
sanction of temporarily suspending the authorization to legally possess a weapon for up to three 
months, which is the only administrative sanction provided for legal entities. 

Case study 8: a Swedish case of altered firearm markings, 2022. 199 

In a notable case on November 4, 2022, in Sweden, a search of a defendant's residence led to 
the discovery of a bag containing a Kalashnikov automatic rifle with a 7.62 x 39 mm caliber. 
The rifle had altered markings and was found alongside associated magazines and ammunition. 

The court noted that the seized weapon had their serial numbers altered, emphasizing that such 
modifications  hinder  efforts  to  trace  the  weapon's  origin  or  supply  route  up  to  the  point  of 
seizure. This, the court stated, could be indicative of an environment where such weapons are 
likely to be used for criminal purposes. The district court convicted the defendant for aggravated 
firearms offence and drugs offence and sentenced the defendant to three years' imprisonment.  

Additionally, according to broader UNODC data in Sweden, Swedish authorities have reported 
an increase in the seizure of firearms with altered markings over several years: 175 firearms in 

UNODC 

198 UNODC data based on the annual Illicit Arms Flows Questionnaire: dp-firearms-arms-seized | dataUNODC 
199 
case 
doc/illicitfirearmscrimetype/swe/2023/case_b_903-23.html?lng=en&tmpl=sherloc  
UNODC data based on the annual Illicit Arms Flows Questionnaire: dp-firearms-arms-seized | dataUNODC 

https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld//case-law-

903-23. 

URL: 

law: 

case 

B 

193 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019, 219 in 2020, 208 in 2021, and 284 in 2022. Moreover, the seizures of firearms without 
markings also increased significantly during the same period: 83 in 2019, 176 in 2020, 243 in 
2021, and 540 in 2022. 

The Swedish court decision highlighted the significant challenges that erasing or altering firearm 
markings poses to the investigation and prosecution of firearms trafficking offenses. The absence 
of criminalisation for this issue in various Member States complicates the gathering of specific data 
and the prosecution of these offenses. However, the above case studies and statistics demonstrate 
the ongoing - and possibly growing - relevance of this issue. 

3.  illicit possession of firearms 

The following  case studies focus on  an issue that, while not  explicitly  addressed, are implicitly 
indicated by the UN Firearms Protocol and the Firearms Directive: the illicit possession of firearms. 
Tackling  this  issue  is  essential  for  ensuring  a  comprehensive  criminalization  strategy  to  tackle 
firearms-related threats. 

The  legal  basis  for  this  offense  is  implicitly  clear  in  the  Firearms  Directive  but  has  not  been 
explicitly defined in the UN Firearms Protocol. While all Member States enforce sanctions for this 
offense,  the  methods  of  sanctioning  vary  significantly  among  them.  This  inconsistency  in 
classification and enforcement leads to challenges in effective enforcement and prosecution. 

Case study 9: seizures in Europe based on the illicit possession of firearms, 2020-2022. 200 

UNODC data on arms seizures in Europe based on the legal justification of “illicit possession” 
demonstrate that there were 8,629 seizures linked to illicit possession in 2020, 11,587 seizures 
in 2021, and 7,496 seizures in 2022. 

However, the actual number is likely much higher: the questionnaire that led to these results 
was completed by only 10 EU Member States in 2020, 9 in 2021, and 9 in 2022. Additionally, 
the dark figure likely far exceeds the official seizure statistics. 

Case study 10: operation Conversus, 2023. 201 

In  an  operation  led  by  Romania  and  Bulgaria,  law  enforcement  agencies  from  31  countries 
targeted individuals  suspected of  buying,  and subsequently thus  illicitly possessing,  weapons 
from firearms traffickers. 

As  the  procurement  of  illegal  firearms  becomes  increasingly  difficult  and  expensive,  both 
individuals and organised crime groups often turn to converted alarm and signal weapons to 
acquire and possess firearms. Most of the seized weapons in operation Conversus were alarm 
and signal models produced in Turkey before a change in national legislation governing their 
production. These weapons were imported into the EU and legally offered for sale in Bulgaria 

200 UNODC data based on the annual Illicit Arms Flows Questionnaire: dp-firearms-arms-seized | dataUNODC. 
201 Europol: « 22 firearms traffickers arrested across Europe.”  

194 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
and other Member States. However, once sold, they were frequently trafficked across borders 
and converted into lethal firearms in other countries, both within and outside the EU.  

This contributed significantly to the illicit acquisition and possession of illegal firearms. The 
operation not only involved numerous house searches and seizures but also led to the arrest of 
22 firearms traffickers across Europe. 

Case study 11: 1,388 firearms seized in 16 European countries, 2024. 202 

Europol reported on a law enforcement operation led by Romania and coordinated by Europol, 
involving more than 630 house searches and resulting in 107 arrests. This operation, conducted 
in  February  2024,  spanned  16  European  countries.  Nearly  500  converted,  or  ready  to  be 
converted, illicit firearms were recovered during the operation, together with almost 900 illicit 
firearms, as well as 60,192 rounds of unconverted, converted, and live ammunition.  

Europol further explained that individuals and organised criminal networks often use gas, alarm 
and signal firearms, as certain models remain easy to modify to discharge live ammunition and 
convert into lethal weapons. Once these firearms enter the EU, they are usually bought for an 
affordable price from legitimate marketplaces. The weapons would then be converted and resold 
in other countries where obtaining, importing, and possessing a handgun requires a license. 

If illicit manufacturing, illicit trafficking, or the illicit modification of firearm markings cannot be 
proven, there is a risk that harmful firearms activities may remain unpunished. A comprehensive 
criminalisation strategy must therefore also address the issue of illicit possession. While the data in 
the case studies offer only a snapshot, it is evident that each of these weapons could potentially be 
used  in  future  illegal  and  criminal  activities,  such  as  organised  crime  or  terrorist  attacks. 
Consistency  in  classification  and  enforcement  regarding  the  illicit  possession  of  firearms  may 
provide an additional tool to counter this threat. 

Additionally, operation Conversus, which involved the legal production of alarm and signal models 
in Turkey, highlights the importance of a harmonised level of criminalisation across jurisdictions 
to close legal loopholes and mitigate security threats. 

4.  illicit  brokering  activities,  arms  embargo  violations,  and  record-keeping  and  licensing 

offences 

The  UN  legislative  guidelines  to  implement  the  Firearms  Protocol  suggests  States  Parties  to 
enhance their legal frameworks by including additional voluntary offenses beyond those specified 
in  the  Protocol.  These  suggested  offenses  encompass  illicit  brokering,  violations  of  arms 
embargoes,  and  misconduct  related  to  record-keeping  and  licensing.  These  voluntary  or 
complementary offences may help to enforce an EU-wide firearms control regimes. 

Illicit brokering activities 

202 Europol: “Almost 1 400 firearms removed from circulation in 16 European countries.” 

195 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The criminalisation of brokering activities conducted to circumvent established systems is at the 
discretion of individual nations. However, this approach can result in varying rules and penalties 
across Member States, thereby potentially weakening the coherence and effectiveness of the EU 
legal framework. 

Case study 15: dealer supplied guns and ammo to more than 100 crime scenes, 2017. 203 

A  legally  registered  firearms  dealer  in  the  UK  was  found  to  be  supplying  criminals  with 
hundreds of firearms. These firearms were either fraudulently acquired in the United States or 
illicitly reactivated. For example, he imported prohibited 1950s Colt pistols from Chicago, Las 
Vegas, and Denver, falsely declaring them as antiques over a century old to evade regulations. 
His illicit brokering activities were linked to over 100 crime scenes, including gangland murders 
and a firearms attack on a police helicopter. 

The  judge  remarked  that  the  firearms  dealer  had  disregarded  his  legal  responsibilities  as  a 
registered firearms dealer and that he was “at the top of the chain of supply of handguns and 
ammunition to criminal gangs.” The judge sentenced him to 30 years in prison. 

The case study above highlights the potential consequences of illicit brokering activities, which can 
have negative impacts on multiple countries. It may be beneficial to consider incorporating these 
offenses  into  a  comprehensive  EU-wide  criminalisation  framework  aimed  at  addressing  the 
firearms threat. 

Arms embargo violations 

Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council can impose sanctions, including arms 
embargoes, which all Member States must follow. Additionally, countries that are parties to the 
Arms Trade Treaty must not authorise the transfer of conventional arms, including firearms, if it 
violates such arms embargoes. These measures may be considered arms control measures, but they 
could simultaneously also act as crime control measures. 

Case study 16: transnational trafficking of arms and dual-use goods to Libya and Iran, 2018. 
204 

Three Italian nationals were arrested in Venice on 31 January 31, 2017. They were charged 
with trafficking arms and dual-use items to Libya and Iran, in violation of both countries' arms 
embargoes, between 2011 and 2015. The goods were negotiated and sold in several African, 
Asian,  and European countries. Without  passing through Italian territory, the products  were 
shipped to Iran and Libya. The illegal trade included 13,950 M14 rifles, but also the selling of 
anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles, helicopter spare parts, and ammunition made in the Soviet 
Union. 

203 Vlaams Vredesinstituut ”Project DIVERT: Firearms fraud in the European Union”, p. 44. The Guardian: ” Antique-
gun dealer jailed for 30 years for supplying to gangsters.”  

UNODC 

204 
Sent. 
doc/illicitfirearmscrimetype/ita/2018/sent._571632018_.html?lng=en&tmpl=sherloc  

57163/2018, 

URL: 

case 

law, 

https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld//case-law-

196 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even though the rifles did not pass through Italian territory, the Prosecutor opened jurisdiction 
because  the  perpetrators  were  Italian  nationals.  The  three  individuals  were  respectively 
convicted to 3 years and 8 months imprisonment and a EUR 8,500 fine, 3 years and 6 months 
imprisonment and a EUR 9,000 fine, and 2 years imprisonment.  

The  above  example  illustrates  that  the  integration  of  arms  embargo  violations  in  an  EU-wide 
criminalisation  strategy  may  aid  in  countering  and  sentencing  both  internal  and  external  illicit 
trafficking flows. This could also be beneficial in addressing potential jurisdictional issues. 

Record-keeping and licensing offences 

Firearms  control  regimes  are  typically  based  on  licensing,  authorisation  and  record-keeping 
systems  for  various  types  of  firearms-related  conduct,  such  as  importing  and  exporting.  The 
criminalisation of these issues is left to the discretion of individual states. 

Case study 17: export of 4,000 assault rifles based on false end-user certificate, 2019. 205 

The German company Heckler & Koch exported over 4,000 assault rifles to Mexico from 2006 
to 2009. To bypass German export control restrictions due to human rights concerns, Heckler 
& Koch officials colluded with the Mexican procurement office to obtain a falsified end-user 
certificate that excluded certain states, including Jalisco, Chiapas, Guerrero, and Chihuahua. 
However, some of the firearms ended up in Guerrero State, which had been seen as the most 
important  customer  from  the  outset,  according  to  internal  Heckler  &  Koch  email 
communications.  

In  2014,  seven  students  were  killed  and  43  went  missing  in  Iguala,  Mexico.  Investigations 
revealed that some of the rifles used were from the Heckler & Koch shipment.  

In 2019, two company officials were convicted of export fraud, and 3.7 million euros from the 
sale were confiscated. One accused person was convicted for a term of imprisonment of 1 year 
and 10 months, while the other accused was convicted for a term of imprisonment of 1 year of 5 
months. 

Case study 18: operation Gravilla, 2015. 206  

Operation  Gravilla  uncovered  multiple  instances  of  fraud  involving  gun  shop  owners  who 
manufactured  and  distributed  illegally  sized  ammunition  to  unauthorized  users.  These 
individuals forged registry books and police control documents to divert legal components for 
illegal production. 

In Castellón and Valencia, two shop owners were found supplying explosive materials such as 
gunpowder and primers. Seized items included 25 firearms, 20 kilograms of gunpowder, 30,000 
cartridges, military-grade ammunition, a silencer, 55,000 primers, cash, ammunition reloading 
equipment, and numerous counterfeit documents. 

205 UNODC Case law, BGH, Urteil vom 30.03.2021, 3 StR 474/19. URL: https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/case-law-
doc/criminalgroupcrimetype/deu/2021/bgh_urteil_vom_30.03.2021_3_str_47419.html 
206 Vlaams Vredesinstituut ”Project DIVERT: Firearms fraud in the European Union”, p. 63. 

197 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above cases illustrate that the establishment of specific offences regarding record-keeping and 
licensing  may  improve  the  overall  comprehensiveness  and  effectiveness  of  the  EU  approach 
towards the firearms threat. 

5.  Conclusion 

The threat of firearms is a complex and multidimensional issue that requires the criminalisation of 
multiple  activities:  a  key  supply  channel  for  illicit  firearms  within  the  EU  comes  from  illicit 
manufacturing, which also includes illegal conversion of non-lethal weapons into fully functioning 
firearms,  illicit  reactivation  of  deactivated  firearms  and  new  technologies  such  as  3D  printing. 
Furthermore,  criminal  organisations  also  use  illicit  transfers  and/or  trade  between  EU  Member 
States as a source for their firearms. The modification of markings, illicit brokering and misconduct 
in  the  context  of  record-keeping  and  licensing  are  often  accompanying  crimes  to  firearms 
trafficking. Lastly, illegal possession of firearms, essential components and ammunition is not just 
a  result  of  illicit  manufacturing  and  trafficking  of  firearms  but  is  also  often  a  prerequisite  for 
trafficking. Externally, the supply channels are mostly linked to illicit firearms trafficking across 
borders and can include violations of arms embargoes.  

The above case studies illustrate  the consequences of an uneven criminal framework within the 
borderless EU area and demonstrate the need for EU-wide criminalisation. To address the threats 
associated with the criminal use of firearms, robust criminal-law rules are needed that allow for the 
prosecution and punishment of acts that infringe the Firearms Directive, the Firearms Regulation, 
and the UN Firearms Protocol. 

198 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 8: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE PREPARATORY STUDY 
ASSESSING AND COMPARING THE CRIMINALISATION OF OFFENCES 
RELATED TO FIREARMS 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

In  2023,  the  European  Commission  commissioned  a  study  to  map  and  compare  how  firearms-
related offences are criminalised in the Member States (207). This Mapping Study was conducted in 
light of the 2020-2025 EU action plan on firearms trafficking (208). One of the four priorities focuses 
on increasing pressure on criminal markets. The EU Action Plan established that this priority should 
be implemented, amongst other actions, by identifying possible gaps in the existing EU legislative 
framework on the criminalisation of firearms trafficking. 

The Mapping Study provides a comprehensive overview of the Member States’ legislation (209) 
regarding  the  criminalisation  of  firearms-related  offences.  Through  a  series  of  country  studies, 
undertaken by national experts, the study examines how four specific firearms-related offences are 
defined and sanctioned in the Member States. These four offences are illicit manufacturing, illicit 
trafficking, falsification, illicit obliteration, removal, or alteration of the markings (hereafter illegal 
modification of markings), and illegal possession. 

This  executive  summary,  drafted  by  the  Commission  services,  provides  an  overview  of  the 
findings of the Study. The summary focusses on the main problems identified by the study. These 
problems include the divergences in how Member States define firearms offences, the incomplete 
or partial implementation of the definitions in the UN Firearms Protocol and the Firearms Directive 
in  national  legislation,  and  the  significant  differences  in  the  level  of  sanctions  imposed.  The 
executive summary is based on the overall report of the Study and includes specific examples from 
the Member States. 

2.  THE MAPPING STUDY  

2.1. 

Scope of the Study 

The scope of the study is to provide a mapping on how Member States implemented the offences 
provided by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (hereinafter, 
UN Firearms Protocol) (210) and the Directive (EU) 2021/555 (hereafter Firearms Directive) (211). 

207 28 studies assessing and comparing the criminalisation in the Member States and the UK in relation to Northern 
Ireland of offences related to firearms, under Specific contract HOME-2022-ISF-TF1-FW-LECO-0044 
208 COM/2020/608 final. 
209 It is worth noting that the Mapping Study also assessed the situation in the United Kingdom, with regard to Northern 
Ireland. However, this executive summary does not take into account the findings related to Northern Ireland, as they 
will not be included in the legislative actions that will be the subject of the Impact Assessment, of which this executive 
summary is a part.  
210 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2326, p. 208; Doc. A/55/383/Add.2. 
211 Directive (EU) 2021/555 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons (codification),  

199 

 
 
 
These firearm offences are illicit manufacturing, illicit trafficking of firearms, illegal modification 
of markings on firearms and illegal possession of firearms. 

In light of the emerging risks connected to the new technology of the 3D printing of firearms, the 
Mapping Study analysed if Member States have specific provisions to criminalise 3D printing of 
firearms or how this is added to the offence of illicit manufacturing of firearms. 

2.1.1.  Legal basis  

The  UN  Firearms  Protocol  and  the  EU  Firearms  Directive  establish  the  framework  for  the 
criminalisation of firearms-related offences. Article 5 of the UN Firearms Protocol requires Parties 
to adopt legislative measures to criminalise the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, as 
well as the illicit modification of firearm markings.  

The Firearms Directive defines illicit manufacturing and trafficking in Article 1(1), points 11 and 
12. The Directive also sets out rules on the acquisition and possession of firearms, including the 
requirement for authorisation and the prohibition on certain categories of firearms. These rules form 
an  implicit  basis  requiring  Member  States  to  criminalise  illegal  possession  of  firearms. 
Furthermore,  Article  23  of  the  Firearms  Directive  requires  Member  States  to  establish  rules  on 
penalties  applicable  to  infringements  of  national  provisions  adopted  pursuant  to  the  Directive, 
which must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. 

2.1.2.  Aim study and methodology. 

The Mapping Study provided an overall report, based on findings from 27 country fiches, one for 
each Member State (212). Each country fiche includes an analysis of the relevant national legislation 
and  administrative  provisions  in  the  field  of  firearms.  In  particular,  the  experts  analysed  the 
legislation  notified  by  the  Member  States  in  the  context  of  the  transposition  of  the  Firearms 
Directive. Additionally, the experts gathered publicly available relevant case law, administrative 
measures,  documents  (e.g.,  instructions,  policy  documents  such  as  strategies),  and  relevant 
publications/reports to better understand the practical implementation of sanctions. 

Following  the  finalisation  of  the  report  by  the  experts,  each  Member  State  received  its  country 
fiche.  Member  States  were  asked  to  provide  a  factual  check  of  these  reports  and  send  possible 
comments to the Commission services, in order to make sure that the quality of the report was as 
high as possible.  

The criminalisation of firearm offences is primarily governed by criminal law or specific firearms 
legislation.  Depending  on  national  practices,  the  study  evaluates  either  the  criminal  law,  the 
firearms  law,  or  both.  In  addition  to  criminal  sanctions,  the  country  profiles  also  consider 
administrative sanctions.  

212 The Commission consulted the Member States in order to verify the accuracy of the country fiches. Comments were 
received from 16 Member States. In preparing this executive summary, the Commission has taken into account the 
observations submitted by the Member States that identified factual errors in the contributions provided by the national 
experts. 

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3.  DEFINING THE OFFENCES REGARDING FIREARMS 

3.1. 

Illicit manufacturing 

Both  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  and  the  Firearms  Directive  include  a  definition  of  illicit 
manufacturing. These definitions read as follows: 

UN Firearms Protocol, Article 3(d) states : 

“Illicit  manufacturing”  shall  mean  the  manufacturing  or  assembly  of  firearms,  their  parts  and 
components or ammunition: 

(i) From parts and components illicitly trafficked; 

(ii) Without a licence or authorization from a competent authority of the State Party where 
the manufacture or assembly takes place; or 

(iii) Without marking the firearms at the time of manufacture, in accordance with article 8 
of this Protocol. 

Article 1(1)(11) of the Firearms Directive states : 

‘illicit  manufacturing’  means  the  manufacturing  or  assembly  of  firearms,  their  essential 
components and ammunition: 

a)  from any essential component of such firearms illicitly trafficked; 
b)  without an authorisation issued in accordance with Article 4 by a competent authority of 

the Member State where the manufacture or assembly takes place; or 

c)  without marking firearms at the time of manufacture in accordance with Article 4; 

3.1.1.  Coverage of illicit manufacturing as an offence 

Almost all Member States have covered the offence of illicit manufacturing in their criminal or 
firearms legislation. The exceptions are Malta and Sweden, where the  definition of the offence 
only partially covers the scope of the definition set down in the UN Firearms Protocol and the 
Firearms  Directive.  In  Sweden,  illicit  manufacturing  is  only  criminalised  if  it  concerns  the 
manufacturing of military firearms, thereby leaving a gap concerning civilian firearms. In Malta, 
the  definition  of  illicit  manufacturing  has  been  literally  transposed  from  Article  1(1)(11)  of  the 
Firearms Directive. However, this transposition is incomplete, as the manufacture of firearms is 
only penalised as an offence if it concerns the manufacture of firearms listed under Category A of 
the Firearms Directive.  

3.1.2.  Constitutive elements  

Both the UN Firearm Protocol and the Firearms Directive provide as constitutive elements for the 
offence  of  illicit  manufacturing:  the  manufacturing  or  assembly  of  firearms,  their  parts  and 
components or ammunition from either illicitly trafficked parts and (essential) components, without 
a license or without marking the firearms.  

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Firstly, manufacturing firearms from illicitly trafficked essential components is not considered 
a criminal offence in five Member States (Austria, France, Hungary, Malta(213) and Sweden(214)). 
Additionally, in six other Member States (Belgium, Greece, France, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
Poland),  the  text  of  national  law  makes  it  not  directly  clear  whether  the  definition  of  illicit 
manufacturing  also  covers  manufacturing  from  illicitly  trafficked  essential  components.  For 
instance, in Belgium, illicit manufacturing is not defined as such in national legislation. Some of 
the criminal conducts which constitute illicit manufacturing are considered offences and sanctioned 
pursuant to the Belgian Weapons Act. However, Belgian law does not include a clear prohibition 
to manufacture firearms from essential components of firearms illicitly trafficked. 

The second constitutive element of illicit manufacturing, manufacturing without authorisation 
is not covered in Sweden (215).  

The last point, setting out the constitutive element of manufacturing without marking is not set 
out as an offence in two Member States (France and Sweden (216)).  

3.1.3.  Illicit manufacturing by means of 3D printing 

The emergence of 3D printing technology gives rise to concerns regarding the sufficiency of current 
national firearm legislation to effectively address the illegal production of firearms and essential 
components by means of 3D printing.  

None  of  the  EU  Member  States  have  legal  provisions  specifically  addressing  3D  printed 
firearms. However, in those Member States that criminalise the illicit manufacturing of all civilian 
firearms, the definition of illicit manufacturing can be considered general enough to include illicit 
manufacturing of firearms by means of 3D printing.  

Nevertheless,  the  Commission  has  received  reports  by  EMPACT  Firearms,  highlighting 
operational challenges encountered in gathering sufficient evidence to substantiate the offence of 
illicit  manufacturing  of  3D  printed  firearms  or  their  essential  components.  Specifically,  when  a 
workshop is discovered and 3D printed firearms or essential components are seized, the police often 
face difficulties in proving that the 3D printed firearms or components are functional, as this is a 
necessary condition for prosecution in cases of illicit manufacturing. 

In addition, it is often not clear from the national legislation whether the 3D printing of essential 
components is covered by the existing legal framework. At least in four Member States (Greece, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, and Romania), the existing legal framework covers the illicit 3D printing 
of firearm essential components explicitly. For instance, in the Netherlands, as soon as a person 
makes an object that can be considered an essential part of a firearm, the act is penalised under the 
general prohibition of manufacturing weapons without approval. 

213  Malta  has  transposed  the  definition  of  illicit  trafficking  literally,  including  the  constitutive  elements.  However, 
Maltese law does not provide a sanction for these offences.  
214  The  references  to  the  situation  in  Swedish  law,  only  affect  the  illicit  manufacturing  of  military  firearms,  since 
Sweden does not criminalise illicit manufacturing of civilian firearms.  
215  The  references  to  the  situation  in  Swedish  law,  only  affect  the  illicit  manufacturing  of  military  firearms,  since 
Sweden does not criminalise illicit manufacturing of civilian firearms.  
216 With regard to manufacturing of essential components and ammunition, the legislation in Sweden is silent on these 
issues (even with regard to military firearms).  

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Another aspect of 3D printing firearms are the preparatory acts, such as the creation, possession, 
and/or distribution of the blueprints necessary for printing firearms and essential components. The 
general  definition  of  illicit  manufacturing  of  firearms  does  not  include  these  acts  in  its  scope. 
Therefore, in most Member States, there is no guidance or case law on the coverage of blueprints 
for 3D-printed weapons, and it is not clear whether or not it would fall under firearms’ legislation.  

Key findings 

The  assessment  of  national  transposition  of  the  definitions  of  illicit  manufacturing  reveals  the 
following key findings: 

-  Limited  scope  of  implementation:  In  two  Member  States,  the  implementation  of  the 
definition of illicit manufacturing is incomplete, with the scope of the offence covering only 
a part of civilian firearms (limited to category A) or not at all (limited to military weapons). 
Incomplete criminalisation: Not all Member States have enacted legislation to criminalise 
every constituent  element  of the offence of illicit manufacturing,  as required by the UN 
Firearms Protocol and the Firearms Directive. 

- 

- 

-  Specific  gaps  in  coverage:  In  particular,  many  Member  States  do  not  include 
manufacturing from illicitly trafficked essential components in the definition of the offence 
of illicit manufacturing, or it cannot be determined with certainty that this is covered. 
Illicitly manufacturing firearms by means of 3D printing is not covered as a separate 
offence  in  any  Member  State.  Furthermore,  the  preparatory  acts  necessary  prior  to  the 
manufacturing of firearms by means of 3D printing are not covered as a criminal offence in 
any Member State. 

3.2. 

Illicit trafficking 

The UN Firearms Protocol, the Firearms Directive and the Regulation on import, export and transit 
of firearms include a definition of illicit trafficking. These definitions read as follows: 

UN Firearms Protocol, Article 3(e) states : 

“Illicit trafficking” shall mean the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer 
of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition from or across the territory of one State 
Party to that of another State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it 
in accordance with the terms of this Protocol or if the firearms are not marked in accordance with 
article 8 of this Protocol. 

Article 1(1)(12) of the Firearms Directive states : 

‘illicit trafficking’ means the acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their 
essential components or ammunition from or through the territory of one Member State to that of 
another Member State, if any of the Member States concerned does not authorise it in accordance 
with  this  Directive,  or  if  the  firearms,  essential  components  or  ammunition  are  not  marked  in 
accordance with Article 4; 

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Article 2(1)(35) of Regulation 2025/41 (217) states : 

‘illicit trafficking’ means the import, export, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of listed goods 
to, from or across the territory of a Member State to or from the territory of a third country, if any 
of the following applies: 

(a) the Member State concerned does not authorise it in accordance with this Regulation; 

(b) the listed goods are not marked in accordance with the rules on marking referred to in 
Article 6(1); or  

(c)  the  listed  goods  are  declared  for  release  for  free  circulation  without  the  marking 
required  in  the  rules  on  marking  referred  to  in  Article  6(2),  unless  they  are  exempt  in 
accordance with paragraphs 2 or 3 of that Article;  

3.2.1.  Coverage of illicit trafficking as an offence 

For the offence of illicit trafficking, there is a divergence in how Member States define the offence. 
However, this divergence is of a lesser extend as for illicit manufacturing.  

In most Member States, the definition of illicit trafficking is implemented. However, in a federal 
state like Belgium, where import and export of firearms, including relevant criminal provisions are 
regional competences, one of the federal regions has not set out the definition of illicit trafficking. 
As a result illicit trafficking in not criminalised in that region.  

There is a difference between the definitions of illicit trafficking in the UN Firearms Protocol and 
the definition in the Firearms Directive regarding the scope of the cross-border element. Under 
the Firearms Directive, the cross-border element is limited to intra-EU movements, namely from 
or  through  EU  Member  States.  Conversely,  under  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol,  illicit  trafficking 
covers all movements to or from another state party of the Protocol, including third countries. This 
broader scope is a logical consequence of the UN Firearms Protocol being an international treaty. 
Pursuant  to  the  EU  Regulation  on  the  import  and  export  of  firearms,  which  implements  the 
provisions  of  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol,  the  definition  of  illicit  trafficking  is  also  applicable  to 
movements of firearms to third countries. Given that this Regulation has direct effect, the definition 
of illicit trafficking will be directly applicable within the legal systems of the Member States 48 
months following the date of entry into force of the Regulation 

The  study  shows  however  that  most  Member  States  define  illicit  trafficking  in  line  with  the 
Firearms Directive, limiting the cross-border scope to intra-EU movements. Austria, Belgium, and 
Cyprus do reflect both trafficking from or through EU countries and to or from a third countries. 

217 Regulation (EU) No 2025/41 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 on import, export 
and transit measures for firearms, their essential components and ammunition, implementing Article 10 of the United 
Nations  Protocol  against  the  illicit  manufacturing  of  and  trafficking  in  firearms,  their  parts  and  components  and 
ammunition,  supplementing  the  United  Nations  Convention  against  Transnational  Organised  Crime  (UN  Firearms 
Protocol) (recast), OJ L, 2025/41, 22.1.2025. 

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However, in these Member States, trafficking with relation to a third country is subject to higher 
penalties than trafficking between EU countries.  

3.2.2.  Constitutive elements  

The material scope of the offence of illicit trafficking, as defined under the UN Firearms Protocol 
and  the  Firearms  Directive,  is  not  fully  reflected  in  all  Member  States.  In  particular,  in  seven 
Member States (Austria, Belgium (218), Czechia, Spain, Italy, Malta and Sweden), the legislation 
does not include all the criminal behaviours that constitute the essential elements of the offences 
defined in the UN Firearms Protocol and the Firearms Directive. In both the definition of the UN 
Firearms Protocol and the Firearms Directive, illicit trafficking constitutes of committing criminal 
conducts, such as cross-border acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their 
essential components or ammunition,  without  prior authorisation.  In  Italy, for instance, national 
law does not regulate ‘illicit trafficking’ as a definition, but illicit trafficking is penalised under 
Italian  legislation  as  unauthorised  trade  in  weapons  (219).  Under  Italian  law,  the  notion  trade 
includes  importation,  export,  sale,  collection  for  commercial  or  industrial  reasons  of  weapons. 
While  some  criminal  conducts  mentioned  in  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  and  Firearms  Directive 
definition are expressly included by Italian legislation, other criminal conducts such as acquisition, 
delivery, movement and transfer are not covered. This makes that Italy only partially covers the 
offence.  

Both  the  definitions  in  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  and  the  Firearms  Directive  include  as  further 
constitutive  element:  trafficking  firearms  without  correct  marking.  However,  this  is  not 
reflected in the legislation of four Member States (Belgium, Spain, Italy and Malta). As indicated 
above,  under  Italian  law,  the  offence  of  illicit  trafficking  is  penalised  as  unauthorised  trade  in 
weapons. However, this notion of trade does not cover trafficking of firearms, essential components 
or ammunition without markings. In Belgium, where import and export of firearms is a regional 
competence,  the  Flemish  and  the  Brussels  Capital  Region  penalises  certain  aspects  of  illicit 
trafficking.  However,  transfers,  imports  or  exports  of  firearms,  essential  components  or 
ammunition which are not marked are not covered by the relevant criminal provisions.  

In  a  similar  manner  as  for  illicit  manufacturing,  trafficking  of  essential  components  is  not 
explicitly criminalised in some Member States. In Spain , it is unclear to determine, based on the 
current legislation, whether the offence of illicit trafficking also includes the trafficking of essential 
components.  For  instance,  in  Spain  the  definition  of  illicit  trafficking  is  almost  literally 
implemented in national law. However, the national legislation does not link sanctions to the illicit 
trafficking of essential components. It is therefore unclear, whether this is criminalised in Spain.  

3.2.3.  Key findings  

The assessment of national transposition of the definitions of illicit trafficking reveals the following 
key findings: 

218 Only with regard to the Flemish and the Brussels Capital Region. The Walloon Region does not criminalise illicit 
trafficking of civilian firearms as such.  
219 Article 695 of the Criminal Code.  

205 

 
 
- 

Incomplete implementation: Not all national legislations fully implement the definition of 
illicit trafficking as set out in the UN Firearms Protocol and the Firearms Directive. 

-  Partial implementation: In many Member States, the legal definition of illicit trafficking 
is implemented in an incomplete manner, with national definitions only partially covering 
the constitutive elements required by the UN Firearms Protocol and the Firearms Directive. 
 Specific gaps in coverage: In particular, some Member States do not sanction key elements 
of the definition of illicit trafficking, such as the trafficking of firearms without marking. 
-  Most  Member  States  limit  the  cross-border  scope  of  illicit  trafficking  to  intra-EU 

- 

movements. 

3.3. 

Falsification, illicit obliteration, removal, or alteration of the markings  

The UN Firearms Protocol, under Article 5(1)(c), provides for the criminalisation of the offence of 
falsifying or illicitly obliterating, removing, or altering the marking(s) on firearms (hereafter illegal 
modification of markings).  

Article 5(1)(c) of the UN Firearms Protocol reads as follows: 

1.  Each  State  Party  shall  adopt  such  legislative  and  other  measures  as  may  be  necessary  to 
establish as criminal offences the following conduct, when committed intentionally:  

(c) Falsifying or illicitly obliterating, removing or altering the marking(s) on firearms required by 
Article 8 of this Protocol. 

Based on this provision, the state parties to the Protocol are bound to criminalise, when committed 
intentionally, the conduct of falsification or illicit obliteration, removal or alteration of the markings 
on firearms, affixed in accordance with Article 8 of the UN Firearms Protocol. 

3.3.1.  Coverage of illegal modification of markings as an offence  

The study highlights the fact that less than half of the EU Member States have criminalised the 
offence of illegal  modification of markings.  In 14 Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, 
Spain, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal 
and Sweden), this conduct is not criminalised.  

3.3.2.  Constitutive elements  

Of  the  13  Member  States  that  do  criminalise  the  illegal  modification  of  markings,  only  eight 
Member States (Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland and Poland) have 
fully  reflected  the  requirements  of  Article  5(1)(c)  of  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol  regarding  the 
criminalisation of the illegal modification of markings.  

Five Member States (Belgium,  Greece, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia) criminalise the illegal 
modification  of  markings  partially.  The  UN  Firearm  Protocol  defines  illegal  modification  of 
marking  only  with  regard  to  firearms.  It  does  not  extend  the  scope  to  essential  components. 
Nevertheless,  considering  its  importance  to  ensure  proper  traceability,  the  Firearms  Directive 
requires that essential components are marked. Notably, it should be remarked that in two Member 
States (Belgium and Denmark), the illegal modification of markings on essential components is 
not criminalised.  

206 

 
Key findings  

The  assessment  of  national  transposition  of  the  definitions  of  illegal  modification  of  markings 
reveals the following key findings:  

-  Limited criminalisation: Less than half of the EU Member States have criminalised 

- 

illegally modifying markings. 
Incomplete definitions: Among the Member States that have criminalised the offence of 
illegal modification of markings, the definitions in national law do not consistently 
include all the constitutive elements required for the offence.  

-  Gaps in coverage: Specifically, the modification of markings on essential components is 
not uniformly included as an element of the offence of illegal modification of markings in 
national law (220). 

3.4. 

Illegal possession  

Although  the  Firearms  Directive  does  not  define  illegal  possession  of  firearms,  it  implies  that 
Member States should criminalise this offence. Article 5 stipulates that only licensed individuals 
or those specifically permitted under national law may acquire and possess firearms. Article 6(1) 
further requires that acquisition and possession of firearms should be allowed only to persons who 
have  a  good  cause,  who  are  at  least  18  years  of  age  and  who  are  not  likely  to  be  a  danger  to 
themselves or others, to public order or to public safety. additionally, article 9(1) of the Firearms 
Directive requires Member States to take all appropriate measures to prohibit the acquisition and 
possession of the firearms, the essential components and the ammunition of category A firearms as 
defined in Annex I of the Firearms Directive. Article 10(2) requires authorisation for the possession 
of  firearms  listed  in  category  B.  Under  Article  11(1)  of  the  Firearms  Directive,  individuals  are 
prohibited from possessing category C firearms unless they have first declared the possession to 
the  authorities.  Based  on  these  articles  in  the  Firearms  Directive,  illegal  possession  can  be 
described as the offence of possessing firearms, without an authorisation, licence, or without 
being specifically permitted to acquire and possess such firearms under national law.  

3.4.1.  Coverage of illegal possession of firearm as an offence 

No Member State provides an explicit definition of illegal possession as an offence. Nevertheless, 
all Member States criminalise conducts that corresponds with the illegal possession as described 
above.  

The  manner  how  the  criminal  behaviour  constituting  illegal  possession,  is  criminalised  differs 
between Member States. Some Member States include conduct, such as carrying, using, storing, 
keeping,  holding,  selling  etc..  Furthermore,  certain  Member  States  penalise  some  criminal 
behaviour more severely, e.g. carrying firearms in Italy and France. 

In  Belgium,  Czechia,  Greece,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  the  Netherlands,  Finland,  and  Slovakia  illegal 
possession of firearm is criminalised in a general manner, whereby no differentiation is made based on the 
category of the firearm as defined by Annex I of the Firearms Directive. In other Member States, illegal 
possession of some firearms categories are only sanctioned in administrative or minor offences. For instance, 
unlawful  possession  of  category  C6  (deactivated  firearms)  is  an  administrative  offence  in  Romania, 

220 It should be remarked that the UN Firearm Protocol defines illegal modification of marking only with regard to 
firearms. It does not extend the scope to essential components. However, the Firearms Directive requires that essential 
components are marked. 

207 

 
 
 
penalised  only  by  an  administrative  fine.  In  Hungary,  possession  of  category  A  and  B  firearms  without 
authorisation is subject to criminal sanctions, whilst any other infringement of rules regarding the possession 
of firearms is a minor offence. In Czechia owning, possessing, or carrying a firearm or ammunition without 
holding a firearm licence is only an administrative misdemeanour. 

Furthermore, if we then look at the illegal possession of essential components and ammunition, this is not 
explicitly criminalised in Spain and Romania.  

3.4.2.  Key findings  

The assessment of national definitions on illegal possession reveals the following key findings:  
-  Conduct constituting illegal possession is sanctioned in all Member States. However, the 
manner how Member States sanction differs significantly between Member States.  
-  Some Member States only provide for administrative sanctions for the illegal possession 

- 

of specific types of firearms.  
Inconsistent criminalisation of essential components and ammunition: The possession of 
essential components and ammunition is not uniformly criminalised across all Member 
States. 

4. 

SANCTIONS 

The UN Firearms Protocol does not specify requirements on the nature or severity of the sanctions 
for the offences of illicit firearms manufacturing, illicit firearms trafficking and illegal modification 
of markings. In the same vein, Article 23 of the Firearms Directive does not prescribe minimum 
and maximum sanctions for illicit manufacturing, illicit trafficking. The Directive only provides 
the general clause that the penalties provided shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.  

This leaves it up to the Member States discretion, to decide the manner and level of the penalties 
for  the  behaviour  described  under  illicit  manufacturing,  illicit  trafficking  of  firearms,  illegal 
modification of  markings and  illegal  possession  of  firearms.  As  a consequence,  there is  a  great 
variation in the range of sanctions and in the modalities of the sanction.  

4.1.  Range of sanctions 

4.1.1.  Criminal sanctions 

The study provides a mapping of the criminal prison sanctions and fines set out across the Member 
States as penalty for the different firearms offences. The study compared sanctions for both natural 
persons (imprisonment and fines) and for legal persons (fines).  

Some Member States do not set out an upper limit on the fines. These Member States work with 
daily penalty systems, whereby the fine is calculated on the basis of the income or turn-over (for 
legal persons), or on the amount of advantage received from the offence. In Hungary, the maximum 
fine for legal persons, convicted for illicit trafficking is calculated based on the value of the financial 
advantage achieved or intended to be achieved by the offence multiplied by three. Therefore, where 
the average fine is mentioned below, it is only calculated based on fines in the Member States that 
impose a maximum fine. 

It should be remarked that for the Member States that set out a maximum fine, the study could not 
identify how often, in practice, national courts impose the actual maximum fees as sanction.  

208 

 
 
Offences  of  Illicit  manufacturing  are  sanctioned  on  average  by  the  Member  States  with  a 
maximum sentence of 5 years and 4 months of imprisonment. There is a large divergence between 
the maximum sentences provided in the Member States: the highest maximum sentence is 15 years 
(Cyprus), and the lowest is 4 months (Denmark). 

The average maximum criminal fine for natural persons is EUR 1,062,985. There is also a large 
divergence for maximum fines for natural persons: the highest maximum fine is EUR 10 million in 
Germany, and the lowest is EUR 1,600 in Malta. Six Member States (Bulgaria, Czechia, Spain, 
Romania, Sweden, Slovenia) do not provide for criminal fines for natural persons, yet some of them 
provide instead for administrative fines. Criminal fines are not provided for legal persons in five 
Member States (Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Finland and Italy). Yet Bulgaria and Germany provide 
administrative  fines  instead.  For  legal  persons,  the  average  maximum  fine  for  illicit  trafficking 
across the Member States is EUR 6,192,553. Four Member States (Denmark, Estonia, Finland and 
Croatia)  do  not  provide  maximum  fines  for  legal  persons  –  these  Member  States  use  daily  rate 
systems or similar systems to calculate the fine.  

Highest maximum imprisonment sanctions 
available in the MS for illicit manufacturing (in 
years)

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Figure 1: Highest maximum imprisonment sanctions available in the MS for illicit manufacturing 
(in years) 

Illicit trafficking is sanctioned on average with a maximum sentence of 6 years of imprisonment. 
Also, for illicit trafficking, there is a large divergence between the maximum sentences provided 
in the Member States: the highest maximum sentence is 15 years (Germany), and the lowest is 4 
months (Denmark). 

Furthermore, the maximum fines for natural persons on committing illicit trafficking have large 
divergence  between  Member  States.  The  average  maximum  fines  are  EUR  999,734  for  natural 
persons and EUR 5,839,503 for legal persons. In four Member States (Denmark, Estonia, Finland 
and Croatia), there is no upper limit set for criminal fines for natural persons. Additionally, Czechia, 
Denmark,  Hungary  and  Slovenia  do  not  provide  an  upper  limit  for  legal  persons.  Furthermore, 
criminal fines are not provided for legal persons in four Member States (Bulgaria, Germany, Greece 
and Italy). 

209 

 
 
Highest imprisonment sanction available in the 
MS for illicit trafficking (in years)

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Figure 2: Highest maximum imprisonment sanctions available in the MS for illicit trafficking (in 
years) 

Of the thirteen Member States that criminalise the illegal modification of markings, as described 
under Article 5(1)(c) of the UN Firearms Protocol, the average maximum sentence is 4 years and 
2 and half months of imprisonment. The Member State with the highest maximum imprisonment 
sanction is Cyprus with 10 years and the Member State with the lowest is Denmark with 4 months. 

The average fines for natural persons are EUR 999,734, in the Member States that impose an upper 
limit on fines. Three Member States do not set out an upper limit for fines (Denmark, Estonia and 
Finland) for natural persons who illegally modify markings. Two Member States do not provide 
criminal fines (Czechia and Estonia) as sanction for natural persons, even though these offences 
are  criminalised  in  these  Member  States.  For  legal  persons,  the  average  fine  is  EUR  621,276. 
Denmark and Czechia do not set out an upper limit for fines for legal persons. Two Member States 
do not provide criminal fines for legal persons (Greece and Finland).  

Highest imprisonment sanction available in the 
MS for illegal modification of marking (in years)

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DK

SI

CZ

FI

PL

BE

EE

EL

FR

RO

IE

SK

CY

210 

 
 
 
Figure  3:  Highest  maximum  imprisonment  sanctions  available  in  the  MS  for  the  illegal 
modification of markings (in years) 

Illegal possession is sanctioned on average with a maximum sentence of 5 years and 3 months of 
imprisonment. The highest maximum sentence is 10 years (Cyprus), and the lowest is 4 months 
(Denmark). 

The average maximum fine for natural persons across the Member States is EUR 944,531. For legal 
persons, the average fine is EUR 6,118,589. 

Highest imprisonment sanction available in the 
MS for illegal possession (in years)

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

T
A

E
B

G
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Z
Y C
C

E
D

K
D

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L
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S F
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R
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U I
E
H

T
T L

I

U
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V
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L
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L
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T
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O
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I

E S
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K
S

Figure 4: Highest maximum imprisonment sanctions available in the MS for the illegal possession 
(in years) 

As is mentioned above, the lowest maximum term of imprisonment sanction for the four firearms 
offences is four months. In addition, other Member States also have very low imprisonment 
terms as maximum penalty. For illicit manufacturing five Member States have sanctions of less 
than three years of imprisonment. For illicit trafficking, this is the case in three Member States. 
For illegal modification of markings and illegal possession four (221) Member States provide 
maximum sanctions of lower than three years in prison.  

4.1.2.  Administrative sanctions 

Administrative sanction are different from criminal sanctions. While administrative sanctions have 
the aim to also penalise and discourage certain behaviour, they have a different legal nature than 
criminal  sanctions.  Generally,  administrative  sanctions  are  penalties  imposed  by  administrative 
authorities  rather  than  through  the  criminal  justice  system.  They  are  typically  less  severe  than 
criminal sanctions and often involve financial fines or other non-criminal penalties. These sanctions 
are governed by administrative law and are enacted under laws separate from the criminal code.  

221 Of the thirteen Member States that criminalise the offence of illegal modification of markings, only four Member 
States provide prison sanctions of more than three years.  

211 

 
 
 
 
The study discovered that administrative sanctions on firearms-related offences encompass mostly 
financial fines. Nevertheless, for the offences of illicit manufacturing, illicit trafficking and illegal 
possession, Austrian law foresees that administrative sanctions also  encompass a deprivation of 
freedom of maximum six weeks. This detention can be imposed by an administrative authority. 

For illicit manufacturing, six Member States foresee administrative sanctions for natural persons 
(Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Spain, Latvia and Slovakia). The average maximum administrative 
fine  in  these  Member  States  is  for  natural  persons  EUR  10,119.  In  Bulgaria  and  Germany,  the 
assembly of firearms without marking is only sanctioned by an administrative sanction. In these 
Member States, no criminal sanction is provided for natural persons. Four Member States (BG, CZ, 
DE, LV) provide for administrative fines for legal persons who committed illicit trafficking. For 
legal persons this is on average EUR 2,554,230. 

Illicit  trafficking  is  sanctioned  in  eight  Member  States  (Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czechia, 
Germany  Spain,  Latvia  and  Slovakia)  through  administrative  fines.  The  average  highest 
administrative fee for natural persons is EUR 242,833. Also here, four Member States (BG, CZ, 
DE,  LV)  provide  for  administrative  fines  for  legal  persons  for  illicit  trafficking.  The  average 
administrative fine for legal persons is EUR 2,676,730. 

For illegal modification of markings, no Member State foresees an administrative sanction. The 
Member States that penalise these offences provide criminal sanctions.  

Illegal  possession  of  firearms  is  subject  to  administrative  sanctions  in  seven  Member  States 
(Austria,  Czechia,  Germany  Spain,  Romania,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia).  The  average  maximum 
administrative  fine  (EUR  2,879)  is  substantively  lower  than  the  other  firearm  offences.  Only 
Germany  and  Czechia  also  provide  for  administrative  fines  for  legal  persons.  The  average 
maximum fine is EUR 3,339,700.  

Key findings  

The  assessment  of  national  provisions  on  criminal  and  administrative  sanctions  for  firearms 
offences reveals the following key findings; 

-  Large variations in sanctions: There is a significant divergence among Member States in 
the highest and lowest maximum imprisonment sanctions and fines for firearms offences. 
-  Low  maximum  sentences:  Some  Member  States  have  established  very  low  maximum 

sentences for firearms offences. 

-  Not all Member States provide financial fines as a criminal sanction for legal persons 

convicted of firearms offences. 

4.2.  Modalities of sanctioning  

This part provides an overview of the accompanying sanctions that can be imposed under national 
law, as identified by the Study. Furthermore, this part provides a summary on how Member States’ 
legislations regulate the sanctioning of aggravating circumstances and how Member States sanction 
the attempt to commit a firearms-related offence.  

212 

 
4.2.1.  Accompanying sanctions  

Accompanying sanctions are criminal law measures that are imposed by the courts in addition to 
the main criminal sanctions for an offence (imprisonment or fines). Accompanying sanctions are 
dependent  on  the  main  sanctions,  meaning  it  cannot  be  imposed  unless  a  main  sanction  is  also 
applied. For firearms-related offences, the study shows that accompanying sanctions often focus 
on mitigating the risk of firearms towards public security.  

The confiscation of the firearms  which  are the object  of an illicit trafficking  offence, is  in  all 
Member  States  an  accompanying  sanction.  For  illicit  manufacturing  and  illegal  modification  of 
markings, the confiscation of the firearms can be imposed as an additional sanction in all Member 
States, except Sweden (where illicit manufacturing is not an offence regarding civilian firearms). 
For  illegal  possession,  only  three  Member  States  (France,  Romania  and  Sweden)  impose  the 
confiscation of the firearms involved as an additional sanction. French law also imposes property 
confiscation,  including  confiscation  of  proceeds,  as  a  specific  additional  sanction  for  firearms 
manufacturing. 

The  withdrawal  or  refusal  of  the  firearms  authorisation  is  another  possible  accompanying 
sanction  for  the  offences  of  illicit  manufacturing,  illicit  trafficking  and  illegal  modification  of 
markings. Only eleven Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Hungary,  Malta,  Portugal,  Slovenia  and  Sweden)  include  this  accompanying  sanction  in  their 
national framework for illicit manufacturing and illegal modification of markings. Eleven Member 
States  provide  these  additional  sanctions  for  illicit  trafficking  (Bulgaria,  Germany,  Denmark, 
Finland, France, Hungary, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Belgium, Romania). For illegal possession, 
only five Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland and Romania) include withdrawal as 
an  additional  sanction  in  their  national  framework.  When  the  withdrawal  of  an  authorisation  is 
included in the national framework, this is not a mandatory penalty. It remains within the discretion 
of  the  courts  to  decide  if  the  withdrawal  of  the  authorisation  is  imposed,  as  an  accompanying 
sanction for a specific case. Only in Finland, the withdrawal of licences is mandatory if the licence 
holder  committed  an  aggravated  firearms-related  offence,  yet  for  other  firearm  offences,  the 
decision to withdraw a licence lays within the discretion of the judicial authorities. 

The  deprivation  of  rights,  related  to  the  possession  and  use  of  firearms,  can  be  imposed  as 
additional sanction in multiple Member States. Examples are the deprivation of the right to carry, 
acquire  or  possess  firearms.  Furthermore,  the  deprivation  could  also  include  the  revocation  of 
hunting  rights.  Sanctions  entailing  the  deprivation  of  certain  rights  are  included  in  the  national 
framework in ten Member States (Estonia, Spain, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Poland, 
Portugal  and  Romania)  for  the  offences  of  illicit  manufacturing  and  illegal  modification  of 
markings. In eight Member States, the deprivation of rights are an accompanying sanction for illicit 
trafficking (Estonia, Spain, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Poland and Portugal).  

Lastly,  a  prohibition  to  engage  in  certain  professional  activities  is  included  in  the  national 
framework,  as  accompanying  sanction,  for  the  offences  of  illicit  manufacturing,  trafficking  of 
firearms  and  illegal  modification  of  markings  in  thirteen  Member  States  (Belgium,  Czechia, 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Sapin France Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland and Portugal). In 
Spain and Romania, such prohibition are included in the national framework as an accompanying 
sanction for illegal possession of firearms.  

213 

 
4.2.2.  Aggravating circumstances  

Aggravating  circumstances  are  factors  associated  with  committing  an  offence  that  the  law 
recognizes as increasing its severity, resulting in more severe penalties. The study examined two 
kinds of aggravating circumstances in relation to firearm-related offences. Firstly, the study looked 
at aggravating circumstances specific to the firearm offences. These are typically the number of 
firearms involved or whether certain dangerous weapons (222) are involved. Secondly, the study 
focused on two more general aggravating circumstances; if a firearms-related offence is committed 
in the context of organised crime or with a terrorist intend.  

The number of the firearms involved  in the offence of illicit manufacturing is  considered  an 
aggravating  circumstance  in  nine  Member  States  (Austria,  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Estonia,  Finland, 
Lithuania,  Sweden,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia).  In  at  least  two  Member  States  a  high  number  of 
trafficked firearms is included in the national framework as a specific aggravating circumstance for 
the  offence  of  illicit  trafficking  (Austria  and  Slovenia).  For  illegal  possession  high  numbers  of 
firearms are an aggravating circumstance in Bulgaria and Sweden. 

The illicit manufacturing of dangerous weapons is an aggravating circumstance in four Member 
States (Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and  Slovenia).  In particular,  illicit manufacturing or 
trafficking  of  category  A  firearms  is  only  considered  as  aggravating  circumstance  in  Romania. 
Illicit manufacturing of war materials or military equipment (223) is an aggravating circumstance in 
three Member States (Austria, Greece, and Sweden).  

 A firearms-related offence committed by commercial actors, such as brokers and dealers, can lead 
to  specific  aggravating  circumstances.  For  example,  illicit  manufacturing  committed  by 
commercial actors leads  to  higher sanctions in  six Member States  (Austria, Belgium,  Germany, 
Hungary, Sweden and Finland).  

In  all  Member  States,  illicit  manufacturing,  trafficking  and  illegal  possession,  committed  in  the 
context of organised crime, leads to higher penalties. In some Member States, firearms offences 
committed in the context of organised crime are considered as aggravated circumstances. In these 
Member States, convicted persons will receive higher penalties if the firearm offence is committed 
in context of a criminal organisation. For instance, this is the case for Germany, France, Greece, 
Hungary,  Slovakia  and  Sweden.  In  Bulgaria,  Spain,  Croatia,  and  Italy,  a  firearms  offence, 
committed within the framework of a criminal organisation is considered a specific offence in its 
own right. Where a conviction is obtained for a firearms offence as a specific offence of organised 
crime,  the  sanctions  imposed  are  also  more  severe  than  those  applicable  to  a  firearms  offence 
committed outside the context of organised crime.  

222  The  concept  of  "dangerous  weapons"  is  a  term  employed  by  national  legislation.  The  scope  of  which  varies 
significantly from one Member State to another. In general, a number of Member States consider high-calibre firearms, 
military weapons, and automatic firearms to be inherently dangerous. 
223 The  concept of “war materials or military equipment” is a term employed by national legislation. The scope of 
which varies significantly from one Member State to another. Typically, this notion covers specific military weapons 
(tanks, heavy artillery), but in some Member States “war materials or military equipment” include also some of the 
firearms of category A.  

214 

 
 
Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism (224) provides a list of intentional acts considered 
as terrorist offences, when committed with a terrorist intend. The four firearms-related offences 
discussed  in  the  study  are  not  included  in  this  list.  Nevertheless,  all  Member  States,  except 
Germany, consider the fact that a firearms-related offence is committed with a terrorist intent as an 
aggravating circumstance.  

Illicit manufacturing or illicit trafficking offences committed with aggravating circumstances can 
lead  to  higher  imprisonment  sanctions.  On  average,  the  maximum  prison  sentences  are  then 
increased with 4 years and 5 months.  

4.2.3.  Attempt  

The  attempt  of  a  criminal  offence  occurs  when  someone  takes  intentionally  significant  steps 
towards  committing  a  crime  but  ultimately  does  not  complete  the  act.  In  many  legal  systems, 
attempt is sanctioned with a lower penalty than what would be imposed if the offence was fully 
completed. It should be noted that according to Article 5(2)(a) of the UN Protocol, an attempt to 
commit  illicit  manufacturing,  illicit  trafficking  or  illegal  modifications  of  markings  should  be 
criminalised. 

A  significant  number  of  Member  States  does  not  sanction  attempts  for  at  least  one  of  the 
firearms-related offences. For illicit manufacturing, attempt is sanctioned in 17 Member States. 
Those who do not sanction it are Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Romania, Sweden. For illicit trafficking the situation is similar, except that Romania 
also sanctions attempt. Of the thirteen Member States that criminalise the illegal modification of 
markings, an attempt is not sanctioned in two Member States: Romania and Slovenia. In most of 
the  thirteen  Member  States,  the  attempt  to  commit  one  of  the  firearms-related  offences,  is  not 
criminalised in the specific law on firearm offence, but by the general principles of penal law, as 
set out in the criminal code.  

4.2.4.  Key findings  

Key findings on the imposition of accompanying sanctions by Member States:  

-  Significant divergence: There is considerable divergence between the accompanying sanctions 

that can be imposed under national law for the four firearms-related offences.  

-  Limited availability of risk-mitigating sanctions: In more than half of the Member States, 

accompanying sanctions aimed at mitigating the risks associated with firearms, such as the 
withdrawal or refusal of firearms authorisation, cannot be imposed as a sanction for the four 
firearms-related offences.  

-  Limited use of confiscation: For the offence of illegal possession, only three Member States 
provide the additional sanction of confiscation, which also mitigates the risks associated with 
firearms. 

Key findings on the setting out of aggravating circumstances by Member States:  

224 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism 
and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, OJ L 88, 
31.3.2017. 

215 

 
 
 
 
 
-  Divergence in aggravating circumstances: There is significant divergence among Member 

- 

States in the way national laws impose aggravating circumstances.  
Inconsistent consideration of public security risks: Circumstances linked to public security 
risks, such as the number of firearms involved or the dangerous nature of firearms, are not 
consistently considered as aggravating factors across all Member States. For example, only four 
Member States consider the manufacturing of dangerous firearms as an aggravating circumstance. 

-  A significant number of Member States do not sanction attempt to one of the firearm 

- 

offences.  
In all Member States, committing firearm offences in the context of organised crime leads 
to higher penalties, either as an aggravating circumstance or as a specific offence in its 
own right, resulting in more severe sanctions. 

-  All Member States, except one, consider committing firearm-related offences with a 

terrorist intent as an aggravating circumstance, leading to higher penalties. 

5. 

MAIN KEY FINDINGS  

The assessment conducted in the Study reveals significant divergences and gaps in the implementation of 
the four firearms-related offences by the Member States. Considering all the findings from the study, these 
are the key findings:  

- 

- 

- 

Incomplete implementation of definitions: Some Member States have not implemented or have 
only partially implemented the definitions for the offences as provided by the UN Firearms 
Protocol.  
o 

In some Member States, the implementation of the firearm offences does not fully cover 
or only partially covers the scope of the firearm offences defined in the UN Firearms 
Protocol. For example, only illicit manufacturing of category A firearms is covered.  
o  Less than half of the Member States have implemented the offence of illegal modification 

of markings.  

Incomplete definitions: Not all definitions of the firearms-related offences in national law include 
all the constituent elements, as provided by the definitions in the UN Firearms Protocol and the 
EU Firearms Directive.  

o 

o 

In many Member States, the definition of illicit manufacturing does not cover the element 
of manufacturing from illicitly trafficked essential components.  
In multiple Member States, the definition of illicit trafficking does not cover the element 
of trafficking of firearms without marking.  

Illicitly manufacturing firearms by means of 3D printing is not covered as a separate offence in 
any Member State. Furthermore, the preparatory acts necessary prior to the manufacturing of 
firearms by 3D printing are not covered as a criminal offence in any Member State.  

-  Wide range of maximum prison sentences: There is a significant disparity between the highest 
and lowest maximum prison sentences imposed by national laws for the four firearms-related 
offences.  

-  Low maximum imprisonment sanctions: Many Member States impose very low maximum 
prison terms as a penalty for the four firearms-related offences, with the lowest maximum 
penalties being only three months.  
Insufficient mitigation of firearms risks in accompanying sanctions: Many Member States 
lack effective sanctions to mitigate the risks associated with firearms, such as withdrawal or 
refusal of firearms authorisation, and confiscation. 

- 

-  Aggravating circumstances are inconsistent in considering public security risks: 
Circumstances linked to public security risks, such as the number of firearms involved or the 
dangerous nature of firearms, are not consistently considered as aggravating factors across all 

216 

 
 
 
Member States. For example, only four Member States consider the manufacturing of dangerous 
firearms as an aggravating circumstance. 

-  A significant number of Member States do not sanction the attempt to one of the firearms-
related offences. Even though Article 5(2)(a) of the UN Protocol foresees that an attempt to 
commit illicit manufacturing, illicit trafficking or illegal modifications of markings should be 
criminalised. 

217 

 
 
 
ANNEX 9: CALCULATIONS FOR COSTS FOR ADMINISTRATIONS 

1.  COSTS OF AN INCREASE IN STAFF IN MEMBER STATE POLICE AND PROSECUTION OFFICES 

There are no studies nor data regarding a potential impact of increase in staff related to firearms 
offenses, instead the studies carried out during the impact assessment for a proposal for a Directive 
on  the  protection  of  the  environment  through  criminal  law  (ECD),  carried  out  in  2021,  will  be 
used.225  

The transferability of this study comes from the fact that neutral data related to labour costs in the 
EU has been used and environmental crimes and firearms crimes share common problems, such as 
the lack in many occasions of special prosecutor offices or specialised units for investigations. 

According  to  that  study,  the  labour  costs  of  additional  police  officers,  prosecutors  or  judges 
needed  to  handle  the  environmental  crime  cases  can  be  a  useful  approximation  of  the  costs 
associated with an increase of the number of such cases resulting from the revision of the ECD. 
In  order  to  estimate  what  number  of  additional  personnel  might  be  needed,  it  is  important  to 
understand the baseline or the current situation across the Member States. 

Currently, around half of the Member States already have personnel that have some responsibility 
for environmental crime. They do not usually work exclusively on environmental crime, but their 
remit  includes  other  specific  types  of  crimes  related  to,  for  example,  occupational  health  and 
safety, food safety, natural heritage or fraud. 

The baseline research does not indicate that having specialised judges or courts for environmental 
crime is a common practice. The possibility for judges to work exclusively on one type of crime 
depends on the specificities of each national judicial system and might be unlikely226. Moreover, 
one of the interviewed stakeholders signalled that there is no need for judges to be specialised in 
a particular domain to effectively handle environmental crime cases227. (This does not, however, 
exclude  the  possibility  for  additional  training  of  judges  to  improve  their  knowledge  on 
environmental crime generally and the impacts of the revised Environment Criminal Directive.) 
It  was,  therefore,  more suitable to  base calculations of the expected cost  of an increase in  the 
number  of  environmental  crime  cases  on  the  human  resource  needs  for  police  officers  and 
prosecutors in the Member States. 

The starting point to generate a realistic prediction of the number of additional staff that Member 
States would be likely to add in reaction to the revised ECD is the current number of staff working 
on environmental crime in the police and prosecution offices in each Member State. However, 
quantitative  data  for  these  were  only  available  for  a  fraction  of  Member  States  and  were  not 
entirely comparable. Using statistical data on the total numbers of police and prosecutors in each 
Member State, the percentage of those working on environmental crime was calculated for those 
Member States who reported data. This is shown in the table below. 

225 More information can be found in the final report ( JUST/2020/JACC/FW/CRIM/0122), study to supply the impact 
assessment accompanying the document for a proposal for a Directive on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law and replacing Directive 2008/99/EC (SWD(2021) 465 final. 
226 In addition, some Member States have also highlighted the lack of sufficient number of cases to warrant having a 
judge dedicated to environmental crime. 
227 Interview with representatives of the Swedish authorities and practitioners. 

218 

 
 
Table 1: Quantitative baseline data and calculation of % of police and prosecutors working on environmental crime in 
Member States for which data available 

*The sources for the data on numbers of police officers and prosecutors in the Member States are as follows: 

Police: data from Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/crim_just_job/default/table?lang=en%20b, except Ireland, found at: 
https://www.garda.ie/en/faqs/. All police data are 2018 except Italy latest figure available 2016 

Prosecutors:  data  are 
Explorerv2020_1_0EN/Tables 

for  2018  and 

taken 

from  Council  of  Europe,  https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/cepej/viz/CEPEJ- 

**Numbers of police and prosecutors working on environmental crime is based on information available in the 8th Round of Mutual  Evaluation 
country reports as well as information obtained through consultations with some authorities; more details in Baseline Annex. 

It was then assumed that the lowest observed percentage of police and prosecutorial staff working on 
environmental  crime  (0.20%  and  0.17%  respectively,  cells  shaded  grey228)  from  across  the  Member 
States could be considered a reasonable proxy for the amount of additional staff that each Member State 
would be likely to take on to carry out a larger volume of work on environmental crime. The average of 
the available baseline data has also been calculated (1.0% for police and 3.5% for prosecutors), and these 
data are used to generate an estimate for the number of police and prosecutors that would require training. 
The total estimated costs for additional staff linked to the revised ECD are presented in the table below. 

66  These proportions are based on the proportion of total police working on environmental crime in France and the proportion 
of the prosecution in Greece, as these were the lowest figures from those Member States for which data were available. 

228 These proportions are based on the proportion of total police working on environmental crime in France and the 
proportion of the prosecution in Greece, as these were the lowest figures from those Member States for which data 
were available. 

219 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Costs for additional staff in police and prosecution offices in response to revised Directive 

*The sources for the data on numbers of police officers and prosecutors in the Member States are as follows: 

Police: data from Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/crim_just_job/default/table?lang=en%20b,  except Ireland, found 
at: https://www.garda.ie/en/faqs/. All police data are 2018 except Italy latest figure available 2016 

Prosecutors:  data  are 
Explorerv2020_1_0EN/Tables 

for  2018  and 

taken 

from  Council  of  Europe,  https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/cepej/viz/CEPEJ- 

220 

 
 
2.  COSTS OF AN INCREASE IN BALLISTIC DEPARTMENTS WITHIN MEMBER STATES. 

Case study: costs of ballistic reports in Spain and Germany 

Based on regular contacts of staff of DG HOME with ballistic experts in some Member States, it is 
possible to estimate that a Spanish ballistic expert needs an average of 9 hours to finalise a ballistic 
report of a commercial well-known pistol, assuming no hits with other cases, including reception of 
the object, examination, test-fired, check against the automatic ballistic system and issue of the report. 
The average cost of a ballistic expert per hour is €60. In Germany, for the same case this would be 8 
hours  with  an  average  cost  of  €83  per  hour.  The  administrative  cost  of  the  ballistic  report  of  an 
essential component should be establish as 1/3 of that time, so that means 3 hours in Spain and 2.6 
hours in Germany. 

Based on the calculation above, the cost of a ballistic report in Spain is €540 per firearm and €180 
per essential component and in Germany € 664 per firearm and €221 per essential component. 

In case of a ballistic report related to proving that a digital blueprint would result in the printing of 
functional essential components of a firearm, in Germany it is estimated that this would require an 
increase  of  16  hours  on  top  of  the  8  hours,  in  order  to  finalise  the  printing  of  the  parts  and  the 
assembly. The cost of a ballistic report of an essential component 3D printed would be 7.3 hours. The 
administrative  cost  of  a  ballistic  report  related  to  a  digital  blueprint  for  the  manufacture  of  a  3D 
printed firearm would be 1,992€ and 605€ for an essential component. 

To establish a baseline of cases, data collected under the global firearms study carried out by UNODC 
was used.229 The baseline for Spain was calculated, as Germany did not provide data to the Global 
firearms study of UNODC. During the reporting period, Spain reported the seizure of 267 firearms 
related to illicit manufacture, 1,111 firearms seized related to illicit trafficking, 3,713 firearms related 
to alteration of marking and 3,078 firearms related to illicit possession. 

Based on the study carried out by the Commission, assessing and comparing the criminalisation of 
offences  related  to  firearms230,  it  became  clear  that  the  Spanish  criminal  code  does  not  contain 
references to  essential components. Therefore,  it is  estimated that these  figures would need to be 
increased by 5%. 

Furthermore, there is also an estimation that the overall numbers need to be increased by 2% for the 
number of seizures related to firearms trafficking, as the Spanish legislation does not include all the 
criminal  behaviours  that  constitute  an  offence  related  to  essential  elements  defined  in  the  UN 
Firearms Protocol and the Firearms Directive. As a result, there is an estimated increase of 5% of 
seizures as the conduct of illegal modification of marking is not criminalised in Spain. 

Based on the calculation above, the cost of a ballistic report in Spain is € 540 per firearm and €180 
per essential component. Assuming that there was a ballistic report per seized firearm in Spain, for 
the  period  2020-22  the  costs  for  the  Spanish  administration  related  to  illicit  manufacture  were 
€144,180,  for  illicit  trafficking  €599,940,  for  alteration  of  marking  €2,005,020  and  for  illicit 
possession €1,662,120. In total the costs for the Spanish administration for the period 2020-22 were 
of €4,411,260, so an average of €1,470,420 per year. 

229 https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-arms-seized 
230 Annex 8: Executive summary of the preparatory study assessing and comparing the criminalisation of offenses related 
to firearms. 

 
 
 
A  5%  increase  of  all  seizures  in  general,  with  the  inclusion  of  essential  components  as  criminal 
offenses  would  represent  an  average  increase  of  136  cases  per  year,  which  would  result  in  an 
additional cost of € 29,340 per year. 

A 2% increase of seizures related to firearms trafficking would represent an average increase of 136 
cases per year, which would mean an additional cost of €4,000 per year. 

A  5%  increase  of  seizures  related  to  illegal  modification  of  marking  would  represent  an  average 
increase of 61 cases per year, which would mean and additional cost of €33,417 per year. 

As a result, the total increase in administrative costs in Spain, could be estimating to amount to € 
66,757 per year.  

To calculate the increase of administrative costs related to investigating 3D printed firearms, essential 
components and digital blueprints, the data provided by the project HamsTeR, a German research 
project, is used. This project identified 23 seizures of 3D printed firearms in Germany between 2020 
and 2024.  

PO  2  and  3  identified  in  the  impact  assessment  will  include  the  criminalisation  of  the  illicit 
possession,  creation  and  distribution  of  digital  blueprints.  As  a  result,  there  will  be  an  increased 
number of seized blueprints that need to be investigated. Furthermore, it is also expected that the 
seizures of 3D printed firearms and essential components will increase. Using Germany as example, 
the average number of seized 3D printed firearms was 4.6 seizures per year during the period 2020-
24. It is estimated a multiplicator factor of 3 for digital blueprints, which would mean 13.6 seizures 
of blueprints per year, with an administrative cost of €27,091. However, if Member States cooperate 
in testing and identifying these blueprints, this cost could be greatly reduced.  

222 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 10: MONITORING FRAMEWORK 

Specific objective 

Indicator 

Baseline 

Success 

making it easier to 
investigate and 
prosecute 

Number of:  
- Investigations 
- prosecutions 
- convictions  
- training available 

information 

is 
Where 
available,  it  does  not 
show an upward trend in 
firearms-related cases in 
the Member States.  

 ensuring a future proof 
enforcement of 
firearms-related 
offences 

above  but 

As 
specific 
manufactured firearms 

then 
for  privately 

- An increase in cases on 
3D  printed  firearms  can 
already  be  noted 
in 
multiple Member States. 
- EMPACT Firearms has 
a  dedicated  action  to 
improve cooperation and 
exchange of information 
on  3D  printed  firearms.  
removal  orders  on 
- 
digital 
blueprints 
currently  only  linked  to 
terrorism cases.  

223 

specialised 

to  at 
the 

- increase of successful 
prosecution of firearms 
offences by 20% within 
five years. 
training 
- 
sessions  for  prosecutors 
least 
accessible 
80% 
legal 
of 
professionals involved in 
firearms  cases  within 
two years 
- increase in 
investigations and 
prosecutions of cases 
involving new 
technologies with 
20% throughout the 
EU. 
- All Member States 
have a specific focus on 
privately manufactured 
firearms within their 
national strategies.  
- EMPACT Firearms 
dedicated action 
includes cooperation 
and sharing of 
information on digital 
blueprints known to be 
used to manufacture 
firearms and essential 
components.  
- Increased number of 
removal orders on 
digital blueprints 
through the application 
of the Digital Service 
Act.  
- threat assessment on 
technological 
developments of 
privately manufactured 
firearms.  
- Inclusion of the 
particulars of privately 
manufactured firearm in 
national databases on 

 
 
 
Ensure effective, 
dissuasive and 
proportionate sanctions 

- levels of financial 
fines imposed on natural 
persons 
- levels of financial 
fines imposed on legal 
persons 
- levels of imprisonment 
sanctions 
- full use of 
accompanying sanctions 
- types and numbers of 
accessory sanctions 

The available data 
shows that certain 
Member States have 
very low sanction levels 
which cannot be 
considered dissuasive 
and there are large 
discrepancies between 
the Member States in 
terms of accompanying 
and accessory sanctions 
that can be used.  

Additionally, there is 
currently no information 
on the factual sanctions 
imposed.  

Ensure effective 
response through 
cooperation and 
harmonising data 

a. cooperation and 
coordination 

- Continuation of 
EMPACT Firearms  
- Number of firearms 
cases at Eurojust 
- Number of JITs at 
Eurojust  
- Number of SIENA 
messages at Europol 
- Number of established 
and functional NFFPs 
- Number of meetings of 
the Focus Group of 

Current levels of 
Eurojust cases, JITs, 
SIENA messages are 
generally low.  

The Commissions 
scoreboard on the NFFP 
shows that 3 Member 
States have not yet 
established a NFFP and 
that only 8 Member 
States have NFFP’s that 

224 

seized firearms and also 
within the firearms 
module in the firearms 
hub in Europol. 
- An increase of the 
lowest sanction levels 
following the agreed 
upon minimum levels of 
maximum penalties. 
- the current gap 
between the Member 
States’ lowest and 
highest minimum 
maximum penalties is 
diminished by 20% 
within five years 
- Given the current 
situation in which 
sanctions imposed are 
generally taken from the 
lowest segment of 
available sanction 
levels, successful 
implementation would 
show that sanctions 
imposed use the full 
range of sanction types 
and levels (including a 
wider use of 
accompanying and 
accessory sanctions).  
- Confiscation of profits 
is applied 
systematically.  
- specialised training 
sessions for prosecutors 
accessible to at least 
80% of the legal 
professionals involved 
in firearms cases within 
two years 
-  Firearms  remains  a 
the 
priority  within 
EMPACT 
cycle 
-  number  of  SIENA 
JITs 
exchanges 
initiated  for  firearms  at 
Europol  and  Eurojust 
increase 
20% 
respectively 
-  Success  would  be  that 
all  Member  States  have 
established an NFFP and 

and 

by 

 
 
 
 
specialised prosecutors 
against firearms 
trafficking. 

fulfil more than 75% of 
the tasks agreed in the 
Council Conclusions.  

b. harmonising data  

- Harmonised dataset on 
seized firearms. 
- EU Repository based 
on this harmonised 
dataset operational at 
the Firearms Hub of 
Europol 
- Statistics gathered by 
Eurostat 

- Following extensive 
consultations with 
Member States, there is 
still no agreed minimum 
dataset on seized 
firearms.  
- the Firearms Hub at 
Europol is currently 
considering using a 
French dataset (system 
called TRAFFIC) for 
the EU repository, 
however this is not 
based on an agreement 
at EU level. 
- Eurostat currently does 
not gather statistics on 
firearms-related 
offences 

that  all  NFFP’s  fulfil 
more  than  75%  of  the 
the 
in 
tasks  agreed 
Conclusions 
Council 
-  Establishment  of  the 
Focus Group, preferably 
to  EMPACT 
linked 
Firearms,  with  at  least 
one  meeting  each  year.  

-  the  agreed  minimum 
dataset 
seized 
on 
firearms  is  used  by  all 
and 
Member  States 
integrated 
the 
into 
Firearms Hub at Europol 
to  serve  as  an  EU 
repository 
seized 
firearms  through  which 
analysis and cooperation 
can be performed.  

of 

Success  would  be  that 
Eurostat  gathers  at  least 
bi-annual  statistical  data 
on 
firearms-related 
offences.  

225 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 11: ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY 

A. Effectiveness 

1.  Making it easier to investigate and prosecute 

PO1 is expected to increase the focus, on the three mandatory firearms offences as defined by the 
UN  Protocol,  of  those  national  authorities  who  would  be  targeted  by  infringement  proceedings. 
However, it would not be effective in harmonising additional offences, such as the additional offences 
that are defined by the legislative guidelines of UNODC. Furthermore, as the UN Firearms Protocol 
has different marking requirements than the Firearms Directive (the Directive requires marking of all 
essential components), only focusing on infringements linked to the definitions of the UN Firearms 
Protocol will not address the additional marking requirements. Therefore, the effectiveness of these 
infringements would not be as high.  

Additionally,  a  recommendation  paper  on  clarifying  definitions  could  improve  the  legal  clarity 
amongst  Member  States.  However,  the  effectiveness  would  depend  on  Member  States  actually 
adjusting their criminal laws based on these recommendations on a voluntarily basis. Consultations 
with Member States revealed that multiple firearms experts doubted that their Member State would 
take action based on these recommendations. Therefore, recommendations alone, are considered not 
effective enough to tackle the gaps in definitions.  

Setting up a Focus Group of specialised prosecutors against firearms trafficking would be an effective 
tool to improve prosecutions. When searching for specialised prosecutors to set up a consultation 
meeting,  it  became  clear  that  there  is  currently  a  lack  of  prosecutors  with  such  a  specialised 
knowledge. This is specifically problematic as firearms cases require often certain technical skills 
and knowledge. As the  objective of the  Focus  Group would be to  build specialised expertise and 
intensify judicial cooperation, it  would provide a forum  for practitioners  to  exchange knowledge, 
expertise and best  practices. Therefore, this would be an  effective action  to  increase cross-border 
judicial cooperation and result in more successful investigations, prosecutions and convictions for 
trafficking offences. PO2 would be more effective than PO1 due to the legal obligations it would 
include. Notably, the legal obligations of harmonising the criminalisation of the mandatory firearms 
offences and including the offence of illicit possession, and creation and dissemination of blueprints. 
The inclusion of provisions on the establishment of NFFPs and cooperation with EU agencies, and 
on  special  investigative  tools  would  further  improve  the  effectiveness  of  investigations  and 
prosecutions. However, PO2 would not benefit from the setting up of Focus Group of specialised 
prosecutors against firearms trafficking.  

The additional clarifications brought by these non-legislative measures would enhance the overall 
effectiveness of PO3.This is what PO3 does. It combines the legislative measures from PO2 with 
some of the non-binding measures from PO1.  

It  is  unclear  whether  PO4  would  be  more  effective  than  PO3.  It  would  include  further  legal 
obligations regarding the harmonisation of the wider set of firearms-related offences. Based on the 
consultations with  the experts and position of  Member States in  respect  of future of EU criminal 

226 

 
 
law231, especially on how this option would maintain the consistency of national criminal laws, it is 
unclear what the real additional effectiveness of these definitions would be. 

2.  Ensure effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalty types and levels for 

firearms-related offences 

PO1 would be effective in targeting those Member States which currently have low penalty levels. 
However, this would not result in mandatory minimum levels of maximum penalties at EU level.  

PO2  and  PO3  would  be  equally  more  effective  than  PO1  due  to  the  establishment  of  minimum 
maximum penalty levels for all core firearms-related offences. 

PO4 could be slightly more effective than PO2 and PO3 as it would establish minimum levels of 
maximum penalties for the wider set  of firearms-related offences. However,  as already explained 
above, the consultations did not result in identifying clear additional effects of the harmonising efforts 
of these wider sets of offences. 

3.  Ensure a future proof enforcement of firearms-related offences. 

PO1 would focus on recommendations on new technologies only. However, the effectiveness of these 
recommendations is considered low due to the fact that already in 2021 the Commission explained 
how 3D printed firearms fit within the definition of illicit manufacturing232 but still the consultation 
meetings with Member States show a need for further clarifications. Furthermore, within EMPACT 
Firearms  recommendations  have  already  been  made  since  2022  to  criminalise  blueprints  used  to 
produce privately manufactured firearms, but no EU Member State has taken up this action. In the 
meantime,  other  States  in  the  world  such  as  Canada,  Singapore  and  North-Macedonia  have.  The 
adjustments in their legislations are however to recent to already draw clear conclusions regarding 
the effects. 

PO2, PO3 and PO4 are expected to be equally more effective than PO1 due to the introduction of a 
harmonised offence of illicit possession, illicit creation and illicit dissemination of blueprints needed 
to  privately  manufacture  firearms,  essential  components  and  ammunition.  Furthermore,  all  three 
policy options would include a specific clarification in the legal text of how privately manufactured 
firearms, essential components and ammunition (including 3D printed) fit within the definition of 
illicit manufacturing. 

4.  Improve law enforcement and judicial cooperation and harmonised data 

collection on firearms-related offences 

PO1 foresees the establishment of a Focus Group for specialised prosecutors which is considered to 
be an effective action to increase cross-border judicial cooperation. PO1 would invite Member States 

231 The future of EU criminal law: report of the presidency: overview of the discussions. Council Document 16102/24. 4 
December 2024. 
232 
 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive (EU) 2021/555 
of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  24  March  2021  on  control  of  the  acquisition  and  possession  of 
weapons.COM/2021/647 final 

227 

 
 
 
to use a harmonised dataset for seizure of firearms through a recommendation. However, Member 
States do not consider this action to be effective. 

PO2 would be more effective than PO1 due to the legal obligation for Member States to establish a 
National  Firearms  Focal  Point.  Well-established  NFFPs  improve  the  national  coordination  and 
cooperation throughout the entire judicial chain233. Member States who already have such a well-
established NFFP are even supporting the Commission in advocating this towards Member States 
that do not yet have a NFFP or not yet a well-established one. Additionally, the legislative initiative 
would include a specific provision on the need to allow the use of special investigation tools. The 
consultation meeting with magistrates confirmed that this would be an effective measure for cross-
border cooperation.  

Additionally,  PO2  would  establish  the  harmonised  dataset  for  seizure  of  firearms  through  a  legal 
provision. As stated by the experts of the Member States, this would be considered more effective 
than  a  mere  recommendation  paper.  To  collect  any  further  data,  the  initiative  would  refer  to 
cooperation with Eurostat as the responsible entity to gather statistics.  

PO3 would have the same requirements as PO2, and would thus be equally effective. 

PO4 would extend the scope of PO2/PO3 on the offences to be criminalised to include to all firearms-
related offences instead of only the core ones. In addition, it would add the obligation for Member 
States to collect and report data on the different firearms offences to the Commission on a yearly 
basis. As a result, PO4 would be considered more effective. 

B. Efficiency 

1. Making it easier to investigate and prosecute 

PO1  is  seen  as  not  very  efficient  as  the  benefits  resulting  from  infringement  proceedings  and 
subsequent modification of legal framework by Member States would be offset by the efforts and 
cost involved in those proceedings. Although the legal framework would be improved at EU level, 
there would still be gaps and discrepancies. Non-binding policy measures such as recommendation 
papers  on  definitions  of  firearms-related  offences,  or  on  how  new  technologies  fit  in  current 
legislation and lessons learned from MS and other countries have low cost of implementation due to 
their voluntary basis. However, the benefits are limited as the effectiveness is subject all Member 
States applying those recommendations. 

PO2 has a higher level of efficiency than PO1 as the cost from infringement proceedings is subtracted. 
The  cost  incurred  by  the  legislative  changes  are  offset  by  the  benefit  of  harmonising  the  three 
mandatory firearms offences as defined by the UN Protocol and the additional core offense of illegal 
possession, which is considered one of the most important offenses for Member States234 and for the 
citizens.235  

Another important benefit would be to include essential components in all the offenses, as the UN 
Firearms  Protocol  has  different  marking  requirements  than  the  Firearms  Directive  (the  Directive 

233 Council Conclusions 10726/21 on 13 July 2021 on the implementation of the National Firearms Focal Points (NFFPs) 
in the EU Member States. 
234 Annex 2: consultation with law enforcement agencies p. 91 
235 Annex 2: public consultation: need for EU actions on different firearms-related offenses p. 109.  

228 

 
 
 
requires  marking  of  all  essential  components).  Only  focusing  on  infringements  linked  to  the 
definitions of the UN Firearms Protocol will not address the additional marking requirements.  

PO3 is  slightly more efficient  than PO2 insofar  as  it includes additional non-legislative measures 
which have a low cost of implementation, easily offset by benefits these provide, even if small.  

The  level  of  efficiency  of  PO3  would  be  higher  than  PO4,  as  the  extra  legal  obligations  of  PO4 
regarding the harmonisation  of the wider set  of firearms-related offences would mean more costs 
than benefits, as the extra offenses included in PO4 are not so relevant as the ones included in PO3236. 
In addition, the consultation meetings with the experts and position of Member States in respect of 
future  of  EU  criminal  law237  could  not  conclusively  show  the  added  benefit  of  harmonising  the 
criminalisation of all the firearms-related offences. Therefore, there is a possibility that the costs for 
criminalising these harmful conducts would not be outweighed by the benefits for society.  

2.  Ensure  effective,  dissuasive  and  proportionate  penalty  types  and  levels  for  firearms-related 
offences 

PO1  is  seen  as  not  very  efficient  as  the  benefits  resulting  from  infringement  proceedings  and 
subsequent modification of legal framework by Member States would be offset by the efforts and 
cost involved in those proceedings.  

PO2 would be of a higher efficiency than PO1 due to the benefits of establishing minimum maximum 
penalty levels for the core firearms-related offences reflected in the UN Firearms Protocol, without 
the cost resulting from infringement proceedings. 

PO3 would have the same requirements as PO2, and would thus be equally efficient. 

It  is  not  clear whether PO4 would be more  efficient than PO3 in  establishing  minimum  levels  of 
maximum penalties for the wider set  of firearms-related offences.  It  would  incur most costs  as it 
would require more legislative and implementation work. A conservative approach puts the benefits 
as lower than PO2 and PO3 as the consultations have not allowed to identify any clear additional 
impacts of the harmonising efforts of these wider sets of offences. 

3. Ensure a future proof enforcement of firearms-related offences. 

PO2, PO3 and PO4 are expected to equally have higher efficiency than PO1 due to the benefit of 
introducing  a  harmonised  offence  of  illicit  possession,  illicit  creation  and  illicit  dissemination  of 
blueprints  needed  to  privately  manufacture  firearms,  essential  components  and  ammunition. 
Furthermore,  those  policy  options  would  include  a  specific  clarification  in  the  legal  text  of  how 
privately manufactured firearms, essential components  and ammunition  (including 3D printed) fit 
within the definition of illicit manufacturing.  

PO1  would  focus  on  recommendations  on  new  technologies  only  with  no  extra  cost,  but  also  no 
benefit. 

236 Annex 5: analytical methods. 
237 The future of EU criminal law: report of the presidency: overview of the discussions. Council Document 16102/24. 4 
December 2024. 

229 

 
 
 
4. Improve law enforcement and judicial cooperation and harmonised data collection on firearms-
related offences 

PO2, PO3 and PO4 would be of a higher efficiency than PO1 due to the benefit of including a legal 
obligation for Member States to establish a National Firearms Focal Point. The establishment of the 
NFFPs would include specific costs238, but it would be offset by the increase in law enforcement and 
judicial cooperation.  

PO2  and  PO3  would  establish  the  harmonised  dataset  for  seizure  of  firearms  through  a  legal 
provision. This measure would have extra costs239, with the update or creation of national databases 
but the benefits would be higher, as it would mean a significant increase of the intelligence picture, 
which is fundamental for the attribution of resources and correct assessment of the threat at national 
and international level. Another extra benefit would be the ability to better perform analyses through 
which cross-border connections can be identified.  

PO2,  PO3  and  PO4  also  add  the  obligation  for  Member  States  to  collect  and  report  data  on  the 
different firearms offences to the Commission. While PO2 and PO3 require such data to be provided 
5 years after the implementation of the Directive, as part of its evaluation, PO4 requires such data to 
be  provided  on  a  yearly  basis.  This  requirement  would  benefit  the  harmonised  data  collection  on 
firearms-related  offences  as  it  is  unlikely  that  all  Member  States  will  provide  such  information 
voluntarily. The benefit of being able to properly evaluate the Directive and its impact is seeing as 
outweighing the costs that Member States would have to incur to provide the required data. However, 
the yearly reporting is seen as being more cost intensive than the requirement of reporting 5 years 
after implementation. PO4 is thus seen as less efficient than PO2 and PO3.  

238 Annex 4: who is affected and how: II overview of costs-preferred option p.128. 
239 Annex 4: who is affected and how: II overview of costs-preferred option p.128. 

230 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 12: OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 

UN Firearms Protocol 

Firearms 
2021/555 

Directive 

(EU) 

Recast  Firearms  Regulation  (EU) 
2025/41 

Scope 
application 

of 

Transnational  nature of the offences 
between State Parties  

The internal market of the EU  

The  borders  of  the  EU,  therefore  the 
connection  between  the  EU  and  third 
countries 

Definitions 

“Firearm”  shall  mean  any  portable 
barrelled  weapon  that  expels,  is 
designed to expel or may be readily 
converted  to  expel  a  shot,  bullet  or 
the  action  of  an 
projectile  by 
explosive, 
antique 
firearms  or  their  replicas.  Antique 
firearms  and  their  replicas  shall  be 
defined in accordance with domestic 
law.  In  no  case,  however,  shall 
antique  firearms  include  firearms 
manufactured after 1899; 

excluding 

‘firearm’ means any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to 
expel or may be converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action 
of a combustible propellant, unless it is excluded from this definition for one 
of the reasons listed in Part III of Annex I. Firearms are classified in Part II 
of Annex I. 

An object  shall be considered to  be capable of being  converted to  expel  a 
shot, bullet or projectile by the action of a combustible propellant if: 

(a)  it has the appearance of a firearm; and 
(b) as a result of its construction or the material from which it is made, 

it can be so converted; 

 
 
 
 
 
‘essential component’ means the barrel, the frame, the receiver, whether an 
upper or lower receiver, where applicable, the slide, the cylinder, the bolt or 
the breech block, which, being separate objects, are included in the category 
of the firearms on which they are or are intended to be mounted; 

“Parts and components” shall mean 
any element or replacement element 
specifically  designed  for  a  firearm 
its  operation, 
to 
and  essential 
including a barrel, frame or receiver, 
slide  or  cylinder,  bolt  or  breech 
block,  and  any  device  designed  or 
adapted to diminish the sound caused 
by firing a firearm; 

shall  mean 

“Ammunition” 
the 
complete  round  or  its  components, 
including  cartridge  cases,  primers, 
propellant 
or 
powder, 
projectiles, that are used in a firearm, 
provided  that  those  components  are 
themselves  subject  to  authorization 
in the respective State Party 

bullets 

“Illicit  manufacturing”  shall  mean 
the  manufacturing  or  assembly  of 
firearms, their parts and components 
or  ammunition:  (i)  From  parts  and 
components  illicitly  trafficked;  (ii) 
Without  a  licence  or  authorization 
from  a  competent  authority  of  the 
State Party where the manufacture or 
assembly takes place; or (iii) Without 
marking  the  firearms  at  the  time  of 

‘ammunition’  means  the  complete  round  or  the  components  thereof, 
including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, bullets or projectiles, 
that  are  used  in  a  firearm,  provided  that  those  components  are  themselves 
subject to authorisation in the Member State concerned; 

‘illicit manufacturing’ means the 
manufacturing  or  assembly  of 
firearms, 
essential 
their 
components and ammunition: 

/ 

(a) from  any  essential  component 
illicitly 

firearms 

such 
of 
trafficked; 

(b) without an authorisation issued 
in accordance with Article 4 by 

232 

 
 
 
in  accordance  with 
manufacture, 
article  8  of  this  Protocol;  Licensing 
or  authorization  of  the  manufacture 
of  parts  and  components  shall  be  in 
accordance with domestic law; 

“Illicit  trafficking”  shall  mean  the 
import,  export,  acquisition,  sale, 
delivery,  movement  or  transfer  of 
firearms, their parts and components 
and  ammunition  from  or  across  the 
territory of one State Party to that of 
another State Party if any one of the 
States  Parties  concerned  does  not 
authorize  it  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  this  Protocol  or  if  the 
firearms 
in 
accordance  with  article  8  of  this 
Protocol; 

not  marked 

are 

a  competent  authority  of  the 
Member  State  where 
the 
manufacture or assembly takes 
place; or 

sale, 

(c) without marking firearms at the 
in 

time 
of  manufacture 
accordance with Article 4; 
the 
‘illicit  trafficking’  means 
acquisition, 
delivery, 
movement or transfer of firearms, 
their  essential  components  or 
ammunition  from  or  through  the 
territory  of  one  Member  State  to 
that  of  another  Member  State,  if 
the  Member States 
any 
concerned does not authorise it in 
accordance with this Directive, or 
if 
essential 
firearms, 
components  or  ammunition  are 
not  marked  in  accordance  with 
Article 4; 

the 

of 

‘illicit  trafficking’  means  the  import, 
export,  sale,  delivery,  movement  or 
transfer  of  listed  goods  to,  from  or 
across the territory of a Member State to 
or from the territory of a third country, 
if any of the following applies: 

(a) the Member State concerned does not 
authorise  it  in  accordance  with  this 
Regulation; 

(b) the  listed  goods  are  not  marked  in 
accordance with the rules on marking 
referred to in Article 6(1); or 

(c) the  listed  goods  are  declared  for 
release  for  free  circulation  without 
the marking required in  the rules on 
marking  referred  to  in  Article 6(2), 
unless they are exempt in accordance 
with paragraphs 2 or 3 of that Article; 

233 

 
 
 
 
“Tracing” shall mean the systematic 
tracking  of  firearms  and,  where 
possible, their parts and components 
and  ammunition  from  manufacturer 
to  purchaser  for  the  purpose  of 
assisting the competent authorities of 
States 
detecting, 
investigating  and  analysing  illicit 
manufacturing and illicit trafficking. 

Parties 

in 

/ 

‘tracing’  means  the  systematic 
tracking  of  firearms  and,  where 
possible, 
essential 
their 
components and ammunition from 
manufacturer to purchaser, for the 
purpose of assisting the competent 
authorities  of  Member  States  in 
and 
detecting, 
analysing 
illicit  manufacturing 
and illicit trafficking. 

investigating 

/ 

Contains definitions on alarm and 
signal  weapons, 
and 
acoustic  weapons,  deactivated 
brokers, 
dealers, 
firearms, 
museums and collectors 

salute 

Contains many more definitions linked 
to customs terminology and to firearms 
terms (same as the Firearms Directive). 

Harmonised 
application 

State Parties can be more stringent  Member  States  can  be  more 

Member States cannot be more stringent 

stringent 

Criminalisation  3  mandatory 

offence 

(illicit 
manufacturing, illicit trafficking and 
falsifying  or  illicitly  obliterating, 
removing or altering the markings on 
firearms) + attempting to commit or 
participating as an accomplice in an 
offence  +  organizing,  directing, 

Member States shall lay down the 
rules  on  penalties  applicable  to 
infringements of the Directive and 
shall  take  all  measures  necessary 
are 
to 
that 
penalties 
implemented. 

ensure 

they 

The 

Member States shall lay down the rules 
on penalties applicable to infringements 
of  the  Regulation  and  shall  take  all 
measures necessary to  ensure that they 
penalties 
are 

implemented.  The 

234 

 
 
abetting, 

facilitating  or 
aiding, 
counselling  the  commission  of  an 
offence 

provided  for  shall  be  effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive. 

provided 
proportionate and dissuasive. 

shall  be 

for 

effective, 

Confiscation, 
seizure 
disposal 

and 

Record-
keeping 

and 

components 

State Parties should establish rules to 
enable confiscation of firearms, their 
and 
parts 
ammunition  that  have  been  illicitly 
manufactured or trafficked. + make it 
possible 
the  seized 
firearms 

to  destroy 

Information  in  relation  to  firearms 
shall  be  kept  for  not  less  than  10 
years,  in  order  to  facilitate  tracing. 
The information needs to include the 
marking of firearms and the issuance 
and expiration dates of authorisations 
for international transactions. 

Member States need to ensure that 
illegally  possessed  category  A 
firearms are impounded. 

In the event of a reasonable suspicion of 
illicit  trafficking  of  listed  goods,  the 
goods shall be seized or retained 

Member  States  shall  keep,  for  not  less 
than 20 years, all information relating to 
the import, export and re-export of listed 
goods,  which  is  necessary  to  trace  and 
identify those goods, and to prevent and 
detect illicit trafficking therein 

at 

and 

firearm 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that 
all firearms may be linked to their 
owner 
any  moment.  A 
computerised  data-filing  system 
shall  contain  the  information  of 
essential 
the 
components  (type,  make,  model, 
calibre  and  serial  number),  the 
names  and  addresses  of 
the 
suppliers and persons owning the 
firearms,  and  any  conversions  or 
modifications  made 
the 
firearms.  This  data  shall  be  kept 
for  a  period  of  30  years  after  the 

to 

235 

 
 
destruction  of 
essential component. 

the  firearm  or 

Marking 
firearms 

of 

Each Firearms shall be marked at the 
time of manufacturing, at the time of 
import  and  when  transferred  from 
government stock to civilian market. 
The  marking  shall  include  name  of 
manufacturer, 
of 
the 
manufacture and the serial number 

country 

Each 
firearm  AND  essential 
component shall be marked. This 
to  be  clear, 
marking  needs 
permanent  and  unique.  It  shall 
include  name  of  manufacturer, 
country  of  manufacture,  serial 
number and year of manufacture.  

to 

Firearms  can  only  be  imported  if  they 
are  marked  according 
the  UN 
Firearms  Protocol  rules  and  before 
placement on the EU market all firearms 
and  essential  components  also  need  to 
be marked according to the rules of the 
Firearms Directive.  

Deactivated firearms can be imported if 
they have a certificate.  

Deactivation of 
firearms 

If  deactivated 
firearms  are  not 
recognised as a firearm then offence 
should  be  established  for  the  illicit 
reactivation  of  deactivated  firearms. 
The principle of deactivation are:  a) 
all  essential  parts  of  a  deactivated 
firearms  are permanently inoperable 
and 
removal  or 
replacement;  b)  the  deactivation  is 
verified by a competent authority; c) 
a  certificate  will  be  issued  after  the 
verification.  

incapable  of 

‘deactivated 
firearms’  means 
firearms  that  have  been  rendered 
permanently  unfit  for  use  by 
that  all 
deactivation,  ensuring 
essential  components  of 
the 
firearm  in  question  have  been 
rendered  permanently  inoperable 
and 
removal, 
replacement  or  modification  in  a 
manner  that  would  permit  the 
firearm  to  be  reactivated  in  any 
way; 

incapable 

of 

Deactivated  firearms  need  to  be 
verified by a competent authority, 
which  shall  issue  a  certificate. 

236 

 
 
export, 
and 

Requirements 
for 
import 
transit 
authorisation 
systems 

and 

Security 
preventive 
measures 

transit,  for 

international 

Each  State  Party  shall  establish  or 
maintain  an  effective  system  of 
licensing  or 
import 
export  and 
authorization, as well as of measures 
on 
the 
transfer  of  firearms,  their  parts  and 
components  and  ammunition.  When 
a  third  country  is  concerned  by  a 
transit, the State Party will ask for its 
for 
consent. 
temporary  import  and  export  for 
lawful  purposes  such  as  hunting, 
sport 
evaluation, 
repairs  may  be 
exhibitions  or 
established. Exchange of information 
between  State  Party  on  receipt  of 
dispatched goods should be possible.  

Simplified 

shooting, 

rules 

State  parties  shall  take  appropriate 
measures 
to  detect,  prevent  and 
eliminate the theft, loss or diversion 
of, as well as the illicit manufacturing 
of  and  trafficking  in,  firearms,  their 
and 
parts 

components 

and 

to 
Implementing  act  adopted 
establish  technical  standards  for 
deactivation.  

Transfers  of  firearms  between 
Member  States  are 
regulated 
through a system of prior consent 
which is facilitated by the Internal 
Market 
System. 
Information 
Additionally,  EU  hunters,  sport 
shooters  and  historical  reenactors 
can  use  an  EU  firearms  pass  to 
through  and 
temporary 
in  other 
participate 
Member States.  

travel 
in  events 

All  firearms,  essential  components, 
ammunition  and  alarm  and  signal 
weapons  need  an  import  authorisation 
before  they  enter  the  customs  territory 
of 
the  EU  AND  need  an  export 
authorisation  before  the  exit  the  EU. 
Simplified  rules  are  established  for 
imports  and  exports  for 
temporary 
hunting, 
shooting,  historical 
reenactment, evaluation, exhibition and 
repair.  Post-shipment  checks  may  be 
performed  and  the  export  needs  to 
upload proof of receipt documents in the 
electronic licensing system.  

sport 

In  order  to  minimise  the  risk  of 
firearms  and  ammunition  being 
accessed by unauthorised persons, 
Member  States  shall  establish 
rules on the proper supervision of 
firearms  and  ammunition  and 

Procedure are established at import and 
export to perform controls on the goods. 
non-compliant 
Furthermore,  when 
shipments are detected, these are seized 
or retained.  

237 

 
 
ammunition. Focus is on security and 
controls  at  the  time  of  manufacture, 
import, export and transit.  

Information 
and 
cooperation 

and 

Training 
technical 
assistance 

Information exchange on case studies 
involved  organised  criminal 
(on 
groups,  means  of  concealment, 
modus  operandi  etc.),  how  rules  are 
implemented, establish a single point 
of  contact.  Cooperate  on  tracing  of 
firearms  and  on 
the  prevention, 
combat  and  eradication  of  illicit 
manufacturing  and  illicit  trafficking 
of firearms.  

States  Parties  shall  cooperate  with 
each other so that States Parties may 
receive  the  training  and  technical 
assistance necessary to enhance their 
to  prevent,  combat  and 
ability 
eradicate the illicit manufacturing of 
and trafficking in firearms, 

together. 

rules  on  their  proper  storage  in  a 
secure manner. Firearms and their 
ammunition  shall  not  be  readily 
Proper 
accessible 
supervision  shall  mean  that  the 
person  lawfully  possessing  the 
firearm 
ammunition 
the 
concerned  has  control  over  it 
during its transportation and use.  

or 

Exchange of information between 
the  Member  States  is  facilitated 
through a committee.  

Exchange  of  information  is  facilitated 
through the electronic licensing system 
and also through the establishment of a 
coordination group.  

Exchange of information between 
the  Member  States  is  facilitated 
through a committee.  

Exchange  of  information  is  facilitated 
through the electronic licensing system 
and also through the establishment of a 
coordination group.  

238 

 
 
Brokers 
brokering 

and 

States Parties that have not yet done 
so  shall  consider  establishing  a 
system for regulating the activities of 
those who engage in brokering. Such 
a system  could  include  one or more 
measures  such  as:  (a)  Requiring 
registration  of  brokers  operating 
within  their  territory;  (b)  Requiring 
licensing 
of 
brokering; 
(c)  Requiring 
disclosure  on  import  and  export 
or 
licences 
accompanying  documents,  of  the 
names  and 
locations  of  brokers 
involved in the transaction 

authorizations, 

authorization 

or 

or 

or 

the  rules  of  the  Firearms  Directive  are 
upheld.  

‘dealer’ means any natural or legal 
person  whose  trade  or  business 
consists wholly or partly of either 
of the following: 
(a) the 

trade, 
exchange,  hiring  out,  repair, 
modification  or  conversion  of 
essential 
or 
firearms 
components; 

manufacture, 

trade, 
or 

(b) the 

manufacture, 

exchange,  modification 
conversion of ammunition; 
‘broker’  means  any  natural  or 
legal  person,  other  than  a  dealer, 
whose  trade  or  business  consists 
wholly  or  partly  of  either  of  the 
following: 
(a) the negotiation or arrangement 
of transactions for the purchase, 
sale  or  supply  of  firearms, 
essential 
or 
ammunition; 

components 

(b) arranging 

the 

transfer  of 
firearms, essential components 
or 
a 
ammunition  within 
from  one 
Member  State, 
Member  State 
to  another 
Member State, from a Member 

239 

 
 
  
State to a third country or from 
a 
a 
third 
Member State; 

country 

to 

shall 
Each  Member  State 
establish  a  system  for 
the 
regulation  of  the  activities  of 
dealers  and  brokers.  Such 
systems  shall  include  at  least 
the following measures: 
(a) the  registration  of  dealers 
and brokers operating within 
the 
that 
territory 
Member State; 

of 

(b) the 

licensing 
of 

or 
authorisation 
the 
activities  of  dealers  and 
brokers  within  the  territory 
of that Member State; and 
(c) a  check  of  the  private  and 
professional integrity and of 
the  relevant  abilities  of  the 
dealer  or  broker  concerned. 
In the case of a legal person, 
the  check  shall  be  both  on 
the  legal  person  and  on  the 
natural  person  or  persons 
directing the undertaking. 

240 

 
 
 
Import  and  export  authorisations  can 
only  be  granted  if  the  importer  or  the 
those 
exporter 
firearms  according  to  the  rules  of  the 
Firearms Directive.  

to  own 

licensed 

is 

Authorisations 
to 
a 
own 
firearm 

/ 

Member  States  shall  allow  the 
acquisition  and  possession  of 
firearms  only  by  persons  who 
have  been  granted  a  licence  or, 
with respect to firearms classified 
in  category C,  persons  who  are 
specifically  permitted  to  acquire 
and  possess  such  firearms 
in 
accordance with national law. The 
ownership of a category C firearm 
needs 
to  be  declared.  An 
authorisation is needed to acquire 
and  own  a  category  B  firearm. 
in 
Category  A 
principle  prohibited  to  be  owned 
by  civilians  although  exceptions 
are possible.  

firearms  are 

Member  States  shall  permit  the 
acquisition  and  possession  of 
firearms  only  by  persons  who 
have  good  cause  and  who  are  at 
least 18 years old (exceptions are 

241 

 
 
 
  
  
and 

/ 

Salute 
acoustic 
weapons 

possible) and are not likely to be a 
danger to themselves or others.  

firearms 

‘salute  and  acoustic  weapons’ 
means 
specifically 
converted for the sole use of firing 
blanks,  for  use  such  as  in  theatre 
photographic 
performances, 
television 
sessions, 
re-
recordings, 
enactments,  parades, 
sporting 
events and training; 

film  and 

historical 

Remain 
category.  

in 

their  original 

firearms 

Alarm 
and 
signal weapons 

No  specific  focus,  although 
the 
definition of a ‘firearm’ contains the 
words  that  a  device  that  is  readily 
convertible  should  be  considered  a 
firearm.  

Remain  in  their  original  firearms 
category 

‘alarm and signal weapons’ means 
devices  with  a  cartridge  holder 
which  are  designed  to  fire  only 
irritants,  other  active 
blanks, 
substances 
pyrotechnic 
or 
signalling  rounds  and  which  are 
not capable of being converted to 
expel a shot, bullet or projectile by 

242 

to  an 

Also  an  alarm  and  signal  weapon  is 
subject 
import  authorisation. 
Member  States  need  to  ensure  that  the 
devices  comply  with 
technical 
standards of the Firearms Directive.  

the 

 
 
 
the  action  of  a  combustible 
propellant. 

Technical  standards  were  created 
to establish the non-convertibility 
of  alarm  and  signal  weapons. 
Competent  authorities  have 
to 
check  alarm  and  signal  weapons 
based 
technical 
standards.  

these 

on 

243