Revision of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty
Date: 2026-02-19
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy

Factual summary of the feedback to the call for evidence and the contributions received 
in the context of the public consultation on the revision of Regulation 1/2003 

This  document  should  be  regarded  solely  as  a  summary  of  the  feedback  to  the  call  for 
evidence and the contributions made by stakeholders in the context of the public consultation 
on the revision of antitrust rules. It cannot in any circumstances be regarded as the official 
position of the European Commission or its services and therefore does not bind the European 
Commission.  

This document provides a factual summary. Responses to the consultation activities cannot 
be considered as a representative sample of the views of the EU population. This summary 
does not prejudge the outcome of the impact assessment phase. 

On 10 July 2025, the European Commission (“Commission”) launched a public consultation 
in the context of the impact assessment for the revision of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 
of  16  December  2002  (‘Regulation  1/2003’).  The  Commission  sought  the  views  of 
stakeholders on the upcoming revision of Regulation 1/2003 through a call for evidence and 
a public consultation questionnaire.  

The  public  consultation  questionnaire  was  published  in  English,  French  and  German. 
Participants could reply in any of the official languages of the EU. The call for evidence and 
the  public  consultation  were  promoted  through  a  press  release,  and  on  DG  Competition’s 
website.  

The public consultation led to the submission of 75 contributions from 73 stakeholders1. 27 
contributions were submitted in reply to the online questionnaire and the Commission received 
feedback  on  the  call  for  evidence  from  35  stakeholders.  Additionally,  13  stakeholders 
submitted documents directly to the relevant functional mailbox.  

The  below  is  a  factual  summary2  of  the  responses  received  in  regard  to  both  the  Call  for 
Evidence and the public consultation questionnaire, noting that not all stakeholders addressed 
all  topics  (and  that  therefore  the  total  number  of  responses  on  some  questions  differ  from 
others).  

In parallel, the Commission also invited feedback from the national competition authorities of 
the European Competition Network (“NCAs”). The views that the NCAs shared in this context, 
will be set out in a separate summary. 

1 Two stakeholders submitted feedback to the call for evidence as well as replying to the  public consultation 

questionnaire on EU Survey. 

2  To  keep  the  summary  concise,  it  does  not  report  exhaustively  on  all  questions  asked  or  all  the  feedback 
provided. The summary focuses on the more relevant feedback provided on the topics covered by the call for 
evidence/questionnaire and only briefly mentions other topics raised by stakeholders (see section II.6). Where 
the summary mentions a specific number of respondents taking a particular view, this generally only takes into 
account respondents that answered the specific question that is reported on, or that expressed unequivocal 
views. 

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The law firms that responded are active in Europe and tend to have clients in several Member 
States and beyond. A number of lawyers’ associations also provided comments. 

All companies/business organisations that responded (a total of 8) are large in size (i.e. have 
over 250 employees). They are active in several industries, such as ICT and energy. 

II.  Consultation Results 

1.  Investigative tools  

Stakeholders were asked whether they or their members had been subject to or advised on 
Commission investigations over the past decade. 16 respondents explicitly stated that they 
(or their members) had been subject to or had represented undertakings that had been subject 
to Commission’s investigations over the past 10 years.  

I.  Requests for information 

Stakeholders  were  asked  whether  they  or  their  members  had  received  or  advised  on  a 
Commission request for information (“RFI”) over the past decade. 19 respondents replied in 
the affirmative. 

Stakeholders were then asked to provide estimates as to the costs incurred by companies 
to respond to RFIs under Regulation 1/2003. Respondents across stakeholder groups flagged 
that it was difficult to estimate the cost of a response to an RFI and underlined that costs vary 
highly depending on several factors, namely the scope of the questions posed, the complexity 
of the relevant market, the party’s access to certain resources, such as lawyers, or the size of 
the  company’s  team  handling  the  case.  They  stated  that  replying  to  RFIs  usually  requires 
hiring external staff, such as consultants, IT staff and lawyers, which can become costly, and 
that costs tend to increase significantly if forensic data collection and data review is required 
by the Commission.  

When asked about the average time necessary to reply to an RFI based on search terms5, 
15  respondents  submitted  an  answer  (most  of  them  legal  professionals,  but  also  business 
associations from various industries, and some companies). They stated that the amount of 
time to reply to an RFI is often dependent on the nature of the case and that the deadlines to 
reply  set  by the  Commission  are  often too  short.  Although respondents  acknowledged that 
there  are  some  flexibilities  to  extend  the  time  to  respond,  they  would  prefer  that  longer 
deadlines are set from the start and called for the Commission to be more flexible in allowing 
deadline extensions.   

II.  Preservation orders 

Stakeholders were asked about the added value of including a specific power in Regulation 
1/2003 for the Commission to adopt decisions ordering undertakings to preserve evidence.  

5 An RFI based on search terms or “search-term RFI” refers to a request for documents contained in a specified 
dataset of business records of an undertaking that are responsive to specific search terms (or combinations 
thereof). 

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Respondents representing different types of stakeholders (companies, business associations, 
associations of lawyers, law firms and a public authority) questioned the need for such a new 
power, primarily in view of the existing general obligation to preserve evidence that derives 
from the case law. They referred to potential costs related to changing IT systems to be able 
to comply with the preservation orders. They also mentioned that, if such a power were to be 
introduced, it should be done with safeguards (e.g. proportionality, limited in scope and time, 
only issued if the Commission has suspicions of noncompliance with the general obligation to 
preserve) and called for it to replace the more general obligation to preserve.  Respondents 
also flagged extra-territoriality concerns regarding the potential scope of preservation orders6, 
and  called  for  guidelines  on  how  to  comply  with  the  general  preservation  duty  rather  than 
introducing a new preservation power. 

Other respondents, also representing different types of stakeholders (law firms, associations 
of lawyers, a company and a consumer association) argued that preservation orders (i) would 
be less intrusive than dawn raids; (ii) would bring more legal certainty regarding the scope of 
the general duty to preserve and would be better than such a general obligation; (iii) could 
lead  to  more  targeted  initial  collection  of  data  which,  on  the  one  hand,  would  allow  the 
Commission to optimise its resources and, on the other, would allow investigated companies 
to minimize costs and disruption; and (iv) should not be too burdensome, if the order applies 
to limited custodians. Respondents from the legal profession acknowledged that preservation 
orders would be beneficial if designed in a concrete and proportionate way, limited in time and 
kept under review while the investigation progresses.  

Stakeholders were then asked what would be the benefits of introducing the power to adopt 
preservation orders for both undertakings and the Commission. Responses to this question 
mainly  came  from  stakeholders  active  in  the  legal  profession.  Regarding  benefits  for 
companies,  they  referred  to  greater  certainty  and  less  costs.  Regarding  benefits  for  the 
Commission, they acknowledged that such power could speed up investigations, require less 
resources, allow for more targeted document requests and could also allow the Commission 
to conduct remote inspections.   

Stakeholders  were  also  asked  about  the  additional  costs  that  preservation  orders  would 
trigger as compared to the existing general duty to preserve data. Respondents representing 
companies,  business  associations,  law  firms  and  lawyers’  associations  addressed  the 
question.  They  conveyed  that  costs  would  depend  on  how  broad  the  preservation  orders 
would be (i.e. the narrower the order, the more manageable the costs), and explained that if 
the Commission were to request the data to be kept in specific formats or to retain it under 
parameters that are different to those used by the companies, then companies would incur 
costs related to the services of IT and legal experts. 

Stakeholders were then enquired about the costs and benefits of introducing sanctioning 
powers in the event of breach of preservation orders. The respondents that addressed this 
question represented different types of stakeholders (companies, business associations, legal 
professionals, a consumer association). They identified the following as potential costs: (i) risk 
of defensive behaviour by investigated companies, such as over-preservation, which in turn 
could  lead  to  inefficiencies  (e.g.  costs,  administrative  burden);  (ii)  negative  impact  on 

6 E.g. calling for the Commission not to target data stored outside of the EU that is not accessible by the target 

company. 

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spontaneous cooperation by companies; and (iii) risks of preservation breaches despite good 
faith in implementation by companies. As to the benefits, they referred to (i) deterrence and 
enhanced compliance with preservation orders; (ii) increased effectiveness of investigations; 
and  (iii)  a  better  understanding  of  the  consequences  in  cases  of  non-compliance  with  the 
order. 

Finally,  stakeholders  were  also  asked  to  rate  the  impact  of  a  potential  power  to  issue 
preservation  orders  in  terms  of  (i)  administrative  burden  for  companies;  (ii)  flexibility  for 
companies; (iii) costs for companies; and (iv) legal certainty. Out of the stakeholders which 
replied7: (i) the majority qualified as negative or very negative the impact preservation orders 
would have on administrative burden (14 respondents), flexibility (12 respondents) and costs 
for companies (13 respondents) and (ii) the majority (14 respondents) qualified as positive or 
neutral the impact that the power would have on legal certainty. 

III.  Inspections 

Stakeholders were asked whether they or their members had been subject to or advised on 
Commission inspections over the past decade. 15 respondents replied in the affirmative.  

Stakeholders were then asked to provide an estimate of the average cost that traditional 
inspections trigger for companies under Regulation 1/2003. Respondents acknowledged 
the value of inspections, while noting that they usually entail significant costs for the inspected 
companies. However, respondents explained that it is difficult to give concrete cost estimates 
as this is usually dependent on the scope of the investigation8. Instead, respondents listed the 
factors  that  drive  costs  up  for  companies,  namely  (i)  the  fact  that  several  teams  (legal,  IT, 
security) are usually required to pause their daily business during inspections or (ii) the usual 
need to seek external counsel (e.g. economic consultants, external lawyers, IT experts).  

Regarding the potential introduction of a Commission power to conduct remote inspections 
of digital business records, stakeholders were asked about the safeguards that should be 
in place as compared to those that exist for on-site inspections9.  

If the power were to be introduced, respondents called for remote inspections to be held under 
the same safeguards as traditional inspections, if not slightly higher: (i) the right for companies 
to have a representative monitoring the inspection, such as a legal representative or external 
counsel;  (ii)  the  need  to  respect  privacy,  legal  professional  privilege,  trade  secrets  and 
fundamental  rights  (including  the  right  of  defence);  (iii)  the  need  to  have  a  clearly  defined 
scope for the inspection; (iv) that the Commission keeps a record of all the steps taken during 
inspection to ensure that the Commission’s actions can easily be monitored; and (v) the need 

7 19 respondents gave an explicit answer regarding the impact on administrative burden, 17 addressed costs 
and legal certainty, and 16 replied on flexibility. The rest of the respondents either left a blank answer to these 
questions or replied with “N.A”, “No opinion” or similar terms. 

8 One respondent, a law firm, submitted an estimate of average inspection cost, stating that it can be as high as 
300 000 euro, including costs related to the on-site inspection and the continued inspection taking place at the 
Commission’s premises. 

9 Based on the responses received, it appears that some of the respondents assumed that remote inspections 
would be conducted in full virtual mode. In this regard, it should be noted that remote inspections would not 
necessarily  be  held  in  a  fully  virtual  setting.  For  example,  they  could  take  place  away  from  the  business 
premises and at the Commission’s premises, with attendance of the company’s representatives.    

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to have a formal written decision as the basis for the inspection (e.g. motivating the necessity 
of a remote inspection over a traditional one). 

Stakeholders were furthermore asked to identify benefits and costs of remote inspections 
as compared to traditional on-site inspections.  

Respondents focusing on costs expressed that costs could be reallocated due to emerging 
needs rather than reduced (e.g. increased costs in technology, data protection, etc) or did not 
expect  any  reduced  costs  or  reduced  administrative  burdens  with  remote  inspections. 
Respondents focusing on benefits said that remote inspections (i) could potentially reduce the 
administrative burden on stakeholders, (ii) could be less disruptive than on-site inspections 
and (iii) would save time, cost, travelling, and would facilitate access to relevant data10.  

Stakeholders were then enquired about the benefits and costs of remote inspections (for 
undertakings  and  the  Commission)  as  compared  to  search  terms  RFIs.  The  feedback 
(across  stakeholder  groups)  was  mixed.  Respondents  identified  the  following  benefits:  (i) 
improvement  of  the  Commission’s  investigative  powers  thanks  to  a  more  targeted  forensic 
investigation; (ii) remote inspections would be faster than search terms RFIs; (iii) they would 
interfere  less  with  companies’  day-to-day  business;  (iv)  they  would  entail  lower  costs  for 
companies as searches do not need to be conducted by the company. When asked about the 
costs, respondents referred to the following: (i) remote inspections may entail more costs than 
RFIs (with a respondent acknowledging that this may be the case in the short term, but remote 
inspections may be more efficient/less costly in the long term); (ii) they would be less flexible 
than RFIs and entail more risks for companies’ rights of defence; (iii) they would give rise to 
data protection and privacy issues; and (iv) they may be more intrusive than RFIs. 

Finally, stakeholders were also asked to rate the impact of the possibility to conduct remote 
inspections in terms of (i) administrative burden for companies; (ii) flexibility for companies; 
(iii) costs for companies; (iv) legal certainty; and (v) rights of defence. Out of the stakeholders 
who  replied  to  these  questions11,  the  majority  qualified  the  impact  of  such  a  power  on 
administrative burden, costs and flexibility for companies as neutral or positive12. Half of the 
respondents that addressed the question considered the impact on legal certainty to be neutral 
or positive, while the other half considered it to be negative. The majority of respondents to 
this question13 qualified as negative or very negative the impact that conducting inspections 
out of the company’s premises would have on rights of defence.  

IV.  Interviews 

Stakeholders  were  asked  whether  companies  frequently  refuse  to  make  their 
representatives available for an interview. Out of 17 respondents that provided a response 
to this question, three lawyers’ associations, two law firms, two companies and five business 
associations  stated  that  companies  typically  do  not  refuse  this.  One  lawyers’  association 
stated that some companies do not make their representatives available for an interview and 

10 These benefits were recognized as advantageous for both the Commission and for undertakings (but mainly 

for the Commission, for some respondents).  

11 18 respondents gave an explicit answer regarding the impact on administrative burden and rights of defence, 

and 16 respondents explicitly addressed costs, legal certainty and flexibility.  

12 11 respondents said so regarding administrative burden and flexibility, and 10 said so regarding costs. 
13 I.e. 12 out of 18 respondents. 

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another  that  its  members  advise  clients  not  to  make  their  representatives  available  for 
interviews, as they are less predictable than written submissions.14  

Stakeholders were also asked about potential benefits and costs for stakeholders and the 
Commission  of  introducing  compulsory  interviews,  compared  to  other  investigative 
tools. Respondents flagged the following main benefits: compulsory interviews may enhance 
the  effectiveness  of  the  Commission’s  investigations,  and  lead  to  a  reduced  need  for 
inspections and more targeted RFIs; and it would be reasonable to align the Commission’s 
powers in relation to interviews with its powers under the Digital Markets Act15 and the powers 
of the NCAs under the European Competition Network Directive16.  

Respondents flagged the following main drawbacks and costs: compulsory interviews are a 
less  effective  investigative  tool  than  RFIs  and  the  Commission  should  use  this  tool 
proportionately, only when necessary, and where the individual can provide added value to 
the investigation; decisions summoning individuals for interviews would be subject to appeal 
which would create litigation risks and risk delaying the proceedings; legal fees; traveling and 
time costs; costs for managing and storing records; and disruption of the company’s business.  

Respondents  also  explained  that  if  a  compulsory  interview  power  were to be  introduced,  it 
would have to be accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards: advance notice of the 
interview, protection of the privilege against self-incrimination, protection of legal professional 
privilege (“LPP”) (which some respondents argue should be extended to in-house counsels), 
right to a legal representation for both the company and the individual, the ability to review and 
correct the statement provided during the interview, the right of the company to nominate the 
relevant individual for the interview, a decision ordering the interview that can be challenged 
before the EU Courts, and the right of the company to cross-examine the witness before the 
Hearing Officer.  

Finally, stakeholders were asked about the possibility of introducing fines for failure to 
appear  at  an  interview  or  refuse  to  answer  questions,  and  for  providing  misleading, 
false or incomplete information. The benefits of introducing sanctioning powers identified 
by respondents include: ensuring compliance with this tool and increasing the effectiveness 
of the Commission’s investigation. Other feedback from respondents indicates that fines with 
respect  to  compulsory  interview  powers  should  only  be  imposed  in  case  of  an  intentional 
breach  and  calls  for  the  respect  of  LPP  and  the  privilege  against  self-incrimination.  The 
drawbacks  raised  by  stakeholders  are:  issues  related  to  the  proportionality  of  possible 
sanctioning of companies for conduct of their employees; possible conflicts of interest between 
the company and the individual; duplication of sanctions for the provision of false, misleading 
or  incorrect  information  which  already  exist  for  RFIs;  increased  compliance  risks  and  legal 
costs for companies and employees; more conservative engagement by employees; and a 

14 Three stakeholders did not provide a reply that was responsive to the relevant question. 
15  Regulation  (EU)  2022/1925  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14  September  2022  on 
contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 
(Digital Markets Act), OJ L 265/1, 12.10.2022, Article 22. 

16 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the 
competition  authorities  of  the  Member  States  to  be  more  effective  enforcers  and  to  ensure  the  proper 
functioning of the internal market, OJ L 11/3, 14.01.2019, Article 9. 

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potential  adverse  impact  on  compliance  by  companies  leading  to  an  unfriendly  business 
environment.  

2.  Improving  decision-making  procedures  to  allow  for  effective  (and  faster) 

enforcement 

Respondents made suggestions to improve, in general, the effectiveness of the Commission’s 
decision-making  powers.  Suggestions  included  the  introduction  of  procedural  deadlines  or 
timelines; a clearer, and more structured and transparent investigative process; an increased 
reliance on commitments pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003; better market testing of 
remedies under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003; the definition of clear enforcement priorities; 
and  the  introduction  of  more  powers  for  the  Commission  for  the  monitoring  of  the 
implementation of Commission decisions.  

I.  Interim measures 

When  asked  about  costs  and  consequences  of  the  current  legal  and  procedural 
framework  for  interim  measures  impacting  competition  in  general  and  the  various 
stakeholders, respondents pointed at several negative consequences arising from the current 
framework, namely a lack of enforcement, legal uncertainty, higher costs linked to long-lasting 
proceedings and reduced choice and innovation for consumers.   

On the question of whether the legal test for ordering interim measures should change 
and, if so, which changes they would envisage, 23 respondents (representing both businesses 
and  legal  professionals,  and  including  one  academic/research  institution  and  one  NGO) 
expressed the view that the legal test should not change. 9 respondents belonging to different 
stakeholder  categories,  however,  considered  that  there  would  be  merit  in  applying  a  less 
onerous legal test for ordering interim measures. Others referred to potential changes, without 
however expressing a clear view as to whether such changes would be warranted. Proposals 
advanced in this respect included replacing the requirement of “serious and irreparable harm 
to  competition”  with  “serious  and  immediate  harm/significant  damage  to  consumers  or 
markets”; broadening the scope of  Article 8  of Regulation 1/2003 to  also include individual 
interests of competitors; or replacing the requirement of a “prima facie infringement” with that 
of a “reasonable suspicion of an infringement”. 

Respondents also listed both negative and positive consequences of a potential change to 
the legal test (as identified in response to the previous question) for ordering interim measures. 
As  negative  consequences  of  a  potential  lowering  of  the  substantive  legal  threshold, 
respondents  mentioned  increased  legal  and  operational  risks  and  costs  for  companies,  as 
well  as  an  increased  risk  of  false  positives.  As  benefits,  stakeholders  mainly  referred  to  a 
faster  and  more  effective  competition  law  enforcement,  which  is  seen  as  beneficial  to 
competition (in particular in fast-moving markets). 

On  the  question  of  whether  the  procedural  framework  for  ordering  interim  measures 
should change and, if so, which changes to the procedural requirements stakeholders would 
envisage,  7  respondents  were  against  any  changes,  whereas  26  respondents  (across  all 
major stakeholder categories) were in favour of amendments to the applicable procedure.  

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Respondents  listed  the  following  proposed  changes  aimed  at  making  the  process  faster: 
introducing deadlines/timelines for interim measure proceedings, a more limited access to the 
file,  contemplating  a  purely  oral  procedure,  considering  a  shortened  procedure  in  cases 
introduced by complaints, or dispensing with the need to consult the Advisory Committee on 
Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions. Other proposals included providing for a formal 
right  to  request  interim  measures,  defining  a  maximum  time  period,  during  which  interim 
measures may  apply  and  establishing  specialised  teams  for  dealing  with  interim measures 
within  the  Commission.  Finally,  11  respondents  (both  legal  professionals  and  business 
representatives) underlined the importance of maintaining the right to an oral hearing in interim 
measures proceedings, while 2 respondents were in favour of re-considering the need for an 
oral hearing. 

Stakeholders were also asked about the benefits and costs of a potential change to the 
procedural  framework  for  ordering  interim  measures  (as  identified  in  response  to  the 
previous question). As negative consequences respondents listed the risk that investigated 
undertakings  may  not  be  afforded  adequate  procedural  protection,  which  ultimately  may 
increase  the  risk  of  false  positives,  undue  business  interruption  and  undue  reputational 
damage  for  companies.  They  also  mentioned  that  increased  time  pressure  may  cause  an 
increased burden and cost for investigated undertakings. As regards benefits, respondents 
explained  how  faster  intervention  would  provide  for  more  effective  enforcement,  that  the 
prospect  of  swift  action  itself  could  deter  companies  from  engaging  in  anti-competitive 
conduct,  and  that  resolution  of  a  competition  issue  at  an  early  stage  could  prevent  other 
litigation.  

Stakeholders were then consulted on the possibility of the Commission having the power to 
impose interim measures in situations of extreme urgency without the prior hearing of 
the party concerned. 20 respondents expressed their scepticism or opposition in relation to 
this possibility. Concerns mentioned in this regard were what respondents considered a far-
reaching limitation of the rights of defence, as well as the increased risk of legal uncertainty, 
false positives, unjustified reputational damage and undue business disruption connected to 
such  a  possibility.  Respondents  also  referred  to  the  risk  that  unjustified  interim  measures 
adopted in this way may risk undermining the legitimacy of enforcement action and damaging 
the Commission's reputation, as well as to the risk that interim measures are not realistic or 
are not well informed if they are ordered without the prior hearing of the party concerned. 

The  3  respondents  (all  representing  businesses)  that  were  positive  about  the  possibility  of 
interim measures being ordered without the prior hearing of the party concerned mentioned 
as advantages effectiveness and efficiency gains stemming from a fast intervention. 

II.  Commitments 

Stakeholders  were  asked  about  the  benefits  and  costs  of  a  deadline  for  the  parties  to 
submit  a  binding  commitments  offer  following  a  detailed  opening  decision  outlining  the 
Commission’s preliminary concerns. 

The  benefits  indicated  by  respondents  (across  all  stakeholder  categories)  concerned 
predictability,  increased  effectiveness  of  enforcement,  the  reduction  in  the  duration  of 
proceedings  and  increased  legal  certainty  for  all  parties.  With  respect  to  the  costs, 
respondents  (including  businesses  and  legal  professionals)  indicated  that:  i)  an  opening 

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decision  might  not  be  sufficiently  detailed  to  understand  the  competition  concerns;  ii)  a 
deadline might restrict the party(ies)’s ability to make tailored or appropriate commitments; iii) 
the Commission would lose flexibility to accept commitments later in time; iv) the Commission 
would  have  less  time  to  properly  test  commitments’  proposals;  and  v)  there  are  risks  of 
procedural imbalance given that the deadline would be imposed only on the party(ies).  

Respondents  had  mixed  views  about  the  appropriateness  of  setting  a  deadline  for  the 
party(ies)  to  submit  a  binding  commitments  proposal  running  from  the  adoption  of  the 
opening decision. As alternatives, respondents mentioned flexibility to offer commitments at 
all  stages  of  the  procedure  or  indicated that  the  event triggering  the  deadline  might  be the 
Statement of Objections or the start of the negotiations on commitments. 

With  respect  to  the  appropriate  deadline  to  offer  commitments,  3  respondents  (including 
businesses and a lawyers’ association) indicated a concrete time frame of “a few months”, “a 
couple  of  months”  or  “two  to  three  months”,  while  others  highlighted  the  need  for  flexibility 
when setting a deadline depending on each investigation.  

Stakeholders were then asked whether a commitments proposal submitted by the party(ies) 
under a deadline system should be binding and final, with the exception of a one-time 
amendment  possibility  addressing  the  shortfalls  identified  in  the  formal  market  test.  As 
advantages  of  this,  respondents  (which  represented  different  stakeholder  categories) 
mentioned that this would provide predictability and discourage speculative or poorly prepared 
offers. As disadvantages, respondents mentioned that a binding and final deadline allowing 
only  a  one-time  amendment  would  be  artificial  and  might  lead  to  less  effective  or  tailored 
proposals, not adequately addressing all concerns.  

Stakeholders  were  also  asked  to  indicate  the  benefits  and  costs  of  the  fact  that  the 
Commission  would  not  accept  commitments  submitted  after  the  binding  deadline. 
Specific costs mentioned are that the party(ies) would not be able to improve their proposals 
during the process, leading to less effective outcomes. Benefits mentioned include procedural 
efficiency and predictability as the party(ies) would be encouraged to engage seriously from 
an early stage, preventing tactical delays.  

3.  Access to file 

Stakeholders were asked about the costs that companies (information providers as well as 
addressees  of  statements  of  objections)  incur  in  the  current  access  to  file  system. 
Feedback  from  respondents  from  the  viewpoint  of  information  providers  indicated  that  the 
costs depend on the number and length of documents to be redacted and described the costs 
for  the  preparation  of  non-confidential  versions  of  documents  as  high  or  very  high.  Where 
respondents provided quantitative figures, they pointed to (i) hundreds of hours of work and 
tens of thousands of euros in legal fees for medium-sized cases; and (ii) thousands of hours 
of work and hundreds of thousands of euros in legal fees for large cases. From the viewpoint 
of  the  investigated  company,  respondents  reported  high  costs  for  legal  fees,  IT  costs  and 
internal costs. 

The stakeholders were asked about the potential benefits and costs for the addressees of 
statements  of  objections  of  obtaining  access  via  a  mandatory  confidentiality  ring,  and  to 

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differentiate  those  between  the  options  presented  in  the  call  for  evidence17.  As  regards 
benefits, feedback from respondents indicated the possibility to use confidential information 
in the reply to the statement of objections, as well as gains in efficiency through the proposed 
options,  especially  if  the  access  would  be  given  via  digital  means.  As  regards  drawbacks, 
respondents pointed to a risk for companies’ rights of defence under both options considering 
the reduced access for addressees of statements of objections to non-confidential versions, 
with the concerns being generally more pronounced with respect to Option 2.   

In  particular,  respondents  indicated  that  external  advisors  are  not  always  in  a  position  to 
properly  assess  the  documents;  that  under  Option  1  the  Commission  might  have  a  lower 
incentive to reject excessive confidentiality claims; that requests for additional non-confidential 
versions might involve lengthy procedures; and that delegating the defence mainly or even 
exclusively to external advisors would greatly increase the reliance on and costs for external 
legal teams. A suggestion was made to introduce into a mandatory confidentiality ring only 
those documents for which confidentiality claims are disputed. 

The stakeholders were also asked about benefits and costs of mandatory confidentiality 
rings for information providers. As regards benefits, feedback from respondents indicated 
that  mandatory  confidentiality  rings  could  reduce  the  burden  of  preparing  non-confidential 
versions and that advantages to information providers were possible, provided that technical 
and  legal  safeguards  for  the  protection  of  confidential  information  could  be  ensured.  As 
regards  drawbacks,  respondents  expressed  concerns  regarding  the  risk  of  disclosure  of 
business secrets, and that the introduction of any mandatory system could lead to a higher 
bureaucratic  burden  and  would  need  to  be  accompanied  by  clear  standards  of  protection, 
transparency mechanisms and legal safeguards.  

The  stakeholders  were  further  asked  about  possibilities  to  alleviate  concerns  about 
unauthorized disclosure of business secrets. Feedback from respondents pointed to the 
fact  that  external  lawyers  are  bound  by  professional  rules  which  should  ensure  that 
confidentiality is respected and that concerns could be alleviated by putting in place adequate 
measures,  such  as  strict  legal  safeguards  (in  particular  in  the  form  of  non-disclosure 
agreements),  procedural  and  technical  protections  (such  as  (virtual)  data  rooms  with 
appropriate  audit  capabilities  and  traceability),  higher  confidentiality  tiers  for  particularly 
sensitive information, and sanctions for unauthorized disclosure.  

Stakeholders  were  asked  whether  the  Commission  should  have  a  general  power  to 
investigate and sanction undertakings or their advisors in case they breach confidentiality 
obligations in the context of Commission investigations. Feedback from respondents generally 
supported the introduction of such sanctioning and investigation powers, while stressing that 
these powers would need to be clear, limited, proportionate and subject to robust procedural 
safeguards.  When  asked  for  an  overall  assessment  of  options  1  and  2,  out  of  23 

17 The call for evidence presented the following options as regards access to file: Option 1 - a system under which 
addressee(s)  of  the  statement  of  objections  are  granted  access  to  non-confidential  versions  of  all  the 
documents mentioned in the statement of objections; and external advisors are provided with access to all 
accessible documents in the file under conditions of confidentiality; Option 2 - a system under which access is 
granted  by  providing  all  accessible  documents  in  the  file  to  a  limited  number  of  external  advisors  of  the 
addressee(s) of the statement of objections under conditions of confidentiality. 

11 

 
 
 
respondents that provided a meaningful response, 14 expressed a preference for Option 1, 4 
for Option 2, 4 rejected both options, and 1 did not express a clear preference.  

4.  Complaints and third-party rights 

I.   Formal complaints 

11  stakeholders  (including  businesses  and  legal  professionals)  indicated  that  they  or  their 
members/clients submitted a formal complaint via Form C under Regulation 1/2003 over the 
last 10 years. 

Stakeholders were asked about the benefits and costs of removing the right to a rejection 
decision.  21  stakeholders  (mainly  businesses  and  legal  professionals)  replied  to  this 
question. On the benefits side, they pointed to the reduction of the administrative burden and 
simplifying procedures as potential advantages. They also indicated that removing the right to 
a rejection decision might streamline proceedings, improve speed and reduce costs. On the 
costs  side,  respondents,  including  citizens,  NGOs  and  consumer  organisations  raised  the 
risks  of  removing  the  right  to  a  rejection  decision  for  transparency  and  accountability. 
Respondents (mainly legal professionals) also stated that removing this right would limit legal 
certainty and undermine checks and balances. They argued that simplified procedures should 
be accompanied by enhanced procedural safeguards.  

As to the costs of preparing a formal complaint, no respondents provided precise figures. 
Respondents to this question (primarily businesses and legal professionals) indicated that the 
cost is influenced by the following factors: the complexity of the case, the resources required, 
legal and economist fees, as well as internal business costs, which are case specific.  

7 respondents (mainly legal professionals, but also one business and one academic/research 
institute)  noted  that  handling  a  possible  rejection  involves  additional  work,  such  as 
analysing  the  Commission’s  reasoning,  preparing  observations  to  a  rejection,  deciding 
whether to appeal and managing stakeholder implications. The costs also vary depending on 
the case complexity and the complainant’s interests.  

Stakeholders also provided feedback on how to reduce the burden both on complainants 
and  the  Commission  in  the  formal  complaints’  procedure.  The  feedback  from  legal 
professionals focused on simplification of formalities while not compromising the quality of the 
information  provided;  increased  transparency,  including  by  having  informal  contacts  and 
communication with the Commission; and the introduction of time limits to receive answers 
from the Commission 

Feedback from businesses focused on the possibility to lodge a simplified initial complaint, 
with further information supplied only if the case is pursued by the Commission; guidance from 
the Commission on priority cases; the possibility for the Commission to reject a complaint on 
prioritisation  grounds  without  detailed  reasoning;  and  implementing  stricter  admissibility 
requirements through a higher information threshold.  

Suggestions  from  citizens  also  touched  upon  issuing  rejection  decisions  based  on 
prioritisation  grounds  and  defining  the  Commission’s  enforcement  priorities,  as  well  as 
introducing a guided digital submission tool to improve quality of complaints. 

12 

 
 
II.  Extending  rights  of  formal  complainants  to  other  categories  of 

complainants and third parties 

Stakeholders  were  consulted  on  the  option  of  extending  rights  currently  attributed  to 
formal  complainants  to  other  categories  of  complainants  and  third  parties.  21 
respondents,  across  all stakeholder  categories,  took  a  position  on  this.  One  NGO  and  one 
consumer organisation advocated for extending rights to other types of complainants and third 
parties, noting that the involvement of third parties and civil society in antitrust proceedings 
can be beneficial.  

Views  across  other  stakeholder  groups  were  mixed.  Respondents  raised  concerns  about 
increased complexity, costs and resources. They further argued that complainants and third 
parties  serve  distinct  roles,  and  that  giving  them  the  same  rights  would  undermine  the 
adversarial balance and different burden between formal complainants and other third parties, 
increase confidentiality risks linked to disclosing sensitive information to more third parties and 
increase disclosure claims that could slow proceedings.  

Respondents  across  all  stakeholder  categories  also  provided  feedback  to  improve  the 
procedure  for  third  party  participation  in  antitrust  proceedings.  They  suggested  to: 
streamline  and  clarify  the  roles  and  rights  of  complainants  and  other  interested  parties, 
harmonise procedural rights, simplify access to key documents, ensure timely and transparent 
communication, allow earlier input from third parties in investigations and discuss with them 
the preferred format (i.e., interviews or written RFIs), as well as to allow third party input also 
on remedies. Timelines and regular status updates could also help third parties understand 
when  their  input  will  be  considered  and  plan  resources  accordingly.  One  business  also 
suggested  to  take  inspiration  on  the  Digital  Markets  Act  (DMA)  framework,  which  provides 
structured opportunities for all interested parties to contribute at key procedural stages, without 
distinguishing between third parties and complainants (the latter not having a formal status 
under the DMA). 

5.  European Competition Network  

I.  Stricter national laws on unilateral conduct 

Stakeholders were consulted on the two options set out in the call for evidence on this 
topic.  

Regarding Option 1, respondents were asked whether maintaining the current system and 
adapting  the  existing  coordination  and  information  exchange  mechanisms  between 
competition authorities under Regulation 1/2003 so that these cover the application of such 
stricter national laws on unilateral conduct would be likely to lead to more coherent, effective 
and complementary enforcement of available competition law instruments throughout the EU 
internal market.  

Respondents  expressed  mixed  views,  ranging  from  considering  Option  1  insufficient  to 
address risks of fragmentation to indicating that no changes at all are required to the current 
system. Four stakeholders provided feedback on the costs and benefits of Option 1. None 
of the respondents provided any quantification or estimation of costs. Regarding benefits, one 
law  firm  underlined  that  Option  1  can  help  avoid  duplicate  proceedings  and  conflicting 
outcomes.  Another  law  firm  pointed  out  that  an  adapted  coordination  and  information 

13 

 
 
exchange would allow the Commission and NCAs to take into account the case law of the 
Court of Justice in bpost (C-117/20)18 relating to the ne bis in idem principle. As regards costs 
and  drawbacks,  one  business  association  noted  that  Option  1  would  leave  several  issues 
unaddressed, e.g., short deadlines for the Commission to assess NCAs’ analyses, divergent 
remedies  and fragmented  enforcement,  integrity of the  Single Market. One  public  authority 
questioned the  need  for  a  coordination mechanism regarding  stricter  national  laws  beyond 
Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 38 of the DMA since in these cases only national 
law  provisions  are  applied  and  the  Commission  and  other  NCAs  have  no  jurisdiction.  The 
same respondent warned that notification obligations pose significant procedural burdens on 
the NCAs.  

Regarding Option 2, which is to discontinue the current system of Article 3(2) of Regulation 
1/2003, respondents equally expressed mixed views. 17 stakeholders provided feedback on 
costs  and  benefits  of  Option  2.  None  of  the  respondents  provided  any  quantification  or 
estimation of costs. Three associations of lawyers, one business association and three public 
authorities highlighted that discontinuing the current system would imply significant costs in 
terms of losing benefits that stricter national laws can bring, e.g., to reflect local realities, to 
lower market entry barriers (specifically relevant for SMEs), to apply rules tailored to specific 
features of economic relations between manufacturers and wholesale and retail companies, 
to  allow  swift  intervention  against  abuses  of  economic  power.  One  business  association 
mentioned  as  a  cost  of  discontinuing  the  current  system  negative  consequences  for 
competition. One NGO pointed out that stricter national law is particularly important for private 
enforcement  and  these  benefits  would  be  lost  if  the  current  system  was  discontinued.  14 
respondents representing different types of stakeholders (law firms, associations of lawyers, 
companies, business associations) noted that Option 2 may reduce costs for companies which 
under  the  current  system  may  face  higher  costs  of  innovation  and  expansion  due  to  the 
necessity to adapt business models to local regimes or to adhere to a business model tailored 
to the strictest local regime. 13 respondents also mentioned that companies may, under the 
current  system,  be  affected  by  legal  uncertainty  because  the  scope  of  Article  3(2)  of 
Regulation 1/2003 is not always clear.  

II.  Other comments 

Some respondents proposed additional measures or compromises to address the issue posed 
by  stricter  national  laws,  going  beyond  the  policy  options  consulted  on.  More  generally, 
respondents also commented on other aspects related to the European Competition Network. 
Such  comments  related,  for  example,  to  aspects  of  Article  11  and  Article  15  of  Regulation 
1/2003. These other comments, while useful in a wider context, will not be further reported on 
in this factual summary of the feedback to the call for evidence and the contributions received 
in  the  context  of  the  public  consultation  on  the  revision  of  Regulation  1/2003,  as  they  fall 
outside its scope.  

18 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 March 2022, ECLI:EU:C:2022:202. 

14 

 
 
 
6.  Other topics raised by stakeholders 

2  respondents  argued  that  the  Commission’s  power  to  impose  remedies  on  infringing 
companies pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 should be strengthened, by providing it 
with  sufficient  discretion  to  design  and  implement  (quasi-)structural  remedies.  Conversely, 
one  business  association  and  one  association  of  legal  professionals  are  in  favour  of 
maintaining the hierarchy between behavioural and structural remedies.  

In  addition,  a  citizen  proposed  introducing  two  additional  remedies  specifically  for  cartel 
infringements, namely director disqualification and seizure of bonus payments. 

5 respondents, mainly representing businesses and legal professionals, argued that the formal 
cartel settlement procedure should be extended to other, non-cartel type infringements or that 
an explicit legal framework should be provided for the cooperation procedure. 

7  respondents  (mainly  business  associations,  one  law  firm  and  one  citizen)  also  made 
comments on the process for imposing fines.  

2  respondents  suggested  extending  the  limitation  periods  and  introducing  sanctions  to 
address retaliatory behaviour by companies under investigation. 

8 respondents (consisting of law firms, business associations, and companies), advocated for 
extending LPP to in-house counsel. They argued that this would reflect the approach already 
taken in several Member States and strengthen corporate compliance frameworks.  

8 respondents (mainly business associations, but also one NGO, academic/research institute 
and citizen) made comments on due process and procedural fairness.  

15