COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security
Date: 2026-02-11
Institutions: Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, European Commission
Subjects: EU action, European defence policy, European security, air safety, common security and defence policy, critical infrastructure security, drone, external border of the EU, fight against crime, international cooperation

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 11.2.2026  COM(2026) 81 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security  
 
 
1.  Introduction  

Drones, whether used in the air, at sea or on land, have become an integral part of modern 
economies  and  societies.  Unmanned,  automated  and  increasingly  supported  by  artificial 
intelligence,  they  deliver  tangible  economic  benefits  across  sectors  such  as  construction, 
energy, transport, agriculture, emergency response and logistics. Since 2019, the use of airborne 
drones is governed in the European Union by a harmonised regulatory framework. The growing 
role in  surveillance  and  reconnaissance has  also  made drones a key  component  of Europe’s 
security.  From  a  European  industrial  perspective,  the  commercial  airborne  drone  market 
segment alone is forecast to be worth around EUR 14.5 billion by 2030 and potentially exceed 
EUR 50 billion by 2033.  

However,  recent  incidents  involving  malicious  or  irresponsible  use  of  drones  have  exposed 
significant and growing security challenges for the Union. Drones have been used in violation 
of  Member  States’  airspace,  they  have  disrupted  airport  operations,  and  caused  near-misses 
with  civilian  aircraft,  highlighting  vulnerabilities  in  our  security  architecture  including  in 
aviation safety. In fact, the impact of these incidents extends well beyond airspace, affecting 
the protection of critical infrastructure, external borders, ports, transport hubs and public spaces, 
including densely populated areas, as well as maritime safety and energy security. Specifically, 
in the energy sector, drones have been used to disrupt the operations of power plants, wind and 
solar installations, district  heating systems  and  energy transport vessels, demonstrating their 
potential  to  undermine  continuity  of  supply  and  economic  resilience.  Overflights  by 
unidentified or non-cooperative drones increase security tension and act as a signalling tool, 
testing Union’s preparedness, as well as its capacity to respond and take countermeasures.  

Hiding behind these security threats and challenges are a wide range of actors – state and state-
linked hostile actors, terrorist organisations, organised crime networks and individuals. They 
span different levels of intensity, from criminal or negligent behaviour to hybrid operations and 
military-type  activities.  They  deliberately  blur  the  boundaries  between  civilian  and  military 
domains.  They  also  exploit  the  cross-border  nature  of  the  internal  market  and  shared 
infrastructure making clear that a threat against one Member State is a threat against the 
Union as a whole.  

In this context, while safeguarding critical infrastructure, external borders, public spaces and 
ensuring aviation and maritime security remain primarily the responsibility of Member States, 
the  cross-border  character  and  high-impact  of  drone-related  incidents  make  enhanced 
coordination, shared preparedness and solidarity at EU level indispensable. An effective 
response requires a comprehensive, coordinated and targeted approach, bringing together the 
civil and military dimensions. This Action Plan is a response to the calls from Member States1 
and  the  European  Parliament2  to  develop  a  united  approach  against  the  threats  posed  by 
malicious drone operations. It is designed to support Member States through coordinated action 
and to complement national measures, reinforcing a coherent and effective response.  

1 European Council conclusions of 23 October 2025. EUCO 18/25. 
2 European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU 
Member  States’  airspace  and  critical  infrastructure  (2025/2901(RSP));  European  Parliament  resolution  of  22 
January  2026  on  drones  and  new  systems  of  warfare  –  the  EU’s  need  to  adapt  to  be  fit  for  today’s  security 
challenges (2025/2088(INI)). 

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This  Action  Plan  ensures  a  coherent  whole-of-government  approach,  in  full  respect  of 
relevant competences, while avoiding fragmentation. This Action plan focuses primarily on the 
civilian internal security side, where important gaps and loopholes remain, it addresses the full 
continuum of drone-related threats from the prevention of unintended or negligent incidents to 
threats  against  the  EU’s  internal  security  and  hybrid  threats,  while  complementing  and 
supporting the work carried out in the defence domain. It sets out a prioritised set of actions in 
the civilian field, designed to reinforce prevention, detection and response, and to strengthen 
civil–military synergies as needed. It also strengthens Europe’s defence readiness, in line with 
work  carried  out  by  the  EU  and  Member  States  through  several  work-strands  linked  to  the 
Defence Readiness 2030 Roadmap.   

Enhancing  the  security  of  drone  operations  and  protection  from  malicious  drone  use  are 
prerequisites for trust, public acceptance and the large-scale deployment of legitimate drones. 
This Action Plan therefore also supports a positive agenda on drones. By reinforcing security, 
it  contributes  to  the  development  of  a  competitive  European  drone  market,  unlocking  the 
potential for innovation, economic growth and job creation across sectors. 

This  Action  Plan  is  to  be  read  within  the  framework  of  a  broader  set  of  initiatives  brought 
forward by the Commission to reinforce the EU’s preparedness, and its internal security and 
defence priorities. Considering the imminent security challenges, the Action Plan focuses on 
actions that can be implemented in the short term, while also designing measures for longer-
term  preparedness.  While  most  recent  threats  concern  airborne  drones,  the  Action  Plan  also 
covers terrestrial, maritime surface and undersea drones, and related counter-drone capacities, 
as well as meteorological balloons used against some Member States. This Action Plan builds 
on the 2023 Communication3on countering potential threats posed by drones and supersedes its 
mid-term  review  as  well  as  on  the  EU  Drone  Strategy  2.04  which  provides  the  overarching 
policy framework for the development of a competitive and safe European drone ecosystem. 

2.  Prepare: increasing the resilience of the EU 

The Action Plan focuses on strengthening resilience and preparedness. This relies, first, on 
the  capacity  of  Europe  to  remain  at  the  edge  of  the  technological  evolution  in  drones  and 
counter-drone systems, but also on the capacity to ramp-up industrial production. Second, this 
requires enhanced actions against malicious drones, with a safe and secure integration of drones 
into  the  airspace  and  the  market,  as  well  as  increased  resilience  measures  to  protect  critical 
infrastructures, external borders and public spaces, the maritime domain.  

2.1. Ramping up technological development and industrial production of drones 
and counter-drone systems  

Drones are evolving rapidly, with advances in speed, range, payload, autonomy, swarming, AI 
integration, advanced materials, miniaturisation and resistance to electronic warfare. Counter-
drone systems must therefore also adapt fast to keep pace with these evolutions. Supporting the 
development  of  these  technologies  is  essential  for  Europe’s  preparedness.  This  requires 
mobilising the right level of public and private investments at national and EU level, and from 
both a civilian and defence perspective.   

3 COM(2023) 659 final 
4 COM(2022)652 final 

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EU funding programmes support the technological development of drones and counter-drone 
capacities, notably through Horizon Europe or the European Defence Fund. Several schemes 
are also dedicated to supporting specifically start-ups and scale up to grow, whether it is the 
European  Innovation  Council  (EIC)  through  its  accelerator  scheme,  or  the  EU  Disruptive 
Innovation  schemes  (EUDIS)  for  defence  applications  through  dedicated  Hackathons  and 
Accelerators,  EDA’s  HEDI  (Hub  for  EU  Defence  Innovation)  as  well  as  BraveTech  EU, 
allowing to build on battlefield-tested innovations from Ukraine. Private financing should also 
be leveraged to support innovation and the ramping up of production. 

However, there is an urgent need to increase coherence and impact between the different EU 
instruments, including cohesion funds, as well as national investments, with a view to avoid 
overlaps, reduce dispersion of funds and maximise impact on clear priorities. To that end, the 
Commission  proposes  a  new  and  coordinated  framework  to  boost  the  technological 
development and the production of drones and counter-drone systems building on five pillars.  

First, the EU must focus its investment where it really matters. The Commission will initiate 
with Member States a civil-military industrial mapping, designed to define the right priorities 
in terms of technologies and capacities. This will inform the investments into the development 
of  technologies,  their  integration  into  drones  and  counter-drone  systems  and  the  necessary 
industrial production ramp-up. Such an endeavour will require cooperation and exchange of 
information  between  Member  States,  the  Commission  in  consultation  with  the  High 
Representative,  within  their  respective  responsibilities,  as  well  as  different  national  and  EU 
actors across the civil and military domains.  

Second, the EU must embrace a new approach to testing innovative solutions allowing faster 
movement from lab to deployment. To that end and based on the Commission’s proposal for 
regulatory sandboxes5, any obstacles to test innovative drone and counter-drone technologies 
in specifically designated areas and under a temporary and controlled framework established 
by a Member State or EASA should be removed. European industry needs infrastructure to test 
and  validate  counter-drone  solutions.  The  EU  will  aim  to  strengthen  a  network  of 
multinational test and expertise centres for drones across Member States, established to test, 
demonstrate,  validate  and  qualify  military  or  dual-use  systems  in  their  specific  operational 
environments, such as the maritime Seabed Security Experimentation Centre (SEASEC).  

The counter-drone Living Lab of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) will be upgraded into a 
fully-fledged EU counter-drone centre of excellence. The Centre will work in synergy with 
the  EU  Civil-Defence  Drone  Testing  Centre  Network  which  is  currently  in  its  pilot 
implementation phase in cooperation with the European Defence Agency. It will run – on a 
regular  basis  and  whenever  necessary  –  a  large  testing  and  validation  programme  of 
counter-drone measures, starting with the first edition focused on the protection of critical 
infrastructure.  The  Commission  will  also  support  the  development  of  a  harmonised  testing 
methodology6  for  counter-drone  systems  and  will  issue  a  Recommendation  on  voluntary 
performance requirements for counter-drone systems. 

5 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework of 
measures to facilitate the transport of military equipment, goods and personnel across the Union. 
6 Through the ongoing ISF funded project Courageous2. 
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Third,  there  is  a  need  to  bring  clarity  and  security  into  the  market  through  targeted  safety 
requirements  and  a  certification  scheme  for  counter-drone  systems.  Embedding  safety 
requirements into counter-drone testing and validation ensures that counter-drone measures do 
not compromise aviation safety. EASA, as the competent authority for aviation safety, should 
therefore develop criteria to be respected by counter-drone systems.  

Fourth, interoperability is essential for drone and counter-drone producers to be able to scale 
production for both the civilian and military markets, bringing flexibility, operational continuity 
and  fostering  effective  cross-border  cooperation.  Building  on  ongoing  work  by  EASA,  the 
European Defence Agency and NATO to align civil-military standards, the Commission, with 
the  support  of  the  High  Representative,  will  examine  ways  to  promote  the  use  of  standards 
applicable to both civilian and military drone and counter-drone technologies. 

Fifth,  producing  drones  and  counter-drone  systems  at  scale  is  paramount.  Many  EU 
industrial actors are ramping-up capabilities in different domains, including submarine drones. 
The  EU  therefore  needs  to  invest  into  massification  of  production  capacities  for  deployable 
drones and counter-drone systems, with specific attention to the needs of emergent innovative 
companies. To that end, the European Commission will assess the possibility to leverage the 
forthcoming Industrial Accelerator Act, as well as the joint deployment initiative for critical 
infrastructure  presented  in  section  4.  Additionally,  it  will  also  use  industry  reinforcement 
actions under the European Defence Industry Programme to boost the production in the EU of 
drones and counter-drone capacities as described in section 5. 

European efforts to scale-up drone and counter-drone production must be a joint public-private 
effort. The Commission will expand industry engagement by convening a drone and counter-
drone  Industrial  Forum,  building  on the Drone Alliance initiative with Ukraine. This  will 
bring together a large ecosystem of underlying and enabling technologies such as chips, AI, 
quantum,  cloud  and  cyber.  The  Commission  will  furthermore  consider  options  for  public-
private partnership to address key technology gaps for the development and industrialisation of 
EU produced drone systems. 

2.2. Enhanced internal security and resilience against drones 

The growing presence of unregistered drones in the EU increases the risks of misuse. At the 
same time, a wide range of state and non-state actors can exploit drones, as even basic “off the 
shelf” models can be deployed over strategic assets with minimal efforts. The inherent plausible 
deniability of such acts makes them an effective vector of hybrid threats, capable of causing 
disruption  and  exploiting  vulnerabilities.  It  is  therefore  urgent  to  level-up  resilience 
requirements across several areas.  

2.2.1. Safe and secured integration of drones into the airspace and on the market 

By the end of 2024, the EU drone ecosystem had surpassed two million registered operators, 
representing an increase of around 20% in just one year. At the same time, professional and 
higher-risk operations expanded rapidly, reflecting increasing organisational maturity among 
operators7.  This  rapid  professionalisation  confirms  drones  as  a  permanent  and  expanding 

7 The number of operational authorisations increased almost five-fold, from around 700 to over 3 400, while 
Light UAS Operator Certificates (LUCs) grew by more than 60%, Figures: EASA IAM Hub. 

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component of European aviation, while underscoring the urgency of reinforcing trust, security, 
and resilience. 

The  EU  has  already  established  a  comprehensive  aviation  framework  for  airborne  drones, 
providing a strong foundation for the safe development of a rapidly growing sector. However, 
evolving  security  threats  and  recent  incidents  have  highlighted  limitations  in  the  current 
framework. The Commission, in close cooperation with EASA, will propose a Drone Security 
Package to adapt the airborne drone framework to today’s security realities, while preserving 
the conditions for innovation and market growth. It will amend the relevant implementing and 
delegated acts8 stemming from the regulation on common rules for civil aviation9. The objective 
is  to  strengthen  the  identification  and  accountability  of  drone  operations,  both  for  drone 
operators and drone pilots, including by extending registration and identification requirements 
to all drones above 100g. In this way, the link between operator registration and drone usability 
will be strengthened, thereby avoiding the use of drones that cannot be identified.  

At the same time, the safe expansion of legitimate drone operations requires a modern traffic-
management environment. The EU has already put in place a harmonised framework for  U-
space10,  which  introduces  digital  services  to  support  safe,  automated  and  scalable  drone 
operations. While this framework is  in  force, its  deployment  across Member States remains 
uneven. The Commission will therefore encourage and support a more active implementation 
of U-space services, in line with national priorities and operational needs. It will also accelerate 
work with Member States to improve the definition and digital publication11 of geographical 
zones  where  drone  operations  are  restricted  or  subject  to  conditions.  Building  on  this,  the 
Commission, together with EASA and Member States, will assess the technical conditions for 
future geofencing functionalities that could help prevent compliant drones from unintentionally 
entering sensitive or high-risk areas.  

The Commission will also present regulatory simplification measures for drones aimed at 
introducing flexibility for certain operations12 such as removing the need of pre-approval by 
authorities and reducing the associated administrative burden. This will also include a possible 
extension of geo-awareness requirements to all drones above 100g.  

The Commission will seek to mobilise relevant EU funding instruments to ensure effective and 
coherent implementation across the Union of the measures outlined above. 

Beyond the specific legislative needs and operational measures mentioned above to enhance 
resilience, a central element of security is to make sure that drones placed on the EU market 
meet appropriate security requirements so that legitimate drones cannot become a security risk 
for EU citizens or be turned into threats vectors by malicious actors.  

The Commission will therefore propose to initiate work with Member States on a coordinated 
Union wide security risk assessment of drones and counter-drone capacities, assessing risks in 
their  ICT  supply  chain.  This  could  be  followed  by  a  Drone  and  Counter-drone  Security 

8 Implementing regulation (EU) 2019/947 & Delegated regulation 2019/945. 
9 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 and the related implementing.  
10 Implementing regulations (EU) 2021/664, (EU) 2021/665 and (EU) 2021/666. 
11 Through for instance the EASA Innovative Air Mobility (IAM) Hub. 
12 For Visual Line Of Sight (VLOS), Beyond Visual Line Of Sight (-BVLOS) operations. 

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Toolbox proposing proportionate security mitigation measures, in particular for the deployment 
of counter-drone systems around critical infrastructures.  

With the full application of the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) in December 2027, a large majority 
of drones placed on the EU market will be subject to mandatory cybersecurity requirements, 
thereby  promoting  security-by-design  at  product  level.  Given  the  important  role  of 
semiconductors 
the  development  and  operations  of  autonomous  systems,  drone 
manufacturers should embed trusted chips in their systems. This means chips that are secure, 
reliable, and resistant to tampering or cyber threats. 

in 

At system level, the Commission will work also on the establishment of an EU Trusted Drone 
Label to further enhance trust in civil drones. The label would rely on independent third-party 
verification and define additional product-level trust and resilience criteria without duplicating 
existing EU cybersecurity legislation. 

Finally, in view of the fast-evolving markets of drones, and following calls from the European 
Parliament13 and Member States14 to assess the continued relevance and effectiveness of the 
EU Drone 2.0 Strategy, the 2026 progress review will provide a comprehensive stock-taking 
of the Strategy, identifying gaps and delays in implementation, and  assess whether its actions 
remain  fit  for  purpose  or  require  adjustment,  notably  those  contributing  to  security  and 
competitiveness. 

2.2.2. Enhancing preparedness at external borders, public spaces and critical infrastructures 

Enhancing  EU’s  preparedness  means  significantly  investing  into  the  protection  of  critical 
infrastructures, including in the maritime domain, the external borders and public spaces.  

When it comes to the physical resilience of critical infrastructures, the EU has put in place a 
horizontal  framework:  the  Critical  Entities  Resilience  (CER)  Directive,  which  requires 
Member States to adopt a national resilience strategy, conduct risk assessments in all the eleven 
sectors covered by the Directive, identify their critical entities and take the necessary to prevent 
disruptive incidents. Urgent and full implementation of the CER directive by Member States 
should  be  an  immediate  priority.  To  support  Member  States  and  critical  entities,  the 
Commission will issue non-binding guidelines for resilience enhancing measures, including 
on  countering  threats  posed  by  drones  and  the  use  of  geofencing  functionalities.  The 
Commission will also propose to willing Member States a plan to stress test the resilience of 
critical  infrastructures  against  drone  intrusion,  based  on  the  model  of  the  previously 
conducted stress testing of critical infrastructure in the energy sector and for submarine cables.  

The maritime domain is  particularly susceptible to threats  and attacks by aerial, surface and 
underwater  drones.  Enhanced  maritime  domain  awareness  is  essential  to  protect  critical 
maritime infrastructure and serve military needs. Once established, the Regional Cable Hubs15, 
could  be  expanded  to  ensure  a  broader  Maritime  Domain  Awareness  function,  using  drone 
assets, and monitoring threats from drones16 with a view to protection especially all maritime 
critical infrastructure.  

13 A European Lead Market for Civilian Drones – Now or Never. 
14 COUNCIL: 16054/25 REV 2. 
15 As referred into the Action Plan on Cable Security. JOIN(2025) 9 final. 
16 As elaborated under the EU Action Plan on Cable Security and in line with the European Ocean Pact, relevant 
actions of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). 
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To  this  end,  the  Commission  will  launch  a  pilot  action  to  enhance  maritime  domain 
awareness. It could be implemented by Member States in the context of the Regional Cable 
Hubs, promoting coast guard cooperation and involving European Fisheries Control Agency 
(EFCA), European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and Frontex. The pilot action will also 
identify gaps and urgent operational needs for detecting and countering drones in the maritime 
domain.  It  could  be  supported  by  EU  defence  programmes.  Close  cooperation  with  EDA 
MARSUR project and NATO maritime surveillance systems will be ensured. The Commission 
will  also  support  the  deployment  of  undersea  sensing  capacities,  contributing  to  underwater 
domain awareness  capacities, useful both  for the protection of critical infrastructure and for 
defence maritime applications, especially in areas where infrastructures are subject to threats 
(e.g. Baltic, Black Sea or Arctic regions).  

Malicious use of drones can directly undermine control at the external borders and specifically 
border surveillance by enabling reconnaissance of patrol patterns and border crossing points, 
facilitating  cross-border  crime,  and  disrupting  border  management  infrastructure  and 
operations.  The  Schengen  Borders  Code  allows  the  use  of  civil  counter-drone  measures  to 
protect  land  and  maritime  borders,  and  by  extension,  where  needed  to  prevent  the 
circumvention of border controls, extends to airport security perimeters.  

The protection of public spaces from threats posed by non-cooperative drones has been at the 
core of the current Commission counter-drone policy framework17. The objective is to provide 
law enforcement authorities with the right capacities and training to respond to drone threats 
and to use drones for public security objectives, such as crowd control. The Commission will 
intensify  its  action  to  support  law  enforcement  in  these  efforts,  especially  upgrading  the 
training to integrate the use of mitigation and neutralisation measures and extend it to operators 
of  critical  infrastructures.  The  already  established  counter-drone  expert  group  will  be 
extended to include relevant EU Agencies (e.g. Frontex, Europol, EASA, EDA). It will support 
the identification of promising common counter-drone solutions, including by increasing the 
frequency  of  classified  information  exchange.  To  facilitate  this  work,  a  biennial  work 
programme will be developed for the counter-drone expert group. 

2.2.3. Protection against hybrid threats from other unmanned threat vectors such as balloons  

Over  the  past  year,  several  hundreds  of  meteorological  balloons  have  been  launched  from 
outside the EU into the airspace of some Member States for different illicit purposes including 
smuggling. Typically fitted with SIM cards to transmit their location after landing, they allow 
smugglers  to  recover  the  payload.  Due  to  their  size,  weight,  unpredictable  wind-driven 
trajectories, potential operating altitude, and payload capacity, these unmanned balloons pose 
serious  safety  and  security  risks,  particularly  when  overflying  critical  infrastructure  such  as 
airports,  where  they  can  cause  accidents  or  trigger  closures.  Their  detection  is  especially 
challenging  as  connectivity  modules  are  usually  inactive  during  flight.  As  a  result,  heavy 
unmanned balloons represent a strategic and largely uncontrollable threat. 

Several measures in this Action Plan could  be useful to address threats from meteorological 
balloons. There is a need to take additional measures to disrupt the possibility for criminals to 
use such balloons and for state and non-state actors to exploit it as a tool of hybrid campaign. 
The  Commission  proposes  to  organise  a  specific  working  group  to  address  the  multi-
dimensional  aspect  of  the  threats,  looking  at  measures  linked  to  connectivity,  spectrum 
monitoring,  diversion  of  flight  path  as  well  as  other  ways  to  remedy  the  threats  including 

17 Stemming from the 2023 Communication on countering threats posed by drones. 

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cooperation between telecommunication operators and national authorities on national security 
and defence matters. Moreover, in view of bringing innovative, quick and operational solutions 
to increase the resilience against this type of threat, the Commission, together with the Member 
States most concerned, will swiftly organise a mission driven call for interest to the private 
sector, especially start-ups, to propose new ways to handle such threats.   

Key actions on preparedness: 

•  As a matter of priority, the Commission, together with Member States, where appropriate, will:  

▪  Propose  a  Drone  Security  Package  by  Q3  2026  to  rapidly  adapt  the  regulatory 

framework to new security threats:  
o  Ensure mandatory registration for all drone operators of smaller drones (above 

100g). 

o  Extend drone direct remote identification obligation to smaller drones (above 

100g). 

o  Avoid  take-off  of  drones  unless  an  operator  identification  number  has  been 

entered.  

o  Introduce regulatory simplification and flexibility for certain operations. 

▪  Work with willing Member States on a voluntary plan to stress test the resilience 

of critical infrastructures against drone intrusion. 

▪  Adopt  non-binding  CER  guidelines  on  resilience  enhancing  measures  for  critical 
entities with targeted guidance on countering threats posed by drones (Q2 2026). 

▪ 

Issue a Recommendation on voluntary performance requirements for counter-drone 
systems (Q4 2026) 

▪  Launch by Q3 2026 a Coordinated Security risk assessment on drones and counter-

drone capacities, with a view to adopt a Drone Security Toolbox. 

▪  Launch in Q2 2026 a drone and counter-drone industrial forum – the “D-TECT 

Forum” (Drone TEch for Countering Threats).  

▪  Support  the scaling up of drone and  counter-drone start-ups  and  the ramping up of 

production capacities.  

▪  Gather  immediately  a  working  group  with  interested  Member  States  targeting 
balloon threats and launch in Q2 2026 a dedicated hackathon on balloons threats, 
for the industry and start-up community to propose innovative solutions. 

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•  The Commission, will follow up with Member States, in order to:   

▪  Develop by Q4 2026 an EU Trusted Drone Label to enhance trustworthiness of civil 

drones placed on the market. 

▪  Improve by Q4 2026 the availability of UAS geographical zone information, and 

by 2027 establish the technical requirements for geofencing function.  

▪  Establish by Q1 2027 a EU counter-drone centre of excellence and launch testing 
programmes, integrating aviation safety requirements. Support the development of full 
standard  for  a  harmonised  testing  methodology  for  countering  unmanned  aircraft 
systems. 

▪  Launch by 2027 a pilot action to enhance maritime domain awareness to counter 

surface and undersea drone threats  

▪  Expand  in  Q1  2026  the  composition  of  the  Commission-chaired  Counter-drone 
Expert  Group  (CUASG)  to  include  relevant  EU  Agencies  (e.g.  Frontex,  Europol, 
EDA, EASA).  

▪  Upgrade by Q2 2026 the training cycle for law enforcement operators to include 

mitigation and neutralisation measures. 

3.  Detection: increasing the capacity to detect threats from drones 

Detection, tracking and identification are central elements in the fight against malicious drone 
activities. Being able to distinguish friends from foes helps to filter and classify detected drones 
according to their risk profiles, allowing ultimately to focus the attention and the resources of 
security  authorities.  This  requires  seriously  enhancing  situational  awareness  around  drone 
operations, including through the integration of several information feeds which today are not 
connected. It also requires enhancing detection capacities through the deployment of a multi-
sensing  approach  and  leveraging  technological  evolution  as  well  as  telecommunication 
networks. 

3.1. Improved situational awareness  

The  absence  of  integrated  air  surveillance  for  drone  activities,  combined  with  the  inherent 
limitations  of  detection capacities,  allows  malicious  actors  to  potentially  evade  detection,  at 
least temporarily, and create plausible deniability. It is therefore essential to improve situational 
awareness of drone operations.  

First, there is a need to support the integration of relevant data into dedicated single display 
systems. Based on the existing regulatory framework such as U-space, as well as a strengthened 
registration obligations in the future, it will be possible to establish a capacity to detect, track 
and identify in near real time any legitimate drones. Different information feeds will need to be 
fused. In this regard, Eurocontrol has developed a single air display system – CIMACT (Civil-
Military Air Traffic Management Coordination tool), allowing the detection and identification, 

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in real time of potential threats from drones. The Commission will support the emergence of 
such  tools  integrating  detection  and  identification  data  as  well  as  upstream  enablers  to 
distinguish between authorised and non-cooperative drone activity. Looking ahead, enhanced 
situational awareness could be further strengthened through the gradual development of drone 
conspicuity solutions, building on U-space, registration and identification frameworks. 

Second,  relevant data should be accessible by competent authorities.  The EU  regulatory 
framework for aviation safety already provides the legal basis for it18. Building on this, Member 
States  should  make  practical  arrangements  to  ensure  that  relevant  data  is  shared  among 
competent authorities in civil aviation, law enforcement and the military. This would allow to 
monitor and assess the level of threats, ensure faster response, and enforce liability for operators 
of drones that do not respect security measures.  

Third, it is essential to foster more information sharing between Member States to improve 
lessons  learnt  from  previous  incidents  and  establish  a  clear  situational  picture.  The 
Commission will therefore explore with Member States the possibility of progressively setting 
up an operational, secured, user-friendly and trusted EU drone incident platform, building on 
regulatory reporting of incidents where relevant and an existing open-source digital platform. 
The  platform  would  allow  a  near  real-time  feed  of  relevant  incidents  and  be  accessible  to 
relevant national authorities. The platform could support the creation of a structured database 
of non-authorised drones and would benefit from the development of common data format for 
counter-drone systems. The Commission will support initiatives from willing Member States 
to enhance information sharing, for instance at regional level.  

Fourth,  detection,  tracking  and  identification  capabilities  should  also  be  integrated  into 
national  border  surveillance  systems  and  contribute  to  the  European  situational  picture, 
including EUROSUR19, to enable operational support and the coordinated handling of cross-
border incidents. This should also, where appropriate, cover relevant detections in the context 
of Frontex operations. The Commission will support willing Member States in seeking civil-
military  synergies  with  military  situational  awareness  systems  and  security  systems,  in  full 
respect of EU legislation. 

3.2. Deployment of multi-domain sensing capacities  

Detection of illegitimate and potentially malicious drones necessarily relies on several sensors. 
Traditional radar-based detection comes with specific characteristics. Long-range radars detect 
larger  objects  at  higher  altitude,  while  short-range  radars  are  focusing  on  short  distance 
tracking.  Additionally,  different  characteristics  of  drones  and  drone  operations  present 
challenges, such as the reflection of the terrain, the small radar cross section of drones, the low 
altitude  at  which  drones  can  fly,  and  the  risk  of  saturation  in  case  of  drone  swarms. 
Consequently,  detection  of  malicious  drones  requires  a  multi-sensor  approach,  integrated 
through  AI-powered  command-and-control  (C2)  software,  allowing  to  establish  clear 
situational awareness, in particular to protect critical infrastructure.  

Ongoing technological developments will enhance detection capacities. For instance, in the 
domain of both passive and active radar systems, software-defined radars in the X band and 

18 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Article 74. 
19 European Border Surveillance system. 

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beyond can provide enhanced detection capacities. Other areas of interest are acoustic sensors 
such as AI-powered acoustic phased array microphones, LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) 
using pulsed laser, thermal infrared cameras allowing to detect small variations of heat, and 
optical sensors.  

The  EU  should  enhance  its  support  for  home  grown  development  of  these  dual  use 
technologies,  that  must  be  integrated  into  multi-domain  sensing  systems,  supported  by  a 
modular,  distributed,  AI-powered  C2,  and  encrypted  communication.  These  systems  could 
either be deployed to protect specific critical infrastructure on a permanent basis or be mounted 
on terrestrial or maritime vehicles for increased flexibility. These are civilian by design, but 
they could usefully complement existing military capacities to enhance the overall detection 
capacities. Interoperability – through the deployment of recognised standards – is key to allow 
modularity with legacy and future sensors as well as effectors, and smooth integration with air 
defence  or  air  surveillance  systems.  These  modular  capacities  could  be  usefully  deployed 
through a joint procurement programme for the protection of specific critical infrastructure.20 

3.3. Leveraging telecommunication networks for enhanced detection 

Existing 5G telecommunication networks could be leveraged to enhance and broaden the 
detection of drones. The EU and its Member States should support the deployment of a two-
layered cellular based drone detection and tracking capacity.   

On the first layer, existing network capacity should  be used to detect connected drones by 
identifying  unusual  SIM  card  identities,  types  of  data  transmission  or  activities.  Networks 
should provide behaviour-based alerts of fast-moving assets over non-traditional paths, forming 
AI-based automated detection and early alert systems. This method of detection would rely on 
a strong partnership between national authorities, and telecommunication operators. It requires 
also solid industrial partnerships between AI companies and telecommunication providers and 
operators as well as a full implementation of the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox2122. 

This connectivity tracking capacity could be enhanced with the deployment of the concept of 
“digital airspace” providing 5G-based connectivity to drones – and therefore allowing their 
detection - in higher altitudes than today. To this end, the Commission is working with Member 
States on an Implementing Decision to ensure sufficient harmonised spectrum availability 
in  the  traditional  harmonised  terrestrial  mobile  frequency  bands.  This  will  enable  safe 
operations  of  drones  over  large  distances. It  would  also  design  a  mechanism  to differentiate 
a drone from other  users  and establish  an  obligation  to  condition  connectivity  to  the  mobile 
network to a pre-identification as drone.  

On the second layer,  cellular sensing should be leveraged to  detect non-connected drones. 
Integrated  and  Sensing  Communication  (ISAC)  integrates  sensing  into  the  mobile 
communication  network.  It  can  in  effect  turn  5G  and  next-generation  antennas  into  radar 
sensors, able to detect the spatial location of any flying unidentified object, including balloons. 
In the short term, such technology could be deployed above certain locations such as critical 

20 See section 4. 
21 See https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cybersecurity-5g-networks-eu-toolbox-risk-mitigating-
measures 
22 In line with Cyber Security Act revision COM(2026) 11 and the Digital Network Act COM(2026) 16 .  

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infrastructure facilities. If and when fully deployed over a territory or a large region, it could be 
the basis of digital twins, representing digitally the physical presence of objects in the airspace. 
This could have also potential military applications such as complementing existing military 
air surveillance systems or detecting radio frequency jamming.  

ISAC is being tested by European telecommunications providers, and initial steps have been 
taken for its standardisation, especially in the framework of 6G. To accelerate its deployment, 
the Commission will propose the necessary regulatory changes, such as ensuring that spectrum 
allocation allows sensing, while limiting interference with aviation. To that end, the relevant 
provisions have been foreseen in the recently proposed Digital Networks Act. At short term, 
the  Commission  will  propose  a  mandate  to  the  CEPT  (European  Conference  of  Postal  and 
Telecommunications  Administrations)  to  develop  technical  and  operational  conditions  for 
sensing, which would be followed by an amended harmonisation decision allowing spectrum 
to be used for sensing.  

Additionally,  the  Commission  will  explore  with  Member  States  ways  to  leverage,  for  both 
civilian  and  military  usage,  5G  telecommunication  networks  for  distributed  computing 
capacity, looking at edge and cloud solutions.  

The  Commission  will  support  Member  States  willing  to  live  test  and  deploy  these  new 
detection capacities to protect critical infrastructure or scale this detection capacity across a 
territory  serving  the  military,  law  enforcement  and  any  other  relevant  authorities.  The 
Commission  will  also  invited  Ukraine  to  consider  its  participation  in  these  activities.  The 
deployment of cellular sensing capacities along the borders of Member States most impacted 
by  threats  from  drones  or  other  flying  objects  such  as  balloons  could  be  considered.  An 
appropriate national governance framework will have to be established between  civilian and 
military authorities, telecommunication equipment suppliers, tower owners, telecommunication 
operators  and  infrastructure  manager,  to  make  sure  that  national  security  requirements  are 
explicitly satisfied.  

Key actions on detection: 

As a matter of priority, the Commission, together with Member States, will:  

•  Launch a Call for Expressions of Interest to Member States, Ukraine and European 
industrial  partners  to  live  test  and  deploy  cellular-based,  dual-use  drone  detection 
capacity (Q2 2026): 

o  AI-based early alert mechanism of malicious connected drones enhanced by the 

digital airspace concept; 

o  Cellular sensing detection of non-connected drones; 
o  Embedding cellular sensing into current and upcoming military applications.  

•  Take the necessary regulatory steps to allow spectrum to be used for sensing through 

an amended spectrum harmonisation decision.  

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The Commission will also follow-up with Member States in order to:   

•  Improve situational awareness through  

o  The integration of relevant data into dedicated single display systems;  
o  Exploring the progressive establishment an EU drone incident platform; 
o  Integrating detection, tracking and identification capabilities into national 

border surveillance systems; 

o  Common data formats for counter-drone capabilities. 

•  Strongly  encourage  Member  States  to  set  up  an  information-sharing  framework 

between civil aviation authorities, law enforcement and military.  

4.  Response: Stronger EU cooperation and solidarity 

Whenever an incident occurs and one or more malicious drones are detected, threats must be 
promptly  and  effectively  addressed.  Operational  incident  response  is  the  responsibility  of 
Member  States,  given  the  strong  link  with  national  security  and  defence  matters.  However, 
coordinated actions at EU level can support Member States in the deployment of counter-drone 
capacities and solutions. This dimension requires strong civilian-military synergies, and well 
defined and rehearsed rules of engagement based on the threat. 

4.1. 

 Operational synergies between civilian and military 

When  it  comes  to  collective  air  defence,  NATO  holds  a  primary  role  to  protect  against 
conventional  threats,  such as  high-end air and missile threats.  With the emergence of drone 
threats, especially low-cost systems, air defence is evolving, requiring an additional layer of 
counter-drone  network.  At  the  same  time,  protecting  borders,  airports,  seaports,  energy 
infrastructure and sensitive sites from low-cost drones cannot rely on the military alone. This 
highlights  the  necessary  civil  and  military  coordination.  Counter-drone  capacities  must  be 
approached as a dynamic, adaptable and comprehensive network, for both civilian security and 
defence purposes.  

Once a threat is detected, national protocols are activated leading to preventive measures (such 
as airspace closure), as well as counter-drone measures from a wide array of solutions. While 
these procedures are decided and operated at national level, there is a need to stress test them 
against a scenario of cross border or multi-vector threats but also against emerging threats such 
as swarmed or miniaturised drones. 

Additionally, at very low altitude, counter-drone response requires seconds-long reaction times 
and tightly synchronised civil–military procedures, which remain uneven across borders. The 
cost asymmetry between low-cost threats and scarce defensive means, combined with mass and 
saturation, makes fragmentation difficult to sustain. Divergent data formats, classification and 
reporting  chains  prevent  a  shared  low-altitude  picture  and  complicate  attribution  in  hybrid 
scenarios.  Addressing  these  gaps  require  interoperability,  governance  and  rapid  operational 
delivery across ecosystems. 

This is why it is important that relevant procedures and lines of communication are established 
between all the actors, including  at  EU level. To that end, it is  proposed to  launch, with  all 
relevant civilian and military actors a yearly EU-level counter-drone exercise. 

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4.2.  Support on the deployment of counter-drone capacities 

A  multi-layered  and  multi-effector  (combining  several  counter-drone  technical  measures) 
approach is necessary to counter the large spectrum of threats posed by non-cooperative drones. 
Counter measures rely on a combination of a wide array of solutions such as jammers, lasers, 
high power microwaves, drone catchers, cyber takedown as well as hard kinetic solutions, for 
instance  individual  or  ‘in  swarm’  strike  drones,  gunnery  and  short  ranges  missiles  and 
ammunition.  

When drones are connected to a communication network, a possible counter measure includes 
the capacity to disrupt, slow down, jam or end the connectivity of the malicious vectors, without 
affecting  the  connectivity  of  friendly  drones.  Based  on  a  request  from  relevant  national 
authorities, telecommunication operators should be in position to take the necessary measures 
to  ban  the  SIM  or  the  connectivity  module,  operate  a  forceful  detachment,  or  establish  a 
geofencing  approach.  The  Commission  is  currently  working  on  an  Implementing  Decision 
harmonising operational and technical conditions for the safe operation of terminal devices such 
as drones.  

In light of the evolving security situation, it is essential and urgent that critical infrastructures 
are equipped with the latest counter-drone equipment and systems. In full complementarity with 
ongoing activities in the defence domain, the Commission will therefore work with Member 
States  to  launch  –  through  a  call  for  expression  of  interest  –  an  EU  Counter-drone 
Deployment Initiative for Critical infrastructure: 

First,  based  on  the  mapping  of  needs  described  in  section  2,  the  Commission  will  continue 
supporting  the  development  of  home-grown  counter-drone  systems  giving  particular 
attention to the support of innovative and scalable approaches, notably from new players across 
defence and civilian ecosystems. In this perspective, it will work with industry, and Member 
States, to define priority areas of investment under EU defence and civilian programmes, with 
the view to scale the approach under the future European Competitiveness Fund.  

Second,  the  Commission  will  propose  a  voluntary  EU  counter-drone  joint  purchasing 
initiative for deploying counter-drone solutions in critical infrastructures. The objective is to 
leverage the procurement capacity of relevant EU agencies (e.g. Frontex, EMSA, EFCA), as 
well  as  creating  synergies  with  joint  procurement  (including  pre-commercial  or  innovative 
procurement  schemes)  run  by  relevant  national  Ministries,  notably  defence  or  interior 
ministries,  in the context of the implementation of ISF, BMVI as well as SAFE23, EDIP24 and 
the work of the Drone Capability coalition or, if the Member States choose to, the European 
Defence Drone Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch and the Air Shield initiatives, as well as the 
implementation of the EU strategy for the Black sea and the Black Sea Maritime Security Hub.   

4.3. Building the “software layer” of counter-drone capacities 

23 Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE). 
24 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence 
Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence 
products. COM(2024)/150 final. 

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Effective counter-drone capabilities are necessarily powered by a Command and Control (C2) 
system, the software layer allowing to integrate the sensors and the effectors, as the experience 
of Ukraine has shown. To detect and counter sophisticated and coordinated threats from drones 
it is essential that Member States jointly develop sovereign European Command and Control 
(C2)  capacities,  powered  by  AI  software,  high  level  of  cybersecurity,  state-of-the-art 
encryption,  secured  cloud  on  the  edge,  and  high-performance  computing  capacity. 
Interoperable by design, dual by nature, these C2 solutions, should be able to work in synergies 
with  detection  capacities  and  designed  to  engage  with  multiple  effectors  against  malicious 
drones. They should allow integrating legacy equipment, interacting with each other and with 
relevant civilian and defence systems. In line with the Apply AI strategy, the AI Gigafactories 
currently being established with the support of the EU budget should facilitate the development 
of such C2 capacities.   

4.4. Solidarity: Rapid counter-drone emergency response teams  

Facing threats or to secure targeted sites in anticipation of events, Member States must be able 
to rely on an enhanced, rapid and scalable European solidarity. This is particularly relevant, 
when the nature or the scale of threats exceeds the capacities of a Member State to respond. 

The  Commission  proposes  to  work  with  Member  States  to  set  up  Rapid  Counter-drone 
Emergency Response Teams that could act as rapidly deployable reserve units, equipped with 
the latest technologies for detection and response, at the request of a Member State authority in 
a mutual assistance approach. The Emergency Response Coordination Centre could provide the 
necessary  support,  as  appropriate.  The  Commission  will  explore  how  this  can  build  on  the 
expansion  of  the  pooling  and  sharing  mechanisms  of  the  EU-funded  law  enforcement 
networks25,  the  Protective  Security  Advisory  (PSA)  Programme,  and  EU  agencies  (e.g. 
Frontex) to provide cross-border coverage and the deployment of mobile units in the context of 
high-risk  and  high-profile  events  while  maintaining  interoperability.  It  would  also  work  in 
synergies with existing capabilities such as the EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams.  

4.5.  Counter-drone capacity integrated in border management  

The EU’s external borders are subject to intense drone threats across land and maritime border 
sections  and  their  vicinity.  Frontex  supports  Member  States  in  addressing  these  threats.  It 
deploys drones for border surveillance in joint operations and promotes interoperability.  

The  Commission  will  support  Frontex  in  the  organisation  of  drone  and  counter-drone 
pilots, live demonstrations and prize-based innovation challenges in realistic border settings. It 
will enhance the integration of drones and counter-drone skills into the training of the standing 
corps. Frontex will also provide practical guidance on layered deployment models and cross-
border incident handling. 

The  Border  Management  and  Visa  Instrument  (BMVI)  supports  Member  States  in 
improving border surveillance and detection of threats at the EU’s external borders, including 
on drones and counter-drone capacities. The Commission has evaluated applications received 
for a EUR 150 million call for equipment. The aim is to support Member States in purchasing 

25 Such as the High-Risk Security Network- HRSN or ATLAS 

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uncrewed  equipment  for  aerial  and  maritime  surveillance  with  the  ultimate  objective  of 
deployment by Frontex in joint operations.  

Additionally,  a recent  EUR 250 million call to  better secure  EU  external  borders, including 
against  drones,  was  published  in  December  2025.  It  targets  Member  States  experiencing 
increased and complex pressure on border management and it supports them in one or more of 
the three priority areas: the direct purchase of drones and counter-drone systems for external 
borders, the integration of drones and counter-drone systems into national border surveillance 
systems  and the deployment of innovative technologies and communication systems to address 
hybrid  threats  affecting  external  borders  and  border  crossing  points  including  those  in 
international  airports.  To  facilitate  implementation  and  interoperability,  the  Commission 
encourages  coordinated  approaches  among  interested  Member  States,  including  cooperation 
through joint/cross-border innovation procurement and joint procurement, where relevant.  

4.6. 

Towards an EU level counter-drone regulatory framework  

Today, the legal and operational frameworks for countering non-cooperative or unsafe drone 
activity remain highly fragmented across the Union, as demonstrated by a recent comprehensive 
mapping study of Member States’ regulatory frameworks for counter-drone systems.  

Most  Member  States  rely  on  dispersed  provisions  in  aviation,  police,  defence  and 
telecommunications  legislation,  and  only  a  few  have  started  developing  integrated  national 
counter-drone strategies. Some Member States have no national rules at all. Civilian and critical 
infrastructure operators typically lack legal authority to neutralise a threatening drone. Active 
mitigation  measures  such  as  jamming,  spoofing  or  kinetic  intervention  remain  restricted  to 
military  and  specialised  police  units  due  to  strict  spectrum-interference  and  aviation-safety 
rules. As a result,  some  operators can detect  threats  but  cannot  respond effectively to  them, 
which delays neutralisation and increases security risks.  

There is therefore a need to consider expanding the framework of the 2023 Communication on 
countering threats posed by drones towards a set of common binding and non-binding rules 
for  Member  State  authorities  and  private  operators  to  clarify  roles  and  mandates  of  all 
actors involved, including the owners of critical  infrastructure. This could include minimum 
performance requirements for counter-drone systems, harmonised terminology and taxonomy, 
integrated  monitoring,  support 
incentives  for 
standardisation.  It  should  provide  a  baseline  level  of  resilience  for  Member  States  and  be 
implemented in complementarity with the framework for legitimate use of drones. To that end, 
the Commission will launch a feasibility study on possible options for establishing an EU level 
counter-drone  regulatory  framework  by  2030.  In  parallel,  to  meet  short-term  needs,  the 
Commission will issue a Recommendation on countering threats posed by drones, detailing 
guidance for law enforcement operators. 

incident  reporting  platform,  and 

the 

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Key actions on response: 

As a matter of urgency, the Commission, together with Member States will: 

•  Launch by Q2 2026 a call for Expression of Interest to establish a voluntary EU 

counter-drone deployment initiative for critical infrastructure based on:  

o  An overview of EU dual use counter-drone capability needs.  
o  a joint development pilot programme for counter-drone capacities. 
o  Voluntary joint purchasing for the protection of critical infrastructure. 
o  Deploying Counter-drone capacities in maritime and land border (through the 

€250m call on expression of interest under the BMVI). 

•  As part of the ongoing rollout of AI Gigafactories, support home grown, dual use 
and  AI-Powered  C2  capacities  for  autonomous  assets  with  the  view  to  deploy 
sovereign software solutions. 

•  Launch  a  yearly  EU  large-scale  drone  security/blueprint  exercise  to  testcross 
border cooperation and civilian/military synergies (first exercise in autumn 2026).  

The Commission will follow up with Member States to:  

•  Launch a feasibility study for an EU level counter-drone regulatory framework 
setting  a  common  minimum  baseline  for  Member  State  authorities,  and  private 
operators of critical infrastructure.  

•  Adopt a Commission Recommendation on countering threats posed by drones 

for law enforcement operators.  

•  Support  Frontex  in  using  drones  for  enhanced  border  surveillance  purposes 

through joint operations, drone and counter-drone pilots and live demos. 

•  Explore by Q4 2026 the establishment of Rapid Counter-drone emergency teams 

to enhance the solidarity and mutual assistance against drone threats.  

•  Encourage Member States to develop the right legal framework in place to allow 
to take efficient remedial measures, including take downs, against drone threats and 
empowering private critical infrastructure owners to take the necessary measures.  

5.  Strengthening Europe’s defence readiness against drone threats  

Beyond enhancing EU’s resilience to the wide arrays of drone threats, there is also a need to 
further strengthen Europe’s defence readiness to counter drone threats considering that the use 
of drones has become an integral part of modern warfare. In this context, Europe is drawing 
lessons from the unprovoked war in Ukraine, as well from the innovative ecosystem that was 
put in place to rapidly adjust to the dynamics of the battlefield. 

From a defence perspective, the increasing use of drones and counter-drone systems reflects 
broader evolutions in the security environment, including faster operational tempos, activities 
below the threshold of armed conflict and the growing interaction between civilian and military 
domains. These developments affect not only the conduct of military operations, but also wider 
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considerations  related  to  territorial  protection,  securing  critical  assets  and  overall  defence 
readiness. 

Drones  are  employed  across  a  wide  range  of  military  functions,  including  intelligence, 
surveillance  and  reconnaissance,  strike,  force  protection  and  logistical  support.  At  the  same 
time,  counter-drone  capabilities  have  become  an  integral  element  of  force  survivability  and 
freedom of manoeuvre, particularly in contested and saturated environments. 

Drones and counter-drone systems are one of the capability priority areas identified and agreed 
by Member States. The Defence Readiness Roadmap has underlined the need to address this 
capability as a matter of priority. Lead nations and other Member States, with the support of 
the High Representative, notably through active coordination role of the EDA,  have already 
started work on drones and counter-drones within a dedicated Priority Capability Area (PCA) 
to  address  very  specific  capability  shortfalls.  Other  adjacent  capabilities  are  addressed  in 
capability areas such as Air and Missile Defence, Artillery, Electronic Warfare and Artificial 
Intelligence.  This  coordination  group  provides 
the 
interdependencies as well as interoperability challenges and operational dependencies can be 
jointly  addressed.  It  should  serve  as  the  main  vehicle  to  coordinate  Member  States’  efforts 
towards  agreed  Defence  Readiness  objectives,  including  by  connecting  capability  priorities 
with relevant industrial support instruments. 

framework  within  which 

the 

Regarding financial support, the PCA on drones and counter-drones is aiming at procuring and 
fostering  European  industrial  capacity  in  airborne  drones  through  specific  objectives  and 
timelines  and  leveraging  the  European  Defence  Industry  Programme  (EDIP)  and  the  SAFE 
Instrument.  The  Commission  will  intensify  its  support  to  this,  including  through  EDIP’s 
collaborative  frameworks  (Structure  for  European  Armament  Programme-  SEAP,  European 
Defence Project of Common Interest - EDPCI), facilitating dialogue with the Drone Alliance 
and performing industrial mapping in coherence with the actions described earlier. This work 
will  feed  into  the  European  Drone  Defence  Initiative,  as  well  as  the  Eastern  Flank  Watch 
initiative, proposed in the Defence Readiness Roadmap.  

The Commission and the High Representative will take forward the European Drone Defence 
Initiative,  with  a  view  to  supporting  coherence  across  capability,  operational  and  industrial 
efforts at EU level, towards achieving the Defence Readiness priorities, including across civil, 
dual-use and military strands, and in a cross-cutting manner with ongoing work under relevant 
PCA coalition efforts. 

This work will draw notably on Ukraine’s battlefield experience in areas of interoperable data 
management  systems,  including  Command  and  Control  (integration),  detection  systems 
(awareness)  and  cost-effective  effector  systems  (response).  The  European  Drone  Defence 
Initiative  should  support  a  more  integrated  approach,  taking  into  account  key  operational 
dependencies across the full operational  response chain.  It  will aim at building an industrial 
ecosystem  of  end-users,  innovators,  and  production  lines  able  to  deliver  when  necessary. 
Countering attack of swarms of drones requires a modular and interoperable systems, based on 
an open architecture. Such systems are also instrumental to perform countering strikes in the 
depth.  Strong  synergies  with  the  development  of  dual  use  C2  systems  for  the  protection  of 
critical  infrastructure  should  be  leveraged.  This  will  also  contribute  to  the  Eastern  Flank 
Watch initiative in domains, such as building of an industrial base for drone and counter-drone 
capabilities, air and missile defence, early warning, C2 and data management, detection and 
situational awareness capabilities, kinetic and non-kinetic, as well as Electronic Warfare (EW) 
effectors. 

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Efforts  at  European  level  should  lead  to  a  comprehensive  European  drone  and  counter-
drone capability and offer a multi-layered and multilevel overarching approach, able to link 
sensors and effectors across the Union, to support decision-making processes and to guarantee 
continuous situational awareness. 

Being able to accelerate the development of increasingly advanced drone and counter-drone 
defence capabilities is an integral part of defence readiness of Europe. So far, a total of EUR 1 
billion  from  the  European  Defence  Fund  (EDF)  and  its  precursor  programmes  have  been 
dedicated to a wide range of drone-related research and development actions. The EU plans to 
continue  investing  into  drones  and  counter-drone  technologies  over  the  next  2  years,  with 
EUR 200 million foreseen under the EDF. 

Moreover, EU Member States are about to invest significantly to purchase the latest drones and 
counter-drone weapon systems through the SAFE instrument.  This will enhance EU border 
security,  military  readiness,  and  strategic  autonomy  in  systems  that  are  optionally  manned, 
while boosting the defence technological and industrial base and reducing dependence on non-
EU suppliers.   

The EU will also accelerate the development of innovative and disruptive players in the field 
of  drones  and  counter-drones  for  defence.  With  the  upcoming  AGILE  initiative,  the 
Commission will propose a new instrument in support of agile and rapid innovation of cost-
efficient defence products and technologies for armed forces. The BraveTechEU initiative is 
also  expected  to  include  actions  aimed  at  rapid  innovation  of  counter-drone  solutions  in 
response to real operational needs agreed with Ukraine, taken forward together with the EDA. 
The Commission is also facilitating access to capital (equities) for such companies, that will 
benefit from the EUR 1 billion fund of fund under creation with the EIB/EIF. Furthermore, as 
announced in the EU Defence Industry Transformation Roadmap, the Commission will launch 
EUDIS  Tech  Alliances,  setting  up  a  network  of  defence  startup/scaleups  and  armed  forces 
around  priority  capability  areas.  This  will  help  companies  to  better  address  Member  States’ 
needs. One of these Tech Alliances will be on drones. 

Member  States  need  also  to  invest  into  massification  of  production  capacity  for  drones  and 
counter-drone systems, in the same way it is done for Ammunition, either to actively deploy 
them now or to stock-pile them as strategic reserve. In this vein, and upon agreement of Member 
States, EDIP will provide support to drone and counter-drone industrial production capacities, 
which will work in synergies with the civilian equivalent initiative. As part of this work, there 
is a need to secure access to critical raw materials for the drone industry through research into 
alternatives  or  through  stockpiling  where  necessary.  Additionally,  the  Commission  will 
prioritise  the  implementation  of  EU  Defence  Industry  Transformation  Roadmap  in  building 
drone defence capabilities. Beyond 2027, the defence, resilience, security, and space window 
of the European Competitiveness Fund (ECF), in synergies with other windows, will offer a 
stable and predictable framework, and flexibility to respond to emerging priorities.  

Finally,  to  enhance  the  cooperation  with  Ukraine,  the  Commission  is  establishing  a  Drone 
Alliance with Ukraine as announced in the Defence Readiness Roadmap. This Alliance will 
bring together system producers start-ups/scale-ups and a community of innovators to build on 
Ukraine’s  experience  and  industrial  basis.  It  will  interact  with  end-users,  including  from 
Ukraine, so that it can provide rapid solutions and leverage battle proven solutions. It will also 
facilitate  the  work  on  standardisation,  certification  and  interoperability.  It  will  contribute  to 
establishing of joint ventures and public-private partnerships in EU and Ukraine. The Drone 
Alliance board will coordinate actions with the Member States and industry representatives.  
The Alliance will work in full synergy with the Drone Industrial Forum D-TEC. Where relevant 

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the  Drone  Alliance  will  build  on  network,  knowledge,  and  partnerships  generated  by  the 
Ukraine Investment Framework and broader EU-Ukraine Partnership. 

In  parallel,  enhanced  EU-Ukraine  cooperation  on  supply-chain  securitisation  and 
diversification will be essential to overcome bottlenecks in drone production, particularly to 
ensure surge capacity and availability of critical electronic components. This will be taken 
forward  notably  in  the  context  of  the  EU-Ukraine  Task  Force  on  Defence  Industrial 
cooperation. 

The European Union should also, through the full range of relevant instruments and initiatives 
(including  exploring  use  of  EPF  and  EUMAM),  incentivise  and  support  exchanges  and 
training  programmes  between  Ukraine  and  Member  States  for  drone  pilots,  engineers 
and maintenance specialists.  

Key actions on defence readiness 

As a matter of priority, the Commission and the High Representative within their respective 
prerogatives, will: 

• 

Intensify its support to Member States in the Priority Capability Area Drone 
and Counter-Drone, including through fostering convergence and synergies across 
PCA’s coalition work and related ongoing capability efforts as well as through tools 
such as the EDPCI and SEAP. Such efforts will frame the European Defence Drone 
Initiative, and the Eastern Flank Watch initiative. 

•  Support the rapid industrialisation of drone / counter-drone solutions for defence 

purposes. 

•  Launch the Drone Alliance Initiative with Ukraine to incentivise the creation of 

an innovative industrial ecosystem.  

Incentivise and support exchanges and training programmes between Ukraine and 
Member States for drone pilots, engineers and maintenance specialists. 

• 

• 

6.  International Cooperation 

Enhancing the EU’s security against drone threats can only be envisaged in a broader context 
and through cooperation with partners. Cooperation with Ukraine is central to this Action Plan. 
Many  of  the  actions  envisaged  will  be  implemented  as  part  of  an  intense  partnership  with 
Ukraine and across all the strands, which would benefit both Ukraine and the EU. 

The  Action  Plan  will  open  dedicated  cooperation  with  close  neighbours,  such  as  the  UK, 
Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, as well as Moldova, the partners in the Western Balkans, in the 
Mediterranean , the Black Sea region and other partners with which EU’s security and defence 
interests converge, recognising the fact that the EU’s partners are subject to the same kind of 
drone threats. The EU has  strong  interest  in  establishing necessary cooperation mechanisms 
with partners, especially as there may be cross-border considerations in the protection of critical 
infrastructures.  There  is  particularly  a  need  to  envisage  mechanism  of  early  alerts  between 
partners when a threat is detected.   

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A  strong  EU-NATO  cooperation  on  drones  and  counter-drone  measures  is  essential  for  the 
rapid and efficient delivery of the Action Plan. The Commission and the High Representative 
will  engage  in  regular  and  structured  exchanges  with  NATO  in  order  to  identify  mutual 
integration of potential dual-use counter-drone solutions, to avoid  duplication and maximise 
synergies. 

7.  Conclusion 

The EU must take swift and decisive action to set a powerful example of solidarity and unity. 
The measures laid down in this Action Plan are designed as the EU level contribution to bring 
immediate and short-term responses to the continuum of threats from drones the EU is facing. 
The Action Plan sets a holistic approach by addressing the question of the protection of critical 
infrastructure,  external  borders,  as  well  as  proposing  to  adapt  the  necessary  legislation  to 
enhance  the  security  from  drones  and  deploy  the  latest  technological  evolution  to  increase 
detection and improve response.  

The Action Plan should be seen as a dynamic process, to be adapted according to the evolution 
and nature of the threats. The Actions put forward are proposals to Member States for enhanced 
joint action and cooperation, based on the principle of co-ownership, to address the entire scope 
of  the  issue.  Following  adoption  of  this  Action  Plan,  the  Commission  intends  to  launch  an 
intense and structured discussion on all the proposed actions with interested parties, including 
the industry, the European Parliament and the Member States to establish a clear prioritisation 
of the actions.   

To that end, the Commission will consider setting up with Member States a strategic mechanism 
to coordinate the implementation of the measures proposed in this Action Plan, connecting the 
different  dimensions,  and  ensuring  close  cooperation  with  the  Council.  In  view  of  this,  the 
Commission  invites  Member  States  to  nominate  a  National  Drone  Security  Coordinator, 
whose role will be to oversee, foster and promote the national implementation of this Action 
Plan.  Such  mechanism  should  be  without  prejudice  to  the  existing  technical  cooperation 
platforms in this area. The Commission will publish a yearly census report based on voluntary 
contributions from Member States to monitor implementation of the Action Plan.  

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