Letter from Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (ECB), to Márton Nagy, Minister for National Economy of Hungary, regarding certain amendments to the Law on Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Date: 2026-02-09
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: legal basis

Frank Elderson  
Member of the Executive Board  

Mr Márton Nagy 

Minister for National Economy of Hungary, 

Mininstry for National Economy 

József nádor tér 2-4.  

1051 Budapest 

HUNGARY 

ECB-PUBLIC 

[COURTESY TRANSLATION] 

Frankfurt am Main, 9 February 2026 
Contact person: Niall Lenihan 
email: niall.lenihan@ecb.europa.eu 
tel.: +49 69 1344 7964 

Re: Law containing certain amendments to the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank  

Dear Minister, 

It has come to the attention of the European Central Bank (ECB) that on 10 December 2025 the Hungarian 

National Assembly adopted certain amendments to the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank 1 (hereinafter the 

‘Law on the MNB’) contained in the Law on amendments to laws affecting the financial intermediary system 

(hereinafter the ‘Law’)2. The ECB understands that the Law entered into force on 24 December 2025 and 

aims, inter alia, to transpose into Hungarian law the amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European 

Parliament and of the Council3 introduced by Directive (EU) 2024/1619 of the European Parliament and of 

the Council 4 (hereinafter the ‘CRD6’). In particular, the ECB understands that Article 109 of the Law seeks 

to  transpose  into  national  law  Article  4a  of  Directive  2013/36/EU,  which  relates  to  the  supervisory 

independence of competent authorities and the prevention of conflicts of interest in relation to the officials 

and employees of such authorities. The ECB understands that Article 109 of the Law entered into force on 

11 January 2026. 

The ECB understands that Article 109 of the Law includes the amendments to the Law on the MNB, in 

particular Article 13(9a) and (9b) of the Law on the  MNB; and that Article 13(9a), inter alia, uses the new 

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A Magyar Nemzeti Bankról szóló 2013. évi CXXXIX. törvény. 

2025.  évi  C.  törvény  a  pénzügyi  közvetítőrendszert  érintő  törvények  módosításáról,  published  in  Magyar  Közlöny 
2025/153. 
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions  and  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions,  amending  Directive  2002/87/EC  and  repealing 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj). 

Directive  (EU)  2024/1619  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  31  May  2024  amending  Directive 
2013/36/EU  as  regards  supervisory  powers,  sanctions,  third-country  branches,  and  environmental,  social  and 
governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj). 

Address 
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ECB-PUBLIC 

term ‘supervisory executive’ to refer collectively to the Deputy Governor of the MNB responsible for the 

supervision of the financial intermediary system and the executive, designated by the Governor of the MNB, 

who reports to this Deputy Governor. The ECB further understands that Article 13(9b) of the Law on the 

MNB provides that each supervisory executive’s term of office is limited to 14 years, that their appointment 

may only take place on the basis of objective, transparent and publicly available criteria, and that they may 

be dismissed if they no longer fulfil the criteria for appointment. The reasons for dismissal must be made 

public, unless the supervisory executive concerned objects to such disclosure. 

The ECB understands that the Deputy Governor responsible for the supervisory powers of the MNB is a 

member of the Monetary Council, which is the ESCB-related decision-making body of the MNB within the 

meaning of Article 130 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union5. The ECB also notes that 

all Deputy Governors of the MNB – including the Deputy Governor responsible for the supervisory powers 

of the MNB – are appointed for a term of six years under Article 41(3) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary 

and that, under Article 9(10) of the Law on the MNB, they can only be dismissed for the reasons set out in 

Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank 

(hereinafter  the  ‘Statute  of  the  ESCB’).  The  ECB  understands  that  before  the  entry  into  force  of  Article 

13(9b) of the Law on the MNB there were no statutory limits on the term of office of the Deputy Governor 

and the executive designated by the Governor of the MNB6.  

In accordance with Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty and Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC7, 

national authorities are required to consult the ECB on draft legislative provisions concerning matters that 

fall  within  its  fields  of  competence,  including  national  central  banks  (NCBs)  in  the  European  System  of 

Central  Banks  (ESCB),  including  in  this  case  the  MNB.  The  ECB’s  Annual  Report  includes  information 

regarding clear and important cases of non-compliance with the obligation to consult the ECB. 

The ECB would like to draw to your attention that the ECB has been consulted by, and has adopted opinions 

addressed to, other Member States on draft national legislation concerning the national transpositions of 

CRD68. The ECB highlighted in several of these opinions that in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute 

of the ESCB, statutes of NCBs must provide for a minimum term of office of five years for a Governor. This 

does not preclude longer terms of office. Applying the rules regarding the term of office of Governors to 

other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks 

will also safeguard the personal independence of those persons. Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of 

the Statute of the ESCB, which address the independence of central banks in the ESCB, refer to ‘members 

of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. The application of the same 

rules regarding term of office to  both Governors and  members of decision-making bodies  is particularly 

pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ alongside other members who have equivalent voting 

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See Article 9(1) and (4) of the Law on the MNB. 

The  ECB  understands  that  Article  13(9b)  of  the  Law  on  the  MNB  applies  in  parallel  with  Article  41(3)  of  the 
Fundamental Law of Hungary and Article 9(10) of the Law on the MNB. 

Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 
See Opinions CON/2025/19 (Finland), CON/2025/23 (Lithuania), CON/2025/27 (Bulgaria), CON/2025/29 (Germany), 
CON/2025/32 (Slovakia), CON/2025/33 (Slovenia), CON/2025/36 (Italy), CON/2025/38 (Cyprus), CON/2026/1 (Latvia) 
and CON/2026/2 (Belgium). All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 

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ECB-PUBLIC 

rights,  or  where  other  members  are  involved  in  the  performance  of  ESCB-related  tasks9,  as  the  ECB 

understands is the case for the MNB 10.  

The ECB would like to draw your particular attention to Opinion CON/2025/27 on a draft Bulgarian law on 

the  independence  of  the  members  of  the  Governing  Council  of  Българска  народна  банка  (Bulgarian 

National Bank) (BNB) that transposed Article 4a of Directive 2013/36/EU into Bulgarian law. The ECB noted 

in that opinion that a draft legislative provision according to which the Deputy Governor or any other member 

of the Governing Council of BNB, other than the Governor, cannot be elected or appointed, as the case 

may be, as a member of BNB’s Governing Council if, during the term of office for which they would have 

been elected or appointed, the performance of their duties as a member of BNB’s Governing Council would 

exceed  14 years, taking into account  all  previous terms of office, is consistent  with the requirements of 

Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB 11. 

In a similar vein, the ECB would like to draw your particular attention to Opinion CON/2025/32 on a draft 

Slovak law on the supervisory independence of Národná banka Slovenska (NBS) and the prevention of 

conflicts of interest, which also transposed Article 4a of Directive 2013/36/EU into Slovak law. The ECB 

noted  in  that  opinion  that  under  the  draft  Slovak  law  the  total  term  of  office  of  the  head  of  the  financial 

market supervision unit in the area of banking who is also a member of the Bank Board of NBS other than 

the Governor of NBS (hereinafter the ‘Head of Banking Supervision’) must not exceed 14 years. The term 

of office for the members of the Bank Board of NBS, including the Head of Banking Supervision, is six years 

in line with the Law on NBS. The ECB understands that in practice the maximum term of office of 14 years 

as set out in the draft law is unlikely to be reached very often, due to the combination of (a) the term of 

office of six years of the members of the Bank Board of NBS applicable under the Law on NBS; and (b) the 

minimum term of office of five years applicable to the members of the Bank Board of NBS, including the 

Head  of  Banking  Supervision,  under  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB.  Consequently,  if  the  Head  of  Banking 

Supervision serves two full six-year terms, the dual requirements that his or her term must not exceed 14 

years and that he or she must serve a minimum term of office of five years could only be complied with by 

ensuring that he or she cannot be reappointed to serve a further term of office. Based on the above, the 

ECB understands that the Head of Banking Supervision cannot be appointed as a member of the Bank 

Board of NBS if, during the term of office for which he or she would have been appointed, the performance 

of his or her duties as a member of the Bank Board of NBS would exceed 14 years, taking into account all 

previous terms of office12.  

The ECB trusts that this information regarding these opinions delivered to other Member States on draft 

national  legislation  transposing  CRD6  into  their  respective  national  laws  is  helpful  to  the  Ministry  for 

National Economy.  

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See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2025/27 and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion 
CON/2025/32. 
See Article 9 (4) and (15) of the Law on the MNB. 

See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2025/27. 
See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2025/32. 

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ECB-PUBLIC 

The ECB would also appreciate the Ministry for National Economy giving due consideration to the above 

observations by honouring its obligation to consult the ECB in the future on draft national legislation falling 

within the ECB’s fields of competence, where appropriate. 

Yours sincerely, 

[signed] 

Cc:  Mr M Varga, Governor, Magyar Nemzeti Bank 

Mr V Dombrovskis, Commissioner for Economy and Productivity; Implementation and Simplification, 

European Commission 

Mr A De Gregorio Merino, Director-General Legal Service, European Commission  

Encl.  Guide to consultation of the ECB by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions 

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