COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) Implementation Trackers Overview of Resilience Measures by Selected Global Players Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions The 2026 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report
Date: 2026-01-30
Institutions: Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, European Commission
Subjects: EU industrial policy, circular economy, competitiveness, digital transformation, economic growth, green economy, innovation, investment, single market, twin transition

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 30.1.2026  SWD(2026) 30 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)           Implementation Trackers          Overview of Resilience Measures by Selected Global Players Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions The 2026 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report {COM(2026) 46 final}  
 
 
 
 
 
Table of contents 

Annex 1 ................................................................................................................. 4 

Key performance indicators (KPIs) .................................................................. 4 
1.  A functioning Single Market .................................................................................................... 6 

KPI 1: Labour productivity ............................................................................................................. 6 

KPI 2: Integration in the Single Market .......................................................................................... 7 

KPI 3: Simplification of EU rules ................................................................................................... 8 

KPI 4: Conformity deficit ............................................................................................................... 9 

KPI 5: Ease of regulatory compliance .......................................................................................... 10 

KPI 6: Recognition of professional qualifications ........................................................................ 11 

KPI 7: Length of standard-setting procedures .............................................................................. 12 

KPI 8: Circular material use rate ................................................................................................... 13 

KPI 9: Product compliance monitoring......................................................................................... 14 

KPI 10: Services Regulation, Intra-EEA Services Trade Restrictiveness Index .......................... 15 

KPI 11: Degree of digitalisation and cross-border accessibility ................................................... 16 

2.  Closing the innovation gap ..................................................................................................... 17 

KPI 12: R&D expenditure............................................................................................................. 17 

KPI 13: Patent applications ........................................................................................................... 18 

KPI 14: Digital technologies adoption by companies ................................................................... 19 

KPI 15: Employment rate ............................................................................................................. 20 

KPI 16: Labour shortages relevant for the green transition .......................................................... 21 

KPI 17: PISA scores ..................................................................................................................... 22 

3.  Decarbonisation of industry and investment ........................................................................ 23 

KPI 18: Private investment  .......................................................................................................... 23 

KPI 19: Public investment  ........................................................................................................... 24 

KPI 20: Venture capital investment .............................................................................................. 25 

KPI 21: EU investments supporting the industrial transition ........................................................ 26 

KPI 24: Electricity prices for businesses ...................................................................................... 27 

KPI 23: Electrification rate ........................................................................................................... 28 

KPI 24: Energy from renewable sources ...................................................................................... 29 

KPI 25: Annual growth in renewable electricity generation ......................................................... 30 

4. 

Increasing security and reducing dependencies ................................................................... 31 

KPI 26: Trade with the rest of the world....................................................................................... 31 

KPI 27: The EU economy’s global market share .......................................................................... 32 

KPI 28: Domestic clean tech manufacturing capacity .................................................................. 33 

KPI 29: External vulnerability ...................................................................................................... 34 

1 

 
 
 
 
Annex 2 ............................................................................................................... 35 

Implementation trackers .................................................................................. 35 
1.  A Competitiveness Compass for the EU (adopted on 29 January 2025) ............................... 35 

2.  The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation 
(adopted on 26 February 2025) ......................................................................................................... 38 

3.  The Single Market Strategy (adopted on 21 May 2025) ........................................................ 41 
Annex 3 ............................................................................................................... 44 

Overview of resilience measures by selected global players ......................... 44 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 44 

1. 

2.  Overview of resilience measures by category and by countries .......................................... 46 

2.1 Industrial strategies, regulatory measures and crisis preparedness ................................ 46 

United States 

 ........................................................................................................................ 46 

United Kingdom 

 ................................................................................................................... 47 

Japan 

 ................................................................................................................................... 48 

Republic of Korea 

 ................................................................................................................. 48 

Singapore 

 ............................................................................................................................. 48 

Australia 

 ............................................................................................................................... 48 

India 

 ..................................................................................................................................... 49 

Canada 

................................................................................................................................. 49 

2.2 Financial and fiscal support (including R&D) ................................................................... 49 

United States 

 ........................................................................................................................ 49 

Canada 

................................................................................................................................. 50 

United Kingdom 

 ................................................................................................................... 50 

India 

 ..................................................................................................................................... 50 

Taiwan 

 .................................................................................................................................. 51 

Japan 

 ................................................................................................................................... 52 

Republic of Korea 

 ................................................................................................................. 53 

Brazil 

 .................................................................................................................................... 53 

2.3 Public procurement and prioritisation measures of domestic supply of goods and 
services ......................................................................................................................................... 53 

United States 

 ........................................................................................................................ 53 

Canada 

................................................................................................................................. 54 

India 

 ..................................................................................................................................... 54 

China 

 ................................................................................................................................... 54 

United Kingdom 

 ................................................................................................................... 55 

South Africa 

 ......................................................................................................................... 55 

2 

 
 
2.4 Trade toolbox (tariffs, export restrictions, anti-coercion measures, FDI control, etc.) .. 55 

United States 

 ........................................................................................................................ 55 

Canada 

................................................................................................................................. 55 

Australia 

 ............................................................................................................................... 56 

India 

 ..................................................................................................................................... 56 

China 

 ................................................................................................................................... 56 

Japan 

 ................................................................................................................................... 57 

2.5 International deals and partnerships .................................................................................. 57 

BILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS ............................................................................................... 57 

United States 

 ........................................................................................................................ 57 

United Kingdom 

 ................................................................................................................... 61 

Australia 

 ............................................................................................................................... 62 

India 

 ..................................................................................................................................... 62 

Japan 

 ................................................................................................................................... 63 

Republic of Korea 

 ................................................................................................................. 63 

Vietnam 

 ................................................................................................................................ 63 

PLURILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS ............................................ 63 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 1 

Key performance indicators (KPIs) 

Table 1: Summary of KPIs1 

Legend: 

Improvement year-on-year 

Stable 

Worsening year-on-year 

Single observation 

KPI  

What it measures  

Latest EU values 

A functioning Single Market 
KPI 1: Labour productivity   GDP per hour worked in PPP terms. 

KPI 2: Integration in the 
Single Market   

Share of EU GDP represented by trade between 
EU Member States. 

At 78.5% of US levels (2024)  
At 78.0% of US levels (2023)   
22.0% for goods (2024) 
23.5% for goods (2023) 

KPI 5: Ease of regulatory 
compliance 

KPI 6: Recognition of 
professional qualifications 

KPI 3: Simplification of EU 
rules 

Projected annual administrative savings from 
Commission’s omnibus simplification proposals 
and other initiatives.  
KPI 4: Conformity deficit    Share of transposed EU Single Market Directives 
for which infringement proceedings for incorrect 
transposition were launched. Target <= 0.5%. 
Replies to the survey question: ‘...how easy is it 
for companies to comply with government 
regulation and administrative requirements2?’ 
Positive recognition rates as % (EU average) of 
all received requests for recognition of 
professional qualifications. 
Average length (in years) of the drafting stage of 
standards.  
Material recovered and fed back into the 
economy, as a share of the overall use of 
material. Target = 24% in 2030. 
Median number of product investigations per 
million inhabitants in EU Member States3. 
Restrictiveness of regulation in selected service 
sectors4.  
Share of Single Market relevant administrative 
procedures that are fully online for national and 
cross-border users. 

KPI 7: Length of standard-
setting procedures 
KPI 8: Circular material use 
rate 

KPI 9: Product compliance 
monitoring 
KPI 10: Services trade 
restrictiveness  
KPI 11: Digitalisation of 
Single Market relevant 
procedures 
Closing the innovation gap 
KPI 12: R&D expenditure 

7.9% for services (2024) 
7.7% for services (2023) 
EUR 15 bn (2025)  

1.1% (2025) 
0.9% (2024) 

3.89 out of 7 (2025) 
3.66 out of 7 (2024) 

82.2% (2023) 
77.3% (2022) 

4.0 (2024) 
3.2 (2023) 
12.2% (2024) 
12.1% (2023) 

102 (2024) 
82 (2023)  
4.2% (2024) 
4.2% (2023) 
20.6% (2024) 

Total private and public expenditure in research 
and development as a share of GDP. Target = 
Above 3% by 2030. 

2.24% (2024) 
2.26% (2023) 

KPI 13: Patent applications   Patent applications per million inhabitants5. 

KPI 14: Digital technologies 
adoption by companies 

Share of European enterprises that have taken up 
cloud computing services, data analytics and/or 
Artificial Intelligence.  

152 (2024) 
153 (2023)  
Artificial intelligence:   
20% (2025), 13.5% (2024) 

Data analytics:  

1 KPIs focus on EU averages and the performances of EU Member States. When useful, comparisons are made to global peers. 
The Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard, that includes additional indicators, also includes to a limited extent data 
for the members of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), and enlargement countries. 
2 Index values from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating greater ease of doing business. 
3 Measuring product investigations carried out by market surveillance authorities which are notified in the  Information and 
Communication System for Market Surveillance. 
4 OECD’s STRI showing the share of catalogued restrictions to trade in services being present in selected sectors. 
5 Patent applications submitted to the European Patent Office. 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Target = 75% by 2030. 

KPI 15: Employment rate 

KPI 16: Labour shortages 
relevant for the green 
transition 
KPI 17: PISA score  

The share of working-age people employed.  
Target = 78% by 2030. 
Number of occupations requiring specific skills 
for the green transition where at least five 
Member States reported a shortage. 
15-year-olds’ performance in the OECD’s PISA 
tests. High scores indicate better performance. 

Decarbonisation of industry and investment  
KPI 18: Private investment   Private investment (share of GDP).  

KPI 19: Public investment   Public investment (share of GDP).  

KPI 20: Venture capital 
investment  
KPI 21: EU investments 
supporting industrial 
transition 
KPI 22: Electricity prices for 
non-household consumers 
KPI 23: Electrification  

KPI 24: Share of energy from 
renewable sources 

Venture capital investment (share of GDP).  

Cumulative volume of InvestEU investments 
supporting industrial transition. 

Electricity prices for non-household consumers 
(EU ID price band, large commercial users)6.  
Electricity as a share of the total (final) energy 
consumption. Objective = 32% in 20307. 
Renewable energy generation as a share of the 
overall energy consumption. 
Target = 42.5% in 2030. 
The annually added capacity to generate 
renewable electricity. Objective = + 100 GW8. 

KPI 25: Annual growth in 
renewable electricity 
generation 
Increasing security and reducing dependencies 
KPI 26: Trade with the rest of 
the world as share of GDP  

The EU’s degree of economic integration with 
the rest of the world.  

KPI 27: Exports of goods and 
services as a share of 
worldwide imports   

The EU economy’s market share.  

KPI 28: Domestic clean tech 
manufacturing capacity 

KPI 29: External 
vulnerability 

The share of clean tech components tracked 
under the Net-Zero Industry Act that meet the 
benchmark domestic manufacturing rate. 
Target = 100% of the tracked components. 
External vulnerabilities for strategically 
important industrial products9.  

39.9% (2025), 33.2% (2023) 

Cloud computing services:  
46.7% (2025), 38.9% (2023)  
75.8% (2024) 
75.3% (2023) 
25 (2024) 
13 (2023) 

Maths:  
474 (2022), 492 (2018) 
Reading:  
475 (2022), 488 (2018) 

Science:  
484 (2022), 488 (2018) 

17.6% (2024) 
18.6% (2023) 
3.7% (2024) 
3.6% (2023)  
0.06% (2024) 
0.06% (2023)  
EUR 115.5bn (Jun 2025) 
EUR 52.7 bn (Jun 2024) 

EUR 0.164 per kWh (2025)  
EUR 0.163 per kWh (2024)  
22.9% (2023) 
22.9% of (2022) 
25.2% (2024) 
24.5% (2023) 

+68 GW (2024) 
+67 GW (2023) 

13.9 % for goods (2024) 
14.7% for goods (2023) 

8.1% for services (2024) 
7.8% for services (2023) 
12.6% for goods (2024) 
11.9% for goods (2023) 

25.0% for services (2024) 
25.4% for services (2023) 
6 out of 27 (22%) technology 
components exceed the 
benchmark manufacturing rate 
(2024) 
0.20 (2023) 
0.19  (2022)  

6 Electricity prices here exclude levies and taxes that companies can recover. 
7 This objective was set by the Commission in its “Clean industrial Deal” Communication. 
8 This objective was set by the Commission in its “Clean industrial Deal” Communication. 
9 Combined vulnerability to external shocks of product categories within the scope of the Clean Industrial Deal, including 
semiconductors, net-zero technologies, raw materials, basic metals, chemicals, machinery and motor vehicles. Measured on 
a scale from 0 to 1. Higher value = bigger vulnerability. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
This  annex  zooms  in  on  each  of  the  Report’s  29  KPIs,  showing  the  evolution  of  EU 
performance over time and data by individual Member State as available. It includes the latest 
available data for each KPI, with data sources last accessed on 15 January 2026. 

1.  A functioning Single Market 

KPI 1: Labour productivity  

KPI 1 shows the trend in labour productivity, meaning the economic output per hour worked 
in the economy (in PPS terms). EU indexed at 100 for 2024. 

The  EU  shows  a  persistent  productivity  gap  in  relation  to  the  US,  with  labour  productivity 
significantly below US levels for the past 30 years, currently 21% lower. 

Figure 1: Labour productivity in the EU and other advanced economies. 

Source: European Commission services calculations based on AMECO database, series: UVGD PPS and NLHT 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 2: Integration in the Single Market 

KPI 2 shows the trend in cross-border trade flows in goods and services within the EU Single 
Market as a share of total EU GDP. Trade is measured by the average of imports and exports. 

Since the creation of the Single Market in 1993, trade in goods and services as share of GDP 
has steadily risen. After a strong increase in 2022, trade in goods has fallen back to pre-2022 
levels. Disaggregated trade data suggest that these changes can, to a great extent, be attributed 
to trade fluctuations in energy products, linked to the significant price volatility in the wake of 
the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Trade in services continues to expand, albeit at 
a slow pace, after its pandemic-related dip. 

Figure 2: Integration in the Single Market: Intra-EU trade in goods and services. 

Source: Eurostat 

The  indicator  only  covers  intra-EU  trade.  If  considering  trade  with  non-EU  EEA  partners 
(Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein),  values for Member States with significant trade ties to 
non-EU EEA countries would be higher. 

National data, intra-EU goods, % of GDP (2024) 

CY 

BG 

CZ  DE  DK 

AT   BE 
FR  HR  HU 
29.7  51.2  27.0  12.7  53.9  19.7  18.1  37.8  15.0  15.3  17.2  13.0  28.8  51.1 
IE 
SK  EU 
12.8  14.7  33.8  19.3  38.9  16.1  40.3  29.3  23.8  22.3  19.3  54.0  63.9  22.0 

LV  MT  NL 

RO 

LU 

EE 

EL 

PL 

PT 

SE 

ES 

LT 

IT 

SI 

FI 

National data, intra-EU services (excluding financial services and transport for national data), 
% of GDP (2024) 

AT   BE 
10.8 
9.3 
IT 
IE 
2.9 
17.4 

BG 
4.8 
LT 
7.5 

CY 
16.2 
LU 
38.4 

CZ  DE  DK 
5.6 
7.5 
4.0 
LV  MT  NL 
9.1 
36.8 
7.4 

EE 
13.9 
PL 
4.8 

EL 
4.8 
PT 
6.7 

ES 
4.5 
RO 
5.2 

FI 
6.8 
SE 
7.9 

FR  HR  HU 
10.9 
4.4 
7.0 
SK  EU 
SI 
7.9 
4.8 
8.5 

7 

0%5%10%15%20%25%30%of GDPGoods (intra-EU)Services (intra-EU) 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 3: Simplification of EU rules  

KPI  3  measures  the  projected  annually  recurring  administrative  savings  expected  from  the 
Omnibus simplification proposals and other initiatives10, at the time of their adoption by the 
Commission. It shows the accumulated expected savings of these  proposals  put  forward up 
until the end of December 2025. 

In 2025, the Commission has proposed ten Omnibus proposals.and other initiatives which are 
projected to reduce the recurrent administrative annual costs  by EUR 15 bn, of which EUR 
11.9  bn  from  omnibus  proposals11  and  EUR  3.1  bn  from  other  initiatives.  Moreover,  new 
initiatives,  such  as  European  Business  Wallet  Regulation  has  a  potential  to  contribute 
significantly  to  the  overall  administrative  cost  reduction  for  businesses  and  public 
administrations,  with  minimum  EUR  13.5  bn.  These  savings  were  estimated  using  the  EU 
standard cost model. 

Administrative burdens have been estimated at EUR 150 bn per year. The Commission targets 
to reduce these by at least 25% (amounting to EUR 37.5 bn) for all businesses and by at least 
35% for SMEs. 

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of addressing overly complex EU rules – one 
of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market Strategy. 

Figure 3: Savings expected from Commission’s Omnibus simplification packages and other 
initiatives: towards a 25% reduction in recurrent administrative burden.  

Source: European Commission services, Simplification - European Commission 

10 Other initiatives (14) are those  resulting in administrative cost savings for businesses and public administrations at the time 
of their adoption by the Commission. They cover targeted revisions of existing EU acquis (e.g SFDR Review or Targeted 
revision of the EU rules for medical devices and in-vitro diagnostics). 
11 All information about the Omnibus simplification proposals presented by the Commission is available at Simplification - 
European Commission. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 4: Conformity deficit  

KPI 4 measures the share of transposed Single Market directives for which the Commission 
has  launched  infringement  proceedings  due  to  incorrect  transposition.  It  is  expressed  as 
percentage  of  the  number  of  Single  Market  directives  notified  to  the  Commission  as 
‘transposed’ or ‘not requiring any further implementation measures’.  

This  KPI  tracks  progress  related  to  the  objective  of  addressing  the  lack  of  Single  Market 
ownership by Member States – one of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market 
Strategy. 

The conformity deficit increased to 1.1% in 2025, remaining much above the target of 0.5%, 
with wide variation among Member States. 

Figure 4a: Conformity deficit: share of incorrectly transposed Single Market Directives. 

Figure 4b: Evolution of the EU average conformity deficit.  

Source: European Commission services 

9 

0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%2.0%2.5%3.0%incorrectly transposedDirectives0%1%1%2%2%3%3%incorrectly transposedDirectives 
 
 
  
 
KPI 5: Ease of regulatory compliance 

KPI 5 measures companies’ perceived ease of regulatory compliance by tracking the results of 
replies  to  the  following  survey  question:  ‘In  your  country,  how  easy  is  it  for  companies  to 
comply with government regulatory and administrative requirements (e.g. permits, reporting, 
legislation)  (1  =  Overly  complex;  7  =  Extremely  easy)?’  Higher  values  indicate  a  better 
performance, i.e. less burdensome regulation.  

This  KPI  tracks  progress  related  to  the  objective  of  easing  business  operations,  since 
complicated business  establishment and operations due to  regulation  is  one of the “Terrible 
Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market Strategy. 

According to the World Economic Forum the ease of regulatory compliance in the EU has been 
broadly stable over the past years.  

Figure 5: Ease of regulatory compliance: Companies’ perception of the ease of doing business. 

Source: World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey (2025) 

National data (2025) 

AT   BE  BG  CY  CZ  DE  DK  EE  EL 
FR  HR  HU 
3.05  4.51  4.04  4.33  3.02  3.99  3.89  3.99  3.19  2.74  5.15  4.18  2.82  2.99 
IE 
SK  EU 
4.59  3.69  5.05  4.85  3.0  4.07  3.94  3.18  3.21  3.16  4.98  2.57  2.67  3.89 

LT  LU  LV  MT  NL 

PT  RO 

ES 

PL 

SE 

IT 

FI 

SI 

10 

1234567  Complex Easy  index from 1 to 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 6: Recognition of professional qualifications 

KPI 6 measures response rates (positive, pending and negative) of all the requests received for 
recognition  of  professional  qualifications.  Such  requests  are  made  when  a  person  having  a 
professional qualification certified in their home Member State seeks to get their qualifications 
recognised in another Member State in order to work there. 

This  KPI  tracks  progress  related  to  the  objective  of  simplifying  recognition  of  professional 
qualifications – one of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market Strategy. 

Of the initiated recognition procedures, in 2023, 10% are pending a decision, while 8% have 
resulted in a negative decision, with considerable differences across Member States12.  

Figure 6a: Recognition of professional qualifications per Member State. 

Figure 6b: Evolution of the EU average of recognition decisions. 

Source: European Commission services calculatoins based on the Regulated professions database 

12 Data cut off in 2023. At the time of publication, not all Member States had reported their 2024 data, with less than half of 
the usual observations reported.  

11 

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%positivependingnegative0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%PositivePendingNegative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 7: Length of standard-setting procedures 

KPI 7 measures the average length in years of the drafting stage of standards.  

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of speeding up standard-setting procedures – 
one of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market Strategy. 

The European standardisation system is hindered by the slow pace of the standard development 
process, which fails to meet market and legislative needs, particularly for new technologies. 
Over  the  past  decade,  the  average  time  needed  to  establish  a  new  standard  has  gradually 
increased, which weighs on the competitiveness of EU industry. Several factors contribute to 
this slow pace, including outdated working methods and the underuse of digital technologies13.  

Figure 7: Average length of the drafting stage in standard-setting procedures. 

Source:  European  Commission  services,  Evaluation  study  of  the  regulation  (EU)  1025/2012  on  European 
standardisation - Publications Office of the EU 

13 In June 2025, the Commission presented an evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of 25 October 2012 on European 
standardisation. SWD(2025) 170 final. 

12 

1.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.5Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 8: Circular material use rate 

KPI  8  measures  the  degree  of  the  economy’s  circularity  by  looking  at  the  rate  of  use  of 
secondary  materials  as  share  of  the  overall  demand  for  materials.  When  secondary  raw 
materials replace primary materials in the economy, they reduce pressure on primary resources 
and limit waste. A higher rate indicates a higher degree of circularity. 

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of harmonising today’s fragmented rules on 
packaging,  labelling  and  waste  –  one  of  the  “Terrible Ten”  barriers  identified  in  the  Single 
Market Strategy. 

The share of material brought back into the economy out of the overall use of materials goes 
up slowly, from 12.1% in 2023 to 12.2% in 2024, but is still well below the target of 24% in 
2030. 

Figure 8a: Circular material use rate by Member State. 

Figure 8b: Evolution of the EU average circular material use rate. 

Source: Eurostat 

13 

0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%of material recovered202320242030 target0%5%10%15%20%25%30%of material recovered 
 
 
  
 
KPI 9: Product compliance monitoring 

KPI  9  measures  the  number  of  product  investigations  carried  out  by  market  surveillance 
authorities per million inhabitants in EU Member States14. 

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of modernising product rules and addressing 
the  lack of product compliance – one of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single 
Market Strategy. 

EU market surveillance is characterised by low, if increasing, number of investigations notified 
by national authorities. 

Figure 9a: Product compliance investigations conducted per million inhabitants. 

Figure 9b: Evolution of EU product compliance investigations.  

Source: European Commission services  

14 Measuring product investigations carried out by market surveillance authorities which are notified in the Information and 
Communication System for Market Surveillance. 

14 

0100200300400500600700800Investigations per million inhabitants30405060708090100110120EU median ofinvestigationspermillion inhabitants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 10: Services Regulation, Intra-EEA Services Trade Restrictiveness Index 

KPI  10  measures  the  level  of  restrictiveness  of  regulation  in  selected  services  sectors 
(construction  services,  courier  services,  architecture  services,  engineering  services,  legal 
services). The values are based on the OECD’s intra-EEA STRI questionnaire15 and show the 
share of catalogued restrictions to trade in services that are present in selected sectors. They 
are available for 22 of the 27 EU Member States. 

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of addressing restrictive and diverging national 
regulations on services – another of the “Terrible Ten” barriers identified in the Single Market 
Strategy. 

Based on the indicator, the level of restrictiveness has remained stable in recent years, despite 
efforts to remove restrictions. 

Figure 10a: Services Regulation, Intra-EEA Services Trade Restrictiveness Index for selected 
sectors by EU Member State. 

Figure  10b:  Evolution  of  the  EU  average  in  the  Intra-EEA  Services  Trade  Restrictiveness 
Index. 

Source: OECD 

15 OECD’s STRI showing the share of catalogued restrictions to trade in services in selected sectors. 

15 

0%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%8%9%10%of catalogued restrictionsbeing present0%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%8%9%10%of cataloguedrestrictions beingpresent 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 11: Degree of digitalisation and cross-border accessibility 

KPI 11 measures the share of Single Market relevant administrative procedures required under 
the Single Digital Gateway Regulation to be online, that are fully online for both national and 
cross-border users. This includes aspects such as authentication and payment16. 

This KPI tracks progress related to the objective of digitalising the Single Market, as proposed 
by the Single Market Strategy. 

The Single Digital Gateway (SDG) Regulation17 sets out the main e-government entry point, 
Your  Europe,  which  citizens  and  businesses  can  use  to  access  reliable  and  multilingual 
information on rights, obligations, and administrative procedures in all EU countries. It also 
provides  links  to  national  portals  and  online  services  to  complete  key  procedures  digitally. 
Progress on SDG implementationvaries across Member States. On average, in 2024, only 21% 
of procedures required to be online, were fully online for both national and cross-border users 
as per the specific requirements set out in Articles 6, 13 and 14 of the SDG Regulation. Based 
on  the  previous  methodology  that  only  measures  the  compliance  with  the  requirement 
contained in Article 13.2(b) of the SDG Regulation, i.e. that the cross-border users are able to 
submit the required information, 54% of relevant procedures complied with this requirement18. 

Figure 11: Degree of digitalisation and cross-border accessibility of administrative procedures. 

Source: European Commission services 

16 Digital Decade 2025: eGovernment Benchmark 2025 | Shaping Europe’s digital future 
17 Regulation - 2018/1724 - EN - EUR-Lex 
18 A lower score under the new methodology should not be interpreted as a deterioration in Member State performance but it 
reflects the introduction of a more accurate measurement framework. 

16 

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%of procedures fully onlineboth for national and cross-border users 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Closing the innovation gap 

KPI 12: R&D expenditure 

KPI 12 tracks trends in the combined annual private and public- sector expenditure in research 
and development (R&D) as a share of GDP for the EU, US, UK, Japan and China. 

The EU’s total private and public-sector R&D expenditure reached 2.24% of GDP in 2024, still 
below  the  3%  target.  Progress  over  the  past  10  years  remains  modest.  Comparing  R&D 
expenditure with other major economies, the EU continues to trail behind the US, China, and 
Japan.  

Figure 12: Research and development expenditure in the EU and other advanced economies. 

Source: Eurostat; World Bank 

National data (2024) 

CY 

BG 

CZ  DE  DK 

FR  HR  HU 
FI 
EL 
AT   BE 
3.22  2.18  1.35  1.31 
3.26  3.36  0.77  0.65  1.82  3.13  3.01  1.99  1.54 
IE 
SK  EU 
SE 
PT 
1.38  1.38  1.04  0.99  0.92  0.51  2.29  1.41  1.72  0.46  3.57  2.16  0.98  2.24 

LV  MT  NL 

ES 
1.5 
RO 

LU 

EE 

PL 

LT 

IT 

SI 

17 

0%1%2%3%4%5%of GDPEUUKUSJapanChinaEU 2030 target 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 13: Patent applications 

KPI 13 tracks the number of patent applications per million inhabitants in the EU, US, UK, 
Japan and China. Figure 14 shows i) the number of patent applications to the European Patent 
Office (EPO) by EU applicants per million inhabitants; and ii) the number of patents filed under 
the  Patent  Cooperation  Treaty  (PCT)  per  million  inhabitants  by  applicants’  country  of 
residence. 

The number of EPO and PCT patent applications should not be directly compared because each 
system  provides  a  different  geographical  scope  of  protection.  Nonetheless,    they  are  telling 
indicators of the degree of innovation in different countries. 

The  number  of  PCT  patent  applications  filed  by  EU  applicants  fell  from  104  per  million 
inhabitants in 2022 to 98 in 2023. Similar, patent applications fell in the UK, with even steeper 
drops seen in the United States, Japan and China. In 2023, EU applicants still filed fewer PCT 
patents per capita than Japan (358 per million) and the United States (156), but more than China 
(40) and the UK (80). 

Figure 13: Patent applications in the EU and other advanced economies. 

Source: Eurostat; OECD; World Bank 

National data (2024), patent applications to the EPO per million inhabitants 

AT   BE 
221 
234 
IT 
IE 
82 
209 

BG 
8 
LT 
25 

CY 
64 
LU 
457 

CZ  DE  DK 
23 
425 
299 
LV  MT  NL 
393 
110 
19 

EE 
53 
PL 
19 

EL 
10 
PT 
33 

ES 
45 
RO 
3 

FI 
428 
SE 
468 

FR  HR  HU 
10 
160 
15 
SK  EU 
SI 
152 
11 
73 

18 

050100150200250300350400450Per millioninhabitantsEPO - EUPCT - EUPCT - ChinaPCT - UKPCT - JapanPCT - USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 14: Digital technologies adoption by companies  

KPI 14 measures the degree to which companies are adopting three key digital technologies: 
artificial intelligence (AI), data analytics, and cloud. 

The AI series tracks the percentage of businesses employing 10 or more people using at least 
one AI technology. The  data analytics series shows the percentage of businesses using data 
analytics tools. The cloud series  tracks the percentage of businesses purchasing at least one 
intermediate  or  sophisticated  cloud  computing  service.  The  indicator  is  calculated  for  all 
businesses in manufacturing and service sectors, excluding the financial sector. 

By 2025, the rate of adoption of AI, cloud and/or dataanalytics by businesses in the EU had 
improved, but it remains well below the 75% target for 2030.  

Figure 14a: Digital technologies adoption by companies in the Member States. 

Figure 14b: Evolution of the EU average digital technologies adoption by companies. 

Source: European Commission services, Digital Economy and Society Index 

19 

0%20%40%60%80%100%Use rate by enterprisesAI 2025Data Analytics 2025Cloud 20250%10%20%30%40%50%Use rate byenterprisesAIData AnalyticsCloud 
 
 
  
 
KPI 15: Employment rate  

KPI 15 shows the trends in employment rates of people of working- age between 20 to 64 in 
the EU, US, UK and Japan. 

Employment rates in the EU are steadily increasing and on track to meet the EU’s headline 
target of 78% in 2030. The EU employment rate reached a record high of 75.8% in 2024, driven 
partly by increasing participation of older people, women and migrants in the work force. This 
performance is mostly in line with the US, but below the trends seen in Japan and the UK. 

Figure 15: Employment rate in the EU and other advanced economies. 

Sources: EU: Eurostat; EU Labour Force Survey (2024); Japan, UK, USA: Labour Force Survey 

National data (2024) 

CY 

BG 

CZ  DE  DK 

AT   BE 
FR  HR  HU 
77.4  72.3  76.8  79.8  82.3  81.3  80.2  81.8  69.3  71.4  77.0  75.1  73.6  81.1 
IE 
SK  EU 
79.8  67.1  79.2  74.2  77.4  83.0  83.5  78.4  78.5  69.5  81.9  78.3  78.1  75.8 

LV  MT  NL 

RO 

LU 

EE 

EL 

PL 

PT 

SE 

ES 

LT 

IT 

SI 

FI 

20 

65%70%75%80%85%of working-age peopleemployedEUUKUSJapanEU 2030 target 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 16: Labour shortages relevant for the green transition  

KPI 16 shows the number of occupations requiring specific skills or knowledge for the green 
transition where at least five Member States reported a shortage. Occupations are considered 
relevant for the green transition if they require at least three green skills.19. 

This  KPI  tracks  progress  against  the  objective  laid  down  in  the  Clean  Industrial  Deal  of 
reducing the number of occupations relevant for the green transition with labour shortage. 

The green transition is expected to create between 1 and 2.5 million additional jobs by 2030 in 
the EU20. However, many of these new jobs will be in sectors that already face labour shortages. 
The  number  of  occupations  with  labour  shortages  has  doubled  in  just  one  year.  Such 
occupations  include  plumbers  and  pipe  fitters  (shortages  in  20  Member  States),  insulation 
workers,  civil  engineers  and  air  conditioning  and  refrigeration  mechanics  (14),  civil 
engineering  technicians  (12)  and  roofers  (11). They  require  technical  and  manual  expertise 
essential to the green transition. 

Figure 16: Labour shortages relevant for the green transition. 

Source: European Commission services 

19The concept of green skills refers to the knowledge, abilities, values and attitudes needed to live in, develop and support a 
society which reduces the impact of human activity on the environment (European Centre for the Development of Vocational 
Training,  Cedefop;  see:  Green  skills  labelling  in  ESCO  |  European  Skills,  Competences,  Qualifications  and  Occupations 
(ESCO). 
20 Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2023 (ESDE 2023). 

21 

051015202530Number ofoccupations 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
KPI 17: PISA scores 

KPI 17 tracks 15-year-olds’ performance in the OECD’s PISA tests covering maths, reading 
and science. Figure 18 shows the PISA scores for 2022, 2018 and 2015 for the EU, US, UK, 
Japan and China. The data for the EU are the average scores for the 27 Member States, weighted 
by the number of 15-year-olds enrolled in education. 

The EU’s average PISA scores have  fallen  in  all  disciplines and EU students  underperform 
compared to their peers in the UK, the US, Japan and China21. 

Figure 17: PISA scores for the EU and other advanced economies. 

Source: OECD PISA database 

21 The latest available PISA data are from 2022. Results from PISA 2025 are scheduled for publication in 2026. 

22 

497516498494494505504504555488504516494047547053249253149347852750259149246553648904744965385095184925025295055904884995475000484050010001500USJapanUKChinaEUUSJapanUKChinaEUUSJapanUKChinaEU201520182022ReadingMathematicsScience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  Decarbonisation of industry and investment 

KPI 18: Private investment  

KPI 18 tracks the trends in private-sector investment (gross fixed capital formation) as a share 
of annual GDP for the EU, US and UK. The data refer to the increase in the capital stock owned 
by  companies  and  individuals,  including  equipment,  land,  houses  and  other  buildings,  and 
intangible assetts such as R&D. 

Private-sector investment fell by 3.2% in 2024. As a result, private investment as a share of 
GDP also fell to 17.6% of GDP in 2024 and is now on par with US levels, after being broadly 
stable and higher than in the US in recent years. 

Figure 18: Private-sector investment in the EU and other advanced economies. 

Source: AMECO database 

National data, % of GDP (2024) 

AT   BE 
FR  HR  HU 
19.6  21.1  15.2  17.8  21.8  17.4  20.2  17.7  12.4  17.6  17.6  17.8  20.0  18.8 

CZ  DE  DK 

BG  CY 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

IT 

IE 
SK 
14.8  18.6  18.2  10.7  16.1  15.3  16.6  12.2  17.7  19.4  19.6  15.8  16.9 

LV  MT  NL 

RO 

LU 

PL 

SE 

PT 

LT 

SI 

EU 
17.6 

23 

0%2%4%6%8%10%12%14%16%18%20%of GDPEUUKUS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 19: Public investment  

KPI 19 tracks the trends in public-sector investment (gross fixed capital formation) as a share 
of annual GDP in the EU, US and UK. Public-sector investment is a measure of how much 
money a country spends to increase the value of fixed assets (for example, road infrastructure, 
buildings and equipment). 

Public-sector investment in 2024 edged up to 3.7% of GDP confirming the positive trend over 
the last years. This share and the trend are broadly similar to those seen in the US (3.4% of 
GDP), and higher than in the UK (3.2%).   

Figure 19: Public-sector investment in the EU and other advanced economies. 

Source: AMECO database 

National data, % of GDP (2024) 

AT   BE 
3.1 
3.9 
IT 
IE 
3.6 
2.6 

BG 
3.2 
LT 
4.2 

CY 
2.8 
LU 
4.6 

CZ  DE  DK 
4.7 
3.2 
3.1 
LV  MT  NL 
3.3 
3.2 
6.3 

EE 
6.2 
PL 
4.8 

EL 
3.6 
PT 
2.7 

ES 
2.7 
RO 
5.9 

FI 
4.4 
SE 
5.5 

FR  HR  HU 
5.2 
4.3 
4.3 
SK  EU 
SI 
3.7 
3.6 
5.1 

24 

0%1%2%3%4%5%of GDPEUUKUS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 20: Venture capital investment  

KPI 20 tracks venture capital investments as a share of GDP.  

Venture capital investment in the EU remains at very low levels, equal to 0.06% of GDP in 
2024. Many innovative, fast-growing companies depend on risk capital in the form of venture 
investments for their expansion. Measured as share of GDP, EU venture capital investment is 
estimated to remain just one-tenth the size of investment levels in the US and one-quarter of 
investment levels in China. 

Figure 20: Venture capital investment in the EU and other advanced economies. 

Source: European Commission services based on Invest Europe; Eurostat; OECD; Statista 

National data, % of GDP (2024) 

AT   BE 
BG 
0.03  0.08  0.03 
IE 
LT 
IT 
0.05  0.03  0.03 

CZ  DE  DK 

CY 
0.01  0.01  0.07 
LU 
0.01  0.00  0.02 

ES 

EE 

FI 
EL 
0.13  0.20  0.01  0.06  0.09 
SE 
PT 
0.11  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.11 

RO 

PL 

LV  MT  NL 

FR  HR  HU 
0.07  0.02  0.02 
SI 
SK  EU 
0.01  0.02  0.06 

25 

0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%of GDPEUUKUSJapanChina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 21: EU investments supporting the industrial transition 

KPI 21 shows the cumulative volume of InvestEU investments supporting industry’s green and 
digital transition since the programme became operational in 2021. 

This  KPI  tracks  progress  against  the  objective  laid  down  in  the  Clean  Industrial  Deal  of 
increasing the cumulative volume of investment supporting industrial the transition from EUR 
52.7 billion (value as of June 2024).  

As of June 2025 EU investments supporting the industrial transition amounted to EUR 115.5 
billion.  

Figure 21: EU investments supporting the industrial green and digital transition. 

Source: European Commission services, InvestEU indicators22  

22 https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-programme/investeu-fund/investeu-indicators_en InvestEU Indicators - InvestEU - 
European Union. 

26 

020406080100120140EUR bn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 22: Electricity prices for businesses 

KPI 22 tracks non-household retail electricity prices in the EU, US, UK and Japan. It gives an 
idea of energy costs and cost-competitiveness, especially for industries where electricity prices 
make up a significant proportion of total energy costs.  

Non-household retail electricity prices in the EU are broken down into two consumption bands. 
Prices  are  measured  in  EUR  per  kWh,  excluding  value  added  tax  and  other  duties  that 
companies can recover.  

The  IC  consumption  band  covers  medium-sized  consumers  with  an  annual  consumption  of 
between 500 MWh and 2 000 MWh, i.e. the vast majority of small-sized companies in services 
and manufacturing sectors, and gives an insight into affordability.  

The  ID  consumption  band  covers  large  consumers  with  an  annual  consumption  of  between 
2 000  MWh  and  20  000  MWh,  such  as  companies  in  electricity-intensive  manufacturing 
sectors, and gives an insight into their international competitiveness. 

In the first semester of 2025, electricity prices for large industrial users in the ID band were 
EUR 0.16 /KWh. This is lower than the peak seen in 2023, but since then electricity prices 
have seemingly stabilised at historically high levels, 50% higher than 2020 levels. By contrast, 
US prices remained around EUR 0.07 /KWh over this period. 

Figure 22: Electricity prices for businesses.  

Source:  Eurostat;  US  Energy  Information Administration; UK  Department  for  Energy  Security  and  Net  Zero; 
International Energy Agency (2025) 
National data (2025) – ID price band (EUR/kWh) 

CY 

BG 

CZ  DE  DK 

AT   BE 
FR  HR  HU 
0.18  0.17  0.12  0.23  0.17  0.19  0.13  0.13  0.18  0.13  0.07  0.13  0.20  0.19 
IE 
SK  EU 
0.23  0.20  0.13  0.15  0.11  0.12  0.18  0.17  0.12  0.16  0.08  0.15  0.18  0.16 

LV  MT  NL 

RO 

LU 

EE 

EL 

PL 

PT 

SE 

ES 

LT 

IT 

SI 

FI 

27 

0.000.050.100.150.200.250.300.350.40EUR per kWhEU IC bandEU ID bandUKUSAJapan 
 
 
 
 
KPI 23: Electrification rate 

KPI 23 shows the consumption of electricity as a share of the final  energy consumption. Final 
energy consumption is the total energy consumed by end users, such as households, industry, 
agriculture and transport (including Intra-EU aviation, but excluding international aviation). It 
excludes  energy  used  in  transformation  processes,  fuels  used  for  non-energy  purposes  and 
energy used by the energy sector. 

This  KPI  tracks  progress  against  the  objective  laid  down  in  the  Clean  Industrial  Deal  of 
increasing the economy-wide electrification rate to 32% by 2030.  

The share of electrification has remained unchanged at around 23% over the last decade23. 

Figure 23: Evolution of the EU average electrification rate. 

Source: Eurostat 

National data, % (2023) 

CY 

BG 

CZ  DE  DK 

AT   BE 
FR  HR  HU 
22.3  21.7  27.1  26.1  21.3  21.7  20.2  22.6  26.6  24.7  28.4  26.7  20.3  21.5 
SK  EU 
IE 
24.5  22.2  16.5  17.8  14.3  39.7  23.0  16.6  25.9  15.4  33.2  23.5  19.9  23.0 

LV  MT  NL 

RO 

LU 

EL 

EE 

PL 

PT 

ES 

SE 

LT 

IT 

FI 

SI 

23 At the time of publication, no data were available for 2024. 

28 

0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%of gross final energyconsumptionEU2030 Objective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 24: Energy from renewable sources 

KPI 24 tracks the share of energy from renewable sources as a share of the total (final) energy 
consumption in the EU, US, UK, Japan and China. 

Renewable  energy  generation  accounted  for  25.2%  of  total  energy  consumption  in  2024. 
Progress has been strong in the electricity sector, with the share of renewables increasing from 
37.4%  in  2020  to  47.5%  in  2024.  Progress  was  more  limited  in  heating  and  cooling  sector 
(rising from 23.0% to 26.7%) and transport sector (from 10.3% to 11.%).24  

Figure 24: Share of renewable energy in the EU and other advanced economies.  

Source: Eurostat; European Commission services  

National data, % (2024) 

AT   BE 
43.0  14.3 
IE 
IT 
16.1  19.3 

BG 
23.2 
LT 
35.4 

CY 
21.9 
LU 
14.7 

EL 

EE 

CZ  DE  DK 
ES 
19.2  22.5  46.8  41.0  25.3  25.4 
LV  MT  NL 
PT  RO 
45.5  17.2  20.2  17.7  36.5  25.4 

PL 

FI 
FR  HR  HU 
50.7  23.2  27.5  18.3 
SE 
EU 
62.8  24.6  18.1  25.2 

SK 

SI 

24 Further info and detailed assessment can be found in the recently published state of the energy union report: Assessment 
of progress towards the Energy Union and Climate Action objectives (SWD) - Energy.  

29 

0%10%20%30%40%50%Renewables as share ofgross final energyconsumptionEUUKUSChinaJapanEU 2030 target 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 25: Annual growth in renewable electricity generation 

KPI 25 measures the annually added capacity (in GW) to generate renewable electricity. 

This  KPI  tracks  progress  against  the  objective  laid  down  in  the  Clean  Industrial  Deal  of 
installing at least 100 GW of new renewable energy per year. 

The capacity added every year to generate renewable electricity has been accelerating: it was 
around 68 GW in 2024, more than double the value of 2020.  

Figure 25: Annual growth in EU installed renewable electricity generation capacity. 

Source: European Commission services25. The objective refers to yearly capacity needed in the next 5 years to 
reach the 2030 renewable energy target. 

25 Solar capacity additions are presented in AC (alternating current) as this reflects the maximum power that can be delivered 
to the electricity grid at any given time. In cases where primary sources (e.g. industry reports) report solar capacity in DC 
(direct current) these values are downscaled to AC using a factor of 1.2. 

30 

020406080100GWAnnually installed renewable electricity capacity2026-2030 annual objective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  Increasing security and reducing dependencies 

KPI 26: Trade with the rest of the world 

KPI 26 tracks the EU’s degree of economic integration with the rest of the world by measuring 
trade flows in goods and services with the rest of the world as shares of total EU GDP. Trade 
is measured by the average of imports and exports.  

The long-term trend shows growing trade integration with the rest of the world, but there are 
signals pointing towards a slow-down or even a reversal. EU trade in goods with the rest of the 
world continued to decline for the second year in row. The average of extra-EU imports and 
exports  of  goods  corresponded  to  13.9%  of  GDP  in  2024.  While  it  can  to  some  degree  be 
attributed to energy price fluctuations, it also shows the trend of a deteriorating global trading 
climate.  EU  trade  integration  in  services  with  the  rest  of  the  world  has  equally  slowed  but 
remains on an increasing trajectory.  

Figure 26: EU trade in goods and services with the rest of the world as shares of GDP. 

Source: Eurostat 

31 

0%2%4%6%8%10%12%14%16%18%20%of GDPGoods (extra-EU)Services (extra-EU) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 27: The EU economy’s global market share 

KPI 27 tracks the EU economy’s global market share by measuring EU exports in goods and 
services as shares of total global imports. 

Figures 27a and 27b show the exports of goods and services of the EU, US, UK, Japan and 
China as shares of global imports. They show the relative size of exports from the EU and from 
those four countries in the global market. A higher percentage indicates a greater role in the 
global economy, and a lower percentage indicates a smaller global market share. 

The EU’s share in global trade remains stable, but pressure on the manufacturing industry is 
building up. EU exports of goods as a share of global imports stand slightly above the levels 
of 10 years ago and shows remarkable resilience.  

For exports of services, the outlook is more encouraging, despite a small decline over the last 
year, with the past 10 years having seen the EU’s global market share grow to reach 25% of 
global trade in services, cementing the EU’s position as the top global exporter of services. 

Figure 27a: Exports of goods as a share of total global imports. 

Figure 27b: Exports of services as a share of total global imports. 

Source: Eurostat 

32 

0%5%10%15%20%25%30%of global importsEU (goods)China (goods)Japan (goods)UK (goods)US (goods)0%5%10%15%20%25%30%of global importsEU (services)China (services)Japan (services)UK (services)US (services) 
 
 
 
 
KPI 28: Domestic clean tech manufacturing capacity 

KPI 28 measures the share of clean tech components tracked under the Net-Zero Industry Act 
that meet the benchmark of meeting 40% of EU consumption by domestic manufacturing. The 
objective is for 100% of components to reach this benchmark. 

This  KPI  tracks  progress  against  the  objective  laid  down  in  the  Clean  Industrial  Deal  of 
increasing the domestic manufacturing capacity for clean tech products. 

Looking  at  products  within  the  scope  of  the  Net-Zero  Industry  Act26,  EU  manufacturing 
currently  surpasses  the  benchmark  of  meeting  40%  of  EU  consumption  by  domestic 
manufacturing  in  6  of  the  27  (22%)  monitored  technology  areas27.  However,  for  the  vast 
majority  of  monitored  key  components  in  battery  technologies,  electrolysers,  hydrogen  and 
solar,  EU  manufacturing  capacity  still  significantly  trails  the  benchmark.  The  situation  is 
particularly concerning in battery technologies where the EU has no capacity to manufacture 
anode  active  materials  and  can  only  meet  4%  of  EU  domestic  demand  for  cathode  active 
materials28. 

Figure 28: Domestic clean tech manufacturing capacity: Status on the way towards the 2030 
benchmark manufacturing rate. 

Source: European Commission services 

26 Net-Zero Industry Act.  
27 Comprehensive data collection began in 2024, which is why earlier timelines are not available. Wind power technologies 
exceed  the  benchmark  manufacturing  rate  by  between  260%  and  175%.  Solar  photovoltaic  inverters  exceed  it  by  435%. 
Electrolyser stacks exceed it by 215%. 
28  European  Commission.  For  more  information  about  domestic  manufacturing  of  key  net-zero  technologies,  consult  the 
section on Global trade & economic security in the Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard. 

33 

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%of 2030benchmark 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
KPI 29: External vulnerability 

KPI  29  assesses  the  combined  vulnerability  to  external  shocks  of  strategically  important 
industrial products. The selected products include semiconductors, net-zero technologies, raw 
materials,  basic  metals,  chemicals,  machinery  and  motor  vehicles. The  index  quantifies  the 
degree  of  vulnerability  using  scores  that  range  from  0  (low  vulnerability)  to  1  (high 
vulnerability) and it is built on two pillars: (i) the risks from foreign dependencies, examining 
the concentration of trade flows and reliance on foreign markets, and (ii) risks from a weak 
global  market  position,  evaluating  competitive  strengths  and  weaknesses  through  price 
differences and relative comparative advantages.  

This  KPI  tracks  progress  against  the  objective  laid  down  in  the  Clean  Industrial  Deal  of 
decreasing the EU’s external vulnerability. 

Europe’s supply chains continue to show a significant degree of external dependencies, which 
carry  the  risk  of  being  weaponised.  An  analysis  has  identified  204  products  in  sensitive 
ecosystems where the EU is heavily dependent on a single supplier country, and which could 
therefore be disrupted by an external shock. Among these products, more than half of the EU’s 
dependencies originate from China. The EU’s overall dependence on imports of key industrial 
products remains largely unchanged. Analysis of trade data for industrial products shows that 
the EU is significantly more exposed to external vulnerabilities than China, but less exposed 
than the US. Zooming in on strategically important industrial products, China has the lowest 
degree of external dependency with an EXVI score of 0.12, with the EU at 0.20 and the US at 
0.28.29 

Figure 29: External vulnerability, measured by the EXVI index. 

0,30 Index value 
(0-1)

2022

2023

0,25

0,20

0,15

0,10

0,05

0,00

Source: European Commission servicesservices calculations (DG GROW Chief Economist Team) ; Single Market 
Economics Briefs: EXternal Vulnerability Index (2025)  

29 At the time of publication, no data were available for 2024. 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2 

Implementation trackers  

1.  A Competitiveness Compass for the EU (adopted on 29 January 2025)1 

The expected timelines of actions have been updated in view of most recent developments. 

Status  Pillar 1 – Closing the innovation gap 

Start-up and scale-up strategy2 

28th regime (EU Inc.) 

European Innovation Act  

European Research Area Act  

AI continent action plan3 

Apply AI strategy4 

AI in science strategy5 

Data Union strategy6 

EU Cloud and AI Development Act 

Quantum Europe strategy7  

Quantum Act 

European Biotech Act8 (Part I) 

European Biotech Act (Part II) 

Bioeconomy strategy9 

Life Sciences strategy10 

Advanced Materials Act  

Space Act11  

Review of the EU merger guidelines  

Digital Networks Act12  

Status 

Pillar 2 – A joint roadmap for decarbonisation and 
competitiveness 
Clean Industrial Deal13 

Action plan for affordable energy14 

Industrial Accelerator Act  

Electrification action plan 

European grids package15 

Clean Industrial Deal State aidframework (CISAF)16 

35 

Timeline 

28 May 2025 

Q1 2026 

Q1 2026 

Q3 2026 

9 April 2025 

18 October 2025 

18 October 2025 

19 November 2025 

Q1 2026 

2 July 2025 

Q2 2026 

16 December 2025 

Q3 2026 

27 November 2025 

2 July 2025 

Q4 2026 

25 June 2025 

Q4 2026 

21 January 2026  

Timeline 

26 February 2025 

26 February 2025 

 Q1 2026 

Q1 2026 

10 December 2025 

25 June 2025 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steel and metals action plan17  

Chemicals industry package: (1) Action plan for the chemicals industry18 
… 

  … and (2) Simplification Omnibus VI on chemicals19 

19 March 2025 

8 July 2025 

8 July 2025 

Strategic dialogue on the future of the European automotive industry 

30 January 2025 

Industrial action plan for the European automotive sector20 

Sustainable transport investment plan21 

5 March 2025 

5 November 2025 

European port strategy and industrial maritime strategy 

Q1 2026 

High-speed rail action plan22 

5 November 2025 

Review of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)23 

17 December 2025  

Circular Economy Act 

Vision for agriculture and food24 

Oceans Pact25 

Amendment of the Climate Law26 

Status 

Pillar 3 – Reducing excessive dependencies and increasing 
security 
Conclude and implement ambitious trade agreements, clean trade and 
investment partnerships 

Trans-Mediterranean Energy and Clean Tech Cooperation initiative28 

Joint purchasing platform for Critical Raw Minerals29 

Revision of directives on public procurement 

White Paper for European Defence30 

Preparedness Union strategy31  

Internal security strategy32  

Critical Medicines Act33  

European climate adaptation plan  

Water Resilience Strategy34  

Status  Horizontal enablers of competitiveness 

(1) Definition of small mid-caps (SMCs)35 … 

… and (2) Simplification Omnibus IV on small mid-cap companies, 
digitalisation and common specifications36 

European business wallet37  

Single Market strategy38  

Revision of the Standardisation Regulation  

Savings and Investments Union39  

Proposal for the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2028-2034, 
including the Competitiveness Fund40 

Competitiveness coordination tool 

Q3 2026 

19 February 2025 

5 June 2025 

2 July 2025 

Timeline 

Ongoing27 

Q4 2025 

2 July 2025 

Q2 2026 

19 March 2025 

26 March 2025 

2 April 2025 

11 March 2025 

Q4 2026 

4 June 2025 

Timeline 

21 May 2025 

21 May 2025 

19 November 2025 

21 May 2025 

Q3 2026 

19 March 2025 

16 July 2025 and 3 
September 2025 

Q1 2026 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Union of Skills41  

Quality jobs roadmap42 

Skills Portability Initiative  

5 March 2025 

4 December 2025 

Q3 2026 

 Proposal adopted / For legal proposals, indicates 
adoption by both the European Parliament and 
the Council 

 Legal proposal presented by the Commission 
and currently under adoption by the European 
Parliament and the Council 

1 COM(2025)30 final. 
2 COM(2025) 270 final. 
3 COM(2025) 165 final. 
4 COM(2025) 723 final. 
5 COM(2025) 724 final. 
6 COM(2025) 835 final. 
7 COM(2025) 363 final. 
8 COM(2025) 1022 final. 
9 COM(2025) 960 final. 
10 COM(2025) 525 final. 
11 COM(2025) 335 final. 
12 Proposal for a Regulation for the Digital Networks Act (DNA) | Shaping Europe’s digital future  
13 COM(2025) 85 final. 
14 COM(2025) 79 final. 
15 COM(2025) 1005 final. 
16 C/2025/3602. 
17 COM(2025) 125 final. 
18 COM(2025) 530 final. 
19 COM(2025)526 (adopted), COM(2025)531. 
20 COM(2025) 95 final. 
21 COM(2025) 664 final. 
22 COM(2025) 903 final. 
23 Commission strengthens the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism   
24 COM(2025) 75 final. 
25 COM/2025/281 final. 
26 COM(2025) 524 final. 
27 A first Clean Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and South Africa was signed on 20 November 2025. 
28 Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean-Tech Cooperation Initiative (T-MED). 
29 EU Energy and Raw Materials Platform - Energy - European Commission 
30 White paper for European defence - Readiness 2030 - Defence Industry and Space 
31 JOIN(2025) 130 final. 
32 COM(2025) 148 final. 
33 COM(2025) 102 final. 
34 COM(2025) 280 final. 
35 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION (EU) 2025/1099 of 21 May 2025 on the definition of small mid-cap enterprises. 
36 COM(2025)501 final, COM(2025)502 final, COM(2025)503 final, COM(2025)504 final, COM(2025)258 final. 
37 COM(2025) 838 final. 
38 COM(2025) 500 final. 
39 COM(2025) 124 final. 
40 All proposals available at https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-
2028-2034_en 
41 COM(2025) 90 final. 
42 COM(2025) 944 final.  

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and 

decarbonisation (adopted on 26 February 2025)1 

The expected  timelines of the actions have been updated in view of most recent developments. 

Status  Access to affordable energy and infrastructure 

Action Plan on Affordable Energy2 

EIB pilot offering financial guarantees for PPA offtakers, with a focus on 
SMEs and energy-intensive industry3 

Timeline 

26 February 2025 

20 June 2025 

Legislative proposal on the extension of the Gas Storage Regulation4 

5 March 2025 

Clean Industrial Deal State aid framework (CISAF)5  

Recommendation on network charges 6 

Industrial Accelerator Act:  

− 

speed-up permitting for industrial access to energy and 
industrial decarbonisation  

Recommendation on energy taxation  

25 June 2025 

2 July 2025 

Q1 2026 

Q1 2026 

Guidance on CfD design, including on combining CfDs and PPAs7 

10 Decemeber 2025 

Guidance on promoting remuneration of flexibility in retail contracts 

Q1 2026 

European Grids Package8 

10 December 2025 

Status  Lead markets: boosting clean supply and demand 

Delegated act on low carbon hydrogen, providing regulatory certainty to 
producers of low carbon hydrogen9 
Industrial Accelerator Act: 

− 
− 

create a low-carbon product label 
apply sustainability, resilience and minimum EU content 
requirement to public and private-sector procurement in 
strategic areas to ensure lead markets for low-carbon products 

Timeline 

8 July 2025 

Q1 2026 

Communication and legislative proposal on greening corporate fleets10 

16 December 2025 

Revision of Public Procurement Directives to mainstream the use of non-
price criteria  

Status  Public and private investment 

Q2 2026 

Timeline 

Increase InvestEU’s risk bearing capacity as part of the simplification 
Omnibus II on investment11  

26 February 2025 

IPCEI Design Support Hub12 

Clean Industrial Deal State aid framework13 

Recommendation to Member States to adopt tax incentives to support the 
Clean Industrial Deal14 

9 April 2025 

25 June 2025 

2 July 2025 

Flagship call for proposals under the Horizon Europe programme15 

11 December 2025 

Pilot auction under the Innovation Fund for industrial decarbonisation16 

10 October 2025 

Industrial Decarbonisation Bank 

TechEU investment programme on scale-ups with the EIB Group and 
private sector17 
Powering the circular economy: a secure access to materials 
and resources 

Status 

First list of Strategic Projects under the Critical Raw Materials Act18  

Q2 2026 

20 June 2026 

Timeline 

25 March 2025 & 4 June 
2025 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ecodesign for Sustainable Products and Energy Labelling Working Plan 
2025–203019 
EU Critical Raw Materials Centre for joint purchases and management of 
strategic stockpiles  

Circular Economy Act  

Green VAT initiative 

Trans-Regional Circularity Hubs 

Status  Global markets and international partnerships 

Launch negotiations for the first Clean Trade and Investment Partnership 
20 
Simplification of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as 
part of the simplification Omnibus I on sustainability21 
Comprehensive CBAM review assessing the feasibility of extending  the 
CBAM  scope  to  other  EU  ETS  sectors  at  risk  of  carbon  leakage,  to 
downstream  sectors  and  to  indirect  emissions  and  support  to  exporters, 
closing loopholes22 

16 April 2025 

Q2 2026 

Q3 2026 

Q4 2026 

Q4 2026 

Timeline 

13 March 2025 

26 February 2025 

17 December 2025  

Trans-Mediterranean Energy and Clean tech cooperation initiative23 

Q4 2025 

Legislative proposal on an extension of the CBAM24 

17 December 2025 

Guidelines on the Foreign Subsidies Regulation25 

Status 

Skills and quality jobs for social fairness 

Union of Skills 26 

Quality Jobs Roadmap27 

European Fair Transition Observatory 

Skills Portability Initiative  

Review of State aid GBER rules for social enterprises and for the 
recruitment of disadvantaged workers 

9 January 2026 

Timeline 

5 March 2025 

4 December 2025 

Q1 2026 

Q3 2026 

Q4 2026 

 Proposal adopted / For legal proposals, indicates 
adoption by both the European Parliament and 
the Council 

 Legal proposal presented by the Commission 
and currently under adoption by the European 
Parliament and the Council 

1 COM(2025) 85 final. 
2 COM(2025) 79 final. 
3 EIB Group increases 2025 financing ceiling to record €100 billion to step up investments in security and defence, energy 
grids and Europe’s tech leadership  
4 Regulation (EU) 2025/1733. 
5 C(2025)3602. 
6 C/2026/126. 
7 C(2025)8479.  
8 Several initiatives listed here: Commission proposes upgrade of the EU's energy infrastructure to lower bills and boost 
independence  
9 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/2359. 
10 COM(2022) 548 ; COM(2020) 789. 
11 Regulation (EU) 2025/2005. 
12 Design Support Hub - Competition Policy - European Commission  
13 C(2025) 3602. 
14 C(2025) 4319 final. 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 C(2025) 8493. 
16 Commission publishes Terms and Conditions for the first pilot auction for industrial heat decarbonisation with a budget of 
€1 billion - Climate Action  
17 See endnote 3 above. 
18 Selected strategic projects under CRMA  
19 COM(2025) 187 final. 
20 Global Gateway Investment Package South Africa 
21 Regulation (EU) 2025/2083. 
22 Commission strengthens the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism   
23 Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean-Tech Cooperation Initiative (T-MED) - Middle East, North Africa and 
the Gulf   
24 COM(2025) 989 final  or 2025/0419 (COD); COM(2025) 990 final or 2025/0418 (COD). 
25 C(2026) 42 final. 
26 COM(2025) 90 final. 
27 COM(2025) 944. 

40 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  The Single Market Strategy (adopted on 21 May 2025)1 

The expected timelines of actions have been updated in view of most recent developments. 

Status  Chapter 1. Removing barriers: Doubling down on the ‘Terrible 10” 

Timeline 

Simplification Omnibus VII on digital2 

Simplification Omnibus VIII on environmental rules3 

Competitiveness check as core part of impact assessment 

Review of national and European agencies in the field of the Single Market 

Public Procurement Act 

Revision of Directive on defence and sensitive security procurement 

First meeting of high-level Single Market Sherpas 

19 November 2025 

10 December 2025 

Ongoing 

Q3 2026 

Q2 2026 

Q3 2026 

Q1 2026 

First SMET annual high-level political meeting 

8 December 2025 

Single Market Barriers Prevention Act (if necessary) 

28th Regime for Innovative Companies (EU Inc.) 

Revision of Commission Recommendation on business transfers 

Exploring EU legislation to address barriers to the mobility of workers 

Measures on professional qualifications as part of Skills Portability Initiative 

Explore EU legislation to establish common rules for the recognition and 
validation of qualifications and skills of third country nationals 
Establishing common specifications when needed as part of the simplification 
Omnibus IV4 

Update of rules on standardisation 

Revision of Textile Labelling Regulation 

Circular Economy Act 

European Product Act 

Facilitate provision of pan-EU services by providers authorised or certified in 
one MS on basis of EU law 
Legal guidance and recommendations to MS to provide clarity on the right to 
provide services cross-border on a temporary basis 
Support of co-legislators to conclude negotiations on the revision of 
Regulations (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009 on social security coordination 
Support of co-legislators to conclude negotiations on the proposal for a public 
interface for the declaration of posting of workers 

Fair Labour Mobility Package 

Tools to act against unjustified Territorial Supply Constraints 

Status  Chapter 2. Boosting European Services Markets 

Construction Services Act 

European Strategy for Housing Construction5 

Initiative to facilitate the cross-border provision of industry-related services 
such as installation, maintenance, repair 

Q3 2027 

Q1 2026 

Q1 2026 

Ongoing 

Q3 2026 

Q3 2026 

21 May 2025 

Q3 2026 

Q2 2026 

Q3 2026 

Q3 2026 

Q4 2026 

Q4 2026 

Ongoing 

Ongoing 

Q3 2026 

Q4 2026 

Timeline 

Q4 2026 

16 December 2025 

Q4 2026 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guidance and recommendations to Member States to free regulated business 
services from unnecessary regulation 

Guidance to MS on the proportionality of their retail regulation 

EU Delivery Act 

Digital Networks Act6 

Initiative for single digital booking and ticketing for rail 

Initiative for paperless mobility for passengers and goods 

Initiative on cross-border car rentals 

Ensuring harmonised implementation and enforcement of the EU Services 
Directive 

Status  Chapter 3. SMEs in the Single Market 

SME ID tool based on self-declaration available in all EU languages7 

Reinforcement of the Network of SME Envoys 

Publication of best practice examples of SME-friendly provisions 

Definition of small mid-caps (SMCs)8 

Extension of certain SME benefits to SMCs as part of the simplification 
Omnibus IV9 
Extension of the existing SME fund, implemented by the EUIPO, for 2026 and 
possibly 2027 

Q4 2026 

Q4 2026 

Q3 2026 

21 January 2026  

Q2 2026  

Q4 2026 

Q2 2026  

Ongoing 

Timeline 

21 May 2025 

Q4 2025 

Q1 2026 

21 May 2025 

21 May 2025 

17 September 2025 

Commission Recommendation for a ‘Voluntary SME’ standard10 

30 July 2025 

Development of voluntary streamlined approach to help SMEs demonstrate 
their sustainability efforts and improve their access to sustainable finance 

Status  Chapter 4. Digitalising the Single Market 

European Business Wallet11 

EU Digital Identity Wallets roll-out  

Revision of IMI Regulation 

Digitalisation of declarations of conformity as part of the simplification 
Omnibus IV12 

Revision of the EU acquis on e-Invoicing in public procurement 

Status  Chapter 5. Enforcing respect of Single Market rules 

Strengthening of national SOLVIT centres and whole network 

Systematic follow-up by the Commission and the Member States on structural 
issues identified by SOLVIT and on barriers, where SMET efforts have not 
been successful 

First Annual Single Market enforcement agenda13 

Ongoing 

Timeline 

19 November 2025 

Q4 2026 

Q4 2026 

21 May 2025 

Q4 2026 

Timeline 

Q4 2025 

As of Q2 2025 

29 January 2026 

 Proposal adopted / For legal proposals, indicates 
adoption by both the European Parliament and 
the Council 

 Legal proposal presented by the Commission 
and currently under adoption by the European 
Parliament and the Council 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 COM(2025) 500 final  
2 COM(2025) 836, COM(2025) 837. 
3 COM(2025) 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986 final. 
4 COM(2025) 503 final, COM(2025) 504 final. 
5 COM(2025) 991 final. 
6 COM(2026) 16 final. 
7 SME Self-assessment | EU Funding & Tenders Portal 
8 C(2025) 3500 Commission recommendation of 21.5.2025 on the definition of small mid-cap enterprises 
9 COM(2025) 501 final, COM(2025) 502 final. 
10 C(2025) 4984 final. 
11 COM(2025) 838 final. 
12 COM(2025) 503 final, COM(2025) 504 final. 
13 See Section 1, Box 2 of the main Report. 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3 

Overview of resilience measures by selected global players  

1.  Introduction  

In  2025,  a  significant  number  of  the  EU’s  main  trading  partners  announced  policy 
measures  and  partnerships  aimed  at  bolstering  the  resilience  of  supply  chains.  The 
accompanying international annex provides a non-exhaustive list of such measures, which only 
partially capture the full range of resilience efforts undertaken by partner countries throughout 
the  year. The  range  and  substance  of  the  measures  found  reflect  a  global  drive  to  improve 
supply chain resilience and economic security. The EU’s trading partners have adopted these 
measures  in  response  to  recent  global  shifts  in  trade  policies  and  economic  strategies, 
particularly in the United States, and to the weaponisation of dependencies, for example export 
restrictions announced by China.  

The critical raw materials sector is illustrative of the broader action taken to enhance supply 
chain resilience in 2025. Over the last 15 years, there has been an increase in restrictions within 
this  sector30,  largely  driven  by  export  restrictions  on  rare  earth  elements  and  microchips 
imposed by China, coupled with geopolitical shifts in the US.  

Figure 1: Number of exported raw materials subject to at least one export restriction measure 

Source: OECD Report on Economic Security in a Changing World 

This  trend  extends  beyond  the  critical  raw  materials  sector.  Recent  years  have  seen  a 
proliferation of policies aimed at strengthening supply chain resilience31. This emphasises the 
importance of deepening our understanding of policy developments in this area, and the urgent 
need for the EU to develop a foreign policy that aligns with its Single Market. 

30 OECD Report on Economic Security in a Changing World. 
31IMF Working Paper on Industrial Policy since the Great Financial Crisis. 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of trade policy measures and rationale, by year 

Source: IMF Working Paper on Industrial Policy since the Great Financial Crisis32 

The aim of this Annex is to give a non-exhaustive picture33[2] of the main policy measures 
and international partnerships adopted by some of the EU’s main international partners to 
reduce their strategic dependencies and to make their supply chains more resilient, especially 
in view of the digital and green transitions.  

Gaining  a  better  understanding  of  the  methods  used  by  these  key  international  partners  to 
strengthen  their  supply  chains  can  help  the  EU  to  safeguard  its  critical  supply  chains  and 
increase  its  open  strategic  autonomy.  The  information  in  this  Annex  also  sheds  light  on 
measures that could potentially expose EU supply chains to risks by, for example, encouraging 
delocalisation and future disinvestment decisions.  

In this 2025 edition, the inventory below lists the main resilience measures taken by some of 
the EU’s main trading partners (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, China, 
Singapore, the Republic of Korea, India, Australia, Brazil, South Africa, Vietnam and Taiwan) 
that the Commission is aware of at the time of adopting this document, reflecting the level of 
information available for each partner. Therefore, the actual number of resilience measures 
adopted by international partners could be far greater. 

After examining the collected data, the Commission has classified the measures taken by these 
trading partners into six specific categories with a more detailed description provided for the 
most  recently  adopted  measures.  In  each  category  and  for  each  international  partner,  the 
measures are listed and grouped thematically whenever possible – from broader, usually cross-
sectoral measures to sector- or product-specific measures, for example: 

1. 
2. 

industrial strategies, regulatory measures and crisis preparedness; 
financial and fiscal support (including R&D); 

32 ‘GVC’ stands for global value chains, and ‘national sec’ for national security as referenced in the IMF Working Paper on 
Industrial Policy since the Great Financial Crisis. 
33 The  data  used  in  this  inventory  is  publicly  available  and  has  been  collected  through  the  knowledge  and  intelligence  of 
Commission departments and EU delegations, notably in media articles, press releases, official governmental documentation, 
and from contacts with the public authorities concerned. 

45 

 
 
 
 
3. 

4. 

5. 

public  procurement  and  prioritisation  mechanisms  of  domestic  supply  of  goods  and 
services;  
trade  toolbox  (i.e.  tariffs,  export  restrictions,  anti-coercion  measures,  foreign  direct 
investment control, etc.); 
international deals and partnerships.  

These categories have been chosen as they mirror the policy instruments used internally and 
externally by the EU to make supply chains more resilient and diverse and to anticipate, prepare 
for  and  respond  to  disruptions.  Their  scope  is  deliberately  granular  to  easily  classify  and 
regroup together non-EU country measures according to each policy’s rationale and objectives.  

The evidence collected in this non-exhaustive annex shows that the EU’s main partners have 
announced a significant number of new international partnerships and agreements. They 
focus  not  only  on  trade  and  market  access  but  also  on  specific  sectors  such  as  critical  raw 
materials, clean energy and AI. In addition, several new trade measures have been introduced, 
including stricter foreign investment screenings, tariff quotas on strategic sectors, as well as 
the  initiation  of  anti-dumping  investigations.  The  adoption  of  these  measures  reflects  the 
changing dynamics in geopolitics and international trade.  

In parallel, several trading partners have implemented policies to support their domestic 
industries,  notably  through  public  procurement.  These  policy  measures  include  public 
investments and prioritising supply in strategic sectors, such as energy-intensive industries like 
steel. In this context, international partners have adopted additional domestic measures such as 
financial  support,  fast-track  regulatory  permitting  and  improved  crisis  preparedness  by 
stepping up the monitoring and stockpiling of critical minerals. 

2.  Overview of resilience measures by category and by countries 

2.1 Industrial strategies, regulatory measures and crisis preparedness  

United States 

• 

• 

• 

In November 2025, the United States published an updated List of Critical Minerals. 
The new list includes 60 mineral commodities, of which 10 were new additions to the 
previous list. Some minerals were included based on the results of the economic effects 
assessment; others were included because of the potential for a single point of failure 
within the domestic supply chain and based on a qualitative evaluation.  

In  October  2025,  the  US  Department  of  Defence  announced  plans  to  acquire  up  to 
USD 1  billion  worth  of  critical  minerals,  including  cobalt,  antimony  and  rare  earth 
elements.  The  plan  aims  to  mitigate  supply  chain  vulnerabilities  and  ensure  the 
availability of essential materials for defence and advanced technologies.  

In  October  2025,  the  US  Department  of  Energy  released  its  Fusion  Science  and 
Technology Roadmap, a national strategy to accelerate the domestic development and 
commercialisation  of  fusion  energy.  The  roadmap  focuses  on  i)  building  critical 
infrastructure  to  close  fusion  materials  and  technology  gaps;  ii)  innovating  through 
advanced  research,  high-performance  computing  and  artificial  intelligence;  and  iii) 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
• 

• 

• 

growing  the  US  fusion  ecosystem  through  public-private  partnerships,  regional 
manufacturing hubs and workforce development. 

In August 2025, the US President signed an Executive Order on ‘Unleashing American 
Energy’ to review, rescind or revise regulations that unduly burden domestic energy and 
mineral production and expedite the permitting of energy and infrastructure production. 
The Executive Order also annuls previous Executive Orders related to climate policy, 
including state waivers and subsidies aimed at encouraging EV purchases. It states that 
the US should encourage energy exploration and production on federal lands, boosting 
US leadership in critical minerals and ensuring a reliable supply of energy.  

In August 2025, the US announced the creation of a stockpile of pharmaceutical drugs 
and a critical drugs list. Executive Order 14336 on Ensuring American Pharmaceutical 
Supply  Chain  Resilience  by  Filling  the  Strategic Active  Pharmaceutical  Ingredients 
Reserve seeks to strengthen the resilience of the US pharmaceutical supply chain by 
stockpiling active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) for essential medicines within the 
Strategic  Active  Pharmaceutical  Ingredients  Reserve  and  promoting  the  domestic 
production and procurement of these APIs. Under the Order, the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response within the Department of Health and Human 
Services  is  tasked with  drawing up  a list  of  approximately 26 critical  drugs deemed 
essential to national health and security. 

In July 2025, the Department of Interior announced the launch of a programme to map 
mining  waste  deposits  to  recover  critical  minerals  –  including  rare  earth  elements 
(REEs), germanium, tellurium, antimony, and zinc – from mine waste, coal refuse and 
abandoned  uranium  sites.  The  programme  follows  the  US  Department  of  the 
Interior’s Order  No 3436  which  seeks  to  accelerate  the  extraction  of  critical  and 
strategic minerals from mine waste across the United States. 

United Kingdom 

• 

In June 2025, the UK Department for Business and Trade published the UK’s Modern 
Industrial  Strategy  for  2025.  The  actions  mentioned  in  the  strategy  include  cutting 
electricity  costs,  reducing  grid  connection  times,  providing  finance  for  innovative 
business, enhancing investor support to meet business demand for skills, simplifying 
regulation,  boosting  research  and  development  (R&D)  sending  and  deepening 
economic  cooperation  with  partners.  It  focuses  on  eight  key  sectors:  advanced 
manufacturing,  clean  energy  industries,  creative  industries,  defence,  digital  and 
technologies, financial services, life sciences, and professional and business services. It 
consists of a 10-year plan to make it quicker and easier to invest and expand in a more 
competitive, secure and resilient economy. Following the strategy’s launch, in August 
and September 2025, six sector plans were published for the advanced manufacturing 
sector, clean energy industries, creative industries, digital and technologies sector, life 
sciences sector, and professional and business services sector.  

• 

In February 2025, the UK announced the Plan for Steel, including financial support for 
the sector. The aim of the Plan is to set out a clear and long-term vision for the steel 
industry. While the full details are still being developed, the government has committed 
up to GBP 2.5 billion in support through the National Wealth Fund and other channels. 

47 

 
 
 
 
Japan 

• 

• 

• 

In November 2025, Japan launched the Japan Growth Strategy Headquarters, a policy 
command centre which  aims to  revitalise the country’s industrial  base and economy 
with  public-private  investment.  The  Headquarters  focuses  on  17  strategic  sectors, 
including AI, semiconductors, energy security and defence. It is composed of Japan’s 
Prime Minister, government officials and 12 private-sector experts.  

In  May  2025,  the  Economic  Security Action  Plan  (launched  in  2022)  was  revised 
adding  five  new  critical  areas  to  monitor  in  relation  to  national  security  and 
competitiveness.  The  new  areas  are  fusion  energy,  manufacturing  technologies  for 
nuclear-related  materials,  satellites  and  rockets,  undersea  cables,  and  industrial-use 
data.  

In February 2025, the Japanese government decided to revise the legal guidelines of the 
Economic  Security  Promotion  Act  (ESPA),  which  allows  the  government  to 
temporarily  take  over  critical  factories  of  goods  such  as  semiconductors  during 
emergencies. The new rule could also come into play if a domestic company, influenced 
by  foreign  interests,  were  to  attempt  a  takeover  aimed  at  acquiring  sensitive 
manufacturing technologies. 

Republic of Korea 

• 

In February 2025, the Special Act on National Resource Security came into force. It 
aims to put in place early warning systems, manage the supply and demand for essential 
resources, and develop crisis response frameworks in order to tackle resource security 
challenges.  More  specifically,  the Act  outlines  the  creation  of  a  Resource  Security 
Council, chaired by the Minister of Trade, Industry, and Energy, to coordinate policy 
efforts; mandates the implementation of an early warning system to track and address 
resource security threats; requires designated organisations to stockpile key resources; 
authorises  emergency  actions  such  as  price  controls  and  resource  allocation  during 
crises;  and  requires  the  formulation  of  crisis  response  manuals  alongside  regular 
training exercises. 

Singapore 

• 

In April 2025, the Singapore Economic Resilience Task force (SERT) was formed. The 
SERT is a government task force created to help Singaporean businesses and workers 
navigate  current  economic  challenges,  namely  the  uncertainties  caused  by  the  US 
tariffs, while developing a long-term strategy. In August 2025, the SERT launched an 
Economic Strategy Review (ESR). The ESR aims to develop longer-term strategies to 
strengthen  Singapore’s  global  competitiveness,  leverage  technology  and  innovation, 
nurture  entrepreneurship,  enhance  human  capital  and  manage  the  impact  of 
restructuring. It involves five committees composed of members of government, private 
sector, unions and other stakeholders. 

Australia 

•  On 24 April 2025, Australia committed to create a Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve 
to  maximise  the  strategic  value  of  Australia’s  critical  minerals.  The  government 
allocated AUS 1.2 billion to establish the reserve in the 2025-26 Federal Budget. The 
reserve  is  expected  to  be  operational  in  the  second  half  of  2026. A  task  force  was 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
India 

• 

established  in  the  Department  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  Cabinet  to  advise  the 
government  on the  design  of the reserve. The task  force reports jointly to the Prime 
Minister and the Minister for Resources and will consult with critical minerals industry 
associations and businesses, state and territory governments, international partners and 
other interested stakeholders.  

In October 2025, India announced the launch of the National Critical Mineral Stockpile 
to  secure  rare  earth  elements  and  other  critical  minerals  essential  for  clean  energy, 
electronics  and  defence. The  government  has  allocated  INR 500  (EUR 48.9  million) 
under the National Critical Minerals Mission to support this effort, and private-sector 
participation  is  encouraged  in  procurement,  storage  and  release  mechanisms.  The 
stockpile will initially hold a two-month reserve of processed rare earths and will later 
expand to include other strategic minerals. The initiative is designed to act as a buffer 
against global supply disruptions and price volatility, particularly in response to China’s 
export controls.  

Canada 

• 

• 

In  November  2025,  Canada  announced    seven  initiatives  on  energy  and  critical  raw 
materials  to  be  recommended  for  fast-track  approval.  The  initiatives  are  worth  a 
combined  CAD 116  billion  (EUR 71  billion).  The  announcement  adds  to  the  five 
projects already announced for fast-tracking in September and follows the launch of the 
Major Projects Office in August 2025. The aim of this Office is to have a single point 
of contact to get nation-building projects built faster. 

In June 2025, the One  Canadian Economy Act  received royal  assent,  which  aims to 
remove  interprovincial  trade  barriers  and  accelerate  the  approval  of  major  ‘nation-
building’ projects in an effort to bolster untapped domestic economic potential. The Act 
includes the Building Canada Act, which streamlines the regulatory process for projects 
in Canada’s national interest, to be overseen by the Major Projects Office. The second 
part regards the Free Trade and Labour Mobility in Canada Act, which facilitates the 
movement  of  goods,  services  and  workers  across  provinces,  in  the  absence  of  a 
Canadian internal market. 

2.2 Financial and fiscal support (including R&D) 

United States 

• 

In  July  2025,  the  US  President  signed  the  One  Big  Beautiful  Bill  Act  of  2025 
(‘OBBBA’)  into  law,  providing  fiscal  support  to  domestic  research  or  experimental 
(R&E)  expenditure  and  to  support  the  domestic  minerals  supply  chain.  Under  the 
OBBBA, full expensing of domestic R&E expenditures is restored, while the treatment 
of foreign R&E expenditures will continue to be capitalised and amortised over a 15-
year period. In addition, the OBBBA introduces new federal spending measures that 
could support the domestic minerals supply chain, including USD 2 billion to expand 
the  National  Defence  Stockpile  through  purchases  of  critical  minerals,  and  USD 5 
billion to the Industrial Base Fund to support critical minerals supply chains. It also 
includes USD 500 million to grow the Department of Defence Credit Program Account, 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
to provide loans, loan guarantees and technical assistance to critical mineral industries, 
and USD 1 billion under the Defence Production Act with financing up to September 
2027. The final law is applicable to tax years beginning after 31 December 2024.  

Canada 

• 

• 

• 

In July 2025, Canada announced a new funding round to support clean energy products. 
The new round allocates CAD 40 million (EUR 25 million) of funding under its Low-
Carbon Economy Fund’s Indigenous Leadership Fund to support 13 indigenous-owned 
and  -led  clean  energy  projects.  Projects  receiving  funding  include  solar  panel 
installations,  wind  turbines,  energy  retrofits,  electric  vehicle  infrastructure  and  heat 
pumps.  The  aim  is  to  cut  emissions,  reduce  energy  costs  and  enhance  energy  self-
sufficiency  in  indigenous  communities.  The  fund  is  part  of  Canada’s  efforts  to 
implement Article 29 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, 
and  completements  a  previous  announcement  from  early  July  2025  of  CAD 13.3 
million (EUR 8.3 million) for five clean economy projects in Alberta and the Northwest 
Territories, including two indigenous-led initiatives. 

In  July  2025,  Canada  announced  financial  support  to  the  steel  sector.  The  financial 
support consists of CAD 1 billion (EUR 609 million) as part of the Strategic Innovation 
Fund to help steel companies advance projects that will improve their competitiveness 
and start production of steel products not currently produced in Canada. 

In September 2025, Canada announced a Strategic Response Fund to help firms in all 
sectors impacted by tariffs to adapt, diversify and grow. The fund totals CAD 5 billion 
(EUR 3.05 billion) and will concentrate on strategic sectors disproportionately exposed 
to US tariffs and global trade risks, such as automotive, steel and aluminium. It will 
also  have  flexibility  to  intervene  in  other  high-value  sectors  where  federal  action  is 
deemed critical to maintaining investment and capacity in Canada. 

United Kingdom 

• 

• 

India 

• 

In  February  2025,  the  UK  government  pledged  to  provide  GBP 2.5  billion  (EUR 3 
billion)  of  financial  assistance  to  support  the  steel  industry.  The  financial  support 
followed the US announcement of a 25% tariff on steel and aluminium imports and will 
be provided through the National Wealth Fund.  

In 2025, the UK government announced a series of financial relief measures to support 
the domestic car industry in response to new 25% US tariffs on UK exports of electric 
vehicles (EV). These include i) a reduction of fines under the UK’s EV mandate, that 
sets out the proportion of a manufacturer’s sale that must be EV, from GBP 15 000 to 
GBP 12 000 per non-compliant vehicle; ii) more flexibility for carmakers to meet EV 
sales targets by allowing them to balance annual targets up to 2030, thereby deferring 
fines; and iii) a GBP 2.3 billion support package comprising tax breaks for EV buyers 
and investment in charging infrastructure. 

In September 2025, India approved an INR 1 500 (EUR 147 million) scheme to support 
the development of recycling of critical minerals. The initiative is conducted under the 
National Critical Mineral Mission and will cover e-waste, lithium-ion battery recycling 
and other scrap such as  catalytic  converters from end-of-life vehicles. The incentive 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
• 

• 

will be available for both expanding and modernising existing facilities and will run for 
six years. Both larger and smaller firms will be eligible, but one third of the total amount 
available is reserved for smaller firms.  

In  May  2025,  India  introduced  a  Scheme  to  Promote  Manufacturing  of  Electric 
Passenger Cars in India, in a move to boost domestic electric vehicle (EV) production 
and to attract global players to establish local value chains. Under the scheme, import 
duty reductions are available to global automakers that commit to manufacturing in the 
country. More specifically, up to 8 000 EVs per year can be imported at a reduced 15% 
duty if the automaker invests at least USD 500 million in local EV production facilities 
within three years. 

In  September  2025,  India  adopted  the  India  Semiconductor  Mission  (ISM)  2.0 
initiative, which expands financial support to  capital  equipment  and materials  in  the 
semiconductor supply chain. Although  not  officially  confirmed, the government was 
exploring an outlay of USD 20 billion of investment. The previous edition of the India 
Semiconductor  Mission,  launched  in  2021,  aimed  to  provide  financial  support  for 
investments 
fabrication,  display  manufacturing  and  chip 
design. Under this edition, in May 2025, the Indian Union Cabinet provided USD 422 
million  (INR 3.706)  of  funding  for  the  establishment  of  a  new  semiconductor 
manufacturing unit in Uttar Pradesh under the India Semiconductor Mission. The plant 
will  specialise  in  producing  display  driver  chips  for  mobile  phones,  laptops, 
automobiles  and  personal  computers.  The  approval  of  the  project  brings  the  total 
number of such approved facilities to six under the India Semiconductor Mission.  

in  semiconductor 

•  As  of  March  2025,  the  Indian  government  has  disbursed  EUR 2.1  billion  under  its 
Production Linked Incentive schemes. This scheme is designed to help develop local 
supply chains by inviting foreign companies to set up units in India and encouraging 
local  companies  to  set  up  or  expand  existing  manufacturing  units  and  reduce  the 
country’s  reliance  on  imports  from  other  countries.  It  focuses  on  12  key  sectors 
including  electronics,  IT  hardware,  pharmaceuticals,  bulk  drugs,  medical  devices, 
automobiles, white goods, telecom, food processing, specialty steel, textiles and drones. 
The scheme has attracted a total of EUR 17.6 billion in investment, generated EUR 165 
billion in production and sales, and created over 1.2 million direct and indirect jobs.  

Taiwan 

• 

In April  2025,  Taiwan  amended  the  Statute  of  Industrial  Innovation,  extending  tax 
reduction  incentives  to  companies  in  key  supply  chains. According  to  the  Statute, 
companies  with  a  critical  position  in  the  global  supply  chain  (including  those  with 
technological innovations in semiconductors, electric vehicles and 5G) may claim an 
investment tax credit (‘ITC’) of 25% on R&D expenditure and 5% on procurement of 
machinery/equipment for advanced processes. Companies may apply to use such ITCs 
over  seven years, from  1 January 2023 to  31  December 2029 (the expiry date of the 
Statute).  The  most  recent  amendments  extended  the  tax  incentives  for  equipment 
investment,  expanded  the  scope  of  eligible  investment  to  include AI  products  and 
services, energy-saving and carbon-reduction initiatives, and increased the expenditure 
cap. The amendment also increased the tax incentives for investments in startups and 
safeguards to prevent critical technology outflows, requiring prior government approval 

51 

 
 
 
Japan 

• 

• 

• 

• 

not only for overseas investments but also investments in designated countries, regions, 
industries or technologies. 

In October 2025, the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) announced plans to provide 
financial  support  for  recycling  hubs  aimed  at  supplying  automotive  parts  to 
manufacturers.  The  plan  involves  setting  up  10  domestic  hubs  for  the  collection  of 
recycled plastics. The MoE will supply JPY 974 million to run these hubs, namely to 
conduct research and support the installation of the facilities needed. The aim is to help 
private  automotive  manufacturers  meet  the  mandatory  requirements  for  the  use  of 
recycled plastics in vehicles the EU is expected to introduce. 

In September 2025, the Japanese Environment Ministry launched a subsidy scheme for 
companies and municipalities to promote the instalment of next-generation perovskite 
solar cells in buildings. The initiative consists of JPY 5 billion from the current year’s 
budget  to  cover up to  75% of the costs needed to  purchase and install these cells in 
warehouses,  factories  and  gymnasiums  where  heavy  traditional  panels  cannot  be 
installed.  

In  May  2025,  the  Japanese  Cabinet  approved  a  JPY 900  billion  (EUR 5.5  billion) 
economic  support  package  with  total  fiscal  measures  reaching  JPY 2.8  trillion 
(EUR 17.2 billion) including local government spending. The package, brought in as a 
response to US tariffs, includes JPY 600 billion (EUR 3.7 billion) for energy subsidies, 
and  JPY 300  billion  (EUR 1.8  billion)  to  support  SMEs  through  employment 
adjustment  subsidies,  government-backed  loans  (exploring  lower  interest  rates),  and 
new  business  consultation  centres.  JPY 388  billion  (EUR 2.3  billion)  from  reserve 
funds  will  subsidise  electricity  and  gas  bills,  cutting  average  household  costs  by 
JPY 1 000 (EUR 6) per month. The government also extended its gasoline subsidies, 
which were introduced in 2022, for the tenth time and took action to reduce rice prices. 

In 2025, Japan started updating the Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), which 
is  expected  to  expand  support  tools  for  economic  security.  The  revised  version  is 
expected  to  include  government  funding  for  overseas  expansion  (such  as  port 
development and dock repairs), support to private-sector projects (such as submarine 
cable laying and maintenance), an expanded scope of critical infrastructure to medical 
facilities,  the  creation  of  a  new  think-tank,  the  setup  of  a  Council  for  public-private 
dialogue,  the  protection  of  sensitive  personal  data  and  the  addition  of  five  critical 
products  to  the  current  list  of  12  critical  products.  Specific  companies  supplying 
designated critical commodities will therefore continue to receive financial and fiscal 
support over the medium to long term. Subsidies under the ESPA aim to reduce the risk 
for  private  operators  and  encourage  them  to  enter  currently  low  margin/high-risk 
businesses and R&D. 

• 

In February 2025, Japan published its GX 2040 vision, which indicate bonds totalling 
JPY 20  thousand  billion  for  the  green  transformation  (GX).  The  GX  2040  vision 
presents  a  detailed  roadmap  for  medium-  to  long-term  GX  initiatives,  enhancing 
investment predictability across public and private sectors. It focuses on specific sectors 
such as energy and other challenging industries like steel, chemical, paper and cement, 
alongside advancements in next-generation automobiles and airplanes.  In addition to 

52 

 
 
 
providing financial investment, the vision indicates a gradual move to bring in carbon 
pricing. 

Republic of Korea 

• 

• 

In February 2025, the Republic of Korea launched a ‘key minerals investment council’. 
The council will identify private-centred key mineral investment projects and establish 
a  comprehensive  public-private  support  system  that  includes  existing  support 
programmes  such  as  investments  in  the  supply  chain  stabilisation  fund,  overseas 
resource development investigation, loans, overseas investment insurance and supply 
chain consulting support. The aim is to promote joint public-private investment in key 
minerals at an annual scale of KRW 50 billion. The council includes the Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Energy, Ministry of Strategy and Finance, and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, together with public organisations such as the Korea Mine Rehabilitation and 
Mineral Resources Corporation, local governments, the Export-Import Bank of Korea, 
the  Korea  Trade  Insurance  Corporation,  the  Korea  Energy  Agency,  and  the  Korea 
Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), as well as private associations in the 
overseas resources industry.  

In February 2025, an amendment to the Restriction of Special Taxation Act was passed, 
raising  tax  credit  rates  and  broadening  the  categories  of  companies  eligible  for 
incentives in strategic technology sectors. The amendment included a proposal to add 
AI and future transport sectors to the list of national strategic technologies and to raise 
the  tax  credit  rate  for  investment  in  semiconductors  by  five  percentage  points. This 
measure builds on the Special Taxation Act (in effect since 1 January 2023) which sets 
out  a  precise  list  of  150  strategic  technologies  for  which  Republic  of  Korea-based 
manufacturing companies could receive tax credits, amounting to KRW 937.6 billion 
(EUR 631.1 million) in 2023. In April 2023, the Ministry of Industry announced that 
the list would be updated to include 50 extra technologies, bringing the list to 200 items. 

Brazil 

•  On 22 August 2025, Brazil announced the Sovereign Brazil  plan. The plan has three 
pillars  and  includes  strengthening  the  Brazilian  production  sector,  which  includes  a 
BRL 30  billion  (EUR 4.79  billion)  credit  line,  extended  tax  payment  deadlines  and 
export  incentives  to  the  sectors  most  affected  by  US  additional  duties  on  Brazilian 
imports.  This  credit  line  will  be  available  for  working  capital  and  investments  to 
diversify and strengthen production chains.  

2.3 Public procurement and prioritisation measures of domestic supply of goods and 
services 

United States 

• 

In April  2025,  the  US  President  signed  an  Executive  Order  on  Restoring America’s 
Maritime  Dominance  to  strengthen  US  domestic  maritime  capabilities,  streamline 
procurement and reduce regulatory burdens. Key actions include i) expanding the US-
flagged commercial vessel fleet to ensure reliable domestic and international shipping 
capacity; ii) developing a strategy to ensure US leadership in Arctic maritime routes, 
countering growing foreign presence in the region; and iii) a mandated review by the 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Secretary  of  Defence  on  the  retention  and  mobilisation  of  the  inactive  reserve  fleet, 
ensuring assured access to sealift capacity in times of military need.  

• 

In  March  2025,  the  US  President  signed  an  Executive  Order  to  accelerate  critical 
mineral  production.  The  order  requires  relevant  agencies  to  submit  project  reports 
within 10 days to the Chair of the National Energy Dominance Council and to propose 
immediate  approvals  within  20  days  where  feasible.  Agencies  must  also  identify 
mineral deposits on federal lands, support leasing agreements with private landowners, 
and  collaborate  with  companies  on  mineral  development.  The  order  also  calls  for  a 
mineral  production  fund  to  be  set  up,  and  for  other  federal  agencies  to  engage  in 
financing and sales initiatives to advance mineral supply efforts.  

Canada 

•  By November 2025, the Canadian government will bring in a new policy on Prioritising 
Canadian Materials in Federal Procurement, in the context of the Buy Canadian policy. 
The first tool introduced by the policy will require suppliers contracting with the federal 
government  to  source  key  materials  from  Canadian  companies  in  defence  and 
construction  procurements  exceeding  a  CAD 20  million  threshold.  Initially  covering 
steel  and  softwood  lumber,  the  policy  may  later  be  expanded  to  cover  additional 
materials.  The  policy  is  also  expected  to  stress  reciprocity,  with  Canadian  suppliers 
being prioritised along with suppliers from countries that grant Canada the same access 
through reciprocal trade agreements. The second tool relates to price preferences for 
Canadian suppliers or suppliers of Canadian goods. The scope is still to be defined but 
could be limited to certain critical sectors and apply a threshold mechanism.  

• 

In July 2025, Canada announced the Interim Reciprocal Procurement policy, restricting 
access  to  Canadian  government  contracts  to  countries  that  have  opened  their 
procurement  market  to  Canada.  The  initial  phase  will  focus  on  applying  the  policy 
based on the location of suppliers, with a second phase determining supplier eligibility 
based on the origin of the goods and services offered. 

India 

• 

China 

In April  2025,  India  revised  its  Domestically  Manufactured  Iron  &  Steel  Products 
Policy 2025, prioritising domestic sourcing in public procurement. The policy mandates 
that  all  government  ministries,  departments,  agencies  and  their  funded  projects  give 
priority  to  domestically  manufactured  iron  and  steel  products  for  procurements 
exceeding  INR 500 000.  It  also  prohibits  Global  Tender  Enquiries  for  such 
procurements (including capital goods used in production) valued up to INR 2 billion, 
unless a waiver is granted by the Department of Expenditure. To enforce compliance, 
the  policy  brings  in  self-certification  requirements  for  local  content,  procurement 
procedure  standards,  and  an  authorisation  requirement  for  bidders  representing 
domestic  firms.  In  addition,  a  reciprocity  clause  bans  suppliers  from  countries  that 
exclude Indian firms from their government tenders.  

•  On  30 September  2025,  the  State  Council  issued  a  notice  prioritising  domestic 
production  in  government  procurement  activities. The  notice  specifies  that  domestic 
products must have a 20% price evaluation preference over non-domestic products in 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
government procurement activities. In addition, to be considered ‘domestic products’, 
the notice specifies that the cost of its components must reach the specified proportion, 
and key components and processes must meet the set requirements. It also sets out a 
five-year  transition  period  during  which  for  each  product  category  the  criteria  for 
constituting a ‘domestic product’ will be further defined.  

United Kingdom 

• 

In February 2025, the UK’s updated public procurement rules came into effect. The 
updated rules envisage new economic security powers that make it possible to bar or 
exclude companies from procurement competitions on national security grounds. 

South Africa 

• 

In July  2025, South Africa announced the Public Procurement  Bill,  which mandates 
local production and content requirements in public procurement. Under Article 20, the 
Bill specifically mandates local production and content requirements in specific sectors. 
The  responsibility  for  designating  these  sectors  falls  to  the  Minister  responsible  for 
trade, industry and competition, who is also charged with setting minimum thresholds 
and  the  duration  of  such  designations.  This  legislation  aims  to  establish  a  unified 
framework for procurement, promote the use of technology to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness, and enhance transparency and integrity to combat corruption.  

2.4 Trade toolbox (tariffs, export restrictions, anti-coercion measures, FDI control, etc.) 

United States 

•  Since the beginning of his second term in January 2025, the US President has imposed 
several tariffs across many sectors and global partners, invoking both the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.  

•  On 15 January 2025, the US Department of Commerce expanded export controls on 
advanced  computing  chips  and  certain  AI  model  weights.  The  rule  covers  high-
performance  hardware  and  closed-weight  AI  models  exceeding  defined  compute 
thresholds, it requires licences for export or transfer, and extends controls to foreign-
produced  items  derived  from  US  technology.  It  aims  to  protect  US  technological 
leadership, secure critical supply chains, and prevent the diversion of advanced AI and 
computing capabilities to adversaries. 

Canada 

• 

In July 2025, Canada announced further tariff rate quotas on steel imports. Tariff rate 
quotas were extended to countries that have a free trade agreement with Canada, with 
the  exception  of  Mexico  and  the  United  States.  FTA  partners  face  a  tariff  quota 
equalling 100% of 2024 levels, after which a 50% tariff will be applied. Countries that 
do not have an FTA with Canada face a tariff rate quota equalling 50% of 2024 levels, 
after which a 50% tariff will be applied. In parallel, Canada introduced Melt and Pour 
tariffs of 25%, applied on imports from all countries other than the US containing steel 
melted and poured in China.  

55 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia 

In  August  2025,  Australia  announced  a  measure  to  streamline  its  anti-dumping 
processes. Australia  transferred  the  responsibility  for  safeguard  actions  to  the Anti-
Dumping Commission. The reform is intended to make it easier for domestic companies 
to apply for measures against goods sold below their normal value (dumping) or sold 
with  the  aid  of  foreign  subsidies,  ensuring  a  more  level  playing  field  for Australian 
manufacturers facing a surge in imports, particularly in the steel sector.  

In March 2025, the reform of the Defence Trade Control Act  2012 came into force, 
applying new export restrictions to certain technologies. It includes a ‘deemed export’ 
offence for supplying sensitive technology to foreign persons within Australia, as well 
as supplying assistance such as training relating to these technologies. 

• 

• 

India 

• 

• 

• 

• 

In September 2025, the Directorate-General of Trade Remedies initiated anti-dumping 
investigations  into  solar  encapsulants  (excluding  EVA  encapsulants)  imported  from 
China,  Republic  of  Korea,  Vietnam  and  Thailand,  prompted  by  a  petition  from 
RenewSys India.  

In June 2025, India imposed five-year anti-dumping duties on four chemicals – PEDA 
(herbicides),  Acetonitrile  (pharma),  Vitamin  A  Palmitate  and  Insoluble  Sulphur  - 
imported primarily from China, but also from Russia, Taiwan, the EU, Switzerland and 
Japan. Duties range from INR 481 per tonne to INR 20.87 per kilogram, depending on 
the product and origin. The move follows recommendations by the Directorate-General 
of Trade Remedies (DGTR) and aims to safeguard domestic producers from unfairly 
priced imports. 

In April  2025,  India  imposed  a  12%  provisional  safeguard  duty  on  certain  flat  steel 
imports for 200 days to counteract a surge in low-cost imports, primarily from China, 
Republic of Korea and Japan. The duty applies to specific steel products, including hot-
rolled coils, sheets and plates, but exempts imports priced above certain thresholds to 
ensure  access  to  high-end  products  that  are  not  readily  available  domestically.  The 
DGTR recommended this measure following an investigation that identified significant 
injury to domestic producers due to the sharp increase in imports.  

In April 2025, the Indian Ministry of Commerce issued an alert to customs authorities 
to maintain strict vigilance on imports and exports.  The aim is to prevent trade from 
being  diverted  through  India,  which  could  lead  to  an  artificial  surge  in  imports  and 
threaten  domestic  industry.  Customs  officials  have  been  instructed  to  monitor  for 
unusual  spikes  in  trade  flows,  particularly  from  China  and  ASEAN  countries,  and 
ensure India is not misused as a transit hub. The alert was announced amid concerns 
over  the  re-routing  and  dumping  of  Chinese  goods  following  the  imposition  of 
sweeping US tariffs on China. 

China 

• 

In October 2025, China announced an expansion of its rare earth export controls, adding 
five  new  rare  earth  elements,  expected  to  come  into  effect  on  8 November  2025.  In 
addition, the new export controls include extraterritorial provisions, requiring export 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
licences for products made outside China if they contain Chinese-origin materials or 
are produced using Chinese technologies. 

• 

In April 2025, China imposed new export licensing requirements on seven medium-to-
heavy  rare  earth  elements  (REEs)  –  samarium,  gadolinium,  terbium,  dysprosium, 
lutetium,  scandium,  and  yttrium  –  along  with  their  oxides,  compounds,  alloys  and 
magnets. Under China’s Export Control Law (2020) all shipments of these listed REEs 
now require special export licences  issued by the Ministry of Commerce. The move 
follows earlier export bans on gallium, germanium and antimony, and was introduced 
in direct response to US tariff escalations. However, the controls are widely viewed as 
part of a longer-term strategy to consolidate China’s dominance across global critical 
mineral supply chains.  

Japan 

•  As at September 2025, Japan had launched four anti-dumping investigations on Chinese 
products. The investigations include investigating different types of steel such as cold-
rolled stainless steel and galvanised steel.  

• 

• 

In May 2025, a draft industry guideline on preventing technology leakage was included 
in  the  revised  Economic  Security  Action  Plan.  The  draft  guideline  includes 
requirements  for  companies  in  critical  industries  to  prevent  cross-border  technology 
leaks in order to receive government assistance.  

In April  2025,  the  Japanese  government  tightened  the  exemption  scheme  for  prior 
notification of certain investments in sensitive sectors such as weapons, dual-use items, 
electricity,  railways  and  telecommunications.  The  revised  rules  introduced  two  new 
types  of  investors  for  which  the  scope  of  FDI  screening  exemptions  is  smaller. The 
revised rules follow the review of Japan’s Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. 

2.5 International deals and partnerships 

BILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS  

United States 

•  US-Saudi Arabia.  In  November  2025,  the  United  States  and  Saudi Arabia  finalised 
several  agreements.  These  included  a  Critical  Minerals  Framework,  which  aims  to 
deepen  collaboration  and  strategies  on  critical  mineral  supply  chains,  a  Joint 
Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation, 
which set a nuclear energy partnership between the two parties, and an AI Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU), which gives Saudi Arabia access to American systems while 
protecting US technology from foreign influence. Saudi Arabia also committed to make 
USD 1 trillion of investments in US infrastructure, technology and industry.  

•  US-Switzerland-Lichtenstein. In November 2025, the United States, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein agreed on a Framework on the intention to negotiate an Agreement on 
Fair, Balanced, and Reciprocal Trade. Switzerland intends to encourage and facilitate 
at least USD 200 billion of investment into the United States over the next five years to 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
 
create manufacturing and R&D jobs. Liechtenstein intends to encourage and facilitate 
at least USD 300 million of investment into the United States and increase by 50% over 
the  next  five  years  the  number  of  jobs  created  by  its  private  sector  in  the  United 
States. Switzerland  and  Liechtenstein  intend  to  encourage  and  facilitate  one  third  of 
these investments by the end of 2026. The US intends to lower tariffs to most-favoured 
nation tariffs or to the 15% rate, with some exceptions. The participants intend to begin 
negotiations on the agreement with a view to concluding it by the first quarter of 2026. 

•  US-Ecuador. In November 2025, the United States and the Republic of Ecuador agreed 
on  a  Framework  for  an  Agreement  on  Reciprocal  Trade.  The  agreement  focuses 
primarily  on  non-tariff  barriers  and  includes  commitments  to  refrain  from  imposing 
digital services taxes, to address intellectual property disputes and to raise food, health 
and  safety  standards.  Ecuador  also  committed  to  reduce  or  eliminate  tariffs  in  key 
sectors, including  machinery, health products,  ICT goods, chemicals,  motor vehicles 
and certain agricultural products. The United States committed to remove its reciprocal 
tariffs  on  certain  qualifying  exports  from  Ecuador.  The  agreement  aims  to  provide 
access  to  each  other’s  markets  and  increase  alignment  on  economic  and  national 
security matters.  

•  US-Argentina. In November 2025, the United States and Argentine Republic agreed on 
a  framework  to  deepen  bilateral  trade  and  investment  cooperation.  The  agreement 
focused  primarily  on  non-tariff  barriers  and  included  a  commitment  to  refrain  from 
imposing digital services taxes,  to  address  intellectual property disputes and  to  raise 
food,  health  and  safety  standards.  Argentina  agreed  to  provide  preferential  market 
access for US goods exports, while the United States agreed to remove the reciprocal 
tariffs  on  certain  unavailable  natural  resources  and  non-patented  articles  for  use  in 
pharmaceutical applications. 

•  US-El Salvador. In November 2025, the United States and the Republic of El Salvador 
agreed to a Framework for an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. The agreement focused 
primarily on non-tariff barriers and included a commitment to refrain from imposing 
digital services taxes, to address intellectual property disputes and to raise food, health 
and  safety  standards.  El  Salvador  also  committed  to  move  forward  with  certain 
international intellectual property treaties, provide transparency and fairness regarding 
geographical indications, adopt and maintain high levels of environmental protection 
and  to  effectively  enforce  its  environmental  laws,  among  others.  The  United  States 
committed  to  remove  the  reciprocal  tariffs  on  certain  qualifying  exports  from  El 
Salvador  that  cannot  be  grown,  mined  or  naturally  produced  in  the  United  States  in 
sufficient quantities, as well as certain products, such as textiles and apparel products. 

•  US-Guatemala. In November 2025, the United States and the Republic of Guatemala 
agreed to a Framework for an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. The agreement focused 
primarily on non-tariff barriers and included a commitment to refrain from imposing 
digital services taxes, to address intellectual property disputes and to raise food, health 
and safety standards. Guatemala also committed to provide transparency and fairness 
regarding geographical indications, protect internationally recognised labour rights, to 
adopt and maintain high levels of environmental protection and to effectively enforce 
its  environmental  laws,  among  others.  The  United  States  committed  to  remove  the 
reciprocal tariffs on certain qualifying exports from Guatemala that cannot be grown, 

58 

 
 
mined  or  naturally  produced  in  the  United  States  in  sufficient  quantities,  as  well  as 
certain products, such as textiles and apparel products. 

•  US-China. In October 2025, the United States and China reached a deal on economic 
and trade relations. The agreement covers notably Chinese commitments to suspend for 
a year current and past export controls restrictions on rare earths. In addition, China 
will take significant measures to end the flow of fentanyl to the US; will suspend all of 
the retaliatory tariffs that it had announced since March 2025; and will purchase at least 
25 million metric tonnes of US soybeans in the coming years. China will also remove 
measures it took in retaliation for the US’s announcement of a Section 301 investigation 
on shipbuilding and remove sanctions imposed on various shipping entities. The United 
States will notably lower the tariffs on Chinese imports by 10 percentage points and 
will maintain its suspension of heightened reciprocal tariffs on Chinese imports until 
10 November 2026.  The current 10% reciprocal tariff will remain in effect during this 
suspension period; the US will suspend for one year implementation of the interim final 
rule Expansion of End-User Controls to Cover Affiliates of Certain Listed Entities; and 
the US will suspend for one year implementation of the restrictive measures taken in 
relation with shipbuilding. 

•  US-Thailand:  

o  On  26 October  2025,  the  US  reached  a  new  trade  framework  with  Thailand. 
Thailand will remove tariffs on 99% of goods and both sides will address non-tariff 
barriers.  The  US  will  keep  a  19%  reciprocal  tariff  while  identifying  the  items 
eligible for 0% rates.  

o  Also  in  October  2025,  the  US  and  Thailand  signed  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  to  diversify  global  critical  mineral  supply  chains  and  promote 
investments.  Areas  of  cooperation  include  sharing  information  and  expertise; 
coordinating  on  priority  projects;  engagement  between  governments,  the  private 
sector, universities; streamlining permitting and investment practices; transparency 
in  competitive  tendering;  and  protecting  markets  based  on  fair‑trade  and  high 
standards. 

•  US-Malaysia:  

o  On  26 October  2025,  the  US  announced  a  new  trade  agreement  with  Malaysia, 
maintaining  a  19%  rate  on  goods,  with  some  exemptions.  The  deal  includes 
commitments to avoid restrictive import licensing, ensure fair market access for US 
agricultural products, and strengthen intellectual property protection. Malaysia also 
agreed  to  cooperate  with  the  US  on  regulating  sensitive  technologies,  aligning 
export controls, and sharing information on certain investments. 

o  On  26 October  2025,  the  US  and  Malaysia  agreed  on  a  MoU  to  strengthen 
cooperation to develop and expand critical mineral supply chains; to promote trade 
and investment in critical mineral resource exploration, extraction, processing and 
refining, manufacturing, and recycling and recovery; and to support the transition 
to efficient and secure critical mineral and rare earths markets. 

•  US-Cambodia. On 26 October 2025, the US  announced a new  trade  agreement with 
Cambodia, maintaining a 19% rate on goods, with some exemptions. The deal includes 

59 

 
 
commitments to  avoid  restrictive import licensing, ensure fair market  access  for US 
agricultural  products  and  strengthen  intellectual  property  protection.  Cambodia  also 
agreed to cooperate with the US on regulating sensitive technologies, aligning export 
controls and sharing information on certain investments. 

•  US-Vietnam. On 26 October 2025, the US announced a trade framework with Vietnam. 
Key terms of the framework include preferential market access for US exports, a 20% 
reciprocal  tariff  and  collaboration  on  non-tariff  barriers,  digital  trade,  services  and 
investment.  

•  US-Japan:  

o  In October 2025, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of 
Japan  signed  a  Framework  for  Securing  the  Supply  of  Critical  Minerals  and 
Rare  Earths  through  Mining  and  Processing  (US-JP  Framework).  This 
agreement  commits  the  two  nations  to  bolster  their  collaborative  efforts  in 
securing a steady supply of essential minerals and rare earths required for their 
domestic industries. This is achieved via financial support mechanisms, trade 
initiatives  and  strategic  stockpiling  systems  for  critical  minerals.  Within  six 
months, both countries plan to implement measures that will provide financial 
backing to select projects aimed at producing end products for distribution to 
buyers in the US, Japan and other allied nations.  

o  In October 2025, the US and Japan published a detailed plan for Japan to invest 
USD 550 billion in the United States. A total of 21 projects are listed in the fact 
sheet,  spanning  sectors  such  as  critical  energy  infrastructure, AI  and  critical 
minerals.  

•  US-Australia.  In  October  2025,  the  United  States  and Australia  signed  a  framework 
agreement for securing supply in the mining and processing of critical minerals and rare 
earth. The framework covers closer cooperation with  third parties and provisions on 
securing supply, investment in mining and processing, permitting, price mechanisms, 
asset  sales,  scrap,  stockpiling  and  geological  mapping  as  well  as  establishing  rapid 
response  groups.  It  aims  to  mobilise  USD 8.5  billion  to  enhance  the  mining  and 
processing of critical minerals and rare earths and to reduce dependence on China. Both 
nations committed to investing at least USD 1 billion each within six months to support 
projects in their respective countries.  

•  US-Republic of Korea. In July 2025, the US and the Republic of Korea announced the 
US-Korea  Strategic  Trade  and  Investment  deal.  In  October  2025,  the  two  parties 
reaffirmed  their  announcement,  and  in  November  2025,  a  fact  sheet  was  published 
detailing  the  terms  of  the  deal. The  Republic  of  Korea  will  invest  USD 200  billion 
(USD 20 billion a year) across several sectors including semiconductors, energy, AI and 
critical  raw  materials,  and  will  set  aside  another  USD 150  billion  to  invest  in 
shipbuilding.  The  reciprocal  tariff  rate  will  remain  at  15%,  as  agreed  upon  at  the 
tentative  trade  deal  in  July.  The  deal  also  includes  provisions  to  prevent  foreign 
exchange  market  instability,  limiting  required  dollar  funding  to  USD 20  billion 
annually, eliminating a cap on US vehicles, streamlining agricultural product approval 
and reducing digital service barriers. 

60 

 
 
•  US-Indonesia.  In  July  2025,  the  US  and  Indonesia  reached  an  agreement  on  a 
framework to negotiate an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade aimed at enhancing their 
bilateral economic ties. This agreement commits Indonesia to eliminate tariff barriers 
on  over  99%  of  US  exports,  covering  sectors  like  agriculture,  health  products,  ICT, 
automotive and chemicals. It also addresses a broad slate of non-tariff barriers for US 
industrial, agricultural and digital exports, adopts more facilitative rules of origin and 
covers  cooperation  on  economic  security  (including  removing  export  limits  on 
industrial commodities and critical minerals) and labour standards. 

•  US-UK. In May 2025, the United States and the United Kingdom announced a trade 
deal. While the 10% US reciprocal tariff remains in place for most products, the trade 
deal  brings  in  selected  tariff  relief  and  market  access  improvements,  particularly  in 
agriculture, autos, metals and aerospace. Key measures include a new quota system for 
autos and steel/aluminium, reduced or eliminated tariffs on US exports like ethanol and 
beef,  aerospace  cooperation  with  Rolls  Royce  and  Boeing,  and  plans  for  future 
agreements  on  economic  security,  pharmaceuticals  and  technology.  The  deal  also 
introduces faster trade and customs processes.  

•  US-Ukraine.  In  May  2025,  the  United  States  and  Ukraine  signed  an  agreement  on 
resource extraction and reconstruction, establishing a jointly managed investment fund 
to support mining, energy and infrastructure projects. The deal grants the US priority 
access  to  newly  licensed  critical  natural  resources,  including  rare  earths,  lithium, 
graphite, titanium and manganese, while ensuring Ukrainian ownership and excluding 
any actors linked to Russia’s war effort. Both countries will contribute equally to the 
fund, with future US military aid counting as the American share. The deal excludes 
sovereign  debt  obligations,  ports  and  nuclear  assets,  and  includes  provisions  on 
technology transfer and innovation.  

•  US-India. In February 2025, the prime minister of India and the President of the United 
States  have  signed  the  Transforming  Relationship  Utilising  Strategic  Technology 
(TRUST) initiative. This initiative focuses on AI, semiconductors, defence, space and 
biotech.  It  aims  to  develop  manufacturing  capacity  in  India  while  ensuring  resilient 
supply  chains  for  the  United  States.  It  is  designed  to  foster  collaboration  between 
governments, academia and the private sector with the aim of promoting the application 
of critical and emerging technologies in these sectors. Alongside this initiative, a US-
India Roadmap on Accelerating AI Infrastructure was drawn up, targeting the creation 
of pathways for enabling industry partnerships and investments in next-generation data 
centres,  as  well  as  improving  access  to  compute  and  processors  for AI.  The  Joint 
Statement issued following the meeting between  the prime minister of India and the 
President  of  the  United  States  also  announced  the  launch  of  the  Strategic  Mineral 
Recovery Initiative, a programme dedicated to the recovery and processing of critical 
minerals  such  as  lithium,  cobalt  and  rare  earths.  The  TRUST  initiative  was  later 
expanded to include AI infrastructure and critical mineral recovery. 

United Kingdom 

•  UK-Japan:  

o  In March 2025, the Department for Business and Trade and the Department for 
Energy Security  and Net Zero of the Government  of the United Kingdom  of 
Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  and  the  Ministry  of  Economy, Trade  and 

61 

 
 
 
Industry of Japan signed a MoU on offshore wind. The aim of the MoU is to 
support  and  encourage  collaboration  on  offshore  wind,  in  particular  on 
exchanging  policies  and  best  practices,  encouraging  activities  that  help  build 
sustainable  supply  chain  capabilities  for  offshore  wind  projects,  support 
bilateral investments and encourage collaboration between industries.  

o  In  March  2025,  the  United  Kingdom  Atomic  Energy  Authority  and  the 
Fukushima  Institute  for  Research,  Education  and  Innovation  signed  a 
Memorandum  of  Cooperation  on  joint  research 
in  robotics  and 
autonomous systems. The MoC aims to foster collaboration between the two 
government-funded organisations, mainly on advanced manufacturing, sharing 
best practices in research institutions, and initiatives to drive partnerships and 
support talent and skills development. 

Australia 

•  Australia-Singapore. In October 2025, the two countries updated their Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership (CSP). The CSP 2.0 encompasses closer cooperation in defence, 
supply chain resilience, green and digital economies, food security, renewable energy 
and innovation, as well as emerging areas such as artificial intelligence (AI) and space. 

India 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

India-Canada. In November 2025, India and Canada announced long-term partnerships 
in critical minerals, clean energy and aerospace cooperation. Both sides acknowledged 
the importance of expanding collaboration in these areas due to their importance for the 
energy transition and industrial growth. The details of what the partnerships will consist 
of in practice are yet to be made public. 

India-Isreal. In September 2025, India and Israel signed a bilateral investment treaty 
valued at USD 800 million, aiming to increase investment between the two nations. The 
details of the treaty are yet to be made public.  

India-RoW. As at May 2025, India has signed Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) 
with  the  customs  authorities  of  Republic  of  Korea,  Hong  Kong, Taiwan,  the  United 
States,  the  United Arab  Emirates, Australia  and  Russia. These  MRAs  aim  to  reduce 
inspection requirements and accelerate customs clearance.  

India-United Arab Emirates. In 2025, India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed 
eight  memoranda  of  understanding  (MoUs)  across  various  strategic  sectors.  These 
agreements  aim  to  strengthen  collaboration  in  investment  promotion,  digital 
infrastructure,  local  currency  trade,  port  connectivity,  renewable  energy  and  skills 
development.  The  MoUs  are  part  of  a  broader  effort  to  institutionalise  economic 
integration and secure supply chain resilience between the two nations.  

India-Russia. In 2025, India and Russia agreed on six new strategic investment projects 
during the 8th India-Russia Working Group session in New Delhi. The projects aim to 
enhance bilateral  investment  and expand cooperation across key strategic sectors, as 
well  as  to  reaffirm  the  commitment  from  both  sides  to  deepen  their  long-standing 
‘Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership’.  

62 

 
 
 
 
 
Japan 

•  Japan-India. At their summit meeting in August 2025, Japan and India announced the 
Japan-India Economic Security Initiative. The initiative encourages businesses to invest 
in and collaborate on projects across six key sectors: semiconductors, critical minerals, 
telecommunications, clean energy, pharmaceuticals and advanced technologies like AI. 
Both  countries  released  a  factsheet  detailing  ongoing  partnership  projects  and 
highlighted  the  public  funds  available  to  provide  financial  backing  and  the  forums 
created with businesses and experts to follow up on their commitments. The initiative 
aims to strengthen cooperation in economic security and includes support for the entire 
supply chain, from research and innovation to procurement.  

•  Japan-Brazil.  In  March  2025,  Japan  and  Brazil  signed  a  five-year  action  plan  to 
strengthen their strategic partnership. The plan includes holding reciprocal leader visits 
once every two years and a new consultative framework for senior officials to discuss 
diplomatic and defence-related issues. The initiative aims to strengthen cooperation in 
areas like the economy, climate change and security.  

Republic of Korea 

•  Republic of Korea-India. In August 2025, India and the Republic of Korea resolved to 
industrial  sectors  such  as 

expand 
semiconductors, defence, clean energy and artificial intelligence.  

their  strategic  partnership 

to  cover  new 

Vietnam 

•  Vietnam-Thailand. In May 2025, Thailand and Vietnam upgraded their relationship to 
a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The two countries agreed to map out the ‘Three 
Connects’  plan  in  three  main  areas:  supply  chains,  particularly  in  industries  such  as 
petrochemicals, food, electronics, logistics and semiconductors; local economies; and 
sustainable  development,  including  green  economy,  renewable  energy  and  the 
transition to a digital economy. The aim of the partnership is to promote the value chains 
between the two countries and advance growth. In July 2025, the two countries agreed 
to develop an action programme to implement the comprehensive partnership over the 
2026-2030 period with concrete initiatives. It was also mentioned that a joint working 
group would be put in place to execute the ‘Three Connects’.  

PLURILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS 

•  Japan-India-Africa. In February 2025, in the context of the Japan-India-Africa Business 
Forum, the Japan-India Cooperation Initiative for Sustainable Economic Development 
in Africa was launched. This initiative aims to promote Japanese investment in India as 
a  business  hub  to  facilitate  Japanese  private-sector  investments  in  Africa,  and  to 
incorporate the Indian and African markets into Japan’s economic activities. It focuses 
on  technological  and  human  resource  development,  and  includes  developing  the 
African critical mineral supply chain. 

•  United States-Japan-India-Australia. In July 2025, the United States, Japan, India and 
Australia formally launched the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative. The initiative aims 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to  build  collective  resilience  and  economic  security  by  promoting  i)  joint  efforts  to 
secure and diversify global supply chains for lithium, nickel, graphite and other critical 
minerals; ii) closer cooperation on electronic waste recycling, critical mineral recovery, 
and reprocessing; iii) coordination with private-sector partners across Quad countries 
to  facilitate  greater  investment  in  upstream  and  midstream  segments;  and  iv) 
engagement with third (non-EU) countries, including in Africa. The initiative is part of 
broader effort to diversify and secure critical mineral supply chains essential for clean 
energy, defence and high-tech applications, particularly vis-à-vis China’s dominant role 
and recent coercive action. 

• 

India-Sri Lanka-United Arab Emirates. In April 2025, Sri Lanka, India and the UAE 
signed a tripartite agreement to develop an energy hub in Trincomalee. The agreement 
includes the construction of a multi-product pipeline and the development of a World 
War II-era oil tank farm, partially held by the Sri Lankan subsidiary of the Indian Oil 
Corporation. 

64