REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the functioning of the European Electronic Communications Code, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (‘EECC’)
Date: 2026-01-21
Institutions: Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, European Commission
Subjects: Internet, administrative supervision, competition policy, consumer protection, control of restrictive practices, digital single market, regulation of telecommunications, technological change, transmission network, universal service

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 21.1.2026  COM(2026) 35 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the functioning of the European Electronic Communications Code, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (‘EECC’)  
 
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

on the functioning of the European Electronic Communications Code, Directive (EU) 
2018/1972 (‘EECC’) 

1. INTRODUCTION 

By this report the Commission fulfils its obligation to report to the European Parliament and to 
the Council on the review of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 establishing the European Electronic 
Communications Code (‘EECC’)1, pursuant to its Articles 122 and 123(2).  

The  EECC  in  Article  122  requires  the  Commission  to  review  the  functioning  of  the  EECC. 
Therefore, the general aim of this review report is to assess the functioning of the EECC since 
its applicability as of 21 December 2020.  

In particular, it assesses the functioning of:  

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- 

- 

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the powers granted to national regulatory authorities (NRAs) to impose obligations to 
grant  access  to  wiring  and  cables  and  associated  facilities  inside  buildings  in  Article 
61(3);  
the  regulatory  treatment  of  new  very  high  capacity  network  (VHCN)  elements  in 
Article 76; 
the rules on voluntary separation by a vertically  integrated  undertaking  in  Article 78;  
and  
the  rules  on  commitments  offered  by  undertakings  designated  as  having  significant 
market power in Article 79.  

The report also evaluates whether the ex ante and other intervention powers in the EECC are 
sufficient  to  enable  national  regulatory  authorities  to  address  uncompetitive  oligopolistic 
market  structures,  and  to  ensure  that  competition  in  electronic  communications  markets 
continues to thrive to the benefit of end-users.   

In addition, Article 122(2) requires that the Commission reviews the scope of universal service 
in light of social, economic and technological developments in Articles 84 to 92. This report 
provides an overview of the functioning of those provisions, presents the first lessons drawn 
from the EECC’s application and functioning, and outlines the way forward.  

Furthermore, Article 122(3) allows the Commission, taking utmost account of the opinion of 
the  Body  of  European  Regulators  for  Electronic  Communications  (BEREC),  to  publish  a 
report on the application of the general authorisation provisions in Articles 12 to 19, including 
on  the  possible  conditions  and  to  submit  a  legislative  proposal  to  amend  those  provisions 
where  it  considers  this  to  be  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  addressing  obstacles  to  the  proper 
functioning  of  the  internal  market.  Finally,  Article  123  of  the  EECC  requires  that  the 
Commission publishes a report on the application of end-user rights, taking utmost account of 
the BEREC opinion.  

1   OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1972/oj 

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The aim of this report is to accomplish all these tasks as required in Articles 122 and 123(2). 

Unless indicated differently, references to articles in this report are to articles of the EECC. 

1.1.  Overall review of the EECC  

the  main  findings  from 

the  comprehensive  evaluation  of 

In  view  of  new  challenges  concerning  the  competitiveness  of  the  sector,  and  of  the  need  to 
deepen the Single Market for electronic communications as well as security and resilience of 
networks,  the  need  for  a  major  regulatory  reform  has  been  identified.  Therefore,  this  report 
includes 
the  electronic 
communications framework accompanying the Impact Assessment (IA) of the  Proposal for a 
Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  digital  networks,  amending 
Regulation  (EU)  2015/2120,  Directive  (EU)  2002/58/EC  and  Decision  No  676/2002/EC  and 
repealing  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1971,  Directive  (EU)  2018/1972  and  Decision  No 
234/2012/EU  (Digital  Networks  Act),  hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ‘DNA’.  The  hereby 
mentioned  evaluation  for  the  purpose  of  the  IA,  apart  from  the  assessment  of  the  EECC 
provisions,  includes  an  assessment  of  Regulation  (EU)  2015/2120  on  Open  Internet  Access 
(OIR)2, of some telecom specific (number-related) aspects of Directive 2002/58/EC (ePrivacy 
Directive)3 and of the Radio Spectrum Policy Programme (RSPP)4.  

This  report  is  conducted  together  with  the  evaluation  of  the  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1971 
establishing  the Body of European Regulators  for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and 
the Agency for Support for BEREC (BEREC Office) as required by Article 48 of the BEREC 
Evaluation. 

Finally, the EECC is one of several pillars supporting and regulating the roll-out and provision 
of  electronic  communications  networks  and  services.  Other  important  pillars  have  not  been 
covered by the evaluation report. The Commission will report about their reviews separately. 
More specifically, the full review of the Roaming Regulation5 is scheduled for June 2029 and 
the report on the implementation of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act (GIA)6 for  May 2028. 

This report presents only the main findings of the EECC review  which are the following: 

•  The  Significant  Market  Power  (SMP)  regime  remains  the  key  instrument  for  ex  ante 

regulation.  

•  Radio  spectrum  is  of  outmost  strategic  and  geopolitical  importance;  it  is  essential  to 
enable  communication,  drive  economic  growth  and  social  prosperity,  and  support 
critical services across various sectors. 

•  The  universal  service  obligations  (USO)  in  the  EECC  are  a  safety  net  to  ensure  all 
consumers in  the Union  have affordable adequate internet  and voice communications 
services. However, the possibility to impose USO for the availability of the services is 
not  widely  used  by  Member  States  and  the  measures  to  ensure  affordability,  where 
used, differ across Member States.     

2   OJ L 310, 26.11.2015, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/2120/oj 
3   OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/58/oj 
4   OJ L 81, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2012/243(2)/oj  
5   OJ L 115, 13.4.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/612/oj 
6   OJ L, 2024/1309, 8.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1309/oj 

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•  The provisions on end-user rights are mostly still fit for purpose but in some respects 

could be simplified. 

For more detailed findings on the provisions covered in this report and for the full evaluation 
of  EECC  provisions,  together  with  the  other  legislation  revised  for  the  preparation  of  the 
Commission’s proposal for a Digital Networks Act (DNA) please refer to Annex 11 of the IA 
to  the  DNA  legislative  proposal:  ‘Evaluation  –  Review  of  the  functioning  of  European 
Electronic Communications Code (EECC), BEREC Regulation, Open Internet Regulation, and 
certain aspects of the ePrivacy Directive’ (Part 3 /3 of the IA). 

1.2.  Sources and transposition process 

In preparing this report, the Commission gathered information and feedback from a variety of 
sources  and  targeted  consultation  activities  carried  out  during  the  preparatory  stages  of  the 
DNA proposal. The main sources are listed in Annex I of the IA (Part 2/3 of the IA). 

the  Commission  considered  findings  from 

Furthermore, 
its  ongoing  monitoring  of 
transpositions  and  application  of  the  EECC  provisions  in  the  Member  States  and  from  the 
complaints received.  

Firstly, only three Member States met the December 2020 deadline for transposing the EECC 
into  national  law.  The  transposition  in  all  27  Member  States  was  only  completed  in  August 
2024.  

Secondly,  several  Member  States  adopted  national  provisions  which  relate  to  the  EECC 
provisions but go beyond what would be necessary for the completeness and conformity of the 
transposition.  This  resulted  in  overly  complex  national  legislation  and  subsequently  in 
unnecessary regulatory burden for operators, notably related to security incidents and threads 
to security of public electronic communications networks.  

Lastly, it is important to consider that case law is only starting to be developed regarding the 
application of the EECC. Several cases are currently pending before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (‘the CJEU’) concerning the interpretation of key  EECC provisions such as 
those on rights of spectrum use – both for radio and for TV broadcasting and on the provision 
of  contractual  information  to  end-users.  These  judgments  will  provide  more  clarity  and  will 
contribute to a more harmonised approach amongst Member States. 

2. REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE ACCESS PROVISIONS 

In  line  with  Article  122,  the  Commission  reviewed  in  particular  the  market  implications  of 
Article 61(3)  and  Articles  76,  78  and  79  and  assessed  whether  the  ex  ante  and  other 
intervention  powers  pursuant  to  this  Directive  are  sufficient  to  enable  national  regulatory 
authorities  to  address  uncompetitive  oligopolistic  market  structures,  and  to  ensure  that 
competition  in  electronic  communications  markets  continues  to  thrive  to  the  benefit  of  end-
users. 

Wholesale access regulation has been widely applied across the EU. Such a system promotes 
regulatory predictability  by ensuring a consistent regulatory  approach.  Access  regulation  has 
infrastructure-based 
supported 
competition) by granting access to physical infrastructure and of choice in broadband services, 
including VHCN, for a high proportion of households in the EU.   

the  development  of  competition 

(including  efficient 

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2.1.  Access to in-building wiring 

Article  61(3)  was,  in  principle,  designed  to  limit  network  duplication  inside  buildings.  It 
identifies  a  connection  point  for  wholesale  access  and  requires  that  any  network  operator 
grants access to competitors.  

Eight countries have applied symmetric access to  in-building wiring7. Limited use of Article 
61(3) may be partly because it applies only upon reasonable request by an access seeker and 
NRAs cannot apply it ex officio.  

Mandating access to in-building wiring requires the NRA to demonstrate that replication of the 
in-building  wiring  would  be  economically  inefficient  or  physically  impracticable.  Extending 
the access obligations beyond the building and the first concentration point is possible under 
Article  61(3),  if  the  access  obligations  to  in-building  wires  “do  not  sufficiently  address  high 
and non-transitory economic or physical barriers to replication which underlie an existing or 
emerging market situation significantly limiting competitive outcomes for end-users”. 

Symmetric access to the network that goes beyond the in-building wiring is shielded by a high 
burden  of  proof  to  satisfy,  notwithstanding  the  circumstance  that  there  is  limited  decisional 
practice  or case law.  

The limited use of symmetric regulation under Article 61(3) in other Member States could be 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  EECC  seems  to  prioritise  SMP  regulation,  which  provides  an 
alternative means of mandating wholesale access including to FTTH. SMP based remedies are 
frequently  applied  as,  contrary  to  the  “optional”  symmetric  regulation,  the  requirement  to 
conduct  a  market  analysis  of  markets  listed  in  the  Relevant  Market  Recommendation  as 
susceptible to ex ante regulation is, in principle, mandatory.  

2.2. 

Functional separation, vertical separation and commitments by undertakings  

Regarding  co-investment  under  Article  76,  there  were  no  cases,  in  which  the  NRAs  have 
formally applied this provision in the adopted measure8.  

Therefore, Article 76 did not prove, over the past five years of application, to be an efficient 
tool  to  incentivise  SMP  operators  to  share  investments  with  (potential)  competitors  on  a 
voluntary basis. The co-investment provisions in Article 76 appeared complex, limiting their 
potential  application.  The  provision,  if  applied,  could  potentially  be  counterproductive,  as  it 
would risk locking in customers to the SMP operators’ network, thereby reducing the potential 
customer base that would be needed to support the entry of infrastructure-based competitors. 
Therefore, Article 76 provisions should either be substantially revised or removed. 

7   In accordance with Article 61 (3) EECC. Of these, four countries (Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Poland) impose 
symmetric  access  for  in-building  wiring  only,  while  the  other  four  (France,  Spain,  Portugal  and  Croatia) 
impose  symmetric  access  at  the  first  distribution  point  with  a  possibility  for  this  point  to  lie  outside  the 
building. 

8   Only in Italy an SMP operator sought to make use of the new possibility offered by the Article 76. AGCOM, 
however,  withdrew  its  notification  once  the  SMP  operator  unilaterally  changed  its  offer  on  an  essential 
element  (prices), thus requiring a new assessment by AGCOM. Later, AGCOM requested amendments of the 
offer  and  eventually,  when  the  SMP  operator  did  not  implement  them,  rejected  the  offer  as  non-compliant 
with the EECC. 

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The EECC contains two provisions regarding the separation of vertically integrated operators. 
Article  77  empowers  the  NRAs  to  impose  functional  separation  as  a  ‘last  resort’  remedy, 
whereas Article 78 obliges the SMP operators to inform the NRAs about voluntary separation. 
That allows the NRAs to re-assess the markets affected by the voluntary separation. 

No NRA has ever mandated functional separation under Article 77. However voluntary legal 
or  functional  separation  has  been  pursued  in  at  least  two  Member  States9 under  Article  78. 
Therefore, Article 77 could be considered for removal as the provision has never been applied 
not  only  over  the  past  five  years  of  application  of  the  EECC,  but  also  earlier,  since 
introduction  of  this  obligation  the  EU  law  in  2009.  Removal  of  this  tool  would  not  have 
negative  consequences  for  the  NRAs  who  use  standard  obligations  such  as  detailed  non-
discrimination  rules  to  ensure  equivalence  of  access  and  to  offset  the  advantage  stemming 
from vertical integration of an access provider, addressing the competition problems identified.  
Article 78 could be simplified and qualified as one of general regulatory commitments, which 
SMP operators can propose under Article 78. 

2.3.  Uncompetitive oligopolistic market structures and ensuring competition to the 

benefit of end-users 

Since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  EECC,  NRAs  found  no  cases  of  joint  SMP  which  were 
confirmed  by  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU.  In  its  April  2018  SMP  Guidelines,  the 
Commission  provided  guidance  on  the  interpretation  and  application  of  the  joint  SMP 
concept10.  

Under Article 32, NRAs notified only a very limited number of draft measures, in which they 
found collective dominance.  

Still in 2018, the Dutch NRA ACM found joint SMP in the wholesale fixed access, a finding 
which the Commission did not veto11 under the review procedure for market analyses in force 
at that time (Article 7(3) Framework Directive). However, despite the Commission’s absence 
of serious doubts regarding the finding  of joint  SMP, the ACM’s decision was subsequently 
annulled by the Dutch court12. More precisely, the Dutch court rejected ACM’s position that 
commercial  agreements  cannot  be  taken  into  account  in  the  market  power  assessment.  On 
ACM’s  market  power  assessment,  the  court  stated  that  demonstrating  a  hypothetical 
possibility  of  dominance  is  not  a  sufficient  basis  for  regulation.  Instead,  the  ACM  should 
demonstrate that an undertaking has the incentive and the ability to restrict competition.  

In  February  202213 and  in  March  202314,  the  Commission  adopted  decisions  requiring  the 
Czech  NRA to  withdraw its proposed draft measures to  regulate wholesale access  to mobile 
networks in Czechia via a finding of joint SMP. The  Commission found that other regulatory 

9   Denmark, Italy. 
10   Communication on SMP guidelines | Shaping Europe’s digital future. 
11 Commission  Decision  C(2018)  5848 final  of  30.8.2018 concerning  Cases  NL/2018/2099  and  NL/2018/2100: 

Wholesale fixed access market in the Netherlands.  

12   https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/highest-dutch-court-annuls-acm-s-joint-71679/. 
13   Commission  closes  its  in-depth  investigation  on  the  proposed  Czech  regulation  on  mobile  access  market  | 

Shaping Europe’s digital future. 

14   https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-closes-its-depth-investigation-proposed-regulation-

market-wholesale-access-mobile. 

5 

 
 
 
tools  such  as  the  enforcement  of  already  imposed  spectrum  related  obligations  had  the 
potential to solve the problems15.  

The  Maltese  NRA  attempted  to  regulate  the  broadband  access  market  with  two  local 
nationwide  networks  based  on  single  SMP  findings  and  to  regulate  only  one  out  of  two 
nationwide networks. After a thorough investigation, the Commission found that the Maltese 
NRA should take into account the competitive constraints exerted by the presence of a second 
undertaking operating an alternative cable infrastructure and determined that the draft measure 
would not be compatible with EU law and issued a veto16. 

No other proposed measures addressing findings of joint SMP have been notified. 

Despite the small number of joint SMP cases, competitive concerns in oligopolistic markets 
(most often with only two operators) have been addressed in different ways.  

For  example,  in  the  Belgian  market  they  were  addressed  through  distinguishing  separate 
markets for, on the one hand, access to copper and fibre and, on the other hand, to cable. In 
each of those separate markets the NRAs identified single SMP.  

In the Dutch market, following the above-mentioned Court decision, concerns were addressed 
by  way  of  commitments,  which  the  providers  entered  into  following  a  market  investigation 
under competition law.  

In addition, the oligopolistic market structures in the mobile sector have, so far been addressed 
in two ways, either by conditions to provide access to mobile virtual network operators, among 
others,  attached  to  the  rights  of  spectrum  use  under  the  spectrum  authorisation  regime  –  or 
under competition law commitments in the case of merger approvals.  

Despite  the  small  number  of  cases  where  the  NRAs  proposed  regulation  of  oligopolistic 
markets, the current approach, allowing the NRAs to regulate the markets with single and joint 
SMP  should  be  maintained  because  SMP  assessment  (single  or  joint),  based  on  the  same 
principles  of  competition  law  ensures  internal  coherence  and  regulatory  predictability.  The 
SMP  Guidelines17 adopted  by  the  Commission  set  out  the  main  principles  and  criteria  for 
determining single SMP and joint SMP. 

15   In a 2023 study, see https://www.berec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-

04/BoR%20%2823%29%2041%20Study%20on%20wholesale%20mobile%20connectivity%20trends%20and
%20issues%20for%20emerging%20mobile%20technologies%20and%20deployments_final_0.pdf,  
WIK-Consult  noted  that  the  nature  of  MVNO  obligations  in  spectrum  licences  might  affect  the  degree  to 
which  an  MVNO  could  differentiate  its  services  from  that  of  its  host  and  thus  its  potential  to  provide 
competitive  disruption.  It  noted  that  in  the  Czech  case,  the  spectrum  licence  provides  “prices  must  allow 
equally efficient operators to profitably operate  on the  downstream (retail) market”. The study noted in this 
context that “The fact that the spectrum licence MVNO obligations require wholesale prices to be set on the 
basis  of  an  EEO  margin-squeeze  test  in  practice  limits  the  potential  for  MVNOs  to  engage  in  price 
competition.” 
16   C(2024) 1928 final. 
17   Guidelines  on  market  analysis  and  the  assessment  of  significant  market  power  under  the  EU  regulatory 

framework for electronic communications networks and services (2018/C 159/01). 

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3. REVIEW OF THE SCOPE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE 

Universal  service  obligations  (USO)  in  the  EECC  provide  a  safety  net  to  consumers  in  the 
Union and ensure that they can have access to adequate broadband internet access and voice 
communication services at an affordable price. The definitions of adequate internet access vary 
between Member States. The possibility to impose USO for availability is not widely used by 
Member  States,  and  the  measures  to  ensure  affordability,  where  used,  differ  across  Member 
States. The sector-specific designation rules are  administratively burdensome and procedures 
to  benefit  from  affordability  can  be  complex  for  consumers.  However,  USO  continue  as  a 
safety net also in the contexts of urban-rural divide, levels of risk of poverty for EU consumers 
and technological evolution. 

3.1.  Availability of universal service 

Thanks  to  widespread  commercial  roll-out  of  fixed  and  mobile  networks,  the  availability 
(Article  86)  of  adequate  broadband  internet  access  (as  defined  individually  by  the  Member 
States,  typically  in  the  range  of  10  Mbit/s  download  speed)  is  not  a  concern  because  of  the 
widespread prevalence of fixed and mobile networks which are sufficient to provide such basic 
broadband  speeds.  The  availability  is  also  addressed  through  alternative  public  policy  tools 
such as State Aid measures or financial instruments. Nine Member States designated universal 
service  providers  but  even  where  providers  were  designated,  the  actual  number  of  imposed 
obligations was relatively low.  

3.2.  Affordability of universal service 

Member  States  used  widely  diverging  measures  to  ensure  affordability  (Article  85)  for 
consumers with low income and special social needs. These included various forms of support, 
such  as  vouchers,  social  tariffs  and  discounts  or  addressing  affordability  through  the  social 
welfare system.  

The  methodologies  used  for  determining  what  constitutes  an  affordable  price  vary.  Lack  of 
transparency and the complexity of procedures can be barriers for consumers to benefit from 
defined affordable prices and offers. While affordability measures are in place, their practical 
impact seems often limited due to low take-up, administrative burden, and lack of visibility. 

Member  States  have  additional measures  to  support  consumers  with  disabilities  through  the 
universal  services  regime (Article  85(4)).  These  include,  for  example, higher  quality  of 
service, free service and equipment support. 

The  adequate  broadband  and  voice  communications  at  basic  broadband  speeds  (taking  into 
account both fixed and wireless technologies), are virtually universally available in the Union 
and the possibility  to impose USO for the availability is  not widely  used by Member States. 
However,  the  USO  rules  provide  a  safety  net  for  end-users’  fixed  locations  at  all  areas.  The 
share of people in the Union that could not afford an internet connection has declined over the 
last  decade,  but  affordability  especially  for  consumers  with  low  income  and  special  social 
needs  remains  an  issue  in  certain  cases.  Further  harmonisation  of  the  assessment  of 
affordability  and  determining  the  adequate  internet  access  service  could  improve  the 
effectiveness  of  the  rules.  In  addition,  simplification  of  the  sector-specific  designation  and 
financing could reduce administrative burden both for Member States and for providers. 

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4. REVIEW OF END-USER RIGHTS 

The  end-user  rights  provisions  (Articles  98-116)  are  mostly  still  fit  for  purpose.  They 
complement general consumer protection rules and have supported the objective of promoting 
their 
consumer  choice.  While 
effectiveness  is  reduced  by  the  possibilities  included  in  the  articles  to  introduce  additional 
national  rules.  The  use  by  Member  States  of  the  possibility  to  deviate  from  sector  specific 
rules  has  increased  regulatory  fragmentation  of  the  sector-specific  consumer  protection  rules 
for  electronic  communications.  Industry  stakeholders  have  flagged  this  as  preventing  them 
from operating at scale and from providing consistent cross-border services.  

they  generally  provide  for  maximum  harmonisation, 

As  to  electronic  communications  mass-market  services  in  general,  end-users  in  the  Union 
enjoy  a  high-level  of  choice,  value-for-money,  quality  of  service  and  protection  in  the 
electronic communication sector. The EECC, together with the EU’s competition rules ensure 
consumer choice and competitive markets.  

Further harmonisation of the rules would reduce single market barriers arising from divergent 
implementation of the rules and improve single market functioning especially for cross-border 
providers. This could  reduce administrative burden, lower compliance costs and enhance the 
delivery  of  cross-border  services.  In  addition,  some  updates  and  simplification  could  be 
beneficial for both end-users and service providers, for example, updating the requirements for 
information  provision  and  streamlining  the  protection  granted  to  business  customers  and 
further alignment with related legislation in the sector. 

5. LESSONS LEARNT AND WAY FORWARD 

The EECC, through its objectives of promotion of connectivity and access to, and take-up of, 
VHCNs,  helped  achieve/maintain  effective  competition  in  the  market  for  electronic 
communications networks and services and protect the interests of the end users. However, the 
EECC, as a Directive leaves significant room for national divergence leading to fragmentation 
and therefore, the evaluation shows its limitations in deepening the single market for electronic 
communications.  European  operators  continue  to  face  barriers  to  operating  cross-border  and 
scaling-up,  limiting  their  ability  to  invest,  innovate,  and  compete  with  their  global 
counterparts. Furthermore, electronic  communications, including  satellite-based services,  and 
critical communication have received increased attention for ensuring security, resilience and 
preparedness. 

The  SMP  regime  coupled  with  symmetric  regulation, remain the  key  instrument  for  ex ante 
regulation. Ex ante regulation is still an important tool to ensure that competition problems are 
addressed  in  a  timely  manner.  However, there  is  a  room  for  simplification  of  some  key 
provisions  that  have  either  not  been  applied  by  regulators  (Article 76  regarding  co-
investments, Article 77 regarding the imposition of functional separation) or were applied by 
some  regulators  but  should  be  further  simplified  to  enable  their  broader  application  (e.g. 
Article 61(3) covering symmetric regulation). Finally, as indicated above, the number of cases 
regarding oligopolistic markets, notified under Article 32 was very limited. Possible issues in 
oligopolistic  markets  have  been  addressed  either  under  the  spectrum  authorisation  regime  or 
under competition law. 

USO in the EECC remain as a safety net to ensure all consumers in the Union have affordable 
adequate internet and voice communications services. Simplification of the provisions in light 

8 

 
 
of national conditions could improve the effectiveness of the rules and a future review could 
ensure the rules follow social, economic and technological developments, including transition 
to fibre.  

The provisions on end-user rights are mostly still fit for purpose but in some respects could be 
simplified and have scope for further harmonisation. 

9