COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Review of the Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/654 setting EU-wide maximum termination rates (Eurorates) for voice calls
Date: 2026-01-19
Institutions: Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, European Commission
Subjects: consumer protection, fraud, price regulations, provision of services, regulation of telecommunications, single market, telephone charges, trade relations, transmission network, wholesale trade

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 19.1.2026  SWD(2026) 18 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Review of the Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/654 setting EU-wide maximum termination rates (Eurorates) for voice calls  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 2 

1.1.  Procedure for the preparation of the Review ......................................... 2 

1.2.  Termination services ............................................................................. 4 

2.  Consultation ..................................................................................................... 6 

2.1.  Targeted public consultation ................................................................. 6 

2.2.  BEREC Opinion () ................................................................................ 9 

2.2.1.  General assessment .................................................................. 9 

2.2.2.  Market functioning .................................................................. 9 

2.2.3.  Transparency, reciprocity and fraud ...................................... 10 

2.2.4.  Regulatory consideration ....................................................... 10 

2.3.  Conclusion on Consultations ............................................................... 11 

2.4.  Commission’s view ............................................................................. 11 

2.4.1.  Administrative and compliance burdens ............................... 11 

2.4.2.  Downsized revenue streams .................................................. 12 

2.4.3.  Fraudulent practices and CLI spoofing ................................. 12 

2.4.4.  Reciprocity with non-EU operators ....................................... 13 

2.4.5.  Transit market ........................................................................ 13 

2.4.6.  SMS termination .................................................................... 14 

2.4.7.  Technological  neutrality  and  the  definition  of  termination 
services .................................................................................. 14 

3.  Regulation of termination rates (markets) in the union ................................. 16 

3.1.  The removal of the termination markets from the Recommendation on 
Relevant Markets in 2020 .................................................................... 16 

3.2.  The evolution of the regulatory situation in the EU since the adoption 
of the Delegated Regulation and its entry into force on 1 July 2021 .. 16 

4.  Rates Assessment .......................................................................................... 21 

4.1. 

Introduction to cost principle and cost modelling ............................... 21 

4.2.  Mobile Termination Rate (MTR) ........................................................ 23 

4.3.  Assessment of the MTR in relation to estimated costs ........................ 26 

4.4.  Fixed Termination Rate ....................................................................... 27 

4.5.  Conclusion – Rates assessment ........................................................... 31 

5.  Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 32 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION  

(EU)  2021/654 

Pursuant to Article 75(2) of the European Electronic Communications Code (hereinafter 
the  “Code”  or  “EECC”) (1),  the  Commission  is  required  to  review  the  Delegated 
Regulation 
the  “Delegated 
Regulation”)(2),  which  sets  Union-wide  voice  termination  rates  for  fixed  and  mobile 
services (referred together as “Eurorates”), every five years. This review aims to assess 
whether the Regulation remains appropriate, proportionate, and effective in achieving its 
objectives. 

the  “Regulation”  or 

(hereinafter 

The Delegated Regulation established a single maximum Union-wide mobile termination 
rate (MTR) and fixed termination rate (FTR) (3), replacing divergent national rates with a 
harmonised framework. Its main purpose is to ensure cost-oriented and non-discriminatory 
termination services, promote competition and market integration, and provide regulatory 
certainty for operators across the European Union (EU). The Regulation is underpinned by 
a  bottom-up  long-run  incremental  cost  (“BU-LRIC”)  model,  designed  to  reflect  the 
efficient cost of providing wholesale voice termination while ensuring cost recovery. 

The current review focuses on three main aspects: 

• 

• 

• 

the  outcome  of  the  targeted  public  consultation  (4)  and  the  Body  of  European 
Regulators for Electronic Communications (“BEREC”) opinion (5); 

recent market developments, including the evolution of regulation and deregulation 
of wholesale termination markets across Member States; and 

the assessment of the appropriateness of the current Eurorates and the underlying 
cost  model,  including  whether  market  and  cost  developments  justify  any 
adjustment to the existing rates. 

The analysis also considers whether the existing regulatory framework continues to meet 
the  underlying  policy  objectives,  or  whether  adjustments  may  be  justified  considering 
technological, economic, or market changes. 

1.1. 

Procedure for the preparation of the Review  

To prepare the review of the Delegated Regulation, the Commission services have drawn 
upon a wide and comprehensive range of inputs to ensure that the assessment is robust, 

(1)  Directive  (EU)  2018/1972  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  December  2018 
establishing the European Electronic Communications Code, OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, pp. 36–214. 

(2)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/654 of 18 December 2020 supplementing Directive (EU) 
2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council by setting a single maximum Union-wide 
mobile voice termination rate and a single maximum Union-wide fixed voice termination rate, OJ L 137, 
22.4.2021, pp. 1–9. 

(3)  Under  Delegated  Regulation,  the  Eurorates  are  set  at  0.2  EURcent  per  minute  for  mobile  voice 
termination and 0.07 EURcent per minute for fixed voice termination. The mobile Eurorate entered into 
force in stages from 1 January 2022, reaching its final level of 0.2  EURcent per minute on 1 January 
2024, while the fixed Eurorate has applied at a single level since 1 January 2022. 

(4)  Targeted consultation on the review of the Delegated Regulation setting Union-wide termination rates | 

Shaping Europe’s digital future. 

(5)  BEREC’s  opinion  on  the  review  of  the  functioning  of  the  delegated  regulation  setting  union-wide 

termination rates regulated under the regulation (EU) 2021/654, bor (25)138. 

2 

 
 
evidence-based,  and  reflects  the  market  developments  across  the  Union.  The  review 
process was designed to capture the perspectives of key stakeholders and take into account 
the practical experience gained since the adoption of the Delegated Regulation. 

Firstly,  the  Commission  launched  a  targeted  public  consultation  (6)  aimed  at  gathering 
feedback from industry stakeholders and other interested parties on the functioning and 
implementation of the Delegated Regulation. This consultation provided an opportunity 
for operators, telecom associations, consumer groups, and other relevant actors to express 
their views on the effectiveness and proportionality of the regulatory framework. Through 
this exercise, the Commission collected valuable insights on market trends, technological 
developments and regulatory challenges encountered in practice. 

Secondly, in parallel with the targeted consultation, the Commission sought the opinion (7) 
of BEREC. As an independent advisory body composed of national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs),  BEREC  plays  a  key  role  in  ensuring  consistent  application  of  the  regulatory 
framework across the EU. Its input provided an expert assessment of the functioning of the 
Delegated Regulation, drawing upon the collective regulatory experience of the NRAs.  

Thirdly, the Commission services also  took  into account  the draft measures notified by 
NRAs  under  Article  32  of  the  Code.  These  notifications,  submitted  in  the  context  of 
national  market  analyses,  provided  detailed  evidence  on  how  NRAs  have  taken  into 
consideration the entry into force of the Delegated Regulation and its implications for the 
regulation of wholesale termination markets. The introduction of the Eurorates limited the 
risk  of  excessive  termination  rates,  which  was  previously  identified  as  the  main 
competition concern in these markets. In its Explanatory Memorandum (8) accompanying 
the  Commission  Recommendation  (EU)  2020/2245  of  18  December  2020  on  relevant 
product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex 
ante regulation (9) (hereinafter “2020  Recommendation on Relevant  Markets” or “2020 
RRM”), the Commission found that wholesale fixed and mobile voice termination markets 
no  longer  meet  the  three-criteria  test,  in  particular  the  second  criterion,  which  assesses 
whether  a  market  tends  towards  effective  competition.  In  this  context,  the  national 
notifications examined by the Commission have provided valuable insights into how this 
conclusion  has  materialised  in  practice,  enabling  an  assessment  of  the  consistency, 
effectiveness and impact of the Delegated Regulation across Member States. 

Finally, in order to estimate the costs of providing mobile voice call termination services, 
the Commission services considered the results of a cost model (10), developed by Axon 
Partners  Group  (“Axon”).  This  model,  commissioned  specifically  for  the  purpose  of 
supporting the review, provides a detailed bottom-up assessment of the costs incurred by 
efficient  operators  in  delivering  voice  termination  services.  The  model’s  findings  were 
used to validate the current regulatory approach and to assess whether adjustments might 

(6)  Targeted consultation on the review of the Delegated Regulation setting Union-wide termination rates | 

Shaping Europe’s digital future. 

(7)  BoR (25)138. 

(8)  SWD(2020) 337 final 

(9)  OJ L 439, 29.12.2020, pp. 23–31. 

(10)  Finalisation of the mobile cost model for roaming and the delegated act on a single EU-wide mobile 
voice call termination | Shaping Europe’s digital future and 2025 update: 2025 Update of the mobile 
cost model for roaming and voice call termination in the EU | Shaping Europe’s digital future. 

3 

 
 
be  needed  to  maintain  cost-based  and  proportionate  termination  rates  in  the  evolving 
market context. 

Taken  together,  these  inputs  form  a  comprehensive  evidence  base  that  has  guided  the 
Commission services in preparing the review of the Delegated Regulation, ensuring that 
any conclusions or proposed changes are well-informed, transparent, and aligned with the 
objectives of the Code. 

1.2.  Termination services 

Voice termination rates are the wholesale rates that electronic communications operators 
charge each other to terminate calls on their respective networks (“termination rates”) (11). 
The  establishment  of  a  voice  call  between  two  subscribers  who  are  served  by  different 
operators requires the use of both operators’ networks. The operator who serves the calling 
subscriber  is  called  the  ‘originating  operator’  while  the  operator  who  serves  the  called 
subscriber is called the ‘terminating operator’. The terminating operator will connect the 
call from the point of interconnection with the originating operator in its network up to the 
device of the called subscriber. This service is called voice call termination, and it can be 
provided only by the operator serving the called subscriber, i.e. by the terminating operator. 
Each operator has full control over terminating voice calls to its own subscribers. Thus, 
each operator has a monopolistic position on the market for terminating calls on its own 
network and has the ability and incentives to set the wholesale price for terminating calls 
at a level that is significantly above-cost. 

Wholesale voice termination services (“termination services”) represent a non-replicable 
input for the provision of retail voice services, given that voice termination can only  be 
supplied  by  the  network  provider  to  which  the  called  party  is  connected.  There  are  no 
demand or supply substitutes for voice termination on an individual network. Therefore, 
each network represents a separate relevant market in which each operator is a monopolist 
for the calls terminated in its network. In addition, under the calling party pays (“CPP”) 
principle (12),  which  is  the  one  mostly  used  in  the  Union,  the  party  initiating  a  call  is 
charged  but  the  receiving  party  is  not.  The  wholesale  termination  rate  is  paid  by  the 
originating operator to the terminating operator. The originating operator incorporates this 
cost into its retail prices; thus, it is ultimately borne by the caller (i.e. not by the called 
party). 

In the context of interoperable networks, fixed and mobile interconnections follow a ‘two-
way’  model,  whereby  an  interconnection  agreement  needs  to  be  negotiated  by  the 
interconnecting operators A and B, to deliver calls from operator A’s customers to operator 
B’s  customers,  and  vice  versa.  Figure  1  shows  a  typical  calling  party  pays  (CPP) 
termination  arrangement  for 
termination  of  calls  (showing  only  one-way 
interconnection).  

the 

(11)  Fixed and mobile termination rates relate only to voice calls. They do not relate to data services. 

(12)  Or  “calling  party  network  pays”  (CPNP)  at  the  wholesale  level,  according  to  which  the  termination 

charge is set by the called operator and paid entirely by the operator of the calling subscriber. 

4 

 
 
Figure 1: Termination services for certain numbering ranges 

Source: Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH (RTR) (Austrian Regulatory Authority for 
Broadcasting and Telecommunications) 

This system raises two main competition concerns. Firstly, due to their monopoly position 
in terminating calls in their networks, operators, in the absence of regulation, would be 
able  to  extract  excessive  profits  at  the  wholesale  level(13).  Secondly,  operators  have  an 
incentive to charge high rates to increase their rivals’ costs. This is possible because the 
termination rate charged by an operator is a cost to another operator.  

There are also other, less market-specific, competition concerns affecting the wholesale 
termination  markets.  Operators  with  many  customers  may  have  an  incentive  to  refuse 
terminating calls from smaller operators. This would make the smaller operators’ network 
much  less  attractive  to  (potential)  customers.  More  realistically,  operators  may  not 
refuse(14) but may make it more difficult and costly to interconnect to and terminate calls 
in  their  networks.  Such  behaviour  may  qualify  as  constructive  refusal  to  supply  or 
discriminatory behaviour under competition law. 

High  termination  rates,  even  if  traffic  is  symmetrical,  would  lead  to  anti-competitive 
outcomes  at  least  in  two  ways.  First,  high  wholesale  termination  rates  would  prevent 
otherwise possible unilateral decreases in retail prices, leading to high retail prices. This is 
because high termination rates would act as a price floor for operators and reduction in 
retail prices below termination rates would lead to monetary losses at least in the variable 
part of a two-part retail tariffs. Second, high termination rates, in conjunction with lower 
prices for on-net(15) calls would incentivise mobile customers to keep a large proportion 
of their calls on-net, leading to higher barriers to entry and expansion by smaller operators 
which, due to their size, would be unable to match such high on-net share of calls.  

The  application  of  different  termination  rates  across  the  Union  led  to  distortions  in  the 
functioning of the internal market for reasons explained below.  

Differences which are not due to cost differences in termination rates across the Union can 
lead to cross-subsidisation of operators and ultimately consumers in countries with higher 
termination  rates,  to  the  detriment  of  operators  and  end-users  in  countries  with  lower 
termination rates.  

(13)  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  accompanying  the  Commission  Recommendation  on  the 
Regulatory  Treatment  of  Fixed  and  Mobile  Termination  Rates  in  the  EU,  Explanatory  Note, 
C(2009)3359, SEC(2009) 599. 

(14)  The  possibilities  to  refuse  interconnection  is  limited  by  the  fact  that  according  to  the  regulatory 

framework the NRAs have the powers to intervene in order to ensure end-to-end connectivity. 

(15) “On-net” refers to calls terminated on the originating operator’s own network, as opposed to “off-net” 

calls, which are terminated by a different operator than the originating operator. 

5 

 
 
 
In  general,  and  independently  on  whether  rates  are  based  on  efficient  costs,  when  an 
operator from a country with lower termination rates exchanges traffic with an operator 
from a country with higher termination rates, even if the incoming and outgoing traffic is 
equal, operators from high termination rates countries receive higher remuneration for the 
same service.  

Further, different wholesale termination rates may distort consumer behaviour by reducing 
the volume of calls to countries with high rates.  

Moreover,  as  acknowledged  by  BEREC(16),  termination  rates  higher  than  the  efficient 
costs could have a negative effect on the development of pan-European offers, proposing 
uniform pricing schemes for international calls to networks across the Union, regardless 
of the Member State where the end-user is based. The lack of uniform pricing, together 
with the high cost of calls directed outside the border of each Member State – for which 
historically high termination rates are at least partly responsible – constitute an obstacle to 
voice communication within the internal  market. This  represents  a barrier affecting not 
only  the  electronic  communications  sector,  but  all  sectors  that  rely  on  voice 
communications for their commercial activities.  

Further, unjustified differences in the level of rates among Union countries in two-sided 
and  interdependent  markets  such  as  termination  also  distorts  investment  incentives.  It 
creates regulation-induced asymmetrical revenue streams between Member States, which 
distort efficient investment decisions across Member States’ borders.  

The  unequal  regulation  of  termination  rates,  i.e.  based  on  the  different  principles, 
constitutes a barrier to trade in the internal market. Full harmonisation of termination rates 
is intended to foster market integration by limiting net payments (and cross-subsidisation) 
between operators in different Member States, which are due to different levels of national 
termination  rates  rather  than  due  to  different  call  volumes,  thereby  reducing  barriers  to 
intra-Union trade. 

Finally, divergent approaches to termination rates among Member States undermine the 
predictability of regulation and legal certainty within the Union, with operators not being 
able  to  rely  on  consistent  rules  for  voice  traffic  that  cross  Member  State  borders. 
Regulatory  predictability  reduces  uncertainty  for  investors,  which  in  turn  reduces  the 
return required by the investor – leading to a larger willingness to invest. 

2.  CONSULTATION  

2.1.  Targeted public consultation  

The Commission’s consultation on the Delegated Regulation sought to gather evidence on 
the functioning and impact of harmonised fixed and mobile termination rates within the 
EU. The Commission launched the targeted public consultation on 13 June 2025 via EU 
survey and closed it on 16 September 2025 (17). In total, 18 submissions were received, 
including contributions from 13 operators, four industry associations, and one NRA. The 
responses provided a balanced picture: while the majority of stakeholders recognise that 

(16) BEREC response to the European Commission’s public consultation on the evaluation of the Termination 

Rates Recommendation, BoR (16) 100, p. 8-9. 

(17)  Targeted consultation on the review of the Delegated Regulation setting Union-wide termination rates | 

Shaping Europe’s digital future. 

6 

 
 
Eurorates have delivered important benefits in terms of harmonisation, regulatory clarity, 
and  predictability,  operators  and  industry  associations  also  highlight  new  financial, 
administrative, and operational challenges emerging under the current framework. 

Overall,  respondents  agree  that  Eurorates  have  successfully  eliminated  national 
discrepancies  and  simplified  rate-setting  practices,  thereby  achieving  the  Regulation’s 
primary objective of regulatory alignment across the EU. The harmonised rates are widely 
perceived  to  have  improved  legal  certainty,  enabling  operators  to  plan  with  greater 
confidence and reducing the scope for bilateral  disputes. However, almost  all operators 
emphasise that the reduction in termination rates has put pressure on wholesale revenue 
streams, particularly in traditional voice markets. Several note that the decline in revenues 
threatens their ability to recover costs, maintain infrastructure investment, and innovate. 
This concern is especially notable in smaller or higher-cost markets, where margins were 
already  limited  prior  to  harmonisation.  Accordingly,  a  broad  coalition  of  stakeholders 
invites the Commission to freeze the current rates and to refrain from further reductions. 

From a retail perspective, operators and industry associations observe limited or negligible 
benefits  to  consumers.  Retail  prices  for  voice  services  were  already  low  before  the 
introduction  of  Eurorates.  In  parallel,  the  rapid  adoption  of  Over-the-Top  (“OTT”) 
communications  services  such  as  WhatsApp,  Signal,  and  Telegram  has  continued  to 
impact  traditional  voice  revenues.  As  a  result,  operators  contend  that  the  impact  of 
Eurorates  on  consumers  has  been  minimal,  while  the  financial  burden  has  been 
disproportionately felt by service providers. 

Several  contributions  raise  concerns  regarding  the  continued  presence  of  competition 
challenges, particularly  for smaller operators. These include situations where wholesale 
arrangements exceed the regulated caps through additional internal or transit charges, or 
where  access  to  direct  interconnection  remains  limited  or  subject  to  high  fees,  forcing 
reliance on unregulated transit services. Stakeholders argue that such practices may distort 
competition and raise barriers to entry, calling for the continued empowerment of NRAs 
to address discriminatory or non-transparent behaviour. In this context, some recommend 
the inclusion of SMS termination under the Delegated Regulation, given similar market 
characteristics  and  the  persistence  of  inflated  SMS  termination  prices  across  Member 
States. Others support further updates to the cost model to reflect 5G efficiencies and assess 
the long-term feasibility of approaches such as bill-and-keep. 

One  of  the  most  recurrent  themes  in  the  stakeholders’  feedback  concerns  the  rise  of 
fraudulent  activity,  particularly  Calling  Line  Identification  (CLI)  spoofing  and 
manipulation of call origins. Many respondents report a surge in scam traffic originating 
from outside the EU, disguised with European A-numbers to exploit lower regulated rates. 
This practice results in operational inefficiencies, and an increased need for monitoring 
and  dispute  resolution.  Operators  call  for  the  introduction  of  anti-fraud  mechanisms, 
including  mandatory  call-origin  verification,  CLI  authentication,  and  cost  recovery 
provisions to offset the resources required to combat these schemes. 

Closely linked to this issue is the problem of asymmetry and lack of reciprocity with non-
EU  operators.  Several  respondents  point  out  that  while  EU  operators  are  bound  by 
regulated  Eurorates,  their  counterparts  in  third  countries  continue  to  apply  significantly 
higher  termination  rates,  placing  EU-based  carriers  at  a  competitive  disadvantage. 
Stakeholders  therefore  advocate  for  reciprocity  arrangements,  greater  transparency  in 
international interconnection agreements, and, where appropriate, bilateral or multilateral 
frameworks to ensure more balanced commercial relations with non-EU markets. 

7 

 
A further area of concern relates to the transit market. Respondents describe this segment 
as  a  persistent  loophole  within  the  current  regulatory  regime.  In  their  view,  transit 
providers often apply unregulated mark-ups and hide the true termination costs, leading to 
inflated  wholesale  prices.  Several  operators  propose  that  transit  services  should  be 
explicitly included within the scope of Eurorates, and that monitoring mechanisms or caps 
should  be  introduced  to  prevent  abuse  and  enhance  transparency  throughout  the  value 
chain. 

Despite the intention to simplify regulation, operators and industry associations note that 
the  Eurorates  framework  has,  paradoxically,  increased  administrative  complexity.  The 
need to  track  exceptions, verify call origins,  and comply with  reporting obligations has 
placed  a  disproportionate  burden  on  smaller  operators.  Respondents  argue  that 
administrative costs are now out of proportion to the revenues generated by termination 
services,  undermining  business  sustainability.  Accordingly,  there  is  widespread  support 
for simplification measures and clearer guidance. 

Criticism is also directed at the Axon cost model(18), which serves as the methodological 
study for setting Eurorates. Some operators and industry associations expressed concerns 
that the model could be more transparent  and better aligned with  actual cost structures. 
They  suggested  that  certain  assumptions  may  lead  to  rates  that  do  not  fully  reflect 
operational realities. In this context, several respondents recommended that the model be 
reviewed and, where appropriate, refined or complemented by alternative approaches to 
ensure that the resulting rates remain cost-reflective and sustainable across different market 
conditions. 

Divergences  in  perspective are evident across stakeholder groups. Larger  operators  and 
industry associations generally support the objectives of harmonisation but stress the need 
for  regulatory  stability,  rate  freezes,  and  reciprocity  enforcement.  Smaller  operators, 
meanwhile, emphasise simplified compliance processes and cost recovery mechanisms to 
preserve  viability.  National  regulators,  welcome  the  predictability  of  Eurorates  but 
highlight ongoing challenges related to dispute resolution and non-EU traffic management. 

In light of the above, the following findings emerge as a result of the public consultation: 

•  Operators  and  telecom  associations  urge  the  Commission  to  stabilise  current 
Eurorates  and  to  avoid  further  downward  revisions  until  a  comprehensive 
assessment of cost recovery and investment impact is conducted.  

•  They  recommend  introducing  stronger  anti-fraud  measures  and  CLI  verification 
tools, extending the regulatory scope to transit services, and developing reciprocity 
mechanisms with third-country operators.  
In parallel, respondents call for simplified administrative procedures.  

• 
•  Finally,  respondents  call  for  improved  transparency  in  cost  modelling,  and 
futureproofing of the regulatory framework to account for emerging technologies, 
IP-based interconnection, and the continuing shift towards OTT communication. 

(18)  Finalisation of the mobile cost model for roaming and the delegated act on a single EU-wide mobile 

voice call termination | Shaping Europe’s digital future. 

8 

 
 
2.2.  BEREC Opinion (19)  

2.2.1. 

General assessment  

In  its  opinion  issued  on  2  October  2025,  BEREC  notes  that  the  introduction  of  the 
Eurorates has  not  had  a  significant  impact  on market  dynamics,  including  wholesale or 
retail prices. This limited effect is largely attributable to the fact that, prior to the adoption 
of the Delegated Regulation, existing national termination rate regimes, based on the pure 
Long-Run Incremental cost (LRIC) (20) standard had already reduced termination rates to 
efficient cost levels. This assessment is consistent with the findings of the updated mobile 
cost  model  for  roaming  and  voice  call  termination  in  the  EU.  The  inclusion  of  5G 
technology, while significantly lowering network costs overall, has had a less pronounced 
impact  on  voice  termination  costs  compared  to  voice  roaming  services,  reflecting  the 
limited room for further cost reductions in the termination segment. 

Regarding regulatory burden, BEREC’s assessment is clearly positive. The introduction of 
a  single  EU  cost  model,  replacing  individual  national  cost  models,  has  reduced  the 
administrative workload for NRAs and, to some extent, for operators. The Eurorates have 
also simplified and harmonised termination-rate regulation across Member States. 

However, BEREC cautions that the risk of misbehaviour by market participants remains. 
NRAs must therefore retain sufficient powers to intervene, particularly in response to non-
price  issues  that  may  arise.  Some  NRAs  also  raised  concerns  about  cost  recovery, 
especially for operators in smaller markets. Furthermore, BEREC acknowledges persistent 
operational and regulatory challenges linked to spoofing and the absence of reciprocity in 
relations with non-EU/EEA operators. 

2.2.2. 

Market functioning  

While the Eurorates effectively addressed pricing issues in termination services, BEREC 
identified a range of non-price issues, particularly concerning access and transit fees, non-
discrimination,  and  transparency  obligations.  In  some  instances,  these  issues  required 
direct intervention by NRAs. 

BEREC underlines that the Delegated Regulation does not address non-price competition 
problems,  leaving  room  for  isolated  anti-competitive  practices.  Such  issues  must  be 
addressed  through  national-level  regulatory  measures,  for  which  NRAs  should  be 
adequately  equipped  with  the  necessary  tools  and  powers.  Given  these  circumstances, 
BEREC considers it essential that NRAs retain the ability to adopt symmetric decisions to 
regulate termination markets where necessary, and to continue resolving disputes at the 
national level. Moreover, NRAs should remain empowered to set technical and financial 
conditions  governing  interconnection  and  access,  whenever  required  to  ensure  fair  and 
efficient market functioning. 

Finally,  BEREC  emphasises  that  definitions  of  termination  services  in  the  Delegated 
Regulation must remain technologically and service neutral. Termination services should 
be deemed covered by the Regulation regardless of the type of interconnection (physical 
or  logical)  or  technology  used.  The  Regulation  should  also  clarify  that  Eurorates  cover 
only the costs of termination, excluding transit costs, and that only interconnection port 

(19)  BoR 25(138). 

(20)  The LRIC cost standard is explained in more detail in the section on the cost model below. 

9 

 
 
costs (including installation and testing) should be included in the termination rates and 
not any ancillary service costs. 

2.2.3. 

Transparency, reciprocity and fraud  

BEREC  highlights  a  persistent  lack  of  transparency  regarding  non-EU  operators.  EU 
operators currently lack clarity as to which non-EU operators apply termination rates equal 
to or lower than the Eurorates. As no information is available in the public Annex on the 
Commission’s  website,  BEREC  concludes  that  no  non-EU  country  currently  applies  a 
regulatory regime aligned with the EU framework (21). 

BEREC therefore recommends that the next review of the Delegated Regulation should 
explicitly indicate the country codes to which Eurorates apply. The Commission should 
also publish a list of non-EU countries with comparable regulation to assist EU operators 
in determining whether Eurorates apply to calls originating outside the EU. In this context, 
BEREC also suggests considering reciprocity mechanisms or control measures with third 
countries  to  prevent  the  erosion  of  Eurorates’  benefits  through  unfavourable  trading 
conditions. 

BEREC further notes that termination rates applied by EU operators to non-EU numbers 
vary significantly, leaving international operators uncertain about the applicable charges. 
To  enhance  transparency,  BEREC  proposes  the  creation  of  a  summary  sheet  hosted  by 
NRAs or by BEREC, where operators can publish their voice-termination rates. 

Finally, the issue of fraudulent practices, particularly caller-ID spoofing, was frequently 
mentioned.  Operators  and  transit  providers  from  third  countries  may  manipulate  CLI 
information  to  benefit  from  lower  Eurorates.  BEREC  suggests  exploring  specific 
regulatory and operational measures to mitigate such fraud, especially in cases of systemic 
or bulk fraudulent traffic. In severe cases, operators could be empowered to exclude such 
traffic from being charged under the Eurorates. 

2.2.4. 

Regulatory consideration  

BEREC observes that Article 5a of the amended Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 (22), which 
requires  operators  to  not  apply  different  retail  prices  for  domestic  and  intra-EU 
communications  as of 1 January 2029, may lead to  unfair competition  at the wholesale 
level,  given  the  existing  variation  in  SMS  termination  rates  across  the  EU.  BEREC 
therefore invites the Commission to clarify this issue and to consider either including SMS 
termination within the scope of the Delegated Regulation or conducting a comprehensive 
evaluation of the matter. 

On  the  reporting  obligation  under  Article  75(3)  of  the  Code,  BEREC  considers  it 
reasonable  to  remove  or  reduce  the  frequency  of  reporting.  Replacing  individual  NRA 

(21)  BEREC  here  refers  to  the  regulatory  regime  envisaged  under  Article  1(4)(b)  of  the  Delegated 
Regulation, according to which a third country must fulfil the regulatory regime criteria set out in Annex 
III of the Code. 

(22)  Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 laying 
down  measures  concerning  open  internet  access  and  amending  Directive  2002/22/EC  on  universal 
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation 
(EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union, OJ L 310, 
26.11.2015, pp. 1–18. 

10 

 
 
reports  with  a  single  periodic  BEREC  report  would  streamline  the  process  and  reduce 
resource requirements. 

With regard to the level of the Eurorates, BEREC emphasises the importance of realistic 
cost-modelling assumptions for all operators, including those in smaller markets. Based on 
the updated cost model and the absence of evidence of operator hardship or excessive end-
user  prices,  BEREC  supports  maintaining  the  current  Eurorates’  levels.  To  support 
continuous  evaluation  of  cost  modelling  and  price  calibration,  BEREC  proposes  the 
establishment of an expert group dedicated to  discussing costing and pricing  aspects  in 
greater detail. 

2.3.  Conclusion on Consultations 

The  evidence  gathered  through  the  targeted  public  consultation  and  BEREC’s  Opinion 
indicates  a  broad  consensus  that  the  Delegated  Regulation  has  achieved  its  principal 
objectives of harmonisation, regulatory simplification and predictability across the Union. 
However,  both  processes  confirm  that  the  introduction  of  Eurorates  has  had  a  limited 
impact  on  market  dynamics,  competition  and  consumer  prices,  as  national  termination 
rates had already converged towards efficient cost levels prior to the Regulation’s entry 
into force.  

Stakeholders and BEREC nevertheless acknowledge that the lower regulated rates have 
resulted in reduced revenues for operators and therefore call for the current rate levels to 
be maintained. At the same time, both sources identify a number of continuing challenges, 
notably  concerning  access  and  transit  conditions,  transparency,  and  ancillary  service 
charges, as well as fraudulent practices such as caller-ID spoofing and manipulation of call 
origins.  

The absence of reciprocity and transparency in relations with non-EU operators, and the 
lack of clarity regarding the application of Eurorates to specific country codes, also remain 
points of concern. Furthermore, respondents draw the attention of the Commission to the 
administrative burdens associated with compliance and unregulated segments of the transit 
market that may create distortions.  

Overall,  there  is  wide  support  for  maintaining  the  existing  Eurorate  levels,  enhancing 
transparency  through  clearer  country  listings  and  publication  of  termination-rate 
information, strengthening anti-fraud and reciprocity mechanisms, simplifying reporting 
obligations, and considering the future inclusion of SMS termination within the regulatory 
framework in order to ensure coherence, effectiveness and sustainability in the evolving 
communications environment. 

2.4.  Commission’s view 

2.4.1. 

Administrative and compliance burdens 

The Commission notes that several respondents consider the administrative and reporting 
obligations under the current framework to be disproportionately burdensome, particularly 
for  smaller  operators.  It  recalls,  however,  that  the  harmonisation  of  termination  rates 
through a single Union-wide cost model has considerably simplified regulatory processes 
by replacing multiple national models and rate-setting procedures with one consistent and 
transparent methodology. Periodic updates of this single model are necessary to preserve 
the  accuracy,  consistency  and  effectiveness  of  the  framework.  In  practice,  the 
administrative  effort  has  been  relatively  limited:  over  the  past  six  to  seven  years,  the 

11 

 
Commission has carried out only limited number of exercises involving stakeholder input, 
primarily to support model updates and reviews. 

BEREC,  in  its  Opinion,  also  considered  the  overall  regulatory  burden  to  be  low  and 
proposed  certain  adjustments  aimed  at  further  simplification.  In  particular,  BEREC 
suggested replacing the current annual reporting by NRAs under Article 75(3) of the Code 
with a single consolidated BEREC report covering all Member States. The Commission 
takes  note  of  this  proposal  and  may,  in  cooperation  with  BEREC  and  NRAs,  consider 
whether  such  a  consolidated  reporting  approach  could  enhance  efficiency  without 
undermining transparency or effective oversight. Possible avenues could include increased 
use  of  simplified  templates  or  extended  reporting  intervals,  while  ensuring  that  the 
necessary data remain available to assess the continued proportionality and effectiveness 
of the regulatory framework. 

2.4.2. 

Downsized revenue streams 

The Commission takes note of stakeholders’ concerns regarding the reduction in wholesale 
revenues  following  the  introduction  of  Union-wide  termination  rates.  It  recalls  that  the 
purpose  of  the  Delegated  Regulation  was  to  ensure  that  termination  rates  reflect  the 
efficient  costs of providing  the service and to  remove long-standing divergences across 
Member States that had led to competitive distortions within the internal market. Before 
harmonisation,  several  national  regimes  applied  termination  rates  above  cost-oriented 
levels,  which  effectively  allowed  operators  to  recover  more  than  the  efficient  cost  of 
termination. The introduction of the Eurorates has therefore aligned pricing with the cost 
standard defined in Article 75 of the Code and ensured competitive neutrality across the 
Union. 

The Commission notes that there is no evidence indicating that the application of Eurorates 
has impaired operators’ ability to invest, compete or innovate. Retail prices for consumers 
have remained stable, while the harmonised framework has improved legal certainty and 
predictability. Although the move to cost-reflective rates has inevitably reduced wholesale 
revenues, this outcome is consistent with the Regulation’s objective of fostering efficiency 
and  promoting  a  level  playing  field  in  electronic  communications  markets.  The 
Commission intends to continue monitoring the situation, including in smaller or higher-
cost markets, to ensure that the framework remains proportionate and sustainable. 

2.4.3. 

Fraudulent practices and CLI spoofing 

The Commission acknowledges the concerns raised by stakeholders regarding the increase 
in fraudulent activities, including caller-ID spoofing and manipulation of call origins, often 
originating  from  outside  the  Union.  Such  practices  undermine  market  integrity,  lead  to 
financial losses and harm consumer trust. The Commission underlines that the Delegated 
Regulation  does  not  alter  operators’  obligations  to  comply  with  applicable  Union  and 
national  rules  on  security  and  fraud  prevention.  Member  States  and  NRAs  retain  the 
authority to impose appropriate technical and operational safeguards, including call-origin 
verification and CLI authentication mechanisms. 

In line with Recital 15 of the Delegated Regulation, the accurate identification of the call 
origin is essential to ensure the correct application of Union-wide termination rates and to 
prevent misuse of the regulatory framework. As the origin of a call determines whether the 
Eurorates apply, Union operators must be able to identify the country of origin of the caller. 
For this purpose, operators may rely on the country code contained in the CLI. To ensure 
proper  implementation,  Union  operators  should  receive  a  valid  CLI  assigned  to  every 

12 

 
incoming  call.  Consequently,  Union  operators  are  not  bound  to  apply  Union-wide 
termination  rates  to  the  termination  of  calls  where  the  CLI  is  missing,  invalid,  or 
fraudulent. 

The Commission may, in cooperation with BEREC and NRAs, consider whether further 
guidance or coordinated measures could help to strengthen fraud prevention and detection, 
particularly in cross-border contexts. It could also explore whether additional clarifications 
to the regulatory framework would be appropriate to provide operators with greater legal 
certainty in addressing systematic or large-scale fraudulent activity. 

2.4.4. 

Reciprocity with non-EU operators 

The  Commission  notes  stakeholders’  concerns  regarding  the  absence  of  reciprocity  in 
relations with non-EU operators, whereby Union operators are required to apply regulated 
Eurorates while operators from third countries may continue to impose higher termination 
charges.  The  Commission  recalls  that  the  Delegated  Regulation  already  provides  for 
reciprocity mechanisms under Article 1(4). In particular, Article 1(4)(a) establishes that 
Union operators shall apply the Eurorates when calls originate from a third country where 
the corresponding operator applies a termination rate at or below the Union-wide level, 
while  Article  1(4)(b)  extends  this  rule  to  third  countries  listed  in  the  Annex  to  the 
Regulation  as  having  a  regulatory  framework  aligned  with  that  of  the  Union.  The 
Commission notes that the Annex is currently empty, as no third countries have yet been 
identified as fulfilling the criteria set out in Annex III of the Code. 

In line with Recital 13 of the Delegated Regulation, it is the responsibility of the third-
country operator to provide verifiable information demonstrating that the termination rate 
it applies is equal to or lower than the Eurorates in order to benefit from the mechanism 
established in Article 1(4)(a). The Delegated Regulation does not impose any obligation 
on Union operators to actively verify or monitor the regulatory alignment of third-country 
operators. Where such verifiable information is not provided, or where termination rates 
applied by non-EU operators exceed the Union-wide level, Union operators remain entitled 
to  apply  any  termination  rate  they  consider  appropriate  towards  those  third-country 
operators. 

In its Opinion, BEREC acknowledged the continuing lack of transparency and reciprocity 
with  non-EU  operators  and  recommended  improving  visibility  of  applicable  rates  and 
country  coverage.  The  Commission  takes  note  of  these  recommendations  and  may,  in 
cooperation with BEREC and national authorities, explore whether enhanced transparency 
measures such as the publication of a list of third countries meeting the reciprocity criteria 
or  improved  information-exchange  mechanisms  could  further  support  consistent 
application of the Regulation and promote balanced commercial relations between Union 
and non-Union operators. 

2.4.5. 

Transit market 

The Commission takes note of stakeholders’ observations concerning unregulated transit 
services and potential mark-ups that may obscure the true cost of termination. It recalls 
that the Delegated Regulation applies exclusively to wholesale call termination and does 
not extend to transit or related ancillary services. This delineation ensures that the cost-
based  regime  remains  focused  on  the  termination  segment  while  allowing  commercial 
flexibility in intermediate routing arrangements. 

13 

 
BEREC,  in  its  Opinion,  recognised  that  transit  services  are  outside  the  scope  of  the 
to  avoid 
recommended  clarifying 
Delegated  Regulation  and 
misinterpretation. It also noted that, while certain operators reported limited transparency 
and varying access to direct interconnection, NRAs should retain powers under national 
frameworks to address potential anti-competitive behaviour where it arises. BEREC did 
not  propose  extending  the  Regulation  to  transit  services  but  advised  maintaining 
transparency and monitoring market developments. 

this  distinction 

Based on the information available to the Commission, the transit market appears to be 
highly competitive, with observed prices declining over recent years. These developments 
suggest  that competitive market  forces continue  to  function effectively  in  this segment. 
The Commission therefore does not intend to pursue further regulatory action in relation 
to transit services. It remains clear that the Delegated Regulation does not cover transit 
prices, and any future consideration of this issue would need to be justified by concrete 
evidence of market failure or systemic distortion 

2.4.6. 

SMS termination 

The  Commission  takes  note  of  BEREC’s  observation  that  the  implementation  of  the 
amended Article 5a of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 requiring that, as of 1 January 2029, 
operators shall not apply different retail prices for domestic and intra-EU communications 
may give rise to inconsistencies between retail and wholesale pricing for intra-EU SMS 
services. BEREC highlighted that, in contrast to voice termination, SMS termination rates 
remain  subject  to  significant  variation  across  Member  States,  which  could  result  in 
competitive imbalances once uniform retail pricing is in place. 

The Commission acknowledges these considerations and notes that several stakeholders 
also expressed support for examining whether SMS termination could, in the future, be 
brought within the scope of a harmonised regulatory framework. At the same time, it is 
observed that SMS traffic volumes across the Union have declined substantially in recent 
years and now represent a negligible share of overall communications activity. Moreover, 
the Commission notes that, at the retail level, SMS has different characteristics from voice 
calls  and  it  is  to  a  much  greater  extent  exposed  to  substitution  from  OTT  messaging 
services  and  is  typically  provided  in  unlimited  volumes  within  bundled  offers. 
Consequently, any potential asymmetries in SMS termination rates are unlikely to have a 
material impact on competition or consumer outcomes at present. 

At this stage, the Delegated Regulation applies exclusively to voice termination services, 
and the Commission does not intend to extend its scope. However, the Commission may, 
in the context of future reviews, assess whether the inclusion of SMS termination or the 
establishment of a distinct harmonised mechanism could be justified based on evidence of 
persistent market distortion or regulatory fragmentation across the Union. In addition, the 
Commission may, in the framework of other legislative instruments governing electronic 
communications, assess the need for regulatory intervention concerning SMS termination, 
should market developments warrant such consideration. 

2.4.7. 

Technological neutrality and the definition of termination services 

The Commission agrees  with  BEREC’s view that the definition of termination services 
should  remain  broad  and  technologically  neutral,  applying  equally  to  all  forms  of 
interconnection,  including  2G,  3G,  4G,  5G,  Wi-Fi,  or  IP-based  fixed  networks.  This 
approach reflects Recitals (4) and (5) of the Delegated Regulation, which clarify that voice 
termination encompasses any service used to terminate voice calls by the operator having 

14 

 
both the technical control and legal right to use the called number and to route the call to 
the recipient. 

In  line  with  Recital  (6),  the  cost  elements  included  in  the  Eurorates  should  be  strictly 
limited  to  those  directly  related  to  the  provision  of  termination.  In  particular, 
interconnection port costs including installation and testing form an essential component 
of termination and are therefore covered. Conversely, the costs of associated facilities or 
ancillary services, as well as transit services, fall outside the scope of the Regulation and 
should not be recovered through termination charges. 

Recitals (7) to (9) further clarify the boundaries of the scope by excluding termination of 
calls to certain non-geographic numbers, such as those used for premium-rate, toll-free or 
shared-cost  services,  and  numbering 
(M2M) 
communications, as these do not exhibit the characteristics of a termination monopoly. At 
the  same  time,  calls  to  other  non-geographic  numbers  (e.g.  fixed  nomadic  services  and 
access to emergency services) and hybrid services such as “home zone” offerings remain 
within the scope of the Regulation and should be treated as fixed or mobile termination 
services depending on the number called. 

for  machine-to-machine 

ranges 

15 

 
3.  REGULATION OF TERMINATION RATES (MARKETS) IN THE UNION  

3.1.  The removal of the termination markets from the Recommendation on 

Relevant Markets in 2020 

In the 2020 Recommendation on Relevant Markets, the Commission assessed the need to 
maintain the market for wholesale call termination on individual public telephone networks 
provided  at  a  fixed  location  (market  1/2014)  and  the  market  for  wholesale  voice  call 
termination  on  individual  mobile  networks  (market  2/2014)  in  the  list  of  markets 
susceptible  to  ex  ante  regulation.  These  two  markets  were  listed  in  the  2014 
Recommendation (23). 

After recalling that Article 75 of the Code empowered the Commission to adopt a delegated 
act setting the maximum Union-wide voice termination rates, the recitals of the 2020 RRM 
clarify that that the application of the Union-wide voice termination rates will “limit the 
ability of mobile and fixed operators to set excessive termination rates”. Hence, “the risk 
of excessive termination rates, which has been the most serious threat to competition on 
the termination markets, would disappear” (24). Overall, the Commission concluded that 
the termination markets no longer meets the three-criteria test at Union level. Therefore, 
these markets were not listed in the annex of the 2020 RRM. 

However,  specific  national  circumstances  may  justify  regulation  of  the  termination 
markets in some Member States, if the three-criteria test is fulfilled at the national level. 
Indeed, the introduction of Union-wide voice termination rates might not eliminate all risks 
to effective competition. This could be the case where NRAs have received complaints 
from  operators  that  were  denied  interconnection.  This  is  one  scenario  where  the 
termination markets might remain regulated with the imposition of remedies, apart from 
price control obligations (25).  

3.2.  The evolution of the regulatory situation in the EU since the adoption of 
the Delegated Regulation and its entry into force on 1 July 2021 

Since the publication of the 2020 RRM in the Official Journal on 29 December 2020 (26) 
and the entry into force of the Delegated Regulation on 1 July 2021, the regulatory situation 
in the Member States has evolved considerably.  

Already prior to the entry into force of the Delegated Regulation, several NRAs had begun 
to adapt their national frameworks. Germany (BNetzA) (27) and Hungary (NMHH) (28), in 

(23)  Commission Recommendation 2014/710/EU of 9 October 2014 on relevant product and service markets 
within  the  electronic  communications  sector  susceptible  to  ex  ante  regulation  in  accordance  with 
Directive  2002/21/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  a  common  regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (OJ L 295, 11.10.2014, p. 79). 

(24)  Recital (40) of the 2020 RRM. 

(25)  See  Commission  Explanatory  Note  Accompanying  the  Commission  Recommendation  on  relevant 
product  and  service  markets  within  the  electronic  communications  sector  susceptible  to  ex  ante 
regulation (SWD(2020) 337 final).  

(26)  OJ L 439, 29.12.2020, pp. 23–31. 

(27)  DE/2021/2299. 

(28)  HU/2021/2321. 

16 

 
 
 
relation  to  the  mobile  termination  market,  and  Lithuania  (RRT) (29),  for  both  fixed  and 
mobile termination markets, removed price control obligations from the remedies imposed 
on SMP operators. 

Following the entry into force of the Delegated Regulation, Slovakia (RU) (30) was the first 
Member State to fully deregulate its termination markets in 2021. In its market analysis, 
RU conducted the three-criteria test and concluded that the second criterion was not met. 
RU  considered  that  “the  implementation  of  a  single  maximum  call  termination  rate 
throughout 
the  applicable  Slovak  Law  on  Electronic 
Communications, is sufficiently effective to reduce the incentive and ability of operators 
to  act  independently”.  This  reasoning  aligned  with  the  Commission’s  analysis  in  the 
Explanatory Note accompanying the 2020 RRM. 

together  with 

the  EU, 

In  2021,  no  other  Member  States  fully  deregulated  its  termination  markets.  Poland 
(UKE) (31)  reviewed  the  mobile  termination  market  and  concluded  that  regulation 
remained  necessary  due  to  continuing  non-price  barriers,  despite  the  application  of  the 
Eurorates. UKE argued that despite the price regulation, numerous small operators remain 
dependent and may face other, non-pricing related obstacles (32). Yet, regulation imposed 
under  the  updated  market  analysis  only  included  non-pricing  remedies.  The  same  year, 
AGCOM  in  Italy (33)  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  three-criteria  test  was  fulfilled  on 
fixed termination market. AGCOM argued that the specific national circumstances made 
the regulation necessary (i.e. non-inclusion of unmanaged VoIP calls and mobile calls in 
the retail market reducing indirect constraint on the wholesale markets) in addition to the 
presence of a dominant operator, TIM, with a market share of around 45%.  

In  2022,  Austria  (TKK) (34),  Denmark  (DBA) (35)  and  Bulgaria (CRC)  (36)  fully 
deregulated their termination markets. In Austria, TKK found that the third criterion was 
not met, while DBA and CRC concluded that the second criterion was not met. In all three 
cases,  NRAs  argued  that  the  Delegated  Regulation  had  eliminated  the  most  serious 
competition problem identified in termination markets, i.e. excessive pricing. The same 
year,  Latvia  (SPRK) (37)  maintained  non-price  regulation  on  both  termination  markets, 
arguing lack of countervailing  buying  power and the  dominance of one operator.  In its 
comments, the Commission’s underlined that the Delegated Regulation had addressed the 
risk of excessive pricing and that non-price related issues were less likely to occurs. In that 
context,  the  Commission  urged  SPRK  to  closely  monitor  the  termination  markets  and 
reassess its findings prior to the end of the current review cycle.  

(29)  LT/2021/2322 and LT/2021/2323. 

(30)  SK/2021/2328 and SK/2021/2329. 

(31)  PL/2021/2342. 

(32)  Specifically, UKE mentioned complaints (one in 2019 and two in 2021) it received from fixed operators 

regarding the conclusion of access agreements between fixed and mobile operators.  

(33)  IT/2021/2352. 

(34)  AT/2022/2366 and AT/2022/2367. 

(35)  DK/2022/2387 and DK/2022/2417. 

(36)  BG/2022/2402 and BG/2022/2403. 

(37)  LV/2022/2379 and LV/2022/2410. 

17 

 
 
In  2023,  Ireland  (ComReg) (38)  and  Croatia  (HAKOM) (39)  fully  deregulated  their 
termination markets, while Greece (EETT) (40) and Spain (CNMC) (41) deregulated their 
mobile  termination  markets.  Finally,  Germany  (BNetzA) (42)  concluded  that  regulation 
was  not  deemed  necessary  for  fixed  termination.  In  these  cases,  NRAs  found  that  the 
second  and,  in  some  cases (43),  the  third  criteria  were  not  met.  Similarly  to  the  case 
mentioned  above,  they  concluded  that  the  Eurorates  removed  the  principal  competition 
concern (i.e. excessive pricing).  

BNetzA  in  Germany (44)  maintained  regulation  on  mobile  termination  market.  The 
German  notification  regarded  the  identification  of  a  new  SMP  operator  in  the  mobile 
termination market. To proceed with the SMP designation, BNetzA first conducted a full 
three-criteria test and found it to be met. BNetzA considered that “despite the adoption of 
the  Delegated  Regulation,  [it]  identifies  a  risk  of  potential  indirect  refusal  of 
interconnection  based  on  price  discrimination (45)”.  The  full  set  of  remedies  but  price 
control  obligation  was  therefore  imposed  on  the  newly  identified  SMP  operator.  The 
Commission services issued a comments’ letter inviting “BNetzA to monitor the mobile 
termination market closely and when the conditions are met, proceed without delay to its 
complete deregulation, at the latest by the next market review cycle, expected in 2025”. 

NMHH in Hungary (46) also maintained regulation, but on the fixed termination market. 
NMHH  considered  that  the  Delegated  Regulation  does  not  prevent  non-price  related 
distortive  practices.  NMHH  considered  that  the  specific  characteristics (47)  of  the 
Hungarian market increase the likelihood of these practices to occur. As under the German 
case mentioned above, the Commission services issued a comments’ letter urging “NMHH 
to  closely monitor the fixed termination markets and  reconsider the need for  continued 
regulation, prior to the end of the current market review period”. 

In 2024, Romania (ANCOM) (48), Belgium (IBPT) (49) and Cyprus (OCECPR) (50) fully 
deregulated their termination markets. ANCOM and IBPT found that the second criterion 
was not met, while OCECPR found that both the second and third criteria failed: (i) the 

(38)  IE/2023/2432 and IE/2023/2433.  

(39)  HR/2023/2439 and HR/2023/2440. 

(40)  EL/2023/2426. 

(41)  ES/2023/2429. 

(42)  DE/2023/2470 and DE/2023/2471. 

(43)  BNetzA and HAKOM found that both, the second and the third criteria were not met. Consequently, 

they highlighted the competition authority’s ability to intervene in a timely manner with ex post tools. 

(44)  DE/2023/2425. 

(45)  “By only setting up maximum charges for termination prices, the Delegated Regulation leaves space for 
major operators to negotiate lower prices with smaller operators while charging the maximum prices to 
terminate calls on their own networks. Therefore, interconnection tenders may be designed in such a 
way that it is, in fact, equivalent to a refusal of access”. 

(46)  HU/2023/2445. 

(47)  NMHH  pointed  out  to  the  large  number  of  fixed  telephony  operators  and  the  size  difference  among 

them, resulting in diverse set of relations between the parties.  

(48)  RO/2024/2490 and RO/2024/2491. 

(49)  BE/2024/2513 and BE/2024/2514. 

(50)  CY/2024/2532 and CY/2024/2533. 

18 

 
 
Delegated Regulation solved the main problem of excessive prices and (ii) NRAs have the 
relevant tools to address non-price related issues, if they were to occur. In Cyprus, both the 
second and third criteria were not met.  

The same year, the Dutch regulatory authority (ACM) (51) conducted a market analysis on 
the  two  termination  markets  in  the  Netherlands  and  concluded  that  regulation  is  still 
deemed required. ACM demonstrated that the Delegated Regulation did not fully address 
non-price  related  issues  experienced  in  the  Dutch  market  including  (i)  refusal  of  direct 
access, (ii) non-price tactics such as withholding information, delaying access, imposing 
unfair conditions, quality discrimination, etc. and (iii) price-related issues where providers 
like KPN, with exclusive facilities, can charge above-cost fees for necessary services. To 
support its findings with strong evidence, ACM referred to the complaints it received (52). 
These  situations  could  only  be  solved  via  ex  ante  intervention,  ACM  argued.  ACM 
concluded that both the second and third criteria were met. ACM imposed (i) access and 
(ii)  transparency  obligations  on  all  the  SMP  operators.  Additionally,  price  control 
obligation (i.e. monthly tariffs) was also imposed on KPN for the provision of associated 
facility colocation, one service falling outside of the scope of the Delegated Regulation. In 
its  comments  letter,  the  Commission  acknowledged  ACM’s  decision  to  maintain 
regulation while inviting the Dutch NRA to closely monitor the markets.  

In 2024, Sweden (PTS) (53) notified its draft market analysis of the termination markets. 
PTS’s analysis reached the preliminary conclusion that the three-criteria test was passed 
on both markets in Sweden. Regarding the second criterion, PTS argued that the Delegated 
Regulation did not address other significant price and non-price distortive practices (e.g. 
offering  different  conditions  to  different  originating  operators,  refusal  of  indirect 
interconnection if there is no profitable business interest or if the access seeker’s business 
does  not  directly  compete  with  the  access  provider’s  offering).  Additionally,  PTS 
highlighted the possibility for operators to circumvent direct interconnection by enabling 
higher tariffs not capped by the Delegated Regulation (i.e. traffic would be routed through 
an unregulated transit market). PTS conducted a so-called “proportionality analysis”. PTS 
determined that regulating small markets with limited subscriptions offers leads to reduced 
benefit  for  competition  in  the  retail  fixed  telephony  market  while  imposing  significant 
administrative burden on small operators. To address this concern, PTS set a threshold of 
40 000 subscription  as the minimum  market  size for justified  ex ante  regulation  on the 
fixed  termination  market  and  of  one  million  subscriptions  for  the  mobile  termination 
market.  After  identifying  the  SMP  operators,  meeting  the  required  thresholds,  PTS 
proposed  to  impose  the  following  remedies:  (i)  non-discrimination  obligations,  (ii) 
obligation of general  conditions  of supply, (iii) obligation to  publish  information on all 
fixed  and  mobile  SMP  operators.  The  Commission  raised  serious  doubts (54)  about  the 
three-criteria test justifying ex ante regulation. While acknowledging that the termination 
markets can still be regulated, if justified, NRAs must provide evidence (e.g. complaints, 
dispute resolutions or other enforcement actions) of threat to competition in the absence of 
regulation.  The  Commission  concluded  that  PTS  had  not  presented  compelling 

(51)  NL/2024/2546 and NL/2024/2547. 

(52) ACM provided evidence that providers have circumvented termination rates by denying direct access to 
interconnection,  enabling  them  to  charge  excessive  transit  fees  on  top  of  the  termination  rates. 
Additionally, in the 2022-2023 period, ACM had 17 enforcement procedures ongoing and 4 complaints 
concerning  the  different  access  issues  (i.e.  regarding  access  obligation)  in  the  termination  markets 
between different stakeholders.  

(53) SE/2024/2555 & SE/2024/2556. 

(54) C(2024)9206. 

19 

 
 
evidence (55)  of  potential  non-competitive  behaviour  in  wholesale  call  termination 
markets, also from the forward-looking perspective. PTS withdrew its notifications during 
the Phase II investigation.  

In  2025,  Czechia (56),  Slovenia (57),  Estonia (58)  and  Finland (59)  proposed  to  fully 
deregulate  both  termination  markets,  while  Italy (60)  and  Germany (61)  deregulated  the 
mobile termination markets in their respective country. Finally, Spain (62) deregulated its 
fixed termination market.  

Table  1:  State  of  Play  on  regulation  of  the  termination  markets  since  the  introduction  of  the 
Delegated Regulation on 1 of July 2021 

Full deregulation 
(M1 and M2) 

Only M1 
deregulation 

Only M2 
deregulation 

SK, AT, DK, BG, 
IE, HR, RO, BE, 
CY, DE, CZ, SI, EE, 
FI, ES. 

None 

EL, IT. 

Regulation on 
the basis of a 
market analysis 
conducted after 
1/07/2021 

PL (M2/2014), 
IT (M1/2014), 
LV, HU 
(M1/2014), NL. 

Source: European Commission’s Article 32 notifications since 1 July 2021 (as of the end of 2025). 

Overall, since the entry  into force of the Delegated Regulation  15 Member States  have 
fully deregulated their termination markets based on a full market analysis. Two Member 
States deregulated the mobile termination market only, maintaining the regulation on fixed 
termination, while five Member States concluded that regulation should be maintained on 
at least one of the two markets.  

A  specific  case  is  that  of  France,  which  conducted  a  full  market  analysis  of  both 
termination markets in 2017 and concluded that regulation remained necessary (63). Yet, 
the  final  regulatory  decision  was  valid  for  a  period  of  3  years,  until  December  2020. 
Following  the  adoption  of  the  Delegated  Regulation,  ARCEP  decided  not  to  carry  out 
another market analysis, leading to the automatic deregulation of both termination markets.  

(55)  Specifically, in its response to the request for information, PTS acknowledged the complete absence of 

complaints or enforcement procedures concerning termination markets. 

(56)  CZ/2025/2557 and CZ/2025/2558. 

(57)  SI/2025/2565 and SI/2025/2580. 

(58)  EE/2025/2597 and EE/2025/2598. 

(59)  FI/2025/2601-2602. 

(60)  IT/2025/2561. 

(61)  DE/2025/2567. 

(62)  ES/2025/2604. 

(63)  Notified under cases FR/2017/2028-2029. 

20 

 
 
Among the notified market analyses carried out since the entry into force of the Delegated 
Regulation, at least three Member States imposed price control obligations on ancillary 
services (64). This includes Italy (65), Latvia (66) and the Netherlands (67). 

In addition, among the market analyses notified to the Commission since 1 July 2021, at 
least six Member States deregulating the termination markets introduced a sunset period. 
Ireland (68) provided a six-month period for the SMP operator Eir to lift interconnection 
obligation.  Romania (69)  set  a  12-month  period,  Italy (70)  in  M2/2014  and  Spain  (71)  in 
market  1/2014  both  provided  6  months,  and  Slovenia (72)  30  days  for  the  two  markets. 
Lastly, Finland (73) set a transitory period until the 1 January 2026. Regulatory practices 
across the European Union show varying approaches regarding the necessity and duration 
of sunset periods. 

Finally, the modernization of networks and the transition towards IP-based communication 
were  frequently  used  as  an  argument  to  support deregulation.  Several  NRAs,  including 
those  in  Austria (74),  Romania (75),  Belgium (76)  and  Estonia (77),  argued  that  these 
developments have further reduced the likelihood of market failures and contributed to the 
conclusion that the second criterion of the three-criteria test is no longer met. 

4.  RATES ASSESSMENT 

4.1. 

Introduction to cost principle and cost modelling  

Taking account of the characteristics of voice termination markets, the Code requires that 
the costs of termination services are calculated on the basis of forward-looking long-run 
incremental costs (LRIC). LRIC models include only those costs that are directly caused 
by  the  provision  of  a  defined  increment.  This  incremental  cost  approach  allocates  only 
efficiently  incurred  costs  that  would  not  be  sustained  if  the  service  included  in  the 
increment was no longer produced (i.e. avoidable costs). Such a methodology promotes 

(64)  Falling outside of the scope of the Delegated Regulation. 

(65)  IT/2021/2352. 

(66)  SPRK maintained price control and cost accounting separation for the ancillary service of installation, 
connection and subscription of an interconnection line. Notified under case LV/2022/2379 for market 
2/2014.  Similar  case  notified  under  LV/2022/2410  imposing  price  control  on  ancillary  services  on 
market 1/2014.  

(67)  Additional monthly tariff on KPN for the provision of the associated facility colocation. Notified under 

case NL/2024/2547. 

(68)  IE/2023/2432-2433. 

(69)  RO/2024/2513-2514. 

(70)  IT/2025/2561. 

(71)  ES/2025/2604. 

(72)  SI/2025/2565 and SI/2025/2580. 

(73)  FI/2025/2601-2602. 

(74)  AT/2022/2366-2367. 

(75)  RO/2024/2490-2491. 

(76)  BE/2024/2513-2514. 

(77)  EE/2025/2597-2598.  

21 

 
 
efficient production and consumption and minimises potential competitive distortions on 
the termination markets. 

Avoidable costs are the difference between the identified total long-run costs of an operator 
providing its full range of services and the identified total long-run costs of that operator 
providing  its  full  range  of  services  except  for  the  wholesale  voice  termination  service 
supplied to third parties (i.e. stand-alone cost of an operator not offering termination to 
third parties). To ensure an appropriate attribution of the costs, a distinction needs to be 
made  between  those  costs  that  are  traffic-related,  i.e.  all  those  fixed  and  variable  costs 
which rise with increased levels of traffic, and those costs that are non- traffic-related, i.e. 
all those costs which do not rise with increased levels of traffic. To identify the avoidable 
costs  relevant  for  wholesale  voice  termination,  non-traffic-related  costs  should  be 
disregarded.  Moreover,  it  is  appropriate  to  attribute  traffic-related  costs  firstly  to  other 
services (e.g. call origination, SMS, MMS, broadband, leased lines) with wholesale voice 
termination  being  the  final  service  to  be  taken  into  account.  The  cost  allocated  to  the 
wholesale voice termination service should thus be equal to the additional cost incurred to 
provide  the  service.  Consequently,  cost  accounting  based  on  a  BU-LRIC  approach  for 
wholesale voice termination services in fixed and mobile markets should allow only the 
recovery of costs which would be avoided if a wholesale voice termination service was no 
longer provided to third parties. 

The  further  termination  rates  move  away  from  incremental  costs,  the  greater  the 
competitive distortions between fixed and mobile markets and/or between operators with 
asymmetric market shares and traffic flows. Therefore, and in line with Annex III of The 
Code, it is appropriate to apply a pure LRIC approach, whereby the relevant increment is 
the wholesale voice termination services and includes only avoidable costs. This approach 
also  allows  for  the  recovery  of  all  fixed  and  variable  costs  that  are  incremental  to  the 
provision of the wholesale call termination service over the long run, thereby facilitating 
efficient cost recovery. Annex III of the Code further provides that: 

“the  evaluation  of  efficient  costs  shall  be  based  on  current  cost  values;  the  cost 
methodology to calculate efficient costs shall be based on a bottom-up modelling approach 
using  long-run  incremental  traffic-related  costs  of  providing  the  wholesale  voice 
termination service to third parties” 

Accordingly,  the  cost  model  methodology  for  the  single  maximum  Union-wide  voice 
termination  rate  shall  be  based  on  a  Bottom  Up  Long  Run  Average  Incremental  (BU-
LRIC) approach. The cost model assumes the use of efficient, forward-looking technology 
that hypothetical new entrant would deploy when building a network today. Article 75 of 
the Code and Annex III set out in detail the requirements for such a cost model, drawing 
on the principles established in the 2009 Termination Rates Recommendation (78).  

Annex III requires that costs of wholesale voice termination rates are to be based on the 
principles of recovery of costs incurred by an efficient operator, calculated using the pure 
BU-LRIC  approach.  Only  costs  directly  related  to  traffic  that  would  be  avoided  in  the 
absence of the provision of a wholesale voice termination service shall be allocated to the 
cost of terminating a call. In essence, any cost not directly related to termination (such as 
radio spectrum fees, commercial costs not directly related to the provision of wholesale 
voice termination and capacity-related costs for services other than termination) should be 

(78)  Commission  Recommendation  of  7  May  2009  on  the  Regulatory  Treatment  of  Fixed  and  Mobile 

Termination Rates in the EU, OJ L 124, 20.5.2009, pp. 67–74. 

22 

 
 
excluded  from  the  costs  of  termination  services.  For  the  mobile  network,  the  efficient 
operator modelled should be set to a market share not below 20%. For both the mobile and 
fixed  network,  the  technology  modelled  shall  be  forward  looking,  based  on  an  IP  core 
network. 

4.2.  Mobile Termination Rate (MTR) 

In order to assess the cost of providing wholesale mobile termination rate, the Commission 
commissioned  an  independent  study.  The  objective  of  the  study  was  to  build  on  the 
experience  of  the  previous  cost  model  study  SMART  2017/009 (79)  and  enhance  the 
existing bottom-up cost model to estimate the efficient costs of providing wholesale voice 
call termination services by mobile network operators in the EEA, under the current market 
conditions. The study has been conducted Axon. 

The Axon cost model estimates the costs of providing wholesale mobile roaming services 
as  well  as  voice  termination  in  23  EU/EEA  countries (80).  Each  cost  model  contains  a 
number  of  adaptable  scenarios,  allowing  the  Commission  services  to  evaluate  different 
scenarios  in  each  country.  Although  the  Axon  cost  model  estimates  costs  for  both 
wholesale  roaming  and  termination,  for  the  purpose  of  this  Review  Document  and 
Delegated Regulation, only the parts related to voice termination will be discussed (81).  

In addition, the cost model also covers 5G services that have not been covered by the old 
cost  model.  Additional  information  on  the  methodological  approach  followed  and  the 
results of the cost model are included in the full list of materials published with the Axon’s 
cost model (82). 

The  models  would  rely  on  country-specific  input  where  relevant  and,  where  not,  on 
average/common values across the EU/EEA. On 8 January 2024 the first draft cost model 
was shared with stakeholders for consultation, followed by a second version of the draft 
model shared on 17 April 2024 for a second round of consultation. The relevant comments 
and suggestions  received during both  consultations were implemented in  the draft  final 
model, which was presented to stakeholders at a second workshop on 4 July 2024. The 
cost model was then finalised and published on 18 December 2024 (83). 

The cost model has been updated again in July 2025 (84) to incorporate the latest available 
data for 2023 and 2024, although this update did not involve any methodological changes, 
only revisions to the data inputs to ensure the model remains current and accurate. 

The Axon cost model is based on a number of methodological choices. First of all, the 
model  is  bottom-up,  calculating  the  provision  of  a  service  under  a  given  set  of 
methodologies and scenarios. A bottom-up model involves a reasonable approximation of 
the network that a reference operator would need in order to meet the coverage and capacity 

(79) Study SMART 2017/0091: “Assessment of the cost of providing mobile telecom services in the EU/EEA 

countries”, Axon Partners Group Consulting, published on 22 July 2019, available here. 

(80)  Iceland, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania decided not to participate in 

the data collection. 

(81)  For a general introduction to the cost model we refer to the full publication, available here. 

(82)  Ibid. 

(83)  Ibid. 

(84)  2025  Update  of  the  mobile  cost  model  for  roaming  and  voice  call  termination  in  the  EU  |  Shaping 

Europe’s digital future. 

23 

 
 
requirements of the users. It therefore produces an approximation of the costs that such an 
operator  would  bear  and  provides  service-level  results  under  different  scenarios.  For 
termination, the Axon cost model allocates costs according purely to the LRIC approach 
described in the section above. 

To  estimate  the  efficient  cost  of  terminating  a  mobile  call  in  a  hypothetical  European 
mobile network operator, based on estimates of the Axon cost model, each parameter needs 
to be assessed in order to propose the most suitable scenario. As mentioned in the section 
above, during the entire process, Axon and the Commission services have consulted and 
discussed scenarios with stakeholders and the multiple workshops. The different scenarios 
as defined in the cost model are economic depreciation, definition of increments under a 
LRIC cost standard, traffic patterns and seasonal behaviours, and domestic data demand 
forecasts. Based on the feedback received throughout the process, a final setting for each 
scenario was proposed and is described below. All 72 results based on different scenarios 
are published and a detailed assessment is available in the accompanying documents to the 
cost model (85). 

The combination of scenarios of the Axon model most supported by stakeholders is also 
considered  by  the  Commission  services  as  the  appropriate  basis  for  setting  the  mobile 
single maximum Union-wide voice termination rate. The arguments for the choice of each 
specific scenario are described here below, with the chosen scenario in italic: 

•  Annualisation criteria (Economic depreciation based on demand) 

o  The annualisation criteria most preferred by stakeholders is to depreciate 
assets  based  on  the  demand  they  are  expected  to  serve. Two  production 
factors  are  included  in  the  model  to  assess  the  results  produced  by  the 
economic depreciation. One is depreciation based on “revenues”, where the 
asset is depreciated on the revenue it is expected to generate. 
o  56% of stakeholders preferred depreciation based on demand. 

•  Roaming increment (Specific roaming increment) 

o  Treats the mobile roaming increment separately from other non-regulated 
domestic services, although recognising that roaming services should also 
contribute to the recovery of joint and common costs. 

o  71% of stakeholders agreed with this approach and a specific increment for 

roaming is considered. 

•  Threshold to identify seasonal patterns (50%)  

o  Different preferences across stakeholders were observed for this scenario. 
The alternative to 50% as a threshold is 10% and 30%. This scenario has a 
larger impact on estimates for roaming and does not change the outcome 
for voice termination relevant for the purposes of the Delegated Regulation.  
o  64% of stakeholders preferred this approach, setting the seasonality to 50%.  

•  Demand forecast for data (conservative)  

o  Setting this scenario to conservative, assumes a lower growth of the 
domestic data service as compared to the base case scenario. This 
approach is supported by 54% of the stakeholders. The Commission 
services also support this scenario, as a more conservative approach in 
terms of the expected data development is more likely to ensure cost 
recovery, also if demand does not develop as expected.  

(85)  Finalisation of the mobile cost model for roaming and the delegated act on a single EU-wide mobile 

voice call termination | Shaping Europe’s digital future. 

24 

 
 
o  This is important when approaching the setting of wholesale caps based 

on projections of either costs or prices, which will be subject to 
uncertainties regarding the accuracy of such projections, in particular 
further into the future. 

Figure 2 presents the estimates of the Axon cost model for each of the modelled Member 
States. These results are obtained under the scenario supported by most stakeholders. As 
seen, the MTRs throughout the period range from around 0.09 EURcent/min to just under 
0.02 EURcent/min. 

Figure 2: Axon cost model estimated MTRs per country (most preferred scenario) 

Source: Axon, CNECT/2022/OP/0065 

Detailed cost estimates for MTRs under the chosen combination of scenarios in the Axon 
cost model per Member State can be seen in Table 2 below. 

25 

 
 
Table 2: Cost estimates for MTRs under the chosen combination of scenarios in the Axon model 
(in Euro cent/min) 

Note: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania decided not to participate 
in  the  data  collection.  The  Axon  cost  model  is  therefore  does  not  provide  estimates  for  these  countries.; 
Source: Axon, CNECT/2022/OP/0065 

4.3.  Assessment of the MTR in relation to estimated costs  

The Delegated Regulation’s establishment of a Union-wide termination rate (Eurorate) of 
0.2 EURcent per minute, effective 1 January 2024, has been assessed against cost estimates 
derived  from  Axon’s  cost  model.  Figure  3  presents  the  results  of  this  assessment, 
comparing voice termination unit costs with the Eurorate MTR over the period 2024–2030. 

Throughout the assessed period, the Eurorate remains fixed at 0.2 EURcent per minute, 
which is more than double the highest estimated cost calculated by the Axon model. The 
maximum estimated cost decline from 0.09 EURcent per minute in 2024 to approximately 
0.08 EURcent per minute from 2027 onwards, while average costs fall from 0.05 to 0.04 
EURcent per minute. The minimum estimated cost remains stable at 0.02  EURcent per 
minute. 

This  comparison  demonstrates  a  substantial  margin  between  the  Eurorate  and  all  cost 
estimates, including the upper bound, confirming that the rate is set at a level that ensures 
full cost recovery for operators across the Union. The findings indicate that the Eurorate 

26 

COUNTRY202420252026202720282029203020312032Austria0.030.020.020.020.020.020.020.020.02Belgium0.020.030.020.020.020.020.030.010.01Bulgaria0.040.040.050.040.030.030.020.020.02Croatia0.090.090.090.080.080.080.080.070.07Cyprus0.060.050.060.040.050.050.050.040.03Czech Republic0.070.040.050.030.040.030.030.030.02Denmark0.030.030.030.030.030.030.020.020.02EstoniaFinlandFrance0.050.040.040.040.040.040.030.040.04Germany0.050.060.040.040.040.040.030.030.03Greece0.050.040.040.030.030.030.020.020.02Hungary0.040.030.030.050.030.030.030.020.02IcelandIreland0.050.050.050.040.030.030.030.030.03Italy0.060.050.050.050.050.040.040.030.03LatviaLiechtensteinLithuaniaLuxembourg0.070.050.050.040.040.050.030.030.03Malta0.090.070.070.060.050.050.040.040.04NetherlandsNorway0.020.020.020.020.020.020.020.020.02Poland0.050.060.040.040.040.040.040.030.03Portugal0.050.030.030.030.030.040.040.020.02Romania0.070.060.070.060.050.050.040.040.04Slovakia0.080.070.070.070.070.060.060.050.05Slovenia0.070.050.050.040.040.040.030.020.02Spain0.050.040.040.040.030.030.030.030.03Sweden0.060.070.020.020.020.020.040.020.02 
 
provides  a  comfortable  buffer  above  estimated  efficient  cost  levels,  supporting  the 
financial viability of mobile voice termination services. 

Figure 3: Comparison Eurorate (MTR) against estimated costs by Axon cost model 

i

n
m

/
s
t
n
e
c
R
U
E

0,25

0,2

0,15

0,1

0,09

0,05

0,05

0

0,2

0,08

0,04

0,02

Eurorate

Maximum Value

Average Value (EU/EEA)

Minimum Value

0,08

0,04

0,04

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

Source: Axon, CNECT/2022/OP/0065 

At  the  same  time,  given  the  consistent  downward  trend  in  modelled  costs,  the  analysis 
suggests that, subject to further detailed assessment and continuous monitoring of market 
and cost developments, there may be economic scope to consider future adjustments to the 
mobile termination rate. Any such considerations should remain guided by the principles 
of cost recovery, efficiency, and long-term market sustainability. 

4.4. 

Fixed Termination Rate 

The Delegated Regulation has established FTR at 0.07 EURcent per minute. At the time 
of adoption, the underlying analysis concluded that there was no need for a glide path when 
introducing  a  single  FTR,  unlike  in  the  case  of  MTRs.  This  decision  was  based  on  the 
observation that regulated FTRs across Member States were already closely aligned with 
the level derived from the Commission’s cost model. 

Moreover, given that fixed telephony services and wholesale fixed termination rates have 
not  undergone  any  major  technological  advancements  and  considering  that  traditional 
fixed telephony is increasingly being replaced by alternative communication technologies, 
the Commission  considers the existing  approach  appropriate. For the assessment  of the 
FTR, the Commission envisages therefore to continue relying on the existing cost model 
covering  wholesale  fixed  termination  services,  while  taking  into  account  market  and 
technological developments. 

The  existing  cost  model,  developed  under  SMART  2018/0014 (86),  is  based  on  a 
hypothetical efficient operator deploying an IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) network for 

(86)  Study  (SMART  2018/0014):  “Assessment  of  the  cost  of  providing  wholesale  voice  call  termination 
services on fixed networks in the EU/EEA countries”, published on 26 November 2019, available here. 

27 

 
 
 
the (87) provision of fixed voice services. The cost model covers the period 2015–2025 and 
incorporates  projections  derived  from  historical  traffic  data,  stakeholder  input,  and 
observed technological developments. Over this period, the results indicate a high degree 
of cost stability and convergence among Member States, reflecting the structural maturity 
of  fixed  voice  termination  markets  across  the  Union.  These  markets  have  undergone  a 
gradual  transformation  through  the  transition  to  all-IP  and  fibre-based  infrastructures, 
resulting in a harmonised and efficient cost environment. 

Empirical evidence confirms this evolution. Between 2019 and 2021, a moderate decline 
in  estimated  unit  costs  was  observed,  largely  attributable  to  efficiency  gains  from  the 
optimisation of network architectures. From 2022 onwards, estimated costs have stabilised 
at consistently low levels, with only minimal variation across years and Member States. 
By 2024–2025, cost estimates across the Union fall within a narrow range of approximately 
0.028 to 0.068 EURcent per minute, demonstrating substantial convergence and reflecting 
the efficiency frontier achieved by modern fixed networks. 

As  shown  in  Table  3  and  Figure  4,  the  highest  estimated  cost  of  providing  the  fixed 
termination  service  throughout  the  entire  modelled  period  has  remained  below  the 
regulated Union-wide fixed Eurorate of 0.07 EURcent per minute. This consistent margin 
confirms that the FTR continues to ensure full cost recovery for an efficient operator in all 
Member  States  while  avoiding  overcompensation.  For  2025,  the  model  forecasts  an 
average unit cost of 0.059 EUR cent per minute, reinforcing the conclusion that the current 
FTR remains safely above cost levels and provides a reasonable buffer to accommodate 
national cost variations and operational contingencies. 

The sustained alignment between estimated costs and the regulated rate also supports the 
finding that the FTR remains consistent with the principles of cost orientation, efficiency, 
and  proportionality  as  set  out  in  Article  75  and  Annex  III  of  the  European  Electronic 
Communications Code. Given the maturity of fixed telephony networks and the ongoing 
integration of voice services into broadband and fibre infrastructures, no material upward 
cost pressures are expected beyond 2025. The incremental cost of carrying voice traffic is 
increasingly  marginal,  while  efficiency  gains  from  network  consolidation  continue  to 
offset declining call volumes. 

(87)  IP Multimedia Subsystem is a modern technology delivering IP multimedia services. Compared to the 

previous circuit-switched network, IMS is a fully IP packet switched network. 

28 

 
 
Table 3: Cost estimates for FTRs under the chosen combination of scenarios in the Axon model 
(in EUR cents/min) 

Source: Axon, SMART 2018/0014 

Figure 4: Axon cost model FTR estimates per Member State 

Source: Axon, SMART 2018/0014 

29 

 
 
 
Technological  and  market  developments  further  reinforce  this  assessment.  Figure  5 
illustrates  the  continuous  decline  in  fixed  telephony  traffic  across  the  Union,  reflecting 
long-term substitution effects as end-users increasingly rely on mobile voice services and 
internet-based  communication  platforms  (e.g.  VoIP,  OTT  applications).  The  ongoing 
reduction in  traditional fixed voice volumes represents  a structural and sustained trend, 
which is expected to persist in the medium to long term. 

At the same time, network operators are completing the migration to all-IP architectures, 
whereby  voice  is  provided  as  an  ancillary  function  within  multi-service  broadband 
networks  rather  than  through  separate  legacy  infrastructures.  This  transformation  has 
significantly  improved  operational  efficiency  by  consolidating  service  delivery  and 
reducing the incremental cost of providing voice termination. 

The  widespread  deployment  of  fibre  infrastructure  has  further  enhanced  efficiency  and 
service  quality,  offering  greater  bandwidth,  lower  latency,  and  improved  reliability.  As 
fibre networks are primarily dimensioned to support broadband services, the incremental 
cost  of  carrying  voice  traffic  has  become  marginal,  resulting  in  a  structural  decoupling 
between  cost  levels  and  voice-specific  demand.  Consequently,  even  as  voice  traffic 
volumes decline, the average unit cost of fixed termination is expected to remain broadly 
stable, as capacity and investment decisions are increasingly driven by broadband rather 
than voice services. 

Moreover,  the  progressive  copper  switch-off  across  Member  States  is  not  expected  to 
generate upward cost pressure on termination rates. On the contrary, the transition to fully 
IP-based,  fibre-dominated  networks  is  likely  to  maintain  or  further  improve  efficiency 
levels  over  time,  reinforcing  the  conclusion  that  current  fixed  termination  rates  remain 
sustainable and aligned with cost recovery principles. 

Figure 5: Evolution of fixed telephony traffic volumes in selected Member States (2021–2024) 

10000

9300

s
e
t
u
n
m
n
o

i

i
l
l
i

M

9000

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

5180

1624

8000

3790

1304

6400

3096

1124

5700

2700

1047

Belgium

Croatia

Germany

Hungary

France

Portugal

Romania

Sweden

2021

2022

2023

2024

Source: NRAs data, annual reports 2021 - 2024 

30 

 
 
 
4.5.  Conclusion – Rates assessment 

The  assessment  confirms  that  the  Union-wide  termination  rates  established  under 
Delegated Regulation remain appropriate and consistent with cost-orientation principles. 
Both the MTR of 0.2 EURcent per minute and the FTR of 0.07 EURcent per minute are 
set above the cost levels estimated by the Commission’s cost models, allowing for full cost 
recovery by efficient operators across the Union. 

Model estimates for the period 2024–2030 indicate that the MTR provides a substantial 
margin above the highest calculated unit costs, while the FTR remains close to the long-
term  average  cost  level  observed  in  fixed  networks.  In  fixed  communications,  the 
migration  towards  IP-based  and  fibre  infrastructures  has  led  to  a  gradual  integration  of 
voice services within multi-service broadband networks. As a result, the incremental cost 
of providing voice termination is low and relatively stable over time. 

The  findings  confirm  that  the  Delegated  Regulation  continues  to  meet  its  objectives  of 
ensuring  cost-reflective,  harmonised  termination  rates  across  the  Union,  reducing 
competitive distortions and providing regulatory predictability. 

At the same time, the  analysis suggests that there is  some  economic space for possible 
future adjustments, particularly in the case of mobile termination, where modelled costs 
show a gradual downward trend. Any such consideration would require careful monitoring 
of market and cost developments and should be based on a comprehensive assessment of 
proportionality, sustainability and investment conditions. 

In  the  current  context,  the  existing  Eurorates  remain  appropriate  and  provide  a  stable 
framework that balances cost efficiency with regulatory simplicity and legal certainty.

31 

 
5.  CONCLUSION 

The  review  confirms  that  the  Delegated  Regulation  has  achieved  its  core  objectives  of 
harmonising wholesale voice termination rates, ensuring cost orientation, and facilitating 
the  gradual  deregulation  of  national  termination  markets.  The  establishment  of  single 
Union-wide termination rates has effectively eliminated cross-border price disparities and 
removed  the  need  for  separate  national  cost  models,  thereby  promoting  competitive 
neutrality and legal certainty across the internal market. 

Since its entry into force on 1 July 2021, the regulatory landscape in the Union has changed 
significantly.  The  majority  of  NRAs  have  fully  deregulated  their  fixed  and  mobile 
termination  markets,  concluding  that  the  implementation  of  Union-wide  Eurorates  has 
addressed  the  main  competition  concern  previously  identified.  Namely,  the  risk  of 
excessive pricing. This development is fully consistent with the objective outlined by the 
Commission in the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the 2020 Recommendation 
on Relevant Markets, which anticipated that the adoption of a single Union-wide Eurorates 
would render ex ante price regulation unnecessary in most Member States. 

In cases where regulation has been maintained, NRAs have generally focused on non-price 
related  issues  such  as  access,  transparency,  or  dispute  resolution.  These  limited 
interventions  confirm  that  the  harmonised  cost-based  framework  continues  to  operate 
effectively  and  proportionately,  providing  the  necessary  safeguards  without  imposing 
undue regulatory burdens. 

The targeted public consultation and BEREC’s opinion both confirm widespread support 
for the current Eurorate levels and the overall functioning of the framework. Stakeholders 
recognise the benefits of harmonisation and predictability, while also pointing to specific 
operational  challenges,  particularly  regarding  reciprocity  with  non-EU  operators, 
fraudulent traffic, and transparency in transit arrangements. The Commission takes note of 
these  issues  and,  together  with  BEREC  and  NRAs,  may  explore  whether  additional 
transparency  or  information-sharing  measures  (subject  to  compliance  with  competition 
law) could enhance the consistent application of the Regulation. 

The updated cost assessments demonstrate that the Eurorates remain well above modelled 
efficient  cost  levels,  ensuring  full  cost  recovery  for  operators  across  the  Union.  The 
analysis  also  suggests  a  gradual  decline  in  underlying  costs,  particularly  for  mobile 
termination,  indicating  potential  economic  space  for  future  adjustments.  Any  such 
considerations  should,  however,  be  based  on  continued  monitoring  of  cost  and  market 
developments  and subject  to  a broader assessment  of proportionality,  sustainability  and 
investment incentives. 

Overall,  the  Delegated  Regulation  remains  appropriate,  proportionate  and  effective  in 
achieving its objectives. It has enabled the transition from fragmented national regulation 
to a coherent, Union-wide framework that safeguards competition, promotes efficiency, 
and supports the gradual deregulation of wholesale termination markets. The Commission 
intends  to  continue  cooperating  closely  with  BEREC  and  NRAs  to  ensure  that  the 
framework remains aligned with market and technological developments and continues to 
deliver a stable and predictable regulatory environment across the Union. 

32