Opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 January 2026 on the supervisory independence of Latvijas Banka, the prevention of conflicts of interest, and the insurance resolution and statistical tasks of Latvijas Banka (CON/2026/1)
Date: 2026-01-08
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: legal basis

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 8 January 2026  

on the supervisory independence of Latvijas Banka, the prevention of conflicts of interest, and the 

insurance resolution and statistical tasks of Latvijas Banka 

(CON/2026/1) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 28 November 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Latvian Ministry of 

Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Latvijas Banka (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). On 

12  December  2025  the  ECB  received  an  additional  request  from  the  Latvian  Ministry  of  Finance  for  an 
opinion on a draft law amending the Law on prevention of conflicts of interest in activities of public officials 

(hereinafter the ‘draft amendments to the Law on prevention of conflicts of interest’, together with the draft 

law, the ‘draft laws’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning  of  the  European  Union  and  Article  2(1),  third  and  fourth  indents,  of  Council  Decision 

98/415/EC1, as the draft laws relate to (1) Latvijas Banka, (2) the collection, compilation and distribution of 

statistics, and (3) the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit 

institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the 

Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft laws 

1.1  The main purpose of  the draft laws is  to  transpose into Latvian  law  the amendments to Directive 

2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 2 introduced by Directive (EU) 2024/1619 

of the European Parliament and of the Council3 (hereinafter the ‘CRD6’). However, the draft laws 

also contain a number of provisions not related to the CRD6 implementation, in particular related to 

the  anticipated  extension  of  Latvijas  Banka’s  resolution  tasks  and  to  Latvijas  Banka’s  tasks  and 

powers in relation to its statistical tasks. Finally, the draft laws contain some amendments related to 

the administrative sanctions imposed by Latvijas Banka. 

1.2  The draft laws transpose the provisions of the CRD6 that relate to the supervisory independence of 

competent  authorities  and  the  prevention  of  conflicts  of  interest  in  relation  to  the  officials  and 

1  

2  

3  

Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 

Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions  and  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions,  amending  Directive  2002/87/EC  and  repealing 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj). 

Directive  (EU)  2024/1619  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  31  May  2024  amending  Directive 
2013/36/EU  as  regards  supervisory  powers,  sanctions,  third-country  branches,  and  environmental,  social  and 
governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj). 

 
 
 
 
 
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employees of such authorities, to the extent that these requirements are not included in the existing 

applicable framework consisting of the Law on Latvijas Banka4, the Law on prevention of  conflicts 

of interest5, the Law on transparency of representation of interests 6 and in the internal procedure of 

Latvijas Banka for managing ethics and the prevention of conflicts of interest.  

1.3  Under the Law on Latvijas Banka the term of office of the members of the Council of Latvijas Banka, 

including Latvijas Banka’s Governor, is five years with the caveat that the same person may be a 

member of the Council of Latvijas Banka for no more than two successive terms 7. The draft law does 

not change the term of the office, which will remain five years. However, regarding the members of 

the  Council  of  Latvijas  Banka  the  draft  law  eliminates  the  requirement  that  the  terms  must  be 

successive, thus ensuring a maximum of two terms in the course of a person’s life. This change does 

not concern the Governor of Latvijas Banka. 

1.4  The draft law provides that the reasons for dismissal of both the Governor and the other members of 

the Council of Latvijas Banka must be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s 

governance body concerned objects to the publication by providing that the reason for the removal 

from office of a member of the Council of Latvijas Banka are made public by the Saeima (Parliament) 

if the member removed has not submitted an objection to publication to the Saeima8. 

1.5  The draft amendments to the Law on prevention of conflicts of interest provide that the cooling-off 

period  may  be  reduced  to  one  year  by  the  head  of  the  decision  making  body  of  a  public  entity 

following a submission by a public official and assessment of the risks of corruption and conflicts of 

interest if the application of the two-year time period is not deemed appropriate and proportionate. 

The two-year cooling off requirement applies to the Governor, the other members of the Council of 

Latvijas Banka and to those employees of Latvijas Banka who qualify as public officials by virtue of 

the Law on prevention of conflicts of interest currently in force9. 

1.6  The draft law explicitly empowers Latvijas Banka to impose obligations, prohibitions and restrictions 

on  members  of  the  Council  of  Latvijas  Banka  and  employees  of  Latvijas  Banka  in  the  field  of 

prevention of conflicts of interest, in addition to the provisions laid down in other legal acts.  

1.7  The draft law provides that Latvijas Banka must cooperate with other institutions, and that Latvijas 

Banka and each such institution must coordinate their actions with each other, to ensure that the 

sanctions  and  administrative  measures  imposed  on  persons  who  have  infringed  financial  market 

regulations in respect of a given breach are proportionate and appropriate to the seriousness of the 

offence concerned10. 

4  
5  
6  
7  
8  

9  
10  

Latvijas Bankas likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 193, 06.10.2021. 

Likums "Par interešu konflikta novēršanu valsts amatpersonu darbībā". Latvijas Vēstnesis, 69, 09.05.2002. 

Interešu pārstāvības atklātības likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 207, 25.10.2022. 

See Article 13(3) of the Law on Latvijas Banka. 

Transposing Article 4a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive 2013/36/EU, as inserted by Article 1, point (4), of the 
CRD6. 

See Section 10 of the Law on prevention of conflicts of interest. 

In order to fully comply with the requirements of Article 70 of Directive 2013/36/EU, as inserted by Article 1, point (18), 
of  the  CRD6,  on  the  effective  application  of  administrative  penalties  and  other  administrative  measures,  and  the 
exercise of powers to impose such penalties. 

2 

 
 
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1.8 

In view of the anticipated transposition of Directive (EU) 2025/1 of the European Parliament and of 

the Council 11, the draft law amends the scope of Latvijas Banka’s resolution related tasks. Currently 

the Law on Latvijas Banka attributes to Latvijas Banka resolution tasks specifically in accordance 

with the Law on recovery of activities and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms 12,  13. 

The draft law contains a more generic attribution of resolution tasks to Latvijas Banka in accordance 

with the legal acts in the field of resolution. While the draft law does not contain any further provisions, 

the explanatory memorandum clarifies that it is intended to confer resolution tasks on Latvijas Banka 

in relation to the resolution of insurance and reinsurance undertakings. 

1.9  Finally, the  draft law contains a number of amendments related to  the statistical tasks of Latvijas 

Banka.  In  particular,  the  draft  law  provides  that  Latvijas  Banka  has:  (1)  the  right  to  request  and 

receive, free of charge, information necessary for the performance of its tasks also from statistical 

authorities; (2) the right to complete and connect the information received from other persons with 

other information available to Latvijas Banka, as well as to carry out its analysis thereon; and (3) the 

obligation to process the information at Latvijas Banka’s disposal and received from other persons, 

including statistical data, in accordance with the relevant information protection requirements. More 

specifically, the draft law grants Latvijas Banka the right to collect, analyse, and integrate statistical 

information  received  from  external  sources,  and  allows  Latvijas  Banka  to  process  information, 

including statistical data,  for scientific and research  activities in the economic and financial  fields, 

subject to information protection requirements. 

2. 

General observations  

2.1  Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and 

of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) address the independence of 

central banks in the European System of Central Banks14 (ESCB), stipulating that when exercising 

the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute 

of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank (NCB), nor any member of their decision-

making bodies, are to seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, 

from  any  government  of  a  Member  State  or  from  any  other  body.  This  independence  was  thus 

entrusted to the ECB and Latvijas Banka, as an NCB, by primary law.  

2.2  Based on considerations of central bank independence, and in order to ensure the independence of 

NCBs  such  as  Latvijas  Banka  when  exercising  the  powers  and  carrying  out  the  tasks  and  duties 

conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB has established an ethics 

11  

12  

13  
14  

Directive (EU) 2025/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 establishing a framework 
for  the  recovery  and  resolution  of  insurance  and  reinsurance  undertakings  and  amending  Directives  2002/47/EC, 
2004/25/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2014/59/EU and (EU) 2017/1132 and Regulations (EU) No 1094/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, 
(EU) No 806/2014 and (EU) 2017/1129 (OJ L, 2025/1, 8.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2025/1/oj). 

Kredītiestāžu un ieguldījumu brokeru sabiedrību darbības atjaunošanas un noregulējuma likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
127, 02.07.2015. 

Article 5(1), point (5), of the Law on Latvijas Banka. 

Regarding the doctrine of the ECB as to independence and its ramifications, see the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, 
Section 2.2. Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 

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framework. This includes the ECB’s Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials 15 (hereinafter the 

‘Single Code’), which applies, among others, to the members of the Governing Council of the ECB 

when  exercising  their  functions  as  members  of  a  high-level  ECB  body,  and  Guideline  (EU) 

[2021/2253] of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/49) 16, which is addressed to the NCBs of the 

Eurosystem and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of the decision-making 

bodies and staff of the NCBs.  

2.3  The NCBs, as an integral part of the ESCB, must act in accordance with the guidelines of the ECB17. 

Hence,  national  legislation  is  without  prejudice  to  the  ethics  framework  which  the  ECB  has 

established  in  order  to  ensure  the  independence  of  the  ECB  and  the  NCBs  when  exercising  the 

powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute 

of the ESCB, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis.  

2.4  Furthermore,  Article  19  of  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/2013 18  (hereinafter  the  ‘SSM 

Regulation’) stipulates that when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation, the 

ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the SSM must act independently. The legal 

basis for this provision is Article 127(6) of the Treaty. Article 31(3) of the SSM Regulation furthermore 

requires  the  ECB,  in  cooperation  with  the  national  competent  authorities,  to:  (a)  establish  and 

maintain  comprehensive  and  formal  procedures  including  ethics  procedures  and  proportionate 

periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of interest resulting from subsequent 

employment within two years of members of the Supervisory Board; and (b) provide for appropriate 

disclosures. Those procedures are without prejudice to the application of stricter national rules. 

2.5 

In  view  of  this  independence  and  these  requirements  of  the  SSM  Regulation,  the  ECB  has 

established an ethics framework to ensure the independence of national competent authorities, such 

as  Latvijas  Banka,  when  assisting  the  ECB  in  carrying  out  the  tasks  conferred  on  it  by  the  SSM 

Regulation. This ethics framework includes the Single Code, which  applies, among  others, to the 

members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-

level  ECB  body,  and  Guideline  (EU)  2021/2256  of  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB/2021/50) 19, 

which  is  addressed  to  the  national  competent  authorities  of  the  SSM  and  establishes  ethics 

requirements  applicable  to  the  members  of  their  bodies  and  the  members  of  staff  of  the  national 

competent  authorities.  In  view  of  the  responsibility  of  the  ECB  for  the  effective  and  consistent 

functioning  of  the  SSM20,  the  national  competent  authorities  must  comply  with  Guideline  (EU) 

2021/2256 (ECB/2021/50). 

15  
16  

17  
18  

19  

20  

Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3).   

Guideline  (EU)  [2021/2253]  of  the  European  Central  Bank  of  2  November  2021  laying  down  the  principles  of  the 
Eurosystem 
ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2253/oj). 

(ECB/2021/49) 

17.12.2021, 

Framework 

Ethics 

454, 

(OJ 

7, 

p. 

L 

See Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  (OJ  L  287,  29.10.2013,  p.  63,  ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). 

Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics 
Framework 
the  Single  Supervisory  Mechanism  (ECB/2021/50)  (OJ  L  454,  17.12.2021,  p.  21,  ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2256/oj). 

for 

See Article 6(1) of the SSM Regulation. 

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2.6 

In contrast to the ethics framework, which is  ultimately based on Article 127(6)  of the Treaty, the 

CRD6, including its provision on supervisory independence of competent authorities 21, is based on 

Article 53(1) of the Treaty. A legal act based on this provision cannot alter the rights and obligations 

of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by 

the  SSM Regulation based on  Article  127(6) of the Treaty. It follows from settled case-law of the 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union22  that  the  different  legal  bases,  namely  Article  53(1)  and 

Article 127(6) of the Treaty, cannot be combined as the  legal  basis for a  legal act, in view  of the 

different procedures involved. In particular, the measures adopted under Article 53(1) of the Treaty 

are adopted by  the  European Parliament  and the Council, acting  in  accordance with the ordinary 

legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (and, if relevant, the 

ECB  in  accordance  with  Articles  127(4)  and  282(5)  of  the  Treaty).  By  contrast,  the  regulations 

adopted under Article 127(6) of the Treaty are adopted by the Council alone, in a special legislative 

procedure in which the Council acts unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament and the 

ECB 23. 

2.7  Hence, the amendments made by the CRD6 are without prejudice to the ethics framework which the 

ECB has established to ensure the independence of the national competent authorities in the context 

of  the  SSM,  as  both  frameworks  have  their  own  scope  and  legal  basis.  The  Union  legislator 

acknowledged  this  through  the  CRD6’s  amendments  to  Directive  2013/36/EU,  which  provide  that 

Article 4a(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the national 

competent authorities pursuant to the SSM established by the SSM Regulation24.  

2.8 

In this regard, the ECB welcomes that, under the draft law, which inserts a new paragraph 1, point 

(1), into Article 19 of the Law on Latvijas Banka, Latvijas Banka has been expressly confirmed in its 

power  to  impose  obligations,  prohibitions  and  restrictions  on  members  of  the  Council  of  Latvijas 

Banka and employees of Latvijas Banka in the field of prevention of conflicts of interest through its 

own internal procedures 25.  

3. 

Specific observations  

3.1  Supervisory independence and prevention of conflicts of interest 

3.1.1  As regards the term of office of the Governor of Latvijas Banka, the ECB understands that a person 

could serve as a member of the Council for a maximum of two terms, and that immediately thereafter 

or following a break the same person could serve as the Governor for two consecutive terms. The 

ECB also understands that a person may serve as Governor for two consecutive terms, and, after a 

21  
22  

23  

24  

25  

See Article 4a of Directive 2013/36/EU, as inserted by Article 1, point (4), of the CRD6. 

See  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  29  April  2004,  Commission  v  Council,  C-338/01,  ECLI:EU:C:2004:253, 
paragraphs 57 and 58; and judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council, 
C-178/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, paragraphs 43 to 60. 

See paragraph 2.6.2 of Opinion CON/2024/21 and paragraph 2.1.3 of Opinion CON/2025/19. All ECB opinions are 
published on EUR-Lex. 

See Article 4a(2), fourth subparagraph, of Directive 2013/36/EU, as inserted by Article 1, point (4), of the CRD6. This 
acknowledgement  refers  directly  to  the  dismissal  requirements  included  in  Article  4a(2),  second  subparagraph,  of 
Directive 2013/36/EU, as inserted by Article 1, point (4), of the CRD6. 

Article 19(1), point (1), of the Law on Latvijas Banka, as inserted by Article 6 of the draft law. 

5 

 
 
 
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break, serve again as a Governor for two consecutive terms.  

3.1.2  The draft law proposes to introduce a limitation on the term of office of members of the Council of 

Latvijas Banka, with the exception of the Governor, in order to ensure compliance with the CRD6 

provision  on  the  maximum  term  of  office  for  members  of  the  governance  bodies  of  competent 

authorities,  which  provides  that  Member  States  must  ensure  that  no  member  of  a competent 

authority’s governance body (except for governors of NCBs) who is appointed after 11 January 2026 

remains in office for more than 14 years 26. At present the Law on Latvijas Banka provides that the 

same person may be a member of the Council of Latvijas Banka for no more than two successive 

terms. This means that, following a break, a person may again serve as a member of the Council for 

two consecutive terms, which would exceed the overall maximum term provided for in the CRD6. 

Under the draft law the term of office of a member of the Council of Latvijas Banka is five years, with 

the  possibility of only one renewal  of  their mandates.  The  ECB, therefore, considers that it is not 

necessary for the draft law to include any further provisions in this respect.  

3.1.3  In this context, the ECB highlights that in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, 

statutes of NCBs must provide for a minimum term of office of five years for a Governor. This does 

not preclude longer terms of office. Applying the rules regarding the term of office of Governors to 

other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related 

tasks also safeguards the personal independence of those persons 27. The application of the same 

rules  regarding  the  term  of  office  to  both  Governors  and  members  of  decision-making  bodies  is 

particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ alongside other members who have 

equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related 

tasks28, as is the case in Latvijas Banka. The ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Law 

on Latvijas Banka are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

3.1.4  The  ECB  understands  that  the  current  provisions  of  the  Law  on  Latvijas  Banka  that  regulate  the 

appointment and dismissal of members of the Council of Latvijas Banka are consistent with the CRD6 

and the draft  law only supplements them with  new provisions concerning the public disclosure of 

grounds  for  dismissal.  The  CRD6  provides  in  this  respect  that  Member  States  must  ensure  that 

members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria 

that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet 

the criteria for appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for 

dismissal are to be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body 

concerned objects to the publication29. The ECB considers that it is not necessary for the draft law 

to  include  provisions  relating  to  the  grounds  for  dismissal  of  members  of  the  Council  of  Latvijas 

Banka.  Under  the  Law  on  Latvijas  Banka,  the  Saeima  may  remove  a  member  of  the  Council  of 

Latvijas Banka (this includes the Governor) from the office only if: (1) his or her personal submission 

26  

27  

28  
29  

See Article 4a(2), second subparagraph, first sentence, of Directive 2013/36/EU, as inserted by Article 1, point (4), of 
the CRD6. 

Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, which address the independence of central banks in 
the ESCB, refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically.  

See the ECB’s Convergence Report, June 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26. 

See Article 4a(2), second subparagraph, second and third sentences, of Directive 2013/36/EU, as inserted by Article 
1, point (4), of the CRD6. 

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regarding resignation from the office has been received; (2) he or she no longer fulfils the conditions 

necessary for the fulfilment of the office within the meaning of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB; 

and (3) he or she is guilty of serious misconduct within the meaning of Article 14.2 of the Statute of 

the ESCB30. 

3.1.5  In this context, the ECB highlights that, pursuant to Article 14.2, second subparagraph, first sentence, 

of the Statute of the ESCB, ‘a Governor may be relieved from office only if he no longer fulfils the 

conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct’. 

Applying the same rules regarding the grounds for relieving Governors from office to other members 

of  the  decision-making  bodies  of  NCBs  involved  in  the  performance  of  ESCB-related  tasks  also 

safeguards  the  personal  independence  of  those  persons31.  The  application  of  the  same  rules 

regarding  dismissal  to  both  Governors  and  members  of  decision-making  bodies  is  particularly 

pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ with other members who have equivalent voting 

rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks32, as is the 

case in Latvijas Banka. The ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Law on Latvijas Banka 

are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

3.1.6  The ECB notes that the 24-month cooling-off period, including the possibility to reduce it, is applicable 

to the Governor of Latvijas Banka, the other members of the Council of Latvijas Banka and to those 

employees  of  Latvijas  Banka  who  qualify  as  public  officials  by  virtue  of  the  Law  on  prevention  of 

conflicts of interest currently in force, is also in line with the provisions of the Single Code and of the 

Eurosystem and SSM Ethics Frameworks33.  

3.1.7  The ECB strongly welcomes that the draft law is without prejudice to the Eurosystem and SSM Ethics 

Frameworks and to the Single Code, as they may be amended from time to time. Indeed, as already 

mentioned, the text of the draft law explicitly clarifies that the Council of Latvijas Banka is entitled, in 

addition  to  the  provisions  laid  down  in  other  legal  acts,  to  impose  obligations,  prohibitions  and 

restrictions on members of the Council of Latvijas Banka and employees of Latvijas Banka in the 

field  of  prevention  of  conflicts  of  interest.  While  such  additional  obligations,  prohibitions  and 

restrictions  are  imposed  by  means  of  a  non-legislative  act,  in  the  form  of  an  internal  legal  act  of 

Latvijas  Banka,  the  ECB  understands  that  such  internal  legal  act  is  binding  on  all  employees  of 

Latvijas Banka by virtue of their employment contract, and as a result any disputes arising out of it 

can be adjudicated in court. The ECB considers that the internal legal act adopted by Latvijas Banka 

serves the purpose of achieving full alignment with the ethics frameworks established by the ECB 

pursuant to the Single Code and ECB guidelines, in particular given that in Latvia conflicts of interest 

are regulated by horizontal laws, which also apply, inter alia, to the members of the Council of Latvijas 

Banka. 

3.2  Resolution tasks in relation to insurance and reinsurance undertakings  

30  
31  

32  
33  

See Article 14(1) of the Law on Latvijas Banka.  

Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of 
NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. 

See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26. 

See Article 17.3, point (b), of the Single Code; see also paragraph 2.2.3 of Opinion CON/2025/19 and paragraph 3.1.5 
of Opinion CON/2025/36. 

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3.2.1  As regards the envisaged resolution tasks of Latvijas Banka in relation to the resolution of insurance 

and reinsurance undertakings, the material provisions implementing Directive (EU) 2025/1 are not 

available at the current juncture. Nevertheless, the ECB would like to take this opportunity to highlight 

the  obligations  deriving  from  Union  law  that  need  to  be  complied  with  when  conferring  resolution 

tasks on Latvijas Banka.  

3.2.2  In accordance with Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB, the NCBs, including Latvijas Banka, may 

perform functions other than those specified in that Statute, unless the Governing Council finds that 

those functions interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. Where a Member State assigns 

such a function to its NCB, that NCB is responsible and liable for the performance of that function. 

Nevertheless,  when  defining  the  responsibility  and  liability  of  an  NCB  in  relation  to  that  function, 

Member  States  are  required  to  comply  with  their  obligations  deriving  from  Union  law  and,  in 

particular, Article 123(1) and Article 130 of the Treaty 34. 

3.2.3  Article 123(1) of the Treaty prohibits the NCBs from granting overdraft facilities or any other type of 

credit facility to public authorities and bodies of the Member States. Article 1(1), point (b), of Council 

Regulation (EC) No 3603/9335 defines the term ‘other type of credit facility’ for the purposes of Article 

123 of the Treaty as, inter alia, any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties. 

Accordingly,  the  NCB  concerned  must  not  assume  obligations  vis-à-vis  third  parties  that  could 

potentially be incumbent on the public sector. Consequently, the NCB concerned must not finance 

pre-existing obligations vis-à-vis third parties that are incumbent on other public authorities or bodies 

and the effective financing of the obligations vis-à-vis third parties by the NCB concerned must not 

result  directly  from  the  measures  adopted  by,  or  from  the  policy  choices  made  by,  other  public 

authorities or bodies 36. 

3.2.4  The  designation  of  Latvijas  Banka  as  the  resolution  authority  for  insurance  and  reinsurance 

undertakings would require that the conditions under which Latvijas Banka exercises this function 

must  be  in  line  with  the  abovementioned  limitations  deriving  from  Article  123(1)  of  the  Treaty.  In 

particular,  the  liability  of  Latvijas  Banka  when  exercising  the  function  of  resolution  authority  for 

insurance and reinsurance undertakings must be limited to infringements of a serious nature of the 

rules imposed on Latvijas Banka in that context 37.  

3.2.5  The  Court  of  Justice  has  not  yet  elaborated  on  what  the  limitations  to  infringements  of  a  serious 

nature of the rules imposed on an NCB exactly consist of. In view of the different traditions for the 

liability  of  NCBs  in  the  Member  States’  national  legal  orders,  such  limitations  may  therefore  take 

different  forms,  provided  that  they  exclude  the  effective  financing  of  the  obligations  of  the  public 

sector  vis-à-vis  third  parties  by  the  NCB  concerned  when  exercising  the  function  of  resolution 

34  

35  

36  

37  

See judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, C-45/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraphs 53, 54, 57 and 97; 
paragraph 2.2.1 of Opinion CON/2023/17 and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2024/31.  

Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions 
(OJ  L  332,  31.12.1993,  p.  1,  ELI: 
referred 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1993/3603/oj). 

in  Articles  104  and  104b 

the  Treaty 

(1)  of 

to 

See judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, C-45/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraphs 67 to 75 and 84; 
paragraph 2.2.2 of Opinion CON/2023/17 and paragraph 3.2.1 of Opinion CON/2024/31. 

See judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, C-45/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraph 75; paragraph 
2.2.3 of Opinion CON/2023/17 and paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion CON/2024/31. 

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ECB-PUBLIC 

authority. This is the case if national law addresses the condition of fault and limits liability of the NCB 

concerned to  gross negligence in view of the urgency and complexity characterised by resolution 

measures 38. 

3.2.6  The  ECB  understands  that  the  liability  regime  currently  applicable  to  all  Latvijas  Banka’s  tasks, 

including those related to the resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, is limited. Latvijas 

Banka is responsible for losses caused to a third party by an action of a member of its Council, an 

employee, or an authorised representative of Latvijas Banka in the performance of his or her official 

(work) duties only if the illegal action of the member of the Council, the employee, or the authorised 

representative of Latvijas Banka was intentional or if he or she committed gross negligence 39. If these 

limitations  of  liability  were  also  applicable  to  Latvijas  Banka’s  tasks  relating  to  the  resolution  of 

insurance  and  reinsurance  undertakings,  this  would  address  the  requirement  that  the  liability  of 

Latvijas Banka when exercising these tasks must be limited to infringements of a serious nature40. 

3.2.7  Article 130 of the Treaty prohibits Member States from placing their NCBs in a situation which in any 

way undermines their ability to carry out independently a task falling within the scope of the ESCB41. 

This would be the case if, for example, an NCB were prevented from building up adequate financial 

resources in the form of reserves or buffers to offset losses, particularly those resulting from monetary 

policy operations, and the Member State concerned did not ensure in advance that the NCB had the 

necessary funds to bear the financial burden resulting from exercising a function outside the scope 

of the ESCB (such as the funds necessary to be able to pay the compensation resulting from the 

liability regime for that function), while retaining its ability to carry out its ESCB tasks effectively and 

independently 42. An NCB constrained in its ability to create and/or restore its reserves or buffers may 

need to seek the consent of political authorities to obtain funding or recapitalisation. This places the 

NCB in a situation of dependence on those political authorities of the Member State43. 

3.2.8  The ECB considers that Latvijas Banka’s risk of exposure to liability in the context of the exercise of 

its function as resolution authority for insurance and reinsurance undertakings would be remote if its 

liability is limited as set out under paragraph 3.2.4. 

3.3  Statistical tasks of Latvijas Banka  

3.3.1  Regarding  the  draft  law’s  expansion  of  the  statistical  tasks  and  rights  of  Latvijas  Banka,  the 

introduction  of  the  right  for  Latvijas  Banka  to  request  and  receive,  free  of  charge,  information 
necessary for its tasks from statistical  authorities aligns with  Regulation (EC) No 223/2009  of the 

38  
39  
40  
41  

42  
43  

See paragraph 2.2.3 of Opinion CON/2023/17 and paragraph 3.2.3 of Opinion CON/2024/31. 

See Article 26 of the Law on Latvijas Banka. 

See also paragraph 2.2.3 of Opinion CON/2023/17. 
See judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, C-45/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraph 97. 

See judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, C-45/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraph 105. 

See judgment of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, C-45/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:670, paragraphs 100 to 102; see 
also  paragraph  2.2.4  of  Opinion  CON/2023/17,  paragraph  3.2.1  of  Opinion  CON/2023/44  and  paragraph  3.3.1  of 
Opinion CON/2024/31. 

9 

 
 
ECB-PUBLIC 

European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council44,  which  permits  the  transmission  of  confidential  data 

between the European Statistical System and the ESCB central banks under strict conditions. Such 

data  sharing  is  allowed  if  necessary  for  the  efficient  development,  production,  dissemination,  or 

quality  improvement  of  European  statistics,  with  prior  approval  required  when  the  data  originates 

from Eurostat.  

3.3.2  The ECB recommends that where Latvijas Banka carries out the statistical tasks described in the 

draft law in order to collect statistical information that is necessary to undertake ESCB tasks, it must 

ensure compliance with Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/9845, in particular the confidentiality regime 

thereunder. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 8 January 2026. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

44  

45  

See Article 21(2) of  Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 
on European statistics and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1101/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council  on  the  transmission  of  data  subject  to  statistical  confidentiality  to  the  Statistical  Office  of  the  European 
Communities,  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  322/97  on  Community  Statistics,  and  Council  Decision  89/382/EEC, 
Euratom establishing a Committee on the Statistical Programmes of the European Communities (OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, 
p. 164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/223/oj). 

See Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the collection of statistical information by 
the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1998/2533/oj). 

10