Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 December 2025 on an increase in a tax imposed on credit institutions (CON/2025/45)
Date: 2025-12-19
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: banking supervision

ECB-PUBLIC 

EN 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 19 December 2025 

on an increase in a tax imposed on credit institutions 

(CON/2025/45) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On  12  December  2025  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the  Belgian  Deputy 

Prime Minister and Minister for Finance and Pensions, in charge of the National Lottery and the Federal 

Cultural Institutions, for an opinion on a draft law of 3 December 2025 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) amending, 

inter  alia,  the  Belgian  Code  of  miscellaneous  duties  and  taxes 1  as  regards  the  tax  imposed  on  credit 

institutions (hereinafter the ‘bank tax’).  

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), sixth indent, of Council Decision 98/415/EC2, as the 

draft law relates to (1) rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability 

of financial institutions and markets, and (2) the ECB’s tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit 

institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the 

Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  By way of background, the ECB understands that the bank tax was introduced in its original form by 

the Law of 3 August 2016 introducing a new annual tax on credit institutions in replacement of existing 

annual  taxes,  corporate  tax  deduction  limitation  measures  and  financial  stability  contribution 

measures 3 (hereinafter the ‘Law of 3 August 2016’), which has been amended several times. Various 

types of taxes on credit institutions were in existence prior to 20164. The bank tax applies to all credit 

institutions  incorporated  in  Belgium  and  branches  located  in  Belgium  of  credit  institutions 

incorporated outside Belgium. 

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Code  of  miscellaneous  duties  and  taxes  (Code  des  droits  et  taxes  divers/Wetboek  diverse  rechten  en  taksen), 
previously Code of taxes assimilated to stamp (Code des taxes assimilées au timbre, Moniteur belge, 6 mars 1927/ 
Wetboek der met het zegel gelijkgestelde taksen, Belgisch Staatsblad, 6 maart 1927). 
Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 
Loi du 3 août 2016 instaurant une nouvelle taxe annuelle sur les établissements de crédit en remplacement des taxes 
annuelles existantes, des mesures de limitation de déductions à l’impôt des sociétés et de la contribution à la stabilité 
financière, Moniteur belge, 11 août 2019/Wet van 3 augustus 2016 tot invoering van een nieuwe jaarlijkse taks op de 
kredietinstellingen  in  de  plaats  van  de  bestaande  jaarlijkse  taksen,  van  de  aftrekbeperkende  maatregelen  in  de 
vennootschapsbelasting en van de bijdrage voor de financiële stabiliteit, Belgisch Staatsblad, 11 augustus 2016. 
The ECB understands that a bank tax with a more limited scope was introduced into Belgian law for the first time by a 
royal decree of 18 November 1996, and that it was supplemented by, inter alia, a further bank tax introduced by a 
program-law of 22 June 2012. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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1.2  The  bank  tax  was  amended  for  the  last  time  on  30  December  2023  by  the  program-law  of  22 

December 20235 (hereinafter the ‘Program-Law’), which introduced a progressivity mechanism for 

the calculation of the bank tax. Before the amendment introduced by the Program-Law, there was 

only one rate  of bank tax:  0,13231 %.  After the amendment, the applicable rates are currently as 

follows: (1) 0,13231 % on the first EUR 50 billion of the taxable base amount and (2) 0,17581 % on 

the portion of the taxable base amount exceeding EUR 50 billion. The tax base is the average amount 

of the relevant credit  institution  or branch’s debts to  customers during the year  preceding the tax 

period. For this purpose, ‘customers’ mean any persons other than credit institutions, central banks 

and assimilated institutions, postal cheque offices and national and international official banking-type 

institutions,  and  debts  owed  to  customers  include  debts  resulting  from  the  institution’s  standard 

banking activity, excluding debts represented by a security 6. The ECB understands that the bank tax 

is a non-deductible expense for corporate income tax purposes. It is prohibited for credit institutions 

(and their branches) to pass on the cost of the bank tax to their customers, and the Program-Law 

envisages a fine for breaches of this prohibition. 

1.3  The  draft  law  proposes  to  increase  the  two  abovementioned  bank  tax  rates  to  bring  them  to, 

respectively, (1) 0,15205 % on the first EUR 50 billion of the taxable base amount and (2) 0,20204 

% on the portion of the taxable base amount exceeding EUR 50 billion 7. The increase would enter 

into force on 30 December 2025 8. 

1.4  According to the Minister for Finance, the draft law aims to sustain the efforts being made to reduce 

the Belgian public finance deficit. 

2. 

General observations  

2.1  The  ECB  was  not  consulted  on  the  adoption  of  the  Law  of  3  August  2016,  nor  on  any  of  the 

amendments  made  to  it  prior  to  the  draft  law.  Therefore,  this  opinion  considers  the  draft  law  in 

conjunction with the Law of 3 August 2016, as amended from time to time. 

2.2  The ECB understands that the tax base is largely composed of credit institutions’ customer deposits 

and excludes inter-bank deposits. 

3. 

Monetary policy context  

3.1  From a monetary policy perspective, credit institutions play a special role in ensuring the smooth 

transmission  of  monetary  policy  measures  to  the  wider  economy.  The  envisaged  increase  in  tax 

pressure on Belgian credit institutions on the basis of deposits made by their customers (other than 

credit  institutions)  would  affect  those  credit  institutions  differently  depending  on  their  business 

models,  and  also  increase  their  overall  tax  burden,  creating  potential  distortions  and  increased 

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Program-Law  of  22  December  2023  (Loi-programme  du  22  décembre  2023,  Moniteur  belge,  29  décembre 
2023/Programmawet van 22 december 2023, Belgisch Staatsblad, 29 december 2023).   
Article 201/11 of the Code of miscellaneous duties and taxes, which also provides that the average amount of debts 
owed to customers is to be understood to mean the arithmetic mean of the amounts which, in accordance with the 
rules of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique in the context of territorial reporting, must be 
entered at the end of each month of the year in question in line 229 of table 00.20 ‘Debts owed to customers’ (column 
05, Total amount) of Schedule A.   
Article 6 of the draft law. 
Article 7 of the draft law. 

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heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy in Belgium and throughout the euro area. While 

Belgian  credit  institutions  remain  well  capitalised  and  still  make  sound  profits,  the  changing 

environment along the easing phase of monetary policy has necessarily led to downward pressure 

on their net interest margins. In this respect, the draft law might entail pro-cyclical effects, in a context 

where bank lending dynamics appear to be still recovering for households. The increased taxation 

on  the  basis  of  their  customer  deposit  base  would  incentivise  credit  institutions  to  reduce  the 

remuneration and attractiveness of deposits for households and firms, at their expense, and turn to 

other funding sources.  

3.2  The  costs  from  increased  taxes  could  also  lead  credit  institutions  to  tighten  the  conditions  under 

which they finance the economy, either indirectly through the potential adverse effects on their capital 

positions resulting from dampened profitability, or directly as they would still pass on part of those 

costs to borrowers. Indeed, the imposition of a specific fine for breaches of the existing prohibition, 

under Article 201/19 of the Code of miscellaneous duties and taxes, on credit institutions (and their 

branches) passing on the cost of the bank tax to their customers cannot change the basic fact that 

the financial conditions under which credit institutions operate determine the conditions under which 

they  finance  the  economy.  The  ability  of  individual  credit  institutions  to  maintain  adequate  capital 

positions, to continue to prudently build provisions for potentially increased future credit impairments, 

and to set conditions on deposits, lending and other banking services vis-à-vis their customers in 

adequation  with  the  ECB’s  monetary  policy,  needs  to  be  preserved.  Curtailing  this  ability  would 

undermine the smooth bank-based transmission of monetary policy measures to the wider economy, 

coming at the expense of the provision of credit to the Belgian economy and adversely affecting real 

economic growth9. 

4. 

Financial stability context 

4.1  The ECB has previously opined on draft legislation introducing taxes applicable to credit institutions 

in several Member States 10. It has, in this respect, underscored that, in general, imposing taxes on 

the  banking  sector  could  make  it  more  difficult  for  credit  institutions  to  build  up  additional  capital 

buffers, as their retained earnings will be reduced, making them less resilient to economic shocks. 

As a result, such taxes could have negative economic effects by limiting credit institutions’ ability to 

provide credit. It is essential that credit institutions have a sound capital base for them to fulfil their 

role as credit intermediaries within the economy. Higher costs and reduced credit supply, or higher 

costs of other banking services, can adversely affect real economic growth 11. 

4.2  As noted in paragraph 3, while the Belgian banking sector remains profitable and well-capitalised, 

the  costs  from  increased  taxes  could  adversely  affect  credit  institutions’  capital  positions  by 

dampening  their  profitability.  Furthermore,  as  the  bank  tax  is  calculated  on  certain  parts  of  the 

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11  

See  paragraph  3.2.2  of  Opinion  CON/2010/62,  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion  CON/2011/29,  paragraph  3.1  of  Opinion 
CON/2022/36, paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2023/9, paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2023/45, and paragraphs 3.4 
and 4.1 of Opinion CON/2025/41. All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 
See Opinions CON/2016/1, CON/2019/18, CON/2019/40, CON/2019/44, CON/2020/28, CON/2023/26, CON/2023/45 
and CON/2025/41. 
See paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion CON/2010/62, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2011/29, paragraph 3.1 of Opinion 
CON/2022/36,  paragraph  3.1  of  Opinion  CON/2023/9,  paragraph  4.1  of  Opinion  CON/2023/26,  paragraph  4.1  of 
Opinion CON/2023/45 and paragraph 4.1 of Opinion CON/2025/41. 

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balance sheet total and not on net profits, it also applies to credit institutions that are recording net 

losses, further damaging their resilience 12. In that regard, the bank tax may put additional pressure 

on  credit  institutions’  capacity  to  maintain  a  solid  capital  position  or  to  rebuild  buffers  in  an 

environment in which profits are lower and (credit) losses occur. In addition, the imposition of a levy 

on  customer  deposits,  which  constitute  a  stable  source  of  funding  for  credit  institutions,  may 

incentivise  them  to  switch  towards  less  stable  funding  sources,  such  as  short-term  wholesale 

funding.  Relying  on  less  stable  funding  sources  may  increase  the  likelihood  that  disruptions  to  a 

credit  institution’s  regular  sources  of  funding  will  erode  its  liquidity  position.  Moreover,  relying  on 

more  expensive  wholesale  funding  sources  may  further  negatively  affect  a  credit  institution’s 

profitability.  These  different  factors  should  be  properly  evaluated  in  order  to  ensure  that  credit 

institutions remain well positioned to absorb potential future losses 13.  

4.3  Furthermore, the bank tax may lead to fragmentation in the European financial system because of 

the heterogeneous nature of such taxes as between the banking sectors in different countries. The 

risk of double taxation for  credit institutions in other jurisdictions where a special bank tax  is also 

levied may be a further source of such fragmentation 14. 

4.4 

In the light of the above, the ECB recommends that, in order to assess whether its application poses 

risks to financial stability, and in particular whether it has the potential to impair the banking sector’s 

resilience and cause market distortion, the draft law should be accompanied by a thorough analysis 

of potential negative consequences for the banking sector 15. This analysis should set out in detail 

the specific impact of the bank tax on credit institutions’ longer-term profitability and capital base, 

access to funding and the provision of new lending and competition conditions in the market, and its 

potential impact on liquidity. 

5. 

Considerations relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 

5.1  The  bank  tax  is  narrowly  focused  on  deposits  of  customers  other  than  credit  institutions.  This 

disadvantages  credit  institutions  that  provide  critical  financial  services  to  the  public  against  other 

credit institutions that, for example, predominantly carry on trading activities without a large deposit 

base.  It  also  ignores  a  credit  institution’s  profitability  or,  more  importantly,  its  lack  of  profitability. 

Consequently, the bank tax is a drag on credit  institutions’ profitability, viability  and sustainability, 

and  exacerbates  the  difficulties  experienced  by  credit  institutions  that  are  already  loss-making  or 

barely profitable.  

5.2  While the Belgian banking system is currently well capitalised, lower or no net profits result in lower 

or no potential to retain earnings, which are important to sustain capital positions. The overall impact 

on credit institutions’ capital positions will depend on how they respond to the additional tax burden. 

Credit institutions may choose to offset the bank tax by reducing planned capital distributions, thereby 

maintaining their capital positions, or they may proceed with their original distribution plans, which, 

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14  
15  

See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2022/36 and paragraph 4.2 of CON/2023/45. 

See  paragraph 3.2 of  Opinion CON/2023/9, paragraph  4.3  of Opinion  CON/2023/26  and paragraph 4.2 of  Opinion 
CON/2023/45. 
See paragraph 4.3 of Opinion CON/2023/45 and paragraph 4.4 of Opinion CON/2025/41. 
See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2022/36, paragraph 3.7 of Opinion CON/2023/9, paragraph 4.6 of Opinion 
CON/2023/26, paragraph 4.5 of Opinion CON/2023/45 and paragraph 4.6 of Opinion CON/2025/41. 

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as a result of the impact of the bank tax, would erode their capital positions. This in turn would reduce 

credit  institutions’  ability  to  provide  loans  and  also  reduce  their  capacity  to  absorb  the  potential 

downside risks of an economic downturn. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 19 December 2025. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

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