REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the capacity and tasks of independent fiscal institutions in the EU
Date: 2025-12-17
Institutions: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: application of EU law, budget deficit, budget estimate, budget policy, fiscal policy, national budget, national expenditure, national planning, stability pact

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 17.12.2025  COM(2025) 767 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the capacity and tasks of independent fiscal institutions in the EU         {SWD(2025) 417 final}  
 
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 

on the capacity and tasks of independent fiscal institutions in the EU 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Council  Directive  2011/85/EU  on  requirements  for  budgetary  frameworks  of  the  Member 
States1  entered  into  force  in  December 2011.  It  was  an  important  part  of  the  legislative 
package  on  the  strengthening  of  economic  governance,  also  known  as  the  ‘six-pack’.  The 
Directive set, for the first time, minimum requirements for budgetary frameworks for Member 
States.  Taking  into  account  the  experience  since  2011,  the  whole  system  of  economic 
surveillance was recently reviewed, leading to a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact that 
entered  into  force  on  30 April  2024.  In  this  context,  Council  Directive  2011/85/EU  was 
amended by Council Directive (EU) 2024/12652. 

Directive  2011/85/EU 
introduced  minimum  requirements  for  systems  of  budgetary 
accounting  and  statistical  reporting,  rules  and  procedures  governing  the  preparation  of 
forecasts  for  budgetary  planning,  country-specific  numerical  fiscal  rules,  medium-term 
budgetary  frameworks,  and  mechanisms  that  regulate  fiscal  relationships  between  public 
authorities  across  sub-sectors  of  general  government.  While  the  review  covered  all  of  these 
provisions, looking at whether they were still relevant and had been understood and applied as 
intended,  the  review  also  considered  new  elements,  reflecting  developments  since  2011.  In 
particular, independent  fiscal  institutions  (IFIs)  have proven that they  can play an important 
role  in  informing  the  fiscal  policy  debate  and  fostering  sound  budgetary  practices  if  their 
institutional set-up is strong and they are well-resourced, and the fiscal implications of climate 
change have become more and more pressing. Directive (EU) 2024/1265 reflects the outcome 
of  the  review  and  negotiations  with  the  Council  and  European  Parliament,  resulting  in 
amendments  to  Directive  2011/85/EU,  which  must  be  transposed  into  national  law  by  the 
Member States by 31 December 2025. 

The  newly  amended  Article  16(1)  letter  b)  of  Directive2011/85/EU  states  that  by  31 
December 2025  and every five years thereafter  the Commission must report on the state of 
play  of  the  capacity  and  tasks  of  independent  fiscal  institutions  in  the  Union,  taking  into 
account the progress made since the entry into force of this Directive, building on the findings 
of  the  Commission’s  Fiscal  Governance  Database  and  consultations  with  relevant 
stakeholders, with a view to explore minimum standards”. To that end, the Commission has 
produced this report and an accompanying staff working document with individual fact sheets 
presenting key facts and characteristics for all 31 IFIs currently established in the EU and with 
a  summary  of  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  each  IFI.  The  fact  sheets  are  based  on 
information provided by the IFIs for the 2025 edition of the Commission’s Fiscal Governance 

1 
2  

OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 41. 
Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 and 
Council  Regulation  (EU)  2024/1264  of  29  April  2024  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  1467/97  on 
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure and Council Directive 
(EU)  2024/1265  of  29  April  2024  amending  Directive  2011/85/EU  on  requirements  for  budgetary 
frameworks of the Member States. 

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Database (IFI module) as well as on additional input received for the interim progress report3 
and  in  various  bilateral  exchanges  with  national  authorities  and  IFIs.  This  report  takes  into 
account information available by mid-October 2025, including national legislation adopted up 
to  then.  It  presents  general  conclusions  drawn  from  the  information  contained  in  the  fact 
sheets. 

The purpose of this report is to take stock of the tasks and capacity of EU IFIs with a view to 
facilitating mutual learning and the future development of IFIs. The information set out in this 
report will also serve as a baseline against which to compare follow-up stock-taking exercises. 
As already noted, the Directive calls on the Commission to report on IFI tasks and capacity 
once every five years. Not least this will offer useful insights  when it comes to assessing to 
what  extent  IFIs  have  the  capacity  to  perform  the  tasks  that,  from  2032,  will  become 
compulsory in accordance with the provisions of (EU) Regulation 2024/1263 of the Stability 
and Growth Pact4.  

The  purpose  of  this  report  is  not  to  assess  the  conformity  of  national  provisions  with  the 
amended  Directive.  Such  an  assessment  will  be  performed  following  the  expiry  of  the 
transposition deadline in accordance with EU law.  

The report is structured as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of developments 
since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  original  Directive  in  2011.  The  following  two  subsections 
summarise the current state of play with regard to the tasks and capacity, respectively, of EU 
IFIs.  The  latter  subsection,  in  turn,  covers  the  resources,  independence  and  communication 
activities of the IFIs. The final section of the report summarises the main findings. 

2. 

THE TASKS AND CAPACITY OF EU IFIS  

Developments since the entry into force of Directive 2011/85/EU 

2.1 
The evolving legal framework governing IFIs5 has no doubt been one of the driving factors 
behind the sharp increase in the number of IFIs observed in the EU over the last decade and a 
half. Figure 1 shows that a large number of new IFIs were established in the years following 
the global financial crisis and the new EU legislation that followed, in particular Regulation 
(EU) No 473/2013. Before that, only a handful of IFIs existed in the EU, albeit some of which 
had a long-standing history, such as WIFO in Austria, the CPB in the Netherlands, the Danish 
Economic  Councils  in  Denmark  and  the  Federal  Planning  Bureau  in  Belgium67.  More 
recently, IFIs have been set up in Member States that are not part of the euro area, including 
Czechia  and  Poland.  The  latest  IFI  to  be  established  is  Poland’s  Fiscal  Council,  which  is 

3  Interim  Progress  Report  on  the  implementation  of  Council  Directive  (EU)  2024/1265  of  29  April  2024 
amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. 
4 Articles 11 and 15 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. 
5 In addition to the Directive 2011/85/EU on  requirements for budgetary frameworks of the  Member States, it 
includes  Regulation  (EU)  No  473/2013  on  common  provisions  for  monitoring  and  assessing  draft  budgetary 
plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area. Outside of the EU 
legal framework, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, an 
inter-governmental  agreement  signed  in  March  2012,  also  contains  provisions  with  a  bearing  on  IFIs  in  most 
Member States, in particular in its Title III, which sets out the so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’. The 2024 reform has 
incorporated the fiscal compact into EU law.   
6 For the full name of the IFIs, see Annex 1. 
7  In  most  cases,  these  institutions  have  a  broader  mandate  than  the  typical  IFI,  having  been  set  up  before  the 
establishment of IFIs started.  

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expected to start operating on 1 January 2026. This brings the total number of IFIs in the EU 
up to 328. 

Figure 1. 

The number of IFIs in the EU since 2010 

Source: European Commission Fiscal Governance Database (2025 edition) 
NB. Poland is expected to have an operational IFI as from 2026.  

Five Member States have chosen to  have two  IFIs,  each  with  specific  IFI tasks9. In  all five 
cases,  one  of  the  two  IFIs  is  a  long-standing  institution  with  a  tradition  of  macroeconomic 
forecasting.  When  introducing  IFIs  in  the  national  fiscal  framework,  those  Member  States 
considered it efficient to let these institutions continue taking care of the task of producing the 
macroeconomic  forecast  underlying  the  government’s  budgetary  plans,  and  let  another 
institution  take care of  the  other  IFI task stemming  from  EU legislation,  i.e. monitoring  the 
compliance with fiscal rules, as well as, possibly, other IFI tasks such as assessing long-term 
sustainability or budgetary costing. The amendments to Directive 2011/85/EU explicitly allow 
a Member State to have more than one IFI, to cater for specific national contexts like these. 
Such  solutions  may,  however,  complicate  the  ambition  to  create  an  IFI  identity,  with  one 
institution clearly discernible by the public as the national fiscal policy watchdog10.  

There is also a group of IFIs that are attached to or embedded within a parent institution, such 
as  the  national  Court  of Auditors  (Finland,  France  and  Lithuania),  or  where  the  IFI  role  is 
assigned to an institution that also has other, non-IFI tasks (e.g. Austria/WIFO, Denmark, the 
Netherlands/CPB  and  CoS,  Luxembourg/STATEC,  Slovenia/IMAD).  Such  solutions  can 
enable  an  IFI  to  draw  on  existing  expertise  or  to  ‘borrow’  the  established  credibility  of  an 

8 This number includes institutions that have at least one of the IFI tasks listed in EU level legislation and that 
also meet the basic criteria for independence. Some Member States also have other institutions with tasks similar 
to those of IFIs, such as parliamentary budget offices, without these performing any of the formal IFI tasks (e.g. 
Austria, Greece and Portugal).  
9 These five Member States are Austria, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Slovenia. 
10  Recital  14  of  Directive  (EU)  2024/1265  therefore  states  that  ‘excessive  institutional  fragmentation  of 
monitoring tasks should be avoided’. 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
existing institution while benefitting from some budget protection. However, this again risks 
making  the  specific  role  of  the  IFI  less  easily  discernible,  which  could  complicate 
communication on fiscal matters with the public. 

As  national  fiscal  frameworks  should  be  allowed  to  reflect  specific  national  institutional 
characteristics and traditions, EU legislation on IFIs does not impose a ’one-size-fits-all’ but 
allows  room  for  country-specific  choices  and  a  degree  of  flexibility  regarding  the  exact 
interpretation or practical implementation of certain provisions. This has led to relatively large 
differences  between  EU  IFIs.  The  following  sections  offer  a  brief  overview  of  the  current 
situation regarding some of the key characteristics of IFIs. 

2.2 

The scope of EU IFI tasks  

The wide range of differences between EU IFIs is clearly visible in the scope of their tasks, 
whether  it  be  the  tasks  they  actually  perform  or  their  legal  mandates.  This  diversity  could 
reflect the fact that  until the recent  revision of the legal  framework,  EU legislation  required 
only a relatively narrow mandate for ’independent bodies’, covering mostly the production or 
endorsement  of  macroeconomic  forecasts  (for  the  euro  area)  and  the  monitoring  of 
compliance  with  national  fiscal  rules.  It  was  only  following  the  amendments  to  Directive 
2011/85/EU that these tasks were established as  IFI tasks in all EU Member States and that 
other  tasks  were  added.  As  a  result,  some  Member  States  considered  it  sufficient  to  only 
require their IFI to fulfil this narrow mandate, while others expanded it or, at the very least, 
gave the IFIs the freedom and the means to do so. This is reflected in the SIFI index, an index 
based on data collected by the Commission from EU  IFIs for the annual Fiscal  Governance 
Database Survey (Figure 2). It measures the scope of IFI tasks, weighted by the intensity with 
which they are pursued and the legal strength of their mandate. It is thus not an indicator of 
how efficient or independent they are or what impact they have on fiscal policy. As could be 
expected,  the  overall  index  shows  a  high  degree  of  stability  over  time,  although  a  few  IFIs 
have seen their index strengthen in recent years.  

Figure 2. 

Variation in the scope of IFI activity (SIFI index)  

Source: European Commission Fiscal Governance Database (2025 edition) 
N.B. The highest possible SIFI index value is 100. 

4 

 
 
 
 
Five  IFIs  reported  that  they  produce  the  underlying  macroeconomic  forecasts  for  the 
budgetary  plans  of  their  respective  Member  States.  A  further  14  IFIs  reported  that  they 
endorse  such  forecasts  either  themselves  or  through  a  committee  attached  to  their  IFI  or  in 
which  they  have  voting  rights.  Two  euro-area  Member  States  reported  that  their  IFIs  only 
assess such forecasts (Finland and France), while in most non-euro area Member States, IFIs 
reported  having  little  to  no  involvement  until  now  in  the  preparation  or  assessment  of  the 
macroeconomic forecasts.  

IFIs are somewhat less involved in budgetary forecasts, with about half of IFIs reporting that 
they  either  endorse  or  assess  budgetary  forecasts  before  budgetary  plans  are  adopted  by 
parliament. This does not mean that those IFIs base their assessments on a fully-fledged fiscal 
forecast  of  their  own,  as  most  do  not,  nor  does  it  mean  that  none  of  the other  IFIs  produce 
their  own  budgetary  forecasts,  since  some  IFIs  do  this.  Only  a  handful  of  IFIs  base  their 
assessments  on  quantitative  policy  costing  (e.g.  Austria  (FISK),  Belgium  (FPB),  Italy  and 
Netherlands (CPB)).  

All Member States except Poland reported that they have an IFI with a mandate to perform ex 
post monitoring of compliance with national fiscal rules, this being a core activity of IFIs, 
while almost as many reported that they also have a mandate to perform ex ante monitoring of 
compliance. 

Slightly  more  than  half  of  IFIs  reported  that  they  perform  some  form  of  long-term 
sustainability  analysis,  with  most  stating  that  this  task  is  explicitly  part  of  their  mandate. 
Reflecting the fact that sustainability analyses are a relatively resource-intensive activity and 
are often performed in addition to the other tasks mentioned above, primarily the more well-
resourced  IFIs  reported  carrying  out  this  task,  e.g.  IFIs  in  Austria  (WIFO),  Belgium  (FPB), 
Spain, Italy, the Netherlands (CPB), Portugal and Slovakia. Nevertheless, some smaller IFIs 
reported  being  active  to  various  degrees  in  this  area,  e.g.  IFIs  in  Austria  (FISK),  Czechia, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia (FC). Of those that reported no activity in the area of 
long-term sustainability, almost all were relatively small.  

Regarding  the  involvement  of  IFIs  in  the  first  round  of  national  medium-term  fiscal-
structural  plans  (MTFSP),  the  picture  is  varied,  which  may  reflect  the  fact  that  Member 
States have until the end of 2025 to transpose the amendments to Directive 2011/85/EU and 
have  had  limited  time  to  come  to  grips  with  the  new  EU  fiscal  governance  framework.  In 
addition, as already stated, Member States will not become legally required to involve the IFIs 
until 1 May 2032. Nevertheless, about half of Member States reported involving at least one 
IFI in some way in the first round of MTFSPs, mostly by having it endorse (or in some cases 
produce)  the  macroeconomic  forecasts  underlying  the  plan.  Some  IFIs  issued  their  own 
assessment of the plans even without being formally tasked with doing so. 

Similarly,  since  assessing  the  consistency,  coherence  and  effectiveness  of  the  national 
fiscal  framework  only  became  a  compulsory  task  following  the  amendment  to  Directive 
2011/85/EU, it is unsurprising that only a limited number of IFIs reported being active in this 
area  and  often  only  to  a  limited  extent  without  performing  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the 
framework as a whole.  

2.3 

The capacity of EU IFIs 

2.3.1  Financial resources and staffing  

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The level of financial resources made available to IFIs varies significantly between IFIs. The 
lowest  budget appropriations  reported  for 2024  were  EUR 100 000 (Luxembourg/CNFP), 
By  contrast,  some  stand-alone  IFIs  reported  significantly  higher  budgets  (around  EUR  11 
million in Spain)11. The median budget based on those IFIs able to identify their own budget 
was around EUR 900 000. Three IFIs were unable to indicate an amount as the financing for 
their  activities  was  reported  to  come  from  the  overall  budget  of  a  parent  institution,  over 
which  they  had  little  control  (Belgium/SPBR,  France  and  the  Netherlands/CoS).  The  wide 
range of budgetary appropriations mainly reflects the varying size of IFIs’ technical staff, but 
also a number of other institutional features described in further detail below12.  
Staffing levels vary between IFIs from around one full-time equivalent in Germany13 to 67 in 
Spain. The median staffing level is 6.5 staff members, while the two mid-quartiles spanned a 
range of 4 to 20 staff members14. As a measure of the analytical capacity of IFIs, the median 
number  of  economists  and  legal  experts  amounted  to  four  persons,  who  on  average 
represented around two thirds of total staff15. 

While offering a general picture, these numbers must nevertheless be interpreted with caution 
in  view  of  a  number  of  country-specific  factors.  For  example,  more  than  half  of  all  IFIs 
reported  receiving  varying  degrees  of  material  assistance  from  other  institutions.  Often  this 
comes in the form of common services such as IT, human resources and communications or 
in  the  form  of  premises  being  made  available  or  staff  being  seconded.  Moreover,  in  a  few 
cases,  the  numbers  reported  did  not  include  staff  resources  provided  through  attached 
committees  performing  the  task  of  endorsing  macroeconomic  forecasts  (Germany  and 
Slovakia).  

In the case of a number of IFIs, their budget appropriations overstated the available resources, 
as they were often based on a theoretical number of posts in the IFI, which were not always 
filled.  This  meant  that  in  reality,  the  IFI  used  less  than  their  allocated  budget,  sometimes 
significantly less. IFIs have struggled to fill posts for a number of reasons. The IFIs concerned 
often reported salary-related reasons, stating that they were unable to set staff pay levels but 
had to instead follow established civil servant pay scales, which made it difficult to attract and 
retain candidates with a suitable profile. Another reason related to cumbersome administrative 
procedures  delaying  recruitment  procedures,  which  in  turn  limited  the  pool  of  eligible 
candidates.  

Very few Member States reported having legal protections in place to ensure stable funding 
for  IFIs.  One  Member  State  had  introduced  a  law  that  requires  IFI  appropriations  to  be 
inflation-linked (Malta). Another had a requirement for IFI funding to be sufficient to cover a 
certain  number  of  IFI  activities  (Latvia).  In  another  Member  State,  there  was  legislation 

11  Some  of  the  largest  institutions,  which  have  mandates  that  go  beyond  IFI  tasks,  often  report  the  budget 
appropriation of the whole institution, which complicates comparisons with smaller IFIs.  
12 When comparing IFI budgets, it also has to be borne in mind that wage levels vary between Member States.  
13  Here,  the  task  and  staff  needs  of  endorsing  the  macroeconomic  forecast  are  covered  by  one  institutional 
member of the IFI, the Joint Economic Forecast group. 
14 For the larger institutions that also perform non-IFI tasks, the number of staff members reported was often the 
result  of  an  estimate  of  the  full-time-equivalent  devoted  to  IFI  tasks,  which  introduced  an  element  of 
subjectivity, or the overall staff number was reported without focusing on the IFI part, resulting in (much) 
higher staff numbers than for the Spanish IFI. 
15 Including managers, who often also do analytical work, the median rises to 5 and the average share  of total 
staff to around 80%. For some smaller IFIs, economists and legal experts as a share of total staff accounted for 
only  25-40%  (around  50%  including  managers),  further  limiting  their  capacity.  Other  categories  include 
administrative and other staff.  

6 

 
 
 
laying  down  that  state  budget  appropriations  may  only  be  reduced  in  duly  justified 
exceptional  circumstances  (Portugal).  In  other  Member  States,  established  practices  exist 
pursuing similar aims to those described above (e.g. in Austria), but they are not enshrined in 
law. 

2.3.2 

Independence 

The capacity of an IFI to influence fiscal policy is not only related to its budgetary resources 
or the number of qualified staff (see previous sub-section), but also to the independence of the 
institution. If an IFI is not perceived as independent, its analysis and opinions risk being seen 
as biased and will subsequently gain less traction in the discussions. There is no single best 
way to measure the independence of an IFI. However, key institutional features coupled with 
indicators  concerning  the  IFI’s  ability  in  practice  to  act  and  communicate  freely  within  its 
remit can capture many of the most important aspects for guaranteeing independence16.  

A first line of defence against undue interference is to have legislation in place that prohibits 
IFIs  from  taking  instructions  from  anyone.  Around  half  of  EU  IFIs  are  covered  by  such 
provisions.  A  further  third  have  more  general  references  in  the  legislation  to  the  institution 
being  independent.  As  the  amendment  to  Directive  2011/85/EU  explicitly  includes  a 
requirement  to  prohibit  IFIs  from  taking  instructions,  Member  States  that  have  not  yet 
introduced a specific provision to that effect will be required to do so. 

Another criterion, the aim of which is to ensure that suitable persons are appointed to lead the 
IFI, either as Head of the institution or as a member of its leadership17, is to have transparent 
appointment procedures and adequate professional competence requirements in place. Most 
IFIs  have  appointment  procedures  grounded  in  law,  although  representatives  of  the 
government, in particular from the Ministry of Finance, often have a strong influence over the 
nomination  procedure,  carrying  with  it  some  risk  of  self-interested  bias.  In  Portugal  and 
Greece,  nomination  procedures  draw  on  a  wider  group  of  stakeholders,  involving  the 
President of the Court of Auditors and the  governor of the central bank. In Ireland, an open 
competition  is  publicly  announced,  following  which  a  shortlist  is  drawn  up  by  a  selection 
committee,  comprising,  among  others,  the  incumbent  chair  of  the  IFI  and  an  external 
stakeholder. In Italy, candidates are chosen from a list of ten people, short-listed by the budget 
committees of both houses of parliament, according to a two-third majority rule.  

With  regard  to  professional  competence  requirements,  almost  all  IFIs  have  rules  or 
legislation in place that specify the required qualifications and experience needed to assume a 
leadership  function,  often  with  an  emphasis  on  economics  and  public  finance  expertise. 
However,  there  are  also  cases  where  professional  requirements  are  set  out  in  more  general 
terms (in particular in institutions that also have non-IFI tasks) or where criteria are used that 
may unnecessarily restrict the pool of candidates, such as a requirement to be a citizen of the 
Member  State  in  question.  In  the  case  of  a  few  IFIs,  no  explicit  professional  competence 
requirements exist, although the leadership is in reality very well qualified. 

16 The resources at the disposal of an IFI also contribute to its independence as they set the limits on what it can 
do. Also, being recognised as a key player in the fiscal policy debate by successfully reaching out to stakeholders 
(the topic of sub-section 2.3.3) affects its independence. Together, these elements build the capacity of the IFI. 
17 Most IFIs have a structure based on a Board with a Chair and a few members, seconded by a secretariat with 
technical experts to assist the Board in producing analysis and reports etc. However, exceptions exist, e.g. AIReF 
of Spain, which is led by a one-person Presidency, supported by an Executive Committee consisting of the Heads 
of the four Divisions in AIReF. 

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An  essential  guarantee  of  the  independence  of  IFIs  is  their  ability  to  communicate  freely 
(note that more practical aspects of this criterion are examined in the next sub-section).  IFIs 
in all Member States except France (whose IFI can publish opinions only on a defined list of 
budgetary laws) enjoy a formal right to communicate freely. A similarly important guarantee 
concerns  IFIs’  right  to  access  information  and  the  application  of  this  right  in  practice. 
Around three quarters of IFIs enjoy a legal right to access the information needed to perform 
their tasks. Other IFIs have this right codified via formal agreements.  In the case of a small 
number  of  IFIs,  this  right  is  neither  laid  down  in  law  or  in  a  formal  agreement.  However, 
experience shows that a formal right by no means guarantees timely and complete access to 
information  in  practice.  In  order  to  address  this,  some  IFIs  have  signed  memoranda  of 
understanding  or  similar  agreements  specifying  the  content,  timeline  and  format  of  the 
information to be supplied. Nevertheless, issues still arise, often in relation to budgetary data 
and information on fiscal measures included in budgets and government plans.  

In order to ensure that fiscal policy discussions are well informed and to strengthen the role of 
IFIs  in  such  discussions,  it  is  important  that  IFIs  engage  in  ongoing  dialogue  with  the 
government  on  critical  fiscal  policy  issues.  This  can  happen  spontaneously  or  may  be 
encouraged  by  a  legal  obligation  for  the  authorities  to  either  comply  with  the  various 
assessments  and  opinions  of  the  IFI  or  to  explain  why  they  do  not  intend  to  do  so;  this 
‘comply-or-explain’  principle  is  now  included  in  Directive  2011/85/EU  and  will  need  to  be 
transposed into national law by 2026. In most Member States, the comply-or-explain principle 
has, until now, only really been applied in relation to the correction mechanism, i.e. when a 
Member State is found not to have complied with a fiscal rule18. It is generally less common 
for  the  authorities  to  be  under  such  a  legal  obligation  in  relation  to  other  assessments  and 
opinions issued by IFIs. In some Member States, in particular those in which the IFI is a long-
standing institution (e.g. Denmark and the Netherlands/CPB), it is an established tradition that 
the government responds to the assessments of the IFI, also in the fiscal area, even without a 
legal  obligation  to  do  so.  Conversely,  the  existence  of  a  legal  obligation  does  not  in  itself 
guarantee a meaningful reaction or wide media coverage of any interactions between the IFI 
and the government.  

Another key stakeholder for IFIs is the national parliament. By meeting with lawmakers and 
responding to their questions on fiscal policy IFIs can potentially come to be seen as neutral 
arbiters  on  fiscal  issues  and  have  the  opportunity  to  convey  their  opinions.  Although  most 
Member States usually invite IFIs to hearings, only a few Member States have an actual legal 
obligation to do so, but in most it usually happens anyway. In 2024, around a third of all IFIs 
appeared in parliament at least four times.  In contrast, a quarter were not  invited at all. The 
practice of IFIs responding to parliamentary questions is not very widespread in the EU. Half 
of IFIs did not engage in this activity  at all in 2024, while only  a handful did so more than 
four times.  

Finally, IFIs can strengthen their independence by regularly undergoing external evaluations 
by  independent  evaluators.  External  evaluations  usually  result  in  recommendations  for  both 
the IFIs and for the authorities on how to improve the  organisation, work and impact of the 
IFI. Although this practice has so far not been very widespread in the EU, with around two 
thirds of IFIs having never undergone such an evaluation, the amended Directive makes such 
evaluations  compulsory  in  future.  Currently,  where  evaluations  are  carried  out,  they  are 
mostly voluntary. In cases, where there is  a legal framework or long-standing experience of 

18 This follows from an obligation established in the Fiscal Compact agreement. See footnote 5. 

8 

 
 
 
evaluations,  they  are  normally  carried  out  at  appropriate  intervals,  namely  every  4-6  years 
(e.g. Lithuania and Ireland). 

2.3.3  Communication 

A third aspect underpinning the capacity (and independence) of IFIs is their ability in practice 
to reach a wide audience, and to consequently build a reputation for technical expertise and 
impartiality among key stakeholders – including the general public –and to make themselves 
an  indispensable  reference  point  in  fiscal  policy  discussions.  IFIs  that  attach  importance  to 
external  communication,  that  use  a  range  of  channels  and  outlets  to  convey  their  messages 
and that actively adjust their communication strategy based on its impact  are more likely to 
leave their mark on the fiscal policy discussions than more passive institutions. Smaller IFIs 
may have difficulties developing such communication activities. 

With regard to  communication in a more formal sense, about a third of IFIs  have a specific 
communication  strategy  and  two  thirds  assign  a  formal  external  communication  role  to 
the chair.  In  practice, one of the most common  means of external  communication is  for the 
head of the IFI to be interviewed on mainstream TV, radio or in daily newspapers. Three 
quarters of IFIs reported that interviews had occurred regularly throughout 2024, with some 
linked to the release of  IFI opinions/recommendations. A similar share of IFIs also reported 
issuing press articles (op-eds. etc.) in mainstream domestic media. Another common means 
of  communicating  was  through  press  releases,  with  half  of  IFIs  reporting  that  they  had 
released  at  least  seven  press  releases  in  202419  and  a  further  quarter  releasing  at  least  four. 
Press conferences were less common, with only a third of IFIs holding at least three in 2024, 
a further third holding just one or two and another third holding none at all. 

the 

Spain, 

largest 

institutions 

Italy,  Luxembourg/STATEC,  Netherlands/CPB, 

Around  half  of  IFIs  reported  having  at  least  one  part-time  staff  member  specialised  in 
external  communication.  Unsurprisingly, 
(Austria/WIFO, 
Portugal, 
Belgium/FPB, 
Slovenia/IMAD  and  Slovakia)  or  those  embedded  in  larger  institutions  (Finland,  Lithuania 
and the Netherlands/CoS) had better access  to  specialised communication staff than smaller 
ones  which,  bar  a  few  exceptions,  generally  had  no  communication  specialists.  More  than 
three  quarters  of  IFIs  had  at  least  one  social  media  account.  IFIs  with  no  social  media 
presence tended also to be those least likely to organise press conferences or conferences in 
general or to participate in conferences organised by others. Those same IFIs also tended not 
to track their media impact in any way, contrary to two thirds of IFIs which reported doing 
various degrees of tracking.  

3. 

CONCLUSION 

When  EU  legislation  with  a  bearing  on  IFIs  was  introduced  in  2011  in  the  wake  of  the 
financial crisis, only around a dozen Member States had IFIs and in several cases, the tasks of 
those IFIs had not been fully established. By 2018, a large number of additional IFIs had been 
established and as of now, all Member States have – or will shortly have – an IFI (the Polish 
IFI  will  be  operational  from  1 January  2026).  Furthermore,  since  2011,  many  IFIs  have 
established  themselves  as  important  actors  in  national  fiscal  policy  discussions,  due  to  the 
quality of their analyses. 

19  Including  larger  institutions  that  also  have  non-IFI  tasks,  meaning  that  not  all  press  releases  were  not 
necessarily linked to IFI matters. 

9 

 
 
 
In order to respect the different administrative traditions in Member States and to encourage 
national ownership, EU legislation allowed Member States significant room for manoeuvre in 
deciding how to implement the various provisions which, in any case, mostly concerned only 
euro area Member States. This resulted in a large differences between EU IFIs, most visible in 
the scope of the tasks assigned to them and resources allocated to them to pursue these. Major 
differences  between  EU  IFIs  also  exist  regarding  independence  safeguards,  such  as  legal 
protections against outside interference and the practical ability of IFIs to attract suitable staff 
and  to  obtain  all  information  they  require  in  a  timely  manner.  Similar  diversity  can  also  be 
seen  in  the  ability  of  IFIs  to  reach  out  to  various  stakeholders  and  the  public,  with  larger 
institutions generally having a more elaborate communication machinery in place. 

Institutions already established prior to the entry into force of IFI legislation more often tend 
to operate according to established practice and unwritten rules than more recently established 
IFIs.  While  this  is  indicative  of  a  high  degree  of  national  ownership,  the  aim  of  the 
amendments  to  Directive  2011/85/EU  is  ultimately  to  formally  anchor  these  practices  in 
national legislation in order to provide increased protection.  

Experience has also shown that it is possible to make significant progress in a relatively short 
space of time. Examples from Spain, Ireland and Portugal show that if IFIs are given the right 
framework conditions, they can relatively quickly establish themself as strong actors in fiscal 
policy discussions.  

The level  of financial and human resources  assigned to  IFIs has also  been shown to  greatly 
influence what an IFI can do. This not only concerns the number of tasks IFIs can cover, but 
also how thoroughly they can pursue those tasks and how much they can invest in the crucial 
task  of  communicating  IFI  messages  to  key  stakeholders  and  the  wider  public.  With  the 
amendments  to  Directive  2011/85/EU  having  introduced  new  tasks  and  more  demanding 
independence  safeguards,  ensuring  that  IFIs  have  sufficient  resources  over  which  they  have 
full control will become all the more important in future. 

The information and analysis provided in this report, which will be updated in similar stock-
taking  exercises  in  the  future,  serve  as  a  basis  for  assessing  whether  IFIs  ‘have  built  up 
the 
sufficient  capacity’  ‘to  issue  an  opinion  on  the  macroeconomic  forecast  and 
macroeconomic assumptions underpinning the net expenditure path’20. In order to determine 
whether  an  IFI  fulfils  certain  ’minimum  standards’  with  regard  to  its  capacity  a 
comprehensive assessment of several characteristics of IFIs involving expert judgement, will 
be needed. Such standards require consideration to be given to both inputs and outputs, with 
the  former  covering  characteristics  such  as  those  captured  by  the  independence  criteria  laid 
down in the amendments to Directive 2011/85/EU, and the latter relating more to the scope 
and  quality  of  IFI  products  and  how  these  are  communicated.  In  this  regard,  the  external 
evaluations  called  for  by  the  amendments  to  Directive  2011/85/EU  will  be  particularly 
important  for  obtaining  a  more  granular  and  comprehensive  assessment  of  the  capacity  of 
IFIs. 

20  This  is  established  as  a  condition  under Article  11(2)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2024/1263  to  be  achieved  before 
such opinions become mandatory. 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 1. 

Member 
Sate 

Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) in the EU 

IFI – full name 

AT 

BE 

BG 
CY 
CZ 
DE 

DK 
EE 
EL 
ES 
FI 

FR 
HR 
HU 
IE 
IT 
LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 
NL 

PT 
RO 
SE 
SI 

SK 

-  Public  Sector 

Austrian Fiscal Advisory Council 
Austrian Institute of Economic Research 
Federal Planning Bureau 
High  Council  of  Finance 
Borrowing Requirements 
Fiscal Council of Bulgaria 
Fiscal Council of Cyprus 
Czech Fiscal Council 
Independent  Advisory  Board  to  the  Stability 
Council 
Danish Economic Councils 
Fiscal Council of Estonia 
Hellenic Fiscal Council 
Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility 
National Audit Office of Finland 

High Council of Public Finance 
Fiscal Policy Commission 
Fiscal Council of Hungary 
Irish Fiscal Advisory Council 
Parliamentary Budget Office 
National  Audit  Office  of  Lithuania  (Budget 
Monitoring Department) 
National Council of Public Finances 
National  Institute  of  Statistics  and  Economic 
Studies of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
Fiscal  Discipline  Council  of  the  Republic  of 
Latvia 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council 
Council of State 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
Portuguese Public Finance Council 
Romanian Fiscal Council 
Swedish Fiscal Policy Council 
Fiscal Council 
The  Institute  of  Macroeconomic  Analysis  and 
Development of the Republic of Slovenia 
Council for Budget Responsibility 

11 

IFI – 
acronym/short 
form 
FISK 
WIFO 
FPB 
HCF - PSBR 

FCB 
FCC 
CFC 
Advisory 
Board 
DEC 
FCE 
HFISC 
AIReF 
NAOF - 
FPMD 
HCPF 
FPC 
FCH 
IFC 
PBO 
NAOL - BMD 

CNFP 
STATEC 

FDC 

MFAC 
CoS - AD 
CPB 
CFP 
RFC 
SFPC 
FC 
IMAD 

CBR