COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the capacity and tasks of independent fiscal institutions in the EU
Date: 2025-12-17
Institutions: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: application of EU law, budget deficit, budget estimate, budget policy, fiscal policy, national budget, national expenditure, national planning, stability pact

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 17.12.2025  SWD(2025) 417 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL  on the capacity and tasks of independent fiscal institutions in the EU      {COM(2025) 767 final}  
 
 
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

Under Article 1(15) of Directive 2024/1265/EU, the Commission is asked to “report on the 
state of play of the capacity and tasks of independent fiscal institutions in the Union, taking 
into account  the progress made since the entry into force of  this Directive, building  on the 
findings  of  the  Commission’s  Fiscal  Governance  Database  and  consultations  with  relevant 
stakeholders, with a view to explore minimum standards” by 31 December 2025 and every 
five  years  thereafter.  To  that  end,  the  Commission  has  produced  a  report  and  this 
accompanying staff working document (SWD). The SWD contains individual fact sheets for 
all  the currently 31  IFIs in  the EU. The  fact  sheets  present  key facts  and  characteristics for 
each IFI and a summary of each IFI’s strengths and weaknesses.  

In line with the above-mentioned provision of the Directive, the fact sheets are based on the 
information  provided  by  the  IFIs  in  the  2025  edition  of  the  European  Commission  Fiscal 
Governance  Database  (IFI  module)  as  well  as  on  additional  input  received  for  the  interim 
progress report1 and in various bilateral exchanges with national authorities and IFIs.  

This SWD takes on board information available by mid-October 2025. As the transposition 
period regarding the amended Directive ends on 31 December 2025, this means that not all 
planned changes in national legislation on IFIs have yet been adopted by the Member States. 
The SWD only takes on board new legislation adopted by mid-October 2025. Hence, it does 
not  constitute  an  assessment  of  the  conformity  of  national  provisions  with  the  amended 
Directive.  Such  an  assessment  will  be  performed  following  the  expiry  of  the  transposition 
deadline in accordance with EU law. 

1 Interim Progress Report on the implementation of Council Directive 2024/1265/EU of 29 April 2024 amending 
Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) in the EU 

IFI – full name 

Austrian Fiscal Advisory Council 
Austrian Institute of Economic Research 
Federal Planning Bureau 
High Council of Finance - Public Sector Borrowing Requirements 
Fiscal Council of Bulgaria 
Fiscal Council of Cyprus 
Czech Fiscal Council 
Independent Advisory Board to the Stability Council 
Danish Economic Councils 
Fiscal Council of Estonia 
Hellenic Fiscal Council 
Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility 
National Audit Office of Finland 
High Council of Public Finance 
Fiscal Policy Commission 
Fiscal Council of Hungary 
Irish Fiscal Advisory Council 
Parliamentary Budget Office 
National Audit Office of Lithuania (Budget Monitoring Department) 
National Council of Public Finances 
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies of the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg 
Fiscal Discipline Council of the Republic of Latvia 
Malta Fiscal Advisory Council 
Council of State 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
Portuguese Public Finance Council 
Romanian Fiscal Council 
Swedish Fiscal Policy Council 
Fiscal Council 
The Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development of the 
Republic of Slovenia 
Council for Budget Responsibility 

Member 
Sate 
AT 

BE 

BG 
CY 
CZ 
DE 
DK 
EE 
EL 
ES 
FI 
FR 
HR 
HU 
IE 
IT 
LT 
LU 

LV 
MT 
NL 

PT 
RO 
SE 
SI 

SK 

IFI – acronym/ 
short form 
FISK 
WIFO 
FPB 
HCF - PSBR 
FCB 
FCC 
CFC 
Advisory Board 
DEC 
FCE 
HFISC 
AIReF 
NAOF - FPMD 
HCPF 
FPC 
FCH 
IFC 
PBO 
NAOL - BMD 
CNFP 
STATEC 

FDC 
MFAC 
CoS - AD 
CPB 
CFP 
RFC 
SFPC 
FC 
IMAD 

CBR 

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Austria – Austrian Fiscal Advisory Council (FISK) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce, assess or endorse annual and 
multiannual macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce, assess or endorse annual and 
multiannual budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 

Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

FISK voluntarily assesses the macroeconomic forecasts prepared by WIFO (the sister IFI) but does not endorse them officially. 

Performed according to its official mandate. Assessment of the budgetary forecasts after the adoption in the Parliament of the budgetary 
planning documents, based on FISK’s own forecast. 

Performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output. Costing of most relevant discretionary measures, e.g. using a microsimulation tool. 

Performed according to its official mandate with a 50-year horizon (corresponding to available statistical information concerning population, 
ageing etc.). Starting in 2021, FISK regularly publishes a fiscal sustainability report. The second report from 2025 was extended by a climate 
module. 
Both ex ante and ex post monitoring performed according to its official mandate for budget balance, debt and expenditure rules. 
Assessments of compliance with national and EU fiscal rules are reported twice a year (Compliance with fiscal rules report - in May/June; 
Annual report - in December) 

IFI performs ex-post forecast evaluation  Performed according to its official mandate in the Fiscal Advisory Council and Productivity Board Act. The last evaluation of macroeconomic 

and budgetary forecasts was published in November 2024 covering the period 2005-2023, detecting no systematic bias in WIFO and MoF 
forecasts. 
For FISK’s budgetary forecasts, the information is published in the FISK's forecast reports, providing a breakdown of fiscal forecast errors 
into macro based, revision based (i.e. revision of past data), discretionary measure based and a residual considered a “fundamental” fiscal 
forecast error. 

Involved in correction mechanism  Assesses circumstances and submits recommendations that activate, extend or end corrective measures according to Article 7 Federal Law 

Gazette I No. 30/2013. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  No involvement. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

No official mandate. FISK voluntarily assesses medium-term fiscal-structural plans prepared by MoF but does not endorse them officially. 
FISK assessed the first AT fiscal-structural plan from May 2025 in its “Report on Compliance with Fiscal Rules 2024-2029” from June 2025. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  This has so far not been part of the FISK’s tasks. 

Comply-or-explain requirement  Based on its own commitment, the government responds in a regular and meaningful manner. The statements are published on the MoF 

website. 

CAPACITY  

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Only the source of the funding is part of the law, but not the mechanism or the volume (Fiscal Advisory Council and Productivity Board Act 

Adequacy of funding 

of 2021 (Federal Act No. 226/I/2021; § 3 (11)) 
FISK considered funding comfortably adequate in 2024. Spent around 80% of appropriation of EUR 125.700. 

Number of Secretariat staff  6 (1 manager, 4 economists, 0.5 admin, 0.5 others (= research assistance)) 

Support from other institutions  The central bank provides support in the form of infrastructure (e.g. rooms, communication services) and human resources (office of the 

FISK with 6 full-time equivalents). Its budget also contains an ear-marked budget line for the FISK, which covers expenses related to 
meetings and conferences (e.g. catering), business trips, data acquisitions, software, office materials, print jobs, expense allowance for the 
President, costs of external seminars etc. This budget is freely and directly available/in the area of responsibility of the head of office. 

Procedures for stability of funds  No legal protection, but by convention, the FISK budget is indexed to inflation.   

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures 

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Ordinary law. Federal Law on the Establishment of the Fiscal Advisory Council, Federal Law Gazette I No. 149/2013. Updated by Fiscal 
Advisory Council and Productivity Board Act of 2021 (Federal Act No. 226/I/2021). 

15 Members (6 appointed by federal government, 3 by the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, 3 by the Federal Chamber of Labor, 1 by 
the Austrian Association of Municipalities, 1 by the Austrian Association of Cities and Towns and 1 by the Austrian Conference of Provincial 
Governors) are appointed for a term of six years, renewable more than three times. The President of the Fiscal Advisory Council is the 
highest-ranked member appointed by the federal government. The vice Presidents are the highest ranked members appointed by the two 
Chambers. If a member resigns before the end of a term, a successor is appointed for a term of office of six years, enabling some staggering 
of mandates. 
Members of the Fiscal Advisory Council must be recognized specialists in the fields of fiscal and budgetary matters and must not be bound 
by any instructions. They are not permitted to request or take instructions from the body by which they have been appointed or from any 
other organization. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  According to Article 2(2) of the Act of 2021: "The members of the Fiscal Advisory Council are not bound by any instructions. They must not 

Role of the Chair 

Policy dialogue with government 

solicit or follow any instructions from their respective nominating organizations nor from anyone else." 
In the event of a tie, the Chair has the deciding vote. They also represent the FISK to the public and are entitled to make decisions on urgent 
matters together with two other members appointed by the federal government, one member appointed by the Austrian Federal Economic 
Chamber and one member appointed by the Austrian Federal Chamber of Labour. 
FISK reports that, in 2024, the official government reaction took place after more than two months and did not elicit any meaningful media 
echo. Both the FISK’s President and/or Head of Office regularly exchange information with the Federal Minister on current developments 
and assessments in an informal, non-public manner. 

Interaction with parliament  2-3 parliamentary hearings/No parliamentary questions in 2024. By law, FISK is required to report its analyses and findings to the Austrian 
parliament on an annual basis. This usually takes place on two occasions:  In spring, to present and discuss the annual public finance report, 
and in autumn, to discuss the budget proposal. 
FISK has a legal right to access information (administrative authorities must reply to requests from FISK for information necessary to fulfil its 
tasks), but in practice, FISK reports that it is sometimes difficult to gather internal information, which instead is collected via informal 
channels. It also reports making use of informal channels and reports recent improvements in the transparency efforts of the government. 

Access to non-public information 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  As the staff of the Secretariat are employed by the central bank, the latter’s hierarchy is involved, and staff is subject to salary scheme of the 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
central bank. Application process must follow the central bank application procedure and formally, the application is approved by one 
member of the board of directors. However, the selection of suitable candidates is made by the FISK President and the head of the FISK's 
office. In the case of leadership positions or a specialist career position, a hearing is held beforehand, which is also attended by one member 
of the Board of Directors and the head of human resources. Both also participate in the subsequent decision-making process. 
FISK reports that it has so far never been subject to an independent external review. 

External review of the IFI 

Communication 
Freedom to communicate 
Explicit communication strategy  No 

FISK reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Leadership role in communication  According to the FISK charter, the President represents the Council and its resolutions externally. 

Number of press releases/conferences 
Visibility in media/Presence in social media 

FISK reports that, in 2024, it issued 4-6 press releases and organised 3-5 press conferences. 

FISK reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers and published articles in the 
mainstream domestic media regularly throughout the year, also on general fiscal and economic issues. It reports a presence in social media 
(X and LinkedIn). 

Media impact tracking  Performs a reach and target audience analysis concerning the website every year; weekly media response analysis. 

Staff specialised in communication  Temporary employment of a PR expert; FISK economists have received some training. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences 

FISK regularly organises its own conferences including outside experts. 

Summary: FISK primarily performs monitoring of compliance with fiscal rules, but also does forecasting and long-term projections and, more sporadically, 
costing  of  measures.  Its  assessment  of  the  budgetary  forecast  takes  place  only  after  the  adoption  of  the  budget  by  parliament.  FISK  considers  that  it 
currently  has  sufficient  resources  for  these  tasks.  The  Board  has  a  relatively  large  number  of  members  nominated  by  a  few  large  associations  and 
government organisations. FISK reports some progress on access to information. Government reactions to FISK assessments sometimes take longer than 
planned. . Interactions with the parliament is limited, which could partly be explained by the existence of a Parliamentary Budget Office, which performs 
other related tasks. Although FISK does not have an explicit communication strategy, it is relatively present in both traditional and social media, has a stand-
alone website and regularly organises conferences.  

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria – Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce, assess or endorse annual and 
multiannual macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce, assess or endorse annual and 
multiannual budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

Following its official mandate, WIFO produces the macro-economic forecasts used for fiscal planning for both the annual 
budgets and the medium-term plans. There is a legal obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts. 

No production/endorsement/assessment of budgetary forecasts 

Performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output 

Performed according to its official mandate with a horizon up to 2050. 

No 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  As WIFO produces the macroeconomic forecast used for budgetary planning, it cannot fulfil the external evaluation role 

(which is done by FISK). However, WIFO still evaluates its own forecasts on a voluntary basis from time to time. 

Involved in correction mechanism  No 
(De)activation of escape clauses  No 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

WIFI produced the macroeconomic forecast on which the MTFSP was based but was not involved in any assessment of the 
plan. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  No 

Comply-or-explain requirement  The government responds in a discretionary manner as it is not constrained by legislation, memorandum of understanding 

or commitment. The statements are published on the MoF website. 

CAPACITY  

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  No 

Adequacy of funding  WIFO reports that funding was adequate. Formally, payments must be approved by another institution, but WIFO reports de 

facto full spending autonomy. 

Number of Secretariat staff  WIFO reports 18.6 FTE staff responsible for IFI related tasks (11,5 economists, 7.1 others – mainly research assistants) 
Support from other institutions  Besides public sector funding (subsidies), WIFO receives about 40% of its funding from membership fees and publications, 
third-party funds, income from research grants, contract work and other revenues. 

Procedures for stability of funds  No 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations 
or binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedure  
Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

WIFO was founded in 1927 as a non-profit association. Its legal basis is the Austrian Association Law (VerG) and the 
association's own statutes. 

13 Members (1 President, 2 Vice-Presidents, Treasurer, Secretary, 8 members). The Board is elected by the General 
Assembly every 4 years with no staggering of mandates. Renewable more than three times. 

They should be relevant players in the Austrian Economy and represent their stakeholder organisations. The president or 
one of the two Vice Presidents should hold a university professorship in the field of economics with a special connection to 
the research agendas of WIFO. 
Prohibition against taking instructions  No explicit prohibition, but statutes heavily emphasise the scientific ethos of WIFO. 

Role of the Chair  The Chair has the deciding vote in case of equality of votes. Furthermore, s/he leads the high-level board meetings and 

together with the cashier agrees upon the conditions of employment for the director. 

Policy dialogue with government  The government responds in a discretionary manner as it is not constrained by legislation, memorandum of understanding 

or commitment.  

Interaction with parliament  WIFO is generally auditioned by the parliament, though there is no such legal obligation. Reports having attended one 

parliamentary hearing in 2024. 

Access to non-public information  The right to access to information is governed by a Memorandum of Understanding. WIFO reports having de facto full 

access. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  WIFO reports full autonomy in recruitment decisions. Reports having non-nationals on the Board. 

External review of the IFI  Occasionally on a voluntary basis, financed out of regular own annual budget. The latest one took place in 2021. Report not 

published. Next one planned to start in 2025. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  WIFO reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  WIFO has a non-published communication strategy and a staff unit for communication. 

Leadership role in communication  The communications department is a staff unit of the Executive Board and works closely together with the Board. 

Number of press releases/conferences  WIFO reports that, in 2024, it issued 9 press releases and organised 5 press conferences on the forecast. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  WIFO reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers and published 
articles in the mainstream media regularly throughout the year, also on general fiscal and economic issues. It reports a 
presence in social media. 

Media impact tracking  WIFO reports that it tracks the annual number of press quotes. 

Staff specialised in communication  WIFO has one press spokesperson, one expert in event management and social media and one expert in public affairs. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  WIFO reports that it regularly organises its own conferences including outside experts and that WIFO leadership regularly 

participate as speakers/discussants in conferences organised by others. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary: WIFO is a well-established institution, whose IFI role is limited to producing the macroeconomic forecast underlying the government’s budgetary 
planning. It is supported by a developed communication infrastructure. It reports no issues with access to information, although this access is only governed 
by a Memorandum of Understanding. WIFO is subject to external evaluations only on a voluntary basis and the resulting reports are not published. 

8 

 
 
 
 
Belgium – Federal Planning Bureau (FPB) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce, assess or endorse annual and 
multiannual macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce, assess or endorse annual and 
multiannual budgetary forecasts 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 

Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

In line with its official mandate, the FPB produces macro-economic forecasts used for fiscal planning for both the annual 
budgets and the medium-term plans. There is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the FPB forecasts. 

In line with its official mandate, the FPB produces budgetary forecasts, but the government is free to use its own forecasts 
for the national fiscal planning without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the FPB forecasts. Still, the 
budgetary forecasts of the FPB are public, constitute a de facto reference point and, in practice, the government forecasts 
for national fiscal planning do not deviate much from the FPB’s forecasts. Impact analysis through model simulations. 
Performed according to its official mandate. Quantification/policy costing at the FPB is generally done using specific models. 

Performed according to its official mandate. Macroeconomic scenario until 2070 based on assumptions regarding the 
evolution of the labour force, total factor productivity and the structural unemployment rate. The report is focussing on 
social expenditure linked to ageing. 
No 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  As FPB produces the macroeconomic forecast used for budgetary planning, it cannot fulfil the formal external evaluation 
role. However, FPB still produces a postmortem evaluation of its own macroeconomic forecasts which is submitted by law 
every three years to a scientific committee that issues an opinion. (The evaluation of the budgetary forecasts is assigned to 
the HCF, the other Belgian IFI).  

Involved in correction mechanism  No 
(De)activation of escape clauses  No 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

The FPB provided estimations of the expected (potential) growth and budget impact of some reforms underpinning the 
extension of the MTFSP. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  No 

Comply-or-explain requirement  The government has no obligation to react to FPB assessments.  

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  No. Funding mainly through government appropriations. Around 10% of total funding via conventions with third parties 

Adequacy of funding 

(research projects). 
FPB reports a need for more resources. Total budget appropriation of EUR 6.6 million in 2024 (based on a rough estimate of 
the IFI tasks within the FPB’s total package of tasks). 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Secretariat staff  48 (2 managers, 38 economists, 8 administrative staff, 6 others). These figures are an estimate of FPB staff devoted to IFI 

activities. The FPB adopted a procedure for selecting experts that is in accordance with its values of independence and 
transparency and with the emphasis it places on scientific skills. Job offers are widely disseminated. Candidates are 
preselected on the basis of transparent and objective criteria and interviews are conducted by an interview committee 
composed of in-house experts. 

Support from other institutions  No 
Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedure  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Ordinary Law of 21 December 1994 (M.B. du 23.12.1994) 

4 Board Members are appointed for nine-year mandates, renewable more than three times with staggered starting times. 
The FPB is managed by the Plan Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner and the Heads of the two departments in charge 
of analytical work, the General Directorate and the Sectoral Directorate. The recruitment procedure is not grounded in law 
but is - for the two Commissioners - determined by the Council of Ministers based on a proposal from the two ministers 
responsible for the FPB. 
Competences and experience required: Solid experience in management; thorough knowledge of macroeconomics, 
microeconomics and public finances; thorough knowledge of the Belgian economy; good knowledge of the Belgian 
institutional framework; good knowledge of the European and international institutional framework; good understanding of 
the political decision-making process.  

Prohibition against taking instructions  No such provision exists, nor any legal provision mentioning explicitly that the FPB is statutorily an independent institution. 

Role of the Chair  The Commissioners are in charge with the daily management of FPB and are responsible for the proper execution of the 

budget. 

Policy dialogue with government  The government is not required to react to the FPB reports. The FPB does not initiate any formal policy dialogue with the 

Interaction with parliament 

government but often presents the results of its analyses to the team(s) of the competent ministers and is available for 
questions. 
FPB reports that, in 2024, it participated in 4-6 parliamentary hearings and replied to 4-6 parliamentary questions. 

Access to non-public information  Privileged but limited. Governed by Art.128 of the law of 21 December 1994. The FPB reports that access to some regional 

information is not systematic but reported no issues for 2024. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes, but the wage scales used in the public sector are applied to the FPB. 

External review of the IFI  Yes, occasionally on a voluntary basis. The latest evaluation took place in the framework of a European Commission-led 

Technical Support Instrument project and was published in October 2023. Its conclusions were not discussed in parliament. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The FPB reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  Yes, but not yet publicly available. 

Leadership role in communication  No 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of press releases/conferences  The FPB reports that, in 2024, it issued more than 10 press releases and organised 3-5 press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The FPB reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly 

throughout the year, also on general fiscal and economic issues, but published no articles in the national press. It has a 
presence in social media. 

Media impact tracking  The FPB reports that it tracks the number of citations in the media. 

Staff specialised in communication  Yes 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The FPB reports that its leadership regularly participate as speakers/discussants in conferences organised by others. 

Summary: The FPB is a relatively large IFI with a fairly broad mandate. While the FPB has an active interaction with parliament, the policy dialogue with the 
government is not a well developed practice. The procedure for the nomination of Board Members is dominated by the government and is not established 
in law. Mandates are relatively long with no restrictions on reappointments, which could potentially dampen adaptability. However, following the external 
review by the OECD in 2023, its recommendations are now feeding organisational improvements. There is currently no legal requirement to undergo such 
evaluations in the future though. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Belgium – High Council of Finance - Public Sector Borrowing requirements (HCF - PSBR) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce, assess or endorse annual and 
multiannual macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce, assess or endorse annual and 
multiannual budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

No production/endorsement/assessment of macroeconomic forecasts 

No production/endorsement/assessment of budgetary forecasts 

No quantification of effects of policies. 

No assessment of long-term sustainability. 

In line with its official mandate, the HCF (its permanent Section 'Public sector borrowing requirements', PSBR) should perform ex post 
monitoring of compliance with the budget balance rules at general and local government level. However, as the (multiannual) 
budgetary agreements between the different layers of government have not been concluded since 2014, this monitoring task cannot 
be officially executed. Only an indicative evaluation is possible (without applying any corrective mechanism). 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  According to the Royal Decree of 23 May 2018 and the Cooperation Agreement of 22 May 2014, the PSBR Section is assigned the task 
of evaluating the forecasts underlying the budgetary planning of the government. The HCF-PSBR reports that this task has never been 
well described and that the logic of assigning this to the PSBR is thus not clear. Therefore, this task has until now never been executed 
by the PSBR Section (the structural understaffing of the Secretariat is also a contributing factor). On the other hand, the sister IFI, the 
Federal Planning Bureau, carries out some ex-post evaluation of its own macro-economic projections. 
In line with the Cooperation Agreement of 13 December 2013, the PSBR Section is to formulate a recommendation on the extent of 
the corrective measures to be taken in case of a significant deviation. However, this task has not yet been implemented due to the 
absence of (multiannual) budgetary agreements between the different layers of government. 

Involved in correction mechanism 

(De)activation of escape clauses  The PSBR Section reports involvement for the budget balance rules at general and local government level.  

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

No 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  The PSBR Section has never made an official evaluation of the consistency, coherence and effectiveness of the national fiscal 

framework. However, in its reports and recommendations, it sometimes makes qualitative recommendations regarding the national 
fiscal framework. For example, chapter 4 of the July 2024 Advice presents some key reflections of the PSBR Section on the new 
European budgetary framework and on the recommendation of an internal stability and growth pact for Belgium. 
Comply-or-explain requirement  Based on its own commitment, the government responds in a regular manner and in a broad sense to the written 

opinion(s)/recommendation(s)/finding(s) of the IFI. According to the Cooperation Agreement of 13 December 2013 with the 
governments at various levels, the PSBR Section has a monitoring task and in the case of a significant deviation the concerned 
government(s) must justify immediately the deviation and take corrective measures. 

12 

 
 
 
 
CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes.  

Adequacy of funding  The HCF-PSBR reports that they are structurally understaffed (See Number of Secretariat staff) and has no knowledge of the size of its 
budget, as the operating costs are still covered by the budget of the Federal Public Service Finance. The Royal Decree of 23 May 2018 
stipulates that to guarantee the independence of the HCF-PSBR, the latter needs to have sufficient resources. To this end, the 
operating costs of the PSBR Section and its Secretariat are to be covered by a specific program of the federal general expenditure 
budget that is reserved for independent institutions, such as the IFI. Both the federal government and the governments of regions and 
communities are to make contributions to this budget according to specific cooperation agreements between these parties, but no 
such cooperation agreements have so far been concluded. 
According to the Royal Decree of 2018, the PSBR Section can draw up its own internal regulation which may envisage the introduction 
of fees and reimbursement of costs of the Members of the Section. This may, however, prove difficult in practise, given recent legal 
judgments in similar cases. 

Number of Secretariat staff  The Secretariat's work is carried out by 2 FTE employees (3 part-time employees, one of whom is in training). In 2024, the manager 
also worked as an economist. The economists were also responsible for logistics, purely administrative tasks and a large part of the 
translations to the second national language French/ Dutch and to English. The whole staff combined their tasks for the PSBR Section 
with their tasks as employees of the Study Department of the Federal Public Service Finance. There is a structural understaffing of the 
Secretariat of the PSBR Section that is not in line with the Royal Decree of May 2018.  

The Royal Decree of 23 May 2018 stipulates that the members of the Secretariat of the PSBR Section have to be experts in the 
financial, fiscal and economic area. They are appointed by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Budget, on a recommendation 
from the Chair of the PSBR Section. There has to be as many Dutch-speaking Members of the Secretariat as French-speaking ones. Five 
members of the Secretariat are chosen among the staff of the Policy Expertise and Support Administration/Study Department of the 
FPS of Finance and the staff of the Budget and Policy Evaluation Administration of the FPS Policy and Support and another five 
Members are chosen among the staff of regional and community administrations, subdivided as follows: - two members of the 
Flemish Community; - one member of the Walloon Region; - one member of the French Community - one member of the Brussels-
Capital Region. A region or a community can only propose a member if it has concluded a cooperation agreement with the federal 
government, represented by the Minister of Finance. No such agreements have so far been concluded. All staff members of the 
Secretariat have to be civil servants appointed on a permanent basis or contractual employees with an indefinite contract. 
Support from other institutions  The Federal Public Service (FPS) Finance provides offices and meeting rooms for free to the Section ‘Public sector borrowing 

requirements’ (PSBR) and to the Secretariat of the Section. Nevertheless, due to the limited available meeting space and in addition to 
the energy-saving measures taken by the FPS Finance, the PSBR Section was in recent years regularly forced to move to another 
location: the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) meeting rooms (the Chairman of the PSBR Section is the Governor of NBB); 

According to the modifications referred to in the Royal Decree of 23.05.2018, the members of the Secretariat should consist of 5 
federal and 5 regional members according to the following rules:  
- 5 members coming from 1) the staff of the Federal Public Service FINANCE (more precisely the administration Policy expertise and 
Support/Study Department) and from 2) the staff of the Federal Public Service POLICY and SUPPORT (BOSA) (more precisely the 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Administration Budget and Policy Evaluation) and, 
- 5 members of the staff of the administrations of the federated entities (regions and communities). 

The regions and communities should contribute financially to the working of the Secretariat (for example: for the wages of their 
representatives in the Secretariat of the Section). However, these arrangements have so far not been applied, with the result that the 
Secretariat's work is currently carried out by three part-time employees, all civil servants of the Study Department of the Federal 
Public Service FINANCE. Moreover, these employees combine their assignments within the Secretariat with their tasks for the Study 
Department. Although a Royal Decree was adopted in February 2023 to regulate the legal status of the staff of the Secretariat, the 
secondment provided for therein has not yet been carried out.  

The PSBR Section does not have its own budget. All expenses (the Secretariat wages, the attendance fees and travel allowances of the 
Members of the Section, etc.) are charged to the FPS Finances, with the wages of the Secretariat staff paid from the overall wage pool 
of the FPS. The other expenses are charged to a separate HCF program in the general expenditure budget of the federal government. 
But there is no transparency about the budget available to the Section PSBR, not even for the Secretariat. Earlier attempts to get 
access to this information have failed. 

Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 

Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedure  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

The PSBR Section was established by royal decree of 20 June 1989. The latter was last modified by the royal decree of 23 May 2018 to 
bring the PSBR Section into line with the requirements set out in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union, especially the obligation to guarantee the independence of the IFI. This RD of 2018 and another 
executive RD of 3 February 2023 have still not been implemented. 
12 Members (of which 1 is Chair). The Chair of the PSBR Section is chosen from the 3 Members of the Section coming from the 
National Bank of Belgium. The Chair is formally appointed by the King (Royal Decree) after considering the advice received from the 
Ministers of Budget and Finance of the Regions and the Communities and after deliberation in the federal Council of Ministers. 
The Members of the PSBR Section are nominated jointly by the federal Minister of Finance and the federal Minister of the Budget and 
are formally appointed by the King (Royal Decree). 3 of the 12 are nominated by the National Bank of Belgium, 1 by the federal 
Minister of Finance, 1 by the federal Minister of the Budget and 1 is nominated jointly by the federal Minister of Finance and the 
federal Minister of the Budget. The other 6 members are nominated jointly by the federal Minister of Finance, the federal Minister of 
the Budget and the governments of the Regions and the Communities. The Government of the Flemish Community nominates 2 
Members and the Government of the Walloon Region and the Government of the French Community nominate 1 Member each. The 
Government of the Brussels Capital Region nominates 2 Members (a French-speaking and a Dutch-speaking Member). In total, the 12 
Members of the PSBR Section must be equally divided between Dutch-speaking and French-speaking Members. Besides these 12 
Members, the Government of the German-speaking Community also nominates 1 Member who has only an advisory vote in the 
assemblies of the Section. Mandates are five years, renewable more than three times.  
The Members must be particularly competent and experienced in finance, fiscal policy and economics. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  According to article 9 of the RD of 2018 “a member may not receive any instructions in the exercise of his mandate in particular from 

the government or institution that has nominated the member". 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Role of the Chair  The Chair of the PSBR Section (i) decides on the organisation of the activities of the Section, (ii) chairs the Section's meetings, (iii) leads 

the Secretariat and gives instructions to its Members, who are exclusively subject to the hierarchical authority of the Chair, (iv) 
ensures the external official representation of the Section. 

Policy dialogue with government  Based on its own commitment, the government responds in a regular manner and in a broad sense to the written 

opinion(s)/recommendation(s)/finding(s) of the IFI. According to the Cooperation Agreement of 13 December 2013 with the 
governments at various levels, the PSBR Section has a monitoring task and in the case of a significant deviation the concerned 
government(s) must justify immediately the deviation and take corrective measures.  
The recommendations and reports of the PSBR Section are advisory, not binding. The recommendations are generally not adopted in 
the Stability Program nor subsequently respected. As since 2014 no budgetary (multiannual) agreements have been signed between 
the different levels of government, the PSBR Section lacks the financial and human resources necessary to execute this monitoring 
task or to prescribe any corrective measures in an official way as provided for in the 2013 Cooperation Agreement. The Section is 
consequently limited to performing a non-official illustrative monitoring/evaluation.   
In 2024, the PSBR Section did not receive an official government reaction to its publications. 

Interaction with parliament  None in 2024. 

Access to non-public information  Access to some non-public information is regulated by cooperation agreements between the HCF and the Institute for National 

Accounts (INA) and the Federal Planning Bureau (FPB), respectively. According to the 2013 Cooperation Agreement, which has the 
force of law, the Governments must transmit to the HCF-PSBR the information needed for the monitoring of the implementation of 
the corrective measures in the case of a significant deviation from the fiscal targets. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  According to art. 12(7) of the Royal Decree of 23/05/2018, the legal situation, the allocation of wages, any allowances and premiums, 
and the reimbursement of actual expenses are to be determined by royal decree. The latter was adopted in February 2023 in order to 
regulate the legal status of the staff of the Secretariat, but it has not yet been implemented. The secondment provided for therein has 
not yet been carried out. Since 2018, the Secretariat operates with a staff that is only a fraction (less than 20%) of the staff foreseen in 
the royal decree. 
External review of the IFI  No such review has taken place or is required by law. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The PSBR Section reports being free to communicate at any time 

Explicit communication strategy  No 
Leadership role in communication  No 

Number of press releases/conferences  The PSBR Section reports that, in 2024, it issued 1-3 press releases but organised no press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The PSBR Section reports that, in 2024, it issued articles about its activities once or twice in the mainstream domestic media, closely 

linked to the release of opinions/recommendations by the PSBR Section but gave no interviews. It reports no presence in social media. 

Media impact tracking  No 

Staff specialised in communication  No, except one part time employee that is responsible for the publishing of the reports and recommendations of the PSBR Section on 
the website of the HCF and for informing stakeholders (government cabinets, parliamentarians, press and other people who asked to 
be on the mailing list) by e-mail about new publications. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  Members of the Secretariat occasionally participate in conferences organised by others . 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
Summary: Due to the fact that, since 2014, binding agreements on the budgetary objectives between the various levels of government  are missing, the 
HCF-PSBR  is  prevented  from  officially  performing  its  main  task  of  monitoring  the  compliance  with  fiscal  rules  and  playing  the  role  assigned  to  it  in  the 
correction  mechanism.  Besides,  the  HCF-PSBR  is  severely  hampered  in  its  activities  by  the  lack  of  a  financing  agreement  among  the  various  layers  of 
government, which has led to a lack of financial and human resources. It also partly explains why it hasn’t performed any ex-post assessment of forecasts 
and why the HCF-PSBR has a relatively poor visibility in the media. This is further hampered by the fact that the PSBR Section doesn’t have its own website 
and thus does not control the format of its external communication.  The government also plays a large role in nominating Members of the HCF and the 
staffing  of  its  Secretariat.  Rules  governing  nominations  are  heavily  influenced  by  regional  sensitivities  in  Belgium,  thereby  limiting  the  freedom  of 
recruitment of the Secretariat. Independence could also be negatively affected by the fact that the Governor of the central bank is a member of the PSBR 
Section. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bulgaria – Fiscal Council of Bulgaria (FCB) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

In line with its current mandate, the FCB assesses the official macroeconomic forecast. The assessment is published before the budgetary 
planning documents are submitted to parliament. No reconciliation procedure envisaged. The government would just proceed with its own 
projections without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the FCB forecasts. 
In line with its current mandate, the FCB assesses the budgetary forecasts before the budgetary planning documents are adopted by 
Parliament. The government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the FCB 
forecasts. 
No quantification of effects of policies. 

The FCB produces and presents to the Budget Committee in Parliament long-term fiscal projections. 

In line with its mandate, the FCB monitors ex ante and ex post the compliance with the budget balance and expenditure rules at general 
government level and the debt and budget balance rules at local government level. The Council regularly reports its analysis to the Sub-
Committee on Fiscal Issues in Parliament. The latest such session took place on 30 September 2025. 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  The FCB performs an ex-post evaluation of the budgetary forecast. 

Involved in correction mechanism  The FCB monitors the implementation of automatic correction mechanisms by producing a reasoned opinion on the existence of a 

significant deviation from the medium-term budgetary objective for the structural deficit and the corrective plan. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  According to Art. 6(1) of the Law on the Fiscal Council and Automatic Corrective Mechanisms, the FCB drafts a reasoned opinion on the 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

existence or termination of extraordinary situations under Article 24 of the Law on the Public Finance and shall notify the minister of finance 
thereof. 
The FCB makes its analyses on the medium-term fiscal-structural plans publicly available and engages Parliament in discussion on significant 
deviations. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  Not a compulsory task. The FCB has proposed improvements to the framework, including the introduction of a Medium-Term Expenditure 

Framework (MTEF), the regulatory implementation of public expenditure reviews, and the enhancement of the capital expenditure 
management framework.  

Comply-or-explain requirement  The legal provision says the following: “The reasoned opinions and recommendations of the Council are not binding. When the Council of 
Ministers does not accept those of them that are relevant to it, it must be motivated in writing.”.  

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes 

Adequacy of funding  The FCB has signalled a need for more staff (see next item). The FCB’s budget is a separate line item in the National Assembly (NA) budget, 

which uses a programme-based classification system. Expenditure is subject to processing by the NA administration. Ther FCB reports no 
cases of politically motivated restrictions. The planned budget appropriation for 2024 of EUR 814.000 was only used to around 2/3 (EUR 
543.000). The main reason was the number of unfilled expert positions, but since two staff positions for communications were filled after 
the new FCB Board was approved by Parliament in March 2025, the execution gap is expected to narrow. 

Number of Secretariat staff  The FCB technical staff currently consist of five experts (3 economist and 2 communication experts). With euro zone entry and the new EU 

fiscal framework, the FCB has reported to Parliament a need for several more experts, divided into one department focusing on 
macroeconomics (forecasts and analyses) and another on fiscal matters (fiscal rules, forecasts and analyses), plus a separate administrative 
apparatus (technical secretary, public relations etc.). Since 2025, experts at the FCB are included in the bonus system at Parliament, 
implying that they receive another monthly salary after each session of Parliament. The FCB also reports that it can hire experts on 
temporary contracts, which are not bound by the rules of salary ceilings. 

Support from other institutions  The FCB receives support in the form of premises, and coverage of some administrative services, such as accounting, IT support, HR 

assistance etc. from the National Assembly administration. 

Procedures for stability of funds  No  

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations 
or binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  
Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Ordinary law. The Law of Fiscal Council and Automatic Correction Mechanisms. 

The five Members (1 Chair, 4 Members) are elected by the National Assembly for a period of six years, renewable once with simultaneous 
start. 

The members of the FCB shall be persons of high morals with at least a master’s degree in economics and with no less than 10 years of 
professional experience in the field of macroeconomic analysis and/or public finance management. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  The Law of Fiscal Council and Automatic Correction Mechanisms prohibits taking instructions from the Council of Ministers or any other 

body and institution. 

Role of the Chair  The Chair of the FCB shall: 

1. represent the FCB; 
2. inform the public about the opinions and the recommendations of the FCB; 
3. convene and preside over the meetings of the FCB; 
4. administer the activities of the FCB; 
5. submit the opinions and/or recommendations to the relevant authorities; 
6. deliver an annual report on FCB activities to the National Assembly by end-February of the following year. 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy dialogue with government  The FCB reports that the Council of Ministers has never published official responses. Certain individual recommendations that the FCB made 
in its opinions were accepted by the Ministry of Finance. This was explicitly stated in their analytical documents accompanying the budget or 
the report on its implementation but not in the form of a formal response to the FCB opinions. The communication takes place during the 
hearings in the Parliamentary Committee on Budget and Finance after the budget has been submitted to the Parliament. The FCB reports 
that, in 2024, there was no government reaction. 

Interaction with parliament  None in 2024, but the FCB reports an improvement in 2025. 

Access to non-public information  Access to information reported to be regulated in legislation and via (unpublished) MoU. Despite this, the FCB reported issues of non-access 

(or late or partial access) in 2024 but also some improvements in 2025. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Only partly, as salaries of the technical staff of the FCB are determined by the rules for the administration in the National Assembly of 
Bulgaria and not by the FCB, as the staff are part of the administration of the former. 

External review of the IFI  The FCB reports that the latest external review took place in 2016/17 and that a new one is planned for 2026. Currently no legal 

requirement for the FCB to undergo such reviews. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The FCB reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  Yes, adopted in mid-2025. 

Leadership role in communication  Yes, a Communications Manager with long experience in media was hired in March 2025 and a second expert, specializing in social media, 

was added to handle the increased traffic. 

Number of press releases/conferences  The FCB reports that, in 2024, it issued 10 press releases but organised no press conferences. Thanks to the staff reinforcements, a 

significant increase in the number of press releases has taken place in 2025. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The FCB reports that, in both 2024 and 2025, its members have been interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly 

throughout the year, also on general fiscal and economic issues and it issued articles once or twice in the mainstream domestic media, 
closely linked to the release of opinions/recommendations by the FCB. Since 2025, the FCB has a significant presence in social media, both 
through its Facebook and LinkedIn accounts.  

Media impact tracking  Yes, monthly reporting and analysis – also done by an external provider (September 2025 media report). 

Staff specialised in communication  Yes, two staff hired in 2025. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  Yes, by October 2025, the members of FCB had participated in more than a dozen such events, a number that is likely to increase 

significantly in the final months of the year due to Bulgaria’s pending entry into the eurozone. 

Summary: The FCB has a relatively narrow mandate, monitoring compliance with fiscal rules and assessing the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts, 
which  is  about  to  be  broadened  following  the  euro  area  entry  of  Bulgaria  in  January  2026  and  the  introduction  of  the  requirements  of  the  reformed 
economic  governance  framework  in  the  national  legislation.  It  does  not  produce  its  own  forecasts  or  perform  policy  costing.  The  FCB  reports  recent 
progress on its ability to offer more competitive  salaries for its  experts. The six-year mandates of Members are not  staggered, underlining the need  for 
transparency in the appointment process. Despite having a legal right to access to information and a (non-public) MoU with the Ministry of Finance, the FCB 
reports having experienced some issues with the timeliness and completeness of information, albeit with some recent improvements. The policy dialogue 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
with  the  government  is  not  fully  developed  and  the  FCB  reports  that  the  comply-or-explain  requirement  is  not  fully  respected/applied.  Despite  being 
attached to the parliament, the FCB reports only  limited interaction with the National Assembly. Some recent improvements in external communication 
have been achieved. 

20 

 
 
 
 
Cyprus – Fiscal Council of Cyprus (FCC) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

Official endorsement of the government’s macroeconomic forecasts used for fiscal planning for both the annual budgets and 
the medium-term plans. The FCC bases its assessment on forecasts produced by other institutions. If there is disagreement, 
the MoF will call for a meeting with the FCC. The government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the FCC’s 
forecasts have to be justified publicly 
In line with its official mandate, the FCC assesses the budgetary forecasts before the budgetary planning documents are 
adopted by parliament. The FCC does not produce a fiscal forecast of its own. The government generally consults the fiscal 
institution but is not obliged by law to do it. There is no formal consultation of the fiscal institution by the parliament in the 
planning stage of the budgetary process. 
Performed according to its official mandate. 

No assessment of long-term sustainability. 

Ex ante and ex post monitoring performed according to its official mandate for debt rule and budget balance rule for general 
government. 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  Yes  

Involved in correction mechanism  The FCC can ask for the activation of the correction mechanism and then assess compliance. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  The FCC has no role in the (de)activation of escape clause, unless the correction mechanism is active. In that case, the 

decision regarding the (de)activation of the escape clause is taken by the Minister of Finance, taking into consideration the 
opinion of the FCC (related articles 41,42 and 46 of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Systems Law) 
The FCC delivered an opinion on the macroeconomic forecast and the macroeconomic assumptions underpinning the draft 
budget for 2025 and the 2025–2027 medium-term budgetary framework in the context of the 2025 budgetary process. 
These macroeconomic forecasts and assumptions were the ones used in the Medium-term fiscal-structural plan for 2025-
2028. 
FCC reports that it carries out such assessments regularly as part of its mandate (Article 19 of law Νo.20(Ι)/2014). 

In line with its legal obligation, the government responds to most of the FCC reports. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

Assessment of national fiscal framework 
Comply-or-explain requirement 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  The FCC Chairman (with the agreement of the members of the Council) submits a draft FCC budget for the following year to 
the Ministry of Finance, including the amount deemed necessary for carrying out its duties. The FCC budget is subject to the 
approval by the Parliament. Once approved by Parliament, the FCC requests releases of funds from the Ministry of Finance 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adequacy of funding  The FCC considered the budget appropriation of EUR 508.000 in 2024 to be adequate. Only EUR 316.000 was actually spent. 

(three instalments throughout the calendar year).  

Number of Secretariat staff  The FCC has a technical staff of four persons. Three of those are assigned to the FCC on secondments from the Public 

Service/Public Organizations with a limited duration of 3 + 3 years. 
The FCC reports difficulties in attracting and employing suitable staff, due to the employment conditions (incl. qualifications 
criteria and salary) of the FCC staff positions, which need to be processed and approved by the Ministry of Finance. Staff 
numbers are by law limited to six persons.  

Support from other institutions  No 
Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations 
or binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedure  
Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Ordinary law. Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Systems Law (FRBS). 

The Council consists of 3 members (1 Chair, 2 Members) appointed by the Council of Ministers after consultation with the 
Parliamentary Committee on the Finances and the Budget. The length of the mandates are 6 years for the Chair, 5 and 4 
years for the other two Members, respectively, renewable once. 

Only citizens of the Republic of Cyprus or any other EU Member State can be appointed Board Member. They must be a 
person with integrity, long experience and a significant academic background in public finances and the economy and cannot 
be a member of the House of Representatives, a Minister, a public official or an officer or employee of an organisation under 
the competence of the general government. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  Article 18(3) of Law N.20(I)/2014 prohibits Members of the FCC from taking instructions. ("(3) The members and staff of the 
Council, in the exercise of their duties, do not take instructions from any person or organization, including but not limited to 
members of the House of Representatives, the President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers, and bodies of the General 
Government, and no such person shall intervene with the aim of influencing the independence of the Council.”) 

Role of the Chair  No specific powers other than deciding on funding (under the approval of parliament) and information. 

Policy dialogue with government 

In line with its legal obligation, the government responds to most of the FCC reports. In 2024, the reaction took the form of a 
statement in parliament and non-public contacts with the FCC, which happened within two weeks from the FCC issuing the 
report. The FCC assesses the reactions to be of varying coverage and quality and the government only complied with some 
of the recommendations of the FCC. 

Interaction with parliament  There is no formal consultation of the FCC by the parliament, but, in 2024, the FCC took part in more than 6 parliamentary 

hearings and responded to 1-3 parliamentary questions.  

Access to non-public information  Access grounded in law and based on Memoranda of Understanding. However, the FCC reports issues of non-access and 

delays, a significant hurdle stemming from the fact that most governmental ministries and departments lack readily available 
structured and machine-readable data; information is often absent, in non-digital formats, or scattered across various 
incompatible systems. This lack of standardized, easily processable data makes it difficult and time-consuming for the FCC to 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
gather necessary information for fiscal monitoring and assessment, requiring manual extraction and hindering timely 
updates. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  The FCC can recruit staff subject to several restrictions set by the Ministry of Finance, the Parliament and/or the Regulation 

of the Public Service, e.g. regarding the type and number of positions, the Service Schemes / Job Description (including 
qualifications and salaries), the length of contracts etc 

External review of the IFI  The FCC has not been subject to any external evaluation. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The FCC reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  No 

Leadership role in communication  The FCC leadership has communication as one of its main roles. However, this role is not explicitly laid down in law (there is 

no job description for the leadership). 

Number of press releases/conferences  The FCC reports that, in 2024, it issued 7-10 press releases and organised 1-2 press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The FCC reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers and issued 

articles regularly in the mainstream domestic media, also on general fiscal and economic issues. The FCC is present in social 
media and conducted various public awareness activities in 2024 (articles, pod casts, conferences) on various fiscal matters. 
It is also developing a Data Visualization Platform to present key fiscal indices on the FCC website in an easily understandable 
visual format. 

Media impact tracking  No 
Staff specialised in communication  No 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The FCC leadership regularly participates in conferences organised by others . 

Summary: The FCC has several tasks related to monitoring the compliance with fiscal rules as well as assessing/endorsing macroeconomic and budgetary 
forecasts but is not involved in long-term fiscal sustainability assessments. The Secretariat has four employees, mostly government officials on secondment 
to the FCC. The  FCC reports  having problems attracting staff of a suitable profile, due to insufficiently attractive employment  conditions (e.g. pay level). 
Moreover,  the  secretariat  staff  number  is  capped  by  law  at  maximum  6  persons,  which  puts  a  further  limit  on  the  potential  capacity  of  the  FCC.  The 
nomination  and  appointment  procedures  are  dominated  by  the  government,  which  appoints  the  Board  after  consulting  the  relevant  Parliamentary 
Committee. The FCC reports issues of access to information, mostly due to the information being non-standardised and in a format that makes it difficult to 
process.  The  FCC  reports  having  a  fairly  high  visibility  in  the  media  and  having  performed  various  fiscal  policy  awareness  activities  in  2024,  despite  not 
having specialised communication staff nor a formal leadership communication role.  

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Czechia – Czech Fiscal Council (CFC) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 

Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

Macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts (revenues only) are evaluated by the Committee on Budgetary Forecasts (CBF), which is a 
committee founded by the same law as the CFC but is a different body. 

Macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts (revenues only) are evaluated by the Committee on Budgetary Forecasts (CBF), which is a 
committee founded by the same law as the CFC but is a different body. 

Not normally performed by the CFC or the CBF. Quantification/policy costing associated with a proposal of policies is usually part of the 
so-called inter-ministerial consultation procedure where quantification/policy costing may appear in the so-called RIA (Regulatory Impact 
Assessment). On the other hand, some CFC outputs indeed contain the quantification/policy costing of the effects of policies. 
Once per year, the CFC publishes a "Report on the Long-Term Sustainability of Public Finances" (the 2024 report).  

Performed according to its official mandate both ex ante and ex post for debt rules for local gov’t and general gov’t and for general gov’t 
budget balance rule. In September, the CFC issues a "Report on Compliance with the Rules of Budgetary Responsibility for the Year..." for 
the previous year. This report assesses compliance with fiscal rules. 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  No. 
Involved in correction mechanism  Yes. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  The CFC reports involvement regarding the budget balance rule. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

According to the information provided in the MTFSP of Czechia, the CFC was invited to a roundtable discussion on the plan. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  The CFC does not analyse the fiscal framework as a whole, but selected aspects of it. 

Comply-or-explain requirement  The government responds to the monitoring report(s)/statement(s) on fiscal rules of the CFC, as it is mandatory. In other cases, it is 

voluntary (discretionary). 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes. Expenditure for the activities of the Council and the Office of the Council are paid from a separate budgetary unit of the state budget. 

Full autonomy in spending decisions. 

Adequacy of funding  The CFC reports that the funding in 2024 of CZK 25.688.149 was adequate.  

Number of Secretariat staff  The CFC reports a staff of 12 (1 manager, 6.5 economists, 3 administrative staff, 1 driver and 0.5 FTE spokesperson). General rules of 

public sector salary setting are applied to the CFC. The Council appoints a Head of the Office of the CFC. 

Support from other institutions  No 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedures for stability of funds  No, but only the Budgetary Committee of the Chamber of Deputies can alter the budget of the CFC. 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedure  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Prohibition against taking instructions 

Ordinary law. Act No. 23/2017 Coll., on the Rules of Budgetary Responsibility. 

Board Members are appointed for a 6-year term, renewable once, in a staggered manner. The Chair is elected by the Chamber of Deputies 
on a proposal by the Government. The other two members of the Council are elected by the Chamber of Deputies, one at the suggestion 
of the Senate and another at the suggestion of the Czech National Bank. 
Due to the Chairwoman Eva Zamrazilová stepping down early in 2022 (2 years before the end of her term), the mandate of her successor 
now more or less coincides with that of one of the other Members (term 2022-28), making the staggering less symmetrically distributed. 
Members must have completed university studies in a master's degree program; and must be a recognized and experienced personality in 
the field of finance or macroeconomics with a practice of at least 10 years within the field. Board members cannot hold political or public 
administration posts. Most legislative, executive and judicial positions are incompatible with being a member of the CFC. Also, other 
positions where there could be a conflict of interest may not be held by the CFC member. 
In Section 23 of the Act No. 23/2017 Coll., on the Rules of Budgetary Responsibility, as amended, it is stated that: "The members of the 
Council shall perform their functions personally and shall not accept or seek instructions from any other body or person in the 
performance of their functions." 

Role of the Chair  The Chair acts on behalf of the Council externally and summons a meeting of the Council at least twice a month. 

Policy dialogue with government  The CFC reports that the government responds within two weeks via a press release, sometimes creating media echo. The content of the 

replies is of varying coverage and quality.  

Interaction with parliament  The Parliament is obliged to audition the CFC. The CFC reports it attended 2-3 parliamentary hearings and replied to 1-3 parliamentary 

questions in 2024. Section 24 of Act No 23/2017 Coll. specifies that “the Chairman of the Council is entitled to attend, in an advisory 
capacity, meetings of the Government and meetings of the Committee on Budgetary Forecasts. If the chairman of the Council asks to 
speak, he shall be given the floor. /…/ The chairman of the Council shall attend meetings of the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate or their 
bodies when reports or opinions of the Council are discussed. If the chairman of the Council asks to speak, he shall be given the floor.” 

Access to non-public information  The CFC has a legal right to access (According to Section 22 of the Act No.23/2017 Coll., on the Rules of Budgetary Responsibility). The CFC 

has access to internal budgetary information on the budget execution and access to non-public datasets for in-depth budget analysis. 
However, it reports that there is no uniform format and structure of even basic data from the general government sector provided by the 
Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic. Also, time series of sufficient length and granularity are often not available. Their analyses often 
must rely on multiple sources, which may not contain the same values even for the same indicators. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes. General rules on public sector salary setting are applied to the CFC. 

External review of the IFI  No 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The CFC reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  The communication policy is not publicly available and is mainly reactive (reactive communication prevails over active communication). 

Active communication is centralized – spokesperson cooperates with experts on commentaries etc. and discusses suitable topics. Reactive 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
communication is decentralized – questions from media are answered by the spokesperson, Council member or staff (based on their 
expertise); however, the spokesperson is in most cases informed and involved in preparation of the answer. 

Leadership role in communication  Communication is managed by a designated person from the technical staff (0.5 FTE). The Council Chairman and two other Council 

Number of press releases/conferences 

members have the final say on CFC communications to the public. 
In 2024, the CFC issued more than 10 press releases and organised 1-2 press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  Been interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly throughout the year, also on general fiscal and economic issues. 

Issued articles regularly in the mainstream domestic media, also on general fiscal and economic issues. Presence in social media. 

Media impact tracking  The CFC uses “Mediatool” for monitoring and analysing media releases. Tools implemented directly by individual social networks are used 

for social media analysis. For web analysis, Google Analytics 4 is used. As part of the evaluation, an analysis of similar Czech institutions 
such as the Supreme Audit Office and the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic is conducted and compared with the communication 
activities of the CFC. The annual report of the Office of the CFC includes a chapter devoted to a summary of the CFC's media outreach and 
communications.  

Staff specialised in communication  One person (0.5 FTE) from the technical staff. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The CFC leadership and members of the Secretariat regularly participate in conferences organised by others . 

Summary: Overall, a well-resourced IFI with a relatively narrow mandate, focused on the monitoring of compliance with national fiscal rules and long-term 
sustainability analysis. Macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts (so far revenues only) are evaluated by the Committee on Budgetary Forecasts (CBF), which 
is not an IFI and the role of the CFC is limited to nominating its members. Staggered appointments of the CFC members ensure gradual renewal, even if the 
effective staggering has been reduced recently. The CFC has a well-developed communication strategy with a specialised staff member and media-impact 
analysis. However, it reports access to information issues, and it has not been subject to any external reviews. 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
Germany – Advisory Board of the Stability Council (Advisory Board) 

Tasks 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

The Joint Economic Forecast Group, which institutionally is attached to the Advisory Board, endorses the federal government's 
macroeconomic forecast. The forecast that is underlying the fiscal projection is also assessed by the Advisory Board itself against the forecast 
of other institutions like the Deutsche Bundesbank, the German Council of Economic Experts, the Joint Economic Forecast, the IMF and the 
OECD. 
Performed according to its official mandate. The Advisory Board assesses the general government fiscal forecast provided by the federal 
government but does not formally endorse it. It does not produce its own forecast. 

No quantification of effects of policies. 

No assessment of long-term sustainability. 

Performed according to its official mandate. So far, the Advisory Board oversees compliance with the balanced budget rule for the general 
government as defined in article 7 of the Stabilitätsratsgesetz and specified in article 51 para. 2 of the Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz. 

Ex post forecast evaluation  No. Ex post evaluations of the macroeconomic forecasts by the federal government are conducted regularly by the Joint Economic Forecast 

Involved in correction mechanism 

Group. 
Yes. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  Not applicable. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 
Assessment of national fiscal framework 

Comply-or-explain requirement 

The Advisory Board has so far not been involved in setting up the MTFSP of Germany. 

The Advisory Board assesses the national fiscal framework regularly, but reports that the Stability Council has not reacted to past 
comments of the Advisory Board regarding the national fiscal framework, as the Stability Council deemed this so far not to have been 
within the scope of the Advisory Board’s mandate. 
The policy dialogue is conducted in a discretionary manner as it is not regulated by legislation, memorandum of understanding or 
commitments. According to the current version of the procedural rules (§ 7a section 6, Geschäftsordnung des Stabilitätsrates), the 
Stability Council is subject to the comply-or-explain principle. The principle is thus grounded in law only by a sub-legal regulation. 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  No 
Adequacy of funding 

The Advisory Board reports a need for more resources. In 2024, it spent EUR 170.000 with a budget of EUR 150.000, covering the gap by 
delaying the invoicing. As of 2026, the budget will be temporarily increased to EUR 210.000, with the new permanent budget amounting to 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Secretariat staff 

Support from other institutions 
Procedures for stability of funds  No 

EUR 180.000 for the years after 2026. 
The Advisory Board reports a technical staff of 0.9 FTE (0.75 economist and 0.15 administration). This does not include the staff of the Joint 
Economic Forecast Group. 
Support from the Stability Council for maintaining the website, secretariat and budget functions. 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedure  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Ordinary law. Section 7 of the Stabilitätsratsgesetz (Stability Council Act) establishes the Advisory Board and defines the mandate 
and Article 51(2) of the Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz (Budgetary Principles Act) specifies the Advisory Board's mandate. 

Its 9-member Board has mostly 5-year mandates renewable more than three times. Staggering depends on the individual time of 
appointment as well as on the organizational structure as decided by the research institutes taking part in the "Joint Economic Forecast" (host 
institute sends a representative to the Advisory Board and the host rotates among the involved institutes), the central organisation of the 
municipalities or the central organisation of the social security funds. Appointment takes place by written declaration vis-à-vis the chairman of 
the Advisory Board, who in turn informs the chairman of the Stability Council. 
Not explicitly specified. Reference only made to the need to be an “expert”. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  No explicit prohibition to take instructions for the Advisory Board, but the procedural rules stress its independence. The Joint Economic 

Role of the Chair 
Policy dialogue with government 

Interaction with parliament 
Access to non-public information 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions 
External review of the IFI 

Communication 

Forecast Group is prohibited from taking instructions (§ 3 Satz 2, Vorausschätzungsgesetz – EgVG). 
External representation and agenda setter. 

The Advisory Board reports that, in 2024, no official reaction from the government took place (only informal reaction by non-public e-mail). 
The Advisory Board considers the reactions to have been of varying coverage and quality. 
The Advisory Board reports that, in 2024, it took part occasionally in parliamentary hearings but received no parliamentary questions. 

The Advisory Board does not have a legal base for access to information, but reports privileged but limited access. However, the Stability 
Council’s rules of procedure contain a regulation about the access to information (§ 7a paragraph 2, Geschäftsordnung des Stabilitätsrates). 
So far, there is no regulation on the level of adopted parliamentary law. Nevertheless, the rules of procedure state that the Board can request 
further information necessary to fulfil its task. The Advisory Board considers that the underlying information available must be improved. In 
particular, the individual German states should also provide differentiated and harmonised current information on their respective budgets in 
a format that is close to the national accounts, and material deviations from fiscal statistics should be reported. In the spring of 2024, the 
Advisory Board received the usual fiscal projection, whereas in the autumn, no projection was presented to the Advisory Board. For the Joint 
Economic Forecast Group, access to information is specified in section 3 of EgVV. 
Yes, but the salary is set according to the collective wage agreement of the civil servants of the German states. 
The Advisory Board has never been subject to an external evaluation. The external evaluations of the research institutes taking part in the 
Joint Economic Forecast Group are in principle provided by the Leibniz Senate. 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Freedom to communicate 
Explicit communication strategy  No 
Leadership role in communication  No 

The Advisory Board reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Number of press releases/conferences 
Visibility in media/Presence in social media 

The Advisory Council reports that, in 2024, it issued 1-3 press releases and organised 1-2 press conferences. 

The Advisory Board reports that, in 2024, it was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly throughout the year, also 
on general fiscal and economic issues. It also issued articles, but only in media outlets specialised in economy/finance. The Advisory Board’s 
statements are occasionally distributed via social media. 

Media impact tracking  No 
Staff specialised in communication  No 

Organisation of/participation in conferences 

The Advisory Board reports that its leadership regularly participate as speakers/discussants in conferences organised by others. 

Summary: The German IFI is very small, with a technical staff of only 0.9 full-time equivalents and has a narrow mandate, focused on the monitoring of the 
compliance with a fiscal rule, while the  attached Joint Forecast Group takes care of the endorsement of the macroeconomic forecast. There is no public 
policy dialogue with the government taking place and the media presence is relatively limited. Although the Board members are well qualified in practice, 
they  are  not  subject  to  any  formal  professional  competence  requirements.  The  Advisory  Board’s  access  to  information  is  not  protected  by  a  legal  base 
rooted in parliamentary law and it signals some issues in this area, e.g. with the format and timeliness of some information. The Advisory Board has never 
been subject to an independent, external evaluation. 

29 

 
 
 
 
Denmark – Danish Economic Councils (DEC) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 

Performed according to its official mandate. Production of macro-economic forecasts, but these are not used for the national fiscal 
planning. The government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the DEC 
forecasts.  
DEC publishes two annual reports which always contain a macroeconomic projection and a forecast of the budget balance. DEC does not 
make an explicit assessment of the government’s macroeconomic forecast. Interim forecasts are occasionally published. 
Performed according to its official mandate. Production of budgetary forecasts, but these are not used for the national fiscal planning. The 
government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution’s 
forecasts. The DEC forecast is used for comparison with the government’s forecast with regard to revenues, deficit and debt of general 
government, but not for assessment of the government’s forecast. 
Performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output. 

Produce or endorse long-term fiscal projections  Performed according to its official mandate. Once a year, a long-term (100 years) projection is made. In principle, the horizon is infinite. 

However, after 2128 the budget balance is kept constant in subsequent years. The purpose is to evaluate the long-term sustainability of the 
Danish public finances (Dansk Økonomi, efterår 2024: Kapitel III, Finanspolitisk holdbarhed) 
Performed according to its official mandate. Monitoring of compliance with budget balance and expenditure rules. 

Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 
Ex post forecast evaluation  No 

Involved in correction mechanism  The chairmanship may provide recommendations regarding the activation of the correction mechanism. However, such recommendations 
are not provided for by law. A comply-or-explain requirement applies for any recommendations made by the chairmanship regarding the 
activation of the correction mechanism. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  The DEC reports involvement regarding the budget balance rule. Yet, decisions concerning the escape clauses are made by the Ministry of 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

Finance and the government. The chairmanship of the Economic Councils has no formal rule in that respect. 
According to the MTFSP of Denmark, the DEC continuously monitor compliance with fiscal targets and assess the sustainability of fiscal 
policy, as well as economic policy more generally, although the DEC is not involved in the production of the plan. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  This does not appear among DEC’s formal tasks, but DEC makes assessments of some elements of the national fiscal framework. 

Comply-or-explain requirement  A comply-or-explain requirement is set out in law with respect to the correction mechanism and (de)activation of escape clauses, as well as 

some non-IFI-related tasks. Beyond this, the government responds in a regular manner to the monitoring report(s)/statement(s) on fiscal 
rules issued by the DEC (twice a year). The comments are publicly available on the DEC website within one month of the publication of a 
report.  

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  The funding of the DEC and the secretariat is ensured with the yearly Danish Budget Bill Section 10.11.09. 

Adequacy of funding  DEC reports a need for some more resources, as an annual 2% real reduction in the budget (similar for other public authorities) in practice 
means that the staff level will have to be reduced by about 1 person per year (ceteris paribus). In 2025, the DEC received an extraordinary 
increase in funding of DKK 1.8 million (EUR 240.000) annually to ensure the continued fulfilment of tasks. 

Number of Secretariat staff  DEC reports a total staff of 28.6 (5 managers, 20.4 economists, 1.6 administrative staff and 1.6 others), but this covers all the tasks of the 

institution, including the function of Productivity Board, the general Economic Council and the Environmental-Economic Council. DEC 
estimates the number of staff dedicated to IFI-related tasks to be 1 full-time equivalent employee.  

Support from other institutions  No 
Procedures for stability of funds  No procedures other than inflation indexing for ensuring stability of funds reported. A requirement to achieve an annual 2%-real-reduction 

in the budget rather implies ceteris paribus a gradual reduction in the real value of the DEC budget over time. 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment procedure  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Ordinary Law ("Lov om det Økonomiske Råd og Det Miljøøkonomiske Råd"). 

4 Members, appointed for a period of up to 6 years at a time, although in practice the term is up to 3 years at a time. The chairmanship of 
the DEC consists of 4 academics - typically professors in economics. The chairmanship is formally appointed by the minister of economic 
affairs. In practice, the existing chairmanship has a large degree of autonomy in deciding its new members. Members of the chairmanship 
leave the chairmanship at their own discretion.  
The chairmanship is required to be knowledgeable in economics. One of four chairpersons should also be knowledgeable in environmental 
economics. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  DEC is not prohibited by law to take instructions, but it reports that it has always been independent and not taken outside instructions 

regarding its analyses and recommendations. 

Role of the Chair  The Director is the head of the secretariat, and in charge of the day-to-day operations of the institution. The chairmanship is responsible for 

policy recommendations and public communication. 

Policy dialogue with government  The government responds in a regular manner to the monitoring report(s)/statement(s) on fiscal rules issued by the DEC (twice a year). The 

comments are publicly available on the DEC website within one month of the publication of a report. DEC considers that the response(s) 
systematically covered all main findings/recommendations in a meaningful manner. 

Interaction with parliament  DEC reports having attended parliamentary hearings 4-6 times in 2024, including those held in connection with the production of its two 

Access to non-public information 

annual reports, but received no parliamentary questions. 
Section 31 of the Danish Public Administration Act, states that “to the extent that an administrative authority is entitled to disclose 
information, it must, upon request from another authority, share the information if it is relevant to the requesting authority’s function”. 
This principle applies to the DEC. Furthermore, the legislative comments to the 2011 amendment (LF 167 2011/1) state that “to carry out its 
work, the DEC secretariat will have access to the resources and data necessary to perform the task”. DEC reports it can contact ministries 
for more detailed information after a bill has been proposed/passed.  

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes. However, DEC reports that the chairmanship’s independence and capacity to carry out its tasks have been significantly impaired by the 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External review of the IFI  There are no provisions under current law regarding external evaluation. However, in 2024, the DEC was thoroughly reviewed by the 

European Fiscal Board, including its role as IFI. 

political decision in 2018 to relocate a large part of the secretariat to Horsens (Jutland). 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  DEC reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  No 
Leadership role in communication  No 

Number of press releases/conferences  DEC reports that, in 2024, it issued 4-6 press releases and organised 3-5 press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  DEC reports that, in 2024, members of the chairmanship were interviewed and published articles on mainstream national TV/radio/daily 

papers regularly throughout the year on both IFI and non-IFI issues. Hence, the chairmanship’s assessments of fiscal policy and public 
finances receive extensive coverage in the media. DEC has a presence in social media. 

Media impact tracking  No 
Staff specialised in communication  No 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The DEC reports that its leadership and members of the Secretariat occasionally participate in conferences organised by others. 

Summary:  The  long-standing  Danish  Economic  Councils  (DEC)  has  a  remit  that  goes  beyond  the  tasks  of  the  typical  IFI,  as  it  also  fulfils  the  role  of 
Productivity  Board,  general  Economic  Council,  and  Environmental-economic  Council.  Its  multiple  areas  of  responsibility  are  reflected  in  the  professional 
competence requirements of its leadership, which do not make specific reference to public finance expertise. Regarding the IFI tasks, it has a relatively broad 
mandate, covering assessing forecasts and compliance with national fiscal rules as well as performing long-term sustainability analysis. The DEC’s access to 
information is covered by the Danish Public Administration Act. DEC reports strong medium-term concerns regarding resources, with the institution being 
subject  to  an  annual  2%  real  reduction  requirement  for  its  budget.  It  does  not  yet  perform  regular  comprehensive  assessments  of  the  national  fiscal 
framework,  although  some  elements  of  the  national  fiscal  framework  have  been  assessed.  DEC  does  not  perform  any  impact  assessment  of  its  external 
communication.  

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estonia – Fiscal Council of Estonia (FCE) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and 
multiannual macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and 
multiannual budgetary forecasts 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

Performed according to its official mandate. Official endorsement of the government`s macroeconomic forecasts used for fiscal planning 
for both the annual budgets and the medium-term plans (within the meaning of Art. 2.1b of the Two-Pack Regulation 473/2013). The 
government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's opinion must be justified publicly. 
Performed according to its official mandate. Assessment of budgetary forecasts BEFORE the adoption in the Parliament of the budgetary 
planning documents. Focus on revenues and budget balance. The government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the 
fiscal institution`s opinion must be justified publicly.  
No quantification of effects of policies. 

No 

Performed according to its official mandate both for ex ante and ex post assessment of compliance of the budget balance rule. 

Ex-post forecast evaluation  No. Neither for macro economic nor budgetary forecasts. 

Involved in correction mechanism  Yes. The FCE is expected to give its assessment on the measures proposed (or implemented) in case the correction mechanism has been 

activated, considering the required size of the adjustment. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  The FCE reports involvement regarding the budget balance rule, where the assessment of compliance includes an assessment whether 

Involvement in assessing the medium-
term fiscal-structural plans 

the escape clause should be activates/extended/exited. 
The MTFSP of Estonia does not report on a consultation process with relevant national stakeholders (including the independent fiscal 
institution) prior to submission. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  No 

Comply-or-explain requirement  As required by law, the government responds to the FCE’s monitoring report(s)/statement(s) on fiscal rules. 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes. Bank of Estonia Act Chapter 1 §4/2 (7). 

Adequacy of funding  The activities of the FCE are financed by the central bank, which approves an annual budget for the FCE based on the principle that the 
allocated funds must be sufficient for the FCE to be able to independently perform its functions. In 2024, the FCE budget appropriation 
amounted to EUR 113.000, of which EUR 99.000 were used, a funding level the FCE found comfortably met its needs. The staff of the 
FCE are central bank employees whose wages are not paid out of the FCE budget. At the request of the central bank, the Estonian 
government compensates the central bank for the direct expenses incurred due to the work of the FCE. The central bank has not yet 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Secretariat staff 

exercised this right. 
FCE payments have to be approved by another institution, but the FCE reports that it de facto has full autonomy to use the funds. 
In 2024, the staff of the FCE consisted of 3 economists. 

Support from other institutions  The work of the FCE is supported by three economists from the central bank, one of whom also performs the tasks of secretary. The FCE 

also receives assistance from the central bank when it comes to editing and translation of published materials, website administration 
and other organisational tasks. 

Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, 
regulations or binding administrative 
provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedure  
Professional competence requirements 
for Board members 

Ordinary law. Bank of Estonia Act (Chapter 1 §4/2. Fiscal Council). State Budget Act (Chapter 1 §4. Fiscal Council). 

The 5-year mandates of the 6 Members are renewable more than 3 times. No staggering of the six mandates. The FCE Chair, Vice-Chair 
and four members are nominated to office and can be dismissed by the Eesti Pank Supervisory Board at the proposal of the Governor of 
Eesti Pank. 

Members of the Council must have: 
1) an unblemished reputation; 
2) a master’s degree or equivalent in economics at the minimum; 
3) the experience required for the work of the Fiscal Council. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  The statutes of the Fiscal Council (Paragraph 4 of the Bank of Estonia Act) establishes that the FCE is independent in the execution of its 

duties and that it does not accept guidance from the central bank, the government or any other bodies from the public or private 
sectors. 

Role of the Chair  The Chair represents the FCE in public, organises the activities of the Council, summons and chairs the Council meetings (including 

deciding whether to invite people who are not members), signs the decisions of the Council and the minutes of the Council meetings.  

Policy dialogue with government  Policy dialogue may happen as part of the national comply-or-explain arrangement. No such interaction reported to have taken place in 

2024. 

Interaction with parliament  The FCE reports that it participated in no parliamentary hearings and replied to only 1-3 parliamentary questions in 2024. 

Access to non-public information  The mandate of the FCE states that it has the right to ask for data and explanations needed for its work from the ministries, government 
institutions and the central bank. The legal base is the Bank of Estonia Act (see Article 42(6)) 
This usually means correspondence with the Ministry of Finance. The FCE reports no issues with access to information in 2024. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  As the secretariat of the FCE consists of employees of the central bank, the recruitment decisions are also done by the head of that 

External review of the IFI 

specific department in the central bank (and not by the chair or vice-chair of the Fiscal Council). 
FCE has never been subject to an external evaluation. 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communication  
Freedom to communicate 
Explicit communication strategy  No 

FCE reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Leadership role in communication  The chair and vice-chair are expected to present the opinions of the FCE in various official meetings and are also the first options when 

responding to media inquiries. 

Number of press releases/conferences  The FCE reports that, in 2024, it issued 4-6 press releases, but did not organise any press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social 
media 

The FCE reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed in mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers and issued articles in 
mainstream domestic media regularly, closely linked to the release of opinions/recommendations by the IFI. No presence in social 
media reported. 

Media impact tracking  After each publication, the FCE checks the media impact it gathered, i.e how many media outlets used the press releases and whether 

there were any additional requests for comments or interviews. The FCE also monitors the website visitor data. 

Staff specialised in communication  No 
Organisation of/participation in 
conferences 

The FCE reports that its leadership and members of the Secretariat occasionally participate in conferences organised by others. 

Summary: The Fiscal Council of Estonia (FCE) is a relatively small IFI with a secretariat of only three staff members. It has a narrow mandate, focusing on the 
endorsement of the macro forecast and the assessment of compliance with the budget balance rule. It is involved in the assessment of the budgetary plans 
but does not provide an endorsement. The FCE is strongly attached to the Estonian central bank, from which it receives its budget and all three economists 
in the secretariat are central bank employees. Its policy dialogue with both the government and the parliament as well as its communication activities are 
not fully developed. The FCE has never been subject to an independent external evaluation. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Greece – Hellenic Fiscal Council (HFISC) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

In line with its official mandate, the HFISC officially endorses the government’s macroeconomic forecasts used for fiscal planning for 
both the annual budgets and the medium-term plans (within the meaning of Art. 2.1b of the Two-Pack Regulation 473/2013). The HFISC 
also endorses macroeconomic forecasts used in the DBPs and MTFSPs. No reconciliation procedure: The government would proceed 
with its own projections.  
In line with its official mandate, HFISC assesses the government’s general government budgetary forecasts used for national fiscal 
planning. The assessment covers annual budgets, medium-term plans, but also DBPs and MTFSPs. 

No quantification of effects of policies in general, but HFISC has the responsibility to assess and quantify the fiscal impact of policy 
proposals included in the platforms of political parties or coalitions, following a request by the political parties concerned. 

No assessment of long-term sustainability. 

Ex ante and ex post monitoring of numerical fiscal rules performed according to its official mandate before the submission of the Draft 
Budgetary Plan, the State Budget and the Medium-Term Budgetary Plan. 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  The ex-post evaluation of the forecast is a responsibility assigned to the HFISC by legislation. 

Involved in correction mechanism  HFISC assesses the correction plan and monitors its implementation (Law 4270/2014, article 40) 

(De)activation of escape clauses  Activation and de-activation of escape clauses allowing deviations from national numerical fiscal rules follow the procedures related to 
the activation and deactivation of the general escape clause and the national escape clause of articles 25 and 26 of the preventive arm 
Regulation. HFISC assesses the implementation of fiscal rules in relation to the activation and deactivation of escape clauses. 
In October 2024, HFISC issued an opinion on the macroeconomic forecasts and the macroeconomic assumptions underpinning the 
MTFSP of Greece. In April 2025, it issued an assessment of the Annual Progress Report 2025. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 
Assessment of national fiscal framework 

Since the adoption of Law 5217/2025, HFISC has the formal task of assessing the consistency, coherence and efficiency of the national 
fiscal framework and to make such assessments public.  

Comply-or-explain requirement  The government is legally obliged to react to HFISC opinions on the activation of the correction mechanism (article 38 of Law 4270/14). 
In addition, since the adoption of Law 5217/2025, the comply-or-explain requirement applies to all assessments and opinions of HFISC 
pursuant to its responsibilities in relation to the evaluation of macroeconomic forecasts, to the monitoring of compliance with national 
fiscal rules, to the assessment of the national fiscal framework, and to the responsibilities attributed to IFIs in the new preventive arm 
and corrective arm regulations.        

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adequacy of funding  HFISC reports a budget appropriation of EUR 1.100.000 for 2024, of which EUR 897.000 was used. HFISC considers its funding as 

appropriate. The Ministry of Finance is legally obliged to provide a budget that covers the number of staff and the other needs for the 
functioning of the institution laid down in the Organic law. Article 13 of Law 4270/2014 states that the budget of the HFISC is prepared 
by the HFISC on the basis of the estimated operational cost and Article 54 of the same law states that the Ministry of Finance is not 
authorised to amend this draft budget (a procedure only used for HFISC).  

Number of Secretariat staff  The HFISC reports a total number of staff of 8 (2 managers, 4 economists and 4 administrative staff). This number includes 1 part-time 

legal expert, 1 part-time graphic designer, 1 part-time econometrician and 1 part-time communications expert. 

Support from other institutions  The Ministry of Finance provides some administrative support by validating HFISC expenditure. 
Procedures for stability of funds  No direct procedure. Stability of funding is ensured by the procedure whereby HFISC prepares its own Budget and by the legal provision 

stating that the Ministry of Finance cannot amend it. 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Ordinary law. Articles 1-13 of Law 4270/2014 “Principles of fiscal management and supervision (incorporation of Directive 2011/85/EU 
into domestic law) - public accounting and other provisions” as amended by Articles 3-17 of Law 5217/2025. 

5 (1 President and 4 Members). The length of mandates of the first board of Directors varied. The President and another member were 
appointed for six years, two other members for five years and one member for four years. For all future new appointments, it is a five-
year term, that can be renewed once. After an open call, a committee consisting of the Minister of Finance, the Governor of Bank of 
Greece and the President of Court of Auditors makes a short-list of candidates. Then, the Committee makes the selection, that is 
approved by the Special Permanent Committee on Institutions and Transparency of the Hellenic Parliament. 
PhD from a Greek institution or other internationally accredited institution in the field of HFISC mandate. The candidates should be 
internationally renowned with high scientific qualifications and relevant professional experience of at least 15 years and be fluent in a 
foreign language. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  HFISC's independence is functionally and operationally guaranteed by Article 2(1) and 2(3) of Organic law 4270/2014, as amended by 

Articles 4(2) and 4(3) of Law 5217/2025:                                                                                        
"1. ... The Hellenic Fiscal Council shall enjoy operational independence, administrative and financial autonomy and shall not be subject 
to control or supervision by government bodies, public bodies, or other administrative authorities...."                                     
"3. The President, the members of the Board of Directors and the staff of the Hellenic Fiscal Council, in the performance of their duties, 
do not take instructions from any government body or other public or private body. The President and the members of the Hellenic 
Fiscal Council enjoy personal and functional independence." 

Role of the Chair  The President represents the Council (also in case of legal action). The President’s responsibilities are outlined in the legislation. 

Policy dialogue with government  HFISC reports that, so far, the government has had no reaction to any of the HFISC reports or statements.   

Interaction with parliament  HFISC reports that it participated in one parliamentary hearing in 2024 but received no parliamentary question in 2024. 

Access to non-public information 

Full access, based on both legal provisions and a MoU, with the latter covering budgets and medium-term planning documents. 
According to Article 3 of Law 4270/14, HFISC is obliged to sign a MoU with the Ministry of Finance. In addition, HFISC can sign MoUs 
with various entities including the Hellenic Statistical Authority, the Independent Authority for Public Revenue, the Single Social Security 
Fund, the Public Debt Management Agency, and the Bank of Greece. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Recruitment takes place under the general provisions for the public sector through the Supreme Council for Civil Personnel Selection 

(ASEP). External experts (that are not civil servants) can be hired on three-year contracts that can be renewed once. Some vacancies can 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
be filled via the System of Mobility in Public Administration. It is quicker than ASEP but it usually offers only time-restricted mobility for 
about one year, and it does not lead easily to the attraction of highly specialized and technically knowledgeable personnel. In the ASEP 
system, the recruitment procedure includes an interview, giving HFISC some influence. 
External review of the IFI  The Greek Court of Auditors published a review on the functioning of the HFISC in 2022. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  HFISC reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  No 

Leadership role in communication  The Chair has the main responsibility for HFISC external communication (articles, presentations, conferences etc.). The Chair is assisted 

in this role by a dedicated unit. 

Number of press releases/conferences  HFISC reports that it issued 7-10 press releases in 2024 but organised no press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  Representatives of HFISC gave interviews only in media outlets specialised in economy/finance and issued articles once or twice in 

mainstream media, closely linked to the release of opinions/recommendations. HFISC has a presence in social media. 

Media impact tracking  The part-time communications expert collects data and informs the Board. 

Staff specialised in communication  One part-time external communication expert. Six staff positions have been established in the dedicated unit assisting the Chair. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The HFISC leadership and members of the Secretariat regularly participate in conferences organised by others. Through its participation 

in a Technical Support Instrument project financed by the European Commission, the HFISC is enhancing its outreach capabilities. 

Summary: The Hellenic Fiscal Council (HFISC) is a medium-sized IFI with a mandate to endorse macroeconomic forecasts and to monitor compliance with 
fiscal rules but does not do fiscal sustainability analysis or policy impact quantification. However, with recently adopted changes to relevant legislation, the 
number  of  tasks  has  been  expanded  and  some  independence  safeguards  strengthened.  It  experiences  some  difficulties  in  recruiting  staff  with  the 
appropriate  skills,  as,  in  practice,  candidates  are  mostly  limited  to  civil  servants.  The  policy  dialogue  with  the  government  and  interactions  with  the 
parliament are not fully developed. HFISC is trying to enhance its outreach activities, employing one half-time communications expert and by establishing a 
dedicated unit supporting the Chair. 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain – Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 

Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 

Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

Endorse macroeconomic forecast underlying the annual budget and the medium-term plan. Endorse regional macroeconomic forecast in case they 
deviate from that of the central government, but the procedure in case of non-endorsement is not established. Governments are free to use its own 
macro projections but are required to react to AIReF’s recommendations (under the Comply or Explain principle). 
AIReF assesses the budgetary forecast both before and after the adoption in the Parliament of the budgetary planning documents. It also assesses 
the budgetary documents of autonomous regions and some local entities. Governments (general and regionals) are free to use their own budgetary 
forecast but are required to react to AIReF’s recommendations (under the Comply or Explain principle).  
AIReF estimates the budgetary impact of different measures when assessing compliance with fiscal rules as well as to assess the sustainability of 
public finances. The assessment of the pension expenditure rule has obliged AIReF to quantify the impact of measures related directly or indirectly 
to the evolution of social contributions.    
In 2023, AIReF issued an opinion on the Long-term sustainability of public administrations with 2070 as the time horizon for its projections on the 
basis of its own demographic, macroeconomic and budgetary projections.  In 2025, AIReF published an update of this opinion, accompanied by nine 
technical documents explaining the methodologies underpinning the projections.  
AIReF monitors compliance ex ante according to its mandate and ex post voluntarily on a regular basis. 

Ex post forecast evaluation  AIReF does perform ex-post evaluation of both its own and the government's macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts. Government forecasts are 

analyzed ex post, usually once per year, according to article 14 of Law 6/2013. The last vintage is annexed to this report. In relation to its own 
forecasts, this exercise follows a recommendation of AIReF’s first external evaluation and provisions of Directive 2011/85. It takes the form of 
technical document. Three updates have been published to date: 2022, 2023 and 2024.  

Involved in correction mechanism  Article 21 of 6/2013 Law establishes that AIReF may advice the activation of measures foreseen in the Spanish legislation (Organic Act 2/2012 on 
Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability). In addition, Royal Decree-Law 2/2023 mandates AIReF to prepare, every 3 years, an assessment 
report on the estimated impact of measures adopted since 2020 to strengthen the public pension system between 2022 and 2050 with data and 
methodologies established in the RD, thus showing whether the Expenditure Rule of the pension system has been complied with. Non-compliance 
triggers a procedure that ultimately may activate a correction mechanism.  

(De)activation of escape clauses  The escape clause is legally foreseen only for rule 1- or rather and more specifically for the structural balance. The domestic legal framework 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

establishes that Parliament must agree - by absolute majority - to the activation of the escape clause, after AIReF's assessment on the concurrence 
of the exceptional circumstances established by the law.  In 2020 the escape clause was activated for the first time following the article 11(3) of 
Organic Law 2/2012 of Budget Stability and Financial sustainability. The escape clause was further kept activated in 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023. The 
Ministry of Finance requested AIReF to report on the existence of the exceptional circumstances referred to in Article 11(3) of the Organic Law on 
Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability in three occasions, which triggered the publication of three reports (An example).  
AIReF delivered an ex-post opinion on the macroeconomic forecast and the macroeconomic assumptions underpinning the multi-annual net 
expenditure path. The macroeconomic scenario covering the 2024-2026 period was endorsed by AIReF. AIReF highlighted some discrepancies in the 
medium- and long-term macroeconomic projections that underpin the sustainability analysis. In May 2025, it published the first report assessing the 
Annual Progress Report regarding the MTFSP of Spain. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  Not yet part of its mandate. AIReF reports that it intends to voluntarily publish an assessment of the national fiscal framework during 2025 as it is a 
direct task that stems from the Directive 2024/1265 that should be reflected on the Law 6/2013. 

39 

 
 
Comply-or-explain requirement  By virtue of the comply-or explain requirement in place regarding AIReF’s reports on fiscal rules, the government responds to such reports. 

However, AIReF can only issue reports on elements stipulated in its founding law 6/2013. If a budgetary planning document is not recognized in that 
law, AIReF can only issue opinions without the c-o-e principle. 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Article 11 of 6/2013 Organic Law. The main source for funding according to the Organic Law 6/2013 is the fee that AIReF charges to the public 
administrations as compensation for its fiscal supervision. In 2024 this concept meant 94% of the Revenue Budget. Public prices derived from 
studies amounted to 4,5%. Other incomes like reimbursement, litigations, or regularizations of past exercises amounted to 1,5% in 2024. 

Adequacy of funding  AIReF considers that the budget appropriation of EUR 11.240.900 in 2024, of which 10.015.300 was used, was adequate. 

Number of Secretariat staff  67 (8 managers, 44 economists, 1 legal expert, 14 administrative staff). Recruitment is mostly restricted to civil servants and as such, subject to the 

list of public posts approved by the Ministry of Finance. 

Support from other institutions  No, except for sporadic secondments with fixed duration from Bank of Spain. 
Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Organic Law 6/2013, of 14 November on the establishment of an Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility. 

The governing body of the institution is not a Board, but a single-person body (the Presidency). Hence, only the President governs the institution. 
The President is supported by the Executive Committee, which consists of the Heads of the four Divisions in AIReF: Economic Analysis, Budgetary 
Analysis, Public Expenditure Evaluation and Legal Affairs. 
The mandate of the President is six years, non-renewable. The mandate is not aligned with the four-year electoral cycle. 
Mandates of the Heads of Division are not specified. The Heads of Division are appointed and ceased by the Council of Ministers after the petition 
of the AIReF’s President. 
The Council of Ministers appoints the candidate after the proposal of the finance minister, once the candidate has appeared before the Parliament’s 
Finance Commission. The Parliament must approve the nomination with an absolute majority vote. There is a possibility of a second round at the 
Senate, 15 days after the 1st vote, for which a simple majority is sufficient. 
In the case of the President, at least 10 years of experience in the fields of budgetary, economic and financial analysis of the public sector, in 
addition to a reputation for independence and objectivity.  
In the cases of the Heads of Division, at least 10 years of experience in the subject matter of their division, in addition to the general principles of 
merit and capacity. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  Article 7(1) of the Organic Law 6/2013 of 14 November on the establishment of an Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility prohibits its 

President or the members of the bodies of the Authority or its personnel to seek or take any instructions whatsoever from any institution, whether 
public or private. 

Role of the Chair  According to Article 25 from the Organic Statute, the President represents the IFI legally, directs and coordinates the activities of all its directive 

40 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy dialogue with government  AIReF considers the quality of responses by the central government can be improved. The comply-or-explain principle allows a dialogue with all the 

levels government. 

organs, is the head of the staff, approves the expenditures, has the power to contract and to appoint and dismiss the Heads of Division (through the 
Council of Ministries) and the rest of the staff. 

Interaction with parliament  AIReF's President must appear before Parliament at least twice a year. AIReF reports that, in 2024, their interaction with parliament was affected by 

the implementation of the new European fiscal governance framework and the fact that the government did not present a Draft General State 
Budget for 2025, which meant that, for the second year in a row, the President of AIReF was not called to appear before Parliament. AIReF reports 
that no parliamentary questions were received in 2024. On its own initiative, AIReF gathers annually the spokesmen from all political parties at the 
Budgetary as well as the Public Finance Committees of the Congress at its premises. Also on its own initiative, AIReF keeps regular contact with the 
studies department of the Congress. 

Access to non-public information  AIReF’s access to information is grounded in law (Article 4 of the Organic Law 6/2013) and when possible has been further elaborated via 

Memoranda of Understanding (with the Ministry of Social Security and the Tax Agency, lasting until 27/03/2026. Within the framework of the study 
of public sector financial instruments to support productive sectors of the Spanish economy AIReF has also signed a MoU with the Tax Agency, the 
State Secretariat of Commerce, ICO, CESCE, COFIDES and the Bank of Spain, lasting until 20/04/2025). AIReF reports that it has not been possible to 
sign a MoU with the Ministry of Economy or the Ministry of Finance despite AIReF proposals. 
In 2024, AIReF reports cases of information not being provided or only with a delay and in insufficient detail. In particular, AIReF reports issues with 
regard to the elaboration of the medium-term fiscal-structural plan, where AIReF did not have access to sufficient information to assess the whole 
7-year plan but was limited to endorsing the macroeconomic forecasts for 2025 and 2026 only. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Recruitment is mostly restricted to civil servants and as such, subject to the list of public posts approved by the Ministry of Finance.  

External review of the IFI  AIReF has been subject to external reviews occasionally and on AIReF’s own initiative, as no legal provision obliges the institution to do so. The 

latest evaluation took place in 2024 and was carried out by an independent evaluation team selected by the European Commission in the 
framework of a project funded through DG REFORM’s Technical Support Instrument. It resulted in 26 recommendations being formulated, the 
implementation of which is being monitored. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  AIReF reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  AIReF reports that its communication strategy is a part of the 2020-2026 Strategic Plan. It is meant to help AIReF to disseminate its knowledge and 

to generate trust and accountability in its operations.  

Leadership role in communication  AIReF reports that the President devotes a significant part of her time to giving visibility to AIReF’ s outputs and insights. The President participates 

in most of the press conferences held at AIReF and in seminars and workshops. AIReF states that the President’s main goal is to increase general 
awareness of the institution not only among economic or fiscal stakeholders but among the general public. 

Number of press releases/conferences  AIReF reports that it issued more than 10 press releases and organised more than 5 press conferences in 2024. In 2025, this type of activity has 

been intensified. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  AIReF reports that it gave no interviews in 2024 but regularly issued articles in domestic mainstream media, closely linked to the release of 

opinions/recommendations. AIReF has a presence in social media. 
In 2024, an important impulse was given to the development of more informative materials. Nine videos, ten informative infographics and 13 
posters were produced and disseminated. As a new development, in 2024 all infographics were also produced in English. Two video summaries of 
the institution's activities were produced and a new type of infographic for LinkedIn was tested. 
AIReF reports that, in 2024, an intense documentation and data collection work was carried out to facilitate the work of the evaluation team 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
regarding AIReF’s communication efforts. In 2025, an important impulse was given to the development of more informative materials. Six videos, 
28 informative infographics and 10 posters have been produced and disseminated. As a new development, in 2025 AIReF has launched AIReF 
Divulga, a new section on our website aimed at making economic and fiscal content more accessible and engaging for a broader audience. AIReF 
Divulga is designed as a dynamic outreach platform, with weekly posts explaining key economic and fiscal concepts in a simpler, more visual format. 
Weekly posts are announced in social media through graphic posters, the glossary is updated weekly including words form the latest posts, and an 
interactive quiz is proposed to test and reinforce economic knowledge. 

Media impact tracking  On a quarterly basis, AIReF’s communication team monitors the impact of AIReF's publications in different media (written press, digital media) and 

on social networks (LinkedIn and X both on the institutional account and the President's account). 

Staff specialised in communication  AIReF's communication team is outsourced and is under the control of the President's Office. The team includes: a project manager with full 

availability (with at least 10 years of experience in communication management positions), a graduate in journalism specialized in the management 
and elaboration of contents related to economic information with full availability, a journalist specialized in media relations management and 
content development and a journalist responsible for the Digital Communication Plan (community manager for social media and elaboration of 
visual contents). These two last members don't work full time for AIReF. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  AIReF reports that it regularly organises its own conferences including outside experts and that the AIReF leadership regularly participates as 

speakers/discussants in regional, national and international conferences organised by others. 

Summary:  In  its  first  decade  of  existence,  AIReF  has  relatively  quickly  established  itself  as  a  well-known  independent  fiscal  institution  with  a  broad 
mandate.  It  is  well  staffed,  reflecting  its  resource-intensive  tasks  stemming  partly  from  the  decentralised  structure  of  Spain.  For  staffing,  the  pool  of 
candidates  is  limited  to  civil  servants.  It  has  experienced  some  issues  regarding  access  to  information,  partly  due  to  a  lack  of  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Economy. Furthermore, AIReF considers that the dialogue with the government and the 
parliament could be improved. Recently, AIReF has increased its communication efforts. Based on its own initiative, AIReF has been subject to independent 
external reviews. 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
Finland – National Audit Office of Finland – Fiscal Policy Monitoring Department (NAOF - FPMD) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 

Performed according to its official mandate.  
Assessments about the reliability and plausibility of the government’s published forecasts. 
No role in the preparation, but the Ministry of Finance is legally obliged to take NAOF-FPMD conclusions about the forecasts into 
account. If NAOF-FPMD reports a significant bias in the forecast, the Ministry of Finance must take corrective action. 
Performed according to its official mandate. The NAOF-FPMD assesses the budgetary forecasts (with a focus on budget balance and 
debt) before the budgetary planning documents are adopted by Parliament. It’s not based on quantitative policy costing. 

Performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output. NAOF-FPMD reports that it follows and checks quite closely the employment 
measures of the government in the context of the government’s employment target (and a fiscal target linked to it), but not (directly) in 
the context of the budgetary forecast assessment. 

Produce or endorse long-term fiscal projections  No assessment of long-term sustainability. 

Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

In line with its official mandate, NAOF-FPMD monitors both ex ante and ex post compliance. 

Ex post forecast evaluation  NAOF-FPMD reports that it performs such evaluations. 

Involved in correction mechanism 

Involved in the correction mechanism related to Fiscal Compact.  

(De)activation of escape clauses  NAOF-FPMD does not have an explicit role in the process of triggering of escape clauses. However, it monitors the whole Fiscal Policy 

Act that implements the Fiscal Compact in Finland, and it monitors the whole correction mechanism (including possible use of the 
escape clause). 
There is no indication that NAOF-FPMD has been involved in the MTFSP of Finland. 

Functioning of the national fiscal framework is assessed through fiscal policy audits. The latest ones: 
Effectiveness of the assessment procedure in balancing local government finances and safeguarding services (2024), Functioning of the 
central government spending limits system (2021), Steering of local government finances (2018).  
In certain situations, a government reaction in the form of a public statement is required by law, e.g. if NAOF-PBMD conclude that the 
government has not complied with the Fiscal Policy Act and it disagrees with that conclusion. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 
Assessment of national fiscal framework 

Comply-or-explain requirement 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  No; The budget for NAOF-FPMD is part of the annual appropriation for NAOF as a whole. Funding of the NAOF is decided directly by the 

Parliament, not through the budget process of the Ministry of Finance. 

Adequacy of funding  NAOF-FPMD considered its allocation of approximately EUR 1.000.000 in 2024 adequate. 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Secretariat staff  NAOF-FPMD reports a staff of six (1 manager, 5 economists). 

Support from other institutions 

IT support, communications, offices, human resources services and general administration support from the relevant departments of 
NAOF. 

Procedures for stability of funds  According to Rules of Procedure of NAOF, NAOF allocates adequate personnel and other resources for fiscal policy monitoring through 

the NAOF’s resource and budget plan. 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment procedures  
Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Ordinary law. Fiscal Policy Act 869/2012. The institution itself (National Audit Office, NAOF) is established by the Constitution, but the 
task of the IFI by the Fiscal Policy Act. 

Being a department in NAOF, the FPMD does not have a board structure, but one Director of Department. The staff of civil servants is 
appointed based on merits according to the procedure defined in the Act on the Civil Servants of the Parliament. 

The staff of civil servants is appointed based on merits according to the procedure defined in the Act on the Civil Servants of the 
Parliament. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  Explicit prohibition against taking instructions does currently not exist in the legislation, but NAOF’s general independence (a concept 

that also includes the prohibition against taking instructions) is clearly established in the Constitution and in ordinary law. 

Role of the Chair  The NAOF-PBMD Director decides on statements, reports and the work program of the PBMD. 

Policy dialogue with government  The regular policy dialogue takes place between NAOF and Ministry of Finance officials, not directly with the representatives of the 

government. In certain situations, a government reaction in the form of a public statement is required by law, e.g. if NAOF-PBMD 
conclude that the government has not complied with the Fiscal Policy Act and it disagrees with that conclusion. So far, there has been 
no instances of non-compliance and the Government disagreeing with such a conclusion. 

Interaction with parliament  The NAOF report is discussed in the Parliament, both in the Plenary and at least in the Audit Committee. NAOF-PBMD also provides a 

statement to the Finance Committee of the Parliament when the draft budget and General Government Fiscal Plan (MTBF) are 
discussed. NAAOF-PBMD reported that it participated in 2-3 parliamentary hearings but received no parliamentary questions in 2024. 
Access to non-public information  The access to information of NAOF-PBMD is legally protected (Act on National Audit Office (676/2000)) and the PBMD did not report 

any issues in 2024. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  The NAOF Auditor General appoints personnel, but the Director of the PBMD is involved in the recruitment process. 

External review of the IFI  One independent external evaluation has taken place so far (in 2019), carried out by OECD, with peers from other IFIs and a national 

expert. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The NAOF-PBMD reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  No 

Leadership role in communication  The NAOF-PBMD reports that its Director oversees communication. 

Number of press releases/conferences  The NAOF-PBMD reports that, in 2024, it issued 1-3 press releases but organised no press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  Been interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers once or twice in 2024. Issued articles once or twice in the mainstream 
domestic media, closely linked to the release of opinions/recommendations by the IFI. Government reaction to recommendations not 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Media impact tracking  Media tracking is made by the NAOF Communication Department, also separately for IFI-related issues. 

well covered. NAOF-PBMD has a social media presence. 

Staff specialised in communication  Not within the NAOF-PBMD. The NAOF Communications Department has a dedicated person for IFI-related communication. The staff of 

NAOF-PBMD is involved in communication activities. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  NAOF-PBMD reports that it has organised two seminars on EU fiscal rules (2021, 2025) and that the NAOF-PBMD leadership and its staff 

occasionally participate in conferences organised by others. 

Summary: NAOF-PBMD has a relatively narrow mandate focusing on monitoring compliance with fiscal rules. It is embedded into the National Audit Office 
of  Finland, which  provides  horizontal  services.  It  considers  its  staffing and  resources  to  be  sufficient  for  its  current  tasks.  No  serious  information  access 
issues  have  been  reported.  NAOF-PBMD  is  keeping  a  fairly  low  media  profile  (although  it  reports  that  media  attention  has  increased  recently)  and 
government reactions to IFI recommendations are not well publicised. 

45 

 
 
 
 
 
France – High Council of Public Finance (HCFP) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and growth 
sustainability 

In line with its official mandate, the HCFP assesses the official macroeconomic forecasts which are published before submission to the 
Parliament of the budgetary planning documents. No explicit endorsement nor reconciliation procedure foreseen.  

In line with its official mandate, the HCFP assesses the budgetary forecasts before the adoption in parliament of the budgetary planning 
documents. The HCFP delivers an opinion on the consistency of the budgetary forecasts with European commitments and with the 
structural balance trajectory defined by the programming law. It also checks the internal consistency of the budget bill (credibility of 
assumptions, consistency of budgetary forecasts with macroeconomic assumptions, realism of budgetary impact estimates of new 
measures).   
The HCFP does not carry out systematic quantitative costing of policies. 

Produce or endorse long-term fiscal projections  Performed on a voluntary basis with sporadic output. The Opinion on the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan 2025-2028, 

released in October 2024, included a brief assessment of debt sustainability. 
For the structural balance and expenditure growth, ex-ante and ex-post assessment of compliance with the programming law. 

Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  The organic law 2021-1836 of 28 December 2021 on the modernization of public finance management requires that the HCFP issues an 

opinion at least once every four years on the accuracy of the government's forecasts. To prepare such an opinion, the staff of HCFP 
issued a Paper in August 2024 comparing the government's macroeconomic and public finance forecasts in the initial budget bill with 
their outcome, between 2004 and 2023. The opinion of the HCFP on this matter was published in April 2025. 
Previously, the HCFP had presented forecast evaluations in its activity reports (see for example the Activity report 2015-2018, pp 28-39).  

Involved in correction mechanism  Every year in April, the HCFP gives an ex-post opinion on any deviations between the outturn and the structural balance trajectory laid 

down in the programming law. In case of "significant deviation" from the trajectory, the correction mechanism is triggered, and the 
government must put forward correcting measures to bring the public finances back into line with the trajectory. The correction 
mechanism was triggered in May 2014, for a significant difference on the structural balance in the previous year, and in April 2025 for 
the same reason. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  The organic law of December 2012 provides that "the Government can ask the HCFP to check whether the conditions mentioned in the 

TSCG for the definition of exceptional circumstances are satisfied". The Government invoked such exceptional circumstances in 2020. 
HCFP was referred on the 2024 MTFSP in October 2024. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term fiscal-
structural plans 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  No 

Comply-or-explain requirement  There is no explicit comply-or-explain procedure in the legislation, except for the correction mechanism. 

46 

 
 
 
 
CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes 

Adequacy of funding  The HCFP reports funding to be adequate, but difficult to quantify, as its funding flows from the overall Court of Auditors budget. 
Number of Secretariat staff  6.6 full-time equivalent staff (1 manager, 5.4 economists and 0.2 administrative staff). Staff members are selected by the President and 

the Secretary General based on their competence and experience in the fields of macroeconomics and public finance. They are 
appointed by the President. 

Support from other institutions  The HCFP is attached to the French Court of Auditors, which provides premises, office material and logistical facilities. 

Some experts and economists of the permanent secretariat work part time for the Court of Auditors. 

Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Yes (Article 61 and 62 of the amended Organic Law n°2001-692 of 1 August 2001 on budget laws). 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment procedures  

11 Members appointed for 5-year mandates, renewable once. To ensure staggering of mandates, when the HCFP was set up in March 
2013, four members (two magistrates and two qualified individuals) chosen by the drawing of lots were appointed for two and half 
years instead of five years. A first renewal of the High Council occurred in September 2015, the second one in March 2018. 
The High Council is chaired by the President of the Court of Auditors. The ten other members are: i) four magistrates of the Court of 
Auditors appointed by the President of the Court; ii) five qualified individuals appointed, respectively, by the presidents of the National 
Assembly and the Senate, the chairs of the Finance Committees of the National Assembly and the Senate and the President of the 
Economic, Social and Environmental Council and the Parliament and the Economic and Social Council; and iii) the Director General of the 
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). 
Members are appointed based on their experience and competence in the fields of macroeconomics and public finance. The qualified 
individuals are appointed after a public hearing by the Finance and Social Affairs Committees of the assembly concerned (National 
Assembly or Senate). The magistrates and the qualified individuals appointed by the parliamentary authorities must include equal 
numbers of men and women. Board Members are not allowed to hold political posts. 
Prohibition against taking instructions  Article 61-I of the amended Organic Law No. 2001-692 of 1st August 2001 concerning Budget Laws) states that “when they carry out 
their missions, the members of the High Council of Public Finance must not seek or receive any instructions from the Government or 
from any public or private person”. 

Professional competence requirements for Board 
members 

Role of the Chair  The president chairs the meetings, prepares the meetings with the permanent secretariat, is heard by the Finance Committees of the 

Parliament for main opinions delivered by the HCFP and oversees the HCFP media communication. 

Policy dialogue with government  As the government is not constrained by any legislation (except in the correction mechanism), memorandum of understanding or 

commitment, it is free to react in a discretionary manner. It tends not to react. 

Interaction with parliament  The HCFP reported that it participated in 4-6 parliamentary hearings in 2024 but received no parliamentary questions. The opinions of 

the HCFP were discussed as specific agenda items in parliamentary committee meetings. 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Access to non-public information 

Legal right to full access but which can (and sometimes is) interpreted as limited to the short time period of referrals. One week before 
the HCFP has to deliver its opinion, the Government sends it a "referral file" containing relatively detailed information on the budget bill 
(or other budgetary texts). The information is complemented by some answers of the administration to questions of the HCFP and by 
hearings of the Treasury, Budget and Social Security departments. 
The HCFP reports two types of problem with access to information in 2024: 
- when the HCFP was consulted on the macroeconomic framework of the draft Stability Programme in April 2024, the request was late 
and incomplete, making it difficult to have a precise understanding of the choices made 
- when the HCFP was consulted on the macroeconomic forecasts of France's medium-term fiscal-structural plan (MTP) for 2025-2028, 
the information provided by the Government was insufficient, with no details on the composition of growth beyond 2025, no mention 
of the reforms and investments needed to benefit from an extension of the budgetary adjustment period from 4 to 7 years, and no 
explanation of how the Government would reduce its public deficit over the plan's horizon. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes, but pay level is subject to the same rules as for the Court of Auditors as a whole. 

External review of the IFI  HCFP has never been subject to an external evaluation. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The HCFP can publish opinions only on a defined list of budgetary laws.  

Explicit communication strategy  Article 24 of Chapter 6 of the Internal rules of the HCFP states that the opinions of the HCFP should be published on its website. 
Leadership role in communication  Article 3 of the Internal Rules of the HCFP states that only the President of the HCFP or a member that the President specifically 

designates is allowed to speak on behalf of the HCFP regarding its opinions. 

Number of press releases/conferences  The HCFP reports that no press releases were made in 2024 and that 1-2 press conferences were organised.  

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The HCFP reports that it was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly throughout 2024, also on  

general fiscal and economic issues. It reports a presence in social media.  

Media impact tracking  The documentation service of the Court of Auditors performs media impact tracking on a daily basis (page 23 of the 2019-2022 Activity 

report). 

Staff specialised in communication  No 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The NCFP regularly organises its own conferences including outside experts. Its leadership and members of the Secretariat occasionally 

participate in conferences organised by others.  In May 2024, the annual conference of the HCFP addressed European and national 
challenges in the area of public debt sustainability. It was organised together with the Ecole Polytechnique and involved several national 
and international experts. 

Summary: The HCFP has a relatively narrow mandate, focusing on the core tasks of assessing forecasts and monitoring specific aspects of the compliance 
with fiscal rules. Despite the requirement in the Regulation 473/2013 that euro area IFIs should produce or endorse the macroeconomic forecast, the HCFP 
reports having the more limited mandate of only assessing the macroeconomic forecast underlying the budgetary plans of the government. The HCFP is 
deeply embedded in the National Audit Office (NAO), with staff working part time for both the HCFP and the NAO and its funding flowing from the overall 
NAO budget. This arrangement, while allowing the HCFP benefit from the notoriety of the Court, could make it more difficult to develop a clear IFI identity 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
and for the public to discern the particular role of the HCFP. The freedom to communicate is significantly curtailed by the limit on when the HCFP is allowed 
to publish. The policy dialogue with the government is not well developed. Although some outreach activities take place, the communication strategy is not 
fully developed. The HCFP reported some issues with access to information in recent years, mainly related to the lack of detail in the information provided. 
It reports having no MoUs in place with key information providers.  

49 

 
 
 
 
Croatia – Fiscal Policy Commission (FPC) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

Official endorsement of the government`s macroeconomic forecasts used for fiscal planning for both  
the annual budgets and the medium-term plans. 

Official endorsement of budgetary forecast. 

No 

No 

Ex ante and ex post monitoring performed according to its official mandate for the general government debt rule, budget balance rule 
and expenditure rule. 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  No 

Involved in correction mechanism  Yes. The Government is obliged to propose, within 30 days after receiving a Report from the FPC, a plan with measures (with deadlines 

for implementation) aiming at fulfilling the fiscal rule. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  The FPC reports involvement regarding the rules that it monitors. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

In November 2024, the FPC reviewed the Medium-Term Fiscal and Structural Plan (MTFSP) for the Period 2025–2028 and, in June 2025, 
it examined the Progress Report regarding 2024 and 2025 of that plan. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  No 

Comply-or-explain requirement 

In line with its legal obligation, the government responds to (some) of the monitoring report(s)/statement(s) on fiscal rules of the FPC. 
No reaction reported in 2024. 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 
Funding grounded in law 

Funding is secured through the State Budget (Budget Act). 

Adequacy of funding  The FPC reports that adequacy of funding was just right. At the same time, it reports that less than half of the budgeted amount for 

2024 of EUR 857.011 was actually used. In accordance with the Fiscal Responsibility Act, only civil servants can be employees of the FPC, 
which causes significant recruitment problems, as the FPC has no freedom to set salaries of its staff. 

Number of Secretariat staff  The FPC reports a staff of 5 (3 economists, 1 legal expert and 1 administrative staff). 

Support from other institutions  No, since October 2024, the FPC no longer relies on support from the Office for General Affairs of the Croatian Parliament or the 
government for managing the administrative, accounting-financial, IT, and public procurement tasks, but is rather using external 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedures for stability of funds  No 

services from the private market. 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Fiscal Responsibility Act (Official Gazette number 111/2018; 83/2023) 

7 (1 President and 6 Members, who are representatives of other independent institutions: State Audit, Economic Institute, Public 
Finance Institute, Croatian National Bank, Economic Faculty and Faculty of Law), 5-year non-staggered mandates, renewable more than 
three times. The President is selected through a public call for candidates. The members of the FPC are proposed to the Parliament by 
independent institutions. The Parliament then must confirm proposed candidates. 
The President of the FPC must be a citizen of and reside in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, must have a university degree or a 
specialist diploma, at least eight years of professional experience in the field of public finance, macroeconomics, economic policy and 
accounting with an outstanding track record. The President must not have been convicted of crimes and cannot be a member of a 
political party or cannot have been a member of a political party for the three years preceding the candidature for president of the FPC. 
No Board Member is allowed to hold any political or public administration posts. 
Regarding the other Board members, the independent institutions referred to above must nominate as their representatives persons 
from the ranks of eminent scientists and experts, who have completed a graduate university study or a specialist graduate study 
program, have work experience in the areas of public finance, macroeconomics, economic policy or accounting, and who, since at least 
three years back are not members of any political party. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  No formal prohibition against taking instructions exists, although there are other independence safeguards. Article 12 (2) of the Fiscal 

Responsibility Act states that "Any form of influence on the work of the Commission that could jeopardize its independence and 
autonomy in decision-making is prohibited.” 

Role of the Chair  The President directs the work of the FPC and convenes and chairs its sessions. He/She signs the acts adopted at its sessions, prepares a 

proposal for securing funds for the work of the FPC and is the commissioner for the financial and material operations of the FPC. 

Policy dialogue with government  No government reaction reported in 2024, as the FPC reports not having produced anything that required one by law. 
Interaction with parliament  The FPC reports that, in 2024, it participated in 4-6 parliamentary hearings and received 1-3 parliamentary questions. 

Access to non-public information  The FPC reports a legal right to access, albeit with some limitations. Ministries and other central state administration bodies, as well as 

other budgetary and extrabudgetary users of the state budget are obliged to submit, at the request of the FPC, documents and data 
necessary for the Commission to carry out its tasks. Agreements/MoUs with the Croatian National Bank and the Ministry of Finance, 
respectively, on the exchange of statistical data has been signed or are planned. The FPC reports receiving important information only a 
few days before they are expected to issue an opinion on the government projections. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  As the Fiscal Responsibility Act lays down that the FPC's office can only hire civil servants, their salaries are set by Law. 
External review of the IFI  The FPC is not obliged to undergo independent external reviews, and no such evaluation has taken place. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The FPC reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  No 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leadership role in communication  No 

Number of press releases/conferences  The FPC reports that, in 2024, it issued 4-6 press releases and organised 1-2 press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The FPC reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed only in media outlets specialised in economy/finance and issued articles 
once or twice in the mainstream domestic media, closely linked to the release of opinions/recommendations by the IFI. It also reports 
being present in social media. 

Media impact tracking  The FPC reports that it monitors the number of visitors to its official website and to its LinkedIn account. 

Staff specialised in communication  No 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The FPC reports that its leadership and members of the secretariat regularly participate as speakers/discussants in conferences 

organised by others. 

Summary: The FPC has a narrow mandate, focusing on the monitoring of compliance with fiscal rules and endorsing/assessing the macroeconomic forecast 
underlying the budgetary plans of the government (without relying on a forecast of its own). Its work is hampered by the fact that Members work full-time 
for  their main  employers, leaving  them  in  practice  with  very  little time  to  devote  to their  FPC  tasks.  In addition,  although  less  than  half  of  its  allocated 
budget was used in 2024, the FPC still experienced difficulties recruiting staff to its Secretariat, as it can only hire civil servants and, consequently, is not free 
to  set  the  pay  level  of  its  staff.  Partly  linked  to  these  staffing  constraints,  the  FPC  has  not  yet  developed  any  significant  outreach  activities  and  the 
description of the role of the President does not refer to any external communication tasks. Still a young institution, the FPC has yet to undergo an external 
review. Some interaction with parliament has taken place, but the policy dialogue with the government is not fully developed.  

52 

 
 
 
 
 
Hungary – Fiscal Council of Hungary (FCH) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 

Performed according to its official mandate. Official endorsement of the government`s macroeconomic forecasts used for 
fiscal planning for the annual budgets. FCH does not have the legal obligation to endorse the forecast underlying the 
medium-term budgetary planning. However, the latter one often coincides with the former. No reconciliation procedure.  
Assessment of budgetary forecasts before the adoption in the Parliament of the budgetary planning documents. 

Performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output. Usually, the FCH does not perform policy costing. 

Produce or endorse long-term fiscal projections  No 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

Both ex ante and ex post monitoring performed according to its official mandate for both budget balance rules and the debt 
rule. 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  No. 

(De)activation of escape clauses 

Involved in correction mechanism  The budget can only be accepted when the Council has given its permission (the budget has to decrease the national debt, 
except when an escape clause is in effect, e.g. for example during a recession). 
FCH is involved with regard to the debt rule, but activation and deactivation is outside the scope of the FCH. It is either by 
the decision of the National Assembly (in cases of national emergency, war, etc.), or – in case of a recession – due to the 
data. 
No, but the option is provided by the Hungarian legislation. The most recent three-year outlook of the Council assessed parts 
of the medium-term fiscal structural plan. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  No 

Comply-or-explain requirement  The government responds to written opinion(s)/recommendation(s)/finding(s) as it is legally required to do so, often in 

detail. In most years, the response was systematically covering all main findings/recommendations in a meaningful manner 
and was included in the budget law proposal sent to the National Assembly. 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes 

Adequacy of funding  The FCH considers the funding level in 2024 of EUR 540.335 to have been adequate. This covered the expenses related to 

the chairman and the 4 persons employed at the Secretariat, the costs of travel, and the costs of external research 
commissioned by the Council. Expenses related to IT, infrastructure, utilities etc are covered by the National Assembly. 

Number of Secretariat staff  The secretariat has a staff of less than 4 full-time equivalent persons (1 manager and 3 economists - 2 full time, 2 part-time). 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Support from other institutions  The FCH draws on support from the staff of the National Bank (MNB) and the State Audit Office (SAO). From the MNB, this 

implied 14 experts employed at the directorate for fiscal analysis, plus the director himself, as well as another 4 experts from 
the macroeconomic department. To deal with the issue of the equity of the National Bank, it also draws on 4 experts from 
the monetary policy division, bringing the total number of staff to 23 from the MNB. From the SAO, 12 experts from the 
special analysis department, including its head, usually produce 5-11 reports on topics related to the Fiscal Council remit. 

Procedures for stability of funds  There exist no explicit mechanisms for stability of funds. 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment procedures  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Yes 

The FCH has a Board of 3 persons. The Chair is selected for 6 years, the Members are rotated based on their mandates at 
their respective mother institutions, implying a certain degree of staggering. The mandates are renewable more than 3 times 
(except for the MNB member, who can only be re-elected once). The Chairman of the Council is appointed by the President 
of the Republic, while the heads of MNB and SAO are ex officio members of the Council, i.e. once they are elected to those 
positions, they automatically become members of the Council. Only the Members must be approved by the National 
Assembly, whereas the Chair is appointed by the President of the Republic. 
For the Governor of the National Bank and the President of the State Audit Office, the FCH reports the CV requirements to 
be “self-explanatory”, i.e. the conditions are covered by the requirements of the National Bank Governor/Head of State 
Audit Office. For the Chair, the regulation asks for an economist with exceptional knowledge of the field, as well as 
outstanding experience in public finances. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  No formal prohibition against taking instructions exists, although there are other independence safeguards. Article 12 (2) of 

the Fiscal Responsibility Act states that "Any form of influence on the work of the Commission that could jeopardize its 
independence and autonomy in decision-making is prohibited.” 
Initiating Council meetings and suggesting agenda; representing the Council. 
Policy dialogue with government  The government reacts to monitoring reports/statements on compliance with fiscal rules as it is compelled to do so by 

Role of the Chair 

legislation. In 2024, the FCH reports that the government reaction to the opinion of the FCH was published in the budgetary 
document within two weeks and that the associated exchange of views featured prominently in the domestic media. 

Interaction with parliament  The FCH reports that, in 2024, it participated in 2-3 parliamentary hearings, but did not receive any parliamentary questions. 

Access to non-public information 

Legal right to full access. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes, but someone else sets restrictions on salaries, i.e. the rules of the Office of the National Assembly apply to those 

employed at the FCH Secretariat. 

External review of the IFI  The FCH has never been subject to a comprehensive independent external review. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The FCH reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  No 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leadership role in communication  Yes. 

Number of press releases/conferences  The FCH reports that, in 2024, it issued no press releases and did not organise any press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The FCH reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly 
throughout the year, also on general fiscal and economic issues and that it issued articles regularly in the mainstream 
domestic media, closely linked to the release of its opinions/ recommendations. The FCH reports that it is not present in 
social media. 

Media impact tracking  No 
Staff specialised in communication  No 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The FCH regularly organises its own conferences including outside experts and its leadership regularly participate as 
speakers/discussants in conferences organised by others. 

Summary: The FCH is a small IFI with a narrow mandate, focusing on assessing the macroeconomic forecast underlying the annual budgetary plan of the 
government and monitoring the compliance with national fiscal rules. It produces medium-term forecasts but no long-term macroeconomic or budgetary 
projections and does no policy costing. The President of Hungary appoints the Head of the FCH without any nomination procedure and two of three Board 
members are Head of other  institutions at  the  same time  (Central bank  and  Audit Office),  which  could affect the independence of the FCH  and make  it 
harder to develop a proper IFI identity. It also relies heavily on staff from these two other institutions to perform its regular tasks. It maintains a relatively 
low media profile, having given no press conferences in 2024 and having no social media presence. The FCH has never undergone an independent external 
evaluation.  

55 

 
 
 
 
 
Ireland – Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFC) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

In line with its official mandate, the IFC endorses the government’s macroeconomic forecasts used for fiscal planning for both the 
annual budgets and the medium-term plans.  
The government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution's 
forecasts, but an MoU between the IFC and the MoF stipulates that if the IFC would have significant reservations regarding the 
provisionally final government forecast, these would immediately be communicated to MoF on an informal basis. Further discussions 
could then take place and a revised forecast addressing the concerns raised could be provided to the IFC as a basis for endorsement. The 
substantive conclusions of such discussions would be reflected in written communications between the IFC and MoF. 
In line with its mandate, the IFC assesses the budgetary forecasts after the budgetary planning documents have been adopted by 
parliament. 

Performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output. 

Performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output. 

In line with its mandate, once per year the IFC monitors ex ante and ex post compliance with budget balance and debt rules at general 
government level and budget balance rule at local government level. 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  No formal ex post forecast evaluation is carried out. However, as part of the IFC’s mandate to assess the budgetary forecasts, the IFC 

regularly assesses budgetary forecast errors. As part of the IFC’s endorsement function, the IFC regularly assess the MoF’s 
macroeconomic forecast errors. 

Involved in correction mechanism  Yes, via a comply-or-explain provision. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  Under the Fiscal Responsibility Act (2012), the IFC is required to give its opinion on whether “exceptional circumstances” exist or cease 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

to exist. 
No formal role at present, but IFC delivered an opinion on the macroeconomic forecast and the macroeconomic assumptions 
underpinning the multi-annual net expenditure path. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  No. 

Comply-or-explain requirement  The authorities react in a regular manner based on its own commitment.  

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adequacy of funding  The IFC considers that it needs some more resources. The Council is funded directly from the Central Fund, i.e. the Parliament 

(Oireachtas) has declared by law that this expenditure is to be paid from the Central Fund without annual reference to the lower House 
of parliament (Dáil). Funding in the Fiscal Responsibility Act (2012) was capped initially at EUR 800,000 and indexed to HICP inflation. 
The budget appropriation for 2024 amounted to around EUR 913,000 (ceiling of around EUR 971,000). Due to a temporary drop in staff 
numbers, only around EUR 753,000 was spent. Plans of increasing the ceiling and linking the indexation to the main items of IFC’s 
expenses are being discussed. 

Number of Secretariat staff  6 (1 manager, 4 economists, 1 administrative staff). Open competition. Secretariat staff appointments and terms are defined in the 

Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 and comply with the Public Appointments Service (PAS) process set out in the Guidelines on Appointments 
to State Boards. 

Support from other institutions  No 
Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Yes. Ordinary Law Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2012. 

5 (1 Chair, 4 Members) appointed for a four-year period, renewable up to three times. When there is a vacancy, there is a publicly 
advertised open competition and a selection committee is formed (consisting of four to five members: one or two representatives from 
the Public Appointments Service, a representative from the MoF, the Council Chair and an external stakeholder). The selection 
committee reviews the applicants and draws up a shortlist of three candidates. The Minister of Finance then appoints from the 
shortlisted candidates. 
The initial appointments to the Council were made on a staggered basis with terms of office ranging from two to four years. Thereafter 
the standard term of office was for four years. 
From the Fiscal Responsibility Act.  
“In appointing members of the Fiscal Council, the Minister shall (a) have regard to the desirability of their having competence; (b) and 
experience in domestic or international macroeconomic or fiscal matters, and (b) to the extent practicable, ensure an appropriate 
balance between men and women in the membership of the Fiscal Council.” 
When vacancies on the Council are advertised, more specific requirements are usually listed (e.g., at least 10 years experience working 
in fiscal or macroeconomics area). 

Prohibition against taking instructions  No such requirement reported. 

Role of the Chair 

Leadership of the Council: Chairs all Council meetings, signs off on agenda; ensures effectiveness on all aspects of Council’s role; displays 
high standards of integrity and probity. 
Day-to-day advice and liaison with the Head of Secretariat (HoS): Sign-off on working papers etc. Sign-off on social media engagements; 
performance review of the HoS; Reviews work plans, provides feedback. 
External engagements: Engagement with the EU IFI network and other international groupings; Represents Council at conferences and 
at other meetings/events; Leading Council's interactions with the Oireachtas; Responsible for high-level interactions with Department of 
Finance and other bodies; Designated spokesperson – press conferences, media articles. 
Accountable Officer: Signs off on financial accounts; Accounts for performance of Council to the Oireachtas. 

Policy dialogue with government  The IFC produces Fiscal Assessment Reports twice a year. The finance minister responds to each of them. The IFC reports reactions in 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
Interaction with parliament 

2023 and 2024 via open letter within two months. Contents of the response(s) are of varying coverage and quality and produced no 
meaningful media echo. 
In 2024, 2-3 parliamentary hearings and more than 10 parliamentary questions. The IFC is generally invited to hearings by the 
parliament, though there is no such legal obligation. 

Access to non-public information  Access not based on legal provisions, but a memorandum of Understanding only for endorsement-related information. Bilateral 

communication in other cases. Reports that responses from the Ministry for Public Expenditure, Infrastructure, Public Service Reform 
and Digitalisation are often slow, but answers are often provided. 
Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes, but grades and salary scales are fixed to civil service grades. 

External review of the IFI 

IFC reports that external reviews take place regularly on a voluntary basis. The latest one, produced by the OECD, took place in 2021.  

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The IFC reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  Yes. 
Leadership role in communication  Yes.  

Number of press releases/conferences 
Visibility in media/Presence in social media 

Media impact tracking 

IFC reports that it made 4-6 press releases in 2024 and organised 3-5 press conferences. 

IFC reports that its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers and issued articles in domestic media 
regularly throughout the year, also on general fiscal and economic issues. IFC has a social media presence. 
IFC reports that it performs regular tracking of the number of articles that IFC reports appear in as well as the number of X and LinkedIn 
impressions. 

Staff specialised in communication  No 

Organisation of/participation in conferences 

IFC reports that it regularly organises its own conferences including outside experts and that its leadership and members of the 
secretariat regularly participate as speakers/discussants in conferences organised by others. 

Summary:  The  IFC  is  a  relatively  small  IFI  with  a  relatively  narrow  mandate.  The  IFC  has  autonomy  in  selecting  staff  members  but  does  not  have  full 
autonomy  over  how  it  uses  its  budget,  as  it  needs  to  have  new  positions  or  regrading  of  existing  positions  approved  by  the  Department  of  Public 
Expenditure, Infrastructure, Public Service Reform and Digitalisation (DPER). The right to access to information does not benefit from legal protections and 
is only partly governed by an MoU. Generally, to obtain the necessary information, the IFC must rely on informal channels. External reviews are done with 
regular  intervals,  but  so  far  only  on  a  voluntary  basis.  The  independence  of  the  Board  is  strengthened  by  having  one  non-Irish  Member.  The  IFC  has  a 
relatively active  dialogue with Parliament and presence  in the  media.  Appointments to the  Board are  made  by the Minister of Finance  from a  short-list 
drawn up by a selection Committee, which typically includes the current Chair, a senior official from the Ministry of Finance, and an official from the Public 
Appointments Service.  

58 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy – Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 

Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

In line with its mandate, the PBO officially endorses the government’s macroeconomic forecasts used for fiscal planning for both the 
annual budgets and the medium-term plans. The government is free to use its own forecasts, but deviations from the fiscal institution's 
forecasts have to be justified publicly 
In line with its mandate, the PBO assesses the budgetary forecasts before the adoption in the Parliament of the budgetary planning 
documents. 

The PBO makes costing analysis of the main envisaged policy measures. Policy costings and distributional effects of major legislative 
measures are performed using either microsimulation models or other simpler instruments, where these models are not useful/suited. 

Performed according to its official mandate. The PBO's analysis covers medium-term sustainability of public debt, with stochastic and 
deterministic analysis published in its flagship Reports. It is also working on its own long-term sustainability model encompassing also 
demographic changes. 
In line with its mandate, the PBO performs ex ante and ex post monitoring of fiscal rules and is carried out after the Government 
submits the annual budget and its medium-term budgetary programme, but before these documents are voted on by Parliament. 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  Yes 

Involved in correction mechanism  The PBO in its analysis would flag the existence of a significant deviation from the MTO in the previous year. This significant deviation 

would require the adoption of corrective measures by the Government, pursuant to Law n. 243 /2012, article 8, implementing the 
provision of the Fiscal Compact in the domestic legal order. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  The PBO reports involvement regarding the structural budget balance rule.  

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

PBO assessed the first MTFSP in 2024. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  Occasionally, on a voluntary basis. In March 2025 the PBO conducted an assessment of the coherence of the national fiscal framework 

Comply-or-explain requirement 

with the new EU economic governance framework. The assessment was presented to the parliamentary working group dedicated to the 
issue, but at the moment there is no public document, as it is all confidential. The previous assessment of the coherence of the national 
fiscal framework with the new EU economic governance framework was published on 7 May 2024 with the title "Implications of the new 
EU governance on national budgetary procedures". 
In line with its legal obligation, the government responds to some of the PBO’s monitoring report(s)/statement(s) on fiscal rules. As 
envisaged by Article 18 of Law n. 243/2012, in case the PBO's assessments are significantly different from those of the Government, 
upon request of at least one third of the Members of the Parliamentary Budget Committees, the Government must explain to 
Parliament the reasons why it intends to confirm its own assessments. Otherwise, the Government shall comply with the assessments of 
the PBO. Whenever the Government presents a request for deviation from the fiscal adjustment path, the PBO is asked to provide an 
opinion on the request. 

59 

 
 
 
 
CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes. In the 2025 Budget Law the funding provided by the Houses of Parliament was increased from 3 to 3.5 million euros from each 

House starting from 2025. No automatic indexation to inflation is in place. 

Adequacy of funding  The endowment established by the law refers to a fully operational structure, although in 2022 the PBO staff consists of only 24 people, 
while it may potentially staff up to 40 people. Funding is appropriate for the actual number of staff, but it remains to be seen whether it 
is appropriate for its maximum potential staff number 

Number of Secretariat staff  32 (1 manager, 26 economists, 4 administrative staff, 1 spokesperson/press officer). Legal room to have 40 staff. 

Support from other institutions 

In line with their legal obligation, the Houses of Parliament provide premises and other facilities to the PBO (for example, IT facilities and 
support). 

Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  
Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Yes. Constitutional Law n. 1/2012, art. 5, line 1, point f; Law n. 243/2012 art. 16,17,18,19. 

3 independent Members (including one Chair) are appointed for non-staggered, non-renewable mandates of 6 years. 
They are selected by the two Houses' Chairs from a list of ten people, which is previously voted on by the Budget Committees of both 
Houses of Parliament, with a two-third majority rule. 

The law mandates that the PBO Board members must be independent and widely recognized experts in public finance and economics, 
at national or international level. Currently, they are all university professors. All of them were obliged to take a leave of absence from 
their positions during their terms of office as Board members, as they cannot be employed by someone else at the same time. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  There is no explicit ban on taking instructions in the law, which includes a more general phrase: "The Office shall enjoy full autonomy 

and independence in its judgements and assessments." 

Role of the Chair  The President legally represents the PBO and conveys the official position of the institution to the media and in parliamentary 

Policy dialogue with government 

committee hearings, if requested. The President proposes the PBO's annual work programme to the Parliamentary Budget Committees. 
The President calls and defines the agenda of the PBO Board meetings and proposes to the Board the adoption of all PBO reports and 
analyses. The President appoints and may revoke the Director General of the PBO. 
In 2024, the response(s) were systematically covering all main findings/recommendations in a meaningful manner and were provided 
within two weeks time. However, as they were conveyed only informally and not in a public way, they gave no media echo. 

Interaction with parliament  The PBO reports that it participated in parliamentary hearings more than six times in 2024 but received no parliamentary questions. 
Access to non-public information  Access based on Law n. 243/2012. In particular, the PBO is considered part of the national statistical system and therefore has a legal 

right to access to a wide array of information. The PBO has signed MoUs with several institutions, further regulating its access to 
information. For 2024, the PBO reports issues with insufficiently detailed and non-timely delivery of information in several areas. For 
example, the PBO reports no access to budgetary forecasts for trend and policy scenarios before their publication. Moreover, for its 
analyses, the PBO would need more detailed information than that provided by the government in the official public finance 
documents. It reports that the information provided about EU fiscal surveillance for 2025 is not sufficiently detailed, especially in view of 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes. 

External review of the IFI  The PBO has never been subject to an external evaluation.  

the reform of EU fiscal governance framework. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The PBO reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy 

Starting from 2018 the Annual Work Plan of the PBO has included a section specifically dedicated to communication, which describes 
the annual communication strategy.  
The PBO reports that, in 2024, it strengthened its presence on the social media platform X and opened a LinkedIn account, which aims 
at reaching professional and institutional communities more effectively. It considers adding an Instagram account in 2025 and to use the 
new opportunities offered by the WhatsApp channel to send alerts to the media and other stakeholders. Over the last two years, the 
PBO also improved the institutional website to make it clearer and more accessible. The section of the PBO website related to the 
dissemination of data and analysis through interactive infographics and short podcasts was developed and updated, something which 
has received positive feedback from users and specialised media.  

Leadership role in communication  Board members, and in particular the PBO President, have the final say on official communication. The regulation for the organization 

and functioning of the PBO states that The President normally maintains relations with the media and takes part in public events to 
illustrate the PBO's duties and the decisions taken by the Board. These activities may also be carried out by the other Board Members, 
subject to the President's approval. The Board may appoint a spokesperson - who may also serve as a press officer - to promote external 
communication regarding the PBO activities and to manage relations with the media. 

Number of press releases/conferences  The PBO reports that, in 2024, it issued more than 10 press releases and organised 1-2 press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The PBO reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly throughout the 

year, closely linked to the release of opinions/recommendations by the PBO but published no articles in the domestic press. 

Media impact tracking  To monitor and track media impact, the PBO performs daily press and online monitoring, also using a web analytics platform, measuring 
formal and informal reactions, “long term” mentions on key data and topics and key journalist follow up. 

Staff specialised in communication  One spokesperson 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The PBO leadership and members of the secretariat regularly participate as speakers/discussants in conferences organised by others. 

Summary: The PBO is a well-established and relatively well-resourced IFI with a broad mandate. Despite a number of MoUs, the PBO still reports issues of 
access to information, in particular regarding the timeliness and level of detail of the information received. There is a policy dialogue with the government, 
which  takes place  in a non-public way, giving no media echo.  The PBO  has a clear presence  in the domestic media debate  and  is further developing  its 
outreach  activities,  becoming  more  active  in  social  media  and  developing  new  features  of  its  website.  The  PBO  is  currently  undergoing  its  very  first 
independent external evaluation.  

61 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lithuania – National Audit Office of Lithuania - Budget Monitoring Department (NAOL-BMD) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

Performed according to its official mandate. Official endorsement of the government’s macroeconomic forecasts used for fiscal planning 
for both the annual budgets and the medium-term plans (within the meaning of Art. 2.1b of the Two-Pack Regulation 473/2013). 
The fiscal institution prepares and (from September 2023) publishes independent macroeconomic forecasts (using own developed 
econometric models) to evaluate and endorse the forecast of the Ministry of Finance (MoF). If NAOL-BMD is not in the position to 
endorse the latter, both institutions must reach consensus on addressing the reasons preventing the NAOL-BMD from endorsing it. The 
NAOL-BMD thus does not have the option not to endorse the MoF forecast. 
Performed on a mandatory basis, with regular output. NAOL-BMD assesses the budgetary forecasts before the adoption in Parliament of 
the budgetary planning documents and provides a public opinion, but there is no legislated requirement for the budget or financial 
update to receive a formal endorsement from the NAOL-BMD. 
No quantification of effects of policies. 

Performed on a voluntary basis at least every 5 years (unless there are exceptional circumstances) and with a 30-year time horizon. 

NAOL-BMD monitors compliance ex ante and ex post according to its mandate. 

Ex-post forecast evaluation  Yes (e.g. as from page 29 in this document). Assessment of the accuracy of macro indicators is not carried out regularly but when 

deemed necessary. 

Involved in correction mechanism  Yes, in line with the Fiscal Compact provisions. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  The establishment and cancellation of exceptional circumstances is initiated by the government or its authorised institution by 
preparing a notice on exceptional circumstances and submitting it to the BMD for its approval along with the updated economic 
development scenario. 
NAOL-BMD endorsed the macroeconomic forecast underlying the MTFSP and concluded that it is based on credible macroeconomic 
assumptions and in line with the projections prepared by the NAOL-BMD. At the time Lithuania was preparing its first MTFSP, there was 
no legal requirement for the BMD to make such an assessment. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  NAOL-BMD has not published a comprehensive assessment of the national fiscal framework but has covered some issues in its regular 

Comply-or-explain requirement 

reporting. 
In case of infringement of the national fiscal discipline rules (if it is detected and concluded in the context of ex-post evaluation done by 
NAOL-BMD), the government is obliged to publicly respond and react to the conclusions within the budgetary preparation process (in 
line with the Fiscal Compact). For all other reports, it responds to the NAOL-BMD written opinion(s)/recommendation(s)/finding(s) in 
line with the procedures set in the Statute of the Parliament where there is foreseen that certain parliamentary Committees have to 
debate the reports published by the BMD. The MoF always participate in the debate, which is publicly accessible.    

62 

 
 
 
 
CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes. The appropriations to the NAOL as an institution implementing the functions of the budget monitoring department (independent 

fiscal institution) are granted in the State budget law. The NAOL-BMD has a separate budget line in the annual budget of NAOL. 

Adequacy of funding  The NAOL-BMD reports a need for additional resources for salaries. The 2024 approved appropriation was EUR 305.000. Approved plan 
for salaries was EUR 270.000 while BMD requested EUR 310.000. In 2025 approved plan was EUR 320.000 and requested EUR 376.000.    
Number of Secretariat staff  7 (1 manager, 5 economists, 1 administrative staff – with 1 economist being on maternity leave). Requirements for the competence and 

experience of the staff members of the BMD are stipulated in their job descriptions approved by the Auditor General. 

Support from other institutions  The NAOL-BMD is embedded in NAOL, thus benefiting from lower overhead costs (IT systems, buildings, human resource management, 

communication services, budget integration). 

Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  
Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Law on national Audit Office defines the Budget Policy Monitoring authority (article 7(3)). The Budget policy monitoring authority is also 
defined in Article 2(1) of Constitutional Law on the Implementation of the Fiscal Treaty. 

There are no members of the governing/high-level board in the set-up of the Lithuanian independent fiscal institution. It is headed by an 
Auditor General, but the day-to-day operations are managed by the Head of the Department. 

Chapter VII (Article 20) in I-907 Lietuvos Respublikos valstybės kontrolės įstatymas lays down that “The Auditor General may be 
appointed ... with a higher university education or equivalent, ... with at least 5 years of managerial experience and at least 10 years of 
audit, legal, economic, public administration, management and (or) financial or pedagogical work experience in these areas.”  

CV requirement for NAOL-BMD leadership (Head of the BMD): At least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent and at least 4 years of work 
experience in the fields of control, finance, economics or sociology research and analysis. The Auditor General sets the job requirements 
and is responsible for hiring the BMD Head, in accordance with NAOL internal rules. 
Prohibition against taking instructions  Article 4.3 of the Law on the National Audit Office and Article 9.1 of the Constitutional Law on the Implementation of the Fiscal Treaty 

explicitly states that IFI members and staff must not accept instructions from any other institution and person. 

Role of the Chair  There are no members of the governing/high-level board in the set-up of the BMD.  

Policy dialogue with government 

In case of infringement of the national fiscal discipline rules, the government is obliged to publicly respond and react within the 
budgetary preparation process (in line with the Fiscal Compact). For all other reports, it responds to the NAOL-BMD written 
opinion(s)/recommendation(s)/finding(s) in line with the procedures set in the Statute of the Parliament where there is foreseen that 
certain parliamentary Committees have to debate the reports published by the BMD.  

Interaction with parliament  The BMD reports that, in 2024, it participated in more than 6 parliamentary hearings and received 1-3 parliamentary questions. 
Access to non-public information  Article 9 of the Constitutional Law on the Implementation of the Fiscal Treaty and Article 11 of Law on National Audit Office gives it the 

right to obtain the documents and information required for the performance of its activities. MoU with Ministry of Finance, Bank of 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lithuania, Statistics Lithuania, Ministry of Social Security and Labour, State Social Insurance Fund, Municipalities, State Tax Inspectorate. 
To receive requested information on time and in sufficient detail, NAOL-BMD reports having had to maintain informal contacts (e. g. 
calls, emails) with the respective Government institutions about the agreed deadlines and expected quality of the data. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes, but requirements for the competence and experience of the staff members of the Budget monitoring department are stipulated in 

their job descriptions, which must be approved by the Auditor General of NAOL. 

External review of the IFI  Article 6(5) of Law on National Audit Office defines the obligation to conduct an external review regularly. One was conducted in 2019 
(OECD) and another is expected to be publicly available by the end of 2025 (OECD). These evaluations are financed out of NAOL's own 
budget 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The NAOL-BMD reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  NAOL adopted a communication strategy in 2022, to which BMD contributes. The strategy is not public. 

Leadership role in communication  No. The position description of the Head of the BMD does not specify a communication function. The Law of the Republic of Lithuania 

on National Audit Office describes the competence of the Auditor General to represent the institution.  

Number of press releases/conferences  The NAOL-BMD reports that, in 2024, it issued press releases 7-10 times and organised 1-2 press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly throughout the year and issued articles 

regularly in the mainstream domestic media, closely linked to the release of opinions by the IFI. To communicate in social media, BMD 
uses NAOL social media accounts with distinct BMD logo and colour. 

Media impact tracking  Press coverage and number of the visits to the website are being monitored. 

Staff specialised in communication  The NAOL-BMD does not have staff specialised in communication. However, NAOL has a Communication and International Relations 
Department. The BMD works with external communication officers from this department to prepare press releases and messages in 
social networks, communicate with journalists etc. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The NAOL-BMD reports that its leadership and members of staff occasionally participate in conferences organised by others. 

Summary: The Budget Monitoring Department of the NAOL is of close-to-average IFI size and active in many typical IFI areas. It is using its own internal 
forecast model to assess the government forecasts before endorsement decisions. However, the fact that the reconciliation procedure for the endorsement 
of the forecasts excludes the option of the BMD not endorsing the forecast limits its independence. Moreover, although the embedded nature of the BMD 
within  the  NAOL  allows  the  IFI  to  rely  on  supporting  functions  of  the  mother  institution,  it  may  hamper  the  development  of  a  proper  IFI  identity  and 
impinge on its operational freedom with regard to recruitment and communication decisions. The BMD has been subject to external evaluations. 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Luxemburg – National Council of Public Finances (CNFP) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 

Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

The official macroeconomic forecasts are independently produced by STATEC, the sister IFI. The CNFP assesses the macroeconomic 
forecasts once they are published in the annual and multiannual budget documents. 

In line with its official mandate, the CNFP assesses the budgetary forecasts before the budgetary planning documents are adopted by 
Parliament.  

No 

Long-term sustainability assessments performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output. In 2024, the CNFP published an Assessment 
of long-term fiscal sustainability, its fourth evaluation of this kind, following two earlier evaluations from October 2017, June 2018 and 
October 2021. 
In line with its official mandate, the CNFP monitors compliance with the structural balance rule of general government. 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  Yes, it performs the ex-post evaluation of STATEC’s macroeconomic forecasts. The last one was published in 2023.  

The preceding one in 2018. Regarding the budgetary forecast of the government, the most recent evaluation took place in July 2025.  

Involved in correction mechanism  Yes, if a significant deviation from the MTO is found ex post. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  CNFP reports involvement regarding the structural balance rule of general government. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

CNFP performed an ex-post evaluation of the national medium-term budgetary fiscal-structural plan and the annual progress report in 
May 2025, but has no official mandate to do so yet. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  No specific evaluation has been performed, but some aspects of it have been included in other assessments. 

Comply-or-explain requirement 

In line with its obligation laid down in a MoU, the government must comply or explain regarding all recommendations made in the CNFP 
assessments. However, the CNFP makes a distinction between on the one hand the main recommendations relating to monitoring 
compliance with the structural balance rule and the application of the correction mechanism and on the other the other 
recommendations arising from the legal missions of the CNFP. For the former, the Ministry shall provide the CNFP with an explanation 
within two months if it does not follow the main recommendations made by the CNFP, whereas for the latter, the Ministry shall proceed 
in the same manner, but a lesser degree of detail is accepted. 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Article 7(7) of the modified law of 12 July 2014 states: “The Council’s operating costs are covered by the State budget.” 

Adequacy of funding  CNFP reports funding as comfortably adequate, with only around ¾ of a total appropriation of EUR 100.000 used in 2024. Human 

resources covered fully by Ministry of Finance (MoF) staff budget. Operating expenses of CNFP have a specific line in the MoF budget. 

65 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Secretariat staff  2.5 economists (civil servants on detachment from MoF). 

Support from other institutions 

IT systems and communication services such as maintaining the website are provided by the Government IT Centre, whereas office 
space, human resource management (wages, leave etc) and budget integration are provided by the MoF. 

Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Ordinary Law. Articles 7 and 8 of the modified Law of 12 July 2014 on the coordination and governance of public finances. 

7 (1 Chair and 6 Members). 2 Members proposed by the Parliament; 1 Member proposed by the National Audit Office; 1 Member 
proposed by an employers’ organization; 1 Member proposed by an employees’ organization and 2 Members proposed by the 
Government. Formal appointment by the Grand-Duke (by decree). Normally, the 4-year mandates start simultaneously, but due to some 
late appointments, they are now staggered to some extent. Mandates are renewable more than three times. The Council itself elects its 
Chair. 
No specific conditions apply, but the law mentions "members are recognized for their economic and financial competence". 

Prohibition against taking instructions  No such explicit ban exists. Article 7 of the modified 12 July 2014 law on the coordination and the governance of the public finances 

states that the Members of the CNFP performs their duties in an independent and neutral manner. 

Role of the Chair  Proposal of meetings and agendas. External representation. 

Policy dialogue with government 

In line with its obligation laid down in a MoU, the government responds to CNFP’s written recommendations on compliance with fiscal 
rules and on macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts. 

Interaction with parliament  The CNFP reports that, in 2024, it participated in 2 parliamentary hearings but received no further parliamentary questions. 

Access to non-public information  No legally protected access reported. The CNFP reports privileged but limited access via a MoU with MoF. No issues reported in the last 

two years. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes, but only civil servants can be hired. 

External review of the IFI  The CNFP has never been subject to an external evaluation. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The CNFP reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  No 

Leadership role in communication  Only the Chair communicates with the media. 

Number of press releases/conferences  The CNFP reports that, in 2024, it issued 7-10 press releases and organised 1-2 press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  Been interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers and issued articles in the mainstream domestic media regularly 

throughout the year, closely linked to the release of opinions/recommendations by the IFI. The CNFP reports no social media presence. 

Media impact tracking  No 
Staff specialised in communication  No 

66 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisation of/participation in conferences  The CNFP reports that members of the secretariat regularly participate in conferences organised by others. 

Summary: The CNFP has a narrow mandate, focused on monitoring the compliance with a fiscal rule. The sister IFI, STATEC, produces the macroeconomic 
forecast.  While  reportedly  a  stand-alone  entity,  the  CNFP  seems  to  be  fully  integrated  into  the  MoF  budget  when  it  comes  to  both  staff  expenses  and 
operating  expenses  and  funding  is  not  grounded  in  law.  Its  access  to  information  is  not  protected  in  law  but  is  regulated  by  an  MoU.  The  professional 
competence requirements for Members are not very specific and mandates are shorter than the electoral period. For the Secretariat positions, only civil 
servants are eligible. The CNFP generally limits its outreach activities to when it publishes something.  

67 

 
 
 
 
 
Luxemburg – National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (STATEC) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

In line with its official mandate, STATEC produces the macro-economic forecasts used for fiscal planning for both the annual budgets and 
the medium-term plans. There is a legal or constitutional obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts. 

On a voluntary basis, STATEC regularly produces budgetary forecasts, but these are not used for the national fiscal planning. The 
government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from STATEC’s forecasts. 

No 

STATEC does not assess long-term sustainability but produces long-term macroeconomic forecasts up to 2060. 

No 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  The other IFI, CNFP is mandated to perform the task, STATEC acts in case significant biases are identified in the macro forecast. 

Involved in correction mechanism  No 
(De)activation of escape clauses  No 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

STATEC produced the macroeconomic scenario on which the plan was based. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  No 
Comply-or-explain requirement  No. 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  No. STATEC is funded by the annual budget of the central government.  

Adequacy of funding 

Number of Secretariat staff 

Support from other institutions 

STATEC reports funding adequacy was just right, although, in 2024, it only spent around EUR 21 million out of an appropriation of around 
EUR 37 million. Pending payments for staff and premises is reported to explain this difference. 
STATEC reports a total staff of 177 (19.5 managers, 60.3 economists, 47.52 administrative staff and 49.85 others). Staff is recruited under 
the rules of the general procedure for recruiting civil servants (GovJobs portal). 
STATEC reports that it receives support through the Comité économique et financier national, which coordinates work related to 
Luxemburg’s EU economic and financial governance obligations, facilitates the exchange of relevant data and information among national 
authorities, and assists the government in analyzing public finance and economic policy issues. 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 
Prohibition against taking instructions 

Yes 

8 (Director General, Deputy Director General, Head of macroeconomic statistics division, Head of enterprise statistics division, Head of 
social statistics division, Head of business cycle analyses and modelling division, Head of Statec Research divisions, Head of General 
Services Division, Head of IT); Director General and Deputy Director General are appointed by the government. 
Head of divisions are appointed by the Director General. The Director General and the Deputy Director General are appointed for a 7-year 
term, renewable more than 3 times. However, the current Director General was still appointed under the old regime for an unspecified 
number of years. Board Members allowed to hold political posts. 
There are no formal rules. Nevertheless, high level members of the institution have a university degree and most have long standing 
experience in the field of statistics (experts). 

[No information available] 

Role of the Chair  The director/chairman has the ultimate responsibility of all decisions taken. 

Policy dialogue with government  No 
Interaction with parliament 

STATEC reports that, in 2024, it participated in 2-3 parliamentary hearings and replied to more than 10 parliamentary questions though 
not all related to its IFI tasks. 

Access to non-public information  The law of July 10, 2011 on the organization of the National Institute of statistics and economic studies stipulates that public 

administrations, municipalities and public establishments as well as all natural or legal persons are obliged to provide the statistical 
information requested by STATEC within the deadlines set in its request (Art. 13-15). MoUs with Eurostat, ECB, OECD to access to financial 
accounts, balance of payment data, OECD data. Access to administrative sources (social security, VAT declarations, very detailed Budget 
data, etc) covered by MoUs. Tacit agreements with other administrations. An issue with insufficiently detailed information regarding data 
on central government reported in 2024. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes, but the salary level is set in law regarding civil servants (“Code Administratif de la Fonction Publique”). 

External review of the IFI 

1)  STATEC was audited along with every EU statistical office as part of the European Statistical System Peer Review. The Review Report 
highlighted 17 recommendations for better compliance with the Code of Practice for European Statistics. These recommendations 
each fell into one of three categories: Protecting Trust in Official Statistics, Strengthening the National Statistical System, Embedding 
Quality Management Approaches throughout the National Statistical System (full report). 

2)  Assessment of the reliability of STATEC’s macroeconomic forecasts by the National Council of Public Finances (CNFP) (full report) 

Communication 
Freedom to communicate 

STATEC reports being free to communicate at any time.  

Explicit communication strategy  The STATEC social media strategy is being revised as part of a new work program. An external communication strategy is currently being 

developed. 

Leadership role in communication  Yes 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of press releases/conferences 
Visibility in media/Presence in social media 

STATEC reports that, in 2024, it issued more than 10 press releases and organised 3-5 press conferences. 

In 2024, STATEC leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly throughout the year and issued 
articles regularly in the mainstream domestic media, also on general fiscal and economic issues. 

Media impact tracking  Yes 
Staff specialised in communication  Yes 

Organisation of/participation in conferences 

STATEC regularly organises its own conferences including outside experts and occasionally participate in conferences organised by others. 

Summary:  STATEC  produces  the  macroeconomic  forecasts  underlying  the  budgetary  planning  of  the  government.  The  forecasts  are  subject  to  ex-post 
assessment by CNFP. As a statistical office, STATEC has undergone external reviews, although not with a focus on its IFI function. The government appoints 
its  Director-General  (and  the  Deputy),  who  in  turn  appoints  the  other  Members  of  the  Board  and  there  are  no  formal  professional  competence 
requirements. Media visibility is difficult to assess, as the Statistical Office also has many non-IFI roles. 

70 

 
 
 
 
 
Latvia – Fiscal discipline council of the Republic of Latvia (FDC) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 
Ex post forecast evaluation 

Performed according to its official mandate. Official endorsement of the government`s macroeconomic forecasts used for fiscal planning 
for both the annual budgets and the medium-term plans (within the meaning of Art. 2.1b of the Two-Pack Regulation 473/2013).  
Reconciliation mechanism regulated via a MoU. 
No production/endorsement/assessment of budgetary forecasts, but the FDC produces tax revenue forecasts and compare them to 
government’s figures. 

No quantification of effects of policies 

Performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output. Last long term sustainability assessment done in December 2022. 

Ex ante and ex post monitoring according to its official mandate 

From time to time, the FDC performs a formal ex-post evaluation of the macroeconomic forecasts. The latest one (from 2023) can be 
found in the most recent Surveillance report (pp 36-41). 

Involved in correction mechanism  According to the MoU with the MoF the FDC assesses whether the conditions for the correction mechanism apply according to the Article 

(De)activation of escape clauses 
Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

11 of the Fiscal Discipline Law. 
FDC reports involvement for the debt, budget balance and expenditure rules. 

Yes. The FDC issued an opinion on the macroeconomic forecasts underlying the 2025-2028 MTFSP and has issued a surveillance report on 
its implementation. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  No 

Comply-or-explain requirement  The government responds to (some) of FDC’s monitoring report(s)/statement(s) on fiscal rules in a mandatory manner as it was compelled 

by a Memorandum of Understanding. 
(“5.14 In cases where the Council's assessment includes recommendations for introducing changes to fiscal policy, in their response MoF 
explains that the recommendations will be implemented or explains how other measures will ensure compliance with the targets set in 
the FDL. The Council can comment upon MoF's reply regarding whether the attainment of fiscal targets set in the FDL is being ensured.”) 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  According to Section 31.6 of the Fiscal Discipline law (Ensuring of the work of the FDC), the Ministry of Finance shall plan the expenditure 
necessary for the provision of the work of the FDC in a separate budget programme (sub-programme) of the Ministry of Finance. The FDC 
budget is a separate line in the budget of the Ministry of Finance (a subprogram).  

71 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adequacy of funding  The FDC reports that the funding for 2024 of around EUR 300.000 was just right. It used about 80% of the amount. 

Number of Secretariat staff  4 (0.5 manager, 2.5 economists, 0.5 legal expert, 0.5 administrative staff) 

Support from other institutions 

In accordance with the Fiscal discipline law section 31(2), the activities of the Council shall be technically ensured by the Ministry of 
Finance. MoF shall ensure IT support and the Treasury basic accounting support. 

Procedures for stability of funds  Article 31.6 of the Fiscal Discipline Law stipulates a number of minimum items that the MoF must cover, including the remuneration for 

the members of the Council at least for six meetings of the FDC per year, the remuneration for the Secretary of the Council; the 
remuneration for experts invited by the Council, transport and accommodation expenditure for the members of the Council and 
expenditure necessary for the technical provision of the activities of the Council. 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Yes. Articles referring to the FDC are within Chapter III - Fiscal Discipline Surveillance of the Fiscal discipline law. 

6 Members (Chair, deputy Chair and four Council members) appointed for six-year mandates, renewable once. Initially 3 Members 
nominated for 6 years and 3 Members for 3 years to achieve staggered mandates. 3 representatives nominated according to the joint 
proposal of the Governor of the Bank of Latvia and the Minister of Finance, and 3 representatives nominated by at least ten deputies of 
the parliament. 
In accordance with the Fiscal discipline law, Members should be specialists in the field of finance and economics from Latvia or another 
Member State of the European Union and have experience in fiscal policy issues. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  There has so far not been any explicit prohibition against taking outside instructions, but Section 21 of Fiscal discipline law provides that 

Role of the Chair 

the Council is independent. 
In accordance with the Fiscal discipline law, the Chair of the Council shall 1) organise and manage the work of the Council; 2) convene and 
chair meetings of the Council; 3) hire and dismiss from work the secretariat of the Council; 4) represent the Council without special 
authorisation. 

Policy dialogue with government  The legal base for the policy dialogue have been defined in the provisions of Memorandum of understanding between MoF and FDC as he 

following:  
Based on the information received from MoF, other appropriate state institutions or the decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers, the FDC 
assesses fiscal policy by preparing: 
- A fiscal discipline monitoring report (monitoring report) on the draft annual state budget and MTBF, which is submitted to parliament 
simultaneously with the abovementioned documents;   
- An interim report (opinion) on the Stability programme of Latvia; (SP to be updated with MTFSP) 
- A non-conformity report if an infringement has been identified, in accordance with Section 29 of the FDL;  
- The FDC's opinion on questions that are important for the maintenance of fiscal discipline.   
The FDC prepares an opinion on fiscal policy matters after they have been reviewed and approved in the Cabinet of Ministers or upon 
receipt of information from MoF, … and the assessment pertaining to the correction mechanism. 
MoF encourages the FDC's participation in the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers in order that FDC representatives could express a 
preliminary opinion if an item with fiscal impact is being discussed, even though the final opinion is included in the documents specified 
above. 
The FDC invites MoF to the FDC and working group meetings to coordinate opinions prior to their expression in the Cabinet of Ministers, 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
and improve the representation of the goals of fiscal policy in government documents. 

Interaction with parliament  The FDC reports that, in 2024, it participated in 4-6 parliamentary hearings but received no parliamentary questions. 

Access to non-public information  According to Section 28(9)(2) of the Fiscal Discipline Law, the FDC may request and receive the information from the State institutions 

necessary for the performance of its tasks. The Council has full access to non-public information. The issue is covered by a Memorandum 
of Understanding. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes. 

External review of the IFI 

FDC reports that an external review took place in 2025. The State Audit Office audits are limited in scope. OECD reviewed the FDC in 2021. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The FDC reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  Yes. Communication strategy of the FDC.  

Leadership role in communication  According to Fiscal Discipline Law, the Chair has the right to represent the organisation in single person - therefore he/she is the main 

communicator of the FDC’s opinions in mass media, parliamentary and cabinet of ministers’ sessions etc. If unavailable, he/she delegates 
this task to another member of the FDC. 
Number of press releases/conferences  The FDC reports that, in 2024, it issued 7-10 press releases but held no press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The FDC reports that its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly throughout the year, also on  

general fiscal and economic issue but published no articles in the national press. The FDC is present in social media. 

Media impact tracking  The FDC receives daily mass media monitoring reports, including anything related to the FDC, its members or fiscal discipline. The FDC also 

uses Google analytics to analyse webpage activity (Number of sessions increased by 63% to 3651 sessions in 2024 and the number of 
active users rose by 13% to 2277.) The FDC has ordered a detailed analysis of its mass media presence. 

Staff specialised in communication  No 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The FDC reports that, in 2024, its leadership and members of its Secretariat occasionally participated in conferences organised by others. 

Summary:  The  Fiscal  Discipline  Council  of Latvia  is  a  relatively  small  institution  with  a  rather  narrow  mandate,  endorsing  macroeconomic  forecasts  and 
monitoring the compliance with fiscal rules. It is not involved in any budgetary forecast assessments but occasionally does some work on long-term fiscal 
projections. For this narrow mandate, the FDC considers that it has sufficient resources. It has a strong presence in both traditional and social media, based 
on an explicit communication strategy. 

73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malta – Malta Fiscal Advisory Council (MFAC) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

In line with its official mandate, MFAC officially endorses the government’s macroeconomic forecasts used for fiscal planning for both the 
annual budgets and the medium-term plans. No reconciliation procedure, but informal contacts take place. 

In line with its official mandate, MFAC officially endorses the government’s budgetary forecasts used for national fiscal planning. MFAC 
does not yet produce a fully-fledged fiscal forecast of its own but has started to issue estimates for the main revenue components in its 
assessments. 
No quantitative policy measure assessment. 

No assessment of long-term sustainability 

In line with its mandate, MFAC performs ex ante and ex post monitoring of general government debt and structural balance rules. 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  Yes (2024 and 2023). 

Involved in correction mechanism  Yes 

(De)activation of escape clauses  When performing an assessment, the MFAC is required by law to state whether exceptional circumstances exist or have ceased to exist. 
However, MFAC is not formally requested to suggest that an escape clause be triggered, and there is no automatic process to trigger the 
escape clause even if MFAC concludes that exceptional circumstances exist. 
MFAC was not involved in the elaboration or assessment of the MTFSP but endorsed the macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts of the 
Annual Progress Report in 2025.  

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  Article 13(3)(f) of the Fiscal Responsibility Act states that MFAC shall "provide information and advice to Government and the Public 

Accounts Committee concerning any legislative proposals on the maintenance of fiscal discipline and the transparency of the fiscal and 
the budgetary policies and processes.". MFAC conducted such an assessment in 2025. 

Comply-or-explain requirement  The government responds to MFAC’s written opinion(s)/recommendation(s)/finding(s) in a broad sense and in a discretionary manner as 

it is not constrained by legislation, memorandum of understanding or commitment. 

74 

 
 
 
 
 
 
CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Article 55 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. 

Adequacy of funding  The MFAC budget was initially set at EUR 250,000 in 2015 and has since been adjusted annually for inflation reaching EUR 300.000 in 
2024. That year, MFAC had expenses of EUR 319.000 and covered the shortfall with past savings. MFAC signals a need for some more 
resources. 

Number of Secretariat staff  At end 2024, staff was composed of 5 persons (1 chief economist, 2 senior economists, 1 economist and 1 administrator). In 2025, an 

additional economist was hired, bringing the total to 6.  

Support from other institutions  No 
Procedures for stability of funds  MFAC funding is indexed to inflation by law since 2015.  

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  
Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Article 42-61 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014  

The MFAC consists of three Members, including the Chair, all appointed for a period of four years by the Minister of Finance after 
consultation with the opposition. A person may not be a member of the Fiscal Council for more than two consecutive terms of office but 
shall otherwise be eligible for reappointment. 

Having competence and experience in domestic and international macroeconomic and fiscal matters is desirable. To the extent 
practicable, there should be an appropriate balance between men and women in the membership of the Fiscal Council. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  Article 43 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act states that the members of MFAC will not seek or receive instructions from public authorities or 

Role of the Chair 
Policy dialogue with government 

from any other institution or authority. 
Same as the other Council Members. 

In 2024, MFAC produced a number of publications including policy recommendations that warranted a reaction from the government, but 
the latter did not respond. 

Interaction with parliament  MFAC reports that, in 2024, it did not participate in any parliamentary hearings nor received any parliamentary questions. The Public 

Accounts Committee can audition the Chair of the Council. The last time this happened was in 2017. 
Access to non-public information  Article 46 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act gives MFAC full access. For 2024, MFAC reported no issues. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes 

External review of the IFI  MFAC reports that it has never been subject to an external evaluation. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  MFAC reports being free to communicate at any time.  

Explicit communication strategy  No 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leadership role in communication  The Chair does not have a particular external communication role. 

Number of press releases/conferences  MFAC reports that, in 2024, it issued 4-6 press releases but organised no press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  MFAC reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers and issued articles in the 

mainstream domestic media regularly throughout the year, closely linked to the release of opinions/recommendations by the IFI. The 
MFAC recently activated accounts in social media to increase its visibility and to transmit economic and fiscal updates to the public, issuing 
posts from time to time. 

Media impact tracking  MFAC reports that it monitors website traffic and clicks, responses of newspapers to press releases and articles, and social media 

reactions. 

Staff specialised in communication  No 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  MFAC reports that its leadership occasionally participates in conferences organised by other, while members of the Secretariat do so 

regularly. 

Summary: MFAC is a relatively small IFI with a narrow mandate, focusing on endorsing the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts of the government and 
monitoring the compliance with fiscal rules. Its budget is frozen in real terms by law since 2015, which provides security in the short term, but could be 
problematic  in  the  long  run,  if  wages  cannot  remain  competitive. MFAC  indicates  that  it  currently  needs  more  resources.  The  professional  competence 
requirements  for  Members  only  refer  to  the  “desirability”  of  certain  competences,  and  the  appointment  of  members  is  done  solely  by  the  Minister  of 
Finance (after consulting the opposition). Regarding external communication, MFAC recently set up social media accounts to reach a wider audience. The 
Chair  does  not  have  an  explicit  external  communication  role.  The  policy  dialogue  with  the  government  and  relations  with  parliament  are  not  fully 
developed. 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands – Council of State - Advisory Division (CoS - AD) 

TASKS 

Current status 

No (performed by CPB, the other IFI) 

No (performed by CPB, the other IFI) 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 
Ex-post forecast evaluation  No. 

No 

No 

Performed according to its official mandate, both ex ante and ex post for the debt and budget balance rule.  

Involved in correction mechanism  Yes, in relation to the Fiscal Compact provision. 

(De)activation of escape clauses  CoS – AD reports involvement for the debt and budget balance rules. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

The CoS delivered an opinion on the MTFSP of the Netherlands. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  No 

Comply-or-explain requirement  The government responds to our written opinion(s)/recommendation(s)/finding(s) in a broad sense and in a regular manner on the basis 

of its own commitment. The reaction of the government is added to the reports on Fiscal Monitoring of the CoS - AD. 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  As a High Council of State founded in the Dutch Constitution, the CoS enjoys financial independence with its own chapter in the State 

Budget (Chapter IIB). 

Adequacy of funding  The CoS – AD does not have a budget specifically for IFI-related tasks. The IFI budget derives from the budget of the Council of State as a 

whole. That budget for 2024 was €75,7 million. It signals that the budget was comfortably commensurate with its tasks. 

Number of Secretariat staff  The CoS – AD reports a staff of 2 persons. 

Support from other institutions  No. The IFI function is embedded in the CoS as a whole, which provides support services (IT systems, buildings, HR, etc). 
Procedures for stability of funds  No. 

77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

CoS set up by Government decree. Sustainable Public Finances Act ('Wet Houdbare overheidsfinanciën'), article 2(8). 

The governing board consists of 15 state councillors, including the Vice-President. As state councillors are formally appointed for life, 
there are no fixed terms. De facto membership ends when a member reaches the age of 70. In 2022, the CoS – AD created a group of 5 
external experts to support them in the analysis of the DBP and in fiscal rule monitoring: Expertisekring Begrotingstoezicht - RVS 
begrotingstoezicht (raadvanstate.nl) (only available in Dutch). 
Vacancies are published in the Government Gazette, together with the profile of the candidate or candidates sought. The CoS makes a 
recommendation for the appointment of state councillors. Candidates are chosen from those who have proved their competence or 
expertise in the field of legislation, public administration or in related matters (such as public finance). The Vice-President and the state 
councillors are then formally appointed by Royal Decree, after a positive decision by the council of ministers. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  The Dutch Constitution and the Council of State Act establishes the CoS as an independent institution. 

Role of the Chair  The Vice-President chairs the meetings of the Advisory Division and is in charge of the running and organisation of the Council as a whole. 

Policy dialogue with government  The CoS – AD reports that, in 2024, the government replied to the recommendations within two weeks via a public document, which 

sometimes gave media echo. The response(s) were systematically covering all main findings/recommendations in a meaningful manner. 
The government complied with some of the recommendations. 

Interaction with parliament  The CoS – AD reports that, in 2024, it participated in at least one parliamentary hearing. CoS – AD regularly participates in parliamentary 
hearings, but the frequency depends on the political cycle and 2024 was an election year. It did not receive any parliamentary questions. 

Access to non-public information  The right to access to information of CoS- AD is laid down in the Sustainable Public Finances Act ('Wet Houdbare overheidsfinanciën'), 
article 2(8)(9). Ministers provide the Advisory Division with the information that is required in connection with the performance of its 
duties. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes 
External review of the IFI  No 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  CoS – AD reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  No 
Leadership role in communication  No 

Number of press releases/conferences  CoS – AD reports that, in 2024, it issued 1-3 press releases and organised 1-2 press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  CoS – AD reports that, in 2024, it issued articles regularly in the mainstream domestic media, also on general fiscal and economic issues, 

but gave no interviews. CoS – AD is not present in social media. 

Media impact tracking  No 

Staff specialised in communication  CoS has a unit specialised in communication. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  CoS – AD reports that, in 2024, it did not participate in any conferences. 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary: The CoS – AD has a very narrow mandate, consisting of monitoring the compliance with fiscal rules and, once a year, publishing an opinion on 
the Budgetary Memorandum,  where  it  reflects more  broadly on the fiscal and social-economic policy of the government.  Therefore,  CoS –  AD deems it 
sufficient to have a staff of only 2 persons working on IFI issues. However, in combination with the fact that the CoS - AD is deeply embedded in the CoS as a 
whole (in fact, it is a part of the CoS), this may make it difficult to create a clear IFI identity and may complicate name/role recognition among the public, 
especially since the CPB may  be  better known as a fiscal  surveillance  institution  in the  Netherlands. This issue  risks being compounded by the  CoS  –  AD 
keeping a relatively low media profile when it comes to its IFI tasks, its leadership having given no interview or participated in no conferences in 2024 and 
the institution having no social media presence. However, the CoS – AD does give briefings to both chambers of the parliament and provides press briefings 
when the fiscal monitoring is published. CoS – AD has so far not been subject to any external review. 

79 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands – Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 

Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

Performed according to its official mandate. Production of macro-economic forecasts used for fiscal planning for both the annual budgets 
and the medium-term plans (within the meaning of Art. 2.1b of the Two-Pack Regulation 473/2013). 
There is a legal obligation to use CPB’s macroeconomic forecasts. This legal obligation is enshrined in Wet Hof (Article 2a). 
In line with its official mandate, the CPB produces and publishes an independent projection of the budget but does not assess the 
government’s own budgetary forecasts. 

The CPB conducts several types of policy costing analyses during the year. During regular forecasts, the CPB makes estimations of the ex-
ante budgetary effects of different policy measures and consequently, analyses their effect on the public finances and on economic 
growth. Ahead of parliamentary elections, the CPB also provides an analysis of the election manifestos of the political parties. This 
includes estimating the budgetary effects of the parties' proposed fiscal packages. In addition to regular forecasts and party manifesto 
analyses, the CPB can also be asked by political parties to conduct an analysis of a package of policies during the cabinet period. These 
analyses are also published. Revenue policy measures are certified by the CPB to ensure that the estimation of the budgetary effects is 
reasonable and neutral.  
Yes. Time horizon for long-term analysis: 2060. 

No. Done by the CoS (the other IFI). 

Ex-post forecast evaluation  Yes, for its own macroeconomic forecasts, but no ex-post evaluations of budgetary forecasts. 

Involved in correction mechanism  No 
(De)activation of escape clauses  No 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

The CPB produced the macroeconomic and the budgetary forecast underlying the MTFSP of the Netherlands. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  According to Article 2b(1)(f) of the Wet Hof, the Dutch IFIs have the task to assess the national fiscal framework. Until now, this has been 

done by the Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte, of which CPB is a member. 

Comply-or-explain requirement  Article 2(b)(2) of the Wet Hof states that the minister of Finance will comply or explain regarding the assessments of the IFIs. In practice 
most such assessments are done by the Council of State. Based on its own commitment, the government regularly responds to (some) of 
CPB’s monitoring report(s)/statement(s) on fiscal rules, macroeconomic forecasts and research. The public expects the government to 
reply to CPB's most important reports, and in practice, members of parliament will always ask for such a response. 

80 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes, by government decree. Not more than 20% of the budget can stem from external financing from different ministries. Most of the 

budget is provided as a lump sum from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 

Adequacy of funding  The CPB considers itself adequately funded. In 2024, it used EUR 22.4 million out of a total budget of EUR 23.4 million. This budget covers 

also non-IFI related tasks. 

Number of Secretariat staff  149. 
Support from other institutions  No. 
Procedures for stability of funds  No. 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  
Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Ordinary Law (“Wet voorbereiding van de vaststelling van een Centraal Economisch Plan”). 

1 Director and 2 Deputy-directors. The Director is appointed for a non-renewable mandate of 7 years by the Cabinet based on a proposal 
by the Minister of Economic Affairs. The two Deputy-directors are appointed by the Director for indefinite terms. If a Deputy-Director 
leaves the organisation, a new Deputy-Director will be recruited. 

Not specified. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  Article 2b.3 of the Wet Hof states that the ministers will not give instructions to the CPB regarding IFI tasks. For the non-IFI tasks, the 

Aanwijzing 4 in the “Aanwijzing voor de Planbureaus” state that the Minister and state secretaries are not allowed to give instructions to 
the CPB. This Aanwijzing does not have status of law and no other limitations are reported. The CPB itself is not forbidden from taking 
instructions from any external party. 

Role of the Chair  According to Aanwijzing voor de Planbureaus (nr 6), the Director determines CPB’s work programme. 

Policy dialogue with government  There is no formal “comply-or-explain” principle regarding the dialogue with the government, but the CPB regularly produces publications 

that lead to responses from the government.  

Interaction with parliament  The CPB reports that, in 2024, it participated in 2-3 parliamentary hearings and replied to more than 10 parliamentary questions (not all 

related to IFI issues). 

Access to non-public information  Article 2b.4 of the Wet Hof states that the Ministry of Finance should provide IFIs with timely access to adequate information to perform 

the IFI-tasks.  

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes, but contracts are based on the salary scales of the Rijksoverheid (civil service). 

External review of the IFI  Aanwijzing 5 (of Aanwijzing voor de Planbureaus) requires that there should be an independent committee responsible for periodic 

visitations to the CPB. It lays down that for the CPB, this committee is het Central Planning Committee (CPC). In practice, the CPC puts 
together an Evaluation committee and appoints its members. The latest evaluation took place in 2022.  

81 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The CPB reports being free to communicate at any time. The explanation of Wet Hof (Memorie van toelichting) states that there are no 

legal restrictions for CPB employees regarding external communications about IFI tasks. 

Explicit communication strategy  A short summary of the CPB's communication strategy can be found in the 2025 workplan.  

Leadership role in communication 

In the complete version of the external communication strategy, the Director is named as responsible for the external communication. 

Number of press releases/conferences  The CPB reports that, in 2024, it issued more than 10 press releases and organised 3-5 press conferences (not all related to IFI tasks). 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The CPB reports that, in 2024, its leadership and researchers were interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly 

throughout the year, closely linked to the release of opinions/recommendations by the CPB, and it issued articles regularly in the 
mainstream domestic media, also on general fiscal and economic issues.  

Media impact tracking  The CPB follows the media impact, e.g. the number of downloads from and visits to its website, appearances in the media and 

engagement on social media. 

Staff specialised in communication  Yes, the CPB has seven staff members specialising in communication including a press officer, editor and graphic designer/data 

visualisation. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The CPB regularly invites academics from universities and other research institutes to present internally on their research. In addition, the 

CPB hosts the yearly CPB Lecture during which a guest speaker is invited to present on a current topic. In 2024, the CPB also organised 
symposiums in relation to certain publications. Furthermore, the leadership and staff members participate in events organised by other 
institutes. 

Summary: The CPB is a well-resourced long-standing IFI with a strong media presence. Together with the Council of State, the CPB covers the typical IFI 
tasks. However, some features that are important for IFI independence and effectiveness, such as access to information and an active policy dialogue with 
the government, have so far been upheld via tradition and tacit agreements rather than via legal protections, but recent legal changes could improve the 
situation. 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Portugal – Portuguese Public Finance Council (CFP) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 

Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

In line with its mandate, the CFP officially endorses the government’s macroeconomic forecasts used for fiscal planning for both the 
annual budgets and the medium-term plans. Reconciliation takes place via informal contacts before publication. The government is 
free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the fiscal institution's forecasts. 
In line with its mandate, the CFP assesses the budgetary forecasts before the budgetary planning documents are adopted by 
Parliament. The government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide justification for deviations from the CFP 
forecasts. 
The official mandate does not give the CFP the task of quantifying the effects of policies. However, for certain significant-impact policy 
measures, and whenever there is enough information, CFP has recently started to produce its own estimates (using EUROMOD and 
other tools). This is critical to assess net expenditure (i.e. the discretionary revenue measures). 
Performed according to its official mandate. The latest long-term sustainability report was released in December 2023. 

In line with its mandate, the CFP monitors the budgetary rules, in particular the ex-ante and ex-post compliance with the debt rule at 
general, regional and local government level as well as the budget balance rule at general and regional government level and the 
ceiling defined for the structural primary balance of general government. 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  The amendment of the Budget Framework Law made though Law 10-B/2022 of 28 April gave the CFP the role of undertaking ex-post 

assessments of the government’s macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts. The CFP published its first evaluation Report in the beginning of 
2024. 

Involved in correction mechanism  Yes, the Budget Framework Law (BFL) foresees a role for the CFP in the correction mechanism.  

(De)activation of escape clauses  No escape clauses are foreseen in the national legislation for any rules except in what regards the correction mechanism (under a 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

significant deviation procedure). 
In October 2024, the CFP published its analysis of the MTFSP of Portugal and, in May 2025, the CFP published an Opinion on the 
Annual Progress Report 2025. Such analyses were carried out despite the fact that this competence had not yet been formally 
attributed to the CFP by law. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  Despite the absence of an explicit provision in the law, the CFP is called upon to give its opinion on successive amendments to the 

budgetary framework law. 

Comply-or-explain requirement  There is a legal comply-or-explain requirement in the correction mechanism, but there is also technical interaction during the 

endorsement process of the macroeconomic forecasts. 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  The preparation of the CFP's budget is done by the senior board and is subject to a favourable opinion issued jointly by the President 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of the Court of Auditors and the Governor of the Bank of Portugal. The funding is provided on an annual basis by a transfer from the 
State Budget. 

Adequacy of funding  The CFP considers the 2024 appropriation of around EUR 2.8 million to have been just right, although only around EUR 2.2 million was 
executed, as it reportedly will need the unused allocation for a database project. Moreover, the institution has also not yet reached its 
human resources limit. 

Number of Secretariat staff  17 (2 managers, 12 economists, 3 administrative staff and 2 others).  

Support from other institutions  No 
Procedures for stability of funds  By law, the state budget appropriations can only be reduced in duly justified exceptional circumstances.  

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  

The CFP was created by Law no. 22/2011 of 20 May, article 12-I. The Statutes were approved by the Parliament under the Law no. 
54/2011 of 19 October, amended by Article 187 of the Law no. 82-B/2014 of 31 December.  

5 Members (Chair, Vice-President, Executive Member, two Non-Executive Members) are appointed for 7-year mandates, except for 
those corresponding to the first appointment made in 2012. 2 of the members (the vice-President and a non-executive member) could 
be non-Portuguese citizens and the President and the executive member have to be residents in Portugal. Excluding the non-executive 
members, whose mandates can be renewed once, outgoing Members cannot be appointed again within a period of five years after 
the end of their previous term. The appointments are made by the Council of Ministers under joint proposal by the President of the 
Court of Auditors and the Governor of the Bank of Portugal. 

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

The members of the Senior Board shall be personalities of acknowledged merit, with experience in the economics and public finance 
areas and a high degree of independence.  

Prohibition against taking instructions  Article 5 of the CFP Statutes lays down that the CFP and the members of its governing bodies shall act independently while performing 

the functions assigned to them by law and through the CFP statutes and cannot request or receive instructions from the Assembly of 
the Republic (the Parliament), the Government or any other public or private entity. 

Role of the Chair  To convene and chair the meetings, to coordinate the activities of the Senior Board, to chair the Executive Committee, to take part in 

the parliamentary hearings and press conferences and to perform any other functions conferred by the internal regulations or 
delegated by the Senior Board. 

Policy dialogue with government  There is a legal comply-or-explain requirement in the correction mechanism, but there is also technical interaction during the 

endorsement process of the macroeconomic forecasts. 

Interaction with parliament  The CFP reports that, in 2024, it participated in 1 parliamentary hearing, but did not receive any parliamentary questions. 

Access to non-public information  The access to information is governed by article 8 of the CFP Statutes. Some details for specific data provision are set in MoUs, one of 

which relates to the endorsement process, based on the Code of Conduct of the Two-Pack Regulation 473/2013. Although the CFP 
does not consider there to be any widespread issues regarding access to information, it should be noted that requested information is 
not always delivered within appropriate timeframes or in a complete manner. Furthermore, the explanations provided are sometimes 
insufficient, and certain requests for clarification remain unanswered. So far CFP has not been given access to microdata. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  To increase the number of staff, the CFP needs an authorization by the Minister of Finance due to a restriction imposed in the annual 

budget execution Decree-Law from which the CFP is not exempted (contrary to Regulatory Authorities). The CFP Statutes stipulates 
that preference should be given to civil servants. The salary scale is set by a Remunerations Committee, whose three members are 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
 
External review of the IFI  The CFP reports that one external review has taken place (in 2019) but not stemming from a legal obligation. 

appointed by the Minister of Finance on a joint proposal of the President of the Court of Auditors and the Governor of the central 
bank. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The CFP reports being free to communicate at any time.  

Explicit communication strategy  The CFP reports that since July 2025, it has an explicit communication strategy. The tasks of the CFP do not explicitly include 

contributing to the public debate, but the CFP Statutes contain a provision of mandatory press conferences and parliamentary 
hearings. 

Leadership role in communication  The leadership participates in press conferences, parliamentary hearings, and are interviewed by the national press. 

Number of press releases/conferences  The CFP reports that, in 2024, it issued more than 10 press releases and organised 1-2 press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The CFP reports that, in 2024, it was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers once or twice and published articles in 

the mainstream domestic media, closely linked to the release of opinions/recommendations by the IFI. It is present in social media 
(LinkedIn, X, Facebook). 

Media impact tracking  The CFP reports that it tracks the number of CFP mentions in the press (Online, newspapers, radio, TV) and monitors the usage of the 
CFP website and of social media (LinkedIn, X, and Facebook). It reports that, in 2024, the CFP was cited 1,920 times in national news 
outlets (paper, digital, TV and radio) and regularly features in media on matters related to fiscal issues and macroeconomic forecasts. 

Staff specialised in communication  The CFP reports that it has 1 press officer. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The CFP reports that its leadership and members of its Secretariat regularly participate as speakers/discussants in conferences 

organised by others. It also organizes some conferences together with different academic partners, albeit not on a regular basis. 

Summary:  The  CFP  is  a  relatively  well-resourced  IFI  with  a  wide  mandate.  Two  of  the  five  members  of  the  Senior  Board  could  be  (and  often  are)  non-
Portuguese citizens, thereby contributing to bringing in new perspectives. However, the ability of the CFP to autonomously take recruitment decisions and 
set salaries is limited and although there is a provision prohibiting sudden cuts in its budget, it does not provide a protection against inflation or other cost-
driving  factors  such  as  real  wage  growth.  Since  July  2025,  the  CFP  has  an  explicit  communication  strategy  and  is  quite  present  in  traditional  and  social 
media.  

85 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Romania – Romanian Fiscal Council (RFC) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 

In line with its official mandate, the RFC assesses the official macroeconomic forecast that is published before submission to the 
Parliament of the budgetary planning documents. The government is free to use its own forecasts, without any obligation to provide 
justification for deviations from the RFC forecasts. The macroeconomic forecast produced by the National Forecasting and Strategy 
Commission is assessed by comparing it with international institutions' macroeconomic forecasts (European Commission, IMF, World 
Bank, EBRD, etc) and own expert judgement. 
In line with its official mandate, the RFC assesses the budgetary forecasts before the budgetary planning documents are adopted by the 
Parliament.  

The RFC provides policy costing of the main measures on a voluntary basis and assesses the economic programs of political parties (at 
their request). 

Produce or endorse long-term fiscal projections  No. 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

Ex ante and ex post monitoring of debt and budget balance rules performed according to its official mandate.  

IFI performs the ex-post forecast evaluation  The RFC reports that no explicit ex-post evaluation of the historical track record of the macro forecasts that are used by the government 

for their budgetary planning has been made. 

Involved in correction mechanism  Yes 

(De)activation of escape clauses  RFC reports involvement regarding the budget balance rule. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

Romania published its MTFSP in October 2024, and in November 2024, the RFC approved it. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  The RFC is not obliged by law to perform such an assessment. In December 2024, a “Position Note on the Public Budget and Fiscal Rules” 

was published, pointing to shortcomings in the budgetary practices of the government, but it does not include a comprehensive 
assessment of all aspects of the national fiscal framework. 

Comply-or-explain requirement  The government reacts in a discretionary manner as it is not constrained by legislation, memorandum of understanding or commitment. 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes 

Adequacy of funding  According to Chapter X of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL), the RFC sets its own budget as a separate title in the budget of the Romanian 

Academy.  

Number of Secretariat staff  6.5 (1 manager, 2.5 economists, 3 administrative staff). The Technical Secretariat of the RFC is assigned a total of 20 full-time positions 

and their wages are equal to corresponding personnel of the Ministry of Public Finance (excluding civil servants and not including 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bonuses). The RFC reports that this wage level is too low to enable it to fill all its Secretariat positions and argues that RFC experts should 
be paid what senior experts at the Court of Auditors are paid. 

Support from other institutions  According to Article 59(1) of the FRL no 69/2010, the secretariat of the Fiscal Council operates within the Romanian Academy. The host 
institution provides for head-quarter, communication services and budget integration while the RFC sets its own budget proposals. The 
RFC provides human resource management and IT systems. 

Procedures for stability of funds  No. 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment procedures  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) no 69/2010. 

The President, the vice-president and the 3 other members are appointed by Parliament, based on the nominations made by independent 
institutions (National Bank of Romania, Romanian Banking Association, Romanian Academy, Bucharest University of Economic Studies, 
Romanian Banking Institute) and after being validated by the Budget Committees of the Romanian Parliament with a majority vote. 
Mandate of 9 years, non-renewable and non-staggered. The nominations are based on very strict criteria regarding the level of expertise 
and political independence. 
Should be Romanian citizens with a clean criminal record. Should hold a university degree, have extensive professional experience in 
economic, budgetary or financial matters, and an outstanding reputation in such matters of at least ten years. 
During the four years prior to their nomination, they cannot have held a position in government, been members of the Romanian 
Parliament or the European Parliament or held a senior official position in a political party, nor could their close relatives. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  Article 53(1) of the Fiscal Responsibility Law no 69/2010 explicitly prohibits taking instructions (“Fiscal Council members will exercise their 

mandate under the law and will not seek or receive instructions from public authorities or from any other institution or authority.”) 

Role of the Chair  The President acts as Chair of RFC, convenes the meetings, represents the RFC, approves publication of the analysis, studies, opinions and 

recommendations prepared by the RFC, upon their approval by the members of the RFC through majority vote and also coordinates the 
secretariat of the RFC. The President is also responsible for the fairness and accuracy of the analysis, studies, opinions and 
recommendations prepared by the RFC. 

Policy dialogue with government  The government reacts in a discretionary manner as it is not constrained by legislation, memorandum of understanding or commitment. 

No reactions reported in 2024. 

Interaction with parliament  The RFC reports that, in 2024, it participated in no parliamentary hearings but replied to more than 10 parliamentary questions. 

Access to non-public information  Article 64 of the Fiscal Responsibility Law no 69/2010 lays down the right to access to information. In practice, the RFC reports issues with 
timing of access to information (e.g. on budgetary measures), making it difficult for it to assess. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes, but someone else sets restrictions on salaries. 

External review of the IFI  The RFC reports that it has never been subject to an independent external evaluation. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The RFC reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  No 
Leadership role in communication  No 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of press releases/conferences  The RFC reports that it issued more than 10 press releases but organised no press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The RFC reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers and published articles in the 

mainstream domestic media regularly throughout the year, also on general fiscal and economic issues. It reports a presence in social 
media. 

Media impact tracking  No 
Staff specialised in communication  No 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The RFC reports that, in 2024, it regularly organised its own conferences including outside experts and its leadership regularly participated 

as speakers/discussants in conferences organised by others and its Secretariat staff occasionally did so.  

Summary:  The  RFC  performs  the  roles  of  monitoring  the  compliance  with  fiscal  rules  and  assessing  the  macroeconomic  and  budgetary  forecasts  of  the 
government, including by costing the main discretionary measures. It is not involved in long-term sustainability analysis. Its members have mandates of 9 
years with no staggering,. Members are nominated by several independent institutions. At the Secretariat, only 6.5 out of 20 available positions are filled, 
indicating severe recruitment problems, possibly linked with restrictions on pay level. The RFC reports having some issues with access to information, in 
particular  regarding  budget  measures.  It  reports  high  visibility  in  the  media,  despite  having  given  no  press  conferences  or  having  participated  in  no 
parliamentary  hearings  in  2024.  It  does  not  report  any  formal  media  coverage  analysis.  The  RFC  does  not  have  a  developed  policy  dialogue  with  the 
government, possibly due to lack of formal arrangements for such a dialogue. 

88 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sweden – Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (SFPC) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and 
multiannual macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce or endorse annual and 
multiannual budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

No production, assessment or endorsement of the macroeconomic forecasts before the budgetary documents are sent to parliament. No 
long-term projections.  

No production or endorsement. Assesses general government forecast on a voluntary basis, with regular output. 

Performed according to its official mandate. 

Ex-ante monitoring performed only after the adoption of the budget bill by the parliament. Ex-post monitoring performed. 

Ex-post forecast evaluation  Yes, every 3-4 years. The latest one was published in 2024.  

Assess the fiscal impact of policies 

If the SFPC has an opinion on a budgetary forecast, it is based on quantitative policy costing, although it does not have to be its own costing 
calculations. The SFPC may, at its own discretion, assess whether a measure is costly, ineffective etc, an example of which was the assessment 
of the electricity support measures in 2023. 

Involved in correction mechanism  No 

(De)activation of escape clauses  No, as there is no escape clause in the Swedish national framework. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-
term fiscal-structural plans 

No 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  No 

Comply-or-explain requirement  On the basis of its own commitment, the government regularly responds to written opinion(s)/recommendation(s)/finding(s) in a broad 

sense.  

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  No. Separate appropriation in the national budget. Equal funding conditions as other government institutions. 

Adequacy of funding  The SFPC considers that its budget appropriation for 2024 of SEK 11.7 million (around EUR 1.1 million) is enough to fulfil its mandate. 

Number of Secretariat staff  5 (1 manager, 3 economists, 1 administrative staff). 

Support from other institutions  No 

89 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, 
regulations or binding administrative 
provisions 

Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  

Professional competence requirements 
for Board members 

The SFPC established via a government decree. The national fiscal framework (of which the SPFC is an integral part) is part of a  
parliamentary agreement. The framework is only amended every eight years after an investigation by a parliamentary committee. Any  
changes to the framework are implemented in three kinds of legal acts: (i) laws decided on by parliament, (ii) decree with instructions for  
authorities decided by government, and (iii) the Framework Letter decided by parliament. The Framework Letter is a code of conduct that  
is passed through parliament. 
No more than 6 Members, of which 1 Chair and 1 Vice-Chair. According to the legal provisions, the Chair may be appointed for a period of up 
to six years and the other Members for a period of up to three years, not renewable (unless appointed as Chair, in which case another three-
year period is possible). In practise, the general rule is that the Chair is appointed for three years with the possibility to be reappointed once 
for another three-year period. One to two out of six members are replaced each year, ensuring that mandates are staggered. The three-year 
mandate is shorter than the four-year political cycle. Discussions ongoing of allowing members to be reappointed once. 
This is specified as high scientific expertise and practical experience of economic policy decision making. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  There is no explicit prohibition against taking instructions, but the SFPC reports that the government in practice does not give any other 

instructions than specifying the remits of the institution. 

Role of the Chair  The Chair leads and represents the SFPC but has no formal powers above other members. The chairperson must be present for the SFPC to 

have a quorum. 

Policy dialogue with government  The SFPC reports that, in 2024, the government responded in a public document to the SFPR Report. The reaction was included in the Budget 
Bill, which was made public more than two months after the SFPC report was published. The SFPR considered the content of the government 
response to be of varying coverage and quality and it gave no meaningful media echo. 

Interaction with parliament  The SFPC reports that, in 2024, it participated once in a parliamentary hearing and received no parliamentary question. 

Access to non-public information  There is no legal base for the right to access to information, but the SFPC obtains information via meetings with the Ministry of Finance. It 

reports no issues so far with access to information. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes. 

External review of the IFI  The SFPC reports that it has so far never been subject to an external independent evaluation.  

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The SFPC reports being free to communicate at any time.  

Explicit communication strategy  No 
Leadership role in communication  No 

Number of press releases/conferences  The SFPC reports that, in 2024, it issued 4-6 press releases and organised 1-2 press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social 
media 

The SFPC reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly throughout the year, 
also on general fiscal and economic issues, and issued articles once or twice in the mainstream domestic media, closely linked to the release 
of opinions/recommendations by the IFI. The SFPC reports no presence in social media (except for Linkedin). 

90 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Media impact tracking  The SFPC reports that it tracks mentions in press articles etc. 

Staff specialised in communication  No 
Organisation of/participation in 
conferences 

The SFPC reports that it regularly organises its own conferences including outside experts and that its leadership and members of the 
Secretariat occasionally participate in conferences organised by others. 

Summary: Sweden established the Fiscal Policy Council in 2007, some years before relevant EU legislation was enacted. It has a relatively narrow mandate 
regarding  compulsory  tasks,  focusing  on  monitoring  the  compliance  with  fiscal  rules,  but  the  mandate  also  includes  a  wide  range  of  tasks  that  it  may 
perform.  Regarding  macroeconomic  forecasts,  its  role  is  limited  to  performing  the  ex-post  assessment  of  accuracy  every  four  years.  For  its  current 
compulsory tasks, it seems sufficiently funded, allowing it to maintain a small secretariat staff of 5 experts. The mandates of Board members are shorter 
than the electoral cycle and have so far not included any possibility of renewal, possibly making the build-up of institutional memory and name recognition 
more difficult. The right to access to information is currently not enshrined in law but based on informal contacts with ministries. The SFPC keeps a rather 
low media profile, publishing one main report per year, occasionally complemented by a special study. It has no explicit communication strategy, reports 
limited social media presence, and has no staff specialised in communication. Its interaction with parliament is relatively limited, having participated in only 
one hearing and having received no parliamentary questions in 2024.  

91 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slovenia – Fiscal Council (FC) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and growth 
sustainability 

The Fiscal Council only assesses the compatibility of macroeconomic forecasts, which are produced by another IFI (IMAD), with fiscal 
forecasts once the latter are submitted to the Parliament. Within that the Fiscal Council also evaluates risks to macroeconomic 
forecasts. 
In line with its official mandate, the FC assesses the budgetary forecasts before the adoption in the Parliament of the budgetary 
planning documents. The FC is not required to prepare budgetary forecasts, but the SI FC produces forecasts regularly when assessing 
the official budgetary forecasts and presents them in its publications. 
Performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output 

Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

Produce or endorse long-term fiscal projections  Performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output. The FC typically performs debt sustainability analysis and long-term risk 
assessments (e.g. Box 1.1 and Chapter 2.2 in the assessment of the 2024 update of the Stability programme or Box 3.1 in the 
assessment of the Medium-Term Fiscal Structural Plan.  
Ex-ante and ex-post monitoring of budget balance rule performed according to its official mandate. The ex-ante assessment is done 
after the submission of the Medium-term fiscal-structural Plan (before: the Stability Programme) and of budgetary documents by the 
Ministry of Finance to the Parliament. Ex-post assessment is done based on the Annual progress report (before: the consolidated public 
finance records). 
In accordance with the transposition of Directive EU/2011/85 into Slovenian legislation, the Fiscal Council was obliged, as from 2020, to 
assess and publicly publish the results of the assessment of deviations of macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts on a biannual basis (2016-
19, 2018-2021, 2020-2023). With the adoption of the revised Fiscal Rule Act, the Fiscal Council is obliged to make such assessments 
every 4 years, starting in 2028. 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation 

Involved in correction mechanism  Yes. Part IV of the Fiscal Rule Act (Elimination of Deviations and Exceptional Circumstances) defined the role of Fiscal Council in the 

correction mechanism. According to Article 11 of the Fiscal Rule Act, the FC needed to assess the adequacy of the corrective measures 
to ensure medium-term sustainability, proposed by the Government. According to Article 11 of the recently adopted Fiscal Rule Act, the 
Fiscal Council assesses the Revised Medium-term fiscal-structural plan that is prepared due to non-compliance with fiscal rules. 
(De)activation of escape clauses  Article 12 of the Fiscal Rule Act stipulates that "The Government shall determine whether exceptional circumstances exist, after 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term fiscal-
structural plans 

obtaining the assessment of the Fiscal Council". With the new Fiscal Rule Act, no decision on cessation of the exceptional circumstances 
is foreseen as the exceptional circumstances at national level are directly linked to the use of general escape clause EC or national 
escape clause at the EU level. 
In October 2024, the FC published an opinion on the Medium-Term Fiscal and Structural Plan 2025–2028 and in April 2025, it published 
its assessment of the draft 2025 Annual Progress Report. According to Article 5 and 6 of the revised Fiscal Rule Act, the Fiscal Council is 
mandated to assess both documents. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  According to Article 7(2) of the recently adopted Fiscal Rule Act, the Fiscal Council is mandated to prepare an assessment of the 

consistency, coherence and effectiveness of the budget planning system every four years, starting in 2029. 

Comply-or-explain requirement  According to Article 7(3) of the Fiscal Rule Act, the government is legally required to respond to all periodic monitoring reports on fiscal 

rules, which it is obliged to deliver before the discussion in the Parliament of the related budgetary documents or at the latest within 
two months of the FC preparing the report/statement. The FC publishes the reactions by the government alongside the Fiscal Council's 

92 

 
 
assessments. The government has so far not changed the underlying documents due to the FC assessments. 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes. Fiscal Rule Act (Article 10(4)) defines that the funding of the Fiscal Council is ensured in the government budget at the proposal of 

the Fiscal Council. 

Adequacy of funding  The FC considers its funding needs in 2024 to have been comfortably met via an appropriation of EUR 730.000, EUR 580.000 of which 

was actually used. 

Number of Secretariat staff  4 (1 manager, 2 analysts, 1 administrative staff). The appointment procedure regarding the staff of the Fiscal Council is entirely decided 

by the members of Fiscal Council. With the new Fiscal Rule Act, the previous numerical 4-person-limit for technical staff has been 
removed. 

Support from other institutions  According to Fiscal Rule Act (Article 10), administrative-technical support is provided by the services of the Court of Audit of the 

Republic of Slovenia. 

Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment procedures  

Professional competence requirements for Board 
members 

The FC was established via Constitutional Law: Fiscal Rule Act (Part III: Articles 7-10). 

3 Members (1 President, 2 Members) are appointed for 5 years, renewable once. Simultaneous start. The procedures for the 
nomination and appointment are defined in Fiscal Rule Act. The Government publishes in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia 
a call for applications from candidates. The Government proposes candidates to the Parliament from the candidates that applied. The 
Parliament votes on a proposed candidate, who is appointed if two-thirds of all deputies cast their vote in favour of the candidate. With 
the revised Fiscal Rule Act, all Members are to be employed full time at the Fiscal Council, while this was only possible for the President 
before the legal change. 
Appointed members of the Fiscal Council shall be experts in the fields of macroeconomics, public finance or budget management. A 
person with at least a university degree or a degree attained in a second-cycle study programme in accordance with the Act governing 
higher education, and with at least 10 years of work experience in their field of expertise, shall be deemed an expert in the field of 
macroeconomics, public finance or public management, taking into account their business performance, performance in positions to 
date and reputation. Members are not allowed to hold executive public sector functions or functions of representing either indirect or 
direct budget users. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  The new Fiscal Rule Act explicitly states in Article 8(2) that Members of the Fiscal council are not allowed to take any instructions 

regarding their work. 

Role of the Chair  The President represents the FC and manages and organises the work of the institution. 

Policy dialogue with government  The FC reports that, in 2024, the government reacted within two weeks and the reactions gave some brief media echo. The reactions 

were presented during the parliamentary sessions on the underlying documents.  

Interaction with parliament  The FC reports that, in 2024, it participated in more than 6 parliamentary hearings and replied to 1-3 parliamentary questions. 

93 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Access to non-public information  The right to access to non-public information is ensured by legislation (Fiscal Rule Act, Art 10(7)); however, some information is either 
not accessible (e.g. information exchange between Eurostat and National Statistics Office) or access is limited (e.g. on micro data from 
the National Statistics Office, requiring burdensome procedures and registration of the institution as a research entity). The 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of Finance to transmit budget information and data was enhanced in 2021 and 
additionally in 2025 to bring it in line with the updated Fiscal Rule Act. The FC also has a MoU with IMAD (the sister IFI), mainly regarding 
the technical discussion and early access to data on macro forecasts. MoUs with other institutions are published on the FC web site. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes. 

External review of the IFI  The FC reports that it has so far never been subject to an independent external evaluation. The revised Fiscal Rule Act stipulates that 

such reviews starts in 2028 and are subsequently undertaken every seven years. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The FC reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Explicit communication strategy  No 

Leadership role in communication  Article 7 of Fiscal Rule Act states that the FC is an institution that prepares and publicly publishes its findings, but it does not explicitly 

define a communication role for the leadership. However, Article 19 of the Rules of Procedure of the FC lays down that FC assessments 
should be made public and declares that the Chair is the main responsible for external communication. 
Number of press releases/conferences  The FC reports that, in 2024, it issued more than 10 press releases but organised no press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The FC reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly throughout the 
year, also on general fiscal and economic issues and published articles, albeit only in media outlets specialised in economics/finance. 
Since 2021, the FC has an X account (previously Twitter), where it posts messages when it publishes assessments, views and analyses.  
Information on media relations regularly published in the Annual Report on Fiscal Council Operations (2024 edition). The FC reports that, 
in 2024, its messages on X received around 115.000 views, up from around 85.000 the year before. Views were concentrated to the 
spring and autumn assessments of the budget documents and those on the findings of the Monthly Information publication. There was 
reportedly also a high response rate in different media to the presentations of the FC opinions in the Parliament. 

Media impact tracking 

Staff specialised in communication  No. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The FC reports that, in 2024, its leadership occasionally participated in conferences organised by others. 

Summary: The Slovenian Fiscal Council is a relatively small IFI with a relatively narrow mandate, focusing on monitoring of compliance with fiscal rules and 
assessing the fiscal forecast of the government, while the other IFI (IMAD) is responsible for producing the macroeconomic forecasts. On a voluntary basis, 
the FC has recently developed its own budgetary forecast. The recent adoption of a revised Fiscal Rule Act implied a strengthening of the status of the IFI, 
e.g. by removing the previous 4-person limit on the secretariat staff size, which has enabled the FC to start recruiting additional staff members. Despite 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
having a legal right to access information, it reports some issues with this in practise. The FC is developing its outreach activities to broaden the awareness 
of fiscal issues. 

95 

 
 
 
 
Slovenia – The institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development of the Republic of Slovenia (IMAD) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 
Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 
Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 
Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

In line with its mandate, IMAD produces the macro-economic forecasts used for fiscal planning for both the annual budgets and the 
medium-term plans. There is a legal obligation to use the fiscal institution's forecasts. 

No. 

Performed on a voluntary basis, with sporadic output. 

No. 

Not applicable (Done by the FC). 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  Yes, IMAD evaluates its own forecast. Last time performed in 2024 regarding the period 1997-2023. The Fiscal Council also performs ex-

post evaluations of the IMAD macroeconomic forecasts. 

Involved in correction mechanism  Not applicable (Done by the FC). 
(De)activation of escape clauses  Not applicable (Done by the FC). 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

The macroeconomic assumptions of the Slovenian MTFSP were based on the IMAD forecast. 

Assessment of national fiscal framework  Not applicable (Done by the FC). 

Comply-or-explain requirement  No. Macroeconomic forecasts of IMAD are used in full as prepared by IMAD and not altered by the government when preparing fiscal or 

budgetary documents. 

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Yes, via the Public Finance Act. 

Adequacy of funding 

IMAD reports that funding levels was adequate.  

Number of Secretariat staff  17.4 (2 managers, 15 economists, 0.2 administrative staff and 0.2 others). IMAD staff are civil servants, selected on the basis of open 

competition in line with the Civil servant act (Official Gazette of RS 63/07). 

96 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Support from other institutions  No. 
Procedures for stability of funds  No. 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations or 
binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

Prohibition against taking instructions 

Ordinary law. Ordinance on the Organisation and Work of the Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development of the Republic of 
Slovenia. 

1 Director and 2 Deputy Directors. 5-year non-staggered mandates, renewable more than three times. The Director is appointed by the 
Government of the Republic of Slovenia upon the proposal of the Prime minister, who selects a candidate from among the persons 
proposed by the independent Officials' Council selection Board for officials in top official posts. After an open competition, the Board 
determines which candidates are qualified and suitable for the position on the basis of their professional qualifications. The Director 
reports directly to the Prime minister. IMAD reports that the position of the Director is not a political one, as the director is checked by the 
independent Official’s council selection Board to be professionally suitable for the job. However, the Director can be prematurely 
dismissed in the period of one year after a new government is appointed, as is the case for all officials in top official posts. Deputy 
Directors are appointed by the Director. 
University education (Academic higher education (former) o specialisation after professional higher education (former) or a Master's 
degree); minimum of 10 years of work experience; functional knowledge of administrative procedure and human resource management; 
proficiency in English; capability of strategic planning; communication skills. 
Formally not prohibited, but Ordinance clearly states that "In performing its tasks ... the Institute enjoys complete independence 
regarding technical and methodological matters related to the use of analytical and forecasting tools and the interpretation of results." 
Role of the Chair  According to Article 3 of the Resolution on the Organisation and Work of IMAD, the Director is responsible for the management of IMAD 

and for the professional reliability of the tasks performed by the Institute. 

Policy dialogue with government  None. 
Interaction with parliament 

Access to non-public information 

IMAD reports that, in 2024, it did not participate in any parliamentary hearing on the macroeconomic forecasts, but replied to 4-6 
parliamentary questions. 
IMAD reports that it has full access, but it is not codified in legislation. It is rather in line with the activities of IMAD as set in the 
Ordinance. IMAD reported no issues in 2024. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes, but IMAD is a part of the public sector and can only employ civil servants, who are covered by the Public Sector Salary System Act. 

External review of the IFI 

IMAD reports that the FC conducts ex-post evaluations of forecast accuracy every 4-6 years, but no comprehensive evaluation of IMAD as 
an institution is reported to have taken place. 

Communication 
Freedom to communicate 
Explicit communication strategy  No. 

IMAD reports being free to communicate at any time. 

Leadership role in communication  The Director of IMAD is officially responsible for ensuring public access to information in all areas of IMAD's work. 

Number of press releases/conferences 
Visibility in media/Presence in social media 

IMAD reports that, in 2024, it issues more than 10 press releases and organised 1-2 press conferences, including also non-IFI issues. 

IMAD reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly throughout the year, 

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Media impact tracking 

also on general fiscal and economic issues, and issued articles, albeit only in media outlets specialised in economy/finance. It reports a 
presence in social media. 
IMAD reports that it monitors media coverage on a daily basis, by having a media monitoring service search for selected keywords. It 
continuously assesses the coverage based on the tone of reporting (positive, negative, neutral) and in relation to its communication goals. 
IMAD uses Google Analytics to track visits to our website, the number of clicks, and interest in specific published sections and content. 

Staff specialised in communication  Yes, but not specifically for the IFI function. 

Organisation of/participation in conferences 

IMAD reports that, in 2024, its leadership regularly participated as speakers/discussants in conferences organised by others. 

Summary: The IFI-related mandate of IMAD is relatively narrow, focused on producing the macroeconomic forecasts underlying the budgetary planning. For 
this task, it devotes a staff of around 17 FTE. It can only employ civil servants. Although the Director’s mandate is not tied to the government's mandate and 
strict selection criteria apply, the Director can be replaced if a new government comes into office, potentially raising independence issues. IMAD’s right to 
access  information  is  not  enshrined  in  law,  but  so  far  it  seems  not  to  have  experienced  any  issues  with  access.  IMAD  does  not  have  an  explicit 
communication strategy, and the Chair is not assigned an explicit outreach role for its IFI function, but it has a presence in both traditional and social media, 
and it tracks its media impact. 

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Slovakia – Council for Budget Responsibility (CBR) 

TASKS 

Current status 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
macroeconomic forecasts 

Produce or endorse annual and multiannual 
budgetary forecasts 

Since 2021, the CBR is a member of Macroeconomic Forecasting Committee (MFC, an advisory body to the Ministry of Finance) with voting 
rights. The CBR produces its own forecast, which serves as basis for assessing and voting on the forecast prepared by the Ministry of Finance 
submitted for assessment in the MFC, which is headed by the MoF. As decisions of the Committee are based on simple majority, a forecast 
may be endorsed by the MFC without the CBR having voted in favour of such endorsement. Individual votes of Members of the MFC are 
published. 
According to the constitutional Fiscal Responsibility Act, the government should take into account the official forecast of the Tax Revenue 
Forecasting Committee (TRFC - an advisory body to the Ministry of Finance), of which the CBR is a member with voting rights. The CBR 
regularly and on a voluntary basis produces its own forecast, which serves as a basis for assessing and voting on the forecast that MoF 
submits for discussion in the TRFC. The CBR, similarly to the TRFC, mainly focuses on tax revenues, social security contributions, selected 
non-tax revenues, and some expenditures - mainly pensions. 

Assess the impact of policies on fiscal and 
growth sustainability 
Produce or endorse long-term fiscal 
projections 

Monitor compliance with country-specific 
numerical fiscal rules 

Yes, when it comes to measures pertaining to tax revenues. The CBR published an official methodology for quantification of effects of 
policies on its website in March 2025 (only in Slovak).  

Long-term macroeconomic projections with a time horizon of at least 50 years produced to project pension, healthcare, education and 
other government expenditure related to ageing population. The aim is to regularly (on annual basis) assess the long-term sustainability of 
public finance. The latest Report on the Long-term Sustainability of Public Finances was published in April 2025. 
Ex-ante monitoring performed on a voluntary basis, with regular output. Ex-post monitoring performed according to its official mandate 
regarding the debt rule (General and local government), the general government budget balance rule and the national nominal expenditure 
ceiling (computed based on the net expenditure growth of the MTFSP - for the first time assessed in 2025). 

IFI performs the ex post forecast evaluation  No 

Involved in correction mechanism  The CBR shall assess and publish its evaluation of the application or non-application of the correction mechanism. Its involvement is limited 

to an advisory role.  

(De)activation of escape clauses  The role of CBR in triggering escape clauses is limited. Escape clauses are triggered by the government based on the proposal of the MoF. 

Involvement in assessing the medium-term 
fiscal-structural plans 

Before the government decides on it, the CBR assesses the proposal of the MoF on the start and end of the period of exceptional 
circumstances. 
The legislation does not assign to the CBR the task of assessing the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan and the CBR was not asked 
to issue an opinion on the macro economic forecast and the macroeconomic assumptions underpinning the net expenditure path of the 
plan. However, the CBR shall prepare and publish an assessment of the compliance of the budgetary outcome with the trajectory of net 
expenditure, as well as of the compliance with the expenditure ceiling, and an analysis of the factors underlying any deviation from the 
expenditure trajectory. In line with this, it published an assessment of the 2025 Progress report.  

Assessment of national fiscal framework  According to its legal mandate, once a year the CBR publishes a Report on Compliance with the Fiscal Responsibility and Fiscal Transparency 

Rules, which includes normative recommendations to promote responsible budgeting practices and improve transparency in the public 
finances. However, this report is not equivalent to a comprehensive assessment of the national fiscal framework as it only covers certain 
limited sections of fiscal framework. 

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Comply-or-explain requirement  The MoF is legally required to officially react to the assessments of the CBR regarding the balanced budget rule (transposition of the Fiscal 

Compact - TSCG), the compliance of the budgetary outcome with the trajectory of net expenditure, the fulfilment of the general 
government expenditure ceiling, the analysis of the factors underlying deviations from the expenditure trajectory, the application or non-
application of the correction mechanism, as well as the start and end of the period of exceptional circumstances. Other reports prepared by 
the CBR do not require official reaction, although MoF usually comments on some aspects of the reports via media.  

CAPACITY 

Resources and staffing 

Funding grounded in law  Article 3(8) of the Constitutional Act No. 493/2011 on Fiscal Responsibility 

Adequacy of funding  The CBR considers that, in 2024, funding needs were comfortably met with a budget appropriation of EUR 4.2 million, EUR 3.4 million of 

which were actually used. 

Number of Secretariat staff  28.07 (5.67 managers, 18.96 economists, 1.69 administrative staff and 1.75 communication experts) 

Support from other institutions  EU budget funds finances participation of staff in training/courses in renowned institutions. 
Procedures for stability of funds  No 

Independence 
IFI established by national laws, regulations 
or binding administrative provisions 
Board structure/length of 
mandate/renewability/appointment 
procedures  

Professional competence requirements for 
Board members 

CBR was established via Constitutional act No 493/2011. 

3 Board Members (1 Chair, 2 Members). The normal term length is 7 years. The terms of the first Board members were set to 7 years for the 
Chair and 5 and 3 years for the other two Board members, respectively, to ensure staggering of the non-renewable terms. The Chair of the 
Board is elected (and could be recalled) by the national parliament by a three-fifth majority of deputies upon a proposal by the Government. 
One member of the Board is elected (and could be recalled) by the parliament by a simple majority of the deputies present upon a proposal 
by the President of the Slovak Republic. The other member of the Board is elected (and could be recalled) by the parliament by a simple 
majority of the deputies present upon a proposal by the Governor of the National Bank of Slovakia. Members of the Board shall have the 
status of public officials. 
Only individuals with appropriate professional knowledge and experience, full legal capacity and a clean criminal record shall be eligible for 
election to the Board. This means having a complete university education at masters’ level and no less than five years of practice in the area 
of finances and macroeconomics.  
The office of Board member is incompatible with any office in a political party or movement, with the office of a statutory representative of 
a company, with the office of the President of the Slovak Republic, member of the National Council, member of the European Parliament, 
member of the Government, member of the European Commission, with the office of mayor, Chair of a self-governing region, municipal 
councillor, regional councillor and member of the Bank Board of the National Bank of Slovakia. The incompatibility of the office of Board 
member and of the office of Government member shall last three more years following the termination of the office of Board member. 

Prohibition against taking instructions  By virtue of being set up by the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which is a constitutional act, there is an established legal norm of what an 

independent body is. However, in contrast to what is the case for the National Bank of Slovakia, the legal text does not contain any explicit 
prohibition against taking outside instructions. 

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Role of the Chair  The Chair organizes and chairs the meeting of the Board members, represents the CBR towards other institutions and proposes the head of 

the Secretariat. 

Policy dialogue with government  The CBR reports that, in 2024, no policy dialogue with the government took place. 

Interaction with parliament  The CBR reports that, in 2024, it participated in 2-3 parliamentary hearings and replied to 1-3 parliamentary questions. 

Access to non-public information  The legal base for access to information stems from Article 4(2) of the Constitutional Act No. 493/2011 on Fiscal Responsibility and a 

number of specific laws. Furthermore, the CBR has full access to the budgetary information system of the Ministry of Finance. In 2020, a 
MoU was signed with the Statistical Office giving CBR full access to EDP data. In 2022, the Parliament amended several laws (social affairs, 
pensions, health insurance, etc.) that strengthened the role of CBR as a recipient of governmental information and data, which improved 
CBR's access to data and information from other governmental institutions and public bodies. However, the current legislation and MoUs 
are not general enough to cover any future information needs and, unlike some other institutions, the CBR has no recourse if an entity 
refuses to provide the requested data. There is no legal base for access to data from entities outside the general government sector, such as 
state-owned enterprises. 

Autonomy in recruitment decisions  Yes 

External review of the IFI  The latest review was published in 2020 (OECD Review of the Slovak Council for Budget Responsibility). The next one is planned for 2026. 

Communication 

Freedom to communicate  The CBR reports being free to communicate at any time.  

Explicit communication strategy  Yes, but it has not been published. 

Leadership role in communication  The Chairperson and the members of the council are involved in external communication. 
Number of press releases/conferences  The CBR reports that, in 2024, it issued 7-10 press releases and organised 3-5 press conferences. 

Visibility in media/Presence in social media  The CBR reports that, in 2024, its leadership was interviewed on mainstream national TV/radio/daily papers regularly throughout the year, 

closely linked to the release of opinions/recommendations by the IFI, but no articles were published. The CBR reports that it is present in 
social media. 

Media impact tracking  The CBR tracks its media impact and performs an internal evaluation annually. The CBR also tracks its social media impact. 

Staff specialised in communication  Yes, the CBR´s office has 1.75 FTE staff specialised in communication.  

Organisation of/participation in conferences  The CBR reports that its leadership regularly participate as speakers/discussants in conferences organised by others and that members of 

the secretariat occasionally do so. 

Summary:  The  CBR  is  a  well-resourced  IFI  with  a  broad mandate  and  a  fairly  broad  media  presence.  The  leadership  has staggered  (but  non-renewable) 
mandates of seven years and is subject to a three-year “cooling off period” before joining a government. It has recently improved its access to information. 
Its policy dialogue with the government is  not fully developed and interactions with parliament is moderate. 

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