JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Strengthening EU economic security
Date: 2025-12-03
Institutions: Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, European Commission
Subjects: EU strategy, competitiveness, critical infrastructure security, economic coercion, economic independence, economic policy, industrial policy, risk management, supply chain, technology

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 3.12.2025  JOIN(2025) 977 final  JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Strengthening EU economic security  
 
 
1. Introduction 

The  increasingly  frequent  and  targeted  use  of  economic  tools  to  advance  strategic 
objectives has become a defining feature of today’s geopolitical landscape. From disruptive 
tariffs  and  the  weaponisation  of  dependencies  to  the  arbitrary  deployment  of  trade  defence 
measures, major players  are using economic levers to  pursue their strategic and geopolitical 
objectives, putting the EU’s security, public order, competitiveness and economy at risk.  

The  risks  to  the  EU’s  economic  security  are  not  new  but  have  recently  intensified: 
vulnerabilities  are  now  more  visible,  more  pressing,  and  more  difficult  to  overlook.  These 
risks include: 

- 

- 

- 

a growing instability in the global trade and investment environment, marked by the 
rise of disruptive trade measures and export restrictions to weaponise dependencies; 
a  proliferation  of  predatory  practices  targeting  critical  supply  chains  and  technologies, 
undermining  our  industrial  base,  some  of  which  (such  as  State-funded  overcapacities) 
creating new dependencies;  
the continued deterioration of the security landscape, including in the context of Russia’s 
continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and the rise in hybrid attacks. 

The 2023 European Economic Security Strategy set out the EU’s initial response to these 
challenges.1 It outlined a series of actions – grounded in risk assessments – to strengthen the 
EU’s  economic  security  by  promoting  competitiveness,  protecting  against  risks  and 
partnering with those who share our concerns. These three pillars remain at the core of our 
economic  security  approach  and  the  Commission  together  with  Member  States  work  to 
integrate  them  into  any  policy  considerations  and  actions.  Moreover,  economic  security  is 
essential for the EU to maintain its values, its principles and the wellbeing of its citizens, as 
well as to reinforce our economic independence. 

However,  since  the  adoption  of  the  2023  strategy,  the  need  for  the  EU  to  act  with  greater 
boldness,  speed  and  unity  has  become  even  stronger.  This  Communication  outlines  a  more 
strategic  and  assertive  use  of  the  Union’s  tools  –  complementing  their  original  policy 
objectives  -  to  support  Europe’s  economic  security,  which  concerns  the  Union’s  ability  to 
ensure security, alongside other objectives, through a strong, dynamic and resilient economy 
by  anticipating,  deterring  and  responding  to  potential  or  actual  threats,  linked  to  the  EU’s 
economic relationships with the wider world. The EU can do this, in particular, by ensuring it 
stays ahead in terms  of  critical  technologies, industries and services.  It reflects  a  paradigm 
shift, moving from a reactive posture towards a more proactive and systematic deployment of 
our  toolbox.  Moreover,  in  certain  cases,  the  EU,  its  Member  States  and  industry  will 
increasingly  need  to  be  ready  to  accept  economic  costs  for  the  benefit  of  reduced 
vulnerabilities and enhanced overall security. 

This  call  to  action  includes  improving  information  gathering,  monitoring  and  analysis,  as 
well  as  the  capacity  to  anticipate  emerging  threats;  deterring  third  countries  from 

1 JOIN(2023) 20 final. 

1 

 
 
 
weaponising  the  Union’s  dependencies;  reducing  our  exposure  to  third  countries  that  may 
weaponise such dependencies; and preventing efforts to undermine our derisking actions.  

Importantly, this call to action also recognises the need to play to the EU’s strengths in terms 
of,  among  others,  the  unparalleled  weight  of  the  EU’s  single  market,  our  technological  and 
industrial  capabilities  as  well  as  access  to  EU  funding  and  programmes.  This  includes 
identifying,  the  EU’s  economic  opportunities  as  well  as  those  areas  where  others  are 
dependent  on  the  EU.  Therefore,  this  communication  makes  the  case  for  an  integrated, 
whole-of-government  and  business  approach,  improved  governance  as  well  as  even 
closer cooperation with like-minded partners and, where appropriate, joint action. It is 
complementary to  the comprehensive EU Preparedness  Union Strategy. The EU’s economic 
security  is  underpinned  by  that  of  its  Member  States.  It  is  also  intrinsically  linked  with  its 
broader  relations  with  the  world  and  therefore  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy, 
which will be used more systematically to support the stated objectives. 

On this basis, anchored in a risk-based analysis, this Communication focuses on six high-risk 
areas  outlined  in  Section  3,  applies  the  tools  at  our  disposal  and  outlines  how  they  can  be 
further improved. 

2. A proactive approach to economic security  

The EU has a wide range of tools that contribute to its economic security. It must now deploy 
them  more  strategically,  efficiently  and  proactively  to  strengthen  its  economic  security. 
While most of these tools were not originally developed with economic security in mind, they 
are nevertheless highly relevant to advance the Union’s economic security objectives.  

A  non-exhaustive  list  of  key  tools  is  set  out  in  Figure  1,  and  their  coordinated  application 
further articulated in section 3. 

2 

 
 
 
 
Figure 1: List of tools which support economic security, non-exhaustive 

Trade and 
competition
- Anti-subsidy 
measures

- Anti-dumping 

measures
- Safeguards
- Foreign 

Subsidies 
Regulation

- Other 

competition tools

- Customs 

procedures and 
controls

- Trade 

agreements

- Standards based 

trade

Resilience / cyber-
security
- Internal Market 
Emergency and 
Resilience Act
- Regulation on 

common rules for 
exports

- Stockpiling 
strategy

- Resilience of 

Critical Entities 
Directive

- Cyber Resilience 

Act

Security and public 
order
- FDI Screening 

Regulation
- Regulation on 

Dual Use Export 
Controls

- Recommendation 

on outbound 
investment 
monitoring

- Council 

Recommendation 
on Research 
Security

- NIS2 Directive
- 5G toolbox
- Cyber Security 
Act (revision)
- Cyber Solidarity 

Act
- Public 

Procurement 
Directive

Anti-coercion and 
restrictive 
measures
- Anti-Coercion 
Instrument
- Sanctions / 
restrictive 
measures  

- Blocking Statute 

Regulation

Funding and 
restrictions
- Global Gateway
- EU funding 

restrictions in 
Horizon Europe, 
Digital Europe 
Programme, 
Connecting 
Europe Facility

- Economic 
security 
restrictions (post-
2027 MFF)

- High-risk supplier 
restrictions (post-
2027 MFF)

- Competitiveness 

Coordination 
Tool

- Article 136 of the 

Financial 
Regulation

Selected sectoral 
initiatives
- ResourceEU
- CHIPS Act 2.0
- Quantum 
Strategy
- Industrial 

Accelerator Act

- Data Union 
Strategy

- CRM Act / CRM 

Centre

- EU startup 

scaleup strategy

- European 

Innovation Act 
- EU Port Strategy
- Drone Strategy 

2.0

To  advance  the  EU’s  economic  security,  the  Commission  will  deploy  these  tools,  in 
coordination with Member States, as follows: 

•  Trade  and  competition  tools  will  be  used  to  gradually  reduce  the  EU’s  exposure  to 
risks and to prevent the EU’s derisking objectives from being undermined. This includes 
expanding  diversification  opportunities  and  thus  our  broader  security  under  EU  trade 
agreements, making strategic use of customs toolbox and addressing distortions caused 
by  foreign  subsidies,  both  within  the  Single  Market  and  through  subsidies  or  dumped 
imports.  

•  Resilience  and  cybersecurity  tools  will  focus  on  preparing  for  and  managing 
emergency  situations,  as  well  as  on  reducing  exposure  to  external  threats,  such  as 
cyberthreats. 

•  Security and public order tools will be used to reduce the EU’s excessive exposure to 
risks  to,  inter  alia,  ensure  the  normal  functioning  of  society,  while  supporting  actions 
aimed  at  developing  its  position  in  critical  technologies  and  industries,  as  well  as 
preventing its derisking objectives from being undermined. 

•  Anti-coercion  and  restrictive  measures  will  aim  at  deterrence  and  dealing  with 
situations where third countries attempt to coerce the EU as well as shielding the EU’s 
businesses  from  extraterritorial  measures  imposed  by  third  countries  and,  where 
relevant, triggering a change in behaviour of the country concerned. 

•  Funding and restrictions through EU tools like the NDICI (Global Gateway), Horizon 
Europe,  NextGenerationEU,  InvestEU,  Digital  Europe  Programme,  Connecting  Europe 
Facility, Instruments for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPAs), Growth Plans for the Western 

3 

 
 
 
Balkans  and  Moldova,  as  well  as  the  Ukraine  Facility,  EU4Health  and  the  future 
European Competitiveness Fund should strengthen the EU’s economic security or, as a 
minimum, not weaken it, in line with the programmes’ rules.  

•  Sectoral  initiatives  –  will  be  used  to  build  up  the  EU’s  own  capacity  and  strategic 

capabilities in the high-risk areas identified in the risk assessment process. 

Close cooperation and coordination with countries that assign similar importance to economic 
security  and  a  rules-based  global  order,  is  more  important  than  ever.  The  EU  will  work  to 
strengthen international cooperation on economic security issues, particularly with trusted 
partners,  including  through  focused  economic  security  dialogues  conducted  both 
bilaterally and in plurilateral settings. Such cooperation will support joint action on shared 
economic  security  interests  or  concerns.  It  will  also  deepen  the  collective  understanding  of 
risks, help anticipate threats, enable the design of mitigation measures that minimise negative 
externalities,  contribute  to  building  and  maintaining  reliable  and  resilient  supply  chains  in 
key  strategic  sectors,  and  help  to  avoid  negative  impacts  on  our  like-minded  international 
partners. 

The  Commission  will  seek  cooperation 
with  third  countries,  bilaterally,  through 
the  G7,  and  in  frameworks  such  as  the 
Comprehensive  and  Progressive  Trans-
Pacific  Partnership  and  other  relevant 
fora.  It  will  work  with  partners  on  the 
of 
development 
economic security standards for resilient 
supply  chains.  Closer  cooperation  may 
include  coordinated  deployment  of 
tools  and  coalition  building  with 
partners  who  share  similar  economic 
security  objectives  or 
face  similar 
challenges.  

deployment 

and 

Deploying economic security standards 

encourage 

Building  on  work  in  the  G7  on  standards-based 
trade, 
the 
the  Commission  will 
security 
development  and  use  of  economic 
standards. They will be: 
→  focused  on  action  to  diversify  critical  supply 
chains  by  creating  the  conditions  for  new 
suppliers  to  enter  the  market  or  limiting  access 
of dominant suppliers;  

→  guided  by 

the  principles  of 

transparency, 
with 

compliance 

interoperability 
international rules; 

and 

→  targeted  and 

tailor-made,  factoring 

the 
specific  risks,  economic  impacts  and  business 
realities of each supply chain. 

in 

This  work  will  focus  as  a  matter  of  priority  on 
critical  raw  materials  and  semiconductor  supply 
chains,  while  exploring  further  collaboration  in 
other areas.  

The  relevance  of,  and  impact  on,  the 
EU’s neighbourhood and enlargement 
policy must also be adequately factored 
in. Risks and opportunities for the EU’s 
economic  security  will  be  integrated  in  the  Commission’s  implementation  of  policies  and 
programmes  with  these  regions.  Candidate  countries  are  on  a  path  to  become  future  EU 
Member  States;  their  alignment  on  economic  security  policy  as  well  as  gradual  integration 
into the Single Market, is essential to ensure their successful accession, while enhancing the 
EU’s  ability  to  address  both  existing  and  new  risks.  It  is  therefore  important  that  candidate 
countries reflect the EU’s economic security approach and, where appropriate, gradually align 
with EU legislation of relevance to economic security objectives.  

3. Advancing Europe’s economic security: high-risk areas 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
The  2023  Strategy  launched  risk  assessments  covering  supply  chain  resilience  and  energy 
security,  critical  infrastructure,  weaponisation  of  economic  dependencies,  and  technology 
security  and  technology  leakage.  Four  critical  technologies  –  AI,  quantum  technologies, 
semiconductors, and biotechnology - have already been assessed. Building on this work, the 
Commission  has  identified  six  high-risk  areas  where  it  will  concentrate  its  efforts  in 
immediate  to  short  term,  in  close  cooperation  with  Member  States,  industry  and  trusted 
partners.  At  the  same  time,  the  Commission  will  continue  to  monitor  developments  and, 
where needed, assess and act on newly emerging high-risk areas. 

Overview of six high-risk areas 

Strengthening supply 
chain resilience and 
counteracting strategic 
dependencies in goods 
and services

Attracting value-added 
inbound investment
that reinforces the EU's 
economic security

Supporting a vibrant 
defence and space 
industrial base, and 
other high-risk 
industrial sectors

Developing and 
maintaining leadership 
across critical 
technologies

Preventing access to 
sensitive information 
and data that could 
undermine the EU’s 
economic security

Preventing and 
mitigating disruptions to 
EU critical infrastructure
affecting the EU 
economy

3.1. Strengthening supply chain resilience and counteracting high-risk dependencies in critical 
goods and services  

e.g. 

critical 

Non-cumulative indicators of a high-risk 
dependency: 
-  60%  or  more  of  EU  supply  is  controlled 
by a single third country or operators; 
-  input/service  has  systemic  value  for  the 
EU’s economy due to their role  in multiple 
raw  materials, 
sectors, 
semiconductors; 
-  input/service  is  critical  to  the  EU’s 
defence 
industry/strategic  capacities  or 
specific  critical  technology  supply  chains, 
such as clean energy technologies; 
- the third country has already weaponised 
economic  dependencies  or  threated  to  do 
so, e.g. through export restrictions; 
-  there  is  already  non-market  overcapacity 
or it is being created. 

The  risk.  Modern  economies  are  deeply 
interconnected  and  rely  on  a  wide  range  of 
inputs, intermediate goods and essential services 
from partners globally. In some cases, supply is 
highly concentrated – often in countries that do 
not  share  the  same  strategic  interests  and  that 
have  the  capability  and  willingness  to  increase 
and  weaponise  such  dependencies.  These  risks 
to the EU’s supply chains are particularly visible 
in  our 
reliance  on  certain  critical  raw, 
processed and advanced materials, clean tech 
mainstream 
and 
components, 
in 
semiconductors,  as  well  as 
financial 
services, 
aeronautics, 
digital  and  space  technologies.  They  are  also 

pharmaceuticals, 

5 

 
 
 
 
visible in the agri-food sector, where the Vision for Agriculture and Food2 sets out the need 
to  reduce  strategic  dependencies,  notably  where  the  EU  relies  on  a  handful  of  partners  for 
imports of feed and feed additives as well as fertilisers. 

services); 

economic 

vulnerability 

Application example: mainstream 
semiconductors 
Risk:  structural  reliance  on  a  single  third 
country  supplier  for  the  manufacturing  of 
low  margin  chips  puts  several 
essential 
European 
Such 
at 
semiconductors form a critical part of multiple 
supply chains.  

High-risk  dependencies  can:  (i)  be  weaponised  for  coercion  purposes  (e.g.  critical  raw 
materials,  mainstream  semiconductors,  advanced  materials,  energy  products,  threats  of 
(ii)  create 
disabling  certain 
or 
systemic 
systemic  risk  to  public  order  and  public 
health  protection  in  crises  (e.g.  personal 
protective  equipment,  critical  medicines 
supply, food supplies); (iii) create the risk of 
large-scale,  cross-sector  disruption  (e.g.  by 
penetrating  telecom  networks,  reliance  on  a 
single cloud provider, kill switches of digital 
services); 
EU´s 
competitiveness,  slowing  down  the  green 
and digital transitions if supply is disrupted 
(e.g.  batteries,  permanent  magnets,  clean 
tech  products  and  components,  advanced 
materials); 
(v)  affect  Member  States’s 
autonomy  to  develop  and  operate  military 
capabilities;  or  (vi)  threaten  EU’s  food 
sovereignty.  

Use  of  tools:  the  Commission  will  work  with 
trusted  partners  to  diversify  sources  of  supply 
and  will  seek  to  encourage  the  ramping  up  of 
production  within  the  EU.  The  upcoming 
revision of the Chips Act will  set out effective 
mitigation  measures.  The  cyber  security  of 
imported  mainstream  semiconductors  used  in 
security-related  applications  should  be  further 
assessed under the Cyber Resilience Act. 

industries 

affect 

risk. 

(iv) 

the 

Objective.  The  Commission  and  Member  States  will  seek  to  minimise  the  potential  for 
short-term  disruption  while  putting  in  motion  measures  to  progressively  reduce  current 
high-risk  dependencies  in  the  single  market  and  counter  efforts  to  create  new  ones.  It 
will  use  its  tools  to  monitor  the  supply  chain,  create  a  framework  to  support  supply 
diversification  and  prevent  the  undermining  of  EU  action  by  addressing  distortions  of 
competition  in  the  single  market. Actions  in  the  context  of  advancing  towards  the  Circular 
Economy will also play an important role. 

The Commission will take the necessary action to ensure its alternative supply chains are not 
being undermined by dumping and price manipulation. 

The Commission will assist Member States in deploying fully and effectively existing tools, 
notably  the  resilience  criteria  that  will  have  to  be  applied  as  of  January  2026  by  Member 
States  in  public  procurement,  auctions  and  public  support  schemes  under  the  Net  Zero 
Industry Act. 

The  Commission  will  also  take  measures  to  both  develop  the  EU’s  internal  capacity  and 
capability  and  to  diversify  supply  through  cooperation  with  partners,  including  by 
building on its extensive network of trade agreements and other forms of bilateral and 

2 COM/2024/75 of 19 February 2025. 

6 

 
 
 
 
plurilateral  forms  of  cooperation.  This  will  include  considering  the  production  of  certain 
critical products in our candidate countries and our partner countries more broadly, including 
with regions, such as the Middle East and North Africa. This will reinforce the resilience of 
the  EU’s  diversified  supply  chains  and  open  further  opportunities  for  EU  businesses.  The 
Commission  will continue to  identify and continuously monitor supply chain  vulnerabilities 
and  high-risk  dependencies  through  its  risk  assessment  process  and  engagement  with 
Member States and industry. .  

3.2. Attracting value-added inbound investment that reinforces the EU’s economic security  

The  risk.  Inbound  investments  boost  EU  resilience  and  competitiveness  by  creating  jobs, 
developing industrial capabilities, tapping into financing and scale, supporting innovation and 
technology transfer. However, certain forms of inbound investments may pose risks. The risks 
include:  (i) risks to  security and public order, including access  to  sensitive data (e.g. geo-
localisation, biometric data, trade secrets), access to critical infrastructure, access to dual-use 
and  other  critical  technologies;  and  (ii)  economic  resilience  risks,  such  as  deeper 
dependencies  or  a  single  point  of  failure  in  critical  supply  chains  controlled  by  high-risk 
entities  or  third  countries  which  undermine  our  economic  security  interests  (e.g.  batteries, 
CRM, software and components), which render the EU vulnerable to economic disruptions or 
weaponisation; 
low 
competitiveness  challenges,  such  as 
lack  of  technological  transfer,  limited 
added  value  creation  (e.g.  assembly 
lines  only),  hiring  workers  from  the 
thereby 
investing 
and 
impacting,  among  others, 
local 
labour market.  

Example: battery electric vehicles (BEVs) 
Risk.  The  dominant  position  of  certain  suppliers  of 
BEVs and strict controls on the technologies needed for 
BEV  production  risk  undermining  the  key  role  of  the 
automotive sector in the EU economy, while benefiting 
from 
inherent 
the  EU  market.  There  are  also 
cybersecurity risks associated with connected vehicles. 

country 

(iii) 

and 

the 

to 

and 

Use  of  tools:  The  Commission  is  exploring  ways  in 
which  value-added  investments  can  be  encouraged, 
including  through  the  use  of  trade  and  competition 
policy  initiatives.  It  will  continue  monitoring  trade 
flows  and deploy its  risk mitigating toolbox to de-risk 
connectivity  elements,  support  investment  in  the  next 
generation  of  BEV  technologies  to  ensure  Europe 
remains resilient and competitive and where necessary 
limit  exposure 
in  relevant 
connected components of BEVs. The Commission will 
also  incentivise  the  sharing  of  technology  and  related 
know-how  that  can  strengthen  the  EU’s  economic 
security objectives. 

Objective.  The  Commission’s  focus 
will be on ensuring that the EU remains 
foreign 
attractive 
open 
investments. It will seek to balance this 
openness, where necessary for the EU’s 
economic  security,  against  the  need  to 
avoid  deepening  dependencies  or 
creating  new  ones.  Moreover,  it  is 
crucial  to  preserve  the  ability  of  EU 
companies 
including 
through  foreign  acquisition  of  key 
intellectual  property  from  emerging 
champions, and ensuring security of supply and continuity of service. The Commission will 
use  its  tools  and  initiatives  to  set  out  and  implement  targeted  measures  such  as  inbound 
investment  conditioning  that  encourage  technology  transfer  for  entities  in  countries  that 
purposefully undermine our economic security.  

to  high-risk  entities 

innovate, 

to 

7 

 
 
 
3.3.  Supporting  a  vibrant  defence  and  space  industrial  base  and  other  high-risk  industrial 
sectors  

The risk. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, rising geopolitical tensions and policy-
driven  action  to  weaponise  trade  dependencies  highlight  the  importance  of  investing  in  a 
vibrant domestic industrial base, notably in the defence and space sectors as well as strategic 
dual-use sectors, such  as  transport (e.g.  aviation,  aeronautics,  shipbuilding  and  ports),  that 
fuels  the  EU’s  economy  and  supports  its  strategic  autonomy.  Risks  in  this  area  include:  (i) 
insufficient  (internal)  investment;  (ii)  low  production  volumes  combined  with  insufficient 
procurement  of  domestic  technology  for  institutional  infrastructure;  (iii)  third-country  non-
market  policies  and  practices  that  lead  to  distortions  in  global  and  regional  markets;  (iv) 
unjustified  or  disproportionate  export  controls  from  third-countries  imposed  on  European 
products  and  technologies  (extraterritoriality  of  third-country  export  regimes);  (v)  loss  of 
ownership and control due to foreign acquisitions, including in certain cases through portfolio 
acquisitions;  (vi)  rigid  regulatory  framework  and  fragmented  capital  markets  that  neither 
facilitate  flow  of  funds  nor  promote  the  start-up  and  scale-up  of  high-risk  /  high-reward 
technologies with dual-use capabilities. 

to 

Certain  components  in  critical  sectors 
such as  defence  are  sourced from high-
risk  entities,  which  could  prevent  the 
access 
and  use  of  defence 
equipment, dual use technologies and 
military  mobility  assets  if  a  situation 
of geopolitical tension arises. Moreover, 
it  is  crucial  that  the  EU  maintains  a 
highly  skilled  workforce  and  does  not 
fall  behind  the  innovation  curve  in  the 
strategic 
technologies  underpinning 
sectors.  Effectively  mitigating 
these 
risks by swiftly mobilising targeted and 
effective  tools  is  essential  for  defence 
and military capabilities in the EU.  

Application example: Key components for drones 
and counter drones systems  

innovation  cycles 

Risk:  Dependence  on  third-countries  suppliers  for 
key  components  of  drones,  batteries  and  counter 
drones systems; extremely short innovation cycle to 
keep  drone  solution  operationally  effective,  based 
on  real  battlefield  experience  (counted  in  months 
sometimes in weeks).  
Use  of  tools:  the  Commission  will  use  its  tools 
under the European defence industrial programmes 
to  secure  EU-made  production  capacity  and  the 
shortening  of 
for  drone 
technologies  based  on  real  operational  experience. 
It  will  continue  to  strengthen  cooperation  and 
information exchange on a voluntary basis between 
relevant bodies (e.g. national procurement agencies, 
international  procurement  organisations  -  OCCAR, 
EDA,  NATO)  and  within  European  defence 
industrial programmes instruments/actions. In order 
to  ensure  supply  chain  resilience,  it  will  establish 
targeted  mapping  of  supply  chains  for  specific 
products  and  equipment,  including  dual-use  items, 
and support production through co-investment. 

Objective. The Commission will use its 
tools  to  maintain  and  develop  strategic 
manufacturing  capacity  and  capabilities 
in  the  EU,  notably  by:  (i)  promoting 
and,  where  relevant,  derisking  public 
and private investment; (ii) supporting 
through 
(incentives)  also 
demand 
aggregation  or  joint  purchasing;  (iii) 
preventing the relocation of strategic capabilities and sectors; (iv) phasing out potentially 
hostile  actors  from  defence  and  other  critical  supply  chains  including  limiting  the 
procurement  of  restricted  critical  defence  and  space  technologies  from  outside  the  EU;  (v) 
mitigating  threats  posed  by  foreign  direct  investments  into  companies  supplying  critical 

8 

 
 
 
 
technologies,  (vi)  support  the  development  of  critical  technologies, 
products  or 
components  and  materials  in  the  EU  following  long  term  objectives  as  well  as  their 
domestic  procurement  for  institutional  infrastructures;  (vii)  ensuring  that  EU  start-ups  and 
businesses have the conditions needed to scale up, for example, through adequate financing 
and  via  a  temporary  favourable  tariff  treatment  for  certain  inputs  as  well  as  a  favourable 
capital markets ecosystem. 

The priority will be to support the defence and space industrial base. While the immediate 
focus will be on the specific high-risk situations identified in the risk assessment process, the 
Commission  will  closely  monitor  from  an  economic  security  perspective  all  key  industries 
such as clean tech, energy and energy-intensive and circular industries, agri-food, digital and 
electronics, aviation (incl. aeronautics), shipbuilding, automotive and health.  

3.4. Developing and maintaining leadership across critical technologies 

in 

to  compete 

Application example: quantum  
Risk: Foreign state-backed or high-risk entities seek 
access to  EU  quantum  computing,  communication, 
and  sensing  know-how  and  infrastructures  via 
investments,  acquisitions  or  R&D  partnerships, 
accelerating  sensitive  military/intelligence  uses 
abroad and eroding EU technological sovereignty.  

The risk. Certain third countries and businesses have demonstrated their interest in acquiring 
control of nascent or advanced EU technology and know-how. In some instances, such actions 
have  been  aimed  at  compromising  the 
the 
Union’s  ability 
technology.  They  are  pursuing  this  aim 
by,  for 
instance,  acquisitions,  R&D 
reverse  engineering,  or 
cooperation, 
industrial  espionage.  It  is  also  done  by 
artificially  taking  market  share  away 
from more innovative companies, which 
in turn results in less revenue for them to 
invest in cutting-edge R&D. In the long 
term,  the  EU’s  economic  performance, 
security  and  geopolitical  standing  will 
depend  on  maintaining  and  developing 
our technological capabilities. Therefore, 
preserving  EU  capabilities  across  these 
technologies,  by  enhancing  dedicated 
tools  and  addressing 
EU 
technology  security  and  leakage,  is  of 
strategic importance. At the same time, a 
close  attention  must  be  paid  to  the 
increasingly 
fragmentated 
implementation  and  enforcement  of 
dual-use export controls. 

Use of tools: the Commission will continue to map 
key  EU  quantum  actors/infrastructures  and  track 
foreign  investments,  partnerships  and  IP  flows  to 
feed  FDI  screening,  export  control  and  research-
security  risk  assessments.  It  will  use  its  tools  to 
investigate   investments that pose risks and to work 
with  Member  States  to  coordinate  rapid  responses 
to  attempted  hostile  takeovers  or  leakage  cases.  In 
order  to  support  economic  security  objectives,  it 
and 
will  prioritise  EU/like-minded 
suppliers  for  critical  quantum  components  and 
services, 
high-risk 
quantum/cloud providers in sensitive sectors. It will 
further  seek  to  ensure  that  entities  under  undue 
foreign  influence  cannot  access  sensitive  quantum 
projects. 

funding 

reliance 

funding 

limit 

and 

on 

Objective. The Commission will use its 
tools  to  support  a  positive  framework  environment  to  for  the  development  of  critical 
technologies  in  the  EU  and  prevent  action  that  undermines  the  EU’s  efforts  by  addressing 
distortions. It will monitor market developments and provide further support for research and 
innovation  in  the  EU  by  start-ups  and  scale-ups,  established  businesses,  research  and 

9 

 
 
 
innovation  organisations  and  academia.  It  will  focus  on  ensuring  the  industrial  deployment 
and valorisation of RDI achievements in the single market’s industrial base. The 28th regime, 
providing businesses with a single, harmonised set of EU-wide rules for company formation, 
governance, mobility and access to finance, will strengthen the EU’s economic resilience by 
enabling more secure cross-border operations and more robust, diversified supply chains. 

The  Commission  will  advance  research  and  innovation  security  and  take  the  flanking 
measures  needed  to  mitigate  the  risk  of  leakage  of  technology  or  know-how,  for  example 
through  predatory  acquisitions,  R&D  cooperation  and  investment  in  strategic  and  emerging 
EU  markets  in  sensitive  destinations  or  sectors  while  continuing  to  promote  trusted 
international  research  and  innovation  partnerships  that  are  crucial  for  the  Union’s  economic 
security objectives. It will explore how to ensure that businesses and research and innovation 
organisations  in  the EU  can  scale up  and  avoid  acquisitions/ownership transfers exclusively 
driven  by  insufficient  financing  opportunities  from  trusted  sources.  At  the  same  time,  the 
Commission will seek to prevent access by high-risk entities to Union supported actions in the 
critical technology sphere, which can potentially be weaponised against the EU. 

3.5. Prevent access to sensitive information and data that could undermine the EU’s economic 
security 

in  certain  products 

The  risk.  Third  countries  gain  access 
to 
sensitive  information/data  of  the  EU  or  its 
Member  States,  either  as  a  result  of  industrial 
espionage, their supply of hardware or software 
(e.g.  connected 
used 
vehicles,  5G/other  telecommunication  systems, 
electricity  grid  infrastructure,  DNA  sequencing 
platforms) or due to their ownership and control 
of  certain  businesses  possessing  sensitive 
information/data  (e.g.  port,  airport  and  traffic 
operators,  financial  networks,  AI  models,  data 
portals,  telecom,  personal  data  or  sensitive 
market 
clear 
implications  on  security  and  public  order, 
further  compounded  by  potential  economic 
impacts, 
the 
fragmentation  of  supply  chains.  In  the  energy 
sector,  for  example,  this  risk  extends  to  the 
acquisition  by  non-EU 
investors  of  EU 
companies  that  hold  advanced  technologies  for 
monitoring  and  processing  operational  data 
from critical energy infrastructure.  

information).  There 

example 

linked 

are 

for 

to 

Objective. Lower and where possible eliminate 
the  risk  of  access  by  high-risk  entities  and 
related  entities  to  sensitive  information/data  of 

10 

Example: detection equipment at EU 
borders (ports, airports, land borders etc.) 

Risk:    lack  of  common  practice  across  the 
EU,  dependency  on  a  single  or  limited 
number  of  suppliers,  unauthorised  access 
(including  through  authorized  channels,  e.g. 
maintenance)  that  impacts  the  performance 
of  the  detection  equipment  and  the  integrity 
and/or  confidentiality  of  related  sensitive 
information,  vulnerability  to  malware  that 
could  compromise  or  distort  the  related 
information/systems/networks 
the 
equipment 

through 

Use of tools: based on the cybersecurity risk 
assessment  under  the  NIS2  Directive,  the 
Commission  will  seek  to  mitigate  identified 
risks  through  the  identification  of  high-risk 
suppliers,  use  cybersecurity  certification 
cybersecurity 
schemes, 
security 
standards 
requirements 
for 
tenders.  The  Commission  will  assess  the 
potential  role  of  foreign  subsidies  in  giving 
competitive advantage to certain suppliers. 

embedding 
in  procurement  calls 

strengthening 
and 

 
 
 
 
the  EU  or  its  Member  States  and  thereby  limit  the  potential  negative  impacts  on  the  EU 
economy  and  security. Attention  will  also  be  given  to  the  risk  potentially  posed  by  foreign 
workers  in  strategic  sectors  and  foreign  students  at  higher  education,  including  in  Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) in line with relevant procedures. 

3.6. Prevent and mitigate disruptions to EU critical infrastructure affecting the EU economy 

The risk. The EU’s critical infrastructure - including critical transport, space systems, energy 
and  communications  infrastructure,  in  particular  those  that  are  identified  as  strategic  to 
military mobility - being disrupted by foreign actors, which could lead to cascade effects on 
the  European  economy.  The  focus  will  be  on  ensuring  the  stability  of  services  provided. 
Disruptions could occur through physical-, cyber- or hybrid-attacks, including the sabotage of 
entire facilities or their parts/subcomponents. They could also be linked to ICT supply chains, 
which underly critical components or services to critical infrastructures. There is also a risk of 
pre-positioning  of  high-risk  third  countries  and  operators  in  the  EU’s  critical  infrastructure 
with a view to gaining the capacity to disrupt them (when and if needed). In addition, there is 
a reputational and credibility risk if certain infrastructure is threatened or actually impacted. 
Finally,  there  is  a  risk  linked  to  third  countries  taking  a  leading  role  in  setting  international 
standards, which may affect critical infrastructure.  

(i) 

preparedness, 

Example: solar inverters 
Risk:  increasing  reliance  on  a  single  supplier;  cyber 
risks  -  manipulating  electricity  production  parameters, 
preventing  electricity  production,  access  to  operational 
data, infiltrating supply chain actors. 

Objective. In line with relevant EU 
internal 
for  defence, 
strategies 
security 
to 
and 
enforce  existing  rules  to  lower  the 
risk  of  data  leakage/espionage  and 
of  physical  and  cyber-disruption, 
notably 
limiting 
by: 
by 
ownership/control/operation 
high-risk  entities  of  European 
critical infrastructure; (ii) increasing 
physical  protection  measures;  (iii) 
limiting  cyber-vulnerabilities;  and 
limiting  dependencies  on 
(iv) 
suppliers  or  high-risk 
single 
suppliers,  as  well  as  concealed 
vulnerabilities, 
or 
supply 
potential 
disruptions,  particularly  in  cases  of 
technological 
lock-in  or  supplier 
dependency;  (v)  reserving  critical 
EU manufacturing capacities with 
the potential to  scale up in  times of 
global supply chain disruptions or health crises; (vi) the Commission will prevent access by 
high-risk entities to Union supported actions, including those actions supported by public 
financial institutions and instruments; ; (vii) support the development of trusted suppliers of 

Use  of  tools:  the  Commission  will  continue  to  assess 
cyber risks through a coordinated assessment  under the 
framework  of  the  NIS2  Directive  (to  be  concluded  in 
2026).  On  this  basis  it  will  deploy mitigation  measures 
focused  both  on  strengthening  preparedness  (e.g. 
Electricity  Risk  Preparedness  Regulation,  Critical 
Entities  Directive) 
identified 
vulnerabilities  through  for  example:  certification  and 
standardisation under the Cyber Resilience Act and non-
price  criteria  under  the  Net-Zero  Industry  Act.  The 
Commission  will  monitor  market  developments  and 
seek  to  prevent  or  mitigate  high-risk  investments.  The 
Commission  will  continue  to  assess  the  role  of  foreign 
subsidies that may distort the level playing field in solar 
energy markets, notably through subsidised imports. 

backdoors 
ICT 

systemic 

address 

and 

to 

11 

 
 
 
critical  subcomponents  in  the  EU  and  in  trusted  third  countries  so  that  there  are  viable 
alternatives;  (viii)  supporting  flagship  initiatives  in  defence  and  related  domains  (Eastern 
Flank Watch, European Drone Defence Initiative). 

4. Actions to strengthen EU economic security 

Access  to quality  information and its thorough analysis is  the starting point for  an  effective 
and  well-informed  EU  economic  security  policy  and  decision-making.  The  risk  assessment 
system launched by the 2023 Strategy will remain at the heart of these efforts. The existing 
assessments  will  be  updated,  deepened,  and  complemented  by  new  ones  across  critical 
technologies and supply chains. 

The Commission will further develop its economic security information gathering capability. 
It  will  speed  up  the  mapping  of  strategic  dependencies  along  value  chains  that  lead  to 
vulnerabilities  for  the  Union’s  economy  and  strengthen  monitoring  and  anticipation  of 
third country actions to create new dependencies or sustain existing ones.  

Furthermore,  the  success  of  the  EU’s  economic  security  policy  will  depend  on  greater 
coordination both at EU level and with Member States. This includes building a common 
understanding  of  the  economic  security  threats,  identifying  concrete  risks,  and  developing 
mitigation  measures.  This  should  be  underpinned  by  better  information  flows,  a  full 
understanding  of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  EU  action,  and  a  willingness  to  act  jointly  when 
needed,  putting  the  EU  in  a  position  of  strength.  The  Commission  has  taken  the  necessary 
internal  organisational  steps.  But  this  also  requires  a  new  way  of  working  with  Member 
States,  and  increasingly  among  and  within  the  Member  States  themselves,  especially  with 
regards to policy areas that are increasingly strategic but have been traditionally decentralised 
such as research and innovation. 

The  EU  will  continue  to  engage  closely  with  industry,  by  ensuring  secure  information 
exchange  and  a  more  structured  engagement.  Industry  is  in  the  front  line  of  the  EU’s 
economic security. Businesses must become more resilient and diversify their critical supply 
chains,  notably  by  eliminating  a  complete  reliance  on  a  single  high-risk  supplier.  It  is  also 
crucial  to  integrate  in  their  business  models  the  costs  that  come  with  greater  diversification 
recognising  the  benefit  that  resilience  to  geopolitical  risks  brings.  This  must  be  a  two-way 
process and a responsibility that must be shared between the public and private sector, 
allowing  policymakers  to  improve  the  EU’s  threat  assessment  and  business  intelligence 
capacity  and  equip  it  for  action,  while  helping  industry  to  pursue  company-level  mitigation 
measures. 

The Commission, supported by the High Representative, will: 

→  Improve its information gathering and analysis capacity by advancing risk assessments 
more  rapidly  on  specific  critical  supply  chains,  critical  infrastructure  and  critical 
technologies, and launching regular calls for evidence to obtain industry and stakeholder 
input into supply chain vulnerabilities and exposure to external pressure.  

→  Promote  greater  coordination  and  information  exchange  through  its  Economic 
Security  Network  with  Member  States.  The  Commission  will  use  the  Network  to 

12 

 
 
promote  scenario  development,  align  understanding  of  threats,  risks  and  scope  for 
mitigation, facilitate information exchange and support implementation, particularly in the 
use of the tools that are in the remit of Member State responsibilities. In this context, the 
Commission  will  ensure  that  there  are  suitable  information  systems  available  to  support 
the  rapid  and  secure  exchange  of  classified  information  among  and  with  Member 
States on economic security issues – including on risk assessments, critical and high-risk 
entities, and transactions of potential concern.  This will complement the work of the EU 
stockpiling  network,  which  focuses  on  ensuring  the  supply  of  essential  goods  in  crisis 
situations. 

→  Create  an  Economic  Security  Information  Hub  where  with  the  support  of  EEAS, 
INTCEN/SIAC3,  the  EU’s  Delegation  network  and  Member  States,  as  well  as  existing 
Single  Market  economic  monitoring  tools  like  the  Supply  Chain  Alert  Notification 
(SCAN);  it  will  map  and  consolidate  available  information  under  existing  public  and 
private  mechanisms  and  coordinate  the  collection  of  additional  information  relevant  for 
economic  security.  This  will  include  a  market  monitoring  mechanism  to  collect 
information  on  developments  in  high-risk  areas,  including  rapid  information  on  trade 
flows in sectors subject to diversification to ensure that EU action isn’t undermined. It will 
also  consolidate  information  on  high-risk  entities  to  support  the  process  of  assessing 
eligibility for EU funding and participation in an EU investment or procurement process. 
In addition, the European Customs Authority and the EU Customs Data Hub would allow 
to  efficiently  support  and  enforce  the  implementation  of  the  related  EU  economic 
security initiatives facilitating also the exchange of relevant information. 

→  Intensify  structured  engagement  by  EU  Delegations,  liaising  with  Member  State 
Missions, other EU bodies and the EU business community present in third countries; to 
ensure effective contributions to risk assessments, monitoring and mitigation with regard 
to  economic  security,  including  by  facilitating  business-to-business  and  business-to-
government exchanges. 

→  Assess by Q3 2026 the extent to which the Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act 
(IMERA)  allows  to  gather  company  level  supply  chain  information  from  businesses  in 
high-risk  sectors.  In  light  of  this  analysis,  the  Commission  will  assess  the  necessity  for 
further measures.  

→  Recommend  that  Member  States  nominate  senior-level  National  Economic  Security 
Advisers  responsible  for  cross-government  coordination  of  economic  security  risk 
assessment and mitigation. The Commission will promote greater policy coordination and 
joint actions by regularly bringing these advisers together. It also invites the Council of 
the EU to consider regularly convening the relevant Council formations for political-level 

3 The EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) at the European External Action Service is part of the 
EU’s Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), and is the civilian intelligence centre of the EU, providing in-
depth analysis for decision makers in all EU Institutions. 

13 

 
 
 
 
discussions. 

→  Create  a  trusted  adviser  group  drawn  from  EU  business  representatives  to,  among 
others,  advise  on  specific  risks  and  potential  responses  as  well  as  discuss  de-risking 
strategies. The Commission will regularly invite industry representatives to participate in 
sector-specific discussions of the Economic Security Network and, where relevant, debrief 
European Commissioners.  

→  Set up a Trade Resilience Information Portal to provide EU businesses with up-to-date 
information,  as  part  of  the Access  to  Markets  (A2M)  portal,  on  export  restrictions  and 
other  restrictive  measures  imposed  by  third  countries,  as  well  as  on  the  potential  risks 
linked to the need to build EU resilience.  

→  Expand  the  Observatory  on  Critical Technologies  to  identify,  monitor  and  analyse  the 
defence and space industry and related supply chains, and to cover emerging technologies 
and  to  support  implementation  at  EU  and  national  level  of  the  resulting  EU  technology 
roadmaps. 

→  Use the future  Centre of Expertise on Research Security to  promote research security 
and increase the research community’s resilience, including by developing a due diligence 
platform to support universities in choosing their international partners. 

→  Explore  ways  to  align  and  integrate  candidate  countries  with  our  economic  security 
approach, especially in those areas where their economic security vulnerabilities can pose 
a security risk to the EU. 

Building  on a strengthened analysis and governance, the EU  can better pursue its  economic 
security objectives by  (i) clarifying  and improving the  deployment  of existing tools and (ii) 
developing new tools where needed. 

First, the Commission will adapt how it uses some of its tools to make them more effective 
in  managing  economic  security  risks  and  will  seek  to  improve  coordination  between  these 
tools. 

The Commission will take the following steps to improve the use of tools: 

→  EU funding: 

•  Going forward, the Commission will incentivise in its funding activities projects 

• 

that support the EU’s economic security.   
In  particular  it  should  mobilise  a  sufficient  level  of  funding  for  reducing 
dependencies  of  critical  technologies,  components  and  materials  especially  in 
strategic  sectors  as  space  and  defence,  including  to  fully  implement  the 
Observatory for Critical Technologies’ (OCT) technology roadmaps. 

•  The  Commission,  Member  States  and  implementing  partners  should  seek  to 
prevent access by high-risk entities to sensitive Union supported actions.  Article 
136  of  the  Financial  Regulation  provides  a  horizontal  legal  base  to  protect  the 
EU’s security and public order when the Commission and implementing partners 

14 

 
 
 
implement  the  EU  budget.  This  allows  preventing  high-risk  entities  from 
benefitting from EU funds as well as restricting access to EU funds in the strategic 
sectors and areas of critical technology and infrastructure by entities coming from 
third  countries  which  undermine  the  EU  economic  security  interests.  For  the 
avoidance of doubt implementing partners should refrain from supporting projects 
that contradict the above, including  in operations  at  own risk. To that end and to 
ensure  better  policy  alignment  between  EU  programmes  and  economic  security 
aims  guidance  will  be  made  available  in  Q1  2026,  thereby  supporting  the 
development  of  a  more  cohesive  and  effective  approach.  Furthermore,  the 
Commission  will  encourage  the  Member  States,  the  EIB  group  and  other 
IFIs/national  promotional  banks  and  institutions  that  are  implementing 
national or EU budgets to prioritise support to EU businesses that reduce foreign 
dependencies 
in  critical  sectors,  especially  for  specific  projects,  critical 
technologies  and  critical  infrastructure  identified  as  high-risk.  Similarly,  third-
country  high-risk  suppliers  should  be  prevented  from  accessing  EU  and  national 
funding  where  those  third  countries,  based  on  specific  criteria,  are  identified  as 
undermining EU economic security interests. 

→  FDI screening: 

•  Develop  guidelines  drawing  on  the  experience  of  implementing  the  current  FDI 
Screening Regulation to  ensure national screening authorities approach screening 
consistently, including in strategic sectors. The guidelines would also set out how 
to take account of the potential cumulative risk of multiple investments. This will 
be complemented by guidance on the interplay between any EU level requirements 
and the application of national screening mechanisms in the financial sector. 

→  Export Controls of Dual-Use items: 

•  Carry  out  an  overall  evaluation  of  the  Dual-Use  Export  Control  Regulation. As 
part  of  this  evaluation,  the  Commission  will  assess  whether  the  Regulation 
achieves  its  objectives  in  the  context  of  the  new  geopolitical  and  geoeconomic 
realities,  including  the  impacts  of  increasing  recourse  to  unilateral  controls  that 
may also impact the Single Market. It will continue exploring with Member States 
how  to  efficiently  adopt  European  controls  in  emerging  technology  areas  in  this 
new  context.  During  the  evaluation  process,  the  Commission  will  ensure  active 
outreach to stakeholders from the Member States, industry, research institutes and 
academia.  

→  Trade defence instruments: 

•  When  a  case  of  relevance  for  the  EU’s  economic  security  is  initiated,  the  EU’s 
economic security will be reflected in the conduct of the investigation and in 
the design of possible measures. 

→  Internal Market, Customs and Competition tools: 

•  Make full use of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation to maintain fair competition in 

15 

 
 
areas where foreign subsidies lead to distortions that pose economic security risks.  

•  Encourage Member States to make full use of existing State aid possibilities, such 
as  the  Clean  Industrial  State  Aid  Framework,  the  Regional  Aid  Guidelines,  the 
Research Development and Innovation framework, the General Block Exemption 
Regulation and important projects of common European interest as instruments to 
build greater resilience. 

•  Review  the  use  of  strategic  customs 

instruments  (tariff  suspensions, 
autonomous quotas) for key inputs with the view to support the competitiveness 
of Union enterprises.  

Second, the Commission will develop new measures to advance the EU’s economic security. 

The Commission will: 

→  Explore  putting  in  place  on  a  pilot  basis  an  EU-level  start-up  monitoring  mechanism 
aimed at identifying  startups in  critical technology  areas that are vulnerable to the 
risk of hostile foreign acquisitions, redirecting them to  EU investment alternatives and 
other  forms  of  support  (e.g.,  advisory,  capacity-building,  matchmaking  with  investors). 
The mechanism would work in lockstep with existing initiatives, such as the EU Startup 
and Scaleup Strategy. 

→  Work with supervisory authorities to monitor portfolio investments, (that fall outside the 
scope of the FDI coordination mechanism), in areas identified as high-risk for economic 
security purposes. 

→  Include  an  economic  security  component  for  key  strategic  sectors  in  the  upcoming 

Competitiveness Coordination Tool. 

→  Strengthen  the  EU’s  industrial  base  and  supply  chains  resilience  through  the  Industrial 

Accelerator Act.  

→  As outlined in ResourceEU, further develop secondary markets for critical raw materials, 
including through the Circular Economy Act, to make it easier to finance strategic CRM 
projects in areas identified as high-risk for economic security purposes. 

→  Assess by Q3 2026 ways of strengthening the protection of the industry from unfair 
trade policies and negative global market developments, such as overcapacity. Here, 
the  Commission  will  evaluate  the  effectiveness  and  adequacy  of  the  existing  tools  and 
consider the necessity of possible new measures. 

→  Review the Blocking Statute to simplify its application and reduce compliance costs for 
EU  persons  and  businesses  and  create  a  credible  deterrent  against  the  extra-territorial 
application  of  third-country  sanctions.  This  will  strengthen  European  economic  security 
by better protecting EU operators from conflicting third-country measures and by ensuring 
a more predictable, effective and assertive framework. 

→  Explore  the  modalities  of  encouraging  companies  in  specific  high-risk  sectors  to  ensure 
that supplies are sourced from at least two different suppliers and limit exposure to a 

16 

 
 
single dominant supplier. 

→  Explore the scope to provide financial support to companies subject to FDI screening 
decisions in situations where their financial viability may be at risk absent an investment, 
without prejudice to State aid rules. 

→  As  part  of  the  review  of  the  Public  Procurement  Directives,  propose  European 
preference  criteria  in  specific  strategic  sectors  in  which  our  public  procurement 
stimulates  demand  for  European  industrial  leadership,  increases  our  resilience  and 
mitigates risks for security. 

→  Incentivise companies to reduce dependencies in emerging technology areas as part of 
the  upcoming  Chips  Act  2.0,  Quantum  Act,  Cloud  and  AI  Development  Act  and 
Commission Strategy on Open Source. 

→  Use the upcoming review of the  Cybersecurity Act to  enact  at  EU level  restrictions on 

access of high-risk suppliers to critical infrastructure. 

5. Conclusion 

The  EU  remains  firmly  committed  to  open  and  rules-based  trade,  investment  relations  and 
international  cooperation.  It  will  therefore  continue  to  support  and  benefit  from  open  trade 
and  investment  with  partners  around  the  world.  At  the  same  time,  in  today’s  geopolitical 
environment, safeguarding the EU’s economic security is imperative. Addressing the risks that 
come  with  openness  is  key  to  preserving  it,  as  well  as  our  broader  security  and  the 
competitiveness of our industry. 

The  EU  already  has  many  tools  at  its  disposal  to  pursue  this  goal.  These  instruments  must 
now be used strategically and, where needed, further improved, both to credibly deter threats 
to  the  EU’s  economic  security  before  they  arise  and  respond  effectively  when  they  do. 
Achieving this requires the Commission, European Parliament and Member States to work in 
lockstep and to cooperate closely with industry, towards an efficient and informed decision-
making. 

The EU is determined to make a more proactive, strategic and coordinated use of all available 
tools  to  build  a  strong,  secure  and  resilient  economy  for  the  long  term,  and  to  operate 
effectively in the new geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions shaping global trade. 

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