Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 December 2025 concerning the ownership of the Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves (CON/2025/39)
Date: 2025-12-02
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: legal basis

ECB-PUBLIC 

EN 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 2 December 2025 

concerning the ownership of the Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves 

(CON/2025/39) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 28 November  and 1 December 2025 the  European  Central Bank (ECB) received requests from  the 

Italian Minister for Economy and Finance for an opinion on a provision (hereinafter the ‘draft provision’) of 

the draft Budget Law 2026 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) concerning the ownership of the Banca d’Italia’s gold 

reserves. 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of Council Decision 98/415/EC1 as the 

draft provision relates to the Banca d’Italia’s gold reserves and therefore to the basic task to be carried out 

through the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of 

the  Member  States  pursuant  to  Article  127(2),  third  indent,  of  the  Treaty,  and  to  the  Banca  d’Italia, 
respectively.  In accordance with  Article  17.5, first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European 

Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft provision  

1.1  The draft provision provides that Article 4.2 of the Italian Presidential Decree 31 March 1988 no. 148 

concerning  the  management  of  reserves  must  be  construed  as  meaning  that  the  gold  reserves 

managed and held by the Banca d’Italia belong to the Italian people 2.  

1.2  The  draft  provision  is  not  accompanied  by  an  explanatory  note  or  memorandum  explaining  its 

rationale. 

2. 

Observations 

2.1 

In 2019 the ECB adopted an opinion on a draft law (hereinafter the ‘2019 draft law’) concerning an 

authentic  interpretation  of  Article  4  of  the  Italian  Consolidated  law  on  foreign  exchange  on  the 

management of official reserves3, in response to a request by the President of the lower chamber of 

the Italian Parliament. The 2019 draft law provided an authentic interpretation of Article 4.2 of the 

Italian Presidential Decree 31 March 1988 no.148 concerning the management of reserves, which 

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2  
3  

Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 

See Article 1.1 of the draft law. 

See Opinion CON 2019/23. All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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provides that the Banca d’Italia manages the official reserves within the framework established by 

Article 31 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank 

(hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). In particular, the 2019 draft law provided that this article shall 

be construed as meaning that the Banca d’Italia manages the official gold reserves exclusively as a 

depositary,  without  prejudice  to  the  property  of  such  gold  reserves  of  the  Italian  State,  including 

reserves held abroad. Many of the observations made by the ECB on the 2019 draft law correspond 

to those made in this opinion.  

2.2  The  question  of  the  legal  ownership  and  the  competences  of  the  ESCB  with  regard  to  the  gold 

reserves of Member States ultimately relate to the competences of the ESCB under the Treaty. The 

basic points of reference are Article 127(2) and Article 130 of the Treaty. Article 127(2) of the Treaty, 

which is contained in Chapter 2 (Monetary Policy) of Title VIII of the Treaty, sets out the basic tasks 

to be carried out through the ESCB. In this respect, it is noted that under Article 3(1), point (c), of the 

Treaty, the Union has exclusive competence in the area of monetary policy for the Member States 

whose currency is the euro. Article 127(2), third indent, of the Treaty provides, in particular, that one 

of  the  basic  tasks  to  be  carried  out  through  the  ESCB  is  to  hold  and  manage  the  official  foreign 

reserves of the Member States. Article 130 of the Treaty guarantees the independence of the national 

central banks (NCBs), including the Banca d’Italia, and the ECB in performing their ESCB tasks4. 

2.3  The  Treaty  does  not  determine  ESCB  and  ECB  competences  with  respect  to  official  reserves  by 

using the concept of ownership. Rather, the Treaty only deals with the dimension of exclusive holding 
and management of the reserves5. 

2.4  On the basis of Article 31 of the Statute of the ESCB, operations in foreign reserve assets remaining 
with the NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, after the transfers to the ECB referred to in Article 306, 

and Member States’ transactions with their foreign exchange working balances, are, above a certain 

limit established within the framework of guidelines issued by the ECB with a view to facilitating such 

operations, subject to approval by the ECB in order to ensure consistency with the exchange rate 
and monetary policies of the Union 7. 

2.5  Pursuant to Article 18.1, first indent, of the Statute of the ESCB, in order to achieve the objectives of 

the ESCB and to carry out its tasks, the ECB and the NCBs may, inter alia, operate in the financial 

markets by buying and selling outright (spot and forward) or under repurchase agreement and by 

lending and borrowing claims and marketable instruments, whether in euro or other currencies, as 

4  
5  
6    

See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON 2019/23.  

See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON 2019/23.  

Article 30 requires all NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, to transfer a defined amount of foreign reserves, including 
gold, to the ECB, in proportion to their share in the capital of the ECB. For the purpose of regulating the transfer of 
foreign  reserve  assets  by  NCBs  to  the  ECB  pursuant  to  Article  30  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  the  ECB  adopted 
Guideline ECB/2000/15, which included gold among the foreign reserves which had to be transferred by the NCBs, 
including  the  Banca  d’Italia,  to  the  ECB  upon  the  start  of  Stage  3  of  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  and 
subsequently upon joining the euro. The ECB may effect further calls of foreign reserve assets, including gold, from 
the NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, in case of need for such foreign reserve assets. See Guideline ECB/2000/15 
of  the  European  Central  Bank  of  3  November  1998  as  amended  by  the  Guideline  of  16  November  2000  on  the 
composition,  valuation  and  modalities  for  the  initial  transfer  of  foreign-reserve  assets,  and  the  denomination  and 
remuneration of equivalent claims (OJ L 336, 30.12.2000, p. 114 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2000/15/oj); 
Article 30.4 of the Statute of the ESCB; and Article 1 and Article 2(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1010/2000 of 8 
May 2000 concerning further calls of foreign reserve assets by the European Central Bank (OJ L 115, 16.5.2000, p. 
2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2000/1010/oj). 

7  

See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON 2019/23.  

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well as precious metals. In addition, under Article 23 of the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB and the 

NCBs may, inter alia, acquire and sell spot and forward all types of foreign exchange assets and 

precious metals. 

2.6 

In accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty, when carrying out the task of holding and managing 

gold reserves, neither the ECB, nor an NCB, including the Banca d’Italia, nor any member of their 

decision-making bodies, shall seek or take instructions from, inter alia, any government of a Member 

State. The governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to 

influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or the NCBs, including the Banca 

d’Italia, in the performance of their tasks 8. 

2.7 

In view of these provisions, the ESCB task of holding and managing foreign reserves includes all 

actions  necessary  for  its  effective  performance  of  the  Eurosystem’s  mandate.  For  instance,  for 

reserve assets to accomplish their function in foreign reserve management operations, the aspect of 

full effective control by the central bank is essential. This implies the ability of NCBs to take decisions, 

in complete autonomy, relating to the holding, retention, disposal, negotiation and daily, as well as 
long-term, management of the foreign reserves 9, including by buying and selling gold outright, spot 

and forward and under repurchase agreements. 

2.8 

In this regard, an explicit reference in the draft provision to the provisions of Article 127(2) and Article 

130 of the Treaty and, additionally, to Article 31 of the Statute of the ESCB may be useful: it would 

further clarify the scope of the draft provision, even if these Treaty provisions apply in any case. The 

independent holding and management of the official foreign reserves (including the gold reserves) 
also  specifically  means  that  the  official  foreign  reserves  (including  the  gold  reserves)  must  be 

recorded  on  the  balance  sheets  of  the  NCBs  or  of  the  ECB.  A  transfer  of  the  foreign  reserves 

(including the gold reserves) off the balance sheet of the Banca d’Italia to the State would circumvent 

the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty, which prohibits central bank 

financing of the public sector, and would be also against the principle of independence under Article 
130 of the Treaty 10.  

2.9 

Consistently  with  the  principle  of  financial  independence  under  Article  130  of  the  Treaty  and  the 

prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty, any income accruing to the Banca 

d’Italia as a result of the management of such official foreign reserves can only be distributed to the 

State  through  the  process  for  the  distribution  of  profits  as  set  out  in  the  relevant  legislative  and 

statutory  provisions.  The  principle  of  financial  independence  requires  that  a  sufficient  amount  of 

reserves  has  been  constituted  to  ensure  that  the  Banca  d’Italia  has  the  financial  means  to 
independently perform its tasks11. 

2.10  The ECB notes that if the Italian authorities consider it necessary to clarify the legal ownership of the 

gold  reserves,  then  the  Banca  d’Italia  must  be  consulted  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  Treaty 

8  
9  
10  
11  

See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON 2019/23.  

See paragraph 3.5 of Opinion CON 2019/23.  

See paragraph 3.6 of Opinion CON 2019/23.  

See paragraph 3.7 of Opinion CON 2019/23.  

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requirements and in particular the independence of the Banca d’Italia established in Article 130 of 
the Treaty will continue to be fully respected12. 

2.11 

In the light of the above considerations, it is not clear to the ECB what the concrete purpose of the 

draft provision is. For this reason, and in the absence of any explanation as to the purpose of the 

draft provision, the Italian authorities are invited to reconsider the draft provision, also with a view to 

preserving the independent performance of the basic ESCB-related tasks of the Banca d’Italia under 

the Treaty. 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 December 2025. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

12  

See paragraph 3.8 of Opinion CON 2019/23.  

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