REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Evaluation of the Unfair Trading Practices Directive
Date: 2025-12-01
Institutions: Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, agri-foodstuffs, application of EU law, chain store, consumer protection, food industry, restriction on competition, supplier, supply chain, unfair terms of contract

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 1.12.2025  COM(2025) 728 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Evaluation of the Unfair Trading Practices Directive   {SWD(2025) 405 final}  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 

Under  Article 12  of  Directive  (EU)  2019/633  on  unfair  trading  practices  in  business-to-
business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain (‘the Directive’)1, the European 
Commission (‘COM’) must carry out a first evaluation of the Directive and present its main 
findings in a report. The present document is intended to serve as that report. 

Accordingly, this report draws on the evaluation of the Directive2 to outline key takeaways and 
lessons learned from the first years of the Directive’s implementation. As the evaluation took 
place at an early stage due to delays in transposition in some Member States (‘MS’), its findings 
reflect only a short period of practical application of the Directive’s rules and should be read 
in this light. 

More  generally,  this  report  is  part  of  broader  efforts  to  strengthen  farmers’  position  in  the 
agricultural  and  food  supply  chain  (‘chain’),  as  reflected  in  the  Strategic  Dialogue’s 
recommendation for a more effective, balanced, and proportionate framework to tackle unfair 
trading practices (‘UTPs’)3, or in COM’s Political Guidelines for the 2024-20294. In line with 
the Vision for Agriculture and Food5, the COM will, based on the evaluation of the current 
rules  and  a  review  of  national  regulations,  propose  further  initiatives,  including  the  UTP 
Directive revision, to address the principle that farmers should not be forced to systematically 
sell  their  products  below  production  costs,  while  preserving  the  market  orientation  of  the 
Common Agricultural Policy.   

Together with other sources of information and following thorough consultations, the report 
will inform the reflection on a future revision of the Directive, without pre-empting its scope 
or content.  

2.  BACKGROUND, SOURCES AND POLICY CONTEXT  

Economic power has become ever more concentrated in the downstream segments of the chain, 
which  has  increased  the  scope  for  potential  abuses  of  bargaining  power.  Such  abuses  often 
affect farmers and small suppliers, who find themselves in a weaker position when dealing with 
larger,  more  powerful  buyers6.  In  response  to  such  concerns,  the  Directive  was  adopted  to 
combat UTPs in the chain, covering also the fishery and aquaculture sectors, and contribute to 
their prevention and mitigation across the EU. UTPs include practices which grossly deviate 
from the principles of good commercial conduct, are contrary to good faith and fair dealing, 
and are unilaterally imposed by one trading partner on the other. They can lead to the unjustified 
and disproportionate transfer of economic risk or create a significant imbalance of rights and 
obligations, increasing the financial vulnerability and operational uncertainty of farmers and 
small suppliers. 

The Directive provides for a minimum level of harmonisation by establishing a list of UTPs 
that  buyers  are  prohibited  from  imposing  on  suppliers.  It  lays  down  minimum  rules  on 

1 OJ L 111, 25.4.2019, p. 59, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/633/oj 
2 Accompanying Staff Working Document on the Evaluation Report (‘SWD’). 
3 Strategic dialogue on the future of EU agriculture - COM. 
4 Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 - COM. 
5 Vision for Agriculture and Food – COM. 
6 SWD(2018) 92 final, p. 20. 

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enforcement and on cooperation between the enforcement authorities (‘EA’). MS may adopt or 
maintain  rules  that  go  beyond  the  UTPs  listed  in  the  Directive  provided  that  these  are 
compatible with internal market rules. 

The deadline for transposing the Directive was 1 May 20217, but not all MS fully transposed it 
until  December 20228.  The  transposition  and  conformity  checks  by  the  COM  showed 
variations in MS’ transposition choices. While some had pre-existing rules or went beyond the 
Directive’s  minimum  harmonisation,  others  had  no  pre-existing  rules  or  stayed  close  to  the 
minimum harmonisation level. The conformity checks also revealed differences in the level of 
protection  of  national  transposition  laws,  in  relation  to  the  possibility  for  buyers  to  cancel 
orders of perishable products under Article 3(1)(b), the charging of payments as referred to in 
Article 3(2)(b), and the transposition of Article 3(4), whereby MS must ensure the black and 
grey UTPs listed in the Directive constitute mandatory provisions overriding any other rules 
that would apply to a supply agreement. 

The evaluation focused on the implementation of the Directive from an EU perspective, while 
providing  an  overview  of  the  situation  in  MS  following  transposition.  It  assessed  the 
effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, EU added value and relevance of the Directive in relation 
to its core objectives of combating UTPs, enabling effective enforcement, addressing the fear 
factor experienced by suppliers, and ensuring a level playing field across the EU. 

The evaluation was carried out with the support of an external study (‘support study’)9, and 
built on various sources, including previous COM’s reports, such as its report of October 2021 
on the state of the transposition and implementation of the Directive10 and its interim report of 
April 202411. Additional inputs included targeted surveys, interviews and case studies, regular 
exchanges with EA, the JRC’s annual public survey of farmers and suppliers12 and the annual 
MS  reports13.  The  evaluation  report  of  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee 
(‘EESC’)14 and the EA’s annual activity reports15 were also taken into account.  

The  evaluation  coincided  with  a  broader  set  of  measures  by  the  COM  to  address  concerns 
expressed by farmers16, including the targeted revision of the Common Market Organisation 
(‘CMO’) Regulation17, the launch of the EU Agri-Food Chain Observatory (‘AFCO’)18, and a 
study on mechanisms to ensure fair remuneration for farmers19. 

7 Article 13(1) of the Directive. 
8 SWD, Section 3. 
9 Evaluation support study of the EU Directive 2019/633 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business 
relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain (DOI: 10.2762/2191333). 
10 COM/2021/652 final 
11 COM/2024/176 final and SWD/2024/106 final/2. 
12 Unfair Trade Practices - JRC. 
13 Article 10(2)  of  the  Directive  requires  MS  to  send  to  the  COM  a  report  on  their  enforcement  activities  by 
15 March of each year. 
14 Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2019/633 - EESC 
15 Article 10(1) of the Directive requires EA to publish an annual report of their activities. A link to the reports: 
Unfair trading practices - COM. 
16 EU actions to address farmers’ concerns - COM. 
17 COM/2024/577 final. 
18 AFCO – COM.  
19 Study on regulatory and voluntary schemes for fair agricultural remuneration (DOI: 10.2762/0016025). 

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3.  SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS 

This section summarises the main findings of the evaluation. While based on the best available 
evidence, it is important to take into account the limitations mentioned above, specifically the 
short time period between the full implementation of the Directive and its evaluation. This, 
together  with  the  limited  availability  of  data  due  to  the  confidential  nature  of  commercial 
relations,  external  shocks  such  as  COVID-19  and  the  Russian  war  of  aggression  against 
Ukraine, and the resulting rise in inflation and input costs, made it difficult to isolate the effects 
of the Directive’s implementation from broader developments. 

3.1.EFFECTIVENESS 

The  evaluation  examined  the  Directive’s  contribution  to  combating  UTPs,  preventing  their 
occurrence, mitigating their negative impact on farmers and supporting effective enforcement. 
It also looked at the unintended effects of the Directive20. 

Perceived  improvements  in  the  occurrence  of  UTPs  but  varying  views  throughout  the 
chain 

From  the  available  evidence,  it  was  not  yet  possible  to  confirm  that  UTPs  substantially 
decreased following implementation of the Directive. However, data from the most recent JRC 
survey suggested a reduction in the number of reported UTPs. Moreover, other quantitative and 
qualitative data pointed to improvements in reducing late payments, for both perishable and 
unperishable goods21, and certain other UTPs more frequently experienced by suppliers.  

Views throughout the chain varied, with farmers and suppliers reporting positive trends, while 
other segments expressed more mixed views. Specifically, buyers expressed scepticism about 
the Directive’s impact, while also noting that compliance efforts by wholesalers and retailers 
through contract revision and staff training had played a key role in reducing UTPs. 

Differing levels of awareness among suppliers 

According  to  JRC  survey  data,  reported  awareness  level  ranges  between  62%  and  76%  of 
respondents  depending  on  the  type  of  suppliers,  without  any  clear  trend  emerging  across 
different survey waves. Low level of awareness and challenges in submitting complaints are 
also reported among non-EU stakeholders. 

Although some EA  had focused on awareness-raising and outreach activities  right from  the 
early years of implementing the Directive, awareness was generally low, particularly among 
farmers  and  smaller  suppliers,  due  mainly  to  the  short  time  since  the  Directive’s  full 
implementation. Larger suppliers and processors tended to report moderate levels of awareness 
but also mentioned difficulties in understanding their rights and obligations under the Directive.  

Low complaint rates 

In addition to low levels of awareness among suppliers, only a limited number of complaints 
were received across all MS during the first years of implementation. According to the 2024 
JRC  survey,  only  52%  of  respondents  knew  where  to  file  a  complaint. To  address  this,  EA 

20 SWD, Section 4.1. 
21 Support study, p. 20. 

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focused  their  initial  efforts  on  guidance  cases  or  increased  the  number  of  ex  officio  (own 
initiative) investigations. 

Data from the JRC annual survey pointed to several reasons why suppliers did not raise UTPs 
with EA when they experience them. 29% of respondents cited fear of retaliation as a major 
barrier,  while  other  reported  obstacles  included  the  perception  that  certain  UTPs  were 
customary and not worth reporting (20%),  or a lack of trust in the EA’ capacity to act (19%). 

Concerns about confidentiality and fear of retaliation were particularly prevalent, as illustrated 
by MS case studies (BE, ES, NL, SE). These case studies highlighted that national procedural 
rules could require the disclosure of certain information during proceedings to safeguard the 
buyer’s  right  of  defence,  raising  concerns  among  suppliers  about  potential  exposure  and 
reinforcing their reluctance to submit complaints. 

Although the Directive allows producer organisations (‘PO’) or other supplier organisations 
with a legitimate interest to file complaints on behalf of their members, the evaluation showed 
that this mechanism remained unused. In parallel, anonymous tip-offs proved to be a potentially 
valuable source of market information for EA as a way of informing ex officio investigations 
and sectoral inquiries. However, challenges were still observed in highly concentrated sectors 
where anonymity of the whistleblower may still be difficult to guarantee. 

Increased enforcement actions but still significant variation between MS 

The evaluation showed that the number and type of enforcement actions were largely shaped 
by national strategic priorities, reflecting different approaches to implementation22. In line with 
the  Directive’s  emphasis  on  deterrence  through  effective,  proportionate  and  dissuasive 
penalties, there was a gradual increase in the number of investigations launched by EA, whether 
ex officio or following a complaint. A total of 4 610 investigations were opened between 2021-
2024, of which around 53% were closed during this period (2 462 closed investigations). Of 
these, 4 MS (ES, IT, CY, HU) carried out 90% of investigations, while 13 other MS each carried 
out fewer than 5 investigations. 

While the overall number of investigations in the EU remains relatively low compared to the 
volume  of  sales  transactions  in  the  sector,  the  upward  trend  suggests  growing  institutional 
engagement  with  UTPs.  However,  no  investigations  were  reported  in  some  MSs  and  a 
relatively  modest  number  in  others,  suggesting  a  need  to  further  exploit  the  potential  of  ex 
officio investigations. 

Based on MS reporting, the evaluation found that around one third of the investigations closed 
between 2021 and 2024 concluded in the finding of an infringement and resulted in penalties, 
i.e.  a  total  of  754 infringements.  Between  2022  and  2024,  infringements  led  to  a  total  of 
EUR 41.9 million  in  fines.  Generally,  penalties  were  perceived  as  an  effective  way  of 
supporting  compliance  through  their  deterrent  effect,  although  the  number  and  severity  of 
penalties  varied  between  MS,  reflecting  the  wide  range  of  legal  frameworks  in  place. 

22 SWD, Annex VI. 

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Reputational  measures,  such  as  ‘name  and  shame’  approaches,  were  generally  considered 
effective, especially in relation to consumer-facing buyers. 

In addition, several MS developed other preventive approaches to foster compliance, facilitate 
dialogue, or resolve disputes at an early stage. Such approaches were generally considered to 
be important and effective for combating UTPs. Examples include the introduction of internal 
UTP compliance officers by ‘large buyers’ in IE, or the creation of a mediator or ombudsman 
as an initial contact point in AT and FI. 

The evaluation also showed that some stakeholders viewed other preventive measures by EA, 
such as awareness campaigns, as moderately effective, while retailers and a large part of the 
farming sector considered the compulsory use of written contracts to be generally useful for 
combating UTPs. 

Another  type  of  measure  examined  concerned  additional  corrective  and/or  compensatory 
mechanisms available in some MS. These include the power to obtain specific commitments 
from the buyer, to issue compliance orders, or to impose civil remedies, such as the annulment 
of contract terms, restitution of charges, or compensation for damages. Some EA considered 
that  focusing  on  remedying  the  harm  to  suppliers  provided  a  more  immediate  and  targeted 
response than penalties. However, the availability and use of these mechanisms, which are not 
explicitly required by the Directive, varied between MS. 

Cooperation between EA 

The evaluation highlighted positive developments in relation to the work of the UTP Network, 
which was largely regarded by EA as having helped to improve mutual cooperation. 

However,  the  evaluation  showed  that  enforcement  efforts  primarily  concentrated  on  UTPs 
occurring within one MS, with few instances of cross-border investigations. Limitations in the 
existing  legal  framework  regarding  the  sharing  of  confidential  information  in  cross-border 
cases, and uneven enforcement capacities posed challenges to establishing a truly level playing 
field. The COM’s recent proposal on this issue is seen as a positive move towards addressing 
existing shortcomings23. 

3.2.EFFICIENCY 

The  evaluation  assessed  the  costs  and  benefits  associated  with  implementing  the  Directive, 
taking  into  account  the  administrative  costs  for  MS  and  EA  and  the  operational  costs  for 
suppliers and/or buyers24. 

Identifiable benefits for farmers but quantification remains a challenge 

Factors affecting the nature and severity of the impact of UTPs on farmers and small suppliers 
include the degree to which farms are aggregated and whether suppliers are affected directly 
or  indirectly  by  UTPs  due  to  the  pass-through  effect  along  the  chain.  For  example,  the 
evaluation found that farmers who were not part of a PO and who were directly affected by 
UTPs tended to be more exposed to economic risks. 

23 COM/2024/576 final. 
24 SWD, Section 3. 

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Since  late  payments  represented  the  most  common  reported  UTP  with  significant  negative 
consequences  due  to  their  disruptive  effect  on  cash  flow,  the  support  study  estimated  the 
potential benefits for the farming sector from addressing late payments to farmers. The support 
study suggested that as a result of the Directive, payment periods, cash flow management and 
predictability  for  farmers  and  small  suppliers  would  improve.  In  turn,  this  would  reduce 
reliance on loans, support creditworthiness, and lower the risk of insolvency, potentially freeing 
up resources for investment. The estimated average advantage stemming from the additional 
yearly cash flow per supplier (including farms) ranged from approximately EUR 16 000 in PL 
to nearly EUR 175 000 in FR25. 

After late payments, the UTPs with the largest negative economic impact on farmers were last-
minute  cancellations,  especially  for  perishable  products,  and  shifting  of  commercial  risk 
through unilateral changes to contract terms or compulsory contributions to cover the buyer’s 
losses. Such practices could lead to revenue loss and increase the exposure of farmers and small 
suppliers to unpredictable costs. 

Farmers often found it difficult to quantify the economic effects of UTPs, as they tended to 
perceive the impact in relative terms, e.g. in relation to harvest results, market fluctuations or 
other external factors. The limited data available and the complexity of isolating the Directive’s 
effects  made  it  challenging  to  produce  a  precise  cost-benefit  analysis  based  on  a  robust 
counterfactual  assessment.  Wherever  possible,  the  evaluation  quantified  the  effects  of  the 
Directive,  but  otherwise  relied  on  a  qualitative  assessment  and  a  review  of  stakeholder 
perceptions. In this regard, the results of a survey of business associations indicated that most 
businesses consulted had experienced some financial benefits stemming from the Directive, 
including from transparent and reliable contract terms (24% of the 228 indications), a reduction 
in the number of unilateral changes to contracts (19%), and more transparent pricing (15%)26. 

In  addition  to  the  financial  effects  of  the  Directive,  qualitative  benefits  were  also  reported, 
including improved dialogue and trust and the promotion of a culture of fairness within the 
chain. 

For  farmers  and  suppliers  the  costs  of  the  Directive  remained  proportionate  to  the 
benefits27 

The  evaluation  examined  the  administrative  costs  incurred  by  EA  and  MS  following 
transposition  of  the  Directive  and  found  significant  variations  depending  on  the  national 
approach. For the MS which were most active in pursuing investigations, estimates suggest 
that annual enforcement costs were close to EUR 800 000. 

Adjustment costs for business operators across the chain, including suppliers and buyers, also 
varied  widely.  According  to  estimates,  initial  adjustment  costs  ranged  from  around 
EUR 12 million in DE to EUR 19 million in DK, with retailers bearing the highest costs per 
operator. 

Overall, the evaluation found that enforcement costs for EA and adjustment costs for business 
operators  acting  exclusively  or  primarily  as  suppliers  were  proportionate  to  the  benefits 

25 Support study, p. 135.  
26 Support study, p. 63. 
27 SWD, Section 3. 

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achieved  in  terms  of  improving  business  practices.  By  contrast,  buyers  perceived  their 
adjustment costs, stemming primarily from contract adaptation, as outweighing the benefits. 
This  came  as  no  surprise  as  the  Directive  is  designed  to  protect  weaker  suppliers  against 
stronger buyers. Nevertheless, no evidence was found to suggest that costs for buyers had led 
to significant damage or operational disruption within the chain. 

3.3. EU ADDED VALUE 

The evaluation found that the EU added value of the Directive, especially its contribution to 
creating a level playing field, came from the minimum level of protection from UTPs provided 
to suppliers across the EU, in particular in MS where protection previously did not exist28. 

However,  the  evaluation  also  found  that  significant  differences  in  national  legislation  and 
enforcement  remained  despite  the  implementation  of  the  Directive.  In  particular,  most 
stakeholders  identified  these  differences  as  one  of  the  main  challenges  undermining  the 
Directive’s  EU  added  value,  with  buyers  linking  continued  national  differences  to  several 
unintended  negative  effects,  most  notably  increased  legal  uncertainty  and  inconsistent 
enforcement in cross-border cases within the EU. In addition, the retail sector reported other 
unintended effects due to the decision of some MS to extend protection against UTPs to large 
suppliers. The retail sector believed this could unnecessarily shift the balance of power towards 
large suppliers, causing particular harm to smaller buyers. 

At the same time, other stakeholders viewed the differences between MS more positively and 
considered  that  by  allowing  such  differences,  MS  could  better  address  specific  national 
circumstances and respond more quickly to emerging issues. 

The  support  study  found  that  the  Directive’s  harmonised  minimum  requirements  had 
contributed overall to EU added value, a view that was broadly shared by suppliers and EA, 
but  less  so  by  buyers29,  who  had  concerns  about  MS  maintaining  or  introducing  stricter  or 
highly diverse national rules under Article 9 of the Directive, which some saw as problematic 
for Single Market freedoms. 

3.4. COHERENCE 

The  evaluation  found  the  Directive  to  be  complementary  to  other  EU  legal  instruments, 
including the CMO Regulation30 and its counterpart in the fisheries sector31. As part of this 
broader  policy  framework,  the  Directive  supports  the  CMO’s  structural  approach,  aimed  at 
strengthening farmers’ bargaining power by promoting collective action and setting a general 
contractual  framework.  However,  the  Directive  addresses  issues  not  covered  by  the  CMO 
Regulation  by  providing  protection  at  the  level  of  individual  commercial  relationships  and 
business  operations,  offering  a  targeted  legal  framework  that  shields  farmers  and  smaller 
suppliers from specific abusive behaviour by stronger buyers. 

28 SWD, Section 4.2. 
29 Support study, p. 91 ff. 
30 OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1308/oj.   
31 OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 1, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1379/oj.  

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Similarly, the evaluation highlighted the complementary function of the Directive in relation 
to EU rules on late payments32, including the recently proposed Late Payments Regulation33, 
underlining its distinct function and continued relevance for the agricultural sector. 

No conflicts or inconsistencies with other legal instruments were identified. On the contrary, 
important synergies were identified between the Directive and other actions or initiatives, such 
as the EU competition rules and the EU Code of Conduct on Responsible Food Business and 
Marketing Practices, known as the ‘Agri-Food Code’ since mid-202534.  

3.5. ONGOING RELEVANCE 

Overall,  the  evaluation  found  the  Directive  to  be  broadly  proportionate  and  balanced  in 
addressing existing needs. At the same time, it identified scope for further action, in particular 
regarding the Directive’s contribution to the economic viability, resilience, and competitiveness 
of the agricultural sector and the emergence of new or evolving UTPs. While the Directive was 
found  to  provide  a  robust  and  suitable  framework,  scope  remained  for  addressing  evolving 
challenges, such as ensuring fair remuneration for farmers and tackling new UTPs. Feedback 
from stakeholders confirmed this finding, although views differed on the Directive’s capability 
to address the root causes of UTPs and influence price-setting mechanisms35. 

Many  of  the  potential  areas  for  improvement  identified  by  stakeholders  were  also  raised  in 
discussions held at the time the Directive was adopted, highlighting a continued divergence of 
views. Some suppliers called for measures such as extending the Directive’s scope in terms of 
turnover thresholds or introducing an EU-wide ban on sales below cost, as is already in place 
in some MS36. Buyers opposed broadening the scope in this way and called for bi-directional 
protection against UTPs, allowing smaller buyers to also be protected against larger suppliers.  

Alongside  these  longer-standing  issues,  stakeholders  also  pointed  to  more  recent  concerns 
regarding  potential  emerging  UTPs.  In  particular,  these  related  to  practices  that  could 
circumvent  the  Directive  and  shift  disproportionate  risks  or  costs  onto  suppliers,  including 
more  complex  service-related  arrangements,  such  as  ‘pay-on-scan’37,  or  demands  linked  to 
buyers’  sustainability-related  commitments  (e.g.  transferring  buyers’  corporate  social 
responsibility commitments to suppliers). 

4. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND NEXT STEPS 

Although  the  Directive  has  only  been  fully  implemented  for  a  short  period  and  despite 
significant variation in MS approaches and stakeholder views, early experience of the Directive 
shows encouraging signs as regards preventing and combating UTPs, with greater trust in the 
chain having contributed to a more responsible business culture. 

At  the  same  time,  the  evaluation  of  the  Directive  identified  a  number  of  shortcomings  and 
challenges. The following lessons learned highlight areas where the UTP framework and its 

32 OJ L 48, 23.2.2011, p. 1, ELI : http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/7/oj 
33 COM(2023)533 final. 
34  The Agri-Food Code – COM. 
35 SWD, Section 4.3. 
36 See footnote 19. 
37 In this model, suppliers are paid only when the retailer sells the product to the final consumer, rather than 
upon delivery. This can effectively extend the payment deadlines allowed under the Directive. 

8 

 
 
 
application  could  be  further  strengthened,  including  through  a  possible  revision  of  the 
Directive: 

-  Raising awareness among farmers and suppliers about their rights. This is a key 
area for further action which could be addressed by improving access to information, 
including for suppliers involved in cross-border transactions or from third countries, or 
by encouraging targeted outreach or training activities. 

-  Taking  action  to  enhance  enforcement  and  addressing  the  ‘fear  factor’  among 
suppliers. Fear of retaliation remains a barrier discouraging suppliers from reporting 
UTPs, especially in sectors with high buyer concentration and buyer-dependency. To 
address this issue and reduce reliance on individual complaints, EA could already make 
greater  use  of  ex  officio  investigations,  the  potential  of  which  has  not  been  fully 
explored in some MS. At the same time, PO and other supplier organisations, including 
those from third countries, could play a stronger role in supporting suppliers and filing 
complaints on their behalf. 

- 

Improving  cross-border  cooperation.  Procedural  obstacles  continue  to  hamper  the 
exchange  of  confidential  information  between  EA  in  cross-border  cases.  The  COM 
published  a  proposal  in  December 2024  addressing  this  issue  which  is  expected  to 
provide a robust framework for cooperation and resolve the shortcomings identified in 
relation to the harmonised list of UTPs established by the Directive38. 

-  Enhancing monitoring in support of evidence-based policy making. While progress 
has been made in data collection through annual reports and surveys, further efforts are 
needed to ensure consistent, comparable and robust monitoring of UTPs across the EU. 
Possible action in this regard could include collecting more standardised, reliable and 
quantifiable data, or conducting more comprehensive evaluations at MS level on the 
effects of national transposition laws. 

-  Addressing the uneven application of the Directive. Differences in MS implementing 
choices  and  enforcement  practices  have  led  to  diverging  interpretations  of  the 
provisions of the Directive or the application of stricter national rules. A diversity of 
national  rules,  also  beyond  the  scope  of  the  Directive  can  create  variations  in 
enforcement  and  oversight.  Further  consideration  must  be  given  to  ensuring  greater 
consistency in how UTPs are combatted. 

-  Facilitating responsiveness to emerging needs. While only a limited number of new 
UTPs were reported, it is important to be actively looking out for emerging issues and 
anticipating market changes. Moreover, action must be taken to avoid farmers being 
forced to systematically sell below their production costs, as mentioned in the Vision 
for Agriculture  and  Food.  Specific  new  tools  for  these  purposes  must  be  examined 
further, alongside the possible expansion of the list of UTPs. 

38 COM/2024/576 final 

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While the revision of the Unfair Trading Practices Directive must be approached with caution 
as  the  Directive  has  only  been  fully  implemented  for  a  relatively  short  period  of  time,  it is 
apparent that addressing remaining shortcomings and challenges will require further thought 
in order to determine how the Directive and other instruments might best support the economic 
performance  of  the  agricultural  sector  and  the  chain  as  a  whole,  and  whether  additional 
measures  may  be  needed,  all  while  preserving  the  market  orientation  of  the  Common 
Agricultural Policy. Building on the findings of this evaluation, and as confirmed in President 
von der Leyen’s 2025 State of the European Union39 address, the COM intends to review the 
implementation  of  the  EU’s  unfair  trading  practices  legislation.  Its  proposals  to  revise  the 
Directive will be accompanied by an impact assessment that will cover different options for 
tackling the challenges set out above and carefully examine the impacts of those options on 
farmers and other actors in the chain. 

39 State of the Union 2025 - COM. 

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