COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Evaluation of the Directive (EU) 2019/633 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Evaluation of the Unfair Trading Practices Directive
Date: 2025-12-01
Institutions: Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, agri-foodstuffs, application of EU law, chain store, consumer protection, food industry, restriction on competition, supplier, supply chain, unfair terms of contract

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 1.12.2025  SWD(2025) 405 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Evaluation of the Directive (EU) 2019/633 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain          Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  Evaluation of the Unfair Trading Practices Directive   {COM(2025) 728 final}  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. 

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 

1.1.  Purpose and scope of the evaluation ..................................................... 1 

2.  What was the expected outcome of the intervention? ..................................... 4 

2.1.  Description of the intervention and its objectives ................................. 4 

2.2.  Point(s) of comparison ........................................................................ 13 

3.  How has the situation evolved over the evaluation period? .......................... 16 

4.  Evaluation findings ........................................................................................ 24 

4.1.  To what extent was the intervention successful and why? .................. 24 

4.2.  How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom? ......... 47 

4.3. 

Is the intervention still relevant? ......................................................... 48 

5.  What are the conclusions and lessons learned? ............................................. 51 

5.1.  Conclusions ......................................................................................... 51 

5.2.  Lessons learned ................................................................................... 53 

ANNEX I 

PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ....................................... 55 

ANNEX II 

METHODOLOGY  AND  ANALYTICAL  MODELS  USED
 ............................................................................................... 59 

ANNEX III 

EVALUATION MATRIX .................................................... 68 

ANNEX IV 

OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND COSTS ......................... 77 

ANNEX V 

STAKEHOLDERS’  CONSULTATION 
-  SYNOPSIS 
REPORT ................................................................................ 83 

ANNEX VI 

SUMMARY OF EAS ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES .... 101 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Glossary 

Meaning or definition 

Better Regulation 
Competent Authority(ies). Public authorities e.g. Ministries involved 
in the transposition of the Directive into national legal orders. 
Common agricultural policy 
Call for evidence 
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 establishing a common organisation 
of the markets in agriculture  
European Commission 
Committee of Regions 
Council of the European Union  
Directorate(s)-General of the European Commission 
Directive (EU) 2019/633 on unfair trading practices in business-to-
business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain 
Days of sales outstanding 
Enforcement Authority(ies) 
European Commission 
Enterprise Europe Network 
European Economic and Social Committee 
European Parliament 
European Union 
Inter-service steering group 
Joint research centre 
Multi criteria decision analysis 
Member State(s) of the European Union 
Non-governmental organisation(s) 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board  
Sustainable Development Goal(s)  
Small and medium sized enterprise 
European Commission Staff Working Document 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
Impact Assessment accompanying the UTP Directive proposal 
Unfair trading practice(s) 

Term or 
acronym 

BR 
CA(s) 

CAP 
CfE 
CMO 

Commission 
CoR 
Council 
DG(s) 
(UTP) 
Directive 
DSO 
EA(s) 
EC 
EEN 
EESC 
EP 
EU  
ISG 
JRC  
MCDA 
MS(s) 
NGO(s) 
RSB 
SDG(s) 
SME(s) 
SWD 
TFEU 
UTP IA 2018 
UTP(s) 

 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The  Directive  (EU)  2019/633  on  unfair  trading  practices  in  business-to-business 
relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain (`UTP Directive´ or, if not specified 
otherwise, `Directive´) sets minimum rules to better protect farmers and small and medium 
sized  suppliers  operating  in  the  agricultural  and  food  supply  chain,  including  primary 
production in the fishery and aquaculture sectors, from trading practices that are considered 
unfair.  This  document  presents  the  findings  of  the  first  interim  evaluation  of  the 
Directive which assessed the extent to which it is successful in doing so. 

1.1.  Purpose and scope of the evaluation 

The  legal  base  for  this  evaluation  is  Article  12  of  the  UTP  Directive.  It  requires  the 
European  Commission  to  carry  out  an  evaluation  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  the 
measures  implemented  at  national  level  aimed  at  combating  unfair  trading  practices 
(UTPs) in the agricultural and food supply chain as well as the effectiveness of cooperation 
among  national,  competent  enforcement  authorities  (EAs)  and,  where  appropriate,  to 
identify ways to improve that cooperation. 

The  evaluation  serves  as  a  basis  to  the  Commission´s  Report  on  the  Directive  to  the 
European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the Committee of Regions and 
the European Economic and Social Committee by 1 November 2025. As groundwork to 
the Report, the evaluation informs reflections on the opportunity and, if relevant, extent of 
possible  amendments  of  the  UTP  Directive.  This  deadline  directly  affects  the 
evaluation´s timing. 

The evaluation period spans from the entry into force of the Directive from end of April 
2019 up to March 2025. Given the need for transposition of the EU rules by EU Member 
States (MSs) into their respective national legal orders, a 12-month transition period for 
existing agreements, as well as evidence gathering activities and availability, the focus of 
the evaluation lies in the period 2022-24. 

The  geographical  focus  of  the  evaluation  is  the  EU.  The  evaluation  assesses  the 
effectiveness of the EU measures as implemented in MSs, hence with a focus on the EU 
dimension  of  the  Directive  and  especially  on  minimum  harmonisation  i.e.  those 
elements of the Directive representing the minimum, common EU level standard that MSs 
were  obliged  to  transpose  into  their  national  legal  orders  and  implement.  It  does  not 
systematically  evaluate  the  national  transposing  legislation  and  measures  of  each  MS. 
Additional, MSs-specific elements are considered as contextual elements in view of a more 
refined  assessment.  Put  differently,  the  evaluation´s  approach  mirrors  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity. 

Besides  fulfilling  the  legal  obligation  set  out  in  the  Directive,  the  evaluation  has  been 
executed  in  light  of  the  Commission´s  Better  Regulation  (BR)  framework,  a  set  of 
(analytical)  tools  and  procedures  to  which  the  European  Commission  (EC)  committed 
itself in view of better policy making. In line with them, this evaluation report covers all 
five main evaluation criteria set out therein. It examines to what extent the Directive has 
been:  

1 

 
 
 
 
•  effective in meeting its objectives of strengthening the resilience of weaker 
operators in the agri-food supply chain, in particular farmers, of improving 
the  functioning  of  the  agri-food  supply  chain  and  of  contributing  to  fair 
living standards for the agricultural community (1); 

•  efficient in terms of cost-effectiveness i.e. the proportionality of costs the 
Directive imposed compared to benefits it produces to main stakeholders;  

•  relevant compared to past, current and emerging needs related to tackling 

abuses of power imbalances in the agri-food supply chain; 

•  coherent with the common agricultural policy (CAP) and other, pertinent 

EU policies; 

•  providing EU added value i.e. producing results beyond those that would 
have been achieved by MSs acting each on their own i.e. adopting (or not) 
national UTP related legislation. 

The evaluation process strived to collect to the best possible extent all available evidence, 
complementing it with extensive data collection primarily drawing from   

(1) 

secondary 

sources,  encompasses  extensive, 

an evaluation support study (2), which, starting from in-depth analysis 
targeted 
of  91 
consultation activities in the form of (i) two workshops, (ii) about 130 
interviews,  (iii)  three  targeted  surveys  (covering  wholesalers  and 
retailers,  EU  and  national  level  sector  associations  (from  farming  to 
agri-food  retail,  together  representing  around  1.1  million  member 
companies) and to public authorities, (iv) 10 case studies focusing on 
selected  agri-food  supply  chains  in  different  MSs.  Case  studies,  the 
CA/EA survey and parts of the interviews and sector association survey 
delve also into national aspects. 

In terms of recurrent evidence collection i.e. monitoring: 

(2) 

(3) 

the annual public survey, (3) open to suppliers in the agri-food chain 
under the scope of the Directive, covering five survey waves: from a 
pre-implementation baseline year 2020 to 2024;   

annual  reports  by  MSs  to  the  EC,  reporting  on  about  10  metrics 
encompassing,  the  numbers  of  guidance  cases,  investigations,  formal 
complaints, sector inquiries, infringements, for the years 2021 to 2024;  

(1)  Given Article 12(2) of the Directive, particular attention has been paid to this criterion.  

(2)  `Evaluation  support  study  of  the  EU  Directive  2019/633  on  unfair  trading  practices  in  business-to-

business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain´ (DOI: 10.2762/2191333). 

(3)  Interactive  dashboards  on  survey  results  carried  out  by  the  Commission’s  science  and  knowledge 
here: 

Research 

available 

publicly 

(JRC), 

the 

are 

Centre 
service, 
https://datam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/datam/topic/UTP/. 

Joint 

2 

 
 
 
 
(4) 

regular  EU  level  UTP  Enforcement  Network  meetings  among 
competent EAs with the participation of the EC. 

In terms of further main evidence sources: 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

first assessments and interim evaluations on national transpositions 
of  the  Directive  (Belgium  (December  2024),  Denmark  (November 
2024), Germany (October 2023), Sweden (2025); 

national level annual activity reports of EAs at times complemented 
by ad hoc surveys and analytical briefs (4); 

SME  panel  targeted  survey  carried  out  by  the  EC  to  directly  reach 
SMEs in  the agri-food supply  chain  and  complementing  (2) above to 
specifically target  small  operators which are  predominantly operating 
also as `buyers´; 

previous EC reports on the Directive of October 2021 (`UTP Report 
2021´) on the state of transposition and implementation of Directive and 
April  2024  (`UTP  Report  2024´)  on  an  updated  state  of  play  of  the 
implementation  accompanied  by  a  Commission  Staff  Working 
Document  (SWD  –  `UTP  SWD  2024´)  with  further  details  on  MSs´ 
transposition choices and enforcement activities. 

Further sources of evidence are the evaluation report of the EESC, and the Opinion of 
the  Fit4  Future  Platform,  a  high-level  expert  group,  in  operation  from  2021-24, 
composed  of  stakeholders  and  representatives  from  MSs  assisting  the  Commission  in 
simplifying  and  future-proofing  existing  laws.  A  summary  of  the  consultation  of 
stakeholders can be found in Annex V Stakeholders’ consultation - Synopsis report. 

In  addition,  in  terms  of  methodological  approaches  the  evaluation  encompasses  multi 
criteria  decision  analysis  (MCDA),  cost  models,  supply  chain  analysis,  descriptive 
statistical analysis as well as some ad hoc approaches to estimate costs and benefits accrued 
to  stakeholders  paired  with  qualitative  analysis.  Annex  II Methodology  and  Analytical 
models  used  provides  a  more  detailed  explanation.  It  also  presents  limitations  to  the 
evaluation more in detail and how these were addressed and mitigated.  

Indeed, this evaluation faces four non-negligible limitations: Firstly, the main limitation 
is the short time span of actual implementation of the Directive, which suggests that 
results have not yet fully materialised (5). Secondly, different legislative situations at the 
start  of  the  implementation  period  as  well  as  transposition  in  many  cases  beyond  the 
minimum  harmonisation  requirements  of  the  Directive,  make  the  EU  level  evaluation 
complex. It is challenging to disentangle impacts resulting from the implementation of 
the minimum harmonisation provisions from the ones of national transpositions and 
attribute effects only to the elements present in the Directive. A third set of limitations 
concerns the difficulty, intimately linked to  the specific  kind  of  problems  the Directive 

(4)  Hyperlinks to web-pages of national EAs are collected and published at the EC´s UTP Webpage. A large 

majority of annual activity reports can be retrieved there. Summaries can be found in Annex VI. 

(5)  This limitation was also acknowledged by the Fit for Future Platform, in its Opinion adopted in 2024. 

3 

 
 
 
 
seeks  to  address,  to  retrieve  quantitative  and  robust  data,  for  instance,  information 
linked to  confidential  commercial  transactions,  or the `fear factor´ (see below). Finally, 
strong external factors such as, for instance, high inflation due to the consequences of the 
COVID 19 pandemic, paired with the complexity of agri-food supply chain(s) confound 
the effects of the Directive making attribution of effects to the Directive challenging.  

These  interacting  limitations  and  challenges  are  compounded  by  the  limited  empirical 
evidence  in  the  post-implementation  period  and  the  uniqueness  of  the  Directive  as 
regulatory instrument with no comparable approaches in terms of scope and depth outside 
the EU that could be taken as evaluation benchmark (6).  

2.  WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION? 

This section recalls the rationale and most important components of the Directive. It also 
presents  what  success  of  the  Directive  was  expected  to  look  like  and  derives  points  of 
comparison on how to compare it to what actually happened. 

2.1.  Description of the intervention and its objectives 

Power  imbalances  in  markets  have  been  an  ongoing  concern  for  market  operators, 
academics and policymakers across all EU economic sectors, when they become a source 
of risk for abusive behaviour by more powerful market participants. Two used conceptual 
frameworks  to  capture  power  imbalances  are  `market  power´  and  `bargaining  power´. 
Although  related,  the  concepts  capture  distinct  traits  of  power.  Market  power,  often 
associated with high levels of concentration in a relevant market, can be defined as `the 
ability  of  a  firm  to  raise  prices  above  competitive  levels  in  a  profitable  way´ (7).  This 
generates profits for the supplier (buyer) but diminishes demand (or supply) in the product 
markets, leading to welfare losses. Many parts of the agri-food market are more complex 
than the simple scenario where just one side has market power. In the agri-food chain many 
interactions involve both horizontal and vertical coordination typically achieved through 
contracts. These contracts can boost the overall economic benefits but the distribution of 
these among transacting operators depends on their relative bargaining power. Bargaining 
power  focuses  on  the  arrangements  between  transacting  parties  (e.g.  through  written 
contracts)  and  not  on  the  (relevant)  market  as  a  whole  i.e.  a  multitude  of  market 
participants.  In  line  with  this  approach,  the  party  that  is  to  gain  the  most  from  being 
involved in a transaction is the potentially more vulnerable one and has less bargaining 
power  than  the  other (8).  In  the  context  of  these  often  bilateral  (or  multilateral (9)) 
interactions  of  market  operators,  one  party  can  obtain  a  concession  from  another  by 

(6)  Though there have been several studies  before the  implementation  of the Directive i.e. before 2021, 
scientific, empirical literature on the effects on the ground after 2021 is yet scarce. See, for instance, the 
bibliography to the evaluation support study for an overview. 

(7)  BR-toolbox, Tool # 24. 

(8)  Fałkowski, J., C. Ménard, R.J. Sexton, J. Swinnen and S. Vandevelde (Authors), Marcantonio, F. Di and 
P.  Ciaian  (Editors)  (2017),  Unfair  trading practices  in  the  food  supply  chain:  A  literature  review  on 
methodologies, impacts and regulatory aspects, European Commission, Joint Research Centre. 

(9)  Cafaggi,  Fabrizio  and  Iamiceli,  Paola,  Unfair  Trading  Practices  in  Food  Supply  Chains.  Regulatory 
Responses  and  Institutional  Alternatives  in  the  Light  of  the  New  EU  Directive  (2019),  discusses 
multilateral exchanges in global food supply chains (p.11). 

4 

 
 
 
 
threatening to impose a cost or withdraw a benefit if the concession is not granted. While 
both bargaining and market power can result in lower prices or surplus transfers, `the key 
difference  is  that  the  exertion  of  market  power  always  determines  lower  trade  level 
compared to perfect competition, while this conclusion is not necessarily true in the case 
of bargaining power´ (10). 

EU  competition  law  is  clear  in  addressing  the  abuse  of  dominant  position,  i.e. 
anticompetitive behaviour by dominant undertakings. However, a focus of competition law 
on market power by addressing anticompetitive practices of dominant undertakings, may 
not always be able to capture all (abuses of) power relations (11). 

The  issue  of  (abuses  of)  bargaining  power  has  been  especially  acute  in  the  EU 
agricultural  sector  with  agricultural  producers  being  particularly  exposed  to  the 
`emergence´  of  bargaining  power  imbalances  due  to  specific,  contextual  conditions 
inherent to  this sector, which expose them to  potentially  abusive behaviour by stronger 
counterparties in their transactions.  

Although risk is inherent in all economic activity, agriculture is fraught with uncertainty, 
in  particular,  but  not  exclusively,  due  to  weather  which  has  a  direct  impact  on  the 
variability  of  the  quantity  and  quality  of  produce  supplied.  Moreover,  there  are  long 
production  lags  due  to  the  biological  processes  on  which  agricultural  production 
depends. These factors can have a significant impact on farmers’ production activities, and 
yet they have practically no control over them.  

These (uncertain) circumstances often cannot be fully captured by contracts. This so-called 
incompleteness of contracts is a further factor contributing to the emergence of bargaining 
power imbalances (12).  

Moreover,  short-run  inelastic (13)  supply  exposes  agricultural  producers:  processors’ 
contracts are typically shorter than the lifetime of the assets required by farmers to produce, 
leading to the ‘holdup’ problem (14): anticipating that, for example, processors  can take 

(10) Sorrentino, Alessandro, Carlo Russo, and Luca Cacchiarelli. 2018. `Market Power and Bargaining Power 

in the EU Food Supply Chain: The Role of Producer Organizations.´ Section 2.2. 

(11) Ibid; as well as UTP  IA  2018 Annex  H: `Indeed competition law only deals with situations where a 
particular seller/buyer possesses a "dominant position" in that it has some power over buyers/suppliers 
in general, and not only over one or few particular firm(s), and where there are likely anti-competitive 
effects. Therefore, unequal bargaining power and resulting imbalances in trading relationships rarely 
imply an infringement of competition law.  Such issues may be, where appropriate, addressed by other 
policy tools, […] ´ (emphasis added). As well as: Renda, A., Cafaggi, F., Pelkmans, J., Iamiceli, P., de 
Brito, A. C., Mustilli, F. and Bebber, L. Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-to-Business 
Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain. DG Internal Market, European Commission, 2014. 

(12)  Russo, C., editor (2020), JRC, Pass-through of unfair trading practices in EU food supply chains. 

(13)  Inelasticity  refers  to  a  situation  where  the  quantity  demanded  or  supplied  of  a  good  is  relatively 
unresponsive to changes in price (and the other way around). For instance, even if the price of a good 
increases  or  decreases  (substantially),  the  amount  consumers  buy, or  producers  sell  does  not  change 
much. Demand and supply of agricultural and food products are typically considered inelastic. 

(14)  The hold-up problem occurs when two parties may be able to cooperate (e.g. trade) for mutual benefit, 
but  one  party  takes  advantage  of  the  situation  after  the  other  party  has  made  a  non-recoverable 
investment. For example, if a supplier invests in specialised equipment to produce goods for a specific 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
advantage of short-run inelastic supply, agricultural producers underinvest in specialised 
production assets relative to the (socially) optimal level pointing towards a market failure. 

Short run supply in-elasticities of agricultural production are further exacerbated by the 
perishability of products and limited selling channels. The EU agri-food supply chain 
is characterised by market concentration in processing, distribution and retail stage, while 
on the contrary the farming stage is fragmented. (15) Limited selling channels might also 
be the consequence of geographical circumstances: an agricultural producer in a remote 
area might have only a single processor to which to sell a perishable product e.g. milk (16). 

buyer, the buyer might later demand a lower price, knowing that the supplier cannot easily switch to 
another customer without incurring significant costs. 

(15)  Eurostat,  Key  Figures  on  the  European  Food  Chain  –  2024  Edition  for  an  overview;  European 
Commission, Joint Research Centre Technical Report - Market Power in Food Industry in Selected EU 
Member States (2021) for a more detailed discussion of various metrics, sub-sectors, geographical levels 
and stages in the EU agri-food supply chain. Also a recent study has shown that, the EU agri-food chain 
displays notable market concentration in particular at the manufacturing and retail and wholesale stage 
and  markups  in  some  MSs,  supporting  the  notion  that  market  power  likely  exists  in  several  of  the 
European agri-food chain(s), potentially creating negative welfare and distributional effects. See Nes, 
Kjersti,  Liesbeth  Colen,  and  Pavel  Ciaian.  2024.  `Market  Structure,  Power,  and  the  Unfair  Trading 
Practices Directive in the EU Food Sector: A Review of Indicators.´ for an in depth discussion. The 
authors  also  discuss  turnover  thresholds  employed  to  approximate  bargaining  power  in  the  UTP 
Directive finding that ` Despite limited theoretical and empirical support for the use of turnover as an 
indicator  of  power,  we  find  that  –  in  its  practical  implementation  –  most  buyers  in  the  highly 
concentrated  food  subsectors,  would  indeed  fall  under  the  directive.  While  being  a  very  imprecise 
indicator, it has the advantage of being easy and provide predictability in the legal rights and obligations 
for operators engaging in transactional relationships.´ 

(16)  Ibid. as well as Eurostat, Farm Structure Survey 2020. For a discussion at the time of the legislative 

proposal see UTP IA 2018 Annex C, especially parts 1 to 5. 

6 

 
 
 
 
Figure  1: Stylised  representation  of  the  EU  agri-food  net  chain  from  farmers  to 
consumers (2022). 

Source: DG AGRI based on CAP specific objectives explained – Brief No. 3, Key Figures on the European 
Food Chain – 2024 Edition and Russo, C., editor (2020), JRC, Pass-through of unfair trading practices in EU 
food supply chains. For agriculture: number of holdings and employment, 2020. 

Food is a necessity, and consumers will continue to purchase it even when prices change. 
While this in-elastic demand for food is not detrimental to agricultural producers in all 
circumstances, it can (and often does) amplify (demand) shocks in terms of enhanced price 
volatility,  further  intensifying  the  pressure  on  the  bargaining  power  to  the  detriment  of 
agricultural producers. 

Finally,  as  already  discussed  in  the  UTP  IA  2018,  increased  market  orientation  in 
agriculture has come with challenges for farmers. Successive reforms of the CAP since 
1992 have led to a shift from price to income support. Accordingly, primary producers no 
longer experience systematic price support via market measures. Support through the CAP 
is provided through decoupled income support (so called direct payments) i.e. monetary 
support  payments  not  related  to  production  levels  of  the  farmer  who  get  them.  The 
integration of EU agri-food supply chains in global markets presents opportunities but also 
risks. Trade barriers have been removed through trade agreements. This has resulted in EU 
prices  of  agricultural  products  being  largely  aligned  with  world  market  prices.  EU 
agriculture has  become  more competitive in  this new global context contributing to the 
recurrent annual trade surpluses the EU has achieved in food products. But the removal 
of price support and the insertion into global markets have exposed the EU agri-food 
sector to global market instabilities and their corollary, price volatility. 

All these elements contribute to farmers, on average, being in a situation with less relative 
bargaining power when compared to average downstream operators in the EU agri-
food supply chain they trade with i.e. sell their produce. This relative disparity makes 
them  vulnerable  to  unfair  trading  practices,  such  as  unilateral  impositions  by  trading 

7 

FOOD AND BEVERAGE PROCESSINGFOOD & BEVERAGE WHOLESALING AND RETAILINGFOOD & BEVERAGE SERVING ACTIVITIESAGRICULTURECONSUMERS (EU population)9.18.7218.1265.94.70.31.6326.5180.78.58.41.1446.7Number of holdings/enterprises/consumers (million)Employment (million)Value added(EUR billion)Netchain 
 
 
 
partners  downstream  i.e.  taking  advantage  of  their  superior  bargaining  power  thought 
practices that grossly deviate from good commercial conduct and are contrary to good faith 
and fair dealing. These practices are not only perceived as unfair, contributing to a climate 
of distrust, but can also impair the efficient functioning of the agri-food supply chain. 

Within this context, the policy discussion about measures addressing unfair practices at the 
EU level dates back to 2009. There was consensus among a large part of stakeholders that 
such  trading  practices  were  occurring  throughout  the  agri-food  supply  chain  and  were 
detrimental to its good functioning (17). Some MSs had implemented legislation at national 
level. The EC had put forward several EU level soft measures based primarily on voluntary 
approaches to address unfair practices, such as the ‘Supply Chain Initiative’ (18). However, 
given the persistence of MSs legal and, in part, de facto heterogeneous situation in terms 
of occurrence as well as level of protection granted to weaker suppliers (19), stronger action 

(17)  `There is a wide-spread consensus that UTPs occur throughout the food supply chain. Their frequency 
distinguishes the food supply chain from other supply chains in terms of the magnitude of the problem. 
[…]  Specific UTP rules in 20 Member States bear witness to the significant concern about UTPs at the 
national level. […] The open public consultation of 2017 confirms the perception that UTPs are an issue 
in the food supply chain: 90% of respondents agreed or partially agreed that such practices existed. 
Confirmation rates ranged between 80% for trade organisations to 98% for civil society respondents, 
93% for organisations in the farming sector and 86% for organisations in the agri-food sector. A 2016 
study also concluded that UTPs occurred across all Member States and at all stages of the food supply 
chain and that they were perceived as serious by most stakeholders.´ UTP IA 2018 p. 12 and p 13. See 
also recital 8 of the Directive. 

(18)  See UTP IA 2018 (p.8 as well as Annex A). 

(19)  A  detailed  overview  on  `Specific  regulations  on  Unfair  Trading  Practices  in  Member  States  in  the 
Business-to-Business Retail Supply Chain´ before the adoption of the Directive can be found in Annex 
F (p.142-259) of the UTP IA 2018. Before the introduction of the UTP Directive, the laws regulating 
UTPs in MSs differed in several ways: 

- The presence of dedicated UTP legislation itself: Some MSs did not have any legislation on UTPs 
(Estonia,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  he  Netherlands).  Others  had  legislation  limited  in  scope  mainly 
consumer-type  UTP  approach  (Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  Sweden).  While  others  had  specific 
legislation on UTPs which however differed. 

- The legislative coverage and instruments: Italy, for instance, had adopted specific business-to-business 
legislation  for  UTPs,  where  the  definition  of  UTPs  was  incorporated  by  reference  into  its  legal 
framework.  In  contrast,  Belgium  extended  consumer  protection  laws  to  cover  certain  business-to-
business practices, focusing primarily on pre-contractual information and advertising. 

- The scope of legislation: for instance, Croatia's Act on the prohibition of UTPs provided both general 
and specific lists of prohibited UTPs based on the type of relationship, such as between supplier and 
buyer or reseller. Similarly, the French Commercial Code included both general provisions and specific 
provisions related to distribution contractual relations. 

- The types of practices covered: Slovenia, for example, targeted payment periods longer than 45 days, 
differing slightly from the more  common 30-day period in other MSs. Ireland specifically addressed 
last-minute order cancellations concerning perishable products as part of its UTP regulations. 

- The legal frameworks and principles adopted: Germany used a principle-based approach, prohibiting 
the abuse of relative market power, particularly when it involved SMEs. Poland employed a prohibition 
on imposing unfair contractual advantages contrary to the principles of morality. 

- Enforcement mechanisms: For instance, in the UK (a MS at the time), the Groceries Code Adjudicator 
enforced UTP regulations with powers to levy fines and impose requirements on grocery retailers. Italy's 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
at EU level was necessary. This to grant to all EU agricultural producers a minimum level 
of protection and make coordination across MSs effective in view of the EU internal 
market.  

To do so, the Directive codifies 16 unfair trading practices (Article 3). Ten black UTPs 
are  prohibited,  whatever  the  circumstances.  A  supplier  cannot  agree  to  them.  Six  grey 
UTPs  are  prohibited  only  if  not  agreed  beforehand  in  clear  and  unambiguous  terms 
between the parties. 

Figure 2: List of UTPs in the Directive. 

Source: Evaluation support study. 

The Directive applies to agricultural and food products i.e. products listed in Annex I to 
the TFEU as well as products not listed in that Annex but processed for use as food using 
products listed in that Annex. The Directive also applies to services that are `ancillary´ to 
the sale of agricultural and food products, as far as explicitly referred to in Article 3 of the 
Directive, such as marketing or promotional services provided by the buyer to the supplier. 

Moreover, the Directive contains several other key provisions. Firstly, although bargaining 
power  can  be  influenced  by  several  (concurring)  factors  like  information  asymmetry, 
availability  of  substitutes  at  a  specific  moment  and  place  in  time  etc.,  the  Directive 
establishes  annual  turnover  thresholds  of  different  operators  to  approximate  and 
operationalise relative bargaining powers and therefore imbalances in bargaining power 
between a supplier and a buyer in view of policy enforcement (Article 1, Recital 14). These 
thresholds  represent  framework  conditions  for  the  protection  granted  to  the  relatively 

enforcement was carried out by its Competition Authority, which had the power to impose penalties for 
non-compliance with national UTP legislation. 

-  How  MSs  included  SMEs  and  addressed  cross-border  considerations:  Some  MSs  adopted  a 
combination of legislation and self-regulation. 

9 

1.Return of unsold products2.Payment of the supplier for stocking, display and listing3.Payment of the supplier for promotion4.Payment of the supplier for marketing5.Payment of the supplier for advertising6.Payment of the supplier for staff of the buyer, fitting out premisesTen “black” UTPs1.Payments later than 30 days for perishable agricultural and food products2.Payment later than 60 days for other agri-food products3.Short-notice cancellations of perishable agri-food products4.Unilateral contract changes by the buyer5.Payments not related to a specific transaction6.Risk of loss and deterioration transferred to the supplier7.Refusal of a written confirmation of a supply agreement by the buyer, despite request from the supplier8.Misuse of trade secrets by the buyer9.Commercial retaliation by the buyer10.Transferring the costs of examining customer complaints to the supplierSix “grey”UTPs 
 
 
 
 
weaker  supplier (20).  Secondly,  UTPs  are  to  some  extent  passed  through  the  agri-food 
`netchain´- the web of operators´ interactions (so called `pass-through´) (21). In principle, 
this  can  happen  in  both  directions,  upstream  and  downstream.  However,  given  the 
circumstances  of  agricultural  producers  presented  above,  they  are  more  likely  passed 
through from downstream to upstream actors; the Directive, hence, not only applies to 
the  first  stage  of  supply,  i.e.  the  agricultural  producer  to  the  first  buyer,  but  to 
subsequent stages i.e. sales as well (Article 1, Article 2). The Directive applies to sales 
where  either  the  supplier  or  the  buyer,  or  both,  are  established  in  the  EU  (Article  1). 
Thirdly, in view of  – if  not  exclusively,  mainly – protecting agricultural  producers, the 
protection  applies  in  one  direction  only,  namely  protecting  from  UTPs  perpetrated  by 
buyers  towards  suppliers  (Article  1).  The  350  million  annual  turnover  threshold  in  the 
Directive  is  regarded  as  an  upper  limit  beyond  which  suppliers  are  regarded  to  be  less 
exposed to the contextual pressures specific to the agricultural sector leading to imbalances 
in bargaining power (22). 

In terms of implementation the Directive provides for national enforcement by mandating 
the  designation  (Article  4)  of  national  competent  enforcement  authorities  (EAs) 
entrusted with at least six powers as set out in Article 6 to carry out enforcement. EAs 
should have the power to initate and conduct investigations, to require market operators to 
disclose  necessary  information,  to  carry  on  site  inspections  when  investigating,  to  take 
decisions finding an infringement, to require the buyer to bring the practice to an end, to 
impose or initiate proceedings for the imposition of fines or other penalties and interim 
measures, and to publish the decisions concerning the infringements and fines. 

The EAs should be able to act ex officio or following a complaint. The effects of decisions 
requiring a buyer to bring an UTP to an end depend on national legal orders. They may be 
limited the operator suspected or  condemned for  breaking  the national  UTP law and/or 
may produce effects beyond the complainant if other participants in the agri-food chain 
have adopted similar conducts originated by the same practice. As EAs may take measures 
to ensure the confidentiality of complainants, enforcement by EAs contributes to tackle the 

(20)  The Directive applies to certain UTPs which occur in relation to sales by: (a) suppliers which have an 
annual turnover not exceeding EUR 2 million to buyers which have an annual turnover of more than 
EUR  2  million;  (b)  suppliers  which  have  an  annual  turnover  of  more  than  EUR  2  million  and  not 
exceeding  EUR  10  million  to  buyers  which  have  an  annual  turnover  of  more  than  EUR  10  million; 
(continuing with other three thresholds up to EUR 350 million). 

(21)  Russo, C., editor (2020), JRC, Pass-through of unfair trading practices in EU food supply chains, p 63. 
See also recitals 7 and 9 of the Directive referring to cascading effect i.e. unfair trading practices being 
passed on to agricultural producers. 

(22)  See recital 9 of the Directive: `Unfair trading practices are particularly harmful for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in the agricultural and food supply chain. Enterprises larger than SMEs but 
with an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 350 000 000 should also be protected against unfair trading 
practices to avoid the costs of such practices being passed on to agricultural producers. The cascading 
effect  on  agricultural  producers  appears  to  be  particularly  significant  for  enterprises  with  an 
annual turnover of up to EUR 350 000 000. The protection of intermediary suppliers of agricultural 
and food products, including processed products, can also serve to avoid the diversion of trade away 
from agricultural producers and their associations which produce processed products to non-protected 
suppliers. ´ (emphasis added) 

10 

 
 
 
 
`fear factor´ (23) i.e. weaker operators being afraid of commercial retaliation and therefore 
not coming forward. 

The  EAs  meet  in  a  network  of  national  EAs  coordinated  by  the  EC  for  sharing  and 
exchanging best practices, and information on new cases and developments (Article 8). 

These enforcement powers together with the UTP framework are expected to lead to an 
effective enforcement against UTPs, including through the monitoring, investigation and 
sanctioning of UTPs and where relevant through cooperation across EAs. Cooperation is 
especially  important  in  the  case  of  cross-border  cases,  meaning  cases  in  which  the 
involved parties are established in at least two different MSs. Effective enforcement can 
reduce the occurrence of UTPs, and, in case of damages occurred due to an UTP, provide 
suppliers with access to effective redress. 

In this context, it is important to recall again that the Directive is a minimum harmonisation 
Directive: following at least the minimum standards set out in the Directive that need to be 
transposed into national law, the provisions aim to ensure an EU wide minimum level of 
protection  of  suppliers  across  MSs  and  the  contribution  to  a  level  playing  field  in  the 
internal market. In addition, additional national UTPs rules need to be compatible with the 
rules on the functioning of the Internal Market (Article 9). 

This is expected to lead to an overall improved functioning of the agri-food supply chain, 
in particular shield agricultural producers and small suppliers of food products from unfair 
behaviour and in general promote a fair business culture. 

The Directive is set to contribute to the achievement of several SDGs. By providing for a 
better agri-food supply chain it contributes towards SDG 2 – zero hunger and SDG 8 – 
Decent work and economic growth. By making transactions fairer, making it easier for 
agri-food  operators  to  integrate  into  value  chains  and  markets,  it  contributes  to  the 
achievement of SDG 9 – Industry Innovation and infrastructure. 

Figure 3 represents in a stylised manner how the Directive is expected to work taking into 
consideration the elements presented in this section. 

(23)  For a discussion see Fałkowski, J., C. Ménard, R.J. Sexton, J. Swinnen and S. Vandevelde (Authors), 
Marcantonio, F. Di and P. Ciaian (Editors) (2017), Unfair trading practices in the food supply chain: A 
literature  review  on  methodologies,  impacts  and  regulatory  aspects,  European  Commission,  Joint 
Research Centre. See also Annex B of the UTP IA 2018. Several (for example, Ireland, the Netherlands) 
but not all EAs admit anonymous complaints or tip-offs. Usually, during the judicial phase the identity 
needs to be disclosed. See a discussion 4.1 To what extent was the intervention successful and why?. 

11 

 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Intervention logic of the Directive. 

Source: DG AGRI, based on the evaluation support study. 

12 

 
 
 
 
2.2.  Point(s) of comparison  

When proposing the Directive, the Commission expected impacts to be mostly economic; 
to a respectively lesser degree also social and environmental (24). No explicit, quantitative 
targets  defining  success  were  identified,  either  in  the  UTP  IA  2018  or  in  the  Directive 
itself. Nonetheless, the assessments carried out at the time by the EC in the context of the 
legislative  proposal,  allow  to  estimate  expectations  about  the  main  (quantitative) 
impacts and to derive key metrics on how the achievement of success was to be assessed. 
The possible monitoring indicators proposed in the UTP IA 2018, in combination with the 
estimated impacts, and actual monitoring arrangements are used to establish the points of 
comparison for the purpose of this evaluation. 

For  economic  operators:  notwithstanding  assessment  challenges,  impacts  were 
quantitatively  estimated  in  terms  of  orders  of  magnitude.  Direct  benefits  in  terms  of 
avoided harm by eradicating  the occurrence of UTPs were estimated between EUR 2.5 
billion to 8 billion per year (EUR 1 billion to 3.3 billion for agricultural SMEs and EUR 
1.5 billion to 4.7 billion for food SMEs) via a 1-2% of total annual turnover of operators 
estimation;  Indirect  benefits  of  improved  trust  in  the  food  supply  chain  and  related 
reduced transaction costs, increased level playing field  and coordination between national 
EAs as well as appropriate (pecuniary) remedies were not quantified. One off costs were 
found to be negligible to EUR 1.4 million; recurrent costs between zero to EUR 193 000 
per year, per non-SME operator (25). 

For consumers: no major impact was expected. 

For MSs: detailed analysis of the legal status quo at the time can be retrieved in Annexes 
F  and  G  of  the  UTP  IA  2018.  Some  MSs  had  already  legislation  in  place.  Table  1 
summarises expected benefits. One-off costs for national administrations: negligible to 
between EUR 228 000 and EUR 3 million per administration depending on the extent of 
pre-existing structures. Recurrent costs: negligible to between EUR 708 000 and EUR 3 
million per administration, per year depending on enforcement modalities and already pre-
existing  enforcement,  as  well  as  EUR  950  median  value  per  administration  year  for 
attending an annual EU level coordination meeting. 

(24)  See UTP IA 2018 p.51. To contextualise the analysis, it should be noted that the EU co-legislators in 
exercising  their  legislative  prerogatives,  amended  the  legislative  proposal;  in  some  parts  also 
substantially. These amendments are taken into account e.g., in the presentation of the intervention logic 
above. However, as there are no publicly available impact estimations of amendments, their expected 
impacts are accounted for in view of establishing the points of comparison  here only where feasible. 
Key  amendments  included:  adding  black  practices,  transforming  proposed  grey  practices  into  black 
ones; adding grey practices; introducing a set of  legislation-specific thresholds, beyond the proposed 
definition that in the proposal had followed Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning 
the  definition  of  micro,  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises.  E.g.  not  including  headcounts  of  a 
company. 

The  four originally proposed black UTPs, to a  large  extend linked to  perishability, included: i)  late 
payments above 30 days of perishable products, ii) cancellation of orders of perishable food products 
short notice, iii) unilateral and retroactive change in the terms of the supply, and iv) banning the practice 
of forcing a supplier to pay for the wastage of food products occurring on the buyer's premises.  

(25)  See Annex 3 of UTP IA 2018, p. 93 and Section 6.2.1 p.53. Note that estimates were made at a time 

when the United Kingdom was part of the EU. 

13 

 
 
 
 
Table 1: Overview of the benefits of the proposed UTP measures. 

Benefit 

Benefitting MSs 

Potential 
Impact 

Introduction of a UTP regime (Annex F, Table n.1)  

4 (EE, LU, MT, NL) 

Large 

More comprehensive UTP approach (Annex F, Table n.1)  

4 (BE, DK, FI, SE) 

Medium  

Extension of UTP regime beyond retailers (Annex F, Table n.3)   5 (LT, CZ, HU, IE, UK)   Medium 

Added enforcement of UTP rules (Annex F, Table n.6 & n.7)  

Level playing field for competition  

Coordination across MS  

8 (EE, LU, MT, NL,  
BE, DK, FI, SE)  

28 (all)  

28 (all)  

Medium 

Small 

Medium  

Source: UTP IA 2018, p.59; References in the table point to Annexes of the UTP IA 2018, not of the present 
document. UK  was part of the EU at the time of the UTP  IA  2018. For abbreviations of MSs codes see 
Eurostat. 

Socio-economic and environmental impacts (26) were expected in terms of  i) improved 
predictability of business relations for economic operators in the agri-food supply chain; 
ii) increased trust between partners and a strengthening of the `Supply Chain Initiative´; 
iii) positive impact in terms of social cohesion by virtue of approximating commercially 
relevant  conditions  for operators  active in  the production and trade of food products  in 
MSs; iv) complementarity with voluntary initiatives at MS level to enhance the importance 
of voluntary dispute resolution; and v) no significant, direct impact on the environment. 
Operators who are not subject to UTPs may, however, be left with more economic margin 
to invest in producing in environmentally sustainable ways and to prevent food waste. 

The UTP IA 2018 also discussed other expected impacts including: how a specific list of 
prohibited UTPs  would  be  preferable to  a general  (‘principles-based’) prohibition; how 
covering  both  agricultural  products  and  food  products  would  avoid  potential  negative 
impacts; the scope in terms of operators: (i) all operators in the food supply chain protected 
or  protection  restricted  to  weaker  operators;  (ii)  question  of  coverage  of  third-country 
suppliers  possibly  opening the door for trade diversion if not covered;  the enforcement 
modalities including coordination: value of coordination would lie in working towards the 
harmonised  application  of  EU  UTP  rules,  including  a  EU  Network (27);  type  of  legal 
instrument to be used: the option of detailed harmonisation was discarded because of the 
expected impracticability and resistance by MSs given the already existing legislation in 
some  MSs  and  the  to  some  degree  different  structures  for  the  agri-food  supply  chain 
acrossthe EU (28). 

(26)  See UTP IA 2018, p.61. 

(27)  According to MSs, the costs of annual reporting would go from no additional costs, as they would be 
integrated in the existing operational costs, to up to EUR 20 000. Participating in an annual coordination 
meeting in Brussels: median value EUR 950 per year (average EUR 1 327). In addition, the costs for the 
EC of organising the coordination meeting were estimated at EUR 17 000. ICT costs, mainly related to 
setting up and running an online coordination platform, were estimated at EUR 50 000. 

(28)  For  an  overview  see  for  example  Key  Figures  on  the  European  Food  Chain  –  2024  Edition  and  its 

previous edition in 2021 as well as historic data on the EU agri-food data portal. 

14 

 
 
 
 
The  points  of  comparison,  along  which  the  actual  situation  presented  above  will  be 
compared with the expected situation, are presented in the following paragraphs (29). 

In  order  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the 
Directive have been effective in reducing the occurrence of UTPs listed in the Directive, 
the following approaches have been followed by this evaluation:  

A first approach consists in considering the number of UTP cases handled by EAs in the 
27  MSs,  especially,  but  not  exclusively,  in  terms  of  investigations  resulting  in  an 
infringement – this metric has the merit of being an objective starting point, based on data 
from EAs; however, it is arguably incomplete as ´the efficiency of a public enforcement 
regime is not necessarily a function of the number of its enforcement cases; nor can its 
effectiveness  be  measured  by  exclusively  counting  decisions  by  competent  UTP 
authorities.´  (30).  

For these reasons, this approach is complemented by the perception of stakeholders on 
the occurrence of UTPs. This has the merit of considering the UTPs that do not result in 
a  formal  investigation,  complaint  or  litigation.  However,  the  metric  can  be  subject  to 
limitations linked, among others, to the understanding, perceptions and possible biases of 
consulted stakeholders. 

A  second  angle  to  effectiveness  consists  in  the  assessment  of  the  effectiveness  of 
enforcement measures, introduced to fight UTPs, including preventive or less formal 
measures. This assessment relies on the collected evidence to determine which preventive 
approaches, such as ex-ante/guidance measures, are deemed more effective in reducing the 
occurrence  of  UTPs,  and  which  enforcement  measures  appear  to  be  more  effective  in 
combating UTPs and providing relief to victims, responding to UTPs once they occur (ex 
post). 

A third angle, the evaluation assesses to what extent the implementation and enforcement 
of the Directive have been effective in relation to  cooperation among competent EAs 
and  the  ability  to  effectively  address  cross-border  cases.  The  assessment  relies  on  the 
number and perceived contribution of cooperation initiatives. 

Moreover, the Directive’s contribution in mitigating the negative impact of UTPs on the 
living standards of the agricultural community is addressed, in the context of the wider 
legislative  framework  in  which  the  Directive  is  embedded,  with  particular  attention  to 
coherence across the various levels of intervention. 

A further dimension to assess the degree of success of the Directive consists in considering 
whether the costs accrued to the various stakeholders are in line with the expectations and 
proportionate to the benefits as well as if these accrue to the same stakeholder category 
along the supply chain and across MSs. 

(29)  A more detailed explanation is available in Annex III Evaluation matrix. 

(30)  UTP IA 2018, p. 70. An increase in reported cases, might be a symptom of an increased occurrence in 
UTPs.  It  might  be  also  a  result  of  an  increased  enforcement  activity  without  any  correlation  on  the 
occurrence of UTPs on the ground. 

15 

 
 
 
 
Background information on inflation at various levels and market concentration levels in 
the  different  stages  of  the  agri-food  supply  chain  are  important  to  appropriately 
contextualise the findings. 

3.  HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD?  

Having described how the Directive was intended to function, identifying expectations and 
ways to compare them to what actually happened, this section provides a factual summary 
of  the  evolution  and  current  state  of  play  of  the  Directive’s  implementation  after  its 
adoption, both from a legal angle as well as from an ´on the ground` perspective.  

MSs had to notify transposition measures of the Directive by May 2021, approximately 
two years after its adoption and apply those transposition measures by November 2021. 
However, no MS had notified all transposition measures for a complete transposition of 
the Directive by May 2021 (31). The Directive is hence only applicable since end 2022 in 
all MSs. Furthermore, existing contracts had to be brought in line within 12 months after 
publication of national measures. This leaves mere two full years – three years at best – 
for effects of the UTP Directive to be captured in the present evaluation. 

MSs’ transposition choices went well beyond the minimum harmonisation level set in 
the Directive  

The  accompanying  SWD  to  the  UTP  Report  2024  presents  an  overview  of  MSs’ 
transposition  choices  of  the  Directive  into  their  national  legal  orders  as  well  as  their 
notification date to the EC.  

In terms of instrument choice, the Directive allows MSs to choose how they incorporate 
its provisions into their national legal orders. 13 MSs, including Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, 
and Ireland, introduced new and separate legislation specifically for UTPs. By contrast, 14 
MSs,  including  Austria, Belgium,  and  Germany,  chose  to  amend  existing  legislation  to 
transpose the Directive. This, in most cases, but not all (see e.g. Italy) reflects the presence 
of an already more or less developed UTP-related legal framework before the adoption of 
the Directive. 

In view of the scope of application and business size, the Directive sets a threshold of EUR 
350 million turnover below which suppliers are protected, but MSs can extend this scope. 
Some MSs chose to protect suppliers beyond this threshold. For example, Lithuania has 
legislation that applies  to  retailers with  significant  power,  defined as having  at  least  20 
stores with a surface area of at least 400 m2, and an aggregate income of not less than EUR 
116  million.  6  MSs  transposed  the  Directive  regardless  of  business  size  i.e.  albeit  with 
some exceptions, not sticking to the turnover thresholds of the Directive. 6 MSs followed 
the  threshold  logic  targeting  business  relationships  between  suppliers  whose  annual 
turnover is lower than a given threshold, and buyers whose annual turnover is higher than 
the same threshold. 13 MSs enlarged the scope on business size to varying degrees. 

(31)  23 MSs did in 2021mostly in the third quarter (Q3) of the year and 4 MSs in 2022. Timing is roughly in 
line with transposition of Single Market Directives. See Single Market Scoreboard.  Annex II presents 
a more detailed elaboration on how this affects the evaluation.  

16 

 
 
 
 
Overall, MSs followed the distinction between black and grey practices (except Hungary 
which does not follow the distinction). 16 MSs added practices to the list of black UTPs. 
For specific types of UTPs, certain MSs chose to go beyond the minimum level by, for 
example, applying stricter terms for payment delays (11 MSs). 

Regarding enforcement measures and penalties, MSs designated EAs, with a high degree 
of  variation  regarding  the  types  of  authorities  they  empower  and  their  enforcement 
strategies. Germany, for example, designated its Federal Office for Agriculture and Food 
as  a  sector-specific  authority,  while  other  MSs,  like  Bulgaria,  designated  their  national 
competition  authorities.  When  considering  financial  penalties  and  remedies,  different 
choices of MSs beyond the minimum level are apparent as well. For instance, the minimum 
and maximum thresholds for fines and other equally effective penalties (where existing) 
vary ranging from EUR 5 (Germany) to EUR 5 000 (Slovenia) for minimum amounts and 
EUR 2 329.37 (Malta) to EUR 2.5 million (Portugal) for maximum amounts, or from 0.2% 
(Latvia)  to  10%  (Czechia,  Hungary,  Italy,  the  Netherlands)  of  the  infringing  party´s 
turnover for maximum amounts. 

The Directive allows for stricter regulations at the national level. Some MSs have adopted 
more protective measures, such as shorter payment terms than the Directive's prescribed 
30 and 60 days for perishable and non-perishable goods, respectively. For instance, Poland 
has  implemented  stricter  conditions  on  contract  cancellations  to  enhance  supplier 
protections. Certain MSs have introduced prohibitions on pricing practices that exceed the 
Directive's  requirements.  For  example,  some  MSs  may  have  bans  on  selling  below 
production cost (32). 

In  sum,  the  UTP  Directive  established  a  minimally  harmonised  baseline  for  addressing 
UTPs providing for a more uniform approach than before the adoption of the Directive 
across  the  EU.  Although  now  a  minimum  protection  is  granted  in  the  whole  EU,  MSs 
exercised the foreseen discretion in several areas. This resulted in variations in legislative 
instruments, scope, enforcement mechanisms, and more in general, diversity across MS 
choosing to add new practices to the list of UTPs while maintaining the minimum level of 
protection. These changes can be partly explained by the necessity to align to pre-existing 
legislation and to fill the enforcement gaps that had emerged in cases where legislation 
was present. 

MSs that have transposed closer to the minimum harmonisation level of the Directive are 
in general MSs without any pre existing specific legislative framework to address UTPs. 
MSs with pre existing rules tended to expand the scope of application of the Directive and 
maintained the wider scope of application of pre-existing legislation. 

Transposition  checks  and  conformity  checks  of  the  transposition  measures  by  the  EC 
showed variations in transposition choices by Member States and in the level of protection 
of national transposition laws, in particular in relation to the possibility for  buyers to cancel 
orders of perishable products under Article 3(1)(b)), the charging of payments as referred 
to in Article 3(2)(b), and the transposition of Article 3(4), whereby  MS must ensure the 
black and grey UTPs listed in the Directive constitute mandatory provisions overriding any 
other rules that would apply to a supply agreement. Conformity checks are still ongoing 

(32)  For an analysis of the topic spanning also beyond selling below production cost see ´Study on regulatory 

and voluntary schemes for fair agricultural remuneration´ (DOI: 10.2762/0016025)  

17 

 
 
 
 
for the transposition measures of some MSs. Some MSs have amended their transposing 
legislation after the notification of transposition. These changes as notified to the EC are 
reflected  in  the  UTP  Report  2024  and  accompanying  SWD  up  to  1  March  2024.  In 
addition,  Belgium,  Germany  and  Ireland  have introduced  changes to  their  transposition 
measures in the remainder of 2024. 

Enforcement of MSs differs  

Each MS has set up an EA entrusted with at least the six defined powers set out in the 
Directive. 

Some  MSs  had  already  dedicated  authorities  enforcing  UTP-related  national  legislation 
(e.g. Spain). Other MSs set up new entities or delegated enforcement powers to established 
entities,  for  instance,  competition  authorities  (e.g.,  Sweden,  Poland),  or  consumer 
authorities  (e.g.,  Belgium).  In  most  MSs,  enforcement  measures  and  mechanisms  are 
organised as administrative enforcement.  In such cases,  administrative decisions can be 
challenged  before  courts  in  accordance  with  national  procedural  laws.  In  some  MSs, 
enforcement  is  reserved  to  courts  (e.g.  imposition  of  penalties  in  Austria,  Finland;  in 
France courts may adopt injunctions, corrective measures and civil penalties at the request 
of the administrative authority). 

Enforcement, besides the transposition choices of MS and the powers given to EAs, is also 
influenced by the availability of resources and the enforcement strategy chosen (see more 
below in Section 4.1 and Annex VI Summary of EAs enforcement activities). 

The  number  of  UTP  cases  handled  by  EAs  in  the  27  MSs,  with  the  related  share  of 
investigations  resulting  in  an  infringement,  can  be  drawn  from  annual  reporting  EAs 
submit to the EC. Table 2 provides yearly aggregate numbers. 

Table 2: Activity reports of EAs – reporting periods 2021- 2024 

Number of complaints received 

Number of guidance cases 

Number of ex officio cases opened 

Number of investigations opened 

Number of investigations closed 

2021(a) 

2022 

2023 

2024 

Total 

15 

n.a. 

172 

170 

66 

178 

809 

277 

673 

223 

564 

693 

2 046 

1 393 

1 113 

1 306 

3 984 

1 437 

1 590 

1 413 

4 610 

812 

1 021 

563 

2 462 

Number of investigations resulting in finding an 
infringement 

- 

218 

271 

265 

754 

Source: Evaluation support study and own computations based on MSs notifications to the EC. (a) 15 MS 
(out of 27) notified their national implementing measures to the EC by 31 July 2021 (complete transposition 
of the Directive). 

EAs opened a total of 4 610 investigations in the four years considered (2021-24): Around 
53%  (2 462)  of  these  investigations  were  closed  over  this  period.  Of  the  2 462 
investigations opened in total between 2021 and 2024, 90 % were reported by four MSs 
(Cyprus, Spain, Hungary, Italy), with 13 EAs from other MSs reporting a limited number 
(each less than 5) of opened investigations. 

18 

 
 
 
 
Out of the opened investigations, 754 (30% of closed investigations) resulted in findings 
of  infringement.  The  total  amount  of  fines  for  established  infringements  amounted  to 
EUR 15.1 million  in  2022  and  EUR 24.4 million  in  2023  (EUR  20  million  amount  to 
Poland only). In 2024, the fines in the EU amounted to EUR 2.4 million (33).  

In the first years of implementation, some EAs (e.g., in Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania and 
the Netherlands) concentrated significant efforts on awareness raising and outreach, and 
less on enforcement strictly speaking.  

Guidance cases where EAs provide guidance about how they apply the law were also used, 
especially in 2022. This approach was linked to the low number of complaints received in 
some  MSs.  The  need  to  build  up  the  EA’s  reputation  and  trustworthiness  among 
stakeholders, and to raise awareness among operators on UTP legislation are key concerns 
for consulted EAs. 

At  the  same  time,  some  EAs  increased  the  number  of  ex  officio  inspections  performed 
(Belgium, Italy, Spain, Lithuania) i.e. cases started by an EA on its own initiative, as a way 
to  overcome  the  issue  of  limited  complaints  received.  Ex  officio  inspections  are  often 
performed on the grounds of risk-based assessments of sectors/stages of the supply chain. 
Ex officio cases opened by EAs may be based on the findings of an inspection or of other 
information  gathering  tools.  In  line  with  data  on  investigations  closed  provided  above, 
Cyprus, Spain, Hungary and Italy reported the highest number of ex officio cases opened 
in the 2021-24 period. More details can be found in Annex V Stakeholders’ consultation 
- Synopsis report. As explained in more detail in 4.1 To what extent was the intervention 
successful and why?, enforcement strategies and enforcement costs differ between MSs. 

A key element and reason for EU level intervention  was the need to be able to address 
cross-border  cases.  In  line  with  Article  8  of  the  Directive  on  the  requirements  on 
cooperation  among  EAs,  the  EC  facilitated  the  setting  up  of  the  UTP  Enforcement 
Network, composed of representatives of EAs. The Enforcement Network aims to ensure 
a common approach concerning the application of the rules set out in the Directive and the 
sharing  of  good  practices,  of  new  developments  and  of  new  enforcement  tools. 
Additionally, it may issue recommendations as part of its collaborative efforts in enhancing 
the  enforcement  framework.  Between  June  2022  and  October  2025,  the  Enforcement 
Network met three times at the level of heads of the EAs, twice at technical level and once 
in  a  mixed  setting.  Six  additional  focus  meetings  for  in-depth  discussions  on  specific 
technical topics (e.g., the calculation of turnover thresholds, cross-border enforcement, and 
buying alliances) were organised in the same time span.  

In  addition  to  the  Network’s  meetings,  some  EAs  reported  bilateral  or  multilateral 
exchanges  and/  or  cooperation  initiatives  between  EAs.  For  example,  the  Swedish  EA 
maintains regular contact with other EAs in Nordic countries; the Italian EA implemented 
cooperation activities with the EAs of Spain, France, Portugal, Sweden and Denmark in 
2022 and 2023.  

The survey of national public authorities, covering those responsible for transposition of 
the Directive and EAs, carried out in the context of the external support study confirmed 

(33) The amounts of fines may yet be subject to changes as in some cases they were/are still confidential or 

in the administrative process and therefore not included in the total. 

19 

 
 
 
 
that the number of cooperation initiatives increased after the Directive’s implementation. 
75  %  of  respondents  reported  that  cooperation  initiatives  improved  to  some  extent  the 
effectiveness  of enforcement activities related to  the UTP Directive mainly  through the 
exchange of investigative methods, experiences, and best practices to fight UTPs; periodic 
round table meetings to facilitate cooperation; an online system designed to facilitate the 
exchange of information across EAs set up by the EC. The EC also set up a public webpage 
directing amongst others to information of national EAs. 

Positive trend of declining UTPs experienced by operators on the ground 

The perception of affected stakeholders on the occurrence of UTPs sheds some further 
light  on  whether  and  how  the  situation  has  evolved  following  the  transposition  of  the 
Directive, complementing the metrics related to enforcement. 

According to the recurring survey of suppliers run by the JRC there is a diminishing trend 
for all UTPs when compared to the baseline survey (wave 1) (dark blue line in Figure 4). 
This trend came to a halt in the last survey (wave 5) carried out at the end of 2024. Black 
UTPs  (numbers  1  to  10)  are  more  frequently  experienced  by  suppliers  than  grey  UTPs 
(numbers 11 to 16), which appear to be less widespread. 

Figure 4 Evolution of experienced UTPs. 

50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

1st wave (baseline)

2nd wave

3rd wave

4th wave

5th wave

Source: JRC UTP survey. Due to readability the full name of UTPs is not displayed here. For the full name 
of UTPs please see Section 2. Question: `Have you experienced any of the following practices during the 
last three years with one of your buyers? ´ Note: the ´last 3 years´ refers to full calendar years, e.g. the period 
2017-19 etc. Participation to the JRC survey is open to all agri-food suppliers on a voluntary basis: the sample 
is thus not selected and non-constant. 

20 

 
 
 
 
29.5 % of respondents in 2024 (5th wave) were not aware of the Directive (34). The share 
of  non-awareness  increases  to  39.7 %  among  agricultural  producers.  Among  the  most 
frequently  experienced  UTPs  are unilateral  contract  changes by the buyer and payment 
delays for non-perishable products were experienced by over 25 % of respondents in the 
JRC  surveys,  although  both  have  decreased  in  incidence  since  2020 (35).  Generally 
speaking,  late  payments  may  be  easier  to  ascertain,  compared  to  other  UTPs,  since 
evidence on the time of payment can often be retrieved. They also appear to be the most 
frequently experienced UTPs (36). More evidence pertaining to the evolution on the ground 
can be found in Section 4 and Annex V. 

Case study the Netherlands- Focus on Pig meat, sugar and potato supply chains (Source: evaluation 
support study)  

The Dutch Unfair Trading Practices Act for the Agri-Food Supply Chain (UTP Act, 2021) incorporated the Directive 
into Dutch legal order. Its implementation in the Netherlands meets the Directive's minimum standards through a 
direct transposition. Before the UTP Act 2021, there were no specific rules governing unfair trading practices in the 
agri-food supply chain, aside from regulations on late payments.  

The  Dutch  Authority  for  Consumers  and  Markets  (ACM)  is  responsible  for  enforcing  the  UTP  Act  and  has  the 
authority  to  impose  penalties,  including  fines,  similar  to  those  in  competition  and  consumer  law  enforcement.  A 
unique feature of the Dutch implementation is the Dispute Resolution Committee for Unfair Trading Practices in the 
Agricultural and Food Supply Chain, which assists in resolving disputes between agri-food suppliers and buyers in 
the Netherlands and is also authorised to handle UTP cases. 

Regarding the prevalence of unfair trading practices in the Netherlands, the number of cases processed by the ACM 
and the Dispute Resolution Committee under the UTP Act so far seems to be quite limited, with only the  Vion pig 
slaughterhouse case and the Lactalis dairy processor case reported. This limited activity might be due to a lack of 
awareness among stakeholders about the UTP Act; several stakeholders consulted in the three supply chains examined 
in the case study (pig meat, sugar, potatoes) confirmed this lack of awareness. A survey carried out by the ACM in 
2022 and presented in a report indicated that most respondents encounter few  UTPs in their sectors. However, this 
does not apply to all practices, such as late payments and last-minute cancellations. 

Case  study  Spain  –  Focus  on  Wine  and  Fruit  and  Vegetables  (F&V)  supply  chains  (Source: 
evaluation support study) 

Spain has considerable experience with legislating on UTPs, beginning with the introduction of the 'Ley de la cadena' 
in 2013. Many of the provisions included in the Directive were already addressed by this law. Since then, the law has 
been  amended  twice,  in  2020  and  2021.  Spanish  legislation  continues  to  extend  significantly  beyond  the  UTP 
Directive.  As  of  the  end  of  2023,  the  Agencia  de  Información  y  Control  Alimentarios  (AICA)  had  initiated 
approximately  2 000  disciplinary  actions  for  non-compliance  with  the  law  since  its  inception,  with  Autonomous 
Communities also conducting inspections at the regional level.  

The most frequently identified unfair trading practice is non-compliance with payment deadlines, accounting for about 
40%  of  cases,  followed  by  the  absence  of  contracts,  which  makes  up  20%.  Wholesalers  are  the  most  frequently 
sanctioned entities in the supply chain, followed by the processing industry. Operators in the fruit and vegetable and 
wine sectors are the most commonly penalised. 

(34) Number of respondents: 434. The 4th wave of the survey (2023/2024) had 1 511 respondents, 38 % of 

which were not aware of the Directive. 

(35)  These results are in line with the survey of SMEs where the two most prevalent UTPs were payment 
delays over the 30- and 60-days limits, followed by the cancellation of orders for perishable agri-food 
products at short-notice. 

(36)  In September 2023 the EC proposed  a Regulation on combating late payment in commercial transactions 
explicitly also addressing the agri-food supply chain (see Articles 2 and 3). It proposes more stringent 
conditions for payment terms. If adopted by the co-legislators as proposed, the Regulation would, in 
general, apply also to the agri-food sector. 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Unintended effects mainly linked to differences in transpositions by MSs on elements 
going beyond the minimum requirements 

Unintended  effects  of  the  Directive  are  understood  to  include  any  effects  caused  by  its 
implementation  and  enforcement  that  differ  from  the  ones  that  were  pursued  by  the 
Directive, as identified by the intervention logic in Section 2.1. A certain unintended effect 
may be seen as negative by some stakeholders, and as positive (or at least neutral) by other 
stakeholders. 

The results of the three surveys of the external support study provide a broad appraisal of 
the  perceived  occurrence  of  the  unintended  effects  of  the  Directive  and/or  of  its 
transposition  at  national  level  within  stakeholder  groups.  There  are  some  significant 
differences  in  the  prevailing  perceptions  within  each  group.  The  majority  of  public 
authorities did not identify any unintended effects, whereas important parts of surveyed 
business  associations  and  in  particular  retailers  identified  mostly  unintended  negative 
effects (37). Interviews (including in the context of case studies) confirmed the trends that 
emerged  from  the  surveys.  Several  business  stakeholders  (together  with  most  experts 
interviewed in the context of the evaluation support study) highlighted certain unintended 
effects  of  the  Directive  and/or  of  the  national  transposing  legislation.  Uncertainties 
regarding  legal  requirements  for  intra-EU  cross-border  supplies  of  agri-food 
products,  due  to  differences  in  the  transposition  of  the  Directive,  emerged  as  a 
recurrently  perceived  unintended  negative  effect  across  the  three  surveyed  groups 
(CAs/EAs,  business  associations,  retailers).  This  was  also  the  case  with  the  related 
perceived  inconsistent  enforcement  of  the  Directive  in  intra-EU  cross-border  UTP 
cases. Another noteworthy identified unintended negative effect was the protection given 
also to large suppliers, due to the removal of turnover thresholds in national transposing 
legislation. Few and no major unintended positive effects of the Directive/of national 
implementing legislation were highlighted by stakeholders. 

The agri-food sector experienced disruptive external pressures  in the first years of 
implementation of the Directive 

The  first  years  of  the  Directive  coincided  with  a  period  marked  by  several  exceptional 
external  factors  notably  the  COVID-19 (38)  pandemic  and  Russia’s  war  of  aggression 
against  Ukraine.  These  have  influenced,  among  others,  price  levels  and  input  costs 
especially in the period covered by this evaluation. Figure 5 depicts the evolution of price 
levels for  farmers, processors and consumers with respect  to  2015.  Figure 6 shows the 

(37)  More  precisely,  63 %  of  CAs/EAs  (24  respondents)  did  not  identify  major  unintended  effects;  this 
perception is less widespread among national business associations (35 % of 111 respondents), EU-level 
business  associations  (31 %  of  16  respondents)  and  retailers  (16 % of 73 respondents). The  share  of 
respondents that identified mostly negative unintended effects is the highest among retailers (73 % of 
73 respondents), and decreases moving from national business associations (35 % of 111 respondents) 
to CAs/EAs (21 % of 24 respondents) and EU-level business associations (19 % of 16 respondents). 

(38)  While many stakeholders mention the negative effects of COVID-19 in increasing UTPs, it is interesting 
to note that in the baseline survey, when asked about the effect of COVID-19 on UTPs´ occurrence: 
Food Chain - UTP  - survey results. 75 % of  the 759 respondents across different agricultural supply 
chains indicated that they were not affected in terms of increased occurrence of UTPs. 

22 

 
 
 
 
price evolution for selected agricultural inputs. Figure 7 compares the evaluation consumer 
price inflation with price inflation for food, which has sharply risen in the past years. 

Figure 5: Price transmission along the food chain (Index 2015=100). 

170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90

Farmer price index

Processor price index

Consumer price index

Source: Agri food data portal based on Eurostat. Farmer prices (blue): what the farmer receives. Processor 
prices (orange): what the processed product costs to greengrocers and to supermarket purchase department. 
Consumer prices (green): what consumers pay at the store. All compared to their respective base level in 
2015 (vertical axis).  

Figure 6: Index of purchase prices for means of agricultural production (Index 2020 
=100). 

270
250
230
210
190
170
150
130
110
90
70

1
Q
-
5
1
0
2

4
Q
-
5
1
0
2

1
Q
-
6
1
0
2

2
Q
-
6
1
0
2

3
Q
-
6
1
0
2

4
Q
-
6
1
0
2

1
Q
-
7
1
0
2

2
Q
-
7
1
0
2

3
Q
-
7
1
0
2

4
Q
-
7
1
0
2

2
Q
-
8
1
0
2

3
Q
-
8
1
0
2

4
Q
-
8
1
0
2

1
Q
-
9
1
0
2

2
Q
-
9
1
0
2

3
Q
-
9
1
0
2

4
Q
-
9
1
0
2

1
Q
-
0
2
0
2

2
Q
-
0
2
0
2

3
Q
-
0
2
0
2

4
Q
-
0
2
0
2

1
Q
-
1
2
0
2

2
Q
-
1
2
0
2

3
Q
-
1
2
0
2

4
Q
-
1
2
0
2

1
Q
-
2
2
0
2

2
Q
-
2
2
0
2

3
Q
-
2
2
0
2

1
Q
-
3
2
0
2

2
Q
-
3
2
0
2

3
Q
-
3
2
0
2

4
Q
-
3
2
0
2

1
Q
-
4
2
0
2

3
Q
-
4
2
0
2

4
Q
-
4
2
0
2

Animal feedingstuffs

Energy; lubricants

Fertilisers and soil improvers

Input total (Input 1 + Input 2)

Machinery and other equipment

Seeds and planting stock

Source: Agri food data portal. The index of purchase prices of the means of agricultural production measures 
the change in the prices paid by domestic producers (farmers) for their intermediate inputs, at EU-27 level. 
The index covers key inputs such as fertilisers, energy, animal feed, seeds, and other essential resources. All 
compared to their respective base level in 2015 (vertical axis). 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Consumer general and food price inflation evolution (Index 2015=100). 

160

150

140

130

120

110

100

90

5
1
0
2
-
1
0

5
1
0
2
-
5
0

5
1
0
2
-
9
0

6
1
0
2
-
1
0

6
1
0
2
-
5
0

6
1
0
2
-
9
0

7
1
0
2
-
1
0

7
1
0
2
-
5
0

7
1
0
2
-
9
0

8
1
0
2
-
1
0

8
1
0
2
-
5
0

8
1
0
2
-
9
0

9
1
0
2
-
1
0

9
1
0
2
-
5
0

9
1
0
2
-
9
0

0
2
0
2
-
1
0

0
2
0
2
-
5
0

0
2
0
2
-
9
0

1
2
0
2
-
1
0

1
2
0
2
-
5
0

1
2
0
2
-
9
0

2
2
0
2
-
1
0

2
2
0
2
-
5
0

2
2
0
2
-
9
0

3
2
0
2
-
1
0

3
2
0
2
-
5
0

3
2
0
2
-
9
0

4
2
0
2
-
1
0

4
2
0
2
-
5
0

4
2
0
2
-
9
0

5
2
0
2
-
1
0

EU Food price inflation

EU General price inflation

Source: AGRI food data portal based on Eurostat. Much richer and more granular data are available on the 
portal at product category level as well as MSs level. Monthly data. 

4.  EVALUATION FINDINGS 

4.1.  To what extent was the intervention successful and why?  

Heterogeneous approaches and level of enforcement by EAs  

The number of infringements found, 754 in the four years from 2021 to 2024 compared to 
the large number of existing contracts and sales transactions in the EU agri-food sector (39), 
has been interpreted by some stakeholders – especially in the retail stage – as an indication 
that UTPs have been largely phased out from the market. On the contrary, associations 
representing  agricultural producers  and –  to  some extent  – processors, do not  share the 
same positive view on the number of infringements. The fear of retaliation is deemed to 
still  be  an  important  factor  behind  the  small  number  of  complaints  received,  limiting 
enforcement against UTPs. In general, it is necessary to account for this polarisation of 
views when delving into further outcomes of the analysis. 

According to insights from the case studies and interviews of the evaluation support study, 
ways to tackle UTPs less formally than filing a complaint, opening an investigation and 
finding an infringement appear to play an important role in some MSs. For example: i) in 
France, mediation through the Mediator service is mandatory before any referral of a case 
to  civil  courts;  ii)  in  Germany,  some  investigations  were  discontinued  after  the  alleged 
perpetrator cooperated with the EA to end the practice; iii) in Denmark some UTP issues 
were solved through dialogue between the parties and the reference business associations; 
iv)  in  Austria  the  `Fairness  Office´  serves  as  a  first  point  of  contact,  carrying  out  a 
confidential  and  anonymous  analysis  of  complaints.  Only  after  this  preliminary 

(39)  According  to  Eurostat  Key  figures  on  the  European  Food  Chain  2024  edition  the  number  of 
holdings/enterprises in the agriculture, food and beverage processing and food and beverage wholesaling 
and  retailing  stages  in 2022  amounted  to overall  10.1  million.  (p.10)  Contracts  are  very likely  to be 
multiple of these; commercial transactions an even higher multiple. 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
examination, and with the consent of the affected party, the case is forwarded to the EA 
(Federal Competition Authority) for formal investigations. 

The number of enforcement activities and especially infringement cases do not seem to be 
strongly correlated with the occurrence of UTPs on the ground but rather dependent on the 
strategic choices on, among other factors, enforcement of EAs, the previous experience in 
enforcement due to pre-existing national legislation, the amount of resources available for 
enforcement, and the size and structure of the agricultural sector in a given MS (40). For 
instance, the share of agricultural production in gross value added along the food chain 
varies across the EU from just below 10 % in Malta and Luxembourg to around 50 % in 
Bulgaria and Romania. 

Figure 8: Share for primary producers in gross value added along the food chain (%). 

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Source: Agri food data portal- Adding value.  

2012

2021

2022

In terms of integration of the agricultural supply chain at the level of primary producers 
the situation is also heterogeneous. For instance, in the fruit and vegetable sector the share 
of  production  marketed  by  recognised  producer  organisations  varies  between  virtually 
none in some MSs to shares of 85% in Belgium (average 2018-2022). 

(40)  The Agri food data portal presents a vast array of indicators depicting this heterogeneity. For instance 

through analytical factsheets about the agricultural sector at EU and MSs levels. 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure  9: Average  share  of  fruit  and  vegetables  production  marketed  by  recognised 
producer organisations 2018-2022 (%). 

85

46

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

66 66

67

65

57

54

33

33

22

43

33

18

21

15

71

36

18

3

6

0

2

3 0

0

1 0

Source: Agri food data portal- Adding value 

Moreover,  EAs  also  enforce  national  transposing  legislation  that  in  some  cases  goes 
beyond  the  minimum  requirements  of  the  Directive.  The  number  of  infringements 
presented here and in Section 3 and Annex V as well as enforcement activities in Annex VI 
should  be  read  in  light  of  the  rather  recent  transposition  of  the  Directive:  sufficient, 
dedicated resources for enforcement appear to not yet be available in all MSs.  

The available evidence does not yet allow to fully assess the extent to which MSs´ choices 
in  implementation  and  enforcement  affect  the  effectiveness  of  the  UTP  Directive, 
including in reducing the occurrence of UTPs and addressing the fear of retaliation. MSs´ 
choices  reflect  different  starting  points  and  needs  as  well  as  different  enforcement 
strategies, and most MS have not yet conducted an evaluation of their transposition choices 
including those elements that go beyond EU minimum rules. 

Diverging  perceptions  of  stakeholders  along  the  agri-food  supply  chain  on  the 
occurrence of UTPs 

For both black and grey UTPs, the relative majority of survey respondents (about 43 %) of 
the three surveys carried out in the context of the support study indicated that no change 
has been identified in the number of UTPs on the ground. Around 25% of respondents 
indicated that no UTPs have been identified at all, e.g., by their institution or among their 
members (in the case of associations). However, for roughly another 25% of respondents, 
the  number  of  identified  UTPs  has  diminished  over  the  years  of  application  of  the 
Directive and transposing legislation (41). For the majority of MSs, UTPs appear to have 
remained  stable,  or  no  UTPs  were  identified  according  to  surveyed  national  public 
authorities. However, in  Czechia, Germany, Denmark,  Ireland and Portugal  UTPs  have 
diminished after the transposition of the Directive according to the EAs. Aggregated views 

(41)  Figures 3.1. (p.17) and 3.2 (p.18) of the evaluation support study summarise the replies. Total number. 
of replies to this question: 144. Survey of public authorities: 24 replies from 20 MSs. Survey of sector 
associations: 15 replies from major EU-level associations, representing different stages of the agri-food 
supply chain; 105 replies from national associations, representing ~1.1 million member companies. 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
of stakeholders, as already highlighted, mask differences in perceptions when broken down 
by the stage in the agri-food supply chain (42). 

A  majority  of  associations  representing  agricultural  producers  (about  70 %  in 
dedicated survey for sectorial associations, (31 or 32 out of 45 for black and grey UTPs 
respectively) indicated that the number of UTPs (black and grey) remained the same after 
the implementation of the Directive. Nevertheless, the Directive is deemed by them to be 
a  significant  advancement  in  the  protection  of  primary  producers  as  numerous 
contracts between buyers and suppliers were revised and a common understanding around 
UTPs  is  spreading.  Hence,  the  Directive  is  perceived  positively  by  associations 
representing  farmers,  as  a  first  step  in  the  right  direction.  At  the  same  time,  these 
associations do not consider that there is evidence indicating an actual decrease in 
UTPs at EU level also due to the consistently high vulnerability given  external market 
disruptions. The JRC annual survey specifically for agricultural producers finds that late 
payments as well as unilateral contract changes have all diminished when comparing the 
baseline wave of 2020 with the last survey wave in 2024. 

Associations representing processors conveyed a more varied picture: about half of the 
survey respondents indicated no change either (especially in grey UTPs), but 45 % of them 
indicated a decrease in the occurrence of black UTPs and 33 % a decrease in grey UTPs. 
When further triangulating with other evidence sources, the Directive appears to be a first 
important step to rebalance contract practices in the supply chain, but the number of UTPs 
does  not  appear  to  have  substantially  decreased.  More  positive  outcomes  in  terms  of 
effectiveness  were  reported  specifically  in  view  of  the  respect  of  payment  terms  by 
retailers. Several consulted associations in the processing stage, across different sectors, 
reported a reduction of payment periods and that the 30 and 60-days payment terms are 
now respected in many MSs, at least as far as large retail chains are concerned.  

The  majority  of  survey  respondents  having  among  their  members  wholesalers  and 
retailers reported that no UTPs have been identified. There have been noticeable changes 
from  the  perspective  of  retailers  and  wholesalers.  Buyers  have  undergone  training,  and 
contracts have been updated in line with the Directive and transposing legislation. Overall, 
this stakeholder group reported that the occurrence of UTPs largely decreased following 
the Directive’s implementation. 

The Directive is also applicable to suppliers outside the EU if the buyer is located in the 
EU. The Directive is deemed a positive tool in this regard by stakeholders representing the 
segment.  However,  shortcomings  are  reported  in  terms  of  awareness  of  non-EU 
stakeholders similarly as for EU suppliers as well as possibilities to interact with national 
EA´s to submit complaints e.g. considering linguistic barriers. 

In  addition  to  the  above,  a  lack  of  awareness  of  the  Directive  may  still  be  an  issue  for 
smaller  suppliers,  especially  farmers.  Larger  suppliers  and  processors  tend  to  have 
moderate  levels  of  awareness  about  the  Directive  and  may  still  face  challenges  in 

(42)  These are broadly in line with the evaluation report of the EESC that also finds that while some progress 
has been made in reducing UTPs, they continue to occur in the MSs covered by the assessment (Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Germany, Hungary and Slovenia), and that different stakeholders, in line with what is presented 
here,  have  contrasting  views  on  the  degree  of  effectiveness  of  the  UTP  Directive  in  addressing  the 
occurrence of UTPs. 

27 

 
 
 
 
understanding their rights and obligations under the Directive. Awareness of the Directive 
fluctuates between 62% and 76% of respondents of the JRC survey to suppliers, with no 
clear trend across the different waves (43). 

UTPs occur throughout the agri-food supply chain  

Investigating  the  extent  of  possible  changes  in  pass-through  has  proven  challenging.  A 
comprehensive assessment was not possible. However, the JRC survey of suppliers also 
gathered insights on the stage of the supply chain where UTPs are mostly encountered 
(see  Figure  10).  For  agricultural  producers,  buyers  exposing  them  to  UTPs  are  equally 
primary processors, commodity traders, wholesaler, and retailers. In turn, processors claim 
retailers and wholesalers to be the main perpetrators of UTPs. 

Figure  10: Type  of  buyers  perpetrating  UTPs  according  to  JRC  survey  respondents 
(processors column left, agricultural producers column right). 

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

5th wave (2024) 

Retailers

Wholesalers

59%

Primary processing companies

50%

Commodity traders

32%

31%

31%

Commodity traders

14%

Secondary and further processing
companies

13%

Other

13%

Trader of intermediary products

11%

Primary processing companies

POs (including agricultural
cooperatives)

8%

2%

Other

5%

Commodity traders

4%

Secondary and further processing
companies

3%

Primary processing companies

3%

Trader of intermediary products

3%

Organisations of producers
(including agricultural…

1%

Wholesalers

Retailers

27%

Secondary and further processing
companies

Trader of intermediary products

20%

20%

POs (including agricultural
cooperatives)

15%

Other

13%

 1st wave - baseline (2020) 

Commodity traders

15%

Organisations of producers
(including agricultural cooperatives)

10%

Trader of intermediary products

7%

Secondary and further processing
companies

7%

Other

3%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

Retailers

54%

Wholesalers

21%

Wholesalers

28%

Primary processing companies

Retailers

19%

19%

Source: evaluation support study, elaboration of the results of the JRC survey – 5th wave (2024) and wave 
1 (2020) It was possible to select multiple profiling options. Wording of the question: ` In which stage of the 
agri-food supply chain do buyers that expose you to unfair trading practices mostly operate? ´. 

(43)  Similar findings have for instance also been reported at MS level in Sweden in the 2025 report comparing 

three previous surveys carried out by the Swedish EAs. 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex-ante measures are generally perceived positively to prevent UTPs 

Although an important focus in terms of enforcement of the Directive is  on deterrence, 
preventive approaches through ex ante or guidance measures have been introduced in some 
MSs aiming to change how operators behave in the agri-food supply chain in a way that 
reduces  the  likelihood  of  future  UTPs.  This  is  done  by  changing  the  business 
environment and/or introducing certain safeguards in the contractual relationship between 
suppliers and buyers.   

Combined results from all three surveys to businesses and public authorities reveal that (i) 
public  campaigns,  events,  workshops,  and  documentation  around  UTPs  to  increase 
awareness  amongst  agri-food  operators  and  (ii)  introduction  of  a  general  obligation  for 
written sales contracts in the national legal order are seen as effective measures. 

Retailers appear to deem both as generally effective, while stakeholders representing the 
farming stage of the agri-food supply chain view the first (i) set of measures (albeit with 
some notable exceptions in Ireland and Germany) as not having been very effective. The 
obligation to have written sales contracts (ii), which has been introduced by some MSs, is 
the only ex ante measure deemed effective by a large part of farmers’ representatives (45%) 
(44). 

In  addition  to  the  above,  some  less  widespread  preventive  approaches  were  identified 
positively  by  stakeholders.  Dialogue  between  operators  and  the  EA  appears  to  be 
important and effective, especially in the initial years of implementation of the Directive. 
The  appointment  of  an  internal  UTP  compliance  officer  for  `large  buyers´,  who 
exchanges with the relevant authority to verify and remove UTPs was deemed effective by 
26 % of respondents. Moreover, the availability of a consultation office within the CA 
or the EA, to which all businesses can address questions and/or ask for legal opinions was 
mentioned  by  multiple  public  authorities  as  a  way  to  provide  informal  guidance  to 
companies.  National  authorities  had  mixed  views  on  the  actual  preventive  effect  of 
information 
introducing 
anonymously  to  fight  UTPs.  Most  respondents  view  the  effectiveness  of  such  tools  in 
preventing/reducing UTPs ex ante as medium to low. Results are similar when the public 
authorities were asked to assess the effectiveness of `confidential tip-off´ mechanisms in 
combating UTPs once they occur. This scepticism appears to be linked to the persistence 
of `fear factor´ issues and to the actual anonymity of tip-offs. 

tip-off´  mechanisms 

`confidential 

to  share 

relevant 

Another  measure  with  a  primarily  preventive  focus  has  been  the  creation  of  an 
Ombudsman  to  help  mediation  between  parties,  and/or  to  help  in  the  preparation  of 
enquiries/complaints before the EA. This type of measure can be seen in connection with 
the promotion of voluntary alternative dispute resolution mechanisms under the Directive. 
While  in  place  in  some  Member  States,  such  mechanisms  were  reported  as  a  less 
adopted/known measure. However, where used (e.g.in Austria), this was judged positively 
by respondents across different categories. Mediation efforts are also favoured by retailers, 
in lieu of formal investigations. 

(44)  39  %  of  respondents  of  farming  representatives  indicated  however  that  the  increased  burden  for 
farmers/small suppliers is one of the (negative) unintended effects of the Directive (for example due 
to obligatory written contracts, shorter invoice periods and more complex contracts). 

29 

 
 
 
 
Finally, the adoption itself of the Directive has promoted more awareness about UTPs 
among  supply  chain  actors  (albeit  with  limitations)  and  has  contributed  to  setting  a 
standard in contractual negotiations between suppliers and buyers in the agri-food supply 
chain. 

As for the perception regarding the occurrence of UTPs, different stakeholder categories 
have different  views  on ways to  improve  ex ante  measures  to  reduce the occurrence of 
UTPs  (and  on  the  need  to  do  so).  From  surveys  addressed  at  business  associations 
throughout the agri-food supply chain, it emerged that there are still gaps in information 
provision  and  awareness-raising  activities.  In  particular,  the  provision  of  timely 
information  (e.g.,  in  case  of  changes  to  the  national  UTP  legislation)  and  support  to 
organisations in their dissemination activities towards members is lacking. 

Low complaint rates persist among victims of UTPs 

As provided for in the Directive, EAs can initiate investigations ex officio or on the basis 
of a complaint. According to the latest survey conducted by the JRC on the topic (2024), 
only 51 % of respondents knew to which authority they should turn to file a UTP-related 
complaint. Looking at the results of the targeted SME survey conducted in 2024 through 
the  Enterprise  Europe  Network,  this  share  drops  to  22  %  (17  out  of  78  replies  to  the 
question).  

Suppliers indicate several reasons for not raising UTPs when they experience them. Even 
if Article 5(3) of the Directive requires EAs to ensure the protection of the identity of the 
complainant and other confidential information, a major obstacle continues to be the fear 
of some form of retaliation by the buyer, reported by 29 % of respondents in the last wave 
of  the  JRC  survey.  A  19  %  share  of  surveyed  suppliers  thinks  that  unfair  behaviour  is 
customary  practice  in  the  sector,  and  thus  not  worth  reporting.  Lack  of  trust  in  the 
effectiveness of EAs’ help is another important drawback for 19 % of respondents. 

In  this  regard,  the  JRC  survey  results  indicate  that  business  associations  representing 
suppliers identify the fear of retaliation and the maintenance of anonymity throughout the 
complaint  process  as  crucial  factors  in  establishing  effective  enforcement  systems. 
Confidentiality was a major concern in several case studies, including those in Belgium, 
Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Suppliers often express doubts about the likelihood 
of  remaining  anonymous  and  fear  potential  commercial  retaliation,  such  as  losing  a 
customer. However, to ensure the alleged perpetrator's right to defence, some information 
about the complainant must generally be disclosed at a certain point in the procedure. 

A possible solution offered by the Directive is to enable supplier associations or groupings 
to submit complaints on behalf of their members (Article 5), but widespread use of this 
possibility could be documented. 

Ex officio cases  and  investigations  conducted by EAs are seen as a  crucial means of 
overcoming the limitations imposed by the fear of retaliation on the effectiveness of 
the complaint system.  

Alongside  formal  complaints  (including  confidential  ones),  anonymous 
tip-off 
mechanisms can also provide EAs with valuable insights without requiring the submission 
of a formal complaint, as is the case in countries such as France, Ireland, and Lithuania. 

30 

 
 
 
These anonymous tips can support the EA's investigative efforts and inform the launch of 
ex officio cases or sector-level inquiries. However, in highly concentrated sectors or when 
a buyer has a limited number of suppliers, concerns regarding confidentiality persist, as 
the  source  of  the  tip-off  may  be  easily  identifiable.  Overall,  the  majority  of  survey 
respondents in the three surveys of the evaluation support study across various categories 
rated anonymous tip-offs as moderately to minimally effective. 

Penalties  are  generally  perceived  as  effective  to  support  compliance  through 
deterrence 

The core enforcement mechanism of the Directive remains focused on deterrence through 
the imposition of effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties. Once an infringement 
has  been  established  following  an  investigation,  the  Directive  empowers  EAs  to  issue 
decisions  finding  an  infringement  and  decisions  requiring  the  buyer  to  bring  the 
prohibited trading practice to an end. 

Furthermore, the Directive empowers EAs to impose on the buyer fines and other equally 
effective penalties and interim measures. Such fines and other equally effective penalties 
are viewed in many MSs as a key deterrent to ensure compliance with UTP legislation if 
they  are  sufficiently  severe  and  strictly  enforced.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  in 
several MSs fines imposed so far have been limited (with exceptions, or absent see Section 
3.1), making it difficult to assess the effectiveness of this measure to this date.  

In  addition,  the  Directive  contemplates  the  use  of  reputational  measures  through  the 
regular  publication  of  infringement  decisions.  This  may  include  so-called  `name  and 
shame´ approaches, where the names of buyers found to have committed UTPs are made 
public.  According  to  stakeholders  consulted  across  several  MSs  (e.g.  Poland,  Spain, 
France,  Germany,  Lithuania),  such  measures  are  seen  as  effective  in  reinforcing 
deterrence. In some instances, national stakeholders indicated that this measure should be 
applied  more  consistently  and  broadly.  It  was  also  observed  that  ´consumer  facing´ 
companies are most impacted by reputational risk. 

Some MSs rely on additional measures to correct non-compliance and/or compensate 
victims of UTPs 

In  addition  to  the  enforcement  measures  provided  for  in  the  Directive,  some  MSs  may 
make use of corrective or compensatory mechanisms not provided for by the Directive but 
present at national level. In the case of corrective mechanisms, these are meant to restore 
compliance  after  a  breach.  As  such  measures  are  part  of  national  transpositions,  their 
uptake may thus vary. However, several stakeholder categories could only provide limited 
feedback on the actual effectiveness of corrective measures due to the limited number of 
actual cases handled by EAs in many MSs.  

example, 

the  power 

some  EAs  have 

For 
specific 
commitments/compliance activities on the part of the buyer. The possibility to issue/agree 
on commitment actions for offenders (the name and functioning of these measures vary 
across MSs and is not a power provided for in the Directive) is often considered an efficient 
and effective alternative to the imposition of financial penalties (this is the case, e.g., of 
Czechia, Lithuania and Poland). 

issue/agree  on 

to 

31 

 
 
 
While only a few EAs provided extensive input on orders to comply (i.e., requiring require 
buyers to stop UTPs and take actions to ensure compliance), those who (can) apply them 
expressed positive judgements on the effectiveness of this measure. 

While the Directive’s primary focus is on administrative enforcement rather than on civil 
law consequences, some MSs may also provide for classical civil law remedies against 
UTPs  (e.g.,  annulment  of  contract  terms,  restitution  of  charges,  compensation  for 
damages) as part of their transposing legislation. The annulment of contract terms was the 
corrective measure with  the most positive judgment  among  representatives of the retail 
stage (62% of dedicated survey). 

Overall, survey results of farming representatives found that additional measures are not 
well-known among farmers. Furthermore, most respondents from farming organisations 
believed that  measures including orders to  comply, financial penalties, and reputational 
measures  were  not  effective  deterrents  compared  to  fines  and  other  equally  effective 
penalties and publicising decisions establishing the existence of a UTP which were seen 
as the most effective ways to tackle UTPs. The combination of reputational consequences 
and the potential for suppliers to recoup unjustified costs and expenses was also considered 
important.  Some  supplier  associations,  representing  both  farmers  and  processors,  also 
advocated for increased harmonisation of penalties at the EU level. 

Despite  some  limitations,  associations  representing  suppliers  generally  expressed  a 
positive  view  of  the  Directive.  This  positive  assessment  is  in  line  with  the  findings  of 
several case studies, which highlight the Directive's key merit in promoting a culture of 
fairness in business practices, a process that, although lengthy, has begun to take hold. 

Shortcomings remain in cooperation on enforcement between EAs 

Overall, several EAs consulted during the study expressed a favourable opinion regarding 
the cooperation initiatives facilitated by the EC. The meetings of the  UTP Enforcement 
Network  are  viewed  as  valuable  opportunities  for  discussion  and  exchange  amongst 
authorities  from  different  MSs,  and  it  was  suggested  that  these  should  continue  in  the 
future.  Nevertheless,  certain  shortcomings  were  also  highlighted (45).  Cooperation 
initiatives show some limitations for 62.5 % of the surveyed public authorities. Reported 
limitations  are  mostly  related  to  the  legal  framework  set  by  the  Directive,  and  its 
adequacy vis-à-vis the practical needs of enforcing the Directive in the case of cross-border 
transactions. 

The  evaluation  corroborates  the  findings  presented  in  the  UTP  Report  2024,  which 
emerged from exchanges in the UTP Enforcement Network, that `the general obligation 
in Article 8 [of the Directive] to provide each other with mutual assistance in cross-border 
investigations  may  not  always  provide  a  sufficient  legal  basis  to  ensure  effective  and 
efficient cooperation and enforcement´. 

A consulted EA expressed that, at present, they can only exchange public information (e.g., 
information about current legislation and issued decisions) with EAs in other MSs. Another 
EA pointed out that the online platform set up by the Commission is not - in its current 

(45)  For summary proceedings of the  UTP Enforcement Network see  the  Register  of Commission expert 

groups, group E02730, meetings related to the UTP enforcement. 

32 

 
 
 
 
form  -  a  practical  tool  for  cooperation.  The  aim  should  be  to  align  the  exchange  of 
information in UTP cases to the practices of the European Competition Network and the 
Consumer  Protection  Cooperation  Network,  mentioned  by  EAs  as  positive  examples. 
Some consulted EAs expressed the wish to have a centralised system (standard templates; 
online platform; an alert/notification system on cross-border cases) for safely exchanging 
information  with  other  authorities  and  engaging  in  common  enforcement  activities. 
Enhanced  guidance  from  the  EC  on  how  institutions  should  cooperate  would  also  be 
important. The Network discussed on the need to improve the system with the EC.  

Improving  coordination  and  dialogue  among  EAs,  especially  for  UTPs  in  cross-border 
transactions,  is  an  aspect  where  further  work  is  needed,  also  according  to  some  key 
stakeholder  representatives  across  the  supply  chain (46).  For  them,  the  issue  is  often 
twofold  and  is  intertwined  with  the  differences  in  transposition  choices  and  with 
maintaining  a  level  playing  field  at  EU  level.  Two  aspects  were  mentioned:  how 
cooperation at EU level can improve enforcement at MS level, and how cooperation should 
work in cross-border cases.  

As regards the former, the variety of approaches to enforcement was noted by different 
stakeholders, with cooperation between authorities mentioned as a way to develop more 
aligned practices. In terms of the enforcement of cross-border UTP cases, many of the 
consulted business stakeholders and experts acknowledged a need to improve cooperation, 
but  practical  suggestions  of  how  to  do  this  were  limited.  EAs  are  focusing  mostly  on 
national cases at present, pursuing and sanctioning UTPs against buyers based in their own 
MS, even if these are part of a larger multinational. 

Despite the above, a limited number of cases of positive cooperation between EAs in cross-
border UTP enforcement were reported by stakeholders (47). 

Acknowledging the need to act, given the indications pointing towards some shortcomings 
in terms of EAs´ cooperation and due to the political urgency following farmers´ protest in 
2024, the EC proposed  on 10 December 2024 a  Regulation  on  the cooperation  aspect 
anticipating  the  publication  of  the  analysis  done  as  part  of  the  evaluation (48).  The 
Regulation,  if  adopted,  would  establish  a  framework  to  facilitate  EAs´  cooperation  in 
cross-border cases. 

Stakeholders report greater transparency and certainty, and promotion of trust and 
fairness in business relationships 

The  main  benefit  identified  from  the  implementation  of  the  Directive  by  surveyed 
CAs/EAs  was  the  strengthened  protection  for  victims  of  UTPs (49).  Other  identified 

(46)  Larger,  cross-sectoral  organisations  were  usually  in  the  position  of  commenting  on  the  topic,  while 
several sectoral or smaller associations were less aware of current cooperation activities and possible 
improvements.  Generally  speaking,  business  stakeholders  had  limited  information  on  the  existing 
challenges in cooperation among EAs for cross-border cases. 

(47)  See evaluation support study p. 39 for more details. 

(48) Proposal for a Regulation on cooperation among enforcement authorities responsible for the enforcement 

of Directive (EU) 2019/633 COM/2024/576 final. 

(49) This was indicated 18 times out of a total of 83 indications (22 %). 

33 

 
 
 
 
benefits (50) were, in decreasing order of prevalence: i) more transparent price conditions; 
ii)  terms  of  supply  contracts  less  prone  to  ambiguous  and  unilateral  interpretations  and 
reduction  of  the  number  of  unilateral  and  retrospective  changes  to  contract  terms  (ex-
aequo); and iii) an increase in the number of written supply contracts. Shorter payment 
terms and consideration of production costs in price-setting were also mentioned under the 
`other benefits` reply option. 

The analysis of benefits was differentiated – to the extent possible – by stage of the supply 
chain, with a view to identifying any specificities that characterised a certain stage. 

A great majority of surveyed business associations stated that  some monetary benefits 
were experienced by their members because of the implementation of the Directive. The 
most frequently indicated benefits were (in decreasing order of prevalence): i) terms of the 
supply contracts less prone to ambiguous and unilateral interpretations (24 % out of 228 
indications); ii) reduction of the number of unilateral and retrospective changes to contract 
terms (19 %); and iii) more transparent price conditions (15 %).  

The vast majority of responding business associations reported that some non-monetary 
benefits  were  experienced  by  their  members  because  of  the  implementation  of  the 
Directive. The most frequently indicated benefits were (in decreasing order of prevalence): 
i) improved trust between suppliers and buyers (19 % out of 254 indications); ii) increase 
in  the  number  of  written  supply  contracts  (18 %);  and  iii)  strengthened  protection  for 
members affected by UTPs in domestic transactions (17 %). 

Several  consulted  stakeholders,  especially  in  the  farming  and/or  processing  stages, also 
highlighted the following additional non-monetary benefits stemming from the Directive: 

Highlighting the issue of UTPs and thereby promoting a discussion on the topic – and more 
generally  on  fairness  in  business  relationships  -  among  business  and  institutional 
stakeholders, at both EU and national level. 

To some extent, the Directive has acted as a deterrent to perpetrating UTPs, mainly thanks 
to the start of investigations by EAs and the related risks for detected offenders (mainly 
stemming from penalties and reputational damage). 

The  Directive  has  also  contributed  to  the  development  of  a  business  culture  where  the 
concept of fairness is increasingly seen as something that operators can highlight in their 
promotional and marketing activities. 

(50) Indicated at least 10 times out of a total of 83 indications (prevalence in the 10-20 % range). 

34 

 
 
 
 
Even  in  the  framework  of  a  generally  negative  perception  about  the  (lack  of)  benefits 
stemming from the Directive, some stakeholders at the retail stage acknowledged that the 
Directive  has  improved  legal  certainty  about  trading  practices  thereby  contributing  to 
improved trust between suppliers and buyers (the main non-monetary benefit identified in 
the survey of business associations). 

Case study Spain – Focus on Wine and Fruit and Vegetables (F&V) supply chains 

Due  to  Spain's  extensive  experience  and  broader  scope  of  legislation,  it  is  challenging  to  clearly  attribute  the 
Directive's impacts (indeed, consulted stakeholders generally believe the Directive has brought little change). Overall, 
since  2014,  the  ley  da  cadena  appears  to  have  been  largely  effective  in  reducing  the  occurrence  of  UTPs  and 
addressing them when they do occur. The positive impact on payment periods is particularly notable. Additionally, 
the  2021  requirement  to  register contracts  was  viewed  by  many  interviewees  as  having  significantly  reduced  the 
occurrence  of  such  practices.  Most  interviewees  found  'naming  and  shaming'  to  be  particularly  effective,  with 
penalties also seen as broadly effective. However, not all interviewees shared this positive view. The lack of cases 
for certain UTPs at specific stages of the agri-food chain, both historically and currently, was noted as a potential 
indicator of limited impact, and the varied impact of 'naming and shaming' depending on the stage of the chain was 
also questioned. The confidential tip-off mechanism was generally viewed positively, though its effectiveness was 
limited due to challenges in maintaining anonymity. 

The overall positive assessment also extended to the law's impact in reducing the impact of UTPs on farmers. The 
most significant impact was perceived to be on payment periods, as farmers benefited from reduced financing costs 
previously incurred due to late payments.  However, there is some uncertainty about whether the improvement in 
payment periods occurred before the law came into effect. Although there were positive impacts noted in mitigating 
other unfair trading practices, several cases were identified where the law had not reduced their impact on farmers. 
A notable example is the case of intermediaries in central supply markets within the fruit and vegetable sector, whose 
traditional methods of operation are difficult to control under the Directive and the law, despite some efforts to address 
this. 

Regarding costs, the general perception is that the upstream stages of the chain have not incurred significant expenses 
due to the law, whereas the downstream stages might have. Chief among these costs were those related to the contract 
registration requirement, which some interviewees found particularly burdensome. Benefits were perceived to accrue 
to the upstream stages of the chain, including shorter payment periods and greater legal certainty. Whether costs 
outweighed benefits depends on the supply chain stage in question. 

Trend of decreasing number of days for the execution of payments points to economic 
benefits for the agricultural community 

The extent of the mitigating effect of the Directive felt by the operators in the farming stage 
is mainly assessed based on evidence collected through stakeholder consultation (including 
in the framework of case studies), in the support study, supplemented by desk research. In 
spite of the limited quantitative elements provided by stakeholders in the farming sector, 
the analysis of the available qualitative elements and the development of estimates based 
on  assumptions  allows  for  a  qualitative  and  quantitative  assessment  of  the  nature  and 
severity  of  the  negative  impacts  of  UTPs  on  operators  in  the  farming  stage  and  the 
effectiveness  of  the  mitigation  provided  by  the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the 
Directive. 

A  consideration  emerging  from  the  assessment  is  that  the  nature  and  –  above  all  –  the 
severity  of  the  negative  impacts  of  UTPs  on  operators  in  the  farming  stage,  and  on 
individual farmers in particular, derive from the combination of two intertwined elements: 

•  The impact mechanism, i.e., whether the operator: i) is the victim of a UTP 
(direct  impact);  or,  ii)  is  affected  by  UTPs  occurring  in  the  downstream 
stages of the chain via the pass-through (indirect impact). 

35 

 
 
 
 
•  The level of countervailing power at the farming stage, i.e., the diffusion 
and economic importance of Producer Organisations (POs)s, cooperatives, 
and  similar  organisational  forms,  since  this  contributes  to  determine  the 
bargaining power of suppliers of agricultural products vis-à-vis their buyers. 

The elements emerged from the assessment suggest that the severity of negative impacts 
can be significant for individual primary producers that are victims of UTPs perpetrated 
by a stronger buyer (direct impact/no aggregation); it may instead be limited for farmers 
that  are  members  of  POs  and  cooperatives,  especially  where  there  is  a  further  level  of 
aggregation  and/or  the  organisations  controlled  by  primary  producers  have  integrated 
downstream operations like packing or processing. 

Farmers  and  small  suppliers  tend  to  perceive  the  severity  of  the  negative  impacts  of 
UTPs in relative terms, i.e., compared to the strength of other factors that can negatively 
affect their economic results (low yields, low selling prices, high production costs, etc.). 

Most  of  the  recent  quantitative  evidence  comes  from  two  surveys  commissioned  by 
national authorities in Ireland (51) and Lithuania (52). These surveys suggest that while the 
overall  extent  of  the  adverse  economic  impacts  of  UTPs  may  be  significant  for  some 
operators in the farming stage, other farmers do not experience significant negative impacts 
or are unable to determine with sufficient precision the extent of such impacts. 

The assessment in the evaluation support study revealed that the main negative impacts of 
UTPs experienced in the farming stage, with particular regard to those affecting individual 
farmers, are the following (broadly ranked from the more widespread to the less common 
ones): 

(1) 

Delayed  payments.  The  main  negative  impact  is  disruption  to  cash 
flow,  which  may  in  turn  cause  recourse  to  loans,  with  the  related 
financial burden. The severity  of these impacts  was reported to  vary, 
also  in  relation  to  the  specific  financial  situation  of  each  supplier.  A 
quantitative  assessment  on  a  panel  of  just  under  50 000  companies 
mainly  operating  in  the  farming  stage  or  close  to  it  found  that  the 
average  payment  period  towards  operators  in  the  farming  stage  was 
significantly above the 60-days payment term in the years preceding the 
Directive (2015-2019). 

(2) 

Cancellation of orders at short notice. The main negative implications 
were  identified  in:  the  efforts  needed  to  find  an  alternative  outlet, 

(51) A survey conducted by a research company for the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine in 
2023  asked  farmers  to  estimate  the  costs  to  their  business  arising  from  UTPs.  Within  a  pool  of 709 
respondents  subject  to  one  or  more  UTPs,  39 %  claimed  to  be  unsure  of  the  estimated  cost;  27 % 
estimated a cost up to 2 % of annual revenues for their business; 34 % reported an estimate higher than 
2 %. The share of respondents claiming higher than 2 % costs did not vary significantly (31-34 %) across 
different sectors (beef, dairy, sheep), with the exception of the mixed group  `cereals, poultry, other`, 
where it reached 40 %. 

(52) The Agency of Agriculture carried out a survey in 2024 to assess the effects of the national transposing 
legislation on business operators. The results of the survey are publicly available (in Lithuanian only 
link). Based on the survey results, UTPs seem to have a significant negative impact on a minority of 
farmers only (6 %), mostly in terms of additional costs. 

36 

 
 
 
 
decreased revenues where sales to alternative customers occur at less 
favourable  pricing  conditions  or  complete  loss  of  revenues,  often 
combined with costs for product disposal, if no alternative outlet can be 
found. The most severe negative impacts are experienced in relation to 
the latter point, which concern perishable products (fruit and vegetables 
in particular). 

(3) 

Additional costs and/or decreased revenues related to UTPs such as 
unilateral  changes  of  contractual  terms  by  the  buyer  or  payments  for 
deterioration/loss of products on the buyer's premises (with particular 
regard to perishable products). The available evidence suggests that the 
severity  of  the  related  impacts  is  case-specific  and  can  hence  vary 
significantly. 

To assess the potential benefits stemming from the implementation of the Directive (or, 
conversely,  to  provide  quantitative  indications  on  the  negative  impacts  of  delayed 
payments on the farming stage), the support study showcases an analysis of the trends of 
payment periods towards operators in the farming stage using Days Sales Outstanding 
(DSO) as a proxy (53). The analysis compared the trend in DSO for a sample of companies 
that operate mainly in the farming stage (or close to that) of supply chains (and therefore 
mainly  acting  as  suppliers)  in  selected  MSs  in  the  periods  preceding  and  following  the 
entry into force of the Directive (54). The analysis revealed that while DSO remained stable 
or even increased in the period preceding the entry into force of the Directive, a decrease 
in DSO was recorded in three out of four analysed MSs (Italy, Poland, Spain). In Poland 
and Spain, DSO in 2023 were rather close to the 60-days payment term established for 
non-perishable  agricultural  and  agri-food  products  in  the  Directive.  Nevertheless,  the 
observed evolution is in line with the expected effects of the Directive. 

The same approach was replicated using FADN data, a yearly survey of 80 000 EU farms. 
Here it was also not possible to distinguish between the 30 days payment term and the 60-
days payment term. Results are overall in line with the ones presented in the evaluation 
support study: DSO is declining over the 2014-2022 period for farms in the sample. 

The external study team also estimated the potential economic benefits for operators in the 
farming stage that would stem from further reduction of DSO to meet the 60-days payment 

(53) DSO are a measure of the average number of days that it takes an operator to collect the payment for a 
sale. DSO are computed by dividing the average accounts receivable during a given period, in this case 
a  year, by  the  total value  of sales  during  the  same  period,  and  then by  multiplying  the result  by  the 
number of days in the period being measured. 

(54) To put the data quantified in the exercise in  a broader context,  it is useful to consider the figures on 
`average payment period in days´ for all businesses reported in the EU Payment Observatory Indicators 
Mapper database for the four MSs covered (data are available for 2019 and 2023; no specific figures 
for the agricultural sector and for the food and beverage sector are available): France: 65 days in 
2019, 62 days in 2023; Italy: 50 days and 62 days; Poland: 62 days and 65 days; Spain: 65 days and 62 
days. Whereas the DSO quantified in the exercise for 2019 are significantly above the average payment 
periods for all businesses in the MSs of interest (73-89 days versus 50-65 days), quantified DSO for 
2023 in Italy, Poland and Spain are much closer to  this source (63-70 days versus 62-65 days), with 
France still lagging behind (88 days versus 62 days). 

37 

 
 
 
 
term (55). These benefits would mainly be in the form of potential additional yearly cash 
flow for suppliers, which is assumed to translate into reduced recourse to loans, reduced 
insolvency,  and  increased  availability  of  financial  resources  for  investments.  The 
average  additional  yearly  cash  flow  per  company  of  the  panel  used  in  the  evaluation 
support study is estimated to range in an order of magnitude from around EUR 16 000 in 
Poland to nearly EUR 175 000 in France (where DSO in 2023 was still substantially above 
60 days) (56). 

Variability in transposition and enforcement costs for MSs 

The analysis of costs and benefits for each stakeholder is mostly based on quantitative and 
qualitative  evidence  from  the  external  support  study.  A  more  detailed  and  schematic 
analysis of costs and benefits can be found in Annex IV Overview of benefits and costs 

The  analysis  on  costs  incurred  by  public  authorities,  based  mainly  on  labour  input, 
revealed  variability  of  both  transposition  and  enforcement  costs,  irrespective  of  the 
presence/absence of pre-existing legislation. This variability is in part related to differences 
in  labour  effort,  and  in  part  related  to  different  wage  levels  across  the  EU  as  well  as 
enforcement strategies. 

Transposition  costs  range  from  an  estimated  one/a  few  thousand  euro  to  over 
EUR 150 000  in  some  MSs  that  did  not  have  previous  UTP  legalisation  in  place  (the 
Netherlands, Denmark). However, transposition costs are estimated to be substantial (close 
to  or  above  EUR 100 000)  also  in  some  MSs  (Croatia,  Ireland)  that  had  pre-existing 
legislation.  The  most  plausible  explanations  are  that  achieving  compliance  with  the 
Directive required extensive amendments, that several new provisions were added to the 
pre-existing legislation in the framework of the transposition, and/or that an ex-ante impact 
assessment  was  carried  out.  Moreover,  the  decision  to  go  beyond  the  minimum 
requirements of the Directive and/or of pre-existing national UTP legislation may have had 
implications on the extent of the transposition costs.  

Annual  enforcement  costs  also  display  variability  and  are  broadly  in  line  with 
expectations  in  the  UTP  IA  2018.  Variability  is  also  related  to  the  different  nature  of 
enforcement  activities  carried  out  in  each  MS,  and  the  number  of  these  activities.  In 
general, enforcement costs are estimated to be close to EUR 800 000 in MSs with extensive 
enforcement  activities  (Spain,  Italy  and  France  in  particular,  which  all  had  pre-existing 
UTP  legislation,  and  whose  transposition  of  the  Directive  went  significantly  beyond 
minimum harmonisation). However, there are some noteworthy exceptions, especially in 
MSs without pre-existing UTP legislation (Denmark, the Netherlands, Estonia and Malta 
in particular).  

More than half of the surveyed CAs/EAs (13 out of 24) perceive the enforcement of the 
relevant  national  legislation  (i.e.,  the  application  of  ex  ante/guidance  and  corrective 

(55) The impossibility of distinguishing in the dataset the turnover and trade receivables related to sale of 
perishable  products did  not  allow  to  perform  an  analogous exercise  for  the  related  30-days  payment 
term. In any case, the consideration of the sole 60-days payment term in the exercise translated into a 
prudent estimate of the potential benefits in terms of additional cash flow for suppliers. 

(56)  The methodology for this estimation, as well as the related limitations, are explained in Annex 1 of the 

external support study. 

38 

 
 
 
 
measures) as their most time-consuming activity. Four EAs reported that the monitoring 
and assessment of UTP cases requires most of their time, while seven EAs reported that 
other  activities are  the  most  time-consuming  ones.  Indicative  estimates  of  the  costs  for 
investigating a UTP case were also made. The analysis revealed significant variability. 

It is also useful to note that over half of the respondents in MSs with pre-existing UTP 
legislation (eight out of 12) deem that more time is spent on enforcement activities since 
the entry into force of the Directive, compared to the previous period.  

Figure 11: Estimated transposition costs and enforcement costs of the Directive in the 
27 MSs (in thousand EUR). 

Source: elaboration of data from the survey of CAs and EAs, case studies, and Eurostat in the evaluation 
support study. * MSs whose labour cost was estimated through assumptions on ISG for transposition. ** 
MSs whose labour cost was estimated through assumptions on FTEs for both transposition and enforcement 
*** MSs whose labour cost was estimated through assumptions on FTEs for enforcement. For more details 
see  Annex  IV Overview  of  benefits  and  costs.  Note  that  the  degree  of  enforcement  activities  before  the 
Directive already varied for MSs that already had UTP related legislation and enforcement. 

Data on the importance and extent of cost items other than labour costs was more limited 
and did not allow for any meaningful overall inference. 

Compliance costs for businesses are small compared to the turnover of the sector  

Costs incurred by business operators: The direct and indirect costs incurred by business 
operators  in  relation  to  the  implementation  of  the  Directive  vary  in  nature  and  extent 
according  to  a  combination  of  elements.  In  the  first  place,  a  key  determinant  is  the 
prevalent activity performed by operators (suppliers, buyers, both equally), the approach 
to the enforcement at national level and whether they are (alleged) offenders or (alleged) 
victims.  The  paucity  of  evidence  made  it  difficult  to  carry  out  estimates  based  on 
assumptions. Nevertheless, the analysis of survey results allowed for an appraisal of the 
main trends– to the extent possible – by stage of the supply chain. 

39 

80704220761691572634396528774786757420207325289157462591601578788101765759Euro /000Transposition costsEnforcement costs 
 
 
 
Figure 12: General impact of the Directive’s implementation on the operating costs. 

Source: External evaluation support study: elaboration of data from the survey of business associations. 

In terms of the order of magnitude of the overall cost impact on business operators 
stemming from the implementation of the Directive at national level, the case studies in 
Germany, Sweden and Denmark allowed the collection of some quantitative elements. An 
assessment made in 2021 for the German Bundestag (57) estimated the one-off compliance 
costs with the German UTP legislation at around EUR 12.5 million for the national 
economy as a whole, corresponding to EUR 36.20 per company. Another assessment made 
in  2024  for  the  German  Bundestag (58)  estimated  the  one-off  compliance  costs  for  the 
national economy as a whole at EUR 1.24 million in relation to the recent amendment 
of  the  national  UTP  legislation,  once  in  force.  A  2023  report  by  the  Swedish  EA 
Konkurrensverket (KKV) featured estimates by sectoral associations according to which 
compliance  with 
the  Swedish  UTP  Act  had  cost  buyers  approximately 
EUR 12 million, with an average expenditure per company of around EUR 4 300. An ex-
ante assessment of the impacts of the Danish UTP Act, made in 2021, estimated at around 
EUR 19 million the overall one-off adaptation costs (59) for business operators, of which 
around EUR 7 million for buyers and EUR 12 million for suppliers. The overall recurring 
compliance  costs  for  business  operators  (post-adaptation)  were  estimated  at  around 
EUR 336 000 per year, of which around EUR 202 000 for buyers and EUR 134 000 for 
suppliers. 

In  terms  of  direct  monetary  cost  impacts  deriving  from  specific  activities,  those 
concerning checks by public authorities and modification of existing contracts/contractual 
clauses were rated as `high´ or `medium´ by the highest shares of respondents to the survey 
carried out in the context of the evaluation support study (25 % and 29 %, respectively, out 
of  a  total  of  114  surveyed  associations).  Moreover,  impacts  deriving  from  drafting  and 
agreement of new contracts/contractual clauses (where none were required before) were 
rated  as  `high`  or  `medium`  by  significant  shares  of  respondents  (21 %  and  18 %, 
respectively).  

(57) Draft of a Second Act to Amend the Agricultural Market Structure Act, 25.01.2021: Anlage 2. 

(58) Draft of a law amending agricultural law provisions, 25.06.2024. 

(59) Costs for gathering and updating information about suppliers’ business size, segmentation of procured 
goods as perishable and non-perishable goods, re-negotiation of contracts, and training of staffs. 

40 

7 %4 %24 %16 %15 %38 %7 %8 %58 %34 %35 %37 %33 %7 %40 %29 %19 %22 %23 %7 %57 %36 %22 %24 %24 %22 %21 %12 %13 %OverallresultsFarmersProcessorsRetailersFarmersProcessorsRetailersBroad splitStrict splitI don’t know / I am not in a position to replyNo impact was detectedThe overall impact onoperating costs can varysignificantly among membersThe impact on operatingcosts has been negativeoverall: costs are now higherThe impact on operatingcosts has been positiveoverall: costs are now lower 
 
 
 
 
Retailers appeared to bear the highest per operator costs according to the support study. 
Scarce quantitative evidence on the costs incurred by operators in the farming and 
processing  stages  of  the  chain  for  complying  with  the  relevant  national  legislation 
emerged from interviews with business stakeholders and independent experts, and from 
case studies. 

Compliance costs for processors (60) were reported in the dedicated survey to business 
associations  carried  out  in  the  evaluation  support  study  as  ranging  from  EUR 2 000  to 
EUR 40 000 per operator in the meat supply chain, depending on a combination of factors, 
including the applicable legislation, the size of the firm, the complexity of its procurement 
patterns and the number of its suppliers and customers.  

As for compliance costs incurred in the farming stage, qualitative elements emerging 
from  interviews  and  case  studies  suggest  that  they  are  limited,  thus  confirming  what 
emerged from the analysis of survey results. 

The most significant direct monetary cost impacts for national business associations 
were found to derive from (in decreasing order of prevalence): i) support to members on 
contractual  matters,  in  order  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  Directive  (aggregate  share: 
43 %  of  121  respondents);  and  ii)  handling  UTP-related  requests  or  complaints  from 
members and training on UTPs, ex-aequo (aggregate share: 40 %). 

Case study the Netherlands- Focus on Pig meat, sugar and potato supply chains 

According to stakeholders, most large operators in the Netherlands are aware of the UTP Act, which has 
become  a  key  reference  in  contract  negotiations  between  suppliers  and  buyers.  Stakeholders  in  the 
processing stage noted that the UTP legislation has had a preventative effect on certain elements, such as 
the  30-day  payment  term  for  perishable  goods,  and  has  established  a  suitable  set  of  minimum 
requirements for companies to follow. However, those interviewed in the pig meat supply chain indicated 
that the impact of these preventative measures has been rather limited due to a lack of awareness among 
suppliers,  and  also  buyers,  about  UTP  legislation  in  the  Netherlands.  Despite  the  presence  of  an 
anonymous tip-off system, farmers still seem worried about being identified when reporting a UTP. 

In the Netherlands, the CA has faced several adjustment costs to implement the UTP legislation. These 
include, for example, setting up the dispute committee (EUR 185 000) and employing additional staff 
members  (two  FTEs)  to  manage  UTPs.  The  EA  hired  eight  more  staff  members  to  address  UTPs. 
Additionally, the CA allocated an annual sum of EUR 930 000 to the EA for executing its statutory role—
namely,  enforcing  the  UTP  Act—and  another  EUR  50 000  is  allocated  to  the  Dispute  Resolution 
Committee (which also receives EUR 5 000 per case  for incidental costs). The EA allocated between 
EUR 4 000 and EUR 7 000 for staff training costs. Both the CA and EA view the costs incurred as highly 
proportionate to the benefits derived from the UTP legislation. It proved challenging to quantify benefits 
and costs at the farm level in the three supply chains examined in the case study. Compliance costs were 
highlighted by one processor, who spent EUR 250 000 to adhere to the UTP legislation. A consulted 
stakeholder  in  the  pig  sector  reported  that  the  efforts  and  costs  associated  with  the  Vion  case  were 
substantial due to a lack of knowledgeable lawyers (which increased the legal consultancy costs incurred 
by the complainants) and the reputational damage to the processor; in contrast, the perceived benefits 
were limited, as pig farmers were not compensated for the economic damage suffered. 

(60) Compliance costs mainly derive from the adaptation of the business operators’ organisational structure, 
operational procedures and contractual arrangements to comply with the national transposing legislation. 
They include, inter alia, revision of existing contracts, training of personnel involved in procurement 
and marketing activities, etc. It is also worth reminding that processors generally act as both suppliers 
and buyers with regard to the Directive. 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
The external study also attempted to estimate the cost for an operator that stems from being 
involved in a UTP case. Costs for suppliers operating in the farming stage are reported 
as  lower  than those incurred by  suppliers  operating in the processing stage  (when 
being  `victims´  in  a  UTP  case).  The  costs  for  buyers,  all  reported  by  surveyed 
retailers/wholesalers, are significantly higher than those incurred by suppliers, and include 
disbursements for any penalties imposed on them (leaving aside the economic implications 
of  reputational  damage,  which  are  hard  to  quantify).  Higher  average  costs  (in  absolute 
terms) for buyers are in part related to their large size and to the fact that they source from 
a high number of suppliers, often based in multiple MSs. The costs incurred by reference 
associations supporting members in UTP cases were also reported to vary significantly. 

Figure  13: Indicative  costs:  i)  for  an  operator  involved  in  a  UTP  case  as  suppliers 
(alleged  victim)  or  buyer  (alleged  perpetrator);  ii)  for  a  national  sector  association 
supporting a member company/farmer in a UTP-related case. 

Source:  External  evaluation  support  study:  elaboration  of  survey  results  (business  associations; 
retailers/wholesalers). It was not possible to report cost ranges for operators in other stages of the supply 
chain  as  alleged  perpetrator  because  of  the  small  number  of  replies  from  categories  other  than 
retailers/wholesalers. 

Proportionality  of  costs  perceived  positively  by  farmers,  while  questioned  by 
wholesalers and retailers   

The majority of the surveyed CAs/EAs stated that that the administrative burden for the 
authorities related to the implementation of the Directive is proportionate to the benefits 
achieved. An equally positive judgment  was expressed by the majority of the surveyed 
CAs/EAs on whether the administrative burden for business operators related to the 
implementation of the Directive is proportionate to the benefits achieved. 

Stakeholders in  the  farming stage of supply chains  converged on a  generally positive 
judgment. In their view, the benefits for operators deriving from the implementation of 
the  Directive  at  MS  level  far  outweigh  the  compliance  costs  and  any  other  direct  and 
indirect costs. Several stakeholders in this stage, however, deemed that there is still room 
for improvement in terms of benefits from combating UTPs in the agri-food supply chains. 

42 

 
 
 
 
These  could  be  delivered  through  a  combination  of  more  effective  enforcement  and 
expanded scope of the protection from UTPs ensured by legislation. 

The perceptions of stakeholders in the processing stage emerged as more articulated and 
nuanced, even though they were generally positive, i.e., indicating that the costs related 
to the implementation of the Directive are at least proportionate to the benefits, or that the 
latter outweigh the former. 

As for stakeholders in the wholesale and (especially) retail stages of supply chains, a wide 
convergence on a negative judgment emerged from the assessment. These stakeholders 
consider that the compliance costs and other direct and indirect costs for operators resulting 
from the implementation of the Directive outweigh the limited benefits accruing to them. 
This is confirmed by the share of business associations representing these stages of the 
chain  that  did  not  identify  any  monetary  (especially)  or  indirect/non-monetary  benefits 
stemming from the Directive.  

Consistency and synergies between the UTP Directive and other EU legislation with 
similar objectives 

The assessment of coherence between the UTP Directive and other EU-level interventions 
that  have  similar  objectives  include  the  identification  of  any  `synergies´  and/or 
inconsistencies/conflicts in terms of addressing UTPs. 

There is a high degree of coherence between the UTP Directive and the CMO Regulation, 
where the Directive complements the structural approach of the CMO Regulation. (61)  The 
CMO Regulation aims to strengthen farmers’ position in the chain through structural tools 
that empower farmers to act collectively and increase their market leverage, for example, 
by encouraging collective action through producer organisations and cooperatives, through 
exemptions from competition rules that allow farmers to cooperate more effectively or by 
setting a general contractual framework. Conversely, the UTP Directive acts at the level 
of  individual  commercial  relationships,  providing  a  protective  framework  which  is 
designed to shield farmers and other weaker suppliers from a specific abusive behaviour 
by buyers. 

One concrete example of how the two instruments complement and reinforce each other 
lies in their approach to contractual relations. Under the CMO Regulation, MSs can require 
the use of written contracts for the sale of agricultural products. Because written contracts 
are  easier  to  trace  and  monitor,  they  can  promote  transparency  and  facilitate  the  fight 
against  UTPs.  Consequently,  the  rules  on  contracts  of  the  CMO  Regulation  can 
complement and reinforce the UTP Directive, but they do not replace it. This is because 
even clearly documented contracts can still reflect unequal bargaining power and include 
unfair or disproportionate terms, such as return clauses that place all risk on the supplier, 
or because certain practices may arise during the life of the contract, like unilateral changes 
to what was agreed or last-minute order cancellations.  

(61)  The same degree of coherence also holds with respect to  the common organisation of the markets in 

fishery and aquaculture products Regulation (EU) 1379/2013. 

43 

 
 
 
 
The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), adopted in June 2024, 
complements  to  some  degree  the  UTP  Directive  by  promoting  responsible  purchasing 
practices, including in the agricultural sector. It will apply across economic sectors to large 
EU and non-EU companies with a significant presence on the EU market. The Directive 
will  require  in-scope  companies  to  identify,  assess  and  address  human  rights  and 
environmental adverse impacts in their own operations, those of their subsidiaries and of 
the  companies’  business  partners  in  their  chains  of  activities.  They  will  need  to  take 
appropriate  measures  to  tackle  potential  or  actual  adverse  impacts,  including  making 
necessary investments, providing support to their business partners, in particular SMEs, 
and  making  necessary  changes  to  their  purchasing  practices,  design  and  distribution 
practices. In addition, the in-scope companies will be required to adopt climate transition 
plans. 

In December 2024, the Commission adopted a proposal with targeted amendments to the 
CMO  Regulation.  Among  other  things,  the  proposed  amendment  aims  to  reinforce  the 
contractual rules applicable to the sales of agricultural products under Articles 148 and 168 
of  the  CMO  Regulation.  More  specifically,  the  proposal  would  make  written  contracts 
mandatory by default, while providing for certain exceptions or flexibilities. In this regard, 
the proposed rules would preserve the complementary nature of the UTP Directive to the 
CMO rules on contracts. As outlined above, compulsory written contracts can be useful to 
improve transparency and fight against UTPs, but they are not a replacement for UTP rules, 
which  ensure  fairness  and  accountability  throughout  the  duration  of  the  business 
relationship. 

The UTP Directive requires EAs to cooperate with each other and with the Commission 
and  to  offer  each  other  mutual  assistance  in  UTP  investigations  with  a  cross-border 
dimension. However, the experience of EAs shows that the current legal framework is not 
apt to address procedural difficulties that may exist when carrying out cross-border actions, 
exchanging information or collecting fines from operators in other MSs.  

In December 2024 the Commission proposed new rules on cooperation for cross-border 
enforcement  against  UTPs  which  would  further  develop  the  cooperation  obligations  of 
EAs under Article 8(1) of the UTP Directive and provide them with the tools to allow for 
the implementation of the mutual cooperation mechanism, the ultimate objective being to 
provide for tools to ensure a proper enforcement of EU law. The two legal instruments are 
thus complementary and coherent with each other since the Commission proposal does not 
alter in any way the UTP Directive and has a limited scope, aiming to enhance and make 
operational already existing obligations under the UTP Directive. 

The  Late  Payments  Directive  is  closely  linked  to  the  UTP  Directive,  and  the  legal 
relationship between the two is explained in the recitals to the UTP Directive. The Late 
Payments Directive complements the UTP Directive's emphasis on timely payments. 

Under  the  current  framework,  the  prohibition  of  late  payments  in  the  UTP  Directive  is 
complemented  by  the  rules  on  the  consequences  and  remedies  of  late  payments  as  laid 
down in the Late Payments Directive. The features of this relationship will be preserved 
under the Commission proposal for a Late Payment Regulation, which was published after 

44 

 
 
 
the adoption and transposition of the UTP Directive and is not yet in force, as it remains 
under negotiation by the co-legislators.  

Among other things, the proposal aims to introduce a 30-days cap on payments in business-
to-business  transactions  across  all  sectors.  Although  consistently  adjusting  the  payment 
deadline applicable to  the delivery of non-perishable agri-food products under the UTP 
Directive, the proposal recognises the lex specialis nature of the rules that exist in the agri-
food sector. For this reason, the proposal is without prejudice to stricter payment deadlines 
that may apply under national transposition laws, to the methods of calculating the starting 
point of the payment period  (dies a quo), or to  the specific  enforcement  and complaint 
mechanisms which exist in the agri-food sector. 

Should the Late Payments Regulation be adopted, it would reinforce the enforcement of 
payment  deadlines  but  would  not  render  the  sector-specific  protections  under  the  UTP 
Directive redundant. 

The Protection of Trade Secrets Directive establishes a framework for the protection of 
undisclosed  know-how  and  business  information  (trade  secrets)  against  unlawful 
acquisition,  use,  and  disclosure.  Although  it  addresses  a  different  aspect  of  business 
conduct and is not only applicable in the agri-food supply chain, as the UTP Directive, it 
also aims to create a fair and balanced business environment. 

The UTP Directive prohibits the unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure of trade secrets, 
as defined by the Trade Secrets Directive. The two instruments are consistent with each 
other, as the UTP Directive refers to the definitions of the Trade Secrets Directive on what 
constitutes a `trade secret´ or `lawful´ versus `unlawful´ acquisition. At the same time, the 
UTP  Directive  complements  the  Trade  Secrets  Directive  by  offering  a  different 
enforcement  approach.  While  the  Trade  Secrets  Directive  provides  for  civil  remedies 
through the courts, the UTP Directive allows EAs to investigate and sanction violations, 
offering  an  additional  and  more  immediate  layer  of  protection  for  farmers  and  small 
suppliers in the agri-food sector. 

The  Misleading  and  Comparative  Advertising  Directive  aims  to  protect  traders  against 
misleading advertising and the unfair consequences thereof and to lay down the conditions 
under which comparative advertising is permitted. It complements the UTP Directive in 
relation to provisions on advertising.  

The Commission Recommendation on the definitions of company sizes is coherent with 
the UTP Directive, as it defines small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are 
also relevant in the context of the UTP Directive. 

Synergies were identified between the EU competition rules and the UTP Directive, with 
the former addressing the potential impacts  of  anticompetitive behaviour  and abuses of 
dominant position, and the Directive addressing UTPs imposed by more powerful buyers 
on  agricultural  producers  or  small  food  suppliers.  However,  some  differences  in 
perspective were noted, particularly the fact that the UTP Directive relies on turnover as a 
proxy to assess bargaining power, which may not provide a complete view of the relative 
power  of  the  parties  involved  but  has  the  advantage  of  facilitating  intervention  when 
needed. 

45 

 
 
 
As outlined in the UTP IA 2018, UTP rules have been designed to be compatible with and 
complementary  to  EU’s  competition  rules (62).  Although  closely  related,  the  two 
frameworks have distinct scopes and objectives. 

EU competition law aims to preserve effective competition on the internal market, with a 
focus  on  preventing  anticompetitive  behaviour  that  affects  or  is  likely  to  affect  price, 
quality,  consumer  choice  or  innovation.  In  contrast,  UTP  rules  address  the  impact  of 
superior bargaining power in individual trading relations, targeting situations where one 
party imposes disproportionate or unfair terms or practices on the other. 

This difference in scope is also reflected in how each instrument considers the notion of 
`power´. Whereas competition law assesses market power structurally, typically through 
the  lens  of  dominance  in  a  given,  relevant  market,  the  UTP  rules  rely  on  a  relational 
assessment of bargaining power, using differences in turnover as a proxy to identifying 
asymmetries in the supplier-buyer relationship. For example, a firm that is not dominant 
under  competition  law  may  still  wield  enough  leverage  to  impose  unfair  conditions  on 
weaker suppliers.  

Ultimately,  these  differences  reflect  distinct  but  complementary  policy  objectives  that 
justify the continued relevance of UTP rules: competition law aims to safeguard consumer 
welfare by preserving efficiency, while UTP rules are designed to protect weaker suppliers, 
and  particularly  farmers,  from  unfair  treatment  while  contributing  to  the  long-term 
resilience of the agri-food sector. 

The  EU  Code  of  Conduct  on  Responsible  Food  Business  and  Marketing  Practices, 
launched in 2021 as a voluntary industry initiative and since mid 2025 known as the `Agri-
Food Code´, is considered relevant and complementary to the UTP Directive. The Code, 
which has been signed by 155 agri-food organisations to date, includes several relevant 
aspirational objectives, each with indicative actions, focused on topics such as sustainable 
sourcing or partnerships within the chain.  

In terms of other initiatives based on a voluntary approach, some stakeholders also noted 
synergies with the Supply Chain Initiative (SCI), which was in place from 2013 to 2019 
and improved dialogue in the agri-food supply chain. It was formed by multiple EU-level 
organisations  representing  various  sectors,  including  the  food  and  beverage  industry, 
branded goods manufacturers, the retail sector, SMEs and agricultural traders. Its purpose 
was to encourage equitable business practices within the food supply chain as a foundation 
for commercial interactions. The SCI established a framework to implement and enforce a 
series of Principles of Good Practice, designed to conduct business respecting contractual 
freedom and promoting competitiveness.  

(62)  Annex H of the UTP 2018 IA prepared by the Chief Economist – DG COMPETITION, refers to risks 
of interventions in pricing agreements for competition in market oriented economies: `UTP regulations 
should be very carefully tailored in order not to prevent trading partners from engaging in efficiency-
enhancing agreements or trading conditions`; `Regulating prices it is even more challenging if one wants 
to maintain the room for operators to innovate in a market-oriented economy´. 

46 

 
 
 
 
The objective of the UTP Directive to protect a 'weaker' party against unfair practices by 
a  'stronger'  party  is  consistent  with  the  objectives  of  EU  consumer  law (63)  which  is  to 
protect the weaker party – the consumer – in the business-to-consumer relations.  

4.2.  How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom? 

This section assesses the UTP Directive’s effects described in the previous sections, by 
taking  an  EU-level  angle  i.e.  to  what  extent  the  Directive´s  harmonised  minimum 
requirements  have  created  EU  added  value  for  the  targeted  stakeholders  versus  a  non-
harmonised status quo before the Directive.  

The assessment focuses on differential benefits versus a non-harmonised situation that are 
related to  the objective to  contribute to  ´level  playing  field  conditions´ for operators of 
different  MSs.  Any  other  differential  benefits  for  stakeholders  that  can  be  related  with 
sufficient certainty to the implementation and enforcement of the Directive across the EU 
are also considered. 

The  consulted  stakeholders  have  an  overall  positive  view  of  the  added  value  deriving 
from the entry into force of the Directive. 

There are two mechanisms working in opposite directions regarding the contribution 
of the Directive to the level playing field. To some extent, the Directive has led to greater 
clarity and a more uniform approach in dealing with UTPs. However, differences across 
MSs on how the Directive is transposed and implemented have emerged. It appears that 
the  overall  level  of  harmonisation  has  increased,  especially  when  considering  the 
previous non harmonisedsituation . However, differences after transposition remain, 
in the definition of the scope of application, in the consequences of infringements to 
UTP  rules  imposed  by  public  authorities  and  in  the  number  of  national  practices 
qualified as unfair by one or the other MS. To some stakeholders, this difference is not 
necessarily a negative outcome. MSs can adapt the Directive as it best suits their national 
specificities to minimise costs and maximise benefits, since some markets are highly local. 
However, the majority’s view was that differences in transposition at national level are the 
source of the most serious challenges and shortcomings affecting the EU added value of 
the Directive. 

The analysis of survey  results  allows an appraisal  of the differential  benefits  stemming 
from the Directive, as perceived by different stakeholder groups and across various stages 
in the supply chain summarised in the following table. 

(63)  In particular Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer  commercial  practices  in  the  internal  market  (UCPD)  and  Council  Directive 
93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts (UCTD). 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure  14: Importance  of  the  differential  benefits  stemming  from  the  harmonised 
minimum requirements in the Directive, according to survey respondents. 

Source: External evaluation support study, No importance = 0; Maximum importance = 3. 

The evaluation support study used the perceived importance scores by including them in 
an MCDA  approach  and based on the  analyses  carried out  through the study under the 
various evaluation criteria, attempted an overall synthesis. Details of this assessment can 
be found in section 3.5 of the evaluation support study as well as in Annex II Methodology 
and Analytical models used. The MCDAs were applied separately for assessments at the 
level of some MSs, and for an EU-level assessment. The baseline scenario was concisely 
assessed  on  the  grounds  of  the  situation  in  EU MSs  prior  to  the implementation  of  the 
Directive.  Considering  several  factors  that  feed  into  the  analysis,  the  Directive’s 
harmonised minimum requirements appear to have created EU added value (score of 
2.98 vs. 2.16 without a Directive in place, out of 5). 

4.3.  Is the intervention still relevant? 

The overall relevance of the Directive was deemed satisfactory by the majority of surveyed 
national  authorities (CAs/EAs) and business  associations (operating at  EU and national 
level).  However,  in  the  case  of  retailers,  only  a  minority  expressed  a  similar  positive 
judgment about  the Directive’s relevance.  Several  respondents  across the three targeted 
categories highlighted some limited cases of mismatches between the original objectives 
of the Directive and the current needs to combat UTPs, while not calling into question its 
relevance.  

The recitals of the Directive identify imbalances in bargaining power between parties as a 
key element leading to UTPs. One of the primary arguments put forward by those who 
question  the  overall  relevance  of  the  Directive,  as  well  as  by  some  of  those  who 
acknowledge its merits, is that the Directive is not designed to address the most serious 
root  cause  of  the  weak  bargaining  power  of  many  suppliers  of  agri-food  products 
(individual farmers, small producer organisations, and small cooperatives in particular), 
which lies, inter alia, in the fragmentation of supply.  

Another important point is that the Directive is not designed to influence the mechanisms 
of  price  formation  along  the  agri-food  supply  chains,  despite  aiming  to  improve 
transparency  in  price  formation  and/or  changes  to  contractually  agreed  pricing 
mechanisms/price levels.  

48 

OverallFarmers only* Processors only* Improved definition of UTPs at both national and EU level2.541.692.001.921.01Improvement of pre-existing national legislation (if any) dealing with UTPs (i.e., simplification/streamlining of legislation)1.921.321.361.600.58Reduction of differences in the legislation addressing UTPs across EU MSs (improved EU-level harmonisation)2.251.541.432.040.88Strengthened protection for victims of UTPs in domestic transactions2.461.371.501.640.99Establishing a level playing field for operators of different MSs in cross-border intra-EU transactions1.961.401.431.720.68Establishing a level playing field for operators of different countries in transactions with non-EU operators1.461.141.071.240.36Strengthened protection for non-EU operators that are victims of UTPs by EU operators1.330.930.930.880.36Other benefits1.170.300.210.080.23Business associationsCAs & EAs Wholesalers & RetailersLikert scores 
 
 
 
However, it should be recalled that the common agricultural policy (CAP) as well as the 
common fisheries policy (CFP) have traditionally included measures, notably through the 
respective Common Market Organisations (CMOs), aimed at promoting the aggregation 
of supply in the primary production stage, strengthening the bargaining power of primary 
producers, and improving their remuneration. 

Case study Spain – Focus on Wine and Fruit and Vegetables (F&V) supply chains 

Although the Spanish law and the Directive are generally seen as relevant to the issues they were initially intended 
to address, consulted stakeholders have identified several gaps. These notably include emerging new UTPs and the 
inability  to  apply  the  law  to  certain  transactions,  particularly  those  involving  the  mercas,  large  wholesale  food 
distribution centres, due to the deposit contract system and use of intermediaries, as well as imports and exports, 
which are crucial for the F&V sector. Some interviewees felt that the scope of the law and Directive is too limited, 
while others believe it has already extended beyond the original focus on primary production. 

Finally, concerning EU added value, the Directive is considered to have established a harmonised base at the EU 
level. However, there are significant concerns about variations in provisions and implementation across the EU, 
particularly given the justified perception that the Spanish law is stricter than that in most other MSs. 

Several points regarding the Directive's relevance have been raised by stakeholders, with 
at times polarised views. For each of these points put forward by some stakeholders, there 
are others who express doubts or opposite views. The key points include:  

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

The  removal  of  relative  turnover  thresholds  and  the  consequential 
extension of protection from UTPs to all suppliers, regardless of their 
size, which some stakeholders believe would have a positive or negative 
influence on the relevance of the Directive in addressing the originally 
identified needs (64). 

The  'cascading  effects'  discussed  in  recitals  7  and  9  of  the  Directive, 
which  some  stakeholders  link  to  the  need  to  grant  protection  to  all 
suppliers, regardless of size.  

The 'bi-directional' protection from UTPs,  which would protect small 
buyers from UTPs perpetrated by large suppliers.  

The introduction of a 'general fairness  clause' in the Directive, which 
would prohibit any trading practice deemed unfair, even if not included 
in the lists of prohibited specific practices.  

The elimination of the distinction between 'black' and 'grey' UTPs, with 
the latter becoming 'black' UTPs.  

(64) In this regard findings from `Market Structure, Power, and the Unfair Trading Practices Directive in the 
EU Food Sector: A Review of Indicators.´ are interesting. In their analysis of market concentration rates 
compared with turnover thresholds of the UTP Directive they find that `with a few exceptions, the UTP 
directive covers the highly concentrated sectors for the agricultural sector quite well, also in smaller 
Member States. ´ 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

The  consideration  of  derogations  from  specific  provisions  in  the 
Directive  in  cases  of  'hardship/force  majeure',  as  suggested  by  some 
stakeholders in the processing stage and independent experts. (65)  

Requests for an expansion of the scope of the Directive, including the 
possibility  of  extending  its  applicability  to  all  deliveries  by  member 
farmers to cooperatives and producer organisations (66).  

The inclusion in the Directive of an explicit prohibition of sales below 
the  cost  of  production,  which  was  discussed  during  the  legislative 
process but not included in the final text. Some MSs have introduced or 
maintained this prohibition in their national legislation (67).  

The inclusion in the Directive of an obligation to have written contracts, 
which  is  already  included  in  the  implementing  legislation  of  some 
member  states  and  is  part  of  the  proposed  revision  of  the  CMO 
Regulation.  The  main  arguments  in  favour  of  this  obligation  are 
certainty on contract conditions and improved possibilities for controls 
by EAs.  

Few  and  relatively  limited  (at  least  for  now)  `genuinely  new  needs´  in  terms  of 
combating UTPs appeared. This could be due to the rather short period that has passed 
since the entry into force of the Directive and the completion of its transposition in all MSs. 

The  most  significant  cases  concern  `new´  practices  that  have  been  adopted  by  some 
retailers,  that  are  perceived  as  unfair  by  their  suppliers,  and  which  are  not  explicitly 
included in the current harmonised list of UTPs in the Directive. These practices include 
requests by retailers to their suppliers to help cover the costs of voluntary initiatives 
–  promoted  by  the  retailers  themselves  and  not  related  to  compliance  with  any  legal 
obligations  – focusing on  social and/or environmental responsibility (e.g., support  to 
charities,  campaigns  about  the  environmental  sustainability  of  agri-food  products,  etc.). 
Even if these initiatives have no linkage with the supply of products, suppliers they often 
consider  that  if  they  were  to  refuse  to  support  such  initiatives,  there  would  likely  be 
negative  consequences  on  their  business  relationships  with  retailers.  The  increasing 
diffusion of the `pay on scan` model in retail outlets (68) was also highlighted by certain 
consulted stakeholders as an attempt to circumvent the Directive’s provisions on payment 

(65)  It  is  worth  considering  that  where  national  legislation  makes  written  (sales)    contracts  compulsory, 
Articles  148  and  168  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1308/2013  require  that  such  contracts  include  rules 
applicable in the event of force majeure. 

(66) The potential extension of the scope of the Directive is also discussed by scholars: see for instance Knapp 

(2020). 

(67)  UTP  Report  2024  four  MSs  (Spain,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Italy)  have  introduced  provisions  on  sale  or 
purchase below production cost; three MSs (Spain, Hungary, Romania) have introduced provisions on 
re-sale at a loss; and two MSs (Spain, Italy) have introduced obligations to respect a certain price level. 
Germany has analysed the issue in its national level evaluation. 

(68)  In `pay on scan model´ the start of the payment period by the buyer is triggered by the purchase of the 
product by the final customer rather than by the delivery of the product to the buyer (retailer). Hence, 
it entails a period of indefinite length after the delivery in which the product can sit in the warehouse or 
on the shelf before the related payment period is actually triggered. 

50 

 
 
 
 
terms. These emerging practices according to the evidence that could be gathered in the 
evaluation do not seem to be widespread. Although in time to come, further evidence might 
suggest  otherwise, they do not  appear to  fundamentally put  into question the continued 
relevance of the Directive. 

Case study the Netherlands- Focus on Pig meat, sugar and potato supply chains 

Some stakeholders believe that the turnover thresholds set by the Directive, which were incorporated into the UTP 
Act,  limit  both  the  effectiveness  and  relevance  of  the  UTP  Act.  Some  complaints  are  filed  by  organisations 
representing hundreds of suppliers (such as in the Vion case), requiring the EA to verify the turnover of all suppliers 
involved. Additionally, the absence of a legal basis for information exchange with other EAs and the inadequacies 
in the tip-off system (as per Dutch General Administrative Law, the supplier's name must be disclosed when reporting 
a violation, which often deters suppliers from pursuing a UTP case) are seen as shortcomings by some consulted 
stakeholders. 

Most of the consulted stakeholders feel that the Directive has helped establish a minimum standard for fair business 
practices at the EU level, but there are still uncertainties about addressing UTPs in cross-border transactions. 

In this regard, it is interesting to note that only a minority - (22 %) - of the 81 respondents 
to  the  survey  in  support  of  the  evaluation  carried  out  through  the  SME  Panel  in  2024 
reported that their clients had found ways to circumvent the Directive’s provisions since 
the beginning of 2022. This suggests that buyers have not found `innovative solutions´ to 
that purpose that are perceived as unfair by the affected suppliers. However, the survey 
results suggest that this phenomenon is not yet particularly widespread. 

The evaluation also revealed no significant cases where the influence of external factors 
(e.g., price volatility in agri-food markets, disruptions in global logistical chains) caused 
such changes in the original needs expressed in the UTP IA 2018 to make the tools of the 
Directive unfit for addressing them. 

5.  WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED? 

5.1.  Conclusions 

Conclusions of the evaluation process are to be seen within the mentioned limitations of 
the assessment and cannot be isolated from the broader context in which UTPs can occur 
as well as related EU-level policy (initiatives). 

The Directive appears to have contributed to positive trends in the prevention of and 
fight against UTPs: Decreases in black and grey UTPs were reported by stakeholders in 
the annual JRC survey. Improvements are perceived in the reduction of payment delays 
(30- and 60-day terms), among the most occurring UTPs. 

Stakeholders' experiences are divided: farmers and processors reported some, albeit small, 
improvements, while retailers noted compliance efforts by large buyers as a key factor in 
reducing UTPs which in their view have now largely been eradicated. 

Although  there  has  been  an  increase  in  UTP  investigations,  pointing  towards  a  gradual 
catch-up in enforcement efforts by EAs, their overall number is still rather low across the 
EU  when  compared  to  the  number  of  sales  transactions,  especially  in  some  MSs. 
Approximately one third of closed UTP investigations between 2021 and 2024 led to a 
finding of UTP infringement. 

51 

 
 
 
 
The relatively short time span that has passed since the implementation of the Directive 
does  not  allow  to  judge conclusively  on  its  effectiveness  in  reducing  the  occurrence  of 
UTPs in the EU agri-food-supply chain. 

The Directive has however been effective in contributing to promoting a fairer business 
culture in agri-food supply chains.  

The main identified elements that hinder the Directive from fulfilling its full potential are 
the still unsatisfactory level of awareness among business operators about the Directive 
and its below potential national enforcement in some MSs; this element is strongly linked 
to the short time frame since its implementation. Moreover, constraints on a more effective 
cooperation among EAs  were also reported with  particular regard to the lack of a legal 
basis  within  the  Directive  to  exchange  confidential  information  with  other  EAs,  and  to 
effectively provide mutual assistance in cross-border UTP cases.  

Although the Directive has created certain costs for the national authorities responsible for 
its implementation and for business operators who primarily or exclusively act as suppliers 
(i.e., those whom the Directive aims to protect), based on extensive qualitative evidence 
those  costs  can  be  regarded  as  being  proportionate  to  the  benefits  that  have  been 
achieved. 

In the specific case of farmers, the benefits of the Directive outweigh the costs. As expected 
from a policy intervention that provides protection to suppliers, the assessment revealed 
that for business operators who primarily or exclusively act as buyers e.g., with regard to 
retailers, the costs and burdens incurred outweigh the benefits. However, the evaluation 
did not find any evidence to suggest that these costs and burdens resulted in significant 
damage or operational disruptions to the affected operators. The assessment highlighted a 
scarcity of quantitative evidence regarding compliance costs for operators, but qualitative 
evidence suggested that, for SMEs, these costs are not substantial. 

The limited availability of quantitative evidence on costs for operators including the extent 
of  economic  damages  caused  by  UTPs  as  well  as  their  benefits  in  quantitative  and 
monetary  terms,  is  linked  to  the  intrinsic  nature  of  the  issue,  which  often  concerns 
transaction-specific circumstances, as further elaborated in Annex II under the evaluation´s 
limitations. This data-related limitation is likely to pose an ongoing challenge, especially 
when considering the need of proportionality with regard to the administrative burden on 
operators  when  establishing  evidence  gathering  strategies.  Business  operators  who 
primarily  or  exclusively  act  as suppliers,  as  well  as  national  authorities involved in  the 
implementation  of  the  Directive,  generally  converged  on  a  positive  assessment  of  its 
ongoing  relevance  in  addressing  the  needs  that  prompted  its  introduction.  By  contrast, 
business operators who primarily or exclusively act as buyers, and retailers in particular, 
questioned the usefulness of the Directive in mitigating the negative impact of UTPs on 
the living standards of the agricultural community. They observed that the Directive is not 
designed to address the root causes of imbalances in bargaining power or to influence the 
mechanisms of price formation along the agri-food supply chains, although it does aim to 
improve  transparency in  price formation and/or  changes  to  contractually  agreed pricing 
mechanisms/price levels. 

It is also worth considering whether sufficient time has passed since the entry into force of 
the Directive and its transposition at MS level to allow for a conclusive judgement on its 

52 

 
 
 
relevance  in  addressing  the  originally  identified  needs.  Some  stakeholders  and  experts 
have observed that the experience in terms of enforcement is still limited, and it may be 
too early to conclude whether the Directive has serious enough shortcomings in terms of 
relevance to justify substantial changes to its provisions. 

Moreover, certain policy elements that were already being discussed at the time of the UTP 
proposal remain central to the policy debate. These include: the extension of protection 
from  UTPs  to  all  suppliers,  regardless  of  their  size,  with  six  MSs  having  included  or 
maintained provisions to this effect that go beyond the scope of the Directive. The lack of 
bi-directional  protection  from  UTPs in  the Directive, meaning  the protection  of weaker 
buyers from UTPs perpetrated by stronger suppliers, which significantly contributes to the 
perceived  imbalance  between  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  Directive  for  buyers.  Some 
stakeholders  in  the  farming  sector  have  also  raised  concerns  about  the  absence  of  an 
explicit prohibition on sales at prices below the cost of production in the Directive. 

The evaluation identified only a few, limited, genuinely new needs in terms of combating 
UTPs that have emerged since the Directive came into force. 

The coherence assessment revealed no conflicts or inconsistencies between the Directive 
and other EU interventions that directly or indirectly address UTPs, or other relevant EU-
level initiatives and objectives. On the contrary, the assessment identified complementarity 
with  interventions  and  initiatives.  The  greatest  coherence  was  found  between  the  UTP 
Directive  and  the  CMO  Regulation,  both  of  which  work  to  strengthen  the  position  of 
farmers in the supply chain. 

The  evaluation  suggests  that  the  Directive  contributes  to  creating  EU  added  value, 
primarily by providing a minimum level of protection from UTPs to suppliers across the 
EU,  including  in  MSs  where  such  protection  was  previously  unavailable.  This,  in  turn, 
reduces national differences in this regard, positively contributing to a level playing field 
within  the  EU's  internal  market,  in  line  with  the  Directive's  objectives.  However,  the 
'minimum harmonisation' nature of the Directive at the same time allowed for significant 
heterogeneity in enforcement approaches and for a number of practices qualified as 
unfair  by  one  or  the  other  MS.  This  is  reported  by  some  operators,  notably  retailers, 
operating across MSs, as making it difficult to operate throughout the EU. This difference 
is  partly  explained  by  national  transposing  legislation,  partly  due  to  differences  on  the 
ground and in part due to the short time frame of implementation to date. 

5.2.  Lessons learned 

The UTP Directive is an important component of EU agricultural policy, which, through 
an  array  of  policy  instruments  including  the  CMO,  sectoral  interventions,  and  direct 
income support for farmers, aims to achieve the overarching goals set out in the TFEU. 

Despite the relatively early stage of implementation of the Directive, the evaluation has 
identified  some  challenges  that  can  hinder  the  achievement  of  the  full  potential  of  the 
Directive in reducing the occurrence of UTPs. Several EAs appear to not have yet fully 
used their potential to conduct UTP investigations, particularly ex officio investigations, 
which has been found to be an effective way to address the 'fear factor' among victims of 
UTPs. 

53 

 
 
 
The introduction of measures to provide restitution and compensation to victims of UTPs 
has been limited. In most cases, victims can only seek compensation through ordinary civil 
court proceedings, which may not provide adequate anonymity. 

In  addition,  the  evaluation  has  also  highlighted  room  for  improvement  in  terms  of  the 
Directive´s awareness, especially for small and medium sized operators in the upstream 
stages of the agri-food supply chain. To improve the level of awareness of the Directive, 
the  role  of  producer  organisations  and  sector  organisations  in  addressing  UTP-related 
issues emerged: although these organisations are already providing support, there is still 
potential  for  further  strengthening  their  efforts,  for  example,  by  providing  dedicated 
awareness-raising  activities  on  UTP  legislation  and  filing  complaints  on behalf  of  their 
members. This could help address confidentiality concerns and reduce the obstacles for 
individual operators, not only for EU-based operators but also for non-EU suppliers. The 
evaluation has also identified some limitations in the practical, user-centric information 
available on the Commission's website to direct farmers, SMEs, and non-EU suppliers in 
dealing with UTPs, especially in cross-border transactions. 

The EU level  Enforcement  Network introduced by the Directive appears to  be a useful 
forum for cooperation among EAs. Nevertheless, the evaluation found the need to deepen 
cross-border  cooperation,  particularly  on  procedural  enforcement  elements,  such  as  the 
exchange  of  confidential  information.  Stronger  cross-  border  cooperation  may  also 
contribute to further strengthening the EU level playing field in the EU internal market. 
The proposal by the EC for a Regulation on cooperation is expected, if adopted, to facilitate 
EAs’ cooperation in cross-border cases. 

The Directive continues to appear to be overall relevant. No strong, genuinely new needs 
emerged. Most of the issues raised by stakeholders were already discussed at the time of 
the  Directive’s  proposal.  For  example,  several  stakeholders  expressed  concerns  and 
suggestions  on  how,  in  their  view,  the  Directive  should  be  improved,  by  abolishing 
turnover thresholds, introducing bi-directional protection and introducing new UTPs, such 
as  rules  on  selling  products  below  production  cost.  Opposing  views  among  various 
stakeholders in the stages of the agri-food supply chain emerged on the opportunity and 
extent  of  needed  changes  to  the  Directive.  The  fact  that  many  of  the  suggestions  for 
changes  were  already  discussed  at  the  time  of  the  Directive’s  proposal,  with  similarly 
diverging views, suggests that the Directive as it stands may represent an overall balanced 
and proportionate approach for intervention at EU level.  

Finally, the gathering of quantitative evidence on compliance costs and the economic harm 
caused by UTPs, especially when taking into account especially difficult to track cascading 
effects, is an ongoing challenge. While the JRC survey has addressed this issue to some 
extent,  and  the  present  evaluation  made  use  of  dedicated  ad  hoc  approaches,  the 
information gathered is in parts still insufficient. To overcome this challenge, and mindful 
of the complexity of the task and involved administrative burden to stakeholders, it may 
be necessary to consider enhancing periodic monitoring activities at EU and national level 
to collect more robust data in this specific regard. 

54 

 
 
 
 
Annex I  Procedural Information 

Lead DG   

Directorate-General Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI)  

Decide planning references   

PLAN/2023/1063  (linked  to  the  Report  on  the  main  findings  of  the  evaluation  to  the 
European Parliament and to the Council, as well as to the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: PLAN/2023/1075) 

Work Programme reference  

Commission Work Programme 2025 (COM(2025) 45 final), Annex II 

Exceptions to the Better Regulation guidelines  

The evaluation was carried out without a public consultation. This course of action was 
pursued  because  the  Directive  targets  business-to-business  relationships  in  a  specific 
sector, the agri-food supply chain, and not the broad, general public. Besides the call for 
evidence, open to the general public, and the targeted, yearly public consultations open to 
all  agri-food  suppliers,  as  well  as  regular  exchanges  with  EAs,  further  targeted 
consultations  on  the  various  stakeholders  have  been  carried  out  in  the  context  of  this 
evaluation. See Annex V Stakeholders’ consultation - Synopsis report for a summary. 

Organisation and timing  

This evaluation was carried out in accordance with Article 12 of the UTP Directive. The 
evaluation work draws, among other sources of evidence (see Annex II Methodology and 
Analytical models used and Annex V Stakeholders’ consultation - Synopsis report ), on an 
evaluation support study, contracted under a DG AGRI Framework Contract.  

The evaluation support study, carried out by the external contractor, started in February 
2024 and was completed in March 2025. The work was carried out in conformity with the 
DG AGRI procedure for the organisation and management of evaluation support studies 
carried out by external contractors.  

The  evaluation  support  study  as  well  as  evaluation  overall  was  supervised  under  the 
technical and contractual management of DG AGRI´s Policy Performance Unit A.3. An 
Inter-service  Steering  Group  (ISG)  among  different  EC  DGs  was  established,  with  the 
mandate  to  steer  the  overall  evaluation  process  throughout  its  duration  by  providing 
feedback on the consultation strategy and the call for evidence, the terms of reference for 
the evaluation  support study and  by  contributing  to  monitor the work of  the  evaluation 
support study as well as to prepare this evaluation report. Besides DG AGRI, the ISG was 
composed of the Secretariat-General (SG) of the Commission and invited DGs: COMP, 
GROW, JRC, JUST, MARE, TRADE and SJ. The ISG started its meetings in June 2023 
and held 8 meetings.  

55 

 
 
 
The  EC  reached  out  to  the  general  public  through  a  call  for  evidence  published  on  22 
October 2023 on the `Have Your Say´ platform. The call for evidence set out the context, 
scope  and  aim  of  the  evaluation. During  the  six-week  feedback  period,  46  stakeholder 
contributions were received. These did not require changes of the overall approach towards 
the evaluation.   

Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board  

This standalone evaluation SWD was subject to scrutiny by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board 
(RSB),  an  independent  body  within  the  Commission  that  advises  the  College  of 
Commissioners by providing central quality control and support for Commission impact 
assessments and evaluations. An upstream meeting, involving RSB members as well as 
representatives from SG, DG AGRI and JRC, was held on 6 December 2024. The RSB 
hearing was held  on  18  June 2025. The RSB gave a positive opinion with  reservations 
which have been addressed as follows: 

RSB remarks  

Uptake in the evaluation report 

The report should clearly present the heterogeneous 
situation in terms of UTP occurrence as well as the 
level  of  protection  granted  to  weaker  economic 
operators in the different Member States before and 
after the implementation of the Directive. It should 
discuss key factors influencing this heterogeneity, 
including the fact that some Member States already 
had  a  UTP-related  legislation  in  force,  varying 
levels  of  enforcement  and  the  differing  size  and 
specificities  of  the  agri-food  chain  in  different 
Member  States.  To  the  extent  possible  it  should 
then  make  conclusions  and  present  the  lessons 
learned,  for  instance  in  terms  of  impact  on  fear 
factor or on deterrence to UTPs. 

Annex VI has been added to the report. It provides 
an overview of the different enforcement activities 
as reported by MSs in relation to UTP enforcement. 
It  also  briefly  summarises  national  evaluations 
carried out to date. 

References to the existing mapping of UTP-related 
legislation before the adoption of the UTP Directive 
have  been  strengthened  in  the  text.  Also,  a 
summary  of  the  main  aspects  in  which  national 
legislations  differed  has been  added  in  the  text  in 
the form of an extensive footnote. 

The  references  to  the  UTP  2024  SWD,  which 
presents 
a  detailed  overview  of  national 
transposition  of  the  Directive,  have  been  made 
more explicit. The text presenting main differences 
in transposition choices has been enriched. 

References to indicators showing differences in the 
agricultural  sector  and  agri-food  supply  chain  in 
different  MSs  have  been  made  more  explicit. 
Exemplifying graphs have been inserted in Section 
4.1. 

of 

each 

detailed 

assessment 

A 
national 
transposition law, including the MSs specific needs 
and reasons that led to transposition choices beyond 
the  minimum  harmonisation  set  out 
the 
Directive,  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  EU  level 
evaluation. 

in 

Annex II has been amended including a reference 
to indicators used to approximate market power and 
their relation in view of bargaining power. 

Limitations  on  the  attribution  of  effects  are 
mentioned there as well. 

The report should further analyse the effectiveness 
of  the  Directive  in  terms  of  reaching  the  specific 
objectives and analyse which indicators can be used 
for this. It should explain how these indicators can 
be  measured  and  which  methods  and  data  are 
needed for this and future evaluation(s) in terms of 
the  effects  on  economic  operators.  Given  that  the 
rates  of  late  payments  seemed  to  decrease  before 
2022,  and  that  the  number  of  UTP  complaints 
seemed to increase after the intervention, the report 
needs to assess to what extent any decrease in the 
UTPs can be attributed to the intervention. 

56 

 
RSB remarks  

Uptake in the evaluation report 

Whereas the stakeholder views on effectiveness are 
divided  (buyers  vs.  suppliers),  the  costs  and 
benefits  are  not  clearly  identified  and  quantified. 
The  report  should  provide  a  better  economic 
analysis based on observational data to understand 
the  implications  and  the  potential  impacts  on 
different  stakeholder  groups.  The  analysis  of 
effectiveness  and  efficiency,  should  as  far  as 
possible, go beyond opinion data and be primarily 
based  on  observational  data  on  market  outcomes, 
such as profit margins, market shares, etc. To the 
extent  possible  the  analysis  should  include  an 
analysis of pass-through effects including on final 
for  all 
consumers.  All  costs  and  benefits 
stakeholders,  including  both  the  suppliers  and 
buyers  should  be  identified  and  form  part  of  the 
analysis of efficiency. 

The  report  should  also  reflect  how  the  UTP 
prohibitions  might  impact  on  the  number  of 
transactions, the quantities exchanged and the price 
at which they are exchanged. Effects of this on the 
general  objective  of  improving  the  functioning  of 
the  agri-food  supply  chain  should  be  assessed. 
Conclusions to the effect that the costs outweigh the 
benefits or that the intervention is a success should 
be avoided unless they are based on data of market 
outcomes  accounting  for  all  costs  and  benefits 
accruing  to  all  stakeholders.  In  case  the  report 
identifies evidence or data gaps, it should reflect it 
in the conclusions and propose mitigating measures 
in the lessons learned. 

Innovative  solutions  to  circumvent  unfair  trading 
practices such as the ‘pay on scan’ practice should 
be  further  discussed  and  assessed  against  the 
effectiveness  and  relevance  of  the  Directive.  The 
report  should  explain  how  and  to  what  extent  the 
Directive  addresses  or  not 
those  emerging 
practices. 

The  report  should  better  analyse  the  coherence  - 
and  the  risk  of  overlaps  -  of  the  Directive  with 
existing  and  recently  proposed  initiatives  such  as 
the  proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  combating  late 
payments  in  commercial  transactions  (payment 
times), the proposal for targeted amendments to the 
common  market  organisation  of  agricultural 
products  and  other  CAP  Regulations  (written 
contracts, price conditions, mediation service) and 
the proposal for a Regulation on cooperation among 
EAs  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  the  UTP 
Directive. 

Cost  and  benefits  for  all  stakeholders  along  the 
supply chain are discussed in the evaluation report. 

Limitations to the analysis are expressed in Annex 
II, notably the fact that bargaining power does not 
refer to a  sectorial concept  (as market power) but 
needs to be seen in the context of bilateral, concrete 
commercial  interactions  which  pose  fundamental 
challenges to the use of observational data. 

References  to  market  concentration  levels  have 
been added as contextual elements in Section 2 and 
Annex II. 

conceptual 

expected 
The 
consequences of bargaining power has been refined 
in Section 2. 

explanation 

of 

The  reference  to  data  gaps  has  been  made  more 
explicit in the conclusions part. 

An explicit reference to qualitative evidence related 
to costs and benefits has been added in the text. 

More details on the practice(s) have been added in 
the main text. Short explanations have been added 
in view of the Directive under Section 4.3. 

The  text  under  section  4.1  has  been  enriched  in 
view  of  better  explaining  the  complementarity  of 
existing legislation with the Directive, notably the 
CMO and the Late payment Directive. The Section 
has also been amended to provide more details on 
the  coherence  between 
the  Directive  with 
legislative proposals concerning the Late Payment 
Regulation, the targeted amendments of the CMO 
and  the  UTP  cross  border  Regulation.  Not  only 
aspects  of  consistency  have  been  mentioned  but 
also  explanations  of  synergies,  for  instance,  the 
proposal  for  mandatory  written  contracts  helping 
also UTP enforcement. 

57 

 
  
 
 
 
 
Evidence used together with sources and any issues regarding its quality  

Evidence was collected  under the evaluation support study covering, besides secondary 
evidence, primary data collection in the form of interviews, surveys and workshops on a 
variety  of  stakeholders  at  various  levels  (Individual,  Regional,  MS-level,  EU-level). 
Overall, the ISG found the conclusions to be based on the evidence and analysis presented 
in the support study and judged the work to be of good quality as documented by the final 
quality assessment of the evaluation support study. 

Besides the evaluation support study, the main sources of evidence used comprehended:  
the  feedback  on  the  call  for  evidence,  the  annual  public  survey  to  agri-food  suppliers 
carried  out  by  the  JRC,  annual  reports  by  MSs´  EAs  to  the  EC,  regular  EU  level  UTP 
Enforcement  Network meetings among  national  EAs and the EC, first  assessments  and 
interim evaluations on national transpositions, annual activity reports of EAs available at 
national level at times paired with additional ad hoc surveys and analytical briefs, SME 
panel targeted survey, previous EC reports on the transposition and implementation of the 
Directive  of  October  2021  and  April  2024,  with  accompanying  SWD  summarising  the 
transposition choices of MSs. Further key sources of evidence were the evaluation report 
of the EESC and the Opinion of the Fit4 Future Platform. For more information see Annex 
II Methodology  and  Analytical  models  used  and  Annex  V Stakeholders’  consultation  - 
Synopsis report. 

Use of external expertise  

External expertise related to the evaluation analysis has been employed in the form of an 
evaluation support study (see also above). 

58 

 
Annex II  Methodology and Analytical models used 

This  Annex  presents  the  system  of  methods  employed  in  the  evaluation  i.e.,  how  the 
evaluation has been carried out. 

The evaluation´s approach takes as a blueprint the evaluation support study. The evaluation 
questions by design coincide with the study questions of the evaluation support study. The 
overall approach encompasses a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. These cannot 
always be neatly separated by evaluation question or evaluation criterion as methods are 
often horizontal, contributing to several evaluation criteria and evaluation questions. They 
are intricately linked to the primary evidence gathering activities whose existence, in many 
cases, per se constitutes a way of how the evaluation has been carried out and therefore are 
part of the methodology. 

Table  3  explains  the  methodological  approaches,  makes  references  to  the  sources  of 
evidence employed together with these approaches, concisely outlining their strengths and 
limitations  to  convey  a  sense  of  their  robustness.  Methodological  approaches  are  also 
related to the main evaluation criterion(a) and evaluation question(s). 

As a final introductory point, methodological approaches need to be seen in the context of 
the overall study limitations  mentioned in 1.1 Purpose and scope of  the evaluation and 
further explained here: 

Firstly,  the  main  limitation  is  the  short  time  span  of  actual  implementation  of  the 
Directive (69).  MSs  had  to  notify  transposition  of  the  Directive  by  May  2021  i.e. 
approximately  two  years  after  adoption  and  apply  the  Directive  by  November  2021. 
However, no MS notified  complete transposition of the Directive by  May 2021 (70). 
The transposition measures of the Directive are only applicable since end 2022 in all MSs. 
Furthermore, existing contracts had to be brought in line within 12 months after publication 
of the transposing legislation in the national Official Journal. This leaves  mere two full 
years – three years at the very best (71) – for effects of the UTP Directive to materialise, 
also considering the bulk of the additional primary data collection of the evaluation carried 
out in 2024 to meet the legal deadline for 2025. As a result, consulted stakeholders, across 
all  types,  and  experts  on  several  occasions  reported  limited  experience  with  the  actual 
implementation of some measures and could only provide their contribution accordingly. 

Secondly, different legislative situations at the start of the implementation period as 
well  as  implementation  in  many  cases  well  beyond  the  minimum  harmonisation 
requirements of the Directive, make the EU level evaluation complex. As determined 
in  the 2018 Impact  Assessment accompanying the UTP Directive´s  legislative proposal 
MSs  had  different  approaches  to  UTPs  in  the  agri-food  supply  chain  ranging  from  no 
dedicated legislation at all to rather articulated national provisions: roughly half (14 MSs) 
had already related legislation to a varying degree in place that was amended, others (13 
MSs) introduced new and/or separate legislation. This provides for several, simultaneous 

(69)  This limitation was also acknowledged by the Fit for Future Platform, in its Opinion adopted in 2024. 

(70)  23 MSs did in 2021-mostly in the third quarter (Q3) of the year, 4 MSs in 2022. Timing is roughly in 

line with transposition of Single Market Directives. See Single Market Scoreboard. 

(71)  This ideal, minimum evaluation period is discussed in the  BR-toolbox, (p. 386): `[…] sufficient time 
should have passed since its implementation to ensure at least three years´ worth of sufficiently full set 
of data, meaning the evaluation cannot be produced before the fourth year following implementation´. 

59 

 
 
evaluation  baselines  and  makes  establishing  a  pre-Directive,  EU  baseline  complex. 
Moreover,  many  MSs  went  beyond  the  commonly  mandated  minimum  in  the 
implementation to varying degrees (72). It is, hence, challenging to disentangle impacts 
resulting  from  the  implementation  of  the  minimum  harmonisation  provisions  and 
attribute  effects  only  to  the  elements  that  are  due  to  the  elements  present  in  the  EU 
legislation. These differences in transposition choices in some instances, made it difficult 
for EU-level stakeholders to form an overall opinion on the Directive’s effectiveness. 

A  third  set  of  limitations  concerns  the  difficulty,  intimately  linked  to  the  specific 
nature of the needs the Directive seeks to address, to retrieve quantitative and robust 
data.  As  further  explained  above,  UTPs  by  their  very  nature  happen  in  the  context  of 
specific  commercial  relationships  between operators. These relationships  are frequently 
related to (i) confidential, commercial information, which, in turn, makes it hard to access 
and  gather  information.  A  further  element  complicating  not  only  enforcement  of  the 
Directive but also the evaluation in terms of obtaining information is the so called (ii) `fear 
factor´  (73).  Moreover,  (iii)  some  UTPs  can  be  against  the  law,  but  also  be  perfectly 
legitimate,  depending  on  the  specific  context  involved  in  the  concrete  case  (see  grey 
UTPs).  This  further  contributes  to  the  difficulty  of  robust  data  retrieving.  Finally, 
especially operators downstream of the farming stage but before the retail stage (iv) often 
act as both suppliers but also buyers in their business operations depending on the specific 
business transaction. For example, in one commercial interaction they may be in a stronger 
position  vis-a-vis  their  supplier,  in  another  they  might  be  themselves  a  supplier  to  a 
stronger buyer. 

In this regard, although more conventional indicators used to discuss power relationships 
within the (agri-food) supply chain such as concentration and markup (markdown) indices 
can provide relevant insights also into possible bargaining power, they mostly relate to the 
concept of market power (74). 

Finally, exceptionally strong external factors as, for instance high inflation due to the 
consequences of the CODIV19 pandemic and complexity of agri-food supply chains, 
confound the effects of the Directive. A key argument for the rationale of the Directive 
– but also key struggle in the evaluation – is the concept of `pass through´ i.e. abuses of 
stronger bargaining power, passed through the agri-food `netchain´– the web of operators´ 

(72)  Article 9 of the Directive with a view to ensuring a higher level of protection, explicitly provides for the 
possibility for MSs to maintain or introduce stricter rules aimed at combating UTPs than those 
laid down by the Directive, provided that these are compatible with the rules on the functioning of the 
internal market. 

(73)  The `fear factor´ as a challenge is in line, with the EESC evaluation ( e.g. paragraphs 2.7, 2.8) as well as 
the Fit4future platform´s Opinion (p.6). See also Fałkowski, J., C. Ménard, R.J. Sexton, J. Swinnen and 
S. Vandevelde (Authors), Marcantonio, F. Di and P. Ciaian (Editors) (2017), Unfair trading practices in 
the food supply chain: A literature review on methodologies, impacts and regulatory aspects, European 
Commission, Joint Research Centre. 

(74)  See  Nes,  Kjersti,  Liesbeth  Colen,  and  Pavel  Ciaian. 2024.  `Market  Structure,  Power,  and  the  Unfair 
Trading Practices Directive in the EU Food Sector: A Review of Indicators.´ for a discussion on the 
complexity  of  capturing  and  measuring  market  power  as  well  as  considerations  of  metrics  used  for 
market power in relation to bargaining power. For instance, they state `Although concentration levels do 
not directly measure bargaining power, one could argue that firms with a larger market share are more 
difficult for the trading partners to be replaced by an alternative buyer/supplier in case negotiations 
break down. This may result in a stronger position to negotiate prices or other contractual elements, 
even though many other, and likely more important, factors will also influence its bargaining position. 
Thus, in more concentrated sectors, bargaining power vis-a-vis other trading partners could be, but is 
not necessarily, larger.´ 

60 

 
 
interactions. For example, from a downstream actor e.g. a wholesaler to the upstream actor 
e.g.  the  primary  producer.  It  is  particularly  challenging  and  resource  intensive  to 
empirically  track  the  magnitude  of  this  `pass  through´  and,  considering  the  evaluation, 
attribute  (possible  mitigation/extinctions)  to  the  Directive  and  not  to  other  legislative 
instruments,  voluntary  agreements  or  external  cofounders  e.g.  high  inflation  due  to 
COVID-19.

61 

 
Table 3: Methodological approaches within the evaluation. 

Approach/Analytical method 

Evaluation question (s)/ evaluation criterion(a) 

Descriptive statistical analysis of survey results has 
been  used  in  all  evaluation  criteria.  However,  the 
main  use  has  been  in  relation  to  the  criterion  of 
effectiveness,  efficiency  and  EU  added  value  and 
related evaluation questions. 

Analysis  through  descriptive  statistics  involves  summarising  and 
describing the basic features of a dataset, typically using measures such 
as  mean,  median,  etc.  to  provide  an  overview  of  the  data's  central 
tendency,  dispersion  and  distribution.  By  utilising  these  statistical 
techniques,  analysts can effectively organise and analyse data, thereby 
facilitating a clearer understanding of the underlying patterns and trends 
within the dataset. 

The method in this evaluation is mainly used to analyse the results of the 
various  surveys  carried  out  in  the  context  of  this  evaluation:  the  JRC 
survey, the SME panel carried out by the EC as well as the surveys done 
in the context of the external support study to public authorities, sector 
associations, retailers and large buyers. For more details on these surveys 
see Annex V Stakeholders’ consultation - Synopsis report. 

Surveys had as an overarching objective to collect primary evidence from 
various stakeholders on the ground to complete secondary evidence, for 
instance, MSs reports to the EC, literature. 

Descriptive  statistics  were  also  employed  when  analysing  the  annual 
notifications of enforcement activities by EAs submitted in the annual 
reports of EAs. 

Strengths/ limitations in the context of this 
evaluation 

Descriptive statistics are a standard, key component 
of  the  evaluation  to  make  sense  of  the  evidence 
collected  in  the  various  surveys  and  to  establish 
relationships  between  respondents’  profiles  and 
their answers as well as answers overall to uncover 
the structure of replies and their trends. 

Descriptive  statistics  alone  are  not  sufficient  to 
establish  cause-effect  relationships  between  an 
intervention (in this case the UTP Directive) and an 
outcome (e.g. The reduced occurrence for UTPs). In 
this  evaluation  descriptive  statistics  are  combined 
with other quantitative/qualitative methodologies to 
reinforce observed trends. 

Cost models, in general, are used to estimate the financial implications 
of  various  (business)  activities  or  decisions.  They  involve  creating 
structured frameworks that incorporate different cost elements, such as 
fixed  and  variable  costs,  to  predict  expenses  and  assess  economic 
feasibility, helping organisations make informed decisions. 

Mainly used in the efficiency assessment under Q5 
to  quantify  the  costs  incurred  by  CAs/EAs  and 
business operators in relation to the implementation 
of the Directive. 

The framework provided by cost models allowed to 
clearly structure and identify the main types of costs, 
cost components as well as their characteristics such 
as recurrent vs one-one off costs, direct vs indirect 
costs.  Estimations  were  strongly  dependent  on  the 
completeness of underlying data. For instance, in the 
case of labour component of EAs data  were rather 

62 

 
 
 
complete,  while  other  cost  components  could only 
be  collected  for  selected  cases  and  had  to  be 
approximated. Cost data collection for operators was 
more limited and due to the various situations that 
can  occur (78)  as  well  as 
limited 
feedback  provided  by  consulted 
quantitative 
stakeholders,  more  assumptions,  MSs 
level 
estimations, and qualitative analysis was employed. 

the  more 

In the context of the EU Better Regulation framework, cost models are 
used to assess the economic impact of regulatory proposals by estimating 
the  administrative  and  compliance  costs 
for  businesses  and 
stakeholders (75). 

The evaluation support study used them as a framework–in particular the 
EU standard cost model – to estimate the costs induced by the Directive 
for EAs and business stakeholders. 

The main steps involved: 

•  A theoretical analysis, defining the main typologies of costs 
and benefits potentially related to the Directive and its 
enforcement at national level. 

•  Characterisation of the main costs and benefits that were 
actually incurred/enjoyed in practice by the different 
stakeholder categories: Competent EAs. Business operators in 
the different stages of the supply chains. 

•  Quantification (to the extent possible by the available 

evidence) of the main costs (and benefits) that were actually 
incurred (enjoyed) in practice (quantitative evidence, 
qualitative judgments by the concerned stakeholders on the 
perceived importance of the costs and benefits that they 
incurred (enjoyed)). 

•  Comparative analysis to assess whether the actual costs are 

proportionate to the actual benefits. 

•  Comparative analysis to assess whether the actual costs and 
benefits have similar or different extent/importance among 
Member States. 

(75)  For more information see BR-toolbox #65 to #58. 

(78)  See evaluation support study (p.55-56) for a more detailed discussion. 

63 

 
 
To estimate costs where actual data could not be retrieved or collected, it 
also used ad hoc approaches: 

1)  When assessing the (potential) benefits of the Directive a 

quantitative part of this assessment, consisted in estimating the 
saved costs to operators in the primary stages induced by the 
60-day payment term. This payment term was approximated 
by the financial metric of Days of sales outstanding (DSO) – 
the average number of days that it takes an operator to collect 
the payment for a sale, computed by dividing the average 
accounts receivable during a given period by the total value of 
sales during the same period – that could be retrieved through 
balance sheet data of operators. A reduction in DSO was then 
translated into additional cash-flow for operators which is 
taken as an approximation of (partial) saved cost i.e. benefit 
for relevant stakeholders. (76) 

2)  One of the main cost components for enforcement was 

identified to be labour. Where data gaps were identified, 
estimations of labour input in terms of full-time equivalents 
were made. (77) 

Supply  chain  analysis  involves  examining  the  flow  of  goods, 
information,  and  finances  as  they  move  along  the  (agri-food)  supply 
chain from supplier to processor to wholesaler to  retailer. The  method 
focuses  on  identifying  inefficiencies,  assessing  risks  within  the  supply 
chain, generally, to determine how to improve it. The examination was 
carried out by using secondary data i.e. sector statistics, reports as well 
as through the collection of primary data through surveys, interviews and 
workshops and in combination with cases studies (see below). 

Used  in  the  assessment  of  effectiveness  under  Q1, 
Q2 and Q4, of efficiency under Q5 and of EU added 
value under Q8. 

The  analysis  contributed  to  answering  of  various 
evaluation questions mainly by providing context to 
the  analysis  i.e.  through  metrics  such  as  size  and 
workings  of  selected  supply  chains,  structures, 
turnovers 
in  value  and  volume,  relationships 
between various stages and main actors. 

Multi Criteria Decision analysis is a decision-making framework that 
evaluates  and  prioritises  multiple,  often  conflicting  criteria  to  aid  in 

Contributed to assess EU added value. 

(76)  For more details see evaluation support study (p.42) as well as Annex 1 of it. 

(77)  Ibid. Annex 1. 

64 

The  main  advantage  of  this  approach  consisted  in 
and  understandable 
providing 

structured 

a 

 
 
making  complex  decisions.  It  involves  identifying  relevant  criteria, 
assigning weights to reflect their importance, and scoring each decision 
option against these criteria to derive an overall ranking or decision.  

The method usually is applied in ex ante settings. However, in the context 
of the evaluation it was employed from an ex-post perspective. 

The main steps included: 

•  Definition of the two `options´, in this case identified as a 

`baseline´ i.e. what would have happened without Directive 
and as the current scenario i.e. what actually happened based 
on the assessment carried out in the study.  

•  Evaluation criteria were used as decision criteria and 

sometimes also refined with sub-criteria.  

•  Each criterion was then assigned a score on a scale from 1 to 
5, 5 indicating the most positive level. This scoring was done 
in the final phase of the support study, in light of the findings 
of each study question and qualitatively motivated. In other 
words, it represents a translation/synthesis of findings into 
scores. 

•  Each of the criteria was weighted for its relative importance 

based on the analysis carried out in the evaluation support 
study.  

•  The external study team also carried out some local sensitivity 
analyses used to analyse the robustness of the assumptions in 
the MCDA. Its primary goal is to understand how changes in 
the input parameters or weights of the MCDA affect the 
overall ranking or of alternatives.  

Qualitative  research  is  a  method  focused  on  understanding  (human) 
behaviour  and  the  reasons  behind  it  through  non-numerical  data.  It 
involves  collecting  insights  through  methods  like  interviews,  focus 
groups,  and  observations,  emphasising  depth  and  context  to  explore 
experiences. 
and 
complex 

phenomena 

subjective 

framework for aggregating several criteria and make 
a  judgment  upon  them;  of  particular  interest  and 
relevance for the  evaluation criterion of EU added 
value. 

The  limitation  derives  from  the  fact  that  by 
employing  the  method  outside  of  the  commonly 
used framework i.e. in an ex-post setting poses limits 
to the alternatives to be considered. 

Moreover,  in  the  specific  case  also  the  assessment 
matrix (i.e. the dept of criteria (indicators)) used was 
limited  in  terms  of  detail  not  allowing  for  an 
appreciation of the method´s full potential. 

The method was used in the entire assessment for the 
interpretation  of  elements  collected 
through, 
interviews, hybrid workshops and case studies. 

Complementing  descriptive  statistics  and  desk 
research. 

65 

 
  
Case studies have been used to triangulate evidence 
from other sources with some in-depth analysis that 
could also consider the national transposition of the 
Directive, 
regulatory 
environment  as  well  as  specific  agri-food  supply 
chains that were considered.  

national 

broader 

the 

Although  the  selection  of  case  studies  was  carried 
out with great care to cover a wide range of realities, 
extrapolations of findings to the EU level have to be 
carried out with care and cannot be encompassing.  

Insights from case studies have been used to answer 
evaluation  questions  under  all  evaluation  criteria, 
except coherence. 

Case studies have been used as a qualitative method to explore a specific 
instance or a small number of instances in depth and within their real-life 
context with specific agri-food supply chains at MS level. This method 
involved collecting detailed information through various sources, such 
as interviews, observations, and desk research.  

To  understand  the  complexities  and  unique  aspects  of  the  agri-food 
supply chains, providing insights and informing broader conclusions or 
recommendations. 

The selection of case studies carried out by the external study team, has 
been done based on criteria comprehending geography, including MSs 
which  already  had  or  did  not  have  specific  UTP-related  legislation; 
socio-economic  importance  of  the  agri-food  system,  both  in  absolute 
terms  and  within  the  national  economy;  diversity  of  the  operational 
contexts  where  UTPs  arise,  mainly  deriving  from  differences  in  the 
structure  and  organisation  of  the  agri-food  system  and  from  different 
combinations  of  supply  chains  covered;  different  occurrence  of  UTPs 
and  of  the  processes  related  to  the  enforcement  of  the  Directive,  with 
particular  regard  to  the  number  of  investigations  opened,  of  ex  officio 
cases opened, and of investigations resulting in finding an infringement; 
earlier vs. later transposition of the Directive. 

The ten case studies focus on specific agri-food supply chains of selected 
MSs  also  considering  the  aspect  of  feasibility  e.g.  information 
availability (79). 

Case studies carried out in the evaluation support study complement with 
the ones covered in the evaluation report of the EESC. 

Desk research also known as secondary research, involves gathering and 
analysing information that has already been collected and published by 
others.  This  method  includes  reviewing  existing  reports,  studies, 

Contributed to all evaluation criteria. 

Desk research allowed to include analyses and their 
respective  underlying  evidence  base, 
the 
evidence base e.g. collected data of the evaluation. 
Desk research also informed overall methodological 

into 

(79)  See the evaluation support study for a Section 3.6 for a summaries of the then case studies (p.106) 

66 

 
 
academic papers, online databases, and other sources of available data to 
gain insights without collecting primary evidence. 

Through the evaluation support study 139 secondary sources have been 
covered. 

In particular, the EESC evaluation, Fit for future platform opinion as well 
as some national level interim evaluations were included in the evidence 
base. 

Source: Own elaboration based on the evaluation support study.

approaches 

used 

with 

the 

evaluation.  

There  is  yet  limited  published  scientific  empirical 
work  available  covering  the  post  implementation 
period  from  2022-2024  of  the  Directive  to  draw 
from, for instance, on topics as (evolution(s) in the 
extent) of the pass-through of UTPs. 

67 

 
 
Annex III Evaluation matrix 

The table below represents a schematic overview of the evaluation questions as well as the success criteria and related indicators used to answer them 
within the frame of the five evaluation criteria. Where relevant the matrix, in the first column makes reference to other parts of this evaluation and/or the 
evaluation support study.  

Table 4: Evaluation matrix. 

Remarks on the approach 

Judgement criterion 

Indicators 

Main sources of evidence 

Effectiveness:  Q1 – To what extent have the implementation and enforcement of the Directive been effective?  

a) In combating unfair trading practices in the agricultural and food supply chain listed in the Directive? 

b)  In  reducing  the  occurrence  of  unfair  trading  practices  in  the  agricultural  and  food  supply  chain  listed  in  the 
Directive? 

to 

approach 

The 
this 
Questions  consisted  in  (i) 
developing an understanding 
of  national  implementation 
and 
enforcement 
mechanisms.  Moreover,  (ii) 
identified 
the 
implementation 
and 
enforcement  mechanisms 
were  linked  to  the  specific 
objectives  of  the  Directive 
(see Figure 3). 

Effectiveness 
identifying UTPs 

in 

1.1.a  Evolution  in  the  number  of  identified  UTPs  per  year, 
broken down into `black` and `grey` UTPs 

Desk research, annual reports of EAs, EESC evaluation report. 

1.1.b – Evolution in the frequency of experiencing individual 
`black` and `grey` UTPs over the last year / the last three years 

Indicators 1.1.a and 1.1.b are also relevant for this assessment 

1.2.a  –  Perceived  effectiveness  of  all  preventive  measures 
(prevalence of qualitative judgments by stakeholders) 

1.2.b  –  Perceived  effectiveness  of  all  corrective  measures 
(prevalence of qualitative judgments by stakeholders) 

of 
Effectiveness 
preventive 
and 
corrective  measures 
taken by EAs in terms 
of  combating  UTPs 
and 
their 
reducing 
occurrence. 

Surveys of: 
• 
• 
•  MS CAs/EAs 

business associations 
retailers/large buyers 

Interviews 

Case studies 

JRC survey 

SME panel survey 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, (iii) an analysis 
of  the  concrete  outcomes  of 
the  application  of  national 
implementing  legislation  in 
terms  of  combating  UTPs 
and 
their 
reducing 
occurrence was done. 

three  main 

The  set  of  proposed  criteria 
and  indicators  is  related  to 
aspects 
the 
under 
considered 
effectiveness 
of 
and 
implementation 
enforcement of the Directive 
under Q3 below. 

1.2.c  –  Effectiveness  of  individual  preventive  measures 
(qualitative assessment based on actual outcomes) 

Call for evidence 

1.2.d  -  Effectiveness  of  individual  corrective  measures 
(number  of  resolved  UTP  cases  on  the  total  number  of 
ascertained  UTPs  +  qualitative  assessment  based  on  actual 
outcomes) 

Concrete  effects  of 
the measures taken on 
the 
concerned 
operators 

1.3.a  –  Effects  of  preventive  measures  on  offenders 
(qualitative) 

1.3.b – Effects of preventive measures on direct and indirect 
victims of UTPs (qualitative) 

1.3.c  –  Effects  of  corrective  measures  on  offenders 
(qualitative) 

1.3.d – Effects of corrective measures on direct and indirect 
victims of UTPs (qualitative) 

Effectiveness: Q2 – To what extent have there been any (if any) major unintended (positive and/or negative) effects? 

negative; 

Unintended  effects  are  not 
necessarily 
a 
certain  unintended  effect 
may  be  seen  as  negative  by 
some  stakeholders,  and  as 

The  effects  diverge 
from 
the  expected 
ones of the Directive, 
its 
as  defined  by 
intervention logic 

Qualitative  description  of  the  main  identified  unintended 
effects 

Desk  research  and  literature  review  (to  supplement  the 
findings from Q1) 
Interviews 
Survey of MS Cas/EAs 
Case studies 
JRC survey 
SME panel survey 
Call for evidence 

69 

 
 
 
unintended 
The 
effects  are  perceived 
or 
negative 
as 
positive 
the 
by 
consulted 
stakeholders 

Qualitative characterisation of unintended effects as negative 
or positive. 

2.2.a - Prevalence of survey replies on the perceived negative 
or  positive  nature  of  the  main  unintended  effects  of  the 
Directive 

positive (or neutral) by other 
stakeholders. 

The  assessment 
identified 
and  described  those  effects 
that  appear  to  be  the  main 
or 
unintended 
(positive 
negative)  effects  of 
the 
Directive 

It  characterised 
the  main 
identified unintended effects 
as negative or positive, based 
of 
the 
on 
stakeholders, 
consulted 
including  EU 
legislators 
were possible (see recitals of 
Directive, for example) 

perceptions 

Effectiveness:  Q3  –  To  what  extent  have  the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  Directive  been  effective  in 
relation  to  cooperation  among  competent  enforcement  authorities?  If  applicable,  how  can  the  cooperation  among 
competent enforcement authorities be improved? 

proposed 

The 
judgment 
indicators includes: 

criteria 

set 

of 
and 

Diffusion 
cooperation 
initiatives among EAs 

of 

3.0.a – Evolution in the number of cooperation initiatives over 
the years 

1.  A  `context´  criterion  to 
assess  the  diffusion  of 
cooperation 
initiatives 
among  EAs  over  time 
(an  increasing  number 
of  such  initiatives  over 
the  years  should  be 
plausibly  linked  with  a 
perceived  effectiveness 

to 

of 

Contribution 
cooperation 
initiatives 
improved 
of 
effectiveness 
national 
legislation 
related  to  the  UTP 
Directive 

3.1.a  -  Perceived  contribution  of  all  cooperation  initiatives 
(prevalence of qualitative judgments by stakeholders) 

3.1.b  –  Contribution  of  individual  cooperation  initiatives 
(qualitative assessment) 

70 

Desk research 
Survey of MS CAs 
Workshop of EAs 
Interviews 
Case studies 
See Q1 

 
 
 
 
Shortcomings/limitati
ons  of  cooperation 
initiatives  /  areas  for 
their improvement 

3.2.a - Perceived shortcomings of all cooperation initiatives 
(prevalence of qualitative judgments by stakeholders) 

3.2.b  –  Shortcomings/limitations  of  individual  cooperation 
initiatives + areas for improvement (qualitative assessment) 

3.2.c – Number of cooperation initiatives affected by serious 
shortcomings/limitations (based on indicator 3.1.b) 

of cooperation on UTPs 
among  the  authorities, 
or  at  least  a  growing 
interest  towards  those 
initiatives / an increased 
willingness  to  test  their 
practical effectiveness). 

assessment 

2.  Two criteria focusing on 
of 
the 
cooperation 
initiatives, 
including cooperation at 
EU  level  through  the 
Enforcement Network. 

Effectiveness:  Q4  –  To  what  extent  have  the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  Directive  been  effective  in 
mitigating the negative impact of unfair trading practices on the living standards of the agricultural community? 

The  main  negative  impacts 
of UTPs on the operators in 
stage  was 
the 
farming 
quanti-
characterised 
qualitatively. 

Nature and severity of 
the  negative  impacts 
of UTPs on operators 
in the farming stage 

of 

assessment  of 

The 
the 
effectiveness 
the 
and 
implementation 
enforcement of the Directive 
in  potentially  mitigating 
those  impacts  will  also  be 
quanti-qualitative. 

For each identified typology of negative impacts: 

4.1.a – Quantification of the negative impacts (e.g., additional 
costs, foregone revenues, etc.) (to the extent allowed by the 
available evidence) 

4.1.b  –  qualitative  judgment of  the  severity  of  the  negative 
impacts  based  on  triangulated  perceptions  reported  by 
stakeholders 

Desk research 
Interviews 
Case studies 
Survey of business associations 

Importance  of 
the 
mitigation  provided 
the 
by 
implementation  and 
enforcement  of 
the 
Directive 

For each identified typology of negative impacts: 

4.2.a  –  Quantification  of  the  importance  of  the  mitigation 
(e.g., in terms of reduced additional costs, foregone revenues, 
relief  provided  to  incurred  damages,  etc.)  via  an  ad  hoc 
approach DSO 

71 

 
 
Efficiency:  Q5  –  What  are  the  direct  and  indirect  costs  and  benefits  as  they  accrue  to  different  stakeholders  (in 
quantitative and qualitative terms) resulting from the Directive? 

4.2.b  –  qualitative  judgment  of  its  importance  vis-à-vis  the 
severity of the negative impacts. 

a) To what extent are overall costs proportionate to the benefits? 

b) To what extent/how do these compare/differ between Member States? 

The  assessment  covers  a 
conceptual  dimension  as 
well  a  concrete  one  i.e.  on 
the ground. 

The conceptual part is based 
on: 

1.  The  intervention  logic 

of the Directive 

2.  The analysis of national 

implementing 
legislation 
enforcement 
mechanisms 

and 

The  part  about  concrete 
effects is based: 

1.  on  the  approach  to  the 
quantification 
and 
qualitative  appraisal  of 
the  main  costs  and 
benefits  accruing  to  the 

Desk research 
Surveys of: 
• 
• 
•  MS Cas/EAs 

business associations 
retailers/large buyers 

Interviews 
Case studies 

5.0.a  –  Direct  monetary  costs  incurred  by  CAs  in  the 
transposition of the Directive into national legislation, and in 
the successive enforcement of such legislation 

5.0.b – Direct monetary costs incurred by operators to comply 
with the national legislation 

5.0.c  –  Indirect  and/or  non-monetary  costs  incurred  by 
operators, CAs that are related to national implementation of 
the UTP Directive 

5.0.d  –  Direct  (monetary)  benefits  for  operators  stemming 
from prevention of / fight against UTPs 

5.0.e – Indirect and/or non-monetary benefits for operators, 
CAs stemming from prevention of / fight against UTPs 

Costs 
proportionate 
benefits (or not) 

are 
to 

5.1.a – Wherever costs and benefits accruing to the different 
stakeholders are quantifiable: cost-benefit ratio 

5.1.b – Wherever costs and benefits accruing to the different 
stakeholders  are  non-quantifiable:  qualitative  assessment  of 
whether  the  costs  are  perceived  as  proportionate  to  the 
benefits by the different stakeholders 

72 

 
 
 
different 
explained in. 

stakeholders 

2.  on 

two 

quanti-
qualitative  comparative 
analyses: 

a.  main  costs  vs. 
main benefits; 

b.  main costs and 
in 

benefits 
different 
Member 
States. 

or 
extent 
The 
importance  of  costs 
in 
and 
benefits 
are 
different  MSs 
or 
similar 
significantly different 

Wherever  costs  and  benefits  accruing  to  the  different 
stakeholders are quantifiable 

5.2.a  –  Extent  of  the  main  costs  in  different  MSs  (mainly 
based on labour input) 

5.2.b – Extent of the main benefits in different MSs 

Wherever  costs  and  benefits  accruing  to  the  different 
stakeholders are non-quantifiable 

5.2.c  –  Perceived  importance  of  the  main  costs  in  different 
MSs 

5.2.d – Perceived importance of the main benefits in different 
MSs 

Relevance:  Q6 – To what extent are the scope, objectives and implementation choices relevant at time of evaluation 
study for protecting suppliers of agricultural and food products in the supply chain against unfair trading practices also 
considering continuously evolving needs and circumstances? 

Qualitative  assessment,  and 
the  consideration  of 
the 
perceptions  of  the  different 
stakeholders  in  this  regard. 
Assessment  contains  also  a 
reference 
continued 
to 
relevance. 

in 
Relevance 
addressing 
the 
original  needs,  also 
considering 
their 
evolution over time 

6.1.a  -  Perceived  overall  relevance  of  the  scope,  objectives 
and  national  implementation  choices  in  addressing  the 
original  needs  (prevalence  of  qualitative  judgments  by 
stakeholders, broken down by stakeholder category) 

Desk research 

Surveys of: 

6.1.b  – Number and severity of the identified `mismatches` 
between the original objectives and current needs in terms of 
protection from UTPs (qualitative assessment) 

•  business associations 
•  retailers/large buyers 
•  MS CAs 

in 
Relevance 
addressing new needs 

6.2.a  – Perceived overall relevance of the  scope, objectives 
and national implementation choices in addressing new needs 
(prevalence of qualitative judgments by stakeholders, broken 
down by stakeholder category) 

Workshops with EAs and business stakeholders 

Interviews 

73 

 
 
 
6.2.b  – Number and severity of the identified `mismatches` 
between  the  original  objectives  and  new  needs  in  terms  of 
protection from UTPs (qualitative assessment) 

Case studies 

Coherence: Q7 – To what extent is the Directive coherent with interventions that have similar objectives? 

a) considering relevant interventions or regulations which directly/indirectly address unfair practices? 

b) considering agricultural and food chain related EU initiatives and EU strategies? 

c) considering other relevant EU level initiatives and objectives? 

legislation 
against 

Mainly 
qualitative 
assessment  of 
identified 
relevant 
and 
initiatives 
the 
objectives  of 
the  UTP 
the 
Directive 
extent  of  coherence.  Done 
through  a  textual  analysis 
the 
and 
through 
the 
consideration 
perceptions  of  the  different 
stakeholders. 

identify 

of 

to 

Coherence of relevant 
or 
interventions 
regulations 
which 
directly/indirectly 
address 
unfair 
practices  within  the 
objectives 
the 
Directive. 

of 

of 
Coherence 
agricultural  and  food 
chain 
related  EU 
initiatives  and  EU 
the 
strategies  with 
the 
of 
objectives 
Directive 

Coherence  of  other 
level 
relevant  EU 
initiatives 
and 
objectives against the 
objectives 
the 
Directive 

of 

7.1.a - Identified relevant interventions or regulations 

Desk research 

7.1.b – Specific synergies and inconsistencies and/or conflicts 
identified or perceived (if any) between relevant interventions 
or regulations and objectives of the Directive 

Interviews 

7.2.a – Identified relevant agricultural and food chain related 
EU initiatives and EU strategies  

7.2.b – Specific synergies and inconsistencies and/or conflicts 
identified or perceived (if any) between agricultural and food 
chain  related  EU  initiatives  and  EU  strategies  against  the 
objectives of the Directive 

7.3.a – Identified relevant other EU initiatives and objectives  

7.3.b – Specific synergies and inconsistencies and/or conflicts 
identified  or  perceived  (if  any)  between  other  relevant  EU 
level  initiatives  and  objectives  against  the  objectives  of  the 
Directive 

74 

 
 
EU added value: Q8 – To what extent have the Directive´s harmonised minimum requirements created EU added 
value for the targeted stakeholders versus a non-harmonised status quo before the Directive? 

a) In view of level playing field, in particular in cross border transactions? 

b) In view, of other dimensions of EU added value? 

Extent/importance  of 
the  EU  added  value 
stemming  from 
the 
harmonised minimum 
requirements  of  the 
Directive 

8.1.a – Extent of differential quantifiable* benefits stemming 
from harmonised minimum requirements 

Surveys of: 

8.1.b  –  Perceptions  of  stakeholders  about  the  presence  and 
importance  of  the  types  of  differential  benefits  stemming 
from  harmonised  minimum  requirements  (prevalence  of 
qualitative  judgments  by  stakeholders,  broken  down  by 
stakeholder category) 

• business associations 
• retailers/large buyers 
• MS EAs 
Interviews 

Case studies 

Desk research 

Findings from Q 1 to 7 summarised in the MCDA 

The  proposed  set  of  criteria 
is consistent with the quanti-
qualitative  approach  to  the 
assessment  explained  in  the 
column at left. 

of 
combination 
A 
quantitative  and  qualitative 
indicators  is  used,  and  the 
perceptions  of  stakeholders 
on  the  added  value deriving 
harmonised 
from 
minimum 
requirements 
established  by  the  Directive 
and 
considered 
are 
synthesised in a MCDA. 

the 

The assessment includes: 

a.  A  specific 

focus  on 
benefits in terms of level 
playing field 

b.  An appraisal of the other 
dimensions of EU added 
value 

Source: Own elaboration based on the evaluation support study and other main sources of evidence.

75 

 
 
 
Annex IV Overview of benefits and costs 

The Directive´s costs and benefits can be summarised as follows: 

(1) 

(2) 

Costs incurred by public authorities in the transposition of the Directive into 
national law. These are one-off costs as subsequent adjustments to national UTP 
transposing legislation (e.g. see Germany, Belgium) are not a direct cause of the 
EU level Directive but consequences of national level decisions on elements going 
beyond  the  minimum  requirements  of  the  Directive.  A  strong  variation  in  the 
magnitude of these cost (ranging from a few thousand euro to beyond EUR 150 000 
in  some  MSs)  has  been  found  mainly  based  on  the  dedicated  survey  in  the 
evaluation  support study. At  EU level, costs are estimated  to  be in  the  order of 
magnitude  of  EUR  1.75  million  (EUR  1.4  million  for  labour  plus  25%  of 
overheads  such  as  expenses  for  premises,  telephone,  electricity  etc.) (80).  This 
amount is very likely on the lower end as the estimations mainly consider labour 
input expressed as the number of full time equivalents (FTE) and do not consider 
other  relevant  linked  costs  (beyond  overheads),  for  instance,  related  to  the  core 
legislative  processes  e.g.  parliamentary  debates,  cost  of  (externally  contracted) 
impact assessments (e.g. see Denmark) for which a meaningful EU level estimation 
was not possible. Taking this into account, the magnitude is broadly in line - rather 
on  the  low  end  -  with  expectations  of  the  UTP  IA  2018  (see  2.2 Point(s)  of 
comparison).  A  clear  difference  between  MSs  with  and  without  pre-existing 
legislation, as expected in the UTP IA 2018, could not be found. This is related to 
the  fact  that  some  MSs  with  pre-existing  legislation  decided  to  go  beyond  the 
minimum harmonisation rules. 

Direct enforcement costs borne by EAs related to information and monitoring, 
investigations and sanctions complaint handling and possibly litigation. This 
is for the most part a recurring cost in each year of enforcement. Also here, the 
labour cost component is likely to be the most significant part of these costs. The 
variability  between  MSs  is  significant  due  to  the  different  ways  of  enforcement 
discussed  in  4.1 To  what  extent  was  the  intervention  successful  and  why?  i.e. 
transpositions going beyond the minimum requirements, enforcement strategies in 
the first years of implementation of the Directive, choice of competent national EA, 
size  of  the  agricultural  sector  at  MSs  level.  Based  on  the  input  provided  by  the 
evaluation support study on FTEs and 25% of overheads (81), the cost for all MSs 
is estimated to be at EUR 5.4 million annually. Further non-labour enforcement 
costs related to equipment, software, training, and ranged from negligible to EUR 
3 million. The majority of these have recurrent components, but also a one-off part. 
This, paired with the fact that the collected evidence is anecdotal, did not allow for 
a  meaningful  inclusion  in  the  EU  level  estimate.  Hence,  the  estimated  costs 
represent  likely  a  lower  bound.  Furthermore,  it  was  not  possible  to  clearly 
distinguish  between  costs  attributable  only  to  the  minimum  requirements  of  the 
Directive and those that are incurred because of some provisions that go beyond 
e.g. additional black practices that are introduced (likely to increase enforcement 

(80)  See evaluation support study Section 3.2.1.1 (p.48) and Annex 1 for more details on the estimation of 

labour costs as well as BR-toolbox #58 (p.531) for the overheads. 

(81)  Ibid. 

76 

 
 
 
 
(3) 

(4) 

costs)  and  transposition  elements  that  would  likely  decrease  these  costs,  e.g. 
removal of turnover thresholds. Moreover, estimates are based on the first years of 
enforcement activities which, as described in 3. How has the situation evolved over 
the evaluation period? and 4.1 To what extent was the intervention successful and 
why?, are in many MSs at their beginnings and likely to increase. It can be assumed 
that this in the years to come will lead to a multiple of this number as enforcement 
picks  up.  Considering  these  elements,  including  a  foreseeable  increase  in  these 
costs in line with enforcement activities, also here estimates are broadly in line with 
the expectations of the UTP IA 2018.  

Direct costs incurred by business operators to comply with the introduction of 
the  UTP  Directive.  Costs  incurred  by  business  operators  in  relation  to  the 
introduction of the Directive vary in nature and extent according to a combination 
of  elements:  i)  due  to  the  activity  performed  by  business  operators  as  supplier 
and/or  buyer (82);  ii)  the  already  pre-existing  national  legislation;  iii)  size  of  the 
business operator. Based on collected evidence, direct costs of this type include, 
among  others, checks  and modification of existing  contracts/contractual clauses, 
drafting  and agreement of new contracts/contractual clauses, creation of internal 
systems for UTP compliance controls as well as training on UTPs. These costs are 
for the most part one-off costs falling mostly on operators that are predominantly 
buyers/when buying. One-off compliance costs estimations range from EUR 36 per 
operator in Germany to 4 300 per operator in Sweden (83). Estimations carried out 
at national level (see Germany, Sweden, Denmark) cannot be extrapolated at EU 
level  due  to  the  different  starting  points  and  transposition  choices.  However,  an 
assessment made for the German transposing legislation reported a one off-cost of 
EUR 12.5 million for the German economy as a whole. The evaluation makes a 
tentative  extrapolation  of  this  data  for  Germany  to  approximate  the  costs  for 
businesses at EU level. Taking the German share of EU agricultural output in 2023 
of 14% (Source: Eurostat), and using this to project the EUR 12.5 million estimated 
for  Germany,  would  translate  in  about  EUR  88  million  at  EU  level.  This 
approximation has to be considered with caution, as the baseline situation was very 
different in the different MSs.  

Direct  costs  incurred  by  operators  to  comply  with  the  enforcement  of  the 
Directive. In addition to the three aspects expressed under point 3) above, further 
elements determine the  magnitude of costs stemming for the enforcement of the 
Directive:  i)  the  approach  to  the  enforcement  at  national  level,  with  particular 
regard to the transposing legislation, which presents notable differences across the 
EU, among others, in terms of scope of the protection, prohibited UTPs, activities 
implemented  by  EAs;  ii)  the  involvement  in  actual  UTP  cases:  the  costs  for 
operators  vary  according  to  whether  they  are  (alleged)  offenders  or  (alleged) 
victims. The evidence collected in the various consultation activities reports that a 
non-negligible part of consulted stakeholders is not able to quantify (and monetise) 
the  costs  of  the  Directive  of  their  business  operations (84).  For  suppliers  and 
especially famers, the main intended beneficiaries of the Directive, the costs  are 

(82)  Mainly/exclusively as ´suppliers´: this situation is more likely in the farming/primary production stage 
the  category  of  operators  the  Directive  aims  to  primarily  protect;  
retail  distribution;  
`buyers´: 

of  supply  chains 
Mainly/exclusively 
situation 
Both as suppliers and buyers, a situation which is typical of most processors, traders and wholesalers. 

is  most 

i.e. 
as 

likely 

this 

in 

(83)  See evaluation support study 3.2.1.1 (p.58) for more details. 

(84)  For a discussion see Section 4 as well evaluation support study. 

77 

 
 
negligible. Other operators, especially retailers report (qualitatively) higher costs 
to  comply  which,  however,  they  do  not  appear  to  affect  business  operations 
substantially. The evaluation makes  a tentative  approximation of  recurring costs 
for businesses based on the ratio between one-off and recurring costs as estimated 
for businesses in Denmark. This translates in total recurring costs for businesses of 
about EUR 1.5 million per year at EU level. 

The evaluation support study also estimates indicative cost for an operator that 
stems  from  being  involved  in  a  UTP  litigation  case  as  (alleged)  victim  or 
perpetrator ranging from about EUR 650 to EUR 23 000 for offended parties and 
from  about  EUR  50 000  to  EUR  560 000.  The  indicative  cost  for  a  sector 
association at national level to support a member company/farmer in a UTP-
related case before the relevant EA ranges from EUR 450 to EUR 32 000. As these 
ranges  are  estimated  on  limited  observations  they  should  be  considered  with 
extreme care. These data cannot be translated in total cost, due to the absence of 
data on the number of litigation cases  

Indirect and/or non-monetary costs incurred by operators that are related to 
national  implementation  of  the  Directive  could  not  be  monetised.  Especially 
operators  predominantly  acting  as  buyers  reported  more  complex  procedures  in 
dealing with suppliers and foregone benefits available prior to the implementation 
of the Directive. The latter, however, cannot directly be considered as a foregone 
benefit if it resulted from an unfair trading practice e.g. paying suppliers late.  

Direct  benefits  for  operators  stemming  from  prevention  of  /  fight  against 
UTPs. A clear majority business associations in the evaluation support study stated 
that  some  monetary  benefits  were  experienced  by  their  members  because  of  the 
implementation  of  the  Directive.  This  is  generally  confirmed  also  by  other 
consultation  activities. The most frequently indicated benefits  were terms of the 
supply contracts less prone to ambiguous and unilateral interpretations, reduction 
of  the  number  of  unilateral  and  retrospective  changes  to  contract  terms,  more 
transparent  price  conditions.  The  majority  of  responding  business  associations 
reported also that some non-monetary benefits were experienced as a result of the 
implementation  of  the  Directive.  The  most  frequently  indicated  benefits  were 
improved  trust  between  suppliers  and  buyers,  increase  in  the  number  of  written 
supply  contracts,  strengthened  protection  for  members  affected  by  UTPs  in 
domestic transactions. The absence of any monetary benefits in the case of business 
associations  representing  the  wholesaling/retailing  stages  only  was  indicated, 
which  reveals  a  negative  overall  judgment  on  the  monetary  benefits  for  these 
categories of operators resulting  from  the implementation  of the Directive.  Also 
very limited non-monetary benefits were indicated.  

Indirect benefits for operators. Several consulted stakeholders, especially in the 
farming and/or processing stages, also  reported further non-monetary benefits to 
which  the  UTP  Directive  contributed.  The  Directive  helped  to  shed  light  on  the 
issue of UTPs and promoted a (policy) discussion on the topic of the fairness of 
business  relationships.  They  point  also  to  the,  albeit  still  limited  effect,  of  the 
Directive  acting  as  a  deterrent  to  perpetrating  UTPs.  The  Directive  has  also 
contributed to the development of a business culture where the concept of fairness 
is  increasingly  seen  as  a  positive  value  that  operators  can  highlight  in  their 
promotional and marketing activities. 

78 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

 
Even  in  the  framework  of  a  generally  negative  perception  about  the  (lack  of) 
benefits  stemming  from  the  Directive,  some  stakeholders  at  the  retailing  stage 
acknowledged that the Directive improved legal certainty about trading practices; 
this contributed to improved trust between suppliers and buyers.  

No  significant  potential  for  simplification  and  savings  in  terms  of  reduction 
administrative  burden  of  operators  were  highlighted  for  action  at  EU  level. 
Suggestions for improvements at EU level were reported. These, however, involve 
changes to some fundamental aspects of the Directive such as removing turnover 
thresholds,  introducing  changes  to  the  list  of  UTPs  and  hence  affect  the  policy 
objectives going beyond a strict cost and benefit remit (85).

(85)  See main part of the evaluation report for a discussion. 

79 

 
 
Table 5. Overview of costs and benefits identified in the evaluation 

Citizens/Consumers  

Businesses: (large) buyers 

Businesses: suppliers, 
including farmers 

Public Administrations 

Quantitative 

Comment 

Quantitative   Comment 

Quantitative 

Comment   Quantitative 

Comment 

Direct Compliance costs: administrative costs 

Creation of internal systems 
for UTP compliance 
controls and training 

one-off 

-- 

-- 

-- 

Costs covered 
under one-off 
adjustment costs 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

Direct Compliance costs: adjustment costs 

Checks and modification of 
existing and/or drafting and 
agreement of new contracts 
/ contractual clauses 

one-off 

-- 

-- 

~ EUR 88 
million 

Increased operating costs 

recurring 

-- 

UTP litigation case 

recurring 

-- 

Support in a UTP litigation 
case 

recurring 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

EUR 36 -  
EUR 4 300 per 
business; EU 
approximation 
extrapolated 
from data for 
Germany. 

EU 
approximation 
based on ratio 
between one-off 
and recurring 
costs for 
Denmark 

EUR 50 000 - 
EUR 560 000 for 
an (alleged) 
perpetrator 

Costs covered 
under cost 
estimate for 
buyers; costs 
assumed to be 
predominantly 
borne by buyers 

Costs covered 
under cost 
estimate for 
buyers; costs 
assumed to be 
predominantly 
borne by buyers 

EUR 650 -  
EUR 23 000 for 
an (alleged) 
victim 

EUR 450 – EUR 
32 000 borne by 
the sector 
association 

Negligible 

Negligible 

Not 
quantifiable 

Not 
quantifiable 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

~ EUR 1.5 
million 

Not 
quantifiable 

-- 

-- 

80 

 
 
 
 
Transposition of the 
Directive into national law 

Information and 
monitoring, investigations 
and sanctions complaint 
handling and possibly 
litigation 

one-off 

-- 

recurring 

-- 

Increased complexity in 
commercial procedures and 
potential foregone benefits 

recurring 

-- 

recurring 

-- 

Prevention of UTPs and 
strengthened protection 
against UTPs, including 
through ex ante measures 
and remedies 

Increased clarity and 
transparency in terms of 
supply contracts and price 
conditions  

Enhanced coordination 
between MSs 

recurring 

recurring 

-- 

-- 

Improved  climate  of  trust 
in  business 
and  fairness 
relations 

recurring 

Negligible 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

Enforcement costs 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

EUR 1.75 
million 

Lower bound 
estimation. 

EUR 5.4 
million 

Lower bound 
estimation. 

Indirect costs 

Not 
quantifiable 

Direct benefits 

-- 

Negligible 

-- 

Indirect benefits 

Not 
quantifiable 

81 

-- 

Negligible 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

Not 
quantifiable 

Not 
quantifiable 

Not 
quantifiable 

Not 
quantifiable 

EUR 16 000 – 
EUR 175 000 
potential 
additional cash 
flow per 
company due to 
payment terms 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

Not 
quantifiable 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

-- 

 
Annex V  Stakeholders’ consultation - Synopsis report  

This Annex provides an overview of the consultation activities carried out in view of the 
evaluation  of  the  Directive.  It  expands  on  the  sources  of  evidence  mentioned  in 
1.1 Purpose  and  scope  of  the  evaluation  and  complements  Annex  II Methodology  and 
Analytical models used. 

Outline of consultation strategy 

Figure  15  depicts  the  consultation  approach  in  a  stylised  manner  following  the  overall 
approach in the call for evidence (86): 

Within this overall consultation framework, some activities are carried out directly by the 
EC (marked with an ´*`), some activities have been executed in a hybrid mode i.e. the EC 
as an event ´host´ and the evaluation support study team as facilitators (marked with a (`+´) 
while  other  consultation  activities  have  been  carried  out  indirectly  i.e.  through  the 
evaluation support study. 

National authorities (EAs and Cas) as well as national and EU-level business associations 
for the purposes of this evaluation  were seen as having a high stake and high influence 
because they, on the one hand fundamentally shape the way the Directive is transposed 
and  enforced  and,  on  the  other  hand,  represent  a  plenty  of  member  organisations 
(businesses) conveying their interests, points of view but as well are able to promote the 
Directive.  

Single operators in the agri-food supply chain were considered having a high stake, as the 
legislation  directly  targets  them  but,  as  single  operators,  to  have  lower  influence  with 
respect to business associations. 

In  view  of  the  need  for  primary  evidence  collection  through  consultations,  consumer 
organisations and academia have been classified as low stake and low influence.  In this 
specific business to business legislation, consumers and consumer organisations have only 
an indirect stake and impacts were expected to be minor. Academia is not affected by the 
Directive  and  their  work  is  mainly  taken  into  account  through  desk  research  i.e.  their 
scientific output. In any case, both stakeholder types have been considered also in primary 
evidence collection in the evaluation support study. 

NGOs and Media were considered to have a lower level of stake than targeted businesses 
and  their  associations  but  potentially  wielding  a  high  level  of  influence  given  their 
organisational structures and outreach capacities. 

(86)  See call for evidence Section `B. Better regulation´, p.2. 

82 

 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Stylised consultation approach. 

Source:  Own  elaboration.  Note:  the  diagram  is  a  schematized  and  simplified  representation.  It  does  not 
preclude any overlaps e.g. NGOs have been also interviewed in the evaluation support study. Activities are 
carried out directly by the EC (´*`). Activities executed in a hybrid mode i.e. the EC as an event ´host´ and 
the external support study team as facilitators (`+´). 

A) Consultation activities carried out directly by the Commission  

Besides regular exchanges with various stakeholders in the context of its policy making 
role, the EC carried out directly three main consultations contributing to this evaluation: 

(1) 

Call for evidence  

(2) 

SME panel survey 

(3) 

JRC annual survey 

Although not specifically carried out in view of this evaluation only, it worthwhile to recall 
the recurrent exchanges with EAs in form of the EA UTP Network as well as the annual 
Reports submitted to the EC.  Not carried out  by the EC  but  by  competent  EAs, annual 
activity reports as well as EAs own surveys and consultations are also important outreach 
activities considered as evidence base of this evaluation. 

B) Consultation activities carried out in a hybrid mode with indirect involvement of 

the Commission 

With the indirect contribution of the EC as event ´host´ and the external support study team 
as facilitators, the following consultation activities have been carried out: 

(4)  Workshop with national, competent EAs  

83 

 
 
 
(5) 

Thematic workshop with business and non-business stakeholders (87)   

C) Consultation activities carried out without direct involvement of the EC 

Primary  data  collection  activities  carried  out  through  the  evaluation  support  study  are 
described in the external study report. Overall, they can be summarised as follows: 

(6) 

Targeted survey of CAs 

(7) 

Targeted survey of retailers and large buyers 

(8) 

Targeted survey of sector associations 

(9) 

Horizontal interviews 

(10) 

Interviews in the context of case studies  

The  remainder  of  the  section  summarises  the  results  of  the  consultation  activities  with 
particular focus on the ones carried out directly by the EC. 

(1) 

Call for evidence 

The  feedback  period  of  the  call  for  evidence  (CfE)  spanned  over  six  weeks,  from  18 
October 2023 until 29 November 2023. It was carried out through the `Have Your Say´ 
platform. All qualitative responses and supporting documents (if necessary, translated by 
using  an  EC-internal  artificial  intelligence-powered  tool  into  English)  were  read  and 
processed by EC staff. Summaries have been made using the help of EC-internal artificial 
intelligence-powered tools.  

46 contributions were received. Almost half of them (n=22) were business associations, 
about 20 % (n=9) were NGOs, 8 (17%) declared to be EU citizens. The remaining feedback 
was obtained from trade unions (n=4), companies (n=2) and one public authority. In terms 
of countries, most respondents (n=11) declared Belgium as their country of origin (likely 
also because it is often the country of registered offices of EU level associations), followed 
by  France  (n=9,  20%),  and  Slovakia  n=5  (9%).  Other  contributions  (n=20)  came  from 
remaining 11 MSs. One contribution came from outside the EU (Tanzania). 

Several  contributions  provide  feedback  with  regards  to  the  evaluation  of  the  Directive. 
Overall, stakeholders call for the evaluation to be thorough and focused on assessing the 
Directive's real-world impact, particularly in terms of protecting vulnerable actors in the 
supply chain and ensuring fair competition. They advocate for an evaluation that consider 
both  the  Directive's  implementation  and  its  broader  economic  and  social  impacts. 
Producers and farmers emphasise the importance of evaluating the Directive to see if it 
has fulfilled its objectives in improving the position of weaker partners, such as primary 
producers.  They  suggest  that  the  evaluation  should  consider  the  structural  imbalances 
between suppliers and retailers and  examine the  Directive’s effectiveness in  addressing 

(87)  The workshop with the EAs was carried out in the context of an expert group meeting of competent EAs. 
The external study team organised the session content-wise, facilitated it and harvested the results in 
view of the evaluation support study. The workshop with business and non-business stakeholders was 
hosted  by  the  EC-  DG  AGRI  by  providing  the  facilities.  The  organisation  in  terms  of  content  and 
execution of the workshop was carried out by the external study team. 

84 

 
 
 
these issues. Retailers and distributors highlight that the evaluation should consider the 
economic  context  of  agri-food  markets,  which  have  been  unstable  since  the  Directive's 
implementation.  They  argue  that  over-implementation  by  MSs  can  create  risks  to  legal 
certainty and impose unnecessary burdens on companies, suggesting that the evaluation 
should assess these impacts. Environmental and social advocacy groups suggest that the 
evaluation  should  focus  on  the  economic  situation  of  farmers  and  analyse  contractual 
relationships between farmers and other operators in the supply chain. They emphasise the 
need  for  the  evaluation  to  consider  the  effectiveness  of  the  Directive  in  providing  the 
intended protections to farmers. National and regional entities discuss the need for the 
evaluation  to  investigate  how  MS  have  implemented  the  Directive  and  whether  it  has 
effectively protected small and medium-sized suppliers. They highlight the importance of 
examining the Directive's impact and the role of national implementation in its success. 
Other  stakeholders  express  concerns  about  the  Directive's  current  effectiveness  and 
suggest  that  the  evaluation  should  address  issues  like  market  concentration  and  the 
promptness of payments. 

Besides  addressing  the  call  for  evidence  directed  to  the  evaluation  i.e.  an  ex  post 
approach, in many cases respondent´s feedback went well beyond the contribution to 
the evaluation  strictly  speaking and  conveyed general  positions  as well as  forward 
looking  considerations  e.g.  in  terms  of  amendments  (or  not)  to  the  Directive  and 
improvements in its implementation. These considerations are often contrasting. 

Producers and farmers emphasise the necessity for a strengthened UTP Directive. They 
advocate for extending the Directive's coverage to all operators (suppliers), including those 
outside  the  food  sector,  and  stress  the  importance  of  fair  pricing  structures  that  cover 
production costs. These groups argue for stricter regulations to shield farmers from late 
payments and exploitative practices. Sectorial associations within the agricultural sector 
call for specific attention to the wine sector's unique payment cycles and contractual needs. 
They  call  for  maintaining  industry-specific  exceptions  and  a  coherent  regulatory 
framework to safeguard these sectors from unfair practices. Retailers and distributors 
focus  on  the  Directive's  impact  on  market  dynamics,  particularly  concerning  large 
manufacturers' influence. They highlight ongoing issues with unfair practices imposed by 
powerful  market  players  (acting  as  suppliers)  and  recommend  more  harmonised 
implementation of the Directive across MSs to prevent legal fragmentation and ensure fair 
competition. SME associations stress the importance of maintaining distinctions based on 
company size within the Directive to protect SMEs. They suggest implementing turnover 
thresholds  to  ensure  that  SMEs  are  shielded  from  the  adverse  effects  of  broad 
implementation. Organisations representing non-EU suppliers linked to the fair-trade 
sector  advocate  for  extending  the  Directive's  protections  to  non-EU  suppliers  and 
improving complaint mechanisms' accessibility. They stress fair treatment for small-scale 
food producers worldwide, aiming for increased inclusivity and protection in global supply 
chains.  National  and  regional  entities  mention  the  Directive's  national-level  impacts. 
They emphasise the need for effective enforcement  mechanisms, and some propose the 
establishment of ombudsman offices to handle complaints efficiently. Environmental and 
social advocacy groups: propose integrating social and environmental assessments into 
the Directive. They advocate for policies that emphasise sustainability and consider the 
broader  social  impacts  of  trading  practices.  Other  stakeholders,  including  consumer 
representatives and specific national associations, express concerns about the Directive's 
current  effectiveness,  particularly  regarding  issues  like  late  payments  and  market 
concentration.  They  call  for  more  robust  enforcement  and  clearer  definitions  of  unfair 
practices to ensure comprehensive protection across the supply chain. 

85 

 
(2) 

SME panel survey 

The  EC  launched  a  dedicated  SME  Panel  consultation  on  the  evaluation  of  the  UTP 
Directive  on  5  August  2024  for  a  period  of  12  weeks.  The  consultation  closed  on  27 
October  2024.  The  consultation  was  conducted  through  the  EU  Survey  portal  and 
submitted to the Enterprise Europe Network members with the support of the European 
Innovation  Council  and  SMEs  Executive  Agency  (EISMEIA).  The  SME  panel  survey 
made it possible for SMEs, both in their capacity as buyers and suppliers within the 
agri-food  chain,  to  share  their  experience  with  the  UTP  Directive.  The  results  of  this 
targeted consultation contributed to the evidence base of what happened in practice in the 
first years of application. Results were analysed with the help of summary representation 
visualisation tool in EU survey and a spreadsheet. 

The  SME  Panel  survey  gathered  responses  from  81  SMEs,  with  the  highest  number  of 
respondents coming from Spain and Poland (n=18), followed by Romania (n=12) and Italy 
(n=11). The rest of the responses (n=22) came from other 8 EU Member States (MS). 

Most respondents represented micro businesses, with 1-9 employees (n=29), followed by 
small businesses with 10-49 employees (n=25). Additionally, 13 mid-sized businesses with 
50-249 employees answered to the consultation, while 6 answered as businesses with 250-
499  employees  (small  midcaps).  Lastly,  there  were  8  single-person  businesses  or  self-
employed individuals who took part. 

In terms of business’ annual turnover just under a quarter (n=19) indicated to fall within 
the  EUR  100  000  –  500  000  range,  about  a  quarter  below  this  (n=20).  51  respondents 
indicated to be below the EUR 2 million threshold, 9 within EUR 2 - 10 million range, 9 
within EUR 10 - 50 million range, 6 above the EUR 50 million mark. 3 did not know and 
3 chose not to answer. 

Sector-wise, about half of the respondents (n=41) identified themselves as being from the 
agriculture, forestry and fishing sector, approximately 23% (n=19) identified themselves 
as  manufacturing  sector  and  about  17%  (n=14)  represented  wholesale  and  retail  trade 
activities. The remaining 7 respondents fell into other sectors. 

More specifically, when asked about the stages (one or more) within the agri-food supply 
chain they operate in, about 60% answered to be involved in production (n=48), 44% in 
processing (n=36), 46% in trade or wholesale (n=37), 14% in retail (n=11). 

Within the agri-food sector, based on turnover, 12 respondents indicated the dairy sector 
to be the first most important. For 5 businesses the meat sector was the most important 
one. 19 respondents indicated fruits and vegetables as their main sector of activity while 
for 21 it was cereals. 21 respondents had another sector as the most important. 

In 2023, roughly 44% of respondents (n=36) were only active on their national market, 
17% (n=14) export to other EU countries and 31% (n=25) export both to EU and non-EU 
countries. 3 respondents did not know, 2 did not answer. 

In terms of general awareness about the UTP Directive, 53% (n=43) of respondents were 
aware that the UTP Directive provides for 10 blacklisted practices. This percentage slightly 
drops to 46% (n=37) when asked about the awareness regarding grey practices. Moreover, 
27% (n=22) were aware that protection only applies in transactions with buyers larger than 

86 

 
 
suppliers, while the majority, 64% (n=52), was not aware of these thresholds in the EU 
legislation. 

When asked about the level of protection (in transactions with clients) for the 10 blacklisted 
practices, following the introduction of the UTP Directive, roughly half of the respondents 
expressed  a  positive/acceptable  rating  (15  very  good,  10  good,  15  acceptable),  12%  a 
negative (7 unsatisfactory, 3 poor). The rest did not know (n=17) or claimed it not to be 
applicable (n=8) or did not answer (n=6). 

A similar picture emerges about the same question with respect to the grey practices: about 
half of the respondents expressed a positive rating (11 very good, 16 good, 15 acceptable), 
10% a negative (6 unsatisfactory, 2 poor). The remaining did not know (n=18) or claimed 
it not to be applicable (n=9) or did not answer (n=4). 

In terms of improving the level of protection (in transactions with clients) following the 
introduction of the UTP Directive, 30% (n=24) and 21% (n=17) claimed it to be the case 
for  black  and  grey  practices  respectively,  30%  (n=24)  and  31%  (n=25)  respectively 
expressed it not to be the case, while the largest chunk of respondents – be it for blacklisted 
or grey listed – did not know (37% (n=30) and 40% (n=32) respectively) or gave no answer 
(n=3 and n=7 respectively). 

Without differentiating between agricultural sectors, supply chain stages and countries, the 
three most experienced blacklisted practices since 2022 were: 

•  paying  later than 30 days for perishable agricultural  and food products  (31% (n=25) 
experienced it regularly and 25% (n=20) occasionally, while 21% did never experience 
it (n=17)); 

•  paying  later  than  60  days  for  other  agri-food  products  (21%  (n=17)  experienced  it 
regularly and 41% (n=33) occasionally, while 19% did never experience it (n=15)); 

•  cancelling  orders  for  perishable  agri-food  products  at  short-notice  (6%  (n=5) 
experienced it regularly and 30% (n=24) occasionally, while 33% did never experience 
it (n=27)). 

The 3 least experienced blacklisted practices are: 

•  payments not related to a specific transaction (52% (n=42) never experienced it); 

•  refusing  supplier’s  requests  for  a  written  confirmation  of  a  supply  agreement  by  the 

buyer (46% (n=37) never experienced it); 

•  transferring the costs of examining customer complaints to the supplier (43% (n=35) 

never experienced it). 

In the same line of reasoning, for grey listed practices, the two most experienced were: 

•  payment  of  the  supplier  for  advertising  (14%  (n=11)  regularly,  16%  (n=13) 

occasionally, while 38% did never experience it (n=31)); 

•  payment of the supplier for promotion (12% (n=10) regularly, 21% (n=17) occasionally, 

while 37% did never experience it (n=30)). 

87 

 
The two least experienced are: 

•  payment of the supplier for staff of the buyer, fitting out premises (47% (n=38) never 

experienced it); 

•  payment of the supplier for stocking, display and listing (43% (n=35) never experienced 

it). 

74% of respondents (n=60) said they did not face other practices that they consider unfair 
while 17% (n=14) did. The rest (n=7) did not answer the question. 

When asked if they heard of other buyers in the agri-food sector who would (since 2022) 
exercise specific practices, just over half respondents (n=41) indicated that they did so with 
regards to payments for perishable products later than 30 days or later than 60 days (non-
perishables) (44% did not hear, 5% did not answer), about 42% (n=34) stated that they 
heard  about  cancellation  of  an  order  for  perishable  products  less  than  30  days  before 
delivery  or  at  such  a  short  notice  that  the  supplier  could  not  be  expected  to  find  an 
alternative  (53%  did  not,  5%  did  not  answer).  28%  (n=23)  did  hear  about  changes  in 
contracts or conditions without supplier’s consent, 32% (n=26) about refusing agreements 
to be made in writing and 27% (n=22) heard about threats to stop selling a product whose 
supplier would report unfair trading practices to the authorities. 

Respondents were asked about their agreement or not to a number of statements regarding 
all 16 UTPs. Results are presented in the below figure.  

Figure 16: Statements regarding 16 UTPs (number of respondents). 

UTPs are much less accepted on the market

29

16

34

My company has been suffering from UTPs more than before

7

My company has found ways to counter UTPs

My clients have found ways to circumvent the Directive’s 
provisions

The overall occurrence of UTPs has decreased

Companies in the agri-food sector have been better aware of
the UTP protection

The situation has remained the same as before

18

18

29

30

28

47

33

22

15

19

22

25

28

39

34

29

29

2

2

2

2

3

3

2

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Agree

Do not agree

Do not know

No answer

Source: SME panel survey. Own elaborations. 

Regarding  late  payments  in  relation  to  the  Late  Payment  Directive  (2011/7/EU):  about 
22% (n=18) of respondents were aware that they can claim interests and compensations of 
EUR 40 for each request for late payment, about 43% (n=35) stated they were not aware 
of this, while 26% (n=21) did not know, 6% claimed it not to be applicable (n=5) and 2% 
did not answer (n=2). Furthermore, about 15% (n=12) stated to ask their clients for the 
EUR 40 compensation fee when they pay late, 54% (n=44) did not, 20% (n=16) did not 
know, and the remaining stated it not to be applicable (5%, n=4) or did not answer (6%, 
n=5). 

Always on the topic of late payments, about 46% (n=37) agreed with the statement that 
their business would benefit from bringing maximum payment terms for non-perishable 

88 

 
 
goods to 30 days - in line with maximum payment terms with for perishable goods, 20% 
(n=16) did not agree with this, 16% (n=13) did not know and 16% (n=13) claimed it not 
to be applicable, while 2% (n=2) did not answer. 

The statement `My business has been negatively affected by the fact that the UTP Directive 
allows public healthcare entities to pay later than others (i.e. go beyond the 30 days for 60 
days  provided  in  the  Directive  as  standard)´  brought  forward  about  20%  (n=16)  of 
agreement, 38% (n=31) of disagreement, while 20% (n=16) specified not to know, 17% 
(n=14) regarded it as not to be applicable and 5% (n=4) did not answer. 

The questionnaire included several questions about the enforcement of the UTP Directive. 

About 21% (n=17) respondents replied to know which authority to ask for help or complain 
to about UTPs in their Member State. Around three-quarters answered no (n=61). 

When asked if, when they experienced any of the UTPs, they did contact the UTP EA in 
their country, 31% (n=25) stated this was not applicable, 5% (n=4) did not answer. Of the 
remaining 64%, 42 respondents answered negatively (52%), while the remaining asked for 
information  (7%,  n=6),  went  to  court (6%,  n=5), asked for guidance (4%,  n=3), filed  a 
complaint (2%, n=2) or used alternative dispute resolution mechanism (2%, n=2). 

The  respondents  were  further  presented  a  series  of  statements  and  asked  for  their 
agreement/disagreement (n of replies). Results are presented in the below figure. 

Figure 17: Answers related to the enforcement (number of respondents). 

The complaint procedure was quick

Submitting a complaint was easy

I was satisfied with the help from Alternative Dispute Resolution
mechanism

The sanction was proportionate to the offence

The enforcement authority has solved my problem

The level of fines was too high

I am satisfied with the help of the enforcement authority

I would use again the Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism

The names of companies committing UTPs were made public

I received answers to my questions / complaints in reasonable time

Names of UTP offenders should always be made public

2

2

4

4

4

5

5

7

7

7

10

10

6

6

20

20

20

25

14

9

13

19

24

18

3

24

7

8

22

26

21

2

18

41

41

44

38

38

36

37

39

34

37

32

8

8

7

8

6

7

8

8

7

7

7

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Yes

No

No not know

Not applicable

No answer

Source: SME panel survey. Own elaborations. 

When confronted with their experience with UTPs since the beginning of 2022 and their 
reasons for not contacting the EA in their country, 14 (17%) did not answer. The remaining 
67 questionnaires report 103 answers (multiple reasons where possible). They stated to not 
know whom to contact (32%, n=26), to not being confident that filing a complaint would 
solve the problem (19%, n=15), to be able to solve the issue by themselves (17%, n=14) 
as well as to be afraid the buyer would retaliate if they would file a complaint (15%, n=12). 
Some respondents also selected that they did not know how to do it (12%, n=10) or that 
they  felt  that  the  UTP  was  a  common  practice  in  the  sector  (11%,  n=9).  Some  replies 

89 

 
 
indicated  other  reasons  (10%,  n=8)  or  to  be  afraid  that  a  submission  would  not  remain 
confidential (6%, n=5), the feeling that the issue was not important enough (4%, n=3) or 
to know whom to contact, but the procedure being too complicated (1%, n=1). 

No or insignificant direct costs to comply with the law since its introduction in 2021 were 
incurred  by  respectively  about  42%  (n=34)  and  6%  (n=5)  of  the  respondents.  On  the 
contrary,  around  14%  (n=11)  incurred  some  costs  (of  which  1  respondent  significant 
costs). 30% (n=24) did not know. 6 respondents (7%) did not answer this question. 

When asked about the UTP-related experience in transactions with business partners from 
other EU countries compared to domestic ones, 28% (n=23) of respondents indicated to 
not know. For 14 (17%) this was not applicable while 8 (10%) decided not to answer the 
question. Of the remaining 36 (about 44%), 17 (21%) answered not to have suffered from 
UTPs in cross-border transactions, 8 (10%) replied that UTPs are the same in cross-border 
and  domestic  only  transactions,  5  (6%)  selected  that  UTPs  are  more  widespread  in 
domestic-only  transactions  than  in  cross-border  transactions  while  6  (7%)  selected  the 
opposite, indicating more widespread UTPs in cross-border transactions. 

When asked about the same question, however, with regard to non-EU transactions, the 
pattern was: as above a large share of respondents (30%, n=24) indicated not to know. For 
22 (27%) this was not applicable while 8 (10%) decided not to answer the question. Of the 
remaining 27 (about 33%), 17 (21%) answered not to have suffered from UTPs in cross-
border transactions, 2 (2%) replied that UTPs are the same in cross-border and domestic 
only  transactions,  2  (2%)  selected  that  UTPs  are  more  widespread  in  domestic-only 
transactions  than  in  cross-border  transactions  while  3  (4%)  selected  the  opposite, 
indicating more widespread UTPs in cross-border transactions. 

The survey concluded with a free text question asking, if applicable, to indicate other unfair 
practices to be added to the 16 listed in the Directive and under which list, grey or black. 
5 respondents completed this question. 2 specified it not to be the case, 1 not to know. 1 
expressed  general  concerns  about  farmers  in  Romania  being  disadvantaged  vis-a-vis 
producers  outside  the  EU  countries.  1  manufacturer  referred  to  a  ban  of  any  form  of 
payment for marketing expenses of wholesales. 

(3) 

JRC UTP annual survey 

Results of the survey are published on the following dashboard: Unfair Trade Practices 
where it is possible explore the results of each wave and compare them among each other 
in detail by using a set of adaptive filters and views. The collection of responses has been 
done through the EU survey tool via a public consultation carried out by the EC (JRC and 
DG AGRI). Participation to the JRC survey is open to all agri-food suppliers on a voluntary 
basis:  the  sample  is  thus  not  selected  and  non-constant.  The  average  number  of 
respondents  is  around  640  responses  per  year (88),  with  the  first  and  fourth  waves 
gathering higher level of responses (respectively 789 and 1511 respondents). The summary 
analysis with selected key insights below was carried out with the help of a spreadsheet. 

As  shown  in  Figure  18,  the  greatest  share  of  respondents  across  all  five  waves  and 
increasingly so in  the last  ones is  represented by agricultural  producers.  Followed  by a 

(88)  This excludes the 3 315 replies from Hungary alone in the 2020/2021 baseline wave. These data were 

removed to ensure comparability of data between waves. 

90 

 
 
 
constant share of primary food processors around 17%, food processors at other stages and 
other agri-food traders. 

Figure 18: Split of respondents according to the stage in the agri-food supply chain (as 
percentage of respondents). 

4%
5%
7%

9%

23%

4%
7%

9%

11%

17%

17%

17%

3%
6%
7%

14%

16%

17%

3%
5%
7%

10%

11%

15%

3%
6%
7%

10%

15%

16%

35%

36%

37%

49%

42%

1st wave 2nd wave 3rd wave 4th wave

5th wave

Trade of intermediary products

Other

Commodity trade

Wholesale

Secondary and further processing
stages for food purposes

Primary processing for food
purposes

Agricultural production

Source:  JRC  UTP  survey;  Number  of  respondents  per  wave:  789,  319,  164,  1511,  434.  Due  to  the  vast 
number of replies from Hungary (3 315) in the first wave (baseline) the numbers above do not reflect these. 
Full results are available online: Food Chain - UTP - survey results 

Figure 19 shows that over the 5 waves most responses have been coming from respondents 
within the EUR 100 000 to 10 million turnover bracket, followed, except for the second 
wave by the group of smaller suppliers in terms of turnover. 

Figure 19: Annual turnover of the respondents (number of respondents) 

619

505

41

64

38

30

19

253

175

90

104

77

43

283

218

151

120

117

83

74

1st wave (baseline)

2nd wave

3rd wave

4th wave

5th wave

Less than € 100.000

€ 100.000 - € 10 million

€ 10 - 350 million

More than € 350 million

I do not know

Source: JRC UTP survey.  

91 

 
 
 
 
Awareness of the Directive fluctuates around between 62% and 76% of respondents, with 
no clear trend across the different waves.  

Figure 20: Awareness of the UTP Directive (as percentage of respondents). 

69%

76%

67%

62%

70%

31%

24%

33%

38%

30%

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

1st wave
(baseline)

2nd wave

3rd wave

4th wave

5th wave

No

Yes

Source: JRC UTP survey. Question: `Are you aware that the European Parliament and the Council adopted 
on  17  April  2019  the  Directive  (EU)  2019/633  on  unfair  trading  practices  in  business-to-business 
relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain? ´ 

When asked about the experience with UTPs over the previous years, payments exceeding 
the 60-day and 30-day period rank consistently among the highest reported UTPs. Except 
for  the  30-day  term  in  the  baseline  wave  where  23%  of  respondents  indicated  to  have 
experienced this UTP, and an increase in the 5th wave for the 60-day term UTP, there is an 
overall decrease in the rates of which these two UTPs are experienced.  

This declining trend appears for all 16 UTPs when compared to the baseline wave. When 
considering wave 2 to wave 4, overall, the occurrence of UTPs diminished with each wave, 
while the fifth wave reports a halt to this declining trend and, in some cases, a reversal. 
UTPs  related  to  the  misuse  of  trade  secrets  and  costs  examining  consumer  complaints 
reduced  markedly  in  relative  and  absolute  terms  over  the  years  when  compared  to  the 
baseline wave according to the respondents. The difference between the baseline and the 
last 2 waves broadly covering a post implementation period is depicted in figure 22. 

92 

 
 
 
Figure 21: Evolution of experienced UTPs (percentage of respondents). 

50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

1st wave (baseline)

2nd wave

3rd wave

4th wave

5th wave

Source: JRC UTP survey. Due to readability the full name of UTPs is not displayed here. For the full name 
of UTPs please see Section 1. Question: Have you experienced any of the following practices during the last 
three years with one of your buyers? Note: the ´last 3 years´ refers to full calendar years, e.g. the period 2017-
19 etc. 

Figure  22: Experience  of  black  UTPs  by  agricultural  producers  when  comparing 
baseline and last waves (percentage of respondents). 

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Agricultural producers 1st wave (baseline)

Agricultural producers 4th wave

Agricultural producers 5th wave

Source: JRC UTP survey. 

93 

 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Evolution of UTP perpetrators´ stage in the agri-food supply chain according 
to respondents (percentage of respondents). 

Secondary and further processing companies

Other

Trader of intermediary products

Organisations of producers

Commodity traders

Primary processing companies

Wholesalers

Retailers

5th wave

4th wave

3rd wave

2nd wave

1st wave (baseline)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Source: JRC UTP survey. 

Table 6 - Reasons not to raise the issue of UTPs with the EAs – JRC survey, 5th wave. 

Reasons not to raise the issue 

Fear of some form of retaliation from the buyer 

It is a common practice in the sector 

I thought the Public Enforcement Authority/ies were not able to handle it 

I could address the issue myself 

I did not feel the issue was important enough 

I do not know 

An association to whom I belong (producer organization or cooperative) did it for me 

Other reasons 

Source: JRC survey, 5th wave.  

Answers 

29 % 

19 % 

19 % 

13 % 

5 % 

5 % 

5 % 

4 % 

94 

 
 
 
 
Figure  24: Food  waste  reduction  of  the  Directive  (number  of  respondents  (left  axis), 
percentage (right axis)). 

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

Yes, it reduces
food waste

Yes, it increases
food waste

No, it has no
impact on food
waste

I don't know

5th wave

4th wave

3th wave

5th wave (%)

4th wave (%)

3th wave (%)

Source: JRC UTP survey. Note that in the first waves this question was not asked. 

Insights from MS annual reports: 

Figure 25: Number of complaints received during the reporting period – MS reports for 
2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024. 

250

200

150

100

50

0

15

223

178

93

Sweden

Slovenia

Romania

Poland

Malta

Lithuania

Italy

Hungary

Germany

Finland

Denmark

Cyprus

Bulgaria

Austria

Spain

Slovakia

Portugal

Netherlands

Luxembourg

Latvia

Ireland

Greece

France

Estonia

Czechia

Croatia

Belgium

2021

2022

2023

2024

Source: Annual reports by MSs as notified to the EC. 

95 

 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Number of investigations opened during the reporting period – MS reports 
for 2021,2022,2023 and 2024. 

1800

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

170

1590

1437

1413

Sweden

Slovenia

Romania

Poland

Malta

Lithuania

Italy

Hungary

Germany

Finland

Denmark

Cyprus

Bulgaria

Austria

Spain

Slovakia

Portugal

Netherlands

Luxembourg

Latvia

Ireland

Greece

France

Estonia

Czechia

Croatia

Belgium

2021

2022

2023

2024

Source: Annual reports by MSs as notified to the EC. 

Figure 27: Number of ex officio cases opened during the reporting period – MS reports 
for 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024. 

1393

1306

1113

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

172

2021

2022

2023

2024

Source: Annual Reports by MSs as notified to the EC. 

96 

Sweden
Slovenia
Romania
Poland
Malta
Lithuania
Italy
Hungary
Germany
Finland
Denmark
Cyprus
Bulgaria
Austria

Spain
Slovakia
Portugal
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Latvia
Ireland
Greece
France
Estonia
Czechia
Croatia
Belgium

 
 
 
Figure 28: Number of investigations resulting in finding an infringement – MS reports 
for 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024. 

271

265

218

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Sweden

Spain

Slovenia

Slovakia

Romania

Portugal

Poland

Malta

Lithuania

Italy

Hungary

Germany

Netherlands

Luxembourg

Latvia

Ireland

Greece

France

Finland

Estonia

Denmark

Czechia

Cyprus

Croatia

Bulgaria

Belgium

Austria

2024
Source: Annual Reports by MSs as notified to the EC. 

2023

2022

Figure  29: Total  number  of  infringements  found  on  total  number  of  closed 
investigations (% ratio) 2021-24. 

86% 86%

100%

82%

42%

33%

20%

13%

42%

36%

20% 17%

67%

26%

9%

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

Source: Annual Reports by MSs as notified to the EC. 

97 

 
 
 
 
 
B) Consultation activities carried out with indirect involvement of the EC 

(4)  Workshop with national, competent EAs  

The hybrid format, half-day workshop was carried out at EC premises in Brussels in June 
2024. 52 participants attended, representing the large majority of the competent EAs. 

The workshop discussion covered four main agenda points related to the enforcement of 
the Directive. The first topic informed about the survey of national competent authorities 
and EAs, where participants raised questions about  the survey process.  The study team 
provided clarifications and emphasised the importance of collecting data. 

The second agenda point focused on the enforcement of the UTP Directive in cross-border 
transactions, with participants highlighting the lack of rules on case allocation and legal 
basis for exchanging information. Two EAs shared experiences of difficulties in enforcing 
penalties  outside  their  own  MSs,  while  two  EAs  mentioned  a  successful  cross-border 
enforcement using Request for Information (RFI) mechanisms. 

The  third  agenda  point  explored  the  experience  of  EAs  in  enforcing  the  Directive  in 
transactions between operators based in the same MS. Participants discussed challenges in 
interpreting  definitions  and  concepts  and  the  importance  of  protecting  witnesses  and 
suppliers. 

The final point addressed the coherence of the Directive with other interventions that have 
similar objectives. Participants did not point to any particular legislation with the exception 
of  one  example  mentioning  an  internal  debate  at  time  of  transposition  of  the  Directive 
about what constitutes commercial confidentiality in relation to competition law and the 
CMO, which ultimately did not pose any issue.     

Overall,  the  discussion  highlighted  the  need  for  clearer  guidelines,  protocols,  and 
procedures for handling cross-border cases and enforcing the UTP Directive, as well as the 
importance of cooperation and information sharing among EAs. 

(5) 

Thematic workshop with business and non-business stakeholders 

The hybrid format, whole-day workshop was carried out at EC premises in Brussels in July 
2024. 26 organisations across all stages of the agri-food supply chain attended. 

The  workshop  discussion  covered  six  topics  related  to  the  Directive.  The  first  topic 
addressed  the  effectiveness  of  the  Directive  in  reducing  UTPs,  with  mixed  views  from 
participants.  Some  reported  a  decrease  in  UTPs,  while  others  (among  other  famers´ 
organisations) noted that the number of UTPs has not decreased significantly. 

The second topic discussed the challenges arising from different transposition choices at 
MS  level,  with  some  participants,  mainly  representing  the  retail  and  distribution  stage, 
highlighting the need for greater harmonisation.  

The third topic focused on the survey of business associations, where participants reported 
questions  about  completing  the  survey  questionnaire,  including  uncertainty  about  the 
applicability of questions to specific contexts. 

The fourth topic addressed the enforcement of the Directive in cross-border transactions, 
with participants discussing the challenges and potential solutions, including cooperation 
and transparency.  

98 

 
The fifth topic explored new needs in addressing UTPs, with participants identifying areas 
for  improvement,  e.g.  including  the  introduction  of  logistic  penalties  and  measures  to 
prevent value destruction. 

The  final  topic  discussed  the  coherence  of  the  Directive  with  other  interventions,  with 
participants highlighting potential conflicts as well as synergies with other regulations and 
initiatives, including the Late Payments Directive and the EU agri-food chain Observatory.  

Overall, the workshop discussion highlighted the complexity and often diverging positions 
of various stakeholders of the issues surrounding UTPs and the need for harmonisation, 
cooperation,  and  clarification  among  all  stakeholders  in  the  agri-food  supply  chain  to 
ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of the Directive. 

C) Consultation activities carried out without direct involvement of the EC  

The  external  study  team  carried  out  extensive  primary  data  collection,  encompassing 
targeted survey of CAs, targeted survey of retailers and large buyers, targeted survey of 
sector associations, horizontal interviews and interviews in the context of case studies. The 
insights from these collection activities can be found in the support study. An overview is 
provided by Figure 30. 

Figure 30: Overview of the data collection activities in the evaluation support study. 

Source: Evaluation support study, p.12.  

99 

 
 
 
Annex VI Summary of EAs enforcement activities 

This Annex presents elements of the enforcement activities carried out by EAs based on 
the publicly available, own activity reports, as of July 2025. The EC webpage dedicated 
to UTPs displays EA contact details and strives to collect links to activity reports as they 
become publicly available.  

Some EAs carry out  other  duties  apart from the  enforcement of the UTP Directive, for 
instance,  when  the  competent  UTP  EA  is  also  responsible  for  other  policy  areas  like 
competition  policy  e.g.  in  Czechia,  Romania.  In  these  cases,  UTP-related  enforcement 
activities are often part of wider reporting. Moreover, in some cases, enforcement relates 
to national provisions that go beyond the minimum requirements of the UTP Directive; or 
relate  to  national  legislation  with  a  wider  scope  containing  as  a  part  thereof  the  UTP 
transposition. These factors make enforcement activities exclusively related to the UTP 
Directive  not  always  clear  cut.  The  information  present  in  the  reports  varies  greatly, 
spanning from summary remarks, to full-fledged, dedicated reports displaying number of 
cases  and  investigations,  descriptions  of  closed  cases  as  well  as  more  contextual 
enforcement-related information. For a group of MSs, no annual activity reporting could 
be publicly retrieved (Greece, Hungary, Malta) (89).  

Austria (90)  

In  2022,  the  Austrian  EA,  Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde  (BWB)  -  Federal  Competition 
Authority- did not receive any complaints explicitly referencing potential breaches of the 
Austrian UTP transposing law, the Fairness in Trade Practices Act (FWBG). However, 
the EA did initiate an investigation into a possible case of UTPs, following an anonymous 
tip-off regarding a letter sent by a food retail company to its suppliers. The letter requested 
the  suppliers  to  adjust  their  production  planning  and  quantities  to  ensure  full  product 
availability. The investigation ultimately found no evidence of a breach of the FWBG. 

The BWB also conducted a review of its cross-sector guidelines for entrepreneurial fair 
conduct, known as the Fairness Catalogue, which was first published in 2018. The updated 
catalogue  took  into  account  the  new  legal  framework  introduced  by  the  FWBG  and 
included examples and practical guidance for businesses. Furthermore, the BWB started a 
sector  enquiry  into  the  food  sector,  organised  presentations  on  the  UTP  topic  and 
participated in a meeting of the UTP Enforcement Network to exchange experiences and 
best practices with other EAs. 

In 2023, the BWB received several complaints regarding potential breaches of the FWBG. 
One case involved a food retail company that demanded payments from its suppliers for a 

(89)  The  translation  and summary of the activity reports has  been  in part carried out  with the  aid of  EC-

internal artificial intelligence-powered tools. 

(90)https://www.bwb.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Bericht_gemaess____5h_Absatz_3_FWBG_fuer_den_Z

eitraum_vom_1.1.2022_bis_zum_31.12.2022_Barrierefrei.pdf,  

https://www.bwb.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Downloads/PDFs/Jahresbericht_FWBG_2023_26-
1_Barrierefrei.pdf,  

https://www.bwb.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/BWB_Jahresbericht_FWBG_2024_mit_CI.pdf  

100 

 
 
 
transformation  process,  which  were  not  related  to  the  sale  of  agricultural  and  food 
products. The BWB initiated an investigation and subsequently filed applications for the 
imposition of a fine with the Austrian Cartel Court. Another case, flagged by the Fairness 
Büro, a dedicated independent and impartial body to handle complaints regarding UTPs in 
the agri-food sector, concerned a buyer on the wholesale level who  allegedly made late 
payments to two fruit farmers. The BWB's investigation confirmed the allegations, and the 
EA reported the intention to file an application for a fine with the Austrian Cartel Court. 

The  BWB  also  terminated  its  sector  inquiry  into  the  food  industry,  which  aimed  to 
investigate the prevalence of  UTPs  in  the sector. The inquiry found that  approximately 
40% of the suppliers supplying food retailers surveyed had experienced UTPs, with the 
most  common  black  UTPs  being  payment  delays  (18%),  unilateral  changes  to  supply 
agreements (14%), and demands for payments not related to the sale of products (13%). 
The BWB concluded that UTPs are non- irrelevant phenomenon in the Austrian food sector 
and  that  the  EA  needs  to  focus  on  enforcing  the  FWBG  more  effectively.  The  first 
investigation following the sector inquiry started in 2023.  

Exchanges  with  other  EA,  for  instance  though  a  dedicated  exchange  with  Croatian, 
Romanian  Slovenian  and  Czech  EAs)  as  well  as  at  EU  level  continued.  Also  the 
collaboration with the Fairness Büro continued well. 

In 2024, the BWB received several complaints regarding potential breaches of the FWBG, 
including  a  case  where  a  food  retail  company  demanded  a  bonus  from  its  suppliers  to 
finance its digital sales channels. The BWB initiated an investigation and found evidence 
of a breach of the FWBG. The BWB also received complaints regarding unilateral changes 
to supply agreements and late payments. The BWB investigated these cases and reports 
the intention to file applications for fines with the Austrian Cartel Court if necessary. 

The BWB also in 2024 participated in meetings of the UTP Enforcement Network. The 
EA  also  continued  cooperation  with  the  Fairness  Büro  and  received  information  about 
potential breaches of the FWBG (Case C-311/24, pending). 

Notable developments in 2024 include the establishment of a dedicated FWBG Unit within 
the BWB, which is responsible for enforcing the FWBG (3 collaborators, 1.5 FTEs). The 
EA also noted that the number of complaints regarding UTPs is increasing, and that the 
BWB  needs  to  focus  on  enforcing  the  FWBG  more  effectively  despite  the  challenges 
which are also linked to the relatively novel legal instrument complementing competition 
law.  The  Austrian  Cartel  Court  was  considering  several  cases  related  to  the  FWBG, 
including  the case  regarding  the food retail  company that demanded payments from  its 
suppliers for a transformation process. The Austrian Cartel Court referred questions to the 
European  Court  of  Justice  regarding  the  interpretation  of  the  UTP  Directive  and  the 
FWBG. 

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Fairness Office 

In 2022 the Fairness Büro, was established as an independent and impartial body to handle complaints 
regarding  UTPs  in  the  agri-food  sector.  The  Office´s  main  tasks  include  providing  general  advisory 
services, analysing complaints, and mediating between parties. In 2022, no cases were forwarded to the 
Federal Competition Authority, as the complainants were reportedly afraid of revealing their identities 
and losing their business relationships. Full capacity of the Office was expected to be reached mid- 2023. 

In  2023,  the  Fairness  Office  handled  two  cases,  which  were  forwarded  to  the  Federal  Competition 
Authority,  resulting  in  applications  for  fines  being  filed  with  the  Austrian  Cartel  Court.  The  reports 
highlight the challenges faced by the Office in handling cases, including the fear of retaliation and the 
complexity of the cases, which often require several months to resolve. The Office's efforts to support 
complainants and promote fair trading practices are also reported, with the aim of maintaining business 
relationships under fair conditions. 

In 2024, the activity report of the Office mentions that it continued to handle cases and provide support 
to  complainants.  The  Office´s  activities  included  cooperating  with  other  stakeholders,  such  as  the 
European Commission, to improve the enforcement of the UTP Directive. 

Belgium (91)  

The  reports  provide  detailed  insights  into  the  activities  carried  out  by  the  Directorate-
General for Economic Inspection, the competent national EA in Belgium. 

In  2021,  the  Belgian  legislator  transposed  the  UTP  Directive  into  national  law,  which 
entered into force on 25 December 2021. The report explains some key elements of the 
national  law  including  the  ones  which  went  beyond  the  minimum  requirements.  No 
complaints or investigations were reported in 2021, as the law had just been introduced 
and a transitional period of 12 months was provided for existing agreements to comply 
with the new rules. 

In  2022,  the  Directorate-General  for  Economic  Inspection  received  one  complaint 
concerning UTPs. The complaint was from a farmer who sold hay to a hay selling company 
but  never  received  payment  for  it.  An  official  warning  was  directed  to  the  hay  selling 
company for an infringement of the law, and eventually, an official report was directed to 
the  company  for  an  infringement  of  the  UTP  Law.  The  EA  also  carried  out  one 
investigation on its own initiative, concerning a supermarket in Belgium, which was still 
ongoing at the end of 2022. In addition to these enforcement activities, the EA also engaged 
in outreach activities, holding a general information session on the new UTP legislation, 
and participating in an online meeting with other EAs. 

In  2023,  the  Directorate-General  for  Economic  Inspection  did  not  receive  any  formal 
complaints  about  UTPs.  However,  the  EA  decided  to  focus  on  own-initiative 
investigations, given the limited number of complaints and the transitional period until 15 
December  2022  to  bring  existing  agreements  into  compliance.  Ten  new  own-initiative 
investigations were started, nine of which were in the meat sector and one in the sugar beet 
sector. The investigations were conducted in different stages of the agri-food supply chain, 

(91)  https://economie.fgov.be/en/themes/enterprises/business-protection/unfair-practices/unfair-trade-

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ranging from retailers to producers, and checked for the presence of prohibited practices, 
such  as  non-compliance  with  the  30-day  payment  period  and  unilateral  contract 
amendments. Six cases were closed without infringements, and four investigations were 
still ongoing at the end of 2023. The case initiated in 2022 on its own initiative in the retail 
sector was closed in 2023 with no further action following an exchange with the UTP EA 
of the MS where the suppliers concerned were located. The EA also participated in several 
(European  level)  meetings,  including  the  UTP  Roundtable  and  the  UTP  Enforcement 
Network, to exchange information and best practices with other EAs.  

In 2024, the EA received one formal complaint about UTP, which was filed by a producer 
organisation. The complaint did not fall within the EA's competence, but the complainant 
was  provided  with  information  and  guidance.  The  EA  intensified  its  ex  officio 
investigations  at  various  stages  of  the  agri-food  supply  chain,  opening  16  new  cases, 
including one case that involved several contracts between a buyer and its suppliers. Seven 
cases were closed without infringements, and nine cases were still ongoing at the end of 
2024.  One  case  resulted  in  two  official  reports,  involving  a  retailer  that  demanded 
payments or free products from suppliers for the opening of new grocery stores, which was 
found to be an infringement of the law.  

The  EA  also  engaged  in  outreach  activities,  including  attending  an  online  information 
webinar of the Irish Agri-food Regulator and participating in several meetings organised 
by the EC were discussed on the evaluation of the UTP Directive and the strengthening of 
the position of farmers in the food chain were also touched upon. The EA met with various 
stakeholders from the meat sector to address common and specific problems in the sector 
and  answered  questions  from  entrepreneurs,  stakeholders,  and  foreign  organisations 
regarding the enforcement of UTP legislation in Belgium. 

Notably, in 2024, the Belgian legislator adopted a Royal Decree, which expanded both the 
grey list and the blacklist regarding UTP, following up on the federal Task Force Agro 
established in the wake of farmers´ 2024 protests. The EA agreed to provide a dedicated 
referent to the agri-food supply chain. This referent is a neutral contact person for the agri-
food supply chain who, among other things, acts as a confidential, anonymous and informal 
contact point for companies, federations and recognised industry organisations. The EA 
will  continue  to  prioritise  investigations  on  its  own  initiative  in  2025,  focusing  on  the 
practices already mentioned in the existing UTP law, as well as the new UTPs mentioned 
in the Royal Decree. 

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The Belgian EA also carried out an evaluation of the national UTP law completed in November 2024. 
The evaluation report aims to assess the implementation and effectiveness of the UTP law, which was 
enacted in Belgium on November 28, 2021. 

The  evaluation  involves  consultations  with  various  stakeholders,  including  agricultural  organisations 
(Boerenbond and Fédération Wallonne de l’Agriculture), food industry organisations (Fevia and BABM), 
and distribution sector representatives (Comeos, Eurocommerce, Carrefour, and Lambrechts). 

The  Belgian  UTP  law  applies  to  suppliers  in  the  agricultural  and  food  supply  chain  with  an  annual 
turnover not exceeding EUR 350 million. Suppliers and industry organisations argue for the removal of 
this threshold, citing potential cascading effects and unbalanced protections. Conversely, buyers favour 
maintaining  the  threshold  to  prevent  large  suppliers  from  gaining  undue  advantages.  The  law  covers 
UTPs by buyers and is applicable to transactions where either the buyer or supplier is based in Belgium. 
Suppliers  are  divided  on  whether  protections  should  be  reciprocal,  also  covering  UTPs  by  suppliers 
against buyers. Buyers generally support reciprocity in protections. 

The Belgian UTP law distinguishes between blacklisted grey listed practices. The report notes proposals 
for additional practices to be added to these lists, reflecting diverse views from stakeholders: suppliers 
express issues with payment delays and unilateral contract modifications by buyers. They propose stricter 
measures against certain unfair practices, such as excessive promotions and abuse of market position. 
Buyers  emphasise  the  need  for  reciprocal  protections  and  criticise  the  lack  of  flexibility,  particularly 
concerning payment terms and the sharing of risks in product deterioration. 

The Belgian Directorate-General for Economic Inspection oversees compliance, using both preventive 
and punitive measures. The report highlights a lack of formal complaints, attributed to the  ´fear factor´ 
among suppliers and the absence of written contracts. Suppliers and buyers appear to view mediation as 
a preferred conflict resolution method, given the slow and costly nature of legal proceedings. There is a 
call for more awareness on the UTP law among suppliers. 

The report concludes that the UTP law marks progress toward fairer trading practices in the  agri-food 
supply chain. However, it notes challenges such as the need for greater awareness, improved contractual 
practices, and possibly expanding protections to include certain practices. 

The evaluation raises points as maintaining the current turnover threshold while considering publishing 
lists of protected enterprises. It also recommends exploring the introduction of sector-specific standard 
contract clauses and strengthening interprofessional agreements to enhance compliance and reduce the 
fear  of reprisals.  The  report underscores  the  importance  of balancing  supplier  protection with  market 
competitiveness and consumer interests, while acknowledging that the UTP law’s implementation is still 
in its early stages. 

Bulgaria (92)  

The  reports  provide  an  overview  of  the  activities  carried  out  by  the  Bulgarian  EA,  the 
Commission  on  Protection  of  Competition  (CPC)  marginally  covering  also  elements 
related to the enforcement of the UTP Directive and its national transposition law. 

The 2023 report notes that the CPC has received several complaints regarding UTPs. The 
CPC  has  also  carried  out  investigations  into  alleged  breaches  of  the  UTP  Directive´s 
national transposition law, including investigations into the behaviour of enterprises active 
in  the  markets  for  distribution  of  ice  cream  products.  In  2023  the  EA  also  specifically 

(92)  https://www.cpc.bg/en/publications  

https://www.cpc.bg/media/about-kzk/annual-reports/annual-reports-
EN/Extract%20from%20the%20Annual%20report%20of%20the%20CPC%20for%202023%20-
%20Report%20for%20the%20Unfair%20trading%20practices.pdf  

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reported on an ex officio ongoing investigation on contractual clauses used by a retailer 
possibly constituting breaches of the national UTP law. 

The report also highlights the outreach activities undertaken by the CPC to raise awareness 
about the UTP Directive and its national transposition law. These activities have included 
participation  in  working  groups  and  meetings  with  representatives  of  the  European 
Commission, as well as the organisation of workshops and seminars to inform stakeholders 
about the UTP Directive and its implementation. In addition to these activities, the report 
notes  that  the  CPC  has also  been  involved  in  international  cooperation  and  networking 
with other EA to share best practices and experiences also in enforcing the UTP Directive. 

In  2024,  the  CPC  identified  several  priority  areas  for  enforcement,  including  the  food 
sector.  The  EA  noted  that  the  food  sector  is  of  particular  importance,  given  its  social 
significance  and  the  increased  public  interest  in  the  sector.  The  CPC  received  several 
complaints  regarding  UTPs  in  the  food  sector,  including  allegations  of  misleading 
advertising and unfair contract terms. 

The  CPC  handled  several  cases  related  to  UTPs,  including  investigations  into  the 
behaviour of large retail chains and their treatment of SMEs in the food sector. The EA 
also received complaints regarding the use of unfair contract terms, including allegations 
that large retailers are imposing unfair prices and payment terms on their suppliers. The 
CPC  has  also  engaged  in  outreach  activities  to  raise  awareness  about  UTPs  and  the 
importance of fair competition more in general. The EA also acknowledged the importance 
of  cooperation  with  other  national  authorities  and  international  organisations  to  ensure 
effective enforcement of the UTP Directive. 

Cyprus (93)  

The 2023 report provides an overview of the activities carried out by the Department of 
Agriculture, the competent Cypriote EA, in relation to the enforcement of the Directive 
and its national transposition law, specifically the Laws of 2021 and 2023 (N.200(Ι)/2021 
and N.32(Ι)/2023). 

In 2023, the EA received a total of 14 complaints. It conducted 89 checks at various stages 
of the agri-food supply chain. These checks were carried out across the country. The checks 
focused on wholesale markets, retail points of sale, such as supermarkets and fruit shops, 
businesses  involved  in  the  marketing  of  agricultural  products,  producers'  organisations, 
wineries, restaurants, and hotels. 

The investigations conducted in 2023 centred on payment schedules, the use of reusable 
plastic  packaging  or  transport  containers  by  unauthorised  parties,  and  the  issuance  of 
invoices. Out of the 89 checks, 82 were completed, and an additional 2 checks that had 
commenced in 2022 were also finalised in 2023. 

The results of the checks revealed that in 74 cases, breaches of the laws were identified. 
The majority of these infringements, 58 in total, related to the unauthorised possession or 
use  of  packaging  or  transport  containers.  Furthermore,  22  infringements  concerned 

(93)https://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/da/da.nsf/All/B6D9FDDF76C1EA9CC2258ACF00488BC6/$file/973121

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payments,  where  buyers  failed  to  pay  suppliers  within  the  stipulated  30  or  60  days  for 
perishable  and  non-perishable  agricultural  products  and  food,  respectively.  There  were 
also  9  instances  of  non-issuance  of  invoices  and  1  case  of  failure  to  provide  requested 
information. As a consequence of these findings, 42 administrative fines were imposed, 
amounting to a total of EUR 10 450. 

In  addition  to  these  enforcement  activities,  the  EA  also  undertook  outreach  efforts, 
although  the  report  does  not  provide  detailed  information  on  these.  However,  it  does 
mention that as part of the process to improve the application of the laws, the scales of 
administrative fines to be imposed in case of breaches were determined and published on 
the Department of Agriculture's website. 

Czechia (94)  

The Office for the Protection of Competition has been actively engaged in enforcing the 
UTP Directive and its national transposition law, specifically the Significant Market Power  
Act (SMPA). 

In 2021 the Office together with the Ministry of Agriculture prepared the transposition of 
the  UTP  Directive  into  the  Significant  Market  Power  Act,  the  already  present  national 
legislation closest in content to the Directive. It carried out enforcement activities under 
the existing SMPA. 

In 2022, the report mentions the amendment of the SMPA by the Amendment Act No. 
359/2022 Coll. to transpose the UTP Directive taking effect form the 1 January 2023. The 
report  further  explains  the  main  differences  and  novelties  vis-à-vis  previous  national 
legislation, comprehending among other things, the increase in the number of entities that 
are subject to statutory regulation, changes in the concept of significant market power and 
the concept of UTPs. The Office also did sector inquires in view of future enforcement 
work on lower levels (i.e. upstream) of the agri-food supply chain, the widespread use of 
oral  contracts  (the  amended  act  introduced  the  obligation  of  written  contracts  with  a 
transition  period in  2023).  The Office also  investigated the factors that led to  the sharp 
increase in retail food prices over the two years before and the level of profitability of the 
various links in the agri-food supply chain. 14 complaints were received and 11 ex offcio 
investigations started. 

In 2023, the SMPA Act amendments transposing the UTP Directive came fully into force. 
11 acts of abuse of significant market power accompanied by a general clause of sorts have 
become  22  types  of  absolutely  prohibited  UTPs,  which  have  been  supplemented  by  3 
additional  practices  permitted  under  certain  conditions.  In  the  first  half  of  2023,  the 
Office’s supervisory activities focused on methodological guidance for market operators. 
In addition, the Office had provided interpretative opinions and methodologies on the new 
legislation in the previous year in response to individual requests (61 requests). In the first 
year of the amendment’s fully entering into force, the Office deliberately chose the strategy 
of proactive education and provision of expert background to  address the occurrence of 
illegal conduct and, in particular, to minimize the costs of companies related to the need to 
obtain expert legal analyses from third parties and to orient themselves in the relatively 
complex  legal  novelties.  In  the  second  half  of  the  year,  the  staff  of  the  Market  Power 

(94)   https://uohs.gov.cz/en/significant-market-power/news-significant-market-power.html   

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Methodology and Supervision of Market Power Department launched an area-wide audit 
of compliance with the SMPA, focusing on all food sectors, involving 21 sector inquiries. 
2 ex offcio cases and 1 administrative proceeding were launched. Exchanges with the UTP 
Enforcement Network happened. 

In 2024, the Office received a total of six complaints related to UTPs and investigated 38 
cases from its own initiative. Additionally, the Office received 17 questions regarding the 
interpretation of the SMPA. The Office also completed 21 sector inquiries, which resulted 
in  the  initiation  of  14  administrative  proceedings,  with  10  of  these  proceedings  being 
concluded at the lower levels (upstream) of the agri-food supply chain. 488 buyers were 
contacted by the Office and 4 058 contracts and other agreements reviewed. 

The  Office  imposed  fines  in  seven  cases,  with  a  total  amount  of  CZK  4 280 000,  and 
accepted commitments in three cases. The most frequent infringements of the Significant 
Market Power Act were the failure to comply with the 30-day deadline for payment of the 
purchase price for agricultural  or food products, and content deficiencies in  contractual 
documentation. 

In terms of resources and workforce, the Office has a dedicated team for the enforcement 
of  the  UTP  Directive  and  its  national  transposition  law.  The  Office's  staff  are  actively 
involved  in  discussing  proposals  and  working  groups  related  to  the  enforcement  of  the 
UTP Directive. The Office also cooperates with other EAs, as well as, via a Memorandum 
of  Cooperation  between  the  competition  authorities  of  the  European  Union,  with 
authorities  in  Ukraine  and  Moldova,  to  strengthen  regional  cooperation  and  exchange 
information on competition issues also in relation to UTP-related enforcement experience. 
The  Office  has  also  been  involved  in  international  cooperation,  including  the  UTP 
Enforcement Network. 

The Office is actively involved in discussing the proposal for a new regulation on cross-
border enforcement against unfair trading practices in working groups together with other 
MSs. 

Germany (95)  

The competent German EA, Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung (BLE), has 
been actively engaged in enforcing the UTP Directive and its national transposition law 
Agrarorganisationen- und Lieferketten-Gesetz (AgrarOLkG) in Germany since 2021. 

In 2021, the BLE commenced its activities as the EA, with a focus on establishing itself as 
a trusted and reliable partner for companies  in  the  agri-food  supply chain in  relation  to 
UTPs. The EA received several concrete hints on  UTPs from operators across different 
agri-food  sectors  and  supply  chain  stages,  which  it  pursued.  Although  no  formal 
complaints  were  filed,  the  BLE  initiated  one  investigation.  The  EA  also  engaged  in 
outreach activities, including bilateral discussions with market operators and associations, 
to raise awareness about the UTP Directive and the AgrarOLkG. The BLE as an Authority 
had  overall  approximately  1 600  employees,  with  a  specific  department,  Referat  516, 
dedicated to handling UTP cases. 

(95)https://www.ble.de/DE/Themen/Marktorganisation/UTP/Veroeffentlichungen/UTP_Veroeffentlichunge

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In  2022,  the  BLE  continued  its  enforcement  activities,  with  a  focus  on  supporting 
companies in adapting to the new law. The BLE did not conclusively find any violation of 
the UTP prohibitions in any of its previous proceedings. 

The BLE received two complaints and initiated five investigations, including cases related 
to the pricing practices of a dairy company, Arla Foods, and the use of reusable packaging 
containers (RPCs) by a retailer as well as two cases related to `soja credits´ (then merged 
into a single case) involving retailers ALDI Nord and ALDI Süd. All cases were concluded 
finding no infringement or after parties’ commitments to change behaviour. The BLE also 
engaged in outreach activities, including the development of an anonymous whistleblower 
system,  to  encourage  reporting  of  UTPs.  The  EA  reported  that  many  companies, 
particularly SMEs, were not aware of their rights and obligations under the AgrarOLkG, 
highlighting the need for continued outreach and education. The report also mentions cases 
in  which the UTP Directive helped suppliers in  the  negotiations with  buyers as  well as 
challenges  in  the  implementation  of  the  law  linked  to,  among  others,  the  turnover 
thresholds and scope of products covered.  

In 2023, the BLE reported an increase in complaints and hints on potential UTPs, with 11 
complaints filed and five investigations initiated. The EA handled cases related to pricing 
practices of an agricultural producer cooperative, the return of unsold fruits and vegetables 
by  retailers,  and  the  distribution  fees  charged  by  a  retailer,  Kaufland.  The  BLE  also 
engaged in outreach activities, including the development of guidance materials and the 
participation  in  industry  events,  to  raise  awareness  about  the  UTP  Directive  and  the 
AgrarOLkG. The EA noted that the anonymous whistleblower system, established in 2022, 
was well-received and had contributed to an increase in reports of potential UTPs. 

In 2024, the BLE reported a decrease in complaints, with five complaints filed, and two 
investigations  initiated.  It  handled  cases  related  to  the  pricing  practices  of  a  retailer, 
including the use of `assortment´ fees, and the payment terms for perishable food products. 
The  BLE  also  engaged  in  outreach  activities,  including  the  development  of  guidance 
materials  and  the  participation  in  industry  events,  to  raise  awareness  about  the  UTP 
Directive  and  the  AgrarOLkG.  The  authority  noted  that  the  anonymous  whistleblower 
system continued to be an important tool. The BLE also reported, as in previous years, on 
its continued participation in the Network of EAs, which aimed to facilitate cooperation 
and information-sharing on UTP enforcement. 

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In 2023 Germany published an evaluation report of the German Transposition law of the UTP Directive. The 
evaluation report´s on the German implementation of the Directive through the Agrarorganisationen-und-
Lieferketten-Gesetz  (AgrarOLkG)  primary  objective  was  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  the  AgrarOLkG  on 
supplier-buyer relationships and the prevalence of UTPs, particularly focusing on sections §§ 11 to 23 of the 
AgrarOLkG. It also considered the potential prohibition of purchasing food and agricultural products below 
production costs. 

The  evaluation  was  conducted  as  a  self-evaluation  by  the  Bundesministerium  für  Ernährung  und 
Landwirtschaft  (BMEL),  with  assistance  from  the  Statistisches  Bundesamt  (StBA)  to  mitigate  potential 
confirmation bias. Methodologically, the evaluation involved stakeholder surveys and interviews, engaging 
suppliers,  buyers,  associations,  and  the  German  EA  the  BLE  to  gather  both  qualitative  and  quantitative 
insights.  Various  stakeholders,  including  economic  associations  and  the  BLE,  were  consulted  to  obtain 
diverse  perspectives  and  experiences.  The  Thünen-Institut  für  Betriebswirtschaft  also  participated  in 
examining the feasibility of banning purchases below production costs. 

Primary  data  was  collected  through  surveys  (379  suppliers  and  83  buyers  completed  participation)  and 
interviews  with  market  participants,  focusing  on  the  effects  of  the  AgrarOLkG  on  contracts  and  the 
prevalence of unfair practices. Feedback from associations and stakeholders provided additional qualitative 
data. Secondary data  included BLE's annual reports and enforcement data, encompassing complaints and 
investigations related to UTPs, as well as insights from other national and international studies on unfair 
trading practices for contextual and comparative analysis. 

Stakeholder positions varied, with many suppliers and associations reporting continued exposure to unfair 
practices,  such  as  contract  penalties  and  unilateral  changes,  despite  the  legislation.  Associations  like 
Deutsche  Raiffeisenverband,  Deutscher  Bauernverband,  and  Zentralverband  des  Deutschen  Handwerks 
supported  maintaining  strict  prohibitions,  whereas  the  Handelsverband  Deutschland  advocated  for  more 
flexible measures, arguing that broad prohibitions endangered traditional business models. 

The evaluation found that the AgrarOLkG has contributed to a reduction in the frequency of unfair practices, 
yet many suppliers continue to face these issues, indicating that the legislation's impact is not fully realised 
and further improvements may be necessary. Businesses faced a one-time compliance cost of approximately 
EUR 12.5 million, with ongoing compliance costs also identified, although specific figures were not detailed. 
Recommendations from the evaluation included expanding the scope of the law to include more suppliers, 
clarifying legal provisions to reduce interpretation burdens, and exploring additional protective measures for 
suppliers. 

Overall, the evaluation highlights the challenges in fully implementing and enforcing UTP prohibitions, with 
mixed feedback from stakeholders on the current national regulatory framework's adequacy and impact. It 
underscores the need for continued regulatory evolution and stakeholder engagement to effectively address 
UTPs in the food supply chain. 

Denmark (96)  

The  Danish  Competition  and  Consumer  Authority  (DCCA)  has  been  appointed  as  the 
independent EA for the UTP Directive and its national transposition law, the Danish UTP 
Act. 

From the reports emerges that in 2021, the Danish UTP Act entered into force on 1 July, 
and  the  DCCA  began  its  enforcement  activities.  The  DCCA  received  one  complaint  in 
2021, but it was subsequently withdrawn, resulting in no decisions being adopted.  

In  2022,  the  DCCA  continued  its  enforcement  activities,  focusing  on  informing  and 
providing  guidance  to  companies  about  the  rules  in  the  new  Danish  UTP  Act.  The  EA 
published guidelines on its website, providing companies with an overview of the rules 
and examples of UTPs. The DCCA also participated in several events to present the new 

(96)  https://en.kfst.dk/utp  

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legislation and engaged in dialogue with market operators about the challenges companies 
faced in relation to the new legislation. 

In 2023, the DCCA carried out its second monitoring of the effects of the Danish UTP Act, 
sending out a survey to industry and trade organisations representing the different stages 
of  the  agri-food  supply  chain.  The  feedback  from  market  operators  was  limited,  with 
companies expressing concerns regarding a few areas, generally related to the prohibition 
provisions in  the Directive. The DCCA  also  participated in  discussions with  other  EAs 
about the transposition and enforcement of the provisions. 

The DCCA's organised an annual meeting with stakeholders to discuss experiences with 
the Danish UTP Act, which was held in June 2023. The EA planned to conduct a third and 
final  monitoring  survey  round  in  spring  2024  to  track  developments  and  evaluate  the 
Danish UTP Act. The DCCA's cooperation with other EAs and the European Commission 
was also an essential aspect of its enforcement activities, aiming to achieve a consistent 
approach to the interpretation of the rules on UTPs throughout the EU. 

In November 2024 the evaluation of the Danish UTP Act was completed. The evaluation report is based 
on  annual  monitoring  rounds  conducted  in  2022,  2023,  and  2024  including  a  combination  of  annual 
questionnaires sent to relevant businesses, meetings and ongoing dialogue with industry organisations, 
as  well  as  analysis  of  relevant  data  and  statistics,  including  online  prices  through  web  scraping.  The 
survey targeted both suppliers and buyers of agri-food products (45 to 57 completed questionnaires each 
year). 

Findings  indicate  that  only  a  few  businesses  frequently  encountered  UTPs,  with  a  general  trend  of 
decreasing  frequency  over  the  monitored  years.  Key  issues  included  long  payment  terms,  unilateral 
contract changes by buyers, and demands for payments unrelated to the sale of agricultural products. 

According to the evaluation, the regulation had minimal impact on Danish suppliers' competitiveness 
against foreign buyers and no significant influence on the choice of smaller suppliers. The act did not 
lead  to  changes  in  consumer prices.  Most  businesses  did  not  adjust  their  prices  due  to  the  act or  the 
general UTP rules. The act's payment terms affected the use of credit facilitation, with some businesses 
reporting adverse impacts due to shorter payment deadlines, which made credit facilitation less attractive. 

The findings suggest that the Danish UTP act has largely met its objectives of protecting suppliers from 
UTPs without causing significant adverse effects. There was a general adaptation among businesses, and 
issues were often resolved through dialogue rather than formal complaints. 

The  evaluation  report does  not  explicitly  state  recommendations  for  legislative  changes.  However,  it 
highlights ongoing dialogue and adaptation within the industry as positive outcomes. It also mentions 
that there were no calls for changes in the act from businesses or industry organisations. 

Spain (97)  

The  EA,  Agencia  de  Información  y  Control  Alimentarios  (AICA),  has  been  actively 
engaged  in  enforcing  the  UTP  Directive  and  its  national  transposition  law,  specifically 
Law  12/2013.  As  annual  activity  reports  before  2021  depict,  the  Agency  already  had 
enforcement experience in this realm before the introduction of the UTP Directive. 

In  2021,  AICA  carried  out  1 204  inspections  of  its  own  initiative,  controlling  1 846 
commercial relationships between operators in the agri-food supply chain. The authority 
also  received  76  complaints,  of  which  37  were  investigated.  The  complaints  were 
distributed across various sectors, with the majority coming from the fruit and vegetable 

(97)  https://www.aica.gob.es/en/informes-de-la-actividad-de-aica-en/  

110 

 
 
 
sector. AICA also initiated investigations into possible breaches of the UTP law in different 
sectors, including the destruction of value in the agri-food supply chain. 

The report highlights that 54% of the penalties imposed in 2021 corresponded to breaches 
of payment terms, with the majority of these cases involving retailers. The total number of 
penalties  imposed  in  2021  was  580,  with  the  fruit  and  vegetable  sector  being  the  most 
affected,  accounting  for  311  penalties.  The  report  also  notes  that  the  total  number  of 
penalties imposed since the creation of AICA is 3 054, with the fruit and vegetable sector 
accounting for 49% of these penalties. 

In  2022,  AICA,  participated  in  three  meetings  with  the  Commission  and  other  MS  to 
discuss new cases, share best practices, and exchange information on the application of the 
Directive. Furthermore, AICA, cooperated with the Commission and other MSs through a 
website  managed  by  the  Commission,  where  information  was  exchanged,  and 
consultations were held on the application of the Directive. 

A notable event in December 2022 was the creation and launch of the Register of Food 
Contracts. The register is a digital platform where buyers must record food contracts and 
their modifications with primary producers and their associations. The registration of food 
contracts became mandatory from 30 June 2023. 

In 2022, AICA carried out various controls and inspections, including 852 actions related 
to the unilateral modification of contract terms for agricultural and food products. The EA 
also received complaints and communications about potential breaches of Law 12/2013, 
which  were  examined  and  either  admitted  as  complaints  or  included  as  indications  in 
control programmes. 

In 2023, AICA, continued to enforce the UTP Directive and its national transposition laws. 
The authority participated in six meetings with the Commission and other Member States 
to discuss new cases, share best practices, and exchange information on the application of 
the  Directive.  AICA  also  cooperated  with  the  Commission  and  other  Member  States 
through the website managed by the Commission. 

In 2023 the operationalisation of the Register of Food Contracts took place, which allowed 
buyers to register food contracts and their modifications with primary producers and their 
associations. The register's purpose is to provide AICA, and other Autonomous Authorities 
contributing to the UTP enforcement and Regional level, with the necessary information 
to verify compliance with the obligation to register food contracts and other requirements. 

In  2024,  AICA  maintained  enforcement  activities  as  well  as  encounters  to  exchange 
experiences with the French, Italian, and other EAs, as well as with other organisations. 
The authority also responded to questionnaires from the EC and participated in working 
groups to discuss the application of the Directive. 

111 

 
Regional Authorities in Spain 

In 2022, the Regional EAs conducted a total of 604 inspections, with the majority being carried out in 
the Castilla y León region (286 inspections). The authorities also reported a total of 125 infringements, 
with  the  most  common  being  the  failure  to  include  essential  terms  in  contracts  (19%)  and  the  non-
compliance with payment deadlines (63%). The authorities received a total of 4 complaints. The report 
also highlights the sectors that were most inspected, including the fruit and vegetable sector, the wine 
sector, and the dairy sector. 

In 2023, the Regional EAs conducted a total of 725 inspections, with the majority again being carried 
out in the Castilla y León region (324 inspections). The authorities reported a total of 167 infringements, 
with the most common being the failure to formalise contracts in writing (27%) and the non-compliance 
with payment deadlines (45%). 

In 2024, the Regional EAs conducted a total of 609 inspections, with the majority being carried out in 
the Castilla y León region (170 inspections). The authorities reported a total of 399 infringements, with 
the most common being the failure to formalise contracts in writing (24%) and the non-compliance with 
payment deadlines (52%). The authorities received a total of 25 complaints. The report also highlights 
the sectors that were most inspected, including the fruit and vegetable sector, the wine sector, and the 
dairy sector. 

Finland (98)  

reports  provide 

The 
the 
Elintarvikemarkkinavaltuutettu  (Food  Market  Ombudsman)  in  Finland,  related  to  the 
enforcement of the UTP Directive and its national transposition law the Food Market Act. 

carried  out  by 

account  of 

activities 

the 

an 

In 2022, the Food Market Ombudsman received 50 requests for guidance and 2 complaints, 
which  were  handled  in  accordance  with  the  national  transposition  laws.  The  EA  also 
conducted investigations into 1 case and issued 2 guidelines and 2 recommendations to 
promote fair trading practices. Additionally, the Food Market Ombudsman participated in 
international cooperation with other MSs and the European Commission, and engaged in 
outreach activities, including seminars and meetings with stakeholders. The Ombudsman 
had a workforce of 7.36 FTEs and a budget of EUR 614 807. 

In 2023, the Food Market Ombudsman received 39 requests for guidance and 2 complaints 
and  conducted  investigations  into  2  cases.  The  EA  issued  2  guidelines,  but  no 
recommendations. The Food Market Ombudsman continued to participate in international 
cooperation  and  engaged  in  outreach  activities,  including  seminars  and  meetings  with 
stakeholders.  The  authority  also  conducted  sectorial  surveys  on  UTPs.  The  workforce 
consisted of 5.7 FTEs, and the budget was EUR 550 000. 

In 2024, the Food Market Ombudsman received 18 requests for guidance and 1 complaint 
and  conducted  investigations  into  1  case.  The  authority  issued  1  guideline,  but  no 
recommendations. The Ombudsman continued to participate in international cooperation 
and  engaged  in  outreach  activities,  including  seminars  and  meetings  with  stakeholders. 
The EA also conducted surveys (beverages sector, fruit and berry sector, meat sector) and 
gathered data on the functioning of the food market. The workforce consisted of 4 FTEs 
and the budget was EUR 463 000. 

(98)https://www.ruokavirasto.fi/elintarvikemarkkinat/elintarvikemarkkinavaltuutettu/toiminta/toiminnansuu

nnittelu/  

112 

 
 
 
The Food Market Ombudsman participated in the preparation of a project to reform the 
Food Market Act.  It cooperated with other authorities, such as the Finnish Competition 
and  Consumer  Authority.  The  reports  also  mention  the  EA´s  efforts  to  raise  awareness 
about UTPs and to promote fair trading practices among stakeholders.  

France (99) 

Within  its  overall  yearly  activity  reporting,  the  French  EA,  the  Directorate  General  for 
Competition Policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF), provides only very 
concise  references  to  the  agri-food  UTP-related  enforcement  activity.  In  France  the 
reported so-called pratiques restrictives de la concurrence, are not specific only to the agri-
food sector. In most of the reporting the data are not specific to the agri-food sector.  

In 2022, the report provides an overview of all activities carried out by the DGCCRF. 

According  to  the  report,  the  DGCCRF  received  several  complaints  and  carried  out 
investigations  into  alleged  unfair  trading  practices,  including  cases  related  to  the  non-
respect of contractual obligations, late payments, and unfair commercial practices. 

The  report  mentions  Decree  No.  2022-1701  of  29  December  2022  that  authorises  the 
DGCCRF to publish the names of companies subject to administrative injunctions ordering 
a professional to cease a practice that contravenes regulations, both in terms of combating 
restrictive competition practices and consumer protection. 

In 2022, the DGCCRF inspected 1 219 establishments (no specific data on the agri-food 
sector  are  mentioned)  as  part  of  its  investigations  into  compliance  with  payment 
deadlines, including 30 public companies and 178 companies that had benefited from a 
state-guaranteed loan (PGE). These inspections confirmed the findings of previous years: 
the main causes of late payments are shortcomings in accounting organisation and a poor 
understanding of the principle of joint responsibility of buyer and seller. 

Following these inspections, violations were found in 33 % of the inspected operators. The 
consequences consisted of warnings in 38% of cases, injunctions in 3% of cases (reported 
as being educational and corrective measures), and administrative fines in 59% of cases. 

In  2022,  administrative  penalty  proceedings  totalled  approximately  EUR  33  million  in 
fines, including approximately EUR 19 million in fines notified to the companies involved 
(204  decisions)  and  approximately  EUR  14  million  in  pre-notified  fines  (87  pre-fines 
where procedures not yet completed). 

The report also highlights the action by the French Competition Authority (Autorité de la 
concurrence) ordering four major retail chains to comply with the EGalim 2 law and to 
cease their abusive logistics penalties against their suppliers. 

In 2023, according to the report, the DGCCRF was actively engaged in countering unfair 
trading practices. Although it is not made explicit in which sector (beyond/including the 
agri-food sector) these were carried out, the EA conducted 19 national investigations into 
unfair trading practices,  resulting in 4 460 controlled operators, 4 990 visits, and issued 

(99)  https://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/comprendre-la-dgccrf/publications-et-kits-de-

communication/bilans-dactivite  

113 

 
 
 
710  warnings,  including  80  warnings  related  to  payment  delays.  Additionally,  231 
administrative injunctions were issued, including 12 injunctions related to payment delays. 

The report also highlights the adoption of the so called Loi Descrozaille of 30 March 2023, 
which aims to strengthen the balance in relations between suppliers and distributors. 

In 2024, according to the report, the DGCCRF  has continued to be actively engaged in 
enforcing against unfair trading practices. The EA carried out several investigations into 
alleged unfair trading practices, including cases related to late payments, unfair contract 
terms, and retaliation against suppliers. 

Besides the activities across various economic sectors aimed at ensuring balanced relations 
between operators (14 national inquires, over 4 000 controls out of which 737 related to 
delayed  payments,  723  notifications  out  of  which  70  related  to  late  payments,  254 
injunctions out of which 10 for delayed payments and 270 fines out of which 217 for late 
payments  amounting  to  approximately  EUR  36  million),  the  DGCCRF  carried  out  186 
investigations  into  the  dairy,  beef,  pork,  poultry  and  egg  sectors  to  verify  to  verify 
compliance with the mandatory written contract between the producer and their first buyer. 
Several proceedings are ongoing.  

Moreover,  after  an  investigation  under  the  lead  of  the  DGCCRF,  highlighting  unfair 
contract  terms  and  practices  by  the  group  of  hypermarket  group  to  the  detriment  of  its 
franchisees, and attempted mediation attempt, the Franchisee Association took the group 
to  court  at  the  end  of  2023.  The  Minister  reportedly  joined  this  action  to  request,  in 
particular, the nullity of the disputed clauses, the cessation of abusive practices and a fine 
of EUR 200 million. 

The  report  also  mentioned  DGCCRF's  outreach  activities  aimed  at  raising  awareness 
among operators, for instance, by publishing a guideline related to late payments. 

As for the year 2022 and 2023 also in 2024 the EA indicated collaboration on enforcement 
with  several  national  bodies,  including  ministries,  national  authorities  and  national 
agencies as well as the EC. The reports indicate an overall staff of approximately 3 000 for 
all actions under its remit. 

Besides the DGCCRF annual activity reports, unfair trading practices are also reported on 
in the annual activity reports of the Commission d'examen des pratiques commerciales. 
The reports (100) cover studies carried out on mapping judicial decisions on transparency 
and restrictive competition practices in France. These court decisions were handed down 
following actions brought by operators, independently of the DGCCRF's interventions. 

Croatia (101) 

The reports provide an overview of the activities carried out by the Croatian Competition 
Agency  (CCA)  in  relation  to  the  enforcement  of  the  UTP  Directive  and  its  national 
transposition, specifically the 2017 Act on the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices in 
the  Business-to-Business  Food  Supply  Chain  (UTPs  Act)  and  its  2021  amendment  to 
transpose the UTP Directive. 

(100) https://www.economie.gouv.fr/cepc/publications/rapports  

(101) https://www.aztn.hr/en/about-us/annual-reports/  

114 

 
 
 
In 2021, the CCA received a total of 40 initiatives or complaints for the initiation of ex-
officio administrative proceedings, with 22 cases being initiated ex officio on the basis of 
received initiatives or complaints, including 13 cases in the area of competition and nine 
cases  in  the  area  of  unfair  trading  practices.  The  CCA  also  handled  ten  anonymous 
complaints, with seven being in the area of UTPs. The agency conducted investigations 
into all relevant facts and circumstances, and the duration of the proceedings depended on 
the volume and complexity of information and documentation, as well as the activity of 
the party concerned and their cooperation with the CCA. 

In  2022,  the  CCA  resolved  79  cases,  including  ten  administrative  cases  and  69  non-
administrative cases, under the UTPs Act. The agency imposed fines in five decisions and 
terminated proceedings in four cases. The CCA also received a large number of queries 
from  natural  and  legal  persons  that  were  not  directly  connected  with  concrete 
administrative cases but were responded to by the CCA in non-administrative cases. The 
agency had 56 employees at the end of 2022, with seven new workers being employed 
during the year. 

In 2023, the CCA resolved 50 cases under the UTPs Act, including seven administrative 
cases and 43 non-administrative cases. The agency imposed fines totalling EUR 81,500 
for infringements of the UTPs Act, with EUR 42,491 being paid into the State Budget. The 
CCA also received 14 reasoned submissions, with four being anonymous, and resolved 13 
reasoned submissions, including ten received in 2023 and three from previous periods. The 
agency had 53 employees at the end of 2023, with two recruitment processes being carried 
out during the year. 

The CCA also had a Division for the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices, which was 
responsible for handling cases related to unfair trading practices. 

The  CCA  engaged  in  outreach  activities,  including  publishing  decisions,  opinions,  and 
annual  reports  on  its  website,  as  well  as  participating  in  conferences,  trainings,  and 
workshops. The agency also published a monthly e-bulletin, AZTNinfo, which contained 
updates on its decisions and activities. The CCA's representatives participated in meetings 
of national EAs under the UTP Directive and discussed relevant issues, including cross-
border collaboration. 

Ireland (102)  

In 2021, the EA was established on an interim basis within the Department of Agriculture, 
Food and the Marine to enforce the Unfair Trading Practices Regulations 2021. The EAs 
role  was  to  enforce  the  Regulations,  provide  guidance  and  advice  to  stakeholders,  and 
promote awareness of the Regulations. The EA conducted outreach activities, including 
meetings with stakeholders, media advertisements, and attendance at a foodservice trade 
show,  to  promote  awareness  of  the  Regulations  and  the  role  of  the  EA.  The  EA  also 
established a dedicated website, containing useful resource materials, including a summary 
leaflet, a more detailed information brochure, and a Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) 
document. No complaints were received in 2021, and no investigations were opened. The 
approach  to  enforcement  was  focused  on  developing  a  culture  of  compliance  with  the 

(102) https://www.agrifoodregulator.ie/corporate/publications/  Reports  before  2021  are  not  publicly 

retrievable anymore.  

115 

 
 
 
Regulations, and it worked closely with the largest entities in the agri-food supply chain to 
ensure their compliance. 

In 2022, the EA continued its targeted engagement with the largest food retailers and food 
wholesalers in Ireland, with a view to bringing about beneficial change for all operators, 
particularly  primary  producers,  along  with  other  small,  medium,  and  mid-range  sized 
suppliers of agricultural and food products. The EA requested these businesses to submit 
implementation reports, which outlined the measures they had taken to ensure compliance 
with the Regulations. The EA also engaged with the largest direct buyers from primary 
producers, providing guidance and advice on the Regulations. A secure online complaints 
submission form was created, allowing suppliers to submit confidential complaints. The 
EA received ten complaints in 2022, six of which were found not to be within the scope of 
the Regulations. One complaint was withdrawn, and the other three complaints remained 
under examination at the end of the year. No investigations were opened in 2022. 

The  Authority  also  conducted  outreach  activities,  including  a  survey  of  suppliers  of 
agricultural  and  food  products,  which  aimed  to  establish  baseline  awareness  and 
knowledge  of  the  protections  available  to  suppliers  under  the  Regulations.  The  survey 
found that 50% of primary producers and business-to-business suppliers claimed to have 
heard  of  the  Regulations,  but  only  14%  of  primary  producers  and  20%  of  business-to-
business  suppliers  were  aware  of  the  legal  protection  against  specific  UTPs.  It  also 
conducted two extensive communication campaigns across multiple media platforms to 
raise awareness and to address key issues raised in the surveys. The campaigns resulted in 
a significant increase in traffic to the Authority's website, with over 35 000 visits recorded. 
Additionally, the Authority hosted a breakfast seminar, which was attended by over 330 
people, to raise awareness of the Regulations and to provide guidance to stakeholders. 

The Authority's workforce consisted of a Principal Officer, two other full-time equivalent 
staff members, and an Agricultural Inspector, who commenced working with the Authority 
in late 2022. The Authority's staff completed specialist training in 2022 to enable them to 
effectively  undertake  their  roles.  The  report  mentions  that  the  Authority  appointed  a 
specialist financial consultancy body, following a public procurement tender process, to 
assist in the examination of complex financial matters related to complaints. 

The  transition  to  a  new  independent  authority,  An  Rialálaí  Agraibhia  (the  Agri-Food 
Regulator), was expected to occur once the relevant legislation would be enacted. The EA 
had been working closely with  the  Department  of Agriculture,  Food  and  the Marine to 
ensure a smooth transition of its functions to the new Regulator also providing advice and 
input  to  inform  the  preparation  of  the  draft  Agricultural  and  Food  Supply  Chain  Bill 
establishing the new Regulator. 

In 2023, the Agri-Food Regulator was established as an independent Office, and it took 
over the responsibilities of the EA. The Agri-Food Regulator's functions include promoting 
fairness and transparency in the agri-food supply chain, enforcing unfair trading law, and 
providing  guidance  and  advice  to  stakeholders  on  the  UTP  Regulations. The  Regulator 
comprises a Board of eight members, including a chairperson, and has a staff of 17, with a 
budget of EUR 2 590 000 allocated for 2024. 

In the period from its establishment on 13 December 2023 to the end of the year, the Agri-
Food  Regulator  prioritised  correspondence  with  stakeholders,  alerting  them  to  the 
establishment  of  the  Regulator  and  its  main  functions.  The  Regulator  also  provided  an 
overview of the revised Unfair Trading Regulations and outlined the main differences vis-
à-vis  previous  Regulations  in  place.  No  complaints  regarding  the  Unfair  Trading 

116 

 
Regulations  were  received  by  the  Agri-Food  Regulator  during  this  period,  and  no 
investigations were opened. However, one open investigation transferred from the interim 
Unfair  Trading  Practices  Enforcement  Authority  to  the  Agri-Food  Regulator  upon  its 
establishment. 

In 2024, the Agri-Food Regulator commissioned its first (globally the third) annual survey 
of primary producers’ awareness and understanding of the regulations. In 2025 the Agri- 
Food Regulator conducted a supplier survey to gather feedback from suppliers of agri-food 
products  on their experience of trading  with  specific buyers in  the  retail and wholesale 
sectors. 

Italy (103) 

The  reports  provide  a  detailed  overview  of  the  activities  carried  out  by  the  Italian  EA, 
ICQRF  (Ispettorato  Centrale  della  Tutela  della  Qualità  e  della  Repressione  Frodi  dei 
Prodotti  Agroalimentari)  on  the  enforcement  of  the  UTP  Directive  and  its  national 
transposition law. 

In 2022, the  ICQRF  commenced its activities as EA, following the transposition of the 
UTP  Directive  into  national  law.  The  EA  established  a  dedicated  structure  for  the 
enforcement  of  the  UTP  Directive,  including  a  webpage  with  a  complaint  form  and  a 
system for monitoring economic trends in the agricultural and food sectors in collaboration 
with ISMEA Istituto di servizi per il mercato agricolo alimentare. The ICQRF received a 
number  of  complaints  (n=3)  of  operators  of  the  fruit  and  vegetable  sector  (primary 
production):  one  was  not  related  to  UTPs,  on  the  other  two,  investigations  into  alleged 
UTPs were carried out (related to payment terms, and contractual obligations). Based on 
internal  assessments  and  also  through  territorial  offices  139  ex  officio  inspections  and 
controls on 76 operators were carried out (mostly in the fruits and vegetables sector (n=33), 
milk  (n=49)  and  meat  (n=37).  15  administrative  fines  were  imposed.  The  most  serious 
infringements identified concerned the lack of written contracts,  late payments, and the 
return  of  unsold  goods  without  payment  to  the  supplier.  The  ICQRF  also  conducted 
outreach activities, including the dissemination of information on the UTP Directive and 
its  national  transposition  laws,  as  well  as  the  organisation  of  training  events  for 
stakeholders. The EA participated at the UTP Enforcement Network and at meetings with 
other EAs. 

In 2023, the ICQRF continued to enforce the UTP Directive and its national transposition 
as in the previous year, which was considered a transition year. 

The EA received six complaints, four of which were investigated and led to the verification 
of  the  contractual  conditions  and  documentation  related  to  the  commercial  agreements 
between the parties involved. The EA also carried out investigations on its own initiative, 
focusing on specific sectors such as the dairy (172 ex officio investigations) and fruit and 
vegetable sectors (n=163). In total 488 ex officio inspections on 315 operators resulting in 
87 fines were carried imposed. The most occurring UTP related to payment terms (n=40), 
unilateral  change  of  contractual  agreements  (n=19)  and  incompleteness  of  written 
contracts (n=16).  

The  ICQRF  participated  in  the  UTP  Enforcement  Network  and  collaborated  with  other 
EAs, including the French authority, to address cross-border cases of UTPs. It continued 

(103) https://www.masaf.gov.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/7817  

117 

 
 
 
outreach activities with stakeholders and exchanged with the EC on necessary changes of 
the  Italian  transposition  law  of  2021  which  was  amended  on  payment  terms  in  2023 
(Decreto-Legge  13  giugno  2023  n  136).  The  Authority  also  carried  out  an  analysis  on 
international purchase agreements related to retail alliances in the sector and liaised with 
the French EA on this regard. 

In 2024, the  ICQRF  carried out  a total  of  809 inspections and investigations (of which 
n=441 in milk sector, n=285 in fruit and vegetables sector) also though Territorial offices. 
The activities, as in the previous years, were programmed also based on the cooperation 
with  ISMEA.  The  EA  verified  325  operators.  The  ICQRF  imposed  a  total  of  569 
administrative fines in 2024. The fines were imposed on buyers found to have engaged in 
unfair trading practices, including the modification of contractual conditions (n=236) and 
the non-respect of payment terms (n=164). 

The ICQRF received a total of 25 complaints in 2024 (of which n=11 were not deemed as 
acceptable), which were submitted by private individuals, associations of producers, and 
consortia. The complaints related to alleged UTPs in various agricultural and food sectors, 
including  the  dairy,  fruit  and  vegetable,  and  meat  sectors.  The  ICQRF  carried  out 
investigations  into  the  complaints  received,  which  included  on-site  inspections  and 
verification  of  contracts  and  documentation.  The  EA  found  that  some  contracts  lacked 
essential  elements,  such  as  the  price  or  payment  terms,  and  that  some  buyers  had 
unilaterally modified the contractual conditions. The ICQRF also carried out a notification 
to the Polish EA for a buyer based in Poland (based on four complaints from four Italian 
suppliers, fruit and vegetables sector). 

The  ICQRF  continued  outreach  activities  in  2024,  including  the  dissemination  of 
information  on  the  UTP  Directive  and  its  national  transposition  laws.  The  EA  also 
organised training events for stakeholders, including producers, buyers, and associations. 

In  2024,  the  ICQRF  participated  in  the  UTP  Enforcement  Network.  The  EA  also 
collaborated with other  EAs, including the French EA, to address cross-border cases of 
UTPs. 

Lithuania (104)  

Reports contain information on the enforcement activities of the Lithuanian EA the Agency 
of Agriculture related to the UTP Directive and its national transposition law the NPPD.  

In 2022 the EA reports a total of 82 consultations made. The own initiative cases amounted 
to 3. One complaint was received. Two cases (both related to late payments in the raw milk 
and potatoes sectors) were closed with no imposition of any fine. 

In  2023  the  EA  received  4  complaints  and  opened  6  own  initiative  investigations.  One 
investigation was closed relating to a case of a buyer allegedly unilaterally modifying the 
terms of the contract for the purchase/sale of raw milk. No fines were imposed.  

In 2024 the EA reports one complaint received and 11 opened own initiative investigations. 
17 investigations with infringements were closed the vast majority thereof relating to late 
payments. A total of approximately EUR 10 400 of fines was imposed. 

(104) https://zua.lrv.lt/lt/veiklos-sritys/nesazininga-prekyba/  

118 

 
 
 
The webpage also contains a list of foreseen and carried out checks on operators according 
to  which  for  2025  73  checks  are  planned  (54  for  2024).  The  webpage  also  collects 
Decisions taken regarding penalties and the description of the cases as well as operative 
information and guidance. 

Luxembourg (105)  

The reports provide an overview of the activities carried out by the Autorité de la 
concurrence, the EA in Luxembourg. They also cover some elements in relation to the 
enforcement of the UTP Directive and its national transposition law. 

In 2022, the Conseil de la concurrence, which later became the Autorité de la concurrence, 
did  not  receive  any  complaints  related  to  UTPs  in  the  agri-food  supply  chain.  This  is 
reportedly  likely  due  to  the  fact  that  the  law  transposing  the  UTP  Directive  had  only 
recently entered into force, and stakeholders may not have been fully aware of their rights 
and  obligations  under  the  new  legislation.  Nevertheless,  the  EA  took  steps  to  raise 
awareness  about  UTPs among  stakeholders, including  farmers and small operators.  For 
instance,  the  EA  collaborated  with  the  editorial  team  of  news  outlet  guichet.lu  to 
disseminate  information  on  the  protection  offered  to  operators  in  the  agri-food  supply 
chain, and to set up an online service for receiving complaints. 

In 2023, the Autorité de la concurrence continued its efforts to raise awareness about UTPs 
among stakeholders. The EA published a comprehensive information page on its website, 
specifically dedicated to operators in the agri-food supply chain, providing information on 
the protection offered by the law and the procedures for filing complaints. Additionally, 
the  EA  collaborated  with  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Food,  and  Viticulture  to  inform 
members of the agricultural sector about the protection offered by the law. The authority 
also collaborated with the Chambre d'agriculture to translate its information brochure into 
German and disseminate it among its members. 

In 2024, the EA did not receive any formal complaints concerning UTPs. However, the 
EA strengthened its outreach activities. The EA also participated in a joint meeting with 
EAs to discuss the implementation of the Directive and share best practices. Furthermore, 
the EA attended meetings of the EU Agri-Food Chain Observatory, which took place on 
17 July and 15 October 2024, to discuss issues related to the agricultural and food supply 
chain. 

Regarding cases handled, the reports do not provide detailed information on specific cases 
related  to  UTPs.  However,  it  is  mentioned  that  the  Autorité  de  la  concurrence  has  a 
dedicated team for handling complaints and investigations related to UTPs. 

Latvia  

The EA, Competition Council (CC), has been engaged in enforcing the UTP Directive and 
its national transposition law, specifically the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices Law, 
since its entry into force in November 2021 transposing the UTP Directive. 

In  2022,  the  CC  provided  more  than  30  consultations  on  the  application  of  the  law  to 
promote operators´ understanding and implementation of fair-trade principles in practice. 

(105) https://concurrence.public.lu/fr/publications.html 

119 

 
 
 
 
The most frequently asked questions concerned the application and interpretation of the 
law.  Additionally,  12  opinions  were  issued.  The  CC  also  developed  guidelines  on  the 
application of the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices Law for all operators in the agri-
food supply chain.  A self-assessment tool for food and drink suppliers was  prepared to 
help them check whether buyers are implementing fair trade practices. 

The CC assessed 18 submissions for possible breaches of the law in 2022, with the most 
frequent requests being for an assessment of the market operator's conduct and clarification 
on whether the conduct was compatible with the law. The CC implemented a preventive 
measure  and  invited  a  market  participant  to  cease  its  current  practice,  warning  that  the 
conduct did not comply with the principles of fair practice. A market inquiry was carried 
out to assess the sanctions stipulated in retailers' contracts and imposed on their suppliers, 
revealing that in most cases, there is a cap on penalties for any breach of contract. However, 
the CC noted that the upper limit of contractual penalty for any breach of contract cannot 
be considered fair and reasonable, despite formally complying with the provisions of the 
law. 

In 2023, the CC assessed 16 submissions for possible breaches of the law, with submissions 
seeking clarification on the conduct of the buyer and its compliance with the Prohibition 
of Unfair Trading Practices Law. The CC implemented two preventive procedures, giving 
notice  to  a  total  of  29  legal  entities,  and  invited  traders  to  review  the  terms  of  their 
cooperation with suppliers. The CC carried out 14 information and education activities, 
including  press  conferences,  seminars,  expert  articles,  and  other  activities,  to  raise 
awareness among operators about the principles of fair trade and how to implement them 
in practice. The CC provided 36 consultations to market participants on the application of 
the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices Law, with the most frequently asked questions 
concerning the application and interpretation of the law. 

The  CC  prepared  a  self-assessment  tool  for  buyers  to  assess  fair  trading  practices  and 
justify the imposition of penalties. A market  inquiry was conducted to  investigate non-
compliance with the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices Law, monitoring four sectors/ 
stages, including the cooperation between agri-food producers and suppliers and retailers, 
the  cooperation  between  traders  and  suppliers  during  and  after  marketing  promotions, 
dairy prices, and the prices of cereals and bakery products. The CC found that more than 
half of the players in the retail chain had experienced unfair trading practices, including 
unfair and unjustified sanctions imposed by retailers for breach of contract. 

In  2024,  the  CC  assessed  13  submissions  on  possible  breaches  of  the  law,  including 
requests  for  explanations  on  the  conduct  of  goods  procurement  organisers  and  their 
compliance with the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices Law. The CC conducted 29 
information and education activities to raise awareness among traders and suppliers about 
the principles of fair trade and how to implement them in practice. The CC delivered 31 
consultations related to the application of the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices Law, 
answering  questions  on  the  application  of  the  law,  including  payment  deadlines,  lease 
agreements, and aspects of conducting negotiations with buyers. 

The  CC  prepared  four  international  requests  for  information  related  to  the  practice  of 
applying the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices Law and provided other EU member 
states with explanations on the application of the law. A market inquiry was conducted to 
investigate  breaches  of  the  Prohibition  of  Unfair  Trading  Practices  Law,  including  the 
prices of eggs, fish, and meat products, the competitive situation in the retail of everyday 
consumer goods, and follow-up surveillance actions on retailer sanctions for a breach of 
contract against suppliers. 

120 

 
The CC has established a separate Unfair Trading Practices Prevention Unit to actively 
educate market players about the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices Law and prevent 
UTPs. The EA has undergone structural changes to strengthen its capacity, including the 
creation  of  an  additional  post  to  monitor  UTPs.  The  CC  has  also  improved  its  internal 
processes, developed individual competences of staff, and strengthened its IT capacity. 

Netherlands (106)  

The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) is responsible for enforcing 
the UTP Directive and its national transposition law. The annual reports do not provide 
detailed information on the specific activities carried out by the ACM in relation to the 
enforcement of the UTP Directive. 

On the webpage results of a survey of 2023 can be found. This survey commissioned by ACM aimed to 
assess  the  awareness  and  knowledge  of  the  Agriculture  UTP  Act  among  buyers  of  food  products.  It 
follows up on a 2022 survey carried out among food producers. 

Poland (107)  

The reports provide a comprehensive overview of the activities carried out by the Polish 
Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) and also cover the enforcement 
activities  related  to  the  UTP  Directive  and  its  national  transposition  law  on  contractual 
advantage. 

In 2021, the UOKiK received 52 complaints regarding UTPs and initiated 3 proceedings 
against companies, including Cefetra Polska, PolishAgri, and Kaufland Polska Markety. 
The  authority  also  conducted  5  explanatory  proceedings  and  issued  8  so-called  'soft' 
interventions,  which  are  non-binding  recommendations  to  companies.  Notably,  the 
UOKiK imposed fines totalling PLN 200 million (approximately EUR 44 million) on two 
companies,  Eurocash  and  Kaufland  Polska  Markety,  for  engaging  in  unfair  trading 
practices.  The  authority  also  published  a  report  on  its  investigation  into  the  practice  of 
granting  discounts  by  retail  chains,  which  provided  guidance  to  companies  on  how  to 
comply with the law. 

In 2022, the UOKiK received 72 complaints and initiated 4 proceedings against companies, 
including Auchan Polska, SCA PR Polska, SM Mlekpol, and Agri Plus. The authority also 
conducted  17  explanatory  proceedings  and  issued  14  'soft'  interventions.  The  UOKiK 
imposed  fines  totalling  PLN  70.9  million  (approximately  EUR  15.6  million)  on  three 
companies,  Cefetra  Polska,  PolishAgri,  and  Agri  Plus,  for  engaging  in  unfair  trading 
practices. Furthermore, the authority published a report on its investigation into the practice 
of  charging  fees  by  retail  chains  for  various  services,  such  as  marketing  and  logistics, 
which highlighted the need for greater transparency in these practices. 

In 2023, the UOKiK received 42 complaints and initiated 2 proceedings against companies, 
including Carrefour Polska and Okręgowa Spółdzielnia Mleczarska w Kole. The authority 
also conducted 11 explanatory proceedings and issued 18 'soft' interventions. The UOKiK 

(106) https://www.acm.nl/en/about-acm/our-organization/annual-reports  

(107) https://uokik.gov.pl/bip/raporty-przewaga-kontraktowa dedicated reports. For UOKiK´s general annual 
activity reports also covering the UTP related enforcement activities: https://uokik.gov.pl/en/reports . 

121 

 
 
 
 
 
imposed a fine of PLN 87.2 million (approximately EUR 19.3 million) on Auchan Polska 
for  engaging  in  UTPs,  specifically  for  charging  suppliers  for  logistics  services  without 
providing  them  with  any  benefits.  Additionally,  the  authority  found  agreements  with 
several operators to change their trading practices. 

The  UOKiK  instituted  proceedings  concerning  practices  involving  an  unfair  use  of 
contractual advantage, which may be preceded by a preliminary investigation to establish 
whether  there  has  been  a  violation  of  the  law.  In  2024,  the  EA  initiated  three  new 
proceedings  and  received  29  notifications  from  operators.  Additionally,  two  inspected 
operators  were  subject  to  investigation,  and  one  decision  was  made  with  an  accepted 
commitment  from  the  operator.  The  EA  also  issued  31  soft  calls  to  undertakings  and 
provided two reasoned opinions on judicial cases. 

Notable cases handled by the EA included the unfair discounts of a retail chain, where the 
court upheld the decision of UOKiK, confirming that retail chains should pay suppliers the 
agreed price for their products. Another case involved the milk market, where the UOKiK 
obliged a dairy cooperative to change practices unfavourable to milk suppliers, allowing 
them to terminate contracts with notice and removing provisions that obliged suppliers to 
return premiums if they changed their milk purchaser. 

In terms of resources and workforce, the Report does not provide specific details on the 
allocation of resources for the enforcement of the UTP Directive. However, it does mention 
that the authority has a budget of PLN 174.5 million and a workforce of 656 employees. 
The report indicates that the UOKiK has a dedicated team responsible for monitoring and 
enforcing the law, and that the EA cooperates with other institutions, such as the Polish 
Agricultural Market Agency, to gather information and conduct investigations. 

Portugal (108)  

The Portuguese annual report provides limited information on enforcement activities of 
the UTP Directive and its national transposition law (Decreto-Lei n.º 76/2021 de 27 de 
Agosto)  carried  out  by  the  Portuguese  EA  Autoridade  de  Segurança  Alimentar  e 
Económica (ASAE) and published by the Ministry of Agriculture.  

It  provides  summary  tables  reporting  key  figures  among  which,  the  number  of  cases 
opened during the reporting period (2021=56, 2022=1, 2023=13), number of complaints 
received during the reporting period (2021=0, 2022=0, 2023=11).  

Romania (109)  

The EA, Consiliul Concurenței, reports on elements of its enforcement activity related to 
UTPs the Romanian national transposition law, Legea nr. 81/2022. 

In 2023, according to the annual activity report, the EA received approximately 30 requests 
for information and clarification on the application of the national transposition law from 
the  business  environment  and  legal  specialists.  To  address  these  requests,  the  authority 

(108)https://www.gpp.pt/images/Producao_e_Mercados/OrgProducao_CadeiaAlimentar/PARCA/Relatorio_

Anual_sobre_as_Praticas_Comerciais_Desleais_2021-23.pdf  

(109) https://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/documente-oficiale/rapoarte/rapoarte-anuale/  

122 

 
 
 
 
prepared a synthesis of the main aspects and unclear points raised and published a guide 
on its website. 

The EA also carried out investigations into UTPs in the agri-food supply chain. Although 
the report does not provide specific details on the number of investigations carried out, it 
mentions  that  the  authority  has  the  obligation  to  transmit  annual  information  to  the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development regarding the status of files/investigations 
into unfair trading practices. 

The EA has a dedicated structure for dealing with UTPs and that it cooperates with other 
authorities to ensure the effective enforcement of the national transposition law. 

According to the report in 2024, the EA carried out a thorough investigation into possible 
unfair trading practices, which was finalised through the mediation of a conflict between 
PROFI  ROM  FOOD  SRL,  a  major  retailer  in  Romania,  and  Prăvălia  D'Art  SRL,  a 
Romanian  producer  of  desserts.  The  investigation  examined  aspects  such  as  delayed 
payments, unilateral contract modifications, and discrepancies in procedures at the buyer's 
warehouses. The mediation procedure, assisted by an authorised mediator, resulted in an 
amicable agreement between the parties, creating an important precedent in the application 
of the new legislation on unfair trading practices. 

The EA received complaints and conducted investigations into various cases, including 
one previously mentioned which was closed without the imposition of penalties due to 
the amicable agreement reached through mediation. 

Sweden (110)  

The report provides a comprehensive overview of the activities carried out by the Swedish 
Competition  Authority,  the  EA  responsible  for  enforcing  the  UTP  Directive  and  its 
national transposition law, specifically the Law on Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices 
(LOH). 

Regarding  the  enforcement  of  the  UTP  Directive,  the  Authority  has  closed  nine 
investigations in 2022, which mainly concerned the prohibitions against late cancellations 
and late payments. Seven cases were closed due to changes in behaviour, and two cases 
were closed without action. 

The Authority conducted several investigations and outreach activities to enforce the UTP 
Directive. For instance, the Authority carried out a follow-up of the first year of the new 
law prohibiting unfair trading practices in the purchase of agricultural and food products. 
The  report  also  mentions  that  the  Authority  participated  in  international  networks  and 
organisations. 

In  2023,  the  Authority  closed  twelve  investigations  related  to  UTPs,  with  two  cases 
resulting in the imposition of penalties for the first time. Three cases were closed due to 
changes  in  behaviour,  and  seven  cases  were  closed  without  action.  The  investigations 
primarily concerned late payments and late cancellations but also covered a broader range 
of prohibitions. 

The Authority received a limited number of complaints and tip-offs regarding UTPs, which 
is one of the reasons why all relevant indications of infringements were investigated, rather 

(110) https://www.konkurrensverket.se/otillborliga-handelsmetoder/  

123 

 
 
 
than  being  subject  to  a  prioritisation  policy.  Since  the  legislation  came  into  force,  the 
Authority has initiated 29 investigations, with 3 in 2021, 17 in 2022, and 9 in 2023. 

The report highlights several cases handled by the Authority, including an investigation 
into  a  dairy  company's  practices,  which  was  closed  without  action  due  to  a  lack  of 
evidence.  Another  case  involved  a  retail  chain,  which  was  investigated  for  allegedly 
imposing  UTPs  on  its  suppliers,  but  the  investigation  was  closed  after  the  company 
changed its behaviour. 

The Authority also conducted outreach activities to raise awareness about the LOH and the 
UTP Directive, including publishing reports and guidelines. The Authority collaborated 
with  other  national  authorities  and  international  organisations,  such  as  the  UTP 
Enforcement  Network  to  share  experiences  and  best  practices  in  enforcing  the  UTP 
Directive. 

In 2024, the Authority received a total of 12 new indications of suspected infringements 
of LOH, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 40 since the law came into 
force  in  2021.  The  Authority  closed  eight  cases  in  2024  that  involved  extensive 
investigative measures. One of these cases resulted in a decision imposing penalties, four 
were  closed  taking  into  account  behavioural  changes,  two  were  closed  with  a  reasoned 
decision, and one was closed without any further action. 

The Authority  also  conducted outreach activities to  raise awareness  about  LOH  and its 
enforcement. In 2024, the Authority organised two meetings on unfair trading practices, 
where  representatives  from  primary  production,  the  food  industry,  and  retail  trade 
participated. The Authority also participated in external events to raise awareness about 
UTPs. In 2024, the Authority organised a webinar to mark the three-year anniversary of 
LOH's entry into force, where it presented its work on UTPs and provided information on 
the ongoing evaluation of LOH. 

In 2024, the Authority conducted a survey to investigate the occurrence of UTPs in the 
agri-food supply chain. The survey was the third of its kind, and the results will be used to 
assess the impact of LOH on the food supply chain. The Authority also published a report 
on the impact of LOH on local food trade, which found that the law has had a positive 
effect on the trade. 

In 2024, the Authority participated in the UTP Enforcement Network. The Authority also 
cooperated with other national authorities, such as the Danish Competition Authority. The 
EA also publishes decisions regarding closed (alleged) UTP cases. 

124 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slovenia (111) 

The reports provide an account of the activities carried out by the Slovenian EA, Javna EA 
Republike Slovenije za varstvo konkurence (the EA), in relation to the enforcement of the 
UTP Directive in the agri-food supply chain and its national transposition law, Agriculture 
Act (ZKme-1).  

The EA is responsible for supervising unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain, 
and it has the power to impose fines on traders who engage in such practices. In 2022, the 
EA  received  one  complaint  regarding  potential  unfair  trading  practices,  but  after 
conducting an inspection, it did not initiate a proceeding against the trader.  

The EA also conducted an investigation into the wheat supply chain, where it found that 
some traders were not complying with the requirements of the ZKme-1 law, including the 
obligation to  conclude contracts  in  writing  and to include certain  essential  clauses.  The 
investigation  revealed  that  out  of  61  contractual  relationships  examined,  only  three 
contracts were concluded in writing and included all the necessary clauses, while in nine 
cases,  no  written  contracts  were  concluded,  and  the  business  was  conducted  through 
purchase blocks and orders. 

Furthermore, the EA found that some traders were charging suppliers for services that were 
not explicitly agreed upon. The EA also identified cases where traders were not respecting 
the payment deadlines. 

In 2022, the EA issued one decision imposing a fine on a trader for engaging in unfair 
trading practices, specifically for not concluding contracts in writing and for not including 
the necessary clauses. 

The EA also carried out outreach activities to raise awareness about unfair trading practices 
and the rights of suppliers in the agri-food supply chain. It participated in a professional 
programme  organised  by  the  Agricultural  and  Forestry  Institute  Maribor,  where  it 
presented its competences and the protection offered to agricultural producers under the 
law.  

In addition, the EA cooperates with the European Commission. The Agency also submits 
an annual report to the European Commission on the enforcement of the UTP Directive in 
Slovenia.  

The  EA  also  cooperates  with  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forestry,  and  Food  and  the 
Ombudsman for the agri-food supply chain (Varuh). 

In terms of cases handled, the 2023 report notes that the authority issued one decision on 
an  infringement.  Additionally,  two  complaints  were  received  regarding  potential  unfair 
trading practices, but no investigation was initiated. The report provides a table outlining 

(111) https://www.varstvo-konkurence.si/fileadmin/varstvo-

konkurence.si/pageuploads/letna_porocila/Letno_porocilo_2024.pdf  

https://www.varstvo-konkurence.si/fileadmin/varstvo-
konkurence.si/pageuploads/letna_porocila/Letno_porocilo_2023.pdf  

https://www.varstvo-konkurence.si/fileadmin/varstvo-
konkurence.si/pageuploads/letna_porocila/Letno_porocilo_2022.pdf  

125 

 
 
 
 
the  number  of  complaints  received,  investigations  opened,  and  investigations  closed  in 
2023. 

The EA also conducted an investigation into a case involving a food processing company 
that failed to conclude contracts in writing, as required by law. The company was fined 
EUR 15,854.43, and the responsible person was fined EUR 15,000. The report notes that 
the company and the responsible person have appealed the decision, and the court has yet 
to rule on the matter. 

The report also discusses the authority's outreach activities, including its participation in 
the UTP Enforcement Network, a working group established by the European Commission 
to facilitate cooperation and information sharing  among national authorities responsible 
for  enforcing  the  UTP  Directive.  The  authority  attended  working  group  meetings  and 
submitted its annual report to the European Commission. 

Furthermore, the EA participated in the ECN Food Subgroup, a subgroup of the European 
Competition Network (ECN), which focuses on competition issues in the food sector. The 
EA attended two subgroup meetings in 2023. 

In  addition  to  its  participation  in  European  networks,  the  authority  also  continued  to 
collaborate with the Slovenian Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Food. The authority 
worked  with  the  ministry  to  prepare  amendments  to  the  national  transposition  law  and 
participated in regular working meetings. 

The authority also organised a forum on competitive law in the  agri-food sector, which 
was attended by representatives from the food industry and other stakeholders. The forum 
focused on price increases in the food sector over the past two years. 

The  report  also  notes  that  the  EA  conducted  a  survey  on  price  ratios  in  the  market  for 
selected food products. The survey aimed to identify potential indicators of unfair trading 
practices and assess the level of transparency in the market. 

The  EA  also  analysed  the  contractual  relationships  between  trading  companies  and 
suppliers.  The  analysis  revealed  that  the  contractual  relationships  were  often  poorly 
regulated, with many contracts lacking essential clauses. The EA identified potential signs 
of unfair trading practices, including the improper return of unsold perishable products, 
non-compliance with payment deadlines, and the imposition of disproportionate or unfair 
contractual penalties. 

The report concludes by noting that the EA will continue to monitor the market and take 
enforcement  action  where  necessary.  The  authority  also  adopted  guidelines  for 
determining  and  imposing  administrative  penalties  for  administrative  offences.  The 
guidelines  provide  a  general  methodology  for  determining  administrative  penalties  and 
take into account the severity of the offence, the duration of the infringement, and the need 
for deterrence. 

The  report  highlights  that  in  2024,  the  EA  received  three  complaints  regarding  unfair 
trading  practices,  two  of  which  were  anonymous,  and  one  was  submitted  by  the 
Ombudsman for the agri-food supply chain. The EA also issued one decision based on a 
settlement application and one decision to initiate proceedings. 

In  terms  of  investigations,  the  EA  conducted  an  investigation  into  the  company  LIDL 
SLOVENIJA  d.o.o.  k.d.  for  alleged  breaches  of  articles  61.f  and  61.g  of  ZKme-1.  The 
investigation found that  LIDL SLOVENIJA had likely  exploited at  least  one supplier of 
agricultural and food products, despite having significant market power. The company had 

126 

 
continued to do business with the supplier without a written contract, as required by article 
61.g  of  ZKme-1,  when  the  value  of  the  contracts  between  LIDL  SLOVENIJA  and  the 
supplier exceeded EUR 15 000 in 2023. 

The EA also conducted an investigation into the company SPAR SLOVENIJA d.o.o. for 
alleged breaches of articles 61.f and 61.g of ZKme-1. The investigation found that SPAR 
SLOVENIJA had likely exploited at least three suppliers of agricultural and food products. 
The company had continued to do business with the suppliers without written contracts, as 
required  by  article  61.g  of  ZKme-1,  when  the  value  of  the  contracts  between  SPAR 
SLOVENIJA and the suppliers exceeded EUR 15 000 in 2023. The company cooperated 
with  the  EA  during  the  investigation,  and  as  a  result,  the  EA  accepted  a  settlement 
application and issued a decision imposing an administrative fine. 

The report also mentions that the EA received four court decisions regarding unfair trading 
practices in 2024 [1]. In two cases, the court overturned the EA's decisions, citing that the 
descriptions of the offences did not clearly indicate that the legal representatives of the 
companies  were  directly  responsible  for  the  alleged  breaches.  The  EA  appealed  these 
decisions, arguing that they deviated from existing court practice. In two other cases, the 
court upheld the EA's decisions, and the companies were fined for UTPs. 

In  addition  to  these  investigations,  the  EA  conducted  a  sectoral  inquiry  into  marketing 
activities in the agri-food supply chain. The inquiry found that suppliers of meat and meat 
products, as well as wine, often paid for marketing services, while suppliers of fruit and 
vegetables, and fish, did not. The inquiry also found that some contracts included payments 
for super rebates and discounts, which could be considered as payments for services not 
provided or not clearly agreed upon in writing. 

The EA also engaged in outreach activities, including participation in meetings with the 
European  Commission's  UTP  Enforcement  Network  and  the  European  Competition 
Network (ECN). The EA also collaborated with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Food (MKGP) and the Varuh, and participated in a forum on competition law in the agri-
food sector. 

Slovakia (112)  

The reports provide a detailed overview of the activities carried out by the in EA Slovakia, 
The  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development,  specifically  related  to  the 
enforcement of the  UTP Directive and its national  transposition law (Act No 219/2021 
amending Act No 91/2019). 

2021 was a transition year in which the Directive was transposed into national legislation 
amending the existing Act. The EA received one complaint related to UTPs. However, also 
due  to  the  ongoing  COVID-19  pandemic  and  the  resulting  state  of  emergency,  no  new 
investigations were initiated, and the EA focused on completing the ongoing cases from 
2020. A total of nine investigations were completed in 2021, with five of them resulting in 
the identification of UTPs. The 2021 report presents the cases and summarises the results 
of the controls. 

In 2022, the EA did not receive any complaints related to UTPs. The EA initiated 20 new 
investigations/inspections,  all  of  which  were  completed  within  the  same  year.  The 

(112) https://www.mpsr.sk/potravinarstvo-a-obchod/utps-agri-food/47-111-1500  

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investigations  focused  on  aspects  relating  to  the  payment  terms  and  conditions  for  the 
supply  of  agricultural  and  food  products.  A  total  of  12  investigations  resulted  in  the 
identification of UTPs, with the most common infringement being the non-payment of the 
purchase  price  within  the  stipulated  timeframe.  The  report  also  mentions  the  transition 
period for bringing in line contracts with the Act and the focus of investigations of those 
provisions i.e. UTPs non related to this. 

In  2023,  the  EA  received  two  complaints  related  to  UTPs.  The  EA  initiated  five  new 
investigations/inspections,  all  of  which  were  completed  within  the  same  year.  The 
investigations focused on the enforcement of various articles of the Act mostly related to 
late payments and investigations for imposing unfair conditions regarding the return and 
exchange of products. A total of 12 investigations were completed in 2023, with eight of 
them  resulting  in  the  identification  of  UTPs.  Also  here  the  report  provides  summary 
overview of the 12 completed inspections. According to the report the EA also published 
7 decisions imposing administrative fines. 

In  2024,  the  EA  received  three  complaints  related  to  UTPs.  The  EA  initiated  10  new 
investigations,  eight of which were completed  within the same year and 2 continued in 
2025.  The  investigations  focused  on  the  enforcement  of  various  articles  of  the  UTP 
Directive  mainly  related  to  late  payments  and  sales  of  products  to  consumers  at  prices 
lower than the purchase price. A total of nine investigations were completed in 2024, with 
three of them resulting in the identification of UTPs. 

The  reports  mention  that  the  EA  has  been  working  to  raise  awareness  UTPs  and  the 
importance of fair-trade practices in the agri-food supply chain. 

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