JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS European Democracy Shield: Empowering Strong and Resilient Democracies
Date: 2025-11-12
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: EU action, EU body, EU institution, access to information, civil society, democracy, disinformation, election, freedom of the press, mass media

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 12.11.2025  JOIN(2025) 791 final  JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS European Democracy Shield: Empowering Strong and Resilient Democracies   
 
 
“It is only by showing that democracy works for people and that it delivers, that we can 
create a stronger Union. Europe can only thrive if democracy thrives.” 

President Ursula von der Leyen, International Charlemagne Prize 

1.  Introduction  

Democracy is the cornerstone of the European Union and is key to building peace, security, 
economic prosperity, competitiveness, and social cohesion. The foundations of democracy 
reside in free people, free and fair elections, free media and strong democratic institutions and 
processes. More than a system of governance, democracy is our way of life - it guarantees our 
rights and freedoms, safeguards equality before the law, promotes societies that are open and 
just,  and  ensures  that  those  in  power  can  be  held  accountable.  EU  citizens  see  democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law as the EU’s main strength1.  

In an age of growing geopolitical confrontation, international and regional conflicts, as well as 
technological  disruption,  our  democracies  are  under  internal  and  external  pressures. 
Authoritarian regimes see democracies as a threat and deploy increasingly aggressive tactics, 
including by relying on state or non-state proxies, to weaken them. While democracy is about 
bringing  together  different  voices  in  society  and  finding  common  solutions,  authoritarian 
regimes  seek  to  create  or  widen  divisions,  instrumentalise  conflicts,  discredit  democratic 
actors, in particular free media and civil society, and undermine free and fair elections. Their 
aim is to erode citizens’ trust in democratic institutions and in the capacity of democracy to 
deliver for people. 

This is a pressing concern for the EU, its neighbourhood and democracies around the world. 
Supporting EU candidate countries and potential candidates in their efforts to strengthen and 
consolidate  democracy  is  essential.  Some  have  been  targets  of  intense  destabilisation  and 
interference attempts. In addition to its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia is also 
escalating  hybrid  attacks,  waging  a  battle  of  influence  against  Europe.  The  tactics  used  are 
reaching  deep  into  the  fabric  of  our  societies,  with  potentially  long-lasting  impacts.  By 
spreading  deceitful  narratives,  sometimes  including  the  manipulation  and  falsification  of 
historical facts, they try to erode trust in democratic systems.  

These threats do not come in isolation, but feed on and reinforce other important challenges 
democracy is  facing  today. These include  rising  extremism  and polarisation,  declining  trust 
and engagement, threats to the integrity of elections and the plurality of public debate and free 
speech, and a deterioration of the environment in which journalists and civil society operate2. 
These challenges come amidst a deep digital transformation of our societies which has reshaped 
the way in which public debate takes place, how information flows and how citizens engage in 
the public sphere. This has brought significant new opportunities for people to freely access 
information,  express  their  opinion  and  participate  in  public  life  and  democratic  debate. 

1 According to Flash Eurobarometer 550 “Challenges and priorities in the EU”, of July 2024,  the first EU main 
strength identified by Europeans was respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (38%). 
2 2025 Strategic Foresight Report Resilience 2.0: Empowering the EU to thrive amid turbulence and uncertainty, 
COM/2025/484 
polycrisis’, 
societal 
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC142772 .  

‘Rethinking 

resilience 

final; 

time 

and 

of 

in 

a 

1 

 
 
 
However,  it  has  also  exposed  and  created  new  vulnerabilities.  People’s  views  are  being 
increasingly shaped by algorithm-based, personalised sources, which limits the shared space 
for democratic debate. Social media platforms also impact the sustainability of media revenue 
models.  The  developments  in  Artificial  Intelligence  (AI)  can  also  severely  impact  the 
democratic space, including electoral processes.  

Protecting  democracy  and  building  the  democratic  resilience  of  citizens,  societies  and 
institutions  is  an  urgent  collective  endeavour,  which  requires  a  whole-of-government  and 
whole-of-society approach. This is not only necessary to preserve the EU’s values, but also to 
ensure Europe’s security and to safeguard its independence, freedom and prosperity. The EU 
institutions, Member States, EU candidate countries and potential candidates, civil society and 
the private sector, each have a crucial role to play, guided by our shared values. Our citizens 
and their freedoms must be at the heart of it all.  

2. The European Democracy Shield  

There is growing awareness of the shared challenges facing democracies across the EU and 
globally, and action is already being taken at all levels. Member States have established new 
bodies and new capabilities to strengthen their national democratic resilience. Political actors 
and  a  wide  community  of  active  citizens  and  groups  have  led  the  call  for  action  and  are 
contributing to the response.  

The EU has put in place a robust policy and legal framework, anchored in the 2020 European 
Democracy Action Plan3 and the 2023 Defence of Democracy package4, to help coordinate, 
mobilise, complement and strengthen this collective effort.  

Building on that framework, with the European Democracy Shield, the Commission and the 
High  Representative  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy  are  presenting  a  set  of  new 
measures in three priority areas, aimed at empowering strong and resilient democracies by: 

- 

- 

reinforcing situational awareness and support response capacity to safeguard the 
integrity of the information space, 
strengthening  democratic  institutions,  free  and  fair  elections  and  free  and 
independent media, 

-  boosting societal resilience and citizens’ engagement. 

To  support  better  cooperation  and  coordination  in  addressing  several  aspects  under  these 
priority  areas,  a  European  Centre  for  Democratic  Resilience  (‘the  Centre’)  will  bring 
together expertise and capacities across Member States, EU candidate countries and potential 
candidates, and EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including the European External 
Action  Service  (EEAS),  as  relevant.  The  Centre  will  facilitate  information  sharing  and 
support  operational  cooperation  and  capacity  building  to  withstand  evolving  common 

3 European Commission, Communication on the European Democracy Action Plan, COM(2020) 790 final. 
4  European  Commission,  Communication  on  Defence  of  Democracy,  COM(2023)  630  final.  As  part  of  this 
Package, the Commission proposed a Directive on interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third 
countries, currently under discussion by the co-legislators.  

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threats,  in  particular  foreign  information  manipulation  and  interference  (FIMI)  and 
disinformation. Its aim will be to improve situational awareness and the capacity to anticipate 
and detect threats, develop a robust and coordinated early warning system and support rapid 
response  capacity.  It  will  also  support  the  raising  of  awareness  to  prepare  and  empower 
societies  and  institutions,  making  them  more  resilient  to  information-manipulation  and 
disinformation. Its work will contribute to consolidating the EU’s whole-of-society approach 
to strengthen preparedness, increase awareness and build democratic resilience. 

The  European  Democracy  Shield  will  contribute  to  strengthening  our  democracies  and 
empowering Europeans to exercise their rights, to freely form and express their opinions, and 
to have agency and participate in the democratic life of the Union actively and safely. Its actions 
will  strengthen  democratic  institutions,  protect  the  integrity  of  elections  and  support  media 
freedom and pluralism, so that our democracies remain strong, open and plural, and built on 
citizens’ trust. It will be implemented in synergy with the EU’s agenda on security, defence, 
preparedness5,and in coherence with EU external action more broadly.  

2.1. A new European Centre for Democratic Resilience: reinforcing 
situational awareness and strengthening societal resilience  

Building democratic resilience requires reinforced efforts at all levels of government, among 
EU institutions, Member States, and within society as a whole. These coordinated efforts need 
to  focus  on  improving  situational  awareness  and  the  collective  capacity  to  anticipate, 
detect and respond to threats and on building democratic resilience. A great deal of work 
has already been done to meet  these  challenges, with  tools and structures  emerging  at  both 
national and European level6 and delivering some important results.  

However,  many  of  these  structures  only  address  specific  areas  and  communities,  they  use 
different methodologies and often offer limited response capacity and have limited links to the 
work of competent authorities at  national and  EU level.  It is  essential  that  these efforts  are 
brought together; stronger links need to be fostered to reinforce the situational awareness and 
to  improve  the  EU’s  collective  capacity  to  monitor,  detect  and  anticipate  information 
manipulation and disinformation campaigns7.  

To  address  these  needs,  the  Commission  will  set  up  a  European  Centre  for  Democratic 
Resilience.  The  Centre  will  offer  a  framework  to  strengthen  coordination  and  information 

5 European Commission 2025: White Paper for European Defence Readiness, JOIN/2025/120 final; European 
Preparedness  Union  Strategy,  JOIN(2025)  130  final;  ProtectEU:  a  European  Internal  Security  Strategy, 
COM(2025) 148 final. 
6 Several frameworks, structures and tools already exist at EU level and national level for addressing FIMI and 
disinformation, as well as societal resilience more broadly. At EU level, this includes, among others, the EEAS 
managed  EU  Rapid  Alert  System  (RAS),  the  Commission’s  internal  Network  against  Disinformation, 
EUvsDisinfo,  the  European Digital  Media  Observatory  (EDMO),  the  DSA  elections  roundtables,  work  in  the 
European Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE). Dedicated structures exist also at national level such as 
Viginum  in  France  and  the  Swedish  Psychological  Defence  Agency,  or  the  whole  of  society  approach  to 
democratic resilience rolled out by Finland. 
7  As  also  called  in  the  Presidency  Conclusions  of  May  2025  on  strengthening  democratic  resilience  - 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/27/presidency-conclusions-on-strengthening-
eu-democratic-resilience/.  

3 

 
 
 
sharing between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and Member States and support 
operational  cooperation  and  capacity  building.  This  will  facilitate  a  more  integrated  and 
effective  approach  to  increasing  the  situational  awareness  and  to  develop  a  robust  and 
coordinated early warning system that can support response capacity. The Centre’s work will 
also contribute to raising awareness to prepare and empower citizens, society and institutions 
and make them more resilient.  

The Centre will primarily work as a dedicated hub for exchange and operational cooperation 
among EU institutions and Member States. The Centre will link together existing networks and 
structures working on prevention, detection, analysis and response to patterns of threats in the 
information  space,  and  work  to  develop  joint  approaches,  practices  and  methodologies  and 
exchanging relevant data and analyses. It will support trainings and capacity-building activities. 
It could further advise on common response tools, strategies, standard operating procedures, 
protocols or joint exercises. The Centre will be supported by and work in close coordination 
with the Rapid Alert System, which is an established mechanism to exchange information on 
FIMI and disinformation between EU institutions and the Member States. 

A Stakeholder Platform for independent non-institutional stakeholders will be established to 
enable contributions from a broad set of relevant stakeholders and communities and to  feed 
these contributions into the work of the Centre. This platform will bring together stakeholders 
such as civil society organisations, think tanks, researchers and academia, fact-checkers and 
media  providers.  In  full  respect  of  the  independence  of  all  participants,  this  platform  will 
facilitate  the  exchange  of  information,  expertise  and  advice,  and  will  gradually  build  on 
existing stakeholder communities such as the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), 
and new communities, such as the European Network of Fact-Checkers and the future common 
research support framework. The platform will support the dissemination of research and other 
outputs and encourage exchange among different stakeholders. 

The Centre will fully respect EU and national competences and the independence of existing 
structures at national and EU level. Its development will be rolled out progressively, based 
on Member States’ voluntary participation, and on their input and needs for support and 
cooperation, to ensure that it delivers the best support to national authorities and jointly at EU 
level. Building on ongoing EU support and engagement with international partners8, the Centre 
will also be open to associate EU candidate countries and potential candidates to support them 
and foster mutual learning. Cooperation with like-minded partners could also be foreseen. 

Work  under  the  Centre  will  be  complementary  to  and  in  synergy  with  other  measures  put 
forward to safeguard the integrity of the information space, strengthen the integrity of elections, 
foster media freedom and media pluralism and build overall societal resilience by empowering 
and engaging citizens.  

2.2. Safeguarding the integrity of the information space 

Strengthening the integrity of the information space to support everyone in society to access 
reliable and trustworthy information, exercise their democratic rights and engage meaningfully 

8 G7, NATO, the UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or the Council of Europe. 

4 

 
 
 
with institutions and communities is essential. Transparency, accountability and integrity in 
the information space are key for ensuring that people’s voices are heard, to empower them to 
be active citizens and to build and sustain their trust in democratic processes.  

Foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI)9 and disinformation campaigns are 
precisely  intended  to  undermine  public  trust  in  the  information  space  and  democratic 
institutions while amplifying societal divisions10. They are enabled by a proliferation of new 
online manipulation techniques. These include the inauthentic use of social media11, fake social 
media accounts, websites designed to mimic official sources, artificial amplification of divisive 
content,  use  of  synthetic  content  like  deepfakes  and  other  Artificial  Intelligence  (‘AI’)- 
generated content. Their spread often relies on inauthentic behaviour like fake accounts, AI 
and bot-driven amplification and inauthentic engagements. Such coordinated operations, often 
part of broader hybrid campaigns, are increasingly sophisticated and decentralised, and may 
involve networks that operate across multiple platforms and jurisdictions, often under the veil 
of  anonymity,  which  makes  them  particularly  difficult  to  detect,  attribute  and  counter 
effectively.  

To address these issues, the EU has dedicated legislation in place. The AI Act12 establishes 
transparency obligations for providers and deployers of certain AI systems, including the duty 
to mark and enable detection when content has been artificially generated or manipulated, and 
an obligation of labelling regarding deep fakes and certain other AI-generated publications on 
public matters. The Digital Services Act13 (DSA) also contributes to strengthening the integrity 
of  the  information  space,  regulating  responsibilities  and  requiring  providers  of  Very  Large 
Online  Platforms  (VLOPs)  and  Very  Large  Online  Search  Engines  (VLOSEs)  to  mitigate 
systemic risks to society and democracy stemming from their services, in full respect of users' 
freedom  of  expression.  The  DSA  enhances  algorithmic  transparency,  empowering  users  to 
control  how  recommender  systems  influence  the  content  they  see  online  and  enabling 
researchers  to  access  platforms’  data.  The  DSA  also  grants  the  Commission  the  power  to 
scrutinise the design of the algorithmic systems, with the support of the European Centre for 
Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT). The implementation and enforcement  of this legislation 
are  key  priorities,  and  several  procedures  related  to  certain  providers  of  VLOPs  on  the 
assessment and management of systemic risks to civic discourse and electoral processes are 

9 FIMI is a pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact values, procedures and 
political processes. Such activity is manipulative in character, conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner. 
Actors of such activity can be state or non-state actors, including their proxies inside and outside of their own 
territory. 
10 The replies to the open public consultation carried out by the Commission to prepare the Democracy Shield 
show that respondents consider the inauthentic use of social media and FIMI as some of the most important risks 
to democracy. Also, a special Eurobarometer [reference: EB Special 568] from 2025 revealed that respondents 
consider FIMI and disinformation as a major challenge for democracy, alongside growing distrust in democratic 
institutions and processes. The same Eurobarometer survey shows that over seven in ten Europeans are concerned 
that voters’ decisions are based on disinformation. 
11 Automated software programmes designed to perform repetitive tasks over a network, often imitating real users 
12  Regulation  (EU)  2024/1689  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  June  2024  laying  down 
harmonised rules on artificial intelligence, OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024. It will apply from 2 August 2026. 
13 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022  on a Single 
Market for Digital Services, OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, pp. 1–102. 

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ongoing.  More  broadly,  the  Commission  will  continue  to  monitor  and  enforce  obligations 
under the DSA and will engage with stakeholders to ensure that these obligations are upheld14.  

To  prevent  and  address  major  incidents  and  interference  in  the  information  environment, 
together with the European Board for Digital Services, the Commission will prepare a DSA 
incidents and crisis protocol15. This will facilitate coordination among  relevant authorities 
and ensure swift reactions to large-scale and potentially transnational information operations. 
This  protocol  takes  into account  and  will  work  alongside  other  crisis  mechanisms  in  place, 
notably the Cybersecurity Blueprint16, to ensure that actions are coordinated and coherent, and 
by taking into account relevant EU legislation17. Exchanges among these mechanisms may be 
supported by the European Centre for Democratic Resilience and its stakeholder platform. 

The Code of Conduct on Disinformation, supported by a collaborative Taskforce, provides a 
robust  set  of  commitments  and  detailed  measures  that  taken  together  help  mitigate 
disinformation  related  risks,  while  fully  upholding  the  freedom  of  expression,  for  instance 
through  enhanced  tools  for  users  to  recognise,  understand  and  flag  disinformation  and  to 
empower  researchers.  It  is  also  useful  for  determining  compliance  with  the  obligations 
regarding systemic risks related to disinformation for the providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs 
that  adhere  to  and  comply  with  the  commitments  under  this  Code18.  The  Commission  will 
assess the levels of commitment of individual signatories of the Code and their implementation. 
If  necessary,  the  Commission  will  hold  regulatory  dialogues  under  the  DSA  with  these 
signatories  and  decide  about  other  appropriate  follow-up  actions.  For  example,  the 
Commission will work with signatories to strengthen their efforts as regards the transparency 
of recommender systems and to demonetise disinformation19, including to remove financial 
incentives for disinformation via advertising revenues20 and to develop relevant indicators to 
measure platforms’ efforts in this regard21. 

The Commission will also explore possible further measures with the Code’s signatories. These 
could include ways to improve the detection and labelling of AI-generated and manipulated 
content circulating on social media services22 and voluntary user verification tools23. Such 
measures would be complementary to the AI Act and other relevant EU rules. The EU Digital 
Identity Wallets, which will be available for EU citizens and residents by the end of 2026, 

14 According to Article 91(2) of the DSA, by 17 November 2027, and every five years thereafter, the Commission 
shall evaluate this Regulation, and report to the European Parliament, the Council and the  European Economic 
and Social Committee. 
15 Article 48 of the DSA Regulation provides for a specific procedure for the establishment of such a protocol. 
16 Commission Delegated Regulation of 1.7.2025 C(2025) 4340 final and Article 40 DSA. 
17 Such as the NIS2 Directive, the Cybersecurity Act, the AI Act, the Regulation on political advertising and the 
Regulation on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online. 
18  See  Commission  Opinion  -  Assessment  of  the  Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation,  C(2025)  1008  final, 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/112679 
19 Building on Commitment 19 of the chapter on Empowering Users and Commitment 1 of the chapter Scrutiny 
of Ads Placement of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation. 
20 To those who consistently spread disinformation. 
21 Building on commitment 41 of the chapter Monitoring the Code of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation 
related to structural indicators. 
22 Building on Commitment 15 and Measure 15.1 of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation. 
23 Solutions could be explored notably to help users to verify if they interact with a real human being (e.g. through 
a verification icon).  

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could facilitate such measures and promote trust and security in online interactions by enabling 
secure identification and authentication24.  

Member States efforts to ensure the integrity of the information space can be strengthened at 
EU  level  through  coordination  of  approaches  and  the  pooling  of  expertise  and  information 
building on the existing FIMI Toolbox25. Working with national authorities and experts, the 
Commission  will  support  the  preparation  of  a  Blueprint  for  countering  FIMI  and 
Disinformation, including tools and guidance on measures to anticipate, detect and respond, 
as  well  as  a  dedicated  mechanism  for  professional  exchanges  and  team  working  to  support 
national capacity-building and mutual learning.  

Strengthening  the  capacity  of  the  independent  fact-checking  community  across  the  EU  is 
critical for boosting the detection and monitoring of FIMI and disinformation campaigns. An 
independent European Network of Fact-Checkers26 will be set up with the Commission’s 
support and its  work  will contribute to  the Stakeholder Platform  of the European Centre of 
Democratic  Resilience.  The  Network  will  be  based  on  the  highest  ethical  and  professional 
standards  and  operate  in  the  EU  and  in  candidate  countries,  potential  candidates  and 
neighbouring  countries  associated  with  the  Digital  Europe  Programme.  It  will  boost  fact-
checking capacity in all EU official languages, especially during situations such as elections, 
health  emergencies  or  natural  disasters  where  access  to  reliable  information  is  critical.  The 
network  will  also  create  and  maintain  an  independent  repository  for  fact-checking  to 
consolidate  fact-checks  issued  by  independent,  eligible  and  trusted  organisations,  and  will 
facilitate  access  by  journalists,  online  platforms,  researchers  and  civil  society  to  verified 
information, supporting cross-border collaboration and enabling timely reactions. It will also 
provide  access  to  a  protection  scheme  for  fact-checkers  in  the  EU  against  threats  and 
harassment, including legal and psychological protection. In supporting fact-checkers to reach 
a broader audience, the network will make a substantial contribution to societal resilience27. 

The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) provides a pan-European, independent 
and  interdisciplinary  network  of  research  and  analysis  to  counter  FIMI  and  disinformation 
campaigns. Under an extended mandate28, EDMO will be able to develop new independent 
monitoring  and  analytical  capabilities  to  support  situational  awareness  in  particular  around 
elections  or  in  situations  of  crises.  Its  monitoring  will  cover  all  Member  States,  candidate 

24 EU Digital Identity Wallets will provide a safe, reliable, and private means of digital identification for everyone 
in Europe. Every Member State will provide at least one wallet to all its citizens, residents, and businesses allowing 
them to prove who they are, and safely store, share and sign important digital documents. 
25  This  toolbox  provides  a  framework  for  action:  https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-
countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en.  
26 As announced in the Commission President’s 2024-2029 Political Guidelines. A call for proposals was open 
from  15  April  to  2  September  2025  https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-launches-eu5-
million-call-strengthen-european-fact-checking-network.  
27  Preparatory  Action  call  for  projects  increasing  the  reach  and  impact  of  professional  content  produced  by 
independent  fact-checking  organisations  in  the  EU  https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/boosting-
visibility-fact-checking-content-europe. 
28 A call for tenders for up to EUR 2.56 million was issued under the Digital Europe Programme (DEP) in July 
2025.  See:  https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/commission-launches-call-continuation-european-
digital-media-observatory/.  

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countries (e.g. Ukraine, Moldova)29 and potential candidates and also feed in the work of the 
Stakeholder Platform under the European Centre of Democratic Resilience.  

The research and academic community has also developed relevant contributions, by providing 
independent analysis and evidence on FIMI and disinformation campaigns. The Commission 
will support setting up a common research support framework to provide access to data and 
advanced  technology30,  pooling  and  strengthening  these  independent  capacities.  This 
framework which will rely, among others on the privileged access to data under the DSA and 
the Regulation on Political Advertising31, will feed into the work of the Stakeholder Platform 
of the European Centre of Democratic Resilience. It will help deepen the understanding of how 
campaigns spread online and how they impact the integrity of the information space. It will 
support  the  development  of  tools  to  facilitate  the  detection  of  AI  generated  or  manipulated 
audio, images and video to misrepresent facts or depict disinformation narratives (for instance 
deepfakes  impersonating  politicians).  It  will  also  help  trace  new  forms  of  coordinated 
inauthentic behaviour, including by cross-platform coordination, the use of bots, or algorithmic 
amplification.  

To  anticipate  and  robustly  respond  to  FIMI,  it  is  important  to  make  full  use  of  the  FIMI 
toolbox32.  This  toolbox  includes  a  wide  range  of  responses,  including  Union  restrictive 
measures on non-EU individuals and entities which have engaged in FIMI campaigns targeting 
the EU, candidate countries and potential candidates. The scope of the EU sanctions’ regime 
targeting Russia’s destabilising activities includes the prohibition to broadcast Kremlin-backed 
propaganda outlets involved in FIMI. Further actions have been taken at both EU and national 
level  to  restrict  the  distribution  of  content  from  rogue  non-EU  media  service  providers 
presenting  risks  to  public  security  including  by  suspending  media  licences.  The  European 
Media Freedom Act (EMFA)33 allows for quick and efficient coordination of actions against 
such providers by EU media regulators, gathered in the European Board for Media Services. 
To further support these regulators, the European Board for Media Services will develop, in 
consultation  with  the  Commission,  a  list  of  common  criteria  to  guide  national  media 
regulators  when  they  act  to  protect  the  EU  information  space  from  rogue  non-EU  media 
services. 

run 

See 

will 

until 

29 A new EDMO hub, FACT, is being launched in 2025 to fight disinformation in Ukraine and Moldova with an 
EU grant worth EUR 1.29 million under DEP (as part of a broader call for proposals worth EUR 8.8 million). The 
project 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-
2027. 
tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projects-details/43152860/101226241 Link to the  new  EDMO 
tender:  Commission  launches  call  for  the  continuation  of  the  European  Digital  Media  Observatory  |  Shaping 
Europe’s digital future.  
30 Such as access to shared cloud resources and software.  This will complement ongoing initiatives increasing 
detection  speed  and  analytical  capacity  of  sophisticated  malicious  activities  (e.g.  coordinated  inauthentic 
behaviours) often part of hybrid attacks. 
31 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency 
and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj). 
32 
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-
interference-fimi_en.  
33 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a 
common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European 
Media Freedom Act) (OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj). 

8 

 
 
 
FIMI  and  disinformation  campaigns  can  also  rely  on  behaviours  or  activities  of  a  criminal 
nature,  such  as  money  laundering  or  organised  crime.  The  EU  criminal  law  acquis  covers 
certain forms of FIMI and disinformation activities, and reinforced EU cooperation in this area 
can help counter them better. The planned revision of the mandates of Europol and Eurojust 
will explore ways to further enhance this effort.  

In  a  context  of  geopolitical  tensions  and  increased  polarisation,  it  is  important  that  the  EU 
strengthens  its  efforts  to  build  alliances  with  like-minded  countries  and  regional  partners. 
Supporting  democratic  actors  and  the  integrity  of  information  ecosystems  worldwide,  will 
benefit European democracy, security, and prosperity. The Commission will engage with third 
countries  to  support  civic  and  digital  education,  trustworthy  fact-checking  initiatives,  and 
regulatory  initiatives  aimed  at  reinforcing  the  integrity  of  the  information  space.  The  Team 
Europe Democracy Initiative contributes to increased knowledge-sharing and coordination on 
information integrity and assistance to journalists at risk outside the EU, working together with 
Member States, like-minded partners and civil society. 

The EU will step up its efforts to counter FIMI in its external action, through  the EEAS, in 
close collaboration with the Commission, the Member States and international partners. This 
will include building the capability of the EU’s global presence, including the network of EU 
Delegations, Common Security and Defence Policy missions and Member States’ diplomatic 
missions, scaling-up training and providing counter-FIMI instruments to staff on the ground. 
The EU will reinforce their cooperation with EU candidate countries and potential candidates, 
and  partners  to  counter  FIMI,  with  a  particular  focus  on  the  EU  neighbourhood,  while 
advancing  collective  action with  international  partners, including  the G7, NATO and in  the 
context of the Security and Defence Partnerships.  A more proactive approach to countering 
FIMI  will  be  advanced,  combining  strategic  communication  activities  with  efforts  aimed  at 
disrupting the infrastructure which enable FIMI operations, including by stepping up efforts to 
deploy restrictive measures to raise the costs for perpetrators.  

Actions: 
• 

In the framework of the Digital Services Act 

o  Prepare a DSA incidents and crisis protocol 
o  Continue  its  engagement  with  signatories  of  the  Code  of  Conduct  on 
Disinformation  to  strengthen  measures  to  tackle  manipulative  techniques 
online 

•  Support the preparation of an EU Blueprint for countering FIMI and disinformation 
•  Set up a European Network of Fact-Checkers 
•  Extend the mandate of the European Digital Media Observatory 
•  Support setting up a common research support framework to strengthen monitoring of 

information manipulation and disinformation campaigns 

•  Development  by  the  European  Board  for  Media  Services,  in  consultation  with  the 
Commission,  of  a  list  of  common  criteria  for  EU  media  regulators  when  they  act 
against rogue non-EU media operators presenting risks to public security 

•  Reinforce capabilities of EU Delegations, CSDP missions and operations, EU Member 

State Embassies to counter FIMI 

9 

 
 
•  Deploy proactive strategic communication campaigns in priority regions 
•  Provide  targeted  capacity  building  and  support  to  EU  candidate  countries  and 
potential  candidates  to  reinforce  resilience  to  FIMI  and  hybrid  interferences, 
including through CSDP missions 

•  Leverage international partnerships for collective responses against FIMI, including 
through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, EU-NATO cooperation and Security and 
Defence Partnerships 

2.3. Stronger democratic institutions, free and fair elections and 
free and independent media 

Free  and  independent  media,  free  and  fair  elections  and  strong  and  resilient  democratic 
institutions  and  processes  are  essential  to  enable  citizens  to  participate  meaningfully  in  the 
political life, choose their representatives, hold them accountable and fully exercise their rights 
and  freedoms.  Recent  elections,  including  in  Romania  and  Moldova34,  illustrated  a  broader 
escalation in interference from Russia and its proxies in the European democratic space.  

2.3.1. Strengthening the fairness and integrity of electoral and other democratic processes 

Elections  that  are  universal,  equal,  free  and  based  on  secret  and  direct  suffrage  are  part  of 
Europe’s common electoral traditions35. While the organisation and conduct of elections are 
the  competence  of  the  Member  States,  strengthened  cooperation  at  EU  level  is  needed  to 
address common challenges in this field36. The Commission facilitates valuable exchanges and 
mutual  support  through  the  European  Cooperation  Network  on  Election  (ECNE),  which 
brings together national authorities with responsibilities in electoral matters. For example, in 
June  2025,  the  Commission  published  a  checklist  on  the  integrity  of  elections  and  a  risk-
management matrix for elections, prepared with Member States in the framework of ECNE. 
The joint mechanism for electoral resilience, organised and coordinated through ECNE (in 
close cooperation with the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Cooperation Group and 
the RAS) supports the operational deployment of joint expert teams and expert exchanges, in 
particular in the area of online forensics, disinformation and cybersecurity of elections. 

The  Commission  will  intensify  its  support  to  Member  States  and  stakeholders  to  enhance 
electoral  integrity  and  preparedness,  protect  election-related  infrastructure  critical  for  the 
organisation  and  conduct  of  elections,  minimise  risks  of  foreign  interference,  strengthen 
election  networks,  electoral  cooperation  and  reporting,  and  encourage  the  observation  of 

34 
and 
https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente%20CSAT/Document%20CSAT%20SIE.pdf 
https://www.sis.md/sites/default/files/comunicate/fisiere/Raport_SIS_Public_Interferenta_in_procesul_electoral.
pdf.  
35  See  among  others  the  EU  Electoral  Act,  the  2023  Commission  Recommendation  on  inclusive  and  resilient 
electoral processes in the EU, as well as the Code of good practice in electoral matters, European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law, Venice Commission, Opinion No. 190/2002, Strasbourg, 25.10.2018) 
36 There is a need to better protect electoral processes, including the election-related infrastructure, from attacks 
combining FIMI and disinformation campaigns and a range of other tools and tactics, such as cyberattacks, covert 
campaign financing, vote buying, attacks against political candidates, attempts to instigate social unrest or acts of 
violence and destabilisation.  

10 

 
 
 
 
elections  by  citizens  and  international  organisations  which  endorse  relevant  international 
standards, which are all key aspects of the 2023 Recommendation.  

To ensure free and fair elections, election-related infrastructure should be protected against 
cyber-attacks.  The  NIS2  Directive37  and  Cyber  Resilience  Act38  strengthen  the  EU’s 
cybersecurity by ensuring that both critical sectors and digital products are secure, resilient, 
and coordinated by design across the EU, which directly contributes to the security of electoral 
processes in the EU and the overall preparedness for cyber threats in the context of elections. 
For instance, the Compendium on Elections Cybersecurity and Resilience, updated in 202439, 
was prepared by the NIS Cooperation Group in coordination with the European Union Agency 
for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and ECNE. The Cybersecurity Reserve, established by the Cyber 
Solidarity Act40, is an effective tool at the disposal of Member States, as well as EU partners 
through  external  assistance,  that  can  be  used  upon  request  to  assist  them  in  responding  to 
significant or large-scale cybersecurity incidents. 

The Regulation on political advertising, provides common EU standards that make it easier 
for citizens to recognise political ads, know if they are targeted by such ads, and distinguish 
them  from  other  types  of  content.  To  prevent  foreign  interference,  the  Regulation  bans  the 
provision of ads to third country sponsors in the three months before an election or referendum 
in an EU country. The new rules help safeguard the integrity of electoral processes and support 
an  open  and  transparent  democratic  debate41.  Information  on  online  political  ads  will  be 
available from an online repository, including about who paid for them. 

To  further  improve  preparedness  around  elections  and  the  resilience  of  electoral  processes, 
cooperation with Member States will be reinforced under ECNE. ECNE’s capabilities will be 
strengthened through more systematic exchanges to support the joint development of common 
tools and products in areas of common interest. New thematic settings will foster exchanges 
on topics such as  election integrity  and election-related risk management  and preparedness, 
election  observation  in  the  EU,  new  ways  of  political  campaigning  including  regarding 
financing, the safety of political candidates and elected representatives and the impact and role 
of Artificial Intelligence and other new technologies regarding electoral processes42. Based on 
exchanges in ECNE, the Commission will prepare a repository of common references and 
standards  for  electoral  processes43.  The  Commission  will  promote  the  use  of  the  joint 

37 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures 
for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, pp. 80–152. 
38 Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal 
cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements, OJ L, 2024/2847, 20.11.2024. 
39  https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/new-cybersecurity-compendium-how-protect-integrity-elections-
published.  
40 Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down 
measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats 
and incidents, OJ L, 2025/38, 15.1.2025 
41 The Guidelines issued by the Commission support the application of this Regulation and help all actors falling 
under its scope to understand and comply with their obligations. The Commission will establish a new stakeholder 
expert  group  to  monitor  and  collect  practical  feedback  on  the  implementation  of  the  rules.  Furthermore,  the 
Commission will support the preparation of templates and other tools to facilitate the application of the Regulation. 
42 Within the framework of ECNE, the Commission will also organise exchanges on election polls.  
43  This  will  be  based  on  relevant  standards  and  include  experience  gained  in  the  context  of  EU  Election 
Observation Missions.  

11 

 
 
 
mechanism  for  electoral  resilience,  encourage  peer-to-peer  exchanges,  mutual  voluntary 
assistance,  common  training  and  tabletop  exercises.  It  will  also  promote  short-term 
exchanges  of  national  experts  among  Member  States.  As  EU  candidate  countries  and 
potential candidates are regularly targeted by electoral interference, they will be more closely 
and systematically associated to the work of ECNE, including through dedicated meetings. In 
addition,  further  engagement  will  be  sought  with  international  organisations  developing 
reference frameworks and methodologies on elections, including elections observations, such 
as the OSCE and the Council of Europe.  

Building on the EU legislative framework and policy tools44, the Commission will further work 
with  Member  States  and  stakeholders  to  prepare  a  dedicated  guidance  on  the  fair, 
transparent, human-centred and responsible use of AI in electoral processes. Based on 
this  guidance,  to  be  prepared  with  the  support  of  ECNE  and  the  European  AI  Office,  the 
Commission  will  encourage  voluntary  commitments  on  the  responsible  use  of  new 
technologies (notably AI) in political activities by European and national political parties and 
other  relevant  actors  and  further  promote  the  sharing  of  best  practices  on  these  matters, 
complementing existing legal obligations.  

Online platforms and search engines have become important venues for public debate and 
for shaping public opinion and voter behaviour. As such, providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs 
have an obligation under the DSA to put in place measures to mitigate risks related to negative 
effects  on  civic  discourse  and  electoral  processes45.  To  support  compliance  with  these 
obligations,  the  Commission  adopted  Guidelines  on  the  mitigation  of  systemic  risks  for 
electoral processes46 and cooperates with national authorities of the Member States regarding 
their  preparedness  ahead  of  elections47.  Together  with  the  national  Digital  Services 
Coordinators, the Commission will update the DSA Elections Toolkit, in cooperation with 
ECNE, to take into account experience from recent elections and the need to cover particular 
phenomena48. 

The  Code  of  Conduct  on  Disinformation  will  continue  to  play  a  key  role  in  addressing 
election-related threats through its voluntary multistakeholder approach, in particular through 
the Rapid Response System for elections which allows non-platform signatories such as civil 
society  organisations  to  swiftly  report  time-sensitive  content  or  accounts  that  they  deem  to 

44 Beyond the AI Act, this notably includes the Regulation on political advertising and the 2023 Commission’s 
Recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections. 
45A wide  range of phenomena involving online platforms and search engines give rise to a heightened risk to 
election  integrity.  These  include,  but  are not  limited  to,  the  proliferation  of  illegal  hate  speech  online,  threats 
linked to FIMI as well as the wider phenomenon of disinformation, the spread of (violent) extremist content and 
content intending to radicalise people, as well as the spread of content generated through new technologies such 
as generative AI . 
46 Communication from the Commission on Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation 
of systemic risks for electoral processes C/2024/3014. Within the scope of the DSA, in particular building on the 
DSA Elections Toolkit for Digital Services Coordinators published by the European Board of Digital Services 
and the Commission in February 2025, election roundtables and stress tests organised by Member State’s Digital 
Services Coordinators have proven useful in enhancing information exchange between stakeholders on election 
related issues, strengthen situational awareness and to test platforms’ preparedness. 
47 By participating in roundtables with all actors concerned as well as by organising stress tests. 
48 For example, the exposure of EU citizens living abroad to FIMI and disinformation campaigns during electoral 
periods. 

12 

 
 
 
present  threats  to  the integrity of the  electoral  process  to  the online platforms, ensuring the 
latter can take appropriate actions in light of their respective policies. This should be further 
pursued and expanded, including to  crisis  situations49.  New election-related  work under the 
Code will focus on mapping and analysing novel and emerging threats linked to information 
manipulation  campaigns,  that  are  increasingly  observed  during  the  electoral  periods. 
Signatories  of  the  Code  are  encouraged  to  take  this  forward  through  their  work  within  the 
Code’s Taskforce, identifying best practices by distilling lessons learned from previous EU and 
national elections. 

Influencers play an increasingly significant role in online political campaigns. Building on the 
EU Influencer Legal Hub, the Commission will support the setting up of a voluntary network 
of influencers to raise awareness about relevant EU rules50, including on their responsibilities 
when  engaging  in  political  campaigning  and  promote  the  exchange  of  best  practice.  The 
Commission  will  also  encourage  ethical  standards  and  voluntary  commitments,  including 
regarding information integrity, and support work by influencers to promote digital literacy.  

Transparency and accountability of funding in politics, including campaign financing, are 
key to prevent interference and critical to ensure a level playing field among political parties 
and candidates and to maintain citizens’ trust in the integrity and fairness of elections. Building 
on  relevant  EU  rules  and  standards51  the  Commission  will  support  common  work  with  the 
Member States on the transparency and integrity of funding in politics, looking at issues of 
common interest such as anonymous donations and cryptocurrency, which can be used to fund 
activities in ways that are not transparent and difficult to detect. The Commission will bring 
together national experts, notably under the umbrella of ECNE and in close cooperation with 
other  EU  networks  and  involving  stakeholders52,  to  exchange  best  practices,  prepare 
possible guidelines and foster joint actions.  

Societal  and  technological  developments,  especially  online,  provide  new  opportunities  for 
political parties and candidates to reach out to voters, but they also bring new challenges. The 
rapid change of the information landscape, tensions and polarisation have resulted in political 
candidates  and  elected  representatives,  being  increasingly  exposed  to  threats,  attacks  and 
violence, online and offline53. Women in politics are a particular target of such behaviours54, 

49 Cooperation under the Code proved to be particularly useful in the context of crisis such as the Covid pandemic 
and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well as regarding elections. 
50 For example, the Regulation on political advertising, DSA, AI Act, EMFA, etc. 
51 This will notably rely on the work to support the  application of the Regulation on political advertising, the 
Commission  Recommendation  (EU)  2023/2829  of  12  December  2023  on  inclusive  and  resilient  electoral 
processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European 
Parliament, the proposed Directive on combating corruption, EU anti-money laundering rules and other relevant 
EU rules (e.g. the revision of the Regulation on European political parties and European political foundations, 
agreed between the co-legislators in June 2025, provides for reinforced rules on the prohibition of indirect funding 
and donor transparency). 
52 Including expertise gathered during elections observation missions.  
53  Threats  against  journalists,  media  professionals  and  politicians  figure  prominently  among  the  concerns 
respondents to the open public consultation that the Commission conducted to prepare the Democracy Shield had 
with regards to the risks for democracy in the EU. 
54 
girls-developing-eu-measurement-framework.  

https://eige.europa.eu/publications-resources/publications/combating-cyber-violence-against-women-and-

13 

 
 
 
which can discourage them  from  running for office and in  some cases drive them to resign 
from elected positions, which has a clear negative effect on democratic representation, whereas 
they  continue  to  be  underrepresented  in  politics55.  To  better  ensure  the  safety  of  political 
candidates and elected representatives, the Commission will adopt a Recommendation on 
safety in politics56. The Commission will also work, within the framework of the ECNE and 
in close consultation with relevant stakeholders,  on the preparation of a dedicated guide of 
best  practices  and  support  capacity-building,  practical  support,  collection  of  data  and 
voluntary commitments (e.g. pledges and codes of conduct) and ethical standards in this field. 
Particular  attention  will  be  paid  across  this  workstream  to  women  and  other  groups  at 
heightened risk of discrimination, and to the situation of local politicians.  

The  threats  to  the  integrity  of  electoral  processes  are  complex  and  multifaceted,  requiring 
preparedness and response across a broad spectrum of policies and actors. Moldova’s recent 
experience  demonstrates  that  FIMI  can  be  resisted,  and  its  impact  reduced,  and  that 
preparedness,  firm  political  commitment,  effective  coordination  and  EU’s  support  can 
significantly enhance democratic resilience to hybrid threats.  

Examples of threats and approach to response: the Moldova case study 

In 2024 Moldova held presidential elections and a referendum on whether to enshrine its EU 
aspirations in the constitution, amid extensive Russian disinformation, interference and vote-
buying.  Its  September  2025  parliamentary  elections  saw  intense  Russian  hybrid  threats 
including  cyber-attacks,  fake  bomb  alerts,  FIMI  and  disinformation57  including  artificially 
amplifying certain candidates or parties’ profiles, widespread use of AI generated content, fake 
media sites and vote buying58. 

In  the  context  of  its  EU  accession  process,  Moldova  reinforced  its  resilience  through  a 
comprehensive  and  holistic  approach  aimed  at  tackling  FIMI  and  disinformation  upstream. 
With  assistance  from  the  EU  and  other  partners,  Moldova  bolstered  its  cyber  and  internal 
security,  judicial  integrity,  the  capacity  of  investigative  authorities  to  detect  illicit  financial 
flows - including through cryptocurrencies, strategic communication capabilities and capacity 
to deliver services to the population even during crises (e.g. energy and the influx of individuals 
fleeing  Russia's  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine)  to  help  address  fault-lines  in  national 
cohesion. The national Electoral Commission took decisive action regarding violations of party 
financing  rules.  A  newly  established  StratCom  Centre  has  coordinated  implementation  of 

https://cdn.table.media/assets/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/07145057/Gender-Equality-Report-Chapeau-

55 
Communication.pdf.  
56 Among other, this will build on the 2023 Recommendation on inclusive and resilience electoral processes, other 
relevant EU rules and policies (e.g. on victim rights, violence against women, racism and xenophobia and personal 
data protection) as well as ongoing international initiatives supported by the EU 
57 The main disinformation narratives during the election campaign aimed at polarising society, undermining trust 
in democracy, and obstructing the country’s European path. They focused on claims of political oppression and 
corruption  by  the  government,  electoral  fraud,  loss  of  sovereignty,  as  well  as  fear-stoking  of  potential  armed 
conflicts  (EDMO  hub  report  https://brodhub.eu/en/republic-of-moldova/report-the-observation-mission-of-the-
2025-parliamentary-elections-in-the-republic-of-moldova/ n of the 2025 Parliamentary Elections in the Republic 
of Moldova – BROD).  
58 See reports by FACT (EDMO hub covering MD): https://fact-hub.eu/moldova/ 
and BROD (EDMO hub covering RO and BU): https://brodhub.eu/en/republic-of-moldova/.  

14 

 
 
 
multiparty strategic communication frameworks to strengthen societal resilience against FIMI 
based on complex analysis and foresight. 

To support situational awareness and preparedness, a new regional hub of the European Digital 
Media Observatory focusing on Russian disinformation and covering Moldova and Ukraine 
was established59. The Commission also organised, together with the EU Delegation and the 
EU Partnership Mission (EUPM), a Disinformation and Cyber Threat Simulation to increase 
preparedness  related  to  hybrid  threats  in  Moldova60  and  facilitated  a  temporary  escalation 
mechanism  between  four  major  online  platforms  signatories  of  the  Code  of  Conduct  on 
Disinformation and local civil society actors61. 

Continuous efforts by the Moldovan national authorities, civil society and independent media, 
as well as support from the EU, including to election observation missions, played a crucial 
role in exposing interference, promoting media literacy, and countering disinformation through 
factual  communication.  This  experience  showed  that  main  vulnerabilities  occurred  in  the 
online  space  and  that  continued  engagement  by  both  national  authorities  and  the  EU  is 
necessary to ensure digital accountability in support of democracy. 

Enhancing electoral integrity is also a central priority in the EU external policy. It is a strategic 
imperative,  as  many  of  the  challenges  and  attacks  on  European  democracies  and  electoral 
processes are transnational by nature and can only be truly safeguarded if the EU is surrounded 
by  resilient  democracies.  Recent  elections  in  the  neighbourhood  highlighted  the  need  to 
respond to national authorities’ requests for assistance in countering disinformation on social 
media. The EU will strengthen its support to international election observation missions present 
on the ground. 

Work under the European Centre for Democratic Resilience will contribute to reinforcing the 
fairness and integrity of electoral and other democratic processes. Cooperation and exchanges 
between the Centre and relevant EU-level structures and cooperation mechanisms in this area, 
will  fully  respect  applicable  legal  frameworks,  the  independence  or  particularities  of  these 
structures and their participants, and existing procedures (e.g. ECNE, the network of national 
contact points on political advertising or the Digital Services Board).  

Actions:  

•  Support  reinforced  cooperation  with  Member  States  under 

the  European 
Cooperation  Network  on  Elections  (ECNE)  to  enhance  electoral  integrity  and 
preparedness 

•  Prepare guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes 
•  Update of the Digital Services Act Elections Toolkit 
•  Support the setting up of a voluntary EU network of influencers  

https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/new-european-digital-media-observatory-hub-fights-

59 
disinformation-ukraine-and-moldova.  
60 On 11 June 2015, in cooperation with Moldova’s Ministry for Economic Development and Digitalisation, the 
Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Moldova and the European Union Partnership Mission in 
Moldova,  https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-services-and-moldovan-authorities-conduct-
stress-test-potential-digital-hybrid-threats.  
61 Building on the successful iteration of the temporary escalation mechanism during Moldova’s 2024 elections 
and the experience of the Rapid Response of the Code. 

15 

 
 
 
•  Support common work with the Member States on the transparency and integrity of 

funding in politics 

•  Prepare a Commission Recommendation and a dedicated guide of best practices on 

the safety of political candidates and elected representatives 

•  Reinforce cooperation with   international election observers to strengthen capacities 
to monitor disinformation on social media during election observation outside the 
EU 

2.3.2. Strengthening the resilience of free and independent media  

Free,  independent  and  plural  media  underpin  the  integrity  and  diversity  of  the  information 
space, making them essential to our democracies. They hold power to account and by providing 
a plurality of reliable information sources, help people form their opinions and make informed 
choices62. Fostering media freedom and pluralism has also been at the heart of the work of the 
EU, through legislative initiatives such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) or the 
anti-SLAPP  Directive63.  The  EU  is  also  a  strong  supporter  of  media  freedom  globally, 
including  at  multilateral  level,  and  recognises  the  essential  role  of  independent  media  and 
journalism in upholding democratic values and fundamental rights worldwide.  

But the media sector is under strong economic pressure in a context marked by digitalisation. 
These  changes  in  the  information  environment  affect  how  information  is  produced,  shared, 
consumed and trusted. Citizens rely increasingly on online platforms and recently on generative 
AI to access information and form their opinions on a wide range of issues, including politics. 
Online platforms are becoming the main sources of information for young people64, especially 
via influencers65. The algorithms that online platforms use to sort content drive engagement, 
often  by  prioritising  sensational  or  controversial  content  over  reliable  and  substantiated 
information.  This  risks  amplifying  disinformation,  societal  divisions  and  challenges  the 
visibility of  media content.  Independent  media providers and news outlets  are struggling to 
adapt  their  business  models  when  it  comes  to  advertising  revenue66,  a  market  increasingly 
dominated by online platforms.  

This has made it harder to sustain independent news media and the availability of quality and 
investigative  journalistic  content,  based  on  professional  and  ethical  standards.  In  several 
regions,  and  many  rural  areas  in  particular,  local  news  outlets  have  been  driven  out  of  the 

62 Respondents to the open public consultation conducted by the Commission to prepare the European Democracy 
Shield identified as a priority for democratic resilience to ensure pluralism of free and independent media and a 
safe environment for journalists. 
63 Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons 
who  engage  in  public  participation  from  manifestly  unfounded  claims  or  abusive  court  proceedings,  OJ  L, 
2024/1069, 16.4.2024. 
64 According to the Social Media Survey 2025, for youth aged between 15 and 24, the most used source for content 
on 
Source: 
is 
affairs 
political 
https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3592. 
65 European Media Industry Outlook. See: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/2025-european-media-
industry-outlook-report. The 2024 Reuters Institute Digital News Report shows that 57% of TikTok users and 
53% of Instagram users declare that influencers are their primary source of news, ahead of journalists and print 
media (41% and 34% respectively). 
66 Insert latest market share stats from Eurostat. 

social  media 

platforms 

current 

(65%). 

social 

and 

16 

 
 
 
 
market, creating ‘news deserts’ resulting in a decline in the availability, plurality and quality 
of  information67,  which  can  lead  to  loss  of  engagement  and  trust  in  democracy  and  greater 
exposure  to  disinformation.  In  addition,  attacks,  abusive  lawsuits  and  other  forms  of 
intimidation are damaging the environment in which journalists work, making the safety and 
protection of journalists an essential priority68.  

The EU has been proactive in addressing challenges to media freedom and media pluralism, 
putting  forward  several  legal,  policy  and  funding  tools.  The  EMFA  provides  a  new  set  of 
common rules to protect media pluralism and independence in the EU, aiming to ensure that 
both public and private media can operate easily in the internal market, without undue pressure 
and taking into account the digital transformation. The Commission supports Member States 
in the application of the EMFA, including through guidelines, and will ensure its enforcement. 
The  Commission  will  maintain  an  active  dialogue  with  relevant  industry  players  and  civil 
society organisations to ensure that the safeguards and mechanisms provided by the EMFA are 
effectively applied across the EU. 

To ensure that the providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs pay due regard to  media freedom and 
pluralism,  the  DSA  requires  that  they  diligently  identify  and  mitigate  any  systemic  risks 
stemming from the design or functioning of their services, including as regards freedom and 
pluralism of the media. The Commission will continue to monitor and enforce these obligations 
and will engage with relevant stakeholders to ensure that they are upheld in the digital sphere. 

Safeguarding  the  free  flow  of  information  in  our  democracy  needs  vibrant  and  contestable 
markets  for  free  and  independent  media.  The  Commission  will  continue  to  enforce  EU 
antitrust rules in the digital sector to help promote a fair and diverse media landscape and 
combat  practices  that  can  undermine  media  pluralism,  including  by  protecting  independent 
media  providers  against  anticompetitive  behaviours  in  online  advertising.  In  addition, 
protecting  competition  can  also  foster  media  plurality  and  diversity,  not  only  in  traditional 
media sectors but also in fast-moving sectors such as AI. In the revised Merger Guidelines69, 
the Commission will provide more guidance on how it preserves competition on quality and 
how this may foster media plurality and diversity, to the benefit of consumers and citizens. 
Under  the  Digital  Markets  Act70,  the  Commission  will  include  amongst  its  priorities 
enforcement actions that promote an independent and diverse media landscape, including by 
increasing transparency of online advertising. Emerging challenges, such as the rollout of AI-
powered services, is also having an impact on fair and contestable digital markets for media. 
The  Commission  is  holding  regulatory  dialogues  on  these  issues  with  the  concerned 

67 https://cmpf.eui.eu/local-media-for-democracy-research-results/.  
68  In  its  2025  Rule  of  Law  report  the  Commission  found  that  increasing  attention  is  given  to  the  safety  and 
protection of journalists, amidst continuing threats, with Member States setting up or continuing to operate support 
structures  or  strengthening  the  legal  protection  of  journalists.  https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2025-
rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en  
69  Guidelines  on  the  assessment  of  horizontal  mergers  under  the  Council  Regulation  on  the  control  of 
concentrations between undertakings, 2004/C 31/03 and Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers 
under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 2008/C 265/07. 
70 Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable 
and fair markets in the digital sector, OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, pp. 1–66. 

17 

 
 
 
gatekeepers.  This  is  also  part  of  the  ongoing  DMA  review,  which  will  report  on  the  issues 
identified and potential future steps.  

To further support the economic viability of the sector, in the context of the current evaluation 
and  upcoming  review  of  the  Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive71  (AVMSD),  the 
Commission will assess ways to strengthen the prominence of media services of general 
interest  and  modernise  advertising  rules  with  a  view  to  foster  the  sustainability  of  EU 
media. The role of influencers will also be considered in the review of the AVMSD72 and in 
the forthcoming Digital Fairness Act, complementing existing EU rules.  

Public financing for public service broadcasting aims to allow them to fulfil the democratic, 
social and cultural needs of society and to guarantee pluralism, including cultural and linguistic 
diversity. The EMFA requires Member States to put in place funding procedures guaranteeing 
that  public  service  media  providers  have  adequate,  sustainable  and  predictable  financial 
resources corresponding to the fulfilment of and the capacity to develop  within their public 
service  remit.  The  ongoing  evaluation  of  the  2009  Broadcasting  Communication73  aims  to 
assess whether the existing state aid rules for public service broadcasting are still fit for purpose 
in light of market developments - from new technologies to new ways of watching and new 
players in the sector.  

The development of generative AI, while bringing opportunities, presents various challenges 
to the media ecosystem. Online piracy and the use of copyrighted material to train AI models 
without  permission  remains  a  significant  threat  to  the  media  sector,  eroding  revenues  and 
impacting on quality and diversity of media. The Commission will review the Directive on 
copyright in the Digital Single Market74 and consider how to improve its effectiveness in the 
context of these developments.  

The Commission will also deploy its financial tools to support the economic resilience of the 
media sector in the EU and beyond. The Media Resilience Programme will bridge current 
support  to  the  media  with  funding  programmes  proposed  in  the  new  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework  (MFF)75,  preparing  the  ground  for  the  successful  deployment  of  the  next  MFF. 
This  Programme  will  support  independent  journalism  and  media  literacy,  underlining  the 
Commission's efforts to strengthen sustainable news media sector, including local journalism, 
also in  EU candidate countries and potential candidates. The Commission will ramp  up the 
support provided to local media through Creative Europe, by fostering projects focusing on 

71 Directive  (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending 
Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive) in view of changing market realities, OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, pp. 69–92. 
72  In  the  review  of  the  audiovisual  media  rules,  the  Commission  will  focus  on  ways  to  ensure  a  fairer  media 
ecosystem, where viewers – particularly younger ones – are adequately protected when they consume audiovisual 
content online, including content made available by influencers. 
73 European Commission, Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service  broadcasting, 
2009/C 257/01 on which the Commission launched  a public consultation in October 2025 seeking input from 
public authorities, businesses, and citizens. 
74 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and 
related rights in the Digital Single Market, OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, pp. 92–125. 
75 Notably the proposed AgoraEU programme. 

18 

 
 
 
the  viability  of  independent  and  local  journalism76.  Creative  Europe  will  also  expand  its 
existing calls for proposals on skills in 2027, by adding a new action on upskilling news media 
professionals.  A  new  action  under  Horizon  Europe  will  further  support  the  digital 
transformation of the media industry by, inter alia, designing new innovative tools for media 
to reach new users and revenue sources.  

Private  investment  in  the  media  remains  relatively  low  and  requires  new  tailor-made 
investment solutions, focusing on long-term returns on investment. Private equity should be 
enabled  to  support  quality  independent  media.  The  Commission  will  promote  impact 
investments in the news media sector and start engaging with potential investors alongside the 
EIB Group.  

The Commission has committed, as part of its support to the uptake of AI in the cultural and 
creative sectors, to help the development of pan-European platforms to make available real-
time news and information from professional media outlets to wider audiences across the EU, 
in  multiple  languages77.  The  Commission  will  also  step  up  its  support  to  innovative  media 
projects providing new formats and content to audiences across the Union and beyond78. In 
addition, the Commission will explore future pathways for the EU’s tech environment, with an 
initial  focus  on  future  social  networking/social  media  platforms,  supporting  EU  digital 
sovereignty.  

Ensuring the safety and protection of journalists remains a key priority, including in the EU 
external action79. To intensify its efforts to protect journalists against undue pressure, threats 
and attacks, the Commission will update its Recommendation on the safety of journalists80 
to  support  a  stronger  safety  and  enabling  environment  for  journalists  and  for  quality  news 
reporting  (primary  source  journalism)  in  society  and  will  organise  a  high-level  event  on 
combating SLAPPs to support the review of its anti-SLAPP Recommendation81. In addition, 
to promote safe harbours for journalists, researchers and civil society organisations active in 
analysing  the  information  environment  and  its  evolutions  (e.g.  the  impact  of  AI),  the 
Commission will adopt guidelines to support the implementation of relevant EU rules82.  

are 

sectors 

Actions 

available 

supporting 

news  media 

76  The  Commission  also  supports  independent  local  journalism  and  contributes  to  the  training  of  aspiring 
journalists through measures focusing on specific topics, such as under EU cohesion policy. Its locally oriented 
information measures and capacity-building actions help tackle the ‘news deserts’. 
77 AI strategy COM(2025) 723 final.  
78 
https://digital-
the 
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/news-initiative. Noteworthy cooperation initiatives have also been launched at 
the  initiative  of  Member  States.  New  examples  of  such  cross-border  initiatives  include  ARTE+  and  the 
“informational shield” project launched by Deutsche Welle and France Médias Monde. 
79 Support to independent and pluralistic media, access to information and the fight against disinformation, as well 
as  safety  of  journalists  and  media  workers  online  and  offline  are  key priorities  under  the  EU  Action  plan  for 
Human  Rights  and  Democracy,  and  includes  actions  such  as  EU’s  Human  rights  defenders  mechanism: 
ProtectDefenders.eu and EU support to the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) who supports democracy 
actors, including independent media platforms and journalists . https://democracyendowment.eu/.  
80 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and 
empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union, C/2021/6650.  
81 The Commission will also renew the mandate and composition of the expert group against SLAPPs to foster 
support for victims and review EU private international law rules to assess the possible need to include SLAPP-
relevant aspects. 
82 Such as the DSA, the Regulation on political advertising or the AI Act. 

at: 

19 

 
 
 
To contribute to the overall goal of supporting media freedom and pluralism, the Commission 
will also continue to fund mechanisms  to monitor press freedom in EU Member States and 
candidate countries83.  

the  European  Endowment 

The Commission is also supporting quality independent media and journalism internationally, 
in particular in the EU neighbourhood and EU candidate countries and potential candidates. 
Core funding to sustain independent media operations is an effective and  efficient means in 
countering  authoritarian  regimes’  disinformation  operations  both  domestically  and  abroad. 
Independent, high quality investigative and entertainment formats help prevent FIMI narratives 
from  taking  hold  and  can  limit  dissemination  into  the  EU  and  EU  partner  countries84. 
the  Commission’s 
Furthermore, 
ProtectDefenders.eu mechanism offer support to journalists at risk as human rights defenders 
from outside the EU. In 2024, at least 943 media workers were supported through the latter 
mechanism.  The  Commission  will  continue  to  provide  core  support  to  exiled  independent 
journalists and media outlets, including from Russia and Belarus and other countries, who are 
working from within the EU and its neighbourhood, as well as helping to sustain high quality 
independent media outlets in key partner countries. The Commission will scale up the rapid 
response  work  with  trusted  partners  to  ensure  that  digital  censorship  circumvention,  anti-
surveillance and anti-shut down solutions are made available to citizens, civil society actors 
and journalists under authoritarian regimes  The Commission  has also  proposed to  prioritise 
support to media freedom under the new MFF Global Europe. 

for  Democracy  and 

Actions: 

•  Review the Audiovisual Media Services Directive  
•  Address  challenges  to  the  media  ecosystem  in  the  context  of  the  review  of  the 

Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market 

•  Provide guidance to maintain competition and foster media plurality and diversity in 

the context of the revision of the Merger Guidelines  

•  Assess the fitness of existing State aid rules for public services broadcasting in the 

evaluation of the 2009 Broadcasting Communication 

•  Launch  a  Media  Resilience  Programme  to  support  independent  journalism  and 

media literacy 

•  Reinforce  measures  on  the  safety  of  journalists  and  combating  abusive  litigation 

(SLAPP)  

•  Support quality independent media and journalism beyond EU borders 

2.4. Boosting societal resilience and citizens engagement   

Engaged and empowered citizens and an active civil society are the backbone of democracy. 
Promoting  citizenship  education,  including  media,  digital  literacy  and  critical  thinking 
strengthens  awareness  of  risks  and  threats  and  empowers  citizens  of  all  ages  across  all 

83 See for instance projects in receipt of funding from the Creative Europe programme such as Media Freedom 
Rapid Response. 
84 EU core support to independent media, delivered via the European Endowment for Democracy has reached an 
audience of at least 36 million via social media channels, in Russia alone. Since 2022, the EU supported outlets 
have increased their audience by at least 15 to 20 %. 

20 

 
 
 
 
communities  to  navigate  the  information  environment,  access  reliable  information,  exercise 
their democratic rights and engage in democratic processes. Promoting citizens’ engagement 
in the democratic life, through support to participatory and deliberative tools, is also needed to 
reinforce ownership, empowerment and public trust. These are key for building overall societal 
resilience. 

2.4.1. Citizenship education and skills for democracy 

Citizenship skills, including media and digital literacy are critical for democracy. A broad range 
of projects support such skills under various EU programmes, for example Erasmus+ and the 
Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) and Horizon Europe. 

Measures in education 

Schools and educational institutions play a key role in developing citizenship skills to enable 
people  to  act  responsibly,  by  fostering  critical  thinking,  inclusivity,  freedom  of  speech  and 
active civic engagement. By nurturing these skills, educational entities at all levels empower 
informed and engaged citizens, thereby building more resilient democratic societies.  

As part of the Union of Skills, the Action Plan on Basic Skills considers both citizenship skills, 
and digital skills as basic skills that are fundamental to enable citizens to thrive, both in their 
professional  and  personal  lives.  The  2026  Education  package  will  include  a  Basic  Skills 
Support  Scheme  for  schools  to  support  children  and  young  people  to  acquire  literacy, 
mathematics, science, digital and citizenship skills. As part of this package, the Commission 
will  present  a  2030  Roadmap  on  the  future  of  digital  education  and  skills,  building  on  the 
review of the Digital Education Action Plan, focusing on digital skills, AI literacy and critical 
thinking and boosting democratic resilience in the digital world. 

The Commission will provide recommendations for school leaders and policymakers. This will 
include  updated  Guidelines  for  teachers  and  educators  on  tackling  disinformation  and 
promoting  digital  literacy  through  education  and  training85,  to  strengthen  the  pedagogical 
expertise of teachers and the critical thinking skills of young people, to promote the responsible 
use  of  digital  technologies  and  to  support  informed  choices  online.  These  will  cover 
developments such as generative AI, information manipulation86 and the role of social media 
and influencers. The Commission is also developing guidelines to support the acquisition of 
basic skills on preparedness, including relevant elements of media literacy, as a key for active 
and  informed  citizenship  and  fighting  disinformation  and  information  manipulation.  The 
Commission  will  develop  an  EU  citizenship  competence  framework87,  along  with  the 
guidelines to strengthen citizenship education in schools. This will inform the development 
of curricula and training programmes. 

85 European Commission: Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, Guidelines for teachers 
and  educators  on  tackling  disinformation  and  promoting  digital  literacy  through  education  and  training, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2022, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/28248.  
86 Including the possible differentiated targeting of boys and girls. 
87  Taking  into  account  among  others  EU  citizenship  rights  as  explained  in  the  Guide  to  EU  Citizenship: 
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/guide-eu-citizenship_en  and  the  upcoming  EU  democracy guide  for 
citizens. 

21 

 
 
 
Media literacy actions beyond education 

Complementary  to  measures  in  the  field  of  education,  actions  in  support  of  media  literacy 
including digital literacy across the EU need to be scaled up inclusively and efficiently, to reach 
people  of  all  ages  and  socioeconomic  background,  especially  people  beyond  education  and 
training settings.  

The  Commission  will  roll  out  a  package  of  measures  on  media  literacy.  The  Media 
Resilience Programme will include  new actions to  support media literacy  reaching  all age 
categories (youth, adults, seniors), across rural and urban areas. It will address new and existing 
challenges of information integrity, linking media literacy to preparedness and focusing on new 
trends  in  terms  of  media  consumption88.  Potential  actions  to  improve  existing  mechanisms 
under  the  Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive  on  media  literacy  will  also  be  part  of  the 
evaluation and review of these rules. Priority will be placed on supporting Member States that 
face particular challenges and needs, as well as candidate countries and potential candidates89 
and groups facing barriers in engaging in democratic life90.  

The  Commission  will  support  Member  States  in  developing,  extending  or  implementing 
national or regional action plans on media literacy91.  

The Commission will also reinforce the media literacy community, to increase coordination 
and  strengthen  links  between  actors  involved.  This  will  include  strengthening  the 
Commission’s  Media  Literacy  Expert  Group  (MLEG)  of  Member  States  authorities,  by 
fostering  exchanges  of  best  practices,  offering  new  cooperation  tools  and  expanding  its 
mandate to cover aspects of societal resilience and preparedness. To complement the efforts of 
MLEG, the Commission will also establish a new independent expert network for media 
literacy, bringing together independent experts from various fields (e.g. preparedness, FIMI 
and  disinformation,  data  analysis,  information  integrity  risks,  behavioural  sciences,  etc.)  to 
provide independent inputs and insights to meet new challenges. Media literacy efforts will 
also build on the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) media literacy community, 
further growing the repository of best practices and use cases based on the EDMO Guidelines 
for  Effective  Media  Literacy  Initiatives92  and  by  scaling-up  success  stories  developed  and 
deployed by EDMO regional/national hubs, for instance for outreach to vulnerable and rural 
communities and to seniors or collaboration with the media.  

88 Actions to improve the AVMSD mechanism on media literacy will also be part of its evaluation and review.  
89 Which are particularly exposed to FIMI and disinformation due to their proximity with Russia and Belarus.  
90  The  latter  could  be  based  on  existing  indicators  such  as  the  Media  Pluralism  Index  which  contains  a  sub-
indicator on the level of media literacy. 
91 The EU Preparedness Union Strategy called to step up work on digital and media literacy, including in the 
context of the European Democracy Shield and 2030 Roadmap on the future of digital education and skills to 
enhance critical thinking and build resilience against disinformation and cyber threats from an early age. Several 
Member States have national programmes to achieve these objectives. For example, LU adopted a national action 
plan for digital inclusion in 2021 and MT has a digital education strategy for 2025-2030. 
92 See: https://edmo.eu/areas-of-activities/media-literacy/raising-standards-the-edmo-guidelines/.  

22 

 
 
 
The  Commission  will  present  an  EU  democracy  guide  for  citizens,  to  promote  citizens’ 
awareness of their democratic rights under EU law and policy frameworks and how to exercise 
them93. Particular emphasis will be put on young people. 

To involve citizens in framing these measures on democracy, citizenship and media and digital 
literacy  skills  the  Commission  will  organise  a  European  Citizens’  Panel  on  democratic 
resilience.  

Actions:  

•  Develop the 2026 Basic Skills Support Scheme for Schools, including citizenship and 

digital skills 

•  Update  the  Guidelines  for  teachers  and  educators  on  disinformation  and  digital 

literacy 

•  Develop  an  EU  citizenship  competence  framework  along  with  guidelines  to 

strengthen citizenship education in schools 

•  Support  Member  States  in  developing,  extending  or  implementing  national  or 

regional action plans on media literacy 

•  Roll  out  measures  on  media  literacy,  with  new  priorities  and  a  reinforced  media 

literacy community  

•  Prepare an EU democracy guide for citizens 
•  Organise a European Citizens’ Panel on democratic resilience 

2.4.2. Promoting citizens’ engagement and participation 

New and meaningful methods of citizen participation, deliberation and engagement, across all 
generations94, provide additional ways for citizens to get involved in democratic debates and 
in public policymaking, enriching deliberations with diverse perspectives – as demonstrated by 
the Conference on the Future of Europe - and reinforcing representative democracy based on 
elections.  

At EU level, the Commission uses several tools to involve EU citizens in its policymaking, 
starting with the European Citizens’ Initiatives, a unique agenda-setting tool allowing citizens 
to put forward their ideas for EU action. The European Citizens’ Panels and the Citizens’ 
Engagement Platform, have become important assets to inform and support policymaking, 
build democratic resilience and foster European citizenship and their use at EU level and in the 
Member  States  will  be  encouraged.  The  Commission  will  explore  possibilities  to  open  its 
Citizens Engagement Platform or to enable its interoperability with national, regional and local 
public administrations.  

93 Focusing on rights under the Digital Services Act, the AI Act, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the 
Regulation on political advertising, EU electoral rights and other relevant frameworks. 
94  These  include  intergenerational  citizens’  panels,  citizens’  assemblies,  participatory  budgeting,  participatory 
planning or new digital civic tech tools and platforms, complementing practices such as public consultations or 
surveys. 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
The  Commission  will  work  closely  with  relevant  bodies  and  entities,  such  as  the  European 
Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee and stakeholders95 
to reinforce a network of national authorities on citizens’ participation, with national focal 
points, building in particular on the Commission’s virtual Competence Centre on Participatory 
and Deliberative Democracy96. The work of this network will focus on the local level, youth 
empowerment  and  intergenerational  dialogue,  providing  practical  support  and  promoting 
relevant tools to national authorities. Within this framework, the Commission will support the 
preparation  of  a  training  package  for  Member  States  on  citizens’  participation  in  all  EU 
official languages.  

The Commission will ensure wider access to information about citizens’ participation through 
a  multilingual  portal  for  resources  at  EU  level,  to  disseminate  tools  and  information  on 
democratic  participation  more  widely,  for  use  at  all  levels  across  the  EU,  including  public 
administrations,  stakeholders  and  citizens,  centralising  information  gathered  through  the 
network of national authorities on citizen’s participation and under the Competence Centre on 
Participatory and Deliberative Democracy.  

Innovative digital tools should be promoted to complement and support personal exchanges. 
The  Commission  will  stimulate  innovation  in  online  platforms  that  enable  participation  in 
democracy (civic tech97), including local digital platforms supporting democratic engagement, 
leveraging AI for participatory purposes. To launch engagement with the civic tech sector, the 
Commission will organise a civic tech hackathon to showcase innovative projects and will set 
up a European civic tech hub98, which will provide a comprehensive, multilingual focal point 
for information, resources  and tools  on the  civic  tech.99 The Commission will support pilot 
projects  in  this  area  under  relevant  EU  funding  programmes,  involving  local  authorities, 
communities and tech start-ups to develop scalable solutions, also in rural areas100. Across these 
work-strands, particular attention will be paid to the accessibility and interoperability of civic 
tech tools. 

Youth participation and consultation at all levels ensures that policies and decisions consider 
the  perspectives  and  needs  of  the  younger  generation,  who  will  live  with  their  long-term 
consequences. Engaging  young people, in an inclusive manner, also fosters a sense of civic 
responsibility, encouraging lifelong participation in society and democracy. Young people play 

95  The  EU  Strategy  for  Civil  Society  will  propose  measures  to  work  with  Member  States  to  strengthen  the 
engagement of civil society organisations, also following up to the 2023 Recommendation when it comes to these 
actors, whereas actions under the Democracy Shield focus on citizens’ participation. 
96 This Centre supports participatory and deliberative projects at EU level and involving candidate countries and 
potential candidates, with a variety of resources, trainings, in-person events, citizens’ labs and a community of 
practice with multidisciplinary expertise from across the EU. 
97 Civic tech can be defined as the use of digital technologies to reinforce democracy by enabling the public to be 
informed, participate in decision- and policymaking, and increase governments' responsiveness and accountability 
(see OECD Public Governance Policy Papers No. 72 of 2025).  
98 It will be connected to the Interoperable Europe Portal, which  was established through Regulation 2024/903 
and gives access to interoperability solutions and open-source solutions used by public administrations in Europe. 
It already hosts examples of open-source tools for citizen participation. 
99 As such, it will support the visibility of civic tech tools and the share sharing of expertise and knowledge across 
the civic tech ecosystem, and foster awareness of this sector among national and local authorities. 
100 Building on the European Interoperability Framework, an assessment model will be created to evaluate the 
maturity level of interoperability of civic tech platforms and help online platforms identify areas for improvement. 

24 

 
 
 
a central role in the Commission’s efforts to involve citizens in its policymaking,  including 
through  the  President’s  Youth  Advisory  Board.  Youth  Policy  Dialogues  between 
Commissioners and young people will be organised on the implementation of the European 
Democracy  Shield.  The  EU  Youth  Dialogue  Participation  Toolkit,  created  with  national 
youth  councils,  will  be adapted  to  reach  more  young  people  and  will  be  promoted  via  the 
European Youth Portal to boost youth engagement more broadly. The Voices of the Future 
initiative will aim to create a European Forum for Intergenerational Fairness in Democracy, as 
an inclusive space where people of all ages can meet to shape Europe’s long-term choices.  

Actions:  

•  Promote  citizens’  and  youth  participation,  including  by  reinforcing  a  network  of 
national  authorities  on  citizens  participation,  with  a  training  package  and  a 
multilingual portal for resources at EU level 

•  Set up a European civic tech hub to support the civic tech sector 

2.4.3. Strengthening democracy through whole-of-society actions 

To further strengthen democracy, it is necessary to provide sustained support to engaged actors 
and  communities,  recognise  and  amplify  their  initiatives,  and  showcase  best  practices  that 
demonstrate innovative approaches. Particular focus is necessary on regions affected by low 
civic and political engagement. 

To address growing challenges such as social fragmentation, digital isolation, and declining 
trust  in  public  institutions,  the  Commission  will  foster  community-building  approaches. 
Together with local authorities and networks across the EU – including the EU Network of 
Local  Councillors  – the Commission  will encourage  and support grassroots  initiatives that 
bring together people of different ages and backgrounds and strengthen local connections and 
inclusive public spaces, including through sports, music, storytelling and collaboration.  

Local  democracy,  inclusion  and  participatory  approaches  are  among  the  core  values  and 
principles of the New European Bauhaus.  It  will support local  democracy through concrete 
initiatives  that  promote  innovative  approaches  to  community  engagement  at  the  level  of 
neighbourhoods.  This  includes  strengthening  community  participation  and  intergenerational 
connections,  as  well  as  advancing  collaborative  approaches  for  inclusive  public  spaces  and 
neighbourhoods. 

The  Commission's  EUROPE  DIRECT  centres  will  act  as  local  micro-hubs  of  democracy – 
open, lived-in spaces where communities meet, exchange and act together, supporting inclusive 
dialogue rooted in their everyday realities. In partnership with local authorities, they can host 
activities  that  turn  discussion  into  shared  experience  –  from  community  evenings  to 
neighbourhood skill-shares or local podcasts101.  

To  encourage  more  exchanges  and  synergies  between  stakeholders  active  on  democratic 
innovation, the sharing of best practices, and the visibility of their projects the Commission 
will organise a High-Level Event on democracy and grant an annual award for democratic 

101 The Citizens’ Engagement Ambassadors, alumni of the European Citizens’ Panels, could share their experience 
and help promote citizen participation. 

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innovation102.  Showcasing  democracy-related  projects  increases  their  visibility  to  private 
donors and philanthropic organisations which are encouraged to play an increasing role. 

The  Commission  will  roll  out  dedicated  awareness-raising  campaigns  to  articulate  why 
democracy matters and how all citizens, including young people, can exercise their democratic 
rights and make their voices heard103. 

The private sector also has a role to play in promoting and upholding democracy, which is 
fundamental to a fair and well-functioning business environment and economic prosperity. In 
turn,  a  prosperous  economy  is  essential  for  democracy  to  thrive.  The  Commission  will 
encourage  private  companies  and  business  associations  to  share  best  practices,  undertake 
voluntary commitments in this area and to build a business coalition for democracy104.  

Actions: 

•  Organise a High-Level  Event on democracy and an annual award for democratic 

innovation 

•  Roll out dedicated awareness-raising campaigns by the Commission 
•  Support  building  voluntary  commitments  of  the  private  sector  to  build  a  business 

coalition for democracy 

2.4.4. Safeguarding evidence-based decision making 

Evidence-informed  policymaking  ensures  that  institutions,  debates  and  decision-making  are 
rooted in factual, transparent and accountable processes and impartial data based on freedom 
of scientific research, fostering trust and legitimacy in governance. To guarantee effective and 
democratic scientific advisory processes and scientific support to public policies, it is necessary 
to promote adherence to the highest research ethics and integrity standards. It is also essential 
to enable the involvement and trust of citizens in science and to ensure robust and independent 
advisory systems. In this view, the Commission will adopt a Recommendation on supporting 
scientific evidence and its use in public policymaking.  

Freedom  of  scientific  research  is  a  crucial  part  of  academic  freedom  and  is  essential  for 
generating trustworthy knowledge and reliable data. By protecting researchers’ and academics’ 
independence  to  explore,  question,  and  innovate,  they  ensure  that  evidence  used  in 
policymaking  is  credible  and  unbiased.  These  values  are  also  a  prerequisite  for  higher 
education institutions to achieve their academic and societal mission, nurturing and promoting 
public discourses by offering expertise and evidence, and essential to democratic resilience. 
The  forthcoming  European  Research  Area  Act  will  reaffirm  the  freedom  of  scientific 
research in EU law, as an essential part of academic values. Freedom of arts, and protecting 
artists  and  cultural  institutions,  as  addressed  in  the  Culture  Compass  for  Europe,  is  also  an 
important component of the democratic fabric and resilience.  

102 Which could be open to concrete projects in EU candidate countries and potential candidates. 
103 The Citizens’ Engagement Ambassadors, alumni of the European Citizens’ Panels, could share their experience 
and help promote citizen participation. 
104 Supported by a starting workshop and by a study on options for business community contributions. 

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Building  on  the  2024  Council  Recommendation  on  Enhancing  Research  Security105,  the 
Commission is also assessing the options for the setup of a European Centre of Expertise on 
Research  Security  to  strengthen  the  evidence  base  for  research  security  policymaking  and 
foster a cross-EU community of practice. 

More broadly, the European Centre for Democratic Resilience could also facilitate exchanges 
of  experience  on  democratic  resilience  building,  such  as  best  practices  for  community 
building, media literacy initiatives and preparedness actions. 

Actions: 

•  Adopt a Commission Recommendation on supporting scientific evidence and its use in 

public policymaking 

•  Enshrine the freedom of scientific research in EU law under the European Research 

Area Act 

•  Assess options for the set-up of a European Centre of Expertise on Research Security 

3. Investing in democracy is investing in our future  

Financial support is key to achieving the priorities of the European Democracy Shield in the 
immediate and long term. Several EU funding programmes are relevant in this regard. Creative 
Europe  provides  funding  to  support  the  media,  journalism  and  digital  and  media  literacy. 
Digital  Europe  supports  multidisciplinary  collaborations  to  counter  disinformation  via  its 
funding of EDMO, including its regional hubs, and the European Network of Fact-Checkers. 
Horizon Europe supports research, innovation and experimentation to strengthen democracy 
and  governance  and  develop  democratic  innovation.  The  Citizens  Equality,  Rights  and 
Values  (CERV)  programme  protects  and  promotes  Union  values  and  promotes  citizens’ 
engagement and citizens’ participation in the democratic life of the Union.  

The  rapid  response  pillar  under  Neighbourhood  and  Development  and  International 
Cooperation  Instrument  supports  independent  journalism  and  builds  countering  FIMI 
capacities  in  crisis  situations.  Other  programmes,  such  as  the  Justice  programme  and 
Erasmus+,  strengthen  democracy  by  achieving  their  main  objectives.  The  facilities  for 
Ukraine, the Western Balkans and Moldova allow to disburse funding based on the fulfilment 
of  structural  reforms,  aiming  to  strengthen  democracy,  with  support  to  civil  society 
organisations,  independent  media,  media  literacy  and  resilience  against  FIMI  and  hybrid 
threats.  The  Commission  will  consider  with  priority  democracy-related  aspects  when 
programming  these  funds  for  the  remaining  time  under  the  current  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework (MFF). Innovative funding should be considered, such as micro-grants for local 
initiatives,  financial  instruments  such  as  guarantees,  loans  and  equity,  and  encouraging  and 
streamlining crowdfunding.  

Private funding should be incentivised. For instance, private equity funding can already be used 
for  de-risking  creative  projects  in  the  audiovisual  sector  by  funding  development  and 
distribution of films, media content or cultural initiatives. Such de-risking could be applied to 

105 Council Recommendation of 23 May 2024 on enhancing research security, C/2024/3510.  

27 

 
 
 
 
future  projects  supporting  independent  media  and  journalism.  Fundraising  events  could 
stimulate philanthropic contributions and collaborations with private foundations to strengthen 
the financial support for the European Democracy Shield. 

As  part  of  the  next  MFF  for  2028-2034,  the  Commission  has  proposed  a  number  of 
programmes to contribute to the objectives of the European Democracy Shield. The proposed 
funding would cover support across a broad spectrum of priorities and actors, including free 
and  independent  media,  the  work  of  civil  society  organisations,  education  and  overall 
democratic resilience. In particular, AgoraEU is intended to promote shared values, including 
democracy, and to support the European cultural diversity, its audiovisual and creative sectors, 
media freedom as well as the involvement of civil society. The new MEDIA+ strand under 
AgoraEU would provide holistic support to free and independent journalism and news media, 
protect and promote media freedom; enhance the financial viability of the media, support media 
literacy and the detection and countering of disinformation. The CERV+ stand of AgoraEU 
intends  to  support  the  implementation  of  the  Democracy  Shield  by  fostering  free,  fair  and 
inclusive electoral processes and by strengthening citizens’ participation and engagement in 
the democratic and civic life of the Union. Other important support actions would be funded 
through  the  Justice  Programme106,  Horizon  Europe107,  Erasmus+108,  the  European 
Competitiveness Fund109, the Global Europe Instrument110 and the National and Regional 
Partnership Plans111.  

Democratic  resilience  and  defence  reinforce  each  other.  Defence  spending  could  also  be 
regarded as a means to support democratic resilience, for instance by investing in cybersecurity, 
prevention  against  hybrid  threats  or  protection  of  critical  infrastructure  and  democratic 
institutions from external interference. EU defence resilience and actions on countering hybrid 
threats 
through  strengthening  Europe’s 
technological excellence in cyber defence and the development of cutting-edge technologies. 

reinforce  democratic 

resilience, 

including 

106 The proposed next Justice programme aims to strengthen democracy by promoting and supporting training for 
the judiciary and judicial staff with a view to promoting democracy  and ensuring the consistent and effective 
implementation of relevel EU legal instruments. 
107 The next Horizon Europe programme proposed by the Commission will continue to support research aiming 
to strengthen democracy and democratic values, by promoting civic engagement, fostering resilient, pluralistic 
societies and the integrity of the information space and of the media landscape and countering disinformation. 
108 The next Erasmus+ programme proposed by the Commission would put particular emphasis on supporting 
citizenship education and civic engagement, EU values, societal resilience and media literacy, in full respect of 
the competence of the Member States in defining schools and academic curricula and the organisation of their 
education structures, including through non-formal and informal learning activities supporting youth participation 
and young people’s learning how to participate in democracy. 
109 The proposed European Competitiveness Fund would support the civil security industry in areas such as the 
fight against hybrid threats. 
110 In the enlargement and neighbourhood east regions, the proposed Global Europe instrument will provide tools 
to promote democracy, good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
In  addition,  Global  Europe  will  support  candidate  countries  and  potential  candidates’  progress  towards  EU 
standards in line with a ‘fundamentals first’ to enlargement. In this context, particular attention will also be given 
to  strengthening  independent  media  and  media  literacy,  as  well  as  to  enhancing  resilience  against  foreign 
information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and hybrid threats. 
111 National and regional partnership plans, implemented in respect of the principles of multi-level governance 
and partnership, can support Member States’ capabilities in countering serious and organised crime, notably linked 
to hybrid threats such as FIMI, and measures that strengthen democratic governance for instance by improving 
transparency, fostering civic dialogue, supporting civil society and strengthening rule of law. 

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EU financial support under the European Defence Fund, Horizon Europe, Digital Europe, 
the SAFE instrument (Security Action for Europe) and in the future MFF under the proposed 
European Defence Industry Programme is essential in this regard. 

4. Conclusions 

This  Communication  on  the  European  Democracy  Shield  provides  a  strategic  approach  to 
safeguard,  strengthen  and  promote  democracy  in  the  EU  in  the  long  run.  It  highlights  the 
Commission’s strong commitment to enhancing democratic resilience across the Union and its 
readiness  to  work  together  with  other  EU  institutions  and  bodies,  the  EU  Member  States, 
partners from the EU neighbourhood, relevant stakeholders, as well as citizens, to address the 
challenges that democracy is facing.  

Under this strategic approach, a series of actions are announced, that will be gradually rolled 
out  by  2027.  Member  States  will  play  a  key  role  to  achieve  these  objectives,  and  the 
Commission will pursue its efforts to ensure joint ownership.  

To  ensure  the  political  follow-up  regarding  the  implementation  of  this Communication,  the 
Commission will regularly update the European Parliament and the Council. The Commission 
will organise an  annual  high-level Ministerial Forum to take stock of the  actions rolled out 
under the European Democracy Shield and facilitate the sharing of best practices, through the 
engagement of both institutional and non-institutional actors. The Commission will also engage 
with interlocutors and stakeholders at national and local levels. By the end of the mandate, the 
Commission will take stock of the implementation and impact of the actions included in this 
Communication.  

The  European  Democracy  Shield  is  an  integral  element  of  the  proactive  approach  the 
Commission takes to defend and uphold EU values. The Commission has taken strong actions 
to safeguard and promote the rule of law and fundamental rights in the EU, notably through 
the annual Rule of Law Report and the annual reports on the application of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. Protecting and promoting human rights and democracy is also a key 
priority of the EU’s external actions, as highlighted in the Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy 2020-2027. The EU Strategy for Civil Society112 complements these efforts by 
promoting a stronger engagement with civil society organisations and fostering a thriving civic 
space across the EU.  

Democracy is a daily commitment that we must protect, nurture and never  take for granted. 
The EU remains firmly committed to defending democracy and promoting democratic values, 
institutions, and processes, in the face of growing external and internal challenges. What we 
have is worth preserving and we will do so with full strength and unity, building strong and 
resilient democracies. 

112 European Communication, Communication on EU Strategy to Support, Protect and Empower Civil Society, 
COM(2025) 790 final.  

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