COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Georgia 2025 Report Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy
Date: 2025-11-04
Institutions: Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, European Commission
Subjects: Georgia, accession criteria, accession negotiations, pre-accession strategy, regional cooperation

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 4.11.2025  SWD(2025) 757 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Georgia 2025 Report Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy                               {COM(2025) 690 final} - {SWD(2025) 750 final} - {SWD(2025) 751 final} - {SWD(2025) 752 final} - {SWD(2025) 753 final} - {SWD(2025) 754 final} - {SWD(2025) 755 final} - {SWD(2025) 756 final} - {SWD(2025) 758 final} - {SWD(2025) 759 final}  
 
 
Contents 

1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 3 

1.1. Context ............................................................................................................................................... 3 

1.2. Main findings of the report ................................................................................................................ 3 

1.3. Assessment of the implementation of the steps / priorities ........................................................... 14 

2. Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process ........................................................................... 20 

2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform ..................................... 20 

2.1.1 Democracy ................................................................................................................................. 20 

2.1.2. Public administration reform .................................................................................................... 24 

2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights ................................................................................................. 26 

2.2.1  Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights ....................................................................... 26 

2.2.2  Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security ............................................................................. 41 

2.3. Economic criteria ............................................................................................................................. 50 

2.3.1 The existence of a functioning market economy ....................................................................... 50 

2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union ........... 54 

2.4. Public procurement, statistics, financial control ............................................................................. 56 

Chapter 5 - Public procurement .......................................................................................................... 56 

Chapter 18 - Statistics ......................................................................................................................... 56 

Chapter 32 - Financial control ............................................................................................................. 57 

3. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation ........................................................................... 58 

4. Ability to Assume obligations of membership ........................................................................................ 59 

Cluster 2: Internal Market ....................................................................................................................... 59 

Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods ................................................................................................. 59 

Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers ................................................................................. 60 

Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ................................................ 60 

Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital ................................................................................................ 61 

Chapter 6 - Company law .................................................................................................................... 61 

Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law .................................................................................................. 61 

Chapter 8 - Competition policy ........................................................................................................... 62 

Chapter 9 - Financial services .............................................................................................................. 62 

Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection ................................................................................... 63 

Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ................................................................................... 64 

Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media .................................................................................. 64 

Chapter 16 - Taxation .......................................................................................................................... 65 

Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy ...................................................................................... 66 

Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment ....................................................................................... 66 

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Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy ..................................................................................... 68 

Chapter 25 - Science and research...................................................................................................... 69 

Chapter 26 - Education and culture .................................................................................................... 69 

Chapter 29 - Customs union ............................................................................................................... 70 

Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity .................................................................... 71 

Chapter 14 - Transport policy ............................................................................................................. 71 

Chapter 15 - Energy ............................................................................................................................ 72 

Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks .............................................................................................. 73 

Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change .................................................................................. 73 

Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ...................................................................................... 75 

Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development................................................................................ 75 

Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy .......................................................... 76 

Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture .............................................................................................. 77 

Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments ......................................... 77 

Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions ............................................................................... 78 

Cluster 6: External relations .................................................................................................................... 79 

Chapter 30 - External relations ........................................................................................................... 79 

Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy ............................................................................. 80 

Annex I – Relations between the EU and Georgia ...................................................................................... 82 

Annex II – Statistical data ........................................................................................................................ 84 

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1. INTRODUCTION1   

1.1. CONTEXT 

In December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that 
the relevant reforms (i.e. the nine steps) set out in the Commission recommendations of 8 November 
2023 were taken. In view of the developments in Georgia, the European Council concluded in June 
and  October  2024  that  the  authorities’  course  of  action  jeopardised  Georgia’s  EU  path,  de  facto 
leading  to  a  halt  of  the  accession  process.  In  December  2024,  the  European  Council  regretted  the 
Georgian  government’s  decision  to  suspend  the  country’s  EU  accession  process  until  2028.  In  the 
2024  Communication  on  EU  Enlargement  Policy,  the  Commission  concluded  that,  unless  Georgia 
reverted  to  its  EU  path  and  demonstrated  tangible  efforts  to  address  key  reforms,  the  Commission 
would not be in a position to consider recommending opening negotiations with Georgia.  

Instead  of  demonstrating  commitment  to  further  EU  integration  and  taking  the  necessary  reforms 
forward,  in  the  reporting  period  Georgia  further  derailed  from the  EU  path.  In  the  aftermath  of  the 
parliamentary  elections  on  26  October  2024,  which  were  marked  by  widespread  irregularities, 
increasingly  repressive  actions  and  legislation  targeting  protesters,  civil  society,  independent  media 
and  the  political  opposition,  Georgia  was  plunged  into  a  deep  political  crisis.  Widespread  human 
rights  violations  were  consistently  observed.  In  November  2024,  the  Georgian  authorities’  decision 
not to pursue the opening of accession negotiations unequivocally confirmed their shift away from the 
policies  of  previous  governments,  the  European  aspirations  of  the  vast  majority  of  the  Georgian 
people,  and  the  commitment  inscribed  in  the  Constitution  of  Georgia  of  ensuring  Georgia’s  full 
integration into the EU. The Georgian authorities’ decision was followed by further repressive action, 
which is fundamentally incompatible with EU values of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights. In parallel, the Georgian authorities systematically engaged in unprecedented, hostile anti-EU 
rhetoric, often echoing Russian-style disinformation. 

As  Georgia’s  accession  process  reached  a  halt,  this  report  focuses  on  the  fundamentals  of  the 
accession  process  that  underpin  its  candidate  status  and  the  related  recommendations.  Given  the 
substantial backsliding observed in this year’s report, and the need to address the steps identified by 
the  Commission  in  2023  as  a  matter  of  priority,  it  does  not  set  recommendations  for  the  chapters 
beyond the fundamentals .  

1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT  

CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS  

Democracy  

The state of democracy in Georgia was marked by significant backsliding during the reporting period. 
The  Georgian  authorities  have 
imposed  repressive  measures  against  civil  society,  media 
representatives and opposition leaders that severely undermine democratic processes and effectively 
abolished  civic  participation  and  the  system  of  checks  and  balances.  Eight  opposition  figures  were 
sentenced to 7-8 months’ imprisonment and banned for holding public office in the next two years. Of 
these,  six  are  currently  incarcerated,  while  two  have  been  granted  pardons  by  the  President  of 
Georgia. Another opposition figure is under criminal investigations with potential imprisonment up to 
fifteen years, if convicted. The absence of effective parliamentary oversight has led to an increase in 
executive power. Civil society and critical voices face intimidation, with hostile rhetoric, threats and 

1 This report covers the period from 1 September 2024 to 1 September 2025. It is based on input from a variety of sources, 
including contributions from the government of Georgia, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information 
from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and 
indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.  

The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, 
moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it 
uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. 
Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used. 

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violence  becoming  more  prevalent.  Parliament  removed  the  mandatory  participation  of  non-
governmental  organisations  (NGOs)  in  decision-making,  further  excluding  civil  society  from 
governance. Gender equality councils in Parliament and at municipal level were abolished.   A large 
number of civil society organisations received court-approved orders by the Anti-Corruption Bureau 
requesting sensitive and excessive information. Protests against the authorities’ decision not to pursue 
EU accession negotiations until 2028 were met with a disproportionate use of violence and repression. 
The Georgian authorities should reverse their course of action, which runs counter to the values and 
principles upon which the EU is founded, and the obligations of the country under international law. 
Georgia  should  repeal  repressive  legislation,  adopt  democratic,  comprehensive  and  sustainable 
reforms, in line with the core principles of European integration.  Fundamental rights and principles, 
including the right to a fair trial, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and media freedom and 
pluralism, should be upheld and guaranteed. Those arbitrarily detained should be released. All cases 
of  alleged  human  rights  violations  and  abuses  should  be  effectively  and  promptly  investigated  and 
perpetrators brought to justice.  

The  general  framework  for  elections  requires  comprehensive  reforms,  as  highlighted  by  the 
OSCE/ODIHR, Venice Commission and the European Commission in past recommendations, which 
remain  unaddressed.  Parliamentary  elections  were  held  on  26 October 2024.  The  Organisation  for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR)  observation  mission  found  that  the  elections  were  held  in  a  highly  polarised  atmosphere 
marked  by  democratic  backsliding,  with  restrictive  laws  undermining  fundamental  rights  passed 
earlier in the year. Several shortcomings persisted, including but not limited to reports of intimidation, 
coercion,  inducement  and  pressure  on  voters,  especially  public  sector  employees  and  persons  in 
economically vulnerable situation persisted. This raised concerns about the ability of some voters to 
freely form their opinions and cast their votes without fear of retribution. Other shortcomings included 
insufficient handling of post-election day complaints and violations of vote secrecy. Recent legislative 
amendments have moved further away from international standards.  

Municipal  elections  were  held  on  4  October.  The  lead-up  to  the  elections  was  marked  by  intense 
political polarisation, violence, as well as intimidation targeting civil society and independent media. 
Most opposition parties boycotted the elections. The amendments to the electoral legislation favouring 
the ruling party, coupled with the extensive crackdown on dissent, drastically reduced the possibility 
of  holding  competitive  elections.  Furthermore,  the  refusal  by  the  Georgian  authorities  to  invite 
international observers in due time, in particular OSCE/ODIHR, undermined the transparency  of the 
electoral  process  and  prevented  credible  international  monitoring.  Domestic  observers  were  also 
largely absent due to the repressive environment. The voter turnout was relatively low. 

As a result of the October 2024 elections, only members from the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party 
have  exercised  their  mandate  in  Parliament.  In  this  context,  Parliament’s  exercise  of  its  powers, 
including  oversight  of  the  executive  and  involvement  in  the  legislative  process,  is  severely  limited. 
MPs  from three  opposition  parties renounced  their  seats,  deeming the  elections rigged.  In  February 
2025,  Parliament  terminated  the  mandates  of  49  opposition  MPs  at  their  request.  MPs  from  one 
opposition party, which did not resign their seats, but did not participate in parliamentary proceedings, 
decided in October to take up their seats in Parliament, thereby ending an almost year-long boycott. . 
Legislation  on  important  issues,  including  laws  affecting  freedom  of  expression,  peaceful  assembly 
and  association,  was  adopted  in  expedited  procedures  by  Parliament.  This  undermines  the 
transparency and accountability of the legislative process.  

On governance, there has been very little progress in decentralising policy- and decision-making from 
the  national  to  the  local  level.  In  April  2025,  Parliament  removed  the  requirement  to  involve  civil 
society/citizens in decision-making process. There are no formal participatory mechanisms in place to 
involve civil society/citizens in local decision-making.  

The  government  programme  for  2025-2028, titled  ‘Only  with  peace,  dignity  and  prosperity towards 
Europe’,  articulates  Georgia’s commitment to  Euro-Atlantic integration.  Contrary  to this  stated  aim, 
on  28  November  2024  the  Prime  Minister  announced  the  decision  not  to  pursue  the  opening  of 

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accession negotiations and reject EU financial support until 2028, sparking unprecedented widespread 
protests.  This  marked  a  significant  departure  from  past  policies  and  the  European  aspirations  of 
Georgian people. While a 2025 action plan was adopted to further EU integration, the authorities have 
not reported on the implementation of the key reforms (the nine steps) outlined in the Commission’s 
2023 enlargement policy Communication, which is crucial for Georgia’s progress on the EU accession 
path.  

Civil  society  organisations  (CSOs)  operate  in  a  repressive  environment  which  increasingly 
deteriorates.  This  undermines  the  fundamental  role  of  civil  society  in  upholding  and  strengthening 
democracy. The adoption of repressive laws has consistently restricted the legal framework for civil 
society and the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) has been vested with wide discretion in applying these 
laws.  CSOs  and  activists  have  been  subjected  to  repressive  actions,  including  court-approved 
information  orders  from  the  ACB,  the  freezing  of  bank  accounts  of  several  CSOs  and  increasing 
administrative  hurdles.  The  financial  environment  for  CSOs  has  been  severely  undermined  by  the 
amendments to the Law on grants and the Foreign Agents Registration Act. In addition, many human 
rights  defenders  and  civil  society  activists  have  been  increasingly  subject  to  acts  of  intimidation, 
threats, physical assaults and smear campaigns.  

Public administration reform  

Georgia  is  between  having  some  and  a  moderate  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  public 
administration reform (PAR). There was backsliding during the reporting period. The previous PAR 
framework  has  been  undermined  by  institutional  changes  and  legal  amendments  that  reverse  civil 
service legal protection and weaken guarantees of a merit-based civil service free from undue political 
pressure.  To  ensure  a  stable,  modern,  people-centred,  effective,  accountable  and  transparent  civil 
service, significant efforts are necessary.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Georgia should in particular: 

→  realign  the  public  administration  reform  agenda  with  European  public  administration  principles 
and  standards,  and  ensure  an  open,  participatory  and  evidence-based  process  for  public  policy 
development, monitoring and evaluation; 

→  reverse the backsliding in civil service legal protection by reintroducing sufficient guarantees and 

protection from undue political interference and other interference; 

→  ensure  the  right  to  access  to  public  information,  including  by  strengthening  the  legislative  and 

institutional framework, and re-engage with the Open Government Partnership. 

Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 

In the area of judiciary and fundamental rights,  Georgia is between an early stage of preparation 
and having some level of preparation, down from some level of preparation in 2024. For a second 
consecutive year, there was backsliding during the reporting period.  

Functioning of the judiciary 

Georgia is at an early stage of preparation, down from some level of preparation in 2024, and for a 
second  consecutive  year,  there  was  backsliding.  The  revised  legal  framework  undermines  the 
independence  and  integrity  of  the  judicial  system  and  reverses  earlier  reforms.  Amendments  to  the 
Law on common courts adopted in June 2025 weaken the legitimacy of the judiciary and jeopardise 
the  accountability  and  impartiality  of  key  judicial  institutions  and  judges.  The  amendments  were 
passed  through  accelerated  procedure,  without  proper  consultations  or  in-depth  consideration.  The 
amendments  exacerbate  risks  of  judicial  capture  and  go  against  numerous  recommendations  of  the 
Venice  Commission  and  the  nine  steps.  The  revised  composition  and  election  rules  of  the  High 
Council of Justice (HCJ) amended regulations on judicial disciplinary liability and the incorporation 
of the inspector’s service into the HCJ significantly weaken the independence  and accountability  of 

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the  judiciary.  The  transparency  of  court  proceedings  is  limited  by  the  June  2025  amendments  that 
grant  the  HCJ  the  right  to  decide  on  public  access  to  court  proceedings.  There  were  also  negative 
developments,  including  the  appointment  in  June  2025  of  a  new  Prosecutor  General  by  simple 
majority and four years prior to the end of the predecessor’s mandate. A Supreme Court judge was 
appointed as a judge at the Constitutional Court. The appointment of a non-judge member to the HCJ 
by  the  President  of  Georgia  was  annulled  and  subsequently  a  competitor  was  appointed  by  the 
decision of the Tbilisi City Court. Georgia has not addressed recommendations in the EU’s nine steps 
and those of the Venice Commission. The harsh and disproportionate sentences inflicted on protesters 
show that the judiciary system is used by the governing party to enforce a system of repression.   

The  Commission’s recommendations  from  last  year were  not addressed  and  therefore  remain valid. 
Moreover, Georgia needs to: 

→  reverse amendments to the Law on common courts and adopt legislation to bring it fully in line 
with  Venice  Commission  recommendations  on  the  powers  of  the  HCJ  concerning  transfers  of 
judges  and  on  the  selection  process  for  the  Supreme  Court  (including  effective  appeal, 
qualifications of Supreme Court judges and an anti-deadlock mechanism); 

→  adopt  and  implement  a  broader  reform  of  the  judiciary,  in  particular  to  reform  the  HCJ  in  line 
with  Venice  Commission  recommendations,  including  restrictions  on  the  reappointment  of  its 
members, notably by fixed non-renewable terms. Moreover, establish a system of extraordinary 
integrity checks, with the involvement of international experts with a decisive role in the process, 
for  candidates  and  persons  currently  appointed  to  all  leading  positions  in  the  judiciary,  in 
particular the HCJ, the Supreme Court and Common Court presidents; 

→  adopt  constitutional  amendments,  which  include  changing  the  appointment  procedure  of  the 
Prosecutor  General  from  simple  to  qualified  majority  in  Parliament;  align  the  Law  on  the 
Prosecutor’s  Office  with  European  standards  following  the  recommendations  of  the  Venice 
Commission,  OECD  and  the  Technical  Assistance  and  Information  Exchange  (TAIEX)  peer 
review on the functioning of the justice sector and the fight against organised crime carried out in 
May 2023. 

Fight against corruption  

Georgia  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  the  fight  against  corruption.  There  was 
backsliding  in  the  reporting  period.  The  authorities  still  failed  to  address  key  Venice  Commission 
recommendations  related  to  the  independence  of  the  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  (ACB),  its  lack  of 
political neutrality and investigative functions in high-level corruption cases. The ACB’s mandate was 
substantially  extended,  allowing  it  to  be  instrumentalised  for  the  enforcement  and  monitoring  of 
repressive legislation targeting civil society and media organisations. Substantial efforts are needed to 
address corruption at all levels. A comprehensive strategic framework on anti-corruption needs to be 
adopted. No step was taken to address de-oligarchisation, and no effort was made to pursue it through 
a  systemic  approach.  Targeted  risk  assessments  and  specific  measures  are  also  needed  to  address 
corruption in the most vulnerable sectors.   

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. 
Moreover, in the coming year Georgia should in particular: 

→  align the legislation on the ACB to the ODIHR/Venice Commission recommendations and ensure 
that the ACB, as well as the relevant enforcement agencies, operate independently and effectively, 
avoiding any politically selective approach; adopt an anti-corruption strategy and action plan, and 
ensure that it is comprehensively implemented through realistic timelines, adequate funding and 
appropriate  monitoring  mechanisms;  the  ACB  should  consistently  publish  officials’  asset 
declarations;  

→  repeal  the  decision  of  February  2023  to  withdraw  from  the  OECD/Anti-Corruption  Network 
Istanbul  Anti-Corruption  Action  Plan  monitoring  programme  and 
implement 
recommendations  from  the  2022  pilot  report,  including  on  combating  bribery  of  foreign  public 
officials in international business transactions;  

fully 

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→  implement  a  systemic  approach  on  de-oligarchisation  in  line  with  the  recommendations  by  the 

Venice Commission (opinions of March 2023 and June 2023). 

Fundamental rights  

Human rights are being severely curtailed and are undermined by the adoption of new repressive laws 
and amendments to existing laws that infringe upon fundamental rights, including equality and non-
discrimination, the freedoms of expression, assembly and association, as well as the right to privacy, 
family life, liberty and security. Ill-treatment of participants in protests, in some cases amounting to 
torture  or  inhuman  and  degrading  treatment,  was  widespread  during  the  reporting  period.  Law 
enforcement agencies have made disproportionate and indiscriminate use of crowd control measures. 
Investigations  launched  by  the  now  abolished  Special  Investigation  Service  have  not  resulted  in 
bringing  the  perpetrators  of  violence  to  justice,  and  the  lack  of  accountability  of  law  enforcement 
raises  serious  concerns.  Cases  of  arbitrary  detentions,  excessive  use  of  pre-trial  detention  and  the 
disproportionately harsh sentencing of protesters and journalists raises concerns about the right to fair 
trial. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. 
In the current context, Georgia should take urgent action to: 

→  repeal laws and amendments that restrict fundamental rights and freedoms, violate the principle of 
non-discrimination and contradict relevant European and international standards, in particular the 
Law on transparency of foreign influence, the Foreign Agents Registration Act and the legislative 
package on family values and protection of minors; 

→  investigate  reports  and  allegations  of  excessive  use  of  force,  including  torture  and  other  ill 
treatment,  by  law  enforcement  agencies  and  violence  by  informal  groups,  and  bring  the 
perpetrators to justice; ensure that the right to a free trail is upheld;  

→  ensure that the right to assembly is upheld and there are no arbitrary or unlawful restrictions on 

exercising it.  

Freedom of expression  

Georgia declined to an early stage of preparation in the area of freedom of expression, down from 
between an early stage of preparation and some level of preparation. For a second consecutive year, 
there was backsliding during the reporting period. The new legislation, including amendments to the 
Law  on  broadcasting,  the  Foreign  Agents  Registration  Act  and  the  legislative  package  on  family 
values and protection of minors, negatively affects the right to freedom of expression and the ability 
of  the  media  to  operate  freely.  Acts  of  intimidation,  threats  and  verbal  and  physical  assault  against 
journalists and media workers were widely reported. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid.  
In the current context, Georgia should take urgent action to: 

→  release journalists being held  arbitrarily  in pre-trial detention and ensure that the criminal cases 
against  them  are  concluded  in  accordance  with  the  criteria  set  by  the  European  Convention  on 
Human Rights and the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR); 

→  ensure the safety of journalists and provide prompt, impartial and due legal follow-up to all cases 
of  attacks  against  and  intimidation  of  journalists;  restore  a  safe  and  pluralist  environment  that 
enables  the  media  to  carry  out  their  work  independently  and  without  fear  of  reprisals  or 
dismissals;  

→  repeal  amendments  to  the  Law  on  broadcasting  as  well  as  laws  and  amendments  which  do  not 

respect freedom of expression. 

Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security   

Georgia  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  field  of  justice,  freedom  and  security.  There  was 
backsliding during the reporting period. Reports of brutal, disproportionate and unlawful use of force 

7 

 
 
by the police and intimidation tactics against protestors, as well as perpetrators’ lack of accountability 
resulting in impunity for these acts underscore serious deficiencies that undermine the independence 
and credibility of the justice’ system. The conduct of the law enforcement authorities shows signs of 
undue political interference. Law enforcement oversight and accountability mechanisms were further 
weakened,  and  investigative  functions  were  further  concentrated  within  the  Prosecutor’s  Office 
following  the  abolition  of  the  Special  Investigation  Service.  The  envisaged  legislation  on  the 
separation of powers between criminal prosecution and investigation bodies is still pending.  Georgia 
is not complying with and departed further from the recommendations of the seventh visa suspension 
mechanism report.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. 
Moreover, in the coming year Georgia should in particular:  

→  ensure  fulfilment  of  the  visa  liberalisation  benchmarks;  address  the  recommendations  of  the 
seventh visa suspension mechanism report, strengthen action to address the increasing number 
of unfounded asylum applications and irregular stays of Georgian citizens in EU Member States, 
and align visa policy with the EU acquis; 

→  fulfil the visa liberalisation benchmarks  regarding measures to combat anti-money laundering, 

and to prevent/tackle corruption and organised crime, and address asset recovery; 

→  strengthen  institutional  and  operational  capacities  to  fight  organised  crime  and  improve 

international police cooperation.    

Fight against serious and organised crime  

Georgia  has  some  level  of  preparation  in fighting  serious  and  organised  crime.  Limited  progress 
was  made  during  the  reporting  period.  Some  measures  were  taken  to  tackle  money  laundering  and 
terrorist  financing,  including  risk  assessment  and  legislative  amendments,  sectoral  risk  assessments 
and the establishment of a regulatory framework for Virtual Asset Service Providers. Additional steps 
are necessary to comply with MONEYVAL recommendations related, inter alia, to the lack of anti-
money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism obligations for real estate agents and trust or 
company  service  providers.  Inadequate  communication  and  enforcement  of  targeted  financial 
sanctions  and  insufficient  regulation  and  supervision  of  designated  non-financial  businesses  and 
professions also remain to be addressed.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain 
mostly valid. Moreover, in the coming year, Georgia should in particular: 

→  increase  the  accountability  and  effectiveness  of  investigations  into  criminal  networks  and 
participation  in  international  police  cooperation  on  drug  trafficking  and  high-risk  organised 
criminal networks;  

→  address  recommendations  identified  in  MONEYVAL’s  Third  Enhanced  Follow-up  Report  and 

Technical Compliance Re-Rating;  

→  adopt  legislation  on  the  separation  of  powers  between  criminal  prosecution  and  investigation 
bodies; set up an asset recovery office and an asset management office and introduce a register of 
ultimate beneficial owners. 

ECONOMIC CRITERIA 

The existence of a functioning market economy 

Georgia  is  moderately  prepared  and  made  limited  progress  in  establishing  a  functioning  market 
economy. The authorities’ course of action and the decision not to pursue EU accession negotiations 
until  2028  created  high  uncertainty  for  businesses.    While  growth  remained  strong,  it  is  subject  to 
downside risks reflecting heightened political instability and the developments regarding Russia’s war 
of  aggression  against  Ukraine.  The  macroeconomic  policy  mix  was  broadly  appropriate.  Despite 
improvements  in  the  labour  market,  the  structural  weaknesses  remain  unaddressed.  While  the 

8 

 
 
authorities  continued  with  selected  public  finance  reforms,  the  reform  of  state-owned  enterprises 
advanced slowly. No progress was made on strengthening the legislation related to independence of 
the central bank, although the vacancies at the NBG board were filled.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  only  partially  implemented  and  therefore 
remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular: 

→  strengthen  the  legislation  towards  ensuring  the  independence  of  the  central  bank,  enhance  and 
implement the medium-term revenue strategy and the reform of public investment management, 
streamline tax expenditures, and further improve fiscal oversight and governance of state-owned 
enterprises; 

→  address  the  main  weaknesses  of  the  labour  market,  such  as  the  low  employment  rate  and 
significant  regional  differences,  adopt  and  start  implementing  the  new  Labour  Market  Strategy, 
and prepare a programme to reduce informal economy in a comprehensive manner;  

→  further develop the non-banking segments of the financial sector, including by implementing the 

capital market development strategy, and strengthening the insurance sector. 

 The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 

Georgia  has  some  level  of  preparation  and  has  made  some  progress  in  coping  with  competitive 
pressure  and  market  forces  within  the  EU.  It  continued  to  upgrade  its  education  framework  and 
adopted  a  vocational  education  and  training  (VET)  strategy.  Spending  on  research  and  innovation 
remains  very  low.  The  level  of  public  investment  continued  to  be  high,  with  a  focus  on  transport 
infrastructure.  The  structure  of  the  economy  is  dominated  by  low-skilled  services,  and  economic 
integration with the EU remains limited, with a decreasing value of exports from Georgia to the EU.  

The  Commission's  recommendations  from  last  year  were  only  partially  implemented  and  therefore 
remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular: 

→  further  improve  the  quality  of  education  and  training  to  ensure  that  their  outcomes  align  with 
labour market needs, in particular through further VET reforms,  enhancing cooperation between 
the educational institutions and business and improving teachers’ professional development;   

→  continue efforts to develop the necessary transport, connectivity and energy infrastructure and to 

increase the share of renewables in the energy mix;  

→  stimulate  innovation  and  make  efforts  to  increase  exports  of  higher  value  added  goods  and 
services,  in  particular  by  facilitating  certification,  compliance  with  sanitary  and  phytosanitary 
standards,  export  promotion,  logistics  and  the  development  of  the  necessary  infrastructure  for 
exports. 

Chapter 5 – Public procurement   

Georgia  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  public  procurement.  No  progress  was  made 
during the reporting period.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Georgia should in particular: 

→  further  align  its  legislative  framework  with  the  EU  public  procurement  acquis,  including  on 

utilities and concessions and public-private partnerships; 

→  further align its legislation with Directive 2009/81/EC on procurement in the fields of defence and 

security; 

→  further strengthen the Procurement Dispute Resolution Council, in particular by safeguarding its 
independence  and  extending  its  jurisdiction  to  cover  public  procurement  processes  that  are 
implemented according to the rules of international financial institutions. 

9 

 
 
Chapter 18 – Statistics  

Georgia  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  statistics.  Limited  progress  was  made, 
including  by  establishing  the  Inter-Agency  Coordination  Council  to  promote  coordination  among 
statistical authorities. Georgia has transmitted slightly more data to Eurostat. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  only  partially  implemented  and  therefore 
remain largely valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular: 

→  further  strengthen  coordination  of  the  national  statistical  system  and  improve  cooperation  with 

data providers from line ministries and agencies; 

→  further  improve  the  human  resources  and  technical  capacity  of  the  National  Statistics  Office 

(Geostat); 

→  increase  the  production  and  dissemination  of  timely  and  high-quality  data  and  prepare  new 

versions of classifications. 

Chapter 32 – Financial control 

Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of financial control. No progress was made during 
the reporting period.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Georgia should in particular: 

→  implement  financial  management  and  control  arrangements  and  strengthen  managerial 

accountability; 

→  consolidate the capacity of the central harmonisation unit within the Ministry of Finance in terms 

of human and financial resources; 

→  increase the implementation rate of State Audit Office recommendations by the government. 

Cluster 2: Internal Market  

Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods   

Georgia  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  free  movement  of  goods.  No  progress  was 
made during the reporting period. 

Chapter 2 – Freedom of movement for workers 

Georgia  is  at  an  early  stage  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  freedom  of  movement  for  workers.  No 
progress was made during the reporting period.  

Chapter 3 – Right of establishment and freedom to provide services  

Georgia  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  the  right  of  establishment  and  freedom  to  provide 
services. There was no progress during the reporting period.  

Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital  

Georgia  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  free  movement  of  capital.  However,  there  was  no 
progress in the reporting period.  

Chapter 6 – Company law  

Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of company law. There was  no progress during 
the reporting period.  

Chapter 7 – Intellectual property law  

Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of intellectual property law. Limited progress was 
made during the reporting period, notably with amendments to the Law on trade marks.  

10 

 
 
Chapter 8 – Competition policy  

Georgia is between an early stage of preparation and having some level of preparation in the area 
of competition policy. There was no progress during the reporting period. 

Chapter 9 – Financial services 

Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of financial services. Georgia made no progress 
during the reporting period.  

Chapter 28 – Consumer and health protection  

Georgia  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  consumer  and  health  protection.  There  was 
limited progress on alignment with the EU acquis on blood, tissues, cells and organs. 

CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH  

Chapter 10 – Digital transformation and media   

Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of digital transformation and media. No progress 
was  made.  Strategies  on  the  digital  economy  and  information  society  as  well  as  the  action  plan  on 
digital governance were adopted. However, the adoption of amendments to the law on broadcasting 
seriously restricts media freedom.  

Chapter 16 – Taxation 

Georgia is between having some and a moderate level of preparation in the area of taxation. There 
was  limited  progress  during  the  reporting  period,  notably  with  amendments  to  the  Tax  Code,  the 
increase of excise duties on tobacco products and  the implementation of the automatic exchange of 
information.  

Chapter 17 – Economic and monetary policy 

Georgia  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  economic  and  monetary  policy.  Limited  progress 
was made in the reporting period gradually improving fiscal oversight of state-owned enterprises. The 
legal amendments necessary to strengthen the central bank’s independence have not been adopted.  

Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment   

Georgia  has  some level  of  preparation  in  the  field of  social  policy  and  employment  and made  no 
progress in the reporting period.  

Chapter 20 – Enterprise and industrial policy  

Georgia is moderately prepared in the area of enterprise and industrial policy and made no progress 
in the reporting period. 

Chapter 25 – Science and research   

Georgia  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  science  and  research.  There  was  limited  progress 
related to the European Research Area, and increased participation of universities and research centres 
in Horizon Europe. 

Chapter 26 – Education and culture  

Georgia is moderately prepared in the area of education and culture.  Limited progress was made 
during  the  reporting  period  with  regard  to  the  adoption  of  the  2024-2030  VET  strategy  and  the 
implementation  of  the  2024-2030  strategy  for  professional  orientation,  counselling  and  career 
guidance.  

Chapter 29 – Customs union  

Georgia  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  the  customs  union.  Limited  progress  was  made 

11 

 
 
 
during  the  reporting  period.  Georgia  acceded  to  the  Common  Transit  Convention  supported  by  the 
New Computerised Transit System (NCTS) on 1 February 2025. 

CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY  

Chapter 14 – Transport policy  

Georgia  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  transport  policy.  There  was  some  progress  during  the 
reporting  period,  in  particular  on  alignment  with  the  Directive  on  transport  of  dangerous  goods  by 
road and the establishment of the national accident investigating body for rail transport. The maritime 
single window system is now operational across all ports. Georgia needs to make additional efforts on 
road safety to reduce the high number of road crashes and fatalities.  

Chapter 15 – Energy   

Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of energy. There was limited progress during the 
reporting  period,  notably  towards  the  unbundling  of  transmission  system  operators,  adopting  all 
implementing  legislation  on  energy  labelling,  and  largely  completing  harmonisation  with  the 
Regulation on measures to safeguard the security of gas. Technical regulations on radiation protection 
were adopted. 

Chapter 21 – Trans-European networks  

Georgia  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area of  trans-European  networks.  There  was  limited 
progress during the reporting period, notably in aligning with the TEN-T road network standards.  

Chapter 27 – Environment and climate change 

Georgia is at an early stage of preparation in the area of environment and climate change. There was 
limited progress in the reporting period, notably with the adoption of the air quality plan for Tbilisi 
and implementing legislation for the management of river basins.  

CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION 

Chapter 11 – Agriculture and rural development  

Georgia is at an early stage of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development. Limited 
progress  was  made  in  the  reporting  period,  in  particular  to  advance  setting  up  an  integrated 
administration and control system (IACS).  

Chapter 12 – Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy  

Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy. 
Some progress was made in the reporting period, notably  on alignment with the EU Regulation on 
official controls and the adoption of some new strategies and action plans.  

Chapter 13 – Fisheries and aquaculture 

Georgia has some level of preparation in the area of fisheries and aquaculture. There was  limited 
progress  during  the  reporting  period,  notably  on  the  adoption  of  a  strategy  for  sustainable 
development  of  aquaculture  2024-2028,  the  monitoring,  control  and  surveillance  of  the  anchovy 
fishing industry and the ongoing allocation of delimitated zones for marine aquaculture.  

Chapter 22 – Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments  

Georgia  continues  to  be  between  an  early  stage  of  preparation  and  having  some  level  of 
preparation in the area of regional policy. No progress was made during the reporting period.  

Chapter 33 – Financial and budgetary provisions  

Georgia  is  at  an  early  stage  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  own  resources  and  made  no  progress 
during the reporting period.  

12 

 
 
 
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS  

Chapter 30 – External relations 

Georgia is moderately prepared in the area of external relations. No progress was made during the 
reporting period. 

Chapter 31 – Foreign, security and defence policy  

Georgia  is  between  having  some  and  a  moderate  level  of  preparation  in  this  area.  There  was 
backsliding  during  the  reporting  period.  Georgia’s  alignment  with  statements  by  the  High 
Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on sanctions decreased during the reporting 
period and remains low, with an alignment rate of 40% as of 24 October 2025, compared to 53% in 
2024.  Georgia  has  not  aligned  with  the  vast  majority  of  the  EU’s  restrictive  measures  (sanctions) 
against  Russia,  Belarus  and  Iran.  It  did  not  participate  in  EU  crisis  management  missions  and 
operations under the common security and defence policy during the reporting period.  

1.3. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STEPS / PRIORITIES 

Step 1: Fight disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference against the EU 
and its values.  

The  Georgian  authorities  have  been  actively  engaging  in  disseminating  disinformation  narratives 
against  the  European  Union  and  have  dismantled  Georgian  structures  to  combat  disinformation. 
There has been serious backsliding in the implementation of this step.  

The  Georgian  authorities  continued  to  declare  EU  integration  as  their  main  priority,  while 
systematically engaging in hostile anti-EU rhetoric, manipulative narratives and conspiracy theories, 
often mirroring Russian-type disinformation. The EU, its institutions and its policies, in particular EU 
integration, are discredited daily through disinformation by high-level state officials, the ruling party 
and  affiliated  media.  These  narratives  have  become  increasingly  aggressive,  targeting  EU  and 
Member States’ diplomats, politicians and officials. Moreover, CSOs receiving EU funding have been 
accused  of  undermining  Georgia’s  sovereignty  and  stability.  This  framing  is  used  to  justify 
crackdowns  on  civil  society  and  portray  pro-EU  actors  as  serving  external  interests,  thus  echoing 
Russian-type  conspiracies  and  tactics.  Under  the  pretext  of  combating  foreign  interference,  the 
government  has  introduced  a  series  of  laws  and  regulatory  changes  that,  in  practice,  target  civil 
society, independent media  and  citizens  exercising their fundamental  rights.  Rather  than  addressing 
genuine  foreign  disinformation  threats,  these  measures  have  served  to  delegitimise  organisations 
committed to human rights, the rule of law and accountability. This approach undermines Georgia’s 
alignment  with  EU  values  and  weakens  its  ability  to  counter  foreign  disinformation  threats.  The 
Georgian authorities’ decision to abolish the Information Centre on NATO and the European Union 
will further weaken efforts to combat disinformation about the EU. 

Step 2: Improve Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy. 

There has been backsliding regarding Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and 
security policy. Georgia’s alignment with statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU 
and Council decisions on sanctions decreased during the reporting period and remains low,  with an 
alignment rate of 40% as of 24 October 2025, compared to 53% in 2024. Georgia did not join most 
restrictive measures relating  to  Russia,  Iran and  Belarus and significantly  increased  direct flights to 
multiple destinations  in  Russia.  Cooperation in  preventing  that the territory  of Georgia  and/or  legal 
entities registered in  Georgia are  used  to  circumvent  EU  restrictive measures needs improvement. 
Legislation  allowing  the  tax-free  transfer  of  offshore  funds  to  Georgia  passed  last  year  remains  in 
place, increasing risks of sanctions circumventions. 

13 

 
 
 
 
During the reporting period, Georgia did not systematically align with international and EU initiatives 
in  support  of  Ukraine,  including  on  resolutions  adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United 
Nations, the Human Rights Council, and the Council of Europe.  

Step  3:  Further  address  the  issue  of  political  polarisation,  including  through  more  inclusive 
legislative  work  with  opposition  parties  in  Parliament,  notably  on  legislation  related  to  Georgia’s 
European integration.  

The  level  of  political  polarisation  further  deepened  and  intensified.  There  has  been  serious 
backsliding in the implementation of this step. The aftermath of the 2024 parliamentary elections 
marked  by  reports  of  widespread  electoral  irregularities,  the  boycott  of  Parliament  by  opposition 
parties and Georgian Dream’s announcement of its intention to ban certain opposition parties, further 
exacerbated  political  polarisation.  The  ruling  party  established  a  parliamentary  investigative 
commission, which served as a tool for political retribution against the opposition. Under the pretext 
of non-cooperation with the commission, eight leading opposition figures have been sentenced to 7-8 
months’  imprisonment  and  banned  from  public  office  for  two  years.  Two  of  them  have  been 
pardonned by the President of Georgia, while the other six remain in prison. Additionally, the ruling 
party  has  used  the  commission  as  a  platform  to  amplify  its  rhetoric  on  the  need  to  ban  certain 
opposition  parties  and  to  pressure  critical  CSOs,  claiming  that  their  actions  represent  a  threat  for 
peace  and  the  country’s  constitutional  order.  This  directly  attacks  the  principle  of  democratic 
pluralism.   

Several  opposition  representatives  have  been  verbally  and  physically  attacked  and  threatened, 
including  by  Georgian  Dream  representatives.  The  political  discourse  is  characterised  by  strong 
hostility,  aggressive  rethoric  and  threatening  language.  This  environment  undermines  constructive 
dialogue and exacerbates social division. The opposition remains fragmented: while  most opposition 
parties have boycotted local elections, two of them participated.  

Step  4:  Ensure  a  free,  fair  and  competitive  electoral  process,  notably  in  2024,  and  fully  address 
including  ensuring  adequate 
OSCE/ODIHR  recommendations.  Finalise  electoral  reforms, 
representation of the electorate, well in advance of election day.  

There  has  been  backsliding  in  electoral  reforms,  significantly  undermining  the  prospects  for 
free, fair, and competitive elections. Georgia failed to address any of the important OSCE/ODIHR 
recommendations  from  previous  elections.  There  was  no  genuine  commitment  to  carry  out  a 
comprehensive and sustainable electoral reform and to re-establish trust in the electoral process.  

Amendments  to  the  Electoral  Code  passed  in  December  2024  reversed  changes  to  the  legal 
framework  for  the  municipal  elections  established  in  2021,  introducing  significant  modifications  to 
the  composition  of  the  municipal/city  assembly  (sakrebulos),  the  delineation  of  the  electoral 
constituencies  as  well  as  to  the  electoral  threshold.  The  Venice  Commission  noted  that  the 
amendments modified the voting system for municipal elections in a way that may result in the further 
entrenchment  of  the  governing  party’s  position  and  undermine  the  principle  of  equal  suffrage.  The 
Venice Commission’s recommendation to repeal the amendments were not addressed. 

Further  amendments  introduced  in  March  2025  introduced  new  limitations  for  registration  as  local 
observers, media and electoral subjects, which may negatively affect the transparency of the electoral 
process. The  ruling  party’s  increased  control  over  the  selection  and  nomination  process  of  Central 
Election  Commission  members  further  eroded  public  perception  about  the  independence  of  this 
institution. 

Any further amendments to the electoral framework should be based on a thorough review, ensuring a 
comprehensive reform, rather than fragmented adjustments. 

The  pre-electoral  environment  ahead  of  the  local  elections  of  4  October  2025  was  marred  by  high 
political  polarisation,  intimidation  and  hostile  rhetoric  against  the  opposition  parties,  activists  and 
civil  society  observer  groups.  Among  the  opposition  parties  which  reached  the  threshold  in  2024 
parliamentary elections, only two registered to participate while the remaining parties boycotted the 
election.  The  amendments  to  the  electoral  legislation  favouring  the  ruling  party,  coupled  with  the 

14 

 
 
extensive crackdown on dissent, drastically reduced the possibility of competitive elections. The voter 
turnout was relatively low.  The OSCE/ODIHR was  unable to deploy an observation mission, as the 
invitation  from  the  Georgian  authorities  came  less  than  a  month  before  election  day  preventing 
credible and meaningful international observation – an essential element for ensuring transparency in 
the electoral process. Moreover, established domestic organisations also refrained from observing due 
to the repressive environment.  

Step  5:  Further  improve  the  implementation  of  parliamentary  oversight  notably  of  the  security 
services.  Ensure  institutional  independence  and  impartiality  of  key  institutions, notably  the  election 
administration, the National Bank and the Communications Commission.  

The effective absence of political plurality in Parliament and an increased politicisation of the work of 
the Central Election Commission and the Communications Commission have weakened oversight and 
institutional independence. There has been backsliding in the implementation of this step. 

Several  longstanding  recommendations  from  ODIHR  and  the  Venice  Commission  related  to  the 
impartiality  of  election  administration  remained  unaddressed.  This  includes  a  recommendation  to 
review the appointment process for election commission members at all levels to prevent dominance 
by  any  single  political  party  and  address  the  low  level  of  trust  towards  election  administration 
amongst  citizens.  In  contradiction  to  these  recommendations,  amendments  adopted  in  April  2025 
further  increased  the  ruling  party’s  control  over  the  selection  and  nomination  process  of  Central 
Election  Commission  members,  now  only  requiring  simple  majority  of  votes  (76)  instead  of  two 
thirds (90).   

longstanding  concerns  about 

Whilst 
the 
the  effective 
Communications Commission remain, amendments to the Law on broadcasting adopted in April 2025 
significantly  extended  the  powers  of  the  Communications  Commission  to  impose  strict  content 
restrictions  on  broadcasters.  The  self-regulatory  regime  previously  in  place,  allowing  disputes  over 
ethics  and  impartiality  to  be  processed  by  broadcasters’  self-regulating  bodies,  was  significantly 
weakened.  The  new  provisions  have  already  been  used  by  the  ruling  party  to  submit  complaints 
against opposition-leaning TV channels for use of allegedly inflamatory language.  

independence  and 

impartiality  of 

With the approval of four new members, the Board of the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) is now 
fully  constituted  with  a  majority  of  non-executive  members.  However,  no  progress  was  made  on 
strengthening  the  independence  of  the  central  bank.  Several  provisions,  such  as  the  grounds  for 
dismissal  of  the  governor  and  members  of  the  NBG  bodies,  are  not  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis. 
Georgia needs to take credible steps to strengthen the NBG independence, notably by strenghtening 
the qualification and independence criteria for board members. 

The quality of parliamentary oversight over security services remained limited. Since the formation of 
a  new  Parliament  after  the  26  October  elections,  the  opposition  quota  in  the  Parliamentary  Trust 
Group tasked with overseeing security services was filled by a representative of a group affiliated to 
the ruling party. The investigation into allegations of large-scale illegal wiretapping in 2021 has not, 
so far, led to any prosecutions.   

Step 6: Complete and implement a holistic and effective judicial reform, including a comprehensive 
reform  of  the  High  Council  of  Justice  and  the  Prosecutor’s  Office,  fully  implementing  Venice 
Commission recommendations, and following a transparent and inclusive process.  

Georgia  has  not  undertaken  any  actions  to  address  systemic  and  substantial  reform  of  the  judiciary 
and related European Commission and Venice Commission recommendations. Instead, legal changes 
introduced  during  the  reporting  period  reverse  earlier  reforms,  undermine  the  independence  and 
integrity of the judicial system and exacerbate risks of judicial capture. Moreover, the justice system 
has  been  used  by  the  governing  party  to  enforce  a  system  of  repression.  There  has  been  serious 
backsliding in the implementation of this step. 

A comprehensive reform of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the Supreme Court (SC)  in line 
with the existing recommendations remains outstanding, particularly with regard to ensuring a system 
of integrity checks. Amendments to the Law on common courts adopted in June 2025 undermine the 

15 

 
 
independence,  and  jeopoardise  the  accountablity  and  impartiality  of  key  judicial  institutions  and 
judges. The amendments reverse earlier reforms regarding the election and composition of the High 
Council  of  Justice  (HCJ),  and  judicial  disciplinary  liability.  The  incorporation  of  the  Independent 
Inspector’s  Service  into  the  HCJ  further  concentrating  powers  to  the  unreformed  HCJ  risks  to 
undermine judicial independence. The amendements also grant the HCJ the right to decide on public 
acces  to  court  proceedings.  This,  together  with  a  new  regulation  limiting  access  to  court  decisions 
until they are final, severly constrains the transparency of court proceedings.  

Key  Venice  Commission  recommendations  regarding  the  position  of  the  Prosecutor  General,  in 
particular  its  appointment  procedure,  the  functioning  of  the  Prosecutor  General’s  Office  and  the 
Prosecutorial  Council,  including  the  conduct  of  disciplinary  proceedings,  were  not  addressed. 
Amendments adopted in June 2025 revert earlier reforms and further undermine the independence of 
the position of the Prosecutor General.  

The  appointment  procedures  to  key  judicial  positions,  including  the  Supreme  Court  are  not  in  line 
with  European  standards  undermining  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  judicial  system.  The 
annullment by the Tbilisi City Court in March 2025 of the fifth President’s decision to appoint a new 
non-judge member to the HCJ and the subsequent appointment of a competitor is concerning.  

The excessive resort to pre-trial detention and disproportionate application of sentencing deeply affect 
the right to a fair trial. The continued violation of the right to a fair trial affected in particular court 
proceedings  of  individuals  detained  during  protests.  The  harsh  and  disproportionate  sentences 
inflicted  on  protesters  show  that  the  judiciary  system  is  used  by  the  governing  party  to  enforce  a 
system of repression.   

Step 7: Further address the effectiveness and ensure the institutional independence and impartiality of 
the  Anti-Corruption  Bureau,  the  Special  Investigative  Service  and  the  Personal  Data  Protection 
Service.  Address  Venice  Commission  recommendations  related  to  these  bodies,  in  an  inclusive 
process. Establish a strong track record in investigating -corruption and organised crime cases.  

There  has  been  backsliding  in  the  implementation  of  this  step.  Key  Venice  Commission 
recommendations  related  to  the  Anti-Corruption  Bureau’s  (ACB)  independence,  political  neutrality 
and  investigative  functions  have  still  not  been  addresssed.  The  mandate  of  this  institution  was 
substantially  extended,  based  on  repressive  legislation,  including  the  amendments  to  the  Law  on 
grants  and  the  Foreign  Agents  Registration  Act  adopted  in  spring  2025.  These  laws  give  wide 
discretionary powers to the ACB and raise deep concern on the use of this institution for politically-
motivated purposes and for the enforcement of repressive legislation targeting civil society and media 
organisations. Furthermore, in a setback for transparency, since 2025, public access to the system of 
monitoring asset declarations has not been consistently ensured.  

The  Special  Investigation  Service  (SIS),  tasked  with  investigating  crimes  committed  by  public 
officials  and law  enforcement  agencies and  which  was  accountable  to  Parliament,  was  abolished  in 
May 2025 and its competencies were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Prosecutor General's Office. 
This change further increased the concentration of powers in the Office of the Prosecutor General, in a 
context  where  long-standing  Venice  Commission  and  EU  recommendations  regarding 
the 
strenghtening  of  the  independence  of  the  Prosecution  Service  remain  unaddressed.  The  number  of 
cases  referred  to  criminal  prosecution  has  been  very  low  and  the  Public  Defender  raised  concerns 
about the lack of efficiency and independence in SIS investigations, including those in relation to the 
protests in 2024 and 2025.  

The track record in prosecuting public sector including high-level corruption cases and investigating 
organised crime cases weakened in 2024. No action was undertaken to increase the effectiveness and 
institutional independence of the Data Protection Office and  Venice Commisssion recommendations 
were not addressed. 

Step  8:  Improve  the  current  action  plan  to  implement  a  multi-sectorial,  systemic  approach  to  de-
oligarchisation,  in  line  with  Venice  Commission  recommendations  and  following  a  transparent  and 
inclusive process involving opposition parties and civil society.  

16 

 
 
The  Georgian  authorities  have  not  undertaken  any  activities  to  implement  the  de-oligarchisation 
action  plan  in  line  with  previous  recommendations.  There  has  been  no  progress  in  the 
implementation of this step. 

No  step  was  taken  to  address  de-oligarchisation,  and  no  effort  was  made  to  pursue  it  through  a 
systemic  approach  and  the  recommendations  of  the  Venice  Commission  have  not  been  addressed. 
Implementation of the action plan is lacking and progress in sectoral aspects is not contributing to a 
coherent appraoch on de-oligarchisation. Consultation with the opposition parties and civil society on 
the  action  plan  has  not  taken  place  amidst  legal  changes  abolishing  the  mandatory  consultation  of 
CSOs in legislative processes and widespread attacks against opposition parties. 

Step 9: Improve the protection of human rights, including by implementing an ambitious human rights 
strategy  and  ensuring  freedom  of  assembly  and  expression.  Launch  impartial,  effective  and  timely 
investigations  in  cases  of  threats  against  vulnerable  groups,  media  professionals  and  civil  society 
activists, and bring organisers and perpetrators of violence to justice. Consult and engage with civil 
society,  allowing  for  their  meaningful  involvement  in  legislative  and  policymaking  processes,  and 
ensure they can operate freely.  

The adoption of repressive legislation, including the Foreign Agents Registration Act, amendments to 
the Law on grants and Law on broadcasting, represent a serious backsliding in the implementation 
of  this  step.  This  legislation,  adopted  without  due  public  consultation  and  in  an  expedited  manner, 
infringes  upon  fundamental  freedoms,  in  particular,  the  rights  to  freedom  of  association  and 
expression,  and  significantly  undermines  the  work  of  civil  society  and  media.  The  legislation 
threatens the country’s democratic foundations and is unprecedented among candidate countries. In its 
opinion of 15 October 2025, the Venice Commission found that the legal framework created by these 
laws cannot be regarded as compatible with the principles of legal certainty and proportionality in a 
democratic  society  and  called  for  their  repeal.  It  noted  that  their  cumulative  effect  is  coercive, 
stigmatising, and ultimately inconsistent with democratic pluralism.  

The environment for media operation deteriorated significantly, with increasing threats, intimidation, 
hate  speech  and  violence  against  journalists.  The  Foreign  Agents  Registration  Act  (FARA)  places 
additional  pressure  on  civil  society  and  the  independent  media,  given  that  non-compliance  with  its 
requirements may result in imprisonment up to five years. The amended Law on broadcasting gives 
more power to the Communications Commission to control broadcasting content and prohibits direct 
or  indirect  funding  of  audio-visual  broadcasters  by  foreign  entities.  These  developments  add  to  the 
chilling effect on the freedom of expression that the Law on transparency of foreign influence had, 
stigmatising  media  outlets  that  receive  foreign  funding  and  exposing  them  to  burdensome 
requirements.  

The reporting period has been marked by a pattern of serious violations of freedom of assembly and 
expression  guaranteed  under  the  Constitution  of  Georgia  and  international  treaties,  resulting  in  the 
infringements on individuals' personal integrity and persisting reports of torture and other forms of ill-
treatment.  No  perpetrators  were  held  accountable,  fostering  an  environment  of  impunity. 
Amendments to various laws governing the right to assembly, including the Law on assemblies and 
demonstrations,  the  Code  of  administrative  offences  and  the  Criminal  code,  result  in  undue 
restrictions  on  demonstrators  and  are  incompatible  with  the  principles  of  lawfulness,  necessity,  and 
proportionality. Cases of arbitrary detentions, lack of due process rights of those detained, excessive 
use of pre-trial detention and the disproportionately harsh sentencing of protesters and journalists put 
in question the right to a fair trial and revealed the political instrumentalisation of the justice system. 

The  civic  space,  fundamental  for  enabling  human  rights,  shrunk  significantly.  The  repressive 
legislation,  combined  with  political  pressure,  the  removal  of  consultation  requirements,  and  the 
politicisation  of  public  funding,  reflects  a  deliberate  policy  of  institutionalising  control  over  civic 
space  by  severely  undermining  the  independence  and  functionality  of  civic  actors.  A  legislative 
package adopted in April 2025 dismantled key mechanisms for civil society consultation. Changes to 
the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  Parliament  removed  the  requirement  for  mandatory  participation  of  non-
governmental  organisations  in  public  decision-making  processes.  These  steps  represent  a  decisive 
departure from the hitherto de jure commitment to inclusive policymaking and a deliberate exclusion 

17 

 
 
of  civil  society  from legislative processes.  The  authorities froze  the  bank accounts  of  several  CSOs 
amid  ongoing  criminal  investigations  into  alleged  sabotage  and  activities  against  national  security, 
raising  concerns  about  the  instrumentalisation  of  the  justice  system  as  another  tool  of  systemic 
repression and political persecution against civil society.  

The  national  strategy  on  the  protection  of  human  rights  2022-2030  has  not  been  amended  to 
incorporate the recommendations from the 2024 enlargement report. LGBTIQ persons in Georgia are 
facing an increasingly hostile and stigmatising atmosphere, in particular as a result of the legislative 
package  on  family  values  and  protection  of  minors.  The  authorities  not  only  fail  to  recognise  and 
address  the  systemic  nature  of  discrimination  against  LGBTIQ  persons  but  amplify  discrimination, 
intolerance  and  systemic  violence.  Investigations  into  the  organisation  of  violence  of  the  2021  and 
2023 Pride events have not been concluded. The national action plan for combating domestic violence 
and violence against women and protection of victims expired. Instances of physical assaults, sexual 
harassment, and threats of rape or death by law enforcement officials directed at women participating 
in demonstrations were reported. There was backsliding on alignment with the legal framework of the 
Istanbul  Convention.  The  legal  definition  of  rape  does  not  comply  with  the  standards  set  in  the 
Convention.  

*** 

2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS  

2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM  

2.1.1 Democracy   

The basic foundations of democracy were significantly undermined during the reporting period. The 
Georgian  authorities’  attack  on  democratic  institutions  and  fundamental  freedoms  through  hostile 
rhetoric,  constant  spreading  of  disinformation,  intimidation,  repressive  actions  and  legislative 
measures is a drastic setback for the country's democracy. Civil liberties, the principle of checks and 
balances,  and  democratic  decision-making  have  been  eroded.  There  is  an  absence  of  effective 
parliamentary oversight and a consolidation of executive power was observed. Parliament, which is 
composed  of  members  from  the  ruling  party  and  its  affiliated  parties  due  to  a  boycott  by  the 
opposition, frequently used expedited procedures to pass legislation. Legislation adopted in a rushed 
manner without meaningful consultation includes laws that roll back human rights protection, unduly 
restricting  fundamental  freedoms  and  eroding  democratic  decision-making.  Parliament  removed  the 
requirement  for  the  mandatory  participation  of  NGOs  in  public  decision-making  processes  from 
legislation.  Civil  society  organisations  were  not  involved  in  decision-making  processes.  Several 
institutions and bodies essential to Georgia’s democracy lack impartiality and independence, notably 
the  Central  Election  Commission,  Communications  Commission,  High  Council  of  Justice, 
Constitutional Court, Prosecutor’s Office, Anti-Corruption Bureau, National Bank, law enforcement 
and security agencies.  

Persistent  hostile  rhetoric  and  increasing  acts  of  intimidation,  threats  and  physical  assaults  against 
civil  society,  opposition  politicians,  activists  and  journalists  were  observed  in  the  reporting  period. 
The  Georgian  authorities  increasingly  resorted  to  intimidation  tactics  and  violence  to  silence 
dissenting  voices.  Following  the  protests  that  erupted  throughout  Georgia  in  response  to  the  ruling 
party’s  announcement  not  to  pursue  the  opening  of  EU  accession  negotiations  until  2028,  peaceful 
protesters, journalists and opposition politicians have been targeted for exercising their fundamental 
rights, including with arbitrary detentions. In June and July, eight opposition figures were imprisoned 
for 7-8 months and were barred from taking public office for the next two years. This was due to their 
refusal  to  appear  before  a  politically  motivated  parliamentary  investigative  commission,  which  was 
set up in February 2025 to investigate the activities of officials affiliated with political parties under 
the United National Movement-led government from 2003 to the present. In September, the President 
of Georgia pardoned two of the imprisoned politicians. Other opposition leaders became the subject of 
criminal investigations, with some facing up to 15 years in jail if convicted. These steps illustrate an 
instrumentalisation  of  the  justice  system  by  the  ruling  party.  The  declared  aim  announced  by  the 
ruling  party  ahead  of  the  2024  parliamentary  elections  was  to  pave  the  way  for  the  Constitutional 

18 

 
 
Court to ban opposition parties. This move fundamentally threatens democratic pluralism.  

Elections  

During the reporting period, Georgia held parliamentary elections on 26 October 2024. Voters had to 
elect  150  Members  of  Parliament for  a  four-year term  under  a  proportional election system.  Parties 
competed in a single countrywide constituency and had to pass a 5% threshold to be eligible for the 
allocation of mandates. In total, 18 parties registered for the elections. Voter turnout stood at 60.2%.  

The  final  report  by  the  OSCE/ODIHR  election  observation  mission  stated  that  numerous 
shortcomings negatively impacted the integrity of the elections and eroded public trust in the process. 
Elections  took  place  in  a  tense  and  highly  polarised  environment  amid  serious  concerns  about  the 
impact of legislation  restricting fundamental freedoms and civil society’s work. Reports of pressure 
on  voters,  particularly  on  public  sector  employees,  remained  widespread  in  the  campaign.  This, 
coupled with extensive tracking of voters on election day, raised serious concerns about the ability of 
some voters to  cast  their  vote  without  fear of  retribution.  While  preparations  for  the  elections  were 
well  administered,  a  significant  imbalance  in  financial  resources  and  the  incumbency  advantage 
contributed  to  an  already  uneven  playing  field.  A  polarised  media  environment  and  the 
instrumentalisation  of  private  outlets  for  political  propaganda  affected  news  coverage,  hindering 
voters’  ability  to  make  an  informed  choice.  Legislative  shortcomings  and  inconsistent  enforcement 
undermined  the  transparency  and  effectiveness  of  party  and  campaign  finance  oversight,  which  is 
exercised by the Anti-Corruption Bureau since 2023. According to the OSCE/ODIHR, the insufficient 
handling of post-election day complaints by election commissions and courts undermined the right to 
due process, failed to provide an effective remedy and did not comprehensively address widespread 
concerns about the integrity of election results.  

None of the priority recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR following previous elections have so 
far  been  implemented.  On  the  contrary,  additional  amendments  made  to  the  Electoral  Code  in 
December  2024  and  March  2025  mark  a  step  further  away  from  international  standards.  The  latter 
reverse  the  changes  to  the legal  framework  on municipal  elections  established  in  2021,  introducing 
significant  modifications  to  the  composition  of  the  municipal/city  assembly  (sakrebulos),  the 
delineation of the electoral constituencies as well as to the electoral threshold. In its opinion published 
on  18  March  2025,  the  Venice  Commission  noted  that  the  amendments  reinforce  the  majoritarian 
component  of  local  electoral  legislation,  which  may  result  in  the  further  entrenchment  of  the 
governing  party’s  position  and  undermine  the  principle  of  equal  suffrage.  The  Venice  Commission 
urged the repeal of the changes introduced in 2024 and recommended the establishment, after the next 
local  elections,  of  an  impartial  authority  to  oversee  the  delimitation  of  electoral  boundaries.  In 
addition, according to the Venice Commission, any further amendments to the Electoral Code should 
be  made  within  the  framework  of  a  thorough  review  of  the  electoral  system.  This  should  ensure 
comprehensive  reform  rather  than  frequent  and  fragmented  adjustments.  This  is  in  line  with  the 
European  Commission’s  recommendation  for  necessary  comprehensive  electoral  reform  outlined  in 
the 2024 enlargement report.  

On  4  March  2025,  Parliament  adopted  additional  amendments  that  may  negatively  affect  the 
transparency of the electoral process. The amendments introduced new limitations for registration as 
local  observers,  media  and  electoral subjects.  Amendments  adopted  in  April  2025  further  increased 
the ruling party’s control over the selection and nomination process of Central Election Commission 
members, now only requiring a simple majority of votes (76) instead of a 3/5 majority (90). 

The  municipal  elections  of  4  October  2025  were  held  against  the  backdrop  of  high  political 
polarisation,  physical  confrontations,  intimidation,  arrests  as  well  as  hostile  rhetoric  against  the 
opposition parties, activists and civil society observer groups. The polls were boycotted by a large part 
of  the  opposition  and  were  marked  by  relatively  low  turnout.  The  amendments  to  the  electoral 
legislation  favouring  the  ruling  party,  coupled  with  the  extensive  crackdown  on  dissent,  drastically 
reduced  the  possibility  of  competitive  elections.  The  Georgian  authorities  did  not  invite  an 
OSCE/ODIHR  observation  mission  in  a  timely  manner.  OSCE/ODIHR  declined  the  late  invitation 
explaining  that  a  request  from  Georgia  less  than  a  month  before  elections  made  credible  and 
meaningful  observation  impossible.  Moreover,  most  local  observer  organisations  were  unable  to 

19 

 
 
deploy  observation  missions,  largely  due  to  on-going  repressions  against  CSOs,  including  those 
working on elections.  

On 13 May, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on political associations of citizens and the 
Law  on  the  Constitutional  Court.  The  changes  empower  the  Constitutional  Court  to  prohibit 
opposition  groups  whose  leadership,  objectives,  or  activities  are  identical  to  those  of  a  previously 
banned party. These provisions, combined with the absence of an independent Constitutional Court, 
risk undermining political pluralism and hampering the conduct of fair and competitive elections.  

As regards women’s participation in elections, despite constitutional provisions requiring the state to 
take special  measures  to ensure gender  equality  and the  Venice  Commission’s opinion  on the legal 
amendments adopted in 2024 that abolish mandatory gender quotas on parliamentary candidate lists, 
women remain under-represented in public office. The repeal of mandatory gender quotas, combined 
with existing  under-representation  of  women  in  elected  positions  as  well  as  entrenched  stereotypes, 
internal  challenges  within  political  parties  and  gender-specific  threats,  had  a  significant  negative 
impact on women’s political participation. As a result, in the 2024 parliamentary elections only 29% 
of  party  list  candidates  were  women,  with  most  of  them  in  non-electable  positions,  marking  a 
substantial  decrease  from  44%  in  the  2020  elections.  Among  the  elected  Members  of  Parliament 
(MPs), 34 were women, representing 23% of the total.  

Parliament  

Following the October 2024 parliamentary elections, Parliament has been attended by only 89 MPs 
elected from the  Georgian Dream  party.  Elected MPs  from  three  of the four opposition  parties  that 
crossed the electoral threshold renounced their seats, while the fourth party declared the newly elected 
Parliament illegitimate, claiming that the elections were rigged. On 5 February, Parliament terminated 
the mandates of 49 MPs from three opposition parties after their formal request for their mandates to 
be revoked. A fourth opposition party did not resign the 12 MPs seats won in the elections, but did not 
participate in parliamentary proceedings. On 20 October, this party announced its decision to take up 
its seats in Parliament, thereby terminating an almost year-long boycott. Eight opposition figures were 
sentenced to for 7-8 months’ imprisonment and banned for holding public office in the next two years. 
Two of them were pardoned by the President of Georgia, while. another opposition leader can face 
criminal charges with potential imprisonment up to fifteen years upon return.  

The  legislature  is  represented  only  by  the  ruling  party  and  its  affiliated  parties.  The  ruling  party 
effectively  holds  control  over  both  the 
legislative and executive branches. 

to 

The  new  Parliament  frequently  used 
pass 
procedures 
expedited 
legislation, including on significant and 
sensitive  subjects,  at  times  within  a 
matter  of  a  few  days.  Examples  of 
legislation  passed  under  expedited 
procedure  within  a  couple  of  days 
include:  amendments  to  the  Election 
Code (December 2024), to the Law on 
manifestations 
and 
assemblies 
(February  2025)); 
the  Code  of 
administrative offences (February 2025 
and October 2025); to the Criminal Code (October 2025) and the amendments to the Organic Law on 
common courts (June 2025). Parliamentary oversight of the security services, including through the 
Parliamentary  trust  group,  remained  limited.  In  March  2025,  Parliament  recognised  a  new 
composition of the trust group, with no participants from opposition parties.  

to 

Governance  

The  October  2024  elections  were  disputed  by  the  four  opposition  parties  that  crossed  the  electoral 
threshold, considering the government to be illegitimate. The mandatory consultations of NGOs in the 

20 

 
 
policymaking process removed by the Parliament via legislative amendments marks another setback 
to the country’s democratic governance.  

The  decentralisation  strategy  2020–2025 continues to  guide  reforms in local  governance.  There  has 
been very little progress in decentralising policy- and decision-making from the national to the local 
level.  There  are  no  formal  coordination  mechanisms  between  the  national  and  local  government 
authorities.  The Prime  Minister  exercises legal supervision  over  the activity  of municipalities.  State 
authorities  continue  to  exercise  political,  administrative  and  financial  pressure  on  local  decision-
making.  There  are  no  formal  participatory  mechanisms  in  place  to  involve  civil  society/citizens  in 
local decision-making.  

EU integration  

The  government  programme  for  2025-2028,  ‘Only  with  peace,  dignity  and  prosperity  towards 
Europe’,  states  that  Georgia  will  continue  its  irreversible  path  of  Euro-Atlantic  integration.  On  28 
November 2024, the Prime Minister announced the ruling party’s decision not to pursue the opening 
of accession negotiations and to reject EU financial support until 2028. The announcement marked a 
shift  away  from  the  European  aspirations  of  the  vast  majority  of  the  Georgian  people  and  the 
provision of the Constitution of Georgia to ensure the full integration of the country into the European 
Union. 

The authorities have not reported on the implementation of the action plan to address the nine steps 
defined in the Commission’s 2023 Communication on  EU Enlargement Policy, which are necessary 
for  Georgia’s  progress  on  the  EU  accession  path.  Georgian  authorities  continued  to  declare  EU 
integration  as  their  main  priority,  while  systematically  engaging  in  hostile  anti-EU  rhetoric, 
manipulative narratives and conspiracy theories, often mirroring Russian-type disinformation.  

EU  integration  formally  remained  under  the  coordination  of  the  Directorate-General  on  European 
Integration  in  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  EU  Integration  Committee  within  Parliament 
retained its oversight function.  

Civil society  

Civil  society  organisations  (CSOs)  operate  in  a  repressive  environment  that continues  deteriorating. 
This undermines the fundamental role of civil society in upholding and strengthening democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights. The introduction of multiple restrictive and discriminatory laws 
and  amendments,  which  are  against  international  human  rights  law,  have  a  chilling  effect  on  civil 
society and give the Georgian authorities additional tools to supress dissent. The cumulative effect of 
the  new  legislation  threatens  the  very  survival  of  independent  civil  society  in  the  country.  This 
contributes  to  the  further  erosion  of the foundations of  democracy  in  Georgia  and  is fundamentally 
incompatible  with  EU  values  of  democracy,  rule  of  law,  respect  for  fundamental  rights  and  media 
pluralism.  The  Venice  Commission  opinion  of  15  October  2025  found  that  these  laws  impose 
extensive and overlapping obligations combined with harsh liability provisions that disproportionately 
burden and subject to control those engaged in democratic oversight and rights advocacy. It concluded 
that  their  cumulative  effect  is  coercive,  stigmatising,  and  ultimately  inconsistent  with  democratic 
pluralism, and called for their repeal.   

The  Foreign  Agents  Registration  Act  adopted  in  April  2025  requires  individuals  and  entities  to 
register  as  ‘foreign  agents’,  and  they  are  obliged  to  submit  detailed  reports  on  their  activities  and 
finances. The law introduces harsher penalties for non-compliance, including criminal liability and the 
suspension of activities. The law also mandates individuals and entities to label their public statements 
as produced by a foreign agent, further stigmatising these organisations.  

Amendments to the Law on grants adopted in April 2025 further contribute to a shrinking civic space. 
The  legislation  significantly  narrows  options  for  international  financial  support  and  introduces 
restrictive monitoring  and  punitive  administrative  liability.  The  law  requires  international  donors  to 
seek  pre-approval  for  grants  from state  authorities,  and  non-compliance  results in  an  administrative 
fine for the grant recipient. The requirements cripple civil society and discourage organisations from 
accepting  international  funds,  including  from  the  EU.  Most  CSOs,  in  particular  at  local  level,  are 

21 

 
 
dependent on funding from foreign donors. A state grant-making agency established in February 2025 
also  does  not  contribute  to  the  development  of an independent  and  vibrant  civil  society  sector.  The 
state  grant  agency  risks  fostering  an  environment  dominated  by  government-aligned  organisations 
(so-called GoNGOs), biased funding practices, thereby weakening genuine representation and CSOs’ 
autonomy.  

The  overall  environment  for  CSOs  has  also  suffered  from  increasing  acts  of  intimidation, 
vandalism,  threats  and  physical  assaults  against  civil  society  representatives,  repressive  actions 
including court-approved information orders from the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the  freezing of bank 
accounts of several CSOs and increasing administrative hurdles making it difficult for CSOs to carry 
out  their  tasks.  The  legal  uncertainty  linked  to  the  implementation  of  repressive  legislation  risks 
selective application.   

The  key  mechanisms  for  policy  dialogue  and  civic  participation  in  policymaking  and  lawmaking 
have been abolished with the adoption of a package of legislative amendments in April 2025. Changes 
to the rules  of  procedure of  Parliament removed  the  requirement  for the  mandatory  participation  of 
NGOs  in  public  decision-making  processes.  This  represents  a  decisive  departure  from  the  formal 
commitment to inclusive policymaking and  the deliberate exclusion of civil society from legislative 
processes, against the EU’s longstanding recommendations, including the nine steps.   

2.1.2. Public administration reform   

Strategic framework for public administration reform  

The  strategic  framework  for  public  administration  reform  (PAR)  is  partially  in  place,  but  has  been 
significantly  undermined  by  amendments  to  the  Law  on  public  service,  the  Law  on  the  structure, 
powers and procedures of the government, and the Law on diplomatic service. The amendments were 
adopted amid widespread anti-government protests, raising concerns that they may serve as a tool for 
politically  motivated  persecution  of  dissenting  voices  within  the  public  service.  The  legislative 
amendments,  combined  with  the  reorganisation  of  several  institutions,  led  to  a  mass  dismissal  of 
public  servants.  Hundreds  of  civil  servants  -  and  reportedly  some  of  those  who  were  dismissed  — 
signed collective statements in support of Georgia’s EU integration path.  The legal amendments are 
reversing civil service reforms and significantly impact accountability and transparency and the legal 
protection of civil servants. This indicates a growing political influence of the ruling party over the 
public  administration.  As  a  result  of  institutional  changes,  the  central  government  entity’s 
(Administration of the Government) critical role in supporting PAR as a strategic priority is no longer 
recognised.  The  PAR  unit  under  the  Administration  of  the  Government  was  abolished  and  its 
responsibilities  were  transferred  to  the  analytical  department.  The  PAR  interagency  co-ordinating 
council did not convene in the reporting period. 

No  monitoring  report  was  prepared  on  the  implementation  of  the  2023-2026  PAR  strategy  and  its 
2023-2024 action plan. The 2025-2026 action plan has not yet been developed. 

Policy development and coordination  

Policy  development  and  coordination  aspects  still  need  to  be  strengthened.  The  institutions  for 
government policy development and coordination have been increasingly centralised. Evidence-based 
policy and legislative development, consultation and public coordination mechanisms and monitoring 
mechanisms  have  been  severely  constrained.  Policy  coordination  has  been  significantly  weakened. 
Civil  Society  Organisations’  (CSO)  mandatory  participation  in  public  policy  and  decision-making 
processes has been abolished.  

Public financial management 

Public  financial  management  (PFM)  is  broadly  in  place  but  needs  to  be  improved  further.  The 
implementation  of  the  2023-2026  PFM  strategy  and  annual  action  plans  contributed  to  the  stable 
management of public finances. Budgetary control policies retain the budget deficit and public debt 
within the limits set by fiscal rules. A medium-term revenue strategy was adopted in December 2024. 
Internal audit capacities were strengthened, and risk management policies improved.  

22 

 
 
To strengthen the links between strategic planning and budgeting, a policy classifier was introduced 
within  the  eBudget  electronic  system.  It  covers  among  others  gender  equality,  climate  change  and 
national development strategy markers.  

Public  investment  management  reform  continued  with  the  development  of  the  electronic  public 
investment management system (ePIM). New investment projects are selected in accordance with the 
PIM methodology before being included in the relevant budget. 

No  progress  was  made  in  public  assets  inventory  and  valuation,  internal  financial  control  and 
auditing. 

Budget  transparency  is  broadly  ensured.  There  were  no  further  developments  on  budget 
transparency. Public engagement in budget processes and dissemination of the citizens’ budget needs 
to be improved. 

Public service and human resources management  

Public service and human resources management has been seriously affected by the December 2024 
legal  amendments  to  the  Law  on  public  service.  These  have  reversed  past  core  reforms  and 
undermined  civil  service  protections  from  undue  political  pressure  and  jeopardised  a  merit-based 
professional  civil  service.  The  amendments  significantly  weaken  the  rights  of  public  servants, 
including to legal recourse,  and increase  the  risk  of  politicising  the  public service.  Since  December 
2024, hundreds of civil servants have been dismissed or their contracts not renewed.  

The Civil Service Bureau was abolished in April 2025 and part of its functions were transferred to the 
human resources department under the Administration of the Government.  

The  civil  service  in  Georgia  is  characterised  by  an  underrepresentation  of  women  in  senior 
management positions. 

Accountability of administration 

The accountability of administration still needs to be improved. The government has yet to take action 
to introduce legislative reforms and establish an independent supervisory body to uphold the right to 
access to public information in line with international standards. There are legal gaps  in freedom of 
information  and  the  lack  of  recognition  of  the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  access  to  official 
documentation.  Legal  Entities  of  Public  Law  are  not bound  by  the  existing  legislation  on  access  to 
public information.  

The  right  to  access  public  information  is  not  properly  enforced.  The  rate  of  proactive  information 
publication  continues  to  deteriorate.  In  2024,  the  Public  Defender  considered  60  complaints  about 
restrictions on access to public information, particularly regarding media outlets, journalist and human 
rights defenders. Its analysis concluded that legislative amendments are necessary and the concept of 
a public institution needs to be more clearly defined. 

The  rate  of  implementation  of  recommendations  from  oversight  bodies,  including  the  Public 
Defender’s  Office  and  the  State  Audit  Office,  remains  low.  In  2024,  out  of  258  recommendations 
issued by the Public Defender to central authorities, only 19% were fully implemented by authorities, 
24% were partially implemented and 34% were not implemented. Only 46% of recommendations by 
the  State  Audit  Office  were  fully  implemented,  and  28%  were  partially  implemented.  The  right  to 
seek  compensation  lacks  systematic  enforcement,  including  as  regards  the  length  of  judicial 
proceedings in the event of administrative disputes. 

Georgia has failed to meet the recommendations of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), leading 
the  OGP  Steering  Committee  to  officially  suspend  the  Georgian  government  from  the  partnership 
following concerns over legislative actions that undermine civic freedoms and fundamental rights. 

The  Internal  Audit  Service  was  transformed  into  the  Government  Efficiency  Department  and 
established as a department within the Administration of the Government in May 2025. It will oversee 
both internal audits and efficiency evaluations across all executive bodies. 

Service delivery to citizens and businesses 

23 

 
 
The service delivery to citizens and businesses needs further strategic development and investment. 
Progress  was  made  with  the  adoption  of  the  2025-2030  strategy  for  the  development  of  Georgia’s 
digital economy and information society, and the 2025-2027 action plan. In February 2025, Georgia 
adopted the digital governance strategy 2025-2030 and action plan for 2025-2027. Existing strategies, 
including  on  public  services  development,  still  need  to  be  implemented.  The  number  of  digital 
services increased, while the quality of services declined.  

2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS  

2.2.1  Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights  

The  EU’s  founding  values  include  the  rule  of  law  and  respect  for  human  rights.  An  effective 
(independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are 
of paramount importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice. 

Functioning of the judiciary  

Strategic documents  

Structured  and  comprehensive  strategic  documents  and  a  legislative  framework  still  need  to  be 
adopted in view of a comprehensive reform of the judiciary.  The High Council of Justice (HCJ) has 
not yet developed a strategy on the functioning of the HCJ and the judiciary. 

No  reforms  were  undertaken  to  address  all  the  existing  systemic  and  substantial  European 
Commission and Venice Commission recommendations. In particular, a comprehensive reform of the 
HCJ  and  the  Supreme  Court  (SC)  in  line  with  the  existing  recommendations  and  conducted  in  a 
thorough and inclusive consultation process remains outstanding. 

The  revised  legal  framework  undermines  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  judicial  system  and 
reverses  earlier  reform  steps.  Amendments  to  the  Law  on  common  courts  adopted  in  June  2025, 
without consultation with the EU or the Venice Commission reverse earlier reforms and are contrary 
to  former  EU  recommendations  and  Venice  Commission  opinions.  The  amendments  further 
undermine the independence, accountability and transparency of the HJC by revised election rules and 
not ensuring the balance between the number of judges versus non-judge members as recommended 
by  the  Venice  Commission.  Additionally,  the  revised  rules  on  the  judicial  disciplinary  liability  of 
judges  negatively  affect  judiciary  independence.  They  significantly  broaden  the  legal  basis  for 
initiating  disciplinary  proceedings,  which  is  too  vague  and  creates  a  high  risk  of  overly  broad 
interpretation  and  abuse.  Furthermore,  the  amendments  shift  the  authority  to  initiate  disciplinary 
proceedings from the  Independent Inspector to the Secretary of the High Council of Justice, further 
concentrating  powers  to  the  unreformed  HCJ,  which  risks  undermining  judicial  independence. 
Furthermore, the new rules on the transfer of judges now foresee the possibility of a transfer without 
consent of up to five years (before three years), which seriously undermines judicial independence in 
particular as safeguards are still lacking. Moreover, the new rules restrict media access and limit the 
timely  disclosure  of  court  decisions,  reversing  previous  reforms  and  reducing  transparency.  The 
constitutional provision on lifetime appointment of judges of all courts has come into full effect. Since 
31 December 2024, judges are to be appointed for life tenure, without an initial three-year term. 

The legislative framework for the Prosecutor General’s Office, including the appointment procedure 
of the Prosecutor General and disciplinary proceedings of prosecutors, is not aligned with European 
standards. There has been no follow up to address the recommendations of the Venice Commission, 
OECD  and  the  Technical  Assistance  and  Information  Exchange  (TAIEX)  peer  review  on  the 
functioning  of  the  justice  sector  and  the  fight  against  organised  crime  carried  out  in  May  2023. 
Furthermore,  the  legal  amendments  on  the  Law  on  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  of  June  2025  reversed 
earlier reforms. The amendments abolish consultations with CSOs and legal experts for the selection 
of candidates for the position of Prosecutor General and envisage that the procedure for nominating 
and  appointing  the  new  Prosecutor  General  is  completed  within  one  week.  In  June  2025,  a  new 
Prosecutor  General  was  appointed  by  simple  majority  and  four  years  before  the  end  of  the 
predecessor’s mandate. This is not in line with EU and Venice Commission recommendations. 

Management bodies 

24 

 
 
The management bodies, the HCJ and the Prosecutorial Council are in place. However, they do not 
meet EU and Council of Europe standards of independence, impartiality and transparency.  

In the reporting period, no reforms 
were  undertaken  to  align  these 
judicial institutions with European 
standards.  No  steps  were  taken  to 
address  outstanding  issues  with 
the  composition,  functioning  and 
powers  of  both  management 
bodies  outlined 
the  Venice 
Commission recommendations.  

in 

Georgia has not taken any steps to 
establish  a  system  of  integrity 
checks,  with  the  involvement  of 
international 
a 
decisive  role  in  the  process,  for 
candidates  and  those  currently  appointed  to  all  leading  positions  in  the  judiciary,  in  particular  the 
HCJ, the Supreme Court and presidents of common courts. 

experts  with 

In March 2025, the Tbilisi City Court annulled  the appointment of a non-judge member of the HCJ 
nominated  in  July  2024  and  decided  that  a  competitor  be  appointed  instead.  The  decision  further 
undermined the independence and the integrity of the HCJ. The Venice Commission noted concerns 
over previous appointments of lay members of the HCJ in its opinions.   

In  November  2024,  the  ECtHR  ruled  that  the  HCJ  had  acted  in  a  discriminatory  manner  by  twice 
refusing to reappoint a judge in 2015-2016.  

Venice  Commission  recommendations  for  the  evaluation  of  candidate  judges  and  judges  have  not 
been addressed.  

Independence and impartiality 

The  independence  and  impartiality  of  the  judiciary  are  inadequate  both  at  higher-level  courts  and 
courts  of  first  instance.  A  thorough  and  comprehensive  reform  of  the  judiciary  is  needed,  as 
recommended by the Venice Commission, in particular to ensure integrity in the HCJ and the SC, to 
improve independence and impartiality and to increase public trust in the judicial system. 

In September 2025, the Independent Inspector’s Service and the position of the Independent Inspector 
were abolished and its functions were incorporated into the HCJ, further concentrating powers to the 
unreformed HCJ, which risks undermining judicial independence.  

No progress was noted in the reporting period in strengthening safeguards to protect the independence 
and autonomy of prosecutors and the Prosecution Service, in line with EU and Venice Commission 
recommendations.  The  recommendation  by  the  EU  and  the  Venice  Commission  to  adopt 
constitutional amendments that would require a qualified majority in the appointment procedure of the 
Prosecutor General has not been addressed.  

In  its  opinions,  the  Venice  Commission  underlined  the  need  to  ensure  that  candidates  for  judicial 
appointments are treated equally.  

The June 2025 legislative amendments to the Law on common courts, which restrict photo, video and 
audio recordings at court premises, risks undermining public trust in the judiciary and seriously limit 
the oversight of judicial proceedings.  

Accountability 

The accountability of the judiciary is insufficient. There has been no progress to address challenges in 
the effective implementation of the legislative framework and the rules on the accountability of judges 
and prosecutors.  

25 

 
 
In  2024,  the  number  of  initiated  and  completed  disciplinary  procedures  against  judges  increased 
significantly.  The  number  of  disciplinary  procedures  initiated  and  sanctions  pronounced  against 
prosecutors decreased compared to 2024.  

The  concentration  of  powers  in  the 
the  Prosecutor  General 
Office  of 
simple 
(appointed  politically  by 
majority 
further 
in  Parliament) 
increased  with  the  absorption  of  the 
Special  Investigation  Service  into  the 
Office  of  the  Prosecutor  General  in 
May  2025.  This  change 
further 
increased the concentration of powers 
in 
the  Prosecutor 
General  in  a  context  where  long-standing  Venice  Commission  and  EU  recommendations  regarding 
the strengthening of the independence of the Prosecution Service remain unaddressed. 

the  Office  of 

There has been no progress to improve the transparency of the HCJ. Decisions or minutes were not 
published  during  the  reporting  period.  The  transparency  of  court  proceedings  is  undermined  by  the 
June 2025  legislative  amendments  to the  Law  on  common courts,  which  grant  the  HCJ the  right to 
decide on public access to court proceedings. 

Quality of justice  

The quality of justice needs to be improved.  

More efforts are still needed to further align it with European standards and best practices on effective 
and efficient administration of justice, including the use of European Commission for the  Efficiency 
of Justice (CEPEJ) tools (Council of Europe). 

There was no significant progress on increasing the number of second instance judges and prosecutors 
and  filling  open  vacancies  for  judges  and  prosecutors.  The  quality  of  justice  remains  negatively 
affected by the high caseload, causing delays in cases and ineffective management of backlogs in the 
common  courts  system.  The  effective  implementation  of  transparency  standards  declined.  Open 
access  to  reasoned  court  decisions  was  not  systematically  ensured.  Access  to  court  decisions  via 
freedom  of  information  requests  and  the  transparency  of  HCJ  sessions  and  decisions  further 
deteriorated  during  the  reporting  period.  At  the  same  time,  the  Supreme  Court  ensured  proactive 
access to the anonymised texts of its decisions.  

26 

 
 
The number of cases resolved by mediation and accredited mediators  has increased. Data collection 
needs to be improved.   

The judicial training system needs further improvements. Training and the exchange of best practices 
should be further developed and integrated into professional development. Further improvements are 
needed on the scope, participation rate, and budgetary allocation of the judicial training system. 

Efficiency 

The  efficiency  of  justice  could  be 
further  improved,  in  particular  for 
administrative cases.  

The number of incoming non-criminal 
increased  by  3%  for  first 
cases 
instance courts and by 8% for second 
instance courts in comparison to 2023 
raising  further  the  high  caseload  per 
judge.  At  the  level  of  courts  of  first 
instance,  the  disposition  time  (the 
time a judicial system takes to resolve 
a case) in civil and commercial cases 
increased  to  356  days  compared  with 
325 days in 2023. For administrative cases, the disposition time increased to 695 days in 2024 against 
633 days in 2023. For criminal cases, the disposition time was 80 days in 2024, down from 144 days 
in 2023. 

The  clearance  rates  for  civil  and  commercial  cases  in  all  courts  remained  at  a  high  level  overall  in 
2024. For civil and commercial cases, the clearance rate fell to 91% in courts of first instance in 2024 
(94% in 2023).  

The  backlog  of  pending  criminal  cases 
increased  to  7 841  in  2024  (7 079  in 
2023) at first instance and was 716 (823 
in  2023)  at  second  instance  courts  of 
appeal.  For  civil  and  commercial  cases, 
the  number  of  pending  cases  at  first 
instance increased to 97 899 in 2024 (88 
764  in  2023)  and  to  4  337  (4  097  in 
2023) at second instance courts.  

The number of judges increased from 
332 in 2023 to 367 in 2024, with the 
majority of them assigned to courts of 
first  instance  (from  218  in  2023  to 
251  in  2024).  The  number  of  second 
instance  judges  increased  to  89  in 
2024 (from 87 in 2023).  

The number of decisions delivered by 
the  Constitutional  Court  decreased  to 
18  in  2024  (from  19  in  2023).  The 
high  number  of  vacancies  in  judicial 
positions  remains  a  challenge  for  the 
efficiency of the judicial system. The 
backlogs are declining but remain high overall. The modernisation of court management needs to be 
addressed, including through implementation of new IT justice tools and full application of the court 
case management system for automatic/randomised case allocation. The number of cases allocated by 
the system remains high (95-100%). More efforts are needed to digitalise the justice system. There is 

27 

 
 
still a need to improve the interoperability of IT platforms across the penal chain.  

While  the  total  budget  allocated  to  the 
judiciary  has  been  steadily  increasing  in 
recent  years,  it  is  still  below  the  EU 
average  as  a  proportion  of  the  total  state 
budget. The overall budget of the Georgian 
judiciary increased by 5,2% between 2024 
and 2023.  

Fight against corruption  

Track record  

The  fight  against  corruption  track  record 
has  weakened  for  public  sector  including 
for high-level corruption cases.  

The  investigation,  prosecution  and  final 
conviction  of  high-level  corruption  cases 
declined  overall  in  2024.  Three  high-level 
officials were prosecuted (12 in 2023) and three officials were convicted for corruption in the public 
sector  (four  in  2023).  The  number  of 
investigated  non-high-level  corruption 
cases declined to 225 in 2024 (from 233 
in 2023); the number of prosecuted cases 
fell to 185 (from 232 in 2023), while the 
number  of  final  convictions  increased  to 
153 (up from 140 in 2023).  

of  States 

implemented.  This 

The  recommendations  from  the  fifth 
the  Council  of 
evaluation  round  of 
Europe  Group 
against 
Corruption  (GRECO)  still  need  to  be 
fully 
includes 
adoption  of  a  targeted  anti-corruption 
strategy, a code of conduct for those with 
an 
top 
independent  oversight  mechanism 
to 
ensure  the  proper  implementation  of 
transparency laws. 

executive 

functions 

and 

There has been no progress in public communication and accountability as regards cases of alleged 
high-level corruption. Detailed statistics on the detection, investigation, prosecution and adjudication 
of corruption cases, especially high-level corruption cases, are still not publicly available. 

Legal framework 

The legal framework on the fight against corruption is not adequate in terms of preventive measures 
and needs to be improved regarding law enforcement.  

There was no progress in revising the Law on the fight against corruption in order to provide the Anti-
Corruption  Bureau  (ACB)  with  a  legal  framework  to  ensure  operational  independence.  Venice 
Commission recommendations, in particular related to the ACB’s independence, political neutrality, 
the transparent verification of officials’ assets and interest declarations, and investigative functions in 
high-level corruption cases still need to be addressed. The ACB’s mandate was extended to monitor 
and enforce the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and the legislative amendments to the Law 
on grants in April 2025 and the ACB has been vested with wide discretion in applying these laws. The 
additional extensive investigatory and enforcement powers of the ACB include inspections, issuing of 
fines,  questioning  individuals,  and  initiating  criminal  proceedings  with  investigative  bodies.  These 

28 

 
 
additional  tasks  contribute  to  increasing  the  ACB’s  lack  of  independence  and  an  increased 
politicisation  of  the  institution.  The  selective  implementation  of  its  extended  mandate,  and  in 
particular  the  enforcement  of  FARA  legislation  and  the  revised  Law  on  grants,  has  raised  serious 
concerns about the legal grounds of the court-approved information orders issued to a large number of 
CSOs.   

The legal framework does not provide for an independent advisory institution on anti-corruption since 
the advisory Anti-Corruption Council was abolished in May 2024.  

Further  alignment  is  needed  on  whistle-blower  protection.  Procedures  and  reporting  mechanisms 
related to whistleblower protection are integrated into an online platform.  

Strategic documents  

Strategic documents are not in place. No anti-corruption strategy and action plan have been developed 
since  2020,  and  no  updated  anti-corruption  sectoral  risk  assessment  was  developed  in  the  reporting 
period. Georgia needs to adopt a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy and action plan that aligns 
with recommendations from GRECO, with particular focus on integrity checks, conflicts of interest, 
lobbying and asset declaration systems. 

Georgia should follow up on all recommendations in GRECO’s fifth evaluation round, including on a 
targeted  anti-corruption  strategy  for  those  with  top  executive  functions,  a  code  of  conduct  for  top 
executive  functions,  the  extension  of  the  list  of  people  subject  to  asset  declarations  and  the 
investigation  of  corruption  crimes.  Strategic  documents  on  risk  assessment  and  the  prevention  of 
conflicts of interest, an anti-corruption strategy for the police and a targeted corruption risk approach 
for law enforcement agencies need to be prepared.  

There  has  been  no  progress  on  implementation  of  the  de-oligarchisation  action  plan  adopted  in 
November  2023.  Venice  Commission 
followed  up. 
Recommendations in GRECO’s fifth evaluation round still need to be fully implemented. 

recommendations  still  need 

to  be 

Institutional framework 

The institutional framework on the fight against corruption is in place but is not adequate in terms of 
preventive measures and needs to be improved regarding law enforcement.  

There  was  no  progress  on  the  ACB’s  institutional  set-up  and  strategic  framework,  and  key  Venice 
Commission  recommendations  have  yet  to  be  addressed.  The  ACB’s  mandate  was  substantially 
extended  based  on  repressive  legislation,  including  the  amendments  to  the  Law  on  grants  and  the 
Foreign  Agents  Registration  Act.  Legislation  adopted  in  April  2025  removed  the  mandatory 
participation and consultation of civil society in public decision-making processes. This excluded civil 
society from the selection commission for appointing the head of the ACB. 

The  number  of  asset  declarations  checked  by  the  ACB  increased  in  2024.  It  checked  the  asset 
declarations  of  353  officials;  in  319  cases,  monitoring  was  concluded  with  no  shortcomings; 
violations  were  found  in  34  cases  (220  officials  in  2023,  of  which  23  cases  of  incompatibility  of 
duties and conflicts of interest).  

More efforts are needed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the relevant law enforcement 
investigation units. They still lack autonomous powers and safeguards for their independence  and to 
prevent risks of undue political influence.  

Transparency and public access to asset declarations on the ACB website  was problematic. In 2025, 
public access to the system of monitoring asset declarations was not consistently ensured.  

Georgia  continues  to  lack  dedicated  and  autonomous  entities  in  law  enforcement,  the  prosecution 
services or specialised courts to fight corruption, and stand-alone specialised bodies for investigating 
and  prosecuting  high-level  corruption.  The  investigation  of  corruption-related  cases  remains  shared 
between different institutions, resulting in a fragmented approach and repercussions for enforcement.  

Georgia should rejoin the OECD anti-corruption monitoring network for Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia and follow up on the recommendations of the Fourth Round of Monitoring of the Istanbul Anti-

29 

 
 
Corruption Action Plan. 

Fundamental rights  

General framework 

The 

revised 

The  general  framework  for  fundamental 
severely  weakened  by 
rights  was 
to  be 
legislative  actions  and  needs 
fundamentally 
against 
new 
standards. 
international 
legislation, including the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act, amendments to the Law 
on  assemblies  and  demonstrations,  the 
Code  of  administrative  offences  and  the 
Criminal Code, was adopted without due 
public  consultations.  These  measures  contradict  Georgia’s  obligations  under  human  rights  law  and 
infringe in particular on the rights to freedom of association and expression. There are significant gaps 
in the national strategy on the protection of human rights 2022-2030 and its action plan 2024-2026.  

The 
the 
implementation  and  enforcement  of  fundamental  rights  was  overshadowed  by 
disproportionate, unlawful and excessive use of force, in some cases amounting to  ill-treatment and 
torture, against protesters during the reporting period.  

International human rights instruments  

Cooperation  with  international  human  rights  monitoring  bodies  and  the  follow-up  to  their 
recommendations needs to be improved. Georgia has ratified most main  European and international 
human  rights  instruments.  It  has  not  signed  the  International  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance. 

European Court of Human Rights 

in  breach  of 
Convention 

The cooperation with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the implementation of its 
judgements is inadequate. During the reporting period, the ECtHR delivered eight judgements against 
Georgia.  The  ECtHR  found 
the 
Georgia 
European 
on 
Human  Rights  in  cases  relating 
mainly  to  the  length  of  judicial 
proceedings,  the  right  to  life, 
the  right  to  a  fair  trial,  the 
prohibition  of  torture,  the  right 
to respect for private and family 
of 
life, 
discrimination 
as 
freedom  of  thought,  conscience 
and  religion.  Currently,  there 
are  45  cases  under  enhanced 
supervision  by  the  Committee 
of  Ministers.  Georgia  needs  to  address  the  systemic  and  structural  issues  raised  by  the  Court,  in 
particular regarding the justice system, penitentiary and law enforcement systems and the protection 
from discrimination, and to ensure systematic enforcement of ECtHR judgments.  

prohibition 
as  well 

the 

Promotion and enforcement of human rights  

The legal and institutional framework for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights 
is  incomplete  and  needs  to  be  improved.  The  implementation  of  the  action  plan  2024-2026  for  the 
national strategy on the protection of human rights has still not started. The process for monitoring its 
implementation has not been defined.  

30 

 
 
The Public Defender’s Office (PDO) remains a key 
the  protection  and 
institution  for  supervising 
implementation  of  Georgia’s  human 
rights 
obligations.  The  PDO  continues  to  carry  out  its 
mandate  satisfactorily,  albeit  selectively.  In  2024, 
the  PDO  issued  82  recommendations,  16  special 
reports  and  several  communications 
the 
authorities.  However,  the  implementation  of  its 
to  state  authorities  remains 
recommendations 
limited – only 56% were taken into account.  

to 

Prevention of torture and ill-treatment 

Georgia has an inadequate legal framework for the 
prevention  of  torture  and  ill-treatment,  and  the 
follow-up  to  cases  is  insufficient.  Participants  in  peaceful  assemblies,  detainees  and  journalists 
reportedly  faced  torture  and  other  ill-treatment  by  law  enforcement  officers.  Based  on  interviews 
conducted by the PDO representatives, between 28 November 2024 and 1 March 2025, 60% of visited 
detainees reported ill-treatment, highlighting systematic and widespread character of violence against 
protesters. Victims were subjected to severe beatings and other forms of ill-treatment, in some cases 
amounting  to  torture  and  inhuman  and  degrading  treatment.  This  occurred  during  the  dispersal  or 
encirclement  of  protesters,  at  the  time  of  arrest,  and  later  during  police  transport.  According  to  the 
PDO,  a  consistent  pattern  of  methods,  techniques  and  forms  of  ill-treatment  may  indicate  that  the 
uniform methods of ill-treatment had been pre-planned. Between 28 November 2024 and 28 January 
2025, the PDO identified a total of 282 alleged ill-treatment cases. No law enforcement officers have 

been held accountable. 

to 
of 

the 
The 
follow-up 
the 
recommendations 
Preventive 
National 
Mechanism  (NPM)  remains 
inadequate. In 2024, the NPM 
preventive 
conducted 
92 
institutions. 
in  65 
visits 
Patients 
psychiatric 
in 
institutions  are  still  not  fully 
protected  from  violence  and 
degrading 
or 
inhumane 
treatment. The NPM received 
reports  of  both  physical  and 
psychological  violence  at  the 
hands of members of staff. In 2024, the now-abolished Special Investigation Service received reports 
of  175  allegations  of  physical  and  psychological  violence  against  prisoners  by  employees  of  the 
Special Penitentiary Service and initiated investigations into 16 criminal cases. 

Protection gaps in the Code of administrative offences, including with respect to the legal safeguards, 
the lack of clarity about standards of proof and the absence of a meaningful right to appeal  against 
detention  decisions,  remain  unaddressed.  Furthermore,  18  judgments  of  the  ECtHR  concerning 
various substantive and procedural violations of Articles 2 and 3 on account of torture and other forms 
of ill treatment are pending execution. 

Efforts  to  reduce  the  prison  population  need  to  be  increased  as  Georgia  ranks  second  on  the 
incarceration  rate  (256  per  100 000)  among  the  Council  of  Europe  countries.  The  occupancy  rate 
stood at 82.1% in December 2024. The use of de-escalation and safety rooms for punitive purposes, as 
well as prolonged placement in such rooms, continue to be a concern. The Public Defender qualified 
these practices as ill-treatment. The use of excessive force and physical and psychological violence by 
law enforcement officers needs to be addressed.  

31 

 
 
Execution of criminal sanctions  

The excessive resort to pre-trial detention and disproportionate application of sentencing deeply affect 
the right to a fair trial. The continued violation of the right to a fair trial affected in particular court 
proceedings of individuals detained during protests. 

The system for executing criminal sanctions, including probation, needs to be improved. Data on the 
average  duration  of  pre-trial  detentions  is  not  collected.  Individuals  detained  during  the  November 
2024  demonstrations  have  been  subject  to  numerous  violations,  including  the  disproportionate  and 
often  unlawful  application  of  pre-trial  detention  –  commonly  imposed  immediately  upon  arrest 
without adequate justification or individualised assessment.  

Protection of personal data  

The legal framework for the protection of personal data is insufficient and the capacities of the Data 
Protection Agency need to be improved. The Law on personal data protection is not fully aligned with 
the General Data Protection Regulation and the Law Enforcement Directive. Georgia has not signed 
the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  108+.  Key  recommendations  of  the  Venice  Commission  on 
institutional independence, impartiality and powers of the Personal Data Protection Service have still 
not been addressed. 

Freedom of religion or belief  

Freedom  of  thought,  conscience  and  religion  is  generally  upheld.  The  ECtHR  judgment  (Georgian 
Muslim  Relations  and  Others  v.  Georgia),  which  found  that  Georgia  violated  the  European 
Convention on Human Rights regarding freedom of religion, has not been implemented. In July 2025, 
the  Kutaisi  Court  of  Appeals  upheld  the  Municipality’s  appeal  against  the  construction  of  a  new 
mosque  in  Batumi,  overturning  the  lower  court  decision.  This  case  raises  concerns  about  religious 
freedom  and  potential  discrimination  against  the  Muslim  community.  Hate  speech  and  alleged  hate 
crimes  committed  on  religious  grounds  persisted.  During  2024,  seven  applications  were  registered 
with the PDO regarding allegations of 
discrimination  on  religious  grounds, 
two  of  which  concerned  crimes 
motivated by intolerance. 

Freedom of expression  

Intimidation of journalists 

and 

pressure 

The  safety  of  journalists  deteriorated 
significantly  with  a  growing  number 
of intimidation, hate speech, violence, 
legal 
detention, 
preventing  them  from  carrying  out 
their  professional  duties  freely.  Since 
29  November  2024  and  4  June  2025,  more  than  150  cases  of  interference  in  journalistic  activities 
were  reported.  Despite  reports  of 
violence  against  journalists  by  the 
special  forces  and  police,  including 
physical  assaults  and  destruction  of 
their  equipment,  none  of 
these 
incidents  have  led  to  any  charges  or 
convictions,  leaving  the  perpetrators 
unpunished. Numerous journalists and 
media 
received 
workers 
disproportionate  administrative  fines 
or  were  arbitrarily  detained  while 
carrying  out  their  work.  The  founder 
and  director  of  online  media  outlet 

32 

 
 
Batumelebi  was  arrested  during  protests  and  sentenced  to  two  years  in  prison.  The  use  of  strategic 
lawsuits  against  public  participation  (SLAPPs)  continues.  Alignment  with  the  EU  Anti-SLAPP 
Directive and Recommendation needs to be ensured. 

Legislative environment  

The adoption of the Foreign Agents Registration Act places additional pressure on the media sector 
and  undermines  press  freedom,  given  that  non-compliance  with  its  requirements  may  result  in 
imprisonment up to five years. Extending the definition of ‘agents’ to individuals is likely to affect the 
independence of journalists.  

In April 2025, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on broadcasting, prohibiting the direct or 
indirect  funding  of  audio-visual  broadcasters  by  ‘foreign  entities.  The  restrictions  apply  to  various 
forms of support, including direct financial assistance, equipment transfers,  staff training and media 
development  programmes.  These  amendments,  combined  with  amendments  to  the  Law  on  grants 
introducing an ex ante authorisation requirement for each foreign-funded grant, drastically limit media 
outlets’  access  to  funding and  undermine media  pluralism.  The  amended  Law on  broadcasting  also 
gave  the  Communications  Commission  (ComCom)  more  control  over  broadcasting  content  amidst 
newly introduced requirements on factual accuracy, fairness and impartiality.  

In June 2025, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on freedom of speech and expression. The 
amendments abolished important guarantees related to freedom of expression, in particular qualified 
privilege, shifted the burden of proof for defamation from the plaintiff to the defendant, and weakened 
the  standard  for  protecting  confidential  sources  and  professional  secrecy.  Earlier  this  year, 
amendments to the Code of administrative offences adopted in February 2025 significantly reduced 
the  possibility  of  expressing  critical  views  of  government  officials,  contradicting  the  standards  of 
legitimate interference with freedom of expression. The adoption of the legislative package on family 
values and the protection of minors in September 2024 restricted freedom of expression on LGBTIQ-
related content as it prohibits the distribution of information aimed at promoting LGBTIQ identities. 

Implementation of legislation/institutions   

The  Law  on  transparency  of  foreign  influence  continued  to  have  a  chilling  effect  on  the  media, 
stigmatising outlets that receive foreign funding. 

There  are  concerns  about  the  effective  independence  and  impartiality  of  ComCom,  which  is 
responsible for licensing and broadcast media oversight. ComCom has been criticised for its selective 
and arbitrary interpretation of laws, making legal compliance difficult for media outlets. In June 2025, 
the ruling party filed complaints with ComCom against the opposition-aligned TV channels Formula, 
Mtavari  and  TV  Pirveli,  accusing  them  of  coverage  standards  violations.  In  its  decision  of  10  July 
2025,  ComCom  recognised  the  violation  of  the  “fairness  and  impartiality”  provision  by  the  three 
broadcasters but freed them from an administrative liability.  Russian-style disinformation, primarily 
targeting the EU and EU ambassador, via television and various media outlets is widespread. 

The April amendments to the Code of administrative offences served as a legal basis for complaints 
that  the  ruling  party  filed  with  the  Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs  against  activists,  journalists  and 
politicians. Based on these complaints, courts applied the highest fines possible in the majority of the 
cases (GEL 4 000). There were also two cases of administrative detention. 

Public service broadcaster  

The Georgian Public Broadcaster lacks independence, has biased editorial policy and  contributed to 
the  promotion  of  anti-EU  rhetoric.  Ahead  of  the  October  2024  parliamentary  elections,  it  allocated 
airtime unproportionately, with most of the campaign coverage (61%) focused on Georgian Dream. In 
April 2025, a former high-ranking Georgian Dream politician was re-elected as Chair of the Board in 
the  absence  of  any  other  candidate.  Complaints  were  filed  against  the  Board  and  management  for 
failing to serve public interest and failing to reflect the diversity of views by refusing to air coverage 
of  protests.  Several  journalists  were  dismissed  following  their  criticism  of  the  public  broadcaster’s 
decision to terminate a talk show critical of the authorities.  

33 

 
 
Economic factors 

Although  political  parties  are  prohibited  from  owning  media,  concerns  persist  with  regards  to  the 
independence  and  impartiality  of  the  big  media  networks  as  political  affiliations  influence  media 
ownership.  The  advertising  market  is  underdeveloped,  and  many  media  outlets,  in  particular 
independent online outlets, remain highly dependent on donor funding. The shrinking media market, 
restrictive government policies and increasing risks associated with receiving donor support make it 
increasingly difficult to secure sustainable funding. 

Internet  

Internet provision generally functions without undue restrictions.  

Professional organisations and working conditions 

Georgian  journalists  and  media  outlets  are  represented  by  several  membership-based  professional 
associations and organisations. There is no dialogue between the government and media professional 
bodies.  Downsizing  and  delays  in  salary  payments  are  frequent.  Staff  turnover  is  high  across 
newsrooms, especially among regional media. 

Freedom of assembly and association  

Georgia  provides  insufficient  legal  guarantees  for  freedom  of  assembly  and  association,  and  the 
regulation  of  assemblies  is  restrictive.  In  December  2024,  in  February  2025  and  in  October  2025, 
Parliament adopted numerous amendments to the laws governing the right to assembly, including the 
Law  on  assemblies  and  demonstrations  and  the  Code  of  administrative  offences  and  the  Criminal 
code.  These  amendments  impose  arbitrary  restrictions  on  demonstrators,  expand  law  enforcement 
powers, and broaden the grounds for administrative arrest, search and seizure and criminal liability. 
The  amendments  substantially  and  disproportionately  increase  penalties  including  administrative 
detention and imprisonment for the infringements related to the exercise of freedom of assembly and 
impose unreasonably strict liabilities for new violations. 

Peaceful protests during the reporting period were met with disproportionate, unlawful and excessive 
use  of  force.  Beyond  reported  physical  violence,  law  enforcement  forces  resorted  to  the 
disproportionate use of aggressive crowd control measures, such as water cannon, tear gas and rubber 
bullets.  The  PDO  reported  violations  of  protesters’  rights,  including  of  their  liberty  and  security  of 
person, and of the prohibition of torture and other forms of  ill treatment. Several hundred protesters 
were  detained.  Criminal  investigations  were  launched  into  over  60  people.  The  use  of  arbitrary 
administrative fines was widespread.  

Freedom  of  association  has  been  seriously  curtailed  by  the  introduction  of  multiple  restrictive  laws 
and amendments as tools to supress dissent. The cumulative effect of the new legislation, combined 
with  widespread  disinformation,  stigmatisation  and  an  attack  on  the  financial  resources  of  CSOs, 
threatens freedom of association. 

Labour and trade union rights are covered in Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment. 

Property rights  

Legislative  guarantees  on  property 
rights  are  in  place.  The  process  for 
the initial registration of land through 
the  cadastral  system  has  not  been 
completed. 

Non-discrimination  

The legal and institutional framework 
on  non-discrimination,  hate  crime 
and  hate  speech  is  incomplete,  and 
the  capacities  of  equality  bodies  are 
and 
This 
insufficient. 

legal 

34 

 
 
institutional framework remains to be fully aligned with the EU acquis, including inter alia as regards 
the  Racial  Equality  Directive (Directive  2000/78/EC)  and  the  Directives  on  standards  for  equality 
bodies (Directive (EU) 2024/1499 and Directive (EU) 2024/1500). Legislation on hate crime and hate 
speech is not in line with the EU acquis and European standards. Better enforcement of the Law on 
the elimination of all forms of discrimination and more tangible actions to improve the conditions of 
persons in vulnerable situations are needed. Hate offences, including from politicians, are widespread 
and  remain  largely  unaddressed.  Cases  of  hate  crime  are  not  investigated  and  not  prosecuted 
effectively. 

Gender equality  

The  legal  and  institutional  framework 
on  gender  equality  and  combating 
gender-based  violence  is  incomplete, 
and  implementation  and  enforcement 
is  insufficient.  Recent  developments 
constitute  backsliding 
in  gender 
equality  and  in  efforts  to  combat 
sexual  and  gender-based  violence.  In 
adopted 
April 
amendments 
terms 
to  remove 
‘gender’ and ‘gender equality’ from all 
the 
Georgian 
terms with ‘equality between women and men’. Gender focal points were replaced by women’s rights 
focal  points.  This  shift  marks  a  significant  departure  from  previous  efforts  to  align  Georgia’s  legal 
framework  with  international  human  rights  standards  and  the  EU  gender  equality  acquis.  Local 
human rights organisations reported instances of physical assaults, sexual harassment, and threats of 
rape or death by law enforcement officials directed at women participating in demonstrations. 

legislation,  replacing 

2025,  Parliament 

the 

The national action plans on combating violence against women and domestic violence and protecting 
victims expired. There was backsliding on the alignment with the Istanbul Convention and on efforts 
to  address  the  2022  recommendations  by  the  Group  of  Experts  on  Action  against  Violence  against 
Women  and  Domestic  Violence  (GREVIO).  In  2024,  the  Prosecutor’s  Office identified  16  cases  of 
femicide  and  13  cases  of  attempted  femicide.  Various  forms  of  gender-based  violence  against 
participants of protests were reported. 

Georgia made no progress in encouraging municipalities to sign and implement the European Charter 
for  Equality  of  Women  and  Men  in  Local  Life.  The  legislative  amendments  removing  the  words 
‘gender’ and ‘gender equality’ from the national legal framework have created additional barriers to 
adopting the Charter at local level. 

Rights of the child  

The legal and institutional framework on the rights of the child is in place, but its implementation and 
enforcement need to be improved. Although the Permanent Council on the Protection of the Rights of 
the Child was set up already in 2019, its work has not yet started. Implementation of the Code of the 
rights  of  the  child  remains  a  challenge.  Implementation  of  a  child-friendly  justice  reform,  in 
accordance with the Juvenile Justice Code and the Code on the rights of the child, is still outstanding. 

Implementation efforts in children’s rights protection should also be in line with the EU  acquis and 
draw guidance from key European Commission recommendations, in particular as concerns integrated 
child  protection  systems,  as  there  was  still  no  progress  on  an  integrated  child  protection  system. 
Comprehensive data on violence against children is lacking, making it difficult to assess the scale of 
the  problem.  According  to  State  Care  Agency  data,  there  were  2 055  cases  of  violence  against 
children in 2024 compared with 1 564 in 2023. 

The elimination of child marriage remains a challenge. Due to insufficient legislative regulation, cases 
of  child  marriage  initiated  by  parents  often  go  unrecorded  in  statistics  with  no  proper  response.  In 
2024, the  official  data reported  427  underage  pregnant  girls  and  365  child  parents.  The  Ministry  of 

35 

 
 
Internal  Affairs  launched  184  investigations  into  possible  crimes  motivated  by  child  marriage  and 
issued 74 restraining orders. 

Persons with disabilities  

The  legal  and  institutional  framework  on  the  rights  of  persons  with  disabilities  needs  to  be  further 
aligned with the EU acquis and its implementation and enforcement needs to be improved. Georgia 
has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and its Optional 
Protocol,  but  persons  with  disabilities  continue  to  face  systemic  barriers  to  the  enjoyment  of  their 
rights. In contravention of the CRPD convention, Georgia relies on the medical model for determining 
disability  status.  The  implementation  of  the  biopsychosocial  model  is  experiencing  considerable 
delays,  raising  concerns  about  the  timely  introduction  of  the  new  system.  The  closure  of  a  large 
institution in Martkopi at the end of 2024 marks progress in deinstitutionalisation, but further efforts 
are needed to ensure the full and effective implementation. The 2024 report by the PDO highlighted 
gaps in the provision of inclusive education for children with disabilities. 

LGBTIQ persons  

The legal protection of the rights of LGBTIQ persons is largely insufficient and LGBTIQ persons face 
serious  discrimination,  intolerance  and  systemic  violence.  Homophobic  and  transphobic  rhetoric, 
including messages incited and amplified by high-level officials, continued.     

The  adoption  of  a  legislative  package  on  family  values  and  the  protection  of  minors  in  September 
2024  reinforced  a  hostile  environment  for  sections  of  the  Georgian  population  and  fuelled 
stigmatisation  and  discrimination,  in  addition  to  very  adverse  legal  consequences  for  LGBTIQ 
persons. Its provisions include, among others, enshrining the prohibition for non-heterosexual persons 
to adopt children,  preventing LGBTIQ persons from changing their gender marker on identification 
documents, and outlawing public gatherings and the distribution of information aimed at promoting 
LGBTIQ  identities  in  educational  settings and in  the media.  The  Venice  Commission  considers the 
legislation  to  be  incompatible  with  relevant  European  and  international  standards.  Its  adoption 
contributed  to  a  surge  in  hate  crimes  and  increased  barriers  for  LGBTIQ  persons  in  enjoying  their 
rights related to healthcare, education, and employment.   

The  authorities  not  only  fail  to  recognise  and  address  the  systemic  nature  of  discrimination  against 
LGBTIQ persons but amplify discrimination, intolerance and systemic violence. The national strategy 
for the protection of human rights and its action plan for 2024-26 omit considerations for the rights of 
LGBTIQ persons. Georgia has systematically failed in implementing ECtHR rulings, including in the 
A.D  and  others  v.  Georgia  case.  The  impunity  of  instigators  and  organisers  of  violence  that  target 
LGBTIQ persons, including at Tbilisi Pride in 2021 and 2023, continues.  

Procedural rights and victims’ rights  

The  legal  framework  on  procedural  rights  is  incomplete,  and  its  protection  of  victims’  rights  is 
insufficient.  Violations  of  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  persist.  The  annual  report  by  the  PDO  highlights 
cases of convictions solely on police testimonies, a lawyer’s participation in investigative actions was 
denied,  an  obligation  was  imposed  on  the  defence  to  maintain  the  confidentiality  of  case  material 
without specific justification or scope, and there were delays in expert examinations. Violations of fair 
trial standards and due process guarantees were also reported during court proceedings of individuals 
detained during mass protests. In 2024, the ECtHR found violations of the right to a fair trial in six 
cases against Georgia. These mainly concerned delays in proceedings, and in two cases the issue of 
recusal of judges. 

Protection of minorities 

The  legal  and  institutional  framework  for  the  protection  of  persons  belonging  to  minorities  is 
incomplete, and they face serious discrimination. Ethnic minorities continue to struggle with access to 
quality education and public services, participating in civic activities and finding employment in the 
civil service. Language and information barriers persist, in particular affecting political participation. 
Although  minorities  make  up  13%  of  the  population,  only  5%  of  candidates  in  the  2024  elections 
belong  to minority  communities.  The  continued  lack of  regular  consultative  bodies at  both  national 

36 

 
 
and  local  levels  limits  the  political  representation  of  minorities.  Significant  gaps  in  the  strategic 
framework, including the national strategy for the protection of human rights 2022-2030 and the state 
strategy  for  civic  equality  and  integration  2021-2030,  remain.  The  amendments  to  the  Law  on 
broadcasting risk restricting minority-language media access to funding.  

Roma  

There  is  no  specific  legislative  framework  to  ensure  the  rights  of  Roma2  people.  The  Roma 
communities continue to face discrimination, including with respect to access to housing, education 
and other government services.  

Citizenship rights 

Georgian  citizenship  can  be  acquired  by  birth,  naturalisation,  Presidential  decision,  restoration  of 
citizenship,  adoption  or  derivation.  Georgia  generally  does  not  allow  dual  citizenship,  but  the 
President  may  grant  permission  to  retain  dual  citizenship  in  special  cases.  The  State  Services 
Development Agency (SSDA) handles applications for citizenship. Georgia does not currently offer a 
formal, guaranteed citizenship-by-investment or “golden passport” programme, however, the country 
allows foreigners to acquire temporary or permanent residence permits via investment. In 2024, 3 587 
persons,  mostly  from  Russia  (2 361),  Germany  (251)  and  Ukraine  (175)  were  granted  Georgian 
citizenship, 476 more than in 2023, while 1 592 lost their citizenship mostly due to their acquisition of 
Russian citizenship (802 cases).  

2.2.2  Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security  

The EU has common rules for border and migration management, visa policy,  and asylum.  Schengen 
cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also cooperation in the fight 
against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and judicial, police and customs cooperation, all 
with the support of the EU justice and home affairs agencies. 

Fight against serious and organised crime  

The  legal  framework  on  serious  and  organised  crime  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The 
capacity to fight against serious and organised crime needs to be improved.  

Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks   

Further alignment is needed in the areas of fighting trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of 
migrants,  confiscation  of  criminal  assets,  legislation  on  the  interception  of  communications  and 
legislation on the fight against financial crime and money laundering. 

The  separation  of  powers  between  criminal  prosecution  and  investigation  bodies  has  not  yet  been 
addressed. 

Human resources management and professional development in law enforcement agencies should be 
strengthened  in  line  with  transparent,  professional  and  merit-based  criteria.  In  December  2024, 
legislation was adopted to lower recruitment standards for police officers. The percentage of  female 
police officers in the police force fell to 14.7%. Further efforts are needed to ensure a higher gender 
balance in law enforcement agencies. 

As  part  of  the  strategy  for  combating  organized  crime  2025-2028,  approved  by  the  Interagency 
Coordination Council for combating organized crime in August 2025, Georgia should further develop 
and  implement  a  comprehensive  and  intelligence-led  approach  to  combating  serious  and  organised 
crime,  by  forming  a  better  intelligence  picture  on  high-risk  criminal  networks  and  supporting 
community-oriented policing, in line with the European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment of March 2025. Georgia has not updated the 2021 assessment. 

An  effective  and  dedicated  asset  recovery  office  in  line  with  European  standards  and  an  assets 

2 In line with the terminology of European institutions, the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer to a 
number of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups. 

37 

 
 
 
management office need to be established. The International Relations and Legal Department of the 
Prosecutor General’s Office manages the cooperation with asset recovery offices.   

should  establish 

Georgia 
the  use  of  extended 
confiscation and confiscation of equivalent value as the 
norm  in  all  cases  involving  income-generating  serious 
crimes as well as the financing of terrorism. 

In  July  2025,  a  division  for  combating  organised 
criminal groups was established in the Central Criminal 
Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 

On  child  sexual  abuse  online,  Georgia  still  needs  to 
develop  a  national  action  plan  for  combating  violence 
against children in the digital environment, aligned with 
the Lanzarote Convention. 

Legislation on trafficking in human beings should be 
further  aligned  with  Directive  2011/26/EU  on 
preventing  and  combating  trafficking  in  human  beings 
and protecting its victims. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity  

The  number  of  criminal 
overall.  The  number  of  prosecutions  and  convictions  increased  for  organised  crime  cases  but 
decreased  for  serious  crime  cases.  Efforts  to  combat  the  smuggling  of  goods  and  illicit  substances 

investigations  decreased 

need to be stepped up. 

No  progress  was  made  on  increasing 
the  possibilities  for  law  enforcement 
independent 
conduct 
to 
agencies 
investigations  without 
prior 
the 
the  Prosecutor’s 
authorisation  of 
Office  for 
investigative 
steps.  Prosecutors  and  investigators 
need 
at 
collaborate 
to 
operational level.  

initial 

better 

the 

implementation 

Effective 
of 
intelligence-led  policing  practices  is 
still constrained by a lack of technical 
infrastructure 
to  support  analytical 
practices and institutional barriers that 
limit  evidence-based  practices.  This 
the 
also 

negatively 

impacts 

implementation of counter-trafficking action.  

Efforts  to  strengthen  community-oriented  policing  as  an  integral  part  of  a  long-term  response  to 
combating organised crime have continued. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) set up a working 
group  on  the  development  of  community-oriented  policing  (COP)  tasked  with  monitoring  the 
implementation of the COP 2024-2027 strategy following its adoption in July 2024. COP efforts are 
severely undermined by the lack of accountability of law enforcement officers for repressive actions 
and the brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters since 28 November 2024.  

Progress  has  been  made  in  the  forensic  inspection  field  related  to  the  crime  scene  with  the 
international  ISO  accreditation  of  the  forensic-criminalistics  division  of  the  MIA  as  well  as  the 
establishment of a DNA database created at the National Forensics Bureau. 

Law  enforcement  agencies  (police  investigators  and  prosecutors)  apply  the  ‘double  rail’  method  of 

38 

 
 
conducting 
investigations in parallel. 

criminal 

and 

financial 

a 

seen 

investigations 

The  amount  of  seized  and  confiscated 
assets,  especially  in  relation  to  money 
substantial 
laundering,  has 
increase.  Confiscated  assets  still  remain 
low  at  less  than  EUR 14.3 million.  In 
2024,  there  was  a  fall  in  the  number  of 
into  money 
registered 
laundering  crimes,  while  the  number  of 
solved  cases  remained  low.  The  level  of 
cooperation  with  EU  Member  States’ 
law  enforcement  bodies  is  good.  Georgia 
should 
in 
international  police  cooperation  on  drug 
trafficking and high-risk organised criminal networks. The number of pieces of operative information 
the  MIA  exchanged  with  Europol  members  and  partner  countries  through  the  Secure  Information 
Exchange  Network  Application  (SIENA)  increased  since  2023  with  800  pieces  of  operative 
information exchanged between January and June 2025 and 1 400 in 2024. At the same time, Georgia 
increased its participation in Europol analytical projects.  

participation 

increase 

The MIA continued cooperation with Interpol, and Georgia was actively involved in seven working 
groups.  Georgia  continued  its  cooperation  with  CEPOL,  the  European  Union  Agency  for  Law 
Enforcement Training (mainly through its Eastern Partnership regional project ‘TOPCOP’ (Training 
and Operational Partnership against Organised Crime). 

The MIA deployed 19 police officers to partner countries (including 12 EU Member States) covering 
38 countries (including 26 EU/Schengen countries). 

Georgia  increased  its  participation  in  the  European  Multidisciplinary  Platform  against  Criminal 
Threats (EMPACT). In 2024-2025, the MIA participated in 10 operational action plans, taking on the 
role of co-leader in one, and 136 operational actions.  

Georgia  needs  to  strengthen  its  capacities  to  address  cybercrime,  in  particular  by  further  training 
agency  employees  involved  in  fighting  cybercrime,  including  cybercrime  on  the  dark  net.  Fewer 
cybercrime  cases  were  resolved  in  2024  (317)  compared  with  2023  (505),  while  fewer  cases  were 
registered (749 in 2024 compared to 999 in 2023). 

Child sexual abuse cases that were prosecuted and resulted in convictions fell in 2024, with 143 cases 
prosecuted  (191  in  2023)  and  94  convictions  secured  (114  in  2023).  National  legislation  on  sexual 
violence  against  children  remains  substantially  inconsistent  with  international  standards,  and 
institutional capacities need to be strengthened.  

On  trafficking  in  human  beings,  gaps  persist  in  the  implementation  of  protection  measures,  pro-
active investigations and intelligence-led policing. Georgia needs to further improve the effectiveness 
of  criminal 
institutional  cooperation  on  effective 
investigations. In 2024, 19 statutory victims were recognised.  

investigation  capacities  and  strengthen 

On arms control, 797 crimes were registered in 2024 (1 003 in 2023), of which 688 were solved. 

Despite  an  increased  legal  response  to  cases  of  femicide,  there  are  still  gaps  in  investigation, 
prosecution  and  judicial  review.  Proper  criminal  legal  qualification  of  cases  remains  challenging, 
demonstrated by the accusation of a less strict crime when legal and factual circumstances indicate a 
more severe crime. 

Cooperation in the field of drugs  

The legal framework for cooperation in the field of drugs needs to be improved.  

Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks  

39 

 
 
The  national  drug  strategy  2023-
2030  and  the  2022-2026  national 
action  plan  are  largely  in  line  with 
the  2021-2025  EU  drugs  strategy. 
Amendments  adopted  in  April  and 
June 2025 tighten penalties for drug 
use  and  trafficking,  including  the 
rules  on  minimum  sentences  and 
penalties  for  drug-related  criminal 
offences.  Cooperation  between  the 
National  Drugs  Observatory  and 
civil  society  has  been  severely 
limited  against  the  background  of 
repressive  legislation  on  CSOs.  The 
national  early  warning  system  on 
new  psychoactive  substances  needs  to  be  further  strengthened,  in  particular  as  regards  information 
exchange. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity  

Georgia  remains  a  transit  country  along  the  Caucasus  drugs  route,  which  is  increasingly  used  for 
smuggling  heroin  from  Iran  and  Afghanistan  to  Türkiye  and  further  into  the  EU.  The  number  of 
investigations and final convictions of cases related to production and trafficking of drugs decreased 
in 2024. The volumes of drugs seized and destructed increased in 2024. Enforcement and institutional 
capacity need to be strengthened, and international police cooperation on drug trafficking prevention 
increased.  

Fight 
radicalisation and violent extremism  

terrorism 

against 

and  prevention 

of 

The  fight  against  terrorism  and  violent  extremism  is 
broadly satisfactory. 

Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks  

The  legal  framework  for the  fight  against terrorism and 
for countering violent extremism is largely aligned with 
the  EU  acquis.  The  legal  framework  for  critical 
infrastructure  protection  on  cybersecurity  is  partially 
aligned with the EU acquis. The legal framework on the 
protection  of  critical  infrastructure  and  the  resilience  of 
critical entities needs to be aligned with the Directive on the resilience of critical entities as well as 
with the Terrorist Content Online regulation.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity  

The  national  counterterrorism  strategy  for  2022-2026  and  the  corresponding  action  plan  are  being 
implemented and monitored by the Permanent Interagency Commission.  

40 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  terrorist  threat  level  remains  low  and  no  incidents  took  place  during  the  reporting  period.  The 
government  undertook  preventive  counter-terrorism  measures  leading  to  arrests  and  convictions. 
Georgia continued to cooperate actively on counter-terrorism activities with Europol and Interpol and 
further  participated  in  preventive  counter-terrorism  activities  with  international  organisations 
including NATO and the UN.  

Judicial cooperation in criminal, civil and commercial matters  

Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters is broadly satisfactory. Georgia has yet to accede to 
two  key  instruments  under  the  Hague  conference  on  private  international  law:  the  2000  Hague 
Convention  on  the  International  Protection  of  Adults  and  the  2019  Hague  Convention  on  the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters.      

The number of incoming and outgoing requests for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters under 
the  responsibility  of  the  Prosecutor  General’s  Office  increased  in  2024.  Georgia  has  also  been 
participating in the negotiations on a new Council of Europe instrument that promises to strengthen 
judicial  cooperation  in  matters  of  criminal  asset  recovery.  The  number  of  incoming  and  outgoing 
requests in civil matters under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice increased substantially in 
2024.  Nevertheless,  the  execution  of  judicial  cooperation  requests  in  criminal  matters  experiences 
significant delays. 

Cooperation with Eurojust, the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, continued. 
In 2025, Georgia participated in  88 new cases at Eurojust, including five Joint Investigation Teams 
coordinated by Eurojust (three in 2023) related to money laundering, fraud and cybercrime; the vast of 
majority  of  these  cases  (59)  were  opened  at  the  request  of  the  Liaison  Prosecutor.  The  European 
Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  (the  EPPO)  and  the  Prosecution  Service  of  Georgia  signed  a  working 
arrangement  in  September  2022,  although  there  were  no  requests  for  mutual  legal  assistance 
exchanges in 2024 (one in 2023). 

Legal and irregular migration 

The legal framework for the management of legal and irregular migration is partially aligned with the 
EU acquis. The management of legal and irregular migration needs to be improved.  

Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks  

Legal amendments on the Law on labour migration were adopted in June 2025.  

The  migration  strategy  2021-2030  and  integrated  border management  strategy 2023-2027  are  being 
implemented.  The  annual action  plan  for  2025  was  adopted in  December  2024,  complementing  the 
2021-2030 migration strategy. Further efforts are needed to achieve the set targets and improve data 
collection, analyses and evidence-based policymaking.  

The  institutional  framework  for  migration  and  border  management  remains  well  established.  The 
migration  policy  coordination  framework  is  overall in  line  with effective  international practice,  and 

41 

 
 
the  State  Commission  on 
Migration  Issues  continues  to 
efficiently  fulfil  its  role.  The 
institutional set-up of migration 
management  needs  capacity 
strengthening  and 
increased 
budgetary resources. 

has 

Georgia 
readmission 
agreements  with  the  EU,  and 
bilaterally  with  Denmark,  as 
well  as  with  the  UK,  Iceland, 
Switzerland, 
Norway, 
Montenegro, Moldova, Belarus, 
Armenia  and  Ukraine.  It  also 

has implementing protocols with 13 EU Member States.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity  

The  number  of  Georgians applying  for  asylum  in  EU  Member  States declined  by  40%  in  2024  (14 
765 applications). Despite this significant reduction, Georgia remains among the top 30 countries for 
asylum  applications  despite  the  recognition  rate  staying  low.  Health-driven  migration  is  still  on  the 
rise and the overall rates of outward migration including irregular migration remain high. 

The  implementation  of  the  readmission  agreement  with  the  EU  is  very  good.  In  2024,  11 525 
Georgians effectively returned following an order to leave the territory (10 195 in 2023). 

In 2024, 75% of the total number of returnees from Georgia did not receive any reintegration support 
by sending European countries (88% in 2023). Georgia needs to increase return support and delegate 
more functions and resources on reintegration to local government.  

Georgia is increasingly a destination country for migration. In 2024, 363 return decisions were issued 
by  the  MIA,  with  the  top  three 
nationalities being Azerbaijan (71), 
Iran (54) and India (33).  

is  only  one 

to 
Service  capacities  connected 
Georgia’s 
increased  migration 
flows  need  to  be  strengthened. 
temporary 
There 
accommodation  centre  in  Tbilisi, 
which  mainly 
functions  as  a 
migration  detention  centre  with  a 
capacity  of  around  80  people  at  a 
time. Between 1 January 2023 and 
31  March  2025,  57  minors  were 
placed 
temporary 
accommodation  centre.  The  Public  Defender  raised  concerns  about  the  detention  of  minors,  in 
particular on allegations of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, which have been referred to 
the now-abolished Special Investigation Service. 

the 

in 

Asylum  

The legal framework on asylum is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The management of asylum 
needs to be improved.  

Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks 

Legal amendments to the asylum system included in a package of 18 laws on foreign citizens were 
adopted  in  June  2025.  The  amendments  fail  to  provide  a  mechanism  for  detecting  and  addressing 

42 

 
 
right  of 
refoulement.  The 
cases  of 
applicants  to international protection must 
be 
procedural 
safeguards.  

guaranteed 

through 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

convention 

In  2024,  1 641  individuals  applied  for 
asylum  in  Georgia  (compared  to  1 052  in 
2023),  the  majority  from  Türkiye  (248), 
Iran  (226)  and  Pakistan  (220).  The  total 
recognition  rate  in  2024  was  4%  for 
Geneva 
1 418 
applications  for  asylum  were  rejected,  11 
people  were  granted  refugee  status  and 
104  humanitarian 
status.  There  are 
currently  an  estimated  30 000  Ukrainian 
citizens in Georgia. In March 2025, the visa-free stay of Ukrainian citizens who entered Georgia after 
24 February 2022 was extended by one year. However, the maximum duration of visa-free stays was 
reduced from three years to one year. Asylum decisions are issued within 11.7 months on average.  

refugees. 

Visa policy 

Georgia  is  not  complying  with  and  departed  further  from  the  recommendations  of  the  seventh  visa 
suspension  mechanism  report.  These  still  need  to  be  addressed  for  continued  compliance  with  visa 
liberalisation requirements. 

Georgia continues to pursue a visa policy that diverges substantially from the EU acquis, particularly 
by  granting  entry  to  nationals  of  visa-required  countries  on  the  basis  of  a  visa  or  residence  permit 
issued by a third country. To combat irregular migration, as of May 2025 the conditions for visa-free 
travel have been restricted for nationals of 17 countries with a visa and/or residence permit valid for 
less than one year issued by the Gulf countries (United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Kuwait or Oman).  

The list of third countries with which Georgia maintains visa-free regimes is not fully aligned with the 
list of third countries whose nationals are subject to a visa for short stays in the EU. Georgia now has 
a visa-free regime with 26 countries that are subject to a visa for short stays in the EU.   

Security features of visas and travel documents are broadly aligned with EU standards. 

Due  to  Georgia’s  breach  of  the  fundamental  principles  on  which  the  EU-Georgia  Visa  Facilitation 
Agreement  was  concluded,  the  Commission  adopted a  proposal for a  Council  decision for  a  partial 
suspension  of  the  Agreement  in  December  2024.  The  adopted  partial  suspension  provides  for  the 
suspension of the visa exemption for Georgian diplomats and visa facilitations for Georgian diplomats 
and  officials.  In  January  2025,  the  Council  adopted  the  Commission  proposal.  Following  this 
decision,  the  Member  States  will  no  longer  need  to  exempt  Georgian  diplomats  from  the  visa 
requirement  and  to  facilitate  the  issuance  of  visas  to  Georgian  holders  of  diplomatic  and  service 
passports. By September 2025, 19 EU Member States had adopted the necessary internal measures to 
implement  the  Council  decision  on  suspending  visa  facilitation  and  stopped  exempting  Georgian 
holders of diplomatic and service passports from visa requirements, 

The seventh visa suspension mechanism report contained recommendations, including to ensure the 
protection  of  fundamental  rights,  to  repeal  any  legislation  that  may  restrict  fundamental  rights  and 
freedoms,  to  align  Georgia’s  visa  policy  with  the  EU  list  of  visa-required  third  countries.  and  to 
ensure the Anti-Corruption Bureau’s effective independence, political neutrality and functions.   

Schengen governance and external borders  

The  legislative  and  strategic  framework  for  the management of  external  borders  is  partially  aligned 
with the EU acquis. The management of borders is broadly satisfactory.   

43 

 
 
Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks  

Georgia continued strategic engagement under the integrated border management (IBM) framework. 
The IBM strategy and its five-year action plan (2023-2027) are broadly based on the EU concept of 
IBM. The 2025 action plan for the implementation of the integrated risk analysis model of the State 
border of Georgia was approved in December 2024. Strategic decision-making remains a challenge, 
and  the  implementation  of  key  reforms  continues  to  be  constrained  by  institutional  fragmentation, 
lack  of  coordination  and  limited  resources.  Institutional  and  human  resource  capacity  needs  to  be 
strengthened. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity  

The  IBM  strategy  and  the  annual  action  plan  are  being  implemented.  Some  infrastructure 
improvements were recorded in 2024, including the renovation and partial upgrade of border crossing 
points,  border  sectors  and  posts.  In  2024,  a  new  patrol  police  incident  recording  system  was 
developed. The previous system has been in operation since 2019. In December 2024, Georgia joined 
the European Common Transit Convention and began using the new computerised transit system. It 
facilitates the secure and paperless cross-border movement of goods.  

Substantial further investments are still required to address critical gaps in surveillance and control, 
particularly  along  green  and  blue  borders.  The  border  management  information  system  needs 
upgrading. 

Institutional and inter-agency coordination remains weak. The capacities of the border guard services 
and border police need further strengthening.  

Cooperation  with  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency  (Frontex)  was  decreased  in  the 
context of EU measures taken in response to the country’s democratic backsliding but continues to be 
effective,  particularly  in  the  field  of  returns.  Georgia  cooperated  with  Frontex  on  a  joint  operation, 
capacity building, combating document fraud and returns. A Frontex contingent is present at selected 
border crossing points in an advisory capacity. 

Cross-border  cooperation  with  neighbouring  countries  remains  satisfactory.  Measures  to  fight 
corruption need to be strengthened.  

Counterfeiting of the euro (criminal law aspects)  

The  relevant  legislation  on  the  suppression  of  counterfeit  currency  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU 
acquis. No progress was made in aligning legislation with the acquis in the reporting period.  

All aspects of customs cooperation are covered in Chapter 29 – Customs Union.  

2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.1 The existence of a functioning market economy 

Economic governance  

The authorities’ course of action and the decision not to pursue EU accession negotiations until 
2028  has  created  considerable  uncertainty.  Progress  on  economic  reforms  was  limited  and 
concerns about central bank independence remain. The authorities advanced with selected public 
finance reforms, for instance by publishing  the medium-term revenue strategy, albeit with a limited 
scope of planned reforms and without their quantification and timeline. They also started a new phase 
of  modernisation  of  the  Revenue  Service  and  published  a  report  assessing  the  economic  impact  of 
existing  tax  expenditures  in  agriculture.  The  implementation  of  the  2023-2026  Public  Finance 
Management strategy based on the public expenditure and financial accountability (PEFA) assessment 
continued,  with  some  specific  dimensions  considered  as  requiring  further  efforts,  such  as  annual 
financial consolidated reporting, public asset management, and municipal finances. No progress was 
made  on  strengthening  the  legislation  related  to  independence  of  the  central  bank,  although  the 
vacancies at the NBG board were filled. The three-year stand-by arrangement with the IMF had been 
suspended since mid-2023 and expired in June 2025.   

Macroeconomic stability 

Georgia recorded strong growth, driven by private and government consumption, continuing to 
benefit from the recovery in tourism, high- skilled migrants from Russia and the reallocation of 
certain  services  and  trade  routes  away  from  Russia  following  its  full-scale  war  of  aggression 
against Ukraine. GDP growth reached 9.4% in 2024. Private and government consumption were the 
most  important  growth  factors,  stimulated  by  strong  wage  increases,  employment  growth  and  fast-
growing consumer loans. Investment also continued to rise in the same period, supported by higher 
business lending, good financial results of enterprises and strong public investment. The contributions 
of net exports of goods and services and of inventories to growth were negative. On the supply side, 
the value added increased most in ICT, construction, tourism, transport, education and other services.  

Growth  appeared  resilient,  but  it  is  subject  to  downside  risks,  reflecting  in  particular  the 
heightened  political 
to 
preliminary figures, growth continued in the first half of 2025, reaching 8% year-on-year in the first 

international  environment.  According 

instability  and  uncertain 

45 

Table 19:202220232024Georgia - Key economic figuresGDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)0.330.390.410.45Real GDP growth 2.911.07.89.4Economic activity rate of the population aged 20-64 (%), total61.765.968.770.8Unemployment rate of the population aged over 15 (%), total21.117.316.413.9Employment of the population aged 20-64 (annual growth %)0.35.44.05.1Nominal wages (annual growth %)6.518.320.416.5Consumer price index (annual growth %)4.111.92.51.1Exchange rate against EUR2.93.12.82.9Current account balance (% of GDP)-9.5-4.4-5.6-4.4Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP)7.27.15.32.7General government balance (% of GDP)-2.3-2.2-1.9-2.1General government debt (% of GDP)43.439.238.936.1Notes: Sources: National Statistics Office of Georgia, IMF, National Bank of Georgia, Ministry of Finance of Georgia, own calculations2016-21 average 
 
 
 
seven months of the year. However, Georgia’s economy 
is  subject 
to  a  high  degree  of  uncertainty.  The 
deterioration  of  the  domestic  political  situation  and  the 
de facto halt of the EU accession process may adversely 
affect  the  confidence  of  investors  and  consumers, 
discourage  tourism  and  put  renewed  pressure  on  the 
Georgian currency, the lari.  

The  current  account  deficit  narrowed  to  4.4%  of 
GDP  in  2024  from  5.6%  of  GDP  in  2023.  Goods 
exports  increased  by  6%  in  USD  terms,  thanks  to  a 
rebound  in  demand  for  metallurgical  products  and  re-
exported  cars.  Imports  increased  by  7%,  due  to  higher 
domestic  demand  for  investment  and  consumer  goods 
and  despite 
imported  oil.  The 
merchandise  trade  deficit  deteriorated  in  2024.  A 
stronger surplus in services, especially in tourism which benefited mainly from arrivals from Russia, 
Türkiye and the  EU,  and a  lower  net  outflow  of investment income  have  helped  reduce  the current 
account  deficit.  On  the  other  hand,  lower  inflow  of  remittances  reflecting  the  reduction  in  money 
transfers from Russia, had the opposite effect.  

lower  prices  of 

Foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  inflows  and  international  reserves  decreased  in  2024.  FDI 
inflows  decreased from  6.3%  of  GDP  in  2023  to  4.6%  of  GDP  in  2024.  The  drop  was  particularly 
noticeable in equity investment. Georgia has a strongly negative net international investment position 
and  relatively  high  external  debt.  However,  both  decreased  in  the  last  three  years,  mainly  due  to 
nominal GDP growing faster than external debt. As of December 2024, they stood at -89% and 75% 
of GDP respectively. The level of gross official foreign reserves dropped from USD 5 billion at the 
end  of  2023  to  USD  4.1  billion  in  November  2024,  which  was  caused  by  foreign  exchange 
interventions of the central bank, aimed at stabilising the lari in view of domestic uncertainty. Since 
then, the central bank has replenished its reserves to USD 5.2 billion in August 2025, which is still 
below  the  authorities’  desirable 
range of 120-130%    of the IMF’s 
Assessing  Reserve  Adequacy 
metrics. 

consumer 

Average 
price 
inflation slowed to 1.1% in 2024 
thanks to low imported inflation 
and  the  central  bank’s  prudent 
monetary  policy,  but  in  2025  it 
gradually  picked  up  to  4.6%  in 
  The  acceleration  of 
August. 
consumer  prices  can  be  attributed 
to  the  pass-through  from  wage  increases  and  rising  food  prices,  as  well  as  to  base  effects.  Core 
inflation, excluding food and energy, reached 3% in August. The central bank has kept its policy rate 
unchanged at 8% since May 2024.  

General  government  revenue  in  2024  was  much  stronger  than  expected,  although  current 
expenditure  grew  even  faster.  Public  revenue  increased  by  18%  compared  to  2023,  boosted  by 
economic expansion, in particular wage increases stimulating personal income tax revenues, as well 
as  by  discretionary  measures,  such  as  increases  in  gambling  fees  and  a  tax  reform  in  the  banking 
sector. Current expenditure increased by 20% in the  same period, mainly due to rising public sector 
salaries  and  interest  expenditure.  The  already  high  capital  expenditure  rose  by  10%.  The  general 
government deficit stood at 2.1% of GDP in 2024, below the initially planned 2.5% of GDP. General 
government debt fell from 38.9% of GDP in 2023 to 36.1% of GDP in 2024, largely due to the debt-
reducing effect of high nominal GDP growth.   

46 

 
 
The macroeconomic policy mix was broadly appropriate. While the rise in current expenditures by 
20%, and especially of public sector salaries by 30% over the previous year, was high, this one-off 
adjustment  could  help  public  sector  compete  with  private  sector  for  qualified  staff.  The  monetary 
policy  of  the  central  bank  was  sufficiently  tight  to  anchor  inflation  expectations  in  the  situation  of 
high  domestic  and  global  uncertainty.  The  key  risks  to  macroeconomic  stability  include,  among 
others,  domestic  political  developments,  which  may  adversely  affect  business  and  consumer 
sentiment,  the  developments  regarding  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine,  as  well  as  the 
slowdown in global trade.   

Functioning of product markets  

Georgia has a fairly dynamic business fabric, but many structural weaknesses still hamper the 
business  environment,  and  there  was  very  limited  progress  in  addressing  them  last  year. 
Georgia’s business environment has been liberalised and the barriers to market entry are low. Georgia 
has one of the highest firm birth rates and one of the lowest company survival rates in Europe. There 
is  evidence  of  weak  productivity  growth  in  individual  companies  and  a  continued  reliance  on  low-
sophisticated  markets,  while  companies  face  high  costs  to  enter  the  EU  market  (including  lack  of 
standardisation and the associated infrastructure). The main obstacles for businesses include political 
instability, an inadequately educated workforce, court inefficiency and exchange rates fluctuations.  

There  is  scope  to  further  reduce  the  share  of  the  informal  economy.  Informality  in  Georgia  is 
closely  linked  to  the  country’s  economic  structure  which  is  dominated  by  agriculture,  construction 
and tourism, a lack of unemployment benefits, a large share of self-employment and a high share of 
cash  payments.  In  October  2024,  the  authorities  established  an  inter-ministerial  working  group  to 
prepare a programme for reducing the informal economy in a holistic, government-wide manner. The 
working group launched cooperation with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) with a request 
to  conduct  a comprehensive  assessment  of the informal  economy in  Georgia, including its  size and 
structure, to serve as a basis for the further analysis of employment, revenue generation, and other key 
issues related to informal economy. areas. The working group and the ILO organised workshops with 
employers’ and workers’ organisations to gather their insights on the root causes of informality.   

Progress  on  the  reform  of  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  has  been  slow,  while  the  financial 
oversight  has  improved.  The  state  footprint  in  the  economy  remains  limited:  SOEs  accounted  for 
4.2%  of  Georgia  value  added  and  8%  of  employment  in  2024.  The  authorities  piloted  a  shared 
ownership of three SOEs by ministries of economy and finance, appointed independent supervisory 
boards  at  several  SOEs,  established  SOE  performance  targets.  However,  no  agreement  on 
strengthening  the  exercise  of  the  ownership  function  has  been  found  yet.  The  Ministry  of  Finance 
continues  to  gradually  enhance  financial  oversight  by  bringing  the  accounts  of  114  SOEs  into  the 
single treasury account to better monitor contingent fiscal risks. The revenues from privatisation and 
sales of state property amounted to 0.26% of GDP in 2024. The total amount of state aid issued by 
public bodies in Georgia was very low at 0.01% of GDP but the reporting methodology is not aligned 
with  the  EU  acquis  requirements.  The  extent  of  price  regulations  remains  very  limited  in  Georgia. 
Public funds for business development have increased in the last few years, especially those provided 
by the agency Enterprise Georgia in three areas: co-financing of business loans, investment promotion 
and export support. 

Functioning of the financial market 

The Georgian banking sector remains sound, although it is exposed to foreign exchange risks. 
According  to  data  from  the  National  Bank  of  Georgia,  the  banking  system’s  capital  adequacy  ratio 
stood at 23% in July 2025. Most lenders remained very profitable, reaching an aggregate 22.1% return 
on equity. The asset quality of the sector as a whole remains strong, with the ratio of non-performing 
loans  to  total  loans  broadly  unchanged  at  a  low  2.6%.  The  high  dollarisation  of  both  assets  and 
liabilities  remains  a  structural  weakness  of  the  banking  system  although,  from  a  financial  stability 
perspective,  banks  have  ample  foreign  exchange  buffers.  The  share  of  loans  in  foreign  currencies 
remained  broadly  stable  in  the  reporting  period  and  amounted  to  40%  in  July  2025.  The  level  of 
dollarisation for deposits is higher compared to loans and slightly increased in the last months of 2024 
to  51.5%  reflecting  the  heightened  uncertainty,  before  decreasing  to  50.0%  in  July  2025.  Credit 

47 

 
 
growth remained strong at 14.9% in July 2025 (excluding the effect of exchange-rate fluctuations) for 
both corporate and retail loans. Access to finance is still perceived as a major obstacle for many small 
businesses, although the situation has improved in the recent period.  

The insurance sector and the capital market are still underdeveloped. The local securities market 
is characterised by its small size, low liquidity and dominance of government securities, as well as an 
inactive secondary market. Some improvements have been achieved thanks to the implementation of 
the  2023-2028  capital  market  development  strategy.  For  instance,  the  Capital Market  Support  State 
Programme was significantly revised in September 2024 to co-finance the costs of issuance of bonds 
by  Georgian  companies  and  of  their  credit  ratings,  with  a  view  to  improving  businesses’  access  to 
finance. In June 2025, amendments were made to the law on investment funds.  

Functioning of the labour market  

The  situation  on  the  labour  market  has  further  improved,  supported  by  the  economic 
expansion,  but  weaknesses  remain.  The  employment  rate  among  the  population  aged  20-643  rose 
from  56.9%  in  2023  to  60.4%  in  2024,  but  is  still  well  below  the  Member  States  with  the  lowest 
employment rate (67%). The unemployment rate among the population aged over 15 decreased from 
16.4% in 2023 to 13.9% in 2024. The capacities of the State Employment Support Agency continued 
to develop, with an extension of its network in municipalities. A new national strategy of labour and 
employment  policy  still  needs  to  be  adopted.  Some  structural  labour  market  weaknesses  persist, 
including  the  persistent  mismatch  between  labour  skills  and  business  needs,  high  youth 
unemployment,  significant  gender  disparities  and  regional  differences.  Following  a  dynamic  rise  in 
2023, real wages increased strongly again in 2024, by 15%. This reflects several factors: the spillover 
effects from wages of high-skilled migrants from Russia, in particular in the IT sector, strong demand 
allowing  Georgian  companies  to  compensate  rising  living  costs,  especially  of  housing  rents  in  the 
main cities, labour shortages in some production sectors.    

2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 

Education and innovation  

Georgia  continued  to  upgrade  its  education  framework  but  the  mismatch  between  skills  and 
business needs remains an issue. Government expenditure on education in 2024 increased to 3.9% 
of GDP but was still below the EU average; there is also potential to enhance spending efficiency of 
current education resources. Reform efforts focused on the vocational education and training (VET) 
system,  which  included  the  adoption  of  the  VET  strategy  in  September  2024,  the  development  of 
occupational  and  educational  standards  for  VET,  the  upgrading  of  teachers’  qualifications  and  the 
development of their networks. The compulsory general education age was increased from 15 to 16 
years  and  a  reform  of  pre-school  education  was  implemented.  Despite  the  ongoing  reforms,  the 
mismatch between skills and private sector needs persists, largely due to outdated teaching methods, 
insufficient 
between 
businesses and educational institutions, and 
a lack of clearly defined skill requirements 
from  businesses.  The  private  sector’s 
participation 
development 
low  despite  significant 
programmes 
external 
skills 
organisations are being developed as a way 
to  bridge  the  gap  between  industry  and 
education,  although  they  face  challenges 
limited  sectoral  cooperation  and 
like 

cooperation 

Sectoral 

support. 

skills 

in 

is 

3 Eurostat’s employment indicators are calculated among the population aged 20-64, while Geostat uses 
indicators based on International Labour Organisation definitions covering the population aged 15 years or 
older. Therefore, according to Geostat definitions, the employment rate in Georgia was 47.1% in 2024.  

48 

 
 
 
capacity. 

Georgia is making efforts to improve its innovation environment but spending on research and 
development is still very low, at 0.3% of GDP. Georgia ranked 57th (out of 133 economies) in the 
2024  Global  Innovation  Index,  an  improvement  from  63rd  in  2022.  The  Georgia  Innovation  and 
Technology Agency continued to support innovative start-ups and training, with a focus on the ICT 
sector.  The  authorities  also  decided  to  build  a  Technology  Hub  in  Kutaisi,  including  a  technology 
park, industrial innovation laboratory, an IT and technology school and other facilities.  

Physical capital and quality of infrastructure  

Public  investment  has  remained  high  (over  8.5%  of  GDP  in  2024),  with  a  focus  on  transport 
infrastructure. In line with Public Investment Management (PIM) reform, all new larger investment 
projects  are  selected  in  accordance  with  the  new  PIM  methodology  before  being  included  in  the 
relevant budget. In the reporting period, significant progress was made with the completion of several 
sections  of  the  East-West  Highway,  as  well  as  with  upgrading  of  the  secondary  road  network.  The 
recent  railway  modernisation  project  is  nearing  completion,  but  large  parts  of  the  rail  network  and 
rolling stock are still obsolete. The development of a new deep-water port in Anaklia started in 2024 
as part of the Middle Corridor connecting China and Central Asia with Europe, bypassing Russia. A 
Chinese consortium was selected as an investor in this port, but an investment agreement has not been 
finalised yet. In October 2024, the construction of a new runway at Kutaisi airport also began. In the 
energy  sector,  the  government  is  focused  on  expanding  the  transmission  network  and  on  securing 
private  investment  for  new  wind,  solar  and  hydropower  plants.  Following  two  big  auctions  for 
renewable  power  generation  in  2024,  the  authorities  assessed  the  applications  received  for  further 
renewable projects, to be granted via direct contracting. Preparatory activities continued for the Black 
Sea  Submarine  Cable  project,  intended  to  link  Georgia  with  Romania  by  electricity  and  fibre-optic 
submarine  cable  interconnections.  In  the  area  of  information  and  communications  technology,  the 
penetration  of  fixed  broadband  internet  subscribers  among  households  increased  and  reached  99%. 
The authorities continued to invest in fibre networks in more remote regions. However, issues such as 
relatively high prices of high-speed fixed broadband, insufficient digital skills and weak international 
digital connectivity persist.   

Sectoral and enterprise structure 

The  economy  is  increasingly  based  on  services,  with  a  diminishing  role  of  agriculture  and 
manufacturing.  Services  increased  their  share  in  GDP  to  71.9%  in  2024,  with  the  biggest  gains 
recorded last year by the information and communication technology, education and tourism sectors. 
The share of construction is relatively high at 8.4%, thanks to a residential construction boom in big 
cities  and  substantial  investment  in  public  infrastructure.  The  share  of  manufacturing,  at  9.3%,  is 
relatively  low  in  Georgia  compared  to  peer  countries  and  diminishing.  Agriculture,  a  traditionally 
important  sector  but  characterised  by  low  productivity,  declined  to  6.2%  of  GDP  in  2024,  but  still 
accounts for 16% of total employment. SMEs accounted for 54% of the value added of the enterprise 
sector and the same share in employment.   

Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness 

Economic integration with the EU is limited. The EU share in Georgia’s exports fell from 11.6% in 
2023 to 8.7% in 2024. This reflected a decline in the value of exports to the EU by 19%, but also a 
surge in re-exports of cars from Georgia to Central Asia. Georgia’s imports from the EU rose in 2024 
by  2.7  percentage  points  to  27.2%  of  the  total.  As  a  result,  Georgia’s  trade  deficit  with  the  EU 
increased  to  over  USD  4  billion,  or  12%  of  GDP.  In  contrast,  Georgia  had  a  positive,  albeit  much 
smaller, balance in trade services with the EU (equal to 1% of GDP). In 2024, the EU remained the 
biggest source of remittances to Georgia (43% of the total, or 4.5% of GDP) and the second source of 
foreign direct investment after the UK (23% of the total, 1% of GDP).  

49 

 
 
The real effective exchange rate of the lari depreciated by 4% in twelve months until July 2025. 
The  real  exchange  rate of the  Georgian  currency  weakened  especially  against  the  euro and  Turkish 
lira,  while  it  strengthened  against  the  US  dollar  and  Russian  ruble.  As  regards  nominal  exchange 
rates, the effective rate of lari remained broadly stable over the last twelve months, while it weakened 
against the euro, strengthened against the lira and   remained stable against the US dollar.  

2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL  

Chapter 5 - Public procurement  

EU  rules  ensure  that  the  public  procurement  of  goods,  services  and  works  in  any  Member  State  is 
transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal treatment. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The legal framework is partially aligned with the EU acquis on public procurement. The entry into 
force of the new Law on public procurement was postponed to January 2027  on the grounds that it 
requires  significant  adjustments to  align  with  EU legislation.  Georgia’s rules in  the  area  of  defence 
and sensitive security procurement are not fully aligned with Directive 2009/81/EC, and its legislation 
remains not aligned with the EU acquis on utilities, and concessions and public-private partnerships. 

The current legislation safeguards the independence of the Procurement Dispute Resolution Council 
(PDRC).  The  Council  is  independent,  and  its  members  are  selected  through  public  competitive 
procedure and later appointed by the Prime Minister. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity  

On  the  public  procurement  market,  in  2024,  30 014  open  electronic  tenders  were  announced 
through  the  unified  electronic  system  for  state  procurement  (6.43%  less  than  in  2023).  Of  these, 
approximately 88.6% were NAT (tender with no auction) tenders, 6.4% - SPA (with auction) tenders 
and  5%  were  all  other  electronic  procurement  procedures.  In  3 623  cases,  procuring  entities  used 
direct award procedure. The total volume of public procurement transactions carried out dropped from 
13.1% of the country’s GDP in 2023 to 9% in 2024. 

The  State  Procurement  Agency  (SPA)  continues  to  provide  training  sessions  on  procurement 
procedures and practice to line ministries, municipalities and SOEs (273 officials in 2024). Works on 
setting up an online contracting process monitoring system have not been completed.  

Overall, the legal and institutional framework regarding  integrity and management of conflicts  of 
interest is in place. However, risk assessments within the contracting authorities, internal and external 
controls remain  weak.  SPA  regularly monitors public  procurement  procedures applied  by  procuring 
entities.  In  case  of  irregularities,  SPA  can  issue  administrative  orders  or  take  cases  to  court. 
Monitoring statistics results are reported annually. In 2024, five consolidated tenders were appealed 
by SPA, of which two were terminated based on the petition, and three are under review. 

Efficient remedy system 

50 

 
 
Georgia  made  no  progress  in  aligning  the  legislation  with  the  EU  acquis  on  the  right  to  legal 
remedy. In 2024, the PDRC dealt with 1 164 complaints compared to 1 006 complaints in 2023. Of 
these, 63% of complaints were decided in favour of businesses.  

Chapter 18 - Statistics  

European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the 
principles  and  quality  criteria  elaborated  in  the  Regulation  on  European  statistic,  such  as 
professional  independence,  impartiality,  reliability,  accessibility  and  statistical  confidentiality. 
Common  rules  are  provided  for  the  methodology,  production  and  dissemination  of  statistical 
information,  which  are  further  specified  in  sectoral  legislation  that  constitute  the  EU  acquis  on 
statistics. 

Statistical infrastructure 

Regarding  the  statistical  infrastructure,  Georgia’s  legal  framework  remains  partially  aligned  with 
European  standards  and  principles laid  down in the European  Statistics  Code  of  Practice.  An  Inter-
Agency  Coordination  Council  was  established  in  March  2025  to  strengthen  coordination.  The 
institutional framework needs further strengthening, including human resources and technical capacity 
of the National Statistics Office.  

On  registers  and  classifications  there  has  been  no  progress  in  agreeing  on  NUTS-equivalent 
statistical  regions.  The  updated  international  classifications  for  economic  activities,  products, 
occupations and education should be adopted and put into use. The production and dissemination of 
timely  and  high-quality  data  improved.  Georgia  started  to  transmit  data  to  Eurostat  for  the  national 
statistical  business  register,  but  further  development  of  the  register  is  needed  as  a  quarter  of  the 
mandatory  variables  required  by  regulations  on  European  Business  Statistics  are  missing  or 
incomplete.  

Regarding  macroeconomic  statistics,  Georgia  prepares  national  accounts  in  line  with  international 
methodology from 2008, calculating GDP by production, expenditure and income and based on the 
relevant classification of activities, but data are not transmitted to Eurostat.  

As regards social and agricultural statistics, a population and agricultural census was conducted at 
the end of 2024 after previous delays. 

Despite a slight increase over the period the level of compliance for many statistical domains cannot 
be  assessed  because  Georgia’s  data  and  metadata  reporting  and  transmission  of  data  to  Eurostat  is 
very limited. Georgia has increased transmission and its compliance level for  education, transport, 
business, energy efficiency and environmental statistics. 

The National Statistics Office of Georgia (Geostat) increased accessibility of official statistics for its 
users  through  the  introduction  of  a  new  interactive  energy  portal  in  June  2025.  Furthermore,  in 
December 2024, Geostat introduced 37 new indicators to the regional and municipal statistics portal, 
which  now  features  161  indicators  at  municipal  level,  covering  a  wide  range  of  sectors  including 
population and demographics, health, education, culture, construction, tourism, business register and 
business.  

Chapter 32 - Financial control  

The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, 
sound  financial  management  of  income  and  expenditure,  and  external  audit  of  public  funds.  The 
financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of 
EU funds and the Euro against counterfeiting. 

Public internal financial control  

The practical implementation of financial management and control system remains at an early stage 
of  development.  The  new  2025-2028  Strategy  for  the  development  of  the  public  internal  financial 
control system (PIFC) was adopted in May 2025. The focus remains on improving methodologies and 
promoting  awareness  and  accountability  in  central  ministries  as  well  as  on  implementing  a  pilot  in 
three selected ministries.  

51 

 
 
As  of  2024,  in  eight  central  ministries,  coordinators  for  the  risk  management  process  have  been 
appointed,  and  the  corresponding training  has  been  provided.  Additionally,  risk  registers  have  been 
developed in collaboration with sectoral departments. 

In  the field  of  internal  audit, the  new  global standard  set  by  the  Institute  of  Internal  Auditors  was 
approved  and  entered  into  force  in January 2025.  19  auditors  from  ministries  and  municipalities 
received qualification certificates.  

The central harmonisation unit, set up in the Ministry of Finance, remains understaffed and lacks a 
suitable mandate to support effectively PIFC reform implementation.  

External audit 

The implementation rate of the State Audit Office (SAO) recommendations by the executive remains 
low (below 50%). The constitution includes guarantees for the independence of the SAO and the SAO 
Law  guarantees  the  independence  of  the  Auditor  General  (AG).  However,  the  independence  of  the 
decision-making power of the AG is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution.  

The mandate for auditing tax revenues is not clearly defined and large SOEs are not being audited. In 
addition, the head of the SAO is not given an appointment with sufficiently long and fixed terms to 
allow them to carry out their mandates independently.  

Since 2025, the SAO conducts a financial audit of the government's consolidated financial statements, 
replacing  the  previous  practice  of  auditing  individual  ministries.  As  a  result,  the  coverage  of  the 
consolidated  budget  will  increase  significantly  to  96%  (compared  to  88%  in  2023).  This  shift  will 
ensure  full  compliance  with  international  standards  and  assessments,  such  as  the  supreme  audit 
institution  performance  measurement  framework,  the  IMF  fiscal  transparency  evaluation,  and  the 
public expenditure and financial accountability programme. 

Protection of the EU’s financial interests 

Georgia started the legal approximation with EU acquis requirements and in particular the Directive 
on the fight against fraud against the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law. No anti-fraud 
coordination  service  has  been  officially  designated  but  the  Prosecution  Service  of  Georgia  acts  as 
focal  point  for  cooperation  with  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF)  and  the  European  Public 
Prosecution Office. There were no requests by the latter in 2024 (one in 2023). 

In  2025,  the  Financial  Investigations  Unit  further  strengthened  its  institutional  structure  by 
establishing  a  Strategic  Analysis  Department.  This  new  unit  represents  a  shift  toward  a  more 
intelligence-led  and  proactive  approach  to  financial  supervision  and  national  risk  assessment.  The 
department  is  mandated  to  conduct  thematic,  forward-looking  analyses  on  money  laundering  and 
terrorism financing trends and typologies. 

Protection of the Euro against counterfeiting 

No  developments  were  reported  regarding  further  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis.  In  2000,  Georgia 
acceded  to  the  1929  International  (Geneva)  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  Counterfeiting 
Currency but has not yet ratified it. 

3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION  

Georgia participates in various regional cooperation platforms, including the Eastern Partnership, the 
Central  European  Initiative,  the  Organization  of  the  Black  Sea  Economic  Cooperation,  the 
Organization  for  Democracy  and  Economic  Development,  the  South-East  European  Cooperation 
Process and the Regional Cooperation Council.  

Georgia  generally  maintains  good  bilateral  relations  with  its  neighbours  and  other  enlargement 
countries.  In  2024,  it  strengthened  its  engagement  with  Serbia.  In  particular,  Georgia  has  a 

52 

 
 
 
memorandum  of  understanding  with  Serbia  on  cooperation  in  the  field  of  European  integration. 
Georgia does not recognise Kosovo* as an independent state. 

Georgia  and  Türkiye  enjoy  a  strategic  partnership  with  high-level  contacts,  including  as  part  of  a 
High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. Türkiye is Georgia’s largest trading partner after the EU, 
and  the  two  cooperate  on  major  energy  projects  such  as  the  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  oil  pipeline,  the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum  gas  pipeline  and  the  Southern  Gas  Corridor.  Active  cooperation  also  takes 
place  on  the  development  of  the  Middle  Corridor,  notably  by  resuming  traffic  on  the  Baku-Tbilisi-
Kars railway line. In 2024, Türkiye and Georgia signed a cultural cooperation programme for 2024-
2028. The strategic trilateral cooperation format between Georgia, Türkiye and Azerbaijan continues 
at  a  high  level  in  view  of  enhanced  regional  energy  and  transport  connectivity  as  well  as  security 
cooperation.  

Georgia and Ukraine have implemented a strategic partnership since 2017. While Georgia supports 
Ukraine’s  territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty,  Ukraine  has  expressed  concerns  about  the  non-
alignment  of  Georgia  with  EU  sanctions  against  Russia  and  the  absence  of  military-technical 
cooperation.  Relations  deteriorated  in  the  reporting  period  –  in  December  2024,  Ukraine  imposed 
sanctions on Georgian Dream honorary chairman Bidzina Ivanishvili and 19 other officials. In March 
2025,  the  visa-free  stay  of  Ukrainian  citizens  who  entered  Georgia  after  24  February  2022  was 
extended by one year, while the maximum duration of visa-free stays was reduced from three years to 
one year.  

Georgia  and  Moldova  traditionally enjoy  good  bilateral relations  based  on  mutual  support  for  each 
other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  

4. ABILITY TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP  

CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET 

This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1); freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 
2);  right  of  establishment  and  freedom  to  provide  services  (Chapter  3);  free  movement  of  capital 
(Chapter  4);  company  law  (Chapter  6);  intellectual  property  law  (Chapter  7);  competition  policy 
(Chapter 8); financial services (Chapter 9); and consumer and health protection (Chapter 28). 

Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods   

The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on 
common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules,  the principle of the 
free movement of goods prevents these rules from creating unjustified barriers to trade. 

General principles 

Some elements of the EU legislative and institutional framework for the free movement of goods are 
in  place.  Under  the  Association  Agreement  and  the  Deep  and  Comprehensive  Free  Trade  Area, 
Georgia has committed to align with the EU acquis in the harmonised area.  

Non-harmonised areas 

Georgia  did  not  take  further  steps  to  ensure  that  legislation  and  administrative  practices  are  in 
accordance with Articles 34-36 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and relevant case 
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 

Harmonised area: quality infrastructure 

On  standardisation,  Georgia’s  National  Standards  Organisation  has  now  met  the  technical 
requirements defined in the guide on the organisational structure and processes for the assessment of 

 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the 
Kosovo declaration of independence. 

53 

 
 
 
 
the membership criteria of the European Committee for Standardisation and the European Committee 
for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CEN/CENELEC Guide), making it eligible for full membership 
to these organisations. 

Georgia’s  ‘pre-notification’  system  of  market  surveillance  is  not  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis. 
Amendments  to  the  Law  on  product  safety  and  free  movement  entered  into  force  in  January  2025, 
clarifying  the  liabilities  of  economic  operators,  updating  existing  penalties  and  introducing  new 
penalties for infringements of general product safety requirements by economic operators. The Market 
Surveillance  Agency  ensured  452  market  surveillance  controls  in  the  reporting  period  and  imposed 
penalties on 80 economic operators. 

Georgia made no progress on conformity assessment, accreditation and metrology.  

Harmonised area: sectoral legislation  

On the EU new and global approach product acquis, 14 technical regulations were adopted to align 
with Regulation (EU) 2017/1369 on energy labelling. There was no progress on the EU old approach 
product acquis and procedural measures. 

The Georgian market surveillance provision does not provide for measures related to anti-corruption.  

Chapter 2 - Freedom of movement for workers  

Citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the 
same working and social conditions as other workers. 

Regarding access to the labour market, Parliament adopted in June 2025 amendments to the Law on 
labour  migration  introducing  a  work  permit  as  of  1 March 2026.  EU  citizens  and  other  visa-free 
foreigners  are  no  longer  exempted.  The  amendments  reflect  the  Georgian  authorities'  intention  to 
better control and monitor labour migration in the country. Georgia’s legal framework is not aligned 
with the EU acquis and there is no designated body dealing with free movement of workers. 

Georgia  did  not  carry  out  any  preparatory  work  to  join  the  European  Network  of  Employment 
Services and the European Labour Authority. 

There  was  no  progress  on  the  coordination  of  social  security  systems.  No  new  agreements  for 
bilateral  coordination  of  social  security  systems  were  concluded.  Georgia  has  three  bilateral 
agreements with EU Member States (Germany, Bulgaria and France).  

Georgia has not implemented a national health insurance card and there have been no developments 
on the introduction of the European Health Insurance Card over the reporting period. 

Chapter 3 - Right of establishment and freedom to provide services   

EU  natural  and  legal  persons  have  the  right  to  establish  themselves  in  any  Member  State  and  to 
provide  cross-border  services.  For  certain  regulated  professions,  there  are  rules  on  the  mutual 
recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal 
service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator. 

There was no progress on the right of establishment, the freedom to provide services and on postal 
services.  Work on the update of the Association Agreement / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area annex on the rules applicable to postal and courier services is currently on hold. Georgia is not 
fully  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on  the  mutual  recognition  of  professional  qualifications.  The 
sectoral benchmark defining minimum competencies for qualified nurses was approved in December 
2024 to align with Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications.  

Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital  

In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common rules for 
cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight 
against money laundering and terrorist financing. 

There  was  no  progress  on  capital  movements  and  payments.  Restrictions  on  the  acquisition  of 
agricultural  land  by  EU  nationals  remain  in  place.  On  payment  services,  Georgia  took  no  further 

54 

 
 
steps to align with the EU acquis.  

technical  compliance  with 

Concerning the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, alignment of Georgia’s 
framework  with  the  EU  acquis  remains  incomplete.  In  October  2024,  MONEYVAL  reclassified 
Georgia’s 
the  Financial  Action  Task  Force  (FATF) 
recommendations  to  largely  compliant:  Recommendation  1  –  Assessing  risks  and  applying  a  risk-
based  approach  and  Recommendation  15  (R.15)  –  New  Technologies.  In  2025,  the  Financial 
Monitoring Service, serving as financial intelligence unit, established a strategic analytical department 
based on MONEYVAL's identified areas for improvement. Georgia needs to strengthen IT capacity 
for  data  processing  to  address  increasing  challenges  such  as  the  circulation  of  cryptocurrencies. 
Georgia  still  has  several  FATF  recommendations  to  implement,  including  the  establishment  of  a 
beneficial ownership register. 

two  of 

Chapter 6 - Company law  

The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, 
with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit. 

There was no progress on company law and corporate governance. Georgia is partially aligned with 
the  EU  acquis.  Further  alignment  with  the  acquis  in  this  area  and  strengthening  of  the  National 
Agency of Public Registry’s administrative capacity are needed. 

On company reporting, by-law amendments entered into force in October 2024 aiming to align with 
the requirements on size criteria as regards small and medium-size companies.   

On statutory audit, Georgia’s Service for Accounting, Reporting and Auditing Supervision (SARAS) 
Management  Reporting  Guide  was  updated  as  a  non-binding  document  to  provide  entities  with 
information  on  the  requirements  of  the  EU  Corporate  Sustainability  Reporting  Directive  and  the 
European Sustainability Reporting Standards. Two orders of the Head of SARAS entered into force in 
May 2025, approving the rules for preparing and publishing the annual transparency report by audit 
firms  conducting  audits  of  the  financial  statements  of  Public  Interest  Entities  and  the  rules  for 
preparing and submitting an additional report by audit firms to audit committees. Updated regulatory 
standards for auditing entered into force during the reporting period.  

Chapter 7 - Intellectual property law  

The EU has to a large extent harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property  rights  (IPR),  covering  notably  patents,  biotechnological  inventions  and  pharmaceuticals, 
including  supplementary  protection  certificates  (SPCs),  trade  marks,  designs,  geographical 
indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs, as well as copyright and related rights. 

Georgia made no progress on copyright and related rights. 

Regarding  industrial  property  rights,  amendments  to  the  Law  on  trade  marks  were  adopted  in 
September  2024,  expanding  the  authority  of  the  Chamber  of  Appeal  of  the  National  Intellectual 
Property Centre of Georgia (Sakpatenti). Under the Agreement on the Validation of European Patents 
between  Georgia  and  the  European  Patent  Organisation,  Sakpatenti  received  nine  applications  for 
patent validation since January 2024, three of which were granted by February 2025. The electronic 
filing system of Sakpatenti was updated so it can receive and publish applications. In 2025, Georgia 
acceded to the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement.  

In the area of enforcement, no progress can be reported.  

Chapter 8 - Competition policy  

EU  rules  protect  free  competition.  They  include  antitrust  rules  on  restrictive  agreements  between 
companies  and  abuse  of  a  dominant  position,  and  also  include  rules  on  concentrations  between 
companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of 
State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if restrictive conditions are met, 
with a view to preventing distortion of competition. 

Antitrust and mergers 

55 

 
 
Georgia’s  legislative  framework  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on  antitrust  and  mergers. 
Amendments were made to regulations on block exemptions and on control and notification forms of 
mergers  to  align  them  with  EU  rules.  As  regards  the  institutional  framework,  the  Georgian 
Competition and Consumer Agency (GCCA) adopted its institutional development strategy for 2025–
2027,  which  outlines  the  Agency's  mission,  current  challenges,  and  strategic  priorities.  On 
implementation,  the  GCCA  concluded  investigating  two  antitrust  cases  concerning  excessive 
pricing in the automotive resale and pharmaceutical sectors. These resulted from complaints related to 
abuse of a dominant position, anti-competitive agreements, distortion of competition by the State, and 
unfair  competition.  The  GCCA  launched  an  investigation  on  its  own  initiative  (alleged  abuse  of  a 
dominant position by a commercial bank in the e-commerce sector). The GCCA assessed 14 merger 
(concentration)  notifications.  All  mergers  were  approved,  in  two  cases  with  remedies.  This  is  the 
first  time  that  the  GCCA  has  imposed  remedies  as  a  condition  for  merger  approval.  The  GCCA 
proactively monitors completed mergers in cooperation with the National Agency of Public Registry 
and the Revenue Service.  

State aid 

The legal framework  on State aid  is  not  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis.  No  progress  was made in  the 
reporting period. The institutional framework and enforcement capacity of the GCCA needs to be 
strengthened. On implementation, no decisions were taken during the reporting period on State aid 
issues, only information on de minimis State aid was collected. 

Liberalisation 

Georgia’s  competition  and  State  aid  legislation  is  applicable  to  public  undertakings  and  those  with 
special  or  exclusive  rights.  No  progress  was  made  on  aligning  the  rules  on  financing  services  of 
general economic interest with the EU acquis. 

Chapter 9 - Financial services   

EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among financial institutions and the stability and integrity 
of financial  markets,  namely in  the field  of  banking,  insurance, supplementary  pensions,  investment 
services  and  securities.  They  include rules  on  the  authorisation, operation  and supervision  of  these 
institutions. 

As  regards  banks  and  financial  conglomerates,  the  Counterparty  Credit  Risk  Management 
Regulation was approved and entered into force in February 2025 to manage the risks arising from the 
increased volume of derivatives in the Georgian banking sector. The existing rules-based supervision 
approach  was  replaced  by  a  risk-based  approach.  An  updated  regulation  on  the  rule  on  defining 
systemically important commercial banks and determining the systemic buffer rate was approved in 
December  2024.  The  decree  covering  the  publication  of  information  on  sanctions  imposed  by  the 
National Bank of Georgia came into force in January 2025. Further work is needed to align with the 
EU acquis on deposit insurance and bank recovery and resolution. 

As regards insurance and occupational pensions, a decree aiming to align with the Directive on the 
activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORP II) was adopted 
and entered into force in January 2025. Several pieces of legislation on voluntary private pensions and 
depositories  entered  into  force  during  the  reporting  period:  on  the  governance  of  the  pension  fund; 
expansion  of  the  supervisory  mandate  of  the  National  Bank  of  Georgia  (NBG);  regulation  of  the 
activities of the pension fund; and for financial institutions wishing to act as specialised depositories, 
as well as for asset managers intending to undertake private pension scheme management. For both 
insurers  and  reinsurance  undertakings,  the  current  supervisory  regime  in  Georgia  remains  based  on 
the  Solvency  I  regulatory  framework.  Georgia  should  work  towards  aligning  with  the  Solvency  II 
framework.  The  adoption  and  implementation  of  legislation  on  domestic  motor  third  party  liability 
insurance is still pending.  

There  was  no  progress  on  aligning  Georgia's  financial  market  infrastructure  legislation  and 
securities markets and investment services legislation with the EU acquis.  

Concerning  sustainable  and  digital  finance,  the  NBG  published  its  first  assessment  of  climate-

56 

 
 
related  and  other  environmental,  social  and  governance  risks  in  September  2024  and  completed  its 
first climate stress test in December 2024, evaluating the potential impact of climate-related risks on 
Georgia’s financial sector. In March 2025, the NBG launched the second sustainable finance roadmap 
for Georgia.  

Chapter 28 - Consumer and health protection  

EU  rules  protect  consumers’  economic interests  and also ensure  product safety,  prevent  dangerous 
imitations  and  establish  liability  for  defective  products.  The  EU  also  guarantees  a  high  level  of 
protection of public health and in particular also ensures high common standards for tobacco control, 
blood, tissues, cells and organs, and human and veterinary medicinal products. The EU also has rules 
for  upholding  patients’  rights  in  cross-border  healthcare  and  in  preparing  for  and  responding  to 
serious cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases. 

Consumer protection  

On horizontal aspects and non-safety related issues, consumer protection laws are only partially in 
line with the EU acquis. The institutional framework on consumer protection is in place. With regard 
to  enforcement  and redress,  the main  consumer protection  authority,  the  Georgian  Competition  and 
Consumer  Agency  (GCCA)  strengthened  its  enforcement  capacity  and  took  an  active  role  in  the 
International  Consumer  Protection  and  Enforcement  Network.  In  December  2024,  the  Agency 
developed guidelines on price indication for goods and services, based on Directive 2019/2161 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council.  

During the reporting period, the Agency processed  1 158 applications (320 between  September and 
December 2024, and 838 between January and August 2025). Almost 90% of cases were resolved in 
favour of consumers (39% in the previous reporting period).  

There  was  no  further  progress  in  aligning  Georgia’s  legal  framework  on  product  safety  related 
issues with the EU acquis. National market surveillance legislation and processes are not aligned with 
the EU acquis. 

Public health 

As regards public health, there was no further alignment of national health protection legislation with 
the EU acquis. Georgia continues to implement its national health strategy for 2022-2030 with an aim 
to achieve universal health coverage. In December 2024, the 2025-2027 communication action plan 
for early cancer detection and screening was adopted. 

There were no developments on eHealth during the reporting period. 

On blood, tissues, cells and organs the legal framework was further aligned with the EU acquis with 
the  adoption  of  amendments  to  the  Law  on  quality  and  safety  of  blood  and  its  components  in 
December  2024,  which  is  expected  to  enter  into  force  in  April  2026.  Georgia  should  consider 
preparing  for  harmonisation  with  the  latest  Regulation  on  standards  of  quality  and  safety  for 
substances of human origin intended for human application (EU) 2024/1938. 

Georgia  is  partly  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on  tobacco  control  and  with  the  World  Health 
Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Starting from April 2025, 
the  regulation  on  standardised  packaging  of  tobacco  products  entered  into  force.  The  sale  and/or 
distribution of certain tobacco products in Georgia is allowed only in standardised (plain) packaging. 
Georgia needs to revise its national legislation to ensure compliance with the EU-Georgia Association 
Agreement and its FCTC obligations.  

Access to cancer treatment for adults and children, including access to treatment and medicines, was 
significantly improved in 2024.  

Regarding non-communicable diseases, Georgia was certified malaria-free by the WHO in January 
2025.  Georgia  made  progress  on  antimicrobial  resistance  on  integrating  bacteriophage  therapy  and 
implementing  a  ‘One  Health’  approach.  Georgia  needs  to  continue  to  bolster  its  efforts  on 
antimicrobial resistance.  

57 

 
 
There  has  been  no  progress  on  medical  devices,  on  serious  cross-border  health  threats, 
communicable diseases, on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, on human and veterinary 
medicinal  products,  on  health  technology  assessment,  on  drug  abuse  prevention  and  harm 
reduction, on health inequalities, on mental health, on rare diseases, or on cosmetics. 

The Ministry of the Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Health, Labour and 
Social  Affairs  should  strengthen  anti-corruption  measures  based  on  the  Ministry’s  strategy  on 
fighting corruption implemented by the Department of Internal Audit, Monitoring and Inspection.  

CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH  

This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10); taxation (Chapter 16); economic 
and  monetary  policy  (Chapter  17);  social  policy  and  employment  (Chapter  19);  industrial  policy 
(Chapter 20), science and research (Chapter 25); education and culture (Chapter 26); and the customs 
union (Chapter 29).  

Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media   

The  EU  supports  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  internal  market  for  electronic  communications, 
electronic  commerce  and  audiovisual  services.  The  rules  protect  consumers  and  support  the  83 
universal availability of modern services. 

On  the  digital  transformation  strategy,  the  2025-2030  strategy  for  the  development  of  Georgia’s 
digital  economy  and  information  society,  and  its  2025-2027  action  plan  were  adopted  in  February 
2025.   

On electronic communications, Georgia has not aligned with the Regulation on geo-blocking and the 
platform-to-business  relations  Regulation.  Georgia  is  yet  to  align  with  the  European  Electronic 
Communications  Code.  On  5G,  the  Georgian  Communications  Commission  (ComCom)  awarded 
Magticom  the  licence  for  the  implementation  of  5G  Internet.  Georgia  needs  to  align  with  the  5G 
Cybersecurity Toolbox to ensure that roll-out is not based on high-risk suppliers.  

In the field of digital services, the new digital governance strategy outlines key objectives, including 
expanding  access  to  digital  services,  enhancing  processes  and  components  that  support  digital 
governance,  fostering  the  development  of  opportunities  and  competencies  in  digital  governance. 
Furthermore,  Georgia  signed  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Framework  Convention  on  Artificial 
Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law in September 2024. 

On digital trust and cybersecurity, Georgia should establish a national interoperability framework, 
in alignment with the European Interoperability Framework and aim at aligning with the provisions of 
the Interoperable Europe Act. 

On  media  regulation,  amendments  to  the  law  on  broadcasting  adopted  in  April  2025  introduced  a 
ban  for  broadcasters  and  their  online  platforms  to  receiving  financial  and  material  support  from 
foreign  sources,  with  limited  exceptions  for  commercial  advertising,  sponsorship  deals,  or  product 
placement arrangements.  

In addition, the amendments empowered the media regulator ComCom to impose financial penalties 
and suspend broadcasting licences for content-related violations. Complaints regarding factual errors, 
privacy breaches, impartiality and other issues that were previously handled by internal media bodies 
can  now  also  be  filed  directly  with  ComCom,  considerably  increasing  its  power  in  disputes  over 
journalistic  ethics,  the  truthfulness  of  reporting,  and  alleged  defamation  and  effectively  abolishing 
self-regulation bodies (see section on freedom of expression under 2.2.1. Chapter 23: Judiciary and 
fundamental rights).  

Georgia needs to align with the EU Artificial Intelligence Act and to create the necessary governance 
structures. 

58 

 
 
 
Chapter 16 - Taxation   

EU  rules  on  taxation  cover  value  added  tax,  excise  duties  and  aspects  of  corporate  taxation.  They 
also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent 
tax evasion. 

Concerning  indirect  taxation,  the  Georgian  Tax  Code  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on 
value added tax. In January 2025, excise duties on tobacco products were increased to further gradual 
harmonisation with EU duty levels. There was no progress on alignment on excise duties on alcohol 
and  alcoholic  beverages  and  energy  products.  An  effective  system  to  control  and  monitor  the 
movement of excisable products is not in place. 

On direct taxation, rules on retained or reinvested profits, mergers, subsidiaries, interest and royalties 
remain  not  fully  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  tax  rate  on  income  from  gambling  activities 
increased from 15% to 20% in January 2025.  

Concerning  administrative  cooperation  and  mutual  assistance, Georgia 
the 
Automatic  Exchange  of  Information  in  line  with  the  common  reporting  standard.  In  January  2025, 
Georgia started sharing its country-by-country reports with partner jurisdictions.  

implemented 

As regards operational capacity and computerisation, the Revenue Service adopted its 2025-2030 
strategy.  The  strategic  goals  cover  digital  transformation  and  improvement  of  compliance, 
modernisation  of  IT  systems  and  strengthening  of  analytical  capabilities,  development  of  the 
institutional  capacity  of  the  organisation,  and  international  cooperation.  The  pre-filled  income  tax 
declaration for small businesses was launched for non-VAT taxpayers.  

Chapter 17 - Economic and monetary policy   

EU  rules  require  the  independence  of  central  banks  and  prohibit  them  from  directly  financing  the 
public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic 
and financial surveillance.   

The  NBG’s  primary  objective  is  to  ensure  price  stability,  which  is  in  line  with  the  EU  monetary 
policy legislative framework. In February 2025, the Georgian Parliament approved four new members 
to  the  Board  of  the  NBG  and  confirmed  the  governor.  With  these  appointments,  the  Board  is  now 
fully  constituted  with  a  majority  of  non-executive  members.  The  provision  allowing  the  first  vice-
president to assume the role of acting governor for an undetermined period of time remains in place. 
This  provision,  as  well  as  that  the  legal  grounds  for  dismissal  of  the  governor  and  members  of  the 
NBG  bodies,  are  not  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  National  Bank’s  independence  needs  to  be 
strengthened, including by strengthening the qualification criteria for board members.  

On  economic  policy,  the  budgetary  framework  is  considered  overall  strong  and  transparent. 
Weaknesses  remain  in  the  comparability  of  the  main  fiscal  aggregates  published  in  various 
government’s fiscal reports, reconciliation of government’s net financing and the change in the stock 
of  debt,  and  external  oversight  of  the  government’s  financial  position.  The  Parliamentary  Budget 
Office’s  independence  needs  to  be  further  strengthened,  in  particular,  by  clarifying  its  mandate, 
qualification criteria and financial autonomy. The fiscal oversight over the general government sector 
continued  to  improve,  in  particular,  over  non-commercial  SOEs  by  gradually  bringing  their  cash 
management under the single treasury account (STA). As of September 2025, 114 SOEs were covered 
under the STA. 

Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment  

EU  rules  in  the  social  field  include  minimum  standards  for  labour  law,  equality  and  non-
discrimination, health and safety at work. They also promote social inclusion, social protection, and 
social dialogue at EU level. 

On labour law, major gaps remain in the alignment of the legal framework with the EU acquis. The 
institutional  framework  is  in  place  but  needs  further  strengthening.  Georgia  has  still  not  ratified 
several  ILO  conventions,  including  those  on  labour  inspections,  occupational  safety  and  health  at 
work,  maternity  protection,  minimum  wage,  social  security  and  violence  and  harassment  at  work. 

59 

 
 
Several labour rights provisions under the European Charter of Social Rights are yet to be accepted by 
Georgia.  The  December  2024  amendments  to  the  Law  on  public  service  significantly  weaken  the 
labour  rights  of  civil  servants  and  are  inconsistent  with  the  principles  of  ILO  Convention  no  158, 
particularly regarding arbitrary dismissal, job security and procedural fairness.    

On  occupational  health  and  safety  at  work,  there  was  no  progress  to  further  align  with  the  EU 
occupational  safety  and  health  acquis.  19  out  of  25  directives  are  yet  to  be  aligned  with.  Georgia 
needs  to  ensure  that  the  rules  are  enforced,  specifically  as  regards  the  most  recent  directives  on 
occupational  safety  and  health.  The  Labour  Inspection  Office’s  capacities  –  both  institutional  and 
human resources – were further strengthened. The budget of the office was increased by 16% in 2025 
compared to 2024. 

During 2024, 33 people died (34 in 2023) and 260 were injured (347 in 2023) as a result of accidents 
in  the  workplace.  Although  there  is  a  steady  decrease  in  the  number  of  occupational  accidents  the 
average incidence of fatal occupational accidents remains higher than in the EU. 

On social dialogue, the tripartite dialogue is functioning at national level, but is largely absent in the 
regions.  There  was  no  progress  related  to  collective  bargaining.  The  ILO  Convention  on  Collective 
Bargaining has not been ratified by Georgia.  

On employment policy, the capacities of the State Employment Support Agency were developed and 
strengthened. Further work is needed in particular to improve access to its services in the regions and 
a new national strategy of labour and employment policy remains to be adopted. The overall labour 
force participation rate in 2024 was 54.8% (53.3% in 2023), with women’s labour force participation 
rate being 44.8% (43.1% in 2023) and that of men 66.2% (65.1% in 2023). In 2024, 15 609 supported 
jobseekers  were  employed  on  the  open  labour  market  (15  899  in  2023).  In  order  to  increase  the 
availability  of  employment  promotion  services,  representative  offices  of  the  State  Employment 
Support  Agency  were  expanded  in  five  municipalities  (Khelvachauri,  Samtredia,  Kharagauli, 
Sighnaghi, Chokhatauri) in 2024. 

The  unemployment  rate  in  2024  in  Georgia  was  13.9%,  down  from  16.4%  in  2023.  The 
unemployment rate in 2024 among men was higher than among women (16.1% vs 11.1%) as well as 
the  employment  rate (55.6%  vs  39.8%).  However,  the  gender  pay  gap remains a  problem,  with  the 
average  wage  of  women  constituting  67.9%  of  men’s  wage.  No  cases  of  gender-based  wage 
discrimination  have  been  prosecuted.  The  share  of  NEETs  (young  people  aged  15-29  not  in 
employment,  education  or  training)  decreased  to  24.1%  in  2024  (from  26.9%)  but  remains  high 
compared to the EU average (11% in 2024). Georgia needs to address high youth unemployment and 
align with the Council Recommendations on the Youth Guarantee and the long-term unemployment. 

Undeclared work remains a challenge, with a substantial proportion of the population of working age 
being  engaged in  non-agricultural  undeclared  work in  2024 (29.1%).  More men  were engaged than 
women (34.2% vs 23.3%) and more in rural than in urban areas (34.4% vs 26.8%).  

On  social  protection  and  inclusion,  Georgia  still  lacks  a  comprehensive  and  targeted  social 
protection system that supports employment policies.  In 2024, the share of the population under the 
absolute  poverty  line  reached  its  lowest  level  on  record  at  9.4%  (down  from  11.8%  in  2023).  The 
GINI  coefficient  remained  stable,  indicating  inequalities  remain  high.  A  national  strategy  on  the 
deinstitutionalisation  of  children  and  provision  of  alternative  care  is  not  in  place.  The  de-
institutionalisation  of  large-scale  boarding  homes  for  persons  with  disabilities  is  ongoing. 
Construction and renovation of four new houses for people with psychosocial needs were in progress 
throughout 2024. In 2024, one major institution for persons with disabilities was closed.  

60 

 
 
There  are  important  and  expanding  gaps  in  the  legal,  policy  and  strategic  frameworks  on  non-
discrimination  in  employment  and  social  policy.  Amendments  to  the  anti-discrimination  law,  the 
gender  equality  law  and  Labour  Code  adopted  in  April  2025  remove  the  terms  gender  and  gender 
equality,  departing  from  earlier  steps  to  align  with  the  EU  non-discrimination  and  gender  equality 
acquis.  There  is  no  alignment  with  the  Employment  Equality  Directive  nor  the  Racial  Equality 
Directive.  Moreover,  the  enforcement  of  the  national  Law  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  of 
discrimination  remains  weak.  The  participation  of  persons  with  disabilities  in  the  labour  market 
remains a challenge. An agreement on the facilitation of employment opportunities  for persons with 
disabilities was signed between government agencies in February 2025. 

As  regards  equality  between  women  and  men  in  employment  and  social  policy  only  the  basic 
principles and general provisions exist in current legislation. Georgia has to adopt targeted provisions 
to  align  its  legislation  with  the  gender  equality  acquis,  including  inter  alia  The  Work-Life  Balance 
Directive, The Pay Transparency Directive and the Women on Boards Directive. Legal amendments 
in April 2025 removed references to gender equality in legislation replacing it with equality between 
men  and  women.  Women’s  segregation  by  industry,  occupation  and  degree  concentration  in 
humanities, education and healthcare confines them to economic activity with lower earnings. Unpaid 
household and care work by women is five times higher than that by men, mainly due to prevailing 
stereotypes and limited availability and accessibility of care services and local transportation, which 
are also the main reasons for women’s limited participation in the labour market. Women are more 
likely to be the beneficiaries of state social assistance than men, and the gender pay gap shows women 
earn 32.1% less than men.  

As regards the European Social Fund (ESF), Georgia is not a participant or beneficiary of the ESF. 
(See also Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments). 

Chapter 20 - Enterprise and industrial policy  

EU  industrial  policy  strengthens  competitiveness,  facilitates  structural  change,  and  encourages  a 
business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises. 

Regarding enterprise and industrial policy principles, the industrial policy of Georgia is outlined in 
the  development  strategy  “Georgia-Vision  2030”  and  substantiated  in  the  annual  government 
programmes instead of a separate industrial strategy. An SME Development Strategy 2021-2025 is in 
place. A strategy to reform  state-owned enterprises  is in place and acknowledges the importance of 
separating the state’s shareholder, regulatory and policy functions. 

61 

 
 
On enterprise policy and instruments, there was no progress on aligning with Directive 2011/7/EU 
on  combating  late  payment  in  commercial  transactions.  In  September  2024,  Enterprise  Georgia 
introduced a loan/lease co-financing component aiming at boosting the competitiveness of the private 
sector in the area of waste collection, treatment and disposal to their business support programme. In 
2024, the programme supported 560 beneficiaries and approved EUR 154 million in loans and leases. 
In addition, during the reporting period, three new regional consulting centres (Growth Hubs) started 
operating  bringing  their  total  number  to  six,  and  diagnostic  centres  were  launched  in  those  regions 
where  Growth  Hubs  are  not  yet  operational.  The  Innovation  and  Technology  Agency  initiated  the 
setting-up of an innovative startup acceleration programme in Spring 2025. 

In  September  2024,  significant  changes  were  introduced  to  the  capital  market  support  programme, 
increasing  the  total  revenue  limit  for  beneficiaries  and  expanding  the  list  of  eligible  activities  and 
sectors.  In  April  2025,  a  new  action  plan  2025-2026  for  the  capital  market  development  strategy 
2023-2028  was  adopted.  In  June  2025, amendments to  the  Law  on  investment  funds  were  adopted, 
whereby  the  share  of  equity  participation  of  state  authorities  and/or  of  state-owned  enterprises  in 
investment funds has been increased from 25% to 40%. 

There were no new developments concerning sectoral policies.  

Chapter 25 - Science and research  

The EU provides significant support for research and innovation. All Member States can participate 
in  the  EU’s  research  and  innovation  programmes  and  benefit  from  them,  especially  where  there  is 
scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation. 

Georgia took some actions to modernise its research and innovation policy and to align with the EU 
acquis.  The  Ministry  of  Education,  Science  and  Youth  integrated  Open  Science  principles  into  its 
2022-2030  unified  education  and  science  strategy.  Training  and  capacity  building  initiatives 
supported Georgian institutions to align with European standards on open science. A growing number 
of researchers are publishing in open access journals or depositing scientific publications in national 
repositories. The use of open access resources in the country is estimated at 60%, which is in line with 
the EU average. 

A draft sectoral action plan 2025-2027 for the development of the science, research, technology, and 
innovation system aiming to implement the unified national strategy for education and science 2022-
2030 was prepared and published in April 2025 for public consultations. The action plan should serve 
as a national European Research Area (ERA) roadmap and include the priority areas of ERA. 

There has been no progress to promote innovation in line with the five flagships of the new European 
innovation agenda and cooperation between research and industry remains difficult due to the lack of 
collaborative culture among research organisations, universities and private companies. There remain 
challenges in establishing university-business cooperation including with regard to insufficient human 
and  financial  capacities  at  the  universities.  On  smart  specialisation,  the  government  approved  the 
smart specialisation strategy 2024-2030 for the pilot region of Imereti and adopted an action plan for 
2024-2026.  The  setting  up  of  the  Kutaisi  Technological  Hub,  a  planned  innovation  centre  for  the 
region is still in preparation. 

As regards the European Innovation Scoreboard, in the absence of the necessary statistical indicators 
Georgia has not been included in the European Innovation Scoreboard for 2024.  

As regards the EU framework programmes for research and innovation, Georgia is associated to 
Horizon  Europe  since  2021  and  there  has  been  increased  participation  of  universities  and  research 
centres in Horizon Europe.  

Gross  domestic  spending  on  R&D  (GERD)  as  a  share  of  GDP  has  not  changed  since  2020  and 
remains at around 0.24%, which is below the EU-27 average 2.24% and the EU target of 3% of GDP.  

Chapter 26 - Education and culture  

The EU supports cooperation in education and culture by funding programmes and the coordination 
of Member State policy through the open method of coordination. The EU and its Member States must 

62 

 
 
also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant workers, including 
those from disadvantaged backgrounds. 

In  education  and  training,  government  expenditure  on  education  in  2024  amounted  to  3.93%  of 
GDP, which is a slight increase from last year, but still below the EU average (4.6% in 2022).  

Access  to  pre-school  education  remains  a  challenge.  The  enrolment,  including  women  and  girls,  in 
primary education slightly decreased, while it increased for secondary education in 2024 compared to 
the previous year. Georgia is participating to PISA 2025. Moreover, Georgia has enrolled to take part 
to the international tests “Progress in international reading literacy study” (PIRLS) 2026, “Trends in 
International  Mathematics  and  Science  Study”  (TIMSS)  2027  and  the  “International  civic  and 
citizenship education study” (ICCS) 2027. 

The  Vocational  Education Training  (VET)  2024-2030  strategy  was  adopted  in  September 2024  and 
access  to  vocational  education  increased  in  2024  with  the  implementation  of  integrated  vocational 
education and training  programmes. The number of admitted VET students increased in 2024 to 17 
083 (from 15 494 in 2023). 

On  higher  education,  enrolment  increased  in  2024  compared  to  2023.  Georgia  has  been  a  full 
member of the European Higher Education Area (Bologna Process). According to the 2024 Bologna 
Process  implementation  report,  Georgia  still  needs  to  work  on  the  full  implementation  of  the  key 
commitments,  such  as  the  Bologna  degree  structure  and  automatic  recognition.  There  are  3  higher 
education  institutions  from  Georgia  which  participate  in  the  European  Universities  Alliances  as 
associated partners. 

There  was  significant  backsliding  in  quality  assurance  in  higher  education.  In  November  2024,  the 
membership  of  the  National  Centre  for  Educational  Quality  Enhancement  in  the  European 
Association  for  Quality  Assurance  in  Higher  Education  (ENQA)  was  suspended  with  regard  to  the 
institution’s  independence  and  its  interpretation  and  application  of  authorisation  and  accreditation 
standards.  Distance  education  and  e-learning  in  higher  and  vocational  education  are  part  of  the 
curriculum. 

Regarding  inclusive  education,  in  April  2025,  the  Ministry  of  Education’s  department  of  inclusive 
education was abolished and its functions were transferred to the strategic planning and international 
relations  department,  de-prioritising  the  approach  to  inclusive  education.  On  a  more  positive  note, 
amendments  were  made  to  the  rules  and  conditions  of  enrolment  in  the  vocational  educational 
programmes  facilitating  the  enrolment  of  ethnic  minorities  in  VET  programmes.  As  a  result,  494 
persons  were  enrolled  in  vocational  educational  programmes  in  2024.  The  enrolment  of  socially 
vulnerable people was supported through social scholarships. Moreover, in 2025, the Skills Agency 
prepared  a  short-term  vocational  training  programme  for  assistants  to  persons  with  disabilities  for 
providing high-quality support services to children and persons with disabilities. Access of vocational 
education for women in particular in rural areas remains limited. 

Digital  citizenship  and  green  skills  are  reflected  as  pervasive  skills  in  the  national  curriculum  at 
primary,  basic  and  secondary  and  VET  levels.  Further  efforts  are  needed  to  align  digital  education 
with  the  EU  Digital  Education  Action  Plan  2021-2027.Georgia  takes  part  in  the  international 
dimension of the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme.  

The  National  Council  of  Youth  Organisations  of  Georgia,  a  non-governmental  organisation  which 
was  a  full  member  of the European  Youth  Forum,  ceased its  activities  due to  restrictive  legislation 
regarding CSOs adopted in 2024 and 2025.  

In  2025  the  Ministry  of  Sport  was  established  as  an  independent  state  entity. Georgia  continues  to 
take part in the European Week of Sport.  

The  dialogue  on  cultural  policy  between  the  government  and  civil  society  was  halted  against  the 
background  of  amendments  to  14  laws  removing  mandatory  NGO  participation  in  public  decision-
making. Georgia has not yet joined the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion 
of  the  Diversity  of  Cultural  Expressions.  Georgia  continues  to  participate  fully  in  the  Culture  and 
Cross-Sectoral strands of the Creative Europe Programme and partially in the MEDIA strand. 

63 

 
 
Chapter 29 - Customs union  

All  EU  Member  States  are  part  of  the  EU  customs  union  and  follow  the  same  customs  rules  and 
procedures. This requires legislative alignment, as well as adequate implementing and enforcement 
capacity, and access to and interoperability with the EU electronic customs environment. 

Georgia took some steps to align its customs legislation with the Union Customs Code. In February 
2025, Georgia joined the Common Transit Convention and the Convention on the Simplification of 
Formalities in Trade in Goods and integrated two conventions into its legal structure. As a result, all 
transit  movements  to  and  from  Convention  member  countries  are  conducted  through  the  New 
Computerised Transit System. 

Georgia  needs  to  increase  the  administrative  and  operational  capacity  of  the  customs  service. 
Smuggling  of  tobacco  products  and  other  illicit  activities  in  the  regions  close  to  the  occupied 
breakaway regions remains a problem. There was little reported progress on strengthening measures 
to  combat  customs fraud and  on acceding  to  the  WHO  FCTC  Protocol  to  Eliminate  Illicit  Trade in 
Tobacco Products. 

Concerning the Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) system, as of September 2025, 28 companies 
have AEO status. Out of that number, 22 have been granted the AEO-S authorisation, making them 
eligible  for  mutual  recognition  once  the  related  agreement  is  concluded  with  the  EU.  Work  on  the 
mutual recognition of authorised economic operators is currently on hold.  

CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY  

The  cluster  on  Green  Agenda  and  sustainable  connectivity  covers:  transport  policy  (Chapter  14); 
energy  (Chapter  15);  trans-European  networks  (Chapter  21);  and  environment  and  climate  change 
(Chapter 27).  

Chapter 14 - Transport policy  

The EU has common rules on technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State aid and 
market liberalisation  in  road  transport,  railways,  inland  waterways,  multimodal  transport,  aviation 
and maritime transport. 

On  general  transport,  the  national 
transport  and  logistics  strategy  is  in 
force. The action plan 2025-2026 was 
adopted during the reporting period.  

than 

Regarding  road  transport,  road 
safety  remains  a  concern  with  a 
higher  fatality  rate 
the  EU 
average.  In  2024,  there  were  5 866 
crashes with 444 fatalities (compared 
to 5 594 crashes with 442 fatalities in 
2023).  The  first  half  of  2025  saw  a 
20% increase in road accidents. 

Georgian  legislation  is  not  fully  aligned  with  the  main  acquis  related  to  social  legislation  in  road 
transport such as the Regulation on driving and rest times. On the transport of dangerous goods, the 
rules  for  roadside  inspection  and  determination  of  degrees  of  violations  in  the  roadside  zone  were 
adopted  in  January  2025.  Inspections  will  check  compliance  with  rules  on  transporting  dangerous 
good  and  with  the  driver’s  work  and  rest  regime.  Georgia  started  to  align  with  the  environmental 
acquis applicable to the transport sector. 

On  rail  transport,  the  Transport  Safety  Investigation  Bureau  was  established  in  January  2025  and 
acts as the national accident investigating body. The railway safety rules were established in January 
2025, requiring owners of access tracks to obtain safety authorisation to manage and operate railway 
infrastructure.  The  legal  framework  on  transport  of  dangerous  goods,  certification  of  train  drivers, 

64 

 
 
 
interoperability  of  the  rail  system  and  safety  on  railways  is  partially  aligned  with  the  relevant  EU 
acquis. There were no developments during the report period. 

On  maritime  transport,  the  maritime  single  window  system  is  operational  across  all  ports  since 
October 2024. Implementing legislation was further adopted in November 2024 on the procedure for 
registering and authorising users in the system.  

On  inland  waterway  transport,  the  government  adopted  several  core  legislative  acts  to  improve 
safety  rules,  registration  rules  and  inspection  rules.  In  addition,  the  Internal  Waterway  Transport 
Department was created under the Maritime Transport Agency to strengthen regulatory oversight of 
the sector.  

No progress was made on civil aviation and multimodal transport. Georgia has not yet aligned with 
the Combined Transport Directive. 

Chapter 15 - Energy   

EU  energy  policy  covers  energy  supply,  infrastructure,  the  internal  energy  market,  consumers, 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear 
safeguards. 

Regarding security of supply, Georgia aligned with most of the provisions of the Risk-preparedness 
Regulation  into  its  electricity  security  of  supply  rules.  Georgia  made  steps  to  align  with  the  Gas 
Security  of  Supply  Regulation  concerning  measures  to  safeguard  the  security  of  gas  supply,  by 
submitting the natural gas risk assessment. In addition, Georgia submitted to the Energy Community 
Secretariat its Security of Supply Statement for natural gas in October 2024.    

Regarding internal energy market, alignment with and implementation of the Electricity Integration 
Package has not progressed further during the reporting period. Provisions on unbundling and market 
opening  have  only  been  partially  applied  (e.g.  changing  managing  entities  of  several  energy 
companies).  Amendments  to  the  Law  on  State  property,  which  are  necessary  for  unbundling  the 
transmission  system  operator  of  electricity  and  gas  (TSO),  entered  in  force  in  December  2024,  but 
they need to be strengthened by secondary legislation and corporate reforms. The Georgian regulatory 
framework is  not aligned with  the  Electricity  Integration  Package.  In the  electricity  sector, through 
amendments  to  the  Electricity  Market  Concept  Design,  the  launch  of  a  balancing  and  ancillary 
services market was postponed to 1 July 2027. Georgia closely cooperates with the Turkish TSO to 
sign  inter-TSO  operating  agreements  for  the  future  opening  of  the  balancing  and  ancillary  services 
market in July 2027. 

Electricity  production  is  still  largely  regulated  with  the  deregulation  schedule  until  2027  for  hydro 
power plants with a capacity below 120 MW.  

On renewable energy, the 2030 renewable targets in the national energy and climate plan are in line 
with Georgia’s legal obligations under the Energy Community Treaty. Amendments to the renewable 
energy law, to implement the second Renewable Energy Directive (REDII), have not been adopted. 
Provisions  related  to  the  sustainability  and  greenhouse  gas  emission  saving  criteria  for  biofuels, 
bioliquids, and biomass from REDII are needed. 

As  of  February  2025,  the  total  installed  capacity  of  the  renewable  electricity  producers  benefiting 
from  the  net  metering  scheme  reached  160.8 MW.  Few  by-laws  regarding  the  heating  and  cooling 
sectors were adopted. 

No progress was made regarding energy efficiency, including in the area of energy performance of 
buildings. 

All 14 implementing legislations to transpose the EU acquis on energy labelling were adopted at the 
end of 2024 and will enter into force end of 2025. In addition, Georgia has established the minimum 
legal framework for setting mandatory ecological (i.e. eco-design) requirements for all energy-using 
and energy-related products. 

On  governance,  the  introduction  of  the  national  energy  and  climate  plan  complies  with  the 
Regulation on the Governance of the energy union and climate action.  

65 

 
 
On  nuclear  safeguards,  Georgia  aligned  partially  with  the  safeguards  provisions  (See  Chapter  7  – 
Intellectual property law) of the Euratom Treaty through the adoption in March 2025 of the technical 
regulations on radiation protection provisions and fundamental requirements for the management of 
sources of ionising radiation.  

Chapter 21 - Trans-European networks   

The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and 
energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment. 

The  Trans-European  Transport  Networks  (TEN-T)  are  extended  to  Georgia.  The  Georgian 
indicative network consists of 714 km of railways (of which 585 km are on the core network), 855 km 
of motorways (of which 768 km are on the core network), three ports (one of which is core) and one 
core airport.  

Georgia  continued to  upgrade its  road infrastructure in line  with  TEN-T  compliance standards.  The 
road infrastructure quality of the core network is satisfactory with 58% rated as very good or good in 
2024 (52% in 2023). Together with the extensive network, only 25% complies with TEN-T standards 
(20% in 2023). Construction of the Grigoleti - Kobuleti Road Section of the E-70 Highway is not yet 
finalised. 

On railways, authorities are addressing bottlenecks that have been identified on the core network via 
the railway modernisation project which is currently 99% completed.  No progress was made during 
the  reporting  period  with  regard  to  the  TEN-T  railway  compliance  indicators  on  line  speed,  train 
length  or  track  gauge.  Georgian  Railways  has  not  implemented  the  European  Rail  Traffic 
Management System.  

A  new  railway  section  (Senaki  –  Khamiskuri)  was  added  to  the  comprehensive  network.  A 
memorandum  of  understanding  on  the  development  of  transport  corridors  for  the  China-Europe 
Railway Express, Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) was signed between 
Georgia and China end of 2024.  

The construction of the Anaklia Deep Sea Port started with dredging works.  

Georgia  has  not  transposed  the  old  TEN-E  Regulation  (EU)  347/2013.  The  revised  TEN-E  is 
currently not applicable to Georgia.  

Chapter 27 - Environment and climate change  

The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. 
EU  rules  contain  provisions  addressing  climate  change,  water  and  air  quality,  waste  management, 
nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil protection. 

Environment 

On  horizontal  legislation,  Georgia  is  partially  aligned  with  the  acquis  regarding  with  EU. 
Environmental  policy  implementation,  monitoring  and  enforcement  remain  a  challenge,  notably 
due to limited and unstable administrative capacity. There was no progress during the reporting period 
to ensure the quality of the preparation and implementation of environmental investments – including 
the  transparency  of  procedures,  compliance  with  the  environment  impact  assessment/strategic 
environment assessment and other elements of the horizontal acquis. The country has not yet ratified 
the Espoo Convention Protocol on strategic environmental assessment.  

On air quality, Georgia approved the air quality plan for Tbilisi in September 2024. In January 2025, 
the Law on vehicle emissions and EURO-5/V vehicle emission standards entered fully into force and 
now also applies to M3 and N category vehicles. As of 2025, 35 industrial plants have implemented a 
self-monitoring  system  and  continuously  provide  information  on  emissions  to  the  supervisory 
authority. Self-monitoring devices have been installed by another six large plants. 

Alignment with the EU waste management and circular economy legislation is at an early stage. 54 
(out of 69) municipalities have developed waste management plans. 

66 

 
 
In  the  area  of  water  quality,  implementing  legislation  on  the  boundaries  of  river  basins  and  river 
basin districts as well as the establishment and operation of River Basin Management Advisory and 
Coordination  Councils  has  been  adopted  respectively  in  March  and  February  2025.  All  river  basin 
management plans have been finalised except for the Kura river. The monitoring network for surface 
water and groundwater has been further expanded. 

Georgia’s legislation on nature protection is partially aligned with the acquis. The current Emerald 
Network  covers  18%  of  national  territory  which  is  on  track  to  reach  the  30.8%  target  by  2030. 
Georgia  should  identify  and  pre-designate  sites  that  will  be  covered  by  the  Natura  2000  network. 
Protected areas currently cover 13.34% of the national territory. Georgia needs to update its national 
biodiversity  strategy  and  action  plan.  The  draft  law  on  biodiversity  needs  to  be  improved  before 
adoption. The national forestry inventory covers 55% of forests. 

On  the  EU  acquis  on  industrial  pollution  control  and  risk  management,  no  progress  was  made 
during  the  reporting  period.    Work  towards  the  creation  of  a  single  national  pollutant  release  and 
transfer register needs to be accelerated.  

The level of transposition of the chemicals acquis remains limited with no progress recorded in the 
reporting period.  

Georgia is at an early stage of alignment with the EU noise legislation. Amendments laying down the 
noise norms were adopted in November 2023 but have  not been implemented. Strategic noise maps 
and action plans have not been prepared.  

Georgia continued to build the capacity of its civil protection and disaster risk management system 
at central and local levels. Nationwide floods risk maps have been developed in accordance with the 
EU  Floods  Directive.  Flood  risk  management  plans  have  been  completed  for  four  river  basins 
(Khobistskali,  Natanebi,  Kintrishi,  and  Supsa),  while  the  development  of  plans  for  the  remaining 
basins was ongoing. The hydro meteorological network was expanded by 50 new monitoring stations, 
bringing the total to 255.  

The  Emergency  Management  Service  developed  five  additional  emergency  management  plans  for 
five municipalities; bringing the total to 16.  

Climate change 

On climate change, some progress was registered over the reporting period. Georgia is still working 
on a climate change law that is not yet adopted.  

Georgia  has  made  efforts  to  introduce  the  monitoring,  reporting,  verification  and  accreditation 
framework  for  greenhouse  gas  emissions  during  the  reporting  period  by  amending  the  Law  on 
environmental  protection,  the  objective  being  to  start  operating  the  Monitoring,  Reporting, 
Verification and Accreditation (MRV-A) system in January 2026.  

A climate stress test framework was developed in December 2024 and integrates multiple analytical 
modules to assess the economic and financial impacts of climate risks. 

A national greenhouse gas inventory and a biennial transparency report were published in May 2025 
and submitted to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Georgia is preparing a 
new Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement; this new NDC must be 
in line with the efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C. 

Despite  some  streamlining  and  rationalising  efforts,  administrative  capacities  remain  low  affecting 
Georgia’s ability to implement the climate  acquis. The administrative capacities in this area need to 
be strengthened in terms of human and financial resources.  

CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION  

Cluster 5 on resources, agriculture and cohesion covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 
11); food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12); fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 
13); regional policy and coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22); financial and budgetary 

67 

 
 
 
provisions (Chapter 33). 

Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development  

The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and ensures Europe’s food security. It helps 
tackle climate change and the sustainable management of national resources; maintains rural areas 
and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-
food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong management and control systems. There 
are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming. 

On horizontal issues, the Rural Development Agency (RDA) was designated as a paying agency. The 
RDA implements state support programmes to the sector. An action plan was approved in December 
2024 to establish a farm sustainability data network (FSDN). As an initial step to set up a Land Parcel 
Identification System, land use and land cover for Georgia (except the occupied breakaway regions of 
Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia)  were  mapped  during  the  reporting  period  using  the  most  recent 
orthophoto imagery.  

On  common  market  organisation,  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis  remains  limited  and  is  mostly 
related to certain marketing standards. A 2025 action plan was approved to align progressively with 
relevant  EU  legislation  on  a  common  organisation  of  the  markets  in  agricultural  products.  As  an 
initial  step,  Georgia  should  recognise  producer  organisations  as  provided  for  in  the  action  plan, 
encouraging farmers to strengthen their market position.  

On rural development, the implementation of the 2024-2027 action plan of the agriculture and rural 
development  strategy  mobilised  in  2024  a  budget  of  EUR 387  million  (up  23%  compared  with  the 
previous year). The RDA implements a portfolio of 14 rural development programmes.  

As  regards  quality  policy,  legislation  on  protection  and  use  of protected  designations  of  origin and 
geographical indications, aligning with the EU acquis, entered into force in November 2024. 

On organic farming, no progress was made during the reporting period. 

On  the fight  against  corruption,  the  Law  on  the  prevention  of  corruption is the  legal  basis  for all 
sectors.  The  RDA  reports  on  observed  irregularities  and  provide  subsequent  information.  The 
institution  has  an  Irregularity  Officer, and  the  Manual  of  Procedures  of  the  authority  prescribes  the 
handling of irregularities whose implementation with transparency and accountability is challenging.   

Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy  

The EU food acquis including hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensures a high level of food and 
feed safety and a high level of protection of consumers’ interests. Animal health and welfare and the 
safety  of  food  of  animal  origin  are  safeguarded  together  with  quality  of  seeds,  plant  reproductive 
material,  protection  against  harmful  organisms,  animal  nutrition  and  the  use  of  plant  protection 
products. 

In the area of general food safety, food safety rules and its specific rules for feed, Georgia adopted 
legislation  in  January  2025  harmonising  with  the  EU acquis,  notably  Regulation  (EU)  625/2017  on 
official control, which will enter into force in January 2027. In June 2025, the food safety strategy for 
2025-2028  was  approved.  The  strategy  includes  six  strategic  objectives  covering  the  legislative 
framework,  the  national  food  control  system,  crisis  response,  risk  analysis,  sustainability  and 
digitalisation.  The  competent  authorities’  certification  for  the  Quality  Management  System  (ISO 
9001:2015) were extended to the veterinary control system in October 2024. 

Additional provisions to the control system of the country are needed for its implementation. Notably, 
regular training requirements of the staff of the competent authorities; capacity building for staff of 
the  Scientific  Research  Centre  of  Agriculture  (SRCA),  which  is  the  competent  authority  for  risk 
assessment in food safety, veterinary and plant protection, and emergency preparedness.  

Georgia’s animal health legislation is not yet aligned with the EU’s animal health policy and acquis.  

Georgia’s animal welfare practices and legislation are not yet aligned with the EU’s animal welfare 
policy and acquis.  

68 

 
 
As regards placing on the market of food, feed and animal by-products, the National Food Agency 
continued  to  carry  out  risk-based  official  checks.  The  traceability  system  engaging  the  primary 
responsibility of Food Business Operators (FBO) for food safety and quality is to be  strengthened to 
ensure comprehensive coverage of registered FBOs throughout the food chains, including small-scale 
producers  and  family  production  entities.  Further  efforts  are  necessary  to  improve  private  sector 
awareness and self-control of food safety. 

A comprehensive range of food safety laboratory analysis is not yet in place. Some operational issues 
persist on issuing TRACES electronic certificates. Five out of ten border inspection posts need to be 
upgraded with infrastructure and equipment and a risk-based evaluation system for food importers is 
yet to be developed.   

Based  on  a  risk  assessment  performed  by  the  competent  authority  (SRCA),  recommendations  were 
issued in 2025 for the risk management of aflatoxin M1 in milk and risk management of contaminated 
fish with malachite green. 

An EU compliant system of collection, storage and processing of animal by-products (ABPs) is not 
yet in place.   

No  progress  was  reported  on  genetically  modified  organisms  risk  assessment  and  market 
authorisation processes. 

On  phytosanitary  policy,  a  certification  system  was  put  in  place  for  professional  users  of  plant 
protection products and for pesticide application equipment to implement EU Directive 2009/128 on 
plant protection. This action aims at a sustainable use of pesticides and also includes the promotion of 
integrated pest management and organic production. As regards plant health legislation, Georgia has 
not yet provided any information on their level of alignment with the EU acquis. 

Chapter 13 - Fisheries and aquaculture  

The  common  fisheries  policy lays  down  rules  on  fisheries  management, protects  living resources of 
the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing 
fleet  capacity,  rules  on  control  and  inspection,  rules  on  markets  and  aquaculture  and  support  for 
fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture. 

Existing legislation sets out basic requirements such as the obligation of the flag state, coastal state, 
port state and market state.  

On  fisheries  resources,  the  National  Environment  Agency  (NEA)  actively  participates  in  the 
BlackSea4Fish research programme of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean and 
the Black Sea to align with standardised methods for data collection such as demersal trawl survey for 
stock assessment of the commercial species. NEA participated in awareness campaigns on sensitive 
and protected species and contributed to a socio-economic study of the small-scale coastal fishermen. 
Catch certificates required to export to the EU are not issued by the competent authority as relevant 
fisheries products (fish oil and fish mill) from authorised processing establishments are not yet meant 
to be exported to the EU. 

A  fleet  management  system  is  in  place  with  a  fishing  vessel  register  and  monitoring  of  fishing 
activities. Five anchovy licence holders are closely monitored under a licensing agreement.  

A comprehensive inspection and control system is in place for vessels operating under the anchovy 
licensing  agreement,  with  online  video  surveillance,  inspections  at  sea  and  on  landing  areas.  The 
fisheries  control  system  does  not  result  from  a  risk-based  management  methodology.  The  Coast 
Guard monitors the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone. Traceability of the catches and 
monitoring of the fishing activities of the small-scale coastal fleet is not ensured. As advised by the 
General  Fisheries  Commission  for  the  Mediterranean  (GFCM)  Compliance  Committee,  Georgia 
needs to step up its efforts to implement the GFCM recommendations on compliance and to fulfil its 
international  obligations,  in  particular  developing  a  legislative  framework  to  regulate  small-scale 
fishing and aquaculture activities. 

69 

 
 
Georgia  has  no  specific  structural  action  for  fisheries.  There  were  no  developments  on  state  aid 
providing preferential credit loans to modernise the fleet. 

On market policy, no progress was made during the reporting period.  

On aquaculture, the strategy for sustainable development of aquaculture 2024-2028 was approved in 
September  2024.  The  management  plan  for  eight  allocated  zones  for  marine  aquaculture  was 
approved  in  March  2025.  A  first  auction  procedure  was  launched  in  April  2025  for  one  allocated 
zone.  A  permit,  initially  issued  in  May  2025  for  a  period  of  20  years,  will  facilitate  an  investment 
estimated at USD 55 million over the next 10 years, aiming to achieve an annual production of about 
18 000  tons  of  fish.  Challenges  persist  in  enforcing  the  Law  on  aquaculture,  especially  in  ensuring 
that small-scale producers comply with permit procedures. 

On international agreements,  Georgia continued to participate in GFCM meetings and should aim 
for  full  membership.  The  allocated  zones  for  marine  aquaculture  have  been  delimited  as  part  of 
maritime spatial planning. 

Chapter 22 - Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments  

Regional policy is the EU’s main tool for reducing regional disparities and investing in sustainable 
and  inclusive  socio-economic  growth.  It  is  operating  through  shared  management  between  the 
Commission  and  EU  Member  States.  The  implementation  of  cohesion  policy  programmes  requires 
appropriate administrative capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of systems of 
sound financial management and control and also the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as 
environmental or public procurement legislation. 

Georgia  does  not  have  a  legislative  framework  on  regional  development  nor  on  cohesion.  The 
government  approved  the  high  mountain  settlements  development  strategy  2024-2030  and  its 
accompanying  action  plan  2024-2026  in  September  2024.  The  strategy  aims  at  enhancing  the 
attractiveness of mountainous settlements for living and working, while reducing socio-economic and 
territorial disparities between mountainous and non-mountainous municipalities. 

On  institutional  framework,  in  April  2025,  the  government  split  the  Ministry  of  Regional 
Development  and  Infrastructure  (MRDI)  into  two  separate  entities  (Ministry  of  Regional 
Development and Ministry of Infrastructure) to improve the coordination between regional and local 
authorities. 

On  administrative  capacity,  the  Ministry  of  Regional  Development  and  state  representatives  in 
regions  have  sufficient  financial  and  administrative  resources  to  coordinate  and  monitor  the  policy 
implementation. 

On programming, the MRDI continued working on a smart specialisation strategy to be developed 
for West Georgia in line with the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) 2 level.   

Georgia  remains  a  participating  country  in  the  Interreg  NEXT  2021-2027  Black  Sea  programme. 
However, the recent reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as the national authority, 
has weakened the effectiveness of the management and control system required for proper functioning 
of the programme.  

As of end 2024, under the framework of the decentralisation strategy and its action plan, nearly 1 300 
(1 254)  units  of  properties  (buildings,  land,  roads)  were  transferred  from  central  government  to 
municipalities. 

On monitoring and evaluation, the consolidated monitoring report for 2024 was published by MRDI 
in January 2025, in accordance with the existing “Manual for Monitoring the Implementation of the 
Harmonisation Plan” for introducing NUTS in Georgia.  

On financial management, control and audit, no progress was recorded in the reporting period.  

On  the fight  against  corruption,  the  Law  on  the  prevention  of  corruption is the  legal  basis  for all 
sectors.  The  RDA  reports  on  observed  irregularities  and  provides  subsequent  information.  The 

70 

 
 
institution  has  an  Irregularity  Officer, and  the  Manual  of  Procedures  of  the  authority  prescribes  the 
handling of irregularities.   

Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions  

This  chapter  covers  the  rules  governing  the  funding  of  the  EU  budget  (‘own  resources’).  These 
resources  mainly  consist  of:  (i)  contributions  based  on  the  gross  national  income  of  each  Member 
State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource and (iv) a resource based on value 
added  tax.  EU  Member  States  must  have  the  appropriate  administrative  capacity  to  adequately 
coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources. 

As regards traditional own resources, Georgia has structures in place to levy customs duties at the 
point of import. It operates a national VAT system (Information on Revenue Administration and taxes 
is provided in Chapter 16). Georgia needs to align further its 2019 Law on customs with the Union 
Customs Code.  

As regards administrative infrastructure, the Ministry of Finance has the overall responsibility for 
financial and budgetary issues. The Revenue Service, in charge of tax and customs issues, is a legal 
entity  of  public  law  under  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  The  Revenue  Service  needs  to  strengthen  its 
operational capacity and computerise its key business processes. 

CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS  

There are two chapters in this cluster: external relations (Chapter 30); foreign, security and defence 
policy (Chapter 31).  

Chapter 30 - External relations  

The EU has a common commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral and bilateral 
agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules in the field of humanitarian aid and 
development policy. 

On the common commercial policy, Georgia continued to demonstrate good administrative capacity 
to manage its commitments in external commercial relations, as a World Trade Organization member. 
Georgia  is  party  to  the  Ministerial  Declaration  on  the  Investment  Facilitation  for  Development. 
Georgia ratified the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies in May 2025. The new disciplines of the 
WTO’s Services Domestic Regulation Reference Paper are close to adoption.  

The  country  should  remove  regulatory  constraints  to  improve  the  investment  climate  including  the 
wider  legal  framework  and  institutions,  policies  to  promote  responsible  business  conduct,  and 
impediments to growth of priority sectors.  

On dual-use items, export controls on dual-use goods are applied in accordance with the 2013 Law 
on the control of military and dual-use goods that was amended in 2019. Georgia is yet to develop its 
legislation  covering  export  controls  on  goods  that  could  be  used  for  capital  punishment,  torture  or 
other  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis  on  anti-torture,  namely 
Regulation (EU) 2019/125. Georgia is a member of the Alliance for Torture-Free Trade. Georgia is 
not a member of multilateral export control regimes such as the Wassenaar arrangement, the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.  

 As  regards  bilateral  trade  agreements  with  third  countries,  Georgia  is  a  party  to  16  free  trade 
agreements,  including  with  the  European  Free  Trade  Association  (EFTA),  Türkiye,  and  the  United 
Kingdom. Preferential agreements are in place with some countries with whom the EU does not have 
preferential agreements: Azerbaijan, China, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. A 
new  generation  free  trade  agreement  (Comprehensive  Economic  Partnership  Agreement)  between 
Georgia and the United Arab Emirates is in force since June 2024. In November 2024 Georgia and the 
Republic  of  Korea  concluded  an  Economic  Partnership  Agreement,  which  will  enter  into  force 
following national ratification processes. 

The Georgia – Hungary Bilateral Investment Treaty entered into force in January 2025 , bringing the 

71 

 
 
 
number of bilateral investment treaties with third countries to 35, out of which 16 with EU Member 
States.  

Georgia should align its (future) national legislation on the screening of foreign investments with the 
EU Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation 2019/452.  

As regards development policy and humanitarian aid, Georgia remains primarily a recipient of aid 
programmes  rather  than  a  donor.  Repressive  legislation  adopted  in  the  reporting  period  including 
amendments to the  Law  on  grants  and  the  Foreign Agents  Registration  Act  severely  undermine  the 
enabling  financial  environment  for  CSOs.  A  legislative  framework  on  humanitarian  aid  and  the 
allocation of dedicated funds remain to be set up. Dedicated administrative structures are still not in 
place.  Georgia  has  still  not  developed  legislation  on  development  policy  nor  an  administrative 
structure for it. 

Chapter 31 - Foreign, security and defence policy  

Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue under the EU foreign, security and defence 
policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU action, and apply agreed sanctions and restrictive 
measures. 

There was no political dialogue between the EU and Georgia on common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP) during the reporting period due to downgraded political contacts by the EU in response to the 
serious democratic backsliding undertaken by the Georgian authorities. 

Georgia’s  alignment  with  statements  by  the  High  Representative  on  behalf  of  the  EU  and  Council 
decisions on sanctions decreased during the reporting period and remains low, with an alignment rate 
of 40% as of 24 October 2025, compared to 53% in 2024. 

Cases  of  non-alignment  included  statements  and  sanctions  related  to  Russia’s  war  of  aggression 
against  Ukraine,  as  well  as  those  related  for  example  to  Hong  Kong,  Syria,  terrorism  or  LGBTIQ 
rights. Georgia did not systematically align itself with international and EU initiatives in support of 
Ukraine, including on resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Human 
Rights  Council,  and  the  Council  of  Europe.  In  June  2025,  Georgia  abstained  from  supporting  the 
creation  of  the  Special  Tribunal  for  the  Crime  of  Aggression  against  Ukraine  set  up  within  the 
framework of the Council of Europe.  Georgia abstained from the UN General Assembly Resolution 
Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine, marking the third anniversary of the 
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, after having co-sponsored it. 

The  re-export  of  common high  priority  and  economically  critical  goods  is  still of  concern.  Georgia 
should  step  up  cooperation  efforts  to  prevent  that  its  territory  and/or  legal  entities  registered  in 
Georgia  are  used  to  circumvent  EU  restrictive  measures.  The  number  of  direct  flights  to  various 
destinations in Russia continued to significantly increase. 

Georgia  is  a  member  of  various  international  organisations,  including  the  United  Nations,  the 
Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organisation of 
the  Black  Sea  Economic  Cooperation.  In  January  2025,  Georgia  withdrew  its  delegation  from  the 
Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the  Council  of  Europe  following  the  Assembly’s  vote  to  conditionally 
ratify the delegation’s credentials  while significantly limiting its rights. Georgia is a member of the 
Human Rights Council until the end of 2025. While cooperation has been partially reduced, Georgia 
continues  to  aspire  to  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation  (NATO)  membership  and  has  been 
contributing to NATO-led operations. 

Georgia  is  actively  engaged  in  supporting  disarmament  and  non-proliferation  at  international, 
regional  and  bilateral  levels.  Georgia  is  fulfilling  all  its  commitments  to  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency,  the  Organisation  for  the  Prohibition  of  Chemical  Weapons  and  the  Biological 
Weapons  Convention.  As  regards  small  arms  and  light  weapons  (SALW)  control,  Georgia 
committed itself to the UN Programme of Action on SALW, which contains a wide array of measures 
to combat the illicit proliferation of SALW. 

On  security  measures,  the  agreement  on  security  procedures  for  the  exchange  and  protection  of 

72 

 
 
classified information signed in 2016 is being revised.  

As regards the common security and defence policy, Georgia has not offered any new contributions 
to  EU  crisis  management  missions  and  operations.  Security  and  defence  cooperation  has  not 
progressed, due to the political developments in the country.  

On  hybrid  threats,  the  cooperation  with  the  EU  in  this  area  is  currently  limited.  Dialogue  and 
cooperation  on  countering  foreign  information  manipulation  and  interference  (FIMI),  with  the 
authorities is constrained, while EU cooperation with civil society on countering FIMI continues. The 
Georgian  authorities  are  actively  spreading  disinformation  narratives  and  conspiracy  theories,  often 
targeting the EU and EU accession.  

73 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND GEORGIA 

Georgia  applied  for  EU  membership  on  3 March 2022.  The  European  Council  recognised  the 
European  perspective for Georgia in June  2022.  Georgia  was  granted candidate  status in  December 
2023, on the understanding that it takes the relevant steps set out in the Commission recommendation 
of  8 November 2023.  On  27 June 2024,  the  European  Council  concluded  that  the  Georgian 
government’s  course  of  action  jeopardised  Georgia’s  EU  path,  de  facto  leading  to  a  halt  of  the 
accession process. This was reiterated by the European Council on 17 October 2024.  

There was no political dialogue between the EU and Georgia during the reporting period due to the 
serious democratic backsliding by the Georgian authorities.  

The EU and Georgia signed an Association Agreement (AA) in June 2014, which entered into force 
in July 2016. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) is an integral part of the 
Agreement.  The  Agreement  provides  the  foundations  for  political  association  and  economic 
integration.  Yearly  political  and  economic  dialogue  between  the  EU  and  Georgia,  as  well  as 
subcommittee  meetings  under  the  AA/DCFTA  structure,  have  been  for  the  most  part  halted.  The 
Association Council last met in February 2024, the Association Committee in Trade Configuration in 
December  2023,  and  the  Association  Committee  in  July  2023.  The  Parliamentary  Association 
Committee last met in June 2023.  

In addition to the AA/DCFTA structures, a Human Rights Dialogue with Georgia has been in place 
since 2009 and usually convenes annually. The Human Rights Dialogue was not held in the reporting 
period. The High-Level Strategic and Security Dialogue, taking forward cooperation on foreign and 
security policy, was last held in January 2024.  

The Georgian government does not exercise effective control over the occupied breakaway regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within 
its internationally recognised borders and has been engaged since 2008 in peaceful conflict resolution 
efforts, including through the EU Monitoring Mission and the work of the EU Special Representative 
for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia. The EU Monitoring Mission is the only international 
presence on the ground, counting more than 300 personnel.  

Citizens of Georgia have enjoyed visa-free travel to the Schengen since March 2017. As part of the 
visa liberalisation monitoring mechanism, the Commission has been regularly assessing the progress 
made by the country in implementing reforms introduced under the visa roadmap. In its Report under 
the Visa Suspension Mechanism, published in December 2024, the Commission urged Georgia to take 
urgent  action  to  address  its  recommendations,  particularly  related  to  fundamental  rights,  anti-
discrimination  and  anti-corruption,  in  order  to  avoid  the  possible  activation  of  the  visa  suspension 
mechanism.  On  27  January  2025,  the  Council  suspended  parts  of  the  EU-Georgia  visa  facilitation 
agreement  to  end  visa-free  travel  for  holders  of  service  and  diplomatic  passports  in  response  to 
Georgia’s  democratic  backsliding.  A  readmission  agreement  between  the  European  Union  and 
Georgia has been in place since 2011.  

Bilateral financial assistance was reviewed following the latest political developments. The EU has 
withheld EUR 121.3 million of bilateral funds directly benefiting the Georgian authorities (i.e. budget 
support,  technical  assistance,  NIP  investment  grants)  under  the  Neighbourhood,  Development  and 
International  Cooperation  instrument  –  Global  Europe  2021-2027  (NDICI-GE).  Since  its  launch  in 
2009, Georgia has participated in the  Eastern Partnership (EaP). This overarching framework has 
further boosted bilateral and regional relations with the EU.  

The  EU’s  support  through  the  European  Peace  Facility  (EPF)  in  2021-2023  totalled  EUR 62.75 
million (only for non-lethal equipment). The adoption of the 2024 EPF assistance measure has been 
suspended  as  a  result  of  the  deteriorating  situation  observed  in  the  country  in  2024.  No  new  EPF 
assistance was provided to Georgia in 2025. 

Since 2014, Georgia has participated in EU programmes. It currently takes part in Horizon Europe, 
Creative  Europe,  EU4Youth,  the  Customs  Programme  Fiscalis  and  the  transnational  cooperation 

74 

 
 
Interreg  programme  Black  Sea  Basin.  Organisations  and  individuals  from  Georgia  can  also  benefit 
from certain actions of the Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps Programme.  

75 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX II – STATISTICAL DATA  

STATISTICAL DATA (as of 11/09/2025) 

Basic data 
Population (thousand) 
Total area of the country (km²) 

National accounts 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 
GDP per capita (euro) 
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS)) 
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) 
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the 
previous year (%) 
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) 
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the nominal unit labour cost growth index (2015 = 100) 
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU 
average (EU-27 = 100) 
Gross value added by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Business 
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 
Number of active enterprises (number) 
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of 
enterprises active in t (%) 
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of 
enterprises active in t (%) 
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial 
business economy) (%) 

76 

Note 

Note 
1) 
1) 
1) 

1) 

1) 

1) 
1) 

1) 2) 
1) 2) 
1) 2) 
1) 2) 
1) 
1) 
1) 
1) 
1) 

Note 

3) 

2012 
4 498 i 
69 700 w 

2012 
27 897 w 
13 139 w 
3 524 w 
: 
: 
6.6 w 
2 iw 
4 w 

4 w 
: 
: 

9.6 w 
14.4 w 
6.8 w 
69.2 w 
92.4 w 
21.6 w 
35.6 w 
54.1 w 
5 w 

2020 
3 717 i 
69 700 w 

2020 
49 789 w 
14 017 w 
3 765 w 
: 
: 
-  6.3 w 
-  4 iw 
-  2 w 

0 w 
121.4 iw 
: 

9.5 w 
15.4 w 
8.7 w 
66.3 w 
94.5 w 
22.2 w 
36.9 w 
56.0 w 
7 w 

2021 
3 729 i 
69 700 w 

2021 
60 724 w 
15 921 w 
4 293 w 
: 
: 
10.6 w 
-  2 iw 
13 w 

-  3 w 
122.4 iw 
: 

8.3 w 
16.9 w 
7.3 w 
67.5 w 
95.6 w 
20.8 w 
42.7 w 
58.9 w 
6 w 

2022 
3 689 i 
69 700 w 

2022 
72 860 w 
23 662 w 
6 374 w 
: 
: 
11.0 w 
5 iw 
5 w 

2 w 
123.2 iw 
: 

7.6 w 
16.5 w 
8.0 w 
67.9 w 
85.7 w 
19.8 w 
52.5 w 
62.2 w 
6 w 

2023 
3 736 i 
69 700 w 

2023 
80 883 w 
28 464 w 
7 661 w 
: 
: 
7.8 w 
4 iw 
4 w 

4 w 
128.2 iw 
: 

6.9 w 
14.1 w 
7.6 w 
71.4 w 
83.6 w 
21.5 w 
49.3 w 
57.9 w 
7 w 

2012 
98.1 w 
54 626 w 
26.1 w 

2020 
110.8 w 
129 659 w 
17.5 w 

2021 
128.6 w 
139 741 w 
21.2 w 

2022 
147.2 w 
149 110 w 
29.5 w 

2023 
148.7 w 
162 891 w 
25.2 w 

3) 

: 

17.4 w 

17.5 w 

17.9 w 

12.8 w 

68.7 iw 

63.7 iw 

63.4 iw 

61.9 iw 

61.4 iw 

2024 
3 695 i 
69 700 w 

2024 
91 892 w 
31 213 w 
8 448 w 
: 
: 
9.4 w 
5 iw 
4 w 

-  6 w 
115.8 iw 
: 

6.2 w 
13.5 w 
8.4 w 
71.9 w 
84.8 w 
22.0 w 
48.4 w 
56.0 w 
: 

2024 
149.8 w 
: 
: 

: 

: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 

3 192 iw 
5 271 w 

4 205 iw 
6 268 w 

4 647 iw 
7 300 w 

7 199 iw 
11 741 w 

8 866 iw 
14 016 w 

Inflation rate and house prices 
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 

Balance of payments 
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 
*3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) 
*Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) 
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) 
*Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) 
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant 
workers (%) 

Public finance 
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) 
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) 
Total  government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Financial indicators 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) 
*Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) 
*Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) 

77 

Note 

Note 

1) 

Note 
1) 
1) 
1) 
1) 

Note 
1) 

1) 
4) 

2012 
: 

2020 
: 

2021 
: 

2022 
11.8 w 

2023 
2.1 w 

2012 
- 1 467.0 w 
- 3 292.1 w 
864.7 w 
-  133.4 w 
1 093.8 w 
818.7 w 
-  10.9 iw 
45.2 w 
582.9 w 
230.8 w 
137.2 w 
813.8 w 
285.7 w 
-  94.8 w 
4.2 iw 

2012 
-  0.6 w 
30.5 w 
27.1 w 
23.3 w 

2012 
77.5 iw 
222.8 w 
1 529.0 w 
3 979.2 w 
: 
32.6 w 
7.44 w 
2.124 
97.9 w 

2020 
- 1 737.7 w 
- 2 771.0 w 
120.4 w 
-  662.1 w 
1 575.0 w 
709.2 w 
-  8.4 iw 
-  8.7 w 
493.6 w 
30.1 w 
120.8 w 
523.7 w 
299.1 w 
-  157.5 w 
7.3 iw 

2020 
-  9.2 w 
59.5 w 
24.9 w 
26.9 w 

2020 
122.0 iw 
354.3 w 
2 825.9 w 
: 
: 
77.7 w 
8.45 w 
3.553 
97.8 w 

2021 
- 1 645.6 w 
- 3 211.4 w 
615.9 w 
- 1 002.0 w 
1 952.0 w 
816.6 w 
-  9.6 iw 
-  3.0 w 
786.5 w 
271.7 w 
110.1 w 
1 058.2 w 
302.9 w 
-  141.2 w 
8.5 iw 

2021 
-  6.2 pw 
49.0 pw 
24.9 pw 
25.3 pw 

2021 
122.8 iw 
273.5 w 
2 970.3 w 
: 
: 
71.5 pw 
9.50 w 
3.814 
97.3 w 

2022 
- 1 012.9 w 
- 4 873.7 w 
2 593.5 w 
- 1 656.5 w 
2 924.0 w 
1 144.9 w 
-  9.1 iw 
27.7 w 
1 837.9 w 
312.4 w 
179.0 w 
2 150.4 w 
800.4 w 
-  113.6 w 
9.2 iw 

2022 
-  2.4 pw 
39.1 pw 
26.6 pw 
23.0 pw 

2022 
94.9 iw 
181.0 w 
4 346.1 w 
: 
: 
61.9 pw 
10.89 w 
3.080 
123.7 w 

2023 
- 1 582.8 w 
- 5 620.1 w 
3 172.0 w 
- 2 212.2 w 
3 077.5 w 
767.5 w 
-  6.8 iw 
5.1 w 
1 493.1 w 
267.6 w 
143.0 w 
1 760.7 w 
632.9 w 
-  98.0 w 
7.9 iw 

2023 
-  2.3 w 
38.8 w 
27.4 w 
22.9 w 

2023 
77.8 iw 
161.4 w 
6 175.0 w 
: 
: 
65.0 w 
10.43 w 
2.842 
152.6 w 

: 
: 

2024 
1.7 w 

2024 
- 1 388.3 w 
- 5 982.6 w 
3 575.4 w 
- 2 035.8 w 
3 054.6 w 
966.5 w 
-  4.8 iw 
: 
841.6 w 
394.9 w 
147.1 w 
1 236.5 w 
289.2 w 
-  89.0 w 
6.3 iw 

2024 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2024 
77.2 iw 
154.2 w 
5 957.0 w 
: 
: 
: 
8.27 w 
2.945 
159.5 w 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries 
(2015 = 100) 
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 

0.1 iw 

- 0.1 iw 

- 0.1 iw 

0.2 iw 

0.6 iw 

0.6 iw 

2 180.8 w 

3 184.9 w 

3 777.0 w 

4 591.6 w 

4 528.2 w 

4 260.6 w 

External trade in goods 
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 

Note 

2012 
6 106 iw 
1 801 iw 
- 4 305 iw 
: 
14.0 iw 
28.8 iw 

2020 
7 047 iw 
2 925 iw 
- 4 122 iw 
: 
20.9 iw 
22.9 iw 

2021 
8 539 iw 
3 587 iw 
- 4 951 iw 
: 
16.9 iw 
22.9 iw 

2022 
12 866 iw 
5 302 iw 
- 7 563 iw 
: 
15.4 iw 
22.6 iw 

2023 
14 430 iw 
5 629 iw 
- 8 802 iw 
: 
11.6 iw 
24.5 iw 

2024 
15 657 iw 
6 061 iw 
- 9 597 iw 
: 
8.7 iw 
27.2 iw 

Demography 
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus 
deaths (per thousand inhabitants) 
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 

Note 

2012 
: 

: 
: 
: 

2020 
-  1.1 

7.9 
: 
: 

2021 
-  3.8 

: 
: 
: 

2022 
-  1.8 

7.6 
69.4 
78.1 

2023 
-  0.7 

8.2 
69.9 
77.5 

2024 
-  1.2 

: 
: 
: 

Labour market 
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that 
is economically active (%) 
Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are 
in employment (%) 
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are 
in employment (%) 
Employment by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 
(%) 
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 
(%) 
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 
Male unemployment rate (%) 
Female unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for 
12 months or more (%) 

78 

Note 

2012 
77.5 w 

2020 
63.2 bw 

2021 
64.5 w 

2022 
65.9 w 

2023 
68.7 w 

2024 
: 

63.0 w 

51.1 bw 

50.6 w 

54.0 w 

56.9 w 

72.4 w 
54.8 w 
65.7 w 

46.9 w 
7.2 w 
: 
45.8 w 
18.5 w 

58.7 bw 
43.9 bw 
47.0 bw 

19.8 bw 
11.4 bw 
6.9 bw 
61.9 bw 
23.5 bw 

58.1 w 
43.5 w 
47.3 w 

18.9 w 
11.3 w 
7.8 w 
62.1 w 
24.3 w 

62.2 w 
46.4 w 
50.6 w 

17.9 w 
11.9 w 
8.5 w 
61.8 w 
23.4 w 

64.9 w 
49.4 w 
52.3 w 

16.5 w 
12.2 w 
8.8 w 
62.4 w 
23.3 w 

81.5 w 

76.5 bw 

75.7 w 

76.6 w 

76.7 w 

5) 
5) 
5) 
5) 6) 

7) 
7) 
7) 

7) 

17.2 w 
18.2 w 
16.1 w 
36.1 w 
7.5 w 

18.5 bw 
20.2 bw 
16.2 bw 
39.4 bw 
5.8 bw 

20.6 w 
22.7 w 
17.8 w 
42.9 w 
7.2 w 

17.3 w 
19.3 w 
14.6 w 
39.4 w 
6.6 w 

16.4 w 
18.3 w 
14.0 w 
34.5 w 
6.5 w 

: 

: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary 
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%) 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED 
levels 5-8) (%) 

8) 

6.2 w 

25.0 bw 

32.1 w 

24.8 w 

20.8 w 

21.3 w 

14.5 bw 

15.3 w 

13.0 w 

13.1 w 

Social cohesion 
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the 
inflation index) (2016 = 100) 
Gini coefficient 
Poverty gap 

Standard of living 
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 
Number of mobile phone subscriptions relative to population size (number per thousand 
population) 
Mobile broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 
Fixed broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 

Infrastructure 
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 

Length of motorways (kilometres) 

Education, Innovation and Research 
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) 
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8), 
males 
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8), 
females 
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) 
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males 
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females 
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading 
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics 
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science 
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most 
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or 
training 
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower 
secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or 
training 

Note 

9) 

Note 

Note 

Note 

2012 
713 w 
: 

44 w 
6.8 w 

2020 
1 191 w 
106 w 

37 w 
5.5 w 

2021 
1 305 w 
106 w 

36 w 
5.5 w 

2022 
1 543 w 
112 w 

36 w 
5.8 w 

2023 
1 767 w 
125 w 

36 w 
5.6 w 

2012 
150.0 i 
1 088.3 w 

2020 
319.0 
1 273.7 w 

2021 
343.0 
1 343.6 w 

2022 
357.0 
1 388.5 w 

2023 
389.0 
1 480.6 w 

: 
: 

2012 
20.9 iw 

80 w 

2012 
42.4 w 
42.6 w 

: 
: 

2020 
16.0 iw 

234 

2020 
38.2 w 
33.6 w 

: 
: 

2021 
16.0 iw 

263 

2021 
35.5 w 
32.3 w 

: 
: 

2022 
16.0 iw 

263 w 

2022 
35.2 w 
30.4 w 

: 
: 

2023 
16.0 iw 

271 w 

2023 
35.6 w 
31.2 w 

42.2 w 

42.7 w 

38.9 w 

40.1 w 

40.3 w 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
7.1 w 

158.1 w 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
8.2 w 

154.5 w 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
7.3 w 

148.7 w 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
6.0 w 

141.3 w 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
5.3 w 

8.6 w 

8.8 w 

7.6 w 

6.1 w 

5.1 w 

: 

: 

2024 
: 
: 

: 
: 

2024 
414.0 
: 

: 
: 

2024 
: 

: 

2024 
: 
: 

: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 

79 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most 
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or 
training 
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 
weeks) 
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 
weeks), men 
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 
weeks), women 
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of 
population aged 20-34) 
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) 
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males 
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females 
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP 
(%) 
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 

Environment 
Index of greenhouse gas emissions,  CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant 
prices) 
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 

Energy 
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 

Agriculture 
Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) 
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) 

80 

5.8 w 

7.4 w 

7.0 w 

5.9 w 

5.4 w 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 
: 
: 
2.7 iw 
0.13 iw 
0.20 w 

1) 
1) 
1) 

1.1 w 

0.9 w 

1.2 w 

: 

29.8 w 
27.7 w 
31.8 w 
3.8 iw 
: 
0.23 w 

1.2 w 

1.1 w 

1.3 w 

: 

31.5 w 
29.4 w 
33.4 w 
3.6 iw 
: 
0.20 pw 

1.6 w 

1.3 w 

1.8 w 

: 

32.4 w 
30.5 w 
34.1 w 
3.2 iw 
: 
0.15 pw 

1.7 w 

1.6 w 

1.8 w 

: 

34.5 w 
33.5 w 
35.4 w 
3.7 iw 
: 
0.18 pw 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

36.3 w 
35.9 w 
36.6 w 
: 
: 
0.16 pw 

10) 

31.1 w 

83.8 w 

86.1 w 

88.4 w 

89.0 w 

91.5 w 

Note 

11) 

Note 

Note 

2012 
43.7 w 
: 

: 
9.6 ew 

2012 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2012 
87.4 w 
: 
1 128.8 w 
204.3 w 
742.6 iw 
589.5 w 

2020 
: 
445.9 w 

: 
19.6 ew 

2020 
1 043 
32 
40 
8 
3 984 i 
4 998 
11 160 

2020 
109.3 w 
: 
925.8 w 
165.7 w 
946.5 iw 
569.0 w 

2021 
: 
463.1 w 

51.3 
17.8 ew 

2021 
1 248 
36 
60 
14 
4 133 i 
5 385 
12 645 

2021 
111.8 w 
: 
928.6 w 
152.9 w 
956.8 iw 
587.9 w 

2022 
: 
365.1 w 

55.5 
14.8 ew 

2022 
1 272 
37 
59 
13 
4 561 i 
5 867 
14 247 

2022 
109.9 w 
: 
853.7 w 
150.2 w 
914.0 iw 
564.8 w 

2023 
: 
309.4 w 

66.3 
16.1 ew 

2023 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2023 
106.8 w 
: 
837.7 w 
141.6 w 
761.7 iw 
584.3 w 

2024 
: 
: 

: 
: 

2024 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2024 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 

370.0 iw 
: 
235.2 w 

405.1 iw 
: 
259.7 w 

430.2 iw 
: 
226.9 w 

370.5 iw 
: 
201.1 w 

392.5 iw 
: 
187.5 w 

12) 

: 
: 
: 

Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Georgia 

: = not available 
  b = break in series 
  d =  definition differs 
  e = estimated value 
  n =  not significant value 
  p = provisional 

i = Eurostat estimate 

  w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any assurance as regards their quality and 

adherence to EU statistical methodology 
* = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator 
** = Data shown for Georgia exclude the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia over which the government of Georgia does not exercise control. 

  Footnotes: 

1)  Based on 2008 SNA. 
2)  Calculations are made according to NACE Rev. 2. 
3) 

Includes: limited liability companies, joint stock companies, joint liability companies, cooperatives, limited partnerships, individual enterprises, foreign enterprise branches. 
Excludes: NACE Rev. 2 Sections K, O, T and U. 

4)  TIBR 1 Day. 
5)  Since 2020: NACE Rev.2; before 2020: NACE Rev.1.1. 
6) 
7)  Persons aged 15 years and older. 
8)  Persons without education are excluded. 
9)  Consumption based relative poverty. 

Including construction. 

10)  Percentage of households having fixed internet connections at home (therefore excluding mobile phone network). 
11)  Does not follow the 'territorial principle'; including the performance of all resident carriers on the national territory and abroad. 
12) 

Including kitchen gardens. 

81