COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Türkiye 2025 Report Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy
Date: 2025-11-04
Institutions: Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, European Commission
Subjects: Türkiye, accession criteria, accession negotiations, pre-accession strategy, regional cooperation

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 4.11.2025  SWD(2025) 756 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Türkiye 2025 Report Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy                               {COM(2025) 690 final} - {SWD(2025) 750 final} - {SWD(2025) 751 final} - {SWD(2025) 752 final} - {SWD(2025) 753 final} - {SWD(2025) 754 final} - {SWD(2025) 755 final} - {SWD(2025) 757 final} - {SWD(2025) 758 final} - {SWD(2025) 759 final}  
 
 
Contents  
1. 

Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 2 

1.1. 

Context .......................................................................................................................................... 2 

1.2. Main findings of the report ................................................................................................................ 3 

2. Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process ........................................................................... 18 

2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform ..................................... 18 

2.1.1. Democracy ................................................................................................................................ 18 

2.1.2. Public administration reform .................................................................................................... 24 

2.2.   Rule of law and fundamental rights ............................................................................................ 26 

2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights ........................................................................... 26 

2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security ................................................................................ 41 

2.3. Economic criteria ............................................................................................................................. 51 

2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy ...................................................................... 51 

2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union ........... 55 

2.4. Public procurement, statistics, financial control ............................................................................. 57 

Chapter 5: Public procurement ........................................................................................................... 57 

Chapter 18: Statistics .......................................................................................................................... 59 

Chapter 32: Financial control .............................................................................................................. 60 

3.  Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation ....................................................................... 61 

4.  Ability to assume the obligations of membership .............................................................................. 66 

Cluster 2: Internal Market ....................................................................................................................... 66 

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods .................................................................................................. 67 

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers .................................................................................. 68 

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ................................................. 69 

Chapter 4: Free movement of capital ................................................................................................. 70 

Chapter 6: Company law ..................................................................................................................... 71 

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law ................................................................................................... 71 

Chapter 8: Competition policy ............................................................................................................ 72 

Chapter 9: Financial services ............................................................................................................... 73 

Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection .................................................................................... 74 

Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ................................................................................... 76 

Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media ................................................................................... 76 

Chapter 16: Taxation ........................................................................................................................... 77 

Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy ....................................................................................... 78 

Chapter 19: Social policy and employment ........................................................................................ 79 

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Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy ...................................................................................... 82 

Chapter 25: Science and research ....................................................................................................... 83 

Chapter 26: Education and culture ..................................................................................................... 83 

Chapter 29: Customs Union ................................................................................................................ 85 

Cluster 4: The green agenda and sustainable connectivity .................................................................... 86 

Chapter 14: Transport policy .............................................................................................................. 86 

Chapter 15: Energy .............................................................................................................................. 87 

Chapter 21: Trans-European networks ............................................................................................... 89 

Chapter 27: Environment and climate change ................................................................................... 90 

Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ...................................................................................... 91 

Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development ................................................................................. 91 

Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ........................................................... 92 

Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture ............................................................................................... 93 

Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments .................................... 93 

Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions ................................................................................ 95 

Cluster 6: External relations .................................................................................................................... 95 

Chapter 30: External relations ............................................................................................................ 95 

Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy .............................................................................. 96 

Annex I – Relations between the EU and Türkiye ................................................................................. 103 

Annex II – Statistical data ...................................................................................................................... 106 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION1  

1.1. 

CONTEXT 

Türkiye  is  a  key  partner  for  the  European  Union  and  a  candidate  country.  In  December  2024,  the 
Council2  restated  the  EU’s  strategic  interest  in  a  stable  and  secure  environment  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  and  in  the  development  of  a  cooperative  and  mutually  beneficial  relationship  with 
Türkiye. The Council stressed again that the EU attaches particular importance to resumption of and 
progress  in  the  Cyprus  settlement  talks  in  further  enhancing  EU-Türkiye  cooperation.  Both  the  EU 
and  Türkiye  pursue  re-engagement in areas  of  mutual interest,  in line  with  the recommendations  of 
the Joint Communication on EU-Türkiye relations of 23 November 20233 and the relevant European 
Council Conclusions. The EU is re-engaging constructively with Türkiye in a phased, proportionate 
and  reversible  manner,  subject  to  established  conditionalities;  high-level  engagement  continued  in 
areas of joint interest4.  

Accession  negotiations  with  Türkiye  have  remained  at  a  standstill  since  2018,  as  reiterated  by  the 
Council Conclusions of December 2024. The EU’s serious concerns about the continued deterioration 
of  democratic  standards,  the  rule  of  law,  the  independence  of  the  judiciary  and  respect  for 
fundamental rights were not addressed. The arrests of and charges brought against elected officials, 
opposition figures, political activists, civil society and business representatives, journalists, and others 
since  the  beginning  of  2025,  gave  rise  to  increasing  questions  regarding  Türkiye’s  adherence  to  its 
democratic tradition, and deepened concerns about the independence of the judiciary. 

The  2016  EU-Turkey  Statement  continued  to  yield  results  and  remained  the  key  framework  for 
cooperation  on  migration.  Türkiye  sustained  its  remarkable  efforts  to  host  2.7  million  refugees  
including  Syrians  under  temporary  protection.  The  EU  has  mobilised  EUR 12.5 billion  to  support 
refugees and host communities since 2011. The EU continued to provide assistance in areas such as 
basic  needs,  border  management,  education,  healthcare,  protection  and  socio-economic  support.  On 
the  economic  side,  Türkiye  remained  the  EU’s  fifth  largest  trading  partner  in  2024,  with  trade 
reaching a record high of over EUR 210 billion. Türkiye has also asserted an increasingly active and 
multi-layered foreign policy. Increasing geopolitical challenges underscored its strategic regional role, 
particularly in relation to developments in Syria, Ukraine, Gaza and South Caucasus. 

Since  2023,  bilateral  relations  between  Türkiye  and  Greece  have  improved,  with  Türkiye  not 
engaging in any unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean or in flights over Greek 
islands. Türkiye continued to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and repeatedly advocated a 
two-state solution in Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.  

1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT 

CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS 

Democracy 

1 This report covers the period from 1 September 2024 to 1 September 2025. It is based on input from a variety of sources, 
including contributions from the government of Türkiye, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information 
from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and 
indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.  
The  report  uses  the  following  assessment  scale  to  describe  the  state  of  play:  early  stage,  some  level  of  preparation, 
moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it 
uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. 
Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used. 
2 During the reporting period, the Council of the EU adopted Conclusions concerning Türkiye on 17 December 2024.  
3 JOIN(2023) 50 final 
4 The EU-Türkiye High-Level Dialogue on Economy took place in April 2025; the EU-Türkiye High-Level Dialogue on 
Trade and High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Security took place in July 2025; and the EU-Türkiye High-Level 
Dialogue on Climate took place in October 2025. 

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The general framework of the elections ensures free choice between alternative political options but 
does  not  provide  a  level  playing  field  for  all  political  stakeholders.  Excessive  judicial  pressure  on 
opposition  politicians  stifles  political  competition,  thereby  undermining  fundamental  democratic 
principles. Türkiye has not implemented the recommendations to improve the election process issued 
by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe and the Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through Law 
(Venice Commission). 

While the Parliament formally has powers – including control of the executive and involvement in 
the  legislative  process,  it  can  exercise  them  only  in  a  constrained  way.  The  highly  centralised 
presidential  system,  which  has  seriously  weakened  Parliament’s  prerogatives  and  the  separation  of 
powers, remained in place.  

The  system  lacks  effective  checks  and  balances,  and  the  tools  needed  to  hold  the  government 
accountable  beyond  elections.  Most  regulatory  authorities  remain  directly  linked  to  the  Presidency, 
and  public  administration  is  highly  politicised.  Local  democracy  was  further  weakened  as  elected 
opposition mayors were prosecuted and removed, with some being replaced by government-appointed 
trustees. 

The  institutions  in  charge  of  the  EU  integration  process  are  in  place,  and  are  well  staffed  and 
effective.  

Civil  society  organisations  (CSOs)  continue  to  operate  in  a  difficult  and  increasingly  restrictive 
environment. The civic space has further shrunk due to sustained judicial and administrative pressures 
from the authorities, hindering the work of CSOs. Despite this, civil society continued to be vocal and 
participates  actively  in  civic  life,  making  crucial  contributions  in  several  areas.  Türkiye  needs  to 
ensure that independent CSOs are effectively consulted on new legislation and policies. 

Public administration reform 

Türkiye is between having some and a moderate level of preparation and made no progress in the 
reporting period.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular:  

→  prepare  and  adopt  an  overarching  strategy  for  public  administration  and  public  financial 

management reform in line with the EU principles and after extensive consultations; 

→  introduce merit-based recruitment, appointments and promotions, notably to senior positions; 

→  review the policymaking process to achieve inclusive and evidence-based methods of preparing 

policy planning documents and legislative proposals. 

Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 

Türkiye  remains  at  an  early  stage  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  the  rule  of  law  and  fundamental 
rights.  Backsliding  occurred  on  key  issues  identified  in  previous  reports  and  the  serious  concerns 
noted in previous reports heightened. 

Functioning of the judiciary 

Türkiye’s judiciary is still at an early stage of preparation and backsliding resumed. Fundamental 
systemic shortcomings were not addressed. The judiciary continues to remain under the control of the 
executive,  affecting  the  independence  and  compromising  the  quality  of  judicial  outcomes.  The 
judiciary  has  repeatedly  acted  selectively,  targeting  opposition  figures  and  elected  officials,  while 
refraining  from  pursuing  similar  action  against  the  ruling  coalition’s  officials.  This  dynamic  casts 
doubt on the impartiality of judicial proceedings and brought public trust in the legal system down to 
an all-time low. The judicial system still failed to implement certain judgments of the European Court 

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of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR),  while  several  courts  refused  to  implement  rulings  of  the  Turkish 
Constitutional Court, undermining the integrity and the functioning of the entire system. 

The  European  Commission’s  prior  recommendations  for  addressing  these  issues  still  need  to  be 
implemented  and  therefore  remain  valid  and  are  considered  even  more  urgent.  In  the  coming  year, 
Türkiye should focus on the following areas: 

→  create a political and legal environment in line with European standards that allows the judiciary 
to  carry  out  its  duties  independently  and  impartially,  strengthen  the  separation  of  powers,  and 
ensure that lower courts respect judgments by the Constitutional Court, whose decisions should 
abide by ECtHR jurisprudence; 

→  amend the structure and selection processes of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK)  so 
that  the  role  and  influence  of  the  executive  is  limited,  and  introduce  safeguards  against 
interference by the HSK or senior officials in judicial proceedings;  

→  ensure that all judicial proceedings respect fundamental rights, with a special emphasis on victims 
and  procedural  protection  for  suspects  and  accused  persons,  duly  guarantee  the  presumption  of 
innocence,  the  principles  of  individual  criminal  responsibility  and  legal  certainty,  the  right  of 
defence, and the right to a fair trial. 

Fight against corruption 

Türkiye is still at an early stage of preparation in the fight against corruption and no progress was 
made  in  the  reporting  period.  The  country  has  neither  created  a  framework  for  the  prevention  and 
control  of corruption,  nor set up  anti-corruption  bodies  in  accordance  with  the Council  of  Europe’s 
Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) 
recommendations, and the UN Convention against Corruption. The legal framework and institutional 
structure  require  improvement  to  limit  undue  political  influence  in  prosecuting  and  adjudicating 
corruption  cases.  During  the  reporting  period,  several  high-level  corruption  cases  were  launched 
against opposition-elected mayors in major cities and districts, while no investigation was launched 
against  current  or  former  elected  officials  from  the  ruling  party  in  large  cities.  These  selective 
investigations/prosecutions  do  not  ensure  trust  in  the  effectiveness  of  the  authorities’  fight  against 
corruption.  An  effective  fight  against  corruption  requires  clear  political  guidance,  together  with 
independent, accountable, transparent and effective public institutions, starting with investigative and 
judicial  bodies.  Progress  in  the  fight  against  corruption  is  therefore  also  hampered  by  the  lack  of 
independence  of  the  judiciary.  Targeted  risk  assessments  and  specific  measures  are  also  needed  to 
address corruption in the most vulnerable sectors.   

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  implement its international obligations in relation to the fight against corruption, in particular the 

UN Convention against Corruption and the relevant Council of Europe Conventions; 

→  ensure effective follow-up to the recommendations issued by GRECO, including by adopting the 

necessary legislation, as indicated in the EU-Turkey Visa Liberalisation Roadmap; 

→  develop  an  anti-corruption  strategy  that  reflects  a  clear  political  will  and  vision  to  effectively 

address corruption, underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan. 

Fundamental rights 

The  overall  human  rights  situation  in  the  country  deteriorated.  While  the  Turkish  legal  framework 
provides  general  guarantees  for  the  respect  of  human  and  fundamental  rights,  parts  of  Türkiye’s 
legislation  and  its  implementation  are  not  in  line  with  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights 
(ECHR)  and  ECtHR  case  law.  Investigations,  prosecutions  and  convictions  of  journalists,  writers, 
lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and other critical voices for alleged support for terrorism 
intensified in the reporting period. For the first time in several years, a sitting chair of a legal political 

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party was prosecuted for his public speeches. Judicial action against opposition politicians continued, 
and investigations were launched against one opposition political party.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not  implemented and remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  align  its  anti-terror  legislation  and  its  implementation,  with  European  standards,  the  ECHR, 
ECtHR case law, the Venice Commission’s recommendations, and the EU acquis and practices;  
→  improve the legislative framework and its implementation in order to effectively protect women’s 
rights and gender equality, to effectively tackle all forms of racism and discrimination, including 
against LGBTIQ persons, and to ensure the protection of minorities;  

→  implement  the  ECtHR  judgments  as  a  matter  of  priority,  including  in  the  case  of  Kavala  vs 

Türkiye. 

Freedom of expression 

implementation  of  criminal 

Türkiye remains at an early stage of preparation in this area and there was backsliding during the 
to  national  security  and 
reporting  period.  The 
counterterrorism  continued  to  violate  the  ECHR  and  to  diverge  from  the  case  law  of  the  ECtHR, 
hindering  freedom  of  expression.  Judicial  and  administrative  action  against  journalists,  media  and 
other  voices  that  are  critical  of  the  government  intensified.  The  media  and  broadcasting  regulator 
continued  to  impose  administrative  and  monetary  fines  in  a  discriminatory  way,  targeting  almost 
exclusively  independent  and  opposition  media  outlets.  A  new  law  on  cybersecurity.  like  the  2022 
Disinformation law, raises serious concerns due to vague rules and the lack of independent oversight 
that may result in further restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms.  

laws  related 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  release journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers and academics being held in pre-trial 
detention, and ensure that the criminal cases against them are concluded in accordance with the 
criteria set by the ECHR and the ECtHR;  

→  revise  its  criminal  legislation,  in  particular  the  anti-terror  law,  the  Criminal  Code,  the  data 
protection law, the internet law, the disinformation law, the cybersecurity law, as well as the legal 
framework  related  to  the  Radio  and  Television  Supreme  Council  and  the  Internet  Supervisory 
Authority,  to  ensure  that  they  comply  with  European  standards  and  are  implemented  in  a 
proportionate and non-discriminatory manner that does not curtail freedom of expression; 

→  take steps to restore a safe and pluralist environment that enables the media to carry out their work 

independently and without fear of reprisals or dismissals.  

Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  justice,  freedom  and  security.  Some  progress  was 
made in this area, particularly in relation to further strengthening the  capacity to survey and protect 
the  land  border  with  Iran.  Türkiye  continued  to  make  significant  efforts  to  host  and  support  2.7 
million refugees including Syrians under temporary protection. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  fully implement the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016, particularly by resuming returns from 
the  Greek  islands,  and  implement  all  provisions  of  the  EU-Turkey  Readmission  Agreement  in 
relation to all EU Member States; 

→  align legislation on personal data protection with the EU acquis, facilitating the conclusion of an 

international agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and Türkiye; 

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→  adopt and implement a strategy and action plan on border management  to improve coordination 

between border services at national and international levels. 

Fight against serious and organised crime 

Türkiye has some level of preparation in implementing the EU acquis in this area. Limited progress 
was  made  overall in  aligning  with the  EU  acquis  and  practices.  The  completion  of  an international 
agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities responsible 
for fighting serious crime and terrorism is still pending, as Turkish data protection legislation is not 
yet in line with the EU acquis. Organised crime remains a threat. Progress in increasing the legal and 
institutional capacity to successfully prosecute and convict organized crime cases is inadequate. The 
Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  only  partially  implemented,  and  therefore 
remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  continue  to  improve  its  legal  framework  and  practices  on  counterterrorism  in  line  with  the  EU 
acquis,  and  strengthen  its  anti-money  laundering,  terrorist  financing  and  financing  of  the 
proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  system  in  line  with  the  recommendations  of  the 
Venice Commission; 

→  conclude an international agreement with the EU on cooperation with Eurojust; further increase 
its  operational  willingness  to  cooperate  and  exchange  information  with  EU  law  enforcement 
partners and engage in effective judicial cooperation with EU Member States; 

→  improve its legislation on witness protection and data protection. 

ECONOMIC CRITERIA 

The existence of a functioning market economy 

Türkiye is well advanced in creating a functioning market economy and made  some progress over 
the  reporting  period.  Faced  with  the  economic  fallout  of  domestic  political  turmoil,  the  authorities 
tightened their policy stance further. Economic growth moderated amid weakening domestic demand, 
while  the  external  position  strengthened.  Tight  monetary  policy  was  instrumental  in  bringing  down 
inflation and inflationary expectations, although both remained elevated. The banking sector remained 
stable.  Fiscal consolidation  advanced  largely  due to the  winding-down  of  earthquake  reconstruction 
spending. The labour market was strong in 2024, but still faces major structural challenges, such as 
large  labour  underutilisation,  a  high  youth  unemployment  rate,  and  a  low  female  participation  rate. 
The authorities took limited steps to improve the business environment, which were mostly related to 
the  functioning  of  the  judiciary  and  specialised  courts.  State  aid  control  remained  weak,  and 
transparency declined. 

The policy guidance set out in the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2024 
was  partially  implemented,  but  implementation  improved  markedly  in  comparison  with  previous 
years. To improve the functioning of the market economy, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  maintain a tight economic policy stance to support disinflation; 

→  reduce the budget deficit as planned; 

→  further improve the business environment by increasing institutionalised and inclusive stakeholder 
consultation,  reducing  state  interference  in  price-setting  mechanisms,  preventing  State  aid  that 
distorts competition, and ensuring State aid transparency. 

The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU 

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Türkiye has a good level of preparation and made limited progress in increasing its capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. 

The  economy  is  diversified,  with  a  well-developed  service  sector  and  strong  manufacturing  and 
agriculture  sectors.  Investment  activity  decelerated  slightly  in  2024.  While  efforts  to  boost  human 
capital  and  the  innovation  system  continued,  skills  mismatches  and  insufficient  innovation  persist. 
Economic integration with the EU remained high. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  2024  were  only  partially  implemented.  To  improve 
competitiveness and support long-term growth, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ further tailor education and training to labour market needs, improve the quality of and access to 

vocational education and training, and support the school-to-work transition; 

→  continue  efforts  to  diversify  energy  supplies  and  further  increase  the  share  of  renewables  in  the 

energy mix, while ensuring stability and reliability of the grid;  

→ improve small to medium-sized enterprises’ access to long-term finance. 

Chapter 5: Public procurement 

Türkiye is moderately prepared  in the area of public procurement.  No progress was made in this 
area over the reporting period and significant gaps with the EU acquis remain.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  not  implemented,  and  therefore  remain 
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  revise  its  public  procurement  legislation  to  further  align  it  with  the  EU  acquis,  including  on 

utilities, concessions and public-private partnerships, and to increase transparency; 

→ reduce the excessive use of the negotiated procedure and improve instruments to evaluate contract 
performance  and  benchmark  the  effectiveness  of  public  procurement  procedures  and  contract 
management; 

→ repeal exemptions that are incompatible with the EU  acquis and avoid the use of discriminatory 

domestic price advantages and offset practices. 

Chapter 18: Statistics 

Türkiye is  moderately  prepared on  statistics.  Some  progress  was made,  notably  by  improving  its 
national  accounts,  excessive  deficit  procedure,  and  government  finance  statistics.  The  Turkish 
Statistical  Institute  (TurkStat)  stepped  up  its  efforts  to  further  align  with  the  new  requirements  for 
short-term  business  statistics.  The  preparations  for  the  agricultural  census  also  advanced.  However, 
Türkiye needs to increase the credibility of TurkStat and strengthen public trust in official statistics. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ establish transparent, professional criteria for the appointment of the President of TurkStat and any 
grounds for dismissal, to strengthen the professional and scientific independence of TurkStat; 

→ continue work to align national accounts with the European System of Accounts (ESA 2010) and 
the requirements of the ESA 2010 transmission programme, including amplified efforts to remove 
the flags preventing the publication of data; 

→ further improve statistics on agriculture (including completion of the agricultural census) and on 

migration and asylum. 

Chapter 32: Financial control 

Türkiye  has  a  good level of  preparation  on  financial  control.  It  made  no  progress throughout  the 
reporting  period.  The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  not  implemented,  and 
therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

7 

 
 
 
→ organise a new round of public expenditure and financial accountability to assess the performance 
of the current public finance management, update the public internal financial control policy paper 
and  the  related  action  plan,  and  help  prepare  a  comprehensive  public  financial  management 
strategy; 

→ develop and adopt a national anti-fraud strategy; 

→  review the arrangements for including municipalities and state-owned enterprises in the treasury 

single account. 

CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET 

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods 

Türkiye has a good level of preparation on the free movement of goods. Some progress was made 
in  aligning  with  the  EU  acquis,  particularly  under  the  ‘old  approach’  and  the  ‘new  and  global 
approach’  to  product  legislation.  Türkiye  removed  some  technical  barriers  to  trade  in  the  reporting 
period. Yet, there are remaining unjustified checks for EU products and requirements discriminating 
against EU products, in breach of Türkiye’s obligations under the Customs Union. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  continue to eliminate the remaining non-tariff barriers to the free movement of goods that are in 
breach of Customs Union obligations, with particular attention to the priority barriers discussed in 
the context of the July 2025 High-Level Dialogue on Trade; 

→  review the remaining schemes setting local content requirements; 

→  increase  the  coverage  and  effectiveness  of  market  surveillance  measures,  particularly  in  e-

commerce. 

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers 

Türkiye  remains  at  an  early  stage  of  preparation  on  the  freedom  of  movement  for  workers.  No 
progress was made during the reporting period. 

The Commission’s recommendation from last year was not implemented, and therefore remains valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  prepare  legislation  and  administrative  practices  in  view  of  joining  the  European  Employment 

Services (EURES) network; 

→  align national legislation with EU acquis on access for EU citizens to the labour market. 

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 

Türkiye  remains  at  an  early  stage  of  preparation  on  the  right  of  establishment  and  freedom  to 
provide services. No progress was made during the reporting period. Overall, substantial efforts are 
still required to achieve alignment in this area. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  not  implemented,  and  therefore  remain 
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:  

→  align national legislation with the Services Directive and set up a point of single contact; 

→  continue to align its legislation in the area of postal services with the EU acquis; 

→  align national legislation with the EU acquis on mutual recognition of professional qualifications, 

including the Professional Qualifications Directive and the Proportionality Test Directive. 

8 

 
 
 
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital 

Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of free movement of capital. Some progress was made 
during the reporting period. Building on recent reforms intended to enable the country’s removal from 
the  Financial  Action  Task  Force’s  (FATF)  grey  list,  Türkiye  continued  to  strengthen  its  legal 
framework  and  administrative  capacity  for  combating  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing. 
While  limited  steps  were  taken  on  foreign  ownership  and  capital  movements,  limitations  persist  in 
numerous sectors. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  minimise limitations on foreign ownership and capital movements; 

→  further  align  with  the  FATF  recommendations  and  the  EU  acquis  by  strengthening  the  legal 
framework  and  administrative  capacity  to  more  effectively  prevent  money  laundering  and  the 
financing of terrorism. 

Chapter 6: Company law 

Türkiye is well advanced on company law. Limited progress was made during the reporting period 
by adopting accounting principles for the measurement and classification of crypto assets.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  further align its national legislation with the EU acquis on shareholder rights on encouragement of 

long-term shareholder engagement and cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions; 

→  put arrangements in place for company reporting, including corporate sustainability reporting and 

disclosure of income tax information (country-by-country reporting); 

→  take steps to align its legislation with the EU acquis to improve gender balance among directors 

of listed companies and take related measures. 

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law 

Türkiye has a  good level of preparation on intellectual property law.  Limited progress was made 
during  the  reporting  period.  There  are  still  some  legislative  discrepancies  as  well  as  outstanding 
problems with implementation and enforcement, notably in relation to judicial procedures. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  improve enforcement measures to efficiently fight intellectual property right (IPR) infringements, 
including online sales of counterfeit and pirated goods, improve the level of IPR specialisation of 
judges, and resolve difficulties in the judicial procedures to obtain search and seizure warrants for 
criminal law enforcement; 

→  further  improve  cooperation  with  IPR  holders  for  efficient  implementation  and  effective 
enforcement,  particularly  in  cases  involving  accelerated  and  simplified  destruction  procedures 
applied by the judiciary and customs authorities; 

→  ensure the collection and processing of accurate statistical data, especially on the effective judicial 
enforcement  of  intellectual  and  industrial  property  rights,  to  better  analyse  systemic  IPR 
shortcomings. 

Chapter 8: Competition policy 

Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  on  competition  policy.  No  progress  was  made  during  the 
reporting period. Concerns remain in the area of State aid.  

9 

 
 
The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  not  implemented,  and  therefore  remain 
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  ensure the independence and functionality of the State aid institutional framework in accordance 

with the EU acquis; 

→  implement the State aid law by adopting implementing legislation without further delay; 

→  make available a transparent and up-to-date inventory of all aid schemes. 

Chapter 9: Financial services 

Türkiye has a good level of preparation on financial services. Limited progress was made during 
the reporting period, in particular by further unwinding the disruptive macroprudential and regulatory 
measures in the financial sector. Türkiye took some steps to promote investments in venture capital 
companies and strengthen the legal framework for crypto assets. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain largely valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  increase efforts to align its legislation with the revised Capital Requirements Regulation, Capital 

Requirements Directive and Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive; 

→  further phase out the distortive macroprudential measures and simplify the regulatory framework; 

→  further  align  its  legislation  with  the  EU  acquis  related  to  capital  markets  and  financial  market 

infrastructures, and ensure their proper supervision. 

Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection 

Türkiye has a good level of preparation on consumer and health protection. Limited progress was 
made during the reporting period, notably by strengthening its surveillance system for health services 
and  tackling  serious  cross-border  health  threats,  as  well  as  on  the  de-institutionalisation  of  mental 
health services. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  strengthen consumer rights enforcement, and further improve coordination and cooperation with 
the consumer movement and with enforcement bodies; increase awareness-raising activities, take 
more  measures  on  infringements  in  the  digital  environment,  and  introduce  more  measures  to 
support vulnerable consumers; 

→  strengthen  its  primary  healthcare  services  by  providing  sufficient  resources  for  public  health 
emergencies  risk  assessment  and  risk  management  at  central  and  provincial  levels,  and  by 
boosting its workforce and administrative capacity for preparedness and response to disasters; 

→  start preparing to align its legislation with the new EU Regulation on substances of human origin. 

CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH 

Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media 

Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  on  digital  transformation  and  media.  Some  progress  was 
made during the reporting period. Türkiye recorded progress on e-commerce and e-governance, and 
adopted the 2030 Technology and Industry Strategy and a cybersecurity strategy and action plan.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented, particularly as 
regards  cybersecurity  and  5G,  and  therefore  remain  valid.  In  the  coming  year,  Türkiye  should  in 
particular: 

10 

 
 
 
→  align its universal service, authorisation arrangements, and rules on market access and rights of 

way in electronic communications with the EU acquis; 

→  align  its  cybersecurity  framework  with  EU  cybersecurity  standards,  including  with  the 

NIS 2 Directive and the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox;  

→  strengthen  the  independence  of  the  regulatory  authority  and  its  board  members,  and  amend  the 
internet law in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations to ensure media pluralism; 
and take steps to strengthen the public broadcaster’s independence. 

Chapter 16: Taxation 

Türkiye is moderately prepared on taxation. No progress was made over the reporting period.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  not  implemented,  and  therefore  remain 
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  enable  the  automatic  exchange  of  tax  information  with  all  EU  Member  States  according  to 

international standards; 

→  continue  to  align  its  legislation  on  value  added  tax  and  excise  duties,  notably  the  range  of 

excisable energy products, with the EU acquis; 

→  continue  to  fight  against  the  informal  economy,  and  report  on  progress  transparently  using  key 

performance indicators. 

Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy 

Türkiye has some level of preparation on economic and monetary policy. Good progress was made 
during the reporting period, notably by taking measures to support the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism  and  presenting  a  more  realistic  macroeconomic  framework.  Türkiye  also  made 
improvements in data quality and timeliness of reporting under the excessive deficit procedure. 

The Commission's recommendations from last year were partially implemented, and therefore remain 
mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  safeguard the independence of the central bank; 

→  further  simplify  the  monetary  policy  framework  under  a  transparent  monetary  policy,  while 

maintaining financial stability. 

Chapter 19: Social policy and employment 

Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  on  social  policy  and  employment.  No  progress  was  made 
over  the  reporting  period.  Concerns  remain  regarding  discrimination  in  employment,  trade  union 
rights, persistent levels of informal employment, with the Roma community particularly affected, the 
labour market gender gap, and income inequalities.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye 
should in particular:  

→  take steps to  align  with  the  EU  acquis  on non-discrimination  based  on  racial and  ethnic  origin, 
religion  and  belief,  disability,  age  and  sexual  orientation,  equal  opportunities  in  the  workplace, 
work-life balance, and pay transparency. 

→  remove  obstacles  that  limit  the  unionisation  and  collective  bargaining  rights  by  using  social 

dialogue mechanisms effectively; 

→  tackle  challenges  to  health  and  safety  at  work,  particularly  in  relation  to  fatal  incidents  in  the 

construction sector and among platform workers and young apprentices; 

→  increase the formal employment rate of women and young people by expanding affordable care 

11 

 
 
services and adopting more substantial and more effective active labour market programmes. 

Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  on  enterprise  and  industrial  policy.  Limited  progress  was  made 
during the reporting period by adopting a new strategy document and conducting impact assessments 
of  a  few  support  schemes.  Concerns  persist  regarding  the  compatibility  of  public  procurement 
practices  with  EU  industrial  policy  principles,  the  lack  of  transparency  in  State-aid  for  large 
investments, and the sizeable informal economy. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  remove  public  procurement  price  premiums  that  are  incompatible  with  EU  industrial  policy 

principles, and substitute them with measures that encourage innovation; 

→  publish the amounts distributed under the industry support programme as well as the results of the 

industrial strategies from previous periods; 

→  continue assessing the impact of the SME support framework to reduce gaps and overlaps. 

Chapter 25: Science and research 

Türkiye  is  well  advanced  on  science  and  research.  Good  progress  was  made  during  the  reporting 
period, notably linked to participation in Horizon Europe and continued actions to raise awareness of 
and increase capacity for the programme. There is active and expanding cooperation between the EU 
and  Türkiye  on  research  and  innovation  underlined  by  the  improved  ranking  of  Türkiye  in  the 
European Innovation Scoreboard. 

The  Commission’s  recommendation  from  last  year  was  only  partially  implemented,  and  therefore 
remains valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:  

→  step up efforts to boost innovation to ensure continuous improvements to the European Innovation 

Scoreboard rankings. 

Chapter 26: Education and culture 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  on  education  and  culture.  Some  progress  was  made  during  the 
reporting period, notably regarding the vocational education and national qualifications systems. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  further  improve  inclusive  education,  with  a  particular  focus  on  girls  and  children  from 
disadvantaged  groups  including  Roma,  and  closely  monitor  and  continue  work  to  reduce  the 
proportion of school dropouts; 

→  ensure  the  good  functioning  of  the  Turkish  Qualifications  Framework  and  the  Turkish  Higher 

Education Quality Council; 

→  continue  taking  steps  to  implement  the  2005  UNESCO  Convention  on  the  Protection  and 

Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 

Chapter 29: Customs Union 

Türkiye maintains a good level of preparation on the Customs Union. No progress was made during 
the reporting period. Duty relief, free zones and the surveillance scheme are still not fully aligned with 
the EU acquis, and are in breach of the Customs Union rules. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye 
should in particular: 

12 

 
 
→  step  up  efforts  to  fully  align  new  legislation  with  the  EU  Customs  Code  and  bring  risk-based 

controls and simplified procedures in line with the EU acquis; 

→  strengthen  controls  and  cooperation  with  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF)  in 
administrative investigations, e.g. in cases of transhipment or simple transformation of goods in 
the country that could lead to false declaration of origin of goods at import into the EU; 

→  continue to eliminate import and export restrictions as well as additional duties on goods in free 

circulation in the EU-Turkey Customs Union. 

CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY 

Chapter 14: Transport policy 

Türkiye remains moderately prepared on transport policy. Limited progress was made during the 
reporting  period,  particularly  regarding  sustainable  transport  strategies  and  sectoral  legislative 
adjustments. Türkiye’s general compliance with the EU transport acquis still presents gaps, notably in 
road safety, rail liberalisation, maritime safety, and multimodal transport facilitation. The provision of 
subsidies to the incumbent railway operator continued at an increasing pace.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  consider measures for effective monitoring, along with potential feasibility schemes to support the 

uptake of new and green technologies for alternative fuels in Türkiye; 

→  consider  establishing  tools  and  capacity  building  at  private  and  public  level  for  transport 

decarbonisation, starting with aviation and maritime transport, and set interim targets; 

→  finalise and publish its first white paper on sustainable urban mobility planning, including disaster 
aspects,  as  part  of  the  ongoing  work  on  the  sustainable  urban  mobility  plans,  while  improving 
policy dialogue and increasing coordination between local and central authorities. 

Chapter 15: Energy 

Türkiye is moderately prepared on energy. Limited progress was made during the reporting period, 
with the roll-out of renewable energy and energy efficiency as well as further diversification of energy 
sources.  Local  content  requirement  practices  in  the  renewable  energy  sector  remain  in  place. 
Türkiye’s legislative changes related to the natural gas market do not yet ensure compatibility with the 
EU’s  third  energy  package.  Energy  dependency  on  Russia  continued.  Türkiye  continued  to  make 
efforts on the legislative alignment of nuclear safety regulations. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  deepen  natural  gas  market  reform  by  setting  up  a  legally  binding  plan  and  a  timetable  for 
unbundling  activities  to  ensure  consistency  with  the  natural  gas  market  law  and  the  EU’s  third 
energy  package  of  2009  and  its update, the  EU’s  hydrogen  and  gas  decarbonisation  package  of 
2024;  

→  transition to non-price measures to tackle energy poverty and provide economic relief to eligible 
households,  in  order  to  restore  market-based  retail  pricing  and  remove  disincentives  to  energy 
efficiency gains; 

→  complete the legislative alignment with Euratom acquis, and address the recommendations from 

the stress tests on the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. 

Chapter 21: Trans-European networks 

13 

 
 
 
Türkiye  is  well  advanced  on  trans-European  networks.  Limited  progress  was  made  during  the 
reporting period. On transport networks, Türkiye continued to advance projects that contribute to the 
extension  of  the  comprehensive  trans-European  transport  networks  to  its  territory,  and  the 
construction of the Halkalı-Kapıkule railway advanced. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  create a transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory gas transit framework in line with the 

EU acquis; 

→  take concrete steps to mobilise investments for Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge railway connections 
while increasing the rail capacity of the Marmaray tunnel and optimising freight operations; 

→  accelerate  action  to  align  with  key  pieces  of  the  EU  acquis  to  facilitate  alignment  in  the  trans-

European networks. 

Chapter 27: Environment and climate change 

Türkiye has some level of preparation on environment and made some progress over the reporting 
period. Türkiye took some steps on industrial emissions and waste management. On climate change, 
Türkiye  adopted  the  2053  Long-Term  Climate  Strategy  and  a  climate  law  setting  up  an  emissions 
trading system. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  ensure that environmental standards are met when building back better in the earthquake-affected 
areas,  in  particular  by  fully  implementing  the  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Directive  and 
other horizontal environmental legislation, and ensure that protection from exposure to asbestos in 
the earthquakes affected areas is duly implemented; 

→  complete  alignment  with  the  Directives  on  industrial  emissions,  water  and  waste  as  well  as  on 

nature protection and air quality; 

→  complete its alignment with the EU acquis on climate action, notably but not limited to emission 
trading, and submit a more ambitious Nationally Determined Contribution  to the UNFCCC. 

CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION 

Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development 

Türkiye has some level of preparation on agriculture and rural development. Limited progress was 
made in the reporting period. Türkiye’s agricultural support policy continued to move away from the 
principles  of  the  EU  common  agricultural  policy.  Notable  improvements  were  made  on  the 
implementation of the EU Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for Rural Development (IPARD), 
with an increased national financial contribution and a significant absorption of funds. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented,  and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  align legislation to the EU acquis, notably on the agricultural support policy; 

→  set up a farm sustainability data network and an integrated administration and control system; 

→  pursue the opening and transparent management of import quotas for beef and live bovine animals 

on a lasting basis. 

Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 

14 

 
 
 
Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  on  food  safety,  veterinary  and  phytosanitary  policy.  No 
progress  was  made  over  the  reporting  period.  Full  implementation  of  the  EU  acquis  in  this  area 
requires significant further work. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  not  implemented,  and  therefore  remain 
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  upgrade producing food, feed and animal by-products to meet EU structural standards, notably for 

raw milk; 

→  meet EU maximum limits for pesticide residues, and effectively address recurrent shortcomings; 

→  integrate the EU’s One Health approach into the zoonosis control system. 

Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture 

Türkiye is moderately prepared on fisheries and aquaculture. Some progress was made, notably on 
resources and fleet management, and on inspection and controls.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  further  improve  data  collection  and  sharing  to  support  scientific advice for sustainable fisheries 

management in line with EU law; 

→  step up efforts to align its market policy with EU rules, in particular on the criteria governing the 

recognition and roles of professional organisations; 

→  accelerate alignment of monitoring, control, enforcement, surveillance and inspection of fisheries 
in  the  Mediterranean  Sea  with  European  standards,  and  strengthen  efforts  to  combat  illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. 

Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  on  regional  policy  and  coordination  of  structural  instruments.  No 
progress was made during the reporting period.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Türkiye 
should in particular: 

→  ensure the proper functioning of local democracy and more balanced regional development; 

→  improve the monitoring of ongoing operations under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
(IPA  II),  and  accelerate  implementation  under  IPA  III  with  high-quality  results  and  avoiding 
decommitments; 

→  address over-centralisation and structural weaknesses in regional policy implementation. 

Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions 

Türkiye has some level of preparation on financial and budgetary provisions. No progress was made 
over the reporting period.  

The Commission’s recommendation from last year was  not met, and therefore remains valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  further align the gross national income inventory with Eurostat’s GNI Inventory Guide. 

CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS 

Chapter 30: External relations 

15 

 
 
 
Türkiye is moderately prepared on external relations. Limited progress was made in the reporting 
period. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  not  implemented,  and  therefore  remain 
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  fully realign the customs tariff with the Common Customs Tariff; 

→  complete alignment with the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences and dual-use export control 

regime; 

→  align its (future revised) national legislation on the screening of foreign investments with the EU 

foreign direct investments (FDI) Screening Regulation 2019/452. 

Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy 

Türkiye has some level of preparation on common foreign, security and defence policy, and made 
limited  progress. While  showing little  political  will to  harmonise  its foreign  policy  with  the  EU’s, 
Türkiye  appeared  more  open  to  substantive  exchanges  with  the  EU  on  foreign  policy  and  regional 
issues.  In  this  regard,  a  number  of  EU-Türkiye  foreign  and  regional  policy  dialogues  and 
consultations  took  place  during  the  reporting  period.  Türkiye  did  not  demonstrate  willingness  to 
improve  its  alignment  with  the  EU’s  common  foreign  and  security  policy  (CFSP).  Absence  of  any 
effort to improve alignment contravenes Türkiye’s proclaimed strategic goal of joining the EU.  

Türkiye  continued  to  implement  an  active  and  multi-layered  foreign  policy.  Increasing  geopolitical 
challenges  underscored  Türkiye’s  strategic  regional  role  and  highlighted  the  shared  interest  and 
responsibility of the EU and Türkiye to address common challenges.  

As regards Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye continued to highlight its facilitation 
and potential mediation role, as underpinned by hosting direct talks between Russia and Ukraine  in 
Istanbul  in  May,  June  and  July  2025.  Türkiye  consistently  does  not  align  with  the  EU’s  restrictive 
measures against Russia; however, it has made steps to prevent the circumvention of sanctions against 
Russia via Turkish territory, delivering some results. 

On the Middle East peace process, Türkiye aligns with the EU’s position on the need to relaunch the 
political  process  in  order  to  implement  the  two-state  solution,  and  participates  in  the  ‘Global 
Coalition’ for its implementation. The Turkish position on certain issues – such as Hamas, which is 
considered a legitimate political interlocutor by Ankara – cannot be reconciled with the EU’s position, 
which  clearly  labels  Hamas  as  a  terrorist  organisation.  Türkiye  constructively  contributed  to 
mediation  efforts  in  the  Gaza  ceasefire  and  participated  in  the  Gaza  peace  summit  in  Sharm  El-
Sheikh,  co-signing  the  declaration  on  13  October  2025.  On  Syria,  following  the  fall  of  the  Assad 
regime  in  December  2024,  Türkiye  increased  its  leverage  over  developments  in  the  country 
significantly. Türkiye engaged heavily with stakeholders to support the transition, strongly advocating 
the  lifting  of  EU  and  US  sanctions.  Türkiye  maintained  a  strategic  partnership  with  China,  seeking 
opportunities to  strengthen  economic and investment links, increase bilateral trade and reduce trade 
imbalances, while also engaging in consultations on major regional and global issues.  

Under  the  common  security  and  defence  policy,  Türkiye  continued  to  actively  participate  in  and 
substantially contribute to EU crisis management missions and operations.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations from last  year were  only  partially  implemented, and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:  

→  urgently and significantly improve alignment with the High Representative’s statements on behalf 

of the EU and relevant Council decisions on sanctions;  

→  continue  its  efforts  to detect and  prevent circumvention  of restrictive measures,  in  particular  on 
advanced technology items used for military purposes by Russia; extend its measures to prevent 
re-export the economically critical goods; and address risks linked with Russia’s ‘Shadow Fleet’ 
in terms of maritime and environmental safety; 

16 

 
 
→  continue to  engage  in  a  more  structured  and  frequent  political  dialogue  on  foreign  and  security 
policy  with  the  EU  and  seek  collaboration  on  convergent  interests  while  working  on  reducing 
divergences. 

2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS 

*** 

2.1.  FUNCTIONING  OF 
DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS 
PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
REFORM  

AND 

2.1.1. Democracy 

functioning 

The 
of 
democratic 
Türkiye’s 
institutions  continued  to  be 
severely 
hampered. 
Democratic 
backsliding 
resumed  on  critical  issues, 
particularly  the  rule  of  law 
and  local  governance.  The 
structural  flaws  of  the  presidential  system,  and  the  insufficient  separation  of  powers  between  the 
executive and the judiciary remained unaddressed, while adherence to basic democratic processes was 
put into question. 

Elections 

The  general  framework  of  the  elections  largely  ensures  free  choice  between  alternative  political 
options  but  does  not  provide  a  level  playing  field  for  all  political  stakeholders.  Excessive  judicial 
pressure  on  opposition  politicians  limited  their  freedom  to  operate,  organise,  and  participate  in  the 
political process without fear of repression, thereby undermining fundamental democratic principles. 
In  March  2025,  the  mayor  of  Istanbul  and  the  presumptive  presidential  candidate  of  the  opposition 
was arrested along with many others, including Republican People’s Party (CHP) district mayors and 
senior  municipal  officials  on  charges  of  alleged  corruption.  A  university  invalidated  the  mayor’s 
diploma, which was issued 30 years ago. This decision would prevent him from running for president, 
as  the  position  requires  candidates  to  hold  a  university  degree.  He  is  appealing  the  decision.  No 
elections were held in the reporting period. 

The shortcomings identified in the legal framework governing elections and political parties were 
not  addressed.  Türkiye  has  not  yet  acted  upon  the  recommendations  put  forward  by  the  Office  for 
Democratic  Institutions  and  Human  Rights  of  the  Organization  for  Security  and  Co-operation  in 
Europe and the Venice Commission. 

Parliament 

The  President  continues  to  retain  far-reaching  powers  over  a  wide  range  of  policy  issues,  limiting 
Parliament’s functions. The frequent and continued use of presidential decrees and decisions restricted 
Parliament’s  legislative  function.  Opposition  parties  had  limited  power  to  shape  the  agenda  of 
legislative debates. 

Parliamentary  oversight  of  the  executive  remains  very  weak.  Members  of  Parliament  (MPs)  may 
submit  written  questions  to  the  Vice-President  and  Ministers,  but  not  to  the  President.  Moreover, 
standard presidential decrees fall outside the remit of parliamentary scrutiny, despite their significant 

17 

 
 
impact  on  public  policy.  The  Venice  Commission  emphasised  the  urgent  need  to  strengthen  the 
legislature’s oversight of public spending. 

Political pluralism continued to erode due to judicial and administrative actions targeting opposition 
parties  and  their  representatives.  The  Republican  People’s  Party  (CHP)  faced  a  steep  increase  in 
criminal  investigations  and  lawsuits  against  its  mayors  and  members,  contributing  to  a  climate  of 
intimidation  against  the  political  opposition.  Despite  a  binding  ruling  by  the  European  Court  of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) calling for their immediate release, several former lawmakers from the pro-
Kurdish  Peoples’  Democratic  Party  (HDP),  including  two  former  co-chairs,  remain  incarcerated. 
Moreover, the Constitutional Court ruling calling for the release of one of the detained defendants in 
the Gezi trial, who had been elected as an MP, is yet to be implemented. Meanwhile, the closure case 
against  the  HDP,  based  on  terrorism-related  accusations  and  seeking  a  political  ban  on  451  party 
members,  continues  before  the  Constitutional  Court.  The  pro-Kurdish  Peoples'  Equality  and 
Democracy Party (DEM) HDP’s political successor, continued facing increasing pressure with several 
thousand party members being detained and several hundred were arrested pending trial.  

Restrictions  on  public  gatherings  were  used  selectively  to  prevent  political  action  by  opposition 
parties.  

Although  female  representation  in  Parliament  has  reached  a  historic  peak,  women  remain 
significantly under-represented in decision-making and political life.  

Governance 

Under  the  current  presidential  system,  Parliament  lacks  access  to  mechanisms  for  holding  the 
executive  accountable,  such  as  motions  of  confidence  or  oral  question  time.  The  President  has  far-
reaching  powers  of  appointment,  execution  and  policymaking,  while  presidential  political 
accountability is limited primarily to the electoral process. The executive’s influence over the public 
administration,  the  judiciary,  and  security  institutions  remains  extensive.  The  President  retains  the 
authority  to  appoint  the  leadership  and  board  members  of  most  key  institutions  and  regulatory 
agencies.  The  public  sector  remains  marked by  politicisation.  The recommendations  outlined  in the 
Venice Commission’s 2017 opinion on Türkiye’s presidential system are yet to be addressed. 

On  local  self-governance,  the  government’s  pressure  on  opposition  mayors  escalated,  including 
through  administrative,  financial  and  judicial  means.  The  use  of  pressure  tools,  such  as  the 
appointment  of  trustees  or  the  selective  seizure  of  financial  assets  of  opposition  municipalities, 
culminated in the arrest of the mayor of Istanbul in March 2025. Between  1 September 2024 and 1 
September  2025,  judicial  investigations  were  launched  across  Türkiye  against  several  opposition-
controlled municipalities, with suspensions of mayors as well as detentions and arrests of political and 
administrative personnel. Allegations included membership of terrorist organisations, corruption, and 
illicit  financial  activities.  A  total  of  28  mayors  from  opposition  parties  –  18  from  the  CHP  and  10 
from the DEM – were arrested and removed from office, with some of them accused of supporting a 
terrorist organisation due to an informal political agreement between  the  CHP and  the  DEM before 
the  March  2024  local  elections.  In  11  cases,  mayors  were  replaced  with  trustees,  while  in  four 
municipalities, the assemblies could elect a new acting mayor. In March 2025, the Congress of Local 
and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe criticised the practice of replacing democratically 
elected mayors with government-appointed trustees. It also noted signs of deterioration of the working 
conditions of local and regional elected representatives, while it considered the dismissals, arrests and 
prosecutions  of  opposition  mayors  on  grounds  of  terrorism  and  corruption  as  contributing  to  the 
weakening of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law in Türkiye. The Congress took the view that 
the arrest of the mayor of Istanbul bore the hallmarks of political pressure. 

EU integration 

Türkiye  has  put  in  place  institutional  structures  to  manage  the  accession  process  effectively.  The 
Directorate for EU Affairs and its network of focal points within line ministries is adequately staffed. 
The Directorate cooperates effectively with the EU Delegation and has a communication department 

18 

 
 
responsible for communication on EU enlargement and reforms supported by the Instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance. 

Civil society 

Civil  society  organisations  –  especially  those  dealing  with  women’s  rights,  LGBTIQ  issues, 
environmental protection and human rights – continued to face growing pressure, including by means 
of  systematic  administrative  harassment  and  judicial  prosecutions.  Human  rights  defender  Osman 
Kavala and his four co-defendants in the Gezi trial remained in prison, despite a ruling by the ECtHR 
and  numerous  resolutions  adopted  by  the  Council  of  Europe  Committee  of  Ministers  urging  his 
immediate release. New judicial proceedings were launched against journalists and other individuals 
for  their  alleged  participation  in  Gezi  protests,  12 years  after  the  events.  The  Istanbul  Bar 
Association’s chairperson and executives faced dismissal and prison sentences on charges of ‘making 
propaganda for a terrorist organisation’ and ‘spreading false information’.  

Only  a  very  limited  number  of  CSOs  benefit  from  public  funds,  which  are  distributed  in  a 
discriminatory manner. Heavy taxation hampers the functioning and development of foundations and 
associations.  CSOs  receiving  funding  from  foreign  donors  were  subjected  to  frequent  audits. 
Moreover, CSOs and independent media outlets supported financially by foreign sources were often 
targeted with hateful rhetoric and slander by pro-government media. 

Public consultations of independent CSOs on new legislation and policies remained very limited and 
ineffective. Overall, the political, legal, financial and administrative hurdles that prevent civil society 
in Türkiye from operating effectively remained unchanged. 

Civilian oversight of the security forces 

The  President  and  the  government  exercise  substantial  control  over  the  country’s  security  forces. 
Genuine  democratic  oversight  remains  weak  due  to  limited  public  accountability  and  inadequate 
parliamentary  oversight.  Security  institutions  have  reportedly  become  increasingly  politicised, 
undermining  their  professionalism  and  independence.  Strengthening  inter-party  parliamentary 
oversight  of  security  and  intelligence  bodies  is  a  key  reform  priority.  Parliamentary  oversight  and 
follow-up  regarding  the  defence  budget,  expenditures,  and  arms  procurement  remain  limited  and 
ineffective.  Impunity  among  security  forces  remains  widespread,  with  personnel  often  enjoying 
informal legal and administrative protection in cases of alleged human rights violations, excessive use 
of force, and other misconduct. Overall, civilian democratic oversight of the security forces remains 
weak and needs to be strengthened. 

Situation in the east and south-east regions  

An initiative to address the Kurdish issue and end the violence linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK),  designated  as  a  terrorist  organisation  by the EU,  was launched  by  a  ruling coalition  partner 
and  gained  with  broad  political  support.  The  process  is  led  confidentially  by  the  government.  The 
Parliamentary  ‘National  Solidarity,  Brotherhood  and  Democracy  Committee’,  including  members 
from major political parties, was established in August to oversee PKK disarmament process and to 
conduct  preparatory  consultations  on  reforms  required  to  address  the  Kurdish  issue.  After  years  of 
prolonged isolation – repeatedly criticised by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention 
of Torture  – the imprisoned PKK  leader was permitted visits from family members and delegations 
from the DEM party, as part of this government-led initiative.  

In  February  2025,  the  PKK’s  leader  publicly  called  for  the  organisation  to  disarm  and  dissolve, 
leading to a unilateral ceasefire in March 2025. In May 2025, at a congress in northern Iraq, the PKK 
officially  ended  its  armed  struggle  and  formally  dissolved  its  organisational  structure.  DEM  party 
representatives met the Turkish President to support democratic solutions. In July 2025, a group of 30 
PKK  militants  symbolically  burned  their  weapons  in  northern  Iraq,  marking  the  start  of  the  PKK’s 
transition  from  armed  struggle  to  political  engagement.  On  26  October,  PKK  announced  it  was 
withdrawing  its  fighters  from  Türkiye  to  northern  Iraq  as  part  of  the  peace  efforts  and  called  on 
Türkiye to help it transit to democratic politics with concrete measures. 

19 

 
 
However, Türkiye continued its domestic and cross-border military operations in northern Syria and 
Iraq against the PKK. On 20 October, the Turkish Parliament passed a three-years mandate extension 
of  the  Turkish  troops  deployed  in  Syria  and  Iraq.  The  security  situation  in  border  areas  remained 
precarious,  marked  by  sporadic  PKK-led  attacks.  In  October  2024,  the  PKK  carried  out  a  deadly 
terrorist attack targeting employees of the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) in Ankara. 

The government has the right and responsibility to combat terrorism. However, it should respect the 
rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Violations of human rights by security forces 
continued  to  be  reported.  Hate  offences  against  Kurds  continued.  The  administrative  remedies  and 
judicial cases in relation to property rights cases in Diyarbakır’s Sur district and the region continued 
in  court.  The  practice  of  applying  a  broad  interpretation  of  terrorism,  and  the  judicial  and 
administrative  pressure  on  journalists,  political  opponents,  bar  associations  and  human  rights 
defenders working on the Kurdish issue, continued. 

Eleven  mayors  in  the  east  and  south-east  were  dismissed  and  replaced  by  state-appointed  trustees. 
These  appointments  triggered  widespread  protests  and  led  to  numerous  detentions,  with  law 
enforcement reportedly using disproportionate force. In response, governorates imposed blanket bans 
on  all  public  gatherings  for  several  days  to  suppress  further  demonstrations.  The  March  2022 
recommendations issued by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe 
regarding local democracy in Türkiye are yet to be implemented. 

In  March  2025,  Newroz  celebrations  took  place  peacefully,  despite  heavy  police  presence  and 
measures against public gatherings. Still, around 200 people were detained in Diyarbakır on Newroz 
day,  and  were  released  the  next  day.  Most  Kurdish-language  media  outlets  and  cultural  rights 
institutions have remained closed since 2016.  

Former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş remained in prison despite the ECtHR rulings and repeated 
calls for his immediate release by human rights organisation and the EU. Many DEM party members, 
representatives  and  mayors,  including  from  large  municipalities,  were  detained  on  terrorism-related 
charges.  The  case  of  the  killing  of  Diyarbakir  Bar  Association  Chair  Tahir  Elçi  reached  the 
Constitutional Court. 

Court  cases  continued  over  government-funded  construction  projects  on  cultural,  historical  and 
religious heritage sites damaged during the 2015 and 2016 military and security operations. There was 
no  comprehensive  approach  to  addressing  the  issue  of  missing  persons,  or  to  independently 
investigating  alleged  extrajudicial  killings  by  security  forces.  So  far,  all  cases  of  enforced 
disappearances  from  the  1990s  before  local  courts  ended  in  acquittals  or  were  dropped  due  to  the 
statute of limitations. The village guard system continued to hinder the return of displaced villagers 
and constituted an impediment to a political resolution of the Kurdish issue. 

Refugees and internally displaced persons 

Türkiye  continues  to  host  one  of  the  largest  refugee  populations  in  the  world.  As  of  August  2025, 
according to official data, Türkiye was hosting 2 508 446 Syrians with temporary protection status, 
and  52 437  Syrians  with  short-term  residence  status.  Türkiye  does  not  regularly  publish  the  total 
number of refugees in the country.  

According to the government, the pace of voluntary returns of Syrians accelerated after the fall of the 
Assad regime in December 2024.  

20 

 
 
the  Turkish 
In  August  2025, 
authorities announced that more than 
450 000 Syrians had returned to their 
country from Türkiye since the fall of 
the  Assad  regime.The  total  number 
of  voluntary  returns  since  2016  has 
reached  1.2  million.  Additionally,  the 
Interior  Ali  Yerlikaya 
Minister  of 
in  May  2025, 
that, 
announced 
Türkiye hosted 172 602 people under 
international 
protection,  mostly 
Afghans, Iraqis, and Iranians. On the 
other  hand,  as of  August  2025  there 
were  1 106  660  foreign  nationals 
holding  residence  permits,  including 
humanitarian 
permit 
holders.  

residence 

schooling, 

Türkiye  continued  to  make  significant  efforts  to  support  refugees  and  ensure  wider  access  to 
although 
healthcare 
and 
registration  hampered 
restrictions  on 
access.  Refugees  (mainly  Syrians  under 
temporary  protection)  continued  to  benefit 
from  free-of-charge  healthcare  services 
provided  in  176  migrant  health  centres, 
nine  container  health  units,  and  Turkish 
hospitals. The capacity of mental health and 
psychosocial support services, reproductive 
health  services,  mobile  health  services  and 
health 
refugees 
services 
improved.  Construction  and  renovation  of 
migrant  health  centres continued.  Effective 
international 
access  of  applicants 
protection 
in 
particular  to  formal employment,  remained 
difficult.  However,  in  October  2024,  Türkiye  allowed  foreigners  under  temporary  protection  or 
holding  humanitarian  residence  permits  to 
be  exempted  from  the  requirement  to 
obtain work permits. 

labour  market, 

literacy 

the 

for 

for 

to 

into 

of  Syrians 

On  refugee  education, 
the  EU-funded 
PIKTES  project  continued  to  support  the 
integration 
formal 
education. The number of refugee children 
enrolled  in  formal  education  in  October 
2024 was 938 610. A significant number of 
refugee  children  –  310  301    –  were  not 
enrolled 
the 
academic  year  2024-2025.  This,  however, 
is  a  reduction  from  405  544  in  2023.  An 
average  of  approximately  1.5  million 
refugees  received  monthly  cash  assistance 
throughout the year 2024.  

formal  education 

in 

in 

21 

 
 
The return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands did not resume. The EU has repeatedly called 
on  Türkiye  to  resume  return  operations  in  line  with  the  commitments  made  under  the  2016  EU-
Turkey Statement. Resettlement of Syrian refugees from Türkiye to EU Member States continued in 
the reporting period, totalling 43 945 by July 2025. 

There was no progress on the situation of internally displaced persons due to violence in the south-
east  region  during  the  1990s  and  in  more  recent  years.  People  displaced  after  the  February  2023 
earthquakes continued to encounter significant challenges. 

2.1.2. Public administration reform 

Strategic framework for public administration reform 

Türkiye  lacks  a  comprehensive  strategy  for  public  administration  and  financial  management 
reform.  As  a  consequence  of  the  heavy  centralisation  of  decision-making  in  the  Presidency, 
coordination among key administrative stakeholders remained weak. Political commitment  to public 
administration  reform  is  lacking.  There  is  no  effective  performance  measurement  and  monitoring 
system based on performance indicators linked to specific targets. 

Policy development and coordination 

Policy  development  and  coordination  mechanisms  need  improvement.  Policymaking  has  become 
very  centralised  under  the  presidential  system,  limiting  inclusive,  participatory  and  evidence-based 
approaches. The Presidency lacks detailed procedural rules for drafting and deciding on policies.  

Under Türkiye’s presidential system, only members of Parliament can introduce legislative proposals. 
In  the  reporting  period,  only  bills  sponsored  by  the  ruling  coalition  were  passed,  due  to  an 
increasingly polarised political climate. This dynamic significantly limits broader participation in the 
legislative process. In addition, Parliament needs to strengthen its capacity for drafting legislation to 
ensure  that  all  laws  adopted  –  regardless  of  their  origin  –  are  evidence-based  and  effectively  serve 
their intended policy objective. 

Administrative  and  political  accountability  is  low.  The  connection  between  policy  planning  and 
budget  allocation  remains  weak. State  institutions  do  not  conduct  regular  evaluations  or  publicly 
report  on  the  implementation  of  major  government  programmes.  As  a  result,  public  oversight  of 
government activities is very limited. 

Public financial management 

While  the  basic  legal  framework  for  public  financial  management  exists,  it  needs  strengthening, 
implementation.  The  Medium-Term  Economic  Programme  is  the 
particularly  in  terms  of 
government’s main planning tool for managing public finances. The annual budget is then prepared 
within this medium-term financial framework. Several sectoral policy and planning documents were 
adopted, but they fall short of offering a strategic reform agenda. 

The efficiency of public finances needs to be improved. Conducting comprehensive and transparent 
expenditure reviews as part of the budget process would help improve the effectiveness of spending. 
A gender-responsive planning and budgeting approach is still lacking. During the reporting period, the 
Presidency  and  the  Ministry  of  Treasury  and  Finance  published  monthly  budget  execution  data. 
Budget  figures  remain  highly  aggregated,  making  detailed  analysis  difficult.  Public  involvement  in 
the budget process is low. Parliamentary oversight of the budget needs to be improved. 

Parliament has limited capacity to thoroughly analyse each audit report. Limited parliamentary control 
over  the  budget  further  undermines  transparency and  effective  oversight.  The  Turkish  State Wealth 
Fund remains largely unaccountable. 

Public service and human resources management 

22 

 
 
The  centralised  system  for  civil  service  human  resources  management  remains  inadequate.  The 
legal framework for civil servants does not ensure neutrality, continuity, or merit-based recruitment 
and  promotion.  This  undermines  the  efficiency  of  public services.  The  selection  process  for  senior 
civil  service  roles  lacks  clear  and  objective  criteria,  making  appointments  prone  to  favouritism  and 
political  influence.  Politicisation  of  the  civil  service,  also  at  managerial  level,  is  concerning. As  of 
July 2025, there were 5 288 449 public employees, making up 16% of total employment. Only about 
35% of public-sector employees are women. 

Accountability of administration 

Administrative  accountability  remains  weak,  with  most  key  government  functions  delegated  to 
appointed ministries under the Presidency. The legal and administrative accountability of ministers is 
limited,  as  their  ultimate  political  accountability  rests  with  the  President.  However,  the  President’s 
accountability  mechanisms  are  equally  weak.  In  particular,  parliamentary  oversight  requires 
significant improvement. 

Supervisory  institutions  like  the  Ombudsman  lack  functional  and  administrative  independence,  and 
thus play a limited role. Internal control and audit bodies lack independence, capacity and autonomy. 
The public’s right to good administration requires more robust oversight structures. Accountability of 
civil  servants  remains  problematic,  as  demonstrated  by  the  few  investigations  related  to  the  2023 
earthquakes.  Prosecution  of  civil  servants  for  negligence  or  misconduct  must  be  authorised  by  the 
relevant  ministries.  This  requirement  delays  cases,  and  very  few  cases  are  authorised.  Broad 
exemptions  to  access-to-information  rules  hinder  transparency.  There  is  no  central  mechanism  for 
proactively disclosing public information. 

Recent tragic events, such as the devastating 2023 earthquakes and the 2025 hotel fire at a ski resort, 
have once again brought attention to the issue of accountability of civil servants who are responsible 
for oversight and authorisation. Legal proceedings against government and municipal officials remain 
slow  or  completely  absent.  One  major  hurdle  to  holding  public  officials  accountable  is  the 
requirement to obtain a special permission by the Ministry of Interior to prosecute, which is almost 
always refused. 

Service delivery to persons and businesses 

Service delivery to persons and businesses needs to be improved. While public services are generally 
accessible,  significant  gaps  remain  in  both  their  quality  and  availability.  Türkiye  lacks  a  general 
administrative  procedure  law,  which  makes  it  difficult  to  ensure  adherence  to  good  administrative 
practices. There is no central policy or coordination mechanism to improve service quality across the 
board. Nonetheless, progress was made in expanding e-services through the e-Government Gateway. 

2.2.   RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS  

2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 

The  EU’s  founding  values  include  the  rule  of  law  and  respect  for  human  rights.  A  robust 
(independent, high-quality and efficient) judiciary and a strong commitment to fighting corruption are 
essential, as is respect for fundamental rights, both in legislation and practice.  

Functioning of the judiciary 

Strategic documents 

In January 2025,  Türkiye adopted  the Judicial Reform Strategy (JRS) for 2025-2029, and a judicial 
reform package in November 2024, but these documents fail to address critical shortcomings in the 
judiciary.  The  authorities  do  not  acknowledge  key  issues  of  concern,  such  as  the  lack  of  judicial 

23 

 
 
 
limiting 

the 
further 
independence, 
potential for meaningful reform. A lack 
of  proper  consultation  during 
the 
drafting  process  also  undermines  the 
effectiveness of these documents.   

Management bodies 

The judicial management bodies are in 
place,  but  no  progress  was  made  in 
addressing the lack of independence of 
the  High  Council  of  Judges  and 
Prosecutors  (HSK),  Türkiye’s  highest 
judicial  administrative  body.  None  of 
the  judicial  members  are  elected  by 
their peers. The strong influence of the executive in appointing HSK members continues to undermine 
the  judiciary’s  autonomy.  Members  of  the  HSK  do  not  enjoy  security  of  tenure  and  functional 
immunity, which are key safeguards of their independence. The President of the HSK, who is also the 
Minister  of  Justice,  is  not  elected  by  HSK  members  and  enjoys  very  broad  powers,  particularly 
regarding inspections and investigations of judges and prosecutors. The decisions of the HSK cannot 
be  subject  to  judicial  review,  thus  preventing  an  independent  body  from  assessing  the  fairness  and 
legality of its decisions. 

Independence and impartiality 

The  independence  and  impartiality  of  the  judiciary  needs  to  be  improved  in  the  higher-level  courts 
and is problematic in the courts of first instance. 

Despite  constitutional  guarantees  of  judicial  independence  and  the  separation  of  powers, significant 
challenges persist due to executive influence on the HSK. In many instances, lower courts continue to 
ignore  or  delay  the  implementation  of  Constitutional  Court  rulings.  These  shortcomings  remained 
unaddressed in either the new JRS or the recently adopted legislation. Politicisation remains a major 
concern,  with  senior  government  officials  frequently  interfering  in  ongoing  cases  by  publicly 
criticising  defendants  and  indicating 
members  of  opposition  parties  as 
potential  suspects.  Such  actions  exert 
undue 
and 
prosecutors, compromising their ability 
to perform their duties impartially. 

pressure 

judges 

on 

judiciary  continues 

target 
to 
The 
opposition  figures, 
journalists,  civil 
society,  and  human  rights  defenders, 
often relying on vague legal definitions 
that 
discriminatory 
interpretations.  The  failure  to  address 
these issues in the JRS raises questions 
about  the  political  will  to  improve  the 
rule of law. High-profile cases, such as the arrest of the mayor of Istanbul who is also the presumptive 
presidential  candidate  of  the  opposition,  have  deepened  concerns  about  the  independence  of  the 
judiciary.  

enable 

No progress was made to improve transparency in the selection, recruitment and promotion of judges 
and  prosecutors.  The  Ministry  of  Justice  continues  to  oversee  selection  boards  for  new  judges  and 
prosecutors. Moreover, judges are frequently removed from cases or transferred without their consent, 
particularly when their rulings conflict with government interests. The lack of clarity in the case file 
distribution system can give rise to questions on impartiality of the process. 

24 

 
 
Accountability 

The accountability of the judiciary did not improve. The effectiveness and the transparency of asset 
declarations  by  the  judiciary  needs  to  be  improved.  Despite  public  allegations  of  corruption  in  the 
judiciary,  no  information  is  available  on  the  investigation  and  the  follow-up  to  such  allegations. 
Judges and prosecutors are required by law to declare their assets upon assuming office, every five 
years, and upon leaving  office. Although the legal framework is strong, its practical enforcement is 
limited  due  to  lack  of  oversight  and  inconsistent  disciplinary  procedures.  There  is  also  no  publicly 
available  information  on  sanctions 
applied  to  non-compliant  or  corrupt 
individuals, highlighting the need for 
strengthened  oversight  and  greater 
judicial 
transparency 
accountability. 

ensure 

to 

Quality of justice 

The  quality  of  justice  needs  to  be 
improved.  

Indictments frequently lack thorough 
legal  reasoning  and  solid  evidence, 
resulting  in  prolonged  proceedings 
that  undermine  public  confidence  in 
the judiciary. These inadequacies are rooted in vague and broad legal texts, which grant prosecutors 
and  courts  wide  discretion  in  interpreting  laws.  This  has  also  created  a  pattern  of  discriminatory 
application of the law, with selective targeting of opposition figures and critical voices in general. The 

omnibus law adopted in February 2025, which allows the 
Savings  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  of  Türkiye  (TMSF)  to 
appoint trustees to private companies, raises concerns as it 
allows  public  authorities  to  intervene  in  private  companies,  creating  a  climate  of  intimidation  to 
suppress  dissent  and  silence  independent  voices.  As  part  of  the  corruption  investigation  into  the 
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, the TMSF appointed trustees to 24 companies belonging to some 
of the 101 suspects, including the mayor of Istanbul. 

The Justice Academy continued to provide pre-service training for candidate judges and prosecutors 
as  well  as  in-service  training.  However,  since  the  Academy  is  overseen  by  a  president  appointed 
directly  by  the  President  of  the  Republic,  its  functional  independence  from  the  executive  branch  is 
constrained.  

A growing concern is the questionable evidence used by the prosecutors in politically charged cases. 
Several  people  were  charged  with  ‘supporting  a  terrorist  organisation’  for  entering  into  a  political 

25 

 
 
non-competition agreement between two parties during the 2024 local elections that enabled them to 
secure  victories in  competitive  races.  A similar  political  agreement involving the  ruling  parties  was 
not prosecuted. Such cases illustrate how judicial mechanisms are selectively used to stifle political 
opposition and critical voices. Lawyers of defendants were detained and arrested, de facto limiting the 
rights of defence.  

In  high-profile  cases,  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  defence  are  often  neglected.  Defence  lawyers 
continue to face significant challenges in accessing case files, particularly in political criminal cases. 
Additionally,  the  use  of  evidence  from  secret  witnesses,  who  cannot  be  cross-examined  by  the 
defence,  continued  in  several  important  cases  and  is  a  matter  of  serious  concern  given  its  clear 
interference  with  the  right  to  a  fair  trial.  Despite  legal  provisions  requiring  corroborating  evidence, 
statements  from  single  witnesses  are  often  accepted  without  additional  verification.  Furthermore, 
testimony  of  a  single  witness  was  used  in  multiple  cases,  further  undermining  the  integrity  of  the 
judicial process. These practices are not in line with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 

Efficiency 

The  efficiency  of  the  judiciary  system  needs  to  be  improved.  The  judiciary  struggles  with 
inefficiency,  including  a  significant  backlog  of  cases,  which  remains  a  problem.  Legal  proceedings 
are  prolonged  because  indictments  are  often  accepted  without  sufficient  evidence.  The  frequent 
transfer of judges and prosecutors, coupled with the appointment of inexperienced personnel to high-
level criminal courts, further exacerbates these inefficiencies.  

In 2025, the budget for the justice system increased to TRY 280 billion, up from TRY 207 billion in 
2024.   

Fight against corruption 

Track record 

The  fight  against  corruption  track  record  did  not  improve  for  either  high-level  or  non-high-level 
cases.  

The  track  record  of  investigations,  prosecutions  and  convictions  in  corruption  cases  needs  major 
improvement.  There  is  insufficient  cooperation  between  audit  and  inspection  units  and  prosecution 
offices. Frequent exemptions in procurement procedures weaken the integrity of public procurement 
processes.  Political  party  financing,  the  judiciary,  the  public  administration,  municipalities,  and  the 
construction sector remain vulnerable to corruption. 

In the reporting period, several mayors from opposition parties – including the mayor of Istanbul  – 
were  detained  and  arrested  for  corruption  and  bid-rigging  allegations.  The  defendants  face  various 
charges,  including  ‘leading  a  criminal  organisation’,  ‘bribery’,  ‘embezzlement’,  ‘aggravated  fraud’, 
and  ‘rigging  public  tenders’.  The  details  of  the  investigation and  evidence  remain  undisclosed.  The 
court rejected the charge of ‘supporting a terrorist organisation’ against the mayor of Istanbul – thus 
26 

 
 
no trustee was appointed in Istanbul – but the prosecutor appealed this decision. The case is pending 
in court.  

Local  government  authorities  remained 
prone to corruption. In 2024, out of 1 701 
complaints  filed  against municipalities  for 
corruption, misconduct, and related issues, 
the Ministry of Interior permitted only 176 
investigations.  Opposition  mayors  are 
more frequently prosecuted on corruption-
related  charges,  particularly  in  the  big 
metropolitan municipalities. No current or 
former metropolitan mayor from the ruling 
parties  has  been  subjected 
to  anti-
corruption  prosecutions.  The  selective 
application  of  justice  and  the  use  of 
corruption  investigations  as  a  tool  to 
pressure  opposition  politicians  undermine 
confidence  in  the  actual  fight  against 
corruption.  Ensuring 
impartiality  and 
transparency  in  anti-corruption  efforts  is 
essential to maintain public trust in democratic governance and the rule of law. 

Legal framework 

Türkiye  is  a  signatory  to  all  key  international  anti-corruption  conventions,  including  the  UN 
Convention against Corruption. However, it has not introduced anti-corruption legislation or reforms 
to  meet  its  obligations  under  these  instruments. The  legal  framework  for  whistle-blower  protection 
and public procurement is yet to be aligned with European standards. The corruption-related rules in 
the Penal Code are inadequate. The definition of active bribery in the Criminal Code does not meet 
international standards, especially on bribery in the private sector. 

Public procurement legislation needs reform to ensure alignment with  the EU acquis, particularly in 
the  areas  of  exemptions,  concessions,  and  public-private  partnerships.  Legal  privileges  for  public 
officials – such as the need for prior authorisation before investigating alleged misconduct – provide 
undue protection, thus obstructing anti-corruption efforts. 

The legal framework for managing conflicts of interest, asset declarations, and financial oversight of 
political parties remains insufficient. 

Strategic documents 

Türkiye does not have a national strategy or action plan to combat corruption. There was no progress 
in  implementing  outstanding  recommendations  from  the  Group  of  States  against  Corruption 
(GRECO). Türkiye needs to align with the recommendations of GRECO’s Fourth Evaluation Round, 
which focuses on preventing corruption among MPs, judges and prosecutors. In its latest evaluation 
report, published in 2023, GRECO concluded that Türkiye had satisfactorily implemented only three 
of the 22 recommendations. Of the remaining recommendations, nine had been partially implemented, 
while 10 had not been implemented at all. 

Institutional framework 

lacks  a  permanent,  functionally 

to  preventing 
Türkiye  still 
corruption. Coordination between various anti-corruption bodies is insufficient. The legal framework 
for  combating  corruption  in  the  private  sector  remains  insufficient. Türkiye  lacks  specialised  law 
enforcement agencies, prosecutorial services and courts. 

independent  body  dedicated 

27 

 
 
Fundamental rights 

General framework 

The  implementation  and  enforcement  of  fundamental  rights  is  insufficient  and  deteriorated  in  the 
reporting period. Türkiye urgently needs to align its human rights-related legislation and its anti-terror 
legislation,  as  well  as  their  implementation,  with  European  standards,  the  ECHR,  ECtHR  case  law, 
and  the  Venice  Commission’s  recommendations.  Persistent  issues  are  yet  to  be  addressed,  such  as 
arrests of activists and journalists, selective application of the law, restrictions on media freedom, and 
the disproportionate use of anti-terror laws. 

International human rights instruments 

The  cooperation  with  international  human  rights  monitoring  bodies  and  the  follow-up  to  their 
recommendations are insufficient. Despite Türkiye being a signatory to numerous international human 
rights instruments, its domestic legislation  as well as its  implementation still fall short of alignment 
with  the  ECHR  and  the  case  law  of  the  ECtHR.  The  Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the  Council  of 
Europe continues to subject Türkiye to a full monitoring procedure due to concerns regarding human 
rights standards. A youth Turkish delegate to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the 
Council of Europe was arrested in August 2025 following his intervention during a plenary session on 
charges of ‘spreading misleading information to the public’. Later, he was released pending trial. The 
charges  set  a  concerning  precedent  of  attempting  to  restrict  the  freedom  of  expression  within  an 
international organisation to which Türkiye is a member.  

European Court of Human Rights 

The implementation of ECtHR judgments remains inadequate.  

During the reporting period, the ECtHR delivered 69 judgements against Türkiye. The Court found 
breaches  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  relating  mainly  to  the  right  to  a  fair  trial, 
respect for private and family life, right for liberty and security, and freedom of expression. Currently, 
there  are  205 cases  under enhanced  supervision  by  the  Committee  of  Ministers  related  primarily  to 
right  to  life  and  protection  against  torture,  right  to  peaceful  assembly,  unjustified  and  extended 
detention without reasonable suspicion and lack of effective investigations (185 cases last year).  

No progress was made on aligning legislation on human rights and its implementation with the ECHR 
and ECtHR case law, which raises serious concerns. Türkiye still did not implement certain ECtHR 
rulings and the related judgments of its own Constitutional Court. Türkiye needs to address systematic 
issues such as judicial independence, judicial review mechanism, use of  excessive  force  by security 
forces, unjustified detention, the right to a fair trial, the right to liberty and security, and the freedom 
of assembly and association.  

Promotion and enforcement of 
human rights 

legal  and 

The 
institutional 
framework  for  the  promotion, 
protection  and  enforcement  of 
is  incomplete 
human  rights 
and needs to be improved.   

address 

The  2021-2023  Human  Rights 
Action  Plan,  which  did  not 
fully 
serious 
shortcomings  in the  protection 
of  human  rights  in  Türkiye, 
expired and was not replaced.  

the 

28 

 
 
The  effectiveness  of  Türkiye’s  Human  Rights and  Equality  Institution (HREI) and the  Ombudsman 
remains limited. The HREI’s legal and 
institutional 
framework  should  be 
adapted to fully comply with the Paris 
Principles,  and  adequate  and  secure 
resources  should  be  allocated  to  the 
bodies  to  effectively  perform  their 
duties.  No  progress  was  made  in 
operational, 
the 
strengthening 
structural  and  financial 
independence  of 
these 
bodies  or  in  ensuring  an 
to 
impartial 
appoint  their  members. 
Their  ability  to  serve  as 
independent 
oversight 
bodies  remains  limited, 
which 
significantly 
undermines  trust  in  the 
mechanisms  designed  to 
safeguard human rights. 

process 

Despite  a  high  number 
of  human  rights-related 
complaints  submitted  to 
oversight bodies, there is 
little evidence of substantial institutional responses. 

Türkiye  lacks  a  national  action  plan  that  defines  the  responsibilities  of  public  institutions  in 
preventing violations of fundamental rights through corporate activities. Türkiye needs to align with 
the  EU  Corporate  Sustainability  Due  Diligence  Directive,  as  the  absence  of  legal  and  regulatory 
oversight leaves significant gaps in corporate accountability for human rights abuses. 

Right to life 

The  impunity  of  security  services  remains  a  critical  concern,  with  no  substantive  steps  taken  to 
address  the  situation  regarding  past  extrajudicial  killings  and  arbitrary  executions.  Cases  of  alleged 
deaths  caused  by  state  agents  between  1993  and  1996  continue  to  fall  under  statutes  of  limitation, 
preventing accountability and justice for the victims.  

Prevention of torture and ill-treatment 

Türkiye provides insufficient legal guarantees  for the prevention of torture and ill-treatment and the 
follow-up to cases is insufficient. Cases of torture and ill-treatment continue to be reported. Although 
in a few cases administrative measures were taken against officers, such responses remain insufficient 
and limited in scope. Credible allegations of abuse by prison officials remain unaddressed. Instances 
of  ill-treatment  were  particularly  notable  during  the  protests  following  the  arrest  of  the  Istanbul 
mayor.  Reports  highlighted  the  disproportionate  use  of  force  by  security  forces,  including  physical 
abuse  and  psychological  intimidation.  The  European  Committee  for  the  Prevention  of  Torture  and 
Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or  Punishment  (CPT)  carried  out  a  visit  to  several  prisons  and 
detention centres in Türkiye in April 2025, to assess the treatment and legal safeguards  provided to 
those detained during the protests that began on 19 March. 

Despite Türkiye’s obligations under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, no progress  was made in improving 
the  compatibility  of  the  HREI  –  as  the  national  preventive  mechanism  –  with  the  Protocol’s  key 
requirements. The prison visits conducted by the HREI proved ineffective in addressing allegations of 
29 

 
 
torture, maltreatment and abuse. The HREI still fails to effectively handle cases referred to it, raising 
questions  about  its  operational  capacity  and  efficacy.  Türkiye  should  take  concrete  measures  to 
strengthen  the  enforcement  of  the 
right  to  life  and  the  prevention  of 
ill-treatment.  The 
torture  and 
requirement  to  obtain  permission 
servants 
civil 
to 
(including 
officers) 
security 
should be reformed or abolished to 
address  systemic 
impunity  and 
improve  accountability.  Türkiye 
should  allow  the  publication  of 
pending reports from the CPT and 
introduce  procedures 
the 
automatic  release  of  these  reports 
and 
to 

transparency 

prosecute 

ensure 

for 

adherence to international obligations. 

Execution of criminal sanctions 

The  system  for  execution  of  criminal 
sanctions  (including  probation)  needs  to 
be improved.  

inadequate 

Turkish  prisons  operate  beyond 
their 
capacity,  exacerbating  problems  such  as 
overcrowding, 
living 
environments, and limited access to basic 
resources.  Pre-trial  detention 
remains 
widely used, including for cases involving 
alleged  offences  related  to  freedom  of 
expression  and  the  right  to  peaceful 
assembly.  No  progress  was  made  in 
addressing  the  arbitrary  decisions  by  the 
Prison  Administration  and  Observation 
Boards, which often delay inmates’ conditional releases without clear justification. 

Reports  of  human  rights  violations  in  prisons  increased.  Political  inmates  continue  to  face 
discriminatory  treatment,  highlighting  unequal  standards  within  the  prison  system.  Urgent  action  is 
needed on access to education, healthcare, rehabilitation, and resocialisation programmes, as well as 
to  improve  the  probation  system. 
Inmates  are  often  subjected 
to 
arbitrary  limitations  on  communal 
activities.  The  conditions  of  PKK 
leader  Öcalan  and 
three  other 
inmates  at  İmralı  prison  improved, 
as  they  were  allowed  visits  during 
the reporting period. 

Protection of personal data 

for 

legal 

framework 

the 
The 
protection  of  personal  data  is  not 
adequate  and  the  capacities  of  the 
data  protection  agency  need  to  be 
improved.  

30 

 
 
Türkiye’s  Personal  Data  Protection  Authority continues  to  operate under  the framework  established 
by the 2016 personal data protection law. However, this legislation does not fully comply with the EU 
acquis  on  data  protection,  particularly  regarding  privacy  safeguards,  legal  consistency,  and 
enforcement mechanisms.  

Despite its role in overseeing data protection regulations, the Authority’s operational framework does 
not fully align with European standards. Serious gaps remain in ensuring transparency, accountability, 
and  adequate  enforcement  of  personal  data  rights,  particularly  in  cases  involving  law  enforcement 
agencies. Further legislative improvements are necessary to ensure stronger protection for individuals 
and strengthen regulatory independence and oversight. 

Freedom of religion or belief 

Türkiye provides generally adequate legal guarantees for freedom of religion or belief.  

Freedom  of  worship  is  generally  respected  in  Türkiye,  but  the  situation  of  freedom  of  thought, 
conscience and religion needs to be improved. The Venice Commission’s recommendation to allow 
the  Greek  Orthodox  Ecumenical  Patriarch  to  use  the  title  ‘Ecumenical’  was  not  implemented 
consistently.  The  lack  of legal  personality  for the  non-Muslim  and  Alevi  communities  remained  an 
unresolved  issue,  notably  in  relation  to  the  lack  of  legal  status  for  places  of  worship.  The  Venice 
Commission’s  recommendations  to  grant  legal  status  to  non-Muslim  religions  are  yet  to  be 
implemented.  There  are  still  no  legal  provisions  on  the  conscientious  objection  to  army  service, 
despite  several  ECtHR  judgments,  a  Council  of  Europe  Committee  of  Ministers  resolution  and  a 
decision  by  the  UN  Human  Rights  Committee.  Foreign  Protestant  pastors  and  Jehovah’s  Witness 
ministers  were  deported.  An  ECtHR  judgment  is  to  be  finalised  soon  on  this  issue.  Atheists  and 
agnostics  face  discrimination,  stigmatisation,  social  pressure,  or  restrictions  on  their  right  to 
education.  The  Turkish  education  system  still  fails  to  guarantee  neutrality  and  impartiality  towards 
various religions, denominations and beliefs. No measures were taken by the authorities to address the 
shortcomings identified by the ECtHR in compulsory religious culture and ethics classes.  

No  steps  were  taken  to  reopen  the  Halki  (Heybeliada)  Greek  Orthodox  Seminary,  which  has  been 
closed since 1971. The UNESCO World Heritage Committee’s concerns about the Hagia Sophia and 
Chora museums having been converted into mosques remained unaddressed. Acts of vandalism and 
the  destruction  of  minority  places  of  worship  continued.  High-level  officials  and  the  media  used 
aggressive anti-Semitic statements in the context of the conflict in Gaza. Hate crimes against religious 
minorities need to be effectively investigated. 

Freedom of expression 

Türkiye  provides  insufficient  legal  guarantees  for  the  freedom  of  expression.  The  enabling 
environment for media freedom and pluralism is constrained. 

Intimidation of journalists 

The  environment  for  journalists  and  media  professionals,  and  other  critical  voices  in  Türkiye, 
remained  restrained  through  arbitrary  arrests,  detentions,  prosecutions  and  convictions.  Between 
September 2024 and September 2025, according to CSOs working in the area of media freedom 62 
journalists and media workers were arrested, imprisoned, or remained in pre-trial detention (51 in the 
same period in 2023-2024). Media outlets critical to government were at times selectively subjected to 
fines by the media regulator. Such practices perpetuate a culture of self-censorship. 

Legislative environment 

No  steps  were  taken  to  align  rules  related  to  anti-terrorism,  national  security,  public  order, 
disinformation, and the protection of public morals with international and European standards. Access 
to  information  continued  to  be  often  restricted  under  the  pretext  of  protecting  national  security. 
Furthermore, a new cybersecurity law, enacted in March 2025, would penalise whistle-blowers if the 
authorities declare their reports on cybersecurity-related data breaches to be false. There are concerns 
that the law could be used to silence independent reporting and further restrict access to information. 
31 

 
 
The law introduces new criminal offences with severe penalties even for circumstances that are not 
directly linked with cyberattacks.  

Implementation of legislation/institutions 

The enforcement of existing legislation does not align with European standards and remains selective 
and  discriminatory.  The  Radio  and  Television  Supreme  Council  (RTÜK)  continued  to  lack 
independence  and  the  imposition  of  fines  in  a  discriminatory  manner  is  common.  Fines  were 
frequently  justified  on  grounds  that  content  was  ‘contrary  to  national  and  moral  values’,  or  on  the 
basis  of  ‘general  morality’  or  ‘protection  of  the  family’.  Media  outlets  and  websites  were  targeted 
with accusations of ‘propagating terrorism’, ‘obscenity’, ‘defaming Islam’, ‘insulting the President’, 
or  ‘compromising  national  security’.  Content  critical  of  the  government,  including  reports  on 
corruption, the economic situation, election coverage, and sensitive social issues, was often penalised.  

Public service broadcasters 

The  coverage  of  public  service  broadcaster  Turkish  Radio  and  Television  Corporation  (TRT) 
continued to heavily favour ruling parties, undermining the principle of impartiality. 

Economic factors 

Media ownership in Türkiye remains highly concentrated in the hands of few economic players close 
to  the  government,  as  the  broadcasting  law  does  not  include  rules  to  prevent  monopolisation.  The 
selective  allocation  of  public  advertising  funds  and  distribution  of  printed  media  (controlled  by  a 
single  company)  continue.  Media  outlets  related  to  officially  recognised  religious  minority  groups 
receive  very  limited  revenue  from  public  advertisements,  making  their  financial  sustainability 
challenging.  

Internet 

The legislation fails to guarantee an open and unrestricted internet. Access to websites, specific news 
articles and social media accounts critical of the government is often blocked, and authors often face 
prosecution.  Authorities  frequently  imposed  temporary  restrictions  on  social  media  platforms,  or 
slowed  down  (throttle)  their  services,  particularly  during  protests  or  crises.  Furthermore,  the 
government  requested  closure  of  hundreds  of  X  accounts  belonging  to  journalists,  political  figures, 
women’s groups, youth groups and activists, often in the absence court orders. Concerns also persist 
regarding  licensing requirements for  internet  broadcasting,  as  these  are  used to facilitate  censorship 
and limit online access. A change in Google’s algorithm reduced the visibility of some independent 
news  sites  in  Türkiye,  negatively  affecting  their  revenues.  It  led  to  closure  or  downsizing  of  some 
media outlets. 

Freedom of artistic expression 

Legislation  with  vague  provisions  such  as  ‘morality’  is  often  used  to  restrict  freedom  of  artistic 
expression. Artistic events and performances were banned, and artists critical of government policies 
faced derogatory remarks from high-ranking officials and pro-government media. These restrictions 
stifle  cultural  and  creative  expression,  further  narrowing  the  space  for  critical  voices.  Artists  who 
spoke against the arrest of mayors and supported boycott calls were dismissed from TV series run on 
state-owned TRT. 

Professional organisations and working conditions 

Journalism  in  Türkiye  remains  a  precarious  and  risky  profession,  with  low  wages,  a  high  risk  of 
prosecution,  limited  trade  union  rights  and  no  job  security  (see  also  Chapter  10  –  Digital 
transformation and media). 

Freedom of assembly and association 

Türkiye  provides  insufficient  legal  guarantees  for  freedom  of  assembly  and  association,  and 
regulation of assemblies is restrictive. 

32 

 
 
the  right 

to  assembly  and  demonstration,  along  with 

its  practical 
Legislation  governing 
implementation, remains inconsistent with European standards and falls short of guarantees provided 
also  in  the  Turkish  Constitution.  The  Council  of  Europe’s  Committee  of  Ministers  had  urged  the 
authorities to amend the Law on demonstrations and meetings in line with the case law of the ECtHR 
and the Constitutional Court. Authorities continued to impose blanket bans on public gatherings and 
demonstrations  based  on  vague,  discretionary  and  often  arbitrary  criteria,  undermining  the 
constitutional right to freedom of assembly. Following the arrest of the Istanbul mayor in March 2025, 
hundreds of thousands of people in various cities protested his detention and suspension from office. 
Over  2 000  individuals  were  detained  during  the  protests,  with  over  800  subsequently  arrested 
pending  trial.  Detentions  and  arrests  took  place  also  following  the  International  Women’s  Day 
celebration and the Newroz celebrations in March 2025. According to the Minister of Interior, at least 
409  people  were  detained  on  1 May  on  grounds  of  ‘non-authorised  demonstrations’.  While  official 
statistics  on  the  number  of  protesters  injured  have  not  been  provided,  credible  reports  documented 
aggressive  crowd  -control  measures,  and  ill-treatment  by  security  forces,  including  physical  and 
psychological abuse. The authorities have dismissed these allegations as baseless. There is an urgent 
need 
for 
disproportionate law enforcement practices, and protecting people’s right to peacefully express their 
views.  

restrictions  on  public  gatherings,  ensuring  accountability 

to  address  arbitrary 

Although  freedom  of  association  in  Türkiye  is  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution  and  international 
agreements,  legislation  imposes  numerous  legal  barriers  and  administrative pressures  on  NGOs  and 
labour  unions,  particularly  those  critical  of  the  government.  Associations  face  challenges  to  gain 
public  benefit  status  or  benefit  from  public  support.  The  requirement  to  keep  numerous  documents 
and  the  inequalities  in  access  to  digital  systems  are  particularly  challenging  for  small  and  local 
associations.  Inspections  are  often  carried  out  by  security  units,  which  is  viewed  as  excessive  and 
intimidating.  

Property rights 

The  legal  framework  in  this  area  is  mostly  in  place.  However,  there  are  still  some  legislative 
shortcomings,  in  particular  related  to  property  rights  for  non-Muslim  minorities,  and  its 
implementation  is  often  selective  and  discriminatory.  The  Mor  Gabriel  Syriac  Orthodox  Monastery 
property  issues  and  court  cases  continued.  Court  cases  regarding  the  2016  expropriations  in 
Diyarbakır’s Sur district continued. Property rights of people who lost their lands and immovables in 
the  February  2023  earthquakes  need  to  be  urgently  addressed,  especially  in  Hatay,  where  no 
comprehensive restoration plans for cultural and religious heritage were developed. Council of Europe 
Resolution  1625  of  2008  on  property  rights  on  the  islands  of  Gökçeada  (Imbros)  and  Bozcaada 
(Tenedos) still needs to be fully implemented. 

Non-discrimination 

The  legal  and  institutional  framework  on  non-discrimination  is  incomplete  and  equality  bodies’ 
capacities need to be improved. In addition, the legal and institutional framework on hate crime and 
hate speech is not in line with the EU  acquis and European standards. Türkiye made no progress in 
revising non-discrimination legislation to ensure alignment with EU acquis and European standards, 
including as regards the Racial Equality Directive and the Directives on standards for equality bodies. 
Similarly,  no  progress  was  made  towards  ratifying  Protocol  No.  12  of  the  ECHR  providing  for  a 
general  prohibition  of  discrimination.  Instances  of  discrimination  continued  to  be  reported, 
particularly in relation to ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation. The situation of LGBTIQ persons 
is particularly worrying. Türkiye could draw useful guidance from the EU Anti-racism Action Plan to 
adopt its own Anti-racism strategy. Existing legislation on hate offences, including hate speech, still 
diverges significantly from the EU acquis and European standards, leaving vulnerable groups without 
adequate  legal  protection  against  bias-motivated  crimes.  Hate  attacks  against  Kurds,  Christian  and 
Jewish minorities and Syrians continued. Alevis were also the subject of attacks.  

Gender equality 

33 

 
 
and 

legal 

institutional 
and 
The 
framework  on  gender  equality  and 
combating  gender-based  violence  is 
incomplete  and  implementation  and 
insufficient. The 
enforcement  are 
2024  Vision  Document 
for 
Strengthening  the  Family  –  which 
puts  the  traditional  family  at  the 
centre  of  government  policies  – 
continued  to  be  implemented.  The 
document 
is  characterised  by  a 
strong  discourse  that  prioritises  the 
casts 
family, 
‘traditional’ 
‘gender  ideology’  as  one  of  the 
major 
family 
institution.  Although  Türkiye  has  in 
place a legislative framework and some policy initiatives that aim to address violence against women 
and  girls,  significant  gaps  persist  in 
implementation,  access  to  services 
and  legal  enforcement,  making  the 
issue  systematic  and  widespread. 
Women’s rights centres and legal aid 
offices  of  bar  associations  provide 
free  legal  support  to  victims  of 
in 
violence.  However, 
requests for legal aid can lead to loss 
of  time  in  protecting  the  victim.  A 
resources  hinders  bar 
lack  of 
to  quickly 
associations’ 
respond to every application. 

threats 

ability 

delays 

the 

to 

The  legal  framework  was  weakened 
further  by  Türkiye’s  withdrawal  in 
2021  from  the  Istanbul  Convention  on  preventing  and  combating  violence  against  women  and 
domestic  violence.  The  implementation  of  legislation  remains  inconsistent,  with  perpetrators  often 
benefiting  from  judicial  leniency  and  impunity.  Law  enforcement’s  approach  often  treats  violence 
against women and girls as a private family matter, which contributes to impunity. According to We 
Will  Stop  Femicide  Platform  data,  in  2024,  there  were  394  femicides  and  259  suspicious  deaths  of 
women.  This  is  the  highest  number recorded  since  the  platform  began collecting  data in  2010.  The 
lack of a comprehensive official data collection system on femicides also remains a serious concern.  

Rights of the child 

The legal and institutional framework on rights of the child is incomplete and its implementation and 
enforcement are insufficient. The legislation on the rights of the child and its implementation are not 
in  line  with  international  standards  and  the  EU  acquis.  Also,  the  budget  allocated  to  this  area  is 
insufficient.  Although  the  principle  of  the  ‘best  interest  of  the  child’  is  recognised  in  the  legal 
framework, its application frequently relies on subjective judgements rather than consistent criteria.  

The existing infrastructure for juvenile justice is still insufficient and significant challenges persist in 
ensuring  equitable  access  to  justice  for  minors.  NGOs  and  bar  associations  struggle  to  effectively 
intervene,  monitor  cases,  or  pursue  strategic  litigation  due  to  limited  institutional  capacity  and 
resources. The number of specialised juvenile courts and child assize courts should be expanded, and 
staffing should be increased by hiring qualified professionals, including judges, prosecutors, lawyers, 
and experts trained in child welfare. 

34 

 
 
Moreover,  for  several  years  children  have  been  subjected  to  investigations,  detentions  and 
prosecutions under the Turkish Penal Code and anti-terrorism law for offences such as insulting the 
President on social media, engaging in terrorist propaganda and violating the Law on demonstrations 
and  marches.  Following  the  protests  against  the  detention  of  the  Istanbul  mayor,  reports  emerged 
indicating the detention and arrest of several students and minors. Allegations of ill-treatment during 
these detentions, such as physical abuse and psychological harm, were reported by credible sources.  

While  the  adoption  of  a  Child  Rights  Strategy  and  Action  Plan  (2023-2028)  was  a  positive  step 
forward,  significant  gaps  remain  in  addressing  key  issues  like  violence,  child  labour,  schooling  of 
girls, and early or forced marriages. Data collection mechanisms to monitor trends in violence against 
children  are  still  inadequate,  complicating  efforts  to  identify  patterns  and  design  evidence-based 
policies.  High-profile  incidents,  such  as  the  murder  of  an  8-year-old  girl  and  a  double  femicide  in 
Istanbul, highlight failures in existing child protection policies and gender-based violence prevention 
measures. Türkiye should take decisive action to eliminate child marriages, particularly unregistered 
religious ones, by enforcing mandatory civil registration for all marriages.  

To  strengthen  child  protection  systems  and  ensure  effective realisation  of  children’s  rights,  Türkiye 
could  draw  guidance  from  key  European  Commission  recommendations—such  as  the  EC 
Recommendation  on  integrated  child  protection  systems—and  align  its  efforts  with  broader  policy 
frameworks like the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child. 

Persons with disabilities  

The  legal  and  institutional  framework  on  the  rights  of  persons  with  disabilities  needs  to  be  further 
aligned with the EU acquis, including in the area of accessibility such as the European Accessibility 
Act.  Its implementation and enforcement need to be improved. Türkiye has a strategic framework to 
promote  the  rights  of  persons  with  disabilities,  yet  the  level  of  practical  implementation  is  still 
insufficient. Türkiye is a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its 
Optional Protocol. Nevertheless, gaps persist in the alignment of the national legislation and practices 
with  the  requirements  of  the  Convention.  There  are  legislative  barriers  that  prevent  persons  with 
disabilities from holding certain civil servant positions, such as governor or ambassador. The National 
Action  Plan  on  the  Rights  of  Persons  with  Disabilities  2023–2025  is  broadly  consistent  with  EU 
strategies,  but  its  practical  impact  has  remained  limited.  Similarly,  the  National  Action  Plan  for 
Persons  with  Autism  Spectrum  Disorder  (2023–2030)  is  in  place,  but  tangible  results  are  yet  to  be 
seen.  Efforts  to  improve  data  collection  on  accessibility  and  the  availability  of  inclusive  public 
services have been insufficient. Additional investments are needed to make infrastructure and services 
accessible.  There  is  a  need  to  increase  the  accessibility  of  work  environments,  including  physical 
spaces, digital tools, communication, and transportation to and from the workplace.  

Türkiye needs to strengthen data collection on children with disabilities to ensure adequate access to 
services  and  guide  disability  inclusion.  Early  detection  and  cross-sector  collaboration  for  timely 
intervention  needs  to  be  improved  for  children  with  disabilities,  particularly  in  the  education  and 
health sectors.  

Türkiye maintains a deinstitutionalisation policy for people with intellectual and mental disabilities, 
supplemented  by  a  community-based  care  support  programme.  However,  opportunities  for 
independent living remain scarce. The Commission Guidance on independent living and inclusion in 
the community of persons with disabilities in the context of EU funding (C/2024/7188) could serve as 
a guiding document in this respect.  

LGBTIQ persons 

The legal protection of the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) 
persons is insufficient and not aligned with the EU acquis. Moreover, LGBTIQ persons are subject to 
discrimination, hate speech and stigmatisation.   

The protection of fundamental rights for LGBTIQ individuals in Türkiye remains a major concern, as 
discriminatory practices and restrictions on freedoms persist. Episodes of hatred targeting individuals 
35 

 
 
based on their sexual orientation and gender identity continue to be reported. Negative stereotyping in 
the  media,  along  with  inflammatory  rhetoric  from  high-ranking  government  officials,  further 
exacerbated  the  marginalisation  of  LGBTIQ  individuals  and  communities.  With  the  launch  of  the 
‘Year of the Family’ in January 2025, these verbal attacks further increased. The government’s 2024-
2028  Vision  Document  and  Action  Plan  for  Strengthening  the  Family  frequently  refers  to  ‘harmful 
trends  threatening  the  family’,  ‘global  desexualisation  projects’  and  ‘national  and  spiritual  values’. 
Authorities  have  allowed  the  organisation  of  anti-LGBTIQ  rallies,  granting  official  permissions  for 
demonstrations  that  promote  exclusion  and  discrimination,  while  gatherings  expressing  opposing 
views are regularly banned by the authorities. In 2025, the Kuir fest (Queer fest) and the Pride March 
in Istanbul were officially prohibited. 

Procedural rights and victims’ rights 

The legal framework on procedural rights for suspects and accused as well as the rights of victims of 
crime is insufficiently aligned with the EU acquis and systemic issues in application persist. There are 
significant inconsistencies compared with the EU acquis and broader European standards (see Quality 
of  justice).  Prolonged  periods  of  pre-trial  detention  remain  common.  This  issue  is  compounded  by 
instances of detention linked to the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights, such as the right of 
assembly and the freedom of speech. Issues of compliance with fair trial standards and the rights of 
defence further erode confidence in the judicial process. These include concerns over evidence being 
unreliable or gathered in violation of procedural safeguards, including the admission as evidence of 
testimony by secret witnesses, who cannot be cross-examined by the defence. Further efforts need to 
be  made  to fully  align  the  national  legislation  with the  Victims’  Rights  Directive  and  the  Directive 
relating  to  compensation  to  crime  victims.  In  rural  areas  and  among  disadvantaged  groups,  public 
awareness of the availability of legal aid remained limited.  

Protection of minorities 

The  legal  and  institutional  framework  for  the  protection  of  persons  belonging  to  minorities  is 
incomplete and persons belonging to minorities face hatred and discrimination.  

Legislation  on  hate  crimes  is  still  not  in  line  with  European  standards  and  remains  a  serious  issue. 
Hate speech and hate crimes continued, with the main targets being Syrians, Greeks, Armenians, Jews 
and Alevis. After the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria and the attacks on Alawites, hate speech against 
Alevis  increased,  including  from  public  officials  and  political  figures.  In  January  2025,  the 
Constitutional  Court  ruled  that  barring  two  Greek  Orthodox  clerics  from  being  elected  on  a 
foundation’s  board  violated  their  right  to  freedom  of  association.  Overall,  persons  belonging  to 
minorities continued to face difficulties, such as the lack of legal status for their religious institutions, 
protection  for  minority  languages,  schooling  support,  clergy  training,  access  to  media  in  minority 
languages,  legal  restrictions  on  access  to  public  advertisements  by  minority  media  outlets  and 
complications in enjoying property rights. No steps were taken to revise school textbooks  to remove 
discriminatory  and  derogatory  references.  Minority  schools  received  no  public  funds.  Outside 
activities for the ‘Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day’ were prohibited in April 2025. The court 
case concerning the retrial of state officials involved in the murder of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink 
was  concluded  in  February  2025,  but  the  Dink  family  appealed  the  decision  on  the  grounds  of 
‘incomplete investigation and prosecution’. There are still no mechanisms in place to include persons 
belonging to minorities in decision-making and ensure that they are adequately represented in public 
administration. Minorities are seriously under-represented in political life. 

Cultural rights 

Legal restrictions on mother-tongue education in primary and  secondary schools remained in place. 
However, with the positive climate brought by the peace initiative on the Kurdish issue, alternatives in 
mother-tongue education are being publicly discussed. Optional courses in two Kurdish dialects and a 
few other mother tongues are provided in public state schools, but the requirement of a minimum of 
10 students for these courses, along with the insufficient number of appointed teachers, remained an 

36 

 
 
impediment.  Six  universities  continue  faculty  courses  and  provide  degrees  in  Kurdish  language 
education.  

Roma5 

The 2023-2030 National Roma Strategy and its Action Plan are being implemented. Şişli municipality 
(in  Istanbul)  won  the  EU  Award  for  Roma  Integration  in  Türkiye  for  its  activities  in  the  field  of 
inclusion  of  Roma  children  in  education.  Concrete  measures  are  needed  to  address  direct 
discrimination  and  prejudices.  High  levels  of  inequality  in  housing,  employment  and  education 
perpetuate  marginalisation  and  social  exclusion.  Integration  of  Roma  children  into  the  education 
system would help eliminate child labour and early marriages. The problem of incorrect diagnosis of 
Roma children with mental disabilities or learning difficulties was not addressed.  

2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security 

The EU has common rules for border and migration management, visa policy, and asylum  Schengen 
cooperation entails the lifting of border controls within the EU. There is also cooperation in the fight 
against serious and organised crime and terrorism, and on judicial, police and customs matters, all 
with the support of the EU justice and home affairs agencies. 

Fight against serious and organised crime 

The  legal  framework  on  serious  and  organised  crime  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis. The 
capacity to combat serious and organised crime needs to be improved.   

Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks 

Specialised departments dealing with various forms of organised crime  still operate primarily within 
the  two  law  enforcement  agencies:  the  Turkish  National  Police  and  the  Gendarmerie  General 
Command. Türkiye lacks a dedicated, centralised asset recovery office. Asset seizure and confiscation 
are managed via general criminal justice procedures. 

No new specific anti-corruption or integrity measures were introduced in the law enforcement sector 
during  the reporting period.  Integrity  safeguards  and internal  oversight  mechanisms  are  still limited 
and  should  be  significantly  strengthened,  particularly  through  independent  complaint  channels, 
internal affairs capacity, and clear codes of conduct. 

The legal framework for the fight against organised crime and police cooperation is partially aligned 
with  the  EU  acquis.  A  national  strategy  (2022-2027)  and  an  action  plan  (2025-2027)  against 
organised crime are in force. The first action plan (2022-2024) has been concluded. 

Türkiye  does  not  currently  have  a  national  equivalent  to  SOCTA  (Serious  and  Organised  Crime 
Threat  Assessment)  as  produced  by  Europol.  However,  the  Turkish  authorities  carry  out  strategic 
threat  assessments  on  organised  crime,  though  these  are  generally  not  made  public  and  are  not 
structured or institutionalised in the same way as SOCTA. 

Cooperation  with  Europol  is  still  limited  to  the  existing  Strategic  Agreement  on  Cooperation.  As 
Türkiye’s data protection legislation is still not aligned with the EU acquis, the exchange of personal 
data with Europol is still pending. 

Türkiye is party to the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on Cybercrime but has yet to sign 
its Second Additional Protocol on enhanced cooperation and disclosure of electronic evidence. In the 
reporting period, there was no national strategy or action plan in place against cybercrime. Although 
Türkiye  has  ratified  the  Council  of  Europe’s  ‘Lanzarote  Convention’,  further  alignment  is  needed 
with  the  Directive  on  combating  the  sexual  abuse  and  sexual  exploitation  of  children  and  child 
pornography.  

5 In line with the terminology of European institutions, the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer to a 
number of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups. 

37 

 
 
 
 
The legal framework on trafficking in human beings is largely in line with international conventions 
and the EU acquis. Türkiye needs to fully align its definition of trafficking in human beings with the 
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. In January 2025, the 
Migration Board adopted the third national action plan against human trafficking, following a request 
from  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Group  of  Experts  on  Action  against  Trafficking  in  Human  Beings 
(GRETA). Legislation on witness protection is providing protective measures; however, it needs to 
be expanded to cover all types of serious crime. 

There was an increased involvement of Turkish authorities with the EU in the fight against firearms 
trafficking  and  especially  the  threat  of  the  illegal  conversion  of  alarm  and  signal  weapons 
manufactured  in  Türkiye.  The  changes  in  the  Turkish  legislation  on  alarm  and  signal  weapons  are 
positively received. Türkiye participates in the EMPACT firearms,  

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The  operational  capacity  of  law  enforcement  agencies  continued  to  be  strengthened  through  new 
recruitment and training programmes. 

A total of 14 EU Member States have liaison officers in Türkiye. A cooperation agreement with the 
EU  Agency  for  Law  Enforcement  Training  (CEPOL)  is  in  place,  but  participation  from  Türkiye  in 
training activities significantly declined compared with the previous reporting period. In 2024-2025, 
Türkiye took part in eight operational actions within the framework of the European Multidisciplinary 
Platform  Against  Criminal  Threats  (EMPACT)  in  the  fields  of  migrant  smuggling,  firearms,  and 
criminal finances, money laundering and asset recovery.  

Between  September  2024  and  April  2025,  31  385  people  were  arrested  for  organised  crime. 
Regarding confiscation of criminal assets in corruption and organised crime cases, the Gendarmerie 
took action against 567 suspects involved in 104 incidents. 

Türkiye remains an important transit and destination country for trafficking in human beings. In 2024, 
the  Turkish  authorities  identified  179  victims  (compared  with  223  in  2023).  As  of  March  2025,  43 
victims  had  been  identified.  Most  victims  are  of  Syrian  origin.  There  is  still  a  need  to  increase  the 
capacity  to  host  and  provide  effective  and  professional  services  to  victims  of  trafficking  in  human 
beings and to enhance cooperation with Europol. 

Concerns  persist  about the  capacity  of  law  enforcement  authorities  in  Türkiye  to  effectively  handle 
cases of gender-based violence and to provide adequate protection and support to victims. 

Cooperation in the field of drugs 

Cooperation in the field of drugs and treatment and rehabilitation capacities need to be strengthened. 

Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks 

The National Strategy and Action Plan against Drugs (2024-2028) is currently in force, with overall 
coordination entrusted to the Ministry of Health. 

The Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction is the national focal point of the EU 
Drugs Agency and functions as the national drugs observatory. It is responsible for data collection and 
risk  assessments,  and  for  issuing  recommendations  within  the  framework  of  the  national  early 
warning system on new psychoactive substances. A total of 1 068 new psychoactive substances have 
been included in national legislation, and 23 of these were put on the list in 2024. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Türkiye’s geographical position continues to make it a key transit route for drug trafficking between 
Asia and Europe. Information exchange and collaboration with EU law enforcement partners need to 
be  strengthened.  In  2024,  Turkish  law  enforcement  agencies  carried  out  operations  that  led  to 
increased seizures of cannabis, cocaine, methamphetamine, and ecstasy tablets, while heroin seizures 
declined. 

38 

 
 
In  2024,  Turkish  authorities  seized  approximately  4.8  tonnes  of  heroin,  62  tonnes  of  cannabis, 
3 tonnes of cocaine, 36 tonnes of methamphetamine, 2 tonnes of synthetic cannabinoids, 16 million 
amphetamine tablets bearing the Captagon logo, and 5.2 million ecstasy tablets. 

In 2025, Türkiye continues to take a decisive stance against drug trafficking, evidenced by historically 
high  seizure  rates.  The  destruction  of  these  drugs  is  an  integral  part  of  Türkiye’s  anti-narcotics 
strategy, though the efficiency and environmental impact of these methods necessitate a continuous 
evaluation. 

Fight against terrorism and prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism 

The  legal  framework  for  the  fight  against  terrorism  is  not  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  fight 
against terrorism needs to be carried out respecting the rule of law. 

The  legal  framework  for  countering  violent  extremism  is  not  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The 
countering of violent extremism needs to be improved. 

The legal framework for critical infrastructure protection  and the resilience of critical entities is not 
aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  protection  of  critical  infrastructure  and  the  resilience  of  critical 
entities need to be improved. 

Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks 

Given  the  presence  of  multiple  legitimate  domestic  and  cross-border  security  threats,  Türkiye’s 
counterterrorism  efforts  remain  essential for  both the  country’s  domestic  security  and  the  European 
security  architecture.  Türkiye  has  adopted  legislation  and  set  up  robust  institutional  frameworks  to 
combat  terrorism.  However,  the  legal  framework  remains  flawed  and  frequently  lacks  a  proper 
balance between fundamental freedoms and security considerations.  

Legislation  needs  to  be  brought  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis,  notably  regarding  the  definition  of 
terrorism  as  outlined  in  the  EU  Directive  on  combating  terrorism,  which  remains  an  essential  and 
outstanding  reform.  Preventive  measures  are  insufficient.  There  is  no  comprehensive  strategy  or 
political  ownership  in  place  for  counterterrorism,  and  preventing/countering  violent  extremism 
practices should also respect the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms. Türkiye focused its 
anti-terrorism  operations  on  the  PKK,  Daesh  and  the  Gülen  movement  (the  latter  is  not  listed  as  a 
terrorist organisation in the EU).  

Türkiye  participates  in  the  EU’s  biannual  review  process  of  terrorist  designations  under  Council 
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The EU currently designates the PKK, the Great Eastern Islamic 
Raiders’  Front  (IBDA-C),  the  Revolutionary  People’s  Liberation  Party  (DHKP/C),  and  Teyrebazen 
Azadiya  Kurdistan  (TAK)  as  terrorist  groups.  Türkiye  does  not  consider  Hamas  a  terrorist 
organisation, in contrast to the EU, which includes it on its list of designated terrorist entities. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Türkiye’s  continued  anti-terrorism  efforts  led  to  a  decline  in  terrorist  incidents  and  an  improved 
security climate. The EU condemned all acts of terrorist violence in Türkiye. However, the politically 
motivated  and  overly  broad  application  of  counterterrorism  legislation  continues  to  undermine  the 
rule of law and fundamental freedoms. There is a persistently growing trend of selective enforcement 
of  counterterrorism  laws  targeting  political  opposition  to  silence  dissent  and  imprison  political 
opponents and journalists. 

In  March  2025,  the  country  published  its  first  National  Strategy  Document  for  Enhancing 
Effectiveness in Combating the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 2025-
2029.  

In 2024, MASAK filed criminal complaints against 148 individuals on money laundering charges.  

Türkiye  strengthened  its  system  for  the  confiscation  of  criminal  assets.  In  terms  of  managing 
recovered assets, a legal provision adopted in February 2025 allows the court to appoint the Savings 

39 

 
 
Deposit Insurance Fund as a trustee for up to 5 years. This should apply in cases where there is strong 
suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing offences.  

Sanctions imposed by the UN resulted in the freezing of assets belonging to two individuals and three 
organisations in 2024 and 2025. During the same period, three inter-ministerial decisions led to the 
freezing of assets of 53 individuals and 19 companies in Türkiye.  

Police and judicial cooperation with EU Member States and EU agencies in the fight against terrorism 
remained limited due to the absence of a law on the protection of personal data in line with the EU 
acquis,  as  well  as  differences  in 
the definition of terrorism. These 
requirements 
included, 
among  others,  in  the  EU-Turkey 
Visa Liberalisation Roadmap and 
remain unfulfilled.  As Türkiye’s 
data protection legislation is still 
not  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis, 
the conclusion of an international 
agreement 
exchange  of 
personal  data,  including  related 
to 
suspects,  with 
Europol  remains  pending.  In  the 
absence  of  such  an  agreement, 
transfers of data related to terrorist suspects and other persons posing a threat known to Türkiye from 
the Turkish side to Europol remain limited.    

terrorist 

are 

for 

MASAK and the Ministry of Interior engaged with civil society organisations to promote risk-based 
AML/CFT  oversight.  In  2024,  the  Constitutional  Court  annulled  a  legal  provision  that  allowed  the 
Minister of Interior to suspend NGO representatives during AML/CFT investigations. This ruling also 
addressed  a major  criticism that  had prevented  Türkiye  from  being  rated  as  compliant in  the fourth 
round of the FATF's Mutual Evaluation process. No new legislation has been introduced to replace 
this provision. 

Judicial cooperation in criminal, civil and commercial matters  

on 

Judicial  cooperation  in  civil  and 
criminal  matters  needs  to  be 
improved 
to  meet  European 
standards.  Türkiye  still  needs  to 
accede  to  the  Hague  Convention 
of  30  June  2005  on  Choice  of 
Court  Agreements  and  the  2019 
the 
Hague  Convention 
Recognition  and  Enforcement  of 
Foreign  Judgments  in  Civil  or 
Commercial  Matters.  Türkiye 
has not yet ratified the European 
Convention on the Compensation 
of  Victims  of  Violent  Crimes. 
However,  Türkiye  has  been 
participating in the negotiations on a new Council of Europe instrument that promises to strengthen 
judicial  cooperation  in  matters  of  criminal  asset  recovery.  The  legal  framework  for  judicial 
cooperation in civil and criminal matters is partially aligned with the EU acquis. In November 2024 a 
new  circular  on  extradition  was  issued.  A  central  monitoring  system  was  developed  to  make  the 
handling of cross-border legal matters more transparent and efficient to improve the management and 
tracking  of  incoming  and  outgoing  requests.  The  users  of  the  system  were  trained.  The 
40 

 
 
implementation  of  the  2024  circular,  which  set  up  international  judicial  cooperation  liaison  offices 
within  seven  prosecution  offices  across  the  country,  continues.  These  offices  aim  to  facilitate 
coordination  and  improve  the  processing  of  requests  related  to  criminal  matters,  both  domestically 
and internationally, including with Eurojust, and help alleviate the workload of the Central Authority. 
The functioning of these offices needs to be improved. Additionally, there is a need to strengthen the 
capacity  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  courts,  and  prosecution  offices  to  efficiently  process  judicial 
cooperation requests in criminal matters. This includes increasing the number of personnel dedicated 
to  handling  mutual  legal  assistance  and  extradition  cases  within  the  Central  Authority.  Between  1 
March 2024 and 31 July 2025, 
Türkiye  was  involved  in  10 
Eurojust cases, mostly  related 
to  organised  crime  and  fraud. 
international  agreement 
An 
with  the  EU  on  cooperation 
with  Eurojust  is  not  in  place. 
Cooperation 
the 
European  Public  Prosecutor’s 
Office  (EPPO)  has  yet  to  be 
established, although in 2024, 
the  EPPO  sent  eight  requests 
for  mutual  legal  assistance  to 
the authorities of Türkiye. 

with 

Legal 
migration 

and 

irregular 

The management of legal and irregular migration needs to be improved. Cooperation on combating 
irregular migration is generally effective.  

Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks 

The  Presidency  for  Migration  Management  (PMM)  is  still  the  institution  in  charge  of  migration 
management.  In  the  past  year,  the  PMM  continued  to  recruit  auditors  and  migration  experts  for  its 
headquarters  and  provincial  administration  as  well  as  a  limited  number  of  social  workers, 
psychologists,  lawyers  and  interpreters.  Nevertheless,  significant  shortages  in  these  profiles  persist, 
particularly in removal centres and the provincial administration. To address the shortages, the PMM 
initiated recruitment of new cadre of ‘administrative detention personnel’ to be deployed in removal 
centres. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The  EU-Turkey  Statement  remained  the main framework  for  cooperation  on migration  between the 
EU and Türkiye. 

However, Türkiye’s unilateral suspension of the return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands 
under the ‘One-for-One’ scheme of the Statement continued. As regards resettlement from Türkiye to 
the  EU  under  the  same  scheme,  the  total  number  of  Syrian  refugees  resettled  from  Türkiye  was 
44 046 by the end of August 2025.  

Türkiye  continued  to  not  fully  implement  the  EU-Turkey  Readmission  Agreement.  It  continued  to 
maintain  its  position  that  it  would  not  implement  the  rules  on  third-country  nationals  until  the  visa 
liberalisation process is completed. 

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 175 migrants lost their lives in the 
Eastern Mediterranean in 2024, compared with 171 in 2023. Between January and August 2025, 134 
migrants lost their lives, and five are missing, compared with 89 in the same period in 2024. 

41 

 
 
In the first half of 2025, there were less than 15 000 arrivals from  Türkiye to the EU, a decrease by 
more  than  one  third  compared  to  the  same  period  last  year.  Arrivals  from  Türkiye  decreased  in  all 
relevant MS (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and Italy). 

Starting in Istanbul in July 2023, the Ministry of Interior introduced 270 mobile migration points in 81 
provinces of Türkiye as part of intensified efforts to detect and process foreigners residing illegally in 
Türkiye. The Minister of Interior announced that since July 2023, 145 435 irregular migrants had been 
detected  by  these  units  and  subjected  to  deportation  processes.  Overall,  Turkish  authorities 
apprehended 108 244 irregular migrants in 2025 (454,662 in 2019, 285,027 in 2022, 254,008 in 2023, 
225,831 in 2024).  

According  to  the  Ministry  of  Interior,  as  of  18  September  2025,  7  528  migrant  smugglers  were 
apprehended  in  2025  (7,942  in  2021,  9,235  in  2022  and  10,482  in  2023,  13,061  in  2024).  5  164 
suspected migrant smugglers were arrested in 2024. Türkiye takes part in the Global Alliance against 
Migrant Smuggling, , and is invited to renew its engagement at the occasion of the Global Alliance's 
second conference scheduled to take place at the end of 2025.Voluntary returns of irregular migrants 
financed  through  national  as  well  as  EU  funds  continued.  In  2024,  3  444  irregular  migrants  were 
returned through the national voluntary return scheme, while 5 487 were returned with the assistance 
of the IOM and EU financing. 

The number of removal centres stands at 32, with a total capacity of 18 780. The PMM also set up 
pre-reception  and  transfer  centres  in  major  provinces  to  process  the  cases  of  irregular  migrants 
apprehended by law enforcement agencies, before their transfer to removal centres. In October 2024, 
European  media  reported  on  alleged  human  rights  violations  and  misconduct  in  removal  centres, 
citing issues such as overcrowding, poor hygiene, access to healthcare and legal aid as well as cases of 
ill-treatment.  Cases  of  forced  returns  to  Syria  and  Afghanistan,  and  pushbacks  at  the  Türkiye-Iran 
border were also reported. The PMM issued a statement underlining its zero-tolerance approach to ill-
treatment and rejected these allegations.  

A  limited  number  of  irregular  migrants  in  removal  centres  (1  594)  benefited  from  free  legal  aid  in 
2024  (956  in  2023,  939  in  2022,  1 059  in  2021).  In  addition  to  the  free  legal  aid  scheme,  108  145 
migrants  were able  to  have  access to and meet  their lawyers in  removal  centres  in  the  same  period 
(24 148 in 2023).  

foreigners  were 

legal 
1 056 632 
residents  in  Türkiye  in  2024  (1 107 032 
in 2023, 1 345 488 in 2022, 1 275 741 in 
2021).  As  of  August  2025,  there  were 
1 108  394  resident  permit  holders  in 
Türkiye.  Nationals  of  Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan  and  the  Russian  Federation 
were  the  most  common  holders  of 
residence permits. 

Asylum 

The  legal  framework  on  asylum  is 
partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis. 
The  management  of  the  asylum  system 
needs to be improved.  

Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks 

The  PMM  is the  main institution  responsible for all asylum-related  procedures.  Decisions  on  status 
determination are subject to administrative and judicial appeal procedures. 

Legislation  in  this  area  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  Law  on  foreigners  and 
international protection maintains the reservation (geographical limitation) expressed in the New York 

42 

 
 
Protocol to the 1951 Geneva Convention. As a result, the vast majority of people seeking international 
protection in Türkiye cannot apply for full refugee status but only for ‘conditional refugee’ status and 
subsidiary protection. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Türkiye continued to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world, with 2 508 446 Syrians 
with temporary protection status, and 52 437 Syrians with short-term residence status (August 2025). 
According to Turkish authorities, there are also over 172 602 non-Syrians (July 2025), whose number 
declined over the reporting period (259 000 in 2024).  

The  number  of  asylum  applications  dropped  significantly.  In  2024,  Türkiye  granted  international 
protection  (refugee  status,  conditional  refugee  status  or  subsidiary  protection)  to  1653  applicants, 
down  from  11 094  in  2023.  In  2024,  Türkiye  rejected 34  570  applications.  In  2024,  the  cumulative 
total of pending international protection applications stood at 162 787 (224 065). There is no data on 
the  number  of  rejected  applications. 
The  significant  backlog  was  not 
reduced.  There  is  still  no  publicly 
accessible  data  on 
international 
protection  with  a  breakdown  by 
category  of  decisions  and  pending 
cases at the end of the year. 

the 

There are still challenges in accessing 
registration  and  asylum  procedures 
across 
country.  Concerns 
the  quality  of 
remained  about 
decisions  on  asylum,  their  reasoned 
notification  and  challenges  with  the 
awareness  of  and  access  to  legal  aid 
for appeals. 

Following  the  fall  of 
the  Assad 
regime  in  Syria  in  December  2024, 
the  voluntary  returns  to  Syria  considerably  increased.  On  7  September  2025,  Interior  Minister 
Yerlikaya announced that 474 018 Syrian nationals had voluntarily returned to their country 
since 8 December 2024. Between January and July 2025, the Turkish authorities allowed “go-and-
see  visits”,  that  allowed  Syrians  to  temporarily  travel  to  Syria  while  keeping  their  temporary 
protection status). It is important that returns continue to be independently monitored by UNHCR to 
ensure compliance with international law and standards.  The PMM and the EU Agency for Asylum 
continued  their  cooperation  and  prepared  the  2024-2026  Cooperation  Roadmap.  The  Roadmap 
provides  capacity-building  assistance  on  asylum-related  legislation  and  procedures  and  an  effective 
reception system in line with the Common European Asylum System and European standards. 

Visa policy 

The national visa  policy is not aligned with that of the EU, in particular the list of countries whose 
nationals require a visa to enter the EU.  

Türkiye needs to further align its visa policy with the EU’s visa policy. This would include: (i) further 
aligning  Turkish  visa  requirements  with  the  EU  lists  of  visa-free  and  visa-required  countries;  (ii) 
phasing out the issuing of visas at borders and electronic visas; and (iii) ensuring that the issuing of 
visas at its diplomatic missions is carried out in line with the conditions and procedures set out in the 
EU Visa Code. Türkiye continues to apply a discriminatory visa policy against nationals of Cyprus.  

43 

 
 
Türkiye  made  no  progress  in  meeting  the  six  unfulfilled  benchmarks  of  the  visa  liberalisation 
roadmap6. 

While Turkish nationals are still subject to visa requirement when travelling to the EU, the European 
Commission  adopted  on  15  July  2025  more  favourable  visa  rules  for  Turkish  citizens  applying  for 
Schengen visas (so called “cascade rule”)7, in order to further facilitate people-to-people contacts.  

Schengen governance and external borders 

The legislative framework for the management of external borders needs to be improved. 

Legal alignment, strategic and institutional frameworks 

The PMM remains the main body responsible for border management. The PMM’s coordination role 
in  border  management  alongside  its  existing  responsibilities  in  migration  management  was  further 
defined  and  institutionalised  with  the  Presidential  circular  of  January  2025.  The  circular  designates 
the  PMM  as  the  central  authority  for  coordinating  migration-related  activities  across  public 
institutions in Türkiye and bolsters integrated border management (IBM) by advancing inter-agency 
collaboration,  boosting  data-driven  decision-making,  and  promoting  a  unified  approach  to  border 
control and migration management.    

The 6th meeting of the Border Management Implementation Board  was held in December 2024. Its 
supervising body, the Integrated Border Management Coordination Board, has not yet met since its 
creation. Interinstitutional meetings on specific topics were held at technical levels. 

The National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Centre (NACORAC) is still not fully operational. 
Staff secondments from all relevant institutions were completed. The legislative framework governing 
NACORAC’s mandate continues not to grant NACORAC sufficient authority over other institutions 
on data sharing and risk analysis. Efforts are under way to address the shortcomings of NACORAC’s 
existing legal framework, to upgrade its status, and to redefine its duties and authorities – including 
data collection, sharing, processing and joint risk analysis – under a broader national law instead of an 
implementing law. In the absence of comprehensive data-sharing protocols, NACORAC has started 
collecting data from central and local institutions at a basic level only. In 2024, a pilot risk analysis 
report and the first  annual risk  analysis  report  were  prepared using  open-source and  hand-delivered 
data only. NACORAC continued to use test data to further analyse its software. In-house instant data 
transfer  from  the  Ministry  of  Interior’s  GÖC  NET  to  NACORAC  has  only  started  and  further 
capacity-building activities are ongoing. The risk analysis process remains limited, and negotiations 
on harmonising data patterns and efforts to sign protocols for improved data sharing with all relevant 
institutions are ongoing. 

Türkiye  still  lacks  a  national  IBM  strategy  and  an  updated  action  plan.  These  are  the  main  policy 
documents that would make it possible to coordinate national and international efforts and initiatives 
in this area under a single framework. To bring the country’s border management system in line with 
the  EU  acquis,  Türkiye  should  step  up  its  efforts  to  improve  interservice  and  international 
cooperation,  by  accelerating  the  adoption  of  an  IBM  strategy  and  updating  its  IBM  national 
implementation action plan from 2006. It would also need to enact new legislation and set up a non-
military  border  management  body  in  charge  of  all  aspects  of  border  management,  including  border 
surveillance at the ‘green’ border, which is under the responsibility of the Turkish Land Forces. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

6 The six benchmarks relate to the anti-terror law, personal data protection legislation, implementation of the 
EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, conclusion of an international agreement with the EU on Europol, 
implementation of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations on anti-corruption and 
judicial cooperation with all EU Member States. 
7 C(2025) 4694 final 

44 

 
 
 
Türkiye continued to invest significant efforts and financial resources in modernising border security 
at the land border, especially in the south and south-east of the country, with 75% of modular concrete 
wall construction activities on the Iranian border having been completed. The EU provides substantial 
support to Türkiye for modernising its border surveillance infrastructure, particularly for the electro-
optical communication and surveillance masts system. 

Relations  with  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency  (Frontex)  are  based  on  the 
memorandum of understanding of 2012. The memorandum should be renewed to reflect the revisions 
of the EBCG Regulation and in order to allow the EU and Türkiye to fully benefit from the Agency’s 
expanded mandate. The authorities continued to provide monthly reports on irregular migration flows 
at the country’s western land and sea borders. The PMM is now the national Frontex contact point. 
Focal  points  within  the  relevant  authorities,  i.e.  the  Turkish  Coast  Guard  and  the  Turkish  National 
Police  (the  Department  of  Combating  Migrant  Smuggling,  and  Border  Gates),  are  ensuring 
cooperation  and  communication  with  Frontex  and  its Liaison  Officer  in Ankara.  Several  significant 
interactions took place between Frontex and Turkish authorities throughout 2024. 

Cooperation  with  neighbouring  Greece  and  Bulgaria  through  the  trilateral  Police  and  Customs 
Cooperation  Centre  at  the  Bulgarian-Turkish  border  crossing  point  Kapitan  Andreevo / Kapıkule 
continued  in  the  form  of  data  sharing  and  regular  and  ad  hoc  meetings  between  the  countries’ 
respective authorities within the scope of existing agreements. 

Türkiye continued to contribute to INTERPOL’s databases, albeit only based on manual inquiries in 
case of need. INTERPOL’s stolen and lost travel documents database is not integrated into Türkiye’s 
local  database  and  there  is  no  access  to  other  international  police  databases.  Local  database 
connections are used by authorised officers of the Turkish National Police in all 81 provinces. 

2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA 

45 

Table 19:202220232024Türkiye - Key economic figuresGDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)1)62.068.072.071.0Real GDP growth 4.95.45.03.3Activity rate of the population aged 15+ (%), total52.053.153.354.2      female33.135.135.836.8      male71.371.471.271.9Unemployment rate of the population aged 15+ (%), total12.010.59.48.7      female14.713.512.711.8      male10.79.07.77.1Employment of the population aged 15+ (annual growth %)1.56.72.93.1Nominal wages (annual growth %)18.773.1106.391.8Consumer price index (annual growth %)13.772.353.958.5Exchange rate against EUR6.317.425.735.5Current account balance (% of GDP)-1.9-5.1-3.7-0.8Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP)0.91.00.40.4General government balance (% of GDP)-2.4-1.1-5.1-4.8General government debt (% of GDP)32.530.228.724.0Notes: 1) EurostatSources: Turkstat, Central Bank of Türkiye, Turkish Ministry of Treasury & Finance and Eurostat2016-21 average 
 
 
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy 

Economic governance 

political 

turmoil, 

Faced  with  the  economic  fallout  of 
the 
domestic 
authorities  further  tightened  their 
policy 
stance.  Domestic  political 
tensions  following  the  arrest  of  the 
in  March  2025 
mayor  of  Istanbul 
triggered  financial  turmoil  and  large 
capital  outflows.  The  authorities  took 
action to stem the fall of the lira, restore 
and  preserve 
investor 
financial  stability,  although  market 
interventions  led  to  a  sizeable  decrease 
of  official  reserves.  The  central  bank 
interrupted  its  rate-cutting  cycle  and 
raised  its  key  policy  rate  in  April,  before  resuming  monetary  easing  in  July.  It  also  took 
macroprudential measures to strengthen the monetary transmission mechanism and manage liquidity. 
In support of disinflation efforts, the 2025 budget sets a much lower deficit target, mostly reflecting 
the winding down of earthquake reconstruction spending. However, the target was revised upwards in 
early September, softening consolidation efforts.  

confidence, 

The policy guidance set out in the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 
2024 was only partially implemented, yet the rate of implementation improved markedly from 
previous  years.  In  line  with  the 
the  authorities 
recommendations, 
maintained 
tight 
overall 
an 
macroeconomic  policy  mix  and 
reduced 
deficit 
significantly  beyond  initial  plans, 
while 
their 
reconfirming 
commitment  to  sound  fiscal  policy 
over  the  medium-term.  They  also 
reduced 
rapidly 
winding  down  the  stock  of  foreign 
exchange  (FX)  guaranteed  deposits 
the  opening  and 
and 
renewal  of  such  accounts  in  August.  Tax  exemptions  were  curtailed  only  marginally  and  the 
government continued to subsidise fossil fuels. 

terminated 

risks  by 

budget 

fiscal 

the 

Macroeconomic stability 

Economic  growth  moderated  amid  weakening  domestic  demand.  Real  gross  domestic  product 
(GDP)  increased  by  3.3%  in  2024,  compared  with  5.0%  in  2023  and  the  5-year  average  of  5.1% 
(2019-2023). Household consumption and investment growth decelerated strongly, while net exports 
contributed  positively  to  real  GDP  growth,  largely  due  to  a  fall  in  imports.  Economic  activity 
contracted in industry and weakened in services but remained robust in agriculture and construction. 
Tight economic policies curtailed domestic demand and growth decelerated further to 2.3% year-on-
year  in  the  first  quarter  of  2025.  However,  domestic  demand  rebounded  somewhat  in  the  second 
quarter  on stronger  household  consumption,  investment  and  rising stocks,  driving  economic growth 
up to 4.8%. Türkiye’s per capita GDP in purchasing power standards slightly declined to 71% of the 
EU average in 2024, down from its peak of 72% in 2023. 

Türkiye’s  external  position  strengthened,  yet  vulnerabilities  remain.  External  imbalances 

46 

 
 
declined faster than expected and the current account deficit fell to 0.8% of GDP in 2024 and to 1.3% 
of  GDP  in  the  first  half  of  2025,  down  from  3.7%  in  2023.  Higher  capital  inflows  helped  rebuild 
official  FX  reserves,  which  reached  record-high  levels  in  early  2025  before  falling  in  early  spring 
amid  domestic  financial  turbulences.  However,  already  by  end-July  2025,  the  central  bank  reserves 
had largely recovered. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows were subdued at below 1% of GDP in 
2024, pointing to Türkiye’s untapped potential to attract FDI. The country risk premium declined, the 
lira  strengthened  in  real  terms,  and  external  debt  declined  to  around  38%  of  GDP  in  2024.  The 
improved external position was also instrumental in the upgrades of Türkiye’s sovereign credit rating 
last  year.  However,  the  domestic  political  tensions  in  the  spring  weakened  the  lira,  increased  the 
country  risk  premium,  and  triggered  large  capital  outflows.  Türkiye’s  5-year  credit  default  swap 
spread  increased  from  around  250  basis  points  in  mid-March  to  375  basis  points  in  mid-April. 
However, in September it fell below 250 basis points, a five-year low. 

reduce  exchange 

The  central  bank  remained  hawkish,  fighting  both  elevated  inflation  and  domestic  financial 
turmoil. The central bank kept its policy 
rate  at  50%  for  most  of  2024.  It  started 
its  rate-cutting  cycle  in  December  (250 
basis points), followed by two cuts (250 
basis points each) in January and March 
2025.  The  authorities  also  tightened  the 
caps  on  the  growth  of  certain  credit 
categories to help curb domestic demand 
and support disinflation. To stem market 
turmoil  and 
rate 
volatility  triggered  by  the  arrest  of  the 
mayor  of  Istanbul  in  March,  the  central 
bank increased its overnight lending rate 
by  200  basis  points  to  46%  and  took 
macroprudential  measures  to  strengthen  the  monetary  transmission  mechanism,  support  the  tight 
monetary stance, and manage lira and FX liquidity. In April, the bank tightened its policy further by 
increasing its 1-week repo auction rate (the key policy rate) to 46%, its overnight lending rate from 
46% to 49%, and the overnight borrowing rate from 41% to 44.5%. The monetary policy stance has 
remained tight even after the central bank resumed its easing cycle in July, with the key policy rate at 
40.5%  in  September.  This  stance  was  instrumental  in  bringing  down  inflation  and  inflation 
expectations,  and  in  markedly  improving  the  FX  position  of  the  central  bank.  However,  annual 
inflation  remained  elevated  at  33.0%  in  August.  Inflation  expectations  of  market  participants  (12-
month  ahead)  fell  to  22.8%,  but  expectations  of  the  real  sector  (37.7%)  and  households  (54.1%) 
remained very high. 

Fiscal consolidation advanced due to the winding-down of earthquake reconstruction spending. 
The 2024 accrual-based government deficit was 4.8% of GDP, broadly in line with the revised target 
but  markedly  below  the  initial  budget  plan.  While  the  deficit  also  decreased  in  comparison  to  the 
previous  year,  due  to  lower  earthquake-related  spending,  net  of  it  the  underlying  budget  deficit 
increased  in  2024.  The  2025  central  government  budget  targets  a  sizeable  reduction  of  the  budget 
deficit  to  3.1%  of  GDP,  supporting  the  fight  against  inflation,  again  largely  driven  by  lower 
earthquake  reconstruction  expenditure.  However,  this  target  was  revised  upwards  to  3.6%  of  GDP 
with  the  new  medium-term  economic  programme  (2025-2028)  adopted  in  September,  leaving  the 
underlying budget deficit broadly unchanged in 2025. In 2024, the government debt ratio declined to 
24.0% of GDP, helped by the strong denominator effect from the very high inflation.  

The authorities remained committed to lowering inflation, relying mostly on a tight monetary 
policy stance. A response to the financial turmoil that occurred in the spring of 2025, monetary policy 
was  tightened  further.  The  key  policy  rate  was  increased  significantly  above  current  and  expected 
inflation,  while  macroprudential  measures  additionally  tightened  financing  conditions.  However, 

47 

 
 
fiscal consolidation plans were relaxed with the medium-term programme update in September.  

Functioning of product markets 

Business environment 

The  authorities  took  some  limited  steps  to  improve  the  business  environment.  Insufficient 
transparency  and  predictability,  along  with  a  large  informal  economy,  remain  concerns.  In  January 
2025, Türkiye adopted a judicial reform package, which includes measures to increase the efficiency 
of the judiciary and strengthen the role of specialised courts. The results of the action plan to improve 
the business environment adopted in 2024 were not disclosed in the reporting period.  A new action 
plan  for  2025  was  adopted  in  July  2025  consisting  of  39  actions,  including  measures  on  data 
protection,  improving  the  functioning  of  judiciary  mainly  through  alternative  dispute  settlement, 
alignment  with  international  standards  on  public  procurement,  and  actions  on  green  and  digital 
transition,  largely  mirroring  the  measures  of  the  12th  Development  Plan.  Türkiye  still  lacks  a 
mechanism  for  systematically  consulting  business  organisations  and  social  partners  when  preparing 
new  legislation.  Even  though  alternative  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  have  been  promoted, 
commercial  judicial  processes  are  slow,  and  a  large  backlog  of  commercial  court  cases  remains. 
Market  exit  remains  costly  and  time  -consuming  due  to  complicated  insolvency  procedures. 
Nevertheless,  due  to  the  deteriorating  economic  conditions,  the  number  of  liquidated  companies 
increased by 12.1% and the number of closed companies went up by 21.4% compared with 2023. The 
number  of  newly  set  up  businesses  dropped  by  10.2%  in  2024.  Meanwhile,  the  acquisition  and 
management  of  companies  under  the  trusteeship  of  the  Savings  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  is  still 
conducted in a non-transparent manner. In June 2025, the trusteeship of the Fund was still managing 
654  companies  based  in  42  provinces  across  Türkiye,  with  a  total  asset  value  of  TRY 328 billion 
(EUR  8.3  billion)  and  23 838  employees.  Problems  in  enforcing  intellectual  property  rights  persist 
(see Chapter 7 – Intellectual property law). The government continued to implement its action plan to 
fight against the informal economy (2023-2025),  yet  the  lack  of  performance  indicators hinders  the 
monitoring  and  transparency  of  the  implementation  progress.  The  informal  sector’s  share  in  the 
economy remains structurally high and well above the OECD and EU averages. 

State influence on product markets 

Price-setting  interventions  persist,  and  State  aid  transparency  and  control  remains  weak.  The 
authorities introduced various import tariff quotas (e.g. for corn) and export restrictions (e.g. for eggs 
and  oil).  As  part  of  the  efforts  to  support  households,  residential  properties  consuming  less  than 
417 kWh per month are receiving a subsidy as of 1 April 2025. Furthermore, the government covers 
65%  of  the  cost  related  to  natural  gas  consumption  of  these  properties.  Regulatory  authorities 
continued  to  carry  out  extensive  price  audits  to  investigate  allegations  of  unfair  pricing  and 
stockpiling. The State aid law cannot be enforced due to the lack of implementing legislation and an 
operational institutional framework. In May 2025, Türkiye adopted a new State aid incentive scheme 
focusing  on  strategic  sectors,  the  green  transformation,  and  regional  development.  Türkiye  did  not 
formally establish a comprehensive State aid inventory or implement an action plan to align all State 
aid schemes with the EU acquis (see Chapter 8 – Competition policy). 

Privatisation and restructuring 

The  scope  of  privatisation  remains  limited.  This is  partly  because  Türkiye  has  already  privatised 
many  of  its  state-owned  enterprises.  The  Turkish  Wealth  Fund  (TWF)  has  a  portfolio  of  assets 
consisting  of  31  companies  from  the  financial  (including  state-owned  banks,  Borsa  Istanbul  and 
consolidated  public  insurance  companies),  telecommunications,  petrochemicals,  real  estate,  mining 
and iron/steel, agriculture and transport/logistics sectors. At the end of 2024, the TWF completed its 
first Sukuk issuance and signed an Islamic financing agreement worth USD 150 million with Dubai 
Islamic Bank, indicating Türkiye’s growing participation in Islamic finance markets. The TWF’s total 
assets increased to TRY 9.4 trillion in terms of value in 2023, up from TRY 5.6 trillion in 2022, yet its 
share in GDP declined from 37.3% to 35.2%. 

48 

 
 
Functioning of the financial market 

The  banking  sector  remained  stable.  The  pace  of  decline  of  bank  loans  –slowed  down,  and  by 
April, real lending started growing again. Lending activity was relatively weaker in the corporate and 
housing  loan  segments.  The  authorities  took  steps  to  gradually  simplify  the  complex  regulatory 
environment.  They  terminated  the  securities  maintenance  regulation  and  took  further  steps  to  wind 
down  other  disruptive  macroprudential  measures  in  2024.  However,  in  July  2025  the  central  bank 
introduced a new macroprudential package to support the lira. The share of FX -protected lira deposits 
declined rapidly from more than a quarter of the total deposit stock at their peak in 2023 to less than 
2%  in  September  2025,  removing  a  key  source  of  financial  sector  vulnerability,  the  central  bank 
terminated  the  opening  and  renewal  of  such  accounts  in  August.  Commercial  banks’  capitalisation, 
still favourably affected by forbearance measures, increased to 19.7% in 2024 (19.1% in 2023). Both 
profitability and capitalisation remained lower in state-owned banks. The non-performing loan ratio 
was 2.2% in July 2025 (1.7% in state banks) – increasing slowly since early 2024. In 2024, the central 
bank  recorded  a  significant  loss  for  a  second  year  in  a  row.  High  inflation  and  subdued  lending 
activity 
banking 
caused 
system assets to decline from 
87% of GDP in 2023 to 73% 
in  2024.  The 
share  of 
foreign-owned banks  in  total 
assets 
sector 
banking 
declined slightly to 24.4%. 

Functioning  of  the  labour 
market 

further, 

Labour  market  indicators 
improved 
but 
challenges 
structural 
labour 
remain.  Türkiye’s 
market remained robust. The 
participation rate (15+ age group) increased from 53.3% on average in 2023 to 54.2% in 2024,  and 
remained  elevated  at  54.3%  in  July  2025.  The  employment  rate  also  increased  from  to  48.3%  on 
average  in  2023  to  49.5%  in  2024,  and  49.8%  in  July  2025.  The  unemployment  rate  fell  further, 
reaching  8.3%  in  July.  The  gap  between  the  male  and  female  employment  rate  is  still  very  large 
(66.9% for men against 32.5% for women in 2024), and the unemployment rate for women stood at 
11.8%  in  2024.  Women’s  participation  in  the  labour  force  is  still  restricted  by  barriers  in  certain 
occupations,  traditional  gender  roles  and  gender  gaps  in  education,  limited  quality  and  affordable 
childcare  facilities  (largely  inaccessible  in  the  countryside),  and  insufficient  skills.  To  tackle  this 
restriction,  the  expansion  of  affordable  care  services  and  adoption  of  more  effective  active  labour 
market  programmes  is  pertinent.  The  composite  measure  of  labour  underutilisation  increased  from 
22.8% in 2023 to 26.7% in 2024 (from 30.6% to 35.3% for women), and further to 31.6% (40.1% for 
women;  highest  on  record)  in  the  second  quarter  of  2025,  as  time  -related  underemployment 
increased. Young people still have difficulties entering the labour market. The youth unemployment 
rate (15-24) declined from 17.4% in 2023 to 16.3% in 2024, before increasing again to 17.3% in July 
2025.  The  share  of  young  people  not  in  employment,  education  or  training  remained  unchanged  at 
22.1% in  the  second  quarter  of  2025.  Regional  labour  market  disparities  continued  to  decline,  with 
unemployment rates across different provinces ranging from 4.0% to 18.3% in 2024. With a view to 
lowering inflationary pressures, the gross minimum wage was raised only once in 2024, and again by 
30% (below the inflation rate) at the beginning of 2025. 

2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 

Education and innovation 

49 

 
 
While  efforts  to  improve  human  capital  continue,  skills  mismatches  remain  a  significant 
challenge. Expenditure on education was 4.3% of GDP in 2023, up from 3.9% in 2022. Government 
spending was 3.6% of GDP in 2023, increasing by 0.5 percentage points from 2022. In the 2023/2024 
school  year,  net  enrolment  rates  increased  at  the  primary  level  and  slightly  at  the  lower  secondary 
level,  while  declining  marginally  for  preschool  and  significantly  for  upper-secondary  and  higher 
education  (see  Chapter  26  –  Education  and  culture).  Addressing  skills  mismatches  remains  a  key 
challenge in making the economy more competitive. In the 2022 Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) survey carried out by the OECD, students in Türkiye performed below the OECD 
average  in  mathematics,  reading  and  science.  Türkiye  also  continues  to  score  poorly in  educational 
attainment in the Global Gender Gap Index calculated by the World Economic Forum, ranking only 
127th out of 146 countries in 2024. While the share of students in vocational and technical secondary 
education increased by 4 percentage points to 30.1% in 2024, further measures are needed to improve 
the quality of and access to vocational education and training (VET). 

Innovation  outcomes  improved,  but  are  still  lagging  behind  the  EU  average.  After  dropping  to 
1.3%  of  GDP  in  2022,  the  research  and  development  (R&D)  expenditure  ratio  rose  marginally  to 
1.4% in 2023. However, the gap from the EU average of 2.2% remains significant. The private sector 
is  the  primary  driver  of  R&D,  accounting  for  65.1%  of  R&D  expenditure  in  2023,  reflecting  an 
increase  of  3.7  percentage  points  from  2022.  In  March  2025,  Türkiye  announced  its  Industry  and 
Technology Strategy for 2030, which aims to increase the share of R&D expenditure to 2.2% of GDP 
by 2030. In the Global Innovation Index 2024, Türkiye ranked 37th out of 133 countries, a significant 
improvement over  the  last decade.  However, the performance  of the  innovation  system  lags  behind 
that of its European peers, with Türkiye being an emerging innovator, with its performance at 51.7% 
of  the  EU  average  in  2024.  In  2024,  the  total  number  of  granted  patents  increased  by  15.9%  in 
comparison with 2023, and was close to its 5-year average. The number of domestic patents granted 
in Türkiye increased by 33.7% and the number of international patents increased by 9.8% in 2024 in 
comparison with 2023. 

Physical capital and quality of infrastructure 

Investment  activity  decelerated  slightly  amid  tight  financial  conditions.  Total  gross  capital 
formation accounted for 31% of GDP in 2024, down by 0.9 percentage points from 2023. The decline 
was particularly pronounced for machinery and equipment investment, while the share of construction 
in total investment increased to 45.2% in 2024, mostly due to reconstruction efforts in the aftermath 
of  the  February  2023  earthquakes  and  urban  transformation  plans.  Türkiye  retains  its  ambition  of 
becoming a regional energy hub, investing heavily in expanding its liquified natural gas import and 
regasification  capacity  as  well  as  natural  gas  storage  capacity.  The  share  of  renewable  energy 
continued  to  increase,  reaching  60%  of  the  installed  power  in  operation  in  April  2025  and  45%  of 
energy  generation  in  2024.  Türkiye  continues  its  efforts  to  accelerate  the  digitalisation  process  by 
extending the  scope  of  e-government  services,  regulating  and  monitoring  e-commerce markets,  and 
supporting the digitalisation of small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Türkiye ranks 10th out of 
35  countries  (EU,  European  Free  Trade  Association,  and  enlargement  countries)  in  the  latest  e-
government benchmark report (2022-2023), with an overall score of 83% in e-government maturity, 
which  is  above  the  EU  average  (76%).  Digitalisation  efforts  in  businesses  continued,  with  96%  of 
companies having internet access in 2024, while the proportion of individuals using the internet for 
buying or ordering goods or services for private use increased from 49.5 % in 2023 to 51.7% in 2024. 

Sectoral and enterprise structure 

The economy is diversified, with a well-developed service sector and strong manufacturing base. 
The share of services in GDP increased to 57.5% in 2024, up 3.2 percentage points from 2023. The 
industry’s  share  declined  from  22.8%  in  2023  to  19.7%  in  2024.  Driven  mostly  by  earthquake 
reconstruction  efforts,  the  construction  sector’s  share  in  GDP  rose  from  5.4%  in  2023  to  5.8%  in 
2024,  but  it  remained  significantly  below  its  pre-2019  levels.  Facing  productivity  challenges,  the 
agriculture  sector’s  share  fell  further  to  5.8%  of  GDP  in  2024.  SMEs  are  the  backbone  of  the 
economy, accounting for 70.5% of employment in 2023 and 40.1% of the total value added in 2023, 
50 

 
 
increasing by around 4 percentage points compared with 2022. Approximately 55.6% of SMEs in the 
manufacturing  sector  operated  in  low  technology  sectors  in  2023.  Türkiye  continued  to  implement 
various economic support schemes that target SMEs, yet access to and the cost of long-term finance 
remain a problem. 

Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness  

Economic  integration  with  the  EU  is  high.  Türkiye  is  the  EU’s  fifth  largest  trading  partner, 
representing  4.2%  of  the  EU’s  total  trade  in  goods  with  non-EU  countries  in  2024,  compared  with 
4.1%  in  2023,  while  the  EU  is  Türkiye’s  largest  trading  partner.  The  EU’s  share  of  Turkish  goods 
exports  increased  to  41.4%  in  2024,  up  from  40.8%  in  2023.  The  share  of  Turkish  goods  imports 
originating from the EU increased from 29.3% in 2023 to 32.1% in 2024, but it is still below its long-
term  average.  Russia’s  share  in  Turkish  merchandise  exports  fell  to  3.3%  in  2024,  down  from  a 
historic high of 4.3% in 2023. The nominal value of imports of goods from Russia declined in 2024, 
largely  influenced  by  lower  international  energy  prices,  but  Russia’s  share  remained  significant  at 
12.8% of total goods imports. 

The EU’s share of FDI inflows into Türkiye was 55% in 2024. Trade openness significantly declined 
to  55%  in  2024  mainly  due  to  lower  deflators  of  both  exports  and  imports  of  goods  and  services. 
Türkiye took steps to address some of the trade barriers with the EU, reducing their number from 26 
in early 2021 to 14 in early 2025. 

2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL  

Chapter 5: Public procurement 

EU  rules  ensure  that  the  public  procurement  of  goods  and  services  in  any  Member  State  is 
transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal treatment. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The  legal  framework  on  public  procurement  remains  only  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis. 
Concerns remain over the legislation containing discriminatory practices, including compulsory use of 
domestic  price  advantage  and  offsets,  that  allow  authorities  to  demand  compensatory  measures  if 
goods are not produced domestically. Major infrastructure projects using public-private partnerships 
are frequently excluded from public procurement rules. The number of exclusions that are not in line 
with the EU acquis continued to increase in 2024, narrowing the scope of public procurement rules. 
The  legislation  also  allows  Türkiye  to  further  expand  the  scope  of  exclusions  by  requiring  public 
institutions  and  organisations  to  procure  specific  goods  and  services  from  the  State  Supply  Office. 
Sector-specific laws continue to restrict transparency. 

A  coherent  framework  for  coordinating,  supervising  and  monitoring  public-private  partnership 
operations is still lacking. 

Türkiye’s Medium-Term Economic Programme (2025-2027) and Development Plan (2024-2028) use 
public procurement to promote domestic production and technology transfer, and reduce the foreign 
51 

 
 
 
trade deficit by favouring domestic products. 

The institutional framework still needs further strengthening to ensure the operational independence 
of the Public Procurement Board (PPB) within the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) is secured. It 
remains  potentially  impaired  since  the  President  is  authorised  to  directly  appoint  the  chair  and 
members without specific regard to candidates' education or sector experience. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

In 2024, despite the increase of Türkiye's public procurement market in value, its size as a share of 
GDP  slightly  declined  to  5.6%,  down  from  6.1%  in  2023.  The  PPA  has  expanded  the  scope  of  its 
public procurement platform (EKAP), effective from August 2025, to enable the electronic execution 
of  tenders,  direct  procurement,  and  related  contracts.  However,  in  2024  Türkiye  continued  an 
excessive  use  of  negotiated  procedure,  which  corresponded  to  31.26%  and  43.79%  (compared  with 
30.13% and 43.27% in 2023) of the total tenders, respectively, in terms of value and number. When 
tenders with limited competition are excluded (i.e., restricted tenders, negotiated tenders, derogations 
and  direct  awards)  only  39.7%  of  the  public  procurement  market  (in  value)  is  open  to  fair 
competition.  Also,  the  implementation  of  the  domestic  price  advantage  in  international  tenders 
increased  to  54.39%  and  41.62%  (up  from  48.68%  and  40.35%  in  2023)  in  value  and  number 
respectively. The extensive use of these practices leads to allegations of political influence over public 
tenders. A risk indicator system is also required to detect potential integrity issues in the procurement 
process. 

Regarding the capacity to manage public procurement processes, the PPA remains stable with 322 
staff. The level of monitoring of contract awards and implementation remains satisfactory. The PPA 
publishes  statistics  every  six  months  for  measuring  the  performance,  while  it  held  trainings  to 
contracting authorities, with 6 359 participants (compared with 5 287 in 2023).  

Mechanisms  remain  in  place  to  identify  and  prevent  corruption  and  fraudulent  practices  in  public 
procurement, including rules on integrity and conflict of interest. 

Efficient remedy system 

The right to a legal remedy is provided by the Constitution, and the PPL established an institutional 
framework  and  a  system  for  handling  complaints.  However,  the  mechanism  needs  to  be  further 
aligned with the EU remedies directives. The appointment policy and the PPB’s position as part of the 
PPA is a source of concern. Establishing a completely independent procurement review board that is 
distinct  from  the  PPA  and  guaranteeing  the  independence  of  board  members  remains  a  pending 
priority.  The  PPB  received  1  924  complaints  (2.96%  of  contracts)  in  2024,  compared  with  1  626 
(2.2%) in 2023. 

Chapter 18: Statistics 

European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the 
principles  and  quality  criteria  elaborated  in  the  Regulation  on  European  statistics,  such  as 
professional  independence,  impartiality,  reliability,  accessibility  and  statistical  confidentiality. 
Common  rules  are  provided  for  the  methodology,  production  and  dissemination  of  statistical 
information,  which  are  further  specified  in  sectoral  legislation  that  constitute  the  EU  acquis  on 
statistics. 

On statistical infrastructure, Türkiye’s statistics legislation is based on European standards and the 
principles  of  the  European  Statistics  Code  of  Practice.  The  number  of  members  and  representative 
institutions  in  the  Statistical  Council  were  increased  through  a  legislative  amendment.  Concerns 
persist over the credibility of TurkStat and the declining public trust in key macroeconomic statistics. 
The  institution  still  lacks  transparent  appointment  and  dismissal  procedures,  including  professional 
criteria  for  the  appointment  of  TurkStat’s  President.  Türkiye  further  improved  the  use  of  public 
institutions'  administrative  records  and  continued  strengthening  cooperation  between  TurkStat  and 

52 

 
 
other  data  providers.  However,  there  is  a  significant  number  of  data  which  are  flagged  as  non-
publishable. 

As regards classifications and registers, registers in the statistical office are updated regularly. The 
main classifications are aligned with the EU acquis. 

On macroeconomic statistics, Türkiye improved the level of compliance of its national accounts in 
terms of timeliness and provision of data, but further efforts are needed to close the remaining gaps in 
data  reporting.  Türkiye  transmitted  non-financial  sector  accounts  data  for  2009-2023.  TurkStat 
provided regional accounts for 2024, but there is still room for improvement in terms of coverage of 
indicators. Concerning the Gross National Income (GNI), Türkiye has made efforts to fully align its 
GNI calculations with the European system of accounts 2010, yet some methodological improvements 
are still needed, such as for imputed rents and completeness of exhaustiveness. The GNI inventory is 
generally not fully aligned with the Eurostat’s GNI Inventory Guide, and the transmission of national 
accounts data does not always occur in a timely manner. Türkiye continued to improve the quality and 
timeliness  of  the  transmission  of  excessive  deficit  procedure  (EDP)  data,  but  additional  efforts  are 
required  to  address  methodological  issues,  while  ensuring  the  completeness  of  the  transmission  of 
EDP  notifications  and  government  finance  statistics. In  2024,  Türkiye  transmitted  quarterly  general 
government  debt  data  for  the  first  time,  but  did  not  send  the  supply,  use,  and  input-output  tables. 
Türkiye produces good quality statistics in international trade in goods. It has sent international trade 
in  services  statistics  for  the  years  2022  and  2023,  but  needs  to  improve  the  timeliness  and  the 
completeness  of  the  dataset.  Türkiye  does not  provide  monthly balance  of  payments, and data  gaps 
remain  in  the  areas  of  international  investment  positions  and  foreign  direct  investment  statistics. 
TurkStat started providing harmonised indices of consumer prices administered prices in 2025. 

As  regards  business  statistics,  TurkStat  has  progressed  in  aligning  with  the  new  requirements  in 
short-term business statistics, particularly in terms of data quality and completeness. Eurostat received 
the  monthly  index  of  production  in  construction  from  January  2017.  R&D  statistics,  as  well  as 
railway,  maritime  and  regional  transport  statistics  have  a  high  level  of  compliance.  The  annual 
surveys on the use of information and communication technologies are largely compliant with the EU 
acquis.  

Social  statistics  are  highly  compliant  with  the  EU  acquis.  TurkStat  continued  transmitting  labour 
force  survey  quarterly  data.  It  has  improved  the  regularity  and  timeliness  of  data  transmission  on 
monthly unemployment, but there is still room to improve. Türkiye transmits part of demographic and 
international migration statistics, but it does not collect statistics on asylum and managed migration in 
line with the EU acquis. 

On agricultural statistics, the implementation of the agricultural census is ongoing. As a result of the 
census,  the  integrated  farm  statistics  should  now  be  completed.  Statistics  for  most  of the  crops and 
animal  production  are  available  and  sent  to  Eurostat.  Cereals  and  oil  seed  crop  balances  are  also 
transmitted to Eurostat. The economic accounts for agriculture are still not fully in line with the EU 
acquis.  

Monthly and annual energy statistics and data on energy prices are sent regularly. Türkiye produces 
most of the environmental statistics. Further progress is still needed on waste generation statistics.  

Chapter 32: Financial control 

The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, 
sound  financial  management  of  income  and  expenditure,  and  external  audit  of  public  funds.  The 
financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of 
EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting. 

Public internal financial control 

The strategic framework is partially in place. Türkiye currently lacks a coherent strategic framework 
for  public  administration  reform  and  public  finance  management.  Similarly,  the  public  internal 

53 

 
 
financial  control  policy  paper  has  not  been  updated  since  2013.  Inconsistencies  in  the  different 
planning  documents  and  strategies,  as  well  as  a  lack  of  coordination  on  regular  monitoring  and 
reporting, undermine the credibility of both the public finance management framework and strategies 
outlined in the policy documents. 

Türkiye has a uniform administrative management structure that incorporates aspects of managerial 
accountability  and  delegation  with  a  results-oriented  performance  management  system.  All  public 
institutions  are  governed  by  the  public  financial  management  and  control  law  (PFMC),  which  also 
outlines  the  components  of  financial  control.  Further  efforts  are  required  to  harmonise  legislation, 
managerial  accountability,  including  reporting  structures,  decision-making  delegation  and  internal 
control operations. 

Internal  control  is  governed  by  the  PFMC  and  is  largely  compliant  with  international  standards. 
However,  capacity  and  ownership  problems  continue  to  undermine  the  implementation  of  internal 
control systems. Further improvement is needed in risk management practice, as well as monitoring 
and  reporting  of  irregularities.  Concerns  on  the  listing  of  local  administrations  and  state-owned 
enterprises in Türkiye’s treasury single account remain. 

The  PFMC  regulates  internal  audit  practices  in  line  with  international  standards.  However,  the 
purpose,  authority  and  responsibility  of  internal  audit  remain  undermined  by  the  lack  of  a  legal 
requirement  to  have  internal  audit  units  in  ministries.  Furthermore,  the  status  of  internal  audit  unit 
heads must be legalised; the number of internal auditors needs to be increased; and related manuals 
are required to be updated. There is no systematic follow-up procedure to ensure that agreed internal 
audit recommendations are implemented. The lack of clarity in the legislation and in practice between 
the internal audit and inspection organisations jeopardises the internal audit function’s effectiveness. 

The Internal Audit Coordination Board is the central harmonisation unit for internal audit, whereas the 
Directorate-General for Public Financial Management and Transformation of the Ministry of Treasury 
and Finance is the central harmonisation unit for financial management and control. Further action is 
needed to ensure its independence and improve its capacity, organisational structure and resources to 
fulfil its mandate. 

External audit 

The  constitutional  and  legal  framework  provide  for  the  independence  of  the  Turkish  Court  of 
Accounts  (TCA).  Concerns  regarding  the  fiscal  discipline,  transparency  and  accountability  of  the 
Türkiye Wealth Fund (TWF), which is chaired by the President of the Republic and not fully subject 
to  direct  audit  by  the  TCA,  remain.  The  TWF  is  audited  by  an  independent  audit  firm  and  State 
Supervisory Council appointed by the President. However, TCA is not allowed to audit all companies 
in  the  TWF  portfolio.  The  audit  reports  on  the  TWF  operations  are  not  publicly  available.  The 
Disaster  Reconstruction  Fund,  created  in  2023  to  manage  the  funds  allocated  to  disaster  recovery 
work, which is exempt from the general budget and the TCA audit scope, is not yet operational. 

The  Turkish  Court  of  Accounts  law  complies  with  International  Organisation  of  Supreme  Audit 
Institutions  standards.  It  establishes  an  almost  exhaustive  audit  mandate  and  allows  the  TCA  full 
discretion in performing its responsibilities. The TCA submits four audit reports a year to Parliament 
in  addition  to  a  statement  of  general  conformity.  However,  the  TCA  reports  are  only  evaluated  by 
Parliament during its budget deliberations. 

On the impact of audit work, TCA reports, excluding those on state-owned economic enterprises, are 
released  online  on  an  annual  basis.  More  parliamentary  oversight  of  TCA  audit  findings, 
recommendations and the performance of public institutions is needed. There is no efficient follow-up 
procedure  to  ensure  that  the  agreed  recommendations  are  implemented  in  a  systematic  and  timely 
manner by the audited institutions. The discussion of budget and audit issues needs to be separated. 

Protection of the EU’s financial interests 

While Türkiye’s legislation still needs to be fully compliant with the EU Directive on the fight against 

54 

 
 
fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law, the country maintains a good level of 
alignment with the EU acquis. The State Supervisory Council has been designated as the anti-fraud 
coordination service in 2019. There is no national anti-fraud strategy. In the previous year Türkiye 
reported  203cases  to  the  Commission  via  the  online  Irregularity  Management  System.  Türkiye 
cooperates  well  with  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  and  should  continue  building  up  the  track 
record of cooperation on investigations as well as on reporting of irregularities. 

Protection of the euro against counterfeiting 

Türkiye has reached a high level of alignment with the EU acquis in this area. Technical analysis of 
counterfeit  currency,  including  euro  banknotes,  are  conducted  by  a  specialised  department  of  the 
central bank. Furthermore, the Turkish State Mint carries out technical analyses of counterfeit coins, 
including  euro  coins.  Financial  penalties  are  imposed  on  financial  institutions  that  fail  to  withdraw 
counterfeits from circulation. 

3. 

GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION  

Cyprus  

Türkiye continued to refuse to recognise and cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus. Despite repeated 
calls by the European Council and the Commission, Türkiye has yet to fulfil its obligations as outlined 
in the Declaration of the European Community and its Member States of 21 September 2005 and in 
Council Conclusions, including those of December 2006 and December 2015. Türkiye did not fulfil 
its obligation to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to 
the Association Agreement and did not remove all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including 
restrictions on direct transport links with the Republic of Cyprus. Türkiye also refused to cooperate 
with the Republic of Cyprus on security-related issues, including terrorism. Türkiye continued to veto 
applications  by  the  Republic  of  Cyprus  to  join  several  international  organisations,  including  the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 

In the reporting period, Türkiye did not carry out any unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States 
as well as to upholding regional stability. In November 2024, following the fifth annual review of the 
framework  for  restrictive  measures  in  response  to  Türkiye’s  unauthorised  drilling  activities  in  the 
Eastern Mediterranean, the European Council extended its restrictive measures for a further year, until 
30 November 2025. Currently, one individual is subject to sanctions. 

Türkiye’s  military  exercises  in  the  maritime  zones  of  Cyprus  continued.  The  flights  of  Turkish 
unmanned  aerial  vehicles  in  the  flight  information  region  and  national  airspace  of  the  Republic  of 
Cyprus  also  continued  unabated.  Türkiye  continued  upgrading  its  military  drone  base  in  Lefkoniko 
and naval base in Bogazi. Harassment of Cypriot fishing vessels and IUU fishing activities by Türkiye 
continued to be reported.  

Türkiye again criticised the decision of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to renew the mandate of the 
UN  Peacekeeping  Force  in  Cyprus  (UNFICYP)  without  the  consent  of  the  Turkish  Cypriot 
community, and accused UNFICYP of bias. UNFICYP’s mandated authority extends throughout the 
island of Cyprus, and restrictions on its freedom of movement can pose serious risks to the safety and 
security of UN personnel serving in peacekeeping operations. 

Despite international condemnations, and the inadmissibility of the settlement of any parts of Varosha 
by people other than its inhabitants as provided for in UNSC Resolution 550 (1984), Türkiye did not 
reverse its actions to open the entire fenced-off area of Varosha, thereby further entrenching the fait 
accompli on the ground. The restrictions imposed in 2022 on the activities of UNFICYP within the 
fenced-off area of Varosha remained in effect – challenging UNFICYP’s ability to execute its tasks in 
accordance  with  its  mandate,  and  violating  UNSC  Resolution  789  (1992).  On  19  July  2025,  five 
Greek  Cypriots  were  arrested,  detained  and  prosecuted  while  visiting  their  property  in  the  non-

55 

 
 
 
government controlled areas.  

In  November  2024,  the  Turkish  and  Cypriot  Presidents  briefly  met  in  the  margins  of  the  European 
Political  Community  Summit  in  Budapest.  The  Turkish  Foreign  Minister  also  participated  in  the 
informal  gatherings  on  Cyprus  in  Geneva  and  New  York.  These  meetings  were  hosted  by  the  UN 
Secretary-General  (UNSG)  in  the  broader  format  including  the  two  Cypriot  leaders  and  senior 
representatives of the Guarantor Powers (Greece, Türkiye, and the UK). They followed the informal 
meeting convened by UNSG with the two Cypriot leaders in New York in October 2024. In Geneva, 
the participants agreed, among other things, to the reappointment of a Personal Envoy by the UNSG. 
During these meetings, the Turkish Foreign Minister expressed a commitment to sustaining dialogue 
on  the  way  forward  and  to  pursuing  initiatives  that  aim  to  build  trust.  A  tripartite  meeting  on  the 
Cyprus  issue  also  took  place  in  New  York  in  September  2025,  with  the  participation  of  the  of  the 
UNSG and the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. 

Türkiye  continued  to  advocate  for  a  ‘two-state  solution’  in  Cyprus,  contrary  to  relevant  UNSC 
Resolutions,  stating  that  any  process  seeking  a  bi-zonal,  bi-communal  federation  would  not  be 
successful.  The  internationally  not  recognised  ‘Turkish  Republic  of  Northern  Cyprus’  has  been 
participating as an observer in the Organization of Turkic States since 2022. The EU recognises only 
the  Republic  of  Cyprus  as  a  subject  of  international  law  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  UNSC 
Resolutions  and  has  stressed  that  any  action  to  facilitate  or  assist  in  any  way  the  international 
recognition  of  the  Turkish  Cypriot  secessionist  entity  severely  damages  efforts  to  pave  the  way  for 
formal settlement talks under the auspices of the UN. 

The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN 
framework,  in  accordance  with  all  relevant  UNSC  Resolutions  and  in  line  with  the  principles  on 
which the EU is founded and its acquis. The EU has expressed, most recently in the European Council 
Conclusions of December 2024, its readiness to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-
led process, with all the appropriate means at its disposal. The EU attaches particular importance to 
the  resumption  of  and  progress  in  the  Cyprus  settlement  talks  in  further  strengthening  EU-Türkiye 
cooperation. In December 2024, the EU welcomed the steps taken by the UNSG for a resumption of 
settlement talks, and in May 2025, it welcomed the reappointment of the UNSG’s Personal Envoy on 
Cyprus. In May 2025, the European Commission appointed a Special Envoy for Cyprus.   

As  emphasised  in  the  Negotiating  Framework  and  Council  declarations,  Türkiye  is  expected  to 
actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue 
within  the  UN  framework,  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  UNSC  Resolutions  and  in  line  with  the 
principles on which the EU is founded and the EU  acquis. It is important that Türkiye reaffirms its 
commitment to the UN-led settlement talks on Cyprus in line with the relevant UNSC Resolutions, 
including their external aspects. No unilateral actions should be taken that could raise tensions on the 
island  and  prevent  the  resumption  of  talks.  On  Varosha,  Türkiye  must  immediately  reverse  the 
unilateral actions announced on 20 July 2021 and all steps taken since October 2020 that run contrary 
to  the relevant  UNSC  Resolutions.  The  EU  underlines  the importance  of  the  status  of  Varosha  and 
calls for full respect of UNSC Resolutions (particularly Resolutions 550, 789 and 1251). 

Peaceful settlement of border disputes 

The  positive  climate  and  re-engagement  between  Türkiye  and  Greece  continued.  In  addition  to  a 
number of ministerial meetings, the Greek Prime Minister and the Turkish President met in September 
2024 in New York during the UN General Assembly, in November 2024 in Budapest on the sidelines 
of the European Political Community Summit, and in June 2025 in The Hague on the sidelines of the 
NATO Summit. On 20 October 2025, the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs met in the margins of the 
Ministerial Meeting on Cross-Regional Security and Connectivity in Luxembourg. 

On  the  basis  of  the  December  2023  Athens  Declaration  on  Friendly  Relations  and  Good 
Neighbourliness  signed  by  the  two  leaders,  Turkish  and  Greek  delegations  met  several  times  to 
discuss  military  confidence-building  measures,  complemented  by  separate  meetings  between  both 
countries’  respective  coast  guard  authorities.  The  last  round  of  political  dialogue  at  the  level  of 
56 

 
 
Deputy  Foreign  Ministers  was  held  in  Ankara  on  12 June.  The  implementation  of  the  short-stay 
tourist  visit  scheme  for  Turkish  nationals  to  visit  12  Greek  islands  in  order  to  promote  people-to-
people contacts between Greece and Türkiye was extended. Despite the positive atmosphere and the 
ongoing dialogue, the unresolved dispute over the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones 
continued  to  strain  bilateral  relations.  In  April  2025,  Türkiye  rejected  the  publication  of  the  Greek 
Maritime  Spatial  Plan,  which  Greece  must  draw  up  and  implement  under  the  relevant  Directive8, 
while  declaring  its  readiness  to  cooperate  with  Greece  in  the  Aegean  Sea.  In  June  2025,  Türkiye 
presented  its  maritime  spatial  planning,  challenging  Greece’s  sovereign  rights  and  jurisdiction.  In 
August 2025, it announced the establishment of  two marine parks extending into areas under Greek 
jurisdiction.  Türkiye  also  persisted  in  objecting  to  Greece’s  establishment  of  three  marine  parks 
entirely within Greek territorial waters. Türkiye continued to systematically issue general navigational 
warnings  – ostensibly for aeronautical exercises – making demilitarisation claims regarding Eastern 
Aegean islands assigned to Greece under international treaties, thereby implicitly challenging Greek 
sovereignty,  sovereign  rights  and  jurisdiction.  The  inclusion  of  the  doctrine  of  “Blue  Homeland” 
(Mavi Vatan) in Turkish school textbooks is a cause of concern. 

The possible extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean Sea under Article 
3 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) continued to weigh on Greece--Türkiye 
relations. The 1995 declaration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly that any unilateral action by 
Greece to extend its territorial waters would be considered a casus belli still holds.  

No  flights  of  Turkish  military  jets  over  Greek  inhabited  areas  have  been  reported  since  February 
2023.  There  were  several  months  of  near-zero  incidents,  but  subsequently    violations  of  Greek 
airspace and traffic regulations were reported. Türkiye continued to impede survey activities for the 
Great  Sea  Interconnector,  an  EU  project  of  common  interest.  Türkiye  insists  on  its  plans  for  an 
electricity  interconnector  with  the  so-called,  internationally  non-recognised,  ‘Turkish  Republic  of 
Northern  Cyprus’  in  the  nongovernment  controlled  areas  of  the  Republic  of  Cyprus.  Violations  of 
Greek  territorial  waters  continued  to  be  reported,  with  a  noticeable  increase  in  incidents  compared 
with the previous reporting period.  

Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international 
agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if necessary, to the International 
Court of Justice. Türkiye must: (i) avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations; 
(ii)  normalise  its  relations  with  the  Republic  of  Cyprus;  and  (iii) respect  the  sovereignty  of  all  EU 
Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including the 
right  to  explore  and  exploit  natural  resources  in  accordance  with  EU  and  international  law,  in 
particular the UNCLOS. 

The  2019  memorandum  of  understanding  (MoU)  on  the  delimitation  of  maritime  jurisdiction  areas 
between Türkiye and the Libyan Government of National Unity (GNU) infringes the sovereign rights 
of third states,  does  not comply  with  the  UNCLOS  and  cannot  produce  any  legal  consequences  for 
third states. Türkiye has still not ratified the October 2022 MoU between Türkiye and Libya’s GNU 
for  the  development  of  bilateral  scientific,  technical,  technological,  legal,  administrative  and 
commercial  cooperation  in  the  field  of  hydrocarbons  on  land  and  at  sea.  In  June  2025,  Libya’s 
National  Oil  Corporation  signed  an  MoU  with  Türkiye’s  state  oil  company  (TPAO)  to  conduct 
geological  and  geophysical  studies  in  four  offshore  areas.  This  agreement  strengthens  the 
operationalisation of the 2019 MoU. 

Regional cooperation 

Good  neighbourly  relations  are  an  essential  part  of  Türkiye’s  accession  process.  In  the  reporting 
period,  bilateral  relations  with  other  enlargement  countries  were  good.  However,  they  remained 

8  Directive  2014/89/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23 July 2014  establishing  a  framework  for 
maritime spatial planning. 

57 

 
 
 
challenging with some neighbouring EU Member States, particularly Greece and Cyprus. Tensions in 
the  Aegean  and  Eastern  Mediterranean  have  been  markedly  reduced  after  the  February  2023 
earthquakes, and this continued during the reporting period. Türkiye should avoid actions that could 
undermine  regional  stability.  Illegal  unreported  and  unregular  (IUU)  fishing  activities  of  Türkiye’s 
flying vessels continue to be reported. The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those 
of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. 

Türkiye’s  policy  in  the  Western  Balkans  remained  aligned  with  the  EU’s  strategic  objectives  of 
regional  stability,  Euro-Atlantic  integration  and  economic  development.  The  EU  and  Türkiye  hold 
regular  political  consultations  on  the  Western  Balkans,  most  recently  in  September  2025.  Türkiye 
portrayed itself as an EU partner in the region, while leveraging its distinctive cultural, religious and 
economic  ties.  In  July  2025,  the  inaugural  meeting  of  the  ’Balkans  Peace  Platform’  took  place  in 
Istanbul,  with  the  participation  of  Foreign  Ministers  from  the  region  (Türkiye  and  the  six  Western 
Balkan countries). In October 2024, the Turkish President visited the Western Balkan countries. Trade 
and economic cooperation, as well as investment opportunities, remained the main topics on Ankara’s 
bilateral agenda with all Western Balkan countries, thus providing for regional connectivity, stability 
and security. Strengthening military and defence cooperation became a standing bilateral item, in line 
with Türkiye’s commitment to strengthening military capabilities and modernising the armed forces 
of Western Balkans countries. This positioned Ankara as an arms exporter and boosted its investments 
in  the  defence  industry  and  its  collaboration,  training  activities,  and  provision  of  equipment  and 
logistical support, all within the framework of bilateral military cooperation agreements. Bilaterally, 
Türkiye continued to ask all countries to act against the Gülen movement and its alleged members, 
calling for extraditions and closures of affiliated schools and businesses. 

Türkiye and Albania strengthened their strategic partnership and bilateral ties across multiple sectors. 
High-level visits took place within the framework of the Strategic Cooperation Council. In October 
2024, the Turkish President and the Albanian Prime Minister inaugurated the  Namazgah mosque of 
Tirana, which was built with the support of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and 
is now the largest mosque in the Balkan region. Türkiye continued to support the modernisation of the 
Albanian Armed Forces. 

Türkiye  remained  a  close  partner  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  committed  to  its  political  unity, 
territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty.  It  maintained  regular  contacts  with  all  members  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina’s  tripartite  Presidency,  with  strong  diplomatic  ties  and  frequent  visits  at  all  levels. 
Türkiye  stated  its  willingness  to  engage  with  all  parties  in  the  country  and  the  region,  including 
through bilateral and trilateral formats, stressing the importance of regional stability and security. 

Türkiye  maintained  good  relations  with  Serbia,  considering  it  as  an  important  country  for  regional 
stability.  The  fourth  meeting  of  the  Türkiye-Serbia  High-level  Cooperation  Council  took  place  in 
Belgrade  in  October  2024,  chaired  by  the  two  Presidents,  who  agreed  to  strengthen  defence 
cooperation.  Disagreement  over  Türkiye’s  support  to  Kosovo’s  membership  of  international 
organisations (the Council of Europe) remains. 

Türkiye maintained strong cultural and economic ties with Kosovo* and continued to advocate for its 
international recognition. Cooperation in the defence industry continued. Türkiye supports Kosovo’s 
stability,  territorial  integrity,  development  and  integration  with  European  and  Euro-Atlantic 
institutions. In this regard, Türkiye supports the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Process. 

Türkiye’s  relations  with  Montenegro  remained  stable,  with frequent  meetings, most  recently  at the 
2025 Antalya Diplomacy Forum. In December 2024, the President of Montenegro visited Ankara and 
agreed with the Turkish President to set up a high-level strategic council.  

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the 
Kosovo declaration of independence. 

58 

 
 
 
Türkiye  and  North  Macedonia  have  a  Strategic  Partnership  Agreement  and  continued  to  engage 
actively. In February 2025, the Turkish President and North Macedonian Prime Minister agreed to set 
up  a  high-level  cooperation  council,  thus  institutionalising  further  bilateral  ties.  A  framework 
agreement on military cooperation was also signed.  

Türkiye’s  relations  with  Georgia  are  at  the  level  of  a  strategic  partnership,  with  regular  high-level 
contacts, including in the framework of a  high-level strategic cooperation  council. Türkiye supports 
Georgia’s  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity,  as  well  as  its  Euro-Atlantic  aspirations.  Türkiye  is 
Georgia’s largest trading partner after the EU, and  a cultural cooperation programme for 2024-2028 
was signed in 2024. Türkiye and Georgia cooperate on major energy projects. Active cooperation also 
takes  place  for  the  development  of  the  Middle  Corridor.  The  strategic  trilateral  cooperation  format 
between Türkiye, Georgia and Azerbaijan continues at high level in view of enhanced regional energy 
and transport connectivity, as well as security cooperation. 

Türkiye  and  the  Republic  of  Moldova  maintained  strong  diplomatic  relations  and  their  strategic 
cooperation. High-level exchanges focused on economy, trade,  energy and  cooperation in the Black 
Sea  region,  as  well  as  Turkish  support  for  projects  in  Gagauzia.  Türkiye  supports  Moldova’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.  

Türkiye’s relations with  Ukraine remained of strategic significance, and several high-level contacts 
took  place.  Türkiye  consistently  supported  Ukraine’s  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  and 
continued  to  highlight its facilitation  and  potential  mediation role,  as  underpinned  by  hosting  direct 
talks  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  in  Istanbul  in  May,  June  and  July  2025.  Türkiye  continued  to 
refrain from aligning with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia in relation to the latter’s war 
of aggression against Ukraine. Nevertheless, it continued to make efforts to prevent the circumvention 
of  sanctions  against  Russia  via  Turkish  territory,  delivering  some  results.  In  August  2024,  Ankara 
ratified  the  free  trade  agreement  with  Ukraine  (signed  in  March  2022).  Cooperation  in  the  defence 
industry continued. Türkiye has expressed strong interest in Ukraine’s reconstruction, marked by the 
inaugural  meeting  of  the  Turkish-Ukrainian  ‘Reconstruction  Task  Force’.  Türkiye  is  part  of  the 
‘Coalition of the Willing’ initiative. 

4. 

ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP 

CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET 

This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1), freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 
2),  right  of  establishment  and  freedom  to  provide  services  (Chapter  3),  free  movement  of  capital 
(Chapter  4),  company  law  (Chapter  6),  intellectual  property  law  (Chapter  7),  competition  policy 
(Chapter  8),  financial  services  (Chapter  9),  and  health  and  consumer  protection  (Chapter  28).  This 
cluster is  key  to  the good functioning  of the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union  and to  integrating  Türkiye 
into the EU’s internal market. 

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods 

The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on 
common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the principle of the 
free movement of goods prevents these from creating unjustified barriers to trade. 

General principles 

The EU framework for the free movement of goods is largely in place. During the reporting period, 
Türkiye resolved some barriers liable to affect the free moment of goods in the internal market and the 
alignment with the EU common commercial policy, in the context of intensified engagement on the 
implementation  of  the  Customs  Union  under  the  High-Level  Trade  Dialogue.  Specifically,  Türkiye 
resolved the difficulties faced by EU operators in obtaining alcohol banderols. The licensing system 
for  second-hand  goods,  including  the  issue  of  re-treaded  tyres  has  become  obsolete  on  the 
understanding that Türkiye would swiftly grant import licences to products that show characteristics 
59 

 
 
 
of  the  circular  economy.  In  addition,  progress  was  made  in  the  implementation  of  the  risk-based 
TAREKS system for product safety controls at imports and the exemption of a prioritised list of EU 
products from the scope of the import surveillance regime. On preferential quotas for live bovine and 
beef meat for EU operators, Türkiye restarted imports from the EU, yet a transparent administration of 
the quota system remains an issue. 

However, no  developments  were made  on the  elimination  of  export taxes  on  hides, skins,  and  wet-
blue  leather.  Türkiye  still  applies  artificial  exchange  rate  on  pharmaceutical  products  and  does  not 
accept  the  EU’s  good  manufacturing  practices  (GMP)  certificates.  It  retained  local  content 
requirements  in  renewable  energy  and  tobacco  products.  Türkiye’s  TAREKS  system  for  product 
safety  controls  at  imports  may  require  additional  documentation  and  information,  which  is  also 
contrary to the Customs Union rules.  

Türkiye  needs  to  resolve all outstanding  trade  barriers  between  the  EU  and  Türkiye as listed in the 
Access2Market database. 

Non-harmonised areas 

Türkiye’s mutual recognition  legislation  in  the non-harmonised  areas is in  line with  the  EU  acquis. 
However, Türkiye has notified only one product legal act in the non-harmonised areas in 2024, and no 
notification was made in 2025 until now. This is not sufficient, given the size of Türkiye’s economy 
and legislative activity and its close ties with the European Union’s economy via the Customs Union. 

Harmonised areas: quality infrastructure 

Türkiye  is  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on  standards,  technical  regulations,  conformity  assessment, 
accreditation, metrology and market surveillance. The national  Standards Institute is a full member 
of the European standards bodies. By the end of the  second quarter of 2025, it had adopted 24 597 
national  standards  aligned  with  European  standards.  The  rate  of  harmonisation  with  both  CEN  and 
CENELEC standards is 99.5%. 

Türkiye has 67 notified bodies, six recognised third-party organisations, and two technical approval 
bodies in place. The Turkish Accreditation Agency (TÜRKAK), a member of European co-operation 
for  Accreditation  (EA),  has  launched  new  accreditation  services  for  verification  bodies  operating 
under the ISO standards on product carbon footprint and water footprint, and for certification bodies 
on artificial intelligence systems, which may have relevance to free movement of goods in the future. 
Türkiye implements market surveillance in compliance with the EU  acquis and submits its annual 
programme  to  the  European  Commission.  However,  the  coverage  and  effectiveness  of  market 
surveillance measures should be strengthened. Türkiye adopted a regulation on market surveillance of 
products placed on the market through means of distance sales in October 2024, aiming to align with 
the EU acquis. There is still limited market surveillance on e-commerce activities. According to the 
market surveillance report for 2024, a total of 262 898 products were checked by market surveillance 
authorities in 2024 representing a 26% increase as compared with 2023.  

Harmonised area: sectoral legislation 

On the EU ‘new and global approach’ product acquis, Türkiye adopted legislation designed to align 
with the latest acquis on the eco-design and energy-labelling of various household products. 

On  the  EU  ‘old  approach’  product  acquis,  Türkiye  adopted  new  legislation  on  motor  vehicles,  in 
particular  relating  to  automated  driving  systems  of  fully  automated  vehicles,  advanced  driver 
distraction  warning  systems,  intelligent  speed  assistance  system,  driver  drowsiness  and  attention 
warning  system,  alcohol  interlock  installation  facilitation  and  event  data  recorders  of  vehicles. 
Amending legislation were adopted on the type of approval and market surveillance of motor vehicles 
and their trailers, on eCall in-vehicle system and type approval of two-  or three-wheel vehicles and 
quadricycles. On pharmaceuticals, Türkiye issued legislation on market control of medicinal products 
and food for special medical purposes and withdrawal of such products from the market. Amending 
legislation were issued on the granting of marketing authorisation for pharmaceuticals, homeopathic 

60 

 
 
medicines and traditional herbal medicines. Türkiye does not accept EU good manufacturing practice 
certificates  on  medicines  for  human  use.  Türkiye  has  in  place  a  regulatory  data  protection  regime 
since  2005.  However,  the  scope  is  limited  and  excludes  biologics  and  combination  products. 
Inadequate protection of undisclosed test and other data generated to obtain marketing licensing for 
pharmaceutical  and  agrochemical  products  do  not  converge  with  the  EU  acquis.  On  chemicals, 
Türkiye  remains  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  Regulation  on  registration,  evaluation,  authorisation 
and restriction of chemicals (REACH). 

On  procedural  measures,  Türkiye  has  specific  licensing  and  regulation  systems  for  economic 
operators dealing with drug precursors, with a strict follow-up and monitoring system in cooperation 
with the police and customs. It is aligned with the EU  acquis on licensing procedures for firearms. 
However, it made no developments on alignment with the acquis on cultural goods. 

On  anti-corruption,  the  product  safety  law  and  regulations  on  conformity  assessment  bodies  and 
notified bodies, market surveillance and accreditation contain rules on transparency, impartiality and 
prevention of conflicts of interest. Turkish Accreditation Body TÜRKAK has an ethical commission 
and ethical guidelines in place. 

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers 

Citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the 
same working and social conditions as other workers. 

Regarding  access  to  the  labour  market,  certain  restrictions  remain.  Notably,  employment  in  the 
following  industries  require  Turkish  citizenship:  legal,  dentistry,  nursing,  pharmacy,  veterinary, 
security, fish exportation, diving, maritime pilotage and captainship, engineering and as a mariner on 
ships within the territorial waters, as a managing director in private health institutions, as a customs 
brokerage, and in tourist guiding.  In 2024, a total of 300 852 work permits were issued for citizens 
from more than 13 EU countries, compared with 239 835 in 2023.  

Türkiye  did  not  make  any  progress  on  access  to  the  labour  market  or  in  preparing  for  future 
participation  in  the  European  Employment  Services  (EURES)  network.  Türkiye  maintains  six 
labour  force  agreements  with  EU  Member  States,  but  made  no  progress  in  preparing  to  join  the 
European  Labour  Authority.  Progress  in  aligning  with  the  European  Skills,  Competences, 
Qualifications, and Occupations classification also remains modest. 

No progress was made in the coordination of social security systems. Türkiye remains a party to the 
European Convention on Social Security. The number of bilateral social security agreements with EU 
Member States remains unchanged, with 15 agreements concluded.  

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 

EU  natural  and  legal  persons  have  the  right  to  establish  themselves  in  any  Member  State  and  to 
provide  cross-border  services.  For  certain  regulated  professions,  there  are  rules  on  mutual 
recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal 
service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator. 

There  was  no  progress  on  the  right  of  establishment,  which  remains  restricted  by  several 
requirements  in  Türkiye.  On  the  freedom  to  provide  cross-border  services,  service  providers 
registered in the EU still face requirements on registration, licensing and authorisation. The point of 
single  contact  has  not  yet  been  created.  There  is  no  specific  regulation  or  practice  governing  the 
temporary or occasional provision of services. 

On postal services, Türkiye is partially aligned with the Postal Services Directive and the Regulation 
on cross-border parcel delivery services. A reserved area in the letter mail market is maintained for 
the  universal  service  provider,  although  in  practice  the  postal  monopoly  for  letter  mail  service  is 
limited  to  official  notification.  There  are  currently  56  other  postal  operators  active  in  the  postal 
market. During the reporting period, an amendment to the Regulation on the authorisation on the mail 
sector entered into force, whereby authorisation requirements were updated to include courier services 
61 

 
 
offered via digital platforms into the postal sector. Türkiye still needs to abolish the regulatory postal 
monopoly  and  introduce  accounting  separation  at  the  universal  service  provider,  and  ensure  the 
national regulatory authority with the appropriate powers and means to guarantee its independence. 

On  mutual  recognition  of  professional  qualifications,  the  Vocational  Qualifications  Authority 
(VQA) continued to implement the national qualification framework. Türkiye has drawn up a list of 
341  regulated  professions.  However,  in  accordance  with  national  legislation,  certain  professions 
require  additional  mandatory  certification  from  the  VQA  beyond  the  recognition  of  professional 
qualifications  which  contradict  the  acquis.  As  of  April  2025,  the  number  of  occupations  requiring 
certification remains at 204, while the number of national occupational standards increased to 925 and 
691  national  qualifications  were  aligned  with  these  standards.  Türkiye  distinguishes  between  the 
recognition of qualifications for academic purposes and the recognition of professional qualifications 
for  access  to  regulated  professions,  in  line  with  the  acquis.  The  Turkish  Referencing  Report  to  the 
European Qualifications Framework is not updated. It is possible to apply online for the recognition 
and  equivalence  of  higher  education  qualifications.  However,  some  regulated  professions  remain 
reserved for Turkish nationals, and language requirements for access to certain professions have not 
been removed. Türkiye also needs to intensify its efforts in the alignment with the minimum training 
requirements for seven sectoral professions (medical doctors, dental practitioners, nurses responsible 
for  general  care,  midwives,  pharmacists,  veterinary  surgeons,  and  architects).  Continuous  and 
significant steps are needed to align national legislation with the EU acquis in this area. 

Chapter 4: Free movement of capital 

In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common rules for 
cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight 
against money laundering and terrorist financing. 

On  capital  movements  and  payments,  restrictions  on  foreign  ownership  remain  in  many  sectors, 
including  broadcasting,  education,  transportation,  financial  services,  the  electricity  market  and  real 
estate.  Türkiye’s  legislation  on  real  estate  acquisition  by  foreigners  still  does  not  apply  to  all  EU 
nationals  in  a  non-discriminatory  way.  Immovable  property  acquisition  by  citizens  of  neighbouring 
countries  in  border  provinces  remains  restricted  for  national  security  reasons.  Following  an 
amendment  introduced  to  the  Decision  on  the  Protection  of  the  Value  of  Turkish  Currency,  people 
residing in Türkiye must utilise intermediary Turkish banks whenever obtaining loans from abroad. 
Meanwhile, the obligation for people residing in Türkiye to pay in Turkish lira in movable property 
contracts (except for vehicle sales contracts) was removed in March 2025, enabling payments to be 
made once again in foreign currency. While the minimum share for exporters to sell of their foreign-
earned incomes to the central bank was lowered from 30% to 25% in February 2025, it has since been 
increased to 35% in May 2025 until 31 July 2025. 

In the area of payment services, Türkiye advanced the implementation of the Instant and Continuous 
Transfer  of  Funds  (FAST)  system.  The  FAST  Request-to-Pay  overlay  service,  which  has  been 
available  only  for  private  individuals  since  2024,  was  updated  in  January  2025  to  allow  access  for 
corporate customers. The central bank aimed to ensure more secure data sharing, strengthen customer 
information protection and ensure a more robust digital infrastructure in the payment systems through 
legislative amendments.  

As regards the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, Türkiye still needs to align 
more  closely  with  the  EU  acquis  and  FATF  recommendations  to  further  strengthen  its  anti-money 
laundering and  counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) framework. In 2025, the country entered the 
fifth  round  of  mutual  evaluation  under  the  revised  FATF  standards.  In  line  with  FATF 
recommendations,  Türkiye  placed  particular  focus  on  developing  strategies  and  conducting  risk 
assessments.  

During  the  reporting  period,  Türkiye  has  also  introduced  strict  AML/CFT  regulations  for 
cryptocurrencies  and  their  service  providers.  With  the  recent  amendments,  digital  currency  service 
providers and platforms must verify user identities for transactions over a certain threshold and flag or 
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block  transfers  deemed  risky,  especially  from  unregistered  wallets.  All  crypto  service  providers  are 
required to obtain a licence and comply with ongoing oversight and reporting obligations. Türkiye has 
not  aligned  its  regulatory  and  legal  framework  with  EU  Regulation  2023/1113.  While  Turkish  law 
mandates  traceability  data  for  traditional  wire  transfers  under  FATF  standards,  it  lacks  equivalent 
obligations for crypto asset transfers.  

Türkiye has also continued to strengthen its financial intelligence unit (MASAK,) and has improved 
the use of financial intelligence in criminal investigations. It is now standard practice for prosecutors 
to request AML/CFT input from MASAK when building cases related to relevant predicate offences. 

MASAK has also developed a well-established information-sharing mechanism with financial market 
players.  

Further  measures  have  been  taken  to  ensure  that  penalties  for  AML/CFT  violations  and  the  rules 
governing  beneficial  ownership  are  both  effective  and  dissuasive.  In  April  2024,  the  Turkish 
Constitutional Court annulled key provisions of Law No. 7262 on the Prevention of the Financing of 
the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, citing infringement on freedom of association. In 
the  reporting  period,  no  new  legislation  has  been  enacted  to  replace  the  annulled  provisions].  This 
leaves a gap in the regulatory framework on ensuring a proportionate and risk-based approach to NPO 
monitoring. The Constitutional Court initially annulled lawyers as obliged entities due to professional 
secrecy  concerns.  However,  the legislation  was  amended  in  July  2024  to  reintroduce  lawyers  as 
obliged entities, incorporating revised provisions and safeguards for legal professional privilege. The 
sufficiency of these new safeguards for AML/CFT reporting and attorney-client privilege is still under 
assessment.  

Chapter 6: Company law 

The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, 
with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit. 

On  company  law  and  corporate  governance,  Türkiye  adopted  some  legislative  acts  during  the 
reporting  period,  but the legislation  on  domestic mergers  and  divisions,  takeover  bids,  shareholders 
rights,  including  long-term  shareholder  engagement  and  the  use  of  digital  tools  and  processes  in 
company law, still require full alignment with the EU acquis. On business registrations, Türkiye lacks 
rules requiring all limited liability companies to publish annual accounts. 

On company reporting, the Public Oversight, Accounting, and Auditing Standards Authority (POA) 
made assurance audits for sustainability reporting mandatory in September 2024.The POA continued 
to  reflect  changes in international  standards into  national  standards  in several  areas.  These includes 
financial reporting standards allowing medium-sized enterprises to prepare their financial statements 
at a lower cost, a code of ethics for independent auditors, and auditing criteria for independent audit. 
In  December  2024,  the  POA  updated  the  financial  reporting  standard  for  large  and  medium-sized 
companies (BOBI FRS) to regulate accounting principles and classification of cryptocurrency assets. 
The  alignment  of  non-financial  information  and  government  payment  reports  remains  unclear, 
particularly on EU non-financial reporting standards (PTF-NFRS) and Directive 2013/34/EU.  

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law 

The EU has to a large extent harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property  rights  (IPR),  covering  notably  patents,  biotechnological  inventions  and  pharmaceuticals, 
including  supplementary  protection  certificates  (SPCs),  trade  marks,  designs,  geographical 
indications (GIs), including craft and industrial GIs, as well as copyright and related rights.  

On  copyright  and  related  rights,  the  Turkish  Law  is  yet  to  be  aligned  with  the  Directives  on 
copyright and related rights to ensure sufficient protection, in line with technological developments. 
Notably, legal protection against the circumvention of technological protection measures (TPMs) for 
authors, performers and phonogram producers, or protection of rights management information (RMI) 
are not adequate.  Several challenges persist, particularly  the weak or non-existent compensation for 

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exceptions  such  as  lending  rights  and  exceptions  in  education  as  well  as  the  lack  of  distribution  of 
private copying levies to the rightsholders and the licensing difficulties. Online piracy continues to be 
of  very  high  concern  in  Türkiye,  undermining  economic  opportunities  for  domestic  and  foreign 
rightsholders. The enforcement against online copyright piracy remains ineffective in Türkiye.  

On  industrial  property  rights,  regarding  trade  marks,  considering  lack  of  ‘bad  faith’  to  be  an 
absolute  ground  of  refusal  in  the  first  instance  renders  the  cancellation  procedure  ineffective.  The 
amendment of the regulation on administrative procedures for the revocation of trade marks entered 
into force in March 2025, making the Turkish Patent and Trade Mark Office responsible to examine 
requests for revocations. Stakeholders report expensive and lengthy procedures to revoke, oppose and 
invalidate trade marks need to be improved. Stakeholders also report that the trade mark registration 
system is unpredictable and unclear. Administrative examinations are currently not being carried out 
and therefore uncertainties regarding the administrative trade mark cancellation procedure persist. The 
cancellation procedure as well as the opposition or invalidation of a trade mark, are disproportionately 
expensive and excessively long.  

There  are  currently  no  laws  for  the  protection  of  supplementary  protection  certificates.  Türkiye’s 
regulatory  data  protection  regime  in  place  since  2005  has  a  limited  scope  excluding  biologics  and 
combination  products.  Inadequate  protection  of  undisclosed  test  and  other  data  generated  to  obtain 
marketing  licensing  for  pharmaceutical  and  agrochemical  products  do  not  converge  with  the  EU 
acquis. 

On judicial enforcement, criminal courts rarely order deterrent fines for commercial scale industrial 
property  infringements,  even  though  laws  may  provide  for  higher  penalties.  Inefficient  litigation 
procedures,  including  at  courts  of  appeal,  still  need  to  be  resolved.  Challenges  and  inconsistencies 
persist  in  deciding  preliminary  injunctions  and  monetary  compensation  claims,  in  the  storage  and 
destruction processes and related financial burdens, and in the overuse of expert witness statements. 
Difficulties  persist  with  the  issuance  of  search  and  seizure  warrants  even  when  strong  evidence  of 
counterfeiting is provided by right holders. Enforcement authorities need to increase the efficiency of 
action against industrial property infringements. 

The  customs  enforcement  legislation  is  not  fully  harmonised  with  the  EU  acquis.  Despite  an 
increasing number of customs applications for seizures (up from 2 869 in 2023 to 3 031 in 2024), it is 
necessary to improve customs enforcement to combat counterfeit goods, particularly those in transit 
and exports. While cooperation between customs authorities and rights holders increased, additional 
efforts are required to strengthen the protection and enforcement of IPR. According to the last report 
on the EU enforcement of IPR, Türkiye ranked third in the top provenance economies of counterfeit 
and pirated goods in terms of customs seizures in 2023. Its share of global seizures at the EU borders 
is  8.42%.  In  2023,  Türkiye  was  also  the  third  country  of  provenance  (12%)  by  value  as  regards 
infringing goods detained in the EU Member States customs.  

Türkiye needs to increase public awareness on the risks of counterfeiting and piracy, particularly on 
the  impact  on  health,  safety,  rule  of  law  and  employment,  while  also  emphasising  the  economic 
benefits  of  IPR-intensive  industries.  Stronger  political  commitment  is  needed  to  enforce  IPR,  both 
inland and at the border, and prevent high volume of counterfeit goods to enter the EU. 

Chapter 8: Competition policy 

EU rules enable free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements between 
companies and the abuse of a dominant position, and also include rules on concentrations between 
companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of 
State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if strict conditions are met, with a 
view to prevent distortion of competition. 

Antitrust and mergers 

The  legal  framework  remains  broadly  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  Law  on  the  protection  of 
competition broadly reflects Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
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Union (TFEU). Implementing legislation in this field remains largely in place. The relevant legislation 
still needs to be aligned to ensure full compliance with the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation. In 
December  2024,  the  Turkish  Competition  Authority  (TCA)  renewed  and  published  a  regulation  on 
administrative  fines  for  competition  infringements,  allowing  more  discretion  in  determining 
administrative fines regardless of limitations and based on the nature and severity of the violation. 

The  institutional framework  is in  place.  The  Law on  the  protection  of  competition is enforced  by 
TCA.  The  TCA  maintains  its  financial  and  administrative  autonomy.  The  TCA’s  enforcement 
capacity  is  adequate.  In  2024,  overall  implementation  was  effective.  Decisions  were  taken  in  the 
areas  of  antitrust  (166  compared  with  145  in  2023),  exemption/negative  clearance  decisions  (10 
compared with 8 in 2023) and merger/acquisition/joint venture/privatisation (254 compared with 217 
in 2023). In 2024, the total amount of fines imposed by the TCA for infringements of competition law 
(fines related to substance) increased considerably to TRY 7.5 billion compared with TRY 1.9 billion 
in 2023. The number of ex officio investigations launched by the TCA increased in the last two years 
(70  in  2023  and  80  in  2024,  while  the  previous  3-year  average  was  13).  In  2024,  Turkish  courts 
upheld  65% (decreased from  87% in  2023)  of the  119  judgments  concluded in response to  appeals 
against the TCA decisions.  

State aid 

No  progress  was  made  on  legislative  framework.  Overall,  Türkiye’s  Law  on  the  monitoring  and 
supervision  of  State  aid  is  broadly  aligned  with  Articles  107  and  108  TFEU.  However,  Türkiye’s 
legislative framework is de facto ineffective due to the indefinite suspension of the implementation of 
the State aid law.  

There  is  no  functioning  institutional  framework  and  the  administrative  structure  in  force 
significantly deviates from the EU acquis. Therefore, Türkiye still needs to align its legislation with 
the EU acquis. 

In May 2025, Türkiye published a new incentive scheme repealing the former 2012 incentive scheme, 
as  well  as  the  supplementary  schemes  (technology-driven  industry  initiative  and  the  centres  of 
attraction programme). Türkiye continued the implementation of the selective project-based incentive 
schemes for large scale investments. The committed amount for project-based investment programme 
declined to TRY 496 billion supporting 58 projects, as a result of cancellation by the President of 11 
projects worth TRY 54 billion in 2024. The lack of a transparent State aid inventory covering all aid 
schemes, including the amount or budgeted amount of the state support granted, remains a source of 
concern. The transparency of the State  aid further deteriorated following the Presidency decision in 
November  2024  allowing  the  government  not  to  publish  the  project-based  investment  support 
decisions. Such deficiencies were not addressed by the new incentive scheme. 

Liberalisation 

State-owned enterprises are subject to competition and in theory to State aid rules.  

Chapter 9: Financial services 

EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among financial institutions and the stability and integrity 
of financial  markets,  namely in  the field  of  banking,  insurance, supplementary  pensions,  investment 
services  and  securities.  They  include  rules  on  authorisation,  operation  and  supervision  of  these 
institutions. 

On banking and financial conglomerates, Türkiye continued taking steps to gradually simplify the 
regulatory  environment.  The  banking  sector  continued  demonstrating  resilience,  with  its  capital 
adequacy  ratio  remaining  above  the  legal  thresholds.  Regardless  of  tighter  financial  conditions,  the 
deterioration in asset quality indicators remains limited. The non-performing loan ratio stood at 2.1% 
in June 2025. 

Regarding insurance and occupational pensions, in January 2025, the Insurance and Private Pension 
Regulation  and  Supervision  Agency  (SEDDK)  published  an  amending  regulation  on  insurance 
65 

 
 
agencies,  mainly  determining  new  minimum  paid-in  capital  and  equity  requirements  for  the 
authorisation  and  operational  permits,  revising  the  supervision  conditions  of  insurance  agency 
activities and expanding the responsibilities of agencies.  

As  regards  financial  market  infrastructure,  Turkish  legislation  continues  to  be  partially  aligned 
with the EU acquis. In March 2025, the requirement for trading derivatives exclusively on organised 
exchanges was removed. According to the new legislative framework, these transactions can now be 
conducted through intermediary institutions and banks; as long as they comply with capital markets 
regulation. Furthermore, Turkish residents are now allowed to engage in derivative transactions with 
foreign financial institutions at their own discretion, as long as no targeted promotional activities are 
conducted.  

On securities markets and investment services, significant regulatory changes were introduced as 
regards the principles for venture capital investment funds. Following an amendment, venture capital 
investment funds must invest 51% of their assets in companies located in Türkiye, down from 80%. 
Moreover,  the  requirement  for  companies  to  be  either  joint-stock  companies  or  limited  liability 
companies in order to invest in companies established abroad has been abolished. Meanwhile, venture 
capital  investment  funds  can  now  be  established  as  umbrella  funds  or  fund  baskets.  Under  certain 
conditions, investments with Simple Agreement for Future Equity agreements are also recognised as 
venture capital investments.  A resolution on sales methods and distribution principles to be applied in 
initial public offerings was taken with the aim of ensuring that investor demand is effectively met in 
the initial public offerings of non-public companies. 

On sustainable and digital finance, the CMB adopted detailed secondary regulations in March 2025, 
enhancing  the  legal  framework  for  crypto  assets,  by  setting  out  rules  for  crypto  asset  service 
providers,  including  their  establishment  and  operational  principles,  governance  standards,  capital 
adequacy  requirements,  and  information  system  audits.  Meanwhile,  the  BDDK  laid  down  the 
procedures and principles for calculating and reporting the green asset ratio and other key indicators 
of banks' contributions to financing environmentally sustainable activities. 

Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection 

EU  rules  protect  consumers’  economic interests  and also ensure  product safety,  prevent  dangerous 
imitations and establish liability for defective products. The EU also ensures high common standards 
for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, and human and veterinary medicinal products. 
The  EU  also  guarantees  a  high  level  of  protection  of  public  health  and  in  particular  has  rules  for 
upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in preparing for and responding to serious 
cross-border health threats, including communicable diseases. 

Consumer protection 

On product safety related issues, consumers’ awareness of the national unsafe products information 
system  remains  low.  Regular  monitoring  and  more  robust  regulatory  tools  are  required  to  combat 
online  sales  of  counterfeit  goods  that  endanger  consumer  and  public  health  (see  Chapter  7  – 
Intellectual  property  law).  Moreover,  although  the  volume  of  online  shopping  has  increased,  the 
market surveillance of e-commerce remains limited (see Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods). 

Türkiye’s national legislation remains mostly aligned with the EU  acquis on consumer protection in 
non-safety  related  issues.  The  alignment  with  the  Representative  Actions  Directive  remains  at  an 
early stage and significant work is needed. Challenges remain with the application of consumer rights. 
Consumer  awareness  and  education,  cooperation  and  coordination  of  sectoral  stakeholders  remain 
weak. Consumer arbitration committees need to ensure better enforcement of consumer rights.  

Public health 

On horizontal aspects, there was no movement towards putting into action the One Health Strategy. 
In  the  enhancement  of  Türkiye’s capacities  on  key  public  health  microbiology  service  capacities 
against  public  health  threats,  the  strategy  plan  on  national  genomic  sequencing  was  approved  and 

66 

 
 
workforce  empowerment  continued.  The  government’s  population-growth  strategy  resulted  in  a 
decline in trained reproductive healthcare professionals, limited access to contraception and prenatal 
care – especially in rural areas – and fewer public hospitals offering abortion services. 

Progress  continued  on  serious  cross-border  health  threats  including  epidemic  preparedness  for 
communicable  diseases,  enhancing  the  health  system’s  response  capabilities.  Türkiye's  Field 
Epidemiology Training Programme joined the Global Field Epidemiology Partnership, strengthening 
international  collaboration.  Surveillance  efforts  were  expanded  through  nationwide  outbreak 
investigations  and  development  of  a  Vector  Surveillance  Roadmap  for  pilot  implementation.  No 
updates  were  reported  on  antimicrobial  resistance  since  the  implementation  of  the  latest  National 
Antimicrobial Resistance Strategic Action Plan (2017-2022). 

On  tobacco  control,  Türkiye  launched  the  "Smoke-Free  Türkiye"  campaign  with  a  national  action 
plan for 2024-2028, aiming to reduce smoking rates and encourage a healthier lifestyle.  

On blood, tissues, cells and organs, the organ donor donation rate continued to decline – the number 
of  patients  awaiting  organ  transplants  exceeded  33  000.  Türkiye  needs  to  align  with  the  new  EU 
acquis  on  substances  of  human  origin,  which replaces  the  previous directives  on  blood, tissues  and 
cells. 

The  country  is  not  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on  patients’  rights  in  cross-border  healthcare. 
Türkiye  must  also  align  with  the  new  EU  Regulation  on  Health  Technology  Assessment  (EU) 
2021/2282 which entered into application in January 2025. 

On  mental  health,  Türkiye  continued  to  implement  a  de-institutionalisation  policy,  expanding 
services  to  284  healthy  life  centres  in  urban  areas,  in  addition  to  182  existing  community  mental 
health centres. However, Türkiye is yet to adopt a stand-alone mental health law.  

On health inequalities, infant and under-5 child mortality remained high at 9 and 11.1 per 1 000 live 
births  respectively,  with  significant  disparities  in  the  southeastern,  eastern,  and  central  provinces. 
Türkiye also  exhibits considerable  inequalities  in  the regional  distribution  of  doctors, hospital  beds, 
and  hospitals.  Access  to  safe  motherhood  and  sexual  and  reproductive  health  services  remains  a 
critical issue, especially for women and adolescents. 

For  cervical  cancers,  3  527  259  women (30-65) received cervical  cancer  screening  at  primary  and 
secondary  levels  in  2024.  Türkiye  needs  to  include  the  human  papillomavirus  infection  (HPV) 
vaccine  in  the  Expanded  National  Immunisation  programme  for  children  under  the  age  of  15, 
including both girls and boys.  

On  anti-corruption,  regulations  on  market  surveillance  contain  rules  on  transparency,  impartiality 
and prevention of conflicts of interest (see Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods). However, there is 
no anti-corruption plan on public health. 

CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH 

This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10), taxation (Chapter 16), economic 
and  monetary  policy  (Chapter  17),  social  policy  and  employment  (Chapter  19),  industrial  policy 
(Chapter  20),  science  and  research  (Chapter  25),  education  and  culture  (Chapter  26),  and  Customs 
Union (Chapter 29). 

Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media 

The  EU  supports  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  internal  market  for  electronic  communications, 
electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers and support the universal 
availability of modern services. 

On  electronic  communications,  Türkiye  is  not  yet  aligned  with  the  European  Electronic 
Communications  Code  and  concerns  remain  over  the  lack  of  financial  and  administrative 

67 

 
 
 
independence of the regulatory authorities. More transparency is needed in the Telecommmunication 
Regulatory  Authority’s  revenue 
in  establishing  a  consumer-friendly 
telecommunication  market  .  Further  regulatory  and  administrative  steps  are  required  to  create  a 
competitive  and  consumer-friendly  market  in  telecommunications,  such  as  effective  structural 
separation  of  the  regulatory  functions  from  activities  associated  with  ownership  or  control, 
appointment and dismissal rules of the board and independence from State bodies. 

transfers  and 

its  use 

On  digital  services,  the  Ministry  of  Trade  adopted  an  amending  regulation  on  e-commerce 
intermediary  service  providers  and  e-commerce  service  providers,  imposing  new  requirements  on 
platforms  regarding  verification  of  sellers’  information,  unfair  trade  practices,  keyword  advertising, 
data  usage  and  sharing, auditing and reporting obligations.  Türkiye’s  e-commerce market  expanded 
further by recording an increase of 61.4% in terms of financial volume in Turkish lira and by 1% in 
terms of number of transactions in 2024. The proportion of individuals using the internet in buying or 
ordering  goods  or  services  for  private  use  continued  increasing.  Further  implementation  efforts  are 
required to ensure and facilitate equal access to online services for all. Türkiye has yet to align with 
the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act. 

The  revision  of  some  of  Türkiye’s  existing  legislation  for  digital  services  and  its  enforcement, 
including  the  social  media  regulations  law,  the  disinformation  law  and  the  cybersecurity  law,  is 
required  due  to  the  laws’  incompatibility  with  the  EU  Charter  and  key  principles  of  EU  acquis  for 
digital services.   

The number of services offered by the e-Government Gateway increased from 8 360 in August 2024, 
to  8  614  as  of  August  2025.  The  number  of  integrated  institutions  increased  from  1 061  in  August 
2024 to 1101 in August 2025. The number of people using e-government increased from 66.1 million 
in  August  2024  to  67.95  million  in  August  2025  according  to  official  statistics.  Further  efforts  are 
required  to  align  with  both  the  European  Interoperability  Framework  and  the  Interoperable  Europe 
Act. 

Regarding  digital  television  broadcasting,  Cyprus  is  still  facing  an  objection  from  Türkiye  to  the 
recording  at  the  International  Telecommunications  Union  (ITU)  of  a  new  unified  Cypriot  digital 
television broadcasting plan below 700 MHz under the ITU Geneva06 plan. This continues to deprive 
Cyprus from the necessary regulatory protection against interferences from neighbouring countries.  

The  lack  of  sufficient  competition  on  the  broadband  market  remains  a  concern.  While  the  share  of 
fixed  broadband  subscribers  increased  from  23%  in  2023  to  23.9%  in  2024,  it  remains  below  the 
OECD  average  of  35.8%.  The  total  number  of  mobile  broadband  users  was  75.9  million,  which 
corresponds to a penetration rate of 88.6% of the population at the end of 2024, against the OECD 
average of 134.1%. The number of LTE subscribers continued growing and reached  88.1 million in 
the  first  quarter  of  2025  compared  with  84.9  million  at  the  end  of  2023.  There  was  some  progress 
reported in the procurement of 5G as a Presidential decree was published in August 2025 setting the 
minimum prices for the available frequency packages. 

On  artificial  intelligence,  Türkiye  adopted  a  new  industrial  strategy  in  March  2025  entitled  2030 
Industry and Technology Strategy, where building AI capacity and AI applications are considered a 
priority,  which  will  contribute  to  broader  digitalisation  of  services  in  line  with  the  EU’s  Digital 
Decade  goals.  This  Strategy  provides  the  policy  foundation  for  reforms  needed  to  meet  EU  acquis 
while  driving  the  digital  transformation  of  Türkiye’s  economy.  Türkiye  needs  to  continue  aligning 
with  the  EU’s  Artificial  Intelligence  Act,  including  through  the  establishment  of  the  necessary 
enforcement structure.  

On  data,  Türkiye  has  yet  to  adopt  a  National  Data  Strategy  to  enable  a  trusted,  secure  and 
interoperable data ecosystem in line with the EU Data Governance Act and Data Act.  

On  digital  trust  and  cybersecurity,  compliance  with  the  eIDAS  Regulation  is  still  pending.  The 
Ministry of Trade published a legislation regulating commercial electronic mail management system 
integration  services,  regarding  authorisation  of  such  services,  determination  of  their  responsibilities 

68 

 
 
and  conditions  for  cancellation  of  their  authorisations,  in  order  to  address  data  protection  and 
cybersecurity  risks.  Türkiye  created  institutional  disruption  in  digital  policy  coordination  by 
abolishing  the  Digital  Transformation  Office  in  March  2025  and  creating  a  not  yet  operational 
Cybersecurity  Presidency.  Defining  and  operationalising  the  new  structure  with  clear  mandates  is 
critical  to  drive  digital transformation  in  the  country.  Türkiye  also  adopted  a  cybersecurity  strategy 
and  action  plan  to  strengthen  the  country’s  cyber  resilience  and  published  a  law  on  cybersecurity 
during  the  reporting  period.  Türkiye  needs  to  continue  the  implementation  of  the  EU  5G 
Cybersecurity Toolbox measures, including assessing the risk profile of suppliers and putting in place 
appropriate  restrictions  and/or  exclusions  for  high-risk  suppliers.  Türkiye  continued  building  a 
structured,  sector-specific cyber  incident  response  ecosystem  to  contribute to its  alignment  with the 
NIS 2  Directive.  As  of  September  2024,  there  are  14  sectoral  Cyber  Emergency  Response  Teams 
(CERTs) for critical infrastructures and more than 2 200 institutional CERTs. 

On media, a revision of the legislation regulating radio, television and on-demand media services is 
required  to  ensure  clarity  in  terms  of  its  scope,  definitions,  licensing  criteria,  and  to  remove 
controversial points relating to jurisdiction and restricting access to online content. Concerns over the 
impartiality and independence of RTÜK persisted and were not addressed (see Chapter 23 – Judiciary 
and fundamental rights). 

Chapter 16: Taxation 

EU  rules  on  taxation  cover  value  added  tax,  excise  duties  and  aspects  of  corporate  taxation.  They 
also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent 
tax evasion. 

On  indirect  taxation,  as  regards  VAT,  the  legislation  governing  the  structure,  exemptions,  special 
schemes and the scope of reduced rates of VAT is not fully aligned with the EU acquis. 

On excise duties, Türkiye’s excise duty legislation on cigarette diverges from the EU acquis, whereas 
the  overall  level  of  taxation  (ad  valorem)  on  cigarettes  is  comparable  to  EU  levels.  Excise  duty 
legislation  on alcohol  and alcoholic  drinks  also  differs  from the  EU  acquis.  Moreover,  Türkiye  has 
reinstated an excise duty differential between raki and similar spirits in December 2024. Excise duties 
on some energy products remain lower than EU minimum rates. Contrary to the EU acquis, coal, coke 
and electricity are not subject to excise duties, while kerosene is zero rated. 

On direct taxation, Türkiye still implement 25% corporate income tax, while the financial sector is 
levied at 30%. In August 2024, Türkiye introduced a minimum 15% corporate income tax for large 
multinational  enterprises,  a  10%  local  minimum  corporate  income  tax  and  increased  the  general 
corporate  income  tax  for  public-private  partnerships  to  30%.  Since  2025,  Türkiye  is  collecting  an 
additional 1% tax on service providers for goods purchased on online marketplaces. 

The income tax exemption implemented since 2022 for the minimum wage, including the tax on all 
wages corresponding to the minimum wage, continued. In 2024, TRY 21 billion was collected as a 
7.5% digital services tax (on digital advertising, content, and intermediary services) which has been in 
effect since March 2020. 

On administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, the OECD Global Forum on Transparency 
and  Exchange  of  Information  for  Tax  Purposes  (Global  Forum)  qualified  Türkiye  as  'largely 
compliant' on the exchange of information on request. However, the country remains on Annex II to 
the Council Conclusions on the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes for criterion 
1.1  (automatic  exchange  of  tax  information  on  financial  accounts),  as  it  is  still  not  fully  compliant 
with  the  relevant  requirements.  As  a  result,  in  February  2025,  the  Council  reiterated  its  call  on 
Türkiye to begin the outstanding automatic information exchange relationships with Member States in 
order to meet criterion 1.1 of the EU list. 

On  operational  capacity  and  computerisation,  the  Turkish  Revenue  Administration  uses  an 
electronic document management system. On the other hand, Türkiye failed to develop a functional 
integrated  public  finance  management  information  system.  The  action  plan  to  combat  the  informal 
69 

 
 
economy  (2023-2025)  still  lacks  performance  indicators  and  a  publicly  accessible  system  for 
monitoring the implementation. 

Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy 

EU  rules  require  the  independence  of  central  banks  and  prohibit  them  from  directly  financing  the 
public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic 
and financial surveillance. 

On monetary policy, the central bank deviated from the official inflation target over the last decade, 
which is set jointly with the government and consistently aimed at 5%. Concerns over the institutional 
underpinning  of  central  bank  independence  persist,  with  the  President  of  the  Republic  having 
extensive  powers  in  the  appointment  and  dismissal  of  the  Central  Bank  Governor  and  Board 
members. In June 2024, the Constitutional Court had annulled the President's powers to dismiss the 
Central  Bank  Governor  before  the  end  of  their  term,  on  the  ground  that  this  authority  was  granted 
with  a  presidential  decree  and  not  by  law.  The  Court’s  decision  entered  into  force.  However,  the 
Parliament has not adopted the appropriate legislation to replace the relevant annulled articles within 
the one year given by the Court.  

The central bank kept monetary policy tight, which was instrumental in bringing down inflation and 
inflationary expectations, and improving markedly its foreign exchange (FX) position. It maintained 
the main policy rate at 50% from March until December 2024, initiating its rate-cutting cycle only at 
the end of the year. However, in response to financial markets turmoil, following domestic political 
tensions after the arrest of the mayor of Istanbul, the authorities took prompt and coordinated actions 
to preserve financial stability. The central bank raised the key policy rate to 46% in April 2025, and 
resumed  its  easing  cycle  only  in  July  (43%).  The  Turkish  authorities  continued  to  simplify  the 
macroprudential  policy  framework  and  also  took  measures  to  support  the  monetary  policy 
transmission mechanism and the tight monetary stance, and as well as to manage Turkish lira and FX 
liquidity. The central bank took gradual steps to accelerate the phase-out of the FX-protected deposit 
scheme,  before  terminating  the  opening  and  renewal  of  these  accounts  (excluding  the  Turkish  lira 
Time  Deposit  Account  for  Non-Resident  Real  Persons  –  i.e.  YUVAM  accounts)  as  of  23  August 
2025.  The  decline  in  the  FX-protected  deposit  balance  has  enhanced  the  monetary  transmission 
mechanism and reduced the risks to the central bank's balance sheet. 

As  regards  economic  policy,  significant  progress  was  made  in  the  presentation  of  a  more  realistic 
macroeconomic  framework,  but  further  efforts  are  needed  to  strengthen  the  coherence  among  key 
macroeconomic targets. Main policy documents do not present alternative macroeconomic and fiscal 
scenarios. Türkiye is still not aligned with the Directive on Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks 
and  lacks  numerical  fiscal  rules  and  an  independent  fiscal  body  to  monitor  compliance.  A 
Constitutional Court decision taken in January 2025 cancelled a provision allowing the government to 
spend  excess  revenue  if  the  budget  deficit  limit  is  respected.  Türkiye  made  some  improvements  in 
data quality and timeliness of reporting under the excessive deficit procedure data, but further efforts 
are required (see Chapter 18 – Statistics). 

Türkiye  submitted  its  2025-2027  Economic  Reform  Programme  on  time.  For  the  first  time,  the 
structural  reforms  section  was  developed  through  consultation  with  civil  society  organisations.  The 
macroeconomic framework would benefit from the presentation of an alternative scenario, while the 
fiscal  framework  could  be  strengthened  by  providing  further  details  about  the  main  discretionary 
fiscal  measures.  The  policy  guidance  set  out  in  the  conclusions  of  the  Economic  and  Financial 
Dialogue  of  May  2024  has  been  partially  implemented,  and  the  rate  of  implementation  improved 
markedly in comparison to previous years. 

Chapter 19: Social policy and employment 

EU  rules  in  the  social  field  include  minimum  requirements  for  labour  law,  equality  and  non-
discrimination, health and safety at work. They also promote social dialogue at European level. 

70 

 
 
Türkiye  made  no  progress  regarding  labour  law.  Applicability  of  the  labour  law  is  hindered  by 
various  exemptions  and  high  levels  of  informality  at  work  with  the  Roma  community  particularly 
affected. Undeclared work remains high at 26.58%, and the figure excludes a vast number of migrant 
workers.  There  is  a  need  to  create  regulatory  frameworks  for  platform  work  and  other  emerging 
sectors. Labour force participation of children aged 15-17 rose to 24.9% in 2024, up from 22.1% in 
the  previous  year.  Efforts  need  to  be  stepped  up  to  eliminate  child  labour,  especially  in  hazardous 
work, including renewal of the national programme on the elimination of child labour. 

On occupational safety and health (OSH), amendments introduced to implementing legislation aim 
to  ease  access  to  OSH  services  in  low-risk  sectors.  However,  the  effectiveness  of  OSH  risk 
assessment  systems  at  workplace  level  needs  to  be  increased.  Most  fatal  accidents  in  the  reporting 
period occurred in the construction sector. The Turkish authorities need to step up implementation of 
and compliance with the OSH framework. A deadly fire at a winter resort hotel in Bolu Province has 
revealed gaps and deficits in the OSH system in the tourism sector. Many road accidents involving 
workers go unreported in various occupational sectors, such as for platform workers or couriers and 
the seasonal agricultural workers. OSH risks related to the national apprenticeship system (MESEM) 
need  to  be  addressed,  as  several  fatal  accidents  have  involved  apprentice  children  in  secondary 
education. There is also a need to improve reporting system for occupational diseases. In 2024, the 
number of labour inspectors increased to 916. 

There  was  no  progress  on  social  dialogue.  Türkiye  still  does  not  have  a  functioning  economic  and 
social  council.  The  tripartite  consultation  board  convened.  Further  substantial  efforts  are  needed  to 
increase  the  systematic  functioning  of  the  existing  tripartite  social  dialogue  mechanisms.  The 
coverage of collective bargaining for workers remained low at 11.33%. The unionisation rate dropped 
significantly for private  -sector employees, reaching 6.83%. For civil servants, it was 76.88%. Only 
24.7%  of  unionised  workers  are  women.  In  the  private  sector,  serious  impediments  to  unionisation 
and  collective  bargaining  persist.  Effective  and  dissuasive  sanctions  are  needed  against  anti-union 
discrimination,  including  anti-union  dismissals.  Türkiye  has  yet  to  recognise  the  right  to  strike  for 
civil  servants;  and  the  right  to  organise  and  bargain  collectively  for  certain  categories,  including 
prison staff and locum workers. In August 2025, the Government postponed four planned strikes by 
mine  workers  at  state-owned  enterprises,  citing  national  security  matters.  The  systematic  use  of 
postponements  compromises  the right  to  strike  and  raises  concerns  regarding  Türkiye’s  compliance 
with international labour standards. 

On  employment  policy,  the  number  of  job  and  vocational  counsellors  in  the  Turkish  Employment 
Agency  (İŞKUR)  declined.  Despite  a  notable  increase  in  the  number  of  active  labour  market 
programmes,  including  the  number  of  participants,  the  figures  remain  well  below  the  levels  of  the 
period 2020-2022. The share of the informal economy has decreased but remains structurally high and 
continues  to  negatively  affect  social  security  and  welfare  systems.  As  part  of  efforts  to  facilitate 
migrants’ access to the formal labour market, the implementing regulation of the international labour 
force law was amended. It allows foreigners under temporary protection and those with humanitarian 
residence permits to work under a work permit exemption, within the defined scope and duration. It 
also enables those under temporary protection to apply for a work permit exemption independently of 
a specific employer (see 2.1.1 Democracy). The number of issued work permits increased in 2024, but 
remains low given the large working age population among Syrian migrants. The vast majority of the 
Syrian refugees under temporary protection work in the informal sector. 

The  labour  market  develops  positively  with  higher  employment  and  lower  unemployment  rates, 
except  for  the  structurally  high  gender  employment  gap.  Türkiye  only  partially  applies  the  EU 
recommendation  on  long  term  unemployment.  See  the  statistical  annex  and  the  section  on  the 
functioning of the labour market under 2.3 Economic criteria. 

On social protection and inclusion, the rate of persons at risk of poverty and social exclusion stood 
high  at  30.4%.  The  rate  of  children at  risk  of  poverty  is  high  with  40.3%.  Income  inequalities  also 
remained  high,  with  the  Gini  coefficient  being  44.8.  Türkiye  continues  to  lack  a  comprehensive 
poverty reduction strategy and a minimum income scheme, yet several social assistance mechanisms 
71 

 
 
are in place targeting various vulnerable groups. The impact of social transfers on poverty reduction is 
low  at  11.9%  (EU  34.15%).  Affordable  social  housing  programmes  need  to  be  enhanced,  as  home 
ownership is declining and housing costs have dramatically increased. Transition from institutional to 
community-based care for vulnerable children is continuing, including development of an emergency 
foster care system. Affordable community-based care options need to be expanded for older people 
and  persons  with  disabilities.  Türkiye  nominated  a  national  Contact  Point  for  the  European  Child 
Guarantee. 

Türkiye made no improvement in non-discrimination in employment and social policies, including 
as regards alignment with the Employment Equality Directive and the Racial Equality Directive. The 
country still lacks an enforcement strategy and laws protecting against discrimination on the grounds 
of  sexual  orientation  and  gender  identity.  Further  efforts  are  needed  to  implement  the  principle  of 
reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities. 

On equality between women and men  in employment and social policy, the gender employment 
gap in the labour market, despite a slight decline, is almost four times higher than EU average.  The 
increase  in  educational  attainment  for  women  has  not  yet  translated  into  a  higher  degree  of  gender 
parity in economic life. With only 36.6 per cent (compared with the male rate of 72) Türkiye has one 
of  the  lowest  female  labour  force  participation  rates  among  OECD  countries.  The  rate  of  women 
experiencing unregistered employment increased to 32.9%. The gender pay gap for earnings increased 
to 7.8%, which is below the rate of the EU (12%). It reached 20% for high school graduates. Türkiye 
has  officially  joined  the  Equal  Pay  International  Coalition  (EPIC)  in  January  2025.  Employment 
support for women continued to be implemented by İŞKUR, but its impact remained limited given the 
large  working  age  population  of  women.  The  law  on  part-time  leave  for  civil  servants  following 
childbirth or adoption was adopted on 17 July 2025. It allows both parents to work half of the normal 
weekly  working  hours  until  their  child  reaches  primary  school  age.  The  legislation  is  not  yet  fully 
aligned  with  the  Directive  on  work-life  balance  for  parents  and  carers  and  the  Directive  on  equal 
opportunities  and  treatment  of  women  and  men  in  employment  and  occupation.  There  has  been  no 
notable development in availability of affordable care services. Gender-based stereotypes, gender bias 
in caring responsibilities and insufficient availability of affordable care services continued to hinder a 
higher  women’s  employment  rate.  Women  continued  to  face  a  higher  risk  of  poverty  or  social 
exclusion  than  men  in  all  age  groups.  In  March  2025,  a  presidential  circular  on  prevention  of 
psychological  harassment  in  workplaces  was  released,  but  further  action  is  needed  to  prevent  and 
eliminate all types of violence 
and  harassment  at  work,  in 
accordance  with  Convention 
190  of 
International 
Labour  Organization.  The 
share  of  women  in  decision-
making  positions 
remained 
very  low  (see  Chapter  23  – 
fundamental 
Judiciary  and 
rights).  Measures 
including 
steps  to  align  the  legislation 
with  the  EU  Directive  on 
Gender  Balance  on  Corporate 
Boards need to be adopted.  

the 

The good level of preparation 
for  the  participation  in  the 
European Social Fund was maintained. (See also Chapter 22 – Regional policy and coordination of 
structural instruments). 

72 

 
 
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy 

EU  industrial  policy  strengthens  competitiveness,  facilitates  structural  change  and  encourages  a 
business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 

On industrial policy, Türkiye adopted the ‘2030 Industry and Technology Strategy’ (ITS) in March 
2025.  The  strategy  added  green  and  digital  transition  initiatives  and  strengthened  efforts  towards 
technological  and  industrial  independence.  However,  consultation  of  industrial  stakeholders  for  the 
design  of  this  strategy  was  not  completely  transparent,  and  the  ITS  lacks  a  system  of  comparable 
impact  indicators.  The  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Technology  is  responsible  for  reporting  every  six 
months, with the involvement of some selected stakeholders, but no publication of progress reports or 
external  evaluation  has  been  envisaged.  A  new  action  plan  for  the  Improvement  of  Investment 
Environment  was  adopted  in  July  2025,  including  measures  on  data  protection,  improving  the 
functioning of judiciary, compliance with international standards on public procurement and actions 
on green and digital transition. Türkiye kept the scope of the 15% domestic price advantage in public 
procurement. Its use has further increased in terms of financial volume and number of procurement 
exercises  (see  Chapter  5  –  Public  procurement),  even  though  this  is  against  EU  industrial  policy 
principles  and  ineffective  in  contrast  to  improving  the  innovation  performance. Outcomes  of  the 
current action plan for the fight against the informal economy (2023-2025) are yet to be published. 
Türkiye  revised its  SME  definition in  August  2025  by  increasing the  financial  threshold for annual 
turnover or balance sheet for medium-sized companies from TRY 500 million to TRY 1 billion. 

On enterprise policy and instruments, Turkish legislation is still not fully harmonised with the Late 
Payment Directive. The Project Based Investment Programme (PBIP) for large-scale investments was 
maintained.  Türkiye  revised  its  incentive  scheme  framework  in  May  2025  repealing  the  2012 
incentive scheme. This new scheme is a multi-layered framework focusing on four priority objectives: 
boosting domestic production, fostering technological advancement, addressing regional development 
disparities, and promoting the green and digital transformation. Türkiye also continued to implement 
various schemes supporting companies, particularly small and medium-sized ones. The breakdown of 
State aid for investments made under the industry support programmes was not disclosed, contrary to 
the  commitments  made  under  the  Customs  Union  between  the  EU  and  Türkiye  (see  Chapter  8  – 
Competition policy).  

Türkiye  continued  to  implement  the  Small  Business Act  framework  and is  participating  in  the  new 
cycle  of  SME  Policy  Index  by  the  OECD,  funded  by  the  EU.  The  SME  support  administration 
(KOSGEB) continued to run a range of technical assistance and financing schemes. The Ministry of 
Industry and Technology published the impact evaluations for 20 support schemes, including those of 
KOSGEB  and  the  Turkish  Scientific  and  Technological  Research  Institution  (TÜBITAK).  A 
Presidency decision was issued on priority sectors for KOSGEB support, identifying manufacturing 
industry as a top priority in all sectors.  

Türkiye participates in the SME pillar of the single market programme. Country data compiled as of 
April  2025  confirms  that  Türkiye  has  been  successful  in  submitting  proposals  and  receiving  grants 
under  the  SME  pillar.  10  SME  pillar  project  proposals  involving  Turkish  organisations  have  been 
accepted in response to different calls. 

On sectoral policies, no new sectoral strategy was adopted during the reporting period (as of April 
2025). Türkiye issued a cybersecurity strategy (see Chapter 10 – Digital transformation and media) 
and regional development national strategy during the reporting period with implications for industry. 
The  Ministry  of  Environment,  Urbanisation  and  Climate  Change  adopted  a  regulation  on  industrial 
emissions introducing green transformation certificates for enterprises compliant with the rules of the 
regulation. 

73 

 
 
Chapter 25: Science and research 

The EU provides significant support for research and innovation. All Member States can participate 
in  the  EU’s  research  and  innovation  programmes  and  benefit  from  them,  especially  where  there  is 
scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation. 

On  research  and  innovation,  the  positive  trend  of  Türkiye’s  performance  in  Horizon  Europe 
continued. Türkiye’s participation in the Innovation Pillar of Horizon Europe remains weak, except in 
the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) where Türkiye has emerged as a dynamic 
participant  in  EIT  initiatives.  It  is  worth  mentioning  the  operational  launch  of  the  EIT  Community 
Hub  in  the  first  quarter  of  2025  aiming  to  strengthen  the  existing  collaboration  with  EIT  and  the 
participation of Turkish innovators in EIT schemes. 

On the policy side, Türkiye announced ambitious targets in its new Industry and Technology Strategy 
for 2030 such as increasing R&D spending to 3% of GDP and expanding R&D personnel to 500 000 
by 2030.Targets outlined in the Industry and Technology Strategy for 2023 were partially met. While 
the  targets  for  high-technology  product  exports  and  full-time  equivalent  R&D  personnel  are  nearly 
achieved, Türkiye has fallen short of the target for R&D expenditure as a share of GDP. After a slight 
decline in 2022, the share of R&D expenditure in GDP resumed its upward trend, reaching 1.42% in 
2023 according to OECD data. However, the gap with the EU average of 2.24% remains significant.  

Türkiye  has  initiated  the  design  of  Smart  Specialisation  Strategies  in  three  pilot  regions  (West 
Mediterranean, Eastern Anatolia and Ahiler) with the aim of spreading the process to the rest of the 
country.  So far there has been significant progress in identifying areas of competitive advantage and 
supporting  innovation  and  entrepreneurship.  With  continued  support,  Türkiye  can  leverage  smart 
specialization to drive economic growth, innovation, and regional development. 

Despite a programme to reverse brain drain, official statistics show a steady increase of brain drain 
among higher education graduates since 2015, in particular in the  fields of ICT, molecular biology, 
and engineering. This could potentially have a significant negative impact on science and technology 
in Türkiye.  

According  to  the  European  innovation  scoreboard  2025,  Türkiye  is  regarded  as  an  emerging 
innovator, performing at 58% of the EU average. The innovation gap between Türkiye and the EU is 
narrowing. 

Chapter 26: Education and culture 

The  EU  supports  cooperation  in  education  and  culture  through  funding  programmes  and  the 
coordination  of  Member  State  policy  through  the  ‘open  method  of  coordination’.  The  EU  and  the 
Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant 
workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds. 

On education and training, the proportion of the total public education budget in GDP increased to 
3.93% in 2024, below the EU average of 4.6% of GDP. The share of the total education budget in the 
consolidated government budget amounted to 14.6% in 2024. 

Despite a 34.7% growth in early childhood education (ECE) capacity over the past decade, Türkiye’s 
enrolment rate remains below the OECD average. The net enrolment rate for preschool education at 
age 5 has reached 84.26% in 2024, while the combined net enrolment rate for Turkish children aged 
3–5  is at  51.89%.  Among refugee  children,  the  pre-primary  gross  enrolment  rate  for age  5 is  much 
lower  and  stands  at  44.48%.  More  than  half  of  disadvantaged  children  miss  ECE  or  attend  for  less 
than a year, compared with only 14% of children from advantaged backgrounds. Cost-effective and 
quality ECE services need to be expanded through multiple delivery models, including at municipal 
level. 

The  net  enrolment  rate  in  2023-2024  in  primary  school  and  lower  secondary  school  increased  and 
reached  respectively  95.03%  and  91.45%.  In  secondary  education,  the  net  enrolment  rate  declined 

74 

 
 
considerably,  reaching  87.97%.  There  has  been  also  a  significant  decline  in  the  enrolment  rate  in 
higher education from 46.02% to 42.72%. 

Türkiye  took  part  in  the  Teaching  and  Learning  International  Survey  (TALIS  2024).  Türkiye  is 
participating to PISA 2025 and has enrolled to join Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
Study (TIMSS) 2027.  

On  vocational  education  and  training  (VET),  the  implementation  of  the  National  Vocational 
Qualifications System by the Vocational Qualifications Authority is ongoing. The number of national 
occupational  standards  and  approved  qualifications  slightly  rose,  whereas  the  number  of  authorised 
certification bodies declined, with five authorisations cancelled. There was an increase in the number 
of individuals who took exams and had their skills tested by these certification bodies. 

Despite the Turkish Qualifications Framework being operational, the vocational training provided by 
VET institutions remains mismatched with the needs of national qualification candidates. To improve 
the  functioning  of  the  framework,  other  vocational  educational  institutions,  such  as  continuous 
education centres of universities, public education centres of the Ministry of National Education and 
private  vocational  education  centres  need  to  be  involved.  It  includes  preparation  of  modular 
vocational  training  courses  for  certain  occupations  according  to  the  expected  national  qualification 
learning outcomes, in cooperation with the relevant authorised certification bodies and considering the 
need to avoid conflict of interest. 

In  2025,  Türkiye  updated  referencing  of  the  national  qualifications  framework  to  the  European 
Qualifications Framework (EQF). 

Türkiye  is  a  member  of  the  European  Alliance  for  Apprenticeships  (EAfA)  and  should  encourage 
regional and local stakeholders to join the network. 

On higher education, Türkiye remains at an advanced stage of implementing the Bologna process, 
although  significant  quality  differences  persist  among  Türkiye's  208  higher  education  institutions. 
According to the 2024 Bologna Process implementation report, Türkiye still needs to work on the full 
implementation  of  the  key  commitments,  especially  regarding  degree  structures,  where  some 
programmes exist outside the agreed Bologna model. The Turkish Higher Education Quality Council, 
which is a member of the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) 
board, is awaiting a renewal of its ENQA membership and the European Quality Assurance Register 
for  Higher  Education  (EQAR)  registration.  Five  universities  from  Türkiye  participate  in  European 
Universities alliances. According to the report on Scholar at Risk published in October 2024, Türkiye 
now  ranks  in  the  bottom  10%  of  states  worldwide  for  respect  for  academic  freedom.  In  July  2025, 
Türkiye adopted a law reaffirming the  president’s sole prerogative to appoint rectors of both public 
and foundation universities. This raises concerns in terms of university autonomy in Türkiye. 

The number of students in special education and related institutions increased in 2023-2024. Among 
these  students,  76.2%  attend  mainstream  classes,  and  the  remaining  are  in  special  education 
institutions or in special education classes across different levels. Inclusive education rates amount to 
more  than  70%  in  primary  and  upper-secondary  education.  Despite  progress,  segregation  remains 
significant, with nearly 50 000 children studying in separate classrooms and over 50 000 in separate 
schools.  There  is  no  significant  difference  in  education  enrolment  rate  between  girls  and  boys, 
although in some regions, the drop-out rate is higher for girls. Girls with disabilities face lower access 
to education than boys, due to perceived financial burdens, higher risk of violence, and being kept at 
home  post-puberty  for  safety  reasons.  Children  with  disabilities  are  also  more  likely  to  drop  out  at 
secondary level as many schools are not physically accessible. Refugee children with disabilities face 
additional barriers, such as language challenges and social stigma. 

As an associated country, interest in the Erasmus+ programme in Türkiye continues to rise. In 2024, 
Turkish  organisations  participated  in  2  675  Erasmus+  projects.  Türkiye  is  participating  in  all  the 
European Education Area working groups 2021-2025. 

75 

 
 
In  the  field  of  youth  policy,  youth  services  are  diversifying,  besides  increased  number  of  youth 
centres, offices and mobility camps run by the government. Türkiye is in the process of updating its 
national youth policy document, which dates to 2011. Democratic participatory mechanisms for youth 
remain  limited.  Go-For,  a  solid  rights-based  umbrella  youth  network,  which  takes  part  in  the 
European Youth Forum, is still not recognised by the government. In parallel, the Ministry of Youth 
and  Sports  has  initiated  preparatory  work  to  establish  a  National  Youth  Council.  Unjustified, 
excessive and prolonged pre-trial detention for young students during protests in spring 2025 raises 
concerns  about  political  participation  opportunities  of  youth  in  Türkiye.  The  budget  of  awarded 
European  Solidarity  Corps  applications  reached  EUR 5.6 million,  while  their  number  saw  a  minor 
decline in 2024. 

In the field of sports, Türkiye has no national sport strategy. It continues to take part in the European 
Week of Sport. 

In the area of culture, despite significant resources allocated to cultural activities at central and local 
level,  the  impediments  to  development  of  systematic,  consistent  and  sustainable  cultural  policies 
persist.  The  cultural  policy  in  Türkiye  remains  centralised,  with  limited  space  for  independent 
stakeholders and critical expression. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism continued promoting state-
led large events, while transparent participation and cultural diversity were often sidelined. The share 
of the central budget managed by the ministry is less than 0.36% and illustrates the marginal place of 
culture  in  national  priorities.  Several  metropolitan  municipalities  across  Türkiye  have  increasingly 
engaged  in  supporting  literature,  performing  arts,  and  participatory  heritage  initiatives,  aiming  to 
improve  cultural  access,  local  identity,  and  civic  engagement.  Political  interventions  and  arbitrary 
bans  of  cultural  events  continued  in  the  reporting  period.  The  country  is  not  participating  in  the 
Creative Europe programme. 

Chapter 29: Customs Union 

All  Member  States  are  part  of  the  EU  Customs  Union  and  follow  the  same  customs  rules  and 
procedures.  This  requires  legislative  alignment  as  well  as  adequate  implementing  and  enforcement 
capacity, and access to and interoperability with the EU electronic customs environment. 

Türkiye made no advancements on customs legislation. Türkiye continued to apply additional duties 
on  a  large  number  of  products originating in  non-EU  countries,  which are  in  free  circulation  in  the 
EU-Turkey Customs Union. 

Türkiye's  application  of  value-based  import  surveillance  measures  remains  inconsistent  with  the 
principles of transparent, objective, and verifiable customs valuation procedures. In addition, the lack 
of  a  legal  mechanism  to  recover  overpaid  duties  resulting  from  the  application  of  the  value-based 
surveillance  is  not  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis.  Export  tax  measures  on  hides,  skins,  and  wet-blue 
leathers remain in place. A draft Turkish customs law harmonised with the Union Customs Code has 
yet to be finalised. Furthermore, regulations concerning free zones and duty relief regime remain not 
fully aligned with the EU acquis. 

In  line  with  the  rules  on  mutual  administrative  assistance  in  customs  matters  under  Annex  7  to 
Association Council Decision No 1/95, Türkiye should continue its cooperation with the EU to ensure 
that  customs  legislation  is  correctly  applied,  in  particular  by  the  prevention,  detection  and 
investigation  of  operations  in  breach  of  that  legislation.  As  part  of  the  anti-fraud  efforts,  it  is 
recommended  that  Türkiye  strengthens  combating  customs  fraud,  in  particular  the  smuggling  of 
tobacco products and its cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). 

On administrative and operational capacity, efforts continued to strengthen customs enforcement 
capacity for border controls, particularly on anti-smuggling operations. However, full alignment with 
the EU acquis on the customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and in particular on export 
and  in-transit  operations  is  yet  to  be  completed.  Risk-based  controls  to  enforce  safety  and  security 
measures  need  to  be  streamlined  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis.  Türkiye  implements  the  New 
Computerised Transit System (NCTS) updated in phase 5 as part of its membership in the Convention 

76 

 
 
on  a  Common  Transit  Procedure.  Tariff  IT  systems  are  still  operating  in  line  with  the  EU  tariff  IT 
systems. Türkiye needs to implement the IT strategy in line with business initiatives and update the 
documented customs business processes in line with the legal basis. 

CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY 

This  cluster  covers:  transport  policy  (Chapter  14),  energy  (Chapter  15),  trans-European  networks 
(Chapter 21) and environment and climate change (Chapter 27). 

Chapter 14: Transport policy 

The EU has common rules for technical and safety standards, security, social standards, and market 
liberalisation  in  road  transport,  railways,  inland  waterways,  multimodal  transport,  aviation  and 
maritime transport. 

Regarding  the  EU  acquis  on  general  transport,  Türkiye  has  yet  to  adopt  a  White  Paper  on 
Sustainable  Urban  Mobility.  Türkiye  continued  working  on  decarbonisation  pathways  based  on  an 
emission projection model. 

On  road  transport,  Türkiye  adopted  a  regulation  on  motor  courier  services  bringing  in  vocational 
standards  and  a  regulation  on  transport  of  perishable  foodstuffs,  aiming  at  compliance  with  the 
International Carriage of Perishable Foodstuffs Agreement. Alignment gaps still remain on access to 
the  profession  and market,  licensing,  accessibility,  certificates  for professional  competence training, 
road safety management (especially road infrastructure and tunnels), roadworthiness testing, rest time 
enforcement,  alternative  fuels  infrastructure  deployment,  and  emission  targets  for  heavy-duty 
vehicles.  On  road  safety,  according  to  the  Turkish  Statistics  Institute,  the  total  number  of  crashes 
increased  by  9.9%,  the  number  of  crashes  with  death  or  injury  increased  by  13.5%,  the  number  of 
accidents with equipment damage increased by 9.1%, and the number of injured increased by 9.8%. 

On  rail  transport,  dangerous  goods  transport  regulations  were  updated  for  railway  operations, 
aligning partly with the 2025 standards set by the Regulation concerning the International Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Rail. The new railway framework law is not yet adopted, and Türkiye has still 
not  aligned  with  the  EU’s  fourth  railway  package.  The  railway  safety  and  the  interoperability 
regulations are not yet aligned with the EU acquis. Further training on railway safety is needed. The 
independence of the National Safety Authority, currently assigned to the DG for Railway Transport 
Services,  has  yet  to  be achieved.  The subsidies to the  incumbent railway  operator  and  the  financial 
independence  of  the  transport  operator  from  infrastructure  manager  remain  major  issues.  There  are 
still gaps in alignment requiring further efforts on regulatory independence (Directive 2012/34/EU), 
safety  certification  (Directive  (EU)  2016/798),  train  driver  certification,  cost  calculation  modalities, 
public service contract regulation, and passenger rights. 

and 

On  maritime  transport,  Türkiye  introduced  a  domestically  produced  navigational  text  messages 
system  which  started  transmitting  maritime  safety  information,  navigation  warnings,  weather 
forecasts, 
essential 
updates  to  ships  at  sea.  National 
legislation  implementing  the  EU 
Port Services Regulation is yet to be 
developed. 

other 

Türkiye  continues  to  prohibit  the 
docking  of  vessels  flying  Cypriot 
flag calling at Turkish ports as well 
as ban all vessels with cargo bound 
for  or  coming  from  Cyprus  from 
calling at Turkish ports.  

77 

 
 
 
Türkiye has yet to align with the relevant EU legislation on inland waterway. 

On  aviation,  Türkiye  has  not  yet  adopted  national  legislation  on  sustainable  aviation  fuel,  and  the 
timeline for its adoption and implementation remains unclear. Türkiye opened the 58th international 
airport of the country in Cukurova. 

The  lack  of  adequate  communication  between  air  traffic  control  centres  in  Türkiye  and  Cyprus 
continued to compromise air safety in the Nicosia flight information region, requiring an operational 
solution.  Türkiye  continued  not  to  accept  the  principle  of  EU  carrier  designation  in  its  air  services 
agreements with Member States, which is a cornerstone of the EU internal market in aviation. 

On multimodal transport, further legislative work is required to align with the Combined Transport 
Directive and regulatory facilitation measures.  

As  regards  alignment  on  EU  passenger  rights  regulations  Türkiye,  introduced  compensation  for 
delays of three hours or more in its legislation. 

As long as restrictions remain in place on vessels and aircrafts registered in Cyprus, related to Cyprus, 
or  whose  last  port of call was  Cyprus,  Türkiye  will not  be  in  a position to fully  implement  the  EU 
acquis relating to this chapter. 

Chapter 15: Energy 

EU  energy  policy  covers  energy  supply,  infrastructure,  the  internal  energy  market,  consumers, 
renewable  energy,  energy  efficiency,  nuclear  energy,  nuclear  safety,  radiation  protection  and 
nuclear safeguards. 

On security of supply, in 2024 Türkiye became the second largest country in Europe, after Spain, in 
terms of LNG regasification capacity, reaching 51.3 billion cubic metres. Türkiye continued to invest 
in  enhancing  its  regional  natural  gas  trading  role  capitalising  on  its  geographical  location  and 
increased natural gas infrastructure capacity. A long-term agreement with Algeria was extended until 
2027  while  new  LNG  supply  agreements  were  reached  with  major  players  in  September  2024.  In 
February  2025,  BOTAŞ  and  Turkmengaz  signed  an  agreement  for  the  transportation  of  1.3  billion 
cubic  metres  of  Turkmen  natural  gas  to  Türkiye  via  a  swap  agreement  with  Iran.  In  March  2025, 
Türkiye inaugurated the  Igdir-Nakhichivan natural  gas  pipeline,  which  is  a  new  85 km  gas  pipeline 
with  a  500  million  cubic  metres’  annual  capacity.  BOTAŞ  and  the  national  Egyptian  gas  company 
signed an agreement in May 2025 enabling a floating storage and regasification unit from BOTAŞ’s 
fleet  to  operate  abroad  for  the  first  time.  Türkiye  improved  upstream  operations  at  the  Sakarya  gas 
field in the Black Sea, completing the first phase of gas production, which at  the end of April 2025 
reached  9.5  million  cubic  metres  per  day.  The  construction  works  at  the  country’s  biggest 
underground  storage  facility  at  Tuz  Golu  (Salt  Lake)  continued  and  the  second  underground  gas 
storage facility at Silivri was expanded. No developments were reported on legislative alignment with 
the EU acquis in this area.  Overall, despite some diversification efforts, energy dependence on Russia 
continued. 

On the internal energy market, Türkiye suspended yet again the unbundling of the state-owned gas 
company  BOTAŞ,  which  dominates  the  country’s  natural  gas  market  and  trade.  The  natural  gas 
market law  remained  incompatible  with  the  EU's  Third  Energy  Package  and the  pricing is  not  yet 
transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory. 

On  the  wholesale  electricity  market,  as  of  January  2025,  subsidies  to  electricity  were  removed 
beyond  5 000 kWh  per  year  for  consumers  and  beyond  15 000 kWh  per  year  for  industrial  users. 
Türkiye’s  electricity  generation  installed  capacity  continued  increasing,  and  as  of  March  2025, 
reached 117 876 MW. Clean energy sources accounted for around 70 000 MW of the total capacity. 

The share of fossil fuels is at the historic low level of 55%, with gas generation reaching only 18.5% 
also  due to increase  hydropower  generation and increasing  electricity  demand. Combined  wind  and 
solar energy generated (62 TWh) more electricity than domestic coal for the second year in a row. 

78 

 
 
On hydrocarbons, Türkiye is yet to align its legislation with the Directive on the safety of offshore 
oil and gas operations, also regarding the transit of hydrocarbons. Türkiye allocated TRY 75.7 billion 
to  the  energy  sector  in  2025  under  its  latest  investment  programme,  which  meant  a  70%  increase 
compared  with  2024.  Daily  oil production in  Türkiye  continued  to  increase.  Türkiye  signed a  four-
year venture with US-based companies to explore for shale oil and gas in four fields in the Diyarbakir 
basins. 

On  coal,  Türkiye  continued  to  provide  incentives  for  domestic  production  of  lignite  coal  and  the 
contribution  of  imported  coal,  including  from  Russia  to  energy  generation  remained  significant  at 
about 20%. Türkiye has yet to set specific date for a coal phase-out and reduce the envisaged capacity 
for the coal-fired power generation in Türkiye for the next decade.   

On renewable energy, the share of renewable sources in installed power continues increasing from 
56% in 2023 to 60.06% in 2024, and in production, from 42% in 2023 to 53% in 2024. Out of 59.2 
GW  of  electricity  generated  from  renewable  sources  in  Türkiye  in  2024,  32  GW  came  from 
hydropower,  11.8  GW  from  wind,  11.3  GW  from  photovoltaics  and  the  rest  from  geothermal  and 
bioenergy. An energy transition roadmap to 2035 was adopted, where a 120 GW target of cumulative 
solar and wind installed capacity was announced. A target was set to increase the share of domestic 
resources in electricity generation to 63% by 2028 as part of its 2024-2028 Strategic Plan.  

In 2024, a new round of the Renewable Energy Auctions (YEKA) was launched for 1.2 GW of wind 
and  800 MW  of  solar  photovoltaic.  However,  the  local  content  requirement  practices  in  Türkiye 
continue  raising  concerns  as  they  contradict  World  Trade  Organization  and  EU-Turkey  Customs 
Union rules and undermine the competitiveness of the EU and other international companies on the 
Turkish energy market. 

The Turkish long-term climate strategy released in 2024 also sets targets for battery storage capacity 
in 2030 and 2035 of 2.1 GW and 7.5 GW respectively. 

As  regards  energy  efficiency,  no  developments  were  reported,  including  in  the  area  of  energy 
performance of buildings. 

On nuclear energy, nuclear safety and radiation protection, the commissioning of the first reactor 
of Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant at Akkuyu on the Mediterranean Sea (a 99.2% investment by 
Russia’s  Rosatom)  was further  delayed  and  is  not  yet  operational.  The  construction  of the second, 
third and fourth reactors at Akkuyu power plant continued.  

Following  its  voluntary  commitment  to  conduct  EU/ENSREG  methodology-based  post-Fukushima 
nuclear safety stress tests on the Akkuyu power plant, a peer review report from the European Nuclear 
Safety  Regulators  Group  (ENSREG)  containing  a  number  of  recommendations  was  published. 
Türkiye is not yet member of the European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange 
and continued refusing to accept its obligations to the Republic of Cyprus as a Contracting Party to 
the  Joint  Convention  on  the  Safety  of  Agent  Fuel  Management  and  on  the  Safety  of  Radioactive 
Waste Management. 

Chapter 21: Trans-European networks 

The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and 
energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment. 

On transport networks, Türkiye continued to progress on the Halkali-Kapikule railway line in all of 
its  stages.  The  project  reached  95%  physical  progress  in  the  Cerkezkoy  –  Kapikule  section.  Rail 
capacity  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Halkali  to  Kars  corridor  is  yet  very  limited  and  requires 
improvement of infrastructure. 

Increasing the capacity of  the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge is crucial for seamless Bosphorus railway 
crossings.  Substantial  investment  is  needed  to  install  rail  infrastructure  on  the  bridge  and  fully 
integrate  it  into  the  TEN-T.  Completing  this  link  would  ensure  uninterrupted  freight  and  passenger 
rail flows between Europe and Asia, strengthening multimodal corridors. The 7th Railway Monitoring 
79 

 
 
Board  was  convened  in  March  2025,  reaffirming  Türkiye’s  commitment  to  European  standards  for 
interoperability, network performance monitoring, and better coordination among stakeholders. 

Increasing rail capacity in the Marmaray tunnel, the only functioning undersea rail connection across 
the Bosphorus, has become increasingly urgent. Marmaray currently experiences capacity constraints 
due  to  mixed  passenger  and  freight  use.  Enhancing  throughput  is  essential  for  accommodating 
projected  volumes and ensuring a resilient and uninterrupted flow between the European and Asian 
TEN-T extensions. 

The Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway line saw initiatives for capacity expansion during the reporting period. 
This corridor provides an alternative east-west rail link connecting Türkiye, Georgia, and Azerbaijan 
and is an essential element enabling connections towards Central Asia. The Ankara-İzmir High-Speed 
Rail  project  continued  construction,  enhancing  east-west  connectivity  within  Türkiye.  The  Mersin-
Adana-Gaziantep  rail  line  construction  progressed  albeit  slowly.  This  corridor  is  crucial  for  linking 
southern Turkish ports to the Middle Corridor and strengthening alternative east-west supply chains.  

On energy networks, Türkiye has not yet fully aligned with the TEN-E Regulation. The integration 
of increased amounts of intermittent renewable energy remains a major challenge in modernising the 
country’s electricity network. 

Chapter 27: Environment and climate change 

The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. 
EU  rules  contain  provisions  addressing  climate  change,  water  and  air  quality,  waste  management, 
nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil protection. 

Environment 

On horizontal legislation, Türkiye has yet to become party to the Espoo Convention is recommended 
to  fully  align  with  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  and  Strategic  Environmental  Assessment 
Directives.  Türkiye  is  not  yet  party  Aarhus  Convention  and  difficulties  persist  in  accessing  public 
information,  justice  in  environmental  matters,  and  public  participation  in  decision-making.  Further 
regulatory  work  remains  necessary  to  align  with  the  Environmental  Liability  Directive  and  the 
Environmental Crime Directive. 

On air quality, Türkiye has yet to adopt national legislation in line with the revised EU Directives on 
Ambient Air Quality and a National Emission Ceilings legislation. Reports on severe air pollution in 
some  cities  continued.  Measurement  results  for  PM  2.5  are  not  yet  publicly  available  and  the 
threshold values for most parameters remain higher than the EU limit values. 

On waste management, Türkiye’s recycling rate increased from 30% to 36% in the reporting period, 
the deposit management system principles were published in January 2025, and implementation was 
initiated in one pilot province (Sakarya). The level of implementation of waste management plans at 
local and regional level is however still insufficient. Türkiye has yet to adopt the legislation on ship 
recycling  to  mirror  the  requirements  of  the  EU  Ship  Recycling  Regulation.  Türkiye  has  not  yet 
adopted a national circular economy action plan, and the management of construction debris remains 
a major environmental problem. 

On  water  quality,  no  advancements  were  made  on  aligning  with  the  revised  EU  Directive  on 
drinking  water.  The  coverage  of  the  1 258  wastewater  treatment  plants  remains  at  91%  of  the 
municipal population. Alignment with the EU marine strategy remains pending. 

Further  work  remains  necessary  on  nature  protection  Türkiye  has  not  yet  set  national  targets  to 
implement  the  Kunming-Montreal  Global  Biodiversity  Framework  and  has  not  yet  adopted  the 
framework legislation, the national biodiversity strategy and the action plan. Türkiye signed but did 
not  ratify  the  Agreement  under  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  on  the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction 
(BBNJ  Agreement).  Further  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis  is  required  for  the  planning  and 
construction  in  wetlands,  forests  and  natural  sites.  The  implementation  of  the  mining  regulation, 
80 

 
 
allowing  mining  in  agricultural  areas,  protected  areas,  national  parks  and  coastal  areas,  remained  a 
concern among non-governmental organisations and the general public. 

On industrial pollution and risk management, while Türkiye adopted implementing legislation in 
January 2025, this is yet partially aligned with the EU’s Industrial Emissions Directive, and further 
work is required, especially concerning the permit system. 

On  chemicals,  alignment  with  the  EU  legislation  on  registration,  evaluation,  authorisation  and 
restriction of chemicals (REACH) is yet to be achieved. 

No  improvements  were  made  on  noise,  where  the  level  of  alignment  and  implementation  remains 
high. 

On  civil  protection,  Türkiye  continued  its  participation  in  the  relevant  activities  under  the  Union 
Civil  Protection  Mechanism.  Türkiye  also  contributed  to  the  EU  Civil  Protection  Pool  and  rescEU 
reserve with its capacities for response to earthquakes and medical emergencies. The establishment of 
a Secure Trans-European Services for Telematics between Administrations, not yet in place, remains 
a precondition for connecting to the Common Emergency Communication and Information System. 

Climate change 

While  the  country’s  level  of  climate  ambition  still  does  not  align  with  the  EU’s,  Türkiye  made 
improvements  on  climate change  over  the  reporting period.  In  November  2024  Türkiye  adopted  its 
long-term climate strategy in line with the Paris Agreement but it has not yet released detailed, model-
based  scenarios  to  align  short-  and  medium-term  measures  with  its  long-term  goal  of  reaching 
climate-neutrality  by  2053.  In  July  2025,  Türkiye  adopted  a climate  law  including  the  rules for the 
establishment of a domestic emission trading system. While this is a crucial step for the introduction 
of a carbon price, the law  is still only partially aligned with the EU acquis.  

Türkiye  does  not  fully  implement  the  Fuel  Quality  Directive,  nor  does  it  align  with  EU  emissions 
standards for new light and heavy-duty vehicles. Türkiye is not aligned with the EU Carbon Capture 
and  Storage  Directive.  In  October  2024,  Türkiye  published  a  regulation  implementing  the  Kigali 
Amendment  to  the  Montreal  Protocol  on  ozone-depleting  substances,  improving  its  alignment  with 
EU standards on ozone-depleting substances and on fluorinated greenhouse gases although alignment 
is still not complete and requires further work in particular on sectoral restrictions and the ambition of 
the quota system.  

The submission of a new Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) ahead of UNFCCC COP30 with 
an increased level of ambition in line with the efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C, especially an 
absolute emission reduction target, remains crucial.  

CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION 

This  cluster  covers:  agriculture  and  rural  development  (Chapter  11),  food  safety,  veterinary  and 
phytosanitary  policy  (Chapter  12),  fisheries  and  aquaculture  (Chapter  13),  regional  policy  and 
coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22), and financial and budgetary provisions (Chapter 
33). 

Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development 

The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and ensures Europe’s food security. It helps 
tackle climate change and the sustainable management of national resources; maintains rural areas 
and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-
food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong management and control systems. There 
are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming. 

On horizontal issues, Türkiye took no significant steps to advance on sustainable agriculture under 
the Turkish Green Deal action plan. Türkiye continued to move away from the principles governing 

81 

 
 
 
support  under  the  EU’s  common  agricultural  policy.  There  were  no  developments  as  regards  the 
establishment of the integrated administration and control system. 

There  were  no  developments  on  agricultural  markets  –  common  market  organisation.  The 
effective  opening  and  filling  of  the  preferential  quotas  for  beef  and  live  bovine  animals  under  the 
trade agreement with the EU remains untransparent. 

On rural development, Türkiye has increased the national contribution to the EU Instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance for Rural Development (IPARD III). Seven calls for applications were launched 
under  this  programme,  with  a  continuous  high  number  of  applications  submitted  exceeding  the 
available budget. IPARD II implementation has ended with a nearly full absorption rate. 

On quality policy, alignment with the EU acquis needs to continue.  

On organic farming, there was no developments in aligning with the EU acquis. 

On  the  fight  against  corruption  measures,  the  IPARD  bodies  are  obliged  to  prevent,  detect  and 
report irregularities. 

Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 

The EU food acquis including hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensures a high level of food and 
feed safety and a high level of protection of consumers’ interests. Animal health and welfare and the 
safety  of  food  of  animal  origin  are  safeguarded  together  with  quality  of  seeds,  plant  reproductive 
material, protection against harmful organisms and animal nutrition and the use of plant protection 
products. 

On  general  food  safety,  the  number of  notifications  to  the  rapid alert system  for  food  and feed on 
pesticide residues in fruits and vegetables as well as contaminants in dried figs, pistachios, herbs and 
spices  imported  from  Türkiye  into  the  EU  remains  high.  Following  the  approval  of  six  poultry 
slaughterhouses by the EU, Türkiye started exporting heat-treated poultry products to the EU.  

On veterinary policy there is still no progress on identification and registration of swine animals, and 
on  identification  of  cattle  and  small  ruminants.  Lack  of  enforcement  continued  on  animal  welfare, 
where rules on slaughterhouses, long journeys and the transition to enriched cage systems are still not 
implemented. The implementation of compulsory requirements for controlling animals, meeting their 
feed and water requirements, sheltering and resting needs during transport was once more extended 
until December 2026. While Türkiye adopted an implementing regulation on the protection of animals 
in  December  2024,  the  rules  regarding  the  use  of  euthanasia  created  controversy  in  the  country. 
Animal health legislation in Türkiye is not yet aligned with the EU’s animal health policy and acquis. 

On the placing of food, feed and animal by-products on the market, there are still problems on raw 
milk quality as the strategy on raw milk is not yet adopted and the general rules to be implemented by 
raw milk producers are not yet in place. Raw milk specifications and rules on the use of milk that does 
not  meet  the  somatic  cell  criteria  remained  unadopted.  Further  work  is  required  to  align  Türkiye’s 
rules on funding inspections with the EU system. An EU compliant system of collection, storage and 
processing of animal by-products is not yet in place. 

While Türkiye continued efforts on its food safety rules and its specific rules for feed, no progress 
was reported.  

On phytosanitary policy, Türkiye adopted a regulation concerning the registration of plant varieties 
in  September  2024  aiming  at  determining  the  principles  regarding  the  registration  of  varieties  of 
agricultural plant species. No progress on plant health law was reported. 

Türkiye has yet to align its legislation on novel food and on genetically modified organisms. 

Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture 

The  common  fisheries  policy lays  down  rules  on  fisheries  management, protects  living resources of 
the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing 

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fleet capacity, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for fisheries and coastal communities. 
Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture. 

Türkiye  made  some  progress  on  resource  and  fleet  management.  Following  the  first  year  of 
implementation of the regulation on planning of agriculture production – which also includes fisheries 
and aquaculture – further actions were taken through regulating commercial fisheries and regulating 
recreational  fisheries.  The  legislation  included  catch  limits  for  ecologically  and  economically 
important  species,  mesh  size  restrictions,  depth  limits,  fisheries  closed  areas,  and  species-specific 
bans.  Specific  measures  were  also  adopted  to  protect  vulnerable  species,  such  as  seabirds  and  sea 
turtles.  Türkiye  continued  working  towards  the  operationalisation  of  the  General  Fisheries 
Commission  for  the  Mediterranean’s  (GFCM)  non-indigenous  species  observatory  for  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean. 

On  inspections  and  control,  Türkiye  made  some  progress  on  legislative  alignment  and 
implementation of binding control measures recommended by the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and the GFCM. Monitoring, surveillance and control capacities were 
further  strengthened  with  the  establishment  of  a  new  fisheries  inspection  centre,  and  traceability 
systems. 

The amended fisheries law provided for some structural action and a stronger conservation regime, 
such  as  improved  fishing  monitoring,  control  and  surveillance  systems  and  new  penalties  that 
increased the number of vessels confiscated due to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Further 
measures were put in place during the reporting period to support small-scale fisheries and women in 
fisheries. National data collection was also improved: catch data/landings, fleet activity records and 
economic indicators were regularly collected and used for fisheries management. 

On  market  policy,  IT  tools  were  set  up  to  support  the  development  and  control  of  professional 
organisations in line with EU market policy. Türkiye continued providing  State aid for aquaculture 
and improved data quality on marine and inland artisanal fishing vessels. 

There was no significant development concerning aquaculture.  

On  international  agreements,  Türkiye  kept  cooperating  with  the  EU  in  regional  and  international 
platforms.  Türkiye  participated  with  an  active  and  supportive  stance  in  the  works  of  the  GFCM. 
However, it has not ratified yet the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which would 
improve cooperation with the EU on fisheries and maritime policy. 

Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments 

Regional policy is the EU’s main tool for reducing regional disparities and investing in sustainable 
and  inclusive  socio-economic  growth.  It  is  operating  through  “‘shared  management”’  between  the 
Commission  and  EU  Member  States.  The  implementation  of  cohesion  policy  programmes  requires 
appropriate administrative capacity on programme and project level, the establishment of systems of 
sound financial management and control and also the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as 
environmental or public procurement legislation. 

There were no improvements on the legislative framework. Türkiye has not put in place mechanisms 
for evidence-based policymaking, policy and programme evaluations, and impact assessment. Türkiye 
needs  a  comprehensive  reform  agenda  for  public  administration  and  public  finance  management 
addressing the lack of accountability at higher levels of public administration, as well as mechanisms 
for  evidence-based  policymaking,  policy  and  programme  evaluations,  and  impact  assessment.  The 
autonomy  of  local  governance  is  not  upheld.  State  overregulation  and  interventionism  in  planning 
decisions of local authorities persists.  

There is a need to improve the overall framework and statistical tools for monitoring and evaluation 
of  the  National  Strategy  for  Regional  Development  and  Regional  Development  Agencies' 
performance, along with enhancing implementation tools. 

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On  the  institutional  framework,  some  improvements  are  observed  in  the  supervision  and 
intervention capacity  of  the  National  Authorising  Officer in contracting and implementation  of  IPA 
funding. The role of the National IPA Coordinator (NIPAC) requires strengthening to ensure effective 
coordination  amongst  ministries,  prioritisation  of  interventions  under  IPA  III  and  monitoring  of 
results.  The  institutional  set-up  and  the  system  for  management  of  IPA  funds  under  indirect 
management by the beneficiary country has been adapted to the IPA III requirements.  

Efforts continue to improve  administrative capacities for programming, monitoring and evaluation 
activities,  as  well  as  to  strengthen  the  Audit  Authority.  However,  clear  staff  retention  policy  and 
strategy  in  the  IPA  structures  are  still  lacking.  Recruitment  procedures  for  the  most  senior  civil 
service  posts  lack  objective  selection  criteria.  The  capacities  of  the  indirect  management  by 
beneficiary country (IMBC) structures need to be further strengthened in order to ensure efficient and 
timely  contracting  and  implementation  of  IPA  programmes.  The  project  management  capacities 
should  also  be  enhanced  to  enable  sound  financial  management  and  put  more  emphasis  on 
performance aspects in addition to compliance.  

On  programming,  the  NIPAC  continued  to  coordinate  the  process  and  ensured  overall  monitoring 
and evaluation of the implementation. Although Türkiye continues to gain experience in programming 
in  regional  policy  and  implementing  some  Interreg  IPA  programmes,  it  should  address  structural 
weaknesses in the regional policy implementation, ensure the proper functioning of local democracy 
and more balanced regional development. Implementation under IPA III should be accelerated. 

On  monitoring  and  evaluation,  as  part  of  the  monitoring  procedures  applicable  under  the  IMBC, 
results-oriented monitoring  missions  continued, and the  NIPAC  office submitted  an  evaluation plan 
for 2025 and 2026. Management Information Systems functions should be significantly improved to 
facilitate  tracking  of  project  and  programme  progress  through  output  and  result  indicators  and 
eventually facilitate the application of result-based management.  

The  IPA  structures  are  equipped  on  financial  management,  control  and  although  their 
implementation  effectiveness  needs  to  be  improved,  in  particular  in  terms  of  use  of  performance 
indicators  and  adherence  to  sound  financial  management  rules  and  practices.  A  countrywide 
management information system for risk management, internal control and monitoring and reporting 
of  the  financial  management  is  in  place.  The  audit  work  is  carried  out  in  accordance  with 
internationally  accepted  audit  standards  as  indicated  in  the  Financial  Framework  Partnership 
Agreement and Framework Agreements. 

On fight against corruption, Türkiye lacks a national anti-fraud strategy. The IMBC system has been 
addressing potential risks, detecting and combating fraud and irregularities. Türkiye needs to improve 
shortcomings concerning legal status, independence, charters, quality assurance and reporting lines of 
internal audit units of IPA III structures.  

Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions 

This  chapter  covers  the  rules  governing  the  funding  of  the  EU  budget  (‘own  resources’).  These 
resources  mainly  consist  of:  (i)  contributions  based  on  the  gross  national  income  of  each  Member 
State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource and (iv) a resource based on value 
added  tax.  Member  States  must  have  the  appropriate  administrative  capacity  to  adequately 
coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources. 

Türkiye  has  already established the  fundamental  principles  and  institutions  in  the  underlying  policy 
areas  related to the implementation of the own resources system (see Chapters 16 – Taxation, 18 – 
Statistics, 29 – Customs Union, and 32 – Financial control). However, in due course, it will need to 
set  up  solid  coordination  structures,  strengthen  management  capacity  and  adopt  implementing  rules 
for  the  effective  administration  of  the  own  resources  system.  The  Customs  Union  with  the  EU  on 
processed  agricultural  goods  and  industrial  goods  (with  the  exception  of  coal  and  steel  products) 
continues  to  ensure  considerable  alignment  of  Türkiye’s  customs  legislation  with  the  acquis  on 
customs. Türkiye has yet to adopt a draft customs law aligned with the Union Customs Code. This 

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will facilitate preparation in traditional own resources (mainly customs duties). 

Systems to accurately calculate the VAT base and the weighted average rate for the value added tax-
based resource are not in place yet. VAT and customs duties fraud remains an issue as does the size 
of  the  informal  economy.  Legislation  on  structure,  exemptions,  special  schemes  and  the  scope  of 
reduced rates is not fully aligned with the EU acquis. 

Concerning  the  gross  national  income-based  resource,  Türkiye  has  made  efforts  to  fully  align  its 
national  accounts  and  gross  national  income  calculations  with  the  European  System  of  Accounts 
(ESA 2010). It also needs to improve the estimates’ exhaustiveness to ensure that they take account of 
the  non-observed  economy.  The  gross  national  income  inventory  is  not  fully  aligned  with  the 
Eurostat’s Inventory Guide and the transmission of data does not always occur in a timely manner. 

In  terms  of  the  administrative  infrastructure,  Türkiye  needs  to  set  up  a  fully  operational 
coordination structure, with sufficient administrative capacity and the implementing rules needed to 
ensure  that  it  can  correctly  calculate,  forecast,  account  for,  collect,  pay,  monitor  and  report  own 
resources to the EU in line with the EU acquis. 

CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS 

There  are  two  chapters  in  this  cluster:  external  relations  (Chapter  30),  and  foreign,  security  and 
defence policy (Chapter 31). 

Chapter 30: External relations 

The EU has a common  trade and commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral 
and bilateral agreements, and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules on humanitarian aid 
and development policy. 

On the common commercial policy there was limited progress during the reporting period. Türkiye 
maintained  the  large  scope  of  the  additional  duties  diverting  from  the  common  external  tariff  and 
partial alignment with the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences in terms of beneficiary countries 
and products. Türkiye initiated one new safeguard investigation. 

There  is  a  need  for  closer  coordination  between  the  EU  and  Türkiye  within  the  World  Trade 
Organisation  (WTO),  in  the  OECD  and  in  the  G20.  At  the  WTO,  Türkiye  has  been  an  active 
participant  in  the  Joint  Initiative  on  Electronic  Commerce  discussions,  but  it  has  not  yet  expressed 
support  for  the  outcome.  While  it  has  supported  the  renewal  of  the  multilateral  moratorium  on 
customs duties on electronic transmissions, it continues to express scepticism about the meaning and 
scope  of  the  commitment.  Türkiye  (together  with  India  and  South  Africa)  blocks  the  consensus  to 
adopt the request for legal incorporation of the  Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement 
into the WTO rulebook. Türkiye did not join the Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement 
(MPIA) either. 

The  work  is  progressing  on  the  technical  revision  of  the  bridging  legislation  of  the  EU-Turkey 
Customs Union (Association Council Decision 1/2006) to align it with the new rules of the revised 
Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Convention. On export controls of military equipment and technology, and 
dual-use  goods,  Türkiye  did  not  align  with  the  EU  position  on  certain  multilateral  export  control 
arrangements. Türkiye’s non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia remains a 
concern,  although  it  has  taken  practical  steps  to  prevent  the  circumvention  of  EU  sanctions  against 
Russia on dual-use goods. 

On  bilateral  trade  and  investment  agreements  with  third  countries,  Türkiye  has  84  bilateral 
investment  treaties  in  force,  24  of  which  are  with  25  EU  Member  States,  and  23  free  trade 
agreements.  The  Free  Trade  Agreement  signed  with  Ukraine  entered  into  force,  but  its 
implementation  is  suspended.  Türkiye  continued  to  implement  its  free  trade  agreements  with 
Malaysia, Venezuela, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, diverging from the common commercial 

85 

 
 
 
policy  under  the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union  since  the  EU  has  no  such  agreements  with  those 
countries.  In  addition,  Türkiye  implemented  preferential  trade  agreements  with  Iran,  Uzbekistan, 
Pakistan and Azerbaijan. 

As for development policy and humanitarian aid, Türkiye granted official development assistance 
in  2024  of  EUR  6.87  billion  (USD 7.48 billion),  which is  equivalent to  0.56%  of  its gross national 
income. It was below the 0.7% target enshrined in Sustainable Development Goal 17. The assistance 
was  largely  directed  towards  humanitarian  support  for  projects  related  to  Syria  but  carried  out  in 
Türkiye. 

Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy 

Member  States  must  be  able  to  conduct  political  dialogue  under  EU  foreign,  security  and  defence 
policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU actions, and apply agreed sanctions and restrictive 
measures. 

The political dialogue between the EU and Türkiye on foreign and security policy issues intensified 
through contacts, meetings and bilateral visits at high- and senior officials’ level. Several high-level 
visits  took  place.  The  President  and  the  High  Representative/Vice-President  of  the  European 
Commission travelled to Ankara in December 2024 and January 2025 respectively. Türkiye actively 
engaged with EU Special Representatives on a range of regional issues (Horn of Africa, Central Asia, 
South Caucasus, Western Balkans, Gulf) and the EU-Türkiye consultations on Western Balkans took 
place in September 2025. The political dialogue at Political Directors’ level took place in March 2025 
after a hiatus of three years and informal consultations on Security and Defence resumed in June 2025 
after  a  four-year  pause.  The  EU  Special  Envoy  for  the  implementation  of  EU  sanctions  visited 
Türkiye  and  engaged  on  circumvention  of  sanctions  against  Russia  in  April  2025.  In  March  2025, 
Türkiye  attended  the  9th  Brussels  Syria  Conference  organised  by  the  EU.  The  Turkish  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  participated  in  the  informal  meeting  of  the  EU  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs 
(Gymnich) in Warsaw in May 2025, and in the Ministerial Meeting on Cross-Regional Security and 
Connectivity in Luxembourg in October 2025, held in the margins of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, 
where he also held a bilateral meeting with the HR/VP. 

The  institutional  framework  enabling  Türkiye’s  participation  in  the  EU’s  common  foreign  and 
security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP) remained in place.  

Regrettably,  Türkiye  maintained  a  very  low  alignment  rate  of  4%  with  the  statements  by  the  High 
Representative  on  behalf  of  the  EU  and  Council  decisions  on  sanctions  as  of  24  October  2025, 
compared with 6% in 2024.  

Türkiye maintained its position of not supporting sanctions adopted outside the UN framework, but 
suspended trade with Israel for its actions against Palestinians. Türkiye refrained from aligning with 
the  EU’s  restrictive  measures  against  Russia  in  relation  to  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against 
Ukraine  while  emphasising  that  it  did  not  want  to  become  a  platform  for  the  circumvention  of  EU 
sanctions. Türkiye issued a guidance to financial institutions about the risks of non-compliance with 
G7  sanctions.  Türkiye  has  engaged  with  the  EU  to  address  sanctions  circumvention  for  the  most 
sensitive  goods  and  has  banned  the  re-export  of  sanctioned  goods  transiting  through  its  free  trade 
zones/warehouses.  In  April  2025,  Türkiye  accepted  to  prevent  the  re-export  of  EU-origin 
economically critical goods to Russia. After having surged in the wake of Russia’s war of aggression 
against Ukraine, Türkiye’s direct export of common high priority list (CHPL) items to Russia dropped 
significantly in 2024, down to the pre-war volumes at the beginning of 2022. Türkiye took measures 
to prevent the direct re-export of CHPL items to Russia originating from the EU, US, UK and Japan. 
The  EU  and  Türkiye  continued  their  cooperation  to  prevent  the  ‘false  transit’  of  CHPL  items, 
however Türkiye should step up work with relevant third countries to stop the false transit of CHPL 
items, which are declared as exports to Central Asia but ultimately reach Russia,  and cooperate more 
actively  with  EU  investigative  authorities  on  cases  of  falsification  of  origin  of  Russian-origin 
sanctioned goods that are entering the single market illegally. The EU has warned Türkiye about the 

86 

 
 
maritime  and  ecological  risks  associated  with  Russia’s  ‘Shadow  Fleet’  and  welcomes  that  Turkish 
authorities have been checking actively the insurance of vessels crossing through the Bosphorus.    

Türkiye  continued  to  operate  flights  to  and  from  Russia.  As  of  1 September  2025,  twenty-three 
Türkiye-based  entities  were  listed  under  EU  sanctions  in  the  context  of  Russia’s  war  of  aggression 
against Ukraine. 

Türkiye  actively  engaged  with  international  organisations,  including  the  UN  and  OCSE,  while 
continuing to systematically obstruct the accession of the Republic of Cyprus in several organisations 
and  arrangements.  Türkiye  applied  for  membership  in  BRICS+,  but  was  offered  a  partner  country 
status,  which  it  rejected,  and  continued  to  play  a  pivotal  role  in  the  Organization  of  Turkic  States 
(OTS)  and  an active  role in  the  OIC  (Organisation  for  Islamic  Cooperation).  Türkiye  is  not  a  State 
Party to major UN treaties, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the 
UN  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  (UNCLOS)  as  well  as  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Istanbul 
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence from which 
Türkiye  withdrew  in  2021.  Türkiye does  not  have  a  National  Action  Plan  (NAP) for  the 
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 
agenda. 

As regards disarmament and non-proliferation, Türkiye is a party to most international treaties and 
conventions  and  participates  in  export  control  regimes  and  other  politically  binding  arrangements, 
complying with its legally binding obligations and political commitments. However, it continued to 
prevent the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the Conference on Disarmament, and in other 
Arrangements  and  Committees.  Türkiye  has  yet  to  ratify  the  Arms  Trade  Treaty,  to  which  it  is 
signatory.  Türkiye  does  not  align  with  EU  statements  in  the  framework  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As of 2025, Türkiye stopped aligning with EU statements in 
the context of the Chemical Weapons Convention/OPCW. 

In  terms  of  security  measures,  Türkiye  has  no  security  of  information  agreement  with  the  EU  on 
procedures  for  the  exchanges  and  protection  of  EU  classified  information  (EUCI).  Since  2006,  a 
framework agreement allows Türkiye’s participation, including reception of EUCI, in the context of 
CSDP missions.  

Under the CSDP, Türkiye continued to actively participate in and make substantial contributions to 
EU  crisis  management  missions  and  operations.  Türkiye  continued  being  the  biggest  non-EU 
troops’  contributor  to  the  EU  Force  Operation  Althea  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  remained  a 
major contributor to the NATO KFOR peacekeeping force in Kosovo, as well as contributing to UN 
peacekeeping operations. Türkiye pursued to seek involvement in CSDP and EU defence initiatives, 
while  simultaneously  maintaining  its  policy  of  excluding  one  EU  Member  State  from  cooperation 
with  NATO.  While  meetings  between  the  Political  and  Security  Committee  and  the  North  Atlantic 
Council  resumed  on  28 May 2025,  Türkiye’s  narrow  interpretation  of  the  EU-NATO  cooperation 
framework  continued  to  pose  an  obstacle  to  enhancing  key  aspects  of  a  genuine  and  sustainable 
organisation-to-organisation  relation,  particularly  with  a  view  to  information  sharing.  As  a  positive 
step,  informal  EU-Türkiye  CSDP  consultations  were  held  on  11 June 2025,  following  a  four-year 
hiatus.  Türkiye  continued  to  express  strong  interest  in  participating  in  EU  defence  initiatives 
showcasing its claim to play a significant role in strengthening future European security. 

On counterterrorism, Türkiye is an active member of the Global Coalition against Da’esh, and has 
been  cooperating  with  the  EU  to  improve  the  exchange  of  information  and  cross-border 
investigations, in particular on foreign terrorist fighters and individuals suspected of terrorism.  

On hybrid threats, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) activities, including the 
circulation of  disinformation on social and traditional media, continued in Türkiye. Türkiye did not 
restrict  the  operations  of  Russian  state-controlled  media  outlets  in  the  context  of  Russia’s  war  of 
aggression  against  Ukraine.  Pro-Russian  narratives  are  widespread  in  Türkiye.  Russia-linked 
disinformation  networks  have  notably  penetrated  the  Turkish  information  space,  focusing  on 
narratives related to the war in Ukraine, NATO, energy security, and anti-Western sentiment. 

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Türkiye  continued  to  develop  intense  relations  and  strategic  partnerships  with  countries 
worldwide, while also enhancing its regional geopolitical role and normalisation efforts, at the same 
time seeking to consolidate its stance as a mediator and provider of humanitarian aid. 

Türkiye claimed to have a balanced position on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. While 
expressing  support  to  the  new  US  President’s  initiative  to  end  the  war,  Türkiye  continued  to  put 
forward  its  ambition  to  facilitate  and  mediate  talks  between  Ukraine  and  Russia,  within  a  mutually 
agreed  framework  among  the  parties.  Türkiye  successfully  hosted  direct  talks  between  Russia  and 
Ukraine in Istanbul in May, June and July 2025. Türkiye also expressed readiness to restart the Black 
Sea  grain  corridor,  to  continue  efforts  to  ensure  the  safety  of  navigation  in  the  Black  Sea  in 
collaboration with the littoral states, such as the demining initiative with Romania and Bulgaria, and 
insisted  on  its  position  to  ‘strictly  enforce’  the  Montreux  Convention.  Türkiye  reiterated  its 
commitment  to  Ukraine’s sovereignty  and territorial integrity.  In  February  2025,  Türkiye supported 
the  UN  General  Assembly  Resolution titled  ‘Advancing  a  comprehensive,  just  and  lasting  peace  in 
Ukraine’ marking the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.  

Türkiye continued its engagement policy towards  Russia. High-level contacts took place in various 
areas, demonstrating willingness to enhance and deepen the relation further, including on regional and 
global issues. Turkish President attended the BRICS+ Summit held in Kazan in October 2024, and, in 
August  2025,  the  two  Presidents  met  on  the  sidelines  of  the  Shanghai  Cooperation  Organisation 
summit in China. Türkiye remained consistently dependent on Russia’s energy supplies.  

Türkiye  remained  both  an  important  and  a  challenging  partner  for  the  United  States.  As  a  NATO 
ally,  it  engaged  in  regular  exchanges  with  the  US  at  all  levels.  Under  the  new  US  administration, 
Türkiye renewed its interest in advancing its strategic partnership with the United States,  notably by 
seeking the lifting of restrictions related to  the  Russian  S-400  surface-to-air  defence system,  with a 
view  to  enhancing  cooperation  in  the  defence  industry  and  rejoin  F-35  programme.  Türkiye  hosted 
two rounds of bilateral talks between the US and Russia and welcomed the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace 
agreement brokered by the US. The US President acknowledged Türkiye’s role in Syria and in Gaza 
ceasefire negotiations and called for normalisation of Türkiye’s ties with Israel and urged it to cease 
purchases of Russian oil. 

While  Türkiye maintained deeply  rooted  strategic  relations  with  Qatar,  including  political, military, 
and  economic  cooperation,  its  relations  with  Oman  intensified  (defence  deals  were  signed  in  early 
2025),  and  normalisation  with  the  Gulf  countries  continued  at  both  bilateral  and  regional  level, 
pursuing  engagement  on  trade  and  economic  cooperation,  investments,  and  defence.  Türkiye 
proactively reached out to Gulf countries on regional peace and security, including developments in 
Syria,  as  well  as  on  Gaza,  Ukraine,  and  Sudan.  Visits  at  all  levels  were  frequent,  including  the 
landmark visit by the Omani Sultan Haitham to Türkiye in November 2024 – the first by an Omani 
ruler in nearly four decades, and the Türkiye-GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) Joint Action Plan for 
Cooperation was extended until 2029. 

Following  the  normalisation  of  their  relations  in  2024,  Türkiye  and  Egypt  continued  to  expand 
bilateral trade and investment  and to develop their cooperation in the energy and defence sector. In 
September  2024,  the  two  Presidents  held  in  Ankara  the  first  meeting  of  the  High-Level  Strategic 
Cooperation Council, and the two countries resumed military cooperation in 2025. 

Türkiye  relations  with  Israel  continued  to  deteriorate.  Türkiye  maintained  an  embargo  on  all  trade 
with Israel and diplomatic relations remained  de facto frozen. Türkiye expressed strong criticism  of 
Israeli actions in Gaza, the West Bank, and in neighbouring countries such as Lebanon and Syria, as 
well as  in Iran and Qatar. Türkiye supported South Africa’s claim before the International Court of 
Justice  that  Israel  is  committing  a  genocide  in  Gaza.  It  strongly  opposed  the  ideas  on  any  forced 
displacement of Palestinian populations from the Gaza Strip and supported the UN General Assembly 
Resolution demanding Israel to end its presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Türkiye did not 
condemn the 7 October Hamas’s terrorist attack against Israel, and continued to support Hamas, listed 
as  a  terrorist  organisation  by  the  EU,  which  is  in  complete  disagreement  with  the  EU’s  position. 

88 

 
 
Türkiye  constructively  contributed  to  mediation  efforts  in  advancing  the  first  phase  of  the  Gaza 
ceasefire and, on 13 October 2025, together with US, Egypt and Qatar, signed the Gaza peace summit 
declaration  in  Sharm  El-Sheikh.  Türkiye  expressed  readiness  to  monitor  ceasefire  implementation 
joining an international stabilisation force.  Türkiye provides considerable humanitarian assistance to 
Palestinians  and  supports  ceasefire  efforts  in  Gaza,  including  all  related  UN  resolutions.  Türkiye  is 
also  a  member  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Liaison  Committee  and  of  the  Gaza  Contact  Group.  On  the  Middle 
East  peace  process,  Türkiye  aligns  with  the  EU’s  position  on  the  need  to  relaunch  the  political 
process with a view to implementing the two-state solution and is a member of the ‘Global Coalition’ 
supporting its implementation.  

In Syria, after the fall of the Assad’s regime, Türkiye significantly increased its leverage, reopened its 
embassy in Damascus, and established close relations with Syrian transitional government. In August 
2025, Türkiye signed a MoU with the Syrian transitional government to provide military training and 
advisory support, with the objective of strengthening Syria’s defence capabilities.  Türkiye’s declared 
objective  is  achieving  a  stable  and  prosperous  Syria,  and  supporting  its  sovereignty  and  territorial 
integrity. In  the  longer term,  this  would  also  allow  to  create the  conditions  for  the  return  of  Syrian 
refugees  that  Türkiye  is  hosting  in  large  numbers.  Türkiye  advocates  a  complete  lifting  of 
international sanctions on Syria and welcomed the easing of economic sanctions decided by the EU 
and  US.  In  June  2025,  the  Council  underlined  in  its  Conclusions  that  ‘the  EU  remains  concerned 
about involvement of Turkish-backed armed groups in the north of the country’, and that ‘Türkiye’s 
security  concerns  should  be  addressed  while  ensuring  all  Syrians  –  including  Kurds  –  can  enjoy 
security and fundamental rights’. Türkiye’s political efforts towards an internal process for a peaceful 
and sustainable solution to the Kurdish issue, has the potential, if successful, to reduce security threats 
with important benefits also for the stability of the region, including Syria.  

Relations with Iraq continued to improve, marked by strategic agreements and increasing cooperation 
in the fight against terrorism,  the Development Road Project, as well as in the fields of  energy and 
water  management.  In  March  2025,  Türkiye  and  Iraq,  together  with  Jordan,  Lebanon  and  Syria, 
established the Quintet Mechanism to coordinate common policies on regional issues. In May 2025, 
the Turkish President hosted the Iraqi Prime Minister for the fourth meeting of the Türkiye-Iraq High-
Level  Strategic  Cooperation  Council.  Eleven  agreements  were  signed  across  various  sectors, 
including defence and migration. In September 2025, oil flows through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to 
Türkiye  resumed,  following  an  interim  agreement  between  the  Iraqi  Federal  Government,  the 
Kurdistan  Regional  Government,  and  international  oil  companies.  Despite  the  PKK’s  historic 
announcement of its dissolution, Türkiye maintained its military operations in northern Iraq, diverging 
from EU policy.  

Türkiye  and  Iran  maintained  a  high-level  dialogue  within  their  multi-faceted  relationship.  The  two 
Presidents met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2024 and in 
September  2025  on  the  side  lines  of  the  25th  summit  of  the  Shanghai  Cooperation  Organization  in 
China.  In  June  2025,  Iran’s  Foreign  Minister  visited  Türkiye  to  attend  a  session  of  the  Council  of 
Foreign  Ministers  of  the  Organisation  of  Islamic  Cooperation.  Türkiye  and  Iran  prioritised  good 
relations, given their shared security concerns and mutual interests in trade and connectivity. In March 
2025,  following  a  five-year  suspension,  train  services  between  the  Turkish  city  of  Van  and  Tehran 
resumed.  Türkiye  strongly  condemned  Israel’s  attacks  on  Iran,  highlighting  the  risks  of  regional 
escalation following the US strikes, and reiterated its support for a diplomatic solution to the dispute 
over  Iran’s  nuclear  programme.  Ankara  sought  to  act  as  a  backchannel  between  Iran  and  the  US 
during the war, and welcomed the subsequent ceasefire.  

Türkiye remained a pivotal and active player in Libya. Ankara continued to advocate for stability and 
supported  the  efforts  to  revitalise  the  UN-facilitated  political  process.  Türkiye  continued  to  engage 
with  domestic  actors  across  the  board.  While  keeping  formal  relations  with  Libya's  internationally 
recognised  Government  of  National  Unity  (GNU)  in  Tripoli,  it  has  also  significantly  increased 
its diplomatic,  military,  and  economic  outreach  and  presence  eastern  Libya.  Türkiye  worked  to 
enhance the cooperation in the field of oil and gas exploration, reaping the benefits stemming from the 

89 

 
 
memoranda of understanding signed with the Tripoli authorities on the demarcation of maritime zones 
(2019),  and  on  research  and  drilling  in  the  delineated  areas  (2022),  considered  by  the  EU  as  an 
infringement upon the sovereign rights of third states, which does not comply with the Law of the Sea 
and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states, as also recalled by the European Council 
Conclusions  in  June  2025.  Ankara  also  continues  to  assess  that  the  UN  arms  embargo,  the  UN 
Security Council resolutions requesting the withdrawal of all mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign 
forces from the Libyan territory, and the suspension of military training, have no bearing on the GNU. 
After  having  extended  its  military  deployment  in  Libya  until  January  2026  via  a  Parliament  bill 
ratified in 2023, Türkiye initiated steps to ratify a MoU on the status of Turkish forces in Libya. EU’s 
efforts  to implement the  UN  embargo  on  Libya  continued  to  be  challenged  by Türkiye’s  continued 
scepticism towards Operation EUNAVFORMED Irini, openly questioning its purpose, legitimacy and 
impartiality. 

Türkiye has a growing presence and geopolitical ambitions in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. 

The normalisation  process  between  Türkiye  and  Armenia continued  to  advance,  with  contacts 
between  the  two  Special  Envoys,  bilateral  talks  and  confidence-building  steps.  A  notable  highlight 
was  the  historic  visit  of  the Armenian  Prime  Minister  to  Türkiye  on  20 June,  where  he  met  with 
the Turkish  President.  Although  Türkiye  has  publicly  stated  that  there  are  no  preconditions  for 
normalisation with Armenia, in practice, it links progress with developments in the peace negotiations 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Turkish-Armenian border remained closed, but it was briefly 
opened  in  March  2025  to  allow  humanitarian  aid  from  Armenia  to  Syria.  Türkiye  maintained  very 
close relations with Azerbaijan, holding regular high-level visits and consultations, and joint military 
exercises.  Türkiye  unequivocally  supported  Azerbaijan’s  stance  towards  Armenia.  Türkiye, 
Azerbaijan  and  Georgia  continued  to  cooperate  through  a  trilateral  platform,  with  the  latest  edition 
held  in  September  2024  at  the  level  of  Defence  Ministers.  In  addition,  Türkiye  hosted  the  South 
Caucasus  3+3  meeting  (Türkiye,  Iran,  Russia  +  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Georgia  –  though  the  latter 
boycotts the format). 

Türkiye has a well-established presence and geopolitical ambition in Central Asia. Türkiye remained 
focused  on  strengthening  bilateral  relations  with  countries  in  the  region,  advancing  connectivity 
projects on  transport and energy. In February 2025 Türkiye and Turkmenistan signed an agreement 
facilitating  the  flow  of  natural  gas.  Türkiye  continued  to  press  for  stronger  political  role  for  the 
Organization  of  Turkic  States  (OTS),  while  also  promoting  efforts  to  legitimise  the  so-called, 
internationally  not  recognised  ‘Turkish  Republic  of  Northern  Cyprus’  through  participation  as  an 
observer  in  the  OTS.  This  move  undermines  efforts  to  foster  an  environment  conducive  to  the 
resumption of settlement talks under UN auspices.  

Türkiye’s relations with Pakistan remained strong, at strategic partnership level, and high-level visits 
took  place.  In  February  2025,  the  Turkish  President  visited  Islamabad  for  the  7th  Türkiye-Pakistan 
High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, reciprocated by the Pakistani Prime Minister who visited 
Türkiye  in  May  2025.  Amidst  India-Pakistan  tensions  in  the  spring  2025,  the  Turkish  President 
expressed solidarity with Pakistan and offered Türkiye's support to de-escalate the situation. Türkiye 
contributed to mediate, together with Qatar, the October 2025 ceasefire agreement between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan.  Türkiye maintained a pragmatic approach on Afghanistan, holding talks with the 
Taliban de facto authorities, while not recognising the Taliban regime. Türkiye hosts Afghan political 
opponents, though, without facilitating the formation of a joint opposition or armed resistance.  

Türkiye  continued  expanding  cooperation  opportunities  in  Asia  through  its  ‘Asia  Anew’  initiative, 
aspiring  to  become  the  axis  connecting  Asia  to  Europe.  Focused  on  building  partnerships  with 
countries from the region, Türkiye sought broad collaboration on economy, trade, defence (including 
defence industry), cultural and geostrategic issues. During its Asia tour in February 2025, the Turkish 
President visited Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The Indonesian President visited Türkiye in April 
2025.  Türkiye  also  continued  its  cooperation  with  ASEAN,  in  line  with  its  status  as  a  sectoral 
dialogue  partner,  and  further  deepened  its  engagement  in  the  region  by  becoming  a  member  of  the 
Asian Development Bank.  

90 

 
 
Türkiye  continued  to  seek  opportunities  to  strengthen  trade,  economic  and  investments  links  with 
China,  aiming  to  reduce  its  negative  trade  deficit  but  also  to  elevate  the  bilateral  trade  volume 
through  various  initiatives  (Belt  and  Road  Initiative,  Middle  Corridor,  etc.)  and  formats,  such  as 
BRICS.  Moreover,  the  countries  engaged  in  bilateral  consultations  on  major  regional  and  global 
issues, such as the developments in the Middle East (Syria), Ukraine, and the ‘Global South’ agenda. 
The  Turkish  President  participated  in  the  Shanghai  Cooperation  Organization  summit  in  China 
(Türkiye is a “dialogue partner”) and met with the Chinese President. 

In  Africa,  Türkiye  continued  stepping  up  its active  involvement and further  strengthened its ties  in 
sub-Saharan Africa, notably in the Horn of Africa and West Africa, developing cooperation in areas 
such as defence, hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation, mining. Türkiye managed to successfully 
mediate  between  Somalia  and  Ethiopia,  brokering  in  December  2024  the  Ankara  Declaration  that 
reduced  regional  tensions  and  charted  a  possibility  for  regional  cooperation.  Türkiye’s  efforts  to 
mediate between Sudan and the United Arab Emirates aiming at restoring regional stability have been 
encouraged by both parties. 

Türkiye maintained its diplomatic engagement with Latin America, aiming to expand and deepen the 
political  and  trade  relations.  The  Turkish-Venezuelan  ties  remained  strong,  marked  by  frequent 
bilateral visits and a free trade agreement since 2018.  

91 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TÜRKIYE  

Türkiye remains a candidate country and a key partner  to the EU in many areas of joint interest. In 
April  2024,  the  European  Council  reiterated  the  EU’s  strategic  interest  in  a  stable  and  secure 
environment  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  in  the  development  of  a  cooperative  and  mutually 
beneficial  relationship  with  Türkiye.  The  EU  and  Turkiye  are  engaged  in  advanicng  on  the 
recommendations of the November 2023 Joint Communication by the High Representative and the 
Commission  on  the  state  of  play  of  EU-Türkiye  political,  economic  and  trade  relations.  The  EU 
progressing 
in  a  phased,  proportionate  and  reversible  manner,  subject  to  the  established 
conditionalities.  Work  itensified  in  the  2024  and  2025  with  the  launch  of  the  new  High  Level 
Dialogue  on  Trade  (held  twice),  and  the  resumption  of  the  High  Level  Diaologue  on  Economy, 
meetings  of  the  High  Level  Dialogue  on  Security  and  Migration  and  on  Climate,  and  the 
intensification of political consultations on foreing and security policy issues. The European Council 
stressed  that  Türkiye’s  own  constructive  engagement  will  be  instrumental  in  advancing  the  various 
areas of cooperation identified in the Joint Communication. 

Türkiye continues to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and advocates for a two-state solution 
in  Cyprus,  contrary  to  relevant  UN  Security  Council  (UNSC)  resolutions.  In  December  2024,  the 
Council reconfirmed its commitment to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within 
the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions and in line with the principles 
on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis. It welcomed steps taken by the UN Secretary-General 
towards a resumption of settlement talks, confirming that the EU remains ready to play an active role 
in  supporting  all  stages  of  the  UN-led  process,  with  all  appropriate  means  at  its  disposal.  Former 
Commissioner Johannes Hahn was appointed by the Commission as Special Envoy for Cyprus. 

The  Council  conclusions  of  July  2019,  adopted  as  a  response  to  Türkiye’s  unauthorised  drilling 
activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, remain in place. In November 2024, following a review of the 
framework  for  restrictive  measures  in  response  to  the  unauthorised  drilling  activities,  the  Council 
extended the regime for a further year, until 30 November 2025. One individual is currently subject to 
sanctions.  Türkiye  has  not  engaged  in  any  unauthorised  drilling  activities  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean since the beginning of 2021. 

In  December  2024,  the  Council  reiterated  its  serious  concerns  about  the  continued  and  deeply 
worrying situation in the areas of democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights  and that accession 
negotiations with the country have come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for 
opening or closing. As part of accession negotiations, 16 chapters had been opened and one of these 
had been provisionally closed.  

Reforms  and  developments  in  Türkiye  continued  to  be  monitored  by  the  bodies  set  up  under  the 
Association Agreement, with subcommittees in place throughout the reporting period. The meetings 
of the Association Council remain suspended in line with the 2019 Council conclusions.   

The  Commission  continued  intensified  engagement  with  Türkiye  to  discuss  the  functioning  of  the 
Customs Union, including a High-Level Dialogue on Trade in July 2025. Türkiye made progress on 
trade  barriers  and  took  measures  to  prevent  the  circumvention  of  EU  restrictive  measures  against 
Russia imposed in reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Commission recommended opening 
negotiations with Türkiye on the modernisation of the Customs Union in December 2016. In the Joint 
Communication  of  November  2023,  the  High  Representative  and  the  Commission  recommended to 
resume discussions on the draft negotiating framework for the modernisation of the Customs Union. 
This  was  on  the  understanding  that  Türkiye  rapidly  addresses  the  circumvention  of  EU  restrictive 
measures against Russia via its territory and continues to resolve trade irritants in an efficient way 

Türkiye  was  EU’s  fifth  largest  trading  partner  in  2024,  while  the  EU  continued  to  be  Türkiye’s 
largest  partner.  Türkiye’s  exports  to  the  EU  amounted  to  EUR  98.4  billion  in  2024,  while  imports 
from the EU amounted to EUR 112 billion.  

92 

 
 
In  the  area  of  visa,  migration  and  asylum,  the  implementation  of  the  March  2016  EU-Turkey 
Statement has continued to deliver concrete results in reducing irregular and dangerous crossings on 
the  Eastern Mediterranean route to  Europe and in  saving lives  at sea.  Türkiye  continued  significant 
efforts  to  provide  support  to  2.7  million  refugees,  including  2.5  million  Syrians  under  temporary 
protection  (as  of  August  2025),  while  it  continued  working  to  prevent  irregular  migration.  In  the 
context of the EU-Türkiye visa liberalisation dialogue, no outstanding visa liberalisation benchmarks 
were fulfilled. In July 2025, the European Commission adopted a decision to facilitate  visa rules for 
Turkish citizens applying for Schengen visas. An international agreement on the exchange of personal 
data between Europol and the Turkish authorities responsible for fighting serious crime and terrorism 
is yet to be concluded. High-level engagement continued in the area of migration, with a High- Level 
Dialogue held in July 2025.   

Türkiye  and  the  EU  continued  to  cooperate  effectively  in  supporting  refugees  and  host 
communities  in  Türkiye.  Almost  EUR  12.5  billion  has  been  allocated  for  that  purpose  since  2011, 
including  EUR  6  billion  under  the  Facility  for  Refugees  in  Turkey.  Support  continued  to  focus  on 
humanitarian assistance, education, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic development 
and  migration  management.  Support  also  covered  host  communities.  Over  1.2  million  refugees, 
including the most vulnerable, continue to receive basic needs support, and close to 938 610 refugee 
children are enrolled in schools. Other achievements include the construction of two major hospitals, 
176 new schools (out of a target of 348) and delivering over 6 million healthcare consultations. Out of 
the total allocation of EUR 12.5 billion, EUR 1.5 billion for 2025-27 will be committed this year.   

On bilateral financial assistance, projects under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 
for  Türkiye  continued  to  be  implemented,  in  compliance  with  the  political  guidance  of  the  EU 
budgetary authority. Financial assistance under IPA III focuses on priorities linked to the fundamental 
pillars  of  the  enlargement  strategy  and  sectors  of  common  strategic  interest,  mainly  related  to  the 
green  and  digital  transition,  connectivity  as  well  as  to  building  more  resilient  and  more  sustainable 
economies and societies.  

Implementation of the EU pledge of EUR 1 billion for the people in Türkiye affected by the February 
2023 earthquakes continied.  

Türkiye  continues  to  participate  in  EU  programmes  and  agencies,  including  Erasmus+,  Horizon 
Europe,  the  European  Solidarity  Corps  programme,  the  Customs  programme,  the  Single  Market 
Programme  (SME  component)  the  Digital  Europe  Programme,  the  Union  Civil  Protection 
Mechanism,  the  European  Environmental  Agency,  and  the  European  Union  Drugs  Agency.  On 
research and innovation, the positive trend of Türkiye’s performance in Horizon Europe continued in 
2024, with the EU contribution awarded to Turkish stakeholders exceeding EUR 87 million (the total 
EU  contribution  surpassed  EUR  330.3  million  over  the  first  four  years  of  Horizon  Europe).   The 
Turkey  Investment  Platform  (TIP)  under  the  European  Fund  for  Sustainable  Development  Plus 
(EFSD+)  enables  stronger  EU  support  to  investments  through  guarantee  programmes  in  the  three 
overarching policy priorities, namely the Green Deal, global gateways as well as jobs and growth. It is 
expected to mobilise close to EUR 2.4 billion of investments in Türkiye on the back of up to EUR 400 
million in EU budget guarantees. To strengthen capacities in modelling the macro-economic effects of 
green policies and investments and to support municipalities with their long-term inclusion strategies, 
Türkiye is participating as an observer in two pilot projects under the Technical Support Instrument. 

93 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex II – Statistical data 
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 11/09/2025) 

Basic data 
Population (thousand) 
Total area of the country (km²) 

National accounts 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 
GDP per capita (euro) 
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS)) 
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) 
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the 
previous year (%) 
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) 
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the nominal unit labour cost growth index (2015 = 100) 
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU 
average (EU-27 = 100) 
Gross value added by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Business 
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 
Number of active enterprises (number) 
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of 
enterprises active in t (%) 
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of 
enterprises active in t (%) 

Note 

94 

Note 

Note 

2012 
74 724 i 
: 

2012 
1 581 479 
683 587 
9 090 
15 233 
58.6 
4.8 
: 
: 

2020 
83 155 i 
780 270 

2020 
5 048 568 
626 785 
7 520 
18 320 
60.2 b 
1.9 
: 
: 

2021 
83 614 i 
780 270 

2021 
7 256 142 
690 246 
8 200 
19 989 
60.3 
11.4 
: 
: 

2022 
84 680 i 
780 270 

2023 
85 280 i 
780 270 

2024 
85 372 i 
780 270 

2022 
15 011 776 
862 310 
10 150 
24 509 
68.2 
5.5 
: 
: 

2023 
26 545 722 
1 030 514 
12 080 
27 458 
72.0 
5.1 
: 
: 

2024 
43 410 514 
1 220 308 
: 
: 
: 
3.2 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 

8.7 
21.8 
8.4 
61.2 i 
76.0 
27.1 
24.4 
28.5 
: 

2012 
83.4 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 

7.5 
25.6 
5.9 
60.9 i 
71.8 
27.5 
29.1 
32.2 
: 

2020 
115.4 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 

6.2 
29.2 
5.7 
59.0 i 
68.2 
28.2 
35.7 
35.3 
: 

: 
: 
: 

7.2 
29.5 
5.5 
57.7 i 
69.0 
29.2 
38.6 
42.6 
: 

2021 
135.6 
3 600 429 
16.0 i 

2022 
143.3 
3 806 819 
16.1 i 

: 
: 
: 

6.9 
25.8 
6.2 
61.1 i 
72.5 
31.9 
31.9 
34.4 
: 

2023 
144.6 
: 
: 

: 

11.4 i 

: 

: 

: 
: 
: 

6.3 
22.6 
6.7 
64.2 i 
74.2 
31.0 
28.0 
27.8 
: 

2024 
: 
: 
: 

: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial 
business economy) (%) 
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 

76.8 iw 

73.9 iw 

74.0 iw 

73.3 iw 

72.5 piw 

102 423 iw 
183 539 w 

95 660 iw 
181 250 w 

88 925 iw 
178 072 w 

144 282 iw 
281 635 w 

155 216 piw 
304 258 pw 

: 

: 
: 

Inflation rate and house prices 
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 

Balance of payments 
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 
*3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) 
*Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) 
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) 
*Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) 
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant 
workers (%) 

Public finance 
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) 
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) 
Total  government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Financial indicators 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) 
*Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) 

95 

Note 

Note 

1) 
1) 
1) 
1) 
1) 

Note 

Note 

2012 
9.0 d 

2020 
12.3 d 

2021 
19.6 d 

2022 
72.3 d 

2023 
54.0 d 

2024 
58.5 d 

2012 
- 32 316.2 
- 50 905.9 
22 587.9 
- 5 124.2 
1 126.1 
305.5 
-  6.5 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
0.1 iw 

2012 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2020 
- 27 404.9 
- 33 199.5 
13 210.2 
- 7 569.2 
153.5 
90.9 
-  1.4 
-  9.4 
3 883.8 i 
2 833.7 
1 069.1 
6 717.5 
1 201.1 
-  49.6 
0.0 iw 

2020 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2021 
- 5 110.7 
- 24 850.1 
27 960.7 
- 9 016.9 
795.6 
355.2 
-  1.0 
5.3 
5 336.9 i 
4 262.0 
1 805.9 
9 598.9 
2 084.4 
-  30.4 
0.0 iw 

2021 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2022 
- 43 409.5 
- 85 457.6 
50 712.6 
- 8 353.1 
-  311.3 
-  583.1 
-  3.4 
11.2 
8 170.2 i 
4 475.1 
2 266.9 
12 645.3 
5 060.0 
-  38.9 
0.0 iw 

2022 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2023 
- 36 990.3 
- 79 815.6 
52 867.9 
- 10 555.6 
513.0 
-  762.6 
-  3.1 
18.4 
4 324.7 i 
5 334.1 
2 438.9 
9 658.8 
4 378.0 
-  28.7 
0.0 iw 

2023 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2024 
- 9 497.5 
- 52 163.2 
57 165.2 
- 14 571.0 
71.5 
-  159.2 
-  3.1 
12.8 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
-  26.7 
0.0 iw 

2024 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2012 
40.6 iw 
168.7 w 
76 512.5 w 
325 483.7 
18.4 

2020 
59.7 iw 
205.7 w 
135 348.7 w 
386 656.9 
34.1 

2021 
53.2 iw 
150.9 w 
143 842.8 w 
361 436.1 
42.9 

2022 
50.1 iw 
131.4 w 
156 740.1 w 
452 583.0 
80.9 

2023 
44.8 iw 
139.5 w 
145 708.9 w 
472 686.1 
48.3 

2024 
39.8 iw 
141.1 w 
171 564.1 w 
541 008.8 
25.3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) 
*3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries 
(2015 = 100) 
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 

62.2 
7.59 
2.314 
128.6 w 
- 0.1 iw 

88.1 
10.85 
8.055 
40.0 w 
- 0.5 iw 

87.3 
17.87 
10.512 
30.7 w 
- 0.5 iw 

64.7 
13.16 
17.409 
17.8 w 
- 0.6 iw 

57.3 
18.69 
25.760 
12.4 w 
- 0.7 iw 

48.0 
48.95 
35.573 
9.1 w 
- 0.7 iw 

16 389.8 

- 29 004.1 

19 405.7 

13 110.7 

- 1 949.6 

691.1 

External trade in goods 
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 

Demography 
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus 
deaths (per thousand inhabitants) 
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 

Labour market 
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that 
is economically active (%) 
Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are 
in employment (%) 
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are 
in employment (%) 
Employment by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 
(%) 

96 

Note 

Note 

Note 

2012 
184 087 
118 644 
- 65 443 
: 
33.2 iw 
34.7 iw 

2012 
11.7 

11.6 
74.8 
80.5 

2012 
57.4 

52.8 

75.0 
30.9 
31.9 

23.6 i 
19.1 i 
6.9 i 
50.4 i 
: 

2020 
182 328 
140 035 
- 42 293 
98.4 iw 
41.1 iw 
33.1 iw 

2020 
: 

: 
: 
: 

2020 
58.7 

51.0 

70.1 
32.0 
31.1 

17.6 i 
20.5 i 
5.7 i 
56.2 i 
: 

2021 
219 224 
180 299 
- 38 925 
85.9 iw 
41.1 iw 
31.1 iw 

2022 
324 441 
223 777 
- 100 663 
75.7 iw 
40.4 iw 
25.5 iw 

2023 
311 586 
214 180 
- 97 406 
85.0 iw 
40.8 iw 
29.0 iw 

2021 
: 

9.3 
: 
: 

2021 
61.2 b 

53.9 b 

73.6 b 
34.2 b 
33.6 b 

17.2 bi 
21.4 bi 
6.1 bi 
55.3 bi 
: 

2022 
6.2 

9.2 
74.3 
78.4 

2022 
63.1 

56.5 

75.9 
37.0 
34.9 

15.7 i 
21.7 i 
6.0 i 
56.6 i 
: 

2023 
5.1 

10.0 
74.8 
79.8 

2023 
63.1 

57.3 

76.5 
38.0 
36.3 

14.6 i 
21.3 i 
6.3 i 
57.8 i 
: 

2024 
296 606 
219 316 
- 77 291 
86.7 iw 
41.9 iw 
32.0 iw 

2024 
5.2 

: 
: 
: 

2024 
64.0 

58.5 

77.5 
39.4 
38.5 

14.6 i 
20.7 i 
6.6 i 
58.1 i 
: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 
(%) 
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 
Male unemployment rate (%) 
Female unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for 
12 months or more (%) 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary 
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%) 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED 
levels 5-8) (%) 

Social cohesion 
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the 
inflation index) (2016 = 100) 
Gini coefficient 
Poverty gap 

Standard of living 
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 
Number of mobile phone subscriptions relative to population size (number per thousand 
population) 
Mobile broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 
Fixed broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 

Infrastructure 
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 

Length of motorways (kilometres) 

Education, Innovation and Research 
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8) 
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8), 
males 
Percentage of persons aged 30-34 with a tertiary education level (ISCED 2011 levels 5 to 8), 
females 
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over) 
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males 
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females 

97 

Note 
2) 

Note 

Note 

Note 

: 

8.2 
7.7 
9.4 
15.7 
1.8 

6.7 

6.7 

2012 
1 327 w 
: 

: 
30.3 

2012 
114.0 
895.0 w 

26.0 w 
10 w 

2012 
: 

2 127 

2012 
18.0 
19.8 

16.2 

: 
: 
: 

: 

13.2 
12.4 
14.9 
25.1 
3.3 

11.8 

10.0 

2020 
3 501 w 
: 

43.4 
27.5 

2020 
157.0 
982.0 w 

78.5 w 
20 w 

2020 
13.3 i 

3 523 

2020 
33.1 
33.9 

32.2 

42.2 
42.5 
41.8 

: 

12.0 b 
10.7 b 
14.7 b 
22.7 b 
3.7 b 

10.4 b 

10.0 b 

2021 
3 904 w 
: 

42.5 
27.0 

: 

10.5 
9.0 
13.5 
19.5 
2.5 

8.6 

9.4 

: 

9.4 
7.7 
12.7 
17.5 
2.0 

7.6 

8.2 

2022 
4 742 w 
: 

45.3 
24.8 

2023 
8 568 w 
: 

44.2 
24.7 

2021 
162.0 
1 019.0 w 

2022 
167.0 
1 058.8 w 

2023 
178.0 
1 080.3 w 

82.7 w 
21 w 

2021 
13.5 i 

3 532 

2021 
35.5 b 
36.0 b 

35.1 b 

31.7 
32.1 
31.3 

84.0 w 
22 w 

2022 
13.7 i 

3 633 

2022 
37.6 
37.4 

37.9 

48.6 
48.9 
48.3 

86.3 w 
23 w 

2023 
14.6 i 

3 726 

2023 
39.9 
39.2 

40.5 

54.9 
55.3 
54.5 

: 

8.8 
7.1 
11.8 
16.4 
1.7 

7.1 

7.6 

2024 
17 480 w 
: 

44.8 
24.3 

2024 
189.0 
: 

: 
: 

2024 
: 

: 

2024 
41.7 
40.3 

43.1 

: 
: 
: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading 
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics 
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science 
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of persons aged 18-24 with at most 
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or 
training 
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower 
secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or 
training 
Early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most 
lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or 
training 
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 
weeks) 
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 
weeks), men 
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 
weeks), women 
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of 
population aged 20-34) 
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) 
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males 
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females 
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP 
(%) 
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 

Environment 
Index of greenhouse gas emissions,  CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant 
prices) 
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 

Energy 
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 

Note 

98 

21.6 
42.0 
26.4 
39.6 

: 
: 
: 
26.7 

: 
: 
: 
23.1 b 

29.3 
38.7 
24.7 
21.2 

: 
: 
: 
19.5 

: 
: 
: 
18.7 

36.1 

27.5 

23.9 b 

22.2 

20.1 

19.6 

43.0 

25.8 

22.2 b 

20.2 

19.0 

17.8 

3.9 

4.0 

3.8 

: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
0.83 
0.34 

47.2 

5.8 

6.0 

5.5 

: 

: 
: 
: 
4.0 
1.37 
0.41 

90.7 

6.5 b 

6.5 b 

6.5 b 

: 

30.1 
34.0 
26.2 
: 
1.40 
0.38 

92.0 

6.7 

6.4 

7.0 

: 

: 
: 
: 
3.1 
1.32 
0.36 

94.2 

Note 

2012 
199.6 ew 
183.5 

2020 
232.5 ew 
162.8 

2021 
250.9 ew 
159.6 

2022 
244.9 ew 
157.8 

26.9 w 
94.9 w 

2012 
30 490 
2 310 
15 554 
521 

41.9 w 
94.6 w 

2020 
43 636 
3 274 
15 006 
363 

35.6 w 
95.6 w 

2021 
46 208 
3 518 
17 151 
324 

41.6 w 
95.7 w 

2022 
50 484 
3 663 
18 835 
312 

7.4 

7.0 

7.8 

: 

33.1 
36.8 
29.4 
: 
1.42 
0.37 

95.5 

2023 
: 
: 

41.8 w 
96.5 w 

2023 
48 870 
4 206 
14 682 
665 

8.0 

7.3 

8.6 

: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
0.40 p 

96.5 

2024 
: 
: 

: 
: 

2024 
: 
: 
: 
: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 

Agriculture 
Agricultural output volume index (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) 
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 

Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Türkiye 

Note 

89 313 i 
117 910 
239 497 

2012 
: 
38 412.0 
14 022.4 
: 
35 782.5 i 
: 
33 025.0 
15 000.0 
28 105.0 

104 983 i 
148 074 
306 703 

2020 
: 
37 747.0 
18 158.0 
: 
54 112.6 i 
: 
38 050.8 
23 026.0 
31 120.0 

115 096 i 
161 774 
334 723 

2021 
: 
38 038.0 
18 036.1 
: 
57 519.2 i 
: 
32 602.0 
18 250.0 
31 691.0 

113 942 i 
159 458 
328 379 

2022 
: 
38 450.0 
17 023.8 
1.7 e 
56 265.8 i 
: 
39 562.1 
19 000.0 
31 525.0 

114 008 i 
162 366 
331 149 

2023 
: 
38 563.0 
16 583.0 
1.7 
52 363.4 i 
: 
43 176.3 
23 498.0 
31 716.0 

: 
: 
: 

2024 
: 
38 596.0 
16 986.3 
1.7 
54 902.7 i 
: 
39 922.3 
22 999.0 
33 496.0 

: = not available 
b = break in series 
d =  definition differs 
e = estimated value 
p = provisional 
i = Eurostat estimate 
w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and 
without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology 

* = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator 

Footnotes: 
1)  Based on BPM6. 
2)  Source: Income and Living Conditions Survey. 

99 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100