REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on the Implementation and Enforcement of EU Trade Policy
Date: 2025-11-03
Institutions: Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, European Commission
Subjects: Dispute Settlement Body, common commercial policy, international trade, small and medium-sized enterprises, third country, trade agreement, trade agreement (EU), trade dispute, trade policy, trade restriction

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 3.11.2025  COM(2025) 920 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on the Implementation and Enforcement of EU Trade Policy                                                {SWD(2025) 940 final}  
 
 
CONTENTS 

I. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................... 1 

II.  MAKING THE MOST OF EU PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS .................... 7 

II.2 

Implementing EU bilateral trade agreements....................................................................... 12 

III.  HELPING SMES FIND THEIR PLACE IN GLOBAL TRADE ....................................... 17 

IV.   ADDRESSING BARRIERS AND FINDING SOLUTIONS ............................................... 21 

IV.1  State of play and trends in 2024 ............................................................................................. 21 

IV.2  Bilateral and multilateral enforcement of trade commitments: dispute resolution .......... 28 

IV.3  The Single Entry Point ............................................................................................................ 31 

EN 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
I. 

Executive summary 

In recent years, the global geopolitical paradigm has undergone a significant shift, resulting in 
changes in the implementation and enforcement of EU trade policy. 

This fifth report on the implementation and enforcement of EU trade policy reflects concerted 
efforts  to  recalibrate  and  strengthen  trade  relations,  build  collaborative  partnerships  and 
navigate  the  complexities  of  an  increasingly  fragmented  world,  illustrating  the  cross-cutting 
role of trade in buttressing competitiveness, security and sustainability.  

Trade agreements have helped to strengthen EU’s competitiveness globally 

In uncertain economic times, trade agreements have helped to boost EU companies’ access to 
third country markets and EU exports in important sectors, as the following examples show: 

•  EU goods exports to Canada have increased by 51% since the provisional application 
of  the  Comprehensive  Economic  and  Trade  Agreement  (CETA),  which  started  in 
September  2017.  This  compares  to  a  20%  increase  in  EU  exports  to  the  rest  of  the 
world over the same period. Agriculture, which saw exports increase by 40%, was the 
driver of this growth, with EU wine exports to Canada up 22% and cheese exports up 
97%1. 

•  EU exports to Japan since the entry into force of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership 
Agreement  (EPA)  in  2019  have  grown  by  an  estimated  EUR 267 million.  Sectors 
which have benefited include wine, drinks and processed agricultural products, animal 
products (except pigmeat), arable crops and plant-based products. 

•  EU  businesses  have  seen  increased  trade  worth  some  EUR 4  billion  with  Andean 
countries, specifically Colombia,  Peru and Ecuador, as a direct result of the EU’s 
free  trade  agreement  (FTA)  which  provisionally  entered  into  force  in  2013  with 
Colombia and Peru and in 2017 with Ecuador. 

Furthermore, the EU’s more recent agreements supporting investment and promoting the use 
of EU rules and standards, thus ensuring a level-playing field, have had a positive effect on 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and their expansion outside the EU. This has 
been  essential  for  the  EU’s  over  680 000  SMEs  which  engage  in  exports,  and  which 
represent 95% of all exporting EU companies. 

A  recent  ex post  evaluation  study2 on  CETA  conducted  for  the  Commission  compared  the 
percentage increase in the number of EU SMEs exporting to Canada in the years leading up to 
CETA  (2012-2016)  with  the  percentage  increase  during  the  first  five  years  following  its 

1 Source: Ex post evaluation of the EU-Canada CETA; draft final report published on 16 June 2025: Circabc. 
2 Ex post evaluation study by Trade Impact BV published on 16 June 2025; Circabc. 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
provisional application (2017-2022). It concluded that the number of EU SMEs exporting to 
Canada  had  grown  by  20.3%,  an  increase  that  also  trumped  the  increase  in  larger  firms 
exporting (i.e. by 13.8%). 

Trade agreements have also increased resilience and helped to diversify the EU economy 

Pursuing EU trade policy objectives as part of an integrated set of EU policies also supports 
the wider transformation of specific sectors. 

• 

Industrial  sector/cars:  once  the  Mercosur  (politically  concluded  in  December  2024) 
agreement enters into force, tariffs on car parts (currently at 14%) and cars (currently 
at  35%)  will  be  progressively  eliminated,  while  the  risk  of  export  restrictions 
affecting  the  supply  of  critical  raw  materials  for  EU  battery  production  will  be 
reduced. 

•  Digitally  enabled  trade  in  goods  and  services:  the  EU  has  included  digital  trade 
chapters in its bilateral trade agreements with Japan (complemented recently by a 
bilateral  agreement  on  data  flows)3,  the  UK,  New  Zealand,  and  in  its  modernised 
agreements  with  Chile  and  Mexico.  In  addition  to  the  bilateral  agreements  with  e-
commerce  chapters,  the  EU  has  also  concluded  negotiations  for  digital  trade 
agreements  (DTA)  with  Singapore  (July  2024)  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  (March 
2025). 

•  Government  procurement: the EU is  party to trade agreements, including  the  World 
Trade  Organization  (WTO)  Government  Procurement  Agreement  (GPA),  containing 
procurement  commitments  ensuring  reciprocal  access  to  40  countries4 (GPA  and/or 
to  an  estimated  EUR 1.8 trillion-worth  of 
FTA  parties),  giving 
procurement. 

it  access 

Economic  security  and  supply  chain  security: 
diversification and secured the supply of inputs 

trade  agreements  have  supported 

Trade  agreements  have  helped  EU  companies  to  find  new  export  markets  while 
diversifying supply sources and export destinations. In turn, this has enabled them to respond 
flexibly to global risks and reduce dependencies on specific markets. 

3 EU-Japan agreement on cross-border data flows 
4 Albania,  Armenia,  Australia,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Canada,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  El 
Salvador,  Georgia,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Hong  Kong,  Iceland,  Iraq,  Israel,  Japan,  Kazakhstan,  South  Korea, 
Kosovo,  Lichtenstein,  Mexico,  Moldova,  Montenegro,  Aruba,  New  Zealand,  Nicaragua,  North  Macedonia, 
Norway, Panama, Peru, Serbia, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, the UK, the US and Viet Nam. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  total  fall  in  EU  exports  of  goods  to  Russia  of  EUR  53.1  billion  (2024  to  2019-2021 
average)  was  more  than  outweighed  by  an  over  EUR  200  billion  worth  increase  in  EU 
exports to EU FTA partners over the same period.5 

After  trade  sanctions  were  imposed  on  Russia,  EU  firms  rapidly  found  new  alternative 
markets, often in countries which already had a trade agreement with the EU. 

•  Reduced  sales  of  vehicles  and  vehicle  parts  to  Russia  worth  EUR 8 billion  were 

offset by higher exports to the UK worth EUR 8.8 billion alone. 

•  Lower  exports  of  electrical  machinery  worth  EUR 7 billion  were  offset  by  higher 
exports (worth EUR 7.6 billion) to a range of countries including Switzerland, the UK, 
Mexico and Norway. 

The  EU’s  network  of  trade  agreements  in  place  reinforces  the  EU’s  ability  to  enhance  its 
strategic flexibility, supporting the Union’s long-term economic interests. The value of new 
trade agreements pending adoption or under negotiation has also come into sharper focus in 
view of recent developments, notably the US tariff measures. In this context, agreements like 
Mercosur,  once  in  place,  will  make  an  important  contribution  to  diversification,  which  is  a 
core part of the EU’s trade strategy. A successful bilateral agenda could also help to counter 
the knock-on effect  of  US tariffs, i.e. an increase in  Chinese exports to  other countries, and 
the subsequent erosion of EU market shares.  

The EU’s large network of trade agreements and partnerships has strengthened its geopolitical 
presence  in  a  rapidly  deteriorating  international  environment.  In  this  context,  it  has 
contributed  to  supply  chain  resilience  by  helping  the  EU  to  secure  critical  inputs,  such  as 
energy and raw materials needed for the clean energy transition and other critical sectors of 
the  EU  economy,  and  to  reduce  the  EU’s  over-dependence  on  individual  markets,  a 
vulnerability which could be used against it. 

•  EU  trade  agreements  have  helped  the  EU  to  diversify  its  energy  and  raw  material 
supply away from Russia. For example, imports of gas and liquefied natural gas from 
Norway, Algeria and Kazakhstan have helped make up the supply shortfall generated 
by sanctions on Russian gas (supplementing  imports from  the US), while imports of 
copper from  Chile and the Democratic Republic of the Congo filled the void  left  by 
the drop in imports of copper from Russia. 

•  EU trade agreements have also helped to diversify supply, with a greater number of 
products being traded with FTA partners compared to ‘like’ partners without an FTA. 
Recent research by the DG TRADE/Chief Economist team in cooperation with the 
Swedish National Board of Trade, looking at trends in EU trade with Canada, Japan, 
Viet Nam and Singapore between 2016 and 2023, confirmed that EU trade 
agreements created a more diversified supply in their early years of 

5 This increases to approximately EUR 270 billion, if EEA and customs union partners are included. 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
implementation, in particular in the area of chemical products, one of the most 
important product categories. This observation reflects the EU’s broader objectives of 
reducing supply chain vulnerabilities, developing partnerships with like-minded 
countries, and strengthening and deepening the EU’s industrial capacity. 

Effectively  tackling  trade  barriers  has  enabled  companies  to  compete  on  fair  terms  and 
ensured reciprocity 

The  Commission  has  continued  its  work  within  the  WTO  and  within  trade  agreement 
management  structures  to  tackle  behind-the-border  barriers,  in  particular  technical 
barriers.  The  value  of  EU  exports  affected  by  technical  barriers  to  trade  (TBT)  in  third 
countries in 2024 was in the order of EUR 25 billion. As the graph below shows, EU exports 
most affected by TBT are exports to China (EUR 14 billion), followed by Morocco (EUR 5 
billion) and Colombia (EUR 2 billion). 

Figure 1: Examples of EU exports affected by TBT in third countries (2024) 

TBT are often most acute with partners which either do not have an EU trade agreement or 
which have a relatively old agreement with the EU. 

The strong institutional component of EU trade agreements has helped all parties to prevent 
and remove trade barriers as efficiently as possible, through regular contacts between trade 
and sectoral experts. 

•  Following  bilateral  engagement  supported  by  the  EU-Japan  EPA,  Japan  revised  its 
list  of  safe  food  additives  in  a  way  that  protected  the  interests  of  EU  exporters.  In 
2024,  Japan  confirmed  that 33 additives  widely  used in  the EU  would  remain on  its 
list,  emphasising  the  EU’s  reputation  for  providing  high-quality  and  safe  food 
products. 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
•  Following  bilateral  engagement  with  Serbia  under  the  Stabilisation  and  Association 
Agreement,  in  March 2025  Serbia lifted its  ban – in  place since  April 2024 –  on the 
import of wood pellets, which had cut around EUR 4 million in EU exports. Likewise, 
quantitative  restrictions  on  imports  of  margarine  and  sunflower  oil  introduced  in 
March 2024 were removed in  March 2025  and quantitative restrictions on exports of 
metal scrap, introduced in January 2025, were removed in July 2025. 

By  contrast,  where  diplomatic  engagement  is  unsuccessful,  the  Commission  will  resort  to 
dispute settlement (five  new cases were launched between June 2024 and June 2025) or use 
autonomous measures to defend its interests. In 2025, the Commission has started to use its 
powers  under  the  EU’s  International  Procurement  Instrument  (IPI)  to  tackle  unfair 
practices  limiting  access  to  public  contracts  for  EU  suppliers,  goods  and  services  in  trading 
partner countries:  

•  On 14 January 2025, after launching  an investigation into the medical devices sector 
in  China,  the  Commission  published  findings  confirming  that  China  had  unfairly 
treated EU medical device suppliers in its public procurement of such devices.  

•  On  19 June  2025,  the  Commission  decided  to  impose  measures6 on  China,  barring 
Chinese companies from bidding on public procurement contracts for medical devices 
in  the  EU  exceeding  EUR 5 million.  In  addition,  successful  bidders  would  not  be 
allowed  to  source  more  than  50%  of  inputs  for  the  purposes  of  such  contracts  from 
China. 

Trade agreements have played a major part in promoting sustainability 

EU  trade  agreements  have  continued  to  play  a  major  role  in  strengthening  trade  and 
sustainability.  14  agreements  concluded  since  2012  (starting  with  the  Republic  of  Korea) 
have  provisions  promoting 
labour  and  environmental  standards.  The 
Commission has continued identifying country-specific priorities covering labour, gender, the 
environment,  climate  and  civil  society  issues  with  the  close  involvement  of  EU  domestic 
advisory  groups  (DAGs)  set  up  under  those  agreements,  bringing  together  business,  trade 
unions  and  other  stakeholder  interests  to  assist  the  Commission  in  implementing  its  trade 
agreements. 

international 

In  2024,  progress  was  made  in  Colombia,  Guatemala  and  Moldova  towards  ratifying  and 
implementing core international conventions on labour rights. 

The Commission’s Single Entry Point7 has been assessing two additional formal complaints 
on trade and sustainable development (TSD), both concerning Viet Nam. One was received in 
March 2024  on  its  ratification  of  core  International  Labour  Organization  (ILO)  conventions 

6 OJ L, 2024/2754, 29.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj. 
7 The Single Entry Point is the first point of contact for all EU stakeholders facing potential trade barriers in third 
countries, or non-compliance with sustainability rules related to trade and sustainable development or the 
Generalised Scheme of Preferences. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
and the other one was received in February 2025, concerning human rights and labour rights 
violations. 

Scope of the report 

This is the fifth consolidated annual report8 on the implementation and enforcement of trade 
commitments  covered  by  preferential  bilateral  trade  agreements9 in  place  in  2024  and  the 
WTO. It provides an overview of the EU’s main activities and achievements in 2024, and the 
first seven months of 2025 led by the Commission’s Chief Trade Enforcement Officer. 

The accompanying  staff  working  document10 contains additional information on 41 of the 
EU’s  major  preferential  agreements.  The  Commission’s  website11 contains  supplementary 
information to this report on: (i) the evolution of EU trade with preferential partners in 2024; 
(ii) the use of tariff preferences on EU exports and imports from preferential trading partners, 
both for the EU and Member States; and (iii) data on the use of tariff rate quotas under certain 
trade agreements. 

This  report  focuses  on  the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  EU  trade  policy  through  the 
EU’s network of preferential trade agreements and relationships. It also ties in with broader 
issues relating to economic security and enforcement in specific areas, which are only briefly 
touched on in this report, but are the subject of Commission reports in their own right. Those 
issues include:  

• 

the use of trade  defence  instruments (anti-dumping, anti-subsidies and safeguards), 
covered by the Commission’s annual trade defence report12; 

•  monitoring and tackling counterfeiting, piracy and other infringements of intellectual 
property  rights  (IPR),  covered  by  the  Commission’s  biennial  Third  Country  IPR 
Report13 and Piracy Watchlist14; 

• 

the screening of foreign direct investments (FDI) and the control of dual use exports, 
which are the EU’s strategic trade and investment controls for security, and which 

8 The fourth report was published on 3 October 2024 and is available here: Register of Commission Documents - 
COM(2024)385. 
9 For the purposes of this report, “preferential” refers to agreements that establish a free trade area or liberalise 
trade in services and are therefore exempted from GATT and GATS MFN.  
10 Commission  Staff  Working  Document:  Individual  Information  Sheets  on  the  Implementation  of  EU  Trade 
Agreements; SWD(2025) 940; Circabc. 
11 Commission/DG  TRADE;  implementation  and  enforcement  page:  Implementing  and  enforcing  EU  trade 
agreements - European Commission (europa.eu). 
12 43rd Commission report on trade defence: Register of Commission Documents - COM(2025)428 
13 The  most  recent  report  on  IPR  protection  and  enforcement  in  third  countries  published  on  22  May  2025  is 
available here: Register of Commission Documents - SWD(2025)131. 
14  The  latest  Counterfeit  and  Piracy  Watchlist  published  on  22  May  2025  is  available  here:  Register  of 
Commission Documents - SWD(2025)132.  

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
are covered by the Commission’s annual reports on FDI screening15 and on Regulation 
(EU) 2021/821 (the Export Control Regulation)16; 

• 

the  application  of  the  EU  General  Scheme  of  Preferences  (GSP)17,  covered  by  the 
Commission’s GSP reports. 

In addition, separate annual reports are prepared on the application of the Foreign Subsidies 
Regulation18 and the International Procurement Instrument19. 

II.  Making the most of EU preferential trade agreements 

II.1  EU trade with preferential partners – main developments in 2024 

2024 saw the entry into force of the EU-New Zealand FTA (1 May 2024) and the EPA with 
Kenya  (1 July  2024),  bringing  the  number  of  preferential  trade  agreements  in  place  to  4420 
and representing 46.1%21 of total EU external trade. 

As  Figure 2  below  shows,  the  EU’s  largest  preferential  partners  (i.e.  those  accounting  for  a 
share of total EU trade with preferential partners exceeding 5%) were the UK (21.8% of EU 
trade with preferential partners), followed by Switzerland (14.2%), Türkiye (9.1%), Norway 
(6.9%), Japan (5.6%) and South Korea (5.3%). Together, these six partners accounted for 63% 
of EU preferential trade in 2024.  

15 Fifth Annual Report on the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union and staff working document 
of 14 October 2025; Register of Commission Documents - COM(2025)632. 
16 See Report on the on the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 and Statistical update on dual-use 
export control of 30 January 2025; COM(2025) 19; Register of Commission Documents - COM(2025)19. 
17 The last report on the application of the GSP Regulation: JOIN(2023) 34; Register of Commission Documents 
- JOIN(2023)34 (europa.eu). 
18 See Article 52 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 (OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, p. 1). The first report is due in 2026. 
19 See Report under Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 of 30 July 2025; COM(2025) 430 final; eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0430. 
20 A list of agreements can be found here: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-
region/negotiations-and-agreements_en.  
21 Adding  agreements  with  Argentina,  Brazil,  Paraguay  and  Uruguay  (Mercosur)  and  the  EPAs  with  the  East 
African  and  West  African  Communities  that  have  been  finalised  and  are  now  pending  adoption  (representing 
3.4% of total EU trade), the share of EU preferential trade will rise to almost 50%. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: EU trade by preferential partner (2024) 

Source: Eurostat Comext  

As Figure 3 below shows, although EU trade with preferential partners in 2024 declined by 
0.8%,  a  greater  decline  was  registered  in  EU  trade  with  all  partners  (-1.1%)  and  non-FTA 
partners (-1.4%). Over the same period, growth in EU exports to preferential partners rose by 
1.4%, outstripping growth in exports to all partners (1.1%) and non-FTA partners (0.7%). 

Figure 3: Annual growth in EU goods trade by type of partner (2023-2024) 

Source: Eurostat Comext 

Especially the more modern trade agreements, such as CETA, the EU-Japan EPA or the EU-
Viet Nam FTA tend to facilitate market access for EU industry. 

•  For example, the EU-Viet Nam FTA, which entered into force in August 2020, is one 
of  the  most  ambitious  trade  agreements  the  EU  has  concluded  with  a  developing 
country.  It  has  also  progressively  eliminated  tariffs  and  reduced  non-tariff  barriers, 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
providing better market access conditions for both sides. Over the past five years, EU 
exports to Viet Nam have accounted for two-thirds of the increase in EU exports to the 
Asean-422. Exports of the most significant product category for the EU, i.e. Chapter 30 
(pharmaceutical products), almost doubled from EUR 1.1 billion in 2019 to EUR 2.1 
billion in 2024, accounting for 60% of EU exports of pharmaceuticals in both years23. 

•  The  number  of  successful  EU  bidders  on  the  Japanese  government  procurement 
market has steadily increased since the entry into force of the EU-Japan EPA. In 2022 
(latest  data  available),  EU  companies  won  public  contracts  in  Japan  worth 
EUR 317 million. 

EU  trade  agreements  have  also  helped  the  EU  maintain  its  position  as  the  number  one 
exporter of agri-food products 

EU  agri-food  exports  to  all  partners  hit  a  new  record  in  2024,  reaching  EUR 235 billion 
(+2.8% compared to 2023). In 2024, EU trade with preferential partners (imports and exports) 
increased by more (+6.4%) than EU trade with non-FTA partners (+2.8%). 

Figure 4: Annual growth in EU agri-food trade by type of partner (2023-2024) 

The UK was by far the number one destination for EU agri-food exports among preferential 
partners and overall, representing 23% of total EU exports. 

EU agri-food exports to the UK rose by EUR 12 billion (+29%) between the entry into force 
of  the  EU-UK  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement  in  2021  and  2024.  Similarly,  EU  exports 
have  increased  by  EUR 2.1 billion  (+139%)  to  Ukraine  since  2016,  by  EUR 1.6 billion 
(+51%) to Canada since 2017, and by EUR 1 billion (+15%) to Japan since 2019. 

22 ASEAN-4 refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
23 Source: Eurostat (Comext). 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following  a  decrease  in  2023,  EU  agri-food  imports  rebounded  to  2022  levels,  totalling 
almost EUR 172 billion in 2024. This recovery was primarily driven by higher import prices 
for  cocoa,  coffee,  fruit  and  nuts.  Brazil  was  the  EU’s  top  supplier,  accounting  for  a  10% 
market share of total EU agri-food imports, followed by the UK (9%), which consolidated its 
position as the top source of EU agri-food imports among preferential partners. Ukraine was 
also a major supplier of the EU food chain (8%), with grain accounting for half of Ukrainian 
exports destined mainly for the EU animal feed market. 

The EU’s broad network of trade agreements has contributed to its generally strong agri-food 
trading  performance.  In  particular,  EU  agri-food  trade  increased  with  Canada,  Japan  and 
Viet  Nam following the implementation of corresponding trade agreements, with exports of 
products  granted  preferential  access  seeing  significant  increases  due  to  the  elimination  or 
reduction of tariffs. A Commission study24 published in November 2024 looking at the export 
performance  of  EU  products  granted  preferential  access  under  CETA  found  exports  had 
grown  by  an  average  of  14%  between  2019  and  2023,  which  was  worth  an  additional 
EUR 400 million. This success  could be partly attributed to the steady  removal  of  sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) barriers in partner countries (95 between 2020 and 2024) through 
close cooperation with Member States. 

Exports  of  high-value  EU  products  are  safeguarded  through  the  protection  of  geographical 
indications (GIs) under FTAs and other international agreements. As of 31 December 2024, a 
vast  number  of  EU  geographical  indications  benefited  from  protection  under  bilateral 
agreements  with  more  than  30  countries which  together account  for some 60% of global 
GDP and 30% of the world’s population. 

New Zealand – advantages for protected EU GIs. 

•  Due  to  the  protection  of  GIs  required  under  the  EU-New  Zealand  FTA,  New 
Zealand  must  remove  products  from  its  market  which  are  not  genuine  GIs.  For  the 
most common GIs (such as feta, port, and prosecco), transition periods of up to nine 
years have been allowed, and two names have been grandfathered. 

•  Protection  of  GIs  under  the  EU-New  Zealand  FTA  benefits  EU  producers  by 

safeguarding their rights and eliminating unfair competition.  

Overall,  EU  agri-food  trade  is  highly  diversified  and  involves  many  import  and  export 
partners. Nevertheless, trade dependencies remain for certain agri-food products25. In terms of 
imports, FTAs ensure stability in trade relations between the EU and its partners, boosting the 
EU’s resilience. On 12 June 2025 the Council also adopted a regulation imposing new tariffs 
on  the  remaining agricultural  products and  certain fertilisers from  Russia  and  Belarus  that 
were  not  yet  subject  to  extra  customs  duties.  The  aim  is  to reduce  EU  dependence on  those 
imports as well as to reduce Russian export revenues, thereby limiting its ability to finance its 
war of aggression against Ukraine. The regulation entered into force on 1 July 2025. 

24 Study by the European Commission/DG AGRI published on 26 November 2024: Monitoring agri trade policy. 
25 4th Report on the state of food security in the EU; EU Agricultural Economic briefs. 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EU services trade with preferential partners increased more than with non-FTA partners  

EU  trade  in  services  (imports  and  exports)  with  preferential  partners 26  was  worth 
EUR 1.3 trillion in 2023 (latest figures available), representing almost half (48%) of total EU 
trade  in  services.  In  2022-2023,  EU  trade  in  services  with  preferential  partners  increased 
faster than trade with non-FTA partners (+4.5% versus +1.2%). 

The  EU’s  trade  balance  in  services  with  preferential  partners  showed  a  surplus  of 
EUR 178.2 billion,  while  its  trade  balance  with  the  rest  of  the  world  showed  a  deficit  of 
EUR 25.4 billion. The EU’s total trade balance in services reached EUR 152.8 billion in 2023, 
representing a decrease of 15.6% compared to 2022. 

Following  the  recovery  from  the  COVID-19  pandemic  which  saw  EU  trade  in  services 
(imports  and  exports)  experience  a  sharp  rise  between  2021  and  2022  (+24.1%),  growth 
slowed  to  a  more  normal  level  in  2023  (+2.8%).  Meanwhile,  the  EU  exported  some 
EUR 1 427 billion  in  services  in  2023  (+1.6%  compared  to  2022).  The  main  export  sectors 
were  other  business  services  (23.9%),  telecommunications,  computer,  and  information 
services  (20.7%),  transport  services  (17.2%),  travel  services  (126%)  and  financial  services 
(7.1%). The EU imported some EUR 1 274 billion in services (+4.1% compared to 2022). 

Figure 5: Annual growth in EU trade in services (2022-2023) 

26 Preferential partners refer to the 76 countries with which the EU has a preferential trade agreement, whether or 
not the agreement also includes services. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
The EU is a global leader in digitally delivered services, which in 2023 accounted for more 
than  half  (54%)  of  the  EU’s  total  external  trade  in  services  and  corresponded  to  around 
EUR 3 trillion in imports and exports. 

II.2 

Implementing EU bilateral trade agreements 

A.  Implementing market access commitments 

Preventing/removing barriers through FTA committees 

Experience  addressing  potential  trade  barriers  has  consistently  shown  that  the  EU  is  most 
effective when it can identify and anticipate new legislative or regulatory barriers before they 
become  law.  It  is  also  one  of  the  reasons  why  in  both  the  WTO  and  in  the  management 
structures  for  EU  trade  agreements  so  much  emphasis  is  placed  on  transparency  and  early 
warning.  Prevention  is  also  crucial  for  SMEs  which  may  have  limited  resources  to  follow 
potential developments in their export markets. 

The  most  effective  action  has  been  collective,  i.e.  mobilising  the  resources  of  the 
Commission,  EU  delegations,  Member  States  and  businesses  operating  both  in  partner 
countries  and  in  the  EU.  For  example,  coordinated  action  under  the  EU-UK  Trade  and 
Cooperation  Agreement  recently  helped  to  prevent  a  potential  barrier  being  introduced  in 
the form of subsidies for offshore wind investments by way of the UK’s Sustainable Industry 
Rewards with a budget of EUR 646 million. The EU successfully challenged this measure in 
2022. 

To  build  capacity,  the  Commission  and  Member  States  are  continuing  to  explore  practical 
ways of facilitating information flows between EU delegations and Member States’ embassies 
in third countries.  

Trade agreements have acted as a stepping stone to cooperation in areas of mutual interest 

Dealing  with  different  technical  regulations  across  jurisdictions  heavily  influences  the  costs 
and complexities of doing business abroad. For this reason, the EU uses its trade agreements 
as a way of facilitating regulatory cooperation in areas of mutual interest, lowering costs by 
recognising each party’s approaches and promoting coherence between them. Below are some 
examples of successful cooperation in 2024. 

•  Through  regulatory  exchange  between  the  European  Medicines  Agency  and  Health 
Canada  via  the  EU-Canada  Regulatory  Cooperation  Forum,  access  to  paediatric 
medicines  could  be  improved.  Discussions  between  the  Canadian  Hydrogen 
Association  and  Hydrogen  Europe  resulted  in  the  signing  in  June  2024  of  a 
Memorandum  of  Understanding,  while  discussions  continue  on  the  regulation  of 
hydrogen energy, sustainable practices and artificial intelligence. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Market  access  has  also  been  facilitated  through  mutual  recognition  agreements 
(MRAs) on conformity assessments, ending the need for expensive double-testing. In 
2024, a new EU conformity assessment body was accredited under the  1999 EU-US 
MRA27 and  two  EU  conformity  assessment  bodies  had  their  accreditation  renewed 
under the EU-Japan MRA. 

B.  Trade and sustainable development in focus 

In  2024,  the  Commission  continued  to  implement  its  review  of  trade  and  sustainable 
development (TSD) policy28, recognising the role of TSD in trade policy. 

For  the  14  EU  agreements  which  specifically  include  TSD,  the  Commission  continued 
identifying country-specific priorities covering labour, gender, the environment, climate and 
civil society issues in close cooperation with the EU domestic advisory groups (DAGs) set 
up  under  those  agreements.  The  three  most  recent  agreements  (EU-Chile  Interim  Trade 
Agreement, the  EU-Kenya  Economic  Partnership  Agreement and the  EU-New  Zealand 
FTA) also include binding provisions on gender equality, women’s empowerment and labour 
rights. 

In  2024,  the  Commission  contracted  an  independent  consultant  to  conduct  an  ex post 
evaluation of the impact of EU FTAs on key environmental aspects, including climate. 
The evaluation, published in February 202529, provides a qualitative analysis of the impact of 
environmental and climate provisions in seven EU trade agreements, based on a desk analysis 
and  interviews  with  various  stakeholders.  It  is  accompanied  by  20  case  studies  covering  a 
total of 11 partner countries. 

•  The  evaluation  generally  agreed  that  environmental  provisions  in  FTAs  had  had  a 
positive impact on the environment and climate in partner countries and, in particular, 
had  not  led  to  any  backsliding  on  environmental  or  climate  standards  to  encourage 
trade or attract investment. 

•  More specifically, the evaluation found that climate and environmental provisions in 
EU FTAs had generally achieved their objectives and were effective. They were also 
considered to be efficient since the benefits of achieving the objectives outweighed the 
costs for stakeholders. 

•  Finally, the evaluation concluded that the environmental provisions in EU FTAs were 

coherent and relevant. 

27 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A21999A0204%2801%29 
28 For a summary of the main conclusions of the TSD review, see the 2022 annual report on implementation and 
enforcement: Register of Commission Documents - COM(2022)730 (europa.eu). 
29 https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/8a31feb6-d901-421f-a607-ebbdd7d59ca0/library/01b3ba3c-a300-45ca-
b12c-d069db91ed7e/details?download=true 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another priority in  2024 was  to  monitor progress  with  the first  TSD  complaint  filed by an 
NGO in May 2022 with the Commission’s Single Entry Point  concerning workers’ rights in 
the mining sector in Peru and Colombia. Dialogue with these countries continued in 2024 to 
identify  issues  with  the  implementation  of  their  respective  labour  laws.  In  the  case  of 
Colombia, discussions focused on progress with its domestic labour reforms. In terms of TSD 
cooperation with  Peru,  a list  of technical  cooperation activities  was  published in  March and 
November 2024  on  freedom  of  association,  child  labour,  forced  labour,  combating  informal 
work and, in particular, strengthening the labour inspection system. These activities are due to 
be implemented in the coming years with extensive support under EU programmes. 

The  positive  outcomes  of  this  work  demonstrate  the  important  role  civil  society  plays  in 
alerting and monitoring compliance with TSD policy in third countries. 

In  March 2024,  a  second  formal  complaint  concerning  TSD  policy  was  filed  with  the 
Single Entry Point. It concerned the TSD chapter of the EU-Viet Nam FTA, in particular the 
commitment  made  by Viet Nam  to  ‘make continued and sustained efforts towards  ratifying 
the  outstanding  fundamental  ILO  conventions’.  The  Commission’s  preliminary  assessment 
noted  the  limited  progress  made  by  Viet  Nam  in  relation  to  continued  and  sustained  efforts 
towards ratifying ILO Convention 87. On 27 November 2024, Viet Nam adopted a new Trade 
Union Law. However, this new law does not make ratification of Convention 87 a condition 
or requirement, nor  does  it constitute ratification of Convention 87. On  21 March 2025, the 
Viet  Namese  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs  provided  a  written  update  on  several  labour-related 
issues of interest to the EU. The letter provided some recent insights and included Viet Nam’s 
interpretation of its new Trade Union law, but it did not provide sufficient details about Viet 
Nam’s past and planned efforts to assess whether it complies with the commitment under the 
EU-Viet  Nam  FTA  to  make  continued  and  sustained  efforts  towards  the  ratification  of  ILO 
Convention 87. Further analysis is therefore needed, for which the Commission looks forward 
to receiving additional information from Viet Nam. 

A  third  TSD  complaint  also  regarding  the  EU-Viet  Nam  FTA  was  received  in  February 
2025,  concerning  human  rights  and  labour  rights  violations.  The  Commission  is  currently 
conducting its preliminary assessment of this complaint.  

Under  EU  bilateral  trade  agreements  containing  TSD  chapters,  Joint  TSD  Committees  are 
set up to discuss TSD issues. 

Examples  of  tangible  progress  in  2024  on  ratifying  and  implementing  core  conventions  on 
labour  rights  and  the  environment,  prompting  partner  countries  to  upgrade  their  respective 
domestic  frameworks  (in  line  with  the  provisions  of  their  agreements  with  the  EU),  are 
presented below. 

•  Colombia  ratified  ILO  Convention  C156  (the  Workers  with  Family  Responsibilities 
Convention)  on  6 December  2024.  Guatemala  ratified  ILO  Convention  C191  (the 
Safe  and  Healthy  Working  Environment  Convention)  on  6 August  2024.  Moldova 
ratified  ILO  Convention  C190  (the  Violence  and  Harassment  Convention)  on 
19 March 2024. 

14 

 
 
•  Moldova  also  made  progress  on  upgrading  its  domestic  arrangements  relating  to 
labour and the environment. It adopted a law on climate change, which lays down a 
legal  framework  for  achieving  net-zero  emissions  by  2050.  Furthermore,  Moldova’s 
Low Emission Development Programme 2030 was launched in 2024 and the country 
also  published  eco-design  requirements  for  21  energy-related  products.  Concerning 
labour 
legislative  amendments  allowing 
unannounced  inspections  to  help  detect  and  regularise  undeclared  work.  Progress  in 
this  area  was  also  made  by  Georgia,  who  further  bolstered  its  labour  inspection 
system  through  additional  recruitment,  training  and  capacity  building.  The  country 
also adopted its National Climate Change Strategy 2030. 

inspections,  Moldova 

reported  on 

As  in  previous  years,  the  Commission  used  TSD  Committees  set  up  under  EU  trade 
agreements to engage with partners on key elements of the TSD policy review and enhance 
cooperation  on  environmental  and  climate  matters,  as  well  as  on  gender  issues.  Work 
was notably carried out through dedicated policy dialogue and green partnerships. Examples 
of progress made in 2024 are presented below. 

•  The  EU  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  deepened  their  cooperation  under  the  Green 
Partnership  launched  in  May 2023  on  trade-related  issues  such  as  offshore  wind, 
decarbonisation of the shipping industry, the circular economy and the Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).  

•  The EU and Japan stepped up their cooperation under the Green Alliance on issues 

such as carbon pricing, offshore wind power and carbon capture and utilisation. 

•  The EU and Singapore strengthened their cooperation on technologies to support the 

green transition. 

•  A  dialogue  was  started  between  the  EU  and  Central  America  and  between  the  EU 
and  Peru,  Colombia  and  Ecuador  to  strengthen  the  implementation  of  the 
sustainability component of their respective trade agreements. 

•  Discussions  took  place  between  the  EU  and  Canada  on  the  implementation  of  the 
CETA  Trade  and  Gender  Recommendation 30 .  Events  were  held  to  share 
information  on  policies,  laws  and  best  practices  on  a  range  of  issues.  On  19 March 
2024, a workshop on trade, gender and SMEs was organised as part of the 2024 Civil 
Society Forum, and in April 2024 an event was held in Toronto on supporting women 
in international trade. 

The structures set up under the TSD chapters were also key forums for the EU’s partners to 
deepen  their  understanding  of  recently  proposed  or  enacted  EU  legislation  on 
sustainability, some of which had been a major source of concern for different partners. For 
example,  in  preparation  for  the  latest  TSD  Committee  with  New  Zealand,  the  Commission 

30 CETA Trade and Gender Recommendation: EU-Canada Work Plan 2020-2021 

15 

 
 
 
organised meetings on deforestation between experts on sustainable forest management from 
the EU and New Zealand. 

The EU has continued to fund technical cooperation supporting sustainability objectives 

In  order  to  make  progress  on  implementing  and  enforcing  the  sustainable  development 
aspects of EU trade agreements, the Commission has generally relied on offering incentives to 
its  partners,  alongside  having  a  dispute  settlement  option  available  to  it.  In  2024,  the  EU 
continued  to  implement  cooperation  projects  in  Central  America31 and  South-East  Asia, 
including  through  phase 2  of  the  ‘Trade  for  decent  work’  project  (EUR 4  million  for  the 
period 2024-2027), aimed at improving the implementation of labour standards, in particular 
in Bangladesh, Mongolia, the Philippines and Viet Nam. Through the ‘Responsible business 
conduct for green, digital and resilient supply chains in Asia’ initiative, the EU continued to 
support  the  work  of  the  OECD  and  its  partners  in  the  region  by  raising  awareness  of,  and 
supporting  capacity  building  to,  implement  internationally  agreed  standards  for  responsible 
business conduct. 

Working with Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs) 

An  EU  project  to  support  the  implementation  of  civil  society  mechanisms  under  trade 
agreements – contracted by the Commission in 2018 with a budget of EUR 3 million – was 
concluded  at  the  end  of  2024.  Thanks  to  input  from  the  DAGs,  a  new  financial  facility  is 
being set up to support the functioning of DAGs, with the possibility of supporting them in 
several  FTA  partner  countries,  including  Andean  and  Central  American  countries.  The  new 
support  facility  (with  a  budget  of  EUR 1.5 million  for  two  years,  renewable  once)  will 
finance the work of DAGs  in  the EU  and in  developing  partner countries. The scope of  the 
new contract for this project has been adjusted to take on board the needs of DAG members, 
such as additional expert input, note-taking during meetings and secretarial support for DAGs 
in partner countries to help them organise meetings. 

Contributions  by  both  European  and  partner-country  DAGs,  who  monitor  the  situation  on 
the ground in partner countries, inform the Commission’s position in ensuring implementation 
of TSD commitments.  Below are some examples. 

Examples of input from DAGs. 

• 

Issues raised by EU  civil society organisations in Vietnam related to human  rights 
violations against some environmental activists or trade union representatives support 
the EU’s discussions with Vietnam on the matter.  

• 

Information  supplied  by  the  EU-Canada  DAG  helped  both  sides  to  boost  the  EU-
Canada joint workplan on TSD. 

31 https://www.euroclima.org/en/mapas-2021-en 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Examples  supplied  by  the  EU-Japan  DAG  shed  light  on  a  large-scale  advertising 
campaign  in  Japan  which  was  being  investigated  by  the  Advertising  Review 
Organisation for alleged greenwashing. This fed into the discussions on the merits of 
a regulated approach in this area, as is already the case in the EU. 

•  Against a  backdrop of political  uncertainty and  democratic decline in  Georgia, civil 
society organisations raised concerns over the compatibility of Georgia’s  draft  bill 
on  family  values  and  the  protection  of  minors  with  ILO  conventions  111 
(Discrimination/Employment  and  Occupation)  and  190  (Violence  and  Harassment) 
and asked for the bill to be withdrawn.  

III.  Helping SMEs find their place in global trade 

Throughout  2024,  the  Commission  maintained  its  strong  commitment  to  helping  EU 
businesses, in particular SMEs, make the most of EU trade agreements. 

A.  Upgrading and promoting the Access2Markets platform 

The Access2Markets  platform  has attracted 12 million visitors since its launch in 2020.  In 
2024,  it  received  more  than  three  million  visitors,  the  most  of  any  year so  far.  At  the  same 
time, the Commission has trained 14 000 stakeholders to use the platform, enabling them to 
benefit from free, multilingual information. The Access2Markets platform has been regularly 
upgraded  to  make  it  even  more  streamlined,  user-friendly  and  helpful  for  European  SMEs 
looking to expand internationally. It now also includes new services statistics. 

•  The  Rules  of  Origin  Self-Assessment  tool  (ROSA)  is  a  valuable  resource 
enabling  companies  to  assess  whether  their  products  meet  the  conditions  to 
benefit  from  preferential  treatment  under  an  EU  trade  agreement.  Major 
improvements  were  made  to  the  tool  in  2024  to  make  it  available  in  all  EU 
languages  and  to  extend  its  coverage  to  include  the  FTA  with  New  Zealand. 
The tool now covers 32 agreements  and the conditions under the Generalised 
Scheme of Preferences. 

•  My Trade Assistant for Services and Investment is an online tool launched 
in  2022 which provides practical  information about  the requirements that EU 
service providers must fulfil when exporting outside the EU. On average, it is 
consulted 2 000 times per month. An extension made to the tool in 2024 means 
that  it  now  covers  more  than  100  services  sectors,  including  business  and 
professional  services,  financial  services,  telecom  services,  and  transport 
services in eight countries: Canada, China, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland,  the  UK,  and  the  US.  In  2025,  information  for  Brazil,  India, 
Mexico,  and  South  Africa  was  uploaded  to  My  Trade  Assistant  for  Services 
and Investment. 

•  My Trade Assistant for Procurement helps EU businesses establish whether 
a  specific  public  procurement  tender  is  covered  by  one  of  the  EU’s  bilateral 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
trade  agreements.  The  tool  covers  the  US,  Canada,  Japan,  the  UK  and,  since 
2025,  Switzerland,  Norway,  Iceland,  Liechtenstein,  Albania,  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina, Serbia, North Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro. 

•  Access2Conformity,  which  was  added  to  the  Access2Markets  platform  in 
2023,  helps  EU  exporters  identify  where  in  the  EU  they  can  have  their 
products conformity-tested and certified when exporting to third countries that 
have an MRA with the EU. The tool currently covers Australia, Canada, Japan, 
New Zealand, the US and Switzerland. 

•  Procurement4Buyers  was  added  to  the  Access2Markets  platform  in  June 
2024. The tool helps contracting authorities in the EU to understand which of 
their  tenders  should  be  opened  up  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis  to  bidders, 
goods  and  services  from  certain  third  countries.  This  helps  to  guarantee  the 
transparency  of  the  EU’s  procurement  commitments  with  respect  to  third 
countries. 

B.  Helping SMEs make the most of international trade agreements 

International  trade  offers  a  variety  of  benefits  for  the  economy,  businesses  and  consumers. 
Data  from  2023  showed  that  while  around  95%  of  companies  exporting  from  the  EU  were 
SMEs,  the  value  of  their  exports  accounted  for  only  30%  of  total  exports.  In  2024,  the 
Commission again stepped up its efforts to help SMEs have more of an international reach. 

Enterprise Europe Network 

The  Enterprise  Europe  Network 32  (EEN)  supports  SMEs  with  international  ambitions, 
including  start-ups  and  scale-ups.  It  offers  business  partnering  services,  market  entry  and 
import/export support, and regulatory guidance. 

To this end, the EEN has cooperated closely with contact points established in international 
markets  of  significant  interest  to  EU  SMEs,  including  Japan,  South  Korea,  Singapore,  Viet 
Nam, India, Canada, Chile, the UK, and the US. 

On 30 September 2024, an open invitation was published33 to strengthen the EEN and expand 
it  to  include  additional  strategic  third  countries.  The  goal  of  the  open  invitation  was  to  add 
new  business  support  organisations  to  the  EEN,  known  as  ‘international  network  partners’, 
and to leverage their experience on the ground. 

In  December 2024,  the  EEN  addressed  an  online  survey  to  its  advisers  providing 
internationalisation  services  for  local  businesses.  The  main  findings  of  the  survey  were  as 
follows. 

32 https://een.ec.europa.eu/ 
33 https://een.ec.europa.eu/news/open-invitation-join-enterprise-europe-network-international-network-partner 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
➢  Around  one  third of EEN advisers  had  clients  asking for support on how to  benefit 

from reduced tariffs and regulatory alignment linked to EU trade agreements. 

➢  Around 45% of EEN advisers regularly provided support in connection with EU trade 
agreements.  Over  one  third  of  EEN  advisers  referred  clients  to  more  specialised 
service providers. 

➢  Over  40%  of  EEN  advisers  had  already  made  achievements  and/or  brought  about 

success stories relating to the trade services they provided for their clients. 

➢  Over  two  thirds  of  EEN  advisers  regularly  (or  at  least  occasionally)  used  the  EU’s 

Access2Markets platform. 

In 2024, the EEN supported and hosted webinars promoting EU trade agreements streamed on 
YouTube34, including webinars on: 

-  Testing  and  certifying  for  export  –  the  benefits  of  mutual  recognition  agreements 

(MRAs) on conformity assessment content; 

-  Doing  business  in  New  Zealand:  how  to  implement  the  EU-New  Zealand  trade 

agreement. 

-  Doing business in Viet Nam: exploring opportunities in the local agri-food sector. 

Concrete results of the work done by EEN business advisers and examples of how they have 
helped EU SMEs to seize trade opportunities can be found on the EEN website35. 

Market Access Days 

The  Commission,  in  cooperation  with  Member  States,  has  continued  to  organise  Market 
Access Days. These events, held in various EU countries, have helped to increase awareness 
among businesses at national and local level of the benefits of EU trade agreements. In 2024, 
Market  Access  Days  were held  in  France, Austria, Germany,  Belgium,  the Netherlands and 
Hungary.  The  Chief  Trade  Enforcement  Officer  participated  in  these  events  which  brought 
together nearly 700 stakeholders to discuss the specific challenges of accessing third-country 
markets and the competitive advantages of trade agreements. 

Study of the EU SME internationalisation strategy 

On 3 February 2025, the Commission published36 a study of the EU SME internationalisation 
strategy.  The  study  mapped  and  analysed  existing  national  and  EU  support  measures, 
identified gaps, overlaps and potential improvements. It offered recommendations for making 
more  efficient  use  of  existing  national  and  EU  resources.  The  outcomes  of  the  study  were 

34 https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLq0qsbVGoO6EO_q6ho_ip0x9IgDTRRAJd 
35 https://een.ec.europa.eu/success-stories 
36 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/study-european-union-smes-internationalisation-
strategy_en 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
presented at a workshop37 on 7 February 2025. The Commission is working on implementing 
the study’s key recommendations.  

Implementation of SME chapters in EU trade agreements 

EU-Canada  Comprehensive  Economic  and  Trade  Agreement 
In 
December 2024, following regular discussions between their respective SME Contact Points, 
the EU and Canada agreed on a three-year action plan38 (2025-2027) to implement the CETA 
recommendation on SMEs. 

(CETA). 

EU-Japan  Economic  Partnership  Agreement  (EPA). On 20 September 2024, the EU and 
Japanese SME Contact Points held their fourth meeting under the EPA, which was followed 
up by a separate meeting on 11 November 2024 in Brussels. Both sides reported on their latest 
initiatives  to  implement  the  information-sharing  provisions  under  the  EPA  and  on  other 
activities to encourage more SMEs to take advantage of the EPA. The joint activity report of 
the SME Contact Points is available online39. In addition, the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial 
Cooperation 40 continued  to  play  a  key  role  in  supporting  SMEs.  Examples  of  EU  SMEs 
successfully entering the Japanese market are available online41. 

EU-New  Zealand  FTA.  Following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  EU-New  Zealand  FTA  on 
1 May  2024,  the  EU  and  New  Zealand  SME  Contact  Points  held  their  first  meeting  on 
11 December  2024.  They  discussed  progress  on  implementing  the  information-sharing 
commitments  under  the  SME  chapter,  topics  of  interest  for  future  meetings  and  how  to 
structure future work. 

World Trade Organization (WTO) 

In 2024, the EU contributed to the development of the Global Trade Helpdesk42, an initiative 
jointly led by the WTO, the International Trade Centre and the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development to simplify market research by bringing together trade and business information 
in a single online portal. The EU participated in the 13th Ministerial Conference of the WTO 
which took place between 26 February and 2 March 2024 in Abu Dhabi. At that conference, 
two  documents  entitled  Access  to  finance  for  women-led  micro,  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises (‘MSMEs’): a compendium of financial inclusion initiatives43 and A compendium 
of special provisions for MSMEs in Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) Programs44, were 
published, with significant contributions from the EU. 

37 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/news/hybrid-workshop-sme-internationalisation-2025-02-10_en 
38 https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/09242a36-a438-40fd-a7af-fe32e36cbd0e/library/8c22233e-aa1c-4d70-9f0e-
abcd021fc1f7/details 
39 https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/09242a36-a438-40fd-a7af-fe32e36cbd0e/library/619f8187-79fe-4141-9756-
ca58c042333d/details 
40 https://www.eu-japan.eu/ 
41 https://www.eu-japan.eu/eubusinessinjapan/procedures/import-export/case-studies-and-success-stories 
42 https://globaltradehelpdesk.org/en 
43 directdoc.aspx (wto.org) 
44 INFMSMEW47R1.pdf 

20 

 
 
 
In  the  course  of  2024,  the  EU  also  took  part  in  the  four  meetings  of  the  WTO  Informal 
Working Group on MSMEs45 – composed of 103 countries – at  which it presented to  WTO 
members the EEN, the TRACES online platform for animal and plant health certification, and 
action taken to implement the December 2020 MSME Package. 

IV. Addressing barriers and finding solutions 

IV.1  State of play and trends in 2024 

In  2024,  a  mix  of  ongoing  geopolitical  tensions,  economic  fluctuations  and  shifts  in  trade 
policies  increasingly  shaped  the  global  trade  landscape.  Countries  and  trade  blocs  grappled 
with  finding  a  balance  between  protecting  domestic  industries  and  ensuring  a  free  and  fair 
trading system is in place.  

Import restrictions, local content requirements, discriminatory practices and, more generally, 
measures directed at import substitution (e.g. non-automatic licences for a variety of imports), 
in particular in the Southern Neighbourhood46 but also in Asia, became the industrial policy of 
choice for some of the EU’s trading partners.  

EU businesses continued to face export restrictive measures targeting (critical) raw materials 
to  create  policy  space  for  industrial  development  and  processing,  taken  in  particular  by 
partner countries in South-East Asia (e.g. Indonesia’s export ban on nickel ore), the Far East 
(e.g.  China’s  restrictions  on  rare  earth  exports),  or  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (e.g.  Ghana  and 
Tanzania or, more recently, export bans on lithium imposed by Namibia and Zimbabwe), but 
also the US move to restrict export access to advanced semiconductors for over 120 countries, 
including some EU Member States.  

The importance of addressing and navigating trade barriers  and protectionist measures 
again came to the fore and was a continued cause for concern as a total of 23 new barriers 
were registered. The majority were sanitary and phytosanitary measures (nine new barriers), 
followed  by  technical  barriers  to  trade  (five  new  barriers)  and  barriers  to  service  provision 
(four new barriers). 

A.  Inventory of registered trade and investment barriers as of 31 December 2024 

A  total  of  410  market  access  barriers  across  67  third  countries  were  recorded  in  the 
Commission’s Access2Markets database as at the end of 2024. This represented a decrease of 
13 compared to the 423 barriers registered at the end of 2023. The reduction reflected – as in 
previous  years  –  the  implementation  of  a  two-pronged  strategy:  first,  proactively  working 

45 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/msmes_e/msmes_e.htm 
46 The Southern Neighbourhood comprises 10 partner countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia) which enjoy cooperation with the EU as part of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
with  partner  countries  to  eliminate  trade  barriers  affecting  EU  exporters  and,  second, 
conducting regular internal reviews to remove outdated entries that no longer represent actual 
market access challenges. 

In terms of geographical distribution, the highest numbers of market access barriers in 2024 
were registered in Russia (32), India (31) and China (30), followed by the US (24), Brazil 
and  Indonesia  (18  each).  This  overall  pattern  is  broadly  consistent  with  2023,  although  the 
order of the top three countries changed, with Russia and India overtaking China. Brazil and 
Indonesia  again  had  the  same  number  of  barriers.  Other  third  countries  with  10  or  more 
barriers included South Korea (17), Türkiye (14), Malaysia, Australia and Algeria (11 each), 
and Mexico, Thailand and Morocco (10 each). As Figure 6 below shows, 63% of barriers to 
trade were imposed by non-preferential trading partners. 

Figure 6: Distribution of barriers per type of agreement 

As  Figure  7  below  shows,  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  (SPS)  measures  represented  the 
largest  category  of  barriers  in  2024,  accounting  for  93  barriers  or  23%  of  all  registered 
barriers,  the  same  as  in  2024.  Technical  barriers  to  trade  (TBT)  were  the  second-largest 
category,  with  79  barriers,  while  tariffs,  tariff  equivalents  and  quantitative  restrictions 
accounted for 65 barriers. The top three categories combined made up 58% of all active trade 
barriers as at the end of 2024. 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Types of barriers registered as at the end of 2024 

In  terms  of  trends,  2024  saw  a  sharp  decline  in  two  specific  categories:  tariffs  and 
quantitative  restrictions,  which  saw  the  number  of  barriers  fall  from  70  to  65,  and 
export taxes and restrictions, which saw barriers fall from 20 to 16. SPS measures also 
continued their downward trajectory, registering a cumulative reduction of nearly 15% since 
2020,  consolidating  a  five-year  trend.  Similarly,  tariffs  and  quantitative  restrictions,  and 
administrative  procedures,  both  decreased  by  17%  over  the  same  period.  Government 
procurement-related barriers registered a decrease of 4% compared to 2020. 

The  number  of  barriers  in  all  other  categories  remained  broadly  stable  compared  to  figures 
from the end of 2020. 

B.  Trends in the number of trade and investment barriers over the period 2020-

2024 

In  2024,  the  number  of  newly  registered  barriers  increased  further  compared  to  2023, 
while remaining well below pre-COVID levels. A total of 23 new barriers were recorded in 
2024, up from 16 in 2023.  

Category 

2020 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2024 

SPS  
TBT  
Tariffs  and  equivalents 
and 
quantitative 
restrictions  

13  
5  
5  

2  
6  
2  

3  
2  
3  

3  
3  
4  

9 
5 
2 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Administrative 
procedures  
Services & investment  
Other measures55  
IPR  
Public procurement  

taxes 

Export 
restrictions  
Grand total  

and 

5  

4  
4  
1  
3  

1  

1  

1  
2  
0  
2  

0  

0  

0  
0  
2  
0  

0  

4  

0  
0  
0  
0  

2  

2 

4 
0 
1 
0 

0 

41  

16  

10  

16  

23 

The largest increase came from SPS measures, where nine new barriers were registered, more 
than  in  any  of  the  three  previous  years.  TBT  also  rose  to  five  newly  registered  barriers, 
compared  with  three  in  2023.  By  contrast,  tariffs,  tariff  equivalents  and  quantitative 
restrictions,  decreased  to  two  from  four  in  2023.  Four  new  barriers  were  registered  in  the 
category of services and investment after none were recorded in the two previous years.  

In 2024, as  the table below shows, agriculture  and  fisheries  remained  the  most  affected 
sector  with  10  new  barriers,  more  than  double  the  number  recorded  in  2023.  Services  also 
saw an increase with four new measures, up from one the year before. New barriers were also 
recorded  in  previously  unaffected  industries  such  as  cosmetics,  electronics,  wood/paper, 
textiles/leather, and ceramics/glass. By contrast, horizontal measures fell to zero. 

Type of sector  

New barriers 
2022  

New barriers 
2023  

New barriers 2024 

Agriculture & 
Fisheries  
Horizontal  
Wines and spirits  
Other industries  
Automotive  
Pharmaceuticals  
Mining  
Services  
Ceramics and glass 
Cosmetics 
Electronics 
Wood, paper and pulp 
Textiles and leather 
Total  

5  

3  
1  
1  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10  

4  

5  
1  
1  
2  
2  
1  
1  
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
16  

10 

0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
4 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
23 

Figure 8 below shows the geographical spread of new trade barriers in 2024. The Southern 
Neighbourhood  again  registered  the  highest  number  of  new  trade  barriers,  with  eight 
barriers.  This  was  closely  followed  by  South  and  South-East  Asia,  Australia  and  New 
Zealand, which registered six new barriers. 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Geographical spread of new trade barriers in 2024 

C. Barriers removed in 2024 

In  2024,  progress  was  made  in  tackling  trade  barriers,  with  44  barriers  fully  or  partially 
removed  in  27  partner  countries.  This was achieved through a combination of diplomatic 
outreach  and  the  effective  use  of  institutional  mechanisms  under  bilateral  trade  agreements 
and in the WTO. 

In  all  cases,  the  Commission  cooperated  closely  with  Member  States  and  EU  stakeholders 
through  the  Market  Access  Partnership,  under  which  monthly  meetings  are  held  of  the 
Market Access Advisory Committee  which brings together the Commission, Member States 
and EU business associations. The EU’s delegations in partner countries played a key role in 
tackling trade barriers, leveraging their expertise on the ground and facilitating direct access 
to  partner  countries’  authorities.  The  Council’s  Trade  Policy  Committee  also  regularly 
discussed  implementation  and  enforcement  issues,  including  in  relation  to  country-specific 
barriers. 

Most  tackled  barriers  (48%)  related  to  the  agriculture  and  fisheries  sector.  Additionally, 
14% of cases addressed cross-sectoral issues, affecting products from more than one industry. 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Number of barriers tackled per sector (2024) 

Once again, the majority of barriers removed concerned SPS measures, with 21 barriers 
removed in 2024 and similar successes during the first seven months of 2025. The prevention 
and full or partial removal of such barriers, achieved in close cooperation with Member States 
trade  counsellors  and  relevant  industry  associations,  had  a  direct  positive  impact  on  the 
European food sector, as the following examples show. 

•  Saudi Arabia lifted its ban on EU beef. In turn, EU exports of beef, sheep and goat 
meat  to  Saudi  Arabia  were  valued  at  some  EUR 10 million  in  2024  (with  beef 
accounting for the majority) and are expected to rise in future. 

•  After suspending beef and pork imports from Germany for three months, Singapore 
recognised  Germany  as  a  ‘foot  and  mouth  disease-free  zone  without  vaccination’  in 
April 2025  and  allowed  exports  to  resume.  Germany  is  currently  one  of  Singapore’s 
main  pork  suppliers,  with  exports  valued  at  EUR 25 million  in  2024.  Singapore  also 
approved  exports  of  pork  and  pork  products  from  Portugal  under  pre-listing 
conditions.  An  initial  consignment  of  25  tonnes  of  pigmeat  was  exported  from 
Portugal to Singapore in February 2025. 

•  The US recognised Italy as officially free of swine vesicular disease. As a result, it has 
lifted  trade  restrictions  on  pork  and  pork  products  originating  from  Tuscany  and 
Umbria.  The  removal  of  these  restrictions  will  have  a  significant  positive  impact  on 
Italian  exports  to  the  US  of  certain  speciality  products,  in  particular  high  value 
protected products such as the Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) ‘Finocchiona’ 

26 

 
 
 
 
and the PGI ‘Prosciutto di Norcia’. Exports to the US account for 13.5% of certified 
‘Finocchiona’ production and 15% of ‘Prosciutto di Norcia’ production. 

•  The US also reopened its market to imports of sheep and goat meat products. This 
is expected to have a positive impact on EU exporters,  particularly from  Spain, with 
exports  estimated  to  reach  750 tonnes  by  2027,  up  from  120 tonnes  in  2025, 
corresponding to a value of around EUR 13 million per year. 

Five of the barriers lifted in 2024 were TBT, while a further seven concerned tariffs,  tariff 
equivalents or quantitative restrictions. The removal of these barriers helped reduce costs 
and  improve  market  access  for  EU  exporters.  Below  are  some  examples  of  the  barriers 
removed. 

•  Paraguay  eliminated a fee for legalising export documents  at  its consulates (costing 
EU importers EUR 22 million per year), thereby removing a major bone of contention 
from EU-Paraguay trade relations. 

• 

• 

In  2021,  the  Dominican  Republic  following  action  taken  by  the  EU  delegation, 
Member States and other affected countries decided to exempt importers of alcoholic 
beverages  from  its  fiscal  control  and  traceability  system  (TRAFICO).  This  system 
requires individual labelling of each individual unit of product (e.g. bottles, cans etc.), 
and had significantly raised the cost of imported products compared to local products. 
EU importers are now saving around EUR 6.5 million per year. 

In  2025,  the  Dominican  Republic  also  ended  discrimination  against  imports  of 
cheeses,  cooked  hams  and  canned  vegetables  from  the  EU  which,  unlike  their 
domestic  equivalents,  were  subject  to  a  18%  VAT.  Following  discussions  held 
bilaterally and within the WTO Market Access Committee, the Dominican Republican 
authorities  ended  the  discrimination  by  extending  VAT  to  domestic  products  (other 
than for certain types of canned vegetables and turkey ham). This is set to benefit EU 
exports of cheeses and hams  to  the  Dominican Republic, which in  2024  were worth 
around EUR 50 million. 

•  The  Peruvian  fisheries  authority  amended  its  rules  on  accommodating  the  cross-
border  provision  of  services  and  in  November 2024  officially  recognised  an  EU 
laboratory  to  work  in  Peru  as  a  testing  entity  for  the  issuing  of  SPS  certificates  for 
exports  of  food  and  feed.  This  means  that  the  EU  laboratory  will  no  longer  face 
procedural hurdles, such as on-site inspections and overly strict working conditions for 
its staff. This breakthrough followed many years of negotiations to address regulatory 
barriers under the EU’s trade agreement with Peru. 

• 

Indonesia  lifted  its  ban  on  imports  of  textiles  and  textile  products  (e.g.  carpets  and 
rugs) by EU companies. Before the ban was lifted, EU textile companies could only 
import  semi-finished  materials  or  unfinished  products  if  asked  to  do  so  by  SMEs 
registered with the Indonesian Ministry of Industry. 

27 

 
 
 
 
•  Saudi Arabia further facilitated market access for EU ceramic tiles in 2024 and 2025 
by making audits less burdensome. Following numerous attempts to resolve the issue 
within WTO TBT meetings and in bilateral meetings, including through a letter from 
the Commission’s Chief Trade Enforcement Officer in September 2024, Saudi Arabia 
finally provided a written guarantee that its audit bodies would comply with a limit on 
audit costs for EU exporters. Since redundant testing and product audits were stopped 
following an investigation under the Trade Barrier Regulation, EU exports of ceramic 
tiles 
in  value  from 
EUR 385 million in 2021 to EUR 502 million in 2024. Overall, ceramic tiles represent 
30% of all EU exports to Saudi Arabia. 

to  Saudi  Arabia  have  seen  steady  growth, 

increasing 

• 

In  January  2024,  following  consistent  calls  from  the  OECD  and  the  EU,  Brazil 
reformed  its  rules  on  ‘transfer  pricing’,  i.e.  the  price  that  branches  of  the  same 
corporation  charge  each  other  for  goods  and  services  provided  across  borders.  Such 
transactions must now be billed at the market rate, according to new rules aligned with 
the OECD’s ‘arm’s length principle.’ This change, which reflects a long-standing EU 
priority,  brings  greater  tax  certainty,  reduces  double  taxation  and  simplifies 
compliance for EU businesses operating in Brazil. While the full impact will take time 
to materialise, the change already marks a major step forward in creating a fairer and 
more predictable trade environment. 

In 2024, good progress was also made on tackling export restrictions. 

•  Türkiye  removed  a  long-standing  licensing  regime  for  copper  scrap  exports  which 
had  in  practice  amounted  to  an  export  ban  because  of  the  prohibitive  conditions  it 
imposed. Copper scrap is now automatically registered for export. 

• 

India and Bangladesh ended their long-standing export restrictions on hides and skins 
which  had  affected  the  EU  clothing  and  leather  industries  for  some  time.  India 
scrapped  its  excessive  export  duty  on  raw  hides  and  skins  and  certain  semi-finished 
leathers  (which  were  the  highest  globally,  ranging  from  25%  to  60%),  which  had 
limited  the  ability  of  the  EU  clothing  industry  to  acquire  a  sufficient  supply  of  raw 
materials  from  reliable  sources  at  market  prices.  In  2025,  basic  customs  duties  were 
reduced  from  10%  to  zero  on  wet  blue  leather  for  hides  and  skins  and  from  20%  to 
zero  on  leather  (crust  hides).  In  2024,  Bangladesh  partially  lifted  its  export  ban  and 
now allows raw hides and wet blue leather to be exported on a case-by-case basis. 

IV.2  Bilateral and multilateral enforcement of trade commitments: dispute 

resolution 

While most barriers continue to  be tackled by bilateral  engagement with  the trading  partner 
through  FTA  committees  or  committees  in  the  WTO,  it  continues  to  be  necessary  in  some 
cases to move to formal dispute settlement procedures, either under a bilateral agreement or in 
the WTO. For the latter, it remains therefore crucial to preserve the ability to get disputes 
adjudicated between WTO Members.  

28 

 
 
 
 
In particular, the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Agreement (MPIA) as well as ad 
hoc appeal arbitration agreements have helped to preserve the adjudication of disputes at the 
WTO notwithstanding the WTO’s Appellate Body has not been functioning since 2019 due to 
the  United  States  blocking  the  appointment  of  its  members.  The  MPIA  guarantees  its 
participants  access  to  a  functioning  dispute  settlement  system  in  the  WTO  and  ensures  that 
rules  can  be  enforced,  and  trade  disputes  can  be  adjudicated,  without  appealing  “into  the 
void”. After Paraguay, Malaysia and the UK joined in the first half of 2025, the MPIA now 
covers 57 out of 166 WTO Members (counting EU Member States), accounting for 57% of 
world  trade.  The  MPIA  was  put  in  place  in  2020  and  has  proven  effective  in  ensuring  the 
orderly resolution of disputes.  

At the time of drafting this report, no appeals ‘into the void’ have been filed in any dispute 
between  MPIA  participants.  The  first  MPIA  award  was  issued  in  December 2022  in  a  case 
brought by the EU (DS591, Colombia – Frozen fries). 

On 22 April 2025 the EU also appealed within the MPIA in case DS611 (China – Anti-Suit 
Injunctions).  On  21  July,  the  WTO  appeal  Arbitrator  overruled  important  findings  of  the 
initial panel and agreed with the EU that concluded that China’s anti-suit injunction policy is 
inconsistent  with  the  TRIPS  Agreement.  This  is  an  important  win  for  EU-based  high-tech 
companies whose research outcomes were undermined by the Chinese policies in questions. It 
ensures  European  companies  can  continue  to  defend  their  intellectual  property  in  European 
courts.  

Dispute  settlement  remains  an  important  avenue  for  EU  enforcement  action.  It  is  a  well-
established,  rules-based  approach  to  dispute  resolution  that  provides  legal  certainty  and 
predictability to traders, businesses and governments. 

In total, five new disputes were launched between June 2024 and July 2025: 

•  On  14 June  2024,  the  EU  launched  a  bilateral  dispute  settlement  case  against 
Algeria  under  the  EU-Algeria  Association  Agreement 47 ,  in  which  it  requested 
consultations  with  the  Algerian  authorities  to  address  several  restrictions  on  EU 
exports and investments, including, among others, an import licensing system having 
the  effect  of  an  import  ban,  subsidies  contingent  on  the  use  of  local  inputs  for  car 
manufacturing,  a  cap  on  foreign  ownership  for  companies  importing  goods  into 
Algeria and an import ban on ceramics and marble. The EU is challenging those trade 
and  investment  restrictive  measures  as  incompatible  with  Algeria’s  commitments 
under the EU-Algeria Association Agreement. Unfortunately, the consultations did not 
manage to resolve the EU’s concerns. Therefore, on 15 July 2025, the EU proceeded 
to the next step in the dispute appointing an arbitrator. 

•  On  26  July  2024,  the  EU  requested  dispute  settlement  consultations  at  the  WTO 
concerning  Taiwan’s  use  of  local  content  criteria  for  offshore  wind  energy  projects 

47 https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/09242a36-a438-40fd-a7af-fe32e36cbd0e/library/46ce9fe8-838a-4d71-8dde-
9f4cd9976d3e/details?download=true 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(DS625,  Chinese  Taipei  —  Measure  Relating  to  Investments  in  Offshore  Wind 
Installations).  In  the  view  of  the  EU,  Taiwan’s  local  content  eligibility  and  award 
criteria  in  energy  generation  capacity  allocation  auctions  for  offshore  wind  farms 
discriminated  against  imported  goods  and  services.  Following  consultations,  in 
November 2024 the EU and Taiwan reached an understanding on how Taiwan would 
address the EU’s concerns going forward. The EU is monitoring the implementation 
of these commitments.  

•  On  23  September  2024,  the  EU  requested  dispute  settlement  consultations  with 
China at the WTO on the initiation of an anti-subsidy investigation against imports of 
certain dairy products from the European Union (DS628, China — Initiation of CVD 
Investigation  on  Imports  of  Certain  Dairy  Products). This  was the first  time the EU 
decided  to  challenge  an  investigation  at  initiation  stage.  The  EU’s  action  was 
prompted by an emerging pattern of China initiating trade defence measures, based on 
questionable allegations and insufficient evidence, within a short period of time. In so 
doing, the Commission is following through on its commitment to firmly defend the 
interests of the EU dairy industry and the Common Agricultural Policy against abusive 
proceedings.  

•  On  25  November  2024,  the  EU  requested  dispute  settlement  consultations  with 
China  at  the  WTO  on  provisional  anti-dumping  duties  imposed  by  China  on  EU 
brandy (DS631, China — Provisional Anti-dumping Duties on Brandy from the EU). 
Consultations  were  requested  because  the  EU  believes  the  provisional  measures  to 
breach  WTO  rules  as  China  based  them  on  insufficient  evidence  and  questionable 
allegations (in particular, on the existence of a threat of injury to its brandy industry 
and on the causal link between the alleged threat of injury and imports of brandy from 
the EU). 

•  On 20 January 2025, the EU requested dispute settlement consultations with China 
at  the  WTO  over  Chinese  court’s  practice  of  fixing  worldwide  royalty  rates  for 
standard essential patents without the consent of the patent holder (DS632,  China — 
Worldwide Licensing Terms for Standard Essential Patents). These practices prevent 
EU  companies  from  seizing  EU  courts  to  defend  their  IP  rights  and  pressures 
innovative  European  companies  into  lowering  royalty  rates  on  their  patents  on  a 
worldwide basis for the benefit of Chinese companies.  

Where the EU is confronted with delaying tactics or partner countries fail to comply with the 
expert panels’ conclusions the Commission may activate compliance proceedings, as done in 
DS577 (US – Ripe olives).  Following the failure by the US to implement the findings of the 
compliance  panel  report  of  14  March  2024,  the  EU,  on  14  November  2024,  requested  the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body to authorise the imposition of countermeasures as provided by 
Article 22.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Following the US request for an 
arbitration on the level of countermeasures proposed by the EU, a WTO panel was established 
on 29 November 2024 and the proceedings are currently ongoing.  

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally,  the  Commission  continued  efforts  to  ensure  the  full  implementation  of  panel 
rulings in the EU’s favour. To do so, it is making full use of the possibilities offered by the 
WTO dispute settlement scheme. In November 2024 the Commission launched a consultation 
under  its  strengthened  Enforcement  Regulation 48  on  the  effect  that  India’s  WTO 
inconsistent tariffs on certain ICT goods have on entities affected by the Indian measures or 
by possible EU commercial policy measures in response.  

IV.3  The Single Entry Point 

The  Commission’s  Single  Entry  Point  is  a  centralised  platform  for  companies,  trade 
associations  and  other  EU  stakeholders  to  efficiently  report  trade  barriers.  It  provides  a 
streamlined  process  for  assessing  complaints  and  has  now  received  more  than  180  external 
complaints  since  it  was  launched  five  years  ago.  The  vast  majority  (approximately  97%) 
concern  market  access  issues,  while  3%  relate  to  trade  and  sustainable  development  (TSD) 
matters. In 2024, the Single Entry Point again proved to be an effective instrument. 

Single Entry Point: How does it work? 

Complaints may be submitted using dedicated online forms on the Access2Markets platform. 
There  is  one  form  for  market  access  issues  and  another  for  TSD  matters  and  the  General 
Scheme  of  Preferences  (GSP).  These  forms  are  intended  to  provide  the  European 
Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  Trade  and  Economic  Security  (DG TRADE)  with 
sufficient  information  to  carry  out  a  preliminary  assessment  and  determine  the  appropriate 
course of action. 

In  December 2023,  DG  TRADE  updated  and  further  streamlined  the  Single  Entry  Point 
operational  guidelines 49,  introducing  an  indicative  timeline  of  120  working  days  for  the 
processing of TSD/GSP-related complaints. 

To clarify matters, pre-notification meetings may be organised with prospective complainants 
and  follow-up  discussions  may  be  held  once  complaints  have  been  submitted.  The 
Commission may also, if necessary, launch a complaint on its own initiative (ex officio). 

In  2024,  the  Single  Entry  Point  received  43 complaints  concerning  trade  barriers  in 
24 partner  countries,  spanning  all  geographical  regions.  As  in  previous  years,  the  largest 
number  of  complaints  (approximately  one  third)  concerned  the  region  comprising  the 
Southern  Neighbourhood,  the  Middle  East,  Türkiye,  Russia  and  Central  Asia.  This  was 
followed by the region comprising South and South-East Asia, Australia, and New Zealand, 
which accounted for 28% of complaints. Europe and the Eastern Neighbourhood50 accounted 

48 Regulation (EU) 2021/167 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 February 2021 amending 
Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 concerning the exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and enforcement 
of international trade rules (OJ L 49, 12.2.2021, p.1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/167/oj).  
49 https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/form-assets/operational_guidelines.pdf 
50 The Eastern Neighbourhood comprises six Eastern European and South Caucasus countries (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) which enjoy cooperation with the EU as part of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for  nearly  one  fifth  of  all  complaints.  Together  these  three  regions  accounted  for 
approximately 78% of all complaints received in 2024. 

Figure 10: Complaints submitted to the Single Entry Point in 2024 by region 

In 2024, the Single Entry Point received complaints from a broad range of stakeholders. The 
vast  majority  were  submitted  by  EU  businesses,  with  25  complaints  coming  from 
individual  companies,  10  from  European  trade  associations,  and  3  from  national  industry 
associations.  An  additional  four  complaints  were  submitted  by  EU  Member  States.  This  is 
consistent with the general trend since the Single Entry Point was launched. To date, 89% of 
all external complaints have come from EU businesses, with 52% from individual companies, 
29% from EU-level associations, and 8% from national associations. Member States account 
for the remaining 10%. 

So far, 48% of all complaints submitted have related to the identification of new or existing 
trade barriers. 

Not all complaints received in 2024 led to  the finding of a trade barrier. Furthermore, some 
complaints  were  not  taken  up  as  they  were  not  submitted  to  the  Single  Entry  Point  by  EU 
stakeholders  or  other  bodies  entitled  to  submit  complaints  in  accordance  with  the  operating 
guidelines. A number of complaints were not processed further because the Single Entry Point 
did  not  receive  sufficient  information  to  proceed  with  an  assessment.  In  addition,  some 
complaints concerned EU Member States and were therefore outside the scope of the Single 
Entry Point. Finally, some complaints were not registered as trade barriers as the Single Entry 

32 

 
 
 
 
Point  did  not  find  any  evidence  of  an  infringement  in  its  preliminary  assessment.  These 
complaints were closed without any further action. 

A practical example: Argentina – ceramic tiles 

Complaint:  At  the  end  of  2023,  the  Single  Entry  Point  received  a  complaint  concerning  a 
resolution  introduced  by Argentina establishing  a  new import certification scheme for  both 
domestically produced and imported ceramic tiles. 

Issue  reported:  The  scheme  required  manufacturers  to  have  a  third-party  conformity 
assessment carried out by the Argentine Institute of Standardisation and Certification (IRAM) 
before  they  could  place  their  products  on  the  market.  This  measure  was  regarded  as  an 
unnecessary obstacle for EU manufacturers who already manufacture their tiles according to a 
globally accepted self-certification standard which does not call for  a third-party conformity 
assessment.  The  scheme  therefore  imposed  a  significant  economic/administrative  burden  on 
EU companies wishing to compete on the Argentinian market. 

Action taken: Following joint efforts by the Commission, various Member States and the EU 
delegation in Buenos Aires, a meeting was held in March 2024 with the Argentinian Secretary 
of Commerce who conceded that the resolution placed an excessive burden on producers and 
put the final consumer in Argentina at risk of having to pay higher prices for ceramic tiles. 

Solution: On 30 August 2024, a new resolution (236/2024) was published which removed the 
requirements  for  importers.  Instead,  companies  that  are  required  to  certify  imports  of 
construction materials (including ceramic tiles) will be able to present a sworn declaration of 
compliance with  international  certification, which will be  deemed  equivalent  to  certification 
by  the  IRAM.  The  removal  of  this  barrier  is  estimated  to  be  worth  approximately 
EUR 16 million per year to EU exporters of ceramic tiles to Argentina. 

33