Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 October 2025 on the supervisory independence of Národná banka Slovenska and the prevention of conflicts of interest (CON/2025/32)
Date: 2025-10-20
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: legal basis

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 20 October 2025 

on the supervisory independence of Národná banka Slovenska and the prevention  

of conflicts of interest 

(CON/2025/32) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 18 September 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Finance 

of the Slovak Republic for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Banks and on amendments to 

certain laws 1 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of Council Decision 98/415/EC2, as the 

draft  law  relates  to  Národná  banka  Slovenska  (NBS)  and  the  specific  tasks  conferred  upon  the  ECB 

concerning  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  pursuant  to  Article  127(6)  of  the  Treaty.  In 

accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the 

Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The  main  purpose  of  the  draft  law  is  to  transpose  into  Slovak  law  the  amendments  to  Directive 

2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 3 introduced by Directive (EU) 2024/1619 

of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 4  (hereinafter  the  ‘CRD6’).  In  particular,  several 

provisions of the draft law seek to transpose Article 4a of Directive 2013/36/EU, which relates to the 

supervisory  independence  of  competent  authorities  and  the  prevention  of  conflicts  of  interest  in 

relation to the officials and employees of such authorities. 

1.2  The draft law provides that, in order to secure the independence of supervision and to avoid conflict 

of  interests,  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  draft  law  apply  to  (a)  the  head  of  the  financial  market 

supervision unit in the area of banking who is also a member of the Bank Board of NBS other than 

the Governor of NBS (hereinafter the ‘Head of Banking Supervision’) and (b) employees of NBS who 

1  

2 

3  

4  

Návrh zákona ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon č. 483/2001 Z. z. o bankách a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov 
v znení neskorších predpisov a ktorým sa menia a dopĺňajú niektoré zákony.  

Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions  and  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions,  amending  Directive  2002/87/EC  and  repealing 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj). 

Directive  (EU)  2024/1619  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  31  May  2024  amending  Directive 
2013/36/EU  as  regards  supervisory  powers,  sanctions,  third-country  branches,  and  environmental,  social  and 
governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj). 

 
 
 
 
 
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perform supervision in the field of banking (hereinafter together with the Head of Banking Supervision 

‘designated persons’) 5.  

1.3  The  draft  law  provides  that  the  total  term  of  office  of  the  Head  of  Banking  Supervision  must  not 

exceed 14 years, unless otherwise provided in the transitional provisions of the draft law6, i.e. if the 

person referred to in the relevant provision was appointed before 11 January 2026. 

1.4  The draft law provides that if the Head of Banking Supervision is removed from office, the respective 

decision will be published, unless the member objects to such publication 7. 

1.5  The draft law provides that designated persons must file a declaration on the prevention of conflicts 

of interest, including information on ownership of financial instruments 8 (as described in paragraph 

1.6), and any interests held by designated persons in the form of shares, bonds, or similar securities 

and  units  in  collective  investment  funds  pursuant  to  a  separate  regulation,  if  such  ownership  or 

holding  could  give  rise  to  concerns  about  conflicts  of  interest9.  This  is  without  prejudice  to  the 

provisions of special regulations 10. The declaration must be made as of the day preceding the day 

when the designated person became subject to the draft law11, and thereafter annually by 31 January 

of the calendar year concerned, according to the status as of the date on which that declaration was 

made 12. 

1.6  The draft law provides that in order to avoid conflicts of interest designated persons must not trade 

in financial instruments (a) issued by a credit institution supervised by NBS; (b) issued by a direct or 

indirect parent company of a credit institution supervised by NBS; (c) issued by a direct or indirect 

subsidiary of a credit institution supervised by NBS; (d) issued by a company that is an affiliate of a 

credit  institution  supervised  by  NBS,  its  direct  or  indirect  parent  company  or  its  direct  or  indirect 

subsidiary;  or  (e)  any  financial  instrument  the  value  of  which  is  linked  to  the  value  of  a  financial 

instrument as issued by the entities referred to in (a) to (d)13.  

1.7  The draft law provides for a few exemptions for designated persons 14 from the above prohibition on 

trading in financial instruments. More specifically, if the third party or collective investment entity does 

not invest predominantly in the financial instruments listed in paragraph 1.6, the prohibition does not 

apply to (a) trades in a financial instrument managed by a third party in the context of the provision 

of  a  portfolio  management  investment  service  in  accordance  with  a  separate  regulation,  and 

designated persons as the owner of that instrument cannot intervene directly or indirectly in portfolio 

management; or (b) investments in collective investment entities.  

5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  

11  
12  
13  
14  

See Article 6b(1), points (a) and (b), of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(2) of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(3) of the draft law. 

As set out in Article 6b(6) of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(4) of the draft law. 

The footnote to Article 6b(4) of the draft law refers, as an example, to Constitutional Law No 357/2004 Coll. on the 
protection of the public interest in the performance of the functions of public officials, as amended. 

See Article 6b(5) of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(5) of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(6) of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(8) to (10) of the draft law. 

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1.8  The draft law provides NBS with the possibility to require designated persons to sell or otherwise 

dispose of the financial instruments in their possession as of the date of taking office or acquired 

during the term of office, within a reasonable period of time, if the designated persons do not comply 

with the prohibition15. The draft law also provides designated persons with the possibility to request 

authorisation from NBS for the sale or other disposal of financial instruments in their possession as 

of the date of taking office 16. 

1.9  The draft law provides that designated persons must have a cooling-off period following the end of 

the  decision-making  in  a  supervisory  capacity  or  of  the  performance  of  supervision.  During  the 

cooling-off period designated persons must refrain from entering into any employment relationship 

with, or performing a gainful activity for, or entering into any contract for the provision of professional 

activities  with,  (a)  any  credit  institution  in  the  supervision  of  which  the  designated  persons  were 

directly  involved,  including  direct  or  indirect  parent  companies,  direct  or  indirect  subsidiaries,  or 

affiliates of such credit institution; (b) any persons providing services to any entity listed in point (a), 

except if the designated persons are excluded from participating in any provision of services to the 

credit institution listed in point (a) during the cooling-off period; or (c) any persons who promote or 

defend interests in relation to NBS in  matters for which the designated  persons were responsible 

during the performance of their duties. The cooling-off period starts on the day when the designated 

persons ended their decision-making in the supervisory capacity or the performance of supervision 

over the credit institutions referred to in point (a) 17.  

1.10  The draft law sets out different cooling-off periods for different categories of designated persons. For 

the  Head  of  Banking  Supervision  the  cooling-off  period  must  be  at  least  12  months  in  respect  of 

entities  listed  in  points (a)  and (b) of  paragraph 1.9.  For NBS banking supervisors the cooling-off 

period must be at least six months in respect of the same type of entities. However, for all designated 

persons the cooling-off period must be at least three months in respect of entities listed in point (c) 

of paragraph 1.918. 

1.11  The draft law provides that NBS may also apply a cooling-off period for designated persons when 

concluding an employment relationship, an employment contract or a contract for the provision of 

professional  activities  with  direct  competitors  of  a  credit  institution  in  the  supervision  of  which 

designated persons were directly involved, including direct or indirect parent companies, direct or 

indirect subsidiaries, or affiliates of such credit institution. For such cases, the length of the cooling-

off period must be at least six months for the Head of Banking Supervision, and at least three months 

for NBS banking supervisors19.  

1.12  The draft law provides that NBS may shorten the cooling-off period to a minimum of three months 

for NBS banking supervisors, if (a) the cooling-off period of a minimum of six months in relation to 

credit  institutions  in  the  supervision  of  which  NBS  banking  supervisors  were  directly  involved, 

including direct or indirect parent companies, direct or indirect subsidiaries, or affiliates of such credit 

15  
16  
17  
18  
19  

See Article 6b(8) and (9) of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(10) of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(11) and (12) of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(13) and (14) of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(15) of the draft law. 

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institution, could adversely restrict NBS in its ability to hire persons with adequate skills or skills to 

ensure the performance of supervision of banks, or (b) it has been proven that the cooling-off period 

is contrary to the Constitution or to special regulations 20. 

1.13  The  draft  law  entitles  NBS  to  take  measures  to  ensure  that  from  the  beginning  of  the  cooling-off 

period, designated persons do not have access to any information pursuant to a separate regulation 

concerning credit institutions in the supervision of which designated persons were directly involved, 

including direct or indirect parent companies, direct or indirect subsidiaries, or affiliates of such credit 

institution.  If,  despite  the  measures  taken  by  NBS,  designated  persons  gain  access  to  such 

information during the cooling-off period, the cooling-off period restarts from the date following the 

day on which NBS became aware of designated persons having gained access to such information21. 

1.14  The draft law provides that, during the cooling-off period, designated persons are entitled to monetary 

compensation from NBS for a period when they are not in an employment relationship or other similar 

relationship  with  NBS,  meet  the  conditions  set  out  in  the  draft  law22  and  have  not  misused  the 

information  accessed  pursuant  to  a  separate  regulation  concerning  a  credit  institution  in  the 

supervision of which the designated persons were directly involved, including direct or indirect parent 

companies, direct or indirect subsidiaries, or affiliates of such credit institution. Where the relevant 

cooling-off period is restored, the monetary compensation must be paid to such person only within 

the scope of the original cooling-off period23. The amount of the monetary compensation is to be set 

out in a separate regulation24.  

2. 

General observations  

2.1  Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and 

of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) address the independence of 

central banks in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 25, stipulating that when exercising 

the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute 

of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank (NCB), nor any member of their decision-

making bodies, are to seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, 

from  any  government  of  a  Member  State  or  from  any  other  body.  This  independence  was  thus 

entrusted to the ECB and NBS, as an NCB, by primary law. 

2.2  Based on considerations of central bank independence, and in order to ensure the independence of 

NCBs such as NBS when  exercising the  powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred 

upon  them  by  the  Treaties  and  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  the  ECB  has  established  an  ethics 

framework. This includes the ECB’s Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials 26 (hereinafter the 

20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  

26  

See Article 6b(16) of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(17) of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(11) of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(18), second sentence, of the draft law. 

See Article 6b(18) and (19) of the draft law. 

Regarding the doctrine of the ECB as to the independence and its ramifications, see the ECB Convergence Report 
2025, Section 2.2. Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 

Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3). 

4 

 
 
 
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‘Single Code’), which applies, among others, to the members of the Governing Council of the ECB 

when  exercising  their  functions  as  members  of  a  high-level  ECB  body,  and  Guideline  (EU) 
[2021/2253] of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/49) 27, which is addressed to the NCBs of the 

Eurosystem and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of the decision-making 

bodies and staff of the NCBs. 

2.3  The NCBs, as an integral part of the ESCB, must act in accordance with the guidelines of the ECB28. 

Hence,  national  legislation  is  without  prejudice  to  the  ethics  framework  which  the  ECB  has 

established to ensure the independence of the ECB and the NCBs when exercising the powers and 

carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, 

as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. 

2.4  Furthermore,  Article  19  of  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/2013 29  (hereinafter  the  ‘SSM 

Regulation’) stipulates that when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation, the 

ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the SSM must act independently. Article 

31(3)  of  the  SSM  Regulation  furthermore  requires  the  ECB,  in  cooperation  with  the  national 

competent authorities, to: (a) establish and maintain comprehensive and formal procedures including 

ethics procedures and proportionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of 

interest  resulting  from  subsequent  employment  within  two  years  of  members  of  the  Supervisory 

Board; and (b) provide for appropriate disclosures. Those procedures are without prejudice to the 

application of stricter national rules 30. The legal basis for these provisions of the SSM Regulation is 

Article 127(6) of the Treaty.  

2.5 

In  view  of  this  independence  and  these  requirements  of  the  SSM  Regulation,  the  ECB  has 

established an ethics framework to ensure the independence of national competent authorities, such 

as NBS, when assisting the ECB in carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation. 

This ethics framework includes the Single Code, which applies, among others, to the members of 

the Supervisory Board of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB 

body,  and  Guideline  (EU)  2021/2256  of  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB/2021/50)31,  which  is 

addressed  to  the  national  competent  authorities  of  the  SSM  and  establishes  ethics  requirements 

applicable  to  the  members  of  their  bodies  and  the  members  of  staff  of  the  national  competent 

authorities. In view of the responsibility of the ECB for the effective and consistent functioning of the 

SSM32, 

the  national  competent  authorities  must  comply  with  Guideline  (EU)  2021/2256 

(ECB/2021/50). 

27  

28  
29  

30  

31  

32  

Guideline  (EU)  [2021/2253]  of  the  European  Central  Bank  of  2  November  2021  laying  down  the  principles  of  the 
Eurosystem 
7, 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2253/oj). 

(ECB/2021/49) 

17.12.2021, 

Framework 

Ethics 

454, 

(OJ 

p. 

L 

See Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  (OJ  L  287,  29.10.2013,  p.  63,  ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). 

See  paragraph  2.4  of  Opinion  CON/2025/23  and  paragraph  2.4  of  Opinion  CON/2025/27.  All  ECB  opinions  are 
published on EUR-Lex. 

Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics 
Framework 
the  Single  Supervisory  Mechanism  (ECB/2021/50)  (OJ  L  454,  17.12.2021,  p.  21,  ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2256/oj). 

for 

See Article 6(1) of the SSM Regulation. 

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2.6 

In contrast to the ethics framework, which is  ultimately based on Article 127(6)  of the Treaty, the 

CRD6, including its provision on supervisory independence of competent authorities 33, is based on 

Article 53(1) of the Treaty. A legal act based on this provision cannot alter the rights and obligations 

of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by 

the  SSM Regulation based on  Article  127(6) of the Treaty. It follows from settled case-law of the 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union34  that  the  different  legal  bases,  namely  Article  53(1)  and 

Article 127(6) of the Treaty, cannot be combined as the  legal  basis for a  legal act, in view  of the 

different procedures involved. In particular, the measures adopted under Article 53(1) of the Treaty 

are adopted by  the  European Parliament  and the Council, acting  in  accordance with the ordinary 

legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (and, if relevant, the 

ECB  in  accordance  with  Articles  127(4)  and  282(5)  of  the  Treaty).  By  contrast,  the  regulations 

adopted under Article 127(6) of the Treaty are adopted by the Council alone, in a special legislative 

procedure in which the Council acts unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament and the 

ECB 35. 

2.7  Hence, the amendments made by the CRD6 are without prejudice to the ethics framework which the 

ECB has established to ensure the independence of the national competent authorities in the context 

of  the  SSM,  as  both  frameworks  have  their  own  scope  and  legal  basis.  The  Union  legislator 

acknowledged  this  through  the  CRD6’s  amendments  to  Directive  2013/36/EU,  which  provide  that 

Article 4a(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the national 

competent authorities pursuant to the SSM established by the SSM Regulation36. For the avoidance 

of doubt, the national legislator may wish to clarify this within the text of the draft law. From an ECB 

perspective,  the  provisions  from  the  CRD6  may  nevertheless  serve  as  guidance  for  establishing 

safeguards for the independence of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying 

out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation37. 

3. 

Specific observations  

3.1  The draft law proposes to limit the maximum term of office of the Head of Banking Supervision to 14 

years, whereas currently he or she may be appointed to unlimited six-year terms 38. In this context, 

the ECB highlights that in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, statutes of NCBs 

must provide for a minimum term of office of five years for a Governor. This does not preclude longer 

terms of office. Applying the rules regarding the term of office of Governors to other members of the 

decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks also safeguards 

33  
34  

35  
36  

37  
38  

See Article 1, point (4), of the CRD6, which inserts Article 4a in Directive 2013/36/EU. 

See  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  29  April  2004,  Commission  v  Council,  C-338/01,  ECLI:EU:C:2004:253, 
paragraphs 57 and 58; and judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council, 
C-178/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, paragraphs 43 to 60. 

See paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/23 and paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/27.  

See  Article 4a(2),  fourth subparagraph, of  Directive 2013/36/EU,  as  inserted by  the  CRD6.  This acknowledgement 
refers directly to the dismissal requirements included in Article 4a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive 2013/36/EU, 
as inserted by the CRD6. 

See paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2025/23 and paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2025/27. 

Article 7(4) of Law No 566/1992 Coll. on Národná banka Slovenska, as amended (hereinafter the ‘Law on NBS’). 
The term of office of the Governor and Vice-Governors is limited to two six-year terms. 

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the  personal  independence  of  those  persons 39.  The  application  of  the  same  rules  regarding  the 

minimum term  of office to  both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly 

pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ alongside other members who have equivalent 

voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks40, as 

is the case in NBS. 

3.2  As  noted  in  paragraph  1.3,  under  the  draft  law  the  total  term  of  office  of  the  Head  of  Banking 

Supervision must not  exceed 14 years. The term of  office for  the members of  the  Bank Board  of 

NBS, including the Head of Banking Supervision, is six years in line with the Law on NBS. The ECB 

understands that in practice the maximum term of office of 14 years as set out in the draft law is 

unlikely to be reached very often, due to the combination of (a) the term of office of six years of the 

members of the Bank Board of NBS applicable under the Law on NBS; and (b) the minimum term of 

office  of  five  years  applicable  to  the  members  of  the  Bank  Board  of  NBS,  including  the  Head  of 

Banking Supervision, under the Statute of the ESCB, as specified in paragraph 3.1. Consequently, 

if the Head of Banking Supervision serves two full six-year terms, the dual requirements that his or 

her term must not exceed 14 years and that he or she must serve a minimum term of office of five 

years could only be complied with by ensuring that he or she cannot be reappointed to serve a further 

term  of  office.  Based  on  the  above,  the  ECB  understands  that  the  Head  of  Banking  Supervision 

cannot be appointed as a member of the Bank Board of NBS if, during the term of office for which he 

or she would have been appointed, the performance of his or her duties as a member of the Bank 

Board of NBS would exceed 14 years, taking into account all previous terms of office41. 

3.3  The  CRD6  provides  that  Member  States  must  ensure  that  members  of  a  competent  authority’s 

governance body can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been 

convicted  of  a  serious  criminal  offence 42.  Under  the  Law  on  NBS,  the  Governor,  the  Deputy 

Governors  and  the  other  members  of  the  Bank  Board  of  NBS  can  only  be  dismissed  prior  to  the 

expiration of their term of office if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of 

their duties or if they have been found guilty of serious misconduct within the meaning of Article 14.2, 

of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB43.  Against  this  background,  the  ECB  understands  that  the  current 

provisions of the  Law on NBS regulating the appointment and dismissal of members of the  Bank 

Board of NBS44 are consistent with the principles of the CRD6 and that, therefore, it is not necessary 

for the draft law to include any provisions in this respect. Furthermore, the ECB understands that the 

draft  law  only  supplements  the  Law  on  NBS  by  adding  new  provisions  concerning  the  public 

disclosure of grounds for dismissal that transpose the amendments to that effect made by the CRD6 

to Directive 2013/36/EU45. 

39  

40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  

Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, which address the independence of central banks in 
the ESCB, refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. 

See the ECB Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26. 

See, for example, paragraph 1.3 of Opinion CON/2025/27. 

See Article 4a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive 2013/36/EU, as inserted by the CRD6. 

See Article 7(9) of the Law on NBS. 

See Article 7 of the Law on NBS. 

See  Article  4a(2),  second  subparagraph,  second  and  third  sentences,  of  Directive  2013/36/EU,  as  inserted  by  the 
CRD6. 

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3.4 

In this context, the ECB highlights that, pursuant to Article 14.2, second paragraph, first sentence, of 

the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  ‘a  Governor  may  be  relieved  from  office  only  if  he  no  longer  fulfils  the 

conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct’. 

Applying the same rules regarding the grounds for relieving Governors from office to other members 

of  the  decision-making  bodies  of  NCBs  involved  in  the  performance  of  ESCB-related  tasks  also 

safeguards  the  personal  independence  of  those  persons46.  The  application  of  the  same  rules 

regarding  dismissal  to  both  Governors  and  members  of  decision-making  bodies  is  particularly 

pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ with other members who have equivalent voting 

rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks47, as is the 

case in NBS. The ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Law on NBS are consistent with 

the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

3.5  The minimum 12-month cooling-off period applicable to the Head of Banking Supervision under the 

draft law 48 is in line with the requirements of the Single Code. In this respect, the ECB understands 

that under the draft law NBS could apply a cooling-off period of a maximum of two years when such 

an extended period is applied based on the Single Code49.  

3.6 

In addition, the Single Code sets limits on the establishment of post-employment relationships, not 

only  directly  with  significant  or  less  significant  credit  institutions,  but  also  with  ‘other  financial 

institutions’ or ‘any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy 

for the ECB or for any [supervised] institution’ 50. In contrast, the categories of entities in respect of 

which a cooling-off period is applied, extends only to those listed in paragraph 1.9 of this opinion, i.e. 

‘other  financial  institutions’  or  entities  ‘engaged  in  lobbying  in  relation  to  the  ECB,  or  consultancy 

and/or advocacy for the ECB of for any [supervised] institution’ do not seem to be covered by the 

relevant provisions of the draft law51. In any event, the ECB notes further that the draft law must be 

interpreted without prejudice to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time 52. 

3.7  The prohibition on the trading by designated persons of certain financial instruments is less restrictive 

as  regards  the  relevant  entities  than  the  requirements  of  the  Eurosystem53  and  SSM54  Ethics 

Frameworks which the ECB has established and the requirements of the Single Code 55 insofar as it 

limits the prohibition to financial instruments issued by, or referring to, credit institutions supervised 

by  NBS  and  the  direct  or  indirect  parent  companies,  subsidiaries,  or  affiliates  of  such  credit 

46  

47  
48  
49  

50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  

Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of 
NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. 

See the ECB Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26. 

See Article 6b(13) of the draft law. 

See Article 17.3, point (b), of the Single Code; see also paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion CON/2025/19 and paragraph 3.3 
of Opinion CON/2025/23.50  
See Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the Single Code. 
See Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the Single Code. 

See Article 6b(11) of the draft law. 

See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2025/23. 

See Article 11 of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49). 

See Article 11 of Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 (ECB/2021/50). 

See Article 16 of the Single Code. 

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institutions 56, and does not extend to other regulated entities57. The ECB highlights that the draft law 

should  be  without  prejudice  to  the  Eurosystem  and  SSM  Ethics  Frameworks  which  the  ECB  has 

established and to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time, and must not prevent 

the possibility of extending such prohibition to financial instruments issued by regulated entities to 

members of the Bank Board of NBS and NBS employees. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 October 2025. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

56  
57  

See Article 6b(6) of the draft law. 

As  defined  in  Article  2(8)  of  Guideline  (EU)  [2021/2253]  (ECB/2021/49);  Article  2(7)  of  Guideline  (EU)  2021/2256 
(ECB/2021/50). 

9