JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030
Date: 2025-10-16
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU action, EU-NATO cooperation, European defence policy, European security, Ukraine, defence expenditure, defence industry, investment, military equipment, peacekeeping

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 16.10.2025  JOIN(2025) 27 final  JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030  
 
 
1 – Introduction 

What Europe and its Member States do for the rest of this decade will shape the security 
of  the  continent  for  the  whole  century.  By  2030,  Europe  needs  a  sufficiently  strong 
European defence posture to credibly deter its adversaries and respond to any aggression. 
To  be  “2030  ready”,  Europe  needs  to move  now.  This  is  why,  at  the June  European 
Council,  EU  Heads  of  State  or  Government  invited  the  Commission  and  the  High 
Representative “to present a roadmap” “to review progress [on the White Paper] at its 
October  2025  meeting  and  discuss  the  next  steps  in  the  implementation  of  its  defence 
readiness objective.”  

This  Roadmap  translates  the  White  Paper  and  the  guidance  provided  by  the  European 
Council  into  clear  objectives,  milestones  with  concrete  dates  for  deliverables,  and 
indicators to track progress. It proposes European flagship where urgency is greatest, to 
focus efforts, in accordance with international commitments, including NATO targets.   

Defence readiness entails developing and acquiring the capabilities that are needed for 
modern warfare. It means ensuring that Europe has a defence industrial base that gives it 
a strategic advantage and the independence needed. And it means being ready to deliver 
cutting-edge innovation and fast, mass production at critical times.   

The need to speed up and ramp up efforts reflects the increasing dangers of today, as well 
as the evolving threat landscape which Europe and its Member States must contend with, 
adapt  to,  and  prepare  for.  This  starts  with  Russia’s  unprovoked,  full-scale  military 
aggression  against  Ukraine,  which  is  reaching  new  heights  of  brutality  and  violence. 
Reckless  provocations  and  acts  of  hybrid  warfare  against  Member  States,  from  cyber-
attacks  to  violation  of  air  space  are  increasing.  Russia  has  militarised  its  economy  and 
society. In 2025, its declared defence budget will surpass 7% of GDP. Around 40% of its 
budget  in  2025  is  for  security  and  defence.  This  militarised  Russia  poses  a  persistent 
threat to European security for the foreseeable future. 

Europe’s readiness must be rooted in the wider global context with a 360° approach. We 
cannot be blind to threats from other parts of the world. The international order is being 
challenged.  Strategic  competition 
immediate  and  wider 
neighbourhood, but also far beyond. From Gaza and the Middle East to several latent or 
open  conflicts  in  Africa,  from  increasing  tensions  in  the  Asia-Pacific  to  the  Arctic, 
flashpoints are multiplying. Authoritarian states are increasingly interfering in our societies 
and economies. Traditional allies and partners are shifting their focus to other regions of 
the world. Finally, we must contain horizontal threats such as terrorism, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and the security consequences of climate change.  

increasing 

in  our 

is 

To ensure peace through deterrence, Europe’s defence posture and capabilities must 
also  be  ready  for  the  battlefields  of  tomorrow,  in  line  with  the  changing  nature  of 
warfare.  Technological  innovation  and  iteration  –  developed  at  speed  and  scale  and 
building on dual-use solutions – will dictate strength on the battlefield. Those that develop 
their own technologies will be the strongest and least dependent, notably for the critical 
systems of modern warfare, such as drones, satellites or autonomous vehicles.  Ukraine 
remains  Europe’s  first  line  of  defence  and  is  an  integral  part  of  Europe’s  defence  and 
security architecture, and the EU will continue the support and intensified cooperation with 
Ukraine.  

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Member States must urgently equip themselves with an independent interoperable 
strategic capacity, collectively developed and maintained, capable of responding in real 
time to any threats to Europe’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The EU and its Member 
States must be able to act independently and take responsibility for their own defence and 
security without relying too much on others. They must contribute positively to global and 
transatlantic security, in close partnership with NATO. A Europe that is readier to ensure 
its own defence is a Europe more coordinated with NATO and more able to take its fair 
share in the transatlantic alliance. In all the areas of this Roadmap, EU-NATO cooperation 
is key, as the transatlantic alliance remains an indispensable pillar of the security of the 
EU.  It  will  ensure  maximum  coherence  and  mutual  reinforcement,  while  avoiding 
unnecessary duplications. 

This should build on the work already started. Europe has turned the corner on decades 
of under-investment in defence.  Member States increased defence budgets  from  EUR 
218 billion in  2021 to  EUR  343 billion  in  2024, projected to  reach  EUR  392 billion in 
2025.  Defence  investments  rose  by  42%  in  2024,  with  EUR  106  billion  allocated,  and 
procurement  of  new  equipment  reached  EUR  88  billion.  New  EU  instruments  were 
presented, like the European Defence Industry Programme, and a new strategic framework 
was provided with the White Paper for Defence Readiness.  The ReArm  Europe agenda 
will  mobilise  up  to  EUR  800  billion  for  defence,  including  through  new  funding 
instruments such as SAFE. The spending commitments undertaken by Allies at the June 
2025 NATO Summit to reach the new core defence spending target of 3.5% GDP by 2035 
will require sustained expenditure in the next decade of at least additional EUR 288 billion 
each  year.  This  increased  spending  must  pay  off  in  terms  of  jobs,  innovation  and 
competitiveness in Europe.  

Member States are and will remain sovereign for their national security and defence. 
They are responsible for defining the capability objectives required to ensure the readiness 
of  their  national  armed  forces  so  that  they  can  fulfil  their  strategic-military  missions, 
including  those  undertaken  within  NATO.  Their  respective  national  objectives  and  the 
associated timelines for achieving them are a sovereign decision.  

At the same time, the complex threat landscape points to the need for Member States to 
act together, rather than fragmenting efforts across uncoordinated national initiatives. So 
far,  still  less  than  50%  of  defence  equipment  is  procured  within  the  EU,  and 
overwhelmingly at a national level while non-European suppliers have gained in market 
share.  

Therefore, there is a clear need to invest more, invest together and invest European.  

2 – What does defence readiness mean?  

Achieving full defence readiness means that Member States’ Armed Forces can anticipate, 
prepare for and be able to respond to any defence-related crisis, including high intensity 
warfare.  It  requires  well-equipped  and  resourced  armed  forces  that  are  coherent  and 
interoperable, adequate training and a doctrine for the use of military force.  

In a nutshell, Europe’s readiness demands that collectively it reaches the capability targets 
based on Member States’ undertaken commitments, including within NATO.   

It also depends on a strong, resilient and innovative industrial and technological European 
industrial base. This in turn needs the right regulatory framework, a continent-scale market, 

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increased  military  mobility,  more  innovation  and  skills,  and  an  expanded  network  of 
defence partnerships with allies and partners. In a broader sense, defence readiness further 
requires a robust enabling civilian environment, based on resilient societies, well-prepared 
and  informed  citizens,  and  enhanced  civil-military  cooperation1.  While  focusing  on 
capabilities,  this  Roadmap  also  addresses  these  other  essential  conditions  for  Europe’s 
defence readiness. 

It aims to bring together the work undertaken by Member States at national, multinational 
and EU-levels, and the processes launched by the Commission through ongoing and new 
defence-related instruments. 

3 – Closing Europe’s capability gaps by 2030: key steps and milestones 

At  the  core  of  the  readiness  objective  is  ensuring  that  Europe  has  the  full  spectrum 
capabilities needed to deter any aggression and to defend its borders by land, air and sea, 
as well as its networks and assets in cyber and outer space. Member States have identified 
the following initial priority capability areas: 

Air & 
missile 
defence 

Strategic 
enablers 

Military 
Mobility 

Artillery 
systems 

Cyber, AI, 
electronic 
warfare 

Missile & 
Ammuni-
tion 

Drones & 
counter-
drones 

Ground 
Combat 

Maritime 

Defining and tracking Member States operational needs  

Delivering  on  the  joint  objective  of  defence  readiness  by  2030  requires  a  systemic 
approach.  Maximum  interoperability  and  complementarity  of  the  military  capabilities 
acquired are essential. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) is carrying out a classified overview 
of the current state of play of Member States’ capabilities and objectives.  This includes 
the  priority  capability  areas  and  takes  into  account  NATO  targets  as  well  as  Ukraine’s 
needs. The overview will deliver quantitative insights on the existing capability shortfalls 
across the full spectrum of military operations, including territorial defence.  

The overview will be updated on a yearly basis and will be integrated into the Coordinated 
Annual  Review  on  Defence  prepared  by  the  European  Defence  Agency  (EDA)  and 
supported  by  the  EUMS.  This  will  ensure  the  link  between  the  analysis  of  military 
capability shortfalls and  the priority capability areas  for procurement and development. 
Chiefs of Defence Staffs will regularly review in a classified setting the outcome of the 
analysis to inform further work by National Armament Directors and Capability Directors 
on proposed solutions. It is therefore key that Member States continue to share aggregate 

1  The  Preparedness  Union  Strategy  (JOIN(2025)  130:  Joint  Communication  on  the  Preparedness  Union 

Strategy, 26 March 2025) therefore complements this Roadmap. 

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information  on  their  objectives  and  progress  with  the  EUMS.  While  classified,  this 
information will allow collective progress to be monitored in line with the Readiness 2030 
Roadmap.  

Building  on  this  process,  the  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  will  present  an 
Annual Defence Readiness Report to each October European Council. It will focus on the 
aggregate situation at EU level for the agreed priority capability areas, and the other issues 
set out in this Roadmap. The Report will provide an update on collective progress across 
key indicators which are proposed in this Roadmap and will be consulted with Member 
States.  The  Report  will  allow  Leaders  to  review  collective  progress  on  this  basis  and 
provide  strategic  guidance  to  Defence  Ministers’  discussions  in  the  Foreign  Affairs 
Council in Defence format. 

Capability development through Member States Capability Coalitions 

The key for Europe’s defence readiness is to close the existing critical capability shortfalls 
by developing and procuring defence capabilities in all the agreed priority areas. 

For this, Member States should swiftly complete the ongoing process of forming Member 
States Capability Coalitions. They should detail which Member States will tackle which 
shortfalls  and  agree  on  the  governance  of  each  coalition,  the  role  of  lead  and  co-lead 
nations, the capability objectives and the collaborative projects to be launched to achieve 
them. Within these coalitions, Member States will always remain sovereign in deciding 
their  role  and  contribution.  Building  on  existing  EDA-led  Priority  Implementation 
Roadmaps2, each capability coalition should set out specific objectives and timelines.  

Capability Coalitions should remain open to other Member States  that wish to join at a 
later stage. Co-leadership should be encouraged to ensure Member States’ ownership and 
appropriate burden-sharing. Each coalition may use one or several of the tools available in 
EDIP3 to trigger targeted EU support for flagship projects, as well as possible new PESCO 
projects. Horizontal guidelines could facilitate the work of these coalitions, regarding the 
role of lead nations, relations between co-leaders if needed, membership, implementation 
plan, link with the EU actors and reporting mechanism.  

Existing processes should be used as much as possible. Under Member States’ guidance, 
the EDA will play a central  role  to  facilitate the Coalition process,  notably through the 
Capability expert groups. The EUMS work on capability shortfalls will  also inform the 
process.  The  Commission  will  ensure  the  link  between  coalitions  and  EU  funding 
instruments  and  policies.  The  Foreign  Affairs  Council  in  Defence  format  will  ensure 
political  steer.  Given  the  urgency,  Member  States  should  report  by  early  2026  to  the 
Council. 

The rapid mobilisation of the new SAFE Instrument and other EU and national tools will 
be  vital  to  ensure  the  timely  procurement  of  the  most  important  capabilities  within  the 
coalitions  –  jointly  as  much  as  possible.  This  requires  working  at  speed,  as  the  SAFE 
Regulation sets out tight deadlines, which must be respected to remain on course for 2030.  

2 Each of the 22 areas identified in the Capability Development Priorities (November 2023) has a roadmap.   

3  E.g.  European  Defence  Project  of  Common  Interest  (EDPCI)  or  Structures  for  European  Armament 

Programmes (SEAP) when in force. 

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A  crucial  variable  will  be  the  degree  to  which  Member  States  can  coordinate  needs, 
aggregate  demand  and  organise  joint  procurement.  Defence  procurement  remains 
overwhelmingly  national.  This  leads  to  fragmentation,  cost-inflation  and  lack  of 
interoperability.  In  2007,  Member  States  agreed  to  dedicate  35%  of  their  defence 
investment  to  collaborative  procurement4.  Yet,  it  remains  below  20%.  Increasingly 
gearing  defence  investment  towards  joint  procurement  will  be  a  key  factor  for 
readiness,  as  demand  aggregation  and  economies  of  scale  will  help  ramp  up  European 
defence  industry  production  capacity  and  foster  interoperability.  Aggregating  European 
demand  will  lower  costs  by  avoiding  that  Member  States  outbid  each  other  and  will 
improve  their  overall  purchasing  power.  It  will  also  enhance  scale  effects  and  support 
ongoing  efforts  to  collectively  secure  and  ramp-up  key  production  nodes  and  supply 
chains.  

Objectives: 

It is proposed that Member States should collectively fill capability shortfalls by 2030. In 
addition, the share of joint procurement should converge towards the agreed 35% target 
and defence investment procured from the EDTIB should reach the political target of at 
least 55% of the total investment. 

Milestones:  

1.  Set up Capability Coalitions in all priority areas, decide on lead and co-lead nations, 

and on respective implementation plans until 2030 – by Q1 2026  

2.  Collect initial data on EU’s defence industrial capacity in the priority capability areas, 

supported by the Commission as appropriate – by mid-2026 
3.  Launch projects in all priority areas within the first half of 2026 
4.  Organise at least 40% of defence procurement as joint procurement – by end 2027 
5.  Ensure that projects,  contracts  and financing  are  in  place to close  critical capability 

shortfalls in the prioritised areas – by end 2028 

6.  Receive all SAFE-funded procurements, contributing to close all capability shortfalls 

in the prioritised areas – by end 2030 

Indicators: 

It  is  proposed  that  the  Annual  Defence  Readiness  Report  monitors  the  evolution  of 
collective EU Military shortfalls per priority capability area (compared to previous year) 
and the number of projects launched and capabilities procured per priority area, based on 
information provided by the EUMS and EDA. 

4 – Launching European Readiness Flagships  

While progress is needed across all the defence capabilities areas, there is an urgent need 
to invest massively and in a coordinated manner in pan-European projects that will shield 
Europe as a whole against those pressing threats.  

Therefore, the Commission and the HRVP propose a set of initial European Readiness 
Flagships that are pan-European by nature. They will benefit the security of Europe as a 

4 Within the European Defence Agency. In 2017, it became a PESCO more binding commitment.   

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whole  and  will  be  mutually  reinforcing:  the  European  Drone  Defence  Initiative,  the 
Eastern Flank Watch, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield. 

They will be open to all Member States who want to participate. Flagships are of a cross-
cutting nature and imply progress in several capability areas and in sectors beyond core 
defence. Protection of critical infrastructure, border management and internal security will 
be of particular importance.  

Member States will decide on these flagships, as well as on possible additional ones (e.g. 
cyber, maritime…). They will be drivers of these initiatives, agreeing as they see fit on the 
concrete  objectives,  task  distribution,  national  budgets  funds’  allocation,  and  the  most 
appropriate framework to achieve them.  

The  Commission  will  act  as  a  facilitator,  providing  a  “one-stop-shop”  service  to  give 
technical assistance and advice to Member States on how to link national actions with its 
available  tools  and  funding  opportunities  (including  regional  funds),  while  ensuring 
consistency and continuity among  the different  work strands.  The High Representative, 
through EEAS, EUMS and EDA, will provide advice to Member States and ensure that 
Flagships support agreed priority capabilities areas, are aligned with long term-capability 
development objectives and are coherent with NATO military plans. 

By Spring 2026 participating Member States should agree on the appropriate coordination 
arrangement, with support from the Commission, the High Representative and other EU 
actors,  including  the  European  Defence  Agency.  Progress  on  each  flagship  will  be 
monitored in the Annual Defence Readiness Report.   

The European Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch 

Recent repeated violations of the airspace of EU Member States have shown the urgency 
of creating a flexible, agile and state of the art European capability to counter unmanned 
aerial vehicles. While the Eastern border Member States face the greatest direct threat from 
Russia  and  Belarus,  such  a  threat  can  reach  any  Member  State,  as  shown  by  recent 
incidents.  

The European Drone Defence Initiative will be designed with a 360° approach, as a multi-
layered, technologically advanced system with interoperable counter-drone capabilities for 
detection,  tracking,  and  neutralisation,  as  well  as  capabilities  to  hit  ground  targets  by 
leveraging drone technology for precision strikes. The counter drone capacity should be 
fully interoperable and connected among Member States providing European situational 
awareness and ability to act together and secure critical infrastructure together with NATO.  

These European anti-drone capabilities should build on the lessons learned from Ukraine 
about the key value of creating innovative drone and counter-drone ecosystems, linking 
R&D  with  production,  and  relying  on  scalable  production  capacity  and  continuous 
technological  development.  This  is  Europe’s  opportunity  to  learn  the  Ukrainian  way  to 
conduct military tech innovation, and it will be linked to the proposed Drone Alliance with 
Ukraine. The counter-drone network will be adaptable for civ-mil and dual use purposes 
and  help  deal  with  non-defence  related  threats  or  other  hazards  common  to  every  EU 
border. This includes border protection, weaponisation of migration, protection of critical 
infrastructure and transnational organised crime.  

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Anti-drone capabilities will form a core component of the Eastern Flank Watch flagship, 
which aims to build-up the capacity of Member States on the Eastern border to face a wide 
range of threats, including also hybrid operations, Russia’s shadow fleet and the risk of 
armed  aggression.  It  aims  to  fortify  the  EU’s  Eastern  borders  across  land,  air  and  sea, 
contributing to the security of the whole Union.   

The Eastern Flank Watch will integrate the air defence and counter-drone systems with a 
set  of ground defence systems with maritime security  in  the Baltic and Black Seas and 
systems  for  increased  situational  awareness,  as  well  as  internal  security  and  border 
management. The Eastern Flank Watch should be fully aligned with the EU’s Black Sea 
Maritime  Security  Hub  and  NATO’s  integrated  command  and  control  structure,  and 
complementary to Operation Eastern Sentry, Baltic Air Policing, and the Forward Presence 
forces. It will help develop with maximum urgency elements which will be expanded and 
integrated in a broader project at European scale. 

Objectives:  

It is proposed to aim to establish a comprehensive European border defence capability with 
multi-domain  surveillance  systems,  drone  and  counter-drone  capabilities,  electronic 
warfare capabilities, precision strike systems, and responsive operational coordination. All 
in close cooperation with NATO and complementary with its regional plans for territorial 
defence. An Eastern Flank Watch should be developed in all the Member States along the 
EU’s Eastern border, including taking into account the land and sea border with Russia 
and Belarus, to contribute to ramp up European defence.  

Milestones:  

1.  EUCO to endorse the European Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch 

as priority flagships - by end 2025 

2.  European Drone Defence Initiative and Eastern Flank Watch launched – Q1 2026 
3.  First EDIP calls for production scaling and support to common procurement. First pre-
financing payments in the SAFE framework for the projects part of the Flagships – 
Q1 2026 

4.  European Drone Defence Initiative and Eastern Flank Watch initial capacity – by end 

2026 

5.  European Drone Defence Initiative fully functional – by end 2027 
6.  Eastern Flank Watch functional – by end 2028 

While the Eastern Flank Watch and the European Drone Defence are the most urgent, work 
should  accelerate  to  develop  a  European  Air  Shield  to  achieve  an  integrated,  multi-
layered  air  and  missile  defence  protection  for  Member  States,  fully  interoperable  with 
NATO’s Command and Control system, as well as on a European Space Shield to ensure 
the protection and resilience of space assets and services. 

European Air Shield 

The integrated European Air Shield Flagship will protect Member States’ airspace and 
state  functions.  EU  programmes  will  support  Member  States  to  achieve  an  integrated, 
multi-layered  air  and  missile  defence  shield,  including  necessary  sensors,  that  protects 
against the full spectrum of air threats and is fully interoperable with NATO’s Command 
and Control system. It will help Member States’ Armed Forces reduce dependencies and 
support Allies in achieving their NATO targets. 
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Objective:  

It is proposed to create a European Air Shield to cover the entire Air and Missile Defence 
spectrum  that  is  fully  interoperable  with  NATO  Command  and  control  system  and 
doctrine.  

Milestones:  

1.  EUCO to endorse the European Air Shield as a priority flagship – by end 2025 
2.  European Air Shield launched - Q2 2026 
3.  EDF and EDIP work programmes to prioritise Air and Missile Defence related actions 

– by end 2026 

European Space Shield 

The European Space Shield is key to enhance Member States’ defence capabilities and 
ensure the protection and resilience of space assets and services against growing threats 
and to achieve defence readiness 2030 building on national and commercial space assets, 
with  the  support  of  the  EU  space  systems.  It  will  complement  the  EU  dual  use  Space 
capabilities that will provide governmental services for the benefit of all Member States 
in:  Positioning,  Navigation  and  Timing  with  the  Galileo  Public  Regulated  Service, 
geospatial  intelligence  with  the  Earth  Observation  Governmental  Service  and  secure 
communications with IRIS2 in incentivising Member States to develop together sovereign 
capabilities. It will foster the development of interoperable national defence capabilities, 
focusing  notably  on  Galileo  enabled  equipment,  Space  Domain  Awareness,  countering 
jamming  and  spoofing,  and  in-space  operations  and  services,  where  Europe  has  clear 
shortfalls and dependencies. 

Objective:  

It is proposed to set up and protect a comprehensive European system of space capabilities 
that  serve  defence  purposes,  building  on  the  EU  space  systems  and  existing  national 
capacities. 

Milestones: 

1.  EUCO to endorse the European Space Shield as a priority flagship – by end 2025. 
2.  Prioritise  related  actions  in  Space,  IRIS²,  EDF  and  EDIP  work  programmes  in  a 
coordinated approach and work with Member States to support coordination of their 
procurement plans (SAFE) – as of 2026 

3.  Launch the European Space Shield – Q2 2026 

5 – The defence industrial dimension 

A strong, resilient and technologically innovative industrial base, with its roots in the EU, 
is a key component of Europe’s deterrence and both its physical and economic security. It 
is also an engine for growth, given the size of the EU market, employment potential and 
the spill-over effects on the wider economy. The drive to close capability gaps must be an 
opportunity for EU defence industry to increase its competitiveness, cooperate further and 
embrace  innovation,  positioning  itself  at  the  technological  frontier  and  boosting  export 

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potential. This must benefit all companies in the supply chain, notably start-ups, scale-ups, 
SMEs  and  Mid-Caps,  and  must  also  benefit  regional  economies  and  smaller  Member 
States.  

Four years of war in  Ukraine have shown how critical  it is  to  have sufficient  stocks of 
ammunitions  and  equipment,  to  have  production  lines  that  can  expand  quickly  and 
resupply, and to have well-synchronised supply chains. Public and private investment must 
foster scale up of industrial ecosystems in the next five years, with benefits for regional 
economies. 

In  this  context,  the  Commission  stands  ready  to  provide  industry  with  competition 
guidance on cooperation projects in the defence sector. The Commission is also engaging 
with  Member States to  assess whether it should modernise its approach  under State aid 
rules in the sector and possibly provide guidance. 

To better connect progress on closing capability gaps with the ramp up of the European 
Defence  Technological  and  Industrial  Base  (EDTIB),  the  Commission  will  deepen  its 
understanding of the current and planned European industrial production capacity, 
focusing  each  year  on  selected  priorities.  This  will  start  with  air  and  missile  defence, 
drones/counter-drone systems and space systems.  

Member  States  should  leverage  their  joint  buying  power  through  multiannual 
procurement  programmes  to  send  the  right  long-term  signals  to  help  business  take 
investment decisions on expanding production and deliver what is required to close the 
capability gaps. A greater coordination of these programmes would reduce fragmentation, 
strengthen much needed interoperability, and ensure value for money.  

Innovation  is  a  critical  component  of  Europe’s  defence  readiness.  Disruptive 
technologies, their fast testing and embedding in defence capabilities and agile engagement 
with the tech community are essentials for modern warfare.  EU funding will therefore be 
directed  to  stimulate  R&D  investment  and  innovative  industrial  productions,  catalysing 
additional private investment and promoting dual use start-ups, scale-ups and innovative 
SMEs and Mid-Caps. Simplified procurement procedures for start-ups and SMEs could 
also be considered. The recent mid-term review of cohesion policy provides incentives to 
re-programme cohesion  funding towards the development and manufacturing of critical 
technologies and enhancing defence capabilities. The future EU Competitiveness Fund 
will focus on novel technologies and disruptive solutions from new tech actors, including 
scale-ups, SMEs and Mid-Caps. The future Horizon Europe Framework Programme 
and  notably  its  European  Innovation  Council,  will  support  deep  tech  and  disruptive 
innovation from research to scale-up, including on defence applications. The European 
Defence  Transformation  Roadmap  will  provide  a  framework  for  this  and  will  be 
presented by the end of November. It will propose new ways to boost innovation with the 
defence industry, including scale-ups and SMEs, driven by  the need  for  greater  agility, 
speed and risk-taking.  

Europe must ensure it stays ahead of the defence tech curve, notably on the use of Artificial 
Intelligence. We must strengthen investment and innovation in Europe’s defence-tech-
industrial  base,  in  particular  regarding  the  production  of  critical  systems  for  modern 
warfare – whether drones, satellites, command and control or a secured European cloud – 
where AI will be a determining factor for our ability to produce the capabilities needed. 

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these  efforts, 

To  support 
therefore  accelerate 
simplification  to  ensure  access  to  relevant  datasets  for  training  and  validating  robust, 
human-centric  and  trustworthy  AI  solutions,  and  cut  administrative  burden,  including 
through possible new simplification measures. 

the  European  Commission  will 

A  new  partnership  of  EU,  national  governments  and  stakeholders  in  the  defence  sector 
must  underpin  collective  readiness  efforts.  Building  on  the  dialogue  between  the 
Commission and the European defence industry, an annual Summit of Defence industry 
should involve governments, EU actors, primes, SMEs, mid-caps and tech innovators.   

The  European  defence  industry  needs  skilled  workers.  Within  the  Pact  for  Skills,  the 
Large-scale  Skills  Partnership  in  Aerospace  and  Defence  is  working  on  skills 
forecasting,  upskilling  and  reskilling  programmes,  and  talent  engagement,  to  support 
Member States to reskill 600,000 people for the defence industry by 2030. The EU Skills 
Guarantee can also help transit workers from sectors at risk to strategic sectors, such as the 
defence industry.  

Defence  manufacturing  also  depends  on  secure  access  to  critical  raw  materials. 
Strategic dependencies and bottlenecks in critical raw materials and components must be 
tackled. The Observatory of Critical Technologies will produce a risk analysis which will 
form  the  basis  for  clear  targeted  measures  to  address  weaknesses.  These  could  include 
giving industry the possibility to obtain support for projects that secure supply, for instance 
through  research  into  alternatives  or  through  stockpiling,  or  other  projects  under  the 
Critical Raw Materials Act.  

Promoting partnerships on security and defence with like-minded countries is essential 
for  our  capability  development,  interoperability,  innovation  and  defence  industrial 
readiness as well as to diversify supplies of raw material or critical components. In line 
with the White Paper, the EU has taken concrete steps to advance its partnership agenda in 
the field of security and defence with allies and like-minded partners, notably NATO, with 
which  the  EDA  will  pursue  a  technical  arrangement  for  the  exchange  of  classified 
information.  This  model  is  pioneered  with  United  Kingdom  and  Canada,  with  which 
bilateral agreements are being negotiated to allow their respective defence industries and 
products to benefit from joint procurement under the SAFE instrument. Defence industrial 
cooperation is also at the centre of Defence Industrial Dialogues with Japan and, potentially 
in the future, with India. The EU should also deepen its security and defence partnership 
with Moldova. 

Objectives: 

It is proposed to ensure that by 2030 the EDTIB can deliver the capabilities that Member 
States  need  at  the  necessary  scale  and  speed.  Production  lines  should  be  substantially 
increased and delivery times for critical defence materiel should be significantly reduced. 
The  full  potential  of  innovation  for  defence,  including  Ukrainian  solutions,  should  be 
tapped. The resilience of defence supply chains should be secured, including by reducing 
critical dependencies in raw materials and other critical inputs. 

Milestones:  

1.  Co-legislators adopt the European Defence Industry Programme. Commission presents 

the European Defence Transformation Roadmap – November 2025 

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2.  Commission establishes Tech Alliances for Defence connecting tech innovators with 
defence users in Member States to help them address critical capability gaps - by end 
of 2025  

3.  Commission,  in  close  cooperation  with  lead  nations  of  the  capability  coalitions, 
expands the strategic dialogue with  industry in  first  half of 2026  and hosts the first 
annual Defence Industrial Summit by mid-2026 

4.  Commission to present an overview of the industrial capacity ramp up needed to ensure 

reliable supply for the agreed capability areas – starting by mid-2026  

5.  Analysis of risks coming from strategic dependencies and bottlenecks in critical raw 
materials  and  an  Action  Plan  with  mitigating  measures  for  the  European  defence 
industry’s international supply chains – second half of 2026 

6.  Reskilling of 200,000 employees for the defence industry by 2026 
7.  Competitiveness Fund, defence window, and Horizon Europe Framework Programme 

are adopted as part of the next MFF and ready to operate – by end 2027 

Indicators:  

It is proposed to use as  indicators in the Annual Defence Readiness Report the following: 
EU27  defence  industry  contribution  to  EU  GDP  percentage;  share  of  workers  in  EU27 
defence industry, including new jobs created annually; share of new or expanded defence 
production  facilities,  the  implementation  of  EU  programmes  support  to  innovation  in 
defence, the number of defence related patents registered in the EU, the number of start-
ups created and the number of unicorns in the defence sector. 

6 – Ukraine as a key part of Europe’s readiness effort 

Making Ukraine a ‘steel porcupine’ – indigestible to any invaders  – is as important for 
Ukraine’s security as it is for Europe’s. Europe’s defence readiness efforts should further 
strengthen  Ukraine  and  ensure  Europe  benefits  from  Ukraine’s  battlefield  experience, 
innovative ingenuity, effective civ-mil cooperation and ramped-up industrial capacity. 

Member  States  and  the  EU  will  contribute  to  a  framework  of  long-term  security 
guarantees to Ukraine that rests on: enduring legal arrangements; predictable multi-year 
finance  and  military  supplies;  defence  industrial  integration  into  the  EDTIB;  clear 
consultative  mechanisms;  and  a  link  to  Ukraine’s  EU  accession  and  postwar 
reconstruction.  

At the heart of this lies  a  sustained effort to harness  Ukraine’s Qualitative Military 
Edge  (QME).  To  ensure  Ukraine’s  QME  over  the  medium  term,  the  Commission  is 
working  on  a  reparation  loan,  funded  with  the  cash  balances  associated  with  the 
immobilised  Russian  assets.  This  would  create  the  predictable  multi-year  finance  for 
Ukraine and ensure that Ukraine has immediate access to a steady flow of superior military 
equipment, predominantly from the European and Ukrainian defence industry, in line with 
its battlefield requirements, fuelling industrial partnerships with European companies 
to innovate and scale-up. Increased and better training, thanks to the EUMAM mission, 
and improved intelligence gathering will also be essential parts of Ukraine’s QME.  

The  Commission’s  announcement  of  a  Drone  Alliance  with  Ukraine,  which  could  be 
financially  supported  by  different  funding  mechanisms  including  with  the  help  of  the 
frontloaded EUR 2billion from the ERA loans, shows that this can work in practice. The 
Drone Alliance will support the creation of joint ventures between Ukrainian and European 
companies  outside  Ukraine,  exploiting  European  technology  together  with  Ukraine’s 

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knowledge and experience. Ukraine will also be a full part of the implementation of EU 
financial instruments, such as SAFE and EDIP/Ukraine Support Instrument (USI), so 
that equipment is procured for Ukraine, with Ukraine and from Ukraine’s industry as much 
as  possible.  Depending  on  progress,  a  possible  complementary  Ukraine-focused 
initiative could be considered in early 2026 to incentivise further collaborative efforts.  

Objectives: 

It is proposed to aim to ensure that Ukraine can defend itself and deter any future Russian 
aggression. The Ukrainian defence industry  should be fully integrated  with Europe’s to 
provide scale for Ukraine’s production and tap the full potential of Ukrainian innovation 
successes for European defence. 

Milestones:  

1.  Adoption of the Ukraine Support Instrument within EDIP and the “Reparation loan” 

with an annual allowance for Ukraine to support its QME – by end 2025 

2.  Deliver on the High Representative’s 2 million artillery ammunition initiative – by end 

2025 

3.  Inclusion of Ukraine in the relevant capability coalitions and launch of the EU-Ukraine 

Drone alliance – by Q1 2026 

4.  In  light  of  the  level  of  SAFE  contributions  to  Ukraine’s  defence,  assess  possible 

additional incentives to Member States support to Ukraine – by Q1 2026. 

5.  Proposals for additional measures to incentivise Member States rapid military support 

to Ukraine – by Q1 2026. 

6.  Roll-out  of  ‘Brave  Tech  EU’  including  funding  of  the  testing  of  new  technological 
solutions to meet battlefield challenges identified together with UA – by end 2026 
7.  Continuation of EUMAM, and support to the Coalition of the Willing when conditions 

allow. 

Indicators:  

It is proposed to track progress, in the Annual Defence Readiness Reports by monitoring 
the volume of overall EU military support (EUR) to Ukraine, the total soldiers trained by 
EUMAM, the volume of large calibre ammunitions delivered and the share of SAFE loans 
involving Ukraine. Total direct EU27 investment in UADTIB (EUR) and the number of 
EU – UA Joint Ventures in defence will also be covered to monitor the integration of the 
Ukrainian defence industry into the EU defence industry. 

7 – Horizontal enablers  

Towards a true EU-wide market for defence equipment 

A well-functioning and simplified EU defence equipment market is a key condition for 
achieving  large  scale  production,  create  economies  of  scale  and  defence  innovation.  It 
requires efficient, uniform and fair defence procurement rules, a reliable intra-EU transfer 
system,  a  robust  Security  of  Supply  regime,  and  widespread  adoption  of  recognised 
standards and mutual recognition of certification.  

The review of the Defence and Security Procurement Directive should provide Member 
States with agile procurement procedures adapted to their procuring needs, in particular 

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when carrying out joint procurement. Increased transparency and openness should allow 
the EU defence industry to deliver innovative products and services at competitive prices, 
while predictability should help them develop additional production capacity. The creation 
of  an  internal  market  for  defence  will  require  enhanced  trust  in  intra-EU  cross-border 
supply  chains.  The  Defence  Readiness  Omnibus  contains  proposals  to  address  these 
issues. Co-legislators should adopt it no later than end 2025. Similarly, the Defence ‘Mini-
omnibus’ should be adopted no later than December 2025 to better incentivise defence 
industry-related investment ahead of the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). 

Objective: 

It is proposed to aim to create by 2030, a genuine EU-wide Market for Defence equipment, 
with simplified and harmonised rules.   

Milestones:  

1.  Finalise adoption of Defence Readiness  Omnibus and the “mini” Omnibus  – by end 

2025 

2.  Finalise additional legislative action for the Single Market, notably evaluation of Public 

Procurement and intra-EU Transfers Directives – by end 2026 

Towards an EU-wide military mobility area 

Military mobility is a crucial enabler to ensure European security and defence, including 
for EU support to Ukraine. It is still too difficult to move troops and military equipment 
across  Europe,  as  shown  by  exercises  with  Member  States.  In  2024,  only  half  of  the 
Member States were fully compliant with the 5 working days commitment. The EU has 
identified over 500 “hotspot” projects with investment needs of around EUR 100 billion. 
These should be addressed as a priority to remove key gaps and bottlenecks along the four 
priority  military  mobility  corridors.  The  Eastern  Flank  is  particularly  exposed  by  the 
absence of continuous and interoperable trans-European transport networks. To spearhead 
progress,  an  ambitious  Military  Mobility  package  will  be  presented  in  November, 
including proposals to set up a unified regulatory framework to facilitate the transport of 
equipment, goods and passengers for military or civil protection purposes across Europe, 
and  targeted  amendments  to  existing  EU  legislation  to  better  accommodate  military 
mobility requirements for dual-use infrastructure.  

Objectives: 

It is proposed to set up by end 2027 an EU-wide military mobility area, with harmonised 
rules  and  procedures  and  a  network  of  land  corridors,  airports,  seaports,  and  support 
elements ensuring unhindered transport of troops and military equipment across the Union, 
in  close  coordination  with  NATO,  and  boosting  the  availability  of  civ-mil  transport 
capabilities. 

Milestones:  

1.  Presentation of the Military Mobility package – before end 2025 
2.  Identify and prioritise concrete military mobility hotspot projects along the Military 

Mobility Corridors – by Q1 2026 

3.  Co-legislators adopt the Military Mobility Package – by end 2026 

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4.  New  Military  mobility  window  within  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility  adopted  and 

operational – by end 2027 

Indicators:  

It is proposed that the Annual Defence Readiness Report will report on commitments taken 
by Member States to ensure that issuing movement permissions for troop and equipment 
is as swift as possible (3 to 5 working days); number of hotspot projects supported with 
EU funding; CEF Military Mobility budget percentage disbursed; and number of Military 
Mobility projects supported by EIB Group. 

Ensuring adequate financial resources and investment  

Under the current MFF, EU instruments supporting the defence industry have shown their 
added value. The European Defence Fund (EDF) is now the third defence R&D investor 
in the EU and, with limited amounts, ASAP and EDIRPA contribute to reducing critical 
shortfalls and have leveraged additional investment from industry and Member States of 
more than EUR 12 billion. Once in force, EDIP will offer new specific tools for delivering 
additional capabilities, including flagship projects, such as the European Defence Projects 
of Common Interest (EDPCIs) or the Structures for European Armament Projects (SEAP). 

The activation of the National escape clause (NEC) gave additional fiscal space to 16 
Member States so far to further increase their defence spending. The Security Action for 
Europe (SAFE) instrument has been fully subscribed by 19 Member States, exhausting 
the  envelope  of  EUR  150  billion.  In  addition,  following  the  mid-term  review  of  the 
Cohesion Policy instruments, Member States and regions can reallocate cohesion funds to 
defence-related investments including military mobility, benefiting from higher flexibility 
and  pre  and  co-financing  rates  and  EU  regions  adjacent  to  Ukraine  will  also  receive 
targeted support as those bordering Russia and Belarus. 

In the next MFF, the Commission has proposed to increase substantially the budget for 
defence and space. Within the European Competitiveness Fund, defence and space would 
benefit from a window of EUR 131 billion to support Member States’ long-term efforts to 
achieve defence readiness. Within the Horizon Europe Framework Programme dual-use 
actions would be eligible for support from the EUR 175 billion budget, and the European 
Innovation Council would be able to support innovation in critical technologies with focus 
on defence applications. In addition, the Military Mobility budget would increase from 
EUR 1.76 billion (already frontloaded and fully allocated by early 2024) to EUR 17.65 
billion.  

Private capital flows to defence are equally important. Progress towards a Savings and 
Investments  Union  in  Europe  will  help  channel  long-term  private  capital  into  defence 
investment,  innovation  and  infrastructure.  The  EIB  Group  has  recently  stepped  up 
substantially its financing of projects related to defence, including infrastructure, to further 
support European defence industry and contribute to finance EU’s defence capability and 
technological priorities. This will send a strong signal to markets.  

Objectives:  

It  is  proposed to  incentivise a surge in  private and public investment  in  defence and to 
achieve maximum efficiency and impact for EU funded support.  

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Milestones:  

1.  Together with EIB/EIF, create an up to EUR 1 billion Fund of funds (equity) 

supporting the fast growth of defence-related scale-ups and defence related projects – 
by Q1 2026 

2.  New MFF instruments are approved and operational by end 2027 
3.  SAFE is at least 50% disbursed by Q3 2028 

Indicators:  

The annual defence readiness report could include specific indicators on the public-private 
investment ratio in defence and on the annual evolution of EIB Group support to security 
and defence. 

8 – The way forward: the road to 2030  

Europe needs urgent action to address an escalating threat. Member States have changed 
gear. Investment in defence has surged. The SAFE regulation was approved in record time 
and  the  whole  EUR  150  billion  envelope  is  fully  subscribed.  The  omnibus  on  defence 
readiness was presented. The wheels are in motion. When Europe works with a sense of 
urgency, results are delivered.  

Building a credible EU defence readiness in five years is, by any standards, an ambitious 
endeavour. But  if we achieve clarity  on goals,  match our objectives with the necessary 
resources, act in a coordinated way and work against precise timelines, it can be achieved. 

Europe’s most successful projects, the Single Market or the euro, have been realised with 
this method, based on a multi-year programme in different phases and a constant political 
steer to drive the process forward. The same logic must drive the leap in Europe’s defence 
policy. 

This Roadmap sets out clear objectives for 2030, identifies areas where swift and sustained 
action is needed and sets tangible collective milestones. 

To keep momentum, the European Council needs to provide regular political steer, tracking 
progress on an annual basis and recommending priority actions. 

Europe needs to agree on projects, investment and contracts already now, for its readiness 
by 2030.  

The European Commission and the High Representative invite the European Council to 
endorse  the  main  proposals  contained  in  this  Roadmap  and  to  provide  the  political 
orientation to progress towards readiness by 2030 through the proposed milestones. 

15