Country guidance : Somalia : common analysis and guidance note : October 2025.
Date: 2025-10-15
Institutions: European Union Agency for Asylum
Subjects: Somalia, child protection, discrimination based on disability, humanitarian aid, international protection, position of women, protection of minorities, refugee, religious discrimination, user guide, war

Country Guidance: 
Somalia

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Country Guidance: Somalia 

Common analysis and guidance note 

October 2025

Manuscript completed in September 2025 

3rd edition 

Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the 
EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained within this 
publication. 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025 

HTML 

ISBN 978-92-9418-083-4  doi: 10.2847/4488928    BZ- 01-25-054-EN-Q 

PDF 

ISBN 978-92-9418-084-1  doi: 10.2847/7910885     BZ- 01-25-054-EN-N 

© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2025 

Cover photo: Daily Life in Somalia - A Private security officer stands at a look out point on the 
edge of a private beach south of Mogadishu on April 24, 2025 in Mogadishu.  Credit: Ed Ram, 
© Getty Images, 2025, https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/private-security-
officer-stands-at-a-look-out-point-on-the-news-photo/2211151819?adppopup=true 

Please cite as: EUAA, Country Guidance: Somalia, October 2025, available at 
https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-somalia-1 

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction 
of photos or other material that is not under the EUAA copyright, permission must be sought 
directly from the copyright holders

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Contents 

List of abbreviations and glossary ................................................................................................ 8 

Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 12 

Guidance note ................................................................................................................................ 16 

Common analysis ......................................................................................................................... 20 

1.  General remarks ...................................................................................................................... 21 

1.1.  The structure of the Somali governance .............................................................................21 

1.2.  The role of clans in Somalia ....................................................................................................21 

2.  Actors of persecution or serious harm ................................................................................. 23 

2.1.  Map: areas of control and influence .................................................................................... 23 

2.2.  State actors ................................................................................................................................ 25 

2.2.1.  Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) forces ......................................... 25 

2.2.2.  Federal Member States (FMS) forces and Somaliland forces ............ 25 

2.3.  Non-State actors ...................................................................................................................... 26 

2.3.1.  Al-Shabaab ........................................................................................................ 26 

2.3.2.  Clans and clan militias .................................................................................... 27 

2.3.3.  Other non-State actors ................................................................................... 27 

3.  Refugee status ........................................................................................................................ 29 

3.1.  Persons associated with the government of Somalia and/or international actors  30 

3.1.1.  Federal and state officials .............................................................................. 30 

3.1.2.  Members of the federal and state armed forces ...................................... 31 

3.1.3.  Electoral delegates .......................................................................................... 32 

3.1.4.  Civilians perceived as ‘spies’ by Al-Shabaab ............................................ 33 

3.2.  Persons fearing forced recruitment by Al-Shabaab ........................................................ 34 

3.3.  Deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab ........................................................................ 36 

3.4.  Individuals refusing to pay ‘taxes’ to Al-Shabaab ............................................................ 38 

3.5.  Humanitarian workers ............................................................................................................. 39 

3.6.  Journalists and other media workers ................................................................................. 40 

3.7.  Individuals (perceived as) contravening social or religious laws/tenets .................... 42 

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3.7.1. 
Individuals (perceived as) contravening Sharia law in Al-Shabaab 
controlled areas .............................................................................................................. 42 

Individuals (perceived as) contravening religious (and customary) 

3.7.2. 
tenets outside Al-Shabaab controlled areas .......................................................... 43 

3.8.  Individuals involved in clan disputes ................................................................................... 45 

3.9.  Persons belonging to minorities ........................................................................................... 47 

3.9.1.  Persons belonging to low status occupational minorities ..................... 47 

3.9.2.  Persons belonging to ethnic minorities ..................................................... 48 

3.9.3.  Persons belonging to groups specialised in Islamic services ............ 50 

3.9.4.  Persons belonging to clans which can be considered minority groups 
in local contexts ...............................................................................................................51 

3.9.5. 

Individuals in mixed marriages .................................................................... 53 

3.10. Persons with diverse SOGIESC............................................................................................. 54 

3.11.  Women and girls ...................................................................................................................... 55 

3.11.1.  Gender-based violence (GBV) ..................................................................... 55 

3.11.2.  Female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) .......................................... 57 

3.11.2.a. Women and girls who have not undergone FGM/C .............................. 57 

3.11.2.b. Women and girls who have undergone FGM/C .................................... 59 

3.11.3.  Women and girls who have left Al-Shabaab........................................... 60 

3.11.4.  Child marriage and forced marriage ......................................................... 62 

3.11.5.  Single women and female heads of households ................................... 63 

3.12. Children ...................................................................................................................................... 65 

3.12.1.  Violence against children ............................................................................ 65 

3.12.2.  Child recruitment by Al-Shabaab ............................................................... 67 

3.13. Persons living with disabilities and/or with severe medical issues ............................ 68 

3.14. Somalis who have resided for a long time in neighbouring countries or other 
countries in the region ..................................................................................................................... 69 

4.  Subsidiary protection .............................................................................................................. 71 

4.1.  Article 15(a) QD/QR: death penalty or execution .............................................................. 71 

4.2.  Article 15(b) QD/QR: torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ... 73 

4.2.1.  Arbitrary arrests, illegal detention and prison conditions ..................... 73 

4.2.2.  Criminal Violence ............................................................................................ 74 

4.2.3.  Corporal punishments .................................................................................... 75 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

4.2.4.  Forced evictions .............................................................................................. 76 

4.2.5.  Healthcare and socio-economic conditions ............................................ 76 

4.3.  Article 15(c) QD/QR: indiscriminate violence in situations of armed conflict ............ 77 

4.3.1.  Armed conflict (international or internal) .................................................... 79 

4.3.2.  Qualification of a person as a ‘civilian’ ..................................................... 80 

4.3.3. 

Indiscriminate violence ................................................................................. 80 

4.3.4.  Serious and individual threat ....................................................................... 99 

4.3.5.  Qualification of the harm as a ‘threat to (a civilian’s) life or person’ 100 

4.3.6.  Nexus/‘by reason of’ ..................................................................................... 100 

5.  Actors of protection .............................................................................................................. 101 

5.1.  The State .................................................................................................................................... 101 

5.1.1.  The Somali State ............................................................................................... 101 

5.1.2.  Authorities of Somaliland ............................................................................. 102 

5.2.  Parties or organisations, including international organisations ................................. 103 

5.2.1.  Al-Shabaab ....................................................................................................... 103 

5.3.  Considerations of clan support ........................................................................................... 104 

6.  Internal protection alternative ............................................................................................ 105 

6.1.  Part of the country .................................................................................................................. 105 

6.2.  Safety ......................................................................................................................................... 105 

6.2.1.  Absence of persecution or serious harm ................................................ 106 

6.2.2.  Availability of protection against persecution or serious harm ........ 107 

6.2.3.  Conclusion on safety .................................................................................... 108 

6.3.  Travel and admittance ........................................................................................................... 108 

6.4.  Reasonableness to settle ...................................................................................................... 110 

6.4.1.  General situation.............................................................................................. 110 

6.4.2. 

Individual circumstances .............................................................................. 112 

6.4.3.  Conclusion on reasonableness .................................................................. 113 

6.5.  General conclusion on the applicability of IPA ................................................................ 114 

7.  Exclusion ................................................................................................................................ 115 

7.1.  Exclusion based on the commission of international crimes ....................................... 115 

7.2.  Exclusion based on the commission of a serious crime ............................................... 116 

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7.3.  Exclusion based on acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations ................................................................................................................................................. 117 

7.4.  Exclusion based on constituting a danger to the community or to the security of 
the Member State ............................................................................................................................. 117 

Annex: Country of origin information references .................................................................... 118 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

List of abbreviations and glossary  

Term 

Definition 

4.5 power-sharing 
formula 

A power-sharing formula under which key positions in the state 
and parliamentary seats are allocated on a proportional basis 
across the 4 major clans and 0.5 to minorities  

ADR 

Alternative Dispute Resolution  

AFRICOM 

United States Africa Command 

AMISOM 

Africom Union Mission in Somalia 

Amniyat 

The intelligence unit of Al-Shabaab 

ASWJ 

ATMIS 

CJEU 

CEAS 

COI 

Ahiu Sunna Wal-Jama’ah 

African Transitional Mission in Somalia 

Court of Justice of the European Union 

Common European Asylum System 

Country of origin information 

Darwish 

State level: armed forces/militias/paramilitary/special police 

•  Darwish (Federal Police): Paramilitary unit of the Somali 
•  Police Force distinct from the state level unofficial Darwish 

Diya 

EUAA 

EU 

Payment of compensation (see also mag) 

European Union Agency for Asylum 

European Union 

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Term 

Definition 

FGM/C 

Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting 

FGS 

Federal Government of Somalia 

Hudud 

Crimes that are ‘against the rights of God’ under Islamic religious 
law (plural of haad) 

ID 

IDPs 

IED 

IPA 

ISS 

Identification documentation 

Internally Displaced Person(s) 

Improvised explosive device  

Internal protection alternative  

Islamic State in Somalia 

Jaish al-hisba or 
Hisbah 

Armed force that Al-Shabaab uses as both police and a morality 
enforcement force  

Jilib 

The group below which the community assumes the payment of 
‘the blood price’ 

LGBTIQ 

LGBTIQ people are persons: 

•  who are attracted to others of their own gender (lesbian, 

gay) or any gender (bisexual); 

•  whose gender identity and/or expression does not 

correspond to the sex they were assigned at birth (trans, 
non-binary); 

•  who are born with sex characteristics that do not fit the 
typical definition of male or female (intersex); and 

•  whose identity does not fit into a binary classification of 

sexuality and/or gender (queer). 

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Term 

Definition 

Ma’awiisley 

A local clan militia, also referred to as Macawiisley, Macawiisleey, 
Macawisley, named after the sarong, a common piece of clothing 

Mag 

Payment of compensation (see also diya) 

Mooryaan 

Somali for bandits 

Mukhtar 

Local community leader 

NIS 

NISA 

NGO 

PMPF 

PSF 

QD 

(Qualification 
Directive) 

QR 

(Qualification 
Regulation) 

National Intelligence Service 

National Intelligence and Security Agency 

Non-Governmental Organisation  

Puntland Maritime Police Force 

Puntland Security Force 

Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-
country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for 
persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the 
protection granted. 

Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for the qualification of third-
country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for 
persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the 
protection granted, amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC and 
repealing Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council. 

Sharia  

The religious law of Islam, Islamic canonical law 

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Term 

Definition 

SNA 

SPF 

UAE 

UN 

Somalia National Army 

Somalia Police Force 

United Arab Emirates  

United Nations  

UNHCR  

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

UNICEF 

United Nations Children's Fund 

UNOCHA 

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 

UNSG 

US 

Xeer 

Zakat 

United Nations Secretary General  

United States of America 

Customary (clan) law 

The annual religious obligation to pay a specific percentage of a 

person’s wealth to the poor  

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Introduction 

The country guidance documents provide country-specific common analysis and guidance in 
relation to the assessment criteria established in the recast Qualification Directive (QD) (1) and 
in the Qualification Regulation (QR) (2), which will repeal the QD with its entry into application 
on 1 July 2026. They are developed by the EUAA together with a network of senior-level 
policy officials from EU+ countries and represent their joint assessment of the situation in main 
countries of origin, in accordance with current EU legislation and jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The European Commission and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also provide valuable input in this process. 

The aim of the country guidance documents is to assist decision-makers and policy-makers in 
their daily work and to foster convergence in the assessment of applications for international 
protection and the type of protection granted in the context of the Common European Asylum 
System.  

The development, review and update of country guidance is regulated under Article 11 of the 
EUAA Regulation (3).  

In accordance with Article 11(3) of EUAA Regulation, Member States have the 
obligation to take into account the common analysis and guidance notes when 
examining applications for international protection, without prejudice to their 
competence to decide on individual applications. 

For more details on the process of producing country guidance 
documents and the exact role of stakeholders involved, see ‘EUAA, 
Country Guidance: Methodology, November 2024’. 

This document encompasses the development, review and update of 
country guidance and regulates the work of the EUAA Country Guidance 
Network and all related processes. 

(1)    Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the 
protection granted (recast). 

(2)    Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the 
protection granted, amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC and repealing Directive 2011/95/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council. 

(3)   Regulation (EU) 2021/2303 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2021 on the 

European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010. 

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This common analysis is based on country of origin information (COI) covering the period from 
1 April 2023 to 31 March 2025. Additional information on major legislative, security and 
humanitarian developments covering the period from 1 April to 31 July 2025 has also been 
reflected. Each section of the country guidance documents also clearly states the timing of its 
last update. 

The analysis and guidance within this document should be considered valid as long as current 
events and developments in the country fall within the trends and patterns described within 
the COI on which the assessment at hand is based on. 

The analysis and guidance provided within this document are not exhaustive. 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Common analysis, guidance note and methodological 
approach 

The country guidance document consists of two components: the guidance note and the 
common analysis. These two parts focus on the situation in the country of origin and provide 
analysis and guidance on the assessment of relevant international protection needs.  

Guidance note  

The guidance note is the first 
part in the structure of the 
document. 

It outlines the key conclusions 
of the common analysis in a 
light user-friendly format. 

Common analysis 

The common analysis is the second, 
more detailed, part. It analyses the 
available COI and provides guidance in 
accordance with the applicable 
legislation, relevant jurisprudence and 
general guidance. 

The Country Guidance documents should be read in conjunction with 
the separate document ‘EUAA, Country Guidance: Explained, 
February 2025’. 

This document outlines the general guidance relied upon in this 
analysis, as well as the methodological framework, approach and 
indicators used to assess the different elements of qualification for 
international protection. 

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Scope of this update 

The current version of the guidance updates and supersedes the ‘EUAA, Country Guidance: 
Somalia’, August 2023. A new approach regarding the incorporation of COI in the legal 
analysis has been adopted in this document and all sections of the document have been 
updated and restructured to reflect this approach.  

This update is mainly based on the following recent COI: 

 Country Focus 2025 

Security 2025 

COI Update 2025 

EUAA COI Report: Somalia – 
Country Focus (May 2025) 

Available in PDF and online. 

EUAA COI Report: Somalia – 
Security Situation (May 
2025) 

Available in PDF and online. 

EUAA COI Query Response: 

Major legislative, security 
and humanitarian 
developments (August 
2025) 
Available in PDF 

The following relevant EUAA COI report and query have also been used:  

•  AS Deserters 2023, EUAA COI report: ‘Somalia – Defection, desertion and 

disengagement from Al-Shabaab’ (February 2023) 

•  COI Query FGM/C 2023, EUAA COI Query: ‘Somalia: Forms and prevalence of 

repeated FGM/C’ (17 May 2023)  

Annex: Country of origin information references provides further details and links to all COI 
documents used as a basis for the analysis within this document. References within this 
document are to the respective sections of these COI documents. 

 To access EUAA COI reports, visit https://euaa.europa.eu/coi-publications.  

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Guidance note 

Last update: October 2025 

The current version of the document supersedes the one issued in August 2023.  

The guidance note on Somalia is produced by the EUAA together with EU+ countries(4) in 
accordance with Article 11 of the EUAA Regulation(5). It is based on and summarises the 
conclusions of the comprehensive common analysis. The aim of the guidance note and the 
common analysis is to assist EU+ countries in the examination of applications for international 
protection, thereby fostering convergence of asylum practices and decisions across the EU.  

The guidance note is part of the ‘Country Guidance: Somalia’ and should be read in 
conjunction with the common analysis. 

In Somalia, a wide range of groups and individuals can be considered as actors of persecution 
or serious harm, including State and non-State actors, such as the Federal Government of 
Somalia (FGS) forces, Federal Member States (FMS) forces and Somaliland forces, Al-Shabaab, 
clans and clan militias, Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) and other non-state armed groups. 
Members of the extended family and community can also be perpetrators of human rights 
violations. See Actors of persecution or serious harm.  

Among the most commonly encountered profiles of applicants for international protection, the 
following would be highly likely to qualify for refugee status, irrespective of the specific 
region of origin: 

•  Journalists and other media workers seen as critical of actors particularly active in 

an area or in control of a specific area 

•  Individuals (perceived as) contravening social or religious laws/tenets in Al-

Shabaab controlled areas  

•  Individuals (perceived as) apostates, converts, proselytisers or blasphemers 

outside Al-Shabaab controlled areas 

•  Persons with diverse SOGIESC  
•  Girls who have not undergone FGM/C  
•  Single women and female heads of households without support from the extended 

family or clan 

(4)  The assessment and guidance reflect the conclusions of the EUAA Country Guidance Network, which consists 

of EU Member States, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. The guidance note has been endorsed by the EUAA 
Management Board. 

(5)  Regulation (EU) 2021/2303 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2021 on the 

European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010. 

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Furthermore, the following profiles in South-Central Somalia only would also highly likely 
qualify for refugee status:  

•  Prominent and high-ranking federal and state officials  
•  Members of the federal and state armed forces 
•  Electoral delegates 
•  Civilians perceived as ‘spies’ by Al-Shabaab 
•  Deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab 
•  Individuals refusing to pay ‘taxes’ to Al-Shabaab 
•  Humanitarian workers 
•  Women who have left Al-Shabaab  

For these profiles in Puntland, an assessment of risk-impacting circumstances which may 
affect the probability of granting refugee status is required. The same profiles in Somaliland 
would likely not qualify for refugee status.   

Further guidance is provided on the risk-impacting circumstances which may affect the 
probability of granting refugee status for the following profiles, irrespective of the specific 
region of origin: 

•  Persons fearing forced recruitment by Al-Shabaab 
•  Journalists and other media workers (other than those seen as critical of actors 

particularly active in an area or in control of a specific area) 

•  Individuals (perceived as) contravening other social or religious laws/tenets outside 
Al-Shabaab controlled areas (other than apostates, converts, proselytisers or 
blasphemers)  

•  Individuals involved in clan disputes 
•  Persons belonging to low status occupational minorities 
•  Persons belonging to ethnic minorities 
•  Persons belonging to groups specialised in Islamic services 
•  Persons belonging to clans which can be considered minority groups in local 

contexts  

•  Individuals in mixed marriages  
•  Women and girls in relation to child marriage and forced marriage or other forms of 

GBV 

•  Women who have not undergone FGM/C as well as Women and girls who have 

undergone FGM/C  

•  Single women and female heads of households with support from the extended 

family or clan 

•  Children 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

•  Persons living with disabilities and/or with severe medical issues  

The treatment faced by Somalis who have resided for a long time in neighbouring countries or 
other countries in the region would in general not amount to persecution. However, belonging 
to this profile might be a risk-enhancing factor for other profiles.  

If an applicant is not considered eligible for refugee status, case officers should proceed to 
consider the granting of subsidiary protection. 

If there is a reasonable degree of likelihood of death penalty or execution, and no nexus to a 
reason for persecution can be substantiated, subsidiary protection under Article 15(a) QD/QR 
shall be granted. Death sentences continued to be imposed and carried out both by state 
authorities and Al-Shabaab courts.   

Article 15(b) QD/QR relating to the risk of torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, may be applicable in certain cases. For example, in Somalia prison conditions, 
corporal punishments or forced evictions may reach the threshold of serious harm.  

With regard to subsidiary protection under Article 15(c) QD/QR, the guidance provides an 
assessment per administrative region as per following: 

•  There are no areas in Somalia where the degree of indiscriminate violence reaches 
such an exceptionally high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that 
a civilian, returned to the relevant area, would, solely on account of their presence 
there, face a real risk of being subject to the serious threat referred to in Article 15(c) 
QD/QR. 

•  Indiscriminate violence in situations of armed conflict reaches a high level in the 

regions of Lower Juba, Bay, Lower Shabelle, Benadir/Mogadishu, Hiraan, Middle 
Shabelle, Mudug, Galgaduud. Accordingly, a lower level of individual elements is 
required to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the area, 
would face a real risk of serious harm.  

•  In the regions of Gedo, Middle Juba, Bakool, Bari, Sool, Sanaag, indiscriminate 

violence is taking place, however not at a high level. Accordingly, a higher level of 
individual elements is required to show substantial grounds for believing that a 
civilian, returned to the area, would face a real risk of serious harm. 

•  In the regions of Awdal, Nugal, Wogoyi Galbeed, Todgheer, it is considered that there 

is no real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR. 

The international protection needs of Somali applicants are further compounded by the 
general lack of protection in the country. Neither the Somali state nor Al-Shabaab or clans can 
be considered actors of protection fulfilling the requirements of Article 7 QD/QR. On the other 
hand, the authorities of Somaliland, in areas under their control, may be considered able and 
willing to provide protection for some categories of applicants.  See Actors of protection.  

In relation to internal protection alternative (IPA), it is assessed that given the security situation 
and living conditions, IPA in Mogadishu might be applicable only in exceptional cases. IPA in 

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Garowe and Hargeisa may be applicable depending on the profile and individual 
circumstances of the applicant. It is further highlighted that clan affiliation is a crucial element 
to consider for IPA in all three cities. 

Finally, exclusion considerations may be relevant in a number of cases concerning applicants 
from Somalia, such as members of the FGS and FMS forces and deserters and defectors from 
Al-Shabaab.  

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Common analysis 

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COUNTRY GUIDANCE: SOMALIA | OCTOBER 2025 

1. 

General remarks 

1.1. 

The structure of the Somali governance 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security Situation 
2025, 1.1.; COI Update 2025, 1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of 
COI. 

Somalia is a Federal State composed of two levels of government: the Federal Government of 
Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS), which include both state and local 
governments. FMS also have their own constitutions and armed forces. 

South-Central Somalia includes the following FMS: Jubbaland, South-West, Benadir, 
Hirshabelle and Galmudug. Mudug region is divided between Galmudug and Puntland, with 
Galmudug controlling the southern half of the region.  

Puntland was established on 1 August 1998 as an autonomous state within the Somali Federal 
State. As of March 2024, it stopped recognising the FGS. Relations between the FGS and 
Puntland have remained strained until 31 July 2025. Following the refusal of Puntland in March 
2025 to participate in the National Dialogue conference, Puntland and Jubbaland exhibited a 
joint stance of ‘no forward movement on elections or constitutional reform’, and therefore a 
constitutional crisis appeared imminent in Somalia. 

Somaliland declared its independence in 1991 while the civil war was occurring in the rest of 
Somalia. Somaliland remains internationally unrecognised.  

In terms of territorial control and influence, some areas of Sool and Sanaag regions and the 
area of Ayn (Togdheer region) are contested between Somaliland and Puntland. In the Sool 
and Sanaag regions, the FGS recognised Sool Sanaag Cayn-Khatumo (SSC-K) as a new 
administrative entity in October 2023. In April 2025, the FGS officially recognised SSC-K as a 
federal member state, declaring its territories part of Somalia and not ‘disputed areas’.  For a 
depiction of the territorial control and influence in Somalia (South-Central Somalia, Somaliland, 
Puntland) see Map: areas of control and influence.  

1.2. 

The role of clans in Somalia 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.4., 1.5.; 
Actors 2021, 1., 2., 3.2., 3., 3.2.; Targeting 2021, 4.; Country Guidance should not be referred to 
as a source of COI. 

Last update: October 2025 

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Group belonging is important in Somalia. Layered in all aspects of life, the clan is both a tool 
for identification and a way of life. Clans define the relationship between people and 
belonging to a strong clan matters in terms of access to the job market, resources, political 
influence, justice, and security. 

Somalis are roughly divided in five large clan families: the Dir, the Isaaq, the Darood, the 
Hawiye and the Rahanweyn. Large segments of the Somali population are considered as 
minorities, either in local context or in Somalia in general, due to living amongst larger clans or 
due to their occupational status. Somalis are traditionally attached to a territory where their kin 
are more numerous. Until today, most Somalis still rely on support from patrilineal clan 
relatives. 

Clans often compete against each other, as well as against other actors. However, they also 
find alliances with other clans or actors. Those fluid relationships are influencing the power 
balance in the local context. Clan militias are also important actors of political life across 
Somalia. 

Under the customary clan law, the xeer system, clan elders act as mediators, arbiters and 
judges, playing a central role in the resolution of local and intra-clan disputes. It is estimated 
that 80 % of all civil and criminal cases in Somalia are settled through the xeer system which in 
2014 was adopted by the Ministry of Justice as a supplementary approach to justice, renaming 
it as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). 

Therefore, clan affiliation can be both a factor of support and of risk, varying by region and 
local power dynamics. For more information on the clan composition of the regions in Somalia, 
see EUAA COI report: Security Situation 2025.  

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2.  Actors of persecution or serious harm 

For general guidance on the country guidance approach to this section, see ‘EUAA, 
'Actors of persecution or serious harm' in Country Guidance: Explained, February 
2025’. 

The individual assessment of international protection needs should take into account the 
presence and activity of different actors in the applicant’s home area and the situation in the 
areas the applicant would need to travel through in order to reach their home area. 

In Somalia, a wide range of different groups and individuals can be considered as actors of 
persecution or serious harm. A crucial aspect of the Somali context is that the boundaries of 
membership for all the groups constantly shift. Most individuals playing a role in the security 
situation are simultaneously members, to varying degrees, of multiple groups that compete 
against each other. 

The following sections highlight the main actors of persecution and serious harm in Somalia as 
well as their areas of control/ activity, in a non-exhaustive manner.  

2.1.  Map: areas of control and influence 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 1.1., 
1.2.1., 1.2.2.; COI Update 2025, 1., 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of 
COI. 

As of March 2025, Somalia remained deeply fragmented in terms of territorial control. Al-
Shabaab controlled vast areas of South-Central Somalia and maintained influence across key 
routes and towns, including areas near Mogadishu. The group also retained presence in 
northern Somalia despite government offensives. Al-Shabaab has reversed many earlier 
losses and continued launching coordinated attacks, destabilising contested regions and 
encircling Mogadishu. Additionally, in Sool and Sanaag regions, the SSC-Khatumo 
administration was declared in early 2023 and recognised officially by the FGS in April 2025. 
In March 2024, Puntland ceased recognition of the FGS and launched a counter- ISS 
campaign in Bari region. In November 2024, Jubbaland suspended ties with the FGS following 
a political dispute and has since asserted autonomous control over parts of Gedo.  

The approximate areas of control and influence of the main actors are outlined in the map 
below. This map presents an indication and cannot be seen as an absolute representation of 
the situation in terms of spatial or temporal accuracy. The depictions on this map do not imply 
any opinion on the part of the EUAA concerning the legal status or effective control over any 
territory in the country.  

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Figure 1. Somalia - Approximate Territorial Control, 31 July 2025 by Political Geography 
Now (https://www.polgeonow.com/). 

Please note: The depictions on the above map do not imply any opinion whatsoever on the 
part of EUAA concerning legal status or effective control over any country, territory, city, or 
area. Every effort is made to ensure this map is free of errors, but there is no guarantee that 
the map or its features are either spatially or temporally accurate or fit for a particular use.  

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For more information on territorial control and/or presence of the actors of persecution or 
serious harm listed below, please refer to 4.3.3.b) Assessment of indiscriminate violence per 
region .   

2.2.  State actors 

2.2.1. 

Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) forces  

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.2.1., 
1.7.; Security 2025, 1.1., 1.2.2., 1.2.3., 1.6.; Actors 2021, 2.2., 2.4., 2.4.5.; Country Guidance should 
not be referred to as a source of COI. 

The FGS armed forces include the Somali National Army (SNA), the Special Forces (notably 
Gorgor and Danab), the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), the Somali Police 
Force (SPF) and the Prison Forces. 

While the FGS had regained significant territory since 2010, recent developments show a 
reversal of some gains. After a successful joint offensive against Al-Shabaab beginning in 
August 2022, particularly in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle, the group regained territory in 2024-
2025, launching a major counter-offensive that pushed close to Mogadishu. Though 
government operations have become more strategic and coordinated, FGS forces still struggle 
to hold recaptured areas, often lacking stabilisation and administrative capacity. See also Map: 
areas of control and influence above.  

FGS armed forces reportedly committed a wide range of human rights violations, to which they 
were associated in varying degrees, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and 
detentions, sexual violence as well as grave violations against children. 

2.2.2.  Federal Member States (FMS) forces and Somaliland forces 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports and query: Country Focus 
2025, 1.2.1., 1.7.; Security 2025, 1.1., 1.2.3., 1.3., 1.4.3., 1.6., 2.1., 2.1.1., 2.5., 2.6., 2.7., 2.8.; Actors 
2021, 7.; COI Update 2025, 1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

The FMS security forces include Darwish (state level paramilitary/militia) and police forces, 
under each FMS administration, namely: Jubbaland, South-West, Benadir Regional 
Administration [BRA]-Mogadishu, Hirshabelle, Galmudug. Puntland security forces comprise 
the State Police (PSP), the Darwish or ‘Special police’, the Intelligence and Security Agency 
(PISA) and the Maritime Police (PMP). The Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) also 
operates in Puntland. Additionally, SSC-Khatumo, which was recognised as a federal member 
state in April 2025, has its own security forces, estimated at 8 000, mostly from the 
Dhulbahante clan.  

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Somaliland security forces comprise the National Intelligence Service (NIS), which relies on 
formal and informal intelligence networks and includes army and police intelligence officers; 
the Somaliland Police (6 000 officers) the Somaliland National Armed Forces (between 8 000 
and 15 000 soldiers), and the Somali Coast Guard.  

On territorial control and influence of FMS forces and Somaliland forces, see also map above.  

FMS security forces in Somalia have been implicated in human rights violations, including 
arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings, and sexual violence. Reports also cite child 
recruitment, attacks on schools and hospitals, and disruption of humanitarian aid. Journalists, 
human rights defenders, and terrorism suspects were frequently targeted. While South-West 
State Police have shown improved conduct under international oversight, abuses persist 
among Darwish units across states. Notably, serious violations occurred during conflicts in 
Galmudug, Jubbaland, Puntland, and Somaliland, including the 2023–2024 clashes in Laas 
Caanood. Furthermore, in the reference period, a trend of limiting civil liberties in Somaliland, 
including through an increasing number of arrests of journalists was reported. 

2.3.  Non-State actors 

2.3.1.  Al-Shabaab 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.1.1., 
1.2., 1.3.1., 1.6., 1.7., 1.10.; Security 2025, 1.1., 1.2.2., 1.4.1.; Actors 2021, 4.; Country Guidance 
should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Al-Shabaab is an Islamist Salafi-jihadist armed group and designated Al-Qaeda affiliate 
seeking to establish a ‘Greater Somalia’ under strict Islamic rule. It is structured with a military 
wing (Jabahaat), an intelligence wing (Amniyat) and administrative networks. Relatively recent 
estimates indicate that Al-Shabaab had between 7 000 and 12 000 fighters at the end of 
2023, however Al-Shabaab’s true strength remains unknown, as the group continually refills 
the losses by forced recruitment or by deals with clans. The group remains the most potent 
security threat in Somalia, controlling large rural areas in South-Central Somalia, especially in 
Hiraan, Galgaduud, and southern regions and maintained influence across key routes and 
towns, including areas near Mogadishu. Jilib town serves as its de facto headquarters. Al-
Shabaab has limited presence in Somaliland and northern Puntland. See also map above. 

Human rights violations committed by the group are extensive. The group maintains military 
capabilities despite counter-insurgency efforts. It uses improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 
suicide bombings, ambushes, and complex attacks targeting government, African Union 
Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), civilians, and infrastructure across southern and central 
Somalia. The group exploits clan dynamics and uses clan grievances and loyalty for 
recruitment and leverage, while publicly claiming Islam transcends clan divisions. Al-Shabaab 
continues widespread recruitment of children and is responsible for abductions, executions, 
and sexual violence. It also enforces a strict interpretation of Sharia through the Hisbah, its 

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morality police, imposing punishments such as flogging, amputations, and executions, 
operating also mobile courts enforcing the Sharia. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab sustains its 
operations by extracting revenue through coercive taxation, forced seizure of resources, and 
the strategic restriction of humanitarian assistance.   

2.3.2.  Clans and clan militias 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.5., 
Security 2025, 1.2.3.; Actors 2021, 3.2.1., 3.4., 3.6.; Country Guidance should not be referred to 
as a source of COI. 

Clan rivalries and competition over political power, land, and resources remain key sources of 
conflict across Somalia. Violence often stems from revenge killings, unresolved grievances, or 
competition for representation. Clan militias, numbering over 100, are self-organised and often 
act with impunity. Clashes between and within clans are frequent, leading to high numbers of 
casualties and displacement. The Macawisley militia, originally Hawadle-led, was reportedly 
operating in the Lower Shabelle region and their number was estimated at between 8 000 
and 10 000 members across Hirshabelle and Galmudug, as of September 2023. Similar forms 
of clan based, self-organised and self-styled protection forces against Al-Shabaab were also 
set-up in Gedo, Hirshabelle, Middle Shabelle, and in Galmudug at different times in recent 
years. Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama’ah (ASWJ), the multi-clan (Ayr, Dir and Marehan clans) armed 
Sufi group, re-emerged in Galmudug in 2021, clashing sporadically with the SNA and the 
Galmudug State’s forces.  

Clan militias have committed grave human rights violations, including killings, torture, sexual 
violence, abductions, and attacks on civilian infrastructure, also engaging in arms trafficking. 
Child recruitment by clan-based militias has also been documented.  

Violations of human rights have also taken place under the xeer system.  

2.3.3.  Other non-State actors  

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports and query: Country Focus 
2025, 1.10.; Security 2025, 1.2.3., 1.3., 1.5., 2.2.3., 2.6.2.; Actors 2021, 6.; COI Update 2025, 2.; 
Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), formed in 2015 and aligned with IS since 2017, operates 
primarily in Puntland. Recent estimates place its strength between 600 and 1 600 fighters, 
about half of whom are foreign nationals, including from Ethiopia, Tanzania, North Africa, 
Yemen, and Sudan. The group has established operational bases in four districts of Bari but 
controls no population centres. ISS lost ground to Puntland forces during operations in 2024-
2025. By the end of July 2025, in the context of the Hilaac offensive only a few scattered ISS 

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fighters remained in the area. (See also map above). It has also become a significant logistical 
and financial hub for the global IS network, funding operations through extortion, taxation, and 
gold mining. ISS has been involved in numerous attacks, including suicide bombings and IEDs, 
and has caused civilian casualties. Its activities have led to business closures and hospital 
shutdowns in Bossaso due to extortion. The group is also substantially involved in arms 
trafficking.  

In March 2022 the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) transitioned into the ATMIS, 
with a mandate to continue supporting Somali security institutions and combating Al-Shabaab. 
In January 2025, ATMIS was replaced by the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission 
in Somalia (AUSSOM) with 12 626 authorised personnel, including 1 040 police, contributed by 
Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Egypt. By 25 April 2025, the Kampala Summit called for 
increasing AUSSOM troops by at least 8 000 to address Somalia’s security challenges, but the 
mission still faces significant funding shortfalls, despite officially starting on 1 July 2025. While 
human rights compliance reportedly improved, concerns remained: ATMIS forces were 
implicated in civilian deaths in Lower Shabelle in July 2024, and other incidents involving 
crossfire and mortars caused civilian harm.  

As of May 2022, the U.S. redeployed 450–500 troops to Somalia under United States Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) to support Somali and African Union forces, primarily against Al-
Shabaab and ISS. AFRICOM also trains Danab special forces and provides operational 
support. Between April 2023 and March 2025, AFRICOM conducted 62 air and drone strikes, 
reportedly killing 381 people, including civilians. Independent sources reported fewer strikes. 
While no direct human rights violations were attributed to U.S. forces during this period, 
concerns about civilian casualties persist. The U.S. military role remains significant amid 
Somalia’s security challenges and ongoing counter-terrorism efforts. 

Besides the actors mentioned above, the (extended) family and community members can be 
actors of persecution or serious harm, such as in the case of domestic violence, violence 
against persons with diverse SOGIESC, forced and child marriage, female genital mutilation or 
cutting (FGM/C), etc. FGM/C practitioners, including traditional circumcisers and healthcare 
professionals, are another potential example of non-State actors of persecution or serious 
harm.  

Human rights violations are also committed by criminal groups, such as forced labour and sex 
trafficking by networks of smuggling and trafficking in human beings, or violent criminal acts 
committed by youth gangs, notably in Mogadishu.  

For further information on human rights violations committed by different State and 
non-State actors and their relevance as potential exclusion grounds, see 7. 
Exclusion. 

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3. 

Refugee status 

This chapter provides analysis and guidance on the potential international protection needs of 
selected profiles of applicants. These profiles were selected based on their relevance in the 
caseload of EU Member States. 

The list of profiles addressed in this chapter is non-exhaustive and the fact that a certain 
profile is included or not is without prejudice to the determination of their protection needs. 
Furthermore, the order of listed profiles does not reflect any ranking of the potential level of 
risk of persecution. 

While the conclusions under this common analysis provide general guidance, the protection 
needs of each applicant should be examined individually. The non-exhaustive lists of 
examples with regard to sub-profiles at a differentiated risk and to circumstances, which would 
normally increase or decrease the risk, are to be taken into account in light of all 
circumstances in the individual case.  

The considerations under each profile should, furthermore, be viewed without prejudice to 
the credibility assessment of the applicant’s claims. This common analysis deals solely with 
issues of risk analysis and qualification. 

For each profile, the guidance responds to the following questions: 

Step 1: Do the reported acts qualify as persecution? 

This part provides examples of acts reported to be committed against individuals 
belonging to the profile as well as guidance on whether such acts would reach the level 
of persecution according to Article 9 QD/QR.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

This part assesses how likely it is for applicants within the profile to have a well-founded 
fear of persecution. Further guidance is provided with regard to the circumstances 
which should be taken into account in the individual assessment, addressing also how 
they would impact the risk.  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

This part provides guidance on whether in case of established well-founded fear of 
persecution, this would be connected to a reason falling within the provision of Article 
10 QD/QR (nexus).  

Relevant COI is also included in the analysis to substantiate the assessment provided. Links to 
the relevant EUAA COI reports and/or queries are also added. 

For more guidance on how to read the following subsections, see ‘EUAA, 'Refugee 
status' in Country Guidance: Explained, February 2025’. 

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3.1. 

Persons associated with the government of 
Somalia and/or international actors 

3.1.1. 

Federal and state officials  

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.6., 
1.6.1.; Targeting 2021, 6.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

This sub-profile refers to staff of the FGS and FMS and Somaliland administrations and focuses 
on their risk of persecution by Al-Shabaab.  

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Acts to which federal and state officials could be exposed are of such severe nature that they 
would amount to persecution. More specifically, Al-Shabaab has been reported to conduct 
targeted IEDs and mortar attacks, killings by shooting or use of suicide bombers against them.     

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

In South-Central Somalia, a well-founded fear of persecution would in general be 
substantiated for prominent and high-ranking federal and state officials, as they were 
targeted during the reference period on several occasions.  

The targeting of lower-level officials in South-Central Somalia appears to lack a consistent 
pattern, nevertheless the assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood to 
face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as:  

•  Nature of duties and visibility: Al-Shabaab has targeted different categories of federal 
and state officials, including government officials, district and deputy commissioners, 
tax collectors, employees of government institutions.  Family members of these 
officials have also been targeted. Officials with visibility through the exercise of their 
duties, such as tax collectors, may have a higher risk.  

•  Frequented locations and places: Individuals frequenting places where attacks are 
mostly recorded (e.g., hotels, cafes and restaurants where other state officials are 
present) may have a higher risk. The same applies to officials frequently travelling in 
convoys. 

•  Home area and Al-Shabaab operational capacity: In areas bordering contested areas 

or in contested areas between Al-Shabaab and FGS and FMS, federal and state 
officials may have a higher risk.  

In Puntland, Al-Shabaab has lower operational capacity, nevertheless in the case of federal 
and state officials the individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of 
likelihood to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such 
as: 

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•  Nature of duties and visibility: Al-Shabaab’s intelligence service has the ability to track 
and find individuals. Especially, individuals with visibility through the exercise of their 
duties may have a higher risk. For example, in 2020 Al-Shabaab carried out attacks 
killing the governor of Mudug region in Galkayo and the governor of Nugal in Garowe. 

•  Home area and Al-Shabaab operational capacity: Al-Shabaab has stronger presence 

in the northern parts of Puntland (see map). 

In Somaliland, Al-Shabaab has very limited operational capacity and in the reference period 
no incidents against federal and state officials were reported. Therefore, a well-founded fear 
of persecution for state and federal state officials in Somaliland would in general not be 
substantiated.  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this 
is highly likely to be for reasons of religion and/or political opinion, as Al-Shabaab considers 
people associated with the Somali government to be infidels and/or as their political enemies.  

3.1.2.  Members of the federal and state armed forces 

Last update: October 2025 

This sub-profile refers to members of the FGS and FMS armed forces, as well as to Somaliland 
armed forces and focuses on their risk of persecution by Al-Shabaab. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.6.3.; 
Targeting 2021, 6.2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

While certain risks are inherent to armed forces’ duties and activities, acts to which members 
of federal and state forces could be exposed, with regard to the risks outside the performance 
of their duties, are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More 
specifically, Al-Shabaab has carried out targeted assassinations and attacks, involving mostly 
shootings, IEDs and suicide bombings against them, including against officers of lower 
unspecified rank and regular soldiers. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

In South-Central Somalia, a well-founded fear of persecution would in general be 
substantiated for members of the federal and state armed forces as they were targeted 
during the reference period on several occasions. SNA members have been a primary target 
for Al-Shabaab. More specifically, in different incidents in 2023, 2024 and 2025, SNA 
members have been targeted with IEDs planted by Al-Shabaab. 

In Puntland, Al-Shabaab has lower operational capacity, nevertheless in the case of members 
of the federal and state armed forces the individual assessment of whether there is a 

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reasonable degree of likelihood to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting 
circumstances, such as: 

•  Nature of duties and visibility: Individuals with visibility through the exercise of their 

duties may have a higher risk.  

•  Home area and Al-Shabaab operational capacity: Al-Shabaab has stronger presence 
in the northern parts of Puntland (see map). For example, in January 2024 an attack 
with an IED at a tea kiosk/khat chewing point in Bossaso was reported. 

In Somaliland, Al-Shabaab has very limited operational capacity and in the reference period 
no incidents against members of the federal and state armed forces were reported. Therefore, 
a well-founded fear of persecution for members of the federal and state armed forces in 
Somaliland would in general not be substantiated. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this 
is highly likely to be for reasons of religion and/or political opinion, as Al-Shabaab considers 
military personnel as part of the Somali government and therefore infidels and/or as their 
political enemies. 

Exclusion considerations are relevant to this profile, as members of the FGS and 
FMS armed forces may have been involved in excludable acts. See 7. Exclusion. 

3.1.3. 

Electoral delegates 

Last update: October 2025 

This sub-profile refers to electoral delegates, meaning those individuals in Somalia, mostly 
elders, who are the persons responsible to select members of the federal and state 
legislatures on behalf of their communities in indirect elections, and focuses on their risk of 
persecution by Al-Shabaab. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.6.2.; 
Targeting 2021, 6.4.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Acts to which individuals under this profile could be exposed, are of such severe nature that 
they would amount to persecution. More specifically, Al-Shabaab has carried out killings by 
shooting and ‘issued warnings’ to elders who were potential participants in the polls as 
delegates.  

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Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

In South-Central Somalia, a well-founded fear of persecution would in general be 
substantiated for electoral delegates, given the operational capacity of Al-Shabaab as well as 
their prominent profile. Al-Shabaab considers the participation in any election as a crime 
against Islam and has targeted electoral delegates, both in pre-election and post-election 
periods, with most instances taking place in South-Central Somalia in the reference period and 
involving shooting of electoral delegates coming from various corners of the country.  

In Puntland, Al-Shabaab has lower operational capacity, with stronger presence in the 
northern parts (see map). Therefore, the home area of the applicant should be taken into 
account as a risk-impacting circumstance. 

In Somaliland, Al-Shabaab has very limited operational capacity and in the reference period 
no incidents against electoral delegates were reported. Therefore, a well-founded fear of 
persecution for electoral delegates in Somaliland would in general not be substantiated. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this 
is highly likely to be for reasons of religion and/or political opinion, as Al-Shabaab views the 
participation in any election as a crime against Islam and/or electoral delegates as their 
political enemies.  

3.1.4.  Civilians perceived as ‘spies’ by Al-Shabaab 

Last update: October 2025 

This sub-profile refers to civilians accused by Al-Shabaab of spying for the government, for 
ATMIS/AUSSOM or other international actors and/ or for FMS forces or administrations.  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.6.4.; 
Targeting 2021, 6.3.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Acts to which civilians perceived as ‘spies’ by Al-Shabaab could be exposed are of such 
severe nature that they would amount to persecution. Al-Shabaab considers ‘spying’ for the 
government (or foreign powers) as a crime punishable by death. Civilians and businesspeople 
suspected of spying for different actors, such as the government, international actors, 
including the US forces, regional and federal security forces, and regional and federal 
intelligence agencies, were targeted and executed, mostly with public executions, as warning 
examples, and on various occasions abducted. 

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Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

In South-Central Somalia, a well-founded fear of persecution would in general be 
substantiated in the case of civilians perceived as ‘spies’ as they were targeted and executed 
on various occasions during the reference period. As reported in 2021, the level of proof 
before executions was reportedly quite low and no access to a lawyer was allowed.  

In Puntland, Al-Shabaab has lower operational capacity, with stronger presence in the 
northern parts (see map). Therefore, the home area of the applicant should be taken into 
account as a risk-impacting circumstance.  

In Somaliland, Al-Shabaab has very limited operational capacity and in the reference period 
no incidents against civilians perceived as ‘spies’ were reported. Therefore, a well-founded 
fear of persecution for civilians perceived as ‘spies’ in Somaliland would in general not be 
substantiated. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this 
is highly likely to be for reasons of religion and/or political opinion. Al-Shabaab perceives 
individuals of this profile as supporters or collaborators of its political opponents and, by 
extension, infidels.  

3.2.  Persons fearing forced recruitment by Al-Shabaab  

Last update: October 2025 

This profile refers to adult males fearing recruitment by Al-Shabaab against their will. This 
profile also contains information on individuals refusing to be recruited or provide recruits to 
Al-Shabaab.  

In the case of Al-Shabaab, recruitment takes place for a wide range of purposes, such as 
fighting, providing administrative support, collecting taxes, expanding outreach, intelligence 
gathering, etc.  

Women hold various roles in Al-Shabaab such as combatants, spies, recruiters, fundraisers, 
cooks, tailors, cleaners, religious teachers/preachers, zakat (religious tax) collectors, nurses, 
storing weapons, hiding assassins and/or weapons after attacks, helping with money 
laundering, assisting also in terror-related activities. In addition, they are involved in the 
recruitment and brainwash of potential new members. The use of female suicide bombers was 
reported as rare. Women are commonly recruited by Al-Shabaab through marriage, therefore 
for more information, see 3.11.4. Child marriage and forced marriage. For child recruitment by 
Al-Shabaab, see 3.12.2. Child recruitment by Al-Shabaab. For deserters and defectors from Al-
Shabaab see 3.3. Deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab 

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The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.1., 
1.1.1.(a); Targeting 2021, 1.1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

The distinction between voluntary and forced recruitment is not clear-cut. People join Al-
Shabaab for a mixture of reasons, such as financial hardship, social discontent, religious 
indoctrination, military pressure and threats, grievances directed at the government, the 
international community, or rival clans, as well as coercion and fear of repercussions from Al-
Shabaab. Al-Shabaab recruits both from majority and minority clans. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Forced recruitment amounts to persecution. Al-Shabaab’s means of forcible recruitment 
included abduction, Islamic school recruitment or via clan elders.   

Acts to which individuals refusing forced recruitment could be exposed are of such severe 
nature that they would also amount to persecution. More specifically, those who rejected the 
group’s authority were forced to flee areas under its control to ensure their safety. Individuals 
who refused recruitment have been threatened and labelled as infidels who reject Islam and 
the Sharia law, and, in some cases, they have been killed to set a warning for others in the 
community. Furthermore, according to older sources, refusal to join Al-Shabaab or to 
surrender recruits could lead to retaliatory attacks on local communities by the group. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the 
applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: 

•  Age: The recruited persons are usually between 11 and 25 years old, or even younger. 
Elders could get also recruited, if they practice a profession, which Al-Shabaab finds 
useful for the group’s needs.  

•  Home area and the control or influence of Al-Shabaab: Recruitment is more easily 

facilitated in areas where Al-Shabaab has established control over a substantial period 
of time, mostly in South-Central Somalia areas (in Middle and Lower Shabelle, Middle 
and Lower Jubba, Bay, Bakool, Hirshabelle and Galmudug). IDPs residing in the outer 
districts of Mogadishu, where Al-Shabaab has strong influence, are frequently recruited 
by the group. In areas outside the group’s direct control, such as Puntland, the risk of 
recruitment will be generally lower but personal circumstances and the presence of Al-
Shabaab in northern parts (map) are still to be taken into account (see also other bullet 
points). In Somaliland, in general the risk would not be substantiated. Recruitment 
outside Al-Shabaab’s control areas frequently involves aspects of coercion.  

•  (Prior) profession(s) and/or socio-economic status: Al-Shabaab has a particular 

interest in medical professionals and persons with social influence, like university and 
school teachers, especially in Mogadishu, as well as across South-Central Somalia and 
therefore offers them considerable incentives to join the group. Individuals with low 
socio-economic status may be pressured by their families to join Al-Shabaab.  

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Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

While the risk of forced recruitment as such may not generally imply a nexus to a reason for 
persecution, the consequences of refusal could lead to persecution which is highly likely to be 
for reasons of religion and/or political opinion, as those who refuse recruitment are labelled 
by Al-Shabaab as infidels who reject Islam and Sharia law.  

3.3.  Deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab  

Last update: October 2025 

This profile refers to men, having deserted or defected from Al-Shabaab, as well as to boys 
who had been actively involved in the group, especially as fighters.  

For the situation of women and girls having left Al-Shabaab, see 3.13.4. Women and girls who 
have left Al-Shabaab.  

In the context of leaving Al-Shabaab, the following terminology is used: 

Deserter: a man leaving Al-Shabaab without Al-Shabaab’s permission. 

Defector: a man who has left Al-Shabaab without Al-Shabaab’s permission and then 
has reported to the Somali authorities 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.1.1.; 
Targeting 2021, 1.2.; AS Deserters 2023, 1.1., 1.2.1., 1.2.3., 1.2.4., 2.1.1., 2.1.3., 2.1.4., 2.2.4., 2.3.2.; 
Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Several factors influence the decision to leave Al-Shabaab. Control over territory affects 
escape options, as liberated areas offer more chances to desert. Social networks, especially 
clans, play a crucial role in facilitating safe disengagement, often more than the government 
programs. While formal defection processes exist, most leave informally due to fear or lack of 
awareness. The government is actively encouraging defection from Al-Shabaab, however in 
the absence of an amnesty law, presidential declarations have become the main tool for 
granting amnesty.  

Government authorities distinguish between ‘high-value’ and ‘low-value’ defectors. ‘High-
value' defectors are Al-Shabaab commanders or clan elders and warlords, who can make 
many of their followers also leave. ‘Low-value’ defectors are further sorted out into ‘high-risk’ 
defectors and ‘low-risk’ defectors.  

‘High risk’ defectors are those who are considered commanders of some sort and had been 
engaged in the making of explosives, or who had killed someone. ‘Low risk’ defectors are 
generally considered those ‘foot soldiers, porters, mechanics and the like’, who reportedly 

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received amnesty from prosecution. Those who had fundraised, preached jihad, or provided 
logistical support could be classified as either low-risk or high-risk defectors. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Criminal prosecution in itself does not amount to persecution. ‘High-risk’ defectors are often 
sentenced to death and execution. Death penalty and execution amounts to persecution. The 
arrest and detention of children allegedly associated with Al-Shabaab by the authorities in 
South-Central Somalia and in Puntland is a recurring measure. Coercive treatment and in 
some cases use of torture have been reported, with children being prosecuted as adults, 
notably in Puntland and with sentences ranging from some years to life imprisonment.  

Other acts to which deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab could be exposed by Al-
Shabaab are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, 
Al-Shabaab punishes defection potentially by death. In the past, a number of disengaged 
fighters have received death threats, even in rehabilitation centres. Family members are also 
targeted - wives have been executed, threatened, or forced into ‘wife inheritance’, and 
relatives may be extorted for compensation. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab 
could be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should 
be also considered. More specifically, communities often stigmatise former Al-Shabaab 
members, seeing them as security risks, leading to social isolation and challenges regarding 
finding work and making a living. Children might face displacement, separation from families, 
and marginalisation, often ending up in IDP camps or on the streets. Being a child is to be 
taken into account in the assessment of whether an act reaches the threshold of persecution.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

In South-Central Somalia, a well-founded fear of persecution by the group would in general 
be substantiated in the case of deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab. Leaving Al-Shabaab 
is generally not accepted, desertion is seen as an infringement of the jihadist ideology and the 
group would seek to punish the deserters it can reach in order to provide a ‘shocking 
example’ for others who might be considering desertion.  

In Puntland, Al-Shabaab has lower operational capacity with stronger presence in the 
northern parts (see map). Therefore, the home area of the applicant should be taken into 
account as a risk-impacting circumstance. 

In Somaliland, Al-Shabaab has very limited operational capacity and therefore, a well-founded 
fear of persecution by the group for deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab in Somaliland 
would in general not be substantiated. 

The National Defectors Programme cannot guarantee security for individuals who disengage, 
with Al-Shabaab often continuing to threaten its former members long after their exit. 
Additionally, well-founded fear of persecution by the government may be substantiated, 
particularly for ‘high-risk’ defectors, in South-Central Somalia and Puntland. 

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There is no information about the treatment of deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab by 
the government or the community in Somaliland.  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this 
is highly likely to be for reasons of religion and/or political opinion, as desertion and defection 
is seen by Al-Shabaab as an infringement of the jihadist ideology. Political opinion may also be 
the nexus in case of persecution by the government.  

Exclusion considerations are particularly relevant to this profile, as deserters and 
defectors from Al-Shabaab may have been involved in excludable acts. See 7. 
Exclusion. 

3.4. 

Individuals refusing to pay ‘taxes’ to Al-Shabaab  

Last update: October 2025 

The term ‘taxes’ in this context includes checkpoint taxes, extortion, religious ‘taxes’, 
protection money and forced contributions. Al-Shabaab relies on different sources of revenue, 
such as checkpoints, forced charitable tax (zakat), direct extortion of business, taxation of 
imports into ports or farm produce, kidnappings for ransom, livestock selling, water and 
irrigation resources, vehicles registration fees, operating licences fee, local tax imposed based 
on need, as well as property and business ventures.  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.10.1.; 
Security 2025, 1.7.; Actors 2021, 4.3.2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a 
source of COI. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Acts to which individuals refusing to pay ‘taxes’ to Al-Shabaab could be exposed are of such 
severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, Al-Shabaab’s 
retaliation for refusing to ‘pay’ taxes or for paying taxes to others, included attacks with IEDs, 
and suicide attacks, harassment and gender-based violence against women in checkpoints, as 
well as abductions, including for defying the regional tax collection, shooting and killing over 
tax extortion disputes.  

The taxation system through coercion or ‘taxtortion’ that the group employs is sustained 
through intimidation and threats over business continuity and personal safety, with violence 
employed against those who fail to comply. Despite the formal ban on women’s work or 
businesses, both women and men are required to pay taxes to the group. Women who cannot 
afford to pay taxes are sometimes told to hand over their children.  

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Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

In South-Central Somalia, a well-founded fear of persecution would in general be 
substantiated in the case of individuals refusing to pay ‘taxes’ to Al-Shabaab, as they were 
targeted during the reference period on several occasions. More specifically, threats and 
punishments are core parts of Al-Shabaab enforcement tactics and in different incidents in 
2023 and 2024, the group retaliated against people resisting tax collection.  

In Puntland, Al-Shabaab has lower operational capacity, with stronger presence in the 
northern parts (see map). Therefore, the home area of the applicant should be taken into 
account as a risk-impacting circumstance. For example, two incidents of killings over tax 
extortion disputes were reported in 2023 and 2024 in Bossaso (Bari). 

In Somaliland, Al-Shabaab has very limited operational capacity and in the reference period 
no incidents against individuals refusing to pay ‘taxes’ were reported. Therefore, a well-
founded fear of persecution for individuals refusing to pay ‘taxes’ to Al-Shabaab in 
Somaliland would in general not be substantiated. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where a well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, 
this may be for reasons of religion and/or political opinion. Al-Shabaab would perceive refusal 
to pay ‘taxes’ as support for the Somali government or foreign forces with the targeted 
individual being perceived as an infidel or political opponent of the group.    

3.5.  Humanitarian workers  

Last update: October 2025 

This profile refers to employees of humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
United Nations agencies and focuses on their risk of persecution by Al-Shabaab  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.6.4.; 
Security 2025, 1.6., 2.1.1., 2.2.2., 2.4., 2.7.1.; Targeting 2021, 6.4.; Country Guidance should not 
be referred to as a source of COI. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Acts to which humanitarian workers could be exposed are of such severe nature that they 
would amount to persecution. More specifically, humanitarian workers have been subjected to 
life threats, physical violence, abductions, arbitrary arrests, attacks with IEDs, and killings 
mainly by Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is highly suspicious of espionage (see also 3.1.4. Civilians 
perceived as ‘spies’ by Al-Shabaab)  and religious proselytism (see also 3.7. Individuals 
(perceived as) contravening social or religious laws/tenets). NGOs accused of spying or 
seeking to convert individuals to Christianity are especially targeted. Al-Shabaab allows limited 
humanitarian work only under strict control, and non-compliance with its rules can result in 

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serious threats or attacks. Humanitarian workers have been also affected as collateral damage 
in the context of the armed conflict in Somalia.   

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

In South-Central Somalia, a well-founded fear of persecution would in general be 
substantiated in the case of humanitarian workers, in view of, the ban on the operation of 
most international NGOs and the strict vetting of the activities of Somali and local NGOs or 
CSOs in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas, the high suspicions on espionage, as well as the overall 
Al-Shabaab’s pervasive presence in South-Central Somalia. 

In Puntland, Al-Shabaab has lower operational capacity, with stronger presence in the 
northern parts (see map). Therefore, the home area of the applicant should be taken into 
account as a risk-impacting circumstance.  

In Somaliland, Al-Shabaab has very limited operational capacity and in the reference period 
no incidents against humanitarian workers were reported. Therefore, a well-founded fear of 
persecution for humanitarian workers in Somaliland would in general not be substantiated.  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this 
is highly likely to be for reasons of religion and/or political opinion, as being a humanitarian 
worker would be perceived by Al-Shabaab as promoting foreign religious agendas or 
opposing their ideological and political views. 

3.6. 

Journalists and other media workers 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.7.; 
Security 2025, 1.6.; Targeting 2021, 7.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source 
of COI. 

As of September 2024, media freedom in Somalia remains deeply concerning. Journalists 
continue to face harassment and threats by both the Somali government and Al-Shabaab. 
Somalia ranked third on the 2024 Global Impunity Index by the Committee to Protect 
Journalists, highlighting the high rate of unsolved journalist killings. Despite efforts such as the 
National Action Plan and the appointment of a special prosecutor, progress has been limited 
due to ongoing impunity, restrictive legislation, and political interference. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which journalists could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would 
amount to persecution. More specifically, journalists have been subjected to arbitrary arrests, 
detentions, beatings, torture and physical abuse by state actors and government-aligned 
militias all over Somalia, FGS, Somaliland and Puntland authorities. Incidents of killings, 

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physical violence and harassment by Al-Shabaab were also reported in Al-Shabaab-controlled 
areas as well as in Mogadishu. Raids of media houses have also led to violence against media 
workers and arbitrary detention.  

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that journalists and media workers could be 
subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be also 
considered. More specifically, self-censorship is widely spread in Somalia, including in South-
Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, as well as Al-Shabaab-controlled areas. Self-
censorship was usually caused by acts of systematic threats, intimidation, harassment, raids on 
media houses, destruction and confiscation of equipment, freezing of media outlet accounts, 
fines, legal restriction using vague provisions in law (e.g., the practice of making reference to 
the Penal Code to criminalise journalists’ activities was reported), banning coverage of 
politically sensitive issues etc. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

A well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated in the case of 
journalists and media workers seen as critical of an actor particularly active in a specific 
area or in control of a specific area. Journalists or media workers involved in reporting on 
government misconduct, corruption, or security failures, covering politically sensitive topics 
(e.g., Al-Shabaab attacks), or practicing independent journalism in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas 
are particularly targeted in Somalia. 

In the case of other journalists and other media workers, the individual assessment should 
take into account risk-impacting circumstances such as: 

•  Gender: A high number of sexual and gender-based violence against female 

journalists were reported mainly due to their work on issues that are perceived as 
‘controversial’ and as disruptive to traditional gender norms by working outside the 
home.  

•  Visibility of activities and public profile: Illustrative incidents included the killing of a 

prominent and award-winning female journalist, the killing of the Somali Cable 
Television's director by Al-Shabaab, and the announcing of criminal charges against 
the Somali Journalists Syndicate organisation and its leadership by the FGS. 

•  Home area and reach of the actors they report on: Journalists critical of an actor in 

areas outside Al Shabaab’s control or where the actor has limited operational capacity 
would face a lower risk.  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this 
is highly likely to be for reasons of political opinion, as journalists and other media workers 
would be perceived by different actors as critical of their policies, security failures, or as 
promoting views contrary to prevailing political ideologies and being a threat to public order 
and national security. 

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In the case of targeting by Al-Shabaab, persecution of this profile may also be for reasons of 
religion, as journalists and other media workers may be perceived by Al-Shabaab as critical to 
prevailing religious ideologies and being a threat to religious norms. 

3.7. 

Individuals (perceived as) contravening social or 
religious laws/tenets 

3.7.1. 

Individuals (perceived as) contravening Sharia law in Al-
Shabaab controlled areas 

Last update: October 2025 

This sub-profile refers to individuals (perceived as) contravening Islamic laws, including 
apostates, converts, blasphemers and individuals (perceived) as having committed hudud 
crimes, in Al-Shabaab controlled areas. Members of religious minorities are also included. For 
an overview of Al-Shabaab controlled areas see 2.3.1. Al-Shabaab under section 2. Actors of 
persecution or serious harm. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.3.; 
Actors 2021, 2.3.; Targeting 2021, 3.1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source 
of COI. 

A wide range of behaviours may be perceived by Al-Shabaab as contravening Islamic laws, 
such as illicit sexual relations (zina, see also persons with diverse SOGIESC), stealing and 
robbery, consumption of alcohol, drugs, blasphemy, apostasy, and conversion to non-Muslim 
faiths, smoking, being influenced by foreign values in acts, behaviour, social relations or 
appearance, etc. In Al-Shabaab controlled areas, men are not allowed to have a fluffy haircut, 
wear trousers, have a moustache or shave their beard, while women cannot wear a bra 
because perceived as a Western creation. Also, people travelling to Al-Shabaab controlled 
areas have to abide by these rules. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Acts to which individuals (perceived as) contravening Islamic laws could be exposed are of 
such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. Al-Shabaab imposes a ‘harsh’ 
interpretation of Islamic law with hudud punishments for adultery and Illicit sexual relations 
(zina), theft and highway robbery, alcohol consumption, and apostasy. The group’s armed 
morality police force, jaish al-hisba, also enforced compliance and punished individuals failing 
to adhere to the imposed rules. Punishments imposed by Al-Shabaab through its own courts 
include detentions, public beatings, abductions, amputations and executions. Arrest and 
detention, often exposing civilians to torture and beatings were also reported. 

Non-Muslim faiths and converts from Islam and blasphemy are sanctioned with execution and 
death. Social sanctioning and attacks against converts were also reported. 

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Theft falls under the hudud category of hiraba and is harshly punished by amputations.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

A well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated in the case of 
individuals perceived by Al-Shabaab as contravening Islamic laws in areas under its control in 
South-Central Somalia as they are widely targeted by the group. 

With regard to areas outside of the control of the group, including in South-Central Somalia, 
Puntland and Somaliland, see 3.7.2. Individuals (perceived as) contravening religious (and 
customary) tenets outside Al-Shabaab controlled areas. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Persecution for an applicant under this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of religion as 
Al-Shabaab perceives such behaviours as crimes committed ‘against the rights of God’, 
labelling the individual as an apostate.  

In the case of persons perceived by Al-Shabaab as influenced by foreign values in their acts, 
behaviour, social relations and appearance, persecution may also be for reasons of 
membership of a particular social group, based on their common background which cannot 
be changed (the perceived act or behaviour) and/or a shared characteristic or belief that is so 
fundamental to identity or conscience that they should not be forced to renounce it 
(opposition to cultural, social or religious norms and the unwillingness to comply with them) 
and the distinct identity that these individuals may have in the Somali society. 

3.7.2. 

Individuals (perceived as) contravening religious (and 
customary) tenets outside Al-Shabaab controlled areas 

Last update: October 2025 

This sub-profile focuses on individuals (perceived as) contravening Islamic and customary 
tenets, including apostates, converts, blasphemers, individuals belonging to religious 
minorities or (perceived) having committed hudud crimes and other individuals perceived as 
contravening moral norms, in areas outside the control of Al-Shabaab. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.3.2.; 
Actors 2021, 2.3.; Targeting 2021, 3.2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a 
source of COI. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which individuals (perceived as) contravening social or religious laws/tenets 
outside Al-Shabaab controlled areas could be exposed are of such severe nature that they 
would amount to persecution. More specifically, under Sharia law, corporal punishment, such 
as stoning, amputation or flogging, is lawful as a sentence for crime, except possibly in 
Somaliland. Sharia law prescribes corporal punishments for theft, unless justified by need or 

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hunger, however ‘minor’ crimes of theft or stealing are usually taken care of by family elders. 
Nevertheless, corporal punishments by Sharia courts, outside Al-Shabaab controlled areas, 
are rarely enforced.  

Prosecution for acts which are not considered criminal according to international standards 
(e.g. adultery) would also amount to persecution. Adultery in Somalia is punished with 
imprisonment up to two years under the Penal Code, however, adjudication is usually referred 
to elders or family members. Somalia de facto maintains the death penalty for apostasy. 
Conversion from Islam to another religion is prohibited and sanctioned with imprisonment up 
to two years and is socially unacceptable. In Puntland and in Somaliland conversion from Islam 
is explicitly prohibited by the constitution. Somaliland courts have imposed imprisonment 
penalties for alleged conversion from Islam to Christianity, apostasy and blasphemy. Suspicion 
of conversion is punished with imprisonment, harassment and intimidation, including death 
threats by members of their community. Open worship or religious gatherings of non-Islamic 
religious groups (including Christians, Shia Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, and those not 
affiliated with any religion) can result in violent reprisals, forced divorces, or even execution by 
extremist groups. Also, the consumption and trading the leaves of the khat plant, which are 
chewed by Somalis for the stimulatory effects, is forbidden and punished. 

Al-Shabaab’s moral policing extends well beyond their controlled areas and the group has 
targeted individuals in areas outside their control, and in contested areas, including with 
abductions, attacks, tortures and killings.  

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that individuals (perceived as) contravening 
social or religious laws/tenets outside Al-Shabaab-controlled areas could be subjected to, 
such as restrictions to freedom of religion, and whether they occur as an accumulation of 
various measures, should be considered.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

In the case of (those perceived as) apostates, converts, proselytisers or blasphemers, in 
general, a well-founded fear of persecution would be substantiated in the whole of 
Somalia, including South-Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, given the 
criminalisation of such acts and the severity of the punishments. 

In the case of individuals (perceived as) contravening other social or religious laws/tenets 
areas outside Al-Shabaab controlled areas, the individual assessment of whether there is a 
reasonable degree of likelihood to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting 
circumstances, such as: 

•  Belonging to a religious minority: Religious minorities such as Christians and 

individuals not belonging to any religion or being perceived or suspected as converts 
from Islam, would have a higher risk of persecution.   

•  Nature and visibility of the act: The nature of the specific norm transgressed and the 
(perceived) gravity and potential repetitiveness of such transgression could impact the 
risk. For example, adultery may be perceived as a more serious offence compared to 

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consuming khat. Furthermore, the public character of the activity may put an applicant 
at a higher risk (e.g. trading khat compared to consuming).  

•  Home area and operational capacity of Al-Shabaab: Al-Shabaab sanctioned offences 
in areas outside their control, notably in Lower Shabelle, Bay and Lower Juba. Given 
Al-Shabaab’s limited operational capacity in Somaliland, individuals contravening other 
social norms would be at a lower risk.  

It should be highlighted that no applicant under this profile can reasonably be expected to 
abstain from their religious practices in order to avoid persecution(6).  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this 
is highly likely to be for reasons of religion. In some cases, persecution may be also 
substantiated for reasons of membership of a particular social group. For example, where the 
individual is seen as transgressing moral norms due to either past behaviour which cannot be 
changed or because they hold beliefs or characteristics fundamental to their identity or 
conscience. They may also be considered to have a distinct identity in Somalia, as they may 
be viewed as being different from the surrounding society (e.g. stigmatisation).  

A thorough individual assessment should take place as to whether the particular characteristic 
or belief is fundamental to the identity or conscience of the applicant. 

3.8. 

Individuals involved in clan disputes 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2025, 1.5., 1.5.1.; 
Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.  

Clan conflicts can be triggered by various reasons, including access to resources, competition 
over land, access to jobs and markets, political competition, insults and breach of women’s or 
other vulnerable persons’ protection status. Clan conflicts can be settled through traditional 
reconciliation mechanisms based on customary law. Inter-clan conflicts and rivalries have 
substantially increased across Somalia during the past two years (March 2023 - March 2025). 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Acts to which individuals involved in clan disputes could be exposed are of such severe 
nature, that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, incidents reported included 
clashes, various forms of clan related violence, as well as ‘revenge killings’ in the context of 
diya or mag (blood compensation). Additionally, women can play a very specific role in peace-
making between lineages of clans. In order to stabilise a peace agreement between groups, 

(6) CJEU, Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v X and Y and Z v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel, joined cases C-
199/12 to C-201/12 judgment of 7 November 2013, operative part (Court’s ruling), CURIA - Documents. 

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sometimes one or several unmarried girls from the family of the killer(s) are given by the elders 
for marriage to the injured group. In the reference period, women were directly targeted in the 
context of acts of clan revenge on several occasions. Perceived acts of humiliation deriving 
from clan conflicts or linked to any other triggers of feud/conflict can result in revenge killings. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for 
individuals involved in clan disputes in the whole of Somalia, including South-Central 
Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, to face persecution should take into account risk-
impacting circumstances, such as:  

•  Gender and age: Men have a higher risk, as they are mostly the ones directly involved 
in clan (or lineage, or family) conflicts. Individuals between 15 and 40 years old are 
mostly those directly involved in clan (or lineage, or family) conflicts. Children and men 
around 15 and 25 years old would typically be mobilised by elders to form lineage or 
clan militias, engage in attacks or put up defence positions. Women, children and 
elderly are traditionally referred to as ‘sacrosanct’ in clan conflicts. However, they can 
still be incidental victims of attacks or subject to direct acts of targeting or 
indiscriminate violence.  

•  Being considered a priority target: Perceived perpetrator of humiliation would be at 

higher risk. Men of the immediate patrilineal kin of a person who killed another person 
are priority targets, but depending on the social standing of the killed person, also 
others from the patrilineal kin-group of the killer, who hold a similarly high social status, 
can become priority targets. 

•  Clan affiliation: Clan status and power determine the level of ‘blood compensation’ or 
revenge, with victims of minority or marginalised clans ‘worthing’ less in comparison to 
powerful clans. As a result, members of marginalised clans are more vulnerable to 
violence, as their clans may lack the influence or capacity to seek justice or retaliation, 
reducing the deterrent effect for potential perpetrators. Furthermore, if majority groups 
clash with minority groups, it is more likely that women are harmed by majority clan 
militias, as a display of superiority. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

In case of inter-clan disputes, where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, it may 
be for reasons of race/nationality. Alternatively, clan members involved in intra-clan disputes 
may also have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of membership of a particular 
social group, based on their common background that cannot be changed (i.e. being a 
member of a clan under the threat of clan revenge) and due to the fact that clans are known 
and have a distinct identity in the surrounding society.  

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3.9.  Persons belonging to minorities 

Somali society includes both majority and minority groups. Many members of minority groups 
speak languages or dialects different from standard Somali. Clan affiliation remains essential 
for access to protection, resources, and justice, which puts minority groups at a disadvantage.  

While systematic targeting of minorities was most severe in the early 1990s, some still face 
disproportionate violence and discrimination, in varying degrees. Lacking strong militias, they 
are vulnerable to abuses, often carried out by majority clan members or militias, sometimes 
with tacit approval from authorities. Resentment over abuses made minority clans more 
vulnerable to recruitment by Al-Shabaab. For more information see profile 3.2. Persons fearing 
forced recruitment by Al-Shabaab. 

3.9.1.  Persons belonging to low status occupational minorities 

Last update: October 2025 

This sub-profile refers to persons who belong to low status occupational minorities. These 
minorities include the Gabooye (Madhibaan and Muse Diriye sub-groups), the Yibir, the Tumal, 
the Galgale, the Gahayle, the Yahar, the Ugaadhyahan/Ugaaryahan, the Hawle and the 
Hawrasame.  

For the Galgale, the Gahayle and the Yahar there was no available information on their 
treatment in the reference period. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.4., 
1.4.1.; Targeting 2021, 4.1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Low-status occupational groups in Somalia, are traditionally engaged in crafts like barbering, 
blacksmithing, and healing. They face widespread discrimination and social exclusion. For the 
geographical distribution of low-status occupational minorities in Somalia, see Country Focus 
2025, 1.4.1. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which individuals belonging to low status occupational minorities could be 
exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, 
members of the Gabooye experience violations, including physical assaults and abuse. Sexual 
abuse and violence against women and girls belonging to minority groups have been also 
reported. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that low status occupational minorities could 
be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be 
considered. More specifically, members of these groups are discriminated by other Somalis 
and regarded as ‘unclean’ by dominant clans and they experience limited access to education, 
healthcare, employment, and justice. Gabooye lack access to formal education, healthcare 
and economic resources, are largely politically excluded and intermarriages between them 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

and members of majority groups are shunned. Yibir have limited to no access to education 
and healthcare and are often exposed to abuse, exploitation, suffering also from extreme 
poverty. Madhiban experience marginalisation due to their engagement in traditional 
practices and spiritual services. Lucrative businesses belonging to Tumal have been taken 
over by dominant groups. The smaller groups of the Ugaadhyahan/Ugaaryahan, 
the Hawle and the Hawrasame are also marginalised and harassed (e.g., insulted or side-lined 
when competing for jobs; bullied out of their properties). 

Intermarriage with majority clans is rare, and state institutions offer little protection, especially 
in southern Somalia and Somaliland. For more information on individuals in mixed marriages, 
see sub-profile 3.9.5 Individuals in mixed marriages.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for members 
of low status occupational minorities, in the whole of Somalia, including South-Central 
Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, to face persecution should take into account risk-
impacting circumstances, such as:  

•  Gender: Women and girls belonging to minority groups are at a higher risk of sexual 

abuse and violence. Furthermore, group belonging in combination with gender-based 
discrimination influences access to education. 

•  Home area and local clan dynamics: Gabooye have problems with access to health 
care and education, especially in rural settings. They also experience violations, 
especially in Somaliland and southern Somalia. Only in Puntland, occupational 
minorities, such as the Gabooye, enjoy more rights and are in a slightly better position 
vis-à-vis majority group members. Yibir in rural areas are often exposed to abuse, 
exploitation and suffer from extreme poverty. Only in Puntland, are Tumal in a 
somewhat stronger position.   

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, for an applicant under this profile, 
this may be for reasons of race/nationality and/or membership of a particular social group, 
based on an innate characteristic or common background which cannot be changed (the 
family they are born into/their inherited occupational status) and distinct identity in Somalia, as 
they are perceived as different in the Somali society (in relation to stigmatisation by society). 

In the case of occupational groups engaged in spiritual services, persecution may also be for 
reasons of religion, as these activities carry considerable stigma in the Sunni Islamic Somali 
society. 

3.9.2.  Persons belonging to ethnic minorities 

This sub-profile refers to the Somali Bantu/Jareer, including the Shiidle clan, and Bajuni. 

Last update: October 2025 

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The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.4., 
1.4.2., 1.4.3.(a), 1.4.5.; Targeting 2021, 4.2., 4.5.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as 
a source of COI. 

With historical roots in slavery, coastal trade, or urban settlements, ethnic minorities in Somalia 
-including the Bantu/Jareer and Bajuni communities- represent some of the country’s most 
marginalised populations. These ethnic minority groups mostly reside in South-Central 
Somalia. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which individuals belonging to ethnic minorities could be exposed are of such 
severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, sexual abuse and 
violence against women and girls belonging to minority groups have been reported. 
Bantu/Jareer women enter in forced marriages with Al-Shabaab fighters that are described as 
sexual and domestic slavery. Cases of abductions, torture and killings of Bantu/Jareer by 
uniformed Somali police or armed groups that the Somali government was unwilling or unable 
to control were reported. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that ethnic minorities could be subjected to 
and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be considered. More 
specifically, members of these groups are discriminated by other Somalis. Bantu/Jareer face 
systematic exclusion, stigma, social segregation, denial of rights, and low social, economic and 
political status. They have no access to influential positions and are generally 
disproportionately vulnerable to conflict-driven displacement. They often lack the land rights 
and resources enjoyed by more dominant clans. They still face land grabs and forced 
displacement due to lack of political influence. Their children experience significantly lower 
school enrolment rates. Furthermore, intermarriages with members of majority clans are 
generally not accepted. In Al-Shabaab-controlled areas, they face extortion by the extremist 
militia. Also, Bajuni face systematic exclusion, stigma, social segregation, denial of rights, and 
low social, economic and political status. Bajuni population is being exploited by Somali 
businessmen. They lack access to influential positions and face limited opportunities to seek 
justice in case of conflicts over land or property. Furthermore, Shiidle have faced social 
exclusion and discrimination within Somali society. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for ethnic 
minorities, in the whole of Somalia, including South-Central Somalia, Puntland and 
Somaliland, to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such 
as:  

•  The specific minority group that the applicant belongs to: Differences are observed 
in the treatment of ethnic minority groups and the severity of violations against them. 
Bantu/Jareer, apart from discriminatory treatment, have been subjected also to serious 
human rights violations which would amount to persecution as such, whereas Bajuni 
seem to face mostly discriminatory treatment.  

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

•  Gender: Women and girls belonging to minority groups are at a higher risk of sexual 
abuse and violence. In IDP camps, Bantu/Jareer women lack (clan) protection. 
Furthermore, group-belonging in combination with gender-based discrimination 
influences access to education. 

•  Home area and local clan dynamics: Bantu/Jareer face extortion by the extremist 

militia in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas. Also, Bajuni enjoy higher levels of healthcare 
access in urban settings.  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this 
is highly likely to be for reasons of race/nationality, as these groups are distinct ethnic groups. 

3.9.3.  Persons belonging to groups specialised in Islamic services 

Last update: October 2025 

This sub-profile refers to persons who belong to minority groups specialised in Islamic 
services. These minorities include the Ashraf (Hassan and Hussein sub-groups) and the 
Sheikhal (Jasira, Gendershe, Loboge, and Aw Qutub sub-groups).  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.4., 
1.4.4., 1.4.5.; Targeting 2021, 4.3.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of 
COI. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which groups specialised in Islamic services could be exposed are of such 
severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, Ashraf and Sheikhal 
occasionally face human rights abuses due to their non-major-clan origins. Sexual abuse and 
violence against women and girls belonging to minority groups have been also reported. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that individuals belonging to groups 
specialised in Islamic services could be subjected to and whether they occur as an 
accumulation of various measures, should be considered. More specifically, the situation of 
Ashraf has been characterised by their structural marginalisation as a minority group in 
southern Somalia. Members of majority clans have taken advantage of them and rarely face 
serious consequences. In recent years they gained some political and economic influence in 
southern Somalia again. They also have access to education. Some Asharaf and Sheikhal 
engage successfully in businesses. Still, members of both groups (Ashraf and Sheikhal) 
occasionally face discrimination due to their non-major-clan origins. Although intermarriage 
between majority and minority groups such as Asharaf and Sheikhal is accepted, it is typically 
the case that women come from the minority group while men belong to the majority group.  

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Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for groups 
specialised in Islamic services, in the whole of Somalia, including South-Central Somalia, 
Puntland and Somaliland, to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting 
circumstances, such as:  

•  The specific minority group to which the applicant belongs: Although in the Somali 
parliament, three seats are reserved for the Sheikhal clan through the Hawiye clan 
family, the Gendershe and Jasira Sheikhal sub-groups face marginalisation, while 
Loboge and Aw Qutub sub-groups acquire a more ambiguous position. Some Ashraf 
and Sheikhal engage successfully in businesses, including large-scale businesses in 
Mogadishu. 

•  Gender: Women and girls belonging to minority groups are at a higher risk of sexual 
abuse and violence. Furthermore, their group belonging in combination with gender-
based discrimination influences access to education. Regarding intermarriage, women 
from Ashraf minority may marry members of majority groups, due to the highly religious 
prestige the Ashraf hold among other Somalis. 

•  Home area and local clan dynamics: Ashraf living in and around Baidoa have a slightly 
more protected position compared to other areas. The Aw Qutub Sheikhal sub-group 
had suffered some discrimination or harassment in Somaliland from the dominant Isaaq 
clan, being suspected of disloyalty to the Somaliland state after 1991. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile this 
is highly likely to be for reasons of race/nationality. Furthermore, persecution of groups 
specialised in Islamic services may also be for reasons of membership of a particular social 
group, based on an innate characteristic or common background which cannot be changed 
(the family they are born into/their inherited religious status) and distinct identity in Somalia, as 
they are perceived as different in the Somali society. 

3.9.4.  Persons belonging to clans which can be considered minority 

groups in local contexts 

Last update: October 2025 

This sub-profile refers to persons who belong to groups that are seen as the majority under 
one context and as a minority under another context. These groups include the a) Rahanweyn 
clan family divided into the sub-clans Digil and Merifle, each being divided into various sub-
clans as the Tunni, the Begedi and the Geledi (Rahanweyn/Digil) and Eyle (Rahanweyn/Merifle) 
and b) the Benadiri group in local context. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.4., 
1.4.3.(b), 1.4.3.(c); Targeting 2021, 4.4.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source 
of COI. 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which clans which can be considered minority groups in local contexts could be 
exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, 
sexual abuse and violence against women and girls belonging to minority groups have been 
reported.  

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that clans which can be considered minority 
groups in local contexts could be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of 
various measures, should be considered. Although the Rahanweyn are counted among the 
majority groups, they are often subject to discrimination by more powerful groups when found 
displaced into other clan-based areas. Eyle face socio-political marginalisation, while parts of 
Tunni, Begedi and Geledi are described as having a weak position, partly due to ambiguous 
reception of their belonging or due to local circumstances. Tunni face discrimination based on 
clan politics.  

In addition, they are disproportionately vulnerable to conflict-driven displacement. In the past, 
Benadiri were reportedly forced to pay bribes and subjected to extortion by members of 
majority clans. Nowadays, members of the Benadiri groups face socio-political exclusion. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for persons 
belonging to clans which can be considered minority groups in local contexts, in the whole of 
Somalia, including South-Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, to face persecution 
should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as:  

•  Home area in relation to the specific minority group to which they belong: Local 

circumstances cause these groups to be considered minorities in some areas, while in 
other areas they do not hold a minority position. Differences are also observed in the 
treatment of different minority groups and the severity of violations against them. In 
more recent years, direct security threats against the Benadiri have not been reported. 
Furthermore, intermarriage between Benadiri and other Somali clans is not restricted. 
In urban settings, especially in Mogadishu, Benadiri can get access to education. They 
also have gained some access to government institutions.  

•  Local clan dynamics: Although the Rahanweyn are counted among the majority 

groups, they are often subject to discrimination by more powerful groups when they 
have been displaced into other clan-based areas.  

•  Status as ‘noble’, ‘commoner’: Within Rahanweyn group boon (commoners) are 

subject to prejudice, social exclusion and some exploitation as cheap labour force by 
bilis (nobles) who claim a purer patrilineal descent. 

•  Gender: Women and girls belonging to minority groups are at a higher risk of sexual 

abuse and violence. Furthermore, group-belonging in combination with gender-based 
discrimination influences access to education.   

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Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this 
is highly likely to be for reasons of race/nationality. Persecution of minority groups in local 
contexts may also be for reasons of membership of particular social group, based on an 
innate characteristic or common background which cannot be changed (the family they are 
born into) and distinct identity, as they may be perceived as different in the local context. 

3.9.5. 

Individuals in mixed marriages 

Last update: October 2025 

This profile refers to both partners involved in mixed marriages. It does not refer to children 
born under these marriages or members of the extended family. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.4.5.; 
Targeting 2021, 4.5.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which individuals in mixed marriages could be exposed are of such severe 
nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, intermarriage between 
majority and some minority groups is not accepted and may for some clans create violent 
conflicts between the families involved. For example, if a man from the Gabooye or Somali 
Bantu/Jareer marries a woman from a majority clan, this typically produces major conflict. 
Normally, the family of the woman rejects such a marriage. Her relatives can even threaten or 
attack the (prospective) husband and/or his family. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that individuals in mixed marriages could be 
subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be 
considered. More specifically, if a man from a dominant clan marries a Gabooye or Somali 
Bantu/Jareer woman, his own family may disapprove, and his children will likely be insulted. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for 
individuals in mixed marriages, in the whole of Somalia, including South-Central Somalia, 
Puntland and Somaliland, to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting 
circumstances, such as:  

•  Gender: It is most problematic if a man belonging to a minority group marries a woman 
from a majority group. According to the patrilineal logic of belonging, the children from 
this marriage would then belong to the minority group, which the relatives of the 
mother would see as a ‘downgrade’. The family of a man coming from a dominant clan 
would disapprove the intermarriage with a woman from a minority clan.  

•  Specific minority group to which the applicant belongs: Intermarriage between 
majority and minority groups like Ashraf, Sheikhal and most Benadiri groups is 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

accepted, while it is generally not accepted if the minority group is Gabooye and 
Somali Bantu/Jareer, Madhibaan, Muse Diriye, Tumal, Yibir, Yahar, Eyle. Rahanweyn 
and members of other majority groups do intermarry. Majeerteen and Gabooye 
(especially Madhibaan) do not normally intermarry in Puntland.  

•  Home area and local clan dynamics: In Al-Shabaab-controlled areas, intermarriages 
between majority and minority groups happen more frequently. Majority group 
members in Mogadishu and surroundings marry especially women from Benadiri 
groups. Particularly in the north, in Somaliland, marriages between occupational 
minorities and majority groups happen rarely, especially if the man comes from a 
minority group. Majeerteen and Gabooye (especially Madhibaan) do not normally 
intermarry in Puntland. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, for an applicant under this profile, 
this is highly likely to be for reasons of race/nationality. Persecution of individuals in mixed 
marriages may also be for reasons of membership of a particular social group, based on a 
common background which cannot be changed (entering in a mixed marriage) and distinct 
identity in Somalia, as they are perceived as different in the Somali society. 

3.10.  Persons with diverse SOGIESC  

Last update: October 2025 

This profile refers to persons who are perceived as not conforming to state, religious and/or 
social norms because of their sexual orientation (SO) and/or gender identity and expression 
(GIE), and sex characteristics (SC), including the treatment of lesbian, gay, bi-sexual or trans-
gender, intersex and queer, also commonly referred to as LGBTIQ+ persons. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.8.; 
Targeting 2021, 8.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Acts to which persons with diverse SOGIESC could be exposed are of such severe nature that 
they would amount to persecution. More specifically, state-sanctioned acts include 
penalisation of same-sex relationships and enforcement of the relevant provisions with 
penalties including imprisonment from three months to three years, or even eight years in 
Somaliland. Discrimination and other forms of bias-motivated crimes based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity is not prohibited or prosecuted. Although the death penalty for 
homosexuality is not possible under Somali criminal law, a strict interpretation of Sharia law 
can legitimise its use. 

Socially, any behavior deviating from the heterosexual norm is considered a sin and an ‘illness’ 
to be cured by incarceration of the ‘ill’ individual in ‘correction’ facilities, where beatings, 
starvation and rape were reported. Persons with diverse SOGIESC were subjected to 

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stigmatisation, exclusion, harassment, even killings. In addition, LGBTIQ persons cannot 
access healthcare services for issues connected to their sexual life. 

Al-Shabaab courts have issued and executed death sentences for homosexuality in the recent 
past. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

A well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated in the case of 
persons with diverse SOGIESC, in the whole of Somalia, including South-Central Somalia, 
Puntland and Somaliland, given the criminalisation of same-sex relationships, the severity of 
punishments and the pervasive social stigma. 

It has to be noted that an applicant cannot be expected to conceal their sexual orientation(7) or 
gender identity to avoid persecution. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Persecution of individuals under this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of membership of 
a particular social group, based on the shared characteristic or belief that is so fundamental 
to the identity of the applicant, that they should not be forced to renounce it as well as their 
distinct identity in Somalia. Persecution of individuals under this profile may also be for 
reasons of religion, since in matters that are not governed by any legislative text, the courts 
apply the Sharia. 

3.11.  Women and girls 

It should be noted that the different forms of violence against women (above 18 years old) and 
girls (below 18 years old) in Somalia are often significantly interlinked. In such cases, the 
following subsections should be read in conjunction. 

3.11.1.  Gender-based violence (GBV)  

Last update: October 2025 

This profile refers to women and girls at risk of GBV. For more specific forms of GBV see sub-
profiles below 3.11.2. Female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) and 3.11.4. Child marriage 
and forced marriage.  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.2.1.; 
Targeting 2021, 2.1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.  

(7) CJEU Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v X and Y and Z, joined cases C-199/12 to C-201/12 judgment of 7 
November 2013, X and Y and Z, paras. 70-76, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144215&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir
=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7670158 

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Gender equality and women's empowerment remain among the most significant challenges in 
Somalia. Somalia’s hybrid legal system -comprising of formal, Sharia, and xeer (clan-based) 
laws- further restricts women's access to justice. Under the xeer system, women are not 
considered as responsible individuals and require a male guardian, such as a husband, father, 
brother, or uncle, to access traditional justice mechanisms. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which women and girls could be exposed are of such severe nature that they 
would amount to persecution. More specifically, women and girls in Somalia have reportedly 
been subjected to rape, sometimes combined with homicide and with lack of accountability for 
the perpetrators, harmful traditional practices, domestic violence (including intimate partner 
violence) and conflict-related violence -particularly rapes and gang rapes. Besides family 
members, unidentified perpetrators, Al-Shabaab fighters and state actors are mentioned as 
actors of sexual violence. Sexual slavery and abductions by Al-Shabaab have been also 
reported.  

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that women and girls could be subjected to 
and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be considered 
Women generally face institutionalised legal, judicial, social, and economic discrimination. 
More specifically, victims of GBV in Somalia face significant barriers in accessing services, due 
to a combination of limited availability, restricted access, stigma, and fear of reprisals from 
perpetrators, family members, and the broader community. Access to justice is further 
constrained by systemic delays, and perpetrators are rarely held accountable, largely due to a 
weak rule of law and prevailing discriminatory social and cultural norms. Women and girls 
were further impacted by lack of access to protective shelter and adequate specialised 
services for GBV. Moreover, a consistent pattern of online attacks, including ‘gendered 
disinformation’ and hate speech, has been reported both in mainstream and social media 
against women with a presence in public and political life.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for women 
and girls, in the whole of Somalia, including South-Central Somalia, Puntland and 
Somaliland, to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such 
as:  

•  Age: Young adult women and underage girls are among the most vulnerable targets of 
GBV. In the first half of 2024, over 500 cases of sexual violence against children were 
reported. UNICEF noted that 70% of cases of GBV involved individuals under the age 
of 18. In Somaliland, the 2020 law on Rape, Fornication and Other Related Offences 
does not provide any details on the legal age of a minor. 

•  Home area and actor in control of the area: Women run a higher risk of conflict-

related sexual violence in conflict affected areas, in South-Central Somalia. However, it 
is noted that GBV is pervasive and widespread in the whole of Somalia and domestic 
violence is described as rampant.  

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•  Visibility of profile: Women in public and political roles in Somalia, elected officials, 

activists, leaders, and journalists have been targeted due their public profile. 

•  Being from a displaced or nomadic community: Women from displaced communities 
and/or from weak clans are more likely to experience SGBV. Girls and women with 
disabilities also face a heightened risk of SGBV. Vulnerability to GBV increases due to 
multiple displacements, difficult living conditions and overcrowded IDP camps. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where a well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, in relation to GBV, this is highly 
likely to be for reasons of membership of a particular social group(8). For example, survivors 
of sexual violence may be subjected to persecution because of their common background 
(past sexual abuse) and their distinct identity in Somalia (stigmatisation by their communities 
and families due to perceived dishonour associated with sexual violence). Additionally, 
persecution of women in public roles, may also be for reasons of political opinion. In case of 
targeting by Al-Shabaab religion may also be a relevant ground.   

3.11.2.  Female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) 

3.11.2.a. Women and girls who have not undergone FGM/C 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.2.2.; 
FGM/C 2023, 1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

FGM/C remains nearly universal in Somalia, with a 99.2% prevalence rate among women as of 
2020, and no significant change reported in recent years. The most common and severe form 
practiced is the Pharaonic (WHO Type III), though there is a noted shift among some 
communities toward the less severe Sunna (depending on the exact form performed can 
correspond to Type I, Type II or Type III). 

Despite the constitutional ban, Somalia lacks national legislation criminalizing FGM/C. In 2024, 
Galmudug became the first state to outlaw all forms of FGM/C, though enforcement remains 
limited. 

FGM/C is widely seen as essential for social acceptance, marriage prospects, and religious 
compliance, with over 70% of women intending their daughters to undergo the practice. The 
primary factors driving the continuation of FGM/C include tradition, religious beliefs, social 
acceptance, financial incentives, and the perception that the practice protects girls. It is 
primarily performed by traditional practitioners and increasingly by medical professionals. One 

(8) CJEU, WS v Intervyuirasht organ na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite pri Ministerskia savet, case  
C-621/21, Judgment of 16 January 2024, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=281302&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=r%20
eq&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1717409 

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source indicated that women and girls returning from Europe are usually pressured to 
undergo FGM/C.  

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

FGM/C amounts to persecution.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

A well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated in the case of girls 
who have not undergone FGM/C in the whole of Somalia, including South-Central Somalia, 
Puntland and Somaliland, as in Somalia, FGM/C is a widespread and deeply rooted practice, 
predominantly carried out on underage girls. 

For a woman in Somalia, not to have been subjected to FGM/C is very exceptional. The 
circumstances under which the applicant had managed to avoid being subjected to FGM/C 
should be given due consideration.  

In the exceptional case that a woman has not undergone FGM/C, the individual assessment 
of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood, to face persecution should take into 
account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: 

•  Age: While approximately 99 % of women in Somalia had undergone FGM/C, the 

majority had undergone FGM/C between the ages 5-9. Old(er) women may have a 
lower risk to be subjected to FGM/C.  

•  Marital status: FGM/C is commonly performed before marriage, as it is linked to 

notions of premarital virginity and purity, creating therefore strong societal pressure on 
families to have their daughters undergo the practice to improve their marriage 
prospects. 

•  Tradition and the views of family on the practice: Women originating from 

families/communities with more traditional views would be exposed to a higher risk. 
Stigma and social isolation for themselves, their daughters and their families occurred 
for women who were not circumcised. Over 70 % of Somali women aged 15-49 years 
old believe that FGM/C is a religious requirement. Traditionally mothers and 
occasionally grandmothers are in control of the decision whether their daughters 
would undergo FGM/C. Fathers play a secondary role. 

•  Home area: Awareness regarding FGM/C was specifically reported as low among 

pastoralist communities. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, for an applicant under this profile, 
this is highly likely to be for reasons of membership of a particular social group, due to the 
innate characteristic and/or common background which cannot be changed (not being 
subjected to FGM/C) and their distinct identity in Somalia. Persecution of this profile may also 
be for reasons of religion, since FGM/C is broadly regarded as a religious requirement. 

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3.11.2.b. Women and girls who have undergone FGM/C 

Last update: October 2025 

This profile refers to women and girls who have already undergone FGM/C and focuses on the 
risk to be subjected to FGM/C again. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports and query: Country Focus 
2025, 1.2.2.; FGM/C 2023, 1., 2., 2.1., 2.2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a 
source of COI. 

Women who underwent infibulation (type III) can be re-infibulated, such as after de-infibulation 
and childbirth, premarital relation/sexual intercourse or rape to ‘restore the honour’, or after a 
divorce. Women who underwent a milder form of FGM/C (type I or type II) can be subjected, in 
some cases, to an infibulation (type III). 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

FGM/C amounts to persecution.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

There is diverging information regarding the prevalence of different forms of repeated FGM/C. 
Nevertheless, the following considerations can be highlighted and the individual assessment 
of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for women and girls who have been 
subjected to FGM/C to undergo FGM/C again in the whole of Somalia, including South-
Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, should take into account risk-impacting 
circumstances, such as:  

•  Age and marital status: Some sources indicated that de-infibulation and re-infibulation 
are very common and part of the childbirth process. In rural settings, after giving birth, 
women may be re-infibulated by a midwife. This procedure is performed as part of the 
midwife’s routine to carry out deliveries from start to finish. However, if the midwife 
either refuses to carry out the re-infibulation or does not perform the procedure, it may 
be performed by a traditional cutter. Other sources reported that re-infibulation 
becomes less relevant once a woman has been pregnant, or is already married and no 
longer a virgin. Some women have opposed to their re-infibulation, some have not 
explicitly consented, others have been pressured and others have ‘voluntarily’ been 
re-infibulated for the sake of their husbands. Therefore, women of older age are less 
likely to undergo FGM/C again.  De-infibulation and re-infibulation may be more likely 
for women who are young enough to give birth.  Women seeking remarriage may 
choose to be re-infibulated.  

•  Other (family) perceptions and traditions: Women could be re-infibulated when the 
initial infibulation is considered not been done ‘properly’. Furthermore, parents of 
victims of rape often force their daughter to undergo re-infibulation so as to restore her 
honour and protect her marital status. The same could apply to unmarried women who 

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have had premarital relationships or in the case of women or girls whose infibulation 
was damaged due to an accident. Therefore, women who have lost their virginity pre-
marriage, have a higher risk of being subjected to FGM/C again.  

•  Type of FGM/C experienced: women who are infibulated may have a higher risk to be 

defibulated and re-infibulated, depending also on their age and marital status. 
Regarding women who had previously undergone Sunni circumcision, one source 
indicated that they are not usually (re-)infibulated, however they might be pressured to 
do it. It has been reported that girls who had undergone the Sunni type of FGM/C were 
insulted as ‘unclean’ and incapable of controlling their sexual desires. The treatment of 
other women in the family can provide insight into how the family perceives and 
practises FGM/C. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, for an applicant under this profile, 
this may be for reasons of membership of a particular social group. For example, they may 
be subjected to persecution for refusing to be subjected to FGM/C again (fundamental belief), 
or because of a common background which cannot be changed (e.g. victims of rape) and their 
distinct identity is seen as impure in the surrounding society. Persecution of this profile may 
also be for reasons of religion, since FGM/C is broadly regarded as a religious requirement. 

3.11.3.  Women and girls who have left Al-Shabaab 

Last update: October 2025 

This profile refers to women and girls who had been wives of Al-Shabaab members or who 
were actively engaged in the group’s activities and who have left Al-Shabaab.  

For the treatment of adult males and boys who had been actively involved in the group, 
especially as fighters, who desert or defect, see 3.3. Deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab. 
The present subsection should be read in conjunction with the subsection mentioned above. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.2.1.; 
AS Deserters 2023, 1.2.5., 2.2.1., 2.2.2., 2.2.4.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a 
source of COI. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Acts to which women and girls who have left Al-Shabaab could be exposed by the group are 
of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, once they 
have left the group, going back to Al-Shabaab territory is not an option for women, who would 
‘most probably face execution as traitors’. Women from minority clans face execution and 
imprisonment, as well as certain forms of physical violence, including sexual violence and 
torture. Women reportedly face challenges in their new location, such as sexual exploitation. 

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Furthermore, women and girls may have a well-founded fear of persecution by the community 
and the government in individual cases. Former female members of Al-Shabaab could get 
‘raided’ by government security forces as well as stigmatised and excluded from the 
community, being highly vulnerable to extreme poverty. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that women and girls could be subjected to 
and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be considered.  
Poverty, stigma and mistrust from the hosting community or the family circle, and fear of Al-
Shabaab have been also reported. Rehabilitation centres for women formerly associated with 
Al-Shabaab have closed. Being a child is to be taken into account in the assessment on 
whether an act reaches the threshold of persecution.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

In South-Central Somalia well-founded fear of persecution by Al-Shabaab would in general 
be substantiated in the case of women and girls who have left the group.  

In Puntland, Al-Shabaab has lower operational capacity with stronger presence in the 
northern parts (see map). Therefore, the home area of the applicant should be taken into 
account as a risk-impacting circumstance. 

In Somaliland, Al-Shabaab has very limited operational capacity. Therefore, a well-founded 
fear of persecution for women and girls who have left Al-Shabaab in Somaliland would in 
general not be substantiated. 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for women 
and girls to face persecution by the community and the government, in South-Central 
Somalia and Puntland should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: 

•  Past role in Al-Shaabab: The risk may be higher for women and girls who had 

voluntarily joined Al-Shabaab and depending on the prominence of the roles they had 
within the group. 

•  Clan affiliation and protection: The vulnerability of women and girls depends highly 

on the level of family or clan support they can rely upon. Women coming from minority 
clans (e.g. Bantu/Jareer) or who are displaced without access to clan protection 
reportedly end up without any protection and resources. 

•  Displacement situation: The integration of women and girls largely depends on the 

locations to which they settle, with displacement significantly increasing their 
vulnerability. 

•  Participation in a rehabilitation programme: Women and girls who have successfully 
completed the government’s rehabilitation programmes and receive a ‘non-criminal 
certificate’ from the Criminal Investigation Department run a lower risk. As of 2022 
information, due to lack of funding, women residing in Mogadishu do not have access 
to any form of rehabilitation programme. 

There is no information about the treatment of women who have left Al-Shabaab by the 
government or the community in Somaliland.  

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Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, persecution of this profile is highly 
likely to be for reasons of political opinion and/or religion, as leaving Al-Shabaab would be 
considered as opposition to its political and/or ideological stance. Persecution of women who 
have left Al-Shabaab marriages may also be for reasons of membership of a particular social 
group based on their common background which cannot be changed (past marriage to an Al-
Shabaab member) and distinct identity in Somalia (in relation to stigmatisation). 

Exclusion considerations are relevant to this profile, as women who have left Al-
Shabaab may have been involved in excludable acts, particularly those that joined 
voluntarily and were actively engaged in the group’s activities. See 7. Exclusion. 

3.11.4.  Child marriage and forced marriage 

Last update: October 2025 

This profile assesses the risk of women and girls in relation to forced marriage by multiple 
actors. Since Al-Shabaab most commonly recruits women and girls through marriage, this 
profile also covers such cases.   

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2025, 1.2.1.; 
Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Forced and child marriage are amongst the most common forms of GBV in Somalia. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Forced and child marriage amount to persecution. As of 2024, Al-Shabaab remains the 
perpetrator with the highest recorded incidents of forced marriage. The practice of early 
marriage continues to be pervasive as in the Somali society in general, one’s date of birth is 
not viewed as a decisive criterion for when a person is considered an adult, with puberty 
being the marker of adulthood. The 2020 ‘Sexual Intercourse Related Crimes Bill’ allows 
parents to marry off their children once they reach puberty, which could be as young as 10 
years old. Forced marriage is also prevalent among persons with disabilities. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that women and girls could be subjected to by 
the community, such as social stigma as a result of refusing a forced marriage, and whether 
they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be considered.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for women 
and girls under this profile to face persecution in the whole of Somalia, including South-
Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, should take into account risk-impacting 
circumstances, such as:  

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•  Prevalence of the practice in the home area and control or influence of Al-Shabaab: 
Child marriage is widespread in Somalia. Early and forced marriage in Somalia reaches 
approximately 45 %. Girls originating from nomadic and rural communities are 
particularly affected.  

Specifically in relation to Al-Shabaab, marriage is more likely in areas where Al-
Shabaab has established control over a substantial period of time, mostly in South-
Central Somalia. The group can demand support from local families, who regard 
supporting Al-Shabaab as ‘normal’. In areas outside the Al-Shabaab's direct control, 
such as Puntland, the risk of forced marriage to members of the group will be generally 
lower but personal circumstances and the presence of Al-Shabaab in northern parts 
(see map) are still to be taken into account (see also other bullet points). In Somaliland, 
in general the risk of forced marriage to Al-Shabaab would not be substantiated. 
Recruitment/marriage outside Al-Shabaab's control areas frequently involves aspects 
of coercion. 

•  Age: Regarding early marriage, some girls marry before the age of 15. In traditional 

pastoralist communities, early marriage is common, with girls often marrying as young 
as 12 or 13. Also, young women and teenagers between the ages of 11 - 25 are at 
higher risk to be forcibly married to Al-Shabaab members. 

•  Clan and family traditions: Forced and early marriage is more common for girls and 
women coming from minority groups, such as Bantu/Jareer, Gabooye and Eyle clans. 
Furthermore, girls and women who belong to the Bantu/Jareer clan have a higher risk 
to be forcibly recruited by Al-Shabaab than other clans; union to Al-Shabaab fighters 
has been described in their case as sexual and domestic slavery. Additionally, women 
are involved in blood compensation (diya) under the xeer system, as well as under the 
practice of ‘wife inheritance’ or the widower’s right to marry a deceased wife’s sister. 
See also Individuals involved in clan disputes.  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Persecution of this profile may be for reasons of religion, as early marriage is perceived to be 
both a cultural and a religious requirement, and/or for reasons of membership of a particular 
social group. For example, refusal to enter into a marriage may result in persecution for 
reasons of membership of a particular social group in relation to a common background which 
cannot be changed (refusal to marry) and/or a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to 
identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it (the right to choose 
whom to marry) and their distinct identity in Somalia (e.g. stigmatisation). In the case of 
Bantu/Jareer women, persecution may also be for reasons of race/nationality.  

3.11.5.  Single women and female heads of households 

This sub-profile refers to single women (e.g. divorced women, unmarried women, widows) and 
female heads of households. Girls can also fall in this sub-profile. 

Last update: October 2025 

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The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.1., 1.2., 
1.3.; Targeting 2021, 2.5.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which single women and female heads of households could be exposed are of 
such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, displaced single 
women in Somalia face significant risks of GBV and sexual exploitation.  

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that single women and female heads of 
households could be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various 
measures, should be considered. Instances of stigmatisation in case of pregnancies without 
marriage have been reported. Although there is no immediate stigma around getting divorced, 
the attitudes of local communities towards divorced women may differ. A woman still needs to 
obtain her own clan’s consent for a divorce as well as to cite the specific reasons behind it. 
However, remarriage after divorce is common. Evictions against displaced women were also 
reported.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for single 
women and female heads of households to face persecution in the whole of Somalia, 
including South-Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, should take into account risk-
impacting circumstances, such as:  

•  Being in a IDP situation: Single women and girls who are displaced or live in IDP 

camps, face heightened risks of sexual exploitation and other forms of GBV violence. 
In 2023, most recorded cases of conflict-related sexual violence reported by UNSOM 
involved displaced women and girls.  

•  Family status: Divorced women may risk social ostracism within their communities. 

Women with children born out of wedlock might be pushed to live in the area of local 
sex workers. 

•  Family and society perceptions: Victims of rape without a support network are 

possibly being ostracised. 

•  Clan affiliation: Single women from minority clans are also at risk of being ostracised 

by their communities. Minority women are especially vulnerable to violence and abuse-
including sexual and GBV from both within their communities and by armed forces, 
militias, and majority clan members. 

•  Level of assistance by a support/clan network: Single women are often supported by 
their community, which acts as a safety net, provided they have not violated customary 
laws or norms. However, women who are victims of rape or sexual violence frequently 
lack access to effective policing, justice, or welfare systems.  

In the case of single women and female heads of households without support from the 
extended family or clan, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be 

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substantiated in the whole of Somalia, including South-Central Somalia, Puntland and 
Somaliland.  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, persecution of this profile may be for 
reasons of membership of a particular social group. For example, women with children born 
out of wedlock may be subjected to persecution based on their common background which 
cannot be changed (having a child out of wedlock) and distinct identity in Somalia (in relation 
to stigmatisation by society and seen as betraying the family honour). 

3.12.  Children  

This profile refers to Somali nationals under the age of 18. 

3.12.1.  Violence against children  

Last update: October 2025 

This section covers certain child-specific circumstances of increased vulnerability and risks 
that children in Somalia may be exposed to. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports and query: Country Focus 
2025, 1.1.2., 1.2.1., 1.2.2., 1.4.; Security 2025, 1.4.3., 1.5., 2.2.3., 2.4.1., 2.5.1., 2.5.2., 2.6.2., 2.7.2.; 
Targeting 2021, 2.3., 2.4.; COI Query FGM/C 2023, 1.; Country Guidance should not be 
referred to as a source of COI. 

Children in Somalia have been exposed to various forms of violence by various actors.  

On GBV, FGM/C, and child marriage practices against girls, see more under sub-profiles: 3.11.1. 
Gender-based violence (GBV), 3.11.2. Female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C), 3.11.4. Child 
marriage and forced marriage. 

On child recruitment practices by Al-Shabaab, see more under sub-profile 3.12.2. Child 
recruitment by Al-Shabaab. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which children could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would 
amount to persecution. More specifically, during the reference period grave violations against 
children were reported by various actors all over Somalia, including abductions as well as 
attacks on schools.  

In the first half of 2024, there were more than 500 reported cases of sexual violence against 
children, including boys. Child labour incidents were also reported with children forced into 
labour in agriculture, domestic work, livestock herding, and selling khat internally and abroad.  
Incidents of child recruitment by multiple actors in Somalia have been reported, involving SNA, 

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government-aligned clan-based militias, federal armed forces, security services, regional 
forces, and the police. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that children could be subjected to and 
whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be also considered. More 
specifically, stigmatisation resulting in limited school enrolment and a relatively low literacy 
rate of minority group children has been reported. Children born out of wedlock were also 
reported to face stigma, abandonment, and potential destitution. In terms of acute 
malnutrition, more than 1.7 million children, aged between 6 and 59 months were reported to 
be in need of treatment, either for severe or moderate acute malnutrition, notably in South-
Central Somalia, while the destruction of schools and the displacement of teachers due to 
conflict has left children without access to education in conflict affected areas. 

Being a child is to be taken into account in the assessment on whether an act reaches the 
threshold of persecution. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for a child to 
face persecution in the whole of Somalia, including South-Central Somalia, Puntland and 
Somaliland, should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as:  

•  Gender: Boys can also be subjected to child marriage, however at a lower rate 

compared to girls, and increasing concerns about sexual violence against boys were 
also reported. Child recruitment for combatant roles would be more relevant for boys.  

•  Age: Children aged between 11 and 17 years were identified as being most at risk of 

forced recruitment. 

•  Home area and the control or influence of Al-Shabaab: Individuals from areas where 
conflict is active may face increased risk of being abducted and forcibly recruited by 
security forces and clan militias. The destruction of schools and the displacement of 
teachers due to conflict has left children without access to education in conflict 
affected areas. Regarding forced labour children living in Al-Shabaab’s territory are 
particularly vulnerable. 

•  Displacement situation: Regarding forced labour, IDPs children are particularly 

vulnerable. 

•  Ethnic/minority background: Children belonging to marginalised ethnic minorities are 

less often enrolled in school and more exposed to forced labour. 

•  Family status: Children born out of wedlock were reported to face stigma, 

abandonment, and potential destitution. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, the assessment should take into 
account the individual circumstances of the child. For example, children born out of wedlock 
may be subjected to persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group, 

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based on their common background which cannot be changed (born out of wedlock) and 
distinct identity in Somalia (in relation to stigmatisation by society). 

3.12.2.  Child recruitment by Al-Shabaab 

Last update: October 2025 

This profile refers to children fearing recruitment by Al-Shabaab. For an overview of other 
actors recruiting children, see 3.12.1. Violence against children. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.1., 1.2., 
1.10.1.(b); Security 2025, 1.2.2.; Targeting 2021, 1.1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to 
as a source of COI. 

Over the last years, thousands of children (basically between 11 and 17 years old) have been 
recruited by all sides, but the majority of them were recruited by Al-Shabaab. Children form 
most of the new recruits of Al-Shabaab, as the group targets predominantly boys and young 
men. Girls are subjected to forced marriages and sexual slavery (see 3.11.4. Child marriage and 
forced marriage). 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Child recruitment is of such severe nature that it amounts to persecution, including when 
recruitment is not induced by coercion. According to UNICEF, around 500 children were 
recruited by Al-Shabaab between January and September 2023. In 2022, over 900 children 
were recruited and 663 abducted by Al-Shabaab, primarily in Bay, Bakool, Hiraan, Middle 
Juba, and Lower Shabelle, according to the UN Secretary-General's report on Children and 
Armed Conflict. The UN Panel of Experts on Somalia confirms that these patterns of child 
recruitment and abduction have continued unchanged through September 2023 to August 
2024. Al-Shabaab was reported to recruit children for combatant roles (fighters, suicide 
bombers, or guards) and non-combatant roles (transportation of weapons, supplies, or 
communication, conceal explosives or personnel, informants or spies, religious indoctrination, 
sexual exploitation and forced marriages in the case of girls etc.).  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the 
applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as:  

•  Gender: Child recruitment for combatant roles would be more relevant for boys, while 
girls are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence and forced marriage (see 3.11.4. 
Child marriage and forced marriage). 

•  Age: Al-Shabaab usually recruits children from 12 years old, while also recruitment of 
children aged nine or younger was reported. Being an adolescent or of ‘fighting age’, 
from age 15 or 16, may put the person at risk of recruitment as an active fighter or a 
suicide bomber.  

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•  Home area and the control or influence of Al-Shabaab: Recruitment is more easily 

facilitated in areas where Al-Shabaab has established control over a substantial period 
of time, mostly in South-Central Somalia areas (in Middle and Lower Shabelle, Middle 
and Lower Jubba, Bay, Bakool, Hirshabelle and Galmudug). IDPs residing in the outer 
districts of Mogadishu, where Al-Shabaab has strong influence, are frequently recruited 
by the group. In areas outside the group’s direct control, such as Puntland, the risk of 
recruitment will be generally lower. In Somaliland, in general the risk would not be 
substantiated. Recruitment outside Al-Shabaab’s control areas frequently involves 
aspects of coercion.  

•  Clan affiliation and clan positioning towards Al-Shabaab: Minority groups (e.g. 
Rahanweyn, Somali Bantu/Jareer, other groups from the Benadir coast) are 
discriminated against and forced into foot soldier roles and often seen as disposable 
used in high-risk operations like suicide attacks. Clans opposing Al-Shabaab may face 
increased recruitment pressure. Children belonging to marginalised ethnic minorities 
and those living in Al-Shabaab’s territory are particularly vulnerable.  

•  Socio-economic situation of the family: Low socio-economic background families are 
coerced due to economic desperation or inability to resist pressure. For example, 
women who are unable to pay taxes to Al-Shabaab are in some cases forced to hand 
over their children to the group.  

•  Family status: Orphans and single-parent children are more vulnerable due to lack of 
protection or guidance and would be more easily manipulated and socialised into Al-
Shabaab ideology. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, the individual circumstances of the 
child need to be taken into account to determine whether a nexus to a reason for persecution 
can be substantiated. For example, in case of recruitment of minors of specific clans perceived 
to be opposing Al-Shabaab, persecution may be for reasons of political opinion. Alternatively, 
recruitment of children from minority groups may be for reasons of race/nationality.  

3.13.  Persons living with disabilities and/or with severe 

medical issues 

Last update: October 2025 

This profile refers to people with disabilities as well as those who have severe medical issues, 
including mental health issues. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.2.1., 
1.4., 2.1.3.(d); Targeting 2021, 2.2., 2.3.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source 
of COI. 

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Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

The lack of personnel and adequate infrastructure to appropriately address the needs of 
individuals with (severe) medical issues fails to meet the requirement of Article 6 QD/QR 
regarding the existence of an actor that inflicts persecution or serious harm, unless the 
individual is intentionally deprived of healthcare(9).  

Some acts to which persons falling under this profile could be exposed are of such severe 
nature that they would amount to persecution. Private ‘rehabilitation’ centres exist in Somalia 
for mentally ill people. Such centres are run by sheikhs and ‘treatment’ includes reading of the 
Koran, with incidents of physical and psychological abuse being reported. Women with 
disabilities may also be subjected to GBV and forced marriage (see profile 3.11.5. Child 
marriage and forced marriage).  

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that persons living with disabilities and/or with 
severe medical issues could be subjected to, such as discrimination and mistreatment by 
society, and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be 
considered. People suffering from mental issues face huge stigma from the Somali society. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the 
applicant to face persecution in the whole of Somalia, including South-Central Somalia, 
Puntland and Somaliland, should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: 

•  Nature and visibility of the mental or physical disability: Individuals living with 

noticeable physical or mental disability would be at higher risk. 

•  Support network: Individuals that face their family’s or community’s negative 

perception would be at higher risk. Lack of other support networks should also be 
considered a risk factor.  

•  Minority groups: Cultural biases may limit the health care services available to minority 

clan members.  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, for an applicant under this profile, 
this may be for reasons of membership of a particular social group. For example, persons 
with a noticeable physical disability may be considered as having an innate characteristic and 
a distinct identity connected to their stigmatisation by the surrounding society. 

3.14.  Somalis who have resided for a long time in 

neighbouring countries or other countries in the 

(9) CJEU, M’Bodj, paras. 35-36. See also CJEU, MP v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-353/16, 
judgment of 24 April 2018 (MP), paras. 57, 59. 

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region 

Last update: October 2025 

This profile refers to Somalis who returned to Somalia after spending time in neighbouring 
countries or other countries in the region, notably Yemen, Kenya, where they lived mostly in 
camps or were stranded on a migration route. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2025, 1.9.; 
Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

In general, the treatment faced by individuals under this profile would not amount to 
persecution. More specifically, returnees face similar challenges and have similar profiles to 
the urban poor in Mogadishu. The primary hardships encountered upon return include 
widespread poverty and high unemployment, with the informal sector being for many of them 
the only option for work. Access to sustaining livelihoods in Mogadishu depends on personal 
networks, family structures and clan affiliation to strong clans.  

Returnees who are unable to reunite with their families often become IDPs and that could be a 
risk-enhancing factor. For example, women and girls who are returning into precarious 
conditions face risks of sexual and gender-based violence (see 3.11.1. Gender-based violence 
(GBV). 

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4. 

Subsidiary protection 

This chapter addresses the EU-regulated status of subsidiary protection. Where the applicant 
has not been found to qualify as a refugee, they may be eligible for subsidiary protection in 
accordance with Article 15 QD/QR.  

The CJEU ruled in 2023 on the importance of the individual circumstances to be 
taken into account while determining if an applicant is eligible for subsidiary 
protection, before identifying the type of serious harm, notably(10): 

‘1. Article 15 of Directive 2011/95/EU (…) must be interpreted as meaning that in order 
to determine whether an applicant for international protection is eligible for 
subsidiary protection, the competent national authority must examine all the 
relevant factors, relating both to the individual position and personal circumstances 
of the applicant and to the general situation in the country of origin, before 
identifying the type of serious harm that those factors may potentially 
substantiate.’  

Therefore, where refugee status is not granted, established personal 
circumstances (e.g. age, gender, professional and economic background, home 
area, potential vulnerabilities) are still to be taken into account in the assessment 
of Article 15 QD/QR.  

For further information on the specific individual circumstances which may be 
relevant to consider in the assessment of a real risk of serious harm under Article 
15 QD/QR, see relevant sections below.  

4.1. 

Article 15(a) QD/QR: death penalty or execution 

Last update: October 2025 

For general guidance on the country guidance approach to this section, see ‘EUAA, 
'Article 15(a) QD/QR: death penalty or execution' in Country Guidance: Explained, 
February 2025’. 

(10)  CJEU, X and Y v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, C-125/22, Fourth Chamber, judgment of 9 

November 2023, operative part (Court’s ruling), 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=279488&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7856939  

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The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Security 2025, 1.6., 2.1.1., 
2.1.2., 2.1.3., 2.2.1., 2.2.3.; Country Focus 2025, 1.1.1., 1.3.1., 1.6.4., 1.8.; Actors 2021, 2.3.3., 2.3.4.; 
Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

The FGS has not abolished the death penalty, nor has it declared a moratorium on executions. 
Death sentences continue to be imposed and carried out for crimes beyond intentional killing, 
including treason, espionage, and acts endangering public safety, including crimes committed 
while under the age of 18. In this context, military courts often pronounce death sentences to 
civilians and carry out executions at a higher rate than civilian courts. In 2023, Somalia carried 
out at least 55 executions, including of minors and former security personnel. In August 2024, 
Puntland executed 10 alleged Al-Shabaab fighters, four reportedly underaged. The UN and 
other observers raised concerns about executions conducted without legal representation or 
the right to appeal against the execution. 

Islamic courts in Somalia, including Somaliland, may impose the death penalty for hudud 
offences under Sharia law, such as illicit sexual relations (zina) and homosexuality, although 
the Somali criminal law does not provide for the death penalty in such cases. Traditionally, the 
application of hudud punishments by Islamic courts has been severely limited by the strict 
requirements for evidence.  

Al-Shabaab courts also implement Sharia law in a strict and violent way and may impose 
severe punishments for hudud crimes, including for adopting un-Islamic behaviour and for 
‘spying’ for the government or other foreign powers. These punishments refer to instances of 
executions, including public executions by stoning and shooting. Moreover, in areas controlled 
by the group, defectors, people of non-Muslim faiths and converts from Islam routinely face 
execution. Blasphemy is also sanctioned with death. During the reference period, several 
cases of public executions of men accused of spying for the FGS or foreign forces were 
reported in Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, Bakool and Lower Sabelle and one case of a 
public execution of two civilians accused of committing sexual offences in Hiraan.  

Some profiles of applicants from Somalia may be at risk of death penalty or 
execution (e.g. 3.7. Individuals (perceived as) contravening social or religious 
laws/tenets,  3.10. Persons with diverse SOGIESC, 3.3. Deserters and defectors from 
Al-Shabaab, 3.1.4. Civilians perceived as ‘spies’ by Al-Shabaab), and those 
individuals would qualify for refugee status.  

The home area of the applicant is to be taken into account when assessing the real 
risk of death penalty or execution. Such risk is higher where Al-Shabaab operates.  

In case of real risk of death penalty or execution, if nexus to a reason for 
persecution is not substantiated, Article 15(a) QD/QR would apply.  

In some cases, the death penalty would have been imposed for a serious crime 
committed by the applicant, or for other acts falling within the exclusion grounds 
(Article 17 QD/QR). Therefore, although the criteria of Article 15(a) QD/QR would be 
met, exclusion considerations should be examined (see 7. Exclusion). 

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4.2.  Article 15(b) QD/QR: torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment 

Last update: October 2025 

For general guidance on the country guidance approach to this section, see ‘EUAA, 
'Article 15(b) QD/QR: torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in 
the country of origin' in Country Guidance: Explained, February 2025’. 

According to the EUAA Practical Guide: Qualification for International Protection, the 
assessment of whether a treatment or punishment is inhuman or degrading also 
implies a subjective consideration by the person who suffers such treatment. In 
some cases, the gender, age and state of health of the person may be individual 
circumstances to consider for the assessment under Article 15(b) QD/QR.   

4.2.1.  Arbitrary arrests, illegal detention and prison conditions  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Security 2025, 1.6.; Actors 
2021, 2.4.6.; Country Focus 2025, 1.7.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source 
of COI. 

Special attention should be paid to the phenomena of arbitrary arrests and illegal detention, as 
well as to prison conditions.  

Arbitrary arrests and detentions: Security forces have conducted arbitrary arrests and 
detentions. 

Prison conditions: As of July 2024, there were 14 operational prisons in Somalia, with the 
conditions described as ‘substandard’ and ‘below internationally recognized standards’. Issues 
include inadequate infrastructure, lack of steady food and water supplies, limited medical 
facilities, inadequate separation of prisoners by gender and age, and insufficient rehabilitation 
and reintegration programs. Medical facilities within prisons were described as rare, and 
prisoners have restricted access to external medical care. 

In cases where a person faces conditions of arrest and/or detention amounting to 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, a situation of serious 
harm under Article 15(b) QD/QR would occur. 

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In cases where there would be a nexus to a reason for persecution, those 
individuals would qualify for refugee status. If a nexus cannot be substantiated, 
Article 15(b) QD/QR would apply. 

In some cases, the arrest, detention and imprisonment would have been imposed 
on the applicant for a serious crime committed or other acts falling within the 
exclusion grounds (Article 17 QD/QR). Therefore, although the criteria of Article 15(b) 
QD/QR would be met, exclusion considerations should be examined. See Exclusion. 

4.2.2.  Criminal Violence 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Security 2025, 1.3., 1.5.; 
Country Focus 2025, 1.10.2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Criminal violence in Somalia is widespread and deeply rooted in the country’s fragile 
governance and security structures. In 2023, Somalia ranked 13th out of 54 African countries 
for criminality and had the world’s highest score for extortion and protection racketeering, 
mainly by non-state armed groups like Al-Shabaab and ISS. The criminal economy thrives amid 
weak institutions, corruption, and low public trust in law enforcement, perpetuating insecurity 
and violence across the country. 

Major crimes include arms trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking in human beings, 
forced child labour- particularly among IDPs and minority groups- and extortion targeting 
civilians, businesses, NGOs, and humanitarian actors. Extortion through the use of ‘taxes’ has 
been imposed not only by Al-Shabaab (see also 3.4. Individuals refusing to pay ‘taxes’ to Al-
Shabaab), but also by other groups and militias. In the reference period, various incidents, 
including shootings, killings, and beatings, were triggered by disputes over ‘taxes or money 
extortion’. Reported perpetrators include government institutions, local administrations, ISS, 
clan militias, individual soldiers and mooryaan or bandits, depending also on their area of 
operations. Crimes, such as arms trafficking, trafficking in human beings, and smuggling are 
also pervasive in Somalia. Smuggling, often perceived as a legitimate income source, 
frequently transitions into trafficking in human beings involving forced labour and sexual 
exploitation. Youth gangs, such as ciyaal weero, are active in Mogadishu, engaging in robbery, 
assault, and looting. Criminality is driven by non-state actors, clan-based militias, and even 
state-embedded actors. Criminal networks, often intertwined with political actors and Al-
Shabaab, control smuggling routes and illicit trade, including charcoal, frankincense, and gold, 
sometimes resulting in violent disputes.  

Personal circumstances such as: the home area of the applicant as well as his/her 
gender, being in an IDP situation, belonging to a minority are to be taken into 
account for the assessment of real risk of criminal violence. A real risk of a violent 
crime, such as abduction, murder, robbery and violence related to trafficking in 

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human beings and forced child labour would meet the requirements under Article 
15(b) QD/QR. Where there is no nexus to a reason for persecution under the 
refugee definition, but there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the individual 
to face violent crime, this risk would qualify under Article 15(b) QD/QR. 

4.2.3.  Corporal punishments 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Security 2025, 1.6.; Country 
Focus 2025, 1.1.1., 1.3.1., 1.3.2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Corporal punishments for the so called hudud crimes in case of theft, banditry, unlawful sexual 
intercourse, alcohol consumption and drug abuse, as well as drug dealing and espionage may 
be imposed by Sharia or Al-Shabaab courts.  

Corporal punishment in Somalia is not foreseen by the Provisional Constitution nor in the 
Penal Code and it is officially stated that such practices do not occur in Mogadishu’s central 
prison. However, corporal punishment is widely accepted in the Somali society and not 
prohibited either in the home, schools or care settings, or as a sentence for crimes committed 
in penal institutions, or as a judicial sentence for children who have committed offences. 

Under Sharia law, which operates alongside the formal system, corporal punishment, including 
flogging, stoning, and amputation, is lawful and recognised as a sentence for crime. However, 
it is rarely enforced for crimes, such as adultery, alcohol consumption, or theft due to high 
evidentiary standards. In Somaliland, corporal punishment is explicitly prohibited by its 
constitution and juvenile justice law. However, cases of physical assaults and beatings failing 
to ‘return to Islam’ were documented in Somaliland in the period 2019-2021. 

In practice, corporal punishment remains widespread, particularly in areas under Al-Shabaab 
control, where it is imposed harshly and publicly by the group for offenses under Sharia, like 
adultery, sexual misconduct, homosexuality, and theft. Documented incidents between 2023 
and 2025 included public flogging, amputations, injuring, and execution. During the reference 
period, Al-Shabaab demonstrated capacity to sanction adultery and sexual misconduct 
outside its control area with punishments, including flogging, amputation, injuring, and torture. 

Corporal punishments, such as those described above, would meet the 
requirements of serious harm under Article 15(b) QD/QR. The home area of the 
applicant is to be taken into account when assessing the real risk of corporal 
punishment. Particularly where Al-Shabaab operates, there is a higher risk of 
corporal punishment.   

Where there is no nexus to a reason for persecution under the refugee definition, 
and there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the individual to be subjected to 
corporal punishment, this risk would qualify under Article 15(b) QD/QR. 

In some cases, the corporal punishments would have been imposed for a serious 
crime committed by the applicant, or for other acts falling within the exclusion 

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grounds (Article 17 QD/QR). Therefore, although the criteria of Article 15(b) QD/QR 
would be met, exclusion considerations should be examined (see 7. Exclusion). 

4.2.4.  Forced evictions 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Security 2025, 1.4.3., 2.4.1.; 
Country Focus 2025, 1.2.3., 2.1.1., 2.2.3., 2.3.4.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as 
a source of COI. 

In the course of 2024, the Norwegian Refugee Council registered the evictions of more than 
192 000 individuals across Somalia, while there were more than 207 000 in the course of 
2023. Banadir (Daynille, Kahda), Bay (Baidoa), and Wogooyi Galbeed (Hargeisa) accounted for 
more than 90 % of all forced evictions. The most affected are the urban IDPs, particularly those 
living on private land without formal tenure agreements.  

In 2024 alone, 197 000 cases involving eviction of IDPs were recorded, primarily in Mogadishu 
and surrounding areas. In Belet Weyne (Hirshabelle), UNOCHA documented evictions of 180 
IDP households in the first half of 2024. In Hargeisa (Somaliland), 41 % of households living in 
IDP sites were reported to rely on oral land agreements, leaving them vulnerable to disputes 
and eviction risks. In Garowe (Puntland), 36 % of IDP sites were reported to be at severe risk of 
eviction. 

Women and children -who make approximately 80 % of Somalia’s 3.8 million displaced 
persons- are particularly at risk of eviction, facing heightened risks of gender-based violence 
and exploitation (see profiles 3.1.1.5. Single women and female heads of households and 
3.12.1. Violence against children). 

Personal circumstances such as: the home area of the applicant as well as his/her 
gender and being in an IDP situation are to be taken into account for the 
assessment of real risk of forced eviction. Where there is no nexus to a reason for 
persecution, (the risk of) being subjected to forced eviction may qualify under 
Article 15(b) QD/QR, depending on the severity of its consequences in the individual 
case.  

4.2.5.  Healthcare and socio-economic conditions 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Security 2025, 1.4.3.; Country 
Focus 2025, 1.2.1., 2.1.1., 2.2.1., 2.3.1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source 
of COI. 

Somalia faces a prolonged humanitarian crisis fueled by conflict, climate shocks, disease 
outbreaks, and mass displacement. In 2025, 9.1 million people -47 % of the population- were 
affected, with nearly 6 million needing humanitarian aid. Socio-economic conditions remained 
dire, especially in urban centres like Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and Garowe; widespread poverty, 

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informal employment, and lack of access to food, clean water, and secure housing are 
common, especially among IDPs, who make up the most vulnerable group. 

Half of the population is water-insecure, and over 1.7 million children suffer from acute 
malnutrition. IDPs often live in informal settlements without land rights, exposing them to 
forced evictions and exploitation by informal camp managers. Healthcare is limited due to 
inaccessible facilities, high costs, and medicine shortages. Ongoing conflict has severely 
damaged essential infrastructure, with more than 25 attacks on hospitals and numerous 
incidents targeting schools reported between 2023 and 2024. 

Women and children (who constitute 80% of the IDP population), minority groups, the elderly, 
and people with disabilities face heightened risks. In areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, 
residents suffer from extreme restrictions and lack of services. The ongoing destruction of 
infrastructure and the lack of public support systems deepen the crisis, leaving many reliant on 
humanitarian aid for survival. 

It is important to note that serious harm must take the form of conduct of an actor 
(Article 6 QD/QR). In itself, unless there is intentional conduct of an actor, the 
general unavailability of healthcare, education or other socio-economic elements 
(e.g. situation of IDPs, difficulties in finding livelihood opportunities, housing) is not 
considered serious harm meeting the requirements of inhuman or degrading 
treatment under Article 15(b) QD/QR in relation to Article 6 QD/QR. When such 
conditions are the result of an intentional conduct of an actor, they may qualify 
under Article 15(b) QD/QR.  

Personal circumstances such as: the home area of the applicant as well as his/her 
gender, being in an IDP situation, belonging to a minority are to be taken into 
account in the assessment of real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment based on 
the socio-economic conditions.  Where there is the intentional conduct of an actor 
and no nexus to a reason for persecution is substantiated, the treatment may qualify 
under Article 15(b) QD/QR, depending on the severity of its consequences in the 
individual case. 

4.3.  Article 15(c) QD/QR: indiscriminate violence in 

situations of armed conflict  

Last update: October 2025 

For general guidance on the country guidance approach to this section, see ‘EUAA, 
Article 15(c) QD/QR: indiscriminate violence in situations of armed conflict  in 
Country Guidance: Explained, February 2025’.  

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In armed conflicts, the targeting of civilians may have a nexus to one of the grounds for 
persecution according to the refugee definition. Therefore, refugee status may be granted. 
Such targeted violence, furthermore, would not be considered ‘indiscriminate’. 

Reference period: The following assessment for the applicability of Article 15(c) QD/QR is 
primarily based on the EUAA COI report ‘Somalia: Security situation’, published in May 2025 
and concerning the reference period 1 April 2023 – 30 March 2025. Some indicators, mainly 
referring to data until 31 July 2025, are added during the finalisation of the document, based 
on the COI Update 2025.  

This guidance should be considered valid as long as current events and 
developments fall within the trends and patterns of violence observed within the 
reference period of the mentioned COI report. New events and developments that 
cause substantial changes, new trends or geographical shifts in the violence, may 
lead to a different assessment. The security situation in a given territory should 
always be assessed in light of the most up-to-date COI available. 

All of the elements under Article 15(c) QD/QR (Figure 2) have to be fulfilled in order to grant 
subsidiary protection in accordance with this provision. 

Figure 2. Article 15(c) QD/QR: elements of the assessment 

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4.3.1.  Armed conflict (international or internal)  

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 1.; 
COI Update 2025, 1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Throughout the reference period, Somalia continued to be affected by various conflicts. The 
main conflicts are outlined below:  

•  Al-Shabaab – anti Al-Shabaab armed conflict: With the support of the international 
coalition of ATMIS/AUSSOM, Kenya, Ethiopia and the United States of America, the 
FGS continued its offensive against Al-Shabaab which, in response, staged high profile 
attacks, especially in Mogadishu. In South-Central Somalia, particularly, Al-Shabaab 
maintained or regained control over large swathes of territory. This remains the main 
conflict driver in Somalia. 

•  The inter and intra-clan rivalries: The second conflict driver and source of insecurity in 
the country is the continuation of clan rivalries and intra-clan conflicts, which has led to 
an increase of relevant security incidents and estimated fatalities across the country. 
The existence of clan militias has been reported throughout Somalia, including 
Puntland and Somaliland. In some cases, clan rivalries have escalated to armed 
confrontations, therefore taking the form of an armed conflict in the meaning of Article 
15(c) QD/QR.  

•  SNA – SSC-Khatumo conflict: The major conflict that erupted in February 2023 
between SNA and SSC-Khatumo forces continued intermittently throughout the 
reference period, leading to the establishment of the autonomous SSC-Khatumo 
administration in the contested regions between Puntland and Somaliland.   

•  Anti-ISS armed conflict: The operations of Somali and US security forces against ISS 
continued, especially in Bari region, with the associated security incidents spiking 
during the first quarter of 2025. The Hilaac offensive, backed by UAE and US 
airstrikes, expelled ISIS from the Al-Miskaad mountains. By late July 2025, the 
operation entered its final phase to eliminate remaining fighters and prepare for 
Operation Onkod against Al-Shabaab, while US forces captured ISIS’s Somalia finance 
chief. 

Somalia is currently affected by multiple overlapping conflicts, in the meaning of 
Article 15(c) QD/QR. These conflicts affect different areas in Somalia at different 
degrees. See more under 4.3.4. Indiscriminate violence.  

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4.3.2.  Qualification of a person as a ‘civilian’ 

Last update: October 2025 

Being a civilian is a prerequisite in order to be able to benefit from protection under 
Article 15(c) QD/QR. The purpose of the provision is to protect only those who are 
not taking part in the conflict. This includes the potential application of 
Article 15(c) QD/QR to former combatants who have genuinely and permanently 
renounced armed activity. 

Applications by Somali nationals falling under the following profiles should be examined 
carefully. Based on an individual assessment, such applicants may be found not to qualify as 
civilians under Article 15(c) QD/QR. For example, members of: 

•  FGS security forces, including SNA, NISA and SPF;  
•  FMS armed forces;  
•  Somaliland armed forces;  
•  Al-Shabaab; 
•  Clan militias; 
•  ISS.  

See also 2. Actors of persecution or serious harm 

Actively taking part in hostilities is not limited to openly carrying arms but could also include 
substantial logistical and/or administrative support to combatants.  

Exclusion considerations for former members of armed forces may also apply. See  
7. Exclusion. 

4.3.3. 

Indiscriminate violence 

Last update: October 2025  

The common analysis regarding the degree of indiscriminate violence combines 
quantitative and qualitative elements in a holistic and inclusive assessment.  

For more information on the methodology and indicators used to assess the level of 
indiscriminate violence in country guidance documents, see ‘EUAA, Indiscriminate 
violence in Country Guidance: Explained’, February 2025.  

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It should, furthermore, be noted that the COI used as a basis for this assessment 
cannot be considered a complete representation of the extent of indiscriminate 
violence and its impact on the life of civilians. Underreporting issues should be 
borne in mind. 

a) 

Security situation in Somalia: recent events 

Situation in Somalia 

The analysis below is based on following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 1.1.; COI 
Update 2025, 1, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Between April 2023 and July 2025, Somalia experienced a volatile and complex security 
environment marked by persistent conflict, political fragmentation, and humanitarian crises. Al-
Shabaab remained the most significant threat, controlling large swathes of South-Central 
Somalia and maintaining strongholds in the north. The group intensified operations and 
reversed previous government gains, retaking towns in Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, and Lower 
Shabelle, while consolidating control over key routes. In Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab conducted 
high-profile attacks with mortars, IEDs, and suicide bombings targeting the airport, military 
facilities, and civilians, causing heavy casualties and instability. 

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) faced internal divisions, with Puntland and 
Jubbaland suspending ties over political disputes. The emergence of the SSC-Khatumo 
administration in contested northern regions further complicated the federal landscape. The 
major conflict, which led to the official recognition of SSC-Khatumo as the sixth federal 
member state of Somalia with the name ‘Northeastern State’, continued throughout the 
reference period, causing casualties and fatalities from both sides, loss of civilian lives and 
resulting in the displacement of more than 200 000 people.  
Military operations, such as Operation Black Lion, targeted Al-Shabaab, but the group 
demonstrated resilience, aided by forced recruitment and clan alliances. 

Security incidents totalled more than 7 000, with over 18 000 fatalities. Clan conflicts also 
surged, particularly in Gedo, Bay, and Mudug, contributing to over 1 200 deaths between 1 
April 2023 and 21 March 2025. ISS expanded its presence in Puntland, while inter-clan and 
political violence persisted across regions. 

International actors, including the US, AU forces (AUSSOM), and regional militaries, remained 
engaged.  

Presence, methods and tactics of actors  

The analysis below is based on the  following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
1.2.3.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Somalia’s security landscape remains dominated by a complex array of armed actors, with Al-
Shabaab continuing to pose the most significant threat. Al-Shabaab’s control is marked by the 

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establishment of checkpoints, taxation systems, and parallel governance and justice 
structures. 

Al-Shabaab’s tactics include a mix of guerrilla warfare, complex urban attacks, and targeted 
assassinations. The group frequently uses IEDs, suicide bombings, and mortar attacks, 
particularly in Mogadishu and other urban centres. In 2024–2025, it launched a major 
offensive, reversing many of the government’s earlier territorial gains. The group has 
demonstrated increasing operational sophistication, including the use of drones and 
coordinated assaults on military bases and strategic towns. It also engages in forced 
recruitment, including of children, and uses propaganda to mobilise support. 

ISS has conducted IED attacks, assassinations, and drone strikes. A major offensive by 
Puntland forces in early 2025, supported by the U.S. and UAE airpower, disrupted ISS 
operations but did not eliminate the group. 

The SNA, supported by elite units like Danab (U.S.-trained) and Gorgor (Turkish-trained), 
remains the core of the FGS military apparatus. However, the SNA suffers from fragmentation, 
clan-based recruitment, and limited operational capacity. FMS maintain their own forces, such 
as the Jubbaland Dervish and Puntland Security Forces, often operating independently or in 
competition with federal forces. 

Clan militias, including the Macawisley, have played a growing role in anti-Al-Shabaab 
operations, particularly in Hirshabelle and Galmudug. These militias are often mobilised along 
clan lines and have been both a source of local security and inter-clan conflict. Over 100 clan 
militias were active during the reporting period, contributing to over 1 200 fatalities from inter- 
and intra-clan violence. In mid-June 2025, over 150 members of Macawisley, along with SNA 
fighters, defected to Al-Shabaab. 

The AUSSOM continues to provide critical support, though its sustainability is challenged by 
funding issues. AFRICOM and other international actors (e.g., Kenya, Ethiopia, UAE) conduct 
airstrikes and provide training and logistical support.  

Security incidents and geographical scope 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 1.4.1.; 
COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Data concerning this indicator are primarily based on ACLED reporting from 1 April 
2023 to 31 July 2025.  

Relevant reporting from other sources, including the UNSG and INSO CHDC, is also 
noted.  

It should be noted that different sources use different methodologies for the 
recording of incidents, therefore some discrepancies on data are to be expected. 
For more information on the methodologies of data collection, see the COI report 

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Security 2025, Sources. Concerns with regard to underreporting, especially 
pertinent to the quantitative indicators, should be taken into account. 

According to the ACLED dataset, between 1 April 2023 and 31 July 2025 there were 7 269 
security incidents recorded in Somalia. Most security incidents were recorded in Lower 
Shabelle (1 655), Benadir/Mogadishu (955) and Bay (756) regions. 

Figure 3: Breakdown by region of number of security events recorded by ACLED 

No. of security events, breakdown by region: 
1 April 2023 - 31 July 2025

Security events

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

The UNSG reports covering the period 8 February 2023 – 20 September 2024, recorded in 
total 3 145 security incidents. It should be noted that for the period 25 January 2024 – 23 May 
2024, an unspecified number of incidents was recorded according to this source.  

For the period April 2023 – March 2025, INSO CHDC data – the Conflict and Humanitarian 
Data Centre of the International NGO Safety Organisation, which adopts a methodology with a 
stronger focus on NGO security, recorded 6 861 security incidents in Somalia. 

Civilian casualties 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Security 2025, 1.4.1.; COI 
Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Data concerning this indicator are primarily based on ACLED reporting from 1 April 
2023 to 31 July 2025.  

Note on ACLED methodology: Data primarily come from secondary sources such 
as media reports. All ACLED fatality figures provided here are estimates based on 

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ACLED’s methodology. ACLED’s database does not distinguish between civilian 
and non-civilian fatalities and only provides figures of direct deaths or fatalities per 
event, not of injured persons and casualties; indirect deaths resulting from security 
events are also not taken into consideration. Concerns with regard to 
underreporting, especially pertinent to the quantitative indicators, should be taken 
into account. 

Figure 4: Breakdown of number of fatalities by region, recorded by ACLED between 1 April 2023 to 31 July 
2025. 

No. of fatalities, breakdown by region: 
1 April 2023 - 31 July 2025

Fatalities

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

According to ACLED, all types of events had or potentially had an impact on the civilian 
population; the total number of fatalities recorded in Somalia was 18 163. Most fatalities were 
recorded in Galgaduud (2 719), Lower Shabelle (2 601) and Middle Shabelle (2 480). 

Based on ACLED data, further calculations on fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants in each region 
for the period are also provided in the sub-section 4.3.3.b) Assessment of indiscriminate 
violence per region.  

Conflict-related displacement 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
1.4.2.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Data concerning this indicator are primarily based on UNHCR PRMN data reporting 
from 1 April 2023 to 16 March 2025. 

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For more information on the methodologies of data collection, see the COI report 
Security 2025, Sources. 

Between April 2023 and July 2025, Somalia experienced significant conflict-related 
displacement, with approximately 711 355 people forced to flee due to insecurity and violence 
out of about 2 788 000 newly displaced (as of March 2025). This displacement was driven by 
escalating inter-clan conflicts, armed confrontations between federal and regional forces, and 
militant activity, particularly by Al-Shabaab. Many displaced individuals remained within their 
home regions, although thousands relocated to neighbouring areas. The majority settled 
in informal IDP sites in urban and peri-urban zones, often lacking tenure security and access to 
basic services As of June 2025, there were about 3.5 million IDPs in Somalia, who depended 
on humanitarian aid for survival, with Mogadishu and Baidoa being the most densely 
populated. Displacement patterns were compounded by limited humanitarian access, 
infrastructure damage, and ongoing insecurity. The situation remains fluid, with displacement 
continuing into 2025, exacerbated by political fragmentation, armed group offensives, and 
climate-related shocks.  

Further impact on civilians 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Security 2025, 1.4.3.; Country 
Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Infrastructure damage is widespread, and attacks both on schools and hospitals were 
recorded between 8 February 2023 to 20 September 2024. Humanitarian access was 
severely restricted, with aid workers facing threats, detentions, and killings, particularly in 
Gedo, Lower Juba, and Sanaag. The humanitarian crisis persisted, with 6 million people 
needing assistance in 2025, including 1.7 million children suffering from acute malnutrition. 
Access to water, healthcare, and shelter remained inadequate, especially in IDP settlements. 
Forced evictions affected over 192 000 people in 2024 alone (see also 4.2.4. Forced 
evictions). 

b) 

Assessment of indiscriminate violence per region 

The map below summarises and illustrates the assessment of indiscriminate violence per 
administrative region under Article 15(c) QD/QR: 

Last update: October 2025  

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Figure 5: Level of indiscriminate violence in Somalia (based on information up to 31 July 
2025) 

Indiscriminate violence reaches a high level and a lower level of individual elements is 
required to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR. 

Indiscriminate violence is taking place, however not at a high level, and a higher level of 
individual elements is required to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) 
QD/QR. 

There is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) 
QD/QR. 

For more information and analysis on the level of indiscriminate violence per region, see 
sections below.  

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Mere presence 

Areas where the degree of indiscriminate violence reaches such an exceptionally high level 
that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant area, 
would, solely on account of their presence there, face a real risk of being subject to the 
serious threat referred to in Article 15(c) QD/QR. Accordingly, additional individual elements 
are not required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) 
QD/QR. 

No such areas have been identified in Somalia. 

High level of indiscriminate violence 

Areas where ’mere presence’ would not be sufficient to establish a real risk of serious harm 
under Article 15(c) QD/QR, but where, indiscriminate violence reaches a high level. 
Accordingly, a lower level of individual elements (see Serious and individual threat) is required 
to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the area, would face a real 
risk of serious harm in the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.  

The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this 
assessment are highlighted below. 

Bay  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
2.2.2.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Bay remains under the mixed control of FGS coalition and Al-Shabaab, although the group’s 
influence in the area remains strong. The region’s rural terrain is largely under Al-Shabaab’s 
control. Urban areas were controlled by the FGS coalition, while the SNA regained control of 
previously Al-Shabaab controlled areas. In April 2025, Al-Shabaab resurfaced in rural areas of 
the region, temporarily lifting a decade-long blockade in several towns of Bay and Bakool 
regions. However, at the end of July 2025, key roads connecting these regions and the route 
to Mogadishu remained largely blocked. 

ACLED recorded 756 security incidents in Bay region between 1 April 2023 and 31 July 2025 
(an average of 6.3 incidents per week), resulting in 744 fatalities (representing approximately 
60 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Al-Shabaab was involved in almost all the recorded 
incidents. Such incidents included IED attacks striking SNA troops and security forces, ground 
raids against armed forces and using artillery to attack the capital city’s airport and regional 
hospital. During the reference period, a notable increase in deadly clan violence was also 
recorded. Between 1 April 2023 and 16 March 2025, 23 722 individuals were newly displaced 
from Bay due to conflict or insecurity.  

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Despite the high number of fatalities, which includes also combatants, and looking at all the 
indicators, it cannot be concluded that mere presence in the region of Bay would be sufficient 
to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.  

Based on the highly contested control of the region, the ongoing armed confrontations 
involving several actors, the number of security incidents as well as the nature of the violence, 
it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence in Bay region reaches a high level. 

Benadir/Mogadishu 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
1.2.2., 1.3.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of 
COI. 

Mogadishu remained under the control of FGS security institutions although Al-Shabaab 
maintained its capacity to carry out attacks in the region, through the agents of its Amniyat 
intelligence service. In September 2024, the group set up strategic bases in Mogadishu’s 
northern outskirts, collecting taxes and administering justice. In March 2025, reports indicated 
a significant increase of Al-Shabaab’s activity across several other suburbs. During the 
reference period, the Aden Adde International Airport areas, along with government and 
military facilities, were frequently targeted by the group with mortar attacks, coupled with IED 
targeted explosions and bombings.  

ACLED recorded 955 security incidents in Benadir region between 1 April 2023 and 31 July 
2025 (an average of 7.9 incidents per week), resulting in 962 fatalities (representing 
approximately 30 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Al-Shabaab was involved in the majority 
of the recorded incidents, carrying out more than 160 attacks against civilians. For example, Al-
Shabaab carried out complex attacks/suicide attacks against two busy hotels and a restaurant, 
targeting soldiers and civilians alike. Between 1 April 2023 and 16 March 2025, 1 952 
individuals were newly displaced from Benadir due to conflict or insecurity. UNOCHA 
recorded 98 humanitarian access incidents in the region from April 2023 and over the year 
2024 ranking first amongst all regions.  

Despite the high number of fatalities, which includes also combatants, and looking at all the 
indicators, it cannot be concluded that mere presence in Benadir/Mogadishu would be 
sufficient to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.   

Given the number of security incidents and fatalities, the persistent presence of Al-Shabaab in 
the region and the nature of the attacks (e.g. attacks in public spaces), it can be concluded 
that indiscriminate violence is taking place in Benadir/Mogadishu at a high level. 

Galgaduud 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
2.5.1.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

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Federal-aligned coalition forces, Al-Shabaab and Macawisley were the main actors in 
Galgaduud region, while different clan militias were also involved in clan clashes. 

Galgaduud is described as a longstanding battleground for control between government 
forces and Al-Shabaab. Federal-aligned forces captured areas, withdrawing however after a 
short period of time. Airstrikes, battles, explosions from landmines and other explosive de-
vices, remote violence and violence against civilians have been reported. 

Al-Shabaab controlled the southern-central part of Galgaduud from the coastline up to north 
and northeast of Ceel Buur town. The remaining part of the region was under mixed, unclear 
or local control with the exception of the area along the border with Ethiopia, which was under 
the control of the federal-aligned coalition forces, along with the capital city. In January 2025 
intense fights erupted in Masagaway and in February fights continued with Macawisley 
attacking Al-Shabaab. 

ACLED recorded 480 security incidents during the period from 1 April 2023 to 31 July 2025 
(an average of 4 incidents per week), causing 2 719 fatalities (representing approximately 335 
fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). During the period from 1 April 2023 to 16 March 2025, 11 
203 people were newly displaced from Galgaduud. Humanitarian activities were restricted 
due to violent incidents. 

Despite the high number of fatalities, which includes also combatants, and looking at all the 
indicators, it cannot be concluded that mere presence in the region of Galgaduud would be 
sufficient to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.   

Based on the nature of violence, such as the use of landmines and other explosives, as well as 
the high number of security incidents, it can be concluded that the indiscriminate violence in 
Galgaduud region reaches a high level. 

Hiraan 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
2.4.1.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

In Hiraan region the main actors of armed conflicts were the FGS in coalition with 
ATMIS/AUSSOM, Al-Shabaab, Macawisley clan militias, and the Ethiopian National Defense 
Force (summer 2024). Actors in armed inter-clan conflicts, such as the Hawadle, the Abgaal, 
the Makane and the Habar Gidir, were also active. 

Since late 2024, Hiraan has been the focal point of the Federal Government coalitions fight 
and the epicenter of the Macawisley clan militias fight against Al-Shabaab, which resulted in 
battles, explosives and in early 2024 airstrikes. Between April and July 2025, Al-Shabaab 
made significant gains in Hiraan. rising local resentment over the government’s failure to 
support clan militias. Al-Shabaab used IED, suicide attacks and suicide car bombs, causing 
civilian casualties. 

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The north-eastern part of the region and the urban centres were under the control of the 
Federal Government coalition. Al-Shabaab fully controlled the area between South-West state 
border and the Shabelle River Valley. Other parts of the region were under mixed, unclear or 
local control. A counter-offensive against Al-Shabaab by Somali government forces together 
with local clan militias in April 2023 was initially ‘promising’, but later slowed down due to lack 
of forces, inter-clan conflicts and logistical difficulties. In February 2025 heavy fighting was 
reported along the Shabelle River. 

From 1 April 2023 to 31 July 2025, ACLED recorded 567 security incidents (an average of 4.7 
incidents per week), causing 1740 fatalities (representing approximately 345 fatalities per 100 
000 inhabitants). Between 1 April 2023 and 16 March 2025, approximately 10 500 people 
were newly displaced from Hiraan. Al-Shabaab increased attacks on food and water resources 
as a punishment for clans cooperating with the government against the group.  

Despite the high number of fatalities, which includes also combatants, and looking at all the 
indicators, it cannot be concluded that mere presence in the region of Hiraan would be 
sufficient to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.   

Based on the highly contested control of the region, as well as the different kinds of violence 
used by the conflicting parties, including explosive weapons and suicide attacks, it can be 
concluded that indiscriminate violence in Hiraan region reaches a high level. 

Lower Juba 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
2.1.2.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

In Lower Juba, armed confrontations involved Al-Shabaab, Jubbaland forces, and the FGS, 
competing for the territorial dominance of the region. Small-scale counter-insurgency 
operations against Al-Shabaab, including airstrikes and ground operations took place in June 
and July 2023. Clashes intensified in 2024 and Al-Shabaab conducted coordinated attacks. 
Deadly clashes in Kismayo amid pre-election tensions were reported.  

ACLED recorded 598 security incidents between 1 April 2023 and 31 July 2025 (an average of 
5.0 incidents per week), resulting in 1 973 fatalities (representing approximately 170 fatalities 
per 100 000 inhabitants). A significant number of newly IDPs (50 650) was also reported, as 
well as 11 humanitarian access incidents, including the destruction of a school, a water and 
sanitary infrastructure. 

Despite the high number of fatalities, which includes also combatants, and looking at all the 
indicators, it cannot be concluded that mere presence in the region of Lower Juba would be 
sufficient to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.  

Based on the number of security incidents and the nature of violence (attacks and armed 
clashes) and the rising number of IDPs, as well as the ongoing armed confrontations between 
several actors, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence in Lower Juba region reaches 
a high level. 

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Lower Shabelle  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports and query: Security 2025, 
2.2.3.; Country Focus 2025, 1.4.2; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be 
referred to as a source of COI. 

Lower Shabelle remains an Al-Shabaab stronghold as the group exercises control over most 
of the region’s areas, including several checkpoints. By March 2025 Al-Shabaab had seized 
control of strategic locations and relative bridges in the region The group staged attacks 
against SNA, local government and ATMIS troops, using tactics such as hit-and-run attacks, 
IED attacks and ambushing small groups of soldiers. In June 2025 the SNA army and allied 
forces launched ‘Operation Silent Storm’, aimed at liberating areas under Al-Shabaab’s 
control, however as of July 2025, this operation was only partially successful. Dozens of 
civilians were killed in the region due to drone strikes by the FGS, by patrolling ATMIS forces, 
and in artillery crossfire, as well as due to unattributed explosions. A notable increase of clan 
conflicts escalating into armed violence was also reported in mid-2024.    

ACLED recorded 1 655 security incidents between 1 April 2023 and 31 July 2025 (an average 
of 13.8 incidents per week), resulting in 2 601 fatalities (representing approximately 163 
fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Al-Shabaab was involved in 1 302 of the total security 
incidents. Between 1 April 2023 and 16 March 2025, 78 367 individuals were newly displaced 
from Lower Shabelle due to conflict and insecurity. UNOCHA recorded 28 humanitarian 
access incidents in Lower Shabelle region between April 2023 and over the year 2024. Al-
Shabaab reportedly hindered humanitarian access in the region. An increase in child 
casualties due to mortar fire, unexploded ordnance and remnants of war, was documented 
over the summer of 2023 and in early 2024 and mostly attributed to Al-Shabaab.  

Despite the high number of fatalities, which includes also combatants, and looking at all the 
indicators, it cannot be concluded that mere presence in the region of Lower Shabelle would 
be sufficient to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.  

Based on the strategic nature of the region, the significant number of incidents, and the nature 
of violence inflicted in the region as well as the high number of displaced persons, it can be 
concluded that indiscriminate violence in Lower Shabelle reaches a high level.  

Middle Shabelle 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
2.4.2.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

The control of Middle Shabelle remained fragmented, with most of the region being under 
mixed, unclear, or local control shared between Al-Shabaab and the federal-aligned coalition 
forces. By mid-May 2025, al-Shabaab had managed to recapture most of the territory it had 
lost in Middle Shabelle since 2022 and by the end of July 2025 the group had deployed a 
significant number of troops and armoured vehicles along a strategic road. However, at the 
end of June 2025, the SNA and allied forces managed to reclaim control of a zone long 

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exploited by Al-Shabaab for recruitment and attacks, and still highly contested. Additionally, 
violent conflicts have been reported between the Abgaal and the Hawadle clans.  

The ongoing conflict between the federal-aligned forces and Al-Shabaab has led to a series of 
violent incidents, including targeted airstrikes on Al-Shabaab strongholds, battles over control 
of military bases and checkpoints, as well as the use of IEDs, suicide car bombings, remote 
violence, and attacks against civilians. From 1 April 2023 to 31 July 2025, ACLED recorded 
600 security incidents (an average of 5 incidents per week), causing 2480 fatalities 
(representing approximately 245 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). In the period from 1 April 
2023 to 16 March 2025, 66 238 individuals were newly displaced in Middle Shabelle. Al-
Shabaab controlled a key road, disrupting the delivery of aid and daily supplies. In 2024, 14 
humanitarian incidents were recorded. 

Despite the high number of fatalities, which includes also combatants, and looking at all the 
indicators, it cannot be concluded that mere presence in the region of Middle Shabelle would 
be sufficient to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.  

Based on the highly contested control of the region, as well as the high number of different 
kinds of security incidents, including explosives and suicide attacks, it can be concluded that 
the indiscriminate violence in Middle Shabelle reaches a high level. 

Mudug 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
2.5.2.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

In Mudug region, the main actors were the federal-aligned coalition forces and Al-Shabaab. 
The region is also characterised by distinct clan dynamics; the northern part is predominantly 
controlled by the Darod clan (Majerteen-Omar Mahmoud sub-clan), while the southern part is 
dominated by the Hawiye clan (Habar Gidir Sa’ad sub-clan). 

Xarardheere town, historically a stronghold for Al-Shabaab fighters, was liberated in May 
2024. As of February 2025, federal-aligned forces have regained control over key areas in 
southern Mudug, that had remained under prolonged Al-Shabaab control. Illustrative security 
incidents included battles, explosions and remote violence, violence against civilians and a 
drone strike. 

Mudug’s central part is fully controlled by federal-aligned coalition forces. Al-Shabaab fully 
controlled an area stretching from the border with Galgaduud region to towns of Ba’adweyne, 
Amara and Qey’a. Northern Mudug remained under the control of ‘Autonomous armed forces 
(unionists)’. The unionists and the federal-aligned coalition forces had mixed control over 
Gaalkacyo city.  

In the period from 1 April 2023 to 31 July 2025, ACLED recorded 262 security incidents (an 
average of 2.2 incidents per week), causing 1 894 fatalities (representing approximately 129 
fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). 30 787 people were newly displaced from Mudug due to 
conflict and insecurity, during the period from 1 April 2023 to 16 March 2025. 

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Southeastern Mudug is suffering from severe economic hardship, with many people being 
unable to secure food and water. Host communities remained overburdened. Due to security 
incidents, the access to humanitarian help was restrained. School education was also 
disrupted. 

Despite the high number of fatalities, which includes also combatants, and looking at all the 
indicators, it cannot be concluded that mere presence in the region of Mudug would be 
sufficient to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.  

Based on the highly contested control of the region the high numbers of fatalities, as well as 
the increased number of security incidents and IDPs, it can be concluded that the 
indiscriminate violence in Mudug region reaches a high level. 

Indiscriminate violence not at a high level 

Areas where indiscriminate violence is taking place, however not at a high level. Accordingly, 
a higher level of individual elements (see Serious and individual threat) is required in order to 
show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the area, would face a real 
risk of serious harm in the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.  

The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this 
assessment are highlighted below. 

Bakool  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
2.2.1.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Control over Bakool region remained mixed between FGS coalition and Al-Shabaab. The 
group controlled large rural areas, obstructing humanitarian aid, imposing taxes and recruiting 
children to its ranks. Most of the region’s towns, including the capital, remained under the 
control of FGS. In April 2025, Al-Shabaab temporarily lifted a decade-long blockade in several 
towns of Bay and Bakool regions. However, at the end of July 2025, key roads connecting 
these regions and the route to Mogadishu remained largely blocked. 

ACLED recorded 321 security incidents in Bakool region between 1 April 2023 and 31 July 
2025 (an average of 2.7 incidents per week), resulting in 600 fatalities (representing 
approximately 110 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Al-Shabaab was involved in 277 of the 
total security incidents. Notable incidents included an ambush staged by Al-Shabaab against 
Ethiopian troops and airstrikes targeting the group’s positions. Between 1 April 2023 and 16 
March 2025, 20 284 individuals were newly displaced from Bakool due to conflict and 
insecurity. Furthermore, nine humanitarian access incidents were reported in the region from 
April 2023 and over the year 2024, and in August 2024, Al-Shabaab blocked main supply 
routes, leaving the town dependent on airlifts and smuggling. 

Despite the ongoing conflict between SNA and Al-Shabaab and taking into consideration the 
number of security incidents mainly involving warring parties, which followed relatively stable 

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patterns in comparison to the reference period of the previous guidance, it can be concluded 
that indiscriminate violence takes place in Bakool however not at a high level. 

Bari 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
2.6.2.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

In Bari region, armed confrontations involved Al-Shabaab, the ISS, and autonomous unionist 
forces. Al-Shabaab and ISS maintained a presence in key mountain ranges and parts of Bari, 
while most urban centers remained under autonomous unionist control, with some areas 
contested between actors. Violence included clashes between ISS, Al-Shabaab, and Puntland 
forces, car bomb attacks, suicide bombings, and airstrikes.  

ACLED recorded 376 security incidents during the period from 1 April 2023 to 31 July 2025 (an 
average of 3.1 incidents per week), causing 1 241 fatalities (representing approximately 101 
fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Between 1 April 2023 and 16 March 2025, 15 778 
individuals were newly displaced from Bari due to conflict or insecurity. 

Civilians experienced extortion by ISS, business attacks, and restricted access to livelihoods. 
Notable reported incidents include hospital closures, farmers’ displacement, and attacks on 
humanitarian workers and facilities. 

Based on the number of security incidents and fatalities as well as the nature of violence, it 
can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Bari region, however not at a 
high level.  

Gedo 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 2.1.1.; 
COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Gedo region remained a hotspot of armed confrontations involving Al-Shabaab, FGS, 
Jubbaland forces, and Ethiopian troops. Violence stemmed from political tensions between 
FGS and Jubbaland.  

As of July 2025, control of the Gedo region remained fragmented among various actors. Al-
Shabaab held large rural areas, while urban centers were divided between Jubbaland regional 
forces and the FGS coalition. Some areas experienced mixed control. Ethiopian forces seized 
key airports in late 2024, intensifying the conflict’s complexity and strategic importance. 
Violence included Al-Shabaab attacks on military bases, clan clashes, IED road attacks, and 
FGS–Jubbaland armed confrontations. As of mid-July 2025, the FGS planned a new military 
deployment to some of these locations, with the reported objective to bring the entire Gedo 
region under the direct control of Villa Somalia. After days of intense fighting, Somali 
government forces regained full control of a key town, while causing widespread destruction 
and civilian deaths. 

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ACLED recorded 295 security incidents between 1 April 2023 and 31 July 2025 (an average of 
2.5 incidents per week), resulting in 214 fatalities (representing approximately 22 fatalities per 
100 000 inhabitants). Between 1 April 2023 and 16 March 2025, 94 452 individuals were 
newly displaced from Gedo region due to conflict or insecurity.  Humanitarian workers and 
infrastructure were targeted in several attacks 

Despite the ongoing armed confrontations between several actors and taking into 
consideration the number of security incidents and fatalities as well as the nature of the 
violence, including attacks on military bases, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence 
takes place in Gedo region however not at a high level.  

Middle Juba 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
2.1.2.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Middle Juba region remained an Al-Shabaab stronghold as the group has kept control of 
virtually the entire region despite several operations conducted against them by SNA, 
Jubbaland forces, U.S., and Kenyan forces. Violence included ground offensives, targeted 
airstrikes, and public executions. Notable incidents reported involved airstrikes killing Al-
Shabaab commanders and civilians.  

ACLED recorded 72 security incidents during the period from 1 April 2023 to 31 July 2025 (an 
average of 0.6 incidents per week), causing 415 fatalities (representing approximately 96 
fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Between 1 April 2023 and 16 March 2025, 52 217 
individuals were newly displaced from Middle Juba due to conflict or insecurity.  

Despite the increase of fatalities and the large number of IDPs and given the relatively low 
number of security incidents as well as the stable control of Al-Shaabab, it can be concluded 
that indiscriminate violence in Middle Juba is taking place, however, not at a high level. 

Sanaag 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 1.3., 
2.7.2.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Sanaag is part of the Somaliland-Puntland contested areas. The western part of the region 
was controlled by the Somaliland administration with the remaining areas being largely under 
mixed control. Al-Shabaab maintained its presence in the northern part of the region. The 
conflict dynamics in Sanaag involved also clans in land, resources and inter-clan disputes, and 
fights against Somaliland’s forces. In July 2025 the SSC-K state formation process sparked 
clashes between SSC-Khatumo forces and Puntland security forces. ACLED recorded 72 
security incidents in Sanaag between 1 April 2023 and 31 July 2025 (an average of 0.6 
incidents per week), resulting in 129 fatalities (representing approximately 30 fatalities per 100 
000 inhabitants). Illustrative incidents included violent clan disputes and fights between clan 
militias and the Somaliland police forces. Between 1 April 2023 and 16 March 2025, 22 608 
individuals were newly displaced from Sanaag due to conflict or insecurity. UNOCHA recorded 

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12 humanitarian access incidents from April 2023 and over the year 2024. Due to violent 
clashes displaced populations were left in dire humanitarian situation, while the humanitarian 
operations, business activities and schooling were reportedly completely disrupted.  

Although conflicts between the various armed actors persisted, taking into consideration the 
nature of violence and that the numbers of recorded security incidents followed relatively 
stable patterns in comparison to the reference period of the previous guidance, it can be 
concluded that indiscriminate violence in Sanaag is taking place, however not at a high level.  

Sool 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 1.3., 
2.7.1.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Sool is part of the Somaliland-Puntland contested areas. Control over the region’s areas was 
divided between the autonomous armed forces of SSC-Khatumo (for the newly established 
autonomous administration of SSC-Khatumo, see 4.3.3. a) Security situation in Somalia: recent 
events and the Somaliland administration, with certain districts being under mixed control. 
Clan militias were also involved in the conflict.  

ACLED recorded 140 security incidents in Sool between 1 April 2023 and 31 July 2025 (an 
average of 1.2 incidents per week), resulting in 340 fatalities (representing approximately 62 
fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Somaliland military forces and SSC-Khatumo militia were 
involved in 56 of the recorded incidents, causing 255 fatalities. Illustrative incidents included 
an attack to a health facility and deadly clan violence. At district level, Laas Caanood recorded 
the most security incidents (59), followed by Buhodle (53) and Caynabo (14). 

Between 1 April 2023 and 16 March 2025, 54 077 individuals were newly displaced from Sool 
due to conflict or insecurity. UNOCHA recorded 21 humanitarian access incidents in Sool 
between April 2023 and over the year 2024, including the damage of hospitals and the 
injuries of health workers.  

Despite the ongoing conflicts between armed actors and considering the reduced number of 
recorded security incidents and nature of the violence, it can be concluded that indiscriminate 
violence in Sool region is taking place, however not at a high level.  

No real risk 

Areas where, there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of 
Article 15(c) QD/QR. This may be because the criteria for an armed conflict within the meaning 
of this provision are not met, or because no indiscriminate violence is taking place.  

The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this 
assessment are highlighted below. 

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Awdal 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
2.8.1.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Al-Shabaab had no control of any territory in Awdal region. The entire region was reported to 
be under the control of the ‘Somaliland administration (separatist)’ and has generally been 
characterised by relative stability in the latest years. In September 2023, Gadabursi clan chiefs 
stated their desire for the Awdal region to secede from Somaliland. However, as of April 2025, 
no further information on this subject could be found.   

Violence included clashes between protesters and security forces after the killing of an off-
duty Somaliland police officer, by Somaliland police forces. Between 1 April 2023 and 31 July 
2025, ACLED reported 7 security incidents (0.1 per week) and one fatality (approximately 0 
fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants) and the number of newly IDPs (8) remained low.  

Considering the generally stable control exercised by the Somaliland administration as well as 
the low number of security incidents and civilian fatalities, it can be concluded that in Awdal 
region there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected by indiscriminate violence.  

Nugal 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Security 2025, 2.6.1.; COI 
Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Al-Shabaab had no reported presence in Nugal. The region was largely under ‘autonomous 
armed forces’ control, with some mixed/local control near the Galmudug-Puntland border. 
Increased security measures were noted in Garowe in August 2024 due to suspected Al-
Shabaab infiltration. Violence included clashes between government forces and opposition 
clan militias over electoral disputes.  

ACLED recorded 58 security incidents in Nugal region between 1 April 2023 and 31 July 2025 
(an average of 0.5 incidents per week), resulting in 65 fatalities (representing approximately 10 
fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). A significant number of fatalities was the result of clashes 
linked to political opposition. Between 1 April 2023 to 16 March 2025, 48 200 individuals were 
newly displaced from Nugal region due to conflict or insecurity. Moreover, 29 humanitarian 
access incidents were reported in the region from April 2023 and over the year 2024, 
including an attack on humanitarian supplies and the delay in the processing of imported aid 
supplies. Also, school closings and local businesses and transport services facing disruptions 
were reported. 

Considering that Al-Shabaab had no reported presence in Nugal and that security incidents 
and fatalities were mostly associated with political disputes, it can be concluded that in Nugal 
region there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected by indiscriminate violence.  

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Todgheer 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
2.8.3.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Al-Shabaab does not control any territory in Todgheer region. The entire region is reported to 
be under the control of the ‘Somaliland administration (separatist)’.  

Violence included clashes between Somaliland forces, clan-based militias and inter-clan fights. 
On 15 May 2025, protests erupted in the capital of the region against the planned release of 
SSC-Khatumo prisoners. Security forces violently suppressed the demonstrations, resulting in 
at least six deaths, over 30 injuries, and the temporary arrests of hundreds of people, who 
were later released. ACLED recorded 24 security incidents in Todgheer between 1 April 2023 
and 31 July 2025 (an average of 0.2 incidents per week), resulting in 18 fatalities (representing 
approximately 2 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Newly displaced individuals due to conflict 
or insecurity were on the rise compared to previous years (7 712). The region experienced 
significant food aid looting. 

Considering the generally stable control exercised by the Somaliland administration as well as 
the low number of security incidents and civilian fatalities, and despite the rising number of 
new IDPs, it can be concluded that in Todgheer region there is no real risk for a civilian to be 
personally affected by indiscriminate violence.  

Wogoyi Galbeed 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Security 2025, 
2.8.2.; COI Update 2025, 2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Al-Shabaab does not control any territory in Wogoyi Galbeed region. The entire region is 
reported to be under the control of the ‘Somaliland administration (separatist)’. Violence 
included clashes between Somaliland forces, Gacaan Libaah militia and clan militias.  

Notable incidents reported involved the killing of one person in election-related clashes in 
Baliguabadle, the killing of nine soldiers by Gacaan Libaah militia in Saaxil and the deaths of a 
police officer and a civilian by Ethiopian forces near the Ethiopian border.  Between 1 April 
2023 and 31 July 2025 ACLED reported 18 security incidents (0.1 per week), resulting in 27 
fatalities (approximately 2 per 100 000 inhabitants). Furthermore, newly displaced individuals 
number (7) remained stable and low.  

Considering the generally stable control exercised by the Somaliland administration as well as 
the low number of security incidents and civilian fatalities, it can be concluded that in Wogoyi 
Galbeed region there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected by indiscriminate 
violence.  

Please note that in areas where there would be ‘no real risk’ for a civilian to be 
affected by indiscriminate violence within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR, 

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depending on personal circumstances, an applicant may still be exposed to a risk of 
persecution or a risk of serious harm under Article 15(a) or (b). Hence, this 
assessment of ‘no real risk’ should in no way be misconstrued as the designation of 
‘safe areas’ for return or any other purposes.  

4.3.4.  Serious and individual threat 

Last update: October 2025 

For general information on the individual circumstances which may be relevant to 
consider in the assessment of a serious and individual threat in territories where the 
‘mere presence’ threshold is not reached, see ‘EUAA, 'Serious and individual threat' 
in Country Guidance: Explained, February 2025’. 

In the context of the ‘sliding scale’, each case should be assessed individually, taking into 
account the applicant’s personal circumstances together with the nature and intensity of the 
violence in their home area (see also Indiscriminate violence). It is not feasible to provide 
exhaustive guidance as to what the relevant personal circumstances could be and how those 
should be assessed. Individual elements can exist in combination. Other factors may also be 
relevant. 

Below are some examples of personal circumstances to be taken into account, where the 
‘mere presence’ threshold is not reached, in the context of Somalia:  

•  Age: Children and elderly people may not be able to move without help or be able to 
quickly assess and avoid risky locations. Furthermore, infrastructure damage in 
Somalia, mostly South-Central Somalia, is widespread, with schools and hospitals 
being sometimes attacked. In a few occasions, children have also been affected by 
explosive remnants of war, e.g. in Lower Shabelle region. Therefore, younger children 
and elderly persons may be more susceptible to indiscriminate violence.  

•  Health condition and disabilities, including mental health issues: Indiscriminate 

attacks in Somalia, mostly in South-Central Somalia, have taken place in public spaces, 
including checkpoints hindering the access to hospitals. Some attacks in hospitals 
have been also reported in Las Anood. People with disabilities related to mobility may 
not be able to move without help. Furthermore, people with mental health issues might 
not be able to quickly assess and avoid risky situations. Persons with health issues 
required to visit the hospital on a regular basis might be also exposed to indiscriminate 
violence at checkpoints. Infrastructure damage in hospitals is also reported in the 
country. Therefore, some persons with health conditions may be more susceptible to 
indiscriminate violence.   

•  Economic situation: The economic situation in Somalia is difficult. People in dire 

economic situation may be forced to expose themselves to risks, such as working in 
areas which are affected by indiscriminate violence.  

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•  Knowledge of the area: Some Somalis were born or have lived for an extensive period 
of time outside Somalia, such as in neighbouring countries. Such individuals may not 
have knowledge of the area and experience of local violence patterns; therefore they 
may be more susceptible to indiscriminate violence.  

•  Profession and/or place of residence:  Indiscriminate attacks in Somalia, mostly in 

South-Central Somalia, have taken place in public spaces such as restaurants, cafes, 
hotels, checkpoints, khat or mira markets. Persons who, due to their place of residence 
or professional activity, are frequently in the vicinity of such places (e.g.  (employees of 
potentially targeted restaurants, hotels, airport, health workers) or people working 
outside a lot (e.g. street vendors, drivers) may be more susceptible to indiscriminate 
violence. 

•  Family members or support network: Clans in Somalia offer shelter, support and 

protection for their clan members, depending also on the (military) strength a clan has. 
The clan can be a source of information, that is necessary to evaluate dangerous 
situations. Therefore, a person with no or limited clan support may be more 
susceptible to indiscriminate violence.  

In some cases, these personal circumstances may be cumulative, leading to enhanced 
exposure to indiscriminate violence.  

4.3.5.  Qualification of the harm as a ‘threat to (a civilian’s) life or 

person’ 

Some of the commonly reported types of harm to civilians’ life or person in Somalia include 
killing, injury, forced displacement, etc. A real risk of such serious harm would qualify as a 
threat to a (civilian’s) life or person in accordance with the provision of Article 15(c) QD/QR. 

4.3.6.  Nexus/‘by reason of’ 

The interpretation of the causation ‘by reason of’ may not be limited to harm which is directly 
caused by the indiscriminate violence or by acts that emanate from the actors in the conflict. 
To a certain extent, it may also include the indirect effect of indiscriminate violence in 
situations of armed conflict. As long as there is a demonstrable link to the indiscriminate 
violence, such elements may be taken into account in the assessments, for example: 
destruction of the necessary means to survive, destruction of infrastructure, criminality. 

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5.  Actors of protection 

For general guidance on the country guidance approach to this chapter, see ‘EUAA, 
'Actors of protection' in Country Guidance: Explained, February 2025’. 

5.1. 

The State 

5.1.1.  The Somali State 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Security 2025, 1.1., 1.2., 1.2.3., 
1.3., 1.5., 2.6.2.; Actors 2021, 2.1., 2.3., 2.3.1., 2.3.2., 2.3.4., 2.4., 2.4.3., 3.2., 5.1., 5.2., 7.6., 7.6.1., 
7.6.2., 7.6.4., 7.7.4.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Somalia is a Federal State, composed of the FGS and several FFMS, which include both state 
and local governments. The country's political and governance structures were reported 
fragmented, with overlapping responsibilities between federal and state authorities. The 
judiciary, composed of constitutional, federal, and state-level courts, was constitutionally 
independent but practically compromised by political interference, clan influence, corruption, 
and resource limitations. 

Puntland developed significant institution-building and governance mechanisms, and it 
demonstrated the most advanced (formal) judicial infrastructure among the FMS. However, it 
was still affected by security, humanitarian, political, and socio-economic challenges, such as 
tensions with FGS, clashes with Somaliland, Galmudug, ISS and Al-Shabaab, and clan rivalries. 
As from 31 March 2024, Puntland does not recognise the FGS. 

The Somali justice system relied heavily on three co-existing mechanisms: the official state 
justice system, customary law (xeer), and Sharia courts. Most Somalis resolved disputes 
through customary systems. Over 80% of civil and criminal cases were handled outside the 
formal system due to greater accessibility, perceived fairness, and enforceability. However, 
major issues undermined the statutory justice system, including chronic underfunding, lack of 
qualified personnel, and poor enforcement of court decisions. Corruption and clan political 
influence frequently obstructed the fair administration of justice.  

Moreover, access to justice was reported deeply unequal. Women and children faced cultural 
and legal restrictions, especially within the xeer system, which they could only access through 
a male representative. Sharia courts offered somewhat better access for women, but 
patriarchal norms still dominated. Minority groups were particularly vulnerable, often lacking 
effective access to either customary or statutory justice mechanisms. These groups faced 
marginalisation based on clan status and economic disadvantages, further diminishing their 
ability to seek protection or redress. 

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Somalia’s state security architecture remained fragmented and weak. The FGS struggles to 
assert authority over the FMS, many of which act independently, with overlapping or 
competing mandates. Most FMS security forces remained under-resourced, factionalised, or 
politically manipulated. The SNA faced capacity issues due to poor training, insufficient 
equipment, and infiltration by Al-Shabaab. Key security agencies, like NISA were undermined 
by Al-Shabaab infiltration and political manipulation. Notably, special units like Danab and 
Gorgor, often supported by foreign allies such as the US, conducted the bulk of 
counterterrorism operations. 

Within the FMS, Puntland's state police was the only functioning police service. However, 
paramilitary forces like the PMPF and PSF operated autonomously and were heavily involved 
in internal politics and clan disputes, operating outside Somalia’s national constitutional 
framework. 

International forces, such as AUSSOM and AFRICOM also contributed to Somalia’s security, 
despite their limited effectiveness due to underfunding, mandate restrictions, and logistical 
challenges. Although the U.S. military resumed operations in Somalia in 2022, international 
efforts have not resulted in a coherent, sustainable security or justice system. 

The Somali multi-faceted justice system is still experiencing significant weaknesses 
and is unable to effectively detect, prosecute and punish acts that constitute 
persecution or serious harm. Furthermore, law enforcement is continuously 
challenged by the different conflicts taking place in South-Central Somalia and 
Puntland, including the conflict with Al-Shabaab.  

Therefore, it can be concluded that, in general, the Somali State would not be 
considered an actor of protection meeting the criteria under Article 7 QD/QR.  

5.1.2.  Authorities of Somaliland 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Actors 2021, 7.7., 7.7.1, 7.7.4.; 
Targeting 2021, 4.1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

The authorities of Somaliland dispose their own legislative, executive and judiciary branches 
and have generally maintained control over their territory, successfully preventing Al-Shabaab 
from establishing a presence. The justice system integrates statutory courts, customary law 
(xeer), and Sharia, all recognised under Somaliland’s Constitution. While steps have been 
taken to improve access to justice -including doubling the number of judges, introducing 
mobile courts, and appointing female legal professionals- challenges remained. These 
included lengthy procedures, high legal fees, a shortage of legal professionals, limited rural 
access, poor enforcement of court rulings, and corruption. Many residents preferred the 
competence of xeer or Sharia courts for quicker and more affordable resolutions. Even though 
fair trial rights are generally respected, women, children, and minority groups still faced 
restrictions in accessing justice, especially within customary systems. 

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When assessing the availability of protection by the authorities of Somaliland, 
individual circumstances such as home area, age, gender, clan, social and 
economic situation, actor of persecution and type of human rights violation must be 
taken into account.  

The authorities of Somaliland, in areas under their control, may, depending on 
the individual circumstances of the case, be considered able and willing to provide 
protection that meets the requirements of Article 7 QD/QR. In disputed areas 
between Somaliland and Puntland, the criteria under Article 7 QD/QR would 
generally not be met.  

Protection by the Somaliland authorities is generally not considered available for 
members of minority groups, persons with diverse SOGIESC, children and 
women, including girls, especially in cases of sexual and gender-based violence. 

5.2.  Parties or organisations, including international 

organisations  

5.2.1.  Al-Shabaab 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Security 2025, 1.2.2., 2.3.1.(b); 
Actors 2021, 4.3., 4.4.; Targeting 2021, 3.1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a 
source of COI. 

Al-Shabaab has established a parallel justice system in areas under its control, including 
mobile courts that operate even beyond its territory, including in Mogadishu. These courts 
enforce a strict interpretation of Sharia law, often resulting in executions and corporal 
punishments. While some civilians turned to these courts for swift rulings on civil disputes, due 
process is lacking - there is no legal representation, no appeals, and decisions are often 
arbitrary. 

The lack of due process and the nature of the punishments would not qualify the 
parallel justice mechanism operated by Al-Shabaab as a legitimate form of 
protection. Further taking into account its record of human rights violations, it can 
be concluded that Al-Shabaab does not qualify as an actor of protection who is 
able to provide effective, non-temporary and accessible protection. 

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5.3.  Considerations of clan support 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Actors 2021, 2.3.2., 3.2.1., 
3.2.2.; Targeting 2021, 4.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Most Somalis rely on support from patrilineal clan relatives. Clans can provide different forms 
of support for their members. Inside the jilib, community must help individuals in case of 
smaller or larger problems, reaching as far as the mutilation or the murder of someone from 
another clan (blood price). Arrangements can also be made between clans for protection 
outside the clan. 

Under the xeer system, clan elders act as mediators or arbiters, and play a central role in the 
resolution of local and intra-clan disputes. 

For information with regard to support provided by clans, see 1.2. The role of clans in Somalia. 
For more information on the xeer system, see 5.1.1. The Somali State.  

The support provided by clans in Somalia cannot be considered as meeting the 
requirements of Article 7 QD/QR(11). 

(11) CJEU, OA v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-255/19, Second Chamber, judgment of 20 February 
2021 (OA), 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=236682&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&di
r=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3564514. 

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6. 

Internal protection alternative 

For general guidance on the country guidance approach to this chapter, see EUAA, 
'Internal protection alternative' in Country Guidance: Explained, February 2025. 

6.1. 

Part of the country 

Last update: October 2025 

When identifying the part of the country to be considered for IPA, the decision-maker should 
take into account factors related to individual circumstances, including, inter alia, the 
applicant’s area of origin, existing ties with the proposed area of relocation, such as previous 
stay or residence and/or availability of a support network, including the clan affiliation, within 
the proposed area. 

This guidance document looks into the existence of internal protection alternative, specifically 
in Mogadishu (Benadir region), Garowe (Puntland) and Hargeisa (Somaliland), as the main 
urban centres in Somalia in relation to the requirements of Article 8 QD/QR. This is without 
prejudice to the possibility to apply IPA to other places in Somalia. 

Given the importance of clan affiliation in Somalia, the specific clan family the 
applicant belongs to should be considered when assessing a specific part of the 
country for IPA. 

For example, for applicants from the Darood/Harti/Majeerteen/Ise Mahamoud clan 
family, Garowe may be particularly relevant to assess. Hargeisa may be particularly 
relevant to assess for applicants originating from Somaliland and/or belonging to 
the Isaaq clan family. Mogadishu may be particularly relevant for applicants from 
the Hawiye clan family, however being not as segregated by clans as other areas of 
Somalia it may also be considered for IPA for applicants belonging to other clans.  

For more details on the demographic composition of these cities, see Country 
Focus 2025, 2.1.1., 2.2.1., 2.3.1.  

6.2.  Safety 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report/s: Country Focus 2025, 2.; 
Security 2025, 2.3., 2.6.1., 2.8.2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of 
COI. 

Last update: October 2025 

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6.2.1.  Absence of persecution or serious harm 

When examining the element ‘absence of persecution or serious harm’, the decision-maker 
should refer to chapters 2 to 5 of this document.  

When assessing the requirement of safety with regard to the applicability of IPA in individual 
cases of applicants from Somalia, the following elements should be taken into account: 

•  General security situation in relation to indiscriminate violence 

Based on the analysis under 4.3.3. Article 15(c) QD/ QR: Assessment of indiscriminate violence 
and of real risk per region, the conclusions with regard to the three cities of Mogadishu, 
Garowe and Hargeisa are as follows: 

In Mogadishu (Benadir/Mogadishu region): indiscriminate violence reaches a high level, and, 
accordingly, a lower level of individual elements is required to show substantial grounds for 
believing that a civilian, returned to the territory, would face a real risk of serious harm within 
the meaning of Article 15(c) QD. 

In Garowe (Nugal region): there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the 
meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR. 

In Hargeisa (Wogoyi Galbeed region): there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally 
affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD. 

With regard to the safety of IPA in Mogadishu, a careful examination should be performed, 
given the complex security situation in the capital.  

•  Actor of persecution or serious harm and their reach 

In case where the applicant fears persecution or serious harm by State actors (e.g., journalists, 
individuals (perceived as) contravening Islamic and customary laws/tenets outside Al-Shabaab 
controlled areas, persons with diverse SOGIESC), there is a presumption that IPA would not be 
available.  

In specific cases where the reach of a certain State actor is clearly limited to a particular 
geographical area (e.g. FMS authorities, Somaliland authorities), the safety criterion may be 
satisfied with regard to other parts of Somalia.  

In cases where the applicant faces persecution or serious harm by Al-Shabaab, the safety 
requirement would, in general, not be satisfied in South-Central Somalia. With regard to 
Puntland and Somaliland, IPA may be considered safe depending on the applicant’s individual 
circumstances. The group’s capacity to track and attack individuals in areas outside its direct 
control, should be given due consideration.  

In cases where the applicant faces persecution or serious harm by ISS or clans, the safety 
requirement may be satisfied depending on the applicant’s individual circumstances.  

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For more information on the territorial control and influence of different actors, see 2. Actors of 
persecution or serious harm and  4.3.3. Assessment of indiscriminate violence per region. 

In cases where the applicant faces persecution or serious harm for reasons related to the 
prevalent social norms in Somalia and the actor of persecution or serious harm is the Somali 
society at large (e.g. persons with diverse SOGIESC, individuals contravening social or 
religious laws/ tenets), the safety requirement would generally not be met. 

For certain particularly vulnerable individuals, such as some women and children, if the actor 
of persecution or serious harm is the (extended) family or the community at large (e.g. 
FGM/C, forced marriage), considering the reach of these actors, the lack of State protection 
and their potential vulnerability to other forms of violence, the safety requirement would in 
general not be met.      

For the territorial control and influence of actors, see also 2. Actors of persecution or serious 
harm. 

•  Whether the profile of the applicant is considered a priority target and/or a threat by 

the actor of persecution or serious harm 

The applicant’s profile could make him or her a priority target, increasing the likelihood that 
the actor of persecution or serious harm would attempt to trace them in the potential IPA 
location (e.g. high-level federal and state officials).  

•  Behaviour of the applicant 

It is recalled that an applicant cannot be reasonably expected to abstain from practices 
fundamental to their identity, such as those related to religion or sexual orientation and gender 
identity, in order to avoid the risk of persecution or serious harm(12). 

•  Other risk-enhancing circumstances 

The information under 3. Refugee status should be used to assist in this assessment. 

6.2.2.  Availability of protection against persecution or serious harm 

Alternatively, it may be determined that the requirement of safety is satisfied if the applicant 
would have access to protection against persecution or serious harm, as defined in 
Article 7 QD/QR, in the area where IPA is considered. In the case of persecution by the State, a 
presumption of non-availability of State protection applies. See also 5. Actors of protection. 

Last update: October 2025 

(12) CJEU, Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v X and Y and Z v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel, joined cases 
C199/12 to C-201/12 judgment of 7 November 2013, X and Y and Z, paras. 70-76, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144215&pageIndex=0&doclang=e 
n&mode=l%20st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7670158 
CJEU, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y and Z, joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, judgment of 5 September 2012, 
para. 80, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=126364&doclang=en 

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6.2.3.  Conclusion on safety 

 In relation to Mogadishu, the requirement of safety may be satisfied only in 
exceptional cases. Individual circumstances are to be taken into consideration. 

In relation to Garowe and Hargeisa, the requirement of safety may be satisfied, 
depending on the profile and the individual circumstances of the applicant. 

6.3.  Travel and admittance 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is  based on the following EUAA COI reports and query: Country Focus 
2025, 2.1., 2.2., 2.3.; Security 2025, 2.3., 2.6.1., 2.8.2.; COI Update 2025, 4.; Country Guidance 
should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

If the criterion of ‘safety’ is satisfied, as a next step, it has to be established whether an 
applicant can safely and legally travel and gain admittance in the suggested IPA location.  

•  Safely travel  

Travel in Mogadishu raises significant challenges due to insecurity and poor infrastructure. 
Frequent Al-Shabaab attacks, especially at checkpoints, create constant threats, particularly 
near government buildings and strategic areas like Villa Somalia and the Aden Adde 
International Airport. Roads are often in disrepair, with some being further damaged by recent 
floods as of March 2025. Although limited road rehabilitation has been undertaken, many 
routes remain partially closed due to security concerns. The surge in vehicles, especially 
unregulated ones driven by unlicensed individuals heightens vulnerability to attacks using 
vehicle-borne explosives. 

Garowe International Airport serves as a key hub for both domestic and international travel. 
Road access to Garowe is generally open, while checkpoints at city entrances, controlled by 
Puntland police, operate with relatively loose controls, tightening only during specific alerts. 
Within the city, there are no permanent checkpoints, with only ad hoc ones set up by the 
police. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal International Airport is the main entry and exit point for 
flights to/from Somaliland. 

Road conditions in Hargeisa are generally poor despite rehabilitation efforts. Public transport 
is widely used, while checkpoints are limited mostly to customs checks at main entrances and 
security near the presidential palace.  

•  Legally travel  

To access Somalia by air or land, Somali citizens require a passport. One source noted that 
Somalis can access Somalia also with a public ID and, depending on an individual's network 

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and connections, it could be possible to even 'circumvent the need for documents'. It is 
possible to apply for a passport at a Somali embassy.  

Somalis arriving in Mogadishu by air must present valid passports and follow standard entry 
procedures at the airport, while those arriving by land pass through city checkpoints but are 
not always required to show ID. To settle in the city, individuals must register with local 
authorities, including background checks by NISA, while formal registration is also required to 
rent or purchase property. 

For documents required to access Garowe, see general information on access to Somalia, 
above. Somalis who settle into Garowe have to provide an ID and register with the local 
government. In practice, however, people can also settle through personal connections. 

Anybody travelling to Hargeisa by air from abroad requires a valid passport for entering the 
territory of Somaliland. Somalilanders travelling with a passport issued by the Somaliland state 
administration do not require a visa. All other Somalis travelling with a passport issued by the 
FGS, require a visa. For the granting of the visa, sometimes a letter of invitation or travel 
justification is also required. On arrival’ visas are awarded for stays of up to 30 days.  

•  Gain admittance  

While Mogadishu is less segregated by clan compared to other parts of Somalia, clan 
affiliation remains influential, with the Hawiye clan holding most powerful positions. Minority 
groups and individuals from non-dominant clans often face exclusion and discrimination. The 
city also hosts a large population of IDPs, many of whom lack clan support or a local power 
base, leaving them particularly vulnerable. 

Garowe, traditionally the homeland of the Darood/Harti/Majeerteen/Ise Mahamoud clan, has a 
diverse population that includes members of other clans, Hawiye businesspeople, and former 
IDPs from southern Somalia. 

Members of the Isaaq clan-family currently make up most of Hargeisa’s population. While 
people belonging to different clans or ethnic origins can generally reside across the city, 
certain districts are dominated by specific groups. When settling in the city, no particular 
formal requirement is needed to buy land or properties or engage in business and other legal 
activities, provided that the individual is informally ‘identified’ by the hosting community 
through clan or local contacts. ID and other formal documentations are instead needed in case 
people intend to officially register. In this case, women need to be escorted by a male 
guarantor and witness, in whose absence two female witnesses are needed.  

It is concluded that there are some security concerns with regard to the safety of 
travel to Mogadishu. With regard to Garowe and Hargeisa, it is concluded that, in 
general, a person can access these cities without serious risks. 

The existence and/or possibility to issue relevant identification documents should 
be given due consideration. The possession of appropriate identification and/or 
travel documents is required to access Somalia and Somaliland. When passing 

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through checkpoints to travel to Mogadishu, Garowe, and Hargeisa, and to 
circulate in the three cities, the lack of identification documents may render the 
applicant vulnerable to ill-treatment at checkpoints. The possession of a 30-day visa 
would not be sufficient to consider that the applicant can settle in Hargeisa. 

Clan affiliation does not constitute a legal requirement to travel and gain 
admittance in Mogadishu, Garowe and Hargeisa, however it would be a crucial 
factor to take into account when examining the reasonableness to settle in one of 
these cities. 

6.4.  Reasonableness to settle  

If the criteria of safety and travel and admittance are met, the next step is to consider the 
reasonableness to settle in light of the general situation in the respective city and the 
individual circumstances of the applicant. According to Article 8(1) QD/QR, IPA can only apply if 
the applicant ‘can reasonably be expected to settle’ in the area of internal protection under 
consideration. 

6.4.1.  General situation 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 2.1.3., 
2.2.3., 2.3.3.; Security 2025, 2.3., 2.6.1., 2.8.2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as 
a source of COI. 

•  Means of basic subsistence and employment 

Somalia, especially Mogadishu, heavily relies on foreign aid to support IDPs, who are among 
the most vulnerable. Mogadishu is the city with the largest growth opportunities in Somalia, 
with high productivity levels. However, economic growth is hampered by increasing costs for 
land and property, and scarcity of water. The general unemployment rate is still high and 
employment opportunities generally depend on the existence of support network such as, 
family or clan affiliations. The majority of the capital’s residents depend for income on casual 
labour in the city’s markets, restaurants and tea shops, earning low salaries. Another challenge 
for the city is that Al-Shabaab maintains a presence, and taxes businesses, but also private 
persons. The existence of a high IDP population has resulted in increased competition for 
urban livelihoods.  

Garowe is experiencing growing humanitarian challenges, due to increasing number of IDPs, 
driven by drought in surrounding areas and conflict in southern Somalia, as well as due to 
poverty. The employment landscape in Garowe is characterised by general instability and low 
employment rates, especially amongst youth and IDPs. The majority of the population relies on 
casual labour and petty trades, with many international organisations having moved their 
offices from Garowe to Mogadishu.  

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Poverty is also widespread in Hargeisa. Unemployment and poverty rates are generally high 
across the city, especially among young people and IDPs. In Hargeisa, salaries are generally 
low although the city’s economy is booming, with the majority of business based on small to 
medium enterprises. Formal and informal trading plays an important role as well as the various 
markets which are central to the local economy. On the other hand, low unemployment rates 
disproportionally affect young people and women. Clan affiliation plays an important role in 
the social and economic life of Hargeisa residents, with IDPs mostly relying on humanitarian 
aid for survival.  

•  Housing and shelter 

In Mogadishu, property prices and rents are generally high, with the housing situation in urban 
locations being aggravated due to increased movement from rural areas. Owning of property 
in Mogadishu is typically associated with individuals from dominant clans whereas low-income 
inhabitants tend to be mostly tenants. The city’s outer districts record higher levels of 
insecurity and poverty.  

Living costs in Garowe vary depending on income level and life choices. Rent prices are 
increasing as the city is experiencing a steady growth of IDPs.   

The majority of the population in Hargeisa resides in stone houses and shacks, with varying 
rent prices.  

•  Food security 

In Mogadishu, food remains affordable when purchased from local markets.  

Climate changes and low salaries affect the food access rates in Garowe.  

Household food insecurity in Hargeisa is higher than the national prevalence, with people 
living in IDP camps particularly struggling with accessing food.  

•  Water and sanitation 

In Mogadishu, properties in expensive areas are connected to the pipe system, however the 
water is not considered sufficiently clean for consumption. Residents in poorer areas are 
reportedly relying on wells, kiosks and trucks for provision of water. Water shortages and 
pollution are reported, affecting mostly IDPs, whereas the city’s sewage system often 
experiences malfunctions due to planning shortcomings.  

In Garowe, most houses are connected to the pipe system, with the city’s residents having 
access to tap water, bottled water and purified water delivered by trucks. 

Water affordability is a concern for residents in Hargeisa, where limited access to water and 
sewage services result in high costs. Provision of piped water is limited, with residents relying 
mostly on water delivered by truck and hand carts.  

•  Basic healthcare 

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The quality of healthcare services is poorly controlled across Somalia, with the provision of 
specialised or complicated treatments to be either limited or not available at all.  

More specifically, the majority of healthcare services and facilities is located in Mogadishu. 
Officially, public hospitals are free of charge although unofficial fees may apply. The quality of 
health services provided in private hospitals is reportedly better. When it comes to provision of 
specialised treatments, however, this is either limited or unavailable.  

In Garowe, public and private healthcare services are available. Even though healthcare is not 
free, the costs are significantly lower in the public sector. The quality of healthcare services is 
reportedly good although of low capacity. Specialised mental health care is, however, not 
provided in any of the public or private facilities.  

In Hargeisa, both public and private medical health care facilities exist, with costs for services 
provided in private hospitals being higher. Although mental healthcare is generally 
underdeveloped in Somaliland, there are some services provided in Hargeisa.  

The general circumstances prevailing in Mogadishu, Garowe and Hargeisa 
assessed in relation to the factors above entail significant hardship. However, they 
do not preclude the reasonableness to settle in the cities as such. A more careful 
examination of the applicant’s individual circumstances is required when assessing 
the reasonableness of IPA to Mogadishu, given the general socio-economic 
situation, exacerbated also by the security situation, in the city. 

The person’s ability to navigate the above circumstances in the three cities will 
mostly depend on access to clan support and financial means and in individual 
cases, the reasonableness requirement may be satisfied. 

6.4.2. 

Individual circumstances 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2025, 1.2., 
1.2.1.b, 1.2.3., 1.4., 1.4.3., 2.1.3.(d), 2.1.3.(e) , 2.1.3.(f), 2.1.4.(a), 2.2.3.(d), 2.2.3.(e), 2.2.3.(f), 2.2.4.(a), 
2.3.3.(d), 2.3.3.(e), 2.3.3.(f), 2.3.4.(a).; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of 
COI. 

In addition to the general situation in the area of potential IPA, the assessment whether it is 
reasonable to settle in that part of the country should take into account the individual 
circumstances of the applicant. The individual considerations may include potential 
vulnerabilities and availability of coping mechanisms. A non-exhaustive list of relevant 
considerations is provided below: 

•  Clan affiliation and support network: Clan affiliation is one of the most important 

factors in Somali society. The applicant’s clan family and specific clan affiliation should 
be taken into account as members of minority clan families would face discrimination 

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as well as social, political and economic marginalisation when relocating and 
assimilating into an area dominated by another clan. The existence, capacity and 
willingness of other support networks, such as family and/ or social network, to assist 
should be considered on a case-by-case basis. Family and personal connections are 
often a prerequisite for finding and securing employment. Minority groups and 
returnees who have been absent for several years may lack clan support. Large 
numbers of returnees who lack financial means end up in IDP camps where the living 
conditions are no different than for those internally displaced, thus with limited access 
to basic services. 

•  Age: Young age as well as elderly age could significantly limit the applicant’s access to 
means of subsistence such as through employment, making them depended on other 
providers. Children, in particular, are exposed to child recruitment and exploitation and 
the child’s best interest shall be a primary consideration which shall include, among 
others, their access to basic education. For example, access to education may be 
difficult for children belonging to minority clans.   

•  Gender: Women and girls in Somalia may be subject to discriminatory restrictions and 
may need support of a male family member in order to access services, such as in 
relation to education, work and housing, and to exercise certain rights. Further 
difficulties have been reported for single women without a clan network as well as for 
IDPs. The applicant’s gender should therefore be taken into account when considering 
reasonableness in conjunction with their family status and available support.   

•  Health status: The quality of and access to healthcare is strained across Somalia, 
making the health status of the applicant and any need for medical treatment an 
important consideration when assessing the reasonableness of IPA. Health status may 
also affect the ability to work and, for minors, their access to education. For persons 
with disabilities, access to basic subsistence would be further limited.    

•  Professional and educational background and financial means: The professional 
background of an applicant, their level of education and available financial means 
should be taken into account when assessing the reasonableness of IPA. Uneducated 
persons are particularly affected by severe lack of access to the labour market in urban 
settings.  

These factors would often intersect, leading to different conclusions on the reasonableness of 
IPA. In some cases, more than one element of vulnerability would indicate that IPA is not 
reasonable for the particular applicant (e.g. person with a disability without support network), 
while in other cases the relevant factors may balance each other (e.g. non-educated single 
male with strong clan or other support network).  

6.4.3.  Conclusion on reasonableness 

The general conclusions of the reasonableness of IPA for particular profiles of applicants are 
based on an assessment of the general situation in Mogadishu, Garowe and Hargeisa, and the 
applicant’s individual circumstances, as outlined above.  

Last update: October 2025 

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Mogadishu  

IPA might be reasonable in exceptional cases which may include, inter alia, single 
able-bodied men and married couples without children and/or no additional 
vulnerabilities, who belong to the majority or dominant clan families in the area of 
settlement, who have educational and professional background facilitating access 
to employment or with a support network which is able and willing to assist them in 
accessing basic subsistence.   

Garowe and Hargeisa  

IPA may be reasonable in cases of single, able-bodied men and married couples 
without children and/or no additional vulnerabilities, who belong to the locally 
dominant clan.  

Internal protection alternative would in general not be reasonable for families with 
children and unaccompanied children, as well as with applicants from minority 
groups, including clans who can be considered minorities in the local context. 

In the case of other profiles, the individual circumstances of the applicant, in 
particular in relation to clan affiliation, gender, age, the existence of a support/clan 
network, etc. should be given due consideration.  

For more details on the demographic composition of these cities, see Country 
Focus 2025, 2.1.1., 2.2.1., 2.3.1.  

6.5.  General conclusion on the applicability of IPA 

Taking into account the assessment with regard to the three criteria under Article 8 
QD/QR, it can be concluded that:  

Given the security situation and living conditions, IPA in Mogadishu might be 
applicable only in exceptional cases.  

IPA in Garowe and Hargeisa may be applicable depending on profile and 
individual circumstances of the applicant, as detailed above.  

Clan affiliation is a crucial element to consider for IPA in all three cities. 

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7. 

Exclusion 

For general guidance on Exclusion, see EUAA Practical Guide: Exclusion and EUAA 
Practical Guide on Exclusion for Serious (Non-Political) Crimes. 

For general guidance on the country guidance approach to this chapter, see ‘EUAA, 
'Exclusion' in Country Guidance: Explained, February 2025’. 

In the context of Somalia, various circumstances may require consideration of the potential 
applicability of exclusion grounds. The QD/QR does not set a time limit for the application of 
the grounds for exclusion. Applicants may be excluded in relation to events regardless of 
when they took place. 

More specifically, the need to examine possible exclusion issues in the context of Somalia may 
arise, for example, in cases of applicants being former or current members of the groups cited 
below. This list is non-exhaustive:  

•  (Former) members of the Somali state or FMS armed forces, such as SNA members, 

NISA, darwish forces 

•  (Former) members of the federal Somalia or state institutions, such as government 

officials and members of political or administrative institutions of a certain rank or level, 
judicial officials, prosecution authorities, prison officials and detention personnel  

•  (Former) members of Islamist/jihadi groups, such as Al-Shabaab or ISS members 

(Former) members of clan militias or clan elders 

Given the serious consequences that exclusion may have for the individual, the 
exclusion grounds should be interpreted restrictively and applied with caution.  

The examples mentioned in this chapter are non-exhaustive and non-conclusive. 
Each case should be examined on its own merits. 

7.1. 

Exclusion based on the commission of 
international crimes  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Security 2025, 1.2.2., 
1.2.3.,1.3.; Actors 2021, 2.4.6., 3.6., 4.5., 5.1., 6.3., 7.1.5., 7.2.5, 7.4.5., 7.5.5, 7.6.5, 7.7.5.; Country 
Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. 

Last update: October 2025 

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The ground ‘crime against peace’ is not likely to be of relevance in the cases of applicants 
from Somalia. 

Violations of international humanitarian law by different parties in the current and in past 
conflicts in Somalia could amount to war crimes, such as the deliberate and systematic attacks 
on schools and hospitals, the deliberate attacks on civilians, rape, forced and child marriage, 
child recruitment of children under 15 years old, attacks on humanitarian workers etc. 

Relevant situations include the civil war (1988-1991) and the non-international armed conflict 
between the Somali government and Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, fighting between the ISS and 
Al-Shabaab amounts to a non-international armed conflict. 

Reported crimes such as murder, torture and rape by the different actors could amount to 
crimes against humanity, when committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack 
against the civilian population. 

Some acts in the current and past conflicts, such as extrajudicial killings, torture, forced 
disappearance, rape, could amount to both, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 

Especially (former) members of the SNA, the SPF, the NISA, as well as FMS security forces and 
anti-government armed groups, in particular Al-Shabaab and ISS can be implicated in acts that 
would qualify as war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. 

Crimes committed in the context of clan militias clashes, in particular in the civil war in the past, 
could also give rise to considerations under Article 12(2)(a) and 17(1)(a) QD/QR. 

7.2. 

Exclusion based on the commission of a serious 
crime 

Last update: October 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.1., 1.2., 
1.3., 1.10.; Security 2025, 1.2., 1.5.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of 
COI. 

Criminal activity in Somalia is widely reported, including killings, sexual violence, abductions, 
theft, trafficking in human beings, money extortion/illegal taxation, piracy, human and/or arms 
smuggling. In some cases, these crimes are linked to armed groups, such as Al-Shabaab. Such 
serious (non-political) crimes would trigger consideration of the application of Article 
12(2)(b)/Article 17(1)(b) QD/QR. 

Violence against women and children (for example, in relation to domestic violence, honour-
based violence, child labour, forced and child marriage, FGM/C) could also potentially amount 
to a serious (non-political) crime. 

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Some serious (non-political) crimes could be linked to an armed conflict (e.g. if committed in 
order to finance the activities of armed groups) or could amount to fundamentally inhumane 
acts committed as a part of a systematic or widespread attack against a civilian population 
(e.g. kidnapping of recruits, taxation to finance the activities of non-state armed groups), in 
which case they should instead be examined under Article 12(2)(a)/Article 17(1)(a) QD/QR. 

7.3. 

Exclusion based on acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations 

Last update: October 2025 

Former membership in terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab, ISS, a could trigger relevant 
considerations and require an examination of the applicant’s activities under Article 
12(2)(c)/Article 17(1)(c) QD/QR, in addition to the considerations under Article 12(2)(b)/Article 
17(1)(b) QD/QR.  

However, membership alone is not enough to substantiate exclusion. The application of 
exclusion should be based on an individual assessment of the specific facts in the context of 
the applicant’s activities within that organisation. The position of the applicant within the 
organisation would constitute a relevant consideration and a high-ranking position could 
justify a (rebuttable) presumption of individual responsibility for crimes or acts within the scope 
of Article 12(2)(c)/Article 17(1)(c) QD/QR. Other engagement with a group, such as the 
aforementioned, could also trigger exclusion considerations. Nevertheless, it remains 
necessary to examine all relevant circumstances before an exclusion decision can be made.  

Where the available information indicates possible involvement in crimes against peace, war 
crimes or crimes against humanity, the assessment would need to be made in light of the 
exclusion grounds under Article 12(2)(a)/Article 17(1)(a) QD/QR.  

7.4. 

Exclusion based on constituting a danger to the 
community or to the security of the Member State 

Last update: October 2025 

In the examination of the application for international protection, the exclusion ground under 
Article 17(1)(d) QD/QR (danger to the community or the security of the Member State) is only 
applicable to persons otherwise eligible for subsidiary protection.  

Unlike the other exclusion grounds, the application of this provision is based on a forward-
looking assessment of risk. Nevertheless, the examination takes into account the past and/or 
current activities of the applicant, such as association with certain groups considered to 
represent a danger to the security of the Member State or criminal activities of the applicant.  

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Annex: Country of origin information 

references 

The main COI sources used in the common analysis are the following (listed 
alphabetically by reference used in the text) 

Actors 2021 

EUAA Country of Origin Information Report: Somalia, Actors  

(July 2021) 

Available at:  

https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_07_EASO_C
OI_Report_Somalia_Actors.pdf 
EUAA Country of Origin Information Report: Somalia - Defection, 
desertion and disengagement from Al-Shabaab 

AS Deserters 
2023 

(February 2023) 

Available at:  

https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2023_02_EUAA_C
OI_Report_Somalia_defection_desertion_disengagement_Al_Shabaab
.pdf 
EUAA Country Of Origin Information Query: Somalia - Forms and 
prevalence of repeated FGM/C  

FGM/C 2023  

(May 2023) 

Available at:  

https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2023_04_EUAA_C
OI_Query_Response_Q12_Somalia_FGM-C.pdf 

COI Update 
2025 

EUAA Country of Origin Information Query: Somalia – Major political, 
security, and humanitarian developments  

(August 2025) 

Available at:  

https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2025_08_EUAA_C
OI_Query_Response_Q24_Somalia_Major_political_security_and_hum
anitarian_developments.pdf 

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Country Focus 
2025 

EUAA Country of Origin Information Report: Somalia: Country Focus 

(May 2025) 

Available at:  

https://euaa.europa.eu/coi/somalia/2025/country-focus/coi-report-
somalia-country-focus 

Security 2025  EUAA Country of Origin Report: Somalia: Security Situation 

(May 2025) 

Available at:  

https://euaa.europa.eu/coi/somalia/2025/security-situation/coi-report-
somalia-security-situation 
EUAA Country of Origin Report: Somalia – Targeted profiles 

Targeting 
2021 

(September 2021) 

Available at:  

https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2021_09_EASO_
COI_Report_Somalia_Targeted_profiles.pdf 

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