Self-reported and revealed inflation inattention.
Date: 2025-09-30
Institutions: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
Subjects: consumer survey, economic policy, euro area, household income, inflation

Economic and Financial AffairsEUROPEAN ECONOMY DISCUSSION PAPER 225 | SEPTEMBER 2025Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation InattentionChristian Buelens and Staffan LindénEuropean  Economy  Discussion  Papers  are  written  by  the  staff  of  the  European  Commission’s 
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European Commission 

Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 

Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention 

Christian Buelens and Staffan Lindén  

Abstract 

This paper looks at household inflation attention in the euro area, using the European Commission's Business 
and  Consumer  Survey.  The  main  contributions  are  to  measure  inflation  inattention  and  its  drivers  and  to 
illustrate  how  inflation  inattention  differs  across  socio-economic  categories  (gender,  income,  education  and 
age).  We  use  two  measures:  self-reported  inflation  inattention,  corresponding  to  the  share  of  `don't  know' 
responses and a new index of revealed inflation attention. This index assesses how well consumer inflation 
perceptions match actual inflation outturns and takes into account biases by survey participants. We find that 
inflation attention increases with inflation, and accelerates when inflation exceeds a certain level. Our results 
also  show  that  inflation  perceptions  and  expectations  change  not  only  due  to  revisions  in  views,  but  also 
because individuals switch from  having no  view to holding a  view when inflation is  high. We also find that 
there  are  structural  differences  in  inflation  inattention  across  socio-economic  categories,  which  are  closely 
related  to  the  overestimation  of  inflation  in  these  categories.  These  findings  have  implications  for  the 
interpretation  of  inflation  perceptions  and  expectations  and  are  relevant  for  the  targeting  of  policy 
communication towards specific groups and depending on the inflation environment. 

JEL Classification: C81, D83, D84, E31, E7. 

Keywords: Inflation, Attention, Rational inattention, Expectations, Consumer Surveys. 

Acknowledgements:  We  have  benefited  from  discussions  and  many  helpful  comments  and  suggestions 
from  Leonor  Coutinho,  Reinhard  Felke,  Regina  Kiss  (discussant),  Mirko  Licchetta,  Mirjam  Salish,  as  well  as 
seminar  participants  at  the  37th  Centre  for  International  Research  on  Economic  Tendency  Surveys  (CIRET) 
Conference  (Vienna)  and  the  11th  Joint  European  Commission/OECD  Workshop  on  Recent  Developments  in 
Business and Consumer Surveys (Brussels). 

Contact:  Christian  Buelens,  christian.buelens@ec.europa.eu,  Staffan  Lindén,  staffan.linden@europa.eu, 
European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 

EUROPEAN ECONOMY                                                                                                     Discussion Paper 225 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENTS

1 Introduction

2 The consumer survey data

3 Self-reported inflation inattention and its drivers
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3.1 ‘Don’t Know’ .
3.2 A linear model of self-reported inattention .
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3.3 A threshold model of self-reported inattention .
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3.4 The extensive margin of inflation beliefs .

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4 Revealed inflation attention: Descriptive analysis

5 An experimental index of revealed Inflation Attention
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5.1 Methodology .
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5.2 Results .
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5.3 Caveats .

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6 Inflation attention and inflation biases by socio-economic category

7 Discussion and conclusion

Appendix

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A  Stylised facts: inattention about inflation in comparison with other economic variables 

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Figure 3.1. Share of ‘don’t know’ answers to questions about inflation perceptions and expectations,
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euro area, 1997-2025 .
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Threshold regressions for inflation perceptions and expectations, euro area .
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Impact of a 1 percentage point fall in the ‘don’t know’ share .
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Figure 3.2.
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Figure 4.1. Distribution of inflation perceptions .
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Figure 4.2. Combinations of answers picked by respondents
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Figure 5.1. Scoring grid .
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Inflation attention index, euro area .
Figure 6.1. Quantitative inflation perceptions and expectations by socio-economic group, euro
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Figure 6.2. DK shares on inflation perceptions and expectations by socio-economic group, euro
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Figure 6.3. Differences in quantitative inflation beliefs and DK answer shares, perceptions and
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Figure 6.4. Use of response categories by socio-economic group, euro area .
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Figure A.1. Share of ‘don’t know’ answers by question, euro area, 1996-2025 .
Figure A.2. Share of ‘don’t know’ answers by question, euro area, 1996-2025 .

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Inflation attention index by socio-economic group, euro area .

expectations, by category, 2004-2025 .

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TABLES

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Table 3.1. Self-reported inflation inattention: perceptions .
Table 3.2. Self-reported inflation inattention: expectations
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Table A.1. Correlations of ‘don’t know’ answers across questions, euro area, 1996-2025 .

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. 23

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European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

1. 

INTRODUCTION

Inflation b eliefs, i .e. b oth p erceptions a nd e xpectations a bout i nflation, as  we ll as  ab out ot her economic 
variables, play a key role in economic theory and policy as they provide a basis for economic agents’ current 
and future decisions.  Beliefs typically depend on the current state of the economy and change over time, 
depending on the conditions under which they are formed. Also, since Jonung (1981), it is a well-established 
fact that there are heterogeneous inflation beliefs across socio-economic g roups. With the post-pandemic 
surge in inflation, there has been a growing interest in how attentive households are to economic phenomena 
such as inflation. Recent studies have shown that individuals pay more attention to inflation when it is high 
or rises and that there are attention thresholds (Korenok, Munro, and Chen, 2023; Bracha and Tang, 2024; 
Buelens, 2025) beyond which people’s attention accelerates, in line with the theory of rational inattention 
(Sims,  2003).  These  findings a re r elevant, a s t hey s uggest t hat t he s hare o f t he p opulation t hat holds 
informed beliefs about inflation is not stable over time, and that the way in which these beliefs are formed 
may vary.

Household opinion surveys are an important source for obtaining information on beliefs.  In this paper we 
measure the degree of inflation inattention using the European Commission’s Business and Consumer Survey 
(BCS), and assess what explains it and how it differs across socio-economic groups. We distinguish between 
‘self-reported’  inattention,  as  expressed  by  the  share  of  ‘don’t  know’  answers  in  consumer  surveys  and 
an  experimental  measure  of  ‘revealed’  inflation a ttention.1 U sing t he f ull s et o f r eplies t o t he questions 
on  perceived  price  developments  in  the  EU’s  harmonised  consumer  survey,  we  construct  a  new  inflation 
attention index (IAI) by scoring respondents’ answers relative to the prevailing inflation rate and accounting for 
individuals’ biases. The IAI aligns with previous findings about respondents’ heterogeneous beliefs concerning 
inflation developments (see J onung, 1 981; L indén, 2 020). Our study also shows that there are threshold 
effects for peoples’ inattention, i .e. when an economic situation becomes sufficiently important for a person 
and too costly to ignore, that person become more attentive.

Related literature.  Our work contributes to the literature on inflation attention, which has been growing 
rapidly since the post-pandemic surge in global inflation. While many economic models employ economic 
agents that have perfect information and form rational expectations, empirical evidence generally finds little 
support for these assumptions. To overcome these issues, researchers have focused on better understanding 
the  frictions  and  limitations  people  face  in  the  acquisition  and  processing  of  information.  For  example, 
economic  agents  are  subject  to  information  constraints  (Coibion  and  Gorodnichenko,  2012  and  Coibion 
and Gorodnichenko, 2015), which may reflect information acquisition cost (Mankiw and Reis, 2002), noisy 
information (Woodford, 2001) or the allocation of agents’ attention among competing issues (Sims, 2003; 
Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009).  In line with a trade-off between the cost of monitoring inflation and the 
optimality of choice, recent studies establish the presence of inflation attention r egimes. When inflation is 
low, so is attention to inflation. As inflation picks up and exceeds certain thresholds, attention surges. This is 
reflected in people’s google searches for the term ‘inflation’ as shown in Korenok, Munro, and Chen (2023) and 
Buelens (2025).  Related to the present paper, Bracha and Tang (2024) use ‘don’t know’-answers to survey 
questions on inflation and construct a measure of inflation inattention for the US, based on contradictory 
response patterns from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. Both measures show that consumers’ pay more 
attention to inflation as it r ises. Pfäuti (2025) shows that the frequency at which inflation expectations are 
updated, shapes inflation d ynamics. In a high-attention regime, the more frequent updates would prolong 
the inflationary impact caused by adverse supply shocks.

1In this paper, we will use both terms attention and inattention as complements of each other.

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European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

This paper further contributes to the literature on subjective inflation expectations. Since Jonung (1981), it is 
well established that inflation beliefs differ among economic agents and that there are systematic differences 
by gender, income and education (D’Acunto, Malmendier, and Weber, 2023). The gap between inflation beliefs 
of women and men has often been attributed to grocery shopping engagement and the exposure to volatile 
prices (Jonung, 1981; D’Acunto, Malmendier, and Weber, 2021).  Similarly, households with lower incomes 
tend  to  have  higher  inflation e xpectations. A  p ossible e xplanation m ay b e t he f act t hat h ouseholds are 
affected differently by inflation as the consume different bundles of goods. Strasser et al. (2023) for instance 
document large, idiosyncratic inflation differences between households and find that low-income households 
have experienced higher inflation in the 2 010s. Differences in inflation beliefs are particularly relevant for 
central banks that attempt to steer inflation expectations by communicating with the general public (Coibion, 
Gorodnichenko,  and  Weber,  2022;  Kamps  et  al.,  2025.  A  better  knowledge  of  the  broader  public  should 
notably help them to reach groups other than financial market specialists (Haldane and McMahon, 2018). 
De  Fiore,  Sandri,  and  Yetman (2025)  advocate  audience-centric  communication  to  enhancing  the  public’s 
understanding of the central bank’s goals and tools in view of stabilising inflation expectations. An important 
limitation of literature on inflation attention, is that it does not distinguish among socio-economic groups. 
To  our  knowledge,  only  Braitsch  and  Mitchell  (2022)  present  some  evidence  of  heterogeneity  in  inflation 
attention,  which  is  however  limited  to  US  consumers  during  the  COVID-19  period.  Our  two  measures  of 
inflation attention allow us to distinguish among g roups. We find that there are inflation attention gaps and 
that they correspond to the gaps observed for beliefs.

Structure. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the consumer survey data. 
Section 3 describes the measure of self-reported inflation inattention and provides an empirical assessment 
of  drivers  of  inflation i nattention a nd i nattention t hresholds. I n s ection 4  w e d iscuss r evealed inflation 
attention. Section 5 develops the Inflation Attention Index, our measure of revealed inflation attention. Section 
6 further investigates the relationship between inflation inattention and inflation biases across socio-economic 
groups. Section 7 discusses the implications of our findings and concludes.

2.  THE CONSUMER SURVEY DATA

The main data used in this study are consumers’ perceived and expected inflation, obtained from the consumer 
survey in the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys (henceforth BCS). The 
harmonised consumer survey is carried out at the national level according to a common methodology on a 
monthly basis.  It is a repeated cross section, i.e.  respondents change every month and cannot be tracked 
over time. The surveys are conducted in all 27 European Union Member States. The sample size varies across 
countries, depending on the size of the national population.  Each month more than 30 000 people reply to 
the surveys across the EU. The analysis in this study is limited to the euro area.

The BCS elicits consumers’ views on different topics, in particular their personal financial situation, the general 
state  of  the  economy,  the  evolution  of  consumer  prices  and  unemployment.  For  most  topics  covered  by 
the questionnaire, there is both a backward-looking question on realised outcomes that elicits consumers’ 
perceptions, and a forward-looking question that elicits expectations.  Consumers can provide their opinion 
according to a directional qualitative answer scheme consisting of five ordered answer categories or opt out 
by answering ’don’t know’.2  The two questions pertaining to the evolution of consumer prices and the possible 
answers a respondent can give, are formulated as follows:

• Q5: How do you think that consumer prices have developed over the last 12 months? The qualitative

2A few questions only have three or four answer categories and the opt out answer ‘don’t know’.

2

European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

responses are: 1) risen a lot (PP); 2) risen moderately (P); 3) risen slightly (E); 4) stayed about the same
(M); 5) fallen (MM); 6) don’t know (DK).

• Q6: By comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect that consumer prices will develop in
the next 12 months? The qualitative responses are: 1) increase more rapidly (PP); 2) increase at the
same rate (P); 3) increase at a slower rate (E); 4) stay about the same (M); 5) fall (MM); 6) don’t know
(DK).

For each question, there are thus six published series containing the share of respondents that have provided
a particular answer. These series can be combined into an index, for example by calculating the so-called
balance statistic (B), an aggregate summary answer, defined as B =
, where PP, P,
M and MM represent the shares of respondents picking the respective answer category. Respondents picking
the middle option (E) or the DK answer are thus not included in its calculation.

1
2 M + MM

PP + 1
2 P

−

)

(

)

(

Survey participants that have picked responses 1, 2, 3 or 5 are subsequently asked to provide a quantitative
estimate of the percentage by which they believe that consumer prices have changed in the past (Q51) or
will change in the future (Q61):

• Q51: By how many per cent do you think that consumer prices have gone up/down over the past 12
months? Respondents are asked to give a single figure estimate: Consumer prices have increased by
___,_% / decreased by ___,_%.

• Q61: By how many per cent do you expect consumer prices to go up/down change in the next 12
months? Respondents are asked to give a single figure estimate: Consumer prices will increase by
___,_% / decreased by ___,_%.

The BCS reports the results for the entire sample and additionally classifies respondents by the following 
socio-demographic categories:  household income (four subgroups according to income quartile); education 
of respondent (three subgroups:  primary, secondary, further education); age of respondent (four subgroups: 
16-29, 30-49, 50-64, 65+) and gender (female, male).

3.  SELF-REPORTED INFLATION INATTENTION AND ITS DRIVERS

3.1. 

‘DON’T KNOW’

In many opinion surveys, including the BCS, survey participants who do not hold an opinion can acknowledge 
this by picking a ‘Don’t know’ (DK) response.  The reported DK shares for the respective BCS questions on 
inflation perceptions and expectations hence provide simple and readily available measures of self-reported, 
or  acknowledged,  inflation i nattention. A s t he m ain p urpose o f o pinion s urveys i s t o o btain respondents’ 
opinions,  the DK series typically receives little consideration.  However,  variation in the reported DK share 
over time or across socio-demographic categories, provides insights and information on peoples’ attention 
patterns regarding a specific economic variable (see also Annex A). Bracha and Tang (2024) notably use it as 
a proxy for inflation inattention.

Over the sample period (1997-2025), an average of 1.2% and 5.0% of euro area BCS respondents stated 
that they did not have an opinion about perceived and expected inflation, respectively (Figure 3.1). The higher 
DK  share  for  questions  on  future  developments  (expectations)  than  for  questions  on  past  developments 
(perceptions)  is  not  specific t o i nflation, bu t is  al so ob served fo r ot her va riables covered by  th e BC S (see 
Annex A).3  This should not be too surprising, as perceptions should in principle be based on observations of

3The DK series for perceptions is more persistent than the expectations series.

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European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

realised outcomes,4 which is not possible for expectations. The higher DK share for (inflation) expectations
also suggests that holding an opinion on past developments is a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition to
form an expectation.5 Both DK series fluctuate over time, and co-move, in particular since the Global Financial
Crisis and even more so since the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020.6 DK shares on perceptions have been low in the
run-up to the global financial crisis, when inflation exceeded 4%, and in particular during the post-COVID-19
period, when euro area inflation surged to a peak of 10.6% in October 2022.
In turn, the DK replies were
elevated in the 2010s and rose substantially around the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. DK shares for
both inflation perceptions and expectations have been trending up slowly during the disinflation phase at the
end of the sample.

Figure 3.1: Share of ‘don’t know’ answers to questions about inflation perceptions and expectations, euro area,
1997-2025

Note: The figure shows the share of European Commission’s Business and Consumer Survey participants who have responded ’don’t know’ to
questions on inflation perceptions and expectations, respectively.

The magnitude of the reported DK shares needs to be put into perspective: DK shares below 5% on average
may seem low compared with the findings of studies on macroeconomic and financial literacy (e.g. European
Commission Eurobarometer 2007 and 2023). Importantly, as further elaborated in section 5, merely expressing
an opinion by picking a substantive response – the complementary answers to the ‘don’t know’ answers –
does not imply being knowledgeable about inflation. The DK share hence provides at best a lower bound on
the share of the population that genuinely has no view on inflation.7

4However, the DK share for perceptions never drops to zero.
5This assumes that the respondents not having a view on the past also do not express one on future outcomes.
6The correlation coefficient after 2010 in 72%. It rises to 81% for the period starting in 2020.
7The DK share is affected by how the survey is conducted. The structural break in the BCS survey in Germany in 2019, when it
moved from a face-to-face to an online survey, is a potent illustration supporting this hypothesis. For the period February to April
2019, for which the series are available for both survey methods, the DK share for inflation perceptions (expectations) dropped from
5.3% (15.8%) to 1.5% (5.1%). This suggests that survey participants are more likely to acknowledge their inattention when they are

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0246810Inflation (%)02468Don't know (%)1995200020052010201520202025Inflation perceptionsInflation expectationsInflationEuropean Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

3.2. A LINEAR MODEL OF SELF-REPORTED INATTENTION

To assesses what drives the reported DK shares shown in Figure 3.1, we estimate a model linking inflation
inattention to the level and variation of inflation. The relationship is tested in a simple linear model, in which
the reported DK share for inflation beliefs b, where b ∈ [p, e], i.e. perceptions or expectations, is regressed on
lagged inflation,8 and inflation volatility, σπ
t−1, measured by the standard deviation of inflation over the past
12 months. Volatile inflation implies that inflation is more likely to deviate from expectations, thus raising
inflation attention. In addition, the model includes a measure of uncertainty, the Economic Policy Uncertainty
Index (Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2016), EPUt−1, to control for general uncertainty, which is not specific to
inflation.9 If uncertainty is objectively high, it becomes more difficult to form a view, notably about future
developments, and survey participants may genuinely not know what to respond.

DKb

t = cb + αbπt−1 + γbσπ

t−1 + βbEPUt−1 + ϵb
t

(3.1)

The regression results are displayed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below.
Inflation inattention falls as inflation
rises: the share of respondents that expresses an opinion on perceived and expected inflation increases
with inflation. This result is robust across the different specifications. The role of inflation volatility appears
significant when considered on its own. When including the lagged dependent variable, however, it becomes
insignificant, suggesting that it merely captures serial correlation in the dependent variable. Overall, such
behaviour would seem in line with the theory of rational inattention, as being attentive about inflation
becomes more beneficial in a high inflation setting. Economic policy uncertainty raises the share of DK
respondents in the perceptions model, but not in the expectations model.
It also substantially increases
the explanatory power of the perceptions model. The significant positive coefficient on uncertainty in the
perceptions model suggests that inflation perceptions are blurred to an extent that makes it more difficult
to form opinions on (past) realisations of price changes. The negative coefficient on uncertainty in the
expectations model is more puzzling: higher uncertainty makes it more likely that respondents will report
an opinion on future developments.

Overall, the variation in the share of DK respondents that is explained by the model,10 is generally higher for
inflation perceptions than for inflation expectations. This suggests that households take into account other
variables that are not captured by our model when forming forward-looking beliefs.

3.3. A THRESHOLD MODEL OF SELF-REPORTED INATTENTION

The relationship between DK and inflation is assessed further with a continuous threshold (kinked) regression
model, following Hansen (2017):

(

)

(

)

DKb

t = cb + βb
1

πt−1 − τ b

+ βb
2

−

πt−1 − τ b

+ ϵb
t

+

(3.2)

in front of another person rather than a screen. This also implies that comparisons of DK shares in different countries may not be
very informative.

8Note that lagged inflation corresponds to the latest published inflation rate at the time the survey is conducted.

It is hence

more appropriate as the current ‘known’ inflation rate.

9The Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is a quantitative measure of uncertainty regarding future economic policies.
It is
constructed by counting the relative frequency of newspaper articles that mention terms related to the economy, uncertainty, and
policy within a given period.

10As captured by the higher coefficient of variation.

5

European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

Table 3.1: Self-reported inflation inattention: perceptions

(2)

(3)

(1)
-0.14∗∗∗
(-12.1)

-0.14∗∗∗
(-2.8)

Inflation (lag)

Inflation volatility (lag)

Policy Uncertainty (lag)

DK perceptions (lag)

Constant

R-squared
R-squared (adj)
Prob > F
Observations

1.44∗∗∗
(45.8)
0.30
0.30
0.00
342

1.22∗∗∗
(34.9)
0.02
0.02
0.01
342

(4)
-0.18∗∗∗
(-12.9)
0.25∗∗∗
(4.8)

1.40∗∗∗
(43.9)
0.34
0.34
0.00
341

(5)
-0.16∗∗∗
(-14.3)

0.13∗∗∗
(6.9)

1.45∗∗∗
(49.3)
0.39
0.38
0.00
342

(6)
-0.19∗∗∗
(-14.0)
0.17∗∗∗
(3.2)
0.12∗∗∗
(5.9)

1.42∗∗∗
(46.4)
0.41
0.40
0.00
341

(7)
-0.03∗∗∗
(-3.7)
0.02
(0.6)
0.03∗∗∗
(2.7)
0.85∗∗∗
(31.7)
0.22∗∗∗
(5.4)
0.85
0.85
0.00
341

0.05∗∗
(2.3)

1.14∗∗∗
(46.4)
0.01
0.01
0.02
344

Note: Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 3.2: Self-reported inflation inattention: expectations

Inflation (lag)

Inflation volatility (lag)

Policy Uncertainty (lag)

DK expectations (lag)

(2)

(3)

(1)
-0.19∗∗∗
(-9.4)

-0.58∗∗∗
(-7.2)

-0.22∗∗∗
(-5.9)

(4)
-0.16∗∗∗
(-6.2)
-0.24∗∗
(-2.5)

(5)
-0.17∗∗∗
(-8.1)

-0.13∗∗∗
(-3.7)

(6)
-0.15∗∗∗
(-6.0)
-0.16
(-1.6)
-0.12∗∗∗
(-3.2)

Constant

R-squared
R-squared (adj)
Prob > F
Observations

5.23∗∗∗
(94.3)
0.21
0.20
0.00
342

5.11∗∗∗
(93.3)
0.13
0.13
0.00
342

4.87∗∗∗
(124.4)
0.09
0.09
0.00
344

5.27∗∗∗
(91.8)
0.22
0.22
0.00
341

5.21∗∗∗
(95.6)
0.24
0.23
0.00
342

5.24∗∗∗
(91.4)
0.25
0.24
0.00
341

Note: Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

(7)
-0.03∗
(-1.9)
-0.08
(-1.2)
-0.00
(-0.0)
0.74∗∗∗
(19.5)
1.36∗∗∗
(6.7)
0.65
0.64
0.00
341

where τ b is the threshold point, at which the relationship between inflation and DK is allowed to change.
DK is thus regressed on the respective negative and positive deviations of lagged inflation (πt−1) from a
threshold point τ b. The sample is split into two linear regression segments on either side of τ , over which the
relationship between inflation and the DK share is allowed to change: for inflation out-turns lower than τ b,
the slope is βb
2. While the regression function is thus continuous in πt−1, its slope
is discontinuous at πt−1 = τ b. The threshold parameter τ b is determined endogenously. The identification
of the optimal threshold requires setting a parameter space within the support of variable πt−1, increments
within a search grid and a selection criterion to identify the preferred kinked model. Here, the parameter

1, above τ b the slope is βb

6

European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

space is set to τ b  =  [1; 5], which lies within the support of πt  in the pre-pandemic period.11  The model is 
estimated on a discrete grid with increments of 0.1 (i.e.  there are 41 grid points).  τ ∗  is the threshold of the 
specification that minimises the sum of squared errors, the chosen selection criterion. The hypotheses tested 
b ≤  0 
here are:  i) the higher inflation, the lower the share of respondents that do not form a belief, i .e. β 1
b  ≤  0; ii) the formation of inflation beliefs is state-dependent, i .e. it depends on the level of inflation, 
and β2
and changes in a non-linear manner, implying that different attention regimes exist that are separated by the
b; iii) the relationship between inflation and inflation attention differs for perceptions 
thresholds, i.e.  β2
p 
and expectations, respectively.  This may imply a different τ b∗, but also that differences in the size of βi
e.
relative to βi

b  ̸=  β1

Figure 3.2: Threshold regressions for inflation perceptions and expectations, euro area

Note: The figure shows the threshold regression for inflation perceptions and expectations. The vertical lines indicate the thresholds.

Figure 3.2 displays the thresholds and fitted regression lines for DK perceptions and expectations, respectively.
In both cases, the first two hypotheses are accepted, i.e.
i) all coefficients are non-positive and ii) there
is a significant change in the slope above a given inflation threshold. The estimated model for inflation
perceptions is convex. As inflation increases, the reported DK share falls, albeit at a significantly slower rate
once inflation is above 2.2%. The lower marginal impact of inflation on inattention suggests that beyond the
threshold actual inflation has become too high to ignore and inflation signals have become less noisy. In other
words, beyond the threshold, very few respondents are without an opinion.12 The dynamics for expectations
formation are different, however. This is captured by the concave shape of the estimated model. Up until the
expectations threshold, estimated at 1.2%, is reached, an increase in inflation has no significant impact on
respondents’ propensity to form an opinion on future inflation. It is only beyond that threshold that current
inflation significantly induces respondents to adopt an opinion on future inflation.

11The support is obtained by removing the 10% tails of the inflation distribution. It includes the policy threshold τ b = 2%.
12Note, however that a ’hard core’ of consumers without inflation opinion still remains even at unusually high inflation levels.

7

02468Don't know (%)0246810Inflation (%)Inflation perceptionsInflation expectationsEuropean Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

The relationship between inattention and inflation differs for perceived and expected inflation. When inflation
is very low, forming an opinion on current price changes does not imply forming one for future inflation.
However, when inflation falls in between the two thresholds, rising inflation implies that more households will
form beliefs for both inflation perceptions and expectations. Finally, in a high inflation environment, above τ p,
rising inflation has a significantly lower marginal impact on the the number of respondents forming an opinion
about perceived inflation. Meanwhile, for inflation expectations, as inflation increases above τ e, the share of
DK respondents falls at a significant rate. This suggests that above a certain level, the current inflation rate
increasingly matters for the formation of views about inflation in the future.

3.4. THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN OF INFLATION BELIEFS

Aggregate measures of inflation beliefs, such as the balance statistic mentioned in section 2, change when
individuals reallocate their answers among response categories over time (intensive margin). However,
fluctuations in aggregate beliefs may also result from changes in what we call the extensive margin, namely
when individuals switch from not having an opinion to having one or vice versa. Figure 3.3 shows the average
effect of a one percentage point fall in reported DK answers on the other response categories.13 Merely
adopting an opinion on past price movements, pushes up inflation perceptions. On average, a fall in the
DK share coincides with a strong increase in respondents answering that inflation increased ‘a lot’ (PP) or
increased ‘moderately’ (P). This is reinforced by a concurrent fall in the share of respondents answering
‘fallen’ (MM) or ‘stayed about the same’ (M).14 The effect of the extensive margin on inflation expectations
is less strong than for perceptions, but goes in the same direction. Overall, the mere adoption of an opinion
drives up aggregate inflation perceptions and expectations. This supports our earlier finding of the existence
of attention thresholds.

Figure 3.3: Impact of a 1 percentage point fall in the ‘don’t know’ share

Note: The figure shows the average change in the different response categories corresponding to a 1 percentage point decrease in the share of
reported DK answers in the euro area over the period 1997-2025. The bars add up to 1.

13The average effect is the estimated coefficient obtained from regressing the change in a category on the change in the share

of DK answers, i.e. ∆Dt = β∆DKt, where D ∈ [PP, P, E, M, MM] and

∑

ˆβD = 1.

D

14Using the formula for the Balance Statistic, a 1 percentage change fall in the DK share, raises the balance statistic for inflation

perceptions by 3.75 points. The balance statistic for inflation expectations increases by 2.2 points.

8

2.11.1-0.6-1.5-0.1-2-1012PerceptionsD PP (risen a lot)D P (risen modately)D E (risen slightly)D M (about the same)D MM (fallen)1.11.1-0.2-0.7-0.2-2-1012ExpectationsD PP (increase more rapidly)D P (increase at same rate)D E (increase at slower rate)D M (stay about the same)D MM (fall)European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

4.  REVEALED INFLATION ATTENTION: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

The previous section has shown that rising inflation prompts more consumers to report an opinion on perceived 
and expected inflation. However, the mere reporting of an opinion on inflation, including past inflation, does 
not necessarily imply that consumers are knowledgeable about it.  In this section we provide a descriptive 
assessment of how reported opinions change with inflation.

Distribution of responses and modes. We start by assessing the distribution of inflation perceptions over 
inflation.15 Here, we exploit the explicit ordinal character of the answer categories that can be associated to 
perceived price changes:  ‘a lot’ (‘PP’) > ‘moderately’ (‘P’) > ‘slightly’ (‘E’) > ‘stayed about the same’ (‘M’) > 
‘fallen’ (‘MM’). The main difficulty for assessing answers is that there is no defined mapping from the ordinal 
scale into  quantitative  inflation o utcomes. W hile t he fi rst th ree re sponse options cl early re fer to  positive 
inflation, i .e. price increases over 12 months, they have no numerical r anges. The fourth response is more 
precise, implicitly referring to zero inflation (prices ‘stayed the same’), but allowing for some – unspecified 
tolerance band (‘about’).  The final response clearly and exclusively refers to negative i nflation. Al so, the 
implicit range of the response categories varies: ‘about the same’ is a priori very narrow, as it is bounded on 
both sides, while ‘fallen’ and ‘a lot’ are respectively unbounded on one side, going to minus and plus infinity.

Figure 4.1a shows the distribution of qualitative responses over the one-month lagged inflation rate in the 
euro area. The monthly response shares are averaged for inflation bins that are 0.1 percentage points wide, 
and which range from -0.7% to 10.6%.  For example, in the period studied there were 23 individual months 
when inflation fell into the 1.9-2.0% b racket. The average share of respondents picking ‘MM’, M’, ‘E’, ‘P’ and 
‘PP’ in that bracket, was 1%, 14%, 29%, 31% and 25%, respectively (summing vertically in the figure, these 
average shares thus add to 100%). Figure 4.1b separately shows the smoothed distributions of the response 
shares for the five series over inflation bi ns. The peak of each distribution (mode) reveals which inflation 
rate (bin) is associated the most with a specific response c ategory.16 The modes of the answer categories 
that are bounded on either side (‘M’, ‘E’, ‘P’), are inside the inflation distribution and also respect the ordinal 
character of the answers, i.e.  mode ‘M’ <  mode ‘E’ <  mode ‘P’. The modes of ‘M’ (‘about the same’) and 
‘E’ (‘slightly’) are very close to each other and appear in [-0.1%;0%] and [0.5%;0.6%] bins, respectively.  The 
mode of ‘P’ corresponds to the [2.6%;2.7%] inflation bin. However, only ‘E’, ‘P’ (albeit for a narrow range) and 
‘PP’ are the categories that are most used at any given bin. There is no inflation bin for which ‘MM’ or ‘M’ are 
the most used categories. This suggests that ‘E’ and ‘PP’ seem to be ‘focal’ answers at the expense of other 
categories.  Indeed, even at the inflation bin corresponding to the mode of ‘M’, [-0.1%;0%], there are more 
respondents picking ‘E’ than ‘M’. Survey respondents hence do not seem to exploit the granularity provided 
by the proposed survey answers.

Biases of respondents.  An analysis of inflation attention should consider individuals’ response patterns 
over time, which can reveal whether they are biased towards any particular answer categories. A bias, i.e. a 
systematic under- or overestimation of inflation, would make their answers less informative. Indeed, biased 
respondents attach less importance to their perception of a specific variable, in this case price developments, 
and more to other factors.  17

15As our interest is in comparing answers with actual inflation outturns, our exercise is limited to the assessment of inflation

perceptions and does not include inflation expectations.

16The modes of the unbounded categories (‘MM’ and ‘PP’) correspond to the extreme bins
17Of course, while biased respondents may at times provide a plausible answer, the bias needs to be taken into account when
interpreting responses. For example, someone systematically ‘crying wolf’ and picking the ‘PP’ response, would indeed have given
a sensible answer in 2022. However, having also picked ‘PP’ in all periods of negative inflation makes a respondent less credible
overall.

9

European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

Figure 4.1: Distribution of inflation perceptions

(a) Distribution of qualitative responses over inflation

(b) Qualitative responses

Note: The figures show the distribution of qualitative response shares across observed inflation rates in the previous month (bins of 0.1 percentage 
points). The series are smoothed with polynomial regressions.

The BCS is not based on a stable sample and there are no individual respondents that can be tracked over 
time, which implies we cannot establish individual biases.  However, one way to identify biased responses 
in this context,  is to focus on answer percentiles across the set of inflation r ates. G raphically, this would 
imply taking the distribution of responses over inflation (Figure 4.1a) and ‘slicing’ it into 100 horizontal bars, 
containing all the answers of a percentile associated to different inflation rates. Using percentiles is justified 
by the fact that each month’s survey is based on a large representative sample of the population, and the 
implicit assumption that a fixed sample of respondents followed over time, would provide similar answers as 
a fraction of the repeated draw of respondents in the actual surveys.

For any answer percentile one can observe the range of answers picked over the entire realised inflation 
range. For example, the 100th percentile, corresponding to the top horizontal bar of Figure 4.1, uses only one 
answer category, ‘PP’, over the entire inflation distribution. Meanwhile, the first percentile, represented by the 
bottom bar, uses two answer categories, namely ‘MM’ and ‘M’. Figure 4.2 summarises the whole distribution 
of answer categories across the 100 percentiles: there are 8 groups of respondents, among which some use 
only a single answer category, while others use up to four. As shown in the Figure, the upper 6 percentiles of 
euro area respondents have restricted their response to ‘PP’ regardless of the inflation outturns throughout 
the sample.  25% made use of two categories (either ‘MM’ and ‘M’, or ‘P’ and ‘PP’), 57% made use of three 
categories, while 12% used four categories.  There is no percentile in which respondents made use of the 
full suite of possible answer categories.  It follows that on average respondents use 2.75 categories (Figure 
6.4b), while the median percentile uses three categories (E’, ‘P’ and ‘PP’). The implication of the limited use 
of response categories reduces the information content regarding inflation b eliefs. Such biases have to be 
taken into account when assessing survey answers.

5.  AN EXPERIMENTAL INDEX OF REVEALED INFLATION ATTENTION

Having observed the uneven distribution of consumers’ qualitative perceptions of inflation reported in the BCS 
and their biases, we now combine these two dimensions in an inflation attention index (IAI). In a nutshell, the 
IAI assesses whether consumer inflation perceptions are in line with the actual inflation outturns and hence 
interprets the question on inflation perceptions (Q5) as a test of consumers’ attention to i nflation. The IAI

10

European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

Figure 4.2: Combinations of answers picked by respondents

Note: The figure shows the share of respondents that has picked a particular combination of answers.

corrects for possible biases, i.e. respondents who a priori restrict their responses to a subset of the available
answer categories are given a lesser weight. This requires three steps: i) defining a grid to score the replies;
ii) identifying the response biases of survey percentiles; iii) combining both dimensions into the index.

5.1. METHODOLOGY

The scoring grid. The idea behind the IAI is that the qualitative responses can be assessed by benchmarking
them against the actual inflation outturns. Benchmarking thus requires a ‘scoring grid’, which maps the
available response categories into quantitative inflation ranges that are considered to be aligned with inflation,
partially aligned, or wrong. For example, a ‘slight increase’ in prices (‘E’) could be interpreted as aligned if
inflation falls in the range [0%; 1.5%]. When inflation falls into adjacent ranges, say [-0.5%, 0%] or [1.5%;2%],
it could still be argued that ‘E’ is partially aligned, and thus should still be considered as a reasonable choice an
attentive respondent could make. However, the scoring grid should reflect that a more attentive respondent
would have picked a category that would be more fitting in those inflation ranges, i.e. ‘M’ or ‘P’, respectively.
For a given inflation rate a scoring grid will determine which qualitative answers are aligned or partially
aligned by scoring them.

MM sπ

The score attributed to each of the five possible responses for a given (one-month lagged) inflation rate bin
π can be expressed by a vector sπ = [sπ
P sπ
R , would be a number
between 0 and 1, determining to what extent a response category should be counted as an attentive choice
at that inflation rate. A score of 0 means that a respondent is inattentive and should not be counted, a
score of 1 would be awarded to a respondent choosing an answer that is aligned with actual inflation. A
respondent with a partially aligned answer would obtain a score between 0 and 1. The full scoring grid is a
matrix obtained from stacking the scoring vectors assigned to each inflation bin.

PP]. The score for response R, sπ

M sπ

E sπ

This is illustrated by the following example: at an inflation rate of 0-0.1%, two alternative scoring grids
could be considered having scoring vectors s0
B = [0.5 1 0.5 0 0]. The two grids would

A = [1 1 1 0 0] or s0

11

MMMEPPPAnswer categories used020406080100Respondents(%)1 category (6 %)2 categories (25 %)3 categories (57 %)4 categories (12 %)European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

Figure 5.1: Scoring grid

Note: The figure shows the score that we award to a specific answer at a given inflation level.

In this example, scoring grid A
thus differently interpret the alignment of the given answers with inflation.
is more lenient, as it gives a full score of 1 to responses ‘MM’, ‘M’ and ‘E’. Scoring grid B also accepts all
three responses but identifies response M as the most appropriate at the specified inflation rate. Accordingly,
only respondents choosing response ‘M’ would be considered fully attentive. The adjacent answer categories
‘MM’ and ‘E’ consequently receive a lower score (0.5). Taking the example one step further and assuming
that for the specific inflation bin in the example, the response distribution is [20 20 20 20 20], i.e. 20% of
respondents pick ‘MM’, 20% pick ‘M’ and so forth, 60% of respondents would have been counted as attentive
according to scoring grid A, and 40% according to grid B. With a response distribution [10 40 10 20 20], the
respective attention shares would be 60% under scoring vector A and 50% under scoring vector B.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the complete scoring grid that we use to construct the IAI. It is derived from the modes
identified in Figure 4.1, i.e. each response category is centered on its mode. This scoring grid allows for
overlaps. For example, the ‘MM’ answer category is accepted as a fully aligned (score 1) or partially aligned
answer up until an inflation rate of 0.5%. When inflation exceeds -0.2%, the ‘MM’ reply is considered only
partially aligned (its score consequently falls gradually) and ‘M’ would receive the full score, being considered
the most appropriate category. Our scoring grid is thus static and does not change over time.

Measuring the response bias. While the scoring grid grades the qualitative survey answer given at
a specific inflation bin, we also consider respondents’ individual response patterns over time. To identify
individual bias, we focus on the percentiles defined above. We define the bias as a function of the number
of response categories picked by a respondent in a percentile over the sample period. A higher number of

12

European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

answers picked suggests a more unbiased consideration of inflation. The formula for the bias attached to
any specific percentile q is:

θq =

(A − aq)
(A − 1)

(5.1)

where aq is the number of categories picked and A the number of possible responses (i.e. A = 5), implying
that θ ∈ [0, 1]. Respondents in a percentile who always choose the same answer category (i.e. aq = 1)
would have a bias of θ = 1. In contrast, those using all 5 answer categories (i.e. aq = 5) would have a bias
of θ = 0.

Inflation attention index. The IAI combines the score of a response given by respondents in a percentile
q with their bias. In a first step, the responses provided at a given inflation rate are scored in line with the
scoring grid. The score is then adjusted for the bias, i.e. the more biased the respondents in a percentile are,
the more the score is discounted. When the scoring grid allows multiple valid answers (fully and partially
aligned) for a particular inflation rate, a naive allocation - whereby responses are uniformly allocated to the
five categories - would by construction yield a higher attention score than at inflation rates at which only a
single answer is accepted. Under such a naive (random) allocation of responses, inflation attention would be
considered higher whenever multiple categories are valid. To correct for this, the initial score is adjusted by
the score yielded by a naive benchmark for the same inflation bin, sπ

naive.



Q=100∑



q=1

ρπ =



(1 − θq) (sπ

R )q

 /sπ

naive

(5.2)

An attention ratio, ρπ, above 1 then means that more respondents have picked the ‘correct’ categories than
would have been the case under the naive benchmark. While ρπ is bounded on the downside by zero, the
upper bound depends on the scoring grid. To facilitate interpretation, we transform the attention ratio into
an index that is bounded between -1 and 1 as follows:






IAIπ =

(ρπ − 1),

if ρπ < 1

(ρπ − 1)
− 1

Q
sπ
naive

,

if ρπ ≥ 1

(5.3)

For unbiased respondents, a score of 0 would imply that respondents are as attentive as under a random
outcome. A score of -1 would imply that responses are fully unaligned with actual inflation, while a negative
score between -1 and 0 would suggest that respondents are inattentive. Meanwhile, a positive score suggests
that respondents outperform a random allocation of answers.

5.2. RESULTS

Figure 5.2 shows how the IAI changes with the level of inflation in the euro area. Overall, inflation attention
increases with the level of inflation. However, the increase in inflation attention is not linear. Inflation attention
is low when inflation is negative and rises rapidly as inflation approaches 1%. This partly reflects consumers’
upside biases and the fact that a high share perceives positive price changes, even in deflationary episodes.
Inflation attention then falls again and remains relatively stable until inflation reaches about 4%. The dip
primarily reflects respondents’ underuse of category ‘P’. Above 4% inflation, attention steadily increases and

13

European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

Figure 5.2: Inflation attention index, euro area

Note: The figure shows the Inflation Attention Index developed in this paper. The index assesses how well consumer inflation perceptions match
actual inflation outturns correcting for biases by survey participants. A higher value at a given inflation rate implies higher attention.

plateaus for a second time as of 5%. These two plateaus suggest that different inflation attention regimes
exist. Inflation attention is clearly a high inflation phenomenon. Consumers seem to find it difficult to ‘nuance’
their inflation perceptions or perceive marginal changes in inflation. Low attention is also a result of the
relative underutilisation of some categories, notably ‘P’ and to an even greater extent ‘MM’ and ‘M’. Conversely,
the focalisation on the categories ‘E’ and ‘PP’ imply that while consumers change their perceptions, they are
often either too slow or too fast.

5.3. CAVEATS

Despite the numerical nature of the IAI it should be interpreted as an ordinal rather than a cardinal measure.
As noted above, different scoring grids or bias formulas would have produced different values. However,
it captures well how attention changes with inflation. Additionally, as we discuss in the next section, it also
allows us to compare attention levels for given inflation rates among socio-economic groups. Some caveats in
the construction of the IAI are relevant. In this exercise, we assess households’ qualitative responses against
aggregate euro area inflation. However, it is acknowledged that respondents may respond with a different
inflation rate in mind, for instance national inflation. Likewise, when distinguishing among socio-economic
groups, it is acknowledged that personal inflation rates, due to differences in consumption bundles, also may
affect respondents’ assessment of inflation.

14

European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

6. 

INFLATION  ATTENTION  AND  INFLATION  BIASES  BY  SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CATEGORY

It is a well-documented fact that there are patterns in how groups within each socio-economic category
(gender, age, income, education) differ as regards their inflation beliefs.
In particular, biases in inflation
expectations tend to be higher for women relative to men, higher for persons with primary education and
higher for respondents in the lowest income categories. Differences in biases among age groups, meanwhile,
are less systematic.18 This is illustrated in Figure 6.1, which shows the mean quantitative inflation perceptions
and expectations by socio-economic subcategory.19 Except for age, there are clear level differences in both
inflation perceptions and expectations by subcategory, which persist over time. That said, the correlation
among these subcategories is very high.

Figure 6.1: Quantitative inflation perceptions and expectations by socio-economic group, euro area, 2004-2025

Note: The figure shows the quantitative inflation perceptions and expectations by socio-economic group.

Using the detailed socio-economic categorisation of the BCS, this section explores whether similar patterns
also emerge for self-reported and revealed inattention and, if so, how they relate to biases in inflation beliefs.
Figure 6.2 displays the DK series for perceptions and expectations for the same subcategories as in Figure
6.1. A first observation is that the distance between subgroups is lower for perceptions than for expectations.
Second, for perceptions, there is no discernible gap in the DK shares by gender or education levels. However,

18A possible explanation is that the experienced inflation rate matters, which differs by age cohort, the composition of which also

changes over time.

19For socio-economic categories that have more than 2 subcategories, only the ‘extreme’ ones are shown: age groups 16-29 and

65+, lowest and highest household income quartile, primary and further education.

15

0510152025Inflation perceptions (%)20042006200820102012201420162018202020222024MaleFemaleGender0510152025Inflation perceptions (%)20042006200820102012201420162018202020222024PrimaryTertiaryEducation0510152025Inflation perceptions (%)20042006200820102012201420162018202020222024Low-incomeHigh-incomeIncome0510152025Inflation perceptions (%)2004200620082010201220142016201820202022202416-2965+AgeInflation perceptions (%)05101520Inflation expectations (%)20042006200820102012201420162018202020222024MaleFemaleGender05101520Inflation expectations (%)20042006200820102012201420162018202020222024PrimaryTertiaryEducation05101520Inflation expectations (%)20042006200820102012201420162018202020222024Low-incomeHigh-incomeIncome05101520Inflation expectations (%)2004200620082010201220142016201820202022202416-2965+AgeInflation expectations (%)European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

Figure 6.2: DK shares on inflation perceptions and expectations by socio-economic group, euro area, 1997-2025

Note: The figure shows the share of survey participants by socio-economic group who have responded ’don’t know’ to questions on inflation
perceptions (upper row) and expectations (lower row), respectively.

low-income  groups  systematically  display  a  higher  DK  share  than  high-income  groups.  Third,  systematic 
differences clearly emerge for the question on inflation expectations.  Here, all subcategories display relatively 
stable  gaps  in  DK  shares  and  very  high  co-movement  (except  for  age  cohorts).  The  DK  response  share  is 
systematically  higher  for  women,  respondents  with  low  formal  education  and  respondents  with  the  lowest 
incomes.

Figure 6.3 plots the difference between quantitative inflation beliefs against the DK differences for different 
socio-economic  categories.  For  gender,  education  and  income,  the  DK  difference  and  the  difference  in 
quantitative inflation beliefs clearly point in the same direction, i.e.  groups that tend to overestimate inflation 
more are also more inattentive.  It is important to note that the sub-samples for each group differ:  the DK 
gap  is  based  on  survey  participants  that  have  not  provided  a  qualitative  or  quantitative  answer,  while  the 
differences in quantitative beliefs is derived from respondents reporting an opinion.

Turning  to  the  revealed  attention,  Figure  6.4  shows  how  the  use  of  response  categories  differs  across 
socio-economic groups.  Figure 6.4a shows the modes for the three central answer categories across  socio-
economic group in the euro area.  As discussed above, for the entire sample (TOT), the response ‘stayed about 
the  same’  (M)  is  most  picked  when  inflation  falls  in  the  -0.1-0%  bin,  i.e.  very  close  to  the  most  literal 
interpretation  of stable  prices.  The  use  of  ‘slightly’  (E)  peaks  at  the  0.5-0.6%  bin,  while  ‘moderately’  (P)  is 
used most at the 2.6-2.7% inflation bin.

Looking at individual categories reveals that there is heterogeneity, which is most pronounced for the 

16

01234Don't know19962000200420082012201620202024MaleFemaleGender01234Don't know (%)19962000200420082012201620202024PrimaryTertiaryEducation01234Don't know (%)19962000200420082012201620202024Low-incomeHigh-incomeIncome01234Don't know (%)1996200020042008201220162020202416-2965+AgeDon't know - perceptions (%)246810Don't know19962000200420082012201620202024MaleFemaleGender246810Don't know (%)19962000200420082012201620202024PrimaryTertiaryEducation246810Don't know (%)19962000200420082012201620202024Low-incomeHigh-incomeIncome246810Don't know (%)1996200020042008201220162020202416-2965+AgeDon't know - expectations (%)European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

Figure 6.3: Differences in quantitative inflation beliefs and DK answer shares, perceptions and expectations, by
category, 2004-2025

Note: The figure shows the results of individual sub-categories as the difference vis-à-vis a benchmark group. The benchmark group is defined as 
the one with the lower average quantitative inflation belief and is mentioned in the legend. The left panel applies to inflation perceptions, the right 
panel to inflation expectations.

interpretation of the category ‘moderately’ (P). However, some patterns emerge, which correspond to those 
observed  for  the  inflation  biases:  categories  that  are  less  likely  to  overestimate  inflation  (males,  further 
education, high-income quartile), mainly associate ‘moderately’ (P), and to a lesser extent ‘slightly’ (E) with 
higher  inflation  brackets.  Categories  with  high  biases  tend  to  jump  more  quickly  to  the  high  inflation 
answers.  For  example,  the low-income  group  (RE1)  mostly  associates  ‘E’  and  ‘P’  to  0.5%  and  2%,  while 
the  high-income  group  (RE4)  mostly  associates  them  to  0.6%  and  3.3%,  respectively.  This  conclusion  is 
corroborated in figure 6.4b, which shows the average number of response categories picked by members of 
each group.  Groups that have lower inflation  biases,  also  differentiate  their  answers  more.  For  example, 
respondents  in  the  low-income  group have on average picked 2.57 categories, while those in the highest 
incomes group picked 2.84 categories on average.

Figure 6.5 displays the IAI across groups. In all cases there are clear level differences between groups pointing 
to structural attention differences. Overall, men appear to be more attentive to inflation than women, while 
respondents with a higher education degree or higher income exhibit systematically higher attention than 
respondents that only have primary education or are on low incomes.  Again, these patterns are in line with 
those observed for inflation expectations and concur with the pattern of self-reported inflation inattention.

17

FemalePrimaryLow-income0.2.4.6 'Don't know' share (difference, pp)01234Quantitative inflation beliefs (difference, pp)Inflation perceptionsFemalePrimaryLow-income01234 'Don't know' share (difference, pp)0.511.52Quantitative inflation beliefs (difference, pp)Inflation expectationsGender (Male)Education (Tertiary education)Income (High-income)European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

Figure 6.4: Use of response categories by socio-economic group, euro area

(a) Modes of M, E and P

(b) Average number of categories by group

Note: The figures provide information on the reliance on the 5 response categories by socio-economic groups. The analysis is based on the smoothed 
response series.

Figure 6.5: Inflation attention index by socio-economic group, euro area

Note: The figure depicts the Inflation Attention Index for different socio-economic groups.

7.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This paper has assessed the degree of inflation attention in the euro area based on the European Commission’s 
Business and  Consumer  Survey,  using  two  different indicators:  the  share  of  ‘don’t  know’ responses,  as  a

18

MALFEMED1ED2ED3RE1RE2RE3RE4AG1AG2AG3AG4MALFEMED1ED2ED3RE1RE2RE3RE4AG1AG2AG3AG4TOTTOT-.50.511.522.533.54Inflation(%)M (about the same)E (risen slightly)P (risen modately)2.42.52.62.72.82.9Average number of answer categories usedAgeIncomeEducationGenderTotal65+50-6430-4916-29HighMidLowLowTertiarySecondaryPrimaryFemaleMaleAll-.6-.4-.20.20246810Inflation (%)MaleFemaleGender-.6-.4-.20.20246810Inflation (%)PrimaryTertiaryEducation-.8-.6-.4-.20.20246810Inflation (%)LowHighIncome-.8-.6-.4-.20.20246810Inflation (%)16-2930-4950-6465+AgeEuropean Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

measure of self-reported inflation inattention, and the inflation attention index, an experimental measure
of revealed attention. This index assesses how well consumer inflation perceptions match actual inflation
outturns and takes into account biases by survey participants. We find that inflation attention increases
non-linearly with inflation, as well as with inflation volatility. With rising inflation, more households report an
opinion on inflation, which also becomes qualitatively more aligned with the actual inflation rate. Households
are more likely to hold opinions about past inflation than about future inflation, which points to some forward-looking
behaviour in their belief formation. Economic policy uncertainty makes it more likely for households to adopt
an opinion.

A further important finding of our paper is to distinguish between the intensive and an extensive margin of
changes in inflation beliefs. As inflation rises, inflation expectations and perceptions tend to rise both because
opinion-holders revise their views (intensive margin), and because people who hitherto did not hold a view
about inflation now directly switch to the view that inflation is and will remain high (extensive margin).

This composition effect has important potential implications for policy communication and for the measurement
of inflation beliefs. Central banks increasingly communicate with the general public in view of anchoring
inflation expectations around their inflation target. In high inflation environments, risks of a de-anchoring of
inflation expectations grow both because individuals revise their views, but also because there is a higher
In such an environment,
number of individuals paying attention to inflation and expressing a view on it.
communication related to inflation may have to be intensified. Also, taking into account the variable composition
of the general public that is potentially receptive to communication on inflation would be helpful in designing
communication strategies. For example, it may be advisable to differentiate communication with households
that are generally attentive to inflation and with households that only adopt an opinion due to circumstances.

Using our two inflation attention measures, we further find that inflation attention varies structurally among
socio-economic categories: attention is lower for women compared to men, low income compared to high
income groups and groups with primary education relative to groups with tertiary education. These attention
gaps are in line with the well-documented relative biases concerning inflation beliefs:
the more biased
groups are also the more inattentive ones. This socio-economic breakdown can help to better orientate
policy communication, for instance by targeting communication to specific groups and audiences. Moreover,
this breakdown can also help in deciding on the best channels of communication for reaching specific groups,
for example through traditional news channels or social media.

Finally, our proposed measure — inflation attention index (IAI) — is exploratory and may be refined in further
research. Our proposed scoring grid is essentially static and built on a mapping from qualitative answers
into scores that includes arbitrary elements. Further work could notably be devoted to a dynamic attention
scoring grid. For example, the meaning of what constitutes a ’moderate rise’ in prices may reasonably have
a different interpretation in low inflation and high inflation periods. Likewise, future research could focus on
the country dimension of inflation attention.

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European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

APPENDIX

21

European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

A.  STYLISED FACTS: INATTENTION ABOUT INFLATION IN COMPARISON WITH

OTHER ECONOMIC VARIABLES

The focus of this paper is on inflation inattention in the euro area. This annex puts self-declared inflation
inattention in perspective, assessing how it compares to inattention with respect to other issues. It does so
by examining the proportion of ‘don’t know’ answers to a subset of the other questions posed in the BCS. The
fact that the samples are identical, ensures comparability of the ‘don’t know’ series. The questions considered
are the following20:

Financial situation

• Q1: How has the financial situation of your household changed over the last 12 months?

• Q2: How do you expect the financial position of your household to change over the next 12 months?

Economic situation

• Q3: How do you think the general economic situation in the country has changed over the past 12

months?

• Q4: How do you expect the general economic situation in this country to develop over the next 12

months?

Consumer prices

• Q5: How do you think that consumer prices have developed over the last 12 months?

• Q6: By comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect that consumer prices will develop in

the next 12 months?

Unemployment

• Q7: How do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country to change over the next 12

months?

For  each  question,  respondents  are  provided  with  a  set  of  possible  answers.  Here,  we  only  consider  the 
‘don’t know’ response. We compare the questions on the evolution of consumer prices to questions that elicit 
consumers’ views on their personal financial situation, the general state of the economy and unemployment. 
For  each  topic,  except  for  unemployment,  there  is  both  a  backward-looking  question  on  perceptions  and 
realised outcomes and a forward-looking question on expectations. Figures A.1 and A.2 show the distribution 
of the ‘don’t know’ shares across questions. The following stylised facts emerge:

• Survey participants are more likely to report an opinion on past developments, i.e. perceptions,
than on the future, i.e. expectations. This is true for all topics. This should not be too surprising,
as reported perceptions can build on observations of realised outcomes and lived experiences, which is
not possible for future outcomes. The higher ‘don’t know’ share for expectations suggests that having
formed a perception is a necessary but insufficient condition to form an expectation – assuming that
participants reporting no opinion on perceived outcomes also report not having an opinion on future
outcomes. The level difference between expectations and perceptions is a feature that persists over
time and holds for all topics.

20The numbering corresponds to that of the BCS.

22

European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

Table A.1: Correlations of ‘don’t know’ answers across questions, euro area, 1996-2025

Financial Situation (P)
Economic Situation (P)
Inflation(P)
Financial Situation (E)
Economic Situation (E)
Inflation(E)
Unemployment(E)

FinSit(P)
1.00
0.50
0.19
0.49
0.32
-0.01
0.34

EconSit(P)
0.50
1.00
0.20
0.43
0.63
0.20
0.49

Inflation(P)
0.19
0.20
1.00
0.10
-0.17
0.36
-0.49

FinSit(E)
0.49
0.43
0.10
1.00
0.73
0.45
0.25

EconSit(E)
0.32
0.63
-0.17
0.73
1.00
0.46
0.57

Inflation(E) UE(E)
0.34
0.49
-0.49
0.25
0.57
-0.07
1.00

-0.01
0.20
0.36
0.45
0.46
1.00
-0.07

• Volatility of inattention is higher for expectations than for perceptions. Also, while the order
of ‘don’t know’ shares is relatively stable for perceptions, this is not the case for expectations, with
economic situation and prices occasionally switching ranks.

• Survey participants are more inattentive with regard to macroeconomic developments than
to personal issues. This is clearly reflected in differences in inattention levels. In particular, there are
less respondents answering ‘don’t know’ to questions on their personal financial situation than on the
economic situation and prices, both for perceptions and beliefs. This is likely explained by the fact
that individuals’ decisions are most directly conditioned by their personal financial situation, whereas
macroeconomic developments are likely to only exert a more indirect effect.

• Survey participants are more likely to have an opinion on past price developments than on
the overall economic situation in the past. A possible interpretation is that price developments
are more tangible and directly experienced, while the overall economic situation is more abstract.

• Survey participants are somewhat less likely to report an opinion on future inflation than on
the general economic situation or unemployment in the future. It is noteworthy, however, that
the ‘don’t know’ share for inflation expectations is far less dispersed than for the other macro variables.
An interpretation is that prices are the most tangible variable. ‘Economic situation’ is a more abstract
concept, while the question on future unemployment may have a stronger personal dimension, with a
respondent reflecting on her or his own employment situation.

• The ‘don’t know’ answer series to the different questions are more highly correlated among
questions that focus on expectations than among questions that focus on perceptions. This
suggests that perceptions are more variable-specific, i.e. having an opinion on the realised outturn
of one variable (e.g. prices) does not imply having one for another (e.g. economic situation) - see
Table A.1. This is different for expectations, where having or not having an opinion is more likely to be
general feature applying to all variables. For example, the correlation between the share of ‘don’t know’
answers to questions on perceptions of prices and of the economic situation is 0.20. The analogous
correlation for ‘don’t know’ answers to questions on expectations for the same variables is 0.45.

• The highest correlations between ‘don’t know’ shares for expectations and perceptions
questions, respectively, are observed for questions on the same topic. For example, the ‘don’t
know’ share for price perceptions is most highly correlated with ‘don’t know’ share for price expectations.
This supports the hypothesis that having an opinion on the past is necessary to form an opinion on the
future.

23

European Economy Discussion Paper Self-Reported and Revealed Inflation Inattention

Figure A.1: Share of ‘don’t know’ answers by question, euro area, 1996-2025

Note: The figure shows the distribution of the share of survey participants who have responded ’don’t know’ to different backward- and
forward-looking questions in the BCS.

Figure A.2: Share of ‘don’t know’ answers by question, euro area, 1996-2025

Note: The figure shows the share of survey participants who have responded ’don’t know’ to different backward- and forward-looking questions in
the BCS.

24

02468PerceptionsHousehold financial situationEconomic situationConsumer prices02468ExpectationsHousehold financial situationEconomic situationConsumer pricesUnemployment0246819962000200420082012201620202024Household financial situationEconomic situationConsumer pricesPerceptions0246819962000200420082012201620202024Household financial situationEconomic situationConsumer pricesUnemploymentExpectationsEUROPEAN ECONOMY DISCUSSION PAPERS 

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