Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – The European Democracy Shield (exploratory opinion requested by the Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU) – Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Democracy Shield (as announced in the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Commission work programme 2025 (COM (2025) 45 final))
Date: 2025-09-18
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: EU law, EU situation, European Commission, European social policy, action programme, common foreign and security policy, competitiveness, democracy, operation of the Institutions, quality of life








C_202600025EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2026/25


16.1.2026






Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee
The European Democracy Shield
(exploratory opinion requested by the Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU)
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Democracy Shield


(as announced in the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Commission work programme 2025




(COM (2025) 45 final))


(C/2026/25)


Rapporteur: 
Christian MOOS

Co-rapporteur: 
José Antonio MORENO DÍAZ






Advisor


Julian PLOTTKA (adviser to the rapporteur, Group III)
Steven FORTI (adviser to the co-rapporteur, Group II)




Request from the Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU


Letter 7.2.2025




Referral


European Commission, 6.6.2025




Legal basis


Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Exploratory opinion




Section responsible


Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship




Adopted in section


3.9.2025




Adopted at plenary session


18.9.2025




Plenary session No


599




Outcome of vote
(for/against/abstentions)


91/3/1




1.   Conclusions and recommendations









1.1,


With democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and European values under massive attack both from abroad, most notably including public authorities of third countries and tech-companies as attackers, and from within, including some Member States’ governments, extremist and populist parties, especially far right ones, as well as ‘uncivil society’, the EESC calls upon the European Commission and the European legislators to adopt more effective and encompassing measures to protect European democracy. While acknowledging that considerable measures have already been taken, the EESC is of the firm opinion that mounting challenges require increased efforts.












1.2,


The EESC calls upon the European Commission to incorporate all of its efforts to defend democracy, the rule of law and European values into its enlargement policy and to help the candidate countries with their democratic reforms, including with regard to defending their democracies against threats from within and from abroad.












1.3,


The EESC is ready and willing to strengthen European democracy by offering organised civil society and the social partners a platform (1) to engage in EU politics and support these defenders of democracy, and it calls upon the Committee of the Regions to also mobilise public authorities at regional and local level as defenders of democracy in Europe (2).












1.4,


The EESC also calls for increased collaboration with civil society organisations to fight disinformation and propaganda.












1.5,


The EESC calls upon the European legislators to simplify the application procedures for EU funding of organised civil society, to reduce reporting obligations and to extend or establish a real lump sum approach to EU project funding.












1.6,


The EESC calls upon the Commission to more rigorously enforce rule of law standards in all Member States and also to review the effects of European legislation on civic spaces to stop them shrinking.












1.7,


The EESC calls for a new multiannual financial framework (MFF) that defends, supports and strengthens democracy. There is a need to make efficient use of the current conditionality regime so that it is applied strictly in a manner that upholds democratic standards, the rule of law and European values. In addition, in case of non-compliance funds should be withheld from national or regional governments in the Member States in question, while ensuring that civil society and regional and local authorities that do respect European values are not punished, by opening reliable EU funding avenues for them, independent of their governments.












1.8,


The EESC calls upon the EU and its Member States to set up educational programmes which support companies, public authorities, non-governmental organisations and other institutions to train their staff in risk awareness and counter measures.












1.9,


The EESC calls upon all Member State and candidate country governments to make media literacy education a key priority in school curricula and to provide equivalent life-long learning opportunities for all generations.












1.10,


The EESC calls upon the European Commission and all Member State governments to invest in European digital service platforms and AI development to decouple the EU from digital dependency on third-country service providers.












1.11,


The EESC calls for robust enforcement of the existing regulations on social media and very large online platforms, continued evaluation of their effectiveness and, where necessary, further development of the legal basis. It warns against any weakening of the current regulations due to trade negotiations.












1.12,


The EESC calls upon the European Commission to strengthen the EuroStack (3) initiative with the aim of building a true European model of democratic technological and digital innovation.












1.13,


The EESC calls for the efforts of the East StratCom Task Force to be stepped up and for more funding to be provided under the next MFF, including for EuropeDirect Centres, in order to have an EU-wide network of providers of factual information.












1.14,


The EESC calls upon national governments to review their regulations on party donations and implement reforms that ensure higher levels of transparency and prohibit support from third country actors to political parties by closing existing loopholes.












1.15,


The EESC proposes that, at the end of the European Parliament’s term, the option should be considered of establishing a committee on the defence and strengthening of democracy in Europe on a permanent basis.




2.   General comments









2.1,


Democracy, the rule of law as defined in Article 2 of Regulation 2020/2092 (4) and fundamental rights as defined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are key values of the European integration project according to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. Therefore, any threats to democracy in Europe and the rule of law are also threats to the future of the EU itself and malign actors aim to destroy the project of regional integration. The EU is currently under massive attack from abroad and from within the Union.












2.2,


The hybrid war Russia and, possibly in a more subtle way, China are waging against democracies in general, and the EU in particular, is a major threat, as is foreign interference from other authoritarian third countries.












2.3,


The withdrawal of the current US administration from its traditional role as guardian of a rules-based world order provides additional impetus to enemies of democracy and the rule of law in Europe and worldwide. Therefore, it is urgent for the EU to act, to defend itself and its democratic order, to make its democratic systems resilient and to strengthen the coalition of democracies.












2.4,


The EESC is concerned that some European governments and political parties act as Trojan horses and coalesce with anti-democratic foreign powers. Their aim is to destabilise the EU. Therefore, making the EU resilient against European anti-democratic forces also contributes to fending off foreign interference.












2.5,


The EESC reiterates its previous acknowledgment that the EU has taken considerable steps to protect and strengthen democracy and the rule of law in Europe (5). However, the mounting challenges call for further and urgent steps, which need to be of unprecedented scale. It therefore welcomes the Danish Council Presidency’s invitation to give its opinion on ways to enhance the EU’s ability to protect and strengthen democracies in Europe.












2.6,


The EESC welcomes the fact that the President of the European Commission has included the initiative of ten civil society organisations to establish a Democracy Shield for Europe (6) in its political guidelines and will publish a communication proposing further actions to protect democracies in Europe in autumn 2025. It agrees with the European Commission that action against foreign interference, a sound information ecosystem, the resilience of European elections and the empowerment of civil society are priority areas for safeguarding democracy in Europe. In addition to the challenges, which the European Commission plans to address in its Democracy Shield, the EESC calls on the Commission to also address the social causes of democratic regression.












2.7,


The European Democracy Shield complements current initiatives on preparedness, security and defence to make European democracy resilient. Together, these initiatives set out a vision based on an all-hazards, whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach, since threats and crisis often are complex and interconnected. The strength of these initiatives, however, relies on ensuring an integrated, overarching and multi-stakeholder approach.












2.8,


The EESC welcomes the decision of the European Parliament to establish a Special committee on the European Democracy Shield and will closely work with its members to protect European democracy; it recommends establishing this committee on a permanent basis.












2.9,


Some third countries are undermining democracy in Europe and destabilising European political systems to strengthen their geopolitical position, as are certain EU governments and political forces. Disinformation, propaganda, the manipulation of online debates and the control of online platforms, social media and algorithms, hybrid and cyber-attacks, funding and other support for anti-democratic forces in the EU, are their most important means to achieve these goals.












2.10,


Despite recent achievements such as the Digital Markets Act, the Digital Services Act and the AI Act, which need to be properly enforced, the corporate power of some big tech-companies continues to undermine democracy in Europe by defining the rules for online activities on social media platforms, manipulating information reception by users on the internet and political online debates, and facilitating the manipulation of texts, pictures, audio and audiovisual media by offering artificial intelligence technology. Some of them have even gone so far as to explicitly spread extremist narratives and hate speech or support extremist and antidemocratic parties in election campaigns in EU countries. In sum, the digital revolution poses new fundamental questions concerning the functioning of public spaces and offers new instruments to anti-democratic forces in possession of the technologies to interfere with democratic processes. This necessitates rigorous enforcement and continuous evaluation of its effectiveness.












2.11,


Antidemocratic forces, and populist and extremist parties, especially on the far right, weaken democracy by spreading their racist ideologies and legitimising violence as an acceptable tactic in politics. By polarising political debates, they destroy solidarity within European societies. For the first time since 1945, such parties currently hold government offices in some Member States. Some of their most common tactics include:






—


disinformation;










—


hate speech;










—


stirring up hatred and violence;










—


the manipulation of political debates (including online debates);










—


abuse of democratic institutions; antidemocratic reforms;










—


the violation of the rule of law, democratic and European values and norms;










—


the shrinking of public spaces;










—


the narrowing of civic spaces through legal, administrative and other measures;










—


the intimidation of independent civil society, and the promotion of government-controlled ‘uncivil’ society (7);










—


discreditation of civil society and its legitimate control function in democracies;










—


violence and threats against women, minorities, journalists and human rights defenders, elected politicians and candidates running for office, judges, trade unionists and others;










—


to the weakening of all intermediary bodies.




Multiple crises challenging democracy require a culture of preparedness, anticipation and prevention at all levels of society. To achieve this and make European democracies resilient, the underlying causes of societal conflicts need to be addressed, ensuring accountability, dignity, equal opportunities and social progress among individuals and groups in society.












2.12,


European democratic systems are ill-prepared to address these challenges, as most of them are built on the assumption that supporters and not enemies of democracy hold the majority. Democracies in Europe need to be resilient with built-in stabilisers to fend off attacks from enemies of democracy. Organised civil society, which also functions as a ‘school of democracy’, and the social partners are key allies for the EU in defending and protecting democracy in Europe. To support the EU’s efforts, it needs to be supported in its role and protected against increasing attacks, which, recently, also come from within the EU institutions and Member States. Organised civil society also needs more civic space, which has been constantly shrinking in too many Member States.












2.13,


Considering these mounting challenges, the EESC calls for a comprehensive whole-of-society approach (8) with concrete initiatives to defend democracies in Europe – an approach which fends off the ongoing attacks from within and outside the EU and makes democracies and rule of law systems in Europe resilient and strengthens and develops democracy in Europe further.




3.   Defending European Democracies against Foreign Interference









3.1,


The EESC urges the Member States to use qualified majority voting (QMV) more often and to introduce it in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to not allow Member States influenced by the agenda of third countries to veto decisions and undermine EU democracy. Effective solutions to urgent problems are key to increasing legitimacy and support for the EU.












3.2,


The EESC reiterates its support for the objectives of the proposed directive establishing harmonised requirements of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries but calls on the European legislators to find more suitable means to achieve them (9). The defence of democracy in Europe should not impede the operational environment of organised civil society in the European Union, let alone stigmatise civil society.












3.3,


Cyberattacks are a threat to democracy in Europe, but also to European companies, trade unions and civil society organisations, which are either blackmailed after servers have been hacked, or the attack is used for industrial espionage. The most efficient way to ward off cyberattacks is to increase sufficient risk awareness and recognise attacks at an early stage.












3.4,


Foreign interference in European democratic processes is not limited to state actors anymore. Since the second election of Donald Trump as US President, private US actors have increasingly used their ownership of digital service platforms to intervene in the EU. An autonomous digital infrastructure and service market are key to European sovereignty and resilience, and bear the potential of economic growth in the EU.












3.5,


At the same time, we cannot treat the EU as an information bubble. We cannot prevent EU residents from being exposed to information from online platforms outside the EU. It is imperative that we encourage critical thinking and, from an early age, train our citizens to analyse data and cross check sources, as well as raise awareness on the different motivations behind sources and encourage asking critical questions (10). Lifelong learning is key to achieve this, especially for the older generations where a larger proportion of people are relatively unfamiliar with new technologies.












3.6,


The EESC acknowledges the valuable work the East StratCom Task Force (11) and other initiatives are doing in detecting propaganda and disinformation and fact-checking The detecting of information manipulation, propaganda and disinformation should be complemented by an increasingly pro-active communication strategy on the value and benefits of European integration. It should also go hand-in-hand with the preservation of and support for a sound information ecosystem, in order have reliable information and launch a reflective debate on European policies dominant in public spaces.




4.   Ensuring a Sound Information Ecosystem on the Internet and in Traditional Media









4.1,


Media freedom and pluralism are key for a sound information ecosystem and necessary to guarantee the freedom of information, as provided for in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Therefore, the EESC reiterates its proposals to secure media freedom and diversity in Europe, which are prerequisites to make the information ecosystems resilient against attacks from inside and outside the EU (12).












4.2,


Most notably, Public Service Media can play a crucial role in providing sound and reliable information across the Member States. They produce a public good and, if truly independent of government or party influence, are key allies in the fight against disinformation and misinformation. However, their independence is increasingly threatened by political actors across the EU, most notably by questioning or limiting their funding. Therefore, the EU should explore means to ensure their independence and guarantee sufficient funding for free and independent public service media. The EESC also reiterates its proposal to create a fully independent European public service broadcaster (13).












4.3,


While Public Service Media play a key role in providing the public good of reliable information in the market for audiovisual media, their role in the market for online and printed media is far more limited. In these markets especially, media companies are under increasing economic pressure and competition, resulting in a deterioration of journalistic quality and media pluralism, as the Reporters Without Borders 2025 (14) report once again showed. Therefore, the EESC supports the provision of reliable information by Public Service Media also in these markets.












4.4,


The EESC welcomes the Commission initiatives under the European Media and Audiovisual Action Plan (15) to support media companies’ recovery from the economic fallout of the pandemic, their digital and green transition and the facilitation of innovation in the market. However, the EESC underlines that the key challenge to achieving a sound information ecosystem is the need for sustainable business models in the media market that allow for the provision of the public good of high-quality information by a diversity of media companies, on a permanent basis.












4.5,


The EESC underlines the importance of the role of journalists and other persons engaged in public debates (16), and reiterates its work on proposals to protect them and empower them to function as a control mechanism against disinformation, misinformation and the manipulation of public debates (17). At the same time, the EESC points out that the crisis in media companies has had a clear impact on the pay and conditions of journalists’ contracts. Decent wages/renumeration and a working environment that guarantees individual safety are key factors in enabling journalists to do their job (18).












4.6,


The EESC welcomes the Digital Services Act and the AI Act as considerable progress to create a sound information ecosystem. However, technological development continues as the regulatory framework is enacted. In the light of the previously mentioned threats to democracy, the EESC considers the creation of a sound information ecosystem a moving target that requires regular evaluation and potentially updates to the regulatory framework.












4.7,


The EESC is of the firm opinion that regulatory standards for digital services and artificial intelligence protecting European democracy may not be subject to negotiations in any trade agreement. European democracy is not for sale.












4.8,


The EESC is concerned that the enforcement of the EU regulatory framework to secure a sound information ecosystem has been assigned to multiple authorities across EU Member States, including the European AI Office. As the informational space on the internet has a cross-border character by definition, the EESC calls for coherent enforcement of the regulatory framework by EU-level authorities to avoid fragmentation of the Common Market for media and digital services.












4.9,


The EESC considers the Commission’s review obligation under Article 91 of the Digital Services Act with a special focus on the regulation’s interaction with other legal acts due in November 2025 as an opportunity to organise an inclusive consultation process to discuss the state of defence of democracy in Europe on the internet.












4.10,


The EESC considers algorithm transparency key to ensuring a user-friendly internet and informational space. Users should have a right to information about the decisions taken by algorithms when these provide specific content to users. It reiterates its call for citizens to have freedom of choice regarding algorithm design (19).












4.11,


The EESC considers digital and media literacy a key instrument to make citizens resilient against misinformation and disinformation. It is a collective responsibility where citizens should be involved in meaningful citizen engagement. The EU needs to promote critical thinking, engagement in democracy, media literacy, and cross-referencing information in all types of education. It invites the European Commission to earmark sufficient funding under the next MFF for projects empowering teachers to educate pupils in media literacy and projects implementing the recommendations of the Conference on the Future of Europe in this area.




5.   Making Elections Resilient against Foreign Interference









5.1,


The EESC is concerned that rules regulating party donations and other forms of support for electoral campaigns are incoherent across EU Member States, resulting in different levels of transparency. It considers the best solution to be to take a consistent approach to regulating party donations across all Member States.












5.2,


The EESC is concerned that an increasing number of elected politicians, candidates running for office, representatives of civil society and journalists are victims of physical and psychological violence. This is a threat to the right to vote and stand in elections and the freedom of association, as well as to engage in any other form of political activity.












5.3,


The EESC is concerned about recent foreign interference in the presidential elections in Romania and calls for a more rigid enforcement of rules for political advertisement on internet platforms. It welcomes the Commission’s formal proceedings against TikTok on election risks under the DSA and calls for the adoption of regulatory standards for all social media platforms that prevent the prioritisation of one candidate’s political measures and that ensure a fair electoral competition. The EESC welcomes the Regulation (EU) 2024/900 (20) on the transparency and targeting of political advertising as a tool to empower citizens, journalists, political parties, and civil society organisations to play an active role in reporting non-compliant political ads and strengthening transparency in the democratic process (21).












5.4,


The EESC calls upon all Member States to review and, if necessary, to adapt their national electoral laws to ensure that impartial investigations in cases of potential foreign interference in elections take place and that judicial proceedings are initiated in cases of suspected interference. Most notably, the relevant impartial bodies and courts need sufficient capacities to investigate foreign digital interference and access to classified information concerning electoral interference. Granting access to relevant documents may not be subject to a political decision.




6.   Empowering Civil Society to Defend Democracy in Europe









6.1,


The EESC underlines the importance of protecting and developing civic spaces, which are safe rooms for democratic practices, participation, and inclusion. They are key for civil society and the social partners to act as defenders of European democracy and belong to the critical infrastructure of democracies. It is a task for the European, national, regional and local level to protect civic spaces against increasing attacks and to develop existing and new spaces to stimulate political participation.












6.2,


Civil society plays a crucial role in defending and promoting a robust and resilient democracy, by providing space for active citizenship and participation, promoting accountability and transparency, advocating for human rights and democratic values and building trust and social cohesion.












6.3,


European civic spaces are continuously shrinking, due not only to national measures, but also to European legislation. One example of the former is Hungary’s special taxation levied on CSOs working with migrants. A recent example of the latter is that the entire Italian Third Sector has been made subject to VAT regulations as commercial entities, due to a rigid implementation of European VAT legislation. This endangers their role as providers of a public good on the basis of voluntary civic engagement for a democratic and inclusive participatory society.












6.4,


The EESC calls upon all political parties represented in the European Parliament to respect the crucial and valuable contribution of organised civil society to the functioning of representative democracy. Holding elected politicians accountable by critically assessing their work, policies and other activities is one of its key functions. Any attack on them is an attack on representative democracy itself.












6.5,


The EESC calls on the Commission to amend its approach of simplifying EU legislation and its better regulation agenda to improve the quality of EU laws to make Europe more competitive by also systematically reviewing legislation’s effects on organised civil society and the functioning of democracy. The current focus of Commission analyses on effects on the administrative burdens for citizens, administrations and businesses, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, should be extended to cover the administrative burden to which CSOs are subject.












6.6,


The EESC notes the Commission’s recent initiative to regularly hold citizen dialogues on specific policies, which create new public spaces for citizens and civil society to engage in EU politics. It supports the further development of these formats to complement representative democracy with additional forums that allow citizens to have their say.












6.7,


The EESC recalls its opinion (22) on the proposal for a directive on European cross-border associations (23) and the European Parliament’s legislative resolution of 13 March 2024 (24), and calls on the Council of the EU to adopt the directive as a cross-border association can provide regulatory security under national law to associations which face pressure from national governments.












6.8,


The EESC calls for the civil society strategy that will be presented (25), together with the Democracy Shield, to systematically strengthen organised civil society in the democratic process. Its contribution to participatory democracy is invaluable.




7.   A New Multiannual Financial Framework Supporting the Defence of Democracy in Europe









7.1,


The EESC acknowledges that the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (26) has been a first step to protect democracies in Europe against corruption and democratic regression. It urges the European Commission, as a matter of urgency, to make swift use of all the existing instruments to counter attacks on democracy and CSOs. In line with the recommendations of the Conference on the Future of Europe, it also calls upon the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the members of the European Council to develop the regime further and extend its applicability to any violations against the values of the EU, the rule of law and democratic standards in EU Member States before the new MFF.












7.2,


The EESC calls upon the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council to continue applying the general regime of conditionality to ensure compliance with democratic standards, rule of law, human rights and European values. The EESC has also welcomed the Commission’s intention to build a closer link between the recommendations of the Rule of Law Report and funding under the EU budget, and to support to the reinforced application of the Article 7 mechanism. It has urged the Commission to act on its promise quickly to prevent the further deterioration of the rule of law in the Member States and, if considered necessary to reach these ends, called for a reform of the rule of law conditionality regulation to make it more encompassing by overcoming its limited application to rule of law breaches affecting the sound financial management of the EU budget and to link it more clearly to the other legal bases used to suspend EU funds (27).












7.3,


The EESC urges the Commission to systemise and increase the direct allocation of funds to recipients if Member States or foreign governments try to interfere in the funding process. The Commission shall also establish support and capacity building mechanisms for civil society organisations, defenders of human and civic rights, trade unionists and journalists facing such interference, repression and violence from third countries, including their option to relocate to safe havens in the EU.












7.4,


The EESC calls on the EU’s budgetary authorities to considerably increase the budget for the support of civil society organisations within the EU and in the candidate countries under the next MFF. Spending priorities should be structural support for CSOs, capacity building for CSOs, emergency funds for the protection of and judicial support for CSOs and activists against foreign interference, SLAPP and other forms of harassment, and projects in the areas of human rights, rule of law, democracy, anti-corruption, political participation, gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, remembrance, the fight against political extremism, societal resilience, European values, as well as media, digital and AI literacy.












7.5,


The EESC calls on the EU’s budgetary authorities to establish a funding programme to support quality journalism in the EU and candidate countries. Spending priorities should be support for journalism academies, projects on teaching European studies to journalists, projects on digital and AI literacy for journalists, support for the protection of and judicial support for journalists against foreign interference, SLAPP and other forms of harassment, with a special focus on freelancers, and budgetary support for high quality media.












7.6,


The EESC calls on the EU’s budgetary authorities to increase the funding for research on democratic and rule of law regression and the means to prevent it; on foreign interference and hybrid warfare against democracies and how fend it off, on the effects of digital services, AI technology, insufficient media freedom and diversity on the information ecosystem and democracies; on ongoing autocratisation processes and the democratic responses needed to halt and reverse them; on the role of civil society and how to better protect it and civic spaces, as well as the functioning of liberal democracy in the post-truth age and recommendations to make democracy in Europe resilient against systemic risks.












7.7,


Following the Commission priority to simplify European legislation and reduce red tape, organised civil society should also be strengthened by means of simplified administrative procedures and less unnecessary bureaucracy. The extension of funding periods to a minimum of three to five years will also reduce the administrative burden considerably. The current application procedures and reporting obligations overburden and thus exclude many civil society organisations from EU funding. The result in an unfair allocation of funds to those organisations with the best administrative and lobbying capacities (28). The Commission must reverse the dangerous trend of ‘marchandisation’ of civil society (29).












7.8,


In addition to the above, the EESC recalls that all these measures alone will not be sufficient to protect democracy in the EU. In parallel, it is essential and urgent to reduce existing social inequalities. As many academic studies have shown (30), populist and extremist parties, especially far right ones, have increased their votes due to the growing resentment and frustration of many citizens about existing inequalities and the fear of many citizens of being left behind, as well as the growing distrust of institutions that fail to reduce them. It is therefore essential to act in this area as well, and to develop a holistic strategy that acts in different areas at the same time, in order to strengthen our democracies.






Brussels, 18 September 2025.


The President


of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE
               





(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – EU strategy to support, protect and empower civil society (opinion requested by the European Commission) (OJ C, C/2025/5160, 28.10.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/5160/oj).

(2)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Public services principles for stability of democratic order (exploratory opinion requested by the German presidency) (
OJ C 56, 16.2.2021, p. 29.

(3)  
            https://eurostack.eu/.

(4)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1).

(5)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Defence of Democracy (COM(2023) 630 final) – Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1024/2012 and (EU) 2018/1724 as regards certain requirements laid down by Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX (COM(2023) 636 final) – Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2023) 637 final) (OJ C, C/2024/4061, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4061/oj).

(6)  
            https://about.make.org/articles-en/raising-the-democratic-shield-safeguarding-the-2024-european-parliament-elections.

(7)  The term ‘uncivil society’ refers to voluntary and grassroots organisations that aim to undermine liberal society.

(8)  
            COM(2023) 630.

(9)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Defence of Democracy (COM(2023) 630 final) – Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1024/2012 and (EU) 2018/1724 as regards certain requirements laid down by Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX (COM(2023) 636 final) – Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2023) 637 final) (OJ C, C/2024/4061, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4061/oj).

(10)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Safeguarding Democracy Against Disinformation (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2024/4052, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4052/oj).

(11)  
            https://euvsdisinfo.eu/.

(12)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Securing media freedom and diversity in Europe (Own-initiative opinion) (
OJ C 517, 22.12.2021, p. 9.

(13)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Securing media freedom and diversity in Europe (Own-initiative opinion) (
OJ C 517, 22.12.2021, p. 9.

(14)  Reporters Without Borders, ‘RSF World Press Freedom Index 2025: economic fragility a leading threat to press freedom’. Available at: https://rsf.org/en/rsf-world-press-freedom-index-2025-economic-fragility-leading-threat-press-freedom.

(15)  
            COM(2020) 784 final.

(16)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (“Strategic lawsuits against public participation”)’ (COM(2022) 177 final – 2022/0117 COD) (
OJ C 75, 28.2.2023, p. 143.

(17)  EESC opinion on 
Labour rights for journalists and media professionals as a safeguard for independence and truthful information
 (ongoing).

(18)  EESC opinion on 
Labour rights for journalists and media professionals as a safeguard for independence and truthful information
 (ongoing).

(19)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Safeguarding Democracy Against Disinformation (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2024/4052, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4052/oj), point 1.13.

(20)  Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).

(21)  According to the Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, political advertising publishers should put in place mechanisms to enable natural or legal persons to report to them that a particular political advertisement which they have published does not comply with the Regulation. Beside citizens, journalists and political parties, civil society organisations may play an important role in that regard.

(22)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on a) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1024/2012 and (EU) 2018/1724 as regards the use of the Internal Market Information System and the Single Digital Gateway for the purposes of certain requirements laid down by Directive (EU)…/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on European cross-border associations (COM(2023) 515 final — 2023/0314 (COD)) and b) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on European cross-border associations (COM(2023) 516 final — 2023/0315 (COD)) (OJ C, C/2024/2102, 26.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2102/oj).

(23)  
            COM(2023) 516 final.

(24)  
            P9_TA(2024)0147.

(25)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – EU strategy to support, protect and empower civil society (opinion requested by the European Commission) (OJ C, C/2025/5160, 28.10.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/5160/oj).

(26)  
            Regulation (EU) 2020/2092.

(27)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Evaluation of the European Commission’s annual reports on the rule of law in the European Union (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2025/1184, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1184/oj), paras 2.5.2.3 and 2.5.2.4.

(28)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Civil society support and funding in the area of fundamental rights, the rule of law and democracy’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2023/861, 8.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/861/oj).

(29)  
            https://www.lecese.fr/actualites/renforcer-le-financement-des-associations-une-urgence-democratique-le-cese-adopte-lavis.

(30)  See, for example, Stoetzer, L. F., Giesecke, J., & Klüver, H. (2021). ‘How does income inequality affect the support for populist parties?’. Journal of European Public Policy, 30(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1981981; Engler, S., & Weisstanner, D. (2020). ‘The threat of social decline: income inequality and radical right support’. Journal of European Public Policy, 28(2), 153–173. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1733636; Gidron, N., & Hall, P. A. (2017). ‘The politics of social status: Economic and cultural roots of the populist right’. The British Journal of Sociology, 68(S1), 57–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12319.


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/25/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)