Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Blue diplomacy and water cooperation – solutions to relieve the pressure of climate induced migration (own-initiative opinion)
Date: 2025-09-18
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: adaptation to climate change, desertification, forced migration, shortage, sustainable development, water, water management, water protection, water resources, water supply








C_202600018EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2026/18


16.1.2026






Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee
Blue diplomacy and water cooperation – solutions to relieve the pressure of climate induced migration
(own-initiative opinion)
(C/2026/18)


Rapporteur: 
Milena ANGELOVA

Co-rapporteur: 
Ioannis VARDAKASTANIS






Advisors


Ioannis PAPADIMOS (rapporteur’s advisor, Group I)
Ioannis N. GRIGORIADIS (co-rapporteur’s advisor, Group III)




Plenary Assembly decision


22.1.2025




Legal basis


Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure




Section responsible


External Relations




Adopted in section


9.7.2025




Adopted at plenary session


18.9.2025




Plenary session No


599




Outcome of vote
(for/against/abstentions)


129/0/2




1.   Conclusions and recommendations









1.1.


The EESC concludes that there is a general lack of understanding, confusion and misuse of terminology when addressing the issue of human mobility in the context of disasters, climate change and environmental degradation. This has an impact on the collection of data and their quality. Therefore, the EESC recommends adopting one definition at EU level for climate-induced migration.












1.2.


There are no data available on the number of migrants entering the EU having left their country of origin due to climate-related reasons. To address this gap, the EESC recommends encouraging and funding further research of projects, recognising the complexity and multi-faceted aspect of migration, and to investigate the possibility of amending data collection protocols for people entering countries of destination.












1.3.


Despite the lack of change in the legal framework, some courts have evolved in their interpretation to recognise the phenomenon of climate-induced migration. The EESC calls for efforts to encourage dialogue between legal and migration professionals to share different interpretations of the legal framework within and across Member States. Further, the Committee calls on the European Commission to develop a compendium of relevant case law and highlights the need to encourage the use of the Practical Toolkit on International Protection for people displaced across borders in the context of climate change and disasters.












1.4.


The EESC identifies a lack of synergies between existing EU environmental and migration policies, namely the Green Deal and the Pact on Migration and Asylum. To remedy this situation, it calls for efforts to encourage the creation of synergies between the EU’s environmental and migration policy by integrating the Humanitarian Development-Peace nexus further into climate mobility policy and embedding migration as adaptation in its approach to climate mobility.












1.5.


The EESC identifies a need to link environmental policy more closely with humanitarian action in partner countries. Hence, it calls on the European Commission to further shape its cooperation with partner countries, to facilitate access to international funds to support partner countries in climate resilience and preparedness, and to pursue the commitments made.












1.6.


The EESC points out that displacement based on environmental causes alone does not meet the requirements for granting asylum or international protection. However, the legal protection for climate migrants needs to be strengthened. Therefore, the Committee recommends that the scope of the Temporary Protection Directive be extended to migrants fleeing from countries heavily affected by disasters and climate change.




2.   Climate-induced migration – an alarming reality









2.1.


Being a leading pro-environmental and human rights-oriented global actor, the EU endeavours to address issues related to climate change and ecological degradation, including by recently chairing the Platform on Disaster Displacement (1). Yet, the EESC identifies an important gap in this commitment (2): climate-induced migration and environmental migrants are omitted from the EU’s climate change and migration management policies. Building on the previous work undertaken by the EESC (3), this own-initiative opinion calls on the European Commission to map out a proactive, multifaceted and comprehensive strategy that emphasises the importance of the synergy between scientific evidence, decision-making and policy implementation so as to address this gap. The rationale behind this lies in the high probability of a scenario in which a major climate-induced migration crisis will affect the EU within the next two decades.












2.1.1.


There is no universally agreed definition of climate-induced migration. While some definitions focus on the environmental drivers of migration, others emphasise the multicausal nature of the phenomenon or its legal and policy implications. This opinion uses the term ‘climate-induced migration’ to reflect upon a phenomenon of migration rather than internal displacement, and the fact that existing data make it impossible to distinguish whether or not events are related to climate change, or indeed the climate. It therefore accepts the International Organization for Migration’s concept that describes climate-induced migration as ‘the movement of a person or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment due to climate change, are obliged to leave their habitual place of residence, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, within a State or across an international border’ (4).












2.1.2.


There is a comprehensive international and EU legal framework relating to migration and international protection. Although it does not explicitly mention environmental factors as grounds for granting refuges status or subsidiary protection, there is also a wider response to climate-induced migration (5). At the EU level, existing protection instruments (6) could provide protection alternatives, although they contain deficiencies when it comes to the granting of protection to environmentally displaced persons.












2.1.3.


The current definition of the term ‘refugee’ (7) grants protection to individuals fleeing persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, but it does not explicitly include individuals displaced solely due to environmental factors such as climate change. Hence, those displaced by climate-related events do not typically qualify for refugee status under existing legal frameworks. However, there is growing recognition of the need to address this gap (8). The European Parliament (9) has acknowledged the absence of a clear definition of ‘climate refugees’ and the inadequacy of the current protections for individuals displaced due to environmental factors. While discussions are ongoing, it is clear that climate change’s role and impact with respect to migration and displacement should be considered as a ‘threat-multiplier’ or a contributing factor.












2.1.4.


Climate-induced migration disproportionately affects regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and South America that have contributed the least to global emissions, while bearing the brunt of environmental degradation. Expanding the legal definition to include climate refugees would acknowledge these systemic inequities. However, legal recognition alone is insufficient without addressing the underlying causes (e.g. historical environmental exploitation and global power imbalances) that drive climate (and water) vulnerability.












2.1.5.


The EESC invites the European Commission and the Member States to start swiftly considering how this could be translated into the European legal and policy context, building upon the good practices (10) of some Member States that merit emulation and further development (11). In the case of Italy, for instance, there are general provisions preventing return in case of conditions that could include environmental disasters, but these lack definitional clarity. Moreover, it should be considered how instruments like the USA’s ‘temporary protected status’, whose scope includes persons affected by environmental disasters, could be useful in the EU context.












2.2.


Climate-induced migration is not a hypothetical worst-case scenario; it is already happening and could soon reach unprecedented proportions unless policy measures are swiftly taken. Desertification in Afghanistan and Pakistan is one of the main reasons for rising migration waves towards Europe. Similarly, the shrinking of international lakes such as Lake Chad in the Sahel and Lake Aral in Central Asia and the falling water levels in river basins such as the Nile and Congo River basins in Africa, are causing environmental catastrophes of historic dimensions, which also carry the potential to destabilise regional diplomatic relations and trigger conflict and additional migration waves. Scientific evidence from climatology, migration studies and economic modelling supports the claim that climate change is displacing populations worldwide (12). However, it often interacts with other drivers (e.g. poverty, conflict, governance issues), making it difficult to isolate climate as the sole cause of migration. In any case, the trend is clear: as climate conditions worsen, more people will be forced to move. 1.2 billion people – around a tenth of the world’s population – could be displaced by 2050 (13).












2.3.


Whereas comprehensive data is already being collected in the Member States and candidate countries on international migration flows to and from these countries, there is limited data collection on migration that occurs due to climate change. According to recent studies (14), over 376 million people around the world have been forcibly displaced by floods, windstorms, earthquakes or droughts since 2008, with a record 32.6 million in 2022 alone. Since 2020, there has been an average annual increase in the total number of people displaced due to disaster, which has risen by 41 % compared with the previous decade. The upward trend is alarmingly clear. With climate change as the driving catalyst, the number of ‘climate refugees’ will soar. Recent years have seen a rise in unauthorised migrant crossings into the EU, with factors such as geopolitical unrest and climate change contributing to increased migration flows. Moreover, the Mediterranean and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions are particularly susceptible to climate change impacts, including water scarcity and extreme weather events (15). With this in mind, the EESC suggests that, instead of emphasising the likelihood of migration posing a threat, policies should prioritise addressing the root causes of displacement, ensuring legal protections for those affected and supporting climate adaptation in vulnerable regions.












2.4.


Attention should be paid to understanding the impact of slow-onset events on migratory decisions and patterns. Deforestation, desertification, soil degradation, sea-level rise, coastal erosion and the number of climatic shocks experienced are among the many factors that threaten to negatively affect people’s livelihoods over the coming decades. Also considering factors such as urbanisation trends and population growth, especially on the African continent, should enable assessments of future trends.




3.   Water stress and climate-induced migration









3.1.


Climate change is accelerating global water crises, exacerbating droughts, floods and water scarcity at differing magnitudes around the world, which in turn increase migration pressure. Water scarcity and mismanagement have become key drivers for displacement, particularly in regions highly dependent on agriculture and fisheries and where desertification complicates access to drinking water resources. The EESC recognises the urgent need for a comprehensive approach to blue diplomacy, integrating water cooperation into foreign policy and development strategies to mitigate forced migration caused by climate-related water insecurity.












3.1.1.


The EESC stresses that efficient and sustainable water use should be a central component of the EU’s blue diplomacy (16) in order to reduce pressure on water resources, mitigate the effects of climate change-related droughts and ensure the availability of water resources for future generations. International cooperation should be developed further and strengthened by sharing best practices and technologies for efficient water use, and building stronger partnerships with countries in the Mediterranean and MENA regions should be accelerated – especially around the water-energy-food-ecosystem (WEFE) nexus.












3.1.2.


The focus should shift to equitable and sensible water use, ensuring in the case of agricultural practices that local food security and environmental sustainability are the top priority. Special attention should be paid to the proliferation of water-efficient agricultural practices across the Member States. The EU must also examine how its trade policies and consumer demands shape water use patterns beyond its borders. Furthermore, the EU’s definition of ‘blue diplomacy’ should be broadened to include an emphasis that it should also involve ‘using politics to reduce tensions over water and using water to reduce political tensions, respecting the principles of international law’ (17).












3.2.


The EESC appreciates the commitment of the EU to excel in transboundary water management and its extension to water crisis regions. Transboundary water cooperation should not be viewed merely through technical lenses, but as an opportunity to foster peace and promote sustainable development and regional stability. The EU could take a leadership role by encouraging dialogue and knowledge exchange between regions facing transboundary challenges.












3.2.1.


The EESC highlights the potential of the approach of the River Basin Management Plans (18), which involves considering the entire ecosystem when drawing up water strategies and promoting integrated management of river basins across national boundaries, leading to more sustainable and equitable outcomes.












3.2.2.


The EU participates in various international agreements focused on transboundary water cooperation, such as the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. These conventions provide valuable legal frameworks that facilitate collaboration between countries sharing water resources, and their potential should be further tapped and developed.












3.2.3.


The EU has implemented macro-regional strategies like the Baltic Sea Region Strategy and the Danube Region Strategy (19), which address common challenges in specific geopolitical regions. These strategies promote cooperation among countries to improve water quality, enhance service delivery and manage resources effectively, and should be further multiplied to cover more regions.












3.2.4.


Regional agreements such as the Danube River Protection Convention and the Rhine Convention have reinforced this governance framework by creating permanent institutional bodies that oversee implementation, compliance and joint policymaking (20).












3.3.


The EESC underlines that, for water-scarce regions, the EU’s experience underscores the need to embed legally binding frameworks that establish clear rights and responsibilities for shared water resources, while aligning national policies under basin-wide strategies. The institutionalisation of joint river basin authorities and multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms fosters accountability, reduces geopolitical friction and ensures compliance with agreed-upon standards. Transparent and standardised data-sharing protocols, alongside prior notification and consultation processes for water infrastructure projects, mitigate the risks of unilateral actions that could exacerbate existing water stress. Moreover, the introduction of shared investment schemes (whether through co-funded reservoirs, inter-basin water transfers or coordinated ecosystem restoration initiatives) can serve as a powerful incentive for cooperation, particularly in regions where hydro-political tensions are high.




4.   Factors inducing climate migration









4.1.


Climate change has consequences that can take a multitude of forms. Extreme weather conditions, public health crises through the spread of infectious diseases, destruction of homes and livelihoods though flooding and desertification, and famine and malnutrition due to crop failures are a few examples. It often forces people to migrate from economically fragile regions to seek a better standard of living. It is also a threat-multiplier for conflict, socioeconomic inequalities and tensions, causing exponential conflict over natural resources. Regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, South America, the MENA region and Central Asia are particularly vulnerable to these risks.












4.2.


Climate-induced migration may be direct or indirect. Direct migration occurs when the push factors are directly caused by climate change, such as a hurricane, a flood or a drought. Indirect migration happens when the effects of climate change have severe repercussions on the economy or may cause unrest or wars over limited resources, which will indirectly cause migration. Most climate migrants move first within their countries (from rural to urban areas). When urban centres fail to absorb them, they migrate regionally (e.g. from the Sahel to North Africa, or from Afghanistan to Turkey). When job opportunities and living conditions remain poor, they attempt to cross the Mediterranean or find other ways to the EU.












4.3.


The EESC also focuses on the interconnection with the socioeconomic consequences of climate change rather than simply focusing on the environmental repercussions. Given that there is no clear definition of a ‘climate refugee’, and climate refugees are not covered by the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, the EESC is concerned that extreme climate events and disasters cannot currently be cited as grounds for seeking asylum or refugee status, despite the second objective of the 2018 Global Compact for Migration citing climate as a potential reason for migration. While the EU has not formally recognised ‘climate refugees’, it has expressed growing concern and has taken action to support and develop resilience in those countries most vulnerable to climate-related stress factors.












4.4.


In this light, the Kampala Convention (21) on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa stipulates that ‘States Parties shall take measures to protect and assist persons who have been internally displaced due to natural or human made disasters, including climate change’. In addition, the UNHCR responses to the Questionnaire in relation to Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/35/20 on human rights and climate change recognises that ‘in the absence of refugee protection, persons fleeing climate change or disasters should be provided with complementary forms of protection, as a minimum, under temporary protection, particularly when the host country is experiencing large-scale influxes of people or when the situation in the country of origin is fluid or unclear’ (22).




5.   Integrating blue diplomacy into EU foreign policy to address current water and climate-related challenges









5.1.


Integrating blue diplomacy into the EU’s foreign policy can help address water challenges in such important regions as the Mediterranean and MENA by aligning water management and governance goals with existing policies like the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), and, most importantly, by firmly embedding them into the new policy instruments such as the future Pact for the Mediterranean. The EU can promote sustainable water use through trade agreements that include environmental standards, development aid for water infrastructure and capacity building, and research partnerships on innovative solutions like desalination and climate-resilient agriculture. Additionally, engaging in regional dialogues strengthens cooperation on shared water challenges, ensuring a more coordinated and effective response.












5.2.


In this context, blue diplomacy should focus on equitable water sharing, service delivery, safeguarding the human right to water and sanitation and on always protecting water and water infrastructure, including during armed conflict. Regarding the equitable sharing of water, EU foreign policy should promote diplomatic efforts to support basin-wide, climate-resilient water arrangements and cooperative water-sharing mechanisms, with the ultimate goal of reducing tensions between riparian states and promoting peace.












5.3.


The EESC states that improving the efficiency of water management and use in agriculture is an utmost priority. Further research and investment in the technologies that optimise the use of water is warranted.












5.4.


Blue diplomacy should be an integral part of EU conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts and strategies. The EU should hold all parties accountable for violations of international humanitarian law, such as the disproportionate and deliberate destruction of water systems. This applies universally, whether addressing the bombing of water facilities in Ukraine or the destruction of infrastructure in the occupied Palestinian territories. Moreover, blue diplomacy may critically assess how EU trade and development policies contribute to water insecurity in other regions and may prioritise collaborative, justice-oriented approaches to water governance.












5.5.


Water security is increasingly intertwined with international stability, migration flows and conflict prevention. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and Global Gateway Strategy should explicitly incorporate blue diplomacy as a pillar of resilience building in fragile and water-stressed regions to reduce climate-induced migration. This includes:






—


integrating water diplomacy into the EU’s strategic partnerships, particularly in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, where transboundary river basins (e.g., the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, Indus) are potential flashpoints for conflict. The EU should expand its role as a neutral convenor in water-related negotiations, using its experience in transboundary water governance (e.g. the Danube, Rhine) to facilitate mediation and dispute resolution;










—


embedding water security within the European Peace Facility and EU-led conflict prevention mechanisms. Where water scarcity exacerbates political instability, the EU should deploy water-related early warning systems, hydro-diplomatic interventions and capacity-building programmes for water governance in fragile states;










—


strengthening water resilience as a security strategy under the EU Climate and Security Nexus. The EEAS should explicitly recognise water-related risks as part of climate security policies, ensuring that EU delegations proactively monitor water stress in conflict-prone areas and integrate water resilience into stabilisation missions;










—


using trade policy as a lever to encourage sustainable water management, particularly in regions where EU imports contribute to water stress through virtual water trade (e.g. agriculture, textiles). Key measures shall include leveraging EU trade agreements and investment policies to promote sustainable water governance, applying due diligence mechanisms to prevent water exploitation in global supply chains and using trade incentives to reward circular water use and wastewater reuse.








6.   Tapping the potential of blue diplomacy to reduce climate-induced migration









6.1.


The EESC welcomes the swift measures taken by the European Commission and the European Parliament, namely the appointment of a special Commissioner for Water and the Water Resilience Strategy being made a high priority for promoting competitiveness, and the crosscutting approach of the European Parliament in response to the call for a European Blue Deal (23). The Committee further highlights the importance of blue diplomacy, especially with regard to international efforts to promote water cooperation and sustainable water resource management as a means of preventing conflicts and fostering regional stability. Water is a strategic resource whose equitable management is crucial for ensuring resilience to climate change and migration pressures. The EU must undertake a global leadership role in strengthening international water governance through diplomatic engagement, capacity building and investment in transboundary water cooperation. The EESC has declared that water is not a mere commodity but a public good essential to human life. Easy and affordable access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) for all is imperative for public health and human development (24).












6.2.


To effectively monitor and evaluate the impact of blue diplomacy and water cooperation initiatives on reducing climate-induced migration, the EU should establish comprehensive monitoring frameworks with clear indicators on water availability, water quality and socio-economic impacts. Data-sharing platforms can enhance transparency, while impact assessments help track migration trends linked to water initiatives. Stakeholder consultations with local communities, governments and NGOs ensure adaptability, and independent audits provide objective evaluations. Organisations like the International Centre for Migration Policy Development can contribute by conducting migration research, developing policy recommendations and supporting cross-border cooperation to address displacement risks. By integrating these mechanisms, the EU can enhance accountability and improve the effectiveness of water diplomacy in mitigating climate-induced migration.












6.3.


The EU is one of the largest global donors for water-related projects, and blue diplomacy can further align development assistance with geostrategic water objectives. This involves:






—


targeting water-scarce and fragile regions in EU development funding. The future Pact for the Mediterranean and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe) should prioritise water resilience in regions of the world such as MENA, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia where water shortages drive humanitarian crises, migration and conflict. Scaling up investments in integrated water resource management, transboundary water treaties and climate adaptation programmes can prevent water disputes from escalating into geopolitical crises;










—


aligning blue diplomacy with climate finance and adaptation projects. The EU’s Green Climate Fund contributions and Just Energy Transition Partnerships should ensure that water security is a central component of climate adaptation strategies, particularly in regions vulnerable to droughts and desertification. EU-backed nature-based solutions, such as wetland restoration, watershed management and reforestation, can enhance water availability while offering co-benefits for biodiversity, carbon sequestration and local economies;










—


given the EU’s leadership in multilateral environmental governance, actively shaping global water diplomacy through international organisations and governance platforms, including enhancing EU engagement in global water diplomacy through the UN, G20, COP and WTO, developing an EU-led Global Water Resilience Initiative, positioning the EU as a leader in international water standards and expanding EU-Africa and EU-Asia partnerships on transboundary water governance. By leveraging diplomatic channels in Africa and Asia, the EU can strengthen bilateral agreements on shared rivers, finance joint water infrastructure and facilitate conflict mediation efforts over transboundary water disputes.
















6.4.


Blue diplomacy and water cooperation must be central pillars of the EU’s foreign policy in order to address the root causes of climate-induced migration. Through proactive engagement, investing in sustainable water solutions and strengthening legal frameworks, the EU can lead global efforts to mitigate water crises and ensure stability in vulnerable regions. A comprehensive, coordinated approach will not only relieve migration pressures but also foster economic development and peace worldwide.












6.5.


Engaging with civil society and young people is of primary importance. Collaborating with European citizens’ initiatives and local actors and focusing on bottom-up solutions in the countries most affected by climate-induced migration pressure would increase both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of blue diplomacy instruments.












6.6.


An effective blue diplomacy strategy requires the coordinated engagement of governments, regional organisations (e.g. the Union for the Mediterranean, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and MERCOSUR), river basin commissions and cross-border institutions (e.g. the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine, the Mekong River Commission and the Niger Basin Authority), European institutions (e.g. the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Commission and the European Environment Agency), international organisations (e.g. UN-Water, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UNIDO and FAO), NGOs (e.g. WaterAid, IUCN and SIWI), private-sector actors (e.g. agriculture, energy and manufacturing industries) and local communities, ensuring that water governance aligns with climate resilience, trade, conflict prevention (e.g. EEAS mediation in the Nile basin and EU support for the Senegal River Basin Organisation) and finance (e.g. NDICI-Global Europe, the Green Climate Fund, Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) and the World Bank).












6.7.


Strengthening institutions and governance is often the linchpin of water security – even the best laws or technologies falter without capable institutions. Adopting integrated water resource management (IWRM) principles means managing water holistically across sectors and scales, recognising the interconnectedness of rivers, aquifers, land use and ecosystems. The UN’s SDG 6.5 calls for IWRM at all levels, yet at current rates the world will miss this target by decades – on the present trajectory, sustainable water management will not be achieved until 2049, far beyond the 2030 goal. To close this gap, governments should clarify roles and responsibilities among agencies (water, agriculture, energy, environment) and establish powerful coordinating bodies (e.g. national water councils or commissions). Successful reforms often involve consolidating fragmented agencies into a single lead institution for water or creating basin-level authorities that integrate planning across regions.






Brussels, 18 September 2025.


The President


of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE
               





(1)  
            https://disasterdisplacement.org/what-we-do/, European Commission staff working document Addressing displacement and migration related to disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, July 2022.

(2)  The EESC appreciates the contributions to this opinion by the UfM, Geneva Water Hub, EPC, WES and many more stakeholders, which have been incorporated into the text.

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Water resilience and the twin transitions: Industrial approaches addressing the relationship between water, digitalisation and decarbonisation (OJ C, C/2026/15, 16.1.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/15/oj); OJ C, C/2025/769, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/769/oj; OJ C, C/2024/4659, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4659/oj; OJ C, C/2024/878, 6.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/878/oj; OJ C, C/2023/862, 8.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/862/oj; OJ C 349, 29.9.2023, p. 74; OJ C 349, 29.9.2023, p. 60; OJ C 349, 29.9.2023, p. 87; OJ C 349, 29.9.2023, p. 80; OJ C 349, 29.9.2023, p. 50; OJ C 349, 29.9.2023, p. 18; EESC opinion on ‘
            Integrated water management – revised lists of surface and groundwater pollutants
            ’; OJ C 146, 27.4.2023, p. 35; OJ C, C/2025/1189, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1189/oj.

(4)  International Organization for Migration (2019), Glossary on Migration, p. 31.

(5)  See the 2010 Cancún Agreement, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

(6)  Such as the Qualification Directive and the Temporary Protection Directive, as well as protection against non-refoulement in the Return Directive.

(7)  1951 Refugee Convention.

(8)  
            Addressing displacement and migration related to disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, Echo.

(9)  
            https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698753/EPRS_BRI(2021)698753_EN.pdf.

(10)  
            Addressing displacement and migration related to disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, Echo.

(11)  EMN Inform 2023.

(12)  
            https://www.un.org/en/observances/desertification-day.

(13)  
            https://sdgs.un.org/partnerships/water-scarcity-and-human-immobility-identifying-internal-migration-patterns-driven; OJ C, C/2023/862, 8.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/862/oj
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2021)698753.

(14)  European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), The concept of ‘climate refugee’
            , authors: Joanna Apap with Sami James Harju; Graphics: Stéphanie Pradier, Samy Chahri. Members’ Research Service, PE 698.753 – October 2023.

(15)  
            https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/clim/33/14/JCLI-D-19-0910.1.xml.

(16)  Agriculture is one of the largest consumers of freshwater resources. According to the European Environment Agency, it is the largest consumer of water in the EU, using 59 % of the supply, compared with 13 % for households and services. This can lead to significant wastage and environmental degradation.

(17)  Geneva Water Hub suggestion, which also aligns with point 1.13 of EESC opinion OJ C, C/2023/862, 8.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/862/oj.

(18)  Embedded in the EU’s Water Framework Directive.

(19)  
            https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/cooperation/macro-regional-strategies_en.

(20)  The International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR), for instance, harmonises efforts across 14 countries, ensuring basin-wide coordination on pollution control, flood risk management and hydrological monitoring. Similarly, the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) has been instrumental in advancing upstream-downstream cooperation, particularly in pollution mitigation, industrial water use regulation and flood prevention through transboundary infrastructure investments.

(21)  African Union (2009), Article V, African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention). Adopted by the Special Summit of the Union, Kampala, Uganda, 23 October 2009. Entered into force on 6 December 2012. African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

(22)  EXCOM, Providing International Protection Including Through Complementary Forms of Protection, 2 June 2005, EC/55/SC/CRP.16, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdfb49d.html.

(23)  European Economic and Social Committee, Declaration for an EU Blue Deal, EESC-2023-81-EN, © European Union, 2023.

(24)  
            OJ C 349, 29.9.2023, p. 18.


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/18/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)