Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – European public goods: policy priority for financing the EU’s sustainability growth and facing global challenges (own-initiative opinion)
Date: 2025-09-18
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: Economic and Monetary Union, European security, area of freedom, security and justice, economic and social cohesion, own resources, public goods, rule of law, single market, strategic autonomy, sustainable development








C_202600008EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2026/8


16.1.2026






Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee
European public goods: policy priority for financing the EU’s sustainability growth and facing global challenges
(own-initiative opinion)
(C/2026/8)


Rapporteur: 
Stefano PALMIERI






Plenary Assembly decision


27.2.2025




Legal basis


Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure




Section responsible


Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion




Adopted in section


5.9.2025




Adopted at plenary session


18.9.2025




Plenary session No


599




Outcome of vote
(for/against/abstentions)


99/3/1




1.   Conclusions and recommendations









1.1.


Given the significance of the provision of public goods for the well-being of the citizens, the EESC believes that particular attention should be paid to providing these European public goods (EPGs) and identifying them in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) post-2027.












1.2.


Given the persistence of the current polycrisis situation, the EESC also draws attention to the growing importance of global public goods (GPGs), such as peace, the fight against poverty, environmental protection and financial stability, among others, and underlines the need to strengthen world governance and its responsible organisations (the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, etc.).












1.3.


Special attention must be given to ‘functional EPGs’ – those linked to Article 3 TEU – that can ensure the normal functioning of the EU: the completion of the single market; the completion of the economic and monetary union; economic, social and territorial cohesion; EU open strategic autonomy (e.g. the joint EU health policy, food security, the EU energy union); defence and security; EU research and development; and the rule of law.












1.4.


Alongside these functional EPGs, the EESC calls for the financial resources to invest in strategic priorities such as carrying out the green and digital transitions, implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights, and strengthening EU competitiveness (as recommended in the Draghi Report).












1.5.


The post-2027 MFF must also be flexible in order to address certain challenges. This could involve providing for an ‘emergency phase’ during which temporary financial support is granted to mitigate unemployment risks (in line with certain best practices, like SURE) for sectors particularly affected by the energy and/or digital transitions, for example the automotive sector or sectors highly dependent on carbon-intensive processes. It should also involve an assessment on the impact that a permanent European unemployment benefit reinsurance scheme could have from an economic and social point of view.












1.6.


The EESC underscores the importance of taking into account EU added value in all discussions on EPGs. An additional benefit that could be unlocked through EPGs is EUR 2.8 trillion in additional GDP from 2022 to 2032, with an average annual real GDP growth rate of 2,9 % over that period (1). If the EU does not integrate further, this additional GDP could be lost potential – the ‘cost of non-Europe’.












1.7.


As previously highlighted by the EESC in opinion ECO/662, the current outlined framework of EPGs, the strategic priorities and the challenges brought on by the current polycrisis situation require the next MFF to be ambitious: ‘the level of the next MFF – as a percentage of GNI – should not decrease in real terms and in fact must substantially increase to deal with the growing challenges at EU level’ (2).












1.8.


The EESC believes that it is more important now than ever to delve deeper into the different ways of financing EPGs with an adequate amount of EU own resources.












1.9.


The EESC is alarmed that decisions on the EU’s own resources are stalling, and warns that any deadlock on these decisions could jeopardise the existence of the EU itself.




2.   Public goods: global, regional, national, local









2.1.


The concept of ‘public goods’ is deeply intertwined with the well-being of the citizens to whom they will be provided. Although the concept of public good is economic in origin, over time it has acquired institutional and political significance and it has come to be applied more broadly.












2.2.


The most common definition of public goods is ‘collective consumption goods’. According to Samuelson, ‘every individual consumption of such goods does not imply any subtraction from the consumption of that good by any other individual’ (3).












2.2.1.


Public goods have two distinguishing features: they are ‘non-rivalrous’, meaning that consumption by any one person does not reduce the possibility for others to consume them; and ‘non-excludable’, meaning that it is impossible or inconvenient to prevent others from benefiting from them.












2.2.1.1.


From an economic point of view, public goods have specific features that make them much more beneficial than private provision of such goods: (i) every individual can take advantage of public goods once they are provided, regardless of whether they are willing to pay for them (‘free-riding’); (ii) in some cases, it may occur that the benefit for the community that stems from the consumption of some public goods is greater than the individual benefit; (iii) in some situations, the costs of providing public goods have to be covered in the short term whereas the benefits they generate are only tangibly experienced in the medium-long term. Hence, the public provision of public goods is more suitable and appropriate, although it is essential to define the extent of this provision (local, national, regional, global), resulting in the need for discussions about the way in which these goods are financed.












2.2.1.2.


From an economic perspective, the scope of public good provision – whether at local, national, regional (as is the case with EPGs) or global level (GPGs) – will depend on the following factors: (i) the degree of preference heterogeneity among local areas/regions/national states; (ii) the assessment of the externalities that can be generated by the public good (positive externalities) or internalised (negative externalities); (iii) the assessment of economies of scale and savings (identifying the size of fixed costs associated with the provision of public goods).












2.3.


The reasons for shifting from local or national provision of public goods to regional (European) or global provision are not just economic but also institutional and political.












2.3.1.


From an institutional point of view, the cross-border dimension of the public good, whether provided and financed at regional (European) or global level, promotes the mutual interest of states in cooperation, leading to an increase in the added value of the public good itself.












2.3.2.


The political line of reasoning is as follows: (i) on the one hand, a supranational organisation (such as EU or the UN) derives a benefit from the provision of an EPG or GPG which is greater than the mere sum of the benefits that would go to individual states had the provision of the public good been managed at national level; (ii) on the other hand, the provision of the public good, at either European or global level, takes on a key role in the achievement of the EU’s or the UN’s strategic priorities.












2.4.


In summary, decisions regarding the provision of public goods at local, national, European or global level will be determined through three different approaches: economic, institutional and political.




3.   Global public goods









3.1.


From the second half of the 20th century onwards, demand for different kinds of public goods grew, as a result of both globalisation and increasing awareness of certain issues of global concern (e.g. peace, financial stability, environment, etc.).












3.2.


According to existing academic literature, GPGs can be defined: ‘as goods that are marked by publicness in consumption which: spans several regions of the world and possibly the globe as a whole; may reach – without permission – into countries and areas beyond national jurisdiction; and may be of long-duration’ (4).












3.3.


The decision-making process leading to the provision of GPGs (and also EPGs) is long and complex. It involves numerous stakeholders interacting within a dynamic system encompassing both horizontal and vertical multilevel interrelationships of governance, incentives, opportunities, pressures, demands and offers, coercion and externalities.












3.4.


The significance of global (and European) public goods becomes increasingly apparent in times of crisis. Some examples are: the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which sparked growing concern and calls for a globally interconnected health system able to cope with destabilising health crises.












3.4.1.


The worldwide fight against climate change to mitigate natural disasters; peacekeeping; fighting world poverty; financial stability – these issues are closely related to public goods and they require a suitable governance structure in order to make sure that legitimate decisions are taken in the interests of both future generations and the community as a whole.




4.   European public good









4.1.


European public goods, in this case ‘regional’ (relating to the specific EU macroregion), can conceptually be considered GPGs with a narrower scope, defined by the EU borders. The concept of EPGs re-enters the European debate every seven years during the process of developing the MFF, when the EU’s main priorities and related budget items are being decided.












4.2.


Since the choice of which EPGs are to be provided depends on many different factors that are not merely economic but also institutional and political, the decision cannot be separated from the historical context in which it is made.






—


In the initial constitutive phase (1950s-1960s) Europe based its ‘constitutive building blocks’ on security priorities: social, within the coal and steel sectors with the European Coal and Steel Community – ECSC (1951); energy, with EURATOM (1958); and food, with the common agricultural policy – CAP (1962). In addition, it attempted to establish defence security with the European Defence Community in 1952 and the European Political Community between 1952 and 1954, although both of these attempts failed.










—


In the second phase, the ‘integration and convergence’ phase (1970s-2010s), the priority measures were creating the Economic and Monetary Union (1992), with the introduction of the euro in 1999 and the establishment of the single market in 1993, followed by the introduction of cohesion policy the following year.










—


The third phase – the current ‘Security and Strategic Autonomy’ phase (2020s) – contains the EU’s attempted response to threats posed by multiple crises (‘polycrisis’) with the aim of reviving strategic autonomy to ensure security: i) economic and health security (through the recovery plan Next Generation EU NGEU); ii) defence security; iii) the digital and green transition; iv) secure production chains; v) secure management of migration flows and asylum claims; vi) secure transport networks; etc.








5.   The constitutional nature of the European public goods









5.1.


Beyond the political, institutional and economic thinking affecting the definition of EPGs, the EESC believes that there is a ‘constitutional’ element. If a constitutional dimension is added, a ‘prevailing’ category of EPGs can be identified which should be unequivocally recognised and ranked higher because it derives from one of the basic constituent elements of the EU: the Treaty on European Union (TEU).












5.2.


The EU’s fundamental objective of pursuing the well-being of its citizens is enshrined in Article 3(1) of the Treaty on European Union: ‘The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its people’ (5).












5.2.1.


However, further on, Article 3 of the TEU sets out a veritable list of European public goods –outlined in subsections 3(2)-3(5) – which the EU project is tasked with making available to its citizens in order to enhance their well-being. Indeed, we find multiple references:






—


to the EU as ‘an area of freedom, security and justice’ and thus the need for ‘the control of its external borders, asylum and immigration claims, and the prevention and combating of crime’ – Article 3(2);










—


the ‘internal market’ is mentioned, which must ensure ‘the sustainable development of Europe’, through ‘balanced economic growth and a competitive social market economy’, ‘ensuring full employment and social progress’, with ‘high levels of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment’, ‘promoting scientific and technological advancement’, as well as the commitment ‘to combat social exclusion and discrimination’, ‘promote social justice and gender equality and intergenerational solidarity, and child protection’. The legal provision also highlights the commitment ‘to promote economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among Member States’ and ‘to respect linguistic and cultural diversity by ensuring the preservation of cultural heritage’ – Article 3(3);










—


a commitment is made to ‘the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union and the Euro’ – Article 3(4);










—


and the EU commits to ‘the promotion of world peace, security and sustainable development’, ‘to solidarity and respect among peoples’, ‘to free and fair trade’, ‘to the eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights’, ‘to the strict observance and development of international law and to respect for the principles established by the UN Charter’ – Article 3(5);










—


these are all objectives to be pursued by the EU by appropriate means commensurate with the powers conferred on it by the Treaties – Article 3(6).








6.   The European public goods framework









6.1.


Based on the above reasoning, the EESC believes that the development of the post-2027 MFF must involve a deeper reflection on the provision of European public goods and their systematic placement within the next MFF.












6.2.


A first category of EPGs should be considered as functional EPGs – public goods without which the concept of the European Union would be undermined and its functioning jeopardised. These should ensure the normal functioning of the EU as a social market economy able to reach sustainable economic, social and environmental goals.






—



A complete single market for goods and services, strengthening the EU’s competitiveness and developing a consumer protection policy and a single European transport area.










—



A complete economic and monetary union, completing the EU Capital Market and Banking Union, better coordinating fiscal policy, and achieving the sustainability of public finances and the full adoption of the digital euro.










—



Economic, social and territorial cohesion, ensuring that EU territories can achieve their full development potential, and at the same time ensuring that EU citizens and territories are able to escape from development traps – states of ‘sub-par performance of GDP, productivity and employment’
                         (6).










—



EU open strategic autonomy, aimed at ensuring the sourcing and processing of critical raw materials; sustainable trade and global value chains; and better coordination of development aid. There are three EPGs that fall within the framework of EU open strategic autonomy:






—


a joint EU health policy, to enhance the EU’s preparedness, coordination and response to health crises, ensuring equitable access to affordable medication across EU Member States;










—



food security, to ensure a sustainable food production system capable of guaranteeing food supply; and










—


an EU energy union able to ensure a stable, integrated, affordable, secure and sustainable energy supply.














—


The defence of the EU’s external borders and security within these by combating organised and non-organised crime.










—


Strengthened EU research and development.










—


The full respect of the rule of law in all EU territories, with stronger links to the EU budget.
















6.3.


Alongside these functional EPGs, the EESC calls for dedicated investment plans – within the post-2027 MFF – for EPGs closely linked to the following strategic priorities: achieving the green and digital transitions, implementing the EU Pillar of Social Rights, and strengthening EU competitiveness (as recommended in the Draghi Report).












6.4.


The post-2027 MFF must also be flexible and provide for specific budget items dedicated to addressing certain priorities. This could involve providing for an ‘emergency phase’ during which temporary financial support is granted to mitigate unemployment risks (similar to SURE) for sectors particularly affected by the energy and/or digital transitions (for example the automotive sector or sectors highly dependent on carbon-intensive processes). It should also involve an assessment on the impact that a permanent European unemployment benefit reinsurance scheme could have from an economic and social point of view.












6.5.


The EESC agrees with what has been widely demonstrated by the European Parliamentary Research Service: the potential loss of potential future gains from not pursuing EU strategic action on EPGs, which can be understood as the ‘cost of non-Europe’ – the failed potential to generate an additional EUR 2.8 trillion in GDP from 2022 to 2032, with an average annual real GDP growth rate of 2,9 % over that period through targeted integration efforts (7).












6.5.1.


According to experts, there are estimates that indicate that core EPGs will require EUR 1.3 trillion between 2025 and 2031. Of this, EUR 900 billion ought to come from new sources, requiring an EU budget increase from 1,1 % to 1,8 % of EU Gross National Income (GNI). However, taking into account all EPGs, the EU budget is forecast to increase to up to 4 % of GNI (8).












6.5.2.


Even though the two studies reported come from two different sources and refer to two different time horizons (2022-32; 2025-31), it can be noted that the net gain, resulting from the cost savings of non-Europe obtained with the provision of EPGs (EUR 2.8 trillion) and the cost of such provision of EPGs (EUR 1.3 trillion) would be approximately EUR 1.5 trillion.












6.6.


The EESC also believes that the priorities identified during the Conference on the Future of Europe should be included in the post-2027 MFF (9).




7.   Financing European public goods









7.1.


The time has come for the EU and its 27 Member States to align their words with their actions. Consensus on the Draghi Report and its content must be followed by equally committed and consistent behaviour: ‘to meet the objectives laid out in this report, a minimum annual additional investment of EUR 750 to 800 billion is needed, based on the latest Commission estimates, corresponding to 4.4-4,7 % of EU GDP in 2023’ (10). Many of the interventions proposed in the Draghi Report represent interventions capable of increasing the EU’s competitiveness and at the same time providing the functional EPGs












7.2.


The EESC therefore believes that it is more important than ever to delve deeper into the different ways of financing EPGs with an adequate amount of the EU’s own resources.












7.3.


The EESC believes that the possibility of financing EPGs through the following different available sources should be carefully evaluated.




7.3.1.   Current EU own resources







—


GNI-based contributions (currently around 61,5 % of the EU’s revenue).










—


Traditional own resources, mainly customs duties on imports to the EU (13,7 % of the EU’s revenues).










—


A VAT-based own resource (16 % of the EU’s revenues).










—


The plastics own resource, which is a national contribution based on the quantity of each Member State’s non-recycled plastic packaging waste (4,9 % of the EU’s revenues).










—


Other revenue and the balance carried over from the previous year (7 % of the EU’s revenues) (11).




7.3.2.   New own resources







—


The emission trading system (ETS) EU carbon market, where EU companies buy or receive emission allowances (from 2028, this is expected to generate around EUR19 billion).










—


The carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which puts a carbon price on EU imports to equalise costs incurred in the production of the same goods within the single market (set to generate EUR 1.5 billion from 2028).










—


Temporary statistical-based own resource on company profits (EUR 16 billion), which in future will replace the Business in Europe Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT).




7.3.3.   Additional own sources (genuine or shared)







—


Biowaste-based / hazardous waste / food-waste-based.










—


Gender-pay-gap-based own resources.










—


Financial transactions tax.










—


Taxes on crypto-asset activities.










—


Excise duty on share buybacks.










—


Digital levy tax on data traffic.










—


VAT on financial services.










—


EU fair border mechanism against unfair competition (social dumping).




7.3.4.   EU own debt







—


In this way, a direct link could be created between the investment in a specific EPG and the debt required to finance it.












7.3.5.



Transfer of the 27 Member States’ shares of GNI-based contributions to the EU budget, as EPGs would be provided at European level.













7.4.


For each of these options the EESC calls for impact and feasibility analyses to be carried out, and for the conditions regarding the use of each to be carefully assessed. The EESC reiterates the words of the European Parliament resolution Own resources: a new start for EU finances, a new start for Europe in recommending that ‘the own resources arrangements should be guided by the overall objectives of simplicity, transparency and equity’, and that the fiscal legitimacy of the decision taken be ensured by elected representatives (12).






Brussels, 18 September 2025.


The President


of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE
               





(1)  European Parliament study of February 2023, Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe (2022-2032); and European Parliament study of October 2023, Mapping the cost-of non-Europe – Theoretical foundations and practical considerations.

(2)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions – The road to the next multiannual financial framework (COM(2025) 46 final) (OJ C, C/2025/3202, 2.7.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3202/oj).

(3)  Samuelson, P.A., 1954, ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 36(4), 387-389.

(4)  Kaul, I., Blondin, D., Nahtigal, N. (2016). Understanding Global Public Goods; Where We Are and Where to Next. In: Kaul, I (Ed.) (2016). Global Public Goods. The International library of Critical Writings in Economics 321. Introduction. Edward Elgar.

(5)  European Union. (2016). Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union. Official Journal of the European Union. C202/1. 7.6.2016.

(6)  European Commission, 2024, Commission staff working document accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 9th Cohesion Report (SWD/2024/79 final), and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, Lewis Dijkstra and Hugo Poelman, 2023, The geography of EU discontent and the regional development trap. European Commission. Regional and Urban Policy.


(7)  European Parliament study of February 2023, Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe (2022-2032); and European Parliament study of October 2023, Mapping the cost-of non-Europe – Theoretical foundations and practical considerations.

(8)  Thone, M., 2024, European Public Goods and the 2028-2034 Multiannual Financial Framework – Financing the EU in a decade of reform, European Parliament Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs; and Felbermayr, G., and Pekanov, A., 2024, Pan-European Public Goods: Rationale, Financing and Governance, European Parliament Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit.

(9)  Conference on the Future of Europe, May 2022.

(10)  Draghi, M., 2024, The future of European Competitiveness – Part A / A competitiveness strategy for Europe.


(11)  Kowald, K., and Pari, M, 2025, Future of EU long-term financing – Post-2027 needs and how to finance them. European, Parliamentary Research Service.

(12)  European Parliament Resolution of 10 May 2023, (2022/2127(INI)).


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/8/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)