Case C-615/25 P: Appeal brought on 16 September 2025 by Planistat Europe and Mr Hervé-Patrick Charlot against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 16 July 2025 in Case T-735/20 RENV, Planistat Europe and Charlot v Commission
Date: 2025-09-16
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: European Anti-fraud Office, Eurostat, criminal procedure, criminal proceedings, damages, disclosure of information, exchange of information, indemnification, maladministration, offence








C_202505815EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/5815


10.11.2025






Appeal brought on 16 September 2025 by Planistat Europe and Mr Hervé-Patrick Charlot against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 16 July 2025 in Case T-735/20 RENV, Planistat Europe and Charlot v Commission


(Case C-615/25 P)

(C/2025/5815)
Language of the case: French

Parties


Appellants: Planistat Europe and Hervé-Patrick Charlot (represented by: F. Martin Laprade, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court of Justice should:






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set aside the judgment of the General Court delivered on 16 July 2025 under case number T-735/20 RENV in so far as it dismissed the action brought by the company Planistat Europe and Mr Hervé Patrick-Charlot and ordered them to bear their own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission relating to the proceedings referred back to the General Court in Case T-735/20 RENV and the initial proceedings before the General Court in Case T-735/20;










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find that the Court of Justice is not in a position to rule on the dispute relating to the non-contractual liability of the European Union on account of the false accusation on the part of the EU administration to which the appellants were subject, which constitutes a sufficiently serious infringement of the principle of good administration;










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refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union;










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reserve the costs.





Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellants rely on two grounds.
1.   The first ground of appeal, alleging infringement by the General Court of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in so far as it has not complied with the framework set out by the Court of Justice in its judgment referring the case back to the General Court

The first part of the first ground of appeal: the General Court, on referral back, erred in law by not complying with the framework set out by the Court of Justice, since it failed to check the credibility of the information relating to the matters liable to be characterised as criminal which was sent to the French authorities, even though that was a necessary condition for assessing the compliance by the EU administration with its duty of diligence.
The Court of Justice had requested that the General Court, to which the former referred the case back, to check the credibility of certain information contained in the note of 19 March 2003, by determining whether OLAF had sufficiently precise material evidence showing that there were plausible reasons to consider that the information forwarded concerned matters liable to be characterised as criminal. The other information in the note was, therefore, not concerned by the framework set out by the Court of Justice. However, the General Court focused solely on the credibility of the content of Section 2.3 of the OLAF note, which did not contain any reference to potential criminal offences.
The only content in the OLAF note the credibility and plausibility of which the General Court was required to check was the subject matter of Section 3 relating to alleged criminal offences. However, if the General Court had, on referral back, carried out the task requested of it by the Court, it would have immediately found the total lack of sufficiently precise material evidence capable of showing that there were plausible reasons to consider that the European Union had suffered a misappropriation of funds liable to constitute a breach of trust.
By failing to comply with the framework set out by the Court of Justice, the General Court did not put itself in a position to ascertain whether OLAF had more evidence than a mere doubt concerning the alleged use of funds for purposes that were not in the interest of the European Union. On the contrary, the General Court merely raised the possibility of such a ‘risk’ of misappropriation of funds, even though all of the evidence which OLAF had in its possession appeared to show that no misappropriation of funds for purposes that were not in the interest of the European Union had been perpetrated.
The second part of the first ground of appeal: the General Court, on referral back, erred in law by not complying with the framework set out by the Court of Justice, since it failed to check the credibility of the information relating to the matters liable to be characterised as criminal which was sent to the French authorities, even though it was a necessary condition for deducing the (actual) intention with which it was sent and for being able to rule on the false accusation made by OLAF and the Commission
The General Court erred in law by refusing to follow the instructions of the Court of Justice, which obliged it to ascertain the (actual) intention with which OLAF sent the note of 19 March 2003 to the French authorities. The fraudulent nature of such an intention is necessarily inferred by the lack of credibility of the facts alleged. Accordingly, by failing to check the credibility of the information relating to the facts liable to be characterised as criminal which was sent to the French authorities, and, thus, the true intention of the EU administration when it sent that information, the General Court did not comply with the framework set out by the Court of Justice, which had expressly requested that it rule on the good faith of the EU administration. That analysis was, however, essential since it would have enabled the General Court to rule on a potential false accusation made with intent to cause harm.
The General court also erred in law by misconstruing the true (fraudulent) intent of the EU administration when that administration reported the appellants to the French authorities, since the evidence submitted to it showed that the administration must have been aware – at that moment – of the total lack of credibility and plausibility of the criminal offences alleged.
In so doing, the General Court, on referral back, flagrantly distorted the clear sense of the evidence submitted to it for the purposes of assessing the (fraudulent) intent of OLAF and of the Commission and, accordingly, ruling on the false accusation on the part of the EU administration to which the appellants were subject.
2.   The second ground of appeal, alleging infringement by the General Court of the principle ne infra petita and the commission of errors of law stemming from an incorrect interpretation and application of the subject matter of the case before it

The first part of the second ground of appeal: the General Court, on referral back, erred in law as regards the ‘causal link’ between the damage for which the appellants seek compensation and the wrongful conduct of the EU administration
The non-material damage for anxiety for which Mr Charlot, the director of Planistat Europe, seeks compensation was not (in a legal sense) caused by the criminal proceedings brought against him before the French judicial authorities, but by the false accusation to which he was subject, and that point was, furthermore, set out in the application initiating proceedings. Consequently, the General Court erred in law by finding that the appellants sought to widen the scope of the case before it. By contrast, it is true that the anxiety experienced by Mr Charlot lasted only for the duration of the criminal proceedings brought against him in France, namely from the time that he was charged to the moment he was acquitted by the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation).
However, nothing prevented the appellants from adapting – to a higher amount – the sum for the non-material damage caused (in a legal sense) by the false accusation on the part of the EU administration to which they were subject, in order to take into account a type of emotional distress other than anxiety: be it suffering (grief) experienced by Mr Charlot when faced with the effective loss (going out of business) of his life’s work, or the grievance of the Planistat company itself, in its capacity as a legal person which the false accusation plunged (in an economic sense) into a sort of ‘vegetative state’ from which it has still not emerged today.
The second part of the second ground of appeal: the General Court, on referral back, erred in law as regards the explanation of the damages in respect of which the appellants were entitled to seek payment in the present dispute
Even though, in its judgment, the Court of Justice had decided to set aside, ‘without it being necessary to examine … the third ground of appeal’, relating to the error made in the initial judgment as to ‘whether the appellants had suffered the damage alleged and the existence of a causal link’, the General Court, on referral back, incorrectly inferred from the judgment of the Court of Justice that the claim for compensation for the damage consisting in a loss of opportunity had not been referred back to it. The Court of Justice did not, however, rule on that issue, which does therefore not have the force of res judicata, in contrast to the claims for compensation for the (distinct) material damage relating to the termination of Planistat’s contracts with the Commission and its other customers.
In addition, the General Court also erred in law by ruling that the new claim for damages, classified as ‘extraordinary’, ‘punitive’ and even ‘exemplary’ by the appellants, was inadmissible, despite them merely acting – by claiming payment of such ‘supra-compensatory’ damages – upon the fact that the Court had itself innovated by resolving the legal issue relating to the (determinative) significance of whether the EU administration had – or had not – demonstrated an ‘intention of causing harm’ to them (special intent).


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/5815/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)