COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EVALUATION of Directive 2014/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses (recast)
Date: 2025-09-12
Institutions: Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, European Commission
Subjects: EC conformity marking, approximation of laws, explosive, market approval, market supervision, public health, public safety, safety standard, technical standard, traceability

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 12.9.2025  SWD(2025) 266 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  EVALUATION  of Directive 2014/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses (recast) {SWD(2025) 267 final}  
 
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

EVALUATION 

of 

Directive 2014/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 

on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making 
available on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses (recast) 

Table of contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 

2.  WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION? . 3 

2.1 

2.2 

Description of the intervention and its objectives .............................................. 3 

Points of comparison .......................................................................................... 7 

3.  HOW  HAS  THE  SITUATION  EVOLVED  OVER  THE  EVALUATION 
PERIOD? ....................................................................................................... 11 

Current state of play ...................................................................................................... 11 

3.1. 

The market for civil explosives ........................................................................ 11 

3.2.  Human health, safety, security and environmental protection ......................... 14 

3.3.  Harmonisation of laws and implementation ..................................................... 16 

4.  EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART) ................................. 18 

4.1.  TO  WHAT  EXTENT  WAS  THE  INTERVENTION  SUCCESSFUL  AND 
WHY? ............................................................................................................ 18 

4.1.1. 

4.1.2. 

4.1.3. 

Effectiveness............................................................................................. 18 

Efficiency ................................................................................................. 26 

Coherence ................................................................................................. 37 

4.2.  HOW DID THE EU INTERVENTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE AND TO 
WHOM? ........................................................................................................ 42 

4.3.  IS THE INTERVENTION STILL RELEVANT? ........................................ 43 

4.3.1. 

4.3.2. 

4.3.3. 

Relevance of the objectives ...................................................................... 43 

Relevance to other priorities/challenges ................................................... 45 

Relevance of the scope ............................................................................. 46 

5.  WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED? ........... 48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.  CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................... 48 

5.2.  LESSONS LEARNED .................................................................................. 50 

ANNEX I:   PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ................................................... 52 

ANNEX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED ........... 53 

ANNEX III. EVALUATION MATRIX ............................................................... 59 

ANNEX  IV.  OVERVIEW  OF  BENEFITS  AND  COSTS  AND  TABLE  ON 
SIMPLIFICATION AND BURDEN REDUCTION .................................... 88 

ANNEX V. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT ... 102 

ANNEX VI. FUNCTIONING OF THE CIVIL EXPLOSIVES DIRECTIVE ... 129 

ANNEX  VII.  COMPLEMENTARY  INFORMATION  ON  THE  CURRENT 
STATE OF PLAY ....................................................................................... 134 

ANNEX VIII. CASE STUDIES .......................................................................... 140 

 
 
 
 
 
Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

ADR 

ADN 

AdCo 
CIPS 

CLP Regulation  

EEA 

EU  

ESRs  

EUR  

ICSMS  

ICTED 

NACE  

NB 

NGO  

NLF  

Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Road 
Agreement concerning the International Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways 
Administrative Cooperation 
Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence 
Management or Terrorism and other Security-related 
risks (EU programme) 

Regulation (EC) No  1272/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 
on classification, labelling and packaging of 
substances and mixtures, amending and repealing 
Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 

European Economic Area 

European Union  

Essential safety requirements  

Euro  

Information and Communication System for Market 
Surveillance  

Intra-Community transfer of explosives document  

Acronym used to designate the various statistical 
classifications of economic activities developed since 
1970 in the European Union (EU) (Eurostat)  

Notified body 

Non-governmental organisation  

New Legislative Framework, as established by 
Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common 
framework for the marketing of products, and 
repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC and 
Regulation (EC) No  765/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 9  July 2008 setting 
out the requirements for accreditation and market 
surveillance relating to the marketing of products and 
repealing Regulation (EEC) No  339/93  

 
 
MSA 

PC 

REACH Regulation 

RID 

SBS  

SITC 

SOA 

SCEPYLT  

Seveso-III Directive 

SMEs  

The Directive  

Market surveillance authority 

Public consultation 

Regulation (EU) No 1907/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 
concerning the Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals 
(REACH), establishing a European Chemicals 
Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and 
repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as 
Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission 
Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 
2000/21/EC 

Regulations concerning the International Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Rail 

Eurostat Structural Business Statistics 

Eurostat Standard International Trade Classification 

Service-oriented architecture 

Explosives Control and Protection System to Prevent 
and Fight Against Terrorism (managed by Spanish 
Guardia Civil)  

Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-
accident hazards involving dangerous substances, 
amending and subsequently repealing Council 
Directive 96/82/EC  

Small and medium-sized enterprises 

Directive 2014/28/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the 
harmonisation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the making available on the market and 
supervision of explosives for civil uses (recast)  

 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Directive 2014/28/EU on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating 
to the making available on the market  and supervision of explosives for civil uses1 
(hereinafter ‘the Civil Explosives Directive’ or ‘the current Directive’)  aims to enhance 
the  free  movement  of  civil  explosives  in  the  internal  market,  while  protecting  the 
health and safety of persons and public security. Hence the internal market legal base 
was used (Article 114 TFEU, approximation of laws). The Civil Explosives Directive was 
adopted as a recast of Council Directive 93/15/EEC of 5 April 1993 on the harmonization 
of the provisions relating to the placing on the market and supervision of explosives for 
civil  uses2  (hereinafter  ‘the  1993  Directive’),  aligning  it  to  the  New  Legislative 
Framework  (hereinafter  ‘NLF’)3,  but  leaving  the  sector  specific  rules  essentially 
untouched. 

Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC4,  as  amended  by  Commission  Decision 
2010/347/EU5,  sets  out  a  harmonised  document  format  for  intra-EU  transfers  of 
explosives.  Commission  Directive  2008/43/EC  on  explosives  traceability6  sets  up  a 
harmonised  system  for  the  unique  identification  and  traceability  of  explosives  for  civil 
uses. 

Purpose and scope of the evaluation 

The Civil Explosives Directive in its current form has been in force since 2014. Member 
States  had  to  transpose  the  Directive  into  national  law  by  20  April  2016.  A  study  was 

1  Directive  2014/28/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26 February  2014  on  the 
harmonisation of  the  laws  of the  Member  States  relating  to  the  making  available  on  the market  and 
supervision  of  explosives 
(OJ  L  96,  29.3.2014,  p. 1,  ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/28/oj). 

for  civil  uses 

(recast) 

2 Council Directive 93/15/EEC of 5 April 1993 on the harmonization of the provisions relating to the placing 
on  the  market  and  supervision  of  explosives  for  civil  uses  (OJ  L  121,  15.5.1993,  p. 20,  ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1993/15/). 

3 The New Legislative Approach consists of Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council 
Decision  93/465/EEC  (OJ  L  218,  13.8.2008,  p. 82,  ELI:  http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2008/768(1)/oj) 
and Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting 
out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and 
repealing 
ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/765/oj). 

(EEC)  No 339/93 

Regulation 

13.8.2008, 

p. 30, 

218, 

(OJ 

L 

4  Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC  of  15 April  2004  on  an  Intra-Community  transfer  of  explosives 

document (OJ L 120, 24.4.2004, p. 43, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2004/388/oj). 

5  Commission  Decision  2010/347/EU  of  19  June  2010  amending  Decision  2004/388/EC  on  an  Intra-
(OJ  L  155,  22.6.2010,  p. 54,  ELI: 

explosives  document 

Community 
transfer  of 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/347/oj). 

6 Commission Directive 2008/43/EC of 4 April 2008 setting up, pursuant to Council Directive 93/15/EEC, 
a system for the identification and traceability of explosives for civil uses (OJ L 94, 5.4.2008, p. 8, ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/43/oj). 

1 

 
 
 
carried out to assess the effectiveness, impact and utility of the 1993 Directive in 20077, 
but no comprehensive Commission evaluation in accordance with the Better Regulation 
Guidelines  and  Toolbox8  has  yet  been  carried  out,  neither  of  the  1993  rules  nor  of  the 
current legal framework for civil explosives. 

However,  the  environment  in  which  EU  civil  explosives  legislation  operates  has 
changed, not only since the introduction of the substantive provisions in 1993, but also 
since the recast in 2014. From this arose the need to assess the overall performance of the 
current Directive and whether it was still fit for purpose. In line with the Better Regulation 
Guidelines and Toolbox, the evaluation examined the relevance, effectiveness, coherence 
and  efficiency  of  the  EU  civil  explosives  legislation,  as  well  as  its  EU  added  value, 
considering the results and impacts of its implementation.  

Based  on  the  evaluation  criteria  and  taking  into  account  the  Directive’s  objectives  and 
experiences with implementing it, the following aspects were looked at in particular: 

a)  the appropriateness of requirements, including essential safety requirements; 
b)  the safety of articles imported from non-EU countries, including the effectiveness 

of enforcement of those products; 

c)  the effectiveness of the current system for the traceability of explosives; 
d)  the effectiveness and efficiency system for the transfer of explosives, 
e)  the effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness of penalties; 
f)  the impact of national derogations and possible gold-plating; 
g)  internal coherence and potential gaps; 
h)  the  potential  for  simplification  or  burden  reduction  for  economic  operators  and 

authorities. 

The evaluation focuses on the sector specific aspects of the Directive, bearing in mind 
that some horizontal issues are addressed by the evaluation of the NLF9. However, where 
appropriate, NLF-related aspects are also included. 

The evaluation covers the period from 2016 (when the Directive became fully applicable) 
until  the  end  of  2024  and  covers  the  geographical  scope  of  the  EU  civil  explosives 
legislation, the European Economic Area (EEA)10. 

Methodological approach 

This Staff Working Document builds on desk research, including studies commissioned 
by  the  Commission,  academic  literature,  legal  texts  and  grey  literature,  and  on  various 
stakeholder consultations, involving economic operators, authorities, notified bodies and 
citizens.  

7 European Commission, Evaluation on DG Enterprise and industry legislation – Cosmetics and Explosives 

Directives, Final report, 2007. 

8  European  Commission,  Better  regulation  guidelines,  2021;  European  Commission,  Better  Regulation 

Toolbox 2023. 

9 European Commission, Evaluation of the New Legislative Framework, SWD(222) 365 final, 2022. 
10  Agreement  on  the  European Economic  Area,  Annex  II  Technical  Regulations,  Standards,  Testing  and 

Certification, OJ No L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3, pp. 352 et seq. 

2 

 
 
The Commission started the evaluation process with a call for evidence, launched in May 
2023, which aimed to inform the public and stakeholders about the evaluation and to gather 
their feedback on the initiative11.  

The  evaluation  was  supported  by  a  study  carried  out  for  DG  GROW  by  Technopolis 
Group, supported by Milieu, Wavestone and Intellera, between October 2023 and March 
202512.This  Staff  Working  Document  takes  into  account  the  study’s  findings,  but  also 
other relevant  information not  covered by the study. Due to  the limited  amount of  data 
available,  it  was  not  possible  to  substantiate  all  conclusions  quantitatively.  These 
shortcomings were mitigated to the extent possible by using qualitative information. As 
only limited information was available through desk research, the findings strongly rely 
on the stakeholder consultations that reflect  participating  stakeholders’  experiences  and 
perspectives.  

For the market analysis, it was not possible to tailor the data from the Eurostat’s Structural 
Business Statistics (SBS) to the scope of the evaluation. The statistics for the pyrotechnics 
and  civil  explosives  sectors  fall  under  the  same  NACE  division  ‘Manufacture  of 
explosives’. This also includes the gunpowder and match production. In addition, data was 
not  available  for  every  year  covered  by  the  evaluation.  The  cost  assessment  presented 
under  the  efficiency  criterion  is  based  on  a  very  limited  data  from  cost  templates, 
interviews  and  the  targeted  survey.  Although  the  assessment  was  validated  during  the 
stakeholder workshop, it may not fully represent stakeholders’ costs associated with the 
Directive.  Moreover,  stakeholders  encountered  difficulties  in  classifying  costs  into 
adjustment, administrative and enforcement costs13.  

A  detailed  description  of  the  methodology  and  main  sources  of  information  for  this 
evaluation are provided in Annex II. 

2.  WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION? 

2.1 

 Description of the intervention and its objectives 

The  Civil  Explosives  Directive  sets  out  rules  for  making  available  on  the  market  and 
supervising civil explosives, including essential safety requirements, rules for conformity 
assessment, market surveillance and related obligations for economic operators. It defines 
civil  explosives  as  ‘the materials  and articles considered to  be explosives in  the United 
Nations recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods14 and falling within Class 
1 of those recommendations’. Civil explosives are mainly used in the mining, quarrying, 

11  European  Commission,  Evaluation  study  of  Pyrotechnics  and  Civil  Explosives  Legislation  (Directive 
2013/29/EU,  Commission  Implementing  Directive  2014/58/EU,  and  Directive  2014/28/EU, 
Commission  Implementing  Directive  2008/43/EC  and  Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC),  Final 
Report, Technopolis in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025. 

12 Ibid. 
13 These cost categories are used in the Better Regulation (BR) approach, and they are defined in the BR 

Toolbox. 

14 United Nations, Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations, Volume I, 

Twenty-first revised edition, 2019, Chapter 2.1 

3 

 
 
construction, oil and gas industries for the extraction of coal, metals, as well as limestone 
and granite15. Explosives intended for use by public security forces and pyrotechnic articles 
in scope of Directive 2013/29/EU16 are excluded from the scope. Ammunition, other than 
ammunition  used  by  public  security  forces,  is  only  covered  in  relation  to  transit  and 
transfer. More details on the functioning of the Directive can be found in Annex VI. 

2.1.1.   How the intervention fitted in the wider policy framework? 

As part of a package of proposals (‘the Goods Package’) for several product directives, 
the current Directive brought the rules on civil explosives into alignment with the New 
Legislative Framework (NLF)17. The NLF was a response to large-scale product recalls 
and product safety problems. The product recalls, particularly in the toys sector, revealed 
shortcomings  in  the  functioning  of  market  surveillance  and  raised  questions  about  the 
ability of EU legislation to protect the health and safety of consumers18. Other important 
policy considerations for the development of the NLF were the need to streamline the rights 
and obligations of economic operators in the single market and across sectors, in line with 
the Better Regulation agenda and the need to strengthen regulatory coherence across EU 
harmonisation legislation19.  

In the recast, the sector-specific rules established by the 1993 Directive were essentially 
brought  over  into  the  current  Civil  Explosives  Directive.  Pyrotechnic  articles  were 
excluded  from  the  scope  of  the  Directive  and  regulated  separately  in  Directive 
2013/29/EU20. Explosives precursors are regulated under Regulation  (EU) 2019/114821. 
These two pieces of legislation do therefore not fall within the scope of this evaluation. 

15 Interviews with Companies (n = 4) and market surveillance authorities (n = 2), QYResearch, Global Civil 

Explosives Market Research Report 2023, 2023. 

16  Directive  2013/29/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12 June  2013  on  the 
harmonisation  of  the  laws  of  the  Member  States  relating  to  the  making  available  on  the  market  of 
pyrotechnic articles (recast) (OJ L 178, 28.6.2013, p. 27, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/29/oj). 
17 The NLF was conceived as a ‘toolbox’ for future legislation. To gain practical effect, its provisions needed 
to be incorporated into the various pieces of EU product legislation. Decision No 768/2008/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of 
products,  and  repealing  Council  Decision  93/465/EEC  (OJ  L  218,  13.8.2008,  p. 82,  ELI:  OJ)  and 
Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out 
the  requirements  for  accreditation  and market  surveillance  relating  to  the  marketing  of products  and 
repealing 
ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/765/oj). 

(EEC)  No 339/93 

Regulation 

13.8.2008, 

p. 30, 

218, 

(OJ 

L 

18  European  Commission,  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  10  proposals  to  align  product 
harmonisation directives to Decision No 768/2008/EC, New Legislative Framework (NLF) Alignment 
Package (Implementation of Goods Package), SEC(2011) 1375 final, 2011, p. 7. 

19 European Commission, Evaluation of the New Legislative Framework, SWD(222) 365 final, 2022, p. 10. 
20  Directive  2013/29/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12 June  2013  on  the 
harmonisation  of  the  laws  of  the  Member  States  relating  to  the  making  available  on  the  market  of 
pyrotechnic articles (recast) (OJ L 178, 28.6.2013, p. 27, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/29/oj). 
21  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1148  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20 June  2019  on  the 
marketing and use of  explosives precursors, amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing 
Regulation 
ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1148/oj). 

No 98/2013 

11.7.2019, 

(EU) 

p. 1, 

186, 

(OJ 

L 

4 

 
 
2.1.2.   Problems and needs that the intervention aimed to address 

Adopting the Directive was considered necessary to align the Civil Explosives rules to 
the NLF which addressed the following horizontal weaknesses and inconsistencies in 
the implementation and enforcement of EU harmonisation legislation: 

• 

the  presence  of  non-compliant  or  dangerous  products  on  the  market  and 
consequently a certain lack of trust in CE marking;  

•  competitive disadvantages for economic operators complying with the legislation 

as opposed to those circumventing the rules;  

•  unequal  treatment  in  the  case  of  non-compliant  products  and  distortion  of 
competition  amongst  economic  operators  due  to  different  enforcement 
practices;  

•  differing  practices  in  the  designation  of  conformity  assessment  bodies  by 

national authorities;  

•  problems with the quality of certain notified bodies for the mandatory third-party 

conformity assessment of civil explosives22. 

Besides addressing these horizontal issues, the Directive  was to continue to address the 
problems and needs that had motivated the adoption of its predecessor, the 1993 Directive: 

•  divergent legal frameworks for the placing on the market and the use of civil 
explosives in the Member States that created barriers to trade within the internal 
market23. 
the  dangers  inherent  to  the  use  of  civil  explosives  and  different  safety 
requirements across Member States24. 

• 

2.1.3.  General and specific objectives of the intervention 

The Directive maintained the general objectives of its predecessor, as stipulated in recitals 
10, 11 and 20, according to which the Directive aims to achieve the free movement of 
explosives on the internal market while ensuring a high level of protection of public 
interests,  such  as  health  and  safety  of  persons  and  public  security.  Although  the 
Directive  stipulates  that  adverse  environmental  effects  from  explosives  should  be 
minimised, environmental protection is not an explicit objective of the Directive25. 

Linked to those general objectives, the Directive pursues the following specific objectives: 

• 

• 

the  harmonisation  of  rules  for  the  making  available  and  supervising  civil 
explosives and the strengthening of the single market 
the improvement of the traceability of sales and transactions to prevent misuse and 
theft and to assist law enforcement authorities in tracing the origin of lost or stolen 
explosives26. 

22 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
harmonisation of  the  laws  of the  Member  States  relating  to  the  making  available  on  the market  and 
supervision of explosives for civil uses, Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2011) 771 final, p. 2 

23 See recital 4 of the 1993 Directive. 
24 See also European Commission, Evaluation on DG Enterprise and industry legislation – Cosmetics and 

Explosives Directives, Final report, 2007, pp. 40 f, see recital 20 of the current Directive. 

25 See recital 54. 
26 See recitals 10 and 19 of the Civil Explosives Directive. 

5 

 
 
In addition, the Directive, by implementing the NLF, aims to: 

•  ensure the quality and credibility of the work of notified bodies; 
increase the effectiveness of market surveillance activities27.  
• 

Commission Decision 2004/388 provides a model document for the transfer of explosives 
to facilitate such transfers between Member States while keeping in place the security 
requirements these products require28. 

Commission  Directive  2008/43/EC  sets  out  a  harmonised  system  for  the  unique 
identification and traceability of explosives for civil uses to prevent misuse and theft and 
to assist law enforcement authorities in tracing the origin of lost or stolen explosives29. 

2.1.4.  The intervention logic 

The intervention logic of the evaluation is to examine the inter-relationships between 1) 
the  problems  that  the  Directive  was  designed  to  address;  2)  the  general  and  specific 
objectives that it seeks to achieve; 3) the inputs (such as human and financial resources) 
required to achieve these objectives; 4) the activities and implementation processes; and 
5) the expected effects in terms of outputs (shorter-term outcomes), results (intermediate 
outcomes) and impacts (longer-term outcomes) through which the Directive’s general and 
specific objectives should be achieved.  

Essential safety requirements (ESR), in combination with rules for conformity assessment, 
obligations on economic operators (including for traceability and transfer) and measures 
on market surveillance were established to achieve several outputs. It was expected that 
Member States would adapt their national laws, putting in place measures to ensure that 
only compliant civil explosives with a unique identification are placed on the market. The 
Directive also envisaged effective and efficient systems and procedures for the transfer of 
explosives,  conformity  assessment,  oversight  over  notified  bodies,  and  market 
surveillance. A further desired output was the institutionalisation of information exchange 
and  cooperation  between  market  surveillance  authorities,  economic  operators  and  the 
European Commission. 

Overall, these outcomes were expected to result in 1) the harmonisation of laws; 2) the 
reduction of regulatory burdens in the single market; 3) improved transfer procedures; 4) 
traceability of sales and transactions; 5) higher compliance of civil explosives with safety 
requirements; and 6) increased quality and credibility of the work of notified bodies. The 
desired impacts of the Directive were: 1) increased intra-EU flow of civil explosives and 
enhanced competitiveness of EU companies; 2) improved safety of products; and 3) an 
improved level of public security. 

27  European  Commission,  Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on 
theharmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market and 
supervision of explosives for civil uses, Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2011) 771 final, p. 3. 

28 See recital 2. 
29 See recital 3. 

6 

 
 
Figure 1: Intervention logic 

Source: own preparation 

2.2 

 Points of comparison  

A  proper  assessment  of  the  existing  civil  explosives  legislation  against  the  evaluation 
criteria requires a comparison between the current situation and the situation before EU-
wide provisions on the placing on the market of civil explosives were adopted. For this 
purpose, the following points of comparison were identified as the baseline. 

2.2.1.  The market for civil explosives  

In 2016, when the Directive had to be transposed by the Member States, the production 
value  of  civil  explosives30  was  approximately  EUR 2  billion.  EU  production  primarily 
comprised percussion or detonating caps, igniters and electric detonators, with a value of 
EUR 1.2  billion,  followed  by  prepared  explosives  at  around  EUR 569  million.  The 

30 As covered by the available Prodcom Data (INDICATORS: PRODVAL, PRCCODE: Propellant powders, 
Prepared  explosives  (excluding  propellant  powders),  Safety  fuses;  detonating  fuses,  Percussion  or 
detonating caps; igniters and electric detonators). 

7 

 Figure 1: Intervention Logic    
 
 
production  value  of  propellant  powders  and  safety/detonating  fuses  was  approximately 
EUR 176 million and EUR 49 million, respectively31.  

The EU was a net exporter of civil explosives, with exports of approximately EUR 313 
million, exceeding imports of approximately EUR 161 million. The overall positive trade 
balance was due to the significant export of safety and detonating fuses, percussion and 
detonating caps, igniters and electric detonators. The EU was a net-importer of propellant 
powders and prepared explosives32. Trade between Member States was highest for safety 
and detonating fuses, percussion and detonating caps, igniters and electric detonators, but 
propellant powders and prepared explosives were also actively traded. Overall, there was 
intra-EU  trade  (using  Eurostat  intra-EU  export  figures)  with  a  value  of  about 
EUR 259 million33.  

Figure 3: Extra-EU trade in civil explosives in 2016 

    Figure 4: Intra-EU exports of civil explosives in 2016 

Extra-EU trade in civil explosives 
in 2016

Intra-EU exports of civil 
explosives in 2016

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Source: own preparation based on Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Data (Eurostat)(INDICATORS: 
VALUE_IN_EUROS, PRODUCT: Safety fuses; detonating fuses; percussion/detonating caps; igniters and electric 
detonators devices, Prepared explosives (excluding propellant powders), propellant powders) 

31  Prodcom  Data  (INDICATORS:  PRODVAL,  PRCCODE:  Propellant  powders,  Prepared  explosives 
(excluding propellant powders), Safety fuses; detonating fuses, Percussion or detonating caps; igniters 
and electric detonators). 

32 SITC Data (Eurostat)(INDICATORS: VALUE_IN_EUROS, PRODUCT: Safety fuses; detonating fuses; 
percussion/detonating  caps;  igniters  and  electric  detonators  devices,  Prepared  explosives  (excluding 
propellant powders), propellant powders). 

33 Ibid. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2.  Human health, safety and security 

Uncontrolled and accidental explosions are the main health and safety risks linked to civil 
explosives.  While  the  former  describes  the  unpredictable  release  of  energy  during 
explosions, the latter refers to unplanned or untimely initiation of the explosive, either by 
human or environmental circumstances34. 

There is only limited publicly available data on accidents with civil explosives occurring 
after the manufacturing stage. In addition, due to the destruction of the explosive during 
an  explosion,  it  is  often  not  possible  to  identify  the  causes  of  accidents,  such  as  non-
compliance with applicable legislation35. 

Nevertheless, the civil explosives sector does not appear to have been particularly prone to 
accidents. There is information only on two accidents from before the implementation of 
the 1993 Directive: an explosion at a facility for the disposal of explosives in 1991 and an 
accident at a German factory where blasting explosives were manufactured. Few accidents 
were reported in the years after its adoption. In all those cases, the accidents were attributed 
to equipment malfunction or human error during the manufacture of the product rather than 
being caused by a non-compliant civil explosive product36.  

Across sectors, the presence of non-compliant or dangerous products and concerns about 
the quality of certain notified bodies carrying out conformity assessments and insufficient 
enforcement triggered the NLF alignment37. However, for the civil explosives sector, the 
impact  assessment  for  the  NLF  alignment,  while  pointing  to  the  ‘severe  consequences 
including casualties or serious injuries’ and ‘significant economic damage to surrounding 
infrastructures’ that accidents with civil explosives can cause, considered such accidents 
rather rare38. Moreover, in the public consultation that was part of the impact assessment 
for the NLF alignment, only a few respondents considered the sector to be affected by non-
compliance39. 

It has to be acknowledged that data on security incidentsis also limited. However, during 
the consultations with authorities carried in the context of the 2007 evaluation, almost no 

34  European  Commission,  Evaluation  study  of  Pyrotechnics  and  Civil  Explosives  Legislation  (Directive 
2013/29/EU,  Commission  Implementing  Directive  2014/58/EU,  and  Directive  2014/28/EU, 
Commission  Implementing  Directive  2008/43/EC  and  Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC),  Final 
Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025, p. 40. 

35 Ibid. 
36 European Commission, Evaluation on DG Enterprise and industry legislation – Cosmetics and Explosives 

Directives, Final report, 2007, p. 40. 

37 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
harmonisation of  the  laws  of the  Member  States  relating  to  the  making  available  on  the market  and 
supervision of explosives for civil uses, Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2011) 771 final, p. 2 

38  European  Commission,  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  10  proposals  to  align  product 
harmonisation directives to Decision No 768/2008/EC, New Legislative Framework (NLF) Alignment 
Package (Implementation of Goods Package), SEC(2011) 1375 final, 2011, p. 61. 

39 No authority, and only 12.5% and 25% of SMEs and notified bodies, respectively. European Commission, 
Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  10  proposals  to  align  product  harmonisation  directives  to 
Decision No 768/2008/EC, New Legislative Framework (NLF) Alignment Package (Implementation of 
Goods Package), SEC(2011) 1375 final, 2011, p. 19. 

9 

 
 
incidents of stolen or criminally misused civil explosives were reported. The Madrid train 
bombing of 2004 seemed to have been a tragic cexception40. In 2012, the progress report 
on  explosives  security  concluded  that  ‘Member  States  and  EU  institutions  have  made 
significant progress in developing explosives security in the EU since 2008’41.  

2.2.3.  Harmonisation of laws and implementation 

The  1993  Directive  introduced  essential  safety  requirements  and  placed  broad  legal 
responsibilities  on  competent  authorities  for  keeping  non-compliant  products  from  the 
market  but  left  the  details  of implementation  to  the discretion of Member States, while 
giving notified bodies significant room for manoeuvre. As reported in an evaluation study 
of the Directive in 2007, this resulted in divergent conformity assessment and enforcement 
practices.  Likewise,  the  degree  of  post-notification  quality  control  by  notified  bodies 
differed and there were reports from businesses of Member States rejecting CE-marked 
products because they did not accept the results of a conformity assessment carried out by 
a  notified  body  in  another  country.  Member  States  also  handled  the  Intra-Community 
transfer document (ICTE) for civil explosives differently, with some requiring a new ICTE 
for each and every product movement, and others allowing for the ICTE to be valid for a 
particular product for a set period of time42.  

For  the  recast,  no  mapping  of  the  civil  explosives  specific  rules  in  Member  States  was 
undertaken, as this was not the focus of the initiative. However, there were concerns across 
products legislation about the reliability of the conformity assessment carried out by some 
notified  bodies.  68%  of  the  notified  bodies  and  84%  of  the  economic  operators  that 
participated in the public consultation for the impact assessment for the Goods Package 
stated that there were problems with the quality of services provided by notified bodies in 
their  sector,  while  53%  of  public  authorities  shared  this  view43.  In  particular,  where 
subsidiaries  or  subcontractors  of  notified  bodies  were  located  outside  the  EU,  it  was 
unclear how the competence of such bodies had been assessed44. Insufficient coordination 
between notified bodies was also seen as contributing to the different quality of conformity 
assessments45.  For  civil  explosives,  specifically,  there  were  notable  differences  on 
acceptance of test results from other notified bodies, the time needed for the conformity 
assessment, and the handling of minor technical amendments46. 

40 European Commission, Evaluation on DG Enterprise and industry legislation – Cosmetics and Explosives 

Directives, Final report, 2007, pp. 40 et seq. 

41 European Commission, Progress Report on Explosives Security, 2012, p. 12. 
42 European Commission, Evaluation on DG Enterprise and industry legislation – Cosmetics and Explosives 

Directives, Final report, 2007, pp. 44-51. 

43  European  Commission,  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  10  proposals  to  align  product 
harmonisation directives to Decision No 768/2008/EC, New Legislative Framework (NLF) Alignment 
Package (Implementation of Goods Package), SEC(2011) 1375 final, 2011, p. 24. 

44 Ibid., p. 25. 
45 Ibid., p. 26. 
46 European Commission, Evaluation on DG Enterprise and industry legislation – Cosmetics and Explosives 

Directives, Final report, 2007, pp. 41-51. 

10 

 
 
3.  HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD? 

Current state of play 

This section will outline the evolution of the legal and factual situation for civil explosives 
in  the  EU  since  the  adoption  of  the  current  Directive,  structured  along  the  points  of 
comparison described in the previous section.  

3.1.  The market for civil explosives 

The EU production of civil explosives has not significantly changed since the adoption of 
the Directive in 2014 or its entry into force in 2016. Production value remained relatively 
stable at approximately EUR 1.8-2 billion between 2011 and 2017. From 2018 to 2021 the 
sector experienced a decline in production, which was abruptly reversed in 2022, when 
production value returned to its previous level of about EUR 2 billion. The production of 
prepared explosives and propellant powders in particular increased that year47. In 2023, 
the  production  of  prepared  explosives  and  propellant  powders  decreased,  while  the 
production of safety and detonating fuses and percussion and detonating caps, igniters and 
electronic detonators increased. At the time of the evaluation, the 2024 data was not yet 
available. 

Figure 5: EU production value of civil explosives 2003-2023 

EU production value of civil  explosives 2010-2023

2,5

2,0

1,5

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Safety fuses; detonating fuses

Propellant powders

Prepared explosives (excluding propellant powders)

Percussion or detonating caps; igniters and electric detonators

Source: own preparation based on Prodcom Data (INDICATORS: PRODVAL, PRCCODE: Propellant powders, Prepared 
explosives (excluding propellant powders), Safety fuses; detonating fuses, Percussion or detonating caps; igniters and 
electric detonators), not inflation adjusted. 

The levels  of  extra-EU  trade  mean that  the EU  continues  to  be a net  exporter of civil 
explosives. Exports have steadily increased since the adoption of the Directive in 2014. 

47  Prodcom  Data  (INDICATORS:  PRODVAL,  PRCCODE:  Propellant  powders,  Prepared  explosives 
(excluding propellant powders), Safety fuses; detonating fuses, Percussion or detonating caps; igniters 
and electric detonators), not inflation-adjusted. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exports only dropped in 2020, probably because of the Covid-19 pandemic. Imports have 
also increased in recent years. In 2024, the EU exported civil explosives with a value of 
about EUR 850 million, while overall imports were at  approximately EUR 385 million, 
resulting in a significant trade surplus of about EUR 463 million. Exports go notably to the 
United States, Australia, China, Turkey, Chile and Japan. Small trade deficits exist with 
Switzerland and Thailand48. 

Figure 6: Extra-EU trade in civil explosives 2014-2024 

Extra-EU trade of civil explosives (2014-2024)

)
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900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

Export

Import

Source:  own  preparation  of  EU  trade  since  1999  by  SITC  Data  (Eurostat)(INDICATORS:  VALUE_IN_EURO,  PRODUCT: 
Safety  fuses;  detonating  fuses;  percussion/detonating  caps;  igniters  and  electric  detonators  devices,  Prepared 
explosives (excluding propellant powders), not inflation-adjusted 

Looking at the trade balance for the different types of explosives in 2024, the EU was a 
net importer for propellant powders and prepared explosives, but a clear net exporter of 
other civil explosives (including safety fuses, detonating fuses, percussion/detonating caps, 
igniters and electric detonators devices). It is noteworthy that the trade balance reversed 
for  prepared  explosives  around  the  time  of  adoption  and  entry  into  application  of  the 
Directive. 

48  SITC  Data  (Eurostat)  (Indicators:  value_in_euro;  Product:  Safety  fuses;  detonating  fuses; 
percussion/detonating  caps;  igniters  and  electric  detonators  devices,  Prepared  explosives  (excluding 
propellant powders), propellant powders), not inflation-adjusted. 

. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Extra-EU trade in civil explosives per type, 2014-2024 

Extra-EU trade in propellent 
powders

Extra-EU trade in prepared 
explosives

)
s
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Export

Import

Export

Import

Extra-EU trade in safety fuses; 
detonating fuses; 
percussion/detonating caps; 
igniters and electric detonators

600
500
400
300
200
100
0

4
1
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2

5
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Source:  own  preparation  of  EU  trade  since  1999  by  SITC  Data  (Eurostat)(INDICATORS:  VALUE_IN_EURO,  PRODUCT: 
Safety  fuses;  detonating  fuses;  percussion/detonating  caps;  igniters  and  electric  detonators  devices,  Prepared 
explosives (excluding propellant powders), not inflation-adjusted 

Intra-EU trade in explosives, notably in propellant powders and prepared explosives, has 
increased  since  the  adoption  of  the  Directive,  although  a  temporary  decline  could  be 
observed in 2015 – between the adoption and the entry into force – and in 2020. The highest 
overall  intra-EU  trade  took  place  in  2023  and  2024,  with  export  volume  of  EUR 598 
million in 202449.  

49 Ibid. 

13 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Intra-EU exports in civil explosives 2014-2024 

Intra-EU export in civil explosives (2014-2024)

)
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m

(
e
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v

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700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Source:  own  preparation  of  EU  trade  since  1999  by  SITC  Data  (Eurostat)(INDICATORS:  VALUE_IN_EURO,  PRODUCT: 
Safety  fuses;  detonating  fuses;  percussion/detonating  caps;  igniters  and  electric  detonators  devices,  Prepared 
explosives (excluding propellant powders), propellant powders), not inflation-adjusted 

Details on the development of the market structure, including the number of businesses 
and employees as well as the turnover, are presented in Annex VII.1. 

3.2.  Human health, safety, security and environmental protection 

There is still limited publicly available data on unintended and/or accidental explosions of 
civil explosives, which makes it difficult to provide a proper assessment of the current 
safety  level  of  civil  explosives.  This  meant  that  no  statistical  trends  on  the  number  of 
accidents over the evaluation period could be identified. A few accidental explosions were 
reported  after  the  adoption  of  the  Directive.  In  2017,  an  accidental  ignition  led  to  an 
explosion in a bunker for manufacturing detonators, killing one worker in Sweden50. In 
2022, an explosion occurred at the manufacturing plant of an industrial dynamite factory 
in  Greece,  killing  three  people51.  However,  those  incidents  seem  to  be  related  to  the 
manufacturing process, not to the safety of civil explosives placed on the market. 

Of  48  civil  explosives  checked  and  recorded  since  2016  in  the  Information  and 
Communication  System  for  Market  Surveillance  (ICSMS)  30  were  found  to  be  non-
compliant.  Of  those  non-compliant  products,  most  had  been  manufactured  in  Czech 
Republic  (9),  while  only  three  products  came  from  countries  outside  of  the  European 
Economic  Area  (United  States  and  China).  The  origin  of  nine  products  is  unknown. 
However, as the system is not consistently used across Member States and some Member 
States tend to only report cases of non-compliance, this data can only be of informational 
use. No civil explosives posing a risk have been notified to date in the EU rapid alert system 

50 Bureau for Analysis of Industrial Risks and Pollutions, Explosion in bunker for manufacturing detonators, 

7 May 2017. 

51 AP/DPA, Three workers dead after explosion at Greek dynamite factory, euronews.com, 31 March 2022. 

14 

 
  
 
 
 
 
Safety Gate (previously called RAPEX), which since 2010 has also been the compulsory 
channel for risk notifications for products for professional use.52. 

The consultation activities did not produce conclusive results either, as more than half of 
respondents (52.2%, 24 out of 46) in the targeted survey did not know or preferred not to 
reply  to  the  question  on  trends  in  health  and  safety.  However,  28.3%  (13  out  of  46) 
indicated that the situation has remained stable and 15.2% (7 out of 46) reported a decline. 
Studies conducted in Finland and Sweden suggest that the incidences of explosion-related 
deaths are rather rare, although a slight increase was observed in Finland since 200153.  

On  security  issues,  the  same  studies  reported  just  few  cases  of  criminal  misuse.  This 
corresponds to the results of the consultation, where the general perception among those 
who  answered  was  that  cases  of  illicit  activity  were  rare  and  the  level  had  remained 
unchanged  or  declined  since  the  adoption  of  Directive54.  However,  most  stakeholders 
acknowledged a lack of  data  on this55. Moreover, according to  the Swedish  authorities, 
criminal networks have good access to explosives and use stolen explosives for violent 
crimes56, and the Swedish study concludes that ‘[r]estricting availability of explosives to 
criminals  is  a  challenging  task’57.  In  February  2024,  the  Greek  police  discovered  and 
defused  an  explosives-laden  parcel  containing  dynamite  that  had  been  delivered  to  the 
office of a judge58. 

Negative environmental impacts linked to civil explosives primarily involve the release 
of pollutants and the loud noise of  explosions.  For instance,  emissions  of nitrate fumes 
from ammonium nitrate and heavy metals in explosives residues, such as lead and mercury, 
can  contaminate  the  environment59.  The  management  of  explosive  waste  is  still  a 

52 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008setting out 
the  requirements  for  accreditation  and market  surveillance  relating  to  the  marketing  of products  and 
ELI: 
repealing 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/765/oj). 

(EEC)  No 339/93 

Regulation 

13.8.2008, 

p. 30, 

218, 

(OJ 

L 

53  Mäkitie,  I./Pihlajamäki,  H,  Fatal  explosion  injuries  in  Finland:  A  Twenty-Year  Nationwide  Survey, 
Scandinavian Journal of Surgery 95:3, 2006, 180-184; Junuzovic, M., Explosion fatalities in Sweden, 
2000–2018, Medicine, Science and the Law 62:2, 2022, 88-94. 

54 Targeted survey: According to 27.7% (13 out of 47) of stakeholders, the number of cases of illicit activities 
since the entry into force of the Directive has remained unchanged, while 10.6% (5 out of 47) perceived 
a decrease or strong decrease. 55.3% (26 out of 47) did not know or preferred not to say; Interviews: the 
large majority of stakeholders reported that misuse of explosives is rare. 

55 In the targeted survey, between 55% and 100% of respondents selected the ‘Do not know/prefer not to 
say’  option  when  asked  about  the  number  and  types  of  illicit  activities.  Some  specified  in  the  open 
question that there are no records on these activities. 

56 Government Offices of Sweden, Reduce the supply of illegal firearms and explosives, 2024. 
57 Junuzovic, M., Explosion fatalities in Sweden, 2000–2018, Medicine, Science and the Law 62:2, 2022, 

88-94. 

58  Kathimerini/AP,  Explosive  experts  defuse  a  parcel  bomb  sent  to  Thessaloniki  judge,  Newsroom, 

12 February 2024. 

59  Stucki,  H.,  Toxicity  and  Degradation  of  Explosives,  Chimia  58,  2004,  409-413;  Swedish  Mining 

Innovation, Unlocking Sustainability with Green Bulk Explosives, 2024. 

15 

 
 
challenge60. Moreover, the loud blast of explosives can disturb wildlife61 and vibrations 
can  destabilise  surrounding  landscapes62.  Over  past  years,  progress  towards  more 
environmentally friendly solutions has been made in the sector, such as the development 
of new-generation green primary explosives using coordination polymers based on bis-
tetrazole oxide and non-lead metals63 as well as of nitrate and ammonia free explosives64 
and the treatment of product waste65. 

3.3.  Harmonisation of laws and implementation 

A  study  carried  out  in  2022  concluded  that  the  transposition  of  the  Civil  Explosives 
Directive  was  generally  satisfactory,  although  the  transposition  in  most  Member  States 
showed  several  shortcomings66.  In  several  cases,  Member  States  have  incorrectly 
transposed  the  Directive’s  requirements.  Moreover,  some  Member  States  set  out 
requirements  that  go  beyond  the  harmonised  requirements  established  by  the  Directive 
which  could  cause  problems  given  the  free  movement  clause  (Article 3)  in  the 
Directive67. 

Differences exist, in particular, in rules on the transfer of civil explosives. For instance, 
transfers within one and the same Member State are explicitly excluded in one Member 
State and implicitly excluded in four other Member States who refer to transfer ‘between 
Member  States’,  although  such  domestic  transfers  are  implied  in  the  definition  in  the 
Directive:  ‘any  physical  movement  of  explosives  within  the  Union  except  movements 
within  one  and  the  same  site’68.  Moreover,  in  eight  Member  States,  prior  authorisation 
from the Member State of origin needs to be obtained, while the Directive only requires 
the  authorisation  of  the  consignee’s  State.  Five  Member  States  also  apply  the  transfer 
procedure to the transfer to or from non-EU countries, although the Directive covers only 
the transfer ‘within the Union’69.  

The common document for transfer of explosives established by Commission Decision 
2004/388/EC is used unaltered by most Member States, but a few Member States use an 

60 French National Institute for Industrial Environment and Risks (Ineris), Explosive and pyrotechnic wastes 

management practices, 2019. 

61 UK Department for Energy Security & Net Zero, The Use and Environmental Impact of Explosives in the 

Decommissioning of Offshore Wells and Facilities, 2023, pp. 33 et seq. 

62 Olukemi et al., Influence of explosive maximum instantaneous charge on blasting environmental impact,  

Journal of Sustainable Mining 22:4, 344-357, pp. 345 et seq. 

63 Zhang et al., Access to green primary explosives via constructing coordination polymers based on bis-

tetrazole oxide and non-lead metals, Green Chemistry 21:8, 2019, 1947-1955. 

64 Swedish Mining Innovation, Unlocking Sustainability with Green Bulk Explosives, 2024. 
65  Alburto-Medina  et  al.,  The  Impacts  of  Different  Biological  Treatments  on  the  Transformation  of 
Explosives Waste Contaminated Sludge, Molecules 26:16, 2021; Ferreira et al., A Circular Economy 
Approach to Military Munitions: Valorization of Energetic Material from Ammunition Disposal through 
Incorporation in Civil Explosives, Sustainability 22:1, 2019. 

66  European  Commission,  Study  of  conformity  in  all  EU  countries  on  EU  pyrotechnics  and  explosives 

legislation. Final Report, 2022, pp. 83. 

67 Ibid., p. 99. 
68 Ibid., p. 93. 
69 Ibid., p. 100. 

16 

 
 
amended version and/or request additional information, such as the identification numbers 
of the economic operators involved, the purpose of use and the place of use and storage, 
the signature of the supplier, and the net explosive weight, although Member States are 
obliged,  in  accordance  with  Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC,  to  accept  the  module 
transfer document established by that Decision70. While the Commission Decision requires 
the  final  transfer  document  accompanying  the  transfer  to  be  printed  on  paper,  Member 
States may use a common electronic system for the approval procedure71. Currently, some 
Member States are using the electronic system SCEPYLT, while the majority still relies 
on the use of paper documents (see box below)72. 

SCEPYLT  –  Explosives  Control  and  Protection  System  to  Prevent  and  Fight 
Against Terrorism 

SCEPYLT is an information system owned and managed by the Spanish authorities 
and the Spanish Guardia Civil that shall contribute to the prevention of terrorist attacks 
involving civil explosives. It can be used for the verification and approval of intra-EU 
transfers  of  civil  explosives  as  alternative  to  paper-based  exchanges  of  documents. 
Commission Decision 2010/347/EC allows for the use of such system for the purpose 
of complying with the Civil Explosives Directive but does not mandate it. Currently, 
nine Member States are using the system, 15 Member States are familiar with it. The 
digital system is assessed as accelerating the approval process and as being more secure 
and less prone to human error than the paper-based system.  

For more information, see also the case study in Annex VIII. Case studiesII. 

The traceability system (Article 15), as provided for in the Directive, has been fully and 
correctly transposed by most Member States. However, some Member States incorrectly 
transposed the Directive’s provisions by diverging from the general exemptions. Notably, 
two Member States exempt explosives subject to subsequent manufacturing processes or 
that are due to be exported to  non-EU countries. One Member State does not apply the 
exemptions in the Directive, while another Member State exempts more types of articles73. 

Considerable  differences  also  exist  in  penalties  for  infringements  of  the  Directive.  The 
Directive requires Member States to lay down and enforce rules on penalties (Article 50) 
for infringements, but leaves it to the Member States to decide on the kind of penalties, as 
long as they are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Criminal penalties are optional. 
Most  Member  States  apply  administrative  sanctions,  mainly  in  the  form  of  fines,  and 
criminal sanctions. Fines vary between Member States from as low as EUR 100 to as high 
as EUR 670 000, depending on the severity of the infringement and the specific national 

70 No information is available on the remaining seven Member State. 
71 See Article 3a of Commission Decision 2004/388/EC. 
72  European  Commission,  Study  of  conformity  in  all  EU  countries  on  EU  pyrotechnics  and  explosives 
legislation. Final Report, 2022, p. 11, 33; Tukes, Transfer of explosives in Finland and the European 
Economic Area. 
73 Ibid., pp. 108-114. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
legislation. Imprisonment terms range from no imprisonment in some jurisdictions to up 
to 12 years in others. Additional enforcement measures include forfeiture of non-compliant 
explosives,  market  prohibition  measures,  license  revocations.  Voluntary  surrender  or 
notification policies may mitigate penalties74. 

Annex VII.2. provides a more detailed overview of the transposition and implementation 
of the Directive in the Member States. 

4.  EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART) 

4.1.  To what extent was the intervention successful and why?  

This  chapter  summarises  the  evaluation  findings  in  terms  of  effectiveness  (fulfilling 
expectations and meeting objectives), efficiency (proportionality of its cost and benefits) 
and coherence (internal and external). The evaluation matrix included in Annex III lists 
the specific evaluation questions as well as the judgment criteria, indicators and descriptors 
and sources of information used to answer the questions. They include desk research and 
the various consultation activities carried out in the context of the evaluation.  

Overall stakeholder satisfaction with the Directive was mixed. In the targeted survey, a 
majority of stakeholders rated the Directive’s effectiveness at 4 or 5 out of 5 across the 
different areas of intervention75. However, 44.4% (4 out of 9) of respondents to the public 
consultation were not at all satisfied or only satisfied to a limited extent with the internal 
market rules established by the Directive, while only 33.3% (3 out of 9) expressed great or 
very great satisfaction.  

4.1.1.  Effectiveness 

a)  Free movement of civil explosives in the internal market  

According to 66.7% (6 out of 9) of the participants in the public consultation, the Directive 
contributed to the harmonisation of the rules on the making available of civil explosives to 
a large or very large extent. Moreover, 56% (28 out of 50) of respondents to the targeted 
survey  consider  that  the  Directive  harmonised  the  rules  on  making  available  and 
supervising civil explosives to a large or very large extent. This was confirmed in section 
3.3, where a comparative analysis of Member States’ explosives legislation indicated that 
Member States had largely aligned their legislation to the Directive’s requirements, leading 
to an approximation of laws on civil explosives.  

Although it is not possible to establish causality, this harmonisation of national rules might 
have improved the free movement of civil explosives in the internal market. In the targeted 
survey, 46% (23 out of 50) of respondents indicated that the reduction of trade barriers and 
costs in the internal market had been achieved to a large or very large extent, and 16% (8 

74 Ibid., pp. 159 et seq. 
75  When  asked  about  the  satisfaction  with  the  Directive’s  effectiveness  in  the  areas  of  licenses  and 
authorisations,  market  surveillance,  marking  and  labelling,  notification  of  conformity  assessment 
bodies, obligations of economic operators, penalties, seizures, sharing of information,  traceability and 
record keeping and transfer, the most frequently given response was 4 out 5 (‘Do not know’ / ‘Prefer 
not to say’ / not counted). 

18 

 
 
out of 50) observed that there had been at least a moderate reduction. In addition, as shown 
in  section  3.1,  intra-EU  trade  in  civil  explosives  has  continuously  increased  since  the 
adoption of the current Directive. Moreover, representatives from public authorities and 
industry  indicated  in  interviews  that  CE  marking  for  civil  explosives  had  streamlined 
cross-border transactions and increased product circulation  within the EU.  Overall, this 
suggests that the Directive did enhance the free movement of civil explosives within the 
EU and strengthen the internal market.  

Nevertheless, as explained in section 3.3, some differences in Member States’ laws persist, 
in  particular  on  the  rules  for  transfers.  Participants  in  the  targeted  survey  also  noted 
pronounced  differences  in  the  Member  States’  systems  for  licenses  and  authorisations, 
which are left entirely to the Member States’ discretion by the Directive76. Where Member 
States implemented more stringent or additional requirements, this was mainly for safety 
and  security  reasons77.  Although  25.9%  (14  out  of  54)  and  27.8%  (15  out  of  54), 
respectively, considered that such variations between national rules had no effect on the 
intra-EU flows of explosives and competitiveness  of EU companies aspects, the largest 
share of respondents considered the intra-EU flows of explosives and the competitiveness 
of EU companies negatively or very negatively affected (40.7% (22 out of 54) and 31.5% 
(17 out of 54), respectively). 

b)  Human health and safety  

As set out in section 3.2, information on trends in accidents or other health-related issues 
does not allow for firm conclusions to be drawn, but it seems that accidents with explosives 
are  rather  rare.  Moreover,  responses  to  the  stakeholder  consultation  activities  drew  an 
overall positive picture of the Directive’s effect on health and safety. More than two-thirds 
of respondents in the targeted survey considered the Directive’s effect on the protection of 
health and safety as positive (57.8%, 26 out of 45) or very positive (11.1%, 5 out of 45). 
In  addition,  a  considerable  share  of  participants  in  the  targeted  survey  reported  stable 
accident levels (28.3%, 13 out of 46) or even a decline (15.2%, 7 out of 46)78. Moreover, 
33.3%  (3  out  of  9)  respondents  in  the  public  consultation  were  of  the  opinion  that  the 
Directive had increased product safety to a very large extent, 22.2% (2 out of 9) indicated 
that it had increased product safety to a large extent, while 22.2% (2 out of 9) said ‘to a 
moderate extent’. At the same time, several industry stakeholders noted in interviews that 
the Directive’s entry into force in 2016 did not make a significant difference in terms of 
health  and  safety  as  existing  national  regulations  already  largely  ensured  that  civil 

76 39.3% (24 out of 61) of respondents in the targeted survey considered that the most pronounced differences 
across Member States’  laws exist in the rules on licenses and authorisation. The other ten answer options 
were chosen by a lower share of respondents (from 3.3% (2 out of 61) for seizures and ‘other’ to 37.7% 
(23 out of 61) for transfer). Respondents could choose several options. 

77 Stakeholders were asked to provide a rating on a scale of 1-5 for the relative importance of different factors 
for  the  adoption  of  additional  national  rules.  4-5  out  of  5  was  selected  by  60.9%  (14  out  of  23)  for 
‘Enhanced safety and public protection’, by 43.5% (10 out of 23) for ‘Preventing illicit trade and misuse’ 
and by 39.1% (9 out of 23) for ‘Addressing unique national risks.’39.1% (9 out of 23) selected ‘Do not 
know/prefer not to say’ for each aspect. 

78 52.2% (24 out of 46) did not know or preferred not to say. 

19 

 
 
explosives  on  the  market  were  safe,  given  that  the  1993  Directive  had  already  set  out 
essential safety requirements. 

Relevant aspects of health and safety are considered more in detail below. 

Essential safety requirements 

Compliance  with  the  essential  safety  requirements  (ESRs)  set  out  in  the  Directive  is 
intended to ensure the safety of civil explosives. In the consultation activities, only a few 
concerns were expressed regarding the effectiveness of the ESRs, which suggests that they 
are overall fit for purpose. 

In the targeted survey, most stakeholders replied that differing sets of safety requirements 
no  longer  present  a  problem  for  the  protection  of  health  and  safety79,  and  an  explosive 
manufacturer explicitly praised the ESRs for ensuring the same high level of safety for all 
products placed onto the EU market.  

However, a market surveillance authority explained in the targeted survey that the essential 
safety requirements were vague and left significant room for interpretation by harmonised 
standards. Similarly, an industry stakeholder noted in the call for evidence that some ESRs 
could benefit from clarifications, pointing to difficulties in applying them in practice. The 
same  respondent  considered  that  some  ESRs  might  be  obsolete.  When  asked  how  the 
Directive  could  more  effectively  protect  health  and  safety,  43.2%  (16  out  of  37)  of 
stakeholders were in favour of further standardisation and harmonisation of rules80. At the 
same  time,  the  existing  harmonised  standards  developed  in  support  of  the  Directive 
covering a wide range of products were seen as a strength of the Directive by a market 
surveillance authority responding to the targeted survey.  

Compliance and quality of conformity assessments 

To  assess  the  conformity  of  civil  explosives,  manufacturers  must  follow  one  of  the 
procedures set out in the modules further explained in Annex VI. Third-party conformity 
assessment  by  a  notified  body  is  mandatory.  Member  States  notified  ten  bodies,  six  of 
which are accredited81.   

The NLF alignment of the Directive was aimed at enhancing the credibility and quality of 
the  mandatory  conformity  assessment  procedures  and  increase  compliance.  Despite  the 
relatively  high  non-compliance  rate  of  explosives  reported  in  ICSMS  (see  section  3.2), 
many respondents in the targeted survey indicated that the Directive contributed to a high 
or  very  high  extent  (28%,  13  out  of  50,  and  18%,  9  out  of  50,  respectively)  to  higher 

79 25.6% (11 out of 43) replied ‘to a low extent’, and 16.3% (7 out of 43) ‘to no extent’. 25.6% (11 out of 

43) selected ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’. 

80  Respondents  had  the  choice  between  ‘further  standardisation  and  harmonisation  of  rules’,  ‘increased 
controls’,  ‘information  sharing‘,  ‘capacity  building’,  ‘transparent  reporting’,  ‘public  awareness 
campaigns’  and  ‘other’,  with  the  possibility  to  select  several  options.  ‘Further  standardisation  and 
harmonisation of rules’ and ‘information sharing’ were the most frequent responses with 43.2% (16 out 
of 37). 

81 See Single Market Compliance Space. 

20 

 
 
compliance of civil explosives on the market with essential safety requirements, and 24% 
(12  out  of  50)  considered  the  Directive’s  contribution  as  moderate.  The  feedback  was 
similar in the public consultation, with 44.4% (4 out of 9) of respondents replying that the 
Directive has contributed to higher compliance ‘to a large extent’ and 22.2% (2 out of 9) 
‘to a very large extent’. 

Perceptions of a more compliant civil explosives sector coincide with a general satisfaction 
with the rules on conformity assessments for civil explosives. According to 55.6% (5 out 
of 9) of respondents in the public consultation, the Directive has increased the quality and 
reliability of conformity assessments to a large (33.3%, 3 out of 9) or moderate (22.2%, 2 
out of 9) extent. Stakeholders are also mostly satisfied with the current requirements for 
overseeing notified bodies. Most stakeholders that answered the relevant question in the 
targeted survey rated their satisfaction at 4 or 5 out of 5, across the different conformity 
assessment modules. 

Despite the overall positive feedback,  some stakeholders pointed out weaknesses in the 
conformity  assessment  system.  Several  respondents  in  the  targeted  survey  noted 
differences in the conformity assessment practices of notified bodies, some being seen as 
more thorough or stringent than others, and pointed out that not all notified bodies were 
accredited.  Moreover,  some  respondents  mentioned  that  economic  considerations  by 
notified bodies might impact the quality of conformity assessments.  

Moreover, some market  surveillance authorities and notified bodies expressed concerns 
about non-compliant products imported from non-EU countries and the effectiveness of 
conformity assessments carried out by subcontractors of notified bodies based outside the 
EU. However, most stakeholders responding in the targeted survey did not  identify any 
major issues, but did consider that the quality of the assessment process was still to a large 
extent ensured82, which was also confirmed in the validation workshop. 

When  asked  about  their  satisfaction  with  the  different  conformity  assessment  modules, 
stakeholders’ opinions diverge, with highest satisfaction levels for Module D and C2 and 
lowest for Module B. 

82 17% (8 out of 47) rated the extent to which subcontracted conformity assessments in non-EU countries 
ensures the quality of the assessment at 5 out of 5, 23.4% (11 out of 47) with 44 out of 55, and 21.3% 
(10 out of 47) with 33 out of 5. 

21 

 
 
Figure 10: Stakeholders’ satisfaction with the current requirements for conformity assessment per Module 

How satisfied are you with the current requirements for 
conformity assessment?

Module H: Full Quality Assurance (Annex X)

Module G: conformity based on unit verification
module

53%

53%

16%

11%

13%

8%

13%

11%

13%

11%

Module E: Product Quality Assurance (Annex VII)

42%

8%

18%

18%

13%

Module D: Production Quality Assurance (Annex VI)

29%

3%

13%

21%

21%

13%

Module B: EC Type-Examination (Annex IV)

32%

13%

21%

13%

11%

11%

 Module C2: conformity to type based on internal
production control plus supervised product checks
at random intervals

45%

8%

13%

21%

13%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Do not know/prefer not say

To a low extent

No extent

To a moderate extent

To a high extent

To a very high extent

N = 38, Source: own preparation based on targeted survey 

Market surveillance and enforcement  

Market  surveillance  should  identify  and  then  ensure  the  removal  of  non-compliant 
products from the market. It is essential for the enforcement of the Directive. Besides the 
rules and procedures set out in the Civil Explosives Directive, the overarching EU legal 
framework  for  market  surveillance,  including  Regulation  (EU)  2019/102083  and  certain 
provisions of Regulation (EC) No 765/200884, applies to the market surveillance for civil 
explosives, including the provisions for controls on imports. For civil explosives, results 
from  the  targeted  survey  suggest  that  current  market  surveillance  practices  under  the 
Directive  are  overall  satisfactory85.  The  Directive  increased  the  effectiveness  of  market 
surveillance,  according  to  most  stakeholders  participating  in  the  public  consultation, 
although 44.4% (4 out of 9) rated the Directive’s contribution as only moderate and one 

83 Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 of the European Parliament and of the  Council of 20 June 2019 on market 
surveillance and compliance of products and amending Directive 2004/42/EC and Regulations (EC) No 
765/2008 
ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1020/oj). 

25.6.2019, 

305/2011 

(EU) 

p. 1, 

169, 

and 

(OJ 

No 

L 

84 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out 
the  requirements  for  accreditation  and market  surveillance  relating  to  the  marketing  of products  and 
repealing 
ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/765/oj). 

(EEC)  No 339/93 

Regulation 

13.8.2008, 

p. 30, 

218, 

(OJ 

L 

85 33.3% (15 out of 45) provided a grade of 4 out 5, while 13.3% (6 out of 45) provided a grade of 5 out 5; 

15.6% (7 out of 45) rated their satisfaction at 3 out of 5. 

22 

 
 
 
stakeholder as only limited86. According to most respondents in the targeted survey, the 
frequency  of  controls  conducted  by  market  surveillance  authorities  for  both  EU-
manufactured  and  imported  products  has  remained  consistent  since  the  Directive’s 
implementation87  Most  controls  took  the  form  of  documentary  checks,  while  physical 
checks  (product  testing)  were  mainly  carried  out  to  verify  compliance  with  the  safety 
requirements.88 The number of restrictive actions, such as prohibitions and product recalls, 
has, according to most stakeholders, also remained the same.89.  

However, as  emerged from  the targeted survey90  and interviews, stakeholders observed 
significant  differences  in  market  surveillance  practices  between  Member  States,  which 
could be an obstacle to more effective market surveillance. 

Cooperation and information sharing 

Overall, cooperation and information sharing among market surveillance authorities and 
between  authorities  and  economic  operators  seem  to  be  effective  thanks  to  market 
surveillance tools like ICSMS and Safety Gate91 and to regular administrative cooperation 
(AdCo)  and  Expert  Group  meetings92.  In  interviews,  several  market  surveillance 
authorities  and  notified  bodies  highlighted  that  the  Directive  encourages  valuable 
cooperation, although, they stated, there might still be room for improvement. Cooperation 
and information sharing between different actors within one Member State seems to work 
better than across national borders93. One reason might be differences in national laws94. 
In the specific case of notified bodies, reluctance to share information was also linked to 

86 Among the other respondents, 44.4% (4 out of 9) stakeholders responded ‘to a moderate extent’ and 22.2% 

(2 out of 9) chose ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’. 

87 57.1% (12 out of 21) of stakeholders responding in the targeted survey indicated that the frequency of 
controls on EU-manufactured products remained unchanged. For imported products, 52.4% (11 out of 
21) gave that reply. 

88 In the targeted survey, documentary checks was the most frequently given answer across different focus 
areas (e.g. CE marking, compliance with safety requirements,  unique identification). For compliance 
with the safety requirements, product testing seems to be almost equally frequent. 

89 29.3% (12 out of 41) respondents indicated that the number of prohibitions and recalls has remained the 
same since the entry into application of the Directive, while 14.6% (6 out of 41) and 12.2% (5 out of 41) 
reported a decrease and 9.8% (4 out of 41) an increase. 

90 23% (14 out of 61) of respondents in the targeted survey chose ‘Market surveillance’ as one of the areas 
where  they  observe  the  most  pronounced  differences  across  Member  States.  More  pronounced 
differences  were  reported  only  for  three  other  areas  (licenses  and  authorisations,  transfer  and 
traceability/record keeping). Stakeholders could choose several of twelve areas in total. 

91 In the targeted survey, when asked about their satisfaction with digital and electronic tools for exchanging 
information about products governed by the Directive, the Information and Communication System on 
Market  Surveillance  (ICSMS)  got  mostly  positive  feedback,  with  52.6%  (10  out  of  19)  of  the 
respondents rating it highly (4 or 5 out of 5). Dissatisfaction was minimal, with only 10.5% (2 out of 19) 
rating it at 2 out of 5 and one person (5.26%) with 1 out 5. Similarly, Safety Gate, the EU rapid alert 
system for dangerous non-food products, was rated with moderate or high satisfaction levels, as 36.8% 
(7 out of 19) of respondents rated it at 4 or 5 out of 5 and 15.8% (3 out of 19). 

92 Mentioned by two stakeholders in the targeted survey as mechanisms for sharing information. 
93 Out of the stakeholders who answered, 40.4% (19 out of 47) rated information with competent authorities 
of their own Member State 5 out of 5. Only 12.8% (6 out of 47) of stakeholders rated information sharing 
with competent authorities from another Member State 5 out of 5. 

94 As mentioned by a notified body in an interview. 

23 

 
 
the economic competition between them, but the regular meetings of the Forum of Notified 
Bodies  are  considered  useful  in  solving  questions  and  addressing  issues  in  a  consistent 
manner95. Terrorism, illicit trafficking and smuggling and other security challenges are, 
according  to  respondents  in  the  targeted  survey,  areas  requiring  more  cross-border 
cooperation96. 

c)  Security 

The Directive also seems to have contributed to the prevention of security incidents with 
civil explosives. As also mentioned in section 3.2, cases of criminal misuse seem to be rare 
and, according to 82.2% (37 out of 45) of respondents in the targeted survey, the Directive 
has had a positive or very positive impact on security. 

Transfers  

Stakeholders seem to be relatively satisfied with the transfer rules set out in the Directive. 
48.9% (22 out of 45) of respondents in the targeted survey considered the rules to be highly 
or very highly effective, while 22.2% (10 out of 45) rated them as moderately effective97. 
Results from the public consultation also reflect stakeholders’ positive experience with the 
transfer rules: 55.6% (5 out of 9) of respondents replied that the Directive contributed to a 
large or very large extent98 to clear transfer and transit rules, and 22.2% (2 out of 9) said it 
contributed to a moderate extent. 

Nevertheless, in some instances, differences in the way Member States transposed the rules 
seem to have caused complications in the transfer of explosives. According to stakeholders 
in the targeted survey, this was one of the areas where differences between Member States 
are  most  pronounced99.  As  mentioned  in  section  3.3,  such  differences  concern,  for 
instance, the applicability of security requirements for transfers and the validity period and 
the processing time for the issuance of transfer licenses100.  

Moreover, the extent to which the approval of transfers remains paper-based was perceived 
as  rather  inefficient.  In  the  stakeholder  consultations  carried  out  in  the  context  of  a 
feasibility  study  on  alternative  options  for  the  digitalisation  of  intra-EU  transfers  of 
explosives  documents101,  stakeholders  pointed  out  that  delays  from  the  paper-based 
process  impair  the  commercial  interests  of  industry  actors  and  create  administrative 
obstacles for the free movement of civil explosives in the EU. A case study carried out in 

95 As mentioned by a notified body in an interview. 
96  65%  (13  out  of  20  respondents)  consider  that  smuggling  and  illicit  trafficking  require  cross-border 
cooperation  to  a  high  or  very  high  extent.  The  same  share  of  respondents  considers  cross-border 
cooperation is needed to a high or very high extent to address terrorism and security threats. 

97 40% (18 out of 45) rated the effectiveness of the transfer rules at 4 out of 5, 8.9% (4 out of 45) at 5 out of 

5, and 22.2% (10 out of 45) at 3 out of 5. 

98 33.3% (3 out of 9) selected ‘to a large extent’ and 22.2% (2 out of 9) ‘to a very large extent’. 
99 37.7% (23 out of 61) selected this area as one of the areas where differences between Member States are 

most pronounced. 

100 As pointed out by industry actors and public authorities in interviews. 
101 European Commission, Feasibility Study of  alternative options. Digitalisation of Intra-EU transfers of 

explosives documents (SCEPYLT Technical Options), Sopra Steira, 2024. 

24 

 
 
the context of the evaluation also pointed to the risk of clerical mistakes, loss and forgery 
of paper documents (see Annex VIII). 

In interviews in the context of the evaluation, several Member State authorities criticised 
the  fact  that  the  electronic  system  for  transfer  approvals  (SCEPYLT),  established  and 
managed by the Spanish authorities and Guardia Civil (see section 3.3), was not used by 
all Member States, which rules out the possibility of a fully electronic procedure. Several 
respondents  to  the  targeted  survey  and  stakeholders  consulted  for  the  feasibility  study 
considered  an  EU-wide  electronic  system,  which  could  be  developed  on  the  basis  of 
SCEPYLT or a different solution, useful not only for reducing the time for approvals, but 
also for increasing security and enhancing cooperation between the Member States102. 

Unique identification and traceability 

The purpose of the unique identification and traceability of explosives is to prevent misuse 
and theft and to assist law enforcement authorities in tracing the origin of lost or stolen 
explosives. According to most stakeholders participating in the consultation activities, the 
traceability system under the Directive is effective. In the targeted survey, 52.3% (20 out 
of  39)  of  respondents  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  Directive  contributed  to  improved 
traceability of sales and transactions of civil explosives to a large extent and15.4% (6 out 
of 39) replied that it contributed to a very large extent. Moreover, 51.1% (23 out of 45) of 
respondents rated their satisfaction with the traceability system at 4 out of 5, 24.4% (11 
out of 45) gave it a full score. A market surveillance representative described the per-item 
traceability as main strength  of the Directive to enable  a high  level  of  security. Results 
from the public consultation were equally positive, with 66.6% (6 out of 9) indicating that 
the Directive contributed to a large or very large extent to improved traceability. 

In line with the overall satisfaction with the traceability rules, only few minor issues were 
identified. A market surveillance representative noted that the marking and affixation of 
the unique identification is easy to remove and not sufficiently durable. Another market 
surveillance representative underlined that the traceability system could benefit from the 
use  of  technologies,  such  as  scanners  and  specialised  software,  to  be  used  by  market 
surveillance authorities. 

Penalties 

Penalties aim to ensure compliance and deter illicit behaviour. As shown in section 3.3, 
penalties  for  economic  operators  not  respecting  the  provisions  of  the  Directive  differ 
between  Member  States.  Among  the  stakeholders  participating  to  the  targeted  survey, 
38.6% (17 out of 44) indicated that current penalties are to a  large or very large extent 
effective to ensure that civil explosives on the market fulfil the existing requirements, and 
25% (11 out of 44) of respondents considered penalties moderately effective. When asked 
about  their  level  of  satisfaction  with  the  current  penalties,  most  stakeholders  did  not 
provide an answer, but 22.2% (10 out of 45) rated their satisfaction at 4 out of 5 and 17.8% 

102 Ibid., p. 14. 

25 

 
 
(8  out  of  45)  at  3  out  of  5103.  As  pointed  out  in  interviews  with  representatives  from 
different stakeholder groups, the current penalties are appropriate in light of the relatively 
rare and generally minor infringements in the sector.  

However,  according  to  33.3%  (3  out  of  9)  of  respondents  to  the  public  consultation, 
proportionate enforcement and penalties to prevent illicit possession, misuse, and thefts of 
civil explosives (i.e. penalties not mandated by the Directive, which only requires penalties 
for infringements of provisions of national law adopted pursuant to the Directive) should 
be further addressed in the future104.  

4.1.2.  Efficiency 

Overall, the objectives of the Directive seem to have been achieved efficiently.  

While  all  stakeholder  types,  except  for  notified  bodies,  reported  cost  increases  due  to 
compliance with the requirements of the Directive, there were also significant efficiency 
gains for most stakeholders. 

The  cost  estimations  presented  in  this  section  are  based  on  findings  from  the  study  in 
support of the evaluation105. The study relied on cost templates filled in by six companies 
(three SMEs and three large companies), two notified bodies, and one market surveillance 
authority, as well as interviews with these stakeholders. This data was complemented by 
findings from the targeted survey. The assessment of the benefits is based on the findings 
from  the  effectiveness  analysis.  It  is  mostly  qualitative  given  the  difficulty  to  monetise 
these positive effects of the Directive. Efficiency gains were identified on the basis of the 
responses to the targeted survey. In view of the limited available data on costs and benefits, 
the analysis below can provide only an indication of how efficient the Directive is. 

a)  Costs 

Industry 

For the six companies interviewed in the context of the study in support of this evaluation, 
costs arising from compliance with the Civil Explosives Directive represent 0.39% of their 
annual turnover. For the large enterprises interviewed, the share is higher – 0.31% –, while 
the SMEs spend an equivalent of 0.15% of their annual turnover on compliance with the 
Directive. This is below the average regulatory burden of other directives and regulations 

103 46.7% (21 out of 45) did not know or preferred not to say. 
104  22.2%  (2  out  of  9)  replied  that  this  concern  is  already  addressed.  The  remaining  44.4%  (4  out  of 9) 

stakeholders did not know or preferred not to say. 

105 European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 
2013/29/EU,  Commission  Implementing  Directive  2014/58/EU,  and  Directive  2014/28/EU, 
Commission  Implementing  Directive  2008/43/EC  and  Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC),  Final 
Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025. 

26 

 
 
Components 

Turnover 

Compliance costs 

referred  to  in  the  evaluation  of  the  NLF106.  The  annual  compliance  costs  have  been 
calculated as the average (mean) over the period from 2015 to 2022. 

Table 1: Average yearly (2015-2022) compliance costs attributed to compliance with the Civil Explosives Directive as 
share of turnover  

All companies 

Large enterprises 

SMEs 

EUR 49 424 500 

EUR 77 566 667 

EUR 21 282 333 

Share of compliance costs in turnover  0.39% 

EUR 191 979 

EUR 243 892 
0.31% 

EUR 30 943 
0.15% 

N=6 (3 large companies, 3 SMEs), Source: Technopolis Group, based on cost templates 

For the SMEs, most costs are investments and expenses needed to adjust their activity to 
the  Directive’s  requirements  (adjustment  costs).  These  represent  93.3%  of  the  total 
compliance  costs.  Administrative  costs  account  for  only  6.7%.  The  large  companies 
reported  inverse  proportions,  with  administrative  costs  making  up  49.3%  of  total 
compliance  costs,  and  adjustment  costs  22.3%.  Unspecified  costs  indirectly  due  to  the 
Directive represent 27.3% of large companies’ compliance costs. Hassle costs, i.e. costs 
resulting from inconveniences such as unnecessary waiting time, delays, redundant legal 
provisions,  corruption  etc.  seem  to  be  negligible  and  are  not  further  specified  in  this 
section. 

Table 2: Average yearly costs for industry attributed only to the Civil Explosives Directive 

Costs typology 

Companies 

Average total yearly costs of Directive 

EUR 191 979 

Adjustment costs 

Administrative costs 

Hassle costs 

Indirect costs 

17.2% 

64.9% 

0.5% 

17.4% 

Large 
enterprise 
EUR 243 892 

SME 

EUR 30 943 

22.3% 

49.3% 

1.1% 

27.3% 

93.3% 

6.7% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

N=6 (3 large companies, 3 SMEs), Source: Technopolis Group, based on cost templates 

Adjustment costs 

The  SMEs  interviewed  spend,  on  average,  EUR 28 873  on  adapting  to  the  Directive’s 
requirements  (adjustment  costs).  However,  the  costs  vary  widely  from  EUR 15 428  to 
EUR 52 920, depending  on the company. The large companies reported average annual 
adjustment costs of EUR 54 397, ranging from EUR 21 126 to EUR 108 150. While the 
operational costs for traceability and labelling are the biggest adjustment cost factor for the 
SMEs, accounting for 63% of total adjustment costs, they represent only 17% of the large 
companies’  adjustment costs. For  large companies, the costs for conformity  assessment 
procedures are the most relevant adjustment costs, making up 35% of the total adjustment 

106  The  NLF  evaluation  for  industrial  products  assessed  the  efficiency  of  the  Toy  Safety  Directive, 
Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive, the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive, the Low 
Voltage Directive, and the Construction Products Regulation. European Commission, Supporting Study 
for the evaluation of certain aspects of the New Legislative Framework (Decision No 768/2008/EC and 
Regulation (EC) No 765/2008), 2022. In that evaluation study, the regulatory burden of some of the 
horizontal NLF provisions, and the one-off costs ranged between 0.6% and 3% of the industry turnover. 

27 

 
 
costs. Designing, manufacturing and testing civil explosives to ensure compliance with the 
essential  safety  requirements  makes  up  the  second-largest  share  of  large  companies’ 
adjustment costs, 21%. For SMEs, the second most important adjustment cost factor is the 
operational costs for CE marking, with a share of 21% of total compliance costs. Other 
adjustment  costs  for  SMEs,  including  those  for  ensuring  compliance  and  conformity 
assessments, are minor. (See Figure 11) 

Figure 11: Share of adjustment costs for companies by key drivers attributed only to the Civil Explosives Directive as per 
cost templates 

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

29%

24%

19%

10%

4%

4%

3%
3%
2%
1%

Chart Title

17%

35%

21%

6%

5%

6%

3%
3%
1%
0%

63%

1%
2%

21%

3%
3%
3%

5%

Operational cost for traceability &
labeling

Conformity assessment procedure

Designing and manufacturing and
testing explosives to ensure
compliance with Annex II

Equipment cost for traceability &
labeling

Equipment cost for CE marking

Transfer operational activities

Operational cost for CE marking

Sample testing, investigation, and
record-keeping

Corrective operational actions to
withdraw or recall non-conformant
civil explosives from the market

Other operational/investment costs

s
t
s
o
c

t
n
e
m

j

t
s
u
d
a
f
o
)

%

(
e
r
a
h
S

Companies Large Enterprises

SME

N=6 (3 large company, 3 SMEs), Source: Technopolis Group, based on cost templates 

In  the  targeted  survey,  the  three  responding  large  manufacturers  respectively  allocated 
10%,  25%  and  30%  of  their  adjustment  costs107  to  product  testing  before  conformity 

107  Economic  operators  were  asked  to  indicate  the  respective  shares  of  the  following  adjustment  costs: 
designing and manufacturing products according to the requirements of the Directive [manufacturers 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
assessment  and  for  conformity  assessment,  and  10%,  15%  and  25%  to  equipment 
acquisition and implementation of conformity assessment processes (other than product 
testing). Moreover, one large manufacturer indicated that it allocates 50% of the presented 
adjustment costs to traceability and labelling, while the other two allocate 10% and 15% 
respectively. For the three SMEs responding in the targeted survey, adjustment costs in 
relation  to  CE  marking,  labelling  and  traceability  represent  15%,  30%  and  40%  of  the 
presented  adjustment  costs  while  the  main  adjustment  cost  driver  seems  to  be  the 
equipment acquisition for and implementation of conformity assessment procedures (40%, 
40% and 30%). 

Administrative costs 

All  administrative  costs  linked  to  compliance  with  the  Directive  amount  in  total  to  an 
average of EUR 2 070 per year for the three SMEs that submitted cost templates, ranging 
from EUR 1 620 to EUR 2 700. The large companies incur, on average, EUR 120 288 per 
year for administrative activities linked to  compliance with  the Directive, ranging from 
EUR 2 700 to EUR 254 300. 67% of the SMEs’ average administrative costs result from 
administrative actions for traceability and labelling, while record-keeping for traceability 
accounts  for  11%.  For  the  large  companies,  administrative  costs  are  more  evenly 
distributed, with 15% allocated to traceability and labelling, 14% to notifying authorities 
of risks, 10% to administrative actions for the withdrawal or recall of explosives and 9% 
for providing instructions and safety information in the language of users. (See Figure 12) 

In the targeted survey, administrative actions for labelling, CE marking and traceability 
also emerged as the most important administrative cost driver108 for large enterprises, with 
33  out  of  44  large  enterprises  ranking  this  as  the  largest  key  cost  driver  as  a  share  of 
administrative costs109. As regards the three SMEs replying to the survey, each allocated 
their administrative costs differently. For one SME, costs for labelling, CE marking and 
traceability is clearly the most important cost driver, while for another one the documentary 
verification of conformity of the product and record-keeping are more significant. For the 

only];  product  testing  before  and  for  conformity  assessment;  equipment  acquisition  for  and 
implementation  of  conformity  assessment  process;  equipment  acquisition  and  implementation  of 
activities for affixing CE marking, labels, registration numbers, traceability systems or devices in the 
product;  taking  corrective  actions  upon  non-conformant  products  have  been  identified  (e.g. 
recalls/withdrawals); implement the transfer of civil explosives; other adjustment costs. 

108 Economic operators were asked to indicate the respective shares of the following administrative costs: 
produce the technical documentation for conformity assessment procedures (referred to in Annex II); 
keeping records of technical documentation, EU declaration of conformity, and registration numbers of 
products for 10 years; ensure correct labelling, CE marking, identification and registration numbers, and 
traceability data of products; documentary verification of the conformity of the product (i.e. the validity 
of the certificate of conformity, verification of laboratory testing provided by manufacturers, verification 
of  product  versus  safety  requirements,  correct  labelling,  CE  marking,  registration  number,  etc.); 
lodging  applications  for  registrations,  certifications,  accreditations, 
handling  paperwork  for 
authorisations, etc.; Intra-Community Transport of Explosives (ICTE) form (standardised template for 
firms  seeking  permission  from  national  authorities  to  transport  explosives  through  their  territory); 
information  sharing  and  cooperation  with  organisations  and  authorities  related  to  non-compliant 
products, their suppliers and buyers (supply chain). 

109 The four responding large enterprises indicated that they allocate 90%, 60%, 50% or 10%, respectively, 

of the presented administrative costs to CE marking, labelling and traceability. 

29 

 
 
third  SME,  producing  the  technical  document  is  as  cost-intensive  as  the  labelling,  CE 
marking and traceability110. 

Figure 12: Share of administrative costs for companies by key drivers attributed only to the Civil Explosives Directive, as 
per cost templates 

s
t
s
o
c
e
v
i
t
a
r
t
s
i
n
m
d
a
)

i

%

(
e
r
a
h
S

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

15%

13%

11%

10%

10%

7%

7%

6%

5%

5%

4%

3%
3%

10%

14%

15%

9%

7%

6%

8%

6%

5%

7%

5%

4%

4%

Companies

Large Enterprises

3%

67%

1%
6%

2%
2%
1%
3%
2%

11%

3%

SME

Admin actions for withdrawal/recall

Notify authorities of risks

Admin actions for traceability &
labeling

Instructions & safety info in user
language

Collaborate with surveillance
authorities

Technical documentation (Annex II)

Other admin compliance activities

EU declaration of conformity

Maintain docs & declaration for 10
years

Admin procedures for transfers

Conformity Assessment application

Record-keeping of unique
identification numbers

Collect conformity assessment docs

N=6 (3 large companies, 3 SMEs), Source: Technopolis Group, based on cost templates 

Market surveillance authorities 

The  market  surveillance  authority  (MSA)  that  provided  cost  data  spends,  on  average, 
EUR 13 958 per year on compliance with the Directive. 66.5% of these costs are linked to 
enforcement, while adjustment costs represent 27.1% and administrative costs 6.5%. No 
hassle or indirect costs were reported. 

110 The three SMEs allocated 30%, 30% and 10%, respectively to labelling, CE marking and traceability and 
12%, 30% and 40% to recordkeeping. 14%, 30% and 5% were attributed to producing the technical 
documentation. 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Average yearly compliance cost for MSA 

Public body 

Market surveillance authority 

Total yearly costs of Directive 

EUR 13 958 

Enforcement costs 

Adjustment costs 

Administrative costs 

66.5% 

27.1% 

6.5% 

N= 1 (Market surveillance), Source: Technopolis Group, based on cost templates 

Enforcement costs 

The MSA incurs average enforcement costs of EUR 9 276 per year. Among these, 41% 
are linked to checks and risk assessments (excl. outsourced tests), while participation in 
coordination group meetings accounts for 17% of enforcement costs. 10% of enforcement 
costs  are  attributed  to  corrective  actions,  such  as  the  destruction  or  disposal  of  non-
compliant civil explosives and the verification of reports and certificates. (See Figure 13) 

Figure 13: Share of enforcement costs for MSAs by key driver attributed only to the Civil Explosives Directive as per cost 
templates 

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Checks & risk assessments
(excl. outsourced tests)

41%

Coordination group meetings

Corrective actions (e.g.,
destruction/disposal)

Verification of reports &
certificates

Communicating non-
conformance & market
surveillance actions

Mapping non-conformant
supply chain

Monitoring accidents & harms

17%

10%

10%

7%

5%

5%

5%

Market Surveillance Authority

 N=2, Source: Technopolis Group, based on cost templates 

In the targeted survey, the MSA replying to the relevant question indicated that laboratory 
testing represents 5% of all costs covered by the question111, while coordination activities 

111  MSAs  were  asked  to  indicate  the  respective  shares  of  the  following  costs:  administrative  costs  from 
receiving, storing and retrieving the records; coordination of expert groups within the Member State; 

31 

 
 
 
 
(including  with  experts  within  the  Member  State,  competent  authorities  and  regional 
authorities and external groups (e.g. standardisation bodies, EC expert groups) represent 
25% of adjustment costs, and costs related to product recalls 20%. 

Adjustment costs 

The MSA filling in a cost template incurs average annual adjustment costs of EUR 3 782. 

As most costs for MSAs can be categorised as enforcement costs, only two adjustment cost 
factors remain. The familiarisation and training of staff accounts for 75% of adjustment 
costs  and  ensuring  that  personnel  are  informed  of  relevant  harmonisation  and 
standardisation activities for 25%. 

For  the  one  MSA  providing  a  complete  answer  to  the  relevant  question  in  the  targeted 
survey, training inspectors  represents 20% of the costs covered by the question112 which 
were not categorised in administrative, adjustment and enforcement costs for the purpose 
of the survey. 

Administrative costs 

The annual administrative costs incurred by the MSA that filled in the cost templates are 
EUR 901. These are evenly split between record-keeping of surveillance activities (50%) 
and the collection of documents and evidence and reporting to authorities (50%).  

For  the  one  MSA  that  gave  a  complete  answer  to  the  relevant  question  in  the  targeted 
survey,  administrative  costs  from  receiving,  storing  and  retrieving  records  and  the 
maintenance of registers each represent 10% of the costs covered by the question. 

Notified bodies 

When  looking  at  the  costs  for  notified  bodies  (NBs),  it  needs  to  be  borne  in  mind  that 
notified  bodies  owe  their  income  to  the  requirement  for  conformity  assessment  in  the 
Directive  and  can, 
into  account  considerations  of  competitiveness  and 
proportionality as mandated by the Directive (Article 36(2)), freely set the price for their 
assessments in order to cover their costs. Accordingly, costs directly linked to carrying out 
conformity assessments are not considered in this section113. 

taking 

coordination  between  and  with  competent  authorities  and  regional  authorities,  for  surveillance  and 
enforcement  purposes);  coordination  with  external  expert  groups  (standardisation  bodies,  EC  expert 
groups, for knowledge management purposes); the recall process; training of inspectors; maintenance of 
registers; laboratory testing (incl.  safe transportation and storage); legal costs of transposition. These 
costs were not categorised in adjustment, administrative and enforcement costs. 

112  MSAs  were  asked  to  indicate  the  respective  shares  of  the  following  costs:  administrative  costs  from 
receiving, storing and retrieving the records; coordination of expert groups within the MS,; coordination 
between  and  with  competent  authorities  and  regional  authorities,  for  surveillance  and  enforcement 
purposes);  coordination  with  external  expert  groups  (standardisation  bodies,  EC  expert  groups,  for 
knowledge management purposes); the recall process; training of inspectors; maintenance of registers; 
laboratory testing (incl. safe transportation and storage); legal costs of transposition. 

113 To note that the supporting study included them in the efficiency assessment. For this SWD, this cost 

calculation has been adjusted. 

32 

 
 
On  average,  the  three  NBs  providing  cost  data  incur  EUR 66 097  to  comply  with  the 
Directive. Adjustment costs account for 81% and administrative costs for 19%. There are 
no indirect or hassle costs. 

Table 4: Average yearly (2015-2022) compliance cost for notified bodies 

Cost categories 

Total yearly costs of Directive 

Adjustment costs 

Administrative costs 

N=3, Source: own calculationcalculation, based on cost templates 

Adjustment costs 

Costs in euro 

EUR 66 097 

81% 

19% 

The NBs’ reported adjustment costs, on average, amount to EUR 53 454 per year. These 
costs are linked to the liability insurance required by the Directive (39%), participation in 
coordination group meetings (33%) and familiarisation of staff with the essential safety 
requirements (28%). 

Administrative costs 

Administrative costs for the two consulted notified bodies are on average EUR 12 643 per 
year.  Of  these,  91%  are  attributed  to  (re)accreditation114  and  9%  to  non-compliance 
notifications.  The  two  notified  bodies  did  not  report  any  costs  for  informing  national 
authorities of civil explosives that present a risk, nor for informing other notified bodies of 
test results, upon request, or for applications for (re)notification.  

b)  Burden  

In  light  of  the  Commission’s  constant  objective  to  reduce  the  regulatory  burden  for 
stakeholders115,  the  efficiency  evaluation  should  also  include  an  assessment  of  the 
proportionality  of  the  burden  of  legal  obligations116.  In  the  public  consultation, 
stakeholders  were  asked  to  what  extent  certain  operative  and  administrative  tasks 
constitute a proportionate burden. Given the low response rate, with only nine respondents 
at most, the results can only be rough reference values for assessing stakeholders’ burden 
under the Directive.  

As shown above, the most significant cost factors for industry are operational activities 
linked  to  labelling  and  traceability,  conformity  assessments  and  designing  and 
manufacturing  according  to  the  essential  safety  requirements.  While  labelling  and  CE 
marking  was  considered  to  a  large  extent  proportionate  by  the  responding  business 
association, implementing the traceability system is perceived as rather disproportionate. 

114  To  note  that  accreditation  is  not  mandatory  under  the  Civil  Explosives  Directive,  but,  if  available, 

facilitates the notification procedure. 

115  See,  for  instance,  European  Commission,  A  simpler  and  faster  Europe:  Communication  on 
implementation  and  simplification,  European  Commission  2024-2029,  2024;  Ursula  von  der  Leyen, 
Europe’s choice, Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, 2024; Ursula von 
der Leyen, Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024, 2019. 

116 See European Commission, Better regulation toolbox, p. 407. 

33 

 
 
The burden of conformity assessment was considered to a large extent proportionate by 
the  business  association,  while  designing  and  manufacturing  according  to  the  essential 
safety requirements was described as moderately proportionate. Interestingly, carrying out 
conformity assessment procedures was found to be proportionate to a limited extent by an 
MSA. Controlling the transfer of explosives was rated moderately or largely proportionate 
by 5 out of 6 respondents. 

As  regards  authorities,  when  asked  about  the  burden  of  taking  corrective  actions  to 
withdraw or recall non-compliant articles, the three responding authorities gave different 
replies.  Each  one  of  them  replied  that  this  task  constitutes  a  proportionate  burden  to  a 
moderate,  limited  or  large  extent.  More  replies  on  the  burden  of  operative  tasks  are 
presented in Figure 16 below.  

Figure 16: Proportionality of the burden of operative tasks 

Conduct investigations in response to requests from
public authorities

100%

Collaborating with audits and inspections

43%

14%

14%

14%

14%

Take corrective actions to withdraw or recall non-
compliant articles

25%

50%

25%

Labelling, CE marking, and coordinate notified body’s 
authorization to affix registration number to the civil 
explosive

Implement traceability systems and operations

100%

100%

Carry out accreditation procedures

67%

33%

Carry out conformity assessment procedures

50%

25%

25%

Controlling the transfers of civil explosives

17%

50%

33%

Designing and manufacturing according to the
essential safety requirements

100%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Do not know/Prefer not to say Not at all

To a large extent

To a limited extent

To a moderate extent

To a very large extent

N= 1-7 (depending on the task), Source: own preparation based on public consultation 

As regards administrative and office tasks, the notification of risk event (e.g. accidents) 
– one of the most significant cost factors for businesses – constitutes a proportionate burden 

34 

 
 
to  a  moderate  extent  for  3  out  of  5  respondents,  and  to  a  large  extent  for  the  business 
association. Labelling  is also  considered proportionate by the business  association. The 
submission  of  reports,  data  and  statistics  to  competent  authorities  constitutes  a 
proportionate burden to a moderate extent or to a large extent for 2 out of 9 respondents, 
respectively. One stakeholder responded ‘to a limited extent’ or and another one ‘to a very 
large extent’.  

Stakeholders’ replies regarding the burden of the other administrative tasks are shown in 
Figure 17 below. 

Figure 17: Proportionality of the burden of administrative and office tasks 

Recordkeeping information

33%

11%

44%

11%

Lodging applications for authorisations,
accreditations, certifications (excl. transfers)

Supplying technical information of the civil
explosive to surveillance authorities and economic
operators

Information labelling

100%

100%

100%

Submission of reports, data and statistics to
competent authorities

33%

22%

11%

22%

11%

Notification of risk event (e.g. accidents)

20%

20%

60%

Notification of transfers (civil explosives and
ammunition)

Elaborate technical dossier for conformity
assessment application

100%

100%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Do not know/Prefer not to say

To a large extent

To a limited extent

To a moderate extent

To a very large extent

N=1-9 depending on the task. Source: own preparation based on public consultation 

Stakeholders  were  also  asked  where  they  see  potential  for  burden  reduction.  Several 
stakeholders, both in the public consultation and the targeted survey, pointed to the transfer 
procedure  and  the  expected  benefits  of  digitalising  the  transfer  approvals.  One 
respondent  in  the  public  consultation  suggested  the  digitalisation  of  systems  and 
procedures more generally.  

35 

 
 
c)  Trends in costs and efficiency gains 

Looking at how costs evolved during the evaluation period (i.e. since 2016) can provide 
an idea of the stakeholders’ financial burden linked to the Directive, but does not allow a 
causal relationship to be determined between changes in costs and the implementation of 
the  Directive,  because  other  factors,  including  macro-economic  developments  such  as 
increasing energy prices, might have played a role as well.  

In the targeted survey, many of the 44 responding stakeholders did not know or preferred 
not to provide information on how their costs had developed since the Directive started 
applying. Of those who gave an answer, the largest share reported that they experienced 
cost  increases  since  the  implementation  of  the  Directive,  especially  SMEs  and  large 
companies, of which 57.2% (4 out of 7) and 66.7% (4 out of 6), respectively experienced 
an increase or strong increase in adjustment and administrative costs. 

At  the  same  time,  the  majority  of  stakeholders  experienced  efficiency  gains  in  their 
administrative and operational activities due to compliance with the Directive.  

d)  Benefits 

As explained in section 4.1.1., the Directive has in many respects achieved its objectives, 
notably as regards contributing to increased health and safety and the free movement of 
civil explosives on the internal market. In doing so, it has generated a number of benefits 
for stakeholders and society.  

The  following  direct  benefits  have  been  identified  through  the  various  consultation 
activities: 

•  Sustained level of safety: The Directive seems to have contributed to a relatively 
stable safety level of the civil explosives on the market. This benefits not only users 
but also society at large117. 

•  Positive impact on public security: Security incidents with civil explosives seem 
to  be  rare.  Stakeholders  mostly  acknowledge  the  Directive’s  positive  impact  on 
public security118. 

•  Improved market access: Companies and notified bodies report improved access 
to  the  single  market  thanks  to  the  harmonisation  of  rules  and  the  CE  marking 
system.  They  have  also  experienced  advantages  on  non-EU  markets,  as  CE 
marking is widely accepted internationally as complying with other markets’ safety 
requirements119. 

•  Reduction  of  familiarisation  cost:  Although  the  Directive  has  not  entirely 
harmonised rules and definitions across Member States, adaptation of national laws 

117 Interviews with market surveillance authorities and targeted survey. In the targeted survey, 26.5% (13 
out of 49) of respondents replied that a high level of protection of human health and safety has been 
achieved to a high extent, 24.5% (12 out of 49) said it was achieved to a moderate extent, and 14.3% (7 
out of 49) considered it to be achieved to a very large extent. However, 24.5% (12 out of 49) replied that 
it was not at all or only to a low extent achieved. 

118 Interviews with market surveillance authorities. 
119 Cost assessment interviews. In the targeted survey, 26.5% (13 out of 49) of respondents replied that a 
reduction of trade barriers and costs in the Single Market has been achieved to a high extent, and $14.3 
(7 out of 49) said it was achieved to a very high extent. However, 14.3% (7 out of 49) selected ‘to a low 
extent’ and 12.2% (6 out of 49) ‘to no extent’. 

36 

 
 
to  the  Directive  has  reduced  stakeholders’  costs  for  familiarisation  with  legal 
requirements,  notably  in  terms  of  conformity  assessment  and  essential  safety 
requirements120. 

•  Coordination  and  information  exchange:  The  Directive  has  facilitated 
coordination  and  information  exchange  between  market  surveillance  authorities, 
notified bodies and the Commission. Fora like the Forum of Notified Bodies and 
the  Administrative  Cooperation  Group  (AdCo)  have  provided  a  welcome 
opportunity to exchange views on issues encountered during market surveillance 
and  conformity  assessments,  to  find  solutions  and  to  agree  on  common 
approaches121. 

•  Traceability:  The  traceability  system  for  civil  explosives,  which  requires  data 
storage  and  civil  explosives  to  be  labelled  with  a  unique  identification,  has 
enhanced capacity to track civil explosives throughout the supply chain122.  

4.1.3.  Coherence 

The Directive is meant to integrate well into the overall legal and policy framework at EU 
level and at international and national level. Contradictions, overlaps or other tensions with 
other measures should be avoided and, ideally, synergies should be created. This is what 
is understood by ‘external coherence’. At the same time, the various components of the 
Directive should build upon or complement each other in a logical and meaningful way – 
the Directive should be ‘internally coherent’. The external and internal coherence of the 
civil  explosives  legislation  was  assessed  for  this  evaluation  and  no  major  points  of 
incoherence were identified. 

a)  External  coherence 

The  Directive  operates  alongside  other  EU  legislation  regulating  explosive  products  or 
substances, chemicals or other related product categories. 

•  Explosives Precursors Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2019/1148)123 

The  Explosives  Precursors  Regulation  establishes  harmonised  rules  for  substances  or 
mixtures  that  could  be  misused  for  the  illicit  manufacture  of  explosives.  Before  the 
Explosives Precursors Regulation was adopted in 2019, an impact assessment examined 
the  coherence  of  the  initiative  with  the  existing  legal  framework,  including  the  Civil 
Explosives Directive. It was concluded that given that they have a different focus in terms 
of  products/substances,  the  two  pieces  of  legislation  were  complementary.  No  major 

120 Cost assessment interviews. 
121 Cost assessment interviews and targeted interviews. 
122 Interviews with market surveillance authorities and notified bodies. In the targeted survey, 30.6% (15 out 
of 49) of respondents indicated that this benefit was achieved to a very high extent, and the same share 
selected ‘to a high extent’.18.4% (9 out of 49) selected ‘to a very high extent’. However, 8.2% (4 out of 
49) consider this benefit to be achieved not at all or to a low extent. 

123  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1148  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20 June  2019  on  the 
marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing 
Regulation 
ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1148/oj). 

No 98/2013 

11.7.2019, 

(EU) 

p. 1, 

186, 

(OJ 

L 

37 

 
 
inconsistencies or overlaps were identified124. Of the 6 stakeholders sharing their opinion 
on this point in the public consultation, 5 perceived the Civil Explosives Directive as being 
highly or moderately coherent with the Explosives Precursors Regulation125. However, the 
description  of  the  scope  of  the  Explosives  Precursors  Regulation  in  Article 2  can  be 
misleading, as civil explosives are not explicitly excluded.  

•  Pyrotechnics Directive (Directive 2013/29/EU)126 

The  Pyrotechnics  Directive  regulates  articles  containing  explosive  substances  or  an 
explosive mixture of substances designed to produce heat, light, sound, gas or smoke or a 
combination  of  such  effects  through  self-sustained  exothermic  chemical  reactions 
(pyrotechnic articles). While pyrotechnic articles technically fall within the definition of 
explosives  under  the  Civil  Explosives  Directive,  they  are  explicitly  excluded  from  its 
scope. Legally, there are therefore no overlaps between the two Directives. However, in 
practice, stakeholders report difficulties in distinguishing the two kinds of products and, 
accordingly,  the  applicable  rules.  For  instance,  high-hazard  pyrotechnic  articles  (e.g. 
category  P2)  are  extensively  used  like  civil  explosives  and  could  be  considered  to  be 
explosives  due  to  their  potential  risks127.  Primer  caps  are  another  example  of  products 
which, according to notified bodies, do not fit clearly into one or the other category128. 

•  Firearms Directive (Directive (EU) 2021/555)129 

The Firearms Directive sets common minimum standards on the acquisition, possession, 
and commercial exchange of civilian firearms (e.g. firearms used for sport shooting and 
hunting)  within  the  EU.  While  the  Civil  Explosives  Directive  regulates  the  intra-EU 
transfer of ammunition, the Firearms Directive sets out rules on other aspects, such as the 
traceability  and  labelling  and  proper  storage  of  ammunition.  Although  the  Firearms 
Directive and the Civil Explosives Directive have different definitions of ‘ammunition’, 
this is not a lack of legal coherence but reflects the respective specific regulatory context. 

124 European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the document proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending 
Annex  XVII  to  Regulation  (EC)  No 1907/2006  and  repealing  Regulation  (EU)  No 98/2013  on  the 
marketing and use of explosives precursors, SWD(2018) 104 final, 2018, p. 106. 

125 33.3% (3 out of 9) responded that the Directive had ‘Moderate Coherence’, 22.2% (2 out of 9) responded 
‘high coherence’ and 11.1% (1 out of 9) ‘Low Coherence. 33.3 (3 out of 9) chose the ‘Do not know/prefer 
not to say’ option. 

126  Directive  2013/29/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12 June  2013  on  the 
harmonisation  of  the  laws  of  the  Member  States  relating  to  the  making  available  on  the  market  of 
pyrotechnic articles (recast) (OJ L 178, 28.6.2013, p. 27, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/29/oj). 
127 Information from interviews with notified bodies and national enforcement authorities in the context of 

the study in support of the evaluation. 

128 Discussion at meeting of the Forum of Notified Bodies for pyrotechnic articles, 6 March 2025. Minutes 

not yet available. 

129 Directive (EU) 2021/555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 on control of 
p. 1,  ELI: 
of  weapons 

acquisition 

6.4.2021, 

(OJ  L 

115, 

the 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2021/555/oj). 

possession 

and 

38 

 
 
•  Machinery Directive (Directive 2006/42/EC)130  

The Machinery Directive, which will be repealed as of 14 January 2027 by the Machinery 
Regulation131, enables machinery meeting EU health and safety requirements to circulate 
freely within the internal market. During discussions of an expert group meeting in 2016132, 
it was mentioned that mobile explosives manufacturing units (MEMUs), which are used 
for blasting in mining, could be considered both ‘machinery’ in the context of machinery 
legislation and ‘civil explosives’ under the Civil Explosives Directive. Civil explosives are 
not excluded from the scope of the machinery legislation.  

•  CLP  Regulation  (Regulation  (EC)  No  1272/2008)133  and  REACH  Regulation 

(Regulation (EU) 1907/2006)134 

The  Classification,  Labelling  and  Packaging  (CLP)  Regulation  establishes  harmonised 
rules for the classification of substances and mixtures and for the labelling and packaging 
of hazardous substances and mixtures. Civil explosives, if classified as explosives under 
the  CLP  Regulation,  must  be  labelled  and  packaged  as  such  in  accordance  with  CLP. 
Accordingly, civil explosives falling within the scope of the Directive need to comply with 
both the labelling requirements of the CLP Regulation and in the Directive.  

The  REACH  (registration,  evaluation,  authorisation  and  restriction  of  chemicals) 
Regulation  regulates  the  manufacture,  placing  on  the  market  and  use  of  chemical 
substances, on their own, in mixtures or in articles to ensure a high level of protection of 
human health and the environment. REACH applies to substances and mixtures used for 
civil explosives. 

In the public consultation, out of the 5 stakeholders that shared their opinion, 2 perceive a 
high coherence between the EU chemicals legislation (CLP and REACH) and the Directive 
and 2 a moderate coherence135. No concrete coherence issues between the two pieces of 
legislation and the Civil Explosives Directive were identified. 

130 Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on machinery, and 
amending Directive 95/16/EC (OJ L 157, 9.6.2006, p. 24, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/42/oj). 
131 Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2023 on machinery 
and  repealing  Directive  2006/42/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  and  Council 
Directive 73/361/EEC (OJ L 165, 29.6.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1230/oj). 

132 As mentioned in Meeting of the Explosives Working Group in Brussels, 17 October 2016. 
133 Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on 
classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 
67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006  (OJ L 353, 31.12.2008, 
p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/1272/oj). 

134 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 
concerning  the  Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation  and  Restriction  of  Chemicals  (REACH), 
establishing  a  European  Chemicals  Agency,  amending  Directive  1999/45/EC  and  repealing  Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 
76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC (OJ L 
396, 30.12.2006, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/1907/oj). 

135 33.3% (2 out of 9) respondents selected ‘high coherence‘ and 33.3% (2 out of 9) ‘moderate coherence‘. 
One stakeholder chose ‘low coherence‘ and the remaining four (44.4%) did not know or preferred not 
to say. 

39 

 
 
•  Waste Framework Directive (Directive 2008/98/EC)136 

The Waste Framework Directive (WFD) lays down measures to protect the environment 
and  human  health  from  waste,  including  rules  for  hazardous  waste.  It  applies  to  civil 
explosives waste, which falls under the category of ‘explosive’, and therefore hazardous, 
waste137.  However,  ‘decommissioned  explosives’  are  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the 
WFD.  The  Civil  Explosives  Directive  itself  is  largely  silent  about  the  disposal  of  civil 
explosives.  The  essential  safety  requirements  only  very  broadly  stipulate  that  ‘each 
explosive must be designed and manufactured in  such a way that it can  be disposed of 
safely  by  a  suitable  process  with  minimum  effect  on  the  environment’138.  The  WFD 
therefore  complements  the  Civil  Explosives  Directive  and  there  do  not  seem  to  be 
contradictions or overlaps between the two Directives.  

•  Seveso-III Directive (Directive 2012/18/EU)139 

The Seveso-III Directive lays down rules for the prevention of major accidents involving 
dangerous substances in establishments where such substances are present. It also applies 
to economic operators in the civil explosives sector, if dangerous substances within the 
scope of the Seveso-III Directive are present in their establishment. The participants to the 
public  consultation  mainly  considered  the  Civil  Explosives  Directive  coherent  with  the 
Seveso-III Directive140. No conflicting rules were identified. 

•  Product Liability Directive (Directive (EU) 2024/2853)141 

The Product Liability Directive lays down rules on the liability of economic operators for 
damage suffered by natural persons and caused by defective products and on compensation 
for such damage. While it applies to civil explosives in situations where a natural person 
has  suffered  a  damage  caused  by  a  defective  explosive,  the  two  Directives  do  regulate 
distinct aspects – safe products vs liability for defective products – and complement each 
other. 

136 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and 
repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/98/oj). 

137 See Annex III of the WFD. 
138 See Annex II, I.2. 
139 Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of 
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council 
Directive 96/82/EC (OJ L 197, 24.7.2012, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/18/oj). 

140 22.2% (2 out of 9) selected ‘High coherence’ and the same share ‘Moderate coherence’. One respondent 

chose ‘Low coherence’ and 44.4% (4 out of 9) did not know or preferred not to answer. 

141 Directive (EU) 2024/2853 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on liability 
for defective products and repealing Council Directive 85/374/EEC (OJ L, 2024/2853, 18.11.2024, ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/2853/oj).  The  same  applies  to  Council  Directive  85/374/EEC  of 
25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States  concerning 
(OJ  L  210,  7.8.1985,  p. 29,  ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1985/374/oj). The latter will be repealed 9 December 2026. 

for  defective  products 

liability 

40 

 
 
•  Market Surveillance Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2019/1020)142 

The  Market  Surveillance  Regulation  lays  down  rules  and  procedures  for  economic 
operators  and  establishes  a  system  for  their  cooperation  with  supervisory  authorities.  It 
applies  to  civil  explosives  in  so  far  as  there  are  no  specific  provisions  with  the  same 
objective  under  the  Civil  Explosives  Directive.  The  definitions  of  ‘economic  operator’ 
differ  between  the  two  pieces  of  legislation.  While  the  definition  under  the  Market 
Surveillance  Regulation  encompasses  manufacturers,  authorised 
representatives, 
importers, distributors or fulfilment service providers, the definition in the Civil Explosives 
Directive also includes natural and legal persons engaged in the use of explosives. While 
this may create some confusion, the different definitions apply in relation to the specific 
obligations under the two pieces of legislation. 

•  Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU143 

The EU Counter-Terrorism Agenda seeks to support Member States in better anticipating, 
preventing,  protecting  and  responding  to  the  terrorist  threat.  Two  of  the  pillars  for  the 
Agenda  are  identifying  vulnerabilities  and  building  capacity  to  anticipate  threats  and 
promoting security by design and reducing vulnerabilities to protect cities and people144. 
The Directive’s stated objective of ensuring a high level of public security is in line with 
the EU Counter-Terrorism Agenda.  

•  Agreement  Concerning  the  International  Carriage  of  Dangerous  Goods  by 
Road145  (ADR),  Regulations  concerning 
the  International  Carriage  of 
Dangerous  Goods  by  Rail  (RID),  European  Agreement  concerning  the 
International  Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways (ADN) and 
UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods146 

ADR, RID, ADN and the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods set 
out  conditions  or  recommendations  that  should  be  met  when  dangerous  goods  are 
transported. The EU has transposed ADR, RID and ADN into Directive 2008/68/EC which 
makes  them  applicable  to  all  transport  in  the  EU,  both  within  and  across  national 
borders147.  Directive  2008/68/EC  is  complementary  to  the  Civil  Explosives  Directive, 
which does not regulate the transport of civil explosives.  

142 Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on market 
surveillance  and  compliance  of  products  and  amending  Directive  2004/42/EC  and  Regulations  (EC) 
No 765/2008 
ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1020/oj). 

No 305/2011 

25.6.2019, 

(EU) 

p. 1, 

169, 

(OJ 

and 

L 

143 European Commission, Communication from the Commission, A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: 

Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond, COM(2020) 795 final, 2020. 

144 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2326 
145 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Agreement concerning the International Carriage of 

Dangerous Goods by Road, 2022. 

146 United Nations, Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations, Volume 

I, Twenty-first revised edition, 2019. 

147 Directive 2008/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on the inland 
transport of dangerous goods (OJ L 260, 30.9.2008, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/68/oj); 

41 

 
 
 
•  National laws and policies 

The Directive allows Member State to impose special security requirements and security 
derogations for transfers. This and other variations between national laws seem to create 
barriers to the free movement of civil explosives, undermining the Directive’s objective of 
creating  a  single  market  for  these  articles.  According  to  40.7%  (22  out  of  54)  of 
respondents in the targeted survey, current variations in national rules affect the intra-EU 
flows of civil explosives negatively or very negatively148, 31.5% (17 out of 54) observe a 
negative or very negative effect on the competitiveness of EU companies149. At the same 
time, a considerable share of stakeholders replied that there are also positive effects from 
national variations in terms of health and safety (24.1%, 13 out of 54) and public security 
(33.3%, 18 out of 54)150. 

b)  Internal coherence  

In  terms  of  internal  coherence,  most  stakeholders  participating  in  the  targeted  survey 
considered  the  Directive’s  provisions  to  a  large  extent  coherent  (53.2%,  25  out  of  47). 
27.6%  (13  out  of  47)  rated  internal  coherence  as  ‘medium’.  In  line  with  this  positive 
assessment, no issue of internal coherence was identified in the evaluation. 

4.2.  How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom? 

In  line  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  it  is  important  to  evaluate  if  the  EU  civil 
explosives legislation has had a positive impact beyond what could have been achieved by 
the Member States acting alone.  

Overall, stakeholders acknowledge the added value of EU-wide rules on civil explosives. 
When asked about the expected consequences if the Directive was withdrawn, 44.4% (4 
out of 9) of respondents in the public consultation replied that the civil explosives sector 
would be very negatively affected, and 222%% (2 out of 9) said it would be negatively 
affected.  

Looking  at  the  EU  added  value  of  the  Directive  in  relation  to  its  various  objectives, 
respondents to the targeted survey predominantly believe that they could not at all (26.5%, 
9 out of 34) or only to a low extent (47.1%, 16 out of 34) be achieved if Member States 

Directive (EU) 2022/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on uniform 
procedures for checks on the transport of dangerous goods by road (OJ L 274, 24/10/2022, p. 1, ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/1999/oj); Directive 2010/35/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council  of  16 June  2010  on  transportable  pressure  equipment  and  repealing  Council  Directives 
76/767/EEC, 84/525/EEC, 84/526/EEC, 84/527/EEC and 1999/36/EC (OJ L 165, 30.6.2010, p. 1, ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/35/oj). 

148 In the targeted survey, 37% (20 out of 54) of respondents selected ‘negatively’, 3.7% (2 out of 54) ‘very 

negatively, 11.1% (6 out of 54) ‘positively’ and 25.9% (14 out of 54) ‘unchanged/neutral’. 

149 In the targeted survey, 27.8% (15 out of 54) of respondents selected ‘negatively’, 3.7% (2 out of 54) ‘very 
negatively’. However, 11.1% (6 out of 54) positively and 27.8% (15 out of 54) ‘unchanged/neutral’. 
150 For ‘health and safety’, 16.7% (9 out of 54) selected ‘positively’ and 7.4% (4 out of 54) ‘very positively’. 
35.2% (19 out of 54) chose ‘unchanged/neutral’. For ‘public security’, 22.2% (12 out of  54) selected 
‘positively’ and 11.1% (6 out of 54) ‘very positively’. 27.8% (15 out of 54) chose ‘unchanged/neutral’. 

42 

 
 
had  acted  alone.  The  public  consultation  results  are  not  conclusive  in  this  regard,  as 
stakeholders were divided, and a large share did not know or preferred not to answer. 

In  fact,  44.4%  (4  out  of  9)  of  stakeholders  in  the  public  consultation  believe  that  the 
harmonisation of rules could have been achieved only to a limited extent or not at all in the 
absence of the Directive, but 22.2% (2 out of 9) consider that it could have been achieved 
to a large extent. When asked about trade barriers and costs in the single market, 33.3% (3 
out of 9) replied that they could not have or could have only to a low extent been reduced 
without  EU  intervention,  and  22.2%  (2  out  of  9)  considered  that  they  could  have  been 
reduced to a large extent. Improved traceability could have been achieved to a large extent 
without the Directive, according to 33.3% (3 out of 9) of stakeholders, and not at all or to 
a low extent, according to another third of stakeholders. As regards the protection of human 
health and safety, stakeholders said that it could have been achieved to a large (33.3%, 3 
out  of  9)  or  moderate  (33.3%,  3  out  of  9)  extent.  Similarly,  33.3%  (3  out  of  9)  of 
stakeholders  believe  that,  even  without  the  Directive,  a  high  level  of  user  trust  and 
confidence in the safety of civil explosives could have been achieved to a moderate extent 
through national rules, and 22.2% (2 out of 9) said to a large or very large extent. 

Overall,  these  findings  suggest  that  the  Directive’s  added  values  consist  mainly  in  its 
contribution  to  the  harmonisation  of  rules  and  the  internal  market  for  civil  explosives, 
while EU-wide rules seem to be less essential for the protection of safety and security. 

4.3. 

Is the intervention still relevant? 

Under  the  criterion  of  relevance,  this  evaluation  looked  at  the  relationship  between  the 
scope and objectives of the Directive, on the one hand, and the current and future needs 
and problems in relation to civil explosives in the EU, on the other hand As explained in 
the Better Regulation Toolbox, if an intervention does not help address the current and the 
likely future needs or problems, then it does not matter how effective, efficient or coherent 
it is, as it may no longer be appropriate151.  

4.3.1.  Relevance of the objectives 

As explained in 2.1.2, the 1993 Directive was adopted in a time when there was not yet an 
internal market for civil explosives and the Member States’ laws regulating those articles 
varied significantly. Moreover, there was a concern about the safety of civil explosives 
due to the risks inherent in those products. Accordingly, the Directive aimed to set out EU-
wide  essential  safety  requirements  and  a  harmonised  approach  to  the  provision  of 
information on their safe handling and use, which was maintained in the recast leading to 
the adoption of the current Directive. The objective of protecting public security is also 
still  strongly  reflected  in  the  current  Directive  with  its  provisions  on  traceability  and 
transfer aiming to prevent diversion. This section assesses the relevance of the Directive’s 
objectives  in  light  of  current  problems  and  needs.  Stakeholders  in  the  targeted  survey 
mostly believe that the Directive addresses current needs and challenges to a significant 

151 European Commission, Better regulation toolbox 2023, p. 409. 

43 

 
 
extent, with 54.8% (23 out of 42) responding ‘to a high extent’ or ‘very high extent’ and 
28.6% (12 out of 42) ‘to a moderate extent’. 

a) Free movement of civil explosives in the internal market (incl. 

harmonisation of laws and implementation)  

As illustrated in section 3.3, Member States laws have significantly aligned following the 
adoption of the Directive. Nevertheless, there are still notable differences, which are partly 
due  to  differing  understandings  of  provisions  between  Member  States.  These  persistent 
differences, as was explained in section 4.1.1.a), seem to hamper trade between Member 
States  and the competitiveness  of EU companies to  some extent. Differences  in  market 
surveillance activities are also seen as an obstacle to enhanced cooperation between market 
surveillance authorities. 

In the public consultation, when asked about the extent to which the guaranteeing of the 
functioning of the internal market is still relevant, 55.5% (5 out of 9) responded ‘to a large 
extent’ or ‘to a very large extent’. However, in the targeted survey, 32.6% (14 out of 43) 
of stakeholders replied that the issue of differences between national laws causing barriers 
to trade within the Union, thus impeding the free movement of goods within the internal 
market, is only to a low extent or not at all relevant nowadays, while 25.6% (11 out of 43) 
chose ‘to a moderate extent’. 

Against this background, it seems that the objective of ensuring the free movement of civil 
explosives  in  the internal  market  by means of the harmonisation  of laws and practices, 
although being still relevant, is no longer a pressing concern for stakeholders given the 
already relatively well functioning internal market for explosives. 

b) Health, safety and security 

As mentioned in section 3.2, despite the inherent danger of explosives, health and safety 
issues are rather rare. According to 44.% (4 out of 9) respondents in the public consultation, 
the issue of unsafe civil explosives on the market is addressed by the Directive152. In the 
same vein, 43.5% (23 out of 43) of respondents in the targeted survey consider the presence 
of non-compliant or dangerous products on the market relevant to a low extent or not at all 
relevant anymore. Interestingly, while 3 out of 4 enforcement authorities that provided an 
answer shared that opinion153, 44.4% (4 out of 9) of market surveillance authorities said 
that they considered the presence of non-compliant or dangerous products on the market 
still  to  a  high  or  very  high  extent  relevant154.  The  problem  of  heterogenous  safety 
requirements that hamper the protection of human health and safety was rated relevant to 

152 The remaining five respondents did not know or preferred not to say. 
153 One  enforcement authority selected  ‘not at all‘ and two  ‘to a moderate  extent‘. Another  enforcement 
authority indicated that it is moderately relevant. Four enforcement authorities did not know or preferred 
not to answer. 

154  One  market  surveillance  authority  did  not  know  or  preferred  not  to  answer.  The  remaining  Market 
surveillance authorities selected ‘to a moderate extent’ (20%, 2 out of 10), ‘to a low extent’ (20%, 2 out 
of 10) and ‘not at all’ (10%, 1 out of 10). 

44 

 
 
a low extent or not at all relevant by 41.9% (18 out of 43) of respondents in the targeted 
survey, and 18.6% (8 out of 43) considered it moderately relevant.  

Although health and safety issues seem to no longer be a major concern, respondents to 
the public consultation predominantly considered the Directive’s objective of ensuring the 
protection of human health and safety of consumers still relevant, with 33.3% (3 out of 9) 
responding ‘to a very large extent’ and 22.2% (2 out of 9) ‘to a large extent’.  

Looking at public security, as shown in section 3.2, civil explosives do not seem to be a 
major worry for stakeholders, as incidents are rare. Yet, one-third of respondents in the 
public  consultation  (3  out  of  9)  indicated  that  the  theft  and  criminal  misuse  (incl.  by 
terrorists or in war areas) of civil explosives as well as their illicit trade should be further 
addressed  by  the  Directive  in  the  future.  The  same  share  considered  that  the  lack  of 
proportionate enforcement and penalties to prevent these security issues should be further 
tackled155. Stakeholders were divided as regards the relevance of the Directive’s objective 
of  ensuring  public  security,  with  the  same  number  of  respondents  (22.2%,  2  out  of  9) 
replying  that  it  is  to  a  very  large  extent  or  to  a  limited  extent  relevant  nowadays.  Two 
respondents (each 10%, 1 out of 9) considered it not at all or to a moderate extent relevant 
respectively. 

4.3.2.  Relevance to other priorities/challenges 

Although  the protection of the environment is mentioned in  a recital156  as one of the 
public interests the Directive aims to protect, and the Directive requires explosives to be 
designed,  manufactured  and  supplied  in  a  way  as  to  present  a  minimal  risk  to  the 
environment, incl. at disposal157, environmental protection is not a focus of the Directive.  

However, as mentioned in section 3.2, there are certain environmental concerns linked to 
the  use  and  disposal  of  civil  explosives,  such  as  toxic  residues  and  the  disturbance  of 
wildlife.  This  was  also  acknowledged  by  stakeholders  in  the  public  consultation  who 
considered  that  environmental  considerations,  such  as  the  sustainability  of  product 
components,  explosives  residues  and  safe  disposal  are  relevant  and  should  be  better 
addressed  by  the  Directive  in  the  future158.  Moreover,  an  animal  protection  association 
pointed to the negative impacts that explosives can have on animal welfare and underlined 
the importance of protecting animals through appropriate ESRs. 

155 44.4% (4 out of 9) or 55.6% (5 out of 9) of respondents did not know or preferred not to say, depending 

on the concrete security concern. 

156 Recital 20. 
157 ESRs I.1. and I.3. 
158  In  the  public  consultation,  33.3%  (3  out  of  9)  respondents  considered  that  ‘sustainable  product 
components and questions of residues‘ should be addressed by the Directive in the future, while 55.6% 
(5  out  of  9)  did  not  know  or  preferred  not  to  say.  As  regards  the  ‘challenge  in  the  disposal  of  civil 
explosives‘, 44.4% (4 out of 9) indicated that this should be further addressed in the future and the same 
share did not know or preferred not to say. 

45 

 
 
Against this background, the societal concern of environmental protection seems to have 
become  increasingly  relevant  also  in  relation  to  civil  explosives  and  is  currently  only 
marginally addressed by the Directive. 

Moreover, the civil explosives industry experienced certain technological developments, 
including in detonator technology, wireless initiating systems, boosters and on-site mixed 
explosives159,  resulting  in  more  sophisticated  explosives  with  improved  precision  and 
control160. In the public consultation, most respondents abstained from the question as to 
whether technological advancements, in general, are addressed by the Directive, but 22.2% 
(2  out  of  9)  considered  that  they  should  be  addressed  in  the  future.  As  regards,  more 
specifically, civil explosives containing digital components which may be exposed to new 
risks  (e.g.  software  malfunctioning,  cyberattacks),  44.4%  (4  out  of  9)  replied  that  such 
risks should be covered by the Directive161. Moreover, a national MSA mentioned during 
the interviews that it would be good to consider the use of artificial intelligence systems in 
the  explosives  sector  to  ensure  alignment  of  the  Directive  with  technological 
developments. 

Finally, as regards the competitiveness of EU companies, most respondents in the public 
consultation did not know or preferred not to answer and the remaining four were divided 
on the question whether this interest is covered by the Directive162. 

4.3.3.  Relevance of the scope 

After having assessed the Directive’s relevance in terms of objectives, this sub-section will 
look  more  closely  at  the  current  scope  of  the  Directive  and  whether  it  is  still  relevant. 
According  to  67.3%  (33  out  of  49)  of  the  respondents  to  the  targeted  survey,  it  is  still 
relevant163. 

Relevance of product coverage 

The  product  coverage  of  the  Directive  seems  to  be  generally  appropriate,  but  a  few 
concerns were raised in the consultation activities. When asked whether there are products 
or any aspects currently excluded by the Directive that should be included, 44.4% (4 out 
of 9) of respondents in the public consultation answered with ‘No’, and 22.2% (2 out of 9) 
with ‘Yes’. 

Some issues were raised with regard to the delineation of scope set out in Article 1 of the 
Directive. According to Article 1(2)(a), civil explosives intended for non-commercial use 

159 As reported in the targeted survey. 
160 European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 
2013/29/EU,  Commission  Implementing  Directive  2014/58/EU,  and  Directive  2014/28/EU, 
Commission  Implementing  Directive  2008/43/EC  and  Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC),  Final 
Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025, p. 106. 

161 An equal share selected the ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’ option. 
162 55.6% (5 out of 9) selected the ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’ option and each 22.2% (2 out of 9) replied 
that the competitiveness of EU companies is currently addressed by the Directive or should be addressed 
in the future, respectively. 

163 40.8% (20 out of 49) rated the relevance of the scope at 4 out 5 and 26.5% (13 out of 49) at 5 out 5. 

46 

 
 
by the armed forces or the police do not fall under the scope of the Directive. However, 
outside the context of the evaluation,  Member States and industry have approached the 
Commission via email, in administrative cooperation group meetings and meetings of the 
Forum  of  Notified  Bodies,  to  clarify  from  which  point  in  the  supply  chain  does  the 
Directive not apply to a product that will eventually be used by public security forces. The 
question was also raised in the targeted survey. It is especially relevant when one or several 
intermediate companies are involved that manufacture final civil explosives not only for 
use by public security forces, but also for commercial use. The Commission services have 
outlined  their  understanding  of  the  matter  in  a  document  presented  at  the  Commission 
Expert  Group  expert  group  meeting  on  18 March  2025,  explaining  that,  while  the 
exemption is not limited to direct sales to public security forces, it does not necessarily 
apply to the whole supply chain and a case-by-case assessment of the situation is needed.  

As already mentioned in section 4.1.3.a), the delineation between the scope of the Civil 
Explosives Directive and the Pyrotechnics Directive seems to be not always clear. For 
instance,  as  pointed  out  by  several  respondents  to  the  targeted  survey,  there  are 
uncertainties about the correct classification of products like primer caps164, safety fuses 
and rocket propellants. Moreover, as also underlined by some stakeholders in the targeted 
survey, some articles currently falling under the scope of the Pyrotechnics Directive, such 
as heavy flash bangers or rock-breaking cartridges, pose similar risks as civil explosives, 
and it might therefore be warranted to make them subject to the Civil Explosives Directive 
or similar rules. 

Moreover, a respondent in the targeted survey noted that articles intended for use in the 
aerospace industry and those used as maritime equipment, although excluded from the 
Pyrotechnics Directive, are not exempted from the Civil Explosives Directive, resulting in 
a situation where low-risk explosive aviation components and maritime equipment have to 
follow the strict traceability and transfer systems for civil explosives. 

As  regards  the  scope  of  the  transfer  rules,  a  Member  State  authority  suggested  that 
transfers of explosives up to 1 kg should be exempted from the requirement of a transfer 
approval, and instead only be reported to authorities. 

Relevance of provisions 

The provisions of the Directive are still relevant across almost all areas of intervention, 
according  to  most  stakeholders  sharing  their  views  in  the  public  consultation165.  The 

164 As explained by a market surveillance authority in the targeted survey, some EU countries require an 
intra-EU transfer document for hand weapon cartridge primers, while others do not. In Finland, there is 
a national exception: persons having a permission to hand weapon is allowed to buy 1 000 primers and 
2 kg  of  gun  powder  for  reloading  cartridges  at  home  for  their  own  use.  Moreover,  primers  are  not 
covered by the Finish weapons act and the police does not supervise them. 

165 ‘To a large extent‘ was (one of) the most frequently given answers for the following areas: ‘obligations 
of  manufacturers‘,  ‘obligations  of  distributors’,  ‘obligations  of  notified  bodies’,  ‘licenses  and 
authorisation’, ‘control of transfer of civil explosives in the EU’, ‘marking and labelling’, ‘traceability 
and  record  keeping‘,  ‘licenses  and  authorisations’,  ‘sharing  of  information  with  authorities  and 
operators’, ‘conformity assessment procedures’. 

47 

 
 
obligations of manufacturers, the obligations of distributors and the control and transfer of 
civil explosives in the EU and conformity assessments are the areas which the largest share 
of stakeholders consider to a very large or large extent relevant – between 44.4% (4 out of 
9) and 55.5% (5 out 9). The provisions on traceability and record-keeping, licenses and 
authorisations and obligations of distributors were considered to a moderate or a very large 
extent  relevant  by  each  one-third  (3  out  of  9)  of  respondents.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
provisions on seizures and penalties were attributed only low relevance by 22.2% (2 out 
of 9) and 44.4% (4 out of 9), respectively, which might be related to the wide discretion 
left  to  Member  States  regarding  the  concrete  penalties  and  measures  on  seizures 
implemented at national level.  

In the public consultation, stakeholders suggested a number of aspects that are currently 
not covered by the provisions of the Directive but should, in their view, be included, as 
well  as  aspects  that  should  be  regulated  differently.  An  MSA  noted  that  the  current 
requirements do not ensure that the unique identification is affixed in durable way, while 
another  MSA  highlighted  the  need  to  strengthen  the  Directive’s  rules  on  product 
traceability,  training  of  stakeholders,  reporting,  thefts  and  suspicious  transactions,  and 
misuse, without providing more details. One competent authority considered the rules for 
bi- and multi-component explosives not sufficiently clear, also in light of the applicable 
rules  for  transport  and  storage.  Moreover,  an  enforcement  authority  suggested  that,  in 
addition to the existing licensing requirement for economic operators, employees of a civil 
explosives company should also be recognised. The same authority proposed to include a 
provision on the withdrawal of licenses/recognition in the Directive and to harmonise rules 
on bi-material components and safety distances. Finally, there was a call from civil society 
to better address animal welfare. 

5.  WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED? 

5.1.  Conclusions 

The Directive has largely achieved its objectives. It has contributed to the free movement 
of civil explosives in the internal market and, with its essential safety requirements and 
rules for traceability and transfer, helped ensure a high level of human health and safety 
and security. 

5.1.1.  Effectiveness 

Free  movement  of  civil  explosives  in  the  internal  market:  The  Directive  has  largely 
harmonised  Member  States’  rules  on  the  making  available  of  civil  explosives,  thereby 
enabling  the  free  movement  of  these  articles  on  the  internal  market.  However, 
remaining  differences  between  Member  States’  laws,  resulting  from  the  incorrect 
transposition  of  the  Directive’s  provisions  or  additional  national  requirements  in  some 
Member States, may hamper to some extent the smooth trade of civil explosives in the EU. 

Human health, safety and security: Accidents with civil explosives seem to be relatively 
rare, and, according to stakeholders, the numbers have remained stable or declined since 
the adoption of the Directive. The essential safety requirements set out in the Directive 

48 

 
in combination with the system for conformity assessment seem to be overall appropriate 
to ensure that civil explosives placed on the EU market are safe. Despite some concerns 
about divergences in conformity assessment practices of notified bodies, some being more 
thorough  than  others,  stakeholders  largely  believe  that  the  Directive  has  increased  the 
quality and reliability of conformity assessments and contributed to higher compliance. 
Moreover, market surveillance appears to be effective in detecting and removing non-
compliant  explosives  from  the  market,  although  cross-border  cooperation  could  be 
enhanced. 

The rules for the intra-EU transfer of civil explosives seem to contribute to safety and 
security  in  the  sector,  to  the  satisfaction  of  most  stakeholders.  However,  differences 
between  Member  States’  transposition  of  these  rules,  in  parts  going  beyond  the 
requirements  set  out  in  the  Directive  and  Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC,  may 
complicate the transfer of explosives. Furthermore, the still prevalent paper-based system 
for the approval of transfers seems to cause administrative burden and delays.  

Security incidents which involve civil explosives seem to be rather rare. In that regard, 
the traceability system for explosives seems to serve its purpose and can be considered a 
main strength of the Directive. Moreover, penalties are considered appropriate in light 
of the relatively rare and minor infringements in the civil explosives sector. 

5.1.2.  Efficiency 

Bearing in  mind the limited available cost  data, it  can cautiously be concluded that the 
Directive is, overall, operating efficiently. 

Costs have increased for most stakeholders but, overall, still seem to be proportionate – 
they are equivalent to a proportionate share of companies’ turnover. Most stakeholders 
have  also  experienced  improved  efficiency  of  processes  and  tasks  thanks  to  the 
Directive.  Harmonisation  of  rules  has  reduced  costs  for  familiarisation  with  legal 
requirements, notably with safety requirements and  conformity assessments procedures, 
and  facilitated  market  access.  Stakeholders  also  benefit  from  improved  coordination 
and information exchange and enhanced traceability of civil explosives. Costs due to 
conformity  with  the  essential  safety  requirements,  including  design,  manufacturing  and 
assessment, seem proportionate, in particular in light of the benefit for safety and security 
they bring. 

Therefore, the Directive has led to certain burden reductions, as tasks and procedures 
can  be  carried  out  more  efficiently.  Most  obligations  are  perceived  as  proportionate  by 
stakeholders and seem essential for achieving the Directive’s objectives. A potential for 
further burden reduction could be identified in relation to the approval procedure for the 
transfer of explosives which could benefit from further harmonisation and digitalisation. 
Moreover, considering that labelling and traceability seem to create significant costs for 
industry, the potential benefit of digitalising these markings could be explored.  

49 

 
5.1.3.  Coherence 

The Directive is coherent with other relevant EU legislation and it supports broader EU 
policies, notably the Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU. Internationally, the Directive 
is  complemented  by  international  agreements  and  recommendations  on  the  transport  of 
dangerous goods. As regards coherence with national laws and policies, it must be noted 
that divergences between national laws can hamper the free movement of civil explosives, 
but might in some cases be beneficial in terms of health, safety and security. 

In terms of internal coherence, no issue was identified. 

5.1.4.  EU added value 

The Directive has had an added value compared to what could have been achieved by 
the  Member  States  acting  alone.  The  results  from  the  targeted  survey  suggest  that  the 
Directive’s objective could not or only to a low extent be achieved without EU-wide rules. 
Responses in the public consultation, although stakeholders were not entirely in agreement, 
indicate that the Directive is more important for the harmonisation of rules and the free 
movement of civil explosives on the internal market than for safety and security, which 
might also be ensured at Member-State level. 

5.1.5.  Relevance 

The  Directive’s  objectives  of  ensuring  the  free  movement  of  civil  explosives  on  the 
internal  market  via  the  harmonisation  of  laws  and  the  protection  of  health,  safety  and 
security are still relevant in light of current needs and problems. However, given the 
high degree of harmonisation of rules, the overall well-functioning internal market and the 
rare occurrence of safety and security incidents, the problems and needs that the Directive 
intended to address no longer seem to be pressing concerns for stakeholders. In turn, the 
protection of the environment and the technological developments in the sector have 
emerged as relevant concerns over the past years. 

A few concerns about clarity and scope were identified. These relate to the exemption 
of articles intended for use by public security forces, and the fact that explosives for the 
aerospace industry and maritime equipment are not excluded from the scope. Moreover, 
the delineation between civil explosives and pyrotechnic articles revealed to be, in some 
cases, challenging or inappropriate.  

Looking  at  the  concrete  provisions  in  the  Directive,  most  seem  to  be  still  relevant 
according to stakeholders. Only rules on seizures and penalties were attributed relatively 
low relevance. Stakeholders also suggested a few aspects that should be better addressed 
in the Directive’s provisions, such as  the durability of traceability labels, bi- and multi-
component explosives, the training of stakeholders, licenses and animal welfare. 

5.2.  Lessons learned 

The evaluation shed light on those aspects of the Directive that are working well, as well 
as on problems and gaps.  

The main achievements of the Directive are: 

50 

 
•  The free movement of civil explosives on the internal market through harmonised 

conformity assessment procedures and the alignment of national laws; 

•  Essential safety requirements for civil explosives across the EU; 
•  The  traceability  system  at  item-level  that  allows  tracking  civil  explosives 

throughout their lifecycle; 

•  Increased  cooperation  and  information  sharing  between  and  among  market 

surveillance authorities, notified bodies and the Commission. 

The  Directive  does  not  show  any  major  shortcomings,  but  there  is  some  potential  for 
improvement: 

•  Some  concerns  that  have  become  more  relevant  over  the  past  years,  notably 
environmental  protection  and  technological  developments,  seem  not  to  be 
comprehensively addressed by the Directive. 

•  The Directive could  potentially  benefit from the  digitalisation of labelling and 
transfer  approval  procedures,  taking  into  account  existing  technological 
solutions or initiatives, such as the Digital Product Passport and SCEPYLT. 

51 

 
 
ANNEX I:   PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

Lead DG, Decide reference and, if relevant, Work Programme reference 

DG for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs 

Agenda planning/ Work programme reference: PLAN/2022/1203 

Organisation and timing 

After it had been politically validated, the work on the evaluation started with the drafting 
of the terms of reference for the external study in support of the evaluation and the creation 
of the Interservice Steering Group (ISSG) in the last quarter of 2022. The first ISSG took 
place on 6 December 2022. The contract with the Economisti Associati SRL consortium 
for the external study was signed in October 2023 for an initially planned duration of ten 
months which, in May 2024, was extended by an additional three months. The ISSG was 
involved in all steps of the evaluation starting from the terms of reference, the consultation 
strategy and the call for evidence, and continuing throughout the duration of the supporting 
study until the finalisation of the Staff Working Document. In total, the ISSG met seven 
times (06/12/22, 14/03/23, 12/12/23, 31/05/24, 01/10/24, 18/11/24 and 23/05/25. 

Evidence used together with sources and any issues regarding its quality (i.e. has the 
information been quality assured?) 

The evaluation mainly used information gathered through various stakeholder consultation 
activities  but  also  studies,  reports,  academic  and  grey  literature  (e.g.  non-papers)  and 
statistical data from different databases, where available. Availability of cost data was very 
limited, and the market analysis was compromised by a lack of disaggregated data and data 
missing  for  some  years  within  the  evaluation  period.  Quality  was  assured  through 
triangulation  of  information  from  different  sources  and  validation  of  findings  in  the 
stakeholder validation workshop. A more detailed outline of the methodology can be found 
in Annex II. 

Use of external expertise 

Within the Economisti Associati SRL consortium, the Technopolis Group, supported by 
Milieu,  Wavestone  and  Intellera,  produced  a  supporting  study.  The  study  consulted 
external experts on Task 1 (Design of the methodology), Task 2 (Collection of Information 
and  data),  and  Task  4  (Answer  to  evaluation  questions  and  conclusions).  The  external 
experts involved in the study were Ineris and the law firm Kanzlei Wübbe. The legal expert 
from  Kanzlei  Wübbe  primarily  contributed  to  the  analysis  of  transposition  and 
implementation, as well as the coherence aspect of the evaluation. Ineris provided technical 
guidance and feedback to the evaluation team on multiple evaluation criteria across the 
study. 

52 

 
 
 
ANNEX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED 

The evaluation was supported by an external study carried out by Technopolis Group, 
supported by Milieu, Wavestone and Intellera. The contractor carried out most of the 
data collection activities and data analysis and organised two stakeholder workshops. DG 
GROW and the ISSG closely monitored the contractor’s work from the inception phase 
until the final report. Consultation questionnaires were discussed and refined before their 
dissemination.  The  deliverables,  notably  the  final  report,  underwent  several  rounds  of 
commenting and revisions, to improve their quality.  

1.  Data collection activities 

The evaluation relied on information from a variety of sources:  

Desk research: Academic literature, grey literature (e.g. study reports, position papers, 
meeting  minutes,  contributions  and  documents  shared  by  stakeholders)  and  official 
documents  (e.g.  legislation,  Commission  Communications,  Council  decision)  were 
consulted to gather information, mainly on three areas of the evaluation: 

•  The transposition of the Directives by Member States and their implementation; 
•  The market structure analysis in the EU as well as trends in intra-EU and extra-EU 

trade; 

•  The key contextual developments and trends. 

All sources are listed in a bibliography at the end of this Annex. 

In  addition,  data  for  the  market  structure166  analysis  was  retrieved  from  the  Eurostat 
Structural Business Statistics (SBS). The market structure analysis encompasses the entire 
European  ‘Manufacture  of  explosives’  sector,  which  includes  both  civil  explosives  and 
pyrotechnics, because they fall under the same NACE division. Data was available for the 
period from 2008 to 2022. Moreover, a lack of data on some indicators for some years,  
which affects the continuity and completeness of the analysis. 

Data for the market size167 analysis, covering the period from 2003 to 2022, was taken 
from Prodcom, while data is missing for most Member States and the EU aggregate from 
1995 to 2002 in the Prodcom dataset. The trade analysis168 is based on is based on data 
from the Eurostat Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) for the period 1999 
to 2024. However, some data from reporting countries was unavailable which may affect 
the completeness of analysis. 

166 Market structure is defined by the size, number, and distribution of businesses within a sector. 
167 The market size of the European civil explosives industry is defined as the value of sold production of 

civil explosives manufactured in the EU and placed on both EU and global markets. 

168 The trade analysis analyses the trade value of the civil explosives industry, focusing on import and export 
values of civil explosives products. We differentiate between intra-EU trade (transactions between EU 
member states) and extra-EU trade (transactions with countries outside the EU). 

53 

 
 
Call  for  evidence:  With  a  call  for  evidence,  published  in  all  EU  languages  on  the 
Commission  ‘Have  your  say’  from  4  May  to  1 June  2023,  the  Commission  gathered 
preliminary  reactions  from  stakeholders  on  the  main  elements  of  the  initiative.  In  total 
feedback from eleven stakeholders were received: four public authorities, two EU citizens, 
two companies/businesses, two business organisation and one environmental organisation. 

Targeted  survey:  A  targeted  survey,  launched  on  15 March  2024  gathered  specialists’ 
views  across  different  categories  of  stakeholders  on  all  evaluation  questions.  To  take 
account  of  the  different  areas  of  competence  of  the  potential  respondents,  the  survey 
included different question paths, according to the different respondent types (economic 
operators,  notified  bodies,  accreditation  bodies,  notifying  authorities,  etc.).  The  survey 
consisted  of five sections: 1)  national  transposition of the  Directive;  2)  socio-economic 
context;  3)  implementation  of  the  Directive’s  provisions;  4)  overall  assessment  of  the 
Directive; 5) suggestions for improvement.  

The survey was deployed in English, using the tool Medalia169 and took approximately 45 
min  to  complete.  The  survey  was  distributed  to  all  stakeholders  identified  through  the 
mapping  process  (approx.  200  stakeholders).  Multipliers  were  employed  to  further 
disseminate  the  survey,  including  chair  of  the  Civil  Explosives  AdCO  and  industry 
organisations  such  as  Federation  of  European  Explosives  Manufacturers  (FEEM).  The 
contractor aimed at balanced representation across Member States and stakeholder types. 
Tailored  reminders  were  sent  to  specific  stakeholder  groups  as  corrective  measures. 
Responses  were  closely  monitored  on  a  bi-weekly  basis  to  ensure  diversity.  Weekly 
reminders were also sent to selected stakeholders to boost response rates and encourage 
completion of the survey.  

Initially, the survey was set to be open for four weeks (i.e. mid April 2024). However, to 
accommodate  stakeholders’  needs  for  sufficient  time  to  collect  relevant  data,  often 
involving  coordination  across  various  departments  within  organisations  due  to  the 
extensive  nature  of  the  survey  and  the  large  number  of  questions,  the  deadline  was 
extended until the end of May 2024. In total, 61 complete answers were received. A high 
percentage of responses (sometimes exceeding 40% for specific questions) indicating ‘Do 
not know/prefer not to answer’. This trend was particularly evident in questions related to 
environmental  protection,  the  situation  before  the  implementation  of  the  previous 
directive,  and  questions  requiring  factual  information,  such  as  accident  frequency  and 
health and safety issue. Stakeholders cited the lack of available data or aggregated tracking 
systems in their Member States as reasons why they could not answer. Other factors might 
have been the historic focus of some questions and stakeholder fatigue due to the various 
consultation activities stakeholders were invited to. 

Public consultation: A public consultation was held from 8 April to 1 July 2024 on ‘Have 
your  Say’.  It  included  a  questionnaire  with  closed  and  open  questions,  which  the  wide 
public  was  invited  to  fill  in,  in  order  to  reach  a  broad  range  and  large  number  of 

169 For more information, please refer to the following website: https://www.medallia.com/products/agile-

research/?utm_campaign=checkmarketmerger. 

54 

 
 
stakeholders.  The  consultation  aimed  to  validate  the  topics  and  issues  covered  by  the 
evaluation,  gather  information,  data  and  experience  on  the  implementation  of  the  Civil 
Explosives Directive, solicit views and opinions of stakeholders on the extent to which this 
Directive has met its objectives, and gather views on the Directive’s relevance, taking into 
account social developments. Nine answers were collected, among which six from public 
authorities,  and  one  each  from  a  business  association,  an  EU  citizen  and  a  non-
governmental organisation. 

Interviews: The contractor, in total, conducted interviews with 39 stakeholders A smaller 
number of ‘scoping interviews’ took place in the inception phase of the study in the form 
of exploratory interviews. This allowed to obtain necessary and relevant information at an 
early stage, so as to further develop the intervention logic, that ultimately also fed into the 
questionnaires  and  interview  guides  for  the  remaining  stakeholders  to  be  consulted.  In 
addition,  some  key  sources  of  information  to  be  considered  in  the  Desk  research  were 
identified  and  suggestions  for  potential  topics  to  address  via  the  case  studies  were 
collected. 

The majority of interviews were conducted in the main phase of the study, in the form of 
‘study interviews’, which covered some key trends and findings  that emerged from  the 
desk research and the survey in more depth and/or filled some information gaps. These 
also comprise interviews on the eleven completed cost templates that were received. 

The  interviewees  were  identified  through  a  comprehensive  mapping  of  actors  in  each 
category, using existing contact information from the European Commission (e.g. notified 
bodies,  competent  authorities,  market  surveillance  authorities)  and  other  information 
available online. This process also included members of the Expert Group and contacts 
provided  following  pilot  interviews.  Additionally,  some  interviewees  were  identified 
through  the  survey,  which  included  a  question  allowing  respondents  to  indicate  their 
contact details for follow-up interviews. Lastly, some interviewees reached out directly to 
the contractor by email after learning about the study through the Expert Group. 

The interviews used semi-structured questionnaires covering the core  analytical  themes 
selected and issues of interest for deeper analysis, with flexibility to probe responses and 
to  explore  issues  that  emerge  during  discussion.  The  interviews  included  strategic 
questions and operational questions and were tailored to the different types of interviewees. 
The  interviews  were  conducted  via  MS-Teams.  The  interviews  were  undertaken  in 
English, and, where possible, in the national language (some interviews were conducted in 
French or Spanish upon request). 

Cost templates: Templates were circulated to administrations and economic operators for 
the quantification/monetisation of costs. Different cost templates were used for economic 
operators  (manufacturers),  notified  bodies  and  market  surveillance  authorities. 
Stakeholders were asked for estimations of costs and shares of costs across different cost 
categories (adjustment costs, administrative costs, indirect costs …) and whether those are 
one-off or recurrent as well as for information about the number of full-time equivalents 

55 

 
dedicated to compliance with the Directive. Despite the contractor’s efforts, only nine cost 
templates were completed by stakeholders. 

Case study: A case study on the transfer/transit of civil  explosives through SCEPYLT 
within the EU was  carried out  in  the context of the study. A summary  can be found in 
Annex VIII. 

2.  Data analysis 

All collected data was analysed by the contractor using the indicators and judgment criteria 
from  the  evaluation  matrix  (see  Annex  III)  and  information  from  different  sources 
combined and compared (‘triangulation’).  

Responses from the public consultation and the targeted survey were statistically analysed 
to identify trends and patterns. Qualitative insights from interviews complemented these 
findings with context and details. More information on the methodology used to process 
consultation data can be found in the Synopsis Report in Annex V. 

For market structure analysis, the contractor used the following indicators: 

Table 1: Indicators for the market structure analysis 

Indicator 

Description 

Turnover 

Total  revenue  generated  from  operational  activities  within  a  specified  accounting 
period, including all amounts invoiced for goods and services sold during the reference 
period. Measures company size and market performance. 

Number of 
companies 

Number of 
employees 

Number of businesses whose primary activity is in the sector. 

Total human resources employed within the sector. 

Source : Structural Business Statistics glossary and metadata 

The market size of the European civil explosives sector is evaluated using the value of 
sold production of civil explosives manufactured in the EU and placed on both EU and 
global markets.  

For the trade analysis, the contractor used the following indicators: 

Table 2: Indicators for the trade Analysis 

Indicator  Description 

Extra-EU 
imports 

Value of goods entering the EU from non-EU countries under various customs procedures. 

56 

 
Indicator  Description 

Intra-EU 
imports 

Extra-EU 
exports 

Value of goods entering a Member State from another EU country. 

Value of goods leaving the EU for non-EU countries under various customs procedures. 

Intra-EU 
exports 

Value of goods destined for another Member State from a given Member State, including 
those in free circulation or under inward processing. 

Information and findings from the study were checked and complemented for the purpose 
of this Staff Working Document. 

3.  Bibliography 

Documents from public authorities 

Council of the European Union, EU Action Plan on combating terrorism, 2011 

European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation 
(Directive  2013/29/EU,  Commission  Implementing  Directive  2014/58/EU,  and 
Directive  2014/28/EU,  Commission  Implementing  Directive  2008/43/EC  and 
in 
Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC),  Final  Report,  Technopolis  Group 
collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025  

European  Commission,  Feasibility  Study  of  alternative  options.  Digitalisation  of  Intra-
Union transfers of explosives documents (SCEPYLT Technical Options), Sopra Steira, 
2024 

European  Commission,  Evaluation  of  the  New  Legislative  Framework,  SWD(222)  365 

final, 2022 

European Commission, Better regulation toolbox 2023 

European Commission, Study of conformity in all EU countries on EU pyrotechnics and 

explosives legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022 

European Commission, Better regulation guidelines, 2021 

European  Commission,  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  10  proposals  to  align 
product  harmonisation  directives  to  Decision  No 768/2008/EC,  New  Legislative 
Framework  (NLF)  Alignment  Package  (Implementation  of  Goods  Package), 
SEC(2011) 1375 final, 2011 

European Commission, Progress Report on Explosives Security, 2012 

European Commission,  Proposal  for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making 
available  on  the  market  and  supervision  of  explosives  for  civil  uses,  Explanatory 
Memorandum, COM(2011) 771 final 

57 

 
European Commission, Evaluation on DG Enterprise and industry legislation – Cosmetics 

and Explosives Directives, Final report, EEC (GHK, Technopolis), 2007 

French  National  Institute  for  Industrial  Environment  and  Risks  (Ineris),  Explosive  and 

pyrotechnic wastes management practices, 2019 

Gouvernment Offices of Sweden, Reduce the supply of illegal firearms and explosives, 

2024 

UK Department for Energy Security & Net Zero, The Use and Environmental Impact of 

Explosives in the Decommissioning of Offshore Wells and Facilities, 2023 

United  Nations,  Recommendations  on  the  Transport  of  Dangerous  Goods,  Model 

Regulations, Volume I, Twenty-first revised edition, 2019 

Secondary literature 

Alburto-Medina  et  al.,  The  Impacts  of  Different  Biological  Treatments  on  the 
Transformation of Explosives Waste Contaminated Sludge, Molecules 26:16, 2021 

AP/DPA,  Three  workers  dead  after  explosion  at  Greek  dynamite  factory,  euronews., 

31 March 2022 

Bureau  for  Analysis  of  Industrial  Risks  and  Pollutions,  Explosion  in  bunker  for 

manufacturing detonators, 7 May 2017 

Cano, J./Hernandez, R., SCEPYLT: An Information System for Fighting Terrorism, IEEE 

Software Magazine 30, 2013, 73-79 

Ferreira  et  al.,  A  Circular  Economy  Approach  to  Military  Munitions:  Valorization  of 
Energetic  Material  from  Ammunition  Disposal  through  Incorporation  in  Civil 
Explosives, Sustainability 22:1, 2019 

Junuzovic, M., Explosion fatalities in Sweden, 2000–2018, Medicine, Science and the Law 

62:2, 2022,  88-94 

Kathimerini/AP,  Explosive  experts  defuse  a  parcel  bomb  sent  to  Thessaloniki  judge, 

Newsroom, 12 February 2024 

Mäkitie, I./Pihlajamäki, H, Fatal explosion injuries in Finland: A Twenty-Year Nationwide 

Survey, Scandinavian Journal of Surgery 95:3, 2006, 180-184 

Olukemi  et  al.,  Influence  of  explosive  maximum  instantaneous  charge  on  blasting 

environmental impact, Journal of Sustainable Mining 22:4, 344-357 

Swedish Mining Innovation, Unlocking Sustainability with Green Bulk Explosives, 2024 

Stucki, H., Toxicity and Degradation of Explosives, Chimia 58, 2004, 409-413 

Tukes, Transfer of explosives in Finland and the European Economic Area 

Zhang et al., Access to green primary explosives via constructing coordination polymers 
based on bis-tetrazole oxide and non-lead metals, Green Chemistry 21:8, 2019, 1947-
1955 

58 

 
 
ANNEX III. EVALUATION MATRIX  

# 

Question 

Judgment criteria 

Indicators and descriptors 

ECT-
01.1 

Do the existing requirements, 
including essential requirements 
continue to provide for an adequate 
level of protection of public 
interests and security, health and 
safety of users? 

•  Existing requirements adequately 
cover the needs, risks and recent 
developments in terms of health and 
safety; 

•  Existing requirements adequately 
cover the needs, risks, and recent 
developments in terms of security; 
•  Existing requirements adequately 
cover the needs, risks and recent 
developments in terms of environment  

•  Trend and type of accidents and health and safety issues 

involving products covered by the Directive  

•  Trend and type of cases of illicit activities linked to the 

products covered by the Directive 

•  Number and type of cases where Member States found that 
a product in compliance with the Directive presented a 
health & safety, security and/or environmental risk  

Sources of 
information 

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Interviews 
•  Desk research 
•  Safety Gate and 

ICSMS 

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Interviews 
•  Desk research 

•  Targeted survey 

•  New products falling under the scope of the Directive for 

which requirements are not fully fit for purpose 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the level of protection in terms of 
health & safety, security and environment ensured by the 
current requirements and potential uncovered risks 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews  

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 

•  Trend in the number of incidents adversely affecting the 

environment related to civil explosives  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 

59 

 
 
•  Number and type of restrictions going beyond the 

minimum requirements adopted by Member States for 
health and safety reasons 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 

•  The enforcement of the existing 

•  Types and frequency of controls performed by MS to verify 

•  Targeted survey 

ECT-
01.2 

requirements ensures an adequate 
level of protection of public interests 
and security, health and safety of their 
users practices 

the compliance of products on the EU market 

•  Main differences in the controls performed nationally to 
ensure compliance of the products on the EU market  

•  Targeted survey 

•  Frequency, number and types of infringements of national 

•  Targeted survey 

rules on the compliance with Essential Safety 
Requirements 

•  Most common difficulties faced in national and cross-

•  Targeted survey 

border enforcement of rules  

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the level of protection in terms of 
health & safety, security and environment ensured by the 
current enforcement practices 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

•  Type of obligations adopted at the national level on 

economic operators involved in the import of products 
covered by the Directive  

•  Number and type of infringements of obligations on 

economic operators involved in the import of products 
covered by the Directive 

•  Targeted survey  
•  Desk research 

•  Targeted survey 
•  ICSMS 

•  Number and types of requests for clarification sent by MSs 

to the Commission on the obligations of economic 
operators involved in the import 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews  

•  Share of products found not compliant out of the total 

number of products imported from third countries subject 
to controls 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 
•  ICSMS 

ECT-
02.1 

To  what  extent  does  the  Directive 
ensure  that  the  articles  imported 
from third countries (non EEA) are 
equally  safe  as  those  manufactured 
in the EU? 

•  Obligations on the economic operators 
involved in the import are clear and 
cover all possible areas of health & 
safety risks 

•  Conformity assessment carried out in 
third countries is subject to the same 
level of controls and supervision ans 
conformity assessment carried out in 
the EU 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECT-
02.2 

•  Consistency in the application of 

conformity assessment: comparing 
conformity assessment levels between 
products manufactured within the EU 
and those imported from third 
countries 

•  Consistency in Market Surveillance: 

•  Types and frequency of controls performed nationally on 

physical and online incoming flows of goods  

•  Share of subcontracting to third country bodies by notified 

•  Targeted survey 

bodies 

•  List of possible health & safety issues identified during the 

controls of EU-manufactured products and imported 
products 

•  Interviews 
•  Safety Gate 

•  Types and frequency of conformity assessment performed 
by MS on products manufactured in the EU and products 
imported into the EU to verify the compliance  

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Types of controls performed to ensure the compliance of 

products coming from third countries and actors involved  

•  Desk research 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 
•  Targeted survey 

•  Types and frequency of controls performed on Notified 

•  Targeted survey 

Bodies 

•  Frequency, number and types of infringements of national 

rules requiring compliance with Essential Safety 
Requirements for both products manufactured in the EU 
and products imported into the EU  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 
•  ICSMS  

•  Most common difficulties to the implementation of controls 
on products manufactured in the EU and products imported 
into the EU 

•  Targeted survey  

•  Most common difficulties to the implementation of controls 

•  Interviews   

on physical and online incoming flows of goods 

Stakeholders’ opinion on the level of protection in terms of 
health & safety ensured by the current enforcement 
practices 

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey  

comparing levels of control by market 
surveillance actors on articles entering 
the EU market through physical and 
online channels 

61 

 
 
 
 
ECT-
03.1 

Are  the  current  penalties  effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive? 

The level of penalties for infringements of 
the  requirements  set  by  the  Directive  is 
comparable across MS 

ECT-
03.2 

•  Penalties defined at the national level 
allow for cross-border cooperation 
•  The introduction of penalties at the 
national level is accompanied by a 
reduction in cases of non-compliance 

ECT-
04.1 

the  current  system  enabling 

Is 
traceability of articles effective?  

current 

The 
the 
system 
traceability  of  the  articles  through  all 
steps of the value chain 

ensures 

62 

•  Severity of penalties per type of infringement per MS 

•  Main differences in the penalty systems implemented 

nationally 

•  Level of consistency/distortion across sanction regimes 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Number and type of cases requiring cross-border 

•  Targeted survey 

cooperation  

•  Enablers and challenges of cross-border cooperation 

•  Interviews 

•  Trend in the number of non-compliant products circulating 

in the EU market 

•  Trend in illicit activities involving the products covered by 

the Directive 

•  Frequency and trend in the number of infringements or 

cases of non-compliance by stakeholders concerned by the 
obligations of the Directive 

•  Factors affecting the effectiveness of the penalties (e.g.. 
levels of awareness of health & safety, security and 
environmental risks of the public opinion, cultural 
traditions) 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 
•  ICSMS 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

•  Interviews  

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the effectiveness of the system of 

penalties  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

•  Types of measures adopted at the national level to 

•  Targeted survey 

implement the traceability requirements set by the Directive 
(e.g.. marking/labelling processes, digital vs; online record-

 
 
 
keeping practices, type of information stored, exchange of 
information) 

•  Roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in the 
traceability of the products throughout the value chain 

•  Desk research 

•  Main differences in national measures implementing the 

traceability system 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk reseach  

•  Type and frequency of controls on the respect of the 

•  Targeted survey 

traceability requirements 

•  Enablers and challenges in the implementation of controls 

on the traceability requirements 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Interviews  

•  Trend in the frequency of infringements related to 

•  Interviews 

traceability requirements 

•  Number of lost, stolen or diverted products covered by the 

Directive 

•  Number and key features of cases of trafficking of illegal 

civil explosives 

•  Types of mechanisms for sharing information among 
stakeholders and MS in case of security concerns in 
relation to the products covered by the Directive 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the effectiveness of the 

traceability system 

the 

•  Ibid 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Interview  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Interview  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Interview  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

•  Information included in the licences and authorisations 

•  Desk research  

granted to economic operators to engage in the 
manufacture, storage, use, import, export, transfer or trade 

63 

ECT-
04.2 

Does  the  current  system  provide 
enough 
combat 
trafficking of illegal civil explosive 
article? 

safeguards 

to 

current 

The 
traceability of the civil explosiv 

system 

ensures 

 
 
ECT-
05.1 

Is the current framework for storage 
and  or  transfer  or  transit  of  articles 
effective?  

The  framework  for  storage  prevent  civil 
explosives from being stolen 

•  Types of obligations and requirements concerning the 

•  Desk research 

storage and transit set by the Directive and other relevant 
EU legislation 

of civil explosives and challenges in checking the validity 
of licences granted by another MS 

ECT-
05.2 

ECT-
06 

•  Types of measures adopted nationally for the storage and 

•  Desk research 

transit of products covered by the Directive 

•  Types of security risks linked to the storage and transit 

•  Targeted survey 

•  Types and frequency of controls at the national level on the 
storage and transit of the products covered by the Directive 
(e.g.. substantial  vs procedural) 

•  Targeted survey 

•  Trend in the n. of stolen/diverted products covered by the 

•  Targeted survey 

Directive (in the EU and outside) 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the effectiveness of the current 

•  Targeted survey 

framework for storage and transit 

To  what  extent  are  civil  explosives 
diverted  for  terrorist  and  criminal 
purposes? 

The current rulesprevent civil explosives 
from being diverted  

•  Ibid 

•  Targeted survey 

lack 

thereof,  effective 

Are  the  monitoring  provisions,  or 
in 
the 
providing  data  that  allows  well-
informed  conclusions  about 
the 
functioning of the Directive? 

The existing monitoring system covers all 
the  Directive, 
the  key  aspects  of 
Information 
the 
collected 
monitoring  system  allows  well-informed 
EU decision-making processes 

through 

•  List of key provisions of the Directive 

•  Level of compliance of MS with the monitoring 

requirements 

•  Desk research 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Level of involvement of MS in the expert groups on civil 

•  Desk research 

explosives  

•  Types of monitoring arrangements at the national level 

(besides those set by the Directive)  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Interviews 

64 

 
ECT-
07.1 

What have been the qualitative and 
quantitative effects of the measures 
on their objectives? How have they 
evolved since the implementation of 
the measures 

•  Measures had economic effects on 
intra-EU flows and increased 
competitiveness of EU companies 
•  The effects evolved over time since 
the implementation of the measures 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the relevance of the existing 

monitoring provisions of the Directive, the usefulness of 
the information obtained and the potential areas for 
improvement 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Interviews 

•  Level of harmonisation of national rules on the making 

available of products covered by the Directive on the EU 
market (provisions linked to the Single Market) 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 
•  Desk research 

•  Main differences in the current national implementation 
practices and requirements perceived by stakeholders to 
have adverse impacts on the Single Market  

•  Trend in the production value and turnover of the EU 
industry for the products covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in the number and size of companies active in the 

sectors covered by the Directive, per sector 

•  Trend in volume and value of intra-EU flows of products 

covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in volume and value of extra-EU flows of products 

covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in the proportion of sales that EU businesses derive 

from national, intra-EU or extra-EU trade 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews  

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Trend in the proportion of sales taking place online vs 

•  Desk research  

offline  

•  Trend in the share of the EU industry in the total value of 
the market for the products covered by the Directive 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Trend in the trade competitiveness index  

•  Desk research  

•  Trend in the trade barriers affecting the Single market 

•  Targeted survey  

65 

 
•  Level of trust of MSs and economic operators and mutual 
recognition of authorisations, compliance assessments and 
marking/labelling 

•  Desk research  

•  Interviews 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the positive and negative effects 
of the Directive on the strengthening of the Single Market 
and potential areas for improvement 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

ECT-
07.2 

Measures  had  effects  in  terms  of  safety, 
the  effects  evolved  over  time  since  the 
implementation of the measures 

•  Level of coverage of health and safety risks in the Directive 

•  Level of harmonisation of national rules on the making 

available of products covered by the Directive on the EU 
market (provisions linked to the health and safety) 

•  Main differences in the current national implementation 
practices and requirements perceived by stakeholders to 
have adverse impacts on health and safety  

•  Trend in the number of accidents and health & safety issues 

concerning the products covered by the Directive 

•  Key changes in the testing procedures adopted at the 
national level to verify the safety of the products  

•  Trend in the compliance to essential requirements of 

products available on the EU market 

66 

•  Public consultation  
•  Targeted survey   
•  Desk reseach 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 
•  Desk research 

•  Interviews 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Safety Gate  
•  ICSMS 
•  Data from accident 

reporting 

•  Desk research  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 
•  ICSMS 

 
 
 
ECT-
07.3 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the positive and negative effects 
of the Directive on the health and safety of the products 
made available on the EU market 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

•  Measures had effects in terms of 

•  Level of coverage of security risks in the Directive 

public security 

•  The effects evolved over time since 
the implementation of the measures 

•  Level of harmonisation of national rules on the making 

available of products covered by the Directive on the EU 
market (provisions linked to security) 

•  Main differences in the current national implementation 
practices and requirements perceived by stakeholders to 
have adverse impacts negative effects in terms of security 
(e.g. transfer procedures, requirements for authorisation, 
identification and traceability requirements) 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 
•  Desk research 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 
•  Desk research 

•  Interviews  

•  Trend in the number of security-related incidents and illicit 
activities concerning the products covered by the Directive 

•  Targeted survey 

•  Key changes in the national measures for the identification 
and traceability of the products covered by the Directive 

•  Desk research  

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the positive and negative effects 

brought by the Directive in terms of overall public security 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

67 

 
 
 
ECT-
07.4 

•  Measures had environmental effects 
•  The effects evolved over time since 
the implementation of the measures 

•  Level of coverage of the Directive of environmental aspects  
(environmental protection, biodiversity, animal well being, 
etc.) 

•  Public consultation  
•  Desk research 

ECT-
08 

ECT-
09.1 

Are there any unintended effects of 
the measures? 

To  what  extent  has  the  different 
implementation  in  MSs  impacted 
the effectiveness of the measures on 
the objectives?  

The measures had unintended effects  

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the unintended effect of the 

•  Interviews 

Directive 

•  There are differences in the 

•  Level of harmonisation of rules and practices adopted at the 

•  Targeted survey 

implementation of the measures, 
differences in the implementation 
have reduced the effectiveness of the 
measures 

•  Member States have derogated to 

common rules and/or have adopted 
more restrictive rules, derogations 
and/or restrictions resulted in good 
practices, derogations and/or 
restrictions resulted in gold-plating 

national level per area of intervention of the Directive 

•  Main differences in the national implementation practices 
and requirements that might have negative effects/create 
risks on the Single Market, on the health and safety of the 
users, on the public security and on the protection of the 
environment  

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Number and rationale of cases where MSs derogated to 

common rules for security purposes 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 

•  Number and rationale of cases of gold-plating 

•  Targeted survey 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the extent to which differences in 

•  Targeted survey 

national rules and practices affected the overall 
effectiveness of the Directive’s measures and on the effects 
generated 

68 

 
 
ECT-
09.2 

ECT-
09.3 

Is  there  national  gold-plating  that 
hampers the internal market? 

What  is  the  impact  of  national 
derogations  and  possible  gold-
plating  on  the  free  movement  of 
articles in the internal market? 

Ibid 

Ibid 

•  Type of effects brought by differences in the national 

•  Targeted survey 

measures 

•  Number and type of national measures, derogations and/or 
additional restrictions that proved to be good practices 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Interviews 

•  Number and rationale of cases of gold-plating 

•  Targeted survey 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the extent to which national 
derogations and possible gold-plating on the free 
movement of articles affected the free movement of articles 
in the internal market 

•  Interviews 

•  Type of effects brought by derogations and possible gold-

•  Targeted survey 

plating 

•  Number and type of national measures, derogations and/or 
additional restrictions that proved to be good practices for 
the internal market  

•  Interviews 

ECT-
10 

Are  there  any  aspects/means/actors 
that  render  certain  aspects  of  the 
measures more or less effective than 
others,  and  –  if  there  are  –  what 
lessons can be drawn from this? 

•  The allocation of roles and 

•  Types of digital and electronic tools used at the national 

•  Targeted survey  

responsibilities in the implementation 
of the measures to specific actors 
affected the effectiveness of the 
measures, the use of digital and 
electronic tools affected the 
effectiveness of the measures 

•  the means of of transposition (legal 
acts, administrative documents) 
affected the effectiveness of the 
measures 

level for the implementation of obligations and 
requirements stemming from the various measures of the 
Directive 

•  Forms of transposition of the Directive adopted by MSs 

•  Desk research 

•  Key challenges preventing the Directive from effectively 

achieving its intended objectives 

•  Trend in the number of accidents and health & safety issues 
related to the products covered by the Directive per MS 

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey  
•  Interviews 

•  Targeted survey 

•  Trend in the number of security incidents related to the 

•  Targeted survey 

products covered by the Directive per MS 

69 

 
 
 
•  Trend in the number of non-compliant products per MS 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

•  Types of product-related controls and frequency per MS 

•  Targeted survey 

•  Stakeholders’s opinion on the effectiveness of the Directive 
at the national level and on key strengths and weaknesses 
per MS  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on aspects/means/actors that affect 

•  Targeted survey 

the effectiveness of the measures of the Directive 

ECT-
11.1 

To what extent have the specific and 
general objectives been achieved? 

The directive contributed to harmonising 
and 
for  making 
rules 
supervising civil explosives  

available 

•  Level of harmonisation of national rules and practices per 

area of intervention 

•  Main differences in national rules and practices per area of 

intervention 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 
•  Desk Research 

•  Desk research 
•  Targeted survey 

•  Number and rationale cases where MSs derogated to 

•  Targeted survey 

common rules for security purposes 

•  Number and rationale of cases of gold-plating 

•  Targeted survey 

•  Areas of improvement 

•  Main differences in the national measures implementing the 

traceability requirements set by the Directive 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 

•  Desk research 
•  Targeted survey 

•  Trend in the controls on the respect of the traceability 

•  Interviews 

requirements 

•  Trend in the n. of lost, stolen or diverted products covered 

•  Targeted survey 

by the Directive 

ECT-
11.2 

The directive improved the traceability of 
sales  and  transactions  to  prevent  illicit 
possession, misuse and thefts. 

70 

 
 
•  Trend in the n. of security incidents linked to the products 

•  Targeted survey 

covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in the ability of Law Enforcement Authorities and 

•  Targeted survey 

Market surveillance authorities to trace a product 
throughout all stages of the supply chain 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution of the Directive’s 

measures to the traceability of civil explosives 

•  Areas of improvement 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 

•  Trend in the type and number of controls over the notified 

•  Targeted survey 

bodies per MS 

•  Trend in the number of cases where the competence of 

•  Desk research 

notified bodies has been challenged 

•  Trend in the number of appeal procedures against decisions 

•  Desk research 

of a notified body 

•  Trend in the number of non-compliant products covered by 

the Directive (as resulting from incidents, market 
surveillance evaluations or controls performed by EOs and 
notified bodies)  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

•  Rules and topics of discussion of the working group of 

•  Desk research 

Notified Bodies organised by the EC 

•  Level of involvement of national authorities responsible for 

•  Desk research 

notification policy in the platform mentioned above 

•  Rules and topics of discussion in the sectoral group of 

•  Desk research 

notified bodies 

ECT-
11.3 

The directive contributed to ensuring the 
quality and credibility of notified bodies’ 
work 

71 

 
 
 
•  Level of involvement of the national notified bodies in the 

•  Desk research 

sectoral group mentioned above 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution of the Directive’s 
measures to increasing the quality and credibility of the 
work of the notified bodies 

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the extent to which the lack of 
validity of the conformity certificates granted by notified 
bodies represents an obstacle to supervision 

•  Targeted survey 

•  Areas of improvement 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 

•  Channels and frequency of exchange of information 

•  Targeted survey  

between national market surveillance authorities (especially 
when the product’s non-compliance or risk affect other 
MSs) 

•  Trend in the number of incidents and health & safety issues 

related to the products covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in the number of prohibitions, withdrawals, recalls of 
products covered by the Directive and underlying rationale 
(non-compliance and/or risks)  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

•  Targeted survey 

•  Trend in the n. of market surveillance evaluations launched 

•  Targeted survey 

in the MS 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution of the Directive’s 
measures to the improvement of the effectiveness of market 
surveillance authorities 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation  

•  Areas of improvement 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Interviews 

ECT-
11.4 

The directive  increased the effectiveness 
of market surveillance activities 

72 

 
 
ECT-
11.5 

ECT-
12.1 

To  what  extent  has  the  directive 
contributed  to  the  achievement  of 
Sustainable Development Goals?  

•  In addition to all indicators used to assess the achievement 
of the specific objectives (listed above) and those used to 
assess the overall qualitative and quantitative effects of the 
measures the analysis included: 

•  Comparison of the Directive’s impact on market, health & 

safety and security aspects  

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution of the Directives 
to ensuring that civil explosives on the EU market fulfil the 
requirements providing a high level of protection of health 
and safety, and other public interests, while guaranteeing 
the functioning of the internal market 

•  Areas for improvement 

•  Public consultation 

•  Targeted survey  
•  Public consultation  

•  Targeted survey  
•  Public consultation  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 
•  Interviews 

•  Trend in the production value and turnover of the EU 
industry for the products covered by the Directive  

•  Trend in the number and size of companies active in the 
sectors covered by the Directive (with specific focus on 
SMEs) 

•  Trend in volume and value of intra-EU flows of products 

covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in volume and value of extra-EU flows of products 

covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in the proportion of sales that EU businesses derive 

from national, intra-EU or extra-EU trade 

•  Desk research  
•  Interview 

•  Desk research  
•  Interview  

•  Desk research  
•  Interview 

•  Desk research  
•  Interview 

•  Desk research  
•  Interview 

The directive contributed to ensuring that 
civil  explosives  on  the  EU  market  fulfil 
the requirements providing a high level of 
protection of health and safety, and other 
public 
and 
environment),  while  guaranteeing  the 
functioning of the internal  market 

(security 

interests 

The  directive  positively  contributed  to 
Goal  9  (Build  resilient  infrastructure, 
promote 
sustainable 
industrialisation and foster innovation) 

inclusive 

and 

73 

 
 
 
 
•  Trend in the share of the EU industry in the total value of 
the market for the products covered by the Directive 

•  Desk research  
•  Interview 

•  Trend in the trade competitiveness index  

•  Trend in the trade barriers affecting the Single Market (with 

a specific focus on SMEs) 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution of the Directive 

to: 

•  Desk research  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

• 

• 
• 

Increasing the competitiveness of the EU 
sectors and raising the industry’s share of 
employment and GDP 
Integrating SMEs in the value chain 
Increasing the overall sustainability of the 
industrial sector  

•  Trend in the number of security-related incidents and illicit 
activities concerning the products covered by the Directive 

•  Targeted survey 

•  Key changes in the national measures for the identification 
and traceability of the products covered by the Directive 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews  

•  Key changes in the national measures and requirements on 

exchange of information of products covered by the 
Directive 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution of the Directive 

•  Targeted survey 

to: 

• 
• 
• 

reducing violence  
creating peace, security and stability 
ensuring stable enabling conditions for the global 
social and economic development of the EU SDG 
16 

ECT-
12.2 

The  directive  positively  contributed  to 
Goal  16  (Peace, 
justice  and  strong 
institutions) 

74 

 
 
 
ECT-
13 

To  what  extent  has  the  directive 
contributed  to  the  new  European 
Growth Model?  

directive 

enhanced  Europe’s 
The 
resilience  by  strengthening  the  Single 
Market 

•  Trend in the production value and turnover of the EU 
industry for the products covered by the Directive  

•  Trend in the number and size of companies active in the 

sectors covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in volume and value of intra-EU flows of products 

covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in volume and value of extra-EU flows of products 

covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in the proportion of sales that EU businesses derive 

from national, intra-EU or extra-EU trade 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews  

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews  

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews  

•  Trend in the share of the EU industry in the total value of 
the market for the products covered by the Directive 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

EFF- 
01 

What  are  administrative  burdens, 
adjustment  costs  and  enforcement 
costs imposed by the directive to all 
stakeholders along the value chain? 

•  Trend in the trade competitiveness index  

•  Trend in the trade barriers affecting the Single Market  

•  Quantitative assessment of the cost 

•  Quantitative assessment for difference in current costs to 

•  Desk research  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research  

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews 

the baseline 

•  Total administrative, adjustment and enforcement costs 

(min, max, average) by sub-category of costs and 
stakeholder 

•  Administrative, adjustment and enforcement costs broken 
down by sub-category of costs and stakeholder type  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews 

and the administrative burden placed 
on competent authorities, notifying 
bodies, market surveillance and 
economic operators.  

•  Qualitative assessment of the costs on 
importers, distributors, consignees, 
consumers, environment and cultural 
organisations, NGOs). 

75 

 
•  Qualitative assessment for economic operators and 

administrations 

•  What are the likely causes of change (Drivers) of 

administrative, adjustment and enforcement costs by 
stakeholder type and country 

EFF-02  How  affordable  are  the  regulatory/ 
administrative  costs  borne  by  all 
stakeholders? 

Procedures and obligations introduced by 
the Directive are achieved at a reasonable 
cost  

Economic operators 
•  Cost per unit (economic operators) (difference in current 

share of costs to the Baseline) 

•  Share of regulatory cost in total production (current share 

comparison with the Baseline). 

•  Share of regulatory cost in average yearly turnover (current 

share comparison with the Baseline) 

•  Share of survey respondents who express a strong increase 

to strong decrease of costs since the Baseline. 

Administrators 
•  Number of staff (FTEs)  

•  Number of personnel engaged in control and inspection. 

•  Number of personnel engaged in reporting obligations.  

76 

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost interviews 

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost interviews 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews 

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews 

•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews 

 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 
•  Cost templates and 

interviews  

•  Average labour cost  

•  Frequency of inspections per year 

•  Total cost per year  

•  Total cost per FTE 

EFF-03  What aspects of the measures are the 
terms  of 
most 
inefficient 
resources  that  are  mobilised  by 
stakeholders  during  the  different 
phases of the process? 

in 

•  Quantitative assessment based on the 
break-down of administrative costs, 
adjustment costs namely related to 
Product conformity assessment 
procedure and Product traceability and 
labelling and costs of enforcement 

•  Qualitative assessment of the above 

categories 

Economic operators 
•  Average share of (particular sub-categories of) 

administrative costs in total regulatory costs (three year 
average) compared to the baseline 

•  Average share of (particular sub-categories of) adjustment 

costs in total regulatory costs (three year average) 
compared to the baseline  

•  Share of regulatory cost in total production cost compared 

to the baseline 

•  Share of regulatory cost in average yearly turnover  

compared to the baseline  

Administrative costs 
•  Total cost per FTE compared to the baseline  

•  Total cost of reporting obligations compared to the baseline  

All 

77 

 
 
EFF-
04.1  

What  are  the  main  benefits  for 
stakeholders  and  civil  society  that 
derive from the directive? 

•  Measures had economic effects on 
intra-EU flows and Increased 
competitiveness of EU companies 

•  The effects evolved over time since 
the implementation of the measures 

EFF-
04.1 bis 

What  are  the  main  benefits  for 
stakeholders  and  civil  society  that 
derive from the directive? 

•  Measures had benefits in terms of 
safety in the industry and for 
consumers.  

•  Measures had benefits in terms of 

public security.  

•  Measures had benefits in terms of 

environment 

•  Share of survey respondents who characterise the aspects of 
measures as highly inefficient to highly efficient compared 
to the baseline  

•  Trend in the production value and turnover of the EU 
industry for the products covered by the Directive  

•  Trend in the number and size of companies active in the 

sectors covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in volume and value of intra-EU flows of products 

covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in volume and value of extra-EU flows of products 

covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in the proportion of sales that EU businesses derive 

from national, intra-EU or extra-EU trade 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research  
Interviews 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Trend in the share of the EU industry in the total value of 
the market for the products covered by the Directive 

•  Desk research  
•  Interviews 

•  Share of stakeholders with positive opinion on the  effects 
of the Directive on the strengthening of the Single Market 
and potential areas for improvement 

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted stakeholder 

consultation 

•  Trend in number of accidents (injuries and safety issues)  

•  Number and types of infringements of national rules 

requiring compliance with Essential Safety Requirements 

•  Share of stakeholders with positive opinion on the level of 

protection in terms of health & safety, security and 
environment ensured by the current enforcement practices 

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  ICSMS 

•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 

78 

 
 
•  Trend in the number of security-related incidents and illicit 
activities concerning the products covered by the Directive  

•  Share of stakeholders with positive opinion on the effects 

•  Desk research 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 

brought by the Directive in terms of overall public security 

•  List of potential health & safety, security and 
environmental risks linked to civil explosives 

•  Level of coverage of potential risks by the measures 

included in the Directive 

•  Type of industrial accidents (and other accidents?) and 

health and safety issues involving products covered by the 
Directive (in the EU and outside) 

•  Type of cases of illicit activities linked to the products 

covered by the Directive (in the EU and outside) 

•  Type of environmental accidents linked to the products 

covered by the Directive 

•  Examples of products covered by the Directive that do not 

meet the Essential Safety Requirements 

•  Main differences in the measures adopted by MS to 

implement common EU requirements 

•  Type of restrictions to transfer rules adopted by MSs for 

security reasons and products concerned 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Interviews 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Public consultation 
•  Desk research 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 
•  ISCMS 
•  Safety Gate  

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 
•  ICSMS 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

REL-
01 

To what extent do the objectives of 
the  Directive  correspond  to  the 
needs? 

•  Degree of alignment between 

stakeholders’ perception of the needs 
and the objectives of the Directive.  
•  The objectives are; i) achieving free 
movement of articles in the Internal 
Market, ii) protecting human health 
and safety; iii) ensuring high level of 
public security and iv) considering 
environmental aspects. The alignment 
considers past, present and future 
needs.  

79 

 
 
REL-
02 

To what extent are there adaptation 
mechanisms 
to  follow 
in  place 
technological,  and  scientific  and 
social developments? 

•  The essential safety requirement set 
by the Directive adequately protect 
the health and safety of persons, 
property and the environment in 
relation to all types of civil 
explosives.  

•  The harmonised standards used to 
demonstrate the conformity to the 
Essential Safety Requirements ensure 
an adequate protection of the health 
and safety of persons, property and 
the environment. 

•  The Directive addresses new 

emerging trends. 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the continuous need for protection 
in terms of health & safety, security and environment and 
the existence of potential uncovered risks 

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 

•  List of main technological, scientific, and social 

developments relevant to civil explosives 

•  Level of coverage of the main developments by adaptations 

mechanisms foreseen by the Directive 

•  Examples of cases where Member States found that a 

product in compliance with the Directive presented a health 
& safety, security and/or environmental risk  

•  Examples of cases where MSs identified shortcomings in 
the harmonised standards used to prove the conformity to 
essential safety requirement 

•  Type of restrictions going beyond the minimum 

requirements adopted by MSs for health and safety reasons  

•  Examples of good practices adopted nationally (besides EU 

requirements) to adequately follow technological, and 
scientific and social developments  

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the extent to which existing 
adaptation mechanisms allow to keep up with and 
adequately address technological, social and scientific 
developments 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews  

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

REL-
03 

To what extent is the current scope 
of  application  of 
the  Directive 
adequate and clear for the attainment 
of the objectives? 

•  Degree of alignment between 

•  List of civil explosives covered by the Directive 

•  Desk research 

stakeholders’ perception on the clarity 
of the scope of the Directive;  
•  coverage in terms  of products 

covered and exempted;  

•  Health & safety, security and environmental risks per type 

of product 

•  Type of requests for clarifications sent by MSs to the 
Commission in relation to the scope of the Directive 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 

80 

 
 
 
•  stakeholders role within their value 

•  Examples of cases where products were wrongly 

chain.  

categorised 

•  New products whose categorisation (within or without the 

scope of the Directive) appears not clear 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the clarity of the scope of 

application and definitions of the Directive 

•  Indicators listed in the previous questions 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the main gaps (if any) in terms of 

measures, definitions and scope of the Directive 

•  Clear and unambiguous language in provisions 

•  Avoidance of overly technical language 

•  Consistent  use  of  terms  and  definitions  throughout  the 

document 

•  Specification of roles and responsibilities of involved parties 

REL-
04 

Which  gaps  exist  (e.g.  health  & 
safety, 
and/or 
security, 
environmental concerns)? 

The relevance of the Directive to address 
uncovered  health  &  safety,  security, 
and/or  environmental  concerns  in  terms 
of measures, definitions, scope 

COH-
01 

issue  of 

there  any 

Is 
internal 
coherence  of  the  measures  (i.e. 
between the various components of 
the measures)?  

and 

comprehensibility, 
Clarity 
terminology,  
of 
consistency 
logical  structure  and  organisation,  legal 
certainty,  objectives  and  policy  goals 
reflected in provisions.  

81 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 
•  Targeted survey 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research  

•  Interviews 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research  

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research  

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 

 
•  Clear articulation of the objectives and policy goals 

•  Provisions directly linked to the achievement of objectives 

and policy goals. 

•  Adequate coverage of all relevant aspects of the objectives 

and policy goals  

•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research  

•  Interviews 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research  

•  Interviews 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research  

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research  

•  Complaints from stakeholders related to internal coherence 
(e.g. complexity/ lack of clarity/lack of consistency) to the 
EC  Commission  or  via  the  survey  and  Open  Public 
consultation 

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research  

•  No internal contradiction or overlaps 

•  Overlaps between the measures,  
•  In-built mechanism in place,  
•  non- alignment and contradictory 

provisions/objectives,  

•  synergies  

•  Degree of alignment with other measures (high, medium, 

low)  

•  Synergies leading to positive impacts or with limited 

effects.  

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research  

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research.  

•  Interviews 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 

82 

COH-
02 

there 

overlaps 

or 
Are 
complementarities 
the 
measures and any other Community 
action having similar objectives 

between 

 
 
 
 
COH-
03 

Are  there  any  issues  of  coherence, 
alignment with international laws?  

EUAD-
01 

is 

What 
the  additional  value 
resulting  from  the  EU  intervention 
compared  to  the  situation  in  which 
Member State would act at national 
level? 

•  Impacts of overlaps (e.g. administrative burden, cost on 
companies, legal uncertainties due to double regulation) 

•  Impact of in-built mechanisms (derogations, exemptions, 

legal references) to avoid overlaps  

•  Impact of non-alignment and contradictory 

provisions/objectives (e.g. administrative burden, legal 
clarity, barrier to achieve broader EU objectives) 

contradictory 

•  Degree of alignment with international measures (high, 

medium, low) 

alignment 

Non- 
provisions/objectives 

and 

(in 

relation 

Comparison 
to  several 
indicators  and  descriptors)  between  the 
situation  at  national  level  in  relevant 
sectors  before  the  introduction  of  the 
Directive  and  after  the  implementation, 
assessing  the  added  value  of  the  EU 
intervention.  

•  Impact of non-alignment and contradictory 

provisions/objectives with international measures (e.g. non-
compliance) 

•  Trend in the production value and turnover of the EU 
industry for the products covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in the number and size of companies active in the 

sectors covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in volume and value of intra-EU flows of products 

covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in volume and value of extra-EU flows of products 

covered by the Directive 

•  Trend in the number of incidents and infringements 

concerning the products falling under the scope of the two 
Directive 

•  Interviews 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 

•  Interviews 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 

•  Interviews 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 

•  Interviews 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 

•  Interviews 
•  Targeted survey 
•  Desk research 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

83 

 
EUAD-
02 

To what extent the issues addressed 
a 
require 
by 
continuation of the EU action? 

the  measures 

The scale of the issues initially addressed 
by  the  directives  (or  of  their  potential 
impacts  on  other  MSs) 
requires  a 
continuation of the EU action. 

•  Types of measures in place before the entry into force of 

the Directive 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the added value brough by the 

Directive in relation to the current levels of health & safety, 
security, market and environment protection   

•  Level of harmonisation of national measures implementing 

the Directive 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 

•  Main differences in the rules and measures adopted 

•  Desk research 

nationally to implement the Directive  

•  Examples and geographical scope of cases of non-

compliance  

•  Examples and geographical scope of cases of illicit use of 

products covered by the Directive 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the need for EU action to address 

current issues 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 
•  ICSMS 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 

EUAD-
03 

What would be the consequence of 
stopping 
the 
or  withdrawing 
measures on civil explosives? 

•  Without the Directive civil explosives 
may be subject to different rules and 
restrictions in different MSs thus 
raising health & safety, security and 
environmental risks and competition 
distortions among Economic 
operators.  

•  Types of measures in force before the introduction of the 

•  Desk research 

Directive 

•  Requirements and rules stemming from relevant EU and 

•  Desk research 

international law and policies (besides the Directive under 
investigation) 

•  Main technological, scientific and social developments 

relevant to civil explosives 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

84 

 
 
 
•  EU-wide rules and coordination at the 

EU level is necessary to ensure 
synergies in terms of information-
exchanges, controls, investigations.  

•  Measure adopted to implement the 
directive have brought substantial 
changes in the national context that 
will likely remain unchanged. 

•  Type and scale of the changes occurred at the national level 
to Implement the Directive (e.g.. new institutions, changes 
in roles and responsibilities, new operational systems and 
procedures) 

•  Desk research 
•  Interviews 

•  Stakeholders’ opinion on the consequences of withdrawing 

the Directive 

•  Interviews 
•  Public consultation 
•  Targeted survey 

85 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX IV. OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND COSTS AND TABLE ON SIMPLIFICATION AND BURDEN REDUCTION 

Table 1. Overview of costs and benefits identified in the evaluation170 

Citizens/Consumers  

Businesses 

Administrations 

Other … 

Quantitative   Comment 

Quantitative  

Comment 

Quantitative 

Comment  

Quantitative 

Comment 

Administrative costs 

Draw up EU declaration of 
conformity 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

Draw up the technical 
documentation referred to in Annex 
II (e.g. Module B, Module C2, 
Module D, Module E, Module F, 
Module G) 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

Lodge application for Conformity 
Assessment  

Recurrent  

N/A 

N/A 

Collect documentation related to 
carrying out conformity assessment 
procedure 

Keep the technical documentation 
and the EU declaration of 
conformity for 10 years after the 

Recurrent 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 11 794 per 
year, per 
company 

EUR 14 144 per 
year, per 
company 

EUR 18 851 per 
year, per 
company 

EUR 6 811 per 
year, per 
company 

EUR 11 035 per 
year, per 
company 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Importers 

170 Cost data in this table is based on cost templates and related interviews, as reported in  European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation 
(Directive 2013/29/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU, and Directive 2014/28/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2008/43/EC and Commission Decision 
2004/388/EC), Final Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025. The cost classification for notified bodies has been adjusted. 

. 

86 

 
                        
 
 
civil explosive has been placed on 
the market 

Administrative procedures for the 
transfer of civil explosives 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

Inform national authorities of civil 
explosives that may represent a risk 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Administrative actions to ensure 
traceability, labelling of civil 
explosives with the registration 
number assigned by the notified 
body, and according to the uniform 
system determined by the 
Commission 

Affixing, or supervising the affixing 
by the manufacturer, of the 
identification number of the Notified 
Body in the civil explosive 

Ensure civil explosives are 
accompanied by instructions and 
safety information in the language of 
the consumer/user 

Recurrent 

Recurrent 

EUR 11 015  per 
year, per 
company 

EUR 27 719 per 
year, per 
company 

EUR 0 per year, 
per NB 

EUR 23 789 per 
year, per 
company 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Importers 

Distributors 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Importers 

Distributors 

Notified bodies  N/A 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Importers 

Distributors 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

EUR 21 327 per 
year, per 
company 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Importers 

Distributors 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keep records of the unique 
identification 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

Collaborate with market surveillance 
authorities to identify suppliers and 
distributors of their civil explosives 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

Administrative actions to withdraw 
or recall not conformant articles 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

EUR 6 905 per 
year, per 
company 

EUR 20 858 per 
year, per 
company 

EUR 31 081 per 
year, per 
company 

Manufactures 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Importers 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Importers 

Distributors 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Importers 

Distributors 

Resources used to recordkeeping of 
the Market surveillance activities 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 450 per 
year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

EUR 450 per 
year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Resources used to documentary and 
evidence collection, and of 
information exchange with the EC 
on an annual basis of the Market 
surveillance activities 

Resources used to lodge application 
for (re)notification to the notifying 
authority of the Member State in 
which it is established. Includes 
costs of collecting document 
evidence of conformity assessment 
activities, the conformity assessment 
module or modules and the civil 
explosive for which that body claims 
to be competent and accreditation 
certificates. 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 0 per year, 
per NB 

Notified bodies  N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

88 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resources used to (re)accreditation 
procedure, (when applicable) issued 
by national accreditation body the 
competence and capacity of the 
conformity assessment body 

Resources used to ensure 
independence from notifying 
authorities, notified bodies, and so 
on (e.g ethics committee) 

Inform other notified bodies of 
negative or positive results (upon 
request) 

Recurrent  N/A 

N/A 

EUR 11 518 per 
year, per NB 

Notified bodies  N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

EUR 1 125 per 
year, per NB 

Notified bodies  N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 0 per year, 
per NB 

Notified bodies  N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Adjustment costs 

Designing and testing civil 
explosives according to the general 
and specific requirements set out in 
Annex II 

Manufacturing and supplying civil 
explosives according to the General 
requirements set out in Annex II 

Carry out a conformity assessment 
procedure 

N/A 

N/A 

 Recurrent 

 Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Equipment costs for affixing CE 
marking 

Operational costs for affixing CE 
marking 

One-off   N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Account for changes in civil 
explosives design, characteristic, 
harmonised standards, or technical 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 2 667 per 
year, per 
company 

EUR 2 102 per 
year, per 
company 

EUR 9 868 per 
year, per 
company 

EUR  1 841 per 
company 

EUR 1 383 per 
year, per 
company 

EUR 3 143 per 
year, per 
company 

89 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
specifications to remain conformant 
to the Directive 

Equipment costs for traceability, 
labelling of civil explosives with the 
registration number assigned by the 
notified body, and according to the 
uniform system determined by the 
Commission 

Operational costs to ensure 
traceability, labelling of civil 
explosives with the registration 
number assigned by the notified 
body, and according to the uniform 
system determined by the 
Commission 

Upon a duly justified request of the 
competent authorities: 
• Carry out sample testing of civil 
explosives already made available on 
the market 
• Investigate, and, if necessary, keep 
a register of: 
     −Complaints 
     −Non-conforming articles 

Corrective operational actions to 
withdraw or recall non-conformant 
articles 

Resources used to personnel 
familiarisation/training on civil 
explosives Essential Safety 
Requirements set out in Annex II 

One-off   N/A 

N/A 

EUR 3 918 per 
company 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 11 880 per 
year, per 
company 

EUR 1 267 per 
year, per 
company 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Importers 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 665 per 
year, per 
company 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 14 725 per 
year, per NB 

Manufacturers 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Importers 

Distributors 

Notified bodies 

EUR 2 836 
per year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

N/A 

N/A 

90 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resources used to ensure that 
personnel responsible for carrying 
out the conformity assessment and 
risk assessment tasks are informed of 
the relevant standardisation and 
harmonisation activities 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 945 per 
year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

N/A 

N/A 

Participation in coordination groups 
meetings 

Recurrent 

N/A 

Liability insurance (if private) 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 17 804 per 
year, per NB 

EUR 20 925 per 
year, per NB 

Notified bodies  N/A 

Notified bodies  N/A 

Enforcement costs 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 1 576 
per year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

EUR 676 per 
year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR  3 782 
per year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

N/A 

N/A 

Participation of coordination groups 
meetings 

Resources used to communicate the 
non-conformance civil explosives to 
economic operators, notified bodies, 
the EC, and competent authorities 
(incl. third country authorities) 

Resources used to performance of 
appropriate checks and risk 
assessments on the characteristics of 
the civil explosive by means of 
documentary checks and, where 
appropriate, physical and laboratory 
checks (excludes outsourced 
laboratory tests) based on adequate 
samples (includes visit to premises 
of economic operators for sampling 
purposes) 

91 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resources used to monitor accidents 
and harms in the Member State 
caused by civil explosives 

Upon non-compliance, notify 
(require) the manufacturer of the 
need to take appropriate corrective 
measures, and suspend or withdraw 
the certificate if necessary 

Resources used to take corrective 
actions when the Economic Operator 
does not (incl. Resources used to 
destruction/decommissioning/dispos
al) 

Resources used to map non-
conformant civil explosives supply 
chain 

Resources used to verification of 
reports and certificates presented by 
economic operators, notified bodies, 
etc. regarding the conformity 
assessment activities 

Resources used to alert users of civil 
explosives that may pose a risk of 
injury or damage 

Resources used to outsourced 
laboratory tests for conformity 
assessment and risk assessments 

‘Other’ enforcement costs 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

 Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 473 per 
year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

EUR 676 per 
year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 945 per 
year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 473 per 
year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

EUR 901 per 
year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

EUR 450 per 
year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

EUR 0 per 
year, per 
MSA 

EUR 0 per 
year, per 
MSA 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

Market 
surveillance 
authorities 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

92 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sustained level of safety171 

Not 
quantifiable 

Recurrent 

The 
Directive 
seems to 
have 
contributed 
to a 
relatively 
stable safety 
level of the 
civil 
explosives 
on the 
market. This 
benefits not 
only users 
but also 
society at 
large. 

Improved market access172 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

171 Cost interviews with market surveillance authorities. 
172 Cost assessment interviews with industry stakeholders. 

Direct benefits 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Not quantifiable  Companies and 
Notified bodies 
report improved 
access to the 
single market 
thanks to the 
harmonisation of 
rules and the CE 
marking system. 
They have also 
experienced 
advantages on 

93 

 
 
Reduction of familiarisation costs173 

Recurrent 

non-EU markets, 
as CE marking is 
widely accepted 
internationally as 
complying with 
other markets’ 
safety 
requirements 

N/A 

N/A 

Not quantifiable  The Directive has 

resulted in an 
approximation of 
Member States’ 
legislation. 
Largely identical 
definitions and 
similar 
requirements 
have reduced 
businesses’ costs 
for 
familiarisation 
with legislation. 

N/A 

N/A 

Not 
quantifiable 

The Directive 
has resulted in 
an 
approximation 
of Member 
States’ 
legislation. 
Largely 
identical 
definitions 
and similar 
requirements 
have reduced 
authorities’ 
costs for 
familiarisation 
with 
legislation. 

Cost savings in conformity 
assessment activities174 

N/A 

N/A 

Recurrent 

Not quantifiable  The introduction 
of the horizontal 
NLF provisions 
for conformity 
assessments and 
essential safety 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

173 Cost assessment interviews. 
174 Cost assessment interviews. 

94 

 
 
Improved traceability of civil 
explosives175 

Coordination and information 
exchange176 

Recurrent 

requirements has 
brought cost 
savings for 
companies 
thanks to 
harmonised 
procedures and 
requirements. 

N/A 

N/A 

Not quantifiable  The introduction 

of provisions 
regarding the 
traceability of 
civil explosives 
allowed 
stakeholders to 
better track the 
movement of 
civil explosives 
throughout the 
supply chains 

N/A 

N/A 

Not quantifiable  The Directive has 

facilitated 
coordination and 
information 
exchange 
between market 
surveillance 
authorities, 
notified bodies 

95 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Not 
quantifiable 

Not 
quantifiable 

The 
introduction 
of provisions 
regarding the 
traceability of 
civil 
explosives 
allowed 
stakeholders 
to better track 
the movement 
of civil 
explosives 
throughout the 
supply chains 

The Directive 
has facilitated 
coordination 
and 
information 
exchange 
between 
market 
surveillance 

175 Targeted interviews with market surveillance authorities and notified bodies. 
176 Cost assessment interviews and targeted interviews. 

 
 
 
and the 
Commission. 
Fora like the 
Forum of 
Notified Bodies 
and the 
Administrative 
Cooperation 
Group (AdCo) 
provide an 
opportunity to 
exchange on 
issues 
encountered 
during market 
surveillance and 
conformity 
assessments, to 
find solutions 
and to agree on 
common 
approaches. 

authorities, 
notified 
bodies and the 
Commission. 
Fora like the 
Forum of 
Notified 
Bodies and 
the 
Administrativ
e Cooperation 
Group (AdCo) 
provide an 
opportunity to 
exchange on 
issues 
encountered 
during market 
surveillance 
and 
conformity 
assessments, 
to find 
solutions and 
to agree on 
common 
approaches. 

96 

 
 
 
TABLE 2:  Simplification and burden reduction (savings already achieved)  
Report any simplification, burden reduction and cost savings achieved already by the intervention evaluated, including the points of comparison/ where available (e.g. REFIT savings 
predicted in the IA or other sources).  

Citizens/Consumers/Workers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

[Other …] _ specify 

Quantitative  

Comment 

Quantitative  

Comment 

Quantitative  Comment  

Quantitative  Comment 

Indirect compliance cost savings  

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Not quantifiable  The Directive has 

Reduction of 
familiarisation 
cost 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Cost savings in 
conformity 
assessment 
activities 

resulted in an 
approximation of 
Member States’ 
legislation. 
Largely identical 
definitions and 
similar 
requirements 
have reduced 
businesses’ costs 
for 
familiarisation 
with legislation. 

Not quantifiable  The introduction 
of the horizontal 
NLF provisions 
for conformity 
assessments and 
essential safety 
requirements has 
brought cost 
savings for 
companies 
thanks to 

97 

N/A 

N/A 

Not 
quantifiable 

The Directive 
has resulted in 
an 
approximation 
of Member 
States’ 
legislation. 
Largely 
identical 
definitions and 
similar 
requirements 
have reduced 
authorities’ 
costs for 
familiarisation 
with 
legislation. 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

 
               
 
Coordination and 
information 
exchange 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Coordination 
and information 
exchange 

98 

N/A 

N/A 

harmonised 
procedures and 
requirements. 

The Directive has 
facilitated 
coordination and 
information 
exchange 
between market 
surveillance 
authorities, 
notified bodies 
and the 
Commission. 
Fora like the 
Forum of 
Notified Bodies 
and the 
Administrative 
Cooperation 
Group (AdCo) 
provide an 
opportunity to 
exchange on 
issues 
encountered 
during market 
surveillance and 
conformity 
assessments, to 
find solutions 
and to agree on 
common 
approaches. 

Coordination 
an 
information 
exchange 

The Directive 
has facilitated 
coordination 
and 
information 
exchange 
between 
market 
surveillance 
authorities, 
notified bodies 
and the 
Commission. 
Fora like the 
Forum of 
Notified 
Bodies and the 
Administrative 
Cooperation 
Group (AdCo) 
provide an 
opportunity to 
exchange on 
issues 
encountered 
during market 
surveillance 
and conformity 
assessments, to 
find solutions 
and to agree on 
common 
approaches. 

 
PART II: II Potential simplification and burden reduction (savings) 
Identify further potential simplification and savings that could be achieved with a view to make the initiative more effective and efficient without prejudice to its policy objectives177. 

Citizens/Consumers/Workers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

[Other …] _ specify 

Quantitative  

Comment 

Quantitative  

Comment 

Quantitative 

Comment  

Quantitati
ve 

Comment 

Simplification of labelling requirements 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

Introduction of a digital system for the approval of transfers 

Recurrent 

N/A 

N/A 

177 This assessment is without prejudice to a possible future Impact Assessment. 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Not 
quantifiable 

The introduction 
of an EU-wide 
digital system for 
the approval of 
transfers might 
save authorities 
time in the 
treatment of 
approval requests 
compared to the 
current system 
which allows 
paper-based 
approvals. 

Labelling and CE 
marking create 
significant costs for 
businesses. Further 
digitalisation could 
be explored. 

The introduction of 
an EU-wide digital 
system for the 
approval of 
transfers might 
save businesses 
time in the 
preparation of a 
transfer of 
explosives 
compared to the 
current system 
which allows 
paper-based 
approvals. 

Not 
quantifiable 

Not 
quantifiable 

99 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX V. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT  

1.  Introduction  

This synopsis report provides a concise summary of the key findings and insights gathered 
during consultations carried out in the framework of the evaluation of the Civil Explosives 
Directive. Engaging a diverse range of stakeholders, this report incorporates perspectives 
from national authorities, conformity assessment bodies, industry representatives, NGOs, 
logistics operators, and environmental and cultural organisations across all 27 EU Member 
States. 

2.  Consultation strategy 

2.1. 

 Outline of the strategy  

The consultations conducted as part of the evaluation of the Civil Explosives legislation 
(Directive 2014/28/EU and its implementing measures) aimed to determine whether the 
existing  EU legal  framework on civil  explosives remains effective,  relevant,  and fit for 
purpose to achieve its objectives and in addressing the needs and problems, including the 
evolving challenges, in the civil explosives sector. They sought to evaluate the legislation’s 
success in ensuring safety, security, and the smooth movement of civil explosives within 
the  EU,  while  identifying  shortcomings  of  the  legislation  in  addressing  technological 
advancements, emerging risks, and environmental priorities. To achieve these goals, four 
complementary  consultation  methods  were  employed:  a  call  for  evidence,  a  public 
consultation  to  gather  broad  stakeholder  input,  a  targeted  online  survey  to  collect 
detailed data on specific regulatory aspects, interviews to provide in-depth insights from 
key  stakeholders.  A  summary  of  insights  gathered  during  discussions  at  the  validation 
workshop was also incorporated into this synopsis report. 

Each  consultation  tool  played  a  complementary  role  in  ensuring  a  comprehensive 
evaluation  of  the  Civil  Explosive  Directive.  The  public  consultation  provided  a  broad 
platform to gather diverse views from the general public and stakeholders, offering a wide 
range of perspectives on the legislation. The targeted online survey focused on collecting 
detailed,  structured  input,  enabling  a  more  technical  and  nuanced  assessment  of  the 
Directive’s  impact  and  challenges.  Meanwhile,  the  interviews  allowed  for  in-depth 
discussions with key stakeholders, providing qualitative insights and context that enriched 
the understanding of sector-specific issues. Together, these tools ensured a balanced mix 
of broad, focused, and detailed inputs to support a robust evaluation. 

100 

 
 
 
 
 
2.2. 

 Overview of the consultation activities carried out 

Public consultation 

The  public  consultation  (PC)  was  conducted  from  8th  of  April  to  1 July  2024  on  the 
European Commission’s dedicated Better Regulation online platform ‘Have Your Say’178. 
Among  the  9  responses  to  the  public  consultation,  6  (66.7%)  were  provided  by  public 
authorities, 1 (11.1%) by a non-governmental organisation, 1 (11.1%) by an EU citizen 
and  1  (11.1%)  by  a  business  association.  Additionally,  among  the  respondents  to  the 
consultation, 3 (33.3%) stakeholders were from Austria, 2 (22.2%) from Belgium, and 1 
stakeholder each (11.1% each) from France, Sweden, the Netherlands and Czechia.  

Targeted survey 

The  online  survey,  launched  on  the  15 March  2024,  and  closed  on  the  31st  of  May, 
consisted of 115 questions and was distributed to key stakeholders in the field of European 
civil explosives. Multipliers were employed to further disseminate the surveys, including 
the chair of the Civil Explosives AdCO and industry organisations such as Federation of 
European  Explosives  Manufacturers  (FEEM).  Weekly  reminders  were  sent  to  survey 
respondents who had not yet answered. 

61 complete responses from invited participants representing various stakeholder groups 
were  received.  The  largest  number  of  responses  has  been  provided  by  the  national 
enforcement authorities (21.3%) and national market surveillance authorities (19.6%). The 
respondents came from 23 Member States. Notably, Austria and Portugal (10% each), and 
Poland and Spain (8.3% each) were most represented among stakeholder responses.  

Interviews 

The interview process gathered input from a diverse range of 39 stakeholders, ensuring a 
diverse representation across key groups involved in the regulation, enforcement, and use 
of civil explosives. National enforcement authorities and market surveillance authorities 
provided  the  largest  share  of  interviewees,  with  18  participants  (46.15%).  7  (17.95%) 
interviews  were  conducted  with  individual  industry  stakeholders  and  2  (5.13%)  with 
industry organisations. Notified bodies contributed 6 responses (15.38%), while notifying 
authorities  and  the  European  Commission  each  provided  2  responses  (5.13%),  adding 
regulatory and administrative viewpoints. Input  from specialised organisations was also 
represented, with 1 response (2.56%) each from an accreditation body and an NGO.  

It is important to note that in many instances, the same stakeholder was engaged multiple 
times  throughout  the  evaluation  process,  including  during  the  scoping  phase,  survey 
piloting, study phase, and for contributing to the cost templates. 

178 European Commission, Have Your Say ‘EU rules on civil explosives – evaluation’, Link. The summary 

report can be found here. 

101 

 
 
Table 3: Consulted stakeholders by consultation activity 

Public consultation 

Consulted stakeholders 

Public authorities 

NGO 

EU citizen 

Business association 

Targeted survey 

Consulted stakeholders 

National enforcement authorities 

Responses 

6 (66.6%) 

1 (11.1%) 

1 (11.1%) 

1 (11.1%) 

Responses 

13 (21.31%) 

National market surveillance authorities 

12 (19.67%) 

Industry: manufacturers (SME) 

Notified bodies 

Industry organisations 

9 (14.75%) 

6 (9.84%) 

6 (9.84%) 

Industry: manufacturers (large enterprise) 

5 (8.20%) 

Notifying authorities 

Regional authorities 

Industry: importers 

Accreditation body 

NGO 

Interviews 

Consulted stakeholders 

Industry organisations 

Accreditation body 

National enforcement authority & market 
surveillance authority 

European Commission 

Industry 

Notified body 

Notifying authority 

4 (6.56%) 

2 (3.28%) 

2 (3.28%) 

1 (1.64%) 

1 (1.64%) 

Responses 

2 (5.13%) 

1 (2.56%) 

18 (46.15%) 

2 (5.13%) 

7 (17.95%) 

6 (15.38%) 

2 (5.13%) 

102 

 
NGO 

1 (2.56%) 

Source: Technopolis Group 

2.3.  Methodology used to process data  

The  data  and  information  collected  across  the  consultations  were  analysed  using  a 
combination of methods to ensure a balanced and robust evaluation. Responses from the 
public consultation and the targeted online survey were subjected to statistical analysis to 
identify trends and patterns, while qualitative insights from interviews provided context 
and depth to the findings. Triangulation was used to cross-validate information across the 
different consultation tools, as well as sources such as desk research, ensuring consistency 
and reliability. 

Data limitations  

Due  to  limited  information  from  desk  research,  the  evaluation  depended  heavily  on 
stakeholder consultations. While valuable, stakeholder responses often reflected specific 
national  contexts  or  organisational  perspectives, 
introducing  subjective  biases. 
Additionally, an inherent limitation of stakeholder consultations is the fact that respondents 
can  naturally  only  reply  from  their  personal  perspective,  influenced  by  differences  in 
stakeholder type, geographic location, which can introduce biases. This is exacerbated if 
the number of respondents in an activity is small, such as in the targeted survey and the 
public consultation conducted for this study.  

The  low  response  rates  were  largely  attributed  to  respondent  fatigue,  as  stakeholders 
faced  multiple  concurrent  data  collection  exercises,  including  surveys  and  interviews. 
Stakeholders reported difficulties allocating sufficient time to participate fully, particularly 
in  the  public  consultation.  A  significant  proportion  of  responses  (sometimes  exceeding 
40% for specific questions) indicated ‘Do not know/prefer not to answer’. This trend was 
particularly evident in questions addressing: environmental protection, the situation prior 
to the implementation of the Directive and factual information, such as accident frequency 
and health and safety issues. Stakeholders cited reasons such as the absence of aggregated 
data  or  tracking  systems  in  their  Member  States.  Questions  requiring  a  long-term 
perspective, such as trends since the adoption of the first Directive in 1993 (93/15/EEC), 
were particularly challenging for respondents without relevant historical insights. A high 
prevalence of ‘Do not know’ responses was noted in the survey. This outcome was partly 
influenced by the evaluation study team’s inclusive approach, which encouraged a broad 
range of stakeholder types to respond. While this enhanced response rates, it also led to 
instances  where  respondents  lacked  the  requisite  knowledge  or  experience  to  address 
certain  questions.  These  factors  complicated  drawing  general  conclusions.  To  mitigate 
these limitations, the evaluation employed data triangulation, integrating insights from 
desk  research  (where  available),  the  public  consultation,  interviews,  and  survey  data  to 
enhance the robustness and reliability of findings. 

103 

 
3.  Results of the consultation activities   

3.1. Call for evidence 

The call for evidence for the Civil Explosives Directive (Directive 2014/28/EU) received 
input  from  11  stakeholders,  including  public  authorities,  companies,  NGOs,  business 
associations, and EU citizens. Feedback came from several Member States, with notable 
contributions from France, Portugal, Croatia, Norway, and the Netherlands, highlighting a 
diverse  range  of  perspectives.  The  key  themes  emerging  from  the  feedback  were 
harmonisation  and  national  autonomy,  safety  and  traceability,  regulatory  complexity, 
environmental concerns, and market surveillance and enforcement. 

Harmonisation and national autonomy 

Stakeholders  expressed  mixed  views  on  the  balance  between  harmonised  EU  rules  and 
national autonomy. While some contributors, including public authorities, emphasised the 
importance of a unified framework to ensure safety and fair competition across the internal 
market,  others,  such  as  individual  EU  citizens,  voiced  concerns  about  the  Directive 
infringing  on  national  sovereignty.  One  EU  citizen  argued  that  Member  States  should 
retain  the  right  to  independently  regulate  civil  explosives,  particularly  given  varying 
national contexts and priorities. In contrast, business associations highlighted the benefits 
of  harmonised  rules  in  fostering  efficiency  and  clarity  for  cross-border  trade  and 
cooperation. 

Safety and traceability 

The safety and traceability of civil explosives emerged as critical areas for improvement. 
Public authorities raised concerns about gaps in the Directive’s ability to ensure effective 
tracking  of  explosives,  particularly  during  intra-Community  transfers.  Suggestions 
included expanding the application of digital traceability systems, such as the SCEPYLT 
system,  to  better  monitor  the  movement  of  explosives  across  borders.  Business 
stakeholders also highlighted the need for stricter requirements on traceability, including 
real-time  tracking  and  enhanced  coordination  between  Member  States.  Additionally, 
public authorities from France and Portugal stressed the importance of addressing issues 
related  to  mobile  explosives  manufacturing  units  (MEMUs)  to  improve  the  safety  and 
security of explosives during transport and use. 

Regulatory complexity 

Challenges  related  to  the  Directive’s  complexity  and  inconsistencies  were  a  recurring 
theme. Industry stakeholders pointed to difficulties in interpreting and applying Essential 
Safety Requirements (ESRs), particularly in cases where overlaps with other directives, 
such as the Pyrotechnic Directive, create redundancies. A public authority noted that the 
variation  in  procedures  for  obtaining  transit  permits  across  Member  States  undermines 
efficiency and creates barriers for businesses. Feedback emphasised the need for clearer 
definitions  and  streamlined  processes  to  reduce  administrative  burdens  and  enhance 
regulatory coherence. 

104 

 
Environmental concerns 

Environmental considerations were also  prominent in the feedback. Stakeholders raised 
concerns about the environmental impact of explosive materials, particularly in terms of 
waste management and pollution. NGOs and public authorities advocated for aligning the 
directive  with  broader  EU  environmental  objectives,  including  the  promotion  of 
sustainable  manufacturing  practices  and  the  reduction  of  hazardous  materials  in 
explosives.  Industry  stakeholders  supported  updating  technical  standards  to  incorporate 
environmentally  friendly  innovations,  ensuring  compliance  with  modern  environmental 
expectations without compromising safety or functionality. 

Market surveillance and enforcement 

The  need  for  stronger  market  surveillance  and  enforcement  mechanisms  was  a  central 
theme.  Stakeholders  highlighted  persistent  non-compliance  issues,  particularly  with 
imported explosives that fail to meet EU standards. Public authorities called for enhanced 
EU-level  oversight  to  ensure  consistent  enforcement  and  reduce  disparities  in  technical 
capacity among Member States. Feedback also emphasised the importance of providing 
adequate  resources  to  national  authorities  for  monitoring  and  enforcement  activities. 
Suggestions included the establishment of a centralised EU body to oversee compliance 
and the development of standardised protocols for inspections and audits. 

3.2.  Targeted survey  

Relevance 

Evaluating  the  relevance  of  this  Directive  involves  assessing  whether  it  still  addresses 
current health, safety, and market needs, especially as new products emerge. Survey results 
reveal  that  most  respondents  consider  the  Directive  highly  relevant,  with  national 
large  manufacturers  expressing  particularly  high 
enforcement  authorities  and 
satisfaction179. However, 36% of stakeholders considered the Directive only relevant to a 
moderate, notified bodies being the most critical in this regard (i.e. all respondents but 
one in this category mentioned that the Directive addresses the needs and challenges in a 
moderate or low extent)180. 

179 71% (n=5) out of 7 national enforcement authorities answered ‘to a very high extent’ or ‘to a high extent’ 
to question 111. 83% (n=5) out of 6 large manufacturers answered ‘to a very high extent’ or ‘to a high 
extent’ to question 111. 

180 36% (n=15) out of 42 respondents answered ‘to a moderate extent’ or ‘to a low extent’ to question 111. 

105 

 
 
Figure 18: Stakeholders’ views on relevance for addressing current needs and challenges 

Considering its objectives, to what extent do you consider the Directive addresses 
current needs and challenges?

2% 7%

29%

48%

7%

7%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

No extent

To a low extent

To a moderate extent

To a high extent

To a very high extent

Do not know/prefer not say

N = 42, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results 

When asked about the current relevance of the issues that justified the introduction (i.e. 
Council  Directive  93/15/EEC)  and  subsequent  recast  (i.e.  Directive  2014/28/EU)  of  a 
common EU legislation around civil  explosives, respondents  considered the differences 
between national laws within the Union as the main issue that continue to be relevant 
nowadays181. On the contrary, the presence of non-compliant or dangerous products on the 
market and the existence of heterogenous safety requirements across the EU appear to be 
minor concerns at present182.  

Stakeholders  emphasised  persistent  challenges,  particularly  the  overlap  with  the 
pyrotechnics legislation. Multipurpose products, such as rock-breaking cartridges, present 
classification issues, as they may be labelled as pyrotechnic articles yet have similar safety 
concerns as civil explosives. Ambiguities arise when substances like black powder are used 
differently across sectors, complicating regulatory alignment.  

Overlaps  with  other  legislation,  such  as  aerospace  regulations,  further  complicate 
matters. For example, stringent explosives requirements may unnecessarily apply to minor 
aviation  components, and harmonised categorisation  is  needed to  facilitate cross-border 
transfers.  Additionally,  differing  national  interpretations  about  military  versus  civilian 
uses, even with case-by-case Commission guidance, create further complexity. 

181 49% (n=21) out of 43 respondents answered ‘to a very high extent’; ‘to a high extent’ or to ‘to a moderate 

extent’ to question 106. 

182 53% (n=23) out of 43 respondents answered ‘to a low extent’; ‘tot at all’ to question 106 concerning the 
‘presence  of  non-compliant  or  dangerous  products  on  the  market’;  while  42%  (n=18)  out  of  43 
respondents answered ‘to a low extent’; ‘not at all’ to question 106 concerning the ‘heterogeneous safety 
requirements  hamper  the  protection  of  human  health  and  safety  and  the  protection  of  users  and 
professional end-users’. 

106 

 
  
 
Concerning the recent technical and technological developments around civil explosives, 
the results stemming from the survey show diverging opinions on whether the existing 
provisions of the Directive support the categorisation (i.e. in/out of scope) of newly 
emerging  products.  Particularly,  whereas  several  respondents  stated  that  the  existing 
definition adequately cover such products, 37% expressed moderate or great concern on 
such  coverage.  Whereas  market  surveillance  authorities  and  SMEs  appear  to  be  more 
critical  in  this  regard,  large  manufacturers  and  industry  associations  seem  overall  more 
satisfied with the capacity of the provisions to encompass newly emerging products. 

Figure 19: Stakeholders’ views on relevance of definitions 

In your view, to what extent the existing definitions within the Directive facilitate the accurate 
categorisation of newly emerging products covered by its scope?

4%

11%

22%

35%

9%

20%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Not at all

To a low extent

To a moderate extent

To a high extent

To a very high extent

Do not know/prefer not say

N = 46, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results 

Experts also suggested that AN-based products should be explicitly included in the scope 
of the Directive due to the risk of toxic gas in detonation fumes that, pose serious health 
and environmental risks Notably, 47% of respondents indicated that their Member States 
have  adopted  stricter  rules183,  mainly  to  enhance  security  during  the  transport  of 
explosives,  underscoring  the  need  for  ongoing  legislative  adaptation  to  meet  evolving 
safety and market demands. 

Coherence 

External Coherence 

On the questions on external coherence 43 responses were received. A significant portion 
of  respondents  (around  60%)  believe  there  is  a  moderate  extent  of  coherence  (14 
respondents)  or  high  extent  of  coherence  (12  respondents).  Around  30  percents  of 
respondents (12 respondents) do not have an opinion.    

183 47% (n=23) out of 49 respondents answered ‘5’ or ‘4’ to question 36. 

107 

 
  
 
One representative from a market surveillance authority flagged classification ambiguities 
between the Civil Explosives Directive and other directives covering rather similar articles 
(e.g. pyrotechnics, marine equipment, weapons). Such ambiguities affect which legislation 
is applied and the technical requirements that need to be met. Furthermore, it was stressed 
that the application of the exemption for explosives intended for use by the armed forces 
and police was unclear since it is not specified whether the exemption covers the entire 
supply chain or only applies when the final product is delivered to the military or police.    

Internal Coherence 

With  respect  to  internal  coherence,  47  responses  were  received.  Most  stakeholders 
(47.62%) perceive the Directive to have high internal coherence. This suggests that nearly 
half of the respondents find the provisions, clauses, and requirements of the Directive to 
be consistent and harmonious. A significant portion of the stakeholders (28.57%) rated the 
internal  coherence  as  medium.  This  indicates  that  while  they  do  not  see  major 
inconsistencies, there is still room for improvement in making the Directive more coherent. 
No specific issues were reported by respondents.   

Effectiveness 

National transposition 

According  to  the  targeted  survey  respondents,  the  most  significant  changes  to  national 
legislation  resulting  from  the  Civil  Explosive  Directive’s  application  in  2016  are  the 
introduction  of  licensing  systems,  highlighted  by  29%  of  respondents,  and  digitalised 
transfer  declarations,  noted  by  26%184.  When  asked  in  the  targeted  survey,  ‘Did  your 
Member  State  adopt  more  stringent  rules  than  those  included  in  the  Directive  or  add 
additional  requirements?’,  7  Member  States  reported  implementing  stricter  regulations. 
These were primarily driven by the need to enhance safety and public protection, address 
illicit  trade  and  misuse,  and  manage  specific  national  risks185.  In  contrast,  18  Member 
States adhered strictly to the Directive’s provisions without additional requirements186. 

Regarding the impact of differences in national rules, 40% of stakeholders indicated that 
these  variations  have  negatively  or  very  negatively  affected  the  intra-EU  flow  of  civil 
explosives. Meanwhile, 26% reported no change, 11% perceived a positive impact, and 
2%  observed  a  very  positive  effect,  while  25%  stakeholders  report  a  positive  or  very 
positive effect in terms of health and safety in the industry, 35% remain unchanged 11% 
negatively  or  very  negatively.  Regarding  the  impact  on  the  competitiveness  of  EU 
companies and public security, 28% of stakeholders believe the effect has remained neutral 

184 In response to the question: ‘Since the entry into application of the Civil Explosive Directive in 2016, 
what notable modifications occurred to national measures and requirements for the placing on the market 
and intra-EU transfer of the products covered by the directive’ (n=31). 

185 Out of all Member States who answered (n=19), 13 Member States reported that they had not adopted 

stricter regulations or additional requirements beyond those outlined in the Directive. 

186 It is important to note that the answers reported at the level of Member States aggregate all the responses 
provided by different stakeholder types within the same Member State.(n=31). Six respondents reported 
not knowing. 

108 

 
 
or unchanged, 28% report being negatively affected, 4% feel very negatively impacted, 
11% perceive a positive effect, and 4% report a very positive effect187. 

Socio-economic context 

Accidents  and  health  issues  related  to  civil  explosives  remained  stable  since  2016, 
according to 28.3% of stakeholder, while only 13% reporting a decline188. Stakeholders 
linked  many  accidents  to  the  transport  of  explosives  which  is  covered  by  national  and 
European transport regulations rather than by the Directive itself. According to 30% and 
28% of stakeholders, the number of cases of illicit activities since the entry into force of 
Directive  93/15/EC  and  Directive  2014/28/EU,  respectively,  has  remained  unchanged, 
while 13% and 11% perceived a decrease or strong decrease189.  

Implementation of provisions 

Satisfaction with the oversight and assessment of notified bodies is moderate to high190, 
though  concerns  persist  regarding  disparities  in  conformity  assessments  carried  out  by 
different Notified Bodies, variability of accreditation status among Notified Bodies, and 
the  absence  of  Notified  Bodies  in  certain  Member  States.  Satisfaction  levels  with 
conformity  assessment  modules  varied,  with  Module  B  (EU-type  examination)  and 
Module  D  (quality  assurance  of  production)  rated  highest,  while  Module  G  (unit 
verification) scored lowest.  

187 Out of the stakeholders who answered (n=54). 
188 Out of the stakeholders who answered (n=46), 52% of respondents chose the ‘Do not know’ option. 
189 Out of the stakeholders who answered (n=47), 55.32% of respondents chose the ‘Do not know’ option. 
Since  the  adoption  the  Directive  2014/28/EU,  6.38%  considered  it  strongly  decreased,  4.26%  it 
decreased, 4.26% strongly increased, 2.13% increased and 27.66% it remained unchanged. 

190 Stakeholders were asked to provide a rating on a scale of 1-5 for their degree of satisfaction. Out of the 
stakeholders  who  answered  (n=49),  24.5%  expressed  a  degree  of  satisfaction  of  3  out  of  5,  40.8% 
expressed a degree of satisfaction of 4 out of 5 and 26.5% a degree of satisfaction of 5 out of 5. 

109 

 
 
Figure 20: Stakeholders’ satisfaction with current requirements for conformity assessment 

How satisfied are you with the current requirements for conformity assessment (EU-
Type examination, Module C2, Module D, etc.)?

Please grade from a scale of 1-5 your relative satisfaction witth each (1 being the lowest 
and 5 the highest)

Module G: based on unit verification

4%

2%

6%

23%

10%

Module F: based on product verification

2%

4%

6%

21%

13%

54%

54%

Module E: Product Quality Assurance

2%

4%

10%

21%

15%

48%

Module D: Production Quality Assurance

2%

6%

40%

Module B: EC Type-Examination

4%

42%

19%

23%

33%

31%

 Module C2: based on internal production control plus
supervised product checks at random intervals

10%

6%

29%

10%

44%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

1

2

3

4

5

Do not know/Prefer not say

N = 48, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results 

The traceability system was deemed effective by 39% of stakeholders, though 29% noted 
no  improvement  compared  to  the  situation  before  the  introduction  of  the  traceability 
system.  

110 

 
 
Figure 21: Stakeholders’ views on effectiveness of traceability 

To what extent do you consider that your traceability system to identify non-compliant products and 
their origin, as well as lost or stolen products has become more effective since:

The entry into application in 2016 of the current Directive
(2014/28/EU)

38%

28%

33%

The adoption of the first Directive in 1993 (93/15/EEC)

5%

26%

18%

51%

The traceability system was more effective with the adoption of the first Directive in 1993 (93/15/EEC)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

The traceability system became more effective since the entry into application of the current Directive in 2016
(2014/28/EU)

The level of effectiveness of the traceability system in my Member State did not change when comparing the two
directives

Do not know/Prefer not to say

N = 48, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results 

Enforcement and Compliance 

Market  surveillance  and  enforcement  authorities  reported  challenges  in  controlling 
imported  and  EU-manufactured  explosives.  The  most  cited 
include 
nonconformity with EN standards affecting the safety of the product and potential risks to 
safety requirements.  

issues 

111 

 
  
Figure 22: Stakeholders’ replies on reasons behind enforcement actions 

In case controls over EU manufatured and imported products led to 
prohibitions, withdrawals, or recalls, what were the main reasons 
behind these decisions?

Technical nonconformity with EN standards
affecting the safety of the product

16%

16%

5%

63%

Potential risks to public safety

16%

11%

26%

5%

42%

Non-technical noncompliance with the Directive
(CE marking not or wrongly affixed, EU
declaration of conformity has not been drawn…

16%

5%

16%

32%

32%

Non-compliance with national regulations

26%

11%

16%

21%

26%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%100%

1

2

3

4

5

N = 19, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results 

Most stakeholders did not provide an answer on the question as to whether the number of 
non-compliance products changed since the Directive’s entry into application, but 21%, 
25% and 27%, respectively, indicated that it remained unchanged in the mining, quarrying 
and construction sectors. 

Figure 23: Stakeholders’ views on evolution of number of non-compliant products on the EU market 

Since the entry into force of the Directive in 2016, do you consider that the number of non-
compliant products circulating in the EU market in the following sectors has:

Quarrying

4%

7%

25%

7%

57%

Other

4%

11%

Oil and Gas Industry

4%

11%

14%

86%

71%

Mining

4%

7%

21%

7%

Construction

4%

7%

29%

7%

61%

54%

Agriculture

4%

14%

82%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90% 100%

Strongly decreased Decreased Remained unchanged

Increased Do not know/Prefer not say

N = 28, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results 

The most prevalent infringements of obligations by economic operators since the entry 
into force of the Directive in 2016 reported by stakeholders include non-compliance (20% 

112 

 
 
  
of answers), non-conforming product (8%) and reported non-conforming Quality System, 
non-adherence  to  reporting  requirements  or  lack  of  collection  and  storage  of  data  on 
product  put  on the market  (4%). More than half  of the respondents  (60%) reported not 
knowing the answer to this question or preferred not to disclose it191.  

Effects in relation to objectives 

More  than  50%  of  stakeholders  expressed  high  satisfaction  with  the  Directive’s 
contribution  to  security,  health  and  safety,  and  the  single  market192.  Key  strengths 
include  traceability  of  explosives,  harmonised  safety  requirements,  and  exchange 
mechanisms  between  authorities,  notified  bodies  and  the  Commission.  Suggested 
improvements  include  better  harmonisation  of  rules  across  Member  States,  updating 
harmonised  standards,  and  integrating  a  unified  digital  system  for  intra-community 
transfers. 

Figure 24: Stakeholders’ perception of the Directive’s effects 

How do you perceive the effects of the Directive on :

Strengthening of the Single Market

9%

56%

18%

16%

Protection of the environment

33%

38%

9%

18%

Protection of health and safety

16%

58%

11%

16%

Ensuring of security

9%

58%

24%

9%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Negative

Unchanged/neutral

Positive

Very positive

Do not know/prefer not say

N = 45, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results 

Efficiency 

The  efficiency  analysis  evaluates  the  costs  of  compliance  with  the  Civil  Explosives 
Directive,  identifying  the  key  cost  drivers,  the  variations  among  stakeholders,  and  the 
overall  regulatory  impact.  The  targeted  stakeholder  consultation  and  data  analysis 
highlighted the yearly compliance costs, cost composition, and trends in efficiency since 
the Directive’s full implementation in 2016. It is important to note that the cost estimates 
derived  from  this  analysis  are  complementary  to  the  findings  from  the  cost  templates, 

191 Out of the stakeholders who answered (n=25), 60.00% did not know or preferred not to say. 
192 In total, 45 stakeholders answered this survey question. 

113 

 
  
 
providing  additional  insights  into  the  financial  and  operational  burdens  faced  by 
stakeholders 

Yearly compliance costs193 

Yearly compliance costs varied widely among stakeholders194.  

•  SMEs reported costs ranging from less than EUR 25 000 to EUR 500 000, with an 
average of EUR 102 083. Large companies’ costs ranged from EUR 100 000 to 
over EUR 1 million, averaging EUR 356 240.  

•  Notified bodies showed broader cost ranges from less than EUR 25 000 to more 

than EUR 1 million195. 

•  National  enforcement  authorities  averaged  EUR 244 787,  ranging  from 
EUR 50 001  to  €250 000  and  market  surveillance  authorities  EUR 271 482 
annually, ranging from less than EUR 25 001 to EUR 50 000.  

Relative regulatory burden196 

Compliance costs for the Directive accounted for 6.1% of production costs and 5.7% of 
turnover for SMEs, compared to 8.8% and 4.2% for large companies, respectively. This 
might indicate that SMEs manage production-related compliance more efficiently, while 
large companies benefit from economies of scale in turnover197. Authorities incurred high 
personnel  costs  for  compliance,  with  84%  of  market  surveillance  authorities’  total 
compliance  costs  attributed  to  labour,  compared  to  56%  for  national  enforcement 
authorities. 

193 N = 15 (MSA = 3; SME = 6; notifying Authority = 1; national enforcement authority = 3; notified body 

= 1; large enterprise = 4). 

194  Respondents  were  asked  to  estimate  the  yearly  average  cost  attributable  to  the  Directive  (including 
administrative costs, operational and investment costs). The estimate is made with a simple arithmetic 
average for each type of stakeholder. 

195 The large variability in reported costs by notified bodies, to the extent of reporting up to EUR 1 m, may 
be explained by three factors: 1) the scale of the notified body’s operations, which is substantially larger 
in  some  countries;  2)  the  number  of  obligations  the  notified  body  has  (compliance  with  multiple 
Directives, national legislations, additional activities related to the sector such as training, certification, 
education, etc.; and 3) the ownership/governance structure of the  notified body (see figure 15 above), 
for instance, being a university, national institute, or military institution, may have an impact in the cost 
structure of the notified body. The analysis of the costs exclusively allocated to compliance with the 
Directive is part of another analysis,  i.e. cost-efficiency  analysis, which will be included in the final 
report. 

196 N= 12 respondents (2 importers, 1 large company, 9 SMEs). 
197 N= 12 respondents (7 SMEs, 5 large companies). 

114 

 
 
 
 
Key cost drivers for companies 

Adjustment costs198 

The main adjustment costs key drivers across stakeholders are as follows:  

•  SMEs:  Equipment  acquisition  for  conformity  assessments  (37%  of  total 
compliance costs) and CE marking and traceability systems (28%) were primary 
adjustment costs. 

•  Large companies: Product testing (22%) and CE marking (25%) dominated costs, 

with liability insurance at 15%. 

•  Notified  bodies:  Equipment  acquisition  for  assessments  (44%)  and  corrective 

actions (31%) represented the largest costs. 

Administrative costs199 

The main administrative cost driver across stakeholders are as follows: 

•  Notified  bodies:  documentary  verification  of  the  conformity  of  civil  explosive 

articles accounts for 97% of their administrative costs. 

•  Large  companies:  the  largest  administrative  cost  driver  is  related  to  ensuring 
correct labelling, CE marking, identification numbers, and traceability of products, 
which represents 50% of their total administrative costs. In addition, documentary 
verification,  which  includes  creating  and  submitting  technical  documentation, 
accounts for 13% of their costs. 

•  SMEs: documentary verification of conformity, which accounts for 27% of their 
admin costs, followed by handling paperwork for registrations, certifications, and 
authorisations, which makes up 13% of their total administrative costs. SMEs also 
experience a higher burden in handling Intra-Community Transport of Explosives 
(ICTE) forms, with 21% of costs dedicated to this. 

Conformity assessment costs 

•  Companies  were  asked  for  the  fee  paid  to  notified  bodies  per  conformity 
assessment and notified bodies were asked to provide the price asked to companies 
for their conformity assessment process. This allows for triangulation of data. The 
minimum  cost  reported  by  stakeholders  per  Module  B  is  EUR 1 000  and  a 
maximum  EUR 3 000.  Based  on  these  estimates,  the  least  expensive  and  most 
expensive options for obtaining the necessary certificates of conformity according 
to  the  first  pathway  may  range  from  EUR 1 600  (Module  B  minimum  value  + 

198 N=8 (3 large company, 3 SMEs; notified body 2). 
199 N=8 (large companies=4, SME=3, notified body=1). 

115 

 
 
Module C2 minimum value) to EUR 40 000 (Module B max value + Module D 
max value)200. The second option has an estimated cost of EUR 2 700.   

Cost drivers for authorities201 

National enforcement authorities’ main costs stemmed from administrative activities (28% 
of the total  compliance  costs), followed by inspectors’ training (22%) and coordination 
with  expert  groups  (13%).  Market  surveillance  authorities  incurred  higher  costs  for 
laboratory testing (60%) and conformity assessments (33%). 

An analysis of the labour costs considering the total yearly cost of compliance declared by 
the authorities, indicates that in the case of national market surveillance authorities, 56% 
of  the  cost  are  due  to  remuneration  of  the  personnel  performing  regulatory  compliance 
activities,  while  in  case  of  national  enforcement  authorities,  84%  of  the  total  yearly 
regulatory  costs  are  dedicated  to  their  personnel  performing  regulatory  compliance 
activities202. 

Performance indicators and efficiency trends 

Compliance  costs  for  authorities  were  analysed  relative  to  their  regulatory  activities. 
National enforcement authorities conducted 44 interventions annually, with labour costs 
per  intervention  at  EUR 3 119  and  total  costs  at  EUR 8 069.  Market  surveillance 
authorities  conducted  an  average  of  32  interventions  annually,  with  labour  costs  of 
EUR 7 201 and total costs of EUR 8 584 per intervention. 

Since  2016,  most  stakeholders  reported  increased  compliance  costs,  particularly  large 
companies.  However,  SMEs  and  some  authorities  noted  improved  operational  and 
administrative  efficiencies,  attributed  to  the  Directive’s  harmonised  processes.  Notified 
bodies and larger firms emphasised rising costs linked to stricter regulatory requirements 
in comparison to the previous directive. 

EU added value 

The findings stemming from the targeted survey suggest that the EU intervention in the 
civil explosives sector provided added value compared to the situation where different 
MSs would set different legislations. Particularly, there is a large consensus across all types 
of  stakeholders  that,  without  an  intervention  at  the  EU  level,  the  objectives  of  the 
Directive could not have been achieved, or only partially achieved, by Member States 
acting alone, with 82% indicating that the objectives could have been not at all or 
only to a low or moderate extent be achieved. 

200 The cost of module D can vary from EUR 1 500 to EUR 20 000 & Module B can range EUR 3 000 to 

EUR 20 000 according to different manufacturers. 

201  N=5  (accreditation  bodies=1,  national  enforcement  authorities=3,  national  market  surveillance 

authorities=1). 

202 Accreditation bodies=1, national enforcement authorities=2, national market surveillance authorities=3. 

116 

 
 
Figure 25: Stakeholders’ views on achievement of objectives without EU intervention 

In your opinion, to what extent could the objectives of the Directive have been 
achieved if Member States had acted alone (without the intervention of the EU)?

26%

47%

9%

6% 3% 9%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Not at all

To a low extent

To a moderate extent

To a high extent

To a very high extent

Do not know/prefer not say

N = 34, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results 

When asked about the main benefits achieved at the national level since the adoption of 
the  first  Directive  1993  (93/15/EEC),  stakeholders  mentioned  persons’  safety,  public 
security  and  internal  market  as  the  areas  benefiting  the  most  from  an  EU  common 
action.  Particularly,  the  harmonisation  of  rules  on  the  making  available  and 
supervision of civil explosives, the higher compliance of civil explosives available on 
the EU market with the essential requirements (setting up common EU market surveillance 
and control procedures for explosives entering the union market), as well as the reduction 
of  the  trade  barriers  and  costs  in  the  single  market  scored  the  highest  among  survey 
respondents.  

117 

 
  
Figure 26: Stakeholders’ views on achievement of benefits from harmonising national rules 

To what extent were the following main benefits of harmonising different national rules 
on civil explosives achieved in your Member State:

Higher compliance of civil explosives available on
the EU market with the requirements

6%

24%

28%

18%

24%

Harmonising rules on the making available and
supervision of civil explosives

6%

20%

38%

18%

18%

High level of trust and confidence of users

10%

2%

26%

22%

16%

24%

Reduction of the trade barriers and costs in the
Single Market

2%

6%

16%

32%

14%

30%

Cross-border coordination related to the supply,
trade and use of civil explosives

8%

2%

30%

22%

14%

24%

Improved traceability of sales and transactions

8%

38%

16%

12%

26%

High level of protection of human health and
safety

12%

2%

22%

28%

10%

26%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%100%

No extent

To a low extent

To a moderate extent

To a high extent

To a very high extent

Do not know/prefer not say

N=50, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results 

While recognising the value of the Directive, the majority of stakeholders argued in favour 
of additional harmonisation of the legislation around civil explosives to foster the free 
movement of the products while guaranteeing high levels of protection of health, safety 
and  of  the  environment.  However,  interestingly,  industry  organisations  and  large 
manufacturers expressed more conservative views on the need for further harmonisation. 

118 

 
 
Figure 27: Stakeholders’ views on need of further harmonisation of rules 

To what extent do you think further harmonisation of the rules is needed to ensure 
the free movement of the goods covered by the Directive in the EU market and to 
ensure high levels of protection of health, safety and of the environment?

10%

24%

31%

16%

10%

8%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Not at all

To a low extent

To a moderate extent

To a high extent

To a very high extent

Do not know/prefer not say

N=49, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results 

Public security and internal market represent the area where further harmonisation 
could be beneficial as stakeholders pointed out the need for additional streamlining in the 
transfer and transit of civil explosives across the EU and with third countries. In this 
regard, the requirements for the transfer/transit do not appear to be harmonised across EU 
MSs, representing an obstacle for economic operators acting across borders and, thus, to 
the  free  movement  of  products  within  the  EU  single  market.  Hence,  two  stakeholders 
highlighted the need to (i) harmonise the implementation  of the Directive, for instance, 
with regard to the existence of different national approaches to additional control measures 
and information requirements on consignees of explosives; (ii) use a common IT system; 
and (iii) simplify the transfer authorisation process203. 

The majority (86%) of the stakeholders believe the withdrawal of the Directive would 
negatively  impact  the  economic  conditions  of  the  civil  explosives  sector,  67%  even 
expect a strong negative effect. In this regard, stakeholders, in particular, see the risk of 
fall-back to a situation where EU Member States would (re)introduce national legislations 
causing204:  (i)  limitations  to  the  free  movement  of  civil  explosives;  (ii)  increasing 
uncertainties for economic operators; (iii) degradation of competitiveness and innovation 
on the civil explosives market; (iv) possible lower quality of civil explosives; (v) reduced 
traceability  of  civil  explosives;  (vi)  increasing  difficulties  in  importing  civil  explosives 
from non-EU countries; and (vii) negative socio-economic impacts in the EU. 

203 Q43 open question. 
204 Answers to open question 41. 

119 

 
  
 
Figure 28: Stakeholders’ views on impact of withdrawal of the Directive 

How would the withdrawal of the Directive impact the economic conditions 
within your sector?

67%

19%

14%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Strongly negative

Moderately negative

Do not know/ Prefer not say

N=21, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results 

3.3. 
Relevance 

Interviews  

Interviewees generally agreed that the Civil Explosives Directive’s objectives and scope 
remain relevant in addressing current needs and challenges. However, new security 
challenges have emerged such as theft, illegal trade or criminal use of civil explosives. 
Stakeholders  indicated  that  these  issues  could  be  better  addressed  by  further  enhancing 
security measures within the Directive. For instance, improving labelling requirements was 
mentioned by a national market surveillance authority as an area which needs attention so 
as to facilitate better tracking and enforcement. 

Coherence 

Regarding  coherence,  the  interviews  with  notified  bodies  and  enforcement  authorities 
highlighted specific challenges in categorising certain products, such as safety fuses and 
P2 pyrotechnic articles, within the regulatory frameworks of the Civil Explosives Directive 
and  the  Pyrotechnics  Directive.  These  challenges  are  related  to  product  categorisation 
rather than indicating a lack of coherence in the overall regulatory structure. 

Beyond these categorisation issues, the interviews did not reveal significant coherence 
problems  between  the  Civil  Explosives  Directive  and  other  EU  legislation.  When 
attempting  to  gather  additional  insights  through  further  stakeholder  interviews,  low 
response  rates  and  a  lack  of  substantive  input  were  received.  Consequently,  no  major 
coherence deficiencies were identified from the interviewees’ perspectives. 

120 

 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 

Health and safety results 

Interviewees across stakeholder groups expressed a broad satisfaction with the Directive’s 
impact  on  health  and  safety.  Many  noted  that  the  Directive  has  helped  achieve  high 
standards in user safety and the handling of explosives. Some stakeholders, particularly 
industry  associations,  reported  limited  gains  in  health  and  safety  since  the  Directive’s 
introduction, as similar approval schemes and health and safety standards were already in 
place in  some Member States. For instance, countries with  pre-existing  stringent  health 
and safety standards saw fewer noticeable changes. The Directive has notably improved 
traceability, indirectly enhancing safety and security. According to several notified bodies 
and market surveillance authorities interviewed, the implementation of CE markings has 
contributed to standardising product safety across the EU. When it comes to traceability 
some  stakeholders  noted  that  the  Directive  aims  to  enhance  traceability  requirements, 
building on the notable advancements that were already achieved under the 1993 Directive, 

Security and public protection  

The Directive has created a harmonised system for the transfer of civil explosives as well 
as for their traceability throughout their life cycle. Stakeholders, from both the public and 
private  sectors,  praised  its  focus  on  regulating  production  and  distribution,  which  has 
significantly  contributed  to  the  secure  nature  of  the  market.  Moreover,  several  industry 
actors  interviewed  noted  that  companies  with  pre-existing  robust  security  measures  in 
place prior to the directive experienced minimal operational changes as a result. 

Stakeholders  described  the  civil  explosives  market  as  stable,  with  few  significant 
infringements.  Misuse  of  explosives  is  rare,  and  the  sector  is  largely  self-regulated 
compared  to  the  pyrotechnics  sector.  Compliance  issues  generally  stem  from  non-
adherence to ESRs rather than systemic failures. 

Conformity assessments and testing 

Stakeholders, particularly notified bodies, highlighted  concerns regarding subcontracted 
testing  performed in  non-EU laboratories, especially in  China. However,  this issue was 
considered relatively minor in the context of civil explosives compared to its significance 
in the context of pyrotechnics. 

Traceability  

Traceability systems were widely acknowledged as a strength of the Directive. According 
to  several  notified  bodies  and  market  surveillance  authorities  interviewed,  unique 
identifiers  for  each  article  significantly  enhance  safety  and  compliance,  allowing  for 
effective tracking throughout the supply chain. Challenges remain with traceability labels 
that can be easily removed, as highlighted by a notified body. Ensuring secure attachment 
of these labels was identified as a key area for improvement. 

121 

 
Efficiency 

It is important to note that the cost estimates derived from this analysis are findings from 
the cost templates, with the interviews being largely based on the cost templates. 

For the industry, cost interviews data indicates that the total yearly compliance costs per 
company  were  EUR  191 979,  with  17.2%  for  adjustment  costs  and  64.9%  for 
administrative  costs.  The  interviewed  large  companies  incur  adjustment  costs  of,  on 
average,  EUR 54 397  per  year,  with  a  range  from  EUR 21 126  to  EUR 108 150.  SMEs 
report  a  lower  average  cost  of  EUR 28 873,  ranging  from  EUR 15 428  to  EUR 52 920. 
Large  enterprises’  average  administrative  burden  is  at  a  cost  of  EUR 120 228,  with  a 
minimum  of  EUR 2 700  and  a  maximum  of  EUR 254 300.  For  SMEs,  average 
administrative  costs  EUR 2 070,  with  a  narrow  range  between  EUR 1 620  and 
EUR 2 700.205      . 

For  notified  bodies  that  participated  in  costs  interviews,  data  shows206  the  regulatory 
compliance costs on average per year were EUR 66 097. The two interviewed NBs report 
an average annual administrative cost of EUR 12 643. The adjustment costs for the two 
notified bodies were on average EUR 53 454 per year.207. 

For the market surveillance authority that participated in costs interviews, data shows costs 
average compliance costs were EUR 13 958 per year. For this authority, enforcement costs 
(66.5%) naturally constitute the largest portion of their average yearly cost associated to 
the  Directive,  adjustment  costs  (27.1%)  account  for  the  second  most,  followed  by 
administrative costs (6.5%).208. 

The  Directive  brought  direct  benefits  such  as  harmonised  rules,  reduced  familiarisation 
costs with legislation compared to the costs for the familiarisation with different national 
legislations,  and  improved  transparency  in  the  supply  chain.  Notified  bodies  and 
authorities  benefited  from  consistent  conformity  assessment  modules  and  improved 
coordination, while businesses gained from streamlined intra-EU trade processes. Indirect 
benefits  included  enhanced safety,  security, and  alignment with  international  standards, 
boosting access to global markets. 

EU added value 

When  assessing  the  EU  added  value  of  the  Civil  Explosives  Directive,  stakeholders 
generally  recognised  its  importance  in  maintaining  high  safety  standards  across 
Member States. One industry representative expressed the concern that withdrawing the 
Directive  could  lead  to  adverse  effects,  notably  the  potential  influx  of  cheaper,  lower-

205 N = 6 (SMEs = 3; large Enterprises = 3). 
206 To note that the cost classification for notified bodies has been adjusted compared to the supporting study 

to reflect that conformity assessments are notified bodies‘ usual business. 

207 N = 2. 
208 N = 1. 

122 

 
 
quality  products  into  the  market.  Such  a  scenario  could  undermine  safety  and  create 
disparities in product standards across the EU. 

3.4.  Public consultation 

Relevance 

The Directive is generally seen as relevant to ensuring the health and safety of persons 
by  7  out  of  the  9  respondents209.  Regarding  the  objective  of  ensuring  public  security, 
stakeholder opinions were divided. While 22.2% felt the Directive remains relevant to a 
very large extent, another 22.2% believed it was relevant to a limited extent.  

Most areas covered by the Directive, such as obligations of economic operators and control 
of transfer of explosives, are still considered relevant at least to a moderate extent by the 
majority  of  stakeholders210.  However,  the  area  of  seizures  is  considered  relevant  to  a 
moderate extent only by 2 out of 9 respondents, while 2 respondents consider it relevant 
to a limited extent and one not at all relevant. Similarly, the Directive is considered relevant 
to  a  limited  extent  by  4  out  of  9  respondents  and  to  a  moderate  extent  by  only  one 
respondent regarding penalties. 

While the majority of respondents did not know or preferred not to answer, between 3 and 
4 out of the nine respondents, respectively, indicated that the following concerns should 
be further addressed by the Directive in the future: 

•  Security: Theft of civil explosives, terrorist or criminal use of civil explosives, illicit 
trade and risk of misuse in war/conflict areas lack of proportionate enforcement, and 
penalties to prevent illicit possession, misuse, and thefts of civil explosives. 

•  Environmental  issues:  sustainable  product  components  and  questions  of  residue, 

challenges in the disposal of civil explosives. 

Coherence 

The external coherence of the directive was assessed on several EU interventions namely: 
(1) Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 on Explosives precursors, (2) New Legislative Framework 
(Regulation (EC) No 765/2008, Decision No 768/2008/EC), (3) EU Chemicals Legislation 

209 More specifically 33.3% (n=3) out of 9 respondents  responded that it is still relevant  ‘to a very large 
extent’,  22.2%  (n=2)  out  of  9  respondents  responded  ‘to  a  large  extent’  and  22.2%  (n=2)  out  of  9 
respondents responded ‘to a moderate extent’. 

210 In terms of obligations of manufacturers, 44.4% (4 out of 9) of stakeholders responded that the Directive 
is still relevant ‘to a very large extent’ and 33.3% (3 out of 9) of stakeholders responded that it is relevant 
‘to  a  moderate  extent’.  From  the  remaining  stakeholders,  22.2%  (2  out  of  9)  responded  ‘Do  not 
know/prefer  not  to  say’.  Regarding  ‘obligations  of  importers’,  44.4%  (4  out  of  9)  of  stakeholders 
responded that the Directive is still relevant ‘to a very large extent’ and 33.3% (3 out of 9) of stakeholders 
responded that it is relevant ‘to a moderate extent’. From the remaining stakeholders, 22.2% (2 out of 9) 
responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’. Finally, on ‘obligations of distributors’, 44.4% (4 out of 9) 
of stakeholders responded that the Directive is still relevant ‘to a very large extent’ and 22.2% (2 out of 
9)  of  stakeholders  responded  that  the  Directive  is  still  relevant  ‘to  a  moderate  extent’.  From  the 
remaining  stakeholders,  11.1%  (1  out  of  9)  responded  ‘to  a  limited  extent’  and  22.2%  (2  out  of  9) 
responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’. 

123 

 
 
(REACH and CLP Regulations), (4) EU Firearms Directive 2021/555, (5) Directive on the 
(Directive 
control  of  major-accident  hazards 
2012/18/EU).  

involving  dangerous  substances 

A  substantial  number  of  stakeholders  often  chose  the  ‘Do  not  know/prefer  not  to  say’ 
option  across  the  aforementioned  interventions,  ranging  between  33.3%  to  44.4%  of 
respondents  (3  to  4  out  of  9).  However,  in  the  case  of  EU  chemicals  legislation 
(REACH/CLP), EU Firearms Directive, and the Directive on controlling major-accident 
hazards, responses consistently indicated a balanced distribution between ‘high coherence’ 
and ‘moderate coherence’211. 

Effectiveness 

In the area of health and safety, stakeholders were asked whether the Directive addresses 
the issue of unsafe civil explosives on the market. While 44.4% of respondents agreed that 
this concern is currently addressed by the Directive, the remaining 55.6% selected ‘Do not 
know/prefer not to say,’ reflecting some uncertainty about its impact212. 

Regarding the objective of ensuring public security, stakeholder opinions were divided. 
While  22.2%  felt  the  Directive  remains  relevant  to  a  very  large  extent,  another  22.2% 
believed it was relevant to a limited extent.  

For  the  objective  of  harmonising  rules  across  Member  States  on  the  marking  and 
availability of civil explosives in the single market, two-thirds of respondents (66.6%)213 
believed the Directive has contributed positively. Of these, 33.3% stated it has done so to 
a very large extent, and another 33.3% said to a large extent214. 

In the area of traceability systems, 66.6% of respondents agreed that the Directive has 
contributed to improving the traceability of explosives and their transit. Within this group, 
44.4% rated its contribution to a very large extent, and 22.2% said to a large extent215.  

For the quality and credibility of notified bodies’ work, ca. a third of the stakeholders216 
felt the Directive has  contributed to  improving the quality  and reliability of conformity 
assessments to a very large extent.  

Lastly, in the area of market surveillance activities, 22.2% of stakeholders believed the 
Directive has contributed to increasing the effectiveness of market surveillance to a very 

211 In all interventions, responses indicated ‘high coherence’ (22.2%, 2 out of 9) and ‘moderate coherence’ 

(22.2%, 2 out of 9) with the Civil Explosives Directive. 

212  44.4%  (n=4)  out  of  9  of  the  stakeholders  answered  that  this  concern  is  currently  addressed  by  the 
Directive. The remaining respondents, 55.6% (n=5) out of 9, selected the ‘Do not know/prefer not to 
say’ option. 

213 66% n=6) out of 9 respondents. 
214 33% (n=3) out of 9 respondents. 
215 44.4% (n=4) out of 9) of respondents said that the Directive has contributed ‘to a very large extent’ and 

22.2% (n=2) out of 9 respondents that the Directive has contributed ‘to a large extent. 

216 33% (n=3) out of 9 respondents. 

124 

 
 
large  extent,  while  44.4%  rated  its  contribution  as  moderate.  Others  expressed  less 
certainty about its impact. 

In the area of ‘other concerns’, on the issue of ‘Need to increase the competitiveness of EU 
companies’, 22.2% of the stakeholders responded that ‘this concern should be addressed 
by the Directive in the future’, 22.2% responded that ‘this concern is currently addressed 
by the Directive’ and 55.6% responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’. However, notably, 
market surveillance authorities24 unanimously agreed (100%, 2 out of 2) that this issue is 
already currently addressed by the Directive.  

Efficiency 

Stakeholders expressed mixed views on the burden posed by reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.  For  submission  of  reports,  data,  and  statistics  to  competent  authorities, 
22.2% of stakeholders  considered it a proportionate burden to  a moderate extent, while 
another 22.2% viewed it as a proportionate burden to a large extent217. For recordkeeping 
information, 44.4% considered it a moderate burden218. 

When asked about potential ways to reduce administrative, investment or operational costs 
associated with compliance with the Directive, respecting at the same time the objectives 
of the Directive, one stakeholder suggested cancelling the obligation to approve military-
use  products  processed  by  other  companies  and  digitalising  systems  and  procedures 
(Business Association). Another stakeholder (market surveillance authority/national and 
EU  enforcement  agency)  recommended  making  SCEPYLT  mandatory  for  processing 
DTIEs  within  EU  member  countries  and  dematerialising  DTIEs  in  the  tool  to  achieve 
financial and administrative benefits. 

EU added value 

For achieving a high level of protection of human health and safety, 33.3% (3 out of 9) 
of stakeholders believed this could have been accomplished to a large extent without the 
Directive, while another 33.3% (3 out of 9) felt it could have been achieved to a moderate 
extent. 

Regarding coordination of cross-border transfers of civil explosives, 22.2% indicated 
this could  have been achieved only  to  a limited extent without the  Directive, while the 
majority (4 out of 9) of stakeholders did not know or preferred not to say219. 

217 22% (n=2) out of 9 respondents. 
218 44% (n=4) out of 9 respondents. 
219 22% (n=2) out of 9 respondents. From the remaining stakeholders, 11.1% (1 out of 9) responded ‘not at 
all’, 11.1% (1 out of 9) responded ‘to a large extent’ and 11.1% (1 out of 9) to a moderate extent. 

125 

 
 
For  harmonising  rules on  the  making  available  and  supervision  of  civil  explosives, 
33.3% of stakeholders stated this result could not have been achieved at all without the 
Directive. The same share did not know or preferred not to say220. 

3.5.  Validation workshop  

Stakeholders  during  the  validation  workshop  highlighted  several  key  points  and 
perspectives. A key issue highlighted was the lack of timely and systematic updates from 
regulatory authorities, which hinders industry compliance. While minor overlaps between 
pyrotechnic  and  civil  explosives  legislations  were  noted,  they  were  not  seen  as 
significantly  affecting  overall  effectiveness.  Subcontracting  was  identified  as  a  greater 
issue for pyrotechnics than for civil explosives. Stakeholders pointed to inefficiencies in 
paper-based transfer systems and varying license renewal processes across Member States, 
emphasising  the  need  for  harmonised  digital  solutions.  Concerns  around  cross-border 
transfers through non-EU countries and emerging technologies like electronic detonators 
were raised, underscoring the need for clearer guidelines. Sustainability and environmental 
concerns  were  debated,  with  mixed  perceptions  about  their  relevance  to  the  Directive. 
While most stakeholders believed these issues are well-regulated by broader frameworks, 
some  called  for  addressing  the  use  of  metals  and  lead  in  explosives.  Discussions  also 
touched on the potential future role of AI, urging caution to avoid overlapping legislation. 
Overall,  participants  recognised  the  importance  of  avoiding  duplicative  requirements, 
ensuring clarity, and enhancing digitalisation to improve regulatory efficiency. 

Administrative  costs  and  simplification  were  key  areas  of  discussion,  with  participants 
emphasising  that  further  harmonisation,  such  as  unified  digital  systems  and  standard 
transfer documents, could reduce administrative burdens for MSAs and NBs. It was noted 
that,  while  the  Directive  has  replaced  national  standards  and  reduced  costs  in  some 
Member  States,  disparities  remain,  as  some  NBs  face  high  national  accreditation  costs, 
putting them at a disadvantage. In the absence of the Directive, MSAs anticipated enacting 
national 
likely  mirroring  current  practices.  Participants 
acknowledged the Directive’s role in improving industry access to the single market and 
reducing  regulatory  costs  by  providing  a  consistent  EU-wide  framework,  avoiding  the 
complexities  of  27  separate  national  legislations.  Discussions  also  highlighted  the 
importance of analysing compliance costs by company size and presenting detailed figures, 
including  minimum,  maximum,  and  median  values,  to  improve  understanding  of  cost 
distribution.  These  insights  aimed  to  refine  the  methodology  used  in  evaluating  the 
Directive’s overall impact and efficiency. 

legislation  promptly, 

220 33% (n=3) out of 9 respondents. From the remaining stakeholders, 22.2% (2 out of 9) responded ‘to a 

large extent’ and 11.1% (1 out of 9) ‘to a limited extent’. 

126 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX VI. FUNCTIONING OF THE CIVIL EXPLOSIVES DIRECTIVE  

The Civil Explosives Directive sets out rules for the making available on the market of 
civil explosives, including essential safety requirements, rules for conformity assessment 
and related obligations for economic operators. It defines civil explosives as ‘the materials 
and articles considered to be explosives in the United Nations recommendations on the 
transport of dangerous goods and falling within Class 1 of those recommendations’. Civil 
explosives intended for use by the armed forces and the police and pyrotechnic articles in 
the scope of Directive 2013/29/EU are excluded from the scope. Moreover, ammunition is 
only covered in relation to transfer, security derogations and information exchange. Annex 
I  of  the  Directive  contains  a  list  of  articles  that  are  considered  to  be  pyrotechnic  or 
ammunition in the relevant United Nations Recommendations and that, accordingly, are 
not or only partially covered by the Directive. 

1.  Essential safety requirements 

The essential safety requirements in Annex II concern, in particular, the following aspects: 

•  Correct functioning when used for intended purpose 
•  Use instructions 
•  Materials/(chemical) composition 
•  Physical and chemical stability 
•  Sensitivity to impact and friction  
•  Resistance to moisture, low and high temperatures and other conditions 
•  Suitability of the explosive for use in hazardous environments 
•  Disposal 

More  specific  essential  safety  requirements  are  set  out  for  the  following  groups  of 
explosives:  

•  Blasting explosives 
•  Detonating cords, safety fuses, other fuses and shock tubes 
•  Detonators (including delay detonators) and relays 
•  Propellants and rocket propellants 

2.  Conformity assessment of civil explosives  

The Civil Explosives Directive is part of the New Legislative Framework (NLF) which 
introduced harmonised rules on conformity assessments across 29 pieces of EU product 
legislation. The purpose of conformity assessments is that products are assessed against all 
legislative requirements before they are placed on the market. The NLF introduced several 

127 

 
 
model  conformity  assessment  procedures  (‘Modules’)  which  are  included  in  sectoral 
legislation, as appropriate for the product concerned.221 

For the purpose of assessing the conformity of civil explosives in accordance with the Civil 
Explosives Directive, manufacturers have the choice between different (combinations of) 
Modules:  

•  EU-type examination (Module B), and, at the choice of the manufacturer, one of 

the following procedures: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

conformity  to  type  based  on  internal  production  control  plus  supervised 
product checks at random intervals (Module C2); 
conformity  to  type  based  on  quality  assurance  of  the  production  process 
(Module D); 
conformity to type based on product quality assurance (Module E); or 

•  conformity based on unit verification (Module G). 

Table 7: Overview of conformity assessment Modules 

Module 
B: EU-type examination 

C2:  Conformity  to  EU-type  based  on 
internal 
plus 
supervised  product  checks  at  random 
intervals 

production 

control 

D:  Conformity  to  EU-type  based  on 
quality  assurance  of 
the  production 
process 

the 

requirements  of 

Description 
Covers  design.  It  is  always  followed  by 
other modules by which the conformity of 
the  products  to  the  approved  EU-type  is 
demonstrated.  A  notified  body  examines 
the technical design and or the specimen of 
a type and verifies and attests that it meets 
the 
legislative 
instrument that apply to it by issuing an EU-
type  examination  certificate.  There  are  3 
ways to carry out EU-type examination: 1) 
type,  2)  combination  of 
production 
production  type  and  design  type  and  3) 
design 
  Civil  Explosives 
Directive  applies 
the  combination  of 
production type and design type. 
Covers  production  and  follows  module  B. 
Manufacturer  must  internally  control  its 
production  in  order  to  ensure  product 
conformity  against  the  EU-type  approved 
under  module  B.  C  +  product  checks  at 
random intervals tests on specific aspects of 
the product carried out by a notified body or 
in-house accredited body. 
Covers  production  and  follows  module  B. 
The  manufacturer  operates  a  production 
(manufacturing part and inspection of final 
product) quality assurance system in order 

type.  The 

221  See  Decision  No 768/2008/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  9 July  2008  on  a 
common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC (OJ L 
218, 13.8.2008, p. 82, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2008/768(1)/oj).  

128 

 
 
to  ensure  conformity  to  EU-type.  The 
notified body assesses the quality system. 

G : Conformity based on unit verification  Covers  both  design  and  production.  The 
manufacturer  ensures  compliance  of  the 
manufactured  products  to  the  legislative 
requirements.  The  notified  body  verifies 
every individual product in order to ensure 
conformity  to  legislative  requirements  (no 
EU-type). 

Source : Based on the Blue Guide

222

3.  Labelling and traceability system for civil explosives 

Civil explosives need to be labelled in accordance with the Directive. 

In  principle,  the  labelling  of  civil  explosives  need  to  include  the  unique  identification 
number (see below) and, if applicable, the name, registered trade name or trade mark and 
the  postal  address  of  the  importer.  Moreover,  explosives  need  to  be  accompanied  by 
instructions and safety information. 

The unique identification shall have the following format223: 

Name of the 
manufacturer 

An electronic readable 
identification in barcode 
and/or matrix code format 
that relates directly to the 
alphanumerical 
identification code 

Two letters identifying the Member State 
(place of production or import onto the 
Community market) 

The unique product code and logistical 
information designed by the 
manufacturer  

Three digits identifying the name of the 
manufacturing site (attributed by the 
national authorities) 

222 European Commission, Commission Notice. The ‘Blue Guide’ on the implementation of EU product 

rules 2022, (2022/C 247/01). 
223 Commission Directive 2008/43/EC. 

129 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The unique identification shall be marked on or be firmly affixed to the article concerned 
in a durable way and so as to ensure that it is clearly legible. 

Depending on type of explosive, one or several ways of markings or affixation are 
possible/required: 

•  Adhesive label 
•  Stamping  
•  Direct printing 
•  Associated label 
•  Passive inert electronic tag 

Member States are required to ensure that undertakings put in place a system for collecting 
data in relation to explosives, including their unique identification, throughout the supply 
chain  and  life  cycle.  Holders  of  the  explosives  should  be  identifiable  at  any  time. 
Therefore, undertakings have to record all unique identifications of explosives and their 
location and keep and maintain that data in a data collection system that is protected against 
accidental  or  malicious  damage  or  destruction  and  is  tested  at  regular  intervals.  Upon 
request, such data has to be made available to competent authorities. 

4.  Intra- EU transfer of civil explosives 

Civil explosives may only be transferred within the EU if the transfer was approved by the 
competent authority of the Member State of the consignee and of the Member States of 
transit. The Member State of the consignee may give its approval after having verified that 
the consignee is in possession of the necessary authorisation or license and whether special 
security requirements are necessary and satisfied. 

For the purpose of requesting approval, if special security requirements are needed for the 
transfer,  the  consignee  has  to  provide  the  competent  authority  with  the  details  on  the 
explosive and the transfer, including the economic operators concerned, the quantity of the 
explosives  being  transferred  and  the  means  of  transfer  and  itinerary.  Approval  can  be 
obtained  by  sending  the  transfer  document,  containing  the  relevant  information,  to  the 
authorities  concerned  in  paper  format,  or  by  using  the  digital  system  established  and 
managed  by  the  Spanish  Guardia  Civil  SCEPYLT224.  In  both  cases,  a  printed  transfer 
document containing all necessary signatures has to accompany the explosive during the 
transfer.  Commission  Implementing  Decision  2004/388/EC  sets  out  a  harmonised 
document format for intra-Community transfers of explosives. 

Transfer rules for ammunition are slightly different from those for civil explosives. A 
license  has  to  be  obtained  from  the  Member  State  where  the  ammunition  is  located  by 
providing it with information similar to what is required for explosives. Recognised dealers 

224 See Commission Decision of 19 June 2010 amending Decision 2004/388/EC on an Intra-Community 
SCEPYLT: 

transfer 
https://fondoseuropeosparaseguridad.interior.gob.es/es/detalle/proyecto/MANTENIMIENTO-DE-
LOS-SISTEMAS-DE-INTERCAMBIO-DE-INFORMACION-PARA-LA-LUCHA-
ANTITERRORISTA-SCEPYLT/ 

explosives 

document 

and 

on 

of 

130 

 
 
may  receive  an  authorisation  for  a  validity  of  three  years  and  are  exempt  from  certain 
information requirements. Member States are obliged to supply to other Member States 
and communicate to dealers a list of the ammunition the transfer of which to its territory 
may be authorised without its prior consent. Moreover, they are required to communicate 
all  useful  information  concerning  definitive  transfers  of  ammunition  to  the  MS  of 
destination. 

131 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX VII. COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY 

1.  Market structure 

As  regards  the  market  structure,  data  could  not  be  differentiated  between  pyrotechnic 
articles  and  explosives,  as  they  fall  under  the  same  NACE  code225  ‘Manufacture  of 
explosives’. The trends in the number of companies and number of employees in the entire 
‘manufacture  of  explosives’  mirror  the  decline  in  production  until  2021  described  in 
section 3.1, while the increase in production in 2022 is not reflected. The latter, however, 
seems  to  manifest  itself in  an  increase  in  turnover  in  2022. As  some  data  for  the  years 
around the adoption and entry into application is missing, the overall trend since 2008 is 
illustrated below226.  

Figure 9: Turnover, number of companies and number of employees of the EU ‘Manufacture of explosives’ sector 

Number of employees over time

Number of companies over time

20000
17500
15000
12500
10000
7500
5000
2500
0

l

s
e
e
y
o
p
m
E
f
o
r
e
b
m
u
N

600

400

200

0

i

s
e
n
a
p
m
o
c

f
o
r
e
b
m
u
N

2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022

EU turnover over time

3000

2000

1000

0

2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022

)
s
o
r
u
e
f
o
n
o

i
l
l
i

m

(

r
e
v
o
r
u
T

Source: own preparation of SBS data (Economical indicator for structural business statistics: V12110 Turnover or 
gross premiums written - million euro, V11110 Enterprises number, V16130 Employees – number, Statistical 
classification of economic activity: C2051 Manufacture of explosives) 

2.  Harmonisation of laws 

A  study  carried  out  in  2022  concluded  that  the  transposition  of  the  Civil  Explosives 
Directive  is  generally  satisfactory,  although  the  transposition  in  most  Member  States 

225  ‘NACE  is  the  acronym  used  to  designate  the  various  statistical  classifications  of  economic  activities 
developed since 1970 in the European Union (EU). NACE provides the framework for collecting and 
presenting  a  large  range  of  statistical  data  according  to  economic  activity  in  the  fields  of  economic 
statistics  (e.g.  business  statistics,  labour  market,  national  accounts)  and  in  other  statistical  domains.’ 
Eurostat. 

226 Data is missing for the number of companies for the years 2011, 2014, 2015, for the number of employees 
for the years 2011, 2012, 2015, 2016 and 2019, and for the turnover for the years 2009, 2011-2015 and 
2019. No data was yet available for 2023 and 2024. 

132 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
showed  several  shortcomings227.  In  several  cases,  Member  States  have  incorrectly 
transposed  the  Directive’s  requirements.  Moreover,  some  Member  States  set  out 
requirements  that  go  beyond  the  harmonised  requirements  established  by  the  Directive 
which  seems  problematic  with  regard  to  the  free  movement  clause  (Article 3)  in  the 
Directive228. 

Scope and definitions 

As regards the scope (Article 1) of the Directive, most Member State introduced national 
laws  mirroring  the  Civil  Explosives  Directive.  Some  Member  States  included  other 
explosive  materials  in  the  scope  of  their  transposing  laws.  For  instance,  one  Member 
State’s  law  also  applies  to  ammonium  nitrate  and  ammonium  nitrate-based  emulsion 
matrices,  suspensions,  and  gels  for  the  manufacture  of  explosives,  i.e.  to  explosive 
precursors regulated on EU level by Regulation (EU) 2019/1148229230. Another Member 
State’s  explosives  legislation  explicitly  mentions  that  it  also  applies  to  explosives 
accessories231.  

Definitions (Article 2) have been mainly identically taken over with some minor variation 
in a few Member States in the definitions for ‘ammunition’ and ‘transfer’, which seem to 
be  an  incorrect  transposition  of  the  Directive.  For  the  latter,  this  variation  concerns,  in 
particular, the application of the EU transfer rules to transfers within the territory of the 
Member  State.  Although  such  domestic  transfers  are  implied  in  the  definition  in  the 
Directive  – ‘any physical  movement  of explosives  within the Union except  movements 
within  one  and  the  same  site’  –  they  are  explicitly  excluded  in  one  Member  State  and 
implicitly  excluded  in  four  other  Member  States  who  refer  to  the  transfer  ‘between 
Member States’232. Moreover, contrary to the definition of ‘ammunition’ in the Directive, 
some Member States’ definitions require the presence of a projectile or do not cover blank 
ammunitions233. 

Obligations of economic operators 

Little  variation  exists  in  the  transposition  of  the  obligations  of  economic  operators 
(Article 5 to 10). Where Member States diverged from the provisions of the Directive, this 
was to specify requirements for instructions or other information as well as labelling or to 
set out rules for the packaging of explosives. For instance, one Member State’s law requires 

227  European  Commission,  Study  of  conformity  in  all  EU  countries  on  EU  pyrotechnics  and  explosives 

legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022, pp. 83. 

228 Ibid., p. 99. 
229  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1148  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20 June  2019  on  the 
marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing 
Regulation 
ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1148/oj). 

No 98/2013 

11.7.2019, 

(EU) 

p. 1, 

186, 

(OJ 

L 

230 Real Decreto 130/2017, de 24 de febrero, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de Explosivos. 
231 Sprengstoffgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 10. September 2002 (BGBl. I S. 3518). 
232  European  Commission,  Study  of  conformity  in  all  EU  countries  on  EU  pyrotechnics  and  explosives 

legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022, p. 93. 

233 Ibid., pp. 42 et seq. 

133 

 
 
economic operators to indicate the net explosive mass on the label. Under another Member 
State’s explosives legislation, instructions are to cover not only information on the safe use 
of the explosive but also on its safe destruction234.  

Procedure of transfers of explosives  

The  Directive  sets  out  rules  for  the  transfer  and  transit  of  civil  explosives  and 
ammunition. Prior to a transfer, the consignee of the explosive, which needs to be in the 
possession of a transfer license, has to obtain approval of the competent authority in the 
consignee’s  Member  State  and  all  transit  states.  A  transfer  document  issued  by  the 
competent authority of the consignee’s Member State and following the format set out in 
Commission Decision 2004/388/EC235 has to accompany the explosive until they arrive at 
their destination. In the case of transfers of ammunition, authorisation needs to be granted, 
and a transfer license issued by the Member State where the ammunition is located 

There  are  differences  between  Member  States  in  the  transposition  of  the  procedure  of 
transfers of explosives (Article 11). Notably, in eight Member States, prior authorisation 
from the Member State of origin needs to be obtained, while Directive only requires the 
authorisation of the consignee’s State. Moreover, five Member States apply the transfer 
procedure also to the transfer to or from third countries, although the Directive covers only 
the transfer ‘within the Union’236. Five Member States have not transposed the obligation 
to inform the Commission of any problem regarding the verification of the entitlement to 
acquire  explosives  (Article 11(2)).  Both,  for  the  transfer  of  explosives  and  of 
ammunition  (Article 11  and  12),  some  Member  States  have  introduced  additional 
restrictions  or  obligations  upon  economic  operators  going  beyond  the  Directive’s 
requirements. For instance, two Member States require special security measures for all 
transfers, whereas the Directive differentiates between transfers requiring and not requiring 
special  security  measures.  In  addition,  one  Member  State  requires  specific  permits  for 
transfers by air and sea, while another Member Sate prohibits mail-order sale of explosives, 
which are allowed under the Directive237. Finally, the processing time for the issuance of 
transfer licenses and the validity period are also different from one Member State to the 
other238. 

234 European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 
2013/29/EU,  Commission  Implementing  Directive  2014/58/EU,  and  Directive  2014/28/EU, 
Commission  Implementing  Directive  2008/43/EC  and  Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC),  Final 
Report,  Technopolis  Group  in  collaboration  with  Milieu,  Wavestone,  and  Intellera,  2025,  Annex, 
pp. 156 et seq. 

235 Commission Decision of 15 April 2004 on an Intra-Community transfer of explosives document (OJ L 

120, 24.4.2004, p. 43, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2004/388/oj). 

236  European  Commission,  Study  of  conformity  in  all  EU  countries  on  EU  pyrotechnics  and  explosives 

legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022, p. 100. 

237 European  Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 
2013/29/EU,  Commission  Implementing  Directive  2014/58/EU,  and  Directive  2014/28/EU, 
Commission  Implementing  Directive  2008/43/EC  and  Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC),  Final 
Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025, p. 24. 

238 As pointed out by industry actors and public authorities in interviews. 

134 

 
 
The common document for transfer of explosives established by Commission Decision 
2004/388/EC  is  used  unchanged  by  13  Member  States,  seven  others  use  an  amended 
version  and/or  request  additional  information,  such  as  identification  numbers  of  the 
economic  operators  involved,  the  purpose  of  use  and  the  place  of  use  and  storage,  the 
signature  of  the  supplier,  and  the  net  explosive  weight,  although  Member  States  are 
obliged,  in  accordance  with  Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC,  to  accept  the  module 
transfer  document  established  by  that  Decision239.  While  the  Commission  Decision 
requires  the  final  transfer  document  accompanying  the  transfer  to  be  printed  on  paper, 
Member  States  may  use  a  common  electronic  system  for  the  approval  procedure240. 
Currently,  some  Member  States  are  using  the  electronic  system  SCEPYLT,  while  the 
majority still relies on the use of paper documents (see box below). 

SCEPYLT  -  Explosives  Control  and  Protection  System  to  Prevent  and  Fight 
Against Terrorism 

SCEPYLT is an information system owned and managed by the Spanish authorities and 
the  Spanish  Guardia  Civil  that  shall  contribute  to  the  prevention  of  terrorist  attacks 
involving  civil  explosives.  It  can  be  used  for  the  verification  and  approval  of  Intra-
Union  transfers  of  civil  explosives  as  alternative  to  paper-based  exchanges  of 
documents. Commission Decision 2010/347/EC allows for the use of such system for 
the purpose of complying with the Civil Explosives Directive but does not mandate it. 
Currently, nine Member States are using the system, 15 Member States are familiar with 
it. The digital system is considered as accelerating the approval process and as being 
more secure and less prone to human mistakes than the paper-based system.  

For more information, see also the case study in Annex VIII. Case studiesII. 

Traceability system  

Civil  explosives that are placed on the EU market  have to  bear a unique  identification, 
specific to each individual product. Economic operators are obliged to put in place a system 
for collecting data in relation to explosives including their unique identification throughout 
the supply chain and life cycle. This system should allow the economic operators to keep 
track of the explosives so that those holding the explosive can be identified at any time241. 

The basic traceability system (Article 15), as provided for in the Directive, has been fully 
and  correctly  transposed  by  most  Member  States.  However,  some  Member  States 
incorrectly  transposed  the  Directive’s  provisions  by  diverging  from  the  general 
exemptions.  Notably,  two  Member  States,  respectively,  exempt  explosives  subject  to 
subsequent manufacturing processes or that are due to be exported to third countries. One 

239 No information is available on the remaining seven Member State. 
240 See Article 3a of Commission Decision 2004/388/EC. 
241 Commission Directive 2008/43/EC of 4 April 2008 setting up, pursuant to Council Directive 93/15/EEC, 
a system for the identification and traceability of explosives for civil uses (OJ L 94, 5.4.2008, p. 8, ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/43/oj). 

135 

 
 
 
 
 
Member State does not apply the exemptions in the Directive, while another Member State 
exempts more types of articles242. 

Licensing and authorisation 

While the Directive requires economic operators engaged in the manufacture, storage, use, 
import,  export,  transfer  or  trade  of  explosives  to  be  in  possession  of  a  license  or 
authorisation (Article 16 and 17), it does not lay down specific conditions or procedures 
for the licensing by Member States. Accordingly, Member States have adopted their own 
national systems for licensing and authorisation which vary significantly from one Member 
State to the other243. 

Enforcement and penalties 

When it comes to enforcement, five Member States have extended the reasons justifying a 
seizure  (Article 18).  While  the  Directive  provides  for  seizures  if  there  is  sufficient 
evidence that an explosive will be illicitly acquired, used or dealt in, those Member States 
allow for seizures also in the case of lack of documentation, non-conformity with safety 
requirements or imminent danger244. The Directive requires Member States to lay down 
and enforce rules on penalties (Article 50) for infringements, but leaves it to the Member 
States to decide on the kind of penalties, as long as they are effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.  Criminal  penalties  are  optional.  Most  Member  States  apply  administrative 
sanctions, mainly in the form of fines, and criminal sanctions. Fines vary between Member 
States from as low as EUR 100 to as high as EUR 670 000, depending on the severity of 
the infringement and the specific national legislation. Imprisonment terms range from no 
imprisonment in some jurisdictions to up to 12 years in others. Additional enforcement 
measures  include  forfeiture  of  non-compliant  explosives,  market  prohibition  measures, 
license revocations. Voluntary surrender or notification policies may mitigate penalties245. 

Other additional requirements 

The  2022  study  of  the  Commission  identified  other  additional  requirements  set  out  by 
Member States which might impede the free movement of civil explosives on the market. 
In one Member State, civil explosives must be assigned into a storage group by the national 
institute for research and testing, before they may be manufactured, stored or transported 
in  that  country.  Failure  to  comply  with  this  obligation  is  subject  to  a  heavy  fine  and 
potential revocation of the licence to handle civil explosives.  

242  European  Commission,  Study  of  conformity  in  all  EU  countries  on  EU  pyrotechnics  and  explosives 

legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022, pp. 109 et seq. 

243 In the targeted survey, licensing and authorisations emerged as the area where differences across Member 

States are most pronounced, with 39.3% (24 out of 61) of respondents selecting this area. 

244 European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 
2013/29/EU,  Commission  Implementing  Directive  2014/58/EU,  and  Directive  2014/28/EU, 
Commission  Implementing  Directive  2008/43/EC  and  Commission  Decision  2004/388/EC),  Final 
Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025, Annex, p. 159. 

245Ibid., pp. 159 et seq. 

136 

 
 
In  another  Member  States,  civil  explosives  must  be  notified  to  the  competent  ministry 
before they are placed on the market, they, which issues a certificate of notification246. 

246  European  Commission,  Study  of  conformity  in  all  EU  countries  on  EU  pyrotechnics  and  explosives 

legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022, p. 13. 

137 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX VIII. CASE STUDIES 

The  below  case  study,  presented  with  minor  adaptations,  was  carried  out  by  the 
Technopolis Group in the context of the study in support of the evaluation. 

Case study: Transfer/transit of civil explosives through SCEPYLT within the EU 

Introduction 

Purpose and scope 

Directive  2014/28/EU  outlines  several  security  provisions  regarding  the  transfer  of 
explosives and ammunitions  (Art 11-12), including,  among  others,  security  derogations 
(Art. 13), information exchange (Art. 14) and identification and traceability of explosives 
(Art 15)247. This case study aims to assess the use of the Explosives Control and Protection 
System to Prevent and Fight against Terrorism (SCEPYLT) as opposed to the standard, 
paper-based procedure for transfer and/or transit of civil explosives within the EU as a way 
to implement these provisions. Although SCEPYLT is not a requirement of the Directive, 
the evidence collected through the case study can be leveraged to complement the evidence 
base for the following evaluation questions:  

•  ECT-04.2  –  Does  the  current  system  provide  enough  safeguards  to  combat 

trafficking of civil explosive articles? 

•  ECT-05.1 – Is the current framework for transit or transfer of civil explosives 

effective?  

•  ECT-09.1 – To what extent has the different implementation in MSs impacted 

the effectiveness of the measures on the objectives? 

•  ECT-12.1  –  To  what  extent  have  the  specific  and  general  objectives  been 

achieved? 

•  REL-01 – To what extent do the objectives of the Directives correspond to the 

needs? 

•  REL-04 – Which gaps exist (e.g. security)? 

•  EUAD-01  –  What  is  the  additional  value  resulting  from  the  EU  intervention 
compared to the situation in which Member State would act at national level? 

Box 1: Transfer vs Transit - Case study 4 

For  this  case  study,  it  is  important  to  clarify  the  concepts  of  transfer  and  transit.  While 
transfer means ‘any physical movement of explosives within the Union except movements 
within one and the same site’ (Article 2(6)), transit refers to the transportation of explosives 
through a country that is neither the country of origin nor the country of destination. In this 
case, two main options should be considered: Intra-community transfers, involving an origin, 
transit  and  destination  country  all  being  a  Member  State,  which  will  require  an  Intra-
Community transfer of explosives document (ICTED); and extra-community transfers, which 
fall outside the scope of this case study. 

247 Call for evidence for an evaluation: EU rules on civil explosives. 

138 

 
 
Methodology 

The methodology for data collection and analysis involved a combination of: 

•  Desk research, conducted to gather existing information on SCEPYLT and main 

risks associated with the transfer and transit of civil explosives; 

•  Interviews with stakeholders conducted for the study248, which were leveraged 
to gain insights into the practical challenges and benefits of using SCEPYLT; 

•  Written  feedback  requested  from  selected  countries  utilising  the  SCEPYLT 
system, namely national enforcement authorities from the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Spain,  Belgium  and  France,  allowing  to  collect  more  in-depth  perspectives  and 
areas for improvement.  

Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, limited documentation and publicly available 
information  required  reliance  on  stakeholder  input,  especially  from  SCEPYLT-using 
countries.  Overall  findings  should  be  viewed  in  light  of  the  sample  size  and  potential 
stakeholder  biases,  as  well  as  the  limited  availability  of  quantitative  data  (e.g. 
administrative costs). 

Context and background 

The importance of efficient civil explosives transport/transit 

Civil explosives are vital for industries such as mining, construction, and demolition and 
they are traded and transported across international borders for use. However, this transfer 
introduces significant risks. Adequate transfer and transit processes are therefore crucial to 
ensure safety and security. For instance, there are safety risks related to improper handling 
of  explosives,  due  to  the  hazardous  nature  of  civil  explosives.  Preventing  unauthorised 
access and misuse, such as diversion for illegal activities or terrorism, is also a key security 
concern. To this end, robust documentation and tracking systems maintain a secure chain 
of custody from origin to destination. The economic implications of efficient transfer are 
also significant. Delays in obtaining transfer permit and thus delivery can halt operations, 
leading  to  financial  losses  for  suppliers  and  companies  reliant  on  these  materials. 
Navigating different regulatory requirements across countries (e.g. validity periods for 
transfer/transit) might also be challenging, creating uncertainties for both importers and 
exporters.  Overall,  four  main  actors  can  be  identified  in  procedures  linked  to  the 
transfer/transit of civil explosives, namely: 

•  Consignee:  Economic  operator  receiving  the  civil  explosives,  applying  for 
obtaining a transfer permit, which may or not entail the transit in one or more other 
countries. 

•  Competent  authorities  of  the  origin  country:  Country  from  which  the  civil 

explosive will start its journey.  

248 When relevant, stakeholders participating to the interviews conducted in the frame of this study, and in 
particular market surveillance authorities and industry, were asked about which are the advantages and 
disadvantages of using SCEPYLT, if SCEPYLT should be adopted by all Member States, and if there a 
need for a similar system governed by the EC. 

139 

 
 
•  Competent  authorities  of  the  destination  country:  Country  to  which  the  civil 

explosive will be transferred.  

•  Competent authorities of the transit countries: Any other country through which 

the civil explosives need to transit to arrive at destination. 

Currently, as emerged also from interviews with stakeholders, requests for and approvals 
of transfer and transit of civil explosives heavily rely on paper-based procedures, which 
are  rooted in  traditional  regulatory frameworks  that  emphasise physical  documentation. 
This reliance, however, may lead to significant inefficiencies, such as clerical mistakes and 
delays, for instance due to the reliance on postal services, as flagged by some interviewees. 
Paper  documents  are  also  susceptible  to  loss  or  forgery,  complicating  secure  tracking. 
Because of these reasons, transitioning to digital processes is seen as a way to streamline 
operations, while enhancing security and traceability249. 

Introduction to and description of SCEPYLT 

SCEPYLT,  developed  by  Spain  with  funding  from  the  European  Commission’s 
‘Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management or Terrorism and other security-
related  risks’  (CIPS)  programme250,  is  a  safety-critical  software  system  designed  to 
enhance  the  control  and  tracking  of  explosives,  specifically  to  prevent  their  misuse  for 
terrorist activities251. By enabling the electronic issuance of transfer and transit permits, 
SCEPYLT  aids  in  the  cross-border  transfer  of  explosives  within  the  EU,  offering  an 
alternative  to  the  traditional  paper-based  procedures.  The  primary  users  of  SCEPYLT 
include  Government  agencies,  as  well  as  companies  involved  in  the  manufacturing, 
transportation, storage, and usage of civil explosives. 

SCEPYLT  operates  as  a  distributed  computer  system  that  enables  secure,  standardised 
information  exchange  among  participating  countries.  The  system  employs  a  service-
oriented  architecture  (SOA)  and  integrates  multiple  databases  synchronised  over  the 
web252. Key features include: 

•  Web  services-oriented  architecture:  Based  on  Java  Enterprise  architecture  and 

XML information exchange. 

•  Security  measures:  Utilises  end-to-end  host  encryption,  XML  digital  signatures, 
and secure tunnelling between networks to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability (CIA triad). 

• 

Interoperability:  Ensures  seamless  communication  between  different  countries’ 
systems using common ontologies and vocabulary for message exchange. 

249 When asked about the added value of system like SCEPYLT, stakeholders from the sample of countries 

using SCEPYLT consistently pointed at improved efficiency and clarity. 
250 Council of the European Union, EU Action Plan on combating terrorism, 2011. 
251  Cano,  J./Hernandez,  R.,  SCEPYLT:  An  Information  System  for  Fighting  Terrorism,  IEEE  Software 

Magazine 30, 2013, 73-79. 

252 Ibid. 

140 

 
 
The  use  of  SCEPYLT  is  currently  limited  to  countries  that  have  adopted  the  system, 
including  Portugal,  Spain,  France,  Belgium,  Luxemburg,  the  Netherlands,  Germany, 
Sweden and Finland253. For transfers or transits of civil explosives outside these countries, 
the  traditional  paper-based  procedure  must  be  followed254.  Table  32  provides  the  latest 
figures comparing transfers and transit procedures in Spain using SCEPYLT versus those 
requiring a paper-based approach. Spanish authorities have noted an increasing preference 
for  countries  using  SCEPYLT  among  companies  seeking  permits  for  transferring  civil 
explosives,  as  reflected  in  the  growing  number  of  procedures  carried  out  through 
SCEPYLT over the past three years. 

Figure 29: Data on paper-based vs SCEPYLT procedures in Spain 

Year 

2021 

2022 

2023 

SCEPYLT 

Paper-based 

76% 

77% 

79% 

24% 

23% 

21% 

Numbers indicate the percentage (%) of civil explosives that are either transferred from Spain to other MSs or transit 
through Spain using SCEPYLT or the paper-based approach.  Source: Spanish OCARE 

Analysis 

Transfer/transit  of  civil  explosives  within  the  EU:  SCEPYLT  vs  paper-based 
procedure 

This section aims to provide an overview of the main steps of an intra-community transfer 
of civil explosives with transit in other countries comparing the paper-based process and 
SCEPYLT to assess the advantages and weaknesses of the two procedures. To assist in 
this exercise, five main steps linked to the transport and transit of explosives for civil use 
have been identified. Table 33 provides an overview of these steps and the relative actions 
to be performed by the different actors using a paper-based process or SCEPYLT when 
transferring civil explosives from Portugal to Germany, with transit in Spain and France. 

Figure 30: Paper-based vs SCEPYLT procedure: overview of main steps 

Steps 
Application 
submission 

Paper-Based 
The applicant submits via post a 
paper-based transfer request for 
civil explosives with all the 
necessary documentation to the 

SCEPYLT 
The applicant submits the 
transfer request and all 
necessary documentation 
electronically to the competent 

253 Tukes, Transfer of explosives in Finland and the European Economic Area. This list reflects countries in 

which SCEPYLT is installed, connected and daily used. 

254 In the Netherlands, until mid of 2024, 90% of the requests were addressed via SCEPYLT (for a total of 
40 requests), in France in 2023, 88% and in Sweden in 2023, around 94%. For Belgium, while there is 
not statistic on this, the majority of transfers are usually done with SCEPYLT as neighbouring countries 
are using it. Paper-based processes are the exception. 

141 

 
 
 
Steps 

Destination 
country 
processing 

Transit 
country 
assessment 

Origin 
country 
assessment 

Final 
authorisation 

Paper-Based 
competent authority within the 
destination country.  
This request is evaluated in 
accordance with Article 11 of 
Directive 2014/28/EU, along with 
any relevant national procedures. 
If the request is approved, the 
competent national authority 
issues the ICTED permit in 
triplicate. The permit is sealed 
and signed by hand, then given to 
the applicant via post to obtain 
approval from other actors 
involved. 

Each transit country must receive 
the ICTED which must already 
include approval from the 
destination authority via post and 
evaluates the request according to 
its national procedures.  
If approved, the permit is sealed 
and signed by the transit country 
competent authority and returned 
to the applicant for further 
approvals. 
The origin country receives the 
ICTED which must already 
include approval from the 
destination authority via post and 
evaluate this.  
If approved (with a stamp and 
signature), the permit is returned 
to the applicant for further 
approvals. 
The ICTED must ultimately 
include seals and handwritten 
signatures from all Member States 

SCEPYLT 
authority in the destination 
country. 
This request is evaluated in 
accordance with Article 11 of 
Directive 2014/28/EU, along 
with any relevant national 
procedures. 

If the request is approved, it is 
entered into the SCEPYLT, 
which generates a sequential ID 
number and transmits the 
request to the origin and transit 
Member States. Authorities 
receive a notification via the 
SCEPYLT application. 
Transit countries evaluate the 
request digitally through 
SCEPYLT.  
Approval or rejection is 
automatically communicated to 
all Member States involved. 

If approved by transit countries, 
the request is automatically sent 
to the origin country for 
assessment.  
Approval or rejection is 
automatically communicated to 
all Member States involved. 

Upon approval by all countries, 
a final authorisation number is 
generated (e.g. DE-PT-24-
0000)255.  

255  Within  SCEPYLT,  the  serial  number  DE  –  PT  –  24  –  0000,  means  that  the  destination  country  is 
Germany, while the origin country is Portugal. The request is from the year 2024, while the last four 
digits compose an identification number. 

142 

 
 
 
Steps 

Paper-Based 
involved in the transfer and transit 
of civil explosives. 

SCEPYLT 
The economic operator can print 
the ICTED. 

Source: Technopolis Group, based on material and insights shared by Guardia Civil (ES), SCEPYLT 

While the paper-based procedure may take up to 60 days or more256, using SCEPYLT the 
entire process, from submission to permit issuance seems to be much faster, usually some 
days257. It also needs to be acknowledged that other factors than the procedure itself might 
have an impact on the processing time, such as missing information or fees to be paid. 

Main take-aways from the comparison 

Overall, SCEPYLT seems to offer enhanced security safeguards and efficiency, compared 
to  paper-based  procedures,  ensuring  a  full  coverage  of  the  provisions  set  out  in  the 
Directive,  although  challenges  remain  in  achieving  uniform  implementation  across  all 
Member States.  

ECT-04.2  –  SCEPYLT’s  electronic  tracking  and  documentation  enhance  safeguards 
against  trafficking  through  real-time  monitoring,  secure  data  storage,  and  improved 
traceability, making it easier to detect and prevent unauthorised access or diversion of civil 
explosives. By requiring all involved countries’ approval before issuing the final ICTED, 
it ensures transparency and prevents manipulation or misinterpretation, as emphasised by 
the Spanish Guardia Civil. 

ECT-05.1  –  SCEPYLT  allows  for  a  more  streamlined  and  automated  process,  thus 
increasing the efficiency of the framework for transferring and transiting civil explosives 
set out in the Directive. It is considered useful in reducing processing times and errors and 
enhances  communication  between  authorities  and  companies  by  offering  real-time 
exchanges and status updates, with only one final document to be printed and sent by post. 
It  is  worth  noting  that,  according  to  the  Spanish  authorities,  economic  operators 
increasingly prefer to work with Member States in which SCEPYLT is implemented due 
to its efficiency. 

ECT-09.1  –  SCEPYLT  addresses  inconsistencies  among  Member  States  regarding 
procedural  steps  and  regulatory  requirements.  For  example,  it  ensures  that  only  the 
destination country initiates the transfer request, a process not always followed with paper-
based procedures. Additionally, it resolves issues related to varying validity periods for 
transfer  authorisations  by  different  Member  States.  SCEPYLT  automatically  prevents 

256  A  real-life  example  from  2024  was  provided  by  French  authorities,  where  a  paper  transfer  between 
Sweden and Spain via Germany and Denmark (Denmark outside SCEPYLT) took three months, while 
in the same period, a transfer between Spain and Finland via France and Germany using the SCEPYLT 
took  one  month  of  processing  to  obtain  all  the  opinions  and  enable  Spain  to  issue  the  transfer 
authorisation. 

257 According to the Spanish authorities, an average of 3 days is needed from submission to permit issuance. 

143 

 
 
transfers once the shortest authorised timeframe has expired, ensuring compliance across 
borders. 

ECT-12.1,  REL-01  and  REL-04  –  The  system  has  significantly  improved  efficiency, 
security,  and  traceability.  Stakeholders  from  the  selected  sample  of  countries  using 
SCEPYLT report faster processing times and highlight its adaptability to changing needs, 
offering  greater  security  than  paper-based  procedures.  For  example,  SCEPYLT  enables 
real-time tracking and management of civil explosives during transfers, allowing for rapid 
response to suspicious activities. 

EUAD-01  –  According  to  stakeholders  participating  in  interviews,  and  in  particular 
national market surveillance authorities, and from the selected sample of countries using 
SCEPYLT258, EU intervention through electronic systems like SCEPYLT adds significant 
value  by  facilitating  the  implementation  of  Directive  provisions  across  Member  States, 
enhancing  cross-border  cooperation  and  standardisation.  Among  other  benefits  already 
mentioned,  SCEPYLT  offers  features  that  aid  competent  authorities  in  assessing  and 
processing  requests,  such  as  automatically  tracking  the  remaining  quantity  of  civil 
explosives that can be transferred within an authorisation period. Additionally, the system 
supports international messaging for additional documentation and includes a translation 
function to convert transfer content into national languages. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  following  challenges  concerning  the  use  of  SCEPYLT  also 
emerged: 

•  Complex implementation: The distributed and synchronised nature of the system 
across  multiple  databases  can  be  complex  to  implement  and  maintain.  Swedish 
authorities, for instance, mentioned that the installation of the system requires the 
assistance  of  a  network  specialist,  initial  configuration  and  testing  and  ongoing 
support  and  updates.  These  resources  and  cost  needed  to  use  the  system  are 
currently borne by the single Member States adopting it. 

•  Performance issues and need for secure networks: The necessity for frequent 
data  exchanges  and  synchronisation  between  nodes  can  hinder  system 
performance,  particularly  in  queries  involving  multiple  Member  States.  The 
Belgian  authorities  pointed  out  potential  issue  deriving  from  this  decentralised 
system  which  relies  on  the  flawless  operation  of  multiple  independent  national 
systems  and  the  need  to  ensure  that  it  can  handle  failures  in  one  part  without 
impacting the entire process. Further to that, the system requires highly secure and 
isolated networks (e.g. TESTA or VPNs) to function optimally, which might be 
challenging for some countries to maintain consistently. 

•  Uneven  adoption  of  the  system  and  transfers  within  the  same  country  not 
covered: Another area for improvement flagged is that the system is currently not 
used consistently by all Member States, thus ruling out the possibility to use the 

258  When  asked  about  the  added  value  of  system  like  SCEPYLT,  stakeholders  consistently  pointed  at 

improved efficiency and clarity. 

144 

 
 
electronic procedure. It also does not support for transfers of civil explosives within 
the same country. 

Conclusions and lessons learnt 

SCEPYLT seems to support the Directive’s implementation by improving control during 
the transfer of civil explosives and streamlining information sharing, with non-adopting 
countries expressing interest in similar electronic systems for better process management 
of transfer/transit requests. From the evidence collected for this case study, the following 
lessons learnt can be identified: 

•  Need  for  harmonised  processing  and  management  of  transfer  permits: 
Harmonised  processing  times  and  procedures  for  issuing  and  managing  transit 
permits and validity periods, together with a common EU electronic platform259 to 
log  and manage the incoming  requests are likely to  contribute to more effective 
functioning of the single market without compromising on any safety and security 
aspects either intended to be regulated by the Directive, any other related directives, 
or by each country of transit as permitted under EU law. 

•  Enhanced  information  exchange  and  cooperation  through  digitalisation: 
While the paper procedure is expected to continue to be in use by all EU Member 
States, the possibility to process and manage requests digitally offers advantages in 
terms  of  information  exchange  and  cooperation  among  competent  authorities. 
Furthermore,  it  addresses  certain  security  concerns  around  the  paper-based 
workflow, which is more prone to manipulation and provides less visibility of the 
status of the request. 

•  Enhanced  functioning  of  the  single  market  thanks  to  more  certainty  for 
economic  operators:  Having  a  more  harmonised,  faster  and  reliable  system  to 
process  transfer  requests  from  economic  operators  contributes  to  increasing  the 
efficiency  of  the  single  market.  Indeed,  beside  the  advantages  provided  to  the 
national competent authorities dealing with the transfer requests, SCEPYLT is seen 
as a quick and expeditious way for economic operators to submit their requests and 
documentation, as well as to obtain information about the status of permit. 

•  Towards  a  Commission-driven 

initiative 

for  better  adoption  and 
implementation:  Some  stakeholders  advocate  for  the  European  Commission  to 
take over management of a centralised, electronic tool like SCEPYLT. This is seen 
as  ensuring  better  oversight  and  enhanced  trust,  as  well  as  financial  support  for 
harmonised adoption and implementation across all Member States. In this regard, 
it is worth noting that the Commission has already carried out a study on the IT 
aspects of a SCEPYLT takeover. 

259 Some stakeholders called for the European Commission to manage a tool like SCEPYLT. 

145