COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 2025 Strategic Foresight Report Resilience 2.0: Empowering the EU to thrive amid turbulence and uncertainty
Date: 2025-09-09
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU growth strategy, European security, activity report, climate change policy, competitiveness, democracy, foresight, security of supply, strategic autonomy, twin transition

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 9.9.2025  COM(2025) 484 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 2025 Strategic Foresight Report            Resilience 2.0: Empowering the EU to thrive amid turbulence and uncertainty  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 

Since  the  first  Strategic  Foresight  report  in  2020,  the  global  order  has  been  shaken 
tremendously. While that first report explored the concept of resilience mainly linked to the 
first structural lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic, it is time to step up both on preparedness 
and resilience to preserve and re-establish the EU as a strong player in this changing world. 

Therefore, this report introduces the notion of resilience 2.0. The 2020 report already defined 
resilience as not merely absorbing crises to maintain the status quo. It argued that resilience to 
system-wide shocks and long-term trends requires the EU to transform and bounce forward, in 
a sustainable, fair and democratic manner1. And indeed, the EU has shown strength and unity 
in doing so in response to the recent shocks, helping citizens and businesses to adapt to major 
crises and global megatrends (see Figure 1).  

Figure 1: Recent major crises and interlinked megatrends shaping the EU response 

However,  the  scale,  complexity,  diversity  and  persistence  of  challenges  ahead  –  from 
geopolitical  and  geoeconomic  upheavals,  conflicts  and  security  threats,  through  the  triple 
planetary  crisis  (climate  change,  pollution  and  biodiversity  loss)2,  to  technological  and 
demographic changes, and threats to democracy and values – require a new level of resilience. 
This entails a leap beyond a mainly reactive approach towards a proactive and forward-looking 
one, to anticipate events, optimise resources, and prepare for different future scenarios, as our 
world today is more unpredictable than ever before. Many divergent scenarios are plausible, 

1 Resilience in EU policies is defined in: Manca A et al.,  ‘Building a Scientific Narrative Towards a More Resilient 
EU  Society  Part  1:  a  Conceptual  Framework’,  2017,  DOI:  10.2760/635528;  Giovannini,  E.  et  al.,  ‘Time  for 
transformative resilience: the COVID-19 emergency’, 2020, DOI: 10.2760/062495,   and in the 2020 Strategic 
Foresight Report, COM (2020), 493 final. 
2 See https://unfccc.int/news/what-is-the-triple-planetary-crisis.   

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including some that seemed unthinkable only recently3. In such a world, reacting to each crisis 
as a turning  point is  no longer sufficient.  An approach to  resilience that is  transformative, 
proactive and forward-looking (‘resilience 2.0’) becomes a decisive advantage in the new 
geopolitical reality and a crucial need for the European Union. 

This report contributes to the reflection on how to make this leap to a new level of resilience. 
Building on recent strategies and reports relevant to resilience and drawing on a broad process4, 
it  analyses  the  key  long-term  trends  and  developments.  On  this  basis,  the  report  presents 
policymakers with possible actions to be taken today to realise the vision of a resilient EU.  
This approach is closely linked to preparedness that was introduced by the Niinistö report5 and 
translated into EU policy action in the European Preparedness Union Strategy6. Preparedness 
focuses on the EU’s ability to anticipate, prevent, withstand threats and respond to them. The 
strategy  also  recognises  that  the  EU  needs  forward-looking  capabilities  and  systematic 
information gathering, including through the EU-owned space infrastructure and services, to 
scan  proactively  beyond  immediate  threats,  considering  unfamiliar  or  even  hard-to-imagine 
longer-term  scenarios.  In  that  respect,  strategic  foresight,  situational  awareness,  and  early 
warning are key and must be further strengthened.  

In times of global turbulences, strategic foresight helps the EU to stay on course and look beyond 
today’s agenda. It offers a clear-eyed understanding not only of emerging risks but also of future 
opportunities:  by  scanning  the  horizon,  reconsidering  assumptions,  uncovering  blind  spots, 
connecting events and assessing their combined effects, exploring the range of the possible, including 
desirable  futures  and  pathways  towards  them.  To  do  so,  it  taps  into  collective  intelligence  in  a 
structured  and  systematic  way.  Such  insights  are  embedded  in  the  Commission’s  policymaking, 
strategic  planning,  and  preparedness.  This  allows  to  better  consider  the  long-term  impacts  and 
coherence of policies initiated today, as well as their robustness, under divergent future scenarios, 
and  develop  a  shared  positive  vision  of  the  EU’s  future.  Since  2020,  Commission’s  Strategic 
Foresight  Reports  are  instrumental  in  this  context.  This  report,  the  first  under  this  mandate,  is  a 
transitional  one,  paving  the  way  for  the  foresight  process  employing  the  full  range  of  foresight 
methods and tools that will support the next editions from 2026 onwards. They can also be used to 
devise coherent action plans to enhance our resilience, tackle the identified challenges and seize the 
opportunities. 

From resilience to resilience 2.0 

The EU can count on a number of favourable preconditions to strengthen resilience.  

First, the EU has unique resources to ensure resilience at a scale that no single Member State 
can  achieve  alone:  450  million  people,  and  a  single  market  which  is  home  to 24  million 
companies and  the  source  of  15%  of  the  world's  trade  in  goods;  an  agri-food  sector  that 
provides a reliable supply of affordable food with high quality and sustainability standards; 
established common democratic frameworks, and rule of law for its citizens, businesses, and 

3 See e.g. 25 evidence-based potential major disruptions that could reshape policy between 2030 and 2050 in: 
OECD, ‘Strategic  Foresight  Toolkit  for  Resilient  Public  Policy:  A  Comprehensive  Foresight  Methodology  to 
Support Sustainable and Future-Ready Public Policy’, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/bcdd9304-en. 
4 The report builds on the recent Commission strategies relevant to resilience and strategic reports which informed 
them (such as the reports by Enrico Letta, Mario Draghi and Sauli Niinistö),   the evidence cited in the report, 
insights from a public call for evidence, a participative process within the European Commission, consultations 
with EU institutional partners through the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), the foresight 
network  of  the  decentralised  EU  agencies,  think  tanks,  and  Member  States  through  the  EU-wide  Foresight 
Network. It also draws on the previous Strategic Foresight Reports (2020-2023).  
5 Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness. 
6 JOIN(2025) 130 final. 

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external partners alike; a range of governance capabilities, from robust trade policy instruments 
to global standard setting.  

Second,  the  EU  has  the  scale  and  capability  to  mount  a  transformative  response  to  the 
geoeconomic upheaval, the triple planetary crisis, and the digital transition.  

Third, the EU can quickly adapt during a crisis despite complex decision-making, adjusting its 
mechanisms  and  structures.  We  proved  this  by  implementing  NextGenerationEU  to  help 
Member  States  in  the  aftermath  of  the  pandemic  and  by  securing  a  surge  in  European 
investments to ensure that our defence industry can produce at greater speed and volume and 
by facilitating rapid deployment of military troops and assets across the EU through Readiness 
2030. 

Fourth, the EU has already demonstrated resilience in response to diverse recent crises and has 
learnt  from  them.  Joint  European  response  mechanisms  have  been  introduced  and 
strengthened:  joint  purchasing  of  COVID-19  vaccines,  diversifying  gas  supplies  during  the 
recent energy crisis or the mobilisation of rescEU resources in response to wildfires or other 
natural disasters – all those are examples of agile and effective responses, based on solidarity 
and adaptability.  

Based on these experiences, this is the time to develop a vision of a resilient EU 2040. That 
vision should be grounded in the EU’s goals and values7. A resilient EU in 2040 would need 
to deliver the following three fundamental elements:  

•  Peace  through  European  security:  thanks  to  its  strong  abilities,  in  full  alignment  with 
international alliances, the EU will deter and defend itself from ill-intentioned state or non-
state actors; it will achieve this through a combination of military strength, whole-of-society 
preparedness,  instruments  able  to  defend  its  interests,  and  strong  global  standing  and 
diplomacy; an enlarged EU will be a cornerstone of enduring peace, security and prosperity 
across the European continent; it will have strong bonds with like-minded countries as well 
as partnerships based on common interests, leveraging its economic and trading power and 
open strategic autonomy;  

•  the values of democracy, human dignity, freedom, equality, the rule of law, and respect 
for  human  rights:  the  EU  will  uphold,  assert,  defend,  and  enforce  these  values  and  its 
democratic  model  internally  and  project  them  on  the  world  stage.  It  will  offer  effective 
governance through democratic institutions and enable the effective exercise of the rights 
and obligations of people and companies;  

•  people’s  well-being:  built  on  internal  and  economic  security,  quality  jobs,  attractive 
conditions  for  workers  and  businesses,  sustainable  prosperity  respecting  planetary 
boundaries,  a  habitable  planet  with  climate-neutral  and  climate-resilient  economy,  and  a 
healthy natural environment; quality, affordable and inclusive education and training, and 
health systems; Europeans will confidently use safe technologies that make their lives better, 
while enjoying rewarding work, a fulfilling life, favourable conditions for starting families 
and raising children, affordable housing, and safe and high-quality food; Europe will be a 
place  of  accessible  world-class  infrastructure,  healthcare  and  education,  and  thriving 
countries, regions, and cities offering ‘the freedom to stay’, taking into account current and 
future generations. 

Achieving this vision requires bold transformations. While predictability and stability are key 
and one of EU’s assets, we must stand ready to change whenever needed, staying ahead of 
the curve, to preserve and strengthen the fundamentals of the European project.  

7 Treaty on European Union Article 3(1) The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values (defined in Article 2) 
and the well-being of its peoples. 

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2.  MAJOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS AND EU-SPECIFIC CHALLENGES 

TO INCREASED RESILIENCE 

The EU’s future policy space to enhance its resilience is determined by global megatrends 
and by EU-specific challenges that have come to the fore since the first Strategic Foresight 
Report in 2020. In addressing both towards a resilient EU 2040, the EU will need to integrate 
these trends in policymaking and political choices, expand its agency to act and better navigate 
the opportunities and challenges ahead.  

2.1. Key long-term global developments 

Security has  become  a key vector for all  EU policies. Russia's  war of  aggression against 
Ukraine has changed the perspective on security. Geopolitical turmoil and the erosion of the 
global  multilateral  order  further  enhance  the  need  for  autonomy  in  the  capability  to  protect 
current and future generations. Recent years show that everything can be weaponised: supply 
chains, migration, trade, humanitarian aid, space and information8. Since hybrid threats operate 
in the grey zone between war and peace, they create attribution ambiguity, with internal and 
external security aspects increasingly entangled. Security, or lack thereof, affects all of society 
and the economy:  business,  investment,  social  and territorial cohesion,  prosperity and well-
being, as well as our democracies and values. In addition, the end of the post-Cold War peace 
dividend  and  turbulent  economic  projections  challenge  public  budgets,  leading  to  difficult 
choices, but also highlighting opportunities, for example to capitalise on synergies in the civil-
military domain.  

We are witnessing the erosion of the rules-based international order and fracturing of the 
global landscape. From the United Nations to the World Trade Organisation, key pillars of the 
global  order  are  under  stress.  This  is  especially  important  for  the  EU,  which  has  built  its 
strengths on openness: common trade policy functioning in synergy with the single market, 
international  partnerships  and  standards  are  all  contingent  on  rules-based  international 
governance9. Hence, the instability and partial disfunction of the international order and the 
partial fracturing of global economies have a destabilising effect on the EU’s ability to act in 
the interest of its economy and the well-being of its people. A return to the previous status quo 
seems increasingly unlikely. Despite the negative effects, this also creates an opportunity for 
the EU to be more vocal in shaping a future-proof rules-based international order10.  

The impacts of climate change and the degradation of nature and water resources have 
worsened, reaching levels that are harder to deal with. Annual global average temperatures 
have already exceeded 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. The cumulative impact could mean 
crossing  tipping  points  from  melting  ice  sheets  to  coral  reefs  dying  off  to  the  disruption  of 
Atlantic  currents,  beyond  which  abrupt  and  irreversible  changes  will  take  place.    Climate-
related extreme weather events have already caused economic losses in the EU of EUR 738 
billion in the last 40 years (between 1980-2023, with 22% of these losses between 2021 and 
2023)11. Wildfires have burned more than a million hectares of land in the EU by the end of 
summer  in  2025,  the  highest  amount  in  any  year  since  official  records  began  in  200612. 
Europe’s  biodiversity  and  nature’s  vital  contributions  through  ecosystem  services,  such  as 
clean air and water, are declining at an accelerating rate, compromising key enablers of health. 

8 European Union Institute for Security Studies, ‘Hacking minds and machines. Foreign interference in the digital 
age’, 2024, CP_184.pdf 
9 See the Joint Communication on strengthening EU’s contribution to rules-based multilateralism, JOIN (2021) 3 
final. 
10 Biscop, S. This is not a new world order. Europe rediscovers geopolitics from Ukraine to Taiwan, 2024. 
11 European Environmental Agency, ‘Economic losses from weather- and climate-related extremes in Europe’, 
2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/economic-losses-from-climate-related 
12 https://forest-fire.emergency.copernicus.eu/apps/effis.statistics/seasonaltrend  

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It  is  also  a  risk  multiplier:  from  mega-droughts  leading  to  water  and  food  insecurity, 
unpredictability of wildfires, disruptions of critical infrastructure and critical transport routes, 
to threats to financial markets13.  

The  political  momentum  for  climate  change  mitigation  is  at  risk  in  parts  of  the  world,  and 
climate  and  environmental  policies  are  increasingly  instrumentalised  and  subject  to 
disinformation14. At the same time, the green transition for many countries can result in more 
independence  and  growth.  Also,  for  Europe,  a  successful  transition  to  sustainable  growth 
provides  the  opportunity  to  simultaneously  enhance  the  Union’s  strategic  autonomy  and 
competitiveness, in particular through the ramp-up of clean technologies. 

2.2. EU-specific challenges 

The simultaneous quest for economic competitiveness and strategic autonomy. Drawing 
on the experiences of recent crises, various economies, including the EU, are actively pursuing 
strategic autonomy to ensure their long-term economic security15. In parallel, to meet global 
challenges,  the  EU  aims  to  enhance  competitiveness  across  key  sectors.  Both  priorities  are 
essential for resilience: Europe’s security and open strategic autonomy will depend more than 
ever on our ability to innovate and compete with other economies in the world, particularly in 
net-zero and digital technologies.  Hence, to  build true resilience, Europe must  pursue both. 
Open  strategic  autonomy  shields  the  EU  from  external  shocks  and  dependencies,  whilst 
competitiveness drives the innovation and economic strength needed to adapt, lead, and thrive 
in a rapidly changing world. 

In  a  global  economic  system  burdened  by  geopolitical  competition,  trade  tensions  and 
increasing  public  debt  levels,  the  EU  must  integrate  security  and  strategic  autonomy 
considerations more systematically into its economic policies. Pursuing both competitiveness 
and strategic autonomy simultaneously requires careful policy design, as measures to enhance 
autonomy may entail upfront costs or structural adjustments and potentially reduce short-term 
efficiency.  Evolving  global  dynamics  and  excessive  strategic  dependencies  have  brought 
renewed  attention  to  the  use  of  public  procurement  (including  joint  procurement  and 
preferential  EU  sourcing)  as  a  policy  tool  to  enhance  open  strategic  autonomy  and  sustain 
industrial decarbonisation efforts16. 

Excessive dependency on key services provided by non-EU entities in sectors such as digital 
and finance exposes the EU to risks, including data security vulnerabilities, service disruptions, 
espionage and economic coercion. This is particularly relevant for digital services subject to 
network  effects,  which  tend  to  limit  competition17.  For  instance,  around  70%18  of  the  EU's 
cloud infrastructure is controlled by three US companies: Amazon Web Services, Microsoft, 
and Google.  

Energy security is a key building block of a resilient, future-proof and competitive economy, 
especially considering that in 2023 the EU imported 58% of its energy19. Accelerating the clean 

13 European Environmental Agency, ‘European Climate Risk Assessment’, 2024. For a recent stock-take of the 
analytical work being carried out in the European Union and the policy responses taken so far, see the report on 
the monitoring of climate-related risk to financial stability, C(2024) 4372 fin. 
14 International Panel on the Information Environment, ‘Information integrity about climate science: a systematic 
review’, 2025, http://doi.org/10.61452/BTZP3426  
15 European Commission, ‘Shaping and securing the EU's open strategic autonomy by 2040 and beyond’, 2021, 
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/877497  
16 Nicoli, F., ‘Mapping the road ahead for EU public procurement reform’, 2025,  https://www.bruegel.org/first-
glance/mapping-road-ahead-eu-public-procurement-reform  
17 Montero, J., Finger, M., The rise of the new network industries: regulating digital platforms, 2021. 
18 June_-2024_BDO_Market-research_IaaS_PaaS.pdf 
19 Eurostat, Shedding light on energy in Europe – 2025 edition - Interactive publications - Eurostat 

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energy  transition  is  therefore  not  only  vital  for  achieving  climate  goals  but  also  a  strategic 
imperative to reduce dependence on fossil fuel imports and shield the EU from geopolitical 
shocks, such as those that it has faced from Russia’s weaponisation of energy. By strengthening 
energy security, the EU could reduce fossil fuel import spending by EUR 2.8 trillion between 
2031  and  2050,  compared  with  the  2011–2020  average.  By  investing  in  home-grown  clean 
energy and energy efficiency, the EU reinforces its autonomy and builds a more resilient low-
cost energy system for the future. However, this transition is also creating new dependencies, 
both on the clean technology products themselves, where industrial production is dominated 
by other global players, and on the expanding list and quantities20 of the critical raw materials 
that go into those products when they are produced in the EU or elsewhere (see Box 1)21.   

 Box 1. On the horizon: an era of possible new dominance for raw materials and clean tech 

The intensifying global competition for critical resources and the clean tech market share, coupled 
with a more transactional approach to international relations, could foster new alliances between 
state  and  private  actors  aimed  at  establishing  OPEC-style  dominance  of  specific  resources  or 
technologies.  This  control  may  drive  significant  price  inflation  and  restrict  access  to  essential 
materials, posing a serious challenge to the EU’s strategic autonomy and clean energy transition. In 
response,  there  may  be  a  growing  emphasis  on  innovation  in  circular  economy  practices  and 
advanced mining technologies including space mining, starting with the Moon. 

Critical raw materials play a central role in other strategic sectors of the EU, such as defence, 
civil security, healthcare, and automotive. Disruptions in their supply chains, whether due to 
sanctions, geopolitical coercion, or the smuggling of raw materials by criminal organisations22, 
could have significant adverse consequences for the EU. The Union’s reliance on imports of 
these materials, combined with the often high concentration of supply in a few countries along 
the value chain (both in extraction and processing), poses serious economic and security risks, 
especially given that the export restrictions on industrial raw materials have seen a more than 
five-fold  increase  since  200923.  Strengthening  circularity  in  the  EU  can  reduce  these 
dependencies. 

Balancing  the  approach  to  technology:  key  to  unlocking  future  competitiveness  but 
requiring  managing  related  risks.  Technologies  have  a  transformative  potential:  from 
supporting  the  green  and  digital  transitions  or  health  care,  to  boosting  productivity  and 
competitiveness, and enhancing security. Mastering the technologies of the future, from basic 
science  to  full  operational  deployment,  is  therefore  a  powerful  geopolitical,  economic,  and 
societal – and hence resilience – asset. Embracing and shaping them in the EU is a foundation 
of our future competitiveness. It ensures state-of-the-art governance capabilities and enables 
effective protection and defence against nefarious state and non-state actors.  

However,  well-targeted  safeguards  are  needed  to  avert  potential  systemic  risks  to  security, 
citizen and workers’ rights, privacy, climate and the environment, as well as democracy, trust, 
and social and territorial cohesion. We already see the rapid and exponential market penetration 
of new technologies, largely driven by a handful of the world’s largest global companies. Many 
new  technologies  will  make  their  mark  in  the  next  decade:  quantum,  biotechnology, 
neurotechnology, and advanced materials or robotics, each with wide-reaching opportunities 

20The number of Critical Raw Materials (CRMs) identified by the EU has grown from 14 in 2011 to 34 in 2023. 
21 The boxes used in the report illustrate relevant emerging signals of change drawn from the horizon scanning 
process led by ESPAS (https://espas.eu/horizon.html). 
22  European  Commission,  ‘Emerging  risks  and  opportunities  for  EU  internal  security  stemming  from  new 
technologies’, 2025, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/9617320  
23 OECD (2025), ‘OECD supply chain resilience review: navigating risks’,  https://doi.org/10.1787/94e3a8ea-en. 

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but also acute risks. The potential use of some others, such as solar geoengineering (or solar 
radiation modification) 24 is highly disputed (see Box 2).  

Box 2. On the horizon: global governance to investigate solar geoengineering 

Despite global efforts, the adverse effects of climate change are dangerously intensifying. In this 
context,  a  set  of  solar  radiation  modification  (SRM)  technologies,  also  known  as  solar 
geoengineering,  have  been  suggested.  Their  objective  would  be  to  reduce  global  warming  by 
enhancing  the  reflection  of  sunlight  back  to  space.  While  their  potential  benefits  are  highly 
uncertain,  they  also  raise  various  concerns  related  to  distributional  effects  or  malicious  use. 
Currently, there is no international framework to govern their research, testing or deployment. Still, 
several nations have the required capabilities and might test them, for example via stratospheric 
aerosol injection. Others, like the UK, are investing substantially in SRM research, thereby gaining 
knowledge and expertise as a basis for future evidence-based trade-offs and a role in international 
decision-making. 

Artificial  intelligence  (AI)  stands  out  as  a  general-purpose  technology  with  far-reaching 
implications for every domain of human activity. It advances scientific discovery – as seen in 
materials  innovation  or  its  potential  for  quantum  computing,  transformation  of  industrial 
manufacturing,  healthcare25,  optimisation  of  energy  supplies26  and  various  other  aspects  of 
human life, including potential productivity increases as well as labour-market disruption27. AI 
can  be  seen  as  a  force  multiplier,  providing  knowledge  and  capabilities  –  including  critical 
infrastructure,  advanced  bioweapons,  cyber  capabilities,  or  autonomous  surveillance  –  that 
were  once  the  exclusive  domain  of  governments  or  experts28.  Rarely  has  a  technology  so 
rapidly achieved popular adoption. The market dominance and influence, from setting research 
agendas to policy directions, of a few global actors blurs the boundaries between commercial 
and public actors and spaces. This calls for urgent reflection on various scenarios, including 
the extremes, and creates a clear rationale for decisive policy action.  

The EU innovation model promotes the idea that data generated in society – whether personal 
or  industrial  –  should  be  accessible  for  productive,  interoperable  use  under  clear  ethical 
conditions. In addition, the EU regulatory approach prevents unchecked access to data about 
Europeans. At the same  time,  this model can hinder innovation  and market  entry  and faces 
issues  with  funding  and  deployment.  For  example,  EU  entrepreneurs  often  rely  on  bank 
financing  and  have  more  limited  access  to  equity  or  other  forms  of  risk  capital,  where  risk 
capital is more associated with the development of disruptive technologies which can foster 
innovation and drive economic growth29.  

With  increasingly  rapid  technology  developments,  strengthening  the  EU  values-based 
innovation  model,  as  opposed  to  the  US  market-driven  or  the  Chinese  state-driven  ones,  is 
increasingly  relevant30.  A  key  challenge  in  aiming  to  foster  innovation  that  is  ethically 
grounded  and  globally  competitive  is  the  fragmentation  of  EU  technology  governance  and 
related policies, between the EU and its Member States.  

World 

Health 

Organization, 

24  European  Commission,  Group  of  Chief  Scientific  Advisors, ‘Solar 
2024,  https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/391614. 
25 
https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/artificial-intelligence-for-health  
26 International Energy Agency, ‘Energy and AI’, 2025, https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai 
27 Centre for Future Generations, ‘Preparing for AI labour shocks should be a resilience priority for Europe’, 2025, 
https://cfg.eu/ai-labour-shocks/ 
28 Amodei, D. Machines of Loving Grace, 2024. 
29  European  Central  Bank, ‘Capital  markets  union:  a  deep  dive  –  five  measures  to  foster  a  single  market  for 
capital’, 2024,  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op369~246a103ed8.en.pdf 
30 Bradford, A., Digital empires. The global battle to regulate technology, 2023. 

radiation  modification’, 

Intelligence 

‘Artificial 

Health’, 

2024, 

for 

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Figure 2: Changes in the EU population by 204031 

People’s  well-being  and  societal  resilience  under  pressure.  The  well-being  of  the  EU’s 
people is among the core objectives of the Union. The quality and overall experience of life, 
education and skills, work, mental and physical health, the environment are of intrinsic value. 
They also form a foundation of societal resilience – people’s capacity to weather disturbances 
and transformations. In this context, the European model is one of our core strengths. Many 
EU countries are among the world’s happiest places to live32 and Europeans enjoy some of the 
lowest levels of inequality when compared to other parts of the world. Yet, this model is under 
strain: equality remains uneven, and full inclusion is still out of reach. Sustaining the European 
welfare state requires sustainable public finances, and a productive and competitive economy. 

Demographic  change,  while  often  overlooked,  will  have  very  significant  future  knock-on 
effects. Europeans live longer. The average life expectancy has grown by almost four years 
since  2002  and  is  now  81.4  years.  Healthy  longevity  offers  various  opportunities  but  also 

31  European  Commission,  ‘Outlook  and  demographic  perspectives  for  EU’s  rural  regions.  A  modelling-based 
exercise’, 2025. 
32 World Happiness Report 2025, https://worldhappiness.report/ed/2025/  

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challenges, particularly  when coupled with  the  parallel  decline in  fertility  rates33; the EU is 
projected to have 17 million fewer people of working age by 2040 than in 202334. This will 
affect  our  competitiveness  and  put  a  great  strain  on  the  labour  market  and  public  budgets, 
including the ability of labour taxation to generate sufficient revenues35. The issue is reinforced 
by projected marked regional disparities in population decline, with sharp contrasts between 
urban and rural areas, especially more remote ones (see Figure 2).  

Global developments will increase the pressure on migration flows to the EU – especially from 
Africa, where the population is projected to expand from 1.2 billion to 1.8 billion between 2017 
and 2035, when about half of the population would be under the age of 2136. At the same time, 
the  EU  will  need  regular  migration  due  to  demographic  trends,  while  countering  irregular 
migration. Together, this offers a possible policy pathway of matching  the  needs in  the EU 
labour markets with talent from abroad37. Migration, however, presents a complex picture due 
to  the  volatility  of  both  regular  and  irregular  migration  trends,  but  also  market  needs,  and 
because  it  is  a  politically  sensitive  issue  that  needs  evidence-informed  and  depolarising 
debate38.  
In the regional perspective, disparities are on the rise in the EU and growing in complexity39. 
We are also facing the emergence of a ‘geography of discontent’40, with the economic benefits 
not  evenly  distributed.  Technological  progress  and  impacts  of  climate  change  may  further 
complicate this picture, contributing to industrial redistribution. 

On health, long-term challenges include the demands on healthcare and elderly care systems, 
compounded  by  labour  and  skills  shortages  and  impacts  of  climate  change.  Of  particular 
concern  are  increased  isolation  and  loneliness41,  and  an  extreme  increase  in  mental  health 
problems amongst young people42, in part due to the damaging effects of social media43, as 
well as rising rates of non-communicable diseases.  
Resilience  and  well-being  are  also  linked  to  planetary  health44.  Synergies  exist  between 
climate, water and environmental action, as well as between those and other priority policy 
areas.  For  example,  healthy  ecosystems  such  as  freshwater  bodies  or  the  ocean,  forests  or 
peatlands are some of the most effective carbon sinks and help to buffer the increasing impacts 
of  climate  change,  such  as  cloudbursts  and  prolonged  droughts.  Acting  in  sync  with  nature 
contributes  to  security  and  economic  prosperity45;  for  instance,  climate  mitigation  and 
adaptation helps contain pandemics and supports food security. A systemic and future-proof 
approach to climate adaptation can help multiple objectives: e.g. the resilience of infrastructure 

33 Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Fertility_statistics  
34 European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), ‘Choosing Europe’s future. Global trends to 2040’, 
2024,  https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/180422   
35  European  Commission, ‘Annual  report  on  taxation  2025  –  Review  of  taxation  policies  in  the  EU  Member 
States’, 2025, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2778/6367826, and ‘2024 Ageing Report. Economic and Budgetary 
Projections for the EU Member States’. 
36 ESPAS report (2024), op.cit. 
37 https://population-europe.eu/research/policy-insights/labour-markets-rescue-policy-pathways-forward  
38 European Commission, ‘Navigating migration narratives’, 2025. 
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC142039   
39 ESPAS report (2024), op.cit. 
40 European Commission, ‘Single Market economics briefs’, https://single-market-
economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/single-market-economics-briefs_en  
41 Schnept, S.V. at al. (eds.), Loneliness in Europe. Determinants, risks, interventions, Population Economics. 
42 World Health Organisation, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/adolescent-mental-health  
43 Haidt, J., The Anxious generation. How the great rewiring of childhood is causing an epidemic of mental illness, 
2024. 
44  UN  Environment  Programme,  ‘Navigating  new  horizons.  A  global  foresight  report on  planetary health  and 
human wellbeing’, 2024.  
45 United Nations University, ‘Interconnected disaster risks: turning over a new leaf’, 2025. 

9 

 
 
and buildings to both climate-related and other hazards46. Critical ecosystem services, such as 
clean water, soil or air, are key for people but also for the economy47.  

Still, many urgent challenges remain when it comes to capitalising on these synergies. While 
the EU is on track to meet its target of 55% emissions reduction by 2030, progress towards EU 
environmental objectives is still insufficient48. At the same time, potential tensions between 
sustainability policies and social fairness have become visible, increasing the need to support 
those people and places that are the most affected.  

There are also emerging opportunities for planetary health. For instance, our understanding of 
ecosystems could expand significantly (see Box 3), which could be harnessed for systems-wide 
change  and  for  mainstreaming  biodiversity  as  a  cross-cutting  policy  priority.  Globally,  the 
emerging  ‘geopolitics  of biodiversity’ could  help to  shift  the focus towards recognising  the 
value of scarce natural resources and their sustainable use, away from exploitation49.  

Box 3. On the horizon: understanding the dark biosphere and deep-sea ecosystems  

As we face the worsening degradation of ecosystems and the critical services  that they provide, 
scientific attention is turning to less explored territories. Below the world’s surface are the deep 
ocean and ‘dark biosphere’ in the Earth’s soil and crust with microbes that generate so much ‘dark 
oxygen’  (produced  in  the  deep  ocean  and  sub-surface  in  the  absence  of  light)  that  their  global 
importance  is  comparable to  rainforests.  Emerging  research focuses on  what  those  underground 
resources could mean for climate mitigation, biodiversity, and providing essential services. Deep 
ocean  ecosystems  and  their  potentially  revolutionary  implications  for  biotechnology,  climate 
resilience and medicine are another emerging area. Future action could include, e.g. the creation of 
vertical protection zones and ‘invisible’ reserves built into future biodiversity targets. Advanced 
exploration  technologies  could  accelerate  scientific  discovery  and  increase  the  pressure  for 
exploitation of deep-sea environments (e.g. for critical raw materials),  requiring a precautionary 
and systemic approach. 

Our  democracy  and  fundamental  values  under  threat.  Europeans  see  democracy  and 
governance  (41%)  as  the  area  that  is  the  most  crucial  to  resilience50.  Compared  to  other 
systems, healthy democracies have built-in resilience linked with adaptability, popular support, 
accountability and self-correcting mechanisms. Still, they can be vulnerable to erosion without 
strong  protection  mechanisms,  while  re-democratisation  is  not  easy  even  after  electoral 
changes which promise to reverse democratic backsliding51. At the same time, democracy in 
the EU is under external and internal pressure: from undermining the rule of law and media 
freedom, attacks on civil society, spyware, foreign information manipulation and interference 
and disinformation, to electoral interference. We are witnessing the increasing promotion of 
antidemocratic narratives and attitudes, including among young people, and the exploitation of 
societal, political, economic and technological vulnerabilities.  

46 European Environmental Agency, ‘European Climate Risk Assessment’, 2024. 
47 See  e.g. Dechezleprêtre, A. and V. Vienne, ‘The impact of air pollution on labour productivity: Large-scale 
micro  evidence  from  Europe’, OECD  Science,  Technology  and  Industry  Working  Papers,  No. 2025/14, 
https://doi.org/10.1787/318cb85f-en.  
48 European Environment Agency, ‘European Union 8th Environment Action Programme – Monitoring report on 
progress towards the 8th EAP objectives’, 2025.  
49 European Commission, ‘The EU environmental foresight system (FORENV) – Final report of 2023-24 annual 
cycle  –  Emerging risks  and  opportunities  for  biodiversity protection  and  ecosystem  services  in  the  context  of 
economic and societal challenges’, 2025, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2779/9033877 
50 European Commission, ‘Resilience: The future of Europe as seen by EU citizens - Thematic analysis of the 
future stories shared through the #OurFutures initiative, 2025. 
51 European Democracy Hub, ‘How to strengthen democratic resilience. Five lessons for democratic renewal’, 
2024, https://europeandemocracyhub.epd.eu/how-to-strengthen-democratic-resilience/  

10 

 
 
 
While not all of these are new, the scale and the openness of such threats have grown. People’s 
views are increasingly shaped by algorithm-based, personalised sources which limit the shared 
space for democratic debate based on shared facts and evidence. 42% of young Europeans rely 
primarily on TikTok, Instagram, or YouTube for news52. Social media is deepening ideological 
echo  chambers  and  driving  polarisation,  with  algorithms  prioritising  divisive  content.  A 
political and ideological gap seems to be emerging between young women and men53. We also 
see the effects of a new global oligarchy, with a few tech billionaires increasingly influencing 
politics. While AI has the potential to enhance efficiency, transparency and inclusiveness in 
democratic processes, manipulation campaigns using deepfakes or AI-generated fake news are 
already  capable  of  weakening  governments,  reducing  trust,  destabilising  markets,  or 
influencing  elections  (see  Box  4).  Foreign  interference  and  the  misuse  of  social  media 
platforms for disinformation during the recent elections in some Member States illustrate this. 
Fast and uncontrolled technological development might only further complicate the challenge 
posed by disinformation. 

Box 4. On the horizon: a penny for your thoughts 

Technological progress also opens the discussion about what personal and sensitive data could be 
used for political purposes in the future. For some, this could be the case for neural data generated 
by our nervous systems, for instance collected by biometric wearable devices. Advanced AI large 
language models can already consider emotions; powered by neural data they could substantially 
increase their capacity to address emotional needs. Algorithms can now even predict what content 
will ‘superspread’ in social media. Combining this knowledge with neural data could open the door 
to  unprecedented  possibilities  to  steer  also  political  behaviour  at  the  scale  of  individuals  and 
societies. This opens the debate on the possible need to extend privacy rights to other areas, such as 
the neural data, which is more and more sought-after by technology firms.    

Still,  the  picture  is  not  entirely  bleak  if  we  take  trust  in  governments  as  an  indicator  of 
democratic health. 52% of Europeans tend to trust the EU, the highest result since 2007 (see 
Figure 3). Among young people (15-24) this level is even higher – 59%.  

Figure 3: Trust in the national government and in the EU (2019 and 2025) 54 

52 The Eurobarometer Youth Survey 2024, European Parliament 2025. 
53 See e.g. Berland, O. and Leroutier, M., ‘The gender gap in carbon footprints: determinants and implications, 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment’, 2025, Working Paper No. 424. 
54 Standard Eurobarometers, autumn 2019 and spring 2025. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
The roots of democratic resilience and renewal are found in social cohesion, in the institutional 
mechanisms of checks and balances, and in innovating to improve democracy55. The EU has 
the levers to act on all these coherently through its policies and instruments.  

3.  THE PATH TOWARDS A RESILIENT EU IN 2040: AREAS OF ACTION 

Building on the various recent European initiatives relevant to resilience, the EU needs 
to continue articulating a policy mix, based on a coherent and comprehensive approach, 
to  build  up  economic,  societal,  environmental  and  political  resilience.  This  requires  a 
whole-of-government approach as well as consistently ‘stress-testing’ EU policies for current 
and  future  resilience.  Even  more  fundamentally,  given  both  the  existing  challenges  and  the 
vision of a larger Union, the EU needs to carry out the necessary reforms to guarantee a multi-
level institutional set-up and mechanisms that not only allow it to function efficiently, but also 
ensure that it has the capacity to take bold decisions by enhancing qualified majority voting 
where needed. The EU also needs a Multiannual Financial Framework fit for its priorities, more 
focused, simpler and impactful56. The EU institutions need to ensure a resilient, modern, and 
efficient public administration able to deliver our political priorities in a challenging context.  

This report proposes non-exhaustive key areas of action that can have major positive impact 
and where the EU and its Member States have the agency to act. 

Key area n°1: Developing a coherent global vision for the EU 

The  EU  needs  to  leverage  its  position  as  a  strong,  stable,  and  trusted  home  and  worldwide 
partner, based on its fundamental values and objectives. The EU needs to be clearer about what 
it  stands  for  and  more  assertive  in  standing  up  for  its  distinct  model.  This  requires  the 
development of a clear EU strategic concept, consisting of fundamental principles for shaping 
internal  policies,  navigating  the  global  arena  and  bolstering  the  international  rules-based 
system. It needs to be accompanied by the implementation of projects that resonate with people 
and places in Europe, based on their interests and European values. They should portray Europe 
as a reliable player and partner, preferring cooperation over rivalry, but also able to assert itself 
and push back against those who threaten its interests. This also includes attracting talents from 
abroad in academia, research and other crucial sectors, such as biotechnologies. 

To implement this approach, the EU should support the euro in assuming a more prominent 
role on the global stage and provide a stable regulatory environment conducive to attracting 
investments.  Accession of candidate countries should  be a priority for an economically and 
geopolitically  stronger  Union.  As  the  EU  enlargement  process  accelerates  and  gradual 
integration intensifies, candidate countries, potential candidates and EU’s closest neighbours 
should  be  integrated  step  by  step  in  EU  policy  initiatives.  The  EU  needs  to  form  new 
partnerships  and  alliances  based  on  common  interests,  building  on  the  Global  Gateway 
Strategy,  while  strengthening  mechanisms  to  defend  its  energy  and  economic  security 
combined with climate protection. The EU should actively and with a coherent approach shape 
the discussion about a new rule-based global order and a reform of multilateralism, including 
the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation. The EU should move beyond a reactive, 
crisis-driven  approach  to  neighbourhood  policy,  and  instead  cultivate  long-term,  mutually 
beneficial partnerships. These could foster stability in its wider neighbourhood, while creating 
shared prosperity and reinforcing its global influence. 

European  Democracy  Hub, 

55 
https://europeandemocracyhub.epd.eu/a-new-dynamic-of-democratic-resilience/  
56 See the Commission’s proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, COM/2025/570 final. 

resilience?’, 

democratic 

dynamic 

new 

‘A 

of 

2025, 

12 

 
 
 
Key area n°2: Amplifying internal and external security 

The EU and its Member States, together with candidate countries, closest neighbours and like-
minded partners, need to develop a technology-savvy forward-looking approach. The approach 
should capitalise on civil-military synergies, to deter ill-intentioned actors and protect citizens, 
businesses  and  civil  society  from  combined  internal  and  external  security  threats,  in  full 
consistency  with  EU  values  and  international  law.  Particular  attention  should  be  given  to 
streamlined  decision-making  in  crisis  situations  as  well  as  to  developing  and  putting  into 
practice  the  EU-sourced  strategic  enablers,  such  as  secure  digital  infrastructures,  energy 
networks,  transport  networks  and  infrastructure,  space  infrastructure  and  services,  and 
information gathering and analysis systems. This should be done by making better use of EU 
economies  of  scale,  for  example  by  pooling  of  procurement,  in  particular  for  large-scale 
infrastructures and in the security domain. Effectively dealing with security risks requires an 
enhanced state of readiness and preparedness in the entire chain from individual members of 
the public and local civilian organisations to industry, governmental actors and EU Member 
State’s armed forces. Furthermore, existing foresight capacities in areas such as civil security, 
border  management  and  disaster  resilience  should  be  strengthened.  EU-NATO  cooperation 
should be enhanced to avoid fragmentation in the face of security challenges. Security needs 
to be addressed across all key policies and sectors, with an integrated territorial perspective. 

Key area n°3: Harnessing the power of technology and research  

The EU should take a leading role in shaping global governance and guardrails for high-impact 
technologies, in particular innovative and clean technologies, including blue technologies, and 
at the same time ensure that we have a choice of EU critical technologies.  

To  capitalise  on  the  enormous  transformative  potential  of  AI  for  a  positive  contribution  to 
society, the EU and its Member States must ensure that frontier AI can be safely developed in 
Europe and that its adoption and diffusion is aligned with European values of dignity, fairness, 
and solidarity, while systematically preparing for the profound shifts that AI will generate, for 
example  in  the  labour  market  and  the  security  landscape.  By  setting  global  standards  and 
building strategic autonomy in key AI research, infrastructures, and foundational models, the 
EU can ensure that AI’s disruptive power becomes a driver of prosperity, inclusiveness, safety, 
security, and democratic trust. It should position itself as a global leader in shaping ethical and 
transparent,  accountable,  and  human-centric  AI, 
safe  AI 
systematically assessing and mitigating systemic risks of misuse, malfunction or misalignment 
of the most advanced AI models.  

innovations—promoting 

To  embed  its  values,  the  EU  needs  to  be  able  to  influence  how  technology  systems  and 
infrastructures  are  built  and  what  goals  they  optimise  for.  That  is  where  coordination  with 
Member  States,  financial  support,  regulatory  simplification  for  strategic  projects  (such  as 
secure data centres and the most advanced European foundational AI models), open science, 
EU  research  infrastructures,  regulatory  sandboxes,  transparent  standards,  and  robust 
institutional  oversight,  become  key.  The  AI  Gigafactories  as  infrastructure  or  the  General-
Purpose AI Code of Practice as a de facto standard for the safety and security of advanced AI 
are promising examples of such smart and strategic approaches. 

The EU must also strengthen its technology sovereignty in crucial domains, by focusing on 
strategic future value chains, building its role as a trusted regional partner, and stress-testing 
EU  (and  Member  State)  policies  for  their  strategic  autonomy  effects.  The  EU  should  show 
ethical  and  science-based  leadership  in  responsible  and  precautionary  approaches  to  new 
controversial technologies such as superintelligence or human augmentation, advanced ocean 
exploration,  or  solar  radiation  modification,  including  by  fostering  global  collaborative 
governance structures to deal with potential risks, benefits and distributional effects. Building 

13 

 
on  the  experience  of  the  IRIS2  satellite  communication  network,  European  public-private 
partnerships could be envisaged in cases when new technologies are deployed as public goods, 
i.e. digital platforms, AI and algorithms in public services and health, or strategic infrastructure, 
including  for  research.  The  EU  needs  to  address  policy  fragmentation  in  technology 
governance. Coherence at all levels and domains would allow for proactive identification and 
management  of  potential  trade-offs  (e.g.  between  supply  chain  efficiency  and  strategic 
autonomy; new digital technologies and energy consumption), strengthen synergies between 
distinct policy areas (e.g. industrial policy and security), and allow for increased international 
collaboration and standard-setting with like-minded partners. 

Key  area  n°4:  Strengthening  long-term  economic  resilience  and  preparing  for  labour 
market upheavals  

The EU needs to strengthen the ability to deliver inclusive and sustainable growth combined 
with the capacity to quickly absorb and adjust to external shocks. It should work to strengthen 
and  transform  industries,  to  enable  collective  benefits  of  new  technologies.  The  EU  should 
build a comprehensive assessment of current and future sectors, especially those vital for its 
strategic autonomy, and take coherent action to strengthen supply chains, resources (including 
skills), capabilities, capacities, and control, while ensuring the economic, social and territorial 
cohesion of the Union. The EU should also prepare for expected labour market disturbances 
and reconfigurations, caused by various megatrends, from geopolitics, green and technological 
transformations, to the changing nature of jobs and demography.  

The EU and its Member States need to invest in decarbonising the EU economy and promoting 
global action to accelerate the clean energy transition and to cut emissions of greenhouse gases, 
as well as in world-class and climate-resilient infrastructure. The EU should further develop a 
circular economy, strengthen domestic extraction, manufacturing, and recycling of critical raw 
materials,  and  simultaneously  invest  in  research  and  development  for  the  non-fossil 
substitution of these materials  in  strategic sectors, hand in  hand with increased engagement 
with the partner countries on critical raw materials.  

To  mobilise  the  necessary  private  capital  at  scale,  building  a  true  Savings  and  Investments 
Union is essential to channel European savings into strategic investments for  economic and 
climate  resilience,  competitiveness  and  innovation.  The  EU  and  its  Member  States  should 
continue to work on simplification, especially for SMEs.  

The build-up of the EU defence union is an opportunity to enact a coordinated policy (both 
between the EU and Member States, and within EU policies) where competitiveness, security, 
skills, innovation and preparedness are brought together. Additional investments in defence, 
and  for  research  and  innovation,  should  be  used  to  support  dual-use  technologies  and 
infrastructures wherever possible, with a focus on leveraging civil-military synergies along the 
entire innovation chain, from basic research to procurement of capabilities. Equally, civilian 
technologies should be best leveraged in support of defence readiness.  

Key area n°5: Supporting sustainable and inclusive well-being  

The EU  should  continue  strengthening the social market  economy and a just transition to a 
clean economy. This should include continued support to a shift in taxation away from taxing 
labour towards taxing negative externalities, in a balanced manner that ensures sustainable tax 
revenues,  as  well  as  affordability  and  availability  of  sustainable  products  and  services.  In 
pursuing the just transition, it should renew its focus on timely and tangible support for and 
engagement with the affected communities and groups, and an attractive post-carbon vision for 
them. It should pursue reflection on a new social contract that rebuilds trust for the benefit of 
all Europeans, with renewed welfare policies and a focus on high-quality public services as 

14 

 
well as on the regions and populations that are most impacted by disparities. Special emphasis 
should  be  placed  on  securing  safe  and  resilient  medicine  supply  chains,  and  on  preventive 
healthcare, bringing effective and affordable therapies and treatments to patients, addressing 
health inequalities, and promoting healthier lifestyles, availing ourselves of new technologies. 
The Commission’s work on a dashboard of sustainable and inclusive well-being indicators that 
has  the  potential  to  reduce  reporting  burdens57  is  now  mature  enough  to  be  embedded  into 
policy  evaluation,  and  investment  and  reform  decision-making.  The  Commission  should 
strengthen cooperation with the OECD and the United Nations (following up on the Pact for 
the Future) on the international efforts to develop ‘beyond GDP’ frameworks, building on the 
2030 Agenda and their sustainable development goals.  

Key area n°6: Reimagining education  

The EU and its Member States should reflect on reimagining education and work in light of 
new technologies, demography, future disruptions and transformations. This means embedding 
lifelong  learning  as  a  societal  norm,  ensuring  safe  and  nurturing  childhood  environments, 
aligning curricula with future skills needs and creating flexible pathways between education, 
training,  and  employment.  It  also  requires  fostering  adaptability  and  creativity,  preparing 
citizens not only for specific jobs but for multiple transitions across their lifetimes. Enhancing 
learners’ mobility from school to universities to benefit from the best education that Europe 
has on offer prepares them for uncertainty, openness and critical thinking. 

The EU needs a clear approach to attract and educate both a skilled workforce for the increasing 
service and care economy and the brainpower needed to strengthen its research and innovation 
potential, whilst avoiding regional imbalances. Considering the essential role of scientists and 
engineers in driving innovation, ensuring competitiveness and making sustainability transition 
possible, the EU should make best use of its talents to increase the number of STEM (Science, 
Technology,  Engineering  and  Mathematics)  graduates,  both  in  vocational  education  and 
training and in higher education. 

The EU should prepare to reap the benefits of the acceleration of automation and generative 
AI systems by investing in large-scale re- and up-skilling, fostering AI literacy among citizens. 
This  would strengthen resilience, reduce inequalities, and ensure that the benefits  of AI  are 
widely  shared. By coupling  education reform  with future-oriented labour  market  and social 
policies,  the  EU  can  turn  disruptive  change  into  an  opportunity  for  greater  equity, 
empowerment, and intergenerational solidarity. 

Key area n°7: Strengthening the foundations of democracy as a common good  

The  EU  should  take  action  to  counter  polarisation,  information  manipulation  and 
disinformation amplified by social media and AI algorithms. This should include addressing 
media and digital literacy and supporting trusted and independent information ecosystems that 
help create shared deliberation spaces, transcending information bubbles. Schools should be 
further  empowered  to  leverage  their  crucial  role  in  promoting  media  literacy  and  building 
resilience against disinformation. Evidence-informed and coordinated action is needed both to 
protect  young  people  from  the  negative  impacts  of  social  media,  and  digital  technologies, 
especially on their mental health and well-being, and to allow them to better reap their benefits.  

The  EU  should  strengthen  support  for  social  cohesion  and  community-building  through 
innovative ways of engaging and partnering with local communities, including participatory 
territorial development instruments. The EU, Member States, and candidate countries should 

57  European  Commission,  Measuring  sustainable  and  inclusive  wellbeing:  a  multidimensional  dashboard 
approach, 2025, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/4186342   

15 

 
 
assertively pursue the shared vision for the EU (see key area n° 1), safeguarding and promoting 
the rule of law, media freedom, and civil society freedoms, and in strengthening the toolbox 
for  combatting  foreign  information  manipulation  and  interference,  and  disinformation.  The 
Commission  and  other  EU  Institutions  should  develop  a  clearer  communication  strategy  to 
better  inform  European  citizens  and  businesses  about  the  EU  and  to  maintain  their 
understanding and support. The EU should also continue efforts on deliberative democracy, 
through open and evidence-informed debates about policy options. It should also strengthen 
ties with civil society and local democratic actors. The Commission should propose measures 
on strengthening democratic resilience and civil society across Europe by providing dedicated 
frameworks, strategies and support.  

Key  area  n°8:  Anticipating  demographic 
intergenerational fairness 

transformation  and 

strengthening 

The  EU  should  develop  a  framework  on  intergenerational  fairness,  aimed  at  ensuring  that 
decisions  taken  today  do  not  harm  future  generations  and  at  increasing  solidarity  and 
engagement  between  people  of  different  ages  that  will  further  contribute  to  harnessing 
demographic transformation as an opportunity rather than a destabilising force. It should be 
intersectional  and  should  aim  at  mitigating  the  complex  overlapping  vulnerabilities  that 
threaten the resilience of European societies, from  climate change to  the provision  of basic 
services, access to healthcare and long-term care, or social inclusion. The strategy should allow 
to make European policies fit for current and future generations, by rethinking and adjusting 
our decision-making to ensure that it is underpinned by values and goals to allow Europeans to 
thrive in the long term.  

4.  CONCLUSION  

Delivering  on  actions  towards  a  resilient  EU  2040,  informed  by  foresight  methods  and 
processes,  will  allow  the  Union  to  take  full  advantage  of  its  transformative  power  in  the 
changing global context. The EU will need to address the consequences of various long-term 
global developments and its own specific challenges detailed in this report. Coherent action 
and  governance  will  ultimately  empower  the  EU  to  confront  sudden  crises  and  structural 
changes. This requires thinking beyond the short- and mid-term political cycles and adopting 
a perspective that better appreciates the long-term impacts of policies initiated today, as well 
as their robustness under divergent future scenarios. 

To this end, building on the work realised over 2019-2024, the Commission will continue to 
underpin its policies with strategic foresight, including by adopting annual Strategic Foresight 
Reports covering relevant cross-cutting topics.  

From 2026, these reports will be informed by a robust foresight process, including exploring 
alternative possible future scenarios, in a coherent way across different policies. Beyond the 
publication  of  the  yearly  reports,  the  Commission  will  ensure  that,  throughout  this  new 
mandate, foresight tools are fully integrated into policymaking so that our policies are more 
impactful and future-informed, and so that the EU can have a lasting and significant impact in 
a context of growing complexity. This will be underpinned by the strong foresight capabilities 
developed over the past years, specifically designed to anticipate and address uncertainty. The 
2026 Strategic Foresight Report will focus on the future of the EU in a changing world.  

16