JOINT REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Annual Report for 2024
Date: 2025-09-08
Institutions: European Commission, European External Action Service
Subjects: Hong Kong, activity report, bilateral relations, economic cooperation, economic development, economic situation, fundamental rights, human rights, political situation, regional integration

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 8.9.2025  JOIN(2025) 19 final  JOINT REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Hong Kong Special Administrative Region  Annual Report for 2024  
 
 
JOINT REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION: 

ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2024 

Summary  

Since Hong Kong’s handover to the People’s Republic of China in 1997, the European Union 
(EU) and its Member States have closely followed political and economic developments in the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). 

In line with the commitment given to the European Parliament in 1997, the Commission and 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President 
issue  an  annual  report  on  developments  in  Hong  Kong.  Over  the  years,  this  has  included  a 
particular focus on the implementation of the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and on Hong 
Kong’s autonomy as stated in Hong Kong’s own Basic Law. 

This is the 27th report, covering 2024. Politically, the year was marked by: (i) legislation under 
Article  23  of  the  Basic  Law,  resulting  in  the  sweeping  ‘Safeguarding  National  Security 
Ordinance’  (SNSO);  (ii)  a  continued  focus  on  national  security  in  the  fourth  year  after  the 
imposition  of  the  National  Security  Law  (NSL)  including  high-profile  court  cases  against 
independent media and pro-democracy proponents; and (iii) a worrying increase in cases of 
harassment against journalists and civil society actors. There was continued erosion of Hong 
Kong’s autonomy and of the fundamental freedoms and rights of the people of Hong Kong, 
even though China agreed in 1997 to maintain this autonomy and these freedoms until at least 
2047. Nevertheless, in comparison to the crackdown following the imposition of the NSL in 
2020, the implementation of the SNSO has, so far, been relatively measured. 2024 continued 
to  see  court  rulings  supporting  the  advancement  of  the  rights  of  LGBTIQ+  people. 
Comprehensive  legislation  protecting  same-sex  couples,  a  requirement  imposed  by  Hong 
Kong’s Court of Final Appeal in September 2023, is due in autumn 2025 but is expected to be 
delayed. 

In  2024,  trials  brought  against  pro-democracy  activists,  advocates  and  politicians  under  the 
NSL and other legislation continued, in some cases with considerable delays. In the trial against 
47 pro-democracy activists who had participated in a primary election in 2020, a Hong Kong 
court sentenced 45 defendants to imprisonment terms ranging between 4 years and 2 months 
and 10 years, and acquitted two. In another trial, charges had been brought under the colonial-
era sedition law against the two former chief editors of the disbanded independent media outlet 
Stand News. One of the chief editors was sentenced to jail for 21 months and the other was 
sentenced to  jail  for  11 months.  This is  the first conviction  of journalists  for the offence of 
sedition in Hong Kong in 72 years. The trial against media entrepreneur and pro-democracy 
advocate Jimmy Lai continued in 2024, with Lai taking the witness stand. There have been 
substantial delays in the trial. Instead of the 83 hearing days originally allocated by the Court 
for the trial in 2024, there were a total of 110 hearing days in 2024. The trial is not expected to 
conclude before mid-2025. Lai has been held in custody continuously since 31 December 2020, 
mostly in solitary confinement. In the case brought against the Hong Kong Alliance in Support 
of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, including prominent activist Chow Hang-tung, 
the trial had yet to start in 2024, and as of December, proceedings were scheduled to start in 

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May 2025. Many defendants have been held in custody since mid-2021, in some cases for long 
periods in solitary confinement. 

In  an  extra-territorial  application  of  the  NSL,  Hong  Kong  authorities  in  2024  issued  arrest 
warrants  (with  bounties  offered)  against  six  Hong  Kong  pro-democracy  activists  in  exile. 
Relatives and other acquaintances of wanted activists were interrogated by the police. These 
developments continue to undermine confidence in the rule of law in Hong Kong.  

While internet freedom is generally being upheld in Hong Kong, the authorities continued to 
block  online  content  considered  sensitive.  On  8 May,  the  Court  of  Appeal  granted  an 
application by the government to ban the protest anthem ‘Glory to Hong Kong’. The authorities 
argued the song ‘has been used to incite others’ to commit national security offences such as 
secession and sedition.  

The EU has repeatedly raised concerns about these developments, both in public statements 
and in private exchanges with officials from China and Hong Kong.  

The High Representative/Vice-President on behalf of the European Union issued the following 
statement relating to Hong Kong:  

•  19 March 2024 – Statement on the adoption of new national security legislation1. 

The EU Spokesperson issued statements on Hong Kong covering the following issues: 

•  30 May 2024 – Statement by the Spokesperson on the verdict in the ‘Hong Kong 47’ 

case2; 

•  4 June 2024  –  Statement  by  the  Spokesperson  on  the  35th  Anniversary  of  the 

Tiananmen Square events3; 

•  29 August 2024  –  Statement  by  the  Spokesperson  on  the  conviction  of  former  chief 

editors at Stand News4; 

•  19 November 2024 – Statement by the Spokesperson on the sentencing in the ‘Hong 

Kong 47’ case5; 

The EU Spokesperson’s post on X (formerly Twitter) on Hong Kong covered the following 
issue: 

1 Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the adoption of new national security legislation, 19 March, 
available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/03/19/hong-kong-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-
behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-adoption-of-new-national-security-legislation/. 
2 Statement by the Spokesperson on the verdict in the ‘Hong Kong 47’ case, 30 May, available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/hong-
kong-statement-spokesperson-verdict-%E2%80%9Chong-kong-47%E2%80%9D-case_en.  
3 Statement by the Spokesperson on the 35th Anniversary of the Tiananmen Square events, 4 June, available at: 
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/china-statement-spokesperson-35th-anniversary-tiananmen-square-events_en. 
4 Statement by the Spokesperson on the conviction of former chief editors at Stand News, 29 August, available at: 
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/hong-kong-statement-spokesperson-conviction-former-chief-editors-stand-news_en.  
5 Statement by the Spokesperson on the sentencing in the ‘Hong Kong 47’ case, 19 November, available at: 
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/hong-kong-statement-spokesperson-sentencing-%E2%80%9Chong-kong-47%E2%80%9D-case_en. 

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•  24 December  –  Post  on  extra-territorial  arrest  warrants  issued  by  Hong  Kong 

authorities6.  

A post on X (formerly Twitter) by the EU Office in Hong Kong covered the following rights-
related issue:  

•  27 November  –  Post  on  the  Hong Kong  Court of Final Appeal’s decision to  uphold 

rulings granting same-sex couples equal housing and inheritance rights7. 

The EU raised concerns about the human rights situation in Hong Kong in the 57th session of 
the United Nations Human Rights Council on 24 September 2024. The EU urged ‘the Chinese 
government  and  the  Hong  Kong  authorities  to  restore  full  respect  for  the  rule  of  law, 
fundamental  freedoms,  and  democratic  principles’ 8.  During  the  UN  General  Assembly  on 
22 October 2024,  the  EU  underlined  its  concerns  about  developments  in  Hong  Kong  in  the 
Omnibus statement read at the Third Committee9. 

The EU also raised concerns about ‘the negative impact of Hong Kong’s new national security 
legislation on the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong’ at the 39th session of the 
EU-China Human Rights Dialogue that took place on 16 June 2024 in Chongqing10.  

The European Parliament adopted a resolution on ‘the new security law in Hong Kong and the 
cases of Andy Li and Joseph John’ on 25 April11 and a resolution on ‘Hong Kong, notably the 
cases of Jimmy Lai and the 45 activists recently convicted under the national security law’ on 
28 November12.  

In 2024, the Hong Kong economy grew for the second consecutive year, with a 2.5% increase 
in GDP year on year, supported by: external trade in goods and services; the logistics sector; 
construction; and a gradual recovery in the financial industry. Private consumption declined 
and  industries  exposed  to  tourist  spending  continued  to  underperform  when  compared  with 
pre-pandemic times. Inflation was moderate, at 1.7%, and the unemployment rate was 3.1% 
during  the  year.  Hong  Kong  recorded  a  significant  public  deficit  and  a  decrease  in  fiscal 
reserves,  although  fiscal  reserves  still  covered  an  estimated  11  months  of  government 
expenditure.  In  2024,  the  EU  remained  Hong  Kong’s  largest  non-Chinese  foreign  business 
community  measured by  the number of companies  active in  the territory. The EU  was  also 
Hong Kong’s  fourth  largest  trading  partner in  goods  and third largest  in  services  with  total 
trade amounting to EUR 66.7 billion and a surplus for the EU of EUR 30.0 billion. 

6 Tweet on the new round of extra-territorial arrest warrants, 24 December, available at: 
https://x.com/AnouarEUspox/status/1871530643378913663. 
7 Tweet on the Court of Final Appeal’s decision to uphold rulings granting same-sex couples equal housing & inheritance rights, 
27 November, available at: https://x.com/EUinHKandMO/status/1861701177865637911. 
8 HRC57 - Item 4: General debate on human rights situations that require the Council’s attention, 24 September, available at: 
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/hrc57-item-4-general-debate-human-rights-situations-require-council%E2%80%99s-
attention_en?s=62. 
9 EU Statement – UN General Assembly 3rd Committee: Agenda item 71: Human Rights, 22 October, available at: 
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-un-general-assembly-3rd-committee-agenda-item-71-
human-rights_en. 
10 39th Human Rights Dialogue with the European Union took place in Chongqing, 17 June, available at: 
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/china-39th-human-rights-dialogue-european-union-took-place-chongqing_en.  
11 European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on the new security law in Hong Kong and the cases of Andy Li and Joseph John, 
25 April, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/deterioration-of-fundamental-freedoms-in/product-
details/20230616DPU36462.  
12 European Parliament resolution of 28 November 2024 on Hong Kong, notably the cases of Jimmy Lai and the 45 activists recently 
convicted under the national security law, 28 November, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2024-
0051_EN.html.  

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I. 

Political and social developments  

Basic Law Article 23: legislation and implementation  

Article 23 of the Basic  Law,  Hong Kong’s constitutional document, states that Hong Kong 
‘shall  enact  laws  on  its  own  to  prohibit  any  act  of  treason,  secession,  sedition,  subversion 
against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political 
organizations  or  bodies  from  conducting  political  activities  in  the  Region,  and  to  prohibit 
political  organizations  or  bodies  of  the  Region  from  establishing  ties  with  foreign  political 
organizations or bodies’.  

An earlier attempt to enact Article 23 legislation had failed in 2003. After the imposition of the 
NSL and the de facto exclusion of pro-democracy lawmakers from the legislature since 2021, 
the Hong Kong government resumed work to complete the SNSO. The legislative process for 
the SNSO was concluded in only 49 days. On 6 March 2024, Ding Xuexiang, Chinese Vice-
Premier and leader of the Central Leading Group on Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, called for 
the swift enactment of the law. On 7 March, the Hong Kong government announced plans to 
introduce the bill for the first reading and second reading the next day. The Legislative Council 
likewise expedited scrutiny of the 212-page-long draft legal text. The Legislative Council’s 15-
member  Bills  Committee  organised  back-to-back  meetings  to  discuss  the  181-clause  bill 
between 8 and 14 March, including  on the weekend. Legislative Council  President Andrew 
Leung waived the 12-day notice period for the bill to undergo a second and third reading. To 
finish the second and third reading in one day, lawmakers coordinated among themselves to 
limit speech time to five minutes per lawmaker. All interventions were in favour of the bill. As 
a  result,  the  legislation  was  passed  into  law  on  19  March  and  became  effective  on 
23 March 2024. 

Upon invitation of the Hong Kong government, the EU Office together with the EU Member 
States Consulates-General conveyed the EU’s concerns about the draft SNSO in writing via 
diplomatic  note  and  orally  in  two  briefing  sessions  for  the  consular  corps  organised  by  the 
Hong Kong authorities. The consultation process did not lead to substantial changes to the draft 
legislation,  with  the  exception  of  an  added  public  interest  defence  in  response  to  concerns 
raised by journalists about the offence of theft of state secrets. 

The SNSO states that ‘the highest principle of the policy of “one country, two systems” is to 
safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests’. Adding to the provisions 
of Basic Law Article 23, the SNSO outlaws five new categories of offences, namely treason, 
insurrection,  theft  of  state  secrets  and  espionage,  sabotage  activities  endangering  national 
security and external interference. The SNSO introduces the mainland’s sweeping definition 
of ‘national security’ to the territory, de facto granting the executive largely unlimited powers 
in this area.  

Other categories of offences in the SNSO had already existed in Hong Kong law, with the new 
law  expanding  the  scope  of  these  previously  existing  categories  of  offence.  The  SNSO 
supersedes  the  colonial-era  sedition  law,  expanding  on  the  existing  offences  of  inducing 
‘disaffection’ against ‘the fundamental system of the state established by the Constitution of 
the People’s Republic of China’. The legal text of the SNSO also explicitly states that it is ‘not 
necessary’  to  prove  an  intention  to  ‘incite  violence’  for  the  offence,  a  departure  from  both 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
convention in the common-law world and international principles. In addition, the maximum 
penalty for the offence went up from two years of imprisonment to seven years. If the act of 
sedition occurs in collusion with ‘an external force’, the maximum penalty is now 10 years of 
imprisonment.  

Under the SNSO, the amended offence of ‘inciting disaffection of public officers’ now covers 
a  wider  range  of  office  holders,  including  the  Chairperson  of  the  Ombudsman  and  the 
Chairperson of the Equal Opportunities Commission. 

The SNSO furthermore stipulates that those convicted of national security-related offences can 
only  receive  a  one-third  sentencing  remission  contingent  on  an  assessment  by  the 
Commissioner  of  Correctional  Services  that  the  remission  would  ‘not  be  contrary  to  the 
interests of national security’. This has the effect of longer prison sentences in most cases. The 
remission  had  so  far  been  customary  for  inmates  with  a  record  of  good  behaviour  while  in 
prison. Additionally, anyone convicted of national security-related offences will no longer be 
eligible to stand in elections for the Chief Executive, Legislative Council, District Council and 
Rural Representatives, for the rest of their life13.  

Shortly  after  the  SNSO  entered  into  force,  the  authorities  retroactively  applied  its  stricter 
provisions on sentence remission to a concluded NSL case, de facto leading to a prolonged jail 
term for the defendant. A protester, who was convicted of secession in 2021 under the Beijing-
imposed law and serving a five-year jail term, was told on 24 February that he could be released 
on 25 March 2024. However, as the SNSO became effective, his remission was revoked. The 
inmate launched a judicial review against the decision – a first for the SNSO – but lost the bid 
on 6 December. A High Court judge concluded that the courts would ‘generally defer’ to the 
opinion of the executive authorities on what was required to protect national security.  

The first arrests under the SNSO took place on 28 May 2024, targeting jailed activist Chow 
Hang-tung  (Hong  Kong  Alliance  case),  and  five  others.  The  six  were  accused  of  having 
committed  the  sedition  offence  by  publishing  posts  on  social  media  related  to  the  1989 
Tiananmen Square crackdown. As of 31 December 2024, the SNSO had been applied to arrest 
at least 15 individuals, all on sedition charges. Three individuals were convicted and sentenced 
to  jail  terms  under  the  new  law.  While  the  implementation  of  the  SNSO  has  so  far  been 
relatively measured in comparison to the crackdown following the imposition of the NSL, the 
threshold for conviction has been low and the sentences have been harsh. One of the persons 
convicted under the law was sentenced to 14 months in jail for wearing a T-shirt with a protest 
slogan deemed ‘seditious’. 

Invoking  the  new  law  on  12 June 2024  and  again  on  24 December 2024,  Hong  Kong’s 
Secretary for Security cancelled the passports of 13 wanted persons declared as ‘absconders’ 
and barred others from having monetary relationships or setting up joint ventures with those 
targeted, as well as from selling or leasing properties to them.  

The law has further exacerbated the chilling effect the NSL has had on Hong Kong society, 
including  further  self-censorship  among  journalists  and  greater  reserve  on  the  part  of  civil 
society organisations. On 29 March, US-funded news station Radio Free Asia announced the 
closure of its Hong Kong bureau, citing safety concerns for its reporting staff. On 28 March, 

13 A similar clause in Macao limited the period to five years.  

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the Bishop of Hong Kong confirmed that the Catholic Diocese had to adjust certain religious 
practices to avoid breaking the new law.  

Implementation of the NSL and related legislation 

30 June 2024  marked  the  fourth  anniversary  of  the  imposition  of  the  NSL.  As  of 
31 December 2024, 316 people had been arrested under the NSL and related clauses, with a 
conviction rate of over 95%.  

On  Christmas  Eve  2024,  the  Hong  Kong  authorities  issued  a  wanted  list  targeting  six 
individuals residing overseas, including foreign nationals. The Hong Kong national security 
police placed a HK$1 million (EUR 122 000) bounty on each of the self-exiled activists over 
alleged collusion with foreign countries or external elements, secession and subversion. This 
constituted another extra-territorial implementation of the NSL and brought the total number 
of  such  arrest  warrants  to  19.  As  of  31  December,  no  person  on  the  bounty  lists  has  been 
extradited to Hong Kong. The EU Spokesperson posted a statement condemning these extra-
territorial arrest warrants. 

The bounty  lists continued to  create a ripple effect  in  Hong Kong, exerting pressure on the 
activists’  families  and  close  social  circles.  On  10 January,  the  national  security  police  took 
away for questioning the parents and two sisters of an overseas activist who was put on the 
wanted list on 14 December 2023.  

Judicial  proceedings  of  the  cases  charged  under  the  NSL  and  the  colonial-era  sedition  law 
continued in 2024, albeit with considerable delays. Many of the defendants have been held in 
custody since mid-2021, in some cases in repeated solitary confinement. 

The  NSL  trial  of  the  47  pro-democracy  lawmakers  and  activists  who  organised  or 
participated in a legal primary election in 2020 (commonly referred to as the Hong Kong 
47) is the national security trial with the most defendants. The High Court convicted 45 of the 
defendants of ‘conspiracy to subversion’ on 30 May 2024 and sentenced them to imprisonment 
terms ranging from 4 years and 2 months to 10 years on 19 November. The maximum penalty 
under the NSL is life imprisonment. Two of the Hong Kong 47 defendants were acquitted. 

The prosecutor filed an appeal against one of the two defendants acquitted by the court. The 
Hong  Kong  government  resisted  calls  from  pro-Beijing  hardliners  to  seek  even  heavier 
sentencing for the 45. At the same time, 14 of the defendants filed an appeal regarding their 
convictions or sentencing. As of 31 December, the judiciary had not scheduled hearings for 
these appeals. 

The trial, including sessions for mitigation and the verdict, lasted 131 days, exceeding the 90 
days  that  had  originally  been  scheduled.  Meanwhile,  among  the  eight  other  pro-democracy 
activists who were arrested but not prosecuted in the case, at least one was still on police bail 
without access to his passport in 2024.  

The  NSL  trial  against  the  Hong  Kong  Alliance  in  Support  of  Patriotic  Democratic 
Movements  of  China  (the  Hong  Kong  Alliance)  entered  the  trial  stage  in  2024.  As  of 
31 December 2024, the High Court has scheduled the court hearings for May 2025 and reserved 
75  days  for  hearings.  The  now-disbanded  civil  society  group  used  to  organise  the  annual 
candlelight vigil to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. The prosecutor accuses the 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hong  Kong  Alliance  and  its  core  members  of  ‘incitement  to  subversion’.  The  maximum 
penalty is life imprisonment. 

In a related case, the High Court upheld the conviction and sentencing of Chow and two other 
members  of  the  Alliance  on  14 March 2024  for  not  complying  with  a  request  to  provide 
information  issued  by  the  national  security  police.  On  31 July,  the  Court  of  Final  Appeal 
allowed the three defendants to appeal and scheduled the hearing for January 2025.  

The  NSL  and  sedition  trial  brought  against  media  entrepreneur  and  pro-democracy 
activist Jimmy Lai continued in 2024. Alongside Lai, six former journalists of the now defunct 
newspaper Apple Daily who pleaded guilty in November 2022, and three Apple Daily-related 
companies were charged. The prosecution accused Lai, a British citizen, and the others of two 
charges under the NSL (‘conspiracy to commit collusion with a foreign country or with external 
elements to endanger national security’) and one charge under the colonial-era sedition law 
(‘conspiracy to print, publish, sell, offer for sale, distribute, display and/or reproduce seditious 
publications’).  The  maximum  penalty  for  the  NSL  charges  is  life  imprisonment.  The  trial, 
which was expected to last for 83 days, was rescheduled twice – once from 1 December 2022 
to 25 September 2023, and then ultimately to 18 December 2023. The trial entered its 113th 
day as of 19 December, the last day of hearings in 2024. Lai, for the first time, personally took 
the witness stand on 20 November.  

In the Stand News case, where charges were brought under the colonial-era sedition law, 
the District Court on 26 September sentenced the two former chief editors of the disbanded 
independent media outlet to jail for 21 months and 11 months, respectively. One of the editors, 
who was held in custody for 349 days prior to the trial, had to be jailed immediately while the 
other editor was allowed to walk free, citing health conditions. This is the first conviction and 
sentencing of journalists for the offence of sedition in 72 years. The conviction has exacerbated 
the chilling effect of the crackdown on the freedom of the press, further increasing already-
widespread self-censorship among journalists. 

The management of the national security trials has repeatedly raised doubts about due process, 
pertaining to both the question of impartiality of the hand-picked national security judges and 
the prolonged trial procedures. In the Stand News case, the trial was expected to last for 20 
days, but lasted for 57 days. The date of the verdict was postponed three times. The long pre-
trial detention of the defendants of more than 300 days was also problematic. 

In the first sedition trial since the 1997 handover, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction 
of activist Tam Tak-chi on 7 March. The court rejected the UK Privy Council’s ruling that any 
speech  concerned  in  a  sedition  conviction  must  include  an  intention  to  incite  violence.  On 
14 August, the Court of Final Appeal gave approval to Tam to challenge his conviction and 
sentence in January 2025. 

On 11 April, Joseph John, a Portuguese national and UK resident, was sentenced to five years 
in prison for ‘incitement to secession.’  

Many of the approximately 6 000 protesters who were arrested during the 2019 protests but not 
yet  charged  are  still  on  bail,  pending  police  investigations  and  prosecutorial  decisions.  In 
response to calls to drop charges on them ‘categorically’, Secretary for Justice Paul Lam stated 
in an interview in October 2024 that this would be against the principle of the rule of law. He 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
added that new pieces of evidence may emerge and that there was no deadline to prosecute 
crimes that took place in the past.  

In the city’s first trial under the United Nations Anti-Terrorism Ordinance, a jury on 29 
August  convicted  one  person  and  acquitted  six  others  over  an  alleged  plan  to  detonate 
explosives and use firearms against police during the 2019 protests. Six other defendants had 
pleaded guilty. The court sentenced the seven people to imprisonment terms, ranging from 23 
years and 10 months to 5 years and 10 months.  

On  12 August 2024,  Jimmy  Lai  and  six  former  lawmakers  lost  their  final  appeal  against 
convictions for ‘taking part’ in an illegal march on 18 August 2019. The Court of Final Appeal 
dismissed  the  contention  that  the  prosecution  was  an  excessive  restriction  on  freedom  of 
expression  and  assembly.  However,  the  prosecutor’s  request  to  reinstate  the  conviction  for 
‘organising’  the  march  was  equally  refused.  Two  days  later,  Lord  Neuberger,  a  former 
President of the UK Supreme Court who presided over the case, resigned from his position as 
chair  of  the  High  Level  Panel  of  Legal  Experts  on  Media  Freedom  that  advised  the  Media 
Freedom Coalition whose members include EU Member States.  

In 2024, five overseas non-permanent judges in the Court of Final Appeal also resigned. While 
some of them decided not to renew their appointment for personal reasons, retired UK judge 
Lord Sumption, who had been a justice at the British Supreme Court, stated that the territory  
‘once a vibrant and politically diverse community is slowly becoming a totalitarian state. The 
rule of law is profoundly compromised in any area about which the government feels strongly.’  

As of December 2024, six overseas non-permanent judges remained on the bench of the Court 
of Final Appeal.  

In  conclusion,  on  matters  considered  relevant  to  national  security,  the  rule  of  law  in  Hong 
Kong remained under severe strain in 2024. In the sub-index of ‘constraints on government 
powers’  of  the  annual  Rule  of  Law  Index  as  compiled  by  the  World  Justice  Project  and 
published on 23 October 2024, Hong Kong slid by three places to 62nd among 142 countries 
and territories in comparison to 2023. In the sub-index of ‘fundamental rights’ Hong Kong also 
ranked 62nd, a deterioration of four places  from  202314. At the same time, commercial and 
private law still remained largely unaffected by the authoritarian turn in Hong Kong’s legal 
environment. 

2024 also saw a continued focus on integrating ‘national security’ into the governance of 
the SAR, in particular in relation to education and the civil service. On 7 June, Hong Kong’s 
Civil  Service  Bureau  promulgated  a  new  Civil  Service  Code,  which  listed  ‘upholding  the 
constitutional  order  and  national  security’  as  a  top  core  value  for  the  SAR’s  173  000  civil 
servants. On 6 August, the National Security Exhibition Gallery was opened, which describes 
the  2019  protests  as  a  ‘colour  revolution.’  The  Civil  Service  Bureau  urged  all  government 
employees to visit the Gallery at least once before the end of 2026.  

On  18 November,  the  government  held  a  launching  ceremony  for  the  National  Security 
Education District Tutor Training Scheme for the first batch of 120 national security ‘tutors’. 
The government said it expected that by 2025, at least 2 600 district tutors will be trained and 
each of them should disseminate national security messages to at least 30 people a year. The 

14 https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hong  Kong  government  anticipates  that  over  78  000  people  will  receive  messages  about 
safeguarding national security a year.  

The Education Bureau reiterated in 2024 the importance of national security education. Among 
a batch of reports released on 25 June, school inspectors criticised a school catering to children 
with  moderate  learning  disabilities  for  not  teaching  the  Chinese  constitution  and  for  not 
‘comprehensively implementing’ national security education.  

The government also exerted more control on the social work profession. On 3 July 2024, the 
Legislative Council passed an amendment to the Social Worker Registration Ordinance, which 
made government appointees a majority in the city’s licensing body for social workers. The 
law  also  empowered  the  body  to  permanently  disqualify  social  workers  who  have  been 
convicted of national security offences. 

In July, the police revealed that it had received over 750 000 tip-offs via the national security 
report hotline and that around 10% to 20% of these tip-offs could be followed up on. Separately, 
in December, the police said that it had installed 612 sets of surveillance cameras in the city 
this year to improve security. The goal was to install 1 300 more sets by the end of 2025. 

The  space  for  political  opposition  and  pluralistic  voices  in  Hong  Kong  shrank  further  in 
2024.  

On 13 November, Democratic Party chairperson Lo Kin-hei revealed that several core Party 
members as well as their families and businesses had received anonymous threatening phone 
calls and emails criticising them as being ‘anti-China and Hong Kong’ and warning of potential 
imprisonment for their political involvement.  

On 19 November, the newspapers Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po ran full-page stories, singling 
out nine convicted defendants in the ‘Hong Kong 47’ case, and accused them of having current 
or  past  affiliations  with  the  political  group.  The  Democratic  Party,  once  the  largest  pro-
democracy  political  group  in  Hong  Kong,  continued  to  face  difficulties  in  organising 
fundraising events.  

Formerly  the  second  largest  political  opposition  group  in  Hong  Kong,  the  Civic  Party  was 
delisted from Hong Kong’s Company Registry on 27 March; the group had voted to disband 
in May 2023. 

Hong Kong’s external relations  

Hong Kong’s external relations in 2024 were marked by efforts to diversify trade and economic 
links with countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and other emerging markets. In July, 
the Chief Executive led a delegation for a six-day visit to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. So far, 
he has visited seven Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
barring Brunei, the Philippines and Myanmar. In November, he travelled to Peru for seven days 
and attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Economic Leaders’ Meeting. Hong Kong 
also signed a free-trade agreement (FTA) with Peru in 2024.  

In  September,  the  city’s  current  sole  delegate  to  the  Standing  Committee  of  the  National 
People’s  Congress,  Starry  Lee,  proposed  that  the  SAR’s  internationalisation  process  should 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
now focus on countries in the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative, ASEAN and the Middle East, after 
having long focused on Europe and the US. 

Emigration from Hong Kong has continued. In 2024, the UK Home Office announced that as 
of 30 September 2024 it had received 32 429 applications for British National (Overseas) visas. 
The  United  Kingdom  has  received  a  total  of  around  224  204  applications  by  Hong  Kong 
citizens for the special visa scheme that can pave the way to citizenship. Around 158 000 people 
have  arrived  in  the  UK  under  the  scheme.  Canada  and  Australia  continued  to  receive  visa 
applications  under  bespoke  immigration  schemes  for  Hong  Kong  residents.  Hong  Kong’s 
population has remained static at 7.5 million despite emigration, owing mainly to new arrivals 
from the Chinese mainland.  

On  10 July,  the  US  President  extended  the  ‘national  emergency’  status  for  Hong  Kong, 
claiming that the SAR’s situation had posed a threat to the ‘national security, foreign policy, 
and economy’ of the United States. Under the executive order, the SAR has no longer been 
able to enjoy special economic treatment that had previously been granted by US law. On 19 
November, in response to the sentencing of the ‘Hong Kong 47’ case, the US announced the 
imposition of new visa restrictions on Hong Kong officials.  

Rights, freedoms and equal opportunities  

The meeting of the Universal Periodic Review Working Group of the United Nations Human 
Rights  Council  with  regard  to  China,  also  covering  Hong  Kong,  took  place  on  23 January. 
Ahead of the meeting, at least seven countries had made 13 submissions related to Hong Kong, 
marking  a  record  high  number  of  enquiries.  During  the  meeting,  18  countries,  including 
Denmark, Germany, Ireland and France, raised concerns about civil rights in the territory, while 
the US and the UK urged Hong Kong authorities to scrap the NSL. 

On 31 May 2024, the UN’s Human Rights Council published China’s views on conclusions 
and recommendations. China rejected 14 of the 23 human rights recommendations related to 
Hong  Kong  that  had  been  made  by  20  countries.  Countries  whose  recommendations  were 
rejected  included  Belgium,  Czechia,  Denmark,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands  and  Austria. 
China  rejected  all  recommendations  related  to  the  NSL  in  Hong  Kong,  describing  them  as 
based  on  ‘false  information’.  Meanwhile,  China  stated  that  it  ‘accepted  and  already 
implemented’ recommendations from Germany (to restore full respect for the rule of law and 
civil society and political rights in Hong Kong), France (to guarantee freedom of expression 
and association, including online, including in Hong Kong)  and Lithuania (to guarantee the 
right of all citizens to opinion and expression without fear of reprisals and censorship in all 
regions, including Hong Kong, Tibet and others). 

On 4 July, the plenary meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council discussed and 
adopted the review report of China.  

In 2024, United Nations experts voiced concerns about the situation of fundamental rights in 
Hong Kong on two occasions in writing to China’s permanent mission in Geneva. 

On 25 January, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment expressed ‘concerns’ that the key prosecution witness in 
the national security trial of Jimmy Lai, Andy Li, ‘was subjected to torture and/or other cruel, 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ in a mainland prison, and ‘as a result, he was 
forced to confess that he conspired with Mr Jimmy Lai to collude with foreign entities’15.  

On 22 March 2024, a statement was issued by the United Nations Special Rapporteurs on: (i) 
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; (ii) the right to 
education; (iii) the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; (iv) the situation 
of human rights defenders; (v) the independence of judges and lawyers; and (vi) the promotion 
and  protection  of  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  while  countering  terrorism.  The 
statement  argued  that  the  Article  23  legislation  included  ‘numerous  measures  that  would 
significantly  and  unduly  limit  the  exercise  of  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  and 
would  be  incompatible  with  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  the  International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’16. 

In the past year, Hong Kong continued to slip in various rights-related global rankings. In the 
Human  Freedom  Index  2024  compiled  by  the  Cato  Institute  and  the  Fraser  Institute,  Hong 
Kong fell from 46th place in 2023 to 50th place out of 16517. According to a report from the 
NGO Freedom House, Hong Kong in 2024 was a ‘partly free’ territory, scoring 41 out of 100, 
almost identical to 2023 when Hong Kong was ranked 42 out of 10018.  

The situation of press freedom  saw further deterioration. Hong Kong was ranked 135th 
among  the  180  countries  and  regions  in  the  World  Press  Freedom  Index  compiled  by  the 
organisation  Reporters  without  Borders  and  published  on  3 May19.  According  to  the  Press 
Freedom Index prepared by the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) and unveiled on 
20 August 2024, both the general public and journalists in Hong Kong experienced a decline 
in press freedom in 202320.  

The  HKJA  faced  particular  pressure  during  the  year.  On  25 January 2024,  the  trade  union 
revealed  that  the  Inland  Revenue  Department  (Hong  Kong’s  tax  authority)  demanded 
HK$400 000 (EUR 45 000) in profits tax as part of a review of the HKJA’s 2017-2018 accounts. 
The authorities asked the HKJA to submit profits tax returns for six years between 2017/2018 
and 2022/2023. The HKJA filed an objection against the assessment. In April, a fundraising 
concert organised by the HKJA was forced to move online due to ‘irresistible forces’. In May, 
the HKJA’s former chairperson decided not to seek re-election, stating that the association ‘can 
come under attack if I continue to serve’. On 21 June, a day ahead of its annual general meeting, 
the HKJA had to urge members to ignore an anonymous WhatsApp message warning against 
attendance out of ‘security concerns’.  

On 13 September, the HKJA revealed that between June and August, ‘dozens of journalists, 
their  family  members,  or  their  family  members’  employers,  as  well  as  neighbours  and 
associates, were harassed and intimidated both online and offline’. In one case, a journalist’s 
landlord and property agent received anonymous letters containing threats of ‘unimaginable 
consequences’  and ‘collateral  damage’ unless  the  tenant  was  evicted from  the property and 
district. After the HKJA chairperson had reported the cases to the police, the situation came 

15 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28734. 
16 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28893. 
17  https://www.cato.org/human-freedom-index/2024. 
18 https://freedomhouse.org/country/hong-kong/freedom-world/2024. 
19 https://rsf.org/en/index. 
20 https://hkja.org.hk/en/press-release/press-freedom-in-hong-kong-at-11-year-low-according-to-media-survey-amid-fears-over-article-23-
national-security-law/. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
under  control.  Harassment  of  individual  journalists  nevertheless  again  resumed  towards  the 
end of the year. 

On 24 September 2024, the High Court heard a judicial review case launched by  the HKJA 
concerning  a  new  rule  restricting  journalists’  access  to  a  public  register  managed  by  the 
Transport Department. The trade union questioned the consistency of the new rule with the 
principle of press freedom. As of 31 December, no ruling had been handed down.  

Following  the  adoption  of  the  Article  23  legislation,  the  Wall  Street  Journal  announced  on 
2 May 2024 its decision to shift its Asia headquarters from Hong Kong to Singapore. In July, 
the Wall Street Journal dismissed a reporter after her election as the chairperson of the HKJA. 

Local media frequently aligned with the official stance of the Hong Kong government when 
reporting news. Mainstream media, for instance, avoided addressing William Lai as ‘President 
of Taiwan’, reverting to terms like ‘Taiwan’s leader’ or ‘Taiwan’s Lai’ instead. This marked a 
departure from four years ago when mainstream media still referred to then-incumbent Tsai 
Ing-wen as ‘President of Taiwan’. 

The  Hong Kong authorities continued to  use immigration rules  to  bar entry to  the SAR for 
journalists considered as unfavourable and activists for press freedom21. On 10 April 2024, a 
representative from Reporters without Borders of Polish nationality was detained for six hours 
and denied entry into Hong Kong on arrival to the territory, where she had planned to monitor 
the  trial  against  media  entrepreneur  Jimmy  Lai.  In  August,  a  mainland-based  Bloomberg 
journalist,  who  had  planned  to  relocate  to  Hong  Kong,  was  denied  a  work  visa.  On 
14 September, a French photojournalist was denied entry into Hong Kong, likely in relation to 
a photo she had taken of the jailed Jimmy Lai for the Associated Press.  

In 2024, a reporter who specialised in Chinese defence policy and diplomacy at the South China 
Morning Post was still missing after covering the Beijing Xiangshan Forum in October 2023.  

In  more  positive  news,  on  4  September,  the  Court  of  Appeal  upheld  a  lower  court  ruling 
refusing to reinstate the warning issued by the Communications Authority against ‘Headliner’, 
a now-discontinued satirical programme produced by RTHK, Hong Kong’s public broadcaster. 

Freedom  of  expression  also  came  under  further  strain  in  2024.  Starting  from  15 May, 
YouTube blocked local access to 32 videos related to the protest song ‘Glory to Hong Kong’. 
The decision came after the High Court granted the government an interim injunction to ban 
the song, which, according to the authorities, ‘has been used to incite others’ to commit national 
security offences such as secession and sedition.  

The space for critical artists and independent cultural institutions shrunk further in 2024.  

Artists, such as pro-democracy film makers, are facing funding cuts and political pressure. On 
24 October 2024, independent film organisation Ying e Chi announced its disbandment, and 
one of its founders moved to Taiwan in August to restart the institution, citing a ‘relatively 
freer environment’ in Taiwan. The institution distributed controversial political documentaries, 

21 In the past year, the Hong Kong government also refused entry to activists. On 27 June, a Japanese activist was denied entry. On 8 September, 
a German activist was denied entry. Immediately before entering Hong Kong, the German activist travelled to mainland China. He worked 
with the Tibet Initiative Deutschland, which advocated for self-determination in the Chinese region, and co-founded Freiheit für Hongkong, 
an NGO that worked towards a democratic, free Hong Kong.    

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
such as the award winning ‘Lost in the Fumes’. On 17 December, the Hong Kong Federation 
of Drama Societies announced that, for the second year in a row, the Hong Kong government’s 
Leisure and Cultural  Services Department  would  not  provide  a  venue for the annual  drama 
award ceremony scheduled for April 2025. On the same day, the Hong Kong Federation of 
Drama Societies also said that the Hong Kong government’s Arts Development Council would 
not provide monetary support for the ceremony for the second year in a row. Documents from 
two years ago showed that the Council was dissatisfied with the invitation to the ceremony in 
previous years of an independent journalist and a satirical cartoonist as award presenters.  

2024 also saw several last-minute cancellations of concerts by performing artists sympathetic 
to  the  pro-democracy  movement.  For  example,  on  4  December,  the  Hong  Kong  Festival 
Orchestra announced that its performance scheduled for 8 December had to be cancelled due 
to an ‘emergency check-up and repairing work’ at the Tsuen Wan Town Hall. Separately, the 
performance of ‘Accidental Death of an Anarchist’, scheduled for 21 February to 2 March, was 
cancelled on 5 February. On 30 January, theatre troupe ‘Fire Makes Us Human’ lost venues it 
had secured from a school for plays scheduled between 2 and 4 February. The troupe’s founder 
explained  that  the  school  made  the  decision  as  the  Education  Bureau  cited  the  ‘National 
Security: Specific Measures for Schools’ guidelines. The founder said that he had been accused 
of publishing ‘inappropriate comments’ online. The group later announced it would suspend 
operations. 

On 31 March, independent bookstore Mount Zero shut down, citing constant pressure from the 
authorities. On 20 August, another bookstore, Mellow Out, also shut down.  

There has been no sign of a recovery of freedom of assembly for peaceful protests. While 
scattered small-scale protests occasionally took place outside of the government headquarters 
in 2024, there were no larger protests. Most notably, in October, calls by a former Secretary 
for Transport and Housing for the government to allow for peaceful protest and assembly to 
‘reverse the negative image’ of the SAR were dismissed by Hong Kong’s Chief Executive. 

The  pro-Beijing  Hong  Kong  Federation  of  Trade  Unions  and  the  pro-Beijing  Federation  of 
Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions separately confirmed in 2024 that they would not 
organise protests on 1 May (Labour Day) for the second year running. Separately, four protests 
by pro-Beijing groups criticising EU statements on political developments in Hong Kong took 
place outside the EU Office in Hong Kong.  

In 2024, the formerly large-scale candlelight vigil in Victoria Park on 4 June to commemorate 
the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, originally organised by the civil society group Hong Kong 
Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements, did not take place for the fifth year in 
a row. The presence of representatives of the EU Office and EU Member State consulates at 
Victoria Park on the night of 4 June was widely reported in local media. The EU Office also 
again placed candles in its office windows on the day as a sign of remembrance. On that day, 
the police arrested four people, aged between 23 and 69, and granted them bail.  

Freedom of association also continued to  come under pressure in 2024. On 23 July, the 
Hong  Kong  Christian  Institute  announced  its  disbandment,  explaining  that  the  current 
environment had made it difficult to realise its mission ‘freely.’ The group used to be a member 
of the now-dissolved Civil Human Rights Front and the Hong Kong Alliance. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rights-based civil society groups still active in the city continued to face pressure. Institutional 
and anonymous harassment of civil society actors, similar to practices described by the HKJA, 
was widespread. Such harassment also involved other government departments such as the tax 
authorities or the fire-security authorities. The drying up of both public and private funds for 
some NGOs was a further concern in 2024. Nevertheless, civil society actors still active in the 
city showed remarkable resilience, exploring ways to navigate within the remaining space and 
– where possible – expand it.  

The issue of prisoners’ rights continued to be a cause of concern. Chow Hang-tung, the 
detained pro-democracy activist and member of the Hong Kong Alliance,  had to repeatedly 
face solitary confinement in 2024. 

In January, a prison guard and four inmates of the Pik Uk Correctional Institution were charged 
with  ‘wounding  with  intent’  an  18-year-old  inmate,  who  was  not  a  political  prisoner.  The 
Correctional Services Department officer was reported as causing anal laceration and rectal 
perforation. In June, a retired officer was charged in the same case for failing to flag the attack. 

In the 2023 annual report on visits by justices of the peace, published in September 2024, the 
justices of the peace – community leaders appointed with a primary role to visit various penal 
institutions  to  ensure  the  rights  of  inmates  –  received  and  handled  71  complaints,  a  69% 
increase from the previous year.  

Academic freedom also continued to come under pressure. Self-censorship was widespread, 
in particular in the social sciences and the humanities. Critical academic voices were sidelined. 
In the 80-page study entitled We Can’t Write the Truth Anymore: Academic Freedom in Hong 
Kong  Under  the  National  Security  Law  published  on  24  September,  two  US-based  human 
rights groups, Human Rights Watch and the Hong Kong Democracy Council, argued that the 
city’s national security legislation had sweeping effects on university campuses. 2024 saw the 
merging  of  several  social  science  departments  at  Hong  Kong  universities  at  the  expense  of 
‘political science’. In August, the Chinese University of Hong Kong restructured its 54-year-
old Government and Public Administration Department, downgrading it to a programme and 
merging it into the new School of Governance and Policy Science. The City University of Hong 
Kong also made changes, renaming its Public Policy and Politics undergraduate programme to 
Public Affairs and Management.  

Hopeful signs of progress on the rights of LGBTIQ+ people in Hong Kong continued to 
emerge  in  2024.  In  September  2023,  the  Court  of  Final  Appeal  ruled  that  Hong  Kong’s 
discriminatory  housing  policies  and  inheritance  laws  based  on  sexual  orientation  are 
unconstitutional, marking another milestone for the rights of LGBTIQ+ people in Hong Kong. 
Despite  a  pro-Beijing  lawmaker’s  proposal  to  call  on  Beijing  to  overturn  the  decision,  the 
Department of Justice confirmed on 6 December that the ‘legal disputes should be resolved 
locally’. 

On 29 April, transgender activist Henry Tse received a new identity card, after he successfully 
updated its gender marker following a series of lawsuits over a span of seven years against the 
city’s administration. 

In September 2023, the Court of Final Appeal had ruled that it was the government’s obligation 
to provide an alternative framework to protect same-sex partnerships within the next two years. 
In  May  2024,  Secretary  for  Constitutional  and  Mainland  Affairs  acknowledged  that  the 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
authorities were studying the ‘complex’ issue. Meanwhile, a media report published on 18 June 
showed that the Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau had cut half of its funding to civil 
society  groups  supporting  sexual  minority  groups  under  the  Equal  Opportunities  (Sexual 
Orientation) Funding Scheme.  

Freedom of religion remained largely protected in 2024, although there are signs of further 
alignment of policy in this area with political expectations. In a report entitled Hostile Takeover: 
The CCP (China Communist Party) and Hong Kong’s Religious Communities published on 
30 January 2024,  the  US-based  Committee  for  Freedom  in  Hong  Kong  Foundation 
acknowledged  that  ‘religious  persecution  in  Hong  Kong  has  not  been  as  serious  as  it  is  in 
mainland  China’.  However,  religious  leaders  in  the  SAR  were  being  pressured  to  promote 
priorities of the Communist Party, including accepting national security enforcement. For the 
second year in a row, an Anglican church displayed the Chinese national flag on the 1 October 
National Day, drawing criticism from churchgoers.  

Regarding  asylum  seekers,  on  5 November,  the  Secretary  for  Security  revealed  that  the 
government  of  Hong  Kong  had  set  a  target  of  repatriating,  every  year,  at  least  1  320 
‘unsubstantiated non-refoulement claimants’. The situation of asylum seekers in Hong Kong 
remains precarious, as Hong Kong is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Civil society organisations supporting asylum 
seekers came under pressure in 2024. 

On  labour  rights,  the  Labour  Advisory  Board  reached  a  consensus  in  2024  to  set  the  new 
threshold  for  ‘continuous  contract’  employment  at  68  hours  in  4  weeks  to  extend  statutory 
benefits  to  more  employees22.  Labour  organisations  have  reported  a  year-on-year  surge  in 
work-related accidents, especially in logistics and warehouses. The Association for the Rights 
of Industrial Accident Victims reported 19 deaths and 6 serious injuries across 25 incidents in 
2024, as compared with just 5 accidents in these sectors in 2023. 

Hong  Kong’s  400  000  migrant  domestic  workers  remained  a  vulnerable  group,  despite  the 
relatively advanced (by international standards) legal framework governing them, as well as 
their  continued  access  to  justice  and  medical  cover.  The  Hong  Kong  Federation  of  Asian 
Domestic Workers Unions revealed that it had dealt with 13 cases of foreign domestic workers 
who were pressured to work despite falling sick in 2024. In one case, a domestic worker from 
the Philippines was pressured by her employer not to seek chemotherapy. 

Hong Kong authorities have not published official data on the percentage of the population 
living  under  the  poverty  line  since  2021,  the  last  year  when  an  official  poverty  line  was 
determined. According to the  Chief Executive’s  Policy Address  delivered in  October 2024, 
there  were  around  110  000  households  in  Hong  Kong  living  in  subdivided  flats  in  2024. 
Legislation to regulate such housing and improve living conditions for tenants is expected to 
be tabled in 2025 at the earliest. 

II. 

Economic developments 

Hong Kong exercises independent authority in implementing commercial agreements, and sets 
monetary policy autonomously from mainland China. In 2024 Hong Kong remained a separate 
legal jurisdiction from mainland China in particular on issues of economic policy. It maintained 

22 The amendment bill will be tabled in the first half of 2025.  

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a separate currency not limited by capital limitations, as well as separate regulatory structures 
to supervise companies operating in the territory. The priorities of the government during the 
year were to: (i) reach out to the world, including the Middle East and Asian markets; (ii) attract 
skilled workers and companies to Hong Kong; (iii) support the economy and innovation; and 
(iv) continue economic integration with mainland China.  

Hong Kong ranked as the world’s fourth largest destination for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in 2023 according to the World Investment Report 2024 issued by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development23. The latest survey on foreign companies by the Hong 
Kong government indicates that the number of foreign companies in the territory increased in 
2024, surpassing the number in place pre-COVID-19, with the EU remaining the largest non-
Chinese  business  community  in  Hong  Kong.  The  European  Union  business  presence  has 
recorded a notable increase, with a 5.9% increase year on year in the number of companies in 
Hong Kong in 2024, or a 2.3% increase in comparison to 2019. At least 1 640 EU companies 
were active in Hong Kong in 2024. Half of these EU companies use the city as their regional 
headquarters or regional offices, which constitutes a decrease of 9.8% from 2019.  

Hong Kong’s  economy is  dominated by services (accounting for  94% of GDP), including 
financial services and logistics, while manufacturing accounts for only a fraction of GDP (1%). 
Hong Kong is one of the world’s top trading economies (ranking seventh in the WTO’s World 
Trade Statistical Review 2023, the latest available data at the time of writing24). Trade in goods, 
largely re-exports, accounts for about 299% of GDP, indicating the openness of the economy 
for trade25.  

Hong Kong’s population reached 7.53 million as of mid-2024, an increase of 0.1% from the 
end of 2023 and 0.2% on the level reached just before the COVID-19 pandemic (end-2019). 
About 170 000 residents left Hong Kong during the pandemic26. 

Hong Kong’s economy grew for the second consecutive year in 2024, with a 2.5% increase 
in GDP year on year27, after a 3.2% increase in 2023. The growth rate was in the lower range 
of the government forecast in the 2024-2025 Budget (released in February 2024) for a GDP 
expansion of 2.5-3.5% for the full year. Economic growth was supported by: (i) increases in 
external trade in goods and services, the logistics sector and construction; and (ii) a gradual 
recovery  of  the  financial  industry  during  the  year.  However,  private  consumption  fell,  and 
industries exposed to tourist spending continue to underperform compared with pre-pandemic 
times.  

23 Website of UNCTAD: 
https://unctad.org/publication/world-investment-report-2024.  
24 World Trade Statistical Review 2023 by the World Trade Organization: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtsr_2023_e.htm.     
25 Ratio of value of total external trade to GDP, calculated using GDP and external trade statistics (first nine months of 2024) from the 
Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/scode250.html   
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/scode230.html.    
26 The Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/web_table.html?id=110-01001.  
27 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2025/02/20250203/20250203_163405_486.html.  

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inflation remained moderate in 2024, with an annual 1.7% increase in the consumer price 
index during the year28. The unemployment rate  was 3.1% for the full year 2024, a slight 
increase from 2.9% in 202329. 

The trade and logistics sector – which accounts for 19% of Hong Kong’s GDP – recovered 
during the year. GDP from import and export activities grew by 2.6% year on year in the first 
9 months of 202430 (after a contraction of 4.4% in the full year of 2023) and the value of Hong 
Kong’s external trade in goods increased by 7.3% to HK$9.46 trillion (EUR1.2 trillion31) in 
the year32 (after a decline of 6.7% in 2023). Hong Kong’s position as a trading hub for goods 
is largely supported by its role as a transit and re-export centre for mainland China.  

The financial industry (about one quarter of Hong Kong’s GDP but only employing 7.2% of 
the workforce) grew by 0.4% year on year in the first 9 months of 2024, after two consecutive 
years of decline in 2022 and 202333. The number of initial public offerings (IPOs)  further 
decreased to 71 in 2024, from 73 in 2023 and 90 in 2022. However, the total amount raised 
through IPOs surged by 88.9% year on year to HK$87.5 billion (EUR10.7 billion). Hong Kong 
was the world’s fourth largest hub for IPOs by value in 2024, up from eighth in 2023 (Hong 
Kong ranked fourth in 2022 and 2021, second in 2020 and first in 2019).  

During  the  year,  the  Hong  Kong  Hang  Seng  Index  rebounded  by  17.7%,  while  market 
capitalisation  on  the  Hong  Kong  Stock  Exchange  increased  by  13.8%  to  HK$35.3  trillion 
(EUR4.3 trillion). Average daily market turnover increased by 25.5% year on year to HK$132 
billion (EUR16.1 billion)34. The Hang Seng Index increased by 3.9% in the first half of 2024 
and  by  13.2%  in  the  second  half.  The  rebound  in  the  second  half  was  supported  by  lower 
interest rates in the US and Hong Kong and by economic stimulus measures in mainland China 
(mainland Chinese companies account for 80% of Hong Kong’s stock market capitalisation). 
As of the end of October 2024, Hong Kong was  the world’s eighth largest  and Asia’s fifth 
largest  stock  market  by  market  capitalisation  and  the  world’s  largest  offshore  renminbi 
business hub.  

Tourism and industries exposed to tourist spending are yet to recover to their level of 2018, 
which  was  the  last  ‘normal’  year  for  tourism  flows  to  Hong  Kong  before  the  start  of  the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Hong Kong welcomed 44.5 million visitors in 2024, a 30.9% increase 
year on year but this was only 68% of the number of visitors in 201835. Visitors from mainland 
China accounted for 76.5% of the total, or 34 million. Tourists coming to Hong Kong are now 
spending less than they did in the past, and in the first nine months of 2024 (the latest period 
for which data are available), visitors spent about 17% less per capita than they did in 2018. 
Combined  with  fewer  arrivals,  this  resulted  in  a 41%  drop  in  monthly  spending  by  visitors 

28 The Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/web_table.html?id=510-60001.  
29 The Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/web_table.html?id=210-06101#.  
30 The Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/web_table.html?id=310-34501#.  
31 Converted to EUR with 1 EUR = 8.2 HKD (as of end of December 2024) 
https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/procedures-guidelines-tenders/information-contractors-and-beneficiaries/exchange-rate-
inforeuro_en.  
32 The Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/web_table.html?id=410-50001#.  
33 The Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/web_table.html?id=310-34501#. 
34 Market statistics, website of Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Limited 
https://www.hkex.com.hk/Market-Data/Statistics/Consolidated-Reports/HKEX-Monthly-Market-Highlights?sc_lang=en.   
35 Visitor Arrivals to Hong Kong; Hong Kong Tourism Board  
https://partnernet.hktb.com/en/research_statistics/tourism_statistics_database/index.html.  

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
when compared with 2018, to HK$16.1 billion (EUR 2 billion). Industries exposed to tourist 
spending (which include the retail, food and beverage, transport, travel and hospitality sectors) 
were also affected by both the only-partial recovery in visitor arrivals and reduced spending. 
In the first 9 months of 2024, GDP from  the accommodation and food services industries 
dropped by 3.4% year on year and was 26.2% lower than in the same period of 2019. GDP 
from wholesale and retail sales dropped by 11.1% in the same period and was 44.6% lower 
than in 2019. The drop in retail sales and food services was also exacerbated by increased flows 
of residents travelling to the neighbouring city of Shenzhen for shopping and leisure.  

Aviation  and  related  industries  continued  to  recover  in  2024,  but  numbers  of  flights  and 
passengers at Hong Kong International Airport remained below pre-pandemic levels. In 2024, 
the number of flights into and out of Hong Kong increased by 31.6% to 363 309 and passengers 
by 34.5% to 53.0 million, but were still respectively 13.5% and 25.7% lower than in 2019. Air 
cargo freight increased by 14.1% year on year to 4.9 million tonnes in 2024 (also 4.2% above 
2019)36. The opening  of  a third runway  at Hong  Kong airport  in  2024 will increase  annual 
cargo freight capacity to 10 million tonnes and annual passenger numbers to 120 million. 

The construction  and  real  estate  industries  saw increases  in  their contributions to  GDP  of 
7.3% and 0.7% respectively in the first 9 months of the year. Property prices decreased and 
office vacancy rates increased during the year, but Hong Kong still remained one of the most 
expensive cities in the world to buy or rent an apartment or to buy or rent an office.  

The SAR’s linked exchange rate system remained in place during the year, within a band of 
HK$7.75-7.85 to one US dollar. Foreign currency reserve assets were mostly stable, ending 
2024 at USD 421.4 billion, down slightly from USD 425.6 billion at the end of 202337.  

Hong Kong is expected to run a fiscal deficit for the 2024-2025 financial year (ending in 
March  2025).  This  would  be  the  SAR’s  fifth  deficit  in  six  years,  unusual  for  an  economy 
accustomed to recording fiscal surpluses. The  budget presented in February 2024 forecast a 
consolidated  deficit  for  the  financial  year  2024-2025  of  HK$144  billion  (EUR17.6 billion), 
equivalent  to  about  4.5%  of  Hong  Kong’s  GDP,  excluding  proceeds  from  the  issuing  of 
government bonds. The government later warned that the deficit would be noticeably higher. 
The budget was presented with the expectation that the economy would grow by 2.5% to 3.5%, 
instead of the actual 2.5% it ended up growing by.  

The deficits are funded by issuing government bonds and by tapping into Hong Kong’s 
fiscal reserves. As a result, the fiscal reserves decreased to HK$664 billion (EUR80.9 billion) 
in December 2024, a decrease of 4.1% year on year and a drop of 43.3% from HK$1.2 trillion 
in  March  201938.  Reserves  are  now  equivalent  to  an  estimated  11  months  of  expenditure, 
compared with 24 months in 2019. In the same period (March 2019 to December 2024), Hong 
Kong’s government debt increased from HK$1.5 billion to HK$293 billion (EUR35.7 billion), 
or 9.2% of GDP, due to the issuing of bonds.  

Business environment  

36 Website of the Civil Aviation Department of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region  
https://www.cad.gov.hk/english/statistics.html. 
37 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202501/07/P2025010700388.htm. 
38 Website of The Treasury, Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
https://www.try.gov.hk/internet/ehpubl_acco_monfinancial.html.  

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The long-lasting impact of the strict COVID-19 restrictions continued to be felt on the local 
economy, even though they were lifted two years ago. This impact includes a continuation of 
the reduced numbers of flights and passengers at Hong Kong airport and underperformance in 
tourism  and  related  industries.  The  restrictions,  including  on  overseas  travel,  had  made 
operating  a  regional  headquarters  in  Hong  Kong  more  complicated,  and  the  number  of 
international companies with their regional headquarters in Hong Kong has still not recovered 
to pre-pandemic levels (although half of EU companies present in Hong Kong are still regional 
headquarters). The strict anti COVID-19 rules also eroded the reputation of Hong Kong as a 
business centre and a centre for overseas talent.  

Political and legal developments in Hong Kong, including implementation of the national 
security legislation, freedom of information, data privacy and sanctions also helped to diminish 
Hong Kong’s standing as an international business hub for overseas companies and talent. 

The  international  business  community  considers  it  important  that  Hong  Kong  remains  an 
open economy as well as an open and vibrant international society, with advantages such as 
the free circulation of capital and of information, the safety of data, and access to a diversified 
pool of talent. While these advantages still remain largely in place, some international firms 
have departed to other regional hubs.  

Despite these challenges, many in the business sector continue to perceive Hong Kong as a 
competitive business centre. Some of the advantages of being based in Hong Kong include: 
(i) a simple and low tax system;  (ii) free movement  of capital  and full convertibility  of the 
Hong  Kong  dollar;  (iii)  the  common-law  system;  (iv)  low  corruption;  (v)  the  geographical 
location; and (vi) connectivity and access to mainland China.  

Attracting  talent  and  companies  back  to  Hong  Kong  remained  a  policy  priority  of  the 
government during the year. The labour force increased by 0.3% year on year, to 3.83 million 
workers at the end of 2024, but this was still 3.5% below the pre-pandemic and pre-NSL level 
(3.97 million). During  the year,  most  of the  workers attracted to  Hong  Kong under various 
government  talent  schemes  were  mainland  Chinese  nationals  (e.g.  98%  of  the  applications 
approved under the Quality Migrant Admission Scheme; 92% under the Technology Talent 
Admission Scheme; and 95% under the Top Talent Pass Scheme).  

The  government  announced  in  November  2024  that  the  Office  for  Attracting  Strategic 
Enterprises had attracted a total of 57 strategic companies to Hong Kong since it commenced 
operations in December 202239, mostly coming from mainland China and to a lesser degree 
from other parts of the world (including Europe). 

A  recent  annual  survey  of  foreign  companies  in  Hong  Kong  conducted  by  the  Hong  Kong 
Census  and  Statistics  Department 40  indicated  that  the  number  of  foreign  companies 
(excluding mainland Chinese companies) increased in 2024 by 7.0% compared with 2023, to 
a  historical  high  of  7 340.  According  to  the  survey,  the  number  of  foreign  companies  also 
recovered to above pre-pandemic levels, with an increase of 1.4% from 2019. However, foreign 
companies were also smaller, with 49.5 staff members on average per company, down 4.4% 

39 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202411/11/P2024111100391.htm.  
40 Report on Annual Survey of Companies in Hong Kong with Parent Companies Located outside Hong Kong, the Census and Statistics 
Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2024 edition): 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/wbr.html?ecode=B11100042024AN24&scode=360.    

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
on 2023 (51.8 staff members) and 9.2% on 2019 (54.5)41. The number of foreign (non-Chinese) 
companies having their regional headquarters in the SAR remained noticeably lower, with a 
decrease of 17.8% from 2019, despite a slight rebound year on year (up 1.0% from 2023). In 
the meantime, the number of mainland Chinese companies based in Hong Kong surged by 
20.3% year on year in 2024 and by 45.6% when compared with 2019 (they now account for 
26.3% of non-Hong Kong companies, up from 19.9% in 2019).  

In his annual policy address on 16 October 2024, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive proposed 
policies  to  improve  the  development  of  Hong  Kong’s  economy.  These  policies  include:  (i) 
consolidating the SAR’s status as a financial, shipping and trading hub; (ii) promoting Hong 
Kong as an innovation and technology (I&T) centre; and (iii) reviving the tourism sector. The 
policy address further proposed to nurture local talent and further attract talent, companies and 
start-ups  from  overseas.  The  policy  address  also  said  that  Hong  Kong  would  continue  the 
development of the Northern Metropolis area in the New Territories of Hong Kong and seek 
closer  integration  with  the  Greater  Bay  Area  conurbation  of  Hong  Kong,  Macau  and 
Guangdong. Other initiatives mentioned in the policy address included: (i) strengthening Hong 
Kong  as  a  legal  and  dispute  resolution  centre  and  as  a  property  trading  centre;  and  (ii) 
promoting  the  digitalisation  of  Hong  Kong’s  economy.  Finally,  the  policy  address  made 
announcements of plans to address the scarcity and high-cost of properties by: (i) increasing 
land supply and public housing units; and (ii) regulating the renting of subdivided residential 
units.  

To  promote  Hong  Kong  as  an  international  finance  centre,  the  government  is  pursuing 
policies  such  as:  (i)  deepening  mutual  market  access  with  mainland  China;  (ii)  further 
developing offshore renminbi activities and promoting the internationalisation of the renminbi 
(including  providing  more  renminbi-denominated  investment  products);  (iii)  strengthening 
Hong  Kong  as  a  centre  for  risk  management,  asset  management  and  wealth  management 
(including private equity and family offices); (iv) expanding overseas networks (with a focus 
on the Middle East and ASEAN); and (v) attracting more companies to list on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. During 2024, amendments were made to the listing application process42, to 
corporate  governance  rules 43  and  to  the  treasury  share  regime 44 ,  all  of  which  aimed  to 
encourage more companies to list in Hong Kong. In addition, Hong Kong in 2024 recognised 
both the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange and the Dubai Financial Market as recognised stock 
exchanges45 to support secondary listings in Hong Kong of companies whose primary listings 
were on these two bourses. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong also announced plans to open 
an office in Riyadh. The New Capital  Investment Entrant Scheme was open for application 
from March to attract more capital. It offers eligible individuals the opportunity to migrate to 
Hong  Kong  under  the  condition  of  making  investments  in  Hong  Kong  of  at  least  HKD  30 
million. Promoting green finance and financial technologies (FinTech) are also key priorities 
for the government. 

41 Ratios calculated by the European Union Office, using data from the Annual Survey of Companies in Hong Kong with Parent Companies 
Located outside Hong Kong.  
42 Joint statement on enhanced timeframe for new listing application process https://www.hkex.com.hk/News/Regulatory-
Announcements/2024/241018news?sc_lang=en.  
43 Press release by Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited: 
 https://www.hkex.com.hk/News/Regulatory-Announcements/2024/2412192news?sc_lang=en.  
44 Press release by Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited: 
https://www.hkex.com.hk/News/Regulatory-Announcements/2024/240412news?sc_lang=en.  
45 Press release by Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited:  
https://www.hkex.com.hk/News/Regulatory-Announcements/2024/240719news?sc_lang=en.  

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
On  green  finance,  the  Hong  Kong  Monetary  Authority  (HKMA)  issued  the  Hong  Kong 
Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance in May. It encompasses 12 economic activities under four 
sectors,  namely  power  generation,  transportation,  construction,  and  water  and  waste 
management. According to the HKMA, the taxonomy was designed by making reference to – 
and  with  the  goal  of  facilitating  easy  navigation  with  –  the  EU-China  Common  Ground 
Taxonomy and the EU’s Taxonomy (amongst others)46. In December 2024, the government 
issued its Roadmap on Sustainability Disclosure47, which expressed the goal of Hong Kong 
adopting the standards of the International Sustainability Standards Board no later than 2028. 
The Hong Kong government also continued in 2024 to issue additional green bonds under the 
government’s green bond programme launched in 2018. 

A subsidy scheme for proof-of-concept of green and sustainable FinTech was launched in June 
to  provide  funding  support  for  green  FinTech 48.  In  October,  Hong  Kong  issued  a  policy 
statement  on  the  application  of  artificial  intelligence  (AI)  in  the  financial  market 49 .  In 
December, the government published a bill for a regulatory regime for issuers of fiat-referenced 
stablecoins50. During the year, the HKMA continued to test and explore the use of central bank 
digital  currencies,  both  in  Hong  Kong  and  for  cross-boundary  payments.  In  addition,  five 
operators  of  virtual-asset  trading  platforms  were  granted  a  licence  under  Hong  Kong’s 
Securities and Futures Commission’s new licensing regime for virtual-asset trading platforms, 
which  came  into  force  in  202351.  In  December,  the  Hong  Kong  government  informed  the 
Global  Forum  on  Transparency  &  Exchange  of  Information  for  Tax  Purposes  of  the 
Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  of  its  commitment  to 
implementing the Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF)52. 

The Chief Executive’s Policy Address also spoke of plans to improve Hong Kong’s status as 
an international centre for aviation, trade and shipping. These include plans to: (i) expand 
Hong Kong’s trade network; (ii) promote high value added maritime and supply-chain services; 
(iii)  build  a  ‘smart  port’  and  (iv)  promote  green  shipping.  An  additional  focus  of  the 
government  is  to  further  develop  commodity  trading  and  gold  trading  in  particular.  In 
November, the government issued an action plan on promoting the supply of green maritime 
fuels53, while the Hong Kong Sustainable Aviation Fuel Coalition released a policy whitepaper 
for a sustainable aviation fuel strategy54. The same month, Hong Kong International Airport 
opened its third runway55, with the goal of expanding annual capacity to 120 million passengers 
and 10 million tonnes of cargo within 10 years.  

46 Press release by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority: 
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2024/05/20240503-3/. 
47 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/12/20241210/20241210_140433_513.html. 
48 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/06/20240628/20240628_153810_154.html.  
49 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202410/28/P2024102800154.htm.  
50 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202412/06/P2024120500406.htm.  
51 Website of the Securities and Futures Commission 
https://www.sfc.hk/en/Welcome-to-the-Fintech-Contact-Point/Virtual-assets/Virtual-asset-trading-platforms-operators/Lists-of-virtual-asset-
trading-platforms.  
52 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/12/20241213/20241213_184926_513.html. 
53 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202411/15/P2024111500574.htm.  
54 Website of the Business Environment Council https://bec.org.hk/sites/default/files/publications/SAF%20Strategy%20for%20HK_0.pdf.  
55Press release by Hong Kong International Airport: 
 https://www.hongkongairport.com/en/media-centre/press-release/2024/pr_1763.  

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
in 

including 

innovation  and  technology  centre, 

During the year, Hong Kong’s government proceeded with plans to further develop Hong Kong 
into  an 
the  areas  of:  (i)  ‘new 
industrialisation’(encouraging the use of innovation and technologies to develop competitive 
manufacturing and production activities in Hong Kong); (ii) medical and health innovation; 
(iii)  developing  a  low-altitude  economy  (economic  activities  and  industries  operating  in  air 
space  up  to  1  000  metres);  (iv)  aerospace  technology;  and  (v)  new  energy.  The  2024-2025 
budget (released in February 2024) earmarked about HK$24 billion (EUR2.9 billion) for these 
new initiatives. A Digital Policy Office was launched in July56 and a HK$10 billion (EUR1.2 
billion) new industrialisation acceleration scheme, was launched in September to encourage 
the set-up of ‘smart’ production facilities57. An Artificial Intelligence Supercomputing Centre 
commenced  operation  in  December 58 .  Additional  funding  was  announced  for  setting  up 
research institutes in the areas of life sciences and health technology. The number of start-ups 
in the SAR increased by 10% year on year in 2024, to 4 694, according to the government59. 

Work  to  develop  the  Northern  Metropolis  continued.  This  development  zone  north  of 
Kowloon will include residential districts, an I&T zone, a logistics hub and connecting railway 
infrastructure with the rest of Hong Kong and Shenzhen, and will further integrate Hong Kong 
with the Greater Bay Area. Chief Executive John Lee in the 2024 policy address referred to the 
Northern Metropolis as the new engine of Hong Kong’s economic development. The policy 
address said that development of the Northern Metropolis would also be expedited in 2024, 
while maintaining a prudent fiscal position. A new process was announced in 2024 under which 
large plots of land  (10 to 20 hectares) will collectively  be developed by  successful bidding 
developers, with the purpose of speeding-up development and enabling coordinated design. A 
development  conceptual  framework  will  be  published  in  the  first  half  of  2026  for  the 
development of a university town in the zone (for which 80 hectares of land are earmarked), 
for post-secondary institutions and research collaboration with mainland China and overseas, 
and 60 000 housing units are planned to be built in the Northern Metropolis over the next five 
years.  

The Northern Metropolis also plays an important role for developing I&T. A goal of the Hong 
Kong government is to advance the development of the San Tin Technopole (an I&T zone) 
including by delivering new I&T sites in phases beginning in 2026-2027. In November, the 
Hong Kong government published an outline of its development plans for the area60 setting out 
how  it  would  further  develop  the  Hong  Kong  Park  in  the  Northern  Metropolis  (the  park, 
together with  the Shenzhen Park, forms  the Shenzhen‑Hong Kong Science and Technology 
Innovation Cooperation  Zone). One  aspect  of this work  will be  to facilitate cross-boundary 
flows  of  personnel,  materials,  funding  and  data.  In  April,  the  Hong  Kong  Park  signed 
memoranda of understanding with some 60 companies which showed an interest in the Park, 
with  about  a  quarter  of  these  companies  coming  from  overseas61.  The  2024  policy  address 

56 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202407/25/P2024072400394.htm.  
57 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202409/16/P2024091600176.htm.  
58 Press release of Cybeport: 
https://www.cyberport.hk/files/675749ae9d5c5006010568/[Press%20Release]%20Cyberport%20Artificial%20Intelligence%20Supercompu
ting%20Centre%20Officially%20Commences%20Operations.pdf.  
59Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:   
https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/12/20241227/20241227_123331_719.html. 
60 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202411/20/P2024112000145.htm.  
61 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:   
https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/04/20240418/20240418_151712_533.html.  

22 

 
 
 
 
 
stated  that  the  first  batch  of  tenants  –  including  those  working  in  life  sciences,  health 
technology, AI and data science – could begin to move in in 2025.  

Another large development project is the construction of the Kau Yi Chau Artificial Islands 
project west of Hong Kong island (the project covers 1 000 ha, which will be developed for 
new  residential  and  business  districts).  In  December,  an  environmental  impact  assessment 
report was submitted setting out the reclamation work required62.  

On environmental policies, a ban on single-use plastics commenced in April63 and included 
products  such  as  disposable  plastic  tableware,  plastic  cutlery  and  plastic  toothbrushes  in 
restaurant and hotels. In May, the government deferred64, during its trial phase, a fee-charging 
scheme for municipal solid waste, which aimed to reduce waste disposal and increase waste 
recovery. A report by the Environment Protection Department in December65 showed that 67% 
of Hong Kong’s municipal solid waste was disposed of in landfills. The remaining 33% (1.97 
million tonnes) was recovered, of which 1.52 million tonnes were exported outside of Hong 
Kong for  recycling and  0.45 million  tonnes were recycled locally.  In June, the government 
released a strategy for developing the hydrogen economy66 and in December it announced a 
roadmap67 to promote electric buses and taxis and expand electric charging facilities.  

Trade policy  

Hong  Kong  has  nine  free  trade  agreements  (FTAs).  These  are  with  mainland  China  (the 
China Economic Partnership Agreement or CEPA, June 2003 and enhanced thereafter), New 
Zealand  (March  2010),  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Free  Trade  Association  (June 
2011), Chile (September 2012), Macao (October 2017), the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN, November 2017), Georgia (June 2018), Australia (March 2019) and Peru 
(November  2024).  Hong  Kong  has  also  signed  24  investment  promotion  and  protection 
agreements  (IPPAs)  with  foreign  economies  (including  with  10  EU  Member  States)  and 
negotiations  have  been  concluded  (pending  signature)  for  IPPAs  with  the  Maldives  and 
Myanmar.  

In March 2024, Hong Kong and Bahrain68 signed an IPPA. In November 2024, Hong Kong 
signed an FTA with Peru69. IPPAs with Bangladesh, Egypt, Peru, Russia and Saudi Arabia are 
under negotiation. In January 2024, Hong Kong and Croatia signed a comprehensive agreement 
on the avoidance of double taxation70.  

62 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/12/20241231/20241231_150510_663.html.  
63 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202410/20/P2024102000250.htm.  
64 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.gov.hk/en/residents/environment/waste/management/mswcharging.htm.  
65 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202412/19/P2024121900251.htm.  
66 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/06/20240617/20240617_171024_544.html. 
67 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/12/20241210/20241210_170259_596.html.  
68 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202403/03/P2024030300365.htm?fontSize=1. 
69 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202411/16/P2024111600021.htm. 
70 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202401/24/P2024012400293.htm.  

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In his policy address of October 2024, the Chief Executive said that Hong Kong would continue 
to seek early accession to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership comprising 
15 countries in the Asia Pacific region. Hong Kong submitted its accession request in 2022 but 
had not joined the partnership as of end-2024. 

Economic integration with mainland China  

In October 2024, Hong Kong and mainland China signed an agreement to amend the Mainland 
and  Hong  Kong  Closer  Economic  Partnership  Arrangement  (CEPA)  on  Trade  in 
Services71.  The  agreement:  (i)  introduces  additional  liberalisation  measures  across  several 
services sectors; (ii) aims to help Hong Kong service providers establish a presence and do 
business in the mainland; and (iii) make it easier for professionals in Hong Kong to acquire the 
right to practice in mainland China. The agreement also relaxes the rules for foreign companies, 
including European Union companies, in Hong Kong so they can more easily qualify as Hong 
Kong service providers and benefit from CEPA. The CEPA Agreement on Trade in Services 
was signed in November 2015, first amended in November 2019, and complemented by the 
CEPA for Trade in Goods (signed in 2018). 

On  financial  integration  and  mutual  access,  Hong  Kong  and  mainland  China’s  capital 
markets are connected via the ‘Stock Connect’ scheme, linking the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
with its counterparts in Shanghai and Shenzhen, and the ‘Bond Connect’ mutual market access 
scheme for bond markets. This was complemented in September 2021 by the launching of the 
Cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect Scheme in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao 
Greater Bay Area (‘Cross-boundary WMC’), allowing eligible mainland Chinese, Hong Kong 
and Macao residents  to  invest in wealth-management products  distributed by banks  in  each 
other’s  market.  In  2023,  the  ‘Stock  Connect’  schemes  were  enhanced  and  the  northbound 
trading leg of the ‘Swap Connect’ scheme – a mutual access scheme connecting Hong Kong 
and Mainland interest rate swap markets –was launched. 

In January 2024, measures to update the Cross-boundary WMC were announced to: (i) refine 
the eligibility criteria of mainland investors; (ii) expand the scope of participating institutions 
(to include eligible securities firms) and eligible products; (iii) increase the individual investor 
quota; and (iv) improve promotion and sales arrangements72.  

In January 2024, the HKMA and the People’s Bank of China announced six measures to deepen 
financial cooperation73. In April,  the China Securities Regulatory Commission  announced a 
series of measures to further expand mutual access for investors between the capital markets 
of  the  mainland  and  Hong  Kong 74. The  measures  included:  (i)  expanding  eligible  equity 
exchange-traded  funds  and  including  real  estate  investment  trusts  (REITs)  under  the  Stock 
Connect programme; (ii) supporting the inclusion of the renminbi stock-trading counter under 
the  southbound  trading  leg  of  Stock  Connect  (allowing  mainland  investors  to  buy  financial 
assets in the Hong Kong stock market); (iii) improving the arrangements for mutual recognition 
of funds; and (iv) encouraging mainland companies to list in Hong Kong. In May, the People’s 
Bank  of  China,  Hong  Kong’s  Securities  and  Futures  Commission  and  the  HKMA  jointly 

71 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 
https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/aboutus/presspeech/press/2024/20241009.html.  
72 Circular by Hong Kong Monetary Authority:  
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-and-circular/2024/20240124e2.pdf.  
73 Press release by Hong Kong Monetary Authority: 
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2024/01/20240124-3/.  
74 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 
https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/04/20240419/20240419_190851_206.html.  

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
announced  an  upgrade  of  the  mutual  access  arrangements  between  the  mainland  and  Hong 
Kong interest-rate swap markets (‘Swap Connect’)75.  

On the Greater Bay Area (GBA), Hong Kong’s policies aim partly to: (i) increase economic 
integration, connectivity and the harmonisation of rules and mechanisms; (ii) facilitate the flow 
of goods and people around the GBA; and (iii) give Hong Kong residents the ability to live and 
work in the GBA. In June, the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Financial Cooperation Committee was 
established and held its first meeting76. In July, six cooperation agreements were signed at the 
occasion  of  the  24th  Plenary  of  the  Hong  Kong/Guangdong  Cooperation  Joint  Conference, 
including  cooperation  agreements  on  justice,  testing  and  certification,  food  safety  and 
healthcare. The 2024 policy address indicated that the Hong Kong government would work to 
further facilitate the recognition of professional qualifications, and promote the cross-border 
flow of data, medical cooperation and clinical trials. The policy address also announced that 
Hong Kong International Airport’s logistics park in Dongguan city in China will be further 
developed, as will collaboration with Zhuhai Airport which is located in China, west of Hong 
Kong and just north of Macao. In November, an agreement was signed between the Airport 
Authority  of  Hong  Kong  (AAHK)  and  Zhuhai  Transportation  Holdings  Group  for  an 
acquisition of 35% of the share of Zhuhai Airport by AAHK77. The policy address also stated 
that the Hong Kong Investment Corporation Limited, an investment vehicle of the Hong Kong 
government, will also explore investment in projects in the GBA. Increasing legal collaboration 
within  the  GBA  is  also  a  focus  of  government  policy.  The  policy  address  set  out  plans  to 
implement and extend measures allowing Hong Kong-invested enterprises to adopt Hong Kong 
law and to choose for arbitration to occur in Hong Kong when doing business in the GBA. In 
June,  Hong  Kong’s  Department  of  Justice  and  China’s  Supreme  People’s  Court  signed  a 
memorandum  of  understanding  on  establishing  an  interface  platform  on  judicial  and  legal 
cooperation in the GBA.  

III.  Relations between Hong Kong and mainland China  

On 18 July, the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) concluded. The Third Plenum outlined the direction for economic China’s 
future  economic  development.  Under  a  section  entitled  ‘Pursuing  High-Standard  Opening 
Up,’ the decision of the Third Plenum elaborated that ‘harnessing the institutional strengths of 
the one country, two systems policy, we (the Party) will work to consolidate and enhance Hong 
Kong’s status as an international financial, shipping, and trade centre, support Hong Kong and 
Macao  in  building  themselves  into  international  hubs  for  high-calibre  talent,  and  improve 
relevant mechanisms to see the two regions playing a greater role in China’s opening to the 
outside world. We will encourage cooperation between Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao 
in the Greater Bay Area by promoting closer alignment of rules and mechanisms.’ 

At the invitation of the Hong Kong government, Vice-Chairperson of the Constitution and Law 
Committee of China’s National People’s Congress Shen Chunyao and Secretary of the CPC 
Leadership Group of the Ministry of Commerce and the Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao 
visited Hong Kong between 26 and 27 August to explain the implications of the decision of the 

75 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202405/13/P2024051300698.htm. 
76 Press release by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202406/13/P2024061300459.htm.  
77 Press release of Hong Kong International Airport: 
https://www.hongkongairport.com/en/media-centre/press-release/2024/pr_1762.  

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third Plenum for the SAR. Both officials held a closed-door session with around 400 central 
government officials and leaders of state-owned enterprises stationed in the city and another 
closed-door meeting with 500 Hong Kong government officials and office holders. Another 
open-door session was subsequently held with around 700 representatives from the business, 
professional, education, media and youth sectors.  

Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and 
the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council Xia Baolong visited Hong 
Kong between 22 and 28 February 2024 for an inspection visit. During the visit, the Central 
Government added the mainland cities of Xi’an and Qingdao to the Individual Travel Scheme, 
allowing residents of these two cities to visit Hong Kong.  

On  28  February,  the  Chief  Executive  pointed  out  that  economic  development  and  district 
governance  were  the  two  focuses  of  Xia’s  visit.  Xia  recognised  the  work  of  the  SAR 
government and stated that China’s central government ‘fully supports’ the development of the 
city. Separately, Xia reaffirmed the work of the revamped District Council and the newly set 
up ‘community care teams’.  

15 April 2024 was National Security Education Day and marked the 10th anniversary of the 
concept of ‘a holistic approach to national security’ as proposed by President Xi Jinping. In a 
speech on 15 April, Director Xia reiterated that the city should ‘tightly hold’ onto the bottom 
line of national security and called on the city to ‘actively adapt to the new situation and new 
challenges’ under a changing domestic and external environment.  

In 2024, mainland Chinese authorities increased their interactions with the local business 
community. In a reply letter dated 30 July, Chinese President Xi Jinping encouraged Hong 
Kong entrepreneurs with roots in Ningbo, a city on the east coast of China, to ‘better integrate 
into  national  reform  and  development  and  make  a  greater  contribution  to  Chinese 
modernisation’.  

On  8 November 2024,  Director  of  the  Hong  Kong  and  Macao  Affairs  Office  Xia  Baolong 
asked  29  business  leaders  from  the  city to  ‘shoulder  responsibility’  for  the  city’s  economic 
development amid a ‘changing external environment’.  

On 29 November 2024, under the ‘guidance’ of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office and 
with  the  ‘support’  of  the  central  government’s  Liaison  Office,  the  Hong  Kong  government 
organised  a  ceremony  for  the  local  business  community  to  pledge  support  for  the  Northern 
Metropolis – a new development area in the northwestern part of Hong Kong and adjacent to 
the neighbouring city of Shenzhen. Over 80 business representatives attended the event, with 
35 of them signing agreements to contribute to the development of the Northern Metropolis, 
with total planned investment of over HK$100 billion (EUR 11.9 billion). 

The  authorities  in  the  mainland  and  Hong  Kong  worked  together  in  2024  to  improve 
border efficiency. In July, the Hong Kong Secretary for Security Chris Tang revealed that two 
checkpoints with the neighbouring mainland city of Shenzhen would adopt ‘joint clearance’ 
that allowed travellers to only queue once to have their documents inspected, instead of twice. 

Between 3 and 10 November, a delegation of 20 judges and judicial officers from Hong Kong 
visited  China’s  Sichuan  region  for  a  visit  that  was  part  of  ongoing  professional  exchanges 
between judges and judicial officers from Hong Kong and the mainland.  

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
On 20 August 2024, for the first time in 14 years, the Overseas Chinese World Conference 
for Promoting Peaceful Reunification of China took place in Hong Kong. Shi Taifeng, a 
member of the CPC’s Politburo and the Director of the CPC’s United Front Work Department, 
addressed the conference, stating that the implementation of the ‘one country, two systems’ 
principle in Hong Kong played a key role in achieving ‘the country’s reunification’. 

After  a  nine-year  halt,  Shenzhen  resumed  the  multiple-entry  individual  visit  scheme  for 
Shenzhen  permanent  residents  in  2024,  allowing  them  to  visit  Hong  Kong.  Shenzhen  also 
expanded this scheme to Shenzhen residence permit holders on 1 December. The Hong Kong 
government said it expected that the new scheme would ‘substantially increase the number of 
visitors to Hong Kong, further stimulate Hong Kong’s tourism, retail, and catering industries, 
and create new impetus for Hong Kong’s economy’ in a statement published on 29 November.  

In January 2024, an Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters between the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong 
Special  Administrative  Region  signed  in  January  2019  came  into  force  after  the  relevant 
legislative work was completed. 

Mainland China is Hong Kong’s largest trading partner in goods, accounting for 51.0% of 
Hong Kong’s total trade in 2024. In turn, Hong Kong is an important trading hub for mainland 
China and ranked as China’s fourth largest trading partner in 2024.  

Hong Kong remained mainland China’s key offshore financial centre and investment hub 
in 2024. In 2023 (latest year for which data are available), mainland China was Hong Kong’s 
largest source of inward foreign direct investment (FDI), excluding offshore centres, as well as 
the first destination for Hong Kong’s outward FDI, accounting for 31% of the stock of inward 
FDI and 50% of the total stock of outward FDI78. In turn, Hong Kong is the largest source of 
FDI  in  mainland  China  and  the  leading  destination  for  mainland  China’s  outward  FDI, 
accounting  for  59.2%  of  China’s  inward  FDI  and  59.3%  of  China’s  outward  FDI  (2023)79. 
There were 1 478 mainland enterprises listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as at the end 
of December, accounting for 79.8% of total market capitalisation and 90.8% of equity turnover.  

IV. 

EU-Hong Kong bilateral relations and cooperation 

In 2024, the EU Office in Hong Kong held regular meetings with the Hong Kong authorities, 
including  the  Chief  Executive,  during  which  it  conveyed  concerns  about  the  erosion  of 
democracy and human rights in Hong Kong and the implementation of the NSL. The EU Office 
was also in contact with the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
China (OCMFA). The current Head of the EU Office assumed his position in September and 
has already met with most senior officials of  the Hong Kong government as well as with a 
number of key local stakeholders from the business world, academia and civil society. 

In 2024, the EU Office facilitated and supported the visits to Hong Kong of EU officials. On 
13  and  14 April,  the  Managing  Director  for  Asia  and  the  Pacific  of  the  European  External 
Action Service Niclas Kvarnström visited Hong Kong. Further visitors during the year included 

78 Statistical report on External Direct Investment Statistics of Hong Kong (2023 Edition), 10 December 2024: available at 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/EIndexbySubject.html?pcode=B1040003&scode=260.  
79 Hong Kong Trade Development Council https://research.hktdc.com/en/article/MzIwNjcyMDYx.  

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the Deputy Director-General of the European Commission Directorate-General for Financial 
Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA) and two directors from 
DG  FISMA.  The  Chair  of  the  European  Securities  and  Markets  Authority  and  several  EU 
Member State government officials also visited Hong Kong in 2024.  

A number of Hong Kong officials travelled to the European Union and EU Member States in 
2024. In May, Hong Kong’s Secretary for Innovation, Technology and Industry met with the 
European Commissioner for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education and Youth in Brussels.  

As mandated by the Council Conclusions of July 2020 on Hong Kong80, the EU Office in Hong 
Kong and the EU Member States Consulates-General in Hong Kong continued to conduct trial 
observations, attending 80 court sessions in Hong Kong in 2024. 

In 2024, the EU Office continued to organise arts events to promote respect for human rights. 
In close coordination with the Ukrainian community in Hong Kong, the EU Office organised 
a  panel  discussion  to  mark  the  second  anniversary  of  the  Russian  invasion  of  Ukraine  on 
24 February.  To  further  raise  awareness  in  Hong  Kong  about  Russia’s  ongoing  war  of 
aggression in Ukraine, the EU Office opened the Hong Kong EU Film Festival and the EU-
Asia  Documentary  Festival  with  Ukrainian  productions  and  organised  two  screenings  of 
Ukrainian films at local universities.  

On 9 November, the EU Office in cooperation with the journalism school of a local Hong Kong 
university,  organised  a  screening  of  the  Oscar-winning  documentary  film  ‘20  Days  in 
Mariupol’ and a panel discussion to mark the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes 
against Journalists (2 November) and the 1 000th day of Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine 
(19 November). 

The  EU  Office  also  continued  to  co-organise  Hong  Kong’s  annual  ‘EU-Asia  Documentary 
Film Festival’ to shed light on social inequalities.  

In December 2024, the EU Office co-organised the annual ‘Colours of Humanity Arts Prize’, 
formerly known as the Hong Kong Human Rights Art Prize. 

To express the EU’s commitment to the principles of equality and non-discrimination and its 
support for the rights of LGBTIQ+ people, the EU Office organised a film screening  and a 
panel  discussion with  a focus on civil  unions and marriage equality,  bringing together civil 
society, the business community, the consular corps and policy makers. The EU Office again 
participated in the annual Hong Kong Pride event in 2024. 

The EU Office has maintained regular contact with civil society groups in Hong Kong working 
on a range of topics, including prisoners’ rights and the situation of asylum seekers. The EU 
Office also co-organised a luncheon with NGOs and representatives of official bodies on youth 
mental health on 17 December 2024.  

The EU Office, together with local partners, organised the third annual ‘Green Way’ event in 
2024. Green  Way is a conference to promote the exchange of ideas on how best to address 
climate  change.  There  was  high-level  participation  in  the  event  by  both  the  government 
(including  Chief  Executive  John  Lee)  and  industry,  and  this  year’s  event  resulted  in 

80 Council conclusions on Hong Kong, 24 July 2020, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45222/council-conclusions-on-
hong-kong.pdf.  

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
recommendations to allow greater participation of EU industry and EU standards in support of 
Hong Kong’s environmental agenda. In addition, as part of the event there was public outreach 
to  communicate  relevant  EU  policies,  including  on  the  digital  and  green  agenda,  the  Due 
Diligence Directive, and environmental, social and governance reporting.  

In 2024, the EU remained the largest non-Chinese foreign business community in the city, 
ahead of Japan, the US and the UK, according to the annual survey on foreign companies81 by 
the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department82. At least 1 640 EU companies were active 
in Hong Kong in 2024. About half of these EU companies (800) were using the city as their 
regional  headquarters  or  regional  offices.  EU  businesses  were  present  in  a  wide  range  of 
sectors,  including  financial  and  business  services,  trading  and  logistics,  retail,  food  and 
beverage, construction, and engineering. The survey showed that the number of EU companies 
recorded was 5.9% greater than in 2023. This means that the number of EU companies in Hong 
Kong  had  surpassed  pre-COVID-19  and  pre-NSL  levels,  with  2.3%  more  EU  companies 
present in Hong Kong in 2024 than in 2019 (while the total number of non-Chinese foreign 
companies  increased  by  a  smaller  proportion  in  the  same  period,  up  1.4%).  However,  the 
survey also shows that the number of EU companies with regional headquarters in Hong Kong 
remains below 2019 levels (-9.8% in 2024 from 2019), although the decline in the number of 
regional headquarters of EU companies located in Hong Kong was noticeably smaller than for 
non-Chinese foreign companies as a whole (-17.8% in the same period). 

In  2024,  bilateral  trade  in  goods  between  the  EU  and  Hong  Kong  amounted  to  EUR  28.3 
billion,  a  decrease  of  8.7%  on  the  same  period  in  2023.  EU  exports  of  goods  to  Hong  Kong 
amounted to EUR 24.1 billion, while imports from Hong Kong to the EU totalled EUR 4.3 billion, 
resulting in a surplus of EUR 19.8 billion for the EU83. The EU was Hong Kong’s fourth largest 
trading  partner  in  goods  in  2024,  after  mainland  China,  Taiwan  and  the  US 84.  Hong  Kong 
remained an important platform for trade between mainland China and the EU.  

The EU was Hong Kong’s third largest trading partner in services in 2022 (according to Hong 
Kong’s Census and Statistics Department, 2022 was the latest full year for which Hong Kong 
data were available at the time of writing)85. In 2023, Hong Kong was the EU’s 11th largest 
partner  for  trade  in  services  (Eurostat)86.  Eurostat  data  show  that  EU  trade  in  services  with 
Hong  Kong  amounted  to  EUR  38.4  billion  in  2023,  a  decrease  of  10.6%  year  on  year.  EU 
exports of services to Hong Kong in 2023 accounted for EUR 24.3 billion and imports from 
Hong Kong were worth EUR 14.1 billion, resulting in a surplus of EUR 10.3 billion for the 
EU. The main services traded are transport, telecommunications, financial services and other 
business services.  

The EU was the fifth largest investor in Hong Kong and the sixth largest destination for 
Hong Kong’s FDI globally in 2023 (Hong Kong statistics, 2023 was the latest year for which 
data were available at the time of writing). According to Eurostat, Hong Kong was the ninth 

81 The survey only provides data on the number of companies. It does not reflect EU companies cutting or relocating some activities and/or 
staff (including during the pandemic). 
82 Report on Annual Survey of Companies in Hong Kong with Parent Companies Located outside Hong Kong, the Census and Statistics 
Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2024 edition): 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/wbr.html?ecode=B11100042024AN24&scode=360.    
83 Source: Eurostat: European Union trade in goods   
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/comext/newxtweb/.  
84 Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/scode230.html.  
85 The Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/EIndexbySubject.html?pcode=B1020011&scode=240.     
86 Eurostat: European Union trade in services  
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.      

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
largest source of FDI stock into the EU in 2023, worth EUR 157.3 billion (a 19% decrease year 
on year), and the 19th largest destination of the EU’s FDI stock, at EUR 82.1 billion (-26.0% 
year on year)87.  

The EU-Hong Kong and Macao Policy Dialogue Support Facility project provided a platform 
for discussions on topics such as sustainability during the early part of the year, until May 2024. 
In December 2024, the new Policy Dialogue and Public Diplomacy Facility for Hong Kong 
and Macao was launched. The 3-year project supports the EU Office’s continuing engagement 
with key counterparts in Hong Kong on strategic topics of mutual interest, primarily through 
joint events, preparation of studies, and production of visibility material. 

In  December  2024,  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  amended  Decision  2014/145/CFSP 
concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning 
restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine88. One of 
the results of this amendment was to add Hong Kong entities to the list set out in the Annex to 
Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Annexes to Decision 2014/512/CFSP. 

87 Eurostat: European Union direct investment statistics  
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.       
88 Press release of the Council of the European Union: 
 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/12/16/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-15th-package-
of-restrictive-measures/.  

30