Case C-572/25 P: Appeal brought on 29 August 2025 by Brasserie Nationale (formerly Brasseries Funck-Bricher and Bofferding) and Munhowen SA against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 2 July 2025 in Case T-289/24, Brasserie Nationale and Munhowen v Commission
Date: 2025-08-29
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: Luxembourg, beer, beverage industry, distributor, economic concentration, merger control, national competent authority, restriction on competition, wholesale trade








C_202506489EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/6489


15.12.2025






Appeal brought on 29 August 2025 by Brasserie Nationale (formerly Brasseries Funck-Bricher and Bofferding) and Munhowen SA against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 2 July 2025 in Case T-289/24, Brasserie Nationale and Munhowen v Commission


(Case C-572/25 P)

(C/2025/6489)
Language of the case: French

Parties


Appellants: Brasserie Nationale (formerly Brasseries Funck-Bricher and Bofferding) and Munhowen SA (represented by: G. Parleani, O. Parleani and R. Ianniello, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Autorité de concurrence du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Anheuser-Busch Inbev

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:






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declare the appeal brought by Brasserie Nationale and Munhowen against the judgment delivered on 2 July 2025 by the General Court of the European Union in Case T-289/24 admissible and well founded and, consequently,










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set aside the judgment under appeal in its entirety, in so far as it adopted a legally erroneous interpretation of the concept of being ‘made known’ contained in the second subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, (1) and, consequently,










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set aside the judgment of the General Court, in so far as it held that the Commission did not err in calculating the 15-day time limit provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 22(1) of that regulation, when it accepted the referral request made by the Autorité de la concurrence du Luxembourg (Competition Authority, Luxembourg) on 7 February 2024 and, consequently,










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annul the Commission decision of 14 March 2024 by which the Commission had accepted the referral request made by the Competition Authority, Luxembourg.





Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of their appeal, the appellants rely on a single ground of appeal, divided into two limbs.
First limb of the ground of appeal, concerning the concept and interpretation of being ‘made known’, with three criticisms:






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The General Court reasoned that a concentration’s being made known is a prerequisite of and condition for a referral request, which also requires an ‘active’ transmission and ‘must allow the Member State concerned to carry out a preliminary assessment of those conditions and to assess whether it is appropriate to make a referral request’. However, for the appellants, neither is the case. First, Article 22 does not make a concentration’s being made known a prerequisite for a referral request; the only consequence of a concentration being made known is that it triggers the 15-day time limit within which the Member State must make the referral request to the Commission (if it intends to do so). Second, contrary to the General Court’s findings, there is neither a legal nor an intellectual link between a concentration’s being made known and the alleged obligation to actively transmit information making it possible to carry out a preliminary analysis.










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The appellants also submit that the General Court was incorrect in ruling that the requirements of good administration and of the fast-paced business world are to be met only by those subject to administrative decisions, and that the administration is dispensed from them.










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The appellants furthermore criticise the decision of the General Court in so far as it ruled that ‘mere knowledge of the existence of a concentration does not allow an authority to carry out a preliminary assessment’ and that to require a national competition authority to seek information would amount to a ‘considerable administrative burden …, … also … contrary to the objective of efficiency’. Legal certainty is here seriously compromised not only because undertakings still do not know what they have to make known, but also because the principles might vary according to an undertaking’s territorial footprint.




Ultimately, what is criticised is that, according to the decision of the General Court, inertia is the operating guide to be followed by competition authorities for triggering the time limit laid down for initiating a referral procedure before the European Commission. Further, complementary or additional, arguments are also presented.
Second limb of the ground of appeal, concerning the calculation of the time limit:
The Court is asked to set aside the judgment due to an error of law when interpreting the second subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation 139/2004, as ‘the concentration’ was made known to the Competition Authority, Luxembourg, more than 15 days before the latter made the referral request to the Commission. Consequently, the referral request made by that local competition authority to the Commission on 7 February 2024 was out of time. As a direct and an unseverable consequence, the appellants claim that the Court should annul the Commission decision of 14 March 2024, whereby it accepted the referral request made by the Competition Authority, Luxembourg.


(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (‘the EC Merger Regulation’) (OJ 2004 L 24, p. 1).


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/6489/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)