Japan's ‘Plan A+’ strategy in the Trump Era : toward more cooperation with Europe.
Date: 2025-08-29
Institutions: European University Institute, Watanabe, Tsuneo
Subjects: EU relations, Japan, United States, cooperation policy, defence policy, foreign policy, geopolitics, international security

Japan's ‘Plan A+’ strategy in 
the Trump Era: Toward more 
cooperation with Europe

Abstract

Now, with the speed and intensity of a speeded-up video, the interna-
tional order that has been built since World War II is collapsing. Japan 
recognises a drastic shift in the international order and considers the 
new strategy in the Trump era. Although Japan recognizes Trump ad-
ministration's  tough  stance  against  China  is  still  good  news  for  the 
alliance with the US, the ongoing military cooperation between China 
and Russia, and also between North Korea and Russia are bad news. 
In  this  context,  a  decline  in  the  U.S.  commitment  to  NATO  is  bad 
news  for  Japan  since  it  reflects  a  decline  of American’s  interests  in 
oversea allies and leading the international order. Now Japan is stren-
gthening  its  own  defence  capabilities  and  expanding  its  role  in  the 
Japan-U.S. alliance as a hedge against declining U.S. involvement. 
In addition, Japan is promoting closer security cooperative relations 
with U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. The Sasakawa Peace 
Foundation, which the author participates in, calls this strategy ‘Plan 
A+.’ This paper introduces Japan’s strategic thinking and shows that 
cooperation with Europe is an important pillar of its foreign policy.

Issue 2025/13 
July 2025

Authors
Tsuneo “Nabe” Watanabe, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation

POLICY BRIEFIntroduction

Many people in the world were at least vaguely ap-
prehensive  that the  birth of the  second Trump ad-
ministration  would  be  a  major  challenge  to  the  in-
ternational order. Now, with the speed and intensity 
of a speeded-up video, the international order that 
has been built since World War II is collapsing. The 
world  is  seeing  the  reality  that  when  a  destroyer 
sits in the driver's seat of the U.S., which has so far 
sustained  order,  the  destruction  proceeds  beyond 
expectations.

Japan  clearly  recognises  this  shift  in  the  interna-
tional  order  and  is  considering  its  future  strategy. 
What  shocked  the  world  when  Trump  abandoned 
his position of defending the international order and 
instead  stood  on  the  side  of  the  revisionists  was 
the  U.S.  vote  at  the  UN  General  Assembly  on  24 
February  2025.  On  that  day,  three  full  years  after 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the UN held a special 
session and with a majority of 93 countries adopted 
a resolution in which European nations condemned 
Russian  aggression  and  supported  Ukraine's 
territorial  integrity.  The  U.S.  voted  against  the 
resolution, along with Russia and 17 other countries.1

According  to  someone  who  was  there,  the  U.S. 
vote  shocked  the  audience,  as  if  the  sky  and  the 
earth  were  turned  upside  down.  Even  though  a 
compromise with Russia was necessary to end the 
war  in  Ukraine,  the  Trump  administration's  action 
in  opposing  a  resolution  by  its  European  allies 
condemning Russia's war in Ukraine, which clashed 
with the UN Charter and humanity, was a dramatic 
departure  of  the  US  position  from  its  previous 
stance  as  defender  of  the  post-World  War  II inter-
national order. 

Nevertheless,  due  to  the  Trump  administration's 
continued tough stance against China, Japan was 
less  shocked  by  the  U.S.  vote  than  its  European 
allies, as it did not diminish its value as a frontline 
ally  against  China.  On  the  other  hand,  the  war  in 
Ukraine  has  raised  concerns  in  Japan  about  the 
ongoing  military  cooperation  between  China  and 
Russia, and also between North Korea and Russia. 

In  this  context,  a  decline  in  the  U.S.  commitment 
to  NATO  is  bad  news  for  Japan.  This  is  because 
although there are ‘prioritisers’ in the second Trump 
administration who prioritise competition with China 
over  the  security  of  the  Middle  East  and  Europe, 
many  members  of  the  Trump  administration  are 
‘restrainers,’  including  President  Trump  and  Vice 
President Vance, who seek to reduce U.S. security 
engagement all over the world.2

In  this  international  situation,  Japan  is  strengthen-
ing  its  own  defence  capabilities  and  expanding  its 
role in the Japan-U.S. alliance as a hedge against 
declining  U.S.  involvement.  In  addition,  Japan  is 
promoting  closer  security  cooperative  relations 
with  U.S.  allies  in  the  Indo-Pacific  and  Europe. 
The  so-called  ‘America After Trump’  project  of  the 
Sasakawa  Peace  Foundation,  which  the  author 
participates  in,  calls  this  strategy  ‘Plan A+’  and  is 
preparing  policy  recommendations.  This  paper 
introduces  Japan's  ‘Plan  A+’  strategy  and  shows 
that cooperation with Europe is an important pillar 
of its foreign policy.

Trump tariffs reveal tough U.S. perceptions 
of its allies

On 2 April the Trump administration imposed additional 
tariffs  on  all  countries  with  a  flat  10%  tariff  plus  a 
reciprocal  tariff  in  a  formula  that  aimed  to  cut  down 
trade surpluses vis-à-vis the U.S.3 The administration 
decided  to  impose  ‘reciprocal  tariffs’  on  its  allies  the 
EU (20%), Japan (24%) and South Korea (25%), and 
while it imposed a 34% tariff on rival China, it imposed 
tariffs on fellow rivals Iran (10%) and Venezuela (15%) 
that were lower than those on its allies.4

In  response  to  the  decision,  China  and  others 
launched  countermeasures,  and 
the  markets 
predicted a recession resulting from the trade war 
that engulfed the world and sent global stock prices 
plummeting. On 6 April, President Trump defended 
his tariff measures stating "I don't want anything to 
go down, but sometimes you have to take medicine 
to  fix  something"  and  "We  have  been  treated  so 

1   “US sides with Russia in UN resolutions on Ukraine,” BBC, 25 February 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7435pnle0go

2   “China hawks are losing influence in Trumpworld, despite the trade war: “Restrainers” are taking over from “primacists,” The Econo-
mist, 15 April 2022, https://www.economist.com/china/2025/04/15/china-hawks-are-losing-influence-in-trumpworld-despite-the-trade-war

3   Barath Harithas, Evan Brown and Catharine Mouradian, “Three Points on Trump’s “Reciprocal” Tariffs,” CSIS, 7 April 2025, 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/three-points-trumps-reciprocal-tariffs

4   “Trump 2.0 tariff tracker,” Reed Smith, 29 April 2025, https://www.tradecomplianceresourcehub.com/2025/04/29/trump-2-0-tariff-tracker/

2  

  Robert Schuman Centre | July 2025

badly  by  other  countries  because  we  had  stupid 
leadership that allowed this to happen.”5

Trump's  logic  is  to  bring  manufacturing  back  to 
the  U.S.  by  imposing  harsh  tariffs  on  allies  who 
have  enjoyed  economic  prosperity  as  free  riders 
on  the  US  open  market  with  asymmetrical  tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers. The onshoring of manufac-
turing  capacity  will  enrich  struggling  U.S.  workers 
left  behind  the  constant  U.S.  economic  growth  in 
service sectors, which benefited from economic glo-
balisation.6 At the time of writing, no one knows how 
the tariffs will ultimately settle down, as Trump has 
suspended  enforcement  of  the  extra tariffs except 
the universal 10% tariff and the universal 25% tariffs 
on steel, aluminium and automobiles for 90 days to 
lessen the damage to his own economy, and he is 
continuing negotiations with other countries.7

What is clear, however, is that the post-World War 
II  strategic  view  that  U.S.  leaders  have  shared  so 
far is changing dramatically in the wake of Trump's 
reemergence.  Trump's  America  does  not  believe 
that  protecting  its  allies  is  in  the  U.S.  interest  but 
rather that it is a liability.

This has a certain rationale in the U.S. because of 
enthusiastic support by the MAGA (Make America 
Great Again)  movement  backing Trump. The  U.S. 
developed its grand strategy in the Cold War after 
World  War  II  to  fight  and  win  against  the  Soviet 
Union,  China  and  the  communist  camp. The  U.S. 
created  and  led  a  liberal  bloc  against  the  Soviet 
communist  bloc,  which  managed  a  command 
economy  that  was  less  efficient  than  the  liberal 
economy,  and  the  U.S.  gave  nations  in  the  liberal 
bloc  opportunities  for  economic  growth  by  signing 
security  treaties  and  providing  military  assistance. 
At  the  same  time,  the  U.S.  opened  its  markets  to 
guarantee market access and provide opportunities 
for  economic  growth.  It  also  cut  off  China,  which 
had joined the communist bloc, but eventually from 

the 1970s gave it access to the U.S. market to grow 
its  economy  and  compete  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
which  led  to  a  stalemate  in  the  Soviet  communist 
bloc's  economy  and  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet 
Union without a major war.

It  was  Japan  and  Europe  that  took  advantage  of 
this situation to rise from the depths of war-devas-
tated exhaustion to become economic powers after 
the  second  world  war.  Japan's  strategy  of  relying 
on the United States for defence and concentrating 
resources on economic growth became known as 
the ‘Yoshida Doctrine,’ named after Prime Minister 
Shigeru Yoshida, who was often compared to West 
German Chancellor Adenauer in a similar role.8

Japan's  heightened  economic  competitiveness 
threatened U.S. economic primacy from the 1970s to 
the 1990s, and there was U.S.-Japan trade friction, 
but Japan used this experience to expand its role in 
the alliance with the United States and make it more 
important in both economic and security terms. For 
some US security and military experts, Japan is still 
regarded  as  a  critical  partner  to  counter  China,  a 
more formidable rival than Japan both economically 
and security-wise.9

However,  it  has  become  clear  that  the  ‘Yoshida 
Doctrine’ will not work for Trump's America. Japan 
needs to become more independent, both econom-
ically and in terms of security. At the same time, this 
does not mean a confrontation or a break with the 
U.S.  While  maintaining  an  alliance  with  the  U.S., 
which  remains  wary  of  China,  the  strategy  will  be 
to  reduce  Japan's  excessive  dependence  on  the 
U.S. in security and economics, where it could be

5   Trevor Hunnicutt, “Trump, asked about markets, says sometimes you have to 'take medicine,'” Reuters, 7 April 2025, https://
www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-asked-about-markets-says-sometimes-you-have-take-medicine-2025-04-06/

6   White House, “President Trump is Putting American Workers First — And Bringing Back American Manufacturing,” 4 March 2025, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/03/president-trump-is-putting-american-workers-first-and-bringing-back-american-manufacturing/

7   Elisabeth Buchwald and Kevin Liptak, “Trump announces 90-day pause on ‘reciprocal’ tariffs with exception of China,” CNN, 
9 April 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/09/business/reciprocal-tariff-pause-trump; “Tariff tracker: Impacts, insights, and 
resources,” Project 44, https://www.project44.com/tariff-tracker/ (accessed 27 May 2025)

8   History of Japan Review, “Key term-Yoshida doctrine,” https://library.fiveable.me/key-terms/history-japan/yoshida-doctrine 
(accessed 3 May 2025). 

9   Daniel Byman, “Improving Cooperation with Allies and Partners in Asia,” CSIS, 20 May 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
improving-cooperation-allies-and-partners-asia

3  

  Japan's ‘Plan A+’ Strategy in the Trump Era: Toward More Cooperation with Europe

 forced to make unilateral concessions through the 
imposition of tariffs or other measures, such as un-
reasonably expensive security support.10

In order to achieve this aim, Japan will need more 
military  power  than  ever  before  and  cutting-edge 
technology  to  support  its  military  and  economy.  In 
part  to  counter  China,  the  Trump  administration 
would  require  Japan  to  spend  more  on  defence 
than  it  does  now.  Japan’s  strategic  move  should 
be  to  make  this  a  negotiated  condition  to  protect 
the  Japanese  economy  from  tariffs,  and  the  new 
defence  budget  will  need  to  be  invested  in  R&D 
for  military  and  civilian  technologies  that  will  seed 
future economic growth.

China-Russia cooperation in East Asia 
moving forward with an eye on declining 
U.S. involvement

On  23  May  2022,  Chinese  and  Russian  military 
aircraft conducted joint exercises at the same time 
as  a  Japan-U.S.-Australia-India  (Quad)  summit 
in  Tokyo.  Russian  Tu-95  and  Chinese  Xi'an  H-6 
strategic bombers participated in a 13-hour exercise 
over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and 
the Russian Defence Ministry announced that it had 
conducted a joint exercise with the Chinese military 
to  patrol  the  Asia-Pacific  region.11  Since  the  first 
patrol  in  2019,  China  and  Russia  have  conducted 
strategic bomber joint air patrols around Japan and 
Taiwan eight times – in July 2019, December 2020, 
November  2021,  May  and  November  2022,  June 
and  November  2023  and  November  2024  –  and 
they have become the norm.12 As fighting between 
tensions 
Ukraine  and  Russia  continues  and 
between the U.S. and China over Taiwan increase, 

Japan  must  be  wary  not  only  of  China  but  also  of 
China-Russia collaboration.

On  10  February  2024,  Trump  revealed  that  he 
had  said  to  NATO  leaders  that  if  they  did  not  pay 
the  money  they  owed  for  the  military  alliance,  he 
would “encourage” Russia “to do whatever the hell 
they  want”  to  them.13  Trump's  re-election  to  the 
presidency in the November election is a reflection 
of the fact that Trump and his supporters do not see 
any benefit in alliances and allies.

Former President Biden delivered a televised address 
from the White House to the American people on 6 
December 2023 regarding a supplementary budget 
for aid to Ukraine, on which the Republican House 
of  Representatives  took  a  negative  stance.  In  this 
address,  President  Biden  asked  "And  think,  if  we 
don’t support Ukraine, what’s the rest of the world 
going  to  do?  What’s  Japan  going  to  do,  which  is 
supporting Ukraine now? What’s going to happen in 
terms of the G7? What’s going to happen in terms 
of our NATO Allies?”14

There  is  a  reason  why  President  Biden  was  the 
first to mention Japan in the context of support for 
Ukraine.  Former  Prime  Minister  Kishida  actively 
supported  Ukraine  from  the  beginning  of  Russia's 
invasion,  and  he  surprised  Ukrainian  President 
Zelensky by inviting him to the Hiroshima G7 in May 
2023, where they both laid flowers at the Cenotaph 
for the Atomic Bomb Victims in Hiroshima. This was 
a  message  to  Russian  President  Vladimir  Putin, 
who had occasionally suggested the use of nuclear 
weapons in the war in Ukraine, because President 
Biden  had  a  strong  impression  of  Prime  Minister 
Kishida's  diplomacy.  In  addition,  Japan's  active 
support for Ukraine in the face of China may have 

10   Ken Moriyasu, “Trump's ambassador pick wants Japan to pay more for U.S. bases
George Glass expects Tokyo to reduce trade surplus and Russian gas, boost defense budget,” Nikkei Asia, March 14, 2025, 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Trump-administration/Trump-s-ambassador-pick-wants-Japan-to-pay-more-for-U.S.-bases

11   "Chinese, Russian Bombers Fly Together, Around Japan to Host Quad, Both Japan and South Korea Launch Emergency," 
Reuters, 24 May 2022, https://jp.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN2NA0YK/

12   Japan Ministry of Defense, “China’s Activities in East China Sea, Pacific Ocean, and Sea of Japan,” April 2025, p.2, https://
www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/pdf/ch_d-act_a.pdf

13   Michael Gold, "Trump says he gave NATO allies warnings: Pay in or He'd urge Russian aggression," The New York Times, 
10 February 2024(updated February 11), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/10/us/politics/trump-nato-russia.html

14   The White House, "Remarks by President Biden Urging Congress to Pass His National Security Supplemental Request, In-
cluding Funding to Support Ukraine Including Funding to Support Ukraine," 6 December 2023, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.
gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/12/06/remarks-by-president-biden-urging-congress-to-pass-his-national-security-sup-
plemental-request-including-funding-to-support-ukraine/ 

4  

  Robert Schuman Centre | July 2025

been  a  clear  refutation15  of  the  rhetoric  of  Trump 
supporters in the U.S. that the real threat to the U.S. 
was  China  and  that  it  could  not  afford  to  support 
Ukraine.

In  three  security  documents  approved  by  the 
Cabinet in December 2022, Japan set forth a more 
active  defence  of  itself  and  a  security  assurance 
to  the  Indo-Pacific  region.  In  addition  to  its  own 
defence  and  strengthening  its  alliance  with  the 
the  documents  also  strongly  advocate 
U.S., 
security  cooperation  with  key  regional  actors, 
namely Europe, India and ASEAN. Japan’s national 
security strategy document explicitly stated that as 
part of "maintaining and developing a free and open 
international  order  and  strengthening  cooperation 
with  allies,  comrades  and  other  countries,  Japan 
will build a multilayered network among allies and 
comrades,”  while  expanding  and  strengthening  its 
deterrence  capabilities.  To  this  end,  while  utilising 
the  Japan-U.S.-ROK  and  Japan-U.S.-Austra-
lia  frameworks,  Japan  will  develop  cooperation 
with  Australia,  India,  South  Korea,  ASEAN  (the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Canada, 
NATO and the European Union.16

Japan  was  greatly  threatened  by  the  strength-
ening  of  Sino-Russian  ties,  but  it  contributed  to 
support for Ukraine and also promoted cooperation 
with  European  NATO  members  and  U.S.  allies  in 
the  Indo-Pacific  – Australia,  South  Korea  and  the 
Philippines  –  to  ensure  its  own  survival  and  to 
maintain  the  international  order.  This  was  also  a 
hedging  strategy  to  cope  with  drastic  changes  in 
the  world  caused  by  Biden’s  weakening  influence 
and  Trump’s  potential  re-emergence  with  his  dis-
engagement  in  international  security,  which  has 
been  a  matter  of  concern  since  then.  This  was 
the  prototype  of  the  ‘Plan A+’  strategy  that  Japan 
should adopt in the future.

The ‘Plan A+’ strategy for maintaining 
future global order

In  past  discussions  of  Japan's  diplomatic  and 
security  strategy,  the  Plan  A  (based  on  the 
Japan-U.S.  alliance)  and  the  Plan  B  (substituting 
the  Japan-U.S.  alliance  with  cooperation  with  the 
United Nations, China and the Soviet Union) were 
compared  and  discussed  as  options.17  This  was 
at the heart of diplomatic and security discussions 
during  the  Cold  War.18  However,  now  that  the 
UN  has  become  dysfunctional  and  the  appeal  of 
socialist  ideology  has  faded,  Plan  B  has  lost  its 
rationality as a realistic option. On the other hand, 
simply  adopting  the  status  quo  Plan  A  is  not  a 
reliable option to protect Japan's independence and 
prosperity considering the future relative decline of 
U.S. power, which would result in a weakened inter-
national order.

The  direction  of  Japan's  future  foreign  policy 
strategy,  as  proposed  by  the  Sasakawa  Peace 
Foundation's  ‘America  after  Trump’  project,  is  a 
Plan  A+  strategy.  In  short,  in  addition  to  Plan  A, 
Japan  will  strengthen  its  own  defence  capabili-
ties  and  deepen  its  cooperation  with  other  U.S. 
allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. 
In  addition  to  the  Japan-U.S.  alliance,  Japan 
should  strengthen  its  own  defence  capability  by 
introducing mid-range missiles such as U.S.-made 
Tomahawks  and  developing  Japan’s  indigenous 
longer-range  missiles.  Japan  should  deepen  its 
horizontal  cooperation  with  other  U.S.  allies  and 
partners,  such  as  Quad  (Japan-U.S.-Australia-In-
dia) cooperation and Japan-NATO cooperation.

America’s 

  President  Trump's  America  First  policy  suggests 
reducing 
international  military 
involvement, but at the same time Trump's position 
that  U.S.  allies  are  not  bearing  a  commensu-
rate  burden  compared  to  the  excessive  burden 
on  the  U.S.  does  not  necessarily  mean  ‘isolation-
ism’  in  which  the  U.S.  withdraws  from  all  global 
involvement.  Although  nobody  knows  Trump’s 
ultimate aim, at least we can assume that he would 

15   Jash Hawley, "Hawley Delivers National Security Speech 'China and Ukraine: A Time for Truth,'" 16 February 2023, Senator 
Josh Hawley website, https://www.hawley.senate.gov/hawley-delivers-national-security-speech-china-and-ukraine-time-truth

16   Government of Japan “National Security Strategy 2022,” p. 42. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf 

17   Christopher Johnstone, Nicholas Szechenyi and Leah Klaas, “The Evolution of the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership,” CSIS, 
11 July 2024, https://features.csis.org/evolution-of-the-us-japan-security-partnership/

18   Ibid.

5  

  Japan's ‘Plan A+’ Strategy in the Trump Era: Toward More Cooperation with Europe

brag of his great achievement if the U.S. allies bore 
a reasonable financial burden.19

  Given  the  current  situation,  Plan  B,  in  which 
Japan easily abandons the Japan-U.S. alliance, is 
premature. It would be more strategic to strengthen 
its own defence capabilities and reduce the burden 
on  the  U.S.  for  regional  stability.  This  would 
effectively  appeal  to  the  U.S.  with  more  in-depth 
cooperation with NATO members and EU countries, 
which are U.S. allies in Europe that share a similar 
awareness  of  the  problem.  This  is  because  U.S. 
restrainers want relief from the heavy burden in the 
Middle East, in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific. This 
is why cooperation with Europe is one of the pillars 
of Plan A+.

In July 2023 Japan agreed to the Japan-NATO In-
dividually Tailored  Partnership  Programme  (ITPP), 
which  includes  enhanced  responses  to  cyberat-
tacks  and  artificial  intelligence  (AI).20  On  9  April 
2025, after the formation of the second Trump ad-
ministration,  Prime  Minister  Shigeru  Ishiba  and 
NATO  Secretary  General  Rutte  met  in  Japan  and 
confirmed a policy of working to create a standard 
for  ammunition  and  equipment  used  by  Japan’s 
Self-Defence Forces and NATO member countries' 
militaries  by  matching  component  sizes  and  es-
tablishing  a  system  to  facilitate  interchange  in 
the  United  States  and  Europe  to  address  global 
equipment shortages.21

Security  cooperation  between  Europe  and  Japan 
has only just begun, but the uncertain future of the 
U.S., in addition to the threat from China and Russia, 
has undoubtedly increased the value of cooperation 
between them.

Therefore  Plan A+  is  being  steadily  implemented. 
U.S. historian Walter Russell Mead, quoting Hiroyuki 
Akita,  a  participant  in  the  Sasakawa  Peace  Foun-
dation's ‘America After Trump’ project and a Nikkei 

commentator  who  discussed  the  concept,  wrote 
a response. Mead wrote that with challengers such 
as China, Russia and Iran undermining the stability 
of  the  U.S.-led  order  and  the  U.S.  itself  becoming 
less reliable and predictable than in the past, Plan A 
alone is no longer sufficient. The response of most 
of  the  U.S.  allies  has  been  to  move  to  what Akita 
calls a ‘Plan A+’ posture. The allies want the U.S.-led 
order  to  remain  intact,  but  they  have  realised  that 
they must act more aggressively to compensate for 
what they perceive as U.S. weaknesses. He wrote 
that  "countries  that  choose  Plan A+  are  tightening 
their  relations  with  the  U.S.,  increasing  defence 
spending and intensifying efforts to strengthen the 
network of alliances that underpin the world order.” 
He  sees  this  move  as  beneficial  to  the  U.S.  and 
states  that  “Americans  are  rightly  pleased  by  the 
tendency of so many of our allies to go to Plan A+” 
while  “it  attests  to  the  value  that  these  countries 
place on the world order Americans have built, and 
we need all the help we can get in this dangerous 
time.”  He  also  optimistically  expects  that  “greater 
efforts from allies will also help American politicians 
persuade sceptical voters to continue their support 
for American global strategy.”22

Indeed, Japan's Plan A+ responds to complaints by 
President Trump and MAGA supporters that the U.S. 
bears an unduly heavy burden in maintaining the in-
ternational order, while at the same time by actively 
participating  in  the  formation  of  the  international 
order  Japan  can  remove  complaints  by  Japanese 
domestic  nationalists  that  it  might  otherwise  be 
a protectorate of the U.S.

  It  would  be  a  great  crisis  moment  with  a  great 
chance  for  Japan  and  Europe  to  maintain  the 
existing world order with closer security cooperation 
with  strategic  direction  such  as  Plan  A+.  Japan 
and NATO have agreed on cooperation in the field 
of  strategic  communication  and  they  share  best 
practices  on  countering  hybrid  activities,  including 

19   Paul McLeary, “Trump, in show of NATO support, nominates official to key role with alliance,” Politico, 5 June 2025, https://
www.politico.com/news/2025/06/05/trump-nato-nominates-alexus-grynkewich-00389109

20   The Government of Japan, “Japan and NATO: Pursuing Diverse ITTP-Based Cooperation,” Kizuna: Linking Japan and 
world, 23 August 2024, https://www.japan.go.jp/kizuna/2024/08/japan_and_nato.html

21   “Meeting between Prime Minister Ishiba and NATO Secretary General Rutte,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 April 2025, 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/ep/pageite_000001_00006.html

22   Walter Russell Mead, “America Shrugs, and the World Makes Plans:
U.S. allies step up, but a too-aloof Washington could lead them into the arms of enemies,” Wall Street Journal, 27 March 2023, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-shrugs-and-the-world-makes-plans-middle-east-security-defense-energy-russia-chi-
na-plan-b-ad57f4b6?mod=author_content_page_11_pos_10

6  

  Robert Schuman Centre | July 2025

hostile  information.23  For  future  cooperation  on  a 
Taiwan  contingency,  some  may  think  Europeans 
are located too far from a war theatre in East Asia. 
However, European military and intelligence capa-
bilities could assist Taiwan and the U.S. and Japan 
with cyber and space capability “where geography 
does  not  impose  limitations,”  for  example  by  con-
tributing cyber and space capabilities, according to 
a US thinktank CNAS report entitled ‘Regional and 
Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency.’24

23   NATO, “Individually Tailored Partnership Programme between NATO and Japan for 2023-2026,” 20 July 2023 (updated on 
20 July 20), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217797.html

24   Jacob Stokes, Col Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel,” Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingen-
cy – Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire, May 2025, https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/
documents/taiwan-contingency-final.pdf p.12.

7  

  Japan's ‘Plan A+’ Strategy in the Trump Era: Toward More Cooperation with Europe

The Global Governance Programme 

The  Global  Governance  Programme  (GGP)  is  research  turned  into  action.  It 
provides a European setting to conduct research at the highest level and pro-
mote synergies between the worlds of research and policy-making, to generate 
ideas  and  identify  creative  an  innovative  solutions  to  global  challenges.  The 
Programme is part of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the 
European  University  Institute,  a  world-reknowned  academic  institution.    It  re-
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Governance Programme. It is designed to contribute to mutual understanding 
and exchange between Asia and Europe at a time of unprecedented change in 
international politics and global governance. The project also aims at an ambi-
tious academic programme on EU and Asia, with a particular focus on Japan.

www.eui/rsc

© European University Institute, 2025
Editorial matter and selection © Tsuneo “Nabe” Watanabe, 2025

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY 4.0) 
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8  

  RSC | Policy Brief | Issue 2025/13 | July 2025

doi: 10.2870/9668594
ISBN: 978-92-9466-683-3
ISSN: 2467-4540
QM-01-25-108-EN-N

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced StudiesThe Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Professor Erik Jones, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European in-tegration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major re-search programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, de-velopments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world.