Case C-571/25 P: Appeal brought on 28 August 2025 by MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG, in liquidation against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 18 June 2025 in Case T-450/22, MeSoFa v SRB
Date: 2025-08-28
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: EU banking union, bank, bank resolution, company in difficulties, rights of the defence








C_202505441EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/5441


20.10.2025






Appeal brought on 28 August 2025 by MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG, in liquidation against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 18 June 2025 in Case T-450/22, MeSoFa v SRB


(Case C-571/25 P)

(C/2025/5441)
Language of the case: English

Parties


Appellant: MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG, in liquidation (represented by: M. Fellner and P. Blaschke, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Single Resolution Board (SRB), European Central Bank (ECB)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:






—


set aside the judgement under appeal










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declare void the Decision SRB/EES/2022/19 of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) of 1 March 2022 concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Sberbank Europe AG;










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order the SRB and ECB to bear their own costs incurred before the General Court and the Court of Justice;










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order the SRB to bear the appellant’s costs incurred before the General Court and the Court of Justice.





Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on six grounds of appeal.
First, the appellant argues that the SRB did not have the power to adopt a non-resolution decision in relation to the appellant. The appellant claims that the General Court erred in assuming that the SRB did have the power to do so and argues that such power (i) cannot be derived from Article 7(2) of Regulation 806/2014 (1) (‘SRMR’); (ii) would be contrary to Article 18(1) of the SRMR which does not provide for non-resolution decisions; (iii) would require the involvement of the Commission and the Council if the power of passing non-resolution decisions existed at all; and (iv) is not required to allow for a review of the failing or likely to fail assessment.
Second, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in assuming that the appellant’s right to be heard had not been violated by the SRB in its decision of 1 March 2022 since (i) the appellant had not only disputed the assessment by the SRB in relation to Article 18(1) lit a) and b) of the SRMR but also the assessment in relation to Article 18(1) lit c) of the SRMR; (ii) had not been heard in relation to all of the requirements contained in Article 18(1) lit a) through c) of the SRMR; and that (iii) the right to be heard in relation to the requirements contained in Article 18(1) lit a) and b) of the SRMR had not been consumed by the management board of the appellant complying with information obligation under banking law prior to resolution proceedings.
Third, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in assuming that the SRB in the decision of 1 March 2022 provided sufficient statements of reasons in relation to why no alternative measures in relation to Article 18(1) point b) of the SRMR were available and for deviating from the drawn up resolution plan.
Fourth, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in assuming that the SRB in the decision of 1 March 2022 properly applied Article 18(1)(b) of the SRMR, in particular, since the SRB was not entitled to rely on findings of the ECB in this respect and wrongfully rejected a possible private-market transaction as viable alternative measure.
Fifth, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in rejecting as unfounded the appellant’s plea that the SRB’s decision of 1 March 2022 infringes the principle of proportionality.
Sixth, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in rejecting as unfounded the appellant’s plea that the SRB was not entitled to deviate from the resolution plan based on the third paragraph of Article 23 of the SRMR. A deviation from the resolution plan requires that the resolution objectives can be achieved more effectively, while the SRB only established that a deviation from the resolution plan would not put the resolution objectives at risk, which is something completely different.


(1)  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014, L 225, p. 1).


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/5441/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)