Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity and relevant framework conditions : final report.
Date: 2025-08-21
Institutions: Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport
Subjects: EU Member State, EU law, common transport policy, cost-benefit analysis, rail transport, report, transport capacity, transport infrastructure, transport market, transport planning

Study assessing the 
management of infrastructure 
works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant 
framework conditions 

Final Report 

Written by 
July - 2025 

EURO  IMMO  TRANS  CONSEIL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport 
Directorate C - Land 
Unit C.3 – Single European Rail Area 

Contact: Sandro Santamato (Head of Unit) 

E-mail:  move-c3-secretariat@ec.europa.eu 

European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Study assessing the 
management of infrastructure 
works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant 
framework conditions 

Final Report 

Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport 
Directorate C - Land 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025 

ISBN 978-92-68-31054-0 
doi:10.2832/8787968 

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Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
and relevant framework conditions 

Table of Contents 

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. 5 

CONTENU .................................................................................................................. 6 

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG ................................................................................................... 7 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 

SYNTHÈSE .................................................................. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG .................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 8 
1.1.  Rational of the study ................................................................................... 8 
1.2.  Study objectives ......................................................................................... 9 

2.  OVERVIEW OF THE DATA GATHERING EXERCISE ...................................................... 9 
2.1.  Timeline .................................................................................................. 10 
2.2.  Desk research .......................................................................................... 10 
2.3.  Stakeholder consultation approach .............................................................. 11 
Targeted online consultation ........................................................................... 12 
Focus groups ................................................................................................... 12 
Interviews and on-line meetings ..................................................................... 20 
2.4.  Presentation and validation sessions ............................................................ 21 

3.1. 

3.  STUDY RESULTS ................................................................................................ 22 
Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers ..................................... 22 
Implementation of EU legislation on TCR planning ...................................... 22 
Analysis of specific rules for traffic management on double tracks lines....... 34 
3.2. Planning and implementation of TCR .............................................................. 35 
Different approaches to planning TCRs and related coordination activities... 35 
Factors that hamper a stable planning of TCRs .............................................. 44 
Real  use  of  the  period  dedicated  for  TCRs  where  there  is  periodical 

planning ............................................................................................. 58 
3.3. Impacts of TCRs on rail stakeholders .............................................................. 59 
Revenue losses due to TRCs ........................................................................... 59 
TCR impact on the quality of rail services ...................................................... 64 

4.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................. 75 
4.1.  Conclusions and recommendations on each study area ........................................... 75 
Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers ............ 75 
Area 2 - Planning and implementation of TCR ........................................ 78 
Area 3 - Impacts of TCRs on rail stakeholders ........................................ 82 

ANNEX  1  –  TARGETED  COUNTRIES  COMPLIANCE  WITH  THE  COMMISSION  DELEGATED 

DECISION 2017/2075 (ANNEX VII) ...................................................................... 85 

ANNEX  2  –  TARGETED  RFCS  COMPLIANCE  WITH  REGULATION  (EU)  NO  913/2010  ART.12 

TO ART.18 ........................................................................................................ 86 

ANNEX  3  –  ANALYSIS  OF  SPECIFIC  RULES  FOR  TRAFFIC  MANAGEMENT  ON  DOUBLE 

TRACKS LINES .................................................................................................. 87 

ANNEX 4 – TARGETED ONLINE CONSULTATION ............................................................. 88 

ANNEX 5 – CASE STUDIES ......................................................................................... 89 

ANNEX 6 – COUNTRY FICHES ...................................................................................... 90 

ANNEX 7 – QUANTITATIVE DATA EXCEL FILE ............................................................... 103 

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Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
and relevant framework conditions 

ANNEX 8 – METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ................................................................... 104 

ANNEX 9 – SOURCES FOR DESK RESEARCH ................................................................. 106 

ANNEX  10  -  HIGH  LEVEL  COST-BENEFIT  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MEASURES  TO  IMPROVE  THE 

CURRENT SITUATION ......................................................................................... 108 

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Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
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List of acronyms 

Acronym 

Full name 

AT  

BE  

BG  

CBA 

CID 

CIP 

CY  

CZ  

DE  

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Cost-benefit analysis 

Corridor Information Document 

Customer Information Platform 

Cyprus 

Czech Republic 

Germany (including former GDR from 1991) 

DG MOVE 

Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport 

DK  

EC 

EE  

EL  

Denmark 

European Commission 

Estonia 

Greece 

ERADIS 

European Railway Agency Database of Interoperability and Safety 

ES  

EU 

FI  

FR  

FTE 

HR  

HU  

ICM 

IE  

IM 

IRG 

ISCO 

IT  

LT  

LU  

Spain 

European Union 

Finland 

France 

Forum Train Europe 

Croatia 

Hungary 

International Contingency Management 

Ireland 

Infrastructure Manager 

Independent Regulators’ Group 

International standard classification of occupations 

Italy 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

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Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
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LV  

MS 

MT  

NL  

NS 

OSS 

PaPs 

PL  

PT  

RFC 

Latvia 

EU Member State 

Malta 

The Netherlands 

Infrastructure Manager Network Statement 

One-stop shop 

Pre-Arranged Paths 

Poland 

Portugal 

Rail Freight Corridor 

RNAO 

Railway Network Access Ordinance 

RNE 

RO  

RU 

SE  

SERA 

SFOs 

SI  

SK  

Rail Net Europe 

Romania 

Railway Undertaking 

Sweden 

Single European Railway Area 

Service Facilities Operators  

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

SMSS 

Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy 

TAC 

TCR 

Track Access Charge 

Temporary Capacity Restriction 

TEN-T 

Trans-European Transport network 

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Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
and relevant framework conditions 

ABSTRACT 

This document is the final report of the European Commission (DG MOVE) study on the management 
of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity. The study addresses three primary areas: 

a)  analysis  of  the  implementation  of  European  law  on  planned  temporary  capacity  restrictions 

(TCRs); 

b)  current approaches to planning and implementing TCRs and associated hindering factors; 
c)  analysis of the impacts of TCRs on rail stakeholders. 

The study results are based on 20 case studies focusing on TCRs in Europe, conducted through focus 
groups  and  interviews  with  relevant  stakeholders,  including  Infrastructure  Managers,  Railway 
Undertakings and Industry Associations. 

Based  on  this  analysis,  the  study  formulates  conclusions  and recommendations  alongside proposed 
measures  to  ensure  a  more  stable  and  better  coordinated  planning,  management  and  execution  of 
TCRs in Europe. The proposed measures are supported by tentative estimates of costs and benefits. 

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Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
and relevant framework conditions 

CONTENU 

Ce document est le rapport final de l’étude de la Commission européenne (DG MOVE) sur la gestion 
des travaux d’infrastructure ayant une incidence sur la capacité du réseau ferroviaire. L’étude porte 
sur trois domaines principaux: 

a) 

b) 

c) 

l’analyse de la mise en œuvre de la législation européenne sur les restrictions temporaires de 
capacité planifiées (Temporary Capacity Restrictions - TCR); 
les  approches  actuelles  en  matière  de  planification  et  de  mise  en  œuvre  des  TCR  et  les 
obstacles associés; 
l’analyse des incidences des TCR sur les parties prenantes du secteur ferroviaire. 

Les résultats de l’étude se fondent sur 20 études de cas de TCR en Europe. Elles ont été réalisées 
par  l’intermédiaire  de  groupes  de  réflexion  et  d’entretiens  avec  les  parties  prenantes  concernées,  y 
compris  des  gestionnaires  d’infrastructure,  des  entreprises 
ferroviaires  et  des  associations 
industrielles. 

Sur la base de cette analyse, l’étude formule des conclusions et des recommandations pour garantir 
une  planification,  une  gestion  et  une  exécution  plus  stables  et  mieux  coordonnées  des  TCR  en 
Europe. Les mesures proposées sont étayées par une analyse indicative des coûts-avantages. 

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Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 

Bei  diesem  Dokument  handelt  es  sich  um  den  Abschlussbericht  der  Studie  der  Europäischen 
Kommission  (GD  MOVE)  zur  Planung  und  Durchführung  von  Infrastruktur-Bauarbeiten,  die  sich  auf 
die Kapazität des Schienennetzes  auswirken. Die Studie befasst sich mit drei Hauptbereichen: 

a)  Analyse 

der  Umsetzung 

des 

europäischen  Rechts 

über 

vorübergehende 

Kapazitätsbeschränkungen (TCRs, aus dem Englischen: temporary capacity restrictions); 
b)  aktuelle  Ansätze  für  die  Planung  und  Umsetzung  von  TCRs  und  damit  verbundene 

Herausforderungen; 

c)  Analyse der Auswirkungen von TCRs auf die Akteure des Schienenverkehrs. 

Die  Ergebnisse  der  Studie  stützen  sich  auf  20  Fallstudien  zu  TCRs  in  Europa,  die  im  Rahmen  von 
Fokusgruppen  und  Interviews  mit  einschlägigen  Interessenträgern,  wie  Infrastrukturbetreibern, 
Eisenbahnunternehmen und Industrieverbänden, durchgeführt wurden. 

Auf der Grundlage dieser Analyse werden in der Studie Schlussfolgerungen und Empfehlungen sowie 
Maßnahmenvorschläge  formuliert,  um  eine  stabilere  und  besser  koordinierte  Planung,  Organisation 
und Durchführung von TCRs in Europa zu gewährleisten. Die vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen werden 
durch eine grobe Abschätzung von Kosten und Nutzen untermauert. 

7 

 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
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1.  Introduction 

This document is the final report of the Study assessing the management of infrastructure works 
affecting rail network capacity and relevant framework conditions.  
This  report  provides  full  details  of  the  data  gathering  exercise  applied  to  collect  the  information 
for  the  tasks  that  make  up  the  study,  including  the  approach  to  the  desk  research  and  the 
stakeholder consultation activities. Furthermore, the report provides the findings regarding each area 
of  analysis,  the  study’s  conclusions,  and  recommendations  as  well  as  a  high-level  cost  benefit 
analysis on measures to improve Temporary Capacity Restrictions (TCRs) in Europe. 
Accordingly, the report follows the following structure, including: 

•  Chapter 1 introduces the study and explains the rationale behind; 

•  Chapter 2 presents an overview of the strategy employed for the data gathering activities; 

•  Chapter 3 presents the findings to date, articulated along the 3 areas of analysis of this study, 

namely: 

o 

Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

o  Planning and implementation of TCR 

o 

Impacts of TCRs on rail stakeholders 

•  Chapter  4  presents  the  conclusions  and  recommendations  and  the  high-level  cost-benefit 

analysis of the measures to improve the current situation. 

1.1.  Rational of the study 

The  European  railway  network  serves  as  a  critical  backbone  for  the  continent's  transportation 
and  economy.  Spanning  approximately  200.100  kilometres1,  it  represents  one  of  the  densest  and 
most utilised railway networks globally. The railway network in Europe is not just a means of transport, 
but a vital component of the European Union's (EU) strategy (part of the European Green Deal2) for 
a  competitive  and  resource-efficient  transport  system.  It  plays  a  significant  role  in  achieving  the 
EU’ goals of climate neutrality by 2050 and reduce transport emissions by 90% by 2050.  

Historically,  each  Member  State  of  the  EU  has  developed  its  own  railway  system,  leading  to  a 
patchwork of infrastructure and regulations. This lack of uniformity has resulted in discrepancies in 
the  quality  and  efficiency  of  rail  services,  as  well  as  in  the  development  of  differing  standards  (e.g., 
different track gauges, loading gauge, electrification, and signalling system), posing challenges to the 
seamless integration and operation of a pan-European railway network. 

Over the last 30 years, strong efforts have been put in place by the Commission in view of establishing 
a Single European Railway Area (SERA). Four legislative packages were adopted between 2001 and 
2016  cross  cutting  three  main  areas:  market  opening  to  competition,  interoperability  &  safety,  and 
development of rail infrastructure. Framework conditions for SERA cover areas such as charging and 
capacity  allocation  rules,  common  provisions  on  licensing  of  Railway  Undertakings  (RUs)  and  train 
driver  certification,  safety  requirements,  the  creation  of  the  European  Agency  for  railways  and  rail 
regulatory bodies in each Member State as well as rail passenger rights3. 

A  key  role  to  ensure  a  more  resilient  and  reliant  rail  transport  is  played  by  rail  Temporary  Capacity 
Restrictions  (TCRs),  which  often  derive  from  interventions  on  the  network  for  purposes  of 
maintenance,  renewal,  upgrade,  and  development  of  new  infrastructure.  As  such,  prior  adaption  of 
timetables  and  planning  of  alternative  train  paths  and  routes  are  crucial  aspects  to  guarantee  traffic 

1   Eighth monitoring report on the development of the rail market under Article 15(4) of Directive 2012/34/EU 

of the European Parliament and of the Council (2023) 

2   https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en 

3   Railway packages (europa.eu) 

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Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
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flow  and  the  coordination  between  Infrastructure  Managers  (IMs)  and  RUs  is  key  to  make 
infrastructure  available  in  appropriate  quality,  reliability,  and  volume  to  meet  traffic  needs,  ensuring 
that rail freight traffic is an attractive alternative to other modes of transport. 

Without  proper  management,  coordination,  and  timely communication, such restrictions can  become 
major bottlenecks in the rail network, particularly at cross-border traffic. The negative impacts of such 
inadequate  coordination  were  heavily  experienced  in  several  cases  around  Europe,  which  impacted 
rail traffic throughout the EU and called for more coordinated action among different players. 

However,  as  TCRs  are  also  necessary  for  the  due  maintenance  of  rail  infrastructure  and  its 
development,  such  cases,  and  unplanned  disruptions,  as  Rastatt,  have  led  to  the  development  of 
more  harmonised  actions  and  tools  for  rail  capacity  management  at  EU  level,  such  as  the 
development  of  the  International  Contingency  Management  Handbook,  the  TCR  guidelines  and  the 
Commission  legislative  proposal  on  Cross-border  rail  traffic  –  better  management  and  coordination. 
The  Directive  2012/34  on  establishing  a  single  European  Railway  Area  (Annex  VII)  lays  down  the 
specifications  for  the  schedule  of  the  allocation  process,  ensuring  the  implementation  of  a  common 
TCR  process  throughout  Europe.  The  European  Commission  replaced  Annex  VII  of  Directive 
2012/34/EU  with  Delegated  Decision  (EU)  2017/2075,  aimed  at  increasing  the  transparency  of  the 
process for planning, coordinating, and communicating TCRs. 

The revision of Annex VII ensures that IMs involve the main stakeholders affected by TCRs at an early 
stage, increasing the coordination between stakeholders and trying to avoid unnecessary rail network 
bottlenecks.  The  Delegated  Decision  (EU)  2017/2075  replacing  Annex  VII  of  Directive  2012/34/EU 
introduces a set of rules for IMs in respect of the consultation, publication, and coordination between 
IMs concerning Temporary Capacity Restrictions. 

In addition, RFCs were expected to play an important role in the coordination of the planning of works 
along  the  railway  lines,  helping  to  reduce  the  impact  of  works  to  a  minimum  as  well  as  to  find 
alternative  train  paths  or  routes  -  in  case  of  planned  line  closures  or  capacity  restrictions  –  to  keep 
freight traffic running, especially across borders. 

In July 2023 the Commission published a proposal for a regulation on the use of railway infrastructure 
capacity4, as part of the Greening Freight Transport Package, establishing a set of new rules for rail 
capacity  management,  traffic  management  and  performance  management  that  will  amend  the 
Directive  2012/34/EU  and  Rail  Freight  corridor  Regulation  (EU)  No  913/2010.  The  proposal  aims  to 
improve rail’s capacity planning and cross-border coordination, increase punctuality and reliability, and 
boost  European  sector’s  attractiveness  and  competition.  Additionally,  it  repeals  the  RFCs  to  have  a 
network-centred  approach  instead  of  a  corridor  approach.  With  this,  the  proposal  is  expected  to 
improve rail performance and reduce some of the operational costs to IMs and RU. 

1.2.  Study objectives 

Against the backdrop described in the previous  chapter, the overarching objective of this study is  to 
examine  the  factors  that  impede  a  more  cohesive  and  coordinated  approach  to  planning 
temporary capacity restrictions within the rail network. Specifically, the study seeks to evaluate the 
impact  of  these  restrictions  on  various  stakeholders  within  the  rail  industry  for  both  domestic  and 
international  services,  while  also  considering  the  ramifications  for  both  rail  freight  and  passenger 
markets.  The  study  in  fact,  is  expected  to  determine  how  to  better  enforce  existing  legislation, 
including  insights  into  the  implementation  of  a  revised  legal  framework.  It  also  aims  to  offer  initial 
guidance on such frameworks, considering ongoing legislative initiatives at both the EU and national 
level. Drawing from the experiences of the engaged stakeholders in planning and overall management 
of TCRs, the study seeks to provide valuable insights for improving the overall management of these 
restrictions. 
2.  Overview of the data gathering exercise  

The data gathering strategy has been meticulously designed to ensure robust triangulation of data by 
leveraging  various  sources  and  engaging  diverse  stakeholders  on  multiple  facets  of  the  same  topic 
through  different  methods  of  interaction.  Specifically,  this  strategy  integrates  comprehensive  desk 

4   Green Deal: Greening freight for more economic gain with less environmental impact 

9 

 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
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research  with  a  range  of  stakeholder  consultation  activities.  These  activities  include  a  targeted 
online  consultation,  stakeholder  interviews,  20  focus  groups,  a  roundtable  meeting  with  RFC 
Managing Directors, and a final presentation of the study, as elaborated in subsequent sections. 
At the time of this report, the targeted online consultation has been concluded, while the focus groups 
and  interviews  are  ongoing,  and  the  roundtable  is  pending  organisation.  The  findings  from  all 
consultation activities will be incorporated into the final report. 

2.1.  Timeline 

The  consultation  period  commenced  on  December  6th,  2023,  with  the  launch  of  the  targeted  online 
consultation. It continued until May 28th, 2024, aligning with the Roundtable with the RFC Managing 
Directors. The period concluded in June 2024, following the collection of final inputs from stakeholders 
participating  in  the  focus  groups.  The  timeline  below  outlines  the  sequence  of  consultation  activities 
undertaken by the Consortium.  

Figure 1: Study timeline 

2.2.  Desk research 

A  thorough  desk  research  has  been  conducted  by  the  project  team  to  collect  quantitative  and 
qualitative data. A large variety of data sources were reviewed, as presented in Annex 9 – Sources for 
desk  research.  notable  examples  include  guidelines  published  by  rail  associations  (e.g.,  FTE  and 
RNE),  Network  Statements  (NSs),  Corridor  Information  Documents  (CIDs),  Contractual  Agreements 
between  IMs  and  National  Authorities,  IM  business  plans,  relevant  studies  published  by  industry 
associations, public reports from the European Court of Auditors and the European parliament as well 
as databases such as the Eurostat or the European Railway Agency Database of Interoperability and 
Safety (ERADIS). 

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Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
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2.3.  Stakeholder consultation approach 

Several activities of stakeholder consultation have been performed during this study. The table below 
illustrates each of them, describing the objective and timing.  

Table 1: stakeholder consultation means 

#  Means 

Objective 

Timing 

1 

Targeted online 
consultation 

Collect evidence on key topics regarding the 
implementation of the TCR regulation 

6th December 2023 to 7th 
February 2024 

2 

Focus groups 

Investigate the evolution of the TCR methodology at 
national and RFC level 

February to May 2024 

3 

Interviews 

Fill the gaps left open by previous consultation activities 

December 2023 to June 2024 

4 

Presentation and 
validation session  

Discuss the preliminary results of the study with the RFC 
MDs and FTE 

May 2024 

5 

Study’s final presentation 

Present the study during an industry event. The 
alternatives under evaluation are the Single European 
Railway Area Forum or the InnoTrans 2024 event 

September 2024 (SERAF 
Forum) 

October 2024 (InnoTrans) 

Overall, 16 Stakeholder categories have been consulted. For the sake of the easiness of information 
representation  in  this  study,  these  categories  have  been  grouped  into  7  macro-categories,  as 
illustrated in the table below.  

Table 2: Classification of the consulted stakeholders 

Stakeholder group 

Revised classification 

Acronym (if applicable) 

Managing  Director  of  Rail 
Freight Corridor (RFC) 

Managing Director of RFC 

MD RFC 

Infrastructure Manager and related associations 

IMs 

Infrastructure Managers 

Railway and IM association 

Railway Undertakings 

Other industry association 

Rail Regulatory Bodies 

Transport Ministries 

Path Allocation Bodies 

National Safety Authorities 

Railway Undertakings and related associations 

Public Transport Authorities 

RUs 

PTA 

SFOs 

Freight 
Operators (SFOs) 

Service 

Facilities 

Service Facilities Operator 

Maintenance works companies 

Construction companies 

Shipper or Freight end client 

Maintenance & construction companies 

Clients  of  Freight  Network  and 
their associations 

Freight Client 

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Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
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Targeted online consultation 
The objective of the questionnaire is to collect evidence on the (i)  compliance of MS and IMs with 
the relevant EU legislation on TCR5 and the key barriers or ‘pain points’ to the implementation 
of EU legislation, the (ii) performance of planning and implementation of TCRs, (iii) the impacts 
of TCRs on rail stakeholders, and the (iv) possible measures to improve the process of TCRs. In 
detail, the surveys focused on gathering quantitative data, including indicators in terms of costs and 
operational performance on TCRs. The  questionnaire was launched on  December 6th, 2023, with 
an  initial  deadline  set  for  January  26th,  2024.  However,  to  accommodate  the  requests  from 
stakeholders  to  grant  an  extension  of  the  deadline  for  the  online  survey,  the  duration  has  been 
extended  to  February  7th,  2024.  Overall,  106  responses  covering  12  stakeholder  groups,  19  EU 
Member  States  as  well  as  the  non-EU  country  of  Switzerland  have  been  collected  throughout  the 
online  questionnaire.  The  targeted  online  questionnaire  was  designed  on  a  survey  design  software, 
and  results  have  been  analysed  using  data  science  and  analytics  software,  complemented  with 
manual analysis.  

Below we provide an overview of the engagement level per country. 

        Freight client 

Infrastructure 
Manager and related 
association  

Managing 
director of RFC 

Railway 

Undertaking and 
related association  

Public Transport 

authorities  

 Service 
Facilities Operators  

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

1 

6 

1 

1 

1 

2 

2 

2 

1 

8 

6 

1 

2 

1 

2 

2 

1 

4 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

2 

1 

2 

1 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

2 

AT BE BG HR CZ DK EE EU FR DE EL HU IT

LV LT LU PL RO SK SI ES SE CH NL

The results of the survey are presented in an ad-hoc annex attached to the final report (See Annex 4). 

Focus groups 
To  highlight  best  practices  and  challenges  in  the  implementation  of  European  laws  on  Temporary 
Capacity  Restrictions  (TCR),  and  to  identify  prevailing  market  practices  in  their  coordination, 
management,  and  execution,  as  well  as  the  key  obstacles  to  reliable  and  stable  maintenance 
planning, we developed 20 case studies in collaboration with the European Commission. 

5   Please consult chapter 3.1 for additional information on the European legislation concerning TCRs. 

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To  inform  these  case  studies,  we  conducted  20  focus  groups  to  gather  practical  insights  into  TCR 
implementation  and  related  legislation.  Each  focus  group  included  the  Managing  Director  of  the 
relevant Rail Freight Corridor, the concerned Infrastructure Managers (IMs) and Railway Undertakings 
(RUs), along with selected stakeholders such as intermodal operators and port authorities. In addition, 
targeted follow-up interviews were carried out to complement the discussions. 

.

13 

 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity and relevant framework conditions 

The following table presents the status of the focus groups as well as a list of attending organisations. 

Table 3: Focus groups status 

# 

Case study 

Description  

Relevant 
corridor 

Relevant 
Member 
State(s) 

Focus 
group date 

Attending IMs  Attending RUs 

Other 
attending 
stakeholders 

1 

Brenner Axis 

The Brenner Axis is the most important Alpine pass for freight transport, 
connecting Italy to Austria and Germany, with a daily capacity of 100 
freight trains. The line (Verona – Munich) is managed by three 
infrastructure managers (RFI, DB InfraGo and ÖBB-Infra) and it is part 
of the RFC 3. The coordination amongst the 3 IMs and railway 
stakeholders related but not limited to TCRs takes place in the “Brenner 
working group”, which is considered a best practice in Europe. 

Italy 

RFI 

RFC 3 

Austria 

13.02.2024 

DB InfraGO 

Germany 

ÖBB-Infra 

Trenitalia 

Mercitalia 

DB Cargo 

Rail Traction 

Rail Cargo 
Austria 

FTE 

TCR coordination on 
Woippy – Mannheim line 

This cross-border section supports a major part of the rail freight traffic 
connecting Spain to Germany on the Atlantic and Mediterranean side. In 
case of traffic disruption or important TCR affecting RFC1 or RFC2, it 
could be also used as alternative itinerary for connecting both RFCs (as it 
was the case during the Rastatt incident, and it would be the case in 2024 
during the work period planned on RFC1). The TCR impact on the 
AtlanticTTR pilot implemented between Miranda de Ebro and Mannheim 
is also highlighted. 

RFC 4 

Germany 

France 

06.02.2024 

SNCF Réseau 

DB InfraGO 

SNCF Mobilités 

Fret SNCF 

KTL terminal 

2 

3 

4 

Rehabilitation works on 
the Arad–Simeria 
section* 

The reconstruction works on the Arad–Simeria section which requires 
use of alternative routes and continuous closures on one track of the two 
with different duration. Use of alternative routes cause major 
operational challenges for the RUs and are affected by ILB issues. 

RFC 7 

RFC 9 

Upgrade works for the 
German section of 
Betuwe line 

Multi-track expansion with increased line capacity and modernisation of 
technologies between Emmerich & Oberhausen 

RFC 9 

Romania 

Hungary 

Germany 

The 
Netherlands 

07.02.2024 

CFR 

02.02.2024 

DB InfraGo 

14 

DB CARGO 

CFR Marfa 

DB Cargo 

Rail Cargo 
Romania 

DB Cargo 

Lineas 

n/a 

n/a 

 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity and relevant framework conditions 

# 

Case study 

Description  

Relevant 
corridor 

Relevant 
Member 
State(s) 

Focus 
group date 

Attending IMs  Attending RUs 

Other 
attending 
stakeholders 

Maurienne valley traffic 
disruption (2023) 

On August 27th, 2023, an important rockslide has destroyed the rail line 
Montmelian-Modane in the Maurienne Valley (France) and damaged the 
adjacent highway. The line is expected to reopen by the middle of 
November 2024, after the mountainside has been secured and the line 
reconstructed. Concurrently, as traffic on the highway was cancelled for 
13 days, the maintenance period of the Mont Blanc Road tunnel (used as 
road alternative itinerary) was postponed 

RFC 6 

Italy 

France 

12.02.2024 

n/a6 

DB Cargo 

Mercitalia 

Captrain 

Fret SNCF 

SNCF Voyageurs 

Trenitalia7 

T3M 

Modernisation of the 
Warsaw West station 

Modernisation of Warsaw West station and the work impact on the 
corridors’ activities, across east-west operations 

German-Dutch border on 
the two alternative routes 
via Venlo and Emmerich 

The RFC Rhine-Alpine branches off into two lines near the Germany-
Netherlands border, a Southern line passes through Venlo, while a 
Northern line passes through Emmerich. Temporary Capacity 
restrictions in one of these lines is typically rerouted through the other.  

Renovation of the 
Budapest-Hegyeshalom 
line (2023) 

During regular safety checks and resistance measurements, some 
irregularities were identified requiring immediate interventions. 
Additionally, faults in the substructure were detected, leading to the 
urgent implementation of speed reduction measures and unplanned 
infrastructure works for the restoring of the infrastructure parameters 
and improved operations. 

RFC 5 

RFC 8 

RFC 1 

RFC 7 

RFC 9 

Poland 

10.05.2024 

13.05.2024 

- 

DB Cargo 

PKP Intercity8 

Rail  Terminal 
Rzepin 

RFC 11 MD 

06.05.2024 

DB InfraGO 

Lineas 

RFC 1 MD 

Hupac 

Germany 

The 
Netherlands  

Hungary 

Slovakia 

08.02.2024 

MÁV 

Rail Cargo 

n/a 

Austria 

5 

6 

7 

8 

6   Dedicated meeting with RFI organized on 01.03.2024 

7   Dedicated meeting with Trenitalia organized on 01.03.2024 

8   Dedicated meeting with PKP Intercity on 13.05.2024 

15 

 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity and relevant framework conditions 

# 

Case study 

Description  

Relevant 
corridor 

Relevant 
Member 
State(s) 

Focus 
group date 

Attending IMs  Attending RUs 

Other 
attending 
stakeholders 

9 

Works in the HS station of 
Madrid Puerta de Atocha 
(2020) 

10 

Divača-Koper line 
doubling project 

11 

Tunnel works on the 
Bologna-Prato line 

Due to the saturation of Madrid-Puerta de Atocha station, declared in the 
Network Statement ), and although Madrid-Chamartín is also saturated 
according to the NS, the multi-annual framework agreement set by ADIF-
AV in 2019 determined that Madrid-Chamartín was set to be the headend 
station for the Levante corridor. Nevertheless, delays in the scheduled 
works to increase the capacity of Madrid-Chamartín station to 
accommodate standard UIC gauge high-speed services on the Levante 
corridor delayed the transfer of all RENFE AVE and AVLO services 
between Madrid and Valencia to Madrid-Chamartín until January 2023. 
In November 2022, OUIGO Spain filed a formal complaint against ADIF 
(the Spanish IM) and Renfe, alleging capacity modifications before prior 
authorisation from the regulatory body, the Comision nacional de los 
mercados y la competencia (CNMC), thus not following the rules set out 
in the framework agreements for the allocation of rail infrastructure 
capacity.  

The  railway  line  connects  the  city  of  Divača  with  the  port  of  Koper 
(Slovenia),  a  new  track  is  under  construction,  which  will  double  the 
available  capacity  and  reduce  travel  times.  For  this  reason,  in  the  last 
few years, the historic line the is completely closed 2 Mondays per month 
(from 7 AM to 17 PM) and for four consecutive days in multiple occasions 
during 2023. 

The  Bologna-Prato  line  passing  through  the  Apennine  mountains  is 
undergoing  gauge  upgrades  in  compliance  with  T-ENT  standards.  The 
line,  part  of  the  RFC  3,  sees  programmed  partially  and  full  closures 
mostly  in  the  summer  period  from  2021  to  2026.  The  scheduling  of  the 
works has been coordinated between RFI, Regione Toscana and Regione 
Emilia  Romagna  through  a  memorandum  of  understanding.  In  parallel 
to the TCRs, an integrative passenger services if offered. 

RFC 4 

RFC 6 

Spain 

27.02.20249 

n/a 

OUIGO Spain 

ADIF 

CNMC 
(Regulatory 
Body) 

RFC 6 

Slovenia 

05.02.2024 

Slovenske 
železnice 

Rail Cargo 

Port of Koper 

RFC 3 

Italy 

11.04.2024 

RFI 

DB Cargo 

Italo – NTV 

FTE 

9   Not all stakeholders were available, with the first meeting only taking place with one of the RUs. A follow-up meeting will take place on 28.02.2024. In addition, a third 

dedicated meeting with CNMC (the Spanish Regulatory Body) took place on 14.03.2024. 

16 

 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity and relevant framework conditions 

# 

Case study 

Description  

Relevant 
corridor 

Relevant 
Member 
State(s) 

Focus 
group date 

Attending IMs  Attending RUs 

Other 
attending 
stakeholders 

12 

Maurienne valley traffic 
disruption (2019) 

On July 2nd, 2019, a mudslide caused by intense storms disrupted railway 
traffic  between  Modane  and  St-Michel  de  Maurienne,  in  the  French 
Alpine  region.  The  line  was  closed  for  20  days  until  July  22nd,  2019, 
affecting  train  travel  on  the  route  between  Paris,  Turin  and  Milan  and 
impacting more than 500 freight trains. Only 10% of trains were able to 
be  rerouted  through  Switzerland  for  technical  (availability  of  ad  hoc 
locomotive  and  drivers  for  alternative  routes)  and  financial  (high  fees 
paid to SBB in Switzerland) reasons. 

RFC 6 

Italy 

France 

12.02.2024 

n/a10 

DB Cargo 

Mercitalia 

Captrain 

Fret SNCF 

SNCF Voyageurs 

Trenitalia11 

T3M 

13 

14 

Infrastructure works in 
Bulgaria (2023) 

Modernisation and expansion of tracks on ElinPelin – Kostenets (51Km), 
stations  and  platform  improvements  along  with  construction  of  tunnels 
and bridges. Operational implications and performance actions. 

RFC7 

Bulgaria 

05.02.2024 

BDZ 

BDZ Cargo 

n/a 

DB InfraGO programme – 
High performance 
network (2023) 

Planned TCR to modernise the track with ETCS and increase the number 
of  signal  blocks  (without  speed  optimisation)  during  construction 
electronic  interlocking  (ESTW)  for  the  Riedbahn  section  between 
Frankfurt/Main and Mannheim 

RFC 9 

Germany 

02.02.2024 

DB InfraGO 

DB Cargo 

Lineas 

n/a 

15 

Poznań-Warsaw line 

Important infrastructure works on North Sea-Baltic Sea CNC bridging 
the missing link Warszawa/Idzikowice – Poznań/ Wrocław, removing 
existing bottlenecks, reduce the travel time, increase rail interoperability 
and the capacity of the railway infrastructure. 

RFC 8 

RFC 11 

Poland 

10.05.2024 

13.05.2024 

- 

DB Cargo 

PKP Intercity12 

Rail  Terminal 
Rzepin 

RFC 11 MD 

10   Dedicated meeting with RFI organized on 01.03.2024 

11   Dedicated meeting with Trenitalia organized on 01.03.2024 

12   Dedicated meeting with PKP Intercity on 13.05.2024 

17 

 
 
DB Cargo 

Kombiverkehr 

DSB 

SJ 

n/a 

DB 

DB Cargo 

Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity and relevant framework conditions 

# 

Case study 

Description  

Relevant 
corridor 

Relevant 
Member 
State(s) 

Focus 
group date 

Attending IMs  Attending RUs 

Other 
attending 
stakeholders 

16 

Section south of Sweden 
and north of Germany 
passing through Denmark 

Denmark is a pivotal country in the interchanges between the Northern 
Europe countries: on the one hand it is the access point to continental 
Europe for Sweden and Norway, and on the other hand the traffic 
towards the north of Germany and Europe crosses Denmark. Therefore, 
TCRs in Denmark can have a major impact on the rail traffic at the EU 
level. The coordination between the 3 IMs is fundamental as there are 
not rerouting options in this section of the RFC. 

RFC3 

RFC 7 

RFC 8 

Sweden, 
Germany, 
Denmark  

06.05.2024 

n/a 

17 

Rhine-Valley – Total 
closure Raststatt – Baden-
Baden 

18 

Arlberg line 

To  complete  the  southern  connection  of  the  Rastatt  tunnel,  Deutsche 
Bahn  (DB)  prepares  an  expansion  of  the  Rhine  Valley  Railway  between 
Karlsruhe  and  Basel  in  2024.    A  full  closure  is  planned  for  the  summer, 
passenger  trains  will  be  replaced  with  buses  and  freight  trains  will  be 
rerouted over a wide area. Different rerouting options had been studied 
and  planned  with  diesel  shuttle  via  Wörth  –  Kehl  (i.e.,  via 
Wörth/Lauterbourg (border DE/FR) – Strasbourg/Kehl (FR/DE) and via 
Schaffhausen (DE/CH). 

Works on the Arlberg axis to upgrade 2-tracks and raise the speed up to 
130km/h  between  St.  Margrethen  –  Lauterach;  will  lead  to  a  total 
closure  of  the  line  with  long  rerouting  line  in  Germany  in  2025.  The 
announced  rerouting  line  travels  via  St.  Margrethen  –  München  Süd  – 
Rosenheim to Salzburg. 

RFC 2 

Germany 

24.04.2024 

n/a 

SBB Cargo Int. 

FTE 

RFC 3 

Austria 

24.04.2024 

SBB AG 

Rail Cargo 

DB 

ÖBB 

FTE 

Rail Cargo 

ScanMed RFC 

ÖBB-
Infrastruktur13 

Trafikverket 

19 

TCR coordination on the 
Brussels – Namur line 

For the implementation of 2 additional tracks on the Brussels-Ottignies 
section, important TCR are planned by INFRABEL with an important 
impact on passenger traffic (Intercity and Urban); some rerouting 
options are forecasted by INFRABEL for freight and passengers’ trains 
partly affecting RFC North Sea Mediterranean and including some rail 
freight deviation via France (Artère Nord Est) from/to Luxemburg. 

Belgium 

RFC 2 

France 

18.04.202414 

INFRABEL 

Luxemburg 

SNCB 
Passengers 

LINEAS 

North Sea 
Mediterranean 
RFC (MD & C-
OSS) 

13   Although the IM did not participate in the focus group, they have submitted written relevant information by email the day before. 

14   Additional information was provided by HUPAC intermodal operator on 17th April 2024. 

18 

 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity and relevant framework conditions 

# 

Case study 

Description  

Relevant 
corridor 

Relevant 
Member 
State(s) 

Focus 
group date 

Attending IMs  Attending RUs 

Other 
attending 
stakeholders 

20 

TCR  on  RFC5  between 
Ostrava and Břeclav 

Works were done in a local line between Suchdol 19nd Odrou to Budišov 
19nd  Budišovkou,  with  no  rerouting  options  available  and  passengers’ 
lines were completely replaced by diesel shuttles.  

The  TCR  was  initially  published  in  January  2021  and  confirmed  six 
months later in July 2021, following the guidelines set in Annex VII. 

All  operators  (passenger  and  freight)  were  informed  at  the  same  time 
during  TCR  coordination  meetings.  The  passenger  operators’  solution 
(the use of buses) due to the total closure of the line was discussed with 
the IMs, which paid for by the services, but also must be coordinated with 
the local road authority to keep the roads open to buses during the TCR 
timeframe. 

* Name changed due to relevance for more than one corridor, and being a national project 

RFC 5 

RFC 7 

Czech 
Republic 

07.05.2024 

Spravazeleznic 

n/a 

Baltic-Adriatic 
RFC 

19 

 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
and relevant framework conditions 

Interviews and on-line meetings 
To  supplement  the  information  procured  through  the  focus  groups  and  the  desk  research,  the 
Consortium organises a series of interviews, on-line meetings, and mail interviews (consisting of short 
ad-hoc  questionnaires)  with  key  stakeholders  who  were  unable  to  participate  in  the  targeted  online 
consultation and the focus groups or that the consortium decided to consult given their important role 
in the market.  

Please find a list of scheduled interviews in the following table. 

Table 4: Scheduled interviews 

Stakeholder group 

Stakeholder 

Date 

Purpose 

Public Transport 
authority 

Bundesnetzagentur 
(German rail regulator) 

04/12/2023 

Meeting was organised to gain insights into 
current issues of RUs  with TCRs, regulator 
activities related to TCRs and their rights in 
the current regal framework. 

Railway Undertaking 
and related association 

Forum Train Europe (FTE) 

28/12/2023 

14/12/2023 

18/12/2023 

19/01/2024 

17/05/2024 

15/12/2023 

Infrastructure Manager 
and related association 

Rail Net Europe (RNE) 

21/12/2023 

28/02/2024 

Public authority  

Polish Chamber of 
Commerce 

16/01/2024 

Railway Undertaking 
and related association 

Autoroute Ferroviaire Alpine 

14/02/2024 

Infrastructure Manager 
and related association 

Rete Ferroviaria Italiana 

01/03/2024 

Railway Undertaking 
and related association 

Trenitalia 

01/03/2024 

representatives 

Several meetings were organised with FTE, 
the 
wherein 
organisation  provided  guidance  regarding 
TCRs  as  well  as  some  aspects  of  the 
stakeholder consultation activities. 

from 

the 

last  meeting 

In 
the  Consortium 
presented the preliminary conclusions of the 
Study  and  later  collected  written  feedbacks 
from some of its members 

Within  the  meetings  we  organised  with 
the  study  and 
RNE,  we  presented 
requested  access  to  several  key  sources, 
such as the TCR tool and the working group 
on NS compliance. 

Within  the  meetings  we  organised  with  the 
Polish  Chamber  of  Commerce,  we 
discussed  the  polish  case  studies  and  their 
related 
the 
possibility  of  incorporating  two  Polish  case 
studies into our analysis. 

focus  groups,  evaluating 

As  the  stakeholder  was  not  able  to  attend 
the focus group meeting regarding the case 
studies 
traffic 
disruption 2019 & 2023, we organised this 
interview  as  a  follow-up  to  garner  their 
opinions. 

Maurienne 

valley 

As  the  stakeholder  was  not  able  to  attend 
the focus group meeting regarding the case 
studies 
traffic 
disruption 2019 & 2023, we organised this 
interview  as  a  follow-up  to  garner  their 
opinions 

Maurienne 

valley 

As  the  stakeholder  was  not  able  to  attend 
the focus group meeting regarding the case 
studies 
traffic 
disruption 2019 & 2023, we organised this 
interview  as  a  follow-up  to  garner  their 
opinions 

Maurienne 

valley 

Service Facilities 
Operators (SFOs) 

KTL Ludwigshafen 

T3M France 

19/02/2024 

29/02/2024 

As  these  stakeholders  were  not  able  to 
attend  the  focus  group  meeting  regarding 
the  case  studies  Maurienne  valley  traffic 
disruption  2019  &  2023  and  TCR 
coordination  on  the  Woippy-Mannheim 
line  we  organise  the  interview  as  a  follow 
up to garner their opinions 

20 

 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
and relevant framework conditions 

Stakeholder group 

Stakeholder 

Date 

Purpose 

Forum Train Europe (FTE) 

SBB Cargo 

Statens Järnvägar (SJ) 

Železnice Slovenskej 
republiky 

Railway Undertaking 
and related association 

Správa železnic 

Trenitalia 

09/04/2024 

Société Nationale des 
Chemins de Fer 
Luxembourgeois 

Captrain 

Slovenske železnice 

Infrastructure Manager 
and related association 

Rail Net Europe (RNE) 

12/04/2024 

Railway Undertaking 
and related association 

Danske Statsbaner 

23/04/2024 

to 

we 

provide 

selected 

Based  on  their  responses  to  the  online 
some 
questionnaire, 
stakeholders 
information 
regarding  the  nuances  of  a  series  of  topics 
(i.e., 
the 
implementation  of  Annex  VII  as  well  as 
other  pieces  of  EU 
legislation).  These 
clarifications were gathered through a short 
ad-hoc  questionnaire  answered  directly  via 
mail. 

associated  with 

barriers 

we 

selected 

Based  on  their  responses  to  the  online 
questionnaire, 
certain 
stakeholders to provide detailed information 
on  a  range  of  topics,  including  barriers 
associated  with 
implementation  of 
Annex  VII  and  other  relevant  pieces  of  EU 
clarifications  were 
legislation.  These 
gathered through targeted interviews. 

the 

we 

selected 

Based  on  their  responses  to  the  online 
questionnaire, 
certain 
stakeholders to provide detailed information 
on  a  range  of  topics,  including  barriers 
associated  with 
implementation  of 
Annex  VII  and  other  relevant  pieces  of  EU 
legislation.  These 
clarifications  were 
gathered through targeted interviews. 

the 

Rail Freight Corridors 

Rail Freight Corridors 
Managing Directors 

28/05/2024 

We organized a roundtable meeting with the 
the  Rail  Freight 
Managing  Directors  of 
Corridors  (with 
the  participation  of  DG 
MOVE)  where  the  preliminary  conclusions 
and recommendations were presented. 

Later,  we  collected  written  feedbacks  from 
some RFCs MD and IMs. 

2.4.  Presentation and validation sessions 

The study will be discussed and validated in three separate occasions during the year. Upon request 
of the industry association FTE and agreed by the European Commission, the Consortium provided a 
presentation  of  the  preliminary  results  of  the  study  on  May  17th,  2024.  Furthermore,  The  Consortium 
organised a  roundtable meeting with all RFC Managing Directors, held on May 28th, 2024. The objective of 
these  meetings  was  to  discuss  the  preliminary  results  of  the  study.  Given  their  comprehensive  view  of  the 
project,  FTE  and  the  directors’  inputs  played  a  crucial  role  in  ensuring  the  relevance,  accuracy,  and 
effectiveness of the study outcomes. 

21 

 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
and relevant framework conditions 

3.  Study results  

This  chapter  presents  the  results  of  the  study’s  three  areas  of  analysis.  Specifically,  it  contains  an 
investigation  of  the  implementation  of  the  European  TCR  legislation  and  related  barriers,  an 
examination of the planning an implementation of TCR in Europe, and lastly a deep dive on the TCR’s 
impact on rail stakeholders and quality of service.  

3.1.  Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers  

This  section  outlines  the  study’s  results  on  Area  1,  focusing  on  the  implementation  of  European 
legislation  and  the  barriers  preventing  its  adoption.  Initially  the  reception  of  the  relevant  EU  TCR 
legislation  in  the  in-scope  countries15  and  RFCs16  was  examined  to  cover  the  TCR  perspective 
jointly  with  the  broader  dimension  of  the  capacity  allocation.  Subsequently,  barriers  to  the 
implementation  of  EU  legislation  and  achieving  harmonisation  of  practices  across  Europe  were 
identified. Lastly, an investigation was conducted into the specific rules for traffic management on 
double  tracks  lines  in  the  targeted  countries.  The  analysis  of  Area  1  was  conducted  through  a 
combination  of  desk  research  (as  detailed  paragraph  2.2)  and  targeted  online  consultation  (as 
described paragraph 2.3). 

Furthermore,  the  Area  1  analysis  was  also  shared  with  Rail  Net  Europe  (RNE).  Leveraging  the 
expertise  of  its  members  who  are  knowledgeable  about  the  targeted  countries  and  Rail  Freight 
Corridors  (RFCs),  RNE  provided  valuable  feedback  on  the  analysis.  Subsequently  the  Consortium 
reviewed the received comments and was able  to preliminarily validate Area 1 of the study. The full 
analysis performed for Area 1 is available in the following annexes:  

•  Annex  1  –  Targeted  countries  compliance  with  the  Commission  Delegated  Decision 

2017/2075 (Annex VII); 

•  Annex 2 – Targeted RFCs compliance with Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 art.12 to art.18; 

•  Annex 3 – Analysis of specific rules for traffic management on double tracks lines. 

Implementation of EU legislation on TCR planning 

When  managing  Temporary  Capacity  Restrictions,  several  key  regulations  and  guidelines  offer 
essential  guidance  and  normative  provisions  for  effectively  coordinating  TCRs  across  railway 
infrastructures. The table below provides a comprehensive overview of these regulatory sources and 
operational directives that influence the planning and implementation of TCRs. 

15   Austria,  Czech  Republic,  France,  Germany,  Hungary,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovenia, 

Sweden. 

16   RFC 1 - Rhine-Alpine, RFC 2 - North Sea-Mediterranean, RFC 3 - Scandinavian-Mediterranean, RFC 4 – 
Atlantic, RFC 5 - Baltic-Adriatic, RFC 6 – Mediterranean, RFC 7 - Orient-East Med, RFC 8 - North Sea-
Baltic, RFC 9 - Rhine-Danube. 

22 

 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
and relevant framework conditions 

Table 5: TCR key regulations and guidelines 

Regulations and directives 

Commission  Delegated  Decision 
(EU) 
2017/2075 of 4 September 2017 replacing 
Annex  VII  to  Directive  2012/34/EU  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 
establishing  a  single  European  railway 
area 

Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 from Art. 12 
to Art. 18 

Sectoral guidelines 

RNE  (RailNetEurope)  -  Procedures  for 
Temporary 
Restriction 
Capacity 
Management 

Commission  Delegated  Decision  (EU)  2017/2075  of  4  September  2017 
serves  to  amend  Annex  VII,  a  key  component  in  the  establishment  of  a 
unified  European  railway  network.  The  Decision 
introduces  updated 
provisions aimed at establishing  common deadlines and procedures for the 
consultation, publication, and coordination of TCRs in Europe.  

Regulation  (EU)  No  913/2010  lays  down  rules  for  the  establishment  and 
organisation  of  international  rail  corridors  for  competitive  rail  freight  with  a 
view  to  the  development  of  a  European  rail  network  for  competitive  freight. 
Additionally,  it  sets  out  rules  for  the  selection,  organisation,  management, 
and the indicative investment planning of freight corridors. The general aim is 
to  enhance  the  efficiency  and  interoperability  of  rail  freight  transport  within 
the European Union.  

This  handbook  serves  as  a  guide  for  implementing  the  management  of 
Temporary  Capacity  Restrictions  outlined  in  the  Timetabling  and  Capacity 
Redesign  (TTR)  Process  by  RNE,  for  managing  temporary  capacity 
restrictions,  providing  procedures  and  guidelines  for  effective  handling.  The 
handbook  enhances  the  unified  implementation  of  the  Annex  VII  provisions 
by  providing  a  clear  overview  of  the  steps  to  be  followed  during  TCR 
lifecycles.  Namely,  it  facilitates  the  TCR  Coordination  process  by  outlining 
commonly  agreed  principles  and  methods,  contributes  to  the  unified 
clustering  and  impact  calculation  of  TCRs,  provides  an  overview  of  their 
relation  to  various  TTR  components,  facilitates  the  handling  of  Late  TCRs, 
and  offers  a  unified  method 
for  evaluating  planned  and  real  TCR 
consumption. 

Furthermore, the ongoing legislative initiative aimed at enhancing the management and coordination 
of  cross-border  rail  traffic  (Decide  PLAN/2021/10644),  which  will  entail  revisions  to  the  overarching 
framework for rail capacity management, was duly considered in our interactions with stakeholders. 

Considering  the  prevailing  European  regulations  and  sectoral  guidelines,  this  chapter  presents  the 
preliminary  findings  of  the  compliance  analysis  concerning  the  pertinent  European  legislation  within 
the NS of the IMs of the targeted Member States, as well as in the Corridor Information Documents 
of the Rail Freight Corridors. 

The  study’s  final  report  will  contain  the  finalised  results  of  the  compliance  analysis  below,  validated 
with  the  assistance  of  RNE’s  Network  Statement  &  CID  Working  Group17.  This  group  actively 
promotes  harmonisation  in  the  structure,  and  to  some  extent,  the  content  of  the  NSs  and  CIDs. 
Leveraging  the  expertise  of  national  representatives  from  the  targeted  countries,  the  RNE’s  working 
group will offer feedback on the compliance analysis, aid in further refinements, and ultimately validate 
it before the publication of the final report. 

Targeted  Member  States  Compliance  analysis  to  the  Commission  Delegated 
Decision (EU) 2017/2075 (Annex VII) 

The  compliance  analysis  conducted  within  the  scope  of  this  study  across  the  11  targeted  Member 
States  aims  to  provide  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  current  implementation  status  of  the 
Commission  Delegated  Decision  (EU)  2017/2075  (Annex  VII)  in  these  countries.  Specifically,  the 
analysis  focuses  on  evaluating  the  adherence  of  the  targeted  Member  States  to  the  17  provisions 
outlined in the aforementioned Annex, namely: 

17   RNE. RNE Approach and Structure. Available at: https://rne.eu/organisation/rne-approach-structure/  

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# 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

Table 6: Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2017/2075 (Annex VII)’s provisions 

Provision  

The working timetable shall be established once per calendar year. 

The  change  of  working  timetable  shall  take  place  at  midnight  on  the  second  Saturday  in  December.  When  an 
adjustment is carried out after the winter, it shall take place at midnight on the second Saturday in June.  

The deadline for receipt of requests of capacity to be incorporated into the working timetable shall be no more than 12 
months in advance of the change of the working timetable. 

No  later  than  11  months  before  the  change  of  the  working  timetable,  the  Infrastructure  Managers  shall  ensure  that 
provisional international train paths have been established. 

The Infrastructure Manager shall prepare and publish a draft working timetable at the latest 4 months after the deadline 
set in point n. 3. 

The Infrastructure Manager shall decide on the requests it receives after the deadline in provision n. 3 in accordance 
with  a  process  published  in  the  network’s  statement.  The  Infrastructure  Manager  shall  update  the  draft  working 
timetable no later than one month before its change to include all train paths allocated after the deadline referred to in 
point 3. 

In  the  case  of  trains  crossing  from  one  network  to  another  which  arrive  with  a  presumed  delay  of  no  more  than  18 
hours, the Infrastructure Manager of the other network shall not consider the train path cancelled or request application 
for  another.  The  Infrastructure  Manager  shall  communicate  to  the  applicant  the  updated  or  new  train  path  without 
delay. 

If the temporary restrictions of the capacity of railway lines has a duration of more than  7 consecutive days and results 
in the cancellation, rerouting or replacement of more than 30% of the estimated traffic volume of a railway line per day, 
the  Infrastructure  Managers  concerned  shall  publish  all  capacity  restrictions  and  the  preliminary  results  of  a 
consultation  with  the  applicants  for  a  first  time  at  least  24  months  before  the  change  of  the  working  timetable 
concerned, and they shall release an updated form of the consultation 12 months before. 

Infrastructure  Managers  concerned  shall  create  a  mechanism  whereby  they  jointly  discuss  capacity  restrictions  with 
interested  applicants,  the  associations  of  Infrastructure  Managers  and  the  main  operators  of  service  facilities 
concerned when they are published for the first time. 

10  When  publishing  capacity  restrictions  in  accordance  with  point  (8)  for  a  first  time,  the  Infrastructure  Manager  shall 
launch  a  consultation  with  the  applicants  and  the  main  operators  of  services  facilities  concerned  on  the  capacity 
restrictions. Where a coordination in accordance with point (11) is required between the first and second publication of 
capacity restrictions, Infrastructure Managers shall consult with applicants and the main operators of service facilities 
concerned a second time between the end of that coordination and the second publication of the capacity restriction. 

11  Before  publishing  capacity  restrictions,  if  the  impact  of  the  capacity  restrictions  is  not  limited  to  one  network,  the 
Infrastructure Managers concerned shall coordinate capacity restrictions that could involve a cancellation, rerouting, or 
replacement by other modes. The coordination shall be completed: 

(a)  No  later  than  18  months  before  the  change  of  the  working  timetable  if  more  than  50  %  of  the  estimated  traffic 
volume on a railway line per day is cancelled, rerouted, or replaced by other modes of transport for a duration of more 
than 30 consecutive days 

(b) No later than 13 months and 15 days before the change of the working timetable if more than 30 % of the estimated 
traffic volume on a railway line per day is cancelled, rerouted, or replaced by other modes of transport for a duration of 
more than 7 consecutive days 

(c) No later than 13 months and 15 days before the change of the working timetable if more than 50 % of the estimated 
traffic volume on a railway line per day is cancelled, rerouted, or replaced by other modes of transport for a duration of 
7 consecutive days or less 

12  As  regards  capacity  restrictions  of  a  duration  of  seven  consecutive  days  or  less  for  which  more  than  10%  of  the 
estimated traffic volume on a railway line per day is cancelled, rerouted, or replaced, the Infrastructure Manager shall 
consult  the  applicants  concerned  and  communicate  he  updated  capacity  restrictions  at  least  four  months  before  the 
change of the working timetable 

13 

14 

Infrastructure Managers may apply more stringent thresholds for capacity restrictions based on lower percentages of 
estimated traffic volumes or shorter durations, pursuant to a consultation with applicants and facility operators. 

The Infrastructure Manager may decide not to apply the periods laid down in the previous points (no. 8 and 12) if the 
capacity restriction is necessary to re-establish safe train operations, the timing of the restrictions is beyond the control 
of the manager, the application of those period would be cost ineffective or unnecessarily damaging, or if all concerned 
applicants agree. The Infrastructure Managers shall consult the applicants and the main operators of services facilities 
in these cases. 

24 

 
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# 

Provision  

15 

The information to be provided by the Infrastructure Manager when acting in accordance with points n. 8, 12 or 14 shall 
include: (i) the planned day; (ii) time of day of the capacity restriction; (iii) the section of line affected by the restriction; 
(iv) where applicable, the capacity of divisionary lines. Such information shall be published in the NS and kept updated. 

16  As  regards  capacity  restrictions  of  a  duration  of  at  least  30  consecutive  days  and  affecting  more  than  50%  of  the 
estimated traffic volume on a railway line, the Infrastructure Manager shall (if requested) provide the applicants with a 
comparison of the conditions to be encountered under at least two alternatives of capacity restrictions. The manager 
shall design those alternatives based on the input provided by the applicants at the time of their requests and jointly 
with them. The comparison shall include at least: (i) the duration of the capacity restriction; (ii) the expected indicative 
infrastructure charges due; (iii) the capacity available on diversionary lines; (iv) the available alternative routes; (v) the 
indicative travel times. Applicants shall be consulted before deciding. 

17  Regarding the capacity restrictions tackled in point no. 16, the Infrastructure Manager shall establish criteria for which 
trains of each type of service should be rerouted, considering the applicant’s constraints. The Infrastructure Manager 
shall  publish  in  the  NS  those  criteria  together  with  a  preliminary  allocation  of  the  remaining  capacity  to  the  different 
types  of  train  services  when  it  acts  in  accordance  to  point  no.  8.  At  the  end  of  the  consultation,  the  Infrastructure 
Manager shall provide the concerned railways undertaking with an indicative break-down of the remaining capacity. 

For the analysis, the NS and the website of the corresponding IMs were examined.  

Across  the  targeted  countries,  a  consistent  level  of  compliance  was  observed.  Notably,  Austria 
demonstrated full compliance18, while seven countries—namely the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, 
Italy,  Poland,  Romania,  and  Sweden—exhibited  high  levels  of  compliance.  The  Netherlands  and 
Slovenia  fell  into  the  medium  compliance  category.  Conversely,  Germany  displayed  a  low  level  of 
compliance. However,  Germany  plans to  overcome the  compliance  lacunes  with  the  European  TCR 
regulation  by  2028.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  TCR  regulations  are  not  governed  within  the  DB 
InfraGO NS but are instead referenced in the rulebook (RIL 402: Route management). Furthermore, 
according  to  capacity  strategy  2025  report19,  full  implementation  of  Annex  VII  is  expected  to  be 
achieved in calendar year 2027 for the timetable 2028.   

A further in-depth examination of the varying levels of compliance across the provisions Annex VII is 
provided below. 

18   For the sake of the analysis, the provisions of the 17 provision of the Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 
2017/2075 (Annex VII) were divided in 20 points of compliance. A country is considered fully compliant if 
in the analysed documentation has been found compliant with all 20 points. On the opposite, if no points of 
compliance were observed the country has been clustered as non-compliant. If the compliance was on less 
than 10 points, comprehended between 10 and 14 points, or comprehended between 15 and 20 points, the 
country has been categorised respectively as low, medium, or highly compliant. 

19   DB INFRAGOE (2022). Capacity Strategy 2025. Available at:  

https://fahrweg.dbnetze.com/resource/blob/9850152/562bda9531cc957f59702b0c83072cfc/TRR-Datei-
Download-data.pdf 

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The geographical map below visually depicts the compliance levels of the 11 selected member states with 
respect to Annex VII. 

Figure 2: Compliance with Delegated Decision 2017/2075 

In  2021,  IRG  Rail  conducted  a  comparable  analysis,  surveying  regulatory  bodies  within  its 
membership20.  The  results  of  the  analysis  presented  in  this  chapter  appear  consistent  with  those  of 
IRG Rail. Similarly, their analysis revealed that the incorporation of the provisions of Annex VII into the 
NSs of IMs generally exhibited diverse levels of implementation. Additionally, IRG Rail observed that 
the procedures adopted by IMs to adhere to Annex VII, as well as their descriptions in the respective 
NSs, varied significantly in terms of detail.  

Moreover,  the  findings  of  the  compliance  analysis  mirror  those  uncovered  in  the  targeted  online 
consultation  (refer  to  section  2.3),  particularly  regarding  the  perception  of  the  accuracy  of  EU 
provisions  (as  outlined  in  Delegated  Decision  2017/2075  and  Directive  2012/34/EU)  within  the  NSs 
published by IMs. The survey indicated a consensus regarding the accuracy of the incorporation 
of EU provisions in the NSs. A significant majority perceived the reporting to be either very accurate 
or moderately accurate, suggesting a widespread confidence in the precision and reliability of the 
information provided in NSs concerning EU regulations across various stakeholder categories (i.e., 
RU and related association, IM and related association, and Public Transport Authorities). However, a 
smaller  yet  noteworthy  portion  of  respondents  expressed  concerns,  indicating  that  the  provisions 
reported  in  the  NSs  were  either  slightly  accurate  or  not  accurate  at  all.  This  discrepancy  may 
contribute to the non-compliance points identified in the analysis. 

20   IRG-Rail  (2021).  Overview  of  the  implementation  of  current  rules  relating  to  Temporary  Capacity 

Restrictions under Delegated Decision (EU) 2017/2075. Available at:  
https://irg-rail.eu/download/5/898/IRG-Rail202112-ReportonTemporaryCapacityRestrictions.pdf  

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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How  accurately  are  EU  provisions  (with  reference  to  the  Delegated  Decision  2017/2075  and  the 
Directive  2012/34/EU)  reported  within  the  Network  Statements  published  by  the  Infrastructure 
Managers? 

Very accurately 

Moderately accurately 

Slightly accurately 

Not at all accurately 

1; 2%

9; 
20%

13; 28%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

Railway Undertaking and related
association

Managing Director of RFC

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

Freight Client

5 

6 

11 

2 

10 

6 

1 

2 

2 

1 

23; 50%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

The  compliance  analysis  indicates  that  the  provisions  outlined  in  the  Commission  Delegated 
Decision  (EU)  2017/2075  (Annex  VII)  generally  exhibit  a  high  level  of  adherence.  Most  of  these 
provisions  demonstrate  minimal 
instances  of  non-compliance,  often  not  exceeding  one. 
Specifically, the first six provisions  (excluding the third), as well as the eighth to tenth, and  fifteenth, 
show little to no degree of incompliance. 

However, the seventh provision, concerning operational issues related to the  behaviour of IMs when 
trains cross from one network to another with a presumed delay of no more than 18 hours,  was not 
observed by six countries: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, and Sweden. 

Similarly,  the  sixteenth  provision,  which  addresses  capacity  restrictions  lasting  at  least  30 
consecutive days and impacting over 50% of estimated traffic volume, was not integrated into the NSs 
of the Czech Republic, France, Germany, and Slovenia’s IMs. 

Furthermore,  provision  eleven  emerged  as  a  common  point  of  non-compliance.  Specifically, 
Slovenia’s IM NS does not align with this provision, while Germany, the Netherlands, and Hungary do 
not fully integrate all aspects of the provision.  

The remaining provisions of Annex VII showed minor cases of non-compliance, with a maximum 
of three countries exhibiting non-compliance. 

27 

 
 
 
 
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Figure 3: Compliance to provisions of the Delegated Decision (EU) 2017/2075 (Annex VII) 

Provision 1

Provision 2

Provision 3

Provision 4

Provision 5

Provision 6

Provision 7

Provision 8

Provision 9

Provision 10

Provision 11

Provision 12

Provision 13

Provision 14

Provision 15

Provision 16

Provision 17

0

2

5

11

11

10

10

10

10

9

9

9

8

8

8

8

4

7

7

7

6

1

6

8

1

1

1

1

3

3

3

3

3

2

2

2

10

4

4

12

Compliant

Non-compliant

Partially compliant

The  survey  also  delved  into  how  the  EU  provisions  on  Temporary  Capacity  Restrictions, 
specifically outlined in Annex VII, are translated into practice when planning TCRs. In this respect, 
diverse  perspectives  were  provided  by  the  consulted  stakeholders.  While  a  significant  portion  of 
respondents  (41%),  mainly  RUs  and  Public  Transport  Authorities,  indicated  in  their  responses  that 
the Annex VII provisions are properly put into practice when planning TCRs, most of them (59%), 
primarily  from  the  Public  Transport  Authorities  and  RUs,  expressed  concerns  that  these  directives 
are not adequately implemented in practice. This disparity underscores a discrepancy between the 
perceived accuracy of reporting and the actual execution of EU provisions in TCR planning. 

Stakeholders  who voiced negative  opinions about  the  proper  implementation of  EU  provisions when 
planning  TCRs  highlighted  various  concerns.  Firstly,  they  noted  that  unforeseen  circumstances 
often  impede  timely  project  planning,  and  that  IMs  frequently  deviate  from  announced  timetables 
for  train  interruptions.  Moreover,  it  was  argued  that  discrepancies  exist  between  planned  and 
executed  works,  with  issues  regarding  the  communication  of  essential  TCR  information,  such  as 
start/end  dates  and  diversionary  routes,  and  implementation  across  different  countries.  The 
challenges in adhering to deadlines and maintaining accuracy in communicated TCR scope and dates 
were  also  emphasised.  Finally,  stakeholders  highlighted  that  delays  and  errors  in  path  re-allocation 
during the final stages of TCR implementation cause distress to RUs. 

28 

 
 
 
 
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Regarding  the  previous  question  (specifically  Annex  VII),  if  EU  provisions  are  correctly  reported,  are 
these then properly put into practice when planning TCRs? 

Yes 

No 

14; 41%

Public Authorities

8 

6 

Terminal Operator

Railway Undertaking and related
association

3 

Managing Director of RFC

13 

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

Freight Client

3 

1 

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

20; 59%

The subsequent question of the online consultation, which pertained to the  clarity and precision of 
the  provisions  outlined  in  Annex  VII,  can  shed  light  on  why  they  are  often  not  effectively 
implemented in TCR planning. As depicted in the chart below, there are divergent opinions among the 
consulted  stakeholders  regarding  the  clarity  and  precision  of  EU  legislation  on  TCRs,  particularly 
focusing  on  points  7  to  18  of  Annex  VII.  Notably,  19%  of  respondents—primarily  Public  Transport 
Authorities,  IMs,  and  RUs—found  the  legislation  to  be  very  clear  and  precise.  Most  stakeholders 
(43%) still held a positive opinion on the comprehensibility of the Annex VII, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Most notably, almost one-third of the respondents, consisting mainly of RUs and IMs, considered it 
slightly  clear  and  precise,  possibly  providing  an  explanation  for  the  different  levels  of  compliance 
identified  in  the  analysis.  Finally,  there  was  a  small  percentage  (6%)  of  the  consulted  stakeholders 
who considered the provisions of Annex VII to be unclear and inaccurate. 

Upon  further  analysis  based  on  additional  inputs  collected  from  some  identified  stakeholders  that 
participated to the online consultation, the following points concerning Annex VII emerged21:  

•  The regulation focusses on the coordination and information about TCRs (known as the work 
part of the process in the industry) leaving out the planning of traffic solutions for passenger 
and  freight  traffic  impacted  by  TCRs  (run  part  of  the  process).  Stakeholders  from  the  RUs 
category expressed the need of an internationally harmonised process that defines when, in 
which  format,  and  by  which  systems  IMs  have  to  offer  an  internationally  agreed  rerouting 
option  during  the  TCRs.  For  international  operators  it  would  be  effective  to  have  a  single 
place/system and a single format for TCR publications Europe-wide; 

•  The regulation does not clearly  state the date from which the maintenance and construction 
works  must  be  considered  definitive  and  stable  and  therefore  the  elaboration  of  traffic 
solutions (i.e., rerouting, alternative forms of transport, etc.) can start in an iterative dialogue 
between the IMs and RUs;  

•  Annex VII point 9 does not include specifications on how IMs are supposed to guarantee TCR 
coordination  and  cooperation  in  cross-border  cases.  This  issue  was  reported  in  targeted 
interviews with two separate RUs. Additionally, it emerged that one of the issues resides in the 
difficulty  of  assessing  the  extent  to  which  neighbouring  IMs  could  also  be  affected  by  TCRs 
located towards the middle of their country’s network. 

• 

In provision 14 of Annex VII, there exists a broad exemption allowing IMs to bypass provisions 
8  and  12,  which  was  highlighted  during  consultations  with  multiple  IMs  and  RUs.  This 
exemption  is  based  on  ambiguous  criteria  such  as  "cost  ineffective"  and  "unnecessary 
damaging,"  granting  IMs  significant  operational  latitude.  Additionally,  point  14  allows  for  the 
extension  of  TCR  consultations  beyond  regular  deadlines,  contingent  upon  unanimous 
agreement  from  all  affected  applicants.  This  poses  a  particular  challenge  for  IMs  when 

21   Additional  points  on  Annex  VII  are  outlined  in  the  paragraph  dedicated  to  the  Barriers  to  the 

implementation of EU legislation and to the harmonisation of practices across Europe. 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
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consultations  occur  before  the  finalization  of  the  working  timetable,  as  they  must  actively 
secure  approval  from  all  potential  applicants,  whose  intentions  to  apply  for  train  paths  on 
affected lines may vary. 

•  According  to  stakeholders  consulted,  Annex  VII  points  15  and  16  lack  specific  details 
regarding the rules for applicants  to request alternative paths' travel times and the protocols 
for cancelling, limiting, or rerouting trains. Additionally, point 15 specifies that the IM manager 
should include the "time of day" and, once determinable, the start and end hours of capacity 
restrictions  "as  soon  as  it  can  be  set."  Stakeholder  feedback  from  RUs  highlights  concerns 
that  this  requirement's  lack  of  a  precise  timeline  allows  IMs  to  delay  providing  critical 
information, thereby hindering RUs' ability to establish and market a functioning timetable. 

•  Annex  VII  point  17  requires  IMs  to  publish  the  general  criteria  for trains  modification  in  their 
NS.  According  to  the  consulted  stakeholders  point  17  does  not  require  that  IMs  provide 
feedback to RUS on a) how the aforementioned criteria are applied to allocate capacity under 
TCRs and b) the result of the coordination process.  

To  what  extent  is  the  EU  legislation  on  TCRs  -  specifically  the  points  from  7  to  18  of  the  Annex  VII  - 
clear and precise? 

Very clear and precise 

Moderately  clear  and 

Slightly clear and precise 

Not  at  all  clear  and 

precise 

6; 6%

18; 19%

30; 
32%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

Railway Undertaking and related
association

Managing Director of RFC

1 

5 

5 

1 

Maintenance & construction companies

40; 43%

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

6 

precise 

3 

14 

7 

19 

6 

9 

1 

3 

3 

1 

5 

2 

Freight Client

1 

1 

0%

50%

100%

Despite the varying opinions regarding the clarity of the Annex VII, most stakeholders surveyed online 
(refer to section 2.3) do not foresee changes in the current legislative framework on TCRs at the EU 
level  (Delegated  Decision  2017/2075).  Conversely,  they  expect  changes  in  their  country's  legislative 
framework. However, due to the low response rate to these survey questions, the significance of the 
related findings may be limited. 

Do  you  envision  changes  in  the  current  legislative  framework  on  TCRs  at  the  EU  level  (Delegated 
Decision 2017/2075 )? 

Yes 

No 

2; 33%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

Railway Undertaking and related
association

Managing Director of RFC

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

Freight Client

1 

1 

4 

4; 67%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

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Do you envision changes in the current legislative framework on TCRs in your country that adopts the 
EU directive? 

Yes 

No 

6; 25%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

6 

13 

Railway Undertaking and related
association

Managing Director of RFC

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

Freight Client

5 

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

18; 75%

The responses demonstrate receptiveness  to potential modifications of the EU  legislative framework 
and  present varied viewpoints  on potential  changes  to  the  current  legislative framework  on  TCRs  at 
the EU level. Proposed changes  emphasise the need  for enhanced coordination and consultation in 
TCR  planning  and  management,  with  a  focus  on  creating  best  practices  regarding  effective 
consultation  methods  and  scheduling.  Suggestions  include  the  establishment  of  a  dedicated  TCRs 
group,  signalling  a  commitment  to  improving  timetable  adjustments  through  collaboration.  Others 
indicate  an  impending  regulatory  transition  aimed  at  updating  and  enhancing  the  framework  to 
address emerging challenges more effectively. Overall, these responses reflect both operational and 
regulatory approaches to TCR management, highlighting the industry's efforts toward improvement. 

For  what  concerns  forthcoming  changes  in  the  European  legislative  framework,  in  July  2023  the 
Commission presented a proposal for a regulation on the use of railway infrastructure capacity 
in  the  single  European  railway  area22.  The  proposal  aims  to  establish  a  framework  that  enables 
more efficient management of rail infrastructure capacity and traffic, thereby enhancing service quality 
and accommodating increased traffic on the railway network. 

Furthermore,  insights  collected  through  interviews  (as  outlined  in  paragraph  2.5)  reveal  that  some 
consulted  stakeholders  favour  maintaining  a  "global"  approach  within  sectoral  EU  legislation, 
allowing for centralisation of certain aspects while retaining flexibility at the local level. 

Regarding the national regulatory framework, survey responses indicated a readiness to amend the 
legislative  framework  on  TCRs,  demonstrating  proactive  efforts  to  harmonise  national 
regulations  with  EU  directives.  Stakeholders  are  actively  taking  measures  such  as  revising 
ordinances (e.g., Railway Network Access Ordinance (RNAO)), transposing relevant EU directives into 
national railway acts, and developing new aid schemes for TCR in rail freight transport. Furthermore, it 
has been suggested that the development and implementation of the TTR project may necessitate an 
update of Delegated Decision 2017/2075 to ensure coherence.  

Targeted  RFCs’  CIDs  Compliance  analysis  to  Regulation  (EU)  No  913/2010 
art.12 to art.18  

Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, dated September 22nd, 
2010,  concerns  the  establishment  and  organisation  of  international  rail  corridors  for  competitive 
freight.  Its  objective  is  to  foster  the  development  of  a  competitive  European  rail  network  for  freight 
transportation.  To  achieve  this,  the  regulation  outlines  rules  for  the  selection,  organisation, 
management,  and  indicative  investment  planning  of  freight  corridors.  It  applies  to  the  management 
and utilisation of railway infrastructure included in freight corridors. 

22   European  Commission  (2023).  REGULATION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  OF  THE 
COUNCIL  on  the  use  of  railway  infrastructure  capacity  in  the  single  European  railway  area,  amending 
at: 
(EU)  No 
Directive 
https://transport.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-07/COM_2023_443_0.pdf  

repealing  Regulation 

913/2010.  Available 

2012/34/EU 

and 

31 

 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
and relevant framework conditions 

In the compliance analysis conducted within the scope of this study, the focus was on assessing the 
reception of the provisions outlined in Articles 12 to 18 of Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 within the 
nine Rail Freight Corridors (RFC) under examination23. Specifically, the most recent versions of each 
RFC's CID were reviewed. 

The analysis revealed that all RFCs demonstrated high compliance with the provisions of Regulation 
(EU)  No  913/2010,  as  highlighted  in  the  table  below.  This  indicates  a  positive  alignment  with  the 
objectives  outlined  in  the  regulation.  The  complete  analysis  is  annexed  below  (see  Annex  2  – 
Targeted RFCs compliance with Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 art.12 to art.18)  

Figure 4: Targeted RFC Compliance with Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 from art.12 to art.18 

Most notably, the analysis found that all targeted RFCs’ CIDs were compliant with article 12 of the 
regulation  which  prescribes  that  the  RFC’s  management  board  shall  coordinate  and  ensure  the 
publication in one place, in an appropriate manner and timeframe, of their schedule for carrying 
out all the works on the infrastructure and its equipment that would restrict available capacity 
on  the  freight  corridor.  Similarly,  all  targeted  RFCs’  CIDs  comply  with  article  18  thus  including 
provision  mandating  the  management  board  to  publish  a  document  containing  all  the  information 
contained in the NS for national networks regarding the freight corridor, the list and characteristics of 
terminals  (with  a  focus  on  conditions  and  method  for  accessing  the  terminals),  the  information 
concerning  to  procedures  referred  to  in  articles  13  to  17  of  the  regulation,  as  well  as  the 
implementation  plan.    Furthermore,  the  only  common  minor  points  of  incompliance  by  the  targeted 
RFCs were article 14 (specifically for the provisions 14.5 and 14.8), and article 17.5.   

Barriers to the implementation of EU legislation and to the harmonisation of practices 
across Europe  

The analysis continued by examining the barriers to the implementation of European legislation and 
the  harmonisation  of  practices  across Europe.  This  examination  incorporated  insights  gathered  from 
the  targeted  online  consultation  and  the  focus  groups  conducted  up  to  this  point  (refer  to 
paragraph 2.4). 

The  responses  obtained  from  the  online  survey,  primarily  from  Public  Transport  Authorities,  IMs, 
underscore several significant challenges regarding the barriers encountered during the transposition 
of EU provisions into national provisions or NSs.  

Insights  from  the  focus  groups  (as  discussed  in  paragraph  2.4)  revealed  that certain  sections  of  EU 
legislation are sometimes perceived as vague and subject to diverse interpretations. In the case of 
Annex  VII,  this  ambiguity  primarily  pertains  to  the  coordination  and  consultation  processes  linked  to 
TCR management and planning. Specifically, the regulation may benefit from clear procedures and 
solutions  to  formalise  the  coordination  and  consultation  process  in  terms  of  fully  transparent 
information  provided  by  the  IMs  (including  cost  benefit  analysis  of  different  TCR  planning  options), 
opened stakeholders consultation process (RUs and end customers) and IMs final decision considering 
the  results  of  the  stakeholders’  comments.  Additionally,  Annex  VII  does  not  mandate  IMs  to  provide 

23   RFC 1 - Rhine-Alpine, RFC 2 - North Sea-Mediterranean, RFC 3 - Scandinavian-Mediterranean, RFC 4 – 
Atlantic, RFC 5 - Baltic-Adriatic, RFC 6 – Mediterranean, RFC 7 - Orient-East Med, RFC 8 - North Sea-
Baltic, RFC 9 - Rhine-Danube 

32 

 
 
 
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justifications  for  rescheduling  allocated  train  paths  on  the  main  line  or  providing  a  rerouting  train 
path offer on alternative itineraries answering to the market needs, further contributing to ambiguity. In 
addition  to  the  provisions  highlighted  in  the  previous  paragraph,  the  consulted  stakeholders 
highlighted  that  Annex  VII  contains  sometimes  not  sufficiently  precise  provisions.  For  instance,  the 
concept  of  traffic  volume  (used  in  Art.  8,  11,  12,  13,  16,  and  17)  has  no  clear  definition  as  most 
interpret  it  as  train  kilometres  but  such  a  measure  could  not  be  a  fair  representation  of  traffic  when 
trains of very different lengths are used on a line or network. Additionally, unclarity is present also for 
the  concept  of  railway  line  as  it  is  open  to  different  interpretations  (i.e.,  entire  line  from  origin  to 
destination or just the stretch of that line directly affected by a TCR). Furthermore, Annex VII (point 15) 
does  not  set  an  exact  deadline  for  IMs  to  communicate  the  time  of  day  and  hour  of  the 
beginning  and  end  of  the  TCR  to  RUs  thus  hampering  their  capacity  to  define  timetables  and  sell 
services. The stakeholders also mentioned that the concept of “consecutive days” present in Annex 
VII point 8 removes from the influence of the provision all periodic and/or recurring constraints that are 
conducted  during  a  certain  part  of  the  week/month/year  (e.g.,  weekend  restrictions).  Some  of  the 
consulted  stakeholders  commented  that  that  Annex  VII  does  not  address  minor  impact  TCRs 
arguing  that  even  minor  TCRs  (i.e.,  limited  only  to  delays)  can  result  in  major  impacts  on  RUs  and 
most notably customers if announced at the requested deadline of four months prior the occurrence of 
the TCR. Some of the stakeholders commented that for commercial purposes the planning of TCRs 
should be defined at least six months prior to the start of the work regardless of the type of TCR.  

The  consulted  stakeholders  mentioned  the  following  points  as  relevant  but  not  addressed  in  Annex 
VII: 

•  Annex VII does not mandate IMs to provide a complete and clear overview of all TCRs taking 
place  simultaneously  on  international  lines  and  their  impacts  on  traffic  (i.e.,  cumulation  of 
negative effects); 

•  Annex  VII  does  place  IMs  with  the  responsibility  to  coordinate  with  neighbouring  IMs  in  the 
phases of planning TCRs (work part) as well as in the earlier stages of capacity planning (run 
part);  

•  Annex VII does not indicate a dialogue platform for coordination between the IMs, RUs, and 
other involved stakeholders for the purpose of re-planning the services affected by works. 

Furthermore, the variations in how Member States interpret and incorporate the provisions into 
their national legislation can exacerbate ambiguity and inconsistencies in the implementation 
within  the  NSs  of  infrastructure  management,  thus  elucidating  the  differences  in  compliance 
identified in the preceding analysis. 

Secondly,  the  survey  highlighted  the  conflict  between  the  efficiency  of  maintenance  works  and 
maximising  capacity  for  the  market  as  the  second  most  common  barrier  to  implementing  EU 
legislation.  This  underscores  the  need  to  strike  a  balance  between  operational  requirements  and 
regulatory  mandates.  In  the  focus  groups,  it  was  noted  that  infrastructural  interventions'  necessities 
and  schedules  often 
take  precedence  over  capacity-related  considerations.  The  consulted 
stakeholders reported that the budget allocated  for the construction work  does  not include the costs 
associated  with  the  affected  traffic  (e.g.,  rerouting,  alternative  transport,  etc.).  Consequently,  part  of 
the stakeholders (i.e., RUs and SFOs) expressed the desire for a compensation scheme integrated 
in  the  budget  planning  for  the  TCR.  To  add  to  the  overall  complexity,  the  consultations  also 
highlighted  a  difference  in  approaches  when  it  comes  to  TCRs  of  the  different  IMs  across 
Europe  (i.e.,  total  line  closure  to  limit  the  TCR  duration  with  train  cancelled  or  rerouted  or  less 
restrictive TCRs with longer duration). This can result in RUs having difficulty in providing a viable and 
stable-functioning service for cross-borders trains. Another emerged hampering factor in this aspect, 
according  to  the  consulted  stakeholders,  can  be  the  absence  of  muti-year  financing  by  some 
Members States (i.e., Slovakia) thus not enabling the long-term planning of TCRs. 

Among the several obstacles, the consulted stakeholder brought forward that the financing sources 
and timelines for financing of the maintenance and construction works most often are not secured or 
only  confirmed  shortly  before  starting  the  execution  of  the  works.  For  this  reason,  IMs  are  often  not 
able to respect Annex VII’s deadlines. The stakeholders thus expressed the need for the provision 
of  a  stable  financial  framework  for  railway  maintenance  and  construction,  and  coordination  of 
financing  timelines  among  neighbouring  countries.  In  association  to  this,  the  consulted  stakeholders 
mentioned issues with the tendering process for construction works and specifically focussed on 
the  opposition  procedure  triggered  by  the  construction  companies  which  can  lead  to  considerable 
delays.  It  was  further  added  that  the  national  transposition  of  tendering  regulations  and  the  national 
common  contract  conditions  for  works  appear  to  incentivise  contracting  works  with  a  relatively  short 
lead  time  to  the  first  day  of  works.  However,  until  the  works  and  the  associated  conditions  are 
contracted, the TCR  planning may  be subject to changes  (i.e., put on hold)  thus posing a challenge 

33 

 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
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towards effective planning of railways operators. Furthermore, on the funding topic it was mentioned 
that the Annex VII does not address the additional funding of public and replacement transport 
when  IMs  take  different  approaches  to  capacity  allocation  on  lines  affected  by  TCRs  (i.e.,  Public 
Service Obligation Agreements between regions and operators and the issue of road line licensing). 
On a similar note, stakeholders pointed at Annex VII not covering how to deal operationally with 
connections that are disrupted due to the TCRs and not addressed in the annual timetable. 

Moreover,  15%  of  responses  expressed  concerns  regarding  the  differing  maturity  levels  among 
RUs,  which  can  result  in  implementation  inconsistencies  across  various  regions.  Lastly,  limited 
coordination between Member States, Rail Freight Corridors (RFCs), and IMs was identified as a 
barrier, underscoring the importance of enhancing collaboration and communication channels among 
key sectoral stakeholders. 

What  are 
provisions/network statements? 

the  barriers  you  encounter  when 

transposing 

the  EU  provisions 

into  national 

Vagueness of EU 

Different maturity 

Limited 

Conflict between 

Other 

legislation 

levels amongst 
operators 

coordination between 
MS, RFCs, and IMs 

efficiency of 
maintenance works 
and maximised 
capacity to the market 

14; 24%

16; 27%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

9

5

1

2

8

5

Railway Undertaking and related
association

Managing Director of RFC

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

Freight Client

9; 
15%

7

4

4

6

8

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

14; 24%

6; 
10%

Additionally, the following points were raised by the stakeholders in the online consultation: 

•  The  asynchronous  nature  of  financing  programming  for  infrastructure  development, 
where some member states operate on an annual basis, whereas EU legislation mandates a 
5-year period; 

• 

It was highlighted that the implementation of Annex VII necessitates adjustments in both 
timeline  (requiring  earlier  planning  and  revised  milestones)  and  planning  objectives  (such 
as early clustering of TCRs following a more detailed capacity impact evaluation than for total- 
or  single-track  closures).  Concerns  were  raised  regarding  the  associated  IT  developments 
required; 

•  Lastly,  stakeholders  mentioned  the  relevance  of  the  practical  difficulties  associated  with 

meeting the deadlines in the context of TCR planning outlined in the Annex VII. 

Analysis  of  specific  rules  for  traffic  management  on  double  tracks 
lines  
For the targeted countries, desk research was conducted to assess the level of permission allowed 
for  circulation  on  tracks  unaffected  by  Temporary  Capacity  Restrictions  in  the  case  of  double 
track lines (complete analysis available in Annex 3 – Analysis of specific rules for traffic management 
on  double  tracks  lines).  This  was  further  supplemented  through  online  consultation,  which  revealed 
varying practices across different countries. 

Across all targeted countries, instances were found where traffic is always permitted when a TCR is in 
place, albeit often at reduced speeds. This aligns with the findings of the targeted consultation, where 
one-third  of  stakeholders,  mainly  IMs  and  railways  undertakings,  indicated  that  circulation  on 
unaffected  tracks  is  consistently  allowed,  suggesting  a  general  approach  of  maintaining 
operational continuity even during works. 

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Depending  on  the  TCR  organisation  needing  a  partial  closure  of  one  of  the  track  lines  in  Austria, 
France,  Italy,  Poland,  and  Slovenia,  there  are  cases  where  traffic  would  be  allowed  only  with  a 
banalised signalling system when a TCR is implemented. 4% of respondents to the relevant question 
in the online consultation confirmed this. Additionally, 19% of respondents stated that traffic would be 
allowed  in  case  of  banalised  signalling  with  the  implementation  of  ad-hoc  safety  systems  (e.g., 
Automatic Train Warning Systems, ATWS). This latter scenario, as identified through a combination of 
desk research and online survey, appears to be present in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
and Romania. 

However,  most  survey  respondents,  including  Public  Transport  Authorities,  Railways  Undertakings, 
and Managing Directors of Rail Freight Corridors (RFCs), indicated uncertainty or lack of knowledge 
about the permissions granted in their respective countries as this topic is under prime responsibility of 
IMs. 

Ad-hoc support from RNE will be sought prior to the submission of the final report to further refine and 
validate this section. 

In case of works on double track lines, what is the level of permission allowed regarding the circulation 
on the tracks not affected by TCR in your country? 

Always allowed 

Only  allowed  when  the 
line has a banalised signalling 
system 

Only  allowed  when  the 
line has a banalised signalling 
system  and  the  IM  projects 
the track with the working site 
with specific safety systems 

I do not know 

3; 4%

14; 19%

32; 45%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

Railway Undertaking and related
association

Managing Director of RFC

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

2 

Freight Client

8 

15 

2 

2 

1 

7 

8 

7 

13 

1 

1 

3 

2 

23; 32%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

3.2. Planning and implementation of TCR 

This section develops the topic of TCR planning, starting with what are the different practices put in place at 
the EU level. It investigates what are the different drivers that IMs take into consideration when planning TCRs 
and what are the different approaches to TCR planning that different stakeholders might prefer. The analysis is 
based on the inputs of the stakeholder consultations (focus groups and online survey), and it presents what are 
the different perspectives on the topic that different stakeholders might underline. 

The section reflects on what are the main factors that hamper TCR planning, focusing on the aspect of funding, 
changing in TCR planning and the utilisation of TCR windows. 

Different  approaches  to  planning  TCRs  and  related  coordination 
activities 
As  anticipated  in  Area  1,  the  legal  framework  in  the  EU  for  capacity  management  on  the  rail 
infrastructure  is  defined  in  the  Directive  2012/34/EU,  specifically  in  Annex  VII  (revised  in  2017  with 
the Delegated Decision 2017/2075, hereafter referred to as “Annex VII”). 

Under these principles, Annex VII defines a set of provisions for the capacity allocation process and 
the  coordination  of  TCRs  which  should  follow  the  principles  of  transparency,  consultation, 
prioritisation,  coordination,  monitoring  and  review.  The  Annex  VII  aims  to  make  the  procedures 
for capacity allocation more transparent and efficient, by involving all stakeholders in the decision-
making  process.  The  Annex  includes  a  schedule  for  the  allocation  process,  specifying  the 

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establishment  and  change  of  the  working  timetable,  the  deadline  for  requests  for  capacity,  the 
establishment of provisional international train paths, and the publication of a draft working timetable. 
It  also  outlines  the  process  for  decision-making  on  requests  received  after  the  deadline  and  the 
rescheduling  of  allocated  train  paths.  IMs  should  consider  not  only  their  own  costs  but  also  the 
commercial  and  operational  constraints  of  applicants  and  the  risks  of  shifting  transport  to  less 
environmentally friendly modes. Transparent criteria should be established for the diversion of trains 
and the allocation of restricted capacity to different types of traffic.  

Such provisions are then elaborated by Rail Net Europe (RNE), which provides operational guidelines 
that integrate to the timetabling process: 

• 

• 

• 

It  provides  a  common  taxonomy  of  TCRs  and  their  publication  according  to  the  Annex  VII 
provisions (Major, High, Medium, Minor and Less than Minor impact TCRs); 

It defines a standardised model to calculate the impact on traffic; 

It outlines the timing and the activities of a TCR coordination process. 

Nonetheless, IMs in the EU still have different approaches to capacity allocation planning, coordination 
tools and approaches and different procedures regarding TRC planning and execution. The targeted 
online  consultation  (see  section  11)  covered  this  subject  as  well  and  confirmed  the  different 
approaches and priorities to TCR planning. 

Drivers for planning and executing TCRs 

When  questioned  about  the  methodology  for  planning  and  executing  Traffic  Capacity  Restrictions  in 
their  respective  countries  and  the  associated  priorities,  IMs  provided  responses  to  the  inquiry, 
revealing  a  diverse  range  of  approaches  to  TCR  planning.  Generally,  efforts  are  made  to  minimise 
TCRs through predictive and preventive maintenance measures. However, when unavoidable, several 
IMs  prioritise  TCRs  based  on  several  factors.  These  include  planned  maintenance  as  the  foremost 
consideration,  followed  by  the  elimination  of  speed  restrictions  and  the  implementation  of  ERTMS 
(European Rail Traffic Management System), and regular maintenance coupled with improvements to 
side  tracks.  Some  IMs  cited  funding  constraints  as  a  significant  driver  influencing  TCR  planning, 
particularly concerning national infrastructure planning and the need to meet deadlines for EU-funded 
projects. These discrepancies in approach become more pronounced when considering international 
coordination. 

Managing Directors of Rail Freight Corridors (RFCs) underscored safety as the primary concern in 
TCR  planning,  noting  variations  in  infrastructure  conditions  from  one  country  to  another.  These 
differences  contribute  to  disparities  in  TCR  planning,  with  some  countries  having  the  capacity  for 
strategic planning while others must address security-related issues on short notice and with greater 
frequency.  Generally,  TCR  planning  aligns  with  national  capacity  plans,  with  limited  coordination 
across borders. 

Responses  from  RUs  highlighted  the  recognition  of  differing  TCR  planning  frameworks  among  IMs. 
They identified the availability and efficient utilisation of machinery as key drivers influencing planning 
efforts. 

Freight clients and SFOs expressed their views, although, due to the limited number of responses, 
they  cannot  be  considered  representative  of  the  whole  category.  They  indicated  that  the  current 
approach to capacity allocation predominantly emphasises long-term planning, resulting in rigidity that 
doesn’t  sufficiently  adapt  to  actual  customer  demand  or  market  conditions.  Additionally,  they  noted 
there is room for improvement towards a proactive communication with freight clients when TCRs are 
announced. 

Conversely,  when  specifically  questioned  what  elements  or  parameters  they  prioritise  in  Traffic 
Capacity  Restriction  planning,  IMs  identify  the  optimisation  of  TCR  duration  as  the  primary 
consideration.  This  is  closely  followed  by  assessing  the  impact  on  traffic  and  transport  demand,  as 
well  as  the  availability  of  rerouting  options.  Infrastructure  charges  paid  by  RUs  appear  to  be  a 
secondary driver in TCR planning. Additionally, stakeholders point out several driving factors: 

•  Efficient planning of the operational activities and technical constrains; 
•  Operating conditions; 
Impact on travel time; 
• 
International coordination, such as accumulation of TCRs on the same line and the reduction 
• 
of bottlenecks on adjacent tracks or rerouting lines. 

36 

 
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As  Infrastructure Manager,  what parameters do  you  consider/prioritise when  planning TCRs  affecting 
passenger and/or freight capacity? 

Infrastructure Manager and related association 

Duration of TCR

Traffic limitation

Impact on transport demand

Availability of a re-routing option

Other

Infrastructure charges paid by Rus

5

5

18

17

16

15

Preferred approach to TCR planning regarding the line closure period 

Scheduling  represents  another  crucial  facet  of  Traffic  Capacity  Restriction  planning,  as  it  can 
significantly impact circulation, and the types of services affected. The spectrum of scheduling options 
is  broad,  encompassing  factors  such  as  day/night  closures,  partial  or  full  closures,  and  traction 
considerations.  Total  closures,  for  instance,  exert  a  high  impact  on  traffic  but  necessitate  a  shorter 
period,  while  partial  closures  have  a  lesser  impact  on  traffic  but  require  a  longer  TCR  duration  for 
completing  the  same  works.  Survey  findings  underscore  that  preferences regarding TCR  scheduling 
are closely  tied to the length of closure (partial or total), the availability of rerouting options, and  the 
overall impact on the rail network. 

For  instance,  IMs  indicate  that  TCR  scheduling  varies  significantly  based  on  factors  such  as  the 
nature of the works, geographic conditions, available capacity options, and the general impact on the 
network and RUs. Therefore, it is not a one-size-fits-all approach but rather a case-by-case decision. 
However, some IMs (8) express a preference for longer partial closures (e.g., during weekends or for 
some  hours  of  the  day),  while  a  minority  (5)  refers  full  closures  only  when  alternative  itineraries  are 
available. 

RFC  Managing  Directors  concur  that  the  optimal  approach  to  Traffic  Capacity  Restriction  planning 
hinges upon the specific circumstances and characteristics of the line, available rerouting options, and 
the nature of the planned works. They emphasise that the choice of strategy is significantly influenced 
by the preferences of IMs and note that IMs within their respective Rail Freight Corridors may adopt 
differing approaches in this regard. 

The  preference  of  RUs  in  this  regard  is  highly  dependent  on  the  service  offer  (e.g.,  passenger  or 
freight)  and on the level of service (e.g., high-speed service, international service, night  trains, etc.). 
Therefore,  RUs  tent  to  have  a  diversified  spectrum  of  preferences  that  was  reflected  in  the 
respondents  in  the  survey.  Under  these  premises,  the  indications  reported  below  cannot  be 
considered representative of the whole category: 

•  Some RUs reported to prefer for full closures over longer periods, provided that a subsequent 
extended  period  without  TCRs  is  guaranteed  and  adequate  rerouting  and  potential  cost 
compensation are available; 

•  Scheduling  considerations  depend  on  various  factors  such  as  the  affected  line,  time  of 
day  (peak  vs.  off-peak),  origin/destination,  traffic  volume  on  the  line,  and  the  availability  of 
rerouting capacity (including parameters like gauge, traction, travel time, axle load, and train 
length). Thus, a customisable case-by-case approach is favoured; 

•  Some  freight  RUs  reported  that  the  coordination  of  TCR  windows  should  be  extended  to 

freight terminal slots, as they are very important nodes of the railway network; 

•  TCR windows should allow for the adherence to border crossing times for international 

trains and journey times, especially for high-speed passenger trains; 

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•  Some  passenger  RUs  indicated  a  preference  towards  TCR  windows  during  weekends  and 
school  holidays  to  minimise  disruption  to  commuters.  They  also  emphasise  that  planning 
TCRs  on  days  with  lower  passenger  traffic  facilitates  the  organisation  of  alternative  bus 
services and streamlines personnel and rolling stock planning; 

•  Some  passenger  RUs  noted  how  full  closures  during  weekdays  can  pose  a  significant 
logistical  challenge  for  the  organisation  of  alternative  passenger  services,  particularly  on 
commuter  lines  with  high  frequency.  This  also  leads  to  inefficient  planning  of  personnel  and 
rolling stock. 

•  A stakeholder underscores the importance of adopting a “network” perspective when planning 
TCRs,  as  partial  closures  on  one  line  could  render  it  less  suitable  as  a  rerouting  option  for 
another line. Therefore, a flexible approach should prioritise capacity availability between two 
endpoints as the primary objective. 

This  question  was  also  addressed  to  Public  Transport  Authorities  who,  despite  not  being  directly 
involved  in  TCR  planning,  generally  concur  that  the  best  approach  is  to  assess  each  situation  on  a 
case-by-case  basis.  However,  it  is  noteworthy  that  one  Public  Transport  Authority  emphasised  the 
importance of conducting a social cost-benefit analysis as part of the planning process. This authority 
is currently conducting research in this direction to compare alternative restriction options, in line with 
the provisions outlined in Annex VII, provision 16. 

What approach do you favour in TCR planning regarding the closure period (short or long closure) and 
capacity restriction (partial or full closure)? 

Full closure, but shorter 

Full closure only when 

Longer partial closure 

Other 

period 

alternative itineraries are 
available  

(e.g., weekends or some 
hours per day) 

5; 6%

18; 23%

40; 51%

16; 20%

Terminal Operator

1

Public Authorities

2

1

3

Railway Undertaking and related
association

Managing Director of RFC

2

1

6

7

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

Freight Client

0%

8

1

2

5

17

9

1

8

5

50%

100%

In conclusion, the survey results highlight the considerable variation in Traffic Capacity Restriction 
planning approaches and priorities among IMs across Europe. This diversity is evident both at the 
national  and  EU  levels,  as  smaller  IMs  overseeing  segments  of  the  national  rail  network  may  adopt 
distinct  TCR  planning  strategies  compared  to  the  primary  national  IM.  These  disparities  are 
accentuated by feedback from RUs, particularly on international routes involving multiple IMs. 

As  such,  this  section  addresses  the  coordination  and  communication  efforts  among  IMs,  RUs, 
and RFCs. In this context, the provisions outlined in Annex VII strongly advocate for coordination and 
communication among stakeholders throughout the entire capacity allocation process. This has been 
a focal point in the focus groups as  part of the stakeholder consultation activities (as  detailed in the 
dedicated paragraph). 

For what concerns international freight traffic, consultation activities among RUs and IMs are typically 
overseen  by  the  Rail  Freight  Corridor  (RFC).  Coordination  efforts  are  typically  manifested  through 
plenary meetings  held  two  to  four  times  per  year,  where  RUs  and  IMs  convene  together.  These 
meetings  are  preceded  by  coordination  sessions  among  IMs  aimed  at  aligning  Traffic  Capacity 
Restrictions along the RFC. The final compilation of TCRs impacting the corridor is then published on 
the  NS  by  IMs.  TCRs  on  the  corridor’s  network  are also  published  on  the  relative  RFC  website  and 
continuously  updated  based  on  inputs  from  IMs.  This  information  is  generally  presented  in  an  MS 
Excel file template that captures the following data points regarding the TCRs: 

Infrastructure Manager; 
ID (numerical identification code of the TCR); 

• 
• 
•  Section of the affected line; 

38 

 
 
 
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•  Traffic Direction; 
•  Line; 
•  Planning details (year, week, start and end dates, start and end times); 
•  Duration and timing of the restrictions (e.g., day/night, continuous or periodic); 
•  Reason for the restriction; 
•  Traffic impact (total Closure, Reduced Track Availability, Speed Restrictions, Weight, Length, 

Profile Limitations and Diesel Traction Only); 

•  Traffic management measures (Cancellation, Rerouting, Train Replacement, Delays, others); 
•  Description; 
• 

International coordination. 

This  template  can  also  be  the  input  for  the  RNE  TCR  Tool,  a  digital  platform  developed  by  RNE  to 
facilitate  TCR  coordination  amongst  IMs  and  consultations  with  Rus.  The  tool  allows  for  a  unique 
interface  for  TCRs  (in  contrast  to  different  files,  one  for  each  RFC)  for  RUs  and  it  harmonises  TCR 
communication  and  information  sharing  practices  by  IMs.  As  emerged  during  the  consultation 
activities, the utilisation of this tool by IMs is non-homogeneous. 

Furthermore, stakeholders participating in the focus groups have highlighted several challenges with 
the  current  approach  that  are  reported  below.  Once  again,  these  inputs  cannot  be  intended  as 
representative to one or more stakeholder categories: 

•  Some  RUs 

reported 

that  stakeholder  consultations  have  become 

increasingly 
informational  rather  than  consultative  over  time,  with  RUs  having  less  influence  on 
TCRs  planning.  Additionally,  at  this  stage,  IMs  should  provide  indications  of  potential 
rerouting options and their relative capacities; 
In some instances, TCR coordination have been reported to occur on short notice, resulting 
in  RUs  potentially  being  unable  to  utilise  available  rerouting  capacity  due  to  difficulties  in 
reprogramming services; 

• 

•  Coordination activities should involve other major players in the rail network, such as port 

• 

and freight terminals; 
IMs  use  different  software  and  tool  for  communicating  and  coordinating  TCRs  at  the 
national  and  international  level  (e.g.,  RNE  TCR  tool);  data  must  be  updated  frequently  and 
consistently to avoid discrepancies; 

It  is  worth  mentioning  that  from  the  focus  groups  it  emerged  that  many  stakeholders  consider  the 
“Brenner Axis Task Force” to be a best practice in stakeholder coordination. The “Brenner Axis Task 
force” is a working group inside the Scandinavian Mediterranean RFC that coordinates TCR planning 
and coordination activities with other stakeholders on the Brenner Railway line. The working group is 
led by the three IMs (RFI, OBB-Infra and DB InfraGO) that are directly involved in TCR planning. Even 
though  the  working  group  is  considered  a  best  practice  in  terms  of  coordination  processes,  some 
aspects  present  room  for  improvement  (see  “The  Brenner  Axis  case  study”).  Nonetheless,  it 
represents  a  coordination  model  that  many  stakeholders  consider  effective  for  TCR  coordination  in 
particularly important nodes of the rail network. 

Lastly, from the focus groups meetings it was evident in multiple occasions that regional coordination 
groups  can  be  considered  overall  effective  in  the  coordination  of  TCRs.  Nonetheless,  as  emerged, 
coordination efforts that involve multiple stakeholders can be more difficult, but provided the adequate 
timing before the TCR, they can prove to be effective in minimizing the impact on traffic. 

Table 7: Case studies 

# 

Case study 

Coordination efforts 

1 

Brenner Axis 

2 

3 

TCR coordination on Woippy – 
Mannheim line 

Reconstruction works on the Arad–
Simeria section 

•  Coordination activities are managed by a dedicated working group 

of the RFC 3 (“Brenner axe task force”) that involves the 3 IMs (RFI, 
DB InfraGO and ÖBB Infrastruktur) 

•  The WG is considered a best practice in terms of coordination 

procedures and RUs involvement 

•  TCR information is provided by the involved IMs to RFC Atlantic 
representative and published on RFC Atlantic webpage. This 
information is also shared and coordinated between IMs in 
dedicated bilateral meetings. 

•  Construction work is a planned TCR, and coordination activities 
were led by Romanian IM including the proactive involvement of 
RUs and RFCs 7&9 

39 

 
4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
and relevant framework conditions 

# 

Case study 

Coordination efforts 

Upgrade works for the German 
section of Betuwe line 

Maurienne valley rail traffic 
disruption 2023 

Modernisation of the Warsaw West 
station 

German-Dutch border on the two 
alternative routes via Venlo and 
Emmerich 

Renovation of the Budapest-
Hegyeshalom line (2023) 

Works in the HS station of Madrid 
Puerta de Atocha (2020) 

•  Upgrade works are led by German IM (DB InfraGO) as it is a 

planned TCR, and measures were taken in coordination with RUs 
and neighbouring IM (ProRail). 

•  The traffic disruption wasn’t a planned TCR but rather qualified as 

an International Contingency Management (ICM) case 

•  Coordination efforts are led by the national IM (SNCF Réseau) with 

support of the RFC 6. 

•  The Polish IM (PLK) is the responsible for the planned TCR and the 
stakeholders are not generally involved in the coordination process. 

•  The necessary information’s about TCR are provided to RUs 

through corridor website (no stable information) and PLK website 
and terminals do not receive information actively. 

•  Planning typically starts 3 years before construction begins. The 
German, Dutch, and Belgian IMs (BeNeDe group), hold frequent 
trilateral meetings for harmonizing TCR planning 

•  TCRs are not published in the annual timetable; instead, detailed 

scheduling is released during the timetable period. 

•  Renovation was an unplanned TCR, and construction was carried 

out by MÁV FKG (a subsidiary of IM MÁV Zrt.) 

•  Coordination measures were organised by IM (MÁV) in consultation 

with RUs and operators 

•  Changes in the origin station to (initially) all services from Atocha to 

Chamartín 

•  The IM ADIF AV established a coordination working group between 

the three RUs operating on the line (Renfe, Ouigo Spain and Iryo) 

Divača-Koper line doubling project 
(2023) 

•  Regular meetings with RUs are organised, during which the most 

important restrictions are discussed 

Tunnel works on the Bologna-Prato 
line 

Maurienne Valley rail traffic 
disruption (2019) 

Infrastructure works in Bulgaria 
(2023) 

DB InfraGo programme – High 
performance network (2023) 

Poznań-Warsaw line 

Section south of Sweden and north 
of Germany passing through 
Denmark 

Rhine-Valley – Total closure 
Raststatt – Baden-Baden   

18 

Arlberg line 

•  TCRs planning was agreed between RFI and the Regione Emilia 

Romagna and Regione Toscana in a Memorandum of 
Understanding that was updated 3 times over the period of the 
works 

•  The traffic disruption wasn’t a planned TCR but rather qualified as 

International Contingency Management (ICM) case. 

•  Coordination efforts are led by the national IM (SNCF Réseau) with 

support of the RFC 6. 

• 

Infrastructure works are planned TCR, and coordination activities 
are managed by Bulgarian IM (NRIC) in discussion with Rus, 
neighbouring IMs, and RFC. 

•  The German IM (DB InfraGo) is responsible for the planned TCR 
and working groups were formed in terms of train services. 

•  Coordination measures were taken under the procedures with RUs, 

operators, and neighbouring IMs. 

•  The Polish IM (PLK) is the responsible for the planned TCR and the 
stakeholders are not generally involved in the coordination process. 

•  The necessary information’s about TCR are provided to RUs 

through corridor website (no stable information) and PLK website 
and terminals do not receive information actively. 

•  TCRs are coordinated by the 3 IMs in Germany, Denmark, and 

Sweden before the ATT 

•  RUs have reported a lack of coordination during the execution of the 

ATT 

•  The TCR coordination started with the Rhine Alpine North Sea 

Corridor working group at A-2. 

•  The substitution to diesel shuttle was approved by all RUs and the 
path capacities were coordinated by DB InfraGO and the RUs (by 
Captrain France and SBB Cargo Deutschland on behalf of all RUs) 

•  TCR coordination between ÖBB Infra and DB Infra Go occurred 
bilaterally in several meetings in autumn 2022. In addition, it was 
also discussed in the TCR Working Group RFC 3 -South with RFI 
and DB-Infra GO 

40 

 
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# 

Case study 

Coordination efforts 

19 

TCR coordination on the Brussels – 
Namur line 

•  For international freight traffic, RFC North Sea Mediterranean and 
INFRABEL have regular meetings for sharing information about 
TCR planning online with the capacity strategy defined at A-2. 
•  Additional working group of IMs involving the Netherland, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxemburg, and Switzerland is also working for 
TCR coordination affecting international traffic (Rhine Ardenne North 
Sea, RAN group) 

20 

TCR on RFC5 between Ostrava and 
Břeclav 

The TCR was initially published in January 2021 and confirmed six 
months later in July 2021, following the guidelines set in Annex VII. 

Frequency  of  TCRs  exempted  from  the  information  sharing  process  prescribed  by  EU 
legislation 

The  Annex  VII  provides  IMs  with  a  certain  degree  of  discretion  in  applying  a  consultation 
process in three specific instances: “(1) when it is necessary to re-establish safe train operations, (2) 
when the timing of the restrictions  is  beyond the control of the Infrastructure Manager, (3)  when  the 
application of those periods would be cost-ineffective or unnecessarily  damaging in respect of asset 
life or condition, or if all concerned applicants agree.” Stakeholders were queried about the frequency 
with which they encounter this type of Traffic Capacity Restrictions to ascertain whether TCRs planned 
as exceptions to Annex VII are sporadic or, conversely, constitute a significant component of the TCR 
landscape in the EU. 

The  survey  findings  reveal  that  51%  of  respondents  occasionally  experience  these  exceptions, 
while  35%  often  encounter  them.  At  opposite  ends  of  the  spectrum,  9%  of  respondents  never 
experience  them,  while  5%  encounter  them  always.  Interestingly,  despite  variations  in  the  absolute 
number  of  responses  (27  RUs  vs.  13  IMs),  the  distribution  of  responses  among  RUs  and  IMs  is 
similar: approximately one-third answered “Often,” and the majority answered “Occasionally,” with one 
response indicating “Always”. 

How often do you experience TCRs that, for the reasons allowed by the EU legislation (specifically in 
point  14  of  the  Delegated  Decision  2017/2075),  are  exempted  from  the  information  sharing  process 
prescribed by EU legislation? 

Always 

Often 

Occasionally 

Never 

5; 9%

3; 5%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

1

3

Railway Undertaking and related
association

1

10

Managing Director of RFC

1

Maintenance & construction companies

19; 35%

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

1

5

28; 51%

Freight Client

1

4

1

3

1

16

7

0%

20%

40%

60%

80% 100%

IMs experiencing a high frequency of these types of TCRs attribute the reasons, beyond those 
indicated  in  Annex  VII,  to  two  aspects:  funding  stability  and  public  procurement  procedures. 
Specifically,  lack  of  financial  stability  can  pose  challenges  in  planning,  prioritising  urgent  cases. 
Moreover,  in EU-funded  projects,  implementation  time  is  crucial,  and  IMs  are not  always  the  project 
executors,  leading  to  activities  extending  beyond  the  TCR  window.  IMs  also  cite  lengthy  public 
procurement processes and inaccurate work schedules as factors that may prevent the application of 
Annex VII provisions. 

IMs resorting to these types of TCRs more sporadically do so in cases of heavy maintenance works, 
accidents/force  majeure  events,  and  security-related  interventions,  alongside  delayed  planning 
permission and consultation with relevant stakeholders. One RFC Managing Director reports that ad-
hoc TCRs for safety reasons can be frequent, depending on the general condition of the infrastructure. 
Additionally, disparities in national funding and delayed maintenance works can lead to these types of 
TCRs. 

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Conversely,  RUs  have  reported  that  the  frequency  of  this  type  of  TCR  varies  significantly  from 
country to country and it is strictly related to the amount of works on the network. Beyond force 
majeure cases, multiple RUs have reported TCRs requests by IMs  during the running timetable and 
are more frequent when re-establishing safe train operations. 

Presence of different TCR frameworks by IMs in the same country 

Moreover,  different  approaches  to  Traffic  Capacity  Restriction  planning  can  arise  within  the 
same  country,  as  different  parts  of  the  rail  network  may  be  managed  by  separate  IMs.  Most 
respondents  (41%)  highlight  differences  in  TCR  planning  approaches  between  IMs  overseeing  the 
network  in  the  country,  while  40%  perceive  alignment  of  all  TCR  frameworks  with  that  of  the  IM 
controlling most of the rail network (for completeness, 19% of respondents indicated “I do not know”). 
In  this  context,  IMs  acknowledges  that  IMs  within  the  same  country  may  adopt  slightly  different 
approaches  to  TCR  planning  (due  to  exceptions  or  provisions  of  national  laws  implementing  Annex 
VII), but there is generally a level of cooperation, resulting in similar outcomes. 

Conversely, RUs report that, when the network is managed by more than one IM, smaller IMs often 
exhibit similar approaches to TCR planning to the main national IM. Nonetheless, almost as many RUs 
report  an  opposite  experience,  as  smaller  IMs  can  have  diverging  practices  including  delayed 
announcement  of  TCRs  (including  major  ones)  and  varying  levels  of  digitalisation  in  TCR 
communication to stakeholders. In some instances, smaller IMs may not adhere to the same rules as 
the primary IM and in some instances may not fully apply the provisions of Annex VII. Respondents 
also  note 
lacking,  particularly  concerning 
communication of TCRs by IMs at freight terminals and ports, which occurs at different intervals. 

instances  where  harmonisation  between 

IMs 

is 

In  some  countries  parts  of  the  rail  network  can  be  managed  by  different  Infrastructure  Managers.  Do 
IMs have different TCR frameworks with respect to the one of the Infrastructure Manager that controls 
the most part of rail network? 

Yes,  each  IM  uses  a  slightly  different 

I do not know 

TCR framework 

No,  all  TCR  frameworks  are  aligned  with  the 
one of the IM that controls the most part of the rail 
network 

23; 40%

24; 41%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

Railway Undertaking and related
association

Managing Director of RFC

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

Freight Client

1 

1 

6 

4 

12 

5 

11 

7 

4 

7 

11; 19%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Protection of the final capacity offer against TCRs 

Despite  the  potential  for  various  approaches  to  Traffic  Capacity  Restriction  planning  (in  accordance 
with Annex VII) due to multiple factors, the goal remains consistent: a coordinated approach to TCR 
planning involving RUs and IMs with the aim of minimising the impact on traffic and capacity. 
This  objective  can  be  realised  if  the  capacity  offered  by  IMs  to  RUs  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
consultation process is effectively “protected” against further TCRs, barring unforeseen circumstances 
such as force majeure events. 

This  aspect  has  been  emphasised  on  numerous  occasions  by  stakeholders  and  serves  as  the 
cornerstone of the TCR process. On one hand, the “final” capacity offer represents the culmination of 
the  consultation  process,  and  any  subsequent  changes,  such  as  new  TCRs  or  modifications  to 
existing  ones,  would  undermine  coordination  efforts.  On  the  other  hand,  the  “final”  capacity  offer 
serves as a crucial input for RMs to plan and optimise resource allocation, including rolling stock and 
personnel. 

When stakeholders were surveyed about whether  the final capacity offer is  protected against TCRs, 
82%  of  responses  were  negative,  with  the  remaining  18%  being  positive.  Although  “No”  is  the 
predominant  response  across  all  categories,  the  distribution  of  responses  varies  notably  among  the 

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two main stakeholder  groups: 69% for IMs  and 93% for Rus. Among the factors contributing to this, 
IMs cite: 

•  High  utilisation  rates  of  the  infrastructure  leaving  limited  flexibility  in  the  system,  thus 

making an impact on capacity inevitable; 

•  Financial instability, which can complicate TCR planning, leading to delays in planning and 
procurement  activities.  Consequently,  TCR  windows  may  differ  from  what  was  previously 
communicated to stakeholders. These factors can have a systemic impact on TCR planning, 
particularly  when  dealing  with  a  high  number  of  TCRs  or  works  to  be  carried  out  on  the 
network; 

•  Unavoidable safety-related interventions and force majeure TCRs. 

Conversely, IMs who consider the final capacity offer protected against TCRs do not foresee a 
systemic impact, as instances of path cancellation constitute less than 1% of the paths allocated in 
the  annual  timetable,  and  such  occurrences  are  coordinated  with  stakeholders.  However,  they 
acknowledge that in practice, capacity is not always protected due to the need for rescheduling TCRs, 
with the focus varying depending on the impact of the TCR. 

RFC  Managing  Directors  emphasise  that  the  final  capacity  offer  may  not  be  fully  shielded  against 
Traffic Capacity Restrictions, as the primary capacity product of the RFCs (PaPs, Pre-Arranged Paths) 
is  established and  disclosed by X-11. Adjustments to PaPs  offer can only be made based on TCRs 
known up to that point (by reducing TCR days from the offer), with any TCRs that emerge after X-11 or 
are unforeseen resulting in a reduction of the final offer. Furthermore, aside from safety related TCRs 
or  force  majeure  events,  the  degree  of  protection  varies  from  country  to  country,  with  one  RFC 
estimating the percentage of unprotected capacity offer ranging from 10% to 50% depending on the 
country. It is important to note that RFCs manage capacity coordination up to the definition of the final 
offer. 

From the responses gathered in the online questionnaire, it is evident that this presents a major point 
of  interest  for  RUs.  The  main  concerns  raised  by  respondents  (aside  from  force  majeure  instances) 
include: 

•  Stakeholders report instances of TCRs that deviated from the scheduled timing. 

•  Unplanned or  incomplete  maintenance  activities  might  lead  to  the  request  of  TCRs  after 

the publication of the annual timetable; 

•  Coordination  of  TCRs  cross  networks  of  neighbouring  IMs  is  one  of  the  major 

indispensable elements to protect the allocated capacity towards TCRs; 

• 

Instances have been reported were a conspicuous amount of TCRs have been communicated 
after the publication of the final capacity offer; 

•  Different  approaches  of  IMs  towards  TCR  planning  (e.g.,  different  timing  in  the  detailed 
planification  of  the  works  to  be  performed  during  the  TCR)  between  neighbouring  countries 
can lead to conflicts in TCR scheduling that can impact international trains; 

•  Stakeholders reported instances where paths have been revised multiple times before a TCR, 
hindering  a  clear  view  of  the  impacts  on  draft  or  final  offers.  This  complexity  imposes 
significant  challenges  on  RUs  in  maintaining  a  clear  and  stable  commercial  offering  for  end 
customers, particularly for long-distance rail services operating on conventional lines. 

It  is  essential  to  acknowledge  that,  while  desirable,  the  final  capacity  offer  may  not  be  entirely 
immune  to  TCRs  as  they  can  be  triggered  by  force  majeure  events  and  other  unplanned 
circumstances. Directive 2012/34/EU mandates that IMs should prepare a contingency plan for such 
events.  In  response  to  this,  RNE  has  developed  the  “Handbook  for  International  Contingency 
Management”  a  comprehensive  set  of  guidelines  for  the  management  of  unplanned  disruptions  of 
international significance.  

The  guidelines  outline  a  structured  process  for  managing  disruptions,  coordinating  with  relevant 
RFCs, and communicating with Rus. An international contingency management case is defined as 
an  event  lasting  more  than  three  days  and  with  a  significant  impact  on  international  traffic.  The  IM 
whose network is affected takes the lead in this process. 

The IM whose network is affected takes the lead in this process. The coordination and communication 
tasks  to  be  performed  follow  a  priority  order:  i)  assessment  the  impact  on  circulating  traffic,  ii) 
involvement of neighbouring IMs and RFCs, and iii) informing affected Rus. 

43 

 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
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Factors that hamper a stable planning of TCRs 
This  paragraph  delves  into  the  factors  that  hinder  stable  TCR  planning.  TCRs  should  be  scheduled 
within  a  window  that  minimises  disruption  to  traffic,  while  ensuring  the  successful  completion  of 
scheduled  works.  However,  evidence  from  the  stakeholder  consultation  suggests  that  this  ideal 
scenario is not always achieved.  

IMs  and  RFC  Managing  Directors  agree  (in  the  case  of  the  latter,  unanimously)  that  TCRs  cannot 
always be planned within the optimal timeframe. Specifically, one third of the IMs surveyed reported 
that  TCRs  are  exclusively  scheduled  during  off-peak  periods  of  transport  demand,  encompassing 
passenger and freight traffic. 

To what extent do you consider the transport demand seasonality (e.g., peak of the week or of the year) 
when planning TCRs? 

TCRs are planned exclusively in the 
transport 

the 

off-peak 
timeframe  of 
demand (pax and freight) 

TCRs  are  planned  exclusively  in 
the off-peak timeframe of the passenger 
demand 

TCRs  cannot  always  be  planned  in 
to 

time-window  due 

the  optimal 
constrains 

5; 16%

3; 
10%

Railway Undertaking and related association

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

1 

1 

Managing Director of RFC

8 

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related association

5 

2 

14 

Freight Client

23; 74%

0%

50%

100%

When asked about the factor hindering this ideal scenario, stakeholders identified a range of issues: i) 
limited budget availability, ii) limited availability of subcontractors, iii) limited availability of specialised 
equipment  and  iv)  work  seasonality.  The  responses  indicate  that  the  primary  factor  identified  is  the 
seasonality  of  works,  followed  by  the  limited  availability  of  subcontractors.  The  impact  of  the  other 
factors  is  relatively  equally  distributed.  Other  factors  mentioned  are  safety  related  interruptions  and 
TCR clustering (e.g., a TCR might take place outside an optima window but in parallel to another TCR, 
therefore  the  resulting  impact  on  traffic  is  lower).  Overall,  especially  when  international  traffic  is 
involved  and  in  case  of  multiple  services  with  peak/off-peak  periods,  even  the  optimal  TCR  window 
cannot exclude an impact on traffic. 

What are the constrains? 

Limited budget   

 Other 

 Limited 

resources  in  terms  of 
machinery 
and 
specialised staff  

Limited 

availability 
subcontractors 

of 

Seasonality of works 

20; 29%

10; 14%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

1

1

11; 
16%

Railway Undertaking and related
association

Managing Director of RFC

4

1

3

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

5

8

Freight Client

1

5

1

1

6

8

12

6

6

15; 22%

13; 19%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

44 

 
 
 
 
 
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and relevant framework conditions 

IMs were asked about the barriers they encounter when planning TCRs. The main barrier identified 
in this context is budget allocations constrains (e.g., timings of the funding availability, or allocation 
for  a  specific  set  maintenance  of  activities),  followed  by  instances  of  going  over  budget  and/or 
experiencing  delays  in  planned  TCRs,  and  the  limited  availability  of  contractors.  Respondents  also 
highlighted the following factors: 

•  Coordination of TCRs nationally and internationally to ensure sufficient rerouting capacity 

and adequate dwelling times (especially for freight); 

•  Long-term infrastructure planning tied to annual budgets, which can create uncertainty in 
the planning process. Therefore, it becomes difficult to provide information at an early  stage 
(e.g.,  2  years  in  advance  for  high-impact  TCRs)  and  may  delay  the  start  of  procurement 
activities; 

•  Public  procurement  procedures  are  lengthy  in  most  countries,  especially  for  new 

construction activities (e.g., property expropriations); 

•  Construction  works,  and  consequently  TCRs,  may  sometimes  undergo  administrative 

processes that are not completely under control of the IMs, leading to delays; 

•  TCR planning entails a substantial workload that can slow down the process, if not adequately 

supported by efficient IT tools and sufficient personnel. 

What are the main barriers you encounter in the management and planning of TCRs? 

Infrastructure Manager and related association 

Budget allocation/costrains

14

TCRs delays or overbudget with respect to the
TCR planning

Limited availability of contractors with adequate
equipment, resources and capabilities

Limited timeframe for works

Railway Undertakings (RUs) coordination and
management with respect to TCRs

Limited internal resources

10

10

9

6

6

Other

5

When the question was extended to other stakeholders, budget allocation and, in general, funding 
availability,  emerged  as  the  primary  hindrances  in  TCR  planning,  accounting  for  26%  of 
responses.  This  is  followed  by  the  availability  of  construction  companies  and  adequate  machinery, 
noted by 18% and 15% of respondents respectively. Additionally, 16% of respondents cited adverse 
weather  conditions  and  force  majeure  events  as  relevant  factors,  while  6%  indicated  safety 
interventions  required  by  National  Safety  Authorities.  Respondents  also  provided  various  inputs  on 
this matter. 

RUs  identify  the  lack  of  financial  stability  as  one  of  the  main  challenges,  compounded  by 
complex bureaucracy. In some cases, funding for construction works is confirmed with short notice 
relative to the start of the works, complicating coordination with neighbouring IMs and the consultation 
process with Rus. Furthermore, the tendering process can be protracted, especially if the opposition 
procedure is triggered. During the execution of works, planning may be hindered by delays, exceeding 
budgets, and limited availability of personnel and machinery. Overall, the capacity allocation process 

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is not synchronised with the design and contracting process, a problem that is exacerbated in the case 
of a high volume of TCRs. 

RUs  concur  on  identifying  the  lack  of  financial  stability  as  one  of  the  main  impediments  to  TCR 
planning. Many stakeholders suggest a possible solution in the implementation of a more stable multi-
annual  financing  framework,  which  would  enable  IMs  to  plan  TCRs  accordingly.  Furthermore, 
countries  may  prioritise  differently  at  the  national  level,  and  these  discrepancies  can  be  particularly 
pronounced in the case of cross-border traffic. 

What would you consider to be hampering factors toward a stable planning of TCRs? 

 Frequent 
urgent  intervention 
requests 
from 
Safety Authorities  

Impact  of  bad 
the 

weather  on 
infrastructure    

Availability  of 

Construction 

Other   

Availability  of 

Machinery   

company 
availability 

resources 

22; 26%

5; 6%

13; 
16%

Terminal Operator

2

Public Authorities

Railway Undertaking and related association

1

Managing Director of RFC

1

4

Maintenance & construction companies

1

1

6

1

4

1

2

2

5

1

6

13; 
15%

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

3

6

8

7

9

13

Freight Client

0%

20%

40%

60%

80% 100%

16; 19%

15; 18%

Funding of TCR 

The  present  section  delves  into  a  very  critical  topic,  which  is  the  funding  of  TCR  for  which 
perspectives  and  opinions  gathered  from  the  diverse  stakeholders  involved  in  the  consultation  are 
very similar in terms of being pivotal for the stability of TCRs.  

Stable  economic  conditions  are  essential  for  the  conceptual  planning  and  capacity 
management of the IM in the implementation of TCRs. Presently, various countries establish diverse 
economic  parameters  and  funding  schedules  for  the  upkeep  and  enhancement  of  railway 
infrastructure.  In  an  unstable  economic  setting  marked  by  unpredictable  funding  in  terms  of  both 
timeline  and  capital  expenditure,  challenges  arise  in  coordinating  construction  and  maintenance 
efforts. Consequently, this often results in inadequately planned, poorly coordinated, and insufficiently 
communicated  TCRs.  The  repercussions  extend  to  uncoordinated  timetable  adjustments  and  a 
detrimental  impact  on  end  customers.  In  compliance  with  Community  of  European  Railway  and 
Infrastructure  Companies  (CER)24,  IMs  should  be  granted  secure  multi-annual  funding  and  financial 
resources to cover their operational, maintenance, and upgrade costs for a minimum duration of five 
years. This support should be accompanied by harmonised financing procedures and timelines across 
Member States. The activity and performance contractual agreement between the ministry of the state 
responsible for the public finance and IMs conclude the responsibilities and obligations of the Ministry 
to  ensure  the  financial  resources  from  the  state  budget  for  a  minimum  period  of  five  years.  This  is 
maintained  to  cover  the  costs  incurred  in  connection  with  the  operation  of  the  railway  infrastructure 
network, costs incurred by the IM in operating the railway infrastructure and not covered by the track 
access charges and other business activities of the Infrastructure Manager, which are recognised as 
reasonable,  are  contractually  agreed.  The  contractual  agreement  draws  according  to  Article  30  and 
Annex  V  of  Directive  2012/34/EU.  The  details  of  the  TCRs  should  be  included  on  the  MAC  (Multi 
Annual Contract) based on article 30 as well. 

24 Reducing the negative impact of Temporary Capacity Restrictions, available at: 
https://www.cer.be/images/publications/positions/230201_CER_Position_Paper_TCRs.pdf 

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According  to  the  RMMS  202225  report,  an  average  94  EUR  infrastructure  expenditure  per 
inhabitant was registered for 2020 at EU-27 level, with the following distribution: maintenance 25%, 
renewals  27%,  upgrades  28%  and  new  infrastructure  construction  of  20%.  To  evaluate  the  actual 
annual  funding  in  TCR  planning,  the  focus  countries  were  provided  with  the  online  questionnaire 
targeting IMs and regulatory bodies. 

Figure 5: Rail infrastructure funding by source and country (EUR billion, 2020), Source: RMMS, 2022 

Figure 6: Cost of railways per inhabitant (infrastructure expenditure plus PSO compensation) 2015-2020, 
Source: RMMS, 2022 

The Ministry of Transport or Railway shall provide the Infrastructure Manager, under national law and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, hereinafter referred to as TFEU, with financing 
at a level commensurate with its functions, the size of the infrastructure and financial requirements to 
cover new investments. By Government Decision it may be decided, in compliance with the legislation 
in force, to finance these investments through state-guaranteed loans or by means other than direct 
financing  from  the  state.  When  the  IM  carries  out  economic  activities  other  than  infrastructure 
management, it is necessary to separate the accounts between the two categories of activities so that 
State funding is used exclusively for the activity of infrastructure management. The funding has been 
split  into  categories  of  works  depending  on  the  requisites  and  volume.  Once  the  contractual 
agreement is amended, the balance amount in funding from the previous year would be counted in the 
next year and later the newly allocated fund comes into effect depending on the share and intensity of 
work.  Taking  Italy  as  an  example,  the  contractual  agreement  of  the  year  2022-2026  classifies  their 

25   Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS), available at: Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS) - European Commission 

(europa.eu) 

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share of funding into works related to safety and adaptation of new standards which are relevant for 
the  climatic  resilience,  technology  development,  station  accessibility,  tourist  enhancement  of  minor 
railways,  upgradation  of  regional  networks,  works  related  in  the  metropolitan  cities,  rail  accessibility 
and routes with national interest. The requirements and works of each country define how the funding 
should be distributed. 

As per the contractual agreement, the business plan should be provided by the IMs  considering the 
strategy  and  the  funding  provided  by  the  ministry  which  includes  the  investment  and  financing 
programmes.  For  every  country,  the  contract  comes  in  effect  by  drawing  up  a  business  plan  for  the 
reference period. The plan should be comprised of all the investment programs and funding programs 
necessary  for  the  reference  period  which  in  turn  would  be  validated  in  6  months  of  time  after  the 
agreement  has  made.  The  plan  shall  be  drawn  up  in  such  a  way  as  to  ensure  optimal  and  efficient 
use, provision and development of the infrastructure while ensuring financial equilibrium and providing 
the  means  necessary  to  achieve  these  objectives.  The  IM  shall,  at  their  request,  provide  interested 
applicants  with  access  to  relevant  information  and  the  opportunity  to  express  their  views  on  the 
content of the business plan as regards the conditions of access and use and the nature, provision, 
and development of the infrastructure, before approval by the Infrastructure Manager. 

The table below provides a synthesis of relevant information concerning the contractual agreements of 
France, Italy, Germany, and Spain.  

FOCUS – The contractual agreements between Infrastructure Managers and Member States 

France 

Signed on the 6.04.2022, the French State - SNCF Réseau 2021-2030 performance contract sets out the major 
strategic  directions  that  will  enable  the  sustainable  development  of  the  rail  mode,  based  on  a  sustainable 
economic model. 

This strategy and the guidelines set out in this contract aim to: 

• 

Increase the modal share of rail by boosting rail passenger and freight traffic; 

•  Maximise the socio-economic benefits of rail: a high level of safety, time savings, city-centre services, 

and a low environmental footprint. 

According to the annex 1 of the contract, the French State and SNCF Réseau have agreed to monitor 21 yearly 
key performances indicators to report on the overall performance expected of the national rail network like: 

•  Capacity  delivered,  running  and  cancelled  traffic,  punctuality,  frequency  of  significant  rail  accidents 

with/without people work stoppage consequences; 

•  Maintenance and renewal cost;  

• 

Financial information (fees, operational margin, cash flow, etc.); 

•  Carbon emissions from track dimensioning materials. 

The following figures are published in annex I of the contract. 

To achieve these objectives, SNCF Réseau works towards: 

• 

Improving the quality of service offered to all customers; 

•  Making a sustainable effort to renovate and modernise the network; 

•  Ensuring a return to cash-flow equilibrium from 2024 onwards. 

According to annex 2, this contract secures a total budget of €51.33 billion on the period 2021 - 2030. ~60% of 
this  funding  will  contribute  to  the  considerable  effort  to  regenerate  the  national  rail  network,  which  has  been 
underway for several years, to guarantee efficient, safe, and robust rail transport. 

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Germany 

Compared  to  other  European  countries,  Germany  consolidates  all  infrastructure-related  agreements  with  the 
government  into  a  single  document  called  the  Performance  and  Financing  Agreement  (LuFV)26.  This 
agreement governs the relationship between the Federal Government and Deutsche Bahn for the maintenance 
and replacement of the railway infrastructure managed by Deutsche Bahn’s infrastructure companies. 

Background 

LuFV  I  was  signed  on  November  11,  2008,  for  5-year  period  (2009  –  2013)  which  provides  for  replacement 
investments by the federal government amounting to 2.5 billion euros annually. Then, LuFV II was signed (which 
was seen as enhancement of LuFV I) at the beginning of January 2015 between Federal Republic of Germany 
and Deutsche Bahn AG with an investment of €28 billion over a period of 5 years (2015 - 2019). The agreement 
provides planning and financial security for the existing tracks, stations, and DB AG’s power systems. The LuFV 
II thus forms the basis for the long-term reduction of the existing investment backlog in rail network.  

Following enhancement were seen in LuFV III as follows: 

•  Quality indicators for network availability, asset value, and track position; 

•  Ongoing  developments  for  quality  indicator  “Condition  category  fully  and  partially  renewed 

bridges” which was not fulfilled in LuFV II; 

• 

59% of increase in the investment compared to LuFV II27. 

LuFV III 

On January 1, 2020, the third LuFV was signed, allocating 86 billion euros for replacement investments and the 
maintenance  of  the  existing  rail  network  over  ten  years  (2020-2029).  The  ten-year  term  provides  increased 
planning security for Deutsche Bahn (DB) and the construction industry. This allows construction and planning 
companies to build up future capacities and establish long-term agreements with suppliers. A key focus of LuFV 
III  is  to  improve  the  experience  for  rail  customers,  including  enhancements  in  accessibility  and  additional 
weather protection  on platforms.  Additionally,  more  funds  are  allocated to minimise  the  impact of construction 
work on rail traffic, promoting customer-friendly construction.  

As  part  of  this  agreement,  the  federal  government  has  significantly  increased  its  contribution.  A  total  of  €63.4 
billion  will  be  allocated  for  replacement  investments  in  the  existing  network  from  2020  to  2029.  The  largest 
portion,  approximately  €51.4  billion,  will  come  from  the  federal  budget.  Additionally,  funds  from  the  dividend 
payments  of  railway  infrastructure  companies,  made  available  by  the  federal  government,  will  be  used  for 
investments in the current railway lines. Federal requirement plan investments that benefit the existing network 
and  at  least  €1.375  billion  in  investment  capital  from  the  railway  infrastructure  companies  are  also  included. 
Furthermore, the railway infrastructure companies have committed to spend a minimum of €22.78 billion on the 
maintenance of railway lines during the term of the LuFV III contract. The Railway Infrastructure Undertakings 
(RIUs) are  required to annually verify  and report  their maintenance measures  and expenditures. This ensures 
compliance with the minimum maintenance contribution requirements. 

Compliance 

The  performance  and  financing  agreement  is  founded  on  complete  transparency  and  oversight.  The  Federal 
Railway  Authority  oversees  the  implementation  of  the  agreement.  In  case  of  non-compliance,  such  as  not 
meeting  performance  targets  or  economic  efficiency  standards,  the  EBA  can  impose  penalties/fines  and 
demand repayments. This can occur if targets are not met, such as 

1.  Violations of economic efficiency principles,  

2.  Unauthorised route closures,  

3.  Closure of railway bridges due to DB's fault,  

4.  Significant breaches of procurement contracts, or 

5.  Failure to make designated replacement investments as per the contract. 

26   https://www.eba.bund.de/DE/Themen/Finanzierung/LuFV/lufv_node.html 

27   Deutscher Bundestag - Expertenkritik an LuFV III 

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Quality indicators  

The  condition  of  the  infrastructure  is  assessed  using  quality  indicators28  that  are  subject  to  sanctions.  The 
agreement includes annual targets for the indicators as follows, 

1.  DB InfraGo AG 

o  Theoretical  travel  time  loss:  Ensures  that  travel  time  losses  are  accurately  assessed  and 
managed for prioritising routes with substantial traffic and persistent infrastructure issues; 

o  Number  of  infrastructure  deficiencies:  Assess  the  infrastructure  deficiencies,  irrespective  of 
their  inclusion  in  the  annual  timetable.  In  case  of  persistent  for  more  than  100  days,  it  is 
considered in assessment; 

o  Condition category of fully and partially renovated bridge: Improvements in the condition of at 
least 300 railway overpasses (which were a part of infrastructure to be renovated in the next 
ten year) must be evidenced through significant maintenance funded by DB InfraGo. 

2.  DB Station&Service AG 

o  Assessment of plant quality: Assess the quality of the facilities (e.g., platforms, roofs, access 

routes, reception buildings); 

o  Functionality of platforms and "extensive accessibility”: Assess the level of equipment on the 

platform. 

3.  DB Energie GmbH 

o  Security of supply of railway energy: Assess in the security of supply of railway energy.  

If the contractual targets specified in the LuFV are not met, the federal government can demand full or partial 
repayment  of  its  infrastructure  contribution.  Detailed  reporting  on  infrastructure  status,  development,  and 
financial  usage  is  required.  The  condition  of  the  railways  is  documented  in  an  Infrastructure  Condition  and 
Development  Report  (IZB)29,  which  Deutsche  Bahn  AG  must  submit  annually.  Based  on  this  report,  the 
Federal  Railway  Authority  (EBA)  evaluates  whether  the  companies  have  met  the  agreed  targets.  Deutsche 
Bahn is required to submit an Infrastructure Condition and Development Report (IZB) by 30. April each year30.  

Implementation of LuFV III 

The  maintenance  and  modernisation  of  the  existing  infrastructure  will  continue  under  the  Performance  and 
Financing  Agreement  (LuFV)  III.  Significant  investment  in  the  renewal  of  the  superstructure  (tracks  and 
switches)  is  planned  for  2023.  However,  the  agreement  acknowledges  the  challenges  posed  by  current  price 
increases due to the implementation of modernisation efforts and proposes a significant expansion of financing 
starting  in  2024.  To  achieve  this,  the  agreement  also  includes  provisions  for  an  addendum  post-2024  federal 
budget adoption to adjust to changing financial needs. 

Italy 

The concession relationship between the IM RFI and the Italian State (MIT - Ministry of Transport) is regulated 
by  a  5  year-contract  (Programme  Contract).  Since  2013,  the  contract  is  composed  by  two  documents:  the 
Investment  Programme  Contract  (CdP-I)  and  the  Services  Programme  Contract  (CdP-S).  The  first  regulates 
planning  and  financing  of  infrastructure  investments,  while  the  latter  regulates  the  financing  of  ordinary  and 
extraordinary  maintenance  activities  as  well  as  the  financing  of  management  costs.  The  Programme  contract 
2022-2026  is  defined  on  the  premises  of  the  “Strategic  Document  on  railway  mobility  of  people  and 
goods”31. 

The  Strategic  Document32,  as  mandated  by  law,  outlines  the  requirements  for  passenger  and  freight  rail 
mobility,  network  management  activities,  and  network  maintenance  improvement.  It  also  establishes  the 
assessment  criteria  for  the  environmental,  economic,  and  social  sustainability  of  actions  undertaken. 
Furthermore, it sets the necessary safety and resilience standards for national railway infrastructure, considering 

28   Source: EBA, Available at Link 

29   Source: EBA, Available at Link 

30   Source: https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/17/056/1705689.pdf 

31   RFI Programme Contract 

32   Source: Senato della Repubblica e Camera dei Deputati, “Documento strategico della mobilità ferroviaria di 

passeggeri e merci. Atto del Governo 352”, available here. 

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the impacts of climate change. The document is divided into three sections: 

1. 

Introduction  of  the  strategic  objectives  of  infrastructure  and  mobility  policy  considering  the  mobility 
needs of people and goods; 

2.  Description of the program contract 2017-2021 and the update 2020-2021, the resources available for 
the program contract 2022-2026, as well as the strategic programs in the field of railway mobility with 
the indication of the priority of the interventions; 

3.  Description  of  the  evaluation  methodology  ex  ante,  in  progress  and  ex  post  of  investments  in  the 
railway field and the performance of the railway IM in relation to the Programme Contract 2022-2026. 

The 2023-2026 Programme Contract 

In  November  2021  the  Ministry  of  Transport  and  RFI  sign  the  2020-2021  Update  of  the  2017-2021  Program 
Contract (and the Services section is extended to 2022). The Contract provides for the allocation of additional 
resources for a value of about 31.7 billion EUR incorporating the evolution of programming and financing of the 
National Recovery and Resilience Plan, of the Complementary Fund to the PNRR and the Infrastructure Annex 
to the Economic and Financial Document (DEF), as well as the 2020 and 2021 Budget laws. 

As of the 2017-2021 Contract, the total value of the ongoing and programmatic projects portfolio of investments 
stands at approximately 213.448 billion EUR, of which 109.187 billion EUR already funded, while the remaining 
104  billion  EUR  are  to  be  financed  with  subsequent  Contracts.  For  the  2022-2026  Program  Contract,  the 
financial  requirement  is  estimated  at  €54.554  billion  EUR,  while  the  so-called  "beyond  Plan"  financial  needs 
(which refer to the years following 2026) amount to about 49.7 billion euros32.  

The  new  Programme  Contract  2022-2026  is  approved  by  the  CIPESS  (“Comitato  Interministeriale  per  la 
Programmazione  Economica  e  lo  Sviluppo  Sostenibile”)  in  August  2022  and  submitted  to  the  Parliament  in 
December  2022.  The  Contract  approval  follows  the  new  procedures  set  out  in  the  Law  Decree  152/2021  and 
envisaged by the PNRR (Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan), according to which, the Contract does 
not  undergo  the  Parliament’s  approval.  The  Contract  foresees  the  allocation  of  additional  resources  following 
the approval of the Budget Law 2022, respectively: 

•  Services section (CdP-S): +10.220 billion EUR from 2022 to 2027, distributed for the most part in the 

2023-2026 period at an annual rate of approximately 3 billion EUR; 

• 

Investment Section (CdP-I): +13.070 billion EUR, dedicated fort the most part to the development of 
the high-speed network (5 billion EUR) and the financing of the Investment Programme (5.750 billion 
EUR)33. 

Noticeably, the Law Decree 152/2021 has redefined the process of definition and approval of the following two 
distinct types of programming acts, of which the first constitutes the strategic foundation of the second: 

1.  the five-year strategic document, which reports the results of the comparison between the institutions 

that define the strategic policies for railway transport development; 

2.  the contracts for program investments and services (with a 5-year duration and updatable annually) 
between  the  MIT  and  RFI,  which  represent  the  main  operational  programming  documents  and  the 
contractualization of the financial resources allocated by the State. 

In particular, the Programme contract approval process prescribed in the Decree 112/2015 (the national law that 
acknowledges the Directive 34/2012/EU) has been revised to allow for a quicker deployment of railway project: 

• 

• 

it  is  foreseen  a  partial  registration  by  the  Italian  Court  of  Auditors  of  the  approval  resolution  of  the 
CIPESS,  which  becomes  effective  limited  to  what  is  subject  to  registration.  In  this  case,  the  CIPESS 
can adopt, at the request of the MIT, in agreement with the MEF, an integrative or modifying resolution 
of the unregistered parts; 

the approval process of the annual updates is differentiated based on the total amount of public funding 
allocated: if the delta of the allocated funding is below or equal to 5 billion EUR, the annual updates is 
approved by a conjunct decree of the MEF and MIT, after informing the CIPESS. On the contrary, if the 
amount is >5 billion EUR, the same procedure applies as for multi-year program contracts34. 

Performance indicators and penalties 

The  performance  indicators  (bonus  and  penalties)  are  differentiated  for  the  two  sections  of  the  Programme 
Contract. 

33   Source: Camera dei Deputati – Servizio Studi, “Contratto di programma 2022-2026 - Parte Servizi e Parte 

Investimenti tra MIT e RFI - Rete Ferroviaria Italiana S.p.A.”, 28.02.2023, available here. 

34   Source: ART, “Parere al Ministero delle Infrastrutture e della mobilità sostenibili sullo schema Contratto 
di  Programma  - parte  servizi  2022-2026  tra  il  Ministero delle  Infrastrutture  e della  mobilità  sostenibili  e 
Rete  Ferroviaria  Italiana  S.p.A.,  reso  dall’Autorità  di  regolazione  dei  trasporti  ai  sensi  dell’articolo  15, 
comma 2, del d.lgs. 112/2015.”, available here. 

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Services (CdP-S) 

The  IM  is  bound  to  penalties  in  case  the  monitoring  KPIs  are  lower  than  a  specific  threshold.  The  indicators 
monitored  are:  level  of  track  availability,  punctuality  for  class  of  service,  user-oriented  indicators  (perceived 
safety  and  customer  satisfaction).  In  any  case  the  maximum  cumulative  penalties  cannot  exceed  the  0.2%  of 
the resources annually disbursed to the infrastructure Manager. 

Investments (CdP-I) 

RFI  is  set  to  communicate  on  a  yearly  basis  the  performance  objectives  for  the  current  year  and  the 
performance measurement for the previous year (by April of each year). The calculation methodology refers to a 
sample  of  all  relevant  investment  projects,  divided  into  homogeneous  types,  for  which  the  final  design  has 
already  been  approved.  The  performance  of  the  Manager  is  measured  on  a  linear  combination  on  four 
indicators  of  the  sample  project:  total  cost,  total  duration,  annual  production,  and  annual  milestones.  The 
indicators contribute to the synthesis of an annual target performance indicator: if the performance of the project 
under analysis deviates >15% from the reference, the IM is subject to a penalty. The penalty is calculated based 
on the target performance of the project: 1% for deviations from 15% to 30%, 1.5% for deviations from 30% to 
50%, 2% for deviations >50%. 

The  same  mechanism  is  applied  for  investment  programmes,  which  are  monitored  based  on  two  variables: 
annual  production  (60%)  and  annual  milestones  (40%).  The  penalty  scheme  is  analogue,  and  it  triggers  from 
deviations >30% from the target performance. 

The beforementioned penalties do not affect the financial allocation for the execution of the project/investment 
programmes and the total amount is limited to 2 million EUR per year. 

Contract Update (2023) 

In December 2023 the first annual revision of the Programme Contract is approved, introducing the following: 

•  Services Contract (CdP-S): +2.8 billion EUR to finance extraordinary maintenance interventions in the 

period 2024-2037 (200 million EUR per year). 

• 

Investments Contract (CdP-I): +5.35 billion EUR allocated to specific projects as provided by legislative 
acts.  Additionally,  there  has  been  a  revaluation  of  resources  amounting  to  2.5  billion  EUR  million 
affecting  the  CdP-I  2022-2026  for  interventions  whose  project  planning  does  not  foresee  availability 
before the first half of 2024. This is done to meet emerging financial needs related to the continuation 
of the projects linked to the National Recovery and Resilience Plan, as well as the works deemed as 
priority. 

Additionally, the punctuality performance target has been reduced from 1% up to 5% depending on the service 
class. 

The Regulatory body opinion (2022) 

In July 2022, as part of the approval process, the regulatory body (ART – Autorità di Regolazione dei Trasporti) 
submits to the MIT its observations regarding the new Programme Contract, according to the provisions of the 
Decree  112/2015.  Some  of  the  relevant  aspects  stemming  from  the  analysis  of  the  regulatory  body  are 
summarised in the following points34: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

The Authority criticises the simplified procedure planned for the definition of the annual updates of the 
contract in cases of imports below or equal to 5 billion EUR. 

The  assessment  of  the  authority  is  related  to  the  Services  section  of  the  Programme  Contract  as, 
among other elements, the rationale behind the identification of the interventions to be includes in the 
Investment section of the Contract is not known. 

The  reclassification  of  some  activities  (related  to  rail  track  safety,  decommissioning  of  obsolete 
equipment  and  traffic  management  equipment)  within  the  perimeter  of  the  Services  section  could 
generate  ambiguity  between  what  can  be  considered  maintenance  activities  and  what  interventions 
falling  within  the  scope  of  renewal/enhancement  of  the  infrastructure  granted  in  concession  to  the 
operator. 

The contracting parties plan to focus on multiple impact factors over the next five years' maintenance 
activities including aging infrastructure, transport demand growth, safety system obsolescence, climate 
change effects, and digitisation of processes; however, there are no specific cost details or metrics to 
measure these impacts. 

It is reported that the modernisation of the network may increase operational, maintenance, and future 
investment costs due to the rapid obsolescence of safety and communication systems, contrary to the 
expected reduction in staffing and maintenance activities. 

The transition of certain interventions from the Investment Section to the Services Section highlighted 
several  goals  for  the  next  two  years,  however,  there  are  no  specific  performance  objectives  and 
corresponding penalties/rewards for the operator identified. 

•  Some  of  the  contractual  clauses  regarding  the  minimum  track  access  package  might  not  be  fully 

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compliant with the provisions set in Annex V of the Directive 2012/34/EU. 

• 

• 

• 

• 

The monitoring indicators related to extraordinary maintenance activities are too generic and lacking in 
terms of quantitative indicators. 

It is advisable  that the market segments should be better explained and should include a high-speed 
service  category  and  a  non-high-speed  service  category.  The  calculation  of  punctuality  indicators 
should also consider the punctuality levels at intermediate stations. 

The  CdP-S  includes  several  objectives,  but  it  lacks  some  listed  in  Annex  II  to  Legislative  Decree 
112/2015 and Annex V to Directive 2012/34/EU. These include network capacity, asset management, 
annual activity and expenditure volumes, cumulative maintenance delays, and the gradual elimination 
of material goods expected to result in various financial flows. These objectives should be identified in 
line with the commercial plan's assumptions. 

The  maximum  limit  for  the  total  amount  of  penalties  under  CdP-S  is  equal  to  0.2%  of  the  resources 
allocated  annually  to  the  Infrastructure  Manager.  This  threshold  seems  excessively  limited  and  does 
not adequately incentivise RFI to optimise relevant management practices and procedures to fully meet 
contractual obligations. 

Spain 

The Railway Sector Act35 has legally established two state-owned IM entities - Administrador de Infraestructuras 
Ferroviarias  (Adif)  and  Adif  Alta  Velocidad  (Adif  AV)  -  as  public  bodies  under  the  Ministry  of  Transport  and 
Sustainable  Mobility,  with  their  own  legal  status  and  full  capacity.  These  companies  are  responsible  for 
managing a significant portion of rail infrastructure investments and operating the General Interest Rail Network, 
as per current regulations. 

Law 39/200336, of November 17, 2003, set out a comprehensive reorganisation of rail transport in Spain. This 
law has laid the groundwork for the gradual liberalisation of the market in this mode of transport, enabling the 
emergence of new operators. The goal is to transform the railroads into a competitive mode of transportation. 

The  legal  regime  established  (by  Law  39/2003)  is  based  on  three  pillars.  Firstly,  the  functional  separation  of 
infrastructure  management  and  transport  services  operations  led  to  the  dissolution  of  the  state  monopoly  and 
train-infrastructure  in  place  since  the  20th  century.  This  led  to  the  reorganisation  of  Red  Nacional  de  los 
Ferrocarriles Españoles (RENFE), until then the exclusive transport operator in the state railway network, with 
the institutional segregation of the infrastructure management and transport operation areas and the creation of 
the public business entities Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias (ADIF) and RENFE-Operadora, which 
has finally served as the basis for the restructuring of the state railway sector. 

Furthermore,  the  law  initiated  a  gradual  process  of  liberalising  rail  transport.  This  has  led  to  successive 
openings of the market, starting with freight transport, then international passenger transport, and most recently, 
domestic passenger transport. 

Additionally,  the  law  created  a  regulatory  body,  the  Railway  Regulation  Committee,  which  was  entrusted  with 
the functions of supervision and resolution of conflicts between the railway IM and the railway market operators 
to ensure the proper overall functioning of the system. Subsequently, Law 3/201337 of June 4, 2013, abolished 
the Committee and transferred its responsibilities to the new National Commission for Markets and Competition 
(CNMC). 

The  document  that  defines  the  long-term  guidelines  for  the  railway  sector  in  Spain  is  called  the  “Indicative 
Strategy for the Development, Maintenance and Renewal of the Railway Infrastructure”38, and was approved by 
the  Ministry  of  Transport  and  Sustainable  Mobility  in  2021.  The  strategy,  included  in  the  Recovery, 
Transformation  and Resilience Plan (PRTR)  as a reform,  seeks  to strengthen  the development,  maintenance, 
and renewal of the infrastructure, establishing a financial framework and priorities to meet future mobility needs, 
the sustainability of the system and the achievement of a single European railway space.  

This strategy is in line with the new direction of the Ministry of Transport and Sustainable Mobility's investments 
programmed  for  Component  1  and  Component  6  of  the  Next  Generation  EU  funds,  to  promote  "sustainable, 
safe and connected" mobility with an eye on rail as one of the main levers to achieve its decarbonisation and 
reduce accident rates. Once the Indicative Strategy has been published, the general IMs, essentially ADIF and 

35   BOE-A-2015-10440 Ley 38/2015, de 29 de septiembre, del sector ferroviario. 

36   BOE-A-2003-20978 Ley 39/2003, de 17 de noviembre, del Sector Ferroviario. 

37   BOE-A-2013-5940 Ley 3/2013, de 4 de junio, de creación de la Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la 

Competencia. 

38 Microsoft Word - 2021 11 22_Estrategia Indicativa_Borrador_v10.1_rev.docx (mitma.gob.es) 

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ADIF AV, will be responsible for implementing it through activity programs. 

The projected investment in developing and upgrading the railway network is estimated at EUR 24.2 billion from 
2021  to  2026.  This  investment  represents  a  potential  rise  in  expenditure  of  up  to  0.30%  of  the  country's  total 
economic output or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 

State of play with neighbouring Member States 

France 

Approved  in  2019,  the  Law  2019-1428,  Loi  d'Orientation  des  Mobilités,  or  LOM,  sets  the  strategy  and  the 
financial and operational programming of state investments in transport systems for the period 2019-2037. The 
main  objectives  of  this  law  are  to  achieve  the  ecological  and  energy  transition  of  the  transport  systems,  to 
ensure the supply of a wide range of services, and to promote a more efficient use of energy.  The investment 
planned for all areas of transport EUR 14.7 billion over the period 2023-2027. 

Portugal 

In  2020,  the  Portuguese  'National  Investment  Programme  2030'  was  presented  and  set  out  the  actions  and 
investment  priorities  for  the  next  decade.  The  plan  focuses  mainly  on  mobility  and  transport  as  key  factors  to 
increase  the  external  competitiveness  of  the  country.  The  plan  includes  a  total  of  86  projects  valued  at  EUR 
42.8 billion, of which EUR 21.6 billion is for the transport sector. 

In  addition,  in  2021,  Infraestruturas  de  Portugal  (IP)  and  Adif  (IMs  of  the  selective  MS)  signed  a  cooperation 
agreement  to  strengthen  cross-border  connections  and  collaborative  relations,  to  support  operational  and 
business relations, seeking to improve interoperability between the railway systems of Portugal and Spain39. 

The Regulatory body’s opinion  

In  2019  the  CNMC  published  its  Study  on  the  liberalisation  of  rail  passenger  transport40  in  which  it 
recommended: i) to maintain the structural separation of IMs and RENFE; ii) to ensure IMs' independence and 
RENFE; among others.  

The  CNMC  has  monitored  the  market  opening  process,  and  published  in  2024  the  conclusions  of  the 
liberalisation of rail passenger transport41 as follows: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Introducing  new  competitors  has  been  effective  in  boosting  demand  for  high-speed  rail  services  and 
encouraging a modal shift in transport modes. 

In approximately two and a half years, the entry of competition in the three main high-speed corridors 
led to a growth in the number of passengers from 10 million to 31 million passengers. 

The  results  of the  entry  of competition in  Spain are like those observed  in  other European countries, 
despite  the  economic  difficulties  (restrictions  on  mobility  due  to  the  pandemic  and  the  increase  in 
energy prices).  

The introduction of IRYO, OUIGO, and AVLO (RENFE) has enabled the diversification of high-speed 
rail  services’  commercial  offerings  through  innovative  fare  structures,  reductions  in  average  around 
40%. 

•  Consumers  are  the  main  beneficiaries  of  the  liberalisation  process,  with  an  increase  in  their  surplus 

estimated at EUR 343 million. 

•  ADIF Alta Velocidad experienced a significant increase in revenue from railway charges on liberalised 
corridors. Specifically, their income rose by EUR 148 million (a 52% increase) compared to 2019. 

• 

• 

The entry of competition in high-speed services has improved the efficiency of the system. 

IMs  have  enhanced  transparency  regarding  capacity  availability  and  established  explicit  rules  for 
coordinating capacity requests. 

State aid for RUs affected by TCRs 

It is also relevant to point out the recent initiative from the Spanish Ministry of Transport to set up a state aid for 
RUs which are affected by TCRs. The initiative is still under examination by DG COMP, is expected to become 
operational within the next months and may be considered as a good practice. 

The state aid proposed is aimed at mitigating the impacts of TCRs on rail transport, being a measure to further 
boost rail traffic. The main objective of this aid scheme is to provide RUs engaged in rail freight transport with 

39   Infraestruturas de Portugal e Adif celebram acordo | Infraestruturas de Portugal 

40   https://www.cnmc.es/sites/default/files/2554930_16.pdf  

41   https://www.cnmc.es/sites/default/files/5307599.pdf  

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incentives to keep their traffic on rail, even when they are affected by the effects of TCRs caused, thus avoiding 
the  substitution of affected  traffic by other modes of transport  due to cost overruns  and delays  in  the  logistics 
chain. The aid encompasses rail freight services conditioned by significant impacts from TCRs, as well as other 
conditions  regarding  cancellation  and  traffic  diversion.  The  aid  shall  be  made  available  by  means  of  a 
competitive  tender,  with  applications  expected  to  start  in  January  2025,  with  a  maximum  of  EUR  35  M  of  aid 
expected  to  be  granted.  The  document  also  provides  the  criteria  used  for  calculating  the  costs  eligible  for 
compensation. 

For  what  concerns  the  annual  funding  for  railway  infrastructure  maintenance,  only  4  out  of  all 
respondents presented figures for 2022 while Croatia and Germany provided figures according to the 
IMs investment plans for 2024, it is plausible to make a comparative overview as depicted in the table 
below.   

Table 8: Annual funding for railway infrastructure maintenance activities per capita and per km of railway 
infrastructure? (In EUR), Source: Survey responses 

Country 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 
Croatia  

Germany 

Italy 

Slovakia 

Infrastructure maintenance 
activities per capita (in EUR)  

Infrastructure maintenance 
activities per km of railway 
infrastructure? (In EUR) 

78,8 

11 

20 

89 

50 

76,56 

110.300,00 

10.853,00 

22.300,00 

222.000,00 

110.000,00 

60.959,60 

In  addition  to  the  survey  responses,  insights  from  the  focus  group  meetings  revealed  that  the 
extension  of  TCRs  beyond  their  initial  planning  may  lead  to  temporal  overlap  with  other 
infrastructure works projects along the same line. This potential occurrence could create conflict 
in  funding  allocation  between  the  two  projects  and  potentially  end  up  in  delayed  funding  or 
additional  project  management  complications.  Consequently,  this  sequential  delay  might  further 
extend  the  overall  completion  of  respective  infrastructure  works,  especially  when  managed  by  the 
same  IM.  Furthermore,  the  timelines  established  by  the  financial  institution  providing  funding  should 
exhibit flexibility in favour of IMs. This flexibility allows IMs to maintain a stable TCR, affording sufficient 
time  for  collaborative  work  with  RUs  and  meeting  the  specific  needs  of  both  parties.  Such  flexibility 
helps  avert  the  strain  associated  with  completing  tasks  within  rigid  timeframes.  Moreover,  financial 
planning,  along  with  unwavering  commitment  from  the  ministry  or  financing  institution, 
assumes a key role in ensuring a stable TCR. Delays in funding, arising from political discussions 
and  legislative  reasons,  in  contrast  to  budgetary  and  political  considerations,  can  lead  to  disputes  in 
the  planned  TCR  timeline.  Such  discrepancies  might  necessitate  extensions,  ultimately  falling  within 
the  responsibility  of  IMs.  To  uphold  a  consistent  TCR,  it  is  prudent  to  heed  feedback  from 
stakeholders,  emphasising  the  importance  of  securing  financing  before  project  commencement. 
Introducing a provision to accumulate state funds for infrastructure investments two years in advance, 
as  outlined  in  Annex  VII,  stands  as  a  proactive  measure,  fostering  stability  and  harmonisation  within 
the TCR framework. 

Changes in the TCRs and penalties and savings 

Penalty  framework  on  unplanned  TCR  is  a  major  concern  for  IMs  as  they  are  responsible  to 
oversee the planning and any changes developed in the scheduled TCR. Therefore, to evaluate the 
reliability and stability of TCR planning, the online questionnaire mainly targeted IMs. The examination 
includes  identification  of  the  frequency  of  TCRs  modification  within  a  timetable  year  and  the 
significance  of  modifications,  including  new  TCRs,  extensions,  changes  in  time  windows,  and  other 
alterations. Respondents presented unplanned TCRs impacts are different by various disruption such 
as weather conditions, incidents, and derailing ranging from 2 days to longer than 3 days. In addition 
to  this,  RFCs  set  up  specific  guidelines  and  processes  to  manage  traffic  disruption,  thus  playing  a 
coordination/facilitator role with respect to the disruption management and the communication process 
according to ICM – International Contingency Management RNE Handbook.  

RUs reported that TCRs without impact are not informed as disruptions with no/very little impact are 
not  monitored  as  if  TCR  is  planned,  it  would  be  planned  to  execute  without  disturbing  the  already 

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allocated train paths. Additionally, unplanned TCRs during minor construction work will be planned at 
short term, but this will have no impact on train journeys to be monitored.  

In general, most IMs typically lack a penalty framework, there is a crucial need for the IMs to adopt 
one  as  Rail  Undertakings  (Rus)  require  reliable  commitments  for  their  customers,  operational 
staff, and production and revenue planning. Consequently, clarity becomes  essential early  in the 
process, with each allocated path regarded as a commitment. Any alterations or cancellations, even if 
made months in advance due to TCR, can result in damages, such as disruptions in freight customer 
production chains, impacting the viability of business cases.  To support this, two elements can be put 
in  place:  a)  The  process  incentive  to  IMs  to  provide  reliable  information,  and  b)  Damage  compensation 
from IMs to Rus for additional costs. 

An  incentivisation  structure  for  IMs  should  be  designed  to  motivate  the  provision  of  reliable 
information.  In  cases  where  absolute  reliability  is  challenging,  the  incentive  mechanism  must 
encourage IMs to communicate changes as early as possible. A crucial component of this mechanism 
involves  the  payment  of  penalties  from  the  IM  to  the  RUs  for  each  path  that  is  cancelled  or  altered 
after  allocation.  The  financial  incentive  should  escalate  in  proportion  to  the  proximity  of  the 
change notification to the intended day of operation. It is imperative that no exemptions would be 
granted  for  changes  made  in  accordance  with  Annex  VII.  This  is  because  Annex  VII  does  not 
necessarily align with market needs or customer demands for timely and steadfast information. As an 
illustration,  freight  services  in  adherence  to  Annex  VII  might  undergo  significant  alterations  or 
cancellations even up to four weeks before the scheduled day of operation. Therefore, the incentive 
mechanism should underscore the importance of early and stable information provision, aligning with 
the needs and expectations of the market and customers. 

When  a  TCR  adversely  affects  RUs,  it  leads  to  increased  costs  for  the  Rus.  These  costs  are 
challenging  to  customers,  posing  a  threat  to  the  revenue  of  Rus.  The  damages  incurred  are 
independent of when the effects of the TCR are communicated and should, therefore, be addressed 
comprehensively. Examples of such damages encompass additional expenses for energy, personnel, 
detour-related  maintenance,  extra  or  alternative  locomotives  (such  as  switching  from  electric  to 
diesel), and provision of replacement services. Compensation for these damages from the IM to the 
RU could be structured based on actual costs or through flat fees. Even though rerouting may have 
higher access charges, in TCR, track access charges on rerouting are not accounted and its clearly 
based on the principal lane. The case studies suggest that in most of the cases, this is routine for all 
IMs. Offering compensation for such damages not only aids in alleviating the financial burden on RUs 
but  also  serves  to  enhance  the  overall  impact  of  the  TCR  methodology.  By  internalising  the  total 
costs  associated  with  the  chosen  TCR  approach,  this  compensation  mechanism  encourages 
IMs  to  consider  the  broader  implications  of  their  decisions.  Currently,  IMs  primarily  account  for 
“their” costs related to the TCR company, internal staff, and occasionally lost Track Access Charges. 
Costs  incurred  by  RUs  today  are  not  always  perceptible  to  IMs.  Implementing  a  system  for 
compensating  damages  fosters  a  more  holistic  understanding  of  the  TCR  impact,  fostering 
collaboration and a shared responsibility for the overall costs associated with the chosen TCR method. 

In  the  aspect  of  penalty  framework  referring  to  cancelations  and  delays,  the  following  stakeholders 
responded regarding the existence of penalties in the contract between IMs and RU. 

Infrastructure Managers 

•  Austria  applies  penalty  for  IM  based  on  additional  (non-anticipated  delay  minutes  caused 

by TCR prolongation/time-shift. 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

In Hungary, performance Regime/Incentivise Scheme is applicable as per NS. 

In  Germany,  extended  deviations  are  charged  as  no  extra  fees;  However,  there  is  no 
compensation planned beyond already legally established damage/loss compensations. 

In Estonia, penalty framework is regulated by Contract for use of Railway Infrastructure.  

In  France,  IM  is  subjected  to  penalty  in  the  event  of  late  modification  or  cancellation  of  an 
allocated path as described in the dedicated IM reciprocal incentive scheme. 

In Sweden, penalties for non-compliance with disclosure requirements as per NS Penalties 
for  the  impacts  made  from  the  time  perspective  60  days  –  24  hours  before  the  train  run  or 
TCR starts. 

• 

In Italy, the NS describes the detailed penalty system concerning the TCR. 

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In Spain, penalty framework does exist between IM and RU, but it is not effectively in use as both the 
respondents are well enough to investigate the causes of TCR and solve them. Currently, RUs do not 
receive  any  compensation  for  train  cancellations  or  diversions  due  to  TCRs  and  no  penalties  have 
been imposed to ADIF so far because of delayed, cancelled or changed TCRs  (there is  an ongoing 
penalty process by the CNMC related to the change of terminal station from Atocha to Chamartín for 
commercial services to Levante). 

Railway Undertakings 

• 

• 

• 

In  the  Netherlands,  penalty  framework  exists  but  with  special  condition  subjected  to 
restriction  on  time  window  (Specific  conditions  for  compensation  during  certain  hours  –  Not 
applicable Sat 00:00 – Mon 06:00). 

In  Austria,  IM  pays  to  RU  based  on  additional  delay  minutes  caused  by  TCR 
prolongation. Furthermore, subjected to penalty if the measures are proven to be announced 
at short notice. 

In Bulgaria, in the event of a change in the planned capacity restrictions, the IM compensates 
RUs for the additional costs incurred. 

From  the  focus  group  discussions,  diverse  opinions  surfaced  regarding  the  inconsistencies  in 
penalties  across  countries  and  among  respondents.  Notably,  the  costs  incurred  by  RUs  are 
higher compared to IMs, making compensations more desirable than penalties. The criteria for 
imposing penalties on path allocation differ between RUs and IMs. IMs face penalties when alterations 
or  modifications  are  made  to  allocated  paths,  but  no  penalties  are  incurred  when  paths  are  not 
allocated. 

In  contrast,  RUs  face  penalties  if  they  fail  to  utilise  allocated  paths,  unless  the  paths  are  cancelled. 
This  discrepancy  raises  significant  concerns  regarding  the  disparities  in  penalty  application  among 
respondents.  The  process  of  obtaining  compensation  from  IMs  is  inherently  challenging,  often 
involving  denials  of  forwarded  claims.  This  places  a  substantial  burden  of  proof  on  RUs  to  secure 
compensation  for  delays  and  losses.  Addressing  these  discrepancies  and  streamlining  the 
compensation process is crucial for fostering fairness and transparency in the railway system. 

Compensation  schemes  exhibit  notable  variations  across  different  countries.  Taking 
Switzerland  as  an  example,  they  maintain  a  specific  amount  of  X  euros  for  each  additional  hour  of 
locomotive use and X euros for every extra hour worked by a train driver. Additionally, in the case of 
rerouting, Switzerland has implemented a fixed compensation payment based on X hours of extended 
rerouting  and  X  kilometres  of  additional  distance  covered.  Switzerland  also  provides  budget  for  the 
replacement services in the total budget of the project. From the case study of Modernisation of high-
performance  network  in  Germany,  it  is  observed  that  certain  budget  is  allocated  for  the  usage  of 
total  budget.  Proposing  a 
replacement  buses  and  other  contingency  measures 
standardisation  of  such  procedures  within 
foster 
(EU)  could 
harmonisation  of  compensation  schemes  throughout  the  EU,  streamlining  and  unifying  the 
entire process. 

the  European  Union 

from 

the 

To ensure an impartial assessment of compensation schemes and performance regimes, it is widely 
recommended  by  respondents  to  establish  a  distinct  institutional  body  for  analysis  or 
comparable  function  in  existing  neutral  bodies.  While  IMs  currently  monitor  and  assess  relevant 
documents  for  analysis,  entrusting  the  same  institute  with  both  the  investigation  and  compensation 
processes  could  introduce  biases.  Therefore,  the  establishment  of  a  separate  institute  dedicated  to 
approving compensation and analysing performance regimes is deemed more efficient and reliable for 
all participants in the system. This approach enhances transparency and objectivity in the evaluation 
and compensation processes. 

Re-scheduling TCRs can often be a challenging and unfavourable experience for RUs. The process 
of  re-scheduling  results  in  an  increase  in  planning  efforts,  uncertainties  for  staff,  such  as  re-
scheduling  of  their  shifts,  unreliability  for  customers,  and  ultimately,  the  need  for  additional 
compensation to be paid by RUs to customers. Only if the replanning is done well ahead, savings may 
occur – for this however the rescheduling would be needed 4-6 months ahead. To consider a volatile 
savings, common traffic needs are taken into consideration. Although no specific figures for savings 
were  reported  by  IMs,  some  countries  have  reported  approaches  to  secure  the  savings  from 
rescheduling TCR as the following main drivers: 

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•  Estonia: Availability of technology for maintenance works is the focus of such measures.  

• 

Italy: In accordance with the RFI procedure DCO PD INF 003 A the average unit cost index 
per minute of the interruption is about 550 EUR, which could vary depending on the time slot 
and the type of line interested. Such unit cost must be multiplied for the total duration of the 
interruption  (minutes).  Therefore,  RFI  endeavours  to  consolidate  activities  within  the  same 
maintenance  windows  to  optimise  the  cost,  the  duration,  and  the  impacts  on  rail  traffic. 
Usually, it is envisaged to concentrate the interruptions during the night when there are minor 
impacts on traffic. 

•  Latvia: Measures are planned to be put in place to secure savings only related to passenger 

transport. 

•  For other countries, the approach is different from case to case. 

The  stakeholder  expressed  the  IMs  to  offer  alternative  capacity  for  TCR  events  that  impact 
circulation  and  finds  robust  support  in  the  findings  of  focus  group  studies.  This  support  is  evident 
even in instances of unplanned TCR in Hungary, where alternative capacity was provided at the onset 
of the TCR. 

However, it is crucial to ensure that these alternative capacity offerings align with the specific 
needs  of  clients.  Depending  on  various  factors  and  the  requirements  of  the  offered  alternatives, 
clients  may  not  find  them  satisfactory.  Such  dissatisfaction  could  lead  to  significant  impacts  on  the 
clients, emphasising the need for a careful and client-centric approach in the provision of alternative 
capacity during TCR events. 

TCRs  can  either  be  programmed  or  the  consequence  of  an  unexpected  disruption.  In  the  latter  case, 
how often is an alternative capacity offer promptly offered when a TCR has an impact on circulation? 

 Often 

 Sometimes   

Seldom 

Never 

2; 3%

8; 12%

37; 54%

21; 
31%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

2 

8 

Railway Undertaking and related association

14 

11 

Managing Director of RFC

4 

Maintenance & construction companies

1 

2 

1 

7 

Infrastructure Manager and related association

11 

6 

1 

Freight Client

0%

50%

100%

Real  use  of  the  period  dedicated  for  TCRs  where  there  is  periodical 
planning  
The real use of the period dedicated to TCRs varies across countries and is influenced by factors 
such as budget allocation, availability of contractors, rolling stock and human resources, bureaucratic 
processes, and the overall stability of financing. Here are some key preliminary observations based on 
the data provided by the stakeholders up to now: 

•  Countries  with  stable  and  clear  financing  process  have  less  changes  in  the  period 

dedicated for TCR, like Czech Republic, Hungary, and Italy; 

• 

IMs reserves period for TCRs, we do not have specific cases when it was not used; 

•  Example  of  the  Netherlands  –  the  dedicated  TCRs  (no  specific  figures)  deemed  to  be  so 
limited/not  sufficient  as  they  are  fully  used  utilised  (short  periods  –  few  hours  per  week  for 

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each  section  of  line  and  timeframe)  that  are  always  used  or  no  complaints  from  RUs  are 
registered; 

• 

In  France:  Strict  methodology  is  followed  corresponding  to  capacity  for  the  most  common 
works carried out during periods of reduced commercial demand. 

o 
o 

o 

“Generic”: 6h, usually at night from Monday to Friday with partial of full closure line 
“Corrective":  9h  usually  from  Sunday  night  to  Monday  morning  with  partial  of  full 
closure line 
"Surveillance": for maintenance, 1 h during the day out of passenger rush hours. 

•  Periodic planning approach allows for an efficient execution of maintenance activities within 
specified  time  frames.  This  strategy  not  only  facilitates  the  regulation  of  traffic  but  also 
contributes  to  capacity  enhancement  by  scheduling  maintenance  during  periods  of  reduced 
activity. Numerous countries have successfully implemented periodic monitoring of tracks and 
other maintenance tasks. A notable illustration of effective periodic planning emerged from a 
focus group study, citing Hungary's proactive practices. Despite the initially unplanned nature 
of  TCR  work,  the  IM  optimised  the  process,  ensuring  completion  within  the  designated 
timeframe.  Despite  the  short  notice  provided  to  applicants,  the  IM  successfully  met  the 
expected  completion  time  by  implementing  a  comprehensive  total  closure  and  distributing 
work  systematically  for  optimal  efficiency.  The  December  timeframe  for  executing  the 
maintenance  work  posed  a  concrete  challenge  for  the  IM,  particularly  regarding  the  need  to 
finish the work before the annual timetable gets into effect. Nevertheless, meticulous planning 
within this specific period not only facilitated the successful completion of the immediate work 
but also enabled the harmonisation of upcoming projects on the same or other lines that had 
already been scheduled. This case study underscores the effectiveness of periodic planning in 
achieving both efficiency and coordination in railway maintenance. 

3.3. Impacts of TCRs on rail stakeholders 

Within  the  framework  of  Area  3,  we  have  initiated  the  evaluation  of  the  impacts  on  various  rail 
stakeholders  stemming  from  the  practices  regarding  TCR  planning  and  associated  coordination 
activities  highlighted  in  Area  2.  Our  information  base  now  extends  beyond  expert  opinions  to 
encompass the analysis of responses from our online questionnaire and the insights gathered during 
the  Focus  Group  meetings  held.  Observations  suggest  that  only  a  limited  number  of  stakeholders 
have  previously  conducted  analyses  or  maintained  records  of  TCRs  and  their  impacts,  with  RUs 
possessing minimal quantitative data. In some countries, within the scope of our analysis substantial 
rerouting are required, for instance in Romania, while in other capacity problems are more significant. 

Overall, based on the results of the survey, most stakeholders indicated that they experience a loss of 
market share because of TCR activities. This decline in market share can lead to revenue losses 
and  both  temporary  and  permanent  shifts  in  modal  preferences.  Additionally,  albeit  to  a  lesser 
degree,  some  stakeholders  reported  incurring  additional  costs  related  to  hiring  new  employees  and 
acquiring more machinery.  

Moreover,  survey  respondents  highlighted  that  when  customers  switch  from  rail  to  road  transport, 
there is often reluctance to return to rail services in the short term, if at all. Consequently, the impact 
on  the  competitiveness  of  the  railway  industry  is  highly  negative  and  impedes  the  growth  of  freight 
volume. 

However,  due  to  the  freight  industry's  commitment  to  reducing  carbon  footprint,  customers  may 
temporarily  shift  to  road  transport,  only  to  return  to  rail  transport  once  restrictions  are  lifted. 
Additionally,  stakeholders  noted  that  TCR  restrictions  result  in  rerouting  and  changes  in  pathways, 
leading  to  longer  journey  times.  Consequently,  additional  administrative  personnel  and  train  drivers 
must be hired to maintain the same itinerary, which in turn increases energy costs. 

Revenue losses due to TRCs 
IMs  tend  experience  both  direct  and  indirect  revenue  losses  because  of  TCRs.  Direct  losses 
occur  when  capacity  on  the  main  itinerary  is  cancelled  without  an  alternative  capacity  offer.  Due  to 
differences in network characteristics on rerouted itineraries, Rail Undertakings (RUs) are often unable 
to utilise alternative capacity offers (due to unavailable rolling stock and authorised drivers), resulting 
in  indirect  revenue  losses  for  IMs.  Additionally,  IMs  commonly  anticipate  cost  reductions  from  TCRs 

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through temporary closures rather than partial closures over longer periods, providing overall financial 
benefits to IMs. 

Moreover, some RUs may be subject to compensation by IMs in instances of TCRs. This could 
occur  due  to  longer  routes  or  the  need  to  cancel  certain  services  during  construction,  resulting  in 
capacity restrictions. In the following section (French Case:  IMs' Revenue Losses), we illustrate how 
capacity restrictions can impact IMs' revenue losses and lead to compensation for RUs. 

Stakeholders  in  the  survey  also  noted  that  unplanned  TCRs  result  in  unforeseen  rerouting  and 
timetable changes, potentially increasing costs for RUs. Finally, another identified impact is the loss of 
capacity for both IMs and RUs. While IMs may experience a reduction in revenue from traffic charges, 
RUs face opportunity costs as they are unable to expand their range of services to customers, leading 
to a shift toward road transport. 

Economic impacts of TCR  

TCRs affect IMs and RUs differently. RUs, for instance, incur revenue losses and cost increases when 
an unforeseen capacity restriction limits their ability to provide an already scheduled train service. An 
analysis  of  the  results  of  the  targeted  survey  shows  that  32  of  46  respondents  (i.e.,  70%  of 
stakeholders who responded to the respective question) incurred revenue losses due to capacity 
cancellation or alternative itinerary capacity offer on the network because of planned TCR activities, as 
shown below. 

Have  you  incurred  in  any  revenue  loss  due  to  capacity  cancellation  or  alternative  itinerary  capacity 
offer on the network because of planned TCR activities? 

Yes 

14; 30%

No 

Terminal Operator

1 

1 

Public Authorities

Railway Undertaking and related
association

Managing Director of RFC

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

Freight Client

32; 70%

2 

24 

2 

6 

1 

8 

1 

0%

20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Although  few  quantitative  figures  were  provided,  survey  responses  show  that  annual  revenue  loss 
related  to  TCRs  can  be  estimated  to  range  from  EUR  2.0M  to  5.0M,  or  5  to  10  Full  Time 
Equivalents (FTEs) in terms of additional costs with personnel.  

What  are  the  annual  costs  incurred,  in  the  past  year,  for  ensuring  coordinated  TCR  activities  between 
Infrastructure Managers? (In EUR or Full Time Equivalents)42 

DE Infrastructure Manager 

EUR 5,020,000 (or 10 FTEs)  

BE Infrastructure Manager 

EUR 2,000,000 (or 4 FTEs) 

Managing Director of RFC 

EUR 2,252,000 (or 5 FTEs) 

42   The  amounts  were  estimated  considering  Tariff  hour  of  the  category  from  ISCO  2  “Professionals”  from 
International  Standard  Classification  of  Occupations,  as  figures  had  originally  been  provided  in  terms  of 
Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs). 

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French  case:  revenue  losses  incurred  by  IMs  due  to  TCR  –  data  from  desk 
research 

Using  data  from  the  fee  calculation  tool  (EPSICO)  from  the  French  IM  (SNCF  Réseau)  and 
parameters from the French Environment and Energy Management Agency (ADEME), the following 
table shows, for each of the rail service categories (passengers and freight), the potential revenue 
loss in the event of a total closure of a dedicated railway line due to TCR. As demonstrated, even 
though track access charges are higher for regional and urban passenger services, the economic 
impact for SNCF Réseau is greater for freight services due to the longer lengths of these services.    

In  general,  the  table  shows  the  direct  relationship  that  a  capacity  restriction,  in  this  case  total 
closure, has on the generation of revenue of an IM per service/train for not being able to collect line 
access fees. 

Table 9: : Infrastructure Managers revenue loss Indicator 2021 

Service 

Line 

Track Access Charge 
(EUR/Km) 

Revenue loss per train 
(EUR) 

Passengers 

Paris Nord - Creil 

Passengers 

Paris Est-Meaux 

Passengers 

Pairs Austerlitz-Etampes 

Passengers 

TER Tours-Orléans 

Passengers 

TER Bordeaux-Coutras 

Freight 

Hendaye-Forbach 

Freight 

Hendaye-Lille Délivrance 

Freight 

Bayonne-Tourcoing 

10.15 

10.15 

10.16 

5.90 

4.69 

2.68 

2.67 

2.68 

506 

442 

567 

681 

237 

3,278 

2,825 

2,792 

As  a  separate  analysis,  we  have  also  assessed  the  economic  impact  of  the  partial  closure  of  the 
lines, which would lead to prioritising regional and urban passenger rail services over international 
rail  freight  services  in  the  ATL  RFC.  As  shown  in  the  table  below,  prioritising  regional  and  urban 
passenger services over freight services on these French lines would have an economic impact in 
terms of revenue loss on the French RU of as much as EUR 2.78k per train service. 

Table 10: 11: Impact of passenger priority in revenue losses 

Freight services 

Priority to 1 or 2 passengers trains 

Estimated loss in France only 
(EUR) 

(Madrid) Hendaye-Forbach 
(Mannheim) 

Paris Est-Meaux & Paris Austerlitz-Etampes 

(Irun) Hendaye-Lille Délivrance 
(Antwerpen) 

Paris Est-Meaux & Paris Nord - Creil 

Paris Nord – Creil & Pairs Austerlitz-Etampes 

-2,270 

-1,752 

-1,720 

Bayonne-Tourcoing 
(Antwerpen) 

(Madrid) Hendaye-Forbach 
(Mannheim) 

(Irun) Hendaye-Lille Délivrance 
(Antwerpen) 

Bayonne-Tourcoing 
(Antwerpen) 

TER Bordeaux-Coutras & TER Bordeaux-Arcachon 

-2,778 

TER Bordeaux-Coutras & TER Bordeaux-Arcachon 

-2,324 

TER Bordeaux-Coutras & TER Bordeaux-Arcachon 

-2,292 

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(Madrid) Hendaye-Forbach 
(Mannheim) 

TER Tours-Orléans 

(Irun) Hendaye-Lille Délivrance 
(Antwerpen) 

TER Tours-Orléans 

Bayonne-Tourcoing 
(Antwerpen) 

TER Tours-Orléans 

-2,597 

-2,143 

-2,111 

In addition,  TCR activities can lead to compensation claims by RUs. Rules  vary across Member 
States  and  often  depend  on  how  long  the  line  is  disrupted  for,  as  well  as  on  how  the  works  affect 
capacity allocation, among other issues. The box below shows the number of survey respondents who 
incurred compensation costs/reimbursements related to TCR activities. 

Have you sustained/received, in the past year, any compensation costs/reimbursements related to TCR 
activities? 

Yes 

No 

4; 11%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

Railway Undertaking and related
association

Managing Director of RFC

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

1 

14 

1 

4 

32; 89%

Freight Client

4 

12 

0%

20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

When  surveyed  about  compensation  costs  related  to  TCR  activities,  63%  of  respondents 
indicated  that  they  had  not  incurred  such  costs,  regardless  of  whether  the  occurrences  were 
planned  or  unplanned.  Notably,  RUs,  being  the  most  impacted  by  TCRs,  constituted  most 
respondents. 

Funding  for  contingency  measures  is  allocated  based  on  the  traffic  volume  of  affected  lines. 
Replacement buses, frequently used in passenger services, receive annual funding determined by the 
country. The annual costs for these buses vary depending on the nature of the work, whether it 
involves  maintenance  or  the  construction  of  new  infrastructure.  Compensation  costs  may  also 
fluctuate when third-party services are enlisted to address logistical constraints during TCR activities. 
Additionally,  reimbursement  for  reroute  Track  Access  Charges  (TAC)  is  calculated  based  on  the 
regular route rather than the reroute. 

In addition, desk research findings illustrate the following cases. 

Cases of compensation due to TCR 

In Portugal’s Beira Alta Line43, Takargo and Medway were compensated for the loss of capacity due 
to works on the line44. Adif also foresees compensation to some RUs affected by forthcoming TCRs 
due to works in the Spanish tunnels in the Guadalajara-Zaragoza, Córdoba-Santa Cruz de Mudela. 
and  Ronda-Algeciras  lines  as  part  of  the  works  for  developing  the  Rolling  Highway  Algeciras-
Zaragoza45. Compensation rules are foreseen in the IMs’ (IP and Adif) NS. However, although they 

43   Works on the Beira Alta Line, Infraestruturas de Portugal. Available at:  

https://www.infraestruturasdeportugal.pt/index.php/pt-pt/modernizacao-da-linha-da-beira-alta-2  

44   2022 Network Statement, Infraestruturas de Portugal. Available at:  

https://servicos.infraestruturasdeportugal.pt/sites/default/files/inline-files/network_statement_2022_2_0.pdf  

45   Available at:   

https://www.adif.es/-/adif-impulsa-el-servicio-de-autopistas-ferroviarias-entre-zaragoza-y-tarragona  

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are foreseen in national legislation, there is no clarity as to what the criteria are defined by each IM. 
A recent publication by the Spanish Regulator46 may provide some clarity on these criteria. 

In some cases, RUs pay access charge supplements, which help IMs fund and recover the costs 
of  providing  such  compensations47, 
to  TCR 
compensations. Nonetheless, there is not enough evidence to show that is common practice among 
all IMs in the EU. Notwithstanding these access charge supplements, Network Rail incurred costs of 
over  EUR  300  million  in  penalties  for  planned  engineering  works  in  2016  (more  recent  data 
unavailable)48. 

thus  preventing  additional  costs  due 

Responses from the survey show that the following five stakeholders claimed to have paid or received 
compensation  in  2023  due  to  TCR  activities:  Správa  železnic  (CZ),  SBB  Infrastruktur  (CH),  Baltic-
Adriatic RFC, SNCF Réseau (FR) and RFI SpA (IT). 

In  addition,  the  representative  of  SNCF  Réseau  stated  that  the  French  Government  paid  EUR  210 
million in compensations in 2021 for additional costs linked to adjusting work windows to reduce the 
impact of TCRs on rail freight traffic, especially in long-distance freight trains. In addition, IM Správa 
železnic reported the State Fund for Infrastructure of approximately EUR 600,000. 

The compensation scheme for detours is determined according to the original train path, with 
payment variations based on the country and the involved RUs. Some IMs also cover travel and 
accommodation expenses incurred by RUs during TCR-affected activities. Given the additional costs 
and resource commitments by RUs, coupled with TAC responsibilities for longer diversionary routes, 
compensation costs are warranted to mitigate revenue loss. Financial incentives and penalties provide 
IMs with incentives to minimise the impact of work and stabilise allocated train paths. 

When the network access contract of the IM stipulates that if alternative routes cannot be provided 
upon request for capacity allocation, the RUs has suggested that the right to compensation for 
halted  trains  resulting  from  infrastructure  work.  The  fee  for  halting  trains  varies  depending  on 
whether they use diesel or electric traction. Importantly, the total halting fee does not exceed 5% of 
the RU's total minimum access package for that month.  

Rerouting costs due to unplanned TCR  

Data  analysis  suggests  that  TCR  activities  lead  to  constant  service  rerouting  and  last-minute 
changes to the timetables, which increases operating costs for operators. In this regard, we asked 
stakeholders  to  provide  evidence  of  these  impacts.  Some  survey  respondents  were  able  to  provide 
figures on the rerouting costs they incurred due to unplanned TCR (Q5.12). The table below illustrates 
stakeholder evidence provided in the survey. 

46 Disposición 6548 del BOE núm. 80 de 2024 

47  Research  shows  that  this  is  the  case  in  the  UK,  according  to  evidence  from  Network  Rail.  Available  at: 
https://www.networkrail.co.uk/industry-and-commercial/information-for-operators/payments-for-planned-
disruption-on-the-railway/ 

48 Available at: https://www.cityam.com/network-rail-pays-316m-penalties-planned-engineering-works/ 

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Stakeholder Category 

Stakeholder 

Rerouting cost caused by TCR (EUR)49 

Table 12: Rerouting costs due to TCR 

Infrastructure Managers 

Railway Undertakings 

SNCF Réseau (France) 

NRIC (Bulgaria) 

Bulmarket Rail Cargo (Bulgaria) 

Rail Cargo Hungria (Hungary) 

152,453 

100,000 

800,000 

SNCB (Belgium) 

15,000,000  

Estonian Railways (Estonia) 

Správa železnic (Czechia) 

Eurostar Group (Belgium) 

DB Cargo (The Netherlands) 

Lineas (Belgium) 

Infrabel (Belgium) 

265,000 

965,000 

2,250,000 

9,350,000 

470,000 

3,500,000 

In addition to the figures in the table above, TX Logistik (Germany) indicated that it would cost up to 
3.5% of additional costs. Moreover, evidence from the case studies also provides a perspective on the 
additional  costs  incurred  by  RUs  due  to  rerouting.  For  instance,  in  the  Brenner  axe  case,  RUs 
incurred  50%  of  additional  costs  due  to  rerouting.  In  turn,  in  the  case  of  the  2019  Modane  traffic 
disruption, RUs incurred 7% of additional costs due to rerouting. The results of the case studies may 
shed light on more cases of additional costs. 

TCR impact on the quality of rail services 
One of the primary consequences of TCRs lies in their impact on the quality standards of railway 
services, particularly concerning  punctuality and reliability. Punctuality refers to the percentage of 
train  services  that  operate  without  delays,  allowing  for  a  buffer  time.  Conversely,  reliability  is 
associated with the percentage of train services that are cancelled. 

One  of  the  main  impacts  of  TCRs  is  that  it  affects  the  quality  of  services  provided  by  operators 
when  not  well  planned,  coordinated  and  communicated  to  stakeholders.  To  maintain  good 
quality standards within the EU, operators must be fully aware of the allocation of the entire train path 
to be able to publicise and provide the service on time.  

In  September  2023,  the  EC  published  the  eighth  Rail  Market  Monitoring  Report  (RMMS)50,  which 
contains relevant information concerning both passenger and freight rail traffic activity within the EU, 
as well as an assessment of the quality of rail transport services, namely punctuality and reliability. 

An  evaluation  of  the  latest  RMMS  data  reveals  that,  in  terms  of  long-distance  and  high-speed 
passenger services in Europe, punctuality stood at 83% in 2020. Moreover, for international freight 
services, punctuality figures reached 47% in 2020, as depicted in the figure below. It is plausible that 
both rail services were impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in the railway sector during 2020. 

49   The  amounts  were  estimated  considering  Tariff  hour  of  the  category  from  ISCO  2  “Professionals”  from 
International  Standard  Classification  of  Occupations,  as  figures  had  originally  been  provided  in  terms  of 
Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs). 

50   EC Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS), available at: 

Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS) - European Commission (europa.eu) 

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Regarding reliability, which quantifies the proportion of cancelled services among the total number of 
trains in operation, long-distance and high-speed passenger services in the EU-27 saw a cancellation 
rate  of  6.0%  in  2020.  Lithuania,  Slovenia,  Greece,  and  Croatia  reported  the  highest  rates  of 
cancellations  in  2020,  while  the  figures  were  highest  in  Latvia  and  Portugal.  It  is  probable  that  the 
COVID-19 pandemic also contributed to these negative figures.  

On average, in 2020, 9% of international freight services were cancelled in the EU-27. Bulgaria, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, and Portugal had the most unreliable freight services in 2020, most likely due to 
the lower use of rail capacity in these Member States.  

Overall,  the  data  collected  for  2020  from  the  8th  RMMS  shows  a  deterioration  in  the  quality 
(punctuality and reliability) of rail services in Europe compared to 2015. The present study aims 
to investigate the extent to which TCRs are negatively affecting rail transport in Europe, increasing the 
burden on stakeholders, and ultimately decreasing the sector's competitiveness. 

Nonetheless, TCR projects aim to improve the efficiency of the rail sector which concerns a set 
of  measures  and  procedures  to  minimise  disturbance  and  increase  the  attractiveness  of  rail. 
Nonetheless,  TCR  activities  often  lead  to  capacity  loss.  The  table  below  shows  results  from  the 
survey (Q5.13) on the estimated capacity loss incurred by rail stakeholders in 2023 due to TCR. 

Stakeholder Category  Stakeholder 

Rerouting cost caused by TCR (EUR)51 

Table 13: Capacity loss due to TCR 

Railway Association 

Infrastructure 
managers 

Estimated from 10% to 15% of the train 
services are cancelled in the continent and that 
50% of the cancellations are attributable to 
TCRs. 

Estonian Railways (Estonia): 

120,000 tkm in 2023 

ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG 

From 2 to 3M tkm per year 

CFL (Luxemburg): 

GySev (Hungary):  

6% 

2-3% 

MÁV-Start (Hungary):  

Approximately 13M tkm in 2023 

Mercitalia Rail (Italy): 

Mini Marica iztok EAD 
(Bulgaria): 

500,000 tkm 

108 tkm 

Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NL): 

From 100,000 to 200,000 tkm per year 

Railway Undertakings 

ÖBB Personenverkehr AG 

Approximately 1.7M tkm 

Rail Cargo Austria (AT) 

Rail Cargo Hungaria (HU) 

0.5M tkm 

50,000 tkm 

SBB Cargo (Germany): 

10%, including opportunity cost 

SNCB (Belgium): 

From 1-3% of total tkm 

TX Logistik (Germany) 

8% 

Eurostar Group 

Approximately 50% of their pathways are 
modified. 

51   The  amounts  were  estimated  considering  Tariff  hour  of  the  category  from  ISCO  2  “Professionals”  from 
International  Standard  Classification  of  Occupations,  as  figures  had  originally  been  provided  in  terms  of 
Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs). 

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Moreover,  evidence  from  the  case  studies  shows  that  in  the  case  of  the  infrastructure  works  in 
Bulgaria,  less  than  1%  of  capacity  was  lost  due to  TCR,  while  10%-20%  reduction  in  demand 
was  observed  in  the  case  of  the  reconstruction  works  on  the  Arad–Simeria  section.  In  turn, 
traffic restrictions in the Divača-Koper line doubling project, led to a reduction in capacity of 30 pairs of 
trains a day.  

An important aspect of the  capacity loss from the total available train paths due  to the TCR  has 
been  identified  as  varying  for  each  country,  depending  on  the  national  strategy  to  mitigate  capacity 
losses associated with the specificity of the section for each of the case studies analysed. While  the 
actual reduction in the overall capacity available for train paths is within the control of the IM, in 
applying  the  Delegated  Decision,  based  on  the  specific  category  of  TCR,  following  consultation  with 
applicants,  most  cases  identified  showed  very  few  instances  when  full  closure  was  preferred, 
especially in countries like the Netherlands, Germany, Bulgaria, and Austria, where significant planned 
TCRs do not affect traffic. Conversely, in other countries like Slovenia and Romania, where less viable 
rerouting options are available, significant congestions and delays are recorded. 

What impacts has your organisation experienced due to TCRs? 

 Additional signalisation 

Shift in the 
market share 
between 
different 
classes of 
services  

Machinery 

Additional 

Loss of any 

costs   

staff  

market share 
and/or clients   

Modal 
Shift  

1; 1%

5; 5%

15; 
13%

34; 
30%

Terminal Operator

1

3

3

Public Authorities

Railway Undertaking and related association

5

14

22

23

Managing Director of RFC

1

1

4

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related association

1

26; 
23%

Freight Client

1

1

26

3

1

2

0%

50%

100%

31; 
28%

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Economic Benefits of TCR 

Furthermore,  it  is  expected  that  TCR  coordination  can  generate  time  and  cost  savings  for 
stakeholders,  for  instance  reducing  service  delays  and  cancellations.  The  box  below  shows  the 
number  of  survey  respondents  who  incurred  any  time  or  cost  savings  in  the  past  year  due  to 
coordinated TCR activities. 

Do  you  incur  in  any  savings  (in  terms  of  time  and/or  costs)  by  coordinating  and  clustering  different 
TCRs activities? 

Yes 

No 

6; 27%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

Railway Undertaking and related association

Managing Director of RFC

1 

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related association

5 

Freight Client

1 

1 

4 

10 

0%

20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

16; 73%

Although no figures were provided in the survey, on a qualitative assessment, one railway association 
estimated  that  the  benefits  of  TCR  activities  to  railway  stakeholders  could  be  of  millions  of 
euros.  These  comprised  benefits  due  to  the  optimisation  of  bypass  routes,  capacity  improvements, 
better information passed on to customers and the reliability of railway network. 

In the survey, IMs stated that the benefits incurred by ensuring that TCRs activities are properly 
planned can possibly strengthen rail transport, significantly reducing operational costs due to an 
optimal  use  of  resources  such  as  locomotives,  train  drivers  shift,  etc.  and  increasing  reliability. 
Furthermore,  planning  can  lead  to  increases  in  the  network  capacity,  reducing  compensations  and 
penalties paid to RUs, thus increasing operators’ satisfaction within IMs’ customer services. 

To  be  compliant  with  Annex  VII,  before  the  start  of  the  works,  IMs  should  publish  the  potential 
impact of the TCR on the network. RNE has provided guidance52 on how TCR should be handled. 
Despite the low number of responses, the box below illustrates the answers from the survey on how 
far in advance TCRs are published.   

How far in advance do you publish the impact of TCRs in your timetables? 

From 1 to 15 

From 16 to 30 

From 31 to 60 

From 61 to 90 

More than 91 

days    

days 

days 

days 

days 

2; 8%

2; 8%

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

2 

Railway Undertaking and related association

3; 
13%

Managing Director of RFC

Maintenance & construction companies

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

4 

2 

2 

Infrastructure Manager and related association

1 

1 

2 

4 

12; 
50%

5; 21%

Freight Client

0%

20%

40%

60%

80% 100%

52 Available at: TCR-Guidelines.pdf (rne.eu)  

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To implement a better coordination and publication of TCR activities, stakeholders may rely on 
IT software to provide harmonised information. The box below shows the survey respondents who 
currently use software in the process of planning and managing TCRs. 

Do you use any software for better managing/planning TCRs like the TCR tool provided by RNE? 

Yes 

30; 
57%

No 

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

Railway Undertaking and related
association

1 

1 

16 

1 

12 

Managing Director of RFC

1 

4 

Maintenance & construction companies

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

Freight Client

23; 
43%

9 

8 

0%

20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Impacts of TCR on punctuality and customer satisfaction 

The level of impact of TCRs, whether planned or unplanned, varies depending on their status. 
Generally,  planned  TCRs  tend  to  have  a  lesser  impact,  as  stakeholders  typically  adopt 
precautionary  measures  to  mitigate  their  effects.  However,  the  primary  entities  affected  are  RUs, 
followed by IMs and other related associations. 

For RUs, the impact of planned TCRs includes increased train cancellations, delays, rerouting, 
and  revenue  loss.  Constraints  in  infrastructure,  rolling  stock  requirements,  and  traction  power 
contribute  to  these  impacts.  Contingency  measures,  along  with  freight  and  passenger  claims  for 
delayed  and  cancelled  trains,  further  add  to  the  challenges.  Personnel  requirements  for  train 
circulation,  especially  in  cross-border  detours,  result  in  additional  costs  at  handover  points.  Border 
control  verification  additionally  adds  20-40  minutes,  with  variations  across  countries.  Business 
opportunities for passenger RUs may be affected and maintaining harmonisation on the corridor/local 
infrastructure  becomes  crucial  to  prevent  path  congestion  and  reduce  service  frequency.  Energy 
costs, personnel, and maintenance expenses also contribute to the overall impact. 

The focus group example on the Arad-Simeria case study underscores the limitation on train length 
in  alternative  routes,  leading  to  train  splitting,  extra  time,  and  additional  costs.  Despite  shorter 
distances,  limitations  on  train  length  significantly  impact  delays  and  revenue  loss  for  RUs.  Meeting 
delivery time requirements is crucial, as failure may result in penalties or fines and a potential reverse 
modal shift by customers. 

Punctuality figures can be used to estimate the costs that RUs incur due to delays caused by TCRs. 
For instance, based on the general figures for each Member State and data collected from operators 
and RUs on rerouting and other impacts, we can then estimate the share of general delays that are, 
on average, only caused by TCRs. Then, cross-checking with the duration of the TCR from the RFCs’ 
timetables,  we  can  estimate  the  number  of  trains  affected  by  the  specific  capacity  restriction. 
Notwithstanding  this  approach  to  calculate  the  impact  that  punctuality  has  caused,  the  following 
results from the survey show the impact of TCRs on customer satisfaction and punctuality indexes. 

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The  table  below  shows  that  for  most  respondents  43  out  of  50  (i.e.,  83%  of  stakeholders  who 
responded  to the respective question) experienced changes  in customer  satisfaction due to planned 
TCR activities. 

Have  you  experienced  any  changes  (increase  or  decrease)  in  customer  satisfaction  rates  and 
punctuality indexes due to planned TCRs? How is this different from unplanned TCRs? 

Yes 

9; 17%

No 

Terminal Operator

Public Authorities

2 

Railway Undertaking and related
association

Managing Director of RFC

Maintenance & construction companies

24 

6 

Infrastructure Manager and related
association

11 

43; 83%

Freight Client

2 

1 

6 

0%

20%

40%

60%

80% 100%

RU BDZ Passengers EOOD (Bulgaria) stated that unscheduled TCRs leads to a significant shorter period to 
properly notify customers. Another operator (Mercitalia Rail - Italy) noted an increase in customer satisfaction 
and rerouting and re-allocation indicators.    

Question 5.17 asked for those who have experienced changes in customer satisfaction (i.e., 42 participants), 
with 31 out 42, or 74% noticing a decrease in customer satisfaction.  

Moreover,  survey  respondents  also  provided  an  estimate  on  the  percentage  of  cancellations  caused 
due  to  unplanned  TCRs  (Q5.14,  as  shown in  the  table  below.  On average,  IM’s figures  vary  around  10-
25%, and the RUs’ figures around 50-100%, showing that each stakeholder has a different perspective 
on unplanned TCR impact on the capacity network. 

Table 14: Cancellations from unplanned TCRs 

Stakeholder Category 

Stakeholder 

Rerouting cost caused by TCR (EUR)53 

Regulatory Body 

Croatian Regulatory Authority for Network 
Industries (HAKOM) 

Infrastructure 
Manager 

DB InfraGO AG: 

Estonian Railways 

Latvian Railways 

ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG 

Bulmarket Rail Cargo: 

Railway Undertakings 

Deutsche Bahn Fernverkehr AG 

Eurostar Group 

60% 

1% 

25% 

10% 

10% 

100% 

80% 

50% 

53  The  amounts  were  estimated  considering  Tariff  hour  of  the  category  from  ISCO  2  “Professionals”  from 
International  Standard  Classification  of  Occupations,  as  figures  had  originally  been  provided  in  terms  of 
Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs). 

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MÁV-START Zrt 

Mercitalia Rail 

PKP Intercity 

Rail Cargo Austria AG 

Rail Cargo Hungaria 

20% 

100% 

66% 

5% 

1% 

Competitiveness  is  a  key  factor  in  evaluating  alternative  routes.  High-speed  and  regional  trains 
could  face  cancellations  as  well,  especially  when  compared  to  freight  trains.  Passenger  trains, 
however,  may  experience  comparatively  less  loss  as  contingency  measures  are  often  more  readily 
available for these services. 

A significant factor contributing to train cancellations is the shortage of drivers for RUs. This is 
particularly critical when considering the extended travel time on alternative routes. The increased 
travel time demands a higher number of locomotive drivers, typically around 50% more than the 
regular requirements. Beyond economic considerations, the availability of drivers becomes a crucial 
aspect,  varying  across  different  RUs.  Case  study  examples  highlight  instances  where  smaller  RUs 
struggle  to  provide  an  adequate  number  of  locomotive  drivers  to  manage  freight  routes  on  longer 
alternative routes. Consequently, this results in the cancellation of freight trains. The same challenge 
extends  to  high-speed  and  regional  services,  leading  to  cancellations  due  to  insufficient  driver 
availability. 

When you were offered a rerouting alternative, did you have to cancel trains due to lack of resources (i.e., 
missing rolling-stock, missing driver)? On what type of service (regional, high speed, freight)? - Yes, due 
to a lack of rolling-stock 

 Managing Director of RFC 

Railway Undertaking and related association 

Freight service

1

14

High speed service

7

Regional service

1

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When you were offered a rerouting alternative, did you have to cancel trains due to lack of resources (i.e., 
missing rolling stock, missing driver)? On what type of service (regional, high speed, freight)? - Yes, due 
to a lack of drivers 

Managing Director of RFC 

Railway Undertaking and related association 

Freight service

1

15

High speed service

6

Regional service

2

When you were offered a rerouting alternative, did you have to cancel trains due to lack of resources (i.e., 
missing  rolling-stock,  missing  driver)?  On  what  type  of  service  (regional,  high  speed,  freight)?  -  No 
cancellations 

Managing Director of RFC 

Railway  Undertaking  and  related 

 Service Facilities Operators  

association 

Freight service

1

3

1

Regional service

4

High speed service

3

Organisational impacts of TCRs 

The survey also questioned stakeholders regarding the organisational impacts and the demand on 
resources  required  to  perform  during  detours.  In  general,  most  almost  of  the  stakeholders 
experienced a loss of market share as limited capacity directly impacts profitability, leading to 
potential revenue loss. Additionally, most of the stakeholders highlighted that even though the shift is 
initially considered temporary, once customers switch from rail to road transportation due to the 
magnitude of TCRs, the likelihood of them reverting to rail services soon, if at all, is extremely 
low. Consequently, this significantly adversely affects the competitiveness of the railway industry and 
hinders the growth in the amount of freight being transported. 

Extended  journey  times  necessitate  an  increased  allocation  of  train  drivers'  hours  per  train, 
and  the  expiration  of  shifts  mandates  the  maintenance  of  a  reserve  pool  of  drivers  to  minimise 
disruptions.  This 
incurs  notable  additional  expenses,  ultimately  undermining  productivity. 
Furthermore,  due  to  rerouting,  additional  drivers,  train  managers,  and  locomotive  drivers  were 
required,  along  with  changes  in  rolling  stock  for  longer  journeys.  Additional  station  staff  were  also 
needed to manage passenger flows. 

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If  rerouting  occurs  via  another  country  or  involves  more  non-commercial  stops,  higher 
infrastructure charges, delays, and costs are expected. Additionally, expenses arise for training 
on routes and locomotive knowledge. Procuring third-party traction becomes a recurring cost factor 
for rerouting. The originally planned traffic circulation is disrupted, leading to inefficiencies such as the 
need for additional wagons  and  rolling stock, thereby  raising energy costs as well. It should also be 
noted that if additional resources are not available or if extra expenses related to hiring new personnel 
occur, overtime dues for train staff to acknowledge alternative routes are implemented. 

TCRs  create  geographical  imbalances  in  an  organisation's  resource  system,  leading  to 
resources being misplaced in terms of location and timing. On the other hand, there is a demand 
for  additional  traction  on  specific  diversion  routes.  Consequently,  operational  planning  becomes 
inefficient within an organisation. Due to these factors, expanding the locomotive fleet and procuring 
additional machinery becomes necessary. For example, DB Cargo has planned a 20% buffer for any 
kind  of  disruption  (TCRs,  engine  problems,  defaults,  and  delays),  and  many  RUs  have  initiated  an 
increase in the Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) of the TCR planning department and train drivers from 1.5 
to  3.5  FTE  for  the  same  amount  of  traffic,  which  could  stabilise  unexpected  and  worse  situations  in 
changing rolling stock and longer journeys. 

In a planned TCR, it is crucial to establish contingency measures for operational convenience. 
While replacement buses are a common method for passenger transport, they may not be suitable 
for  all  service  types.  Therefore,  an  alternative  approach  involves  rerouting,  aiming  to  address 
the  capacity  of  the  affected  line  or  accommodate  all  service  types  to  mitigate  TCR  impacts. 
However,  practical  challenges  arise  due  to  traffic  in  rerouting  alternatives  and  capacity  limitations. 
Consequently,  the  impact  of  rerouting  adds  complexity,  leading  RUs  to  make  decisions  such  as 
cancelling some trains to optimise rerouting strategies.  

The question was also extended to all stakeholders on cancellation of services due to different lack 
of resources (rolling stock, train drivers) on rerouting. According to the survey, freight services 
bear the brunt of these cancellations, primarily due to limitations in alternative routing. Different 
alternatives  present  distinct  constraints  such  as  varying  train  lengths,  capacity  limits,  infrastructure 
gradients, signalling systems, speed, and gauging for different lines. 

The  focus  group  study  on  the  Budapest-Hegyeshalom  case  highlighted  an  example  where  an 
alternative route lacked the European Train Control System (ETCS), leading to train cancellations 
on  that  track.  Additionally,  another  study  identified  gauge  limitations  on  the  alternative  route, 
specifically in P70 and P400 gauges, resulting in the loss of two pairs of trains. The permissible load 
on  the  track  is  a  critical  factor,  and  cancellations  occur  when  the  alternative  route  cannot 
accommodate the  required train length, impacting both TCR  and overall train operations. The 
type of traction becomes pivotal in selecting alternative routes. If there's a shortage of diesel trains and 
the alternative route supports only  diesel traction, services may  need to be cancelled, depending on 
the RUs available fleet. 

When  changes  in  scheduled  TCRs  occur  without  proper  coordination  and  communication,  it 
amplifies the demand on the planning department, leading to additional staffing costs for drivers 
who may need to work overtime or take on extra shifts on their scheduled days off. Stakeholders have 
expressed  that  when  an  unplanned  TCR  arises  and  its  impact  intensifies,  it  can  significantly 
escalate  costs,  with  insufficient  time  for  a  timely  response,  potentially  resulting  in  cancellations 
and subsequent revenue loss. Conflicts with other TCRs are also possible, necessitating timetable 
replanning  and  leading  to  resource  allocation  bottlenecks.  Consequently,  there  are  associated 
additional  costs  for  coordination  and  replanning  efforts,  as  well  as  penalties  resulting  from 
customer dissatisfaction (if stipulated in the commercial contract) and higher salary rates per hour for 
short-term operational staff. 

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What  (indirect)  operational  costs  does  your  organisation  incur  in  if  the  TCR  is  not  implemented  as 
previously planned and communicated?  

Infrastructure  Manager  and  related 

Railway  Undertaking  and 

related 

 Public Transport Authorities 

association 

association 

Additional Full Time Equivalents

5

19

1

Additional rolling-stock

1

Additional financial resource

8

16

1

Poor customer satisfaction

3

3

1

Fees payment

2

1

Evidence from the case studies also shows that customers may incur additional costs due to TCR 
activities. For instance, in the case of the traffic disruption in Modane in 2019, customers incurred 
additional  costs  varying  between  19%-30%,  while  in  2023  this  reached  as  much  as  36%  in 
additional  costs  to  customers.  This  brings  an  important  perspective,  as  it  may  lead  to  a  direct 
increase in the goods commercialised or in ticket  prices (in  the case of passenger services). In 
the case  of passenger services, the value of time should also be considered. The box  below  shows 
the  answers  from  the  survey  regarding  the  passengers’  perspective  on  the  additional  time  lost  in 
delays due to TCR. 

Opportunity  costs  may  also  be  incurred  in  cases  of  loss  of  market  share  to  other  modes  of 
transport  due to TCRs. For  instance, inconsistencies in timetables, delays and cancellations in the 
rail network amplified by TCRs may lead to an increase in the willingness of freight customers to shift 
transport from rail to road. This is illustrated below for the case of the mudslide in Fréjus, as retrieved 
from the desk research. 

2019 Fréjus case 

In  July  2019,  a  mudslide  occurred  in  Saint-André  à  La  Praz54,  roughly  20  kilometres  from  the 
French  border  with  Italy,  which  totally  interrupted  the  traffic  on  the  Fréjus  line  for  20  days55.  The 
mudslide  caused  a  complete  disruption  on  rail  traffic  in  both  directions.  It  affected  the  road 
infrastructure,  closing  the  Fréjus  Tunnel  for  several  of  days  and  imposing  restrictions  on  the  road 
network. Due to rail capacity restrictions, only 9% of the rail freight traffic planned was rerouted on 
alternative itineraries via Switzerland and Ventimiglia border point: 91% of the rail freight traffic was 
shifted to road. 

In the end of August 2023, a new total traffic closure was registered on the same rail line due to a 
major rockslide56: the rail line restoration will be achieved in mid-November 2024, i.e., 14.5 months 
of full closure. Even though most freight traffic was shifted back to rail after the 2019 disruption, the 
subsequent incident led to traffic being transferred to road transport for a longer period. 

French desk research case: Impact of TCR on GHG emissions 

Considering  the  case  illustrated  above  giving  priorities  to  the  passenger  trains  and  cancelling 
international freight train, we have also estimated the potential impacts on GHG emissions linked 

54 Available at: Mudslide halts rail traffic between France and Italy until mid-August | RailFreight.com 

55 Available at: SNCF Réseau mobilised after a mudslide in Maurienne | SNCF 

56 Available at: Traffic along Frejus Railway halted after a landslide | RailFreight.com 

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to the TCR planning indirectly providing conflict for path allocation, considering urban trains with 
1,000  passenger  occupation  and  380  tonnes  per  train,  Transport  Express  Régional  (TER)  of  500 
passengers occupation and 380 tonnes per train, besides considering a direct shift of traffic from rail to 
road transport. 

Moreover,  we  have  considered  the  following  indicators  from  the  French  Environment  and  Energy 
Management  Agency  (ADEME):  Transilien  line  5.8g/voy.km,  TER  29.7g/voy.km,  VL  161.7g/voy.km, 
PL 58.5g/tonne.km and Fer 2.5g/tonne.km. The results are shown in the table below. 

Table 15: Impacts on CO2 emissions 

Rail services 

Kms 

50 

43 

56 

113 

51 

58 

Pax.km & 

Tons.km 

GHG 
emission / 
car or HGV 

GHG 
emission / 
train 

GHG 
reduction 
(Kg) 

49,800 

43,490 

55,780 

56,450 

25,335 

29,005 

8,053 

7,032 

9,020 

9,128 

4,097 

4,690 

289 

252 

324 

-7,764 

-6,780 

-8,696 

1,677 

-7,451 

752 

861 

-3,344 

-3,829 

1,223 

611,660 

35,721 

1,529 

-34,192 

1,058 

529,020 

30,895 

1,323 

-29,572 

1,043 

521,615 

30,462 

1,304 

-29,158 

TER Paris Nord - Creil 

TER Paris Est-Meaux 

TER Pairs Austerlitz-Etampes 

TER Tours-Orléans 

TER Bordeaux-Coutras 

TER Bordeaux-Arcachon 

RFC train (Madrid) Hendaye-
Forbach (Mannheim) 

RFC train (Irun) Hendaye-Lille 
Délivrance (Antwerpen) 

RFC train Bayonne-Tourcoing 
(Antwerpen) 

Again,  considering  the  planned  TCR  and  the  capacity  offer  priority  given  to  regional  or  urban 
passenger services instead of the international freight services on the ATL RFC, there is a rise in the 
GHG emissions. 

Table 16: Impact of passenger priority in CO2 emissions 

Freight services 

Priority given to passenger services 

Missing GHG reduction (Kg) / 
freight train cancelled in France 

RFC train (Madrid) Hendaye-Forbach 
(Mannheim) 

Paris Est-Meaux + Pairs Austerlitz-
Etampes 

RFC train (Irun) Hendaye-Lille Délivrance 
(Antwerpen) 

Paris Est-Meaux + Paris Nord - Creil 

RFC train Bayonne-Tourcoing (Antwerpen) 

Paris Nord – Creil + Paris Austerlitz-
Etampes 

RFC train (Madrid) Hendaye-Forbach 
(Mannheim) 

TER Bordeaux-Coutras + TER 
Bordeaux-Arcachon 

RFC train (Irun) Hendaye-Lille Délivrance 
(Antwerpen) 

TER Bordeaux-Coutras + TER 
Bordeaux-Arcachon 

RFC train Bayonne-Tourcoing (Antwerpen) 

TER Bordeaux-Coutras + TER 
Bordeaux-Arcachon 

74 

18,716 

13,112 

12,698 

27,019 

22,399 

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RFC train (Madrid) Hendaye-Forbach 
(Mannheim) 

TER Tours-Orléans 

RFC train (Irun) Hendaye-Lille Délivrance 

TER Tours-Orléans 

RFC train Bayonne-Tourcoing (Antwerpen) 

TER Tours-Orléans 

26,740 

22,121 

21,707 

4.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Considering the analysis previously performed concerning the implementation of EU legislation, the planning 
and implementation of TCRs in Europe, and the impact of TCRs on rail stakeholders, this chapter outlines the 
conclusions and recommendations of the study. Furthermore, it contains a high-level cost-benefit analysis on 
the proposed measures to improve the TCR coordination, planning and execution in Europe. In this regard, the 
quantitative assessment undertaken demonstrates that the proposed recommendations could yield economic 
gains for the European rail sector, outweighing the expected implementation costs. The assessment estimated 
cost-savings and additional revenues resulting from the measures proposed, based on assumptions on the time 
saved in undertaking administrative procedures to improve the reliability and stability of TCR planning and on 
revenue losses resulting from TCRs in the baseline.The methodological approach used for estimating the costs 
and benefits of the measures proposed is presented in Annex 8 and the full calculation is presented in Annex 
10. 

4.1.  Conclusions and recommendations on each study area 

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers  

1. 

In  addition  to  varying  levels  of  formal  compliance  with  Annex VII  across  infrastructure  managers, 
there remains a significant gap between the practical application and the legal requirements for TCR 
planning.  

The analysis of Area 1 revealed significant differences in the level of compliance of the analysed IMs’ 
NSs  with  Annex  VII,  indicating  a  potential  need  to  enhance  the  enforcement  of  the  European 
regulatory framework on TCRs. Notably, Austria was the only country found to be fully compliant, while 
seven out of the eleven targeted countries, including the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, 
Poland,  Romania,  and  Sweden,  demonstrated  high  levels  of  compliance.  The  Netherlands  and 
Slovenia fell into the medium compliance category, while Germany was the only country that exhibited 
a low level of compliance albeit has a structured plan to overcome them by 202857. 

However, the survey portrayed a different picture concerning the practical application of the provisions 
of  Annex  VII.  The  majority  of  respondents  (59%)  –  mainly  RUs  and  Public  Transport  Authorities, 
indicated  that  Annex  VII  provisions  are  not  properly  put  into  practice  when  planning  TCRs  – 
while  only  41%,  –  mainly  Infrastructure  Manager,  Public  Transport  Authorities  and  RUs  stakeholder 
groups – stated that these directives are adequately implemented in practice.  

Related recommendations: 

•  The efforts of regulatory bodies to assess and enforce the compliance of infrastructure managers with 
the  provisions  of  Annex VII  should  be  continued  and  intensified.  The  enforcement  activities  of 
regulatory bodies at national level should be coordinated at EU level.  

57 DB BETZE (2022) Capacity Strategy 2025. Available at: 

https://fahrweg.dbnetze.com/resource/blob/9850152/562bda9531cc957f59702b0c83072cfc/TRR-Datei-
Download-data.pdf 

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For this purpose, the European Network of Rail Regulatory Bodies (ENRRB) could regularly summarise 
the  activities  of  regulatory  bodies  and  promote  good  assessment  and  enforcement  practices.  The 
European Network of Infrastructure Managers (ENIM) should prepare and adopt a common European 
framework setting out rules and procedures which support uniform application of European regulation 
related to TCRs by infrastructure managers; ENIM should cooperate with ENRRB regarding this task. The 
Commission should be regularly informed about such activities to enable it to assess the application of 
EU legislation in this area. 

•  The quantitative assessment undertaken demonstrates that establishing a central body to monitor and 
enforce TCR rules would eliminate duplicative coordination and could generate from EUR 20.8 to 28.0M 
in administrative cost-savings for the IMs and from EUR 50.3 to 270.4M for RUs, relative to the baseline 
and expressed as present value over 2025-2050. 

2. 

Infrastructure managers’ current procedures are sometimes inadequate to effectively minimise the 
impact  of  TCRs  on  rail  traffic  due  to  insufficient  efforts  to  provide  alternative  capacity  for  traffic. 
Moreover,  to  a  certain  extent  infrastructure  managers  procedures  are  constrained  by  a  lack  of 
stability and predictability of the Member States’ frameworks for the financing of rail infrastructure. 

In  the  targeted  interviews,  several  IMs  and  RUs  have  signalled  a  key  shortcoming  in  TCR  planning  and 
coordination. In the absence of specific requirements in Annex VII, infrastructure managers focus mainly on 
the 
initial  coordination  process  regarding  TCRs,  while  the  efforts  to  provide  alternative  capacity 
compensating  for  the  loss  in  available  capacity  resulting  from  TCRs  often  remain  insufficient.  The 
implementation of Annex VII does thus not minimise the impact of TCRs on rail traffic effectively. 

Additional challenges in TCR planning stem from uncoordinated railway infrastructure investment and planning 
at  the  national  level,  diverging  financial  frameworks  among  EU  IMs,  and  varied  TCR  design  and  execution 
practices, all of which impede effective coordination. 

Related recommendations: 

• 

It is advisable to establish a European harmonised process defining the timing, format, and methods 
according  to  which  IMs  offer  coordinated  alternative  capacity  across  several  networks  during  TCRs. 
This  would  anticipate  the  legal  requirements  in  the  proposed  regulation  on  the  use  of  rail 
infrastructure capacity,  

•  The definition of such European harmonised process could be included in the responsibility of ENIM 
which  could  be  tasked  with  the  definition  of  common  tools,  guidelines,  operation  phase,  as  well  as 
concrete  rule  proposals.  The  standards  already  developed  by  the  industry  (i.e.,  Yearly  capacity 
strategy  including  TCR  coordination  from  RNE)  should  be  at  the  basis  of  the  European  harmonised 
processes. 

•  To reduce the impact of TCRs, the geographical area (railway lines, terminals, etc.) affected by TCRs 

should be identified as precisely as possible to promote coordination between the IMs. 

•  The quantitative assessment undertaken demonstrates that standardised timing, format and tools for 
publishing  rerouting options  would  the potentially  results  in  adjustment  cost-savings for  IMs  of  EUR 
11.9M and EUR 37.6M relative to the baseline and expressed as present value over 2025-2050. 

3.  The  European  TCR  regulatory  framework  requires  coordination  among  IMs  and  neighbouring 
stakeholders  during  TCR  planning  to  enhance  transparency  and  stakeholder  involvement  in 
decision-making processes 

The  survey  and  targeted  interviews  underscored  the  need  for  clear  procedures  to  formalise 
coordination and consultation process among IMs, RUs, and end customers, with the purpose of 

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enhancing  transparency  of  the  information  provided  by  the  IMs  and  on  the  consideration  of 
stakeholders’ contributions in TCR decisions.  

In  particular,  while  coordination  is  required  by  the  current  TCR  regulatory  framework,  no  operative 
guidelines are included (e.g., tools, timing, procedures) resulting in varying and often suboptimal levels 
of coordination. 

 Related recommendations: 

• 

In  the  context  of  the  TCR  regulatory  framework,  it is  essential  to  indicate  appropriate  methodologies 
and common digital tools (e.g., the TCR tool provided by RNE) to facilitate structured dialogue between 
IMs,  RUs,  and  end  customers.  Additionally,  it  is  important  to  outline  practical  implications  for  the 
consideration by infrastructure managers of the resulting feedback in TCR planning.  

•  The task to define such methodologies could be included among the responsibilities of ENIM. This would 
anticipate the legal requirements envisaged in the proposed regulation on the use of rail infrastructure 
capacity. 

•  The  quantitative  assessment  undertaken  demonstrates  that  introducing  structured  dialogue  and 
feedback mechanisms among IMs, RUs and end-customers would lower adjustment costs for the IMs, 
ranging from EUR 15.2 to 25.3M relative to the baseline and expressed as present value over 2025-2050. 

4.  TCRs  with  limited  individual  impacts  may  have  a  significant  cumulative  impact  on  RUs  and  end 

customers. This should be addressed by a more comprehensive regulatory approach. 

During the consultation process of the study (i.e., online survey, targeted interviews, etc.) the pertinence of the 
TCR classification in current EU legislation emerged in several instances. In particular, the legal requirements 
set out in Annex VII focus on TCRs which have major impacts on the railway system at the level of an individual 
TCR (i.e., total, or partial closure for multiple days). However, those are not the only TCRs impacting the RUs 
and  end  customers.  Specifically,  TCRs  which  are  classified  in  the  “minor  impact”  category,  based  on  criteria 
referring to individual TCRs, may have important cumulative impacts on rail traffic and specific types of service 
(e.g. night trains). 

Related recommendations: 

• 

It  is  advisable  to  adopt  and  implement  a  common  process  for  replanning  timetables  in  the  case  of 
minor TCRs with high impact or unforeseen changes in other TCRs to minimise the negative effects on 
RUs and end customers.  

•  The specific legal requirements on the planning and publication of TCRs, set out in particular in Annex 
VII  should  be  revised  in  the  light  of  the  challenges  identified,  notably  as  regards  the  lack  of  specific 
provisions  regarding  smaller  infrastructure  works,  which  according  to  the  current  criteria  can  be 
planned during the ongoing working timetable. 

•  The consulted stakeholders advised against modifications to planned TCRs in the six months preceding 

their occurrence to avoid the negative effects resulting from replanning. 

•  Alternatively,  it  was  suggested  in  several  instances  (survey  for  the  European  TCR  regulatory 
framework)  to  define  a  common  deadline  for  the  publication  of  all  TCRs,  due  to  their  potential 
disruption  to  RUs  and  end  costumers.  To  set  this  deadline  two  possible  approaches  have  been 
identified, which require further investigation: 

o  Based  on  discussions  with  RUs,  a  first  option  would  be  to  establish  the  deadline  six  months 
prior  to  the  occurrence  of  a  TCR,  after  which  no  modifications  should  be  allowed.  This 
approach promotes flexibility while still preventing most of the negative effects associated with 
a TCR replanning close to the previous TCR occurrence; 

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o  Another approach, supported by IMs, suggests setting a deadline after which TCRs cannot be 
modified, ideally within a period of six to eight months before the publication of the annual 
timetable.  This  method  could  enhance  the  stability  of  TCR  planning  but  would  necessitate 
additional planning efforts. All types of TCRs would need to be finalized earlier than the cut-off 
date of the previous approach. For instance, if a TCR is scheduled to occur several months after 
the timetable's publication, the period from the deadline to the TCR would exceed six to eight 
months. 

o  Additionally,  the  consulted  RUs  recommended  implementing  a  penalty  system  to  incentivise 
respect  of  any  deadline  and  promote  accurate  and  stable  TCR  planning.  The  penalty  system 
should include exceptions for replanning TCRs after the deadline in cases of force majeure and 
unforeseeable events. 

• 

The quantitative assessment undertaken demonstrates that coordinated management of TCRs along 
key network bottlenecks (e.g. Brenner Axis) would reduce revenue losses which RUs and IMs incur in 
the baseline. The implementation of this measure may lead to additional revenues for RUs  of EUR 1.0 
bn,  and  EUR  269.5M  for  IMs,  expressed  as  present  value  over  2025-2050  relative  to  the  baseline. 
Moreover,  coordinating  and  timing  minor  works  with  major  TCRs  would  raise  usable  capacity  and 
reduce the expected impact of TCRs on the industry. RUs are expected to are expected to experience 
an  upsurge  in  revenues  due  to  an  increase  in  capacity  amounting  between  EUR  952.6  M  and  EUR 
1,851.3 M; IMs revenues are expected to increase between EUR 260.0 M and 520.0M, expressed as 
present  value  over  2025-2050.  Finally,  a  reliable,  long-term  TCR  timetable  offers  the  greatest  gain, 
averting  irretrievable  modal  shift  and  would  lead  to  an  economic  impact  of  EUR  3,538.29  M  in 
additional revenue for the RUs and EUR 568.32M for the IMs, expressed as present value over 2025-
2050. In addition, evidence from the case studies show that customers may incur additional costs due 
to  TCR.  Therefore  this  measure  may  also  lead  to  savings  to  customers,  although  these  could  not  be 
quantified in this study. 

Area 2 - Planning and implementation of TCR 

As  a  conclusion  of  the  planning  and  implementation  chapter,  the  feedback  from  stakeholders  highlights 
significant  areas  for  improvement  in  the  TCR  planning  and  execution  processes.  Current  practices  in  TCR 
planning at the national level are constrained by various factors, including the condition of national networks 
and  priorities  set  by  Member  States.  These  differing  approaches  underscore  the  critical  need  for  effective 
lacking.  Additionally,  the 
coordination  of  TCRs  between 
coordination process is not sufficiently supported by digital tools. 

infrastructure  managers,  which 

is  currently 

1.  The stable planning of TCRs is hindered by multiple factors that negatively impact network capacity and 
service quality. Although coordination and consultation efforts with stakeholders are in place, they are 
weakened by the absence of a comprehensive "network approach" which considers not only the effected 
railway lines, but the neighbouring ones as well.  

TCRs  are  essential  for  the  maintenance,  renewal,  or  upgrade  of  the  rail  network.  The  condition  of  the  EU 
railway network is not always homogenous in terms of infrastructure and services’ quality, and thus Members 
States can prioritise different aspects for the development of their railway network. It follows that the status of 
the rail network (e.g., and older rail network could be subject to more maintenance and renewal activities) and 
the  national  priorities  on  the  rail  network  maintenance,  renewal  and  development  are  the  two  key  external 
factors imposing constraints on TCR planning. 

Secondly, National IMs pursue different approaches for infrastructure maintenance and renewal, which result 
in different processes for TCR planning, execution, and timing. For instance, the Capacity Strategy 202758 shows 

58 RNE (2023). Capacity Strategy 2027 - Common document of Infrabel, ProRail, ACF/CFL, SNCF Réseau, DB 
Netz AG, SBB Infrastruktur AG, BLS Netz AG, ÖBB Infrastruktur AG, RFI S.p.A and SŽ Infrastruktura. 

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that  nine  IMs  cluster  TCRs  for  different  reasons  (e.g.,  reducing  impact  or  duration).  Furthermore,  the 
procedures followed by these IMs can be slightly different, while the timings can vary significantly. Specifically, 
the timing differences can be as much as 20 months. This means that although the procedural variations are 
minor, the scheduling differences are substantial.. This variability is also observed in case studies, such as the 
Northern section of RFC 3, where IMs' practices for TCR design, planning, communication, and execution differ 
significantly. 

Lastly, in some cases IMs modify TCRs multiple times between initial announcement and execution, affecting 
capacity  allocation  and  annual  timetable  construction.  While  some  changes  follow  stakeholder  feedback  to 
mitigate impact, some are unilateral IM decisions to align with maintenance schedules. Factors contributing to 
these  changes  include  ongoing  maintenance  planning  and  tendering  processes,  often  incompatible  with  TCR 
coordination timelines. For example, Major and High impact TCRs must be coordinated two years in advance, 
but IMs do not always organise detailed maintenance planning and tendering processes in a way that allows 
them to provide detailed execution information at that stage, leading to subsequent modifications. 

These external factors and infrastructure managers practices hinder the stability of TCR planning and execution 
as  well  as  the  effectiveness  of  the  coordination  between  IMs  and  between  IMs  and  RUs.  This  means  that  a 
fragmentation  of  national  networks  continues  to  prevail  over  an  “European  network  approach”  to  TCR 
planning. 

Related recommendations: 

• 

• 

• 

Stable  and  predictable  financing  of  railway  infrastructure  maintenance  and  renewal,  should  be 
provided in all EU Member States as it is one of the key preconditions for infrastructure managers to 
plan and execute TCRs in way that minimises the impact on rail traffic. The contractual agreements to 
be  concluded  between  Member  States  and  infrastructure  managers  in  accordance  with  Directive 
2012/34/EU should be used as an instrument to provide infrastructure managers with a multi-annual 
financial framework in conjunction with clear user-oriented performance targets. 
The  Member  States  should  be  encouraged  to  develop  comprehensive  rail  strategies  covering 
maintenance,  renewal  and  development  of  railway  infrastructure  and  the  complementary  stable 
financial  framework. A  joint  consideration  of  maintenance,  renewal  and new construction  enables a 
more efficient use of limited financial resources and enhances overall network capacity. 
IMs should adjust their TCR planning and execution processes in a way that allows them to meet the 
legal requirements regarding the coordination of TCRs with other IMs and aim for an alignment of the 
TCR planning and execution phases and share best practices. On this basis, effective mechanisms and 
structures  for  the  practical  coordination  between  IMs  must  be  established.  This  should  take  into 
account  good  practices  such  as  the  Brenner  Axis  Task  force,  a  working  group  within  the  RFC  3  the 
manages TCRs coordination amongst the 3 IMs involved on the Brenner Axis. In line with the proposed 
regulation on the use of railway infrastructure capacity, coordination activities between IMs may be 
supported or coordinated at the EU level by ENIM. 

Moreover,  it  may  be  useful  to  coordinate  TCRs  with  a  particularly  high  impact  with  the  works  on  the 
road/inland  waterway  network  to  avoid  coinciding  capacity  bottlenecks.  The  coordination  effort,  the 
definition  of  the  actors  to  be  involved  and  the  geographical  perimeter  should  be  determined  based  on 
traffic data. It is desirable that these coordination efforts are structured in stable multimodality working 
groups. Moreover: 

• 

TCR  coordination  activities  should  encompass  major  transport  network  nodes,  such  as  ports, 
intermodal hubs, and freight terminals.  

Available 
2027_v1.0.pdf 

at: 

https://rne.eu/wp-content/uploads/231215_Common-pilot-Capacity-Strategy-TT-

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• 

• 

•  High-capacity  reductions  on  freight  lines  due  to  TCRs  should  be  synchronised  with  periods  of  low 
demand or low throughput at the freight facilities. This approach aims to minimise the overall impact 
on the rail freight ecosystem. 
TCR  coordination  should  aim  to  guarantee  a  minimum  volume  of  capacity  between  the  most 
important nodes of the network to avoid as much as possible the temporary isolation of parts of the 
network. IMs should coordinate at the international level TCRs on every section of their network that 
is  utilised  for  international  traffic.  This  is  particularly  important  for  freight  as  rerouting  lines  often 
present different technical characteristics than the main line (e.g., shorter trains allowed, reduced axel 
load,  different  loading  gauging)  and/or  limited  capacity,  that  can  potentially  isolate  nodes  of  the 
network. This aspect has been raised in multiple focused groups. Furthermore, it is desirable that the 
capacity availability intended in this broader sense is constantly monitored at the EU level by an EU-
level entity such as ENIM. 
To  minimise  their  cumulative  disruption  of  traffic,  particularly  at  the  multi-network  level,  individual 
TCRs  need  to  be  considered  and  planned  jointly.  In  many  cases,  the  cumulative  impact  can  be 
significantly  reduced  by  clustering  TCRs.  However,  currently,  two  substantial  factors  hinder  this 
process. Firstly, the IMs execute the planning process at distinct times, as evidenced by the 2027 RNE 
Capacity Strategy59. This discrepancy reduces the efficiency and effectiveness of the process, given that 
it significantly complicates the coordination of TCRs between infrastructure managers. Secondly, TCRs, 
based  on  their  traffic  impact,  are  planned  based  on  different  timelines  and,  thus,  communicated  to 
stakeholders at different points in time. Therefore, the clustering procedure could be impaired by low-
impact  TCRs,  planned,  and  communicated  by  IMs  nearing  their  execution,  which  prove  to  be 
challenging to coordinate and cluster effectively. It is recommended that IMs align clustering practices 
and timing as to maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of the process. 
The  Common  Capacity  Strategy  202760  represents  a  clear  and  fundamental  first  step  in  the  path 
towards  a  “network  approach”  in  the  capacity  management  and  allocation  process.  The  initiative 
showcases  room  for  improvements  as  the  capacity  strategy  2027  resembles  a  collection  of  the 
capacity  strategies  of  the  IMs,  rather  than  a  single  capacity  strategy  shared  by  the  IMs.  It  is  then 
desirable that the initiative evolves in the latter direction and that a wider panel of IMs participates.  

• 

2.  The TCR consultation process is not adequately supported by digital information and services. IMs publish 
information  and  consult  on  TCRs  through  national  tools  that  are  not  connected  with  each  other.  RNE 
provides a digital platform (RNE TCR Tool), but it not adopted by all IMs in the EU. 

Each IM publish information on TCRs on their own network, usually on a digital platform. Nonetheless, it would 
be desirable that information on TCRs is published and accessible to RUs via a single ”data space”.  

In order to provide such tool, RNE developed a digital platform (the RNE TCR Tool) which is adopted by most, 
but not all, IMs. Furthermore, a selection of TCRs on the RFC network is published by the RFC, either on their 
website  and/or  on  the  RNE  Corridor  Information  Platform.  The  fragmentation  of  national  tools  and  the 
reluctancy of some IMs in the utilisation of a common tool as the RNE TCR Tool, hinders the TCRs coordination 
process  (e.g.,  different  timings  of  TCR  publication  and  information,  as  well  as  a  possible  language  barrier  as 
information tends to be published in the national language). Furthermore, TCRs affecting RFCs are published in 

59 RNE (2023). Capacity Strategy 2027 - Common document of Infrabel, ProRail, ACF/CFL, SNCF Réseau, DB 
Netz AG, SBB Infrastruktur AG, BLS Netz AG, ÖBB Infrastruktur AG, RFI S.p.A and SŽ Infrastruktura. 
Available 
https://rne.eu/wp-content/uploads/231215_Common-pilot-Capacity-Strategy-TT-
2027_v1.0.pdf 

at: 

60 RNE (2023). Capacity Strategy 2027 - Common document of Infrabel, ProRail, ACF/CFL, SNCF Réseau, DB 
Netz AG, SBB Infrastruktur AG, BLS Netz AG, ÖBB Infrastruktur AG, RFI S.p.A and SŽ Infrastruktura. 
https://rne.eu/wp-content/uploads/231215_Common-pilot-Capacity-Strategy-TT-
Available 
2027_v1.0.pdf 

at: 

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a  tabular  form:  this  method  of  publication,  although  Annex  VII  compliant,  provides  little  added  value  to 
stakeholders. 

The digital exchange of information in the single European area is regulated in the technical specifications for 
interoperability on the telematics applications for freight services and for passenger services (TAF and TAP TSI), 
adopted under the Interoperability Directive (EU) 2016/797. The specifications currently in force do not include 
information  on  TCRs.  However,  a  process  to  revise  the  specifications  is  currently  ongoing.  The  issue  of  TCRs 
should be taken into account in the revision process. 

Related recommendations: 

• 

The  EU-wide  adoption  of  interconnected  digital  services  providing  information  on  TCRs  in  a  single 
‘data  space’  is  essential  for  the  success  of  TCR  coordination  .  The  digital  services  and  information 
should  be  deployed  and  provided  by  all  IMs  and  guarantee  free  access  to  the  public  and  the  rail 
stakeholders. The digital services and the digital dataspace should provide a complete overview of the 
TCRs  as  well  as  the  relevant  rerouting  options  and  capacity;  the  information  provided  should  be 
continuously  updated,  trustworthy,  and  made  available  to  the  operators  in  a  standardised,  user-
friendly  format  set  out  in  accordance  with  the  technical  specifications  for  interoperability  adopted 
under  the  Rail  Interoperability  Directive.  Across  all  focus  groups  it  was  clear  that  IMs  publish  TCR 
information  via  national  digital  services  and  dataspaces  based  on  specifications  defined  by 
infrastructure  managers  or  at  national  level.  As  a  consequence,  coordination  between  different  IMs 
and between IMs and RUs is not based on digital services within an integrated dataspace.  
The digital services and dataspace should allow stakeholders to: 

o 

Include  a  complete  overview  of  each  TCR  in  terms  of  location,  scheduling,  and  impact  on 
traffic. 

o  Provide an overview of the rerouting options available (and the related capacity). 

o  Ensure  the  consistency  of  the  information  published  in  the  single  EU  dataspace  and  at 

national level and guarantee the constant update and reliability of the data included. 

o 

Support a data-driven decision-making approach and allow monitoring by regulatory bodies. 

• 

The  digital  services  and  dataspace  should  be  fully  compliant  with  EU  technical  specifications  for 
interoperability; their development and deployment should be facilitated and coordinated by entities 
at  EU  level  acting  within  their  areas  of  competence,  including  the  European  Union  Agency  for 
Railways,  the  Europe’s  Rail  Joint  Undertaking  and  ENIM.  Moreover,  the  services  and  the  dataspace 
should: 

o  Be highly user friendly such as, for example, allowing different data visualisation and ways to 

access the data. 

o  Ensure full compliance with current and future technical specifications for interoperability, as 
outlined in the Rail Interoperability Directive (EU) 2016/797, particularly those related to the 
telematics subsystem of the EU rail system. 

o  Enable  seamless  synchronisation  with  tools  and  dataspaces  at  the  infrastructure  manager 
and/or  national  level,  by  adhering  to  common  technical  specifications.  This  should  allow 
infrastructure  managers  to  incorporate  national  specificities  while  maintaining  a  sufficient 
level  of  standardisation.  Additionally,  adopting  a  common  language  (e.g.,  English)  is 
recommended to reduce language barriers and facilitate coordination and communication. 
o  Enable the continuous monitoring of TCR planning and execution, with a view to assess the 
performance  of  infrastructure  managers  and  the  impacts  of  TCRs  on  rail  services  and  their 
operators  and  customers.  For  instance,  analysing  the  evolution  of  capacity  restrictions  can 
help  identify  potential  bottlenecks  resulting  from  TCRs  and  provide  valuable  data  for 
evaluating and improving TCR planning and execution strategies. 

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o  Provide a single channel for operators to provide feedback on TCRs and alternative capacity 
in  the  context  of  relevant  consultation  processes.  This  function  supports  the  goal  of 
promoting  cross-border  traffic  and  enhances  efficiency  by  streamlining  the  process, 
eliminating the need for operators to consult and use multiple national TCR tools. 

o 

Support the process for the coordination of train path between infrastructure managers and 
the capacity allocation process more broadly, from the capacity request to last modification 
of  the  train  path  before  the  actual  train  run.  Currently  the  coordination  of  train  paths 
between  infrastructure  managers  is  supported  by  PCS  (Path  Coordination  System,  a  digital 
tool  developed  by  RNE)  up  to  two  months  before  the  entry  into  force  of  the  new  annual 
working timetable. However, TCRs are a major reason for modifications to train paths at later 
stages of the capacity management process (up to the actual train run). Such modifications 
are managed by infrastructure managers in a piecemeal approach as there are as of yet no 
integrated digital services at EU level supported by a shared dataspace for this purposes. 

• 

The  quantitative  assessment  undertaken  demonstrates  that  mandatory  use  of  a  unified  IT  tool  is 
estimated to lead to recurring adjustment costs for IMs amounting to EUR 32.5 M, this measure would 
generate annual  ongoing  administrative  cost-savings  for  IMs  estimated at  EUR  51.4  million  and  EUR 
43.1M for the RUs, in present value (2025-205) to the baseline. 

5.  The  process  to  allocate  alternative  capacity  during  TCRs  should  be  improved  to  improve 
transparency  and  ensure  fair  and  non-discriminatory  treatment  of  applicants,  especially  in 
situations where the capacity requested by RUs exceeds available capacity. 

In  accordance  with  Directive  2012/34/EU,  capacity  on  the  rail  network  must  be  allocated  in  an  non-
discriminatory  manner,  including  in  situations  where  the  capacity  requested  by  applicants  exceeds  the 
available capacity. Although IMs claim to respect this principle in their NS, there is little transparency on how 
IMs take into consideration input from RUs during the capacity allocation process. For example, it is not always 
clear or specified how the feedback of applicants on TCRs is being taken into account. This aspect is particularly 
relevant in the allocation of alternative capacity during TCRs, as IMs adopt different practices in this respect.  

Related recommendations: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

The  capacity  allocation  process,  in  particular  its  transparency,  should  be  improved  by  utilising 
integrated  digital  services  at  the  EU  level  (see  previous  recommendation).  The  deployment  of  such 
services should be coordinated by ENIM; the compliance of such services should be assessed by the 
European Union Agency for Railways. 

The  criteria  and  procedures  for  the  allocation  of  alternative  capacity  during  TCRs  should  be 
harmonised across the EU. 

In  addition  to  information  on  TCRs,  IMs  should  provide  operators  with  information  on  alternative 
capacity available, including alternative timings and routings. Such information should be coordinated 
between IMs beforehand and should indicate any limitations with respect to the original capacity offer 
(e.g., train length, traction power, loading gauge, line gradient, etc.). 

The  assessment  undertaken  demonstrates  that  while  robust  data  are  lacking,  qualitative  evidence 
indicates that this measure could potentially lead to cost-savings to both RUs and IMs, as priority rules 
would be better harmonised to ensure a minimum network capacity. 

Area 3 - Impacts of TCRs on rail stakeholders 

1. 

TCRs result in negative impacts for RUs and IMs that ultimately translate in additional costs, reduced 
revenues  and  decrease  in  transport  demand.  IMs  are  directly  impacted  by  a  reduction  (or  complete 
revenue  loss  in  case  of  complete  closures)  of  the  TACs  (Track  Access  Charges)  paid  by  operators. 
Operators, on the other hand, can experience revenue losses, additional costs even in cases rerouting 

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options are offered. The impact generated by a TCR can extend beyond the duration of the TCR, while 
the recovery might not be complete. 

TCRs can have a direct impact both in term of additional costs and reduced revenues. IMs see the reduction of 
the track access charges paid by operators, in case of partial reduction of capacity, or no revenues in case of 
total closures. Furthermore, IMs can be impacted also by TCRs on neighbouring networks, as indirect effect of 
the reduction of traffic. For example, in the 2 case studies on the 2019 and 2023 Modane disruptions the total 
closure of the line determined by force majeure on the French network, implied that the Italian side of the line 
became unusable for any cross-border traffic to France. On the other hand, RUs can face a revenue reduction 
because of the reduce capacity available. When rerouting options are available, they can generate additional 
costs for rolling stock, staffing and general operating costs. Regarding freight, the rerouting options offered can 
be  misaligned  with  the  available  capacity  at  freight  terminals  or  ports  and  therefore  freight  clients  can  lose 
interest.  These  effects  are  exacerbated  for  international  traffic  when  TCRs  are  not  properly  coordinated,  or 
their scheduling is modified in proximity of the TCR. This aspect has been brought up in many focus groups, as 
RUs  lamented  that  the  negative  externalities,  they  experience  are  both  due  to  TCRs  themselves  (and  their 
numerosity) and, predominantly, by the lack of harmonisation. For example, multiple minor impact TCRs that 
are not synchronised and harmonised by IMs, can create a “snowball effect” on the available capacity of the 
line  and  on  the  service  performance  (e.g.,  higher  dwelling  times  at  borders,  low  punctuality)  and  ultimately 
lead to cancellations. For passenger operators, the degradation of the quality of the service can trigger costly 
passenger protection mechanisms. For example, operators can be bound (by law or by PSO contracts) to offer 
complementary services (e.g., bus services). 

TCRs  can  also  produce  indirect  impacts  that  can  extend  beyond  the  timeframe  of  the  TCRs  itself.  Passenger 
operators have reported that TCRs can reduce the transport demand in favour of other modes of transport. For 
example, a TCR limited to the early part of the morning (in correspondence of the morning peak) can reduce 
the overall rail transport demand during the day (an in the evening peak) as commuters shift to other modes of 
transport.  On  the  other  hand,  freight  operators  have  generally  lamented  that  path  cancellations,  rerouting 
options not compatible with the supply chain needs and poor service performance can induce a “reverse modal 
shift” in freight clients, as they pivot towards road transport. 

In conclusion, the lack of harmonisation and proliferation of TCRs induces a detrimental effect on the rail sector 
that hinders its attractiveness. 

Related recommendations: 

•  Operators  have  limited  influence  in  TCR  scheduling  (after  all,  network  management  is  one  of  the 
prerogatives of the IMs, by definition) and they operate in a liberalised market. Under these premises, 
and  building  upon  the  examples  of  France  and  Switzerland,  it  is  advisable  to  introduce  an  incentive 
scheme  encouraging  infrastructure  managers  to  reduce  the  impact  of  capacity  restrictions  on  the 
operators  of  rail  transport  services,  based  on  a  common  framework  at  the  EU  level.  The  detailed 
definition  of  such  an  incentive  scheme  should  fall  amongst  the  responsibilities  of  ENIM  in 
collaboration with the ENRRB. 

•  While  it  is  obvious  that  the  shortcomings  of  TCRs  planning  and  execution  processes  have  negative 
impacts  on  rail  operators  and  users  overall,  the  study  has  shown  that  is  difficult  to  determine  the 
impacts at a more detailed level, let alone in quantitative terms. Therefore, in line with the “network 
approach”  introduced  in  Area  2,  the  performance  of  rail  infrastructure  managers  in  planning  and 
executing TCRs should be monitored homogenously at the EU level. This monitoring should be based 
on  a  standardised  set  of  indicators  and  KPIs  that  quantify  the  performance  of  rail  infrastructure 
(network) and rail transport services .  

•  Currently, such performance monitoring is a responsibility of the RFCs. Given the need for a “network 
approach” it is advisable to centralize such activity. The detailed definition of the set of indicators, its 
monitoring  system  and  the  reporting  structure  should  fall  amongst  the  responsibilities  of  ENIM  in 

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collaboration  with  the  ENRRB.  The  results  of  performance  monitoring  should  also  be  reported  by 
infrastructure managers. 

• 

In  addition  to  performance  monitoring,  there  should  be  a  performance  management  process  to 
improve  on  the  basis  of  defined performance  objectives. The  proposed  regulation  on  the  use  of  rail 
capacity  envisages  such  a  process  in  the  Chapter  on  performance  review.  Given  the  importance  of 
TCRs for the performance of rail transport services overall, the issue should be seriously considered in 
this context. 

•  The contractual agreements concluded between IMs and Member States in accordance with the legal 
requirements  of  Article  30(1)  of  Directive  2012/34/EU  should  explicitly  address  the  issues  of  TCR 
planning and execution, in order to promote the optimisation of the rail network and its performance. 
For  example,  and  building  upon  the  Annex  V  of  the  2012/34/EU  Directive,  it  should  include 
performance targets regarding the capacity offer, both in terms of train-km and stability of the offer, 
as  well  as  network  reliability  (e.g.,  number  of  failures)  and  service  performance  (e.g.,  cancellations, 
delays,  etc.).  In  parallel,  it  is  recommended  that  a  penalty  scheme  should  be  introduced  in  the 
contractual agreements concerning the management and execution of investment programmes by the 
IMs, to incentivise the efficient and effective use of public funds.  

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ANNEX  1  –  TARGETED  COUNTRIES  COMPLIANCE  WITH  THE  COMMISSION  DELEGATED 
VII)
DECISION 

2017/2075 

(ANNEX 

The full analysis is internal.  

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ANNEX  2  –  TARGETED  RFCS  COMPLIANCE  WITH  REGULATION  (EU)  NO  913/2010  ART.12 
TO ART.18 

The full analysis is internal.  

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ANNEX 3 – ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC RULES FOR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT ON DOUBLE TRACKS 
LINES  

The full analysis is internal.  

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ANNEX 4 – TARGETED ONLINE CONSULTATION 

The report with the full results of the online consultation is internal. 

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ANNEX 5 – CASE STUDIES 

# 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

Case study 

Status 

Brenner Axis 

First review by DG MOVE  

TCR coordination on Woippy – Mannheim line 

Second review by DG MOVE 

Reconstruction works on the Arad–Simeria section 

Second review by DG MOVE 

Upgrade works for the German section of Betuwe line 

Second review by DG MOVE 

Maurienne valley rail traffic disruption 2023 

Second review by DG MOVE 

Modernisation of the Warsaw West station 

Awaiting stakeholders response 

German-Dutch border on the two alternative routes via 
Venlo and Emmerich 

First review by DG MOVE 

8 

Renovation of the Budapest-Hegyeshalom line (2023) 

Second review by DG MOVE 

9 

Works in the HS station of Madrid Puerta de Atocha 
(2020) 

Second review by DG MOVE 

10  Divača-Koper line doubling project (2023) 

Second review by DG MOVE 

11 

Tunnel works on the Bologna-Prato line 

First review by DG MOVE 

12  Maurienne Valley rail traffic disruption (2019) 

Second review by DG MOVE 

13 

Infrastructure works in Bulgaria (2023) 

Second review by DG MOVE 

14 

DB InfraGo programme – High performance network 
(2023) 

Second review by DG MOVE 

15 

Poznań-Warsaw line 

Awaiting stakeholders response 

16 

Section south of Sweden and north of Germany passing 
through Denmark 

First review by DG MOVE 

17  Rhine-Valley – Total closure Raststatt – Baden-Baden   

First review by DG MOVE 

18  Arlberg line 

First review by DG MOVE 

19 

TCR coordination on the Brussels – Namur line 

First review by DG MOVE 

20 

TCR on RFC5 between Ostrava and Břeclav 

First review by DG MOVE 

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ANNEX 6 – COUNTRY FICHES 

Austria 

The Austrian Railway Network consists of 4843km with an implementation of standard gauge (1435mm) of which 3622km (74.8%) are 
electrified  lines61.  It  includes  336  km  of  high-speed  tracks.  The  network  is  managed  by  ÖBB-Infrastructure  AG,  a  subsidiary  of  ÖBB, 
which is wholly owned by the Republic of Austria. Austria's railway network is part of three Rail Freight Corridors: RFC 3, RFC 5, and 
RFC 762.  

The  sector  comprises  23  freight  railway  companies  and  2  passenger  railway  companies  and  18  freight  and  passenger  companies63. 
High-speed services are provided by ÖBB Railjet, connecting Austria with other parts of Europe. 

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

Compliance with 
2012/34/EU 
Directive 

Traffic 
management 
rules for TCR 
planning 

Case studies 

Brenner Axis 

Network statement compliance analysis 

The  2024  NS  of  ÖBB-Infra,  the  Austrian  IM,  was  found  to  be  fully  compliant  with  the  provision  of  the 
Directive 2012/34 on establishing a single European Railway Area (Annex VII).  

Traffic is always allowed when a TCR is in place in the following instances: 

• 

• 

Traffic is allowed on the tracks in proximity of tracks affected by works on the open track, the track 
spacing must be at least 4.00 m for new construction and the announcement signal is at a locally 
permissible speed if, 

o  Below 80 km/h 400 m 
o 
o 

from 80 km/h to below 100 km/h 700 m and, 
from 100 km/h 1000 m before the initial signal. 

Traffic  in  both ways  on  the  same  track  is  allowed  if  the  adequate  protection  system  is  active  with 
maximum speed of more than 100 Km/h, in case the protection system is not active the maximum 
speed is reduced to 100 Km/h. 

Otherwise,  in  case  of  only  banalised  signal  systems,  traffic  is  carried  out  on  construction  track  must  be 
carried out in accordance with the regulations of driving on sight. The speed may not exceed 20 km/h. 

The  Brenner  Axis  is  the  most  important  Alpine  pass  for  freight  transport,  connecting  Italy  to  Austria  and 
Germany,  with  a  daily  capacity  of  100  freight  trains.  The  line  (Verona  –  Munich)  is  managed  by  three  IMs  
(RFI, DB InfraGo and ÖBB-Infra) and it is part of the RFC 3. The coordination amongst the 3 IMs and railway 
stakeholders related but not limited to TCRs takes place in the “Brenner working group”, which is considered 
a best practice in Europe. 

Arlberg line 

In western Austria, ÖBB-Infrastruktur is making significant investments in the Arlberg Corridor. This corridor 
connects  Innsbruck  to  Bregenz  and  plays  a  crucial  role  in  regional  and  international  rail  transport.  The 
Arlberg Line, which stretches from Vorarlberg (in Austria) to Switzerland, is currently undergoing upgrades. 
These enhancements aim to improve efficiency, safety, and connectivity along the route. 

61 ÖBB Annual Report 2022 (oebb.at) 

62 European Rail Freight Corridors - IRG Rail (irg-rail.eu) 

63 ERA Railway Factsheets | European Union Agency for Railways (europa.eu) 

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Czech Republic 

The  Czech  Republic  Railway  Network  covers  9,349  km  of  standard  gauge  (1,435  mm)  tracks,  with  3,258  km  (35%)  electrified  as  of 
December  31,  2023.  The  country  uses  two  main  electrification  systems:  3  kV  DC  in  the  northern  regions  and  25  kV  50  Hz  AC  in  the 
southern regions64. Most passenger services are currently operated by the state-owned České dráhy. Freight transport is fully managed 
by  ČD  Cargo,  a  wholly  owned  subsidiary  of  České  dráhy.  Správa  železnic,  a  state-owned  entity,  owns  and  manages  the  national  and 
regional railway infrastructure. The Czech rail network is part of three Rail Freight Corridors: RFC 5, RFC 7, and RFC 965.  

The railway sector in the Czech Republic includes 71 freight railway companies and 1 passenger railway companies and 46 freight and 
passenger companies66. High-speed services are provided by the private company RegioJet for passengers and Railjet, which is operated 
by Czech Railways in cooperation with ÖBB67. 

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

Compliance with 
2012/34/EU 
Directive 

Traffic 
management 
rules for TCR 
planning 

Case studies  

Ostrava and 
Břeclav 

Network statement compliance analysis 

The 2024 NS of Správa železnic, was found to be fully compliant with the provision of the Directive 2012/34 
on establishing a single European Railway Area (Annex VII).  

Traffic is always allowed when a TCR is in place in the following instances: 

• 

• 

Traffic is allowed on the tracks in proximity of tracks affected by works with consent by offering and 
acceptance 
Traffic in both ways on the same track is allowed if traffic is allowed with signalling device. In case 
the protection system is not active, traffic is allowed by means of a telephone sign off. 

Works were done in a local line between Suchdol nad Odrou to Budišov nad Budišovkou, with no rerouting 
options available and passengers’ lines were completely replaced by diesel shuttles.  

The TCR was initially published in January 2021 and confirmed six months later in July 2021, following the 
guidelines set in Annex VII. 

All operators (passenger and freight) were informed at the same time during TCR coordination meetings. The 
passenger operators' solution (the use of buses) due to the total closure of the line was discussed with the 
IMs,  which  paid for  by the  services,  but  also must  be  coordinated with the  local  road authority  to  keep the 
roads open to buses during the TCR timeframe. 

64 Czechs to eliminate 3kV dc electrification? - International Railway Journal (railjournal.com) 

65 European Rail Freight Corridors - IRG Rail (irg-rail.eu) 

66 ERA Railway Factsheets | European Union Agency for Railways (europa.eu) 

67 Railjet High-Speed Train | Tickets & Map - CZECH RAILS 

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France 

The  French  railway  network  extends  for  more  than  27,592  km68  (as  of  2022)  and  it  is  managed  by  4  IMs69,  most  of  the  network 
(27,100 km of lines) is managed by SNCF Réseau. The company is owned by the French Ministry of Ecological Transition. Most of the 
network (16,770 km ,61%) is electrified and t also includes a high-speed network (2,657 km). The French network is also involved in 
4 Rail Freight Corridors: North Sea Mediterranean, Atlantic, Mediterranean and Rhine – Danube.70  

The concession relationship between SNCF Réseau and the French State (Ministry of Ecological Transition) is regulated by a 10 year-
contract (Performance contract, valid for the 2021-2030 period). The contract is composed by 4 parts: quality services improvement, 
rail  network  renewal  and  modernisation,  cash  flow  and  depth  management,  risk  management.  It  includes  4  annexes  about  key 
performances  indicators,  planned  investment  and  exploitation  expenditures,  payment  conditions  of  the  French  State  and 
macroeconomic data base.  

The  railway  sector  in  France  consists  of  22  freight  RUs  and  5  passenger  RUs,  with  five  of  them  providing  high-speed  passenger 
services49. EPSF (Etablissement Public de Sécurité Ferroviaire) represents the national safety authority in France, while ART (Autorité 
de Régulation des Transports) represents the national regulatory body.  

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

Compliance 
with 2012/34/EU 
Directive 

Traffic 
management 
rules for TCR 
planning 

Case studies 

TCR 
Coordination 
on Woippy-
Mannheim line 

The 2024 NS of SNCF Réseau, the French IM, was found to be highly compliant with the provision of the 
Directive  2012/34  on  establishing  a  single  European  Railway  Area  (Annex  VII).  The  only  point  of  non-
compliance concern provision 16. 

No traffic management rules for TCR planning are described in the 2024 NS of SNCF Réseau. Each TCR 
is planned with different organisation and planning linked to the type of TCR, allowed budget and line traffic 
level per period. Only safety rules are applicable for the IM workers managing the TCR implementation 

Highly  used  by  the  international  rail  freight  traffic  connecting  Spain  to  Germany  and  freight  cross  border 
traffic connecting France to Germany via the Atlantic & Mediterranean  RFC, this line section (250 km) is 
also  used  by  high-speed  passenger  traffic  connecting  Paris  to  Mannheim,  regional  passenger  traffic  in 
France  and  suburban  traffic in Germany.  TCR  planned  by  both IMs  for  regular  maintenance (FR)  or line 
performance upgrade (DE) needing total line closure have an important impact on rail traffic, even some 
rerouting options are currently delivered to the RUs. 

Modane Valley 
traffic 
disruption 
(2019) 

On  July  3rd,  2019,  after  a  long  period  of  heavy  raining  conditions,  an  important  mudslide  has  partly 
destroyed  the  rail  line  Montmélian-Modane  in  the  Maurienne  Valley  (France),  blocking  the  access  to  the 
Fréjus  tunnel  and  interrupting  the  connection  between  Italy  and  France  for  20  days.  In  this  occasion  the 
International Contingency Management (ICM) Guidelines were implemented for the first time by the RFC 
Mediterranean to manage stakeholders’ coordination and mitigate the impact. 

Modane Valley 
traffic 
disruption 
(2023) 

On  August  27th,  2023,  an  important  rockslide  has  destroyed  the  rail  line  Montmélian-Modane  in  the 
Maurienne  Valley  (France)  and  damaged  the  adjacent  highway.  The  line  is  expected  to  reopen  by  the 
middle  of  November  2024,  after  the  mountainside  has  been  secured  and  the  line  reconstructed. 
Concurrently,  as  traffic  on  the  highway  was  cancelled  for  13  days,  the  maintenance  period  of  the  Mont 
Blanc Road tunnel (used as road alternative itinerary) was postponed. 

68 Source: IRG- 12th Annual Market Monitoring Report, published in March 2024. 

69 Source: SNCF Réseau 

70 Source: SNCF Réseau 

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Germany 

The  German  Railway  Network  spans  38,836  km  of  standard  gauge  (1,435  mm)  tracks,  with  21,360  km  (55%)  electrified  as  of  2022.  The 
overhead  electrification  system  used  is  15  kV,  16.5  Hz.  The  IM  for  the  network  is  DB  InfraGO,  a  100%  subsidiary  of  Deutsche  Bahn  AG. 
Passenger  transport  is  divided  between  two  entities:  long-distance  services  are  managed  by  DB  Long-Distance  (DB  Fernverkehr  AG),  while 
regional transport is handled by DB Regional (DB Regio AG)71. Freight transport is managed by DB Cargo. Germany's rail network is part of four 
Rail Freight Corridors: RFC 1, RFC 3, RFC 4, and RFC 8.  

Germany  consolidates  all  infrastructure-related  agreements  with  the  government  into  a  single  document  called  the  Performance  and 
Financing  Agreement  (LuFV)72.  This  agreement  governs  the  relationship  between  the  Federal  Government  and  Deutsche  Bahn  for  the 
maintenance and replacement of the railway infrastructure managed by Deutsche Bahn’s infrastructure companies.  On January 1, 2020, the 
third LuFV was signed, allocating 86 billion euros for replacement investments and the maintenance of the existing rail network over ten years 
(2020-2029).  The  ten-year  term  provides  increased  planning  security  for  Deutsche  Bahn  (DB)  and  the  construction  industry.  This  allows 
construction and planning companies to build up future capacities and establish long-term agreements with suppliers. 

The railway sector in Germany includes 133 freight railway companies and 54 passenger railway companies  and 230 freight and passenger 
companies73. High-speed services are provided by DB Fernverkehr AG, with the high-speed network extending 1,571 km as of 2021. 

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

Compliance 
with 2012/34/EU 
Directive 

Traffic 
management 
rules for TCR 
planning 

Case studies 

TCR 
Coordination on 
Woippy-
Mannheim line 

Upgrade works 
for the German 
section of 
Betuwe line 

The  2024  NS  of  DB  InfraGo  was  found  to  be  highly  compliant  with  the  provision  of  the  Directive  2012/34  on 
establishing a single European Railway Area (Annex VII). The only points of non-compliance concern provisions 12, 14 
and 17.  

TCR  regulations  are  not  governed  within  the  DB  NS  but  are  instead  referenced  in  the  rulebook  (RIL  402).  Full 
implementation of Annex VII is expected to be achieved in calendar year 2027 for the timetable 2028.   

Traffic is always allowed when a TCR is in place in the following instances: 

• 

Traffic is allowed on the tracks in proximity of tracks affected by works if capacity reduces to 30% from its 
nominal, when the construction is done in single track/tunnel.  

•  On  double-lane  track,  the  level  of  capacity  depends  on  the  line  specific  section  length  and  mode  of 

operation 

Highly  used  by  the  international  rail  freight  traffic  connecting  Spain  to  Germany  and  freight  cross  border  traffic 
connecting France to Germany via the Atlantic & Mediterranean RFC, this line section (250 km) is also used by high-
speed  passenger  traffic  connecting  Paris  to  Mannheim,  regional  passenger  traffic  in  France  and  suburban  traffic  in 
Germany. TCR planned by both IMs for regular maintenance (FR) or line performance upgrade (DE) needing total line 
closure have an important impact on rail traffic, even some rerouting options are currently delivered to the RUs. 

The  Emmerich–Oberhausen  line  is  an  important  section  of  European  freight  traffic  with  a  length  of  around  73 
kilometres. It is an important piece of the puzzle in the freight corridor from Rotterdam to Genoa. Due to the increase 
in  freight  and  passenger  traffic  in  recent  years,  the  line  has  reached  its  performance  limit.  To  take  account  of  this 
development,  IM  will  make  extensive  structural  changes  to  the  line  over  the  next  few  years.  The  upgrade  requires 
complicated  and  different  TCR  types  (short  and  longer  closures,  single  track  operations,  etc.)  and  possible  lesson 
learned and impacts on international and local freight, international high-speed and local passenger traffic at the same 
time. To increase line capacity, three track expansion and modernisation of control and safety technologies are carried 
out. 

71 DB Fernverkehr AG (deutschebahn.com) 

72 Source: EBA, Available at Link 

73 ERA Railway Factsheets | European Union Agency for Railways (europa.eu) 

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Germany 

DB InfraGo 
programme-
High 
performance 
network 

The IM is expanding the currently heavily used network into a high-performance network over the next 5 years. A total 
of 40 route sections with a total length of more than 4,000 kilometres will undergo a general overhaul in the coming 
years. The objective is to improve the levels of punctuality that have decreased in the past years. This means that from 
the  middle  of  2024,  all  the  necessary  construction  work  will  be  done  within  this  closure.  As  a  result,  no  major 
construction  work  will  then  be  necessary  for  several  years.  In  addition  to  renewing  the  infrastructure,  the  general 
refurbishment also includes the modernisation of stations and, in many cases, digitalisation on the respective section. 

Brenner Axis 

German-Dutch 
border on the 
two alternative 
routes via Venlo 
and Emmerich 

Section south 
of Sweden and 
north of 
Germany 
passing 
through 
Denmark 

Rhine Valley - 
Total closure 
Rastatt – 
Baden-Baden 

The  Brenner  Axis  is  the  most  important  Alpine  pass  for  freight  transport,  connecting  Italy  to  Austria  and  Germany, 
with a daily capacity of 100 freight trains. The line (Verona – Munich) is managed by three IMs  (RFI, DB InfraGo and 
ÖBB-Infra) and it is part of the RFC 3. The coordination amongst the 3 IMs and railway stakeholders related but not 
limited to TCRs takes place in the “Brenner working group”, which is considered a best practice in Europe. 

The RFC Rhine-Alpine branches off into two lines near the Germany-Netherlands border, a Southern line 
passes through Venlo, while a Northern line passes through Emmerich. Temporary Capacity restrictions in 
one of these lines is typically rerouted through the other. 

Denmark is a pivotal country in the interchanges between the Northern Europe countries: on the one hand 
it  is  the  access  point  to  continental  Europe  for  Sweden  and  Norway,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  traffic 
towards  the  north  of  Germany  and  Europe  crosses  Denmark.  Therefore,  TCRs  in  Denmark  can  have  a 
major  impact  on  the  rail  traffic  at  the  EU  level.  The  coordination  between  the  3  IMs  is  fundamental  as 
there are not rerouting options in this section of the RFC. 

German Rhine Valley Railway on the Basel-Karlsruhe line will be completely closed in August 2024, with major impacts 
on Swiss rail traffic. Germany and DB InfraGO are making substantial investments in the expansion of the Rhine Valley 
Railway,  a  vital  rail  corridor.  The  four-track  expansion  of  the  approximately  200-kilometre-long  line  is  expected  to 
amount to EUR 14.2 billion in investments and aims to be completed by 2041. The total closure scheduled from 9th to 
30th August 2024 is  part of the ongoing construction  work for the  four-lane expansion of  the Rhine Valley  Railway. 
During this period, the focus will be on completing the southern connection of the Rastatt Tunnel.  

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Hungary 

The Hungarian Railway Network covers 7,907 km, with 3,241 km (41%) electrified as of 202274. The national railway company and 
IM is Hungarian State Railways, Magyar Államvasutak (MÁV). Rail Cargo Hungaria Zrt., a member of the Rail Cargo Group, is part 
of  one  of  Europe's  leading  rail  freight  companies.  Formerly  MÁV  Cargo  Freight  Ltd.  since  2006,  it  was  acquired  by  Rail  Cargo 
Austria  AG  in  2008  and  renamed  Rail  Cargo  Hungaria  Zrt.  in  2010.  MÁV-START  Zrt.  handles  essential  rail  passenger  transport 
activities. The Hungarian rail network is part of two Rail Freight Corridors: RFC 6 and RFC 7. 

The railway sector in Hungary includes 49 freight railway companies and 5 passenger railway companies75. As of 2022, Hungary 
does not have a dedicated operational high-speed network. 

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

Compliance 
with 2012/34/EU 
Directive 

The 2024 NS of MÁV, Hungarian IM, was found to be highly compliant with the provision of the Directive 
2012/34  on  establishing  a  single  European  Railway  Area  (Annex  VII).  The  only  points  of  non-compliance 
concern provisions 6, and 11b. 

Traffic 
management 
rules for TCR 
planning 

Case studies 

Renovation  of 
the  Budapest-
Hegyeshalom 
line (2023) 

Traffic is always allowed when a TCR is in place in the following instances: 

• 

• 

Traffic  is  allowed  on  the  tracks  in  proximity  of  tracks  affected  by  works  if  lines  are  equipped  to 
provide a simplified traffic service, traffic is operated with reduced station and track staff, involving 
the traffic controllers at the traffic control points and the train crew of the trains running, 
o  Trains with a speed of more than 80 km/h are not allowed on these lines. 

Traffic  in  both  ways  on  the  same  track  is  allowed  if  the  adequate  protection  system  in  case  the 
protection system is not active the maximum speed is reduced to 15 Km/h. 

The  Hungarian  railways  have  initiated  an  unplanned  TCR  event  to  have  upgradation  in  tracks  because  of 
screw  pullout  measurement.  This  event  was  urgent  to  be  conducted  and  in  turn  made  TCR  on  very  short 
notice. Two weeks of full closure and partial closure throughout the period was undertaken on the TCR. 

74 ERA Railway Factsheet - Hungary (europa.eu) 

75 ERA Railway Factsheets | European Union Agency for Railways (europa.eu) 

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Italy 

The Italian railway network extends for more than 18,000 km76 (as of 2022) and it is managed by 12 IMs77, most of the network (16,800 
km of lines) is managed by Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI). The company is owned by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) 
as part of the  holding  company  Ferrovie  dello  Stato. Most of the network  (12,100 km ,72%) is  electrified and it also includes a high-
speed network  (1,100 km). The Italian network  is also involved in 4 Rail  Freight  Corridors:  Rhine-Alphine (13% of the corridor is in 
Italy), Scandinavian-Mediterranean (12%), Baltic-Adriatic (15%) and Mediterranean (33%)78. 
The concession relationship between the IM and the Italian State (Ministry of Transport) is regulated by a 5 year-contract (Programme 
Contract, valid for the 2022-2026 period). Since 2013, the contract is composed by two documents: the Investment Programme Contract 
and  the  Services  Programme  Contract.  The  first  regulates  planning  and  financing  of  infrastructure  investments,  while  the  latter 
regulates the financing of ordinary and extraordinary maintenance activities as well as the financing of management costs. 

The  railway  sector  in  Italy  consists  of  21  freight  RUs  and  12  passenger  RUs,  6  both  passenger  and  freight  RUs,  with  two  of  them 
providing  high-speed  services77.  ANSFISA  (Autorità  Nazionale  per  la  Sicurezza  delle  Ferrovie  e  delle  Infrastrutture  Stradali  e 
Autostradali)  represents  the  national  safety  authority  in  Italy,  while  ART  (Autorità  di  Regolazione  dei  Trasporti)  represents  the 
national regulatory body. 

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

Compliance 
with 2012/34/EU 
Directive 

The  2024  NS  of  Rete  Ferroviaria  Italiana  (RFI),  the  Italian  IM,  was  found  to  be  highly  compliant  with  the 
provision  of  the  Directive  2012/34  on  establishing  a  single  European  Railway  Area  (Annex  VII).  The  only 
points of non-compliance concern provisions 7 and 14. 

Traffic 
management 
rules for TCR 
planning 

Case studies 

Brenner Axis 

Modane Valley 
traffic 
disruption 
(2019) 

Modane Valley 
traffic 
disruption 
(2023) 

Tunnel works 
on the Bologna-
Prato line 

Traffic is always allowed when a TCR is in place in the following instances: 

• 

Traffic is allowed on the tracks in proximity of tracks affected by works if: 

o  There is not clearance interference; 
o  The nearest free track is at a minimum distance depending on the train speed allowed on it 

(minimum 1,5 m at 140 km/h up to 2,7 m at 300 km/h). 

• 

Traffic  in  both  ways  on  the  same  track  is  allowed  if  the  adequate  protection  system  is  active  with 
maximum  speed  of  90Km/h,  in  case  the  protection  system  is  not  active  the  maximum  speed  is 
reduced to 30 Km/h. 

Otherwise, if the station is not equipped with banalised signal systems, traffic is allowed on the "illegal" track 
in case of unplanned events or special transports. 

The  Brenner  Axis  is  the  most  important  Alpine  pass  for  freight  transport,  connecting  Italy  to  Austria  and 
Germany,  with  a  daily  capacity  of  100  freight  trains.  The  line  (Verona  –  Munich)  is  managed  by  three  IMs  
(RFI, DB InfraGo and ÖBB-Infra) and it is part of the RFC 3. The coordination amongst the 3 IMs and railway 
stakeholders related but not limited to TCRs takes place in the “Brenner working group”, which is considered a 
best practice in Europe. 

On July 3rd, 2019, after a long period of heavy raining conditions, an important mudslide has partly destroyed 
the rail line Montmélian-Modane in the Maurienne Valley (France), blocking the access to the Fréjus tunnel 
and  interrupting  the  connection  between  Italy  and  France  for  20  days.  In  this  occasion  the  International 
Contingency  Management  (ICM)  Guidelines  were  applied  for  the  first  time  to  manage  stakeholders’ 
coordination and mitigate the impact.  

On  August  27th,  2023,  an  important  rockslide  has  destroyed  the  rail  line  Montmélian-Modane  in  the 
Maurienne Valley (France) and damaged the adjacent highway. The line is expected to reopen by the end of 
2024,  after  the  mountainside  has  been  secured  and  the  line  reconstructed.  Concurrently,  as  traffic  on  the 
highway was cancelled for  13  days,  the  maintenance  period of the  Mont  Blanc Road tunnel (used as  road 
alternative itinerary) was postponed. 

The Bologna-Prato line (part of the RFC 3) is being upgraded to allow trains up to 750 meters and with PC80 
load gauge. Almost 50% of the line run through tunnels that must be enlarged, while the overall technological 
equipment is modernised. The works, started in 2020 and to be completed by 2025, are carried out during a 
TCR of the line that take place mostly in the summer period. While complementary passenger services are 
offered, there are no viable rerouting options for freight. 

76 Source: IRG- 12th Annual Market Monitoring Report, published in March 2024. 
77 Source: ERA Railway Factsheet - Italy 
78 Source: RFI, “Piano commerciale 2023” – November 2023 Update, available here. 

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Netherlands 

The Netherlands Railway Network comprises 3,041 km, with 2,159 km (74%) electrified as of 2022, using standard gauge (1,435 mm). 
High-speed lines account for 3% of the total network. Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS), a state-owned company, is the principal passenger 
railway operator. ProRail, a Dutch government organisation and part of NS Railinfratrust, is responsible for maintaining and expanding 
the national railway infrastructure, allocating rail capacity, and controlling rail traffic. DB Cargo Netherlands is the largest freight service 
provider in the country79. 

The  railway  sector  in  the  Netherlands  includes  14  freight  railway  companies  and  8  passenger  railway  companies  and  7  freight  and 
passenger companies80. 

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

Compliance 
with 2012/34/EU 
Directive 

Traffic 
management 
rules for TCR 
planning 

Case studies 

German-Dutch 
border  on 
the 
two  alternative 
routes via Venlo 
and Emmerich 

The 2024 NS of Pro Rail, Netherland IM, was found to be low compliant with the provision of the Directive 
2012/34  on  establishing  a  single  European  Railway  Area  (Annex  VII).  The  only  points  of  non-compliance 
concern provisions 7, 11b, 11c, 12, 13, and 14. 

No specific information was found. 

 The RFC Rhine-Alpine branches off into two lines near the Germany-Netherlands border, a Southern line passes 
through Venlo, while a Northern line passes through Emmerich. Temporary Capacity restrictions in one of these 
lines is typically rerouted through the other. 

79 ProRail 2023 (jaarverslagprorail.nl) 

80 ERA Railway Factsheets | European Union Agency for Railways (europa.eu) 

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Poland 

Poland’s Railway Network spans 19,355 km, with 12,194 km (63%) electrified as of 2022. The network includes 387 km of high-speed 
lines, making up 2% of the total. The national electrification system operates at 3 kV DC. PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. manages the 
railway  infrastructure,  handling  track  maintenance,  train  operations,  scheduling,  and  railway  land  management.  PKP  CARGO 
INTERNATIONAL Group, part of the PKP CARGO Group, is a key rail freight transport provider in Europe81. The Polish rail network is 
part of two Rail Freight Corridors: RFC 5 and RFC 8.  

The railway sector in Poland includes 107 freight railway companies and 17 passenger railway companies and 17 freight and passenger 
companies82. 

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

Compliance 
with 2012/34/EU 
Directive 

Traffic 
management 
rules for TCR 
planning  

Case studies 

Poznań-Warsaw 
line 

The 2024 NS of Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A, Polish IM, was found to be highly compliant with the provision of 
the Directive 2012/34 on establishing a single European Railway Area (Annex VII). The only points of non-
compliance concern provisions 14, and 17. 

Traffic is always allowed when a TCR is in place in the following instances: 

• 

• 

• 

Traffic  is  allowed  on  the  tracks  in  proximity  of  tracks  affected  by  works  under  certain  safety 
conditions. 
Traffic  in  both  ways  on  the  same  track  is  allowed  if  the  adequate  protection  system  is  active  with 
reduced speed limits. 
In case the protection system is not active the maximum speed is limited, traffic commander shall 
send a telephonic message to the neighbouring signalling station and intermediate traffic stations. 

Otherwise, in case of only banalised signal systems, traffic is allowed when no protection system is equipped 
on the line. 

The  railway  line  connecting  Warsaw  with  Poznań  is  a  very  important  part  of  the  TEN-T  transport  corridor 
North Sea – Baltic. The reconstruction of the line will increase the capacity and allow for the passage of up to 
500 trains per day as well as a good combination of regional and interregional transport. The main objective 
of the reconstruction of the E20 railway line is to increase the capacity of the railway line by the installation of 
modern  railway  traffic  control  systems  and  the  modernisation  of  the  overhead  contact  line  and  the  power 
supply system. This will allow to expand the transport offer, improve travel safety, and comfort, and adapt the 
infrastructure to the technical requirements of the EU interoperability specifications by eliminating barriers for 
people with reduced mobility. 

Modernisation 
of  the  Warsaw 
West station 

The  modernisation  of  Warsaw  West  station  includes  replacing  30km  of  track,  130  switches  and  overhead 
electrification.  The  project  includes  the  construction  of  new  platforms  and  a  modernised  station  hall,  which 
will increase capacity and improve the comfort of travelling for passengers, as well as a new track layout. To 
have future connection between Warsaw West and Wola, new underground light rail platform is also planned 
to  build  at  level  -2.  The  project  was  planned  to  complete  by  end  of  2023  whereas  the  project  is  still  not 
completed and extended until end of 2024.  

81 About us | PKP CARGO INTERNATIONAL | Comprehensive transport and logistics services 

82 ERA Railway Factsheets | European Union Agency for Railways (europa.eu) 

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Romania 

The Romanian Railway Network consists of 10,615 km, with 4,034 km (38%) electrified as of 202283. There are no high-speed lines in 
the network. Compania Națională de Căi Ferate (CFR) manages the infrastructure of the Romanian railway network, including various 
private  infrastructure  components.  CFR  Călători  handles  passenger  services,  while  SNTFM  CFR  Marfă  SA  is  the  national  operator  for 
domestic and international railway freight transport. The Romanian rail network is part of Rail Freight Corridor 7 (RFC 7).  

The  rail  sector  in  Romania  includes  31  freight  railway  companies  and  5  passenger  railway  companies  and  3  freight  and  passenger 
companies84. 

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

Compliance with 
2012/34/EU 
Directive 

Traffic 
management 
rules for TCR 
planning 

Case studies 

Reconstruction 
works  on 
Arad-Simeria 
section 

the 

The 2024 NS of CFR, Romanian IM, was found to be highly compliant with the provision of the Directive 
2012/34  on  establishing  a  single  European  Railway  Area  (Annex  VII).  The  only  points  of  non-compliance 
concern provisions 3. 

Traffic is always allowed when a TCR is in place in the following instances: 

• 

Traffic is allowed on the tracks in proximity of tracks affected by works in case of double lines of 
the  public  railway  infrastructure,  scheduled  works  will  be  carried  out  with  total  closure  on  one  of 
the lines and traffic would be allowed on the adjacent tracks. 

An example of an interesting case on RFC 7 and RFC 9 is the reconstruction works on the Arad–Simeria 
section  which  requires  use  of  alternative  routes  and  continuous  closures  on  one  track  of  the  two  with 
different  duration.  Use  of  alternative  routes  cause  major  operational  challenges  for  the  RUs  and  are 
affected by ILB issues.   

83 https://cfr.ro/ 

84 ERA Railway Factsheets | European Union Agency for Railways (europa.eu) 

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Slovenia 

The  Slovenian  Railway  Network  covers  1,208  km,  with  608  km  (50%)  electrified  as  of  2022,  using  standard  gauge  (1,435  mm). 
There are no high-speed lines in the network. Electrification is provided by a 3 kV DC system. Slovenske železnice - Infrastruktura 
manages  and  maintains  the  railway  infrastructure  and  oversees  railway  traffic85.  Slovenske  železnice,  the  state-owned  railway 
company,  operates  rail  passenger  services  for  domestic,  cross-border  (regional),  and  international  public  transport.  SŽ-Tovorni 
promet manages freight services in Slovenia. The Slovenian rail network is part of Rail Freight Corridor 6 (RFC 6). The rail sector in 
Slovenia includes 7 freight railway companies and 1 passenger railway companies and 1 freight and passenger companies86. 

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

Compliance 
with 2012/34/EU 
Directive 

The 2024 NS of SŽ-Infrastruktura, slovenian IM, was found to be  medium compliant with the provision of 
the Directive 2012/34 on establishing a single European Railway Area (Annex VII). The only points of non-
compliance concern provisions 7, 8, 11, 11a, 11b, 11c, 12, 13, 16 and 17. 

Traffic 
management 
rules for TCR 
planning 

Case studies 

Divača-Koper 
(2023) 

Traffic is always allowed when a TCR is in place in the following instances: 

• 

• 

• 

Traffic  is  allowed  on  the  tracks  in  proximity  of  tracks  affected  by  works  under  certain  safety 
conditions. 
Traffic  in  both  ways  on  the  same  track  is  allowed  if  the  adequate  protection  system  is  active  with 
protection systems and auxiliary telecommunication facilities, but no mention of speed limit. 
In  case  the  protection  system  is  not  active,  traffic  would  be  allowed  with  no  protection  system  as 
well, but no mention of line speed. 

Otherwise, in case of only banalised signal systems, traffic is allowed with irregular operation (train running 
on  wrong  track  of  double  line)  is  introduced  over  several  interstation  sections,  trains  may  pass  through 
intermediate stations not equipped with main signals for irregular operation at a maximum speed of 50 km/h. 

The  railway  line  connects  the  city  of  Divača  with  the  port  of  Koper  (Slovenia),  a  new  track  is  under 
construction, which will double the available capacity and reduce travel times. For this reason, in the last few 
years,  the  historic  line  the  is  completely  closed  2  Mondays  per  month  (from  7  AM  to  17  PM)  and  for  four 
consecutive days in multiple occasions during 2023. 

85 SŽ-Infrastruktura - Infrastruktura (sz.si) 

86 ERA Railway Factsheets | European Union Agency for Railways (europa.eu) 

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Sweden 

The Swedish railway network extends for more than 10,000 km (as of 2023). Trafikverket is the national agency responsible for long-
term  infrastructure  planning  for  transport:  road,  rail,  shipping,  and  aviation.  It  owns,  constructs,  operates,  and  maintains  all  state-
owned roads and railways. 

The railway sector in Italy consists of 27 freight RUs and 15 passenger RUs, 6 both passenger and freight RUs. 

Transportstyrelsen represents the national safety authority in Sweden and also the national regulatory body. 

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

Compliance 
with 2012/34/EU 
Directive 

Traffic 
management 
rules for TCR 
planning 

Case studies 

Section 
south 
of  Sweden  and 
north 
of 
Germany 
passing 
through 
Denmark 

The 2024 NS of Trafikverket, the analysed Swedish IM, was found to be highly compliant with the provision 
of the Directive 2012/34 on establishing a single European Railway Area (Annex VII). The only point of non-
compliance concern provisions 7. 

No detailed information was found.  

Denmark is a pivotal country in the interchanges between the Northern Europe countries: on the one hand it is the 
access point to continental Europe for Sweden and Norway, and on the other hand the  traffic towards the north of 
Germany and Europe crosses Denmark. Therefore, TCRs in Denmark can have a major impact on the rail traffic at the 
EU level. The coordination between the 3 IMs is fundamental as there are not rerouting options in this section of the 
RFC. 

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Spain 

The Spanish railway network extends for almost 15,860 km87 and is managed by 2 state-owner companies (IMs), namely Adif and Adif 
AV. Both companies are owned by the Spanish Government and represented by the Ministry of Transport and Sustainable Mobility. Most 
of the network (10,272 km, 65%) is electrified and 2,629km, 17% is ERTMS/ETCS-enabled. Most of the network is conventional (10,200 
Km, 65%) with Iberian gauge (1,668mm distance between both rails), while the high-speed network is composed of both Iberian and 
European standard gauges (1,435mm). The railway IM participates in two European Rail Freight Corridors - Atlantic and Mediterranean 
– according to Regulations in force. The number of RUs operating in Spain is 1488. 
Since  the  end of  2022,  Spain  has  experienced  the  liberalisation  of  the  rail  market,  which  for  the  first  time in  Europe  has  led  to  three 
competing operators in the same high-speed corridor. Spain chose to adopt a mixed model between competition in the market (where 
several railway companies compete freely on the same terms), and competition for the market (a concessionary regime).  

The figures from CNMC (Spanish Regulatory Body) Report reveals a marked transformation evidenced by the traffic evolution figures 
and the shift in modal share, associated with the entry of new operators. 

• 

• 

• 

The number of passengers grew from 10 million to 31 million passengers; and traffic (trains per km) grew more than 30% in 
2022 and more than 40% during 2023. 
The introduction of IRYO, OUIGO, and AVLO (RENFE) has enabled the diversification of high-speed rail services’ commercial 
offerings through innovative fare structures, reductions in average around 40%. 
Consumers  are  the  main  beneficiaries  of  the  liberalisation  process,  with  an  increase  in  their  surplus  estimated  at  EUR  343 
million. 

•  ADIF Alta Velocidad experienced a significant increase in revenue from railway charges on liberalised corridors. Specifically, 

their income rose by EUR 148 million (a 52% increase) compared to 2019. 

Area 1 - Implementation of EU legislation and related barriers 

Compliance 
with 2012/34/EU 
Directive 

Case studies 

Case 7#  

The  2024 NS of Adif,  the  analysed Spanish IM,  was  found  to be  highly  compliant with  the  provision of  the 
Directive 2012/34 on establishing a single European Railway Area (Annex VII).  

Capacity constraints at Atocha Station in Madrid prevented the increase in train services at Atocha after the 
liberalisation  of  rail  passenger  services  in  Spain.  In  this  regard,  ADIF  AV  (Spanish  IM)  opted  to  transfer 
passenger services in the Levante corridor (i.e., the Mediterranean Corridor) between Madrid and Valencia 
from  Atocha  to  Chamartín  station,  thus  shifting  capacity  from  one  station.  The  shift  between  stations  in 
Madrid would occur following works at Chamartín station, namely ensuring track gauge change, as well as 
works to open a tunnel between both stations in Madrid. 
OUIGO Spain filed a formal complaint against ADIF Alta Velocidad (the Spanish Infrastructure Manager) and 
Renfe,  alleging  capacity  modifications  before  prior  authorisation  from  the  regulatory  body,  the  Comision 
nacional de los mercados y la competencia (CNMC). OUIGO claimed that the change did not follow the rules 
set out in the framework agreements for the allocation of rail infrastructure capacity and that ADIF AV failed 
to properly inform on the delays in construction works at Chamartín station with prior notice. 
Nonetheless, the changes in capacity allocation between both stations in Madrid was only communicated 2 
months prior, even though Directive 2017/2075 stipulates that such changes should be made at least within 
4 months of the change.  
CNMC  concluded89  that  Adif  and  Adif  AV,  the  Spanish  IM,  breached  Annex  VII  of  the  Delegated  Decision 
2017/2075 by neglecting to sufficiently inform the RUs about the TCRs' timing and content. CNMC's verdict 
stated that Adif typically notifies TCR to operators 2-3 months ahead, without accounting for the commercial 
impact. 

87 Source: IRG- 12th Annual Market Monitoring Report, published in March 2024. 

88 Source: IRG- 12th Annual Market Monitoring Report, published in March 2024. 

89 Source: https://www.cnmc.es/expedientes/stpdtsp03421 

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ANNEX 7 – QUANTITATIVE DATA EXCEL FILE 

The report with the full results of the online consultation is internal. 

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ANNEX 8 – METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 

As  presented  in  the  technical  offer,  Area  4  assesses  the  costs  and  benefits  (monetising  as  far  as  possible)  of  the 
potential measures identified in Areas 1 and 2 to improve the reliability and stability of TCR planning. This assessment 
is expected to result in the ranking of the identified measures based on the best ratio between costs and benefits.  

The following table provides an overview of the data points to be collected in Area 4, listing the related indicators and 
the type of data (quantitative vs qualitative), as well as the level in which we will conduct the data collection (MSs vs 
RFC level).  

Table 17 - Data points for Area 4 

Data point 

Data indicators 

Type 
of 
(Quantitative 
qualitative) 

data 
or 

Level 
data 
of 
collection (MSs vs RFC 
level) 

Costs  and  benefits  of  potential 
measures 
the 
situation 

improve 

to 

N. of person-days spent to harmonise TCR activities by IMs and RFC 

Quantitative 

MSs and RFC 

Cost (in €) to guarantee alternative routes which are not necessary for 
regular traffic (i.e., coordination activities, cost of rerouting) 

Quantitative 

MSs and RFC 

Revenue loss (in €) due to TCR 

Quantitative 

MSs and RFC 

Loss of capacity (in terms of train-km or freight/passenger-km) due to 
TCR 

Quantitative 

MSs and RFC 

Costs  of  provision  of  pre-planned  TCR  timetables,  use  of  software, 
for 
provision  of  additional 
diversionary routes 

traction/traction  with  equipment 

Quantitative 

MSs and RFC 

Time  savings  (in  days)  in  traffic  due  to  planned  and  executed 
maintenance activities 

Quantitative 

MSs and RFC 

Information gathered throughout the course of the study (through desk research, the targeted survey and focus groups) enables 
to collect the following information90.    

Table 18 - Evidence from the case studies 

Case study 

RUs  traffic  losses  due 
to TCR 

Loss 
Revenue 
Incurred  by  RU 
due to TCR 

additional 
RUs 
costs 
to 
due 
rerouting per train   

IMs 
losses  due 
TCR  

revenue 
to 

1: Brenner axe 

No data yet available 

2:  TCR  impact  on  TTR  pilot  on  Atlantic  RFC 
(section Metz-Mannheim) 

About 5% losses 

No 
available 

data 

No 
available 

data 

yet 

yet 

No 
available 

data 

No 
available 

data 

yet 

yet 

data 

No 
available 

data 

No 
available 

yet 

yet 

3:  Rehabilitation  works  on 
section* 

the  Arad–Simeria 

10%  decrease  in  the 
number 
trains, 
of 
240,000 tkm in volume 

15% of revenue loss 

EUR 
500/train, 
energy  costs  EUR 
1,000/train 

EUR 4M 

4:  Upgrade  works  for  the  German  section  of 
Betuwe line 

No data yet available 

No 
available 

data 

yet 

10 - 20% per loco 

data 

No 
available 

yet 

5:  Ventimiglia  border  connecting  Italy  and  France 
(2023) 

No data yet available 

No 
available 

data 

6: Modernisation of the Var saw West station 

No data yet available 

No 
available 

data 

yet 

yet 

to 

4000  to  5000  €  / 
train 
(15 
20€/addit 
tr.km  via  Southern 
FR,  25  to  35  €/addit 
tr.km via DE & CH) 
No 
data 
available 

yet 

data 

No 
available 

yet 

data 

No 
available 

yet 

90  Please  note  that  the  information  is  only  presented  for  the  years  xx  –  yy  due  to  lack  of  more  granular  data.  Data  has  been 
extrapolated whenever possible to ensure that the data is representative of most TCR cases experienced in the EU-27 and CH. 

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7:  German-Dutch  border  on  the  two  alternative 
routes via Venlo and Emmerich 

No data yet available 

No 
available 

data 

yet 

No 
available 

data 

yet 

data 

No 
available 

8:  Renovation  of  the  Budapest-Hegyeshalom  line 
(2023) 

No data yet available 

Around EUR 1M 

Additional 
drivers, 
energy costs 

train 
loco  and 

9:  Works  in  the  HS  station  of  Madrid  Puerta  de 
Atocha (2020) 

No data yet available 

10:  Divača  
-Koper (2023) 

No data yet available 

11: Tunnel works on the Bologna-Prato line (2020-
2025) 

No data yet available 

No 
available 

data 

yet 

No 
available 

data 

Approx 
EUR/day of TCR 

200,000 

No 
available 

data 

No 
available 

data 

yet 

No 
available 

data 

yet 

yet 

yet 

data 

No 
available 

data 

No 
available 

data 

No 
available 

data 

No 
available 

yet 

yet 

yet 

yet 

yet 

to 

yet 

4000  to  7000  €  / 
train 
(15 
20€/addit 
tr.km  via  Southern 
FR,  25  to  35  €/addit 
tr.km via DE & CH) 
No 
data 
available 
Additional 
drivers 
international 
rerouting fees 
No 
available 
No 
available 

train 
and 

data 

data 

yet 

yet 

data 

No 
available 

yet 

data 

No 
available 

yet 

Limited  to  freight 
and  long-distance 
trains 

data 

No 
available 
No 
available 

data 

yet 

yet 

12: Modane disruption study (2019) 

No data yet available 

EUR 4.5 M 

13: Infrastructure works in Bulgaria (2023) 

No data yet available 

No 
available 

data 

yet 

14:  DB  InfraGo  programme  -  High  performance 
network (2023) 

Marginal 

Marginal 

15: Poznań-Warsaw line 

16: Section south of Sweden and north of Germany 
passing through Denmark 

17:  Rhine-Valley  –  Total  closure  Rasttatt  –  Baden-
Baden   

18: Arlberg line  

No data yet available 

No data yet available 

30-40%  capacity  loss 
for  passenger 
lines. 
50%  capacity  loss  for 
freight lines.  

reduction 

in 
25-30% 
for 
capacity 
international 
long-
distance services at the 
Basel border 

19: TCR coordination on the Brussels – Namur line 

No data yet available 

20: Ostrava and BřeclavBřeclav 

No data yet available 

No 
available 
No 
available 

data 

data 

yet 

yet 

3  million  euros  for 
passenger  services. 
No 
information 
received  for  freight 
services. 

Significant 
revenue 
losses due to TCR in 
the  summer  pick 
season 

No 
available 

data 

No 
available 

data 

yet 

yet 

No 
available 

data 

yet 

data 

No 
available 

yet 

400  euros  per  train 
(passenger lines) 

data 

No 
available 

yet 

€/train 

for 
4000 
diesel 
locomotive 
needed  on  57  km 
via France 
No 
available 

data 

yet 

data 

No 
available 

data 

No 
available 

yet 

yet 

TCR projects aim to improve the efficiency of the rail sector in cases where there is a need to perform structural changes on the 
existing infrastructure. This concerns a set of measures and procedures that can be implemented in these cases, to  minimise 
disturbance and increase the attractiveness of the rail mode. In most of the cases, there is no investment costs associated to 
TCR, but rather operational efficiency gains primarily affecting the operating costs and travel time of RUs, which require some 
adaptations to the typical Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) usually performed for infrastructure projects.  

The estimation of impacts included a qualitative and a quantitative analysis. The first comprised the description of TCR changes 
along with the identification of expected qualitative impacts. The quantitative analysis translates the savings that elapse from 
changes in TCR in time and costs (resource cost savings) including items identified and collected in Area 3, notably: 

•  Capacity; 
•  Revenue (freight and passenger); 
•  Rerouting cost caused by TCR; 
• 
Total services (k train-km) ; 
• 
Total infrastructure maintenance, renewal, and upgrade expenditures; 
•  Modal split. 

It is also worth noting that all estimates were calculated for the 2025-2050 period. Considering that measures may start to be 
applied as of 2025. Costs and benefits were calculated considering the categories of costs for Impact Assessments, in line with 
the  Commission’s  Better  Regulation  Toolbox.  Considering  that  any  costs  and  cost-savings  should  be  estimated  separately  for 
businesses and administrations. 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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ANNEX 9 – SOURCES FOR DESK RESEARCH 

In the following table, we provide the list of sources to be consulted for each task, and their potential application within the study. Please note that such a list will be further 
expanded throughout the implementation of the desk research activities. 

Data sources 

Potential application 

Area 1  Area 2  Area 3  Area 4 

Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2017/2025 

Reg. (EU) 913/2010 

Annex V of Directive 2012/34/EU 

Network statements 

National TCR planning processes 

National rules on planning priorities by train types 

Corridor Information Documents 

To verify the compliance of NS 

To verify the compliance of CID 

To  verify  the  compliance  of  the  contractual  agreements  between  IMs 
and MSs 

✓ 

✓ 

✓ 

To gather information on the TCR planning 

✓  ✓ 

To  identify  inconsistencies  and  contradictions  between  neighbouring 
countries in TCR planning  

To  identify  inconsistencies  and  contradictions  between  neighbouring 
countries in TCR planning 

✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 

✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 

To  gather  information  on  the  coordination  and  information  publishing 
activities implemented by RFC  

✓  ✓ 

TCRs timetables and tools of each RFC 

To verify how TCRs are planned and communicated 

✓  ✓  ✓ 

European Court of Auditors (2017). ‘A single European rail traffic management system: 
will the political choice ever become reality?’91 

To gather information on ERTMS costs 

✓ 

IRG-Rail (2021). Overview of the implementation of current rules relating to Temporary 
Capacity Restrictions under Delegated Decision (EU) 2017/2075 

To gather information on the compliance with the Delegated Decision 

✓  ✓  ✓ 

ERADIS – European Railway Agency Database of Interoperability and Safety92 

To gather data on railway accidents 

✓  ✓  ✓ 

RNE  (2022).  Guidelines  for  Coordination  /  Publication  of  Planned  Temporary  Capacity 
Restrictions for the European Railway Network93 

To gather information on how TCRs are planned and coordinated 

✓ 

FTE,  ALLRAIL,  ERFA  (2022)  Position paper  on  how  to  optimise  TCR  processes  to 
strengthen rail transport in Europe 

To gather information on proposals by industry representatives on the 
optimisation of TCR processes 

✓  ✓ 

Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  seventh 
monitoring report on the development of the rail market under Article 15(4) of Directive 
2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (2021) 

To gather data and knowledge on the rail market across Europe 

✓ 

Annual Performance Reports of RFCs 

Network Statements 

To gather quantitative data on the issues affecting RFCs 

✓  ✓ 

To gather data on the methodologies of the planning of the TCRs 

✓  ✓ 

91 Available at: https://op.europa.eu/webpub/eca/special-reports/ertms-rail-13-2017/en/ 
92 Available at: https://eradis.era.europa.eu/ 
93 Available at: https://rne.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/TCR-Guidelines.pdf 

106 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Contractual agreements between IM and MS 

To explore the rules regulating the relationship between the MS and the 
IM on TCR planning 

✓  ✓  ✓ 

National/IMs rules on traffic management on double tracks lines 

To explore the rules regulating traffic in the case of double track lines 

✓  ✓ 

DG TREN (2010) “Best practice guide for Railway Network Statements” 

To deepen the knowledge on the Railway NSs 

✓ 

RNE (2019) Overview of priority rules in operation 

To gather information on the priority rules applied by IM 

RNE  (2019)  Guidelines  for  Coordination  /  Publication  of  Planned  Temporary  Capacity 
Restrictions for the European Railway Network, Version 3.00 

To gather information on how IMs and other stakeholders affected and 
involved in TCR handle TCR 

✓  ✓ 

✓  ✓ 

CER  Position  Paper  (2022)  Reducing  the  negative  impact  of  Temporary  Capacity 
Restrictions 

Railway  Infrastructure  Maintenance  -  A  Survey  of  Planning  Problems  and  Conducted 
Research 

To explore industry’s ideas on solving the problems related to TCRs 

✓ 

To  have  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  railway  infrastructure 
maintenance  field,  the  planning  problems  it  contains  and  the  research 
that has been conducted so far 

RNE Description of the Timetabling and Capacity Redesign Process 

To gather knowledge on the state of the Timetable redesign process 

IM Capacity Strategy 

To gather knowledge on the long-term plan of maintenance of IM 

CER (2023) Rail infrastructure capacity and traffic management: implementation of TTR 
and DCM 

To gather knowledge on the industry proposals to maximise passenger 
and freight traffic 

Ljubaj and Mlinarić (2019) The Possibility of Utilising Maximum Capacity of the Double-
Track Railway by Using Innovative Traffic Organisation 

To gather information on the academic point of view on management of 
traffic on double track lines 

✓  ✓ 

✓  ✓ 

✓ 

✓  ✓ 

✓  ✓ 

EU Analysis accompanying the impact assessment for the revision of Regulation (EU) N° 
1315/2013  on  Union  guidelines  for  the  development  of  the  trans-European  transport 
network 

Timetable Redesign for Smart Capacity Management, RNE, Extended Brochure94 

European  Rail 

Infrastructure  Managers  Handbook 

for 

International  Contingency 

Management, RailNetEurope95  

RNE Annual RFC KPIs 

RNE (2023) TCR Webtool Manual96 

To gather knowledge on the strategic goals of the RFC corridors 

✓ 

✓ 

To gather information on how IMs and other stakeholders affected and 
involved in TCR handle TCR 

To gather information on how IMs and other stakeholders affected and 
involved in TCR handle TCR 

✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 

✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 

To gather knowledge of the KPIs used 

✓  ✓ 

To gather knowledge of how IM and RU plan and are affected by TCR 

✓ 

94 Available at: https://rne.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/TTR_Extended_Brochure_2022-2.pdf 
95 Available at: https://rne.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ICM_Handbook.pdf 
96 Available at: https://rne.eu/wp-content/uploads/TCR-Tool-User_manual-v4.3.pdf 

107 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Annex  10  -  High  level  cost-benefit  analysis  of  the 
measures to improve the current situation 

Area 4 assesses the costs and benefits (monetising as far as possible) of the potential measures identified 
in  Areas  1,  2  and  3  to  improve  the  reliability  and  stability  of  TCR  planning.  The  main  objective  of  this 
section  is  to  critically  assess  and  quantify  the  economic  impacts  on  rail  stakeholders  of  TCR 
measures  identified  in  Areas  1,  2  and  3.  The  economic  analysis  aims  to  improve  the  current 
situation by highlighting the main issues affecting rail competitiveness, enhancing resilience in traffic 
across  the  EU  and  improving  the  efficiency  of  the  rail  sector.  All  costs  and  benefits  were  estimated 
considering  their  impact  in  the  2025-2050  period,  considering  that  measures  may  be  applied  as  of 
2025.  The  methodological  approach  used  for  estimating  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  measures 
proposed is presented in Annex 8. 

The  cost–benefit  calculations  presented  in  this  study  concentrate  mainly  on  administrative  savings—
specifically, the staff time and coordination effort that IMs and RUs would avoid under a coordinated and 
harmonised  TCR  regime.  During  the  data-gathering  phase  (desk  research,  interviews  and  case  studies), 
information  on  administrative  expenditure  was  markedly  more  available  and  reported  than  detailed 
operational  data.  Consequently,  administrative  cost-savings  could  be  quantified  with  a  high  degree  of 
confidence.  Nevertheless,  several  measures  also  give  rise  to  considerable  operational  (adjustment)  cost-
savings—including Measures 2, 3, and 5, these operational benefits have been monetised as it follows. 

For  the  remaining  measures  where  operational  impacts  could  not  be  fully  monetised,  evidence  gathered 
from  stakeholders  suggests  that  the  resulting  gains  in  cost  reduction  and  network  productivity  will,  at  a 
minimum,  mirror—and  in  many  cases  exceed—the  administrative  savings  already  identified.  The  results 
presented  should  therefore  be  viewed  as  conservative  lower-bound  estimates.  The  aggregate  economic 
benefit of the measures is expected to rise beyond the current estimates, capturing not only administrative 
efficiencies  but  also  the  broader  operational  improvements  that  will  enhance  industry  productivity  and 
competitiveness. 

The  table  in  Annex  8  provides  a  list  of  quantitative  indicators  collected  in  the  present  study,  listing  the 
related  indicators  and  the  type  of  data  (quantitative  vs  qualitative),  as  well  as  the  level  in  which  we  will 
conduct the data collection (MSs vs RFC level)97. 

For TCRs, the main issues under evaluation are targeted to the identification and quantification of the 
impacts of the harmonisation of procedures between RUs and IMs, and the impacts of administrative 
measures.  A  list  of  quantifiable  and  most  relevant  measures  identified  to  improve  the  reliability  and 
stability of TCR planning and which is within the scope of the analysis can be presented as follows. 

1.  A dedicated entity should be tasked to ensure a consistent level of compliance to the provision of 
the European TCR regulatory framework as well as the monitoring of the TCR process in Europe.  
2.  Establishment  of  an  internationally  harmonised  process  that  defines  the  timing,  the  format,  and 
the  methods  (i.e.,  systems  and  tools)  through  which  IMs’  offering  of  internationally  agreed 
rerouting options during the TCRs are made available. 

3.  The TCR coordination process should be supported by appropriate methodologies and tools (see 
Area 2 conclusion) to structure appropriate dialogue between IMs, RUs, and end customers as well 

97 We have carried out research on the data points proposed in the inception report with the goal of collecting 
as much data as possible. In particular, the team made use of the targeted survey and focus groups to fill 
in  data  gaps.  Nonetheless,  not  all  the  quantitative  elements  necessary  for  a  thorough  cost-benefit 
assessment  of  the  measures  have  been  gathered  due  to  lack  of  granular  data  (especially  as  many 
stakeholders could not estimate certain data points). We have also included the data collected as part of 
the stakeholder consultation activities (survey and focus groups) in Annex 8. 

108 

 
 
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as practical implication on how to integrate the resulting feedback and enhance the transparency 
of the process. 

4.  A  stable  working  group  should  be  created  for  core  nodes  of  the  EU  network  to  avoid  capacity 
bottlenecks. An example of this concept to build upon and extend is the Brenner Axis Task force, a 
working group within the RFC 3 managing TCRs coordination amongst the 3 IMs involved on the 
Brenner Axis. 

5.  The  wide  adoption  of  a  unique  digital  tool  is  essential  for  the  success  of  the  TCR  coordination 
process.  The  tool  should  be  adopted  (mandatorily)  by  all  IMs  and  guarantee  free  access  to  the 
public and the rail stakeholders (open access). The tool should aim to provide a complete overview 
of  the  TCRs  as  well  as  the  relative  rerouting  options  and  the  relative  capacity;  the  available 
information should be continuously updated, trustworthy, and made available to the operators in 
a standardised, user-friendly format. 

6.  Rerouting priorities rules to guarantee a maximum availability of the network capacity during the 

TCR period. 

7.  The  introduction  of  a  deadline  after  which  TCRs  cannot  be  modified  would  mitigate  the 

phenomenon and reduce the impact on the operators.  

8.  Alignment  among  IMs  on  TCR  clustering  practices  and  timing  as  to  maximise  the  efficiency  and 

effectiveness of the process. 

9.  A reliable freight timetable TCR activities as vital tool to allow for stable operation planning for 

RUs. 

It is worth mentioning that the results presented below are still expected to be refined, considering 
additional inputs still expected to be received from stakeholders. 

Measure 1 - A dedicated entity should be tasked to support the competent bodies in ensuring a 
consistent  level of  compliance  to the  provision  of  the European  TCR  regulatory framework  as 
well as the monitoring of the TCR process in Europe.  

Establishing a dedicated entity aims to improve the communication and coordination efforts between 
stakeholders  (RUs,  IMs,  and  RFCs)  in  TCR  planning  at  the  European  level  by  reducing  current  costs 
(cost-savings) incurred to develop coordination activities by stakeholders.  

To  calculate  the  potential  cost-savings  of  the  aforementioned  entity,  we  retrieved  evidence  from  the 
targeted  survey,  where  stakeholders  stated  that  they  incur  extra  costs  due  to  inefficient  TCR 
coordination. Nevertheless, they do not tend to consistently monitor these costs.  

In the survey, stakeholders estimated a cost range between 4 – 10 Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) in TCR 
coordination activities per year98. Due to the low representative of the sample, we assumed, under a 
conservative approach, that, at a minimum and on average, 1 FTE per entity per year was spent on TCR 
coordination activities. This results in 1,612 working hours per year, assuming 215 working days per 
year and 7.5 working hours per day.  

Based on evidence gathered in the focus groups and through the survey, we assumed that, on average 
and under the current situation (i.e., the baseline), IMs currently spend more time per year than RUs in 
TCR  coordination activities.  Nonetheless, given  the lack  of granular  data to make this  distinction, we 
considered  that,  per  year:  i)  IMs  incur  costs  of  between  1-10  FTEs  in  TCR  coordination  activities;  ii) 
RUs incur average costs of 1 FTE in TCR coordination activities. 

The  total  number  of  stakeholders  involved  was  based  on  the  most  recent  number  of  active  railway 
licenses  per  country  (2020),  according  to  data  from  the  eighth  edition  of  Rail  Market  Monitoring 
(RMMS)99 and assuming at least one IM/allocation body on average per Member State. The following 
table shows the number of RUs per MS considered in the calculation. 

98 Based on inputs from 2 IMs and one RFC managers. 

99 Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS) - European Commission (europa.eu) 

 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
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Table 19 - Number of RUs per Member State 

MS 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HU 

HR 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

NL 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SE 

SI 

SK 

Number of RUs 

48 

9 

15 

- 

107 

475 

8 

16 

3 

47 

5 

29 

47 

9 

3 

38 

9 

2 

7 

- 

41 

141 

5 

33 

59 

8 

28 

Total 

1,192 

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The  worker's  wage  was  assumed  considering  ISCO100  3  (technicians  and  associate  professionals)  in 
2023 prices101. 

In  addition,  to  estimate  projections  for  2025-2050,  we  retrieved  data  from  the  Impact  Assessment 
Report on a Proposal for a Regulation on the use of railway infrastructure capacity102 on the evolution 
of rail traffic, as shown in the table below. Moreover, we applied a weighted average considering the 
modal  split  between  each  rail  traffic  type  (i.e.,  passenger  and  freight  traffic),  considering  (80%  of 
passengers and 20% of freight in 2018, following the Impact Assessment Support Study). 

Table 20 - EU rail transport evolution - Baseline projections (as a percentage of million train-kilometres) 

Modal 

2015/2030 

2030/2050 

Passenger  

Freight  

24% 

42% 

69% 

96% 

Administrative cost-savings for Infrastructure Managers: 

We assumed that, at a minimum, establishing a dedicated entity would lead to savings of 3% in terms 
of the total time currently spent on TCR coordination activities relative to the baseline, in line with the 
evidence provided  in the Rastatt case study,  in  which  an  IM mentioned a value of  50  hours per  year 
saved on TCR coordination activities if processes were optimised. Drawing a parallel with a study by 
the World Bank on the benefits of digitalising public services in Estonia, we assumed time savings of up 
to 16% (upper bound) relative to the baseline.  

Under the baseline, we estimated that IMs incur costs of 1-10 FTEs per year in TCR activities. The mid-
point  of  these  figures  has  been  considered  for  the  estimations,  i.e.,  5  FTEs  per  year  spent  in  TCR 
activities for IMs.  

Overall, establishing a dedicated entity for TCR coordination is expected to lead to total cost-savings in 
terms of the time spent dedicated to TCR coordination for IMs in the EU-27 of between EUR 20.8 M 
and EUR 28.0 M, relative to the baseline and expressed as present value over 2025-2050. On average, 
this represents between EUR 1.2 M and EUR 1.6 M in cost-savings for IMs in the EU-27 per year.  

Table 21: Administrative cost-savings for IMs due to measure 1 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Administrative cost-savings for IMs (EUR) 

       Lower bound estimate 

 1,096,683  

 1,201,664  

 1,670,184  

 2,407,866  

       Upper bound estimate 

 816,136  

 894,262  

 1,241,765  

 1,790,224  

Administrative cost-savings for Railway Undertakings: 

We assumed that RUs would, on average, incur the same percentage savings as IMs in terms of the time 
saved in TCR coordination activities.  

Under the baseline scenario we estimated, under a conservative approach, that RUs incur costs of 1FTE 
per year in TCR activities. Overall, establishing a dedicated entity for TCR coordination is expected to 
lead to total cost-savings in terms of the time spent dedicated to TCR coordination for RUs of between 
EUR  50.3  M  and  EUR  270.4  M,  relative  to  the  baseline  and  expressed  as  present  value  over  2025-

100 International standard classification of occupations 

101 Updated according to the HICP factor (2023/2020). 

102  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  use  of  railway 
infrastructure  capacity  in  the  single  European  railway  area,  amending  Directive  2012/34/EU  and 
repealing  Regulation  (EU)  No  913/2010,  available  at:  EUR-Lex  -  52023SC0443  -  EN  -  EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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2050. On average, this represents between EUR 15.4 M and EUR 74.8 M in cost-savings for RUs in the 
EU-27 per year. 

Table 22: Administrative cost-savings for RUs due to measure 1 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Administrative cost-savings for RUs (EUR) 

       Lower bound estimate 

 10,963,609  

 12,013,110  

 15,938,233  

 22,977,788  

       Upper bound estimate 

 2,039,741  

 2,234,997  

 2,965,253  

 4,274,937  

Measure 2 - Establishment of an internationally harmonised process that defines the timing, the 
format, and the methods (i.e., systems and tools) through which IMs’ offering of internationally 
agreed rerouting options during the TCRs are made available.  

The  establishment  of  an  internationally  harmonised  process  may  lead  to  rerouting  cost-savings  for 
RUs due to optimisation of the process across stakeholders. Based on the rerouting costs incurred by 
stakeholders due to TCRs provided in the survey, it was possible to calculate the average unit cost (of 
rerouting) at a European level in terms of the total of train-km. As the baseline for this measure, the 
total annual average cost of rerouting in the EU-27 was extrapolated by applying these unit costs and 
multiplying by the total k-train km for the EU-27. 

To  estimate  projections  for  2025-2050,  we  retrieved  the  projected  values  for  capacity  restriction 
according to the Impact Assessment of the Rail Capacity Regulation103, as shown in the table below. 

Table 23 - Capacity restrictions projections 

2020/2030 

2020/2040 

2020/2050 

Capacity restrictions in - projections  

8% 

54% 

142% 

(% of rail traffic affected by capacity 
restrictions in the baseline) 

Adjustment cost-savings for Infrastructure Managers: 

The  calculation  of  the  benefits  expected  from  the  measure  was  established  assuming  1%  savings  in 
rerouting costs relative to the baseline, according to anecdotal evidence gathered in the focus groups. 
Hence, the potential adjustment cost-savings for IMs generated by the proposed measure could reach a 
value  of  EUR  11.9M  relative  to  the  baseline  and  expressed  as  present  value  over  2025-2050.  On 
average, this represents approximately EUR 710,000 in cost-savings for IMs in the EU-27 per year. 

Table 24: Adjustment cost-savings for IMs due to measure 2 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Administrative 
savings for RUs (EUR) 

cost-

398,805 

415,050 

648,316 

1,518,185 

Adjustment cost-savings for Railway Undertakings: 

103  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  use  of  railway 
infrastructure  capacity  in  the  single  European  railway  area,  amending  Directive  2012/34/EU  and 
repealing  Regulation  (EU)  No  913/2010,  available  at:  EUR-Lex  -  52023SC0443  -  EN  -  EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu) 

112 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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The  calculation  of  the  benefits  expected  from  the  measure  was  established  assuming  1%  savings  in 
rerouting costs relative to the baseline, according to anecdotal evidence gathered in the focus groups. 
Hence, the potential adjustment cost-savings for RUs generated by the proposed measure could reach a 
value  of  EUR  37.6M  relative  to  the  baseline  and  expressed  as  present  value  over  2025-2050.  On 
average, this represents approximately EUR 2.2 M in cost-savings for RUs in the EU-27 per year. 

Table 25: Adjustment cost-savings for RUs due to measure 2 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Administrative 
savings for RUs (EUR) 

cost-

1,262,158 

1,313,571 

2,051,822 

4,804,824 

Measure 3 - The TCR coordination process should be supported by appropriate methodologies 
and tools (see Area 2 conclusion) to structure appropriate dialogue between IMs, RUs, and end 
customers  as  well  as  practical  implication  on  how  to  integrate  the  resulting  feedback  and 
enhance the transparency of the process. 

The  proposed  measure  has  the  potential  to  generate  cost-savings  due  to  the  optimisation  of  the 
methodologies  employed  in  the  planning  of  TCRs.  To  estimate  a  baseline  scenario  in  terms  of 
maintenance  costs  currently  incurred  for  TCRs  by  IMs,  we  retrieved  the  following  data  from the  8th 
Rail  Market  Monitoring  Report104  (2020  prices),  which  were  used  as  a  proxy  to  estimate  total 
maintenance  costs  for  TCRs:  total  expenditures,  specifically  (total  infrastructure  maintenance 
expenditure, total infrastructure renewal expenditure, and total infrastructure upgrade expenditures) 
per Member State.  

Using  the  total  services  in  train-km  as  a  base  parameter,  we  were  able  to  calculate  the  weighted 
average  unit-value  incurred  in  renewing  and  maintaining  the  railways  at  a  European  level.  The 
following table summarises the unit values obtained. 

Table 26 – Unit cost expenditure in maintenance, renewal, and upgrade the railways 

Total infrastructure 
maintenance 
expenditures 2020 
[bn EUR] 

Total infrastructure 
renewal 
expenditures 2020 
[bn EUR] 

Total infrastructure 
upgrade expenditures 
2020 [bn EUR] 

Unit costs for the EU-27 

0.98 

2.05 

1.61 

To further project the values to 2025 - 2050, we retrieved data on capacity restriction for 2025-2050, 
according  to  the  Impact  Assessment  Report  on  the  Proposal  of  the  Rail  Capacity  Regulation105,  as 
shown in the table below. 

Table 27 - Capacity restrictions projections 

2020/2030 

2020/2040 

2020/2050 

Capacity  restrictions  in  the  baseline  -  projections  (Amount  of  rail  affected  by 
capacity restrictions in the baseline) 

8% 

54% 

142% 

Adjustment cost-savings for IMs: 

According  to  anecdotal  evidence  collected  during  the  focus  group,  establishing  such  a  measure  may 
lead  to  3-5%  adjustment  cost-savings  incurred  by  IMs  during  TCRs106  relative  to  the  baseline.  The 

104 Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS) - European Commission (europa.eu) 

105  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  use  of  railway 
infrastructure  capacity  in  the  single  European  railway  area,  amending  Directive  2012/34/EU  and 
repealing  Regulation  (EU)  No  913/2010,  available  at:  EUR-Lex  -  52023SC0443  -  EN  -  EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu) 

106 Using it as a proxy to expenditure in maintenance, renewal, and upgrade the railways. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant framework conditions 

potential cost-savings generated by the proposed measure would range from EUR 15.2M to EUR 25.3 
M  for  IMs,  relative  to  the  baseline  and  expressed  as  present  value  over  2025-2050.  On  average,  this 
represents between EUR 906,000 and EUR 1.5 M in cost-savings for IMs in the EU-27 per year. 

Table 28: Adjustment cost-savings for IMs due to measure 3 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Adjustment cost-savings for IMs (EUR) 

Lower bound estimate 

 848,667  

 883,237  

 1,379,632  

 3,230,733  

Upper bound estimate 

 509,200  

 529,942  

 827,779  

 1,938,440  

Measure 4 - Dedicated working groups should be created for core nodes of the EU network to 
avoid capacity bottlenecks resulting from TCRs. An example of this concept to build upon and 
extend  is  the  Brenner  Axis  Task  force,  a  working  group  within  the  RFC  3  managing  TCRs 
coordination amongst the 3 IMs involved on the Brenner Axis. 

One of the conclusions of the current study, supported by evidence from the case studies, is that a part 
of  the  revenue  lost  by  RUs  becomes  permanent  due  to  a  permanent  modal  shift  from  rail  to  road 
caused  by  high-impact  TCRs.  Such  permanent  loss  of  modal  split  of  rail  is  linked  to  a  lack  of 
coordination of TCR activities, between the network of different transport modes. 

As  a  baseline  for  the  measure,  the  total  revenue  from  RUs  (for  passenger  and  freight  services)  was 
based on the values published by the RMMS107 for each Member State and updated to 2023 prices108. In 
addition,  to  maintain  comparability  among  all  countries,  the  values  were  also  weighted  by  the 
corresponding Price Purchasing Power (PPP) indices. We have assumed a growth in revenue by RUs in 
2025-2050 to grow in line with PRIMES-TREMOVE's GDP projections per Member State. 

Table 29 - Baseline for RUs Revenue Loss 

MS 

AT 

BE 

DK 

ES 

FI 

FR 

DE 

EL 

IE 

IT 

NL 

PT 

SE 

Railway undertakings’ 
revenues from passenger 
transport services per 
country (billion EUR, 2020) 
-8th RMMS 

Railway undertakings' 
revenues from freight 
transport services per 
country (billion EUR, 2020) 
– 8th RMMS 

PPP 
Adjustment 

HICP factor 
(2023/2020) 

RUs Revenue 
loss in EUR, 
2023 (avg. 5%) 
- baseline 

1.90 

2.12 

1.38 

2.36 

0.30 

12.60 

14.05 

0.08 

0.33 

3.91 

2.45 

0.15 

1.03 

1.00 

0.55 

0.05 

0.17 

0.31 

0.99 

5.10 

0.01 

0.00 

0.57 

0.20 

0.08 

0.67 

1.19 

1.16 

1.43 

0.99 

1.28 

1.09 

1.08 

0.85 

1.45 

1.03 

1.21 

0.88 

1.34 

1.20 

1.16 

1.14 

1.15 

1.14 

1.14 

1.19 

1.15 

1.16 

1.17 

1.19 

1.15 

1.17 

0.21 

0.18 

0.12 

0.14 

0.04 

0.85 

1.23 

0.00 

0.03 

0.27 

0.19 

0.01 

0.13 

107 Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS) - European Commission (europa.eu) 

108 Updated according to the HICP factor (2023/2020). 

114 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant framework conditions 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

EE 

HU 

LV 

LT 

MT 

PL 

RO 

SI 

SK 

LU 

HR 

0.11 

0.00 

0.89 

0.05 

0.84 

0.04 

0.05 

0.00 

1.13 

0.13 

0.08 

0.38 

0.22 

0.08 

0.13 

0.00 

0.61 

0.04 

0.38 

0.19 

0.39 

0.00 

1.86 

0.10 

0.17 

0.00 

0.07 

0.09 

Total 

46.67 

13.72 

0.51 

0.94 

0.69 

0.82 

0.61 

0.74 

0.66 

0.91 

0.56 

0.49 

0.86 

0.77 

1.55 

0.66 

1.26 

1.15 

1.33 

1.36 

1.42 

1.32 

1.35 

1.13 

1.32 

1.28 

1.20 

1.28 

1.15 

1.23 

0.01 

0.00 

0.07 

0.00 

0.05 

0.01 

0.02 

0.00 

0.11 

0.01 

0.01 

0.02 

0.03 

0.01 

3.76 

By the same token, as the baseline for the IMs, the total revenue from IMs (for passenger and freight 
services) was based on the values published by the RMMS for each Member State and updated to 2023 
prices. Values were also weighted by the corresponding Price Purchasing Power (PPP) indices, and the 
growth  in  revenue  by  IMs  in  2025-2050  followed  PRIMES-TREMOVE's  GDP  projections  per  Member 
State. 

Table 30 - Baseline for IMs Revenue Loss 

MS 

AT 

BE 

DK 

ES 

FI 

FR 

DE 

EL 

IE 

IT 

NL 

PT 

SE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

EE 

HU 

LV 

Infrastructure managers' 
revenue earned from 
charges (TACs, station 
charges and other 
charges) paid by 
passenger trains, per 
country (EUR million, 
2020) – 8th RMMS 

Infrastructure managers' 
revenue earned from 
charges (TACs, freight 
terminals charges and 
other charges) paid by 
freight trains, per 
country 2020 [EUR 
million] – 8th RMMS 

PPP 
Adjustment 

HICP factor 
(2023/2020) 

RUs 
Revenue 
loss in 
EUR, 2023 
(avg. 5%) 

382.35 

675.56 

77.91 

875.28 

13.80 

4,243.73 

5,685.00 

24.49 

70.61 

827.29 

297.00 

57.05 

109.12 

11.99 

0.00 

72.87 

19.57 

224.72 

7.56 

108.64 

31.00 

13.54 

8.07 

28.40 

145.02 

931.00 

4.33 

4.13 

94.06 

41.00 

7.05 

60.80 

17.74 

0.00 

56.00 

16.33 

56.30 

74.43 

1.19 

1.16 

1.43 

0.99 

1.28 

1.09 

1.08 

0.85 

1.45 

1.03 

1.21 

0.88 

1.34 

0.51 

0.94 

0.69 

0.82 

0.61 

0.74 

1.20 

1.16 

1.14 

1.15 

1.14 

1.14 

1.19 

1.15 

1.16 

1.17 

1.19 

1.15 

1.17 

1.26 

1.15 

1.33 

1.36 

1.42 

1.32 

35.09 

47.82 

7.48 

50.45 

3.09 

272.94 

425.14 

1.40 

6.29 

55.48 

24.41 

3.24 

13.36 

0.96 

0.00 

5.93 

2.01 

12.18 

3.99 

 
  
  
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant framework conditions 

LT 

MT 

PL 

RO 

SI 

SK 

LU 

HR 

5.77 

0.00 

215.40 

104.73 

4.53 

50.74 

4.28 

8.77 

206.43 

0.00 

210.42 

70.27 

9.02 

20.34 

0.27 

9.38 

0.66 

0.91 

0.56 

0.49 

0.86 

0.77 

1.55 

0.66 

1.35 

1.13 

1.32 

1.28 

1.20 

1.28 

1.15 

1.23 

9.46 

0.00 

15.70 

5.53 

0.70 

3.48 

0.41 

0.74 

Total 

14,070.10 

2,223.96 

1,007.32 

Despite  the  lack  of  quantitative  data  provided  in  the  survey  and  case  studies  regarding  the  average 
revenue loss by RUs due to high-impact TCR, anecdotal evidence from the case studies shows that RUs 
may have incurred between 5% - 15% revenue loss per year due to high-impact TCRs. For calculation 
purposes, we have adopted a conservative approach, assuming the average loss of revenue for RUs due 
to  high-impact  TCRs  to  be  of  5%  per  year.  Moreover,  we  assumed  that  15%  of  these  costs  are 
irrecoverable due to a loss of modal split.  

Additional revenues for RUs 

We  consider  that  better  coordination  between  transport  modes  through  a  working  group  or  similar 
entity will enable RUs to avoid revenue loss they incur in the baseline, as traffic shifted to other modes 
other  than  rail  during  TCRs  would  not  be  recovered  after  the  end  of  the  TCR.  Thus,  to  calculate  the 
opportunity costs for RUs, we assumed that part of the revenue loss would potentially be  avoided if 
the measure is implemented. In this regard, assuming a conservative approach, we estimated that 5% 
of revenue is lost due to TCRs in the baseline, of which 15% becomes permanent after the end of the 
TCR. We assumed a Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) for the railway sector like that in that in 
air transport109, i.e., at 8% per year. 

Therefore,  applying  a  WACC  of  8%  and  under  a  conservative  approach,  the  implementation  of  this 
measure  may  lead  to  additional  revenues  for  RUs  (as  they  would    avoid  the  revenue  loss  in  the 
baseline)  of  EUR  1.0  bn,  expressed  as  present  value  over  2025-2050  relative  to  the  baseline.  On 
average,  this  represents  approximately  EUR  55.7  M  in  additional  revenues  for  RUs  in  the  EU-27  per 
year (approximately 0.1% of the total revenue of RUs in the EU-27). 

Table 31: Administrative cost-savings for RUs due to measure 4 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Administrative cost-savings for RUs (EUR million) 

Estimate 

46.4 

49.6 

57.3 

66.6 

Additional revenues for IMs 

To  calculate  the  opportunity  costs  for  IMs,  we  also  assumed  that  part  of  the  revenue  loss  would 
potentially  be  avoided  if  the  measure  is  implemented.  In  this  regard,  assuming  a  conservative 
approach, we assumed that 5% of revenue is lost due to TCRs in the baseline, of which 15% becomes 
permanent after the end of the TCR. We assumed a Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) for the 
railway sector like that in air transport110, i.e., at 8% per year. 

109 https://a4e.eu/wp-content/uploads/a4e-study-york-aviation-the-cost-and-profitability-of-european-airports-

2017-08-04.pdf  

110 https://a4e.eu/wp-content/uploads/a4e-study-york-aviation-the-cost-and-profitability-of-european-airports-

2017-08-04.pdf  

116 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant framework conditions 

Therefore,  applying  a  WACC  of  8%  and  under  a  conservative  approach,  the  implementation  of  this 
measure may lead to additional revenues for IMs (as they would avoid the revenue loss in the baseline) 
of EUR 269.5 M, expressed as present value over 2025-2050 relative to the baseline. On average, this 
represents  approximately  EUR  15  M  in  additional  revenues  for  IMs  in  the  EU-27  per  year 
(approximately 0.1% of the total revenue of IMs in the EU-27). 

Table 32: Administrative cost-savings for IMs due to measure 4 

Administrative cost-
savings for IMs (EUR 
million) 

2025 

12.5 

2030 

13.3 

2040 

15.4 

2050 

18.0 

Measure  5  -  The  wide  adoption  of  a  unique  digital  tool  is  essential  for  the  success  of  the  TCR 
coordination process. The tool should be adopted (mandatorily) by all IMs and guarantee free 
access  for  the  public  and  the  rail  stakeholders.  The  tool  should  aim  to  provide  a  complete 
overview  of  the  TCRs  as  well  as  the  related  rerouting  options  and    capacity;  the  available 
information should be continuously updated, trustworthy, and made available to the operators 
in a standardised, user-friendly format. 

The  adoption  of  a  single  digital  tool  to  concentrate  TCR  coordination  activities  implies  two  distinct 
aspects: 

▪ 

▪ 

increase in IM costs to develop the tool, which will generate an additional one-off development 
cost in the first year (2025), 
in  addition  to  the  implementation  costs,  increase  in  adjustment  costs  for  maintaining  and 
updating the system on an ongoing basis. 

Furthermore, it is expected that the measure will generate benefits for IMs in terms of administrative 
cost-savings due to time savings arising from more efficient coordination resulting from the tool. 

Adjustment costs for IMs: 

We  assumed  that  the  costs  for  developing  such  a  tool  are  already  being  incurred  by  RNE  in  the 
development  of  RNE’s  TCR  tool,  which  can  be  used  for  similar  purposes  once  fully  developed. 
Nonetheless,  drawing  a  parallel  with  a  similar  measure  which  encompassed  the  development  of  a 
digital  tool111,  we  assumed,  under  a  conservative  approach,  that  1  FTE  per  Member  State  would  be 
required for maintaining and updating the tool. 

Considering  a  total  of  27  IMs  affected  by  this  measure  and  assuming  an  hourly  worker’s  wage 
corresponding to ISCO 3 (technicians and associate professionals), this measure is estimated to lead to 
recurring  adjustment  costs  for  IMs  amounting  to  EUR  32.5  M  between  2025-2050,  expressed  as 
present value, or approximately EUR 1.85 M per year, on average.  

Table 33: Adjustment costs for IMs due to measure 5 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Adjustment  costs  for  IMs 
(EUR) 

1,316,020 

1,441,997 

1,913,150 

2,758,145 

Administrative cost-savings for IMs: 

Alternatively,  the  benefits  expected  from  the  measure  were  estimated  considering  the  evidence 
provided in the survey that the average spending on TCR coordination is of 6 FTEs per year. A study by 
the World Bank on the Estonian e-Government Ecosystem112 conservatively estimated that on average 

111 This measure is related to PM A.2 ("Carriers shall establish service quality standards, implement a quality 
management  system  and  publish  biennial  reports  on  the  results"),  in  the  Support  study  for  an  impact 
assessment  on  new  rules  for  making  the  passenger  rights  framework  resilient  and  future  proof.  Staff 
Working  Document 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-
say/initiatives/13290-Travel-better-protection-for-passengers-and-their-rights_en  

available 

at: 

112 WDR16BPEstonianeGovecosystemVassil.pdf (worldbank.org) 

 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant framework conditions 

some  15  minutes  over  an  hour  could  be  saved,  or  25%  of  the  time  spent  on  administrative  tasks, 
compared to the case where such a system was not in place. 

Therefore,  if  an  average  of  25%  of  the  total  costs  to  coordinate  TCRs  will  be  saved  by  IMs  with  the 
establishment  of  the  digital  tool,  and  assuming  an  hourly  worker's  wage  corresponding  to  ISCO  3 
(technicians and associate professionals), the annual ongoing administrative cost-savings for IMs are 
estimated at EUR 51.4 million over 2025-2050, or of EUR 2.9 million per year, on average. 

Table 34: Administrative cost-savings for IMs due to measure 5 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Administrative cost-
savings for IMs (EUR) 

2,083,698 

2,283,162 

3,029,154 

4,367,063 

Administrative cost-savings for RUs: 

The  benefits  expected  from  the  measure  were  estimated  considering  the  evidence  provided  in  the 
survey that the average spending on TCR coordination is of 5 FTEs per year. A study by the World Bank 
on  the  Estonian  e-Government  Ecosystem113  conservatively  estimated  that  on  average  it  could  be 
saved some 15 minutes over an hour, or 25% of the time spent on administrative tasks, compared to 
the case where such a system was not in place. 

Therefore, if an average of 25% of the total costs to coordinate TCRs will be saved by the RUs with the 
establishment  of  the  digital  tool,  and  assuming  an  hourly  worker's  wage  corresponding  to  ISCO  3 
(technicians and associate professionals), the annual ongoing administrative cost-savings for RUs are 
estimated at EUR 43.1 M over 2025-2050, or of EUR 2.5 M per year, on average. 

Table 35: Administrative cost-savings for RUs due to measure 5 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Administrative cost-
savings for RUs (EUR) 

1,645,025 

1,802,496 

2,598,618 

3,746,368 

Measure 6 - Rerouting priorities rules to guarantee a minimum of the network capacity during 
the TCR period. 

As  previously  pointed  out,  TCRs  may  also  lead  to  a  shift  in  capacity  to  accommodate  capacity 
restrictions on the line. For instance, it is often the case that freight services only operate during the 
night  (when  most  passenger  services  do  not  operate).  In  cases  of  works  ongoing  on  the  tracks, 
enabling passenger traffic to circulate during the daytime. Such priority rules may have an economic 
impact for both IMs and RUs. This has been illustrated in chapter 3.3, in the case of prioritising regional 
and urban passenger rail services over international rail freight services in France, which would have 
an  economic  impact  in  terms  of  revenue  loss  on  the  French  RU  of  as  much  as  EUR  2.78k  per  train 
service. 

Therefore, such measure could potentially lead to cost-savings to both RUs and IMs, as priority rules 
would be better harmonised to ensure a minimum network capacity. Nonetheless, there is no reliable 
data that allow estimating such savings for the EU-27. 

Measure 7 - The introduction of a deadline after which TCRs cannot be modified would mitigate 
the phenomenon and reduce the impact on the operators. 

A long-term stable TCR would potentially lead to cost-savings relative to the baseline, as stakeholders 
would  not  incur  costs  to  modify  TCR  activities.  In  the  targeted  survey,  stakeholders  stated  the  cost 
range  between  4  –  10  Full  Time  Equivalents  (FTEs)  in  TCR  coordination  activities  per  year.  Like 
measure 1, due to the low representative of the sample, we assumed, as a baseline, a minimum average 

113 WDR16BPEstonianeGovecosystemVassil.pdf (worldbank.org) 

118 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant framework conditions 

of  1  FTE  per  entity  per  year  was  spent  on  coordination  activities.  This  results  in  a  total  of  1,612 
working hours per year comes, assuming 215 working days per year and 7.5 working hours per day. 

Based on evidence gathered in the focus groups and through the survey, we assumed that, on average 
and  under  the  baseline,  IMs  currently  spend  more  time  per  year  than  RUs  in  TCR  coordination 
activities. Nonetheless, given the lack of granular data to make this distinction, we considered that, per 
year: i) IMs incur costs of between 1-10 FTEs in TCR coordination activities; ii) RUs incur average costs 
of 1 FTE in TCR coordination activities. 

The total of stakeholders involved was based on the most recent number of active railway licenses per 
country (2020), according to data from the eighth edition of Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS)114, a total 
of 1,192 RUs in the EU-27. This data was projected to 2025-2050 considering the projected values for 
capacity  restrictions,  according  to  the  Impact  Assessment  supporting  a  proposal  a  revised  Rail 
Capacity Regulation115, as shown in the table below. 

Table 36 - Capacity restrictions projections 

2020/2030 

2020/2040 

2020/2050 

8% 

54% 

142% 

Capacity restrictions in the 
baseline - projections (Amount 
of rail affected by capacity 
restrictions in the baseline) 

Administrative cost-savings for IMs: 

Based  on  anecdotal  evidence  collected  as  part  of  the  focus  groups,  we  assumed  that  establishing  a 
frozen  zone  may  lead  to  savings  ranging  from  10%  up  to  20%  in  terms  of  time  spent  in  TCR 
coordination activities relative to the baseline (namely in tasks related to any changes occurred in the 
TCR). 

Therefore, the potential administrative cost-savings generated by the proposed measure could reach 
ongoing annual cost-savings for IMs estimated at EUR 202.9 M to EUR 405.7 M between 2025-2050, 
expressed as present value, or on average EUR 24.2 M or EUR 12.1 M per year. 

Table 37: Administrative cost-savings for IMs due to measure 7 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Administrative cost-savings for IMs (EUR) 

Lower bound estimate 

 13,619,340  

 14,174,115  

 22,140,224  

 51,846,544  

Upper bound estimate 

 6,809,670  

 7,087,058  

 11,070,112  

 25,923,272  

Administrative cost-savings for RUs: 

Similarly, we considered that RUs may benefit from more efficient TCR coordination activities in case a 
frozen  zone  was  established.  Assuming  the  same  percentage  savings  of  10%-20%,  this  measure  is 
expected  to  lead  to  total  administrative  cost-savings  in  terms  of  the  time  spent  dedicated  to  TCR 
coordination for RUs of between EUR 19.6 M and EUR 39.2 M, relative to the baseline and expressed 
as present value over 2025-2050. 

Table 38: Administrative cost-savings for RUs due to measure 7 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

114 Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS) - European Commission (europa.eu) 

115  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  use  of  railway 
infrastructure  capacity  in  the  single  European  railway  area,  amending  Directive  2012/34/EU  and 
repealing  Regulation  (EU)  No  913/2010,  available  at:  EUR-Lex  -  52023SC0443  -  EN  -  EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant framework conditions 

Administrative cost-savings for RUs (EUR) 

Lower bound estimate 

 1,316,020  

 1,369,627  

 2,139,382  

 5,009,867  

Upper bound estimate 

 658,010  

 684,813  

 1,069,691  

 2,504,933  

Measure  8. 
efficiency and effectiveness of the process.  

Alignment among IMs on TCR clustering practices and timing as to maximise the 

IMs are expected to incur time- and cost-savings by combining minor TCR activities. Such clustering is 
also  expected  to  lead  to  an  increase  in  network  capacity,  with  a  potential  increase  in  revenue  and 
service quality.  

RUs would also benefit from the clustering by optimising TCRs procedures. From case study number 3, 
we  can  retrieve  an  estimated  10%  loss  in  overall  capacity  due  to  additional  minor  TCR  activities 
concurrently occurring with a major TCR. By developing a TCR clustering scheme, we expect that the 
same (or less) time spent in coordination activities will be required. Nonetheless, such TCR clustering 
is expected to lead to an increase in capacity, consequently resulting in an upsurge in RUs’ revenues. 

As  a  baseline  for  the  measure,  the  total  value  of  RUs’  revenues  was  calculated  for  passengers  and 
freight based on the values published by the RMMS116 for each Member State. In addition, the values 
were updated by the accumulated inflation for the period (2020-2023) and, to maintain comparability 
among all countries, the values were also updated by the corresponding Price Purchasing Power (PPP) 
indices. 

Although limited quantitative evidence was provided in the targeted survey and case studies relative 
to the percentage amount of revenue loss due to high-impact TCR, the information retrieved show that 
RUs incur revenue losses of 5% up to 15%, annually. 

By the same token, the total value of IMs’ revenues was calculated for passengers and freight based on 
the  values  published  by  the  RMMS117  for  each  Member  State,  the  values  were  updated  by  the 
accumulated  inflation  for  the  period  (2020-2023)  and,  to  by  the  corresponding  Price  Purchasing 
Power (PPP) indices. 

Increase in revenues for RUs: 

For  calculation  purposes, we  adopted a conservative  approach,  assuming  an  average  loss  of  revenue 
for operators due to high-impact TCRs to be at 5% per year. Moreover, we assumed that RUs’ Revenue 
would increase between 10% and 20%. To project values from 2025 to 2050, we have assumed that 
revenue  loss  growth  will  be  in  line  with  the  growth  of  PRIMES-TREMOVE's  GDP  projections  per 
Member State. 

To estimate the potential increase in operators’ revenues, we assumed that part of the non-recoverable 
revenue loss would not materialize if the measure is implemented, assuming a WACC of 8% a year. 

Therefore,  applying  the  industry  WACC  of  8%  to  measure  the  total  impact  on  the  industry,  RUs  are 
expected  to  experience  an  upsurge  in  revenues  due  to  an  increase  in  capacity  amounting  from  EUR 
952.6 M to EUR 1,851.3 M, expressed as present value over 2025-2050. On average, this represents 
approximately between EUR 36.8 M and EUR 73.6 M in additional revenues per year for RUs in the EU-
27. 

Table 39: Increase in revenues for RUs due to measure 8 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Increase in revenue for RUs (EUR million) 

116 Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS) - European Commission (europa.eu) 

117 Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS) - European Commission (europa.eu) 

120 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant framework conditions 

Lower bound estimate 

Upper bound estimate 

 61.45  

 30.72  

 65.59  

 32.79  

 75.67  

 37.84  

 87.98  

 43.99  

Increase in revenues for IMs: 

For  calculation  purposes, we  adopted a conservative  approach,  assuming  an  average  loss  of  revenue 
for operators due to high-impact TCRs to be at 5% per year. Moreover, we assumed that IMs’ Revenue 
would increase between 10% and 20%. To project values from 2025 to 2050, we have assumed that 
revenue  loss  growth  will  be  in  line  with  the  growth  of  PRIMES-TREMOVE's  GDP  projections  per 
Member State. 

To estimate the potential increase in operators’ revenues, we assumed that part of the non-recoverable 
revenue loss would potentially not materialize if the measure is implemented, assuming a WACC of 8% 
a year. 

Therefore,  applying  the  industry  WACC  of  8%  to  measure  the  total  impact  on  the  industry,  IMs  are 
expected    experience  an  upsurge  in  revenues  due  to  an  increase  in  capacity  amounting  from  EUR 
260.0  M  to  EUR  520.0  M,  expressed  as  present  value  over  2025-2050.  On  average,  this  represents 
approximately between EUR 10 M and EUR 20 M in cost-savings per year for IMs in the EU-27. 

Table 40: Administrative cost-savings for IMs due to measure 8 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Administrative cost-savings for IMs (EUR million) 

Lower bound estimate 

Upper bound estimate 

 16.63 

 8.31  

17.79 

 8.90  

20.57 

 10.28  

24.02 

12.05  

Measure 9 - A reliable freight timetable for TCR activities. 

We  expect  that  a  more  stable  planning  of  TCR  activities  is  expected  to  reduce  the  overall  impact  of 
TCRs  incurred  by  RUs  and  customers.  Therefore,  we  estimate  the  cost-savings  considering  RUs’ 
revenues  for  rail  freight  services  and  considering  the  time  spent  for  carrying  out  TCR  planning 
activities when additional changes are made to TCR planning.  

As a baseline for the measure, the value of RUs revenues from freight transport services was calculated 
based  on  the  values  published  by  the  RMMS118  for  each  Member  State.  In  addition,  the  values  were 
updated  by  the  accumulated  inflation  for  the  period  (2020-2023)  and,  to  maintain  comparability 
among all countries, the values were also updated by the corresponding Price Purchasing Power (PPP) 
indices. 

Table 41 - Baseline for freight RUs Revenue Loss 

MS 

AT 

BE 

DK 

ES 

FI 

Railway undertakings' revenues 
from freight transport services 
per country (billion EUR, 2020) – 
8th RMMS 

PPP Adjustment 

HICP factor 
(2023/2020) 

RUs Revenue loss in EUR, 
2023 

1.00 

0.55 

0.05 

0.17 

0.31 

1.19 

1.16 

1.43 

0.99 

1.28 

1.20 

1.16 

1.14 

1.15 

1.14 

0.14 

0.07 

0.01 

0.02 

0.05 

118 Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS) - European Commission (europa.eu) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant framework conditions 

FR 

DE 

EL 

IE 

IT 

NL 

PT 

SE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

EE 

HU 

LV 

LT 

MT 

PL 

RO 

SI 

SK 

LU 

HR 

0.99 

5.10 

0.01 

0.00 

0.57 

0.20 

0.08 

0.67 

0.13 

0.00 

0.61 

0.04 

0.38 

0.19 

0.39 

0.00 

1.86 

0.10 

0.17 

0.00 

0.07 

0.09 

Total 

13.72 

1.09 

1.08 

0.85 

1.45 

1.03 

1.21 

0.88 

1.34 

0.51 

0.94 

0.69 

0.82 

0.61 

0.74 

0.66 

0.91 

0.56 

0.49 

0.86 

0.77 

1.55 

0.66 

1.14 

1.19 

1.15 

1.16 

1.17 

1.19 

1.15 

1.17 

1.26 

1.15 

1.33 

1.36 

1.42 

1.32 

1.35 

1.13 

1.32 

1.28 

1.20 

1.28 

1.15 

1.23 

0.12 

0.66 

0.00 

0.00 

0.07 

0.03 

0.01 

0.10 

0.01 

0.00 

0.06 

0.00 

0.03 

0.02 

0.03 

0.00 

0.14 

0.01 

0.02 

0.00 

0.01 

0.01 

1.62 

Alternatively, as a baseline for IMs, we retrieve from IMs revenues from freight transport services was 
calculated  based  on  the  values  published  by  the  RMMS119  for  each  Member  State.  In  addition,  the 
values  were  updated  by  the  accumulated  inflation  for  the  period  (2020-2023)  and,  to  maintain 
comparability  among  all  countries,  the  values  were  also  updated  by  the  corresponding  Price 
Purchasing Power (PPP) indices. 

Table 42 - Baseline for freight IMs Revenue Loss 

MS 

AT 

BE 

DK 

ES 

FI 

FR 

DE 

EL 

Infrastructure managers' revenue 
earned from charges (TACs, freight 
terminals charges and other charges) 
paid by freight trains, per country 2020 
[EUR million] – 8th RMMS 

PPP Adjustment 

HICP factor 
(2023/2020) 

IMs Revenue loss in 
EUR, 2023 

108.64 

31.00 

13.54 

8.07 

28.40 

145.02 

931.00 

4.33 

1.19 

1.16 

1.43 

0.99 

1.28 

1.09 

1.08 

0.85 

1.20 

1.16 

1.14 

1.15 

1.14 

1.14 

1.19 

1.15 

1.55 

0.42 

0.22 

0.09 

0.42 

1.80 

11.97 

0.04 

119 Rail Market Monitoring (RMMS) - European Commission (europa.eu) 

122 

 
 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant framework conditions 

IE 

IT 

NL 

PT 

SE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

EE 

HU 

LV 

LT 

MT 

PL 

RO 

SI 

SK 

LU 

HR 

4.13 

94.06 

41.00 

7.05 

60.80 

17.74 

0.00 

56.00 

16.33 

56.30 

74.43 

206.43 

0.00 

210.42 

70.27 

9.02 

20.34 

0.27 

9.38 

Total 

2,223.96 

Administrative cost-savings for RUs: 

1.45 

1.03 

1.21 

0.88 

1.34 

0.51 

0.94 

0.69 

0.82 

0.61 

0.74 

0.66 

0.91 

0.56 

0.49 

0.86 

0.77 

1.55 

0.66 

1.16 

1.17 

1.19 

1.15 

1.17 

1.26 

1.15 

1.33 

1.36 

1.42 

1.32 

1.35 

1.13 

1.32 

1.28 

1.20 

1.28 

1.15 

1.23 

0.07 

1.13 

0.59 

0.07 

0.96 

0.11 

0.00 

0.52 

0.18 

0.49 

0.73 

1.84 

0.00 

1.55 

0.44 

0.09 

0.20 

0.00 

0.08 

25.57 

Due to the lack of evidence provided, we assumed the anecdotal evidence that 1% of these costs could 
be  saved  by  the  implementation  of  the  measure.  To  project  values  from  2025  to  2050,  we  have 
assumed  that  revenue  loss  growth  will  be  in  line  with  the  growth  of  PRIMES-TREMOVE's  GDP 
projections per Member State. 

The result of this measure is expected to lead to an estimate of cost-savings for TCR planning by the 
RUs  due  to  a  more  stable  TCR  timetable.  Therefore,  the  economic  impact  would  amount  to  EUR 
3,538.29 M, Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, or on average EUR 197.1 M per year. 

Table 43: Administrative cost-savings for RUs due to measure 9 

Administrative 
savings 
million) 

for  RUs 

cost-
(EUR 

2025 

161.54 

2030 

174.45 

2040 

203.70 

2050 

237.16 

Administrative cost-savings for IMs: 

Due to the lack of evidence provided, we assumed as anecdotal evidence that 1% of these costs could 
be  saved  by  the  implementation  of  the  measure.    To  project  values  from  2025  to  2050,  we  have 
assumed  that  revenue  loss  growth  will  be  in  line  with  the  growth  of  PRIMES-TREMOVE's  GDP 
projections per Member State. 

The result of this measure is expected to lead to an estimate of cost-savings for TCR planning by the 
RUs due to a more stable TCR timetable. Therefore, the economic impact would amount to EUR 568.32 
M, Expressed as present value over 2025-2050, or on average EUR 31.7 M per year. 

Table 44: Administrative cost-savings for IMs due to measure 9 

Administrative cost-

2025 

25.57 

2030 

27.85 

2040 

32.87 

2050 

38.47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant framework conditions 

savings for IMs (EUR 
million) 

Administrative cost-savings for customers: 

As  pointed  out  in  Chapter  3.3,  evidence  from  the  case  studies  show  that  customers  may  incur 
additional costs due to TCR activities. For instance, in the case of the traffic disruption in Modane in 
2019, customers incurred additional costs varying between 19%-30%, while in 2023 this reached as 
much as 36% in additional costs to customers. This brings an important perspective, as it may lead to a 
direct increase in the goods commercialised or in ticket prices (in the case of passenger services).  

Therefore,  this  measure  may  also  lead  to  savings  to  customers.  Nonetheless,  given  the  lack  of  more 
granular data, estimates could not be provided in a reliable manner. 

Summary of costs and benefits of the measures proposed 

The following tables summarise the costs and benefits for IMs and RUs of the measures provided for 
2025-2050.  Overall,  measure  9  (a  reliable  timetable  for  TCR  activities)  is  expected  to  lead  to  the 
highest savings for both RUs and IMs. 

Table 45: Cost and benefits per measure for IMs 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

M 1 - Administrative cost-savings for IMs (EUR) 

Lower bound estimate 

1,096,683 

1,201,664 

1,670,184 

2,407,866 

Upper bound estimate 

816,136 

894,262 

1,241,765 

1,790,224 

M 2 – Adjustment cost-savings for IMs (EUR) 

Estimate 

398,805 

415,050 

648,316 

1,518,185 

M3 - Adjustment cost-savings for IMs (EUR) 

Lower bound estimate 

 848,667  

 883,237  

 1,379,632  

 3,230,733  

Upper bound estimate 

 509,200  

 529,942  

 827,779  

 1,938,440  

M 4 – Increase in revenues for IMs (EUR million)  

Estimate 

12.5 

13.3 

15.4 

18.0 

M 5 – Cost and benefit estimates for IM (EUR) 

Adjustment costs  

1,316,020 

1,441,997 

1,913,150 

2,758,145 

Administrative cost-savings  

2,083,698 

2,283,162 

3,029,154 

4,367,063 

M 7 - Administrative cost-savings for IMs (EUR) 

Lower bound estimate 

 13,619,340  

 14,174,115  

 22,140,224  

 51,846,544  

Upper bound estimate 

 6,809,670  

 7,087,058  

 11,070,112  

 25,923,272  

M 8 - Increase in revenues for IMs (EUR million) 

124 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network 
capacity and relevant framework conditions 

 Lower bound estimate 

 Upper bound estimate 

 16.63 

 8.31  

17.79 

 8.90  

20.57 

 10.28  

24.02 

 12.05 

PM 9 - Administrative cost-savings for IMs (EUR million) 

Estimate 

25.57 

27.85 

32.87 

38.47 

Table 46: Cost and benefits per measure for RUs 

2025 

2030 

2040 

2050 

M 1 - Administrative cost-savings for RUs (EUR) 

Lower bound estimate 

10,963,609 

12,013,110 

15,938,233 

22,977,788 

Upper bound estimate 

2,039,741 

2,234,997 

2,965,253 

4,274,937 

M 2 – Adjustment cost-savings for RUs (EUR) 

Estimate 

1,262,158 

1,313,571 

2,051,822 

4,804,824 

M 3 - Adjustment cost-savings for RUs (EUR) 

Lower bound estimate 

 848,667  

 883,237  

 1,379,632  

 3,230,733  

Upper bound estimate 

 509,200  

 529,942  

 827,779  

 1,938,440  

M 4 – Increase in revenues for RUs (EUR million) 

Estimate 

46.4 

49.6 

57.3 

66.6 

M 5 – Administrative cost-savings for RUs (EUR) 

Estimate 

1,645,025 

1,802,496 

2,598,618 

3,746,368 

M 7 – Administrative cost-savings for RUs (EUR) 

Lower bound estimate 

 1,316,020  

 1,369,627  

 2,139,382  

 5,009,867  

Upper bound estimate 

 658,010  

 684,813  

 1,069,691  

 2,504,933  

M 8 – Increase in revenues for RUs (EUR million) 

Lower bound estimate 

 61.45  

 65.59  

Upper bound estimate 

 30.72  

 32.79  

 75.67  

 37.84  

 87.98  

 43.99  

M 9 – Administrative cost-savings for RUs (EUR million) 

Estimate 

161.54 

174.45 

203.70 

237.16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Study assessing the management of infrastructure works affecting rail network capacity 
and relevant framework conditions 

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doi 10.2832/8787968