Opinion of the European Central Bank of 4 August 2025 on civil crisis and national defence (CON/2025/18)
Date: 2025-08-04
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: banking supervision, financial stability, foreign-exchange reserves, legal basis, monetary policy, money, payment system

ECB-PUBLIC

EN 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 4 August 2025  

on civil crisis and national defence  

(CON/2025/18) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 11 June 2025, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Government Office of the 

Republic of Estonia for an opinion on a draft law on the Law on civil crisis and national defence1 (hereinafter 

the ‘draft law’).  

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the second, third, fifth and sixth indents of Article 2(1) of 

Council  Decision  98/415/EC2,  as  the  draft  law  relates  to  means  of  payment,  Eesti  Pank,  payment  and 

settlement systems, rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability 

of financial institutions and markets, and the ECB’s tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit 

institutions  pursuant  to  Article  127(6)  TFEU.  In  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  Article  17.5  of  the 

Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1.

Purpose of the draft law

1.1  The draft law establishes a comprehensive legal framework for crisis management in the Republic

of  Estonia.  In  particular,  the  draft  law:  (1)  consolidates  various  crisis-response  mechanisms 

previously addressed in separate legal acts into a unified structure; (2) establishes procedures for 

coordinated  crisis  management  across  the  civil  and  military  sectors;  and  (3)  identifies  essential 

services and sets continuity requirements for crisis situations.  

1.2  According to the  explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft  law, the  nature and scope  of 

potential crises cannot be fully predicted, and multiple crises in different sectors or of varying severity 

may occur simultaneously or consecutively. Crisis situations can escalate rapidly and necessitate 

proportionate  responses  through  available  legal  instruments.  The  draft  law  aims  to  establish  the 

shortest  possible  chain  of  command  and  promotes  comprehensive  risk  assessments  to  facilitate 

coordinated efforts among multiple stakeholders, with a central objective of ensuring the stability and 

resilience of the financial sector during crisis situations. Through  the unification of crisis response 

1 
2 

Tsiviilkriisi ja riigikaitse seadus, eelnõu. 
Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 

mechanisms,  the  draft  law  seeks  to  improve  institutional  readiness  and  ensure  effective  crisis 

management across all levels of governance3. 

1.3  The draft law defines crisis situations broadly to encompass various types of emergencies that may 

require  a  coordinated  government  response.  A  crisis  situation  is  deemed  to  exist  when  all  of  the 

following conditions are met: (1) pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity, the competent authority or 

person cannot, or cannot in a timely manner, resolve the crisis or avert the threat or prepare for it, 

and it is necessary at the level of the Government of the Republic to ensure unified and coordinated 

actions by several authorities or persons; (2) the situation cannot be resolved without applying the 

management arrangements prescribed in the draft law or without applying measures that restrict a 

person’s  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms;  and  (3)  more  than  the  usual  capabilities  are  needed, 

including personnel, resources, and reserves, and either a civil crisis 4 needs to be resolved, or there 

is a threat to national security or the constitutional order or it is necessary to participate in a collective 

self-defence operation.5 

1.4  Under  the  draft  law,  Eesti  Pank  assumes  a  dual  role  as  both  national  central  bank  (NCB)  and 

essential service continuity organiser for payment services and cash circulation. The draft law also 

amends the Law on Eesti Pank 6 to set out the permanent tasks that must be maintained during crises 

(hereinafter ‘Eesti Pank’s permanent crisis tasks’), many of which overlap with the tasks which Eesti 

Pank must already perform, as follows 7: (1) to help define the monetary policy of the Union and to 

implement the monetary policy set by the ECB’s Governing Council; (2) to hold and manage official 

reserves of foreign currency; (3) to regulate the circulation of money, to facilitate the issuance of euro 

banknotes and to issue euro coins8; (4) to ensure the functioning of payment systems managed by 

Eesti  Pank 9;  (5)  to  contribute  to  the  stability  of  the  financial  system,  including  by  participating  in 

financial crisis resolution 10; and (6) to perform the functions of a business continuity manager for a 

critical service11. The draft law clarifies that Eesti Pank would be subject to orders by the government 

3    
4    

5    

6  
7  
8    

9    

10   

11   

See pp. 11–12 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law. 
A civil crisis is a natural disaster, catastrophe or outbreak of a communicable disease, or other situation that may cause 
serious and widespread disruption to the functioning of society, or pose an immediate threat to the life and health of a 
large number of people, or cause major material, economic or environmental damage. See Section 2(1) of the draft 
law. 
A  collective self-defence operation conducted  to  fulfil  an  obligation under an  international  agreement based  on  the 
right recognised in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, or another lawfully incurred obligation. See Section 
136 p. 1 and Section 3 of the draft law.  
Law on Eesti Pank (Eesti Panga seadus, RT I 1993, 28, 498, RT I, 01.03.2023, 45). 
See Section 186 p. 1 of the draft law.  
The tasks listed in clauses (1) to (3) herein are tasks which Eesti Pank must already perform in all circumstances under 
Section 2(2) points 1, 2 and 5 of the Law on Eesti Pank.  
The tasks listed under clause (4) herein seem to relate to the general task of Eesti Pank currently set out in Section 
2(2) point 4 of the Law on Eesti Pank (‘to promote the efficient operation of payment systems, to exercise oversight of 
payment systems and to participate in the development of the clearing environment’).  
The task listed under clause (5) herein seems to relate to the general task of Eesti Pank currently set out in Section 
2(2) point 3 of the Law on Eesti Pank (‘to promote the stability of the financial system and to exercise macro-prudential 
supervision (hereinafter “macroprudential supervision”) over the financial system’). 
According to the draft law, Eesti Pank will perform the functions of a business continuity manager for payment services, 
technical support services for payment services, and cash circulation. The task listed under (6) seems to relate to the 
general task of Eesti Pank currently set out in Section 36(3) of the Law on emergency (Hädaolukorra seadus, RT I, 
2017, 1, RT I, 22.05.2025, 4), whereby Eesti Pank organises the continuity of payment services and cash circulation. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
authority  responsible  for  dealing  with  the  crisis  situation  within  the  scope  of  the  Eesti  Pank’s 

permanent crisis tasks when strictly necessary 12. 

1.5  Beyond  Eesti  Pank’s  permanent  crisis  tasks  as  outlined  above,  the  draft  law  assigns  several 

additional crisis-related duties to Eesti Pank.  

First, Eesti Pank would participate in the preparation of the national risk analysis in cooperation with 

the Estonian Financial Supervision and Resolution Authority (Finantsinspektsioon)13. According to 

the  explanatory  memorandum  accompanying  the  draft  law,  this  involves  analysing  country-wide 

threats that could lead to crisis situations and assessing their likelihood and consequences. Eesti 

Pank  is  expected  to  contribute  expertise  on  financial  sector  risks,  systemic  vulnerabilities,  and 

interdependencies, ensuring that payment and settlement systems are considered in national crisis 

scenarios.14 

Second, Eesti Pank would prepare and maintain crisis plans, either jointly with the Ministry of Finance 

or  Finantsinspektsioon,  and  submit  them  for  review15.  As  stated  in  the  explanatory  memorandum 

accompanying  the  draft  law,  crisis  plans  outline  necessary  actions,  capabilities,  governance 

arrangements,  and  coordination  measures  for  crisis  response.  These  plans  must  address  the 

continuity of central banking functions, payment systems, and cash circulation, and must be regularly 

updated. 16 

Third, Eesti Pank would act as the organiser of essential services related to payment services and 

cash circulation 17, which entails coordinating continuity measures, advising service providers, setting 

continuity  requirements,  supervising  compliance,  approving  risk  analyses  and  crisis  plans,  and 

leading the resolution of major interruptions 18. 

Fourth, Eesti Pank would reserve mandatory crisis task positions for its President and the Chairman 

of its Supervisory Board, and would be able to classify such further positions as necessary19. Key 

leadership  positions  are  designated  as  crisis  roles  with  work  obligations  to  ensure  institutional 

continuity  during  emergencies.  The  draft  law  requires  these  positions  to  retain  critical  decision-

making  authority,  while  allowing  flexibility  to  designate  additional  staff  as  necessary  for 

comprehensive crisis management. 

Fifth, Eesti Pank would assess and designate which credit institutions, payment institutions, and e-

money institutions qualify as essential service providers, and would set detailed requirements and 

procedures for such assessments, including the  obligation to enable  offline card-based payments 

under  certain  crisis  conditions 20.  In  this  respect,  Eesti  Pank  would  establish  objective  criteria  for 

essential service designation and determine which financial institutions provide vital services based 

See Section 40(7) of the draft law. 
See Section 11(3) p. 2 of the draft law. 
See pp. 48–49 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law. 
See Section 15(1) - (6) of the draft law. 
See p. 66 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law. 

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13   
14   
15   
16   
17    Under  the  Law  on  Eesti  Pank  already  has  the  task  of  organising  the  continuity  of  vital  services  such  as  payment 

services and cash circulation. See Section 36(3) points 1 and 2 of the Law on emergency. 
See Section 73(3) points 12 and 17 and Section 74(1), (3), (5) to (11) of the draft law. 
See Section 100(3) of the draft law. 
See Sections 186, 213 and 222 of the draft law. 

18   
19   
20   

3 

 
 
 
 
on  their  impact  on  payment  operations,  and  may  require  capabilities  such  as  offline  payment 

processing to ensure financial system resilience during network disruptions. 

Sixth,  Eesti  Pank  would  participate  in  the  management  of  the  State's  cash  flow  and  stabilisation 

reserve during crisis situations, upon request by the Ministry of Finance21. The Ministry of Finance 

may involve Eesti Pank in managing State financial resources and reserves during crisis situations. 

Eesti  Pank  would  provide  expertise  and  operational  support  for  managing  State  liquidity  and  the 

stabilisation reserve, especially when rapid and coordinated action is required during emergencies 

to enhance financial resilience and ensure availability of critical funds. 

1.6  The  draft  law  sets  out  special  measures  for  the  financial  sector  during  emergency  situations  and 

national defence crises. It empowers the Government, in coordination with the Finantsinspektsioon, 

to impose extraordinary rules on financial institutions when normal legal instruments are insufficient 

to avert serious threats to financial stability, public order, or national security 22. The draft law grants 

the Government broad discretionary powers over financial sector entities. Provided that the stability 

and soundness of the financial sector, or the continuity of critical functions, are not unduly impaired, 

the Government may decide on measures applicable to the entities under financial supervision where 

a state of emergency or martial law affects the financial sector. 

1.7  The most significant measures the Government may adopt include the following. 

First, the Government may establish prudential or similar standards. The Government may impose 

prudential requirements or other comparable norms, especially in relation to credit institutions and 

certain  other  financial  sector  entities.  It  may  also  deviate  from  standard  prudential  thresholds  if 

necessary. 

Second, the Government may impose conditions on making of investments, including requiring the 

purchase of debt securities issued by the sovereign. This power is subject to the following important 

limitations: it cannot be used to compel investments that are already required for compliance with 

prudential  standards,  the  minimum  requirement  for  eligible  liabilities,  or  other  similar  regulatory 

obligations 

that  apply 

to  entities  under 

financial  supervision.  These 

requirements  are 

comprehensively governed by Union regulations, including those implemented through the Estonian 

Law on financial crisis prevention and resolution23. 

Third,  the  Government  may  prohibit  disbursements  of  profits  or  impose  other  conditions  on  the 

holders  of  qualifying  holdings  in  entities  subject  to  financial  supervision.  The  Government  may 

prohibit or limit profit distributions or impose other conditions on significant shareholders to ensure 

sustainable management of the institution’s cash flows 24. 

Fourth,  the  Government  may  prohibit  or  restrict  certain  transactions  or  operations,  including  their 

volume.  The  Government  may  further  determine  by  order:  repayment  terms,  lending  conditions, 

insurance payouts, securities trading, payment execution, and other measures needed to address 

21   
22   
23   

24   

See Section 241 of the draft law. 
See Section 36 of the draft law. 
See  pp.  120–121  of  the  explanatory  memorandum  accompanying  the  draft  law.  Estonian  Law  on  financial  crisis 
prevention and resolution (Finantskriisi ennetamise ja lahendamise seadus, RT I, 19.03.2015, 3, RT I, 11.10.2024, 5). 
The explanatory  memorandum accompanying  the  draft  law  states  that similar  restrictions  were  encouraged  by  the 
ECB and European Systemic Risk Board during the COVID-19 crisis. See p. 121 of the explanatory memorandum 
accompanying the draft law. 

4 

 
 
 
 
the  crisis.  These  measures  aim  to  ensure  optimal  cash  flow  and  resource  management  within 

supervised  entities  and  are  applied  only  when  necessary  to  resolve  a  crisis  and  ensure  societal 

functioning. Restrictions may include limits on transaction hours or suspension of specific services 

such as investment or foreign exchange services. 

Fifth, the Government may suspend regular contributions within the meaning of the Guarantee Fund 

Act to the sub-funds of the Guarantee Fund. 

Sixth,  the  Government  may  implement  a  complete  or  partial  moratorium  on  credit  institution 

operations or establish a special regulatory regime for insurance companies. Such measures enable 

the temporary suspension or restriction of a bank's or insurance company's activities in accordance 

with specified procedures and conditions 25. 

1.8  Declaring  a  state  of  emergency  alone  does  not,  in  itself,  authorise  the  Government  to  adopt  the 

above  measures.  For  example,  if  a  state  of  emergency  has  been  declared,  but  it  does  not  affect 

financial  sector  stability  in  any  way,  then  it  is  neither  necessary  nor  legally  possible  to  apply  the 

measures  set  out  in  the  draft  law  to  the  financial  sector.  However,  if  a  state  of  emergency  or 

extraordinary situation significantly affects the  provision of an essential service such as electricity 

supply  and  this  significantly  affects,  for  example,  the  work  of  credit  institutions,  then  in  such 

circumstances it may be necessary under the draft law to introduce certain measures to maintain 

sector stability 26. 

1.9  A decision by the Government to impose an extraordinary rule may be adopted for a period of up to 

three months, following consultation with the Finantsinspektsioon and Eesti Pank 27. The Government 

may extend the validity of such a decision for up to three months at a time, depending on the specific 

circumstances and the continued relevance and necessity of the measure 28. 

1.10  The draft law provides that if the Government intends to impose an extraordinary rule on matters 

within the competence of the ECB or the Single Resolution Board (SRB), the Government may do 

so only if the ECB or the SRB does not actually exercise its tasks or is unable to do so in Estonia29.  

As noted in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, where Council Regulation 

(EU)  No  1024/201330  and  Regulation  (EU)  No  806/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 

Council31  grant  exclusive  competence  to  the  ECB  or  the  SRB,  a  special  procedure  applies  if  the 

Government  intends  to  act  in  their  place.  The  Government  may  act  only  in  two  distinct  and 

independent situations: (i) where the ECB or the SRB is not actually functioning, or (ii) where these 

institutions are unable to perform their tasks or exercise their powers in Estonia due to crisis or other 

reasons.  This  includes  inaction,  failure  to  issue  necessary  decisions,  or  the  absence  of  active 

See Section 36(1) and (2) of the draft law. 
See p. 117 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law. 
See Section 36(4) of the draft law. 
See p. 122 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law. 
See Section 36(5) of the draft law. 

25   
26   
27   
28   
29   
30    Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  (OJ  L  287,  29.10.2013,  p.  63, 
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). 

31    Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform 
rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of 
a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ L 
225, 30.7.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/806/oj). 

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supervisory  engagement,  as  well  as  technical  or  operational  barriers  such  as  IT  failures  or 

communication breakdowns32. In addition, where an opinion has been requested from the ECB or 

the SRB on a planned decision and no response has been received within the timeframe set by the 

Estonian Government, the Government is entitled to proceed with the decision 33. 

1.11  The  explanatory  memorandum  accompanying  the  draft  law  state  that  under  Estonian  law  the 

Finantsinspektsioon  is  responsible  for  increasing  financial  sector  stability  and  resolving  financial 

crises34.  However,  its  powers  under  the  law  are  limited  to  a  certain  extent,  particularly  regarding 

banking,  where  direct  supervision  of  significant  credit  institutions  and  the  supervision  of  less 

significant credit institutions are conferred on the ECB under Regulation (EU) No 1024/201335. 

1.12  The  explanatory  memorandum  accompanying  the  draft  law  indicate  that  the  proposed  regulatory 

framework  draws,  in  part,  upon  the  crisis  management  framework  established  in  Finland.  In  this 

context, the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law specifically reference the ECB’s 

previous opinions concerning Finland’s emergency legislation 36 and identify Article 347 of the TFEU 

as  providing  the  legal  basis  for  national  derogations  from  ordinary  TFEU  obligations  under 

exceptional circumstances 37. 

2. 

Observations  

Overlap with tasks of the ECB and the ESCB 

2.1   Many of Eesti Pank’s permanent crisis tasks under the draft law overlap with the tasks which Eesti 

Pank  must  already  perform  under  the  TFEU  and  the  Statute  of  the  European  System  of  Central 

Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), including the basic 

tasks to be carried out through the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) under Article 127(2), 

first, third and fourth indents, of the TFEU, namely: to define and implement monetary policy; to hold 

and manage foreign reserves; and to promote the smooth operation of payment systems.  

2.3  The ECB has noted in its  past opinions that under the TFEU several competences are conferred 

irrevocably on the Union. This includes the exclusive competence for monetary policy for Member 

States whose currency is the euro38. A Member State whose currency is the euro transfers to the 

Union its powers in the area of monetary policy and the tasks of the ESCB listed in the TFEU and 

the  Statute  of  the  ESCB.  These  powers  and  tasks  include  setting  interest  rates,  injecting  or 

withdrawing  liquidity  in  the  market,  ensuring  efficient  and  sound  clearing  and  payment  systems, 

managing  foreign  reserves,  issuing  banknotes,  and  contributing  to  the  stability  of  the  financial 

system. In these areas, certain policy-making and legislative powers belong exclusively to the ECB39, 

32   
33   
34   

35   
36   
37   
38   
39   

See p. 122 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law. 
See Section 36(5) and (6) of the draft law and p. 122 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law. 
See  p.  116  of  the  explanatory  memorandum  accompanying  the  draft  law,  which  refers  to  such  duties  of 
Finantsinspektsioon under Sections 3 and 4 of the Law on the financial supervision authority (Finantsinspektsiooni 
seadus, RT I 2001, 48, 267, RT I, 31.12.2024, 43). 
See pp. 116–117 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law. 
See ECB Opinions CON/2002/27, CON/2006/6 and CON/2018/46. All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 
See p. 123 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law. 
See Article 3(1), point (c), of the TFEU. 
See Articles 8 and 12 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

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including  contingency  planning  with  respect  to  the  continued  performance  of  these  powers  and 

tasks40.  

2.4  Moreover,  under  Article  127(6)  of  the  TFEU  and  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/2013,  specific  tasks 

concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions have been conferred upon the ECB. These 

include the granting and withdrawal of authorisations to take up the business of a credit institution, 

the assessment of acquisitions of qualifying holdings in credit institutions, the imposition of prudential 

requirements, reporting and disclosure obligations, and ensuring compliance with the relevant Union 

law as specified in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.  

2.5  This implies that Member States should refrain from taking any measures which could jeopardise the 

ECB's or the ESCB's objectives, and exceptions under Article 347 of the TFEU should be narrowly 

interpreted by Member States as further discussed in the paragraphs below.  

2.6  More specifically, the ECB notes that while the draft law provides that the Estonian Government may 

act only if the ECB does not actually operate or exercise its competence in Estonia due to a crisis 

situation  or  other  reasons,  the  criteria  for  determining  such  inability  remain  insufficiently  defined. 

Such situations may include information technology or communication failures, as well as instances 

where  a  decision  or  opinion  from  the  ECB  is  not  received  within  timelines  set  by  the  Estonian 

Government41. The ECB emphasises that its competences under the TFEU and Regulation (EU) No 

1024/2013  apply  in  all  circumstances,  including  during  emergency  conditions,  and  cannot  be 

unilaterally set aside by national authorities based on unilateral determinations of the ECB's ability 

to act. The determination that the ECB is unable to perform its tasks cannot be based on situations 

where  the  ECB  is  functioning  but  may  not  respond  within  nationally  imposed  deadlines  or  where 

technical difficulties do not fundamentally impair the ECB's decision-making capacity. Any national 

measures that would effectively replace ECB competences must comply strictly with the conditions 

laid down in Article 347 of the TFEU. 

2.7  More broadly, as previously noted by the ECB, pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation under 

Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, Member States must assist the ECB in these fields, 

carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties42.  

Emergency derogations under Article 347 of the TFEU 

2.8   Article 347 of the TFEU envisages that a Member State may be called upon to take action in the 

event  of  serious  internal  disturbances  affecting  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order,  war,  serious 

international tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted 

for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  peace  and  international  security 43.  Accordingly,  in  the  event  of 

emergency conditions under Article 347 of the TFEU, which may include situations that would be 

40   

41   
42   

43   

See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2014/24, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/2, and paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of 
Opinion CON/2021/35. 
See pp. 122–123 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law.   
See  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion  CON/2021/3,  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion  CON/2020/2,  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion 
CON/2020/15, and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2018/46. 
See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2020/2, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2021/35, and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion 
CON/2014/24. 

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classified  as  such  under  the  draft  law,  national  authorities  may  be  justified  in  exercising,  on  a 

temporary basis, powers that fall within the exclusive competence of the ESCB. 44  

2.9  Any reliance on Article 347 of the TFEU must take place strictly under conditions laid down in the 

TFEU itself, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Article 347 of the 

TFEU deals with exceptional cases which are clearly defined and are to be interpreted in a restrictive 

manner, and it can, therefore, be understood only as a ‘hedging clause’ and not as an expression of 

any residual Member State competence 45. Moreover, the CJEU has held that when acting due to 

urgency in areas of exclusive Union competence, Member States may act only as ‘trustees of the 

common interest’ and may not bring into force any interim measures except as part of a process of 

collaboration with the Union46.  

2.10  Due to the exceptional nature of Article 347 of the TFEU, Member States should refrain from adopting 

preventive legislation in the absence of the conditions laid down in Article 347 of the TFEU. Even in 

situations involving serious internal disturbances affecting law and order, war, or serious international 

tension constituting a threat of war, or for the purpose of fulfilling obligations aimed at maintaining 

peace and international security, national authorities may be justified in exercising, on a temporary 

and  exceptional  basis,  powers  that  fall  within  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  ESCB,  acting 

essentially as trustees of the common interest47. While Member States may establish preparatory 

frameworks,  organisational  structures  and  planning  mechanisms  for  crisis  response,  concrete 

measures  that  would  conflict  with  TFEU  obligations  may  only  be  implemented  when  Article  347 

conditions  are  actually  met  and  after  proper  consultation  with  EU  institutions 48.  If  the  national 

legislature wishes to rely on Article 347 of the TFEU, it is for the Member State to ensure that the 

conditions for applying it are specifically fulfilled at the time of adopting the measure that conflicts 

with  that  Member  State’s  TFEU  obligations.  The  draft  law  should  not  lead  to  a  breach  of  TFEU 

obligations applicable to a Member State. 

Independence of the ESCB NCBs and SSM 

2.11  The ECB notes that, pursuant to Article 130 of the TFEU, when exercising the powers and carrying 

out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, an NCB 

shall not seek or take instructions from any government of a Member State or any other body, and 

the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence 

the members of the decision-making bodies of the NCBs in the performance of their tasks. 

2.12  Furthermore, the  ECB notes that the draft law  also  aims to replace, under certain conditions, the 

competences of the ECB with respect to the prudential supervision of credit institutions under Article 

127(6) of  the TFEU and Regulation (EU) No 1024/201349. In this regard,  Article 19 of Regulation 

(EU) No 1024/2013 stipulates that, when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, 

44  
45   
46   

47   
48   

49  

See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2020/2 and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2014/24. 
See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2020/2 and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2021/35. 
See paragraph 10 of Opinion CON/2002/27, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2021/35, and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion 
CON/2020/2. 
See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2014/24 and paragraph 10.2.2 of Opinion CON/2020/13. 
See C. Zilioli, ‘National Emergency Powers and Exclusive Community Competences – A Crack in the Dam?’, Legal 
Aspects of the European System of Central Banks, European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 2005, pp. 115-133, at 
pp. 131-132. 
See Article 1 and recital 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 

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the  ECB  and  the  national  competent  authorities  acting  within  the  Single  Supervisory  Mechanism 

(SSM)  must  act  independently,  also  requiring  that  the  governments  of  the  Member  States  must 

respect that independence. 

2.13  Under the draft law, Eesti Pank would be subject to orders by the government authority responsible 

for  dealing  with  the  crisis  situation  within  the  scope  of  Eesti  Pank’s  permanent  crisis  tasks  when 

strictly  necessary.  However,  the  ECB  understands  that  the  draft  law  does  not  allow  for  any 

interference with the performance of the tasks conferred on Eesti Pank as part of the ESCB by the 

TFEU or Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 as a constitutional institution under Estonian law. However, 

to avoid doubts, this should be explicitly clarified in the draft law. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 4 August 2025. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

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