Summary of Commission Decision of 18 July 2025 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.40728 – CORNING) (notified under document number C(2025) 4743 final)
Date: 2025-07-18
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy, contract, control of restrictive practices, dominant position, electronic device, exclusive purchasing agreement, glass, mobile phone, patent








C_202600714EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2026/714


9.2.2026






Summary of Commission Decision
of 18 July 2025
         
relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement
(Case AT.40728 – CORNING)


(notified under document number C(2025) 4743 final)


(Only the English version is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(C/2026/714)


On 18 July 2024, the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA agreement. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
          (1)
, the Commission herewith publishes the names of the parties and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed, having regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.

1.   INTRODUCTION









(1)


This Decision makes legally binding the commitments offered by Corning Inc. (‘Corning’) under Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘the Treaty’) and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement.




2.   PROCEDURE









(2)


On 6 November 2024 the Commission initiated proceedings with a view to adopting a decision under Chapter III of Regulation 1/2003 and adopted a preliminary assessment referred to in Article 9(1) of that regulation (‘Preliminary Assessment’), which set out the Commission’s preliminary competition concerns.












(3)


Corning did not agree with the Commission’s Preliminary Assessment and findings. Nevertheless, on 13 November 2024, Corning submitted draft commitments (‘the Initial Commitments’) to the Commission in response to the Preliminary Assessment.












(4)


On 29 November 2024, a notice was published in the Official Journal of the European Union pursuant to Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003, summarising the case and the Initial Commitments and inviting interested third parties to give their observations on the Initial Commitments until 13 January 2025.












(5)


On 7 March 2025 the Commission informed Corning of the observations received from interested third parties following the publication of the notice. On 11 June 2025, Corning submitted an amended proposal for commitments (‘the Final Commitments’).












(6)


On 30 June 2025, the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions was consulted and issued a favourable opinion.












(7)


On 2 July 2025, the Hearing Officer issued his final report.




3.   THE COMMISSION’S COMPETITION CONCERNS









(8)


In the Preliminary Assessment, the Commission expressed concerns that Corning may have held a dominant position on the worldwide market for the supply of Alkali-aluminosilicate glass (‘Alkali-AS Glass’), a special type of glass mainly used as cover glass in smartphones and other handheld electronic devices. It also found that products developed by Corning for Apple Inc. (‘Apple’) are not part of this market, as these products have special compositions and are only used by Apple.












(9)


Moreover, the Commission preliminarily found that Corning may have abused its dominant position in the market for Alkali-AS Glass in breach of Article 102 of the Treaty by concluding exclusive agreements with manufacturers (Original Equipment Manufacturers or ‘OEMs’) of handheld electronic devices and with companies that process raw Alkali-AS Glass (‘finishers’).












(10)


As to the agreements with OEMs, the Commission took the preliminary view that, Corning entered into agreements containing (1) exclusive sourcing obligations requiring OEMs to source all or nearly all of their Alkali-AS Glass demand from Corning, (2) exclusivity rebates, i.e. rebates granted to OEMs on the condition that they comply with the exclusive sourcing obligations and (3) ‘English clauses’ obliging OEMs to report to Corning on competitive offers, and allowing OEMs to accept that offer only if Corning fails to match the price.












(11)


As to the agreements with finishers, the Commission took the preliminary view that Corning entered into agreements containing (1) exclusive purchase obligations obliging finishers to purchase all, or nearly all, of their Alkali-AS Glass demand, or an important subtype of Alkali-AS Glass, from Corning and (2) no challenge clauses preventing finishers from challenging Corning's patents.




4.   THE INITIAL COMMITMENTS, THE MARKET TEST AND THE FINAL COMMITMENTS?









(12)


The Initial Commitments Corning offered can be summarised as follows:






—


In current contracts with OEMs and finishers, Corning committed to waive all exclusive dealing arrangements mentioned in paragraphs (10) and (11) above. In future contracts, Corning committed not to use such clauses or similar clauses that have the same effect. In addition, the following rules applied:






(a)


Agreements with OEMs: In relation to the OEMs’ EEA demand, Corning may not use any purchasing requirements (i.e., 0 %) or price advantages (e.g., rebates, discounts) conditional upon compliance with such requirements. For the OEMs’ worldwide demand, Corning may not (1) require an OEM to source, or condition price advantages on sourcing, more than 50 % of its combined demand for NAS Glass, LAS Glass and Clear Glass Ceramics covers from Corning (overall cap); (2) require an OEM to source, or condition price advantages on sourcing, more than 50 % of its demand for LAS Glass from Corning (LAS Glass cap); or (3) require an OEM to source, or condition price advantages on sourcing, more than 50 % of its demand for Clear Glass Ceramics from Corning (Clear Glass Ceramics cap).










(b)


Agreements with finishers: Corning may not require a finisher to purchase, or condition price advantages on purchasing, more than 50 % of its combined demand for NAS Glass, LAS Glass, and Clear Ceramics from Corning (overall cap).














—


When enforcing its patents, Corning committed (1) to sue for patent infringement, but not for breach of contract and (2) not to use any mechanism under contract law (contractual penalties, early termination, contractual damages etc.) for the enforcement of its patents.










—


Corning committed to deliver a market communication to OEMs and finishers explaining the content of the commitments in English and Chinese Mandarin.










—


The commitments applied worldwide for a period of nine years. An independent Monitoring Trustee was to verify compliance with the commitments and will report to the Commission.










—


Corning committed not to circumvent the commitments in any way (anti- circumvention clause).
















(13)


Respondents to the market test welcomed the general aim of the Initial Commitments, which would grant Corning’s competitors better access to customers purchasing Alkali-AS Glass. However, they also identified certain terms and clauses that would need to be modified to rectify potential gaps and avoid ambiguities, mainly relating to the scope of the Commitments, the role of third parties in patent disputes, Corning’s reporting obligations and the anti- circumvention clause.












(14)


In response to these observations, Corning submitted the Final Commitments, with the following key improvements:






—


Broadening certain terms of the commitments to avoid circumvention. The term ‘agreement’ in the Final Commitments includes not only formal contracts but also informal written agreements and oral agreements. Correspondingly, the terms ‘clauses’ and ‘provisions’ are replaced with broader terms such as ‘conditions’ or ‘obligations’. Moreover, the Final Commitments clarify that they apply not only to ‘percentage requirements’ but also to volume commitments or any other exclusive purchase obligation or price incentives conditioned on exclusive purchasing.










—


Regarding interventions by third parties in patent disputes, the Final Commitments clarify that third parties need not be ‘interested’ to apply for interventions in arbitration proceedings. Furthermore, the Monitoring Trustee may notify not only OEMs and finishers but also competitors of any final judgment or award regarding patent validity.










—


The Final Commitments oblige Corning to provide the Monitoring Trustee regularly with a reliable market intelligence report and data on their position on the relevant market. In addition, not only OEMs, finishers or competitors, but also any third party who suspects non-compliance with the commitments can submit a complaint to the Monitoring Trustee.










—


The Final Commitments include an Annex with a note that further clarifies the anti- circumvention clause.








5.   CONCLUSION









(15)


The Commission considers that the Final Commitments effectively meet the competition concerns identified in its Preliminary Assessment without being disproportionate. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission has taken into consideration the interests of third parties, including those that have responded to the market test.






(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2003/1/oj) (hereafter, ‘Regulation No 1/2003’).


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/714/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)