Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 (JOIN(2025) 120 final)
Date: 2025-07-17
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: EU financing, EU investment, European arms policy, European defence policy, European security, Ukraine, arms industry, common security and defence policy, defence expenditure, military equipment








C_202505162EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/5162


28.10.2025






Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee
Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030


(JOIN(2025) 120 final)


(C/2025/5162)


Rapporteur: 
Marcin NOWACKI

Co-rapporteur: 
Carlos Manuel TRINDADE






Advisor


Paulo José FERNANDES PEDROSO (to the co-rapporteur)




Referral


11.4.2025




Legal basis


Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union




Section responsible


External Relations Section




Adopted in section


12.6.2025




Adopted at plenary session


17.7.2025




Plenary session No


598




Outcome of vote
(for/against/abstentions)


137/3/0




1.   Conclusions and recommendations









1.1.


The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) supports a comprehensive, inclusive European defence strategy that integrates military readiness with civil preparedness, social resilience, diplomacy, international law and the promotion of peace, democracy and human rights. It endorses the European Commission’s White Paper and calls for a coordinated EU approach that treats defence, peace and security as shared public goods, underpinned by strong legal, institutional and financial frameworks with democratic oversight.












1.2.


The EU must urgently address hybrid and conventional threats, reduce dependency on external players and strengthen strategic autonomy. This requires investment in critical technologies with a focus on enhancing Europe’s industrial and technological capabilities, ensuring Europe remains competitive in the global defence market.












1.3.


The EESC highlights the need for targeted support for SMEs and regional development, advocating simplified procedures, equitable access to funding and stronger integration into the defence value chains. This will drive innovation and enhance the competitiveness of the EU’s defence industry, while ensuring that high social, environmental and labour standards are maintained.












1.4.


Defence investment must encompass civil infrastructure, education and dual-use technologies, including in the domains of military medicine and cybersecurity. Strategic foresight, workforce training, and support for research and development in these areas are critical for ensuring Europe’s technological edge and long-term defence capacity.












1.5.


The EESC supports the call for action in the European Council’s conclusions on European defence, issued on 6 March 2025 (1). The EU must act swiftly to close critical capability gaps, mobilising the necessary instruments to bolster the security of the EU and enhance the protection of its citizens. Investment in transport, energy and digital infrastructure must be aligned with military mobility and supply chain resilience, ensuring that Europe’s defence capabilities are supported by a robust industrial base.












1.6.


The EESC welcomes the proposed financing mechanisms, but stresses the need to ensure that Member States each have equal and transparent access to funding. Also, it is essential that these mechanisms support fiscal fairness and promote social cohesion, as well as providing the stability necessary for defence-related industries to flourish, thereby enabling the business sector, articulating public and private sector, to play a very important role in strengthening Europe’s strategic defence capabilities.












1.7.


The EESC supports initiatives to assess the feasibility of solutions accepted by the Member States for the creation of a permanent defence financing mechanism, which could be derived from an intergovernmental agreement and involve non-EU countries.












1.8.


It is concerned that the limited flexibility proposed by the European Commission through the activation of national safeguard clauses for defence spending will not eliminate the risk of trade-offs between defence and social spending. In this context, the EESC proposes to the Commission, Council, European Parliament and Member States that the stability and growth pact be revised in order to allow there to be measures to promote growth-enhancing public investment in the fiscal framework. It also proposes that it be clearly stipulated that social and regional cohesion funds should not be allocated to defence expenditure – neither at European nor at Member State level.












1.9.


The EESC highlights the strategic importance of Europe’s eastern flank and calls for strengthened cooperation with frontline states. This includes targeted investment in defence infrastructure, joint training and enhanced cross-border mobility to bolster EU security and resilience in the region.












1.10.


Close cooperation with NATO, third countries and key partners such as Ukraine is indispensable. The EU should prioritise joint training, technology sharing and cross-border mobility, which would foster shared innovation and increase collaboration on defence capabilities.




2.   Background









2.1.


The EESC emphasises that the EU’s security strategy must be complemented by a broader peace strategy across Europe, with the ultimate goal of achieving a just and sustainable peace. This strategy should also involve increased efforts to promote peace in global conflict zones. As the EESC has pointed out in previous opinions, lasting peace can only be achieved by addressing the root causes of conflict preventively and by promoting human dignity, equality and social progress. All measures must strictly adhere to United Nations (UN) charter and international law, including international humanitarian law (2).












2.2.


European public goods contribute to the collective welfare and security of all Europeans. Defence should be seen as an essential component of the common good, necessitating coordinated action at EU level, aligned with the EU’s values and international obligations.












2.3.


The EESC recognises that threats to democracy are closely tied to Europe’s security. The emergence of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, particularly in neighbouring regions, poses challenges to regional stability and democratic values. This evolving global landscape underscores how important it is for the EU to reinforce its security strategy while safeguarding its democratic principles.












2.4.


The EESC is also concerned about recent trends towards populism and autocracy, both within the EU itself and among NATO partners, including some worrying signs emerging from actions taken by the current US administration.












2.5.


This opinion comes in direct response to the White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, published by the Commission on 19 March 2025. The White Paper, together with the ReArm Europe Plan, marks a significant step forward in reshaping the EU’s defence landscape and is linked to the proposals of the Preparedness Union Strategy and ProtectEU, the new European internal security strategy.












2.6.


The White Paper provides a strategic framework that aligns with the EESC’s long-standing focus on defence and industrial policy. This opinion builds on the EESC’s previous work, supporting a coordinated EU approach to strengthening defence capabilities and industrial resilience (3). It also reflects the EESC’s recent exploratory opinion on defence funding in the EU, reaffirming the need for a comprehensive and stable financial framework (4).












2.7.


As emphasised in the White Paper, both the Niinistö and Draghi Reports highlight the fact that a lack of collaboration has led to significant inefficiencies in defence capability development, generating additional costs for Member States. Fragmented and inadequate defence spending, especially in innovation, has hindered progress in emerging disruptive technologies that are critical for Europe’s defence future.












2.8.


Strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities must be part of a broader EU industrialisation strategy that avoids taking steps that:






(a)


would run counter to efforts to create an environment of peace and to strengthen economic, social and regional cohesion in the EU; and










(b)


could jeopardise the EU’s security in the medium and long term. The White Paper marks a major shift, calling for a defence strategy that combines industrial, technological, societal and military capacity.




This opinion underscores the fact that enhancing EU defence readiness requires a holistic approach, where innovation, infrastructure and resilience are as crucial as military and civil preparedness.












2.9.


Strengthening Europe’s ability to innovate and produce critical defence technologies is vital for reducing reliance on external suppliers. This opinion calls for greater support for SMEs and closer collaboration with research institutions to meet defence needs and safeguard strategic autonomy.












2.10.


With a view to reducing the risk entailed in external dependencies, national and EU funding should support the development of industry and ensure that quality jobs in Europe are protected and created – and not only in security. The EU’s social acquis (existing regulations and legislation) must be consolidated and no exemptions must be allowed because of the need to boost military production.












2.11.


The EESC stresses the importance of expanding international defence cooperation, particularly with key global partners, to enhance Europe’s security stance. The White Paper’s emphasis on international collaboration is echoed in this opinion, which calls for stronger partnerships through technology sharing, coordinated defence strategies and other appropriate means to this end.




3.   General comments









3.1.


The EU should consider a comprehensive security strategy that includes military security, civil preparedness, social resilience, economic security and protection against other threats to democracy, such as foreign interference, cybersecurity and disinformation. It should also address climate change, the digital transition, natural disasters and global health risks, while strengthening public services and infrastructure, as well as ensuring strategic autonomy through a strong industrial policy.












3.2.


The EESC believes the EU must work towards a common defence policy within the broader framework of its foreign and security policy and establish a strong European Defence Pillar. To this end, the necessary legislative and financial measures must be taken urgently. At the same time, the EU needs to develop an active diplomatic role in seeking a just peace in Ukraine and other conflict zones such as the Middle East, particularly in the context of Palestine and Israel, in close cooperation with the relevant governments and in the framework of UN resolutions.












3.3.


The EESC highlights the need for a stronger EU security framework in light of Russia’s aggression. It supports Ukraine’s key role as a frontline state with defence expertise, stressing the importance of EU-Ukraine cooperation to enhance capabilities, innovation and resilience. The EESC also backs Ukraine’s integration into EU military mobility, joint defence and space assets for strategic collaboration.












3.4.


Prioritising the EU’s eastern flank, which would be in the front line of any hybrid and military aggression directed at the EU, the EESC supports the Eastern Border Shield initiative – an integrated border management strategy driven by frontline states – which represents a proactive and cooperative step to bolster EU collective defence and cohesion. In this context, the EESC also stresses the need to support Member States in rapidly developing their national defence capacities to safeguard essential security interests without delaying urgent measures.












3.5.


The EESC recognises the growing strategic importance of the Arctic in EU security. As climate change opens new shipping routes and access to resources becomes increasingly contested, the EU must strengthen its involvement in Arctic governance, ensuring stability, sustainable development and peaceful cooperation in this critical region.












3.6.


It underlines the importance of Mediterranean security for the EU, namely regarding migration and maritime security, as maritime transport is vital for the EU economy.












3.7.


The EESC advocates a transitional period allowing Member States to procure military equipment independently. While supporting the long-term goal of European defence autonomy, immediate replenishment needs must be addressed through all available means. Over the next five years, permitting off-the-shelf purchases will enable Member States to quickly respond to emerging threats and to maintain operational readiness.












3.8.


The EESC considers it crucial to concentrate efforts on plugging current critical defence capability gaps in order to ensure comprehensive defence preparedness and to increase its deterrence capacity, as decided by the European Council of 6 March 2025 and outlined in the White Paper, and is further substantiated by the Council’s adoption of Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 (5) establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE).












3.9.


The development and deployment of advanced communication and defence technologies, such as 5G and quantum systems, are essential for secure and effective operations. Strengthening collaboration between industry, research and academia will accelerate innovation and modernisation in these areas. While partnerships are crucial, certain strategically sensitive technologies may require tailored or independent EU-backed initiatives to safeguard strategic control and resilience.












3.10.


The EESC supports the Commission’s SAFE proposal to boost defence investment through EU-backed loans, while stressing the need for transparency, equitable access and consistency with existing EU initiatives. It also reiterates its call for a stable funding mechanism to ensure long-term consistency and democratic oversight (6).












3.11.


The White Paper broaches the European Investment Bank’s involvement (EIB) in defence financing with suitably measured caution. The EESC supports the European Council’s call on the EIB’s Board of Governors to continue to adapt the EIB’s practices for lending to the defence industry as a matter of urgency, notably by re-evaluating the list of excluded activities and increasing the volume of available funding in security and defence (7). It believes that the investment required – across all sectors – should be financed by issuing common Euro-denominated EU debt. EU-level borrowing can sustain aggregate demand, support social cohesion and help build resilience.












3.12.


Defence investment must prioritise long-term goals over short-term fixes to ensure Europe’s capacity remains robust and adaptable to evolving security challenges. Furthermore, defence spending must include investment in civil preparedness and societal resilience. The EESC notes that this broader approach is missing from the White Paper, despite its aim of preventing conflict and crisis.












3.13.


The high cost of energy in Europe presents a challenge for the production of energy-intensive defence equipment. As a result, many critical components are produced outside Europe, where energy costs are lower. To address this, there must be a focus on increasing domestic energy production and taking measures to counter high energy prices.












3.14.


The EESC agrees that critical supply chains should be supported to mitigate risks and enhance production resilience. However, equal attention must also be paid to securing all the input materials used throughout the production process, since overlooking these risks can create bottlenecks.












3.15.


It calls for the social partners to be involved in the ongoing discussions, as recognised in the Pact for European Social Dialogue, both in the defence industry and more broadly at cross-sector level, as these decisions have an impact on society as a whole.












3.16.


The EESC also calls for mechanisms for dialogue with civil society to be strengthened in order to ensure that the European defence strategy is shared, understood and supported by the general public and is also comprehensive, including the civic education and civil dimensions of defence.












3.17.


It stresses the importance of investing in defence-related education, skills development and strategic foresight. Here, civic education for the wider population will be essential to build awareness and preparedness. To meet EU defence goals, it is crucial to maintain a skilled workforce, including engineers, technicians and cybersecurity experts. This requires aligning education with evolving sectoral needs, enhancing vocational training and promoting dual-career pathways. Additionally, supporting military medicine technologies is essential for improving personnel health and readiness.












3.18.


The EESC emphasises the need a) to proactively invest in social cohesion as well as in measures to combat poverty and inequality in the EU in order to ensure that a popular base of support for the European project is maintained, so that the security of the EU is not undermined internally, and b) to combat the growth of populist, anti-democratic and neo-fascist movements by implementing EU and Member State policies that address the profound economic and social deprivations of the approximately 100 million people who are poor or at risk of poverty.












3.19.


The EESC reaffirms its recommendation that the Commission communicate to the public the challenges of financing joint defence, aiming to build security and maintain European integration based on peace and solidarity. This should include raising awareness about military service for young people and the role of the armed forces (8).












3.20.


It strongly recommends that targeted strategies be devised to support SMEs, including improved funding access, streamlined procedures and better integration mechanisms, to promote cooperation between large consortia and smaller firms and to ensure that armament planning is transparent and inclusive.












3.21.


SMEs are key drivers of innovation in the defence sector. Prioritising regulatory simplification and ensuring equal access to public funding across Member States will help create a more resilient and competitive defence sector. Furthermore, regulatory simplification must be part of a broader strategy to cultivate a competitive and diverse European defence industry, as underscored in the Defence Omnibus proposal. However, the EESC stresses that steps to cut back red tape should not be to the detriment of transparency or market efficiency. A balance between competitiveness and sustainability is crucial to avoid undermining long-term social and environmental goals (9).












3.22.


The EESC advocates the use of financial tools such as low-interest loans for defence producers, guaranteed by national governments, to help SMEs and mid-cap firms overcome access barriers and scale up their operations. While public funding is essential, it is essential to complement it with public-private partnerships, accelerating innovation and deployment in critical areas.












3.23.


While supporting the mobilisation of up to 1,5 % of GDP for defence, the EESC stresses the need for EU Defence Fund contributions to be fairly allocated, ensuring that less-developed defence industries are not disadvantaged.












3.24.


The EESC advocates an even greater commitment, urging NATO members to aim for a minimum defence expenditure of 2,5 % of GDP, as stated in its opinion on Defence Funding in the EU. This increase would enhance the EU’s readiness to address geopolitical threats and strengthen the transatlantic partnership, while respecting Member States’ sovereignty and complementing NATO’s security framework (10).












3.25.


It strongly recommends that defence and security financing include social conditionalities, with the aim of preserving company locations and guaranteeing quality jobs, better employment, working conditions, collective bargaining and full respect for workers’ rights and trade union rights.












3.26.


Recognising the crucial role of military mobility, the EESC supports the White Paper’s proposals to enhance it. To facilitate rapid military movements and improve Europe’s transport networks, it is essential to simplify cross-border procedures, harmonise regulations and upgrade dual-use infrastructure. Moreover, immediate support for the production of means, equipment and defence materials currently in shortage remains a priority.












3.27.


Sustained investment in key transport corridors for both military and civilian use is important in order to secure EU-wide resilience and to step up initiatives to ensure that the single market functions more smoothly. Additionally, comprehensive transport infrastructure analyses are necessary, including analyses of railway platforms and wagons for moving ammunition, heavy gear, raw materials and defence components.












3.28.


The EESC welcomes the recognition of infrastructure investment crucial for facilitating the swift movement of troops and equipment across Europe – an essential element of improved preparedness. Furthermore, it underscores the need to consider connectivity alongside military mobility in order to ensure an integrated, seamless functioning of transport networks and facilities across the EU.












3.29.


It emphasises the importance of aligning EU infrastructure programmes, such as the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), with evolving security and defence priorities. By integrating defence needs into broader EU infrastructure planning, the EU can address regional disparities, enhance long-term connectivity and strengthen its defence resilience.












3.30.


The EESC also stresses how important it is to enhance international defence cooperation through regular information exchange, joint meetings and dedicated coordination officers from each partner nation. It likewise highlights the need for openness to third-country collaboration, recognising that global partnerships are essential.






Brussels, 17 July 2025.


The President


of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE
               





(1)  
            European Council conclusions on European defence, 6 March 2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/06/european-council-conclusions-on-european-defence/.

(2)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Towards a more resilient, competitive and sustainable Europe (COM(2023) 558 final) (
OJ C, C/2024/4062, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4062/oj).

(3)  For detailed discussions on the EESC’s historical contributions to defence policy, see:
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Towards a more resilient, competitive and sustainable Europe (COM(2023) 558 final) (
OJ C, C/2024/4062, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4062/oj, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4062/oj).
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – European defence industrial strategy (JOIN(2024) 10 final) (OJ C, C/2024/4663, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4663/oj, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4663/oj).
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (EDIP) (COM(2024) 150 final – 2024/0061(COD)) (OJ C, C/2024/4662, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4662/oj, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4662/oj).
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Drone manufacturing industry: a case study to assess the outcome in a strategic sector of the different policies in place to enhance European strategic autonomy (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2024/4658, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4658/oj, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4658/oj).
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European defence industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (COM(2022) 349 final) (

OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 168).

(4)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Defence funding in the EU (exploratory opinion at the request of the Polish Presidency) (OJ C, C/2025/2013, 30.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2013/oj, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2013/oj).

(5)  Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument (OJ L, 2025/1106, 28.5.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/2025/1106/oj, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj).

(6)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Defence funding in the EU (exploratory opinion at the request of the Polish Presidency) (OJ C, C/2025/2013, 30.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2013/oj, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2013/oj) and Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee — Proposal for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of the European defence industry instrument (COM(2025) 122 final) (OJ C, C/2025/5156, 28.10.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/5156/oj).

(7)  
            European Council conclusions on European defence, 6 March 2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/06/european-council-conclusions-on-european-defence/.

(8)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (EDIP) (COM(2024) 150 final – 2024/0061(COD)) (OJ C, C/2024/4662, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4662/oj, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4662/oj).

(9)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘First Omnibus on sustainability’ (OJ C, C/2025/4212, 20.8.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/4212/oj, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/4212/oj).

(10)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Defence funding in the EU (exploratory opinion at the request of the Polish Presidency) (OJ C, C/2025/2013, 30.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2013/oj, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2013/oj).


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/5162/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)