COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and financing of health emergency preparedness and response, and repealing Decision No 1313/2013/EU (Union Civil Protection Mechanism)
Date: 2025-07-16
Institutions: Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), European Commission
Subjects: EU alert system, EU financing, Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority, civil defence, crisis management, emergency aid, humanitarian aid, international cooperation, multiannual financial framework, public health

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 16.7.2025  SWD(2025) 546 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and financing of health emergency preparedness and response, and repealing Decision No 1313/2013/EU (Union Civil Protection Mechanism)        {COM(2025) 548 final} - {SEC(2025) 545 final} - {SWD(2025) 545 final}  
 
 
What are the problems to be addressed? 

The policy area of civil protection, preparedness, and response to crises has 
been increasingly challenged by a worsening threat and risk landscape over 
the last decades. This landscape is characterised by a volatile mix of health, 
geopolitical,  security,  socio-economic,  climate  change,  and  environmental 
risks.  The  security  and  resilience  of  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  are 
increasingly  intertwined  with those of  its  partners beyond its  own borders. 
This  new  reality  calls  for  resolute  EU-level  actions  to  protect  citizens, 
societies, economies, and our democracy.  

In this context, the impact assessment has identified three core problems and 
their associated problem drivers:   

1.  EU  crisis  management  is  mostly  reactive  rather  than  pro-active, 
driven  by  an  insufficient  use  of  strategic  foresight,  anticipation, 
innovation, and early warning; a lack of integrated risk assessments and 
risk management.   

2.  The EU crisis management toolbox is fragmented, lacking a whole-
of-government  approach,  driven  by  sectoral  and  cross-border 
in  civil-military  coordination;  and 
coordination  gaps;  deficits 
disconnect between internal and external EU coordination efforts.   

3.  The EU is insufficiently able to act in solidarity, driven by a limited 
whole-of-society  engagement,  including  with  the  private  sector; 
shortcomings  in  EU  funding  mechanisms  for  crisis  response; 
insufficient  strategic  alignment  of  national  budgets;  and  persisting 
capacity gaps. Part of this problem is that different types of crises are 
addressed in the same way. 

What is to be achieved? 

To address the identified issues, the EU crisis management system must be 
equipped  to  meet  four  general  objectives.  These  all  contribute  to  the 
overarching goal to protect people in the Union against crises. 

The  General  Objectives  are  reflective  of  the  principles  enshrined  in  the 
Preparedness Union Strategy. As such, they are not only ways of achieving 
the overarching goal to protect people in the Union against crises but are also 
objectives in and of themselves.  

 
 
➢  General  Objective  1  (GO1):  implement  an  integrated  all-hazards, 
anticipatory, and proactive approach to threat and risk management; 
➢  General  Objective  2  (GO2):  implement  an  efficient  and  effective 
cross-sectoral coordination framework for various crises in a whole-of-
government approach; 

➢  General  Objective 3  (GO3):  ensure  a  whole-of-society  approach to 

preparedness and response to crises; 

➢  General  Objective  4  (GO4):  ensure  the  Union  is  equipped  to  act 
timely, flexibly and in solidarity, to protect people in the Union against 
crises, including health. 

Why should the EU level act? 

As  crises  grow  more  multi-dimensional  and  cross-border,  capability  gaps 
must  be  addressed  at  EU  level  -  either  through  EU-owned  capacities  or 
coordinated  efforts  among  Member  States.  This  would  not  only  allow  for 
better  coordination  of  crisis  response  mechanisms  operated  at  Union  and 
national  also  ensure  that  EU  assistance  can  reach  all  EU  citizens  in  need, 
while having a longer-term positive impact to EU societies and economies. 
Critical  capabilities,  such  as  offered  by  the  Galileo  and  Copernicus 
programmes, are sustainable only through collective action, creating strategic 
infrastructures that no Member State can achieve on its own. 

Strengthening EU-level preparedness will enhance citizens protection against 
cross-border threats, have a dissuasive effect, address the sense of profound 
uncertainty among citizens and contribute to the fundamental pre-conditions 
of  economic  prosperity  and  competitiveness.  As  demonstrated  in  recent 
crises,  the  EU  plays  an  instrumental  role  in  upholding  our  Union’s 
preparedness and resilience. 

Policy Options 

The  Impact Assessment  proposes  three policy  options which address these 
four  General Objectives  to  varying degrees  and from  different  angles. The 
scope of the policy options is in line with the legal proposal associated with 
this impact assessment. 

A fundamental difference in the budget architecture between policy options 1 
and  2,  on  the  one  hand,  and  policy  option  3,  on  the  other,  needs  to  be 
highlighted (see also figure 1):  

 
 
•  Policy  options  1  and  2  propose  a  “complementary”  approach  to 
preparedness  is,  as  horizontal  priority  integrated  in  both  the 
UCPM/UCPM 2.0 in synergy with other programmes.1  

•  Policy option 3 proposes to centralise all preparedness elements under 
a  single  Preparedness  Fund.  In  contrast  to  options 1  and 2,  option 3 
would thus disconnect preparedness from the other relevant policies. 

Figure 1- Preparedness in MFF architecture under the different options (indicative, the size of the 
fields does not resemble the share of the MFF portfolio) 

Under Option 1, a strengthened sectoral Union Civil Protection Mechanism, 
including a targeted strengthening of the ERCC, is put forward. Activities on 
the EU-level need to be complemented by significant efforts on the national 
level, including with view to response capacities, which on the EU level are 
limited to the ‘traditional’ civil protection sector (medical stockpiles, CBRN 
stockpiles,  aerial  forest  firefighting,  etc.).  While  increased  national  efforts 
allow  to  successfully  address  all  objectives,  the  added  value  of  EU-level 
action  is  not  fully  utilised.  As  a  result,  this  option  lacks  in  effectiveness, 
efficiency, external coherence, and simplification, compared to Option 2.  

Under Option 2, a cross-sectoral UCPM brings together UCPM and relevant 
activities  for  public  health  security  preparedness.  Compared  to  Option  1, 
synergies  and  complementarities  between  civil  protection  and  health 
emergency preparedness activities are achieved through a single instrument 
under the UCPM 2.0. The integrated budget structure ensures flexibility and 
agility  in  the  management  of  the  instrument.  Option  2  foresees  the 
establishment of an EU crisis coordination hub, thus becoming the central EU 
capacity  for  cross-sectoral  risk  preparedness,  including  stockpiling,  and 

1  For  example:  Competitiveness  Fund,  including  specialised  research  and  innovation;  National  Envelopes,  including 
forestry  and  floods  management,  energy,  and  critical  infrastructure;  Erasmus+  especially  regarding  population 
preparedness;  or  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility,  including  cross-border  critical  infrastructure  projects,  satellite 
imagery. 

 
 
 
 
 
operational crisis management. Response capacities at EU level go beyond 
the ‘traditional’ civil protection sector, including for example mobile/pontoon 
bridges,  broad  band  telecoms  and  secured  connectivity,  and  medical 
countermeasures,  including  through  virtual  stockpiling.  Further  pertinent 
health emergency activities are encompassed to combat cross-border threats 
to health in line with the general cross-sectoral nature of the initiative.   

In addition, a third Policy Option is described, which is discarded at an early 
stage:  Policy  Option  3  entails  as its  main  element  the creation  of  a single 
funding  instrument  (Preparedness  Fund)  at  EU  level  comprising  all 
preparedness-relevant mechanisms and activities for the entire MFF. Policy 
Option  3  would  be  sub-optimal  due  to  (i)  an  inconsistency  with  the 
Preparedness  Union  Strategy;  (ii)  increased  complexity  in  the  financial 
management  systems;  and  (iii)  an  amalgamation  of  different  types  of 
competences,  both  supporting  and  shared.  In  addition  to  these  inherent 
limitations  of  the  instrument,  due  to  its  complexity  it  is  very  unlikely  that 
Member States would support it during the negotiation process.  Given this, 
Policy Option 3 is considered non-viable and is thus discarded. 

The preferred policy option and its main impacts 

The preferred policy option is Option 2 as it fully utilises the EU added 
value  and,  in  doing  so,  comprehensively  achieves  the  objectives.  In  the 
context of a crisis landscape that is becoming more multi-dimensional, and 
cross-border,  opting  for  policy  option  2  bring  about  important  social  (e.g. 
higher  common  denominator  in  population  preparedness),  environmental 
(e.g. more successful preservation of natural spaces and biodiversity), as well 
as  economic  (e.g.  costs  associated  with  comprehensive  prevention  and 
preparedness are significantly lower than those for response) benefits.