COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the documents Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 'AgoraEU' programme for the period 2028-2034, and repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/692 and (EU) 2021/818 and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Erasmus+ programme for the period 2028-2034, and repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/817 and (EU) 2021/888
Date: 2025-07-16
Institutions: Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, European Commission
Subjects: EU programme, artistic creation, audiovisual industry, civil society, cultural pluralism, education policy, equal treatment, fundamental rights, participatory democracy, sport, youth policy

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 16.7.2025  SWD(2025) 550 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the documents   Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 'AgoraEU' programme for the period 2028-2034, and repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/692 and (EU) 2021/818            and            Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Erasmus+ programme for the period 2028-2034, and repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/817 and (EU) 2021/888                                                   {COM(2025) 550 final} - {SEC(2025) 547 final} - {SWD(2025) 551 final}  
 
 
INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ................................................. 4 
1. 
PROBLEM DEFINITION ...................................................................................................... 8 
2. 
3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? .......................................................................................... 15 
4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ................................................................. 19 
5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ...................................................... 26 
6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ............................................. 28 
7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? .............................................................................. 38 
PREFERRED OPTION ........................................................................................................ 43 
8. 
9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................... 43 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION .............................................................................. 44 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ......................................................................... 49 
ANNEX 3: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE ............................................. 64 
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ....................................................................................... 77 
ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK ................................................................................ 108 
ANNEX 6: SME CHECK ............................................................................................................ 125 

ANNEX  7:  POLICY,  LEGAL  CONTEXT  AND  FUNDING  PROGRAMMES  COVERED  BY 
THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................... 132 
ANNEX 8: RESULTS OF MID-TERM EVALUATIONS .......................................................... 140 
ANNEX 9: PROBLEMS, PROBLEM DRIVERS AND THEIR EVOLUTION ......................... 149 
ANNEX 10: INTERVENTION LOGIC ....................................................................................... 158 

ANNEX  11:  OBJECTIVES-BASED  MERGER.  MODELLING  OF 

INSTRUMENTS, 
SYNERGIES AND COMPLEMENTARITIES.................................................................. 165 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

AI 

Artificial Intelligence 

AVMS Directive 

Audiovisual Media Services Directive 

CCS  

CERV 

CREA 

CSO 

(DG) CNECT 

(DG) EAC 

Cultural and Creative Sectors 

Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme 

Creative Europe programme 

Civil Society Organisation 

(Directorate-General)  for  Communication  Networks, 
Content and Technology 

(Directorate-General)  for  Education,  Youth,  Sport  and 
Culture 

(DG) JUST 

(Directorate-General) for Justice and Consumers 

EACEA 

EMFA 

ESC 

IA 

IP 

MFF 

OPC 

SMCE 

SMEs 

SWD 

European Education and Culture Executive Agency 

European Media Freedom Act 

European Solidarity Corps 

Impact Assessment 

Intellectual Property 

Multiannual Financial Framework 

Open public consultation 

Social-multi-criteria evaluation  

Small and medium-sized enterprises 

Staff Working Document 

2 

 
 
TEU 

TFEU 

VET 

Treaty on European Union 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

Vocational education and training 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

The  implementation  of  the  current  and  previous  EU  programmes  has  shown  that  the 
complexity of the funding architecture can hinder the impact of the EU budget. This has 
been  underlined  through  programme  evaluations.  Currently,  many  programmes  may 
finance  similar  activities,  but  with  varying  rules  and  conditions,  also  impeding  the 
flexibility  to  respond  to  unforeseen  needs.  This  may  lead  to  inefficiencies  and 
administrative burden for beneficiaries, Member States and the Commission. The difficult 
budgetary  situation  (with  the  start  of  NextGenerationEU  repayments,  the  increasing 
number of EU priorities and the tight fiscal situation of Member States) reinforces the need 
to reduce such inefficiencies and administrative burden.  

The  Political  Guidelines1  acknowledge  that  ‘our  spending  is  spread  over  too  many 
overlapping  programmes  –  many  of  which  fund  the  same  things  but  with  different 
requirements and difficulties to combine funding effectively’. The Guidelines set out that 
the new long-term budget needs to be more focused, simpler, with fewer programmes and 
more impactful. In line with the Political Guidelines, the College adopted on 11 February 
2025 the Communication ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’2. This 
states that ‘the next long-term budget will have to address the complexities, weaknesses 
and rigidities that are currently present and maximise the impact of every euro it spends’. 
The  Communication  also  underlines  that  flexibility  is  key  in  guaranteeing  the  budget’s 
ability to respond to a changing reality.  

In this political context, impact assessments for programmes under the next multiannual 
financial  framework  (MFF)  focus  on  streamlining  the  EU  budget  architecture,  thereby 
assessing the most important policy choices underpinning the future legislative proposals. 
Policy aspects are considered in the analysis of the context, the problem definition and the 
objectives, informing the choices on architecture. Given that the structure of the new MFF 
will significantly differ from the current one, budget assumptions for each programme are 
unreliable at this stage. Therefore, the impact assessment (IA) excludes funding scenarios, 
allowing  only  qualitative  cost  benefit  analysis.  This  reflects  the  specificities  of  this 
exercise,  as  acknowledged  in  the  Commission’s  better  regulation  rules  -  which  this  IA 
follows  –  that  state  that  the  special  case  of  preparing  a  new  multiannual  financial 
framework is a unique process requiring a specific approach as regards scope and depth 
of analysis’ (Tool #9). This IA has been  adjusted following the comments made by the 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board.  

1.1. 

Scope and legal context 

This  impact  assessment  focuses  on  EU  funding  for  cross-border  education  and 
training,  solidarity,  youth,  media,  culture  and  creative  sectors,  values,  and  civil 
society3.  

The EU is a community of values ingrained in Europe's history and identity and anchored 
in the EU Treaty. These encompass democracy, fundamental rights, non-discrimination, 
equality,  inclusion,  tolerance,  the  rule  of  law,  solidarity,  cultural  diversity,  freedom  of 
expression, including media and artistic freedom and pluralism. These shared values define 
the European project. They offer a guiding direction to Europe’s younger generations in 
their aspirations for a better future. Justice, civil society, media, culture, sport, as well as 
formal,  non-formal  and  informal  education  are  all  crucial  vehicles  to  realise  these 
principles, delivery mechanisms for a fair, free, inclusive and united society. They help 

4 

 
citizens connect around shared values and equip them with the skills and key competences 
to thrive and contribute to a strong, cohesive, resilient and competitive Europe.  

Democracies in the EU face internal and external threats. Fundamental rights, equality and 
non-discrimination,  EU  values4,  the  rule  of  law,  justice  and  democratic  structures 
themselves need to be nurtured as the foundation of an inclusive and prosperous society. 
There remain major structural issues relating to fundamental rights, including inequalities, 
discrimination  and  violence  in  our  societies,  with  particular  consequences  for  women, 
children, LGBTIQ persons or persons with disabilities, and minorities5. In today's rapidly 
changing  environment,  people  need  skills  that  enable  them  to  navigate,  accelerate,  and 
embrace  opportunities.  To  remain  competitive,  Europe  must  tackle  barriers  to  human 
capital, including the need for new job profiles, swift skills adaptation and lifelong learning 
through  an  inclusive,  agile,  forward-looking  and  lifelong  learning-based  education  and 
training landscape, both formal and informal. A vibrant civic space and opportunities to 
demonstrate  real  solidarity  are  central  to  a  democratic  society.  On  top  of  its  economic 
value,  the  media  is  a  cornerstone  of  democratic  resilience  as  well  as  cultural  vitality. 
Media, including audiovisual, and cultural expressions have an important role to play in a 
values-based  Union,  recognising  and  appreciating  the  tapestry  of  national  and  regional 
diversity,  and  also  as  a  source  of  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth.  In  all  these  areas, 
proactive action is needed to develop the full potential of people, their skills, talent, critical 
thinking, creativity and safeguard their rights6. 

The importance for the EU’s future to continue investing in the policy areas covered by 
this IA has been reflected in the recent EU political agendas and strategic reports of the 
EU (cfr. Annex 7 for more information).  

“Protecting our democracies and upholding our values” is one of the Political Guidelines’ 
priorities for 2024-2029.  President von der Leyen underlined her commitment as well to 
support free media and reunite our societies “through education, supporting young people 
and building on the things that we have in common as Europeans”, as well as the “uniting 
power of Europe’s rich and varied cultural tapestry”. This combined with the need for “a 
radical step change in ambition and action – for all skill levels and for all types of training 
and education”. These themes feature strongly in the Mission letters of Vice-Presidents 
and  Commissioners.  They  are  also  well  aligned  with  the  European  Council’s  Strategic 
Agenda for Europe 2024 – 2029. 

To  meet  these  objectives,  EU  funding  is  indispensable.  The  next  MFF  should  be  built 
around three main pillars, with  a limited number of targeted self-standing programmes. 
This  cluster  belongs  to  the  latter  category.  The  scope  of  the  IA  has  been  intentionally 
limited to  programmes under direct  and indirect  management that share a strong cross-
border and people-focused logic, including Erasmus+; the European Solidarity Corps 
(ESC); Creative Europe; Citizens, Equality, Rights, and Values (CERV); the Justice 
programme; as well as other budgetary prerogative lines (e.g. multimedia actions).  

Other EU funding programmes also  contribute to  these policy goals to  varying degrees 
while supporting other policies under the current MFF, as shown in Annex 7 Section 3, 
including: Digital Europe programme; Horizon Europe, InvestEU, as well as Union 
cohesion policy funds, the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the Technical Support 
Instrument7. In parallel, another key tool to promote EU values and the rule of law, and 
to  ensure  that  shortcomings  do  not  undermine  EU  budget  delivery,  has  been  the 
development  of  conditionality  tools  such  as  the  Conditionality  Regulation  and  the 
Horizontal Enabling Conditions. 

5 

 
1.2. 

 Lessons learnt from evaluations 

The results of the mid-term evaluations for the period 2021-2027 indicate that the existing 
programmes  have  largely  delivered  on  their  policy  objectives  and  provided  EU  added 
value,  while  highlighting  areas  for  improvement  in  terms  of  design.  For  example,  the 
midterm evaluation of the CERV programme confirmed that the programme occupies an 
otherwise largely empty space in the values and fundamental rights funding landscape8, as 
the  dedicated  EU  instrument  to  support  organisations  working  on  safeguarding  and 
promoting fundamental rights, equality and non-discrimination, democracy and the rule of 
law in Europe, organisations often lacking other funding sources.  Creative Europe has 
contributed  to  the  general  objective  of  supporting  cultural  and  linguistic  diversity  by 
increasing people’s access to content and to the objective of competitiveness by helping 
audiovisual, and other creative and cultural operators to scale up at European level. It has 
a unique place as the only source of funding for transnational cooperation, circulation and 
mobility  in  these  sectors.  Finally,  the  Erasmus+  and  ESC  evaluations  show  that  both 
programmes  deliver  strong  European  added  value  for  individuals,  organisations  and 
policy, a result which cannot be matched at national level alone.  

At the same time, the evaluations point to significant areas of improvement in terms of 
design. These include expanding the reach of the programmes, easing access, simplifying 
management, enhancing monitoring, strengthening synergies and avoiding overlaps with 
other programmes, and increasing flexibility to address new challenges. For instance, the 
evaluation  of Erasmus+ found some  overlap between Erasmus+ Youth Participation 
activities  and  Solidarity  projects  funded  under  ESC,  both  supporting  youth-led 
initiatives run by informal groups of young people.9  The evaluations therefore offer an 
important basis to explore the issue of the scope of financing, the justification for EU-level 
financial intervention and the complementarities with Member States financing, which are 
the largest source of financing in some policy areas. More information on the results of the 
evaluations can be found in Annex 8. 

1.3. 

 Approach taken for the impact assessment  

This  IA  examines  current  challenges  and  problem  drivers  in  the  policy  areas  referred 
above. The problem drivers were split into (a) those relating to policy content and (b) 
those relating to design of the funding instruments. The response that future funding 
EU  instruments  may  offer  to  address  these  problems  is  then  articulated  in  general  and 
specific objectives. In line with the political context for the MFF exercise, policy aspects 
are  considered  in  the  analysis  of  the  problem  definition  and  the  objectives,  in  turn 
informing the choices on the architecture of future funding programmes for this cluster. 
An  intervention  logic  is  presented  below,  then  analysed  through  a  social-multi-criteria 
evaluation (SMCE) presented in Chapter 7 and Annex 4. SMCE criteria have been set to 
analyse the priorities of both policy and design of the funding instruments of the cluster. 

The  IA  draws  extensively  on  the  results  of  the  mid-term  evaluations  of  the  current 
programmes  and  final  evaluations  of  preceding  programmes,  the  spending  review 
exercises,  as  well  as  various  existing  monitoring  reports,  studies  and  research  offering 
sectoral  evidence,  and  latest  strategic  reports10.  Finally,  the  assessment  integrates  the 
outcomes of an Open Public Consultation (OPC) launched to inform this IA, and as well 
as of other stakeholder consultations held by the Commission in the context of the different 
policies. Information complementing this IA is available as endnotes.

6 

 
Figure 1: Simplified intervention logic  

7 

 
 
 
 
2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1.  What are the problems? 

As illustrated in the intervention logic above, the EU budget has an unachieved potential 
to  help  address  the  challenges  affecting  the  policy  areas  in  this  cluster.  The  analysis 
identified three sets of problems affecting the EU financial intervention: two relating to 
policy content, the other to design and implementation. A table illustrating the nature 
and typology of policy-related problems is available in Annex 9.  

2.1.1.  Problem 1: Threats to democracy, fundamental rights and EU values, culture and 

cultural diversity, and shrinking civic and media spaces 

The EU faces challenges to democratic participation11, cultural diversity, and in the civic12 
and media spheres. The common values of the EU increasingly face challenges – such as 
from hostility towards the rule of law and democratic institutions, corruption and violations 
of fundamental rights, impacting on the EU level as well as the national, regional and local 
levels.  These  increase  obstacles  to  building  a  fully  integrated  area  of  justice  and  the 
uniform application of EU law, essential to ensure fair and efficient legal proceedings and 
uphold EU values13. The traditional role of civil society organisations in counterbalancing 
these  trends  is  challenged  by  a  weakening  of  financial  and  political  support.  Economic 
losses  due  to  inequality,  discrimination  and  violence  amount  to  billions  annually, 
highlighting the extent to which values are also a driver of prosperity14. 

The media sector comprises of two main pillars: audiovisual and news media. These sub-
sectors display some commonalities but face also different challenges. For example, news 
media is experiencing decreasing pluralism, as well as declining advertising revenues and 
sales,  as  audiences  have  shifted  online,  where  they  are  increasingly  exposed  to 
disinformation;  while  European  audiovisual  content  does  not  travel  enough  across  the 
Single Market15 and faces fierce competition from the US.  Disruptions to the European 
media sphere and obstacles to participation in European culture undermine the economic 
potential of the media and creative industries, as well as weakening connections between 
Europeans. Technological dependence on non-EU actors hampers innovation in the civic 
spaces, media, and other cultural and creative sectors.  

2.1.2.  Problem 2: Shortfall of skills and key competences for life and jobs 

Equipping all citizens with the skills and key competences required for a demanding and 
rapidly evolving labour market and an increasingly diverse, knowledge-based society, is a 
constant challenge.  

Education and training systems in the EU overall fail to provide people with a minimum 
proficiency in basic and digital skills, and to foster the advanced competencies and soft 
skills needed, across all stages of life 16. Based on the 2022 results of the OECD’s PISA17, 
the EU is lagging behind other OECD countries in basic skills, with a downward trend in 
mathematics  (-18  points),  reading  (-12)  and  science  (-3.4).  The  EU  also  falls  short  in 
generating  skilled  graduates  from  higher  education  and  vocational  education  with  the 
highly specialised skills needed in the rapidly evolving technological landscape18. There 
are growing labour and skills shortages across Member States, with nearly four out of five 
employers reporting difficulties in finding workers with the right skills19. Recognition of 
qualifications, skills and learning periods abroad is far from automatic and often requires 

8 

 
 
cumbersome  procedures  both  between  Member  States,  and  with  third  countries.  This 
prevents  the  best  possible  use  of  all  skills  needed  in  the  labour  market  and  of  learning 
opportunities across Europe and beyond20. So too do gender gaps, with almost twice as 
many  men  than  women  studying  STEM,  and  major  socioeconomic  and  territorial 
disparities in the level and the access to quality formal and non-formal education across 
the EU.  

The  skills  challenge  is  not  only  about  competitiveness.  It  is  about  a  healthy,  resilient, 
engaged, inclusive, united and prepared society. Today, close to 18 million young people 
in the EU are at risk of social exclusion21 22; in 2024, almost half of them reported recent 
emotional  or  psychosocial  problems23.  It  is  crucial  to  equip  individuals  with  skills  and 
competences for life, enabling them to navigate the complex and rapidly changing world 
we live in, and take a more active role in society.  

2.1.3.  Problem  3:  Challenges  to  the  design  and  architecture  of  the  EU  financing 

instruments to address the policy-related problems. 

The EU funding architecture is complex. One of the results can be gaps. The 2021-2027 
MFF  supports  many  policy  areas  covered  by  this  IA,  but  it  does  not  comprehensively 
address  all  key  emerging  priorities  set  out  in  the  Political  Guidelines.  For  instance,  the 
current funding programmes have struggled to respond to emerging challenges faced by 
news  media,  quality  journalism  and  the  fight  against  disinformation,  challenges  on  a 
dramatically  different  scale  than  when  the  current  budget  was  conceived24.  In  addition, 
there  is  high  demand  for  financing  at  EU  level,  as  shown  by  the  high  rate  of 
oversubscription of the current EU programmes in these areas25. 

A second challenge relates to overlaps, untapped synergies and complementarities. Policy 
areas under this cluster are often addressed from different angles by multiple instruments, 
with limited coordination. The lack of flexibility, the multiplication of programmes, and 
the differences in the legal provisions which apply, have effectively prevented synergies 
among  EU  programmes.26  In  specific  cases,  a  more  coordinated  funding  approach  is 
needed between European and national  funds. In  some policy areas (e.g.  education and 
skills),  ensuring  coordination  between  direct,  indirect,  and  shared  management  EU 
instruments has been a long-lasting issue. While some measures to mitigate these problems 
were introduced already for the 2021-2027 programming period, the next MFF provides 
for  an  opportunity  to  structurally  improve  synergies.  For  example,  EU  investments  in 
education  and  skills  are  delivered  through  different  programmes  which  lack  a  coherent 
strategic  framework  and  operational  alignment,  hindering  the  ability  of  the  budget  to 
address  cross-cutting  and  structural  skills  challenges.  Finally,  access  to  EU  funding  is 
hampered by a complexity of rules and a limited user-friendliness in funding processes. 
Applicants  to  EU  funding  must  navigate  different  requirements  under  different 
programmes.  Implementation  of  EU-funded  projects  can  be  burdensome,  especially  for 
small organisations with limited resources and capacity.27 

2.2. 

 What are the problem drivers? 

Drivers linked to problem 1 – Threats to democracy, fundamental rights and EU values, 
culture, and shrinking civic and media spaces 

2.2.1.  Threats to EU values  

Deep-seated internal and external pressures lie behind threats to the respect of EU values. 
These include structural inequalities,28 the persistence of violence29 and discrimination30 
on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 

9 

 
orientation, often shown in racism, anti-gypsyism, antisemitism, or anti-Muslim hatred31. 
Hate  speech  and  hate  crime  have  been  steadily  on  the  rise  over  the  past  decade32, 
exacerbated by the spread of digital tools and social media.  

While many actors have a key role to play in protecting EU values, shrinking civic spaces 
are a key factor in putting EU values at risk. Civil society organisations and human rights 
defenders  find  it  increasingly  difficult  to  fully  participate  in  decision-making  and  act 
independently33.  Shortcomings  identified  in  the  consultation  process  included  a  lack  of 
support and compliance mechanisms across the EU, as well as a lack of public awareness 
of the role of civil society,34 including in the promotion of equality and inclusion35. 

2.2.2.  Challenges to the rule of law and judicial systems 

Recent years have seen direct challenges to the rule of law and judicial independence at 
national  level.  Corruption  has  been  recognised  as  a  deep-seated  problem.  There  is  a 
growing recognition that such trends at national level also have a direct impact at EU level, 
making them key drivers of the problem. The impact at EU level is not only an obstacle to 
building a fully integrated area of justice and the effective delivery of EU policies. It also 
hinders a strong business environment encouraging investment, innovation and growth36.  

The  erosion  of  judicial  independence  and  challenges  to  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  are 
undermining  mutual  trust  among  Member  States  and  weaking  the  effectiveness  of  our 
justice  systems.  Structural  weaknesses,  such  as  still  predominant  paper-based  judicial 
processes, uneven digitalisation, complex and time-consuming procedures, as well as slow 
communication between authorities, limit cross-border judicial cooperation, and obstruct 
effective  access  to  justice  and  the  ability  to  handle  threats  like  cybersecurity.  The 
opportunity to address these issues through cross-border cooperation is constrained by the 
fact that justice professionals often lack a solid knowledge of EU law and cross-border 
judicial cooperation procedures and are not sufficiently equipped to embrace the increasing 
digitalisation of justice37. This impedes mutual recognition of judicial decisions and the 
consistent implementation of cross-border EU instruments and policies.  

2.2.3.  Obstacles to democratic participation and societal resilience 

Citizens’  participation  and  engagement  (including  turnout),  and  transparency  and 
accountability  in  decision-making  contribute  to  the  vitality  of  European  democracy.  Of 
particular importance is to promote full and meaningful participation in political and social 
life and inclusive democratic participation, including of young people, children, women, 
persons with disabilities, and mobile EU citizens, including at regional and local level.  

Public  trust  in  democracy  and  democratic  institutions,  the  fairness  and  integrity  of 
elections, and the legitimate concerns and expectations of citizens about their well-being 
are key challenges for democracy in Europe.38 Confidence in democracy is under pressure, 
proactive steps needed to address issues such as a lack of transparency and accountability 
in political funding and the distortion of the democratic level playing field online. A 2024 
Eurobarometer39 showed that EU citizens saw the largest single threats to democracy as 
growing distrust and scepticism towards democratic institutions (36%). The integrity of 
the  information  space  available  to  citizens  is  being  undermined  through  foreign 
information  manipulation  and  interference  (FIMI),  disinformation,  and  abusive  use  of 
technology. This is reflected in a lack of access to fact-checked information, hate speech, 
and  polarisation,  which  threaten  freedom  of  expression,  artistic  freedom,  democratic 
accountability, diversity of views, and free democratic debate.40   

10 

 
2.2.4.  Pressures on European media and the information landscape 

European media companies today compete with giant online platforms for the attention of 
citizens and consumers. Revenues are increasingly shifting to platforms, which dominate 
online  distribution  methods41.In  the  audiovisual  sector,  the  circulation  of  EU  content 
beyond national borders is weak42.  Europeans continue to watch more content from the 
US than from other EU countries, as US films capture 70% of the box office, whilst US 
streamers  capture  80%  of  all  subscriptions.  Similarly,  cross-media  intellectual  property 
continues to be an asset which is underexploited by European media43. At the same time, 
unequal access to high-quality and diverse European content, such as films, persists. This 
limits  media’s  full  potential  to  be  socially  and  culturally  relevant  for  all  citizens, 
particularly for young Europeans. 

The effects of disruptions of the media extend beyond issues of viability; they also impact 
public debate.44 Media pluralism is threatened across the Union45.  The growth of online 
platforms has opened the door to disinformation – which impacts the democratic and social 
fabric of the EU and erodes public trust in media institutions.46 It has also intensified the 
need for digital and media literacy, as well as for tools for accessible digital information.  

2.2.5.  Obstacles to cultural cooperation and preservation of cultural heritage 

The resilience, creativity potential and competitiveness of the cultural and creative sectors 
(CCS), as well as access to a variety of cultural expressions are key tenets of the Union’s 
cultural  and  linguistic  diversity.  Yet  fragmentation  along  national  and  linguistic  lines 
continues  to  drive  cultural  expressions,  limiting  transnational  artistic  collaboration, 
audience reach, and the development of innovative practices. CCS professionals struggle 
working  across  borders  and  accessing  new  markets47,  which  exacerbates  geographical 
imbalances  and  reduces  the  circulation  of  European  cultural  works.  The  lack  of  cross-
border  mobility  and  cooperation  hinders  networking,  economies  of  scale,  pooling 
expertise, and co-creation, all that is crucial for sustaining careers and strong CCS. 

threat 

Europe’s rich cultural heritage, including in digital format, is a shared legacy, but it faces 
a  growing 
from  a  combination  of  budgetary  constraints,  nationalist 
misappropriation,  and  deliberate  destruction,  as  seen  in  Russia’s  war  against  Ukraine. 
Meanwhile, heritage sites face increasing vulnerability to pollution, climate change, and 
natural  disasters,  requiring  urgent  resilience-building  and  point  to  a  need  to  accelerate 
digital preservation as a factor in safeguarding the EU’s cultural heritage. 

2.2.6.  Obstacles  to  innovation  and  technological  dependencies  affecting  democratic, 

societal, cultural and media players 

Recent technological innovations, largely driven by non-EU actors, have transformed the 
democratic, societal, cultural, and media landscapes.48 Conversely, the financial weakness 
of  European  players  limits  investment  in  innovative  business  models,  tools,  and  new 
content  formats.  Private  investment  in  culture  and  media  remains  relatively  low,  with 
venture capital investment significantly trailing behind the US.49 Similarly, societal impact 
investments, such as philanthropic funds for long-term societal and democratic returns, are 
lacking. Innovation uptake is stifled by significant sectoral skills gaps, requiring a mix of 
creative, business, technical and digital skills.50 

These structural obstacles are compounded by Europe’s technological dependence. Non-
EU  tech  giants  increasingly  influence  the  democratic  debate,  civic  space  and  media 
through  algorithmic  recommendations, 
landscapes,  shaping  content  consumption 
automated  distribution  models,  and  AI-generated  content.  The  growth  of  online 

11 

 
advertising, which is expected to triple by 2029, indicates the need to leverage (audience) 
data across all media sectors to adapt to new business models.51  

Drivers linked to problem 2 – Shortfall of skills and key competences for life and jobs 

2.2.7.  Low and unequal capacity to deliver high quality, innovation, inclusiveness and 

insufficient cooperation and knowledge sharing 

The education and skills gaps are closely tied to the structural weaknesses of the Union’s 
27  distinct  education  and  training  systems,  many  of  which  remain  insufficiently  agile, 
inclusive or resilient in responding to the digital, green, and demographic transformations. 
Diverging  levels  of  performance  across  countries  and  regions  exacerbate  social  and 
economic inequalities and limit the EU’s ability to retain and develop lifelong talent — a 
key factor for global competitiveness. European education and training institutions also 
face deepening challenges in securing and retaining talent. As education remains a national 
competence, the EU cannot directly reform or finance national systems. But transnational 
cooperation in education and skills plays a major key role in mitigating these problems – 
allowing education and training providers to accelerate convergence, share innovation, and 
improve quality in ways no national system can achieve alone. The potential for EU-level 
cooperation to drive change is widely recognised52.   

However, barriers to cross-border cooperation, including insufficient funding and lack of 
organisational capacity,  hold  back this  potential, in  particular  for smaller organisations, 
heavily dependent  on  EU funding  as  the main funding source for international  learning 
mobility and cooperation for education and training, youth and sport.53 In addition, many 
of the key strategic initiatives supported by EU funding – such as the European Universities 
alliances, Teacher Academies, and Centres of Vocational Excellence – are relatively recent 
innovations, and have not yet been scaled to a level that delivers systemic impact. As a 
result, EU-level investment remains below the critical mass needed to support high-quality, 
future-proof inclusive education systems and achieve shared policy goals.  

2.2.8.  Obstacles to cross-border learning mobility, including insufficient opportunities 

for all 

Learning mobility is a key component of cross-border education and has proven to be a 
highly  valuable  experience  for  both  learners  and  staff,  such  as  teachers,  in  gaining 
knowledge and skills needed for personal, educational, and professional development and 
employability.  It also strengthens the European dimension of education, training, youth, 
and sport and helps to enhance the quality and inclusiveness of learning offered. Demand 
for  mobility  was  illustrated  through  the  OPC,  with  over  88%54  supporting  mobility  for 
Higher Education students and staff, schools and learners, language learning opportunities, 
and for vocational education and training (VET), as well as for university alliances55.  

The potential for learning mobility is held back in different ways. Opportunities are not 
equally distributed across Member States, fields and sectors of education, and the scale of 
national  and  international  schemes  supporting  learning  mobility  of  learners  and  staff 
remains  limited.56  This  is  not  reflective  of  demand,  with  heavy  oversubscription  in 
Erasmus+  and  the  ESC  (only  1  out  of  10  volunteering  opportunities  requested  can  be 
supported).  Financial  and  social  constraints  prevent  higher  mobility  uptake, 
disproportionately  affecting  individuals  from  less  affluent  backgrounds,  students  with 
disabilities  and  marginalised  groups  including  Roma,  exacerbating  inequalities.  High 
living  costs,  access  to  affordable  and  adequate  housing,  tuition  fees,  and  insufficient 
scholarships57 deter many from studying, volunteering, or working abroad. 

12 

 
2.2.9.  Barriers to transparency and recognition of qualifications across borders   

The barriers driving the inability to make best use of the skills available include diverse 
national  legislations  and  administrative  practices.  These  make  it  difficult  to  work  in 
another country, set up joint programmes and to award joint degrees, especially those with 
embedded learning mobility components. This limits opportunities for the free movement 
of workers and for more innovative educational offerings, factors that also attract talent 
from third countries and support Europe’s competitiveness.  

Obstacles exist also to non-formal and informal learning. The very nature of "soft skills", 
which are less tangible and harder to measure than "hard skills", makes it more difficult to 
gauge  and  quantify  non-formal  learning  outcomes.  This  also  discourages  learning 
mobility, resulting in wasted talent and resources, as individuals may not be able to provide 
evidence of their competences, may have to repeat courses to meet local requirements or 
navigate cumbersome recognition procedures.58 

2.2.10.  Unexploited potential of lifelong learning, including non-formal and informal  

Once people complete their formal education, most will spend up to four decades in the 
labour  market.  There  is  huge  potential  to  meet  the  EU’s  skills  needs  through  up-  and 
reskilling throughout adults’ working  lives, yet  too  few adults still take  part in  training 
each  year,  far  below  the  EU  headline  target  for  203059.  The  reasons  for  this  shortfall 
include limited access to upskilling programmes, a lack of awareness of lifelong learning, 
of  time  or  of  financial  resources,  low  level  of  basic  skills  and  insufficient  support  for 
effective reskilling initiatives – including appropriate incentives for companies. 

Non-formal and informal learning, volunteering and sport are complementary to formal 
education and crucial for the development of skills and attitudes for jobs and life. However, 
the  offer  and  quality  of  youth  work  differ  considerably  across  countries.60  In  addition, 
transnational  cooperation  in  these  fields  is  held  back  by  a  lack  of  networking  and  peer 
learning opportunities. Sport is also currently insufficiently exploited in formal education.  

2.2.11.  Obstacles to societal engagement, civic education and solidarity 

Young people participate less in institutional politics than other age groups and less than 
many young people in the past61. Young people, as with other citizens, can be confronted 
with obstacles in their participation in democracy, such as insufficient knowledge of their 
democratic  rights,  difficult  access  to  information  and  limited  involvement  in  decision-
making processes. Citizenship education on the EU and its values remains uneven62. This 
can be seen as driven by limited opportunities for civic engagement, solidarity, and cultural 
and sports participation. This limits social capital development, particularly among young 
people, preventing them from becoming empowered, active citizens, and fosters a culture 
of preparedness and resilience.63￼  

Drivers  linked  to  problem  3  –  Challenges  to  the  design  and  architecture  of  the  EU 
financing instruments to address the policy-related problems 

2.2.12.  Rapidly evolving policy areas not covered coherently by existing EU programmes  

Rapidly  evolving  policy  areas  and  the  emerging  priorities  outlined  in  the  2024-2029 
Political  Guidelines  are  increasingly  outpacing  the  possibilities  offered  by  existing  EU 
programmes. In some cases, actions are constrained by incompatible provision in the legal 
basis and by pre-allocated funding which falls short of changing needs, needs which cannot 
be  efficiently  managed  by  transferring  funding  between  different  programmes64.  One 
consequence of this has been a multiplication of actions often implemented through annual 

13 

 
EU Pilot Projects and Preparatory Actions (PPPA), lacking stable financing and systemic 
planning. The implications of the structure of current  instruments  are  confirmed by the 
results  of  the  OPC:  approximately  two  thirds  of respondents  signalled  that  the  “lack  of 
flexibility of the EU budget to adapt to new and unforeseen developments” is an obstacle 
preventing the budget to fully delivering on its objectives.  

2.2.13.  Untapped synergies in EU funding across complementary policy areas.  

Priorities under this cluster are currently addressed from different perspectives by several 
EU instruments – sometimes also through instruments beyond this cluster65. While some 
progress  was  made  during  the  current  MFF,  synergies  and  complementarities  have  not 
been fully exploited. The current interplay between instruments does not help to offer an 
effective response to key evolving issues (such as the fight against disinformation). This is 
also reflected in the limited coordination among the national contact points for some of the 
instruments covered by this cluster and the implementation mechanisms of other clusters. 
There is also insufficient coordination with bodies managing programmes at national level. 
Lack  of  upstream  coordination  in  the  implementation,  and  differing  management 
provisions all play a part. The result is a difficulty to implement joint actions which might 
bring about increased impacts, or cross-cutting, innovative actions that do not fit into the 
scope of a single programme.  

Similar issues have also increased the risk of potential duplications, as funding is spread 
over  several  programmes,  budget  lines  and  actions.  Areas  risking  overlap  as  a  result 
include  media  literacy    or  youth  non-formal  activities66,  currently  covered  by  several 
programmes.  Insufficient  coordination  between  EU  and  national  funding  has  also 
hampered the ability to optimally address policy areas implemented through multi-layered 
financing. This was also highlighted in the OPC where aspects such as “lack of consistency 
and effectiveness to deliver on EU policy priorities” (52%) and “too many programmes 
with  overlapping  policy  areas”  (53%)  were  singled  out  by  respondents  as  obstacles 
preventing the EU budget from delivering on its objectives67. 

2.2.14.  Limited  coordination  of  EU  funding  and  complementarities  with  other  EU 

interventions.  

Coordination within and across programmes is hampered by a lack of common operational 
frameworks  -  with  aligned  criteria,  funding  rules,  and  implementing  tools  (e.g.  work 
programmes68, consistent third country participation, monitoring and reporting indicators). 
Different  programme  committee  structures,  each  governed  by  their  own  rules  and 
procedures, adds to the complications of coordination69. For cross-border education and 
skills, fragmented EU support limits impact, coordination, and scalability. This hinders the 
ability to address cross-cutting and structural skills challenges, to scale up effective action 
across instruments, or to align EU funding with national reforms and private investment. 

While the EACEA and National Agencies efficiently implement several programmes or 
large chunks of programmes covered by this cluster70, obstacles are created by a lack of 
integrated  monitoring,  as  well  as  robust  approaches  to  data  collection  and  analysis71 
between direct and indirect management. This is particularly important considering that 
programmes  under  this  cluster  often  involve  the  disbursement  of  small  grants  to  many 
different  beneficiaries.  In  addition,  though  blended  instruments,  which  coordinate  and 
combine funding from  different  EU instruments72  within an EU policy framework with 
agreed objectives, have  proved their value in  mobilising private and public investment, 
their potential has been very rarely exploited in many of the policy areas in this cluster.  

14 

 
2.2.15.  Access to EU funding hampered by complexity and insufficient user-friendliness   

Policy areas and funding covered in this cluster target multiple small scale and grassroot 
actors (e.g. local schools, youth organisations, small and medium-sized enterprises, small 
municipalities, and civil society organisations). These actors often have limited capacity 
to apply for, implement and manage EU funds and this has been an obstacle to best use of 
the  funds.  For  example,  they  have  more  difficulties  to  effectively  use  corporate  tools, 
which do not consider their specificities and lower size of grants. Efforts to improve user-
friendliness  and  accessibility  and  to  reduced  administrative  burden  for  beneficiaries 
through novelties under existing funding instruments73 need to be increased.   

Both the evaluations and the OPC74 confirm significant obstacles. Application processes 
and reporting procedures are not always proportionate to the level of grant and capacity of 
smaller  beneficiaries.  In  some  cases,  insufficient  information  (e.g.  learning  mobility 
opportunities) hinders participation and uptake75. Under some of the programmes covered 
by this IA, many calls are still launched annually, increasing the administrative burden. 
Real costs are still used in the implementation of programmes, as opposed to more user-
friendly methods of financing not linked to cost. This is confirmed by the OPC76.  

2.3. 

 How likely are the problems to persist? 

The policy-related problem drivers described above have been compared to the megatrends 
identified by the Commission’s Competence Centre on Foresight77. These trends are long-
term global driving forces that are most likely to continue to have a significant influence 
in coming decades. The identified problem drivers were found especially congruent with 
seven  megatrends:  (a)  accelerating  technological  change  and  hyperconnectivity;  (b) 
changing nature of work, requiring constant reskilling and upskilling; (c) changing security 
paradigm, with hybrid threats, such as  foreign information manipulation and interference 
(FIMI); (d) diversification of education, training and learning, outside formal systems; (e) 
widening inequalities; (f) growing consumption, influenced by algorithms; (g) increasing 
influence of new governing system (Annex 9 includes a table linking the problem drivers 
and megatrends). 

Consequently, there is a strong likelihood that the problem drivers outlined in section 2.2 
will  persist  and  even  intensify  without  EU  support78.  The  evolving  nature  of  these 
challenges will also increase pressure on the design and impact of EU funding, as some of 
them, such as  the disruption  of the information  space, are insufficiently covered by the 
current  generation  of  instruments.  This  pressure  will  manifest  also  in  new  needs  and 
priorities, shifting synergies and complementarities, growing complexities, and increased 
need for higher flexibility.  

3. 

WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

The policy areas covered by this IA are firmly anchored in the EU Treaties, which provide 
the legal bases for EU action through financial interventions and reflect the Union’s core 
values, long-term objectives, and political and legal commitment in these areas. 

3.1. 

Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action 

The EU budget in these areas is crucial to the foundations of the EU. The EU cannot rely 
solely on national funding to protect EU values, including fundamental rights, the rule of 
law, equality and non-discrimination, democratic participation, media, culture, education 
and  skills.  Many  European  citizens,  especially  young  people,  believe  that  safeguarding 

15 

 
these policy areas cannot be left to Member States alone79. EU level action helps to drive 
progress across all Member States. It is particularly necessary to: (1) address transnational 
and  common  challenges;  (2)  achieve  systemic  impact  by  filling  gaps  and  ensuring  a 
European approach; and (3) enhance coherence between internal and external policies.  

3.1.1.  To address transnational and common challenges 

Several of the problem drivers mentioned in Chapter 2 are common to all Member States 
and/or  have  a  clear  transnational  dimension.  National-level  action  alone  would  be  less 
efficient and impactful than EU level efforts, which enable cooperation, capacity building, 
mutual  learning  and  the  pooling  of  resources,  sharing  of  expertise  and  best  practices. 
Whilst financial intervention is not the only way in which the EU can act in these areas, it 
often plays a decisive role in the policy response mix. 

First,  the  problem  of  skills80  has  a  Union-wide  dimension.  Member  States  face  similar 
challenges and struggle individually to make their education and training systems fit to 
meet  contemporary  and  future  educational  and  skills  needs.  PISA  2022  results  are 
worrying for all EU countries81. Major digital gaps persist in education systems across the 
EU82 while rapid technological advancement, such as generative AI, tests their ability to 
keep up with the necessary digital skills and literacy. While the bulk of funding will come 
from national budgets, EU-supported transnational cooperation mechanisms and capacity 
building are crucial to provide joint impactful approaches and leverage/scale up innovative 
solutions  to  help  education,  training,  youth  and  sport  sectors  address  skills  gaps  and 
improve  performance  and  inclusiveness.  Funding  can  strengthen  the  cross-border 
dimension to build networks and trust among the education and training systems, increase 
the transparency and recognition of skills and qualifications across borders, as well as the 
circulation of staff, learners and workers in Europe.  

Second,  Member  States  have  differing  capacities  to  counter  global  phenomena  such  as 
online hate speech, cyberviolence, data protection issues, threats against the information 
space and risks associated with the use of generative AI – all of which affect EU values, 
citizens’ fundamental rights and economic development of media and culture. The growing 
complexity  of  digital  environments,  disparities  in  digital  skills,  and  inconsistent 
application of data protection rules across the EU83 underscore the need for unified EU 
action to ensure rights are effectively protected and to reinforce the EU's global standard-
setting role. Financial support can galvanise the raising of skills and capabilities to levels 
which are both higher and more consistent84.  

Third,  EU  agencies  and  bodies  such  as  Eurojust  and  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s 
Office, and EU judicial cooperation tools, play a pivotal  role in supporting cooperation 
among  national  authorities, enabling information exchange of critical  information, joint 
operations, and consistent application of justice standards. EU financial interventions for 
training and capacity-building can have a decisive impact on raising standards85.  

Fourth, EU action in the field of culture is also key to supporting transnational cooperation, 
cross-country  circulation  of  cultural  works,  (co)creation,  networking,  capacity-building 
and cultural diversity, as well as the social, economic and international dimension of the 
CCS. Financial interventions are indispensable to addressing common challenges, such as 
digital innovation, sustainability, artistic freedom and equal access to a diversity of cultural 
content, with EU action bringing results often beyond the reach of national schemes.  

Finally,  in  the  audiovisual  sector,  EU  action  to  facilitate  collaboration  and  pooling  of 
resources  and  know-how  can  more  effectively  address  common  challenges,  stemming 
from fierce international competition and disruptions by global players. EU funding for 

16 

 
news media sector is crucial as individual Member States cannot - or in some cases will 
not - address the risks on their own. EU funding can more effectively provide a common 
response and promote a trustworthy debate, including by tackling disinformation. Recent 
shocks to the financial and political support for civil society and news media across Europe 
further highlight the value of EU-level financial support. 

3.1.2.  To achieve systemic impact by filling gaps  

Actions at EU level can address challenges that are not prioritised by Member States. EU 
action on values, fundamental rights and equality can offset political pressure on the civic 
space, protecting EU values and democracy at EU as well as national level, and slower 
progress towards equality. The mid-term evaluation of the CERV programme showed that 
for  many  CSOs,  the  programme  is  the  only  substantial  source  of  funding.  Without  EU 
direct support, CSOs’ activities would end precisely where they are most needed, where 
EU values are under threat86. Specific needs such as those of victims of domestic violence 
do  not  find  sufficient  national  funding.  EU  funding  can  also  offer  services  at  EU  level 
which  would  simply  not  be  viable  on  a  national  scale  in  all  Member  States,  such  as 
children's helplines or victim support hotlines87.  

As  private  and  philanthropic  investment  in  media,  including  audiovisual,  in  the  EU  is 
limited, such support contributes to fill the funding gap. 

Most beneficiaries under the Justice programme believe they could not secure alternative 
funding in the absence of such a programme88. The EU is best placed to foster cross-border 
opportunities  for  justice  professionals  to  connect,  develop  and  contribute  to  a  shared 
European legal  culture.  This  is  particularly  true  for EU-wide legal  networks, where the 
absence of EU funding would end collaboration between these networks89.  

EU funding also creates EU added value by supporting transnational cooperation in testing 
and transfer of innovative practices in education, training, youth, and sport. EU funding 
offers  the  economies  of  scale  needed  to  provide  a  laboratory  for  deeper  sectoral 
transformation, as seen with the European Universities Alliances and Centres of Vocational 
Excellence or the European degree.  

Finally, learning mobility is far more complex to organise on a bilateral basis and Member 
States alone cannot make it accessible to all. EU action is necessary to compensate for the 
lack  of  transnational  learning  mobility  opportunities,  remove  obstacles  and  break  silos. 
This  creates  the  foundation  for  a  deeper  and  more  regular  cooperation  than  would  be 
possible without the intervention of the EU level, whether for pupils, students (including 
VET students), young people and volunteers, also delivering a positive impact on local 
communities in the country of destination (e.g. for volunteers). The EU has also an added 
value through European transparency tools (Europass) and the organisation of cooperation 
to  facilitate  the  free  movement  of  people  for  learning  and  working  in  another  Member 
State.  EU  action  also  fosters  excellence  and  innovation  and  enhances  the  capacity  of 
education and training systems to attract and retain talents based on equal opportunities90.   

3.1.3.  To enhance coherence between internal and external policies  

EU  action  is  critical  to  promote  EU  values  at  international  level,  implementing 
international  standards  coherently  with  internal  policies.  For  instance,  the  Commission 
serves as the focal point for implementing the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities91. In this role, it must report to the UN Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities while EU funding can be used as a leverage to promote shared 
strategic interests and maintain the EU’s role as a global standard setter, particularly in 
areas like data protection and rights.  

17 

 
The participation of candidate and potential candidate countries in EU funded programmes 
alongside  Member  States,  including  funding  for  capacity  building,  has  accelerated 
regulatory reforms (e.g. justice and education reforms) and a faster alignment with the EU 
acquis (e.g. audiovisual92). EU action in the field of culture contributes to building trust 
and forging long-term partnerships with the EU’s neighbours and partners. EU funding can 
play  an  important  part  in  opening  the  door  to  a strong  EU  role  in  promoting  European 
interests in education, youth, and sport, at international level.   

3.2. 

 Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action 

The  added  value  of  EU  action,  in  line  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  is  reflected  in 
different areas. Notwithstanding the significance of the problems, the relevance of policy 
areas addressed under this cluster, and the positive results of the evaluations, the added 
value and impact needs to be taken forward in the context of available budgetary resources.  

3.2.1.  Nurturing a sense of EU citizenship, solidarity and belonging 

EU  actions  nurture  a  sense  of  EU  citizenship  and  mutual  understanding,  through  the 
promotion of EU values, supporting democratic and societal resilience, and a trustworthy 
information space, objectives that national interventions alone cannot fully achieve. This 
includes cross-border EU support for transnational civil society networks, for learning and 
volunteering mobility activities93, including those starting from a younger age, as well as 
for awareness raising initiatives that engage citizens in democratic life and broaden access 
to diverse media and cultural expressions while highlighting our shared heritage. These 
actions also bring Europe closer to its people. Different EU actions help  build a shared 
European identity and enhance citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU.94 

3.2.2.  Ensuring high standards across the EU 

EU action ensures uniformly high standards across the EU and consistent interpretation 
and  application  of  EU  law  across  Member  States.  This  is  essential  for  the  proper 
functioning of the internal market and for effectively protecting EU citizens’ rights. EU 
steering  is  essential  to  ensure  the  implementation  of  EU  policies  by  Member  States, 
promote good practices, address issues and gaps in national approaches and frameworks 
and engage all relevant stakeholders.  

The interplay between financial interventions and policy tools is critical to ensuring this 
impact. In the field of justice, the EU is best placed to ensure that justice systems operate 
in a harmonised manner across the EU. For instance, supporting EU judicial training has a 
clear added value as it fosters a coherent understanding and application of EU law and the 
delivery of key tools like the European Arrest Warrant. In the media sector, the EU has 
promoted  and  funded  the  development  of  journalistic  standards  to  complement  the 
regulatory obligations of EMFA, which also establishes an EU-funded European Board for 
Media  Services.  In  the  field  of  education  and  training,  youth  and  solidarity,  financial 
support complements EU-wide instruments to ensure quality and recognition through the 
development  of  common  standards,  tools  and  procedures,  such  as  the  accreditation  of 
volunteering  structures  and  the  development  of  tools  for  recognising  qualifications. 
Similarly, the EU plays a fundamental role in supporting the development of standards and 
their technical implementation for accessibility.   

18 

 
3.2.3. 

Supporting and reinforcing the Single Market and improving fair access across 
the EU  

With  sector-specific  Single  Market  legislation  in  place95,  EU  action  ensures  that 
audiovisual and media companies and creators can fully benefit from the Single Market 
and  contribute  to  cultural  diversity  and  inclusion.  Fragmentation  in  the  media  sector  is 
exacerbated by a lack of coordination between Member States and the EU96.  EU funding 
helps overcome this by encouraging cooperation and pooling of EU and national resources 
for larger scale audiovisual and media projects, thus improving access for more EU citizens 
and enhancing the competitiveness of the European industry.  

EU-level action plays a key role in promoting the recognition of skills and qualifications 
across  the  EU  by  financial  support  to  a  common  toolbox  supporting  transparency,  the 
simplification of recognition procedures for qualifications, the validation of skills acquired 
through  non-formal  learning,  and  quality  assurance.  It  supports  the  development  of 
European education, through trans-national cooperation, and through the development of 
European  degrees.  It  also  promotes  mobility  and  cross-border  exchanges  from  an  early 
age.  These  efforts  collectively  contribute  to  greater  circulation  of  people,  including  for 
employment, ultimately benefiting the Single Market. Additionally, EU-level action is also 
essential to the functioning of the internal market for accessible products and services. 

Finally,  as  explained  earlier,  the  Justice  programme  brings  significant  added  value  by 
supporting a harmonised justice framework which enables enabling smoother cross-border 
business operations and investments.  

3.2.4.  Added value through better delivery 

EU initiatives can also offer added value through the very nature of larger, cross-border 
financial interventions. This is the basis justifying much of the EU budget, and it applies 
particularly  strongly  in  financial  interventions  where  cross-border  action  is  the  core 
objective of the action. Cooperation between universities or judicial training institutions 
can naturally be provided more efficiently and consistently within a single cross-border 
frame  than  through  multiple  bilateral  or  plurilateral  arrangements.  Audiovisual 
organisations and cultural bodies in different Member States can pool resources and reach 
economies of scale if they can work within a common frame. This added value can be felt 
in terms of developing wider projects addressing a policy goal (instead of separate smaller 
projects under different programmes), reducing the burden on applicants and number of 
staff  and  the  resources  required  to  manage  programmes,  as  well  as  the  reduced 
administrative burden of dealing with a single way of working.  

4. 

OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1. 

General objectives 

The objectives below aim to address the main problems and drivers identified in Chapter 
2. Tables outlining these logical links are shown in Annex 10.   

General objective 1: Enhance and deepen the EU ability to financially contribute, provide 
added value and promote fundamental rights and EU values, democracy, media and culture 

The EU financial intervention must contribute to address the threats against  EU values, 
fundamental rights and democracy, media and culture, thus enhancing a free, democratic, 
cohesive,  inclusive  and  competitive  Europe  based  on  the  rule  of  law.  The  Union  will 
therefore protect, promote and fulfil fundamental rights and EU values, and a thriving civic 

19 

 
  
space;  support  a  free,  viable,  competitive,  and  pluralistic  media  and  audiovisual  space; 
safeguard and protect cultural and linguistic diversity and heritage.   

General objective 2: Enhance and deepen the EU ability to financially contribute, support 
and provide added value to cross-border education and training, youth, sport and solidarity, 
contributing to skills for life and jobs 

The EU financial intervention must also contribute to address the shortfalls of skills and 
key competences for life and jobs, thus contributing to a resilient, competitive, cohesive 
and united Europe and a European identity. The Union will foster high  quality  lifelong 
learning, enhance skills and key competences for all, in line with a swiftly changing society 
and  labour  market  needs,  while  promoting  societal  engagement  and  civic  education, 
solidarity and social inclusion. 

General  Objective 3: Enhance  and deepen the  EU ability to  financially  contribute and 
provide added value in these policies with a design fostering adequacy of funding to policy, 
simplification, coordination and synergies 

The EU intervention must better reflect and protect policy objectives. It must be designed 
and implemented to effectively support policy delivery, including through a feedback loop 
from results to policy making, and greater cooperation among all relevant stakeholders. It 
should be flexible enough to  cater  for new emerging  needs and evolving priorities. EU 
instruments should build up mechanisms to foster synergies within and across policy areas, 
to make the EU intervention more impactful, achieve economies of scale and streamline 
the management of the different programmes. Finally, it must be user friendly and offer 
visible, simplified and easily accessible opportunities.  

4.2. 

Specific objectives 

4.2.1. 

Specific objectives linked to general objective 1 

Specific objective 1.1: Contribute to upholding the rule of law,  fundamental rights and 
equality, reduce discrimination and empower civil society 

EU financial intervention will (1) raise awareness and build capacity of relevant actors97 
for the effective application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; (2) promote  the 
rule of law and  combat corruption; (3) promote equality, and support prevent and fight 
against discrimination98, including through training, education, awareness raising, mutual 
learning, and  exchanges  of good practices  and capacity building;  (4) support actions  to 
promote  and  protect  women’s    rights  and  gender  equality  (e.g.  improving  work-life 
balance,  reducing  gender  gaps,  combating  stereotypes,  and  gender  mainstreaming);  (5) 
support actions to promote accessibility and the rights of persons with disabilities to an 
independent  life,  to  participation    in  the  community,  including  fighting  stigma  and 
violence; (6) support actions to combat all forms of intolerance99; (7) raise awareness on 
the  benefits  of  diversity  and  inclusion;  (8)  promote  and  protect  the  rights  of  the  child, 
including their right to meaningfully participate ; (9) in synergy with  objective 1.4, support 
actions  to  combat  hate  speech  and  hate  crime  and  promote  freedom  of  expression, 
including by  increasing knowledge of EU and national legislation, improving reporting 
and recording mechanisms, empowering victims and witnesses and enhancing resilience 
of civil society organisations; (10) support actions to protect and promote rights and values 
in  the  digital  space,  including    data  protection;  (11)  nurture  a  vibrant  civic  space  by 
building the capacity, empower and fund the activities of civil society organisations at all 
levels, and human rights defenders ; and (12) reinforce the protection of whistleblowers, 
including through better implementation of EU legislation. 

20 

 
  
Specific  objective  1.2:  Contribute  to  fighting  against  gender-based  violence,  violence 
against children and other groups at risk 

The  EU  financial  intervention  will  contribute  to  (1)  support  good  practice  exchanges 
among  stakeholders,  build  the  capacity  of  stakeholders  and  relevant  professionals  to 
address issues related to gender-based violence, and strengthen integrated child protection 
systems  and  the  deinstitutionalisation  of  child  care  and  care  systems  for  persons  with 
disabilities; (2) support actions for the protection of and support for victims and survivors 
of  violence,  including  by  increasing  knowledge  about  victims’  rights,  improving  data 
collection  and  protection  and  support  standards  for  victims;  (3)  strengthen  a 
multidisciplinary and multi-actor approach to prevent and combat violence; and (4) support 
the EU implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women and domestic violence and the UN Convention on the rights of 
persons with disabilities. 

Specific objective 1.3: Contribute to enhancing democratic resilience and participation.  

The EU financial intervention will contribute to (1) promote all citizens‘ participation and 
engagement  in  democracy,  through  elections  (including  electoral  turnout),  democratic 
debates  and  engagement  in  public  policy  making;  (2)  promote  and  protect  Union 
citizenship rights, including by raising awareness of the value and benefits deriving from 
those rights; (3) support  to  free, fair, resilient, accessible and inclusive electoral processes 
and democratic check and balances, processes and frameworks (including by supporting 
independent  elections  observers)  as  well  as  by  addressing  foreign  information 
manipulation and interference; (4) raise awareness, facilitate exchanges and engagement 
in democratic processes, and build citizens’ knowledge in view to better understand the 
Union, its history, cultural diversity, and European remembrance; and (5) strengthening of 
situational  awareness  and  preparedness  across  societies,  in  synergy  with  the  objective 
below (on the protection of the integrity of the media and information space). 

Specific  objective  1.4:  Contribute  to  supporting  news  media,  media  independence  and 
tackling disinformation. 

The  EU  financial  intervention  will  strive  to  enhance  a  viable  and  diverse  information 
ecosystem in the EU. It will promote, on the one side, free, independent and viable media; 
and on the other, contribute to fighting disinformation. It will enhance the availability and 
consumption of professionally produced news media content, including on EU affairs and 
in peripheral areas, addressing the fact that 25% of citizens currently believe that news are 
divisive, harmful or spread lies100. It will protect media and journalists, address risks to 
market plurality, financial viability and increasing political interference, and contribute to 
the  media  freedom  regulatory  rulebook.101  As  regards 
the 
disinformation, it will enhance an independent monitoring of the information ecosystem 
and role of entities detecting and analysing disinformation, including fact-checking. It will 
promote  digital  and  media  literacy,  to  empower  EU  citizens  to  make  well-informed 
choices. Promoting media independence and media pluralism and fighting disinformation 
were signalled as an important policy objective by 83.1% of OPC respondents. 

implementation  of 

Specific  objective  1.5:  Enhance  production,102  circulation,  and  consumption  of  EU 
audiovisual/media content.   

The  current  EU  support  to  the  audiovisual  industry  has  successfully  contributed  to  the 
sectors’  competitiveness  and  cultural  diversity.  Building  on  this,  a  renewed  financing 
intervention  will  enhance  the  societal,  economic  and  cultural  relevance  of  media  and 

21 

 
audiovisual  content.  Citizens’  access  to  high  quality  European  media  and  audiovisual 
content (films, TV series, documentaries) will be fostered to promote a sense of mutual 
understanding whilst strengthening the competitiveness of the industry.  The potential of 
such content to appeal to wider audiences across borders will be enhanced by fostering 
European  collaborations,  notably  cross-border  productions,  distribution  and  promotion. 
Efforts will be renewed to increase cross-border circulation of EU audiovisual, and media 
works as well as to reach isolated communities in media and cinema “deserts”.  Actions 
will  be  updated  to  respond  to  market  trends,  notably  the  increasing  shift  of  audiences 
online.  The  participation  of  all  Member  States  will  be  broadened  through  increased 
collaborations  between  countries  with  different  audiovisual  capabilities.  Support  will 
promote  crossovers  among  media  content  sectors,  transmedia  IP  development  and 
exploitation to foster audience engagement in Europe and beyond.103 It will also support 
the development, marketing and promotion of videogames and interactive content, which 
are particularly popular among young audiences.104  

Specific objective 1.6: Increase in cross-border cultural cooperation, cultural participation 
and accessibility, and circulation of diverse cultural works, while strengthening cultural 
and creative sectors. 

A  renewed  financing  intervention  will  keep  a  strong  focus  on  cooperation  to  promote 
cultural  diversity,  circulation  and  mobility,  to  test  innovative  solutions,  scale  up  good 
practices  and  accelerate  the  development  curve  in  the  CCS,  while  giving  local/national 
initiatives  a  European  dimension/perspective.  Through  cooperation,  the  financing 
intervention  would  help  address  pressing  common  needs,  in  particular  the  needs  to 
continue  supporting  cultural  and  artistic  creation  in  full  respect  of  artistic  freedom,  to 
promote inclusiveness and intergenerational fairness through culture, to help the CCS be 
more resilient and competitive and benefit from the dual transition, and to promote the use 
of new (for example digital) tools, including protecting cultural heritage. The financing 
intervention  would  also  contribute  to  building  trust  and  forging  long-term  partnerships 
with the EU’s neighbours and partners. Finally, there would be a focus on participation 
and access of all, especially the younger generation, to a diversity of cultural and creative 
contents, in particular those coming from beyond national or linguistic borders as well as 
to all forms of cultural heritage, be it tangible, intangible or, more and more often, also in 
digital format.105  

Specific objective 1.7: Spur cross-cutting innovation and promote sustainability of media, 
cultural and societal entities.   

Media  and  CCS  are  well  positioned  to  spearhead  innovation  in  Europe’s  economy  and 
society, as they blend creativity and design with digital tools, accessible solutions and new 
business models.  However, innovation in media and CCS is underfinanced and mainly 
relies on non-European technologies and  foreign  private investments106. Innovation can 
help tackle the problem of media viability, with media organizations turning to alternative 
income sources (e.g. event organisation, e-commerce)107: for example, the ‘promotion of 
trustworthy AI that respects EU values’ was mentioned as an ‘important’ policy objective 
by 73% of OPC respondents108. Furthermore, the current intervention has shown the value 
of blended instruments combining funds from different programmes in attracting private 
funding in nascent markets and should be expanded in the future. Finally, there is a need 
to  enhance  professionals’  skillset  to  adapt  to  the  emerging  media,  cultural  and  societal 
needs.  

22 

 
4.2.2. 

Specific objectives linked to general objective 2 

Specific Objective 2.1: Support transnational cooperation around education and skills  

The EU action will support cross-border cooperation, allowing for pooling of expertise, 
exchange of good practices, networking, peer learning and capacity-building of education 
and training, youth, sport and volunteering organisations. EU investments will also cover 
systematic, large-scale institutional cooperation (through support for example to European 
University  Alliances  or  Centres  of  Vocational  Excellence),  to  promote  innovation  in 
curriculum  design, 
joint  degrees,  partnerships  with  businesses,  recognition  of 
qualifications  and validation of skills,  as well as and research  across borders. This  will 
build on a more integrated Education Area and contribute to the creation of the Union of 
Skills.     

Actions to foster the development of high quality and state-of-the-art teaching and training 
practices  as  well  as  youth  work  methods  will  be  supported.  They  will  aim  to  enhance 
inclusion, digitalisation, innovation and excellence in education and training, youth and 
sport  and  lead  to  improvements  of  performance  and  modernisation  of  the  overall 
functioning of the institutions and organisations thus increasing their capacity to develop 
the skills and competences needed for jobs and life. It will also aim to attract and retain top 
talent  and  securing  and  keeping  high-quality  educators  and  staff  crucial  to  enhance 
academic reputation and drive institutional success.  

Specific  Objective  2.2:  Support  to  transnational  learning  mobility  and  learning 
opportunities. 

The goal is to make learning mobility a reality for all, as early as possible, ensuring that 
opportunities are accessible across all sectors of education and training, youth, and sport.109 
EU  action  will  help  address  the  current  obstacles  and  support  cross  border  learning 
mobility  for  all  learners  and  staff,  providing  as  well  sufficient  funding  and  support 
measures to promote diversity and ensure equal access for individuals regardless of their 
gender, cultural, social, economic, or geographical background, or any special needs they 
may have.  

By supporting learning mobility for all, and exposing learners from an earlier age, allowing 
them  to  develop  key  competences,  language  skills,  and  adaptability,  those  EU  actions 
contribute  to  build  skilled,  engaged,  united  and  prepared  individuals.  Through  active 
involvement in cross-border learning mobility opportunities, organisations increase their 
capacity as well to operate at international level, improve ways of operating and integrate 
good practices enhancing their overall performance. In addition, transnational mobility for 
workers will be facilitated by supporting  the transparency  and recognition  of skills  and 
qualifications across borders.  

Specific Objective 2.3: Promote lifelong learning, improving skills and new competences. 

EU action will promote lifelong learning enabling individuals to gain invaluable skills and 
competences  across  their  life  span,  through  formal  education  but  also  upskilling  and 
reskilling  opportunities,  non-formal  and  informal  learning  experiences,  sport  or 
engagement in volunteering.  

EU  action  will  aim  to  contribute  to  build  a  skilled  and  competitive  workforce  through 
supporting the acquisition of the whole spectrum of skills (including digital and STEM 
skills) from basic to highly specialised skills for all - from learners to staff, at all levels of 
formal,  non-formal  and  informal  education  and  training.  It  will  also  aim  to  support  the 

23 

 
development of the transversal skills (such as critical thinking, civic skills, socio-emotional 
skills)  enabling  full  and  meaningful  participation  in  society  and  making  citizens  more 
resilient,  thus  enhancing  social  cohesion  and  contributing  to  the  Union’s  preparedness 
efforts. Strengthening and orchestrating funding to cover all the skills acquisition spectrum 
in a lifelong learning perspective would increase reach and achieve critical mass, enabling 
more systemic impact.  

Specific  Objective  2.4:  Support  policy  experimentation  and  development  accelerating 
modernisation. 

EU  action  will  aim  to  facilitate  and  accelerate  reforms  of  education  systems  (early 
childhood  education  and  care,  primary,  secondary,  higher  education,  VET)  as  well  as 
support the development of national policy initiatives in the field of youth and sport, in 
line with the EU policy agenda. Such EU action would take the form of testing innovative 
solutions,  scaling-up  of  successful  initiatives  and  practices,  evidence  and  knowledge 
gathering  about  education,  training,  youth  and  sport  systems  and  policies  and  policy 
dialogues.  

Specific Objective 2.5: Foster solidarity, civic education and engagement 

EU action will aim to empower and support all young people to acquire relevant knowledge 
and  skills  to  become  active  and  engaged  citizens  and  Europeans.  It  will  also  promote 
solidarity, intergenerational fairness and common values, and contribute to reduce social 
divergences, advancing social inclusion and cohesion. EU action will also address physical 
and  mental  health  challenges,  particularly  of  young  people,  and  contribute  to  building 
citizens’ resilience, in line with the preparedness strategy.  To this end, EU support will 
also enhance opportunities for exposure to transnational solidarity from an earlier age. 

EU  action  will  support  opportunities  to  engage  in  non-formal  and  informal  learning 
opportunities, volunteering activities, youth participation, and promote healthy lifestyles 
through sport. Additionally, EU action will build capacity of those who work with young 
people and organisations that represent their interest, contributing, and include all young 
people’s voices in EU policymaking. Civic and education will be supported, including for 
media literacy in schools Capacity for meaningful participation and civic engagement in 
EU  and  cross-border  affairs  among  young  people  and  among  all  organisations  that 
represent their interest should contribute to young people’s voices becoming more central 
in EU policymaking.  

4.2.3. 

Specific objectives linked to general objective 3 

Specific  Objective  3.1:  Increase  effectiveness  of  EU  funding  by  addressing  linked  EU 
challenges, improving cooperation, and fostering coordination of the main policy areas 

There is a need for a policy-based EU intervention aligning political priorities and funding 
support, taking as a basis the political guidelines of the new Commission. This will mean, 
for instance, setting objectives aligned with EU priorities, which may change over time. 
Prioritising projects with high added value that contribute to the EU strategic priorities was 
mentioned by 73%  of  OPC  respondents110 as  something that could  help  the EU budget 
become more effective and efficient.  

The  design  of  the  programmes  and  the  approach  to  funding  should  steer  cooperation 
between EC services and agencies, as well as between institutions and organisation within 
EU  member  states,  where  relevant.  Performance  indicators  should  help  track  outcomes 
beyond  actual  expenditure  or  participation  levels  and  monitor  horizontal  policy  goals. 

24 

 
“Feedback to policy” mechanisms, addressing monitoring challenges identified in the mid-
term evaluations, should be strengthened to make sure that the result of the EU intervention 
inform policy making. Given the increased focus on policy monitoring, resources may need 
to  be  reallocated  through  efficiency  savings  on  project  selection  and  execution.111 
Similarly, blending financial instruments which have proved their value in one policy area, 
will  also  be  expanded  to  other  relevant  policy  fields,  ensuring  economies  of  scale  and 
reducing overheads.   

Specific Objective 3.2:  Improve efficiency for applicants and beneficiaries, and at EU 
level 

The 
future  programmes  should  streamline  EU  management,  governance  and 
implementation of EU programmes to improve efficiency for applicants, beneficiaries and 
EU  institutions.  Application  and  reporting  procedures  should  be  simplified  and  further 
harmonised,  through  the  introduction  of  common  or  aligned  rules,  making  it  easier  for 
applicants to apply to calls addressing complementary policy objectives. The application, 
management  and  reporting  should  be  less  complex  and  entail  fewer  administrative 
burdens. 

To simplify implementation and reduce administrative burden for beneficiaries, the use of 
simplified forms of funding (including financing not linked to costs and lump sums) should 
become  the  standard  form  of  contribution  for  reimbursing  grants.  The  use  of  financial 
support to third parties, which has proven efficient in making EU funding more accessible 
to  small  organisations,  should  also  continue  and  could  be  extended  where  appropriate. 
Moreover, increasing the use of multi-annual grants would also have a positive impact.   

Obstacles  encountered  by  grassroots  organisations  and  first-time  applicants  should  be 
addressed  through  targeted  simplification  measures  addressing  their  circumstances, 
enhanced communication, and promotion of funding opportunities.  Pooling of resources, 
including in areas such as monitoring, internal and external communication could bring 
economies  of  scale  and  enhance  the  predictability  of  EU  funding  more  widely  among 
beneficiaries, stakeholders and EU citizens.  

Specific Objective 3.3: Increase coherence by promoting synergies and complementarities 

funding.  Fewer  programmes  would 

Maximising policy impact requires moving from fragmented implementation to coherent, 
complementary,  and  coordinated 
facilitate 
coordination and consistency, thereby helping to reduce existing overlaps and gaps and 
increasing synergies and complementarities within this cluster and with other clusters. This 
would  also  maximise  synergies  with  national,regional  and  local  levels,  by  providing 
overall  direction  and  strategy  across  various  policy  areas.    It  should  also  help  better 
coordinate with and leverage national, regional, local, private and institutional financing – 
thereby strengthening complementarities in relevant policy areas.  

Programming should ensure synergies through cross-cutting actions and integrated calls 
that  span  multiple  policy  domains,  currently  covered  by  different  programmes  in  this 
cluster.  The  design  of  the  programmes  should  allow  to  re-channel  funds  between  areas 
within a programme and reduce overlaps between funding actions. For instance, actions 
could be launched to combine news media funding with supporting the role of civic society 
organisations (CSOs) active in the civic and media spheres.   

Building bridges between the different funding instruments at EU, national,regional and 
local levels will be important. This will be particularly beneficial for enhancing inclusion, 
scaling up projects, ensuring sustainability and a sense of ownership of results, supporting 

25 

 
different dimensions of activities and removing silos between specific fields, e.g. such as 
education,  research  and  innovation.  Similarly,  strengthened  provisions  to  ensure  easy 
transfer  of  funds  between  the  different  EU  instruments  and  timely  and  appropriate 
coordination will enable to increase effectiveness of EU interventions and better address 
policy priorities.  

Specific  Objective  3.4:  Ensure  proportionality  by  improving  reactiveness  to  new 
challenges and minimising risks 

Greater  flexibility  should  be  built-in  to  be  able  to  respond  quickly  to  new  emerging 
challenges and priorities, through easily adaptable funding instruments or rapid response 
mechanisms112. Achieving operational excellence in programme management will require 
harmonising  programme  arrangements,  based  on  annual  and  multiannual  work 
programmes, streamlining evaluation procedures, and leveraging IT tools. Increasing the 
flexibility  of  funding  instruments  to  re-allocate  funding  can  also  help  to  improve  their 
reactiveness to new challenges. At the same time, it is crucial to ensure that policy goals 
are not diluted. 

5. 

WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? 

In a baseline “continuity” scenario, the current programmes would continue to exist. They 
would  continue  providing  added  value  on  their  respective  areas  of  intervention,  as 
evidenced  by  the  respective  evaluations.  However,  the  same  evaluations  highlight  the 
needs for the Union to further enhance and improve its action. For instance, the existing 
programmes have a limited scope in addressing emerging challenges such as those linked 
to threats to media freedom, pluralism, and to addressing disinformation; face funding gaps 
in  areas  such  as  gender  equality113;  or  need  to  further  address  accessibility  challenges, 
continuing  to  expand  their  reach  to  participants  with  fewer  opportunities114.  The 
megatrends referred to in Annex 9 would likely reinforce these issues in a baseline scenario.  

5.2. 

Description of the policy options 

Commission  services  have  explored  several  strategic  options  to  address  the  challenges 
described  in  the  previous  sections,  considering  that  the  current  matrix  of  challenges  is 
likely to persist in the future and that there is scope for valuable EU intervention. The three 
options  described  hereafter  illustrate  architectural  designs  to  meet  the  specific 
objectives presented under Chapter 4. Additional options, which were considered yet 
discarded at an early stage, are also presented.  

The  options  were  developed  using  various  criteria115,  based  on  an  initial  mapping  and 
analysis of components and implementation aspects of each relevant, existing programmes 
and  policy  areas.  Options  were  subsequently  organised  in  three  distinct  and  mutually 
exclusive packages.  

The first option represents the baseline, continuing existing programmes and instruments 
as stand-alone programmes. The second option proposes to align policies and instruments 
in  two  programmes,  based  on  the  two  policy-driven  general  objectives  outlined  under 
Chapter 4. The third option considers a full integration of all policies in this cluster under 
a single programme. The extent to which each option addresses the objectives presented 
under Chapter 4 is shown in Annex 4. For legal reasons, as explained in this chapter, the 
Justice programme remains standalone in all scenarios. 

26 

 
Option 1: Continuity 

This option would maintain the current programmes untouched: CERV, Creative Europe, 
European  Solidarity  Corps,  Erasmus+,  and  relevant  prerogative  lines  (i.e.  Multimedia 
Actions,  activities  on  fundamental  rights),  in  addition  to  the  Justice  programme.  Each 
programme would  continue to  be established by its  own legal  act  and  would  follow its 
specific rules and objectives. Under a dynamic baseline, some incremental improvements 
could  be  introduced,  for  instance  building  on  the  simplification  measures  already 
introduced in the 2021-2027 period. However, aligning the programmes (in their current 
architecture), with the Political Guidelines for 2024-2029 would be partial, at best 116.  

Option 2: Objective-based consolidation 

This  option proposes  to  align instruments  based  on the two main  policy-driven general 
objectives.  It  would  result in  targeted mergers of existing  programmes:  on one hand, it 
would bring together programmes primarily aimed at protecting fundamental rights, EU 
values, democracy, media and culture, thus upholding mutual understanding. It would thus 
address all objectives under General Objective 1, combining policy areas currently covered 
by CERV, Creative Europe and related budgetary prerogative lines, as well as addressing 
emerging challenges (e.g. disruptions of the democratic and media space), and increase 
action on cross-cutting priorities and synergies affecting the societal, media and cultural 
sectors (e.g. sectoral skills, access to finance, innovation uptake, etc.).  

On  the  other  hand,  it  would  merge  Erasmus+  and  the  European  Solidarity  Corps,  two 
instruments  predominantly  supporting  cross-border  education  and  training,  youth,  sport 
and  solidarity,  contributing  to  the  acquisition  of  skills  for  jobs  and  life  (cf.  General 
Objective 2), and thus to competitiveness and social cohesion.  

In  conclusion,  this  option  would  result  in  two  EU  funding  programmes,  aligning  the 
architecture of the EU budget with existing actions and two basic priorities outlined in the 
Political  Guidelines:  (i)  Protecting  democracy,  upholding  values  and  increased  societal 
resilience (primarily addressed by the first merger) and (ii) the Union of Skills (primarily 
addressed by the second merger). The two instruments would be designed with a view to 
fostering adequacy of funding to policy, simplification, coordination and synergies, thus 
in line with General Objective 3. 

Option 3: Full integration 

The third option proposes a full integration of all policies under this cluster under a single 
instrument. This would result in a new single fund integrating all policies covered today 
by CERV, Creative Europe, Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps117. This would thus 
consolidate all policy-oriented general and specific objectives, supporting current policy 
priorities while addressing all emerging challenges and new policy areas through a single 
instrument. 

5.3. 

Options discarded at an early stage 

A discontinuation of the EU funding 

The option of discontinuing the EU intervention in these policy areas was discarded at an 
early stage, given the importance of the problems affecting the sectors, the prominence 
given  to  these  policies  in  the  Political  Guidelines  and  the  added  value  of  the  EU 
interventions  (see  Chapter  3),  underpinned  by  the  respective  mid-term  evaluations  (see 

27 

 
Annex 8). A discontinuation of the EU funding in these areas  would also contradict the 
responses to the OPC (see Annex 2). 

Merging the Justice programme with other programmes in this cluster 

The interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme confirms that the programme 
provides unique added value that would be difficult to replicate at national level (see Annex 
8). However, for legal reasons, this programme cannot be merged with others, as not 
all 27 EU Member States participate in the Justice programme (contrary to the other 
existing  programmes  in  this cluster). The  legal  bases  of the Regulation  establishing  the 
2021-2027 Justice programme are article 81(1) and (2) and article 82 TFEU. These articles 
are part of Title V TFEU, which covers the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. By 
virtue of Protocols annexed to the Treaty, Denmark does not take part in decisions made 
under Title V in line with Protocol No 22 – known as ‘opt-out’ – and Ireland can choose 
to take part in certain measures if it decides to ‘opt-in’, in line with Protocol No 21.  The 
other programmes in the scope of this impact assessment are open to all Member States, 
and they are thus incompatible with the legal bases of Title V118. 

Other potential merging configurations 

The  analysis  considered  different,  partial  merging  combinations  across  policies  and 
existing programmes. None of those offer a similar level of consistency compared to the 
three proposed options. Alternative configurations for merging programmes (for instance, 
merging only the Media strand of Creative Europe with the CERV programme) would not 
effectively  align  with  political  priorities,  and/or  would  not  adequately  cater  for  the 
challenges as presented in chapters 1 and 2, notably the need to reduce the fragmentation 
of funding, as they would offer less potential for synergies119.  

6. 

WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

This section outlines the main potential impacts of the chosen options across the social, 
economic  and  environmental  dimensions.  It  also  analyses,  where  relevant,  costs  and 
benefits,  impacts  on  competitiveness  and  SMEs  and  on  digitalisation,  as  well  as  their 
contribution to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).  

Policies  under  this  cluster  target  a  wider  variety  of  groups  and  a  stronger  impact  on 
people’s lives, as shown by the Public Consultation, which registered 5,845 responses, the 
largest  across  the  consultations  on  the  MFF120.  More  information  on  the  results  of  the 
consultation is provided in Annex 2 while on target groups and benefits in Annex 3. 

28 

 
Impact 
dimension 

Option 1: Continuity 

Option 2: Objective-based consolidation 

Option 3: Full integration 

Social impact121 

–  Citizens’ 
personal, 
social, 
civic and 
profession
al 
developme
nt 

the  current 

–  A  continued  positive  direct  impact  on  the 
academic,  social,  personal,  and  in  terms  of 
the employability development of individuals 
and  particularly  young  people122.  For 
example,  under 
instrument, 
annually,  Erasmus+  engages  over  1  million 
participants,  and  the  European  Solidarity 
Corps  involves  20 000  volunteers,  with  for 
instance, over 90% self-reporting benefiting 
from  their  participation  including  through 
skills.  Creative  Europe  has 
increased 
increased  EU  citizens’  access  to  European 
audiovisual  content,  thus  contributing  to 
cultural  exchange  and  societal  resilience.123  
Similar  benefits  would  be  expected  in  the 
future.   

–  Citizens’ 
participati
on 

–  The  separate  programmes  would  continue 
their  positive  contribution 
to  citizens’ 
participation (e.g. raising awareness on rights 
as EU citizen through CERV124,  support to 
youth  participation  activities  or  solidarity 
activities in Erasmus+ and the ESC) but with 
limitations 
fragmented 
imposed  by  a 
framework.  

Objective-based merger would enhance the already positive 
direct  impact  on  citizens’  personal,  social,  civic  and 
professional development. Merging Erasmus+ and the ESC, 
brings  all  opportunities  for  young  people  under  a  single 
framework and favours a pathway for individuals to take part 
in  different  type  of  learning  experiences  thereby  likely 
increasing  the  number  of  participants  benefiting  from  them 
(currently  Erasmus+  for  students  is  known  by  49%  of  the 
young people surveyed in the recent  Eurobarometer 545 on 
youth  and  democracy,  but  only  8%  were  aware  of  the 
European Solidarity Corps). A single programme would also 
help  promote  the  development  of  lifelong  learning  more 
efficiently.  This  option  would  also  have  a  positive  impact 
– 
through the consolidation of Creative Europe and CERV. It 
would  further  enhance  the  development  of  a  vibrant  civil 
society,  increase  the  capacity  of  organisations  to  support 
cultural  exchanges  and  cross-border  collaborations,  and 
provide  higher  access  to  cultural,  audiovisual  and  media 
content for citizens.  
Objective-based  merger  would  have  positive  effects  on 
citizens’ participation.  A merger of programmes under GO1 
would  enhance  synergies  between  democratic  participation, 
access to media and culture content, and the integrity of the 
information  space  having  a  positive  impact  on  the  citizens’ 
participation.  Similarly,  by  providing  a  comprehensive 
approach to citizen’s engagement and especially children and 
young  people,  a  merge  of  the  Corps  and  Erasmus+  would 
bridge the gap between citizenship education e.g. schools and 
hands-on participation through non formal learning activities 
or  volunteering.  By  combining  education,  training,  youth, 

29 

civic 

social, 

development 

The  impact  of  option  3  on  the 
and 
personal, 
of 
professional 
individuals  might  be  weakened 
due  to  the  broad  set  of  priorities 
that a full integration would create. 
Merging  all  funding  instruments 
could  make  accessibility  to  the 
learning  opportunities,  and 
to 
media  and  cultural  participation, 
more challenging. 

dilution, 

–  This  option  would  have  a  limited 
positive  impact,  due  to  a  risk  of 
heterogenous 
policy 
stakeholders, and a more complex 
governance.  This  might  lead  to 
less  tailored  and  effective  EU 
intervention. 

 
 
 
 
–  Democrac
y and 
societal 
resilience 

–  There  will  be  continued  positive  support  to 
democracy  and  societal 
resilience,  via 
separate  programmes.  However,  this  option 
has  limited  capacity  to  react  to  emerging 
challenges  linked  to  preparedness  or  media 
viability,  for  instance.  Under  status  quo, 
contribution 
to  democracy  comes  from 
separate interventions, lacking a coordinated 
and agile approach. 

sport, and volunteering  opportunities under one  framework, 
the  programme  would  offer  a  cohesive  and  accessible 
pathway  for  young  people  to  learn  about  citizenship,  civic 
rights, EU and then a wide range of opportunities to engage, 
likely increasing their skills and competences in this regard.125  
–  This option would provide an integrated funding framework 
for  the  actors  contributing  to  supporting  fundamental  rights 
and values and strengthening democratic resilience in the EU. 
This would come from a fund focused on democracy, rights, 
media, audiovisual and culture, allowing for a more holistic 
and targeted approach to building democratic resilience. For 
instance,  by  enhancing  the  contribution  of  culture  to 
democratic participation, this option would generate systemic 
social  benefits.  This  option  would  also  provide  the  tools  to 
effectively  support  activities  promoting  societal  resilience 
and  crisis  preparedness,  particularly  those  implemented  by 
involving  civil  society126.  Improved  coordination 
and 
between civic, cultural, and media actors would help address 
disinformation, polarisation, and democratic backsliding with 
greater coherence and effectiveness. 

–  The  effective  contribution  of  this 
option  to  democracy  and  societal 
resilience  might  have  a  limited 
impact  due  to  a  broad  and  not 
focused  framework.  If  all  these 
funding  instruments,  and  related 
EU  policies,  are  merged  in  the 
future  programming  period,  there 
is  a  risk  of  policy  dilution, 
stakeholder 
weakened 
engagement, 
delayed 
response.  

and 

–  The  second  merger  would  leverage  the  impact  of  all 
opportunities  for  young  people  in  formal,  non-formal  and 
informal  education  and  volunteering,  by  combining 
complementary activities, positively affecting its contribution 
to democratic and societal participation and resilience e.g. this 
option  would  allow  to  support  population  preparedness127 
through  an  effective  combination  of  awareness  raising 
volunteering activities and preparedness activities in schools 
and  thus  better  support  the  European  Preparedness  Union 
Strategy. 

–  Social 

inclusion 

–  On the one hand, the Erasmus+ and European 
Solidarity  corps  have  a  positive  impact  on 
social  inclusion  and  cohesion  that  would 

–  This option would likely have a strong contribution to social 
  For  instance,  with  38%  of 
inclusion  and  cohesion. 
participants  with  fewer  opportunities,  the  Corps  is  highly 

–  Full  integration  would  not  bring 
significant  additional  impact  for 
inclusion  and  cohesion, 
social 

30 

 
and 
cohesion  

Value of 
public 
debate 
through a 
trustworth
y media 
sphere 

individuals’  attitudes  –  and 

remain stable in the case of continuity.  The 
programmes’  actions  directly  positively 
in 
affect 
particular young people’s – with e.g. 89% of 
Erasmus+  participants  declaring  increased 
tolerance  awareness  and  90%  increased 
European  sense  of  belonging.  In  addition, 
both  instruments  have  a  strong  focus  on 
inclusion, with  specific measures to  support 
the  participation  of  individuals  with  fewer 
opportunities. On the other hand, the CERV 
programme  supports  the  work  towards  a 
union  of  equality  where  all  people  can  live 
free from discrimination, thus building a truly 
inclusive society (up to 88% of participants to 
CERV-funded activities know about the EU 
legislation to promote and protect values). 
–  The  impact  is  deemed  to  be  moderately 
positive, but fragmented. Creative Europe,128 
CERV,  and  prerogative 
lines  such  as 
Multimedia  Actions  already  include  certain 
measures  to  support  media  pluralism  and 
debate.129 
viability, 
Fragmentation,  lack  of  coordination  and 
untapped  synergies  between  programmes 
limits 
comprehensive 
responses  to  complex  challenges,  such  as 
media capture, threats against the information 
space, and erosion of trust in public discourse 
(as developed in Chapter 2).  Opportunities to 
strengthen the link between media policy and 
to 
civic  engagement  are  missed  due 
programme silos. 

integrated 

public 

and 

and 

to  young 

frameworks. By  bringing 

inclusive  and  has  lower  barriers  to  participation,  making  it 
more  accessible 
individuals  outside  formal 
this  additional 
institutional 
inclusive dimension into Erasmus+, option 2 would enable to 
widen the  access  to  the  future merged instrument  to  people 
inclusion 
from  different  background  further  boost 
dimension  and  raise  positive  direct  impact  on  individuals’ 
attitudes and indirect societal impact.  

its 

e.g..,  in  learning  mobility  and 
volunteering,  CCIs,  audiovisual 
and media industries This is due to 
a 
dilution, 
heterogenous  beneficiaries,  and 
complex governance. 

policy 

risk 

of 

–  Similarly, with an enhanced effectiveness and efficiency, the 
EU  intervention  under  this  option  will  increase  citizens’ 
access to cultural, audiovisual and media content, which are 
essential elements of social inclusion and cohesion. 

–  The  impact  is  expected  to  be  strongly  positive.  Merger  1 
results in a dedicated cluster focused on democracy, media, 
culture,  rights  and  civic  resilience.  It  enables  coherent  and 
strategic  support  for  trustworthy  media,  including  media 
independence 
disinformation 
countermeasures, and democratic participation, which are not 
covered  under  Option  1.131  This  option  enhances  thematic 
synergies and streamlining access for applicants. In addition, 
it will foster a more comprehensive public debate ecosystem, 
where civic engagement and quality journalism are reinforced 
together in transversal actions.  

pluralism,130 

and 

–  The impact  has a broad  potential, 
because  it  offers  flexibility  to 
reallocate  resources  and  support 
initiatives. 
cross-sectorial 
However,  it  brings  in  risks  of 
policy  dilution.  Media-specific 
objectives may become lost within 
a  large  single  fund  as  this  would 
weaken 
for 
journalism,  civic  engagement  and 
to  audiovisual  content. 
access 
Heterogeneous  stakeholders  (e.g. 
universities,  cultural  institutions, 
media  companies,  civil  society 
etc.)  would  be  served  under  one 
umbrella, making it harder to tailor 

targeted 

support 

31 

 
Economic impact132 

funding calls to the specific needs 
of the relevant sectors.  

–  This option has potential for cross-
sector 
greater 
collaborations, 
flexibility  in  funds allocation, but 
this comes with certain limitations. 
First,  some  specific  sectors  (e.g., 
audiovisual  and  cultural  sectors) 
may  lose  policy  focus  amid  the 
much  broader  range  of  objectives 
and  diverse  beneficiaries.  This 
option risks weakening specialised 
support  mechanisms,  such  as  to 
sector-
distribution 
international 
specific 
collaborations. 
Overly 
heterogeneous  stakeholder  base 
could lead to challenges related to 
prioritising different needs. 

networks, 

The existing contribution to competitiveness will be increased 
under  Option  2  (See  Annex  5).  It  will  directly  enhance  the 
international  competitiveness  of  media  and  audiovisual 
companies by continuing to promote cross-border circulation 
of films and series and international co-productions137 but also 
other  types  of  content  such  as  video  games  and  immersive 
content.  It  will  also  boost  international  audiences  and 
competitiveness  by  optimising 
intellectual  property 
exploitation across different media.138 It will boost innovation 
capacity by better integrating support to innovation and skills 
development. The existing blended equity instrument will be 
strengthened  and  expanded  to  other  copyright-intensive 
sectors. International competitiveness is also strengthened by 
reinforcing  Europe’s  attractiveness  as  a  talent  hub  and 
expanding  global  presence.    Action  towards  news  media 
sectors would contribute to their financial viability, and thus, 
their  competitiveness.  The  expected  administrative  benefits 
will  allow  beneficiaries  for  a  higher  access  to  funding.  
Transversal  intervention  would  bring  in  horizontal  benefits, 
such as applied innovation and new sectoral skills needs.  
Option  2  has  a  greater  potential  to  have  a  positive  indirect  
impact on competitiveness, as it would facilitate the access to 
learning  opportunities  through  a  single  entry  point,  in 
particular for young people, and foster the development of the 
skills needed for jobs.  

–  Impacts 
on 
competitiv
eness133 

The  continuity  option  would  have  positive 
impacts,  although  with  limited  capacity  to 
respond  to  current  and  emerging  challenges 
to  competitiveness.  There  are  ongoing 
positive  impacts  on  costs  and  international 
competitiveness  of  media  organisations 
through  co-productions  and  cross-border 
circulation  of  audiovisual  content,  and 
instruments.134  Ongoing 
blended  equity 
positive impact on other cultural and creative 
sectors 
capacity-
includes  networking, 
building  and  sharing  of  good  practices.  
Opportunities for cross-sector innovation and 
digital 
immersive 
technologies,  AI)  are  underexplored  due  to 
limited synergies between programmes.   
Continued  contribution  of  EU  funding    for 
basic  skills  will  have  a  positive  impact  on 
multifactor  productivity  growth:  OECD 
simulations assuming a gradual improvement 
over  15  years  show  that  increasing  basic 
skills by 25 PISA points could lead to a 0.5 
pp higher average annual growth rate in EU 
GDP in the long term.135  While it is difficult 
to  quantify  the  exact  contribution  of  the 
intervention, it is worth mentioning that 90% 
of participants in Erasmus+ and the European 
Solidarity  Corps  report  increased  skills  and 

transformation 

(e.g., 

32 

 
employability.  As also stressed by the Draghi 
report136,  in  an  evolving  socio-economic 
the 
context, 
competitiveness  of  the  economy  by  putting 
stronger  emphasis  on  continuous  skills 
development. 

increases 

learning 

lifelong 

support, 

application 

–  This  option  will  have  a  moderately  positive 
impact  on  SMEs.  Most  Creative  Europe 
beneficiaries  are  SMEs,  and  the  calls  are 
SMEs-targeted,140  hence  to  their  benefit. 
However,  some  limitations  remain.  This 
includes administrative burden deriving from 
fragmented 
and 
to 
reporting  costs.  Continuous  support 
learning  mobility  and  cooperation  actions 
under Erasmus+ is expected, including in the 
VET and adult learning sectors that reach out 
to the highest rate of SMEs in the programme 
and  in  flagship  actions  such  as  Centres  of 
vocational  excellence  or  Alliances 
for 
innovation.141  As  far  as  VET  is  concerned, 
continuous  work  on 
the  attractiveness, 
quality,  inclusiveness  of  this  sector  has  the 
potential to increase SME’s competitiveness 
in the economy, notably in view of the digital 
and green transitions. 142 
Support  to  education  and  skills  as  per  this 
option will continue to have a positive direct 
impact on individual’s employability as they 
will keep supporting learning periods abroad 
that develop skills (e.g. flexibility, resilience) 
increasingly valued by companies144. 83% of 
Erasmus+  participants  confirm  improved 

–  Impacts 
on 
SMEs139 

–  Individual

s’ 
employabi
lity  

This option will have a strong and positive impact on SMEs 
(based on the analysis in Annex 6). This comes from a list of 
direct benefits, which are deemed to be enhanced by synergies 
and  complementarities,  higher  efficiency  and  effectiveness, 
and  harmonised  and  streamlined  procedures,  which  will 
enhance accessibility for SMEs.   
Positive impacts are both for sectors currently covered by the 
programmes  as  well  as  cross-media  collaborations  and 
synergies  and  a  wider  range  of  SMEs  covered  by  the 
intervention  (e.g.  video  games,  news  media).  Strengthened 
blended  equity  instruments  will  help  increase  financial 
liquidity and reduce IP risks of SMEs.143 Simplified processes 
(e.g.,  lump  sums,  national  desks)  and  targeted  support  for 
micro-enterprises  and  under-networked  regions  will  help 
mitigate previous access barriers. 

–  This  option  would  have 

limited  by 

a 
moderately positive impact. Some 
of  the  existing  benefits  would 
continue  to  be  pursued,  but  they 
could  be 
some 
challenges.  This  stems  from  a 
complex  governance,  which  in 
turn  will  increase  administrative 
burden for both the administration 
and SMEs. In addition, the highly 
of 
heterogeneous 
beneficiaries  might  hinder 
the 
accessibility  of  SMEs,  due  to  a 
potential overlook of their needs.  

nature 

indirectly 

This  option  is  likely  to  enhance  benefits  on  individuals’ 
EU’s 
employability, 
competitiveness and economy growth. In the evolving socio-
economic  context,  a  merged  programme  bringing  together 
Erasmus+  and  the  Corps,  would  allow  for  more  flexible 
to  combine 
mobility  pathways,  enabling  participants 

impacting 

also 

–  Option  3  is  likely  to  continue 
generating benefits on individuals’ 
skills  and  employability  while 
possibly enhancing them. 

33 

 
in 

competences useful for their studies or work 
and  81%  believe  they  have  better  career 
opportunities.  In  addition,  students  with 
experience 
studying,  working  and 
volunteering  abroad  have  better  academic 
including  higher 
and  career  outcomes 
– 
salaries145.  A 
large  scale  meta-analysis 
showed that, on a global level, the private rate 
of return on one extra year of schooling is on 
average  about  7%  in  Europe  146,  which  is 
significantly higher for people with medium-
level vocational education (84.9%) and those 
with tertiary education (89.7%) as compared  
for the low-educated (64.1%).147 PIAAC data 
also  demonstrate  that  basic  skills  cater  to 
economic outcomes. In the EU17, an increase 
of  skills  by  around  40  points  (slightly  less 
than  one  skills  level)  is  linked  with  an 
increase 
from 
approximately 5% in Denmark, Finland and 
Italy to more than 10% in the UK.148 While 
the contribution of the current instruments to 
these  projections 
to  assess,  
research papers also show that students with 
studying,  working  and 
experience 
volunteering  abroad  have  better  academic 
and  career  outcomes 
including  higher 
graduate  salaries.149  The  Erasmus+  Higher 
Education  impact  study  underlines  as  well 
that  Erasmus+ graduates report higher values 
on  the  Job  Quality  Index,  which  measures 
aspects of the current job such as job security, 
career prospects. 

in  wages 

is  difficult 

ranging 

in 

educational,  training,  and  volunteer  experiences,  leading  to 
more  dynamic  career  prospects,  increased  employability  of 
participants,  including  by  developing  their  language  and 
transversal skills or acting as a steppingstone towards a work 
experience in another country.150 
In addition, as also stressed by the Draghi report, certification 
of  skills  should  become  less  reliant  on  formal  education 
attainment, and more flexible and granular. Under option 2, 
by  fostering  cross  sectoral  cooperation  under  a  unified 
umbrella, the programme would support greater recognition 
of  skills  across  fields  of  formal,  non-formal,  informal 
education as well as further support the certification of formal 
and  non-formal  learning.  In  terms  of  sectoral  skills  for  the 
media  and  audiovisual  sectors,  Merger  1  will  provide  for 
transversal actions, creating connectors across skills.   

34 

 
–  Impacts 
on costs 
and 
benefits 

Each  programme  operates  under  its  own 
framework,  fewer  opportunities  for  inter-
programme  synergy  or  joint  actions.  Some 
areas  (e.g.  countering  disinformation)  are 
object  of  scattered  and/or  unstructured 
funding,  limiting  effectiveness  and  impact. 
Fragmented 
duplicated 
structures lead to higher implementation and 
transaction costs.  

systems 

and 

stem 

initial  adaptation 

reduced  overlaps 

Direct  benefits 
and 
from 
administrative  burden  through  consolidation  of  structures, 
shared platforms, fewer committees, savings at Commission, 
national  and  beneficiary  level.  Option  2  brings  streamlined 
processes, single point of entry and harmonised rules for the 
two proposed programmes, reduced application effort, better 
support for low-capacity applicants. For instance, the merger 
of Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps, will require 
for  national  authorities  and 
some 
implementing bodies, but there would be a positive impact on 
administrative costs and economies of scale in the long-term 
perspective.  It  would  facilitate  removing 
the  current 
duplications at level of Commission’s and National Agencies’ 
programming,  monitoring, 
supervision 
processes,  required  by  the  financial  rules,  and  enable  full 
standardisation  of  documents  and  procedures,  streamlined 
back  office,  improved  co-ordination,  more  efficient  use  of 
administrative resources151.  

reporting  and 

–  Limited 

efficiency 
additional 
beyond Option 2, given the limited 
stakeholders  who 
number  of 
would  benefit  from  a  unified 
approach in  the two  programmes. 
In  addition,  benefits  could  be 
offset by increased complexity and 
reduced 
accessibility. 
High transition costs may arise due 
to  reorganisation  of  all  systems, 
brands  and  frameworks;  risk  of 
disruptions  and  delays  during 
implementation.  Single  access 
points may be too broad. 

tailored 

Environmental impact 

–  Environm
ental 
impact152 

–  Overall  limited  environmental  impact.  Each 
programme  pursues  some  green  initiatives 
(e.g. 
learning  mobility,  more 
sustainable  cultural  and  creative  sectors; 
MEDIA  carbon  calculator),  contributing 
marginally to climate goals.   

green 

–  Positive, though modest, improvement compared to option 1. 
Positive impacts can stem from easier to share best practices 
on  greening  across  sectors,potential  for  more  projects 
combining  environmental  themes  (through  joint  calls)  and 
strengthening of the MEDIA carbon calculator.  

–  Similar benefits to Option 2. 

–  Impacts 
on 
digitalisati
on 

–  Under Option 1, there would be fragmented 
digital sectorial transformation efforts across 
programmes. Digital skills development will 
be addressed separately with partial coverage 

–  Option  2  offers  more  coherent  digital  strategy  across 
education, skills, solidarity, youth aligned with sectoral needs. 
Coherent  investments  in  digital  methods  and  platforms  and 
digital  tools  widen  participation,  including  for  marginalised 

–  The broad scope of Option 3 could 
support 
risks 
losing strategic focus and sectoral 
depth.  Digital  skills  potential 

transformation, 

Other impacts 

35 

 
  
and lower scalability. There will be untapped 
potential  for  education  technologies  and 
digital innovation. Digital outreach improves 
– 
access  but  remains  uneven,  particularly  for 
those  with  fewer  opportunities.  Untapped 
potential  of  digital  uptake  and  innovation 
shortcomings  across  the  media  sectors,  as 
well  as  in  the  other  cultural  and  creative 
sectors.153 

groups,  better  accessibility  features  and  outreach  capacity. 
Option  2  enables  scaling  pilots  across  Member  States,  also 
addressing problem 3.  
In the area of media and audiovisual cross-platform synergies 
in  IP  use  and  digital  distribution  (e.g.  books/games/films) 
supports transmedia storytelling and market reach. Option 2 
would  build  on  the  success  of  the  current  programme, 
allowing for cross-cutting support to digital transformation of 
societal,  cultural  and  media  stakeholders.154  Option  2  also 
simplifies processes and increases flexibility, allowing for a 
horizontal  intervention  while  keeping  a  sector-specific 
approach. 

but 

fragmented 
maintained, 
sectorial 
implementation  could 
limit  systemic  coverage.  Digital 
tools: single interface possible but 
risks  becoming  too  complex  or 
generic,  reducing  ease  of  use. 
Centralisation of digital platforms 
could 
improve  coverage  but 
confuse  users  due  to  lack  of 
thematic clarity. Dilution of cross-
cutting  synergies  among  societal, 
cultural  and  media  organisations 
within a larger pot of priorities and 
beneficiaries. 

–  Impacts 
on 
fundamen
tal rights 
and on 
equality155 

–  Promotion  of  fundamental  rights,  equality 
and  non-discrimination  through  the  set  of 
objectives of the CERV programme156.  
–  Some limitations157 with insufficient scale or 
coordination on the side of Creative Europe 
and Erasmus+, or a funding gap for equality, 
rights and gender equality, and for combating 
violence  against  women,  children  and  other 
groups  at  risk  on  the  side  of  the  CERV 
programme.  

–  Promotion  of  fundamental  rights,  equality  and  non-
discrimination  continues  through  targeted  actions,  with 
the  political 
enhanced  synergies  and  alignment  with 
guidelines. 
by 
coherence 
policy 
comprehensively  addressing  aspects  related  to  equality  and 
AI bias). 

Stronger 

(e.g., 

–  Contributi
on to the 
relevant 
Sustainabl
e 
Developm

–  Contributions  to  the  relevant  SDGs  through 
the  existing  programmes.  The  analysis  has 
identified SDGs 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 16 and 
17 as relevant for policies under this IA. (See 
Annex 3, Table 3)  

–  On  top  of  the  baseline,  this  option  provides  more  efficient 
support to public access to information, thereby contributing 
to  indicators  16.10.1  (protection  of  journalists)  and  16.10.2 
(policy guarantees for public access to information).  

programme 

–  Risk  that  the  focus  on  promotion 
of fundamental rights, equality and 
non-discrimination is diluted, with 
larger 
diffusing 
visibility  and  political  signalling. 
Stakeholder 
feedback  confirms 
that  clear  mandates  and  thematic 
continuity  are  key  to  maintaining 
operational 
and 
legitimacy 
to 
support 
the 
strength 
fundamental  rights  and  equality 
(see Annex 2). 
–  Similar as option 2. 

in 

36 

 
ent Goals 
(SDGs)158 

37 

 
 
7. 

  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

7.1. 

Description of the analysis’ methods 

On top of the impacts presented in the table above, the policy options were compared by 
applying the Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SMCE). The SMCE was deemed useful 
due to the diversity of policies and interventions in the cluster. This analysis compares the 
three  options  along  four  dimensions,  namely  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence  and 
proportionality.  For  each  of  these  dimensions,  a  set  of  objectives  were  agreed  upon, 
reflecting the priorities outlined under General Objectives 1, 2 and 3 (see Figure below). 
For each objective, a set of indicators was selected (39 indicators overall).  

Figure 2: relationship between SMCE objectives and IA intervention logic 

For each indicator, a score was given, evaluating the impact of the three policy options. 
This was based on an expert assessment from the relevant Commission services, relying 
on current sets of data presented in Annex I (Evidence, Sources and quality), and on results 
of current evaluations, Spending Reviews, political guidelines and policy reports, studies, 
OPC, and independent sectoral reports and surveys. The criterion scores were measured in 
the following range: --- (the most negative), --, -, =, +, ++, +++ (the most positive). The 
neutral score (=) was understood as the option not having impact on the assessed indicator, 
or where the positive and negatives were seen as to balance out. A ranking was obtained, 
under the assumption that all indicators have the same weight, by applying the SOCRATES 
model.159   

The robustness of results was checked by means of local and global sensitivity analyses. 
It should however be acknowledged that data available was used for the triangulation of 
the results to the extent possible, as there remain gaps at EU27 level. Annex 4 provides 

38 

 
 
 
further explanation of the methodology, the expert assessment, including argumentation 
behind each criteria score, the sensitivity analysis, and the ranking of the policy options. 

7.2. 

Results of the Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SMCE) 

7.2.1 Effectiveness 

Objective 1.1: continue to promote fundamental rights, EU values, democracy, media 
and culture: Option 2 achieves strong score (++ across all) in reducing discrimination, 
strengthening media independence and pluralism and tackling disinformation, enhancing 
audiovisual  content  circulation  and  boosting  civic  engagement  and  participation,  and 
creating opportunities for cross-cutting innovation and sustainability of media, culture and 
societal entities. It brings together key programmes in a way which will allow both policy 
coherence and cooperation between beneficiaries working on areas like democracy, media, 
and  anti-discrimination  efforts,  while  preserving  sufficient  thematic  clarity  to  avoid 
undermining  dedicated  objectives.  The  narrative  coherence  of  Option  3  is  less  clear. 
Although  Option  3  has  positive  impact  on  each  indicator,  it  risks  diluting  cultural, 
democracy, and rights-focused programmes by absorbing them into a broad, less focused 
framework with less clarity of goal. In contrast, the status quo (Option 1) offers strengths 
in preserving specific objectives for areas like culture and prevention of violence, but it 
fails  to  address  fragmentation  and  underfunding  in  areas  like  media  independence, 
countering disinformation, and democratic participation. 

lifelong 

Objective 1.2: continue to improve cross-border education and training, youth, sport, 
and solidarity, contributing to  skills for life and jobs: Concerning learning mobility, 
transnational  cooperation, 
learning,  policy  experimentation,  and  social 
engagement, Option 2 stands out as the preferred alternative. Option 2 delivers clear added 
value by fostering greater synergy between Erasmus + and European Solidarity Corps, by 
supporting  learning  mobility  (+)  and  lifelong  learning  (+)  and  enabling  stronger 
transnational  cooperation  (++).  It  also  encourages  policy  experimentation  (+)  and 
significantly enhances  social engagement via education and solidarity (++).  In contrast, 
while Option 3 shows some potential advantages in terms of support to mobility (++) and 
lifelong  learning  (+),  it  risks  dilution  and  loss  of  coherence  in  key  areas  such  as 
transnational cooperation and policy experimentation. At the same time, Option 1 largely 
maintains the status quo with limited progress (=), and with a negative impact on policy 
experimentation and development (-). 

Objective  1.3:  Addressing  linked  EU  challenges:  Considering  the  contribution  to 
democracy  and  competitiveness,  Option  2  emerges  as  the  strongest  and  most  balanced 
choice. While all options score positively in enhancing democracy and competitiveness, 
Option  2  offers  a  notable  improvement  in  policy  coherence  and  alignment  with  EU 
priorities on democracy. Specifically, Option 2 (++) enhances democracy via two areas – 
one focused on rights, values, media, and democracy, and another on skills, education, and 
solidarity – ensuring tailored approaches for both. This option provides a closer alignment 
with two priorities outlined in the political guidelines for the new mandate (i.e., Protecting 
democracy, upholding values and increased societal resilience; and the Union of Skills). 
In contrast, Option 3, also scoring highly (++), contributes to democracy through many 
different angles than the baseline, but risk diluting priorities and losing focus due to the 
complexity  and  broad  scope  of  a  full  integration  model.  For  competitiveness,  Option  2 
(++) scores the highest, as it enables economies of scale without undermining the specific 
objectives  of  key  programmes,  whereas  Option  3  risks  weakening  the  focus  on 

39 

 
competitiveness due to fragmented priorities (+). Status quo has a positive but still limited 
contribution to democracy (+) and competitiveness (+). 

Objective 1.4: Improve cooperation: Both Option 2 (Objective-based consolidation) and 
Option 3 (Full integration) outperform the status quo (which is limited by legal basis and 
fragmented  funding)  in  terms  of  cooperation  between  EC  services  and  agencies  (+), 
cooperation  between  institutions/organisations  in  EU  Member  States  (+),  transnational 
cooperation within EU, and potentiality to integrate inter-related projects (++). However, 
Option 2 is deemed more efficient than Option 3 in terms of cooperation between EU and 
Third Countries (+), due to avoiding additional governance requirements and coordination 
costs associated with full integration (Option 3). 

Objective 1.5: Foster coordination of main policy areas: Option 2 stands out as the most 
balanced  and  effective  approach  in  fostering  coordination  of  main  policy  areas.  While 
Option 1 would have a positive impact in continuity (+), it has a low flexibility between 
programmes (-) and does not prevent the dilution of policy goals (=). Option 3 offers the 
highest flexibility (++), but this comes at the cost of significant risks to continuity (--) and 
potential dilution of policy objectives (-). In contrast, Option 2 strikes an effective balance; 
it  introduces  valuable  flexibility  (+)  to  respond  to  emerging  policy  needs,  although 
maintains a low risk to continuity (-), and strengthens the alignment of planning with policy 
goals (+).  

7.2.2 Efficiency 

Objective  2.1:  Improve  efficiency  for  applicants  and  beneficiaries:  In  terms  of 
accessibility, time required and administrative burdens for beneficiaries, Option 2 emerges 
as the most favourable approach. It scored the highest for ease of access (++) given the 
expected simplifying procedures without introducing excessive complexity, unlike Option 
3 (+), where the full integration risks making requirements heterogeneous for certain calls. 
Both Option 2 and 3 reduces the time required for applications (+) thanks to streamlined 
calls, but Option 2 has a more positive impact in reducing the administrative burdens for 
beneficiaries (+). Although both Option 2 and 3 might imply administrative complexities, 
in  the  case  of  Option  2,  these  are  offset  by  introduced  administrative  simplifications, 
whereas Option 3 does not sufficiently counterbalance its added complexity (=).  

Objective 2.2: Improve efficiency at EU level: From a governance and implementation 
standpoint, Option 2 delivers meaningful simplifications without the excessive complexity 
introduced by a full integration under Option 3. It is expected that Option 2 reduces the 
number of FTEs (+), although Option 3 offers a higher reduction in FTEs in long run (++). 
Option  2  scores  the  highest  (++)  among  the  alternatives  in  streamlining  types  of 
management (direct and indirect) as it would lead clusters to broadly align with existing 
management structures, whereas Option 3 risks of mixing different types of management 
modes (-). In terms of impact on comitology, Option 2 would lead to a slight improvement 
compared to status quo/Option 1 (+) due to fewer programme committees. Conversely, in 
Option (3), there would be too much heterogeneity for committee members, leading to a 
negative  impact  (-).  The  status  quo,  by  comparison,  offers  no  improvements  (=)  and 
maintains fragmented, less efficient governance. 

7.2.3 Coherence 

Objective  3.1:  Promote  synergies  and  complementarities:  Option  2  has  the  best 
prospects  in  promoting  synergies  and  complementarities.  Both  Option  2  and  Option  3 
would improve synergies and complementarities between clusters, compared to the status 

40 

 
 
 
quo  (+).  Within  the  cluster,  synergies  and  complementarities  would  be  achieved  more 
under Option 2 (++), by enabling organic synergies with logical groupings. Option 3 risks 
creating links that dilute coherence (+). In terms of synergies with national and regional 
policies, both Option 2 and 3 offer improvements (+) over the status quo (=). Moreover, 
Option 3 would have the highest flexibility in rechannelling funds (++), while Option 2 
provides a meaningful but more moderate increase (+) compared to the rigid status quo (-
). In reduction of overlaps, Option 2 is the strongest (++), having a structured way to reduce 
overlaps while maintaining policy focus; Option 3 risks introducing dilution despite some 
overlap reduction (+). 

7.2.4 Proportionality 

Objective 4.1: Improve reactiveness to new challenges: In terms of reactiveness to new 
challenges,  Option  2  consistently  emerges  as  the  most  suitable  alternative  across  all 
criteria. Option 2 is the most effective in addressing each of the specific problem drivers 
(++),  as  new  areas  are  covered  (which  are  currently  not  addressed  by  existing 
programmes), and overlaps are avoided. Option 2 also stands out by addressing some of 
the unaddressed policy objectives (++) and allows to sufficiently priorities each of the main 
policy  areas  (++),  such  as  those  addressed  by  the  Political  guidelines  (‘Promoting  our 
democracies and upholding our values’, the Union of Skills, etc.). In contrast, Option 3 
introduces  risks  of  fragmentation  and  complexity,  weakening  its  capacity  to  address 
problem drivers (+), effectively addressing specific objectives (=), and maintaining clear 
policy priorities (=). Meanwhile, the status quo under Option 1 is the weakest (- across all 
criteria), being limited by existing legal bases and an inability to cover emerging policy 
areas such as media and countering disinformation. 

Objective 4.2: Minimise risk: Option 1 and Option 2 register the same score in terms of 
minimising risks. In terms  of risk of loss of customised approaches to  (policy) specific 
needs  and  target  groups,  Option  2  offers  a  clear  advantage  (++)  by  enabling  better 
delineation of policy boundaries and improved alignment between EU policy priorities and 
funding.  In  contrast,  Option  3  risks  excessive  heterogeneity  by  merging  highly  diverse 
target groups and beneficiaries (-), leading to challenges in addressing the distinct needs 
of groups as varied as Erasmus+ students and business in the media sector. The status quo 
already functions reasonably well in targeting (+), however, without the added clarity and 
coordination provided by Option 2. Regarding the risk of losing established programme 
branding  and  visibility  among  target  audiences,  the  status  quo  maintains  the  strongest 
position (+). Option 2 entails some loss of visibility for programmes well known to the 
public  (-);  Option  3  introduces  the  highest  risks  in  this  criterion  (--),  with  larger 
programmes possibly eroding the identity of smaller programmes.   

7.3. 

How do the options compare? 

The ranking of the social and economic impacts (SMCE) is thus:  

First 
Objective-based 
merger (Option 2) 

Second 
Full  integration  of  all 
programmes (Option 3) 

Third 
Status Quo  
(Option 1) 

Third ranked option. The “continuity” option would build on the achievements of the 
current programmes under this cluster and  incrementally improve their implementation, 

41 

 
 
 
 
while  maintaining  the  current  architecture.  While  the  programmes  benefit  from  well-
established brands, which would continue ensuring visibility and recognition among target 
groups, this option would not be fully aligned with the Political Guidelines for 2024-2029, 
nor with the ambition set for the next Multiannual Financial Framework to build a more 
focused,  simpler  and  more  flexible  EU  budget.  This  option  would  not  build  synergies 
between programmes and would lack the flexibility to address new challenges. It would 
continue  to  rely  on  a  multiplicity  of  implementation  modes,  work  programmes,  and 
stakeholder relations, including those with non-EU countries (e.g. on mobility of students 
and young volunteers). 

Second ranked option. The “full integration” option would generate efficiency gains by 
streamlining relevant implementation processes and enhancing coordination. It would also 
offer  flexibility.  However,  despite  these  potential  benefits,  several  downsides  must  be 
considered. The new and growing focus on supporting democratic and societal resilience 
might be overshadowed by the skills and education component and differing budget shares 
within the cluster. It might result in lesser focus being put on enhancing democracy and 
respect of rights, the rule of law, and EU values. The option might more generally result 
in  less  tailored  approaches  to  specific  needs  and  target  groups  and  make  it  more 
challenging to combine EU spending with the right policy tools, as the combination of all 
the  policies  significantly  widens  the  spread  of  EU  activities  involved.  This  option  is 
unlikely  to  provide  significant  extra  synergies  compared  to  option  2,  due  to  different 
management  modes,  varying  degree  of  EU  competences,  and  different  constituencies. 
Existing  stakeholders  might  find  it  challenging  to  adapt  to  such  an  all-encompassing 
merger, which in addition might negatively impact brand recognition and the visibility of 
EU interventions.  

First ranked option. The objectives-based merger achieved the best scoring on all four 
dimensions of the SMCE (effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality), being 
the highest ranked option in nine out of the ten SMCE objectives160 and in 21 out of the 39 
criteria161. Conversely, this objectives-based merger registered negative scores for just 2 
out of the 39 criteria considered.   

•  From  the  standpoint  of  effectiveness,  Option  2  offers  an  optimal  balance  between 
greater  integration  and  the  preservation  of  policy-specific  objectives.  First,  it 
strengthens cooperation, consolidating relationships between EU, Member States and 
third countries, and enhancing cooperation among Commission services. Secondly, by 
allowing greater adaptability within its defined policy areas, it overcomes the current 
rigidity of the status quo while maintaining clear thematic boundaries and preventing 
policy  dilution  that  may  occur  under  option  3.  Finally,  this  option  enhances  the 
contribution to the political priorities.  

•  In terms  of efficiency, option 2 strikes a balance between simplifying processes and 
keeping  operational  complexity  manageable.  It  would  ease  access  and  reduce 
administrative burdens for stakeholders through harmonisation of documentation, calls 
and  processes.  Option  2  would  also  better  consolidate  existing  programmes  under 
common management modes. This would allow implementing bodies to work within 
familiar  operational  models,  while  preserving  clarity  of  roles  and  responsibilities. 
Likewise, the same agencies would be working on the same clusters (or parts of them), 
following the same implementation logic. 

•  From  the  perspective  of  coherence,  option  2  would  create  meaningful  and  targeted 
synergies  and  complementarities,  bridging  gaps  while  reducing  overlaps  between 
funding and policy objectives. In terms of synergies with other  EU programmes, the 

42 

 
more  focused  structure  of  option  2  would  make  it  less  prone  to  inefficiencies  or 
conflicting  priorities  and  create  new  opportunities  for  alignment,  for  instance  with 
programmes in shared management. Option 2 brings important benefits in rechanneling 
funds for evolving policy needs. 

•  Lastly, in terms of proportionality, option 2 strikes a balance between 1) flexibility to 
react to new challenges by enabling reallocation of resources and 2) addressing specific 
problem drivers and policy objectives. Clearer lines of accountability and strategy due 
to the grouping by objectives and management modes would increase the performance 
and impact of these policy priorities. At the same time, this option presents only minor 
risks of loss of customised approaches to policy-specific needs and target groups. To 
address the concerns related to brand recognition, a way forward could allow for strands 
of actions within programmes, to preserve brands and identity of the policies.  

8. 

PREFERRED OPTION 

The  evidence  gathered  shows  that  option  2  (“objective-based  consolidation”)  offers 
better potential compared to the two alternatives and the discarded options. This option 
allows for reinforced coordination, targeted flexibility, and a more impactful use of the EU 
budget  –  without  sacrificing  policy  focus  or  accessibility.  It  offers  the  optimal  balance 
between simplification and policy relevance. It is congruent with stakeholders’ calls, who 
ask for the simplification of access to funding, flexibility of resource allocation and the 
application of common rules (see Annex 2). 

The  option  follows  a  ‘funding-follows-policy’  principle,  clustering  the  programmes 
around the most salient and core policy-related challenges. It will build on the success of 
current programmes, best practices of the current MFF, as evidenced by evaluations, better 
addressing transnational and common challenges, filling funding gaps at Member States 
level, and enhancing coherence between internal  and external policies, while  enhancing 
synergies, efficiency and effectiveness, and reducing overlaps. It will simplify operations 
and enable a rationalisation of resources by streamlining work programmes and developing 
harmonised rules as well as reporting and monitoring mechanisms. It will pay due visibility 
to each of the policy areas under this IA. 

Further information on this option is presented in Annex 3 (Table 1, expected benefits) and 
Annex  11  (with  examples  of  how  proposed  actions  would  contribute  to  the  new  policy 
priorities).   

9. 

HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

This  initiative will be monitored through the performance framework for the post-2027 
budget, which is examined in a separate impact assessment. The performance framework 
provides for an implementation report during the implementation phase of the programme, 
as well as a retrospective evaluation to be carried out in accordance with Article 34(3) of 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. The evaluation shall be conducted in accordance 
with  the  Commission's  Better  Regulation  Guidelines  and  will  be  based  on  indicators 
relevant to the objectives of the programmes.  

Logical links between specific objectives and areas of intervention and examples of how 
success will be measured, are illustrated in Annex 10. 

43 

 
 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references 

The lead DGs are (alphabetical order) CNECT, EAC and JUST. 

There is no DECIDE Planning reference number.  

The proposals for the post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework are listed as Item 44 in 
Annex  I  of  the  Commission  Work  Programme  2025,  under  the  headline  “Delivering 
together and preparing our Union for the future”.  

Organisation and timing 

This  impact  assessment  was  coordinated  by  an  Inter-Service  Steering  Group  (ISSG), 
involving  the  following  Commission  services:  Secretariat-General  (SG);  Legal  Service 
(SJ); Directorate-General for Budget (BUDG); Directorate-General for Communications 
Networks, Content and Technology (CNECT); Directorate-General for Education, Youth, 
Sport  and  Culture  (EAC);  Directorate-General  for  Employment,  Social  Affairs  and 
Inclusion (EMPL); Eurostat (ESTAT); Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs (GROW); Joint Research Centre (JRC); Directorate-General 
for  Justice  and  Consumers  (JUST);  Directorate-General  for  Regional  and  Urban  Policy 
(REGIO); Reform and Investment Task Force (SG REFORM). 

The  Inter-Service  Steering  Group  met  four  times  in  2025:  28  January,  21  February,  17 
March,  and  15  May.  It  was  consulted  throughout  the  different  steps  of  the  impact 
assessment process, notably on the questionnaire for the open public consultation and the 
draft staff working document.  

The  IA  is  based  on  an  extensive  desk  review,  including  the  results  of  the  midterm-
evaluations  for  2021-2027  and  ex  post  evaluations  for  2014-2020  for  the  programmes 
within the scope of this initiatives. The report is underpinned by a broad public consultation 
(no call for evidence). The analysis of the policy options is based in particular on a Social 
Multi-Criteria  Evaluation  (SOCRATES)  model  developed  and  carried  out  by  the  Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission.  

Consultation of the RSB 

The draft report was submitted to the RSB on 21 May 2025 and was discussed by the Board 
on 11 June 2025. The RSB gave an opinion to the impact assessment on 13 June 2025. 
RSB made a series of comments and recommendations on scope, problem definition and 
the use of evaluations, intervention logic and objectives, comparison of options and cost-
benefit analysis, governance, coherence and future monitoring and evaluation. The text of 
the IA has been adjusted taking into account the comments made by the RSB. 

Table: Overview of the RSB board’s recommendations addressed 

The  text  of  this  Impact  Assessment  (IA)  has  been  adjusted  taking  into  account  the 
comments made by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and its recommendations. The IA was 
revised further to these comments. The following table provides information on how the 
RSB comments, when possible, were integrated in the text.  

RSB recommendation  

Justification 

“On scope: The report does 
not  explain  why  other  EU 
instruments 
funding 

The  reviewed  IA  includes  further  explanations  in  Chapter  1  on 
why other EU funding instruments do not fall within the scope of 
this initiative. Coherence with other instruments and MFF clusters 

44 

 
addressing the same policy 
priorities and objectives as 
this  MFF  cluster,  do  not 
fall within the scope of this 
initiative.” 

will  be  further  pursued,  notably  with  national  envelopes,  future 
programmes on competitiveness, research and innovation.  

Annex 11 of the report has been expanded with an additional table 
showing that the architecture is conducive to an effective delivery 
of the policy objectives.  

the 

“On 
problem 
definition and on the use 
of evaluations: The report 
should  clearly  state 
the 
degrees  of  uncertainty  in 
the conclusions  from prior 
evaluations  of  individual 
programmes 
how 
and 
the  conclusions 
strongly 
are supported by a reliable 
evidence  base,  taking  also 
into account opinions from 
the RSB.” 

explain 

“On the intervention logic 
and objectives: The report 
does  not 
the 
magnitude of the gaps and 
market 
to  be 
failures 
addressed.  The  proposed 
objectives 
not 
S.M.A.R.T.” 

are 

Annex 8, on evaluations, shows that the current EU intervention 
in these policy areas is broadly successful. At the same time, the 
new table prepared under Annex 9 (cfr. Below) shows how some 
of the problems are new, requiring new and enhanced responses.   

A  new  table  was  included  in  Annex  9  to  respond  to  the 
recommendations  related  to  the  problem  definition,  providing 
greater clarity. The table addresses the Board’s recommendation 
regarding the types of problem drivers (new or recurrent; social, 
market  vs.  regulatory),  as  well  as  the  magnitude  of  gaps.  The 
second column of the table classifies the policy-related problem 
drivers, as either new or recurrent. The third column describes the 
type of problem driver (societal, market, vs. regulatory), and also 
indicates which drivers are perceived as shortcomings of already 
existing  public  interventions.  The  fourth  column  provides 
examples of gaps, drawing on evaluations or other data sources. 

Chapter  1,  Annex  8  (on  the  results  of  the  evaluations)  and  the 
newly added table in Annex 9, which contextualises the problem 
definition in Chapter 2, draw on data and results from evaluations, 
and show how and to what extent, existing challenges have been 
addressed through the current programmes.  

We  acknowledge  that  discussion  on  how  to  ensure  synergies 
between different MFF clusters to address common challenges is 
still ongoing. At the time of finalising this document, consultations 
are still in progress. 

The  reviewed  IA  presents  the  magnitude  of  gaps  and  market 
failures  in  a  newly  created  table  under  Annex  9.  However,  the 
broad and diverse scope of problem drivers and challenges across 
a variety of policy areas makes prioritisation particularly complex, 
taking  also  into  account  that  the  size  of  the  financial  envelopes 
allocated to this cluster has still to be determined.  

The  reviewed  IA  addressed  the  recommendation:  “describe  the 
objectives  in  S.M.A.R.T.  terms  to  define  the  success  and  to 
facilitate monitoring and evaluation”. Two new tables were added 
under  Annex  10,  which  provide  a  detailed  list  of  examples  of 
output and/or result indicators to measure how success would look 
like.  The  tables  were  prepared  to  show  causal  links  of  areas  of 
intervention, per policy-related specific objective. 

As  regards  the  point  on  “how  the  proposed  options  address 
general  objectives  1  and  2”,  the  justification  under  the  Social 

45 

 
Multi-Criteria  Evaluation  (SMCE)  addresses  this  aspect.  More 
specifically, objectives 1 and 2 under the effectiveness dimension 
of the evaluation model are directly aligned to general objectives 
1 and 2 of the IA, showcasing that Option 2 best contributes to the 
objectives.  At  the  same  time,  the  justification  under  indicator 
4.1.2.  ‘Ability  to  address  each  of  the  specific  programme 
objectives’  under  the  proportionality  dimension  of  the  SMCE 
further  explains  how  the  proposed  options  address  general 
objectives 1 and 2. 

Annex  11  of  the  Impact  Assessment  provides  examples  of 
synergies across objectives (e.g., in the area of disinformation and 
media literacy).  

The  amended  IA  has  strengthened  Chapter  6  on  comparison  of 
options  by  including  additional  endnotes,  building  on  a  broader 
range  of  data  points  from  the  existing  evaluations,  public  and 
stakeholders’  consultations,  and  other  data  sources.  It  also 
provides a clearer distinction between direct and indirect impacts.  

The new table included in Annex 10 on monitoring and evaluation 
outlines  key  areas  of  intervention,  highlighting  which  aspects 
would be central for each key policy area.  

Success of policies across different areas remains closely linked to 
the size of the financial envelope allocated to this cluster, which 
has yet to be determined.  

The IA did not provide additional analysis of administrative costs 
and  quantitative  benefits  given  that  the  size  of  the  financial 
envelope allocated to this cluster, has yet to be determined.   

Governance  issues,  which  were  partly  addressed  in  the  Social 
Multi-Criteria  Evaluation  (e.g.  comitology),  have  been  further 
strengthened in Annex 4 of the Impact Assessment, and provides 
the  overall  methodology.  
more  detailed  explanations  on 
Annex 11 was reviewed and includes a visual presentation of the 
architecture  and  objectives  of  the  future  programme  bringing 
together Creative Europe and CERV. 

The decisions on the future internal governance are a prerogative 
of the European Commission, and as such beyond the scope of the 
impact assessments accompanying the MFF. 

“On 
of 
comparison 
options  and  cost-benefit 
analysis:  The  report  does 
not  adequately  assess  the 
costs  and  benefits  of  the 
options.” 

“On  governance:  The 
report does not sufficiently 
describe 
the  governance 
mechanisms.” 

not 

“On coherence: The report 
does 
sufficiently 
specify  how  the  proposed 
initiative  links  with  other 
parts  of 
the  post-2027 
MFF,  such  as  National 

Chapter 1 of the reviewed IA provides further explanations on the 
rationale behind the cluster.   

As  explained  in  Point  1,  coherence  with  other  instruments  and 
MFF  clusters  will  be  further  pursued,  notably  with  national 
envelopes,  future  programmes  on  competitiveness,  research  and 
innovation.  

46 

 
Envelopes 
Competitiveness Fund.” 

and 

“On  future  monitoring 
and 
evaluation:  The 
report  is  not  clear  what 
monitoring  and  evaluation 
arrangements will be put in 
place 
the 
to  measure 
the 
achievement 
initiative’s  objectives  and 
how  the  Performance  and 
framework 
Monitoring 
would  be  implemented  in 
this case.” 

of 

Monitoring  and  evaluation  arrangements  are  addressed 
horizontally  for  all  MFF  proposals  under  a  dedicated  impact 
assessment.  

The amended AI includes two new tables in Annex 10 clarifying 
the links between specific objectives, and areas of intervention and 
providing  examples  of  indicators  on  how  success  will  be 
measured.  

The Impact Assessment has been further adapted to take into account the latest comments 
received from other Commission services during consultations leading to the adoption of 
the new MFF programme proposals. 

Evidence, sources and quality 

The impact assessment is based on several sources, including those listed hereafter (non-
exhaustive list): 

•  Report  on  the  ex-post  evaluation  of  the  Rights, Equality  and  Citizenship  (REC) 
programme (second part), the ex-post evaluation of the Europe for Citizens (EfC) 
programme, and the interim evaluation of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values 
(CERV) programme. 

•  Report on the ex-post evaluation of the 2014-2020 Justice programme and interim 

evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme. 

•  The  final  evaluation  of  the  2014-2020  Creative  Europe  programme  and  interim 

evaluation of the 2021-2027 Creative Europe programme. 

•  The  final  evaluation  of  the  2014-2020  Erasmus+  programme  and  the  interim 

evaluation of the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme. 

•  The final evaluation of the 2018-2020 European Solidarity Corps programme and 

interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 programme. 

•  Spending review for the 2021-207 multiannual financial framework. 
•  Mario Draghi’s report on the future of EU competitiveness.  
•  Enrico Letta’s report on the future of the Single Market. 
•  Niinistö Report on Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and 

Readiness.  

•  Results  of  Standard  Eurobarometers;  results  of  Special  Eurobarometers  as 

referenced in the footnotes  

•  The Open Public Consultation, carried out between 12 February 2025 and 7 May 

2025.   

•  The Media Industry Outlook SWD European Commission (to be published early 

July). 

47 

 
 
 
•  The  analysis  of  the  impacts  was  carried  out  with  the Social  Multi-criteria 
Evaluation  (SOCRATES)  model developed  by  the  Joint  Research  Centre. 
SOCRATES  (SOcial  multi  CRiteria  AssessmenT  of  European  policieS)  is  a 
multiple criteria assessment software tool, explicitly designed for ex-ante Impact 
Assessment (IA) problems162. Details of the analysis are presented in Chapter 7 and 
Annex 4. 

48 

 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION 

Introduction  

This  report  provides  a  detailed  overview  of  stakeholder  participation  in  the  Open  Public 
Consultation (OPC), which informed the impact assessment for EU programmes in the domains 
of cross-border education, youth, culture, media, values and civil society under the post-2027 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Conducted between 12 February and 7 May 2025, 
the OPC was designed in line with the European Commission's standards for consultation and 
aimed to ensure inclusiveness, transparency, and evidence-based policymaking. 

In total, the consultation gathered 5,845 valid replies. The consultation was structured around 
133  closed  questions  and  four  open-ended  questions,  and  participants  were  also  invited  to 
submit supporting materials such as position papers, analyses, and practical testimonies. A total 
of 383 attachments were submitted. These inputs helped assess public perception of programme 
relevance,  EU  added  value,  barriers  to  impact,  and  potential  improvements  to  programme 
architecture. The wide scope and accessibility of the questionnaire allowed for a nuanced data 
set  that  reflects  a  diversity  of  lived  experiences,  professional  assessments,  and  institutional 
capacities across sectors and countries. 

Methodology 

The  analysis  and  synthesis  presented  in  this  annex  was  developed  through  a  structured  and 
iterative  process  combining  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  dimensions  of  the  OPC.  The 
extraction of key thematic clusters was informed by three primary data streams: (1) aggregate 
response  trends  to  closed  questions,  (2)  disaggregated  data  by  respondent  type,  age,  and 
geography, and (3) content analysis of 383 attached documents and open-text answers. 

Quantitative data from the OPC questionnaire were processed using dashboards provided by 
the  Joint  Research  Centre  (JRC),  dashboards  developed  by  DG  EAC  (Qlik)  which  enabled 
segmentation  by  respondent  category  and  geographic  origin,  as  well  as  other  categories. 
Response  rates  for  each  question  and  dimension  were  evaluated  based  on  Likert-scale 
responses. Items scoring consistently above 60% across both citizens and organisations were 
flagged for inclusion as broadly endorsed priorities. Cross-tabulations were used to identify 
divergence or reinforcement patterns by age (especially under-30s), stakeholder type (NGOs, 
academic  institutions,  public  authorities,  SMEs), and  regional  clusters  (Eastern  vs.  Western 
Europe). 

Qualitative analysis was carried out using a combination of AI-assisted text mining and manual 
coding. Open-text submissions and attachments were run through a dual-model NLP pipeline 
(informed by values, emotion, sentiment, and keyword clustering) to identify recurring themes 
and  positions.  Manual  validation  ensured  thematic  accuracy  and  representative  phrasing  of 
cited quotes. Contributions advocating structural reforms (e.g. simplification, funding scale-
up,  integrated  campuses)  were  tracked  and  tagged  with  frequency  indicators,  then  cross-
checked  against  closed-question  alignment.  This  triangulated  methodology  ensured  that  the 
analysis distils stakeholder sentiment in a transparent, proportionate, and evidence-grounded 
manner—aligned with Better Regulation Tool #54. 

49 

 
Demographics  

Overall participation  

50 

 
 
 
 
The public consultation received 5,845 responses.  

Responses were relatively evenly split between individuals and organisations. Just under half 
(2,780)  were  submitted  by  EU  citizens.  Within  this  group,  around  1,372  respondents  were 
under  the  age  of  30,  meaning  that  nearly  half  of  citizen  participants  came  from  a  younger 
demographic. This demographic had a particularly high level of engagement with questions 
concerning solidarity, mobility, digital transition, and democratic values, and their views will 
be  revisited  in  later  analytical  sections  through  the  lens  of  the  Commission's  Youth  Check 
priorities. Additionally, 169 respondents (3%) declared themselves as non-EU citizens. 

The remaining 2,896 responses (50%) were submitted by organisations and institutions. These 
included 952 submissions from academic and research bodies, making up 16% of all responses. 
The  majority  of  these  institutions  were  large  in  size,  with  69%  employing  more  than  250 
people.  Another  835  submissions  came  from  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs), 
representing 14% of the total number of respondents to the consultation but with several of 
them representing either large quantities of individuals or representing themselves several other 
organisations (e.g. umbrella networks of civil society organisations or representing the interests 
of various cultural and creative sectors). Roughly half of the NGO respondents reported that 
they were micro-organisations with fewer than ten employees.  

Public authorities accounted for 317 submissions, including a mix of international, national, 
regional,  and  local  entities.  A  further  259  responses  came  from  companies  and  businesses, 
especially  those  active  in  the  culture,  media,  and  audiovisual  sectors.  A  small  number  of  
responses (123) were received from trade unions, business associations, consumer groups, and 
environmental organisations. These groups often contributed through both survey replies and 
technical attachments outlining sector-specific needs. 

Geographically, participation spanned 110 countries, with EU Member States a accounting for 
94%  of  all  contributions.  Germany  submitted  the  largest  number  of  responses,  contributing 
2,228 in total (38% of all replies). Among these, 1,302 were from citizens (including 862 from 
citizens under 30), and 926 from organisations.   A notable concentration of responses occurred 
between 10 and 13 March 2025, potentially indicating a coordinated mobilisation campaign. 
Italy and France were the next most represented Member States, each accounting for around 
552 and 467 responses (or 9% and 8% of the total respectively). The remaining EU Member 
States together submitted approximately 2,253 responses. Participation from outside the EU 
totalled  345  responses,  or  6%  of  the  total.  Ukraine  was  the  most  represented  third  country, 
contributing 41 responses (0.7%). This international component is of interest not only for its 
scale,  but  for  the  qualitative  focus  of  the  submissions,  which  often  related  to  EU  values, 
enlargement, and external action. 

Youth  engagement  stood  out  as  a  strong  feature  of  this  consultation.  About  50%  of  citizen 
respondents were under the age of 30, and this age group consistently expressed strong support 
for  funding  initiatives  that  promote  democratic  engagement,  equality,  mobility,  and  civic 
cooperation.  Their  feedback  aligned  well  with  the  Commission’s  strategic  focus  areas  for 
youth, including those highlighted under the Youth Check initiative. Their engagement also 
demonstrated a high level of awareness and investment in the values-based and cross-border 
elements  of  EU  programming.  In  addition  to  this,  responses  from  youth  organisations  and 
informal youth  groups (especially  within the NGO category) emphasised the importance of 
accessibility, digital inclusion, and opportunities for direct co-creation in programme design. 

51 

 
Several called for greater recognition of non-formal learning outcomes and closer integration 
of volunteering, civic service, and mobility schemes. 

Among the 383 attachments submitted, 189 came from NGOs, 38 from academic or research 
institutions,  and  about  26  from  public  authorities.  The  remaining  130  came  from  umbrella 
organisations or networks representing youth groups, media stakeholders, and cultural or civil 
society  sectors.  These  documents  took  various  forms—formal  position  papers,  project 
assessments, or thematic policy proposals. A number of them came from established EU-level 
platforms  and  civil  society  coalitions,  while  others  were  submitted  by  local  or  regional 
organisations.  In  several  cases,  contributions  included  detailed  examples  of  successful  or 
problematic  project  experiences  under  Erasmus+,  Creative  Europe,  CERV,  and  related 
programmes. Collectively, these contributions enriched the consultation’s quantitative findings 
by  providing  deeper,  context-specific  insight  into  stakeholder  challenges  and  ideas  for 
programme  reform.  They  also  revealed  areas  of  emerging  policy  interest,  such  as  the 
intersection between cultural participation and democratic resilience, or the role of mobility 
and volunteering in inclusion and labour market integration. 

Justification for the validity of results  

A key methodological consideration was the substantial share of responses originating from 
Germany, which represented 38% of the total submissions (2,228 out of 5,845 responses). This 
figure is notably higher than Germany’s share of the EU population (approximately 18%) and 
far  exceeds  the  expected  range  of  15–20%  based  on  previous  consultations.  Given  the 
demographic  weight  of  German  respondents,  a  detailed  analysis  was  conducted  to  assess 
whether  this  disproportionality  might  have  introduced  bias  into  the  overall  consultation 
findings. 

To examine this issue, responses from Germany were statistically compared with the responses 
submitted  from  all  other  countries  combined.  The  analysis  focused  on  the  proportion  of 
answers selecting the most positive categories—"very important" or "to a large extent"—across 
all  closed  questions  (133  in  total),  and more  specifically  for  the  seven  main  policy  clusters 
assessed in the questionnaire. 

The  data  were  analysed  using  dashboards  created  by  the  JRC  in  Tableau,  enabling 
segmentation by country and cross-comparison by question. The key indicator used was the 
similarity in ranking and distribution of positive responses between German respondents and 
the aggregate of other EU countries. If significant discrepancies were found in how Germany 
answered compared to the rest of the EU, it would raise the possibility that the overall results 
were being skewed. However, the analysis revealed a high level of alignment.     

The distribution of answers from German respondents did not diverge meaningfully from pan-
European trends in either absolute values or relative importance. The overrepresentation was 
found to be largely quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. Additionally, there was no 
evidence  of  coordinated  campaigning  or  form  responses,  and  no  single  narrative  or  agenda 
dominated  the  free-text  submissions  or  attachments  from  Germany.  The  peak  in  responses 
between 10 and 13 March 2025 – when 851 entries were received – prompted a further quality 
check. However, closer examination revealed this spike did not correspond to identical answers 
or  suspicious  response  patterns.  Instead,  it  is  likely  the  result  of  increased  awareness  and 
mobilisation by youth and academic networks, which remain consistent with open democratic 
participation. A similar pattern occurred in the previous MFF OPC in 2018, suggesting that 

52 

 
mid-campaign  outreach  or  advocacy  events  can  sometimes  generate  temporary  surges  in 
responses. 

In  conclusion,  while  the  high  share  of  responses  from  Germany  initially  raised  a 
methodological flag, robust internal controls and comparative analysis confirmed that this did 
not compromise the representativeness or interpretability of the OPC data. The consultation 
findings can therefore be considered valid and reflective of broader stakeholder perspectives 
across  the  EU.  Germany’s  higher  turnout  should  be  interpreted  as  a  reflection  of  greater 
awareness  and  mobilisation  within  the  country  rather  than  a  source  of  analytical  distortion. 
These  findings  reinforce  the  overall  credibility  of  the  evidence  base  supporting  this  impact 
assessment. 

Respondent’s views on policy priorities  

Question 1/7 – How important are these policy priorities to you? 

53 

 
 
 
The responses to Question 1 reveal a clear affirmation of the EU’s continued role in fostering 
cross-border  cooperation and supporting  democratic and social objectives. Among  answers, 
“support for study/training abroad” was ranked as “very important” by 81% of citizens and 
70%  of  organisations.  This  priority  was  frequently  tied  to  the  broader  theme  of  long-term 
investment  in  skills,  employability,  and  European  identity.  Respondents  linked  learning 
mobility not only with educational benefit but with social integration, civic engagement, and 
labour  market  readiness.  Many  referenced  the  role  of  EU  funding  in  supporting  student 
exchanges, vocational training, language learning, and cross-border partnerships as levers for 
developing a more inclusive and competitive society. Similarly, “protect democracy, promote 
democratic standards” received 80% support among citizens and  72% among organisations, 
showing high convergence between individual and institutional stakeholders. Respondents saw 
democratic protection as a foundation for participation, rule of law, and social trust – frequently 
noting  the  link  between  educational  investment  and  democratic  resilience.  Several 
contributions argued that inclusive access to learning, critical thinking, and civic education are 
essential pillars in safeguarding European democratic systems. 

Geographic variations 

Some differences in emphasis emerged based on respondent geography: 

•  Respondents  from  Eastern  and  Southern  Europe  more  frequently  rated  EU  action  in 
education,  youth  mobility,  and  inclusion  as  "very  important,"  reflecting  structural 
inequalities and a higher dependency on EU funding. 

•  Western and Northern countries placed relatively more emphasis on excellence, innovation, 

and internationalisation. 

•  Respondents from non-EU countries (notably Ukraine, Western Balkans) emphasised the 
EU’s role in solidarity, external cooperation, and value promotion. This was particularly 
evident in open responses highlighting expectations of the EU as a democratic partner. 

54 

 
 
Natural patterns in priority attribution 

Statistical correlation analysis revealed consistent and statistically significant groupings among 
priority  responses,  highlighting  interlinked  policy  preferences  cutting  across  stakeholder 
categories. Looking at response matrices for closed-question data, several clusters emerged, 
indicating how respondents evaluated related priorities. 

•  Respondents who rated study/training abroad as highly important (78%) also tended to 
prioritise  policies  promoting  cross-border  cooperation  (88%),  language  learning 
opportunities (77%) mutual recognition of qualifications (75%), and cooperation with 
non-EU countries (65%), but also stressed the importance of protecting democracy and 
promoting  democratic  standards  (79%)  and  fundamental/human  rights  (73%).  This 
cluster reflects a mobility-driven integration logic. 

•  Those who prioritised democracy and civic participation (62%) also prioritised support 
for fundamental rights (84%), grassroots civil society organisations (77%), as well as 
media  pluralism  and  independence  (76%),  suggesting  a  coherent  rights-based 
governance  cluster.  These  preferences  were  especially  pronounced  among  NGOs, 
youth  organisations,  and  respondents  from  countries  experiencing  civic  space 
contraction. 

•  Respondents  who  assigned  high  scores  to  youth  participation  also  showed  strong 
affinity  (at  least  60%)  for  non-formal  education,  access  to  cultural  life,  and  media 
literacy training. This reflects a participatory empowerment cluster linking civic and 
cultural engagement. 

These patterns suggest a coherent internal logic in how stakeholders understand and connect 
EU  policy  priorities,  reinforcing  the  notion  that  programme  effectiveness  in  one  area  (e.g. 
mobility) depends on complementary support in others (e.g. recognition frameworks, inclusive 
access, civic rights). This correlation-based clustering substantiates the case for maintaining 
synergies  across  programmes  that  contribute  from  complementary  perspectives  to  overall 
policy objectives. 

Qualitative reflections from open text contributions  

Narrative responses and attachments frequently expanded on the policy priorities identified in 
Question 1. For example: 

•  Many NGOs stressed that inclusion and participation are not only desirable goals but 

preconditions for democratic legitimacy and societal cohesion. 

•  Academic networks spoke of the transformative potential of transnational cooperation 
and student/staff mobility to foster European identity and institutional innovation. 

•  Media  contributors  warned  that  without  greater  protection  for  journalism  and  media 

pluralism, democratic erosion could become irreversible. 

•  Several  youth-led  submissions  demanded  that  the  EU  go  beyond  tokenistic  youth 
engagement and instead mainstream youth participation into all areas of policymaking, 
monitoring, and implementation. 

55 

 
Analysis of obstacles preventing the EU budget from delivering on its objectives (Q6) 

Question 6/7 – To what extent do you see the following as obstacles that prevent the EU budget 
from fully delivering on its objectives in these policy areas? 

Respondents  were  asked  to  evaluate  to  what  extent  specific  obstacles  hinder  performance, 
including administrative burden, complex funding rules, fragmentation, lack of flexibility, and 
delays.  Respondents  generally  welcomed  the  Commission’s  focus  on  greater  efficiency  in 

56 

 
 
 
funding,  and  advocated  to  keep  “identity”  and  “trust”,  preserving  thematic  clarity  and 
stakeholder ownership of the interventions.  This section provides an in-depth analysis of Q6, 
based on 5,845 total responses, distinguishing between different respondent groups (citizens 
vs. organisations), stakeholder types, regional origin, and age group. It also integrates insights 
from  qualitative  responses  and  statistical  correlations  to  unpack  how  obstacles  interact  and 
what implications they hold for policy design. 

Quantitative  results  show  that  the  most  frequently  cited  obstacles  across  all  groups  were 
administrative burden (identified by 52% of citizens and 58% of organisations) and complex, 
fund-specific  compliance  rules  (50%  of  citizens  and  53%  of  organisations).  These  issues 
reflect  concerns  not  only  with  regulatory  complexity  but  also  with  fragmentation  between 
instruments and inefficiencies in delivery. 

Additional barriers included lack of flexibility to reallocate resources in response to emerging 
needs (32% of citizens and 32% of organisations), delays in programme implementation and 
funding disbursement, and insufficient communication or clarity about funding opportunities. 
Public authorities and NGOs in particular emphasised delays as a source of reduced impact and 
local credibility.  

Variation by stakeholder type 

Disaggregated analysis reveals significant differences in the perception of obstacles based on 
stakeholder  identity,  with  each  type  of  respondent  highlighting  distinct  structural  and 
procedural challenges that hinder their participation and impact. 

•  NGOs and micro-organisations were consistently the most vocal about the administrative 
burden and procedural complexity. 66% of small NGOs rated these issues as "to a large 
extent" problematic. These organisations often operate with limited staffing, rely heavily 
on  volunteers,  and  lack  dedicated  financial  management  expertise.  The  reporting 
requirements  and  co-financing  rules  were  seen  as  disproportionate  to  their  operational 
capacity,  particularly  for  smaller  grants.  Many  NGOs  also  expressed  concern  about 
unstable  funding  timelines  and  shifting  eligibility  rules  that  added  unpredictability  to 
project planning. 

•  Academic institutions, particularly large universities and university alliances were more 
concerned with systemic inefficiencies across funding programmes. While acknowledging 
bureaucratic  complexity,  they  pointed  to  overlapping  rules  between  Erasmus+,  Horizon 
Europe,  Digital  Europe,  and  regional  development  funds  (e.g.,  European  Regional 
Development  Fund  (ERDF)).  These  respondents  highlighted  duplicated  registration 
processes,  inconsistent  cost  categories,  and  mismatched  timelines.  The  lack  of 
interoperability  between  platforms  and  evaluation  frameworks  was  flagged  as  a  missed 
opportunity for integration and strategic alignment. 

•  Public authorities, especially those at regional and local levels, emphasised the rigidity of 
programme design and the limited discretion available to adapt funding to emerging local 
needs. Respondents referred to crises such as the Ukrainian refugee influx, the COVID-19 
pandemic, and climate-related emergencies as situations where EU programmes lacked the 
necessary  responsiveness.  Several  contributions  argued  for  the  creation  of  emergency 
reallocation  mechanisms  within  mainstream  programmes  to  allow  rapid  funding  shifts 
under predefined governance rules. 

57 

 
•  Youth  organisations,  both  formal  and  informal,  described  complex  rules  and 
administrative procedures as a primary deterrent to participation. This was especially true 
for informal groups of young people, often active in remote or rural areas, who do not have 
legal  personality  or  administrative  infrastructure.  These  groups  are  typically  ineligible 
under current application models, even when their objectives align with programme goals. 
The absence of flexible formats such as microgrants or simplified sub-granting schemes 
was cited as a structural barrier, especially for first-time applicants lacking national-level 
intermediary support. 

Policy Implications and Recommendations 

The findings from Q6 suggest that perceived obstacles are not isolated or episodic but systemic 
and interlinked. Administrative burden, complexity, rigidity, and delays reinforce each other 
and create barriers to access, especially for smaller actors, first-time applicants, and those in 
less developed regions. 

To address these challenges, stakeholders proposed a mix of short- and long-term solutions: 

•  Simplification  and  proportionality:  Respondents  called  for  the  creation  of  tiered 
compliance  systems  that  distinguish  between  small  and  large  grants.  For  instance, 
organisations proposed that microgrants below €60,000 should use simplified cost options, 
lighter reporting, and reduced audit risk. One NGO suggested a "compliance light" track 
for first-time applicants with capped administrative requirements and pre-filled templates. 

•  Better digital tools: Several stakeholders highlighted the need to unify fragmented digital 
platforms  such  as,  e.g.,  EU  Login,  the  Participant  Portal,  and  the  Beneficiary  Module. 
Respondents  called  for  a  one-stop-shop  interface  with  integrated  guidance,  live  chat 
support, and multilingual  features.  One proposal  recommended adapting  national  public 
grant  platforms  that  already  offer  predictive  text,  auto-save  functions,  and  flexible 
management of ongoing applications. 

•  Flexible envelopes:  Public authorities and cultural  operators in  particular advocated for 
setting  aside  flexible  budget  components  within  larger  programme  envelopes,  allowing 
dynamic reallocation in response to crises. Examples included a “local priorities window” 
within Erasmus+ or ESC that regions could activate for targeted challenges such as post-
disaster recovery or refugee inclusion. 

to  support  onboarding  for  new  applicants,  especially 

•  Technical assistance: Many stakeholders proposed regional hubs or rosters of "EU funding 
coaches" 
in  remote  and 
underrepresented areas. Some suggested replicating the European Social Fund’s Technical 
Assistance Units model, including template kits, peer learning sessions, and pre-submission 
clinics. 

•  Transparency and predictability: Respondents requested a publicly accessible, regularly 
updated  calendar  of  calls  and  deadlines  with  12-month  visibility.  Proposals  included 
harmonised guides for cost eligibility and evaluation standards, as well as a requirement to 
publish  reviewer  feedback  summaries,  enabling  unsuccessful  applicants  to  learn  and 
reapply more effectively. 

In-depth stakeholder analysis revealed differentiated preferences and priorities for improving 
budgetary effectiveness:  

58 

 
NGOs and youth organisations strongly endorsed simplification, especially as it relates to 
first-time and grassroots applicants. Many underscored the disproportionate burden posed 
by complex financial reporting, cost justification, and delays in fund disbursement. Their 
emphasis on procedural equity reflected broader concerns about structural exclusion from 
funding  opportunities.  Several  youth  organisations  recommended  pre-defined  lump  sum 
schemes and the expansion of localised sub-granting via trusted intermediaries to support 
smaller, less formal groups. 

Academic  and  cultural  institutions  prioritised  predictability,  continuity,  and  programme 
alignment. They called for unified grant management systems across Erasmus+, Horizon 
Europe,  and  Creative  Europe.  Recurring  recommendations  included  a  harmonised  cost 
model and standardised eligibility rules to reduce duplication and misalignment between 
parallel  programmes.  Institutions  managing  multiple  grants  reported  cumulative 
inefficiencies, citing the lack of interoperability between EU portals as a drain on human 
resources. 

Public authorities—particularly at regional and municipal levels—emphasised the need for 
vertical  and  horizontal  coordination.  They  supported  interoperability  between  EU  and 
national funding frameworks and proposed integrated calendars, joint application formats, 
and aligned eligibility criteria. Some also called for multi-programme investment platforms 
to allow bundling of cultural, youth, and education funding under territorial development 
plans. This approach, they argued, would strengthen regional policy coherence and improve 
impact traceability. 

Small  and  micro-organisations,  especially  in  the  media,  culture,  and  social  innovation 
sectors,  advocated  for  proportionate  rules,  simplified  cost  accounting,  and  faster 
disbursement  processes.  Their  contributions  frequently  cited  the  value  of  microgrant 
schemes with low entry barriers and minimal administrative obligations. Many urged that 
future programmes expand the use of fixed-cost and flat-rate options under simplified cost 
models (SCOs). A number of independent cultural professionals and creative SMEs also 
noted that infrequent calls and short application windows limited their ability to plan, apply, 
and scale up impact. 

Analysis of attached papers and free-text responses 

A detailed review of the  383 submitted documents - including position papers from  NGOs, 
educational  institutions,  local  authorities,  and  sectoral  organisations  –  revealed  complex, 
differentiated, and in many cases deeply relevant inputs across all thematic areas. 

Education:  Across  nearly  40%  of  the  position  papers,  education  emerged  as  a  pillar  of 
European integration and competitiveness. Stakeholders underscored the foundational role of 
Erasmus+ in fostering transnational mobility, employability, and institutional innovation. They 
called for a significant expansion of the Erasmus+ programme (Erasmus for all), with many 
advocating for a significant increase, aligned with inflation and the cost of living in high-cost 
countries. Numerous papers cited the disproportionate administrative burden as a deterrent to 
smaller institutions and first-time applicants. Stakeholders proposed a simplification roadmap, 
which included flat-rate  financing,  enhanced lump sums, and modular budget  architectures. 
The lack of parity in access across Member States – especially between Western/Northern and 
Eastern European regions – was cited repeatedly. Respondents also stressed the importance of 
maintaining  Erasmus+  as  a  standalone  brand,  warning  against  dilution  through  broader 
programme integration. Several university alliances advocated for reinforced synergies with 

59 

 
Horizon Europe, Digital Europe, and ESF+ without compromising the autonomy or identity of 
the programme. 

Youth  and  Solidarity:  Documents  from  youth  organisations,  national  youth  councils,  and 
solidarity networks highlighted the European Solidarity Corps (ESC) as a critical tool for civic 
engagement  and  soft  skills  acquisition.  Stakeholders  demanded  structural  and  multiannual 
funding for youth-led projects, arguing that current project-based financing often excluded less 
experienced applicants or those from underserved areas. Respondents proposed participatory 
budgeting mechanisms and a minimum percentage of the programme reserved for grassroots 
youth initiatives. A dominant theme was the geographical imbalance in volunteer distribution, 
with  rural,  peripheral,  and  Eastern  areas  systematically  disadvantaged.  Recommendations 
included financial incentives for placements in less popular regions, standardised recognition 
tools for ESC learning outcomes, and digital platforms for matchmaking. Many respondents 
tied  ESC  objectives  to  broader  EU  values,  urging  that  any  future  architecture  reinforce  the 
rights-based and inclusive nature of youth engagement. 

Culture  and  Creativity:  Cultural  operators  and  creative  professionals  stressed  that  the 
Creative  Europe  programme  must  remain  autonomous  and  sufficiently  funded.  A  widely 
shared concern was that merging CREA with broader values or youth programmes would lead 
to "mission drift". Stakeholders argued for a recalibration of funding rules to accommodate the 
operational  realities  of  artists  and  micro-enterprises.  Recurrent  themes  included  cultural 
sovereignty, support for at-risk professionals (e.g. in exile or post-pandemic recovery), and the 
need  to  codify  fair  remuneration  as  an  eligibility  criterion.  With  over  a  dozen  submissions 
referencing generative AI, the growing unease around intellectual property protection in the 
digital  era  was  prominent.  Respondents  advocated  for  a  dual-track  approach:  preserving 
support for traditional forms of cultural expression while also investing in capacity-building 
around digital distribution, audience analytics, and platform regulation. Minority and regional 
languages, often underrepresented in mainstream funding calls, were another critical concern, 
with proposals for linguistic equity earmarks. 

Media: Media and audiovisual stakeholders – from independent newsrooms to European film 
distributors – emphasised the geopolitical and democratic stakes of a robust, pluralistic media 
landscape. A majority supported retaining the MEDIA strand within Creative Europe but called 
in  addition  for  dedicated  budget  lines  for  investigative  journalism,  digital  transition  of 
audiovisual SMEs, and copyright frameworks supporting EU rules and values. Many flagged 
growing  asymmetries  between  large  streaming  platforms  and  local  producers,  urging 
regulatory  counterbalances  and  safeguards.  Views  on  cross-border  collaborations  were 
nuanced: while some stressed their importance for market access and resilience, others argued 
that rigid co-production rules or linguistic quotas limited flexibility. Several stakeholders from 
smaller Member States asked for upward budget adjustments to reflect higher relative costs in 
small markets. Ethical journalism, media literacy, and training for next-generation journalists 
were also highlighted as emerging priorities. 

Civil  Society  and  Values:  Almost  all  civil  society  actors  reiterated  concerns  about  the 
shrinking space for civic action, particularly in Member States facing democratic backsliding. 
Respondents advocated for a massive expansion of the CERV programme – many suggested 
tripling its budget – to match the rising scope of its mission. Emphasis was placed on ensuring 
regional balance, predictable multiannual funding, and a stronger role for CSOs in monitoring, 
evaluation,  and  agenda-setting  processes.  Several  organisations  proposed  the  creation  of  a 
European Civil Society Forum, co-financed under CERV, to serve as a consultative body for 

60 

 
EU democracy and values policies. Key barriers identified included lack of core funding, legal 
uncertainty, and administrative burden. Proposals ranged from specific policy instruments (e.g. 
civic action observatories, solidarity grants) to structural reforms, such as recognising CSOs as 
strategic implementation partners within the MFF logic. 

Across  all  thematic  clusters,  stakeholders  converged  around  a  demand  for  systemic  equity, 
stable  and  predictable  financing,  proportionality  in  compliance,  and  clearer  eligibility 
guidance. Framing patterns in the documents leaned heavily on EU identity, intergenerational 
justice, and the imperative of democratic renewal amidst global turbulence. Many stakeholders 
explicitly linked programme success to broader geopolitical resilience, competitiveness, and 
social cohesion within the Union 

Youth respondents  

Youth  respondents  made  up  nearly  half  of  all  EU  citizen  contributions,  equating  to 
approximately  1,367  participants  out  of  2,780  EU  citizen  submissions.  The  high  level  of 
engagement  highlights  the  relevance  of  EU  programmes  to  young  people  and  offers  an 
important  opportunity  to  understand  the  emerging  expectations,  policy  preferences,  and 
engagement patterns of younger Europeans. 

The analysis draws on both quantitative indicators and qualitative content, enabling a layered 
understanding of how youth perspectives align with or differ from the general respondent pool. 
By comparing under-30 responses with those from individuals aged 30 and above, the report 
identifies key points of convergence and divergence in support levels, values, priorities, and 
ideas for programme reform. This approach ensures that youth views are not only heard but 
analytically integrated into the broader findings of the consultation. 

Quantitative overview of youth response patterns 

Youth  respondents  consistently  indicated  higher  support  for  most  proposed  EU  actions 
compared  to  their  older  counterparts.  These  differences  were  particularly  notable  in  areas 
linked  to  democratic  values,  inclusion,  mobility,  non-formal  education,  and  international 
solidarity. For example: 

In Question 1, which assessed the importance of various policy priorities, young respondents 
were more likely to rate support for study and training abroad, civic participation, and equity-
focused measures as "very important." 

Question 5, which evaluated potential future  actions in  the area of values and civil  society, 
showed that 74% of under-30s prioritised mutual learning, exchange of good practices, and 
coalition-building,  compared  to  69%  of  those  aged  30  and  over.  Similarly,  65%  supported 
actions strengthening grassroots  civil  society organisations, aligning  with their emphasis  on 
bottom-up engagement. 

In  Question  6,  youth  respondents  ranked  administrative  complexity,  lack  of  clarity  in 
procedures, and burdensome compliance mechanisms as more significant barriers than other 
age groups. 

Qualitative overview of youth-specific themes and priorities 

61 

 
A  more  detailed  review  of  open-text  answers  and  attached  position  papers  revealed  several 
recurrent themes among youth respondents: 

• 

Inclusion and accessibility: Young people strongly advocated for making EU programmes 
more  inclusive  by  simplifying  application  processes,  reducing  bureaucratic  hurdles,  and 
providing better support for newcomers and marginalised groups. Many emphasised the 
need for multilingual outreach, local partnerships, and targeted funding for rural youth. 

•  Recognition of non-formal and informal learning: Many young participants stressed the 
importance of acknowledging the educational value of volunteering, youth work, activism, 
and  digital  learning.  They  proposed  including  microcredentials,  experience-based 
assessments, and digital portfolios as part of recognition frameworks. 

•  Democracy,  rights,  and  civic  space:  Young  respondents  consistently  identified  EU 
funding as a tool to counter disinformation, hate speech, and shrinking civic space. They 
called  for  greater  investment  in  civic  education,  participatory  democracy  projects,  and 
support for youth-led initiatives that promote tolerance, equality, and critical thinking. 

•  Digital and green skills and transitions: Many highlighted the need for EU programmes 
to  support  climate  education,  youth-driven  green  innovation,  and  environmental 
volunteering. In digital fields, youth expressed interest in digital literacy training, support 
for ethical AI education, and safe online participation platforms. 

•  Mobility  and  international  solidarity:  Respondents  endorsed  continued  and  expanded 
investment in Erasmus+, European Solidarity Corps, and partnerships with candidate and 
neighbouring countries. This was framed not only in terms of individual development but 
as a collective European project rooted in solidarity and intercultural understanding. 

Youth-driven proposals and innovations 

Beyond endorsing existing initiatives, many youth respondents offered forward-looking ideas 
to enhance the effectiveness and inclusivity of EU programmes. Some of the most recurrent 
proposals included (examples): 

•  Establishing a "European Youth Civic Campus" combining education, solidarity, and civic 

action across Erasmus+, ESC, and CERV frameworks. 

•  Setting aside a dedicated percentage of funding within each major programme for youth-

led, grassroots initiatives, including microgrants and project incubators. 

•  Developing  tools  for  participatory  monitoring,  enabling  young  people  to  co-create 

indicators, assess programme impacts, and shape annual priorities. 

•  Creating digital hubs or local support centres to connect rural and underrepresented youth 

with EU-level opportunities. 

Youth check  

These trends underscore a forward-looking, collaborative, and values-based approach among 
youth respondents. Their consistently higher response positivity also suggests a strong belief 
in the potential of EU programmes to address current and future challenges. Findings from the 
OPC  align  strongly  with  the  Commission’s  Youth  Check  framework,  confirming  that  the 

62 

 
perspectives of young people not only match the broader results but reinforce the most forward-
leaning policy directions. While there are no fundamental divergences in terms of programme 
objectives  or  values,  youth  inputs  offer  important  added  value  in  their  emphasis  on 
intersectionality, long-term social impact, and innovation. 

Their  responses  offer  –  in  particular  in  this  cluster  of  interconnected  policies  –  strong 
justification for embedding youth considerations into every stage of programme design – from 
conception  and  budgeting  to  delivery  and  evaluation.  It  also  supports  the  case  for  stronger 
youth representation in governance structures, including advisory groups and midterm review 
panels. 

63 

 
 
 
ANNEX 3: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE 

Who is affected and how? 

The  following  groups  can  be  distinguished  as  the  most  affected  groups  by  the  future 
instruments under this cluster. 

1)  Individuals 

Citizens  and  communities  at  large  –  Citizens  are  impacted  insofar  the  respect  of  their 
fundamental  rights  is  ensured,  and  by  the  rights  and  opportunities  they  have  to  live  freely, 
participate  in  the  democratic  process  and  engage  in  society,  access  quality  education  and 
culture, regardless of their gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual  orientation.  Between  2021-2024,  more  than  60  million  people  were  expected  to  be 
reached by the activities supported by the CERV programme. Through the focus on access to 
cultural content and heritage in the Culture strand of Creative Europe, the general public is also 
impacted: according to a conservative estimate, under the first iteration of the Creative Europe 
programme,  cultural  activity  funded  by  this  strand  was  accessed  91.5  million  times  in  the 
period 2014-2020. 

Children and young people: this group is particularly affected by the environment in which 
they are growing up  and by all  forms  of violence, both  offline  and online, including  in  the 
domestic sphere and at school. They are increasingly facing mental health issues, heightened 
by unhealthy use of digital media and the repercussions from Covid-19 pandemic. They are 
also the most impacted by the quality and methods of teaching and training, as well as access 
to  formal  education  and  other  learning  opportunities  (for  example  non-formal  and  informal 
learning, volunteering or sport), which equip them with the necessary skills and competences 
needed for their future life and jobs. Their capacity to participate to the democratic life at all 
levels of society needs to be increased.  

Education and training, youth and sport staff: Teachers, trainers, educators, coaches, youth 
workers need continuous opportunities to expand their professional and personal skills. This 
ensures that they can deliver high-quality content and methods, which not only benefits learners 
but  also  enhances  their  own  job  satisfaction  and  motivation.  Under  the  current  Erasmus+, 
200.000  staff  in  the  field  of  education  and  training,  youth  and  sport  are  directly  involved 
yearly.  

Human rights defenders, whose work is essential to protect and promote EU values on the 
ground. 

Artists, media and cultural and creative professionals: This group relies on opportunities to 
explore  cultural  and  creative  endeavours,  directly  impacting  their  capacity  to  innovate  and 
create. As an example, around 7,200 artists and creative professionals have benefited from the 
individual mobility scheme of the Creative Europe’s Culture strand from 2021 to 2024. 

2)  Public authorities 

EU and national public authorities, who are often the ones implementing EU policies and 
legislations on the ground, thus contributing to the achievement of overall EU objectives. Local 
authorities and public institutions, notably in town twinning, civic education, and rule of law 
promotion,  improve  enhanced  democratic  culture,  memory  and  cohesion  through  citizen-
centred projects. 

64 

 
 
 
Education  and  training  institutions  and  providers,  including  schools,  VET  providers, 
higher education institutions (HEIs), adult education providers, as well as Erasmus+ National 
Agencies  and  Jean  Monnet  centres,  which  promote  EU  studies,  in  their  ability  to  deliver 
improved  teaching  quality,  institutional  capacity  and  European  cooperation  in  education, 
enhanced institutional modernisation, internationalisation and innovation capacity. Under the 
current  Erasmus+  and  European  Solidarity  Corps,  close  to  20.000  unique  education  and 
training institutions and providers are directly involved yearly. 

Other public authorities at local, regional and national levels in charge of education, youth, 
sport,  and  training  systems,  non-governmental  and  public  entities  hosting  and  coordinating 
solidarity  activities,  including  municipalities,  social  enterprises  and  non-profits,  and  local 
communities, through enhanced civic participation, intergenerational solidarity and support to 
vulnerable populations.  They will strengthen their ability to steer reforms, address challenges, 
and coordinate EU-wide actions in the policy areas  of the cluster but also deliver increased 
social capital and community development from e.g. volunteer involvement.  

3)  Civil society at large 

Civil society organisations play a vital role in European society and democracy, contributing 
to the enrichment of the sectors in this cluster through community involvement and advocacy, 
promoting EU values, citizens' rights, cultural diversity, representing young people’s voices 
etc.  Their  work  benefits  from  opportunities  to  build  capacity,  network  and  (co)operate 
transnationally. Between 2021-2024, more than 5000 civil society organisations were directly 
supported by the CERV programme. 

Civil society organisations and rights defenders, including those working on inclusion, gender 
equality,  anti-discrimination,  child  protection,  and  LGBTIQ  rights,  who  will  see  improved 
ability  to  sustain  advocacy,  inclusion  and  watchdog  roles  contributing  to  EU  fundamental 
values.  Victims  of  violence  or  discrimination,  as  well  as  organisations  offering  legal, 
psychological and social support, offering better protection, support and visibility of victims' 
rights and services. Academic and legal networks, supporting evidence-based rights policy and 
democratic resilience, who will see better informed rights-based policymaking and enhanced 
rule of law awareness. 

Youth  and  grassroots  sport  organisations,  including  NGOs  and  clubs  promoting 
participation,  inclusion  and  healthy  lifestyles,  who  will  increase  capacity  and  make  use  of 
quality and innovative practices, leading to broader reach and impact in fostering inclusion, 
active citizenship and social cohesion. Under the current Erasmus+ and European Solidarity 
Corps, close to 6.000 unique youth and sport organisations are directly involved yearly.  

Cultural  and  creative  entities  of  various  types163  that  benefit  from  the  cooperation, 
networking, peer learning and exchange of ideas and experiences.  80% of beneficiaries of the 
Culture  strand  of  the  current  Creative  Europe  programme  are  entities  employing  less  than  49 
employees, 9% are medium-sized entities (between 50 and 249 employees) and 11% are large 
entities  (250  or  more  employees),  reflecting  the  general  structure  of  the  CCS  in  the  EU. 
Between 2021 and 2023, the Culture strand of Creative Europe benefitted 2,176 organisations. 

4)  Companies 

65 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Companies across sectors that are facing skill shortages, underscoring the need for effective 
education  and  training  systems  that  equip  individuals  with  the  skills  required  by  the  labour 
market. 
According  to  the  Erasmus+  evaluation,  the  connection  with  businesses  has  increased, 
especially  in  the Vocational  education and training (VET) sector, while the adult education 
sector was the second – after VET – registering the highest level of participation of SMEs in 
indirectly managed actions supporting cooperation projects 164. 

Audiovisual and media companies:  According to 2023 European Media Industry Outlook, 
SMEs account for 99.8% of all companies active in the audiovisual, news media and video 
games, mainly independent companies. In the current MEDIA Strand under Creative Europe, 
99% of the direct beneficiaries were SMEs (reflecting the 99% of SMEs amongst European 
AV  enterprises),  of  which  25%  were  small  and  nearly  70%  micro.  Micro  and  Small 
organisations account for 50% and 40% of total value of grants respectively under Creative 
Europe 2014-2020.  

5)  Countries 

Partner, candidate and third countries and organisations and institutions in these countries 
which benefit from increased cooperation and people-to-people contacts with the EU. This is 
particularly relevant for candidate and potential candidate countries, as enhanced cooperation 
can  aid  their  integration  efforts  and  prepare  them  for  future  EU  membership.  In  addition, 
learning mobility will support the cooperation efforts with third countries in the framework of 
e.g.  talent  partnerships.  Under  the  current  Erasmus+  and  European  Solidarity  Corps,  some 
2.5000 unique organisations and institutions from non-EU countries are directly involved 
yearly.  

Overview of benefits 

Table 1: Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 

Measures 

Who will benefit? 

Direct and indirect benefits  

SO 1.1 Contribute to upholding the rule of law, fundamental rights and equality, reduce discrimination and empower civil 
society 

Support 
fundamental 
rights 

to 

Citizens; 
civil 
society 
organisations; society at large    

Increased visibility and awareness of fundamental rights and relevant EU 
policies and tools supported by the programmes.  

Most  participants  to  CERV-funded  activities  self-report  higher  level  of 
awareness of rights as an EU citizen (84%), knowledge of EU legislation to 
promote  and  protect  values  (88%)  as  well  as  relevant  EU  tools  and 
initiatives (68%), and awareness of common European history (91%), than 
the general public165. 

Promote  equality 
and  fight  against 
discrimination 

 Citizens, 
society 
organisations, society at large 

civil 

less  discriminated  against  and  experience 

Citizens  will  feel 
less 
harassment166. A more gender equal EU would have strong, positive GDP 
impacts growing over time, higher level of employment and productivity 
and could better respond to challenges related to the ageing population in 
the EU167. 

66 

 
 
 
 
Nurture  a  vibrant 
civic  space  and 
protect 
human 
rights  defenders 
and 
whistleblowers 

civil 

society 
 Citizens, 
organisations 
human 
rights  defenders,  society  at 
large 

and 

Citizens and organisations will be  enabled to participate  meaningfully in 
the  political,  economic,  social  and  cultural  life  in  their  societies.  Civil 
society will be able to play their key role in bringing to life the values shared 
between the EU and its Member States as specified in Article 2 of the Treaty 
on  European  Union  (TEU).  Civil  society  will  also  be  able  to  make  a 
substantial contribution to the implementation of EU policies in the area of 
human rights.  

A  significant  majority  (88%)  of  respondents  to  the  public  consultation 
carried  out for  the mid-term evaluation  of  the  CERV  programme  agreed 
that, if CERV funding were to cease, the impact on civic space would be 
negative168. 

SO 1.2 Contribute to fighting against gender-based violence, violence against children and other groups at risk 

Girls,  women,  children  and 
other groups at risks, citizens, 
society at large 

 Girls, women, children, LGBTIQ and other groups at risk in the EU will 
be protected and supported, their rights will be safeguarded. Citizens will 
be safe and empowered in all their diversity.  

Address  gender-
based  violence, 
violence  against 
children 
and 
other  groups  at 
risk 

SO 1.3 Contribute to enhancing democratic resilience and participation 

 Society at large 

and 
Diversity 
viability  of 
the 
civic  and  media 
sphere 

In a healthy and thriving democracy, citizens can freely express their views, 
choose their political leaders, and have a say about their future. Free media 
and civil society will be able to play their role in stimulating open debate, 
free from interference, either foreign or domestic. 

SO 1.4 Contribute to supporting news media, media independence and tackling disinformation 

Structural 
support  to  news 
media   

Media organisations; Citizens  Media organisations, in particular SMEs, will benefit from better business 
models, potential avenues to scaling up and improve their uptake of digital 
technologies;  Enhanced  digital  transition,  innovation  and  automation; 
Increased financial viability; Support to local and investigative journalism; 
Improving audience engagement;  

the 
the 

Preserve 
integrity  of 
information 
space  

Civil 

Citizens; 
Organisations 
Factcheckers; 
organisations 

Society 
including 
Media 

Addressing 
media literacy 

Citizens; Factcheckers; Media 
organisations 

Citizens will benefit from enhanced access to quality news on EU affairs 
and diverse offerings of professionally produced news content. 

Strengthened  capacity  and  speed  to  monitor  the  integrity  of  the  online 
information  space;  Strengthened  situational  awareness  on  hybrid  threats; 
better protection of information spaces from manipulation; Acceleration in 
detection through new technology and tools; better collaboration between 
multidisciplinary  communities;  enhanced  detection  and  exposure  of 
disinformation narratives & campaign as well as information manipulation 
attempts 

Strengthened  societal  resilience  against  disinformation  and  information 
manipulation,  including  among  vulnerable  groups;  increased  democratic 
participation  of  all  segments  of  the  population;  improvements  of  online 
safety:  contributions  to  boost  basic  skills,  including  critical  thinking  and 
understanding of online media;  

SO 1.5 Enhance production, circulation, and consumption of EU audiovisual/media content.   

67 

 
Support 
the 
production of EU 
audiovisual  and 
media content  

Audiovisual 
organisations/ companies 

and  media 

Strengthened European cultural diversity, societal resilience, ‘soft power’ 
and  competitiveness;  enhancement  cross-border  collaboration  between 
audiovisual  and  media  companies;  increase  in  content  development  and  
(international)  co-productions  including  among  countries  with  different 
audiovisual capabilities; more internationalisation and market promotion of 
EU  audiovisual  companies;  enhanced.  Support  the  production  of  video 
games; support the production of transmedia content 

Support 
the 
circulation of EU 
audiovisual  and 
media content 

Audiovisual 
organisations/ companies 

and  media 

Increased 
impact  of 
transnational  circulation,  promotion,  visibility 
audiovisual and media content (e.g., films, video games), across Europe and 
worldwide;  

Increasing the level-playing field across participating countries. 

Deepen the Single Market in the audiovisual media sector; 

 Facilitate the adoption of innovative business models responding to global 
market developments, especially digital media and AI 

Enhance  access 
to 
audiovisual 
content 

Citizens;  Audiovisual 
media 
companies 

and 
organisations/ 

Better  facilitate  access  to  European  AV  works  to  people  across  the  EU, 
including in areas currently not well served; Attract international audiences 
to European AV works. 

Audiovisual companies 

Increase the presence of European content and strong European intellectual 
property  outside Europe, expanded market shares of European companies 
in overseas markets (international competitiveness)   

Enhanced  export 
possibilities  and 
increased  access 
to export markets 
for 
audiovisual 
SMEs 

SO 1.6 Increase in cross-border cultural cooperation, cultural participation and accessibility, and circulation of diverse 
cultural works, while strengthening cultural and creative sectors 

all 

Cultural  and  creative  entities 
(SMEs, 
of 
types 
institutions, 
associations, 
networks  etc.);  Artists  and 
CCS  professionals;  Citizens 
and  society  at 
(in 
particular youth) 

large 

Promote 
cooperation, 
creation, 
networking  and 
of 
pooling 
experience 
in 
CCS 

Support 
of 
circulation 
cultural 
diverse 
content 
and 
access  to  cultural 
and 
diversity 
heritage 

Support  mobility 
and 
artists 
of 
CCS 
professionals 

Stronger CCS better equipped to address key challenges, such as market 
fragmentation, the dual transition and surge of AI etc. 

A  significant  majority  (87%)  of  respondents  to  the  Beneficiary  Survey 
caried out for the final evaluation of Creative Europe 2014-2020 and the 
mid-term  evaluation  of  Creative  Europe  2021-2027  said  that  capacity-
building support had an impact in terms of helping them develop skills to 
work  transnationally,  with  around  70%  saying  it  had  either  a  major  or 
significant  impact.169  40  European  networks  are  currently  supported  by 
Creative Europe (representing 4,000 members) offering capacity-building 
activities to cultural and creative sectors’ professionals. 

Reinforced  CCS  creative  potential  in  respect  of  artistic  freedom;  a  more 
diverse cultural content circulating across national and linguistic borders 
Data  from  projects  supported  shows  that  cultural  activity  supported  by 
Creative Europe’s Culture strand was accessed either virtually or in person 
91.5 million times over the course of 2014-2020.170 

More artists and CCS professionals expanding their careers beyond national 
and linguistic borders and developing innovative practises 

68 

 
  
 
beyond  national 
borders 

Strengthen 
dimensions 
CCS 
economic 
international) 

all 
of 
(social, 
and 

Increase 
digitisation, 
access, 
preservation  and 
reuse  of  digital 
heritage 

From 2014 to 2020, the Creative Europe’s Culture strand supported 22,763 
professionals  internationalise  their  careers  and  gain  experience  in  other 
countries,  corresponding  to  a  total  of  296,083  mobility  days.171  The 
individual  mobility  scheme  of  the  Creative  Europe’s  strand  launched  in 
October  2022  supported  the  cross-border  mobility  of  of  3,800  artists 
between end 2022 and 2023172. 

Increased  and  more  inclusive  access  of  all,  in  particular  the  younger 
generations, to more diverse cultural content and heritage 

Monitoring data from Creative Europe’s Culture strand show that over the 
period 2014-2020, one in four projects had a specific focus on reaching an 
underrepresented group, including minority ethnic groups, younger people 
and migrants, with 76% of projects being effective in reaching audiences 
that do not tend to visit, watch or consume culture.173 

Increased number of international cultural partnerships and exchanges 

20% of the projects funded under the Culture strand involve third-country 
organisations,  supporting  in  this  way  the  Union’s  global  strategy  for 
international relations174.  

Increase in the number of digitised cultural assets for preservation purposes.  
Increased access, in particular digital access to high quality cultural content;  
Increase in opportunities to reuse digital heritage for a variety of purposes 
such as for education, tourism or creative purposes; 
More efficient and performing digitisation and preservation processes. 
Gain  deeper  knowledge  of  the  origin  and  evolution  of  heritage  assets 
through the wider use of cutting-edge technologies such as AI and 3D; 
Allow  more  cultural  heritage  institutions  to  benefit  from  technology 
in  remote 
advancement,  especially  smaller 
regions/locations. 

institutions  and 

those 

all 

Cultural  and  creative  entities 
(SMEs, 
of 
types 
associations, 
institutions, 
networks  etc.);  Artists  and 
CCS  professionals;  Citizens 
and  society  at 
(in 
particular youth) 

large 

SO 1.7 Spur cross-cutting innovation and promote sustainability of media, cultural and societal entities 

Support 
innovation 
in 
technology 
and 
business models 

Audiovisual 
organisations/ companies 

and  media 

Organisations/companies 
from  other 
creative sectors.  

cultural 

and 

 Citizens  accessing  cultural 
heritage, 
cultural  heritage 
institutions  such  as  galleries, 
libraries, archives, museums, 

Experimentation  and  testing  of  technology  and  business  models;  Faster 
uptake digital tools and successful business models; Cost and operational 
efficiency  (cost  and  price  competitiveness);  Expanding  market  reach 
(international competitiveness). 

Increase in the number of digitised cultural assets for preservation purposes;  

(indirect benefit) Increased opportunities for cultural tourism, especially in 
less visited regions. 

of 

Expansion 
equity 
instruments 
to 
more IP-intensive 
sectors.  Improve 
access  to  finance 
the  media, 
of 

Audiovisual 
organisations/ companies 

and  media 

Stimulating  more  private 
investment;  Enhancing  co-investment; 
Improvements in Supporting IP exploitation and ownership by European 
players; Financial strength (e.g., liquidity); Lowering the risk of IP. 

Organisations/companies 
from  other 
creative sectors 

cultural 

and 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
cultural 
societal sectors. 

and 

Improve 
access 
to  finance  of  the 
cultural 
media, 
and 
societal 
sectors. 

SO 2.1 Support transnational cooperation around education and skills  

Transnational 
in 
cooperation 
of 
the 
areas 
education 
and 
skills,  youth  and 
sport  to  elevate 
quality  across  all 
fields 

level: 
students, 

learners 
Individual 
VET 
(pupils, 
learners,  Higher  Education 
students, adult learners, youth 
workers, young people, people 
active 
in  sport)  –  Staff:  
teachers,  trainers,  educators, 
youth workers, sport coaches  

level: 
Organisational 
training 
and 
Education 
and  providers, 
institutions 
including 
schools,  VET 
providers,  higher  education 
institutions,  adult  education 
providers,  private  companies 
Youth, 
and 
volunteering 
sport 
organisations. 

SMEs, 

and 

Indirectly:  Individuals  at  all 
stages of learning and training, 
including  school  pupils,  VET 
learners,  students  in  higher 
education, adult 
learners, 
young people overall  

Increased  quality  of  teaching  and  training  practices  and  youth  work 
methods   

Increased  networking  and  internationalisation  of  the  staff  and  the 
organisations  

Improved  capacity  and  performance  of  the  education  and  training,  youth 
and sport institutions and organisations  

Modernisation  of  the  education  and  training,  youth  and  sport  systems 
institutions and organisations  

Increased  excellence  and  innovation  through  strategic,  long-term  and 
enhanced cooperation eg the European Universities Alliances  

Increased development, retention and attraction of talent   

Further ~20,000 organisations/institutions benefit annually from Erasmus+ 
and the ESC. They report improved teaching quality, institutional capacity, 
and stronger international cooperation.  

65 European University Alliances are currently supported, involving more 
than  560  universities  in  Europe  and  beyond  cooperating  on  strategic 
domains like green and digital sectors.   

to 

Support 
transnational 
mobility 

SO 2.2 Support to transnational learning mobility and learning opportunities  

Individuals  at  all  stages  of 
learning 
training, 
and 
including  school  pupils,  VET 
learners,  students  in  higher 
education, adult 
learners, 
young people overall   

Education and training, youth 
and  sport  staff:  Teachers, 
trainers, 
youth 
educators, 
workers, sport coaches 

and 
training 
Education 
and  providers, 
institutions 
including 
schools,  VET 
providers,  higher  education 
institutions,  adult  education 
providers  

Improved  skills  development,  certification  and  portability  Improvement 
and development of new and improvement of existing skills,   

Increased employability  

Increased  transparency,  certification  and  recognition  of  skills  and 
competences cross-border  

Increased 
opportunities  

inclusivity  and  accessibility  for 

individuals  with  fewer 

Improved mental and physical health, increased self-confidence.  

Increased employability. Transnational mobility will boost key transversal 
skills, employability, and personal development.  

70 

 
 
Youth and sport organisations  

SO 2.3 Promote lifelong learning, improving skills and new competences 

Improvement and development of new and improvement of existing skills, 
across lifelong learning including increase of upskilling and reskilling  

Increased employability  

Increased  transparency,  certification  and  recognition  of  skills  and 
competences cross-border   

Improved  skills  development  (over  88%  of  Erasmus+  participants  self-
report improved competences), certification and portability  

Increased inclusiveness 

Promote  lifelong 
learning, 
improving  skills 
and 
new 
competences 

Citizens  
Institutions active in the fields 
of  education,  training,  youth 
and sport  

Or Individuals at all stages of 
learning 
training, 
and 
including  school  pupils,  VET 
learners,  students  in  higher 
learners, 
education, adult 
young people overall   

Education and training, youth 
and  sport  staff:  Teachers, 
trainers,  educators,  coaches, 
youth workers  

and 
training 
Education 
and  providers, 
institutions 
including 
schools,  VET 
providers,  higher  education 
institutions 
adult 
education providers  

(HEIs), 

Youth, volunteering and sport 
organisations 

SO. 2.4 Support policy experimentation and development accelerating modernisation 

Policy 
experimentation 
and development, 
accelerating 
modernisation 
across  education 
and training 

Education 
systems, 
makers 
subnational level  

at 

and 
training 
policies/policy 
and 
national 

and 

Youth 
policies/policy-makers 
national or subnational level 

sport 
 at 

Increased  evidence  based  policy  making  in  the  fields  of  education  and 
training, youth and sport  

Increased  transparency,  certification  and  recognition  of  skills  and 
competences cross-border  

Increased recognition of the role of non formal learning and youth work 
profession   

and 
training 
Education 
and  providers, 
institutions 
including 
schools,  VET 
providers,  higher  education 
institutions 
adult 
education providers  

(HEIs), 

Facilitate  national  reforms  through  the  development,  testing  of  solutions 
and  innovative  practices  which  are  then  scaled-up  and  transferred  at 
national level.   

Increased policy dialogues in the fields of education and training, youth and 
sport and cooperation with relevant stakeholders.  

Youth and sport organisations. 

As example, Erasmus+ triggered the Bologna Process which led to a reform 
of the higher education area in 48 countries by introducing the three-cycle 

71 

 
 
 
 
higher  education  system  and  ensuring  the  mutual  recognition  of 
qualifications and learning periods abroad completed at other universities.  

Indirect  long-term  impact  on  the  overall  quality  of  the  education  and 
training systems, acquisition of skills for life and jobs, and competitiveness  

SO. 2.5 Foster solidarity, civic education and engagement  

Foster  solidarity, 
civic 
education 
and engagement 

Local 
communities, 
Education, training, youth and 
sport  institutions,  local  and 
regional authorities  

Increased sense of belonging and community spirit - Civic and European 
Identity:  88%  of  Erasmus+  and  71%  of  Solidarity  Corps  participants 
reported a stronger sense of European belonging.  

Increased knowledge about the EU, democracy, citizens rights, EU values  

Youth 
organisations   

and 

sport  

Increased civic engagement   

Individuals  at  all  stages  of 
learning 
training, 
and 
including  school  pupils,  VET 
learners,  students  in  higher 
education, 
learners, 
 adult 
young people overall   

Increase of a culture of solidarity   

Improved mental and physical health, increased self-confidence.  

Increased 
opportunities  

inclusivity  and  accessibility  for 

individuals  with  fewer 

Increased  tolerance  and  intercultural  understanding  -  94%  of  Erasmus+ 
participants declared that they have increased their tolerance awareness and 
53% stated that they have reached a better understanding of inclusion and 
diversity.  

 Civic  and  European  Identity:  88%  of  Erasmus+  and  71%  of  Solidarity 
Corps participants reported a stronger sense of European belonging. Over 
6,000 organisations engage in Erasmus+ and ESC. They support inclusion 
through sport, youth engagement, and social cohesion projects.  

Lower access barriers: Students from rural or disadvantaged backgrounds 
face  compounded  barriers,  especially  when  information,  digital  skills, 
housing,  or  guidance  are  lacking.  For  example,  only  8%  of  youth  were 
aware of the Solidarity Corps versus 49% for Erasmus+.  

SO 3.1 Increase effectiveness of EU funding by addressing linked EU challenges, improving cooperation, and fostering 
coordination of the main policy areas 

Administrations 
(i.e., 
Commission, 
European 
relevant  agencies,  national 
authorities where relevant) 

More impactful results through more effective use of impact indicators and 
feedback to policy mechanisms.  

SO 3.2 Improve efficiency for applicants and beneficiaries, and at EU level 

(i.e., 
Administrations 
European 
Commission, 
relevant  agencies,  national 
authorities where relevant) 

Productivity gains for the Commission. There would be  significant gains 
for several Commission services, including central services, as a number of 
procedures  that  are  currently  duplicated  will  be  reduced  (e.g.  two  work 
programmes to be adopted and prepared; two programme committees to be 
held instead of four - with a reduction of the hours of interpretation needed, 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
  
  
the  number  of  translations,  the  reduction  by  50%  of  validation  steps; 
common evaluations, communication campaigns, etc.). 

Productivity gains for Implementation bodies. There would be significant 
productivity gains, in the case of a single programme for Erasmus+ and the 
European Solidarity Corps, as a number of horizontal activities carried out 
by  National  Agencies  such  as  information  sessions,  maintenance  of 
different websites, large scale communication campaigns) will be common 
and thus reduced compared to today.   

 Productivity gains for beneficiaries. Beneficiaries (especially small actors) 
benefit from one-stop-shop, fewer portals, harmonised rules, and simplified 
reporting rules. Reductions in the overall burden of participating in the EU 
programmes  (grant  management  reporting  and  checks  reduced  through 
simplification). For Creative Europe, 66% of beneficiaries report that the 
administrative burden is high or very high, and the length of the application 
and grant process is among the main difficulties in preparing an application 
(56% believe that the process to make applications is hard or very hard). 
Paperless  systems  are  seen  as  a  source  of  simplification.  The  current 
programme has reduced the number of beneficiary organisations that have 
to  submit  financial  capacity  checks  by  51%.  Under  Creative  Europe, 
lumpsums  account  for  62%  of  funded  projects  (vs  24%  in  the  previous 
programme).  Multiannual  financing  entails  as  well  reductions  of  the 
number of days spent by beneficiary organisations on making repeat grant 
applications. The usage of cascading grants equally reduces the number of 
beneficiary organisations that contract with the Commission. Qualitative – 
reduced  time  and  effort  –  In  the  case  of  the  merge  of  the  Corps  and 
Erasmus+,  this  benefit  will  be  significant  for  30%  of  the  current  Corps 
beneficiaries, also applying and managing projects through separate process 
while  option  2  would  bring  opportunities  under  common  call  and 
application process.   

SO 3.3 Increase coherence by promoting synergies and complementarities 

(i.e., 
Administrations 
European 
Commission, 
relevant  agencies,  national 
authorities where relevant) 

Productivity gains for funding bodies. Maximisation of impact stemming 
from reduction of overlaps and study of complementarities.  

Productivity gains from better coordination at local, national, EU levels, 
allowing for scaling up projects and ensuring sustainability of results.  

SO 3.4 Ensure proportionality by improving reactiveness to new challenges and minimising risks 

(i.e., 
Administrations 
European 
Commission, 
relevant  agencies,  national 
authorities where relevant) 

Gains resulting from the adaptability of the funding to new policy areas 
and  support  better  structured  along  tested  policy  problems  over  long 
periods, ensuring predictability. 

 Beneficiaries obtain gains from better flexibility of the funding. 

 Increased visibility of all EU opportunities and policies for stakeholders 
young  people  and  youth  organisations.  Youth  participation  in  formal 
democracy  is  declining,  with  few  pathways  into  civic  decision-making. 
OPC  feedback  confirms  strong  support  for  structured  civic  and  EU 
education  starting  from  early  ages.  Option  2  provides  for  clear-cut 
interventions  per  policy  areas,  which  will  guarantee  and  prevent  any 
dilution  of  the  policy  goals  and  visibility  and  recognition  across  the 
relevant sets of different stakeholders. 

73 

 
  
  
  
  
  
 
Overview of costs 

Table 2: Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Consumers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

 n/a 

 n/a 

Learning and 
getting used to 
streamlined 
application 
systems 

Low 

Direct 
administrative costs 

n/a 

n/a 

Integration of 
processes and 
support systems 

Lower under 
simplified 
procedures 

IT system 
changes, staff 
training, 
migration 
costs 

Alignment of 
back-office 
functions, 
calls and 
oversight 

Minor  

Net decrease 
due to e.g. 
merged 
comitology, 
joint calls, and 
simplification 
for national 
agencies  

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

Objective-
based 
merger 

Direct enforcement 
costs 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

Indirect costs 

 n/a 

 n/a 

Minor 

Minor 

a) Audit 
costs 
harmonised 
across 
merged 
programmes 
(e.g. 
decentralised 
model) 
b) Funding 
support to 
media-related 
regulatory 
framework 
(European 
Board for 
Media 
Services) 

Coordination 
with national 
institutional 
and sector-
specific 
actors 

a) Small 
increase in short 
term, decrease 
long term of 
audit costs 

Offset by 
reduced 
fragmentation 

(1)  Estimates  (gross  values)  to  be  provided  with  respect  to  the  baseline;  (2)  costs  are  provided  for  each 
identifiable action/obligation of the  preferred option otherwise for all retained options when no preferred 
option  is  specified;  (3)  If  relevant  and  available,  please  present  information  on  costs  according  to  the 
standard typology of costs (adjustment costs, administrative costs, regulatory charges, enforcement costs, 
indirect costs;).  

74 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relevant sustainable development goals 

Table 3: Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred Option(s)there are  
Relevant SDG175 
Expected progress towards the Goal 

Comments 

The contribution of the future instruments to 
the  achievement  of  the  SDGs  is  hardly 
quantifiable. This applies to all SDGs listed 
in this table.  

SDG no. 3  – Ensure healthy 
lives and promote well-being 
for all at all ages 

through 

The proposed option will  contribute to improved 
health,  including  mental  health/well-being,  for 
instance by supporting organisations working with 
victims  of  violence,  through  a  focus  on  cultural 
the 
participation  and  access  and 
promotion of sport and healthy life habits e.g. in 
schools  but  also  local  communities  through 
volunteering activities.  
Cultural  and  sport  activities  will  also  have  a 
significant  on  health  in  general,  as  well  as  on 
mental health.  
addrressing 
related 
Measures 
for 
cyberbullying, 
disinformation, 
disadvantaged groups area also expected to have a 
positive role on mental health.  

support 

taken 

to 

SDG  no.  4  –  quality 
education 

The  proposed  option,  primarily  supporting 
objective  2,  will  contribute  to  raise  quality, 
accessibility  and  inclusiveness  of  education  and 
training systems.  

Achievement  of 
these  goals  should  be 
possible  through  a  combination  of  national 
policies  and  funding,  EU  funds  (Erasmus+, 
European Solidarity Corps; but also cohesion 
funds, future competitiveness fund etc).  

/ 

/ 

SDG no. 5 – Achieve gender 
equality  and  empower  all 
women and girls 

in 

transposing 

The  proposed  option  will  make 
specific 
contributions  to  gender  equality,  for  instance  by 
providing  dedicated  funding  to  support  Member 
the  Pay  Transparency 
States 
Directive,  by  bolstering 
the  capacity  of 
organisations  fighting  gender-based  violence,  by 
enabling  grassroots  civil  society  organisations  to 
engage  at  the  local  level  and  promote  an  active 
civil  society,  empower  active  and  informed 
citizens  to  counter  gender-based  discrimination 
and  promote  gender  equality. 
|It  will  also 
contribute to the protection and  fulfilment of the 
fundamental rights of women and girls.  

inclusive 

SDG  no.  8  –  Promote 
sustained, 
and 
economic 
sustainable 
growth,  full  and  productive 
employment and decent work 
for all 

The  proposed  option  will  support  projects 
contributing  to  equal  access  to  work,  equal 
participation  in  the  labour  market,  diversity  in 
public-  and  private-sector  organisations  and  the 
elimination of barriers to career progression in all 
sectors.  Through  support  to  high  quality  and 
inclusive education and training and development 
of  skills  for  all,  the  proposed  option  supports 
employability of individuals including those with 
fewer opportunities. 
Support to audiovisual and media industries have 
multiplier  effects  on  competitiveness,  and  thus 
economic  growth.  This 
support  will  be 
strengthened  and  costs  will  be  minimised,  to 
ensure an efficient and effective EU intervention. 

SDG  no.  10  –  Reduce 
and 
inequalities  within 

Through 
transnational  projects  sharing  good 
practices,  training  courses  and  awareness-raising 

/ 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
among countries SDG no. 10 
– Reduce inequalities within 
and among countries 

activities,  the  proposed  option  will  contribute  to 
reducing 
eliminating 
discrimination  among  EU  citizens  and  among 
Member States.  

inequalities 

and 

-  Promote 
SDG  no.  16 
inclusive 
and 
peaceful 
societies 
sustainable 
for 
development, provide access 
to  justice  for  all  and  build 
effective,  accountable  and 
inclusive  institutions  at  all 
levels  –institutions  at  all 
levels 

/ 

The  proposed  option  will  promote  an  inclusive 
society, the rule of law, democratic participation, 
and the end all forms of violence (against women, 
children,  LGBTIQ  people,  and  other  groups  at 
risk). EU funds will support entities that contribute 
to helping the EU’s common values, fundamental 
rights, freedoms and equality, and its rich cultural 
diversity.  

SDG no. 17 – Strengthen the 
means of implementation and 
revitalise 
Global 
the 
Partnership  for  Sustainable 
Development 

Other SDGs 

The  proposed  option  will  strengthen  potential 
actions  around  media  freedom  and  pluralism. 
Access to information will also be enhanced by a 
coordinated support to news media production and 
distribution. 

The proposed option will contribute to the goal by 
building the capacity of civil-society organisations 
and  promoting 
strong  partnerships  among 
stakeholders. 

/ 

Other connections can be established with SDG 11 
(Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, 
resilient and sustainable) via the synergies between 
some  projects  and  the  New  European  Bauhaus; 
and SDG 12 (Ensure sustainable consumption and 
production  patterns)  through  the  cross-cutting 
focuses on greening. 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS 

1. MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION ANALYSIS  

This  Annex  describes  the  analysis  of  the  impacts  with  the Social  Multi-criteria  Evaluation 
(SOCRATES) model developed by the Joint Research Centre (BR Tool#62, pp. 550-553). 

1.1. Description of Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SMCE) methodological framework 
and software tool  

SOCRATES (SOcial multi CRiteria AssessmenT of European policieS) is a multiple criteria 
assessment software tool, explicitly designed for ex-ante Impact Assessment (IA) problems 176.  
Quantitative evidence plays an important role in many IAs, but also qualitative data such as 
stakeholder  input,  conclusions  of  evaluations,  as  well  as  scientific  and  expert  advice  are 
frequently used. This generates a multitude of criteria, which should be consistently integrated 
and  evaluated  when  comparing  policy  options.  The  most  widespread  multidimensional 
approach to  ex-ante  IAs  is  multi-criteria decision analysis, which forms  the basis for social 
multi-criteria evaluation (SMCE177), which has been explicitly designed for public policy.   

Overall,  the  objective  of  SOCRATES  and  the  underlying  SMCE  methodology  is  not  to 
substitute policy-makers through a mathematical model, but to improve their understanding of 
the  main  features  of  the  problem  at  hand,  such  as  key  assumptions,  degree  of  uncertainty, 
robustness of results and overall technical and social defensibility of options chosen. While 
SMCE has about three decades of applications in a multitude of policy problems around the 
World, its recent technical implementation SOCRATES has been applied in various EC Impact 
Assessments.   

SMCE proceeds on the basis of the following main concepts: dimensions, objectives, criteria, 
weights, criterion scores, impact matrix and compromise solution.  

•  Dimension is the highest hierarchical level of analysis and indicates the scope of 

objectives, criteria and criterion scores.  

•  Objectives indicate the direction of change desired, e.g. growth has to be maximized, 

social exclusion has to be minimized, and carbon dioxide emissions have to be 
reduced.  

•  A criterion is a function that associates alternative actions with a variable indicating 

its desirability.  

•  Weights are often used to represent the relative importance attached to dimensions, 

objectives and criteria. The idea behind this practice is very intuitive and easy, that is, 
to place the greatest number in the position corresponding to the most important 
factor.  

•  A criterion score is an assessment of the impact consistent with a given criterion with 
reference to a policy option. Criterion scores can be both qualitative and quantitative.  

•  The impact matrix presents in a structured way the information on the various 

criterion scores, i.e. each element of the matrix represents the performance of each 
option according to each criterion.  

77 

 
 
In  general,  in  a  multi-criterion  problem,  there  is  no  solution  (ideal  or  utopia  solution) 
optimizing all the criteria at the same time, and therefore “compromise solutions” have to be 
found. 

In summary a SMCE approach can supply a methodological framework where the hierarchical 
structure  of  the  option  comparison  step  of  a  typical  ex-ante  IA  (including  dimensions, 
objectives and evaluation criteria) is clarified as much as possible by means of well-established 
concepts  in  the  decision  theory  literature.  This  might  help  in  increasing  the  degree  of 
homogeneity  across  IA  studies.  The  SOCRATES  software  helps  structuring  such  a 
methodological framework.  

A  typical  SOCRATES  input  requires  the  definition  of  policy  options  (called  alternatives) 
dimensions,  objectives and criteria. This  information leads to  the construction of an impact 
matrix, which may include crisp, stochastic or fuzzy measurements of the performance of an 
alternative with respect to an evaluation criterion. Qualitative information can be introduced 
too (in the form of linguistic or ordinal criterion scores). Weights as importance coefficients, 
may  also  be  introduced.  They  can  be  attached  to  dimensions  or  criteria.  Indifference  and 
preference thresholds can also be introduced when needed. A social conflict matrix can also be 
constructed, where the impacts of each policy option on each social group are presented in a 
transparent way. 

2.1 Assessment structure, criterion scores and impact matrix 

This  analysis  compares  the  three  options  along  four  dimensions,  namely  effectiveness, 
efficiency, coherence and proportionality. For each of these dimensions, a set of objectives 
were agreed upon, reflecting the priorities outlined under General Objectives 1, 2 and 3 (see 
Figure below). For each objective, a set of indicators was selected (39 indicators overall).  

For each indicator, a score was given, evaluating the impact of the three policy options. This 
was based on an expert assessment from the relevant Commission services, relying on current 
sets  of data presented in  Annex I  (Evidence, Sources and quality), and on results  of current 
evaluations,  Spending  Reviews,  political  guidelines  and  policy  reports,  studies,  OPC,  and 
independent sectoral reports and surveys. The criterion scores were measured in the following 
range: --- (the most negative), --, -, =, +, ++, +++ (the most positive). The neutral score (=) was 
understood as the option not having impact on the assessed indicator, or where the positive and 
negatives were seen as to balance out. A ranking was obtained, under the assumption that all 
indicators have the same weight, by applying the SOCRATES model.178   

The assessment structure developed here has the following dimensions, objectives and criteria:  

1.  EFFECTIVENESS  

1.1. Continue to promote fundamental rights, EU values, democracy, media and 

culture 
1.1.1.  Upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights, degree of reduction of 

discrimination  

78 

 
 
 
 
 
1.1.2.  Contribute to fighting against gender-based violence, violence against children 

and other groups at risk 

1.1.3.  Enhance democratic resilience and participation 
1.1.4.  Support to news media, media independence and capability of tackling 

disinformation  

1.1.5.  Production, circulation, and consumption of EU audiovisual/media content 
1.1.6.  Increase in cross-border cultural cooperation and increased cultural 

participation and accessibility, and circulation of diverse cultural works 
1.1.7.  Cross-cutting innovation and promote sustainability of media, cultural and 

societal entities 

1.2. Support cross-border education and training, youth, sport and solidarity, 

contributing to skills for life and jobs 
1.2.1.  Support transnational Cooperation in the area of education and skills 
1.2.2.  Support to transnational learning mobility and learning opportunities 
1.2.3.  Promote lifelong learning, improving skills and new competences 
1.2.4.  Support policy experimentation and development accelerating modernisation 
1.2.5.  Foster solidarity, civic education and engagement 

1.3. Addressing linked EU challenges  

1.3.1.  Enhance contribution to democracy  
1.3.2.  Enhance contribution to competitiveness  

1.4. Improve cooperation 

1.4.1.  Cooperation between EC services and agencies  
1.4.2.  Cooperation between institutions/organizations in EU member states 
1.4.3.  Cooperation between EU and Third Countries (international cooperation) 
1.4.4.  Transnational Cooperation (within EU) 
1.4.5.  Potentiality to integrate inter-related projects 

1.5. Foster coordination of main policy areas  

1.5.1.  Planning impacts continuity 
1.5.2.  Prevention of dilution of policy goals 
1.5.3.  Flexibility between programs to address policy issues 

2.  EFFICIENCY  

2.1. Improve efficiency for applicants and beneficiaries  

2.1.1.  Ease of access for applicants  
2.1.2.  Time required for application  
2.1.3.  Reduction of administrative burdens for beneficiaries  

2.2. Improve efficiency at EU level  

2.2.1.  Number of FTEs managing the program  
2.2.2.  Potential to streamline types of management (direct and indirect) to simplify 

EU governance  

2.2.3.  Potential to use the same implementing 

bodies/agencies/institutions/approaches for several programmes/policy areas  

2.2.4.  Impact on comitology/ interaction with national authorities  

3.  COHERENCE  

3.1. Promote synergies and complementarities  

3.1.1.  Synergies/complementarities between clusters  
3.1.2.  Synergies/complementarities within the cluster  
3.1.3.  Synergies/complementarities with national & regional policies  
3.1.4.  Possibility of a rechannelling of funds between areas within a program  
3.1.5.  Reduce overlaps between funding actions addressing a policy objective  

4.  PROPORTIONALITY  

79 

 
4.1. Improve reactiveness to new challenges  

4.1.1.  Ability to address each of the specific problem drivers  
4.1.2.  Ability to address each of the specific programme objectives  
4.1.3.  Ability to sufficiently prioritise each of the main policy areas  

4.2. Minimize risk  

4.2.1.1. 

Risk of loss of customised approaches to (policy) specific needs and 

target groups  

4.2.1.2. 

Risk of loss of branding fostered by visibility of current programmes 

vis-à-vis existing target groups  

80 

 
 
 
 
Table 1: Impact Matrix 

Dimension 

Objective 

Indicator 

Scoring 

Status 
Quo 
(1) 

1. Effectiveness 

1.1 Continue to promote 
fundamental  rights,  EU 
values, 
democracy, 
media and culture 

1.2.  Support 
cross-
border  education  and 
training,  youth,  sport 
and 
solidarity, 
contributing to skills for 
life and jobs 

++ 

+ 

+ 

- 
- 

1.1.1. Upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights, 
degree of reduction of discrimination 
1.1.2.  Contribute  to  fighting  against  gender-based 
violence, violence against children and other groups at 
risk 
1.1.3. Enhance democratic resilience and participation  
1.1.4  Support to news media, media independence 
and capability of tackling disinformation 
1.1.5. Production, circulation, and consumption of EU 
audiovisual/media content 
1.1.6 Increase in cross-border cultural cooperation and 
increased  cultural  participation  and  accessibility,  and 
circulation of diverse cultural works 
1.1.7.  Cross-cutting 
innovation 
sustainability of media, cultural and societal entities 
1.2.1. Support transnational cooperation in the area of 
education and skills  
1.2.2.    Support  to  transnational  learning  mobility  and 
learning opportunities  
1.2.3  Promote  lifelong  learning,  improving  skills  and 
new competences 
1.2.4. Support policy experimentation and development 
accelerating modernisation  
1.2.5. Foster solidarity, civic education and engagement  = 

promote 

and 

+ 

= 

= 

= 

- 

- 

81 

Alignment 
with 
intervention 
logic 

the 

Full 
integra
tion 
(3) 

GENERAL 
OBJECTIVE 1 

GENERAL 
OBJECTIVE 2 

+ 

- 

++ 
+ 

+ 

- 

- 

= 

++ 

+ 

= 

+ 

Object
ive-
based 
merger 
(2) 
++ 

+ 

++ 
++ 

++ 

= 

++ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

 
 
 
1.3.  Addressing  linked 
EU challenges 
1.4. 
cooperation 

Improve 

1.5. Foster coordination 
of main policy areas 

2.1  Improve  efficiency 
and 
applicants 
for 
beneficiaries 

2.2  Improve  efficiency 
at EU level 

2. Efficiency 

3. Coherence 

3.1.  Promote  synergies 
and complementarities 

1.3.1 Enhance contribution to democracy 
1.3.2 Enhance contribution to competitiveness 
1.4.1. Cooperation between EC services and agencies 
1.4.2. Cooperation between institutions/organisations in 
EU member states 
1.4.3  Cooperation  between  EU  and  third  countries 
(international cooperation) 
1.4.4. Transnational cooperation (within the EU) 
1.4.5 Potentiality to integrate inter-related projects 
1.5.1 Planning impacts continuity 
1.5.2 Prevention of dilution of policy goals 
1.5.3 Flexibility between programmes to address policy 
issues 
2.1.1 Ease of access for applicants 
2.1.2 Time required for application 
2.1.3  Reduction  of  administrative  burdens 
beneficiaries 
2.2.1 Number of FTEs managing the programme 
2.2.2  Potential  to  streamline  types  of  management 
(direct and indirect) to simplify EU governance 
2.2.3  Potential 
implementing 
bodies/agencies/  institutions/approaches  for  several 
programmes/policy areas 
2.2.4  Impact  on  comitology/interaction  with  national 
authorities 
3.1.1 Synergies/complementarities between clusters 
3.1.2 Synergies/complementarities within the cluster 
3.1.3  Synergies/complementarities  with  national  and 
regional policies 
3.1.4  Possibility  of  rechannelling  of  funds  between 
areas within a programme 

the  same 

to  use 

for 

+ 
+ 
= 
= 

= 

= 
= 
+ 
= 
- 

- 
= 
= 

= 
= 

= 

= 

= 
-- 
= 

- 

++ 
++ 
+ 
+ 

+ 

+ 
++ 
- 
+ 
+ 

++ 
+ 
+ 

+ 
++ 

++ 

+ 

+ 
++ 
+ 

+ 

++ 
+ 
+ 
+ 

= 

+ 
++ 
-- 
- 
++ 

+ 
+ 
= 

++ 
- 

+ 

- 

+ 
+ 
+ 

++ 

GENERAL 
OBJECTIVE 3, 
SO 1 

GENERAL 
OBJECTIVE 3, 
SO 2 

GENERAL 
OBJECTIVE 3, 
SO 3 

82 

 
 
 
 
4. 
Proportionality 

4.1 
reactiveness 
challenges 

Improve 
to  new 

4.2 Minimise risk 

3.1.5  Reduce  overlaps  between  funding  actions 
addressing a policy objective 
4.1.1  Ability  to  address  each  of  the  specific  problem 
drivers 
4.1.2 Ability to address each of the specific programme 
objectives 
4.1.3 Ability to sufficiently prioritise each of the main 
policy areas 
4.2.1 Risk of loss of customised approaches to (policy) 
specific needs and target groups 
4.2.2 Risk of loss of branding fostered by visibility of 
current programmes vis-a-vis existing target groups 

- 

- 

- 

- 

+ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

- 

+ 

+ 

= 

= 

- 

-- 

GENERAL 
OBJECTIVE 3, 
SO 4 

Table 2: Explanation of criterion scores 

Criteria  

Explanation of Assigned Impact Matrix Values  

Ranking Value by Alternative  
Objective-
Status Quo 
Based 
(1)  
Merger 
(2)  

Full 
integration 
of all 
programm
es (3)  
+  

Upholding the rule of law 
and fundamental rights, 
degree of reduction of 
discrimination   

Option (1) provides the possibility to continue addressing the sources of 
discrimination as a dedicated objective supporting policy goals (even without a 
merger). Option (2) would allow to address objectives related to the fight against 
discrimination with a comprehensive approach (e.g., covering aspects related to 
biases in algorithms and IA tools). Option (3) might offer a similar benefit as 
Option (2) but risks reducing the dedicated focus on anti-discrimination because 
of the combination with several other policy areas (and hence, the effectiveness in 
supporting the implementation of the relevant EU policies).  

+   

++  

83 

 
 
 
 
++  

+  

-  

-  

-  

++  

++  

++  

+  

Degree of fighting against 
gender-based violence, 
violence against children 
and other groups at risk  

Enhance democratic 
resilience and 
participation  

Support to news media, 
media independence and 
capability of tackling 
disinformation  

Option (1) preserves a long-standing history and identity of the funding. Option 
(2) comes with similar benefits as Option (1) but also with a risk of loss of focus. 
Under Option (3), dedicated support could be lost.  
The support of study/training is seen as an important policy priority for 90% of 
the respondents in OPC179.  
Under the status quo, we score (-), as certain areas particularly important for civic 
engagement and participation such as countering disinformation and media 
literacy are underfunded. The new mergers under Option (2) and Option (3) 
would in any case lead to a better focus on these aspects.   
Option (1) provides insufficient/inexistent funding and scope to certain policy 
areas and in others the support is fragmented and unstructured. For example, news 
media sectors and disinformation are today insufficiently supported through EU 
programmes, and rely on pilot projects and preparatory actions decided on an 
annual basis, or through prerogative lines (e.g., Multimedia Actions). In short, 
fragmented and insufficient support fails to address the growing threats to 
independent journalism and diverse media landscapes, especially in vulnerable 
Member States. 
Option (2) would reduce the aforementioned problems of the status quo and allow 
for additional cross-fertilisation between protection of media and democracy. An 
Objective-based consolidation allows for targeted calls and streamlined 
procedures that can prioritise media independence, notably by creating a strong 
pole of intervention linking media and democracy, potentially addressing the 
emerging policy priority, as stated in the policy guidelines.  
Option (3): Compared to Option (1), this option would still offer an opportunity to 
adapt the new MFF and insert media and disinformation related aspects into the 
next generation of EU programmes. However, this positive aspect is mitigated by 
the fact that media issues risk being diluted because of the lack of clear thematic 
boundaries, risk of confusion and complexity among many competing priorities 
and policy areas. Option (3) would allow to address disinformation also through 
education by, e.g., allowing better coordination between Erasmus+ and CERV. 
However, this would happen at a risk of dilution and not responding to specific 
needs of beneficiaries. 

84 

 
  
+  

++  

+  

+  

=  

-  

Production, circulation, 
and consumption of 
audiovisual/media 
content   

Increase in cross-border 
cultural cooperation and 
increased cultural 
participation and 
accessibility, and 
circulation of diverse 
cultural works   

The support of study/training is seen as an important policy priority for 90% of 
the respondents in OPC180.  
Option (1) is addressing this aspect. The mid-term evaluation of the Creative 
Europe 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2014-
2020. already confirms the success of MEDIA.181 Yet, untapped opportunities 
remain and the challenges faced by the industry exceed the EU intervention. For 
example, on the demand side, EU audiovisual works are facing tough 
competition182, the EU industry experiences a gap in equity financing of €399 
million per year, the opportunities of cross-media IP exploitation remain 
underexplored.  
Option (2) would enhance the current success (e.g., foster competitiveness of the 
AV industry, increase citizens’ access to audiovisual content, explore cross-media 
IP exploitation), but also would offer more flexibility of the legal bases, would 
allow for horizontal intervention in cross-cutting challenges such as innovation, 
investment (by increasing access to finance) and skills, and would contribute to 
administrative benefits in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. 
Option (3) would provide similar benefits as Option (2) but also comes with 
dilution of policy objectives, and complexity of governance. 
Option (1) is the strongest option and scores (+) because with a stand-alone 
programme fully dedicated to the cultural and creative sectors, the risk of using 
cultural cooperation and cultural participation to reach other policy goals is 
decreased as all the objectives of the programme would be centered around 
culture and not on culture and values. The reason is that the current Creative 
Europe programme operated under Option (1) already finances many types of 
cultural works, coming from all the countries participating in the programme and 
from very different types of stakeholders, many of them fighting various forms of 
discrimination, as cultural diversity is precisely the key objective of the current 
programme.   
The risk of Options (2) and even more of Option (3) is that they both would move 
the centre of gravity of the existing Creative Europe programme away from 
culture (encompassing the cultural and creative sectors and audiovisual) towards a 
more values-based approach. The importance of culture would then be reduced to 

85 

 
  
reach other policy goals.  Option (2) would come with the risk of diluting culture 
with media because of, e.g., the focus on disinformation which again would be 
even intensified under Option (3), making the score of a full integration lower 
than of an objective-based merger. However, under Option (2), CERV’s anti-
discrimination could lead to increased types of work. This is why, Option (2) 
would score (=) and Option 3 would score negatively (-).  
OPC: 72% state that cross border support to cultural and creative sectors as an EU 
action would bring a positive impact in the future. OPC: 72% state that EU 
distribution, promotion and circulation EU content would bring a positive impact 
in the future183.    
Option (1) is the baseline, where there were no transversal actions addressing 
commonalities among all three societal, cultural and media entities. Financing 
responses to aspects such as innovation, access to finance, and sectoral skills have 
been fragmented, whereas there are challenges common to all sectors (such as 
digital transformation, rise of AI, financial weaknesses). The existing intervention 
shows examples of success (blending through MediaInvest, Creative Europe 
cross-sectoral strand). Option (2) creates a transversal response exploring the 
synergies across all objectives in General Objective 1, to address these aspects, 
and updating and uplifting the intervention of these areas and vertical policies. 
Option (3) makes the new model unworkable, as all policies would be merged 
together with other sectors, such as solidarity, youth and sport. It is not clear that 
the work of sectoral skills would benefit from being on a common pot with a 
general intervention on skills, whereas the other aspects (innovation and access to 
finance for media, cultural, societal entities) risk dilution within the wider 
priorities of a full merger.  
Option (1) is the baseline, where cooperation exists but there is a clear possibility 
for improvement. Option (2) would bring Erasmus+ and ESC together and offer 
additional cooperation potential, Option (3) provides no added value to Option (2) 
under this criterion, while also leading to loss of coherence and dilution.  
As opposed to Option (1), Option (2) showcases additional synergy between 
Erasmus+ and ESC. Option (3) could stimulate mobility in other areas than 

Cross-cutting innovation 
and promote 
sustainability of media, 
cultural and societal 
entities   

Transnational cooperation 
in the area of education 
and skills  

Support to transnational 
learning mobility and 
learning opportunities    

86 

-  

++  

-  

=   

++  

=  

= 

+  

++ 

 
Promote lifelong learning, 
improving skills and new 
competences   

experimentation 
Policy 
and   development acceler
ating modernisation  

Foster solidarity, civic 
education and 
engagement  

Enhance contribution to 
democracy  

education, e.g., there could be bridges between Erasmus+ and mobility for artists 
currently under CREA.  
OPC: Cooperation and mobility in education, training, and solidarity is considered 
as part of the most impactful factors for young respondents under 30. The support 
of study/training is seen as an important policy priority for 90% of the private 
citizens under 30 responding to the OPC184.  
Option (1) is the baseline. Option (2) and Option (3) would both strengthen and 
orchestrate funding in a way that better covers all the skills acquisition spectrum 
in a lifelong and lifewide learning perspective, including upskilling and reskilling. 
This would increase reach and allow to achieve critical mass, thereby enabling 
more systemic impact. 
Option (1) is characterized by restrictive legal bases that limit the scope. Option 
(2) could lead to (limited) new areas of experimentation like, e.g., new policy 
activities with Erasmus+ and ESC. Option (3) would provide similar benefits to 
Option (2) but would also put policy coherence at risk. The relative difference in 
size of the relevant programmes could lead to dilution of comparatively smaller 
ones.  
Compared to Option (1), Option (2) well aligns with the wording “via education 
and solidarity” of the criterion name. Option (3) allows for a better integration of 
the aspects of social engagement and thus scores better than Option (1), but there 
is less potentiality than Option (2).  
The current Option (1) already works quite well under this criterion. Option (2) 
provides much stronger policy coherence with respect to Option (1), by bringing 
together skills, education and solidarity on one side, and fundamental 
rights/values, countering disinformation/media support and democratic resilience 
on the other side. On the one hand, it would bring together programmes primarily 
aimed at protecting democracy and upholding EU values, media freedom and 
culture. It would combine CERV, Creative Europe and related budgetary 
prerogative lines (cf. General Objective 1). On the other hand, it would merge 
Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps, two instruments predominantly 
supporting the acquisition of skills and key competences for life and jobs (General 

87 

=  

+  

+  

- 

+ 

= 

=   

++  

+  

+  

++  

++  

 
 
 
Objective 2), contributing to competitiveness and fostering solidarity and 
cohesion. This option would provide a closer alignment with two priorities 
outlined in the political guidelines for the new mandate: (i) Protecting democracy, 
upholding values and increased societal resilience and (ii) the Union of Skills.    
Option (3) would allow for an enhanced contribution to democracy through 
different angles (fundamental rights, EU values, media, culture, education and 
solidarity) than the baseline but comes with a risk of dilution given the high 
number of EU policies that would be addressed under one single instrument. This 
might result in a disequilibrium between longstanding priorities of protecting 
rights and combating violence, the growing focus on democratic resilience, and 
the skills and education component, including due to differing budget share within 
the cluster. Overall, this type of harmonisation may result in less tailored 
approaches to specific needs and target groups. Moreover, it may overly simplify 
complex policies that reflect different areas and degrees of EU competence and 
Treaty provisions and might result in lesser focus being put on enhancing 
democracy and respect of rights and EU values, especially in those areas where it 
is most needed.  
OPC: democracy, equality, rule of law, fundamental rights) and civil society are 
considered as part of the most impactful factors for young respondents under 30. 
The protection of democracy is seen as an important policy priority for 90% of the 
private citizens under 30 responding to the OPC185.   
Option (1) shows good performance as the status quo already delivers an approach 
towards competitiveness, but it can be improved upon by Option (2). Option (2) 
could allow for larger economies of scale of EU expenditure. Option (3) comes with 
similar  benefits  to  (2)  but  after  a  full  merger,  it  could  dilute  the  objective  of 
programmes that specifically target competitiveness, like, e.g., Erasmus+. 186 
Currently, the status quo presents room for improvement from the cooperation 
side. Option (2) would showcase better coordination, because services would 
cooperate more on the preparation of programme documents.  

Enhance  contribution  to 
competitiveness  

Cooperation between EC 
services and agencies  

88 

+  

++  

+  

=  

+  

+  

 
Cooperation between 
institutions/organisations 
in EU Member States  

Cooperation between EU 
and Third Countries 
(International 
Cooperation)  

Transnational cooperation 
(within EU)   

Option (3) is similar to (2), there would be even more cooperation which would 
come, however, with an increase in coordination costs due to further complexity. 
Moreover, not all the DGs involved have a standing cooperation with those that 
would be implied by this merger.  
Currently, the status quo presents room for improvement from the cooperation 
side.  Although some policy areas are not politically and/or financially supported 
by certain MSs, Option (2) is scored as + because it would foster cooperation 
between applicants and participants.  
Option (3) is analogous to Option (2).  
Option (1) comes with difficulties that stem from legal obligations and framework 
under the current programmes. Indeed, it is not easy to manage the large number 
of agreements and the decentralised management of the call for funds. However, 
it facilitates cooperation because Third Countries are able to choose to which 
specific programme(s) they want to participate in. There are insufficiencies as 
there are many programmes with different conditions to assess Third Countries.   
Option (2) would create two more coherent clusters, and it would be easier to 
manage the reduced number of agreements. However, it would be harder for 
Third Countries to single out specific policy areas where they wish to collaborate 
with the EU (on this matter, there are already concerns from EFTA). The success 
of this option depends on the condition for associations of Third Countries, e.g., 
requests for setting up an agency.  
Option (3) shares some characteristics with Option (2), but the mandates of 
specific programmes offer excessively diverse coverage of Third Countries, 
which leads to certain inefficiencies, and consequently to a total score of (=).  
Under Options (2) and (3), there could be additional benefits for transnational 
cooperation within the EU between organisations that receive EU funding, e.g., 
cultural, media, civil society, and additionally for Option (3), educational 
organisations etc. Although these benefits would reach a larger pool of 
organisations under Option (3), the resulting heterogeneity of organisations could 
also limit cooperation. Thus, we assign a (+) to both Option (2) and Option (3), as 

89 

=  

+  

+  

=   

+  

=  

=   

+  

+  

 
  
Potentiality to integrate 
inter-related projects  

Planning impacts 
continuity  

Prevention of dilution of 
policy goals   

Flexibility between 
programmes to address 
policy issues   

Ease of access for 
applicants  

in both cases there is an improvement with respect to the status quo. Indeed, under 
Option (1), there is generally no possibility for the abovementioned cross-
fertilisation, e.g., on civic education.  
As opposed to Option (1), where it is desirable to improve coordination, Option 
(2) allows for easier collaboration. Option (3) would produce a similar result to 
Option (2), although it might come with the potential for some additional 
integrated projects, e.g., between education and democratic participation.  
By not altering the status quo, Option (1) preserves continuity. Option (2) comes 
with comparatively little risk. Option (3) might allow for significant shifts of 
funding between programmes, reducing the predictability of the budget of the 
individual components.   
Unlike Option (1), Option (2) would see a planning that better matches the policy 
areas.  
Although Option (3) would allow for covering the new policy areas, it could also 
lead to dilution, e.g., for culture and rights and values, and unwanted 
redistribution of budget.  
Under Option (1), it is currently difficult to move funds between programmes. 
Option (2) would create clusters of common policy issues. There would also offer 
more flexibility to allocate funding to newly emerging policy needs. Option (3) 
would provide the highest degree of flexibility to reallocate budget within a single 
programme.  
OPC: more flexibility should be introduced, to react to crises and emerging needs. 
67% of the respondents still say that the lack of flexibility to adapt to new and 
unforeseen developments is an obstacle to the effective use of the EU budget187.  
Currently, there are already problems in the accessibility of the programmes, 
justifying a (–) as the score for the status quo. Option (2) would lead to some 
simplification as the new level of heterogeneity in the clusters would not be 
overly complex. Also, Option (3) would go in this direction, but there are overly 

=   

++  

++  

+  

-  

--  

=   

+  

-  

-  

+  

++  

-  

++  

+  

90 

 
Time required for 
application  

Reduction of 
administrative burdens 
for beneficiaries   

Number of FTEs (Full 
Time Equivalents) 
managing the programme  

Potential to streamline 
types of management 
(direct and indirect) to 
simplify EU governance  

heterogenous requirements for certain calls which could result, e.g., in pushing for 
same the rules for all applicants, thus complicating their procedures.  
In contrast to the status quo which is ranked as (=), Option (2) and Option (3) will 
lead to a lower time required for applicants due to fewer calls needed to be 
compiled.   
Thus, we see a score of (=) as the baseline status quo. In contrast, Option (2) 
would indeed increase complexity, which is offset by simplification in 
administration leading to an overall positive effect. In case of a full integration, 
the strong increase of complexity is too much to compensate with simplification 
alone, leading to a (=) score.  
OPC: The top obstacle cited by EU citizens (80%) and organizations (86%) was 
the administrative burden for beneficiaries188.  
Although the status quo might allow for improvements that could occur in the 
long term, it remains difficult to measure how much an employee works on 
specific programme-related tasks, justifying the score (=). Under Option (2), there 
would be increased coordination costs but fewer programme committees, fewer 
evaluations etc., and thus, this option simplifies the management as not every DG 
has the same type of managerial workload as before. Under Option (3), there 
might be the highest implementation costs in the short run, but in the long run 
even less programme committees, fewer evaluations, fewer FTEs etc. would need 
to be handled such that a full integration is the highest ranked option.  
Under the “Status quo”, the management of the programmes would continue to 
follow the existing management boundaries, while “Objective-Based Merger” 
would lead to some degree of alignment and streamlining, for example as regards 
programme committees. Compared to the status quo, an objective-based merger 
will not change the implementation mode of the programmes: clusters will follow 
the same implementation logic, meaning the continuation of indirect and direct 
management structures, e.g., for Erasmus+ and ESC, and only direct management 
for CREA and CERV.  Conversely, “Full Integration of all Programmes” would 
mix different types of management mode and lead to overly blurred lines between 

91 

=  

=   

+  

+  

+  

=  

=  

+  

++  

=   

++  

-  

 
  
Potential to use the same 
implementing 
bodies/agencies/institutio
ns/approaches for several 
programmees/policy 
areas  

Impact on 
comitology/interaction 
with national authorities  

Synergies/complementarit
ies between clusters  

Synergies/Complementari
ties within the cluster  

different implementation modes across policies, thus worsening the status quo. 
Moreover, compared to status quo, Option (2) would lead to a constant number 
and a consistent type of national authorities to interact with. Thus, an objective-
based merge would lead to a slight streamlining of programme committees. 
Conversely, in Option (3), there would be too much heterogeneity for committee 
members. 
Compared to the status quo, an objective-based merger would lead to the same 
agencies working on the same programmes, and clusters following the same 
implementation logic. This would lead to streamline work for indirect and direct 
management structures, e.g., for Erasmus+ and ESC, and only direct management 
for CREA and CERV. In case of a full integration, there would be direct and 
indirect managements in one programme with separation per ‘strand’ as it is 
currently the case in Erasmus+. Consequently, there is a risk of politicization for 
support for the area of democracy and rights. The extra layer of complexity would 
require interaction with more heterogeneous entities. Thus, the positive effect in 
Option (3) is lower than in Option (2).   
Compared to Option (1), Option (2) would lead to a constant number and a 
consistent type of national authorities to interact with. Thus, an objective-based 
merge would lead to a slight improvement due to fewer programme committees. 
Conversely, in Option (3), there would be too much heterogeneity for committee 
members.  
Currently under the status quo, there are untapped synergies, and complementarity 
has not worked in some cases, e.g., with CREA and HORIZON. An objective-
based merger or a full integration would make it easier to receive and combine 
funding from multiple programmes.     
Today, we have limited synergies between the programmes and have no 
complementarities at all. This also did not work in the past, and due to the lack of 
legal bases, synergies could not be exploited. Under Option (2), there is a better 
identification of potential gaps and overlaps per each objective. This speaks in 
favour of increased synergies between Erasmus+ and ESC as well as CREA and 

92 

=   

++  

+  

=  

+  

-  

=   

+  

+  

--  

++  

+  

 
 
Synergies/Complementari
ties with national & 
regional policies  
Possibility of a 
rechanneling of funds 
between areas within a 
programme  

Reduce overlaps between 
funding actions 
addressing a policy 
objective  

Ability to address each of 
the specific problem 
drivers   

CERV. These organic synergies would solve the synergy problem at least for this 
cluster. The effect in case of a full integration is still positive, but there is a risk of 
policy dilution, due to the somewhat artificial set up of the cluster, such that the 
structure could force unproductive alliances coming in hand with the risk of lower 
complementarities.  
Under Option (1), there is no reasonable argument for the possibility of synergies 
with national and regional policies. By merging programmes, irrespective of using 
Option (2) or (3), there is a slight chance for an improvement.  
In the status quo, it is difficult to move funds between programmes. Under Option 
(2), there would be more flexibility to allocate funding to newly emerging policy 
needs. Logically, Option (3) would provide the highest possibility of 
rechannelling funds and the highest degree of flexibility to reallocate budget.  
OPC: Currently, 81% of the respondents see the different and often complex fund 
specific rules for access to funding as an obstacle preventing EU budget from 
fully delivering its objectives in these policy areas189.  
In practice, it is still impossible to reduce overlaps between the funding actions in 
the status quo, as also indicated in the OPC: 53% of respondents think that there 
are many programmes with overlapping policy goals harming EU’s objectives 
delivery190. An objective-based merger would provide an increased coordination 
to prevent overlaps. This would also hold for a full integration of all programmes 
but with some risk of dilution.  
Under the status quo, the challenge is that some problem drivers are not addressed 
now, as problems keep evolving and reshaping the ecosystem, while the legal 
bases are fragmented or not sufficiently flexible. Moreover, some important 
problem drivers that would be covered under other options are not yet covered 
under the status quo, such as the disruptions to the media market. Therefore, 
fundamental problem drivers, which were also identified in the political 
guidelines, remain under-addressed under option (1). Using Option (2), new areas 
can be covered, and economies of scale would arise due to the merge by the 
specific policy objectives. For example, the problem drivers 1.3. and 1.4. could be 

93 

=   

-  

+  

+  

+  

++  

-  

++  

+  

-  

++  

+  

 
  
-  

++  

=  

Ability to address each of 
the specific programme 
objectives  

addressed under an objective-based merger, avoiding overlaps, and problem 
driver 1.6 can be specifically addressed by the new instrument. A full merge in 
Option (3) would not solve all issues of the status quo and would be a step 
towards Option (2). However, some problem drivers might not be addressed in a 
targeted manner, due to loss of focus of a fully merged programme. This is in 
particular the case of problem driver 1.6, which would be diluted as it is cross-
cutting for just societal, cultural and media entities, and directly related to the 
objective-based merger. Therefore, the high risk of dilution only speaks for the 
score (+) for Option (3).  
Under the status quo, the problem is that some policy objectives are not funded 
right now as they are a direct response to new problems (while the applicable 
rules are overly strict) or because these are recent priorities of the Commission. 
Moreover, some important policy objectives that would be covered under other 
options are not yet covered under the status quo, such as contributing to a viable 
and diverse trustworthy information ecosystem. Under Option (2), the broader 
scope allows for adaptability and expansion, facilitating the achievement of both 
existing and emerging objectives. Synergies from thematic alignment improve 
strategic coherence in addressing programme objectives. This is the case in 
particular of specific objective 1.7, which seeks to spur innovation and promote 
sustainable financing models in media, cultural sectors and societal ecosystems to 
enhance their innovation. A full merge in Option (3) would not solve all issues of 
the status quo and would be a step back compared to Option (2). A high risk of 
dilution applies for the score = for Option (3). This is specially the case for the 
cross-cutting dimension of the objective based merger under problem 1, which 
creates strong synergies for societal, cultural and media players in adapting to 
digital transformation and increasing access to finance, as it is unclear how this 
cross-cutting part would not be dilute under a full merger. Altogether, the merging 
of disparate policy areas introduces complexity. Risk of trade-offs between 
conflicting objectives weakens the ability to pursue each one effectively.  

94 

 
  
Ability to sufficiently 
prioritise each of the main 
policy areas  

Risk of loss of 
customised approaches to 
(policy) specific needs 
and target groups  

Under the status quo, the problem is that some policy areas are not funded right 
now as a result of the emerging policy priorities as the applicable rules are overly 
strict.   
Option (2): Prioritisation is preserved due to thematic coherence and alignment 
with two new main priorities of the European Commission, as expressed by the 
political guidelines: the Democracy Shield (merger 1) and the Union of Skills 
(merger 2).   
A higher flexibility (compared to status quo) enables proactive reallocation of 
resources based on the evolving nature policy areas. Clearer lines of 
accountability and strategy due to the grouping by objectives and management 
modes will increase the performance and impact of these policy priorities.  
A full merge in (3) would not solve all issues of the status quo and would be a 
step back compared to Option (2). It is nevertheless valuable because it covers 
sufficient grounds of adaptation. The high risk of fragmentation and dilution is the 
reason for the score (=) for Option (3). In fact, in Option (3), the wide range of 
objectives increases the risk of fragmentation. Dilution of focus likely undermines 
the ability to treat an area as a clear priority. Although policy areas in the cluster 
are people’s driven, there is a second risk of confusion of policy areas and 
priorities on areas that in principle have little relation (e.g. audiovisual 
competitiveness with students' mobility). It is to note that the public survey 
included 37 different policy priorities, which illustrate the extent to which a full 
merger risks mixing too many areas of interest under a common pot. As such, 
Option (3) presents a risk of complexity.  
The status quo already works sufficiently well, whereas Option (2) would be a 
step forward as it would then become easier to clearly define the policy 
boundaries and to determine a clear nexus between the EU strategy and funding. 
Furthermore, it would provide more clarity on the target groups of the different 
policy clusters. However, a full integration of the programmes would lead to an 
overly extensive heterogeneity between the target groups, as it would be too 

-  

++  

=  

+  

++  

-  

95 

 
 
  
Risk of loss of branding 
fostered by visibility of 
current programmes vis-
à-vis existing target 
groups  

difficult to compare different beneficiaries such as e.g., compare an Erasmus+ 
student to a competitor of Google.  
OPC: 67% of the respondents say that the limited reach to relevant/diverse/more 
diverse target groups is an obstacle preventing the EU budget from fully 
delivering its objectives191.  
The status quo works, although some segments are not covered and existing target 
groups are accustomed to current branding of programme which would ease 
continuity in the next MFF. Yet, the OPC shows that there is an overwhelmingly 
positive attitude towards the EU programmes, most notably Erasmus+.  An 
objective-based merger could lead to risks of slightly reduced visibility for 
CREA. Under Option (3), there is a risk of reduced visibility of individual 
programmes that are highly popular such as Erasmus+ and to some extent 
Creative Europe.  

+  

-  

- -  

96 

 
2.2 Ranking of policy options  

The importance of mathematical approaches in SMCE is their ability to allow a consistent 
aggregation of the diverse information. Otherwise, even if everybody would agree on the 
multidimensional  nature of an  IA study, the implementation  in  a real-world  assessment 
exercise  would  be  impossible.  The  standard  objection  might  be  that  the  aggregation  of 
apples and oranges is impossible. Multi-criteria mathematics does answer to this objection 
in  a  definitive  way.  When  using  mathematical  rules,  consistency  between  the  problem 
structuring and the ranking of policy options is guaranteed, this makes the overall IA study 
much more defensible.  

SOCRATES  makes  all  required  computations.  From  a  mathematical  point  of  view,  the 
information contained in the impact matrix useful for solving the so-called multi-criterion 
problem is:  

Intensity of preference (when quantitative criterion scores are present).  

• 
•  Number of criteria in favour of a given alternative.  
•  Weight attached to each single criterion.  
•  Relationship of each single alternative with all the other alternatives.  

Combinations  of  this  information  generate  different  aggregation  conventions,  i.e. 
manipulation  rules  of  the  available  information  to  arrive  at  a  preference  structure.  The 
aggregation  of  several  criteria  implies  taking  a  position  on  the  fundamental  issue  of 
compensability.  For  example,  in  evaluating  a  policy  option  that  presents  a  very  bad 
environmental impact and a very good economic impact, it is clear that allowing or not for 
compensability and to which degree is the key assumption.   

An  aggregation  rule  that  is  simple,  non-compensatory  and  minimises  the  rank  reversal 
phenomena is the Kemeny rule. Its basic idea is that the maximum likelihood ranking of 
policy options is the ranking supported by the maximum number of criteria (or criterion 
weights)  for  each  pair-wise  comparison,  summed  over  all  pairs  of  options  considered. 
There is agreement in the literature that the Kemeny method is “the correct method” for 
ranking options, and that the only drawback of this aggregation method is the difficulty in 
computing  it  when  the  number  of  options  grows.  A  numerical  algorithm  solving  this 
computational drawback in an efficient way has been developed recently at JRC and it has 
been implemented in SOCRATES 137.  

Overall,  the  objective  of  SOCRATES  is  NOT  substitution  of  policy-makers  through  a 
mathematical model, on the contrary, the objective is to improve their understanding of the 
main  features  of  the  problem  at  hand,  such  as  key  assumptions,  degree  of  uncertainty, 
robustness of results and overall technical and social defensibility of options chosen. The 
philosopher Socrates said: “I cannot teach anybody anything. I can only make them think.” 
This is the main inspiring principle of the SOCRATES software too.  

Three  main  components  constitute  the  core  of  SOCRATES:  multi-criteria,  equity  and 
sensitivity analyses. Multi-criteria analysis requires the definition of relevant dimensions, 
objectives and criteria. It uses weights as importance coefficients and clarifies their role in 
the  hierarchical  structure.  The  impact  matrix  may  include  quantitative  (including  also 
stochastic  and/or  fuzzy  uncertainty)  and  qualitative  (ordinal  and/or 
linguistic) 
measurements of the performance of an alternative with respect to an evaluation criterion. 

97 

 
 
  
It supplies a ranking of the alternatives according to the set of evaluation criteria (i.e. the 
technical compromise solution/s).   

By applying SOCRATES to the information contained in the impact matrix (see Table 2), 
the  following  ranking,  described  in  Figure  1  is  obtained  (under  the  assumption  that  all 
dimensions have the same weight, see Figure 2).   

Figure 1. Ranking of all options  

The ranking shows that “Objective-Based Merger” is the best choice followed by “Full 
Integration of all programmes”, while “Status Quo” is definitely the worst option.   

Figure 2. Equal dimension weighting assumption  

2.3 Sensitivity analysis   

The  result  robustness  will  be  further  checked  by  means  of  local  and  global  sensitivity 
analyses.  A  degree  of  uncertainty  always  affects  all  model  outcomes;  consequently, 
effective and transparent practice in policy support requires identifying and quantifying 
the different  sources  of  uncertainty as much as  possible. In decision sciences, the main 
objective  of  sensitivity  analysis  is  reinforcing  the  arguments  supporting  a  decision 
recommendation.  

 In  the  framework  of  SOCRATES,  the  objective  of  sensitivity  analysis  is  to  check  the 
ranking robustness and determine which of the input parameters influence more the results. 
Consistently  with  this  objective,  local  sensitivity  analysis  looks  at  the  sensitivity  of 
rankings  obtained  with  respect  to  a)  the  exclusion/inclusion  of  different  criteria  and 
dimensions; and b) dimensions and criterion weights changes; all parameters are changed 
one per time. A very important point is that both dimension/criterion weights are increased 
up to a maximum of 50% of the total importance, consequently any “dictator” effect is 

98 

 
 
 
  
avoided. Global sensitivity analysis explores the whole weight space, thus accounting for 
all possible combinations and interactions of criterion weights; all parameters are changed 
simultaneously. The whole information produced by local and global sensitivity analyses 
is synthesised into simple graphics.   

Let  us  then  first  look  at  the  influence  of  the  exclusion  of  the  various  criteria  and 
dimensions, one per time, and at the effect of using the subset of criteria belonging to one 
dimension only (i.e. first one criterion per time is eliminated and the corresponding ranking 
is obtained later a whole dimension with all its criteria is eliminated and the effect on the 
final ranking is checked). The objective of local sensitivity analysis is to better understand 
the overall assessment structure.  

When  considering  dimensions,  “tilde”  means  without  that  specific  dimension,  while 
without  “tilde”  means  considering  only  that  specific  dimension.  Figure  3  presents  the 
results of this exercise. As one can see ranking of options is very robust. “Objective-Based 
Merger”  is  always  the  winner,  followed  by  “Full  Integration  of  all  programmes”  and 
“Status Quo”. Only when considering the assessment structure without “Proportionality”, 
there is an uncertainty in the comparison between “Full Integration of all programmes” 
and “Status Quo”, since both of them might be second or third, however, also in this case, 
there is no doubt that “Objective-Based Merger” is the most desirable one.  

Figure 4 describes the influence on the overall ranking of each single criterion deletion 
(the  “tilde”  means  without  that  specific  criterion).  No  criterion  alone  can  modify  the 
ranking, thus from this point of view results are very robust, “Objective-Based Merger” is 
the clear winner, “Full Integration of all programmes” is second and “Status Quo” is third.  

Figure 5 synthesises all results as a frequency matrix, where it is indicated how many times 
each  option  is  present  in  any  rank  position,  and  the  percentage  each  rank  position  is 
occupied by each single option. In this way, it becomes clear that option “Objective-Based 
Merger” is the most desirable one, in fact it occupies the first position in the 100 per cent 
of all the rankings obtained, while “Full Integration of all programmes” is second in the 
97.2 per cent of all rankings and “Status Quo” is in the bottom position with no doubt.   

Figure 3. Rankings obtained by eliminating one dimension per time or by using only one 
dimension   

99 

 
  
Figure 4. Rankings obtained by eliminating one criterion per time  

100 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Summary of results on criteria and dimensions   

Finally, the issue of robustness of results with respect to weights is particularly relevant. 
The ranking robustness can be further checked by means of local and global sensitivity 
analyses. In local sensitivity analysis, the weight corresponding to one dimension/criterion 
per time is increased till a maximum of 50 per cent of the total importance, while all other 
weights are reduced proportionally and they are all identical. In global sensitivity analysis, 
all possible combinations of criterion weights are considered (all weights are changed at 
the same time and extreme cases are considered, too).   

As one can see in Figure 6, describing local sensitivity analysis of dimension weights, the 
ranking is corroborated in the 100 per cent of simulations; the same result applies when 
performing  local  sensitivity  analysis  of  criterion  weights,  as  shown  in  Figure  7.  This 
ranking stability is confirmed by global sensitivity analysis in which, as shown in Figure 
8,  all  simulations  confirm  the  original  ranking.  In  summary,  we  can  conclude  that  the 
weights attached to dimensions and criteria have no role in determining the final ranking 
which is very stable.   

101 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Local sensitivity analysis of dimension weights  

Figure 7. Local sensitivity analysis of criterion weights  

102 

 
  
 
 
 
 
2.4 Pairwise comparison  

Finally, more information can be obtained by checking the pairwise comparisons, which 
allow  one  to  be  fully  aware  of  the  mutual  weaknesses  and  strengths  on  each  single 
assessment criterion. This information is summarised graphically in Figure 9, where the 
degrees of credibility that any option is preferred or indifferent with respect to another one 
on each single criterion are illustrated.  

From Figure 9 it is possible to deduce that option “Objective-Based Merger” is better than 
“Status  Quo”  in  most  of  criteria  considered,  with  the  exception  of  “Degree  of  fighting 
against  gender-based  violence,  violence  against  children  and  other  groups  at  risk”, 
“Increase  in  cross-border  cultural  cooperation  and  increased  cultural  participation  and 
accessibility, and circulation of diverse cultural works”, “Planning impacts continuity” and 
“Risk of loss of branding fostered by visibility of current programmes vis-à-vis existing 
target groups”. 

When comparing “Objective-Based Merger” with “Full Integration of all programmes”, 
there are various criteria where the two options show a similar performance (ten criteria), 
but most of the remaining ones are in favour of “Objective-Based Merger” (25 criteria). 
Only four criteria evaluate “Full Integration of all programmes” better than “Objective-
Based Merger”. 

103 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Pairwise comparison 

104 

 
 
 
 
105 

 
 
 
106 

 
 
 
107 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK 

Contribution of media industries to competitiveness 

Overview of impacts on competitiveness  

Dimensions of Competitiveness 

Impact of the initiative 
(++ / + / 0 / - / -- / n.a.) 

References to sub-sections of 
the main report or annexes 

Cost and price competitiveness 

+ 

International competitiveness  

++ 

Capacity to innovate 

SME competitiveness 

+ 

++ 

Synthetic assessment192   

Challenges and Contextualisation 

Assessment  below  under  ‘Cost 
and Price Competitiveness’ 

Assessment 
‘International Competitiveness’ 

below 

under 

Assessment  under  ‘Capacity  to 
Innovate’ 

Assessment  under  ‘Cost  and 
and 
Price  Competitiveness’ 
‘International Competitiveness’ 

Beyond their societal and cultural importance, copyright intensive sectors with a very 
broad user base such as audiovisual, news and publishing, video games and music, 
are strategic for the EU economy and are similarly disrupted due to digitalisation. 
Valued at EUR 206bn in 2023, these sectors together are expected to reach EUR 240bn by 
2030. In the EU, online distribution already makes up around 30% of the revenues of these 
sectors, in the US this is close to 50%193. The audiovisual market (cinema, TV, streaming) 
is the biggest segment, accounting for almost half of revenues. Video games are the second 
largest segment, followed by news/publishing and audio (music/radio/podcasts). 

Global  companies  outweigh  EU  companies  in  the  dynamic  online  segment  of  the 
audiovisual market. Global video sharing platforms such as YouTube and TikTok have 
grown enormously  over  the last few years, reaching  23% of the audiovisual  sector and 
forecast  to  double  by  2029.  Global,  mainly  US,  streamers  control  80%  of  European 
subscriptions.  Streaming  as  a  whole  has  grown  to  17%  of  audiovisual  revenues  and  is 
projected  to  grow  by  31%  by  2029.  EU  companies  have  the  strongest  position  in  the 
traditional segment of broadcasting (53% of revenues) but this is under severe competitive 
pressures in terms of advertising revenues and audiences.  Cinema represents under 5% of 
audiovisual revenues.  Meanwhile the share of US companies in the revenues of the top 
100 audiovisual companies in Europe went up to 40% in 2023.194  

The EU audiovisual sector is fragmented, and dependent on public funding (mostly 
national). 99% of the almost 100,000 EU audiovisual companies, especially producers and 
distributors  (the  main  beneficiaries  of  MEDIA),  are  SMEs.  EU  audiovisual  players, 
including  larger players  like broadcasters,  typically have a national  focus in  contrast  to 
global competitors (Hollywood majors, large tech companies and Netflix). National public 
funding to public sector broadcasters accounts for around half of EU broadcasting revenues 
and public funding is also the main source of financing for EU films. Furthermore, there 

108 

 
 
 
are  substantial  differences  between  funding  across  Member  States  leading  to  uneven 
audiovisual capacities across the EU195.  

The EU video games industry captures a limited share of global revenues (13%), with 
only  two  companies  among  the  25  biggest  game  industry  firms.  It  is  mostly 
characterised by the high fragmentation of its industrial ecosystem, with a vast array of 
developers and a limited number of leading publishers. Europe’s lag is aggravated by the 
dependence on non-European technologies (e.g., game engines and cloud) and distribution 
platforms.  The  number  of  available  games  is  increasing  in  almost  all  segments  (nearly 
tripled for PC between 2020 and 2024), making European games less discoverable since 
consumers are spending much of their time on older and non-EU titles (in 2024, games 
over 6 years old accounted for 57% of playtime on PC and consoles).196 

The news media sector is experiencing a decline of total revenues, with a decrease of 
8% between 2019 and 2023. Traditional sources of revenues accounted for 89% of the total 
revenues  generated  by  the  sector  in  2024,  despite  a  general  gradual  decline.  Digital 
advertising rose from EUR 4.4 billion in 2019 to EUR 5.4 billion in 2023 and is expected 
to  reach  EUR  7.1  billion  by  2028  but  does  not  compensate  for  the  drop  in  traditional 
revenues, leading to a revenue gap. In addition, the total number of news media companies 
in the EU-27 is decreasing, and small enterprises dominate the market across the EU. In 
2023,  there  were  85.087  news  media  companies  operating  across  the  EU-27.  The  total 
number of employees shrank by 7.5%, between 2021-2023. Material and staff costs for 
news  media  companies  have  increased  over  the  last  10  years  by  13%  and  by  14%, 
respectively. All in all, media viability is at risk in nearly all EU countries. In 2023, nearly 
all countries (except the Netherlands and Luxembourg) experience a medium to high risk 
on media viability (i.e. lack of sufficient resources to finance the media). 

Cost and price competitiveness 

The preferred option is expected to increase competitiveness, by further encouraging 
international  co-productions  with  a  potential 
to  achieve  popularity  with 
transnational  audiences  online.  International  co-productions  allow  for  more  cost 
efficiency  in  audiovisual  productions  (through  more  diverse  sources  of  financing, 
economies  of  scale  and  sharing  know-how)  and  access  to  additional  national  markets, 
thereby increasing addressable demand. 55% of MEDIA supported projects over the past 
10 years were co-productions vs. unsupported projects, and the difference has increased 
under  the  current  MEDIA  programme  (82%  of  all  supported  projects  are  co-
productions).197  Moreover  30%  of  developed  works  were  produced  and  released,  thus 
reducing  the  commercial  risks  in  investing  in  production  by  thorough  pre-production 
preparations which increase the potential for quality works. 

Regarding video games, more support would be granted to European developers and 
their  quality  IPs  who  have  been  behind  many  recent  commercial  and  critical 
successes.  The  EU  has  a  strong  mobile  gaming  ecosystem  that  could  be,  if  supported 
appropriately,  an  asset  for  the  EU  economy  as  the  mobile  gaming  sector  is  forecast  to 
grow198. The video games industry also needs support to be able to cooperate with other 
European creative industries in digital and non-digital value chains to strengthen local and 
national game developer communities199. 

Moreover, the preferred option is expected to increase competitiveness, by extending 
current blended equity instruments to other copyright-intensive sectors which face 
funding gaps. Further funding of the loan guarantee facility launched in 2016 and of the 

109 

 
equity investment instrument launched in 2022 (MediaInvest, targeting €400 millions in 
private investment) is also crucial. This will continue attracting capital in the video games 
and other creative sectors, where EU market operators have not yet demonstrated mature 
investment  dynamic.200  MediaInvest  provides  risk  capital,  encouraging  the  creation  of 
dedicated equity funds and enlarging the available sources of financing for audiovisual and 
gaming  companies.  In  2023,  the  value  of  private  equity  deals  in  the  audiovisual  sector 
(including movies, video games and entertainment) was close to its lowest annual level 
since at least 2019201, leaving the gap in equity financing of €399 to €649 million per year 
identified in the Media and Audiovisual Action Plan partially unaddressed.  

Finally,  the  preferred  option  will  scale  up  support  to  news  media,  promoting  new 
business  models  and  economies  of  scale,  thereby  improving  the  viability  of  news 
media outlets. In the field of news media, the limited EU-level funding (under existing 
Creative Europe MEDIA and Multimedia Actions line) has enhanced cost efficiency and 
supporting  sustainable  business  models,  especially  through  cross-border  collaborations 
and multilingual content production202. This indicates a direct contribution to production 
efficiency,  partly  due  to  innovative  business  models  (e.g.,  podcasting)  and  centralised 
coordination.  

International competitiveness  

The preferred option will further improve international competitiveness, through better IP 
exploitation and an increased focus on discoverability of works, including online.  There 
will  be  a  strengthened  emphasis  on  supporting  business  models  leading  to  a  broader 
exploitation of IP, also across different content formats. The preferred option would also 
continue supporting the non-national demand for European films, building on the success 
of MEDIA so far.    

a) Cross media IP exploitation  

Exploiting the same IP across different content formats (films, series, books, games, music) 
can  have  a  positive  impact  on  competitiveness.  It  can  reduce  costs  (development, 
distribution and marketing) and increase access to consumers e.g. gamers may watch a film 
adaptation of a game and vice versa. Young people especially seem to be loyal to IP203. 
Transmedia exploitation helps with discoverability and increases commercial success for 
both  the  original  and  adapted  version.  For  example,  the  box  office  revenues  of  a  film 
adapting pre-existing  content (books) is  around  50% higher than  films with  an original 
screenplay,  while  TV  dramas  adapted  from  books  attract  58%  more  viewers.204  Music 
tracks, similarly, can generate substantial revenues from their inclusion in video games, 
films or TV series.  

However European industry needs support in this regard.  More than two-thirds of the top 
100 films and series in 2024 were based on pre-existing ideas and IP205. However, none of 
the top 20 franchise commissions were from the EU.  Also, none of the titles reaching more 
than 10 million admissions in the EU were from the EU.  Therefore, there is a considerable 
gap in performance, with potential opportunities for growth.  Producers and distributors 
are mainly  micro and small  national  enterprises which often do not  have the resources, 
expertise or contacts to forge links with other creative sectors and explore collaborative 
projects  across  Europe.  Similarly,  writers,  editors,  game  developers  and  publishers  and 
music labels lack structured opportunities to collaborate at European level.  Therefore, the 
European IP industries need support to structure their collaboration. 

110 

 
This option would have added value in promoting the exploitation of IP across different 
formats  on  a  pan-European  basis.    MEDIA  already  has  a  relevant  track  record.    The 
broadcasting of Babylon Berlin, a TV series based on a book and co-financed by MEDIA 
for EUR 1 mio, was followed by the book series selling hundreds of thousands of copies 
in 22 languages.206 The release of the MEDIA-supported videogame The Witcher 3: Wild 
Hunt was followed by the book series selling over 15 million copies worldwide207.  Under 
this option MEDIA would build on this experience to support cross media IP through the 
value chain through a dedicated “IP hub”.   This would enhance support to development 
and production of IP with cross-media potential.  It would also create  professional fora 
which  would  bring  together  professionals  from  across  the  IP  industries  to  stimulate 
collaboration.  Distribution through relevant channels, notably online, would be funded. 

b) Boost circulation and consumption of European content  

The European audiovisual industry needs to reach wider audiences to increase its market 
share,  generate  revenues,  strengthen  its  independence  and  grow.  As  currently  only  an 
average of 25% of admissions for EU films come from abroad, there is great potential to 
increase  growth  across  the  EU  single  market.    Whilst  there  has  been  a  high  level  of 
production by Member States this has not been translated into higher European audiences 
and therefore more efforts are needed in particular to boost circulation and discoverability. 

Therefore, MEDIA funding will be particularly relevant since it is focused on the cross-
border  dimension.    MEDIA  support  between  2014-2020  is  correlated  with  increased 
circulation of films and series with over 9 more EU countries across TV, 6 more countries 
on TV and 3 more countries on online streamers.  MEDIA is also correlated with an over 
240  million  more  non-national  admissions  in  EU27  cinemas.    Also,  80%  of  works 
supported are co-productions, which several studies have confirmed are more successful 
internationally. 

Under this option there will be more focus on content creation, promotion and marketing 
for works online as this sub-segment is driving growth and attracting younger audiences.  
Activities  to  support  distribution  of  works  online  will  be  increased  including  through 
European VOD services.  Innovative hybrid business models between cinema theatres and 
streamers will be pursued, drawing on findings which show that theatrical releases increase 
chances  of  success  online208.    Innovative  online  marketing  tools209  will  be  further 
encouraged, as well as the use of Artificial Intelligence for data analytics on audiences to 
assist  in  content  creation  and  distribution210  and  boost  the  performance  of  promotion 
campaigns.    

Beyond  the  EU,  films  represented  only  1%  of  screenings  in  cinemas211.    However,  the 
highest share of EU content was reached in Mexico and Argentina, largely driven by the 
popularity and success of Spanish films in these markets: the share of Spanish titles within 
EU showings there has been more than 30%212.  Online, only a few EU works are in the 
top 10 worldwide in a market dominated by three giant US streamers. 

Thus, MEDIA will also be relevant in increasing the focus on supporting circulation and 
consumption  of  European  works  in  key  international  markets  beyond  the  EU,  both 
theatrically and online. 

AlsoAlso, the preferred option will provide enhanced opportunities to increase the 
international appeal and exposure of the European gaming sector. MEDIA funding 
for  game  development  significantly  increased  the  chances  of  videogames  being 

111 

 
finalised  and  released  (on  average,  89%  of  development  projects  supported  became 
prototypes). The central role of non-European global digital platforms for the distribution 
of  European  games  creates  the  need  for  enhanced  EU  funding  support  to  improve  the 
exploitation  of  these  games213.  These  include  marketing,  promotion  and  post-release 
operations.  

Capacity to Innovate 

The audiovisual  and other content media sectors are among  the most disrupted when it 
comes  to  digital  technology  and  AI.  For  example,  Generative  Artificial  Intelligence  in 
audiovisual  (including music) outputs  are projected to  grow significantly, with  a recent 
study forecasting a market size of EUR 48 bn by 2028 for AI-driven virtual production, 
with a compound annual growth rate of 85% between 2023 and 202837.  Media markets in 
the EU are increasingly influenced by global tech companies who have made major forays 
into all copyright intensive, mass-market content sectors (audiovisual, games, news, music, 
books).  Other  major  global  players  include  online  players  e.g.  Netflix  and  Hollywood 
studios  who  cooperate  on  technology  through  a  structure  called  ‘MovieLabs’.   Netflix 
allocated approximately 7% of its annual revenue (EUR 2.4 bn) to R&I, while Walt Disney 
has more than 6,000 patents, outpacing EU players overall.  

European media companies need support to  take  up tech innovation  as they lag behind 
other sectors. The 2024 EU R&D Investment Scoreboard shows that among the top 2,000 
companies analysed, only 23 are media companies, including Denmark's TV2 and France's 
Vivendi. Venture capital investment into media technology is much lower than in the US. 
In  2023,  US  tech  companies  in  the  audiovisual  sector  attracted  EUR  3.6  bn  while  EU 
counterparts  only  EUR  520  million  in  venture  capital  investment38.  Based  on  a  recent 
survey of companies in the creative and cultural sectors, only 30% have adopted a digital 
transformation strategy and companies have indicated that investment in AI represents less 
than  1%  of  their  total  investments.39  Therefore  European  media  companies,  which  are 
mainly  small  enterprises,  are  widely  dependent  on  non-EU  tech  tools,  for  example  as 
regards AI. They need funding to develop and/or use innovative tools and business models 
which  are  operational  and  adapted  to  their  activities  on  content  production  and 
distribution.   Also  the  mid-term  evaluation  of  the  current  Creative  Europe  programme 
confirmed these needs are more pronounced for a number of specific copyright-intensive, 
mass-market content industries40.   

The  preferred  option  will  increase  the  capacity  to  innovate  by  focusing  on  larger-scale 
collaborations in innovation with a stronger focus on cross-sectoral deployability for the 
creation, discoverability, marketing and monetisation of EU-produced content across all 
media  segments.  Collaborative  projects  at  European  level  can  be  effective  in  sharing 
knowledge and gaining economies of scale.  Funding will thus aim to bridge current gaps 
by supporting larger-scale collaborations and more directly aligning funded projects with 
industry  needs  for  scalable  content  creation,  discoverability,  and  monetisation 
solutions.   MEDIA  support  will  build  on  its  record  of  supporting  innovation,  notably 
through  the  Innovative  Tools  and  Business  Models  action  launched  in  2021  which  is 
starting  to  deliver  results,  notably  in  analytics  and  AI  tools  to  support  production, 
marketing and subscription models41.  This option would also exploit synergies with other 
programmes such as the European Innovation Council funding of start-ups and scale ups, 
which  could  scale  up  project  seed  funding  of  MEDIA.  Also  it  would  complement  the 
fundamental research and innovation projects of Horizon and Digital Europe, for example 

112 

 
the media data spaces project which has the potential to provide a pool of data relevant for 
media applications.    

SME competitiveness 

Over 99% of companies in the creative and cultural sectors are SMEs. EU funding for the 
IP-intensive industries is overwhelmingly targeted at SMEs, notably in the independent 
production,  distribution  and  theatrical  exhibition  as  well  as  the  independent  gaming 
development  sector.    Therefore,  the  above  findings  on  competitiveness  apply  to  SME 
competitiveness as well. For a detailed analysis of the impact on SMEs, consult Annex 6. 

Conclusion 

All  in  all,  the  preferred  option  (Option  2)  is  deemed  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  the 
competitiveness of the audiovisual and media industries. The proposed architecture will 
enhance effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality of the EU intervention,214 
which in turn, would strengthen the existing contribution to competitiveness. The current 
interventions,  which  were  proven  to  be  successful,  will  be  enhanced,  this  concerns 
promotion  of  cross-border  circulation  of  films  and  series,  international  co-productions, 
with a stronger focus on other types of media content, but also optimising IP exploitation 
across  different  formats  and  strengthening  and  expanding  the  existing  blended  equity 
instrument.  The  intervention  will  be  enhanced  through  improved  cooperation  and 
coordination of main policy areas; improved efficiency for applicants and beneficiaries, by 
streamlining  EU  management,  governance  and 
implementation;  synergies  and 
complementarities, and reduced overlaps; improved reactiveness to new challenges. 

Contribution of the other cultural and creative sectors to competitiveness 

Dimensions of Competitiveness 

Impact of the 
initiative 

(++ / + / 0 / - / -- / 
n.a.) 

References to sub-sections of the main 
report or annexes 

Cost and price competitiveness 

n.a.215 

International competitiveness  

Capacity to innovate 

+ 

+ 

SME competitiveness 

n.a.216 

Annex on evaluation 

Annex on evaluation 

Challenges and contextualisation 

The cultural and creative sectors other than the media and audio-visual sectors encompass 
a wide range of sectors from heritage to music, from books & publishing to visual arts, 
performing  arts  and  architecture.  Some  of  these  sectors  are  partly  industry-based  while 
others are much more dependent on public support. These sectors are mostly made off a 
myriad  of  small  and  medium-sized  entities  of  all  types  (organisations,  associations, 
institutions, SMEs, self-employed workers etc.). The development and competitiveness of 
these sectors is impacted by different global trends. Digitalisation has already changed the 

113 

 
 
 
 
value  chains  in  some  CCS  subsectors  (for  example  in  the  music  industry).  Digital 
technologies are more than a ‘contextual factor’; they are often an ‘enabling factor’, or 
even a radical step in the context of the new industrial revolution, changing the way culture 
and  CCS  products  and  services  are  produced  and  accessed,  and  how  knowledge  is 
transferred. Other  trends  that  have  an  impact  on,  or  offer  new  possibilities  to, 
entrepreneurship  and  innovation  in  the  CCS  include  the  sharing  economy,  new 
technologies (virtual reality, real-time data, smart home technology, AI etc.), changes in 
working life, and climate change. 217 Finally, Europe’s market fragmentation by language 
and country has sometimes impeded the emergence of globally dominant players in these 
fields.  Additionally,  digital  giants  from  the  US  control  much  of  the  distribution  (e.g. 
streaming  platforms,  app  stores),  posing  challenges  for  European  content  creators  to 
capture value. 

The preferred option would impact on the CCS international competitiveness and capacity 
to innovate through providing CCS organisations and professionals with capacity-building 
and networking opportunities on how to market works and reach new audiences including 
at  international  level,  to  develop  greener  cultural  activities  or  to  to  developing  funding 
applications,  testing  new  business  models  in  a  rapidly  evolving  digital  context  and 
developing managerial capacity. 

Contribution of education, training, youth, sport and skills to competitiveness 

The preferred Option – objectives-based merger – is expected to have a positive overall 
impact  on  EU  competitiveness  across  all  pillars  (cost  and  price  competitiveness, 
innovation capacity, international competitiveness and SME competitiveness).  

Table below summarises the key competitiveness impacts and indicators, with comparative 
benchmarks where relevant. 

Overview of impacts on competitiveness  

Dimensions of Competitiveness 

Impact of the 
initiative 

(++ / + / 0 / - / -- / n.a.) 

References to sub-sections of the main 
report or annexes 

Cost and price competitiveness 

International competitiveness  

Capacity to innovate 

SME competitiveness 

Synthetic assessment   

+ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

Assessment below under ‘Cost and Price 
Competitiveness’ 

Assessment below under ‘International 
Competitiveness’ 

Assessment below under ‘capacity to 
innovate’ 

 Assessment below under ‘SME 
competitiveness’ 

114 

 
Investment  in  education  and  skills  are  very  important.  A  JRC  paper  analysed  the 
impact of EU investment in skills (ESF, YEI, and React-EU) and found one of the highest 
multipliers by 2030: investing 1 euro would yield 1.603 euro218 
Simulations219 assuming a gradual improvement over 15 years show that increasing basic 
skills by 25 PISA points could lead to a 0.5 pp higher average annual growth rate in EU 
GDP in the long term. At national and European level, it has been estimated that if Europe 
achieved its current literacy benchmark, this could lead to an aggregate GDP gain of 21 
EUR trillion over the lifetime of the generation born in 2010220.  
Evidence  also  shows  that  low-income  countries  with  higher  shares  of  graduates  with 
tertiary education experienced stronger catching-up towards the average GDP per capita 
between 2008 and 2021.  

VET  graduates  generally  have  good  employment  prospects.  In  2023,  81.0%  of  young 
medium-level graduates who had completed their VET programme were in employment, 
putting the 2025 EU-level target of at least 82% within reach221. 

An analysis of the OECD (2013) shows that countries with high rates of participation in 
adult learning are more competitive. PIAAC data illustrate the central role that basic skills 
play in shaping economic outcomes. In the EU17, an increase of skills by around 40 points 
(slightly  less  than  one  skills  level)  is  linked  with  an  increase  in  wages  ranging  from 
approximately  5%  in  Denmark,  Finland  and  Italy  to  more  than  10%  in  the  UK.  In  the 
upskilling scenario (7.4% ) of the low-skilled, total net benefits over ten years could equal 
2 013 billion EUR278 and 3,528 billion EUR in  a zero low-skilled (0%) scenario with 
increases in annual GDP (2025-50) at 200 billion EUR and 410 billion EUR respectively 
die to the reduction or elimination of low skilled adults222. 

Education and skills reforms are important. Efficient spending ensures that resources are 
channelled to areas where they have sufficient impact and are spent effectively, enhancing 
value for money. Research suggests that reducing inefficiencies in spending on education 
could lead to substantial gains in the EU, with the potential to increase annual growth of 
GDP per capita by 0.8 pp in the long term223.  

Cost and price competitiveness 

The  preferred  option  contributes  to  cost  and  price  competitiveness  largely  through 
efficiency gains and improved productivity in the education, training and CCSIs.  
Cost  competitiveness:  Since  education  is  largely  publicly  provided  in  Europe,  cost 
competitiveness  is  less  about  firm  operating  costs  and  more  about  system  efficiency. 
Europe’s systems tend to be cost-effective relative to outcomes (e.g. EU countries spend 
roughly 30% less per tertiary student than the US, yet produce comparable skill levels in 
many fields). One advantage the EU has internationally is affordability of education – 
low  or  no  tuition  in  many  countries  –  which  can  be  seen  as  a  competitive  strength  in 
attracting foreign students (where cost is a factor, in contrast to high tuition in  the US). 
The  preferred  option’s  continued  support  for  student  mobility  (often  with  scholarships) 
and  potential  new  talent  attraction  schemes  (like  expanding  Erasmus  Mundus)  will 
reinforce this cost advantage by reducing financial barriers for incoming talent. On the flip 
side, the sector’s cost competitiveness can be hindered by demographic changes (declining 
student populations in some countries could raise per-student costs) and by administrative 
overhead. The merger helps by streamlining funding – meaning universities and schools 
face less administrative cost when tapping EU funds for innovation or exchange projects, 
improving their operational efficiency.  

115 

 
 
 
 
 
Streamlined administration and economies of scale: the double merger is projected to 
reduce overhead and compliance costs for both participating organisations and managing 
authorities. By sharing resources, IT systems and support structures, the more integrated 
implementation  will  contribute  to  eliminate,  over  the  long  run,  certain  duplicative 
processes  for  beneficiaries  and  achieving  economies  of  scale.  For  example,  better 
coordination, common application portals and harmonised reporting and support will lower 
the  cost  of  accessing  funds  for  schools,  universities,  cultural  SMEs,  entreprises  active 
under the EU education, training, youth and sport programmes, small-scale organisations 
active in  training,  and civil society and will  also reduce access  costs for applicants  and 
project holders. In addition, the Commission and National Agencies can expect potentially 
lower management and transaction costs (e.g. fewer committees, unified monitoring and 
evaluation),  translating  into  savings  that  can  be  reallocated  to  core  activities,  cutting 
administrative costs in the long run, improving the cost-efficiency of EU funding delivery.  
Lower costs for participants and SMEs: A unified programme simplifies the funding 
landscape for small organisations, including SMEs224. Currently, an estimated one-third of 
Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps beneficiaries are the same entities.  Under the 
preferred  option,  they  would  face  a  single  process  and  interface  rather  than  navigating 
multiple programmes. This will reduce application overhead, especially benefitting SMEs 
and micro-organisations that often have limited administrative capacity. Also, exploiting 
strong synergies between the two sets of merged instruments, will avoid duplicated effort 
(for instance, one joint call can cover both educational, citizenship and cultural objectives), 
the 
improves  small  organisations’  cost 
initiative 
competitiveness. 

lowers  compliance  costs  and 

Sector-specific  cost  considerations:  In  education  and  training,  better  recognition  of 
learning  (including  non-formal  learning)  and  skills  portability  facilitated  under  the 
preferred option across the spectrum of learning activities can reduce the cost of re-training 
or remedial  education. Workers  will carry portable, certified  EU  skills  (including  those 
gained via volunteering or informal learning) which employers trust, reducing duplication 
of training efforts.  

Enhanced labour productivity through skills: in the medium to long term, the preferred 
option will indirectly reduce unit labour costs by improving the skill level and productivity 
of  the  European  workforce.  Continuous  upskilling  and  reskilling,  emphasised  by  the 
Draghi report as key to competitiveness, will be supported through a more flexible, lifelong 
learning-oriented  Erasmus+  that  works  in  tandem  with  the  Competitiveness  (skills) 
agenda. A better-skilled workforce means higher employability and output, helping firms 
produce  more  value  with  the  same  or  lower  cost.  For  example,  digital  and  STEM  skill 
investments can support the mitigation of skill shortages that currently force firms to pay 
a premium for digital talent. As of 2023 only 56% of EU adults have at least basic digital 
skills  and  companies  lacking  skilled  ICT  specialists  incur  higher  costs  and  lost 
opportunities. The preferred option’s integrated funding for digital education and training 
addresses  this  gap,  eventually  lowering  hiring  and  training  costs  for  employers  in  all 
sectors. In sum, by raising productivity and reducing skill mismatches, the initiative 
strengthens cost competitiveness across the economy. 

More generally, by making the use of EU funds more efficient (yielding more output per 
euro spent) and by enabling small organisations and institutions in the targeted sectors to 
operate  more  cost-effectively,  saving  would  be  generated.  These  savings  may  not 
dramatically  alter  unit  labour  costs  economy-wide  in  the  short  term,  but  they  provide 
important support for SMEs and educational  or training institutions, strengthening their 

116 

 
 
 
 
financial  sustainability.  The  magnitude  of  cost  competitiveness  gains  is  moderate  but 
meaningful: for example, administrative cost reductions in the high double-digit millions 
of euros annually are plausible, and participating organisations could see cost overheads 
drop  in  certain  funding  actions.  These  gains,  which  would  need  to  be  monitored 
consistently, are likely to be permanent, accruing each year, as the streamlined structures 
are expected to remain in place through the MFF programming period and likely beyond.  

International competitiveness  

International  competitiveness  refers  to  the  ability  of  EU  sectors  to  compete  globally  – 
attracting  talent  and  investment,  and  achieving  success  in  international  markets.  The 
preferred option has a strong international dimension, which is vital for Europe’s education 
to thrive on the world stage. 

Europe’s education sector competes globally primarily in higher education and research. 
By  metrics  like  international  student  enrolments  and  universities  in  top-100  rankings, 
Europe is competitive but behind the very top. For example, the UK (previously part of 
EU) and some EU countries like Germany and France attract many international students, 
but the US still hosted the largest number (1.1 million) until recently and countries like 
Australia and Canada have rapidly increased their share by aggressive recruitment policies. 
The EU’s collective 1.66 million foreign students in 2022 shows strong performance, and 
with the preferred option we anticipate this could grow (due to more integrated promotion 
and  possibly  new  joint  offerings).  Retaining  talent  is  a  noted  weakness  –  many 
international  graduates  from  EU  universities  currently  depart  (either  home  or  to  third 
countries)  after  studies.  The  preferred  option  will  put  emphasis  on  talent  retention  (for 
instance, through follow-up opportunities in the Solidarity Corps or easier transitions to 
work)  can  improve  Europe’s  “yield”  from  its  education  attractiveness.  When  European 
education  retains  global  talent,  it  directly  boosts  the  skilled  workforce  available  to  EU 
industries  and  research.  Inter-sectorally,  the  education  sector’s  internationalisation  is 
behind sectors like tourism or tech in pure economic terms, but it has strong value in soft 
power and long-term influence. Every international alumnus of an EU programme can 
become an ambassador for Europe or even an entrepreneur in Europe. 

Europe as a talent magnet: a core goal  of the  merged programmes is  to  increase the 
international attractiveness of Europe’s education and training systems. By uniting 
Erasmus+ (known worldwide for mobility) with solidarity corps and enhancing synergies 
with  other  instruments,  and  by  potentially  branding  the  initiative  around  global 
competitiveness, the preferred option can elevate Europe’s profile as a destination for all 
learners, also attracting present and future researchers. The EU already hosts about one-
third  of  globally  mobile  tertiary  students  (with  Germany  and  France  in  the  top  host 
countries),  roughly  on  par  with  the  US  share.  In  2022,  403,500  international  students 
studied in Germany and 265,000 in France. This performance is strong, but competition is 
intensifying  from  Anglophone  and  Asian  education  hubs.  Through  expanded  Erasmus 
Mundus joint degrees, scholarship schemes, and more flexible mobility pathways, the new 
programme will allow the EU to grow its share of global talent. An integrated approach 
means students can more easily move between European universities (including through 
the  alliances),  making  a  pan-European  education  more  seamless.  Similarly,  the  new 
programme  will  also  seek  to  boost  the  internationalisation  of  VET  to  increase  its 
attractiveness  at  global  level,  including  capacity  building  in  VET  and  expansion  of 
mobility of vocational learners worldwide.  

117 

 
 
 
 
 
Additionally,  the  inclusion  of  cultural  and  solidarity  components  can  make  European 
education unique – offering not just academic excellence but also rich cultural experience 
and  civic  engagement,  which  can  be  a  selling  point  for  globally  minded  students.  The 
international competitiveness of EU higher education is expected to improve, contributing 
to the goal of retaining Europe’s status as a leading academic destination. This also feeds 
the  talent  needs  of  European  industry  and  research.  However,  a  noted  risk  is  varying 
national immigration rules for graduates; the programme can encourage Member States to 
align on policies that allow talented graduates to stay, complementing the attractiveness of 
the study experience itself. 

Global  skills  and  mobility  networks:  The  preferred  option  will  deepen  international 
partnerships, not only within the EU but also with third countries. Erasmus+ already has a 
global  outreach  component,  and  Creative  Europe  engages  with  international  cultural 
partners.  Although  the  programmes  will  not  merge,  enhanced  synergies  could  create 
coherent international cooperation frameworks, for example, linking an EU university 
alliance with universities in Africa or Asia under a common project, or supporting cultural 
exchanges that also have an educational dimension, leading to increase skills for the labour 
market. These efforts, including cultural diplomacy, strengthen the EU’s international ties 
and influence. They also prepare Europeans to succeed globally: participants gain language 
skills, intercultural competencies, and international experience, all of which improve the 
competitiveness  of  European  firms  and  institutions  abroad.  Survey  data  (impact  study) 
shows employers value international experience – e.g. in some countries, half of employers 
are willing to pay higher salaries to hires with study-abroad experience. By producing more 
globally  savvy  graduates  and  professionals,  the  programme  enhances  the  international 
competitiveness  of  Europe’s  workforce.  Intra-EU  mobility  also  indirectly  boosts 
competitiveness by optimising the allocation of skills across Member States (helping fill 
labour shortages and spreading knowledge). 

Benchmarking  and  competitive  position:  From  a  sectoral  competitive  position 
standpoint,  European  education  sectors  are  not  in  a  state  of  crisis  but  face  intense 
competitive  pressures.  European  higher  education  boasts  many  top  universities,  but  in 
global rankings it is somewhat eclipsed by the US (and increasingly Chinese universities) 
in  terms  of  research  output  and  funding.  The  Draghi  report  noted  that  formal  lifelong 
learning  and  skills  development  need  to  scale  up  for  Europe  to  maintain  a  competitive 
economy.  The  preferred  option  addresses  these  issues  by  fostering  integration  and 
critical mass: scaling up talent pipelines, aligning efforts across countries, and focusing 
resources on strategic areas (e.g. digital skills, green skills in culture) will improve each 
sector’s competitiveness relative to global peers. Quantitatively, Europe’s share of world 
R&D and innovation in education is expected to rise (academic R&D spending in the EU-
27 already reached €100 billion, topping the US in absolute terms), and the gap in cultural 
export  performance  between  the  EU  and  Asia/US  should  narrow  as  European  creative 
firms innovate and collaborate more effectively. 

In summary, the preferred option strengthens international competitiveness by enhancing 
Europe’s  ability  to  attract  talent,  by  improving  the  global  market  performance  of  its 
education, and by leveraging synergies to present a compelling international profile. The 
effects  are  expected  to  be  significant:  higher  inflows  of  international  students  and 
researchers  (potentially  boosting  EU  international  student  numbers  by  a  few  hundred 
thousand over the next decade), and greater global engagement by European youth  and 
professionals.  

118 

 
 
 
 
 
Capacity to Innovate   

Option  2  is  strongly  oriented  towards  boosting  the  EU’s  capacity  to  innovate  through 
investments  in  human  capital,  cross-border  cooperation  in  research  and  education,  and 
support for the creative and cultural ecosystems that drive innovation. 

Education,  skills  and  innovation  performance:  a  well-educated,  mobile  and  skilled 
population is the foundation of innovation. The preferred option’s emphasis on lifelong, 
lifewide  and  long-term  skills  development  and  a  “Union  of  Skills”  is  expected  to 
strengthen Europe’s innovation potential. By merging the Erasmus+ and solidarity corps 
programmes and exploiting internal and external synergies, the new framework encourages 
cross-sectoral knowledge exchange – for instance, universities, vocational institutes and 
companies  can  collaborate  in  projects  that  link  Erasmus+  mobility  with  innovation-
oriented  objectives  (such  as  joint  curricula  in  emerging  technologies  or  entrepreneurial 
training  in  the  creative  arts).  European  University  Alliances  (fostered  under  Erasmus+) 
will  benefit  from  a  more  coherent  funding  stream,  enabling  deeper  integration  of 
universities  across  borders  in  teaching  and  research.  These  alliances  aim  to  create 
“European  campuses”  pooling  expertise  and  resources,  which  can  become  globally 
competitive  hubs  of  innovation.  Over  the  long  term,  such  integrated  networks  should 
increase the quality and quantity of R&D outputs in the education sector. Already, the EU-
27’s academic R&D intensity (roughly 0.5% of GDP) has been on the rise, surpassing the 
US in relative terms (0.36% of GDP) and narrowing the gap with innovation leaders like 
South  Korea.  Strengthening  higher  education  collaboration  through  Option  2,  which 
encompasses strong synergies between sources of funding, can further raise R&D intensity 
and innovation outcomes in the education and training sphere. 

Research and development in targeted sectors: the merger of Erasmus and Solidarity 
Corps,  operating  under  a  more  effective  MFF  enabling  stronger  and  more  flexible 
synergies,  will  allow  leveraging  complementarities  between  educational  mobility 
programmes and future research funding to spur innovation. For example, joint funding 
could support more industry-academia partnerships in doctoral training or post-doctoral 
research applied to societal challenges.  Moreover, Erasmus+ projects focusing on digital 
and  STEM  skills  will  feed  more  qualified  graduates  into  R&D  roles.  Innovation  in 
educational methods themselves will also accelerate, as the future instruments  can fund 
digital education pilots, EdTech development, and innovative pedagogies at scale across 
the  EU.  This  addresses  the  historically  low  innovation  investment  in  the  education  and 
training sector; by treating educational outcomes as part of competitiveness, the initiative 
may encourage education systems to adopt new technologies and evidence-based practices 
more rapidly (helping modernise curricula, use AI tutors, etc.). The innovation capacity 
of Europe’s education and training sector will thus be improved, with spillover benefits 
as students bring advanced skills into the labour market.  

Talent  development  and  retention  for  innovation:  Europe’s  capacity  to  innovate 
depends on attracting and retaining top talent. Option 2 explicitly targets talent circulation 
and  retention  through  enhanced  mobility  and  exchange  schemes.  By  expanding 
opportunities  for  students,  researchers,  and  young  professionals  to  gain  international 
experience (within Europe and globally), the  future programme not only broadens their 
skills  but  also  encourages  knowledge  transfer  across  borders  –  a  known  catalyst  for 
innovation.  Importantly,  the  programme  can  help  retain  talent  in  Europe  by  creating 
more attractive conditions:  for instance, European University  Alliances  and excellence-

119 

 
 
 
 
 
driven projects can entice high-potential students from around the world to study and stay 
in  the  EU.  While  the  EU  already  hosts  a  large  number  of  international  students  (1.66 
million  in  2022  -  tbc),  many  historically  chose  the  US  or  other  countries  for  post-
graduation opportunities. By improving integration of foreign students (through language 
support,  work  placements,  and  post-study  mobility  via  the  Solidarity  Corps  or  other 
streams),  the  preferred  option  can  convert  a  higher  share  of  these  students  into  skilled 
workers  in  Europe’s  innovation  ecosystems.  Some  Member  States  are  adopting  more 
welcoming post-study visa policies, but a coordinated EU approach under this programme 
could further boost retention. In addition, Erasmus+ alumni themselves are a proven source 
of innovation and entrepreneurship: they have higher rates of developing start-up ideas and 
managerial roles. The mobility experience fosters an entrepreneurial mindset – in Eastern 
Europe, 38% of Erasmus alumni plan to start a company, significantly higher than non-
mobile  peers.  By  nurturing  entrepreneurship  and  leadership  skills,  the  merged 
programme will increase the pool  of innovators and business  founders in  Europe. Over 
time, this replenishes and expands Europe’s innovation capacity in both established and 
emerging industries. 

Non-formal  learning  and  social  innovation:  Option  2  will  also  support  non-formal 
learning  and  civic  engagement,  which  can  drive  social  innovation.  Volunteer  projects, 
youth exchanges, and community initiatives often produce innovative solutions to local 
problems  (e.g.  new  approaches  to  social  inclusion,  digital  literacy  training  for  seniors, 
creative community spaces). These kinds of innovations, while not  always commercial, 
enhance societal resilience and indirectly benefit economic competitiveness by fostering a 
more adaptive and cohesive society. Social innovations can be scaled up across the EU via 
the networks built in the programme, creating a culture of innovation at all levels – from 
classrooms to community centers.  

Overall, the preferred option significantly strengthens the EU’s capacity to innovate by 
investing in the human and creative capital that underpins innovation. The effects will 
materialise progressively: improved educational outcomes and research cooperation yield 
dividends  over  years  and  decades  in  the  form  of  higher  innovation  rates,  productivity 
growth, and new ventures. The risk that innovation benefits do not fully materialise (e.g. 
due to absorption capacity limits or coordination challenges) is mitigated by the clusters 
programmes’  design,  which  focuses  resources  on  known  drivers  of  innovation  (skills, 
collaboration, creativity), including through synergies. By reinforcing both the supply side 
of  innovation  (skilled  and  innovative  people)  and  the  demand  side  (creative  industries, 
digital transformation needs), Option 2’s competitiveness impact on innovation is expected 
to be high and enduring. 

Competitive  position  of  key  sectors  and  ecosystems:  the  education  and  training 
ecosystem (covering schools, vocational education and training (VET), higher education, 
and adult learning) is crucial for the EU’s competitiveness, as it produces the human capital 
for all other sectors. It stands for a significant economic sector itself – primarily public-
funded – employing millions of staff (teachers, trainers, researchers) and consuming about 
5% of EU GDP in public expenditure. While not a tradable sector in the traditional sense, 
its  outputs  (skilled  graduates,  research,  innovation)  directly  affect  productivity  and 
competitiveness  across  the  economy.  For  instance,  with  81%,  the  employment  rate  of 
recent medium-level VET graduates is very high, which underlines the relevance of VET 
for  the  labour  market  and  companies’  competitiveness.  In  terms  of  global  standing, 
European  education  systems  rank  among  the  world’s  best  on  many  indicators:  several 
Member States consistently score above OECD averages in school achievement, and the 

120 

 
 
 
 
EU-27 produces a large share of the world’s STEM graduates (e.g. over 2.0 million tertiary 
graduates per year, ~25% in STEM fields).  

The  EU’s  tertiary  educational  attainment  for  young  people  has  risen  to  41%  (2022), 
catching  up  to  levels  in  the  US  and  exceeding  those  in  most  emerging  economies. 
However, acute challenges remain: skill mismatches and shortages (particularly in digital, 
engineering, and ICT fields), brain drain from certain regions (talented graduates moving 
to  richer  Member  States  or  outside  EU),  and  varying  quality  of  education  and  training 
across  the  Union.  Evidence  shows  that  low-income  countries  with  higher  shares  of 
graduates  with  tertiary  education  experienced  stronger  catching-up  towards  the  average 
GDP per capita between 2008 and 2021.  

Productivity and innovation: The education sector’s productivity is hard to measure in 
economic terms, but one indicator is the student performance per expenditure. Many EU 
countries  manage  to  achieve  high  learning  outcomes  at  moderate  cost  (e.g.  Poland  and 
Finland  have  strong  PISA  results  with  average  spending),  indicating  good  efficiency. 
Nonetheless, there is room to innovate and adopt new methods to improve learning gains 
without proportional cost increases – a process which has been slower in education than in 
other sectors. R&D and innovation within the education and training sector (such as 
developing  new  pedagogical  technologies  or  evidence-based  teaching  methods)  have 
historically  been  limited.  Academic  R&D  spending  in  the  EU  is  mostly  directed  to 
scientific  fields  rather  than  education  science  itself,  and  the  sector  has  lacked  a  strong 
culture  of  R&D  in  schooling.  EU  funding  and  in  particular  a  adequately  funded  EU 
intervention like the preferred option can help change this by funding pilots and scaling up 
successful  innovations  in  education  and  training.  In  higher  education,  European 
universities are a backbone of R&D (contributing ~21% of total EU R&D expenditure) 
and perform well on research output, but they face increasing competition for talent and 
research leadership from the US and China. The competitiveness gap in higher education 
often comes down to funding and integration: the US spends more per student and attracts 
more  top  researchers,  while  Europe’s  efforts  are  split  across  countries.  The  European 
University alliances and greater mobility for researchers (supported by this initiative) aim 
to  give  the  EU  a  more  unified  higher  education  R&D  area,  boosting  critical  mass  and 
efficiency. An inter-sectoral comparison is relevant in this: the education sector’s cost 
structure  is  dominated  by  labour  (teachers,  professors).  Wage  levels  in  Europe  are 
moderate  and  generally  aligned  with  productivity,  but  global  competition  for  star 
professors  and  researchers  means  European  universities  sometimes  struggle  to  offer 
competitive  salaries  compared  to  top  US  institutions.  By  enabling  transactional 
collaborative networks between institutions and resource pooling, the preferred option can 
alleviate some cost pressure (for example, synergies across EU funding for shared digital 
infrastructure  for  e-learning  across  universities  reduces  the  need  for  each  to  invest 
separately). 

Innovation capacity: The education and skills ecosystem is both a recipient of innovation 
(using new tech in classrooms) and a generator of innovation (through research and the 
creation  of  innovators).  Currently,  the  EU’s  capacity  for  educational  innovation  is 
improving  –  accelerated  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic  which  forced  adoption  of  digital 
learning.  Under  the  preferred  option,  with  dedicated  funding  for  digital  education  and 
STEM,  broader  uptake  of  innovative  teaching  tools  may  be  expected  (such  as  online 
platforms,  virtual  labs,  AI-driven  personalised  learning).  European  initiatives  like  the 
Digital Education Action Plan align with this and will find support through the merged 
programme’s objectives. A more innovative education sector means  students graduate 

121 

 
 
 
 
with better skills (critical thinking, adaptability) that feed into the economy’s overall 
innovative capacity. Additionally, synergies between education and industry will be 
strengthened  –  e.g.  VET  programs  cooperating  with  SMEs  to  update  curricula  for  new 
technologies,  or  students  working  on  real-world  innovation  projects  (hackathons,  etc.). 
Such linkages ensure the skills developed are at the cutting edge of industry needs, 
thereby improving the innovative output when these students join the workforce225.  

A  key  strength  of  Europe’s  education  ecosystem  is  its  diversity  and  quality  –  multiple 
centers of excellence and a strong foundation of public education.  The preferred option 
builds  on  this  by  fostering  cooperation  rather  than  competition  among  European 
institutions,  turning  diversity  into  complementarity.  Another  strength  is  the  ingrained 
culture of mobility and multilingualism in Europe, which the programme leverages – intra-
European mobility is far higher than mobility within other world regions. This gives EU 
students  a  comparative  advantage  in  adaptability.  A  risk,  however,  is  that  reforms  and 
innovation  in  education  can  be  slow  due  to  governance  and  consensus  needs;  if  the 
programme’s incentives and support are not sufficient to overcome inertia in curricula or 
qualifications  recognition,  some  competitiveness  benefits  might  take  time  to  emerge. 
There  is  also  the  risk  of  unequal  uptake:  top  universities  might  benefit  more  from  EU 
networks  than  smaller  or  less  experienced  institutions,  potentially  widening  gaps.  To 
mitigate this, the preferred option includes an inclusive approach (widening participation, 
supporting  capacity  building  for  less  experienced  organisations),  ensuring  broad-based 
improvement. The magnitude of competitiveness effects in education is substantial in the 
long run – improved skills can raise GDP growth, with studies showing that even a small 
increase in average skills has large economic returns over decades. These effects are also 
permanent – once a population is more skilled, it tends to remain so, and institutions built 
up (like strong university networks) continue to generate benefits.  

SME competitiveness 

The  preferred  option  links  skills  development  directly  more  closely  with  market  needs 
(including SMEs’ needs). SMEs can more easily partner with educational actors to define 
curricula or offer apprenticeships (Erasmus+ and other funding will be more flexible to 
support such collaborations). This SME competitiveness aspect is crucial: SMEs form the 
vast majority of businesses and often lack in-house training capacity. By tapping into EU-
supported talent  pipelines and innovation  projects, SMEs, including  those in  traditional 
sectors, can become more innovative and competitive. For example, a small manufacturing 
firm could host an Erasmus+ VET apprentice who brings the latest digital techniques from 
their training, boosting the firm’s productivity. The SME check (Annex 6) further ensures 
that impacts on SMEs will be scrutinised and optimised in the detailed design of the Option 
2. 

Cross-sectoral synergies and other competitiveness dimensions 

One of the distinctive benefits of the preferred option is the promotion of cross-sectoral 
synergies withing the future two instruments that themselves can enhance competitiveness. 
By  merging  programmes  following  an  objectives-based  merger,  the  initiative  creates 
interfaces  between  EU  values,  fundamental  rights,  media  and  culture  on  one  side  and 
education, skills, and civic engagement on the other that did not exist formally before. 

Social  inclusion  and  competitiveness:  While  social  policy  and  competitiveness  were 
once  seen  as  separate,  it’s  increasingly  recognised  that  inclusive  growth  supports 

122 

 
 
 
 
 
competitiveness  by  mobilising  all  of  society’s  talent  and  maintaining  social  stability. 
Option  2’s  strong  inclusion  dimension  (e.g.  specific  measures  to  involve  people  from 
diverse backgrounds, vulnerable groups, and a “leave no one behind” ethos) means that 
the  competitiveness  gains  are  broadly  shared.  This  helps  regions  with  weaker  starting 
positions  (such  as  rural  areas  or  poorer  Member  States)  to  catch  up  through  capacity 
building  in  education  and  culture  –  reducing  internal  EU  disparities.  A  more  balanced 
development across the EU can in this context prevent brain drain within the EU (talent 
leaving less developed regions), thereby optimising the use of talent domestically.  
In  a  way,  the  preferred  option  contributes  to  cohesion  competitiveness:  every  region 
building  on  its  strengths  (be  it  a  cultural  heritage  sector  or  a  technical  university)  to 
compete in its niche, adding to the EU’s mosaic of competitiveness. Moreover, enhanced 
social cohesion has economic benefits – as noted in the analysis, it leads to more stable 
environments and can increase productivity and innovation. 

Equality,  non-discrimination,  regulatory  and  values  environment:  Investing  in 
promoting rights, equality, non-discrimination, and EU values strengthens the foundation 
of a just and prosperous society, also ensuring that the benefits of growth and development 
are shared by all226. The EU’s efforts to hone its competitive edge need to be guided by 
EU values, which contribute to our region’s prosperity. Integrating equality, diversity and 
inclusion  considerations  also  helps  foster  a  more  innovative  and  competitive  economy, 
promotes social cohesion, and strengthens democracy. Competitiveness is also affected by 
the regulatory and values environment. The preferred option will boost support to rule of 
law, good governance, and active citizenship. Over time, this reinforces a business-friendly 
environment (fair courts, engaged civil society, low corruption) which is a comparative 
advantage  of  the  EU  in  attracting  investment.  Companies,  especially  innovative  ones, 
thrive in open societies with freedom of expression and robust legal protections (for IP, for 
example). By investing in these “intangibles”, the future programmes indirectly safeguard 
Europe’s competitiveness model – one built on high standards, creativity, and trust. 

Finally, it is worth noting long-term performance implications from this cluster, as the 
preferred option is future-oriented. The skills and networks fostered beyond 2030 could 
set the trajectory for Europe’s competitiveness in 2050. For example, today’s support for 
digital  and  STEM  education  might  be  the  seed  for  Europe’s  leadership  in  quantum 
computing  or  green  tech  in  two  decades.  Likewise,  today’s  cultural  collaborations  may 
ensure that European values and content maintain global influence in an era of significant 
geopolitical competition.  

Conclusion 

The  objectives-based  merger  (preferred  Option  2)  is  expected  to  deliver  a  net  positive 
competitiveness outcome by continuing the financing in these areas and by streamlining 
the way of delivering the funding. By examining education and training, it may be shown 
that strengths are reinforced and weaknesses addressed under this option: skills gaps are 
narrowed, talent flows are improved, innovation ecosystems are nurtured and energised in 
the  policy  fields,  and  cross-border  collaborations  are  significantly  intensified.  These 
effects contribute to a more competitive European economy that can sustainably grow and 
generate high-value jobs, while also preserving the rich cultural fabric that distinguishes 
Europe  globally.  The  risk  versus  reward  balance  is  also  favourable  –  potential  risks 
(administrative complexity, transition costs, need for coordination) are manageable, unlike 
Option 3, and transient, whereas the competitiveness benefits are multi-dimensional and 

123 

 
 
 
 
enduring.  The  reinforced  competitiveness  proofing  thus  supports  Option  2  as  a  strong 
contributor to the EU’s long-term competitive sustainability. 

124 

 
 
Annex 6: SME check 

OVERVIEW OF IMPACTS ON SMES 

Relevance for SMEs  
Audiovisual and Media: 
Based  on  SME  filter  and  the  ISG  discussion,  this  initiative  is  deemed  relevant  for 
SMEs227. SMEs are not a monolithic group but are deeply entangled across the policy 
domains under scope. Their effective participation depends on whether EU instruments 
are  modular,  transparent,  and  accessible,  and  whether  they  offer  incentives  and  entry 
points adapted to SME realities. 
The  EU’s  cultural  and  creative  industries  (CCIs)  ecosystem  encompasses  around  1.2 
million  enterprises  (99.9%),  and  around  8  million  employees.228  According  to  2023 
European  Media  Industry  Outlook,  the  picture  is  the  same  in  sub-sectors  such  as 
audiovisual,  news  media  and  video  games,  within  SMEs  account  for  99.8%  of  all 
companies active in these sub-sectors. 
In  the  current  MEDIA  Sub-programme,  99%  of  the  direct  beneficiaries  were  SMEs 
(reflecting the 99% of SMEs amongst European AV enterprises), of which 25% were 
small and nearly 70% micro. Micro and Small organisations account for 50% and 40% 
of total value of grants respectively under Creative Europe 1.229 

Education and skills: 
In education and skills, SMEs benefit indirectly through the improved employability of 
learners  trained  via  Erasmus+  mobility  and  vocational  education.  They  also  directly 
participate as trainers (for the majority of VET learners)230, as project partners in staff 
exchanges,  adult  learning,  and  upskilling  schemes—particularly  in  digital,  green,  or 
sector-specific training. These SMEs value EU actions that help address skills shortages, 
and the OPC shows strong SME support for actions like a European VET diploma and 
adult education mobility. 
Although less prominent in youth, solidarity, and civil society, SMEs intersect with these 
areas via social enterprises, hosting arrangements for trainees or volunteers, and civic 
education  services.  Some  SMEs  (especially  in  Vocational  Education  and  Training  or 
adult  learning  sectors,  or  on  specific  topics  such  as  digital  education)  participate  as 
project  partners  or  providers  in  transnational  consortia.  Among  more  than  380,000 
participating organisations in Erasmus+ between 2021 and 2024, 8600 were SMEs. 

IDENTIFICATION OF AFFECTED BUSINESSES AND ASSESSMENT OF RELEVANCE 

(1) 
Are SMEs directly affected? (Yes/No) In which sectors? 
Audiovisual and Media: 
SMEs in (news) media and IP-intensive mass-market reach content sectors, especially 
independent  production,  distribution  SMEs,  can  benefit.  The  EU’s  current  funding 
programmes and support initiatives mainly revolve around MEDIA and cross-sectorial 
strands of the Creative Europe programme and Multimedia line. The main areas of focus 
of these funding programmes include:  

•  Audiovisual  industry:  film  production,  distribution  and  exhibition;  television 
(public and private broadcasting, digital TV); animation and immersive content 
(e.g., VR, AR);  

125 

 
 
 
•  Media sector: print and digital journalism news media (including cross-border 

journalism); media pluralism and freedom of expression;  

•  Video Games and interactive content: video games development; interactive 

storytelling and transmedia; 

•  Other copyright-intensive sectors, such as music and publishing, working with 

audiovisual companies, 

In  the  Eurostat  NACE  classification,  the  sectors  that  are  directly  affected  by  the 
intervention are:231 

•  Audiovisual and multimedia (i.e., motion picture, video and television 

programme production, sound recording and music publishing activities; radio 
and TV broadcasting; publishing of computer/video games) 

•  Programming, broadcasting, news agency and other content distribution 
activities (i.e., news agency activities, pre-press and pre-media services) 

•  Publishing Activities (i.e., book publishing, printing, translation and 

interpretation activities) 

•  Visual and performing Arts (i.e., artistic creation; specialised design activities, 

operation of arts facilities; performing arts and its support activities) 

•  Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities 

The Eurostat NACE classification has been updated with new rev 2.1 version that will 
capture  more  accurately  all  the  relevant  sectors,  in  view  of  recent  market  and 
technological  developments,  especially  the  rise  of  digital  media,  including    segments 
such as streaming (audiovisual and music), e-books, online business models in gaming 
etc. 

Education and skills: 
SMEs  engaged  indirectly,  through  the  supply  of  better-skilled  workers,  notably  via 
mobility  and vocational  education and training (VET).  SMEs  from  all sectors benefit 
from EU programmes such as Erasmus+ that support apprenticeships, staff mobility, and 
institutional cooperation, as these improve labour market preparedness and foster local 
innovation. 
Directly  engaged  SMEs  participating  as  project  partners  or  providers  in  transnational 
consortia. Some SMEs are involved in hosting trainees, apprentices or volunteers from 
EU  mobility  schemes.  In  particular,  SMEs  have  shown  support  for  actions  such  as  a 
European VET diploma or adult education mobility, reflecting their interest in upskilling 
current employees and attracting future talent. 

While youth and volunteering activities are primarily not-for-profit, there are indirect 
effects on SMEs. SMEs benefit from the soft skills and civic engagement capacities of 
young participants in Erasmus+ or ESC.  
Estimated number of directly affected SMEs 

Audiovisual and Media: 

30,000 – 50,000 enterprises232 

Education and Skills: 
Estimated 15,000 SMEs involved in Erasmus+ 2021-2027 
Estimated number of employees in directly affected SMEs 

Audiovisual and media: 

84,000-140,000 employees 

126 

 
 
Education and Skills: 

40,000 estimate 

Are  SMEs  indirectly  affected?  (Yes/No)  In  which  sectors?  What  is  the  estimated 
number of indirectly affected SMEs and employees? 
Audiovisual and Media: 
SMEs supplying goods and services to core CCI activities may be impacted. E.g. in the 
audiovisual sector, this includes companies providing catering, construction, costumes, 
technical  services,  logistics etc for productions,  ICT services and analytics  for  online 
distribution,  etc.  The  indirectly  affected  sectors  can  include,  but  is  not  limited  to 
manufacturing of goods, wholesale and retail of products, event production and technical 
services, specialised ICT services linked to creative content. One important sector that 
benefits from the cultural sectors is tourism, which is also characterised by a high number 
of SMEs.  

Education and skills: 
Potentially  all  SMEs  in  Europe  are  positively  impacted  by  improved  education  and 
training systems and a better skilled workforce.  

CONSULTATION OF SME STAKEHOLDERS 
How has the input from the SME community been taken into consideration? 

Through a public consultation for the Impact Assessment 
Are SMEs’ views different from those of large businesses? (Yes/No) 
The results of the Open Public Consultation indicate different views between SMEs and 
large  enterprises.  When  it  comes  to  importance  of  policy  priorities,  SMEs  included 
these  as  the  most  important  ones:  1)  Protect  democracy  and  promote  democratic 
standards  (importance  score  of  3.67  vs.  3.42  of  large  enterprises);  2)  Promote  media 
independence  and  media  pluralism,  fight  disinformation  (3.65  vs.  3.36);  3)  Promote 
entrepreneurship, access  to  market  and scaling-up for small  businesses in  the creative 
sector (3.61 vs. 2.20). 

In terms of cooperation and mobility in the area of education, training and solidarity, 
both the SMEs and large enterprises valued more positively cooperation partnerships in 
education  and training and mobility  for VET learners  and staff. However, SMEs  also 
ranked mobility for higher education students and staff in top 3 actions, whereas large 
enterprises mobility for schools and learners. 

In the areas of culture, creative sectors and media, the top 3 actions ranked by SMEs 
are:  European  cooperation  projects  involving  cultural  and  creative  organisations  from 
different  countries,  cross-border collaboration in  media content  creation, development 
and  production,  and  cross-border  cooperation  and  business  support  to  cultural  and 
creative sectors, 

In terms of actions for values (democracy, equality, rule of law, fundamental rights) 
and civil society, there were no significant differences in ranking between the SMEs and 
large entreprises. 

Both SMEs and large enterprises see administrative burden for beneficiaries as the main 
obstacle that prevent the EU budget from fully delivering on its objectives, followed by 
different  and often complex fund-specific rules for access to funding and compliance, 

127 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and lack of flexibility to adapt to new and unforeseen developments. For both SMEs and 
large companies, simplifying access to funding for beneficiaries and introducing more 
flexibility into resource allocation were ranked in top 3, while SMEs also ranked higher 
the better preventing and combating fraud, corruption and other illegal activities targeting 
EU  funds,  while  large  companies  valued  more  applying  common  rules,  timelines  and 
eligibility criteria to all relevant EU funds. 

(2) ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON SMES233 

What are the estimated direct costs for SMEs of the preferred policy option? (Fill 
in only if step 1 flags direct impacts) 

Qualitative assessment 

Audiovisual and Media:  
The  preferred  initiative  does  not  introduce  mandatory  compliance  costs,  since  the 
cluster’s  initiatives  focus  on  facilitating  access  to  funding  rather  than  introducing 
regulatory  obligations.  Those  SMEs  wishing  to  apply  for  funding  will  incur  some 
administrative costs due to application and reporting requirements linked to EU funding 
calls and participation in capacity-building programmes.  
Key cost drivers: 

•  Preparing funding applications  
•  Reporting obligations during/after project implementation 
•  Costs related to co-financing requirements (for grants requiring matching funds 

or audit certificates) 

However, these costs are expected to be reasonable because of the following: 

1)  Costs  are  borne  at  the  discretion  of  the  SMEs  (unlike  regulation)  so  when  an 
SME makes an application, they are well placed to make the assessment whether 
potential benefits are worth incurring these costs.  Execution and success rates 
for  the  current  programme  (with  success  rates  being  below  30%  for  several 
actions) suggest that the costs are reasonable.  

2)  No new regulatory compliance costs are introduced under the preferred option. 
The costs associated with administration are expected to have already declined 
under the current programme (thanks to the introduction of eGrants and lump 
sums for example.). Further simplification measures will be introduced to reduce 
the administrative burden (e. g., simplified application process). 

Education and skills: 
There are no specific costs for SMEs under the preferred policy option compared with 
other potential applicants or beneficiaries. 

Quantitative assessment 

Precise data is not available 

What  are  the  estimated  direct  benefits/cost  savings  for  SMEs  of  the  preferred 
policy option234? 

Qualitative assessment 

128 

 
 
 
 
 
Audiovisual and Media: 

The main direct benefits for SMEs stem from: 

•  More export possibilities / increased access to export markets 
•  More possibilities to scale-up, pursue international activities and take advantage 

of the Single Market (e.g., international co-productions) 

•  Adoption  of  innovative  business  (revenue  and  financing)  models  and 

diversification of risks (e.g., cross-format IP)  

•  Reduction of risks of developing new IP and content and increased chances of 

successful development 

•  Strengthen skills and innovation with high relevance to their sector and activities 
•  Better access to finance, including equity finance, in sectors traditionally viewed 

by financial institutions/investors as high risk. 

These  measures  directly  improve  financial  liquidity,  investment  capacity,  and 
resilience of SMEs in a sector marked by high rates of micro-enterprises and project-
based revenues. 

Education and skills: 

SMEs are likely to benefit from the complete contribution to lifelong learning and skills 
development that the preferred option aims at achieving, and from the easier access for 
all applicants that this would provide. 

Quantitative assessment 

Audiovisual and media: 

Quantitative assessment is possible for the audiovisual sector, which accounts for almost 
two thirds of funding under current programming. Based on the evaluation of previous 
MFF programming  (Creative Europe MEDIA), the current  quantification is  available 
(beneficiaries are overwhelmingly SMEs).  

• 

Increased export access: MEDIA support is associated with 85% of all non-
domestic territories in which supported works were shown in cinemas 86% 
and 87% of the total non-domestic audience of supported works. On average, 
a film or series supported from the MEDIA programme can be accessed in 
9.5,  6.6  and  3.2  additional  EU  countries  across  TV,  cinema  and  VoD 
respectively, compared to an unsupported film or series. 

•  Scaling up/more competitive business models/taking advantage of the Single 
Market/optimising financing and better access to international markets: 55% 
(under current programme, 86%) of supported projects over the past 10 years 
were international co-productions vs 12% of unsupported projects. 

•  Reducing development risks: 29% of works supported for development got 
made and released eventually, on average within 3 years, which compares 
well to wider industry practice. 

•  MediaInvest  offers  co-investment  from  private  investors,  by  supporting 

investments totalling €400 million between 2022-2027.  

129 

 
 
In addition, competitiveness and innovation spillovers235 may arise but are difficult to 
quantify at this stage. 

Education and skills: 

Precise data not available 

What are the indirect impacts of this initiative on SMEs? (Fill in only if step 1 flags 
indirect impacts) 

Audiovisual and media: 

Indirect impacts include: 

•  Due  to  the  diverse  types  of  activities  on  which  the  support  is  likely  to  have 
indirect  impacts  it  is  difficult  to  quantify  exactly  these  impacts.  However, 
impacts are expected to be positive.  

•  As regards a critical indirect impact on tourism and hospitality: in a recent survey 
two thirds of travellers said their choice of destination was influenced by films 
and TV shows.236 Furthermore, the increasing use of tax incentives and the high 
level  of  competition  among  countries  to  attract  international  productions  is 
further  proof  of  the  positive  effects  of  audiovisual  production  on  the  local 
economy, especially in areas where SMEs and self-employment are prominent 
(technical crews, catering, hospitality, etc). 

Education and skills: 
•  SMEs are likely to benefit also indirectly from the contribution to lifelong learning 

and skills development that the preferred option also aims at achieving. 

(3) MINIMISING NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON SMES 

Are SMEs disproportionately affected compared to large companies? (Yes/No) 

No, the initiative is mainly targeted at SMEs as regards Audiovisual and media, and does not 
negatively impact on SMEs for the other components.  

If yes, are there any specific subgroups of SMEs more exposed than others? 

Audiovisual and media: 

Although  the  initiative  is  SME-targeted,  it  can  be  assumed  smaller  SMEs  and  micro-
enterprises  face  greater  challenges  in  navigating  EU  funding  application  processes 
compared to larger players with dedicated administrative capacity. These costs are voluntary 
and minimal, however, the following subgroups of SMEs can be more exposed than others: 

•  Micro-enterprises (0–9 employees) face higher relative administrative burden 
•  SMEs  in  less  networked,  rural,  or  peripheral  regions  with  lower  access  to  EU 

information points and fewer support structures 

•  SMEs  operating  in  niche  or  experimental  creative  fields  with  weaker  access  to 

traditional finance channels 

130 

 
 
 
 
 
Have mitigating measures been included in the preferred option/proposal? (Yes/No)  

Measures  have  already  been  introduced  to  facilitate  access  for  SMEs  for  Audiovisual  and 
Media  with  less  programme  ‘know-how’:  cascading  grants,  lump  sums  for  example. 
Furthermore,  the  preferred  option  would  continue  supporting  a  network  of  national  desks 
whose main purpose is to help potential applicants navigate the process.  

CONTRIBUTION TO THE 35% BURDEN REDUCTION TARGET FOR SMES 

Are there any administrative cost savings relevant for the 35% burden reduction target 
for SMEs? 

Not Applicable 

131 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 7: POLICY, LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDING PROGRAMMES COVERED BY THE 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

1. Policy areas covered by the Impact Assessment 

1.1 Fundamental rights, EU values, democracy, justice, culture, civic and media spaces 

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which  pluralism,  non-discrimination,  tolerance,  justice,  solidarity  and  equality  between 
women and men prevail.  

An  EU  area  of  Justice  based  on  the  rule  of  law,  is  a  prerequisite  for  protecting  and 
promoting rights and EU values. Effective justice systems ensure that the rights of each 
person are defended. Fostering public integrity and fighting corruption is essential also for 
economic growth and public trust as well as ensuring that public funds are not diverted to 
private interests.  

Media (including audiovisual, news media, etc.) remains a critical, strategic industry for 
the  EU,  in  cultural,  societal  and  economic  terms.  Media  policy  also  benefits  European 
citizens, through increased access to diverse quality content, protection from illegal and 
harmful content, and a more diverse and pluralistic media offer. The digital shift is quickly 
transforming European media. Audiovisual and media services are increasingly available 
online and across borders. In the information space, disinformation is rapidly spreading, 
posing  threat  to  our  societies.  Journalists  and  media  outlets  face  numerous  obstacles  in 
various countries.  

Culture is central to Europe’s values, identity, and democracy. The originality and success 
of  the  European  Union  lies  in  its  ability  to  respect  the  varied  and  intertwined  history, 
languages and cultures of its Member States. Culture fosters a sense of belonging and a 
collective European identity while giving voice to a diversity of expressions and preserving 
European  cultural  heritage.  It  also  contributes  to  strengthening  social  cohesion  and 
enhancing the attractiveness of our regions and cities. In doing so, it leads to a stronger 
democracy and more actively engaged citizens. Europe’s cultural richness and diversity 
also strengthen its role and influence in the world, projecting the image of a Union firmly 
committed to peace, the rule of law, freedom of expression, and mutual understanding 

1.2. Skills and key competences for quality life and jobs 

Education and training, youth and sport are primary means of societal engagement and 
collective  participation.  Europe’s  strength  lies  in  its  people  –  their  skills,  talent  and 
potential. Human capital is the foundation of competitiveness, social cohesion, and equal 
opportunities. Yet, Europe faces critical challenges, as highlighted in the Draghi, Letta, 
and Niinistö reports: global competition, technological disruption, and demographic shifts. 
To respond, Europe must urgently equip its population with basic, digital, and advanced 
skills. This requires a radical: greater investment, reformed education and training systems, 
and better  coordination  of education and skills  policies at  all levels. Only through bold 
action  can  Europe  bridge  the  skills  gap,  drive  sustainable  growth  and  innovation,  and 
ensure global leadership. 

132 

 
2. Policy and Legal context 

Justice:  The  EU  promotes  a  European  area  of  justice  and  protects  the  rule  of  law,  by 
strengthening  judicial  cooperation  in  civil  and  criminal  matters,  enhancing  the 
effectiveness and integrity of judicial systems, and supporting judicial training and access 
to justice.  

Significant  legislative  and  policy  initiatives  include  the  European  Judicial  Training 
Strategy237,  the  EU  Strategy  on  Victims'  Rights238,  and  the  forthcoming  Commission 
Strategy on Digitalisation of Justice, that will aim at promoting the digital transformation 
within  judicial  systems,  fostering  more  efficient  and  accessible  justice  services  across 
Europe. Moreover, to further uphold the rule of law, the European Commission established 
the Rule of Law Mechanism239, including the annual Rule of Law Report, which evaluates 
developments in judicial independence, anti-corruption frameworks, and access to justice 
in  Member  States.  The  Commission’s  Anti-Corruption  Package240,  adopted  in  2023, 
introduced  comprehensive  measures  to  combat  corruption,  enhance  transparency,  and 
safeguard  judicial  integrity  throughout  the  Union. The  EU  has  also  adopted  an  Internal 
Security Strategy241 and a Counter-Terrorism Agenda242. 

Fundamental rights, EU values and democracy: The EU upholds the rights enshrined 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and promotes and protects 
EU values. It fights for equal treatment, the universal application of rights and combats all 
forms of discrimination.   

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union243 enshrines certain civil and 
political, social, and economic rights for European Union citizens and residents into EU 
law, including freedom of the arts and science (art. 13)   

The Commission has adopted a series of initiatives – on gender equality, Roma equality, 
inclusion and participation, LGBTIQ equality, disability rights, anti-racism to help build a 
Union of Equality244, as well as strategies on combating antisemitism, rights of the child245, 
and  the  initiatives  to  combat  hate  speech  and  hate  crime246,  to  promote  EU  values  and 
strengthen European democracies247. In 2023, the EU adhered to the Council of Europe 
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, 
which has then been followed recently by the first-ever EU law combating violence against 
women248. The EU also adopted rules on pay transparency, for men and women to be paid 
equally for the same work or work of equal value.249 

The  EU  also  strengthens  democratic  institutions  and  processes  by  supporting  and 
safeguarding free civic space, free and fair elections and encouraging the participation of 
citizens of all ages in democratic processes. 

The  first  EU  comprehensive  framework  on  democracy  has  been  developed  through  the 
2020  European  Democracy  Action  Plan250,  the  2021  package  of  measures  to  reinforce 
democracy and protect the integrity of elections251 and the 2023 Defence of Democracy 
Package252.  The  most  recent  legislation  in  this  context  includes  the  Regulation  on 
transparency  of  political  advertising253,  European  Media  Freedom  Act  and  the  EU  law 
protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims 
or abusive court proceedings ('strategic lawsuits against public participation')254. In recent 
years,  many  Commission  initiatives  have  also  achieved  meaningful  advances  for  EU 
citizenship  rights,  including  the  regular  EU  Citizenship  reports  and  the  2023  EU 
Citizenship Package255. The upcoming European Democracy Shield will seek to further 
protect and strengthen our democracy256. 

133 

 
Media: The EU has adopted single market legislation for the copyright-intensive industries 
including for the audiovisual and media sectors. It promotes an independent, diverse and 
trustworthy  media 
landscape,  ensures  a  safe  online  environment  and  combats 
disinformation. It supports the production, circulation and promotion of audiovisual and 
media  content  across  borders.  The  audiovisual  and  media  sectors  have  specific 
characteristics and needs, which have shaped the EU’s media policy as reflected in the EU 
acquis and policy developments, namely the AVMS Directive, Copyright Directive, Media 
Action Plan and EMFA. The Commission has further recognised the crucial role of these 
sectors through the adoption of the European Democracy Action Plan and the Media and 
Audiovisual Action Plan in 2020, followed by the European Media Industry Outlook in 
2023.   

Culture:  The  EU  supports  cultural  and  creative  sectors,  by  promoting  cultural  and 
linguistic diversity and cross-border exchanges, cooperation, circulation and mobility, and 
preserving  Europe's  rich  cultural  heritage.  The  role  of  culture  and  cultural  heritage  in 
upholding EU values and fundamental principles is at the core of the framework for EU 
cooperation in the field of culture and of European initiatives such as the New European 
Bauhaus, the European Capitals of Culture and the European Heritage Label. Key policy 
initiatives  include  the  European  Agenda  for  Culture,  the  EU  Strategy  for  International 
Cultural Relations, the European Framework for Action on Cultural Heritage, the Council 
Work  Plans  for  Culture,  and  the  upcoming  Culture  Compass  for  Europe257.  The 
Commission is working on a proposal for a Culture Compass for Europe, as a strategic 
framework to guide the multiple dimensions of culture. This is a major policy initiative 
giving  more  centrality  to  culture  in  the  overall  EU  policy  making  for  years  to  come. 
Finally, the Union and its Member States are parties to the 2005 UNESCO Convention on 
the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which entered into 
force on 18 March 2007. 

Education and training: The EU supports Member States in their efforts to improve the 
quality  and  efficiency  of  education  and  training  at  all  levels  of  education  from  early 
childhood and care to adult education, implements a vocational training policy in line with 
labour market needs, promotes lifelong learning and mobility, equity, active citizenship 
and  enhances  creativity,  innovation  and  entrepreneurship  in  all  sectors  and  levels  of 
education and training.  

The Union of Skills sets the framework for EU cooperation in education and skills policies 
and supports the development of EU’s human capital to strengthen EU competitiveness. It 
aims to deliver higher levels of basic skills, providing individuals with strong foundations 
for  further  development  and  offer  lifelong  learning  opportunities  for  upskilling  and 
reskilling. It also seeks to attract and retain the skills and talents needed in the European 
economy,  ensuring  that  the  region  remains  competitive  on  a  global  scale  and  facilitate 
recruitment  by  businesses.  The European Education Area (EEA) lays the  foundation to 
skills  formation  throughout  life  and  supports  cooperation  and  peer  learning  between 
countries.  It  promotes  high  quality  education  and  training  for  all,  mutually  and 
automatically recognising learning outcomes across borders, and supporting the mobility 
of  learners  of  all  ages.  It  provides  a  framework  with  six  fundamental  strategic 
dimensions which will be fully addressed through cross-synergies by design between the 
future  instruments  of  the  cluster. The  Digital  Education  Action  Plan,  part  of  the  EEA, 
supports the development of digital education across EU Member States and the equipment 
of people with digital skills and competences for the digital transformation. The Union of 
Skills  is  “an  overarching  strategy,  focusing  on  investment,  adult  and  lifelong  learning, 

134 

 
vocational  education  and  training,  skill  retention  and  recognition  and  enhancing  skills 
intelligence.” 

Youth  and solidarity: The EU supports  the participation  of young people in  civic and 
democratic life, connects young people across the European Union, and beyond, to foster 
solidarity,  voluntary  engagement  and  intercultural  understanding  and  supports  youth 
empowerment through quality, innovation and the recognition of youth work. The EU also 
fosters cooperation between organisations in this area. The EU Youth Strategy258  is the 
policy  framework  in  the  field  of  youth  for  2019–2027,  structured  around  the  pillars  of 
Engage, Connect, and Empower aiming to  foster youth participation in democratic life, 
social  and  civic  engagement  and  ensuring  that  all  young  people  have  the  necessary 
resources to take part in society.   

Sport: The EU fosters cooperation to strengthen safety, sustainability, integrity and values 
of sport and enhance participation in sport and health-enhancing physical activities. In the 
realm of sport, the EU Work Plan for Sport259(2024-2027) outlines a strategic approach 
that  recognizes  the  role  of  sports  in  social  cohesion,  promoting  well-being,  building 
inclusive communities, strengthening cultural ties, and enhancing solidarity among people. 
The  work  plan  prioritises  integrity,  sustainability,  and  social  inclusion  within  sporting 
contexts, encouraging cross-border cooperation and the sharing of best practices. 

The  EU's  policies  in  youth  and  sport  focus  on  promoting  inclusivity,  participation,  and 
development through strategic initiatives that aim to empower young people and enhance 
the  role  of  sports  in  social  cohesion.  In  the  realm  of  sport,  the  EU  Work  Plan  for 
Sport260(2024-2027)  outlines  a  strategic  approach  that  recognizes  the  role  of  sports  in 
social  cohesion,  promoting  well-being,  building  inclusive  communities,  strengthening 
cultural ties, and enhancing solidarity among people. The work plan prioritises integrity, 
sustainability,  and  social  inclusion  within  sporting  contexts,  encouraging  cross-border 
cooperation and the sharing of best practices.  

3. EU funding programmes and schemes 2021-2027 and their legal bases 

Under  the  current  MFF,  the  key  legislative  and  policy  initiatives  mentioned  above  are 
supported mainly by the following EU funding programmes which are covered by this IA. 

1. Fundamental rights, EU values, democracy, justice, culture, civic and media spaces 

Funding 
instrument  
Citizens, 
Equality, Rights 
Values 
and 
programme 
(CERV)  
Justice 
Programme  

Creative 
Europe 
programme  

Legal basis  

Content  

Articles 16(2),  
19(2),21(2),  
24,  167,    168 
TFEU  

 Article  81(1) 
and  (2)  and 
Article  82(1) 
TFEU  
Art. 
167(5), 
173(3) TFUE  

CERV seeks to promote and protect rights and values within 
the  EU  as  enshrined  in  the  Treaties,  the  Charter  and  the 
applicable international human rights conventions to sustain 
open, rights-based, democratic, equal and inclusive societies 
based on the rule of law.   
The  Justice  programme  endeavours  to  create  an  area  of 
judicial 
freedom, 
cooperation,  the  rule  of  law  and  fundamental  rights  and  a 
well-functioning independent judicial system.   
The  Creative  Europe  programme  supports  the  cultural, 
creative  and  audiovisual  sectors.  It  aims  to  safeguard 
European cultural and linguistic diversity and heritage and 

security  and 

supporting 

justice, 

135 

 
 
 
  
Multimedia 
Actions  

58  

Art. 
Financial 
Regulation 

to increase the competitiveness and the economic potential 
of  the  CCS,  particularly  of  the  audiovisual  and  media 
sectors.  
The  Multimedia  Actions  is  a  prerogative  line  of  the 
Commission  aiming  to  strengthen  news  reporting  on  EU 
affairs from European perspectives  

The  Citizens,  Equality,  Rights  and  Values  (CERV)  programme  is  the  dedicated 
thematic EU instrument which specifically seeks to promote and protect rights and values 
within the EU as  enshrined in  the Treaties, the  Charter and the applicable international 
human rights conventions to sustain open, rights-based, democratic, equal and inclusive 
societies  based  on  the  rule  of  law.  The  programme  supports  civil  society  organisations 
working at European, national, regional and local levels because civil society plays a key 
role in upholding the common values on which the EU is founded. Established261 for the 
period 2021-2027 as a merge of the previous Rights, Equality and Citizenship (REC)262 
and Europe for Citizens (EfC)263 programmes, the CERV programme has a budget of over 
1.5  billion  EUR  over  7  years.  The  programme  has  four  strands:  (i)  Union  values;  (ii) 
Equality,  rights  and  gender  equality;  (iii)  Citizens’  engagement  and  democratic 
participation; (iv) Daphne – to fight against gender-based violence and violence against 
children  and  other  vulnerable  groups,  including  LGBTIQ  people.  It  is  implemented  in 
direct management under the overall responsibility of the Directorate-General for Justice 
and Consumers (DG JUST) of the European Commission.  

The Justice programme264 supports the further development of an area of justice based 
on EU’s values and the rule of law. Under the current MFF, the programme has a budget 
of around 0.3 billion EUR and covers three specific objectives: 1. facilitate and support 
judicial  cooperation  in  civil  and  criminal  matters,  and  promote  the  rule  of  law,  the 
independence  and  impartiality  of  the  judiciary  –  including  by  supporting  the  efforts  to 
improve the effectiveness of national justice systems – and the effective enforcement of 
decisions; 2. support and promote  judicial training, with  a view to  fostering  a common 
legal, judicial and rule-of-law culture, and the consistent and effective implementation of 
relevant  EU  legal  instruments;  3.  facilitate  effective  and  non-discriminatory  access  to 
justice  and  effective  redress,  including  by  electronic  means  (e-justice),  by  promoting 
efficient civil and criminal procedures and by promoting and supporting the rights of all 
victims  of  crime,  along  with  the  procedural  rights  of  suspects  and  accused  persons  in 
criminal proceedings. The justice programme mainly supports activities for the judiciary 
and judicial staff by their representative bodies, public authorities and training bodies. It is 
also open to academic/research institutes and civil-society organisations that contribute to 
the  development  of  an  EU  area  of  justice.  The  programme  is  implemented  in  direct 
management under the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers 
(DG JUST) of the European Commission.  

Creative  Europe  is  the  EU  programme  dedicated  to  supporting  the  culture  and  media 
sectors, with the objective of enhancing competitiveness, notably the audiovisual industry, 
and strengthening cultural and linguistic diversity.   Cultural and media sectors represent 
a significant industrial ecosystem and face common challenges stemming from the digital 
transformation and intense global competition.  At the same time, Creative Europe operates 
within the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, where culture is a supporting 
competence whilst the EU has a single market focus on audiovisual and media. With an 
envelope of over EUR 2.6 billion,  the Programme is divided into three strands: the Culture 
strand  (33%  of  budget),  which  covers  all  CCS  apart  from  audiovisual  and  media,  in 

136 

 
  
particular  architecture,  archives,  libraries  and  museums,  artistic  crafts,  tangible  and 
intangible cultural heritage, design (including fashion design), festivals, music, literature, 
performing arts (including theatre and dance), books and publishing, radio, and visual arts; 
the MEDIA strand, which covers the audiovisual and gaming sectors (58% of budget); and 
the Cross-Sectoral strand (9%), which covers actions across all CCS (with a focus on media 
freedom and news media). DG EAC and CNECT co-manage the programme. 

The Multimedia Actions line is a prerogative line of the Commission aiming to strengthen 
news  reporting  on  EU  affairs  from  European  perspectives.  It  is  managed  directly  by 
CNECT, with a budgetary allocation of an indicative amount of EUR 145 Mio over the 
MFF 2021-2027.   

2. Skills and key competences for quality life and jobs 

Funding 
instrument  
Erasmus+  

European 
Solidarity 
Corps  

Legal basis  

Content  

Articles 
and 
165(4) 
166(4) TFEU  

 Articles 
165(4), 
166(4) 
and 
214(5) TFEU 

Erasmus+  provides  learning  mobility  opportunities  abroad 
for  people  of  all  ages  in  formal,  informal  and  non-formal 
education  settings  and  invests  in  cooperation  and  policy 
development in the fields of  education and training, youth 
and sport  
The  European  Solidarity  Corps  gives  young  people  the 
opportunity to take part in projects that benefit communities 
facing  unmet  societal  challenges,  either  abroad  or  in  their 
own country, through volunteering or by setting up their own 
solidarity projects.  

Erasmus+265 is the European Union programme for education and training266, youth and 
sport. It provides learning mobility opportunities abroad for people of all ages and invests 
in cooperation and policy development in the fields of education and training, youth and 
sport.  The  general  objective  of  Erasmus+  is  to  support,  through  lifelong  learning,  the 
educational, professional and personal development of people in education, training, youth 
and sport, in Europe and beyond. The total financial envelope allocated to Erasmus+ 2021-
2027  was  set  indicatively  at  more  than  EUR  26.5  billion,  with  an  additional  indicative 
envelope of EUR 2.2 billion allocated from External Cooperation Instruments (IPA III and 
NDICI-Global  Europe).  The  programme  is  implemented  under  direct  and  indirect 
management  (around  80%  of  the  budget  is  implemented  under  indirect  management 
through Erasmus+ National Agencies).  

The  European  Solidarity  Corps267  is  an  EU  programme  that  gives  young  people  the 
opportunity  to  take  part  in  projects  that  benefit  communities  facing  unmet  societal 
challenges, either abroad or in their own country. By supporting vulnerable communities 
and individuals, young people can learn and contribute to building a more inclusive society 
through their volunteering activities. It has an envelope of over EUR 1 billion. 

Other EU funding programmes partially linked to the policy areas object of this IA:   

Digital  Europe 
Programme  

Articles  172, 
173(3) TFEU  

Digital Europe programme supports projects in key capacity 
areas and ensures a wide use of digital technologies across 
the  economy  and  society  –  including  on  aspects  such  as 
digital  heritage,  media  and  data,  and  justice.  Specific 
Objective  4  (SO4)  on  advanced  digital  skills  focuses  on 

137 

 
 
 
Horizon 
Europe  

Articles 
173(3), 
182(1),  183, 
paragraph  2 
of  188 TFEU  

developing  a  talent  pool  in  the  EU  in  advanced  digital 
technologies, addressing skills shortages.  
Cluster  2  of  Horizon  Europe  on  Cluster  2:  Culture, 
Creativity  and  Inclusive  society’  aims  to  strengthen 
European  democratic  values,  including  rule  of  law  and 
fundamental  rights,  safeguarding cultural  heritage,  and 
promoting  socio-economic  transformations  that  contribute 
to inclusion and growth  

European 
Social 
(ESF)+  

Fund 

Articles 
149, 
153(2)(a),  162, 
175 TFEU 

European 
Regional 
Development 
Fund (ERDF) 

Articles 
176, 
177  and  178 
TFEU 

Resilience  and 
Recovery 
Facility (RRF) 

Article 
TFEU 

175 

The European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) supports education 
in  2021-27.  This 
and  skills  with  EUR  42  billion 
encompasses  upskilling  and  reskilling,  including  digital 
skills and green initiatives.  

The  European  Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF) 
(including under its European Territorial Cooperation strand 
–  Interreg)  supports  education,  skills  development,  and 
training  with  EUR  8.8  billion  in  2021-27.  This  includes 
infrastructure, equipment and cooperation across borders to 
facilitate equal access to quality and inclusive education.  

The ESF+ and the ERDF provides a significant contribution 
to the EU’s social policies, including structural reforms in 
these areas, particularly in relation to supporting the strategy 
on the Rights of the Child, gender-balanced labour market 
participation,  socio-economic  integration  of  marginalised 
communities (such as Roma people), as well as equal access 
to  quality  services  and  modernising  social  protection 
systems.   

The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is transforming 
European  economies  after  the  pandemic  with  a  very 
important focus on the social dimension, contributing to the 
implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. In 
total, Member States’ national recovery and resilience plans 
allocate  around  25%  of  their  budget  towards  social 
objectives (around EUR 163 billion of total funding). 

The  RRF  supports  both  education  and  skills  with  around 
EUR  72  billion.268  Member  States’  national  recovery  and 
resilience  plans  include  reforms  and  investments  ranging 
from early education through general, vocational and higher 
education to adult learning. In total, the education or training 
of over 29 million people have been supported by the RRF 
since its inception.269 

The  measures  directly  supporting  media,  and  culture  and 
creative industries in Member States’  national recovery and 
resilience  plans  amount  to  EUR  11.7  billion,  representing 
approximately  2%  of  the  total  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Facility  budget.  In  particular,  the  RRF  has  supported  the 
industrial  and  digital  transformation  of  the  audiovisual 
industry. For example, it has contributed to boost national 
production and attract overseas productions. 

138 

 
 
 
 
The  RRF  further  supports  reforms  and  investments  in  the 
field  of  EU  values,  which  correspond  to  challenges 
identified  by  country-specific  recommendations  under  the 
European Semester. For instance, targeted measures are set 
to  benefit  close  to  300  000  persons  with  disabilities.  The 
recovery and resilience plans also include a broad range of 
measures to promote the inclusion of disadvantaged groups, 
such  as  Roma  communities.  Additionally,  Member  States 
have  put  forth  136  measures  that  directly  promote  gender 
equality270. The RRF has also devoted considerable funding 
for the digital transition of national justice systems. 

Technical 
Support 
Instrument 
(TSI) 

175 
Article 
Article 
and 
197(2) TFEU 

The  Technical  Support  Instrument  (TSI)  is  the  European 
Commission’s key tool for supporting EU Member States in 
implementing  growth-enhancing  and 
designing  and 
inclusive reforms. 

InvestEU 
programme  

Articles  173, 
paragraph  3 
of 175 TFEU  

From 2021 to 2025 TSI has funded 36 projects to support 20 
Member States to implement 43 justice reforms aiming to 
improve  the  quality  and  effectiveness  of  justice,  from 
leveraging technology to better manage case workflows, to 
taking  a  data-driven  approach  to  allocate  caseload  and 
resources.  

In the same period, TSI has funded 77 projects to support 27 
Member States to implement 90 skills and education reforms 
aiming to the development of basic skills, and attractiveness 
and labour market relevance of education and VET systems. 
The TSI has also assisted Member States in rolling out 56 
reforms  aimed  at  enhancing  equality,  including  gender 
equality.  

Moreover, the TSI complements the RRF by supporting EU 
Member States in the implementation of their recovery and 
resilience plans related to digitalisation of justice, reduction 
of backlogs and judicial map reform, as well reforms in early 
childhood  education  and  care  and  the  digital  readiness  of 
higher education among others. 
The  InvestEU  programme,  mobilising  private  and  public 
funds,  provides  guarantees  and  financing  for  culture  and 
creative  SMEs  in  addition  it  blends  funds  with    Creative 
Europe MEDIA and the EIF through a dedicated investment 
vehicle  (i.e.,  MediaInvest)  to  support  investments  in  the 
audiovisual and gaming sectors. Under Social Infrastructure 
and  Skills  Window,  investment  in  skills,  education,  training, 
and  social  infrastructure,  including  educational  infrastructure 
and student housing are supported, leveraging more than EUR 
1 billion 

139 

 
 
ANNEX 8: RESULTS OF MID-TERM EVALUATIONS 

1.  Mid-term  evaluations  on  citizenship,  equality,  rights,  values,  justice,  media  and  culture 

programmes   

Citizenship,  equality,  rights,  values,  and  justice:  interim  evaluations  of  the  CERV  and  Justice 
programmes  

The interim evaluations271 of the CERV and 2021-2027 Justice programmes assess the performance 
of the two programmes over the first three years of implementation. The results of the evaluations 
also rely on the assessment of the respective preceding programmes272. 

Overall, the interim evaluation of the CERV programme shows that it is making good progress 
towards its objectives273. The new features274 of the CERV programme have produced efficiency 
gains for the Commission and beneficiaries, by improving predictability, strengthening monitoring, 
and reducing administrative and reporting burden.  

The main benefits of the CERV programme are directly project related (i.e. the opportunity to 
implement  a  desired  approach)  but  there  are  also  broader  and  societal  benefits275,  including  a 
strong contribution to promoting gender equality276. The CERV programme occupies a space 
in the CSO funding landscape that would otherwise be vacant277. Its comprehensive scope, pan-
EU  coverage,  focus  on  EU  values,  grants  of  a  significant  size,  operating  grants  and  re-granting 
mechanisms,  all  make  the  CERV  programme  an  essential  source  of  funding  for  organisations 
promoting  EU  values  and  fundamental  rights.  The  programme’s  ability  to  directly  provide 
independent sources of financing allows organisations to maintain autonomy and pursue their goals 
without  undue  influence.  The  programme  architecture  fosters  coherence  and  synergies  between 
different policy priorities and contributes to a more holistic approach to addressing societal challenges 
and promoting EU values.  

The  interim  evaluation  of  the  CERV  programme  highlights  that  there  is  a  clear  need  for  the 
programme to continue because the challenges it was set up to address persist and, in some cases, 
have got worse, e.g. the increasing polarisation of society, the rise in populism and extremism, and 
the threat to EU values. Also, the effects of having no CERV programme would likely impact the 
already  shrinking  civic  space  in  the  EU.  Respect  for  the  rule  of  law,  fundamental  rights  and 
democratic dialogue, gender equality and disability rights would also be affected. Violence against 
children, LGBTIQ people, extremism and radicalism would be likely to rise. The sense of being a 
European citizen would weaken. Nevertheless, a funding gap on the strands for equality, rights 
and gender equality, and for combating violence against women, children and other groups at 
risk, is  present and may limit the ability to fulfil  the objectives of these CERV strands. The 
CERV programme has been coherent with wider EU policies and priorities and complementary in 
their  objectives  with  other  EU  funding  programmes.  There  is  a  clear  need  for  the  CERV 
programme to continue because the challenges this programme was set up to address persist 
and, in some cases, have got worse e.g. the increasing polarisation of society, the rise in populism 
and extremism, and the threat to EU values.  

The interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 justice programme highlights that the actions funded are 
coherent  with  policies  and  priorities  at  EU  and  national  levels,  aligned  with  other  EU  funding 
instruments and consistent with international commitments and objectives, such as the Sustainable 
Development  Goals  (SDGs)278.  The  streamlined  architecture  of  the  current  programme  allows  for 
greater  impact  and  a  more  focused  approach  in  key  areas  compared  to  the  previous  programme. 
Specifically,  the  justice  programme  has  successfully  contributed  to  supporting  the  mutual 
recognition  of  judicial  decisions  across  Member  States  and  enhancing  cross-border 

 
 
cooperation, creating a long-term impact by further developing a cohesive European area of justice 
built on mutual trust and cooperation.  

Direct  funding  to  beneficiaries  has  led  to  immediate  and  tangible  benefits  for  the  target  groups 
involved. Notably, funding for EU networks such as the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) 
facilitates sustained collaboration, capacity building, and continuous high-quality engagement among 
legal  professionals  across  the  EU.  Furthermore,  the  programme’s  continued  emphasis  on  judicial 
training significantly contributes to unifying and developing the legal landscape across the EU. 
The programme plays a crucial role in fostering a shared legal culture by training thousands of 
judges,  lawyers,  and  court  staff  and  supporting  the  implementation  of  the  2021-2024  strategy  on 
European judicial training279. By facilitating exchanges of best practices, the programme strengthens 
Member States' collaboration, ensuring a uniform, coherent, and consistent application of EU law 
by judicial practitioners, thereby enhancing the integrity of EU legislation and legal coherence across 
borders.  

The current programme also builds upon progresses achieved in the previous programming period, 
by further reducing barriers to justice and improving frameworks and protections for marginalised 
individuals2803. At the same time, the evaluation points to two main areas of improvement in terms 
of  design:  first  of  all,  evidence  gathered  through  stakeholder  consultations  highlight  the  need  to 
expand the reach of the programme: in fact, higher education and public authorities reported higher 
awareness  of  the  programme  compared  to  CSOs.  This  suggests  that  while  the  programme’s 
communication activities are effective, they may not be reaching all sectors equally281.  

Moreover, some stakeholders suggested to better include correctional services and prison staff in the 
target groups of the programme. Secondly, in terms of addressing new challenges, digitalisation of 
justice has become a significant cross-cutting objective of the current justice programme, particularly 
following  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  which  accelerated  the  use  of  digital  technologies.  This  focus 
facilitates  easier  access  to  legal  information,  modernises  cross-border  judicial  cooperation 
mechanisms,  and  supports  broader  EU  digital  transformation  goals,  making  justice  systems  more 
efficient  and  accessible.  Investment  in  digitalisation  enhances  also  fundamental  rights  within  the 
justice field, such as the presumption of innocence282. Moreover, the increased use of digital tools 
expands  the  programme’s  reach  efficiently.  However,  growing  demands  in  digitalisation  is 
highlighting significant investment gaps at both EU and national levels. The justice programme 
supports the development and maintenance of EU-level IT systems and platforms, but because of its 
limited budget, the programme cannot meet all current and future needs. 

Media  sectors:  Mid-term  evaluations  of  MEDIA  and  Cross  strands  of  Creative  Europe  and 
multimedia actions  

1.  Audiovisual and video games sectors  

The final evaluation of Creative Europe 2014-2020 and the mid-term evaluation of Creative Europe 
2021-2027 has confirmed the relevance of continued support to the audiovisual sector and emerging 
support to news media. The strands’ objectives are well aligned with the media policy agendas and 
regulatory frameworks, notably the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and the European Media 
Freedom Act  

MEDIA  has  been  effective  in  supporting:  1)  the  transnational  circulation  of  European  AV  works 
(relevant  for  both  cultural  diversity  and  competitiveness);  2)  competitiveness  of  the  industry 

141 

 
 
 
(including, crucially, cross-border cooperation between AV players); and 3) cultural and geographical 
diversity  (including  audience  development)  fostering  a  level-playing  field  between  participating 
countries with different audiovisual capacities. These three objectives are naturally interlinked (e.g. 
cross-border cooperations increase and diversify demand in different languages and markets). 

As  regards  the  transnational  circulation  of  European  non-national  works,   the  evaluation 
revealed that on average MEDIA supported EU films and series could be viewed by audiences in 9.5, 
6.6 and 3.2 more EU countries across TV, cinema and VoD respectively, than an unsupported EU 
film  or  series.  MEDIA  support  was  also  associated  with  125,410  more  non-national  cinema 
admissions relative to unsupported films.283 Without MEDIA support, non-national admissions in the 
EU would drop to 30%   of the current level. 

As  regards  competitiveness,  the  KPI  on  co-productions  confirms  the  positive  impact  of  MEDIA 
funding on the competitiveness of production companies. The share of  European co-productions in 
all supported works has increased from 36% under the previous to 86% under the current programme, 
and  is  estimated  to  be  significantly  higher  than  co-productions  among  unsupported  works.  Co-
productions  increase  competitiveness  in  various  ways,  in  particular  by  increasing  the  addressable 
audience abroad, bringing in new sources of financing (public and private), combining know-how 
and capabilities. There is also evidence of distributors growing because of MEDIA support.284 Last 
but not least, MediaInvest has demonstrably created leverage effect for additional funds. MediaInvest 
is a dedicated blended equity investment platform dedicated to European audiovisual and gaming, 
which  aims  to  strengthen  the  financial  strength  of  European  players285.  It  will  for  example  help 
European  production  companies  retain  and  exploit 
intellectual  property,  compete 
internationally, and  harness  their  creative  autonomy286.  It  is  on  track  to  achieve  its  objective  of 
leveraging up to €400 million between 2022-2027.   

their 

As regards cultural and linguistic MEDIA has supported many high-quality films and videogames 
with international standing.287 Accounting for only 10% of all screens in the EU, by 2023 the network 
of cinemas supported by MEDIA sold almost 40% of all tickets sold to non-national European films. 
A  strong  positive  development  can  also  be  observed  in  co-productions  involving  high  and  low 
audiovisual capacity countries.288 

MEDIA  has  been  efficient  in  absorbing  an  increased  budget  of  +66%,  which  has  been  fully 
executed  so  far.  Yet,  the  funding  levels  are  low  compared  to  the  challenges  at  stake,  limiting  its 
effectiveness. The administrative costs have been reduced by providing bigger grants, reducing the 
number of contracts and payment to be administered289.  

The evaluation has identified a need to sharpen the EU intervention and address new challenges, 
such  as  the  platformisation  brought  about  by  giant  global  competitors  and  the  shift  of  audiences 
online. For example, in the critical streaming segment (which is driving all growth in the industry), 
Europeans  spend only  7% of their time on watching  content from  other  EU countries, while they 
spend 60% of their time on US works and 20% on works from other non-EU territories (e.g. UK and 
Asia).  Another  key  challenge  is  to  ensure  a  fair  access  of  European  citizens,  to  quality  European 
content. 290 

The evaluation confirmed that the need to improve synergies among Creative Europe funding strands 
in  support  of  copyright  intensive  industries.  These  industries  share  common  challenges,  from  the 
competition of global platforms, to attracting wider audiences in the digital age and responding to 
consumer  preferences,  with  special  focus  on  digital  native  young  people291.    The  success  of  and 

142 

 
 
experience with MEDIA in reaching wider cross-border audiences through co-productions and pan-
European distribution is very relevant in this regard and could inspire other IP intensive sectors292. 

The  EU  AV  sector  is  also  lagging  behind  the  US  and  other  regions  in  innovation.  Non-EU  tech 
players  have  a  strong  influence  on  what  kind  of  EU  content  Europeans  consume:  e.g. 
recommendations of streaming services have an above-average impact on consumers’ overall choices 
regarding  films  and  series,  especially  among  younger  generations.293  In  this  connection,  the 
evaluation  confirmed  that  synergies  with  research  and  innovation  programmes,  could  be  further 
exploited.    

2.  News media sectors  

Support  to  news  media  was  introduced  in  2021.  Given  budgetary  limitations,  it  has  focused  on 
targeted cross-border collaborations among media organizations, actions promoting media freedom 
and pluralism, and since 2022, media literacy activities. The evaluation confirms that the results are 
very promising. Firstly, the programme has helped monitor and map media pluralism and ownership 
across  the  Union294.    Secondly,  media  collaborations  have  contributed  to  addressing  some  of  the 
industrial challenges. Funding also strengthens democracy and societal resilience by supporting local 
and  regional  journalism,  investigative  reporting,  and  public  interest  news,  in  particular  in  “media 
deserts”.  Finally, media literacy actions have helped citizens to navigate digital media in the context 
of growing disinformation. In this initial stage, with a small annual budget of about EUR 15 mio, as 
the news media actions are new, key performance indicators focus on quantitative results.295 

Regulation (EU) 2021/818 (the Creative Europe Regulation)296, which includes a closed list of actions 
in its annex, has restricted the programme’s capacity to respond to emerging challenges such as threats 
to media freedom and pluralism as well as disinformation. 

While the actions are closely  aligned with  other EU  policies and initiatives, barriers to  exploiting 
synergies  with  other  programmes  such  as  CERV  persist.  Overlaps  are  most  prominent  for  media 
literacy,  between  Erasmus+  and  Creative  Europe297.  The  Multimedia  Actions  line  focus  on  the 
provision and access to content on EU affairs, with an annual average budget of EUR 20 million. The 
evaluation of the Multimedia Actions line, covering the years between 2021 and 2023, confirms that 
the actions were effective in strengthening news coverage on EU affairs from a European perspective. 
The actions supported the production of a high  volume of original  content, with  over 7,100 news 
items annually, excluding translations and secondary output. They achieved a notable audience reach, 
with an estimated 8.9 million weekly on-air viewers, and an average of over 31 million page views 
in 2023 for digital content. Nevertheless, the evaluation showcased that the current funding levels 
cannot address the wide range of issues and challenges evolving around the fast-changing landscape 
of news media and evolving consumption patterns across the Union298.  It recommended a greater 
focus on promotion, reflecting changes on how citizens access news. 

3.  Creative Europe Culture Strand 

The Culture strand of Creative Europe covers all the cultural and creative sectors with the exception 
of  the  audiovisual.  They  include  inter  alia,  architecture,  archives,  libraries  and  museums,  artistic 
crafts, tangible and intangible cultural heritage, design (including fashion design), festivals, music, 
literature, performing arts (including theatre and dance), books and publishing, radio, and visual arts  

143 

 
 
 
The  evaluation  confirms  that  the  Culture  strand  is  working  and  performing  well,  effectively 
engaging with a high number of cultural and creative organisations. It offers them rich opportunities 
to  work  transnationally,  is  strongly  aligned  with  the  evolving  needs  of  the  CCS,  strengthen  their 
capacities, and successfully help all CCS reach new and wider cross-border audiences through co-
creations, co-productions and pan-European circulation, contributing in this way to foster a shared 
area of cultural diversity for the peoples of Europe. The evaluation highlights that, in line with the 
regulation  establishing  the  programme,  the  Culture  strand  Creative  Europe  2021-2027  has  wider 
ambitions than its predecessor in promoting societal resilience and enhancing social inclusion and 
intercultural  dialogue  through  culture,  as  well  in  contributing  to  the  Union’s  global  strategy  for 
international  relations through the many partnerships  involving  cultural  and creative  entities from 
non-EU  Member  States.  Finally,  the  evaluation  concludes  that  growth  in  the  supported  CCS 
organisations came from the additional skills developed through the implementation of projects and 
the larger markets accessed at the transnational level, both of which indirectly helped organisations 
to  become  more  competitive.  Despite  such  significant  achievements,  financial  constraints  and 
oversubscription issues remain a challenge.  

The Culture strand has  been instrumental in  helping the CCS address  to  a good extent key issues 
identified in the regulation, such as the fragmentation of the market along national and linguistic lines 
or the challenges connected with the dual transition. However, the overall sectors’ position relative 
to international competition is still relatively weak some needs have become more acute in recent 
years  while  others  have  appeared,  namely  the  need  to  preserve  artistic  freedom,  to  recognise  the 
intrinsic value of culture and its contribution for the society, the surge of AI, take into account the 
new international geopolitical landscape, and  to improve working conditions in CCS.  The evaluation 
has identified a fourfold proportion of high-quality projects exceeding the available budget for 
some key actions, such as cooperation projects, mobility and literary translations. The proven 
strand’s lack of capacity to absorb demand represents a threat to its attractiveness to stakeholders 
and therefore impact, due to the fierce competition for available funds. The Culture strand should 
keep addressing accessibility challenges and continuing to expand its reach to cultural and creative 
organisations  with  no  prior  experience  at  working  at  EU  level.  The  evaluation  values  the 
international  opening  of  the  Culture  strand  going  beyond  the  EU,  as  an  essential  element  for 
promoting  EU  values,  intercultural  dialogue,  raising  awareness  of  EU  democratic  values  but  also 
facilitating  peer  learning  on  key  issues  for  culture  and  heritage.    Finaly,  despite  the  fact  that  the 
regulation specifies clear actions to be developed, it also leaves enough leeway to adapt to new policy 
priorities and the Culture strand has proved its flexibility and agility in responding to new challenges 
or events, in particular the migration crisis, the upsurge of COVID-19, the Russian war of aggression 
against Ukraine, etc. 

2. Mid-term evaluations of Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps 

Erasmus+ 

The  final  evaluation  of  the  2014-2020  Programme  and  the  interim  evaluation  of  the  2021-2027 
Programme299 found that Erasmus+ performs strongly across key evaluation criteria and fulfils its 
objectives effectively.  Both  Programme generations  have  proven successful  in  delivering a strong 
European added value, playing a key role in the fields of education, training, youth and sport.  

Despite  the  negative  impact  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  Erasmus+  supported  learning  mobility 
abroad of over 6.2 million participants in the 2014-2020 period and around 1.6 million in 2021-2023 
helping  to  increase  their  skills  and  competences.  Erasmus+  also  funded  over  136 000  distinct 

144 

 
 
organisations in the 2014-2020 Programme and more than 77 000 from 2021 to 2023, supporting their 
cooperation and improving their practices. 

Erasmus+  significantly  surpasses  what  could  be  achieved  by  individual  countries  at  national  or 
international levels. Its benefits stem from the opportunities it provides to personal, educational and 
professional development of learners and staff, to cross-border cooperation of organisations and to 
policy  development  in  the  fields  of  education  and  training,  youth  and  sport,  providing  significant 
benefits to those to take part in the programme compared to those who do not. Without Erasmus+, 
the  benefits  deriving  from  the  Programme  for  individuals  and  organisations  would  be  drastically 
reduced. Internationalisation of education, training, youth and sport sectors would be reduced to close 
to zero in several countries, especially in the youth and sport sectors. Erasmus+ funds over half  of 
credit mobilities in the Member States, and in half of the EU countries over 90% of short mobility300. 

The  programme  is  also  responding  to  emerging  needs  related  to  new  challenges  posed  by 
technological developments, in particular the emergence of generative artificial intelligence and the 
provision  of  skills  to  support  EU  competitiveness.  Erasmus+  is  investing  in  supporting  the 
development of skills needed to provide the EU single market and industrial sectors with the future-
proof skills needed to tackle the challenges of competitiveness, as highlighted in Draghi and Letta 
reports. The funding of learning mobility - which is at the heart of the programme - appears key to 
ensure that the younger generations are equipped with the right skills to face the challenges posed in 
a rapidly evolving context. The Programme has also become more inclusive and has increased the 
share  of  people  with  fewer  opportunities  amongst  its  participants,  going  from  around  10%  in  the 
2014-2020 period to around 16% in 2023301.  

Furthermore, the programme is also responding to emerging needs related to new challenges posed 
by technological developments, in particular the emergence of generative artificial intelligence and 
the  provision  of  skills  to  support  EU  competitiveness.  Erasmus+  is  investing  in  supporting  the 
development of skills needed to provide the EU single market and industrial sectors with the future-
proof skills needed to tackle the challenges of competitiveness, as highlighted in Draghi and Letta 
reports. The funding of learning mobility - which is at the heart of the programme - appears key to 
ensure that the younger generations are equipped with the right skills to face the challenges posed in 
a rapidly evolving context. The Programme has also become more inclusive and has increased the 
share  of  people  with  fewer  opportunities  amongst  its  participants,  going  from  around  10%  in  the 
2014-2020 period to around 16% in 2023302.  

Despite the clear progress, the evaluation has identified some still existing barriers to the participation 
of people with fewer opportunities. Erasmus+ should thus keep addressing accessibility challenges, 
continuing to expand its reach to participants with fewer opportunities. Further clarifying definitions 
of  people  with  fewer  opportunities  and  providing  clearer  guidance  on  the  measures  available  to 
support their participation would also enhance inclusivity.  

Reviewing funding rules, simpler reporting procedures and streamlining across the various actions 
and  fields  should  be  assessed  to  simplify  access  for  small  and  newcomer  organisations.  The 
evaluation  also  identified  needs  for  simplifying  alternative  funding,  facilitating  transfer  of  funds 
between instruments and breaking down barriers between different operational modes and funding 
rules to build more synergies between Erasmus+ and other instruments and foster projects’ upscaling. 
That should also be done via better dissemination of projects outcomes. 

145 

 
 
The evaluation shows the international added value of the programme, essential for promoting EU 
values,  intercultural  learning,  raising  awareness  of  civic  and  active  participation  but  also  for 
facilitating peer learning and bringing European expertise in the fields of education, training, youth 
and sport to other regions. Erasmus+ could consider widening its cooperation with non-EU countries 
not associated to the programme. 

The Erasmus+ evaluation identified opportunities to improve coherence with the European Solidarity 
Corps and to identify ways to address potential overlaps, improving overall efficiency and increasing 
clarity for stakeholders. 

European Solidarity Corps  

The  final  evaluation  of  the  2018-2020  Programme  and  interim  evaluation  of  the  2021-2027 
Programme303 have found that the European Solidarity Corps performs well across the five evaluation 
criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, EU added value). The European Solidarity 
Corps  addresses  European  society’s  crucial  needs,  especially  in  fostering  civic  participation  and 
promoting inclusion and diversity. The programme fosters a sense of community, revitalising local 
initiatives  and  promoting  a  broader  global  perspective.  Participation  contributes  to  improved 
personal,  professional  and  study  skills  and  social  and  civic  awareness.  The  programme  has  also 
consistently met its targets on participants with fewer opportunities (30% in 2022 and 2023304). The 
evaluation’s outcomes confirm that the European Solidarity Corps plays an essential role and, in some 
countries,  is  the  only  alternative  for  youth  volunteering  and  solidarity.  A  number  of  areas  for 
improvement have been identified.  Key recommendations suggest improving the identification of 
people  with  fewer  opportunities  to  facilitate  their  further  inclusion  in  the  programme,  aligning 
programme objectives and funding, addressing differences in the geographical distribution of results 
and impacts, improving visa arrangements for non-EU nationals and improving IT and monitoring 
tools, and clarifying the purpose of the humanitarian aid strand. Funding has generally proven very 
limited  given  the  programme’s  ambitions  and  objectives.  The  programme  complements  EU 
programmes like Erasmus+, but actual synergies are somewhat limited, suggesting a need for more 
structured efforts.  

A  potential  area  of  duplication  highlighted  by  the  evaluation  concerns  Erasmus+  Youth 
Participation  activities  and  Solidarity  projects  funded  under  the  European  Solidarity  Corps,  both 
supporting youth-led initiatives run by informal groups of young people, fostering active citizenship 
and sense of initiative. Solidarity projects have a stronger solidarity component, supporting mostly 
bottom-up local solidarity activities with a view to addressing key challenges within the communities 
the young people carrying the project live in. Nevertheless, the many common areas of action suggest 
the need to reflect on potential overlaps and improve communication on the differences to potential 
applicants.  The  support  activities  aiming  at  increasing  the  quality  implementation  of  the  two 
programmes also emerge as examples for possible overlaps. Both activities are run by the same 
National Agencies, active in the youth field, and fund very similar activities, reaching out to 
target  groups  that  are  often  the  same.  These  activities  represent  opportunities  for  synergies 
between the programmes, they could also be looked at to seek for some economy of scale and improve 
efficiency.   

Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps – Coherence with other EU policies and instruments  

Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps (ESC) exhibit a high degree of external coherence with 
key  EU  priorities,  including  education,  skills  development,  inclusion,  youth  engagement,  and 
democratic participation. Evaluations of both the 2014–2020 and 2021–2027 programmes confirm 
their  complementarity  with  major  EU  instruments  of  the  2021-2027  programming  period  such  as 

146 

 
 
ESF+, Horizon Europe, Interreg, and the RRF. This supports the programmes’ roles in building a 
lifelong  learning  society,  enhancing  employability,  and  promoting  civic  values  in  line  with  EU 
strategic frameworks like the European Education Area and the European Pillar of Social Rights.  

Erasmus+  alignment  with  broader  EU  objectives  –  such  as  the  European  Education  Area,  the 
European Skills Agenda, the Digital Education Action Plan, and the European Green Deal – makes 
it well-positioned to drive systemic change. The expansion of its scope in 2021–2027 to include adult 
education,  sport  staff  mobility,  and  initiatives  like  DiscoverEU  further  enhanced  its  external 
coherence. These new dimensions support skills formation, intercultural understanding, and social 
inclusion, while expanding access to previously underserved groups. They also align with the broader 
objectives  of  building  a  Union  of  Skills,  fostering  lifelong  learning,  and  promoting  fairness  and 
Flagship initiatives such as European Universities alliances, Centres of Vocational Excellence, and 
Erasmus+ Teacher Academies which are already deeply embedded in the EU’s strategic education 
and skills  policy frameworks1. These structures also  contribute directly to  building  a resilient and 
interconnected  European  Education  Area  and  advancing  international  partnerships  via  the  Global 
Gateway. Their contribution is not only educational but also socio-political, fostering networks that 
link education, innovation, and regional development. In practice, they have also generated valuable 
spill-over  effects  in  terms  of  curriculum  modernisation,  institutional  reform,  and  cross-sectoral 
cooperation, which are increasingly relevant  for Member States' national  reform  efforts  supported 
under the European Semester.  

The  European  Solidarity  Corps  complements  Erasmus+  by  offering  volunteering  and  solidarity 
experiences to young people outside of formal education and training frameworks.   

Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps (even at a lesser extent) already benefit from deepening 
synergies with other EU funding streams:  

•  Horizon  Europe:  Especially  under  Pillars  I  and  III,  links  with  Marie-Sklodowska-Curie 
Actions and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology boost research mobility and 
innovation  ecosystems. Horizon  Europe  Missions  are  directly  supported  by  the  European 
Solidarity Corps.  

•  ESF+: Supports inclusion and scale-up of Erasmus+ pilots. Germany’s transfer of EUR 57 

million from ESF+ to fund inclusive mobility is a notable example.  

•  ERDF  &  Interreg:  Complement  skills  and  education  infrastructure,  particularly  in  smart 

specialisation regions.   

•  RRF: Supports national education reforms; e.g. Italy dedicated EUR 150 million for school 

mobility in disadvantaged areas.  

These synergies allow for scaling successful pilot actions and integrating Erasmus+ and the Corps 
results into wider  employment and inclusion strategies at  national  level.  Survey data  confirm  this 
complementarity:  45%  of  organisations  participating  in  multiple  EU  programmes  saw  a  link  to 
Erasmus+, often as a continuation or upscaling of earlier efforts.  

The coherence with EU funding, the European Semester and policy priorities – such as Cohesion 
Policy, the RRF, the European Semester, and the European Pillar of Social Rights, connected to the 
RRF and the European Semester, jointly shape education and inclusion initiatives, confirming strong 

147 

 
 
alignment with Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps objectives. In this, the Pillar’s principles 
1,  3,  4,  11,  17,  20  correspond  to  the  combination  of  Erasmus+  and  European  Solidarity  Corps’ 
objectives on lifelong learning, equity, and civic engagement.  Furthermore, the European Semester’s 
country-cpecific  recommendations  (CSRs)  reinforce  national  reforms  in  areas  like  upskilling, 
inclusion, and digital education.   

148 

 
 
ANNEX 9: PROBLEMS, PROBLEM DRIVERS AND THEIR EVOLUTION  

Table 1: Evolution of problems based on megatrends305 

Megatrend 

Connections 

1.Accelerating 
technological 
change 
and 
hyperconnectivity 

2.Changing 
nature of work 

3.Changing 
security paradigm 

4.  Diversification 
education, 
of 
training 
and 
learning   

5.Widening 
inequalities   

6.Growing 
consumption  

to 

increasingly  exposed 

Education systems struggle to keep pace with fast-moving technological innovation 
and students’ digital realities. Many lack the capacity to integrate AI, digital tools 
and  media  literacy  into  teaching  and  learning  at  scale.  Hyperconnectivity  among 
youth increases exposure to online manipulation, while educators are often under-
equipped. For the CCS, media and audiovisual, technology is transforming access, 
production  and  distribution.  In  education  and  training,  digital  learning  platforms 
expand,  while  young  people  are  hyperconnected  among  themselves  and  to  global 
trends.  Technological  changes  are  also  reshaping  justice  systems  and  posing  new 
challenges to fundamental rights, EU values and democratic processes. Social media, 
more than driving civic activism, are also means of exposure to disinformation and 
echo chambers.  
As technology and demographic changes rapidly influence labour markets, there is a 
continuous need for reskilling and upskilling. Education and training systems often 
do not have the tools to rapidly adapt to the current changes, including the growth of 
AI.  Skills  gaps  in  digital  literacy,  adaptability,  civic  engagement  require  a  multi-
faceted approach, combining mobility, solidarity, but also training and professional 
development opportunities for all.  
Hybrid  threats,  such  as  disinformation  and  foreign  information  manipulation  and 
interference,  entail  new  security  challenges  and  require  enhanced  cross-border 
cooperation.  Schools  and  universities  are 
these: 
disinformation,  radicalisation,  and  political  interference.  Yet  education’s  role  in 
building  democratic  resilience,  societal  cohesion,  and  cultural  awareness  is  not 
comprehensively supported. Also, Media, culture and civil society are at frontline to 
strengthen societal resilience through media pluralism, media literacy, democratic 
and civic participation, appreciation of our cultural diversity and common cultural 
features,  upholding  of  European  values  and  mobilising  communities.  They  also 
contribute to the EU’s external soft power.  
Learning is no longer confined to formal settings. Digital, informal, and non-formal 
learning  pathways  are  expanding  but  often  remain  disconnected  and  under-
recognised. National systems alone struggle to ensure quality, equity and portability. 
The education, training and learning are changing with the rise of digital platforms, 
new  demands,  and  informal  and  non-formal  learning.  While  flexible  and  diverse 
learning models can increase access and inclusion, they can also lead to fragmented 
education experiences and unequal recognition of learning outcomes. 
Inequalities in access to quality education, digital tools, and cultural opportunities 
are  widening  —  especially  among  young  people,  marginalised  groups  including 
Roma,  and  across  territories.  Without  effective  public  intervention,  including  in 
support  for  civil  society,  inequalities  are  likely  to  continue  growing,  being 
exacerbated by ongoing trends such as technological disruption, climate change, and 
migration. Inequality is holding economic growth back and can threaten democracy 
and social cohesion. Young people are particularly affected by inequalities but also 
mental health issues that affect social cohesion. 
The rise of algorithm-driven content and low attention spans challenges traditional 
educational  formats  and  trust  in  knowledge.  Media  consumption  habits  fragment 
learning experiences, and the authority of teachers is often undermined. Education 
systems need support to adapt pedagogies, foster digital discernment, and promote 
media literacy – best achieved through joint EU initiatives and teacher cooperation. 
Also, growing consumption has transformed the media into a fast-paced, attention-
driven  environment,  undermining  trust  in  journalism.  In  the  audiovisual  sector,  it 

 
 
  
7.Increasing 
influence  of  new 
governing systems   

exacerbates the power of major non-EU platforms, threatening the availability of and 
access to a diversity of audiovisual and media content.  

As  global  and  non-state  actors  shape  narratives  and  policy  spaces,  the  role  of 
education in developing civic awareness and critical agency becomes more urgent. 
Yet national education reforms alone are insufficient to prepare young people for a 
complex and interdependent world. New governing systems are often driven by non-
state actors, digital platforms, and the internationalisation of decision-making. Given 
this, the role of civil society and other non-state actors is even more important in 
protecting  fundamental  rights,  shaping  public  decisions,  and  holding  public 
institutions  accountable. Media,  as  a ‘watchdog’  of  democracy, is fundamental in 
informing,  entertaining,  and  socialising.  Education  is  essential  through  the 
promotion of solidarity and critical thinking for the youth. 

Table 2: Classification of policy-related problem drivers 

Problem 1: Threats to democracy, fundamental rights and EU values, culture and cultural diversity, 
and shrinking civic and media spaces 

Problem drivers  

Outlook 
vs recurrent) 

(new 

of 

Type 
problem 
(societal,  market  vs. 
regulatory) 

Examples  of  gaps  (as  shown 
by evaluations and other data 
sources).  

Threats to EU values  Recurrent / 

Societal 

Emerging 
the 
during 
course  of 
this 
MFF  term  with 
new/enhanced 
threats 
to 
equality, respect 
for  fundamental 
rights 

150 

threats 

•  2024 OSCE ODIHR reports 
found  an  increase  in  online 
hate  speech,  violence  and 
in  specific 
death 
(e.g. 
Member 
Belgium,  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands),  with  many 
online  harassment  cases 
targeted at women. 

States 

on 

•  As  revealed  by  a  2023 
Special Eurobarometer 493, 
discrimination 
in  Europe 
for 
remains  widespread, 
instance  with  54%  of 
respondents  agreeing  with 
the 
this 
grounds 
sexual 
orientation. 
•  Gender-based 

statement 
of 

violence 
remains  a  persistent  and 
widespread 
fundamental 
rights  abuse  in  the  EU. 
Evidence that Eurostat, FRA 
and  the  EIGE  published  in 
2024  shows  that  a  third  of 
women  in  the  EU  have 

 
 
 
to 

Challenges 
rule  of 
judicial systems 

the 
law  and 

Recurrent /  

Societal  

Market 

Emerging 
during 
the 
this 
course  of 
MFF  term  with 
new,  persistent 
systemic 
and 
the 
threats 
rule 
law 
of 
across  EU  as 
well  as  specific 
challenges 
for 
judicial systems.  

to 

experienced  violence 
at 
home,  at  work  or  in  public  
(cf.  Eurostat,  FRA  and 
EIGE 2024306). 

•  The 

European 
Commission’s  2024  rule  of 
law report, as well as recent 
developments,  highlight  a 
broad range of threats to EU 
values 
across  Member 
States. 

•  Insights from the EU Justice 
Scoreboard  2024  and  Flash 
Eurobarometer 
540 
highlight progress to deliver 
justice 
effective  national 
systems  in  Member  States, 
but  also 
for 
continued improvement, for 
instance  in  the  uptake  of 
digitalisation 
cross 
border judicial cooperation. 

the  need 

and 

Obstacles 
democratic 
participation 
societal resilience 

and 

to 

Recurrent 

Societal 

•  According to the 3rd EEAS 

•  Decreasing electoral 

turnout, 
disengagement in 
traditional political 
frameworks 

•  Foreign information 
manipulation and 
interference 

Emerging 
the 
during 
course  of 
this 
MFF  term  with 
new  challenges 
for 
linked, 
instance, 
to 
foreign 
information 
manipulation 
and  interference 
(FIMI) 

Report on Foreign 
Information Manipulation 
and Interference Threats 
(2025), democratic 
institutions and processes, 
especially elections, have 
been major FIMI targets in 
2024. Among the electoral 
events with most incidents 
recorded are the 2024 
European Elections, the 
Moldovan Presidential 
elections and EU accession 
referendum, and the French 
legislative elections.  

•  Based  on  data  gathered 
though 
Special 
Eurobarometers  514  and 
552,  citizens’  participation 
social 
in  political 
activities  remains  limited. 
Between  2021  and  2024, 

and 

151 

 
 
 
 
 
Pressures 
on 
European  media  and 
the 
information 
landscape 

there  was  a  notable  drop  in 
those who declared that they 
voted  in  local,  national  or 
European elections.  

•  According to Media 

Pluralism Monitor Report, 
23 out of 27 Member States 
are in high or medium risk 
to media pluralism. 
•  Europeans continue to 

watch more content from 
the US than from other EU 
countries, as US films 
capture 70% of the box 
office, whilst US streamers 
capture 80% of all 
subscriptions. 

•  Only 25% of tickets for 

European films are being 
sold outside the film’s 
country of origin, and 
online the consumption of 
content from EU Member 
States is decreasing 
(European Media Industry 
Outlook). 

•  All EU news media 
companies together 
(newspapers, magazines, 
TV, radio, podcasts) and in 
all platforms (both online 
and offline) capture less 
advertising revenues than 
online platforms (EUR 35 
bn vs 41 bn in 2023) 
(European Media Industry 
Outlook). 

•  Misinformation and 

disinformation are ranked 
as the first threat in the 
coming years (World 
Economic Forum’s Global 
risk perception survey, 
2024). 68% of Europeans 
believe they are exposed to 
disinformation on a weekly 

Recurrent/  

Societal 

Emerging 
the 
during 
course  of 
this 
MFF term as the 
integrity  of  the  
information 
landscape 
is 
challenged,  and 
an 
to 
due 
increased 
presence of non-
EU 
platforms 
and  competitors 
in the media and 
audiovisual 
fields.  

Shortcoming  of 
public 
intervention. 

•  Shifting and 

evolving audience 
habits 

•  Unequal access to 
high-quality and 
diverse European 
media content 
•  The growth of 
disinformation 
•  Media pluralism at 

• 

threat 
Insufficient levels of 
digital and media 
literacy 

Market 

•  Competition with 
non-EU online 
platforms; 

•  Limited circulation 
of media content 
within the EU. 

Regulatory 

•  Existing regulations 
needed to streamline 
and address 
problems in the 
audiovisual and 
media markets 
(AVMSD, EMFA), 
whose 
implementation 
requires financial 
support. 

152 

 
 
 
 
 
basis (European Media 
Industry Outlook). 
•  Lack of awareness and 
appreciation of cultural 
diversity 

•  Limited access to 

diverse cultural content 
on digital platforms 
•  Limited mobility of 

CCS professionals and 
circulation of CCS 
content 

• 

In the EU, of the 800 top 
R&D investors, only 7 are 
media firms (European 
Media Industry Outlook). 
•  Only 10% of audiovisual 

• 

• 

professionals participate in 
training programmes 
regularly (European Media 
Industry Outlook). 
In the news media sector, 
the traditional revenue 
streams are gradually 
declining, and the increase 
in digital revenues does not 
offset this decrease (-9 bn 
vs +1.9 bn between 2019-
23) (European Media 
Industry Outlook). 
In the video games sector, 
EU companies account for 
just 13% of global 
revenues, far behind their 
US or East-Asian 
counterparts (European 
Media Industry Outlook). 

Obstacles  to  cultural 
and 
cooperation, 
preservation 
of 
cultural heritage 

to 
and 

Obstacles 
innovation 
technological 
dependencies 
affecting democratic, 
societal, cultural and 
media players 

Recurrent,  but 
more 
made 
acute 
in 
particular  with 
surge  of  AI, 
increased 
threats to artistic 
and 
freedom 
impact 
of 
climate  change 
and  geopolitical 
context 
on 
heritage  

Societal and Market 

•  Limited 

resources for 
cross-border 
cooperation at 
national/regional 
levels 

•  Fragmentation of 
the CCS along 
national and 
linguistic lines 

Recurrent 

Market 

•  Limited access to 
reskilling and 
upskilling of 
professionals 
•  Changing business 
models and revenue 
streams 
•  Low private 
investment 
•  Dependencies on 

non-EU companies 

Problem 2: Shortfall of skills and key competences for life and jobs 

153 

 
 
 
 
 
Problem drivers  

and 

Low 
unequal 
capacity to deliver high 
innovation, 
quality, 
inclusiveness 
and 
insufficient 
cooperation 
knowledge sharing 

and 

Outlook 
vs 
(new 
recurrent) 

Recurrent 

Type  of 
problem 
(societal, 
market, 
regulator
y, etc.) 

Societal 
and 
economic  

Examples of gaps (as shown by evaluations and 
data sources). 

•  2022 results of the OECD’s PISA show that 
in all three subjects tested, the mean score for 
EU27  has  steadily  decreased  over  the  past 
decade.  A  substantial  drop  of  18  points  was 
recorded  in  mathematics  (from  491.7  to 
473.7)  between  2018  and  2022,  while  the 
decrease  was  smaller  in  reading  (-12)  (from 
486 to 474.1) and science (-3.4) (from 487 to 
483.7). 

•  According to Eurostat, in 2023 more than half 
of  EU  enterprises  that  recruited  or  tried  to 
recruit  ICT  specialists  had  difficulties  in 
filling ICT vacancies.307  

•  Even though the rate of early school leaving 
has improved at the EU level, decreasing by 
1.8 percentage points in the period 2013-2024 
and  is  on  track  to  reach  the  2030  EU  level 
target  of  less  than  9%,  the  share  of  early 
school leaving was 9.3% in 2024 on average 
across  EU  countries,  and  still  considerable 
differences exist across and within countries, 
with  persisting  inequalities  among  specific 
groups and territories.308 

in 

target  of  at 

•  Nearly two thirds (65.3%) of recent medium-
level  VET  graduates 
the  EU  has 
experienced  work-based  learning  as  part  of 
their  curriculum,  comfortably  exceeding  the 
least  60%. 
2025  EU-level 
However, work-based learning shows a high 
dispersion  across  EU  countries.  Nearly  all 
graduates take part in work-based learning in 
the  Netherlands,  Germany  and  Spain.  Yet 
very few experienced work-based learning as 
part of their VET curriculum in Romania and 
Czechia. There are EU countries covering the 
full spectrum in between these two extremes  
•  Compared  to  the  EU  average,  some  regions 
have  a  significantly  lower  share  of  tertiary-
level educated people. Over 80% of regions in 
Italy,  Romania,  Czech  Republic,  Portugal, 

154 

 
 
and Bulgaria had tertiary education attainment 
rates below 30% in 2022.309 

the 

•  Support  study  to  the  final  evaluation  of 
Erasmus+  2014-2020  and 
interim 
evaluation of Erasmus+ 2021-2027 highlight 
that  84%  of  public  consultation  respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed that they would not 
have  been  able  to  fund  the  cooperation 
activities undertaken without Erasmus+. Most 
beneficiary organisations interviewed for case 
studies  confirmed  the  inability  to  undertake 
similar activities without Erasmus+ support.   
•  According to PISA 2022, the share of students 
who  report  being  frequently  bullied  ranges 
from 13% to 29% . 

to  cross-
learning 
including 

Obstacles 
border 
mobility, 
insufficient 
opportunities for all 

Recurrent 

• 

Societal 
and 
economic  

In 2022, the outbound mobility rate310  stood 
at 10.9% at EU level,311 12 percentage points 
lower than the target set for 2030. At the same 
time, the latest estimates suggest that 5.1% of 
medium-level  VET  learners  had  a  mobility 
experience abroad, 8 percentage point below 
the 2030 target. 

•  Erasmus+  evaluation  findings  show  that  the 
scale of Erasmus+ is much bigger than that of 
other  comparable  schemes  reviewed  in  the 
fields of education, training, youth, and sport 
with  an  involvement  of  25  times  more 
to 
participants  per  year  compared 
the 
similar 
other 
average 
cumulative 
international funding programmes.  
In  higher  education,  Eurostat  statistics  show 
that  55%  of  those  tertiary  graduates  having 
spent  abroad  at  least  three  months  in  2022 
benefited from Erasmus+.312 

of 

• 

•  Around  20%  of  Eurodesk  2022  survey 
respondents indicated that they cannot afford 
to  go  abroad  unless  through  a  fully  funded 
mobility  activity.  The  ratio  is  even  higher 
(34%) for young people who are not engaged 
training 
in  education,  employment,  or 
(NEETs). 

Barriers 
transparency 
recognition 

to 
and 
of 

Recurrent 

Societal 
and 

• 

Insufficient  transparency  and  comparability 
of qualifications in the EU arise from diverse 
educational  and  training  systems  in  Europe, 
combined with an uneven implementation of 

155 

 
 
qualifications 
borders   

across 

economic, 
regulatory 

• 

field  of 

EU  transparency  tools  (EQF,  ESCO  and 
Europass)  and  a  lack  of  digitalisation.  This 
results  in  overqualification,  in  particular  of 
third country migrants (34.9%).  
regulated  professions, 
In 
the 
their 
have 
individuals 
qualifications recognized often face complex 
administrative  procedures, 
to 
delays in recognition (28% reported excessive 
documentation requirements,  and 16% faced 
significant delays). 

seeking 

leading 

to 

lifelong 

Unexploited  potential 
of 
learning, 
including  non-formal 
and informal 

Recurrent 

Societal 
and 
economic 

•  The  Education  and  Training  Monitor  2024 
highlights  that  the  share  of  adults  that  have 
taken  part  in  training  in  the  past  12  months 
stands at  39.5 %, whereas  the 2030 target  is 
60%. 

•  The digital skills gap in Europe is significant: 
while  70%  of  young  people  (16-24)  have  at 
least  basic digital skills, this share decreases 
to 37% among the older age group (55-74)313. 
A  gap  of  15314  percentage  points  exist 
between rural and urban areas regarding basic 
digital skills. 

•  The  European  Commission  study  “Youth 
work in the EU” published in 2021 shows that 
two thirds of youth workers declare the need 
to have more available funding for non-formal 
activities. All focus group participants voiced 
need for structural and long-term funding, the 
absence of which hinders long-term planning 
and investment in non -formal learning.  

Recurrent 

Societal  

Obstacles  to  societal 
civic 
engagement, 
education 
and 
solidarity 

156 

•  The  European  Parliament  study  on  young 
people’s participation in European democratic 
processes (March 2023) highlights that young 
people  are  turning  away  from  traditional 
politics and democratic structures while using 
social  media  as  their  main  access  to  public 
debate.  They  participate  less  in  institutional 
politics than other age groups and less than the 
cohorts  of  young  people  decades  ago. 
According  to  the  EP  Youth  Survey  2024,  a 
significant  majority  (76%)  of  young  people 
believed 
to 
disinformation  and  fake  news  in  the  seven 
days prior to the survey. 

they  had  been 

exposed 

 
 
 
•  According  to  the  European  Commission 
report  “Learning  about  the  EU:  European 
topics  and  school  curricula  across  EU 
Member  States”  from  2021,  citizenship 
education  on  the  EU  and  its  values  remains 
uneven. 

•  Young people’s belief in equal opportunities 
has  sharply  declined,  with  a  16-percentage 
point drop in the last decade, according to the 
2022 Eurobarometer. Many feel marginalised 
due  to  their  socio-economic  status,  ethnic 
origin,  gender,  sexual  orientation,  disability, 
or  political  views,  particularly  those  with 
fewer opportunities or those living in rural or 
remote areas, with close to 18 million young 
people at risk of social exclusion in the EU.315 

157 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 10: INTERVENTION LOGIC 

1. Logical links between problem drivers and strategic objectives 

10.1 Logical links between Problem 1 and General Objective 1  

10.2 Logical links between Problem 2 and General Objective 2 

10.3 Logical links between Problem 3 and General Objective 3 

158 

 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Logical  links  between  specific  objectives  and  areas  of  intervention  and  examples  of  how 

success can be measured 

The following tables provide illustrative examples, per policy area, on how success would look like 
and possible ways to measure it.  

General objective 1: Enhance and deepen the EU  ability to financially contribute, provide added 
value and promote fundamental rights and EU values, democracy, media and culture 

Policy 

Areas of Intervention 

Illustrating  success:  examples  of  possible  output 
and/or result indicators  

Rights and values 

SO 1.1. Contribute to upholding the rule of law, fundamental rights and 
equality, reduce discrimination and empower civil society 

Support to fundamental 
rights, 
anti-
discrimination 
measures  and  digital 
rights protection 

Substantial  increase  of  awareness  of  rights  and  values, 
measured by e.g.: (a) Increase of citizens’ awareness of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; or, (b) Increase 
of  citizens’  awareness  of  the  General  Data  Protection 
Regulation 

Support  to  civil  society 
organisations, 
human 
rights  defenders  and 
whistleblowers 

Enabling conditions for a vibrant civic space in Europe 
are supported, as measured e.g. by: (a) Number of CSOs 
reached by support and capacity building activities 

159 

 
 
 
 
Rights and values 

SO 1.2. Contribute to fighting against gender-based violence, violence against 
children and other groups at risk 

Ending violence against 
women  and  girls  and 
other groups at risk 

Substantial decrease of violence against women and girls 
in  Europe,  as  measured  e.g.  by:  (a)  Degree  of 
implementation of the gender equality strategy 

Support  to  victims  and 
survivors  of  gender-
based violence  

Victims  of  gender  based  violence  are  supported  to 
address the impacts of such violence, as measured e.g. by: 
(a) Number of people reached by activities (by gender) 

Rights and values 

SO 1.3. Contribute to enhancing democratic resilience and participation 

Promote 
engagement 
participation 

citizens 
and 

A substantially increased number of EU citizens believe 
that  they  can  meaningfully  participate  in  democratic 
processes, as measured e.g. by: (a) Citizens perception on 
democratic participation (cf. “my voice counts” question 
in standard Eurobarometers) (by gender) 

Freedom of expression, 
countering 
disinformation 
promoting  access 
public information 

and 
to 

Substantially increased capacity of civic actors to identify 
threats, 
and  counteract  disinformation  and  other 
measured  e.g.  by:  (a)  Number  of  CSOs  reached  by 
support and capacity building activities.  

Media 

SO 1.4. Contribute to supporting news media, media independence and tackling 
disinformation 

Protect  news  media 
outlets  and  journalists 
&  address 
to 
and 
media 
pluralism 

freedom 

risks 

Improved  media  pluralism  in  Europe  and  protection  of 
news media outlets and journalists, measured e.g. by: (a) 
Results  of  the  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  Report;  (b) 
Number  of  cases  of  media  and  journalists  under  threat 
detected and assessed 

Enhance 
the 
production,  distribution 
and  consumption  of 
professional journalistic 
content 

Support 
digital 
the 
transformation  of  news 
organisations 
and 
innovative practices 

measures 
Promote 
aimed  at  monitoring 
the 
and  safeguarding 

Increased  production,  distribution  and  consumption  of 
professional  journalistic  content;  more  citizens  that 
declare 
themselves  well-informed  on  EU  affairs, 
measured e.g. by: (a) Number of professional journalistic 
content  pieces  produced  under  support;  (b)  Number  of 
supported  news  media  entities;  (c)  Number  of  projects 
across borders; (d) Audience reach and engagement  
Increased digitalisation of news organisations and higher 
use of innovative practices, measured e.g. by: (a) Number 
of  digital  tools  adopted;  (b)  Share  of  total  production 
from digital products (c) Number of innovative editorial 
projects 
The  EU  capacity  to  detect,  analyse  and  store  sufficient 
evidence  about 
important 
disinformation  campaigns  on  social  media  increases, 

the  most  visible  and 

160 

 
 
online 
space 

information 

Promote  digital  and 
media literacy activities 
to empower EU citizens 
to  make  well-informed 
choices 
regards 
as 
media consumption 

measured  e.g.  by:  (a)  Number  of  disinformation  cases 
formally  reported  and  assessed;  (b)  Number  of  fact-
checking 
initiatives  supported/coordinated  via  EU 
mechanisms 
More citizens declaring themselves able to interact with 
media, measured e.g. by: (a) Number of supported 
actions on digital and media literacy; (b) Number of 
people targeted by supported actions 

Media 

SO 1.5. Support production, circulation, and access of EU audiovisual and 
media content 

Support  to  the  creation 
of audiovisual content 

Support  to  circulation 
of audiovisual content 

Support  to  access  to 
audiovisual content 

Level  playing 
geographic 
language diversity 

field, 
and 

Support to video games 

Support  to  cross-media 
IP exploitation 

Improvements  in  the  creation  of  audiovisual  content, 
measured e.g. by: (a) Number and share of coproductions 
among  supported  works,  including  (i)  the  number  of 
coproductions involving a low-capacity country, and (ii) 
led by a low-capacity country; (b) Number and share of 
works supported for development that are released within 
4 years after being given support 
Increased  circulation  of  audiovisual  content,  measured 
e.g. by: (a) Number of non-national EU countries where 
a  supported  EU  work  is  available  on  average,  also 
separately for (i) cinemas, (ii) on TV and (iii) streaming  

Increase access to audiovisual content, measured e.g. by: 
(a)  Number  of  total  admission  attributable  to  funded 
projects; (b) Non-national views of supported EU works 
in  the  EU,  also  separately  for  (i)  cinemas,  and  (ii) 
streaming 
Protection  of  the  geographic  and  linguistic  diversity  of 
the  audiovisual  content,  measured  e.g.  by:  (a)  The 
number  of  audiovisual  works  in  lesser-used  languages 
developed, produced and distributed with the support of 
the Programme and share of funding for these projects; 
(b) Number and share of participants from lower capacity 
countries in supported markets. 
Improvements in  the creation,  circulation  and access  to 
video games content, measured e.g. by: (a) Number and 
share of video games supported for development that are 
released; (b) Critical reception of supported video games 
(e.g., awards and aggregated reviews); 
Improvement 
IP  exploitation, 
the  cross-media 
measured e.g. by: (a) Number of supported adaptations of 
the IP into different media formats (e.g., books to movies, 
games to TV shows). 

in 

161 

 
 
 
 
Culture 

SO 1.6.  Increase in cross-border cultural cooperation, cultural participation 
and accessibility, and circulation of diverse cultural works, while strengthening 
cultural and creative sectors. 

Support  to  the  cross-
border  cooperation  and 
creation of a diversity of 
CCS content 

(a) 

by: 

Increase in the number of CCS international connections/ 
cooperations  and  artists  international  careers,  measured 
e.g. 
transnational 
Number 
cooperations/partnerships  supported;  (b)  Number  of 
artists and cultural professionals supported; (c) Results of 
the  mobility  on  the  career  of  artists  (co-productions, 
exhibitions, collaborations,…) 

of 

Support  to  the  cross-
border  circulation  of 
CCS content 

Increased 
Higher  visibility  of  European  works; 
knowledge 
about  non-national  European  works, 
measured e.g. by: (a) Geographical reach of cultural and 
creative content 

Support to participation 
and  access  of  all  to  a 
diversity 
CCS 
content  and  cultural 
heritage 

of 

Support to the capacity-
building 
skills 
development  of  CCS 
professionals 

and 

Cultural  content  and  heritage  are  more  accessible  to  a 
diversity  of  target  groups,  including  those  who  are 
normally excluded or face barriers, measured e.g. by: (a) 
Number of (and diversity of) visitors/number of people 
reached onsite and online in culture and heritage projects; 
(b) Number of partnerships created among heritage sites 
thanks to EU support 

Increased  capacity  of  CCS  organisations;  Artists/CCS 
professionals  have  higher  skills  in  priority  areas  (i.e. 
green/digital), measured e.g. by: (a) Number of capacity 
building and skills development activities supported (by 
sector/field);  (b)  Number  of  artists  and  cultural 
professionals who have received a training/participated in 
the capacity building activities 

Strengthening 
the 
international position of 
CCS 

Increased sense of belonging to a common cultural sphere 
in  third  countries  organisations,  measured  e.g.  by:  (a) 
Number  of  third  countries  organisations  involved  in 
supported  projects;  (b)  Sustained  cooperation  with  3rd 
countries organisations/artists 

Rights and 
values, media and 
culture 

SO 1.7. Spur cross-cutting innovation and promote sustainability of media, 
cultural and societal entities 

Support  innovation  in 
technology  

Improvements in the use of cross-cutting innovative tools 
and technology, measured e.g. by: (a) Number of active 
media company users of supported innovative tool at  3 
and  5  years  after  project  completion;  (b)  Share  of 
supported  media  innovation  projects  that  scale  beyond 
pilot phase; (c) Number of patents obtained or, number of 
users/beta testers 

162 

 
 
Upskilling 
reskilling 
professionals 

and 
of 

Foster access to finance 

in 

Improvements 
the  upskilling  and  reskilling  of 
professionals, measured e.g. by: (a) Number and share of 
participants who receive a training diploma/pass test; (b) 
Number and share of participants who apply  what  they 
learned  on  the  job;  (c)  Low-Capacity  Countries  and 
gender balance of participants 
Increase access to finance, measured e.g. by: (a) Change 
in  the  number  of  financial  institutions  actively  offering 
tailored financing products for media and other creative 
sector companies, over time 

General  objective  2:  Enhance  and  deepen  the  EU  ability  to  financially  contribute,  support  and 
provide added value to cross-border education and training, youth, sport and solidarity, contributing 
to skills for life and jobs 

Policy 

Areas of Intervention 

Examples  of  possible  output  and/or  result  indicators 
(to give an illustration of how success may look like) 

Education and 
training, youth 
and sport  

Education and 
training, youth 
and sport 

SO 2.1. Support transnational cooperation in the area of education and skills 

Education,  youth 
sport 

and 

Increased  quality,  inclusion,  sustainability,  innovation, 
excellence  and  internationalisation  of  education  and 
training,  youth  and  sport  participating  organisations, 
measured  e.g.  by:  (a)  Number  of  projects  addressing 
priorities on inclusion, digital and green; (b) Number of 
projects  producing/developing  innovative  measures  to 
increase the quality of education and training, youth and 
sport  activities;  (c)  Share  of  organisations  benefitting 
from  their  participation  in  transnational  cooperation 
activities  

SO 2.2. Support to transnational learning mobility and learning opportunities 

Education,  youth 
sport 

and 

Improved skills and competences for jobs and for life, of 
participants  and  increased  number  of  participants  with 
fewer  opportunities,  measured  e.g.  by:  (a)  Number  of 
participants  in  learning  mobility  and  volunteering;  (b) 
Number  of  participants  in  STEM  related  activities;  (c) 
Number  of  participants  with  fewer  opportunities;  (d) 
Share  of  participants  that  consider  they  have  benefited 
learning  mobility  or 
from 
volunteering activities; (e) Share of participants declaring 
that they have increased their key competences’  

their  participation 

in 

SO 2.3. Promote lifelong learning, improving skills and new competences. 

163 

 
 
 
Education and 
training, youth 
and sport 

Education,  youth 
sport 

and 

Improved skills and competences for jobs and for life, of 
participants;  Increased  opportunities  to  engage  in  non 
formal  and  informal  learning  and  sport;  Increased 
capacity  of  youth  work  and  youth  organisations,  
measured e.g. by: (a) Share of participants that consider 
they  have  benefited  from  their  participation  in  learning 
mobility  or  volunteering  activities;  (b)  Number  of 
participants in youth and sport activities; (c) Number of 
adult  learners;  (d)  Number  of  youth  workers  and  youth 
organisations  declaring  having  benefitted  from  their 
participation  

Education and 
training, youth 
and sport 

SO 2.4. Support policy experimentation and development accelerating 
modernisation 

Education,  youth 
sport 

and 

measured 

Acceleration  of  reforms  and  modernisation  at  system’s 
by:  
level, 
(a) Number of public authorities at national, regional of 
local  level  involved  in  funded  projects;  (b)  Share  of 
funded  projects  that  have  impacted/inspired  practices 
transferred  into  policies  and  triggered  modernisation  of 
systems at national level  

e.g. 

Education and 
training, youth 
and sport 

SO 2.5. Foster solidarity, civic education and engagement 

Education,  youth 
sport 

and 

Increased  active  participation,  solidarity  and  European 
sense of belonging among participants; Increase number 
of  activities  addressing  participation,  measured  e.g.  by: 
(a)  Share  of  participants  in  activities  directly  fostering 
solidarity  and  civic  engagement;  (b)  Number  of  KA2 
projects addressing the participation priority (c) Share of 
increased 
participants 
European  sense  of  belonging  after  participating  in 
learning mobility or volunteering activities  

they  have  an 

that  consider 

164 

 
 
ANNEX  11:  OBJECTIVES-BASED  MERGER.  MODELLING  OF 
COMPLEMENTARITIES.  

INSTRUMENTS,  SYNERGIES  AND 

This Annex offers a brief description of the two instruments, and provides examples on how the alignment 
between the proposed financial architecture and the policy priorities would generate the desired synergies, 
complementarities and results within each of the two.  

11.1.  A dedicated instrument for fundamental rights, EU values and democracy, media and culture. 

Scope of financing. The new instrument will support the implementation of fundamental rights policy, the 
rule of law, equality and EU values as well as a thriving civic space; will support a viable, competitive 
and pluralistic media and audiovisual space; and safeguard and protect cultural and linguistic diversity 
and heritage (i.e. General Objective 1). It will provide, ideally, for a single-entry point to all stakeholders 
active in these policy fields, allowing for efficiency gains on aspects such as administrative burden and 
economies of scale. The new instrument will continue to support current successful actions (as shown by 
the evaluations) but also emerging policy areas requiring robust EU responses (e.g. democratic resilience, 
support  to  news  media,  fight  against  disinformation,  Culture  Compass  for  Europe).  It  will  empower 
societal, cultural and media stakeholders across the board, boosting digital transformation and innovation 
(e.g. AI), developing sectoral skills, and enhancing access to finance via blending instruments.  

Implementation. The new instrument  will allow  for a more flexible allocation of budgetary resources, 
addressing shortcomings of the current intervention logic316, and articulate stronger synergies. It will align 
implementation modes where relevant, work programmes, calls for proposals, monitoring and evaluation 
frameworks317. The new financial architecture will allow for a closer alignment with policy priorities, for 
instance by streamlining and focusing the EU direct support to the culture, media and union values sectors, 
in ways that increase added value as shown in Chapter 3. Direct EU funding to non-state actors, such as 
civil society organisations and human rights defenders who work on the promotion of EU values and who 
cannot  rely  on  funding  from  their  Member  States,  supports  the  implementation  of  EU  policies  on  the 
ground. Direct  funding is  equally necessary  for the audiovisual  stakeholders, which  face transnational 
competition, as well as for news media organisations and journalists, amidst a context of deteriorating 
media pluralism. As shown by evaluations, such direct support to culture, media and civic stakeholders is 
essential  for  maintaining  efficiency  and  alignment  with  EU  goals,  thus  constituting  an  efficient  and 
effective way to deliver EU policy objectives in this fields.   

A  successful  implementation  of  the  preferred  option  will  require  flexible  design,  upstream  and 
downstream coordination, and harmonized tools that foster synergies within and beyond the clusters and 
enhance  accessibility  to  funding  for  beneficiaries  through  simplified  processes.  It  will  also  enhance 
coordination,  visibility,  communication,  and  outreach  across  policy  areas.  For  instance,  the  new 
framework  would  foster  connections  between  existing  and  new  strategies  on  democracy,  media  and 
culture.  For  example,  this  could  include  projects  supporting  civil  society  organisations’  journalistic 
activities, especially at local level; involving CSOs in audiovisual screenings in isolated communities; the 
support of film festivals focusing on fundamental rights. At the same time, it will retain a focus on each 
of these policies and their visibility.  

Table 11.1: Links between specific objectives and overall objective-based merger architecture 

 
 
11.2 A dedicated instrument for Education and Training, Youth, Sport and Solidarity  

Scope of  financing.  This funding instrument  will work towards  high  quality lifelong  learning, enhance 
skills and key competences for all, in line with a swiftly changing society and labour market needs, while 
promoting societal engagement and civic education, solidarity and social inclusion. (i.e. related to General 
Objective 2). The new instrument will reinforce the Union’s contribution to labour market resilience and 
competitiveness. It will scale up the impact of key skillsets by offering a more comprehensive approach 
and a coherent landscape of formal, non-formal and informal opportunities for young people, aiming to 
boost  skills  development,  engagement,  preparedness  and  social  cohesion.  Europe  needs  to  ensure  that 
young people are equipped with a minimum proficiency level of basic and digital skills and foster the 
advanced competencies and soft skills needed, across all stages of life. This investment is pivotal to ensure 
a prosperous and competitive Europe but cannot be satisfied through formal education only. Volunteering 
and other forms of non-formal and informal learning bring complementary value to formal education.  The 
instrument  will  contribute  to  systemic  improvements  in  educational  quality  across  the  EU,  strongly 
supporting the key policy initiatives such as the Union of Skills, the European Education Area, the Digital 
education  action.  It  will  link  funding  with  innovative  educational  models,  connect  better  with  young 
people, in line with the EU Youth Strategy 2019-2027318. 

The integrated nature of the future instrument Programme covering learning mobility, volunteering and 
study  opportunities,  in  different  learning  contexts,  whether  formal,  non-formal  or  informal,  and  at  all 
stages of life will further reinforce its potential to boost skills and competences for life and jobs, support 
competitiveness and enhance values, including solidarity, active citizenship and sense of belonging. In 
terms of architecture, the European Solidarity Corps volunteering opportunities will be introduced under 
the first key action of the Programme supporting learning opportunities for all, while keeping a strong 
volunteering pillar. 

166 

 
 
 
 
Implementation. By unifying the intervention logic for these areas (mainly covered by Erasmus+ and the 
European  Solidarity  Corps),  the  EU  funding  could  not  only  better  respond  to  policy  priorities  and 
maximise  delivery,  but  it  could  also  be  significantly  streamlined  and  simplified,  leading  to  greater 
efficiency, economies of scale and reduced administrative burden. Currently, the two programmes operate 
with  similar  processes  duplicating  each  other  in  several  areas  such  as  the  annual  work  programmes, 
comitology, calls for proposals, monitoring and evaluation. By consolidating these into one programme, 
the process could be significantly streamlined and simplified, leading to greater efficiency and reduced 
administrative burden. In addition, by merging duplicative activities (such as communication, training of 
National Agencies staff), a leaner landscape of funding opportunities could be offered to stakeholders. A 
single  programme  would  provide  a  more  accessible  funding  mechanism  for  both  young  people  and 
organisations creating a single-entry point for them, to participate in EU initiatives in the field of youth 
and  engage  in  funding  opportunities  relevant  for  them.  By  promoting  the  European  Solidarity  Corps 
opportunities under the Erasmus+ umbrella, their visibility and outreach could be significantly enhanced, 
leveraging Erasmus+’s strong brand and larger communication networks and funding. While Erasmus+ 
for students is known by 49% of the young people surveyed in the recent Eurobarometer 545 on youth and 
democracy, only 8% were aware of the European Solidarity Corps. 

11.3 Synergies and complementarities  

The  following  section  provides  two  indicative  examples  of  how  the  new  configuration  can  foster  and 
cross-fertilise  actions  to  support  the  new  policy  priorities  covered  in  this  impact  assessment,  through 
synergies and complementarities319. This needs to be seen in addition to current priorities that are covered 
in the current MFF and mentioned in the objectives of the IA. 

11.3.1 2024-2029 Political Guidelines: “Protecting our democracies and upholding our values”.  

The following is an example of how Strategic objectives under merger 1 would contribute to the 2024-
2029 Political guidelines on “protecting our democracies and upholding our values”.  

167 

 
 
 
11.3.2 2024-2029 Political guidelines “Union of Skills”  

The following is an example of how Strategic objectives under merger 2 would contribute to the 2024-
2029 Political guidelines on “the Union of Skills”.  

168 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes 

1 Europe’s choice, Political guidelines for the next European Commission, 2024-2029, Ursula von der Leyen 
2 Communication on The road to the next multiannual financial framework (COM/2025/46 final). 
3 An overview of policies supported by EU funding in this cluster can be found in Annex 7.  
4 Art. 2, TEU: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values 
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity 
and equality between women and men prevail.” 
5 See for instance the indicators on gender based violence, with data available in the Eurostat’s database on equality 
and non-discrimination.  
6  As  also  highlighted  in  the  Report  on  “The  future  of  European  competitiveness”  by  Mario  Draghi,  Europe’s 
economic  growth,  innovation  capacity  and  prosperity  rely  on  the  future-proof  skills  of  present  and  future 
generations.   
7  See  Annex 7  for  the  legal  context as  well as  a more  detailed  description  of current  programmes and funding 
schemes 
8 See interim evaluation of the CERV programme (SWD/2025/133 final). 
9 Interim evaluation of the Erasmus+ Programme 2021-2027 and  final evaluation of Erasmus+ Programme 2014-
2020 - forthcoming. 
10 For instance, the Draghi report, the Letta report, the Niinistö report, but also the 2023 Strategic Foresight Report 
and the Megatrends relevant for the future of Europe. 
11 90.61% of respondents to the public consultation signalled that “protecting democracy and promote democratic 
standards” is an important or even very important  policy priority.  
12 For instance, see the annual Reports on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The interim 
evaluation of the CERV programme (SWD/2025/133 final) confirms that many CSOs rely heavily on EU support 
due to limited national funding and increasing legal or political pressure in several Member States. CERV is very 
often the only source of funding available to civil society organisations in the area it covers.  
13 See Evaluation of the 2011-2020 European judicial training strategy (SWD(2019) 380) and annual reports on 
European  judicial  training.  In  2022,  24,208  justice  professionals  took  part  in  training  supported  by  the  justice 
programme (see justice programme performance statement) demonstrating the relevance of the programme in this 
field. 
14Estimates  suggest  that  annual  GDP  losses  from  discrimination  alone  range  from  EUR  30  million  (sexual 
orientation)  to  EUR  370  billion  (gender  employment  gap),  with  total  estimated  losses  from  all  grounds  of 
discrimination exceeding EUR 500 billion per year. See for instance Šimovičová, S., & Urbančíková, N. (2022). 
The Impact of Social, Economic and Gender Inequality on Prosperity in the European Union Countries. Quality 
Innovation Prosperity, 26(3), 66–87. https://doi.org/10.12776/qip.v26i3.1769. 
15 2023 European Industry Media Outlook 
16 Socio-economic background remains a strong predictor of education outcomes, with disadvantaged learners at 
6.1 times higher risk of severe underachievement in basic skills when compared to their more advantaged peers, a 
reported in the Education and training Monitor. 
17  European  Commission:  Directorate-General  for  Education,  Youth,  Sport  and  Culture, The  twin  challenge  of 
equity and excellence in basic skills in the EU – An EU comparative analysis of the PISA 2022 results, Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/881521 
18 Top and trending skills interactive tool: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/visualisations/skills/ 
19 Eurobarometer survey, November 2023, data.europa.eu; see also Eurostat experimental statistics on online job 
advertisement rate. 
20  European  Commission,  Report  from  the  European  Commission  to  the  Council  on  the  implementation  of  the 
Council Recommendation on promoting automatic mutual recognition of higher education and upper secondary 
education and training qualifications and the outcomes of learning periods abroad (2023). 
21 Young people, aged 15-29 years old ([ilc_peps01n] Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion by age and sex) 

169 

 
 
 
 
 
22 In 2024, 24,2% of all children less than 18 years old (19,5 million children) in the EU were at risk of poverty and 
social exclusion. Source: Eurostat online data base (code: ilc_peps01n) [ilc_peps01n] Persons at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion by age and sex. 
23 2023 Flash Eurobarometer on mental health 
24 As shown by the evaluation on Creative Europe (cfr. Annex 8, Section 2)  
25 In the period 2021-2023, success rates under the CERV equality, rights and gender equality strand and the Daphne 
strand were at 13% and 20%, respectively (see SWD/2025/133 final). For Media, the success rate remained below 
30% for a number of actions, mainly under content creation support for development. In some actions, the success 
rate is noticeable low (10% for news media, 6% for creative innovation labs in 2023). For the European Solidarity 
Corps, only 1 out of 10 volunteering activities are being supported. For Erasmus+, as an example, the success rate 
for Cooperation Partnerships actions, is below 20% and reaches 14% for cooperation partnerships in the field of 
schools in 2023.  
For the Creative Europe Culture Strand, as an example, the success rate for European Cooperation Projects reached 
a low of 17% in 2023. 
26 For instance, over the period 2021-2027, CERV and Creative Europe MEDIA could not launch joint calls, in 
spite of their synergies, owing to differences regarding third countries participation on the basic legal acts.    
27 Results of the stakeholders consultation indicate that ‘a recurring issue is the complexity and bureaucratic nature 
of  the  application  and  reporting  processes  for  EU  funding  programmes,  particularly  Erasmus+.  Stakeholders 
frequently  describe  these  processes  as  "daunting"  and  "overly  complex,"  which  can  discourage  participation, 
especially among smaller institutions and organizations with limited resources.’ 
28 For instance, structural inequalities and gender gaps in employment (10.0 p.p. in 2024), gender pay gap (12.0% 
in 2023) and the gender pension gap (24.7% in 2024) - sources: Eurostat online data base, Gender employment gap 
-  Online  data  code:  tesem060,  Gender  pay  gap  in  unadjusted  form  –  Online  data  code  earn_gr_gpgr2,  Gender 
pension gap – ilc_pnp13 
29 Communication from the Commission  to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025'. 
30 Persistent stigmatisation and institutionalisation of children and adults with disabilities or LGBTIQ people put 
these  groups  at  increased  risk  of  violence  and  exclusion  (see  Towards  Integrated  Child  Protection  Systems  - 
Challenges, promising practices and ways forward, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2025). 
31 See a series of Commission communications including COM/2021/819 final. 
32 See for example, Judit Bayer and Petra Bárd, ‘Hate speech and hate crime in the EU and the evaluation of online 
content regulation approaches’, European Parliament, 2020. Data produced by the EU funded project ‘European 
Observatory on Online Hate’, https://eooh.eu/  
33 CSOs across the EU face increasing administrative burdens, restrictive laws, governmental interference, smear 
campaigns, and exclusion from funding or public dialogue, especially at local level. See, for instance: 2024 Rule 
of Law report; FRA, Civic Space; CIVICUS monitor.   
34  See  special  Eurobarometer  487b  and  special  Eurobarometer  552.  The  activities  supported  by  the  CERV 
programme were expected to reach over 10 million people through awareness-raising campaigns between 2021–
2023 and supported more than 3,000 civil society organisations, including at grassroot level (see interim evaluation 
of the CERV programme, SWD/2025/133 final). 
23  88.55%  of  respondents  to  the  public  consultation  signalled  that  “upholding  and  promoting  the  respect  of 
fundamental/human rights” is a very important or important policy priority, immediately followed by “combatting 
gender-based  violence,  violence  against  children  and  other  groups  at  risk”  (85.46%).  “Protect  democracy  and 
promote democratic standards; promoting media independence and media pluralism; fight disinformation, equality 
and non-discrimination; empowering citizens, strengthening democratic engagement and participation; as well as 
combating racism and other forms of intolerance” are also in the top ten priorities for the respondents of the public 
consultation.  
36 See Stakeholder_contribution_on_rule_of_law_-_oecd.pdf (europa.eu) 

170 

 
 
 
 
 
in 

of 

the 

and 

rights 

citizens 

process. 

electoral 

opportunities 

37 The Commission’s annual report on judicial training in 2023 found that digital training is far underrepresented: 
only 5,2% of all training activities focused on digitalisation and AI and 6,2% on IT-skills. Digitalisation of justice 
also contributes to  fundamental  rights,  helping to  cement  principles such as the  presumption  of  innocence  (see 
Interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 justice, SWD/2025/134 final). 
38 Reports from election observers confirm that divergences in electoral standards have a negative impact on the 
equality 
See 
of  EU 
https://www.wahlbeobachtung.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/election-watch.eu-eam-ep-elections-2024-final-
report-300924.pdf. 
39 https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s3232_fl550_eng?locale=en 
40 81% of people in the EU believe that foreign interference is a serious problem (Flash Eurobarometer 528, 2023). 
In 2023, the EEAS detected and encoded 750 cases of Foreign Information and Interference incidents. A report by 
the European Digital Media Observatory’s Task Force analysing thirteen elections held in 2023, found widespread 
disinformation during the election campaigns in all of them. 
41 All EU news media companies together (newspapers, magazines, TV, radio, podcasts) and in all platforms (both 
online and offline) capture less advertising revenues than online platforms (EUR 35 bn vs 41 bn in 2023) (European 
Media Industry Outlook). 
42  Only  25%  of  tickets  for  European  films  are  being  sold  outside  the  film’s  country  of  origin,  and  online  the 
consumption of content from EU Member States is decreasing (European Media Industry Outlook). 
43  In  2023,  70%  of  the  box  office  went  to  films  based  on  novels,  play  or  video  games  and  only  30%  original 
screenplays (European Media Industry Outlook). 
44 The Media Pluralism Monitor consistently highlights serious risks and threats to media pluralism, journalists and 
media independence. 
45 Media and journalists should be further protected against pressure and threats, building on the work already done, 
for example to protect them against strategic lawsuits against public participation. 
46 Misinformation and disinformation are ranked as the first threat in the coming years (World Economic Forum’s 
Global risk perception survey, 2024). 68% of Europeans believe they are exposed to disinformation on a weekly 
basis (European Media Industry Outlook). 
47  European  Parliament  resolution  of  21  November  2023  with  recommendations  to  the  Commission  on  an  EU 
framework  for  the  social  and  professional  situation  of  artists  and  workers  in  the  cultural  and  creative  sectors 
(2023/2051(INL)). 
48 In the video games sector, EU companies account for just 13% of global revenues, far behind their US or East-
Asian counterparts (European Media Industry Outlook). 
49 In the EU, of the 800 top R&D investors, only 7 are media firms (European Media Industry Outlook). 
50 Only 10% of audiovisual professionals participate in training programmes regularly (European Media Industry 
Outlook). 
51  In  the  news media sector,  the traditional revenue  streams  are  gradually  declining,  and the increase  in digital 
revenues does not offset this decrease (-9 bn vs +1.9 bn between 2019-23) (European Media Industry Outlook). 
52 By 2030, at least 23% of graduates in higher education should have a learning mobility experience and at least 
12% of learners in vocational education and training (VET) should benefit from learning mobility abroad, as per 
the 2024 Council Recommendation “Europe on the Move - Learning opportunities for everyone” (C/2024/3364). 
53 Support study to the final evaluation of Erasmus+ 2014-2020 and the interim evaluation of Erasmus+ 2021-2027. 
In particular, 84% of public consultation respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they would not have been able 
to fund the activities undertaken without Erasmus+. The vast majority of beneficiary organisations interviewed for 
case studies confirmed the inability to undertake similar activities without Erasmus+ support.   
54 The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat". 
55 Question: to what extent do you consider that these actions for cooperation and mobility would bring about a 
positive impact in the future?  
56  As  an  example,  the  findings  of  the  Erasmus+  evaluation  show  that,  over  the  2014-2020  and  the  2021-2027 
programming  periods,  Erasmus+  is  unmatched  in  terms  of  scale  and  scope  when  compared  to  19    national  or 
international  schemes  with  similar  objectives  in  the  fields  of  education,  training,  youth,  and  sport,  with  an 

171 

 
 
 
 
involvement  of  a much  higher  number  of  participants  per  year  compared  to  other  similar international  funding 
programmes.  In  higher  education,  Erasmus+  is  the  primary  funding  tool  for  short-term  (at  least  three  months) 
learning  mobility  across  the  programme  countries.  Based  on  Eurostat  data,  EU  programmes  like  Erasmus+ 
supported around 2 out of 3 (65.6%) of the credit  -mobile graduates from bachelor’s or equivalent at EU level, 
including Serbia and Norway, in 2022. EU programmes are the only possibility to go abroad for a short period 
during studies in countries like Cyprus and Ireland, where 100% of short mobility is financed by Erasmus+. This 
share is higher than 90% in 11 countries according to data from Eurostat. 
57 Erasmus Student Network (ESN), preliminary results of the XV ESN Survey, 2023. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Currently, the share of adults that have taken part in training in the past 12 months stands at 39.5 %, whereas the 
2030 target is 60%. - cf. Education and Training Monitor 2024: Education and Training Monitor 2024 
60 Study on Youth Work in the EU, European Commmission, 2021 
61 European Parliament Study, ‘Young people's participation in European democratic processes - How to improve 
and facilitate youth involvement’, 2023 
62  European Commission: Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, Learning about the EU – 
European  topics  and  school  curricula  across  EU  Member  States,  Publications  Office  of  the  European  Union, 
2021, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/74975. 
63 Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness, Sauli Niinistö, 2024. 
64 To date, the option of transferring funds from ERDF/ESF+ to programmes under direct or indirect management, 
introduced  in  the  2021-2027  programming  period,  has  only  seen  one  case  registered  under  the  Erasmus+ 
programme (transfer of EUR 57 million from ESF+) and very few additional cases under Horizon Europe.  
65 Instruments like ESF+, ERDF, RRF, Marie-Sklodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA), Horizon Europe’s Cluster II on 
Culture, Creativity and Inclusive Society, Digital Europe, IPA III, NDICI, InvestEU, which total higher overall 
share  of  the  EU  budget  on  the  policies  of  this  cluster,  and  are  thereby  critically  important  to  this  cluster’ 
effectiveness.  
66 Spread mainly between Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps. 
67 The percentages refer to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat". 
68 Mandatory Annual Work Programmes for Creative Europe and multiannual Work Programmes for the CERV 
programme. 
69 Lack of alignment in funding rules and criteria as well as the absence of a common operational framework is also 
a barrier to mainstreaming horizontal provisions for equality and inclusion. 
70  An  evaluation  of  the  Agency  conducted  in  April  2019  showed  that  the  EACEA  was  effective  in  the 
implementation of its operational priorities and performed well in the execution of delegated functions with very 
good results in meeting the main indicators describing the timeliness of its evaluation, contracting and payments 
process. Also, the majority of funding in this cluster is implemented through 54 National Agencies, and integrated 
reporting between Nas and EACEA has been developed and is working seamlessly.   
71 ‘Reflection is on-going on concrete measures to support a more systematic approach to Programme data collection 
and analysis, to better address gaps identified in monitoring, and on how to better measure long-term impact’ SWD 
on the mid-term review of Creative Europe. 
72 Media invest pool resources from Creative Europe MEDIA, Invest EU and the EIF. 
73 Such as multiannual work programmes, accreditations, a more extensive use of lump sums, larger grants, higher 
cofinancing rates, a wider use of cascading grants supporting small organisations that would not have otherwise 
been able to benefit from EU funding. 
74  Among  the  five  most  important  obstacles  making  the  EU  budget  effective,  the  Open  Public  Consultation 
highlighted, in decreasing order of importance, administrative burden for beneficiaries (82%), complex funding and 
compliance rules (80%), lack of flexibility in funding (66%), limited reach to diverse target groups (66%), lack of 
consistency and effectiveness to deliver on EU priorities (510%).   
75 Erasmus+ interim evaluation underlines that although Erasmus+ is a well-known EU programme, further efforts 
are needed to increase the visibility of the opportunities it offers. Outreach could be further improved by sharing 

172 

 
 
 
 
 
and better targeting information about the programme to reach out to new participants and organisations across all 
sectors. 
76 82% of respondents highlighting that “Administrative burden for beneficiaries” is an obstacle preventing the EU 
budget from fully delivering on its objectives. Conversely, “simplifying access to funding” and “introduce more 
flexibility” were the most frequently cited options to help the EU budget be more effective and efficient. 
77 14 megatrends have been identified by the Commission’s Megatrends Hub. 
78 Further evidence apply to policy areas under this cluster, such as the European Media Industry Outlook. 
79  Almost  66%  of  respondents  to  the  public  consultation  considered  ”  Protecting  democracy  and  promoting 
democratic standards” is an area where to a large extent, EU funding provides added value compared to funding at 
national, local or regional level. An area where EU action is considered more impactful by younger Europeans is 
the support to civil society organisations that promote EU values. 
80 Including declining basic skills, underdeveloped digital skills, and other advanced and transversal skills necessary 
for the twin transitions. 
81 The underachievement rate has largely increased in mathematics and reading, and more moderately in science, 
in most EU countries compared to the previous PISA 2018. 
82 European Court of Auditors (2023): Special report 11/2023: EU support for the digitalization of schools. 
83 See Second Report on the application of the General Data Protection Regulation,. 
84  According  to  60.32%  of  respondents  to  the  public  consultation,  ”Upholding  and  promoting  the  respect  of 
fundamental/human rights” is an area where EU funding provides added value compared to funding at national, 
local or regional level to a large extent. 
85 According to the findings of the interim evaluation (SWD/2025/134 final), the 2021-2027 justice programme has 
a key role in helping Member States to develop national tools to create the interfaces required between EU-wide 
systems and national systems and it is therefore successfully contributing to a more level playing field in the areas 
of interoperability of IT systems and digitalisation of justice. 
86 According to the interim evaluation of the CERV programme (SWD/2025/133 final), there is a clear need for the 
programme to continue because the challenges it was set up to address persist and, in some cases, have got worse 
e.g. the increasing polarisation of society, the rise in populism and extremism, and the threat to EU values. 
87 As created, inter alia, through EU legislation establishing social services under a European harmonised number 
(2007/116/EC). 
88 See interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme (SWD/2025/134 final). 
89  Leveraging  the  networks’  outreach  has  improved  the  engagement  with  key  target  groups  and  allowed  the 
organisation  of  large-scale  events  at  lower  costs  (see  Interim  evaluation  of  the  2021-2027  Justice  programme 
(SWD/2025/134 final). 
90 Action Plan  on basic skills, COM(2025)88. While overall underachievement in basic skills is on the rise across 
all EU countries, the spread between the best and worst performing countries is wide. Similarly, even though the 
rate of early school leaving has improved at the EU level, decreasing by 2.3 percentage points in the period 2013-
2023, many learners leave education prematurely without an upper secondary qualification. 
91  United  Nations,  Department  of  Economic  and  Social  Affairs,  Convention  On  The  Rights  Of  Persons  With 
Disabilities (CRPD). 
92 Fulfilment of the conditions set out in the AVMS Directive is a requirement for candidate countries to 
participate in the MEDIA and CROSS strand of Creative Europe.  

93 Solidarity and volunteering schemes differ across Member States: without dedicated EU action, some countries 
would have no volunteering opportunities– notably in support of humanitarian aid operations.  
94 According to 65% of respondents to the public consultation, ”Promoting a shared European identity” is an area 
where EU funding provides added value compared to funding at national, local or regional level to a large extent. 
95 Audiovisual Medi Services Directive (AVMSD), European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). 
96  Audiovisual Media Services Directive and the European Media Freedom Act. 
97 Civil Society Organisations, National Human Rights Institutes, equality bodies, ombuds institutions, other human 
rights defenders, and Member State authorities from national, regional and local levels. 

173 

 
 
 
 
98 Discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion  or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, as 
well as non-discrimination on the grounds provided for in Article 21 of the Charter. 
99 Racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, anti-Muslim hatred, LGBTIQ-phobia, hatred against persons with disabilities 
and older persons. 
100 2024 Consumer survey informing the 2025 European Media Industry Outlook. 
101 According to the 2024 Media Pluralism Monitor, risks to market plurality are “medium” or “high” in all EU 
countries. 
102 Production encompasses all phases of creation of audiovisual works, including development, for example. 
103 SWD on the interim evaluation of Creative Europe states that ‘the synergies between the Culture and MEDIA 
Strands could be better exploited, notably among copyright intensive industries which are the CCS most heavily 
affected by the competition from the US platforms, changed consumption patterns and the AI revolution’, e.g. Music 
tracks  generating  substantial  revenues  from  their  inclusion in  video  games,  films  or  TV  series.  Media  Industry 
Outlook SWD, (to be published in July). 
104  Nearly  two thirds  of respondents  to  the  OPC  mentioned  support  to  the  audiovisual  and  media  sectors as  an 
“important” policy objective. 
105 The importance of such actions is corroborated by the results of the public consultation supporting this impact 
assessment where approximately  80% of respondents (summing up responses "very important" and "important") 
see an added value in EU funding going to “Promote cultural and linguistic diversity” and “Promote and preserve 
cultural heritage and European remembrance”. There is also wide support for “Ensure widespread access to culture 
and cultural heritage” and “Support to mobility of artists and culture professionals”,from respectively 76% and 
slightly under 57% of respondents (summing up responses "very important" and "important". 
106 Media Industry Outlook SWD, (to be published in July 2025). 
107 Ibid. 
108 The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "Very important" or "Important". 
109 The Council Recommendation “Europe on the Move - Learning opportunities for everyone” sets EU level targets 
for mobility. EU action will be instrumental to support the achievement of these targets and ensure the elimination 
of barriers to mobility fostering a seamless and inclusive transnational learning environment. 
110 The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat". 
111 SWD on the mid-term review of Creative Europe. 
112  81%  of  respondents  to  the  public  consultation  considered  that  “introducing  more  flexibility  into  resource 
allocation to react to crisis and emerging needs” was mentioned by as something that could help the EU budget 
become more effective and efficient”. 
113 See Annex 8 for details on the results of the mid-term evaluations. 
114 Ibid. 
115  Aspects  used  for  comparison 
legal  basis, 
competence/subsidiarity,  third  countries  participation,  implementation modes,  governance, internal  architecture, 
target groups, branding, and funding. 
116 The current programmes do not comprehensively address all key emerging policy areas set out in the Political 
Guidelines as stated above. 
117  As  stated  above,  this  would  not  include  the  Justice  programme  for  the  reasons  explained  under  section  5.2 
Discarded options. 
118 For instance, during the negotiations by co-legislators, the voting rules for different legal basis would not be 
compatible with other the legal basis of other programmes in this cluster.  
119 Alternative combinations would offer differing degrees of synergies, depending on the nature of the mergers, 
but not at par with the proposed options.   
120 Citizens at large (through areas such as cross-border education and training, fundamental rights, access to media 
and culture, solidarity activities, sport); children and young people (on aspects such as protection against violence); 
professionals  in  sectors  such  as  media,  culture,  education  and  training;  sport,  youth  organisations,  civil  society 
organisations and human rights defenders; media companies and other organisations active in the media sectors; 
cultural and creative organisations; EU and national public authorities and candidate and third countries. Citizens 

the  political  context,  IA  problem  drivers, 

included: 

174 

 
 
 
 
accounted  by  around  half  the  responses,  followed  by  academic/research  institutions  (16%),  non-governmental 
organisations (14%), companies and business associations (5.9%) and public authorities (5.4%). 
121  Social  impacts  of  the  different  options  are  mainly  achieved  by  safeguarding  and  promoting  EU  values  and 
fundamental rights on one side and increasing cohesion in society on the other, increasing the educational, personal 
and professional development of individuals as well as raising the level of skills, education and training and cultural 
diversity and media offer.   
122 European Commission (2019). “Erasmus+ higher education impact study” 
123 A total of 241 million admissions in EU-27 cinemas is attributable to MEDIA (2014-2020). Without MEDIA support, EU 
audiences of films from other EU countries would drop to 30% of what they are today (Interim evaluation of the Creative 
Europe Programme 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2014-2020) 
124 Most participants to CERV-funded activities self-report higher level of awareness of rights as an EU citizen 
(84%) than the general public. 82% of participants in Erasmus+ learning mobility activities declare that they feel 
more European and 86% are more aware of European values. 
125 The European Commission study “Learning about the EU: European topics and school curricula across EU Member States” 
from 2021 points to the added value on participation of combining “learning styles” where formal teaching and learning is 
enhanced by information, non-formal and experiential learning.   
126 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 2025. 
127 As recommended in the report “Safer Together, strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness” 
by Sauli Niinistö 
128 Support to news media has been introduced into the second Creative Europe (2021-2027) part of the Cross-sectoral strand, 
in response to the growing political priority of strengthening democracy and the rule of law across the European Union  
129  Examples  of  calls  include  Journalism  Partnerships  calls  under  Creative  Europe,  Pan-European  and  Digital 
Reporting calls under Multimedia Actions, and capacity building to counter manifestly unfounded or abusive court 
proceedings against journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation under the CERV 
programme. 
130 According to Media Pluralism Monitor Report, 23 out of 27 Member States are in high or medium risk to media pluralism. 
131 Under status quo, news media is not covered, but it is addressed under Option 2 (See Table 11.1, Annex 11). 
132 Economic impacts are mainly achieved through increased employability of citizens, quality of education and 
training systems generating innovation and economic growth, the economic contribution of CCSs and media and 
audiovisual industries, including through strengthening their competitiveness and SMEs’ capacity.   
133 See annex 5 on the competitiveness check. 
134 For example, MediaInvest remains underfunded, with an identified equity gap between EUR 399 to EUR 649 
million per year. 
135 https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/pisa-2022-results-volume-i_53f23881-en.html  
136 The future of European competitiveness: Report by Mario Draghi, September 2024 
137 Over 50% of MEDIA supported EU films and series are international coproductions, rising to 86% under the 
current  programme,  vs  12%  of  comparable  unsupported  EU  films  and  series  in  the  same  period  (Mid-term 
evaluation of the Creative Europe 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2014-2020). 
138 The box office revenues of a film adapting pre-existing content (books) is around 50% higher than films with an 
original screenplay, while TV dramas adapted from books attract 58% more viewers. 
139 This IA is relevant for SMEs concerning the IP intensive industries, including news media, at an est. 30.000-
50.000 companies, and 84.000-140.000 employees (further analysis provided under Annex 6). 
140 In the MEDIA strand of Creative Europe (2021-2027), 99% of the beneficiaries of the Programme are SMEs. In the Culture 
strand,  80%  of  the  beneficiaries  are  organisations  of  less  than  49  employees  (Interim  evaluation  of  the  Creative  Europe 
Programme 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2014-2020). 
141 1 592 SMEs participated in 1 631 KA2 adult education projects, and 2 148 SMEs in 2 166 KA2 VET projects 
142 In the VET field, 61% of VET respondents of the public consultation agreed that Centres of Vocational Excellence highly 
contribute to support excellence, creativity, and innovation at the level of organisations and policies.   
143 Improved access to tailored financing helps mitigate key risks inherent to CCS (Further information on the InvestEU Culture 
and  Creative  Portfolio  Guarantee  Product,  https://www.eif.org/InvestEU/guarantee_products/index-portfolio-ccs).  For 
example, the current CCS GF was found effective in benefitting micro-businesses and small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in the cultural and creative sectors, which often face difficulties in accessing affordable debt financing for their projects. 

175 

 
 
 
 
in  Europe  2024,  Publications  Office  of 

(Interim evaluation of the Creative  Europe Programme 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 
2014-2020). 
144  For  example,  see  Die  Bedeutung  studienbezogener  Auslandsaufenthalte  im  Transformationsprozess  der 
deutschen Wirtschaft, DAAD-IW-Studie, 2025  
145 Iriondo, I. (2020). Evaluation of the impact of Erasmus study mobility on salaries and employment of recent 
graduates in Spain. Studies in higher education, DOI: 10.1080/03075079.2019.1582011 
146 George Psacharopoulos & Harry Anthony Patrinos (2018) Returns to investment in education: a decennial 
review of the global literature, Education Economics, 26:5, 445-458, DOI: 10.1080/09645292.2018.1484426 
147 European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion,  Employment and 
social  developments 
the  European  Union,  2024, 
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/91555. 
148  European Commission, above-mentioned Study to support the Commission impact assessment on Individual 
Learning Accounts. 
149  Iriondo, I. (2020). Evaluation of the impact of Erasmus study mobility on salaries and employment of recent graduates in 
Spain. Studies in higher education, DOI: 10.1080/03075079.2019.1582011 
150 Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a Council Recommendation ‘Europe on 
the move’ – learning mobility opportunities for everyone, (SWD(2023) 719). 
151 A rationalisation of resources for the supervision of the National Agencies is also expected in the relevant ministries (the 
programmes have separate National Authorities). 
152 Programmes that include mobility imply use for transport, which in turn leads to the emission of greenhouse 
gases. However, strong incentives to use sustainable practices including transport are embedded in the design of 
the programmes and the flows are negligible compared to the mobility fluxes in Europe and overall emissions. 
Hence, an in-depth analysis of environmental impacts has not been considered relevant in this case.It is also worth 
noting that both Erasmus+ and the Corps currently have a positive indirect effect by prioritising the green transition 
in cooperation and volunteering activities, raising awareness about environmental sustainability especially among 
young  people  and  supporting  behavioural  changes  linked  to  individual  preferences,  consumption  habits  and 
lifestyles. In the case of Erasmus+, since 2021, more than 1billion € has been used to support cooperation projects 
with climate objectives.  
153 Based on a recent survey of companies in the creative and cultural sectors, only 30% have adopted a digital 
transformation strategy and companies have indicated that investment in AI represents less than 1% of their total 
investments. 
154 The current Creative Europe MEDIA has responded to the digital shift by consistently encouraging innovation. Innovative 
tools and business models have been funded, in particular harnessing artificial intelligence (Interim evaluation of the Creative 
Europe Programme 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2014-2020). In the context of Option 
2, transversal actions bringing together  culture, media and civil society players will allow for enhanced contribution to the 
digital transformation through synergies. 
155 Core impact, as fundamental rights and equality are policy objectives covered within this cluster. 
156  As  highlighted  by  its  interim  evaluation  (SWD/2025/133  final),  the  CERV  programme  makes  a  strong 
contribution  to  promoting  gender  equality,  with  every  fourth  euro  of  financing  from  grants  having  contributed 
strongly and around half of the funded projects closely intertwined with the promotion of gender equality. 
157 See results of interim evaluations in Annex 8. 
158 Policies under this cluster contribute toward the following SDGs: 3. Healthy lives and well-being; 4. Quality 
education; 5. Gender equality; 8. Decent work and economic growth 10. Reducing inequalities; 16. Peace, justice, 
strong institutions; 17. Means of implementation. 
159 See Tool #62 of Better Regulation. To obtain a policy ranking consistent with the information contained in the 
impact matrix, the analysis applied a non-compensatory mathematical aggregation rule. 
160 This result sums up the score of the indicators under each of the objectives (e.g. joint scores of the five indicators 
under ‘improved cooperation’). For the tenth objective, “minimisation of risks”, Options 1 and 2 tied with the same 
score. 
161 For the remaining 9 criteria there was a tie between at least two options. 

176 

 
 
 
 
162 Ownership details: The software has been developed in the context of the European Commission’s Decision 
Analysis Lab (Non free license). 
163 Institutions, associations, NGO, companies (mostly micro and small-sized), self-employed people etc. 
164 Under the Erasmus+ programme 2014-2020, 2 148 SMEs participated in VET cooperation projects, and 1 592 
SMEs in adult education cooperation projects, only to mention these two sectors. 
165 Measured through the EU Survey on Justice, Rights and Values (data 2021-2023) and the special Eurobarometer 
SP552. 
166 European Commission, Acting against discrimination 
167 EIGE, Economic Benefits of Gender Equality in the European Union 
168 See interim evaluation of the CERV programme (SWD/2025/133 final). 
169 SWD on the final evaluation of Creative Europe 2014-2020 and the mid-term evaluation of Creative Europe 
2021-2027, not yet published. Figures not available for the Culture strand in Creative Europe 2021-2027; 
170 Number of people watching, visiting, listening and viewing cultural activity funded by the Creative Europe’s 
Culture strand as reported by projects. This figure does not include the audience of European Capitals of Culture, 
co-funded by the programme’s Culture strand (estimated at 2 million per Capital), the audience reached by the 
recipients of the various Prizes funded by the strand or the readership of books translated by the strand, Ibid. Data 
not available for Creative Europe 2021-2027 
171 Ibid. Figures not available for the Culture strand in Creative Europe 2021-2027; 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Knowledge base for the Sustainable Development Goals 
176 Ownership details: The software has been developed in the context of the European Commission’s Decision 
Analysis Lab (Non free license). 
177  All  methodological  and mathematical  details  behind  SMCE  and  the  SOCRATES  software  can  be  found  in: 
Munda  G.  (2004)  “Social  multi-criteria  evaluation  (SMCE)”:  methodological  foundations  and  operational 
consequences, European Journal of Operational Research Vol. 158, Issue 3: 662- 677. Munda, G. (2008) Social 
Multi-Criteria Evaluation for a Sustainable Economy, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. Munda G. (2009) A conflict 
analysis approach for illuminating sustainability distributional issues, European Journal of Operational Research, 
Volume: 194,   Issue: 1,   Pages: 307-322.. Munda, G. (2012) Intensity of preference and related uncertainty in 
non-compensatory aggregation rules. Theory and Decision 73, 649–669. Munda, G. (2022) Qualitative reasoning 
or quantitative aggregation rules for impact assessment of policy options? A multiple criteria framework. Quality 
and Quantity 56, 3259–3277. Munda, G., Azzini, I., Cerreta, M. and Ostlaender, N., SOCRATES Manual, EUR 
31327  EN,  Publications  Office  of  the  European  UnioUnioo,  Luxembourg,  2022,  ISBN  978-92-76-59331-7, 
doi:10.2760/015604, JRC131755. Azzini I. and Munda G. (2020) A New Approach for Identifying the Kemeny 
Median  Ranking,  European  Journal  of  Operational  Research,  Vol.  281,  pp.  388-401.  Azzini  I.  and  Munda  G. 
(2025)  Sensitivity and  Robustness  Analyses in  Social  Multi-Criteria  Evaluation of  Public  Policies,  Journal  of 
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, Vol. 32, issue 1, pp. 1-19. 

178 See Tool #62 of Better Regulation. To obtain a policy ranking consistent with the information contained in the 
impact matrix, the analysis applied a non-compensatory mathematical aggregation rule. 
179 The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "Very important" or "Important". 
180 The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "Very important" or "Important". 
181 7 out of 10 tickets sold for non-national films in the EU is directly attributable to MEDIA support. Without 
MEDIA support, non-national admissions in the EU would drop to 30% of the current level. 
182  In  the  streaming  segment,  EU  consumers  spend  only  9%  of  their  time  on  watching  content  from  other  EU 
countries, while they spend 61% of their time on US works and 20% on works from other non-EU territories (e.g. 
UK and Asia) (Forthcoming Second Edition of the Media Industry Outlook). 
183 The percentages refer to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat". 
184 The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "Very important" or "Important". 
185 The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "Very important" or "Important". 

177 

 
 
 
 
186 Annex 5 can be consulted for further analysis. 
187 The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat". 
188 The percentages refer to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat". 
189 The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat". 
190 The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat". 
191 The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat". 
192 Given that the assessment is about funding to specific media sectors, the ‘Synthetic assessment’ section is by 
definition a sectoral assessment, hence no separate assessment is needed under ‘Competitive position of the most 
affected sectors’. 
193 CNECT calculations based on Statista 
194 Ibid 
195  For example,  Romanian  public  service  television  receives  around  EUR  22  per household in public  funding, 
while  the  same  amount  id  EUR  158  for  Danish  public  broadcasting.  (CNECT  calculations  based  on  data  from 
European Audiovisual Observatory and Eurostat) 
196 European Media Industry Outlook, forthcoming 2nd edition.  
197 Mid-term evaluation of the Creative Europe 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 
2014-2020.  
198 European Media Industry Outlook, forthcoming 2nd edition.  
199 The State of the European Game Industry, and How to Unleash its Full Potential, 2024 
200 European Media Industry Outlook, forthcoming 2nd edition.  
201 European Media Industry Outlook, forthcoming 2nd edition.  
202  As  an  illustration,  one  beneficiary,  the  Euranet  Plus  radio  network,  achieved  substantial  cost  reductions 
throughout the project implementation, with average costs per produced audio minute declining by 30% from 2021 
to 2023, down to €48.87 per minute.   
203 In a recent EU27 consumer survey on media consumption habits commissioned by DG CNECT, the fact that a 
film or a series was part of a franchise or new season of an existing series was rated by young people to be among 
the top three factors that attract them to films and series. 
204  See the following study focusing on the UK market: ‘The book was better!’ – How literary adaptations contribute 
to the wider creative industries | Frontier Economics 
205  Ampere  Analysis  https://ampereanalysis.com/insight/feel-the-force-of-franchises-commissioners-bank-on-
superheroes-and-crime 
206 Babylon Berlin author Volker Kutsche: “Nobody wants to be a Nazi” 
207 How did The Witcher games affect the popularity of The Witcher books? - Literature Stack Exchange 
208 EAO  
209 https://variety.com/2023/tv/global/newen-artificial-intelligence-ai-french-soaps-producers-crew-1235760713/ 
210 See for example https://publikum.io/ 
211 European Audiovisual Observatory (2024). Made in Europe, Theatrical distribution of European films across 
the globe 2014 - 2023 
212 based on the analysis of International Showtimes 
213 European Media Industry Outlook, forthcoming 2nd edition. 
214 Proven by the SMCE. 
215 Limited number of other CCS SME directly funded by the Creative Europe programme’s Culture strand 
216 idem. 

218  Casas,  Pablo and Christou,  Tryfonas and García  Rodríguez,  Abián and Lazarou,  Nicholas  Joseph and Salotti, 
Simone (2025): The  ex-post  macroeconomic  evaluation  of  the  2014-2020  European  Social  Fund,  Youth 
Employment Initiative and REACT-EU labour market interventions 
219 Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2024 - European Commission 
220 Ibidem, p 276 
221 Education and Training Monitor 2024 

178 

 
 
 
 
 
racism 

against 

and  xenophobia  –  Cost  of  non-Europe 

222 Ibidem 
223 Idem. 
224 Between 2021 and 2024, SMEs represented 3.4% of the organisations taking part in Erasmus+ projects. Source: 
Erasmus+ Dashboard 
225 Benchmarking: Compared to other sectors, education has traditionally lower measured innovation (few patents 
or R&D spending), but its impact on innovation in all sectors is paramount. Investments here likely yield  high 
returns in innovation across the board, albeit with a time lag. 
226 Evidence shows the negative economic impacts of discrimination on competitiveness, resulting in estimated EU-
wide  annual  GDP  losses, due  to  discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  religion  or  belief (EUR  234  million), sexual 
orientation (EUR 30-98 million), disability (EUR 0.84 – EUR 1.42 billion) and age (EUR 289-364 billion). See 
European Parliament: Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union and Ballegooij, W., Equality and the 
fight 
report,  European  Parliament, 
2018, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/1791; “The state and effects of discrimination in the European Union The 
state and effects of discrimination in the European Union | OECD”, 2024. 
227 https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/63274 
228 Cultural and Creative Industries overview by DG for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs 
(DG GROW) 
229 Interim evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2021-2027 and final evaluation of  the Creative Europe 
Programme 2014-2020. 
230 64.5% of recent medium-level VET graduates to have experienced work-based learning as part of their VET 
programme in 2023. 
231 Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE 2.1, Level 2). 
232 Estimated number based on current beneficiaries of Creative Europe 
233 The preferred option includes the mitigating measures listed in section 4.  
234 The direct benefits for SMEs can also be cost savings. 
235 See Annex 5, Competitiveness Check 
236 Based on a survey of 25 thousand travellers: ‘Unpack ’25’ by Expedia  
237 European judicial training strategy (2021–2024) | EUR-Lex. 
238 EU Strategy on victims’ rights (2020-2025) - European Commission. 
239 Rule of law - European Commission. 
240 Anti-corruption: Stronger rules to fight corruption. 
241 Commission presents a European internal security strategy - European Commission. 
242 A Counter-Terrorism Agenda. 
243 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. 
244 Equality and inclusion - European Commission (europa.eu). 
245 Factsheet - Delivering on the EU strategy on the rights of the child 
246 Combating hate speech and hate crime - European Commission (europa.eu). 
247 Protecting democracy - European Commission (europa.eu). 
248 Directive - EU - 2024/1385 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu). 
249 Directive - 2023/970 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu). 
250 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-european-
democracy/protecting-democracy_en#what-is-the-european-democracy-action-plan  
251 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/reinforcing-democracy-and-integrity-elections-all-documents_en. 
252 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/documents-defence-democracy_en . 
253 Directive - 2023/970 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu). 
254 Directive - EU - 2024/1069 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu). 
255 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/citizenship-package_en.  
256  Political  guidelines  2024-2029,  https://commission.europa.eu/priorities-2024-2029/democracy-and-our-
values_en  
257 See A Culture Compass for Europe, a call for evidence. 

179 

 
 
 
 
258 OJ C 456, 18.12.2018, p. 1–22. 
259 OJ C, C/2024/3527, 3.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3527/oj. 

to 

to 

the 

the 

policy 

allocated 

measures 

261  Regulation  (EU)  2021/692  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of  28  April  2021  establishing  the 
Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014. 
262 Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014 of 14 April 2014 establishing the ‘Europe for Citizens’ programme for 
the period 2014-2020. 
263 Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing 
a Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme for the period 2014 to 2020. 
264 Regulation (EU) 2021/693 of the European Parliament and the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Justice 
Programme and repealing regulation (EU) No 1382/2013. 
265  Regulation  (EU)  2021/817  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20  May  2021  establishing 
Erasmus+: the Union Programme for education and training, youth and sport and repealing Regulation (EU) No 
1288/2013. 
266 Higher education, Vocational Education and Training (VET), School education and Adult Education. 
267  Regulation (EU)  2021/888  of the  European  Parliament and  of the  Council  of 20  May  2021  establishing the 
European Solidarity Corps Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) 2018/1475 and (EU) No 375/2014. 
268 Figure as of 2 July 2025. Data are based on the pillar tagging methodology for the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and 
correspond 
area  
‘adult  learning’;  ‘green  skills  and  jobs’;  ‘human  capital  in  digitalisation’,  ‘early  childhood  education  and  care’,  as  well  as 
‘general, vocational and higher education’ as primary or secondary policy areas. 
269 Figure as of 2 July 2025. Source: Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard. 
270  Recovery  and  resilience  plans:  supporting  people  across  the  EU,  September  2024,  available  at: 
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/recovery-and-resilience-plans-supporting-people-across-eu_en. 
271Interim evaluation of the CERV programme (SWD/2025/133 final), Interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice 
programme (XX - forthcoming). 
272 Ex post evaluation of the REC programme, second part (SWD/2025/133 final), Ex post evaluation of the EfC 
programme  (SWD/2025/133  final),  Ex  post  evaluation  of  the  2014-2020  Justice  programme,  second  part 
(SWD/2025/134 final). 
273 The very high ratio of quality projects is to the benefit of the fulfilment of policy objectives.  
274  The  CERV  programme  introduced  lump-sum  funding  to  further  reduce  the  administrative  burden.  The 
introduction of unit costs at Commission corporate level, however, appears to have added complexity, exacerbated 
by the fact that these unit costs do not reflect the actual costs of activities and impose unrealistic limitations on 
travel costs. Re-granting mechanisms have led to the CERV programme being more inclusive than its predecessors 
by allowing the programme to reach smaller and grassroots organisations. 
275 These include, for instance, the opportunity to test innovative approaches to address societal challenges, expand 
project target groups and improve organisations’ capacities. 
276 This is linked to financial contributions, with every fourth euro of financing from grants having contributed 
strongly to gender equality. Around half of the CERV grants funded projects closely intertwined with the promotion 
of  gender  equality.  Nevertheless,  the  mid-term  evaluation  pointed  to  the  need  to  pay  more  attention  to 
intersectionality in addressing gender and social inclusion issues. 
277 The CERV programme provides clear added value. For many CSOs, it is their only possible source of funding 
in this area. Between 2021 and 2023, the CERV programme reached 3 033 CSOs with support and capacity building 
activities across all Member States.  
278 See interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme (SWD/2025/134 final). 
279 For instance, in 2022, 24 208 justice professionals took part in training supported by the Justice programme 
(around 35.3% of all those who received EU (co-)funded training on EU law that year). See Justice programme 
performance statement.  
280 See interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme (SWD/2025/134 final)–. 

180 

 
 
 
 
 
281 See interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme– (SWD/2025/134 final). 
282 See interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme (SWD/2025/134 final). 
283 Admissions for non-national European films in Europe and in largest 10 non-European markets: The targets of 
71  million  tickets  in  Europe  and  85  million  outside  were  each  exceeded  (95  and  88  million);  SWD  Interim 
evaluation of the Creative Europe programme 2021-27. 
284 Out of the  group of beneficiaries who applied before and after COVID, 60% had grew their position in the 
market of non-national EU films, and this includes 26% of beneficiaries who more than doubled their shares Source: 
Programme monitoring data.  
285 MEDIA supports MediaInvest through blending of funding with the Invest EU and EIF on a 1:1 basis.   
286 As of 25th March 2025, 4 deals were signed under MediaInvest for an amount of EUR 95 Mio. 
287 Films supported by MEDIA have received 95 nominations at the Academy Awards, as well as 333 nominations 
at the Cannes and 183 and 170 awards at the Berlinale and European Film Awards respectively. 
288 There has been a notable increase in the share of support for titles that involve collaboration between high and 
low-capacity countries, from less than 5% in the previous programme to around 30% under the current one.  
289 MEDIA the number of grants processed fell by 46%  despite a budget envelope increase of  over 65%.   
290 Screen density varies dramatically across the EU, from 24 screens per million inhabitants in Romania to 102 
screens per million inhabitants in Ireland. There are also big gaps within Member States, with rural or less populated 
areas often lacking cinemas, thereby creating “cinema deserts”. 
291 Media Industry Outlook (publication forthcoming). 
292  Staff  working  document  on  the  interim  evaluation  of  the  Creative  Europe  programme  2021-27  and  final 
evaluation of the Creative Europe programme 2014-2021, page 83. 
293 Consumer survey on media consumption habits commissioned by DG CNECT (publication forthcoming). 
294  A large majority projects on ‘Cross-Border Local’ and ‘Media Innovation Europe’of their funds focused on 
countries where there are high risks to media plurality as identified by the Media Pluralism Monitor.   28% of their 
funds were spent on medium risk countries and 72% on high-risk countries. The average subsidy per inhabitant was 
3 times higher in high-risk countries. 
295 The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) mechanism tracks violations of press and media freedom and 
includes safety training for journalists. In 2021, 1373 violations were verified and 346 requests for support received, 
117 cases were treated. 
296  Regulation (EU)  2021/818  of the  European  Parliament and  of the  Council  of 20  May  2021  establishing the 
Creative  Europe  Programme  (2021  to  2027)  and  repealing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1295/2013  (Text  with  EEA 
relevance), OJ L 189, 28.5.2021. 
297 Erasmus+ supports activities that develop critical thinking as well as media and digital literacy in schools or 
other educational settings.  
298 Evaluation of the Multimedia Actions line CNECT/18/2023/Lot1.December 2024 (to be published soon). 
299 To be published 
300 Source: Eurostat data, code educ_uoe_mobc01. 
301  European  Commission:  Directorate-General  for  Education,  Youth,  Sport  and  Culture, Erasmus+  annual  report  2023, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/833629 
302 Ibid. 
303 COM(2025) 144 final, SWD(2025) 75, 1.4.2025 
304 European Commission: Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, European solidarity corps – Report 
2021-2023, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/235753 
305 Based on the 14 megatrends identified by the Commission’s Megatrends Hub 
306 See joint press release One in three women in the EU have experienced violence by Eurostat, FRA and EIGE (2024). 
307  Eurostat  dataset  on  ICT  specialists  and  ICT  skills  trainings  in  entreprises  (online  data  codes:  isoc_ske_itspen2,  
isoc_ske_itrcrn2 and isoc_ske_ittn2) 
308 Eurostat dataset on ‘Early leavers from education and training by sex and labour status’ (online data code: edat_lfse_14) 
309  Eurostat  dataset  on  ‘Population  by  educational  attainment  level,  sex  and  NUTS  2  region  (%)’  (online  data  code: 
edat_lfse_04). 

181 

 
 
 
 
310 The outward graduate mobility of a country is the sum of all graduates originating from the country who obtained their 
degree abroad (degree-mobile graduates) and graduates who obtained their degree in the country but spent a short period abroad 
(credit-mobile graduates). 
311 Education and Training Monitor, 2024 
312 Eurostat dataset on «Credit mobility graduates» (online data code: educ_uoe_mobc01)  
313 European Commission (2024). Digital Decade 2024 report. 
314 Among all individuals (16-74), Eurostat online data: isoc_sk_dskl_i21 
315 Young people, aged 15-29 years old ([ilc_peps01n] Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion by age and sex) 
316 During this MFF a joint call between Creative Europe and CERV could not be planned due to differences of 
country participation in the legal basis 
317  The  design  could  also  lead  to  cross-fertilisation  of  initiatives  financed  through  financial  support  to  third 
parties/cascading grants, in the fields of culture, media and of rights and values. 
318The EU Youth Strategy 2019-2027 focuses on fostering the participation of young people in civic and democratic 
life; connecting young people across the European Union and beyond to foster voluntary engagement, learning 
mobility,  solidarity  and  intercultural  understanding;  and  supporting  youth  empowerment  through  quality, 
innovation and the recognition of youth work. 
319 Synergies are showcased to illustrate their potential. The usage of a synergy or complementarity under a certain 
category  is  not  exclusive.  For  example,  supporting  media  literacy  under  this  instrument  can  contribute  to  the 
political objective of protecting democracies and upholding our values, but the policy would entail as well support 
from Member States. Finally, the list of examples only refers to how the financing instruments contribute to the 
policy  priorities,  and  hence  should  be  seen  in  context  with  other  policy  initiatives  and  the  relevant  legislative 
framework (e.g. for example, in terms of the interrelation between media policies, regulatory frameworks and EU 
financing, which is not in scope of this document). 

182