COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a framework of measures for the establishment of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and for health preparedness and response repealing Decision 1313/2013 (Union Civil Protection Mechanism).
Date: 2025-07-16
Institutions: Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), European Commission
Subjects: EU alert system, EU financing, Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority, civil defence, crisis management, emergency aid, humanitarian aid, international cooperation, multiannual financial framework, public health

Table of contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ................................................................1 

1.1.  POLITICAL CONTEXT .......................................................................................................................2 

1.2.  LEGAL CONTEXT ...............................................................................................................................3 

1.3.  FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS .............................................................................................................5 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION .....................................................................................................................7 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ......................................................................................................... 16 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ................................................................................ 19 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ..................................................................... 25 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ............................................................ 37 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ............................................................................................. 41 

8. 

PREFERRED OPTION ....................................................................................................................... 50 

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 16.7.2025  SWD(2025) 545 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a framework of measures for the establishment of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and for health preparedness and response repealing Decision 1313/2013 (Union Civil Protection Mechanism). {COM(2025) 548 final} - {SEC(2025) 545 final} - {SWD(2025) 546 final}  
 
 
 
9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................. 51 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................. 54 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) ................................................. 56 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ........................................................................................... 56 

ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ...................................................................................................... 74 

ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK ................................................................................................. 75 

ANNEX 6: ADDITIONAL CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION ................................................................... 80 

ANNEX 7: LARGE VERSIONS OF GRAPHS ............................................................................................ 92 

I 

 
 
 
 
List of acronyms 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

ARGUS 

ATHINA 

CBRN 

CFSP  

CRC 

Corporate coordination mechanism 

Advanced  Technology  for  Health  Intelligence  and  Action  IT 
system 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Common Foreign and Security Policy  

EEAS Crisis Response Centre  

CRII and CRII+ 

Coronavirus response investment initiatives 

CRM 

CSDP 

DRGs 

ECDC 

ECPP  

EEAS 

EFSCM 

EMA 

EMFAF 

EP 

Erasmus+ 

ERCC 

ESI 

EU4Health 

Crisis Response Mechanism (EEAS) 

Common Security and Defence Policy 

Disaster Resilience Goals 

European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 

European Civil Protection Pool 

European External Action Service 

European  Food  Security  Crisis  preparedness  and  response 
Mechanism 

European Medicines Agency 

European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 

European Parliament 

Erasmus+ is a European Union program that supports education, 
training, youth, and sport 

European Response Coordination Centre 

Emergency Support Instrument 

The EU’s programme for the Union’s action in the field of health 
established by Regulation (EU) 2021/522, aiming to improve and 
to  medical 
foster  health,  protect  people,  ensure  access 

II 

 
countermeasures and strengthen response to COVID-19's impact 
on  medical  and  healthcare  staff,  patients  and  health  systems  in 
Europe. 

European Solidarity 
Corps 

EU  funding  programme  for  young  people  wishing  to  engage  in 
solidary activities in a variety of areas  

EUSF 

EWRS 

FIMI 

HSC 

The European Union Solidarity Fund 

Early Warning and Response System 

Foreign information manipulation and interference 

Health Security Committee  

Horizon Europe 

EU's key funding programme for research and innovation 

IHI 

IMERA 

IMI  

IPA III 

IPCR 

IRIS 

JRC 

KAPP 

MCM 

Innovative Health Initiative 

Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act 

Innovative Medicines Initiative 

The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 

Integrated Political Crisis Response 

Infrastructure  for  Resilience,  Interconnectivity  and  Security  by 
Satellite 

Joint Research Centre (European Commission) 

 Knowledge for Action in Prevention and Preparedness 

Medical Countermeasures 

MEDEVAC 

Medical Evacuations in Emergencies 

MFA 

MFF 

Macro-financial assistance 

Multiannual Financial Framework 

MODEX 

EU Module Exercises 

NDICI- GE 

Neighbourhood,  Development  and  International  Cooperation 
Instrument – Global Europe  

III 

 
NGEU 

Next Generation EU (Economic recovery package) 

ProtectEU 

Aims to increase the capabilities of EU Member States to protect 
societies and democracies from online and offline threats.  It will 
guarantee that security implications are considered in all future EU 
policies. 

REACT-EU 

Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe  

RescEU 

RRF 

SEAR 

SG 

SMEs 

TAFF 

TEU 

TFEU 

UCPM 

Strategic  reserve  of  European  disaster  response  capabilities  and 
stockpiles, fully funded by the EU 

Recovery and Resilience Facility 

Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve 

Secretariat-General (European Commission) 

Small and medium-sized enterprises 

Technical  Assistance  Financing  Facility  for  Disaster  Prevention 
and Preparedness 

Treaty on the European Union 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

Union Civil Protection Mechanism 

IV 

 
Glossary of key terms 

Term 

All-hazards approach 

Preparedness 

Preparedness-by-design 

Whole-of-government approach 

Whole-of-society approach 

Civil-military cooperation 

Brief explanation 

An approach that covers the full spectrum of 
natural and human-induced risks and threats and 
brings together all the available tools. 

In line with Decision 1313, 'preparedness' 
means a state of readiness and capability of 
human and material means, structures, 
communities and organisations enabling them to 
ensure an effective rapid response to a disaster, 
obtained as a result of action taken in advance. 

A concept whereby preparedness and security 
considerations are integrated and mainstreamed 
across EU legislation, policies, and 
programmes. New policies, legislation, and 
programmes will be prepared or reviewed with a 
preparedness and security perspective in mind, 
consistently identifying potential impacts of the 
preferred policy option on preparedness and 
security. 

An approach that brings together all relevant 
actors, across all levels of government (local, 
regional, national, and EU), promotes 
collaboration, policy coherence, and sharing of 
resources. It aims to address in a comprehensive 
manner increased risks and threats, their 
interaction, and their cascading effects. It 
includes effective cooperation between the 
civilian and defence authorities, and the 
coherent integration of internal and external 
dimensions. 

An approach which fosters an inclusive culture 
of preparedness and resilience involving 
citizens, local communities and civil society, 
businesses and social partners as well as the 
scientific and academic communities. 

In the context of this Impact Assessment, civil 
military cooperation refers to the cooperation 
arrangements between civilian authorities and 
military actors under various scenarios, 
primarily within the EU. For example, in an 

1 

 
 
increasing number of scenarios (e.g. health 
emergencies, extreme weather events, hybrid 
and cyberattacks), civilian authorities need 
military support. In case of armed aggression, 
armed forces would require civilian support to 
ensure the continuous operation of the state and 
society. 

1.  INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT  

The implementation of the current and previous EU programmes, as also demonstrated by the relevant 
programme evaluations, has shown that the complexity of the funding architecture is the major factor 
hindering the impact of the EU budget. Currently, many programmes may finance the same activities, 
but without the same rules and conditions and there is insufficient flexibility to respond to unforeseen 
needs. This leads to inefficiencies and administrative burden for beneficiaries, Member States and the 
Commission.  In  addition,  a  difficult  budgetary  situation  (with  the  start  of  NextGenerationEU 
repayments, the increasing number of EU priorities, and the tight fiscal situation of Member States) 
reinforces the need to reduce identified inefficiencies and administrative burden.  

The  Political  Guidelines  acknowledge  that  ‘our  spending  is  spread  over  too  many  overlapping 
programmes – many of which fund the same things but with different requirements and difficulties to 
combine funding effectively’. The Guidelines set out that the new long-term budget needs to be more 
focused, simpler, with fewer programmes, and more impactful.  

In line with the Political Guidelines, the College adopted on 11 February 2025 the Communication ‘The 
road to the next Multiannual Financial Framework’, which states that ‘the next long-term budget will 
have to address the complexities, weaknesses and rigidities that are currently present and maximise the 
impact  of  every  euro  it  spends’.  The  Communication  also  underlines  that  flexibility  is  key  in 
guaranteeing the budget’s ability to respond to a changing reality.  

In  this  political  context,  impact  assessments  for  programmes  under  the  next  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework (MFF) focus on how to streamline the architecture of the EU budget, thereby assessing the 
most important policy choices underpinning the legislative proposals for the future EU programmes. 
Policy aspects are considered in the analysis of the context, the problem definition, and the objectives, 
which inform the choices on the programme architecture. Given that the architecture of the new MFF 
will be significantly different from the current structure, assumptions on the budget of each programme 
would be unreliable at this stage. Therefore, the impact assessment does not include funding scenarios 
and, consequently, only qualitative cost benefit analysis is possible.   

This  reflects  the  specificities  of  this  exercise,  as  clearly  acknowledged  in  the  Commission’s  better 
regulation rules, which this impact assessment follows. Tool #9 of the better regulation toolbox states 
that  ‘the  special  case  of  preparing  a  new  MFF  is  a  unique  process requiring  a specific  approach  as 
regards scope and depth of analysis’. 

1.1  Political context 

The EU is confronted by crises that are increasingly frequent and severe. Ranging from climate-related 
disasters  to  health  crises  and  security  threats,  these  crises  have  shown  how  vulnerable  and 

2 

 
 
interdependent  our  societies  have  become. The  causes  of  crises  within  our  borders  and  beyond  are 
increasingly  interconnected,  resulting  in  a  dynamic  and  complex  landscape  of  risks  with  combined 
effects. The Union’s policy framework reflects a strong political will to meet these challenges. 

For example, the European Council addressed cross-border resilience in its Conclusions in 20231 and 
20242, acknowledging the persistent threats posed by climate change and security challenges in Europe 
and globally.3 It also noted the importance of strengthening resilience in strategic areas through an all-
hazards and whole-of-society approach to preparedness and response, including through the Union 
Civil  Protection  Mechanism  (UCPM)4  and  underlined  the  need  for  enhanced  and  coordinated 
military and civilian preparedness and strategic crisis management. 

All the above were echoed in the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission (2024 – 
2029)5 6, in which the Commission President called for a whole-of-government and a whole-of-society 
approach in crisis management, including a closer integration between civil and military capabilities.  

In support of these ambitions, the October 2024 report of former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö Safer 
together, Strengthening Europe´s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness7 advocates 
for a proactive, comprehensive approach to preparedness, urging policymakers to embed preparedness 
across all policy areas and at all levels of society.  

This political vision is captured in the Preparedness Union Strategy of March 20258, which underpins 
the commitment to robust crisis resilience, emphasising a whole-of-government and whole-of-society 
approach and laying out an ambitious roadmap for enhancing the Union’s capacity to withstand and 
respond to future crises. It stresses the importance of anticipatory action, strategic foresight, improved 
early-warning,  situational analysis  and cross-sectoral  coordination  systems,  EU  wide  integrated risk 
assessments  (all-hazards),  the  use  of  lessons  learnt,  and  improved  civil-military  and  public-private 
collaboration. The Preparedness Union Strategy is complemented by the European Internal Security 
Strategy9  and  the  White  Paper  for  European  Defence10  to  form  a  comprehensive  framework  to 
reinforce the Union’s preparedness and resilience to crises.  

Additional political context can be found in Annex 6. 

1.2  Legal context  

1 European Council Conclusions of 29-30 June 2023. 
2 European Council Conclusions of 21-22 March 2024. 
3 This assessment was also shared by participants during the Open Public Consultation where the most common answer to 
which risks and threats respondents are considered as most threatening were disasters caused by climate change (874), followed 
by disinformation (464) and threats to biodiversity and animal/plant health (410). Open Public Consultation EU’s next long-
term budget (MFF) – EU funding for civil protection, preparedness and response to crises.  European Commission, 2025, 
Annex 2. 
4 Established by Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism. 
5 Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024-2029. European Commission, 2024. 
6 Council Conclusions of 21 September 2021, 21-22 October 2021, 16 December 2021, 23-24 June 2022, 18 July 2022, 17-
18 April 2024, and 27 June 2024. 
7 Niinistö Report - Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness. European Commission, 2024. 
8 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions on the European Preparedness Union Strategy. European Commission, 2025. 
9 European Internal Security Strategy – Press release. European Commission, 2025.  
10 Introducing the White Paper for European Defence and the ReArm Europe Plan- Readiness 2030. European Commission, 
2025.  

3 

 
 
In  the  area  of  crisis  management  coordination,  the  Union’s  action  relies  on  a  fragmented  legal 
framework composed of both sectoral and cross-sectoral instruments11. This fragmentation necessitates 
broad coordination to achieve effective responses to increasingly complex crises. To support this, key 
cross-sectoral  crisis  coordination  mechanisms  include  ARGUS  for  the  Commission,  the  Crisis 
Response Mechanism (CRM) for the EEAS, and the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) for the 
Council. ARGUS facilitates information-sharing and coordination of the Commission’s response, while 
the Crisis Response Centre (CRC) is the 24/7 crisis response capability for crises affecting EU citizens 
abroad and/or emergencies threatening the safety of the staff in EU Delegations. The IPCR paves the 
way  for  political  response  by  bringing  together  Member  States,  EU  institutions,  and  other  essential 
stakeholders. Sector-specific strategies reflect this wide approach to crisis management, each designed 
to support the Union’s crisis preparedness (see 1.1. Political context).  

In  the  area  of  cross-sectoral  and  transboundary  disaster  and  crisis  response,  one  of  the  first 
instruments to be activated in times of crises is the UCPM. It is designed to prevent, prepare for, and 
respond to disasters both within and outside the EU. Article 1(2) of the UCPM Decision 1313 captures 
the cross-sectoral nature of the UCPM.12 At the centre of this mechanism is the Emergency Response 
Coordination Centre (ERCC), which acts as a central hub where resource requests from participating 
countries are matched with capacities offered by Member States and Participating States, through the 
European Civil Protection Pool (ECPP), as well as the rescEU strategic reserve.  

In the area of health security preparedness and response, Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 on serious 
cross-border threats to health creates a more robust mandate for coordination and cooperation as regards 
prevention and preparedness and for a more effective response to serious cross-border health threats, at 
both  the  EU  and  EU  Member  State  levels.  It  strengthens  prevention,  preparedness  and  response 
planning;  reinforces  epidemiological  surveillance  and  monitoring  and  established  EU  reference 
laboratories  for  public  health;  improves  data  reporting  for  early  warning;  and  strengthens  EU 
intervention. In addition, the Regulation 2022/2372 provides a framework of measures for ensuring the 
supply of crisis-relevant medical countermeasures in the event of a public health emergency at Union 
level. The EU4Health programme, established in the current MFF, provides support in the area of public 
health, including the area of pandemic preparedness and response (e.g. pandemic avian flu, biotoxin 
attack, COVID-19, Mpox), cancer treatment, global health challenges, and to improve healthcare for 
Ukrainian refugees, and displaced persons. This regulatory umbrella framework is further supported by 
the Commission’s  Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), which plays a 
central  role  within  the  European  Health  Union  to  bolster  the  EU’s  ability  to  promote  research  for, 
development  and  accessibility  of  innovative,  safe,  and  affordable  medical  countermeasures.  The 
European Medicines Agency (EMA)13  and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC)14 have been empowered with reinforced mandates to ensure preparedness and support response 

11 In the area of civil protection, the Union acts under Article 196 TFEU, which designates civil protection as a supporting 
competence. Article 214 governs the Union’s operations in the field of humanitarian aid. Article 222 TFEU obliges Member 
States to act jointly in a spirit of solidarity during terrorist attacks or natural or man-made disasters. Combating cross-border 
health threats is governed by Article 6, point (a), and Article 168(1) TFEU. 
12 “The protection to be ensured by the Union Mechanism shall cover primarily people, but also the environment and property, 
including cultural heritage, against all kinds of natural and man-made disasters, including the consequences of acts of terrorism, 
technological,  radiological  or  environmental  disasters,  marine  pollution,  hydrogeological  instability  and  acute  health 
emergencies, occurring inside or outside the Union.” 
13 Regulation (EU) 2022/123 on a reinforced role for the European Medicines Agency in crisis preparedness and management 
for medicinal products and medical devices. 
14 Regulation (EU) 2022/2370 amending Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 establishing a European centre for disease prevention 
and Control. 

4 

 
 
and manage medical supply chains effectively during crises. 

Additional information on the legal context can be found in Annex 6. 

1.3  Funding instruments 

Under  the  current  MFF,  the  Union’s  crisis  management  relies  on  programmes  and  instruments  to 
reinforce and fund its efforts. While these play a relevant role in different policy areas, most of them 
were not designed specifically for crisis management and are funding the EU response to today’s threat 
landscape in a patchwork approach. 

Crisis response and recovery 

The UCPM finances response and preparedness to disasters and crises. This includes the operational 
response to emergencies (e.g. transport, deployment of teams, and in-kind assistance), as well as the 
establishment  and  maintenance  of  the  ECPP  and  the  rescEU  strategic  reserve.  Further,  the  UCPM 
supports capacity building activities and projects in EU Member States and UCPM Participating States 
leading  to  improved  disaster  prevention  and  preparedness,  shared  knowledge  and  expertise,  good 
practices and networking, and research and innovation in disaster risk management. 

The Emergency Support Instrument (ESI)15 can be activated in response to disasters of exceptional scale 
and impact. The ESI was notably mobilised following the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure swift resource 
allocation to the Member States most in need. 

The  European  Union  Solidarity  Fund  (EUSF)16  supports  Member  States  and accession  countries  by 
offering  financial  support  after  severe  disasters.  Support  to  neighbouring  countries  and  beyond  is 
important, as crises may originate outside of the EU and have spillover effects on Member States.  

Cohesion Policy Funds are also crucial in supporting prevention and preparedness measures, with a 
particular focus on those most vulnerable and exposed regions. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
Cohesion  Policy  Funds  have  been  used  to  support  healthcare  spending  and  address  the  economic 
consequences of the crisis. 

The Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU) programme extends 
the coronavirus response investment initiatives (CRII and CRII+) and constitutes a bridge to the long-
term recovery plan. It supports investment projects that foster crisis-repair capacities and contribute to 
a green, digital, and resilient recovery of the economy. 

The  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (RRF)  is  the  cornerstone  of  the  NextGenerationEU  package, 
supporting Member States’ economic recovery post COVID-19, while also improving resilience and 
accelerating the green and digital transitions. RRF provides direct financial support to Member States, 
tied to legislative reforms across a wide range of policy areas, including crisis prevention, preparedness, 
and response. 

The  Internal  Security  Fund  supports  the  strengthening  of  Member  States  capabilities,  including  in 
relation to managing security-related incidents, risks, and crises.  

Health security preparedness  

The  EU4Health  programme  strengthens  the  EU  and  Member  States’  capacities  for  health  threat 
preparedness and response and as such is partially overlapping with some areas of work of the UCPM. 
It financially supports the implementation of the EU’s legislative and non-legislative initiatives through 

15 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support within the Union. 
16 European Union Solidarity Fund – Performance. European Commission. 

5 

 
 
five strands of action, including one for health crisis preparedness. Additionally, EU health response 
capacities have also been bolstered through the development of rescEU strategic reserves of medical 
countermeasures.  

Research, innovation and digital resilience 

Horizon Europe, the EU’s 9th framework programme for research and innovation, focuses on societal 
challenges, including health and civil security. With over EUR 8.2 billion and EUR 1.5 billion for the 
health and civil security clusters, respectively, it allocates funds for civil security such as measures to 
reinforce preparedness for CBRN incidents as well as funds for pandemic preparedness and response 
such as coronavirus research, climate change and impact on health, antimicrobial resistance research, 
and other areas critical to resilience and preparedness. Through established financing mechanisms and 
in  cooperation  with  Member-States  and  international  organisations  (such  as  CEPI  and  EDCTP3), 
Horizon Europe’s actions have supported critical clinical trials in e.g. coronaviruses or Mpox. 

The  Cyber  Solidarity  Act,  as  well  as  the  Digital  Europe  Programme  funding  it,  are  designed  to 
strengthen preparedness and incident response across the Union. 

The EU Space Programme also supports EU and Members States’ preparedness and crisis response by 
funding programmes like Copernicus, Galileo, GOVSATCOM (and in the future IRIS2) and the Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA) components. These initiatives respectively provide essential geo-spatial 
analysis, positioning, navigational and timing services, secure connectivity and in-space safety services, 
thus contributing to crisis monitoring and response. 

Additional context on financial instruments can be found in Annex 6. 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION  

It is important to note that the issues and objectives described in chapters 2, 3, and 4 are broad in scope 
and  will  be addressed  through  different instruments, in line  with the  Preparedness  Union  Strategy’s 
principle of preparedness-by-design. Indeed, preparedness is not something that can be addressed by a 
single instrument or programme alone. As a result, the instrument linked to this impact assessment will 
contribute  to  resolving  the  issues  and  addressing  the  objectives.  How  exactly  it  will  contribute  is 
covered in subsequent chapters, especially Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Nevertheless, it is important to touch 
on the wider topic of preparedness, in order to provide a comprehensive picture that will need to be 
reflected across the next MFF architecture.17 

Overall risk and threat landscape 

The EU has been exposed to a series of crises over the last two decades. This polycrisis18, in its diversity, 
has  a  common  denominator:  a  strong  transboundary  and  cross-sectoral  dimension.19  The 
unprecedented multitude of health, climate, technological, and geopolitical risks confronting Europe, 
as well the important security implications of the many conflicts and crises raging around the EU, was 
highlighted by Niinistö in his report on civilian and military preparedness and readiness and reflect the 
challenges outlined in this problem definition. 

Pandemics  are  one  of  the  most  impactful  events  for  societies.  While  devastating,  they  are  not 
unprecedented  or  rare  events.  In  the  past  they  were  a  “once-in-a-century”  occurrence,  but  recent 
developments like globalisation and climate change are fast increasing their probability, frequency and 
severity. 

The problem tree below provides an overview of the identified problems and their drivers, showing how 
risk  factors  cascade  and  combine,  impacting  the  EU’s  ability  to  prepare  for  and  respond  to  crises 
effectively. 

Figure 1- Simplified display of problem tree (see Annex 7 for larger version) 

17 Efforts to ensure this is reflected across the next MFF are ongoing, including on adding specific objectives and/or recitals 
in other relevant funding instruments and programmes.  
18 A polycrisis involves overlapping and interdependent issues, making it a more pervasive and enduring state of instability. 
19 2023 Strategic Foresight Report. European Commission, 2023. 

7 

 
 
 
Annex  6  provides  useful  contextual  information  on  risks  and  threats  stemming  from  (i)  a  volatile 
geopolitical,  security,  and  socio-economic  environment  and  (ii)  climate  change  and  environmental 
degradation, as well as corresponding cascading and compounding20 effects. 

Main problems for EU preparedness and response to crises 

P1: EU crisis management is reactive rather than proactive 

The EU is facing a risk landscape that affects all sectors, including public health, critical infrastructure, 
environmental systems, food security, cybersecurity, civil protection, transport, and energy, at all levels. 
While  individual  instruments  at  both  the  EU  and  national  levels  increasingly  apply  a  multi-hazards 
approach, significant gaps remain in anticipating new risks and hazards and in consolidating relevant 
data across sectors. One of the key problems identified in the Commission evaluation of the UCPM 
(2017-2022) is the system’s insufficient ability to anticipate crises21. 

Europe’s  evolving  risk  landscape  often  involves  crises  that  occur  simultaneously,  some  originated 
beyond its borders, and exacerbate one another, as illustrated by the cascading and compounding risks 
above. 

Looking  back,  none  of  the  major  crises  during  the  last  years  were  sufficiently  anticipated  and 
prepared for.22 Too often, the EU is preparing for the past crises rather than the future ones. While after 
every crisis, the Union adapted, developing new instruments and reinforcing the legal framework (e.g. 
European Health Union), before the Niinistö report brought attention to the concept, the EU lacked a 
preparedness-by-design  approach  in  the  development  of  its  policy  and  financial  instruments.  For 
example, financial tools like REACT-EU are mobilised reactively in response to crises rather than being 
structured to anticipate and address risks proactively. The Recovery and Resilience Facility was created 
to mitigate the economic and social impacts of the COVID-19, aiming to make EU economies more 
resilient and sustainable so they can better withstand future shocks. 

EU crisis management lacks an integrated foresight, anticipation, and early warning 
While numerous risk- and sector-specific assessments and early warning systems exist23, their insights 
are  not  brought together into  a comprehensive  all-hazards perspective required  by  the  complex risk 
landscape.  Indeed,  the  Commission’s  evaluation  of  the  UCPM  (2017-2022)  highlighted  persistent 
fragmentation  among  early  warning  systems  and  the  need  to  improve  the  integration  of  data  and 
information flows across Member States. This hampers the ability to understand how risks within and 
outside  the  EU  interact,  including  their  cascading  effects  and  systemic  vulnerabilities.  Scientific 
research,  foresight,  and  technological  advancements  remain  underused  in  enhancing  risk 
understanding, detecting emerging risks, and anticipating future crises. A key driver of this situation is 
the  linear  perspective  on  crises,  which  often  begins  with  sectoral  assessments  (e.g.  human  life, 
infrastructure, or economic impacts) at the EU and national levels. This approach fails to adequately 
address  non-linear  risks,  such  as  tipping  points24.  Supporting  the  above,  according  to  the  UCPM 
evaluation,  the  effectiveness  of  the  UCPM  was  primarily  hindered  by  the  changing  threat  and  risk 

20 Cascading effects are understood as spill-over effects; compounding effects are understood as simultaneous effects. 
21 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF, p. 151-152. The study includes further references to lessons 
learnt and reports. 
22 Niinistö Report - Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness. European Commission, 2024, 
p.6. 
23Including the Early Warning and Response System for human health, the Animal Disease Information System and the Rapid 
Alert System for Food and Feed.   
24Critical  thresholds  that,  when  crossed,  lead  to  large,  accelerating  and  often  irreversible  changes  in  complex  systems, 
exemplary but not exclusively in the climate system. 

8 

 
 
landscape, as well as limitations to the scientific evidence base for disaster risk management.25 More 
generally, and underpinned by the Draghi report, there is a lack of investment in research, innovation, 
and entrepreneurship in sectors supporting anticipation, prevention, preparedness, and crisis response. 
This could have a negative impact on competitiveness of the EU industry and strategic autonomy.26 
Addressing  these  challenges  requires  substantial  adjustments  to  the  EU’s  crisis  management 
functioning,  including  improved  resource  allocation,  legal  framework  adaptations,  and  strengthened 
cross-sectoral coordination. 

The still limited use of strategic foresight at the EU level widens the gap in anticipating future crises 
in  a  systematic  way  and  leveraging  opportunities  to  improve  preparedness.  While  there  have  been 
improvements at EU and national level in recent years, further efforts are needed to strengthen future-
oriented  intelligence,  structures  and  mechanisms,  including  dedicated  resources  (see  problem  3),  to 
integrate  strategic  foresight  more  effectively  into  policymaking.  These  gaps  at  EU  level  in  using 
strategic foresight and early warning systems were also pointed out during the Open Public Consultation 
with participants recommending to improve risk forecasting and support early warning systems.27 

EU lacks integrated risk assessments 
Despite  the  increasing  efforts  to  strengthen  the  all-hazards  approach  to  risk  management  and  crisis 
preparedness, such as improving risk  and threat  assessments, promoting cross-sectoral coordination, 
and enhancing early-warning systems, obstacles remain.  

Integrated risk and threat assessments are critical to ensuring that all potential hazards are identified, 
quantified,  and  their  interconnections  analysed,  enabling  a  comprehensive  strategy  for  anticipation, 
prevention,  preparedness,  and  response.  However,  risk  and  threat  assessments  at  both  the  EU  and 
national levels are fragmented and do not leverage synergies across various sectoral evaluations.28 This 
can  lead  to  gaps  and  underestimation  of  risks  and  the  potential  benefits  of  investing  in  structural 
preparedness. 

The Commission evaluation of the UCPM (2017-2022) emphasises the need to map and consolidate 
existing early warning tools and risk and threat assessments across the EU.29 This would ensure that 
critical information is less fragmented and is better integrated into a strategic, pragmatic approach to 
crisis anticipation and response, both within and beyond the EU. 

P2: Fragmented EU crisis management hinders the preparedness for and response to the 
new complexity of risks and threats  

Coordination is a central component of effective and efficient crises preparedness and response. Over 
the  last  years,  numerous  crisis-related  policy  developments  and  legislative  initiatives  have  been 
launched at EU level (see chapter 1). 

While it can be argued that these efforts have enhanced the EU’s capacity to address an evolving risk 
landscape, the absence of a strategic and systemic approach has resulted in an increasingly fragmented 
EU crisis management architecture (fragmentation in terms of financing instruments is covered under 

25Commission  staff  working  document - Evaluation  of  the  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism (2017-2022). European 
Commission, 2024. 
26 Draghi Report. European Commission, 2024. 
27 Open Public Consultation EU’s next long-term budget (MFF) – EU funding for civil protection, preparedness and response 
to crises. European Commission, 2025, Annex 2. 
28 While we state the problem, we also need to look at the practical feasibility of it, due to particularities of hazards that require 
different  datasets,  models,  and  assets. As  a  reference,  the  MYRIAD  and  PARATUS  are  two  project  for  multi-hazard  risk 
assessments. 
29 Commission staff working document - Evaluation of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (2017-2022). European 
Commission, 2024, p.24. 

9 

 
 
Problem 3). In line with this, the World Bank highlighted in 2021 the need for an integrated approach 
to  make  the  EU's  resilience  robust  enough  to  handle  simultaneous  environmental,  security,  and 
technological risks.30 

The  risk  of  overlapping  mandates  and  unclear  roles  and  responsibilities  within  the  EU’s  crisis 
management  architecture  is  materialising  with  the  proliferation  of  crisis  management  structures, 
mechanisms and instruments over the last years31 and hinders the EU’s crisis management capacity32. 
Such fast-paced and often ad-hoc expansion of sectoral capabilities contributes to the inefficient use of 
scarce resources, while also creating unnecessary administrative burden for the Commission, Member 
States’ authorities, and other public and private partner entities. Moreover, this could obstruct critical 
information-sharing, coordination, and decision-making in times of crisis. The different information-
sharing practices among EU institutions and Member States, as well as the limitations of the role and 
functioning  of  cross-sectoral,  horizontal  crisis  management  arrangements,  such  as  the  Integrated 
Political  Crisis  Response  (IPCR)  at  Council-level,  might  further  contribute  to  delaying  crucial 
horizontal  coordination  to  respond,  as  evidenced  in  the  framework  of  conducted  crisis-simulated 
exercises.33 

Sectoral and cross-border coordination gaps persist 
An inventory of the EU’s crisis management mechanisms, tools, and instruments lists 56 entries, each 
with a defined scope and mandate, covering areas such as natural disasters, agriculture, health, cyber, 
or funding instruments. Despite efforts to mainstream crisis management across sectors, such as the 
UCPM's all-hazards approach and multi-hazard monitoring platforms, significant gaps remain.34  

Many crises have a cross-border dimension and thus require cross-border cooperation. But significant 
obstacles to effective cross-border collaboration still persist, in particular in risk prevention. The 2024 
REGIO-commissioned study, Strengthening the Resilience of EU Border Regions,35 identifies hurdles 
such as administrative and regulatory barriers, lack of coordination and communication,36 disparities in 
funding, resources, and institutional capacity, limited data sharing, cultural and language differences, 
legal  and  liability  issues,  and  uneven  public  engagement.  For  instance,  in  public  health,  many  EU 
Member States have concluded regional cooperation agreements including the possibility for medical 
evacuation  of  patients,  the  sharing  of  human  resources  and  of  medical  countermeasures.  These 
agreements often lack the necessary legal framework or operationalisation to ensure their applicability. 
Several reports from the Committee of the Regions,37 the Commission,38 as well as the Council39 in 
2024, highlight these issues but reveal the need for deeper structural reforms to streamline collaboration. 

In terms of cross-border crisis communication between first responders, the current (national) critical 
communication  systems  used  by  Member  States  do  not  allow  for  interoperability,  i.e.  today, 
communication equipment used by civil protection, law enforcement, and medical responders cannot 

30 Investment in disaster risk management in Europe makes economic sense. World Bank, 2021. 
31 SG Analytical Note: Cross-sectoral mapping of European Commission’s new crisis management capabilities (2020-2023), 
October 2024.  
32 https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2024-12/SR-2024-12_EN.pdf.  
33  Commission  staff  working  document  -  Evaluation  of  the  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  (2017-2022).  European 
Commission 2024, p.32. 
34  Commission  staff  working  document  -  Evaluation  of  the  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  (2017-2022).  European 
Commission 2024, p.27. 
35 Strengthening the Resilience of EU Border Regions. European Commission, March 2024. 
36  Example:  Communication  equipment  used by  civil protection,  law  enforcement,  cyber incident  responders  and  medical 
responders cannot be used in the territory of other Member States. 
37 Cross-border dimension in disaster risk reduction. Committee of the Regions, June 2019. 
38 Strengthening the resilience of EU border regions. European Commission, March 2024. 
39 Roadmap to strengthen cross-border cooperation in crisis preparedness and response in 2024 (No. 11191/24).  

10 

 
 
be used in the territory of other Member States. This significantly reduces their capacity to efficiently 
cooperate and support each other, not only in case of major incidents or crises, but also during daily 
missions. The EU would need an updated secured information exchange system to allow for full inter-
operability  of  Member  States’  critical  communication  systems  and  increase  resilience  of  critical 
communication infrastructure. 

Equally important to cross-border cooperation is cross-sectoral cooperation in terms of agencies. Law 
enforcement and other internal security authorities can function effectively only if they cooperate with 
others, notably in the areas of police and judicial cooperation, civil protection and emergency services. 
This is true for managing major internal security threats, hybrid threats, critical infrastructure incidents 
and for critical communication, among others. 

Similarly, sectoral coordination is constrained by a lack of integration between policy instruments and 
processes, falling short of ensuring structural resilience of assets and societal systems at national and 
EU level.40 A systems-based approach is needed to set clear requirements and incentives that account 
for co-benefits or negative impacts on other systems, beyond the immediate scope of decision.41 

While the UCPM and humanitarian aid instruments aim to complement one another, their effectiveness 
is  often  hindered  by  fragmented  responsibilities.  Humanitarian  aid  typically  falls  under  different 
ministries at the national level, complicating responses to transboundary and large-scale external risks 
and threats with internal implications. With regards to health-related crises, the COVID-19 pandemic 
has illustrated the importance of clear and coordinated approaches to public health and social measures, 
rapid scientific advice to facilitate policy decisions, or the need for a pan-European approach for faster 
and more effective research and development framework, enabled by a pipeline approach.42 The lack 
of  updated  integrated  response  plans,  insufficient  coordination  between  environmental,  animal  and 
human health sectors, insufficient stockpiling mechanisms, and delayed detection and response have 
underscored the importance of strengthening EU – Member States’ collaboration. 

Civil-military coordination deficits are prevalent 
Although  civil  and military  actors  would  mutually  benefit from  increased  cooperation,  this  remains 
limited  both  strategically  and  operationally.  Civilian  and  military  programmes  often  operate  under 
distinct  legal  bases  with  differing  funding  requirements,  and  not  all  Member  States  support  closer 
collaboration. Also in this domain, lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic should be considered. Despite 
the significant support provided across the Union by the military services to the civilian health response, 
further  coordination  and  operationalisation  of  civil  –  military  cooperation  is  needed.  The  lack  of 
coordination  reduces  the  EU’s  capacity  to  address  complex  crises  that  require  multi-dimensional 
responses, such as hybrid threats, combined physical and digital attacks, armed attacks, or the disruption 
of critical infrastructure. 

Disconnect between internal/thematic and external dimensions remains 
Events outside the EU, including in the enlargement region, can have spill-over effects on the EU’s 
internal security. As a result, addressing challenges within the EU, including with regards to climate, 
cyber, hybrid, health, migration, and critical infrastructure, amongst others, also comprises an external 
dimension.  Despite  this  reality,  the  policies  and  activities  of  the  EU’s  external  action  and  internal 
security  and  resilience  are  insufficiently  coordinated,  leading  to  gaps  in  information  sharing  and 

40 2024 European Climate Risk Assessment. EEA, 2024. 
41 Example: Building a flood barrier that shifts waters to downriver residents making their risk exposure higher than before. 
42 A pipeline approach refers to a structured, sequential process designed to ensure continuous progress from initial concept or 
discovery to final delivery or implementation. In this context, the pipeline starts with risk identification and leads to prioritised 
procurement, stockpiling of materials, and rapid distribution during emergencies. 

11 

 
 
fragmented situational awareness43. The resulting inconsistencies in intelligence-sharing and analysis 
mean that the EU struggles to anticipate the impacts of external developments on its institutions and 
Member States.  

P3: EU's ability to act in solidarity in crises is constrained 

While the EU has been instrumental in fostering solidarity among Member States and  citizens44, the 
evolving risk landscape exposes existing and anticipated gaps in the EU’s crisis management system. 
Concerning budgetary matters, the EU has mobilised its financial instruments during crises. However, 
most of these tools were designed under more optimistic circumstances and face structural limitations 
that reduce their overall effectiveness and efficiency in addressing today’s challenges. 

Whole-of-society engagement is limited 
Successful crisis prevention, preparedness, and response to crises require the mobilisation of all levels 
of  society,  including  individuals,  local  communities,  non-governmental  organisations,  businesses, 
critical  infrastructure  operators,  etc.  Despite  this,  a  whole-of-government  approach  remains 
underdeveloped.  

Regarding population preparedness, according to a special Eurobarometer on population risk awareness 
and  disaster  preparedness,45  58%  of  EU  citizens  feel  poorly  prepared  for  disasters,  and  almost  half 
would be unable to power their homes beyond a single day in the event of an electricity outage.  

In  addition,  considering  the  cross-border  nature  of  health  emergencies,  the  Union’s  preparedness  is 
uneven and insufficiently coordinated across Member States and globally. At global level, overlapping 
roles  also  result  in  lack  of  clarity  and  inefficiencies.  This  situation  leads  to  ineffective  risk 
communication  and  community  engagement  alongside 
insufficient  population  preparedness, 
uncoordinated  patient  transfer  arrangements  and  limited  capacity  of  the  (public)  health  sector 
workforce. 

The private sector’s integration into crisis management policies is similarly limited, despite the crucial 
role that it plays in ensuring day-to-day life and continuity during emergency operations (i.e. logistics, 
communication, etc.). Between the start of the war against Ukraine and April 2025, the UCPM was able 
to channel close to EUR 15 million in goods from private companies and third countries to Ukraine and 
the region affected by the war46. Despite these success stories, cooperation with the private sector faces 
challenges due to the absence of a unified approach to engaging external stakeholders and the limited 
availability of coordination platforms to effectively integrate diverse resources and sectors into EU-
level planning.47   

Moreover,  strategic  investments  in  preparedness  infrastructure  and  stockpiling  remain  equally 
underdeveloped.48  49A  comprehensive  approach  to  strategic  stockpiling  involving  both  public  and 
private actors can help mitigate risks of unexpected supply chain disruptions and price fluctuations thus 

43 Example: The EU has lately increased its civil and military support to third countries, notably through the European Peace 
Facility, however this has not been sufficiently leveraged to enhance intra EU-security. 
44 Commission staff working document - Evaluation of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (2017-2022). European 
Commission, 2024, p.38. 
45 Eurobarometer on disaster risk awareness and preparedness of the EU population. European Commission, 2024. 
46  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council:  Capacity  Progress Report  on  the  Response 
Capacities of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. European Commission, 2025, p. 16.  
47 Public-Private Partnerships in Disaster Risk Management: A European Policy Perspective. European Commission, 2021; 
The Role of the Military in Disaster Response: Global Trends and Challenges. RAND Corporation, 2020; Boosting Resilience 
through Innovative Partnerships: The Role of the Private Sector in Emergency Preparedness. OECD, 2022. 
48 Niinistö Report - Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness. European Commission, 2024, 
p. 159. 
49 Acknowledging this shortcoming, the Commission currently prepares EU stockpiling and MCM strategies. 

12 

 
 
enhancing the preparedness for man-made or natural crises.50   

Addressing crises via the EU budget requires reallocating resources from structural goals 
In recent years, the response to crises has often required reallocating resources from budgets originally 
intended for achieving structural goals, in particular from cohesion policy. While these ad hoc solutions 
have contributed to a strong European response, they were time-demanding, and provided a piecemeal 
response to repeated, large and symmetric shocks, while weighing on other objectives under cohesion 
policy.51 

There  are  several  shortcomings  in  EU  funding  instruments  for  structural  preparedness  and 
crisis response  
The EU's funding instruments reveal significant shortcomings52 over the entire crisis management cycle. 
The need to coordinate diverse funding sources and varied eligibility rules complicates the pursuit of a 
coherent  investment  strategy  for  risk  prevention,  preparedness,  and  recovery.  For  example,  actions 
related  to  health  emergency  response  are  financed  under  both  EU4Health  (for  example  emergency 
purchase  of  mpox  vaccines),  as  well  as  the  UCPM  instrument  (for  example  stockpiling  of  medical 
countermeasures). 

In  addressing  long-term  crises,  such  as  energy  supply  needs  in  Ukraine  or  prolonged  public  health 
emergencies the EU lacks anticipatory budgeting mechanisms, while relying instead on programming 
and ad-hoc top-ups53 that delay critical responses. Similarly, the time to effectively implement funds 
such as Next Generation EU54 together with Member States in crisis preparedness measure was at times 
not  sufficient.  Another  example  of  gaps  in  the  current  financial  instruments  concerns  the  lack  of 
allocated funding for repatriation efforts e.g. medical evacuations. In 2022, there was a delay of about 
six months while seeking funding to assist Ukrainian nationals returning home after treatment in the 
EU. These specific challenges exemplify the rigidity and fragmentation problems within the EU crisis 
management system, limiting its ability to respond efficiently to evolving and long-term crises55.  

The EU Solidarity Fund’s annual allocation for the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) had 
to be increased for the years 2024-2027 given the increase in frequency and severity of natural disasters. 
Budgetary shortfalls in 2021, 2022, and 2023 necessitated proportionate reductions in allocated EUSF 
assistance  to  Member  States,  highlighting  how  financial  needs  have  increased  compared  to  the 
expectations at the time of MFF adoption. 

EU funding for neighbouring countries and less developed regions within the Union is hampered by 
low institutional capacities, delaying critical investments in preparedness and response (see the below 
absorption  challenges  at  national  level).  Moreover,  fast  allocation  schemes  for  emergency  research 
funding could be further defined to reinforce the facilitation of rapid support for crisis related research 

50 For example, in Finland the private sector is engaged through the Finnish National Emergency Supply Fund and National 
Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) to maintain compulsory stockpiles across different sectors which are owned and managed 
by private businesses. 
51  Communication  of  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – “The road to the next Multiannual 
Financial Framework”. European Commission, 2025. 
52 Commission staff working document - Evaluation of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (2017-2022). European 
Commission, 2024, pp.46-47. 
53 Commission staff working document - Evaluation of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (2017-2022). European 
Commission, 2024, pp.46-7. 
54 Commission staff working document - Evaluation of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (2017-2022). European 
Commission, 2024, p.43. 
55 Niinistö Report - Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness. European Commission, 2024, 
p.17. 

13 

 
 
and innovation.56 

In foreign policy, the EU’s ability to react to new crises through the NDICI funding framework has 
become critical amidst the simultaneous crises in Ukraine, Middle East, and Sahel. The NDICI ’cushion’ 
has already been largely mobilised for global and geo-political crises (COVID-19, Ukraine and Syrian 
refugee crises), raising concerns that the EU cannot react adequately any more to the increasing number 
of crises in different regions of the world.57 

Strategic alignment of national budgets is insufficient 
Strategic  alignment  of  national  budgets  ensures  public  spending  is  coordinated  with  EU  priorities, 
effectively  addressing  risks  while  avoiding  funding  gaps  and  leveraging  synergies.  Conversely, 
misalignment causes inefficiencies, such as uncoordinated projects that fail to comprehensively tackle 
vulnerabilities.  At  the  same  time,  EU  and  Member  States’  budgets  are  fragmented,  with  limited 
mechanisms to support long-terms strategic investments or aligned priorities across sectors. 

In the area of crisis management, including on disaster risk management and climate adaptation, the EU 
is not the sole, nor the largest source of investments, although it has been a key incentive and support 
to invest in crises preparedness and response. National reports on disaster risk management, submitted 
to the Commission under the UCPM legislation, provide limited information on the funding sources 
and volumes used to implement risk management measures.58   

Scaling up investments in risk prevention, mitigation, and preparedness is challenging. Evidence points 
to  under-investment  at  the  national  level,  as  outlined  for  instance  in  the  2023  review  of  climate 
adaptation progress in Member States59 and in the European Court of Auditors’ 2018 review of flood 
risk  management  plans60.  Feedback  from  national  civil  protection  authorities  highlights  three  main 
categories: (i) issues with the financial and institutional frameworks, coordination, and  awareness of 
risks/their impact; (ii) limitations in the human and technical capacity of civil protection agencies; and 
(iii)  difficulties  accessing  and  using  EU  financing  sources.61  Cross-border  investments  are  further 
hindered by limited administrative capacity and complex institutional setups.62 Additionally, investing 
in disaster resilience is often disincentivised by mismatch between those who pay for the investment 
versus those who benefit. 

In  its  2024  report  on  preventing  and  managing  disaster  risk,  the  Commission  recommended  that 
Member States increase funding for disaster risk management and climate adaptation, develop national 
disaster risk financing options, and focus more on prevention measures.63 

Moreover, the capacity to ‘absorb’ the impact of disasters across the Member States is limited. Insurance 
coverage for public and residential assets are low, reserve funds are limited, and other types of risk 
transfer and contingency funding are lacking. The World Bank estimates that, on average, the combined 
total of the EU Solidarity Fund, reserve, and contingency funds available to Member States covers less 

56 The ‘Scientific Opinion on Strategic Crisis Management’. European Commission, 2022. 
57 Evaluation of the European Union’s External Financing Instruments (2014-2020 and 2021-2027). European Commission, 
2024. 
58 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council – On implementation of article 6 of the UCPM. 
European Commission, 2024. 
59  Commission  staff  working  document  –  Assessment  of  progress  on  climate  adaptation  in  the  individual  Member  States 
according to the European Climate Law. European Commission, 2023. 
60 Is Europe on track towards climate resilience? EEA, 2023. 
61 Understanding the needs of civil protection agencies and opportunities for scaling up disaster risk management 
investments. World Bank, 2021. 
62 Strengthening the Resilience of EU Border Regions. European Commission, March 2024. 
63  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European Parliament and  Council  –  On implementation of article  6  of  the  UCPM. 
European Commission, 2024. 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
than  4%  of  total  government  liabilities  each  year,  considering  worst-case  flood  and  earthquake 
scenarios.64 

Capacity and capability gaps persist 
The current MFF and NGEU allowed to reinforce capacities, including stockpiles, at EU level (through 
the  EU  strategic  reserve,  rescEU).  Nevertheless,  there  is  no  comprehensive  overview  of  existing 
capacities  and  capabilities at  national level,  thus  undermining  EU  efforts to effectively complement 
national efforts. Even the availability capacities in specific sectors, such as energy, medical, and CBRN 
stockpiles, are difficult to assess. Experience from the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war against 
Ukraine highlights the strategic importance of such coordinated capacities. Uneven capacity to address 
health threats could lead to ever more severe outbreaks and health emergencies, with dire consequences 
in morbidity and mortality, and important impact on our societies and economies. 

At the same time, capacity and capability gaps are evident. This is underscored in the 10 Union-wide 
disaster scenarios65 developed by DG ECHO and by a mapping of crisis management capabilities, tools, 
and instruments of the SG. To better assess the nature of the gaps in the area of civil protection, the EU 
conducts capacity gap analyses at EU level (no EU overview of existing other national capacities across 
the MS and Participating States exists). The same can be said in the area of serious cross-border threats 
to health, in particular regarding medical countermeasures, as robust preparedness planning, including 
estimation of needs, provisions on stockpiling, manufacturing, supply chain management, and research 
and innovation are lacking in many EU Member States. 

However, all assessments depend heavily on Member States’ reporting, which can leave blind spots in 
various sectors66. Governance and institutional capacity, particularly in less developed regions, remain 
key factors affecting the ability to implement prevention, preparedness, and reconstruction measures 
effectively. 

Significant capability gaps remain in the areas of situational awareness and secured communication 
systems. For example, EU space services, including data and infrastructure, are not yet fully aligned 
with the Union’s strategic needs for preparedness and response. This shortfall limits the EU’s ability to 
address crises efficiently and proactively. Further, the different information-sharing practices among 
services as explained under above Problem 2, including between Council and Commission services, 
further  contribute  to  delaying  coordination  capabilities.67 There  is  no  available  information  whether 
such sectoral and thematic exchanges take place at national level. 

In  terms  of  stockpiling  of  medical  countermeasures  –  primarily  handled  by  Member  States  and 
complemented by EU stockpiling under rescEU through grants – efforts lack coordination, particularly 
regarding the identification of priority threats and procurement processes, as well as the inclusion of 
innovative  products.68  Finally,  response  capabilities  for  medical  and  CBRN  emergencies  are 
continuously challenged by the rapid pace of innovation, and the emergence of novel threats, such as 
new viruses, pandemics, or low-cost “dirty bombs”.   

64 Economics for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness: Financial Risk and Opportunities to Build Resilience in Europe. 
World Bank Group, 2021. 
65 The scenarios are: 1. Severe nuclear accident 2. Extreme winter weather with a cyber component 3. Extreme heatwave 
4. Severe pandemic 5. Armed conflict 6. Terrorist attack 7. Energy crisis within the EU 8. Inland water and coastal pollution 
9. Earthquake induced tsunami 10. Volcanic eruption.  
66 In specific instances an overview on specific national capacities can play a significant role in increasing the overall efficiency 
of the UCPM (such as for intensive care beds or burn ward availability). 
67 SG Analytical Note: Cross-sectoral mapping of European Commission’s new crisis management capabilities (2020-2023), 
October 2024. 
68 EU’s Stockpiling Strategy; Joint Action on stockpiling (starting in 2025), included in the Commission work programme 
2025. European Commission, 2025. 

15 

 
 
 
3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?  

3.1  On which basis may the Union act? 

The growing impacts of climate change, the emergence of health crises, and the increasingly complex 
global  security  landscape  illustrate  how  threats  and  crises  can  severely  disrupt  key  sectors  across 
Member States and the Union. Addressing the problems identified in chapter 2, which challenge the EU 
crisis management architecture, necessitates examining whether Union-level action is required and to 
what extent. 

The EU has a supporting role in the areas of crisis management and civil protection, which are 
primary  competences  of  the  Member  States.  The  interplay  of  these  Union  competences  reflects  the 
interconnected  nature  of  crises  and  the  need  for  a  Union  level  coordinated  response  when  Member 
States’ capacities prove insufficient. Firstly, Article 122 TFEU provides a flexible legal basis for swift 
Union action during crises, allowing exceptional measures to address severe difficulties, such as supply 
shortages or emergencies. This provision complements other Union competences, ensuring that the EU 
can  effectively  address  situations  where  solidarity  and  collective  responses  are  paramount,  and  has 
proven  vital  in  crises  like  the  COVID-19  pandemic  and  energy  disruptions,  supporting  timely  and 
effective EU action to protect citizens and critical systems. 

In  the  area  of  civil  protection,  the  Union  acts  under  Article  196  TFEU,  which  designates  civil 
protection  as  a  supporting  competence.  Union  level  action  and  coordination  becomes  indispensable 
when  the  complexity  or  scale  of  a  crisis  overwhelms  national  capacities.  Crises  are  increasingly 
transnational  by  nature,  making  anticipation,  prevention,  preparedness,  and  response  efforts  more 
effective  when  coordinated  at  Union  level. This  is  further  reinforced  by  Article  222 TFEU,  which 
obliges Member States to act jointly in a spirit of solidarity during terrorist attacks or natural or man-
made disasters, and Article 42(7) TEU, which mandates mutual defence among EU  nations against 
armed aggression. 

In the area of health security preparedness and response, the Union is empowered to complement 
national policies in combating serious cross-border health threats (Article 6, point (a), and Article 168(1) 
and (5) TFEU).  

3.2 What makes EU action necessary? – Subsidiarity of Union action 

Chapter 2 has identified three main roadblocks to a more efficient functioning of the Union’s crisis 
management framework: It is often more reactive than proactive, overly fragmented, and constrained 
in its ability to act in solidarity during crises.69 Addressing these challenges requires answering two 
fundamental questions: (1) can the identified problems be resolved effectively by Member States acting 
individually  at  national,  regional,  and  local  levels,  and  (2)  can  these  problems  be  better  addressed 
through coordinated action at Union level due to their scale or complexity? 

The EU faces a wide range of crises and security challenges of transnational nature that demand a high 
degree of coordinated action to protect its citizens, resources, and infrastructure. These challenges are 
highly  dependent  on  the  Union’s  level  of  preparedness,  which,  as  seen  in  recent  years,  remains 
insufficient.  For this reason,  Union  action  is  necessary  to  build  capacity  for  crisis response  through 
strategic  foresight,  integrated  risk  management,  enhancing  capabilities  for  cross-border  emergency 
response, cross sectorial integration and the elimination of knowledge gaps. For example, with regards 
to the persistent fragmentation among early warning systems and the need to improve the integration 

69 Chapter 2, figure 1. 

16 

 
 
of data and information flows across Member States, Member States individually would not be able to 
address this matter, as the cause of the fragmentation among early warning  systems is their isolated 
development on a national level. Addressing these gaps at Union level would ensure a more consistent 
and effective approach to strategic foresight, planning and knowledge-based decision making. 

As crises grow more multi-dimensional and cross-border, capability gaps must be addressed at EU level 
- either through EU-owned capacities or coordinated efforts among Member States. This would not only 
allow for better coordination of crisis response mechanisms operated at Union and national  level but 
also ensure that EU assistance can reach all EU citizens in need, while having a longer-term positive 
impact  to  EU  societies  and  economies.  Critical  capabilities,  such  as  offered  by  the  Galileo  and 
Copernicus  programmes,  are  sustainable  only 
through  collective  action,  creating  strategic 
infrastructures that no Member State can achieve on its own. 

Recent crises have illustrated the fact that action at national or regional level proved insufficient, thus 
highlighting  the  need  for  EU-level  action,  from  COVID-19  (especially  with  regards  to  joint 
procurement),  to  the  Russian  war  of  aggression  in  Ukraine  (logistics  hubs),  prepositioning  of 
firefighters across Europe, and more. 

Indeed, by definition, every activation of the UCPM indicates an overburden of a single Member 
State. The significant increase in the number of UCPM activations in recent years, as well as the 
growing number of countries that are activating the UCPM for the first time, thus evidence the 
necessity of EU action.Further information to section 3.2: What makes EU action necessary? – 
Subsidiarity of Union action is included in Annex 6. 

3.3 To which extent is EU action necessary? – Proportionality of Union action 

As demonstrated in chapter 1, there is significant evidence and recent experience pointing at the need 
to  strengthen  EU  preparedness  and  crisis  management.  Faced  with  increasingly  severe  crises  and 
security threats, it has become clear that the Union must act not only to reinforce crisis preparedness 
but also to do so timely and intensively. Achieving this requires an all-hazard, a whole-of-government, 
and  whole-of-society approach,  including  stronger  synergies  between  sectors  and  between  civil  and 
military  capabilities,  which  must  be  enshrined  within  an  EU  framework  to  ensure  the  necessary 
oversight, resources, and coherent investment. 

In many sectors, the speed of progress remains insufficient, necessitating Union action to accelerate 
change. For example, as shown in the European Climate Risk Assessment, the current rate of adaptation 
lags behind the speed of climate change. The implementation of specific measures often depends on 
national  and  local  authorities,  whose  capacities  vary  widely. Adjusting  policy  and  decision-making 
processes to account for complex, multi-layer, and interacting risks, requires an investment that is not 
equally affordable to all Member States. Without EU level action, progress will continue to be uneven, 
potentially aggravating national and regional disparities within the Union. EU level intervention can 
ensure  a  common  baseline,  help  to  overcome  structural  barriers,  and  ensure  that  adverse  risk 
environments are met with proactive and consistent responses. 

Considering the above, the EU’s crisis management framework must not only address the challenges 
posed  by  emerging  crises  but  also  adapt  continuously  to  their  intensifying  scale  and  complexity. 
Strengthening  this  framework  requires  addressing  the  problems  identified  in  chapter  2,  while  also 
reinforcing Union’s investments and commitments to align with the subsidiarity principle. These actions 
are  both  proportionate  and  necessary  to  achieve  the  EU’s  political  objectives  and  treaty  obligations 
effectively. 

17 

 
Further  information  to  section  3.3 To  which  extent is  EU  action  necessary?  –  Proportionality  of 
Union action is included in Annex 6. 

18 

 
 
 
4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

In  order  to  address  the  issues  identified  in  chapter  2,  the  EU  crisis  management  system70  must  be 
equipped to meet four general objectives. These all contribute to the overarching goal  to protect 
people in the Union against crises. 

The General Objectives are reflective of the principles enshrined in the Preparedness Union Strategy. 
As such, they are not only ways of achieving the overarching goal to protect people in the Union against 
crises but are also objectives in and of themselves.   

‒  General  Objective  1  (GO1):  implement  an  integrated  all-hazards,  anticipatory,  and  proactive 

approach to threat and risk management; 

‒  General  Objective  2  (GO2):  implement  an  efficient  and  effective  cross-sectoral  coordination 

framework for various crises in a whole-of-government approach; 

‒  General Objective 3 (GO3): ensure a whole-of-society approach to preparedness and response to 

crises; 

‒  General Objective 4 (GO4): ensure the Union is equipped to act timely, flexibly and in solidarity, 

to protect people in the Union against crises, including health. 

The below figure provides a holistic overview of the problems and its drivers with the general (GOs) 
and specific objectives (SOs). 

Figure 2 - Problem tree with the general (GOs) and specific objectives (SOs) (for larger version see Annex 7) 

GO  1:  Implement  an  integrated  all-hazards,  anticipatory,  and  proactive  approach  to 
threat and risk management 

SO 1.1: Establish an EU-wide overview of hazards and risks across sectors with clearly defined 

70 Throughout this text, crisis management refers to the whole cycle that includes risk awareness, preparedness, prevention, 
response, and recovery. 

19 

 
 
 
roles for EU and Member States.  

SO 1.2: Develop a strong anticipation capacity that can effectively analyse, assess and act upon 
threats and risks, including external, cascading, and compounding risks. 

SO 1.3: Contribute to a European research and innovation ecosystem that is fit to anticipate, assess, 

and respond to risks in a coordinated and timely manner. 

SO 1.4: Contribute to a robust risk management culture across the Commission and broader EU 

(including Member States). 

SO 1.5: Contribute to Union policy making, including crisis management, which is guided by risk 

aware decision making. 

SO 1.6: Strengthening the capability of the Union to prevent and prepare for serious cross-border 

threats, including to health, by supporting data and intelligence gathering, and 
information exchange, including on medical countermeasures. 

Overview 

Foresight  and  early  identification  of  potential  risks  are  essential  tools  for  preventing  crises  or 
minimising their impact. Scientific and anticipatory analysis provide valuable time to take appropriate 
action to prevent crises. Where prevention is not possible, foresight, early identification, and warning 
allow for robust preparation, early action and mitigation of consequences. 

The objective is to implement an integrated all-hazards approach across the EU and Member States. 
This approach encompasses threats to life, health, food supply, the Single Market, supply chains, natural 
resources, or critical infrastructure, and is meant to inform all relevant actors both at Union and Member 
States levels. It would also inform international partners of the cascading risks from global challenges. 
To succeed, strong partnership between the Union, Member States, scientific institutions, and private 
entities is necessary, fostering the application of state-of-the-art methodologies. 

Future reform and investment needs at EU level 

The changing threat landscape demands the strengthening of capacities in foresight, anticipation, and 
early warning at both EU and national level. To realise this vision, the EU needs to be able to connect 
all  competent  institutions  and  information  relevant  for  anticipatory  and  foresight  activities.  Better 
consistency and comparability between the Union and Member States approaches is critical and can be 
achieved by pooling analytical capacities, harmonising risk assessment parameters, and strengthening 
data-sharing across actors and borders.  

An EU-wide integrated and shared overview of threats and risks across sectors and levels of governance 
should  guide  investments  in  prevention  and  preparedness.  This  comprehensive  risk  understanding 
would  support  decision-making  during  crises,  ensuring  resources  are  allocated  efficiently  and 
effectively. 

In order to enhance the science-policy interface, investments in Research and Innovation (R&I) should 
prioritise areas with significance to the EU’s resilience, including public health, artificial intelligence, 
and cyber-security.71 It is estimated that an additional overall investment needs of EUR 10 billion per 

71 This view was further supported by participants during the Open Public Consultation: The strongest call for a single action 
was related to digital innovation and cyber defence with multiple position papers calling for the establishment of a sovereign 

20 

 
 
 
year, is needed for preparedness and response to pandemics at a global scale, with surveillance and 
early warning identified as priority pillars.72 73 Furthermore, the adoption of new legislation, the review 
of regulatory frameworks or the creation of new funding instruments envisage a preparedness-by-design 
approach,  as  also  suggested  in  the  Niinistö  report.  This  involves  ensuring  that  all  future  legal 
frameworks  and  funding  instruments  prioritise  preparedness  as  a  core  objective,  while  embedding 
resilience and risk mitigation at every level of Union action. Member States can use derogations from 
certain  provisions  when  needed  to  mitigate  risk  to  human  lives  during  large-scale  life-threatening 
disasters, whether natural or man-made.  

GO  2:  Implement  an  efficient  and  effective  cross-sectoral  coordination  framework  for 
various crises in a whole-of-government approach 

SO.2.1: Implement a cross-sectoral, operational, crisis management hub at EU level. 

SO.2.2:  Strengthen  cooperation  on  strategic  and  operational  matters  between  civilian  and  military 
emergency management functions.  

SO.2.3: Support a coherent response across relevant national and EU policies and funding with a view 
for crisis preparedness and structural resilience across the entire crisis management cycle. 

SO.2.4: Enhance resilience through external partnerships. 

Overview 

Coordination  is  fundamental  component  of  a  comprehensive,  all-hazards  approach  to  crisis 
preparedness  and  of  an effective crisis  response.  Over  the  last years,  numerous crisis-related  policy 
developments and legislative initiatives have been introduced (see chapter 1&2), strengthening the EU’s 
capacity to respond to the changing risk landscape. This progress, in particular in sectoral approaches, 
has enhanced early detection capabilities and crisis preparedness in key policy areas. However, this has 
also led to fragmented and overlapping efforts within the EU crisis management architecture. Parallel 
initiatives,  insufficient  integration  across  sectors  and  lack  of  interoperability  of  instruments  create 
inefficiencies and hinder opportunities for synergies. 

The objective is to establish an effective and efficient cross-sectoral coordination framework in an all-
hazards  approach.  Embedding  all  relevant  sectoral  and  cross-sectoral  EU  crisis  management 
instruments in a coherent framework will maximise synergies and ensure a swift and efficient response. 

Moreover, the EU must better align the internal and external dimensions of risks and crisis management, 
particularly  as  transboundary  and  global  crises  increasingly  blur  these  distinctions. The  COVID-19 
pandemic and aftermath of the economic crisis of 2008-09, among others, showed that the multilateral 
system and international organisations contribute to avoiding, reducing, sharing, and preparing for risks 
and minimising impacts.  

Future reform and investment needs at EU level 

To achieve a cross-sectoral crisis coordination framework, in a whole-of-government approach, requires 
targeted reforms and investments. Firstly, information sharing and coordination mechanisms within the 
EU  Institutions  and  between  Member  States  must  be  adapted  to  improve  synergies  and  avoid 

or "freedom-themed" tech fund modelled after Germany's Sovereign Tech Fund. Open Public Consultation EU’s next long-
term budget (MFF) – EU funding for civil protection, preparedness and response to crises.  European Commission, 2025, 
Annex 2.  
72 Analysis of Pandemic Preparedness and Response (PPR) architecture, financing needs, gaps and mechanisms. World Health 
Organization and the World Bank, 2022. 
73 Draghi Report. European Commission, 2024. 

21 

 
 
duplications.  Instruments  and  policies  should  work  seamlessly  together  across  various  scenarios, 
including those requiring civil-military cooperation. This would involve creating an EU hub for crisis 
coordination, to connect all sectoral instruments and ensure a coherent response. Secondly, the EU must 
review decision-making procedures in times of crises (including the existing IPCR arrangements), to 
ensure they are fit for purpose within the existing Treaties. 

Finally, investments are needed to align regulatory frameworks, harmonise technical parameters and 
modernise communication structures across EU institutions and Member States (as listed in chapter 1). 
Establishing  a  whole-of-government  approach  to  crisis  management  also  includes  bolstering 
administrative and technical capacities at national level to ensure that Member States can effectively 
implement EU funded projects that aim to prevent, prepare for or respond to crises. These investments 
will  enable  additional  analytical  and  operational  capacities,  essential  for  a  truly  integrated  crisis 
coordination framework.  

GO 3: Ensuring a whole-of-society approach to preparedness and response to crises 

SO.3.1: Enhance citizens’ preparedness and resilience as one of the cornerstones of societal resilience. 

SO.3.2: Build linkages with the private sector to enhance their roles in building the overall resilience of 
society and managing crises, including with regards to medical countermeasures.  

SO.3.3: Strengthen existing voluntary networks/organisations in crisis management. 

Overview 

Effective crisis management requires everyone – citizens, civil society, businesses, research institutions, 
investors, and governments – to understand their roles and act cohesively in the face of crises such as 
natural disasters, pandemics, or armed conflict. Enhancing societal resilience not only ensures more 
optimal outcomes during crises but also reduces the costs of response and recovery74.  

While preparing citizens for crises is a Member States’ prerogative, perceived more and more as an 
obligation, the EU plays an active role in promoting a whole-of-society approach though projects like 
PreparEU  or  financing  instruments  like  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility,  cohesion  funds,  and 
research and innovation programmes. However, the adoption of whole-of-society thinking and action 
must be coherent at both national and EU level. This includes fostering citizens’ trust through effective 
communication based on scientific evidence and empowering their skills, media literacy, employability, 
and social inclusion, which is necessary to better cope with and recover from crises. 

As  highlighted  in  the  Niinistö  report75,  citizens’  preparedness  is  cornerstones  of  societal  resilience, 
which  increases  effectiveness  and  reduces  the  cost  of  managing  crisis.  Engaging  citizens  as  active 
participants  in  their  own  resilience  through  risk  awareness,  preparedness  training,  and  direct 
involvement in crisis prevention (through the participation in designing measures) and response is vital. 
Vulnerable  populations,  often  the  hardest  hit  by  crises,  face  additional  challenges  due  to  economic 
disparities, such as high poverty levels and low employment rates. 

The private sector has a major role in crisis preparedness and response in critical sectors such as food, 
energy,  health,  natural  resources,  transportation,  and  telecommunication.  This  potential  must  be 
maximised at the EU, national, regional, and local levels. 

74 See also: outcome of the  Eurobarometer on disaster risk awareness and preparedness of the EU population. European 
Commission, 2024. 
75 Niinistö Report - Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness. European Commission, 2024, 
pp.19-21. 

22 

 
 
Future reform and investment needs at EU level 

Adopting  a  whole-of-society  approach  in  crisis  preparedness  and  response  requires  streamlined 
implementation across all available EU and national funds and programmes, alongside cross-sectoral 
risk assessments.  

The involvement of the private sector is key across prevention, preparedness and response, including in 
terms of leveraging technology and artificial intelligence. Private and public investments can guarantee 
financing  and  research  and  innovation,  and  ensure  the  resilience  of  key  private  infrastructure  and 
services, such as energy, water, food, and communications.  

GO 4: Ensure the Union is equipped to act timely and in solidarity 

SO.4.1: Enhance Union capacities to prevent, anticipate, detect, prepare for and respond to large-scale, 
multi-sector crises, including cross-border threats to health.  

SO.4.2: Work towards a complete and coherent overview of capacities and capabilities to respond to 
crises. 

SO.4.3:  Invest  in  international  preparedness  and  crisis  management  capacity,  particularly  that  of 
candidate countries. 

SO.4.4: Ensure access at EU level for goods, capabilities and services relevant for crisis preparedness 
and response, including medical countermeasures.   

SO.4.5:  Strengthen  scalable,  fast-deployable,  and  all-hazards  based  EU  financial  mechanisms 
throughout all phases of crisis management.  

SO.4.6: Complement national stockpiling of essential crisis-relevant products, including for medical 
countermeasures. 

Overview 

The ability of the Union to act promptly and in solidarity during crises is critical to protect lives, sustain 
livelihoods, and maintain societal resilience. Achieving this goal requires a combination of enhanced 
capacities, better use of resource, and innovative financing solutions. The Commission and the EEAS 
must work closely with Member States and other stakeholders to optimise the use of existing resources, 
while exploring innovative solutions to support preparedness and resilience initiatives. 

Efforts to include preparedness by design across EU instruments and policies should be intensified. 
Such initiatives can significantly reduce the human and economic toll of crises, while promoting an 
efficient use of resources. Budgetary flexibility and financial preparedness are essential for effective 
crisis management, supporting rapid mobilisation of funds for immediate crisis response and long-term 
prevention and preparedness initiatives. 

Existing  funds  and  policies  must  complement  one  another  throughout  the  entire  crisis  management 
cycle. For example, future funding, particularly under cohesion policy, needs to continue fostering a 
culture of preparedness both within Member States and across the EU. This has to be complemented by 
funds for post-disaster emergency and recovery operations as a tangible expression of EU solidarity. 

Based  on  threat  and  hazard  scenario  (see  also  Objective  1),  centralised  capacities  at  EU  level  (e.g. 
stockpiles, response capacities, etc.) must be adequately equipped to act in solidarity when Member 
States’ resources fall short, particularly in addressing the transboundary impacts of crises. Furthermore, 
the EU institutions must ensure the coordination of response activities across sectors and Member States 
for both shot and long-lasting crises, inside and outside the EU. 

23 

 
Future reform and investment needs at EU level 

Investment  needs  across  sectors  highlight  the  scale  of  the  challenge.  Pandemic  preparedness  alone 
requires an additional USD 10.5 billion annually, according to the World Health Organization and the 
World Bank.76 Climate adaptation costs for the EU Member States are estimated to range between EUR 
15–64 billion per year through 203077, while the defence sector faces an investment gap of EUR 500 
billion  over  the  next  decade.78  These  significant  gaps  underscore  the  need  for  structural  reforms  to 
ensure  crisis  resilience.  Geopolitical  shifts  must  also  be  considered,  while  investment  gaps  in  dual-
purpose initiatives like military mobility need to be further explored to maximise value for both civilian 
and military infrastructure. 

Preparedness-by-design  must  become  an  integral  part  of  EU  funding,  incentivising  an  all-hazard 
approach, which reduces reliance on reactive crisis management.  By acting as a major co-financing 
source, EU funds set standards for preparedness, by embedding it structurally, thus helping national 
authorities, the private sector and project promoters to adopt good/best practices, including in non-EU-
funded projects.  

EU-level  capacities,  such  as  rescEU  stockpiles  and  capabilities  managed  by  the  Commission,  have 
proven  crucial  in  addressing  major  crises,  offering  an  indispensable  complement  to  Member  State 
capacities.79  EU  level  investments  will  continue  to  be  necessary,  including  to  maintain  health 
emergency  capacities  such  as  surveillance,  emergency  medical  and  public  health  teams,  medical 
evacuation and repatriation of severely wounded or sick patients but also to maintain supply of medical 
countermeasures.  This  should  be  done  by  harnessing  all tools such  as  joint  and  direct  procurement, 
stockpiling or using innovative financial instruments like capacity reservation contracts or loans.  

Maintaining and expanding these capabilities is estimated to cost at minimum of EUR 13 billion until 
203480.  Further  investments  are  needed  also  for  EU  space  assets  and  services,  including  satellite 
communication,  earth-observation,  positioning,  navigation,  timing  services,  and  space  situational 
awareness, which contribute to preparedness and efficient crisis management81. Moreover, capacities 
and capabilities in the areas including critical infrastructure, energy, cyber and hybrid threats, will need 
to be further developed at Member States and EU level. This should also make use of direct and joint 
procurement, as well as innovative funding, including incentivising private sector investments82.  

76 The WHO Council on the Economic of Health for All. June 2024. 
77 Climate Adaptation Costing in a Changing World. World Bank, 2024.  
78 Remarks by President Charles Michel following the European Council meeting of 27 June 2024. European Council, 2024. 
79  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council:  Capacity  Progress Report  on  the  Response 
Capacities of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. European Commission, 2025. 
80 Combined internal HERA and ECHO calculation on rescEU needs.  
81 See defence and space impact assessment for further details.  
82 Further lists funding options can be found in Niinistö Report - Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness 
and readiness. European Commission, 2024, chapter 9. 

24 

 
 
 
5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS?  

The  first  four  chapters  of  the  impact  assessment  took  on  a  broad  scope  covering  “civil  protection, 
preparedness  and  response  to  crises”  across  all  relevant  sectors,  including  but  not  limited  to  civil 
protection, including elements of health security preparedness. Keeping this broader context in mind, 
the  following  chapters  discuss  several  policy  options  that  each  address  the  previously  identified 
problems and objectives, albeit to varying degrees and from different angles. The scope of the policy 
options is in line with the legal proposal associated with this impact assessment. 

Before  delving  into  the  description  of  the  policy  options,  a  fundamental  difference  in  the  budget 
architecture between policy options 1 and 2, on the one hand, and policy option 3, on the other, needs 
to be highlighted (see also figure 3):  

•  Policy  options  1  and  2  propose  a  “complementary”  approach  to  preparedness  as  horizontal 
priority  integrated  in  both  the  UCPM/UCPM  2.0  in  synergy  with  other  programmes.83  The 
success of the activities of UCPM/UCPM 2.0 is complementary with but not dependent on the 
preparedness-by-design approach in the rest of the MFF.   

•  Policy option 3 proposes to centralise all preparedness elements under a single Preparedness 
Fund. In contrast to options 1 and 2, option 3 would thus  disconnect preparedness from the 
other relevant policies, thus creating silos and would be difficult to implement politically.  

Figure 3 - Preparedness in MFF architecture under the different options (indicative, the size of the fields does not resemble 
the share of the MFF portfolio) 

Finally, an element that spans all three policy options is the need for a simple, flexible, and integrated 
budget structure given that the instrument will be by definition a crisis instrument which needs to be 
able to support Member States and third countries with a minimum level of constraints. Nevertheless, 
this need for flexibility and responsiveness will need to be balanced with the need for prevention and 
preparedness-related activities, such as anticipation, foresight, and capacity development. All policy 
options seek to address the latter in varying degrees.  

83 For example: Competitiveness Fund, including specialised research and innovation; National Envelopes, including forestry 
and floods management, energy, and critical infrastructure; Erasmus+ especially regarding population preparedness; or the 
Connecting Europe Facility, including cross-border critical infrastructure projects, satellite imagery. 

25 

 
 
 
What is the baseline from which options are assessed? 

Figure 4 - Visualisation of dynamic baseline 

The baseline entails no legal or policy change to the current situation and the existing EU framework. 
It  is  dynamic  in  so  far  as that,  in  addition  to  socio-economic  developments,  funds  from  NGEU  are 
temporary to the instrument as they will not be extended post-2026. While constituting a simplification, 
it is thus nevertheless useful to conceptualise this dynamic baseline in two parts: a) pre-2026 and b) 
post-2026. 

Pre-2026 dynamic baseline 

For the activities under the UCPM, the independent support study established a comprehensive baseline 
description84. Figure 5 visualises the different UCPM actions forming part of the baseline.  

84 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF.   

26 

 
 
 
Figure 5 - UCPM activities, pre-2026 (source: Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF). See Annex 7 
for larger version 

In this baseline, risk assessments for civil protection and health-related activities are conducted strictly 
along  sectoral  lines  at  EU-level  (e.g.  European  Climate  Risk  Assessment).  Anticipation,  strategic 
foresight, and early warning activities are undertaken at EU-level (including through basic analysis, 
anticipatory, foresight, and early warning work by JRC, ERCC, ECDC, EFSA, HERA, EEAS Crisis 
Response  Mechanism  and  EEAS/INTPA/NEAR/FPI  toolset  for  EU  Conflict  Analysis  and  Conflict 
Early Warning) but in a largely disconnected way among the actors, including for intelligence on health 
threats requiring medical countermeasures.  

Partnerships with actors in research and innovation are primarily established and maintained at national 
level.  Knowledge  sharing  in  the  area  of  civil  protection  is  implemented  through  the  Union  Civil 
Protection Knowledge Network85, in cooperation with other services like the JRC.  

Capacity building at EU level is implemented through project funding to authorities and stakeholders 
(for example through grants, peer reviews, advisory missions, exchange of experts), as well as through 
trainings and exercises.  

Response capacities at EU-level are being established and maintained both under the ECPP and rescEU, 
including stockpiles for a wide range of risks, including for health-related risks. As part of the baseline, 
there are already efforts to close capacity gaps, including in terms of increasing medical stockpiling, as 
well as the rescEU firefighting fleet,  which was doubled from 2022 to 2023.86 Nevertheless, despite 
these  efforts,  the  external support  study  also  highlights  persisting  capacity  gaps  and  noted  that  it  is  
“highly relevant” to ensure furthering the development of rescEU capacities to increase its preparedness 

85 The Union Civil Protection Knowledge Network, established in 2021, is a collaborative platform connecting first responders, 
disaster risk managers, scientists, and decision-makers to find resources, expertise and opportunities for exchange. For more 
information, see https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/.  
86 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF, p. 23. 

27 

 
 
 
capacities.87  In  order  to  achieve  the  latter,  there  is  a  clear  need  for  more  comprehensive  needs 
assessment.88 

Sectoral  emergency  response  coordination  is  implemented  through  the  ERCC,  which  exclusively 
focuses on civil protection and humanitarian emergency response. Cross-sectoral crisis coordination at 
EU-level occurs only in a – largely reactive - ad-hoc manner based on cooperation between different 
DGs and Member States. In this area of operation, the ERCC already plays a critical role in enhancing 
coordination  between  Member  States,  Participating  States  and  third  countries  –  one  of  the  main 
elements  of  the  UCPM’s  EU  added  value.89  However,  complex  procedures  and  decision-making 
processes minimised this impact and thus hindered the effective and efficient use of resources at national 
and EU level.90 

Crisis coordination for cross-border health threats is implemented through different fora, such as the 
Health  Security  Committee,  coordinating  prevention,  preparedness  and  response  planning  and 
implementation  following  an  alert91,  risk  and  crisis  communication,  the  HERA  Board,  assisting  the 
Commission to ensure access and availability of medical countermeasures, as well as the Health Crisis 
Board  coordinating  action  by  the  Council,  the  Commission,  the  relevant  Union  bodies,  offices  and 
agencies,  and  Member  States  to  ensure  the  supply  of  and  access  to  crisis-relevant  medical 
countermeasures in a public health emergency.  

Population preparedness is organised at national level and is complemented by EU-level projects in 
targeted  areas.  Private  sector  engagement  occurs  primarily  at  national  level,  including  with  view  to 
capacity building, stockpiling of essential goods, resilience of critical entities, and resilience of critical 
supply chains. In response to the arising needs for closer engagement, the first rescEU stockpile for 
specialised private sector donations was set up following Russia's attack on Ukraine was considered 
“particularly successful” but is limited to a very narrow aspect of cooperation with the private sector, 
namely the area of donations. As a result, the UCPM evaluation noted a large untapped potential for 
UCPM cooperation with the private sector.92 

As  part  of  the  pre-2026  baseline,  health  preparedness  related activities  address  serious  cross-border 
health  threats  by  continuing  prevention,  preparedness,  epidemiological  surveillance,  emergency 
research, and regular reporting and assessment of the state of preparedness at both the EU and Member 
State  levels,  as  well  as  the  supply  of  crisis-relevant  medical  countermeasures.  Response  activities, 
including for EU4Health, are conducted predominantly in complementarity under with the UCPM and 
other crisis instruments umbrella, while coordination takes place in the Health Security Committee (e.g. 
issuing an opinion with recommendations for response such as for the vaccination against mpox93) and 
the HERA Board and the Health Crisis Board where activated.  

87 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF, p.39. 
88 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF, p.22.  
89 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF, p.37. 
90 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF, p.46. 
91 Criteria for alerting are defined in Article 19 (1) of Regulation 2022/2371. 
92 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF, p.28. 
93  HSC Recommendations for a  common EU approach regarding vaccination policies for monkeypox outbreak - response 
2022. European Commission, 2022.  

28 

 
 
 
 
Post-2026 dynamic baseline 

Under the post-2026 dynamic baseline, it is assumed that the NEGU funds are not extended beyond 
2026  and  thus  rescEU  capacities  purchased  under  these  funds,  including  CBRN-related  and  health 
security-related,  will  be  phased  out  (in  line  with  the  budget  availability  for  maintenance  and 
replenishment under the current MFF94). This includes rescEU stockpiles under all EU instruments. 
Concretely, this means that only Aerial Fire Fighting (AFF) capacities continue to be maintained at 
basic levels. This situation poses additional demands on the national level (including through increasing 
demands of the ECPP) to close the gaps for response capacities for long-lasting, “high impact – low 
probability”, and specialised situations and risks.  

The very limited response capacities at EU level will over time imply as indirect consequences (i) a 
duplication of efforts on the national level; (ii) failure to make use of economies of scale by leveraging 
the EU’s purchasing power; (iii) capacity gaps with view to low probability, high impact risks, such as 
those related to nuclear events95; (iv) overall capacity gaps with view to complex and long-lasting crises, 
due to a lack of a reliable EU-level reserve of response capacities.  

Another characteristic of the post-2026 baseline is that it will be impossible to uphold even the current 
limited-in-scope  cooperation  between  the  UCPM  and  the  private  sector,  particularly  the  rescEU 
warehouses that host private sector donations. 

Given  the  evolving  risk  landscape  outlined  in  chapter  2,  the  post-2026  ERCC  set-up  will  likely  be 
unable  to  uphold  the  current  hight  response  rate  to  activations  due  to  a  lack  of  sufficient  EU-level 
response  capacities.96  In  combination  with  reduces  EU-level  capacities  (stockpiles  and  ECPP)  this 
situation would require the national levels to step up its (bilateral) coordination capabilities and provide 
additional response capacities.  

The lack of a coordination on population preparedness and the consequent mismatch in national levels 
of  preparedness  will  over  time  lead  to  an  overall  lower  preparedness  across  the  Union,  negatively 
impacting citizens. Linked to this, EU citizens will experience limited EU solidarity first-hand, a crucial 
contributor to the EU's positive image. Furthermore, vulnerable communities may experience varying 
levels  of  contingency  planning  and  preparedness  depending  on  their  Member  State,  potentially 
exacerbating existing vulnerabilities based on national contexts. Lastly, learning from best practices in 
population preparedness will be more challenging.  

From a policy perspective, synergies and complementarities between the UCPM and other EU activities 
(e.g. cross-border health threat response, consular support activities, critical infrastructure, and internal 
security), and with national authorities (on stockpiles, warehousing, and pre-positioning of essential 
items), are achieved to a very small extent. The EU4Health programme will phase out after 2027.  

94 Especially given that the MFF-part of the UCPM budget was reduced as a response to the temporary NGEU funds. 
95No such capacities would exist on the EU level. On national level, it may not be feasible for smaller and  medium-sized 
Member  States  to  acquire  such  assets.  Even  larger  Member  States  may  find  it  impractical  to  invest  in  capacities  for  low 
probability, high impact risks. 
96 The added value of coordination provided by the ERCC relies on both the Member State-owned capacities of the ECPP, as 
well as importantly the rescEU capacities. Without the latter, this added value diminishes. 

29 

 
 
 
 
Description of the policy options 

The  below  policy  options build  on  each  other.  Elements, that  are  described  in option  1  and  remain 
unchanged  in  options  2  and  3,  are  not  repeated  and  should  be  considered  as  a  given.  All  actions 
described  below  are  complementary  to  and  in  support  of  efforts  on  the  national  level  (the  support 
competence  underlines  the  selection  of  policy  options).  A  simplified,  overall  intervention  logic, 
including the policy options, is depicted in figure 6. 

Figure 6 - Overview of intervention logic (see Annex 7 for larger version) 

Policy Option 1: Strengthened sectoral UCPM   
Policy option 1 partially incorporates the recommendations of the 2024 UCPM Evaluation97 (and the 
recommendation/ opinion of the EESC98). Actions proposed under policy option 1 contribute to the 
Preparedness Union Strategy and its three principles  – all hazards, whole-of-government, whole-of-
society  –  though  not  comprehensively.  Key  actions,  such  as  the  implementation  of  the  Stockpiling 
Strategy, will need to be undertaken at national level. Flagships like the establishment of the EU crisis 
coordination hub will not be feasible through the EU budget. Preparedness actions for public health 
security  would  only  be  supported  through  medical  stockpiling,  in  other  words,  actions  beyond 
stockpiling, such as capacity building (e.g. trainings for the management of medical countermeasures 
etc.) fall away under option 1. 

Budget and budget architecture:  

Under option 1, the UCPM remains as one sectoral instrument. Further, some actions linked to health 
emergency response, such as  procurement of  mpox  vaccines and  virtual  stockpiles99, continue to be 

97 For example, the 2024 UCPM evaluation underscores the importance of including the private sector in the European Crisis 
Management seen which is implemented insofar under policy option 1 as private sector cooperation is maintained. 
98 Incorporated recommendations include, among others, a stronger involvement in the alert and prevention process of the 
UCPM (point 1.18 of the opinion). . EESC, 2022. 
99  DG  HERA’s  capacity  reservation  contracts  ensuring  ever-warm  production  capacities  in  case  of  emergency  (EU  FAB) 
constitute one example. 

30 

 
 
 
 
financed  through  a separate  programme.  Despite  this  non-integrated  budget  structure, 100  the  budget 
architecture  allows  for  a  flexible  and  fast  access  to  reserves  in  case  of  unexpected  emergencies. 
Nevertheless,  due  to  overlaps  in  the  activities  and  scope  of  UCPM  and  EU4Health,  inefficiencies 
remain. 

Policy approach 

Concretely, under policy option 1: 

Risk  assessments  are  executed  along  sectoral  lines  on  EU  and  national  levels.  This  includes  the 
intelligence  gathering  on  health  threats  requiring  medical  countermeasures.  However,  coordination 
efforts are undertaken to harmonise parameters.  

The  role  of  the  ERCC  is  strengthened  in  a  targeted  manner  in  quantity  and  quality  of  operational 
coordination. This includes some improved interlinkages of Early Warning Systems (incl. the currently 
developed  ECMP)  and  strengthened  analysis  and  anticipation,  and  foresight  of  disasters  and  crises. 
Further the collaboration with relevant stakeholders (e.g. UN, scientific organisations) is expanded. 

Response capacities and stockpiles at EU level (especially rescEU) are composed of medical stockpiles 
(including  medical  countermeasures);  CBRN  stockpiles;  Aerial  Forest  Firefighting  (AFF);  medical 
evacuation;  emergency  medical  teams,  specialised  cells  and  the  EU  Health  Taskforce101;  CBRN 
decontamination; CBRN detection, sampling and monitoring; shelter; transport; and energy. In other 
words, option 1 foresees traditional response capacities.  

Partnerships with actors in research and innovation are conducted predominantly at national level 
to provide information and are complemented through EU tools. 

Capacity building at EU level is conducted through both the UCPM instrument by direct funding to 
authorities  and  stakeholders  (for  example  through  grants,  peer  reviews,  advisory  missions,  and 
exchange of experts), as well as trainings and exercises, such as MODEX or JADE. The partnerships 
with external partners (especially EU neighbourhood countries) focus on capacity building activities 
and – in case of disasters - response.   

Civil-military cooperation (i.e. cooperation between civilian authorities and military entities) in crisis 
situations  is  largely  conducted  on  ad-hoc  basis  and  predominantly  for  logistics  support  (e.g. 
transportation capacities owned by military which are used for civilian operations). This work focuses 
on crises within the EU and is thus not in contradiction to the civil-military work under the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EEAS. 

Population  preparedness  is  organised  at  national  level  and  is  complemented  by  limited  EU-level 
projects  like  preparEU  for  transboundary  approaches  and  the  exchange  of  best  practices,  thus 
contributing to a targeted whole-of-society approach.  

Private sector integration remains at the current102 level (for example, the rescEU warehouses hosting 
donations from the private sector are maintained), in contrast to the post-2026 baseline. 

100 I.e. a budget structure in which the two partially overlapping programmes of UCPM and EU4Health remain distinct. 
101 EU Health Task Force (EUHTF). European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.  
102 I.e. the level it is in May 2025. 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  exchange  of  sensitive/  classified  information  between  EU  institutions  and  Member  States  is 
handled through existing workflows. 

Procurement arrangements, including for emergency procurements of rescEU capacities and medical 
countermeasures, remain unchanged compared to the baseline. Direct and joint procurements as well as 
virtual stockpiles103 are not standard practice.   

Policy Option 2: Cross-sectoral UCPM 2.0 

Policy option 2 brings together UCPM and relevant activities for public health security preparedness. 
It fully integrates the recommendations of the 2024 UCPM Evaluation104 as well as the forthcoming 
evaluation of the implementation of Regulation 2022/2371 on serious cross-border threats to health and 
responds to the recommendations from the European  Court of Auditors105 at a policy and structural 
level. Under policy option 2, a full alignment with the Preparedness Union Strategy can be achieved. 
Flagships like the establishment of the EU crisis coordination hub will be achieved through the EU 
budget. 

No fundamental change in the governance mechanisms is expected for the UCPM 2.0, compared to the 
current  instrument.  In  other  words,  in  the  context  of    the  supporting  competence,  the  EU  level 
complements national efforts. Moreover, budget decisions taken by Comitology on the basis of yearly 
work programmes. 

Budget and budget architecture:  

The  UCPM  2.0  will  be  a  cross-sectoral  instrument,  which  incorporates  relevant  elements  of  the 
EU4Health crisis preparedness  strand and becomes the central EU programme for  crisis prevention, 
preparedness  and 
synergies  and 
including 
complementarities between civil protection and health preparedness activities are leveraged through a 
single instrument under the UCPM 2.0 (see assessment of external coherence). The integrated budget 
structure increases efficiency and ensures flexibility and agility in the management of the instrument. 

stockpiling.  Pre-existing 

response  activities, 

Moreover, to respond fast and efficiently to a wide range of crises, broad flexibility rules are embedded 
in the instrument which allows for different financial means106 to be used. Further, the instrument has 
access to reserves in case of unexpected emergencies or crises. Nevertheless, to allow a balancing of 
crisis reaction with long-term preparedness, long term predictability will be ensured through the below 
described prevention and preparedness actions. 

103 In this context, the concept of virtual stockpiling refers to stocks procured under rescEU but held by the industry and  
only delivered/deployed in case of need, thus reducing stockpiling inventory costs. 
104 The 2024 UCPM evaluation calls for an improvement of foresight activities and a dedicated budget reserve for emergency 
response to ensure greater flexibility to adapt to emerging needs and cross-sectoral coordination all of which is implemented 
under policy option 2.  
105  In  its  analysis  of  the  EU’s  response  to  the  Covid-19  pandemic,  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  advocated  for  the 
streamlining  of  procedures  as  well  as  the  standardisation  and  comparability  of  risk  assessments  to  guarantee  an  effective 
response to health emergencies at EU level. The EU’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic. European Court of Auditors, 2024. 
106 Including projects, joint actions, direct grants, operating grants, direct procurement, joint procurement, virtual stockpiles. 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy approach 

Under policy option 2: 

An  EU  comprehensive  cross-sectoral  risk  and  threat  assessment  is  regularly  produced.  This 
comprehensive  assessment  draws  on  existing  EU-level  and  national  assessments  (without  replacing 
them),  scientific  analysis,  foresight,  EU-funded  research  and  innovation,  early-warning  systems, 
satellite and geospatial data (e.g. Copernicus Emergency Management Service), and business insights. 
Risks  cover  several  domains,  including  space,  cyber  and  hybrid,  health  threats  requiring  medical 
countermeasures, critical infrastructure, economic security, energy, environment, and climate. This EU 
overview of risks reflects interactions between risks, including of non-linear nature. The comprehensive 
risks and threat assessment inform all phases of the decision-making process at political and operational 
levels. It utilises modern AI-based intelligence gathering tools, including for health threats.  

The ERCC is strengthened, similarly as in option 1. 

In addition, an EU crisis coordination hub is established to continue and further upscale support to 
Member States in managing the cross-sectoral consequences of crises, based on reinforced planning 
and  more  comprehensive  analysis  and  situational  awareness.  In  order  to  link  external  action  with 
internal crisis response more effectively, the EU crisis coordination hub will closely coordinate with 
the  EEAS,  and  in  particular  with  its  Crisis  Response  Centre.  While  fully  respecting  subsidiarity, 
national competences, and the specificities of Member States and without prejudice to the role of the 
EEAS, the crisis coordination hub will: (i) work towards a common understanding at all levels of crises 
and their implications for various sectors and the entire population; (ii) facilitate work across the sectors 
by  providing  crisis-management  support  to  the  lead  services  without  taking  over  sectoral 
responsibilities; and (iii) monitor the overall response to crises while ensuring constant feedback to the 
Council, including through the IPCR. The creation and operationalisation of the Hub will not affect the 
current  role  of  the  ERCC,  as  the  heart  of  the  UCPM.  To  better  connect  the  Hub  with  the  national 
beneficiaries, the Member States will be invited to identify national contact points for the Hub.  

Linked to the strengthened ERCC and the EU crisis coordination hub, a standalone programme focusing 
on the UCPM 2.0 is created, allowing for prevention, preparedness, response to cross-sectoral, large-
scale  and  long-term  crises.  The  UCPM  2.0  is  characterised  by  two  working  modalities,  a  regular 
emergency working modality and an exceptional crisis working modality.  

Response capacities, including stockpiles, are developed and maintained at EU level, in supporting 
fashion to national efforts, across all relevant sectors, and with increased intensity.  

Example: Potential additional (compared to option 1) response capacities to be financed under the UCPM 2.0 
(policy option 2). The below example links to the UCPM capacity gaps report referenced throughout this impact 
assessment.  

New rescEU capacities to face emergencies induced by climate change: 

a.  Mobile/pontoon bridges 
b.  Water purification/wastewater treatment 
c.  Mobile cooling and hydration (shelters for heatwaves) 
d.  High-capacity pumping modules 

New rescEU capacities to face the changing security landscape: 

e.  Broad band telecoms and secured connectivity 
f.  Satellite systems, drones for air and underwater monitoring and/or remote piloted aircraft 

33 

 
 
 
g.  Demining 
h.  Availability of cable repair vessels or modules 

New rescEU capacities to face the changing health landscape and cross-border health threats 

i.  Medical countermeasures (including through virtual stockpiles) 

Reinforcement of existing capacities (in rescEU reserve or as part of the ECPP): 

b.  Further 

a.  Further  investments  in  forest-fire  fighting  assets,  by  financing  the  procurement  of  additional 
helicopters and/or light planes to boost preparedness in Central Europe and also by adding light planes 
to the array of tools to also equip Northern Europe. The experience in recent years shows that a hazard 
that was considered to be limited to the Southern Member States is increasing its geographical scope 
towards other European regions.  
investments 

in  medical  and  CBRN  stockpiles:  new  vaccines,  devices,  medical 
countermeasures, as well as water and food stocks, to counter threats posed both by climate change 
and  the  changing  security  landscape.  Additional  hospital  modules  and  enhanced  medical  rescEU 
assets could help address risks posed by zoonotic diseases (transmitted from animals to humans like 
avian flu, Zika, Dengue or Chikungunya), burns and infectious diseases, as well as offering a modular 
and more flexible approach to support the national health care systems in case of collapse of hospital 
infrastructures  in  one  or  more  Member  States.  In  addition,  enhanced  preparedness  against  CBRN 
threats would include new specialised equipment, as well as food and water stocks for possible high-
impact low-probability CBRN scenarios. 

c.  Purchase of a first large medical evacuation plane, to address an evident structural gap of the UCPM, 
as experienced in the context of the 2021 Afghanistan repatriation, as well as during COVID and  - 
more recently - in the context of the war in Ukraine. This could also be accompanied by investments 
in Medevac modules, which would allow for rapid conversion of commercial planes to be used in 
those  scenarios  which  require  additional  Medevac  capacity,  such  as  volcano  eruption,  earthquake, 
tsunami, armed conflict, etc. 

d.  Significant reinforcement of the shelter reserves, considering the existing large needs stemming from 
the war in Ukraine, migration flows and natural disasters inducing a displacement of the population; 
these reserves would also cater for the needs of vulnerable groups disproportionally exposed to the 
effects of armed conflicts, energy crisis, pandemics and/or extreme weather events scenarios. 

e.  Purchasing  a  first  dedicated  capacity  for  emergency  operations  (e.g.  cargo  transport,  transport  of 
persons  or  medical  evacuation),  thus  leveraging  the  possibility  to  further  develop  strategic  multi-
purpose transport and logistics capacities. This would also be in line with relevant lessons learnt from 
previous emergencies (see above).  

Relations with external stakeholders (especially EU neighbouring countries and UCPM Participating 
States) will be intensified with regards to capacity building as well as for prevention, preparedness, and 
response activities, to adhere to the new risk environment surrounding the EU.  

EU-level  capacity  building  across  relevant  sectors  and  incorporating  the  cross-border  dimension 
supports Member States and, where relevant, third countries. This includes training activities, including 
for civil protection and health security specialists. 

Civil-military  coordination  (i.e.  cooperation  between  civilian  authorities  and  military  entities)  is 
enhanced  at  EU  level  through  a  civil-military  preparedness  framework,  preparedness  exercises  and 
training  programmes,  and  Standard  Operating  Procedures  (SOPs),  expert  working  groups,  amongst 
others. This work focuses on crises within the EU and is thus not in contradiction to the civil-military 
work under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EEAS. 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
Partnerships  with  actors  in  research  and  innovation  are  strategically  expanded  at  EU  level 
(especially  through  the  Union  Civil  Protection  Knowledge  Network)  and  nationally  to  provide  for 
additional information and operational base for prevention, preparedness, and response activities.  

A strongly intensified realm under policy option 2, compared to option 1, is population preparedness, 
which is achieved through EU-coordinated projects: Where such a need is identified by Member States, 
in  areas  such  as  population  risk  awareness, 
the  EU  could  complement  national  efforts 
risk  and  crisis  communication, 
individual/household  self-sufficiency,  volunteering,  public 
disinformation,  and  crisis  relevant  professional  skills.  The  use  of  existing  programmes,  such  as 
Erasmus+ could incentivise these goals.  

Private sector engagement with view to capacity development of essential goods, resilience of critical 
entities, and resilience of critical supply chains is strengthened.  

The  exchange  of  sensitive/classified  information  between  EU  institutions  and  Member  States  is 
strengthened  through  the  establishment  of  an  updated,  secured  information  exchange  system, 
implemented by EU services and Member States. 

To  adhere  to  the  need  for  fast  and  effective  action  at  EU  level,  procurement,  as  well  as  virtual 
stockpiling, including “ever-warm” facilities, for preparedness- relevant goods and services at EU level 
could be  commonly used.  

Further pertinent health emergency activities are encompassed to combat cross-border threats to health 
in line with the general cross-sectoral nature of the initiative.   

Policy Option 3: Preparedness Fund  

Option 3 entails as its main element the creation of a single funding instrument (Preparedness Fund) at 
EU level comprising all preparedness-relevant mechanisms and activities for the entire MFF. This fund 
will subsume all preparedness- related mechanisms and funding elements of the current MFF, including 
but not limited to UCPM, the EU4Health crisis preparedness strand, and preparedness-relevant elements 
in  the  National  Envelopes,  the  Competitiveness  Fund,  and  Erasmus+  (see  figure  3).  In  terms  of 
structure, this would imply that the various management modes of the programmes are all used within 
this single fund: direct (implemented by the Commission), shared (e.g. structural funds) and indirect 
(e.g. different organisations of the UN system such as WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF). This would constitute 
a  fundamental  change  of  approach  compared  to  the  current  MFF.  This  option  would  bring  about 
inherent fundamental challenges, including in the management of the budget allocations for all funding 
programmes and instruments.   

Currently, the Union funding instruments lack flexibility also entailing reallocation of resources from 
structural  goals.  This  policy  option  also  aims  to  address  EU  crisis  management  fragmentation  in 
national budget alignment.  

Option 3 adopts the same policy approach as option 2. 

Options discarded at an early stage 

While theoretically possible, policy option 3 would be sub-optimal due to:  

(i) 

inconsistency with the Preparedness Union Strategy. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
With the creation of a preparedness fund, the MFF would disconnect preparedness from the 
other  relevant  policies.  This  silo  structure  would  be  in  contrast  to  the  Preparedness  Union 
Strategy,  in  which  a  whole-of-government  approach  with  links  in  all  policy  fields  and  the 
preparedness-by-design approach across all policies are identified as crucial for the success of 
overall preparedness action.  

(ii) 

increased complexity in the financial management systems, due to the combination of direct, 
indirect and shared management which would not be suited for this instrument.  

This  option  would  inevitably  increase  budgetary  complexity  in  managing  indirect  (e.g.  in 
cooperation with WHO), direct (e.g. stockpiling or response operation), and shared (together 
with MS) funds.  

(iii) 

an amalgamation of different types of competences, both supporting and shared.  

In addition to these inherent limitations of the instrument, due to its complexity it is very unlikely that 
Member States would support it during the negotiation process.  

As a result, this policy option is considered  non-viable and is thus discarded. Consequently, it 
does not feature in the following chapters. 

36 

 
 
 
6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS?  

The policy options are compared against the post-2026 baseline. 

Impacts of Policy Option 1  

Overall, policy option 1 implies significant additional efforts at national level to achieve the general 
objectives. While all objectives are largely reached, the steering role of the EU in this process, even 
with clear earmarking in the national envelopes, is lower.107 Thus, the EU added value is not capitalised 
on. Indeed, as an overarching remark, policy option 1 causes indirect negative impacts by not fully 
utilising the potential of EU action in the prevention, preparedness, and response to crises. In other 
words, policy option 1 misses out on important positive impacts across the environmental, economic, 
and social dimensions. Similarly, a study by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction notes that the 
‘cost of inaction’ is not only the disaster losses but also the lack of economic, social, and environmental 
benefits that are generated by having a community or an asset better prepared, and that enhance overall 
well-being and resilience 108,109. 

This being said, the targeted strengthening of the ERCC under policy option 1, compared to the post-
2026  baseline,  will  allow  for  better  prevention  of  (through  strengthened  anticipation  and  foresight 
capabilities)  and  preparedness  for  (through  improved  interlinkages  of  Early  Warning  Systems)  and 
response  to  (through  improved  sectoral  coordination  of  the  ERCC)  disasters  with  a  civil  protection 
angle.  In  the  context  of  these  kinds  of  crises,  option  1  thus  results  in  positive  impacts  across  the 
environmental,  social  and  economic  dimensions.  For  example,  the  improved  use  of  Early  Warning 
Systems tends to have a high cost-benefit ratio: 1 EUR invested in early warning systems returns 2.8-
130+ EUR.110 

However,  with  view  to  the  growing  number  of  complex  crises,  for  example  of  security  and  hybrid 
nature, EU-level response capacities will be limited and thus reliance on national level would increase. 
Indeed, this policy option would allow for European-level response capacities only in the traditional 
civil protection sector.111 For capacities beyond the latter sector, this would have negative economic 
impact  due the inability to  make  use  of  economies  of  scale  and  due to duplications  of  capacities  at 
national levels and thus inefficiencies, including with view to stockpiles. Moreover, at the national level, 
it may not be feasible for smaller or medium-sized Member States to acquire such capacities due to 

107 Moreover, the earmarking would add complexity to the management of other EU instruments. 
108 Business case for DRR: Why investing in DRR makes sense. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2024.  
109 Similarly, a study of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation (2024) revealed that every $1 invested in disaster 
preparedness can save communities up to $13 in economic impact, damages, and cleanup costs. Notably, $6 of the $13 saved 
comes  from  reduced  damages,  while  $7  represents  preserved  jobs,  income,  and  economic  output.  Unpacking  the  ROI  of 
Disaster Preparedness. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation, 2024. 
110 Economics for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness: Financial Risk and Opportunities to Build Resilience in Europe. 
World Bank Group, 2021. 
111  Policy  Option  1  would  not  create  strong  links  to non-traditional  civil  protection  actions  welcomed  in  the  Open  Public 
Consultation as main areas in which the EU can create added value, such as fighting disinformation and securing innovation 
in the digital space to combat authoritarianism.  Open Public Consultation EU’s next long-term budget (MFF) – EU funding 
for civil protection, preparedness and response to crises. European Commission, 2025, Annex 2. 

37 

 
 
 
budget limitations. Even larger Member States might find it impractical to invest in capacities for low 
probability, high impact risks, such as nuclear accidents or attacks.112  

In  addition,  under  option  1  the  operational  coordination  of  such  complex  crises  would  occur  in  a 
disconnected  way  on  the  European  level,  due  to  lack  of  an  EU  crisis  coordination  hub.  Efforts  to 
implement a whole-of-government approach would need to be made on the national level, thus once 
again failing to reap the benefits of the EU added value. To give one example, in this option synergies 
between  civil  protection  and  health  security  are  missing,  despite  being  essential.  The  COVID-19 
pandemic has clearly shown that coordination and collaborative response is needed at EU level e.g. by 
making  interoperable  IT  tools  available  such  as  the  contact  tracing  apps,  connected  through  the 
Federated Gateway and the digital COVID-19 certificate.113 These could be made available in case of 
another pandemic. However, the policy option 1 does not fully consider better coordination, including 
with civil protection and risk communication regarding public health and social measures that may be 
taking in respond to a serious cross-border threat to health. This can result  – like in the COVID-19 
pandemic – in loss of trust in authorities and fuelling of dis- and misinformation.  

Finally, a mismatch in national levels of preparedness under policy option 1 due to limited EU-level 
coordination results in overall lower population preparedness across the Union, negatively impacting 
communities114. Vulnerable communities in particular may encounter varying degrees of contingency 
planning  and  preparedness  depending  on  their  Member  State,  potentially  exacerbating  existing 
vulnerabilities115. Lastly, a more limited EU role in population preparedness will mean that EU citizens 
will experience limited EU solidarity first-hand, which is essential for upholding a positive EU image.  

Impacts of Policy Option 2 

Policy  option  2  fully  utilises  the  EU  added  value  and,  in  doing  so,  comprehensively  achieves  the 
objectives.  While  having  both  positive  and  negative  impacts,  it  is  characterised  by  large  and 
outweighing  positive  impacts  across  economic,  environmental,  and  social  dimensions,  as  outlined 
below.  

The approach and activities foreseen under option 2 address the objectives at EU-level for all types of 
crises, ranging from large-scale natural hazards to complex cross-sectoral threats. Given the effective 
response to complex threats, including of hybrid nature, this policy option has a positive impact on the 
essential security interests of the EU.  

112 Indeed, the Capacity Progress Report on the Response Capacities of the UCPM (2025) identified the need to pursue on the 
EU  level  the  identification  and  development  of  key  specialised  capacities  which  are  not  cost-effective  to  develop  in  the 
necessary quantities at national level. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Capacity 
Progress Report on the Response Capacities of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. European Commission, 2025. 
113 This assessment was also supported by EU citizens in the Eurobarometer survey where medical emergencies were named 
as the second highest response to the question which crisis the EU should prioritise. This was further supported in the Open 
Public Consultation with respondents favouring EU Stockpiling, in particular medicine and medical equipment. Open Public 
Consultation  EU’s  next  long-term  budget  (MFF)  –  EU  funding  for  civil  protection,  preparedness  and  response  to  crises. 
European Commission, 2025, Annex 2.   
114 Papers submitted to the Open Public Consultation  noted concern about the lack of coordination  both between Member 
States as well as between EU Member States, reflecting a “broad consensus on the need for a more integrated and proactive 
approach to crisis preparedness and response”.  Open Public Consultation EU’s next long-term budget (MFF) – EU funding 
for civil protection, preparedness and response to crises. European Commission, 2025, Annex 2. 
115 Sixth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2022 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC, 2023, Summary for 
Policymakers.  

38 

 
 
 
In terms of economic impact, although the initial costs linked to implementing this option are higher on 
EU  level  than  in  other  options,  the  proposed  streamlined  processes  enhance  crisis  prevention, 
preparedness, response across sectors, bringing significant economic benefits by optimising the use of 
resources.116  Policy  option  2  foresees  a  complementary  use  of  national  and  European  capacities, 
coordinated  through  the  ERCC  and  an  EU  crisis  coordination  hub.  For  example,  by  joining  the 
stockpiling  elements  of  EU4Health  with  the  UCPM  2.0,  policy  option  2  increases  the  overall 
preparedness  to  pandemics,  for  which  there  is  a  clear  economic  case:  Investing  in  pandemic 
preparedness  pays  off,  with  EUR  1  invested  in  pandemic  preparedness  returning  EUR  13.3 117. 
Moreover, expanded collaborative, joint and direct procurement  under option 2 enables the efficient 
procurement of goods, reduces costs, and ensures EU-wide interoperability. 

Given  the  more  prominent  EU  coordination  role  in  population  preparedness  under  policy  option  2, 
socially, this option 2 allows for a higher common denominator in population preparedness across the 
Union, resulting in better-prepared citizens and, consequently, lives and assets saved.118 In doing, so it 
fosters a common EU culture of preparedness and resilience. Notably, vulnerable communities – who 
are  often  disproportionately  affected  by  crises119  –  benefit from equitable  contingency  planning  and 
preparedness  coverage  Union-wide.120  EU  efforts  to  enhance  population  preparedness  in  support  of 
national government measures, as citizen volunteers and ad-hoc reinforcements are structured for rapid, 
organised action across the Union. For example, civil society organisations in the field of public health 
preparedness could be supported to further population preparedness e.g. through training in first aid. 
Lastly, recent  crises, including  floods  in  Central  Europe  and  Spain,  have  showcased  a  higher threat 
awareness among citizens and consequently higher public scrutiny and accountability expectation from 
national authorities when responding to a disaster121. In light of this, policy option 2 would have an 
important  positive social impact,  as  a  more  prevalent  EU  action  would  allow  citizens  to  experience 
European solidarity firsthand, aligning with fundamental values and strengthening the European cause 
through direct action. Lastly, option 2 would support Member State’s obligation to act in a spirit of 
solidarity in line with Article 222 of TFEU. 

116 This view was also underlined by participants of the  Open Public Consultation  who welcomed  further investment into 
preparedness and crisis management at EU level.  Participants of the Open Public Consultation generally reported a positive 
experience with the EU's preparedness and crisis management, calling for its improvement and thus further investments rather 
than  requesting  reduced  EU  capacities  or  investments  in  preparedness  and  crisis  management  at  EU  level.  Open  Public 
Consultation  EU’s  next  long-term  budget  (MFF)  –  EU  funding  for  civil  protection,  preparedness  and  response  to  crises. 
European Commission, 2025, Annex 2. 
117 Economics for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness: Financial Risk and Opportunities to Build Resilience in Europe. 
World Bank Group, 2021. 
118 The added value of EU action, complementary to national activities, is highlighted throughout the Preparedness Union 
Strategy. 
119 For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic had a disproportionate impact on the elderly, women, low-income communities, 
and racial and ethnic minorities (see: Liu, E., Dean, C.A., Elder, K.T., Editorial: The impact of COVID-19 on vulnerable 
populations, Frontiers, vol. 11, 2023). 
120 Strengthening actions to meet the needs of vulnerable person would meet the request voiced by EU citizens, government 
authorities, businesses etc. who called for more efforts of the EU to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable populations 
during the Open Public Consultation, with only 28.46% of the respondents considering the needs of vulnerable population to 
have been met ‘somewhat’. Open Public Consultation EU’s next long-term budget (MFF) – EU funding for civil protection, 
preparedness and response to crises. European Commission, 2025, Annex 2. 
121 Even though the 2024 Climate Survey commission by the EIB revealed that 80% of Europeans have experiences at least 
one extreme weather event in the past five years and 94% of Europeans support measures to adapt to climate change, the EEA 
still categorises Europe's societal preparedness as low. The floods in Spain in November 2024, showed critical gaps in early 
warning systems leading to higher awareness amongst citizens of threats and the importance of preparedness with over 100.000 
people protesting in Valencia against the authorities’ handling of the floods. See: 94% of Europeans support measures to adapt 
to climate change, according to EIB survey. European Investment Bank, 2025; Spain floods expose flaws in Europe’s early 
warning  systems.  Context,  2024.European  Investment  Bank,  2025;    https://www.eib.org/en/surveys/climate-survey/7th-
climate-survey/eu-27 

39 

 
 
Moreover, by ensuring successful crisis management, this policy option results in significant positive 
environmental impacts, including by preserving natural spaces and biodiversity. This expected impact 
aligns with the feedback received by citizens in the Open Public Consultation122, in which “mitigating 
consequences of climate change and threats to biodiversity” was named as the main area in which the 
EU can created added value.  

122 Open Public Consultation EU’s next long-term budget (MFF) – EU funding for civil protection, preparedness and response 
to crises. European Commission, 2025, Annex 2. 

40 

 
 
 
 
7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE?  

The different options are compared with the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, external coherence, 
simplification, synergies, and the “ability to act”.  

Effectiveness 

In  line  with  the  scope  of  the  policy  options  (UCPM/UCPM  2.0),  the  below  table  assesses  the 
effectiveness of each policy option vis-a-vis the specific objectives. In other words, the below analysis 
does  not  include  the  impacts  that  other  instruments  in  the  MFF  (for  example  preparedness-relevant 
activities under the Competitiveness Fund) might have on the specific objectives (see figure 3 placing 
the scope of this impact assessment in the context of the wider MFF). 

General  Objective  1:  Implement an integrated  all-hazards,  anticipatory,  and  proactive  approach  to 
threat and risk management 

Both policy options move the EU and its Member States closer to a more proactive all-hazard approach 
to threat and risk management. In the case of option 1, the effectiveness depends on Member States’ 
efforts in harmonising risk assessment parameters, as well as on the quality and quantity of data that is 
shared with the EU level. This is especially the case for transboundary and regional risks, as Member 
States tend to approach threat and risk management through the national lens. This has been identified 
as one of the three key operational gaps in EU Disaster Risk Management by the JRC based on an 
evaluation of nine different reports from the European Committee of the Regions, DG REGIO, DG 
ECHO and the JRC: While risks are increasingly interconnected, Member States have disparate levels 
of governance hindering an integrated EU-wide approach to threat and risk management.123 Option 2 
would be very effective as it includes an EU comprehensive cross-sectoral risk and threat assessment, 
which  connects the  dots  between existing  national  and  EU-level assessments.  In  doing so,  option  2 
entails a streamlining of risk assessment reporting obligations and double reporting is minimised. The 
added value of the activities proposed under option 2 is more than the sum of its parts: for example, the 
added value of the EU integrated risk assessment is not only the centralising of sectoral risk assessments 
but  also  the  additional  insights  on  the  interactions,  including  non-linear,  between  risks.  An  EU 
integrated  risk  assessment  would  close  the  gap  in  data  availability,  consistency,  comparability  and 
accuracy,  as  highlighted  by  the  JRC124.  The  fragmentation  and  lack  of  standardisation  of  methods, 
models, tools and data standards in current risk assessments limits a comprehensive understanding of 
cross-border and cross-sectoral risks that is essential for informed decision making to effectively limit 
their  short-  and  long-term  consequences.  As  the  risk  and  threat  landscape  becomes  increasingly 
interconnected and complex so need risk assessments.  

General Objective 2: Implement an efficient and effective cross-sectoral coordination framework for 
various crises in a whole-of-government approach 

The  extent  to  which  option  1  contributes  to  a  whole-of-government  approach  (across  prevention, 
preparedness, and response) depends on Member States’ action in bringing together the relevant actors 
at EU and Member State level. For example, Member States could use different fora including in the 
Council (for example IPCR), or bilaterally, if considered sufficient by Member States. This will mean 

123 Analysis of Risks Europe is facing: An analysis of current and emerging risk. Joint Research Centre (JRC), 2025. 
124 Analysis of Risks Europe is facing: An analysis of current and emerging risk. Joint Research Centre (JRC), p. 129ff. 

41 

 
 
 
that the approach to managing crises depends on the particular crisis at hand. In practice, this means 
that  for  each  crisis  that  occurs,  Member  States  will  need  to  assess  whether  operational  crisis 
coordination at EU level is needed and, if so, what structure is best placed  to do so (e.g., ERCC or 
other).  In  contrast  to  this,  option  2  offers  a  pre-existing  structure,  with  associated  processes  and 
responsibilities  (including  with  regards  to  civilian  and  military  actors),  namely  the  EU  crisis 
coordination hub. Given this, option 2 offers reliability, timesaving, and allows for optimisation of the 
pre-existing  structure  and  processes  over  time.  In  a  nutshell,  option  2  offers  a  smoother  and  more 
reliable whole-of-government approach. 

General Objective 3: Ensure a whole-of-society approach in crisis management 

While both options advance a whole-of-society approach, the actions proposed under option 1 fall short 
of fully leveraging such an approach at the EU and national levels.  In option 1, the implementation of 
actions on population preparedness on the national level, with some supporting EU projects, will raise 
the overall preparedness of societies and thus allow crisis response authorities to prioritise other areas 
(for  example  reinstalling  vital  societal  functions,  if  they  have  been  compromised).  However,  a 
comprehensive  whole-of-society  approach  is  only  partially  achieved,  as  stark  differences  between 
national population preparedness levels will exist. Option 2 avoids the latter as EU-level action and 
financing  increases  the  EU-wide  common  denominator  in  population  preparedness.  This  is,  among 
others, because the EU will enhance visibility for relevant topics, as was seen with the strong public 
reaction to the Commission’s messaging on a 72h preparedness kit.125 On cooperation with the private 
sector, option 1 entails limited actions, including warehouses that host private sector donations. Option 
2  expands  such  cooperation  to  include,  among  others,  regular  use  of  virtual  stockpiling,  thus  fully 
leveraging the opportunities presented by private sector entities.  

General Objective 4: Ensure the Union is equipped to act timely, flexibly, and in solidarity, to protect 
people in the Union against crises, including health 

Option 1 ensures the Union’s timely acting to the extent that EU-level response capacities (rescEU) are 
developed and maintained in the traditional civil protection sectors (e.g. Medical Counter Measures, 
Aerial Firefighting, etc.) but the remaining capacity gaps must be filled by Member States to ensure 
response to complex and/or security scenarios (e.g. high capacity pumping modules to face large-scale 
flooding, demining capacities, etc.). This causes inefficiencies and duplications (see sections on impacts 
of policy options and efficiency) in the best of cases and lack of response  capacities in the worst of 
cases (where response capacities are not available or insufficient). The latter is avoided under option 2, 
which  ensures  EU-level  response  capacities  across  the  risk  spectrum  thus  much  more  effectively 
ensuring  the  Union  is  equipped  to  act  timely,  flexibly  and  in  solidarity.  Moreover,  under  option  2, 
procurement on EU level could be common practice, meaning that the time between needs identification 
and the deployment of capacities is shortened, thus further achieving General Objective 4.  

The table on “Effectiveness” in Annex 6 depicts the extent to which each option addresses the specific 
objectives. This analysis of the policy options 1 and 2 show that both achieve the specific objectives 
indicated in chapter 4. Nevertheless, compared to the baseline, policy option 1 has a limited positive 
effect on all objectives, option 2 can be expected to have an much higher positive effect in the level of 

125The EU Commission's survival kits - fearmongering or necessary preparedness? Euronews, 2025. 

42 

 
 
achievement of the specific objectives. This is notably because option 2 leverages the added value of 
EU-level action much more.  

Efficiency 

Estimation of costs and benefits – main assumptions and limitations 

The assessment of efficiency is largely qualitative, given the difficulty to calculate quantitative impacts, as 
was already stressed in the Evaluation of the UCPM. 126  Conducting a cost-benefit analysis for specific, single 
actions  for  saving/  protecting  a  certain  number  of  lives  (directly  or  indirectly)  linked  to  EU  emergency 
response, as well as counter-factual assessments (for example comparing a situation in which the ERCC did 
not coordinate emergency response vs. the situation where it did), is not possible (if a Member State requests 
assistance,  the  Mechanism  must  be  activated  (with  little  exceptions).  Humanitarian  principles  must  be 
followed). Similarly, with operations in a complex crisis environment the identification of causations and direct 
impacts of specific actions is not possible.  

Due  to  the  nature  of  this  initiative  as  support  competence  to  Member  States,  the  overall  additional 
administrative  costs (see Annex 3)  are  largely  not quantifiable or  negligible. The initiative  will not impose 
obligations on Member States, businesses or citizens.  Moreover, not pre-empting the budget negotiations of 
the coming MFF, additional costs linked to the achievement of the initiative (e.g. the physical establishment of 
the EU Crisis Management Hub) are not eligible for this analysis.  

Compared to policy option 1, the scope and range of EU-level activities proposed under policy option 
2 is broader and thus requires a higher initial investment. However, long-term, policy option 2 is much 
less costly, and generally more efficient, than option 1 for a number of reasons.  

First, the cost-benefit ratio of prevention and preparedness, coupled with the increasingly volatile risk 
landscape, make option 2 more cost efficient. Policy option 2 foresees the establishment of an EU crisis 
coordination hub,  which will build on the structures and expertise of the ERCC to create synergies and 
avoid  duplications,  inefficiencies  and  further  fragmentation  of  the  crisis  response  framework  at  EU 
level.  This  would  partly address  the  inefficiencies  in  the  Early  Warning  Systems  highlighted in  the 
forthcoming independent study evaluating the implementation of the Regulation on serious cross-border 
threats to health. In line with this, the Evaluation of the UCPM already pointed out that “benefits in 
cost-efficiency, knowledge-exchange, pooling of resources and improved coordination at EU level are 
tangible and clear for all countries involved, whether on the receiving or giving end, in civil protection 
activities.”127 The gains in efficiency are demonstrated by a World Bank study, according to which the 
review of more than 70 investments across Europe showed that investing in disaster prevention and 
preparedness makes economic sense (benefit-cost ratios typically ranging between EUR 2-10 for every 
Euro spent). Importantly, many benefits materialise regardless of whether a disaster happens or not.128  

The cost efficiency of more intensified prevention and preparedness – as proposed under policy option 
2  –  is  particularly  evident  when  looking  at  health  threats:  The  cost  of  managing  and  responding  to 
pandemics  and  health  threats  is  estimated  to  be  as  much  as  1000  times  higher  than  the  costs  of 
preventing them. For instance, the cumulative losses from the COVID-19 pandemic throughout 2024 

126 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF, p. 45 & Annex 6 
127 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF  
128 Economics for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness: Financial Risk and Opportunities to Build Resilience in Europe. 
World Bank Group, 2021. 

43 

 
 
 
are estimated to be about USD 13.8 trillion,129 whereas the global estimate of prevention costs ranges 
from  USD  10.3  to  USD  11.5  billion  per  year.130  According  to  the  forthcoming  evaluation  of  the 
implementation of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371131, for a COVID-19-like threat in five to seven years 
from now, the discounted total benefits are roughly estimated to range from EUR 176 billion to EUR 
566 billion. For an mpox-like threat (outbreak in Europe on 2022), the benefits are estimated to range 
from  EUR  0  to  EUR  8  million.  Net  present  value  of  the  costs  of  Regulation  (EU)  2022/2371  are 
estimated to be EUR 104 million during the regular situation without threat, EUR 26 million additional 
costs during an mpox-like threat, and EUR 84 million addition costs during a COVID-19 like threat.  

Second, policy option 1 would bring both direct and indirect costs at EU and Member State levels for 
response capacities. With the limitation of rescEU capacities to the traditional civil protection sector, 
already made investments in certain response capacities will be lost due to inability to maintain them. 
Simultaneously, the new risk landscape requires capacities to respond to complex and security risks, 
thus forcing Member States to establish such capacities at national level. As a result, policy option 1 is 
inefficient due to (i) the underutilisation of economies of scale (buying certain response capacities at 
EU level) and (ii) duplications of capacities at national levels. Indeed, in support of policy option 2, 
Member States have recognised the significant added value of strategic level capacities at EU level that 
can provide assistance on a scale that surpasses reasonable national preparedness measures. The fact 
that every rescEU capacity created was deployed within one year of its establishment highlights the 
needs for EU-level capacities for strategic needs and underscores that Member States see its usage as 
an efficient way to respond to crises.132 

Third,  under  policy  option  2  important  efficiency  gains  are  made  through  the  integrated  budget 
structure.  Figure  7  displays  the  increasing  importance  of  health-related  emergencies  in  the  UCPM 
framework over the past decade. Option 2 would address one of the factors identified as hindering the 
efficiency  of  the  UCPM  in  the  independent  support  study,  namely  “instances  of  suboptimal 
coordination,  overlaps,  and  unexplored  synergies  […]  with  other  EU  entities  (e.g.  epidemic 
response)”133. Indeed, under option 2, particular gains in efficiency can be made with view to a merging 
of stockpiling activities. This would amongst others address a factor influencing efficiency mentioned 
by the forthcoming independent study evaluating the implementation of the Regulation on serious cross-
border threats to health: budget limitations hindering the maintenance of strategic stockpiles. Lastly, 
the integrated budget structure under option 2 contributes to addressing need for a streamlining of the 
EU health security architecture, as pointed out in the HERA Review134. 

129 A Disrupted Global Recovery. IMF, 2022. 
130 One Health Approach - Prevent the Next Pandemic. World Bank, 2022. 
131 Adoption process ongoing. 
132  This  view  was  further  supported  in  the  Open  Public  Consultation,  where  participants  favoured  stockpiling  and  pre-
positioning of resources at EU level as an action the EU should undertake to ensure Europe’s safety and security.  Open Public 
Consultation  EU’s  next  long-term  budget  (MFF)  –  EU  funding  for  civil  protection,  preparedness  and  response  to  crises. 
European Commission, 2025, Annex 2. 
133 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF, p.213 
134 HERA review: Taking stock to reinforce health security in the EU. European Commission, 2025. 

44 

 
 
Emergencies per Year

200
150
100
50
0

27 39 38 35 34 38 39 35 39 43 46 36 21

161

136

114

101

70

Consular Support

Health emergency

Natural event

Other

Security crisis

Technological event

Figure 7 7 - Emergencies per year measured by number of requests for assistance made to the UCPM 2007-2024 

External Coherence 

The independent study on the UCPM provided a comprehensive overview of the internal and external 
coherence of the instrument135 which serves as basis for this analysis. Further, the Commission issued 
three  relevant  strategies  for  the  crisis  management,  namely  the  Preparedness  Union  Strategy136,  the 
Internal  Security  Strategy137  (ProtectEU)  and  –  to  a  lesser  extend  relevant  -  the  White  Paper  for 
European Defence and the Readiness 2030 Plan138, in March 2025. These strategies will have an impact 
on  the  future  work  of Member  States and the  EU in  the  area  of  “civil  protection,  preparedness and 
response to crises” and, thus, will be reflected.  

The policy options differ in their external coherence with relevant policies and strategies, with the policy 
option 2 being the most coherent. The policy option 1 is to a large extent coherent with EU initiatives 
across several policy fields, including humanitarian aid, EU health security, home affairs and consular 
support. However, the independent support study pointed out important areas and scope for increased 
synergies and coherence with EU and international interventions and policy fields.  Examples of the 
support study include: 

In the domain of health, the policy option 1 is not fully coherent with other policies and actors. Although 
more  synergies  were  established  after  the  outbreak  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  the  support  study 
identified  “room  for  improvement  and  further  coherence”.  Option  2  addresses  this  gap  with  the 
integration  of  the  health  security  preparedness  framework  and  civil  protection  domains  under  one 
instrument.  

Case study: Response to Covid-19 

On  response  to  health  emergencies,  evidence  shows  the  importance  of  facilitating  the  mobilisation  and 
deployment of medical experts in UCPM missions or within the ERCC, with ongoing discussions on how to 
best make use of this expertise in a structured way. As a good practice, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
ERCC was reinforced with an epidemiologist from the JRC. Similarly, in the context of the UCPM activation 
in Ukraine, HERA deployed a Liaison Officer to assess needs in the field of health. DG ECHO also cooperated 

135 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF,, 2017-2022, chapter 5.4, coherence.  
136 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions on the European Preparedness Union Strategy. European Commission, 2025.  
137 European Internal Security Strategy – Press release. European Commission, 2025.  
138  Introducing the White Paper for European Defence and the ReArm Europe Plan- Readiness 2030. European Commission, 
2025.  

45 

 
 
 
with  DG  SANTE  and  ECDC,  with  the  latter  sending  epidemiological  experts  to  DG  ECHO.  Overall, 
coordination with health actors was crucial to ensuring an effective response at EU and national level. 

Source: independent support study of the UCPM, ICF.  

Both options are coherent with the EU environmental policy instruments, such as the Floods Directive, 
the Water Framework Directive, and the Seveso Directive, with room for improved synergies in the 
policy option 1. As example, under policy option 1 the sectoral instruments like the Floods Directive 
are complementing each other in the assessment and management of flood risks across the EU. Policy 
option  2,  however,  would use  data  of  the  environmental  (and  other  domains)  in  its  overall  EU  risk 
assessments and, thus, increase the coherence with this sector. Additionally, this increasing synergies 
at EU level under policy option 2 are likely to have a positive effect on coherence at national level as 
well.  

Policy option 1 is coherent with regards to the newly stated need to improve civil-military coordination 
as stated in the Preparedness Union Strategy and linked to the White Paper on Defence. As per analysis 
of the independent support study, the policy option 1 leaves “unexploited synergies in civil-military 
coordination during emergencies”. While this is largely aimed at transportation capacities, there are 
further areas like the closer link of civilian planning (e.g. Disaster Resilience Goals; EU exercises) and 
military planning (resilience baselines; NATO exercises). While there would still be a clear separation, 
the  policy  option  2  has  a  more  holistic  approach  to  the  coordination  of  civilian  preparedness  and 
response to the military, providing for a more coherent understanding of risks and threats as well as 
resulting needs for response activities. Coherence with the work of the EEAS and its crisis coordination 
structures is ensured through the different geographic scope (the EEAS focusing on crises outside the 
EU and the EU crisis coordination hub focusing on EU-internal scenarios). In order to link external 
action  with  internal  crisis  response  more  effectively,  the  EU  crisis  coordination  hub  will  closely 
coordinate with the EEAS, and in particular with the Crisis Response Centre. 

In the area of research and innovation, only policy option 2 is fully aligned with the needed level of 
integration to respond in an all-hazards approach. Nevertheless, policy option 1  is coherent with an 
overall  need to  improve  operational links  with  the  scientific  community.  Under  policy  option  1  the 
current set-up of sectoral approaches will continue and ensure “complementarities and strengthen not 
only  the  prevention  and  preparedness  pillar,  but  also  response,  leading  to  better  tools  to  face 
emergencies and better knowledge of risks among the civil protection community and beyond”139. With 
the creation of the EU crisis hub and the all-hazards approach under policy option 2, the recommended 
stronger links with relevant Directorate Generals (e.g. JRC, RTD, HOME) will be established, while 
sustaining their strong independent research and innovation pillars.  

Case study: R&I in emergency teams 

“Recent complex emergencies (such as the COVID-19 pandemic) have shown the importance of embedding 
specialised  scientific  expertise  during  crises,  and  the  need  to  improve  operational  links  with  the  scientific 
community for response activities (e.g. involvement of technical experts). In addition to the work with the JRC, 
stakeholders  reported  that  DG  ECHO  could  work  more  closely  with  other  DGs  (such  as  DG  RTD  or  DG 
CLIMA) to promote relevant research, mobilise the academic sector, and fund specific or joint projects. “  

139 Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF, chapter 5.4  

46 

 
 
 
Source: independent support study of the UCPM, ICF. 

Another important EU policy with regards to crisis management is the CER Directive. For all three 
options the distinction of tasks and responsibilities are clear. The policy options will for the response 
part be only active in consequence management as stated in the Directive140. Nevertheless, given that 
an attack on or incident around critical infrastructure would have consequences for a variety of sectors 
and  services  (health,  energy,  transport),  policy  option  1  has  a  less  well-established  cross-sectoral 
approach to effectively respond and mitigate its impacts is necessary. Moreover, only policy option 2 
would make additional analytical value of the two separate reporting obligations of Member States, 
making this option most coherent.   

Lastly,  disaster  risk  management  considerations  are  integrated  into  EU-level  financial  instruments. 
Most  of  the  EU  funds  supporting  disaster  prevention  and  management  activities  are  programmed 
through the Cohesion Policy funds and the Common Agricultural Policy. These include specific funds 
contributing to prevention and preparedness efforts, including the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD), the Cohesion Fund, and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). 
While not in the scope of this Impact Assessment, the inclusion of preparedness objective into other 
EU funding instruments is paramount. This integration is coherent with all options.  

Coherence  with  Preparedness  Union  Strategy,  ProtectEU,  and  the  White  Paper  for  European 
Defence  

Concerning the ProtectEU Strategy, policy option 1 is partially aligned with the assessment of new and 
increasing threats at EU level. This is partly due to the maintained traditional civil protection response 
capacities, which contribute to the principle of “boosting security [related] investments”. However, the 
engagement  of  citizens,  a  whole-of-government  and  whole-of-society  approach  is  only  partly 
implemented at EU level and largely relies on the implementation by Member States. Having all above 
principles  embedded,  policy  option  2  is  very  coherent  with  the  ProtectEU  Strategy  in  its 
implementation.  Moreover,  policy  option  2  can  contribute to  the  Strategy  with  additional  analytical 
input.  

With regards to the seven headings of the Preparedness Union Strategy, the policy options are varying 
in their coherence, with only policy option 2 being fully aligned. Examples include the ‘foresight and 
anticipation’ pillar, which is coherent and a focus in both policy options. However, only policy option 
2 includes a more comprehensive, cross-sectoral anticipation approach at EU level. Same applies for 
the ‘crisis response’ in which policy option 1 has a core ERCC set-up (which is slightly strengthened). 
Only policy option 2 entails the extra layer of the EU crisis hub. Further, policy option 1 only maintains 
the status quo of the rescEU and ECPP capacities and, thus, only policy option 2 is fully in line with a 
possible strengthening of the rescEU and ECPP instruments. For population preparedness, policy option 
1  can  support  national  efforts  through  the  Knowledge  Network  funding  tool  (with  a  very  limited 
budget). Policy option 2 takes this approach structurally into consideration across different sectors and 
in  the  full  support  of Member  States.  Additionally, the  public-private  cooperation  is  possible  under 

140 ‘When providing support to Member States and critical entities in the implementation of obligations under this Directive, 
the Commission should build on existing structures and tools, such as the UCPM’ 

47 

 
 
policy option 1 for in-kind donations (see box above). This cooperation is more advanced and multi-
faced in policy option 2. 

Case study: private sector  

The  purpose of the EU-level private  donation initiative  was to fill gaps in assistance, easing the burden on 
Member and Participating States by supplementing national offers of assistance with the involvement of private 
sector  actors.  It  allowed  private  donations  to  complement  national  offers  and  reinforced  EU  solidarity  in 
channelling  assistance  to  Ukraine.  In  collaboration  with  Belgian  and  Polish  authorities,  two  hubs  were 
established: i) a rescEU medical, shelter and CBRN hub in Belgium (managed by the Federal Public Service 
Health), and ii) a rescEU energy hub in Poland (managed by the Governmental Strategic Reserves Agency, 
RARS). DG ECHO, supported by HERA in the initial phases of the initiative, was responsible for evaluating 
the  offers  received  by  the  private  sector  and  ensuring  that  the  offers  matched  the  needs  identified  by  the 
Ukrainian  authorities.  The  hubs  oversaw  the  logistics,  quality  checks  and  transport,  once  the  donation 
agreement was signed. 

Source: ICF elaboration, based on Minutes from Lessons Learnt Annual Meeting 24/25 April 2023. 

While the White Paper on Defence is largely out of the scope for this impact assessment, both options 
are coherent in the definition of actions and in the clear distinction of tasks. Only policy option 2 will 
engage more strategically in the coordination with military actors, however, this is not a main focus of 
the  White  Paper.  The  areas  of  dual-use  investments  and  research  and  innovation  as  well  as  the 
strengthening of the overall resilience of the EU against outside actors and hybrid threats is possible 
under all options. Nevertheless, policy option 2 would establish a better cross-sectorial coordination 
and analysis platform (including with SIAC) which would add operational value to the strategy from a 
“civil protection, preparedness and response to crises” point of view.  

Coherence with other preparedness-relevant funding programmes 

The  reinforced  UCPM  will  build  synergies  with  other  EU  programmes,  notably  the  national  and 
regional partnership plans, the European Competitiveness Fund, and Global Europe Fund:  

•  The national and regional partnership plans will support reforms and investments to enhance 
preparedness  in  the  Member  States’  plans  and  will  integrate  an  unallocated  thematic  reserve  to 
respond to unexpected events. 

•  The European Competitiveness Fund will enhance the EU’s preparedness and strategic autonomy 
in key sectors and technologies. It will support building up industrial capacities and cutting-edge 
technologies  (e.g.  Copernicus  crisis  tools;  health  innovation  and  manufacturing,  etc.). It  will 
therefore  contribute  to  strengthen  the  resilience  of  the  EU  industry  alongside  its  global 
competitiveness. 

•  The Global Europe Fund will support the management and response of EU preparedness action 

in third countries via humanitarian aid and other tools (e.g. macro-financial assistance). 

48 

 
 
 
Simplification, Synergies and “being able to deliver” 

Overall, policy option 1 has a limited positive impact on simplification, synergies, and the ability to 
deliver, policy option 2 has a vastly bigger positive impact. Looking at the different characteristics of 
the options demonstrates this.  

The integration of the two spending programmes under option 2 constitutes a natural development as it 
merges two areas with pre-existing overlaps, as also pointed out in the UCPM evaluation. Indeed, in 
general  health  has  been  a  central  element  of  civil  protection  work  under  the  UCPM,  as  seen  with 
activities, such as medical evacuations. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic and lessons learnt further 
highlighted these links and synergies. As a result, policy option 2 is in line with simplification principle 
in the next MFF and in doing so it reduces the overall administrative burden. This means that the risk 
of gaps and overlaps is reduced, thus increasing effectiveness of EU funding.  

However, policy option 1 in its budget structure implies a higher reliance on MS for efforts, such as 
implementing the Preparedness Union Strategy.  

Further, policy option 2 – through a stronger adoption of the whole-of-government approach (e.g. option 
2 involving more structured and intense civil-military cooperation, involving the establishment of an 
EU crisis coordination hub spanning sectors) – better leverages synergies in terms of better coordination 
within and between EU institutions.  

To  give  another  example,  regarding  risk  assessments,  the  fact  that  under  policy  option  1  a  mere 
harmonisation of risk assessment parameters is foreseen, whereas under policy option 2 a common EU 
risk  assessment  is  produced,  means  that  policy  option  2  has  a  much  bigger  positive  impact  on 
simplification and synergies, and thus being able to deliver. Indeed, the process of producing the EU 
comprehensive risk assessment will provide opportunities to identify overlaps and duplication of efforts 
in  reporting  obligations.  In  this  way,  the  exercise  will  streamline  reporting  obligations,  avoiding 
unnecessary  administrative  burdens  while  improving  efficiency.  The  Single  Intelligence  Analysis 
Capacity’ (SIAC) role as the single point of entry for Member States’ intelligence will be essential.     

Another example for simplification under policy option 1 and policy option 2 is the foreseen reduction 
of  administrative  burden  for  response  activities  like  the  currently  complex  co-financing  rates  and 
arrangements for  deployment  of  assets  and  teams141.  Member  States  have  voiced the  administrative 
burden on reporting and co-financing in lessons learnt workshops repeatedly.   

141 Stressed in the independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF, p.213 

49 

 
 
 
8.  PREFERRED OPTION 

Presentation of the preferred option 

On the basis of the identified impacts of the policy options, as well as their respective ‘performance’ in 
terms of effectiveness, efficiency, external coherence and simplification, synergies and “being able to 
deliver”, the preferred policy option is policy option 2.  

Policy option 2 achieves the outlined General and Specific Objectives to a much more fundamental and 
successful  degree  than  option  1  thanks  to  a  more  comprehensive  leveraging  of  EU  added  value. 
Concretely, in the context of a crisis landscape that is becoming more multi-dimensional and cross-
border, opting for policy option 2 brings about important social, environmental, as well as economic 
benefits.  Indeed,  while  policy  option  1  is  associated  with  a  lower  initial  budget,  it  would  result  in 
exponentially larger costs of various natures in the medium to long-term. To give just one example, 
policy option 2 provides much more appropriate response capacities in the face of complex security 
risks, which – if left unaddressed at EU level - could cause disruptions in trade routes and global supply 
chains.  Overall,  policy  option  2  will  result  in  much  more  successful  prevention,  preparedness  and 
response efforts, including for health emergencies. This will ultimately result in a much higher cost-
efficiency compared to policy option 1: Work on quantifying the benefits of investing in prevention and 
preparedness demonstrates that these investments always make economic sense. The ‘cost of inaction’ 
is thus not only the disaster losses but also the lack of economic, social, and environmental benefits that 
are generated by having a community or an asset better prepared and that enhance overall well-being 
and resilience.142 Under policy option 2, the aforementioned benefits will be successfully leveraged. 

As demonstrated in chapter 1, the political momentum for strengthening EU preparedness and crisis 
management is significant. Faced with increasingly severe crises and security threats, it has become 
clear that the  Union must act not  only  to  reinforce crisis preparedness  but also  to  do  so  timely  and 
intensively. This, coupled with the need for a “paradigm shift […] to create a mindset that fosters a 
culture of preparedness and resilience”143, evidence that the actions proposed under policy option 1, 
while addressing the objectives to a certain extent, nevertheless fall short of providing a proportionate 
response to the crises of today and tomorrow. Policy option 2, on the other hand, offers a proportionate 
response  to  such  a  complex  risk  landscape,  and  does  so  in  full  respect  of  subsidiarity  and  national 
competences. Indeed, all actions proposed under policy option 2 bring added value to Member States’ 
actions, namely by complementing national efforts, enhancing coordination and efficiency and fostering 
a culture of preparedness and resilience. 

Lastly, policy option 2 proposes a much more important EU support to national efforts in population 
preparedness compared to option 1, which is likely to be received positively by the general population. 
Indeed, according to the April 2024 Flash Eurobarometer on Perceptions of EU crisis management144 
more than 80% of respondents agree that the EU should be more involved in preparedness efforts for 
future  crises,  through  actions  such  as  raising  awareness,  organising  training,  and  crisis  simulation 
exercises.  

142 Economics for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness: Financial Risk and Opportunities to Build Resilience in Europe. 
World Bank Group, 2021. 
143 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions on the European Preparedness Union Strategy. European Commission, 2025. 
144 Eurobarometer on perceptions of EU crisis management. Publications Office of the EU, 2024. 

50 

 
 
REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) 

Many  of  the  operational  rules  set  out  in  the  current  legal  framework  governing  the  UCPM  and 
EU4Health’s crisis preparedness strand lack the clarity and detail needed for effective implementation 
in fast-moving crises. The new framework shall therefore codify and clarify rules on operationalising 
many  response  actions,  such  as  the  establishment  of  logistical  hubs  and  medical  evacuation  hubs, 
medical evacuations, prepositioning of response capacities and intervention teams, incorporate private 
sector donations, etc., and thereby, making them clear and simple to apply as well as adapt the respective 
co-financing rates. 

Also, an option was considered to extend the possibility to request future EU assistance via regional 
organisations. It has not been pursued as recent examples demonstrated that the primary issue hindering 
effective assistance delivery was not the ability to submit a request for assistance, but rather the absence 
of a well-defined chain of command and distribution mechanism within the affected country.  

Lastly, the readability of the text is currently hampered by the mix of substantial provisions with rules 
on Union financial assistance and eligible actions. This shall be remedied by separating from the body 
of the Regulation a list of actions eligible for Union financial assistance in an annex. 

9.  How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated? 

As with any new initiative, if the preferred option is implemented, there will be periodic evaluation and 
monitoring.  As  part  of  the  current  review  programme,  set  out  in  the  Union  Protection  Mechanism 
Decision  1313/2013,  the  Commission  and  Member  States  share  data,  information,  and  assessments 
necessary for them to monitor, analyse, and evaluate all the relevant civil protection actions within the 
Union Mechanism. In widening the scope of EU preparedness and response, monitoring and evaluation 
will  be  undertaken  by  the  Commission  in  conjunction  with  national  competent  authorities  as  civil 
protection is a Member State capacity.  

Moving forward, this initiative will be monitored through the performance framework for the post-2027 
budget, which is examined in a separate impact assessment. The performance framework provides for 
an implementation report during the implementation phase of the programme, as well as a retrospective 
evaluation to be carried out in accordance with Article 34(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. 
The evaluation shall be conducted in accordance with the Commission's Better Regulation Guidelines 
and will be based on indicators relevant to the objectives of the programme. 

The table below contains a number of suggested headline indicators in line with and presented to the 
performance framework for the post-2027 budget under the policy area (level 1): crisis management. 
The performance framework provides for an implementation report during the implementation phase 
of the programme, as well as a retrospective evaluation to be carried out in accordance with Article 
34(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. The evaluation shall be conducted in accordance with 
the  Commission's  Better  Regulation  Guidelines  and  will  be  based  on  indicators  relevant  to  the 
objectives of the programme. 

In order to adequately monitor “preparedness by design”, it will be suggested as a horizontal principle, 
alongside  the  existing  principles  on  “do  no  significant  harm”  and  gender  equality.  Mainstreaming 
requires  a  deliberate  and  upstream  consideration  of  preparedness  factors  in  planning  and  decision-
making—not only ex post categorisation. Following the gender equality model to ensure consistency: 
for the purposes of mainstreaming preparedness, Union budget activities or  implementation through 
plans  by  Member  States  or  third  countries  shall  fall  into  one  of  three  categories  and  corresponding 
preparedness  scores:  a)  Activities  with  crisis  and  disaster  preparedness  as  a  principal  objective 

51 

 
(‘preparedness  score  2’);  b)  Activities  with  crisis  and  disaster  preparedness  as  an  important  and 
deliberate objective, but not as the main objective (‘preparedness score 1’); c) Activities anticipated to 
have no substantial contribution to preparedness (‘preparedness score 0’). This would allow for ex ante 
analysis of the Union’s state of preparedness. 

Monitoring and evaluation are part of the life cycle of strategic foresight and anticipatory approaches 
and  will  not  only  measure  the  accuracy  and  value  of  information  output  but  also  be  measured  as  a 
process of coherence. Data from Copernicus Emergency Management Service (CEMS) and Copernicus 
Support to EU External and Security Actions (SESA) will continue to lie at the heart of the Commission 
situational awareness and analytical support. Continuous information exchange via partnerships such 
as  European  Anthropogenic  Hazard  Scientific  Partnership  (EAHSP)  and  the  close  collaboration  the 
EEAS and decentralised agencies (Satellite Center, Frontex, European Centre for Disease Control) will 
inform outcomes under General Objective 1 and 4.  

The Commission will establish an appropriate integrated framework which will benefit from and inform 
a  cross-sectoral,  all-hazard  approach  to  risks  and  response.  In  the  context  of  such  monitoring,  the 
Commission will pay special attention to the potential need of review of design parameters, such as 
notification thresholds or milestones reached. Should such a need arise, the parameters could potentially 
be modified.  

Lastly, a data plan will be developed to ensure data are available for the evaluation of effectiveness, 
efficiency and EU added value. Work on this has already commenced: In the beginning of 2025, DG 
ECHO  implemented  the  Civil  Protection  Data  Repository,  following  the  UCPM  evaluation,  which 
collects operational data like deployments of capacities or stockpiling locations.   

52 

 
 
 
European 
Commission, 
Member  States, 
Participating 
States, 
European 
scientific 
partnerships 
(e.g. 
European 
Natural  Hazard 
Scientific 
Partnership 
ENHSP). 
UCP 
Knowledge 
Network 

the 

Target  

Source  

Methodology 

Indicator Title 
General Objective 1: Implement an integrated all-hazards, anticipatory, and proactive approach to 
threat and risk management.  
Number  of  scientific 
technical 
and 
assessments 
and 
advice provided to the 
ERCC  in  support  of 
UCPM operations 

>436 

Scientific and technical assessments 
and  advice  are  needed  for  an 
evidence-based 
decision-making. 
The  ERCC,  while  dealing  with 
natural  and  man-made  disasters, 
needs  to  make  use  of  the  latest 
scientific  and  technical  knowledge 
and  expertise  to  support  emergency 
management  activities  under 
the 
UCPM.   

The  Member  States 
UCPM 
and 
States 
Participating 
use 
UCP 
the 
Knowledge  Network 
to  share  knowledge 
a 
and 
community  of  civil 
protection experts 

strengthen 

page 
per 

50,000 
views 
month.  
50%  of  content 
contributed  by 
community.  
2,500 
community 
members.  

reach 

(number  of  community 
Growth 
members), 
(page  views), 
engagement  (number  of  groups  and 
number of participants in knowledge 
sharing  events)  and  knowledge 
sharing 
library 
publications uploaded). 

(number 

of 

General Objective 2: Implement an efficient and effective cross-sectoral coordination framework 
for various crises in a whole-of-government approach 
Response  to  Requests 
for  Assistance  by  all 
countries  

80% 

Common 
Emergency 
Communication 
and Information 
System. 
(CECIS) 
CECIS 

100% 

Response  to  Requests 
for  Assistance  by  EU 
Member States  

of  Requests 

Overall  percentage  of  Requests  for 
Assistance (from EU MS, UCPM PS 
and Third Countries) that resulted in 
the acceptance of at least one offer of 
assistance by EU MS and UCPM PS 
and/or rescEU. 
Percentage 
for 
Assistance by EU MS that resulted in 
the acceptance of at least one offer of 
assistance by EU MS and UCPM PS 
and/or rescEU. 
Number of exercises involving both 
civilian and military stakeholders are 
to  strengthening  civil  – 
crucial 
military 
and 
interoperability in times of major and 
complex crises. 

cooperation 

- 

15 

Internal 
reporting  from 
DG  ECHO  Dir 
A. 

Number  of  exercises 
aiming  to  strengthen 
military 
civil 
cooperation  to  which 
ECHO contributes in a 
significant way 
General Objective 3: Ensuring a whole-of-society approach to preparedness and response to crises 
Percentage  of  the  population  of  the 
Level of awareness of 
Union aware of disaster risks in their 
Union  citizens  of  the 
region.  The  Eurobarometer  is  run 
risk of their region  

>64% 
2024 
Eurobarometer  

Eurobarometer 

the 

in 

53 

 
  
  
  
15 

Internal 
reporting  from 
DG  ECHO  Dir 
B.  

Financing  of  disaster 
prevention 
and 
preparedness  projects 
(inside and outside the 
EU)  
General Objective 4: Ensure the Union is equipped to act timely and in solidarity 
Capacities 
for deployment 

available 

30 

Internal 
reporting  from 
DG  ECHO  Dir 
A.  

Acceptance of Offers  CECIS 

tbd 

with  a  frequency  of  every  three 
years.  
Number 
disaster 
prevention and preparedness projects 
inside and outside the EU. 

financed 

of 

Number  of  capacities  available  for 
deployment, 
including  RescEU 
operational  capacities  and  response 
capacities, registered in the European 
Civil Protection Pool. 
Percentage of accepted assistance for 
in-kind  assistance  and  modules 
compared with offered assistance. 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references 

The lead services of the Impact Assessment were SG and DG ECHO, with close collaboration 
of DG HERA and DG SANTE. After instruction by central services no Decide planning entry 
for the Open Public Consultation was initiated.  

Organisation and timing 

The external support study was supervised by an Inter-service Steering Group (ISG), composed 
of representatives of the EEAS and the following European Commission (EC)  DGs: AGRI, 
BUDG, CNECT, CLIMA, DEFIS, ECHO, EMPL, ENER, ENV, FPI, GROW, HERA, HOME, 
INTPA, JRC, REGIO, RTD, MARE, MOVE, REFORM, SANTE, SG, SJ. 

Six ISG meeting were held on 23 July 2024, 25 September 2024, 18 October 2024, 27 January 
2025, 24 March 2025 and 16 May 2025. 

Consultation of the RSB 

An upstream RSB meeting was conducted on 31 March 2025.  

The regular RSB meeting was conducted on 18 June 2025. 

➢  Following  RSB  meeting  on  18  June,  the  suggested  changes  and/or  additions  were 
implemented throughout the Impact Assessment, including but not limited to:On scope 
and coherence:  

54 

 
 
o  clarification  on  the  rationale  behind  merging  elements  of  EU4Health  with 
UCPM 2.0 instrument (sub-chapter “Simplification, Synergies and “being able 
to deliver””); 

o  further explanation on how the new instrument is proposed to interact with other 
funding programmes (sub-chapter “Coherence with other preparedness-relevant 
funding programmes”); 

o  clarification on coherence of the proposed Hub with existing crisis and civilian 
military  coordination  structures  (sub  chapters  on  “Description  of  policy 
options” and “External coherence”); 

➢  On intervention logic and objectives: 

o  Added  section  on  monitoring  and  evaluation  of  new  instrument’s  activities 

under Chapter 9 “How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated” 

➢  On comparison of options and impacts: 

o  Added evidence from different reports on impacts and comparisons of options 
(Chapter  6  “What  are  the  impacts  of  the  policy  options”  and  ”sub-chapter 
“Effectiveness”) 

o  Additional  explanation  on  the  comprehensive  EU  risk  and  threat  assessment 
added (sub-chapters on “Description of policy options” and “Effectiveness”) 

➢  On governance:  

o  Clarification was added that the fundamental governance mechanism of the new 
instrument  will  not  be  different  to  the  current  one  (Chapter  5  “What  are  the 
available policy options?”) 

➢  On future monitoring and evaluation: 

o  Added  section  on  monitoring  and  evaluation  of  new  instrument’s  activities, 
including the interaction with the Performance Framework Regulation (Chapter 
9 “How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated”) 

Evidence, sources, and quality 

The evidence basis stems from the 2024 UCPM Evaluation as well as the evaluation of the 
implementation of Regulation 2022/2371 on serious cross-border threats to health, as well as 
the responds to the recommendations from the European Court of Auditors.   

The evidence stemming from these reports was supplemented by relevant studies and reports 
like  the  European  Climate  Risk  Assessment  (EUCRA)  or  the  Niinistö  report.  These  are 
references throughout the analysis.   

Nevertheless,  deficits  with  regards  to  the  cost-benefit  analysis  of  interventions  due  to  the 
volatile response environment and the impossibility of counter-factual analyses persist. This 
includes the analysis of the assessment of impacts. Moreover, the UCPM capacity gaps report 
will  be  adopted  only  on  5  June  2025.  Nevertheless,  important  preliminary  findings  were 
included in the analysis (as shared in the inter-service consultation). The same applies for the 
findings  of  the  “mid-term  evaluation  of  the  Regulation  on  serious  cross-border  threats  to 
health”.   

55 

 
 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) 

19 May 2025 

Civil protection, preparedness and response to disasters 

Report - Open Public Consultation  

1.  Introduction  

This report forms part of the outcome of the Open Public Consultation informing the Impact 
Assessment for civil protection, preparedness and response to disasters in preparation of the 
Multiannual Financial Framework 2027. The main body of text is divided into three sections; 
a note on data and method, the main presentation of results, and come final conclusions. The 
main  conclusion  is  that  investment  into  preparedness  and  crisis  management  at  EU  level  is 
welcomed and that the main area in which the EU can create added value is in mitigating and 
responding  to  natural  hazards  as  a  consequence  of  climate  change    and  threats  to 
biodiversity, in fighting disinformation and securing civic space as well as innovation in 
the digital space to combat authoritarianism, and to ensure the EU is overall prepared in 
the event of an armed conflict. 

2.  Note on data and method 

The  data  for  this  report  is  the  responses  to  the  Public  Consultation  –  EU’s  next  long-term 
budget  (MFF)  –  EU  funding  for  civil  protection,  preparedness  and  response  to  crises.  The 
survey was open to all EU citizens, businesses, associations, government bodies etc. in Europe 
and has received 1187 responses of which had attachments for a total of 139 position papers. 
Considering  the  relatively  low  number  of  responses,  there  is  no  inferential  statistics  nor 
conclusion drawn at population level in this report. The respondents will be treated as the 
whole rather than as a statistical sample. It is to note that a Eurobarometer on Civil Protection 
was published in February 2024, thus the demographic expected to engage with the subject 
matter  may  experience  some  survey  fatigue,  main  descriptive  statistical  results  have  been 
compared to the outcomes of the Eurobarometer where appropriate.  

The free text and the position papers have both primarily been treated as qualitative data. The 
free text has been analysed by a Large Language Model (LLM) based on the two following 
inputs: the Executive Summary of the Niinistö Report, which acted as a baseline understanding 
of concepts such as ‘preparedness’, ‘crisis’ and ‘risks’, and a list of ten questions, (see annex 
2) developed to extract relevant data. The list of ten questions were also used to (manually) 
analyse the position papers.  

To contextualise the free text, language from the main survey was used as a compliment, and 
to gain additional insight into the free text JRC provided a sentiment analysis, utilising a new 
version of the state-of-the-art sentiment model called XLM-RLnews-8. The sentiment analysis, 
which is specifically designed for (short-)document-level sentiment analysis across multiple 

56 

 
 
 
languages, was first adapted it to the news domain, using a multilingual news dataset extracted 
via  the  European  Media  Monitor  (EMM)  pipeline.  This  dataset  includes  20  000  news 
headlines and descriptions per each of the 24 official languages of the European Union. 
JRC  further  employed  the  Unified  Multilingual  Sentiment  Analysis  Benchmark  (UMSAB) 
dataset  for  sentiment  fine-tuning,  which  consists  of  eight  datasets  in  eight  languages,  each 
annotated using three classes: negative, neutral, and positive. As the original model trained on 
the  complete  UMSAB  dataset  proved  to  be  biased  towards  neutrality  when  predicting  a 
sentiment class for German texts, they fine-tuned a new version of it with the same architecture 
and domain adaptation but for data in English, Italian, Spanish, French and Portuguese.  

3.  Results and analysis 

3.1 Descriptive statistics 

More  than  half  of  all  respondents,  776  are  individual  EU  citizens  (65.3%),  the  other  411 
responses  are  comprised  of  government  authorities,  businesses  and  companies,  non-
governmental organisations, academia, associations and trade unions. The largest share is from 
France (324), followed by Belgium (298) and Germany (126). There are no major division 
between  responses  from  organisations,  authorities,  businesses,  and  individual  EU 
citizens. They follow a similar pattern, with generally harmonized responses between the four 
groups.  With  the  most  popular  response  being  largely  the  same  between  groups  in  all 
comparative questions.  

The few discrepancies are on question 2 where local conflict stands out as a reply from EU 
citizens,  when asked  what  they consider the worst  ‘spill-over’ risk to  be compared to  other 
entities who indicates that disruptions of supply chains would cause the biggest risk for ‘spill-
over’. On question 6 EU citizens organisations show a preference for health stockpiling more 
pronounced than do public authorities and businesses. The latter would prefer stockpiling of 
energy and energy equipment to a higher degree. The finding among EU citizens is supported 
by the Eurobarometer where medical emergencies score second highest response when asked 
which  crisis  respondent  think  EU  should  prioritise.  Further,  as  shown  by  question7 
organisations are more likely to support civil protection action outside Europe than any other 
group. A final notable division appears in question 9.2 where EU Citizens believe that public-
private  cooperation  is  most  important  in  agriculture  and  food  production,  processing  and 
distribution whereas businesses, organisations and public authorities have selected security of 
supply chains as their preferred area for private-public cooperation. 

When asked which three risks and threats respondents consider most threatening, the three most 
common  answers  were  disasters  caused  by  climate  change  (874),  disinformation  (464)  and 
threats to biodiversity and animal/plant health (410). As Europe is heating up, the frequency, 
severity and visibility of climate change related natural hazards have become a main threat to 
life  and  economic  situation.  Disasters  caused  by  climate  change  was  not  only  the 
overwhelmingly  most  popular  answer  to  the  question,  but  of  the  survey  with  it  being  the 
selected option more times than any other suggested answer in any comparable question.  

57 

 
 Figure 9: Result of question 1) Which risks and threats do you perceive as the most threatening to your personal life 

and/or economic situation (or your organisation’s performance?) Grouped by category of respondents. 

Figure 8: Result of question 1) Which risks and threats do you perceive as the most threatening to your personal life 
and/or economic situation (or your organisation’s performance?) Grouped by country. 

No other comparable question had any outliers, 
as seen in the graph (Figure 3) below, comparing 
the variance in responses of question 1, 2, 3 and 
6. This is also followed up in question 5 where it 
is indicated that 73.38% of respondents indicate 
that EU investment would  have a higher  added 
value than Member State investment, making it 
the most popular response. Similarly, in question 
3,  coordinated  responses  to  the  impacts  of 
climate  change  is  the  most  popular  answer 
overall.  Combined  with  threats  to  biodiversity 
and  animal/plant  health (145)  77.6%  of 
respondents to this survey showed concern for 
Europe’s natural environment. Climate change 
is  also  the  most  common  answer  regardless  of 

Figure  3:  Mean,  quartiles  and  variance  of  responses  to 
questions  1-3  and  6.  The  blue  dot  above  question  one 
represents the outlier disasters caused by climate change. 

(145) 
and disasters caused by climate change which was a total of 367 respondents.  

The figure controlled for respondents that had chosen both threats to biodiversity and animal/plant health 

58 

 
 
 
region  (North,  South,  East  or  West  Europe (146))  However,  there  is  a  skew  towards  armed 
conflict,  disinformation,  cyberattacks  and  hybrid  threats  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  to  a  lesser 
extent also in Northern Europe. This light skew is present in both question 1, 2 and in question 
3. The shadow of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine looms in the combined answers 
from  respondents  based  in  Eastern  Europe.  While  respondents  in  Western  and  Southern 
Europe, where forest fires and floods are becoming more frequent and extreme, show a high 
degree of unanimity in climate change being the main threat/risk, and subsequently also the 
issue  in  need  of  the  most  EU  attention,  respondents  in  Easter  Europe  have  spread  answers 
pertaining to armed conflict, disinformation, and cyberattacks and hybrid warfare more evenly 
next to climate change.  

Figure 4: The gradient of colour shows the frequency of answers, the spread of green in columns 1 and 4 show the more varied 
response of threats and risks.  

Figure 5: The fourth column in both tables containing the responses to question 2 and three respectively, show the skew 
towards conflict as a larger perceived issue in Eastern Europe. 

Disinformation  is  a  common  response  alongside  climate  change  and  since  today  most 
disinformation campaigns are made possible through digital means, either as the source or as a 

(146) 
Northern Europe: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden. Western Europe: 
Austria,  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Southern  Europe:  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Greece, 
Italy,  Malta,  Portugal,  Spain,  Eastern  Europe:  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovakia, 
Slovenia.  

59 

 
 
means of distribution, a combined (cyberattack and disinformation) 56.10% of respondents 
are concerned with the digital health of Europe in some form.  

Another  issue  that  appears  throughout  the  survey  results,  having  a  strong  presence  but  not 
taking the centre stage is the risk/threat of disruption to global supply chains. It is seen as an 
area ripe for public-private cooperation in question 9.2 (596) and, in question 2, indicated as 
the main threat from the outside which could cause spill-over effects inside the EU both when 
looking at all responses in total.  

Figure 6: Responses to question 2, divided by category of respondents (top) and countries (bottom). 

Figure 7: Responses to question 9.2. The red bar shows all responses on 'supply chain'.  

60 

 
It  is  evident  that  responders  to  this  survey  believe  EU  should  make  investments  into 
preparedness,  and that it brings added value in  certain  areas. Such position is  supported by 
responses to question 5. Half or more of respondents have answered that EU investments would 
have more added value than individual Member States, to a large extent across 5 out of 14 
policy field, including in response to armed conflict (238), climate change (277) disruption of 
supply  chains  (242),  Economic  and  trade  instability  (226),  and  in  response  to  health 
emergencies (221).  

Figure 8: Result of question 5) to what extent do you agree that the EU budget should support the following objectives? 

The survey follows up question 5 with responses to question 6 showing that respondents look 
generally  favourably  on  EU  Stockpiling,  especially  medicine,  medical (257)  and  energy 
equipment (238) and food/drinking water (193). Stockpiling preferences show coherence with 
the supported policy fields and the impact of Russias war of agression against Ukraine. Only a 
total of 13 responses indicate that there are no areas in which EU should stockpile. A total of 
13 responses is equivalent to 0.4% of responses or aproximately 4 responents.  

Figure 9: Result of question 6, divided by category of respondents (top) and countries (bottom). 

61 

 
This positive outlook on EU investment into preparedness is further backed up in question 7 
where 61.75% of respondents (733 responses) strongly agree that EU should minimise risk and 
threats and prevent crises in the EU. Further, 56.87% of respondents (657 responses) strongly 
agree that EU budget should support preparedness for crises in the EU. Only 19.12% (227 
responses) strongly agree that the same efforts should be undertaken outside the EU, yet in 
question 4 to agree strongly with the statement “Support preparedness and ensure the EU can 
react  to  unexpected  events  to  act  in  solidarity  with  its  citizens  and  beyond”  was  the  most 
common  answer  at  (635)  responses,  indicating  that  preparedness  and  crisis  management 
beyond European borders are still important.    

Figure 10: Result of question 4) In your view, how important are the following objectives? 

The only questions where respondents did not generally agree with the statement of the survey 
is question 10.2. Among respondents, 37.85% seem to indicate that the EU should step up its 
efforts to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable populations. This sentiment is especially 
true  among  respondents  identifying  as  either  EU  citizens  or  organisations.  Additionally, 
28.64% only consider needs of vulnerable populations to have been met ‘somewhat’.  

Figure 11: Result of question 10.2. 

3.2 Free text   

The free text question “Do you have any feedback or comments EU’s work on civil protection, 
preparedness and crisis response?” received a total of 376 submissions (consisting of more 
than 50 characters) across the survey which were analysed by an LLM. 179  EU citizens had 
provided  free  text,  sharing  their  perspectives  and  another  180  entities  had  done  the  same. 
Respondents covered various areas of competence including academia and research institutions 
specialising  in  environmental  sciences  and  life  sciences,  NGO’s  and  human  rights  groups, 
private  sector  associations,  involved  in  areas  such  as  infrastructure,  logistics,  health,  and 
supply-chain security. 

62 

 
 
Based on the free text, the main areas where improvement of EU policy and engagement is 
suggested is in climate change adaptation and biodiversity and resilience. More than half of 
all free text submitted by EU citizens requested a higher focus on climate change as the main 
risk facing Europe, including “dedicating significant budget to preparing for the impacts of 
climate change” and to invest in “environmental democracy” noting that most of the threats 
facing  Europe  today  have  a  climate  change  component  and  will  be  exacerbated  by  climate 
change.  

Another  issue  raised  alongside  climate  change  is  he  rise  in  defence  spending  impacting 
spending in other areas of crisis management. This sentiment was shared with multiple other 
contributors with variation including ensuring that the power remains squarely with civilian 
authorities  and  to  safeguard  democracy  against  the  rise  of  fascism  in  a  post-truth  era.  As  a 
Slovenian contributor phrased it:  

“As an EU citizen, I am concerned at the notion that armed response is seen as the 
answer to today’s challenges. Redirecting funds toward military build-up contradicts 
our core EU values. We should invest in diplomacy, innovation, and resilience-not feed 
an arms industry that profits from conflict.” (147) 

Finally, among EU citizens there was a clear opposition against how the survey had framed 
migration as a critical issue on par with climate change, epidemic or armed conflict. Several 
contributors noted that they see migration is a symptom of the former issues not a cause itself, 
and therefore suggested a focus on resilience and long-term solutions. The point of view was 
summarised by a contributor from the Netherlands:  

“Please focus on prevention instead of mitigation. Look at the long-term issues, take 
(climate)  scientists  seriously,  and  remember  that  only  non-violence  can  stop 
violence.” (148) 

Among entities (businesses, public authorities, and organisations) main areas for improvement 
of  EU  policy  included  cybersecurity  collaboration,  proactive  EU  resilience  measures  and 
infrastructure enhancement and resilience. Cybersecurity is a recurring topic, especially the 
need  to  cooperate  across  country  borders  as  part  of  the  defence  of  democracy  and  from 
authoritarianism. It is stressed that cyber defence alongside civil protection need to transition 
from what is considered reactive processes to proactive resilience-building actions is stressed, 
with  an  emphasis  on  stockpiling  resources,  proactive  campaigns,  and  significant 
investments in resilience measures. Investments and systems strengthening should occur at 
local, national, and EU levels for effective civil protection and crisis response. 

Further, highlighted by lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic, the free text indicates a wish to 
strengthening of resilient and localized manufacturing networks to enhance preparedness to 
ensure that disruptions to supply chains do not decimate European healthcare, food systems 
and critical industries. Closely connected is the advocacy for coordinated European action to 
modernize  and  improve  transport  infrastructure  for  dual-use  mobility,  to  remove 
bottlenecks,  and maintain  supply chain  sovereignty,  which is  crucial as  climate change and 
geopolitical tensions rise.  

(147) 
(148) 

Quote from contributor F3549854.  
Quote from contributor F3541625.  

63 

 
 
The  tone  of  the  free  text  and  the  position  papers  is  balanced 
with a clear skew towards positivity indicating that whilst the 
subject matter may be of a serious nature, the outlook is bright, 
thus signalling that respondents have an already good overall 
experience with EU preparedness and crisis management and 
are  looking  forward  to  its  betterment  rather  than  it  being  a 
policy  area  causing  negative  public  opinion.  It  also  indicates 
that there is a broader political (left-right scale) consensus, and 
the policy area does not stir controversy among respondents.   

Figure  12:  Share  of  sentiment  in  the 
free text. 

Stockpiling and pre-positioning of resources are favoured as 
a means of action from the EU. It was both seen as part of the meaning of “preparedness” 
(including trainings, SOPs and implementation of early warning systems and risk anticipation 
strategies) and as an explicit action the EU should undertake to  ensure Europe’s safety  and 
security.  Specifically  mentioned  stockpiles  includes  energy  and  health  resources,  critical 
raw materials and food. Other notable recommendations for EU action includes continually 
strengthened cross-border cooperation on civil protection, in which the EU has a coordinating 
role, and in supporting early warning systems and improving risk forecasting. The responses 
overall support an increase in EU spending on preparedness and crisis management.   

3.3 Position papers 

To complement the free text results, 139 position paper attachments were submitted. 53 papers 
were submitted by non-governmental organisations,  45 by businesses, business  associations 
and  trade  unions;  another  22  by  various  associations  and  organisations;  and  14  by  public 
authorities. The position papers (139) can be categorised in the following categories: 1. Civil 
society  representation  and  democracy  (32);  2.  Healthcare  (23);  3.  Infrastructure  and 
transportation (19); 4. Climate adaptation (17); 5. Policy and public authority (16); 6. Digital 
innovation  and  cyber  defence  (15);  and  7.  Civil  protection  and  early  warning  (12).  These 
categorisations are broad and within each group, the subject matter varies. The main outlier is 
the  ‘Digital  innovation  and  cyber  defence’  category,  displaying  nearly  complete  internal 
coherence.  

The strongest call for a single action comes from position papers focusing on digital innovation 
and cyber defence. Ten out of fifteen papers explicitly call for the establishment of a sovereign 
or ‘freedom-themed’ tech fund modelled after Germany’s Sovereign Tech Fund. The aim 
of this proposed fund is to secure Europe’s digital infrastructure against cyber threats, ensure 
safe civic space online (thus combat authoritarianism), boost an economic competitive digital 
Europe. The main risk identified is that of cyberattacks and hybrid threats and attack on 
democracy by authoritarian actors. This aligns well with the secondary result of question 1, 
confirming cyberattacks and hybrid threats as a concern for both EU citizens and organised 
bodies.  The  main  framing  of  the  request  for  an  EU  sovereign  tech  fund  is  in  defence  of 
democracy, pointing out the importance of a secure and free internet during the Arab Spring or 
Iran’s Women, Life, Freedom protests. The main target suggested for funding is development 
of Open-Source Code and Software, which is foundational for nearly all Europe’s digital 
infrastructure, but is often overlooked as it does not promise the same economic reward as 
proprietary systems.  

The focus on a free and safe civic space in Europe carries on in papers submitted by civil 
society, thus invertedly the identified risk of shrinking civic space. Culture Action Europe notes 

64 

 
the role of cultural content and participation in defence against disinformation, hybrid threats, 
and  psychological  warfare  from  authoritarian  regimes  and  The  European  Peacebuilding 
Liaison Office (EPLO) notes that the cost of violence was EUR 18.2 trillion in 2023, equivalent 
to 13,5% of the world’s economic activity, thus making an economic argument for the support 
to strengthened democracy. Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD) makes a similar 
argument for the support of free media in the face of disinformation and low confidence in 
professional  journalism,  noting  that  quality  journalism  has  also  led  to  over  €5  billion  in 
recovered assets  by EU  governments,  exposing dark-money flows, political  corruption,  and 
funding of extremism. 

Echoing  the  free  text  above,  a  number  of  papers,  from  several  kinds  of  entities  expresses 
concerns that the growing importance of defence spending will come at an (expected) cost of 
declining funds in other areas. The umbrella organisation for the Swedish Trade Unions points 
to resilience being the result of both social and military investments, and the Government of 
Ireland, while recognising  the increasing  opportunities for cross-fertilisation of civilian and 
defence research, requests that the new MFF retains the civilian focus of the R&I framework 
programmes.  

Several  organisations  representing  first  responders  and  volunteers  contributing  to  the  civil 
protection  of  EU  Member  States  have  been  submitted.  A  notable  contribution  comes  from 
Federation  Nationale  Sapeurs  Pompiers  de  France  who  highlights  the  vital  role  of 
volunteering in European civil protection and that the renewed interest in civil defence cannot 
come  at  the  expense  of  civil  protection.  The  paper  further  proposes  an  Erasmus  exchange 
programme  for  civil  protection  professionals,  a  request  echoed  by  The  International 
Association of Fire Services (CTIF). The development of cross-border training programs and 
the promotion of a whole-of-society approach to resilience are seen as crucial steps in building 
cohesive and effective crisis management systems.  

There are two issues that stands out among papers submitted on health preparedness: support 
to  staffing  and  inequalities  in  health  care  during  crisis.  The  EU  stockpiling  strategy  is 
welcomed among many respondents, but there are calls to ensure that the EU does not fall 
deeper into the current shortage of health care professionals – especially nurses. The papers 
argue a need for comprehensive staffing plans and coordination with patient organisation to 
ensure healthcare workers are safeguarded during crisis. Seven papers from NGOs in the health 
care sector describe the severe strain on healthcare services experienced during the COVID-19 
pandemic.  A  Belgian  health  NGO  detailed  how  disruptions  in  diagnosis  and  treatment 
negatively  impacted  cancer  patients,  thus  underscoring  the  systemic  strain  on  healthcare 
services and workforce during crisis. Several papers, including papers from organisations such 
as Transforming Breast Cancer Together (TBCT) to COCIR, the European Trade Association 
for medical imaging, radiotherapy, health ICT and electromedical industries raised the need 
for future funding to support mobile diagnostic units, digital health platforms, and cross-border 
healthcare cooperation as means to avoid excess mortality during the nest crisis. Additionally, 
one  paper  raises  the  visibility  of  the  pharmaceutical  pipeline  during  crisis,  noting  that 
pharmaceutical wholesale distribution hubs have been targeted in previous  conflicts with 
malicious intent. 

European Disability Forum (EDF) highlights the lessons learned from earthquake in Turkey, 
flood  in  Spain,  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine  exposing  gaps  in  evacuation 
protocols, access to emergency services for people living with disabilities, who often are among 
the  most  vulnerable  during  disasters.  Healthier  people  have  more  trust  in  democracy  and 

65 

 
political institutions, thus with growing geopolitical tensions, an overall healthy and resilient 
population is imperative. This is especially true since health outcomes are intrinsically linked 
to equality and that crisis exacerbate inequalities and that discrimination should be recognised 
as a determinant of health.  

In order to serve the most vulnerable in society, several NGO-penned papers request a more 
inclusive crisis management system. The involvement of diaconal organizations, churches, and 
other  essential  health  and  social  service  providers  in  national  and  European  preparedness 
frameworks while also providing these organizations with adequate resources and recognition 
is  seen  as  crucial  for  strengthening  overall  crisis  preparedness  and  response  systems, 
particularly in serving marginalized communities. Emergency social services should be part of 
public authorities’ crisis prevention and recovery plans since their role is vital to help people 
affected by crises recover after adversity, coordinate action with other public services, address 
social vulnerabilities and promote long-term recovery. 

The  infrastructure  category  can  be  divided  into  two  sub-categories:  the  preparedness  of 
cities and transportation. Infrastructure stands out as a category where the main theme of the 
papers is not reflected in the survey, but the contribution by the papers is meaningful. (The 
understanding  of  ‘preparedness’  and  ‘risks’  aligns  with  the  baseline,  thus  making  the 
contribution  meaningful.)  The  associated  themes  combine  the  need  for  climate  adaptive 
measures and the role of infrastructure such as roads and waterways, as a means of military 
mobility and civ/mil dual-purpose infrastructure. The Voice of European Railways notes the 
estimated 94% overlap between civilian and military railway networks, which highlights its 
dual use and European Automobile Manufacturers' Association highlights the need for funding 
in order for road networks to serve much heavier – military - veichles. Several papers lament 
the  absence  of  a  budget  envelope  specifically  for  transportation  and  calls  for  the  and  for 
safeguarding the TEN-T network. Cities are highlighted as experiencing the effects of climate 
change in a different way to Europe at large, noting heat hotspots, stormwater management and 
the precariousness of food pipelines into large cities. The advocacy for preparedness in these 
separate  policy  areas  makes  the  case  for  mainstreaming  preparedness  and  crisis 
management as it is how horizontal themes such as climate change have an impact on the risks 
and threats to a wide range of policy areas.  

Climate change is highlighted as the major threat to Europe both within dedicated papes from 
NGO’s  and  academia,  but  also  in  papers  from  the  space  industry  suggesting  tools  for 
monitoring,  forecasting  and  anticipation  with  explicit  mentioning  of  Copernicus.  The 
expansion in use of satellite data and space technologies, particularly the Copernicus system, 
is highlighted as a key in monitoring extreme weather events, borders, population movements, 
and  responding  to  potential  threats  during  the  next  MFF.  With  more  frequent  heatwaves, 
droughts,  floods, wildfires and  a rising  sea level, EU is  asked to  ensure  climate adaptation, 
mitigation and resilience at all levels. Nature-based solutions are suggested as they are crucial 
for climate adaptation, as they provide climate, environmental, social and economic benefits 
on top of helping build climate resilience. It is argued that dykes, dams and flood gates are up 
to ten times more cost-effective than rebuilding after disasters. Interesting to note however is 
the disconnect between both climate change, but especially biodiversity,  as a key identified 
threat/risk, but the comparative lack of position papers on the topic. Only four papers addressed 
biohazards  or  animal  health  as  part  of  a  broader  climate  change  or  health  narrative  despite 
Climate  change  increasing  the  (re)emergence  risk  for  diseases  like  smallpox  by  changing 
animal behaviour and ecology, bringing animals that carry orthopox-viruses into closer contact 
with domestic animals and humans. 

66 

 
A smaller subsection of papers on climate change and infrastructure, specifically addressed the 
state of the agricultural sector in the EU. Whilst many papers fell beyond the scope of crisis 
management,  civil  protection  and  preparedness,  some  did  highlight  the  interconnectedness 
between  whole-of-society  preparedness  and  a  resilient  agricultural  sector.  The  European 
Alliance for Regenerative Agriculture (EARA) suggests agriculture as a core strategic pillar in 
the European Union’s civil preparedness and crisis response strategy as enhancing soil health, 
water retention, and biodiversity, regenerative systems reduce the frequency and severity of 
climate-induced shocks such as droughts, floods, and crop failures. Similarly, Animal Health 
Europe commends the EU Veterinary Emergency Team and request that they are adequately 
funded. They also request  better support  to  farmers who choose to  invest  and be  trained in 
vaccination and other animal health technologies through EU support mechanisms.  

A notable omission of topics among position papers that the survey handles is migration.  Very 
few position papers had any mention of migration as a risk/threat and the few papers that even 
discussed the topic shared sentiment with the free text submitted by EU citizens. The inclusion 
of migration as a threat to Europe is problematic to the responders of this survey with one 
organisation noting that framing migration as a risk stands in contrast to the reality that more 
than 75% of people fleeing their countries of origin remain in neighbouring countries. 

Finally, an issue raised throughout nearly all papers to a variable degree is the complexity of 
EU funding mechanisms and bureaucratic hurdles as significant barrier for many public and 
private  actors.  Stakeholders’  express  concerns  about  the  administrative  and  procedural 
complexities that deter engagement and limit the effectiveness of crisis response initiatives. 
Together with broader concerns about perceived disconnect between EU-level policies and the 
everyday lives of citizens and lack of coordination both bilaterally between Member States 
and between the EU and Member States, the papers reflect a broad consensus on the need for 
a more integrated and proactive approach to crisis preparedness and response.  

4.  Conclusion 

The overall result of this survey reveals a ‘preparedness landscape’ with both challenges and 
opportunities for strategic advancement. The main risk and threats to Europe as identified by 
respondents  are  the  consequences  of  climate  change  and  natural  hazards  as  a  result  of  the 
former; disinformation and cyberattacks/the resilience of Europe’s digital infrastructure; and 
threats to biodiversity- animal and plant health. The request for response mirrors the perceived 
threats and respondents of the survey looks favourably to renewed EU investments into civil 
protection, preparedness  and stockpiling.  EU Citizens  and organisations alike has  identified 
several hurdles to effective European preparedness, including critical outdated infrastructure, 
democracy  in  decline,  underfunded  health  systems,  technological  deficiencies,  and  gaps  in 
coordination among Member States and Member States and the EU. Throughout all qualitative 
data,  and  backed  up  by  the  quantitative  results,  the  threat  of  fascism,  authoritarianism  and 
armed conflict also looms large even though less targeted contributions have been made on that 
topic. Instead, it is found throughout calls for free and safe civic space, health preparedness 
and  in  the  ‘psychological  defence’  of  Europe.  The  request  to  include  civil  society  in  EU 
preparedness structures comes out strongly, and so does health preparedness beyond pandemic 
preparedness. Several practical suggestions have been made including an Erasmus programme 
for civil protection professionals, and a ‘freedom themed tech fund’. Securing innovation in 
the digital space seen as a vital part in the defence against adverse interference from the outside 

67 

 
and  currents  from  within  threatening  the  European  way  of  life.  In  conclusion,  further 
investments into Europe’s preparedness are welcomed by the respondents to this Open Public 
Consultation.  

68 

 
 
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? 

Summary of costs and benefits 

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 

Description 

Better preparedness and 
response to crises, including 
health related 

Amount 

Direct benefits 

The  new  initiative  will  have  as  direct  benefit  a  more 
comprehensive preparedness for and response to crises. The 
all-hazards,  whole-of-government  and  whole-of-society 
dimensions will further contribute to the effective and efficient 
support of Member States.   

Comments 

Overall benefit as described in 
the chapters 4-9.  

Reduced administrative 
burden for Member States 
and COM  

The  new  framework  proposes  reductions  in  administrative 
burdens  for  response  activities  (e.g.  transportation  co-
financing  rates  and  arrangements)  and  preparedness 
activities  (e.g.  reduction  of  double  reporting  of  Member 
States).  

repeatedly 
States 
Member 
voice  heavy  administrative 
burden, including on the report 
on risks.    

Simplified and streamlined 
reporting obligations  

The new initiative will entail that the obligations on reporting 
are more clearly listed. These will be given a dedicated article 
that clarifies WHY exactly they are collected.  
Moreover, 
the  Commission’s  reporting  obligations  are 
foreseen to be consolidated (i.e. which reports the Commission 
produces and why).  
The  timing  of  MS  reporting  and  the  production  of  COM 
reports  will  be  made  more  flexible  so  as  to  allow  for  the 
gathering  of  data  and  the  producing  of  COM  reports  when 
they are needed / when there is a policy-related relevance to 
deliver them; 

More efficient procurement 
of goods, reduces costs, and 
ensures interoperability 

Member State authorities are directly benefitting of a reduced 
administrative  workload  for  capacities  which  are  urgently 
needed (e.g. through direct procurement). 

The time between the identification of a capacity gap/need and 
the availability of capacities is reduced significantly, thereby, 
helping to protect EU citizens. 

Streamlined processes 
enhance crisis response, 
planning, and coordination 
across sectors (incl. through 
EU crisis coordination hub)  

This will enable a faster and more comprehensive overview of 
ongoing crises.  
The  currently  complex  system  of  co-financing  rates  and 
eligible  actions  and  costs  will  be  simplified  drastically, 
reducing the administrative burden both at national as well as 
European levels.  

complementary 
More 
capacities at EU and national 
levels 

The more comprehensive analysis of capacity needs at EU and 
national  level  will  result  in  a  better  preparedness  for  future 
needs and at the same time reduce costs by avoiding gaps and 
overlaps at Union level.  

69 

The  calls  for  proposals  with 
Member  States  for  the  current 
rescEU capacities took up to 12 
State 
months. 
authorities 
only 
beneficiaries.  

Member 
are 

the 

Member 
repeatedly 
States 
voice  heavy  administrative 
burden  when  responding  to 
crises.   

 
 
 
 
This  will  imply  additional  costs  at  EU  level.  However,  the 
overall  costs  for  the  Union  will  be  reduced  due  to  targeted 
addressing of needs.  

Integration  of  two  spending 
programmes  

integration  of  similar  activities  of 

two  spending 
The 
programmes  into  one  will  reduce  the  workload  within  the 
Commission.  Further,  the  clear  alienation  of  actions  to  a 
programme makes workflows and responsibilities clearer for 
Member States. 

Two natural partners are being 
together.  The  DG 
brought 
HERA 
under 
stockpiling 
rescEU is already executed by 
DG ECHO. 

Indirect benefits 

Better-prepared citizens and, 
and 
consequently, 
assets saved 

lives 

The  promotion  of  population  preparedness  will  enhance  the 
knowledge of citizens on risks and how to prepare for these. 
Consequentially, the citizens will know better how to react in 
case of a disaster striking.  

is  no  possibility 

There 
to 
estimate  the  number  of  lives 
and assets saved solely through 
preparedness. 
population 
There 
factors 
like  a  better 
contributing 
response 
preparedness 
agencies 
preventive 
measures. 

are  more 

and 

of 

Citizens 
European solidarity  

experience 

response 

to  disasters  which 

A  European 
includes 
multinational  teams  and  capacities  shows  the  affected  and 
sending communities the value of truly lived and implemented 
European solidarity. In times of wide criticism of the European 
idea, these acts of solidarity help to foster a positive idea of 
the EU.  

This  assumption  is  based  on 
informal  feedback  of  response 
teams  who  were 
in  close 
contact with affected citizens.   

(1)  Estimates  are  gross  values  relative  to  the  baseline  for  the  preferred  option  as  a  whole  (i.e.  the  impact  of 
individual  actions/obligations  of  the  preferred  option  are  aggregated  together);  (2)  Please  indicate  in  the 
comments column which stakeholder group is the main recipient of the benefit;(3) For reductions in regulatory 
costs, please describe in the comments column the details as to how the saving arises (e.g. reductions in adjustment 
costs, administrative costs, regulatory charges, enforcement costs, etc.;).  

70 

 
 
 
 
The new initiative will operate under supporting competence to Member States. Thus, there 
are no direct legal or enforcement obligations for Member States, citizens or business.  

Moreover, due to the sensitive topic matter, Member States do not share any information on 
the administrative set-up or workflows within their administrations with the Commission. It 
can be assumed that an overall higher priority of preparedness and response to crises will lead 
to  additional  human  resource  and  investment  costs.  However,  these  are  not  considered 
administrative costs under this methodology and cannot be specified.  

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Consumers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off  Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

Direct 
adjustment costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct 
regulatory fees 
and charges 

Direct 
enforcement 
costs 

Indirect costs 

New 
reporting 
obligations   

The  new  reporting 
risk 
(e.g. 
of 
assessment) 
Member  States  will 
have 
initial 
an 
additional 
administrative 
burden  due  to  the 
restructuring 
of 
reporting 
arrangements.  

(1)  Estimates (gross values)  to be provided with respect to the  baseline; (2) costs are provided for  each 
identifiable action/obligation of the preferred option otherwise for all retained options when no preferred 
option is specified; (3) If relevant and available, please present information on costs according to the 
standard  typology  of  costs  (adjustment  costs,  administrative  costs,  regulatory  charges,  enforcement 
costs, indirect costs;).  

71 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This initiative is not in the scope of the OIOO approach. Therefore, the table III is not populated.  

III. Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach – Preferred option(s) 

One-off 

Recurrent 

Total 

[M€] 

(annualised total net present 
value over the relevant period) 

(nominal values per year) 

Businesses n.a. 

New administrative 
burdens (INs) 

Removed administrative 
burdens (OUTs) 

Net administrative 
burdens* 

Adjustment costs** 

Citizens - n.a 

New administrative 
burdens (INs) 

Removed administrative 
burdens (OUTs) 

Net administrative 
burdens* 

Adjustment costs** 

Total administrative 
burdens*** 

(*) Net administrative burdens = INs – OUTs;  
(**) Adjustment costs falling under the scope of the OIOO approach are the same as reported in Table 2 above. Non-
annualised values;  
(***) Total administrative burdens = Net administrative burdens for businesses + net administrative burdens for citizens. 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relevant Sustainable Development Goals 

IV. Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred Option(s) 

Relevant SDG 

Expected progress towards the Goal 

Comments 

SDG no. 2 – zero hunger 

Facilitation  of  rapid  deployment  of  food  assistance  by 
coordinating with international partners to establish efficient 
logistics  systems.  This  ensures  that  food  supplies  are 
promptly  delivered  to  areas  affected  by  emergencies, 
helping to prevent acute hunger and nutritional deficiencies 
in disaster-stricken populations. 

SDG  no.  3  –  good  health 
and well-being  

Expected  increase  in  coordination  for  medical  team  and 
resource dispatchments to promptly intervene in the case of 
a disaster.  

SDG no. 6 – clean water and 
sanitation  

SDG  no.  11  –  sustainable 
cities and communities 

Expected progress in deployment of mobile water treatment 
units  and  supports  the  setup  of  temporary  sanitation 
structures  to  provide  essential  clean  water  access  and 
hygiene solutions during emergencies. This action helps to 
mitigate  public  health  risks  by  preventing  outbreaks  of 
waterborne  diseases,  sustaining  community  health  in  the 
immediate response phase. 

The UCPM's focus on enhancing disaster risk management 
and  preparedness  indirectly  contributes  to  the  creation  of 
safer and more resilient communities. This aligns with the 
objectives of SDG 11, which aims to make cities and human 
settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable. 

The implementation of early warning systems, like the one 
developed  in  Latvia,  serves  as  an  example  of  enhancing 
urban resilience in line with SDG 11. 

SDG no. 13 – climate action   The  expansion  of  UCPM  activities  to  address  climate-
related  emergencies  aligns  with  SDG  13's  call  for  urgent 
action  to  combat  climate  change  and  its  impacts.  The 
UCPM's role in coordinating responses to such emergencies 
supports  the  goal  of  strengthening  resilience  and  adaptive 
capacity to climate-related hazards. 

The UCPM activities consider the evolving risk landscape 
due  to  climate  change,  emphasising  the  importance  of 
preparedness  and  adaptation,  which  are  central  themes  in 
SDG 13. 

73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS 

The  Impact  Assessment  qualitatively  analysed  a  number  of  relevant  documents,  including 
Council  Conclusions,  evaluations,  external  studies,  and  more.  Below  is  a  list  of  the  key 
evidence used: 

•  Analysis  of  Risks  Europe  is  facing:  An  analysis  of  current  and  emerging  risk.  Joint 

Research Centre (JRC), 2025. 

•  Business case for DRR: Why investing in DRR makes sense. United Nations Office for 

Disaster Risk Reduction, 2024. 

•  Commission  staff  working  document - Evaluation  of  the  Union  Civil  Protection 

Mechanism (2017-2022). European Commission, 2024. 

•  Draghi Report. European Commission, 2024. 
•  Economics 

for  Disaster  Prevention  and  Preparedness:  Financial  Risk  and 

Opportunities to Build Resilience in Europe. World Bank Group, 2021. 

•  Eurobarometer  on  disaster  risk  awareness  and  preparedness  of  the  EU  population. 

European Commission, 2024. 

•  Eurobarometer  on  perceptions  of  EU  crisis  management.  Publications  Office  of  the 

EU, 2024. 

•  Open Public Consultation EU’s next long-term budget (MFF) – EU funding for civil 

protection, preparedness and response to crises. European Commission, 2025. 
Independent support study, UCPM Evaluation 2017-2022, ICF. 

• 
•  Niinistö  Report  -  Strengthening  Europe’s  civilian  and  military  preparedness  and 

readiness. European Commission, 2024. 

•  Joint  Communication  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 
European Preparedness Union Strategy. European Commission, 2025. 

•  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Capacity 
Progress Report on the Response Capacities of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. 
European Commission, 2025. 

•  The EU’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic. European Court of Auditors, 2024. 

74 

 
 
 
ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK 

Overview of impacts on competitiveness  

Dimensions of Competitiveness 

Impact of the initiative 

(++ / + / 0 / - / -- / n.a.) 

References to sub-sections of 
the main report or annexes 

Cost and price competitiveness 

International competitiveness  

Capacity to innovate 

SME competitiveness 

Synthetic assessment  

+ 

+ 

+ 

6.2.  

2.1; 2.2 (problem definition); 7.1; 
7.2; 7.3 

7.1; 7.3; Annex 3 

n.a. 

See below annex on SME 

The preferred policy option 2 has almost solely indirect impacts on the competitiveness, especially the 
one of SME. This situation is based on the in chapter 2, 5 and 8 described supporting competence and 
the nature of the legal act. The instrument does not (and cannot) impose legal obligations on private 
companies. Further, when purchasing (e.g. for rescEU or ECPP capacities) under the preferred option, 
the  instrument  would  act  almost  exclusively  through  Member  States  and  their  agencies,  with  the 
exception of direct procurement in case of major crises. 

Cost and price competitiveness 

With regard to “cost and price competitiveness” the preferred option has largely indirect impacts by 
contributing to a prevention and preparedness as well as the response to crisis which may impact the 
private  sector.  The  “preparedness  by  design”  principle  in  other  EU  instruments  will  likely  have  a 
positive impact. Overall, the early warning, anticipation and foresight of crises will benefit all private 
sector actors in an affected region. Concerning market stability and the impact on costs and prices (for 
the taxpayer), the establishment of centralised EU capacities will lower the pressure on the market for 
these goods in case of a crises and, thereby, contribute to stabilise the market. Nevertheless, the exact 
benefits are highly dependent on the circumstances, goods and type of crises.  

International competitiveness  

By continuing to standardise response capacities across European Member States (and in Participating 
States) the preferred option has a positive impact on the competitiveness of SME in other European 
countries.  This,  in  general,  might  lead  to  a  more  competitive  advantage  of  EU  companies  outside 
Europe.  

In close cooperation and coordination with other EU instruments (and in supporting role to Member 
States), the preferred option contributes to the overall resilience of the private sector and the general 
population to shocks and crises. As described in the above referenced sections, this has a direct positive 
economic impact.  

Capacity to innovate 

75 

 
 
 
The preferred option does not provide for access to risk capital funding, direct support to the private 
sector to carry out research or directly foster process innovation. However, the close integration and 
coordination  with  the  scientific  sector,  including  through  the  Knowledge  Network,  can  foster  the 
innovation in the overall sector. Moreover, with more possibilities for direct procurement, the preferred 
option has a greater leverage to foster innovative solution for disaster response. 

76 

 
 
 
SME CHECK 

[FOR SME RELEVANT AND HIGHLY RELEVANT INITIATIVES] 

Due to the in chapter 3 described nature of this initiative as supporting competence with no 
legal  obligations  for  SME,  as  well  as  the  almost  exclusive  interaction  with  Member  State 
authorities, this initiative has no relevant influence on SME.  

Moreover, the meeting on “simplification initiatives” at DG/DDG level after an invitation of 
the Secretary-General, on 30 April, came to the conclusion that this “initiative does not appear 
to have a significant simplification potential”. 

OVERVIEW OF IMPACTS ON SMES 

Relevance for SMEs  

(Based on SME filter and the ISG discussion, this initiative is relevant/highly relevant for 
SMEs149)  No. This initiative is not relevant for SMEs 

(1) 

IDENTIFICATION OF AFFECTED BUSINESSES AND ASSESSMENT OF RELEVANCE 

Are SMEs directly affected? (Yes/No) In which sectors? 

The impacts of this initiative on SME are negligible. Single SME may be influenced though 
direct procurement of goods. However, neither the amounts nor the sectors can be predicted.  

(Specify sectors, see also Competitiveness check (Annex 5)) n.a. 

Estimated number of directly affected SMEs 

n.a. 

Estimated number of employees in directly affected SMEs 

n.a. 

Are SMEs indirectly affected? (Yes/No) In which sectors? What is the estimated number 
of indirectly affected SMEs and employees? 

No specific numbers can be provided.  
SME  are  indirectly  affected  through  a  faster  and  more  coordinated  response  to  crises 
(including Early Warning). In general, this would have an overall positive impact in SME.  
Moreover, with an overall better prepared population (including SME staff) further indirect 
impacts on SME are likely.  

149 EU SME Envoy – SME filter. European Commission, 2024.  

77 

 
 
 
 
 
(2) CONSULTATION OF SME STAKEHOLDERS 

How has the input from the SME community been taken into consideration? 

n.a. 

Are SMEs’ views different from those of large businesses? No 

n.a. 

(3) ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON SMES150 

What are the estimated direct costs for SMEs of the preferred policy option? (Fill in only 
if step 1 flags direct impacts) n.a. 

Qualitative assessment 

n.a. 

Quantitative assessment 

(Provide numbers. Include size categories for highly relevant initiatives) n.a. 

What  are  the  estimated  direct  benefits/cost  savings  for  SMEs  of  the  preferred  policy 
option151? 

Qualitative assessment 

SME will benefit from an overall better preparedness for and response to crises. As described 
in the chapter on Impacts, this would likely lead to a better protection of assets (including of 
SMEs) the protection of lives.  

Quantitative assessment 

n.a. 

What are the indirect impacts of this initiative on SMEs? (Fill in only if step 1 flags indirect 
impacts) 

(Summarise the significant indirect impacts qualitatively and, where possible, quantitatively) 
n.a. 

(4) MINIMISING NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON SMES 

150 The costs and benefits data in this annex are consistent with the data in annex 3. The preferred option includes 
the mitigating measures listed in section 4.  
151 The direct benefits for SMEs can also be cost savings. 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Are SMEs disproportionately affected compared to large companies? n.a. 

If yes, are there any specific subgroups of SMEs more exposed than others? 

n.a. 

Have mitigating measures been included in the preferred option/proposal? n.a. 

(Specify  the  mitigating  measures,  including  SME-friendly  provisions  (e.g.  phasing  ins, 
guidance, etc.).  Describe the expected benefits/cost savings qualitatively and, where possible, 
quantitatively) n.a. 

CONTRIBUTION TO THE 35% BURDEN REDUCTION TARGET FOR SMES 

Are there any administrative cost savings relevant for the 35% burden reduction target 
for SMEs? n.a. 

(Provide number from Annex 3) n.a. 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION  

(This  section  should  include  key  elements  of  the  analysis  underpinning  the  assessment  of 
impacts on SMEs (direct costs, direct benefits, and indirect impacts), mitigating measures, and 
additional elements that the lead service considers useful for the analysis, if these elements are 
not  presented  in  other  parts  of  the  impact  assessment  report  and  its  annexes.  If  already 
included in other parts, a reference list of where these elements can be found is sufficient.) 

79 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 6: ADDITIONAL CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION 

CHAPTER 1: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

Political context 

The European Council adopted Council conclusions in May 2021152, reflecting lessons from both the 
2015 migration crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, and calling for measures to improve the Union’s 
resilience and preparedness. The European Parliament (EP) supported these measures153, advocating for 
strengthened cross-border cooperation and rapid-response mechanisms that would enable the Union to 
respond swiftly to crises affecting public health and economic stability. The Council called in November 
2021 for the reinforcement of the resilience of the single market, with a focus on securing supply chains 
and  critical  economic  sectors,  particularly  industries  like  pharmaceuticals,  medical  devices,  and 
semiconductors154. In 2022155, the Council further emphasised the importance of enhancing strategic 
and crisis communication, of fighting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI).  

In  February  2022,  the  Council  adopted  Council  conclusions156  calling  for  further  adaptation  to  the 
consequences of climate change, noting the evident effects of climate-related events, the risk of human, 
material and natural losses, and the strain on both the Member States and the Union as a whole. The 
Council  also  called  for  civil  protection  systems  to  be  further  integrated  into  the  legal  and  policy 
frameworks  on  both  Union  and  Member  State  level.  In  support  of  these  concerns,  the  European 
Commission presented its Communication on Managing Climate Risks157, which recognised that the 
EU and Member States response and recovery capacities can become exhausted with increasing risks, 
unless policymakers take urgent anticipatory actions. The Commission urged Member States to clearly 
define  responsibilities  in  climate  risk  management,  ensure  structural  preparedness  in  planning 
decisions, and use EU solidarity mechanisms to advance anticipatory actions. During this period, the 
EP  reiterated  the  need  for  Member  States  to  adopt  comprehensive  climate  adaptation  strategies, 
especially in regions highly susceptible to climate risks. 

In 2023, the Council adopted a new set of conclusions and recommendations158 on the need to strengthen 
the whole-of-society resilience in the context of civil protection, anti-microbial resistance, as a major 
cross-border health threat and on cooperation with the private sector. In parallel, the EP advocated for 
a  European  Democracy  Shield  to  combat  the  rising  threats  from  FIMI,  aligning  with  the  Council’s 
broader all-hazards approach. 

Furthermore, the Joint Communication on the Climate and Security nexus159 acknowledged the risks 
to peace and security from climate change and environmental degradation, highlighting the impact of 
these  factors  on  migration,  displacement,  pandemics,  and  political  stability,  and  emphasises  the 
importance  of  the  EU’s  Integrated Approach160.  Consequently,  the  need  for  coordinated  EU  action 

152 Council Conclusions of 10 May 2021. 
153 For instance, the European Parliament has been involved in discussions and approvals related to the establishment of the 
Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and has engaged in legislative processes concerning the 
regulation on serious cross-border threats to health. 
154 Council Conclusions of 23 November 2021.  
155 Council Conclusions on foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) of July 2022. 
156 Council Conclusions of 21 February 2022. 
157 Managing Climate Risks: Protecting People and Prosperity. European Commission, 2024. 
158 Council Conclusions of 8 June 2023 and 13 June 2023.   
159  A  new  Outlook  on  the  Climate  and  Security  Nexus:  Addressing  the  Impact  of  Climate  Change  and  Environmental 
Degradation on Peace, Security and Defence. European Commission, 2023. 
160 Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 

80 

 
 
across sectors and for strengthening the resilience and protection of space assets was noted. The Council 
also adopted  conclusions161 on the use of EU satellite services162 playing a crucial role in providing 
secure, resilient, and cost-efficient satellite communications. 

Further  high-level  strategies  include  the  Security  Union  Strategy  (2020)163,  the  European  Industrial 
Strategy (2020)164, the EU Climate Adaptation Strategy (2021)165, the Strategic Compass for Security 
and Defence (2022)166, the Space Strategy for Security and Defence (2023)167, the EU Global Health 
Strategy (2022)168, the health security framework of the European Health Union (2021)169, the European 
Economic  Security  Strategy  (2023)170,  the  European  Defence  Industrial  Strategy  (2024)171,  and  the 
European Water Resilience Strategy (2025)172, among many others. 

Legal context 

In the area of climate and disaster resilience, the European Climate Law173 establishes a requirement 
on  the  Union  and  its  Member  States  to  make  continuous  progress  in  enhancing  adaptive  capacity, 
strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change, which are all anticipatory actions 
meant to reduce the severity and frequency of climate-related disasters across the Union. 

In terms of sectoral resilience, specific legislation is dedicated to ensuring resilience against articular 
risks and supports national responsibilities to reduce hazard pressures at Union level. This includes legal 
acts on the assessment and management of flood risks174, on subjecting the TransEuropean Transport 
Network to climate proofing175, on the resilience of critical entities176 and on network and information 
security177. The last two address online and offline risks, from cyberattacks to extreme weather events, 
mandating  cyber  incidents  reporting  and  reinforcing  Member  States’  capabilities  for  cyber  crisis 
coordination, cooperation, and information sharing. 

In the area of market and supply chain resilience, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the need for 
robust  supply  chain  and  market  resilience  in  the  health  sector  and  the  Union’s  key  enabling 
technologies.  In  response,  the  Internal  Market  Emergency  and  Resilience  Act  (IMERA)178  was 
introduced  to  safeguard  the  free  movement  of  essential  goods,  services,  and  people  during  crises, 
ensuring continued economic stability across the EU. 

161 Council Conclusions of 15 November 2023. 
162 Copernicus, Galileo, EGNOS and GOVSATCOM. 
163 EU Security Union Strategy. European Commission, 2020. 
164 European Industrial Strategy. European Commission, 2021. 
165 Forging a Climate-Resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change. European Commission, 
2021. 
166 A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union that Protects its Citizens, Values and Interests and 
Contributes to International Peace and Security. Council of the European Union, 2022. 
167 European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence. European Commission, 2023. 
168 EU Global Health Strategy – Better Health for all in a Changing World. European Commission, 2022. 
169Regulation 2021/123 on a revised mandate for EMA, Regulation 2022/2370 on a revised mandate for ECDC, Regulation 
2022/2371 on serious cross-border threats to health and Council Regulation 2022/2372 on an Emergency Framework. 
170 An EU Approach to Enhance Economic Security. European Commission, 2023. 
171 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and 
resilient European Defence Industry. 
172 Forthcoming. 
173 Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality. 
174 Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks. 
175 Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network. 
176 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities. 
177 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union. 
178 Regulation (EU) 2024/2747 establishing a framework of measures related to an internal market emergency and to the 
resilience of the internal market. 

81 

 
 
In the area of food and water security, food supply stability in the EU  – an objective of both the 
Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy – is maintained through safeguards in 
the Union acquis. Key regulations establish a common organisation of the markets in agricultural179 and 
fishery and aquaculture products180, while additional provisions aimed at agricultural resilience181 are 
found  within  the  framework  for  the  Common Agricultural  Policy  and  the  European  Maritime  and 
Fisheries Fund (EMFAF). The European Food Security Crisis preparedness and response Mechanism182 
(EFSCM) completes this regulatory framework. 

In the area of energy, the electricity risk-preparedness regulation,  183 the regulation on measures to 
safeguard the security of gas supply184 and the oil stock directive185 constitute the framework for energy 
security. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, adjustments were needed and measures to 
ensure well-filled gas storage in the EU were adopted.186 

In the area of research and innovation for security, Horizon Europe187, anticipates and addresses 
challenges  arising  from  persistent  security  threats  by  funding  research  that  supports  the  EU’s  crisis 
preparedness  and  response  capabilities,  including  innovations  in  disaster  resilience  and  crisis 
management technologies. 

In the area of security and external action, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the 
European Union aims to preserve peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen international security. This 
policy  is  integral  to  the  EU’s  broader  crisis  management  framework,  as  it  encompasses  strategic 
objectives related to conflict prevention, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and response to external threats 
which have direct and indirect impacts on the EU (e.g. conflict, cyber and hybrid, FIMI, intelligence 
operations).  

Funding instruments 

Environmental and climate action 

The  LIFE  Programme  serves  as  the  EU’s  primary  funding  instrument  for  environment  and  climate 
action. It supports projects that address environmental protection, biodiversity, and climate adaptation. 
Through targeted funding, the programme enhances Member States' capacity to manage climate-related 
risks and environmental impacts, and work towards the resilience goals, reinforcing the EU’s overall 
resilience framework. 

External assistance and neighbouring countries 

179 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products. 
180 Regulation (EU) No 1379/2013 on the common organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture products. 
181 Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the 
common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by 
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). 
182 SWD (2021) 317 final - SWD (2021) 318 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Contingency plan for ensuring 
food supply and food security in times of crisis. 
183 Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the 
electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC. 
184 Regulation (Eu) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to 
safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010. 
185 Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum 
stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum production. 
186 Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2022 amending Regulations (EU) 
2017/1938 and (EC) No 715/2009 with regard to gas storage. 
187 Regulation (EU) 2021/695 establishing Horizon Europe. 

82 

 
 
 
The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI- 
GE), funds initiatives for security, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and to build resilience in third 
countries  against  pressures  from  natural  and  manmade  disasters  and  health  crises.  Other  external 
financial  instruments  include  the  macro-financial  assistance  (MFA)  for  partner  countries  facing 
balance-of-payments  crises,  the  Ukraine  Facility  in  support  of  Ukraine’s  resilience  and  to  foster  its 
recovery, or the humanitarian actions (HUMA), providing financial support for disaster risk reduction 
and response in fragile areas beyond EU borders. The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) 
aids candidate and potential candidate countries with capacity building in areas such as cyber-security, 
resilience  to  disinformation  and  other  forms  of  hybrid  threats,  as  well  as  health  security  and 
preparedness for public health and other emergencies. 

CHAPTER 2 PROBLEM DEFINITION 

Risks and threats from a volatile geopolitical, security and socio-economic environment 

The  next  MFF  period  will  unfold  amid  an  increasingly  volatile  geopolitical,  security,  and  socio-
economic  environment.  This  is  exemplified  by  ongoing  conflicts,  such  as  the  Russian  war  against 
Ukraine and escalations in the Middle East. 

Conflict, military build-ups, and aggression in the EU’s neighbourhood and beyond have led to severe 
humanitarian crises and widespread displacement. Fragile or conflict-affected areas, already vulnerable 
to  natural  hazards  and  human-induced  disasters,  may  experience  triggers  that  escalate  high-risk 
situations into violent conflicts. Amid a breakdown of international cooperation, multilateral institutions 
are often unable to prevent large-scale armed conflicts.188 

Hybrid  attacks,  including  foreign  information  manipulation  and  interference  (FIMI)  and  electronic 
warfare,189  have  become  a  permanent  feature  of  today’s  geopolitical  landscape190,  with  critical 
infrastructure being under constant attack.191 In EU Member States, the number of attacks on critical 
infrastructure  have  risen  continuously  since  2023,  with  344  disclosed  incidents  reported  between 
January 2023 and April 2025.192  

The  Covid-19  pandemic  exacerbated  previous  inequalities,  demonstrating  the  potential  social  and 
economic disruption that threats to health can pose to societies, and how access to life-saving medical 
countermeasures, food, energy and critical raw material production can be impacted. Over the last 30 
years, public health emergencies have been occurring more frequently and with increased severity. The 
Union’s critical supply chains, including those for food, raw materials, and medicines, are increasingly 
vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions.  

These  risks  majorly contribute to  an  increased  risk  for  serious  cross-border  health threats  including 
public  health  emergencies  that  will  continue  to  put  the  health  of  Europeans  at  risk  and  require 
coordinated  actions  at  EU  and  global  level. Also,  antimicrobial  resistance  (AMR),  pathogens  with 
pandemic potential and CBRN threats continue to be major concerns.  

188 Risks on the horizon. Joint Research Centre (JRC), 2024, pp.53-5. 
189  Global  Navigation  Satellite  System  GNSS  Radio  Frequency  Interference  Safety  Risk Assessment. The  International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), 2024. 
190 Niinistö Report - Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness. European Commission, 2024, 
p.42. 
191 Critical infrastructures under daily attack – ERNCIP head Georg Peter. Horizon, 2017. 
192 Critical Infrastructure Tracker. 

83 

 
 
 
Moreover,  adequate  health  preparedness  requires  a  constant  investment  and  effort  to  reinforce  the 
resilience to shocks and health emergencies. Costs linked to preparation stages are far less expensive 
than the costs required to respond to outbreaks. This is very relevant in most of EU partner countries, 
which can often not rely on robust health systems. 

Cascading and compounding effects 

Unaddressed global risks create complex, cascading effects for Member States and EU institutions, as 
highlighted  in  the  Niinistö  report.193  Transnational  and  global  threats  can  produce  far-reaching 
cascading effects across the European economy. The COVID-19 pandemic is a stark example of a health 
crisis that led to the second-largest global recession in recent history. Global stock markets experienced 
their worst crash since 1987 and G20 economies contracted 3.4% year-on-year in the first three months 
of 2020. Between April and June 2020, the International Labour Organisation estimated that 400 million 
full-time jobs were lost worldwide. 

Other  cascading  effects  followed  from  armed  conflict  and  other  forms  of  political  violence  at  and 
beyond  the  Union’s  borders.194  Russia’s  aggression  against  Ukraine  has  created  a  sudden  influx  of 
displaced persons, the disruption to energy resources and thus EU stability and security. 195 

While some risks can be managed when treated individually, simultaneous and compounding risks have 
the potential to escalate into “globally-catastrophic or even existential crises”.196 It is thus all the more 
worrying that to-date, no integrated risk management system at Union level exists. 

Risks from climate change and environmental degradation 

The  EU’s  risk  landscape  is  becoming  structurally  more  adverse  due  to  continued  environmental 
degradation  and  the  increasing  severity  and  frequency  of  extreme  weather  events  and  associated 
emergencies  driven  by  climate  change.  At  the  same  time  geological  hazards  and  slower-moving 
phenomena  (e.g.  sea-level  rise,  sea  temperature  rise,  glacier  melt,  desertification)  will  continue  to 
impact  the  EU  risk  landscape.  Climate  change  and  environmental  degradation  exacerbate  existing 
vulnerabilities and pose major social, environmental, economic, and financial challenges. The European 
Climate  Risk  Assessment197  highlights  the  growing  pressure  on  societal  systems.  This  is  further 
highlighted by the growing number of UCPM activations for climate-related emergencies, from less 
than 5 in 2013 to over 20 in 2023 (see figure 2). These numbers are expected to continue to grow due 
to the role of climate change. 

Climate-related disasters cause substantial economic losses. The average annual cost of disasters has 
doubled from EUR 8 billion in the 1980s to EUR 16 billion in the last decade (see figure 1). Recent 
years have seen particularly high spikes, with EUR 59 billion in damages recorded in 2021 and EUR 
52  billion  in  2022.198  As  these  losses  grow,  financial  capacity  for  both  long-term  structural 
improvements and immediate disaster management diminishes. 

193 Niinistö Report - Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness. European Commission, 2024, 
p.32. 
194 It is more critical than ever for development partners to focus on the furthest behind: the 1.9 billion people in fragile contexts 
that account for 24% of the world’s population but 73% of the world’s extreme poor. States of fragility. OECD, 2022. 
195 Economic impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine: European Council response. European Council, 2024. Between the first 
quarter of 2022 and 2023, electricity prices for household consumers in the EU rose by 20%. Electricity price statistics. 
Eurostat, 2025.  
196 Risks on the horizon. Joint Research Centre (JRC), June 2024, p.5. 
197 2024 European Climate Risk Assessment. European Environment Agency EEA, 2024. 
198 Economic losses from weather- and climate-related extremes in Europe. EEA, Oct 2024. 

84 

 
 
 
Figure 111 - Annual economic losses (in billion EUR) caused by weather- and climate- related extreme events in the EU. 
Source: CATDAT, RiskLayer, as published by the European Environment Agency 

Figure 212- UCPM activations for climate-related emergencies 

In the area of transport and energy infrastructure, climate and security-driven risks are a critical concern. 
The  energy  sector,  in  particular,  is  projected  to  experience  the  largest  increase  in  infrastructure 
damage199, with a multi-hazard damages projected to rise up to 15-fold by the 2080s, reaching EUR 8.2 
billion annually from current baselines.200 

While  climate  change  affects  all  Member  States,  the  specific  impacts  and  severity  vary  widely, 
contributing to regional disparities between and within countries.201 Coastal, Mediterranean and south-
eastern regions are most affected, with projected GDP losses of 1% to over 6% annually due to climate 
change.202  

The  vulnerabilities  are  likely  to  increase,  considering  aging  infrastructure  and  underinvestment  in 

199 2024 European Climate Risk Assessment. EEA, 2024, pp. 227-278. 
200 Adaptation challenges and opportunities for the energy system. EEA, 2019, p.46. 
201 Niinistö Report - Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness. European Commission, 2024, 
p.34. 
202 JRC PESETA IV estimations, as published in the 9th Cohesion report, see Ninth Report on Economic, Social and Territorial 
Cohesion. European Commission, 2024. 

85 

 
 
 
 
structural resilience. A recent World Bank study estimates that climate adaptation costs in the EU could 
range  between  EUR  15  billion  to  EUR  64  billion  annually  through  the  2030s,  recommending  an 
adaptation financing between 0.1% and 0.4% of the EU GDP.203 On the other hand, it is also estimated 
that the macroeconomic risks of extreme weather events204 could amount to between 10-12% of the EU 
GDP, potentially reducing it by 7% by 2100.205 

Chapter 3 - WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?  

Addition to section 3.2: What makes EU action necessary? – Subsidiarity of Union action 

As outlined in chapter 1, there is broad consensus on the added value of coordinated Union-level action. 
Anticipation, scientific decision making, strategic foresight, risk assessment and a whole-of-society and 
all-hazards approach at Union level are critical to addressing transboundary and cross-sectoral crises. 
For example, Union action has facilitated significant advancements in research and innovation through 
programs like Horizon 2020, and investments in mRNA technology and diagnostics before the COVID-
19  pandemic  made  it  possible  to  develop  and  deploy  vaccines  and  testing  capabilities  at  an 
unprecedented pace.  

Union action is also indispensable for mainstreaming and broadening the use of tools for risk and threat 
assessment,  early  warning,  and  strategic  analysis.  Furthermore, chapter  2  identified the  underuse  of 
scientific research, foresight, and technological  advancements as a significant problem in enhancing 
risk understanding, detecting emerging risks and anticipating future crises. While it is true that this issue 
persists both at the EU and national levels, the limited use of strategic foresight – particularly at the EU 
level, widens the gap in anticipating future crises and leveraging opportunities to improve preparedness. 
This especially given the nature of crises that the EU is faced with – a fragmented foresight and risk 
assessment  landscape,  as  would  be  created  by  Member  State  action  alone,  would  be  insufficient  to 
anticipate and foster preparedness for crises with a transboundary impact. 

However,  fragmentation  is  not  only  a  driver  of  EU’s  crisis  management  being  more  reactive  than 
proactive, but also a significant problem in itself. Given the scale and complexity of crises facing the 
EU, this fragmentation must be addressed through Union action. Coordination is key – both sectoral 
and between the EU and the Member States. Greater coordination at EU level ensures appropriate and 
balanced preparedness across the Member States, increases inclusion of relevant actors, and enables a 
unified crisis response, addressing many of the drivers linked to the lack of solidarity in Union crisis 
responses. 

In civil protection, two core tasks – the coordination of civil protection activities at national level and 
the organisation of Union response capacities – require a more holistic overview and the ability to assess 
Member State’s policies and capacities, which no Member State can achieve individually. Similarly, 
managing  natural  resources  and  addressing  environmental  degradation  are,  by  their  very  nature, 
transboundary  challenges. While local climate  adaptation  is  possible, climate  change, as  a  driver  of 
natural  disasters,  requires  Union  level  solutions.  Instruments  like  the  Climate  Law,  the  Water 
Framework Directive and the Floods Directive are essential to provide guidance for national and local 
response. The same principle applies as well to other crisis response tools expected to be fit for response 
to Union-wide crises, such as security threats like cyberattacks, terrorism, and serious and organised 

203 Climate adaptation costing in a changing world. World Bank, 2024. 
204 Excluding the consideration of potential critical thresholds. 
205 Managing climate risks communication. European Commission, 2024, p.9. 

86 

 
 
 
crime, which require coordination beyond individual Member States’ capacity. Additionally, disruptions 
to critical infrastructure sectors, such as energy and transport, often have spillover effects across the 
EU, further emphasising the necessity of Union-level intervention. 

It is also crucial to enhance the EU coordination between civilian bodies and military authorities to 
prevent duplication of efforts. Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies is essential to uphold and 
promote  humanitarian  principles,  prevent  competition  between  civilian  and  military  capabilities, 
minimise  inconsistencies  and  pursue  common  objectives  when  necessary.  To  achieve  this,  the 
Commission  closely  collaborates  with  the  crisis  management  structures  of  the  European  External 
Action Service (specifically the EU Military Staff), as part of the EU's integrated approach to external 
conflicts and crises. However, this cooperation needs to be extended beyond the emergency phase. To 
effectively respond to CBRN threats, coordinating the response between civil and military authorities 
requires robust EU communication and planning, part of the whole-of-government approach identified 
in  chapter  1.  However,  other  parts  of  society  remain  insufficiently  involved  in  crisis  management 
(chapter 2). While the implementation of a whole-of- society approach to integrating all actors across a 
society into crisis management can be achieved on the national level, it can only be made fit to respond 
to Union-level crises through Union-level coordination. As it has repeatedly been identified in chapter 
2, a national-only approach to developing preparedness for transboundary crises inevitably results in a 
fragmentation of systems across the EU. 

Additionally,  the  EU  has  a  vested  interest  in  supporting  the  preparedness  and  crisis  management 
capacities of third countries, particularly candidate and neighbouring countries, to mitigate crises with 
wider repercussions on the Union. This is particularly important as the EU increasingly faces crises 
originating  outside  its  borders,  including  health  crises,  migration,  the  fallout  of  conflict  in  third 
countries,  and  other  security  threats.  Since  such  crises  affect  Member  States  differently  as  a 
consequence  of  their  geographical  origin,  no  single  Member  State  can  be  expected  to  have  a 
comprehensive  overview  or  anticipation  structure  on  all  such  crises,  making  Union-level  action 
necessary in order to ensure appropriate foresight and risk assessment, as well as preparedness. 

As  shown  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  Union-level  coordination  and  common  frameworks  are 
particularly needed to allow for coordinated responses at Member States’ level in addressing public 
health threats, as is currently being ensured by the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS), the 
Health  Security  Committee  (HSC)  and  complemented  by  the  HERA  Board  in  the  field  of  medical 
countermeasures.  Declaring a public health emergency at Union level206 would trigger mechanisms for 
monitoring  shortages  of  medicines  or medical  devices,  may lead  to  a mobilisation  of  the  Enhanced 
Emergency Capacity of the EU Health Task Force, as well as an activation of  research, development, 
stockpiling and procurement of crisis-relevant medical countermeasures, as under the coordination of 
the  Health  Crisis  Board207  while  the  Health  Security  Committee  continues  to  coordinate  overall 
response  measures,  including  supporting  the  EU  Integrated  Political  Crisis  Response Arrangements 
(IPCR). Pooling resources at the EU level can lead to economies of scale in procurement, including for 
vaccines and medical equipment, as well as research and health initiatives, making them more cost-
effective than if each Member State acted independently.  

Chapter 3 - WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?  

Addition to section 3.3: To which extent is EU action necessary? – Proportionality of Union action 

206  In accordance with the procedure laid down in Art 23 of Regulation 2022/2371 on serious cross-border threats to health.   
207 After adopting a Council Regulation in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation 2022/2372.  

87 

 
 
Coordination between Member States, as well as Union level capacities and capabilities, are vital for 
anticipating  and  responding  to  transboundary  crises. The  scale  and  complexity  of  such  crises  often 
exceeds  the  ability  of  individual  Member  States  to  act  comprehensively  and  efficiently.  The  data 
available  on  the  number  and  type  of  requests  for  assistance  made  to  the  UCPM  reveal  a  general 
upward trend over the past years, reflecting the growing need for Union level coordination. While the 
UCPM  continues  to  respond  to  the  types  of  emergencies  it  was  first  primarily  established  for,  the 
frequency and intensity of these mostly natural events is typically increasing. However,  at the same 
time the UCPM has been confronted with a new set of challenge due to additional longer and more 
complex  emergencies  such  as  the  COVID-19  pandemic  and  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against 
Ukraine208. 

The necessity for more prominent Union action in crisis management is also evident from the increased 
use of financial instruments such as cohesion funds, to mitigate the negative impact of crises. However, 
as noted in chapter 1.3, the current crisis management architecture depends on a patchwork of (financial) 
instruments,  many  of  which  were  not  designed  for  crisis  management  specifically. The  fragmented 
approach  only  exacerbates  the  problems  identified  in  chapter  2,  hindering  a  proactive  response  and 
perpetuating inefficiencies and solidarity during crises. A more cohesive funding would proportionately 
address these shortcomings. 

Achieving the Union’s overarching crisis management goals is impossible without concerted action. 
For instance, more flexibility in the next MFF is necessary to enable faster and scalable responses to 
unforeseen  needs,  while  ensuring  long-term  impact  of  EU  investments.  Streamlining  preparedness 
across  the  EU  budget  and  financial  instruments,  as  recommended  in  the  Niinistö  Report,  will  also 
reinforce the EU’s crisis management capacity. 

208 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Capacity Progress Report on the Response 
Capacities of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. European Commission, 2025, p. 16.   

88 

 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE 

Effectiveness 

The below table depicts the extent to which each policy option addresses the specific objectives. 

Legend:  

(+) indicates that there is a limited positive impact on the achievement of a specific objective, 
compared to the current baseline. 

(++)  indicates  that  there  is  a  somewhat  positive  impact  on  the  achievement  of  a  specific 
objective, compared to the current baseline. 

(+++) indicates that there is a major positive impact on the achievement of a specific objective, 
compared to the current baseline.  

Effectiveness 

Specific Objective 

Option 1 

Option 2 

SO 1.1: Establish an EU-wide overview of risks across sectors with clearly 
defined roles for EU and Member States  

(+) 

(+++) 

SO 1.2: Develop a strong anticipation capacity that can effectively analyse, 
assess  and  act  upon  risks,  including  risks  from  outside  the  EU  as  well  as 
cascading and compounding risks 

(++) 

(+++) 

SO 1.3: Contribute to a European research and innovation ecosystem that is 
fit to assess and address crises in a coordinated and timely manner 

(+) 

(++) 

SO  1.4:  Contribute  to  a  robust  risk  management  culture  across  the 
Commission and broader EU (including Member States)  

(+) 

(++) 

SO  1.5:  Contribute  to  Union  policy  making,  including  crisis  management, 
which  is  guided  by  risk  aware  decision  making,  and  EU  robust  risk 
management culture. 

(++) 

(+++) 

SO 1.6: Strengthening the capability of the Union to prevent and prepare for 
serious  cross-border  threats,  including  to  health,  by  supporting  data  and 
intelligence  gathering,  and  information  exchange,  including  on  medical 
countermeasures. 

(+) 

(++) 

SO  2.1:  Develop  the  capacity  for  a  cross-sectoral  operational  crisis 
management hub at EU level. 

(+) 

(+++) 

SO 2.2: Strengthen cooperation on strategic and operational matters between 
civilian and military emergency management functions 

(+) 

(+++) 

89 

 
SO 2.3: Support a coherent response across relevant national and EU policies 
and  funding  with  a  view  to  enhancing  crisis  preparedness  and  structural 
resilience across the entire crisis management cycle.  

SO 2.4: Enhance resilience through external partnerships. 

SO  3.1:  Enhance  citizens’  preparedness  and  resilience  as  one  of  the 
cornerstones of societal resilience 

SO  3.2:  Build  linkages  with  the  private  sector  to  enhance  their  roles  in 
building the overall resilience of society and managing crises, including with 
regards to medical countermeasures. 

(+) 

(++) 

(+) 

(+) 

(++) 

(+++) 

(+) 

(+++) 

SO  3.3:  Strengthen  existing  voluntary  networks/  organisations  in  crisis 
management.  

(+) 

(+++) 

SO 4.1: Enhance Union capacities to prevent, anticipate, detect, prepare for 
and respond to large-scale multi-sector crises, including cross-border threats 
to health. 

(+) 

(+++) 

SO  4.2:  Work  towards  a  complete  and  coherent  EU-wide  overview  of 
capacities and capabilities to respond to crises 

(+) 

(+++) 

SO 4.3: Invest in international preparedness and crisis management capacity 
of third countries, and particularly that of candidate countries 

(+) 

(++) 

SO  4.4:  Ensure  access  at  EU  level  for  goods,  capabilities  and  services 
relevant for crisis preparedness and response, including MCM. This is also 
done 
including  direct 
procurement. 

through  different  procurement  procedures, 

(+) 

(+++) 

SO  4.5:  Strengthen  scalable,  fast-deployable  and  all-hazards  based  EU 
financial mechanisms throughout all phases of crisis management.  

(+) 

(++) 

SO  4.6:  Complement  national  stockpiling  of  essential  crisis-relevant 
products. 

(+) 

(+++) 

Overall effectiveness (summary of the above Specific Objectives)  

21 

52 

90 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efficiency 

Example: rescEU budgetary development in the field of civil protection and health security preparedness 

The rescEU strategic reserve consists of capacities that have emerged as critical needs different crisis scenarios 
including, but not limited to wildfires, floods, earthquakes, conflicts, critical infrastructure failures and hybrid 
threats. As the EUs own capacities to supplement national response capacities, the budget for the establishment 
of rescEU has been provided exclusively from EU funding sources. Between 2019 and 2024, approximately 
EUR 3.2 in EU funding has been committed to rescEU capacities.  

Between 2019- 2024, the MFF provided EUR 807 million in funding that has been  committed for the 
provisions of aerial extinction means. From this budget, approximately EUR 700 million has been committed 
for the purchase of aircraft; planes, helicopters, for the permanent rescEU fleet, while approximately EUR 100 
million has been allotted for the provision of a transitional fleet until the completion of the permanent fleet 
aircraft.   

As the COVID-19 pandemic raged on, it became prevalent that the Union needs a wide range of stockpiles in 
cross-sectoral response for all kinds of crises, including health. RescEU was provided with a reinforcement of 
approximately EUR 380 million to establish medical stockpiles for MS and UCPM Participating States to draw 
on in their efforts to combat the pandemic.  

Further capacities were procured using approximately EUR 2 billion of Next Generation EU funding 
with the intention of increasing Europe’s preparedness against future health related crises. The NGEU funding 
was split between the establishment of further stockpiles including medical devices, therapeutics, shelter items, 
generators and CBRN stockpiles and the establishment of response capacities that include CBRN detection 
sampling and monitoring as well as decontamination capacities. Additionally, EMTs and logistical transport 
support in the form of multipurpose aircraft is being procured with the available NGEU funding.   

91 

 
 
 
ANNEX 7: LARGE VERSIONS OF GRAPHS 

Simplified display of problem tree 

92 

 
 
 
 
Simplified display of problems, drivers, General and Specific Objectives 

93 

 
 
Simplified display of General Objectives and Policy Options 

94 

 
 
 
 
UCPM activities, pre-2026 

95